International Ethnic Networks and Intra-Ethnic Conflict: Koreans in China

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International Ethnic Networks and Intra-Ethnic Conflict

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International Ethnic Networks and Intra-Ethnic Conflict Koreans in China Hyejin Kim

INTERNATIONAL ETHNIC NETWORKS AND INTRA-ETHNIC CONFLICT

Copyright © Hyejin Kim, 2010. All rights reserved. First published in 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–10252–1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kim, Hyejin. International ethnic networks and intra-ethnic conflict : Koreans in China / Hyejin Kim. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978–0–230–10252–1 (alk. paper) 1. Koreans—China. 2. Korea (South)—Emigration and immigration. 3. China—Emigration and immigration. 4. Korea (South)—Relations— China. 5. China—Relations—Korea (South) I. Title. DS731.K6K5245 2009 305.895⬘7051—dc22

2009041081

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: June 2010 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

Contents

List of Figures

vii

List of Tables

ix

Preface

xi

1 Introduction

1

2 Korean Migrations to and within China

19

3

41

Ethnicity or Nationality? Korean Identities in China

4 South Korean and Korean Chinese Business Relations in China

61

5 Korean Business, Intra-Ethnic Conflict, and Adaptive Strategies

87

6

Relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans in the Service Sector

113

7 Community Networks and Activities

131

8 Conclusion

167

Notes

173

Bibliography

187

Index

195


Figures

1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 7.1

South Korean direct investment in China The population distribution of Korean Chinese in 2000 Job distribution by sex among Korean Chinese in 2000 The population of Korean Chinese and Han-Chinese in the Yanbian Autonomous Region Volume of the export and import of Korea with China and the United States Foreign investment by SMEs as proportions of total South Korean foreign investment Hourly wages of manufacturing laborers Purposes of Korean investment in China Amount of investment in China by Korean and all foreign companies by region Composition of company Insiders and outsiders in the Chinese workplace Employment relations in Korean firms Age distribution of Korean Chinese in Beijing, 2000 The number of Korean travelers in Japan and China Distribution of Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry

2 32 35 37 63 65 65 67 72 75 96 104 117 118 142


Tables

4.1 Selling structure in China (1993–2001) 5.1 South Korean investment in China by Province

68 98


Preface

K

oreans describe themselves as a danil minjok, a “unitary people.” They are said to share a common culture, language, history, and blood. Cohesion and mutual understanding are taken for

granted. Koreans have spread across the globe, forming a diaspora stretching from Japan to North America and Kazakhstan, and beyond. The largest concentration of overseas Koreans is in China, mostly in the northeast. To South Koreans, these Korean Chinese are part of the diaspora. To the People’s Republic of China, they make up one of the country’s fifty-six minority ethnicities (shaoshu minzu). I encountered these Koreans while working and traveling in China. I had originally gone to China to learn about Chinese society, not to study other Koreans. Yet I was drawn to the stories of Koreans who are not South Koreans. During my stay in northeast China in 2000–2001, I met South Koreans, Korean Chinese, and North Koreans, and discovered unexpected similarities and differences among them. These Korean communities I observed in China were also linked in a variety of ways. South Koreans went into business with Korean Chinese. North Koreans living illegally in China looked to sympathetic South Koreans for help. I compiled stories I heard from and about North Koreans, and I ended up writing a novel based on them. Fiction seemed to be the appropriate medium for writing about North Koreans in China, both because of the drama in their stories and also because of the challenges posed to verifying many statements. The relationships between Korean Chinese and South Koreans were, I felt, more deserving of academic treatment. I returned to China in 2003–2004 for dissertation fieldwork on the subject. I stayed in communities that were home to South Koreans and Korean Chinese, and interviewed members of those groups from a wide range of backgrounds.

xii

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Preface

Korean Chinese warmly welcomed South Koreans to China as members of the same danil minjok. South Koreans, especially soon after normalization of relations with China in 1992, were equally excited to reunite with their brethren in China. There was a perception that Korean Chinese, living in remote villages in the mountains of Manchuria, had better preserved Korean traditional culture than had South Korea with its urbanized population. The myth of danil minjok—and the convenience of working with people who speak the same language and eat the same food—drove many South Koreans living in China to find partners and helpers in Korean Chinese. Seeking out Korean Chinese partners, middlemen, or employees seemed to be the first step for any South Korean wishing to do business in China. At the same time, there were signs of great tension between the two groups of Koreans. Danil minjok turned into a major obstacle to maintaining cooperative relations on the basis of mutual benefit. Simple conflicts which occur between employers and employees or between business partners turned ugly because problems were seen as betrayals of danil minjok. Members of each group would stress, in private conversation, differences in language and habits between the two groups. Mutual prejudice came to replace ethnic trust. This book aims to understand the source of tensions between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. The myth of danil minjok really has mattered, encouraging co-ethnics to seek each other out. Yet these reunions have seldom proved to be as happy as most had expected. Korean Chinese and South Koreans found different ways of being Korean during their decades of separation, though they did not recognize these at first. Blind embrace of the myth of danil minjok has made interactions between members of these communities lead to mutual suspicion and distancing rather than identification. In preparing this book, I have benefited greatly from the support of many individuals. My interest in China’s ethnic minorities was sparked by Professor Stevan Harrell at the University of Washington, where I also wrote a master’s thesis on Koreans in China. Professor Yu Byoungho (Liu Binghu) provided an office for me and my husband at Dalian University in China. Many South Koreans and Korean Chinese were willing to share their experiences with me. Owing to their cooperation, I was able to access valuable materials and information. My dissertation committee members constantly supported me and provided fruitful comments on my work. Their advice from a range of fields has helped me to embrace broader perspectives. I thank my dissertation advisor, Professor John Cantwell, and committee members, Professors Brian Fergurson, Michael Santoro, and Richard Langhorne. I owe thanks to my husband, Erik Mobrand. He joined my fieldwork in China in 2003–2004, while doing his own dissertation work, and we

Preface

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xiii

encouraged each other in the course of our research. He has probably read my manuscript more times than I have and his encouragement has led me to develop my dissertation into a book. My parents’ absolute trust in their daughter, who has always brought them worries due to her frequent sojourns in other countries, cannot be described in words.


CHAPTER 1

Introduction

D

o greatly increased flows of people, goods, and money across borders undermine ethnic identities or reinforce them? Has intensified interaction between diverse peoples made them more similar or more different? International changes in the last few decades have raised these questions about the relationship between globalization and ethnicity. This book takes up these questions through a study of South Koreans in China. Ethnic networks have played an important part in facilitating South Korean business and life in China. With the opening of diplomatic relations between the two countries in the early 1990s, South Koreans and Koreans who have lived in China since before the Chinese revolution have rediscovered each other. Ethnic trust between the two groups underpinned the movement of South Korean investment and people into China. The larger implication of this argument is that ethnicity and globalization are not always at odds with each other. On the contrary, global links can even run more easily along ethnic lines. However, as South Koreans worked with Chinese-born Koreans, problems arose and the viability of the network started to decline. Ethnic trust between the two parts of the ethnic network has turned to distrust and even prejudice. This book thus shows not only how ethnic networks have been crucial to globalization, but also how those networks can be broken down by challenges to the ethnic trust that underpins them. Ethnic Koreans in China This book addresses Koreans in China who belong to one of two nationalities. The ethnic Koreans in this narrative are citizens either of South Korea or of the People’s Republic of China.

2

International Ethnic Networks

●

South Koreans in China Between 1949 and 1992, South Korea recognized the Republic of China on Taiwan as the government of China. Still technically at war with a member of the Communist world, the Republic of Korea was reluctant to establish diplomatic relations with mainland China. While other countries began investing in China from the late 1970s or early 1980s, South Korea got a late start because of its relations with Taiwan. When China and South Korea engaged in trade, it had to be through a third location such as Taiwan or Hong Kong. However, with the normalization of relations in 1992, South Koreans started going to China in large numbers. Business has been the primary reason for South Korean movement to China. Like other foreign businessmen in China, South Koreans have been interested above all in the cheap labor force that China offers. They have set up factories, especially in electronics and textiles, and exported their products back to South Korea or directly to other markets. China has quickly become the major foreign base for South Korean manufacturers. Figure 1.1 shows the rapid increase of South Korean business interests in China. The figure depicts the rise of South Korean direct investment in China from

6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 ’90 ’91 ’92 ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08

Figure 1.1

South Korean direct investment in China (unit: $ million).

Source: www.koreaexim.go.kr (April, 2009). Note: The New York Times says that South Korean direct investment projects in China have increased from 650 in 1992 to 5,000 in 2003 (Oct. 20, 2005).

Introduction

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3

1992 to 2007. In 2004, for example, manufacturing investment in China reached a peak of 62 percent of South Korea’s total manufacturing investment in foreign countries (Export-Import Bank of Korea, www.koreaexim. go.kr, 2009). The service sector, including real estate and restaurants, as well as wholesale and retail trade and finance, has also been strengthening. Education has been another purpose for South Koreans moving to China. Going to China for schooling is partly related to business, because entering business in China is often the ultimate goal of receiving education there. In addition, international schools in China offer a cheap alternative to Korean parents who would otherwise be inclined to send their children to North America. At all levels of education, South Korean parents have transferred their children to Chinese schools. The distinction between permanent and nonpermanent sojourn in China is not clear-cut. Some Koreans first leave South Korea intending to live in China permanently, but change their minds later. Others intend to return after several years—upon completion of their assignment or following graduation—but end up abandoning their original plans. The number of the latter is increasing. Some multinational executives decide that life in China is more comfortable and, after resigning from their companies, establish permanent residence in China. Some students stay after graduation and try to find jobs. The geographic proximity of China to South Korea also allows frequent travel back and forth. Many South Koreans have stayed long enough to establish communities in China. They have organized associations, churches, and schools. These important community institutions are closely linked to business networks. They often receive financial support from South Korean firms in the area. These newborn Korean communities and businesses have linked up with long-standing Korean groups in China. Korean Chinese Approximately 2.6 million ethnic Koreans reside in China as citizens of the People’s Republic. Many of them are descendants of farmers who left the crowded Korean peninsula beginning from the late eighteenth century. Another wave of Korean migration to China came in the first half of the twentieth century in the form of activists for Korean independence from Japan. Migration into China was virtually frozen with the rise to power of the Communists in 1949. The Koreans, who remained in China, living largely in their own village communities, showed few signs of integrating with Chinese society until the 1980s. Until 1990 no less than

4

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98 percent of them were settled primarily in three northeastern provinces (Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Jilin), with 43 percent of the Korean population in Yanbian Prefecture adjacent to North Korea (Tabulation on China’s Nationalities 1994). These Koreans had little interaction with Koreans elsewhere for at least forty years. In villages, they lived in houses whose design originated in Korea. Even in cities, the residential area of Koreans was segregated from that of the Han majority. By 1990 most of the economically active of these Koreans, if not born in China, had grown up there. In China they are known as chaoxianzu, or Korean Chinese in English. Immigrant Economics and Overseas Ethnic Business Networks The argument of this book has implications for the study of the interplay of ethnicity and economics. The function of the Korean ethnic network in China suggests an ethnic economy different from many studied before. The effects of its dysfunction on ethnic configurations also contradict theoretical expectations. The issues in this book fall at the intersection of at least two broad research agendas. First, debates about “immigrant economics,” although generated in the American context, are relevant to Korean business in China. What expectations about cooperation and conflict among Koreans in China can be drawn from that literature? Second, a growing number of studies have been published on overseas ethnic business networks, many of them on Japanese and Chinese cases. Are South Korean strategies and habits in China the same as those of other ethnic networks, or are they very different? The Segmented Labor Market and the Ethnic Enclave Economy Students of immigrant and minority groups in the United States suggest that those groups tend to face a dual labor market structure. For linguistic, educational, and legal reasons, minority groups can have difficulty entering regular job markets. An ethnic sector, in which they are employed by their ethnic brethren, is often easier to enter. Alejandro Portes and his associates hold that the ethnic sector provides opportunities for people who could not possibly succeed in the main labor market. Immigrants can create their own viable pockets in the economy that help all members of their community. According to the segmented labor market theory, entry into the enclave sector rather than into the secondary labor market leads to greater chances for upward mobility for

Introduction

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5

immigrants (Portes and Wilson 1980). However, Sanders and Nee maintain the opposite: the ethnic sector allows for exploitation and serves to keep immigrants and minorities in a lower-income situation. They are paid less, overworked, and have little chance of moving on to the broader job market (1987, 764–765). The Korean sector in China is an ethnic labor market. For many jobs, South Koreans hire only other ethnic Koreans. However, this sector offers higher income possibilities than does the general Chinese labor market. The reason that Korean Chinese enter the ethnic labor market is not that they cannot enter the mainstream labor market, but that the short-term (and possibly long-term) rewards of joining the ethnic sector are higher. This pattern is not what either side in the debate over ethnic labor markets would anticipate. Why does the case of Koreans in China not conform to the usual arguments about ethnic labor markets? It is because the logic relating to enclave economies does not apply in the same way in developing countries as in industrialized ones. In a developing country, ethnic sectors can offer better jobs because the immigrants here differ from those in a developed country. They are not looking for jobs but looking to invest. By showing how the South Korean sector generates opportunities for rapid social mobility to many Korean Chinese, this book provides a critique of understandings of enclave economies. A skeptic might claim that South Korean firms in China do not constitute an ethnic sector, precisely because jobs are high paying. However, the data presented show that these firms do hire Koreans for certain specific and sometimes most positions. That is what makes the sector ethnic. Another idea about the “ethnic enclave economy” is that it creates ethnic solidarity (Bonacich and Modell 1980; Olzak 1983). Working together within the context of a foreign culture is supposed to make an immigrant or minority group have stronger identity, but in the case of the Korean economy in China, just the opposite has happened. The operation of the ethnic economy tore apart group solidarity and strengthened the division between Korean Chinese and South Koreans. For that reason, many Koreans in China have over time moved away from the ethnic sector. This book thus challenges ideas about the consequences of an ethnic enclave economy for ethnicity. A third concept is that of the “middleman minority.” This model was developed by Edna Bonacich1 and based on the experience of Jewish communities in Europe, Chinese in Southeast Asia, and Japanese in the United States, and expanded to Korean entrepreneurs in the United States (Bonacich 1973, 583; Bonacich and Modell 1980, 13–34). For example, many Koreans in California establish small factories that subcontract work from American firms and then hire Latino laborers, or they open stores in African American

6

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neighborhoods. In this sense, Korean entrepreneurs in the United States are middlemen between specific ethnic minorities and the broader population. One effect of the middleman minority situation is that conflict between the majority ethnic population and minority groups is transferred to conflict among minorities. If Korean Chinese are considered a middleman minority, this concept has relevance for Korean networks in China. Korean Chinese play a large number of intermediary roles between South Koreans and Chinese. However, the relations between the ethnic groups follow a pattern that diverges from the experience of Korean entrepreneurs in the United States. The main reason for this is the different economic structures that exist in China and the United States. Korean Chinese often work as managers of Chinese labor but in factories that are run directly by South Koreans. Unlike the situation of ethnic subcontractors in the United States, Korean factories in China have members of all three groups (South Koreans, Korean Chinese, and Chinese) at the workplace. A result of opting for this workforce profile has been that while conflict between South Korean bosses and Chinese workers is displaced, the tension is transferred not only to relations between Korean Chinese and Chinese, but also even more to relations between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. This pattern is not fully explained by the middleman minority model. Overseas Ethnic Networks for Business Korean networks in China can be compared with Japanese expatriate communities, and a number of similarities exist between the two. The growth of Japanese multinational corporations since the 1960s resulted in large population movements abroad. They moved to Southeast Asia, Germany, and the United States. In the early days of Japan’s globalization in the 1960s, most business expatriates moved to other countries alone, but with Japan’s increasing affluence, they have been accompanied by their families. They have clustered together and established visible towns for their community. The existence of large Japanese expatriate communities has spawned an extensive range of other services: grocery stores and specialty shops, restaurants and cafes, clothing stores, real estate, and travel agents (Glebe 2003, 99). All this has led to very little contact with locals or other foreigners: instead of “going international,” overseas Japanese have been “going national” (Ben-Ari 2003, 116). Conflicts within overseas Japanese communities have tended to occur between permanent overseas residents and temporary sojourners. The latter comprise a “rotational community” (Befu 2003, 12), in which business

