Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China

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Author: Arabinda Acharya | Rohan Gunaratna | Wang Pengxin

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ETHNIC IDENTITY AND NATIONAL CONFLICT IN CHINA

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ETHNIC IDENTITY AND NATIONAL CONFLICT IN CHINA Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Wang Pengxin

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ETHNIC IDENTITY AND NATIONAL CONFLICT IN CHINA

Copyright © Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Wang Pengxin, 2010. All rights reserved. First published in 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–10305–4 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gunaratna, Rohan, 1961– Ethnic identity and national conflict in China / Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Wang Pengxin. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978–0–230–10305–4 (alk. paper) 1. Terrorism—China. 2. Domestic terrorism—China. I. Acharya, Arabinda. II. Pengxin, Wang. III. Title. HV6433.C55G86 2009 363.3250951—dc22

2009043571

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: June 2010 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

vii

Abbreviations

ix

Introduction

1

1

Explaining Minority Conf lict in China: A Theoretical Perspective

9

2

Islam and Muslim Minorities in China

19

3

Uighur Separatism: East Turkistan Groups

47

4

Hui Muslims: The Milieu of Radicalization and Extremism

89

5

Threats to China from Al Qaeda

109

6

China’s Perception of the Threat and Response

135

Conclusion: Need for Moderation and a Humane Approach

171

Notes

179

Bibliography

231

Index

241

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

W

e are grateful to Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University for his steadfast support. We thank Ayla Iqbal from Pakistan and Senol Yilmaz from Switzerland for their valuable research assistance. We are indebted to Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, a specialist on Pakistan’s tribal areas, Ustaz Mohamed Redzuan Bin Salleh, an Arabist, Rebecca Givner-Forbes, an Arabist, and Mahfuh Bin Haji Halimi, a specialist on Islamic ideology, who reviewed the manuscript and provided important feedback. We also thank specialists from government organizations and research institutes in China for having supported us during our visits to different parts of China, including Xinjiang. We express our appreciation to Associate Professor Andrew Tan, Convenor, International Studies, University of New South Wales, Robyn Curtis, the Editorial Assistant, Palgrave Macmillan, and the anonymous reviewer. Our colleagues Elizabeth Ong and Kelvinder Singh deserve special mention for their administrative assistance. We also express our appreciation to Mohammed Amir Rana, Director, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, and several others who assisted us in our research and wish to remain anonymous.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AML AQIM ATB CCP ETIC ETIM ETIP ETLO ETNC ETR EWPS FATA IJU IMU ISI MND MPS MSS NATCG NPC NWFP PAPF PBC PLA PRC SCO SWCU TIP TJ TTP

Anti-Money Laundering Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb Anti-Terror Bureau Chinese Communist Party East Turkistan Information Center East Turkistan Islamic Movement Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party East Turkistan Liberation Organization Eastern Turkistan National Congress East Turkistan Republic Early Warning and Prevention System Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan Islamic Jihad Union Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Islamic State of Iraq Ministry of National Defense Ministry of Public Security Ministry of State Security National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group National People’s Congress North Western Frontier Province People’s Armed Police Force People’s Bank of China People’s Liberation Army People’s Republic of China Shanghai Cooperation Organization Snow Wolf Commando Unit Turkistan Islamic Party Tablighi Jamaat Tareek-e-Taliban Pakistan

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UNPO WUC WUYC XPCMC XUAR

A B B R E V I AT IO N S

Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organizations World Uighur Congress World Uighur Youth Congress Xinjiang Production Construction Military Corps Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region

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INTRODUCTION

So what we have seen and what we have heard in the recent incidents in Turkistan is not the fault of passing events no matter how big and enormous. Rather, it is a spontaneous uprising and a response to the long decades of dark injustice, organized cleansing, strong deprivation, humiliating servitude and disgraceful shame, to the point that patience ran out and the matter exceed the limit. Also, this was not the first uprising carried out by the wounded Muslim people, which fights and defends to preserve their identity, to maintain their personality, to protect the honors and to cease the atheist hand of transgression from doing mischief with their creed. —Abu Yahya al-Libi, Head, Religious Committee, Al Qaeda, October 2009.1

I

deological extremism, political violence, and terrorism are among the major national security challenges that the People’s Republic of China is confronted with. As the events in Tibet and Xinjiang have demonstrated, Beijing’s failure to manage its ethnic and religious minorities is likely to make it vulnerable to a campaign of political unrest breaking out into violence and terrorism. This book deals with the threat to China, particularly from Islamist extremism and terrorism. Attempts by scholars to explain ethnic and religious conf licts around the world have often involved the study of root causes. They range from poverty and unemployment, discrimination, and governance issues. Contemporary discourses implicate religion as a causal factor involving arguments such as “clash of civilizations” or, as with Islam, its inherent “incompatibility with modernity.”2 While not discounting the potency of the radical interpretation of Islamic religious discourse in fuelling the contemporary wave of terrorism, this book makes an attempt to explain terrorism in China primarily as an ethno-nationalist or politico-religious conf lict rooted in issues involving minority identity. The book examines the prevailing scholarship on minority issues and armed conf licts and argues that the root cause of the conf lict in China, especially in Xinjiang province, is not only about religious extremism, but also about the systematic violation

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E T H N I C I D E N T I T Y A N D N AT I O N A L C O N F L I C T

of basic rights and insensitivity toward minority identities by the state. Beijing also appears to have lumped all the threats to its domestic security in one basket and addressing the same with overreaction, hypersensitivity, and harsh measures. Thus, three factors contribute to the terrorist threat to China: (a) the perceived threat to minority identity of Muslims in China in general and in the Uighurs in particular; (b) Beijing’s suppressive policy toward these groups; and (c) the exploitation of grievances of Muslims in China by the wider politicized segments of the global Muslim community to internationalize a domestic conf lict. The attacks and attempts in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics demonstrate that China faces a real threat of extremism and terrorism. This is reinforced by the ethnic riots between the Muslim Uighur and Han Chinese in Xinjiang in July 2009. The terrorist threat to China now involves both domestic as well as transnational actors.3 The epicenter of the threat lies in the Xinjiang province where the Uighurs wage a relentless fight against the Chinese state for independence. The spearhead of this threat is what is being collectively referred to as the “East Turkistan Islamic Forces.”4 The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a group associated with Al Qaeda, is the vanguard of this fight. A number of other groups, notably the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), and the World Uighur Congress (WUC), share the same ideology and agenda, though the means to achieve those objectives differ. Even though much of the East Turkistan forces involve domestic elements, the threat from these groups is increasingly externally driven. The entire infrastructure of ETIM, including its command and control structure, training facilities, and key leaders and operatives, is based overseas, notably in tribal areas of Pakistan. There is also evidence that the conf lict involving Muslims in China is getting exacerbated under the inf luence of a global movement being spearheaded by Al Qaeda and its associates and affiliates. As Al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden have demonstrated, it is possible to bring together people from all over and unite them in a common front based on perceived injustice and discrimination and using religion. The ETIM also has close relations with Pakistani religious parties and a number of groups like the Taliban including the Pakistani Taliban. For a long time ETIM leadership along with some of its cadres have been working with Al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and now the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). This makes ETIM effectively the part of the “brotherhood of global jihad.”5 Al Qaeda leaders, especially Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, have mentioned China and more specifically about the Uighurs in various statements. Away from the glare of

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I N T RO D U C T IO N

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the international media, China has been mentioned as one of the fields of jihad along with other areas such as Chechnya, Kashmir, and some North African countries. There is a perception that as China becomes a major power, it might behave like the United States, like the “head of the snake” that is protecting the Jews and corrupt Muslim governments and that can kill or help other governments kill Muslims as America is doing now. From Al Qaeda’s perspective, Beijing’s dealings of Muslims are bad, which makes China an enemy and justifies a state of hostility against it. With the support of Al Qaeda and its associates and affiliates, ETIM has become capable of conducting attacks against Chinese interests not only in China, but also in other parts of the world. ETIM can also leverage the support of associated groups in South, Southeast and Central Asia, Europe, Middle East, and Africa to target Chinese interests. At the same time a more widespread homegrown threat appears to be emerging from within China besides the Uighurs. This involves Hui Muslims and resident Muslim communities in Hong Kong. Other than the Uighurs, anyone who is Muslim, including converts to Islam are known as the Hui. There is ample evidence that segments of these communities are infiltrated by extremist and terrorist groups and getting increasingly radicalized. In the past few years extremist ideologies are becoming stronger among the Hui Muslims living in Ningxia, Gansu, and other places across the country. This is happening slowly, which is very difficult to detect directly. Hong Kong hosts Muslim residents of Middle Eastern and Asian heritage. There are small Arab and Urdu speaking communities that extend from Hong Kong to Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong. This is creating the milieu similar to the ones in other parts of the world where Islamist extremism and terrorism is at its height at present. This milieu has the potential to transform itself into the support base, hub of recruitment, and sources of financing for terrorists to operate and conduct attacks. The rapid pace of development in China has increased cross-border traffic from Muslim Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and possibly from the Horn of Africa. Will the radicalized segments of Muslim migrants traveling to China and taking up residence in China target or facilitate attacks in China? Traditionally, the so-called jihadists from all the regions mentioned above have now produced extremists and terrorists who have traveled overseas and mounted attacks. Moreover, with the penetration of Al Qaeda’s global jihad ideology, all these areas have become incubators of jihadists with global ambitions and reach. These elements could become threats to Chinese interests.

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Much of the Western scholarship deals with the conf lict and terrorism in China largely as a religious minority or political issue. Often times, conf lict in China is projected either as terrorism perpetrated by Uighurs against the China or a result of repression and excessive human rights violations by the Chinese state. Scholars have also studied the issue from ethnographical or political perspectives only and exclusively. Such an approach is not sufficiently comprehensive to reveal the root causes of the conf lict, one of which is the threat to minority identity. There has been little systematic examination of the interaction between the Muslim identity, global jihad, and terrorism in China. The salience of this book is underscored by its contribution to fill this gap in contemporary literature. Michael Dillon’s book, Xinjiang—China’s Muslim Far Northwest provides essential background information of Xinjiang and a detailed analysis of the Muslim opposition against Beijing. The book is largely based on information garnered from both the Chinese official press releases and Uighur diaspora. Dillon assesses China’s reaction to the disturbances as well as the international dimension of China’s policy aimed at stabilizing the region. However, Dillon’s lack of theoretical analysis on the Muslim ethnicity in China is not surprising because analysis grounded in theory is generally absent from most literatures on the conf lict in China especially in Xinjiang. As the pioneering specialist studying Islam in China, Dru C. Gladney breaks such pattern by placing a new approach for the analysis of Muslim minorities and their confrontation with the Chinese state. In his book, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities and Other Subaltern Subjects (an extended version of his work, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic, 1991), Gladney comprehensively demonstrates the ethnicity and identity of the Muslim minorities in China and their relation with the state and the majority Han Chinese. The book provides a compelling view of ethnic and religious politics that have shaped Muslim ethnicity in China. Gladney suggests three basic trends in the development of Muslim identity in China. The first trend is the growing sense of ethnic identity of Muslims in China, which he calls the process of “ethnicization.”6 The second is “transnationalization”7 of their ethno-religious identity caused by the “opening-up” of the country to the world and the broadened links between Muslims inside and outside China. The third is Muslim’s resistance to China’s policies and practice that aim at “integration.” According to Gladney, these factors have largely shaped the grass root conditions that sustain a “low-level” insurgency and sporadic violence in Xinjiang.

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Considering the recent developments, there are several limitations in Gladney’s study on this issue. Although Gladney identified different ethnicity in China’s nationalism, he did not take into account the role of religion, especially Islam as the building block of competing nationalism. As Gladney has noted, ethnic identity lies at the root of the ethnic conf licts in China, such as the cases of Uighur and Tibetan. Gladney did not pay sufficient attention to the critical role of religion in shaping that ethnic identity, which marks the division between these minorities and the Han-Chinese majority. Moreover, the growing inf luence of global jihad movement on the national conf lict involving Muslims in China that is changing China’s internal threat landscape is insufficiently addressed. Gladney argued that the designated Uighur terrorist groups (namely ETIM and ETLO) gain “very little support for radical Islam,” and that the propaganda of these groups “turns up almost no use of the term [global jihad] or call for a religious war against the Chinese.”8 It is true that some of the Uighur exile groups (the World Uighur Congress, for example) are generally secular in their struggles for religious freedom, sovereignty, and human rights in Xinjiang. Nevertheless, there is now increasing evidence that terrorism in China has been integrated into the global jihad movement being spearheaded by Al Qaeda and its associated and affiliated groups. To support its fight against China, the ETIM had galvanized the support of other transnational groups such as Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). This is evident in the ETIM’s latest propaganda. The group has released a number of videos and electronic magazines, promoting jihadist ideology and calling Uighur Muslims to wage a jihad against China (see chapter 3). Raphael Israeli is another specialist who makes significant contribution to the study of Muslim ethnic nationalism and identity in China. The book Islam in China, Religion, Ethnicity, Culture, and Politics is the crowning achievement of his intellectual odyssey. With regard to Muslims in Xinjiang, Israeli notes that “the current revival of Islam around the world, coupled with the growing interest of the Islamic core in the minorities of the periphery, has raised the probability of Islamic renewal in these remote fringes of the Islamic world.”9 He examines Muslims in China not only as a “historical exoticism,” but “as a prototype of a vital Muslim minority that may be undergoing significant developments” under the inf luence of the changing Islamic world.10 Israeli’s elaboration shed light on the significance of Islam in analyzing the ethnic conf lict in Xinjiang and terrorism in China.

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Martin I. Wayne’s book, China’s War on Terrorism: Counter-insurgency, Politics and Internal Security, is the latest literature on China’s response to terrorism. The book focuses on the increasing “effectiveness” of China’s “bottom up” approach to fight separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang.11 Acknowledging the “brutality” of China’s crackdown, he argues that China’s policies nevertheless have successfully reshaped the grass-root conditions of local society and that the Uighur population in general have largely “turned away from the path of violent resistance.”12 However, Wayne’s book lacks analysis about the root causes of the insurgency and terrorism in China. In addition, recent events have surpassed his assessment about the extent of Uighur’s opposition to the Chinese state. The Urumqi riots in July 2009 clearly demonstrate that China’s policies have not eased the “violent resistance” in Xinjiang and that the trend of radicalization in the region is on the increase and Uighur and Han-Chinese relations are getting worse.13 One major contribution of this book—Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China—is the emphasis on religion which has shaped the minority identity in China historically. In other words, it is Islam, and not ethnicity alone, which has shaped the Muslim identity vis-à-vis the Han-Chinese. Moreover, Islam is now at the root of hardening of the identity that has manifested in extremism and terrorism against the state. Thus, the book provides a significantly different perspective that will help develop an understanding of the current and emerging threats to China, especially from Islamist terrorism. With links to the global jihad, the indigenous insurgency and terrorism in Xinjiang challenges the security and stability of China. However, there is much ambivalence about the nature of the terrorist threat to China, especially in the West. This is primarily based on the argument that China has hyped the threat to legitimize its response to pockets of opposition to its rule. In our opinion, this ambivalence is due to a f lawed understanding of the threat and prevailing bias against the Communist regime in Beijing, a tendency that is a relic of the Cold War era. As our analysis demonstrates, the Islamist terrorist threat to China is manifestly clear and is not ambiguous. However, Beijing needs to develop an appropriate counter-terrorism posture that is transparent, legitimate, and fair and addresses the concerns of the international community. This book is a result of authors’ work during the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The authors were engaged by a number of Chinese institutions for assessment of the threat not only to the games but also to the country as a whole. The authors traveled widely in China including to Xinjiang and also interacted with Chinese practitioners and academic

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specialists on terrorism. The book has also used resources available in the jihadi media in respect of the conf lict in China. Overall, the book is based on the examination of existing literature and on extensive field research not only in almost all parts of China but also in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA), which is now the operational headquarters of ETIM. We hope that this book will be useful for scholars and practitioners to understand the conf lict in all its manifestations and to respond appropriately. The book is organized into six chapters, besides Introduction and Conclusion. Chapter 1 of the book offers a theoretical framework to help explain the context of ethno-religious and minorities conf licts and terrorism in general and in Xinjiang in particular. Chapter 2 provides a historical survey of Islam in China, a short description about the Muslim minorities in China, followed by a discussion about China’s policies toward Muslim minorities. This chapter demonstrates how Muslim identity has undergone twists and turns and ups and downs during the long history of China. The condition of the Muslims during different empires and also during the communist rule has significantly shaped the process of identity formation which is now galvanizing the Muslims in China. Chapter 3 discusses the Uighurs and the East Turkistan groups that are at the forefront of terrorism and separatism in Xinjiang. Chapter 4 includes discourses on the origin and identity of Hui Muslims and their Islamic thought. The chapter highlights the potential for radicalization and extremism in the Hui community. Chapter 5 discusses the threat to China from transnational groups, especially Al Qaeda and its associated groups. Chapter 6 examines China’s policies and practice in dealing with the Islamist terrorist threat. The concluding section reaffirms the link between threats to identity and ethnic conf licts and reiterates the hypothesis that nation-building cannot be achieved with attempts to assimilate the minorities with force, where minority identities and aspirations are sharply in contrast to those of the state. A more nuanced and humane approach is recommended based on policies that focus less on the use of force and more on strategies to win hearts and minds, especially of the affected communities.

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CHAPTER 1

EXPLAINING MINORITY CONFLICT IN CHINA: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

There are common and constant ethnicity-oriented challenges facing multinational states, including the danger of great-nation (majority) chauvinism, the extremism of hard-core (small-state nationalism) separatists, terrorism, and the spiral of break-up linked to competing visions of national identity. —Zhu Yuchao and Blachford Dongyan, 2006.1

T

he genesis of ethnic conf lict and terrorism around the world has often been subjected to much scholastic scrutiny. These involve root causes issues such as poverty and unemployment, discrimination and marginalization, and/or domination encompassing majority-minority—linguistic, religious—relations. Following September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, there is now a tendency to treat the terrorist threat more as a civilizational conf lict or “clash of civilizations,” one of the cultural conf licts which Samuel Huntington predicted in his now famous work, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order several years ago.2 Equating contemporary terrorism with Islam has also become the predominant discourse of security debates. In The Roots of Muslim Rage, for example, Bernard Lewis wrote how “we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and governments that pursue them.”3 Use of sweeping generalizations such as “Al Qaeda spearheaded universal jihad,”4 “Islam’s inherent incompatibility with modernity,”5 the “moral and ideological crisis” that has beset “the collective Muslim mind”6 has become commonplace in the new security discourse. Admittedly, September 2001 incidents significantly changed overall perceptions about terrorism worldwide. This especially involves those

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that were willing to make exceptions for the “freedom fighters” and those that did not give their opposition to terrorism priority over other policy issues.7 The key element in this normative shift is its universality arising from what Robert Keohane termed “public delegitimation of terrorism.”8 On the other hand, there is a growing salience of terrorism in the national threat perceptions and the security strategies. This has changed the nature of domestic politics and state-society relations significantly and changed the communal dynamics in many countries where age-old contentions have resurfaced along with new tensions specifically over the role of religion in the public sphere.9 Governments worldwide have resorted to empower themselves with sweeping authorities to deal with terror. This has given rise to the concern that discourses such as the war on terror will militarize efforts to contain threat of terrorism to the extent that while symptoms are addressed, the political/social/economic root causes are ignored. The potency of the radical Islamist religious discourse in fuelling the contemporary wave of terrorism cannot be discounted. However, the tendency to stereotype issues, especially those involving religion, might not be appropriate to provide a rational justification for conf licts that may also have to do with their respective sociological, historical, and political contexts. More specifically, these approaches are inadequate in respect of ethno-nationalist and minority conf licts or conf licts involving identity such as the one in Xinjiang in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In such cases, the problem of political violence and terrorism is also one of internal domestic challenge which has put the defense of territorial sovereignty and regime legitimacy to severe tests.10 A different perception comes from the fact that ethnic conf lict and terrorism, especially involving identity, “always occurs in conjunction with the denial of basic human rights.”11 More specifically, several scholars such as Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens argue that ethnic conf lict is more likely to occur when basic rights are systematically violated by the state.12 These discourses suggest a “causal link” between ethnic conf lict or terrorism and violations of human rights—understood as “political and civil,” “security,” and “subsistence rights.”13 In this respect, the scholars subscribing to the Copenhagen School have made substantial contribution in exploring the relationship between human security, identity and ethnic conf lict, and terrorism.14 This particularly relates to the contentious issue of “broadening” or “redefining” the “agenda” or the “discourse” of security, which according to many international relations scholars became a virtual cottage industry in the post–Cold War era international politics.15 With threats to security now transcending national

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boundaries and challenging the most advanced knowledge and information system in this era of intense globalization, there could be problems in putting security issues in strict neo-realist mold. But there could be equally unwelcome consequences if the security agenda is allowed to be expanded too much. A New Discourse In the post–Cold War era, the emerging security debates followed a period of disorientation when new challenges appeared and the dominant neo-realist discourse was found by some scholars to be deficient in providing a relevant framework of analysis.16 As the focus of security discourse changed from traditionalist nationalism, sovereignty, and balance of power concepts to internationalism and world state, scholastic discontent with the neo-realist conceptualizations of security (state security) and threat (military force) and the assumption of anarchy,17 came to the fore. Questions were raised about human survival and human vulnerability. Together with violence, social strife, and other regular threats, globalization induced dilution of economic boundaries and increasing interdependence increased risks to human survival. Globalization involves a multiplication of actors on the international scene, and complex actor constellations are brought to bear on more and more issues.18 The technological advances and knowledge proliferation added new dimensions to security. New and unprecedented kinds of issues emerged requiring equal attention along with “questions of military security, ideology, and territorial rivalry that traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda.”19 Having emerged from the Cold War with a narrow “conception of national security” with a “preoccupation with military statecraft,” the field of security studies was found to be limited in its “ability to address the many foreign and domestic problems that are not amenable to military security.”20 Emergence of a borderless global society based on international economic interdependence, made security discourse to evolve in myriad directions with scholars calling for reconceptualizing the term “security” and reevaluating the definition of security studies.21 There were two main strands to the new discourse. One was to widen the security agenda by claiming security status for issues and referent objects in the economic, environment, and societal sector as well as in the military political ones. The other was the debate about the primacy of the military element and the state in the conceptualization of security.22 The utility of this state-centered focus was questioned since some found it conveying “a profoundly false image of reality, causing states to

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“concentrate on military threats” and ignoring “other and perhaps even more harmful dangers,” thus “reducing their total security.”23 In a related development, a group of scholars also criticized the realist notion of the state as being inappropriate in the context of Third World states which were insecure not because of military factors, but primarily because of their “relative weakness,” “lack of autonomy,” “vulnerability,” and “lack of room for maneuver” in respect of economic and political levels as with the military one.24 Widening was proposed along two dimensions: (a) in terms of referent objects and (b) in terms of threats, recommending that deep-seated problems in ever more sectors be addressed in security terms.25 The idea was to secure the state against those objective threats that could undermine its stability and threaten its survival.26 The wideners believe, as do the neorealists, that security is reducible to an objective referent and set of threats, but what is really threatened in not an abstraction like “the state” but the material well-being of the individuals.27 Thus, most of the threats posited by the wideners were concerned with internal sources of instability and costs of violent conf lict, social problems, and human health and welfare. Therefore, according to this argument the conceptions of security together with policies and institutions for providing security need to be changed to meet new challenges. In its most optimistic articulation, some wideners even talked about revising and broadening beyond “traditional state centered doctrine,” specifically in the interest of human security.28 The concept of human security became the latest in a long line of “neologisms”29 getting invoked by the emerging epistemic community of scholars, policy-makers, and non-governmental actors who wanted this as a comprehensive approach to replace the real-politik mindset emphasizing the security dilemma, military alliances, and the balance of power. Proposals to widen the concept of security were inspired by the benefits that might follow from elevating the emerging problems to the level of high politics. This argument did not, however, receive universal acceptance. The most obvious protest came from the realist/neo-realist school, which pointed out the intellectual and political dangers in taking the word security into an ever-wider range of issues. The concept of security, according to the neo-realist school “does not simply represent a reaction to objective conditions, it is built on a series of political and epistemological choices that define what is security. To appeal to the reality of environmental threats or to the security of the individuals runs up against the sovereignist resolutions that form the basis of neo-realist thinking.”30 Daniel Deudney for instance argued, “If we begin to speak

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about all the forces and events that threaten life, property and well-being (on a larger scale) as threats to our national security, we shall soon drain the term of any meaning. All large-scale evils will become threats to national security.”31 Patric Morgan similarly argued that “broadening security studies to cover other ‘harms’ is unfortunate for it lumps together deliberate, organized physical harm (or threats thereof ) with other threats and pains.”32 On the other hand, scholars like Keith Krause and Michael Williams looked at the possibility of broadening the agenda of security studies both theoretically and methodologically. They demonstrated a “more profound understanding” of the driving forces for “political loyalties,” “threats,” and criterion for evaluating “collective responses.”33 Based on this, they illustrated an approach to “desecuritization,” which means reducing the salience of issues at hand by taking them off the security agenda through “institutions and practices that do not implicate force, violence, or the security dilemma.”34 Here, “desecuritization” could be quite beneficial when security problems decrease in importance. Given that policy-makers engage routinely with the complexities and possibilities of “security” in its broad sense—ethnic/communal conf licts, environmental issues, health concerns (i.e., HIV/AIDS and SARS)—there is merit in letting the security studies “pursue these issues and debates with even more openness that will, in turn, foster intellectual development and political engagement with the dynamics of contemporary world politics.”35 Security, Identity, and Political Violence The fact that threats and vulnerabilities can arise from different sources and take different forms is not contested. At the same time political violence and terrorism increasingly encompass tensions involving the defense not only of basic rights but also of a broader range of well-being of ethnic and religious groups, such as national and religious identities.36 One recent approach to understand and explain the relationship between security and identity is that of societal security. The term “societal security” first appeared in Barry Buzan’s work in 1991.37 According to him, societal security is one of five security segments—military, political, economic, societal, and environmental—each of which either individually or collectively has the potential to threaten state security. Modifying Buzan’s typology, Ole Waever proposed a duality of state and societal security instead of five sectors of state security. For Weaver, societal security is a referent object of state security in its own right and both societal and state

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security are related to the issue of “survival.” The survival of the state relies on the “maintenance of its sovereignty,” whereas the survival of the society depends on the “maintenance of its identity.”38 State security is generally concerned with protecting the sovereignty of the state from external threats, while societal security concerns situations when societies perceive a threat in terms of identity.39 The existence and development of identity lies in the heart of the concept of societal security and distinguishes itself from that of state security. As Michael Clarke noted, “If a state loses its sovereignty it will not survive as a state, while if a society loses its identity it will not survive as a society.”40 However, the question is how to define a societal identity and how is a given society’s identity threatened? To answer this question, a refined study of society and societal identity is required. Society is about the “self-conception of communities and individuals identifying themselves as members of a community;” it is “fundamentally about identity.”41 According to Waever, the key to a society is the set of ideas and practices that “identify individuals as members of a social group.”42 In other words, societies are constituted by a sense of social identity, where its most “basic, social identity” is what enables its members to consider themselves as “one sector” where the state is to be used. As Buzan and Waever state, societies are “politically significant ethnic/ national and religious groups” that are able to manifest themselves as “distinct referent objects of security.”43 The key problem that has brought Copenhagen School scholars the most criticism is whether identity is a “solid and constant” object, or whether it is a process, “f luid and changing.”44 This is what Helena Lindholm, for example, characterizes as the debate between “constructivism” and “culturalism.”45 Later works of Buzan and Waever tend to sit somewhere in between the culturalist and constructivist sides. They argue that identities are socially constructed, but once constructed they can be regarded as “temporarily fixed” for a certain period of time, until they are “reconstructed” again.46 Societal identity is usually defined along several dimensions; for example, language, religion, culture, and history. On one hand, these identities are definitely constructed by people and groups through numerous processes and practices; they can be recognized as objects in the sense that most members of the group adhere to and behave in accordance with. On the other hand, they are relative in terms of time. Societal identities are objective while they are in a dynamic process. Identities of an ethnic minority are often produced by comparing themselves with dominant identity values of the multinational states. Some societies may need “others” to remind themselves of their own true

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identity. As Roe noted, “who we are” can often mean “who we are not.”47 At any given point in time only one, or a few, of these dimensions will be the “dominant identity values;” that is, those values for which the majority of a society identify as most characterizing “us” and differentiating “us” from the “others.”48 For example, the Islam has been a dominant identity value for Uighur identity as it has distinguished the Uighurs from the Han-Chinese majority, who are traditionally Confucian and Buddhist. Although societal identities can be considered as objects around which security processes can take place, it is still difficult to objectively define when there is a threat to societal security. It is even harder to distinguish a “perceived threat” from what can be objectively assessed as threatening. According to Buzan, real threats may not be “accurately seen” whereas perceived threats may not be real, but still have real effects.49 Threats to societal security can occur when societies perceive that its “we” identity is being put in danger. What underscores the notion of societal security is the ability of a society to sustain its essential character under changing conditions and against actual or possible threats to this ability.50 Besides “sustainability,” it focuses on acceptable conditions for the “evolution” of societal identities, including traditional patterns of language, culture, association, religion, and national customs among others.51 Threats to the reproduction of a society can occur through the sustained application of “repressive measures” against the expression of the identity. For instance, if the organizations for reproducing language, religion, and culture are forbidden to operate, identity will not be inherited by next generations.52 In this respect, threats to an identity can range from the “suppression of its expression” to the “interference” with its ability to “reproduce itself.”53 In practice, these threats may occur in forms of forbidding the use of language, names, and dress; closure of places for education and worship; even the killing or deportation of members of the society. Minority Conf licts Ethno-nationalist and minority conf licts are usually rooted in the perception of threat from the majority group that sustains with an inexhaustible supply of distrust of each other. This distrust feeds on the policies and practices of governance that often brings different ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic groups in to loggerheads. In many cases, it has been found that the desire of particular minorities to protect their ethnic identity often comes into conf lict with the demands of loyalty to the state dominated by the majority group. It is the contradiction in these

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two desires that constitutes the root cause of conf licts in many multinational states and of terrorism with ethno-religious connotations. Except for rare situations where a minority group could be in a monopoly of power, such as Afrikaners in South Africa during the infamous period of the apartheid, most minorities are in disadvantageous positions vis-à-vis the majority in their respective countries.54 They may be at risk of facing political marginalization, economic deprivation, forced assimilation, cultural oppression, physical oppression, and even the worst—genocide.55 In most cases, significant segments of the relevant national minorities do not perceive their current political status as “legitimate,” which explains why some ethnic minorities demand national self-determination and even resort to terrorist activities under particular circumstances.56 In most cases, such a demand is a reaction to the nation-building process, which refers to an exercise of state power dominated by the majority to build a national identity.57 In a state-building process, assimilation is often a national demand, and minorities’ rights and interests are compromised as they have to be subordinated to the dominant political entity.58 Evidently, some policies and commitment of nation-building can be perceived to be violations of human rights, which are linked to ethnic strife and terrorism. It is the real or perceived threat to identities that generate the discontent of the disadvantaged minorities at the very root level. One particular example of such is the ethnic tension related to Chinese Muslim minorities, which demonstrates its closer relation to threats to identity rather than just human rights violations.59 Ethnic issues, however, are not the primary generators of conf lict. Conf licts in which the rights and political or social viability of particular communities are central issues are not evidence of ethnic chauvinism or of hatred for the other. Identity conf licts emerge with intensity when a community, in response to unmet basic need for social and economic security, resolves to strengthen its collective inf luence and to struggle for political recognition.60 National identity is invariably defined in terms of “the dominant group’s values and culture, with other groups on the periphery tending to be left out.”61 “Domination,” as Jack Snyder puts it, works if the power of the dominant group is so overwhelming as to preclude rational resistance or when it is tolerated by those who are deprived of power yet decide that being second-class citizens is better than being first-class rebels.62 In an ethno-nationalist context, identity conf lict and strife are the outcomes if domination fails or is not tolerated by the minority community. Such conf licts are ref lections of a more fundamental social distrust, borne out of a community’s experience of economic inequity, political discrimination, and human rights violations.63 Distrust

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makes it extremely difficult for any side to make significant concessions or compromises. Leaders entrapped in such conf licts often find it difficult to negotiate as negotiation or compromise could be viewed as signs of weakness by the other side and their own supporters. The stronger side believes that being stronger they can bend the other party to its will. For the minority or the weaker, and especially where conf lict is based on a chronic sense of injustice, use of violent means is deemed legitimate, as it seems to be the only way to protect the threatened group. There is often a tendency to explain past defeats and current weaknesses in terms of one’s own virtues that sustains the distrust and perception of threat. This state of dynamic imbalance inhibits the prospect of long-term negotiations in the conf lict situation.64 Most countries in cotemporary world are multinational states with over 5,000 ethnic groups where conf licts involving ethnic issues exist in some form or other.65 Most of these conf licts involve ethnic or religious minorities and their relations with the states where they reside. Indeed, ethnic conf lict presents immense challenges for security of the multinational states as well as of the relevant ethnic minorities. It becomes especially problematic and mostly intractable when these conf licts are layered over issues of identity and religion. The focus of this book is on the ethnic conf lict and terrorism related to the Muslim minorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a multinational state, China comprises fifty-six officially recognized nationalities (minzu) including the Han majority. Ten of the fifty-five minority groups take to Islam as their religion. Like any other Muslim minority residing in non-Muslim states, China’s Muslims have faced series of problems related to their identity. The identity of China’s Muslims is closely related to the millennial existence of Islam in China dominated by the Han-Chinese majority, who are non-Muslims. More specifically, the history of the PRC’s integration and the recognition of Muslims along national minority lines highlight the necessity to examine current ethnic conf lict and terrorist activities from the perspective of Muslim identity in China. Since the PRC was established in 1949, Beijing has made efforts to consolidate “the unity and cooperation” among the various nationalities in the country.66 Its policies toward Muslim minorities have been presented in various forms in different periods of time. From the perspectives of China’s Muslim minorities, especially the Uighurs, China’s nation-building process has posed a serious threat to their identity, which has triggered a growing desire to protect their identities from assimilation. Islamist terrorism and Uighur militancy can be seen as manifestations of a social movement by the Muslim minority competing

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against the state and other social forces, which are perceived as threats to the their identity in particular and the Islamic identity in general. Conf licts involving identity issues are not necessary predicators of violence and terrorism. But, as evident in recent times, some of these conf licts have become extremely violent under the inf luence of a perverted ideology spearheaded by a handful of radical ideologues in the Muslim world. This ideology not only feeds domestic insurgency but also sustains the overall struggle with global linkages. As Al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden have shown the hard way, it is possible to bring together people from all over and unite those in a global front against perceived injustice and discrimination using religion. One of the most significant accomplishments of Osama bin Laden was the effective “melding of the strands of religious fervor, Muslim piety and a profound sense of grievance into a powerful ideological force,”67 and turning it into an effective instrument of hatred that can be used to avenge the injustice against the Muslim communities with whatever means. Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were able to franchise the cause of jihad, linking local movements to a global agenda.68 It subsumed struggles involving Muslims in many parts of the world including in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China with the result that hitherto territorial Islamist groups now espouse universal agendas.69 The global linkages that local groups developed under the inf luence of the notion of jihad propagated by groups like Al Qaeda and the transfer of the combat experience in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Iraq to local militant organizations has raised the level of sophistication and the capacity for violence of these groups.70 This has also led to the reorienting of objectives, targets and tactics and importantly increasing radicalization with attempts to cloak political issues in extremist terminology.71 In China, similarly, what began as a native separatist insurgency has now become part of the global jihad movement. While the militancy in the Xinjiang province have already been under the inf luence of the groups like Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Muslims in other parts of the country are getting increasingly inf luenced by the ideology of global jihad.

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CHAPTER 2

ISLAM AND MUSLIM MINORITIES IN CHINA

Muslims have to look at China from the perspective of Muslims who live under the Chinese grip. They perceive it as one of the fiercest enemies, the most mortal of adversaries, and the most hateful of Islam and Muslims among the infidels, that it makes no effort to wrong Muslims, to punish them, to deny them their rights, and to inflict harm upon them day and night, covertly and overtly. —The Turkistan Islamic Party, Islamic Turkistan, July 20091

I

slam lies at the heart of the identities of Muslims in China even though issues involving ethnicity and language have been present to varying extents. However, it is difficult to generalize Muslim identity in China due to their wide dispersion throughout the country as well as their divergent nature. The ethnic identity of Uighur is very different from that of the Hui Muslims, many of whom share a number of cultural and demographic traits with the Han Chinese. Even within particular minority groupings, issues involving language and culture have been present to varying degrees. This was the reason Muslim identity could not consolidate on a stronger scale on its own until the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Since then, Beijing’s attempts to integrate minorities have triggered a perception of threat among the Muslims, especially the Uighurs. In fact, reforms in the social, political, and economic areas targeting minorities in general and Muslim minorities in particular had never been unproblematic. The result was the overall perception that the Muslim population in China has deliberately been placed in a position of lesser economic, political, intellectual strength vis-à-vis the Han Chinese than at any time previously. This perception is most manifest in Xinjiang, a region with a substantial Muslim population and a turbulent history. Moreover, the divergent ethnic

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composition of the Uighurs and differences in language, cultural, and religious practices were not conducive to policies of integration, which from Beijing’s perspective, were successful in respect of Han or Hui Muslims in other parts of the country. Beijing not only failed to appreciate the divergent cultural and religious aspects of minority identities but also reacted strongly against any opposition to integration. This insensitivity and intolerance was counterproductive as it strengthened the resolve of the Muslim minorities to consolidate and strengthen their distinct identity and pose a more formidable challenge to Beijing’s rule. As Raphael Israeli notes, the identity problems for Chinese Muslims today are so “acute” that “their survival” largely depends on the “clarity of their identity boundaries.”2 Religion has played a crucial role in bonding and hardening this identity involving Muslims in China. Islam in China Islam has spread and developed for over 1,300 years in China, going through dynasties of Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing, and the Republican period. It had various names in Chinese history, such as “Dashi Jiao,” “Tianfang Jiao,” “Huihui Jiao,” “Qingzhen Jiao,” and “Hui Jiao.”3 After the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese State Council issued the “Notice Concerning the Name of Islam” in 1956 and adapted the internationally used common name “Islam” (Yisilan Jiao) for this religion.4 Nowadays, “Hui Jiao” is still commonly used in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and Singapore. Although the name changed in different periods, the identity of the Muslim minorities of China remains focused on the universal Ummah of Islam, which differentiates them to some extent from the Han-Chinese majority. It remains an open question when Islam was first introduced into China. The most popular theory advanced by Chinese historians indicates that it was introduced in AD 651, during the Tang dynasty (AD 618–907).5 This was eighteen years after the death of Prophet Mohammed, during the Caliphate of Uthman ibn Affan, the third caliph of Arabia Othman (AD 644–656).6 According to the ancient records in the Tang Shu (Book of Tang),7 the caliph sent envoys to the capital city of Tang, Chang’an (today’s Xi’an) in the second year of the reign of Emperor Yonghui (AD 651). Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas, the maternal uncle of the Prophet, led the envoys and introduced the emperor to the caliphate, their customs, and Islam. The Huai Sheng Mosque was built in Guangzhou to commemorate this event.8 It is believed that Islam was brought to China through both the “land route” and the “sea route.”9 The transportation and communication

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between China and the countries in Central Asia and the Middle East started from the Han dynasty period (202 BC–AD 220), when the Silk Road emerged as an important passage linking China and the West. During the Tang dynasty, an increasing number of Arabian and Persian merchants traveled along the Silk Road to transact business in China. Arab traders also dominated the sea passage from Persian Gulf and Arab Sea to the South China Sea and a large number of Muslims settled down in the coastal cities such as Guangzhou, Quanzhou, and Yangzhou. From AD 651 to AD 798, Arabian envoys visited China over thirty times.10 During the Rebellion of An and Shi (AD 755–762), Emperor Suzong (on the throne from AD 756 to 762) asked Abu Jafar al-Mansur of the Umayyad caliphate for military assistance and then Arabian troops were sent to China. After the rebellion was repressed, these soldiers were allowed to settle down in China permanently. These merchants, soldiers, and diplomatic envoys from Arabia, Persia, and Central Asia composed the earliest Muslim communities in China. Some of them intermarried with local Chinese people and their descendants became native-born Muslims (called fanke),11 who retained their religious tradition and unique way of life. Muslims were of small number at that time, concentrated in some northwestern cities and ports along the southeastern coast of China. When the Song dynasty (AD 960–1279) came into power, the Muslim population in China increased significantly due to the expanding economic exchanges between China and the Arab world. Muslims had even earlier played an essential role in China’s economy by dominating the import and export industry. In this period, however, intermarriage between foreign Muslims in China and native Chinese became common. More non-Muslim Chinese converted to Islam when they married Muslims. As the size of the Muslim population increased, the Song court issued the “Heritage Law for the Fifth Generation of Local-Born Fanke” to deal with their inheritance matters.12 Muslims in the Song dynasty period became involved in all walks of social life by various means such as running schools, taking imperial examinations, and even keeping slaves. Tens of thousands of Muslims resided in Yangzhou and Hangzhou at that time.13 The four mosques in these coastal cities bear testimony to the early Muslim life and the spread of Islam in China. These Muslims spoke Chinese outside their homes but used Arabic script and ornaments and gave speeches using Arabic or Persian words in the mosque. Today, they are referred to as Gedimu (Kadim in Arabic, means “the Ancients”).14 The genesis of Islam in China’s western frontier, where modern Xinjiang is located, was closely related to the history of Kara-Khitain Khanate (Kara Khitay) from the mid-ninth century to the early thirteenth

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century. The Khanate was established by one group of Huihu (an ancient Turkic tribe), who migrated from Mongolia to eastern Central Asia after the collapse of the Tang dynasty in AD 840.15 Inf luenced by the Muslims of the Samanid dynasty, the Khan declared Islam as the state religion approximately in AD 960. Nearly 200,000 Turk families under his rule were converted to Islam.16 The Khanate became stronger in the eleventh century and then conquered Kashgar (Kashi) and Khotan (Hetian), the southern part of modern Xinjiang. During this period, a great number of Turk nomads started to settle down in this region, which accelerated the transformation of Central Asian aborigines into Turks and the Islamization of the nomads.17 The inf luence of Islam then extended to Cherchen (Qiemo) and Chaqiliq (Ruoqiang), southern and eastern edges of Tarim Basin, where Uighur Islamic culture started to take shape. Since 1219, Mongols under the leadership of Genghis Khan (AD 1162–1227) and his descendants launched campaigns westward and southward aiming to conquer Central Asia and China. Large numbers of Arabian, Persian, and Central Asian Muslims were mobilized by the Mongols for the campaign against the Southern Song dynasty. After the war, these Muslim mercenaries scattered all over the country and settled down as permanent inhabitants, resulting in the extensive spread of Islam in China. Under the Mongol Yuan dynasty (AD 1279–1368), the Muslim population started to grow at a sharp rate due to the preferential policies adopted by the Yuan court. The Yuan rulers gave Muslims higher social status than that of the Han Chinese as they had made great contributions to the establishment of the empire.18 Many of the upper-class Muslims were appointed officials at various levels of the Yuan government and some of them ranked among the ruling class. The Mongols’ successful advances to the west integrated both the northern and southern sides of Tianshan Mountains (now Xinjiang) and enabled communication and integration in terms of people, economy, culture, and religion within the scope of the Eurasian continent. Muslim immigrants of various ethnic groups, classes, and professionals covered a huge area from Dadu (now Beijing) to the south of the Yangtze River, from Yunnan in the south to Tarim Basin in the north. In order to reconstruct the agricultural production destroyed by constant wars, the Yuan government implemented many preferential policies enabling Muslim immigrants to cultivate abandoned land in northwest China.19 Encouraged by the Yuan government, Muslim communities started forming in Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang areas in increasing numbers. The Yuan governors held a tolerant attitude toward Islam, resulting in great development of Mosques and Islamic system in China. Mosques were built wherever the Muslims were concentrated in the country, which

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indicates the recognition and encouragement given to Islam by the Yuan authority. In 1335, a decree of the emperor officially recognized Islam as “the Pure and True Religion” (Qing Zhen Jiao).20 The term Dashi Ren, used for Muslims since the Tang dynasty period, was gradually changed to “Huihui.” Practicing Sunni, Hanafi Islam and residing in independent regions clustered around a central mosque, Hui communities in the Yuan dynasty were characterized by relatively isolated Islamic villages and urban enclaves, linked to each other through trading networks and the recognition of being part of the wider Islamic Ummah. The department of Qadi was established in central and local governments to administer religious, civil, and penal affairs related to Muslims. A Qadi (originated from Arabic words) was an executive officer of Islamic Law, who was authorized to hand down judgments and run the local administration in accordance with the Shari’ah (Islamic law). He was not only a government officer, but also a preacher and a religious leader. As the system of Qadi came to an end during mid-fourteenth century, Jiao Fang (Muslim settlement, also known as the Gedimu21) took its place and became the special organization for managing Muslims’ religious, political, economic, cultural, and civil affairs and social activities. Taking a mosque as center, each Jiao Fang was independent and was not subordinate to the government.22 The systems of Qadi and Jiao Fang played important roles in intensifying Muslims’ faith and educating Muslims to perform religious services and fulfill religious assignments. During the decades of the Yuan dynasty, the development of Mosques and Islamic systems enabled Islam to take deep roots in China. The Ming dynasty (AD 1368–1644) is seen as the “golden age of Islam in China.”23 During this period, Muslims were granted religious freedoms from the Ming emperor Taizu (the founder of the Ming dynasty). Muslims served in high positions in Ming military and civil administrations.24 In the opening decade of the fifteenth century, the second Ming emperor, Chengzu (Yongle), dispatched seven large seaborne expeditions toward Africa. Zheng He, a Muslim navigator, commanded these voyages, the destinations of which were the Muslim states of Aden, Decca, Djofar, and Hormuz. Subsequent voyages explored the east coast of Africa in the area of Mogadishu.25 During the Ming dynasty era, the Muslims residing in China gradually became integrated into Han-Chinese society. An example of this integration was the process by which their names changed and their customs of dress and food underwent a synthesis with Chinese culture. In time, the Muslims began to speak and read in Chinese and could hardly be distinguished from the Han Chinese other than by their unique religious customs. A large number of Muslims made pilgrimages to Mecca. Arabic books were translated into local languages, leading to the development

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of a domestic Muslim literature. During most of the Ming era, there was little friction between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese; Muslims led industrious lives in peace and prosperity. They accepted China as their homeland while keeping their faith in Islam.26 It was this Islamic faith and tradition that prevented the complete assimilation of the Chinese Muslims into the mainstream Chinese society. Before the transition from the Qing to the Ming dynasties (midseventeenth century), the majority of Muslims in China belonged to the Sunni sect.27 Except a few in Xinjiang who followed Shafi’iyyah, the rest were of Hanafiyyah faith. Two exceptions were the Tajiks and a very small number of the Uighurs, who believed in Ithna Ashariyyah of the Shia’h sect.28 As Sufism was introduced into China, many independent sects and “Menhuans” (the “leading” or “saintly” descent groups) emerged one after another and grew rapidly. Among these, three sects—Qadim, Ikhwan, and Xi Dao Tang—and four Menhuan (Orders)— Kubrawiyyah, Qadiriyyah, Khufiyyah, and Jahriyyah—were of greatest inf luence. Sufis, or Islamic mystics, began to make a substantial impact in China from the late seventeenth century, during the second wave of Islam’s entry into China.29 Arriving mainly along the Central Asian trade routes, Sufi Shaykhs (elders), teachers, and tradesmen brought new teachings into China. Sufi claims of descent from the Prophet Muhammad, chains of initiation, close relation to merchants and rulers, and their wealth made the larger Sufi orders powerful institutions with growing religious and political inf luence during this period.30 The hereditary and hierarchical nature of the Sufi orders enabled their persistence and the firmness in controlling their members. These Sufi networks helped in the mobilization of large numbers of Muslims during economic and political crises in the late Ming period, assisting widespread Muslim-led rebellions and resistance movements against late Ming and Qing rule.31 The Turkic nationalities in Xinjiang region were generally Islamized in the seventeenth century.32 Islam in Xinjiang had been consistently inf luenced by the region’s proximity to and communication with eastern Central Asia, with significant similarities in culture and language. By early sixteenth century, inhabitants of the old Uighur kingdom in the oases of the Turfan Basin had followed those of the Tarim Basin in becoming Muslims.33 Sufism was introduced to Xinjiang from Bukhara and Samarkand in Central Asia in the seventeenth century, and separated into two sects—Baishan (White Mountain) and Heishan (Black Mountain).34 As in most of Central Asia, Sufi orders and their leaders, known in Xinjiang as Ishan, retained a considerable degree of inf luence in this region. The followers treated Ishan as contemporary living saints who are closest to

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Allah.35 Particularly, the Naqshbandi Sufism gained strength rapidly and many branches of the Naqshbandiyya order even seized control of political and military affairs in the Tarim Basin and Turfan region. The Naqshbandiyya also spread into inland China via Xinjiang and later became the most powerful of all Sufi movements in China. It is true that the Turkic culture of Xinjiang had been inf luenced by Chinese Confucianism in centuries of communication along the ancient Silk Road. However, the Islamization of Xinjiang deepened the cultural differences between the Han Chinese and the people of Turkic origin. Muslim minorities of China experienced their toughest time during the Qing dynasty (AD 1644–1911) rule, which was established by the Manchu. The Qing court applied the tactic of “divide and rule,” which was used to keep the Muslims, Han Chinese, Tibetans, and Mongolians in conflict with one another. The energetic policy of assimilation began in the early eighteenth century. Native tribal system was replaced by Chinese local administration, which promoted an educational system aiming at a gradual cultural assimilation of these ethnic and religious minorities. Limitations were put on Muslims’ freedom of worship, construction of new mosques, and the pilgrimage to Mecca.36 Political oppression and persecution by the Qing court irritated Muslims and resulted in centuries of Muslim rebellion. Between the years 1648 and 1878, Muslims of China launched several unsuccessful rebellions against the Qing oppression, in which millions of Muslim were killed. During the nineteenth century especially, China witnessed a “Muslim revival” of unprecedented proportions. One such attempt was made by Du Wenxiu, a Muslim who fought against the Qing’s rule and declared an independent Muslim state in Yunnan province (1856–1873). Another prominent example was the 1864 rebellion of Turkic Muslims under the leadership of Ya’qub Beg, who took control of southern Xinjiang and established the Kashgaria emirate (1865–1877). Most of these rebellions occurred in areas where Muslims constituted a majority of the population, and they threw southwestern and northwestern China into chaos. Not surprisingly, it was the oppression against Muslims in China by the Qing rulers that caused much of Muslim resistances, when the tough situation coincided with the new tide of reform and change from the core of the Islamic world.37 In 1911 the Qing dynasty was overturned by the Nationalist revolution and the Republic of China was established by Sun Yat Sen. The new republic immediately announced that the country belonged equally to the Han, Hui (Muslim), Man (Manchu), Meng (Mongol), and the Zang (Tibetan) peoples. The authorities allowed further autonomy in Muslimconcentrated regions of the northwest, and wide areas came under

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virtual Muslim warlord control, leading to frequent intra-Muslim and Muslim-Han conf licts. A new wave of Islamization in China marked this Republican period (1912–1949). During the early twentieth century, Wahhabi-inspired reform movements, known as the Yihewani in Chinese (from Ikhwan), rose to popularity in China. The most important movement at that time was led by a Chinese Muslim named Ma Wanfu (1849–1934), the founder of Xinjiao (new school).38 The Islamic reforms at that time were noted for their critical stance toward both traditionalist Islam and Sufism. The interaction between Chinese Muslims and those of the Middle East started at the end of the Qing dynasty when there was a sudden increase in the interaction between China and the Middle East. This was a time when many Muslims began traveling back and forth to the Middle East. Evidence of this comes from the fact that 834 Chinese Muslims made the Hajj to Mecca between 1923 and 1934.39 As a result of these interactions, the Chinese Muslims began to reevaluate their traditional ideas of Islam and began to identify themselves as belonging to the wider Islamic Ummah. A number of nationwide associations were founded by Muslim intellectuals educated in new schools. These included the Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association (Beijing, 1912), the Chinese Muslim Educational Association (Shanghai, 1925), the Chinese Muslim Association (1925), the Chinese Muslim Young Students Association (Nanjing, 1931), the Society for the Promotion of Education among Muslims (Nanjing, 1931), and the Chinese Muslim General Association (Jinan, 1934).40 These Muslim organizations had considerable social effects during the decades of turmoil in China. Winning the final victory in the civil war (1927–1949) with the Nationalist Army, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949. In the early years of the PRC, Beijing proclaimed that the political rights and religious freedom of all nationalities were equally protected. The CCP attempted to avoid any conflict with Muslims due to the necessity of stabilizing the domestic situation and developing relations with Muslim countries on the international arena.41 Following CCP’s political-administrative structures, the Islamic Association of China (Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Xiehui) was founded in 1953 as an organization for regulating Islamic practices.42 The organization claims to represent China’s Muslims nationwide. Its stated missions and duties are as follows: To assist the people’s government in its implementation of the policy of freedom of religion; to carry forward the fine tradition of Islam; to cherish the motherland; to unify Muslims in participating in the socialist

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construction of the motherland; to develop friendly relation with Muslims in other countries; to maintain world peace; [and] to collect and correct historical data about Islam.43

In April 2001, the government described the aim of the association as promoting “the spread of the Qur’an in China” and opposing “religious extremism.”44 The association is currently run by sixteen Islamic religious leaders who are in charge of making “a correct and authoritative interpretation of Islamic creed and canon.”45 The committee of imams in the association compiles “inspirational speeches” and examines sermons made by clerics around the country.46 In doing that, the committee plays an essential role in preventing clerics using their sermons to spread radical Islam. The CCP policies toward Muslims were generally moderate and tolerant in the first decade of the People’s Republic. However, the harsh periods of ideological and political oppression against Muslims and other religious peoples came during the movements of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). The oppression of religious leaders and destruction of mosques by the Red Guards caused increasing grievances among Muslims. Revolts against the government broke out in many areas where Muslims were concentrated. Since the advent of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” program (gai ge kai fang) in 1979, there has been a considerable moderation of the religious policies of the regime. Muslims have been provided with more rights and freedom such as going on the pilgrimage (Hajj); mosques have been reopened and reconstructed in urban and rural areas. Growing manifestations of “Islamic revival” are evident in Muslim communities of contemporary China.47 Since the 1980s, there has been an expansion in Islamic expressions and movements with fundamentalist characteristics among Muslim communities in China. From the 1980s to early 1990s, increasing number of Muslims from all over China went on the Hajj to Mecca. This pilgrimage deepened their perceptions of the Muslim world and provided them with popular Islamic ideals. Missionary (da’wa) groups from Muslim countries also visited Muslim communities in China. Muslim students from China studied Arabic language and Islamic religion and became teachers, business persons, and religious professionals when they returned to China. The frequent communication with the Muslim world has caused various effects among China’s Muslims, whose religious thoughts take on characteristics of both “modernity” and “anti-modernity.”48 Under the inf luence of the revised Islamic fundamentalism in the post–Cold War era, some Muslims in China tend to favor a return to more orthodox living and traditionalist understanding of Islam. The most recent Islamic

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movement of significant inf luence in China was the Salafism, which follows a radical school of Sunni Islamic thought. The fundamentalist claim of Salafism rose to popularity quickly throughout northwest China including Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, and particularly in the market and urban centers such as Linxia, Lanzhou, Weixian, Wuwei, Tianshui, Zhangjiachuan, Pingliang, Yinchuan, and Xi’an. Following this fundamentalist tide, some Muslims discovered Islam’s potential as political force for resisting the central government.49 The fundamentalist understanding of Islam and the inf luential power of political Islam has made Salafism the fastest growing Islamic movement in the late 1990s, which plays an essential role in the ethno-religious conf licts, separatist movements, and terrorism in China. The Muslim Minorities in the PRC In China today, ten ethnic groups are predominately Muslim. Generally, they can be divided into two basic groups. The first and largest group is the Hui, who are descendants of the Central Asian, Persian, and Arabian Muslim immigrants between seventh and fourteenth century. The second group is the Turkic Muslims inhabiting China’s western frontier, mainly in Xinjiang, which include Uighur, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajik, Uzbek, Baoan, and Tatar.50 According to Chinese official statistics, the total Muslim population in China has exceeded 20 million by the 2000s.51 Islamic identity among these minority nationalities in China is far older than the ethnic concepts recognized by the Chinese government. Before the foundation of the PRC as a nation-state, Muslims had already begun to see themselves as different from the Han Chinese in terms of cultural and religious practices and as in Xinjiang, of different domicile.52 For the Hui Muslims, Islamic identity played a dominant role in prolonged interaction with the majority Han population, although they have integrated into the Chinese society to a large extent. For the Turkic Muslims, however, the salience of this Islamic identity is intensified by the arrival or presence of “others,” the Han Chinese, who possess an altogether different religion, language, and culture.53 The differences in the evolution and status of their identities have determined the different response of these groups to Chinese policy of assimilation. The Hui The most populous Muslim group in China is the Hui, who come from Arab, Persian, Central Asian, and Mongol origins. According to the 2000

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China national census, there are approximately 9.2 million Hui Muslims spread throughout the country. The Hui are also called Dungan (Tungan) in Central Asia and Russia. They have also been labeled as the “Chinesespeaking Muslims,” “Chinese Muslims,” and “Sino-Muslims.” Their native language is basically Chinese with a sizeable Arabic and Persian vocabulary. However, a number of Hui speak Tibetan, Mongolian, or Thai as their first language depending on where they live in China. A majority of the Hui learn Chinese in public schools and retain Arabic script in their mosques for religious scripture.54 They have communities in most of China’s provinces, especially in the northwest (Gansu, Qinghai, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region [XUAR]), the southwest (Yunnan, Guizhou), and the North China plain (Hebei, Henan, Shandong).55 They are also the largest urban ethnic minority.56 By the end of the 1990s, there were 200,000 Hui Muslims in Beijing, 150,000 in Tianjin, and 50,000 in Shanghai.57 Most of the Hui Muslims practice Sunni Islam and belong to the Hanafi School of jurisprudence. The majority of the Hui are members of Gedimu or Laojiao (the Old School) in Chinese. There are also factions of Sufis and Islamic reformists (Ikhwani). Islam is the unifying force that bonds the largely dispersed Hui population. But there are variations in cultural practices and religious traditions. For example, in Ningxia, the region with the largest concentration of Hui population, women wear scarves on their heads, as do the Uighur women in remote villages in southern Xinjiang.58 As this Hui population is relatively isolated, they rely on their Mosques as a place for social gatherings and information sharing.59 On the other hand, the Huis in other parts of China are less traditional. For example, few, if any, go for prayers, especially the younger generation. As an officially recognized nationality (min zu) in China, the Hui, however, do not fully meet the four criteria for ethnic classification—a common language, cultural life, economic life, and common territory. Unlike other minority nationalities of China, the majority of the Hui can be hardly distinguished from the Han Chinese in language, locality, economy, and culture. Majority of them write and speak Chinese, even as Arabic and Persian are the languages commonly identified with Islam. In terms of costume, literature, music, or other cultural practices, the Hui cannot be distinguished much from the Han Chinese.60 In fact, compared to other Muslims living in China, the Hui are the closest to the Han Chinese because of their “demographic proximity” and “cultural accommodation.”61 This is the reason most of the Hui feel less threatened because they have almost integrated with the Chinese society. However, things may be changing for the worse. This change is discussed in chapter 4.

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The Uighurs The second largest Muslim group in China refers to the majority of the citizens of XUAR, comprising Uighur, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Uzbek, Baoan, Salar, and Tatar. In fact, the ethnic classification of these peoples is difficult; it is not always accurate to distinguish sharply among these traditionally nomadic and agriculturalist peoples. The languages of these groups belong to the eastern or Altay branch of the Turkic family. The commonality in the languages among different categories indicates their ethnic ties that they have with Central Asian Turks.62 The largest group among them is the Uighurs (Uyghurs, Uygurs, or Weiwuer in modern Chinese). According to the 2000 census, there were about 8.7 million Uighurs in Xinjiang, comprising 45 percent of the population there, while the population of Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other smaller Turkic groups altogether accounted for 12 percent.63 Unlike the Hui, the majority of whom speak Chinese and are scattered throughout China while being deeply inf luenced by Chinese culture, the Turkic Muslims are the vastly dissimilar to the Han in language, culture, religion, and historical experience. These groups have mostly concentrated in the far northwest frontiers of China and have retained their unique dress, customs, language, culture, and most significantly, their religion—Islam. Their identity has been shaped through close geographic proximity to Central Asia and cultural and religious interactions with the surrounding civilizations.64 Uighurs believe that their ancestors were the indigenous people of the Tarim Basin, which is in the southern part of what is now Xinjiang.65 According to some Western historians, a collection of nomadic steppe peoples known as the Uighur have resided in Xinjiang for over 13,000 years.66 After the fall of the Turkish Khanate (AD 552–744), a Uighur kingdom, mentioned in Chinese ancient records as Hui He and later Hui Hu, was founded in northwestern Mongolia.67 During that time, the Uighur were a single collection of nine nomadic tribes who came increasingly under the inf luence of Persian Manichaeism and Buddhism. The Uighur also adopted Chinese cultural, dress, and agricultural practices during extensive trade and military alliances along the old Silk Road with the Tang Empire.68 In AD 840, the Kyrgyz nomads overturned the Uighur kingdom and the Uighur were dispersed across China. One branch of them settled down in the oases surrounding the Tarim Basin including Turpan, Karashahr, and Kashgar (Kashi) and subsequently established a city-state known as Khocho (Qocho, Gaochang), which existed from AD 850 to AD 1250.69 People of this group are generally considered to be the direct ancestors of the present-day Uighurs.