Introduction

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7

representatives, students, and their families rotate in and out. Another division in overseas Japanese communities tends to be between those who left Japan before World War II and the more recent arrivals. Overseas Chinese networks, too, are known for their ethnic solidarity. Chinese have a long migration history and overseas Chinese are regarded as having built up very successful business networks. Overseas Chinese companies use these networks to form joint ventures abroad (Zhu 2002, 195). These networks provide information, credit, and support. Chinese business networks are formed in formal and informal ways. Ties based on birthplace, common history, friendship, and third-party introduction help to establish entrepreneur groups on an informal level. At the formal level, they have organized meetings by local or country locations. For example, World Chinese Entrepreneurs Conventions have been held every other year since 1991 (Bolt 2000, 30). A segmented structure has tended to characterize the organization of overseas Chinese (Crissman 1967). Traditional associations on the basis of clan and hometown districts have often been used to organize business activities. The main dividing lines, especially among Chinese in Southeast Asia, have been along dialect groups (Skinner 1957). For example, speakers of Hokkien (Fujianese) would set up one set of networks, Cantonese-speakers another, and Hakka yet another. For overseas Chinese investment in China, these kinds of traditional ties have been important in linking them to economic activities within China. The important point from the experiences of overseas Japanese and Chinese is that ethnic networks can be crucial to international business. South Koreans in China seem to be following a similar pattern. As this book shows, South Korean businessmen in China have relied heavily on ethnic networks for local adaptation. In their expatriate communities in China, South Koreans have also remained largely isolated from the Chinese. As in the case of overseas Japanese, South Koreans’ movement to China has also been a process of only “going national.” Divisions within overseas Japanese and Chinese communities are less similar to those within the Korean network in China. Nothing like the dialect differences or allegiances to particular hometowns that characterize overseas Chinese communities exists among Koreans in China. Some separation between temporary and longer-term residents can be seen, as in Japanese networks, but that division is not the most prominent one. The conflict that has emerged between South Koreans and Korean Chinese diverges from comparable situations among overseas Japanese and Chinese. While overseas Japanese, for example in the United States, have been divided to an extent between pre-World War II migrants and later

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ones, they did not attempt strong cooperation and have not experienced intense conflict to the degree seen between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. Overseas Chinese investment in China has relied on reestablishing links among long-separated co-ethnics, just as South Korean investment has. However, whereas the Chinese networks have held together, the Korean ones have fallen apart. Only in the case of Koreans in China can both cooperation and conflict among separated co-ethnics be found. Model of Split Ethnicity To explain the interactions among Koreans in China, I propose a model of “split ethnicity.” While the literature on the economics of minorities and immigrants has tended to focus on developed countries, especially in North America and Europe, the model I suggest should travel across both poorer and richer societies. I expect that if the two following criteria are met, we will see a split emerge within an ethnic group and intra-ethnic conflict will result. First, two communities belonging to one ethnic group must be separated over a certain period. During this time, they have minimal contact with each other and the time lag creates a cultural gap. Each community has maintained and changed its norms in some ways, and these changes create differences in their ethnic identities. What it means to be a member of the ethnic group comes to differ across the communities. Second, the two communities must experience different patterns of economic change during their period of separation. In particular, I imagine this to be when one community is located in an area that experiences significant economic growth and the other in an area that does not. Different economic backgrounds in the two communities create widely divergent expectations from the material world. When these two factors are present, as I will show they are for the case discussed in this book, I expect that efforts at cooperation between the two communities will result in intra-ethnic conflict. Economic exchanges will be awkward, because one group is relatively rich and the other relatively poor, and members of the community will tend to blame the perceived differences in culture that have emerged over the period of separation for problems that arise. Each community will begin to identify the other as belonging to a separate ethnic group. Besides the case of Koreans in China, where else might this model be relevant? The separation of Korean groups in China and on the peninsula resulted, historically, from the cold war context. We might look to other parts of the world that experienced divisions as a result of cold war geopolitics for

Introduction

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9

more cases of “split ethnicity” and intra-ethnic conflict. The model might apply to relations, in some spheres of activity, among Germans after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It might also be relevant to ethnic communities that were reunited after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Other cases might come from diaspora communities in places far from the homeland, where distance rather than political boundaries creates separation. The situations of Japanese in Brazil, and their relations with other Japanese, might fall under this category. Korean Chinese as Intermediaries Korean Chinese have served as intermediaries for South Koreans in three kinds of situations. First, they have facilitated South Korean business in China. Second, they have served South Korean community in China. Third, they have played many roles in relations between South and North Korea. Korean Chinese Roles in South Korean Business in China When South Koreans first went to China for business, they naturally looked for those with whom they could at least communicate. South Korea in the early 1990s had few Chinese speakers and learning the language would require an investment in patience. Turning to Korean Chinese was natural, because otherwise South Korean businessmen simply could not communicate in China. Having a shared language is the primary reason for most firms’ dealings with Korean Chinese. Without them, South Korean business would have to wait until South Korea had generated enough Chinese speakers (or China, Korean speakers). First, not only are Korean Chinese bilingual, but their labor is also on a Chinese scale and thus far cheaper than that of South Koreans. Especially in the early 1990s, South Korean firms and factories were located in Yanbian and other parts of the Chinese northeast. There they easily hired Korean Chinese as laborers. This employment of Korean Chinese as regular workers is the first and simplest configuration of South Korean reliance on Korean Chinese. Second, in many South Korean firms, Korean Chinese have moved up from laborers to labor bosses. South Koreans hire Korean Chinese to find workers for them, because a Korean Chinese labor boss is able to make contact and communicate with potential Chinese (and Korean Chinese) workers. Some Korean Chinese agencies specialize in linking South Koreanowned workplaces with labor pools of Chinese and Korean Chinese workers. Besides accepting responsibility for hiring, Korean Chinese also often work

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as managers on the shop floor. These managers serve as communication links between South Korean owners and Chinese workers who otherwise cannot communicate with each other. Third, Korean Chinese have mediated between South Korean firms and Chinese partners. In these roles they provide interpretation services, translation of business contracts, and advice on dealing with Chinese firms. A fourth role is that of the middleman between South Korean firms and Chinese authorities. As middlemen, they have all the above responsibilities in addition to helping South Korean enterprises get around Chinese property-ownership laws. Finally, Korean Chinese have worked as independent bottari sangin (daigong in Chinese), physically transporting goods on ships between China and South Korea, or working as assistants of South Korean bottari sangin. Through this work they have helped South Korean bottari sangin enter Chinese markets and expand their businesses, as for instance by opening their own stores or small companies. Korean Chinese Roles in South Korean Communities South Koreans have not only depended on Korean Chinese for their business in China but also for other aspects of their lives there. Although this interaction is not directly for business, it makes up an important part of relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans and it has influenced how South Korean enterprises deal with Korean Chinese. Korean Chinese have been less neighbors than service providers to expatriate South Koreans. South Koreans hire Korean Chinese as maids, patronize restaurants and karaoke bars run by Korean Chinese, and purchase groceries from Korean Chinese stores. South Korean students in China take language lessons from Korean Chinese tutors. South Korean residents in China would have tremendous difficulty in negotiating their daily life without the services of Korean Chinese. Their services are needed not only for linguistic reasons, but also because they have greater knowledge of Korean preferences than other Chinese have. They are able to provide Korean food in restaurants and grocery stores and give South Korean style haircuts. Korean Chinese Roles in North and South Korean Issues The role of Korean Chinese as intermediaries has been emphasized in two ways: one as helpers for peaceful reunification between North and South Korea, and the other as middlemen facilitating economic cooperation

Introduction

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11

between North and South Korea. Korean Chinese are able to access North Korea easily. Korean Chinese can be of service to South Koreans who look for information on the whereabouts of separated family members, on goods tradable between the two Koreas, and even on North Korean society. In fact, 233 of 396 meetings for reunions between separated family members in North and South Korea were held in China—in Yanbian, Shenyang, and Beijing—in 1995. Korean Chinese were significant intermediaries at that time (Lee Jonghun 1997, 46). Sometimes, Korean Chinese work for South Koreans who would like to help North Koreans who fled from North Korea because of economic and political instability. Mushrooms, horticultural products, and fish from North Korea have already been popular goods in Korean Chinese community markets and among South Korean merchants.2 In addition, relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans, who have not been in contact for several decades, have been studied for effects after the potential reunification of the two Koreas in the future. Their discordant relations are thus often interpreted as signs of difficulty in reunifying the Korean peninsula. A Korean Chinese writer says that “the meeting of Korean-Chinese and South Koreans was the first experiment for national unification and it completely failed” (C. Song 2005, 9). Problems in Relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans The roles that Korean Chinese have performed for South Koreans are mirrored by conflicts that have emerged. The primary reliance on Korean Chinese as the ears and mouth (and part of the brain) of South Koreans in China is the principal source of the bitter conflict between the two groups. In almost all positions that South Korean firms have placed Korean Chinese, they are given a high-level of trust. While this trust has undergirded South Korean business in China, it has also supplied opportunities for betrayal. Causes for instability in this trust come from both South Korean and Korean Chinese actions. South Koreans’ rush to invest in China is an important cause. Businessmen hurry to set up factories or stores in China without long-term preparation. Many do not acquaint themselves with business practices in China, with dealing with Chinese authorities, or with the Chinese language. Responsibility for all this tends to fall on the heads of Korean Chinese. One mistake, honest or dishonest, has serious consequences. Korean Chinese often lack qualifications for the jobs to which they are assigned. For example, even if they are bilingual, if they are not familiar

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with technical business language, they can easily make errors in translating contracts. The education level of Korean Chinese is frequently too low for their responsibilities. A related problem is that some differences in vocabulary do exist between South Korean and Korean Chinese speech, leading to misinterpretations. Income differences between Korean Chinese and South Koreans also create potential for problems. Korean Chinese in South Korean employment, whether for firms or households, suddenly find themselves in direct contact with amounts of money far in excess of what they are accustomed to. The temptation of poor Korean Chinese and the carelessness of wealthy South Koreans lead to some Korean Chinese taking advantage of their position. A large number of Korean Chinese would like help from South Koreans to go to South Korea, where they could earn in a month what they earn only in a year in China. This is called the “Korean Dream.” Because of the difficulty of staying for an extended period in South Korea, they often try to find illegal ways of prolonging their stay. The expectations of Korean Chinese from South Koreans in this matter have created a conflict between them. South Koreans avoid discussion of this issue with Korean Chinese. Korean Chinese take this as the coldness of South Koreans or even ethnic betrayal. On the other hand, some South Koreans and other Korean Chinese groups exploit their Korean dreams. Demanding a large amount of money from Korean Chinese as the price for making fake passports and visas, or just taking money, and selling women in South Korea are common practices. In workplaces and service points, divergent norms have caused problems. Korean Chinese are not accustomed to South Korean management practices. South Korean employers have been equally inflexible in maintaining South Korean business practices. In restaurants and karaoke bars, South Koreans expect the deferential, prompt service they receive at home. Korean Chinese service establishments often do not meet these expectations, as their ideas of service differ from those of well-to-do South Koreans. Problems in the relations between South Koreans and Korean Chinese are caused not just by their interaction, but also by the interests of the Chinese government. The Chinese government wants to keep Koreans out of political and national issues. Symbolic conflicts between China and South Korea over the history of a medieval kingdom in present-day northeast China, and political conflicts between North Korea and China over support by Korean Chinese and South Koreans for North Korean defectors have had repercussions for relations between South Koreans and

Introduction

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Korean Chinese. One such example is the prohibition of joint church meetings and athletic events between South Koreans and Korean Chinese, which was enforced after Chinese authorities found Korean Chinese, North Koreans, and South Koreans bringing up those sensitive issues in these settings. Changes over Time Although both cooperation and conflict between Korean Chinese and South Koreans have existed from the early 1990s to the present, this book suggests a general trend of change over time. South Korean business has come to rely less on Korean Chinese, in large part because their interaction has led to the conflicts discussed above. Relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans have moved through three stages: from strong cooperation in the early 1990s to intense conflict in the mid-1990s to a condition of more distant coexistence since the late 1990s. When South Koreans first went to China after the normalization of diplomatic relations, Koreans both in China and on the peninsula had hoped for ethnic solidarity. Korean Chinese, hearing of rapid economic growth in South Korea and especially after the 1988 Seoul Olympics, had dreams of returning to their successful homeland. The Olympics and South Korean economic development turned their allegiance more to the southern than the northern part of the peninsula.3 South Koreans saw Korean Chinese as the progeny of heroic independence fighters of the Korean people. Both groups had dreams of reuniting with their fellow Koreans. Their renewed connection seemed to be even a step toward reunification of the two Koreas. They were, after all, of “one ethnicity.” The trust South Koreans placed in Korean Chinese was not just out of expedience. It was based on a sense of common identity. Neither side expected problems, because they were all Koreans, though in an environment in which their culture was not welcome. Yet problems arose and served to breakdown their ethnic trust. South Korean community organizations in China retreated from contact with Korean Chinese. Internet chat rooms sprang up as forums for battles between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. At the same time, other developments decreased South Korean dependence on Korean Chinese for their business and life in China. South Korean demand drove up the price of Korean Chinese labor. By the late 1990s, hiring Chinese was clearly cheaper than hiring Korean Chinese. In addition, over time Chinese and South Koreans have developed human resources for improving their business relations. South Korea has produced Chinese

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speakers and China, Korean speakers. Time has allowed some people of both nationalities to become familiar with how to behave and what to expect in each other’s country. Firms have drawn on these trained people and they have taken over some functions previously almost monopolized by Korean Chinese. By the late 1990s idealistic notions of “one ethnicity” creating shared community had disappeared. Korean Chinese could not but resent South Koreans, and South Koreans were suspicious of Korean Chinese. Big enterprises could avoid hiring Korean Chinese and the baggage of intraethnic conflict because they had the resources to hire highly educated Chinese, South Koreans, or the top Korean Chinese. However, other firms and residents still relied on Korean Chinese for doing business and living in China, at least until they had learned enough Chinese and studied the Chinese market thoroughly. Relations now have become more distant. South Korean, Korean Chinese, Xinxianzu The ethnic trust that underpinned Korean business networks in China in the early 1990s has been destroyed. The interaction made possible by that trust has undermined it. The interaction of South Koreans and Korean Chinese has revealed—or made—the South Koreans and Korean Chinese as two distinct ethnic groups. Koreans in China no longer speak of “Koreans” but they are distinguished as joseonjok (Korean Chinese) and hangugin (South Koreans). They recognize each other by their accents and assume each other to have different norms. Conflict between Korean Chinese and South Koreans is not the only cause of change in Korean identity in China. The opportunities presented by China’s economic development since the 1980s have had a profound impact on Korean Chinese society. Just when their dreams of South Korea peaked, China’s boom began. China on the development path has the advantage of being closer to and providing almost as good chances for success as South Korea. While there are few jobs in the Korean sector, in the Chinese sector there are many. Leaving for South Korea, which has never been easy, has been made more complicated by diplomatic relations between the two countries. Speaking better Korean than Chinese is not practical for getting a job in Chinese society. Korean Chinese parents have started sending their children to regular Chinese schools instead of Korean Chinese ones. Establishing ties with the Chinese in cities has proved a safer road to success in spite of being a slower one. The dispersal of the Korean Chinese population to cities has also led to the dilution of

Introduction

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Korean identity. All these changes hint at the decline of Korean Chinese identity. A new ethnic identity might also be emerging. Koreans in China speak of the emergence of xinxianzu, the “new Koreans.” These are the offspring of South Korean residents in China. They have had their formative experience in China and are equally versed in Chinese and South Korean languages and habits. Companies often prefer to hire these bilingual persons who understand both the cultures. They could play an important part in relations between South Korea and China in the future. Data and Method The interview data for this study come from original fieldwork conducted from summer 2001 to summer 2002, and from summer 2003 to spring 2004. During my stay in China, I probed Korean business and community in three cities: Beijing, Dalian, and Shenyang. I also followed dockworkers on a cargo ship between Dalian and Incheon, South Korea several times. In each place, I interviewed South Koreans, Korean Chinese, and some other Chinese. Each of these places has a large number of South Koreans and Korean Chinese. Within each city, I chose one or two neighborhoods to focus on as well. I also worked as a temporary teacher in a Korean Chinese teaching school and a Chinese high school in Shenyang in 2001. I collected information about schools and conducted interviews at that time. The selection of these three cities permits a varied picture of Koreans in China. Shenyang’s Korean Chinese community is relatively old, while Beijing’s emerged from nothing in 1990. Dalian had some Korean Chinese before 1990, but the city’s proximity to South Korea by ship has led to much South Korean investment there and a sharp increase in the Korean Chinese population. Interviewees included South Korean businessmen, Korean Chinese employees of varying ranks, South Korean and Korean Chinese homemakers, shop-owners in Korean neighborhoods, and community leaders. Documentary research accounts for the rest of the data. The referenced written material relates not just to the three fieldwork sites but to all of China where South Koreans and Korean Chinese meet. The book is thus not intended to be specific to the places where interviews were conducted. In addition, several of my interview subjects discussed their experiences in other parts of China. I collected local newsletters and magazines from Korean communities. These provide important information on the communities, especially on their

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organized activities. Internet pages of local Korean (both Korean Chinese and South Korean) communities were also scanned. I gathered Chinese and Korean data on population and business from libraries in Beijing, Dalian, and Seoul. I also collected materials from newspaper and magazine reports. Korean and sometimes Chinese academic publications on Korean Chinese served to supplement this research. Organization of the Book This book is organized into eight chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. Each chapter examines one sector of interaction between Korean Chinese and South Koreans in China. Together these sectors cover the major parts of South Korean life in China. The chapters show how patterns of cooperation and conflict between South Koreans and Korean Chinese have changed over time. The first chapter after this introduction (chapter 2) addresses movement and concentration of people and business across space. Before analyzing what South Korean entrepreneurs do in China, it is necessary to ask where they go and why. This chapter traces the population movement of Koreans in China, depicting a pattern in which South Koreans have first followed Korean Chinese and then Korean Chinese have followed South Koreans. Patterns of industrial location reveal the importance of the ethnic connection. Rather than investing in the southern coast or Shanghai areas of China, where most foreign investment has gone, South Koreans have focused on the northeast and north coast of China—places where Korean Chinese lived. The chapter also deals with issues of residential location within cities. Chapter 3 looks at ethnic and national identities of South Koreans and Korean Chinese in China. Identity issues must be explored to understand the ethnic trust that built bridges between the Korean communities. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with business. The first, chapter 4, analyzes South Koreans’ employment and other uses of Korean Chinese for business in China. This chapter highlights how the ethnic network has functioned to facilitate South Korean business in China. Chapter 5 on business addresses dysfunction in the ethnic network, documenting conflict between South Koreans and Korean Chinese at the workplace. This chapter also outlines some of the adaptive strategies of South Korean firms that try to avoid Korean Chinese. The service sector is the topic of chapter 6. The focus here starts with the relationship between Korean Chinese providers and South Korean consumers. In recent years, South Koreans have also become service providers to Korean Chinese. In this sector, relations between Korean Chinese and

Introduction

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South Koreans have been more intense. Interviewees revealed that the ethnic connection is particularly important in the service sector. Chapter 6 is followed by one on South Korean community organizations in China. These organizations include Korean associations, athletic meetings, churches, schools, business clubs, and Internet Web sites. The goal is not to give a full account of these organizations but to examine their intersections with the Korean Chinese community. Organized meetings also function to spread information and opinions among the South Korean community about hiring Korean Chinese. The conclusion draws the chapters together to comment on the role of social and especially ethnic ties in international relations. It also points to the potential future trajectory of the Korean ethnic network in China.


CHAPTER 2

Korean Migrations to and within China

T

his chapter offers information about the geographic movements of Koreans as evidence of the ethnic Korean network in China. I first briefly describe the early history of how and when Koreans started moving to other countries. Koreans’ emigrations can be divided into two periods, an early movement for political reasons and later movement for economic and educational goals. Since the 1990s, South Koreans have moved to China and Korean Chinese have also migrated out of as well as within China. The chapter shows how the migration of South Koreans to regions in China has influenced Korean Chinese migrations. Finally, I discuss how those movements have affected the Korean Chinese community in China. Migrations from Korea to China Korean movements abroad in the twentieth century can be generally divided into two periods: before the end of Japanese imperialism in the first half of the century—as political refugees—and from the 1960s to the present—for economic and educational purposes. For political reasons, Korean movements to China have a distinguishable time gap between the first and second period. Very little migration to China occurred between 1945 and the early 1990s. First Movement Before the twentieth century, few Koreans moved abroad and those who did opted for geographically close destinations. At least by the 1860s,

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there were Korean families living in Russia (Lee Kwangkyu 2000, 6–7). Koreans who lived in the northern part of Korea often crossed to China for collecting herbs or wood. Because not a few Koreans went back and forth to the northern part of China after repeated droughts, the Qing dynasty of China seriously prohibited Koreans’ movements by law for more than two hundred years (1627–1875). However, Koreans did not stop going to China. The ineffective enforcement of the law and the success of the agricultural system that Koreans applied to dry land in northeast China resulted in the frequent abrogation of the law. They stayed in China temporarily: “morning-go-evening-return” or “spring-go-autumn-return” (Han Junguang 1989, 42). Thus, they could be regarded as sojourners rather than migrants. If we think of migration in terms of two types—temporary and permanent1—then over time Koreans in China shifted from the first to the second. Koreans had a tendency to move abroad temporarily before the 1900s, but those with the characteristics of permanent migrants increased after the annexation of Korea to Japan by force in the early 1900s. Many Koreans started moving abroad after Japan colonized Korea. Several hundreds and thousands of Koreans moved to China, which was geographically close, and a comparatively smaller number migrated to America. Some 7,400 Koreans moved to Hawaii and the American continent as laborers before 1905 and approximately1,000 picture brides and students between 1906 and 1918 followed them (Lee Kwangkyu 2000, 10–11). Later, in the 1930s and 1940s, Japan forced Korean farmers and laborers to move to the northern part of China as pioneer farmers or railroad workers (Lee Kwangkyu 2000, 110). The Korean ethnic population, according to statistics compiled by the Chinese government in 1907, occupied 16,300 houses inhabited by 77,000 people among 17,400 houses and 94,000 people in one locality in the northern part of China. Before the liberation of Korea in 1945, the Korean population in China reached 1.7 million (Kim Hyundong and Ju Inyoung 1999, 100). Applying Cohen’s theory of diasporas, Inbom Choi describes these Koreans as a victim diaspora because of the coercive element in their emigration or recruitment (I. Choi 2003, 14). After 1945, 0.6 million of 1.7 million Koreans in China came back to the Korean peninsula (S. Kim 2003, 108–109). The rest of them decided to go back later because of ongoing political instabilities in Korea 2 or to settle down in China with a stable status in Chinese society owing to their support for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the Nationalist Party with the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Although Koreans’ migrations to other countries have been continual, new Korean settlement in China almost stopped—except for North Koreans’ limited movements.


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Koreans in China kept the citizenship of their home country. In 1945, almost 20 percent of Koreans residing in China had Chinese citizenship (Kim Byungho and Oh Sangsun 2001, 49). In 1952, most of the remaining Korean Chinese in China obtained Chinese citizenship under the comprehensive policy of the CCP toward ethnic Koreans. In that year, through negotiations between the North Korean government and the Chinese government, Korean Chinese who lived in the north of Shanhaiguan in Hebei province were forced to obtain Chinese citizenship and those who lived in the south got North Korean citizenship without any choice. The Korean Chinese government officials and soldiers, although they lived south of Shanhaiguan, got Chinese citizenship. After the negotiations, Korean Chinese who obtained North Korean citizenship (chaoqiao) numbered 6,000 to 10,000 and the rest of them became Chinese nationals (Jung Sinchul 2000, 92). Second Movement In the period of South Korea’s concentration on economic development after the Korean War, Koreans’ migration abroad was oriented toward economic and educational advantages rather than for political reasons. Pursuing economic and educational opportunities has led Koreans to move toward developed countries, such as the United States and European countries. This kind of Korean emigration has boomed since the 1960s (especially after the United States passed the Immigration Act of 1965) and the large number of Korean migrants yielded Korea towns and districts abroad. Although Korean migration abroad has started since the 1960s, the second movement of Koreans to China has boomed only since 1992 and the number of ethnic Koreans in China has been increasing tremendously. New Korean migrants in China are mostly from South Korea. Meanwhile, underground Koreans, who are North Korean defectors and are not officially calculated, have increased to significant numbers since the 1990s. These new immigrants also look for economic and educational advantages in a fast-developing country, China. An additional impetus for South Korean movement to China was provided by the economic crisis in 1997. As a consequence of the economic instabilities in South Korea during the economic crisis, some South Koreans decided to settle down in China and started small businesses with their retirement savings. In 1999, Hallyu (Korea Wind) brought South Koreans into Chinese entertainment markets. Hallyu refers to the surge of South Korean popular culture—movies, music, fashion, television programs—in East Asia. South

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Koreans have moved to China to gain economic benefits, taking advantages of the “wave” to create business opportunities. The popularity of Korean actors, actresses, and singers has stimulated the growth of Korean fashion industries, in clothing, cosmetics, and cosmetic surgery, in the Chinese market. Some people also argue that more South Koreans became interested in the Chinese market after Kim Jungil’s visit to Shanghai. The explosive increase of South Koreans’ investment in China started after his visit (Sisa Journal, Oct. 23, 2003).3 The mobile population of South Koreans who regarded China as a temporary market place has stabilized and has started settling down in China. After working as resident representatives of big Korean companies for several years, many South Koreans have decided to stay in China instead of going back to South Korea and opened their own business with their experiences in the domestic market and the friendly connections with Chinese businessmen that they accumulated. Unlike their original plans to go back to South Korea, some South Korean students in China have also stayed after graduation and opened their own small business.4 I discuss this in greater detail in the chapters on business. The ethnic Korean population in China is estimated to be increasing very rapidly. The ethnic Korean communities that were formed by the first movement in China were concentrated in the northeastern part bordering the Korean peninsula. On the other hand, the newly formed ethnic Korea towns since the second movement have emerged in big cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Qingdao, and Tianjin, and have quickly reached large scales. Approximately 200,000 to 250,000 South Koreans are estimated to have moved to China after 2000 (Global Korean Chinese Community, http://200man.com, 2003). A chief-director of the Beijing-Korea Association guessed that after the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, the population of resident South Koreans in China would increase to one million. Half of them would be in Beijing (interview in Beijing, Dec. 2003). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), in 2009 413,442 South Koreans are recorded to be living in China (MFAT, www.mofat.co.kr, 2009). However, the Chairman of the China-Korea Association Chung Hyo-kwon in his interview with the Overseas Korean Newspaper said that 700,000 South Koreans live in China (April 16, 2009). Spatial Mobility of Korean Chinese in China The spatial movements of Korean Chinese until the 1990s remained few and geographically limited. Before the economic reforms, the Korean Chinese community tended to exist separately from the Han-Chinese community


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and to be concentrated densely in northeast China. Though this geographical isolation helped with the maintenance of their culture, it was also a disadvantage for their economic development. From the 1900s to the 1970s The Korean Chinese community before the 1970s can be understood as following acculturation and isolation strategies. They were the most active participants in the communist movement in China in the first half of the twentieth century. Their achievements for the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and good relations with the central government resulted in more government officials than any other minority groups.5 Brotherly relations between China and North Korea also helped Korean Chinese to obtain benefits, such as the formation of their own autonomous district, because most Korean Chinese were from areas that fell under North Korea. On the other hand, the maintenance of Korean culture reflects the isolation strategy of migrants. Fredrick Barth defines a migrant community as living together in a concentrated area that has a complete system for its members. A migrant community is much better able to retain its ethnic language, culture, and identity. Migrants’ social and economic activities are mainly limited to the community and, consequently, their assimilation into mainstream society is delayed (1969, 9–38). Geographical isolation helped sustain a stronger ethnic grouping of Koreans. In 1953, the number of Koreans in three provinces (Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Jilin) was 1,103,436 out of a total of 1,111,275 Koreans in China. These three provinces accounted for 99.2 percent of the whole Korean population in China. (Another 0.6 percent lived in Inner Mongolia, which neighbors these three provinces.) Moreover, 68.3 percent of all Koreans in China lived in the Yanbian Autonomous Region in Jilin province (Tabulation on China’s Nationalities, 1994). The geographically dense population of Korean Chinese and the official establishment of their own autonomous region as early as 1953 strengthened ethnic Korean solidarity and helped them maintain strong ethnic characteristics. Their work also contributed to segregating their lives from Chinese. Koreans were largely involved in farming. Building their houses closely and helping each other at harvest time were parts of traditional culture. In the early 1930s ethnic Koreans made up 3 percent of the population of northeast China, but they produced 90.1 percent of the area’s rice. In 1941, 70 percent of ethnic Koreans worked as farmers (Jung Sinchul 2000, 21).