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The emergence of ethnic conf lict in Xinjiang is closely related to the development of the Uighur identity during the twentieth century.70 Although a collection of peoples known as the “Uighur” has existed in the region since the eighth century, this identity disappeared for hundreds of years from the fifteenth century.71 The modern “Uighur,” as a single ethnic nationality, has actually integrated a number of different Muslim Turkish peoples from different oases.72 The “ethnicization” of Uighurs, which involves the process to distinguish the ethnic group by “officially designated identities,” 73 has contributed to the particularity and complexity of the Uighur identity. Throughout its history, however, the term “Uighur” has had significantly different meanings and a unified Uighur identity has been rather obscure. The term had been originally related to Buddhism rather than Islam.74 Buddhist Uighurs resisted conversion to Islam until the Islamization of the Tarim Basin from the tenth to the sixteenth centuries.75 Thereafter, the term “Uighur” faded from the historical records for centuries, as Uighur peoples took on identities based on their separated oases.76 It was not until the twentieth century that the term “Uighur” became generally acceptable to the majority of Xinjiang’s scattered Turkic population. According to some Uighur folklorists, there are at least seven divisions among contemporary Uighurs, who have developed their local identities based on their respective oases in Xinjiang.77 Thus, though over 90 percent of the indigenous inhabitants of Xinjiang were redefined as Uighurs, their primary loyalties had not been to the collective whole of the ethnic group but still to their respective tribes and oases. Therefore, the term “Uighur,” as representing the “perceived ethnicity” of these Turkic peoples, does not provide a unified identity.78 As Rudelson and Jankowiak have noted, the identities of Xinjiang’s Turkic groups, especially the Uighurs are “inherently weak” and “in constant f lux.” 79 The identity of this newly “self-defined” ethnic group is fairly vulnerable to the powerful assimilation of the dominant Han Chinese.80 To some extent, the people recognized as Uighur Muslims emerged out of opposition to the nationalities with other identities, especially the Han Chinese.81 After the PRC was founded in 1949, the salience of Islamic identity has been reinforced by the government policies with an attempt to integrate all nationalities under the dominance of Han Chinese. Given the sociopolitical oppositions with which the Uighur were confronted, it is not surprising that Islam became an important “cultural marker” of Uighur identity.82 As Denise Helly argued, Islam played a critical role as a “unifying ideology” of resistance, rather than a “pure resurgence of Islamic orthodoxy.”83 Nevertheless, Islam was just one of

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several “unifying markers” for Uighur identity, depending on those with whom they were in significant opposition at any particular time.84 However, Beijing’s policy of integration in Xinjiang since 1949 has highlighted the essential role of Islam for these Muslims in the region. For many Uighurs today, the sharply increasing Han migration into Xinjiang has posed the greatest threat to their Islamic religion and Uighur culture. The Han population in Xinjiang has expanded by twenty-six times than that of the 1940s, with an annual growth of 8.1 percent.85 This has triggered the Uighurs’ impulse to protect their own identity by emphasizing those ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural characteristics that differentiate them from the Han Chinese.86 Mosque attendance and Islamic education, for example, have emerged as essential ways for the Uighur Muslims to strengthen their distinct identities vis-à-vis the Han Chinese. A number of Uighur Muslims regard the Chinese policy of integration as threatening and desire more respect and protection of their identity. However, internal differences within the Uighur have often undermined their resistance to “Chinese assimilation.” It is true that Islam is an essential aspect of Uighur identity, but it is not the only source of Uighur confrontation with the Chinese state. Rather, Uighur protest against the Chinese state is characterized by a complex set of issues, not the least being the Beijing’s attempt at assimilation. Only a small segment of the Uighur, who are deeply resentful of the Chinese government, believe that their problems can never be solved unless an independent Islamic republic is established. This segment now represents the milieu that is at the root of organized violence both inside and outside of China especially since the early 1990s. The Saga of Xinjiang Xinjiang (Sinkiang) is the largest provincial-level administrative region of the PRC. Lying on northwestern China, it occupies an area of one-sixth (1.6 million square kilometers) of the country’s landmass. Xinjiang borders eight countries—Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mongolia, India, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, and Tajikistan. Divided by the Tianshan Mountains, it consists of the Jungar Basin in the north and the Tarim Basin in the south. Xinjiang has immense agricultural potential and natural resources, including China’s most important and largely unexploited petroleum reserves. It also occupies a strategically important position between Mainland China and Central Asia. It is one of China’s five autonomous regions for ethnic minorities. There are forty-seven ethnic groups in Xinjiang, mainly the Uighur, Han, Kazak, Hui, Mongolian, Kyrgyz, Xibe, Tajik, Uzbek, Manchu, Daur, Tatar, and Russian.87 By the end of

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2005, the population of Xinjiang had reached 20.1 million.88 The largest population in Xinjiang is the Uighur, mainly concentrated in the southern part of Xinjiang. The second largest group is Han Chinese, the population of which is only a few percentages less than that of the Uighur. The Han Chinese are heavily concentrated in the northern part of Xinjiang around the regional capital city, Urumqi. The divergent historical and political legacy of Xinjiang has resulted in a broad diversity in leadership, politics, and religious practices of its population. As Samuel Huntington contends, the region where “more than one civilization exists” will be the most likely place of conf licts.89 Xinjiang is typically a region of such category. As the crossroad between the nomadic and settler civilizations of Inner-Asia and China, Xinjiang has become an arena for political turbulence and ethnic tensions. The politics of Xinjiang has always been characterized by the accommodation and conf lict between the local powers and the external forces with significant impact on the peace and stability of the region. The Chinese government insists that Xinjiang has been a part of China since the beginning of the Han dynasty (202 BC–AD 220) when several city-states in this region had played an important role in the commerce and transport along the ancient Silk Road.90 In 60 BC, the Han court established Xiyu Duhufu (Protectorate of the Western Regions)91 to oversee this region. According to a majority of Chinese historians, this was the beginning of integration of Xinjiang within Chinese territory. However, it was not until the Tang dynasty (AD 618–907) came to power that the polity based in China established effective control over this area. Since the mid-sixth century, a Turkic tribe called the “Kök Türks” (“Tujue” in Chinese) had founded a steppe empire or Khanate to the north of the Gobi Desert. The empire was divided into western and eastern Khanates in AD 583. The western Türks, who took control of parts of northwest Xinjiang, surrendered to the Tang court in AD 657. Xinjiang region was then placed under the administration of Anxi Protectorate (Protectorate Pacifying the West) at Turpan and later Kuqa. From that time, the Tang had relatively firm sovereignty over the city-states in Xinjiang for over 100 years.92 During that time, Islam was brought to China through the “Silk Road” by merchants and traders from Persia and the Middle East. After the collapse of the Tang dynasty, Xinjiang entered a period during which local Uighur forces ruled the region. From the late twelfth to the thirteenth century, Genghis Khan and his successors built the Mongol Empire into the largest empire in world history. In 1218, the Uighur kingdom in western Xinjiang was conquered by Mongol troops. Large areas of Central Asia and Xinjiang were

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inherited by Chahatai, the son of Genghis Khan in 1237 when the latter passed away. The Chahatai Khanate was a part of the Mongol Empire at first but later went into constant tension with the Mongols ruling China (the Yuan dynasty) and other tribes who remained in Mongolia. In the fifteenth century the Chahatai Khanate disintegrated into separate states of Gulja, Yarkand, and Turpan. Once again, Xinjiang went back to its autonomous status and was ruled by local leaders throughout the Ming dynasty (AD 1368–1644) era. It was only in the eighteenth century did China reassert control of Xinjiang under the Manchu Qing dynasty (AD 1644–1912). The Qing’s control of Xinjiang was the result of long and tiresome efforts, but was not all-inclusive. For example, the Jungar tribe,93 which began its domination of western Mongolia during the late seventeenth century, gradually took control of the Tarim basin and Turpan area. During the early eighteenth century, there was fierce competition between the Qing and the Jungar over China’s northwestern frontiers, including Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet. After prolonged military conflict over this region, Jungars were eventually eliminated by the Qing court under the Qianlong emperor. However, the victory still did not ensure Manchus control over Xinjiang. During 1758 and 1759, rebellions of the Khojas (religious and political leaders of Uighurs) in the south of the Tianshan Mountains prompted the Qing to establish a form of direct military rule over both Jungar (northern Xinjiang) and Tarim Basin (southern Xinjiang). The Qing court put the whole region under the rule of a General of Ili (Yili Jiangjün), with headquarters at the fort of Ili (known as Yining to the Han Chinese and Ghulja to the Uighurs).94 The name “Xinjiang,” which literally means “New Dominion” or “New Territory,” was probably used for the first time in 1768.95 Once Xinjiang was completely in the hold of the Qing Emperor, governed under strict military-colonist control, ethnic tensions involving Uighur Muslims were inevitable because of the discriminate and repressive rule of the Manchus. There were numerous revolts during this time. The massacre of Muslim supporters by the Qing forces prompted further resistances, such as the Tungan Rebellion (1862–1876) in Gansu and Ningxia. Taking advantage of the turbulence in the northwestern provinces, a Tajik elite named Ya’qub Beg96 launched jihad against the Qing court and founded the Kashgaria Khanate (1867–1877). After General Zuo Zongtang (also known as General Tso) reconquered the region for the Qing court in 1877, China’s control over Xinjiang was reestablished and the military administration was strengthened. However, conf licts between the local Muslims and the Manchu rulers, which were accompanied by the penetration of and interference by the Russian Empire, continued for decades.

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By the mid-nineteenth century, Russia started to invade the entire northern frontier along the Qing Empire. In 1871, Russia took advantage of the Muslim rebellion against the Qing in Northern Xinjiang and seized the highly important region of the Ili River valley. The treaty of St. Petersburg in 1881 eventually returned it to Chinese sovereignty. The Uighur territory was divided between the Chinese and Russians, which left Russia in control of more than 500,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory.97 In 1884, the Qing government established Xinjiang (New Frontier) as a province, formally applying the political system of China to it. From this time until the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Xinjiang was to remain under the rule of a succession of Han bureaucrats, with the Begs, headmen, and princes as instruments of local rule.98 During the Republican era (1912–1949), China’s control over Xinjiang was further loosened due to the weakness of the Nationalist government and the dominance of warlords, who seized the de facto political power in most parts of China, especially Xinjiang. Muslims in Xinjiang were often at the mercy of both Han and Muslim warlords. For seventeen years, the province was actually dominated by a Han warlord, Yang Zengxin, whose policies aimed at creating a state of “isolation” for Xinjiang and striking a balance between the interests of Great Britain and Russia.99 On one hand, he showed political loyalties to China and maintained close relations with Great Britain and Russia, who were seeking strategic and political interests in this region. On the other hand, he isolated the province by preventing political interference from either the central authorities or foreign powers.100 Xinjiang became an extremely overcentralized and isolated personal fief under the reign of Yang. In 1928 Chiang Kaishek’s Northern Expedition defeated several opposing warlords and established national government in Nanjing under the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT, Guomindang or GMD). In the same year, Governor Yang was assassinated by Nationalist supporters and succeeded by his subordinate, Jin Shuren, who became the first provincial chairman and commander in chief officially invested by the republican government.101 With the appointment of Jin, it seemed that Xinjiang for the first time would be more firmly tied to the state dominated by the Nationalist party. However, this did not happen in the next two decades. The isolation of Xinjiang by the warlords, the inadequacy of the central government control, and the foreign inf luences especially from the Soviet Union all together gave rise to the acceleration of Uighur nationalist movements, which underlined radicalization of ethnic conf licts. In April 1933, with Hui (Tungan) and Uighur rebels threatening Urumqi, Jin Shuren’s rule was overturned in a coup and replaced by

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the governorship of Sheng Shicai, a new warlord who rose in Chiang’s Northern Expedition. Following insurgencies against Governor Jin, a rebellion in Kashgar (Kashi) led to the establishment of the short-lived First “East Turkistan Republic“ (First ETR or Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkistan). With the sacking of Kashgar in 1934 by Hui warlords allied with the Nationalist government, the first ETR was quickly eliminated.102 In 1944, the “Three Districts Revolution” broke out among the Uighurs and Kazakhs in the region of Ili, Tacheng, and Altai in the northwest. By 1944, the insurgents occupied the city of Yining and later proclaimed the establishment of the second “East Turkistan Republic” (Second ETR). Throughout the rebellion, the insurgents were given significant support and encouragement by the Soviet Union possibly including arms, supplies, and even troops.103 In return, the leaders of ETR opened up some of the richest natural resources to Soviet exploration and exploitation and allowed the Red Army’s penetration in the northwest area of Xinjiang.104 The Chinese government led by Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly refused the recognition of the ETR and considered this regime as a “de facto Soviet dependency.”105 The second ETR existed until 1949 when the Nationalist rule was overturned by the CCP. On October 1, 1949, the PRC was established. At that time, the Nationalists held power in southern Xinjiang while the north remained under the ETR control. Several Kazak tribes retained de facto autonomy in the mountains in the northwest.106 During September and October of 1949, the First Field Army of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) entered Xinjiang. Even though there were “scattered and small-scale” resistance and riots led by local elites, the authorities announced the new unified Xinjiang Provincial People’s Government in December 1949.107 Säypidin Äzizi (Asif al-Din ‘Aziz),108 who served as the minister of education of the ETR (Second) in 1944 and joined the CCP in 1950, was appointed as the provincial vice chairman and chairman of the Xinjiang Nationalities Committee. In 1955, the XUAR was founded based on the policy of “nominal self-rule” or “minority autonomy” (minzu zizhi) principle in the 1954 constitution of the PRC.109 This marked the official integration of Xinjiang into the PRC. Xinjiang is the Muslim borderland to which Uighur identity is historically attached. Throughout its history, the region has been characterized by continuous resentment, opposition, and rebellion. Since the PLA entered Xinjiang in 1949, the CCP has gradually established its political and military control over the region. There is no argument about the fact that under the preferential policies adopted by the CCP and central government toward minority regions, Xinjiang has witnessed significant developments

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in economy and various social undertakings, which has led to a general improvement of the living standards of the people in the region. But the relation between the Han Chinese and the Uighur people deteriorated under China’s repressive policies toward the minority Muslim population especially in the period between the late 1950s and 1970s. This has led to a hardening of the identity among the Uighurs demonstrated by intensified Uighur oppositions to the central government and the Han Chinese. China’s Policies toward Muslim Minorities Since 1949, China has made great efforts for political integration and national unity and sought to transform the Muslim identities into a Chinese identity. This nation-building process followed a gradualist and moderate approach during the early years of the PRC. Beijing implemented preferential policies toward these Muslim minorities. However, since the turbulent period started in the late 1950s, Muslim minorities in general were repressed and their cultural and religious freedom was seriously violated. Prosecutions of religious people during the “Cultural Revolution” greatly aggravated the tension between Muslims and the Chinese government. Entering the “reform and opening up” (gaige kaifang) era, China reinstalled relatively moderate and development-oriented policies toward the Muslims to enhance national unity and maintain stability of the regions where minorities were concentrated. However, a series of new problems such as the increasing Han migration into Xinjiang and the widening gap between the Han and Muslim minorities in socioeconomic development also cropped up. These problems caused a sense of marginalization among the Muslims and fuelled their resentment against the central government. More seriously, Muslims in increasing number started to perceive a threat to survival of their identities. Following the political chaos in the late 1980s, China witnessed fast-growing ethno-religious conf licts and separatist movements in the 1990s. The Early Years of the PRC (1949–1957) In 1949, the PRC was established as a united multinational state “founded jointly by the people of all its ethnic groups.”110 As the majority of the population belonged to the Han ethnic group, the other ethnic groups were referred to as the “national minorities” (shaoshu minzu).111 The issue of the Muslim minorities had been a crucial and continuing concern of the CCP and the central government. Generally, China’s policies toward Muslim minorities in the early 1950s were tolerant, moderate,

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and development-oriented.112 The CCP undertook to end the practice of “Great Han chauvinism” adopted by the Nationalists and promised to adopt policies for the development for the Muslim minorities. The new Chinese government attempted to improve race and ethnic relations through legislation to protect the cultural, religious, and educational rights of the minorities. Xinjiang, with the historical legacies of anti-Han sentiment among the Uighurs and the continuous interference by foreign powers (especially the Soviet Union) in local affairs, was particularly in focus. Attempts were made by the authorities to adopt policies taking into consideration the various problems and unique characteristics accruing to the region and its people. This gradualist approach was ref lected in the measures introduced to promote land reforms and collective agricultural production. The overall approach was to introduce mechanisms for “regional autonomy for ethnic minorities (minzu quyu zizhi)” with a view to promoting the socioeconomic development of areas inhabited by Muslims. The principle of “regional autonomy for ethnic minorities” was laid out in the People’s Political Consultative Conference of September 1949. This autonomy for ethnic minorities means that, under the unified leadership of the state, the people of ethnic minorities living in “concentrated communities” would elect their self-governing agencies to manage their “internal affairs.”113 Similar to the practice in the then Soviet Union, the Chinese used the concept of “nationality” to manage ethnic differences. But instead of creating the so-called autonomous republics as in the Soviet Union, the Chinese established a mechanism of regional autonomy or self-rule (zi zhi) at regional levels under political control of the CCP.114 Autonomous areas for ethnic minorities in China consist of autonomous regions (zizhi qu), autonomous prefectures (zhizhi zhou) and autonomous counties or banners (zhizhi xian or qi). By the 2000s, China has established 155 ethnic autonomous areas, of which 5 are autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, and 120 autonomous counties (banners). In October 1951, during the Third Meeting of the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference, Chairman Mao proclaimed that the land reforms would be completed by the end of 1952 throughout the country except in the areas inhabited by minority nationalities. In minority areas, the reforms would be gradual with special consideration being given to specific local conditions. At the same time, the CCP work teams were send to minority communities in order to help these nationalities imbibe communist ideology, with a view to integrating them into mainstream socialist mechanism. The land reform and collectivization of

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agriculture in Xinjiang was gradually carried out by PLA work teams till the late 1950s.115 Through redistribution of the property of local landlords and the religious establishments, peasants belonging to minority nationalities, especially the poorest of them, were provided with land, livestock, and other property. The CCP attempted to improve the economic conditions of poor farmers, while at the same time recruiting new members and enhancing its presence in local communities by setting up local branches of the party.116 By 1954, over 11,000 hectares had been redistributed to 650,000 households; by the next year, 63 percent of Xinjiang’s farmers were in “mutual aid teams,” which were seen as the rudimental collectivization of agriculture.117 The progress of land reform and collectivization of agriculture in minority areas were much slower than that in other parts of the country due to the CCP’s special concern regarding the “particularity” of these nationalities. The general principles of the Chinese government toward the minority nationalities are laid down in the Constitution of the PRC, which was adopted at the First National People’s Congress on September 20, 1954. The constitution declared that all nationalities in this state were equal and the lawful rights and interest of minority nationalities were protected.118 The constitution guaranteed the protection of freedoms of religion, languages, and customs in respect of the minorities.119 The Chinese government made efforts to build infrastructure facilities and develop agriculture and industries in Muslim autonomous areas. During the First Five-Year Plan period (1953–1957), the state launched in Muslim-concentrated areas a number of construction projects, such as petroleum exploration in Xinjiang and the Qinglongxia Hydropower Station in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.120 Through various measures, such as providing free farm tools and production capital and reducing or exempting agricultural and animal husbandry taxes, the Chinese government made attempts to support the economic development of the areas with large concentration of Muslims.121 The authorities also adopted the preferential financial policy of raising the proportion of the financial reserve fund of the ethnic regions to help local Muslims develop their own economies and improve their livelihood.122 Overall, during the early years of the new Chinese state, the central government adopted preferential policies for Muslim minorities with a view to maintaining stability and ethnic unity. Muslims’ rights and freedom were better protected and Muslims played important roles in their self-governing institutions. The living standards of the Muslims significantly improved compared to what they were before 1949. Still, a number of Muslims perceived the “regional autonomy for minority

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nationalities” as a tool of assimilation that was a threat to their identities. This became more pronounced during the turmoil of the late 1950s to 1970s. The Turbulent Decades (1957–1978) Since 1956, significant shifts in the domestic political and economic circumstances and the rapid deterioration of Sino-Soviet relationship converged to send the CCP lurching to the extreme left, which replaced the more developmental and gradualist approach of the “rightists” in the Chinese leadership.123 The gradualist policies toward minority issues were essentially abandoned during the campaigns of Anti-rightist, Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution during the late 1950s and late 1970s. Between the years 1956 and 1957, the Hundred Flowers Campaign was introduced under Mao’s slogan, “Let a hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred schools of thought contend.”124 The CCP called for open criticism of the party and encouraged a variety of views to address ongoing problems at that time.125 The Hundred Flowers Campaign, which was supposed to give people more freedom to express themselves, resulted in widespread criticism of the party by the people from all walks of life in the country, especially from the minority nationalities. Many individuals belonging to the minority communities expressed their discontent with the dominance of Han officials in autonomous governments, and demanded greater autonomy. Some even called for a total exclusion of Han people and even demanded independence of their autonomous regions.126 Quickly, the initial “open-minded” stance was replaced by the hard-line policy of AntiRightist ( fanyou douzheng). The CCP launched a severe crackdown on the opposition, who were regarded as anti-revolutionaries and rebels. Many Muslim officials, the Uighurs especially, came under attack for their “local nationalism,” which was linked to the Soviet “revisionism.” Thousands of non-Han political elites were removed from office and dispatched to labor camps for “thought reform.”127 The Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957 marked the beginning of ideological intolerance and political oppression against religious people and ethnic minorities. The relation between Muslims and the Han Chinese started to deteriorate from then on. The rapid deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1950s combined with the growing economic hardships in China resulted in the dominance of the extreme left ideology in the CCP and the policy of Great Leap Forward. The Great Leap was underlined by the strategy of socioeconomic development aiming at unrealistically fast modernization and industrialization. The misleading economic and social policies

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caused not only serious economic crisis but also humanitarian disaster for the people all over the country. During the Great Leap period, the CCP fully abandoned the gradualist approach to ethnic matters and launched the Religious Reform movement, with a distinct anti-Islamic stance. The “complete blending of all the nationalities” was considered by the party as critical to “continued socialist construction” in regions where ethnic minorities were concentrated.128 The Chinese Muslim Association was abolished in 1958, and the formal study of Islamic literature and law was banned with the closing of the Islamic Institute.129 Islamic and other religious organizations across China were shut down and their publications were stopped. After 1961, information on minorities became sparse because the only scholarly journal devoted to minorities, the “Nationalities Research,” stopped publication that year.130 With a view to introducing a uniform language, the government promoted Chinese in education, while the languages of the minorities were sidelined.131 The destruction of Uighur education, for example, was ref lected by the frequent changes of writing systems in Xinjiang. In 1956, the Cyrillic alphabet was introduced by the government in Xinjiang to replace the Arabic alphabet, which was used by Uighurs for hundreds of years. In 1960, the Cyrillic alphabet was superseded by a modified Latin alphabet.132 These policies led to the rise of anti-government and anti-Han feelings among Muslim communities who began to demand protection of their ethno-religious and linguistic identity. During this period, Xinjiang experienced tremendous economic difficulties, as did other regions of the country. The living standards of this region collapsed to much below the pre-1949 levels.133 Facing a nationwide shortage of food grains, Chinese authorities ordered increasing food shipments from XUAR to support the cities in the other areas.134 This worsened the famine in Xinjiang and triggered serious grievances in local non-Han communities. The panic caused by the famine led to migration of Uighurs to the Soviet Union at a sharp speed. Although the government attempted to control the f low of refugees across the Sino-Soviet border, large numbers of the Uighur and Kazakh population escaped to Soviet Central Asia. In April 1962, there were large-scale disturbances in north Xinjiang (Yi-Ta incident) linked to the exodus of Uighurs from Yining (Ghulja) city and Tacheng (Qoqek) county. On May 26, 1962, the Uighurs in the Yining city revolted as the local government attempted to prevent them from escaping to the Soviet Union. Authorities claimed that the crowd destroyed the office of the People’s Committee and CCP Committee of Yining.135

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The riots were quickly repressed by the armed forces. According to Chinese officials, the Soviet Consulate in Yining instigated local populations and offered invitations, residence permits, and other assistance to the Uighur refugees. The most chaotic phase in the PRC history was the Cultural Revolution that swept across many parts of the country between 1966 and 1976. During this period, the “proletarian dictatorship” of the Red Guards paralyzed the whole society as the demonstration of their loyalty to Chairman Mao.136 The minority policies of the CCP at this time focused on immediate and total assimilation.137 The CCP began to oppress Sufi and traditionalist Hui Muslim associations, which they thought were too feudal and hence threats to the “proletarian dictatorship.” Muslim communities were thrown into serious chaos. Xinjiang’s public security, administration, economy, and society were damaged more seriously than that of other parts of China because of the severe armed conf licts between different political factions consisting of radical Red Guards.138 Under the extreme left policies, religion was especially suppressed; so were ethnic languages and cultural traditions. The Uighurs in Xinjiang, like other Muslim minorities throughout China, saw their religious texts and mosques destroyed, their religious leaders persecuted, and individual adherents punished.139 Insults to Uighur customs and attacks on Islam caused a strong sense of humiliation and grievances against Han populations among the minority nationalities in Xinjiang. The Soviet Union took full advantage of this development. An article in the Izvestiya, a Russian periodical, said that the ultimate goal of China’s nationalities policy was “the complete liquidation of national characteristics and distinctions.”140 In response, the CCP accused the Soviet Union of deliberately instigating rebellions against the Chinese government. At the same time, it sought to maintain strict political and military control over the region. Even when the Party Central Committee announced its decision to end the Cultural Revolution in 1976, clashes continued between the Uighurs and the Hans in Xinjiang, albeit on a smaller scale. The radical policies against Muslim minorities ref lected the “sharpened assimilationist” agenda embraced by the CCP leadership during this period.141 However, these policies produced exactly the opposite results. The Uighur Muslims in increasing numbers started to rally around their religion as a core element in their struggles for rights and even independence. Islam gradually grew into a uniting force for these Muslims to protect themselves from repression. During those two decades (1960s–1970s), the social turbulence and harsh treatment

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against the Muslims deteriorated the relation between the Muslim minorities and the Han majority. Particularly, the Uighur oppositions against the Han Chinese and Chinese state began to be manifestly radical and violent. The “Reform and Opening Up” (Post 1980s) In the 1980s, the CCP under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping put an end to the Cultural Revolution and introduced the “reform and opening” program (gaige kaifang). Deng’s reforms liberalized not only the socioeconomic system of China but also the nation’s attitude toward the minorities.142 In March 1978, the Fifth National People’s Congress approved the new constitution of the PRC. The new provisions of the constitution restored some civil rights to the Chinese citizenry and gave back to the ethnic minorities the right “to preserve or reform their own customs and ways.”143 The Muslims were encouraged to express their separate identity and also benefit from greater autonomy within their designated areas. Thousands of mosques were rebuilt and reopened, while some received state funds for repairs. Muslims were allowed to practice their faith, and Islamic classical and devotional literature was printed and distributed, subject to legal restrictions. After ten years, Islamic schools at all levels were reopened. Religious festivals were allowed to be observed with the full holiday allowance. Almsgiving (zakat) was permitted again under the condition that the funds were used to support Islamic instruction, mosques, and the poor.144 In 1984, the central government reintroduced the Arabic script for the Uighurs. The Uighur written language was allowed for popular publications, while radio and television used the local vernacular in their broadcasts and telecasts. Socioeconomic development lies at the heart of “reform and opening up” policies. In the early 1980s, Deng adopted a strategy to develop the eastern coastal areas first, which already had a better economic foundation than the western areas. It was proposed that once the eastern regions reached a certain level of development, the development of the western regions would be taken up. With intent to show that minorities were not neglected, the CCP applied several preferential policies to improve the economies in minority autonomies. For instance, the 1982 Constitution proclaimed that “the state gives financial, material and technical assistance to the minority nationalities to accelerate their economic and cultural development.”145 The Law on Regional Autonomy permitted the autonomies to reduce local taxes in order to make it attractive and competitive for investment.146 As a result, Muslim areas, like other areas in China, undertook a series of reforms and as claimed by government agencies, achieved significant economic successes.147

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The Chinese authorities consider the socioeconomic incentive as a long-standing measure in undermining Uighurs’ calls for independence and maintaining social stability in this region. Indeed, the underdevelopment of Xinjiang has not only hindered China’s overall continued prosperity and stability but also triggered the “possible enticements” of religious extremism, and the demands for ethnic separatism.148 During the 1990s, the government particularly focused on promoting economic development of Xinjiang and improving the living standards of local populations. Preferential policies were applied to state-owned and private enterprises in this region. The government carried out investments in infrastructure, such as building energy and transport networks, in order to create better conditions for economic development and provide more job opportunities for local populations. The state policies also encouraged minority people to develop individual economies and private trading began to f lourish under the liberalized regulations. Due to Xinjiang’s great distance from the coastal areas where foreign trade and investment was concentrated, China’s strategy for boosting Xinjiang’s economy was to strengthen the ties with Central Asia in trade and economic cooperation. The expansion of trade and oil and gas industry made the late 1990s Xinjiang rank at the top of inland provinces in GDP per capita.149 Since the “reform and opening up” era started, contact between Muslims of China and the Islamic world had expanded enormously. Authorities granted permits for those who wished to make a pilgrimage. In 1985, an estimated 2,000 Muslims made the pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia and visited Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan or other Muslim states in Central Asia.150 Foreign funds coming in from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran were used to either reopen or establish mosques and religious schools, fund scholarships, and import religious materials such as Qu’rans. The Chinese government was keen on incorporating Islam in their foreign policy initiatives in order to build closer relationship with the Muslim states, which were the most essential energy suppliers for this economically recovering state.151 A number of Chinese Muslim delegates were sent to countries in the Islamic world for cultural-religious communications and in return, the Chinese government hosted religious dignitaries domestically. Most of the border cities in Xinjiang were opened to foreign companies and tourism began to get promoted. The traders in Xinjiang benefited from an increasing autonomy in border trade and the supply vacuum created due to the disruption of the former Soviet internal trade.152 The value of Xinjiang’s direct trade grew from US$31 million in 1980 to 459 million in 1991.153 At the same time, the roads, rails, and pipelines connecting Xinjiang to Central Asia exposed the province directly to militant training and arms as well as the drug trade emanating from these countries and beyond.154

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More specifically, contacts along the border made the pan-Turkic nationalist and Islamist fundamentalist ideologies spread into Xinjiang. By the late 1990s, Xinjiang’s economy had remarkably improved, although it was still relatively backward compared to that of the coastal areas of China. However, the economic improvement contributed to more ethnic tensions in Xinjiang. One particular reason for the Uighur dissent is the rapid growth of Han migrants in Xinjiang. The immigration of millions of Hans into Xinjiang has dramatically shifted the demographic structure of the region, which is considered by indigenous Muslims as a serious threat to their socioeconomic life. Since the XUAR was founded in 1955, it has been an official policy to attract qualified professional and technical personnel, and agricultural workers from all over the country to engage in construction in Xinjiang.155 Most of these Han-Chinese migrants settled down permanently in main cities in northern Xinjiang, particularly Urumqi, and state farms all over the region. In 1949, about 75 percent of the population in Xinjiang consisted of Uighurs, but that figure dropped to 45–50 percent by the late 1990s.156 The Uighurs view this shift as the occupation of Xinjiang by the Han Chinese. Moreover, there are concerns about the widening inequality between the Han and Uighur people in terms of socioeconomic development. From the Uighurs’ perspective, the migration of Han people into XUAR has limited the employment of local Uighurs because the majority of Uighurs do not speak Mandarin Chinese and few are as well educated as the Han immigrants. As a result, the Han people nearly dominated commerce in urban areas and are frequently seen by the locals as having good-paying jobs and higher-ranked positions in the government, the party, and the military in XUAR.157 Uighurs also witnessed how the Han residents usually lived in newer neighborhoods and went to schools that had better teachers and facilities.158 This has led to the sense of injustice and anti-Han and anti-government feelings in the Uighur population. Moreover, many Uighur Muslims believe that the presence of vast numbers of Han Chinese, who are not Muslims, has posed a serious threat to their ethno-religious identity. Many Uighurs are worried that their descendants would be drawn away from the traditional way of Islam by the “atheism” and “materialism” embraced by these Han migrations. Ethnic separatism among Uighurs is thus an outcome of an expression of intense bitterness against China’s “religious intolerance toward Islam.”159 Uighurs believe that their freedom of association and expression, particularly involving the religious issues was limited by China’s strict laws. They are dissatisfied with Beijing’s regulations governing mosque construction, Islamic publications and media, the content of Qur’anic classes, exit requirements for Hajj pilgrimages, and the arrests and interrogation

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of imams and ulama deemed “subversive.” These constraints increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s, driven by Beijing’s perception that religious activities have been utilized by separatists as a tool for spreading their anti-government ideas. Other concerns raised by Uighurs involve the new industries and infrastructural projects that tapped Xinjiang’s enormous gas, oil, and mineral deposits. In their view, this process had significantly harmed the region’s environment and resulted in exploitation of the local resources to the detriment of the local population.160 Since the 1980s, Chinese authorities have announced a series of preferential policies for Muslim minorities in terms of promoting their socioeconomic development and protecting their cultural rights and religious freedom. Beijing repeatedly emphasizes the importance of “great unity” of all nationalities (minzu datuanjie) under the CCP leadership. In doing so, the Chinese government aims to keep local Muslims loyal to the unified multinational state and to demonstrate its tolerance of Islam to Muslims all over the world. However, the state has failed to address the sentiment of marginalization, exploitation, and discrimination among its Muslim communities. As a result, the 1990s witnessed a series of conf licts involving segments of Muslims in Xinjiang that was met with force by the state. This chapter examined the real and perceived threat to the societal identity of Muslim minorities and their reactions to China’s policies. The identity of Muslims in China has evolved historically in the course of continuous interaction between Islam and the Chinese society for over 1,300 years. This interaction has enabled the majority of the Muslims, especially the Hui, to generally integrate into Chinese society and live in apparent harmony with the Han majority. Segments of Chinese Muslims, however, consider China’s nation-building process, especially its policy of integration, as a serious threat to their identity, which has triggered violent reactions. Over the years, Islam has become the rallying point in this battle of contested identities. Many new shifts in this Islamic identity can be seen as a result of China’s transformed and increasingly globalizing society, and especially since the watershed events of the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the subsequent global “war on terrorism.” Beijing might have succeeded in keeping the number of separatist/terrorist acts and the scale of violence low in the short run, but clearly, the root of ethnic tension and Muslim opposition remains unattended. History illustrates that Islamic identity, especially a convoluted perception of the same, may justifiably be regarded as a “potential instrument of political destabilization”161 among Muslim communities under a non-Muslim government. This becomes more problematic as the globalization of information and communication has enabled the

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CHAPTER 3

UIGHUR SEPARATISM: EAST TURKISTAN GROUPS

We say to the Chinese: No matter how unjust, lethal, and fatal you are towards our Muslim brothers, and (no matter) how you improve your methods of torture and excel in the torture of our brothers, do not think that you can enslave them. . . . Know that this Muslim people have men who will take revenge for them. Soon, the horsemen of Allah will attack you, Allah willing. So lie in wait; indeed, we lie in wait with you. . .The safety of the time bomb planted against you has ended. —Seifallah, Military Commander, Turkistan Islamic Party, July 2009.1

O

n January 20, 2009, China issued a white paper “China’s National Defense in 2008” stating that “Separatist forces working for ‘Taiwan independence,’ ‘East Turkistan independence’ and ‘Tibet independence’” are threatening the “unity and security” of the country.2 The specific term “separatist forces for East Turkistan independence” used here indicates a broad range of Uighur separatist groups (either violent or nonviolent), including the terrorist groups identified by China. On January 21, 2001, China’s Permanent Mission to the UN issued its first official statement referring to the “East Turkistan organizations.”3 A 2002 document titled “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” relied frequently on this generic term, which indicated a collection of several groups, many of which have “East Turkistan” in their names. All these groups were alleged to be responsible for terrorist violence against China from 1990 to 2001. In fact, until August 2002, when the then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, identified East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as the “leading Uighur international terrorist organization,” very few people, including Uighur activists themselves, had ever heard of these groups.4 Even in China’s 2002

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report, the ETIM was not specifically mentioned. A “Special Report: Uighur Muslim Separatists,” released by the Virtual Information Center in September 2001, concluded that there is no “single, identifiable group but there is violent opposition coordinated and possibly conducted by exiled groups and organizations within Xinjiang.”5 However, in 2003, China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued a list of the first batch of identified “Eastern Turkistan” terrorist organizations and eleven members of those groups. It specifically identified four groups, East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), World Uighur Youth Congress (WUYC), and East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC) as the main militant Uighur Islamist threat. According to China’s official report in 2003, the “East Turkistan terrorist groups” were responsible for over 200 terrorist incidents in Xinjiang between 1990 and 2001, resulting in 162 deaths and 440 injuries.6 However, in many Chinese official statements, a more general “East Turkistan terrorist forces” are referred to rather than any specific group. The fact that there are numerous variations of the movement’s name has led many analysts as well as governments to simply credit ETIM with all militant attacks or plots in China. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. State Department listed the ETIM as a terrorist organization in 2002. The communiqué credited the group with the complete laundry list of attacks, assassinations, and plots that China considered the work of the “East Turkistan” separatist forces. In order to avoid this ambiguity, this chapter will provide the detailed profiles and analysis of the four groups that China has identified as terrorists. Today, the ETIM is the most active one among these “East Turkistan forces.” ETIM is responsible for a series of terrorist attacks and plots including those during the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008. Separatist Violence in Xinjiang since 1990 Since the early 1990s, Uighur opposition to Beijing has manifested in a number of waves of violence which, however, occurred in clusters. The first wave was marked by the Baren incident in 1990, followed by unrests and bombings between 1991 and 1993. The second wave occurred in Yining in 1997, which triggered a series of bombings in Urumqi, Khotan, Korla, and Kashgar in 1997 and 1998. The third and most recent one was the ethnic clash in Urumqi in July 2009, reportedly killing 197 people including both Han-Chinese and Uighurs. The most deadly riot was followed by a bombing threat to a China-bound Afghan plane and syringe attacks against the Han Chinese civilians in Urumqi in August and

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U IG H U R S E PA R AT I S M : E A S T T U R K I S TA N G RO U P S

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September 2009. These three waves of unrest and violent incidents have shown an escalating trend of Uighur separatist movement. After the protests at Tiananmen Square in June 1989, there was a rapid escalation of Uighur opposition to the authorities in Xinjiang. A massive Uighur rebellion took place on April 5, 1990 in Baren, Akto county of Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture, Xinjiang.7 The rebellion started with the Uighur protests against CCP’s “discriminatory” and “repressive” policies toward Muslim minorities. Later it developed into a mass unrest aiming to drive the Han Chinese out of the region and rebuild the “Eastern Turkistan Republic” under Islamic law. Thousands of local Muslims took part in the revolt, prompting the government to send a large number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers to put down the unrest.8 The conf lict between the armed forces and Uighur rioters lasted for several days. According to Chinese official sources, seven police officers were “savagely slaughtered” by the militants whereas some Western sources estimated that more than eighty Uighur civilians were killed during the unrest.9 The rebellion was reportedly organized by the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP), an underground separatist organization under the leadership of Zeydin Yusup (Zehidin Yusuf ).10 The Chinese authorities described this incident as a “counter-revolutionary rebellion” and pointed out that some of these militants had received military training from secret armed cells in Xinjiang.11 According to the Chinese, these elements had received weapons from Islamic militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.12 Following the Baren incident, the separatist violence spread into other parts of Xinjiang and lasted until 1993. In between May and June 1991, armed insurrections broke out in Tacheng and Bole, which caused a number of injuries and damage to shops and government offices.13 A bus bombing on February 5, 1992 in Urumqi killed six civilians and injured twenty-six others.14 Five Uighur men were arrested for this case and executed in June 1995.15 Media operated by Uighur émigrés reported other bombings against shopping centers, street markets, and hotels in Yining, Khotan, Kashghar, Kuqa, and other cities in Xinjiang from February 1992 to September 1993.16 Chinese official sources claimed that two people were killed and thirty-six injured overall in these explosions.17 Chinese authorities blamed Uighur exiled organizations as masterminds behind these unrests and bombings. The second wave of separatist violence emerged in the year of 1997. On February 5, 1997, deadly ethnic violence took place in Yining (Ghulja), a strategically important town along the Sino-Kazak border. Reports varied and the Chinese official documents blamed this “serious riot” on

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the group known as “East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah” and its allies, claiming nine deaths and nearly 200 injuries.18 Uighur sources in the United States claimed that as many as 100 people died in the disturbances.19 Following the riots, three buses (Buses No. 2, No. 10, and No. 44) were blown up on February 27, 1997 in the city of Urumqi, killing nine and injuring 68 others.20 A previously unknown group, the Uighur Liberation Party claimed responsibility for this incident. Eight Uighurs were arrested and executed for their involvement in the incident.21 In September 1997, large-scale uprisings broke out at several locations in Xinjiang and lasted for about one week. According to one report, more than 3,000 people took part in the uprising and many rebels used small arms and bombs to attack local government offices and communications facilities.22 It was estimated that thirty local party members, PLA officers, and soldiers, and eighty demonstrators were killed.23 Another wave of violence started on October 1, 1997, the national day of the PRC, and lasted for a few days killing more than twenty people.24 In February and March 1998, Uighur separatists launched six bombing attacks against economic and industrial targets, including a gas pipeline in Kashgar Prefecture, injuring three people.25 In July 1998, violent incidents took place in the southern oasis town of Khotan, where the local CCP headquarters came under several bomb attacks. The situation of this region was already very tense since the killing of 16 policemen by a Uighur man in November 1996.26 The Khotan bombing was followed by another bomb attack in Korla (Kuerle) just a few days later. In midAugust 1998, a bomb blast in Kashgar killed eight police officers. The latest wave of separatist violence is marked by the outbreak of ethnic clashes between the Uighur Muslims and Han Chinese in Urumqi on July 5, 2009. A malicious rumor that six Uighurs raped two Han women triggered a fighting between Han and Uighur workers in a toy factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong, on June 25, 2009, killing two Uighurs and injuring 118 people.27 Ten days later, deadly riots bruised the city of Urumqi and shocked the world. Uighur rioters assaulted innocent people with knives, wooden batons, bricks and stones, smashed vehicles and set fire to buildings and public facilities. Chinese official statistics show that the riot has caused 197 deaths and over 1,600 injuries, 28 the majority of which involved the Han Chinese.29 This has made it the deadliest ethnic conf lict in Chinese history since 1949.30 Thousands of security forces were deployed to end the ethnic clashes and restore order in the city. The Xinhua news agency reported that 1,434 people were arrested for rioting.31 On July 6, 2009, the local authorities stated that “the situation was under control.”32 Officials ordered traffic

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off the streets in parts of the city to ensure there was no fresh unrest. On the same day, several Chinese diplomatic missions overseas were attacked by supporters of Uighur unrest in Urumqi. The Chinese Embassy in the Netherlands was attacked and partly damaged by Uighur protestors. In Monique, Germany, two unidentified men threw three Molotov cocktails at the Chinese consulate shortly after dozens of Uighurs held protests near the consulate. At the same time, demonstrations were held against the Chinese government in Indonesia by local Muslim groups. Though no group claimed responsibility for the violence, the Chinese authorities asserted that the unrest was masterminded by the World Uighur Congress (WUC) led by Rebiya Kadeer. However, the WUC denied China’s charge in its statement and called for international investigations of the incidents.33 Nevertheless, the violence and China’s response to the same provoked Islamist groups in many parts of the world. On July 15, 2009, an Al Qaeda affiliate group, Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), based in Algeria denounced the Chinese action against Uighurs in Urumqi and threatened to carry out revenge attacks against Chinese interests in Africa. Two days later, the jihadist Al-Fajr Media Center distributed a video issued by the ETIM in which the group criticized China for the violence against Uighur Muslims in Guangdong in June and Urumqi in July, and called for the Uighurs to wage jihad against China.34 On August 10, 2009, China’s state news agency, Xinhua, reported that an Afghan passenger f light scheduled to land in Urumqi could be the target of a bombing attack.35 The Kam Air f light, carrying more than 200 passengers, including five Chinese,36 returned to Afghanistan and landed on the airport of Kandahar city. According to one source, on August 9, 2009, Afghani intelligence indicated possible threat to the airliner from the “East Turkistan” groups.37 After the plane took off that evening, Xinjiang authorities received further information claiming that a bomb was on board.38 Urumqi airport was immediately asked to prevent the plane from landing while police and emergency vehicles rushed to the airport.39 Chinese authorities provided no further details about the nature of the alleged threat after they claimed that the Urumqi airport “returned to normal operations” on the same day.40 The counterterrorism chief of Afghanistan, Abdul Manan Farahi, later said that no bomb was found on the plane.41 In late August and September 2009, a group of Uighur people stabbed civilians and police officers in the city of Urumqi with hypodermic syringes which were rumored to be tainted with HIV or anthrax. Xinjiang media reported that over 500 people had sought treatment after being

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stabbed in such a manner.42 The majority of the victims were of the Han ethnic group and the others were Uighur, Hui, and Kazak.43 Though, no dangerous viruses or chemicals were involved in the syringe stabbings,44 the attacks were aimed to spread terror among the people. The attacks resulted in the massive demonstration in Urumqi. On September 2, 2009, over ten thousand Han-Chinese gathered in the city to protest local authorities for deteriorating public safety.45 On September 5, 2009, the party chief of the city of Urumqi, Li Zhi, and police chief of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Liu Yaohua, were removed from their posts. This was the first replacement of senior officials in Xinjiang since ethnic violence erupted in 2009. On September 21, 2009, China issued a white paper titled “Development and Progress in Xinjiang,” reaffirming that the “East Turkistan” forces had posed a serious threat to “regional security and stability.”46 The violence in Xinjiang since 1990 has shown that the separatist movement in Xinjiang gained the silent support of a number of Uighurs inside and outside China. It has become apparent that increasing numbers of Uighurs consider violence the only mode of political praxis that actively, frequently, and aggressively contests Chinese authority while powerfully reaffirming their ethnic identity. The rise of terrorism in China can be seen as a radical manifestation of the Uighur separatist movement. East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) The term “Turkistan” (Turkestan) first appeared in Arabic geographical works during the middle ages. It meant “the region or the state of the Turks.” East Turkistan now refers to Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People’s Republic of China. Western Turkistan, on the other hand, refers to the Central Asian region of the former United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This includes the five new republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. On January 21, 2002, China issued its official document “East Turkistan Forces can not get away with impunity,” outlining the whole series of terrorist acts perpetrated by the Uighur group “East Turkistan Islamic Movement” (ETIM) since the late 1990s. The report, in particular, named Hasan Mahsum as the leader of the ETIM and charged that Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had conspired with Hasan Mahsum and others to launch jihad in Xinjiang. According to this document, the “East Turkistan Islamic Movement” is also referred to as the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP), East Turkistan

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Islamic Party of Allah, East Turkistan Opposition Party, or some other combinations of the above. However, recent reports show that the group never called itself “ETIM,” which is usually used by governments and international organizations. The group previously known as “ETIM” is the continuation of the Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan Ash-Sharqiyah (Islamic Party of East Turkistan, East Turkistan Islamic Party, or ETIP) founded by Zeydin Yusup (Ziyauddin Yusuf ) in 1989.47 The now deceased head of the ETIM, Abdul Haq stated in a video that: Our group, the Turkistan Islamic Party, is a group established as a continuation of the East Turkistan Jihad Movement in the year of 1989 under the unique leadership of Ziyauddin Yusuf.

Following the Islamic Pan-Turkic trend in southern Xinjiang during the 1980s, the ETIP aimed at spreading fundamentalist Islam among local Uighurs and developed networks of mosques in the region. 48 According to Chinese sources, the group established its presence in Yining (Ghulja), Urumqi, Turfan, and most major cities in the Tarim Basin.49 The ETIP reportedly led the Uighur rebellion on April 5, 1990, in Baren Township, Akto County, Xinjiang.50 China’s massive crackdown following the rebellion led to the death of Zeydin Yusup and decline of the group and its activities between 1990 and 1997. However, as Abdul Haq said: The group was not dissolved with the martyrdom of Ziyauddin Yusuf . . . On the contrary, it has continued (its operations) until now.

In September 1997, Hasan Mahsum reorganized the ETIP in Pakistan and transformed it into a disciplined militant group. China named the “new” group as “East Turkistan Islamic Movement” (ETIM), which is actually a direct descendent of ETIP. In 2000, the ETIM (ETIP) leadership decided to remove the “East” from the group’s name.51 Since then, the group has been operating under the name of Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).52 ETIM History and Leadership The lineage of East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) could be traced back to 1940, when the Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan (Islamic Party of Turkistan or Turkistan Islamic Movement) was founded by Abdul Hakeem Makhdoom (Mahsum), Abdul Azeez Makhdoom (Mahsum), and Abdul Hameed.53 From the 1940s through 1952, the three led the

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movement in a series of uprisings, first against local warlords and later against the Central Government. In the late 1950s, Abdul Hakeem was imprisoned, Abdul Hameed was driven underground and later killed, and Abdul Azeez Makhdoom disappeared (possibly killed).54 The death and dispersal of top leaders led to a decline of the organization until the late 1970s or early 1980s. In 1979, one of the founders of Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan, Abdul Hakeem, was released from prison. He rebuilt underground religious schools in Xinjiang and started to teach fundamentalist Islam to religious students from Uighur community.55 Hasan Mahsum, one of Abdul Hakeem’s students between 1984 and 1989, established the group known as East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in 1997 in Pakistan. On October 2, 2003, Hasan Mahsum was killed in Pakistan following a raid by the Pakistani forces on a suspected Al Qaeda hideout in Wana on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.56 After his death, the ETIM (TIP) chose another military commander, Abdul Haq, as its leader. Hasan Mahsum Hasan Mahsum (Mahsoun, Makhdoum), alias Abu Mohammad alTurkistani, alias Ashan Sumut, was born in October 1964 in a Muslim family in Kashgar (Kashi) Prefecture in Xinjiang.57 Mahsum was the student and follower of Abdul Hakeem, one of the founders of the Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan. After his release in 1979, Abdul Hakeem became a famous Islamic fundamentalist scholar in Xinjiang, who had thousands of students in the region in the late 1980s.58 From 1984 to 1989, Hasan Mahsum followed Abdul Hakeem to study Islam at Kargharlak in Kashgar, Xinjiang, and later became an Islamic teacher in an underground religious school. During the Baren incident in 1990, Mahsum reportedly established Islamic organizations and took part in the rebellion in Akto County. He was detained and imprisoned in Kashgar on May 8, 1990 and released on November 23, 1991.59 In July 1993, Mahsum was imprisoned again for organizing unlawful assembly in commemorating the demise of his teacher, Abdul Hakeem. In June 1995, he was transferred to a labor camp in Urumqi, where he was released one year later. During the “strike hard” campaigns in August 1996, Mahsum was again brief ly detained until September 1996.60 The experience in prison significantly inf luenced the Islamic and political thinking of Hasan Mahsum. In the early 1990s, various protestors, militants, criminals, and bystanders were caught up in these security campaigns. Some of Uighur prisoners there began to share, refine, and shape their ideology. They took on more extremist tendencies and built up networks, which were apparent in later separatist movements.61

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During that time in prison, Mahsum communicated with other Uighur separatists and extremists and gradually adopted radical Islamist ideology. After his release, he traveled from Urumqi to Beijing and on to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in January 1997. From January to March 1997, Mahsum stayed in Jeddah and mobilized the local Uighur community to wage jihad against Beijing, which occupied “East Turkistan.”62 He also tried to persuade wealthy businessmen to fund his activities. However, he received very little support for his cause in Jeddah. Most of them considered militancy a lost cause and urged Mahsum to give up and simply settle overseas. In March and April 1997, Mahsum took his cause to Pakistan, then on to Turkey in April and May 1997.63 Both missions met with similar results as his Jeddah initiative. In February 1997, another Uighur uprising in Yining, Xinjiang, resulted in several days of clashes between Chinese security forces and Uighur protestors in that city. The growing tension in Xinjiang provided Mahsum a favorable environment to campaign vigorously for his cause. In May 1997, Mahsum and a small group of followers headed to Afghanistan, where they began to interact with the broader Islamist and jihadist movement. Mahsum then brought together religious extremists and criminals from Xingjian to prepare for jihad.64 In September 1997, Mahsum and his deputy Abduqadir Uapqan established the ETIM in Pakistan. The group, however, could manage to recruit just about ten members by March 1998.65 Mahsum then formalized its ideology and mission and started to build broader regional ties in Central Asia.66 From then on, the group no longer concentrated only on organizing rebellions in Xinjiang. Mahsum accepted and promoted the pan-Turkic ideology for his group. The ETIM began to seek closer cooperation with other Turkic peoples outside China. During his time as ETIM leader, Hasan Mahsum operated from abroad, coordinating ETIM’s activities and the setting up training bases inside Xinjiang as well as its links with foreign terrorist organizations. During the late 1990s, ETIM also established secret cells in many locations in Xinjiang, such as in Urumqi, Khotan Prefecture, in Shache, Zepu, and the Yecheng counties of Kashi Prefecture and in the Kuqa County of the Aksu Prefecture. Mahsum received support and direction from Al Qaeda and Taliban and trained ETIM and other militants in military camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan.67 The Chinese government alleged that Mahsum had met with Osama bin Laden in 1999 and obtained Laden’s support, but Mahsum always denied such connections.68 During the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Mahsum led his men to support Taliban and fight alongside them against the U.S. and the coalition forces. On

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October 2, 2003, Hasan Mahsum was killed, along with eight other militants, including an Al Qaeda leader, by a Pakistani army raid on an Al Qaeda hideout in South Waziristan area in Pakistan. There were several key members in ETIM, who assisted Hasan Mahsum. Abduqadir Uapqan (original name Abduqadir Emit), of the Uighur ethnic group, was born in 1958. A native of Uapqan Township, Shufu County, Kashi Prefecture of Xinjiang, he is a key member of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement. According to Chinese reports, he is responsible for organizing and implementing a series of robberies and murders such as the December 14 incident in Moyu County of Khotan Prefecture in 1999 and the February 4, 1999 incident in Urumqi, which resulted in deaths and injuries of innocent people.69 Abudumijit Muhammatkelim, alias Zibibulla, is another leader of the ETIM. He is mainly responsible for personnel training and external liaisons. He was born in December 1967, and is a native of Kashi Prefecture. Abudula Kariaji, alias Abudulla Dawut, served as vice-chairman of ETIM after leaving China for Afghanistan in 1995. He was born in December 1969 and is also a native of Kashi Prefecture. Ismail Kadir was the third highest-ranking leader in ETIM. He was arrested in Pakistan-administered Kashmir in May 2002 and handed over to Chinese authorities. 70 Abdul Haq (Memetiming Memeti) Abdul Haq (Abuduhake), alias Memetiming Memeti, alias Qekeman, alias Aximu was an ethnic Uighur born in Chele County, Khuttan Area, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) on October 10, 1971.71 He quit school at the age of nine and followed several Islamic clerics to study Islam. He studied Islam under Muhammad Amin Jan, who was the student of Abdul Hakeem Makhdoom. Later he followed Islam Muhammad Said, a friend of Abdul Hakeem Makhdoom, and worked for him in a madrassa (Islamic school) in Xinjiang until the year 1996. In 1997, he was arrested and jailed for two months for inciting his students to assault government officials. In March 1998, Abdul Haq traveled to Pakistan with Muhammad Zakir, his former student from the city of Khotan (Hetian), Xinjiang. In April 1998, he was introduced to the leader of a training camp run by ETIM in Khost, near Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, where he joined the group and studied introductory training module for two months. He became a mujahid and was assigned to Afghanistan’s Bagram and Kabul areas for intelligence operations. He also took part in ETIM operations in Khost and later he was appointed as the leader of Kabul branch of ETIM. A few months later, Hasan Mahsum sent him to the “Islamic Institute”

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in Khost to study religious courses under Abu Adbullah al-Muhajir and attend military training courses. In the meantime, he worked as a translator for the new students there. In November 1999, Abdul Haq was appointed to be a member of the “Majlis Shura” (consultation body) of the ETIM. In December 1999, he traveled with several other ETIM members to Mazar-I Sharif in North Afghanistan, where they worked as religious and military instructors in a militant training camp. During this time, he met with Taliban leaders Mullah Abdul Sattar and Mullah Dadallah in Saripul province, Afghanistan. Between 2001 and 2003, Abdul Haq took missions from ETIM and engaged in recruiting new members, leading ETIM branches, and cooperating with Taliban. After Hasan Mahsum was killed in 2003, Abdul Haq became the new leader of the ETIM. According to the Chinese account, Abdul Haq organized physical and military training for a number of terrorists, and led the ETIM members to conduct terrorist activities against China. U.S. reports show that the Uighur detainees held at Guantanamo Bay used to be trained in the ETIM camp in Tora Bora just before the U.S. air-raid in November 2001.72 At least one of the Uighur detainees acknowledged that they had trained under Abdul Haq in an ETIM training camp in Afghanistan.73 In 2005, Abdul Haq became a member of Al Qaeda’s “Shura Council.” 74 In January 2005, his speech was posted to extremist Web sites, calling on Uighurs in China to support and help the ETIM, and urging all Uighur Muslims to take part in jihad.75 China claims that Abdul Haq has sent key members of the ETIM to the Middle East to spread separatism and extremism among the immigrant Uighurs there, and persuading them to join the organization. In 2006 and 2007, Abdul Haq recruited new members and sent them to undergo trainings in physical endurance, firearms, military tactics and making explosives and poisons in preparation for attacks during 2008 Beijing Olympics.76 Since late 2007, Abdul Haq assigned ETIM members to raise funds and purchase explosives in the Middle East, with an attempt to attack Chinese targets outside China.77 In January 2008, he issued an order to conduct terrorist attacks specifically targeting the Beijing Olympic Games.78 Abdul Haq’s video statement was posted to an Islamic extremist Web site and the YouTube in June 2008. He warned all Olympic participants and especially the Muslims that his group was “fully prepared to strike the Olympic Games and fail them,” and his fighters would make 2008 “a year of agony, grief, and sorrow for all the Chinese.” 79 He also called upon “the Muslim people of Turkistan” to prevent the Beijing Olympics from taking place by any means, especially through violent attacks.80

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On October 21, 2008, China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) identified Abdul Haq (Memetiming Memeti) as the current leader of the ETIM (TIP) in its list of the second batch of eight “East Turkistan” terrorists. Beijing’s charges against him include “participating in and leading the terrorist organization,” “recruiting terrorists” and “inciting,” “mastering, plotting and implementing terrorist activities.”81 On November 16, 2008, a self-proclaimed Al Qaeda spokesman stated that a Chinese citizen named “Abdul Haq Turkistani” was appointed by Osama bin Laden as the leader for two organizations—“al-Qaeda in China” and “Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan” (Turkistan Islamic Party, or TIP).82 He added that Abdul Haq Turkistani was the leader of Al Qaeda for China in general and for Xinjiang province in particular, and that he had already been based in Xinjiang region.83 This appointment was confirmed by Abu Sulieman, who introduced himself a member of the “public relations office” of Al Qaeda in the NWFP.84 Although the actual existence of the previously unknown group “al-Qaeda in China” remains uncertain, these statements reaffirms the close relation between ETIM (TIP) with Al Qaeda. On April 15, 2009, the UN Security Council’s 1267 Committee added Abdul Haq on its list of “designated terrorists associated with Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda and the Taliban.”85 This move was followed by a similar designation by the United States. On April 20, 2009, the U.S. Treasury Department published a statement on its official Web site, identifying Abdul Haq as a “brutal terrorist” and adopting financial sanctions against him.86 Abdul Haq was killed in a U.S. drone strike on February 15, 2010 in Pakistan’s North Waziristan Agency. The TIP responded to the U.S. designation in a statement posted by Al-Fajr Media Center on jihadist forums on May 1, 2009. It said that the Chinese government has forced the United States to take this step in exchange of Beijing’s support for Washington’s policies in respect of Afghanistan and Pakistan.87 Commander Seifallah Commander Seifallah (Seyfullah) is another leader of the ETIM who repeatedly appeared in videos issued by ETIM and advocated jihad against China. According to China’s list of “East Turkistan” terrorists issued in 2008, Seifallah, also known as Emeti Yakuf and Aibu Abudureheman, was born in Xinjiang on March 14, 1965.88 In November 1996, Seifallah escaped from China to Pakistan, where he received terrorist training and became a key member of the ETIM in September 1998.89 Since 2001, he has acted as ETIM military commander and engaged in recruiting new members, organizing training as well as planning and carrying out

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terrorist attacks. Directed by Abdul Haq, Seifallah recruited Islamic extremists in the Middle East and organized training camps in Pakistan. Under his instruction, dozens of extremists have received training in military and terrorist skills such as making explosives and poison. In August 2007, he deployed over ten ETIM members with manuals and formulas on making explosives and poisons to China and other countries, attempting attacks against Chinese targets.90 Since 2007, Seifallah has frequently engaged in ETIM’s propaganda on the Internet. In July 2008, he made a statement in a video which was uploaded to the ETIM Web site and the YouTube. He called for “holy war” against the Beijing Olympics, and threatened to attack Chinese government officials, service personnel, police, as well as political leaders from Western countries, athletes, and spectators, who were in Beijing for the games.91 He even threatened to use biological and chemical weapons during the Olympic Games.92 On February 9, 2009, the ETIM issued a six-part video on the YouTube Web site, which included an interview with Seifallah. Demonstrating his training programs, he called on “Muslim brothers” who are “oppressed under Chinese armed occupation” to go on the path of the jihad as “ordered by Allah.”93 In the aftermath of the Han-Uighur violence in Urumqi in July 2009, the ETIM issued an audio message, in which Seifallah threatened revenge against China for deaths of Uighur Muslims. The video with an Arabic transcript was released by the Al-Fajr Media Center on jihadist forums on July 16, 2009.94 Seifallah described China’s crackdown on the Uighurs as “genocide” and threatened the Han Chinese with reprisals.95 Abdullah Mansour, another key figure in ETIM, appears to be the man responsible for group’s propaganda work. He is the “editor-in-chief ” of the e-magazine “Islamic Turkistan” published by the group since January 2009. Along with Abdul Haq and Commander Seifallah, he appeared in the video posted on the Internet on February 9, 2009. In a speech in the video, he advocated armed jihad against the “Chinese tyranny” and “occupation.”96 He also highlighted that “there is no way other than jihad for Muslims to stop (Chinese) tyranny.”97 ETIM Ideology and Structure ETIM’s secession aims are driven by the differences in ethnicity from the Chinese. The Uighurs have their own language, culture, and practices, as well as religion (Islam), and feel that they are distinct and separate from the rest of China. In addition, large-scale migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang has marginalized the Uighurs. However, the percentage of Uighurs

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that support separatism is very small. Those that advocate separation from China believe that their forefathers sought to unite the Turkic-speaking people of Central Asia into a single state, free from Russian control, and governed by Islamist precepts, during the time of the Bolsheviks.98 Despite academic and popular writing and media reporting to the contrary, the resentment caused by Han Chinese culture and language is not widespread. Much of the alleged difficulties faced by the Uighur Muslims such as pursuing Islamic learning in Xinjiang and tight controls imposed by the ruling Communist party over the curriculum of Islamic colleges in Xinjiang appear to be media hype.99 It is also reported that the repressive controls may even take the form of Party authorities prescribing to the Muslims what versions of the Koran to use and making it mandatory for Imams to attend political education camps, run by state authorities.100 However, such repression is not evident in Xinjiang. Considering the developments across the border in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the pressure for Uighurs to band together and form a “Muslim brotherhood” will remain a constant challenge. The ETIM’s strategy is the use of violence to achieve its political aim of a separate and independent state. ETIM aims to make Xinjiang resistant to controls by Beijing by constantly sending trained operatives to sneak into Chinese territory to mastermind sabotage and other terrorist activities.101 ETIM’s former ideologue and leader Hasan Mahsum conceded that the group uses violence to achieve its political aims, but contended that the movement has no choice because peaceful opposition is outlawed.102 Uighur nationalist ideology was transformed after Uighur separatist leaders established ties with Al Qaeda in the late 1990s. Since then, Uighur separatist ideology is steadfastly transforming into a global jihadist ideology. Although most ETIM members are still driven by separatism, its leaders are campaigning on jihadist platform. This has transformed ETIM ideologically from a separatist to a jihadist group. The ETIM members trained in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) since 2005 were heavily indoctrinated in the rhetoric of global jihadism. It is very likely that at least a few of those members would be willing to conduct suicide attacks. With ETIM coming under the greater inf luence of Al Qaeda, it is likely that in the future ETIM could be used by Al Qaeda to attack U.S. interests in China and abroad. As an Islamist movement, ETIM has a consultative council (Majlis Shura), led by an Emir. The committees responsible for administration, fatwa, information, and military affairs report to the Shura. The structure is very similar to Al Qaeda and other jihadi groups. While ETIM