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Except in the periods when the Chinese government strictly suppressed minority groups, such as during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), speaking Korean and preserving Korean culture were allowed. Korean Chinese villages maintained ethnic schools, cultural activities and organizations, and customs. They continued to build traditional Korean houses in China.6 In addition, Korean Chinese were reluctant to mix with Han-Chinese. They avoided intermarriage with ethnic Chinese: If either a man or woman was married to Han-Chinese, village people whispered about that person. People called him (her) a fool or suspected that person might have some handicap that village people don’t know. Han people have such different customs and culture. Even about eating and bathing. (Interview with a Korean-Chinese woman in Shenyang, Sept. 2001) Thus, Koreans in China, as one of the officially recognized minority groups, acquiesced under the Chinese communist system but their spatial density led them to maintain their cultural and ethnic traits. The late 1970s—1990s Since economic reforms in China started in the late 1970s after the death of Mao Zedong, urban migrations have boomed. Some Korean Chinese began to move to urban areas. The extent and characteristics of their population movement were not so different from those of other ethnic groups in China. Their rural-urban movement can be interpreted as one of the changes associated with market reforms in China. However, the percentage of migrants was extremely small during the early reforms. By 1982, only 0.8 percent of Korean Chinese had left the three northeast provinces to other areas (Tabulation on China’s Nationalities, 1984). Their movements to urban areas were limited within three northeast provinces—that is, from villages to cities in the area. Main cities in northeast China, such as Shenyang, Yanji, and Changchun, became the main destinations of Korean population movement. Harris Kim researched 429 Korean Chinese employers and employees in Yanji, the main city of the Yanbian Autonomous Region in Jilin province. Approximately 235 of them (55 percent) moved from the countryside to Yanji in northeast China to get jobs or to start their own business after the 1970s (H. Kim 2003, 812). Thus, northeast China still accounted for 98 percent of all Korean Chinese until the late 1980s (S. Kim 2003, 113). The household registration system


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(hukou), which had been introduced in 1956 as a means of ensuring that people would not move from their place of registration, also did not allow them to move to other areas easily. Meanwhile, the strong characteristic of the segregated Korean community seemed to give disadvantages to Korean Chinese in the open economic market. Economic growth in Yanbian fell behind other areas in the 1980s (T. Kwon 1997, 216). Catching up with the fast economic change of the Chinese coast was difficult for them. Their strategy of isolation from the majority society resulted in them having a slow response to changes in the national economy. In addition, northeast China had developed mainly on the basis of heavy industry. When the reforms started, other regions saw economic growth in light industry. However, the northeast remained stuck with large state-owned firms and, thus, a larger proportion of industrial employment depended on slower growing sectors. Interactions between South Korean and Korean Chinese Movement Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, interactions between South Koreans and Korean Chinese have influenced their spatial movements. Earlier, South Koreans tended to move to places where Korean Chinese settled down. Later, South Koreans’ movements to major cities of all provinces in China resulted in the geographic dispersion of the Korean Chinese population. A large number of Korean Chinese have also had international migration to South Korea as well. The Early and Mid-1990s: South Koreans Follow Korean Chinese The spatial mobility of ethnic Koreans in China in the early and mid-1990s has two characteristics. First, as an international movement, South Korean populations in China became concentrated in Korean Chinese towns. Second, as a domestic movement, Korean Chinese migrated from rural to urban areas. Since 1992, a large number of South Koreans have moved to China for two reasons. First, the Chinese market attracted them. Optimistic about the potential of the Chinese business market, South Koreans have invested heavily in China. In addition, the economic gap between Korea and China gives advantages to South Koreans. To open their own business in China, they do not need as much capital as in Korea. They can use cheap labor, produce goods with a small amount of capital, and sell them

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back to Korea and other countries with high prices. Moreover, cheap living expenses in China let them enjoy things they could not do in Korea. Second, educational considerations became a significant reason for the South Koreans’ movement. The Chinese education boom has been as big as the Chinese market in Korea. Koreans have expected that speaking Chinese and studying about China would produce benefits as good as or better than studying English. For surviving in the competitive South Korean market, being China experts (joonguk-tong, now a popular term in Korea) seemed the best choice for the security of their future. Some South Koreans who quit companies or look for jobs after finishing school have headed for China. On the other hand, for primary and secondary students, the experience of studying in China could give them special qualifications in the South Korean education system. Studying abroad for several years gives them an advantage, and they can enter Korean universities more easily. Rather than sending children to expensive foreign countries, China seems the best option that Korean parents could choose. Geographical proximity and similar culture are likely to give less stress to their children. Sending their children, even five to six years old, to China became popular. Individual South Koreans inclined toward northeast China rather than other areas because of several reasons. First, in business, relative to other foreign enterprises that preferred to open business in big cities and the southern part of China, South Korean businessmen focused on Korean Chinese areas. As strangers who are not familiar with Chinese language, culture, and society, South Koreans favored the areas where Korean Chinese live and where bilingual signs (Korean and Chinese) on store boards can be seen. Second, in education, South Korean parents sent their children to schools in the northeast provinces as well as in big cities. While their children have studied English since childhood, Chinese is an unfamiliar language to them. Thus, they would rather send their children to a Korean Chinese community, which seems safer and is less of a linguistic shock. Particularly when parents send their children to middle or high school in China, they send them to Korean Chinese schools, and aim at sending them to major universities in cities or taking them back to Korean universities. Looking for Korean speaking tutors was also not difficult in those areas.7 Third, South Koreans feel much closer to northeast China than to any other parts of China. For ethnic Koreans, unlike for other foreign visitors to China, the top destination is not the Great Wall or the Forbidden City. It is Mount Baekdu, located on the Chinese-North Korean border. Koreans consider these mountains to be the spirit of Korean culture, a symbol of


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their ethnicity. At the peak of a mountain lies a lake from which one can look down on North Korea. Visiting the top of the mountain and being able to see North Korean land or even talk to North Koreans right on the border satisfy South Korean travelers.8 They enjoy historical sightseeing places, such as independent activists’ combat areas during the Japanese colonization period and relics of ancient kingdoms of Korea. These places, prohibited for several decades, stimulate the interest of South Koreans. Thus, a large number of South Koreans have visited Korean Chinese communities. Encountering Korean Chinese, who have preserved Korean traditions more fully than South Koreans, South Koreans have received a strong impression of them and felt less foreign in China.9 The increase of South Koreans in cities and close relations between South Koreans and Korean Chinese paved the way for rapid rural to urban movements for Korean Chinese. The rapid increase of service jobs and entertainment targeting South Koreans provided jobs to Korean Chinese. The trend of “leaving-hometowns-for-cities” has occurred much faster among Korean Chinese than other groups in China. The 1990s census data shows that the mobile population made up 10 percent of the whole population of Korean Chinese, while that of Han-Chinese reached 6.8 percent. The rate of their migration to cities became the highest of all ethnic groups in China. While 30 percent of the Korean Chinese population was urban in the 1970s, that figure went up to more than 50 percent in the 1990s (Tabulation on China’s Nationalities 1994). The increase of South Koreans’ population in cities gave economic opportunities to Korean Chinese. South Koreans have built new Korea towns and opened companies and factories. The labor force of Korean Chinese has been a crucial part of this. When South Koreans seek laborers, such as service providers and managers for companies, they prefer to hire people who are familiar with Korean culture and with whom they can communicate. As the same ethnic group, Korean Chinese who still maintain Korean culture and speak Korean invest strong ethnic trust in South Koreans. A Korean Chinese who works for a South Korean introduces his or her friends or relatives to other South Koreans. Or, South Koreans ask Korean Chinese employees to introduce other Korean Chinese for themselves or other South Korean compatriots. When some South Korean businessmen move their business to other places, they often bring their employees whom they hired in their previous location. Thus, Korean Chinese movement to cities is more stable and secure than for other ethnic groups. This kind of connection has formed migration chains, and stimulated faster movements to and job-finding chances in urban areas of Korean Chinese. Thus, the increase of South Koreans in cities of northeast China

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and the demand for Korean Chinese employees have expanded Korean Chinese urban communities and injected capital into northeast China. On the other hand, these changes have decreased the number of Korean Chinese villages and weakened traditional customs. This spatial expansion of Korean Chinese and their contacts with South Koreans also brought about sudden changes to their communities. The Mid-1990s–Present: Korean Chinese Follow South Koreans The spatial destination of ethnic Koreans since the mid-1990s has aggressively spread across the main cities of all China’s provinces. Before the mid1990s, Korean Chinese and South Koreans had a tendency to be in Korean Chinese towns that already existed, whereas since the mid-1990s, new Korea towns in big cities have been rapidly developing. South Koreans who started moving to China and lived in northeast China for a short time have preferred to settle down in the country’s major cities. The gradual development of Korean networks in these cities since 1992 has underpinned the rapid increase of the population movement of ethnic Koreans to these areas. The longer South Koreans live in China, the more they opt for major cities that offer more possibilities to acquire economic and educational benefits. The increase of the number of South Koreans in these areas has generated new Korea towns at a tremendous speed. South Koreans living densely in these districts have opened stores for themselves. The growth of new Korea towns meant more demand for Korean Chinese employees. Thus, the movement of Korean Chinese to these cities has increased as well. The emergence of new Korea towns in these main cities encouraged more Korean Chinese to leave their hometowns and transfer to cities outside of the northeast. As South Koreans have set up new Korea towns, the migration chains discussed in the previous section have become much broader. A young Korean Chinese manager from Heilongjiang explained how he was able to get work as a manager in a large restaurant in Dalian, the city of his dreams, despite being young and from the countryside: I thought my life would end in a small town in Heilongjiang. After graduation from high school, I moved to Yanji and started working any jobs, in karaoke, sauna, internet room . . . I was excited about changes there and admired South Koreans who could spend so much money. I worked under one South Korean businessman when he opened sauna. I worked hard for him. He trusted me and while he was not in China, I took care of his business. His friend saw me one time several years ago. Just half a year ago, that friend called my boss and asked me to


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come down to Dalian. Dalian was the place I dreamed of settling in. I got the job as manager right away. As soon as I came here, the old manager quit and I am taking care of most of the restaurant tasks. The owner trusts me because he heard good things about me from my previous boss. (Interview with twenty-two-year-old male Korean-Chinese in Dalian, Sept. 2003)10 When I was in Beijing, I ran into a Korean Chinese middle-aged woman in front of a public phone box in a new Korea town, Wangjing. She was holding Korean flyers, marking several parts on them with her pen, and calling several ethnic Korean restaurants to work as a chef around there. She was from Harbin and was looking for a job. Even though she did not know anyone there, she came to Beijing and walked around Wangjing. She was sure that she could easily find a job as a chef, house-keeper, or cleaner in a Korean community. According to Yu Byungho, in 1998, the number of Korean Chinese in Beijing was approximately 65,000. In Shanghai the figure was approximately 10,000, and in Qingdao it was 30,000 (2000, 145). However, according to the Chinese statistics, they are far fewer: Beijing had 20,369 Korean Chinese, Shanghai had 5,120, and Shandong province (where Qingdao is located) had 27,795 (Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census 2002). When Yoon Injin conducted fieldwork in 2003, he estimated that 70,000 to 80,000 Korean Chinese lived in Qingdao (2004, 73). According to the Korean Consulate in Qingdao, the population of Korean Chinese in Qingdao in 2009 was 120,000 and that of South Koreans was 60,000 (China Radio International http://korean.cri.cn, April 13, 2009). In addition, the Korean Chinese population of major cities in the northeast has been increasing fast from the 1990s. A Korean newspaper in Shenyang reports that the Korean Chinese population of Dalian reached 15,000, tripling the 1990 number (Yonyeong Joseon Munbo (Korean Newspaper in Liaoning), May 29, 1997). Dalian had previously never had an ethnic Korea town, but now has an active Korean community. Since the development of foreign companies (especially Japanese companies, which occupy 80 percent of all foreign companies in Dalian), the number of rural migrants has been growing fast. Shenyang, which is one of the favorite cities of South Koreans, was recorded as having 120,000 Korean Chinese in 1999, twice the number of migrants in 1990. Korean Chinese in South Korea A large number of Korean Chinese have also moved to South Korea since 1992. Approximately 20 percent of the whole population of Korean Chinese

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is estimated to be living in South Korea. Korea Immigration Service indicates that 387,977 Korean Chinese stay in South Korea in 2009 (www. immigration.go.kr, June 30, 2009). An accurate count has never been made, because more than a few Korean Chinese go to South Korea illegally, such as through smuggling ships.11 By March 2002, when they were not officially regarded as overseas Koreans (jaeoe dongpo), there were officially 116,000 Korean Chinese in South Korea. Of those, 76,000 were staying there with an illegal status (Kukmin Ilbo, May. 26, 2002). The old generation wants to visit their native country and find their relatives. The young generation looks for chances from the prosperity of South Korea. The main purpose of their visiting South Korea was to get a job and make money. Working in South Korea for one month was equal to working in China for one year (S. Kim 2003, 31). They have worked mainly in “3 D” (difficult, dirty, and dangerous) jobs, through which they can earn comparatively high salaries over a short term. Some Korean Chinese work in South Korea for one year and then return to China. Some buy taxis to operate, and others who work two or three years start their own business, such as a restaurant, sauna, or karaoke. In a Korean Chinese village, Donggong village in Harbin, four-fifths of the working population of 250 households went to South Korea and worked there. It became the village with the largest amount of cash in banks in Heilongjiang province (Kim Hyundong and Ju Inyoung 1999, 13–15). In 1997, the amount of money that Korean Chinese saved in banks of Jilin province occupied 70 percent. Working in South Korea meant a chance to obtain the economic wealth. In the early 1990s, Korean Chinese could stay in South Korea with a relative-visiting visa for specific term.12 They went to meet their relatives in South Korea, but some of them did not go back to China and stayed in South Korea to look for work. Overstaying their visas, their stay became illegal. The number of illegal sojourners has been increasing fast. Some of them sold Chinese medicine at high prices or sold counterfeits. The highest number of illegal foreigners in South Korea is Chinese and more than half of these are Korean Chinese.13 The Korean government has strictly controlled their visits to South Korea. The law became stricter and the age at which Korean Chinese can visit South Korea with visiting visas rose. However, the number of illegal status sojourners has not been decreasing. They used several ways to go to South Korea. In the case of women, international marriage became an easy way to move to South Korea. In 1993, there were 1,400 international marriages between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. The number has been increasing rapidly (2,000 in 1994, 7,700 in 1995, and 10,000 in 1996). It reached 30,000 by the late 1990s. From 1992 to 2001, 47,500 marriages between South


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Korean men and Korean Chinese women took place (Lee Hyesun 1999, 266; S. Kim 2003, 137).14 In the case of men, they came to Korea with one or two year employment or business visa (15 days to 2 months) and became illegal laborers. Otherwise, they found jobs through South Korean job introduction offices. In order to come to South Korea no matter what methods they use, they have to pay a large amount of money to brokers.15 They were not welcomed in South Korea as much as South Koreans were in China. The law of the Korean government has been getting stricter toward them. They have received some disadvantages or maltreatment from South Koreans because of their status.16 In 2004, Korean Chinese were officially and legally considered as overseas Koreans. While they expected free or easier visits to South Korea after the enactment of the revised regulation, they have to face different conditions when they apply for the F-4 visa which is for overseas Koreans.17 Despite these circumstances, they have continued to go to South Korea and new Korean Chinese towns have appeared in Seoul. The population of Korean Chinese increased threefold between 2002 (116,000) and 2009 (387,977), whereas the number of Korean Chinese staying illegally in South Korea has decreased from approximately 80,000 to 25,855.18 However, conflicts between Korean Chinese and South Koreans and the unfairness of their status compared to other overseas Koreans in South Korea have significantly influenced their relations in China as well. I will discuss this more in the next chapter. Consequences of Population Movement The discussion so far has traced the geographic movement of ethnic Koreans in China chronologically. Spatial movements and interaction with South Koreans have brought about advantages and disadvantages for Korean Chinese. As a result of contact with South Koreans, Korean Chinese have urbanized and found work in new sectors. Korean Chinese culture has spread to cities. On the other hand, Korean Chinese community has weakened and social problems have emerged from fast changes. Urbanization Whereas Korean Chinese rarely left their villages before 1990, the movements of Korean Chinese have now increased exponentially. Besides the easing of the strict hukou system, Korean Chinese have been prompted to move to cities by economic opportunities presented by China’s internal growth and by contact with South Koreans.

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100

Beijing

90

Shanghai Shandong Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 City

Figure 2.1

County

Township

The population distribution of Korean Chinese in 2000 (percent).

Source: Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China, 2002. Note: Chinese cities include several rural counties under their jurisdiction, so a good portion of the “cities” of Beijing and Shanghai is counted as rural.

When Korean Chinese migrate to other areas, they are inclined to stay in cities. Figure 2.1 illustrates Korean Chinese migrants’ preference for cities. It shows the distribution of the population of Korean Chinese in 2000. The three lines beginning below 60 percent describe the population of Korean Chinese in the three northeast provinces of China. Even though they prefer to live in cities, the gap between city and county is not drastic compared to the three new destinations, Beijing, Shanghai, and Shandong province, to which Korean Chinese have recently started moving.

Emergence of Urban Korean Chinese Culture Through this urbanization, the activities of Korean Chinese communities that were limited to northeast China have expanded. The Korean Chinese population in Beijing in 1923 was just 800 and was 2,922 in 1964. By the 1990s, Park Sukja found that Beijing has 5,000 permanent Korean Chinese residents (according to their hukou status) and 30,000 who stayed for a long period without hukou (1997, 264). Most Korean Chinese who have the Beijing hukou were not able to speak Korean and did not maintain Korean traditional culture. Even though after the Cultural Revolution the Beijing Korean Chinese community tried to


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retain Korean culture through several activities, such as new year festivals and athletic tournaments, and opened Korean language courses in universities, those efforts did not last and, thus, did not have effective results (Hwang Yubok 1993, 358). However, the consistent increase of the population of Korean Chinese in Beijing has resulted in the emergence of Korean Chinese schools (including a Beijing Korean school in 1989 and a private Korean Chinese school in 1993), the Beijing Korean Cultural Research Center (1996), and ethnic Korean cultural festivals. At festival activities, they even organize arranged meetings and marriage issues (Park Sukja 1997, 266). In 2008, the Beijing Korean Chinese Sports Event was held for 100,000 Korean Chinese who live in Beijing. Thus, the urban movement of a large number of Korean Chinese expands Korean Chinese activities, which had been limited to northeast China, to other areas. Labor force The geographic expansion of Korean Chinese society has also provided them with various jobs and, thus, the image of Korean Chinese in Chinese society has transformed from one of a farming ethnic group to an urban ethnic group that swiftly adjusts to a market economy. This characteristic is related to the increase of the South Korean population in China, as I mentioned earlier. In the three northeast provinces of China, most Korean Chinese were engaged in family-operated agriculture. Since the 1990s, they have been able to move from simple farmers to service men, tutors, interpreters, and company employees. By 2000, 15 percent of the Korean Chinese labor force was involved in the service sector, the next highest percentage after agriculture (Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census 2002). Chinese and foreign enterprises have been concentrated in cities and needed employees. South Korean-owned companies have requested Korean Chinese employees. In addition, South Koreans who live in big cities have demanded ethnic product stores, such as Korean grocery stores, restaurants, and department stores, and entertainment services, such as nightclubs and karaoke. These changes have provided more chances for Korean Chinese to step into urban lives. Erosion of Rural Korean Chinese Culture The urban movement of Korean Chinese has contributed to the collapse of the traditional Korean family structure. Young people left their hometowns

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and moved to cities. Not entire family members, but one or two members of a family headed for cities. Split families have not only weakened family solidarity, but the preference for young and female employees in urban areas has also induced serious social problems. The fact that whole families usually do not leave for cities together can be interpreted as a change of the traditional Korean Chinese family system. Having several children and living as an extended family have been the characteristics of the traditional Korean ethnic family system, and Korean Chinese families maintained it. However, since the one child policy was launched in China, Korean Chinese has been the minority to conform best to the policy and the dispersal of the population has also supported this policy by posing barriers to family solidarity. More than 90 percent of Korean Chinese has only one child per family (Jang Kongja 2003, 296). In 1996, the Yanbian Autonomous Region had a birth rate of –1.07 percent. Even though their minority status allows them to have two children, most Korean Chinese prefer to raise one child due to high expenses for child-rearing (Kim Hyundong and Ju Inyoung 1999, 59). Thus, the number of family members has decreased, and the urban and overseas movements have resulted in irregular family structures, such as the growth of the number of children living with their relatives or grandparents. Blood ties in the community are not so substantial anymore as well. This change could make them leave their hometown easily. The increase of service jobs has especially required female and young employees. The number of the floating population of female Korean Chinese is much higher than that of male Korean Chinese. Female movements to urban areas and abroad are comparatively high, because of opportunities for female work and because women often set up their own businesses. Early migrant entrepreneurship in the Korean Chinese community started with female Korean Chinese. They set up individual businesses, such as selling kimchi and small dishes, and even exchanging South Korean, American, and Chinese currencies in the street, while their husbands or male family members worked in rice paddies. As female Korean Chinese have more chances to step in the business markets, they participated in professional service jobs, as hair-dressers, cosmetic clerks, and clothing-makers (Jung Sinchul 2000, 148–149). The job distribution between female and male Korean Chinese is shown in figure 2.2. Male Korean Chinese are involved with manufacturing and government jobs. Females, on the other had, are engaged with service and skilled professions.19 Service jobs are more plentiful in big cities. Thus, female Korean Chinese have easily slipped out of their home towns and into big cities.

Korean Migrations to and within China 10,000 9,000

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Male Female

8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 Manufacturing

Figure 2.2

Construction

Service

Government officials

Job distribution by sex among Korean Chinese in 2000 (unit: persons).

Source: Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census, 2002.

This tendency has caused unbalanced sex ratios and age distribution in the Korean Chinese countryside. Single male Korean Chinese have a hard time finding marriage partners and, thus, the population could not naturally help but decrease (Yu Byungho 2000, 142–145).20 I will discuss this more in the chapter on the service sector. Particularly, the long-term absence of parents of family members has caused an increase in juvenile delinquency. Korean Chinese move to other countries, such as South Korea, Japan, and the United States as well as to urban areas in China. As representatives of family members, parents (one side or both of them) mostly leave for South Korea. In teaching at a Korean Chinese school, finding students who have been separate with one of their parents was not difficult: Father went to South Korea first and he begged my mom to go to Korea because it was hard for him to make money on his own. She was worried that he could be involved in bad temptations in Korea and would not come back home. Those kinds of tragic stories are all what we KoreanChinese hear here. She left for Korea right away. So I live in the school dormitory and sometimes go back to my grandparents’ house. But it doesn’t matter for me. Being here with friends having the same situation

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is not bad. (Interview with a female student: sixteen years old in Shenyang in winter, 2001) According to research on ethnic schools in Yanbian (including from elementary to high school), 54 percent of students live separately with one of their parents (Heungnyongang Shinmun, May 19, 2004). In one elementary school in Yanji, 71.4 percent of students live in households where at least one parent is absent (Chosun Ilbo, Dec. 7, 2001). Since the 1990s, crimes by Korean Chinese teenagers have been increasing. For example, from 1999 to 2000, which were the most popular years to go to South Korea, juvenile delinquency rose 20 percent. Heilongjiang newspapers suggested that this was because of the separation between parents and children (Heungnyongang Shinmun, Jan. 12, 2001). In addition, the dispersion of Korean Chinese population has weakened the Korean Chinese community in northeast China. Because of it, the voice of the community has been diminished. With the rapid urban movement of Korean Chinese, the size of Korean Chinese towns has grown. Meanwhile, small Korean Chinese villages are shrinking and, in some cases, disappearing. For example, more than half of the 600 residents in a Korean Chinese village in Heilongjiang province went to South Korea (Wolgan Joongang, Feb. 2002: 282–289).21 While Korean Chinese have moved out of Korean Chinese communities, Han-Chinese have moved into these areas. Figure 2.3 displays changes in the ethnic make-up of the Yanbian Autonomous Region. We can see that the proportion of Han-Chinese has increased since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, and that the region is, in fact, composed of more Chinese than Koreans. To maintain recognition as an autonomous region for a minority group in China, the population of the minority group in that area should be above 30 percent. The trend indicated in figure 2.3 suggests that the Korean Chinese population will soon drop below 30 percent. When the population of Yanbian falls below 30 percent Korean, its status as an autonomous region is unlikely to change. This would follow the precedent of Inner Mongolia, which is less than 30 percent Mongolian. Still, these population shifts indicate that Han-Chinese power in Yanbian is increasing. The political power of the Korean Chinese community as a minority in Chinese society has, thus, been diminishing. We can see this change in other indicators as well. The number of Korean Chinese government officials has been rapidly decreasing in Korean Chinese communities. In 1952, 80 percent of government officials in Yanbian were Korean Chinese. By 1992, the number had decreased to 48 percent. Among


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70 60

62%

61%

35%

33%

57%

63% 51%

50

(%)

40

47% 34%

40%

30 20

Percentage of Korean Chinese Percentage of Han-Chinese

10 0 1949

1965

1996

2000

2007

Figure 2.3 The population of Korean Chinese and Han-Chinese in the Yanbian Autonomous Region. Source: Tabulation on the Yanbian Statistics, 2002.

them, 70 percent are related to activities of cultural education, mass media, and social science. Korean Chinese officials who are involved with political and economic activities are only a few (Lee Hyesun 1999, 271–272). The decrease in the number of Korean Chinese officials signifies a challenge to the solidarity of ethnic Korean networks. The existing Korean Chinese cultural associations have been weaker and participants in these groups are getting older: Cultural associations are just for old people now. Our office has been closed for more than two years. The Chinese government destroyed the old building and promised to give a new office to us. But when? They even put a Han-Chinese in the seat of the chief for the Dalian KoreanChinese Cultural Association. Even though we said we wouldn’t approve it, who cares? I don’t know when we can open the association again, or if we even can. (Interview with the former vice president of the Dalian Korean-Chinese Cultural Association, Sept. 2002) The reason why the number of Korean Chinese officials has declined is the discrimination that Korean Chinese face as a minority group in Chinese society. They complain that they have been and will continue to be an unjustly treated minority in Chinese society. On the outside, the minority policy seems to give benefits to minorities, such as extra opportunities to enter university

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and the possibility to have two children. However, their political activities are limited, making it difficult for them to have real power and authority. In these ways, the minority policy has gushed Korean Chinese out of their communities and market forces have pulled them to other regions: I worked as a government official for more than ten years. I really did my best and was proud of my job. I was supposed to be promoted to the top level soon. But right before the central government promoted to me, they brought in a much younger government official from another province. The place was so far away from here and he didn’t know anything about this area. It didn’t make sense that he got a top job right away. The central government didn’t want to give the highest level post to me because I am Korean-Chinese. Even though my family and friends always said that I might not able to get the top level, I didn’t listen to them. I thought if I work hard, ethnicity doesn’t matter. I was really confident. I lost all my confidence . . . There was no reason to be stuck there. That’s why I got out of my hometown and started my own restaurant in Beijing. At least in my business, I can get as much as I work. (Interview with ex-government official from Yanji, 2003)22 Thus, the movement to cities is related to the weakening of the ethnic community. The decrease in the number of the ethnic Korean schools in northeast China has taken away the chances for the next generation of Korean Chinese to learn Korean. In Yanbian, ethnic Korean elementary schools numbered 419 in 1985 and went down to 177 by 1995. There were 119 middle schools in 1985, but they decreased to 49 by 1995. The decline of Korean Chinese schools means that fewer Korean Chinese can speak Korean (Jung Ingap 1999, 176; Hwang Yubok 2002, 29). Although a large number of Korean Chinese have moved to cities, the establishment of ethnic Korean schools in cities has kept pace. Most new schools for Koreans in cities are for South Koreans. A Korean Chinese school that was built for Korean Chinese urban migrants in Beijing was not so successful because of the high tuition fee and the preference of Korean Chinese parents for sending their children to Chinese schools. As I discussed in the introduction, this spatial dispersion of Korean Chinese since economic reforms has weakened the ethnic solidarity and Korean characteristic of Korean Chinese. Contacting urban cultures beyond their local community has meant more contact with Chinese culture. Not a few Korean Chinese have stepped into Han majority society. Young Korean Chinese prefer to study in the Chinese schools, not the ethnic Korean schools anymore.


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On the other hand, Korean Chinese have been influenced by South Korean culture. Despite being the same ethnic group, Korean Chinese have kept rather different cultural and linguistic characteristics from South Koreans because they did not contact each other for several decades and most Korean Chinese use North Korean dialects.23 The popularity of South Korean pop culture, sudden contacts with capitalist culture and society, and relations with South Koreans have weakened the unique characteristics of the Korean Chinese community.


CHAPTER 3

Ethnicity or Nationality? Korean Identities in China

R

elations of Korean Chinese with South Koreans and with HanChinese have influenced their identities. In this chapter, I describe the ethnic and national identity of Korean Chinese and how Korean Chinese and South Koreans’ identities in relation to each other have changed over time. I divide the changes of Korean ethnicity before and after 1992. I discuss how Korean Chinese and South Koreans look at the other side in ethnic and national ways. Korean Ethnicity before 1992 Korean Chinese preserved a strong ethnic identity since the beginning of the Korean peninsula’s division. This identity was supported by their geographic concentration. The invitation of the market economy in China changed the definition and functions of ethnicity to Korean Chinese. Since economic reforms, their ethnic identities have tended to be inclined toward South Korea. Korean Chinese Identity under Japanese Imperialism and Chinese Communism Ethnic Koreans had a strong tendency to distinguish themselves from HanChinese and other ethnic groups in China. China has 56 ethnic groups including the Han-Chinese, who make up 92 percent of the whole population, and 55 minority groups who make up the remaining 8 percent.

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Most minority groups are rooted in the areas where they live in China at present. Unlike most minority groups in China, many Korean Chinese migrated to China for political reasons since Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910. Ethnic Koreans joined Korean and Chinese associations against Japanese imperialism in China. The ethnic tie of Koreans was strongly connected with their home country and with their relatives and family members on the Korean peninsula. This historical background has conferred on them a strong commitment to a Korean identity, despite settling down in China for more than fifty years (Jang 2003, 287). Korean sojourners who moved to China tended to think of themselves as superior to the Chinese. In the 1930s, as part of the Japanese plan to take advantage of Manchuria, the Japanese government sent Korean farmers and laborers to northeast China. They needed laborers for the Manchuria railway and farmers to exploit the barren land. To apply the irrigation system that Korean farmers used for their farming fields in Korea, the Japanese government encouraged Korean farmers to move to northeast China and promised to give them the land. In the effort to exercise colonial rule over Korea and China, Japanese categorized themselves as the first class, planted Koreans as the second class, and Chinese as the third class. Japanese recruited Koreans to serve as tax collectors in China. After 1945 these policies caused conflicts between Koreans and Chinese (Lee Hyeon-jung 2001, 70–71). Chinese thought that all Korean farmers and laborers worked for Japanese. Koreans claimed that Chinese always attempted to kick them away from the land. Different treatment of Chinese and Koreans by Japanese colonization policies caused ethnic Koreans to have strong ethnic ties and isolate themselves from Chinese. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, ethnic Koreans rapidly organized stable settlements as a minority group in China. Their achievements for the civil war on the side of the Chinese communists helped ethnic Koreans establish their own autonomous region.1 While other minorities applied the language systems that the Chinese government made, Koreans in China kept their own traditional culture in China and, thus, could avoid the Chinese government’s involvement in defining their ethnic identity.2 The maintenance of traditional culture and language strengthened Korean Chinese ethnic identity. They received education in ethnic Korean schools: from elementary school to high school and beyond. Yanbian University in Yanji enrolled many Korean Chinese. Korean Chinese farmed vegetables that Koreans enjoyed eating, and cooked food spicier and less oily than Chinese food. People gathered together with others from the same

Ethnicity or Nationality?