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operates as a well-structured organization in the FATA of Pakistan, its presence in Xinjiang is low-profile and cellular. Most ETIM leaders located in Afghanistan-Pakistan border can speak Arabic. Hence, they have been able to communicate with Arab members of Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other Middle Eastern groups such as the Libyan Islamic Fighters Group. Links with Other Groups Following the relocation to Kabul in late 1998, ETIM largely gave up on the wider overseas Uighur community (although it reportedly established an alliance with ETLO in March 1998) and began to take advantage of the regional jihadist movements, particularly in Afghanistan, for support and training. ETIM also began reaching back to Xinjiang, establishing contacts with local criminal and militant groups. China considers the ETIM a “major component” of the terrorist network headed by Osama bin Laden. The group allegedly received equipment and financial resources from Al Qaeda and the Taliban and had their personnel trained in militant camps in Afghanistan.103 It was reported that between 1999 and 2001, bin Laden and the Taliban provided approximately US$300,000 to ETIM and bin Laden asked ETIM to operate not only in Xinjiang but also in Central Asia alongside the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).104 Some of the ETIM members have fought alongside other jihadists in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Kashmir. According to some reports between 200 and more than a 1,000 Uighur militants received training in Afghanistan.105 However, after the fall of the Taliban, only a score of Uighurs were captured and taken prisoner. Many others moved to Pakistan along with Al Qaeda, Uzbek militants, and other militant groups. Hasan Mahsum used to organize trainings of ETIM members in Kabul and Afghanistan. ETIM militants undertook physical and military trainings in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Vardak, Kandahar, Herat, Shibarghan, and other places in Afghanistan. Some of these terrorist training camps were directly under the control of Osama bin Laden and some were the military bases of the Taliban. The “Turkistan Army” under the ETIM fought in combat for the Taliban in Afghanistan. This “Army” had a special “China Battalion” with about 320 members from Xinjiang.106 The battalion was under the direct command of Hasan Mahsum’s deputy Kabar.107 These ETIM militants practiced with conventional weapons with live ammunition and learned the guerilla warfare tactics and terrorist skills such as assassination, explosion, and poison-doping. After their training, these militants participated in combats in Afghanistan,

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Chechnya, and Uzbekistan, or returned to Xinjiang for terrorist and violent activities.108 According to Chinese reports, in the late 1990s bin Laden demanded that the ETIM “stir up turmoil in the near future” in the three Central Asian countries, namely, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and then stage an organized infiltration into China’s Xinjiang. There are scattered populations of Uighur minorities in post-Soviet Central Asia which escaped from China during the 1990s.109 Working with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), ETIM was able to mount a few attacks against Chinese targets in Central Asia notably in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The ETIM had worked with the IMU in the past; it seems likely that there is still cooperation between Uighur and Uzbek jihadists based in post-Soviet Central Asia.110 Some ETIM members continue to live and work with a group of Uzbek militants belonging to both the IMU and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) currently active in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In addition, ETIM enjoyed close relations with a number of jihadi groups in mainland Pakistan. As the Taliban was reluctant to support ETIM, the group obtained funds from Al Qaeda and other Pakistani groups, and arranged for training of its members in the facilities maintained by these groups. According to some analysts, as an associate group of Al Qaeda, ETIM is a part of the “brotherhood of global jihad.”111 The Uighurs had fought side by side with the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviets, alongside Filipino Moros, Uzbeks, and Arabs.112 The Uighurs also trained in Islam in madrasahs in Pakistan, alongside the Uzbeks and Tajiks.113 Although the Pakistani government itself was not involved, Pakistan served as a liaison and logistics hub for the Uighur groups, and also acted as a bridge between Xinjiang and Uighur groups training and operating in Afghanistan under the Al Qaeda umbrella.114 During his trial in Urumqi, the China-born Uighur-Canadian Huseyin Celil publicly denounced the existence of terrorist camps for East Turkistan separatists in Pakistan.115 Celil was convicted of the crimes of “separating China” and “organizing, leading and participating in terrorist groups, organizations.”116 ETIM and other Uighur terrorist groups have established a significant presence in Pakistan. Many Pakistanis do not regard the Uighur militants as terrorists. Even Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), an apolitical religious group, is believed to have provided supplies to Uighur members. In addition to its presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan, ETIM also operates in Central Asia, most notably in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Chinese authorities claim that Kyrgyzstan has submitted

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evidence to the United States on ETIM militants planning attacks on the U.S. embassy, market places, and other public places in the country.117 The ETIM budget is modest. Poorly resourced in Xinjiang, ETIM raises the bulk of its funds through collection from overseas supporters and sympathizers. The Chinese government has alleged that ETIM engages in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, kidnapping, robbery, and other forms of organized crime to raise funds.118 The Uighur community living in about 15 countries, particularly in Australia, Europe, the United States, and Canada, are the main contributors.119 They have set up associations in these countries to promote Uighur interests and culture. Most of these organizations are not radical and very few advocate violence.120 Operating through front, cover, and sympathetic organizations, ETIM and other militant groups reach out to these Uighurs for financial and other material support. Although the ETIM membership is really small, internationally, ETIM support base among the Uighur communities spread across the world, has a much larger number—perhaps several tens of thousands. ETIM before September 2001 Chinese official statistics show that from 1990 to 2001 the “East Turkistan terrorist groups” conducted series of terrorist incidents inside and outside China, resulting in the deaths of 162 people, including both Han and Uighur officials and religious personnel, and injuries to more than 440 people.121 A number of these terrorist attacks are allegedly the work of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), such as the attack on policemen in Xinjiang’s Khotan Prefecture on June 18, 1999.122 From early 1998 to late 1999, the ETIM set up many secret training camps in Khotan. With about 1,000 members, the ETIM made 5,000-odd bombs to prepare to carry out attacks in Xinjiang.123 By 1998, ETIM started to recruit and train its cadres in Afghanistan while building connections with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In 2000, Mahsum led reform in the ETIM and changed the group’s name into “Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan” (Turkistan Islamic Party).124 Although the name was changed, China continued to refer to the group as East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and has adopted it in official documents since 2002. From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban, then ruling regime in Afghanistan, attempted to create the “ideal” Muslim community in the world. As such, the Taliban invited the Islamic movements worldwide to bring their constituents to Afghanistan to build the perfect Muslim community. At the invitation of the Taliban, ETIM arranged for the travel of Uighurs from

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Xinjiang to Afghanistan. In September 1998, ETIM moved its headquarters to Kabul, Afghanistan, taking shelter in the Taliban-controlled territory.125 In the White Mountains of Afghanistan near Jalalabad and the Pakistan border, ETIM built a village exclusively for the Uighurs who f led from Xinjiang.126 In September 1999, the ETIM leadership reportedly met with Osama bin Laden and other leaders of Al Qaeda, Taliban, and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Afghanistan.127 Between 2000 and 2001, the ETIM militants gained experience at terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and during actual combat operations in support of the Taliban. Reports suggest that thousands of ETIM members trained in camps in Afghanistan prior to 2001. They were mainly trained in Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif in basic military techniques, including weapons-handling and guerrilla warfare tactics.128 Although some reports claim that the Chinese authorities played up the threat of the ETIM in order to provide a facade for its overall policy of quashing dissent in Xinjiang, the evidence that ETIM trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan is overwhelming.129 In February 2001, Osama bin Laden and Taliban leaders reportedly met to discuss further assistance to the various Central Asian and East Turkistan and Islamist militant movements, including ETIM.130 But Al Qaeda’s attention soon shifted to the upcoming attacks on the United States, and the Taliban prepared to strengthen its operations against the forces of the Northern Alliance in anticipation of the Al Qaeda strike and repercussions from Washington. Whilst Hasan Mahsum denied any linkages with Al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden, he admitted that some individual followers might have trained, or fought with Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan.131 In addition, a number of Uighur individuals joined the IMU and other Islamist movements in Central Asia during this time.132 After the U.S.-led coalition intervention in October 2001, about three dozen Uighur militants were detained in Afghanistan and Pakistan.133 About twenty-two Uighur detainees were held by the United States in the Guantanamo Bay detainment camp.134 Appearing before the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) conducted by the U.S. military to review their cases, eighteen of the detainees denied having been members of ETIM or having received any military training. However, few admitted having received minimal military training— how to assemble the rif le and to fire a couple of rounds. They described being trained individually by Hasan Mahsum and Abdul Haq. Though they do not view the United States as an enemy, all of the detainees described China as oppressive occupiers. Some of the detainees said

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that they sought out the training in order to go back to China and defend their fellow Uighurs against their Chinese occupiers.135 However, despite the denials, the presence of the Uighurs in Afghanistan was not an accident. The U.S. and the Afghan forces have recovered videos and photos of ETIM members armed with AK-47 assault rif les, automatic rif les, machine guns, dynamite, and incendiary devices during their raids in the safe houses and training camps in Afghanistan.136 Safe houses in Afghanistan contained evidence that the inmates were engaged in the production of homemade bombs.137 According to the Chinese authorities, underground hideouts have been found in Xinjiang to contain anti-tank grenades, submachine guns, electric detonators, explosive devices, and equipment for making arms.138 In May 2006, the United States released five of the detainees from the detention center and f lown them to Albania for resettlement. This was based on the determination that the detainees represented no danger. But the United States did not want to return them to China for fear that they would face persecution.139 In February 2009, a federal appeals court ruled that the remaining detainees must stay at the prison camp.140 On June 11, 2009, four of the Uighur detainees were released to Bermuda, a selfgoverning British overseas territory. For the remaining Uighur detainees, the chances of release appear grim at present even though they were cleared for release from Guantanamo Bay. ETIM Post–September 2001 With the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in October 2001, ETIM was routed along with Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other militant groups. The remnants of ETIM, including Mahsum, relocated to Central Asia and Pakistan, though some reports estimated that Yapuquan went to Saudi Arabia.141Most of the ETIM members moved to the Shakai Valley in South Waziristan Agency along with Al Qaeda and IMU leadership in early 2002. In October 2003, Hasan Mahsum was killed in the Pakistani Military operations along with Ahmed Saeed Khadar alias Abdur Rahman al-Canadi, an Al Qaeda leader in Shakai valley in South Waziristan of Pakistan. This was seen as the biggest blow to the organization. During that time, Al Qaeda moved north toward Shawal Valley without engaging the Pakistani military. It further moved toward Daur Tribe areas. However, IMU and ETIM fought against the Pak military along with local Taliban militants from Ahmedzai Wazir tribe under the leadership of Nek Muhammad. A part of IMU and ETIM also moved out to the Mehsud tribe area in South

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Waziristan. Between late 2003 and 2006, there was an obvious decline of ETIM and its activities. On November 8, 2006, a video titled “Jihad in Eastern Turkistan” was posted on the Internet, which readdressed the ETIM operations in Central Asia, where it had integrated with local extremist forces. It is very difficult to differentiate the Uighurs from Central Asian militants because both share somewhat similar facial features. These militants have been living and jointly coordinating their operations and harmonizing their activities collectively in Pakistan. Hence the local tribesmen in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) usually refer to all of them as “Uzbeks” or “Central Asian militants.” By October 22, 2007, a growing resentment against the “Central Asian” militants by the local Daur tribe resulted in the latter demanding the former to leave their territory. A 10,000 strong tribal lashkar (militia) was also raised under the leadership of Nek Muhammad alias Nikami to drive out the militants. However, the tribal lashkar failed to achieve its objectives following a series of targeted killing of Daur tribal elders as well as pressure from the local Taliban militants that barred them from removing foreign militants from the area. Following the announcement of a ceasefire agreement by Gul Bahadur on December 16, 2007, and the ongoing negotiations between the government and Gul Bahadur, there were indications that both the Taliban militants and the Pakistani government would be able to revive the September 2006 North Waziristan Peace Agreement, although with some modifications. This made it difficult for the Uzbek militants and ETIM militants to continue to stay in these areas.142 The bulk of IMU, IJU, and ETIM militants continue to take refuge in the Haiderkhel, Ipi, Hasukhel, Musaki, Mullagan, Hurmaz, Zeeraki, Khushali, and other villages of Mirali region, Ghulam Khan, and Miranshah areas of the NWA of FATA.143 At the same time, militants were spotted in the Swat District of Malakand Division of the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) within the ranks of Maulana Fazlullah-led Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-eMuhammadi (TNSM). After coming under heavy pressure from the Pakistani security forces in the Swat district, TNSM militants and Central Asian militants have moved to the adjoining Mardan district of NWFP. Central Asian militants have also been seen in the Mohmand Agency of FATA, which had hitherto remained peaceful. There were reports of the presence of Central Asian militants in the Darra area before and during the operation.144 According to Chinese sources, several ETIM members kept operating inside China in 2007 and 2008. On January 5, 2007, Chinese police destroyed an ETIM training camp in the mountains of Pamirs

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plateau in south Xinjiang. Eighteen terrorists and one policeman were killed in the gun battle.145 The police captured seventeen terrorists and seized twenty-two hand grenades as well as guns and other homemade explosives from the site.146 On January 27, 2008, Chinese security forces attacked a suspected ETIM camp in the Tianshan district of Urumqi, killing two and detaining fifteen.147 The police also uncovered weapons, such as knives and axes, and plans for attacks during the Olympics.148 Chinese reports indicated that these terrorists planed to carry out attacks to mark the anniversary of the February 1997 uprising in Yining.149 During series of counterterrorism raids by Chinese security forces between March 26 and April 6, 2008, forty-five alleged militants were arrested; explosives and jihadist literature were seized.150 According to Chinese security officials, the raids also uncovered plots to attack Beijing and Shanghai during the Olympics.151 Despite the crackdown the lethality of the group stems from the following: First, although ETIM was established to create an independent Islamic state in Xinjiang, its avowed goal has changed under the inf luence of Al Qaeda. Today, the group follows the philosophy of Al Qaeda and respects Osama bin Laden.152 Such groups that believe in the global jihad agenda do not confine their targets to the territories that they seek to control.153 Thus it could present a potent threat to the Chinese as well as to Western targets worldwide. Second, ETIM has been working closely with the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), a group under the direct inf luence of Al Qaeda. IJU has attacked targets both in Uzbekistan and in Europe. IJU and ETIM have been trained to conduct mass fatality attacks using home-made explosives.154 Their favored tactic is suicide operations. Third, the IJU and ETIM operating in FATA are protected by Pakistani Taliban leaders. Many of the Pakistani Taliban leaders have come together to form a platform for cooperation—the Tareek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).155 There were also reports that foreign militants, especially Uzbeks and other Central Asian militants, started shifting to the Mahsud tribal territory of the South Waziristan Agency.156 While IJU protects ETIM, the larger umbrella of protection for both IJU and ETIM is provided by TTP.157 The movement of Uzbek and Central Asian militants could be seen as buttressing the ranks of Taliban militants, who have always exhibited interest in fighting the Pakistani security forces. It seems that the Central Asian militants (Uzbeks, Uighurs, Tajiks, and Chechens) could be trying to find new sanctuaries following their falling reputation with the North Waziristani tribes. The fact that they were attempting to move further

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north (Malakand, Bajaur, Mohmand, and Darra Adamkhel) points to the fact that they want to remain closer to the Central Asian and Xinjiang border. On April 27, 2009, Pakistan announced the arrest of nine Uighur militants and their transfer to China. The nine were captured in the FATA, bringing to light the ETIM presence in this region.158 The Interior Ministry of Pakistan determined that these militants were involved in attacks on security forces and other terrorist activities.159 On May 7, 2009, the ETIM released a video statement through the YouTube, denying their ties with the nine Uighurs who had been arrested in Pakistan and extradited to China. The group also warned that “Countries that arrest our members and extradite them to China will get an actual response from us.”160 Propaganda of ETIM In 2008, Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) issued several videos and publications on the Internet. They claimed responsibility for several attacks in May and July 2008 just before the Beijing Olympics.161 However, Chinese authorities denied all these claims.162 Since its appearance, the relationship between ETIM and TIP has become an issue that puzzles counter-terrorism analysts. Some estimate that the TIP is a new group and some others claim that the TIP is established by former ETIM members, who still have links with the movement but are eager to have their own organization.163 In fact, TIP is just another name for the ETIM. The ETIM (TIP) has started its propaganda on the Internet since 2005. By March 2009, the group has uploaded over fifteen videos on the popular video-sharing Web site, YouTube. In addition, it has published three issues of the e-magazine titled “Turkistan al-Islamia” (Islamic Turkistan) on jihadist Web sites. There has been a clear trend that the group will further utilize the Internet as an essential tool for its jihadist propaganda and fund-raising. Videos ETIM association with Al Qaeda in FATA has improved its capabilities including the quality of its propaganda and access to Al Qaeda’s electronic platforms. Collaboration with Al Qaeda has enabled ETIM to produce videos very similar to Al Qaeda videos. This was first evidenced from a 32 minute 27 second high quality color video entitled “Jihad in Eastern Turkistan,” posted in a Middle Eastern Web site on November 8, 2006.

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The Web site is an Arabic Web site—Al Fajr Information center— based in the United Kingdom and posts publications and news about the developments of jihadi groups.164 Although it did not have asSahab imprint, the Al Qaeda video production company, it was clear that the video was a joint Al Qaeda-ETIM production. For the first time, it was posted on the forum of Al Hesbah, a known Al Qaeda Web site. According to an intelligence estimate, the ETIM video was posted online by an active member of the forum who has a correspondent status, Muffakirat Al Hesbah. The site had 27 links to download the video in high-definition, 56 in medium quality and more than 100 in low and poor quality. The restrictive forum had 5,743 members and 770,092 people have participated in it since 2003. The day after it was posted online, over 1,000 members of the forum had viewed it and expressed their interest in the topic. In all the forums it was posted, it was viewed more than 2,000 times. The video shows mujahideen training and operating in Xinjiang, referred to in the video as “Eastern Turkestan.”165 The video first legitimizes the use of jihad in the Eastern Turkistan region. It then informs individuals eager to learn more about the region to refer to a “World Islamic Resistance Book.”166 The second half of the video displayed an array of weapons and explosives with ETIM. The aim was specifically to highlight the capability of the ETIM through the myriad of weapons at their disposal. The message in the video reinforced the notion that jihad was the duty of every Muslim and it was a rallying call for the Uighur Muslims in Eastern Turkistan to revolt and to voice their disapproval of the government.167 The video illustrates a map of “Eastern Turkistan” before 1949 to highlight China’s invasion to their land and changed the name “Eastern Turkistan” into “Xinjiang.”168 The video contained an elaborate narrative of the history of Islam in China and how the Muslims, especially in Xinjiang came to be subjugated under the Chinese rule during different periods of the history. Referring to Xinjiang as “a new colony,” the spokesperson commented on the Uighur’s struggles for independence since nineteenth century. Accusing China for seeing Islam as the “religion of drugs,” “invention of rich Arabs,” and “against knowledge,” he listed the “suppressive actions” of the Chinese government, such as “prohibiting Islamic teaching,” “considering Islam illegitimate,” “punishing whoever is applying religion in their lives,” “closing down mosques, investigating Muslim houses,” “forcing women to cut their hair and not to wear the veil,” “distributing pamphlets and posters,” and even “lecturing people to prove that God does not exist.”169 The

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speaker added that: Since the Chinese government compels Muslim youth to study communist ideology and is determined to corrupt Muslim youth’s beliefs and morals, Muslims must wage jihad and free themselves from the Chinese rule. Under these circumstances, jihad is not just a collective duty incumbent upon the Muslim community as a whole (fard kifaya), it is also a personal duty (fard ‘ayn) incumbent upon every single Muslim. Therefore, all Muslims must participate in jihad either directly (i.e., by fighting) or indirectly (i.e., by assisting the mujahideen).170

The content of this video is similar to those issued by various jihadist groups especially the Al Qaeda. It includes a mixture of historic facts, statements, and illustrations of injustice to the Muslims, appeal for jihad and selective citations from Qur’an to give these a religious f lavor, and manifestations of their operational capability. A clip of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 indicates that the ETIM had been inspired by Al Qaeda and its affiliates and increasingly inf luenced by the global jihad phenomenon.171 In 2007 and 2008, several videos about Hasan Mahsum were uploaded onto the YouTube Web site. Following the same ideology, the statements accompanying the videos called Uighur Muslims to wage jihad against China. On August 10, 2007, a video titled “Shaheed Hasan Mahsum Rahimallah” (The God bless Holy Martyrs Hasan Mahsum) was released onto the YouTube Web site. This video begins with old recordings of Hasan Mahsum holding the Koran and praying to a group of masked mujahideen. He offered prayers to Allah for their jihad against “heathens” who occupied the homeland of “East Turkistan Muslims,” and for the people who were dedicated to that cause.172 The video featured scenes demonstrating militants undertaking military and physical trainings, including firing anti-tank rockets. On March 16, 2008, another video titled “Hasan Mahsum” was uploaded onto the YouTube. It repeated the old recordings of Hasan Mahsum praising jihad as the 2007 video showed. These videos showcase the capability of the “East Turkistan” militants with an impressive show of weaponry, including pistols, automatic rif les, machineguns, and even armored vehicles.173 However, most of the videos seem to be recorded before the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. These videos are probably posted by supporters or sympathizers of the ETIM, who intended to terrorize the Chinese by threatening to sabotage the Beijing Olympics in August 2008.

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A video uploaded on March 18, 2008 features a Uighur militant who committed a suicide bombing in Afghanistan’s capital city, Kabul. A masked mujahid, who identifies himself as Saif al-Rahman Al-Turkistani, appears in the video and illustrates the biography of the “martyr.”174 According to him, the suicide bomber, named Al-Zubayr Al-Turkistani, was born in a wealthy family in Xinjiang and later migrated to Afghanistan to perform jihad. Al-Zubayr joined training camps there where he was prepared and helped train other mujahideen. After he saw the “injustice done by non-believers who abused Muslims,” he asked the “Amir” of his group to perform jihad against “Infidelity.”175 Al-Zubayr decided to become a “martyr” (suicide bomber) to attack the Intelligence Bureau in Kabul, with a vehicle filled with explosives.176 The footage then shows the scene of the site after bombing. This incident was mentioned in an e-book posted on a jihadist Web site and it was described as “the third and largest suicide operation in Kabul.”177 Though ETIM has not carried out any suicide operations in China yet, the message in the video would indicate a definite shift in that direction in future bombings.178 Before and during the Beijing Olympics in August 2008, the ETIM (TIP) issued a series of threats to attack the Games in a number of videos posted on the Internet. On June 27, 2008, the ETIM (TIP) posted a five-page statement of Commander Seifallah onto a jihadi Web site. Citing grievances against Chinese authorities, the group threatened to use biological weapons and suicide bombers to attack Beijing Olympics.179 On August 7, 2008, just one day before the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games, ETIM issued the video entitled “New Threat Against Olympics,” which had a production date of August 1, 2008. The six-minute video started with images of a burning symbol of Beijing Olympics and a bombing of the National Stadium.180 Abdullah Mansour, an ETIM key member, made a statement in the Uighur language to the “global Muslim ummah,” urging Muslims not to “stay on the same bus, on the same train, on the same plane, in the same buildings or any place the Chinese are.”181 Seifallah threatened to attack key locations of the Beijing Olympics and called Muslims for financial, physical, and spiritual support to the jihad led by his group.182 On August 11, 2008, the ETIM issued another video titled “Islamic Party of Turkistan ‘Our Blessed Jihad in Yunnan.’” The video was dated July 23, 2008. In a statement Commander Seifallah claimed credit for several bombings from May to July 2008 in China and warned of new attacks in China during the Olympics. He stated that the TIP (ETIM) has

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warned China and countries participating in the Beijing Olympics but the Chinese objected and ignored this warning. Therefore, some of his mujahideen conducted several jihadist operations inside China, including the Shanghai bus bombings, suicide bombing in Wenzhou, explosion in Guangzhou and bus bombings in Kunming.183 He added that the group would use “new tactics” to attack China and that his mujahideen would “target all the Olympic participants,” as well as “residential places, grounds, and complexes.”184 In response, Chinese police dismissed this claim and insisted that the explosions Seifallah mentioned had no connection with the terrorist group.185 Another video statement titled “Why Are We Fighting China?” is a typical call for jihad. Uploaded in July 2008, the video ref lects the significant inf luence of the global jihad movement on this radical group. The spokesman, who identified himself as Shaykh Bshir, explained that the “Communist China” is an enemy since it has invaded Muslim countries and occupies eastern Turkistan.186 The video was posted in the forum page of the Amrkhaled.net, which is run by Amr Khaled, an Islamic activist from Egypt. Amr Khaled and his Web site have gained great popularity among young Muslims in the Middle East for his endeavors to spread the moderate and reformist voice of Islam. On February 9, 2009, the ETIM issued a six-part video on the YouTube Web site. The second part of this video could not be found on the site. The five other parts totaling 42 minutes, 34 seconds, contain footages of the TIP head, Abdul Haq (Memetiming Memeti), Commander Seifallah, and another leader Abdullah Mansour, which were accompanied by scenes of their mujahideen undergoing military training in combat, firearms, and firing rockets. The three leaders stress that violent jihad is the only way through which “Muslims of Turkistan” will free themselves from the “oppression” of the Chinese government.187 Abdul Haq states: If you do not wage jihad, you will never be able to get rid of the oppression of the infidels which makes you abandon the religion and which makes slaves of you. Thus, you will not be able to be rescued from the oppression of this world and the torments of the hereafter, or find eternal happiness until you return to the religion of Allah. . .188

The third part of the video included an interview with Commander Seifallah, who introduces the mujahid preparing for combat. In the fifth part, footage of military preparation continues, including mujahideen firing from motorcycles and trucks, receiving trainings for launching BM-1

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(Katyusha) rocket and firing 82mm mortar.189 The video clips also show a trainee preparing a briefcase bomb. When he takes the bomb-laden briefcase and walks away, images of three bombings in China appear. These include two bus bombings in Shanghai on May 5, 2008; a suicide bombing in Wenzhou on July 17, 2008; and a bus bombing in Kunming on July 21.190 This video includes the most systemic description of ETIM ideology and operations so far. It is a typical propaganda call to jihad based on theological justifications of violence. Magazines In January 2009, the Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM) distributed two issues of its electronic magazine, “Turkistan al-Islamia” (Islamic Turkistan), through the Medad al-Sayouf (Ink of Swords) Network.191 The first issue, 46-pages in length and dated July 2008, was released on the network’s jihadist forum on January 26, 2009. It is published entirely in Arabic. The magazine contains sixteen articles including the two communiqués and the introduction. In an introduction, ETIM states that it pursues jihad as a means toward its goal, the establishment of an Islamic State in Xinjiang. The ETIM defines itself as “a group of workers for Islam and the mujahideen in the Cause of Allah in order to liberate Turkistan.”192 The Goal of the ETIM is to “establish an Islamic Caliphate in the light of the Book and the Sunnah” and the path to achieve this goal is to go jihad “in the Cause of Allah, promotion of virtue, prevention of vice, and the call to Allah.”193 In the introduction, ETIM recognizes the importance of media to spread its messages and to foster a community with Muslims all over the world. Thus, We . . . publish our magazine to communicate and get closer to brothers of ours whom we do not know and who do not know us. But we are connected to one another by the brotherhood of faith and heartfelt fondness, those we can only meet through this honest word and honest discussion which they will feel through contact with us, and so that we open with them the doors of discussion and dialog that brings fruit to our Islamic cause.194

The second issue of the “Turkistan al-Islamia” was posted on the al-Faloja jihadist forum on February 6, 2009. Dated November 2008, it contains eighteen articles in fifty-nine pages.195 This issue includes the first part of an interview with the leader of ETIM, Abdul Haq, who brief ly narrates his early life and more recent history of the movement. Among the articles, there is one communiqué announcing that mujahideen in the FATA

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of Pakistan shot down two unmanned aerial vehicles near Miranshah in North Waziristan on October 21, 2008, using anti-aircraft weapons.196 In addition, the issue also includes other pieces of articles disparaging China and the United States. The ETIM published the third issue of “Turkistan al-Islamia” through Al-Fajr Media Center and posted it on jihadist forums on March 25, 2009.197 The 66-pages issue contains eighteen articles, including its narratives about Islamic and “East Turkistan” history, an interview with ETIM leader Abdul Haq, and a biography of a Uighur “martyr,” among others. In the interview Abdul Haq outlines the history of the ETIM (TIP) up until early 2001. He described an ETIM involvement in a military attack led by Taliban in August 1999, providing details on the cooperation between the ETIM and Taliban in Afghanistan. As with the former issues, the majority of the articles focus on condemning the Chinese government for its “crimes” in Xinjiang and encouraging Uighur Muslims to fight against China. In one editorial, ETIM describes the Chinese government and President Hu Jintao as “devils” because the state-owned China Central Television (CCTV) broadcasted a TV program with footages of a portrait of Prophet Mohammad.198 For most Sunni Muslims, visual depictions of the prophets are generally prohibited. The article accused China of “insulting the Prophet Muhammad” and “destroying Islam.”199 There is also an article entitled “In the Company of Female Migrants: True Story in Migration” written by a female author, Um Imran al-Turkistaniya. The author tells that she took part in the Uighur protests in Yining (Ghulja) in February 1997 and collided with the police who came to repress them. She was arrested and put into prison, where she said she was tortured. After her release, she “turned to Islam” and decided to fight against China.200 She went to Pakistan and joined ETIM (TIP) there. The article, once again, supports the existence of female members in the group. The first reported involvement of women in the ETIM operations was a failed attempt of hijacking and crashing a Chinese f light on March 7, 2008. A nineteen-year-old Uighur girl was caught when she was pouring f lammable liquid into the bathroom of the plane. 201 The ETIM (TIP) has increasingly engaged the jihadi media to reach as many people as possible. The group will exploit the new technical advances in the way the Internet operates. The high-quality on-line videos may allow for more effective jihadi propaganda and recruitment via the Internet. The Arabic language used in the videos and magazines suggests that its target audience is not only the Uighurs, but Arab Muslims

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as well. The Uighur-Arabic bilingual propaganda suggests that the group aims to create a broader impact and gain new supporters and sympathizers among not only peoples of “East Turkistan,” but also Muslims all over the World. Attacks during Beijing Olympics According to the Chinese officials, the ETIM planned and conducted a series of terrorist attacks in China before and during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.202 China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) reported that the ETIM sent “seven instructions” to terrorist forces inside the state at the beginning of the year 2008 and used the Internet to teach terrorists inside China how to make explosives and carry out attacks. 203 Before the Olympics opened, Chinese police had detected that trained ETIM members penetrated into Xinjiang and other regions in China for the purpose of setting up cells, raising funds and purchasing chemicals and other raw materials for making explosives and poisons, and purchasing vehicles for terrorist attacks.204 However, there is a lot of confusion about these plots and attacks especially as the Chinese government has blamed certain attacks on various East Turkistan groups which the groups have denied being responsible for. At the same time, the claims of responsibility for certain attacks by ETIM have been dismissed by the government. Although it is still not clear whether these were conducted by ETIM or not, the attacks themselves demonstrate future trends in the group’s strategy and tactics in challenging Beijing authority and hence significant in overall assessment of the threat. Hijacking Attempt On March 7, 2008, China foiled a hijacking plot by two Uighurs who are believed to be connected to ETIM. The two passengers, a male and a female, attempted to hijack f light CZ6901 from Urumqi (the capital city of Xinjiang) to Beijing. They boarded the plane with two canned drinks, the contents of which were replaced by a f lammable liquid using a syringe.205 The woman went into the bathroom during the f light and tried to ignite the liquid in the toilet, but failed.206 She aroused suspicion when she went out of the toilet to pick up the second can.207 One of the air stewardesses detected the smell of petroleum and found the inf lammable substance in the bathroom.208 The crew on board reacted quickly to the potential threat and discovered that the male sitting next to the woman was with her and had those both sequestered.209 The plane then made an emergency landing at Lanzhou (the provincial capital of Gansu

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in Northwest China), where the two terrorists were taken off the plane and arrested. Chinese police claimed that the attack was part of a terror campaign launched by the ETIM. 210 During the interrogation, the nineteenyear-old Uighur woman confessed to attempting to hijack and crash the passenger plane. The male on plane was believed to be of Central Asian origin. 211 There was another person, believed to be the mastermind behind the plan, who remains at large. 212 All of them came from Pakistan. 213 Bombing Plot against Shanghai Stadium On July 25, 2008, police of Shanghai city confirmed that they had cracked an alleged terrorist group, which was plotting an attack on a soccer match to be held in the city co-hosting the 2008 Olympic Games. According to the police, the terrorists targeted the Shanghai Stadium, where the first of two matches for China’s Olympics was scheduled to be played. According to police officials, security forces staged a series of raids and cracked the terrorist cell. However, police did not provide the number and origins of the terrorist suspects detained. No further information on the plot was provided either. Before the soccer events, Shanghai police had tightened security measures since the “international terrorist organizations” had threatened to attack the city.214 Three days before the police raids, the city police of Shanghai announced rewards ranging from 10,000 yuan (US$1,464) to 500,000 yuan for information relating to serious crime.215 Shanghai Stadium was closed for security checks with both police and armed police conducting “round-the-clock patrols” since July 20, 2008.216 Police had posed safety checks at several key locations in the city, such as the stadium and commercial centers.217 Kashgar Assault On August 4, 2008—just four days before the Olympic Games began in Beijing,—two Uighur men assaulted a group of People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) in the city of Kashgar (Kashi) in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. The attack took place around 8 a.m. Two attackers drove a dump truck into a group of 70 PAPF officers during morning exercise outside their barracks, killing seventeen and injuring fifteen others.218 The attackers, taxi driver Kurbanjan Hemit, age twenty-eight, and vegetable vendor Abdurahman Azat, age thirty-three, were arrested on the spot.219 Police also found ten home-made grenades (two were detonated during the attack), along with four knives and a handgun.220 On

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April 9, 2009, the local court of Kashgar announced the death penalties for the two, who were subsequently executed on the same day.221 Chinese counter-terrorism specialists connected this assault to the ETIM, claiming that they were similar to previous attacks by the group.222 Several Western analysts question this, arguing there was little evidence to make any connections. They doubted that ETIM had the resources to carry out such an attack and claimed the Chinese government was just trying to denigrate the group. 223 The U.S. Department of State condemned the assault.224 Dilxat Raxit, spokesperson of the World Uighur Congress claimed that the repressive policies by the Chinese government radicalized Uighurs and pushed them to violent attacks.225 Kuqa Bombings On August 10, 2008, the city of Kuqa (Kuche) in Xinjiang was hit by a wave of violence that left eight people dead.226 A string of explosions occurred in several locations, including supermarkets, hotels, and government buildings.227 Among the eight were seven suspected assailants and a security guard. Ten perpetrators were killed during cross-fire with the police, two others were arrested, and three escaped. The violence occurred just two days after the Olympic opening ceremony in Beijing and less than a week after the attack on PAPF officers in Kashgar.228 Two days later, on August 12, 2008, three security personnel were stabbed to death at a checkpoint in Yamanya, near Kashgar, where the sixteen policemen were killed.229 China’s official news agency Xinhua reported that at least twelve bombings took place that morning. The targets were government and police offices and the devices were made out of bent pipe and gas canisters and tanks.230 It has also been reported that two of the attackers involved in the attacks were women.231 One was killed and the other, a fifteen-year-old girl, was wounded in the attacks.232 Officials also said that three bombers were still on the run and the attackers were a mix of local residents and outsiders.233 These attacks and attempts in 2008 are considered significant as they show that the perpetrators were well-organized. Though no group claimed responsibility for any of these incidents, Chinese authorities alleged that they were perpetrated by the ETIM with an attempt to sabotage the Olympics. Between January and August 2008, Xinjiang police had arrested eighteen members of the ETIM.234 China charged all the eighteen arrested having been trained overseas and involving in terrorist activities inside and outside China.235

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Unconfirmed Attacks On May 5, 2008, there was an explosion in a bus in the Olympic co-host city, Shanghai, during the rush hour in the morning. According to the Chinese official report, at least three passengers were killed and twelve others injured when the bus “suddenly burst into fire.”236 Without referring it to as an “explosion,” Chinese media did not provide further information about the cause of the accident on that day.237 On July 17, 2008, a blast caused by an explosive-laden tractor took place in the eastern city of Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, killing seventeen and injuring forty.238 On the same day, an explosion occurred in a plastics factory in the southern city of Guangzhou, Guangdong Province. Just four days later, two buses were bombed during the morning rush hour in Kunming, Yunnan Province. Two passengers were killed and fourteen others were injured. Yunnan police tripled the reward to 300,000 yuan (US$43,864) for information that could help to solve the two blasts. The “Turkistan Islamic Party” (TIP, ETIM) claimed credit for these explosions as well as several other incidents in the video “Islamic Party of Turkistan ‘Our Blessed Jihad in Yunnan.’” ETIM Commander Seifallah claimed that several attacks throughout China were organized and carried out by the Turkistan Islamic Party, including: • bus-bombings in Shanghai on May 5, 2008, killing three, injuring twelve; • assault on a police post in Wenzhou on July 17, 2008, using a tractor that was laden with explosives; • bombing attack at a plastic factory in Guangzhou on July 17, 2008; • bombing of three busses in Kunming on July 21, 2008.239 Seifallah stated that attacks in Yunnan were warnings to China, and that their aim was to target the most critical points related to the Olympics.240 He threatened to attack Chinese central cities severely using the tactics that have never been employed.241 However, the ETIM did not follow up their threats with actual attacks. The Beijing Olympics proceeded without major interruption. Chinese authorities denied any terrorist background of all these “attacks” claimed by the ETIM. In response to ETIM claims, the head of Wenzhou police stated that the explosion was not a terrorist attack but planned attack carried out by a gambler who had lost money in gambling.242 On July 28, 2008, Shanghai police reiterated that the May 2008 bus blast was not related to “terrorist attacks.”243 The spokesman of Shanghai police claimed that the blast was caused by inf lammables such

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as oil rather than explosives, and that the blast was “indeed deliberate but had nothing to do with terrorist attacks.”244 Three days earlier, police in the eastern city of Yangzhou had detained a twenty-three-year-old HanChinese man who had claimed credit for the explosions in Shanghai and threatened to carry out more in future.245 According to Xinhua report, Wang confessed that he committed the attack with an attempt to get “more, stronger attention and worship from netizens.”246 But his unreasonable confession was questioned by police and media. The Guangdong police also asserted in August 2008 that “there was no terrorist attack on July 17 in Guangzhou.”247 On December 25, 2008, Chinese police stated that a Chinese man of Han ethnicity, Li Yan, arrested on December 24 after trying to plant a bomb at a coffee shop in Kunming, was responsible for the bus bombings there on July 2008.248 On March 6, 2009, the regional governor of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Nur Bekri, said that “the (security) situation will be more severe, the task more arduous, and the struggle more fierce in the region” in 2009.249 This was because of the understanding that the ETIM or the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) remains one of the most serious security threats to China. Under the inf luence of the global jihad, it is highly likely for the group to adopt operational practices such as suicide attacks and the targeting of high-profile events.250 East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) The East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) was established by Mohammad Emin Hazret in Istanbul, Turkey, in 1996.251 The ETLO is one of several ethnic Uighur groups operating in central Asia and the Chinese province of Xinjiang. The principal goal of ETLO is to achieve independence for “East Turkistan” (Xinjiang) through radical means and establish an Islamic state in Xinjiang.252 The leader of the ETLO is believed to be Mohammad Emin Hazret, alias Mamtimin Hazrat.253 Hazret was born in 1950. He is a native of Moyu County in Khotan Prefecture, Xinjiang, China. As a college graduate, he worked for the Xinjiang Film Studio until he f led to Turkey in 1989. He currently heads the ETLO and mainly operates in West and Central Asia. The Chinese police have requested the Interpol to issue a red corner notice to get him arrested. Hazret is alleged to have masterminded a series of robberies and murders in the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan.254 After China identified ETLO as a terrorist group in 2002, Hazret became one of China’s most wanted terrorists.

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Dolqun Isa was reported to be the deputy of Hazret. China’s Ministry of Public Security listed him as one of the eleven most-wanted terrorists in its 2003 document.255 He was also the head of the World Uighur Youths Congress (WUYC) between 1996 and 2004. According to the Chinese government, ever since Dolqun Isa f led China, he had organized and participated in all sorts of terrorist activities launched by the separatist group.256 The second designated member of ETLO was Abulimit Turxun, who f led China in 1997. According to the Chinese authorities, in early May 1998, Turxun sent terrorists into China who made more than forty chemical combustible devices and used them in fifteen consecutive attacks on big stores and wholesale markets in Urumqi, on May 23, 1998. In June 1998, he killed four ETLO members who intended to quit the terrorist group to prevent possible information leaks.257 The third known member of ETLO is Hudaberdi Haxerbik who reportedly smuggled large quantities of arms and ammunition into China on April 6, 1998.258 The ETLO is an organized way of resisting China’s “occupation of Xinjiang” and “oppression” against Uighur people. The members do not see themselves as terrorists, but as fighters to secure independence of Xinjiang. They believe that it is the Chinese government who is the terrorist. The ETLO has been implicated in many violent crimes, including arsons, bomb attacks, and bank robberies, in Xinjiang of China, Kirghizstan, and Kazakhstan. It is also implicated in the killing of a Chinese diplomat to Kirghizstan.259 In February 2003, Chinese police uncovered a subgroup led by an ETLO member in the northern province of Hebei.260 Police did not provide details about the raid as well as the terrorist suspects detained. In early 2003, the Radio Free Asia’s Uighur service had a telephone interview with Hazret, who was at an undisclosed location. He said that “principal goal” of ETLO is “to achieve independence for East Turkestan by peaceful means.”261 But he viewed a military wing as “inevitable” means to show their “determination on the East Turkestan issue.”262 Hazret also denied Chinese allegations that ETLO has engaged in terrorist violence against Chinese interests and nationals in China and Turkey, claiming that: Chinese people are not our enemy, our problem is with the Chinese government, which violates the human rights of the Uighur people. . . We have not been and will not be involved in any kind of terrorist action inside or outside China. . .We have been trying to solve the East Turkestan problem through peaceful means. But the Chinese government’s

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brutality in East Turkestan may have forced some individuals to resort to violence.263

He denied any organizational relations with ETIM and Al Qaeda and claimed that he had never been to Afghanistan and never met Osama bin Laden, stating: We have nothing in common with him (Osama bin Laden) or any group associated with him. We want to concentrate on our issue, which is independence for the Uighur people. We don’t have any problem with any government in the world except China.264

He also expressed his support to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the removal of the Taliban regime from power in Kabul.265 However, recent reports from Central Asian states have shown the presence and activities of ETLO in this region, indicating the connection between the ETLO and other radical groups. On February 12, 2007, Kyrgyz police arrested an alleged ETLO member named Mukhamedali Tursun Talip, a twenty-nine-year-old Uighur man. He was detained at the Erkeshtam border post in southern Kyrgyzstan near the Chinese border by Kyrgyz border guards in May 2006.266 According to the police, Talip had traveled to southern Kyrgyzstan to establish links with local radical Islamic groups and stage terrorist attacks and other actions “to destabilize the social and political situation” in Kyrgyzstan. He was sentenced to two years in jail by the Osh City Court for crossing the border illegally.267 He escaped from a Kyrgyz prison on November 19, 2006 and was subsequently arrested in a southern town Osh, when he was planning terror attacks in Kyrgyzstan.268 World Uighur Congress China’s Ministry of Public Security has identified the World Uighur Youth Congress (WUYC) as one of the four terrorist organizations. On April 16, 2004, the World Uighur Youth Congress and the Eastern Turkistan National Congress (ETNC) merged into one organization— World Uighur Congress (WUC) in Munich, Germany. Today, the World Uighur Congress appears to be the most prominent organization among Uighur exile communities around the world. The WUC is claims that its primary objective is “to promote the right of the Uighur people” and to “determine the political future of East Turkestan” by “peaceful, nonviolent and democratic means.”269 However, Chinese authorities identify it

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as an illegal organization that is responsible for a series of ethnic violence in Xinjiang, including the deadly riot in Urumqi on July 5, 2009. World Uighur Youth Congress Following China’s crackdown on the Baren riots in 1990, many Uighurs f led China and settled predominately in Central Asia, Turkey, and Germany. Inspired by the newly independent Central Asian states, exiled Uighur activists and migrant communities made attempts to unite Uighur diaspora under a common banner. In December 1992, the Uighur diaspora held the first General Assembly in Istanbul, Turkey.270 Following a series of meetings, mostly in Europe, the expatriate Uighurs established the East Turkestan National Center in Istanbul in December 1998 with eleven Uighur organizations from Turkey, Central Asia, and Germany as members. In October 1999, the Uighur diaspora established the East Turkistan National Congress, with a fifteen-member governing body and registered with the German authorities as a legal association. Presently, there are eighteen organizations that are either members of the Congress or intend to become members.271 These groups claim to represent the interests of the Uighur people, such as promoting and lobbying for the rights of the community.272 Most of these groups advocate peace and publicly dissociate themselves from any type of violence. However, China claims that all these groups are terrorist organizations pursuing subversive activities.273 The World Uighur Youth Congress was established in 1996 in Washington DC. The head of the WUYC is believed to be Dolqun Isa (Dolkun Aisa), a Uighur native of Aksu, Xinjiang, born in 1967. After he f led to Turkey, he became the deputy chairman of the Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO).274 In November 1996, he was elected as the “Chairman of Executive Committee” of the WUYC. In May 2008, Dolqun Isa took the presidency of the Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organizations (UNPO) based in Netherlands, which claims to be an international “human right” group.275 Today, Isa is actively engaged in Uighur émigrés’ struggles for independence of Xinjiang. According to Chinese official sources, WUYC is closely linked to other East Turkistan terrorist organizations. Chinese police claimed that there was a terrorist organization affiliated to the WUYC called “East Turkistan Youth Alliance,” which was engaged in plans to assassinate political and military leaders, sabotage public infrastructures, bombings, and attacking Chinese diplomatic agencies overseas.276 The organization also masterminded two bombings in cities of Kashgar and Shache in Xinjiang, killing two and injuring 22 altogether.277 In addition, the

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group allegedly purchased weapons and explosive devices from the terrorist groups in the Middle East.278 The WUYC also established a very small presence in a few Middle Eastern countries and Nepal. Chinese officials claimed that the WUYC leader Dolqun Isa directed some terrorists to establish a training camp in Nepal in October 2000.279 Since the WUYC and Eastern Turkistan National Congress (ETNC) merged as the World Uighur Congress (WUC) in 2004, there has been little information about its activities from Chinese sources. World Uighur Congress In 2004, Erkin Alptekin was elected the first president of the World Uighur Congress (WUC) for a term of two years. Muhammad Tohti, president of the Uighur Association in Canada became his vice-president, and Alim Seytoff, president of the Uighur Association of America, became chairman of the board.280 Erkin Alptekin is the son of Isa Yusuf Alptekin, a Uighur political leader, who was the head of the first East Turkistan Republic in Kashgar from November 12, 1933 to February 6, 1934.281 He served as the General Secretary of the National Assembly of the republic.282 From 1932 to 1934, he represented Eastern Turkistan in Nanjing, then capital of the Republic of China.283 In 1949, Isa Yusuf f led from China to Kashmir in India. Erkin Alptekin was born in 1939 in India. From the early 1970s to the mid-1990s, he worked for the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in Munich, Germany. He was the assistant director of the Nationality Services and the director of the Uighur division of the RFE/ RL until early 1979.284 Alptekin used the radio service to promote the Uighur cause. He also published a book which criticized communism in general and also more specifically China. In 1991, he founded the Eastern Turkistan Union in Europe and became its first chairman.285 The stated objective of the organization is to struggle for the “Right to Self-Determination” for Uighur people in Xinjiang.286 Erkin Alptekin was also one of the founders of the Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organizations (UNPO) based in The Hague in Netherlands. In 1999, Erkin Alptekin was elected as the General Secretary of UNPO.287 In May 2008, Erkin Alptekin became the “Honorary President” of UNPO while Dolqun Isa, the former leader of the World Uighur Youth Congress (WUYC), took the presidency of the organization.288 In 2006, the Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer became the president of the WUC replacing Erkin Alptekin. Rebiya was born in the city of Altai, Xinjiang, on November 15, 1946.289 Her family, which originated from

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Khotan area in southern Xinjiang, earned their living by raising livestock.290 She married in 1965 and moved to the city of Aksu where she ran a clothing business with her husband.291 During the Cultural Revolution, her business was branded as “speculation” and she was purged as a “class enemy.”292 In 1981, she remarried, to Sidik Rouzi, then an associate professor, and moved to Urumqi.293 In Urumqi, Kadeer leased a market in the business district of the city, converting it into a department store that specialized in Uighur ethnic costumes. By 1985, she was one of the wealthiest businesswomen in the region.294 As one of Xinjiang’s business leaders, Rebiya was elected to the People’s Congress of Xinjiang in 1987 and subsequently promoted to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 1992. She attended the National People’s Congress (NPC) session in Beijing in March 1997.295 In August 1999, she was arrested on her way to meet a U.S. Congress delegation in Urumqi.296 In 2000, she was sentenced to an eight-year imprisonment on charges of “illegally disclosing state secrets.”297 She was released on March 17, 2005 after much international pressure and allowed to become a resident in the United States. In 2006, Rebiya Kadeer was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize against which Beijing lodged a strong protest. Although Rebiya was not listed among the China’s most-wanted “terrorists,” Chinese authorities have identified her as a key leader of “East Turkistan” separatist forces. On February 10, 2009, the CCP secretary of XUAR Wang Lequan told the media that members of a “East Turkistan organization” had penetrated four universities in Xinjiang to hand out leaf lets with an attempt to instigate Uighur students to protest against the government, and the “culprit” behind this incident was Rebiya.298 The WUC new leadership included several younger Uighurs from China or abroad, who have got university education and are f luent in many languages. These members actively engage in building ties with different governments and international organizations. However, most countries are reluctant to support their activities at the risk of reactions from China. In order to create more support and sympathy, the WUC is constantly and consciously moderating its message, and emphasizing its peaceful approach to gain democratic rights. WUC Networks The WUC promotes its separatist agenda through its branches and affiliate groups in foreign countries which have Uighur immigrant populations. These include Turkey (WUC Representative, the East Turkistan Foundation, Eastern Turkistan Culture and Solidarity Association),

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Germany (East Turkistan Union), the United States (Uighur American Association), Canada (Uighur Canadian Association), Sweden (Swedish Uighur Committee), United Kingdom (Uighur U.K. Association), Netherlands (Netherlands Eastern Turkistan Foundation), Norway (Norway Uighur Committee), Kyrgyzstan (WUC Representative, “Ittipak” Uighur Society of the Kyrgyz Republic, Society Union of Uighur National Association), Kazakhstan (WUC Representative, Uighur Youth Union in Kazakhstan), Australia (WUC Representative, Australian Uighur Association). Regardless of their official registration in respective states, all of these groups are actively engaged in raising funds and other aid, promoting separatist and anti-China idea among local communities, and lobbying to secure support from local authorities. Funding for the WUC and its affiliated groups comes from several sources, including donations and grants by Uighur émigrés, Islamic movements overseas, Muslim individuals, non-government organizations, as well as foreign governments and its agencies.299 Most of these organizations seek independence of Xinjiang from the PRC through nonviolent political activities. However, there are small parts of Uighur émigrés who object to the moderate stance. 300 They are unwilling to compromise on the independence from China as the final endpoint. Due to the differences in their political objectives, these radical elements formed the Republic of East Turkistan Government-in-exile (ETGE) in October 2004.301 The organization is headed by Yusuf Anwar Turani and based in Washington DC. Since 2006, there is a clear decline in the activities of this group. WUC and the Urumqi Unrest On July 5, 2009, ethnic clashes between ethnic Muslim Uighurs and China’s Han majority broke out in Urumqi, the capital city f Xinjiang, where thousands of Uighur protesters went into conf lict with security forces rushing to restore order in the city. The clashes caused 184 deaths and over 1,600 injures, the largest number of casualties in any single incident of its kind since 1949.302 Soon after the ethnic violence, Chinese authorities claimed that that the unrest was masterminded by Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uighur Congress (WUC).303 On July 6, a spokesman for the WUC in Sweden said that “They (Chinese authorities)’re blaming us as a way to distract the Uighurs’ attention from the discrimination and oppression that sparked this protest.”304 Later on that day, the WUC released its statement on its Web site to reject China’s accusation. In the statement, the group condemned the “brutal crackdown of a peaceful protest of young Uighurs in Urumchi” by Chinese security forces. 305

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While sporadic violence between the Uighur and Han Chinese continued on July 6, 2009, several Chinese embassies and consulates were attacked by supporters of the Uighur cause. According to Chinese officials, the Chinese Embassy in the Netherlands was attacked and partly damaged by Uighur protestors.306 In Monique, where the WUC is based, two unidentified men threw three Molotov cocktails at the Chinese consulate shortly after dozens of Uighurs held protests near the consulate. On July 7, 2009, Rebiya Kadeer made speech at a Uighur protest at Dupont Circle in Washington DC, saying that the Chinese government was responsible for the rising tensions. 307 On the same day, a group of Chinese tourists were assaulted by Uighur supporters in Munich. On July 10, 2009, China’s consulate in Munich warned Chinese tourists in Germany about “possible attacks by supporters of so-called ‘East Turkistan’.”308 Although there is no evidence showing the connection between the attacks and the WUC, it is clear that the WUC and other Uighur separatist groups will play a more important role in Uighur separatist movement. On July 15, 2009, the Al Qaeda affiliated group, Al Qaeda Organization in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) reportedly vowed to attack Chinese workers in North Africa in retaliation for Beijing’s crackdown on Uighur unrest in Urumqi on July 5, 2009. Soon after the report was released, Rebiya Kadeer firmly distanced herself from the Al Qaeda affiliate and condemned the “AQIM threats” to attack Chinese interests.309 She said that she opposed the use of violence in her campaign for “greater rights” for the Uighur Muslims.310 Since 2004, the WUC and its affiliate groups have escalated their separatist activities to the global level. They have achieved a relative inf luential lobbying in the countries where they operate, with a stable source of funds and substantial support from the international rights groups. The General Assembly of WUC was held in Munich from November 24 to the November 27, 2006 which was described by Erkin Alptekin as “a new beginning” for the organization.311 The group highlighted their stance on defending “human rights, religious freedom and democracy” and “the peaceful settlement” of Xinjiang issue through “dialogue and negotiation.”312 On the other hand, they made constant efforts to promote the view that Beijing is “systematically violating the human rights” including “religious freedoms” of the Uighur in China.313 As the largest exile group of the Uighurs, the WUC has highlighted the nonviolent nature of its effort and their struggle for “universal values” in their propaganda to reinforce its legitimacy and gain support from the international community.

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Eastern Turkistan Information Center (ETIC) The Eastern Turkistan Information Center (ETIC) was identified as an “Eastern Turkistan terrorist” organization in the announcement by the Ministry of Public Security on December 15, 2003. Chinese security agencies also labeled the ETIC as a “media group to conduct terrorist activities.”314 China’s charges against the ETIC were “developing networks inside China” to plot and organize terrorist attacks against China.315 According to Chinese police, the ETIC had long been using the Internet for its propaganda on separatism.316 The ETIC has published a lot of articles to advocate separatist ideology, including “Is There Hope for Our Independence” and “To Win Independence or to Die.”317 Shortly after Pakistan’s arrest and extradition of nine Uighur militants captured in FATA, the ETIC released an article on its Web site on April 28, 2009, strongly condemning Pakistan’s action and urging that Pakistan “refrain from future extraditions Uighurs who forced to f lee Pakistan to escape from torture and execution in China.”318 Since the 1990s, several Uighur news groups and media sources have engaged in reporting on the situation of Uighurs in Xinjiang and advocating the independence of Xinjiang. For example, the “East Turkestan Information Bulletin,” published by the East Turkistan Union in Europe (ETUE), a Munich based organization, says that its mission is to “disseminate objective current information on the people, culture, and civilization of Eastern Turkestan and to provide a forum for discussion on a wide range of topics and complex issues.”319 These groups are against Beijing’s rule in Xinjiang. However, most of them are peaceful and moderate in general. They have consistently objected to the use of violence and work to promote human rights in Xinjiang and gain support for their movement. The leader of the ETIC is believed to be Abudujelili Kalakash, a native Uighur born in 1960 in Moyu County of Khotan Prefecture, Xinjiang. He is also a key member of the World Uighur Youths Congress.320 Chinese police accused Kalakash for a plot to carry out terrorist attacks in Africa, and a series of bomb attacks against Chinese embassies there in April 1999.321 Beijing noted that from February 2001 to September 2002, Kalakash provided training to a Uighur terrorist named Abudumijit Enas, who was then in Khotan, Xinjiang.322 Abudumijit Enas also received a scanner, video camera, and more than 30,000 yuan of funds from Kalakash and was asked to gather information, plot, and carry out violent terrorist activities in China.323 Between January and March 2003, he and another terrorist reportedly planned bombings on the railway line between Lanzhou of Gansu Province and Hami of Xinjiang.324

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According to Chinese sources, ETIC consist of two groups of members. One was composed of staff workers in its headquarters.325 Their public identities are as journalists or publishers. The other consisted of the “secret information providers” hired inside and outside China.326 They were Uighur separatists who f led from China and “Eastern Turkistan terrorists” trained outside China.327 The East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), World Uighur Congress (WUC), and East Turkistan Information Centre (ETIC) did not appear in China’s second list of identified “East Turkistan” terrorists issued on October 21, 2008. It can be seen that although China insists that all these groups are part of the “East Turkistan terrorist forces,” the main actor committing terrorism in China today is the ETIM (TIP).

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CHAPTER 4

HUI MUSLIMS: THE MILIEU OF RADICALIZATION AND EXTREMISM

Obviously, we’re different from Muslims in other parts of the world . . . We just can’t go into the streets and protest. You have to have permission from the government. But there are other things we can do. We pray to Allah to protect all Muslims in the world. —Ma Ruxiong, a Hui cleric, February 2006.1

T

he Hui are the largest Muslim group in China and the second largest of China’s fifty-five minority nationalities. According to Chinese population census (renkou pucha), the Hui minority numbered 7.2 million in 1982 and the figure has grown to 9.8 million by 2000.2 The Chinese term “Hui” or “Hui jiao,” according to some Chinese and foreign historians, derives from a Chinese transliteration for the ancient Uighur people (Huihe) or for all Muslims in China (Huihui) for hundreds of years.3 The Chinese character for “Hui” means “return,” which is explained by these Chinese Muslims as “return towards their religion.”4 Under the government of Republic of China, “Hui jiao” (Hui teaching) was the term used in Chinese to indicate “Islam” in general.5 Since the 1950s, the PRC government has used the term specifically to refer to the Chinese-speaking Muslims, differentiating them from the other Turkic Muslim groups. The Hui Muslims are also called Dungan in Russia and Panthay in Yunnan province and Southeast Asia.6 In English literatures, the Hui are often referred to as the “Chinese Muslims” since the majority of them are Chinese-speaking and more culturally similar to the Han Chinese. It has been argued that this term is inappropriate and misleading because, by law, all Muslims in China are citizens of the PRC, or, Chinese; in this respect, the Hui are no more Chinese than

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the Turkic-speaking Muslims.7 Moreover, Hui Muslims are not ethnic Chinese converts but are the descendants of Muslim migrants from the West and Central Asia, who settled in China at various times and for various reasons.8 Through over twelve centuries of intimate contact with the Han majority and other nationalities in China, the societal identity of the Hui has been “exceedingly complex” and “questionable.”9 The socio-cultural and ethno-religious uniqueness of the Hui can be readily seen by briefly examining the historical origins of the Hui, the characteristics of their identity, Islamic thoughts they subscribe, and the new shifts among the Hui communities in the post–September 2001 era. Moreover, this section will make an assessment of the expanding influence of radical nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism among the Hui Muslims, which composes a long-term threat to security of the PRC. Origins and Identity The history of the Hui in China is a long sequence of over 1,000 years. The Tang witnessed the first arrival of Muslims in the seventh century. After centuries of Islamization of China and sincization of China’s Muslims, the Yuan assured a period of awakening of the Huihui as a ethnic group, and the Hui generally integrated into the Chinese society during the Ming dynasty. However in the nineteenth century, violent conf licts between the Hui and China’s central power broke up under Manchu Qing’s rule. It was not until the 1950s that the Hui were recognized as one nationality (minzu) by the PRC. These developments have led to close ties of the Hui Muslims with the Han majority in terms of “demographic proximity” and “cultural accommodation”10 on one hand, and the complexity of their societal identity on the other. Archaeological discoveries of large collections of Islamic artifacts and epigraphy in China suggest that China’s earliest Muslim communities were descendants of the Arab, Persian, and Central Asian Muslim merchants, militia, and officials, who resided in the capital city, Chang’an and the coastal cities, especially Guangzhou and Quanzhou in the seventh century during the Tang dynasty.11 A number of Chinese historical records also provide clear evidence of Muslims residing in China during this period. These Muslim populations were referred to as “ fan ke” and their settlements were called “ fan fang” in these ancient records.12 The Chinese character “ fan” means “foreign,” which, in the case of Muslims especially, refers to Buosi (Persian) and Dashi (Arab). “Dashi,” also used as the name of Arab Muslims, were given a special section for the first time in the standard histories of the Tang from the tenth century.13 According

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to these records, Buosi and Dashi pirates attacked the main Chinese port Guangzhou in 758.14 The description of China in the year 851 indicated that Islamic communities were f lourishing in the coastal cities as well as Chang’an due to the booming trade between China and Arab along the Silk Road and the southeast coast. Islamic inscriptions from the fourteenth century also claim Arab’s communication with China as early as 628.15 The Rebellion of An and Shi in AD 755 became a historical breakthrough for boosting Islamic expansion in China. According to Chinese sources, the Emperor Suzong requested the strong cavalry troops from friendly Muslim countries in Central Asia for military intervention. Subsequently, the Tang forces allied with the Muslim cavalrymen successfully cracked down the revolts. Appreciating the assistance, the Tang court allowed the Muslim troops to stay in certain districts ( fang) in the capital. The earliest reference to the Muslim presence in China appeared in the historical records during the Song (AD 1127–1368), with historical evidence for Muslims in Guangzhou in the eleventh century, Quanzhou in 1009, Chang’ an in AD 1127 and Hangzhou in AD 1281.16 It is evident that during the Tang and Song dynasties (seventh–thirteenth centuries) these fan ke considered themselves, and were considered foreigners rather than Chinese.17 They resided virtually in a foreign territory, maintained their loyalty to the Muslim ruler of Buosi or Dashi, and some even returned home during the chaos of the late Tang period.18 However, a large number of these Arab, Persian, and Central Asian Muslims married Chinese women, raised their children as Muslims, and settled down in China permanently.19 Their descendants became known as tusheng fan ke (native fan ke), meaning “native-born guests from outlying regions.”20 They inherited the Muslim way of life and gradually integrated with the local Han Chinese. The inf lux of Muslims of Arab, Persian, Mongol, and Turkic origin was the largest in number during the Mongol-Yuan dynasties in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.21 During Mongol’s western expeditions and especially after they conquered Baghdad, huge number of Muslims were either forced to move or voluntarily migrated into China. As artisans, tradesmen, scholars, officials, and religious leaders, they spread across many parts of the country and settled down mainly to livestock breeding. These new Muslim migrants and the native fan ke were all recognized as “Semu” Cast, which enjoyed a separate and advantageous status in the hierarchy established by the Mongols. These Muslim communities brought Islam to a broader area of China and began to take root in their localities and settled down permanently. At the same time, their inner cohesion and independent status was consolidated.