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hometowns in Korea and, on that basis, built up towns. Korean Chinese from Hamgyeong province in Korea mainly lived in Jilin province in China, those from Pyeongan province in Liaoning province, and those from Jeolla and Kyeongsang province (South Korea) in Heilongjiang (Go Hyunju 1993, 20).3 A Korean Chinese interviewee, who changed his national citizenship to South Korean in the early 1990s, commented on his community’s strong solidarity based on their place of origin: I was born in a Korean village. More than seventy percent of village people’s ancestors were from Kyeongsang province in South Korea. They all used the provincial dialect. I also learned the dialect and always heard about my grandparents and parents’ hometown. The first time when I visited my relatives in South Korea in 1990, I bowed to them and spoke with them. They were surprised I did not have any difference from people of Kyeongsang province. They were happy. We got close so fast then. (Interview in Beijing, Sept. 2003) However, pride in their ethnic identity and the tendency to keep cultural characteristics were safe only on the condition of national acknowledgment. During the period of the Cultural Revolution, the central government prohibited Korean Chinese from speaking Korean and abolished Korean magazines and mass media. They burned Korean books and closed cultural organizations. The ethnic Korean schools switched to Chinese Union Schools and all classes were taught in Chinese (Jung Sinchul 2000, 57–58). The Yanbian Autonomous Region went through the most painful experiences. In the area, approximately 4,000 Korean Chinese were executed, 5,000 injured, and hundreds of thousands were arrested (C. Lee 1990, 101–102). After the end of the revolution, Korean Chinese went back to the past. They reopened ethnic schools and republished newspapers and magazines in Korean. This can be compared to other minority groups. Mongolians, another minority group, have their own autonomous region inside China and also have an independent country outside China. However, they have not kept a strong ethnic identity. In Inner Mongolia, only 17 percent of the whole population is fully Mongolian and 78 percent is Han majority in 2000.4 In addition, in the cities of Inner Mongolia, Han-Chinese culture is much more dominant than Mongolian culture. Neighborhoods and settlement location were key in helping Korean Chinese maintain ethnic solidarity. A female Korean Chinese who lived in a Chinese district revealed how ethnic identity could be unimportant: “My neighborhood was all Chinese. My parents spoke Korean with each

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other, but Chinese with me. I had all Chinese friends and I got married to a Han-Chinese. I can’t speak Korean and my daughter either” (interview with a female Korean Chinese teacher [thirty-two year old] in Shenyang, Dec. 2001). This respondent was born in northeast China, but lived in the Mongolian autonomous area. She is a teacher in a Korean Chinese school, but speaks Chinese with Korean Chinese students. This suggests that a geographically dense settlement of Korean Chinese was necessary to maintain ethnic identity. Korean Chinese not living within the boundary of Korean Chinese communities seemed not to have chances to learn Korean language and culture or, moreover, have a strong motivation to know about them. In conclusion, Korean Chinese when they moved to China in the 1900s distinguished themselves from Chinese. We could say that they had pride in their ethnicity and culture as distinct from Chinese. On the other hand, those characteristics could only be maintained under the conditions of physically dense communities and government nonintervention. Korean Chinese Identity since Economic Reforms With the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the rise of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the social and economic systems of China underwent profound change. The rate of urbanization began to increase rapidly and this change provided opportunities for greater contact between the Korean Chinese and the Han majority. The ethnic solidarity of Korean Chinese began to decline in this period. Moving to cities, Korean Chinese have started living mixed with Han-Chinese communities. Rising job opportunities in Chinese society led Korean Chinese to be integrated more with Han-Chinese. Before the reforms, Korean Chinese tended to be self-sufficient. Direct and frequent contact with Han-Chinese was not necessary and Korean Chinese tended to avoid them. Korean Chinese make contrasts between Korean and Chinese habits. For example, they regard ethnic Koreans as clean, but Chinese as dirty. While Koreans are diligent, Chinese are lazy. When Korean farmers carry two lunch boxes to work in the early morning, Chinese farmers sleep until noon. Chinese are stingy and do not use money for their own children for education, but Koreans are devoted to their children’s education. These perspectives reflect Koreans’ idea of their superiority to Chinese. However, through stepping into broader Chinese society, Korean Chinese learned that they must recognize that they are only a minority group in Chinese society. Korean Chinese have been regarded as the most


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successful minority group in China, because they have the highest education level and the lowest percentage of illiteracy (Heberer 1989, 48–49; Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoples Republic of China, 2002; S. Kim 2003, 110).5 Despite the high educational level, they were not so welcomed into good jobs. Chinese have felt that education in ethnic schools must not allow Korean Chinese to speak Chinese well enough. Since the open policy, they have been behind in competitive markets. Kwon Tai-Hwan points out that Korean Chinese live on a cultural island and they are held back at work because of their language abilities (1997, 118–119). To maintain their ethnic characteristics was fine in an isolated area, but in a market society disadvantages have been exposed (Kim Doosub 2003, 133). But Korean Chinese also had less personal connections than HanChinese to career opportunities. Even though they started businesses, such as opening restaurants, obtaining customers was difficult. Korean Chinese restaurants and grocery stores were less protected than Chinese ones from administrative officials and, eventually, they paid more fines than other Chinese owners (Lee Hyeon-Jung 2001, 78–79; interviews with restaurant owners in Shenyang in 2001 and in Beijing in 2003). The disadvantages of being a minority group have made Korean Chinese emphasize their ethnic identity less. The characteristics of Korean Chinese who have lived in cities for the long term challenged more about this. The percentage of Korean Chinese residents in the city who are able to speak Korean is much less than those in countryside (Park Kyeong-Rae 2002, 113–145).6 This fact has made Korean Chinese parents send their children to Chinese schools rather than ethnic Korean schools. A Korean Chinese sent his child to a Chinese school even though his job was a teacher in the Korean Chinese school: Being with Korean-Chinese is not helpful for us. That means we will be the handicapped people in this society forever. I sent my kid to a Chinese school. He cannot speak Korean at all. But that kind of education is better for his future. If he is interested in Korean things, he can learn about them whenever he wants later. But not right now. (Interview with a male Korean-Chinese teacher [thirty-six years old], Dec. 2001) On the other hand, a Korean Chinese student at Beijing University I interviewed emphasized that where one studies does not matter. He studied in ethnic schools from elementary to high school. He said that his success in being admitted to Beijing University shows that the ethnic boundary does not hinder adjustment to Han-Chinese society. At the same time, I also

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learned of a Korean Chinese student who was accepted at Beijing University, but went back to his hometown because it was difficult for him to catch up with other students. Some Korean Chinese regarded complete assimilation into Han-Chinese society as necessary for survival in market society. A Korean Chinese woman mentioned that intermarriage between Han-Chinese and Korean Chinese was completely impossible and even shameful when she was young, but she would not care if her son brought home a Chinese woman anymore (interview in 2001). A Korean Chinese taxi driver said that his daughter emphasized that she would not marry a Korean Chinese and he also said that he would not care (interview in 2001).7 In addition, the offspring of ethnic Korean and Chinese parents commonly choose their official ethnicity as Han-Chinese for their own advantages in Han-Chinese society.8 Benefits bestowed to minority groups by the government no longer provide enough benefits to ethnic minorities: Interviewer: Why didn’t you choose Korean Chinese ethnicity for your child? Isn’t it better for her to receive some benefits, especially for education? Female teacher: Getting extra scores for entering universities? That’s useless. Entering good schools in that way will make other students regard her as an extra score student as the minority. Studying harder in Chinese schools and competing with other Chinese in the same situations will give more benefits to her in the long term. (Interview with a female teacher in Shenyang, Dec. 2001) Korean Chinese Identity in Relation to South Koreans to the Early 1990s Korean Chinese started to feel ethnic affinity with South Koreans when Chinese opened to the global economy. Henry’s research on the change of ethnic identity of African Americans can be compared here. African Americans rejected Africa as an ancestral home (except Ethiopia, having a long single African nation). However, economic growth with the discovery of numerous oil fields in Nigeria has led to it becoming a significant player in the world market and has had a recognizable psychological impact, a growth of ethnic pride and awareness, on African Americans during the 1960s and 1970s (Henry 2000, 76–77). In the case of the Korean ethnic group in China, the transformation of the Chinese government policy from Communism to economic modernization planted different views about South Korea to Korean Chinese.


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Just several years ago, mentioning South Korea was illegal in China. One government official reported to a researcher: “Listening to South Korean mass media was strictly prohibited. One local government official mistakenly turned South Korean radio on in public. Even though he was respected by everyone, he was fired. Listening to South Korean programs and songs was not allowed” (Lee Hyeon-Jung 2001, 100). In addition, North Korea was the brother country of China. Korean Chinese had closer relations with North Korea than with South Korea. While Korean Chinese were not allowed to go to South Korea, they often went back and forth to North Korea. After the success of the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Seoul Olympics in South Korea, Korean Chinese acquired strong ethnic pride about their motherland, which was limited now to South Korea. Visible economic growth in the ancestral country gave a positive vision that Korean Chinese could find a path for accomplishing their dreams. In conjunction with the changes in international politics since the 1980s, the arrival of new roads, new services, and new forms of communications technology have clearly influenced Korean Chinese lives. The possibilities of exchange visits with South Korea and the availability of a wide range of mass media materials from western as well as South Korean sources meant many more cosmopolitan influences on Korean Chinese. Even though most Korean Chinese were from North Korea and had North Korean relatives who they were still contacting, their ethnic affinity rapidly headed to South Korea.9 In addition, imported South Korean films, videos, and music, which have been popular in China, made Korean Chinese accustomed to South Korean culture and people. It became easy to buy Korean movies and music on the streets of Chinese cities. The fast economic growth of South Korea and Hallyu established ethnic confidence in Korean Chinese minds. Hallyu especially influenced young Chinese, who followed popular fashions from South Korea—from buying fashion accessories to having plastic surgery.10 Korean Chinese have preferred to find common characteristics between themselves and South Koreans: “We are all baegeui minjok.11 Cleanliness, diligence, and a passion for learning can’t be changed no matter how long we have been apart” (interview with a Korean Chinese in Beijing, Dec. 2003). South Koreans and Korean Chinese describe themselves as “uri minjok” (our ethnic group). Korean Chinese also found that they could assimilate into South Korean society. Toward South Korea, they not only had economic expectations for it as a wealthier country than China, but also had cultural expectations as the same ethnic group. In South Korea, they felt that they would not

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experience the discrimination they experienced as a minority in China. A Korean Chinese woman, whom I interviewed in Beijing, married a South Korean man and gave up her national citizenship. She attends the service for South Koreans at her church and joins social activities for South Koreans. When I interviewed her, she emphasized that she does not know about things related to Korean Chinese anymore because she does not get along with them and has been in South Korea for a long time (interview with the wife of the owner of a Korean grocery store in Beijing, Nov. 2003). Not a few Korean Chinese mass media and radio stations switched their standard language to South Korean—Seoul-mal. When I was a teacher in a Korean Chinese school, students asked me to teach Seoul-mal and loved listening to South Korean songs at break time (Sept. to Dec. 2001).12 South Korean Identity in Relation to Korean Chinese to the Early 1990s In the early 1990s, South Koreans tended to move to northeast China. South Koreans have outnumbered other foreign travelers in the three northeastern provinces. South Koreans’ trust of members of the same ethnic group has strengthened relations between them. In addition to travelers, businessmen and students have preferred to go to northeast China. Many Korean associations in South Korea started having sister and brother relations with Korean Chinese communities and supported them. Many local South Korean schools set up sister and brother relations with ethnic schools in northeast China and have regularly sent school supplies. Local governments and associations have been established, such as sister and brother relations between the Yanji Korean Chinese Soccer Association and the Taebek Soccer Association (owned by a local government in South Korea). In addition, mass media sometimes encourage these kinds of relations to help Korean Chinese continue ethnic activities without financial problems (SindongA, June 2000). Major newspapers arrange a travel package, “Tracing Korean history in northeast China for 20–30 days” every summer for students. Travel agencies make similar offers. Emphasizing the same ethnicity, some South Koreans have cooperated with Korean Chinese or targeted their business toward them. Ethnic enclave economies arose from these trends. On the other hand, South Koreans feel distant from Korean Chinese. Most Korean Chinese have a North Korean accent that was not familiar to South Koreans and gave some reluctance to South Koreans. Since South Koreans were educated to regard North Koreans as the enemy, many wanted nothing to do with people who were closer to North Korea.13 In addition,


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the gap in living expenses between them made it hard to get along. The concept of “overseas Koreans” to South Koreans has developed from Koreans living in developed countries, such as the United States and Europe. Korean Chinese did not match their image. South Koreans, who had experienced rapid improvements in living conditions, and Korean Chinese, who had just started to improve themselves and were not as wealthy and modernized as South Koreans, could not help but recognize the economic gap. This difference generated conflicts. Korean Ethnicity after 1992 Since the 1990s, Korean Chinese have taken their nationality as well as ethnicity as significant. They have started creating their own ethnic and national boundaries through interactions with Koreans and Han-Chinese. In other words, their experiences in a broader society have reshaped their identity. Korean Chinese can be placed into three categories: first, those who emphasize ethnicity; second, those who rely on nationality; and third, those who straddle the fence and embrace both ethnicity and nationality at the same time. The policies of the two governments have also influenced their identities. The more they contact the non-Korean community in China, the more Korean Chinese tend to put heavier significance on their nationality. The more South Koreans contact Korean Chinese, the more South Koreans also believe Korean Chinese nationality to be more important than their ethnicity. Korean Chinese Identity in Relation to South Koreans Contacts with South Koreans since 1992 and direct interaction with HanChinese since economic reforms have given Korean Chinese a third identity: embracing both Korean ethnicity and Chinese nationality. They think of themselves as a group different from Koreans as well as from Han-Chinese. When they lived within their ethnic community, they emphasized their ethnic and cultural differences from the Han-majority. They claimed to be superior to Han-Chinese and liked to distinguish themselves based on dichotomous contrasts. However, when Korean Chinese have moved into Chinese-dominated society, they have felt that adherence to ethnic identity just brings about difficulties in being accustomed to Chinese society and consequent disadvantages. Moreover, contacts with South Koreans have made Korean Chinese more unsure of their identity rather than confirming it. A number of Korean Chinese have moved to South Korea with both economic and cultural

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expectations. However, their experiences in South Korea did not satisfy their expectations. On the one hand, South Koreans request that Korean Chinese should work obediently and hard with complete understanding of the atmosphere of South Korean society. On the other hand, South Koreans distinguish Korean Chinese as foreigners. Korean Chinese are regarded as nationally Chinese in the immigration office and as low-qualified laborers who can engage in simple work for low pay. The attitudes of South Koreans in China, who have emphasized the same ethnicity but treated Korean Chinese as simple laborers, have not improved their relations either. Socioeconomic class divisions separated Korean Chinese and South Koreans. South Koreans have regarded themselves as more cultivated than Korean Chinese. Their relations as employers and employees have also created more distance between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. Against the backdrop of these socioeconomic class divisions, interaction among South Koreans and Korean Chinese has caused conflict through misunderstandings and mutual betrayal. Having experienced these conflicts, Korean Chinese have questioned their ethnic identity. National identity has been emerging as a concern as significant as ethnic identity. The recently dispersed population of Korean Chinese has opened them to Han-Chinese society as well as to South Koreans. Places where they migrated have been mostly cities and coastal areas where new Korean communities are located and a large number of Korean Chinese laborers are required. At the same time, they have had more contact with Han-Chinese society. This circumstance has sometimes made Korean Chinese confused. One event shows it: Han-Chinese and South Korean businessmen cooperated and opened a company together. A Korean-Chinese worked as a middleman between them. But the Han-Chinese tricked the South Korean and took money from him illegally. When the South Korean businessman knew about it, he sued the Han-Chinese and asked the Korean-Chinese to be a witness. When they were in the court all together, the judge criticized the Korean-Chinese because he tried to help the foreigner, not the Chinese who had the same nationality. The judge yelled at him for being a national traitor. The Korean-Chinese was afraid that he would be hurt. He was confused. He didn’t say anything until the end of the trial. The trial was finished. That South Korean businessman couldn’t get any reimbursement from the Chinese man. It occurred at an early time when China had opened the market to foreigners and that’s why such a bizarre and unreasonable thing could happen. But now exactly the same thing happened in Beijing in 2002, too. Although the


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Korean-Chinese tried to help the South Korean businessman honestly, their position in Chinese society doesn’t give any help to us. Right, they are obviously Koreans to us. But it’s just to us. In this society and in this land, they are Chinese. (Interview with a South Korean businessman in Beijing, 2003) These contradictory situations in China and South Korea produced in Korean Chinese a third identity. Their permanent settlement is China, but they are a minority. They regard themselves as ethnic Koreans who reside in China and, on the other hand, their national identity is important. “Becoming Chinese” has become related to their survival. Korean Chinese attempt to use their dual identity to obtain economic advantages and social status: Traditionally, my parents’ generation emphasized he er butong (balanced but not the same). It means that even though we have a good relation with the Han majority, we will not be absorbed into their society and culture. But this gives us confusion right now. We are not Chinese, but we are not Korean either. He er butong doesn’t work anymore. Among the young generation, he er tong (balance and the same) works somewhat better. (From the opinion section of the Korean Chinese Internet homepage: www.moyza.com) Professor Kim Kyeong-il emphasizes that experiences with HanChinese have contributed to the weakening of “returning” consciousness and the strengthening of “settlement” consciousness. South Koreans made Korean Chinese recognize the significance of national identity (1998, 182). Heungnyongang Shinmun, the biggest Korean Chinese newspaper in China, also mentioned that economic reforms and the market economy made Korean Chinese completely Chinese (Nov. 7, 1995). However, it is hard to claim that Korean Chinese choose one and give up the other between national and ethnic identities. Rather, they should be identified as a dual-identity group. This characteristic sometimes confuses South Koreans or even themselves. Yoon Injin examines these conflicts in the writing of Korean Chinese intellectuals. A Korean Chinese poet Heo Ryunsun (1996) likened Korean Chinese to baramggot (wind flower), which cannot settle down in one place and constantly wanders about in two worlds. The third generation novelist Kim Jaeguk (1996) also compares Korea and China to “love toward being born and love toward being raised. (Yoon Injin 2004, 81)” Although they cannot ignore the love toward being born, they cannot help but choose the love toward being raised. Heilongjiang

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Daily even argued that abandoning the parents who raised them because of their poverty and choosing the parents who gave birth to them because they are a little bit better off are not human behaviors (Heungnyongang Shinmun, Sept. 12, 1995; Choi Woogil 2005, 60). Korean Chinese professor Jeong Panryong compares Korean Chinese to a daughter-in-law who was married off to China. He describes that she remains emotionally attached to her hometown, but she should do her best in a new house because she was already married (Choi Woogil 2005, 120). Professor Kim Kang-il articulates a third identity based on a combination of national and ethnic identities. He criticizes the “daughter-in-law” theory for suggesting that Korean Chinese can only succumb to China as inferiors rather than coexist as independent beings. He also criticizes the “motherland (Korea)—fatherland (China) division” theory due to potential discrimination. Kim Kang-il suggests that Korean Chinese should be identified as a community that has the equal relations with the Han-majority and, at the same time, has blood relations with Koreans (2001, 40). Several Web sites that were made by Korean Chinese also reflect changes in their perspectives toward ethnicity and nationality. One webpage made a symbol to represent Korean Chinese independently. The symbol features two circles with blue and red colors. In the middle of the circles, the number two and Chinese character zhong (zhong-guo: China) overlap. The symbol emphasizes Korean Chinese as independent from Chinese society. The two circles and the number two indicate two million, which is the population of Korean Chinese. Zhong in the middle of the circles means that Korean Chinese come together based on their link to Chinese land. This homepage is for Korean Chinese to look for jobs in Chinese and Korean companies and for news from China and Korea. Korean Chinese make small clubs inside the homepage as well. Government policies and diplomatic relations have also influenced their Korean Chinese identities. Ethnic betrayal between Korean Chinese and South Koreans has led to an emphasis on nationality instead of ethnicity. Nevertheless, their inseparable relations in the market economy lead Korean Chinese to have more flexible attitudes toward their identity. Government Policy and Identity The government policies of China and South Korea and diplomatic relations between them have also had significant influence on Korean Chinese identity. The Chinese government is much more cautious about Korean Chinese problems. On November 13, 2003, approximately 5,000 Korean


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Chinese had a demonstration, National Citizenship Restoration Campaign, to get Korean citizenship in South Korea and some of the Korean Chinese started having hunger strikes. They even said that they would give up Chinese citizenship instead. However, the Chinese government did not agree with that and strictly emphasized that Korean Chinese are Chinese. On the 24th of the same month, Korean Chinese had another demonstration, but they said that they would not abandon Chinese citizenship and they would like to get some legal or similar status to live in South Korea as well. The reason why they changed their minds so fast was that they were afraid that they would be regarded as national traitors in China. That could give some disadvantages to their family and relatives in China (Economic Life, 2003: 24–25).14 The South Korean government also did not support Korean Chinese eagerly because they were reluctant to encounter conflicts with the Chinese government. In 1995, the South Korean government identified Korean Chinese as Chinese and support for them would be limited to educational, cultural, and social aspects and not political (Choi Woogil, 2003). In addition, the government characterized them not as legal overseas Koreans ( jaeoe dongpo). According to the policy, Koreans who have foreign citizenship and had Korean citizenship after the establishment of the Republic of Korea (1949) are regarded as overseas Koreans and can stay in South Korea with legal status. Korean Chinese moved to China before the establishment of the Republic of Korea and, thus, they are not included among those who can legally sojourn in South Korea without problems. On the first draft of the law toward Koreans abroad in the late 1990s, Korean Chinese were included as overseas Koreans, but the Chinese government protested the law and gave diplomatic pressure to change it. Thus, the law changed and did not include Korean Chinese as overseas Koreans (Hanguk Gyeongje, Dec. 15, 1998). The South Korean government considered changing the law in 2001 again and tried to enact a new law from 2004. However, as soon as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the plan to change the status of Korean Chinese to permanent residence from 2004, the Chinese consulate stated that the South Korean government should consider that doing so would cause diplomatic conflicts between South Korea and China (Maeil Gyeongje, Dec. 6, 2001). These attitudes of the South Korean government stimulated anger Korean Chinese and some of them even regarded South Koreans as ethnic traitors. The result was for Korean Chinese to cling more to their national identity. Although the Chinese government takes precautions against the increase of relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans on the basis of

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ethnic and national issues,15 it encouraged more frequent relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans for business advantages. In 2001, the money that Korean Chinese sent from abroad (mostly from South Korea) to Chinese banks in Yanbian was approximately 300 million dollars. That amount is higher than the Yanbian government’s financial revenue of 200 million dollars (The Hankyoreh, Jan. 26, 2002). From 1998 to 2008, the Yanbian Autonomous Region earned 6.28 billion US dollars from its labor force working overseas, mostly in South Korea. Every year, Korean Chinese in South Korea bring 100,000 US dollars back to their hometowns, a sum that occupies 33 percent of Yanbian’s GDP (Heungnyongang Korean, June 30, 2009). Local Chinese governments since 1992 have sent Korean Chinese government officials to South Korea to find investors for their areas.16 The Jilin Provincial Government set up the Yanji-Korea Branch Office that helps South Koreans investing in Yanji. The Web site of the office emphasizes how many ethnic Koreans live in Yanji and how close it is to Mount Baekdu, a mountain of spiritual significance for all Koreans (www.yanjichina.net). On the other hand, China tries to separate the increase of South Korean communities from Korean Chinese. Shenyang has a big ethnic Korea town that is called Xita (west pagoda) in the middle of downtown. Historically, Korean independent activists started living there in the 1900s and the street became a Korea town in combination with business and entertainment. A great many Korean Chinese and South Koreans mix together there and the town became famous in South Korea as well. South Koreans and some mass media called it hanin-town (Korea town). In 2003, the Shenyang government official clarified that Xita is a “Korean Chinese Town” and should not be called “Korea Town.” The Chinese government has been concerned that the treatment of Korean Chinese by the South Korean government could ignite political demands from other ethnic minorities in China. If Korean Chinese were granted privileges in South Korea, other minority group might press for similar demands. So, in making policies toward Korean Chinese, the Chinese government has considered the reactions of other minorities. Korean Chinese are called a kuajie minzu (transnational ethnic group), living in two countries along the border. China has approximately twenty transnational ethnic groups (Newsmaker, June 11, 2004). These transnational ethnic groups depend spiritually on their ancestral homes. If their settlement country tries to increase economic and political control, members of the minority group tend to move to their mother land. This was the experience of Korean Chinese in China during the communist period. In the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1956, a large number of intellectuals


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and government officials were executed. Korean Chinese intellectuals also were executed as local nationalists. At that time, a number of scholars and scientists moved to North Korea (Lee Kwangkyu 2002, 99). In the Great Leap Forward in 1958, hungry Korean Chinese who had no food at all ran away to their relatives in North Korea. In the Cultural Revolution, the same phenomenon occurred (Yoon Injin 2004, 53). The large numbers of Korean Chinese who move to South Korea and who intend to change their nationality could stimulate other minority groups to similarly defect from loyalty to China. In addition, the Koreanization of Korean Chinese might hurt China in historical arguments between China and Korea. One of the biggest issues between the two countries recently has been the Goguryeo dynasty. China now occupies part of the land that was once the Goguryeo kingdom. Large numbers of South Korean tourists, as well as historians, have traveled to this region since normalization of relations with China. But the Chinese government has started insisting that the dynasty was a Chinese kingdom since the late 1990s and changed history textbooks in Chinese schools in the 2000s. Even though they know that this would cause diplomatic conflicts with Korea (including North Korea), Chinese scholars have started researching the area and emphasized the important roles of Korean Chinese to study the kingdom in Korean and Chinese (interview with Professor Wang in Dalian, Jan. 2004). The Chinese government worries about potential boundary conflicts after the reunification of the Korean peninsula (New York Times, Aug. 25, 2004). On the other hand, some Korean Chinese participation in this historical research on the Chinese side seems to upset South Korea (SindongA, March 1, 2004). New Term and Another Conflict As the number of South Koreans who live in China is increasing and some of them have been long-term sojourners, they are introduced as xinxianzu (new Koreans, in Chinese). The term has even become a new entry in an online Korean dictionary (Dong-A Ilbo, Oct. 10, 2003; www. ohmynews.com, Oct. 25, 2006). In flyers and magazines for South Koreans in China, they enjoy calling themselves xinxianzu. Obviously, the term distinguishes South Koreans from Korean Chinese, chaoxianzu. In an article on “ ‘Chaoxianzu’ and ‘Xinxianzu,’ ” a Korean Chinese argues that the term encourages discrimination by South Koreans toward Korean Chinese. Some argue that being called xinxianzu implies belonging to a group inferior to the Han-Chinese and therefore recommend not using the term (Heungnyongang Shinmun, Sept. 11, 2007). The new term

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is regarded as a means of enforcing status stratification among different groups. Flexible Identities? Under these complicated conditions, I would like to argue that Korean Chinese have had flexible identities depending on their status and relations with social networks. They can be categorized into three kinds. The first is to emphasize their ethnic identity and disregard the national identity. Korean Chinese who work with South Koreans take their ethnic identity as the most important and some of them have changed their national identity. A Korean Chinese emphasized his ethnic identity and explained why he changed his citizenship: I have never thought I was Chinese. Chinese and Koreans are different and our cultures can’t be mingled. I always told my family and friends I will go to South Korea. Nobody believed me. When I left China in 1990, I carried all my pictures because I thought I would not come back to China. As soon as I got to Korea, everything was fine. I lived with my relatives and they helped me to find my job and wife. I still think that it is impossible for Koreans to mix with Han-Chinese completely. We are different. We are Koreans. (Interview in Beijing, Sept. 2003) The second is to emphasize their national identity and abandon their ethnic identity. Having bad experiences with South Koreans directly or indirectly (from gossip or direct experience or from relatives or friends), some Korean Chinese work to assimilate to Han-Chinese society. In addition, having grown up in Han society, some Korean Chinese naturally have strong national identity. Third, some Korean Chinese do not choose either one and do use both ethnic and national identities. They have business related to South Koreans and come and go to South Korea regularly. They are sensitive about changes in South Korean society and pay attention to relations with them for their business. However, they do not attend any activities with Korean Chinese and get along with Han-Chinese. The case of a Korean Chinese owner of several grocery stores in Korea towns in Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai shows how he has made use of ethnic and national identities for his business: I worked for South Koreans in Harbin for several years and they sent me to South Korea. I worked there and got to know about Korea. My


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wife couldn’t speak Korean at all although she is Korean. She studied Korean hard. I made several good Korean friends in South Korea and I still have business contact with them. I can buy Korean goods from them with much cheaper prices and hear what things are popular in Korea. That helps my business here because most of my customers are South Koreans. But, now I get along with Chinese. I don’t have South Korean and Korean-Chinese friends here. My wife has almost forgotten Korean again. She just remembers basic expressions and my two sons are both in Chinese schools. They can’t speak Korean either. If they need it, they can learn later. (Interview in Beijing, Dec. 2003) Age difference affects these three categories. The first case is seen especially among old people and the second and third cases among young people. The divide is between generations raised before and after the Cultural Revolution. Young people who were influenced by the Cultural Revolution, who are now middle aged, did not have chances to learn Korean and Korean history. They have less ethnic solidarity than older people. In addition, they do not have any specific nostalgia as strong as elderly Korean Chinese who were born in North and South Koreas. Elderly people think about Korea with their hearts, but young people with their brains. Other scholars’ research also reflects different perspectives on ethnic and national identities by generation. Yoon Injin conducted fieldwork in Qingdao in 2003. He researched the extent of consciousness and pride of ethnic identity, inter-ethnic marriage, and maintenance of traditional culture by generation. He concluded that even though the third generation does not have strong consciousness of ethnic identity or maintenance of Korean culture to the extent of the first generation, a high percentage of them still has these tendencies. Of the first and second generations, 83 percent said that they have strong consciousness about their ethnic identity, but only 55.4 percent of the third generations do. However, among the third generation, those who do not regard themselves as Koreans were just 5.3 percent. While 70 percent of the first and second generations said that they have strong ethnic pride, 47.3 percent of the third generation agreed. Another 46.2 percent said that they are “somewhat” proud and 10.3 percent said “not really” or “not at all.” Choosing marriage partners also shows this tendency. More than 77 percent of the first generation emphasized that Koreans should marry Koreans, 63.2 percent of the second said so, and 47.9 percent of the third. More than 31.7 percent of the third generation said that they would marry Korean Chinese possibly and 20.4 percent said that it does not matter. This shows that they still prefer to be married

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to Koreans. Maintaining Korean culture also reveals this. More than 58 percent of the first generation, 52.6 percent of the second, and 37.3 percent of the third said that keeping up traditional culture is important. The rest of the respondents said that they think it is generally important. Through this research, Yoon shows that Korean Chinese generally still think ethnic identity is important (2004, 85–86). On the other hand, Im Gyesun had interviews with 393 South Korean and Korean Chinese university students in 2002. Of South Korean interviewees, 85 percent felt close to Korean Chinese and said that they should be South Korean citizens. However, they did not understand why Korean Chinese think of China as their joguk—their mother land. She interprets their responses in light of their historical perspective as a “one-ethnic-groupcountry.” In Korea-China soccer games, South Koreans think that Korean Chinese should support the Korea team. On the other hand, 86 percent of Korean Chinese students answered that they do not want to be Korean citizens and will support China if there is a soccer game between two countries (Im Gyesun 2003, 348).17 Since the late 1990s, South Koreans have tended to regard Korean Chinese as Chinese as well. Experiences with Korean Chinese taught them that they should not depend on Korean Chinese and ought to survive by their own efforts in China. South Korean businessmen now have a tendency to avoid hiring Korean Chinese as employees and working together as partners. Even though they work together, they regard them as Chinese and have equal treatment with Chinese. In the mass media from the late 1990s, Korean Chinese have been described first as “ jungguk-in” (Chinese). The terms for Korean Chinese in South Korea have been always sensitive issues. Since 2004 after the revised regulations, they are supposed to be included as overseas Koreans and called jaeoe dongpo (brothers and sisters who live abroad). Since 2004, the public media tends to call them “hanguk gye jungguk-in” (Chinese who are ethnic Koreans) or “ jungguk dongpo” (brothers and sisters in China). However, the common term for them in South Korea is still joseon-jok (the Korean pronunciation of chaoxianzu), which sometimes brings criticisms because it is regarded as having the implication of looking down on them or differentiating them from other overseas Koreans who are always called “gyopo” or “dongpo” (brothers and sisters)—including jaemi gyopo (Korean-Americans) and jaeil gyopo (Korean-Japanese). Even small accidents between Korean Chinese and South Koreans sometimes develop into ethnic conflicts and disappointments with each other. In May 2004, a South Korean customer was seriously beaten by Korean Chinese waiters in a Korean restaurant in Beijing. The owner of the restaurant turned


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out to be Korean Chinese. Among South Koreans, anger toward the owner and Korean Chinese arose.18 In conclusion, ethnic and national identities of Korean Chinese have had practical and flexible functions depending on their social, economic, and geographical circumstances. We can see that political and diplomatic matters have also influenced the interplay of the two types of identity.