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It was during the Yuan period that the term Dashi to identify Muslims disappeared in Chinese language and the use of Hui or Huihui (henceforth referred to as Hui) came into being, which indicates the change of attitude by non-Muslim Chinese as well as the Muslims themselves, who were becoming sinicized.22 Before the Yuan, Arab Muslims settled in China considered themselves as people of Dashi, which had built close commercial and political ties with the Chinese empire; whereas after the Mongol took over in China and West Asia, the Dashi empire disappeared as a political power to be reckoned with.23 The abandonment of the term Dashi and the use of the new term Hui weakened Chinese Muslims’ relationship with and spiritual dependence on the Islamic world outside of China. This shift in name resulted in the changes in the mind of China’s Muslims—instead of being Arabs, Persians, or Turks, they began to consider themselves as subjects of the Yuan Empire. Chinese historians argue that Hui’s “national consciousness”24 began to take shape during the Yuan dynasty in the process of warfare and farming by the Hui people, which were the two dominant factors of this period.25 During their westward invasion, the Mongols turned Muslims from West and Central Asia into scouts and sent them eastward on military missions. These scouts were expected to settle down at various locations and to breed livestock while maintaining combat readiness. As time went by they became ordinary farmers in rural areas as well as herdsmen, artisans, and tradesmen, who resided in cities along vital communication lines, taking to handicrafts and commerce.26 Scattered as they were, they stuck together in relative concentration in settlements and around mosques they built. Being people who came to China from places where social systems, customs, and habits differed from those in the east, the Hui began to cultivate their own distinct consciousness. This was also reinforced by the concentration of the Hui around the mosques as the center of their social activities, their increasing economic interaction with each other, and their common belief in the Islamic religion.27 Ming dynasty is considered to be the “Golden Age of Chinese Islam” by several Chinese historians since the Hui began to emerge as an “ethnic group” within China.28 The process of sincization of the Hui gathered momentum and resulted in Hui’s adoption of Chinese Confucius culture. Since the Mongols were replaced by the Ming dynasty, most of the Hui in China had well integrated with the local Han Chinese. Physically, they could not be distinguished from the Han Chinese due to the intermarriages for hundreds of years. They started to speak and write Chinese and give their children Chinese education. Hui names were still used, but

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Han names and surnames became accepted and gradually became dominant.29 Hui culture in this period had been characterized by the combination of the Islamic culture of Western Asia and the Confucius culture of the Han Chinese, which was ref lected by, for example, their clothing similar to the Chinese one. At the same time, Chinese Islam became increasingly cut off from its “outside spiritual base.”30 Many mosques built during the Ming followed the style of Chinese architecture, making them indistinguishable from Chinese temples. However, Islamization and sincization are obviously contradictions in terms, because these processes entail a contest between the two very powerful and self-confident cultures. The proposition that Muslims in China have simply become Chinese is thus a “superficial observation at worst,” a “reckless generalization at best.”31 Though they accepted Confucianism, their religion, Islam, preserved a surprising vitality that persistently shaped the independent identity of the Hui. This was manifested in the revival of Islam in China during eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which galvanized the Muslims to fight the mounting oppression by the Manchu rulers and Han warlords. The incompatibility of the two cultures resulted in a series of violent rebellions which threw northwest China into chaos for decades.32 During the Manchu Qing dynasty, Muslims began to acquire a reputation as a “fierce and rebellious minority.”33 There was sporadic resistance to the Qing in the late seventeenth century, but it was in the late nineteenth century that there were three outbreaks of bitter and brutal communal violence usually known as the Muslim rebellions (Huizu Daqiyi).34 From 1855 to 1873, Muslims in Yunnan rebelled and their leader, Du Wenxiu, declared the independence of Muslim sultanate. The Hui rebellion in Shaanxi and Gansu between 1862 and 1876, known as Tungan Rebellion, threw the whole of northwestern China into chaos. As a result of Qing’s sever repression and massacres, the Hui Muslim population was drastically reduced and faced the real possibility of extinction.35 The chaos in northwest China also inf luenced the nationalist and separatist movements of the Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. After the Uighur rebellion led by Yakub Beg, the Kashghar region of northern Xinjiang was ruled as an independent state from 1867 to 1877. In 1895, another violent conf lict between Hui Muslims and local Han landlords and officials led to a further period of serious disorder on the border between Gansu and Qinghai provinces.36 These uprisings caused social unrest in the northwest frontiers of China and left behind a legacy of historical hatred and mutual suspicion between the Hui Muslims and Han Chinese.

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A renaissance of Islam and the Hui in China emerged after the 1911 Nationalist revolution led by Sun Yat-sen. Since the Republic of China (1911–1949) was established, the Hui were officially recognized as a strand in the new multiethnic state, with the Han Chinese (Han), Mongols (Meng), Manchus (Man), and Tibetans (Zang). The Nationalist government did not distinguish the Turkic-speaking with Chinese-speaking Muslims in its ethnic identification. The term “Hui” then used actually referred to all Muslim minorities in China. In the 1950s, the Chinese government launched nationalities identification program inspired by the Soviet model and officially recognized ten nationalities as being primarily Muslim. The Hui is one among the ten nationalities. Before their identification by the PRC government, the Hui were not a nationality (minzu) in modern sense of the term. The Hui, as they are known today, emerged only after the transition from empire to nation-state, as many other groups in China. The widely divergent historical, ecological, socioeconomic, and political contexts of the Hui people have resulted in the wide variety of their self-understanding and ethnic ascription. The expression of ethnic identity and interpretations of Islam also differ among Hui communities in China.37 Though there is much variety of ethnic expression, the shared idea of descent from common ancestors is the root that grounds Hui identity in a single ethno-religious tradition. Although these communities and individuals are fairly different, they believe they belong to one nationality and maintain relationship with other Hui, no matter how different.38 This perception of descent from common ancestors forms the basis of a meaningful societal identity that continues to maintain the unity of the Hui Muslims in China. In the aftermath of the establishment of the PRC in 1949, several small-scale Hui riots occurred during the land reform campaigns of the early 1950s. More revolts emerged when the rigid conduct of the Red Guards destroyed a large number of mosques in China during the Cultural Revolution.39 Since Deng Xiaoping adopted the reform and opening-up policy, China’s tolerable and preferential policies toward the Muslims have had a positive effect on moderating the ethno-religious attitudes and patterns of behavior of the Huis. However, a number of Hui Muslims have confronted the authorities during the demonstration at Tiananmen Square in May 1989. According to Western sources, the protest of people from different Muslim groups was caused by a Chinese book that they considered offensive to Muslims. Muslims from Beijing, Xian and Urumqi organized marches, met with government leaders, and finally achieved their goals. The book was banned, the publishing house

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was closed, and the authors were arrested.40 However, the Muslim opposition did not cease in the early 1990s. In June 1993, about ten thousand Muslims marched in Lanzhou (the capital city of Gansu province), and in July, passenger and mail services west of Xian were suspended to prevent the protestors from reaching Beijing.41 According to unconfirmed reports, both Uighurs and Huis were involved and protests seemed more fervent in Xining, capital city of Qinghai province.42 The protests were caused by a Chinese comic, which allegedly depicted Muslims worshipping a pig. This activity, as Gladney noted, indicates a level of “nationally coordinated Islamic activism.”43 Since the mid-1990s, there has been a significant decline in the scale and number of ethno-religious conf licts related to the Hui Muslims in China. Nevertheless, the growing inf luence of Islamic fundamentalism has increased the risk of radicalization of the Hui communities in the post–September 2001 era. It is true that compared to most other Muslim nationalities in China, the Hui are closer to the Han Chinese. However, it does not mean that all of the Hui have been fully integrated into the Han society. Ethnic conf licts between the Hui and Han existed in the past and continue today, though at a relatively small scale. As discussed in chapter 1, the perceived threat to the identity of the Hui Muslims lies at the heart of the conf lict between a small part of the Hui minorities and Chinese state. It is of particular essence for the authorities to note the important role of Islam as the key feature of the Hui identity. Islam continues to reinforce Hui Muslims’ resistance to any attempt, either real or perceived, to assimilate their separate and vibrant societal identity. Islamic Schools of Thought Among the 55 identified nationalities in China, the Hui are the only one for whom the religion is the “only unifying category” of their identity.44 After the state-sponsored nationality identification campaigns in the 1950s, these groups have begun to think of themselves as ethnic nationalities and, at the same time, as Muslims. Most of the Hui Muslims practice Sunni Islam and belong to the Hanafi School of jurisprudence. The majority of Huis have adapted many of their Islamic practices to Han ways of life, which often became the source of the criticisms of the Muslim reformers.45 Besides, the Hui Muslims in China today have a wide spectrum of Islamic schools due to a succession of Islamic reform movements that swept across China over the past 600 years. Various schools and teachings among Hui Muslims have contributed further to the complexity of the Hui identity.

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Traditional Chinese Islam—Gedimu The history of Gedimu can be traced to the seventh to fourteenth century, when the descendents of Persian, Arab, Central Asian, and Mongolian Muslim migrants composed the earliest Muslim communities in southeast and northwest China. Practicing traditional Sunni, Hanafi Islam, these independent small communities became known as “Gedimu” (from the Arabic “qadim” meaning “old”) or Laojiao (old teaching) in Chinese. These old Islamic communities established an early Hui pattern of zealously preserving and protecting their identity as enclaves ensconced in the dominant Han society.46 Today, the Gedimu is still the largest Islamic school among the Hui population, which has over 4 million adherents in a broad area of China, including Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Henan, Hebei, Shandong, and Heilongjiang.47 Before the mid-twentieth century, the Gedimu communities were characterized by relatively isolated, independent Islamic villages and urban enclaves, who related with each other through trading networks and recognition of belonging to the same religion. Each village was centered on a single mosque headed by an ahong (from the Persian, akhun), who was invited to teach on a more or less temporary basis.48 These ahong generally moved on an average of every three years from one mosque to another. A council of senior local elders and ahong were responsible for the affairs of each village and for inviting the itinerant imam (e zhangjiao).49 Until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these Hui communities maintained isolation from the Han majority due to different cultural, ritual, and dietary preferences that sometimes led to open conf lict among these communities. Some Western travelers who visited China during that time found that the Han majority and the Hui minority living harmoniously, but it was “on the rarest occasion.”50 This isolation was mitigated somewhat during the collectivization and Leap Forward campaigns in the 1950s, when Han and Hui villages were often administered as clusters by a single commune. With the dismantling of the commune since the 1980s, these homogeneous Hui communities are once again becoming more segregated. The isolation of these Gedimu communities and their thin dispersion throughout China reveals the importance of trade and migration history among the Hui. Although the early origins of the Hui can be traced to the descendants of migrants from the southeast coast and the northwest along the Silk Road, the major concentrations of the Gedimu Hui are no longer in those border areas. After Gansu and Ningxia in the northwest,

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China’s central province, Henan, contains the third largest concentration of Gedimu communities.51 Nowadays, they can be found throughout China, especially evident along the main transport nodes of the Yellow River. The trade and sense of a common religious heritage linked the disparate Gedimu communities. Moreover, until the rise of Sufi brotherhoods many of these Muslims were tied together through nation-wide socioreligious networks.52 National Networks—Sufism In the early decades of the Qing dynasty, increased travel, and communication, and the “general orthodox revival” of Islam had great inf luence on China’s Hui Muslims.53 Arriving mainly along the Central Asian trade routes, Chinese and foreign saintly shaykhs (shengtu) brought new teachings from the pilgrimage cities. Exposure to these new ideas led to a reformulation of traditional Islamic concepts that rendered them more meaningful and practical for the Hui Muslims of the time. As the second wave of Chinese Islamization in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, Sufi movement made a substantial impact in northwest China, including Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai regions.54 Like Sufi centers that proliferated in other countries, many of the Sufi movements in China developed socioeconomic and religio-political institutions built around the schools established by descendants of early Sufi leaders. The institutions became known in Chinese as “menhuan” (the “leading” or “saintly” descent groups), which highlights its connection to the original Sufi founder, extending through his appointed descendants to the leader himself and from him to the Prophet.55 The important contribution that Sufism made to religious organization in China was that the leaders of the mosques owed their allegiance to their respective shaykh, the founder of the order who appointed them. Unlike the Gedimu ahong, who were loyal to their village first, and connected only by trade to other communities, these designated followers were loyal to the leader of their order and remained in the community for long periods of time.56 The tombs of masters and saints played an essential role in these Sufi communities. Each tomb had a shrine or qubba (gongbai or gongbei), and the main shrines became centers of devotional activity.57 The “saintly lineages” obtained contributions from their followers and amassed substantial amounts of property. The growth in the number and importance of the menhuan gradually replaced the Gedimu pattern by linking together the menhuan adherents all over the northwest. The widening compass of social integration that resulted made it easier for

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the “saintly lineages” and other leaders to harness the Muslims’ political and economic potential, facilitating the rise of Muslim “warlordism” in northwest China in the twentieth century.58 The charismatic teachers and tradesmen established widespread networks and brotherhood associations (menhuan). Of these, only four menhuan maintain significant inf luence among the Hui Muslims today, the Khufiyya, Jahriyya, Qadiriyya (Kadiriyya), and Kubrawiyya.59 The former two orders are branches of the Naqshbandiyya, which have their origin in the Yemen, while the latter two can be traced to Central Asian Islam. The Sufi brotherhoods in Xinjiang also mainly belong to the Naqshbandiyya. These four main menhuan are subdivided into a myriad smaller menhuan and branches along ideological, political, geographical, and historical lines.60 These Sufi networks helped in the mobilization of large numbers of Hui during economic and political crises in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, assisting widespread Muslim-led rebellions and resistance movements against the Qing imperial rule in Shaanxi, Gansu, Yunnan, and Xinjiang.61 These Sufi movements are of vital importance in terms of uniting disparate Hui communities across the country. During the turmoil of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, China was faced with widespread domestic social unrest and the advancing encroachment of Western imperialist powers. Sufism gained rapid proliferation of various orders since it provided a theory, terminology, and technique of leadership.62 Unlike the isolated Gedimu communities, Sufi leadership and organizations provided substantial political and economic assistances to the adherents. During the Republican period (1911–1949), extensive Sufi networks were built with the help of some Hui warlords who controlled regions with Hui communities. Under the influence of Sufi movements, the Hui Muslims in China were largely mobilized and united for confronting the domestic difficulties. It is also important to note that the Sufi reforms among the Hui communities from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries were underscored by the contradiction and compromise between the native culture of the “indigenous Muslims” and the “orthodox Islamic law,” the “mystical and scriptural,” and the “real and the ideal.”63 Revealing a key division between “scripturalist” and “mystical” interpretations, these conf licts and reforms ref lect an ongoing debate in China over Islamic orthodoxy.64 The supposed accommodation of orthodox Islamic tenets to local cultural practices led scholars to dismiss or explain such compromise as “syncretism” and “assimilation,” as had been described among the Hui.65 The tensions and conf licts led to the rise and divisions of the Sufi menhuan and subsequent non-Sufi reforms in northwest

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China.66 The conf lict between social realities and Islamic ideals are often left unresolved,67 which very often derives from the questions they raise among Hui populations struggling with traditional meanings in the midst of changing social contexts. Questions of purity and legitimacy became important when the Hui faced radical internal political and socioeconomic changes, and were exposed to different interpretations of Islam from the outside Muslim world. Fundamentalist Reform—Ikhwani The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not only the periods during which ideas about evolution and progress took shape and spread, they were also a time of intense debate over Islamic belief and practices.68 Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula initiated a number of Islamic reform movements that affected Muslims around the world. Central to the calls for Islamic reform was a phenomenon sometimes referred to as scripturalist fundamentalism, which can be understood as the attempt to reproduce the “one true religion” that Prophet Muhammad disseminated through strict conformity to the practices recorded in the Qur’an and Hadith and the rejection of all others.69 This literal orientation was first espoused by the Wahhabi movement, an organized effort to achieve political and religious reform that began in the Arabian Peninsula in the late eighteenth century. As an early attempt to rectify Islamic belief and practice, Wahhabism sparked many other calls to return to Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy, all of which were closely associated with the Muslim violence of the nineteenth century.70 By the mid-1990s, proponents of Islamic reforms were generally referred to by the Western scholars as “fundamentalists,” “reformists,” or “Islamists.” 71 The 1912 nationalist revolution in China allowed further autonomy in Muslim concentrated regions of the northwest, and wide areas came under virtual Muslim warlord control, leading to frequent intra-Muslim and Muslim-Han conf licts until the eventual communist victory led to the reassertion of central control. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Wahhabi-inspired reform movements, known as the Ikhwani (Yihewani or “Xinjiao, meaning “New Teaching”), rose to popularity under warlord and Nationalist sponsorship, and were noted for their critical stance toward traditionalist Islam as too acculturated to Chinese practices, and Sufism as too attached to saint and tomb veneration.72 “Arabization,” as the recreation of an “authentic” Islam through reference to the Middle East, was thus a response to modernization even as it claimed to have provided a model for modernization.73 The process

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of Arabization reached China in the late nineteenth century through the efforts of a Gansu Hui named Ma Wanfu, who made the Hajj in 1888 and remained in Mecca to study for four years. After his return to China in 1892, Ma began disseminating the ideas for Islamic reform that he had developed through contact with proponents of Wahhabism. The reform movement Ikhwani was derived from the Arabic “al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun” (Muslim Brotherhood) in the Middle East.74 The essence of Ma’s teaching was that the Hui Muslims must rely solely upon the Qur’an and Hadith and eradicate those customs and practices that could not be definitively attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. This agenda entailed the rejection of several practices that were common among the Hui Muslims. One was the traditional Chinese form of Qur’anic education, known as “ jingtang jiaoyu” (Mosque Education), originally developed by a religious specialist (ahong) from Shaanxi and that was a great source of local pride. In jingtang jiaoyu, students were taught to recite the Qur’an by using Chinese words to produce rough equivalents of Arabic sounds. Ma insisted upon direct study of Arabic. He and other Ikhwani proponents also criticized the practice of wearing white mourning garb—which Chinese Muslims shared with non-Muslim Chinese—as a deviant Chinese accretion.75 This Arabization movement dominated by Ikhwanis became particularly compelling in Muslim societies in Xi’an because it was exclusively Muslim. Today, the Ikhwani continue to be a powerful Islamic group throughout China. Unlike Gedimu, the Ikhwani emphasize leadership through training and Islamic education rather than inheritance and succession. What differentiates it from the Gedimu is its stress upon reform through Chinese education and modernism.76 Because of its emphasis on nationalist concerns, education, modernization, and decentralized leadership, the order has attracted more urban intellectual Muslims. The Ikhwanis were especially numerous in areas such as Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia, where they proliferated during the Republican period with the support of Muslim warlords. More recently, many of the large mosques and Islamic schools rebuilt with government funds throughout China since the late 1970s tend to be staffed by Ikhwani Imams.77 As the second largest Islamic order in China today, Ikhwani has about 1.5 million adherents, who have widespread dispersal in Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, and Xinjiang in the northwest; Henan, Hebei, and Heilongjiang in the north and Yunnan in the southwest.78 It is also essential to note a small Islamic movement called the Xi Dao Tang (Western School or Mosque), which was the only “completely native” Islamic movement in China.79 Founded by Ma Qixi at the

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beginning of the twentieth century, the movement of Xi Dao Tang focused on sinicization of Islam. Through a fascinating combination of Chinese and Islamic learning known as the “Study the Han Fraction” (Han Xuepai), Ma Qixi strongly stressed the Chinese Confucian-Islamic classics as well as the study of the Qur’an in Arabic. By the 1910s, there were as many as 10,000 followers of the Xi Dao Tang. After Ma’s death in 1914, the movement gradually declined. By the late 1950s, it almost dispersed due to the collectivization and land reforms initiated by the CCP. After the late 1970s, when the CCP reinstalled the relative moderated policies toward Muslims, the Xi Dao Tang revived and had an estimated population of 10,000 mainly in Gansu, Qinghai, and Xinjiang.80 This process of Islamic reform from late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries created profound divisions in the Hui societies in China. The arrival of Ikhwani teachings in China transformed Gedimu into a religious faction because a number of the Huis adopted the new practices and rejected the old. Those who espoused the Ikhwani teachings prided themselves on “depending on the Qur’an to establish the religion” and sharply criticized the Gedimu as having been inf luenced by Chinese customs. On the contrary, the relatively small movement of Xi Dao Tang ref lected a part of Hui Muslims’ desire to strengthen the integration between the Islamic and Chinese culture. Numerous conf licts arose among the members of mosque congregations over correct Islamic practice and whether the new ways were better than the old. As a result, many new mosques were built in order to separate the quarreling factions.81 These Islamic movements inf luenced all Muslim nationalities in China. The impact of Islamic fundamentalism has shaped the most religious expression among the Hui during the China’s turbulent history of the first half of the twentieth century. Today, the Hui people (Huizu Ren), no matter where they reside, believe that they belong to one nationality, taking great pride in being members of the international Islamic Ummah. Islam appeared in China very soon after the founding of the religion during the seventh century. In the following decades, several schools of thought emerged among the Hui communities. The process of Islamization in China can be generally divided into three tides,82 which were characterized by spread of respective Islamic schools inspired by the Islamic movements in West and Central Asia. It is evident that the attempts to return to the orthodox Islam underline a clear tendency in the waves of Islamization in China, which has built close ties between Islamic schools practiced by the Hui Muslims and Islamic fundamentalism that originated in the Middle East. In the twenty-first century, the CCP encouraged greater toleration of the

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religious practices of these Muslim minorities. However, the relaxation of restrictions on religion has strengthened the Hui Muslims’ sense of community with their co-religionists elsewhere in the world which in turn has let fundamentalism take a hold in China. The revival of fundamentalism in the Islamic world in the late twentieth century and the proliferation of Islamic extremism and terrorism in the post–September 2001 period have underscored the importance of shifts in ethno-religious ideals of the Hui Muslims, some of which have taken on characteristics of radicalization and extremism. Radicalization and Extremism The spread of Islamist fundamentalism around the world and the increasing interest of the Muslim core in China’s Hui communities have brought closer links between the Islam inside and outside China. In the 1990s, China witnessed Hui’s growing awareness of the unity of the universal Ummah of Islam.83 This has given rise to spread of fundamentalism among these Muslims. For a small segment of the Hui, opposition against the Han majority and the central government has been persistent and deeply rooted. Under the foreign inf luences, it appears that in the past few years extremist and Islamist forces are becoming stronger among the Hui nationalities living in Ningxia, Gansu, Xinjiang, and other places across the country. This radicalization is happening slowly, which is very difficult to detect directly. But it poses a potentially dangerous development in China. Several factors account for proliferation of Islamic fundamentalism and increasing radicalization and extremism among Hui nationalities. First, an increasing number of Hui Muslims go to Saudi Arabia on pilgrimage every year and bring new ideas on Islam that are popular in the Middle East when they come back. These Islamic fundamentalist ideas have inf luenced China’s Muslim communities. Pilgrimage to Mecca, also called the Hajj (chaojin), is one of the five pillars of Islam (“wu gong”), an obligation that must be carried out at least once in their lifetime by every Muslim who can afford to do so. Since the 1990s, the number of Chinese Muslims allowed to take part in the Hajj pilgrimage increased every year, though the state still controls the number of Chinese pilgrims through the Islamic Association of China. The Chinese authorities currently impose less rigid conditions than in the past to issue a passport to the Hajj applicants.84 Beijing is generally the official departure point for Chinese pilgrims. Other Chinese nationals can also apply individually in Bangkok, Pakistan, or Central Asia. Travels thorough Thailand, Central

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Asia, or Pakistan are considered to be the best alternative routes to Mecca for the Hui of southwestern China.85 According to the statistics provided by the China Islamic Association about 13,000 Muslims made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 2007.86 According to some overseas Muslim groups and human rights organizations, however, most of the Chinese Muslims cannot go for Hajj freely due to China’s de facto selection of candidates on the basis of political beliefs and wealth.87 Indeed, China’s pilgrims make a small proportion in the estimated 20 to 35 million Muslim populations in the country.88 Nevertheless, these pilgrims have significantly inf luenced the religious and political thinking of China’s Muslims. Hajj has provided a good opportunity for interchange of ideas between China’s Muslims and their counterparts in the Islamic world. At the same time it has also become the vehicle for the import of fundamentalist and radical ideas into China. Over the centuries, pilgrimages have benefited Chinese Muslims, helping them strengthen their faith and unifying their communities during the tough years of late Qing and the early Republican period. The Ikhwani movement in nineteenth and twentieth centuries was closely related to the Hui elites, who had made Hajj to Mecca and returned to China with fundamentalist ideas. The revival of Islamic fundamentalism of the post–Cold War era, which was underlined by the spread of jihadist ideologies, has inf luenced a number of Chinese pilgrims. After interactions with the Wahhabist Imams, some Huis have started to change their thought on their religion and cultural identity. Mosques in many Hui communities have adopted Saudi Arabian architecture whereas in the past they were built typically in a Chinese traditional style.89 In some parts of China, Wahhabist imams and ahong have dominated local mosques. Through social service and the like Imams or ahong of these mosques have increased their inf luence in local Hui communities and even among Muslims in other provinces. As a result, the number of the Wahhabist Muslims increased in Hui populations.90 There is thus a potential for large-scale radicalization of the Hui as it has been the case in many other countries. Second, the f low of Middle Eastern visitors to China has also increased significantly, which caused the expanding inf luence of fundamentalist Islam and the growing possibilities of radicalization of the Hui. People from the Muslim world are coming to China in increasing numbers to do business or to study in universities. Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also come to China especially to Muslim areas for anti-poverty programs or build mosques and schools. The increasing communication between Chinese Muslims and foreign Islamic organizations

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is seen as good publicity for China in its diplomatic relations with the Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries. Each year, the Chinese authorities invite foreign Islamic delegations to China to demonstrate the freedom of religion enjoyed by Muslims in China as in other Muslim states. Delegations of foreign Muslim states and religious leaders have been hosted by the authorities and escorted to visit Hui communities. The visits by foreign Muslims are having a profound impact on the religious thinking of local Hui populations who have began to appreciate the unifying force of Islam and its ability to inf luence the political discourse.91 While the government hopes for development assistance and increased economic ties through improved relations with Muslim countries, the majority of these foreign delegations are only interested in setting up mosque and madrassahs (Islamic schools) in order to spread their own brand of religious discourse.92 Under the inf luence of these NGOs coming from different parts of the world and belonging to different sects, the religious identity of the Chinese Muslims is getting diversified.93 Many of the Hui Muslims have become very conservative in their thinking and activities. This is evident from the proliferation of madrassahs with radical orientation especially since the late 1990s. The increasing radicalization is creating the milieu for articulation of stronger grievances against the Han Chinese and the state. In fact, in many cases, these organizations have begun to undermine the authority of the local government in the respective areas.94 Third, the Hui Muslims are playing an increasingly important role in the geopolitics and international economics through China’s trade with Central Asia, the Middle East, and ASEAN countries. The government has sponsored a number of economic and “Muslim Friendship” delegations to Middle Eastern and Central Asian states to correspond with the Hajj, with well-known ahong, and important religious leaders who are f luent in Arabic.95 Several state-sponsored Chinese construction companies that provide development projects to Third World Muslim nations include Muslims from China as translators and “cultural consultants.”96 Many of them are Hui Muslims, who know how to deal with their coreligionists abroad and can speak Arabic f luently. In the 1990s, several joint state and private-collective “Muslim construction corporations” were founded in China, with Hui Muslims at the helm in order to foster increased numbers of development contracts.97 Working and living in the West and Central Asia, these Hui Muslims are also exposed to the inf luence of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism. Fourth, modern information technologies have provided Islamist extremists and jihadists efficient tools for spreading their ideology and

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gain supporters. The spread of fundamentalist, extremist, and terrorist propaganda in the cyber world has further facilitated the spread of radicalization among the Hui Muslims in China. On September 20, 2007, as-Sahab Media Company that produces audio and video materials for Al Qaeda released a video entitled “Power of Truth,” which featured old recordings by Ayman al-Zawahiri praising jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq. In another video of a statement by Abu-Umar al-Baghdadi, the jihadist under the name of The Islamic State of Iraq advocated to “establish an Islamic state from China to Spain.”98 On August 15, 2007, an article entitled “China Under the Microscope of the Salafia al-Jihadia” was posted in the Internet. In the article, the author discussed the position of the global Salafist movement toward China and whether Al Qaeda has any plans about China.99 Many of the online articles deal with issues that make deliberate attempt to creating blatant hostility between Muslims and the Chinese. The traffic from Hong Kong to extremist websites, which has fewer limitations than that from mainland China, has become increasingly significant. The jihadist propaganda online has put great inf luence on several small radical Islamic communities in Hong Kong and neighboring Guangdong province. The Hui are not immune to this new tide of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism, which is due to the particularity in their Islamic teachings and societal identity, and the complexity of the globalizing world.100 The recent shifts among some of the Hui communities have facilitated a favorable environment in these areas for breeding terrorism. Terrorist attacks require planning and preparation and this requires for the terrorists to live safely in the areas where they are planning attacks. To conduct a terrorist attack, terrorists need to have supporters and sympathizers among the local community. The relatively isolated Hui communities all over China, especially the Hui hamlets in rural areas, can become ideal hide-out for terrorists to plot terrorist attacks. The Hui communities could become potential support base for the would be terrorists especially if they are getting radicalized under the inf luence of global jihad. The activities of Tabhligi Jamaat (TJ) among the Hui communities are also a matter of concern.101 The TJ is a transnational Islamic organization, basically a proselytizing group which claims to be nonpolitical. They are trained missionaries who have dedicated their lives to spreading Islam all over the world.102 However, the TJ has always adopted an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam and it has radicalized and become a driving force of Islamic extremism and a major recruiting agency for terrorist causes across the globe. A 2003 report of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stated that groups like Al Qaeda had used TJ for recruitment and

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indoctrination.103 Similar to Muslims in many other parts of the world, the Hui Muslims are facing the radical Islam spread through the activities of Islamic charities and NGOs and TJ. It is evident that a number of Hui who travelled to Pakistan with TJ have been exposed to virulent ideologies.104 Similarly, the members of TJ from Pakistan India, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and even from North Africa and Western Europe have entered China to preach in Muslim concentrated areas. The contact with Salafi, Ikhwani, and TJ has increased the risk of radicalization of the Hui Muslims. In China, Islam continues to play an important role in the ethnoreligious tensions involving Muslims. In the past, when the regime seriously threatened the Muslim identity, the Hui rose up in arms in defense of their ethnic, religious, and cultural heritage. Examples are the Hui rebellions during the Qing dynasty. From time to time, the Hui Muslims have also raised demands for cultural, religious, and even political autonomy, if not “outright political secession” as being demanded by some Uighurs.105 The spread of jihadist ideology has increased the risk of conf lict between the Chinese state and the radicalized segments of the Hui Muslims.106 Unlike the Uighurs, who live in a well-defined geographical area, the Hui Muslims are spread all over the country and have extensive interaction with non-Muslims. But the accommodation or integration of the Hui Muslims with the Han Chinese cannot be taken for granted. Despite centuries of interaction, the Hui Muslims retain distinctiveness in terms of religion, language, and culture, and maintain “ultimate loyalty to the Islamic Ummah”107 Islamic fundamentalism and jihadism underlie much of terrorist violence today. In Muslim-minority states, Islam has become the unifying force for the Muslims to protect their societal identities from assimilation. This is true in respect of both the Hui and the Turkic Muslims in China. However, the Hui and the Turkic Muslims of China are not natural allies since they are so different in their relationships with the Han Chinese. Among the fifty-five nationalities in China, the former are culturally closest to the mainstream Chinese community. The Hui have no inherent connection with the Turkic-origin Islamic groups but have often served as a bridge between Muslim minorities and the Han majority. However, it would be far too simplistic to say that the Hui “lack the sense of group identity that sustains the Uighur separatist movement,”108 even though they have not been implicated in the separatist movement and terrorist violence in any part of the country including in Xinjiang yet. Segments of the Hui have nurtured perceptions of threat to their societal identity and have demonstrated their desire for greater cultural and

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religious freedom albeit through nonviolent means. Under the inf luence of radical Islam and the global jihadist movement the Hui might become increasingly “unfamiliar strangers”109 with a disposition to challenge the state rule and social integration through political violence. The wide dispersion of the Hui Muslims throughout the country would make it extremely difficult for the authorities to respond to the threat effectively. Unless contained at the beginning with appropriate policies, the Hui could become a long-term threat to China’s security and stability.

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CHAPTER 5

THREATS TO CHINA FROM AL QAEDA

To the grandchildren of the scholars and the preachers . . . To those who hold to their faith in a time that sinks in desires and temptations . . . To those who march on the path of light despite the intense darkness . . . To the patient and forgotten Ummah . . . To the Ummah of East Turkistan . . . We dedicate this work in appreciation and veneration . . . —In a dedication to Muslims in Xinjiang, Islamic State of Iraq.1

T

his chapter gives an overview of the terrorist threat to China from Al Qaeda and its associated and affiliated groups. Despite the pervasiveness of its global jihadist ideology, the threat from Al Qaeda to China has so far been assessed to be low. However, most of these assessments fail to take note of the developments in the global jihadist landscape, especially involving the ideology that is now the strategic center of gravity for Islamist terrorism. Besides, assessments tend to focus on jihadists’ current enemy, which for groups like Al Qaeda is the United States primarily and the West generally. What is ignored is the fact that objectives of the jihadists are zero-sum and for them there is no fixed enemy or fixed set of grievances. Besides, as Al Qaeda has demonstrated repeatedly, wherever there is a conf lict involving Muslims, it comes to the aid of co-religionists. This assistance involves commitment of trained fighters to actually taking part in the local conf licts and other types of support such as money, logistics, and training facilities. That is how the group got extensively involved in conf licts in Kashmir, Chechnya, in countries in Southeast Asia and North Africa, and in the Middle East, especially in Iraq.

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Al Qaeda’s links with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the group spearheading the separation of Xinjiang from the rest of China through violence, is more evident now than before. In November 2008, Muhammad Uighuri, a spokesman for Al Qaeda declared that Osama bin Laden had appointed a Chinese citizen Abdul Haq Turkistani as the leader of Al Qaeda in China.2 Prior to this announcement, various intelligence agencies have also determined that Mohammad Abdullah Saleh Sughayer was the Al Qaeda representative to Asia, who was responsible for the group’s operations in China. Saleh Sughayer is a Saudi businessman who has extensively traveled in South and Southeast Asia, allegedly providing funds to a number of groups. His travel itinerary also included visits to China in October 14–18, 2004 ostensibly on business-related work. Though nothing was known about the group “Al Qaeda in China” prior to this announcement, it is not a surprising development considering Al Qaeda’s recent propensity to co-opt groups to join the Al Qaeda mainstream or to set up its own organization in many parts of the world that have active ongoing conf licts involving Muslims. Similarly, on October 6, 2009, a video produced by as-Sahab, the media production unit of Al Qaeda, was released on jihadist forums. The video featured Abu Yahya al-Libi, a senior member of Al Qaeda’s Shariah Committee. In his speech entitled “East Turkistan: The Forgotten Wound,” al-Libi urged Muslims to support their fellow Muslims in East Turkistan, referring to the Uighurs in Xinjiang.3 In a long narrative, al-Libi denounced China’s attempts to separate the Muslims from their faith and obliterate their identity and to dissolve their Islamic personality. According to al-Libi, East Turkistan, which the Chinese have usurped and renamed as Xinjiang, is an “indivisible part of Islamic lands.”4 Successive Chinese governments have attempted “diligently to cut off every link between the wounded Muslims of Turkistan and the Islamic Ummah.”5 To achieve this objective, China has adopted “many devilish methods created by hate, invented by greed and gluttony, and carried out by brutality and separation from values,” to the extent that the Uighurs are now at the verge of extinction.6 According to al-Libi, it is the “duty of Muslims today to stand by the side of their wounded and wronged brothers in East Turkistan.” 7 It is in this context that this chapter examines the threat to China from Al Qaeda and the groups that work closely with Al Qaeda. It also takes into consideration the fact that the threat to China is not only about terrorist attacks inside the country but also possible attacks against Chinese people and infrastructure in other countries where China has substantial interests.

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Al Qaeda and Its Global “Jihad” In order to understand the threat from Al Qaeda to China, it is necessary to explain the concept of global jihad being spearheaded by the Islamist groups. The global jihadist movement can be defined as the campaign unleashed by Al Qaeda and the groups and individuals that are associated with or inspired by Al Qaeda. The movement differs from traditional or local conf licts which are mostly ethno-nationalist in nature and usually have limited aims as well as geographic scope.8 On the other hand, Al Qaeda’s objectives are profoundly internationalist 9 and portrayed (at present) as a struggle against the “crusaders” and the “infidels” represented by the West, especially the United States and Israel, and the “apostates”— the corrupt and un-Islamic regimes (from Al Qaeda’s perspective) in the Muslim countries everywhere. According to the jihadist ideologues there is a war of civilizations in which “Jews and Crusaders” are seeking to destroy Islam. Armed jihad is the individual obligation of every Muslim, and terrorism and other asymmetric strategies are appropriate for defeating the enemy.10 The idea is to establish Islamic states based Islamic jurisprudence (Shariah Law) in those countries and possibly in all parts of the world. Similarly, the perception of the enemy is also different; for the traditional/local conf licts, it is the “near enemy”—the state in which the conf lict is located, whereas for the global jihadists, it could be the “near enemy” or the “far enemy” or both at the same time. For all practical purposes however, the objectives of the global jihadists appear largely zero-sum. There is no compromise except as a tactical expedient. America may be the main enemy in the fight, but not the sole one.11

Al Qaeda’s Jihad Osama bin Laden and his trustees had set up Al Qaeda in August 1988 in Peshawar, Pakistan. At that point, the war against the Soviets was over. The Soviets, unwillingly and unaware, functioned as glue that tied the various ethnicities and nationalities of the mujahideen together. Now, with the enemy leaving the battlefield, the common adversary of the mujahideen had vanished and almost simultaneously the old rivalries, disputes, and divisions between the eclectic groups of fighters resurfaced.12 To realize Abdullah Azzam’s ideal to liberate the Muslims, bin Laden established Al Qaeda as an organized Islamic faction and a worldwide framework of Islamist military and political organizations. Bin Laden invited representatives of Islamist groups and Islamic political movements to join Al Qaeda’s shura majlis or consultative council. The chief

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objectives were the training of mujahideen to fight and free Muslims all over the world from oppression. To bring disparate conf licts together and cement the bond among the mujahideen, Al Qaeda and its ideologues use specific themes that highlight the plight and suffering of the Muslims and the duty of the Muslims to fight back. Most often, these themes are based on a selective interpretation of the religious text. This is done not only to contextualize a particular conf lict but also to give the fight a religious veneer. Al Qaeda’s ideology of global jihad is synthesized from decades of militant Islamist experience. Envisioned as an ongoing process of Muslim liberation, this ideology extols armed combat as legitimate means to defend the faith. Much more than manipulating Islam as a tool of mass mobilization, it uses analogies from the Islamic past to justify the use of exemplary violence, including suicide attacks, to galvanize support among Muslims through what is called “propaganda by deed.”13 Bin Laden claims that Islam was under siege by Christians, Jews, secularists and globalization and that the economy was the vulnerable “center of gravity” of the United States. These themes are circulated widely via the Internet, in books, DVDs and pamphlets, and most notoriously, through videotapes, in which bin Laden and al-Zawahiri expound on various subjects. What makes Al-Qaeda’s propaganda distinctive is the relentlessly global nature of its dissemination and the quality of its productions. As a result of this media strategy, Al-Qaeda’s messages have penetrated deeply into Muslim communities around the world, preying on those Muslims who have a sense of helplessness . . . Al-Qaeda appears to have had an impact by offering a sense of empowerment to those uninitiated in Islamic texts and history.14

The platform of universal jihad has brought disparate Islamist groups from the Middle East, South, Southeast Asia, and East Asia and the Horn of Africa together under a common platform and a common agenda.15 The movement has subsumed Islamist struggles in many parts of the world with the result that more territorial Islamist groups and individuals today espouse universal agendas.16 Al Qaeda’s aim was and still remains the “liberation” of Muslim countries or territories, which they consider as being ruled by “corrupt” or “un-Islamic” governments, and installation of Islamic states—according to their own radical interpretation of Islam. However, after the entry of Western and particularly military forces from the United States of America into the Arabian Peninsula following the first Gulf war 1991, Osama bin Laden started to call for attacking U.S. interests. This was most directly

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seen in his declaration on August 23, 1996 and his declaration of total war against Jews and Crusaders on February 22, 1998. In Osama bin Laden’s own words, the United States has created “an ocean of oppression, injustice, slaughter and plunder” and has thus merited responses like the attacks on September 11, 2001.17 As examples, Osama bin Laden cites U.S. interventions and foreign policy as accountable for the loss of millions of Muslim lives around the world, including in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Kashmir, Central Asia, and Iraq. His message of hatred has now transformed into rhetoric of revenge, focusing on the United States and its allies. This message resonates well with sizeable pockets of disaffected youth across the globe.18 Bound together by an increasing hatred against their perceived enemies, such individuals and groups continue their domestic struggles, but add the prism of a global cause and a global purpose—the defense of Islam.19 Osama bin Laden sees the United States as the “head of the snake,” with the “corrupt” and “un-Islamic” governments in the Muslim world forming the main body. He believes that to topple the regimes in Muslim countries, their “near enemies,” the mujahideen first needs to fight the main supporter of those regimes, namely the United States—the head of the snake—or the “far enemy.”20 By unifying the resources of the various jihadi groups, Osama bin Laden believed that he could defeat the United States as he had previously “defeated” another superpower: the Soviet Union. According to bin Laden, once the United States is defeated and driven from the Muslim world, Washington’s support to those regimes would immediately come to an end. Then, Al Qaeda could release the mujahideen to overthrow the “un-Islamic” governments and found a state in line with his ideals—a state ruled by an extreme interpretation of Islamic law. Al Qaeda on the March? The U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001 successfully destroyed Al Qaeda bases, training facilities, and other logistical networks. The United States also overthrew the Taliban, their state sponsor, and weakened Al Qaeda in many other parts of the world. Many top ranking leaders of Al Qaeda and members of its associated groups were either killed or captured. An estimated 3,200 out of about 4,000 core Al Qaeda cadre have been effectively neutralized by the coalition’s actions.21 With its leadership in disarray, the organization was severely restricted to plan and execute multiple large-scale attacks on its own. However, Al Qaeda has proven to be tremendously flexible and has reorganized in a new form. It is believed to be an even more formidable, more

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elusive adversary as before. The development that the terror organization has undergone is often described as metastasis.22 Today, Al Qaeda is not one monolithic block. Rather, the organization consists of a core, of a number of associated groups, mostly in countries with conflicts involving Muslims, and of cells, mainly in the West. Al Qaeda’s capability may have suffered, but their intention has not. Even worse, a robust Islamist milieu ensures that Al Qaeda will be able to replenish its human losses and material wastage. To survive the U.S.-led global hunt, Al Qaeda has dispersed worldwide, shifting from a centralized network with a strong hierarchy to a decentralized movement, and sought sanctuary within associated Islamist groups fighting territorial and local campaigns in many parts of the world. To compensate the loss of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda’s principal training ground, its members are increasingly relying on the Islamist groups it had financed, armed, trained, and indoctrinated throughout the 1990s. These associated groups offer sanctuary, train new recruits, and conduct operations. The preoccupation of the United States with Iraq and Afghanistan has created opportunities for Al Qaeda to regroup itself. The ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan serve as a magnet for jihadists to join forces against the United States and its allies. According to a RAND Corporation report, the war in Iraq fulfilled four functions for the jihadist cause: • it helped spread ethnic violence • it reactivated dormant and attracted new fighters, • it consumed U.S. resources which could have been used in the war on terror and in securing Afghanistan, • successful attacks by the terrorists are being used for propaganda.23 According to available records, around 40 percent of all foreign fighters in Iraq come from Saudi Arabia, 20 percent from Libya, and approximately 8 percent from each, Syria, Yemen, and Algeria.24 The war in Iraq and the growing insurgency in Afghanistan also function as real-life training camps. It is suspected that those foreign fighters who leave the countries may use their skills and experiences, for example, the planning and carrying out of attacks or bomb-making, in their home countries and train others in those fields.25 Besides, the manner of U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and from Afghanistan would have important implications. The withdrawal of U.S. troops may lead to a downward spiral, attracting more foreign fighters and a surge in attacks. A perceived victory of Al Qaeda in Iraq would embolden the global Islamist movement and turn the country into a terrorist Disneyland, as Afghanistan did after the withdrawal of Soviet

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troops in 1989 and the rise of the Taliban in 1992. The Islamists would project the withdrawal as a defeat for the United States in their propaganda. It is likely that fighters would convene in different conf lict zones or badly governed areas. Thus as Bruce Hoffman contends, Al Qaeda is on the march and the threat from Islamist terrorism is far from over.26 In fact Al Qaeda has been able to replenish the loss of their operational leaders and financiers almost on a one-to-one basis. It has managed to regroup and reorganize itself in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Evidence now suggests that the pace of recruitment has increased and new training camps are being set up. Most of the foreign militants in Pakistan, notably Al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) with some elements of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), set up fairly sophisticated recruitment, training and indoctrination structures in many parts of the FATA. It is now clear that many of the attacks in Pakistan, including the suicide attacks in Islamabad and those attacks that have been foiled in Europe and North America, notably the averted attempts in Germany and Denmark, were directed out of these areas. Most of the perpetrators had traveled to these areas for training. According to Donald Kerr, the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Al Qaeda has “retained or regenerated key elements of its capability, including its top leadership, operational lieutenants, and a de facto safe haven in . . . the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) [of Pakistan] to train and deploy operatives for attacks in the West.”27 In sum, the surviving capability of Al Qaeda and its associated groups to carry out attacks remains substantial.28 These groups are still able to plan, and execute significant attacks in a wide variety of locations and against an even wider number of targets. Most importantly, Al Qaeda has become an ideology and a movement on its own and an attraction for Muslims to fight their enemies wherever they can. In many ways, Al Qaeda has completed its mission of being the vanguard or spearhead of Islamic movements, envisioned by Azzam. It has inspired a generation of existing groups and shown the way for an emerging generation of new jihadists.29 By resigning itself to a robust ideological and less operational structure, Al Qaeda has increased its survivability. To compensate for its depleted operational capability, Al Qaeda is investing extensively in sustained propaganda, inspiring, and instigating the wider Muslim community, as well as other Islamist movements, to join in the fight against the United States and its allies. In effect, Al Qaeda’s new role includes promoting its traditional mission by non-military means through the mass media, especially the new

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communication technologies. It is moving from a physical organization to a virtual one.30 Al Qaeda’s Strategy Noticeably, Al Qaeda’s inner core has become less and less important in the planning and the carrying out of terror attacks. The analysis of the major terrorist attacks following September 11, 2001 reveals a clear decline in Al Qaeda’s inner circle’s involvement in those attacks. The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings and the attacks in London in 2005 were carried out by homegrown cells that had no direct links to Al Qaeda, except for the shared ideology.31 This demonstrates Al Qaeda’s efficiency in the utilization of its loose network and recruitment of European and U.S. nationals who can move freely in their countries. The aforementioned metastasis goes back to the coalition forces’ successful military campaign in Afghanistan where Al Qaeda has suffered substantial losses. Ideologues and strategists like Abu Mus’ab al-Suri identified the centralized hierarchy of the terror organization as its center of gravity: in the case of decapitation, that is, the killing or capturing of senior Al Qaeda leaders, the organization would be extinguished. Hence, al-Suri argued that the organizational form should be changed. Rather than a top-down hierarchy, al-Suri favored a “jihad of individual terrorism,”32 without a direct link between the leaders and foot soldiers who organize in cells anywhere in the world to carry out attacks. The “bond” tying together all the terrorists is their common ideology of radical Islam. Al Qaeda is continuously trying to widen the war to different geographic areas, exploiting Muslim grievances in different parts of the world as in Kashmir, Philippines, Chechnya, or Xinjiang. The strive of those groups is usually limited in terms of means employed, objectives to achieve, and geographic scope. Linking geographically restricted struggles to their own agenda expands the “jihad” to a global phenomenon with the creation of a huge, coherent Islamic state as their overall objective. For the associated groups, linking their operations to Osama bin Laden’s organization entails advantages regardless of how close their actual links to Al Qaeda’s core are. An attack with few victims carried out by a local terrorist group in Algeria would not be reported anywhere else than in the country itself. Linking the attack to and claiming it to be carried out in the name of Al Qaeda, guarantees international media attention. On the other hand, states also try to construct connections between their domestic small-scale skirmishes, insurgencies, or separatist problems, and Al Qaeda. The advantage of such a connection, whether

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constructed or factual, helps those states to join the U.S.-led war on terror and gain allies, or even receive funds, as in the case of the Philippines’ struggle with the Abu Sayyaf Group.33 Characteristics of Attacks Al Qaeda’s tactics have also evolved as evident from the attacks during the last ten years. The East Africa Bombings in 1998 targeted U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The almost simultaneous explosion of bomb-laden cars placed near the embassies killed 250 and wounded more than 5,000. The subsequent hardening of high-value targets transferred the threat to softer targets. Al Qaeda planned to attack U.S. diplomatic targets in Bangkok, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Phnom Penh, Hanoi and Manila, the American Institute in Taiwan, and the U.S. consulate in Surabaya in September 2002,34 but a visible security presence made the group consider softer targets. The group has also made organizational modifications that have resulted in significant changes to the way it conducts operations. The group is adapting dual technologies. There are several examples demonstrating Al Qaeda’s innovative ability; the small boat packed with explosives that devastated the USS Cole in 2000; the hijacking of commercial airplanes for their attacks of September 11, 2001; or the use of commercially available chemicals in the 2005 London Bombings. Noticeably, the organization has moved from mass-casualty attacks to smaller, yet more frequent attacks in a vast geographical area.35 Assaults ascribed to Al Qaeda, affiliated groups or cells have taken place almost everywhere in the world. Al Qaeda is also increasingly aiming at economic targets. Arguably, the World Trade Center was chosen as one of the targets in September 2001 because it is an icon36 of U.S. economic hegemony. Still the organization clearly tries to hit and weaken the economy of its adversaries.37 Among the targets of the 2003 Istanbul Bombings was a branch of the HSBC as a symbol of British economic power. The 2002 and 2005 Bali Bombings explicitly targeted foreign tourists with the aim of spreading fear and depriving the state of revenues from tourism. As a document posted in the Internet mentioned, Through the battle of Al-Qaeda with America, the Islamic nation has entered a new phase that differs from earlier stages in which Muslims fought their enemies; this stage in its most important pillar is based on the economic war because of the difference in the opponent in this vicious war.

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Usually, a conventional war is carried out between two military forces and the victory would fall in the hand of the side with the strongest military force that is victorious on the battlefield. As for our war with America, it is radically different because it depends primarily on defeating America economically; anything that can affect their economy negatively is considered by us as a step on the road to victory, and not the military defeats that we inf lict on them unless they inf luence the total victory measures by impacting their economy indirectly and by shaking the confidence of their economy heads in their ability to protect their various trades, in addition to the losses in their installations or military machinery in the battlefield. 38

The reality is that government countermeasures have increased the vulnerability of population centers. As Islamist groups weaken and governmental targets get hardened, terrorists are likely to hit soft targets, killing civilians, if possible, en masse. As it is impossible to prevent bombings of public places, civilians, and civilian infrastructure targets will remain the most vulnerable to terrorist attacks in the short, mid and long term. Al Qaeda has also made efforts to acquire unconventional weapons such as chemical and biological agents, especially contact poisons that are easy to conceal and breach security. Both bin Laden’s statement in February 2003 “think intelligently and kill Americans secretly” and Sheikh Nasr bin Hamid al Fahd’s May 2003 fatwa legitimize the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN).39 Although an attempt to pervert Islam, it is likely that the Saudi Sheikh presented Qur’anic justifications, a requirement in Islam, as a prelude to an attack. Ref lecting the existing and emerging threat, Eliza Manningham-Buller, Head of the British Security Services (MI5), said in London on July 17, 2003 that a terrorist attack on a Western city using CBRN is “only a matter of time.”40 She added: “We know that renegade scientists have cooperated with Al Qaeda and provided them with some of the knowledge they need to develop these weapons.”41 An Al Qaeda associated group, the Salafi Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), now renamed Al Qaeda Organization in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) successfully developed ricin, one of the contact poisons mentioned in the Al Qaeda manuals, and its rudimentary manufacturing apparatus in London in January 2003. The ricin network in Europe, particularly in London, Manchester, East Anglia, and Edinburgh in the UK, cooperated with Al Qaeda experts in the Pankishi Gorge in Georgia, on the border of Chechnya. Al Qaeda’s ideology has also spawned off a new generation homegrown or local jihadists involving second or third-generation migrant Muslims in Europe and North America and Islamic converts. These

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“do-it-yourself ” jihadists are inf luenced by the ideology of global jihad and see themselves as the vanguard to fight for the cause of oppressed and suffering Muslim communities. A majority of them get inspiration from the Internet, though few, like the London bombers, are exposed to established groups and leaders for indoctrination and training.42According to some analysts this is a product of social exclusion and alienation and lack of opportunities of migrant Muslims or Muslim converts in their host societies. Their sense of alienation is further compounded by global events such as the invasion of Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, and the ageold Israeli-Palestine conf lict. These grievances have contributed to both the expression of extremist rhetoric and, more importantly, the development of a jihadist “soldier of fortune” mindset among some young male Muslims who want to “do something.”43 Many of them are not connected to any particular group and “seem to be moving very rapidly from a period of having no criminal record to suddenly being willing to use violent methods to make a political point.”44 Nevertheless, these selfradicalized individuals and groups can become far more dangerous when they reach out for support from more established terrorist networks.45 Thus, the terrorist threat is not simply from Al Qaeda as an organization, but rather from a more dispersed, less coherent movement of jihadists, inspired by Al Qaeda’s ideology though not necessarily controlled by it.46 The actors in this movement share the agenda, strategy, and tactics of Al Qaeda, even without direct contact. They use extremist ideology as a surrogate for formal structures and rely on mass-effect terrorism as the weapon of first choice.47 Moreover, they are capable of striking at targets with deadly force at the place and time of their choosing. No state can claim to be immune from such a threat. The Core Al Qaeda Groups After September 2001 some of the Al Qaeda’s key leaders are either captured or killed. Its base and training camps in Afghanistan were destroyed. This has reduced the organization’s command and control structures and overall operational capabilities. However, a number of prominent leaders remain at large, including, most obviously, Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. Many of the Egyptians brought into Al Qaeda by al-Zawahiri—who in many ways constitute the logistical backbone of the network—have yet to be detained.48 While it appears that the killing and capture strategy has succeeded in greatly reducing the functional ability of Al Qaeda’s leadership core, it clearly has not brought about the end of the Al Qaeda phenomenon. At the same time, many like-minded

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organizations have come to the fore.49 Some of them have even joined the Al Qaeda central. Thus Al Qaeda has now six organizations besides the parent group that mostly operates in Pakistan. 1. Tanzim Qaedat fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (The Al Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers)—Iraq 2. Tanzim Qaedat fi al-Jazeeratul Arab (The Al Qaeda Organization in the Arabian Peninsula)—Based in Saudi Arabia 3. Tanzim Al Qaeda al-Jihad fi Ard al-Kinnanah (The Al Qaeda Organization in the Land of Kinanah)—Egypt and Palestine 4. Tanzim Qaedat bi-Bilad al-Maghrab al-Islami (formerly GSPC) (The Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb)—North Africa 5. Tanzim Al Qaeda al-Jihad fi al-Khorasan (The Al Qaeda Organization in Afghanistan)—Afghanistan 6. Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad (The Al Qaeda Organization in the Malay archipelago)—Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In addition, the Yemeni militants have formed Al Qaeda in Yemen as a separate branch under the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. While Nasser al-Wahishi is the leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen, Said Ali al-Shihri, a former Guantánamo Bay detainee has now emerged as its deputy leader.50 Though most of these groups are transnational, all of them nevertheless have local agendas. For them targeting the “far enemy” is not necessarily of greater priority. For groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Yemen, the primary objective is to fight their respective national governments. On the contrary, groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or in the Islamic Maghreb have more regional aspirations in addition to the local ones. The relationship of the groups with the leadership of the Al Qaeda central is based on an expectation that such cooperation would be beneficial to the local organization both materially and operationally. These groups can tap into main Al Qaeda’s relatively wider international support base, from which they can recruit and also receive financial and logistical support. From Al Qaeda’s perspective these networks would provide Al Qaeda points of entry into almost all parts of the world. In the long run, this cooperation will unify and strengthen the radical militant groups in different regions, ideologically and perhaps operationally. At the same time, it will lift Al Qaeda into the commanding position of this growing cooperation, as it is the main organization which rallies the various groups and individuals together.

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Affiliated Groups of Al Qaeda There are a number of groups that are associated or affiliated with Al Qaeda and share its world view. These groups are preoccupied with both local conf licts and the “global jihad,” which gives them a threat-potential that goes beyond their immediate tactical environment. The hybrid ideological and operational nature of these organizations stems from their interaction with the global jihadist movement as currently constituted under the umbrella of Al Qaeda’s global network. The relationship of these groups with Al Qaeda was formed mostly during the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad. Many leaders of these groups and their members fought together against the Soviets. They shared the common enemy and common indoctrination and training facilities. The relationship continued even after the Soviets withdrew. During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, these groups continued to cooperate with Al Qaeda and continued to send their members to training camps maintained or supported by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Chechnya, and other places. Al Qaeda on China The threat from Al Qaeda and its associated groups to China stems from what some analysts say the “global terrorism burden” of a rising power.51 Notwithstanding the current global financial crisis, China’s rise in the international system is given. However, an activist and robust commercial and political profile globally can also attract the attention of the terrorists. It has often been argued that much of the terrorism against the United States was the result of the penetrating nature of American cultural, military, and political dominance commensurate with its global ascendancy.52 Thus, it is generally believed that it would be logical for China to take on more of the “terrorism burden” associated with great power status or at the least, both China and the United States may discover that they are facing a common but differentiated transnational threat.53 This is already evident from a number of incidents targeting the interests of China in almost every continent in past few years. There is a perception that as China becomes a major power like the United States, it might behave like the United States, like the “head of the snake” that is protecting the Jews and corrupt Muslim governments, and kill or help other governments kill Muslims as America is doing now. Al Qaeda leaders, especially Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, have mentioned China and more specifically the Uighurs in various statements. On a couple of occasions China has been mentioned as one of the

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fields of jihad along with other areas such as Chechnya, Kashmir, and some North African countries. Since 2006, al-Zawahiri has mentioned the “East Turkistan problem” among various concerns in his messages.54 On September 20, 2007, as-Sahab Media Company, that produces audio and video materials for Al Qaeda, released a video entitled “Power of Truth.” This video featured old recordings by Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri praising jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq.55 The video also featured compilations of old archival material on the September 2001 attacks, statements by the United States and other Western politicians and security experts on the structure and tactics of Al Qaeda, and video clips of attacks against Western troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. The video also features some recent statements by Al-Zawahiri on the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 2008 Red Mosque events in Pakistan in which a crisis was triggered when radicals kidnapped some Chinese workers from beauty parlors in Islamabad. China is mentioned in the video in a statement by Abu-Umar al-Baghdadi of The Islamic State of Iraq. Al-Baghdadi said that they seek to establish an Islamic state spanning from China to Spain.56 A more specific and direct reference to the plight of Muslims in China is made in the speech of senior Al Qaeda leader, Abu Yahya al-Libi, on October 6, 2009. Al-Libi describes China’s rule in Xinjiang as an “occupation,” inundating the region with Han Chinese immigrants and organized settlements similar to what the Jews are doing in Palestine.57 Moreover, the Chinese government is attempting to push the Muslims to extinction by tough birth-control measures, forced abortions, and penalties. The most despicable aspect of this has been forced displacement and deportation of Muslim women to major cities outside Xinjiang on the pretext of providing them with “professional training” for employment.58 In effect, this amounts to cutting the connection of these women to their families indefinitely. Simultaneously, the Chinese government has closed down Islamic schools, institutes, and universities and banned religious education including Qur’anic sessions and study at home and at mosques, especially for those who are under eighteen years of age. The government has arrested and killed scholars and pushed others to f lee the “land of Turkistan.”59 The speech by al-Libi is one of most significant demonstrations of support by Al Qaeda for the Uighurs’ fight against the Chinese state. It is a reminder that the wider Muslim community is deeply affected by the sufferings of the Uighurs and that it would be a matter of time before the mujahideen comes to the aid of Uighurs as the state of atheism and stubbornness (China) is doomed to disintegration and division.

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On August 15, 2007, an article entitled “China under the Microscope of the Salafia al-Jihadia” was posted in the Internet. The author of the document was Dr. Akram Hijazi, an inf luential Arab writer whose analysis appeals to both moderate and radical Islamists. Salafia al-Jihadia refers to the salafi-jihadist movement. In the article, the author discussed the position of the Al Qaeda toward China and whether Al Qaeda has any plans about China.60 Hijazi’s analysis provides a clue of how the jihadist movement is likely to react to China, as China becomes a more powerful player in the international system. According to the author, there was a belief that Muslims, specifically in the Arab world, see China as a friendly country which has given the Arab issues support and assistance and has stood in the face of the West, the United States, and Israel in the international debates. It is also perceived that China did not hurt Muslims either directly or indirectly, especially in their country where Islam had spread. However, according to Hijazi, in reality, there is a blatant hostility between Muslims and the Chinese. Moreover, the façade of this friendly relationship would likely come to an end when China usurps the title of the global hegemon. Hijazi claims that, like the United States in the past, China will support Israel, bringing it into confrontation with Muslims. Thus at some point, “the multi-headed dragon [China] could replace the head of the snake [the United States]” as a global hegemon at odds with the Islamic world.61 Hijazi also says: In fact, there is more than one strategic actor, and each one of them has a meaning in our inquiries. Nevertheless, neither the Salafia al-Jihadia nor the Americans nor the Chinese nor the Jews seem to be an exact answer. In fact, the issue in general is the emergence of alliances on the verge of collapse between the Jews and the West on one hand and another possible alliance between the Jews and the Chinese on the other hand. If the Salafia al-Jihadia has the right to determine its enemies and objectives, which would result in consequences that the Islamic world would ultimately be affected by in the end, therefore, the researchers have the right to inspect the criteria that would allow them to characterize this enemy so that we can predict the next steps, and from here, we begin.62

From Al Qaeda’s perspective, China’s history toward Muslims is bad. Al Qaeda considers itself as the only and unique Islamic jihadist organization, which endorsed the issues of the Islamic nation and took upon itself to protect the interests of Muslims everywhere. So the question arises, does Al Qaeda have an issue and an enmity that justify the announcement of a state of hostility with China?63

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The author grounds his argument on the premise that Al Qaeda, as Osama bin Laden emphasizes, is not immobile, it is and will be present wherever the “creed is present.”64 According to the author, China is growing both economically and militarily and likely to become as powerful as the United States in near future. Therefore, the process of transition of the power centers from the United States and Europe to China, is already taking place. China is about to sit on the throne of the world power and global leadership whether the world likes it or not. China will have the upper hand when it comes to hegemony, and global interventions currently dominated by America and partially by Europe. The long-awaited question is, since the snake’s head will now move from one place to another, will China, as the next snake’s head, ensure the protection and the welfare of Israel as America and Europe do now and if that happens, will Al-Qaeda declare a new war against China, as it proclaimed it on the United States?65

There is also particular concern about increasingly good relations between China and Israel. Since the recognition of the People’s Republic of China in September 9, 1959 by Israel, which was the first state to do so in the Middle East, and the establishment of full-f ledged diplomatic relations between the two countries on January 24, 1999, there have been talks about an Israeli intrusion into China and the story of defense relations which were described as sturdy and centered on security and armaments. Throughout the 1950s, the relations between the two countries have been tense, however, it began to improve steadily since 1979. China deepened its relations with Israel by strengthening cooperation in the areas of defense, telecommunications, science, technology, agriculture, and security. Israel has also offered its services for security of the 2008 Olympics. On the cultural level, symbols of the Jewish culture, including the associations, clubs, cafes, religious activity centers, and the Friendship Society, have emerged in the major Chinese cities. Thus the Jewish activity is on the increase in China which is hostile to the interests of the jihadists.66 There are also historical ties between the Muslims in China especially the Uighur and the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Taliban government in Afghanistan had received a number of fighters from ETIM. Mullah Mohammad Omar, the leader of the Taliban welcomed the fighters and accepted their allegiance. East Turkestan’s fighters fought pitched battles alongside the Taliban against the U.S. forces. Later some of them went to China to “herald and congregate,” some of them, including their leader Hasan Mahsum, were killed by the American and the Pakistani forces.

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Some were arrested and taken to the United States.67 In January 2008, Al Qaeda in Afghanistan released a book on 120 “martyrs” who fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Five Uighurs from Xinjiang were included in that book.68 It also said that one of these Uighurs was killed during the U.S. attacks in 2001.69 At the beginning of 1999, Osama bin Laden met with the leaders of the Islamic Movement of East Turkistan. At the time, he pledged financial assistance, and asked them to coordinate all their activities with the Islamic Liberation Movement of Uzbekistan and the Taliban. Bin Laden has given huge sums of money and offered a large quantity of arms, ammunition, and communication tools and equipment to help ETIM train prepare for attacks. Without a doubt, they represent a great asset for Al Qaeda, and Al Qaeda can exploit them if it decides to declare hostility against China. In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, China joined the United States in its war against terrorism. China gained the support of the Americans and relations between the two countries improved. There is a perception among Muslims that China exploited the September 2001 attacks to stigmatize the struggle of the Uighurs and described it as terrorism. Similarly, China could find itself increasingly at odds with one of Al Qaeda’s most persistent and trenchant grievances—foreign presence and inf luence in the Middle East, especially in those countries which Al Qaeda considers as its enemies. Already, China’s dependence on oil from the Middle East has moved Beijing to sign off a number of projects in many countries in the region especially in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. This involves an increased Chinese presence and a heightened Chinese profile, which could easily attract the attention of terrorist organizations.70 Threats to Chinese Interests Outside of China As mentioned earlier, a number of groups work closely with Al Qaeda or at the behest of Al Qaeda. However, creating a list of Al Qaeda associates is difficult due to the nebulous nature of the groups and their changing capabilities and intentions. Though these groups share Al Qaeda’s world view and the concept of universal jihad, they are primarily interested in the conf licts at the local level. These groups operate as independent organizations to the extent that they are not under the operational control or the inf luence of Al Qaeda. But there is a propensity among the groups to come to support each-other’s cause, both ideologically as well as by extending human and material means. This mutual support is based on the shared understanding that the mujahideen must come to the aid of

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their co-religionists anywhere in the world. Groups in this category have also exhibited willingness to act beyond the borders of their respective countries against foreign targets. According to the radical ideologues every Muslim has a responsibility to take revenge for the deaths of thousands of Muslims by the enemies of Islam “and fight against those all together—just as they fight against you . . .” 71 For example, Imam Samudra, one of the masterminds of the October 2002 Bali Bombings argued that globalization has changed the character of the conf lict between Muslims and non-Muslims. The attack on Islam is not limited to specific areas or zones of conf lict. Rather, Imam Samudra states, Islam is currently being attacked on a global scale. Therefore, Muslim responses to this hostility should be in kind, and not be restricted to the occupied territories such as Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, or Iraq. Samudra suggests that this position is divinely supported, exhorting Muslims to: “Slay those wherever you may come upon them, and take them captives and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every conceivable place.”72 Thus, it is entirely possible that the conf lict in China, more particularly in Xinjiang involving the Uighurs, could mobilize the wider jihadist community. If that happens, as had been the case with many other conf licts, it would be difficult to discount the possibility of attacks targeting the Chinese interest in other parts of the world. South Asia In South Asia, Pakistan and Bangladesh now represent the most radical milieu in the Muslim world. Radicalization is also on the increase in India, which is now the second most populous Muslim country in the world. In the past, a number of groups active in South Asia have sent their members to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan and also developed extensive ties with Al Qaeda generally and Osama bin Laden personally. In South Asia also, China’s stakes—both strategic as well as economic—are immense. Chinese-Pakistani relations are buoyant. Especially economically, the countries have become strong partners. The trade volume undertaken between the two countries has been rising continuously in recent years. China is now a major trading partner of Pakistan. The People’s Republic is the main financier and constructer of the strategically important deep-sea port of Gwadar in the south of Pakistan on the Arabian Sea. The port will play an important role in transporting oil from the Middle East and North Africa to China. The two countries also cooperate in the field of nuclear energy generation, with China building a power plant at Chashma/Punjab.73

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Given this relationship and the high visibility of Chinese companies and workers, Al Qaeda or its associated groups may easily target Chinese interest in Pakistan. Similarly, Chinese-Bangladeshi trade relations have seen a surge in recent years. In 2002 bilateral trade was worth less than US$ 100 million.74 This number increased massively to US$ 3.19 billion.75 China seems especially interested in the gas reserves of Bangladesh and was granted exploration rights.76 The relations to the smaller country are assumed to serve China’s grand strategy to access new markets to export her products. Furthermore, Bangladesh is a geographically close source of natural resources for China’s immense hunger for energy. Given the fact that foreign targets were attacked, there could be a potential threat to Chinese companies in Bangladesh. Attacks against Chinese Interests in South Asia Since 2004, there have been five major attacks on Chinese nationals by Pakistani militants. On May 3, 2004, three Chinese technicians were killed in a bomb attack at Gwadar in the province of Baluchistan.77 Eleven others, including nine Chinese, were injured.78 The Chinese victims belonging to the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) were working on a project of port facilities in the city of Gwadar, a port town about 500 kilometers west of Karachi.79 Though no group or individual claimed responsibility for the blast, according to Pakistani sources, the attack was possibly conducted by the Islamic extremists or Baluch nationalists who opposed the construction project.80 On October 9, 2004, Pakistani Taliban militants kidnapped two Chinese engineers in South Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. During a rescue operation by Pakistan security forces, one Chinese hostage was killed while the other was freed.81 The Chinese workers had been working on the Gomal Zam Dam project, which is close to the tribal areas, where fierce fighting had occurred between security forces and Al Qaeda-linked militants.82 On February 15, 2006, three Chinese engineers working for a cement plant were killed in an ambush by Islamic militants in the town of Hub in Baluchistan.83 Three others accompanying them escaped.84 A terrorist outfit known as the Baluchistan Liberation Army claimed responsibility for the attack. Violence against Chinese nationals in Pakistan peaked in June and July 2007. On 8 July, Islamic extremists killed three Chinese workers and wounded another in Peshawar, the provincial capital city of the North

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West Frontier Province (NWFP). The Pakistani officials saw the attack as revenge for Islamabad’s crackdown on 7 July on religious students who gathered at the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad.85 These students had kidnapped six Chinese women, one man, and two Pakistani men on June 23, 2007.86 The captive persons were released after being held as hostages for about seven hours.87 In yet another violent incident, a convoy escorting sixty Chinese technicians was attacked by a suicide bomber on July 19, 2007. When the explosion happened, the convoy was passing through the RCD Highway in the town of Hub in the province of Baluchistan.88 No Chinese were hurt but twenty-nine Pakistanis, including seven police officers were killed.89 According to Pakistani police, the attack was obviously targeted at the Chinese.90 On August 29, 2008, Pakistani militants kidnapped two Chinese telecommunication engineers in Dir district, located between the Swat valley and Bajaur tribal agency.91 Pakistani security forces had been fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban militants in this area. The Pakistani Taliban, known as the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) claimed responsibility for the kidnappings, which they saw as retaliation for the Pakistan military attacks against them.92 One of the two captive Chinese successfully escaped in mid-October 2008 and another was released in Pakistan on February 14, 2009.93 On June 10, 2004, more than 20 militants attacked a Chinese construction site in northeastern Kunduz province of Afghanistan.94 Eleven Chinese workers were killed and four others injured.95 The workers belonged to China Railway Shisiju Group Corporation, whose workers were engaged in a World Bank project to rebuild a chunk of vital highway between Kunduz and Baghlan provinces in Afghanistan.96 This appalling attack follows a series of other incidents directed against foreigners ahead of Afghan elections in September 2004. Afghani security officials identified the attackers as “remnants” of the Al Qaeda, Taliban, and Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.97 However, they failed to provide any further evidence. Prior to the attack, one of the top Taliban commanders, Mullah Dadullah, had issued orders to his fighters to kill foreign engineers and workers.98 However, both the Taliban and Hezb-eIslami denied responsibility for the killing of Chinese workers.99 Southeast Asia Both in terms of geography and history, China has substantial interests in Southeast Asia. This encompasses economic (business and investment)

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and political and military aspects. For China, Southeast Asia is a strategically important region. Much of China’s exports and imports pass through Southeast Asia’s waters, especially the Straits of Malacca. China cooperates in many fields with Southeast Asian countries. Trade has been soaring and is worth billions of U.S. dollars. Chinese companies are active in virtually all realms of business. China has almost straddled Southeast Asia’s business investment, tourism, and new development initiatives. In 2007, the total trade figure was more than $200 billion. In 2007, there were 3.4 million Chinese tourists visiting Southeast Asian states.100 The region has also a substantial population of Chinese origin who are prominent in business and industry. China is also actively involved in spreading its culture in the region. In Southeast Asia, there are twenty-one Confucius Institutes providing language courses.101 There is a perception that China will both employ its cultural commodity to exploit an economic market, and aim to reconstruct a popular culture in pursuit of ideological hegemony, similar to the United States in the 1950s.102 In Muslim majority countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, there is historic hostility between the people of Chinese origin and Muslims. The Islamist groups in these countries have substantive ties with Al Qaeda. There is always a potential that these hostilities can be exploited by Islamist groups to target Chinese interests in the region. In terms of threats to Chinese interests, two countries in Southeast Asia are of particular interest—the Philippines and Indonesia. Since the beginning of the millennium, Chinese-Filipino trade relations have been growing around 42 percent annually.103 For 2010, a trade volume to the amount of US$ 30 billion is targeted.104 Further, by 2010 a free trade area shall be established between China and the ASEAN 6, to which Philippines belongs. Chinese companies are involved in projects as broad as infrastructure, research and development, machinery, construction, agriculture, and tourism. These could be an easy target for the following extremist groups in the country. In Indonesia, similarly, the bilateral trade is targeted at $30 billion by 2010.105 The Chinese investments in Indonesia encompass the energy sector especially power generation, oil and gas, minerals, and coal mining.106 It may be noted that a number of conf licts in Indonesia involves bitterness arising out of exploitation of resources. Naturally, there is an undercurrent of latent hostility in Indonesia against Beijing’s policies which encompasses its strategic goals, economic activities and domestic policies involving minorities. In the aftermath of the ethnic violence in Urumqi in July 2009, several Muslim organizations in Indonesia denounced what they say was “religious repression” and “violence” against Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.

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The Indonesian Council of Ulemas criticized China for prohibiting Uighur Muslims from performing their Friday prayers at mosques after the riots.107 On July 12, 2009, Indonesian Muslim Workers Association (PPMI) urged the government to permit a protest against China’s “mistreatment” to the Uighur Muslims.108 Following China’s crackdown on the riots, there were demonstrations to support Uighurs in Jakarta and other cities in the country, where protesters were relatively few in number. On July 13, 2009, several dozen Indonesian Muslims held a demonstration outside the Chinese embassy in Jakarta. The activity was reportedly organized by a “coalition of Islamist groups.”109 Protestors demanded action from the Indonesian government to stop what they called “genocide” in Xinjiang. In their statement, protesters urged the Indonesian government to “boycott Chinese products” and “put diplomatic pressure” on Beijing to prevent Uighur Muslims from persecution.110 According to the AFP report, the protesters even shouted calls for “jihad” against China to save the Uighurs.111 Three days later, about 100 Muslim students from the University of Indonesia held another protest outside the Chinese Embassy on July 15, 2009.112 The Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) claimed that its delegation had a talk with the First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy to Indonesia. The group believed that the Chinese government had been “oppressing” the Uighurs and urged China to stop the “violence” against these Muslims.113 Africa and Middle East China has substantial interests in many countries in Africa and the Middle East. For example, in Somalia, China’s immense hunger for natural resources even leads her to places that Western companies abandoned for security reasons long ago. In June 2007, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed an agreement of exploration rights in a part of Somalia. CNOOC will search for oil in the country’s northern Mudog region. The war-torn country had signed another agreement with CNOOC and the China International Oil and Gas (CIOG), which allocates 51 percent of oil revenues to the interim government.114 Though, bilateral trade between China and Algeria is relatively low with US$ 3.8 billion in 2007.115 However, this number is an increase of 83 percent from the previous year116 and trade relations are due to rise further. Algeria exports mainly gas to China which gives the northern African country strategic importance and guarantees the special interest of China.117 Chinese companies export a wide array of goods and construction services seem to be of particular importance.118

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Similarly, Chinese-Egyptian relations are f lourishing. Politically, Egypt follows the One-China policy and China supports the Arab Peace initiative and the “land for peace” formula in the Middle East.119 The countries also cooperate in the use of nuclear energy with China providing know-how, technology, and material.120 China is especially interested in Egyptian oil and gas. To secure imports of natural resources, eleven bilateral cooperation agreements were signed.121 Furthermore, the two countries founded a company to produce oil and gas rigs.122 In 2002, the Chinese Cultural Center in Cairo was founded, the first in the Middle East.123 The initiative is aimed at teaching Egyptians some Chinese to facilitate communication with Chinese visitors. As tourism is Egypt’s largest economic sector, Chinese travelers are considered an important source of income. Economic relations between China and Egypt have been rising in recent years. The trade volume reached US$ 3.19 billion in 2006, increasing by 48.8124 percent from US$ 2.1 billion in 2005, which was an increase by 36 percent from 2004.125 For 2009, the trade volume between the two countries is estimated to rise up to US$ 5 billion,126 to US$ 10 billion by 2010127 and surpass U.S.-Egyptian trade sometime in the next decade.128 China also has business interests in Morocco, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, and even Iraq. Moroccan-Chinese bilateral trade reached US$ 1.484 billion which is likely to rise in the following years. Chinese companies are active in fields such as telecommunications, and infrastructure in Morocco. In 2005, China was granted rights to explore oil in the country. Iraq and China have signed an agreement to develop an oil field worth US$ 1.2 billion, in August 2008.129 Given the huge resources of Iraq and growing market potential on the one side, and China’s engagement in places where Western companies are reluctant to do business on the other, Iraq offers huge potential for Chinese companies. In all these countries in particular and in North Africa and the Middle East in general, Al Qaeda’s ties are complex yet intense. The ties are based primarily on personal contacts that members and leaders established during the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad in the 1980s. Subsequently some of the more senior operatives were directly integrated into the Al Qaeda network. While the local groups remain focused on fomenting an Islamist revolution in their respective countries, they are also willing supporters of Al Qaeda, prepared to act on behalf of or otherwise support Al Qaeda when called to do so. All these organizations have benefited from cooperation with Al Qaeda especially in terms of financial and logistical support. Al Qaeda’s interest in the region is evident from the fact that in September 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri urged Al Qaeda and mujahideen groups to “cleanse” North Africa of infidels.

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The group that is most likely to threaten Chinese interest significantly is the Al Qaeda Organization in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formerly, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria. Though the primary objective of the group is to overthrow the Algerian government and replace it with a government ruled on the basis of Islamic law, the group’s agenda has shifted toward global jihad. Hence the group has targeted foreign interests both inside Algeria and outside. In March 2007, workers of the Russian company Stroitransgas were attacked. In the assault, three Algerians and a Russian were killed and several others injured.130 In December 2006 employees of a Halliburton affiliated company were attacked. One Algerian was killed and one American, four Britons, and four Algerians injured.131 In June 2007 the group also attempted to attack a natural gas pipeline in northern Algeria, killing two security personnel but not damaging the pipeline itself.132 On June 17, 2009, a group of AQIM militants ambushed a convoy of Algerian gendarmes escorting Chinese construction workers at El Mehir, 210 kilometers east of Algeria’s capital, Algiers.133 According to local sources, militants triggered at least two roadside IEDs to stop the convoy and fired at the trapped vehicles with automatic arms.134 Twenty-four gendarmes were killed though the Chinese workers were unharmed in the attack.135 Although it is not clear whether AQIM specifically targeted the Chinese, its anti-Chinese stance became evident in July 2009 following Beijing’s crackdown on the riots in Urumqi. In a statement posted on Islamist websites, AQIM vowed to attack Chinese workers in Algeria and other places across Northwest Africa in retaliation for the deaths of Uighur Muslims in the riots.136 Following the July 2009 riots in Urumqi, a number of extremist Islamic websites affiliated to Al Qaeda called for the killing of Han Chinese in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and other Middle Eastern states in revenge for China’s crackdown on Uighur Muslims.137 This, along with protests against the Chinese government in other parts of the world by Muslims would indicate that the support and sympathy to the Uighur separatist movement has grown significantly within the broader jihadi community. For example, in August 2009, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the Al Qaeda front in Iraq, issued a video on jihadist forums that discussed China’s “prosecution” of Uighur Muslims, and reiterated ETIM (TIP) leader’s call for jihad against China.138 In the video narration, China was blamed for its attempt to “wipe off the Islamic identity” of the Uighur Muslims by demolishing mosques, banning religious practices, implementing the “one-child” policy and forcing “unmarried Muslim women” to work in

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factories outside Xinjiang and marrying non-Muslims.139 The narrator highlighted that the plight of the Muslims in East Turkistan was being ignored by the Islamic world and called for support to the Uighurs. East Turkistan is not an internal issue but rather a pure Islamic state that fell to the “atheist Chinese occupation.” Also, Muslims there are not a minority among the minorities whose rights are violated and fortunes confiscated. Instead, they are an integral part of the body of the Ummah. Muslims there have sacrificed more than a million martyrs on the various fronts of jihad.140

The narrator praised former ETIM leader Hasan Mahsum as a hero, who inculcated in the hearts of Muslims in Turkistan the meaning of allegiance and exemption and the creed that is free from the “filth” of “infidel democracy” and nationalism.141 The video also includes an audio clip that plays from a speech by leader of ETIM, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani in which he emphasized that his fighters would continue the march for the independence of Uighurs in East Turkistan. The Caucasus and Central Asia Al Qaeda has channeled its activities in the Caucasus and Central Asia through two groups: Basayev faction of Chechen jihadists fighting against the Russian Federation and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). There were a number of attacks targeting Chinese interests in Kyrgyzstan. In June 2002, Chinese diplomat Wang Jianping and his driver were gunned down in Bishkek as he was riding in his car along a street. Local officials speculated the involvement of Muslim separatists from China’s Xinjiang region in the attack.142 In March 2003, nineteen Chinese traders were killed when an armed group attacked a bus en route from Bishkek to Xinjiang.143 In recent years, a faction of IMU—Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) appears to be gaining ground in the jihadist landscape especially in South and Central Asia. Of the three, the IMU and IJU pose direct threats to China and its interests. However, Chechen fighters figure prominently in many conf licts around the world. Arguably, in most of the countries, the terrorist violence is directed primarily against the domestic targets and secondarily against foreign interests. This is because, as described at the beginning of this chapter, most of the groups in individual countries pursue domestic objectives. However, developments in the past three to four years demonstrate that these groups are either internationalizing themselves or coming under the inf luence

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of regional (i.e. AQIM) or transnational (Al Qaeda) groups. Therefore, the prospects of foreign interests being the direct and deliberate target of terrorist attacks cannot be easily ruled out. There is also a possibility of attacks against Chinese interests in countries where the domestic regime is being perceived to be too Chinese-friendly such as Sudan. Already in October 2008, nine Chinese employees of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) were kidnapped in the Southern Kordofan State of Sudan out of which five were killed during a rescue operation.144

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CHAPTER 6

CHINA’S PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT AND RESPONSE

We will firmly take control of the initiative in the struggle and resolutely oppose hostile forces inside and outside China who use ethnic issues to infiltrate and sabotage. —Hu Jintao, President of People’s Republic of China, May 2005.1

I

n 2008, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), believed to be inactive since 2003, returned to violence. More than thirty people died in violence in Xinjiang in August 2008. On August 4, 2008, just four days before the Olympic Games began in Beijing, one of the most deadly terrorist attacks occurred in the city of Kashgar, killing sixteen soldiers of People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF).2 The government blamed the killings on the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) that had threatened earlier to sabotage the Beijing Olympic Games. On October 21, 2008, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS) announced the names of eight terrorists belonging to the ETIM, who plotted and committed terrorist activities in China. The spokesman of the MPS said that these “diehard” ETIM members had planned or organized attacks, and had recruited and trained members to sabotage the games since 2007.3 All eight men named were Uighurs, seven of whom left China in the 1990s, with the other departing in 2006. One suspect, Metusun Abuduhalike, the authorities claimed, propagated “extreme and violent terrorist thoughts” to extremists in Xinjiang, who had subsequently set up terrorist groups.4 The MPS also called for “global cooperation” to ferret out the whereabouts of the eight fugitive terrorists and extradite them to China.5 This chapter focuses on the following three questions. First, what is China’s perception of the threat of terrorism? While discussing this, we focus only on the threat from Islamist terrorism and steer clear of the

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typical Chinese rhetoric that brands any disobedience as an act of terrorism. Second, what tactics and strategies have Beijing adopted in its campaigns against nationalist separatism and terrorism involving Muslims in China? Third, how effectively has China fought separatism and terrorism? From Chinese perspective, the “three evil forces”—terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism—are closely related and they have posed one single threat to the unity and stability of the state. Therefore, China makes little distinction among separatists, terrorists, and insurgents—whether they are violent or not.6 Admittedly, there is no one definition of terrorism on which the international community has agreed upon. However, violence is the most undisputed variable in the definitions used.7 It is violence, and the indiscriminate use of it, that renders terrorism condemnable and warrants stiffer measures. Separatism, however, can involve various nonviolent activities and differs from terrorism to that extent. There is a perception that by equating all forms of separatist struggles in China with terrorism, Beijing is trying to choke unpleasant opposition from its diverging ethnicities and covering up human rights violations. China’s “war on terrorism” initially started from the counterinsurgency campaigns during the 1990s, which primarily relied on severe military crackdowns. Since the late 1990s, China’s counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency tactics have shifted away from a military repression toward paramilitary and civilian means. In addition, China has also put efforts into improving the non-military tools such as anti-terror intelligence, legislation, and finance. To solve the terrorism problem at the grass-root level, China has also launched comprehensive economic development programs in Xinjiang. Understanding that the current wave of terrorism is transnational, China has been keen on promoting the international cooperation with broader range of international organizations and other states. These initiatives encompass bilateral cooperation and engagements at multilateral levels through the UN or through regional groupings such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The key for China to fighting the contemporary wave of terrorism lies in the development of a holistic approach where enduring non-military strategies deserve a priority.8 Beijing needs to ensure that military measures are supplemented and cushioned with appropriate non-military measures, which would undercut the appeal for violence. China’s Perception of the Threat Since the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was founded in 1955, the overall situation in the region has been stable

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and the relationship between the Uighur and Han Chinese has been largely harmonious. However, a segment of politicized Uighurs has launched waves of rebellions against Beijing. Separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang emerged as a major concern for the Chinese government in the 1990s. In 1996, Chinese authorities started the “Strike Hard” campaigns in Xinjiang against those they called “separatists” or “splittists.” 9 Before September 2001, Beijing did not label the Uighur separatist movement as “terrorism.” Facing the increasing violence in Xinjiang, Beijing launched its fight against the “three evil forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism” in 2002. From Chinese perspective, terrorism is a byproduct of ethnic separatism and religious extremism, which manifested itself in acts of violence. Therefore, the “three evil forces” have posed one threat to the stability and security of China. Beijing has asserted that the most serious terrorist threat comes from the “East Turkistan terrorists.” According to Chinese official statistics, as on February 2009, the terrorists have launched about 270 attacks, causing 670 casualties since 1990.10 “East Turkistan” Terrorists: One Group? Chinese officials began discussing the violence in Xinjiang openly in the late 1990s. In March 1999, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Governor Abdulahat Abdurishit (Abdurixit) claimed that there had been a large number of explosions, assassinations, and other incidents in the 1990s. Around the same time, internal party documents claimed 380 fatalities from serious incidents in 1998 alone and 100 victims from twenty-seven incidents in the first months of 1999.11 However, documented violent incidents in Xinjiang have dropped off significantly since the late 1990s. In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States declared the global war on terrorism. The Chinese government also launched campaigns against the “East Turkistan terrorist groups.” On January 21, 2002, China’s State Council issued the official document titled “ ‘East Turkestan’ terrorists cannot get away with impunity.” However, the document failed to provide systematic profiles of terrorist and separatist organizations. It just brief ly outlined several incidents in scattered references throughout the document. The document nevertheless demonstrated the “firm stand” of the Chinese government against the “East Turkistan terrorist forces.” Appealing to the international community for recognizing the terrorist and the criminal nature of the activities of the East Turkistan elements,

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the document stated: Since the peaceful liberation of Xinjiang, the people of all ethnic groups have united as one, worked hard and built their fine homeland with joint efforts. But the “East Turkistan” forces, not to be reconciled to their failure and in defiance of the will of the people of all ethnic groups, have been on the lookout for every opportunity to conduct splittist and sabotage activities with the backing of international anti-China forces. In the 1990s, under the inf luence of extremism, separatism and international terrorism, part of the “East Turkistan” forces inside and outside Chinese territory turned to splittist and sabotage activities with terrorist violence as the main means, even brazenly declaring that terrorist violence is the only way to achieve their aims.12

As discussed in chapter 3, the 2002 document relies frequently on the ambiguous term—“East Turkistan terrorist organization.” The term is used to refer to several groups, many of which have “East Turkistan” in their names.13 These groups include the “East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM),” “East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO),” “Islamic Reformist Party ‘Shock Brigade’,” “East Turkestan Islamic Party,” “East Turkestan Opposition Party,” “East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah,” “Uighur Liberation Organization,” “Islamic Holy Warriors,” and “East Turkestan International Committee.”14 According to Chinese officials, these groups are responsible for series of violence inside and outside of China. Throughout the document, “East Turkistan forces” (Dongtu kongbu shili) and “East Turkistan terrorist organization” (Dongtu kongbu zuzhi) appear simultaneously as generic terms for all Uighur radical groups. This causes ambiguity over whether an incident was committed by a specific terrorist group or by unknown radicals from Uighur ethnic group.15 The term “dongtu” in Chinese could be either singular or plural. However, the official English translation of the document uses the singular form—“‘East Turkistan’ terrorist organization” to refer to all these groups.16 This indicates that, from the Chinese perspective, there is one unified terrorist organization of considerable strength, which is responsible for all the incidents listed. However, as borne out in the official documents subsequently released, this has not been the case. On December 15, 2003, China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) released its report on “East Turkistan” terrorist groups and the names of eleven members. The document listed four “East Turkistan” groups: the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), World Uighur Youth Congress (WUYC), and

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East Turkistan Information Centre (ETIC) as the ones engaged in terrorist violence in China. The document identified Hasan Mahsum, Muhanmetemin Hazret, Dolqun Isa, Abudujelili Kalakash, Abudukadir Yapuquan, Abudumijit Muhammatkelim, Abudula Kariaji, Abulimit Turxun, Huadaberdi Haxerbik, Yasen Muhammat, and Atahan Abuduhani as “Eastern Turkistan” terrorists. It provided more detailed profiles of the groups including main terrorist activities, key leaders, and details about finance and manpower and their links to international terrorist organizations.17 The language of the document makes the Chinese perception of the conf lict in Xinjiang explicit. It was claimed that Xinjiang has always been a part of Chinese territory and that Uighurs, like other ethnic groups in China, have joined efforts to create a “great motherland.” However, according to Beijing, a handful of “fanatical Xinjiang separatists and extremist religious elements” have fabricated the myth of “East Turkistan,” and claimed that “East Turkistan had been an independent state since ancient times, and that the ethnic group in that state had a history of nearly 10,000 years.”18 These elements, according to the Chinese, “incited all ethnic groups speaking the Turkic language and believing in Islam to unite to form a state featuring the integration of religion and politics.”19 Importantly, the document also listed the criteria used to identify a terrorist or a terrorist organization: 1. An organization or organizations that engage in terrorist activities endangering national security or social stability, and harm the life and property through violence and terror (regardless of whether it is based in or outside of China); 2. Some form of division for organization and leadership work, or system of division; 3. Meeting the aforementioned criteria and having involved in any of the following activities: a. Organizing, masterminding, instigating, staging, or taking part in terrorist activities; b. Offering funding assistance or support for terrorist activities; c. Having a base or bases for terrorist activities, or recruiting and training terrorists in an organized way; d. Collaborating with other international terrorist organizations, accepting funding, training of other international terrorist groups, or taking part in their activities.20

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“Three Evil Forces”: One Threat? As mentioned earlier, China has put the terms of terrorism, separatism, and extremism on an equal footing. Chinese officials frequently interchange “separatism” with “splittism,” highlighting the fact that separatism is leading to the division and disintegration of the country. In the same vein, the term “extremism” is being used specifically to refer to those Uighur Muslims participating in the “East Turkistan” independence. Beijing perceives the expression of political discontent by the Uighurs as posing challenges to China’s national security, regional stability, and political authority of the central government.21 In fact, the majority of Uighur separatist movements are peaceful and less likely to be connected to the terrorist acts inside and outside China. Since the establishment of the XUAR, several Uighur diaspora groups outside China had expressed their desire for an independent state. The Istanbul-based Uighur organizations have existed since the 1950s. They were established by Uighurs who received substantial Soviet support in their anti-China rhetoric regarding policies in Xinjiang. 22 In the 1980s, China saw a transformation in the separatist movement among Uighurs inside and outside China. These transformations were triggered by growing demands for religious and ethnic rights and greater freedom. 23 After Beijing’s crackdown following the Baren incident in 1990, many Uighur separatists and activists f led China and settled down in Central Asia, Turkey, and Germany. They founded several diaspora organizations in local Uighur communities. Most of these groups are peaceful and some are lawful organizations in their countries of residence. From Chinese perspective, however, these organizations fall into the category of “three evil forces,” which deserves criminal punishment. Since the early 1990s, the struggles of these Uighur émigrés have won increasing sympathy in Europe, North America, and Asia. They started to set up a single umbrella organization to publicize Uighur cause and coordinate their separatist movement. In the early 1990s, the Uighur organizations in Europe were loosely connected. In December 1992, the first General Assembly of Uighur Diaspora met in Istanbul, Turkey. In 1995, Erkin Alptekin was elected as the chair of Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organization (UNPO) based in Hague. 24 Erkin Alptekin is the son of former separatist leader, Isa Yusuf Alptekin. Erkin founded the Eastern Turkistan Union in Europe (ETUE) in 1991 and became the first chairman of the World Uighur Congress in 2004. 25 On December 18, 1998, the East Turkistan National Center was founded in Istanbul, with eleven Uighur organizations from Germany, Turkey, and Central Asian states participating.

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In October 1999, the East Turkistan National Congress (ETNC) was held in Munich, Germany. The congress elected a governing body and framed the by-laws of the umbrella organization. 26 In 2003, the ETNC claimed that there were eighteen Uighur Diaspora organizations belonging to the congress. 27 However, the ETNC and its subordinate groups just represented a small part of overseas Uighur communities. Therefore, the ETNC failed to function as a coordinating body for Uighur separatist movement worldwide. Today, there are over twenty-five international organizations claiming to be working for the independence of “Eastern Turkestan” (Xinjiang).28 They are various communalities and people with divergent agendas and conf licting views.29 They are based in Amsterdam, Munich, Istanbul, Melbourne, Washington, DC, and New York. 30 The most inf luential one is the World Uighur Congress (WUC) that claims to represent the “collective interest of the Uighur people both in East Turkestan and abroad.”31 Established on April 16, 2004 in Munich, Germany, the WUC was a united international organization after the merger of East Turkistan National Congress (ETNC) and the World Uighur Youth Congress (WUYC). The later group was identified as a terrorist organization by China in 2003. 32 The stated objective of WUC is to “promote the right of the Uighur people to use peaceful, nonviolent, and democratic means to determine the political future of East Turkestan.”33 The current elected president of the WUC Ms. Rebiya Kadeer. Rebiya, who is called the “Spiritual Mother of Uighur people,” languished in a Chinese prison and was released due to the pressure from the United States and other human rights organizations 34 After her release, Kadeer told Radio Free Asia (RFA) in an interview that she would make her fight international and “get more people involved” outside China for the Uighur cause. 35 Rebiya Kadeer and WUC did not appear in China’s list of East Turkistan terrorists in 2003 and 2008. However, Chinese officials consider her and the congress posing serious threat to the stability of Xinjiang. 36 Following September 11, 2001 incidents, the majority of these organizations disclaimed any support for violence or terrorism.37 They reaffirmed a peaceful approach to achieve independence of Xinjiang. However, most of these organizations accused China of exaggerating the terror threat in the region in order to crack down on Uighur demands for greater autonomy and religious freedom.38 In 2003, when China identified the four East Turkistan terrorist groups and eleven terrorists, Dilxat Raxit, who later became the spokesperson of the World Uighur Congress, stated that Beijing’s list had “political motives” and they had “produced no evidence.”39

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In addition, separatist campaigns have become increasingly vocal and well organized, especially on the Internet. Chinese authorities have noticed this growing inf luence of Uighur separatism in the “cyber world.” The contents of most of separatist Web sites are peaceful and opposed to violence, except for ones run by the “Islamic Party of Turkistan.”40 This Web site in Uighur language encouraged people to overturn Chinese rule in Xinjiang by “any means.”41 It also includes reports on terrorist incidents in the region from sources such as BBC and Al-Jazeerah—an Arabic-language news network. In the post–September 2001 era, some of these Web sites have taken on jihadist characteristics. Chinese authorities believe that these Web sites are closely related to the “East Turkistan terrorists.” They are all posing terrorist threat to China. China’s general impression of a threat since 1990 has shaped its strategies and tactics for countering separatism and terrorism. Beijing is reluctant to differentiate the “three evil forces” in a general sense. They have constantly asserted that all these forces pose one single threat to China’s security. Beijing has perceived these organizations as part of a joint movement of Uighur oppositions against the Chinese state.42 However, it is of vital importance for Beijing to note distinctions among terrorism, armed resistance, and peaceful protests. The authorities need to make a distinction between terrorism and general oppositions in China’s counterterrorism campaigns. Uighur and human rights groups have repeatedly expressed concern that China is taking advantage of the U.S.-led “War on Terror” to justify its “persecution” and “violent repression” against the indigenous people of Xinjiang.43 This tendency has challenged the legitimacy of China’s initiatives against terrorism. Mechanism for Countering Insurgency and Terrorism For a state facing security threats, the first line of defense has always been the use of its military, paramilitary, and police forces. The state uses force to kill or capture terrorists and separatists and dismantle their infrastructure. The presence of the security forces and the military campaigns can also force the society to “recalculate the risks and rewards” of conducting violence against the state.44 China’s use of military and paramilitary forces in Xinjiang is a key factor in understanding the effectiveness of China’s anti-insurgency and anti-terrorism campaigns. This section investigates what military and paramilitary resources are available to the Chinese state and how these forces have acted as the state attempts to counter the insurgency and terrorism. Currently, China’s anti-terrorism forces consist of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed

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Police Force (PAPF), and the People’s Police. Chinese officials claim that this system of “joint defense” is playing an “irreplaceable special role” in the campaigns of “smashing and resisting internal and external separatists’ attempts at sabotage and infiltration,” and in “maintaining the stability and safety of the borders of the motherland.”45 Military Force—The PLA While Xinjiang is perceived to be a highly militarized society, the strength, readiness, and overall capability of the PLA in Xinjiang today is not easily discerned from open sources.46 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a presence of an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 troops in Xinjiang, which are mainly responsible for border defense, economic development, and internal security.47 These forces are not only relatively small but also professionally inferior.48 Since the late 1990s, the PLA troops in Xinjiang have improved its capabilities both in terms of equipments and personnel. The most famous one is the Forth Motorized Infantry Division, reconfigured under China’s military transformation program as a modern rapid reaction force capable of deployment within forty-eight hours.49 Based at Kucha (Kuche), this troop is equipped with Type-96 and Type-88C tanks and advanced infantry fighting vehicles.50 Lacking sufficient helicopters for its rapid reaction forces, the PLA in Xinjiang currently depends on deployments by road and railway.51 With bases located near Xinjiang’s major cities such as Urumqi and Korla, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) maintains a division and roughly 100 jet fighters.52 Xinjiang is also home to the higher quality Third Army Aviation Regiment, which is equipped with U.S.-made Blackhawk S70C Sikorsky helicopters as well as Russian-designed Mi-8 and Mi-17 and other transporters.53 In October 2001, following the U.S. offensive in Afghanistan, thirty WZ-9Gs54 were transferred to Kashgar for use in the border region.55 The transporters and helicopters are meant to serve as the rapid reaction forces in counter-terrorism campaigns. More recently, the Air Force joined the military exercises under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005, 2007, and 2009. It functions more as a deterrence force against the separatists and terrorists. Due to the threat of terrorism, separatism, and extremism in Xinjiang, the Xinjiang Military District (XMD) has been organized in a manner so as to operate more independently than most other provincial Military Districts, especially in the logistics and armament support that it can provide to the units in the region.56

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One of the most noteworthy uses of the military force in Xinjiang was during the Baren uprising in April 1990. The uprising involved some 200 armed men (according to Chinese accounts) who engaged in a battle with police and killed six or seven policemen before retreating into the mountains.57 The PLA either used airpower directly or airlifted forces to put down the rebellion when the men f led into the mountains.58 In the later incidents of the bombings between February 1992 and September 1993, it was not clear whether the PLA played an active role. Some sources reported that the PLA soldiers were positioned at bus and rail stations to help guard rail lines from sabotage.59 Posse of PLA soldiers were also deployed in the cities.60 Since the late 1990s, Chinese authorities have been more familiar with the challenges they confront in Xinjiang. Not only must they deal with the threat of separatism, but also the prospect of spectacular attacks by terrorists upon remotely located capital cities. The 1997 bus bombing in Urumqi was typical of the changing tactics used by Uighur separatist forces. The growing tension in Xinjiang underscores the need for a more professional counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism force to play the major role in China’s campaigns against separatists and terrorists. Gradually, the role of the PLA in combating Uighur separatism and terrorism evolved from passive support functions to active deterrence especially since 2001. In August 2001, the PLA forces undertook large-scale exercises in Xinjiang with a parade of military hardware through the center of the city of Kashgar.61 After the September 2001 incidents and the subsequent U.S. rout of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, China moved an estimated 100,000 soldiers into Xinjiang, concentrating them on border regions.62 China claimed that these forces were intended to seal the border to keep Taliban forces from getting into the Chinese territory from Afghanistan or Pakistan. According to reports, about 100 such fighters f leeing the war zones were captured by the Chinese authorities.63 The mass presence of PLA troops was aimed at deterring the Uighur separatists in southern Xinjiang. This also successfully cut off the contact between the Uighur radicals inside China and the fighters f leeing the Afghan battlefield. Today, several special units of PLA are the core forces for combating terrorism. The PLA anti-terrorist unit was built under China’s comprehensive security program for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Earlier in 2007, the PLA established a security unit, consisting of army, navy, and air force personnel, for securing the Beijing Olympic Games.64 A command center called the Military Bureau of the Beijing

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Olympic Games Security Work was in charge of organizing and training the security unit. The military bureau is the top command organ in charge of security work of the PLA and it was subject to both the Beijing Olympic Games security command center and the Headquarters of the General Staff of the PLA.65 On June 28, 2007, the Bureau declared that, during the Olympics, this PLA unit would be responsible for “air protection of all arenas” and “maritime safety of coastal venues,” and would particularly deal with “biochemical and nuclear terror attacks.”66 The unit would also prevent disruptions by “organizations wanting to pressure the Chinese government” during the Games.67 Beijing made enormous efforts to improve the equipment and defense abilities of the PLA. Military delegations were sent to learn from Australian and Greek experience in protecting the Olympic Games in those countries. PLA officials also observed security drills for the Commonwealth Games. The PLA security units showed their strength in series of anti-terrorist drills code-named “Great Wall VI” at the national level launched in June 2008. The massive security work during the Beijing Olympics has underscored the importance of this military force in dealing with threats from terrorism. The shift of PLA’s role in countering separatism and terrorism has been ref lected in their participation in military exercises held under the banner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009. The colossal and highly visible PLA maneuver was a classic show of the stance of the authorities on the Xinjiang issue, asserting that any separatist activities would be put down with extreme force. Between July 22 and July 26, 2009, Chinese and Russian troops held the “The Peace Mission 2009” counter-terrorist exercise in China’s northeast province, Jilin. The military drills followed the ethnic clashes between the Uighurs and Han Chinese in the city of Urumqi between July 5 and July 6, 2009. The “Peace Mission” underscores the growing partnership among PLA and its counterparts of SCO members in fighting what they see as common threats of separatism, extremism, and terrorism, as well as a shared interest to improve stability in the region. The role of PLA in China’s counter-terrorism involves both deterrent and supportive functions. The PLA Air Force and Navy monitor any possible terrorist offensives in the air or at sea. The PLA border and coastal defense forces are responsible for managing border control to prevent any terrorist activities and to stop suspicious persons getting into the country.68 In addition, PLA troops are allotted to provide security for the city of Hong Kong if the local government requested.69

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Paramilitary Force—The PAPF The People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) has become a more professional force increasingly capable of handling political unrest and terrorist attacks within China. As a component of China’s armed forces, PAPF is under the dual leadership of the State Council and the Central Military Commission (CMC). The PAPF consists of the internal security force, border public security, firefighting, and security guard forces and various police forces.70 In China’s National Defense in 2008 report, the PAPF is described as “the state’s mainstay and shock force in handling public emergencies” and “an important counter-terrorism force of the state.” 71 The white paper does not provide the strength of the PAPF, but sates that “every day, more than 260,000 PAPF servicemen are on guard duty.” 72 According to China’s 2006 defense white paper, the official government document that for the first time provided a raw number of armed police, the PAPF has a total force of 660,000.73 However, the quantity and quality of the PAPF in Xinjiang is still an open question even among top military experts. The PAPF in Xinjiang include border guards, anti-riot troops, and anti-terrorism forces,74 which are charged with the fundamental task of maintaining security and stability in the region. As the militancy in Xinjiang worsened in the late 1990s, both the PLA and PAPF forces were primarily deployed in operations in combating the unrest. Since 1995, the PAPF started to take a more active role in riot control in Xinjiang. The PAPF engaged in dealing with protests and riots while the PLA took on a support function. On July 7, 1995, Khotan local authorities reportedly arrested imams in the local mosques and replaced them with official appointees. When a group of Uighur Muslims gathered around the local government and Party installation, “riot police” started to disperse the crowd by deploying tear gas, and arresting many of them.75 These “riot police” were most likely from the PAPF.76 In another riot in the same month in Yining, a number of PLA tanks were reportedly dispatched to the site in the name of military exercises.77 This action caused several hundred Uighur men marching in protest.78 Concerned that continued use of the PLA would worsen the situation, the local government decided to deploy PAPF forces in the city. Witnesses said several hundred PAPF soldiers armed with assault weapons patrolled the streets on motorcycles and in personnel carriers.79 There was no violence involving the security forces and the protestors, and the tension in Yining eased after a few days.80 This case marks the beginning of shift in China’s anti-insurgency and anti-terrorist tactics in Xinjiang in the late 1990s.

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In the spring and summer of 1996, shootings, bombings, and assassination attempts rocked Xinjiang. Xinjiang authorities looked to the PAPF as a major force for stability, as local police bore the brunt of responding to as well as being the target of violence. In June, local police worked with more than 10,000 PAPF troops sweeping through Urumqi, arresting hundreds of people suspected of being responsible for the violence. In February 1997, arrests and reports of executions of Uighur men accused of bombings in Yining resulted in protests in the city.81 As turbulence spread over a series of days the protestors turned violent. The PAPF responded with anti-riot troops, and the PLA reportedly moved combat corps from Gansu province to surround and seal the city.82 With PLA surrounding the city, the PAPF forces deployed tear gas, and used high-pressure hoses and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators.83 Dispersing the rioters and arresting ringleaders began to work and other troops were sent to protect critical infrastructure targets, including media and political installations.84 According to Chinese sources, the police crackdown caused no major casualties.85 It has now become evident that the PAPF anti-riot force has become more professional in dealing with widespread acts of rioting and violence. Therefore, the use of PLA forces directly against the protesters and militants has been scaled down since 1997.86 Only when the situation escalates, the PLA is used to show force, parading through the disturbed areas with the PAPF. Since the late 1990s, China’s direct action against insurgency and terrorism has become the domain of the PAPF. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, China has taken steps to enhance the capabilities of the PAPF significantly in terms of personnel and equipment. At the same time, China started to build more professional anti-terror and anti-insurgency forces under the PAPF. The PAPF tactical counter-terrorism units, immediate action units, and various special police units were founded as professional forces to deal with political unrest and terrorist attacks.87 The most prominent one among them was the Snow Wolf Commando Unit (SWCU), a highly classified special police squad established in Beijing in 2002. The 300-strong unit took on tasks of counter-terrorism, riot control, and other special tasks, such as hijacking and bomb disposal.88 Each of SWCU officers was outfitted with sophisticated equipments. The SWCU was one of the major anti-terrorist forces for handling possible terrorist attacks before and during the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008. In 2005, anti-terror squads were established in thirty-six cities in China, though these squads may be of more use in riot control than direct terrorism-related actions. Chinese official media reported that the move

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was aimed at “increasing police agencies’ capability to deal with terrorist crimes, riots and other emergencies.”89 Today, PAPF presence is very highly visible in Xinjiang, complete with armed marches and vehicle patrols through the city of Urumqi, the regional capital of Xinjiang. As an important counter-terrorism force of the state, the PAPF is engaged in strengthening international counter-terrorism consultations and exchanges. In compliance with international counter-terrorism treaties and agreements, the PAPF has sent delegations to over thirty countries for bilateral or multilateral counter-terrorism exchanges, including France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Australia, Israel, Brazil, Cuba, South Africa, Russia, and Pakistan.90 It has also hosted delegations from 17 countries, including those from Russia, Romania, France, Italy, Hungary, South Africa, Egypt, Australia, and Belarus.91 At the same time, the PAPF is sending personnel abroad to receive training or provide training assistance. The PAPF has sent delegations or personnel to countries such as France, Israel, Hungary, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand to attend training courses in special duties, participate in or observe counter-terrorism exercises of various kinds, and conduct exchanges in counter-terrorism techniques and skills.92 It has also sent teams of instructors to Romania and Azerbaijan to provide teaching or training assistance.93 Communication and cooperation with its counterparts in other countries is important for the PAPF in terms of improving its capabilities in countering insurgency and terrorism. The People’s Police Under the direct leadership of the Central Government, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) is in charge of China’s public security force (People’s Police). China’s police system consists of public security agencies right from national down to the province (or autonomous region), prefecture, and county levels. Fight against terrorist activities and maintenance of social security and order is one significant responsibility for China’s People’s Police.94 The Department of Public Security of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region was established on October 1, 1955 as the headquarters of police force in the autonomous region. Xinjiang police has undertaken campaigns against the “three evil forces” of separatism, extremism, and terrorism in the region through what is known as “Strike Hard” crackdown. “Strike Hard” (yanda) is an abbreviation of “Campaign to strike severely at serious criminal offences” (yanli daji yanzhong xingshi fanzui huodong), which means a systematic crackdown on crime throughout the country. Launched in 1983 for the

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first time, “Strike Hard” policy aims to fight serious crime and threats to social order through implementing harder punishment to criminals within a specified period. It is characterized by large numbers of arrests and fast paced prosecution, judgment, and execution. Since the Baren incident of April 1990, Xinjiang police has initiated waves of large-scale “Strike Hard” campaigns mainly targeting Islamic extremists and separatists in the region. From 1990 to 1995, over 100 “separatist organizations and illegal organizations” were wiped out and 1,831 “reactionary gangs” were arrested.95 In the wake of the Yining riots in February 1997, Xinjiang authorities launched massive police crackdown on “illegal Islamic schools” that allegedly indoctrinated and assembled reactionary organizations, and instigated insurrection.96 A large number of “illegal religious organizations” were clamped down and members were arrested for involvement in “illegal religious activities” and “separatism.”97 In the wake of the militancy, police officers were dispatched to key villages, work units, and military installations to strengthen propaganda and “education work.”98 Initiated by the Ministry of Public Security in October 2001, the regional government of XUAR announced that they would intensify the “Strike Hard” campaign against the “three evil forces” and step up measures to deal with threats from these sources.99 The anti-crime campaign launched across China since April 2001 led to a sharp increase in arrests and executions of criminals related to separatist and terrorist activities. According to Chinese official sources, Urumqi police arrested 166 “violent terrorists” and “other criminals” in the city from September 20 to November 30, 2001.100 As elsewhere in China, the police plays an important role in controlling the religious practice and most forms of political dissent in the region. However, this massive use of force with arrests and crackdown on what the officials call “illegal” religious practices of the Uighur have always been criticized as oppression of Muslims and violations of freedom of religion. Shortly after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, China established its National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group (NATCG) and a Secretariat led by President Hu Jintao.101 The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) also simultaneously set up an Anti-Terror Bureau (ATB) responsible for the research, planning, guidance, coordination, and undertaking of the national anti-terror agenda. The NATCG’s office was headquartered in the Anti-Terror Bureau of the MPS. With Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Xinjiang, and Tibet at the forefront, all the provinces followed suit by organizing their own anti-terrorist coordination groups and offices.102

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The NATCG and the MPS have undertaken a number of measures to counter the emerging threats in the post–September 2001 environment. A Quick Response System (QRS) has been in place for China’s relevant authorities to take speedy and determined measures to work for a quick resolution in the event of a terrorist strike. The MPS has enhanced the capabilities of its quick-response anti-terror units since 2004 both in terms of both personnel and equipment.103 They are now deployed not only in Xinjiang, but also in almost every provincial capital city.104 Chinese police has also set up an early warning and prevention system, aiming to monitor the activities of terrorist groups and prevent terrorist attacks.105 Facing the growing terrorist threat during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Chinese police launched a series of counter-terrorism raids against ETIM cells in 2007 and 2008. On January 5, 2007, Xinjiang police raided a terrorist training camp in the mountains of the Pamir Plateau in southern Xinjiang, killing eighteen and arresting seventeen suspected ETIM members.106 One police officer was killed in the shootout.107 Chinese police officials speculated that almost 1,000 ETIM members trained overseas were directly or indirectly in contact with many local Uighurs inside Xinjiang.108 On January 27, 2008, Xinjiang police raided another suspected ETIM camp in Urumqi, killing two and capturing fifteen others believed to have been involved in carrying out acts of terrorism.109 On March 11, 2008, Chinese police detained forty-five terrorist suspects from the “East-Turkistan terrorist organizations” and foiled alleged plots to commit suicide bombings and kidnapping of athletes to disrupt the Olympic games.110 On July 10, 2008, Chinese authorities claimed that in the first half of 2008, the police had destroyed five terrorist groups in Xinjiang and detained eighty-two suspected terrorists who were plotting attacks against the Beijing Olympics.111 Before and during the Beijing Olympic Games in August 2008, the anti-terrorist force of the People’s Police was on high alert for handling terrorist attacks. The police forces prepared to deal with terrorist attacks during the Olympics comprised three parts—security guards in the sporting venues, security forces of the capital and national professional emergency forces.112 They had been in action ahead of the opening ceremony. A series of anti-terrorist drills “Great Wall-5” staged from June 11 to 14 tested the coordination among the PLA, PAPF, and public security forces.113 From June 9 to 17, 2009, China held the “Great Wall-6” anti-terror exercises in Beijing and its neighboring provinces, including Shanxi, Hebei and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.114 These exercises aimed at improving the capabilities of police and PAP forces in the designated areas to combat terrorism and respond to emergencies brought

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about by attacks to critical infrastructures during the celebrations for the sixtieth anniversary of founding of the PRC in October 2009. In order to improve the counter-terrorism capacity, the MPS has also promoted all forms of cooperation with regional and international partners. Before and during the Beijing Olympics, Chinese police had received support from their counterparts from Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, and the United Sates in building its antiterrorist capabilities.115 The MPS also cooperate with relevant international organizations such as the Interpol and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2007, Interpol has produced regular “threat assessments” for China. Prior to the Olympic Games, Interpol sent a “major event support team” to train Chinese police officers in crisis management and major event operations.116 China’s counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency campaign used to be excessive in the use of military and paramilitary force. Since the late 1990s, China has shifted actions down the spectrum of force away from direct military intervention and toward local policing.117 As the insurgency evolved, the burden of response to incidents of rebellion shifted from the PLA to paramilitary forces, and the police since these organizations were able to adopt their tactics to become increasingly more effective against the militancy at the local level.118 Today’s PLA in Xinjiang has increasingly taken on a “support function” as China confronts a more durable threat from the Uighur separatists and terrorists.119 The police and PAPF have become the primary tools through which China has attempted to counter Uighur separatist violence and terrorism. Nevertheless, military crackdown and law enforcement tactics that use force also aggravate the grievances among the affected communities. It is often seen that the use of force has produced the opposite effect desired; it has given the terrorists’ reason to validate their actions and in turn increase their pool of recruits, supporters, and sympathizers, which will provide more supporters and sympathizers for the terrorists. The military forces and law enforcement authorities alone cannot combat terrorism and extremism, as an indiscriminate use can create new resentments, new grievances, and even the next generation of terrorists. Non-Military Response After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the limitations of using military and paramilitary forces in combating terrorism has become increasingly apparent. Contemporary terrorist groups have transformed into multidimensional organizations that require a multipronged response.120

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China also realized the great need to devise a more preventive and comprehensive response to the domestic and international threat of terrorism. China has taken several significant steps to strengthen its non-military measures to fight with terrorism. These means include setting up antiterrorism intelligence system to monitor terrorist activities, enhancing counter-terrorism legislation, and developing a prevention system to cut terrorist finances. In addition, China has made efforts to prevent public support for the terrorists and separatists and improve the grass-root conditions in Xinjiang. This strategic objective is ref lected by the policies on migration to Xinjiang and a comprehensive economic construction program known as “Western Development.” These non-military counter-measures are vitally important for China’s war on terrorism. Social Engineering Facing the potential threat of radicalization, China has developed a strategy to improve the grass-root level condition in Xinjiang through the large scale Han migration to the area. The PRC claims that this policy is designed to promote economic development and stability of Xinjiang rather than demographic change. On one hand, a larger Han population vigilant against separatism and Islamic extremism are essential for improving the grass-root security situation in Xinjiang. On the other hand, the increasing presence of Han Chinese in Xinjiang has caused grievances among the ingredient ethnicities who are felling being deprived and marginalized. Since the Qing dynasty, China has adopted the strategy of “tunken” or “ juntun,” settling Han Chinese in Xinjiang to integrate this Chinese periphery. After the PRC was founded in 1949, Beijing implemented a series of policies providing incentives for Han migration to the region for developing the border area and reinforcing national unity. When the Xinjiang Production Construction Military Corps (XPCMC) was established, it recruited tens of thousands of technical personnel and workers from elsewhere in China. Many of them settled down in Xinjiang permanently. Waves of mass immigrations have dramatically changed the demographic proportion between the Han and Uighur in Xinjiang. The publication of the results of China’s National Census shed some light on the scale of the inf lux of new Han settlers between 1949 and 2000.121 In 1949, when the PRC was established, the total population of Xinjiang was 4.33 million, of whom 75.9 percent were Uighurs and only 6.7 percent were Han.122 The 2000 census put Xinjiang’s total population at about 18.5 million, with the Uighurs at 45.2 percent and the Han at

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40.6 percent.123 Even though the Han Chinese is still a minority in the region, the Han population grew by almost a third (31.6 percent), twice the growth rate of the Uighur population (15.9 percent) between 1990 and 2000.124 In June 2000, the publication of a landmark article by the head of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Li Dezhu, signaled the continuation of China’s strategy of fostering Han migrations to Xinjiang.125 The article highlighted the importance of promoting Han migration to Xinjiang in the new century. Since 2000, China’s comprehensive development project on its west has spurred a new wave of Han Chinese immigration, which has been further alienating the Uighurs. In April 2005 alone, over 9,000 workers from Han-populated poor counties in Gansu accepted “long-term contracts” to work on the XPCMC farms in Xinjiang.126 This increasing Han immigration has became one of the major causes of resentment among the Uighurs and other indigenous groups in Xinjiang.127 There are concerns about the widening inequality between the Han and non-Han people in terms of socioeconomic development in Xinjiang. Some Uighurs believe that increasing Han migration causes high levels of unemployment among indigenous peoples. Graduates from non-Han ethnicities find that it is harder for them to find job compared to their Han counterparts.128 They also perceive that Han immigrants strip away their natural resources and monopolize high paying jobs in resource extraction projects.129 Some others attribute the increased pressure on scarce water resources and rapid desertification to the fast increases of Han migrants. More seriously, many Uighur Muslims believe that the presence of vast numbers of the Han-Chinese, who are not Muslims, has posed serious threat to their ethno-religious identity. They are worried about their descendants, who would be drawn away from Islam by the atheism of these Han migrants. This growing concern may push more Uighurs across the border into Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other Central Asian countries. These Uighurs outside China are exposed to greater inf luences of separatist movements and jihadist groups in those states. In this sense, China’s migration policies in Xinjiang are causing ethnic tensions and exacerbating the tension at the grass-root level. Therefore, increasing Han migration is a “double-edged sword” for resolution of the ethnic conf lict and homogenization of the Han and Uighur in that region. In order to obtain social cohesion and foster a society favorable for combating terrorism, Beijing’s migration policies must coincide with other policies for securing the equality in development of all of ethnicities in Xinjiang.

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The Economic Approach The Chinese government believes that poverty and underdevelopment provides a favorable environment for the emergence and spread of terrorism.130 Therefore, it has made efforts to improve the economic infrastructure of Xinjiang region and to reduce the number of indigenous people in poverty. Beijing considers this economic approach an effective means to solve the root cause of terrorism. Series of economic construction programs are perceived as one essential component of the comprehensive solutions to the ethnic tension and terrorism problem in Xinjiang. Since the late 1990s, China has been banking on a major economic development programs in order to address the Uighur grievances and maintain the stability of Xinjiang. Xinjiang is one of the poorest regions in China.131 The Western Development program (Xibu Da Kaifa) launched in the late 1990s aims to develop the economically backward western areas, where most minority nationalities are living. Developing Xinjiang has become one of the most significant objectives in this program. The major campaigns of the Western Development in the XUAR are the massive government investments in large-scale infrastructure construction. The government believes that increased financial support and infrastructure projects can effectively spur the development of Xinjiang’s economy. Construction projects in Xinjiang include roads, railways, airports, and a 2,500-mile pipeline linking Xinjiang’s natural gas fields to the southeast regions, which cost US$14 billion.132 Twelve new highways in Xinjiang connecting with Russia and Central Asia are scheduled for completion before 2010.133 Other infrastructure projects are underway or completed in 2008, such as a “south-to-north water diversion,” a “west-to-east natural gas transfer” and a “west-to-east power transmission.”134 The Chinese government considered that enhancing infrastructure construction would create better conditions for local economic development and provide more job opportunities for the minorities in XUAR. The state policies also encouraged minority people to develop individual economies. For example, the state-owned banks provided low interest loans to minority borrowers who would use the money to start their own businesses. The deterioration of the natural environment is also considered to be one obstacle for the development of the western region, especially Xinjiang area. From 2000 to 2006, the central government invested more than 122 billion yuan on environmental protection of Xinjiang and other north-western regions.135 The Western Development initiative has achieved great success in stimulating the economic growth of Xinjiang.

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According to recent statistics provided by XUAR government, Xinjiang’s GDP for 2008 was 415 billion yuan (about US$60.7 billion), up 11 percent from the previous year.136 Xinjiang’s per capita GDP has increased from near the bottom in 1949 to twelfth out of thirty-one provinces and autonomous regions in China.137 Official statistics show that income of people in the region is rising dramatically. In 2008, the per capita disposable income of urban residents was 11,430 yuan (about US$1,672), and the per capita net income of farmers was 3,488 yuan (about US$510), increasing by 10.8 percent and 9.6 percent respectively.138 These increases indicate that the regional economy and the overall living standard of people in Xinjiang are improving. However, a large number of ordinary Uighurs did not benefit from this development. The Tarim Basin, where over 75 percent of Xinjiang’s Uighur populations reside, has one of the lowest per capita GDP ratios in the region.139 The economic gap between the rich and the poor, and the Han and the Uighur is growing. Some Uighurs attribute the inequality in development to “economic deprivation” and “marginalization” of the indigenous people in Xinjiang. The Uighurs and other indigenous people in Xinjiang claim with some justification that they are excluded from the new developments and see new employment opportunities going to Han Chinese, many of whom were brought in from the east.140 In the profitable oil industry, for example, there are very few Uighurs.141 Unless these issues are addressed, the social and economic divide between the Han Chinese and the Muslim minorities in Xinjiang will be exacerbated. This in turn will strengthen the grievances of the Uighurs against the state. Since the Western Development program started, the central government has been transferring billions of yuan to Xinjiang annually and launched numerous ambitious infrastructure projects in the region. Chinese authorities have been going to great lengths to portray Xinjiang as a safe and stable place for tourism and foreign investment. However, episodic violence in Xinjiang has decreased investor confidence. The deteriorating security in Xinjiang during the Beijing Olympics forced the big enterprises inside and outside China to think twice before they spread their business into this region. Intelligence Effective security and defense strategies for combating terrorism require reliable intelligence. China has established a counter-terror intelligence mechanism, which is distinctively focused on handling threats in overall perspectives of probable perpetrators of terror and their external

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supporters.142 This mechanism was set up in the aftermath of September 2001 terrorist attacks. It has significantly evolved especially under the comprehensive security plan for the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008. There are three national intelligence setups in China: the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). They are responsible for domestic, foreign and military intelligence respectively. China’s counter-terrorism intelligence mechanism relies on comprehensive networking among these three systems. As a subordinate body of the MPS, the Anti-Terror Bureau (ATB) is responsible for the research, planning, guidance, and coordination for accomplishing national level anti-terror agenda.143 The ATB is authorized to mobilize all human and material resources of the MPS for its functioning.144 Counter-terror intelligence is shared at the top between the ATB and the concerned Bureaux under the Ministry of State Security.145 Within the military system, intelligence sharing has been among the Second, Third and Fourth Department under PLA General Staff Department (GSD); International Liaison Department (ILD) and China Association of International Friends Contacts (CAIFC) under General Political Department (GPD); and the Sixth Research Institute of the PLA Air Force and Naval Intelligence under PLA Navy.146 Xinhua News Agency, the mouthpiece of the Chinese government, provides open source information.147 China has established an effective coordinating mechanism to ensure cooperation and smooth exchange of information among different intelligence units under various ministries. Under the command and control of the President, the National Anti-terrorism Coordination Group (NATCG) is the top coordinating body for China’s counter-terrorism intelligence. In addition, anti-terrorist coordination groups and offices have been founded at the provincial level.148 Along with the Public Security and State Security agencies at various regional levels, these organs play essential roles in ground-level intelligence. China’s counter-terror intelligence agencies have also set up an Early Warning and Prevention System (EWPS) as several Western states have done. The objective of EWPS is to monitor activities of terrorist organizations and prevent any impending attack.149 Based on inputs from all the intelligence agencies, the system gets updates on regular basis. The major task of the EWPS is to collate, interpret, and disseminate reliable intelligence on terrorism.150 The EWPS has shown its significance and effectiveness in the anti-terror security before and during the Beijing Olympics in 2008. The security task was a test for China’s EWPS. Chinese authorities mobilized all means and sources to collect intelligence and intelligence

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leads. Before the Games opened, Beijing had acquired intelligence that the ETIM were training terrorists outside China and planning to send them into China.151 This helped China to frustrate their attempts to sabotage the games in Shanghai. EWPS kept watching and setting priorities for action against thousands of people falling in eleven categories and forty-three sets of suspects.152 From the huge amount of information, the EWPS had to identify suspects and suspected activities. It was required to assess the threats accurately and provide correct and effective advice to the government. To a large extent, the peaceful and secure conduction of the games in Beijing is a testimony to the success of EWPS’s counterterror intelligence system. Another counter-terrorism agency is Quick Response System (QRS). The system is required to follow up on intelligence leads and respond to prevent a terrorist activity from taking place. Other specialized units engaged in counter-terrorism are Consequence Control and Management System (CCMS) and Mass Education and Mass Mobilization System (MEMS). CCMS is tasked to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack and restore order in the quickest possible time. It works in coordination with the police and military agencies, fire-fighting and medical services. The main job of MEMS is to seek public participation in anti-terror operations. This involves creating awareness against terrorism and preparing the public against terrorist attacks.153 This was most evident during Beijing Olympics when the government undertook education and training programs among the population. Even various sections of the public were mobilized to remain alert against any possible threat. One such unit was the “Red Armbands” deployed within Beijing’s communities. These “Red Armbands” were primarily local residents, who were familiar with their communities.154 They would be alerted by the presence of any strangers. Similarly, the government mobilized bus and taxi drivers, workers who supply milk, water, newspapers and the like, door-todoor for maintaining vigilance.155 China has made a number of achievements in its counter-terror intelligence. However, over the years terrorist attacks have become increasingly complicated and undetectable. This has posed new challenges to China’s intelligence apparatus. As a senior PLA officer notes, “prevention is a priority of counter-terrorism.”156 What lies at the heart of terrorism prevention is intelligence required to counteract the design of the perpetrators. Therefore, it is necessary for the Chinese government to make further efforts to improve the quality and effectiveness of their intelligence mechanism in their fight against terrorism.

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Legislation The Chinese government has stated that they combat terrorism of all forms in accordance with law.157 To achieve this end, China must improve its legal regimes against terrorism. Since the late 1990s, China has made great efforts in revising Criminal Law and promoting counter-terrorism legislation. In 1998, China’s top legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), passed a new Criminal Law. In the new law, the term “Counterrevolutionary Crimes” was replaced by “Crimes of Endangering National Security,” which includes actions considered to “split the country and undermine national unification.”158 The ambiguous concept of “counterrevolutionary” has been abandoned for its incompatibility with the practice of criminal justice and law enforcement required in an effective anti-terrorism regime. In the aftermath of September 2001 attacks in the United States, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution of 1373, which urged parties to implement the Resolution by adopting appropriate national legislation. On November 2, 2001, China’s Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security (MPS) jointly issued the document titled “Notice on Strictly Combating Terrorism Activity In Accordance With Law.”159 In this document, Chinese authorities demonstrated their stance on preventing and fighting terrorism. On December 29, 2001, NPC Standing Committee adopted the Third Amendment of Criminal Law of People’s Republic of China. The amendment added Article 120, which provides the punishment of crimes involving forming, leading, and participating in a terrorist organization.160 It is an important legislation for China’s struggles against terrorism. On December 15, 2003, the MPS issued its criteria for identifying a terrorist or terrorist organization. According to the document, a “terrorist” or terrorist organization refers to any individual or group “engaging in terrorist activities at home or abroad.”161 However, there has not been a specific concept of “terrorism” or “terrorist activities” in Chinese legislation.162 This is a great deficiency in China’s counter-terrorism legal regime. Since 2005, the NPC has been drafting a Counter-Terrorism Law.163 Once approved, this law would become China’s most essential legal basis for identifying terrorist acts and countering the same. The complexity involved in contemporary terrorism makes it difficult for the states to fight it effectively with ordinary criminal justice system. Therefore, China should take steps to adopt a comprehensive and integrated antiterrorism legislation. The law should be under the framework of relevant

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UN Resolutions and international conventions and in conjunction with China’s own legal tradition. Most importantly, the concept of terrorism should be clarified in the legislation. Since there is no well-accepted definition of “terrorism” in the world today, China has to create its own concept. China may take experiences of counter-terrorism legislations from other countries as reference and adopt them keeping in view the situation in China. Counter-terrorist Financing Finance is an important requirement for terrorist or insurgent groups. Hence, preventing the access of money to the terrorists or insurgents is a vital component of the counter-strategy. Chinese authorities have paid great attention to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) and strengthened international cooperation with an open and practical attitude. After September 2001, President Hu Jintao noted that “to succeed in anti-terrorism, we must contain and eliminate terrorist financing activities.”164 In recent years, China has improved its Anti-Money Laundering (AML) mechanism for preventing, cracking down, and punishing terrorist-financing activities. Particularly, China’s central bank—the People’s Bank of China (PBC), has made great progress in implementing and enforcing Anti-Money Laundering measures. In May 2003, the PBC was designated as the leading agency for AML work in China.165 In December 2003, the National People’s Congress (NPC) amended the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China.166 According to the amendment, the PBC is responsible for directing and deploying AML strategies in the financial system and monitoring movement of funds in the financial system. The PBC and the MPS have already set up special anti-money laundering units. Other government agencies concerned with AML and CFT tasks are the General Administration of Customs, the General Administration of Taxation, China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Insurance Regulatory Commission, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, among others.167 All these agencies also appointed special units to fulfill AML/CFT functions within their respective jurisdictions.168 China has established a legal system in Anti-Money Laundering and terrorist financing. China’s Criminal Law Article 120(I) and Article 190 define terrorist financing and money-laundering crime as criminal acts.169 In October 2006, China formulated the Anti-Money Laundering

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Law, providing the legal system for the prevention of terrorist financing.170 Since the law came into effect on January 1, 2007, the Chinese government has greatly improved its capability to monitor the illicit f low of money to combat terrorist financing. The Chinese government is keen on the establishment of international cooperation framework in anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing. In February 2004, China officially applied to join the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),171 the inter-governmental agency spearheading the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing at the global level. In January 2005, thirty-three members of FATF unanimously agreed to accept China as an observer. In October 2004, China together with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus established the Euro-Asian Group on Combating Money-laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), which became one of the key components of international anti-terrorist financing cooperation.172 On April 15, 2009, the UN Security Council added Abdul Haq, the ETIM (TIP) leader in its list of “designated terrorists associated with Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda or the Taliban” making him subject to financial sanctions by UN member states.173 Following the UN decision, on April 20, 2009, the U.S. Treasury Department identified Abdul Haq as a terrorist supporting Al Qaeda and adopted financial sanctions against him by freezing his assets and prohibiting transactions with him.174 Since 2001, China’s struggles against terrorist financing have developed rapidly with visible results. However, anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing still face serious challenges from the changing tactics of the terrorists. It is necessary for China to strengthen its antiterror financing initiatives through more robust domestic regimes and through greater international cooperation. International Cooperation While China focuses on improving the grass-root level condition domestically, it has made enormous efforts to create an international environment favorable for its war on terrorism. The immediate official Chinese concerns of the real security threats brewing outside Xinjiang urged China to widen its cooperation with foreign countries in its antiseparatist and anti-terrorist campaigns.175 Though the precise details and scale remain unclear, Uighur groups were engaged in political organization and some form of military training abroad. Chinese sources claim that till 1994, there had been secret training camps in southern Xinjiang, which later, under Chinese pressure, moved abroad. It seems likely that

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at one time or other in the 1990s some sort of weapons training went on in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan. According to Rozi Muhammad, the head of Uighur cultural association Ittipaq in Bishkek, some Uighur youths had formed military groups and engaged in weapons training in the mountains in Kyrgyzstan as early as 1995.176 The U.S. government implicitly confirmed Chinese assertion of Uighurs’ training with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, though not in the large numbers, by holding twenty-two Uighurs prisoners in their facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Besides, China was also concerned about activities of Uighurs in Pakistan.177 Chinese response to these threats is a new diplomatic initiative, which uses China’s rising economic clout to increasingly enhancing its cooperation with countries all over the world, especially the countries in Central Asia and Russia and the United States. The SCO The establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a landmark in the counter-terrorist cooperation between China and neighboring states. Established in 2001, this regional organization currently has six members: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Mongolia, Pakistan, India, and Iran have received observer status in this organization. The SCO is the outgrowth of the “Shanghai Five,” which was founded in 1996 as an effort between China, three Central Asian countries (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan), and Russia to resolve border disputes, develop confidence-building measures, promote troop reductions and facilitate economic cooperation.178 By 1999, the border issues had been resolved, and with concerns mounting over Islamic extremism in that region and the possible inf luence from the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Shanghai five started to develop a stronger focus on regional security. In 1999 a series of bombings in Tashkent targeted Uzbek President Islam Karimov, and in June 2001, Uzbekistan joined the organization. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization thereafter was established and its focus moved to military coordination and anti-terrorism efforts. The U.S.-led global war on terrorism and the existing linkages between East Turkistan terrorists and the Islamic extremist groups in Central Asia have highlighted the essence of collective response to transnational terrorism in at least in the regional context. This consensus among the SCO members has accelerated the shift of the SCO from a loose alliance into an “anti-terrorist security cooperation organization.”179 In a SCO summit in 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao urged that “terrorism in all forms,” which is regarded as a

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“grave threat to world peace and development” must be “suppressed.”180 Since SCO was established, the cooperation between China and other members has met with several successes in combating terrorism. China has engaged in several joint military exercises with SCO member states. In 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan undertook a bilateral military exercise aimed at combating terrorist groups, which was perhaps China’s first joint military exercise ever conducted with another country.181 In 2003, China and four members of the SCO (except Uzbekistan) launched the first joint multilateral military exercise dubbed “United-2003,” which rehearsed a strike on terrorist camps.182 The six-day exercise involved more than a thousand soldiers and was undertaken in Kazakhstan and the Chinese city of Ili, the site of significant Uighur unrest in 1997. The maneuvers, complete with tanks and helicopter gunships, simulated a hostage rescue, an attack on a terrorist base camp, and a border closing manoeuvre.183 The Chinese have hailed the exercise as a major success. General Cao Gangchuan, then Chinese defense minister, called the event “a glorious page in the history of friendly interaction” among SCO members.184 In August 2005, Chinese and Russian armed forces started the first joint exercise between these two states—Peace Mission 2005, with the aim to strengthen “the capability to jointly fight international terrorism, extremism and separatism.”185 With nearly 10,000 troops from the Russian and Chinese navy, air force, army, and para-military involved, the eight-day maneuvers took place at Vladivostok, Russia and Qingdao, a coastal city in east China’s Shandong Province.186 It also involved long-range bomber f lights and cruise-missile drills.187 According to the Chinese officials, the joint military exercises helped “promote mutual trust in the international military and security field,” and “constituted a good practice of the new concept of security” advocated by China.188 In August 2007, the SCO held the “Peace Mission 2007” joint military exercise. About 6,500 troops from the six member countries with much advanced military equipments were involved in the drills. Chinese authorities believe that the highly visible military maneuvers is an effective way of deterring terrorists and separatists, showing that any terrorist and separatist activities in this region would be put down with force. The PAPF is also holding joint counter-terrorism exercises within SCO framework. In September 2007, the PAPF and the Internal Troops of Russia staged the joint counter-terrorism exercise, “Cooperation-2007.” Between 22 and July 26, 2009, the SCO held the “Peace Mission 2009” counterterrorist exercise in China’s Jilin province. The exercise used primarily Chinese and Russian troops and involved participation of military

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observers of other SCO member states.189 The joint military training underscores China’s and Russia’s growing partnership in fighting terrorism, as well as a common desire to improve stability in Xinjiang and Central Asia.190 The SCO has set up a regional counter-terrorism center in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.191 In January 2004, the SCO established a permanent Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) based in Uzbekistan. The SCO framework has also been successful in repatriation of suspected terrorists. China has had over 100 Uighurs repatriated from Central Asia back to China.192 For example, two suspected ETIM members were deported to China from Kyrgyzstan in May 2002 for planning terrorist attacks in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.193 In 2006, Uzbekistan handed over Husein Celil (Huseyin Celil), later convicted of “separating China” and conducting terrorist activities.194 On May 14, 2006, China and Tajikistan made a declaration to intensify their cooperation in fighting the “three evil forces” of “terrorism, separatism and extremism.”195 In addition, the SCO has founded mechanisms for regular meetings of leaders and highranking officials from the member-states, and the organization has become a regional forum to discuss issues on combating terrorism in the region. The shift of the SCO from mainly a trade and border resolution mechanism in the late 1990s—something that it accomplished quite effectively—into an anti-terrorist security cooperation organization after 2001, has met with mixed success. While the incidents of violence in Xinjiang have decreased precipitously, most visitors to the region report that anger and resentment continues to simmer, even as the government continues to report frequent arrests. In Central Asia, groups like the Hizbut-Tahrir, which call for an independent Islamic Caliphate, continue to proliferate and grow in popularity despite concerted efforts by the respective governments to stamp them out.196 Cooperation with India and Pakistan On May 29, 2006, India and China signed a memorandum of understanding during a visit by the then Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee that stipulated that the two countries would hold joint military exercises, and join forces in counter-terrorism operations.197 The military ties between the Indian and Chinese armed forces have been building since 2007. From December 20 to 27, 2007, China and India held the first-ever joint counter-terrorism exercise “Hand-in-Hand 2007” in China’s southwest Province, Yunnan, with the participation

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of over 200 ground troops from the two armies.198 During the drills, Chinese and Indian soldiers jointly accomplished a series of tactical training and psychological training, and conduct a drill that involved rescuing “hostages” from “terrorists.”199 From December 6 to 14, 2008, China and India carried out a military combat exercise in Pune in India to jointly counter terrorism and insurgency. A 137-member strong PLA contingent from the First Company of Infantry Battalion of Chengdu Military Area Command and the Indian Army troops from 8 Maratha Light Infantry Battalion participated in the exercise.200 The week-long anti-terrorism training included “ joint tactical maneuvers and drills,” “interoperability training,” “ joint command post procedures,” and a “ joint counter-terrorist operational exercise.”201 These joint military exercises mark the growing concerns of the two countries in combating terrorist violence in the region. Pakistan has played a unique role in the counter-terrorist cooperation with China due to their all-weather partnership. Ismail Kadir, the third highest-ranking leader of ETIM, was repatriated to China in March 2002 following his capture by Pakistani authorities. 202 Ismail Semed, another Uighur ETIM founder, was deported from Pakistan where he had f led after involvement in the violent incident in Baren in 1990. 203 On October 2, 2003, Pakistani security forces killed Hasan Mahsum, the ETIM leader, in a raid in Pakistan. Since 2003, the two countries have held several counter-terrorism joint exercises. On August 6, 2004, the PLA and the Armed Forces of Pakistan held an anti-terrorism exercise at Xinjiang’s Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County, bordering Pakistan. The exercise aimed to simulate joint crackdown on possible terrorist attacks by “East Turkistan” terrorists operating from Pakistan. 204 In December 2006, Chinese and Pakistani troops held an eight-day anti-terrorism drill in the mountainous area of northern Pakistan’s Abbottabad region. 205 Focusing on “anti-terror operation in mountainous terrain,” the drill included command post exercises and troop exercises such as raids, ambushes, searches, and annihilation. 206 In December 2007, China and Pakistan signed an extradition treaty to facilitate the exchange of prisoners. 207 The treaty provides a legal mechanism for the two countries to facilitate repatriation of wanted terrorist suspects. In April 2009, Pakistan arrested nine ETIM members in the FATA, where they assisted Taliban forces to attack Pakistani military and police targets. 208 In the wake of the extradition of the captured militants, Mr. Rehman Malik, Pakistani Interior Minister visited China for vital talks on counter-terrorism issues with his Chinese counterparts. As the leadership of ETIM is

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still based in Pakistan cooperation with Pakistan is of great essence for China’s anti-terrorism struggles. China-U.S. Cooperation China-U.S. cooperation entailed coordination at the UN, intelligencesharing, law enforcement liaison, and monitoring of financial networks.209 In the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks, China’s concerns appeared to place it in a position to support Washington and share intelligence.210 In a message to President George W. Bush on September 11, 2001, the then president of China, Jiang Zemin, condemned the terrorist attacks and offered condolences. On September 12, 2001, the PRC voted with the others at the UN Security Council for Resolution 1368 to combat terrorism. On September 25, 2001, China’s counter-terrorism experts were invited to an initial meeting in Washington, D.C.211 Three days later, China voted with all others in the UNSC for Resolution 1373, reaffirming the need to combat terrorism and terrorist financing. On August 19, 2002, the U.S. State Department designated the ETIM as “a terrorist group that committed acts of violence against unarmed civilians.”212 The counterterrorism campaign helped to stabilize U.S.-PRC relations up to the highest level. Shortly after the September 2001 attacks, then Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visited the United States and expressed China’s willingness to develop intelligence-sharing with Washington in counter-terrorism campaigns. 213 On December 6, 2001, China agreed to give “positive consideration” to a long-sought U.S. request for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to set up an office of the Legal Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.214 China and the United States also agreed that counter-terrorism consultations would occur semiannually, and that the two sides would set up a Financial CounterTerrorism Working Group.215 In February 2002, the PRC approved the FBI office, and the first semi-annual meeting on terrorist financing was held at the Treasury Department in late May 2002.216 The FBI attaché arrived at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing in September 2002. Later in 2002, the embassy reported that two members of the ETIM were deported from Kyrgyzstan after allegedly plotting to attack the U.S. embassy there.217 Following the attempted attack, the United States and China, along with Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan asked the United Nations to designate the group as a terrorist organization and provide freezing of the group’s assets. China’s interrogators were reportedly allowed access to Uighur detainees at Guantanamo Bay in September

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2002. 218 On October 25, 2002, President Bush said that China and the United States were “allies” in combating terrorism during President Jiang’s visit to the United States. Washington has come to acknowledge that China and the United States could do more together in the global fight against terrorism” after “a good start.” In November 2005, then U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales met with then PRC Minister of Public Security, Zhou Yongkang, in Beijing. In June 2007, FBI Assistant Director for International Operations Thomas Fuentes visited Beijing.219 On January 18, 2008, FBI Director Robert Mueller visited Beijing to discuss U.S. cooperation with Chinese police and security officials for the Beijing Olympic Games.220 Before the Games, FBI offered its expertise to China on security and anti-terrorism issues. The global reach of FBI in intelligence gathering would be immensely useful for China’s anti-terrorist struggles in terms of the information sharing and technical assistance. It is also important to note that the cooperative relationship between China and the United States has not been bereft of mistrust and conf lict. Despite China’s best efforts, Washington has not designated East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), World Uighur Youth Congress (WUYC), and East Turkistan Information Center as terrorist organizations as it did with the ETIM. There was a perception that China’s list was “intentionally misleading or mistaken”221—an outcome of Beijing’s attempt to exploit the global counter-terrorist campaign to validate its harsh measures against the Uighur people. Even the designation of the ETIM as a terrorist organization and its links to Al Qaeda itself was contested in the United States. For example, in February 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted that the “(U.S.) government had not presented sufficient evidence that the ETIM was associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban.”222 Moreover, Washington kept supporting the Uighur exile groups operating in the United States and Europe. In June 2007, President Bush met with the leader of World Uighur Congress (WUC), Rebiya Kadeer, who China considers responsible for instigating a number of violent incidents in Xinjiang.223 In July 2008, just one month before the Beijing Olympic Games, President Bush met Rebiya again at the White House and expressed his support for “Uighurs’ quest for human rights and democracy.”224 Beijing strongly objected to these overtures which it considers as interference with its internal affairs. A contentious issue related to China-U.S. cooperation is the fate of the 22 Uighurs captured during U.S. strikes against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001–2002. These Uighurs were detained at

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Guantanamo Bay military prison. Beijing claims that they are Chinese citizens for legal action as “suspected terrorists,” and demands they be handed over to China. Uighur and rights groups, however, urged the United States not to turn the Uighur detainees over to China, where they would face “torture” and “execution.”225 Starting in late 2003, the U.S. Defense Department reportedly had determined to release 15 Uighurs from Guantanamo, who were considered low-risk detainees.226 Seven others were determined to be “enemy combatants.”227 By 2004, the U.S. officials determined that Uighurs detained at Guantanamo Bay had no more intelligence value, and approached over 100 countries to accept the Uighurs. On May 5, 2006, the United States transferred five Uighurs from the Guantanamo Bay prison to Albania. All of them had been determined to be “no longer enemy combatants” during reviews in 2004– 2005.228 Chinese authorities then demanded that Albania extradite those Uighurs as “terrorists,” but Albania refused. On September 30, 2008, the U.S. Justice Department conceded in the D.C. District Court that the 17 remaining Uighur detainees were “no longer enemy combatants.”229 Then, at a hearing on October 7, 2008, the judge ordered the release of the Uighurs into the United States. On February 20, 2009, however, a three-judge panel of a U.S. appeals court struck down the former ruling to release these Uighur detainees to the United States.230 After his election, President Barak Obama of the United States announced the closure of Guantanamo Bay prison camp in no more than one year time further distancing his counter-terrorism policies from those of his predecessor, George W Bush. However, resettlement of those detainees, including the 17 Uighurs, has put his administration under intense political pressure. Due to strong opposition in Congress against sending these Guantanamo inmates to prisons in the United States President Obama has been seeking help from U.S. allies in resettling them. On June 10, 2009, the Pacific island nation of Palau, which was a UN Trust territory under U.S. administration before becoming independent in 1994, said that it would accept 17 Uighur detainees remaining at Guantanamo Bay.231 In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry demanded the United States to stop the transfer of the suspects to any third country and repatriate them to China. On June 11, 2009, four Uighurs from U.S. Guantanamo Bay were released in Bermuda, a self-governing British overseas territory. Bermuda said the Uighurs would be enrolled in a guest-worker program and would be eligible for citizenship eventually, which would allow them to travel elsewhere.232 The Chinese government has repeatedly called for the early repatriation of “East Turkistan terrorist” suspects and opposed other nations

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taking those inmates. The lack of an extradition treaty has become one of the major obstacles to the China-U.S. cooperation. Without the treaty, it is difficult for the two countries to make repatriation of wanted criminals. This issue is also more than a judicial legal problem as it has got human rights and other political concerns. Officially, China welcomes all forms of cooperation with the United States. However, Chinese authorities object to some aspects of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) led by the United States. From Beijing’s perspective, the Bush administration relied too heavily on military approaches to combat terrorism. Chinese official statements have repeatedly highlighted that counter-terror efforts should address not only the “symptoms,” but also the “root causes” of terrorism.233 The Chinese government views tackling poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment and promoting prosperity in developing countries as a fundamental way to address the problem of terrorism. Moreover, Beijing perceives that Washington took advantage of the GWOT to promote unilateralism and global hegemony. Chinese observers argue that the GWOT serves as “a cloak for the pursuit of narrow US interests.”234 However, Beijing views the counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States as a good chance to strengthen the relationship between the two states and gain international support for China’s war on terrorism.235 The Obama administration is also seeking China’s support in a broad range of issues including counter-terrorism. On September 10, 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with the head of the National People’s Congress of the PRC, Wu Bangguo in Washington and proposed joint consultations on counterterrorism.236 This would be the first institutionalized dialogue on counterterrorism between China and the United States.237 So far China has participated in 11 international counter-terrorism treaties.238 Progressive international cooperation has been founded in the area of anti-terrorist finance. Since the ETIM was designated as a terrorist organization by China, the Bank of China has received regular information from the Office of Foreign Asset Control of the U.S. Treasury, the Financial Crime Enforcement Network, and the Security Council of the UN. With the support from these organizations, the Bank of China has developed countermeasures in “monitoring trails of money laundering” to limit the sources of the terrorist finance.239 On January 20, 2009, the Information Office of the State Council issued a White Paper titled China’s National Defense in 2008, which reiterated Beijing’s continued practice in “security cooperation and maintaining common security with all countries.”240 According to this document,

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the Chinese government is actively involved in multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and attaches great importance to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Moreover, China-ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea) cooperation and cooperation in non-traditional security fields is also “developing in depth.”241 The new White Book shows China’s great hope of seeking broader and deeper cooperation with other states. China’s approach to counter terrorism is to build its own military and non-military capabilities while cooperating with international partners. Between 1990 and 2001, the response mainly concentrated on the military means against the perpetrators of violence. In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Chinese authorities have adopted more non-military approaches including setting up and developing counter-terror intelligence, legislation and financing mechanisms along with military measures. The economic development project—“Western Development” was launched as a long-term solution for the ethnic tension and political violence in Xinjiang. The founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has marked an increasing regional and international cooperation promoted by the Chinese government in this field. China’s counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism policies and practices are generally successful to the extent that the number of violent incidences has remarkably declined. The overall situation in Xinjiang appears stabilized, occasional skirmishes notwithstanding. However, it has been evident in recent years that the terrorist group ETIM is becoming particularly active in plotting terrorist attacks against China. To manage the threat posed by contemporary terrorist groups, it is essential for China to engage and interlock the terrorist groups on all their operational and organizational facets. Developing a multipronged and multijurisdictional response demands a multiagency and multinational response, which involves a significant understanding of the terrorism issue by political leaders and public officials. Most importantly, there must be willingness on the part of government to allocate resources and provide sound and timely leadership.242As the terrorists have always been changing their strategy in gaining support from general population and committing violence, it is necessary for China to pay more attention to advancing its policies and practices in combating terrorism and maintaining the stability of Xinjiang. To manage the growing threat of terrorism, China needs a robust database, intelligence network, international cooperation, and tactical units. To reduce the threat of terrorism and extremism the Chinese approach vis-à-vis the terrorist threat should be strategic instead of being just

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tactical as it is today. Ethno-nationalist and separatist movements never end militarily but by dialogue, consensus and concessions. The problems in Xinjiang cannot be an exception to this trend. Against extremism and terrorism, the most effective weapon is economic development and community engagement using Muslim scholars and clerics. To build the latter capability, China will need to study how a few countries have developed their community engagement programs—such as Singapore. Balanced economic development, especially in the provinces where its minorities live, will dampen the attraction for religious extremism and ethnic separatism among the local population. To sustain the pace of economic development, China should do everything possible to avoid coming into conf lict with the United States or any of its neighbors. In the coming years, China will emerge as an economic, political, diplomatic and a military superpower. In the West, there is a certain degree of concern regarding the rise of China. It is largely a misunderstanding of Western leaders to view the rise of China through the old Cold War lens. Whether the West likes it or not, the rate of China’s development will outpace many of its neighbors and eventually most economies in the world. It is essential for the West and the rest of the world to be part of that development than to perceive and treat China as a competitor. This can be achieved through regular interaction at the leadership level and through other confidence building measures. Engagement rather than confrontation is essential to deal with the rising power. At the same time China should be less suspicious of its neighbors and the West, especially the United States, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.

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NEED FOR MODERATION AND A HUMANE APPROACH

Chinese hostility towards Islam and Muslims does not stop at the Chinese borders. Here is the so called dragon . . . joining a ferocious war against Muslims in Afghanistan and Pakistan alongside with the United States. —The Turkistan Islamic Party, Islamic Turkistan, July 2009.1

I

n multiethnic, multinational societies, minority concerns over their share in the political space, control over resources and protection of their identities (religious, linguistic) often contribute to political conf licts.2 There is also a strong and positive correlation between ethnic conf lict and ethnic nepotism measured by ethnic heterogeneity3 as with religious polarization and the risk of internal conf lict.4 Minority grievances over the lack of political and civil rights, income inequality, and social fragmentation are especially conducive to internal unrest including civic strife and insurgency. With religious polarization, conf licts tend to get protracted as there could be a perception that the conf licting issues are indivisible and hence not amenable to settlement through negotiations.5 It is in this lens that the terrorist threat in China needs to be viewed. Undoubtedly, like many conf licts in other parts of world, the conf lict involving Muslims in China is rooted in issues of national self-determination of a minority population. However, this is increasingly being overshadowed by religious undertones. Thus, today, the real threat stems not so much from Uighur nationalism but from their religiosity which unfortunately is under the inf luence of the ideology of global jihad. In a conf lict situation, the duration of the conf lict and the longevity of the actors also depend on the extent of grassroots support, the ability of the groups to galvanize outside support and the effectiveness of

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government’s counter-measures. For the government, the choice of appropriate counter-measures—stringent policies and repressive measures (the stick) vis-à-vis more accommodative actions (the carrot)—is crucial for the resolution of the conf lict.6 However, leaders are often entrapped in what Holsti calls “state strength dilemma” 7in which rather than seeking legitimacy through political or economic development, there would be a tendency to use force as a means to national cohesion.8 Use of force, especially the indiscriminate use of it, invariably invokes uncertainty among the minorities and thereby their reactions which can often be violent. This goes on in a circle of violence. In order to be effective, the government counter-measures need to undermine grassroots support for insurgency and violence, cut-off outside sympathy and support and create conditions which will be hostile for the violent actors. Terrorism in China in general and Xinjiang in particular is a result of the conf lict over Muslim identity between the indigenous peoples and the Chinese state. The identity formation has also been a dynamic process. Islam lies at the center of a Muslim identity in China, which fairly differentiates the Muslim minorities from the Han Chinese, who make up over 90 percent of China’s population. However, the identities of the Muslims are “inherently weak” and “in constant f lux”9 due to their wide dispersion throughout the country and divergent nature. It was not until the formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 that the Muslim identity was strengthened. A growing sense of identity emerged out of Muslim opposition to China’s nation-building process. In Xinjiang in particular, a critical factor for understanding ethnoreligious conf lict and terrorism is the “geographic-symbolic location” of political, cultural, economic, and religious centers on which these groups are based.10 Many Uighurs center their idea of the state away from China, either in an independent East Turkistan, or in a pan-Turkic caliphate.11 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent Central Asian states led to the revival of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkic nationalism in this region. XUAR is the only region in China which is bordered by five Muslim states out of eight. The Pan-Turkic nationalism calls for the “Turkic-speaking people” to unite and to form a “Turkistan” state with Islamic principles. The Uighur are regarded as one of the branches of the Turkic tree and their nationalist thinking makes some of them more sensitive to the “assimilation” by the Han Chinese. The sense of an independent identity has reinforced their perception that the Uighur Muslims are being threatened by the Han Chinese. This has triggered the growing discontent against Han Chinese domination in Xinjiang’s politics, economy, education, and demography, among others.

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With the moderate policies in the “reform and opening” time, Muslims are allowed to travel to Islamic countries, and encouraged to build connections with their co-religionists abroad. Muslims, including the Uighurs are allowed to travel to Mecca for the Hajj, the annual Islamic pilgrimage in increasing numbers. Chinese authorities also allowed the use of funds contributed from foreign Islamic countries to build new mosques, establish Qur’anic schools, and import religious materials. This “religious revival” has caused renewed thinking on the religion and cultural identity on the part of the Muslims. While this itself is not a cause of concern, some form of fundamentalism and radicalization has also crept in spearheaded by the Wahhabi movement and groups like Tablighi Jamaat. The extensive contacts with the Middle East and Central Asia have strengthened the feeling of a “transnational identity” among the Uighur communities inside and outside China. However, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, as a byproduct, has led to increasing radicalization of Islamic separatist forces with attempts to cloak political issues in extremist terminology. Since the PRC was founded in 1949, Beijing has launched comprehensive campaigns to enhance the extent of integration of its minority Muslim population. To keep the Muslims loyal to the unified multinational state, China has attempted to promote their socioeconomic development and protect their cultural rights and religious freedom. However, China’s approach simultaneously generates grievances among some of these Muslims, who are feeling threatened by this integration process. There is a perception of marginalization vis-à-vis the Han Chinese and a feeling of prejudice in China’s nation-building process, which Muslims consider an aggressive attempt for total assimilation of their religion and culture. The term “sinicization” is frequently used to refer to China’s attempts at integration. Erkin Alptekin, the former president of the World Uighur Congress (WUC), once said that: “The Chinese want to replace us with their own people as colonists, and assimilate those of us who remain, wiping out our culture.”12 Western human rights activists and Uighur diaspora groups allege that Beijing’s policies against separatism and terrorism in the post-September 2001 era has posed further threats to Muslims’ societal identity. They consider China’s “war on terror” a part of an attempt to strengthen the “colonist rule” in the name of counter-terrorism. An analysis of the Chinese response to terrorism would demonstrate that the Beijing’s action often betrays impatience and intolerance, though the government has made significant investments to better the economic conditions in the conf lict areas. Even though the East Turkistan militants

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are by nature too small, disorganized and dispersed to pose any real threat to the Chinese control over the Xinjiang, Chinese response has been disproportionately aggressive. This has resulted in lop-sided policies, which have further alienated the Muslim minorities and driven them toward the path of radicalization and extremism. Chinese aggressiveness and intolerance has also invoked unnecessary criticism and often severe castigation of Beijing’s efforts to deal with the threat of terrorism, which now is not only apparent, but also too real to be ignored. Since 1990, as the violence began to manifest in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Chinese authorities have been mounting a crackdown on what they describe the “three evil forces” of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. China perceives that the threats to its national interests are primarily from these three forces. Beijing fears that any disruption by terrorists will create an impression of instability, which would affect foreign investment and other economic activity not only in the area but also in other parts of the country. Beijing’s response has demonstrated its determination to maintain national unity at any cost and to strictly repress the three evils forces from destabilizing the country in any manner. China has also tried to portray its efforts in Xinjiang as part of the global campaign against terrorism. This is a tendency which has manifested with many governments all over the world especially after September 2001 and China is no exception. Countries facing great difficulty in containing their own domestic skirmishes, insurgencies or separatist problems have now found it convenient to “hijack” the opportunity of labeling what could be their own very domestic problems as part of the larger “transnational terrorism.” This allows them to link a local problem to the larger global struggle to legitimize a broader range of tactics to be deployed. Unfortunately for China, the separatist issue involving Uighur Muslims is no longer a local issue and not confined to Xinjiang alone. Radicalization and extremism among Muslims are beginning to manifest in other areas of China apart from the fact that terrorism in Xinjiang has long been nourished under the patronage of transnational groups like Al Qaeda across its borders. Several Uighur and other human rights groups blame China for its “repression” over the local population in Xinjiang in the pretext of countering terrorism.13 There is a view prevailing in the West that the Uighur were reduced to a minority in Xingjian by deliberate colonization of Han Chinese. The West has constantly accused China of suppressing dissent and the rights of its minorities and gone out of its way to provide platforms to the Tibetan and Uighur leaders to express their grievances and

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operate from its soil despite protests by China. Some Western countries, especially the US, have been reluctant to work with China in countering terrorism. To the extent that, ETIM is galvanizing the support of other transnational groups like Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), China’s concerns about the East Turkistan militants and the threat they pose are understandable. It is worth noting that the nature of the threat from East Turkistan militants, especially from ETIM has significantly changed after their relocation to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan in early 2002. During the past years, ETIM has increasingly come under the inf luence of Al Qaeda and the Uzbek militants. With their support and with active facilitation of the friendly tribes in FATA, especially in South Waziristan, the members of the group have undergone extensive training both in terrorist tactics and the conduct of propaganda. This was evident from the heightened activity—both military and propaganda—during the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and thereafter. As Al Qaeda’s ability to operate in China is limited, it could prepare ETIM teams to infiltrate and conduct attacks in China. This makes it all the more important for the Chinese to adopt robust measures to counter the threat despite concerns by others about the “excesses.” Moreover, the perception of the alleged “excesses” is a systemic issue, the result of the Chinese political and administrative culture and practice. As the Western countries struggle to balance national security and the protection of individual rights in countering terrorism,14 China’s unified political system and administrative machinery has made it convenient for Beijing to adopt tougher measures without the fear of being bugged down by any form of domestic backlash. This is a trap that the Chinese leadership must extricate it from. While the nature of the threat warrants a tough counter-terrorism stance, the political, social, economic, and cultural roots of the conf lict and human rights issues must not be lost sight of. In the document China’s National Defense in 2008, the Chinese government states that “Separatist forces working for Taiwan independence, East Turkistan independence and Tibet independence pose threat to China’s unity and security.”15 This goes to show that despite a need for “soft” options, the security discourse in the minds of the Beijing’s ruling elites remain highly militarized. China has conf lated the threat by lumping together all the “separatist forces” of Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang. The criticisms from the West concentrate on China’s aggressive demeanor on separatism, “overreaction” to any form of protests and high sensitivity

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and low threshold to any criticism of its counter-separatist policies and practices. China’s guideline in dealing with separatism can be seen as that the greater the challenge posed by these separatist forces the tougher is the measures to counter this threat. After the release of 2008 white book on national defense, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) stated on January 21, 2009 that China would never make “compromise or concession” to these “separatist forces.”16 China insists that Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan issues are its domestic affairs and consider any criticism from other countries as interference in its internal affairs. It is understandable why Chinese state must combine the Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan issues in its threat perception and react to these threats with similar policies. Although the historical and political contexts are different in each case, China perceives that these three separatist forces (and perhaps those from Inner Mongolia) are interlinked and have increasingly come close to splitting the homeland. The Tibetan and East Turkistan émigrés in the West have built connections in their struggles for independence. Their close ties have been apparent in their joint protests against the Olympic f lame relay in 2008 all over the world. Several non-government organizations in Taiwan are supporting and cooperating with Tibetan and East Turkistan separatist groups. As the International Tibet Independence Movement (ITIM) stated in 2006, “We (‘freedom fighters’ from East Turkistan, Tibetan, Inner Mongolia, and Taiwan) understand that we share a common goal and we are fighting a similar opponent.”17 China’s counter-separatist stance is in coherence with its basic principles of territorial integrity. It is shaped by its cultural and historical legacy as well as the practical concerns of survival of the state.18 Since the Confucian ideology became dominant in the Han dynasty (202 BC–220), there has been a tradition in China’s political culture, called “great national unity” (da yi tong). It holds that “unity” (tongyi) is the ideal status of the country and should be permanent whereas division is abnormal and temporary. Therefore, both the political leadership and the people believe that securing unity of the country is a top priority and a basic requirement for building a strong, prosperous, and respected state. The Chinese government have enhanced its legitimacy and public support through its successes in recovering territories that China lost in the past, say, Hong Kong and Macao. However, this legitimacy and support will be largely wakened if a “renegade province” split from China. More seriously, China fears that independent movement of one ethnic group will result in demand for independence of the others. If one area of China cedes the country, it will cause a “domino effect,” leading to the

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“disintegration” of the PRC. This would not only be a great loss of territory, but also an unaffordable challenge to the legitimacy of the Central government. China’s response to separatist movements is seen as repressive because of its seemingly over-reliance on military and security forces. China’s hard-line postures are based on the premise that the separatist forces are threatening the state legitimacy by undermining its ability to provide security. Use of force could be effective to reduce the immediate threat by killing and capturing troublemakers and dissuading their potential supporters and sympathizers. But it does not mean that human right violations by the government are reasonable and legitimate. The government crackdown should be in accordance to the law and the international norms of human rights. From Beijing’s perspective, security of the state is indivisible and unitary. However, in multiethnic, multireligious states, security could be multidimensional, an understanding of which seems to have eluded the ruling elite in China. In its eagerness to promote unity and integrity of the nation-state, Beijing inadvertently has trampled upon certain critical components of security which lies at the heart of societal identity especially of the minority population. As discussed in chapter 1, the societal security is undermined when there is a perception of threat to the identity of the given community. The threats to identity could manifest in many forms. One is the inability of a given minority—the Uighurs for example—to sustain its essential character due to policies that are perceived to be deliberately hostile on the part of the majority. In the case of Uighurs in Xinjiang for example, Beijing’s attempt to dilute the demography of the region through sponsored migration of Han Chinese, is seen as a hindrance to “sustainability” of the essential character of Muslim identity. Similarly, use of repressive measures, together with limited autonomy and lack of opportunity for political expression, has hindered conditions that facilitate evolution of the societal identities. This in turn could be seen as limiting the ability of the given minority to reproduce itself. As discussed in chapter 1, if the minority community is inhibited to reproduce its distinct language, religion and culture, there would be concern that their identity would not be inherited by the next generation. Most of the policies of the government—introduction of standard mandarin Chinese in education system, restrictions on cultural and religious practices, to name a few- were perceived as clear attempts to wipe out Uighur identity. According to some analysts, China’s “religious policy is primarily a policy of control.”19 The much hyped development projects also

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appear threatening. For example, there are plans to relocate residents of “Old Kashgar” to new housing estates. While the authorities view that this would improve the quality of life, Uighurs consider this as an attack on their cultural heritage as the project involves destruction of ancient sites of Islamic architecture.20 In the words of Henryk Szadziewski of the Washington-based Uyghur Human Rights Project, “This is the Uighurs’ Jersualem. By destroying it, you rip the soul out of a people.”21 Providing security is the fundamental responsibility of any state. However, in China, attempts to build and maintain national cohesion appear to have produced opposite results. Instead of unity, China’s policies have contributed to problems of insecurity in many regions especially in Xinjiang. Domestic stability and a healthy political and economic life legitimize the state and secure its survival. The question of stability is of particular essence in China today because the majority of Chinese people demand it; no matter they are in Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan or in other parts of China. According to an analysis, the insecurity involving Muslims, especially the Uighur has begun to affect the Han Chinese which was manifested in the July 2009 riots in Xinjiang. There is thus a growing disillusionment among the Han Chinese with the government’s ability to provide security.22 The issue is just not about preventing a few disgruntled forces from what authorities consider “splitting” the country. China needs to ensure overall internal stability and harmony by all means. This must necessarily involve policies of inclusion; instead of current policies that tend to alienate the minorities since the official discursive about the threat from the minorities appear unduly militaristic. This also requires significant investments in developmental projects in the affected areas aimed at enhancing comprehensive security—social, economic, and political—of the local communities.

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NOTES

Introduction 1. “East Turkistan . . . The Forgotten Wound,” a speech by Abu Yahya al-Libi, released on jihadist forums on October 6, 2009. See “Libi Urges Support for Uyghurs, Calls for Jihad,” SITE Intelligence Group (October 7, 2009). 2. Samer Abboud, review of Legitimizing Modernity in Islam: Muslim Modus Vivendi and Western Modernity, by Husain Kassim, The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2005): 96. 3. Rebecca Givner-Forbes, “China Under Threat: Jihadist Community Has China in Its Sights—Debate Brewing over Whether Rising Dragon Should Be Seen as Muslim’s Friend or Foe.” The Straits Times (August 3, 2008). 4. “ ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” People’s Daily ( January 21, 2001). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/21/ eng20020121_89078.shtml. 5. Rohan Gunaratna and Kenneth Pereire, “An Al Qaeda Group Operating in China?” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006): 58. http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/May_2006/ GunaratnaPereire.pdf. 6. Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities and Other Subaltern Subjects (London: C. Hurst, 2004), 150. 7. Ibid., 231. 8. Ibid., 254. 9. Raphael Israeli, Islam in China, Religion, Ethnicity, Culture, and Politics (Lanham: Laxington Books, 2002), 1. 10. Ibid. 11. Martin I. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism: Counter-insurgency, Politics and Internal Security (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 10–11. 12. Ibid. 13. Sofia Jamil and Roderick Chia, “Lifting the Lid off Xinjiang’s Insecurities,” NTS Insight (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, September 2009).

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NOTES

1

Explaining Minority Conf lict in China: A Theoretical Perspective

1. Zhu Yuchao and Blachford Dongyan, “Ethnic Disputes in International Politics: Manifestations and Conceptualizations,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2006): 25. 2. Francis Fukuyama, “History and September 11,” in Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, ed. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 28. 3. Bernand Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 3 (September 1990): 47–60. 4. Peter Chalk, “Al Qaeda and Its Links to Terrorist Groups in Asia,” in The New Terrorism, Anatomy, Trends and Counter Strategies, ed. Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2002), 109. 5. Fareed Zakaria, “The Return of History: What September 11 Hath Wrought,” in How Did This Happen? Ed. James F. Hoge and Giden Rose (New York: Public Affairs, 2001); Timur Kuran, “The Religious Undercurrents of Muslim Economic Grievances,” Social Science Research Council, http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kuran.htm; and Karim Raslan, “Now a Historic Chance to Welcome Muslims into the System,” International Herald Tribune (November 27, 2001). http://www.asiasource. org/asip/raslan.cfm. 6. Farish A. Noor, New Voices of Islam (Leiden: Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, 2002). 7. Robert Keohane, “The Public Delegitimation of Terrorism and Coalition Politics,” in Worlds in Collision, ed. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 141. 8. Keohane, “The Public Delegitimation of Terrorism and Coalition Politics,” 144. 9. Suzaina Kadir, “Mapping Muslim Politics in Southeast Asia after September 11,” EIAS Publications BP 02/05 (December 2002): 3. http:// www.eias.org/publications/briefing/2002/muslimsea.pdf. 10. Amitav Acharya, “Southeast Asian Security after September 11, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canad,” Foreign Policy Dialogue Series (2003). 11. E.g., Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); and Paul Roe, Ethnic Violence and the Social Security Dilemma (London: Routledge, 2005). 12. Rhonda L. Callaway and Julie Harrelson-Stephens, “Towards a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29 (2006): 773–796. 13. Michael Clarke, “China’s ‘War on Terror’ in Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2008): 272. 14. The term “Copenhagen School” first appeared in Bill McSweeney’s article, “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1996): 81.

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15. For a detailed account of what constitutes new security issues, among others, Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1983): 129–153; L. Paggi and P. Pinzauti, “Peace and Security,” Telos, No. 68 (1985): 79; N. Myers, “Environment and Security,” Foreign Policy, No. 74 (1989): 24; Jessica T. Matthews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2 (1989): 162; David Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1994): 3; and David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 23 (1997): 26. The International Human Development Program Research Project on Global Environmental Change and Human Security synopsis on “What Is ‘Human Security?’ ” makes a complete inventory of the human security regimes. http://ibm.rhrz.uni-bonn.de/ihdp/gechuman security.htm. 16. Seyom Brown, “World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security,” in World Security: Challenges for a New Century, 3rd edition, ed. Michael T. Klare and Yogesh Chandrani (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 3–4. 17. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,” Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 40 (Supplement 2, 1996): 229–230. 18. Jessica T. Matthews, e.g., tells us how there has been a novel redistribution of power among states, markets and civil society, so much so that national governments share power—“including political, social and security roles”—with “businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizen groups known as nongovernmental organizations.” Jessica T. Matthews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1 (1997): 50. 19. Henry Kissinger, “A New National Partnership,” Department of State Bulletin (February, 17, 1975): 199 quoted in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence (Boston: Scott, Foresman, 1989), 26. 20. David Baldwin, “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War,” World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1995): 132. 21. Woosang Kim, “Human Security Concerns in Global Politics,” in The Human Face of Security: Asia-Pacific Perspectives, ed. David Dickens (Canberra: Australian National University, 2002), 44; Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge/Stanford: Polity Press/Stanford University Press, 1990); and Martin Shaw, Global Society and International Relations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). 22. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, eds. Security, A New Framework of Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 1. 23. Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1983): 129. 24. Caroline Thomas, In Search of security: the Third World in International Relations (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1987), 4. 25. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), e.g., identifies seven separate components to human security: economic security (assured basic income), food security (physical and economic access to food), health security (relative freedom from disease and infection), environmental

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NOTES

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49.

security (access to sanitary water supply, clean air and a non-degraded land system), personal security (security from physical violence and threats), community security (security of cultural identity), and political security (protection of basic human rights and freedoms). “New Dimensions of Human Security,” in United Nations Human Development Report 1994 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 24. http://hdr.undp.org/en/ reports/global/hdr1994/. Ronnie D. Lipshutz, “On Security,” in On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipshutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 5. Norman Meyers, Ultimate Security (New York: Norton, 1993), 12. Gareth Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intra State Conf lict,” Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Fall 1994): 8–9. Ronald Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security, Vol. 26. No. 2 (Fall 2001): 87. Krause and Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies,” 234. Daniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” Millennium, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1990): 465. Patric Morgan, “Liberalist and Realist security Studies at 2000: Two Decades of Progress?” in Critical Reflection on Security and Change, ed. Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 40. Krause and Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies,” 249. Ibid. Ibid. Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge/Stanford: Polity Press/Stanford University Press, 1990); and Martin Shaw, Global Society and International Relations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). O. Waever, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, and P. Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993), 24–25. Ibid. Clarke, “China’s ‘War on Terror’ in Xinjiang,” 273. Waever et al. Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda, 24. Ibid. 25. Buzan et al., Security, 2. Paul Roe, Ethnic Violence and the Social Security Dilemma (London: Routledge, 2005), 42. Lindholm, Helena, “Introduction: A Conceptual Discussion,” in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Formation of Identity and Dynamics of Conflict in the 1990s, ed. Helena Lindholm (Gothenburg: Nordnes, 1993), 1–39. Paul Roe, “The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conf lict as a ‘Tragedy’?” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1999): 193. Ibid., 194. Roe, Ethnic Violence and the Social Security Dilemma, 43. Waever, et al. Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (1993), 43.

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NOTES

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

67.

68.

69.

70. 71.

183

Clarke, “China’s ‘War on Terror’ in Xinjiang,” 272. Ibid., 273. Roe, “The Intrastate Security Dilemma,” 195. Ibid. Zhu and Dongyan, “Ethnic Disputes in International Politics,” 25. Ibid. Walker Connor, “Nationalism and Political Illegitimacy,” in Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World, ed. Daniele Conversi (New York: Routledge, 2002), 37. Zhu and Dongyan, “Ethnic Disputes in International Politics,” 26. Ibid. Ibid., 52. Ernie Regehr, “It’s not really a matter of hate,” Disarming Conflict (May 9, 2007). http://www.igloo.org/disarmingconf lict/itsnotre/ Andrew Tan, “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 23 (October–December 2000): 267–288. Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 322–323. Ernie Regehr, “It’s not really a matter of hate,” Disarming Conflict (May 9, 2007). Stephen Phillip Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001). Zhu and Dongyan, “Ethnic Disputes in International Politics,” 25. “Zhongguo de Shaosu Minzu Zhengce jiqi Shijian” (National Minorities Policies and its Practice in China) (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of PRC, 1999). English translation is accessed at: http://english. people.com.cn/whitepaper/1.html. Bruce Hoffman, “The Emergence of New Terrorism,” in The New Terrorism, Anatomy, Trends and Counter Strategies, ed. Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2002), 38. Barry Desker, “Islam in Southeast Asia: The Challenge of Radical Interpretations,” Cambridge Review of international Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3 (October 2003): 421. Rohan Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda’s Trajectory in 2003,” IDSS Perspectives (May 3, 2003). http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/Perspective/research_050303. htm. Barry Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah Phenomenon in Singapore,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2003): 495. Ibid.

2

Islam and Muslim Minorities in China

1. The Arabic-language electronic magazine of the Turkistan Islamic Party, Islamic Turkistan, was released through Al-Fajr Media Center. The fourth issue was posted on jihadist forums on July 25, 2009. “Fourth Issue of

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2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

TIP magazine, ‘Islamic Turkistan’,” SITE Intelligence Group ( July 29, 2009), 3–4. Raphael Israeli, Islam in China: Religion, Ethnicity, Culture and Politics (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 2. Mi Shoujiang and You Jia, trans. Min Chang, Islam in China (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2004), 1. Ibid. Mi and You, Islam in China, 3. Ibid. An ancient record of the history of the Tang Dynasty written in the mid-tenth century. Mi and You, Islam in China, 4. Ibid. According to Mi and You (2004), Arabian envoys visited China 37 times during this period. However, some other historians consider the times should be 39. Zhang Guanglin, Islam in China (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2005). “Fan Ke” in Chinese means “guests from outlying regions,” which shows the distinction between Muslims and Chinese in this period. Mi and You, Islam in China, 4. Mi and You, Islam in China, 5. Zhang Guanglin, Islam in China. Ibid. Michael Dillon, Xinjiang—China’s Muslim Far Northwest (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 11. Mi and You, Islam in China, 3. Ibid. The Yuan court divided its people into four castes: Mongol Caste, Semu Caste, Khitay Caste (“Hanren” in Chinese), and Manji Caste (“Nanren” in Chinese). Arab and Persian Muslims, Islamic Turks including Uighurs were among the Semu, which were superimposed by the Mongol rulers upon the Khitays and Manjis mainly consisted of Han Chinese. Israeli, Islam in China, 295. Ibid. Raphael Israeli, “The Muslim Minority in the People’s Republic of China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 8 (August 1981): 901–919. The word “Gedimu” is from the Arabic “Qadim” for “old.” Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 37. Ibid. Yusuf Abdul Rahman, “Islam in China (650–1980 CE),” Islam Awareness (1997). http://www.islamawareness.net/Asia/China/islchina.html. Richard C. DeAngelis, “Muslims and Chinese Political Culture,” The Muslim World, Vol. 87, No. 2 (1997): 152–154. Ibid. Ibid. Mi and You, Islam in China, 66.

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28. Ibid. 29. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 37; and Jean A. Berlie, Islam in China: Hui and Uyhghurs between Modernization and Sinicization (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2004), 39. 30. James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 80–81. 31. Dru C. Gladney, “Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?” China Quarterly (2003): 454. http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file= %2FCQY%2FCQY174%2FS0009443903000275a.pdf&code=e52294f 748e a2813d4063bbf512011e1. 32. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 78–79. 33. Ibid. 34. Mi and You, Islam in China, 70. 35. Dillon, Xinjiang, 17. 36. Israeli, Islam in China, 8. 37. Ibid., 287. 38. Berlie, Islam in China, 29. 39. Israeli, Islam in China, 289. 40. Berlie, Islam in China, 34. 41. Israeli, Islam in China, 288–289. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. “Zhongguo de Yisilanjiao” (Islam in China), Xinhua Net. http://news. xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003–01/23/content_704531.htm. 45. “China Islam Association,” BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ religions/islam/history/china_4.shtml 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, “Islam in Xinjiang” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 330. 49. Ibid. 50. These ethnic groups are ranked by descending order of their populations. Except for the eight Turkic groups listed here, the Dongxiang ethnic minority in China are also Muslims. Views about the origin of the ethnic group are divided. The Dongxiang language belongings to the Mongolian branch of the Altaic language family. “The Dongxiang ethnic minority,” the Web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (November 15, 2000). http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ljzg/3584/ t17882.htm. 51. There is much dispute about the figure of Muslim population in China. Estimates vary between 15 million and 80 million depending on the identity and political inclination of the author. The government of the Republic of China in 1938 declared there were 48,104,240 Muslims in China. “The Nationalist Republic Census of 1938,” China Handbook (Taipei: 1954). The recent Chinese sources show that the Muslim population in China is over 20 million. Zhang Guanglin, Islam in China.

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52. Fuller and Lipman, “Islam in Xinjiang,” 339. 53. Ibid. 54. Richard C. DeAngelis, “Muslims and Chinese Political Culture,” The Muslim World, Vol. 87, No. 2 (1997): 153. 55. Ibid. 56. Dru. C. Gladney, “The Salafiyya Movement in Northwest China: Islamic Fundamentalism among the Muslim Chinese?” in Muslim Diversity: Local Islam in Global Context, ed. Leif Manger (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999), 108. 57. Ibid. 58. Alexander Berzin, “The Relation of the Hui Muslims with the Tibetans and Uighurs,” The Berzin Archives (November 1996). http://www. berzinarchives.com/web/en/archives/study/islam/modern_interaction/ relation_hui_muslims_tibet_uighurs.html. 59. Ibid. 60. Dru. C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities and Other Subaltern Subjects (London: C. Hurst, 2004), 156. 61. Dru. C. Gladney, “Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?” in Religion in China Today: The China Quarterly Special Issues New Series, No. 3, ed. Daniel L. Overmyer (Cambrige: Cambridge University Press, 2003),147. 62. James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, “Political and Cultural History through the Late 19th Century” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 2004), 33. 63. “Xinjiang 2000 Population Census Assembly,” accessed from China Data Online. http://chinadataonline.org/member/census2000/default.asp?KeyT itle=&StartYear=2000&EndYear=2000&KeyType=0&=1&Region=All& page=2#. 64. Millward and Perdue, “Political History and Strategies,” 33. 65. Gladney, Dislocating China, 193. 66. For example, Jack Chen, The Sinkiang Story (New York: Macmillan, 1977), 100. 67. Colin Mackerras, The Uighur Empire: According to the T’ang Dynastic Histories (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972). 68. Gladney, Dislocating China, 193. 69. Denis Dinor, Inner Asia: A Syllabus (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1969), 118–121. 70. Dru C. Gladney, “Relational Alterity: Constructing Dungan (Hui), Uygur, and Kazakh Identities across China, Central Asia, and Turkey,” History and Anthropology, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1996): 445. 71. Ibid., 456. 72. Matthew D. Moneyhon, “Taming China’s ‘Wild West’: Ethnic Conf lict in Xinjiang,” Peace Conflict, and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 5, No. 5 (2004): 6. 73. Dru C. Gladney, “Chinese Programe of Development and Control: 1978–2001” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 102. 74. The term Uighur (Uyghur) was firstly employed as Turkic nomadic society practicing Shamanism and Manichaeanism in Mongolia. Later it referred to

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75. 76.

77.

78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

86.

87.

88. 89.

90.

91.

92.

187

the name for a sedentary oasis society practicing Buddhism. It was also used as a linguistic designation to distinguish one branch of Old Turkish. Chinese originally use Uighur, and later Hui Hu for all Turkic Muslims. Wiilam Samolin, East Turkistan to the Twelfth Century: A Brief Political Survey (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964), 73, quoted in Gladeny, Dislocating China, 210–214; and Millward and Perdue, “Political History and Strategies,” 40–43. Gladney, Dislocating China, 210. Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak, “Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identities in Flux,” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 2004), 299; and Gladney, Dislocating China, 210–214. Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak, “Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identity in Flux,” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe 2004), 302–303. Ibid. Ibid., 299. Ibid., 303. Gladney, Dislocating China, 210. Ibid., 218. Denise Helly “The Identity and Nationality Problem in Chinese Central Asia,” Central Asia Survey, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1985): 107. Gladney, Dislocating China, 218–219. Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China, 218–219; and “China’s Minorities: the case of Xinjiang and the Uyghur people,” Commission on Human Rights, Working Group on Minorities Ninth Session (May 12–16, 2003): 8. http:// www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/a0da2b54fc3b22e7c1256d25 004c086d/$FILE/G0314169.pdf. Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, “Islam in Xinjiang,” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe 2004), 339. The Information Office of the State Council, “History and Development of Xinjiang,” Xinhua Net ( June 12, 2003). http://www.gov.cn/english/ official/2005–07/28/content_17948.htm. “Population in Xinjiang Reaches 20.10 Mln,” China Net, (April 8, 2006). http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/165014.htm. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1993) and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon&Schuster, 1996). “History and Development of Xinjiang” The Information Office of the State Council (2003); and Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 18; and Dru C Gladney, “The Chinese Programme of Development and Control, 1978–2001,” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 102. “Xiyu” in Chinese means “west regions.” The majority of Xinjiang was referred to Xiyu in the Han Dynasty. “History and Development of Xinjiang,” The Information Office of the State Council (2003). James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, “Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Xinjiang:

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93. 94. 95. 96.

97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102.

103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108.

109.

110.

111. 112. 113.

114. 115. 116.

China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). Also spelled as Junahar, Jegun Ghar, Dzunghar, or Zhun-ga-er. Millward and Perdue, “Political and Cultural History,” 49. Dillon, Xinjiang, 17. Millward, Eurasian Crossroad, 97. The name Beg (Baig) was originally a title given to members of the Turkic clan called “Barlas,” who played a pivotal role in Turkic empires in Central Asia, Middle East and South Asia. For the Uighurs, “Begs” refers to gentry who manage local affairs. L. J. Newby, “The Begs of Xinjiang: Between Two Worlds,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 61, No. 2 (1998), 278. “Silk road history of Xinjiang history online guide,” Silk Road China. http://www.silkroadcn.com/silk-road-xinjiang-history.htm. Dillon, Xinjiang, 17. Lars-Erik Nyman, Great Britain and Chinese, Russian and Japanese interests in Sinkiang, 1918–1934 (Stockholm: Esselte Stadium, 1977), 12. Millward and Perdue, “Political and Cultural History,” 67. Millward, Eurasian Crossroad, 189. James A. Millward and Nabijian Tursun, “Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884–1978,” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 2004). Donald H. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–1977 (Boulder: West Press, 1979), 22. Ibid. Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang 1944–1949 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1990). Millward and Tursun, “Political History and Strategies,” 84. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power, 31. Säypidin was one of the most enduring politicians of Uighur ethnicity. He studied law and political science in the Soviet Union, where he joined the Soviet Communist party. Millward, Eurasian Crossroad, 239. Säypidin was elected as Chairman of the XUAR People’s Council and Wang Enmao was appointed the First Party Secretary and the commander of Xinjiang Military Region. “A United Multi-Ethnic Country,” National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China, Part I (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2002). http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/4/index.htm. Ibid. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power, 178. Zhongguo de Minzhu Quyu Zizhi Baipishu (Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China) (Beijing: The Information Office of the State Council, 2005). English translation is accessed at: http://www.gov.cn/ english/official/2005–07/28/content_18127.htm. Millward, Eurasian Crossroad, 242. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power, 133. Millward and Tursun, “Political History and Strategies,” 87.

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117. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power, 131–136. 118. Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa), Article four, the First National People’s Congress (Beiing, September 20, 1954). 119. Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa). 120. “Promoting the Common Development of All Ethnic Groups,” National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China, Part IV (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2000). 121. National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China, Part III. 122. Zhongguo de Minzhu Quyu Zizhi Baipishu (Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China). 123. Some CCP leaders who support a moderate and economy-centric approach, such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were labeled as “rightists” (you pai). A great number of CCP cadres and government officials recognized as “rightists” were severely persecuted in the “Anti-rightist” campaign started in 1957. 124. In Chinese, “Bai hua qi fang, bai jia zheng ming.” 125. Robert L. Worden, Andrea Matles Savada and Ronald E. Dolan eds., China: A Country Study, “Policy toward Intellectuals,” (Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987). http://countrystudies.us/ china/72.htm. 126. Millward and Tursun, “Political History and Strategies,” 92–94. 127. Ibid. 128. Ibid. 129. DeAngelis, “Muslims and Chinese,” 161. 130. Zhou Minglan, “The Politics of Bilingual Education in the People’s Republic of China since 1949” Bilingual Research Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1&2 (2001). http://brj.asu.edu/v2512/articles/art8.html. 131. Ibid. 132. Zhou Minglan, “The Politics of Bilingual Education.” 133. Millward, Eurasian Crossroad, 265. 134. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power, 140. 135. Millward, Eurasian Crossroad, 264. 136. Dillon, Xinjiang, 57. 137. Dru C. Gladney, “Islam,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 54, No. 2 (May 1995): 372. 138. Millward, Eurasian Crossroad, 270. 139. DeAngelis, “Muslims and Chinese,” 161. 140. Gladney “Islam,” 374. 141. Millward, Eurasian Crossroad, 263. 142. Dru C. Gladney, “Chinese Program of Development and Control: 1978–2001.” In Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 110. 143. Raphael Israeli, “The Muslim Minority in the People’s Republic of China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 8 (August 1981): 901. 144. DeAngelis, “Muslims and Chinese,” 163.

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145. Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 4 (Beijing: National People’s Congress, 1982). http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/ Constitution/node_2825.htm. 146. The Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities (minzu quyu zizhi fa) (Beijing: National People’s Congress, May 31, 1984), Article 35. 147. National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China, Part I (2000). 148. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China” (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, January 2008). www.apcss.org/Publications/APCSS%20Uyghur%20Muslim%20 Separatism%20in%20Xinjiang.doc. 149. Calla Wiemer, “The Economy of Xinjiang” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 170. 150. Dru C. Gladney, “Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?” The China Quarterly, No. 147 (2003): 457. 151. Harris C. Lillian, “Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China’s Policy in the Islamic World,” The China Quarterly, No. 133 (March 1993): 111. 152. Ibid., 112. 153. Calla Wiemer, “The Economy of Xinjiang,” 172. 154. Justin Rudelson, Xinjiang’s Uyghurs In The Ensuing US-China Partnership (testimony at the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Uyghur Panel, Washington, DC, the United States, June 10, 2002). 155. Dillon, Xinjiang, 75. 156. Gladney, Xinjiang, 10. 157. Abanti Bhattacharya, “Conceptualising Uighur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3 ( July–September 2003): 369. 158. Ibid. 159. Rahman, “Islam in China,” 53. 160. Sean L. Yom, “Uighur f lex their muscles,” Asia Times ( January 23, 2003). http://www.atimes.com/china/DA23Ad01.html. 161. L. J. Newby, “The Begs of Xinjiang,” 947.

3 Uighur Separatism: East Turkistan Groups 1. The audio message released on YouTube on July 9, 2009, and the Arabic transcript of it released by Al-Fajr media Center. “TIP leader threatens China over Urumqi Violence,” SITE Intelligence Group ( July 17, 2009). 2. “Full Text: China’s National Defense in 2008,” Xinhua Net ( January 20, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–01/20/ content_10688124.htm. 3. “Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Organizations and Their Links with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban,” (New York: Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, November 29, 2001). http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/f k/t28937.htm. 4. Dru C. Gladney, “Xinjiang,” “Xinjiang,” in Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism, ed. Derek Reveron and Jeffrey S. Murer (London: Routledge, 2006), 234.

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5. “Special Report: Uighur Muslim Separatists,” Virtual Information Center (September 28, 2001), 6. http://vic-info.org. 6. “Combating terrorism, we have no choice,” Xinhua Net (December 18, 2003). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003–12/18/content_1237985. htm. 7. Anwar Rahman, Sinicization Beyond the Great Wall: China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Leisester: Matador, 2005), 53. 8. Bhattacharya, “Conceptualising Uighur Separatism,” 373. 9. Gladney, “China’s minorities: the case of Xinjiang and the Uyghur People” (paper at the Commission on Human Rights, Sub-commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Working Group on Minorities [Ninth Session], Geneva, Switzerland, May 12–16, 2003), 457; and Rahman, Sinicization Beyond the Great Wall, 53. 10. James Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004), 14. 11. Michael Dillon, Xinjiang—China’s Muslim Far Northwest (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 63. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., 66–67. 15. “ ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” People’s Daily ( January 21, 2001). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/ 21/eng20020121_89078.shtml; and Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, 15. 16. James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 16. 17. “ ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity.” 18. Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, 16. 19. “The Ghulja Massacre: ‘We Refuse to Forget,’ ” Uyghur Human Rights Project (Washington, DC: Uighur American Association, February 3, 2006). http://www.uyghuramerican.org/articles/252/1/. 20. “ ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” People’s Daily ( January 21, 2001). 21. South China Morning Post, July 29, 1997; and China News Digest, March 14, 1998. 22. Eric Hyer, “China’s Policy towards Uighur Nationalism,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 26 No. 1 (2006): 78. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. “ ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” People’s Daily ( January 21, 2001). 26. Hyer, “China’s Policy towards Uighur,” 78. 27. “Ethnic Clash in Chinese Factory Kills 2, Hurts 118,” Associate Press ( July 26, 2009). http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ ALeqM5gdcfQ8l28f_ jK9yH3RKOBB92CEKQD992QC080. 28. Yuan Ye and Xia Wenhui, “After Horrible Riot, Xinjiang People Hope to Mend Tainted Relations of Ethnic Groups,” Xinhua Net ( July 11, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–07/11/content_11693738.htm.

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29. The Chinese official statistics about the casualties were not independently verified. According to one Chinese report on July 11, 2009, the death toll was 184, among which 137 were Han Chinese, 64 were Uighurs and one was Hui nationality. Yuan Ye and Xia Wenhui, “After horrible riot, Xinjiang people hope to mend tainted relations of ethnic groups,” Xinhua Net ( July 11, 2009). However, the death toll rose to 197 in later reports whereas no further detail was provided in Chinese sources. 30. “Mobs in Xinjiang Face Severe Punishment,” China Daily ( July 7, 2009). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009–07/07/content_8388003.htm. 31. “Police arrests 1,434 suspects in connection with Xinjiang riot,” Xinhua Net ( July 7, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–07/07/ content_11664739.htm. 32. “Civilians and Armed Police Officer Killed in NW China,” Xinhua Net ( July 6, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–07/06/ content_11658819.htm. 33. “World Uyghur Congress’ Statement on July 5th Urumqi Incident,” the WUC Web site ( July 7, 2009). http://www.uyghurcongress.org/En/ PressRelease.asp?ItemID=-1553700856&mid=1096144499. 34. “TIP leaders Threatens China Over Urumqi Violence,” SITE Intelligence Group ( July 17, 2009). 35. “Afghan Plane to Urumqi Lands in Kandahar City,” Xinhua Net (August 10, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–08/10/ content_11853976.htm. 36. “Afghan Plane to Urumqi Lands in Kandahar City,” China Radio International (CRI) (August 10, 2009). http://english.cri. cn/7146/2009/08/10/179s507793.htm. 37. “China says separatist threatened Afghan f light,” Afghanistan News Center (August 11, 2009). http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2009/ august/aug112009.html#23. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. “Urumqi Airport Back to Normal after Alleged Bomb Threat on Afghan Plane,” Xinhua Net (August 10, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2009–08/10/content_11858761.htm. 41. “China says separatist threatened Afghan f light,” Afghanistan News Center (August 11, 2009). 42. “Thousands of Harmony Makers Sent to Urumqi Communities While Authorities Vow Harsh Punishment against Syringe Attackers,” Xinhua Net (September 7, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009– 09/07/content_12006500.htm. 43. Ibid. 44. “Tests Find No Infections in Xinjiang Needle Attack Victims,” Xinhua Net (September 13, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–09/13/ content_12046231.htm. 45. Christopher Bodeen, “10,000 Chinese Protest Series of Needle Stabbings,” Associate Press (AP) (September 3, 2009). http://news.yahoo.com/s/ ap/20090903/ap_on_re_as/as_china_protest.

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46. “ ‘East Turkistan’ Forces Pose Threat to Regional Security, Stability: White Paper,” Xinhua Net (September 21, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2009–09/21/content_12090795.htm. 47. The video of the Turkistan Islamic Party posted on YouTube on February 9, 2009. “TIP Calls for Jihad, Demonstrates Training,” SITE Intelligence Group (March 27, 2009). 48. Rémi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang—The Malaise Grows,” trans. Philip Liddell, China perspectives (September–October 2003). http:// chinaperspectives.revues.org/document648.html#ftn43. 49. Zhang Yumo, “The Anti-Separatism Struggle and its Historical Lessons since the Liberation of Xinjiang” in Yang Faren et al., Fanyisilanzhuyi, fantujuezhuyi yanjiu (Study on Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism) (1994). A Chinese document translated and published in English on the web site of the Uyghur American Association. www.uyghuramerican.org/ researchanalysis/trans.html. 50. “East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” People’s Daily ( January 21, 2001). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/21/ eng20020121_89078.shtml. 51. “TIP calls for Jihad, demonstrates training,” SITE Intelligence Group (March 27, 2009); and Wong, “Warning of Attacks on Olympics.” (August 9, 2008). 52. Ibid. 53. “China: The Evolution of ETIM,” Stratfor Global Intelligence (May 13, 2008). http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_evolution_etim. 54. Ibid. 55. Rodger Baker, “China and Enduring Uighurs,” Rightside News (August 6, 2008). http://www.rightsidenews.com/200808061649/global-terrorism/ china-and-the-enduring-uighurs.html. 56. “ ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Terrorist Killed,” China Daily (December 24, 2003). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003–12/24/content_293163. htm. 57. The video “Turkistan Islamic Party: Biography of Abu Muhammad al-Turkistani,” SITE Intelligence Group (March 31, 2009), trans. Mohamed Redzuan Bin Salleh (Singapore: International Centre of Political Violence and Terrorism [ICPVTR], 2009). 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Rodger Baker, “China and Enduring Uighurs,” Rightside News (August 6, 2008) and “China: The Evolution of ETIM,” Stratfor Global Intelligence (May 13, 2008). 61. Rodger Baker, “China and Enduring Uighurs,” Rightside News (August 6, 2008). 62. “China: The Evolution of ETIM,” Stratfor Global Intelligence (May 13, 2008). 63. Ibid. 64. “China Seeks International Support in Counter-terrorism,” People’s Daily (December 16, 2003).

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65. “China: The Evolution of ETIM,” Stratfor Global Intelligence (May 13, 2008). http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_evolution_etim. 66. Ibid. 67. “Eastern Turkestan Terrorist Killed,” China Daily (December 24, 2003). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003–12/24/content_293163. htm. 68. CACI Analyst, March 7, 2007, quoted in Waliullah Rahmani, “Has al-Qaeda Picked a Leader for Operations in China?” Terrorism Focus, Vol. 5, No. 41 (December 3, 2008). 69. “Profiles of 11 Terrorists Identified,” China Daily (December 16, 2003). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003–12/16/content_290652.htm. 70. “China Says Terror Suspect Handed over by Pakistan,” Associated Press Newswires (May, 1927, 2002). 71. The interview with Abdul Haq published in the magazine Islamic Turkistan, Issue 1–3, released by Turkistan Islamic Party on January 26, February 6, and March 25, 2009, SITE Intelligence Group, translated by Mohamed Redzuan Bin Salleh (Singapore: International Centre of Political Violence and Terrorism [ICPVTR], 2009). 72. “The Guantanamo Docket,” The New York Times. http://int-shared1.ec2. nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/277-bahtiyar-mahnut/documents/5/ pages/317. 73. Ibid. 74. “Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee Adds Name of One Individual to Consolidated List,” SC/9636 (New York: UN Security Council, April 16, 2009). http://www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2009/sc9636.doc.htm. 75. Ibid. 76. “ ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Terrorists Identified,” China Daily (October 21, 2008). 77. “Treasury Targets Leader of Group Tied to Al Qaeda,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 20, 2009) TG-92. http://www. treas.gov/press/releases/tg92.htm. 78. Ibid. 79. Abdul Haq’s statement in Islamic Turkistan, Issue 1. “ ‘Islamic Turkistan’First Issue of TIP Magazine,” SITE Intelligence Group ( January 29, 2009). 80. Ibid. 81. “China Identifies Alleged ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Terrorists,” Xinhua Net (October 21, 2008). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–10/21/ content_10229518.htm. 82. Rahmani, “Has al-Qaeda Picked a Leader,” 8–9. 83. Ibid. 84. Ibid. 85. “U.S. Treasury Targets Leader of Group Tied to Al-Qaeda,” Xinhua Net (April 21, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–04/21/ content_11226318.htm. 86. “Treasury Targets Leader of Group Tied to Al Qaeda,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 20, 2009) TG-92.

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87. The Arabic communiqué of TIP issued on jihadist forums on May 1, 2009, posted by Al-Fajr Media Center. “TIP Responds to US Treasury Designation, Arrests,” SITE Intelligence Group (May 1, 2009). 88. “China Identifies Alleged ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Terrorists,” Xinhua Net (October 21, 2008). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–10/21/ content_10229518.htm. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid. 91. ICPVTR translation of the video “Islamic Party of Turkistan—Our Blessed Jihad in Yunnan,” ( July 23, 2008), http://de.youtube.com/watch? v=E6DLGShOnEg, accessed on August 20, 2008. 92. Ibid. 93. “TIP Calls for Jihad, Demonstrates Training,” SITE Intelligence Group (March 27, 2009). 94. The audio message of Seifallah, issued on YouTube on July 9, 2009, and the Arabic transcript of it posted on jihadist forums by the Al-Fajr Media Center on July 16, 2009. “TIP Leaders Threatens China over Urumqi Violence,” SITE Intelligence Group ( July 17, 2009). 95. Ibid. 96. “TIP Calls for Jihad, Demonstrates Training,” SITE Intelligence Group (March 27, 2009). 97. Ibid. 98. Ahmed Rashid, “Jihad,” 33. 99. “China’s grip on Xinjiang Muslims,” BBC (November 29, 2005). http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4482048.stm. 100. Ibid 101. Shaukat Piracha, “China asks Pakistan to investigate Xinjiang terrorists list,” The Daily Times ( January 17, 2004). http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page=story_17–1–2004_pg1_2. 102. “China Muslim group planned terror, U.S. says,” The New York Times (August 31, 2002). 103. Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, “Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Organizations and Their Links with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban,” (November 29, 2001). http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/f k/t28937.htm. 104. “East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” People’s Daily ( January 21, 2001). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/21/ eng20020121_89078.shtml. 105. Chien-pen Chung, “China’s ‘War on Terror’: September 11 and Uighur separatism,” Foreign Affairs ( July/August 2002). http://www.cfr.org/ publication/4765/chinas_war_on_terror.html. 106. Ibid. 107. “Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Organizations and Their Links with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban” (New York: Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, November 29, 2001). http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/f k/t28937.htm. 108. Chung, “China’s War on Terror.”

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109. Didier Chaudet, “Islamic Terrorism in Greater Central Asia: The ‘Al-Qaedaization’ of Uzbek Jihadism,” Russie. Nei. Visions (December 2008): 25. 110. Didier Chaudet, “Islamic Terrorism in Greater Central Asia,” 25. 111. Chung, Chien-peng, “China’s War on Terror.” 112. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 128. He also wrote that the mujahideen had “come to fight the jihad . . . and to train in weapons, bomb-making, and military tactics so they could take the jihad back home.” 113. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 140–141. 114. “Xinjiang Separatists Lose Ground,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor (April 1, 2003). 115. Rahul K Bhonsle, “China: In Al Qaeda’s Cross Hairs,” News Blaze ( July 12, 2007), http://newsblaze.com/story/20070712062027rahu.nb/ newsblaze/TOPSTORY/Top-Stories.html. 116. “Chinese court rejects appeal of Canadian Muslim jailed for terrorism,” International Herald Tribune ( July 10, 2007). http://www.iht.com/articles/ ap/2007/07/10/asia/AS-GEN-China-Canada-Detainee.php. 117. “US Has Evidence ETIM Plans Attack,” People’s Daily (August 30, 2002). 118. Shaukat Piracha, “China Asks Pakistan to Investigate Xinjiang Terrorists List,” The Daily Times ( January 17, 2004). http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page=story_17–1–2004_pg1_2. 119. “United General Assembly of East Turkistan National Congress,” PRT Press Review (April 13, 2004). 120. Chung, “China’s War on Terror.” 121. “Combating Terrorism, We Have No Choice,” Xinhua Net (December 18, 2002). 122. Ibid. 123. Ibid. 124. “TIP Calls for Jihad, Demonstrates Training,” SITE Intelligence Group (March 27, 2009); and E. Wong, “Warning of Attacks on Olympics Is Said to be Linked to Muslim Separatist Group,” New York Times (August 9, 2008). 125. “China: The Evolution of ETIM,” Stratfor Global Intelligence (May 13, 2008). 126. McDonald Joe, “China Targets Xinjiang Rebels,” The Washington Times ( January 22, 2002). 127. Stratfor Global Intelligence, “China: The Evolution of ETIM” (May 13, 2008). 128. Rohan Gunaratna, “China under Threat,” The Straits Times (August 3, 2008). www.idss.edu.sg/short%20reports/CHINA_UNDER_THREAT.pdf. 129. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Exploiting a Favourable Climate,” China Brief, Vol, 2, No. 19 (September 26, 2002), http://jamestown.org/china_brief/article. php?issue_id=659. 130. Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, and Svante E. Cornell, “Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU,”

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132.

133. 134.

135.

136. 137. 138. 139. 140.

141. 142.

143. 144. 145.

146. 147.

148.

197

Central Asia- Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program ( July 2006). http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0607Islam. pdf. Erik Eckholm, “China Muslim Group Planned Terror, U.S. Says,” New York Times (August 31, 2002). http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.htm l?res=9B0CEEDD133FF932A0575BC0A9649C8B63. B. Raman, “Terrorism in Afghanistan and Central Asia,” South Asia Analysis Group (November 24, 2004). http://www.saag.org/common/ uploaded_files/paper1172.html. Gunaratna, “China under Threat.” Holly Fletcher and Jayshree Bajoria, “The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM),” Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder. http://www.cfr. org/publication/9179/. “Testimony of Detainees before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal,” Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) and Administrative Review Board (ARB), Documents Released March 3, April 3, and April 19, 2006, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/ csrt/. Gunaratna, “China under Threat.” Ibid. “East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” People’s Daily ( January 21, 2001). “Albania Takes Guantanamo Uighurs,” BBC (May 6, 2006). http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4979466.stm. Hope Yen, “Court Bars Release of 17 Uighurs Detainees into US,” Associated Press (February 18, 2009). http://news.yahoo.com/s/ ap/20090218/ap_on_go_ot/guantanamo_detainees. “China: The Evolution of ETIM,” Stratfor Global Intelligence (May 13, 2008). Anders Nielsen and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, “Talibanization of FATA and NWFP: Status and key drivers,” ICPVTR Field study report, 2007; Hassan Abbas, “Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 18 (September 27, 2007). Ibid. Ibid. “Chinese Police Destroy Terrorist Camp in NW Region,” Xinhua Net ( January 8, 2007). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007– 01/08/content_5580233.htm; and Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, April 2008), 33. http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/105904.pdf. Ibid. “Chinese police kill 2 terrorists, arrest 15 others,” Xinhua Net (February 18, 2008). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–02/18/ content_7625432.htm. Ibid.

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149. “Chinese Police Kill 2 Terrorists, Arrest 15 Others,” Xinhua Net (February 18, 2008). 150. Ibid. 151. Ibid. 152. Gunaratna, “China under Threat.” 153. Ibid. 154. Ibid. 155. Ibid. 156. “Tension Grips Waziristan as Uzbeks Find New Sanctuary,” The News 21st (May 2007). 157. Gunaratna, “China under Threat.” 158. “Pakistan Hands over Nine Uyghur Militants to China,” Indian Express (April 27, 2009). http://www.indianexpress.com/news/pakistan-handsover-nine-uyghur-militants-to/451721/. 159. Ibid. 160. “Statement from the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP),” The NEFA Foundation (May 1, 2009). www.nefafoundatin.org; and “TIP responds to US Treasury Designation, Arrests,” SITE Intelligence Group (May 1, 2009). 161. Edward Wong, “Warning of Attacks on Olympics Is Said to be Linked to Muslim Separatist Group,” New York Times (August 9, 2008). http://www. nytimes.com/2008/08/10/sports/olympics/10uighurs.html?ref=asia 162. “Chinese Police Deny ‘Terrorist Attacks’ behind Recent Explosions,” Xinhua Net ( July 26, 2008). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/200807/26/content_8775123.htm. 163. Didier Chaudet, “Islamist Terrorism in Greater Central Asia: The ‘Al-Qaedaization’ of Uzbek Jihadism,” Russie.Nei.Visions (December, 2008). 164. Rohan Gunaratna and Kenneth Pereire, “An Al Qaeda Group Operating in China?” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006): 58. http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/May_2006/ GunaratnaPereire.pdf; and The Middle Eastern Web site. www.tajdeed. org.uk. 165. ICPVTR translation of the video “Jihad in Eastern Turkistan,” uploaded on November 8, 2006. 166. Ibid. 167. Kenneth Pereire, “The Beijing Olympics and China’s Militant Groups,” RSIS Commentaries ( June 28, 2007). 168. ICPVTR translation of the video “Jihad in Eastern Turkistan.” 169. Ibid. 170. Ibid. 171. Pereire, “The Beijing Olympics.” 172. ICPVTR translation of the, “Shaheed Hasan Mahsum Rahimallah” (The God bless Holy Martyrs Hasan Mahsum) uploaded on August 10, 2007. www.youtube.com/watch?v=3lx5lwRm9UA. 173. ICPVTR translation of the video, “Hasan Mahsum,” uploaded on March 16, 2008. www.youtube.com/watch?v=UqFZohw7Qak.

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174. ICPVTR translation of the video, “Al-Zubayr Al-Turkistani,” uploaded on March 10, 2008. 175. Ibid. 176. Ibid. 177. Abu ‘Ubaydah al-Maqdisi, Shuhada’ Fi Zaman al-Ghurbah (The Martyrs in the Time of Alienation) (Markaz Al-Fajr al-I’lami, 2008), 131–133. Translated by ICPVTR. 178. “Terrorism in Western China? An interview with Rohan Gunaratna,” The Politic ( January 7, 2009). http://thepolitic.org/content/view/93/37/ 179. Edward Wong, “Group says Video Warns of Plympic Attack,” New York Times (August 7, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/ sports/olympics/08china.html#; John Garnaut, “Beijing plays down terror threat to Games,” Brisbane Times ( July 28, 2008). http://www. brisbanetimes.com.au/news/olympics/beijing-plays-down-terror-threatto-games/2008/07/27/1217097093432.html?page=fullpage#contentSwa p1; and The Sydney Morning Herald, “Group threatens Olympic terror,” ( July 26, 2008). 180. “Terrorists Issue New Threat to Olympics: US Analysts,” Thaindian News (August 8, 2008). http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/ terrorists-issue-new-threat-to-olympics-us-analysts_10081297.html. 181. Ibid. 182. Ibid. 183. ICPVTR translation of the video, “Islamic Party of Turkistan ‘Our Blessed Jihad in Yunnan,’ ” uploaded July 23, 2008. 184. Ibid. 185. “Chinese Police Deny ‘Terrorist Attacks’ behind Recent Explosions,” Xinhua Net ( July 26, 2008). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/200807/26/content_8775123.htm. 186. “Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP): ‘Why Are We Fighting China,” The NEFA Foundation ( July 2008). www.nefafoundation.org. 187. “TIP Calls for Jihad, Demonstrates Training,” SITE Intelligence Group (March 27, 2009); and “TIP: ‘Steadfastness and Preparations for Jihad in the Cause of Allah,” The NEFA Foundation ( January 20, 2009). www. nefafoundation.org. 188. Ibid. 189. Ibid. 190. Ibid. 191. Islamic Turkistan, Issue 1, distributed by the Meda al-Sayouf (Ink of Swords) Network. “ ‘Islamic Turkistan’- First Issue of TIP Magazine,” SITE Intelligence Group ( January 29, 2009). 192. Ibid. 193. Ibid. 194. Ibid. 195. Islamic Turkistan, Issue 2, posted on the Al-Faloja jihadist forum on February 6, 2009. “ ‘Islamic Turkistan’—Second Issue of TIP Magazine,” Site Intelligence Group (February 9, 2009).

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196. Ibid. 197. Islamic Turkistan, Issue 3, released by Al-Fajr Media Center and posted on jihadist forums on March 25, 2009. “ ‘Islamic Turkistan’—Third Issue of TIP Magazine,” SITE Intelligence Group (March 25, 2009). 198. Mohamed Redzuan Bin Salleh trans., “ ‘Islamic Turkistan’—Third Issue of TIP Magazine,” SITE Intelligence Group (March 25, 2009). 199. Ibid. 200. Ibid. 201. “Woman Confesses to China Plane Attack,” Associated Press (March 27, 2008). http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008–03–27-chinaterror_N.htm. 202. “China Identifies Alleged ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Terrorists,” Xinhua Net (21 October, 2008). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–10/21/ content_10229518.htm. 203. “Xinjiang Official Calls Monday’s Raid on Border Police a Terrorist Attack,” People’s Daily (August 6, 2008). http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90882/6467210.html. 204. “China Identifies Alleged ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Terrorists,” Xinhua Net (October 21, 2008). 205. Bu Ding, “Searching for Eyewitnesses for CZ6901 Incident,” EastSouthWestNorth (March 11, 2008). http://zonaeuropa.com/20080311_1. htm. 206. Chris Buckley and Benjamin Kang Lim, “China Plane Attackers Came ‘from Pakistan, Central Asia’,” Reuters (March 20, 2008). http://in.reuters. com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-32593620080320?sp=true. 207. Ibid. 208. Bu Ding, “Searching for Eyewitnesses.” 209. Ibid. 210. “Woman Confesses to China Plane Attack,” Associated Press (March 27, 2008). http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008–03–27-chinaterror_N.htm. 211. Ibid. 212. Ibid. 213. Chirs Buckley and Benjamin Kang Lim. “China Plane Attackers Came ‘from Pakistan, Central Asia’,” Reuters India (March 20, 2008). http:// in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-32593620080320. 214. “Shanghai Police Swoops Thwart Stadium Terrorist Plot,” People’s Daily ( July 25, 2008). http://english.peopledaily.com. cn/90001/90776/90882/6459128.html. 215. Ibid. 216. “China Thwarts Terrorist Plot At Olympic Football Stadium,” National Terror Alert Response Center ( July 25, 2008). http:// www.nationalterroralert.com/updates/2008/07/25/china-thwartsterrorist-plot-at-olympic-football-stadium/. 217. Ibid. 218. “Two Executed for Kashgar Terror Attack on Police,” China Daily (April 10, 2009). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009–04/10/ content_7664649.htm.

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219. “Xinjiang Official Calls Monday’s Raid on Border Police a Terrorist Attack,” Xinhua Net (August 6, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2008–08/06/content_8984080.htm; and Austin Ramzy, “Jihad in China’s Far West,” Time (August 6, 2008). http://www.time.com/time/ world/article/0,8599,1829791,00.html. 220. “16 police officer die in Kashgar terror strike,” China Daily (August 5, 2008). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008–08/05/content_6903132. htm. 221. “Two executed for Kashgar terror attack on police,” China Daily (April 10, 2009). 222. “Terrorist plot suspected in violent attack on police in west China’s Xinjiang,” Xinhua Net (August 6, 2008). 223. Edward Cody, “Grenade Attack in China Kills 16 Policemen,” Washington Post (August 4, 2008). http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2008/08/03/AR2008080302160.html. 224. Gonzalo R. Gallegos, Daily Press Briefing (Washington: US Department of State, August 4, 2008), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/ aug/107704.htm. 225. Andrew Jacobs, “Ambush in China Raises Concerns as Olympics Near,” The New York Times (August 5, 2008). 226. Kuqa is the most populous county of Aksu prefecture in Xinjiang, with a population of about 400,000. The site of Kuqa County is about 740 kilometers from Urumqi, the regional capital. “Serial Explosions Kill Two in China’s Remote Xinjiang,” Xinhua Net (August 10, 2008). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008– 08/10/content_9113230. htm. 227. Ibid. 228. “Fresh Deadly Attacks in Western China,” Financial Times (August 10, 2008), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6d8b431c-6680–11dd-bc42–0000779 fd18c.html. 229. “Renewed Violence in West China,” BBC (August 12, 2008). http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/ 7555831.stm. 230. “Eight Dead after Wave of Bombings in China’s Xinjiang,” Bloomberg (August 10, 2008). http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2060108 0&sid=aS1Vnm16systc&refer=asia. 231. Edward Wong, “Attack in West China Kills 3 Security Officers,” New York Times (August 12, 2008). http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/ sports/olympics/13china.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=China%20links%20 bombings%20in%20west%20to%20Olympics&st=cse. 232. Ibid. 233. “Two Women among Bombers,” The Straits Times (August 12, 2008), A13. 234. Ibid. 235. “Chinese Police Say 18 Turkistan Terrorist Suspects Arrested This Year,” People’s Daily (August 5, 2008). http://english.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90785/6467045.html. 236. “Three Die as Shanghai Bus ‘Burst into Fire’,” Reuters (May 5, 2008). http:// www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTON50903320080505. 237. Ibid.

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238. Tania Branigan, “Olympics Threatened by Islamic Separatists,” Guardian ( July 27, 2008). http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2008/jul/27/ olympicgames2008.terrorism/. 239. Ibid. 240. Ibid. 241. Ibid 242. “Chinese Police Deny ‘Terrorist Attacks’ behind Recent Explosions,” Xinhua Net ( July 26, 2008). 243. Ibid. 244. Ibid. 245. “Police Scramble to Find Bus Explosion Clues in SW China,” Xinhua Net ( July 26, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–07/26/ content_8775027.htm. 246. Ibid. 247. Ibid. 248. “Bomber Tied to Café and Bus Bombings, Identity Revealed,” Go Kunming (December 29, 2008). http://www.gokunming.com/en/blog/item/767/ bomber_tied_to_cafe_and_bus_bombings_identity_revealed. 249. “Chinese Official Warns of ‘More Severe’ Security Situation in Xinjiang,” Xinhua Net (March 6, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ 2009–03/06/content_10958204.htm. 250. Gunaratna, “China under threat.” 251. “Profiles of 11 terrorists identified,” China Daily (December 16, 2003). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003–12/16/content_290652. htm. 252. Ibid. 253. Ibid. 254. Ibid. 255. Ibid. 256. “Profiles of 11 Terrorists Identified,” China Daily (December 16, 2003). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003–12/16/content_290652. htm. 257. Ibid. 258. Ibid. 259. “China Identifies Eastern Turkistan Terrorists,” Xinhua Net (December 15, 2003). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003–12/15/ content_1231167_1.htm. 260. “China Seeks Cooperation Worldwide to Fight ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorists,” Xinhua Net (December 15, 2003). http://news.xinhuanet. com/english/2003–12/15/content_1232547.htm. 261. “Separatist Leader Vows To Target Chinese Government,” East Turkistan Information Centre ( January 29, 2003). http://www.uygur.org/ wunn03/2003_01_30.htm. 262. Ibid. 263. Ibid. 264. Ibid. 265. Ibid.

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266. “Kyrgyz Authorities Arrest Alleged Uyghur Separatist,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (February 15, 2007). http://www.rferl.org/ content/Article/1074730.html. 267. Ibid. 268. “Kyrgyz Authorities Arrest Fugitive Uighur Separatist,” International Herald Tribune (February 15, 2007). 269. “Introducing the World Uyghur Congress,” the Web site of the World Uyghur Congress. http://www.uyghurcongress.org/En/AboutWUC. asp?mid=1095738888; and Yitzhak Shichor, “Changing the guard at the World Uyghur Congress,” China Brief, Vol. 6, No. 25 (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, December 19, 2006). http://www. ja me stow n.or g /si n g le/?no _ c ache=1& t x _ t t new s% 5Bt t _ new s% 5 D=32346. 270. “China: The Evolution of ETIM,” Stratfor Global Intelligence (May 13, 2008). http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_evolution_etim. 271. ETNC Web site. http://www.eastturkistan.com/html/main.html. 272. PRT Press Review (United General Assembly of East Turkistan National Congress, April 13, 2004). 273. “Eastern Turkistan terrorist evidence revealed,” China Daily (February 14, 2004). 274. Ibid. 275. “Introduction” and “UNPO Presidency & Secretariat,” UNPO Web site. http://www.unpo.org. 276. Ibid. 277. “Combating Terrorism, We Have No Choice,” Xinhua Net (December 18, 2003). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003–12/18/ content_1237985.htm. 278. Ibid. 279. “Backgrounder: Recent Terrorist Activities by Eastern Turkistan Groups,” Xinhua Net (April 16, 2004). 280. Darko Trifunovic, “Separatism Aimed at the PRC’s Xinjiang Province: The Activities of “East Turkestan” in the West Analysis.” 281. Linkda K. Benson, The Ili rebellion: The Muslim challenge to Chinese authority in Xinjiang, 1944–1949 (New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1990), 163. 282. Ibid. 283. Ibid., 228. 284. “Biographical Note of Erkin Alptekin,” The World Uyghur Congress (2005). http://www.uyghurcongress.org/En/AboutWUC.asp?mid=1095 738888&mid2=1109104014&mid3=1109598091. 285. Ibid. 286. East Turkestan Information Bulletin. http://www.caccp.org/et/etib3_5. html#1. 287. The UNPO Web site. http://www.unpo.org/; and “Introducing the World Uyghur Congress,” the Web site of the World Uyghur Congress. http://www.uyghurcongress.org/En/AboutWUC.asp? mid=1095738888.

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288. “UNPO Presidency & Secretariat,” the UNPO Web site. http://www. unpo.org/content/view/6190/62/. 289. Rebiya Kadeer, Dragon Fighter: One Woman’s Epic Struggle for Peace with China (Carlsbad: Kales Press, 2009), 10. 290. Ibid., 7. 291. Ibid., 23. 292. Ibid., 30. 293. Ibid., 56. 294. Ibid., 58. 295. “China Frees Top Uighur Prisoner,” BBC (March 17, 2005). http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4357637.stm. 296. “Congressional Report on Rebiya Kadeer,” Uyghur Human Rights Project (Washington, DC: Uyghur American Association, July 24, 2004). http://www.uhrp.org/articles/27/1/Congressional-Report-on-RebiyaKadeer/Congressional-Report-on-Rebiya-Kadeer.html. 297. “Evidence Shows Rebiya Kadeer behind Urumqi Riot: Chinese Gov’t,” Xinhua Net ( July 9, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ 2009–07/09/content_11676293.htm. 298. “Dongtu sanfa chuandan, Xinjiang jishi chuli (East Turkistan Handed Out Leaf lets, Xinjiang Authorities Handled in Time),” Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong) (February 10, 2009). http://www.takungpao.com:10000/gate/gb/ www.takungpao.com/news/09/02/10/EP-1029880.htm. 299. Darko Trifunovic, “Separatism Aimed at the PRC’s Xinjiang Province: The Activities of ‘East Turkestan’ in the West Analysis.” 300. Dewardric L. McNeal, “China’s Relations with Central Asia States and Problems with Terrorism,” (Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2001) 11–12. 301. Ibid. 302. Among the dead, 137 were Han Chinese, 64 were Uighurs, and one was Hui nationality. Yuan Ye and Xia Wenhui, “After horrible riot, Xinjiang people hope to mend tainted relations of ethnic groups,” Xinhua Net ( July 11, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–07/11/ content_11693738.htm. 303. “Police Have Evidence of World Uyghur Congress Masterminding Xinjiang Riot,” Xinhua Net ( July 7, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2009–07/07/content_11663784.htm. 304. Chris Buckley, “Xinjiang Riot Toll Hits 156 as Unrest Spreads,” Reuters ( July 6, 2009). http://mobile.reuters.com/mobile/m/FullArticle/CTOP/ ntopNews_uUSTRE5650SW20090706?src=RSS-TOP 305. “World Uyghur Congress’ Statement on July 5th Urumqi Incident,” the WUC Web site ( July 7, 2009). http://www.uyghurcongress.org/En/ PressRelease.asp?ItemID=-1553700856&mid=1096144499. 306. “Four Sentenced for Attacking Chinese Embassy in Netherlands,” Xinhua Net ( July 11, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–07/11/ content_11689233.htm. 307. Frank Langfitt, “China Pins Violence on Uighur Activist in D.C.” ( July 9, 2009). http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106415882.

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308. “China Issues Alert for Tourists in Germany,” China Radio International (CRI) ( July 11, 2009). http://english.cri.cn/6909/2009/07/11/53s500605. htm. 309. “Uighur leader rejects Al-Qaeda,” The Straits Times ( July 15, 2009). ht t p://w w w. st r a it st i me s .com / Bre a k i n g % 2 BNew s/A s i a /St or y/ STIStory_403280.html. 310. Ibid. 311. Shichor, “Changing the Guard.” 312. “Introducing the World Uyghur Congress,” World Uyghur Congress. http://www.uyghurcongress.org/En/AboutWUC.asp? mid=1095738888. 313. Darko Trifunovic, “Separatism Aimed at the PRC’s Xinjiang Province: The Activities of ‘East Turkestan’ in the West Analysis.” 314. “Eastern Turkistan Information Center a Terrorist Cover: Official,” Xinhua Net (December 15, 2003). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2003–12/15/content_1232563.htm. 315. Ibid. 316. Ibid. 317. Ibid. 318. “ETIC strongly condemn Pakistan’s extradition of Uyghurs to China,” ETIC Web site (April 28, 2009). www.uygur.org/wunn09/04_28. htm - 26k. 319. East Turkestan Information Bulletin. http://www.caccp.org/et/etib3_5. html#1. 320. “Profiles of 11 terrorists identified,” China Daily (December 16, 2003). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003–12/16/content_290652. htm. 321. Ibid. 322. “China Discloses More Evidence of ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Terrors,” People’s Daily (February 13, 2004). http://www. english.peopledaily.com. cn/200402/13/eng20040213_134802.shtml - 13k -. 323. Ibid. 324. “Profiles of 11 Terrorists Identified,” China Daily (December 16, 2003). 325. Ibid. 326. “Eastern Turkistan Information Center a Terrorist Cover: Official,” Xinhua Net (December 15, 2003). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2003–12/15/content_1232563.htm. 327. Ibid.

4 Hui Muslims: The Milieu of Radicalization and Extremism 1. Ma Ruxiong is a Muslim cleric in Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu Province, China. Jim Yardley, “A Spectator’s Role for China’s Muslims,” The New York Times (February 19, 2006). http://www.nytimes. com/2006/02/19/weekinreview/19yardley.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. 2. National Bureau of Statistics of China (2002).

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3. Justin Ben-Adam, “China” in Islam Outside the Arab World, ed. David Westerlund and Ingvar Svanberg (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999), 190; and Dru C. Glandey, “Muslim Tombs and Ethnic Folklore,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1987): 495; and Muslim Chinese, 18. 4. Berlie, Islam in China, 5. 5. Dru C. Gladney, “Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?” The China Quarterly (2003): 453. 6. June Dyer, China’s Forty Million: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People’s Republic of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979). 7. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 21. 8. Michael Dillon, China’s Muslims (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 15. 9. Ibid. 10. Gladney, “Islam in China,” 454. 11. Ding Mingren, Yisilan Wenhua Zai Zhongguo (Islamic Culture in China) (Beijing: Religious Culture Press, 2003), 2–3. 12. Donald Daniel Leslie, “The Integration of Religious Minorities in China: The Case of Chinese Muslims” (paper presented at The Fifty-ninth George Ernest Morrison Lecture in Ethnology 1998, Canberra: Australia National University, 1998), 11–13. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Donald Daniel Leslie, Islam in Traditional China: A Short History to 1800 (Canberra: Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1986) and “Living with the Chinese: The Muslim Experience in China, Tang to Ming” in Chinese Ideas about Nature and Society: Studies in Honour of Derk Bodde, ed. Charles Le Blanc & Susan Blader (Hong Kong, 1984), 175–193. 16. Leslie, “The Integration of Religious Minorities,” 11. 17. Israeli, Islam in China, 118. 18. Ibid. 19. Haji Yusuf Liu Bao Jun, A Glance at Chinese Muslims: An Introductive Book (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Encyclopedia Research Berhad, 1998), 11. 20. Mi and You, Islam in China, 43. 21. Ding, Yisilan Wenhua, 18. 22. Haji Yusuf Liu Bao Jun, A Glance at Chinese Muslims, 14. 23. Ibid. 24. “The Hui Ethnic Minority,” China Net. http://www.china.org.cn/egroups/shaoshu/shao-2-hui.htm. 25. Ibid. 26. Ding, Yisilan Wenhua, 14. 27. Mi and You, Islam in China, 42. 28. Ibid., 43; and “The Hui Ethnic Minority,” China Net. http://www.china. org.cn/e-groups/shaoshu/shao-2-hui.htm. 29. Ibid. 30. Yang Qichen & Yang Hua, Zhongguo Yisilanjiao De Lishi Fazhan He Xianzhuang (The Historical Development and Present Situation of China’s Islam) (Yinchuan: Ningxia People’s Press), 109.

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31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63.

207

Israeli, Islam in China, 122–123. Justin Ben-Adam, “China,” 200. Dillon, China’s Muslims, 19. Ibid. Ibid. Israeli, Islam in China, 132. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 115. Ibid. Raphael Israeli, “The Muslim Minority in the People’s Republic of China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 8 (August 1981): 917. Gladney, Dislocating China, 316. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 315. Dru C. Gladney, “Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?” in Religion in China Today: The China Quarterly Special Issues New Series, No. 3, ed. Daniel L. Overmyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Ibid., 453. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 37. Ibid. Gladney, “Islam in China,” 454. Ma Tong, Zhongguo Yisilanjiaopai Yu Menhuan Zhidu Shilue (The Brief History of China’s Islamic Schools and Menhuan System) (Ningxia: Ningxia People’s Press, 2000), 90. G. Findlay Andrew, The Crescent in North-West China, 10, quoted in Dru C. Gladney Muslim Chinese, 38. Ma, Zhongguo, 60. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 37. Ibid. Ma, Zhongguo, 73. Jin Yijiu, “Sufeipai yu Zhongguo menhuan” (Sufism and China’s Menhuan) in Xibei Yisilanjiao Yanjiu (Northwest Islam Research), Gansu Provincial Ethnology Department (ed.) (Lanzhou: Gansu Nationality Publishing Society, 1985), 187–203 and “The System of Menhuan in China: An inf luence of Sufism on Chinese Muslims” Ming Studies, Vol. 19, 35. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 41. Berlie, Islam in China, 40; and Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 41. Joseph F. Fletcher, “The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China,” Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 1 (1977): 113–119. In Chinese, they are Hufuye, Zheherenye (or Zhehelinye), Gadelinye and Kuburenye, called sida menhuan (Four Main Menhuan). Yang and Yang, Zhongguo Yisilanjiao, 75–79; and Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 41 and Dillon, China’s Muslims, 22. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 41. Ma, Zhongguo, 228. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 52. Ibid.

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NOTES

64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

69. 70.

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

87.

88. 89.

90.

Ibid. Ibid. Gladney, “China’s Minorities,” 464. Ibid. Maris Boyd Gillette, Between Mecca and Beijing: Modernization and Consumption among Urban Chinese Muslims (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 76–81. Ibid. John Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 158; Jonathan Lipman, “Patch Work Society, Network Society: A Study of Sino-Muslim Communities” in Islam in China, ed. Raphael Israeli and Anthony Johns ( Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1984) and Familiar Strangers: A Muslim History in China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 202–203. Gillette, Between Mecca and Beijing, 76. Gladney, Dislocating China, 454. Ibid. Lipman, Familiar Strangers, 204. Gillette, Between Mecca and Beijing, 77. Yang and Yang, Zhongguo Yisilanjiao, 74. Ibid. Yang and Yang, Zhongguo Yisilanjiao, 86; and Ma, Zhongguo, 265. Ma, Zhongguo, 114. The figure was based on Ma Tong, Zhongguo Isilanjiaopai Yu Menhuan Suyuan (The Origins of China’s Islamic Schools and Menhuan) (Yinchuan: Ningxia People’s Press, 1983) and Gladney Muslim Chinese, Appendix A. Gillette, Between Mecca and Beijing, 80. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 37–47. Gladney, Dislocating China, 317. Ibid. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 332–6. Wang Hongjiang, ed., “More than 8,000 people in China’s largest Muslim region pay pilgrimage to Mecca,” Xinhua News ( July 7, 2008). http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–07/07/content_8505548.htm. “Majority of China’s Muslims Still Cannot Make It to Mecca,” Uyghur Human Rights Project (Washington: Uyghur American Association, October 29, 2007). http://www.uhrp.org/articles/589/1/Majority-ofChinas-Muslims-Still-Cannot-Make-it-to-Mecca-/index.html. Ibid. Fang Jinying, “The Development of Islam Groups in South Asia and Southeast Asia and the Inf luence on China” (paper presented at the International Conference on Harmonious Development of Religion, Society and Economy, Beijing: Institute of Ethnic Minority Groups Development Research Development Research Center of State Council, R.C.’s, October 17, 2007). Ibid.

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91. Dru C. Gladney “Ehnoreligious Resurgence in a Northwestern Sufi Community” in China off Center: Mapping the Margins of the Middle Kingdom, ed. Susan Debra Blum and Lionel M. Jensen (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 123. 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid. 94. Fang, “The Development of Islam Groups.” 95. Gladney, “Ethnoreligious Resurgence,” 124. 96. Gladney, Dislocating China, 317. 97. Ibid. 98. ICPVTR translation of the video, “Power of Truth.” 99. Ibid. 100. Raphael Israeli, “The Muslim Minority in the People’s Republic of China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 8 (1981): 915–917. 101. Fang, “The Development of Islam Groups.” 102. Alex Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions,” Middle Eastern Quarterly (Winter 2005). http://www.meforum.org/686/tablighi-jamaatjihads-stealthy-legions. 103. Susan Sachs, “A Muslim missionary group draws new scrutiny in U.S.,” The New York Times ( July 14, 2003). http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/14/ us/a-muslim-missionary-group-draws-new-scrutiny-in-us.html?. 104. Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat.” 105. Ibid. 106. Israeli, “The Muslim Minority,” 920. 107. Ibid., 916. 108. Paul George, “Commentary No. 73: Islamic Unrest In the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Ottawa: Spring 1998). http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm73-eng.asp/. 109. Gladney, “Islam in China,” 455.

5

Threats to China from Al Qaeda

1. The dedication is excerpted from the sixth entry of the video serises, “Knights of Martyrdom,” released by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) on October 6, 2009. “ISI ‘Kights of Martyrdom 6’ Video, Dedicated to Uyghurs,” SITE Intelligence Group (August 24, 2009). 2. Venkatesan Vembu, “China May Be Next in al-Qaeda’s Crosshairs,” DNA India (December 11, 2008). http://www.dnaindia.com/report. asp?newsid=1213078. 3. “East Turkistan . . . The Forgotten Wound,” a speech by Abu Yahya al-Libi, released on jihadist forums on October 6, 2009. “Libi Urges Support for Uyghurs, Calls for Jihad,” SITE Intelligence Group (October 7, 2009). 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid.

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8. Angel Rabasa et al., Beyond al-Qaeda, Part 1, “The Global Jihadist Movement,” Rand Project Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006): 1. 9. Yael Shahar, “Al Qaida: A Ref lection of Globalization?” (September 1, 2008). http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/490/currentpage/ 1/Default.aspx 10. Angel Rabasa et al., Beyond al-Qaeda, xviii. 11. Goh Chok Tong, “Fight Terror with Ideas, Not Just Armies,” speech of the Prime Minister of Singapore at the Council on Foreign Relations (Washington DC May 6, 2004), as reproduced by The Straits Times (May 7, 2004). 12. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 3. 13. The phrase “propaganda by deed” was first used by Prince Pyotr Kropotkin in his pamphlet Revolutionary Government (1880). Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 17. 14. Angel Rabasa et al., Beyond al-Qaeda, xviii. 15. Rohan Gunaratna, ed., The Changing Face of Terrorism (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004), 14. 16. Rohan Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda’s Trajectory in 2003,” IDSS Perspectives (May 3, 2003). http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/Perspective/research_050303. htm. 17. “Azzam Exclusive: Letter from Usamah Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin to the American People,” Waaqiah (Internet), Foreign Broadcast Information Service (October 26, 2002). 18. Barry Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah Phenomenon in Singapore,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2003), 489–490. 19. Ibid, 493. 20. Marc Sageman, “Understanding Terror Networks,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (November 1, 2004). http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20041101. middleeast.sageman.understandingterrornetworks.html. 21. Rohan Gunaratna, “The Post Madrid Face of Al Qaeda,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer 2004), 93. The figure 4,000 members come from Al Qaeda detainee debriefs, including the FBI interrogation of Mohommad Mansour Jabarah, Canadian operative of Kuwaiti-Iraqi origin now in USA custody since 2002. 22. Banks, de Nevers, Wallerstein, Combating Terrorism: Strategies and Approaches (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 55. 23. Angel Rabasa et al., Beyond al-Qaeda, Part 1, “The Global Jihadist Movement,” Rand Project Air Force (Santa Monica, CA, 2006), 68. 24. Peter Bergen et al., “Bombers, Bank Accounts, & Bleedout,” Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 5. www.ctc.usma. edu/harmony/pdf/Sinjar_2_ July_23.pdf. 25. Ibid., 7. 26. Bruce Hoffman, “Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist Threat: Al Qaeda on the Run or on the March?” (Written Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, February 14, 2007). http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC021407/Hoffman_ Testimony021407.pdf.

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27. Donald Kerr, “Emerging Threats, Challenges and Opprtunities in the Middle East,” Paper Presented at a Conference Sponsored by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Washington DC, May 29, 2008), www.thewashingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=397. 28. National Intelligence Estimate, The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (Washington, DC. : The National Intelligence Council, 2007). http:// www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf. 29. Rohan Gunaratna, “The post-Madrid face of Al Qaeda,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2004): 99. 30. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2006): 7. 31. Jason Burke, “The New Matrix of Terror,” India Today ( July 25, 2005). http://archives.digitaltoday.in/indiatoday/20050725/cs-al.html. 32. Brynjar Lia, “Al-Suri’s Doctrines for Decentralized Jihad Training,” Part 1, Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. V, No. 1 ( January 18, 2007): 2. 33. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 15. 34. Debriefing of Umar Al Faruq, detained at the Baghram Airbase in Afghanistan on September 9, 2002, enabled the U.S. government to issue an alert immediately before September 11, 2002, the first anniversary of 9/11. Tactical Interrogation Report/Umar Al Faruq, CIA, Langley (September 2002). 35. Angel Rabasa et al., “Beyond al-Qaeda,” Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement, Rand Project Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2006), 38–39. 36. Ibid., 39. 37. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ( July 22, 2004), 151. 38. Abu Mus’ab al-Nadjdi, cited in Akram Hijazi, “A Journey into the Mind of the Salafia al-Jihadia: Al-Qa’ida as a Model,” Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper published in London, August 28 to 31, 2006 (four parts), “Part Two: The Economy and the Theory of the Snake’s Head.” 39. Interview, Dr. Reuven Paz, International Policy Institute for CounterTerrorism, Israel (May 192003). 40. Eliza Manninghma-Buller, Terrorism Conference, Royal United Services Institute (London, July 17, 2003). 41. Ibid. 42. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Director Robert S. Mueller, III, Federal Bureau of Investigation,” (The City Club of Cleveland, June 23, 2006). http://www.f bi.gov/pressrel/ speeches/mueller062306.htm; and “New Profile of the Home-grown Terrorist Emerges,” The Christian Science Monitor ( July 26, 2006). http:// www.csmonitor.com/2006/0626/p01s01-ussc.html. 43. Richard A. Falkenrath, “Prepared Statement of Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,” (United States Senate, Washington, DC, September 12, 2006). http://hsgac.senate. gov/_files/091206Falkenrath.pdf.

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44. Gary LaFree, cited in Patrik Jonsson, “New Profile of the Home-grown Terrorist emerges,” The Investigative Project on Terrorism ( June 26, 2006). http://www.investigativeproject.org/133/new-prof ile-of-the-homegrown-terrorist-emerges. 45. Ibid. 46. George J. Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context,” Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Global Security.org, January 24, 2004), http://www. g loba l secu r it y.org /i ntel l / l ibra r y/cong ress/2 0 04 _ h r/tenet _ 24feb 2004.htm. 47. McMillan and Cavili, “Countering Global Terrorism,” 22–23. 48. Angel Rabasa, Beyond al-Qaeda, 31 49. Ibid., 33 50. Robert F. Worth, “Freed by the U.S., Saudi Becomes a Qaeda Chief,” The New York Times ( January 22, 2009). http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/ world/middleeast/23yemen.html?hp. 51. Paul J. Smith, “Prospects for US-China Cooperation,” (testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “China’s Military and Security Activities Abroad,” Washington, DC, the United States, March 4, 2009). http://www.uscc.gov/ hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_03_04_wrts/09_03_04_ smith_statement.pdf. 52. Richard K. Betts, “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 1 (2002): 20. Martha Crenshaw, “Why America? The Globalization of Civil War,” Current History, Vol. 100, No. 650 (December 2001): 425. 53. Paul J. Smith, “Prospects for US-China Cooperation.” 54. Shirley A. Kan, “U.S.—China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,” (Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service, October 29, 2008). 55. “The Power of Truth,” Al-Sahab Video Featuring Osama bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri and others (September 20, 2007), ICPVTR Translation. 56. Ibid. 57. “Libi Urges Support for Uyghurs, Calls for Jihad,” SITE Intelligence Group (October 7, 2009). 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Akram Hijazi, “China under the Microscope of the Salafia al-Jihadia.” 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 63. Akram Hijazi, “China under the Microscope of the Salafia al-Jihadia,” Part Four: Bloody Conf licts and Frantic Competition in Central Asia. 64. The video posted on as-Sahab Web site by al-Qaeda on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the attacks of September 11, 2001, September 7, 2006. 65. Akram Hijazi, “A Journey into the Mind of the Salafia al-Jihadia: Al-Qa’ida as a Model,”Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper published in London, August 28

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66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

71.

72. 73. 74.

75.

76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

82. 83.

84. 85.

213

to 31, 2006 (four parts), Part Two: The Economy and the Theory of the Snake’s Head. Akram Hijazi, “China under the Microscope of the Salafia al-Jihadia,” Part Three. Akram Hijazi, “China under the Microscope of the Salafia al-Jihadia,” Part Four. Shirley A. Kan (October 29, 2008). Al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan, “Martyrs in Time of Alienation,” ( January 31, 2008). Paul J. smith, “Prospects for US-China Cooperation,” (March 4, 2009). http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/ 09_03_04_wrts/09_03_04_smith_statement.php. Imam Samudra Aku Melawan Teroris (“I am fighting for Terrorism”). For a detailed discussion about Imam Samudra’s justification of Bali Bombings, see Mohammad Haniff Hassan, Unlicensed to Kill: Countering Imam Samudra’s Justification for the Bali Bombings (Singapore, Peace Matters, 2006). Ibid. “Pakistan Denies New Reactor Plan,” BBC ( January 3, 2006). http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4577044.stm. Urvashi Aneja, “China-Bangladesh Relations: An Emerging Strategic Partnership?” Special Report No. 33 (Institute of Peace and Conf lict Studies, November 2006), 5. http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-33.pdf. “China, Bangladesh to Further Bilateral Economic Ties,” Xinhua Net ( July 23, 2007). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007–07/23/content_ 6416262.htm. Urvashi Aneja, “China-Bangladesh Relations: An Emerging Strategic Partnership?” 7. B. Raman, “The Blast in Gwadar,” South Asia Analysis Group (May 8, 2004). http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers10/paper993.html. Ibid. “Pakistan blast kills 3 Chinese engineers,” China Daily (May 4, 2004). http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004–05/04/content_328099.htm. “Pakistan car bomb kills Chinese,” BBC (May 3, 2004). http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3679533.stm. “Two Chinese Engineers Kidnapped in Pakistan,” People’s Daily (October 10, 2004). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200410/09/eng 20041009_159503.html. Ibid. Fazal-ur-Rahman, “Targeted Attacks on Chinese: Myth and Reality,” (Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, 2007). http://www.issi.org.pk/ journal/2007_files/no_4/article/a6.htm and Jenny Booth & agencies, “Chinese workers targeted in deadly Pakistan suicide bombing,” Times Online ( July 19, 2007). http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ asia/article2103936.ece. Ibid. “Three Chinese Dead in Pakistan ‘Terrorist’ Attack,” Reuters ( July 8, 2007). http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSISL27353120070708.

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86. Tarique Niazi, “China, Pakistan, and Terrorism,” FPIF Commentary ( July 16, 2007). http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4384; and “Chinese Workers Shot in Pakistan,” BBC ( July 9, 2007). http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ south_asia/6282574.stm. 87. Ibid. 88. Zahid Hussain and Jane Macartney, “Suicide Bomb Attack Jolts China into Realizing the Risks of Global Ambition,” The Times Online ( July 20, 2007). http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2106397.ece. 89. Jenny Booth and agencies, “Chinese Workers Targeted in Deadly Pakistan Suicide Bombing,” The Times Online ( July 19, 2007). 90. Ibid. 91. “Pakistani Taliban Claims Fighter Kidnapped 2 Chinese Engineers,” VOA news (September 2, 2008). http://www.voanews.com/english/ archive/2008–09/2008–09–02-voa19.cfm?CFID=139173390&CFTOKE N=15164071&jsessionid=8430324afe1f23012b2228631a80233a6d37. 92. “Pak Taliban Kidnapped Two Chinese Engineers against Attacks on Them,” Thaindian News (September 3, 2008). http://www.thaindian. com/newsportal/india-news/pak-taliban-kidnap-two-chinese-engineersagainst-attacks-on-them_10091902.html. 93. “Zai bajisitan bei taliban bangjia de zhongguo gongchengshi anquan huoshi” (The Chinese Engineers Kidnapped by Taliban in Pakistan Were Released Safely,” Xinhua News (February 15, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009–02/15/content_10820593.htm; and “Released Chinese engineer leaves Pakistan for China,” People’s Daily (February 18, 2009). http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6595649. html. 94. “ ‘Afghanistan’s Enemies’ behind Killing of Chinese Workers: Karzai,” and “Rebuilding Activities to Continue in Afghanistan: Chinese Ambassador” Afghanistan News Center ( June 11, 2004). http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2004/june/jun112004.html; and Carlotta Gall, “Taliban suspected in killing of 11 Chinese works,” New York Times ( June 11, 2004). http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D01E3DA1530F932A2 5755C0A9629C8B63. 95. Ibid. 96. “Eleven Chinese Dead in Afghan Terrorist Attack, News Black-out Imposed,” Afghanistan News Center ( June 11, 2004). http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2004/june/jun112004.html. 97. Carlotta Gall, “Taliban Suspected in Killing of 11 Chinese Workers,” New York Times ( June 11, 2004); “Mystery Shrouds Killing of Chinese in Afghanistan,” China Daily (updated June 21, 2004). http://www. chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004 – 06/21/content _ 341247.htm. 98. Ibid. 99. “Taliban Denies It Murdered 11 Chinese in North Afghanistan,” Afghanistan News Center ( June 11, 2004) and http://www.afghanistannewscenter. com/news/2004/june/jun112004.html.

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100. H. H. Michael Hsiao and Alan Yang, “Ins and Outs of a China Courtship,” Asia Times (December 4, 2008). http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ Southeast_Asia/JL04Ae02.html. 101. Sheng Ding and Robert A. Saunders, “Talking Up China: An Analysis of China’s Rising Cultural Power and the Global Promotion of the Chinese Language,” East Asia: An International Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2006): 3. 102. Hsiao and Yang, “Ins and Outs of a China Courtship.” 103. “Trade and Commerce, Philippines-China Economic Relations,” Philippine Consulate General Shanghai (October 2008). http://www. philcongenshanghai.org/Trade.htm. 104. Ibid. 105. “China, Indonesia Intensify Economic Cooperation,” China Daily (October 7, 2006). http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/information/details. php?type=news_copy&id=3024. 106. “China intends to increase investment in Indonesia,” ANTARA News Agency (December 22, 2006). http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/information/details.php?type=news_copy&id=3264. 107. Brian Padden, “Indonesian Muslims protest against China’s crackdown on Uighur,” VOA News ( July 16, 2009), http://www.voanews.com/ english/archive/2009–07/2009–07–16-voa10.cfm?CFID=283571748& CFTOKEN=50252070&jsessionid=0030cf81462af08ec7a1237602a2e6 f452f1. 108. “Government Must Lodge Notes of Protest with China,” Bernama ( July 13, 2009), http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v5/newsworld. php?id=424876. 109. “Indonesians Protest at Chinese Embassy,” AFP ( July 13, 2009), ht t p://w w w.goog le.com /hosted news/a f p/a r t icle/A LeqM5g zcZ _ G1WXp3AyiTvGjvgro6Gme7g. 110. Ibid. 111. Ibid. 112. Brian Padden, “Indonesian Muslims Protest against China’s Crackdown on Uighur,” VOA News ( July 16, 2009). 113. The Web site of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/. Translated by ICPVTR. 114. “Barney Jopson, Somalia Oil Deal for China,” Financial Times ( July 13, 2007). http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/20a8a430–3167–11dc-891f- 0000779 fd2ac.html. 115. “Long-standing China-Algeria Ties Show Strong Momentum for Growth,” Window of China (March 21, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2008–03/21/content_7835496.htm. 116. Ibid. 117. “China-Algeria Trade Has Great Potential: MOFTEC,” People’s Daily (August 23, 2002), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200208/23/eng 20020823_101976.shtml. 118. Ibid.

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119. Sun Shangwu, “China, Egypt Agree on Nuke Co-operation,” China Daily (November 8, 2006). http://chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006–11/08/ content_727329.htm. 120. African Economic Outlook 2007, OECD Development Centre (May 2007), 245–246. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/6/38562553.pdf. 121. Ibid. 122. “China and Egypt Go Hand in Hand,” Jane’s Information Group ( January 18, 2007). http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jiaa/ jiaa070118_1_n.shtml. 123. “ ‘China Fever’ Sweeps Egypt,” People’s Daily (October 17, 2006). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200610/17/eng20061017_312665. html. 124. “China, Egypt Launched Construction of Oil Rigs Plant,” Huliq News (May 31, 2007). http://www.huliq.com/23222/china-egypt-launchedconstruction-of-oil-rigs-plant. 125. “Feature: “China Fever” Sweeps Egypt,” People’s Daily (October 17, 2006). 126. “China and Egypt go Hand in Hand,” Jane’s Information Group ( January 18, 2007). 127. Liu Baijia, “Chinese SEZ Likely in Egypt,” China Daily (November 14, 2007). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007–11/14/content_6253381. htm. 128. Ibid. 129. “Iraq and China Sign Oil Deal Soon, International Herald Tribune,” The Associated Press (AP) (August 21, 2008), http://www.iht.com/ articles/2008/08/21/business/21oilchi.php. 130. “Four Oil Workers Killed in Algeria Bus Attack,” Reuters AlertNet (March 4, 2007). http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L04254748. htm. 131. Craig S. Smith, “Qaeda-Linked Group Claims Algerian Attack,” New York Times (December 13, 2006). http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/13/ world/africa/13algeria.html. 132. “Algeria: Militants Focus on Energy Targets,” Stratfor ( June 25, 2007). http://www.stratfor.com/algeria_militants_focus_energy_targets. 133. “At Least 24 Algerian Gendarmes Killed in Insurgent Ambush,” Xinhua Net ( June 18, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–06/18/ content_11563113.htm. 134. Ibid. 135. “Aerjiliya 24 ming xianbing zaoxi shenwang (Algeria 24 gendarmes attacked and dead),” Xinhua Net ( June 18, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet. com/world/2009–06/18/content_11563314.htm. 136. Tania Branigan, “Al-Qaida Threatens to Target Chinese over Muslim Deaths in Urumqi,” Guardian ( July 14, 2009). http://www.guardian. co.uk/world/2009/jul/14/al-qaida-threat-china-urumqi; and Cui Jia and Cui Xiaohuo, “Al-Qaida threatens Chinese abroad,” China Daily ( July 15, 2009). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009xinjiangriot/ 2009–07/15/content_8428724.htm.

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137. Cui Jia and Cui Xiaohuo, “Al-Qaida Threatens Chinese Abroad,” China Daily ( July 15, 2009). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/ 2009xinjiangriot/2009–07/15/content_8428724.htm. 138. “ISI ‘Knights of Martyrdom 6’ Video, Dedicated to Uyghurs,” SITE Intelligence Group (August 24, 2009). 139. Ibid. 140. Ibid. 141. Ibid. 142. “Three Suspects Arrested in Chinese Diplomat Shooting,” People’s Daily ( July 2, 2002). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200207/02/print 20020702_98986.html. 143. Bakyt Ibraimov, “Uighurs: Beijing to Blame for Kyrgyz Crackdown,” Eurasianet.org ( January 28, 2004). http://www.eurasianet.org/ departments/civilsociety/articles/eav012804.shtml. 144. “China Condemns Killing of Kidnapped Workers in Sudan,” Xinhua Net (October 28, 2008). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–10/28/ content_10266701.htm.

6

China’s Perception of the Threat and Response

1. “Hu Jintao Promises to Stif le Unrest and Make Uighur Rich,” Taipei Times (May 29, 2005). http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/ archives/2005/05/29/2003257059. 2. “Beijing Hunts Olympic ‘Terrorist’,” BBC (October 21, 2008). h t t p: //n e w s . b b c . c o.u k /n o l /u k f s _ n e w s / h i /n e w s i d _ 76 8 0 0 0 0/ newsid_7681200/7681297.stm. 3. “Baming Dongtu kongbufenzi mingdan jiqi zhuyao zuixing,” (The eight East Turkistan terrorists and their criminal activities), the Web site of the Ministry of Public Security of PRC (October 21, 2008). http://www.mps. gov.cn/n16/n1237/n1342/n803715/1634373.html. 4. “China Names Eight MUSLIM ‘Terrorists’ Abroad on Most Wanted List,” AFP (October 20, 2008). http://afp.google.com/article/ ALeqM5ioMxf5vKzTvTkyVd9shnKBicSwiQ. 5. “Gonganbu fabuhui tongbao dier pi rending de ‘dongtu’ kongbufenzi mingdan youguan qingkuang” (The MPS news brief ing on the second bath of alleged ‘East Turkistan Theorists’ and relevant information), the Web site of the Ministry of Public Security of PRC (October 21, 2008). http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1237/n1432/n1522/1634347. html. 6. “Rights at Risk: Amnesty International’s concerns regarding security legislation and law enforcement measures,” Amnesty International (2002). http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/001/2002/en/domACT300012002en.html. 7. Boaz Ganor, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?”http://www.ict.org.il/ResearchPublications/tabid/64/ Articlsid/432/currentpage/1/Default.aspx.

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8. Rohan Gunaratna, “Military and Non-military Strategies for Combating Terrorism,” in Combating Terrorism, ed. Rohan Gunaratna (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005), 1. 9. Shirley A. Kan, “U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,” (Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service, October 29, 2008). 10. Yang Hui, “Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Cooperation and Promoting Peace in the Asia-Pacific,” (presented at the Asian-Pacific Intelligence Chief ’s Conference, Singapore, February 18, 2009). 11. Nicolas Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the Nineties,” China Journal, Vol. 44 ( July 2000): 87. 12. Ibid. 13. James Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004), 13. 14. “East Turkestan’ terrorists cannot get away with impunity,” Information Office of State Council ( January 20, 2002). 15. Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, 13. 16. “East Turkestan’ Terrorists Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” Information Office of State Council; and Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, 13. 17. An introduction of the first batch of “East Turkistan” terrorist organizations and terrorists identified by the Ministry of Public Security (December 2003). http://news.china.com/zh_cn/domestic/945/20031215/11587489. html. 18. “Combating terrorism, we have no choice,” Xinhua Net (December 18, 2003). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003–12/18/content_1237985. htm. 19. Ibid. 20. “Combating Terrorism, we have no choice,” Xinhua Net (December 18, 2003). 21. Sheo Nandan Pandey, “2008 Beijing Olympics Security Management: Myth and Reality of Intelligence Inputs on Terror Attack” (Noida: South Asia Analysis Group, November 10, 2008). http://www.southasiaanalysis. org/papers30/paper2918.html. 22. Dru C. Gladney, “China’s ‘Uighur Problem’ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” The U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission Hearings Washington, DC, the United States (2006). 23. “China: the Evolution of ETIM,” Stratfor Global Intelligence (May 13, 2008). http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_evolution_etim. 24. Ibid. 25. “Biographical Note of Erkin Alptekin,” The World Uyghur Congress (2005). http://www.uyghurcongress.org/En/AboutWUC.asp?mid=10957 38888&mid2=1109104014&mid3=1109598091. 26. Help the Uyghurs to Fight Terrorism (Munich: East Turkistan National Congress, 2003), 20–27. 27. Ibid. 28. Dru C. Gladney, “Xinjiang” in Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism, ed. Derek S. Reveron and Jeffrey Stevenson Murer (London: Routledge, 2006), 227.

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29. Dru C. Gladney, “Xinjiang,” 235. 30. Ibid. 31. “Introducing the World Uyghur Congress,” World Uyghur Congress. http://www.uyghurcongress.org/En/AboutWUC.asp?mid=1095738888 32. “Combating terrorism, we have no choice,” Xinhua Net (December 18, 2003). 33. “Introducing the World Uyghur Congress,” World Uyghur Congress. 34. Ibid. 35. Radio Free Asia, “Rebiya Kadeer: A Fight for Human Rights,” (April 5, 2005). http://www.rfa.org/english/news/in_depth/kadeer_appeal20050405.html. 36. Takungpao (Dagong Newspaper), “Dongtu sanfa chuandan, Xinjiang jishi chuli” (East Turkistan spread leaf lets, Xinjiang handled on time) (February 10, 2009). http://www.takungpao.com:10000/gate/gb/www. takungpao.com/news/09/02/10/EP-1029880.htm. 37. Dru C. Gladney, “Xinjiang,” 227. 38. Ian Ransom, “China Names Eight Wanted Olympic Terror Plotters,” Reuters (October 21, 2008). http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/ idUSTRE49K0IW20081021. 39. “Muslim Groups Denounce Inclusion on China’s List of ‘Terrorist’ Groups,” East Turkistan Information Center (December 15, 2003). http://www. uygur.org/wunn03/2003_12_16.htm. 40. The Web site: http://www.turkistan-islam.com/ has been inaccessible. Dru Gladney, “Xinjiang,” 232. 41. Ibid. 42. Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, 14. 43. Amnesty International, “China’s Anti-terrorism Legislation and Repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region” (March 2002). 44. Martin I. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism: Counter-insurgency, Politics and Internal Security (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 72. 45. “Role of Xinjiang Production Construction Corps Important: White Paper,” Xinhua News (Beijing, 2003). 46. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism, 77. 47. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2006), 80. 48. Yitzhak Shichor, “The Great Wall of Steel: Military and Strategy,” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Fredrick Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 122–123. 49. Yitzhak Shichor, “The Great Wall of Steel,” 122–123; and Dennis J. Blasko (2006), 72–73. 50. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism, 76. 51. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 8. 52. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism, 76. 53. Ibid. 54. An armed version of French Aerospatiale Dauphine helicopters coproduced in China. Yitzhak Shichor, “The Great Wall of Steel,”122–123.

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55. Yitzhak Shichor, “The Great Wall of Steel,” 125. 56. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism, 77. 57. Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, 14; and Anwar Rahman, Sinicization Beyond the Great Wall: China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Leisester: Matador, 2005), 53. 58. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism, 81–82. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. Richard McGregor, “Chinese Military in Muslim Region,” Financial Times (August 15, 2001), 8. 62. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism, 75. 63. Ibid. 64. “Chinese Military Preparing for Beijing Olympic Security,” Xinhua Net ( June 28, 2007). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007–06/28/ content_6307814.htm. 65. “Chinese Military Steps up Counter-terrorism Preparations for Olympics,” Xinhua Net (February 18, 2008). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2008–02/18/content_7622174.htm. 66. “Chinese military preparing for Beijing Olympic security,” Xinhua Net ( June 28, 2007). 67. Ibid. 68. “China’s Anti-terrorism Force in Action Ahead of Olympics,” Xinhua Net ( June 19, 2008). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–06/19/ content_8400608.htm. 69. “Chinese military steps up counter-terrorism preparations for Olympics,” Xinhua Net (February 18, 2008). 70. China’s National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: The State Council Information Office of PRC, January 20, 2009). http://www.china.org.cn/government/ central_government/2009–01/20/content_17155577.htm. 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism, 76. 74. Ibid. 75. Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, 15. 76. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism, 82–83. 77. Jay Todd Dautcher, “Reading Out-of-Print: Popular Culture and Protest on China’s Western Frontier,” in China Beyond the Headlines, ed. T. B. Weston and L. M. Jensen (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 273–295. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. Michael Dillon, Xinjiang—China’s Muslim Far Northwest (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 93. 82. Ibid. 83. Rémi Castets, “The Uighurs in Xinjiang: The Malaise Grows,” China Perspectives (2003). http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/document648.html. 84. Ibid.

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85. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism, 85–86. 86. Ibid. 87. Wang Shacheng and Cao Feng, “Information Galaxy: Intelligence Study on Security and Defense: Case of Potential Terrorism at the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games” at the Midwest Political Science Association National Annual Conference (Palmer House, Chicago, April 3–6, 2008). http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Information%20Galaxy_Intelligence%20 Study%20on%20Security%20and%20Defense.pdf. 88. Li Zhihui and Li Shu, “China’s Anti-terrorism Force in Action Ahead of Olympics,” Xinhua Net ( June 19, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2008–06/19/content_8400608.htm. 89. “China Sets Up Anti-Terror Squads as Riots Spread,” Reuters (August 17, 2005). 90. China’s National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: Information Office of State Council of PRC, January 2009). 91. “China Sets Up Anti-Terror Squads as Riots Spread,” Reuters (August 17, 2005). 92. China’s National Defense in 2008. 93. Ibid. 94. The Official Web site of the Ministry of Public Security. http://www. mps.gov.cn/cenweb/English/index.htm. 95. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 328. 96. Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, 17. 97. So far, the Xinjiang government has not published the figures about the number of arrests during the crackdown in the whole region. 98. South China Morning Post, July 17, 1997; December 29, 1997; February 6, 1998. 99. “China’s Anti-terrorism Legislation and Repression in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” Amnesty International (March 2002). http:// a s i a p a c i f i c . a m n e s t y.o r g / l i b r a r y/ I n d e x / E N G A S A 17010 2 0 0 2 ? open&of=ENG-CHN. 100. “Anti-terrorism Legislation and Repression in XUAR,” Amnesty International (2002), 11. 101. Pan Guang, “East Turkestan Terrorism and the Terrorist Arc: China’s Post-9/11 Anti-Terror Strategy,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006): 21. 102. Ibid. 103. Li and Li, “China’s Anti-terrorism Force.” 104. Ibid. 105. Ibid. 106. “Chinese Police Destroy Terrorist Camp in NW Region,” Xinhua Net (January 8, 2007). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007–01/08/ content_5580233.htm. 107. Ibid. 108. Ibid. 109. “Months Later, Xinjiang ‘Terror’ Raid Remains a Mystery,” AFP (April 7, 2008). http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jGUlp674YNDiKZrwMe HeQcuHRuOw.

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110. “China Arrests East Turkestan ‘Terror’ Suspects,” Taipei Times (April 11, 2008). http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/04/11/ 2003408949. 111. “Chinese police detain 82 suspected terrorists targeting Olympics in Xinjiang in 1st half,” People’s Daily ( July 10, 2008). http://english. peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6447914.html. 112. Li and Li, “China’s Anti-terrorism Force.” 113. Ibid. 114. “Chinese Police Forces Kick off Anti-terrorism Drills for National Day Security,” Xinhua Net ( June 9, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2009–06/09/content_11515789.htm. 115. Rohan Gunaratna, “China under Threat,” The Straits Times (August 3, 2008). 116. Bill Smith, “ ‘Great Wall of Steel’ Tightens around Beijing,” Asia-Pacific News ( July 22, 2008). http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/asiapacific/ news/article_1418554.php. 117. Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism, 71–73. 118. Ibid., 29. 119. Ibid. 120. Gunaratna, “Military and Non-military Strategies,” 1. 121. Kua shiji de Zhongguo renkou—Xinjiang fence (The Population of China towards the 21st Century: Xinjiang Volume) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1994), Table 13–7, 418. 122. Ibid. 123. Colin Mackerras, “Why Terrorism Bypasses China’s Far West,” Asia Times Online (April 23, 2004). http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/ FD23Ad03.html. 124. Ibid. 125. Li Dezhu, “Xibu da kaifa yu minzu wenti” (The Opening of the West and China’s nationality problem), Qiushi (Seeking Truth) ( June 1, 2000). 126. “Jointly Prosper: 4,000 Gansu Households Begin Work in Xinjiang’s Construction and Production Corps,” Gansu Daily (April 21, 2005), reprinted on Tianshan Net (April 22, 2005). 127. Nicolas Becquelin, “Staged Development in Xinjiang,” China Quarterly, No. 178 ( July 2004): 375. http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php? file=%2FCQY%2FCQY178%2FS0305741004000219a.pdf&code=5aeb59 7a2d9f4c1b14e1b68b258da7cd. 128. Study Group of the Xinjiang CCP Committee, “Guanyu zhengque renshi he chuli xingshi xia Xinjiang minzu wenti de diaocha baogao” (Investigative report on correctly apprehending and resolving Xinjiang’s nationality problems under the new situation) (February 2001). Reproduced in Makesizhuyi yu xianshi (Marxism and Actuality) (February 2001), 34–38. 129. US Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2005 (Washinton, DC: Congressional-Executive Commission on China, October 11, 2005). http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt05/

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130. 131.

132.

133.

134.

135.

136.

137. 138. 139. 140. 141.

142.

143. 144.

145. 146. 147. 148.

223

CECCannRpt2005.pdf; and Colin Mackerras, “Why terrorism bypasses China’s far west,” Asia Times Online (April 23, 2004). Yang, “Strengthening Counter-terrorism Intelligence.” “China Experiments with Debt,” The Wall Street Journal (March 25, 2009). http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123787407588322681. html#mod=rss_asia_whats_news. Xinjiang Regional Road Improvement Project, Final Report (Hong Kong: SMEC Asia LTD, November 2006), Vol. 3. http://www.adb.org/Documents/ Reports/Consultant/39655-PRC/Volume-III.pdf. “China to build twelve new highways linking its west region with Central Asia,” Xinhua Net (6 April, 2007). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2007–04/07/content_8312145.htm. Chinese “nan shui bei diao,” “xi qi dong shu,” and “xi dian dong song.” National Development Programming Commission of PRC, “xi qi dong shu, xi dian dong song, qing zhang tielu, nan shui bei diao si da gongcheng jinkuang” (Recent situation about the four grant programs—“west-toeast natural gas transfer,” “west-to-east power transmission,” “south-tonorth water diversion,” and Qinghai-Tibet railway. http://www.cec.org. cn/news/content.asp?NewsID=12433. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China,” (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, January 2008). www.apcss.org/Publications/APCSS%20Uyghur%20Muslim%20 Separatism%20in%20Xinjiang.doc. “Report on the Work of XUAR Government in 2008,” Xinjiang Gongyi (Xinjiang Charity) ( January 18, 2009). http://www.xjgy.org/post/ Report-on-the-Work-of-Xinjiang.aspx. Vincent Kolo, “The national question in Xinjiang,” Socialist World ( January 9, 2008). http://socialistworld.net/eng/2008/01/09chinaa.html. Ibid. Ibid. Dillon, Xinjiang, 157–158. Liam Stack, “China Raises Casualty Toll in Uighur Riots,” The Christian Science Monitor ( July 12, 2009). http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0712/ p99s01-duts.html. Sheo Nandan Pandey, “2008 Beijing Olympics Security Management: Myth and Reality of Intelligence Inputs on Terror Attack” (Noida: South Asia Analysis Group, November 10, 2008). Pan, “East Turkestan Terrorism,” 22. Sheo Nandan Pandey, “Chinese Counter Terror Intelligence Module: Compatibility to Nov 26 Mumbai Type Terror Attacks,” (Noida: South Asia Analysis Group, December 27, 2008). http://www.southasiaanalysis. org/%5Cpapers30%5Cpaper2993.html. Ibid. Pandey, “Chinese Counter Terror Intelligence.” Ibid. Pandey “Chinese Counter Terror Intelligence” and Pan, “East Turkestan Terrorism,” 22.

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149. Pan, “East Turkestan Terrorism,” 22. 150. Dailymirror.lk, “Counter Terrorism in UK,” Counter-terrorism Strategies in the West ( January 29, 2009). http://srilankatoday.com/index.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=944&Itemid=52. 151. Yang, “Strengthening Counter-terrorism Intelligence.” 152. Sheo Nandan Pandey, “2008 Beijing Olympics Security Management: Myth and Reality of Intelligence Inputs on Terror Attack,” (Noida: South Asia Analysis Group, November 10, 2008). 153. Pan, “East Turkestan Terrorism,” 22. 154. Wang Shacheng and Cao Feng, “Information Galaxy: Intelligence Study on Security and Defence- Case of Potential Terrorism at the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games,” (paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association National Annual Conference, Palmer House, Chicago, the US, 3–6 April, 2008), 14–15. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ Information%20Galaxy_Intelligence%20Study%20on%20Security%20 and%20Defense.pdf. 155. Ibid. 156. Yang, “Strengthening Counter-terrorism Intelligence.” 157. “Zhongguo Jingfang Jianjue Daji Yiqie Kongbuzhuyi Zhuzhi” (Chinese police firmly strike all terrorist organizations in accordance with law), Xinhua Net ( January 9, 2007). http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007–01/09/ content_5583031.htm. 158. The Criminal Law f the People’s Republic of China, Part II Special Provisions, Chapter I (Amended by the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress on March 14, 1997). http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/ displayModeTwo.asp?id=354&keyword= 159. Zhao Bingzhi and Wang Xiumei, “Countermeasures against Terrorism through Criminal Justice in China,” (paper presented at the First World Conference of Penal Law: Penal Law in the XXIst century, Guadalajara, Mexico, November 18–23, 2007). 160. Amendment of the Criminal Law f the People’s Republic of China (III), issued by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (December 29, 2001). 161. “Combating Terrorism, We Have No Choice,” Xinhua Net (December 18, 2003). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003–12/18/content_1237985. htm. 162. Zhao and Wang, “Countermeasures against Terrorism.” 163. “Woguo zhuanjia zhengzai jiajin zhiding zhuanmen de fankongfa” (Chinese specialists are hastening making a sepcific Counter-terror Law), Zhongguo Wang (China Net) ( January 1, 2008). http://www.china.com. cn/news/2008–07/01/content_15916774.htm. 164. Xiang Junbo, “Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in China,” (speech at the High Level Seminar on AML and Combating Terrorist Financing, Beijing, China, September 22, 2005). http://www. pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6500&ID=86. 165. Zhou Xiaochuan, “Anti-money laundering in China: the status quo and prospects,” (speech at the first meeting of the Ministerial Joint Conference

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167. 168. 169.

170. 171. 172. 173.

174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179.

180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185.

186. 187. 188.

189. 190.

225

on AML, Beijing, China, August 27, 2004). http://www.bis.org/review/ r040920a.pdf. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China (amended by the Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress, December 27, 2003). http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail. asp?col=6800&ID=22. Xiang, “Combating Money Laundering.” Ibid. The Criminal Law f the People’s Republic of China (Amended by the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress on March 14, 1997). http:// www.lawinfochina.com/law/displayModeTwo.asp?id=354&keyword=. “China adopts anti-money laundering law,” China Daily (October 31, 2006). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006–10/31/content_721316.htm. Xiang, “Combating Money Laundering.” The EAG official Web site. http://www.eurasiangroup.org/. “U.S. Treasury targets leader of group tied to al-Qaeda,” Xinhua Net (April 21, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–04/21/ content_11226318.htm. “Treasury Targets Leader of Group Tied to Al Qaeda,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 20, 2009) TG-92. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 335. Ibid. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 335–336. Ibid. Pete Lentini, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Central Asia,” in M. Vicziany, D. Wright-Neville and P. Lentini (ed.) Regional Security in the Asia Pacific (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004), 128. “Chinese President Calls For Joint Efforts In Fighting Terrorism in Central Asia,” People’s Daily ( June 18, 2004). “Kyrgyzstan and China Begin Joint Anti-terrorist Exercises,” Associated Press World Stream (October 10, 2002). “Shanghai Five Fight Terrorism,” China Daily (August 12, 2003). “Counter-terrorism Exercise Ends,” China Daily (August 27, 2003). “China’s Defence Minister Praises Shanghai Organization Antiterror Exercise,” Xinhua Net, (August 15, 2003). “First China-Russia Military Exercise Conclude,” Zhongguo Junwang (Chinese Military Net) (August 25, 2005). http://english.chinamil.com. cn/site2/special-reports/2005–08/26/content_281921.htm. Ibid. “Peace Mission 2005,” People’s Daily ( July 27, 2007). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/91620/91644/6225701.html. “Joint war games testify new concept of security: Chinese DM,” Zhongguo Junwang (Chinese Military Net) (August 26, 2005) http://english.chinamil. com.cn/site2/special-reports/2005–08/27/content_282258.htm. Nadine Godehardt and Wang Pengxin, “Peace Mission 2009: Securing Xinjiang and Central Asia,” RSIS Commentary (September 2, 2009). Ibid.

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191. “China Looks back on Its Anti-terrorism Role over Past Year,” BBC (September 10, 2002); “China Accuses Muslim Separatists of Getting Weapons, Money from bin Laden,” Associated Press Newswires ( January 21, 2002). 192. Dru Gladney, “China’s ‘Uighur Problem’ ” (2006). 193. Philip P. Pan, “U.S. Warns of Plot by Group in W. China,” Washington Post (August 29, 2002), A27. 194. “Husein Celil (known as Huseyin Celil) (m), aged 37, Canadian citizen: Fear of Imminent Execution,” Amnesty International Canada (August 10, 2006). http://www.amnesty.ca/resource_centre/news/view.php?load=arc view&article=3657&c=Resource+Centre+News. 195. “China, Tajikistan Pledge to Further Cooperate in Fighting ‘Three Evil Forces’,” People’s Daily (May 16, 2006). 196. Gladney, “China’s ‘Uighur Problem’,” (2006). 197. “China, India Sign Defense Cooperation MOU,” China Net (May 31, 2006). http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/May/169952.htm. 198. “India and China launch war games,” BBC (December 20, 2007). http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7153179.stm. 199. “China, India kick off joint anti-terror military training,” Xinhua Net (December 21, 2007). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007–12/21/ content_7288587.htm. 200. Praful Kumar Singh, “India and China to hold joint counter terror, insurgency exercise,” Thaindian (December 4, 2008). http://www.thaindian. com/newsportal/india-news/india-and-china-to-hold-joint-counterterror-insurgency-exercise_100127210.html. 201. Ibid. 202. Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism.” 203. Amnesty International, “People’s Republic of China: Uighurs Fleeing Persecution as China Wages Its ‘War on Terror’ ” (2004). http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa170212004. 204. B. Ramam, “Sino-Indian Co-operation in Counter-Terrorism-an Update—International Terrorism Monitor- Paper No. 311,” (Noida: South Asia Analysis Group, November 2007). http://www.southasiaanalysis. org/%5Cpapers25%5Cpaper2472.html. 205. “Sino-Pakistani Joint Drill Concludes,” China Net (December 19, 2006). http://www.china.org.cn/international/2006–12/19/content_1192951. htm. 206. Ibid. 207. “Pakistan, China Sign Extradition Treaty,” Pakistan Latest (December 12, 2007). http://pklatest.com/2007/12/12/pakistan-china-sign-extraditiontreaty/. 208. “Pakistan Hands over Nine Uyghur Militants to China,” The Free Library (April 27, 2009).http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Pakistan+hands+over+n ine+Uyghur+militants+to+China.-a0198683701. 209. White House, “U.S., China Stand against Terrorism,” (October 19, 2001). 210. Dewardric McNeal and Kerry Dumbaugh, “China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism,” (Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2001).

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211. Shirley A. Kan, “U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,” (Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service, October 29, 2008): 5–6. 212. Ibid. 213. Kan, “U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation,” 1. 214. Ibid. 215. Ibid., 2. 216. Ibid. 217. Kan, “U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation,” 5; quoted in Frank R. Wolf, letter to Attorney General Holder Eric H. Holder, Jr., May 13, 2009. 218. Shirley A. Kan, “U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy.” 219. Daniel Schearf, “U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations Seeks Further Cooperation with China,” VOA News ( June 13, 2007). 220. Wang Shacheng and Cao Feng, “Information Galaxy: Intelligence Study on Security and Defense: Case of Potential Terrorism at the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games,” (paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association National Annual Conference, Palmer House, Chicago, April 3–6, 2008). 221. Shirley A. Kan, “U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,” 7. 222. Ibid., 9. 223. Ibid., 10. 224. “Rebiya Kadeer meets with President Bush at the White House,” Uyghur Human Rights Project (Washington, DC: Uyghur American Association, July 30, 2009). http://www.uhrp.org/articles/1239/1/Rebiya-Kadeermeets-with-President-Bush-at-the-White-House-/index.html. 225. “Group Says Chinese Saw Detainees,” Washington Post (May 26, 2004); and “China: Fleeing Uighurs Forced Back to “Anti-Terror” Torture and Execution,” Amnesty International ( July 7, 2004). 226. Robin Wright, “Chinese Detainees are Men without a Country,” Washington Post (August 24, 2005). 227. Ibid. 228. Kan, “U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation,” 12. 229. Ibid. 230. Agence France Presse (AFP), “American court denies Uighurs release from Guantanamo into US,” The Dailystar (February 29, 2009). http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=99484 231. “Palau to resettle 17 Guantánamo detainees,” Guardian ( June 10, 2009). http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/10/palau-guantanamodetainees-housed 232. “Row over release of Guantanamo Uighurs on Bermuda,” AFP ( June 12, 2009). http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20090612/pl_afp/usattacksgu antanamouighurbermuda;_ylt=AtXa484OA1Siv2ikP81mgLdSbA8F. 233. China’s National Defense in 2002 (Beijing: The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, December 9, 2002), Part VI, “International Security Cooperation.” http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/VI.htm#2.

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234. Denny Roy, “Lukewarm Partner: Chinese support for U.S. counterterrorism in Southeast Asia,” (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, March 2006). http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/ LukewarmPartnerChinaandCTinSEA.pdf. 235. Roy, “Lukewarm Partner.” 236. P. Parameswaran, “US-China extend dialogue to cover counter-terrrorism,” AFP (September 11, 2009). http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20090911/ pl_afp/uschinaattacks 237. Ibid., and “Clinton stresses key China goals,” BBC (September 11, 2009). http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8249824.stm. 238. China’s National Defense in 2008. 239. Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism.” 240. China’s National Defense in 2008. 241. Fangyang (ed.) “White Paper: China persists in int’l security cooperation,” Xinhua Net ( January 20, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2009–01/20/content_10688957.htm. 242. Gunaratna, “Military and Non-military Strategies,” 1.

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Journal Articles Abbas, Hassan. “Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies.” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 18 (September 27, 2007). Abuza, Zachary. “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24 (2002). Alexiev, Alex. “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions.” Middle Eastern Quarterly (Winter 2005). Baldwin, David. “The Concept of Security.” Review of International Studies, Vol. 23 (1997). ———. “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War.” World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1995). Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in Its Philippine and International Contexts: A Profile and WMD Threat Assessment.” Monterey Institute of International Studies (December 2003). Becquelin, Nicolas. “Staged Development in Xinjiang.” China Quarterly, Vol. 178 (2008): 358–378. Betts, Richard K. “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror.” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 1 (2002). Bhattacharya, Abanti. “Conceptualising Uighur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism.” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3 ( July–September 2003).

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Callaway, Rhonda L. and Julie Harrelson-Stephens. “Towards a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant of Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29 (2006). Chaudet, Didier. “Islamic Terrorism in Greater Central Asia: The ‘Al-Qaedaization’ of Uzbek Jihadism.” Russie. Nei. Visions (December 2008). Chung, Chien-peng. “China’s War on Terror: September 11 and Uighur Separatism.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 ( July/August 2002): 8–12. Clarke, Michael. “China’s ‘War on Terror’ in Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism.” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2008). Crenshaw, Martha. “Why America? The Globalization of Civil War.” Current History, Vol. 100, No. 650 (December 2001). Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups.” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2006). Daniel Deudney. “The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security.” Millennium, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1990). Dautcher, Jay Todd. “Reading Out-of-Print: Popular Culture and Protest on China’s Western Frontier.” In David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security.” Review of International Studies, Vol. 23 (1997): 5–26. David, Dewitt. “Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security.” The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1994). DeAngelis, Richard C. “Muslims and Chinese Political Culture.” The Muslim World, Vol. 87, No. 2 (1997). Desker, Barry. “Islam in Southeast Asia: The Challenge of Radical Interpretations.” Cambridge Review of international Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2003). ———. “The Jemaah Islamiyah Phenomenon in Singapore.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2003). Evans, Gareth. “Cooperative Security and Intra State Conf lict.” Foreign Policy, Vol. 96 (1994). Fletcher, Joseph F. “The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China.” Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 1 (1977). George, Paul. “Islamic Unrest in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Spring 1998). Gladney, Dru C. “Muslim Tombs and Ethnic Folklore.” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1987): 495–532. ———. “Islam.” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 54, No. 2 (May 1995). ———. “Relational Alterity: Constructing Dungan (Hui), Uygur, and Kazakh Identities across China, Central Asia, and Turkey.” History and Anthropology, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1996). Gunaratna, Rohan. “The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2004). Gunaratna, Rohan and Kenneth Pereire. “An Al Qaeda Group Operating in China?” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006): 55–61. Helly, Denise. “The Identity and Nationality Problem in Chinese Central Asia.” Central Asia Survey, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1985). Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, No. 3 (1993).

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Hyer, Eric. “China’s Policy towards Uighur Nationalism.” Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2006). Israeli, Raphael. “The Muslim Minority in the People’s Republic of China.” Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 8 (August 1981). Jamil, Sofia and Roderick Chia, “Lifting the Lid off Xinjiang’s Insecurities,” NTS Insight, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, September 2008. Krause, Keith and Michael C. Williams. “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods.” Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 40, Supplement 2 (1996). Lewis, Bernard. “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 3 (September 1990): 47–60. Lia, Brynjar. “Al-Suri’s Doctrines for Decentralized Jihad Training.” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 1 ( January 18, 2007). Lillian, Harris C. “Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China’s Policy in the Islamic World.” The China Quarterly, Vol. 133 (March 1993). Matthews, Jessica T. “Redefining Security.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2 (1989): 162–177. ———. “Power Shift.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1 (1997). McSweeney, Bill. “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School.” Review of International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1996): 81–93. Moneyhon, Matthew D. “Taming China’s ‘Wild West’: ethnic conf lict in Xinjiang.” Peace Conflict and Development, Vol. 5, No. 5 (2004). Myers, N. “Environment and Security.” Foreign Policy, No. 74 (1989): 23–41. Newby, Laura J. “The Begs of Xinjiang: Between Two Worlds.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2 (1998): 278–297. Nicolas, Becquelin. “Xinjiang in the Nineties.” China Journal, Vol. 44 ( July 2000). Pan Guang. “East Turkestan Terrorism and the Terrorist Arc: China’s Post9/11 Anti-Terror Strategy.” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006). Paris, Ronald. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001). Querol, M. Reynal. “Ethnicity, Political Systems and Civil Wars.” Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46 (2002): 29–54. Rahmani, Waliullah. “Has Al-Qaeda Picked a Leader for Operations in China?” Terrorism Focus, Vol. 5, No. 41 (December 3, 2008). Roe, Paul. “The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conf lict as a ‘Tragedy’?” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1999). Sheng Ding and Robert A. Saunders. “Talking Up China: An Analysis of China’s Rising Cultural Power and the Global Promotion of the Chinese Language.” East Asia, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2006). Svensson, Isak. “Fighting with Faith: Religion and Conf lict Resolution in Civil Wars.” Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 6 (December 2007): 930–949. Tan, Andrew. “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 23 (October– December 2000): 267–288.

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Ullman, Richard. “Redefining Security.” International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1980): 162–77. Vanham, T. “Domestic Ethnic Conf lict and Ethnic Nepotism: a Comparative Analysis.” Peace Research, Vol. 36 (1999): 55–73. Zhu Yuchao and Blachford Dongyan. “Ethnic Disputes in International Politics: Manifestations and Conceptualizations.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1 ( January 2006): 25–51.

Miscellaneous Acharya, Arabinda. “Southeast Asian Security after September 11.” Foreign Policy Dialogue Series. Vancouver: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2003. Baker, Rodger. “China and enduring Uighurs.” Rightside News, August 6, 2008. Bonner, Raymond and Jane Perlez. “Bali Bomb Plotters Said to Plan To Hit Foreign Schools in Jakarta.” New York Times, November 18, 2002. Cody, Edward. “Truck, Grenade Attack in China Kills 16 Policemen.” Washington Post, August 4, 2008. Crawley, Mike. “Focus Turns to Somali in Search for Terrorists.” The Christian Science Monitor, December 3, 2001. Cui Jia and Cui Xiaohuo. “Al-Qaida Threatens Chinese Abroad.” China Daily, July 15, 2009. Fang Jinying. “The Development of Islam Groups in South Asia and Southeast Asia and the Inf luence on China,” International Conference on Harmonious Development of Religion, Society and Economy. Beijing: PRC’s Institute of Ethnic Minority Groups Development Research Development Research Center of State Council, October 2007. Givner-Forbes, Rebecca. “China under Threat: Jihadist Community Has China in Its Sights—Debate Brewing over Whether Rising Dragon Should Be Seen as Muslim’s Friend or Foe.” The Straits Times, August 3, 2008. http://www.pvtr. org/pdf/ICPVTRinNews/Jihadist%20community%20has%20China%20in%20 its%20sights.pdf/. Gladney, Dru C. “China’s Minorities: The Case of Xinjiang and the Uyghur People.” Paper presented at the Commission on Human Rights, Sub-commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Working Group on Minorities (Ninth Session), Geneva, May 12–16, 2003. ———. “China’s ‘Uighur Problem’ And the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearings. Washington, DC, 2006. Godehardt, Nadine and Wang Pengxin. “Peace Mission 2009: Securing Xinjiang and Central Asia.” RSIS Commentary, September 2, 2000. Gunaratna, Rohan. “Al-Qaeda’s Trajectory in 2003,” IDSS Perspectives, May 3, 2003. ———. “China under Threat.” The Straits Times, August 3, 2008. Jacobs, Andrew. “Ambush in China Raises Concerns as Olympics Near.” New York Times, August 5, 2008. Joe, McDonald. “China Targets Xinjiang Rebels.” The Washington Times, January 22, 2002.

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Kan, Shirley A. “U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated October 29, 2008. Kronsdat, Alan K. and Bruce Vaughn. Terrorism in South Asia. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 9, 2004. Leslie, Donald Daniel. “The Integration of Religious Minorities in China: The Case of Chinese Muslims.” Paper presented at the Fifty-ninth George Ernest Morrison Lecture in Ethnology 1998, Australia National University, Canberra, 1998. McGregor, Richard. “Chinese Military in Muslim Region.” Financial Times, August 15, 2001. McNeal, Dewardric L. “China’s Relations with Central Asia States and Problems with Terrorism.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2001. Pereira, Derwin. “JI Cells ‘Still as Deadly’.” The Straits Times, April 1, 2005. Pereire, Kenneth. “The Beijing Olympics and China’s Militant Groups.” RSIS Commentaries, June 28, 2007. Ramzy, Austin. “Jihad in China’s Far West.” Time, August 6, 2008. Rudelson, Justin. “Xinjiang’s Uyghurs in the Ensuing US-China Partnership.” Paper presented at Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Uyghur Panel, Washington, DC, June 10, 2002. Sahni, Ajai. “Al Qaeda’s Strategic Reach in South Asia.” Paper presented before “The Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in the Asia-Pacific: Linkages to Global Terrorism” Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, February 19–21, 2002. SITE Intelligence Group. “ ‘Islamic Turkistan’—First Issue of TIP Magazine.” January 29, 2009. ———. “ISI ‘Kinights of Martyrdom 6’ Video, Dedicated to Uyghurs.” August 24, 2009. ———. “ ‘Islamic Turkistan’—Second Issue of TIP Magazine.” February 9, 2009. ———. “ ‘Islamic Turkistan’—Third Issue of TIP Magazine.” March 25, 2009. ———. “ ‘Forth Issue of TIP Magazine, ‘Islamic Turkistan’.” July 29, 2009. ———. “Libi Urges Support for Uyghurs, Calls for Jihad.” October 7, 2009. ———. “TIP Calls for Jihad, Demonstrates Training (Video).” March 27, 2009. ———. “TIP Responds to US Treasury Designation, Arrests.” May 1, 2009. ———. “TIP Leaders Threaten China Over Urumqi Violence.” July 17, 2009. Stratfor Global Intelligence. “Geopolitical Diary: Beijing Eyes the Periphery.” March 10, 2008. ———. “China: The Evolution of ETIM.” May 13, 2008. The NEFA Foundation. “Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP): Why Are We Fighting China.” July 2008. ———. “The Islamic Jihad Union.” October 14, 2008. ———. “TIP: ‘Steadfastness and Preparations for Jihad in the Cause of Allah.” January 20, 2009. ———. “Statement from the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP),” May 1, 2009. Tong, Goh Chok. “Fight Terror with Ideas, Not Just Armies.” Paper presented to the Prime Minister of Singapore at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, May 6, 2004. Wang Shacheng and Cao Feng. “Information Galaxy: Intelligence Study on Security and Defense: Case of Potential Terrorism at the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.”

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Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association National Annual Conference, Palmer House, Chicago, the United States, April 3–6, 2008. Watson, Paul and Mubashir Zaidi. “Militant Flourishes in Plain Sight.” Los Angeles Times, January 25, 2004. Wong, Edward. “Warning of Attacks on Olympics Is Said to Be Linked to Muslim Separatist Group.” New York Times, August 9, 2008. Wright, Robin. “Chinese Detainees are Men without a Country.” Washington Post, August 24, 2005, and Asian Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2005. Yang Hui. “Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Cooperation and Promoting Peace in the Asia-Pacific.” Paper presented at Asian-Pacific Intelligence Chief ’s Conference, Singapore, February 18, 2009.

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INDEX Abdul Hakeem 53–54 Abdul Haq 53–54, 56–59, 64, 72–74, 110, 133, 160, 194 Abdullah Mansour 59, 71–72 Abu Mohammad al-Turkistani, see Hasan Mahsum Abu Sayyaf Group 117, 235 Abu Yahya al-Libi 1, 110, 122, 179, 210 Afghanistan 18, 32, 51, 55–58, 60–65, 71, 74, 81, 105, 113–114, 116, 119–122, 125–126, 143–144, 165–166, 213–215 Afghanistan-Pakistan border 54, 61 Ahong 96, 100, 103–104 Akram Hijazi 123, 211, 213 Al Qaeda (Al-Qaeda) 1–3, 5, 7, 18, 57–58, 60–65, 67–68, 70, 105, 109–129, 131–134, 160–161, 166, 174–175, 194–196, 209–213, 225, 232, 234 Al Qaeda in China 58, 110 Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 51, 86, 118, 120, 132, 134 Algeria 51, 114, 116, 130, 132, 216 Anti-Money Laundering (AML) 159–160, 224–225 Anti-Terror Bureau (ATB) 149, 156 Anti-terrorist drills Great Wall 5 145, 150 Great Wall 6 150 Arab 3, 28, 62, 90–92, 96 Arab Muslims 74, 90, 92 Arabian Peninsula 99, 112, 120 Arabic 21, 23, 29, 61, 73, 96, 100–101, 104, 184

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ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 169 Ayman al-Zawahiri 2, 105, 112, 119, 121–122, 131, 212 Bangladesh 106, 126–127, 213 Bank of China 159, 168, 225 Beijing Olympic Games 2, 6, 48, 57, 59, 67–68, 70–72, 75–78, 124, 135, 144–145, 147, 150–151, 155–157, 166, 175, 193, 198, 201, 218, 220–224, 227, 238–239 Bin-Laden, see Osama bin-Laden Bishkek 133, 161, 163 Bombings 48–49, 71, 73, 77–78, 82, 118, 144, 147, 161, 201–202 suicide 71–73, 128, 150 CCMS (Consequence Control and Management System) 157 CCP, see Chinese Communist Party CCTV (China Central Television) 74 Central Asia 22, 24, 28, 52, 62, 66–67, 79, 96–97, 153, 161 Muslims 22, 90–91 China Counterterrorism Cooperation 212, 218, 227, 239 China International Oil and Gas (CIOG) 130 China Islam Association, see Islamic Association of China China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 130 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 134 China Securities Regulatory Commission 159

242

IN DE X

China’s anti-terrorism force 142, 220–222 anti-terrorism legislation 219, 221, 229 counter-terrorism intelligence 156 Islamic Schools 207–208, 233 Minorities 187, 191, 208, 238 Muslims (Chinese Muslims ) 16–17, 20, 24, 26–27, 29, 44, 46, 89, 90, 92, 100, 102–104, 190, 206–208, 231, 233, 239 nation-building process 17, 46, 172–173 National Defense 47, 146, 168, 175, 190, 220–221, 227–229 State Council, see State Council Chinese Communist Party 26, 36–40, 42–43, 49, 101 Chinese engineers kidnapped 127, 213–214 government 28, 32–33, 36–37, 39, 44, 69–70, 74–75, 77, 80, 122, 137, 154, 156–158, 160, 167–169, 175–176 speaking Muslims 29, 89, 94 Chinese Muslim Association 26, 41 Chinese Muslim Educational Association 26 Chinese Muslim General Association 26 Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association 26 Chinese Muslim Young Students Association 26 Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) 64, 197 Combating terrorism 144, 151, 153, 155, 162–163, 166, 169, 191, 196, 203, 210, 218–219, 224, 232 Combating terrorist financing (Also Countering the Financing of Terrorism) 159, 160, 224 Commander Seifallah 47, 58–59, 71–72, 78, 195 Conf lict zones 115, 126 Consequence Control and Management System (CCMS) 157

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Constitution of the PRC 36, 39, 43, 189–190 Counter-terrorism exercise 148, 225 legislations 158–159 policies 167, 169 Dashi 90–92 Department of Public Security of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 148 Desecuritization 13 Development, socioeconomic 37–38, 40, 43, 45–46, 153, 173 Discrimination 1–2, 9, 18, 46, 85 Dolqun Isa 80, 82–83, 139 Domination 9, 16, 34 Early Warning and Prevention System (EWPS) 156–157 East Turkistan 7, 47, 52, 55, 62, 75, 79, 80–82, 86, 110, 124, 133, 137–139, 141, 161, 175–176, 202–205, 218 East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC) 48, 87–88, 139, 166, 205, 219 East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 2–3, 5, 7, 47–48, 51–79, 81, 110, 124–125, 135, 138, 164–166, 175, 193–194, 196–197, 203, 218 East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP) 49, 52–53 East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) 2, 5, 48, 61, 79–82, 88, 138, 166 East Turkistan Union in Europe (ETUE) 87, 140 Eastern Turkistan National Congress (ETNC) 81, 83, 87, 140–141 Eastern Turkistan organizations 48, 87, 190, 195–196 Erkin Alptekin 83, 86, 140, 173 Ethnic conf lict 5, 7, 9–10, 17, 31, 35, 50, 95, 153, 171, 182, 237 groups 17, 28, 31–32, 37, 52, 56, 90, 92, 138–139, 176, 185, 189, 192 identity 4–5, 15, 19, 52, 94

IN DE X

minorities 14, 17, 32, 38, 40–41, 43, 185 nationalism 4–5, 184, 232 tensions 16, 33–34, 45–46, 153–154, 169 Ethnicity 4–6, 59, 136, 153, 179, 182, 184, 228, 232, 237 Euro-Asian Group on Combating Money-laundering and Financing of Terrorism 160 Extremism 2, 6–7, 9, 57, 89, 102, 104–105, 137–138, 140, 143, 145, 148, 151, 162–163, 169–170, 174 FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area) 7, 60, 66–68, 87, 115, 127, 164, 175 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 105, 165–166, 212, 244 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 160 Financial Counter-Terrorism Working Group 165 Fundamentalism 102, 173 Fundamentalist Islam 53, 103 Gansu 3, 22, 29, 34, 75, 96–98, 100–102, 153 Gedimu 21, 23, 29, 96–97, 100–101, 184 Germany 51, 81–83, 85, 115, 140–141, 148, 151 Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 168 Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) 118, 120, 132 Guangzhou 20–21, 72, 78–79, 90–91 Guantanamo Bay 57, 64–65, 161, 167 Hajj 26–27, 100, 102–104, 173 Han Chinese 19–20, 22–23, 25, 28–30, 31–33, 37, 40, 42, 45, 48–50, 52, 59, 89, 91–95, 106, 152–153, 155, 172–174, 177–178 Hanafi Islam 23, 96 Hasan Mahsum 52–57, 61, 63–65, 70, 139, 199 Hezb-e-Islami 128

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243

Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan 53–54, 58, 63 Hong Kong 3, 20, 105, 145, 151, 204, 206, 223, 233 Hui 3, 25, 28–30, 32, 35, 46, 52, 89–90, 92–96, 98–99, 101–103, 105–107, 185–186, 231, 236 communities 7, 23, 90, 95–96, 98, 101, 103–105 Jiao 20, 89 Muslims 3, 7, 19–20, 28, 89–90, 93–95, 97–98, 100–102, 104, 106–107, 186, 206 Muslims in Beijing 29 Muslims in China 94–95, 98, 105 Huihui 23, 89–90, 92 Human rights 5, 10, 16, 80, 86–87, 166, 168, 177, 187, 191, 219, 238 Human security 10, 12, 180–182, 233, 236–237 Husein (Huseyin) Celil 62, 163, 226 Identity 1, 4–7, 10, 13–20, 28, 30–32, 37, 39, 95–96, 171–172, 182–183, 202, 234–237 conf licts 16 Hui 94–95 societal 14, 46, 90, 94–95, 105–106, 173, 177 Uighur 15, 31–32, 36, 177 Ikhwani 29, 99–100, 106 ILD (International Liaison Department) 156 Independence 2, 43, 69, 79–81, 85, 87, 93, 133, 141, 176 Indonesia 120–121, 129–130, 215, 231 Indonesian Muslims 130, 215 Information Office of State Council 168, 183, 187–189, 218, 220, 227 Insurgents 36, 136, 159, 245 Integration 4, 20, 22–23, 32–33, 101, 106, 139, 173, 245 of religious minorities in China 206, 239 Intelligence 155–157, 165, 212, 221, 224

244

IN DE X

International cooperation 136, 156, 159–160, 168–169 counter-terrorism treaties 148, 168 security 181–182, 211, 236–238 Internet 59, 66, 68, 71, 74–75, 87, 105, 112, 117, 119, 123, 142, 210 Interpol 79, 151 Iraq 18, 105, 109, 113–114, 119–120, 122, 126, 131, 245 Isa Yusuf Alptekin 83, 140, 184 Islam 3–7, 9, 17, 19–24, 26–33, 42, 45–46, 93–95, 101–102, 104–106, 112–113, 126, 184–186, 189–190, 206–208, 231–236 in China 4, 7, 17, 20–22, 69, 179, 184–186, 190, 206–209, 231–235 golden age of 23 radical 5, 27, 106, 116 in Southeast Asia 183, 236 traditionalist 26, 99 universal Ummah of 20, 102 in Xinjiang 24, 185–187, 232 Islamabad 115, 122, 128 Islamic Association of China 26, 102–103 Islamic education 32, 100 fundamentalism 90, 95, 101–106, 173, 186, 232 identity 18, 28, 31, 46 law 23, 49, 113, 132 orthodoxy 31, 98–99 reform movements 26, 95, 99–101 schools 43, 56, 95, 101, 104 states 105, 111–112 Ummah 23, 26, 106, 110 world 5, 25, 44, 92, 102–103, 123, 133, 190, 237 Islamic Institute 41, 56 Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) 2, 5, 62, 66–67, 133, 175 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 2, 5, 18, 61–62, 64–66, 115, 133, 175 Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 105, 109, 122, 132, 209, 217, 239 Islamist extremism 1, 3

Pengxin

groups 18, 51, 111–112, 114, 118, 129–130 terrorism 6, 17, 109, 115, 135 terrorist threat 7 terrorist threat to China 6 Islamists 55, 99, 115 radical 10, 46, 123 Islamization 22, 26, 31, 90, 93, 101 of Xinjiang 25 Israel 111, 123–124, 148, 151, 211 Istanbul 79, 82, 140–141 ITIM (International Tibet Independence Movement) 176, 229 Jeddah 55 Jemaah Islamiyah ( JI) 183, 210, 236 Jews 3, 112–113, 121–123 Jihad 2–6, 9, 18, 34, 51–52, 55, 57–59, 62–63, 69–73, 79, 105, 111–112, 116, 121–122, 125, 130–133, 171, 193, 195–196, 199, 239 Jihadi groups, see groups under Jihadist forums Jihadist forums 58–59, 74, 110, 132, 179, 184, 195, 200, 210 groups 60–62, 69, 153 Jihadists 3, 61, 104–105, 109, 114, 119, 124 Jungars 34 Kabul 61, 64, 71, 81 Kashgar 30, 36, 48, 50, 54, 77, 82–83, 93, 143 Kazakhstan 32, 52, 63, 79–80, 85, 160–162 Kunming 72–73, 78–79, 202 Kyrgyz 28, 30, 32 Kyrgyzstan 52, 62–63, 81, 85, 160–163, 165, 225 Land reforms 38–39, 101 Libyan Islamic Fighters Group 61 Local radical Islamic groups 81

IN DE X

London 116, 118, 179–180, 182, 184, 186, 188, 191, 196, 210–211, 213, 218–220, 231–232, 234–235 Ma Wanfu 26, 100 Mahsum, see Hasan Mahsum Manchus 25, 32, 34, 94 Mass Mobilization System (MEMS) 157 Mecca 23, 25–27, 100, 102–103, 173, 208, 232 Menhuan 24, 97–98, 207–208, 233 Middle East 3, 21, 26, 33, 57, 59, 72, 83, 99–102, 104, 109, 112, 124–125, 130–131, 211 Militant Islam in Central Asia 196, 234 Ming dynasty 23–24, 34, 90, 92 Ministry of National Defense (MND) 176 Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 48, 58, 75, 80–81, 135, 138, 148–151, 156, 158–159, 217–218, 221 Ministry of State Security (MSS) 156 Minorities 4–5, 7, 15–17, 19, 37–39, 41, 43, 133, 153–154, 170–172, 174, 177–179, 186, 188, 191, 232 Minority Conf lict 10, 15, 180 identities 2, 4, 6–7, 20 nationalities 28–29, 38–40, 42–43, 190 Modernization 99–100, 185, 208, 231–232 Mohammad Abdullah Saleh Sughayer 110 Mohammad Emin Hazret 79–80, 139 Mongols 22, 25, 91–92, 94 Mosques 21–23, 27, 29, 42–44, 53, 92–94, 96–97, 100, 103–104, 122, 130 Mujahideen 62, 70–74, 111–113, 122, 125, 196 Mullah Mohammad Omar 124 Multinational states 9, 14, 16–17, 46 Munich 81, 83, 86–87, 141, 218 Muslim Brotherhood 60, 100

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245

Muslim communities 18, 21–22, 27, 41–42, 46, 70, 90–91, 96, 102, 112, 115, 119, 122 countries 26–27, 72, 91, 104, 111–113 diversity 186, 232 Han conf licts 26, 99 identity 4, 6–7, 17, 19, 106, 172, 177 migrants 3, 90 minorities 4–5, 7, 17, 19–20, 25, 28, 37–39, 42, 46, 49, 94, 102, 106, 155, 172, 174, 183–184, 190, 207 opposition 4, 46, 95, 172 rebellions 25, 35, 93 states 23, 44, 104, 172 world 18, 27, 99, 103, 113, 126, 184, 186, 236 Muslims in China 5, 7, 19, 24–25, 27, 46, 89, 93, 104, 122, 124, 185 Nation-state 28, 94, 177 National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group (NATCG) 149–150, 156 National conf lict 5–6 identity 9, 16 security 13, 139–140, 175, 182, 236 unity 37, 152, 174 National People’s Congress (NPC) 84, 158–159, 168, 190, 224–225 Nationalist government 35–36, 94 Nationalists 36–37 Nationalities 26, 31, 38–39, 41, 46, 90, 94–95, 101, 111 Netherlands 51, 82–83, 85–86 New Terrorism 180, 183 Ningxia 3, 22, 28–29, 34, 96–97, 100, 102, 207, 233 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 103–104, 106 Olympic Games, see Beijing Olympic Games Osama bin-Laden (bin Laden) 2, 18, 52, 55, 58, 61–62, 64, 67, 81, 110–113, 116, 119, 121–122, 124–126, 160, 190, 195–196 Overseas Uighur communities 61, 141

246

IN DE X

Pakistan 2, 32, 44, 53–56, 58–62, 64, 66, 68, 102–103, 115, 126–128, 161, 163–165, 194–195, 200, 214 Pakistani security forces 66–67, 128, 164 Taliban 2, 67, 127–128 Pan-Islamism 172, 193 Pan-Turkic nationalism 172 Peace Mission 145, 162, 225, 238 People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) 76, 135, 143, 146–148, 150–151, 162 People’s Bank of China (PBC) 159 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 36, 49, 142–147, 150–151, 156, 164 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 1, 4, 10, 17, 19–20, 26–28, 31–32, 36–37, 39, 43, 50, 52, 85, 89–90, 94, 124, 126, 151–152, 158–159, 165, 184–185, 188–190, 195–196, 206–207, 224–226, 231–232 Persian 21–22, 28–30, 90–92, 96 Philippines 113, 116–117, 120, 129 Pilgrimage 23, 25, 27, 44, 102–103, 208 Political violence 1, 10, 13, 107, 169, 180, 193–194, 236 Qadi 23 Quick Response System (QRS) 150, 157 Qur’an 27, 70, 99–101 Radical 72, 81, 138 Radicalization 6–7, 89, 102–103, 105, 126, 152, 173–174, 206 Rebiya Kadeer 51, 83–86, 141, 166, 204, 219, 227 Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) 163 Regional autonomy 38–39, 43, 188, 190 security 161, 193, 225, 233 Republic of China 25, 83, 94, 185

Pengxin

Riots 36, 41, 50, 130, 132, 146, 148, 178, 217 Russia 32, 34, 89, 148, 160–163, 248 Salafia al-Jihadia 105, 123, 211, 213 Salafi Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), see Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb Salafism 28 Security 6, 10–14, 17, 76, 79, 90, 117–118, 124, 137, 145, 177–178, 180–182, 221–222, 231, 233–237, 248 Seifallah, see Commander Seifallah Separatism 7, 57, 60, 87, 136–138, 140, 143–145, 148–149, 152, 162–163, 173–176, 185–186, 190, 206–207, 223, 232 Separatists 9, 45, 60, 85, 136–137, 142–144, 149, 152, 162, 192 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 136, 143, 145, 161–163, 169, 218, 225, 238 Snake’s head 124, 211, 213 Snow Wolf Commando Unit (SWCU) 147 Societal identities 14–15, 46, 90, 94–95, 105–106, 173, 177 security 13–15, 177 Society 14–15, 26, 42, 142, 153, 181–182, 206, 209, 229, 232–233, 238, 248 Society Union of Uighur National Association 85 South Asia 3, 126, 197, 239 Southeast Asia 3, 110, 112, 128–129, 228 Soviet Union 35–36, 38, 41–42, 113, 172, 188 State Council 20, 137, 146, 168, 183, 187–189 Sufism 24–26, 97–99, 207, 233 Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) 62, 105–106, 173, 209, 235 Taiwan 20, 175–176, 178

IN DE X

Tajikistan 32, 52, 62–63, 160–161, 163 Taliban 2, 55, 57–58, 61–65, 74, 113, 115, 124–125, 128, 144, 160–161, 166, 190, 195–196, 214, 234 Tang dynasty 20–21, 33, 90, 184 Tarim Basin 22, 24, 30–32, 34, 53, 155 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 18, 67, 128 Terror 10, 52, 114, 117, 139, 155, 180, 196, 211–212, 231–232, 235–236, 249 Terrorism 1–7, 9–10, 16–18, 136–137, 140–142, 144–145, 147–148, 150–152, 156–161, 168–170, 172–174, 179–180, 218–220, 222–224, 231–233, 235–237 contemporary wave of 1, 10, 136 fighting 158, 163, 225 international 138, 162 threat of 10, 135, 143, 169, 174 transnational 161, 174 war on 46, 136 Terrorist attacks 46, 48, 59, 63, 70, 75, 78–79, 87, 105, 118, 146–147, 149–151, 156–157, 164–165, 198–199, 211 financing 159–160, 165, 224 groups 3, 47, 62, 72, 79–80, 83, 135, 138, 150, 165, 169, 180, 211, 219, 231, 236 incidents 48, 63, 142 organizations 48, 58, 81–82, 125, 138–139, 141, 156, 158, 165–166, 168, 224 threat 2, 6, 9, 109, 119, 137, 142, 150, 169, 171, 211 training camps 61–62, 64, 150, 162 violence 46–47, 80, 106, 133, 138–139 Terrorists 3, 48, 62, 67, 76, 79–80, 83–84, 104–105, 135–137, 141–144, 151–152, 158–160, 198, 200–202, 217–218, 249 designated, 58, 160 suspected 150, 163, 167, 222 Three evil forces 136–137, 140, 142, 148–149, 163, 174 Turkey 44, 55, 79–80, 82, 84, 140, 186, 236 Turkic Muslims 25, 28, 30, 89, 106, 187

Pengxin

247

Turkistan al-Islamia, 68, 73–4 Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) 19, 47, 53–54, 58, 63, 68, 71, 73–74, 78–79, 88, 132, 160, 171, 193–195, 198–199, 239 Uighur 2–5, 30–34, 36–38, 40–43, 45, 50–53, 59–68, 74–76, 80–87, 121–122, 124–126, 138–142, 150, 152–153, 155, 166–167, 172–174, 193, 238 detainees 57, 64–65, 165, 167 Diaspora (émigrés) 4, 49, 82, 85, 140 identity 15, 31–32, 36, 177 kingdom 30, 33 militants 61–62, 64, 68, 71, 87 Muslims 5, 31–32, 42, 45, 57, 60, 70, 74, 86, 130, 132, 140, 146, 153, 172 nationalism 171, 191, 237 organizations 82, 140 separatism 47, 142, 190, 195, 236 separatist groups 47, 86 separatist movement 49, 52, 86, 106, 132, 137, 140–141 separatists 50, 55, 88, 140, 144, 151 Uighur American Association 85, 191 United States (also US) 3, 9, 44, 46, 50, 58, 61, 63–65, 74, 76, 78, 84–85, 109, 111–115, 121–125, 127, 129–131, 137, 155, 165–168, 170– 171, 175, 196–197, 211–212, 224, 227 UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organizations) 82–83, 140, 203–204 Urumqi 33, 35, 45, 48–56, 59, 62, 75, 80, 82, 84–86, 94, 129, 132, 143–145, 147–148, 150 US-China Cooperation 212–213 Uzbekistan 52, 62–63, 67, 161–163 Uzbeks 28, 30, 32, 62, 66–67 Values, dominant identity 14–15 Violence 1, 11, 13, 18, 46, 48, 51–52, 60, 63, 81–82, 86–87, 129–130, 135–139, 141–142, 146–147, 172

248

IN DE X

Violent incidents 49–50, 128, 164, 166 resistance 6 War on Terror 142, 173, 180, 182–183, 195, 226, 229, 236 Terrorism 5, 179, 191, 218–220, 222, 232, 235 Washington 64, 141, 165–166, 168, 189–191, 194–195, 197, 201, 203–205, 208, 210–212, 218, 225, 227–228, 231–233, 238–239 Wenzhou 72–73, 78 World Uighur Congress (WUC) 2, 5, 51, 77, 81, 83–86, 88, 140–141, 166, 173 World Uighur Youth Congress (WUYC) 48, 80–83, 87, 138, 141, 166 Xinjiang 4–7, 24–25, 30–39, 41–46, 48–50, 52–56, 60–65, 82–85, 87, 135–144, 146, 148–155, 174–178, 182–193, 218–223, 231–238 and Central Asia 163, 225 independence of 80, 82, 85, 87, 141

Pengxin

needle attack in 192 occupation of 45, 80 police 77, 148–150 southern 25, 29, 34, 36, 53, 84, 144, 150, 160 stability of 141, 152, 154, 169 Xinjiang Military District (XMD) 143, 188 Xinjiang Military Region, see Xinjiang Military District (XMD) Xinjiang Nationalities Committee 36 Xinjiang Production Construction Military Corps (XPCMC) 152 Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 29, 52, 56, 76, 79, 136–137, 140, 172, 174, 191, 220, 219, 234, 236 Xinjiao 26, 99 Yemen 98, 114, 120 Yinchuan 28, 207–208, 233, 235 Yining 34, 36, 41, 48–49, 53, 67, 146–147 Zeydin (Ziyauddin) Yusup 49, 53

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