CHAPTER 4

South Korean and Korean Chinese Business Relations in China

S

outh Korean investment in China generally has three characteristics: by industry, the focus is in manufacturing; by scale, firms tend to be small or medium-sized; and by region, they are concentrated in the northeast area and Huaibohai area. Recently, South Korean investment has changed from being driven by cheap labor costs to being motivated by Chinese consumers. Until the mid-1990s, the Chinese labor market was the prime attraction to South Korean business. Since then, Chinese consumer markets have taken over as the main impetus for investment. In addition, another recent change is the popularity of all Chinese regions to Korean investors. Korean companies are willing to spread across China’s regions. The importance of local customers is the force that drives this. In addition, it is now easy to find Korean Chinese workers beyond northeast China because of the urban migration of Korean Chinese. The increase in South Koreans who have lived in China for many years and therefore have become familiar with the China markets also contributes to this trend. In the following two chapters, I discuss the characteristics of Korean companies in the Chinese market and relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans as employers and employees or business partners. In chapter 5, I explain why Korean companies favor specific areas in China, what hiring systems they use, and what roles Korean Chinese play. I argue that specific location preferences and the scale of South Korean companies in China relate to roles for Korean Chinese in South Korean business in China.

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In chapter 6, I analyze what results the relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans in business have brought, how these results affect their relations, and why and how South Korean companies have changed their marketing strategies. Business relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans have brought about conflicts. Ethnic solidarity, which was assumed by both parties, has been weakened. In fact, emphasis on ethnic solidarity has instead set off more serious conflicts between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. Characteristics of South Korean Firms in China In this part, I divide characteristics of South Korean firms into four aspects: the rapid rise of Korean companies in China, firm sectors, firm size, and the transformation from orientation to labor markets to Chinese consumer markets. From the United States to China China has become the favorite target of South Korean foreign investment. Indirect trade between South Korea and China started in 1983 by going through a third country, especially Hong Kong. Direct trade opened in 1988, but it was limited until the 1992 normalization relation. The volume of trade between China and South Korea has increased 22 percent every year since 1992. Of companies that have plans to invest abroad, 68.8 percent consider Chinese markets in 2003 (Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy). According to figure 4.1, the volume of trade between South Korea and China in 2003 surpassed the volume of trade that was between South Korea and the United States for the first time. The volume of trade between South Korea and China has increased rapidly. China has also made use of Korean markets. In 1992, business exchange between the two countries amounted to approximately 6.4 billion dollars. In 1995, it increased to 16.5 billion dollars and in 1996, it reached 20 billion dollars. The main reason why South Korean companies turned their interests to China was to use cheap laborers and to participate in the rapid economic growth of Chinese markets (Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy). A characteristic of trade between the two countries is that the exports of South Korea to China are much higher than the exports of China to South Korea. Korea’s trade surplus with China has been rising fast, nearly doubling between 2002 and 2003. In 2003, of 14.9 billion dollars in trade profits earned by Korea, 13.2 billion dollars were from Chinese markets.

Business Relations in China 100,000,000 90,000,000

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China United States

80,000,000 70,000,000 60,000,000 50,000,000 40,000,000 30,000,000 20,000,000 10,000,000 0 1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

Figure 4.1 Volume of the export and import of Korea with China and the United States (unit: $). Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea, www.Koreaexim.go.kr, 2004. Korea International Trade Association, www.stat.kita.net, 2009.

In other words, 88.6 percent of Korean trade profits was obtained from China. However, China has not been happy about this. China pressures Korea to import Chinese agricultural products. In 2000, when Korea prohibited garlic imported from China because of harmful elements (valued at 15 million dollars), China prohibited the importing of cellular phones and polyethylene, worth approximately 500 million dollars, from South Korea (The Hankyoreh, Aug. 24, 2004). In 2007, Korea’s total foreign trade profit was 14.6 billion dollars; Korea’s trade surplus with China was more than 19 billion dollars. When Korea had lost 13.3 billion dollars from trade in 2008, Korea still had a 14.5 billion dollar trade surplus with China. Firm Sectors South Korean companies have concentrated in manufacturing, which makes use of the large number of laborers in Chinese markets. Manufacturing investment in China occupied 61 percent of South Korea’s total manufacturing investment in foreign countries in 2005. However, it has been

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decreasing since 2006 (51 percent of manufacturing investment went to China), in 2007 (46 percent) and in 2008 (34 percent) (Export-Import Bank of Korea). Most manufacturing companies are attracted by Chinese labor markets. In the 1990s, electronic communications equipment and textile and garments were the highest investment fields of Korean companies. Electronic communications equipment made up 24 percent of South Korean investment in China in 1994, and textiles and garments 15 percent. These figures became 38 percent and 10 percent respectively in 2004. In terms of investment acts, electronic communications equipment occupied 9 percent and textile and garments occupied 27 percent in 1994, and 18 percent and 14 percent respectively in 2004. This shows that big companies are engaged in the electronic communications equipment field and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are involved in the textile and garments (Export-Import Bank of Korea). Since 2000, electronic communications equipment, petrochemicals, and transportation machinery have been the top sectors receiving Korean investment. Big companies have been engaged in petrochemicals and transportation machinery in the 2000s. Korean business in China has transformed from labor-intensive industry to capital-intensive industry. In addition, these changes indicate that larger firms account for a larger proportion of total Korean investment in China. Besides the manufacturing field, the second highest amount of investment is in the service sector. In big cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, in northeast China, and in ethnic Korean communities, the service sector, especially as real estate, restaurants, and lodging are fast developing. In 2007, investment in real estate increased to 106.2 percent compared to the previous year (Ministry of Strategy and Finance). Firm Size South Korean firms in China tend to be small, either branch offices and factories of South Korean companies or SMEs. Figure 4.2 shows that investment in China by SMEs in 1993 was approximately 72 percent of the total investment. After 1994, the relative importance of SMEs decreased gradually. In 1998, it even dropped to 12 percent.1 After 1998, their portion has been growing and in 2004, it reached 59 percent. The first reason for the flood of SMEs to China was the increase of Korean labor costs. According to figure 4.3, the wage of Chinese manufacturing laborers in 2003 was more than ten times cheaper than that of Koreans. Even though wages of manufacturing laborers in China are still

Business Relations in China

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80 China All Foreign Countries

71.9 70 60.8 60

53.9 47.6

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48

42 40

40

34

38.8

30 25.7 20.5

23

20.7

18

10

16

41

38

24

22 20

56

27.9 12

17 16.3

5.8

0

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Figure 4.2 Foreign investment by SMEs as proportions of total South Korean foreign investment (percent). Source: Foreign Investment Statistics of the Export-Import Bank of Korea, www.Koreaexim. go.kr, 2004.

Korea

9.99

China

0.8 2003 0

2

4

6

8

10

12

(Unit: $)

Figure 4.3

Hourly wages of manufacturing laborers.

Source: The Boston Consulting Group, Capturing Global Advantage, 2004: 21.

cheap compared to Korea, Chinese wages have been consistently increasing more than 10 percent every year (National Bureau of Statistics, 2008). Rather than choosing China for cheap labor markets, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries as well as North Korea are recently receiving attention. Labor in Vietnam is 30 percent cheaper than in China, and the

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Kaesung Industrial Zone in North Korea has been more attractive to Korean SMEs. From 2008, revised labor contract law in China has also led many SMEs to move to other countries (The Hankyoreh, Dec. 02, 2007). Big enterprises of Korea have also gradually advanced in Chinese markets after being assured of the prospects of Chinese markets and studying their options. They also started early trade with mainland China through Hong Kong in the mid-1980s. First, they exported clothes and later they exported electronics. Samsung already had its own office by the name of Hong Kong investors in Beijing in the mid-1980s. Even though the Chinese government knew that it was from South Korea, they pretended not to know (Hanguk Gyeongje, Feb. 18, 2002). Considering the prospect of Chinese markets, big enterprises invested slower than SMEs. Since the middle-late 1990s, the ratio of investment by big enterprises in China has been increasing. After 1997, the growth of the ratio of foreign investment by SMEs can be explained by the increase of foreign investment in the information technology field. This also explains the relative significance of the electronics and communications markets. Particularly companies focusing on these fields have been dashing to China. Chinese statistics showed that 70 percent of the total investment from Korea to China was from SMEs in 2007 (Liu 2007, 8). From Labor Markets to Chinese Consumer Markets Although SMEs that advanced in China in the early 1990s converged on utilizing cheap Chinese labor and exporting products to other countries, SMEs in the late 1990s have focused on Chinese consumer markets (Dongbuk Journal, July 2004). Preferences differ depending on firm size. In general, the conglomerate enterprises started exploring the internal markets and concentrating on Chinese consumers while the SMEs focused on using cheap labor. More than half of SMEs concentrated on cheap labor and 24.3 percent tended to explore the internal markets before 2003. In contrast with SMEs, 37 percent of big enterprises focused on the labor market and 50.7 percent tried to make use of internal consumer markets. The stronger preference for internal markets by the SMEs and the big enterprises has been clear since 2003. In that year, 37 percent of SMEs opened companies for using cheap labor and, on the other hand, 34.5 percent turned their interest to internal markets. Among conglomerates, 63.6 percent were interested in exploring Chinese consumer markets and only 13.6 percent were focusing on the cheap labor markets (Export-Import Bank of Korea, www.koreaexim.go.kr, 2004).

Business Relations in China 10.00

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Labor Markets/Domestic Markets

143.30%

141.60% 107.60%

100.00%

1.00 1993

1996

1998

2002

2007 47%

0.10

Figure 4.4 Purposes of Korean investment in China. Source: Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, www.korcham.net, 2002. Note: Ratio of Investment in Chinese Labor versus Investment in Chinese Consumption.

Figure 4.4 shows the ratio of investment in Chinese labor market against investment in Chinese consumer market over time. After the normalization of relations between South Korea and China in 1992, South Korean companies preferred to make use of labor markets. In 1996, a roughly equal number of firms were interested in Chinese labor and consumer markets. After the economic crisis in 1997, the number of companies that invest in China for the labor market increased again. However, since recovering from the crisis, companies have been interested in exploring Chinese consumer markets gradually. Many firms have plans to focus on Chinese consumer markets within five years. These changes show how Korean companies have sold products that are made in China chronologically. Table 4.1 shows that 73.6 percent of dollars invested in South Korean manufacturing companies in China was occupied for exporting to South Korea and third countries at the end of 1993. On the other hand, the extent of selling in the Chinese consumer markets was just 26.4 percent. In 1995, the former became 68.3 percent and the latter 31.7 percent. Investment in production for Chinese consumption has been rising. By 2001, half of South Korean investment in China was goods intended for the Chinese market (Export-Import Bank of Korea, www. koreaexim.go.kr, 2002).

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Table 4.1

Selling structure in China (1993–2001) (percent) Sales in the Chinese consumer markets

1993a 1995a 1999b 2000b 2001b

Export to South Korea

26.4 31.7 44.5 46.6 50.0

Export to Third Countries 73.6 68.3

24.1 24.5 21.5

31.5 28.8 28.5

Source: aKorea Entrepreneurship-International Association, 1998. b Export-Import Bank of Korea, 2002. Note: Manufacturing companies that invested 10,000 dollars per event were researched.

Compared to all Korean companies abroad, Korean companies in China still invest less in goods for local markets.2 However, in the case of big enterprises, such as those investing more than 10,000 dollars, the significance of Chinese consumer markets has been rising. Location A South Korean couple I met on a ship from Dalian to Incheon opened a toy store in Yanbian and was on the way back to South Korea to bring Korean stationery goods. Korean stationery products were popular among Chinese teenagers and through their business the couple was so far making a profit. I asked them why they opened their store in Yanbian, rather than in a big, developed city. When the man had worked in a company in South Korea, he was acquainted with some Korean Chinese employees and became friends with them. When he traveled to China and visited Yanbian, he felt comfortable running into ethnic Koreans and living in an area where shop signs were written in Korean. Yanbian was not like a foreign country. In considering doing business in China, his friend, a Korean Chinese, recommended Yanbian and promised to support him and introduce his friends there. Without hesitation over where they would start their business, the couple opened their store in Yanbian. As in this case, South Korean firms’ location decisions have been guided much by informal contacts and private networks, not through research or economic calculations of projected gain or loss based solely on local characteristics. Social networks could provide essential information to entrepreneurs and minimize business risks. South Koreans set up their business in globalizing China using ethnic Korean network and in areas populated by


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many Koreans. Location decisions by Korean firms snowballed in the northern part and east coast of China in the early times and later entrepreneurs followed them. The areas preferred by South Korean firms have generally not been popular among other foreign companies. I will address three preferred places in the following text. Yanbian The Korean Chinese stronghold of Yanbian was a popular early destination of South Korean business in China. South Korean entrepreneurs knew that China was a great business opportunity, but they had little chance to study local conditions. In Yanbian they easily found Korean Chinese who could help them, especially as interpreters and managers of Chinese labor. As a matter of fact, Yanbian was not the best place to start business because the area was economically backward, far from higher growth regions, and also very cold. However, the presence of co-ethnics drove many South Korean entrepreneurs there. In addition, although living standards in Yanbian are low, its living environment has important resemblances to South Korea. In much of Yanji, the prefectural capital, one could walk around and forget that it is part of China. Hot pepper, dried seaweed, kimchi, and other Korean food materials can be purchased in grocery stores from clerks who speak Korean. Restaurants serve Korean food and drinks. All store signs are written in Korean that makes daily life much easier than in towns that are more Chinese. Several interviewees reported that they felt especially comfortable in Yanbian. Particularly in the early 1990s, when Korean settlements in China had just started, Yanbian was attractive to South Korean entrepreneurs. The Pull of the Northeast In addition to Yanbian, northeast China has been a popular destination among South Korean entrepreneurs. No place has grown to be as Korean as Yanbian, but enclaves did emerge in other cities and counties in the northeast for their recently enlarged Korean Chinese populations. Many South Korean businessmen went to these areas for the same economic and lifestyle reasons that others went to Yanbian. Furthermore, once these links were set up, successive waves of businesses followed them. In interviews with businessmen in China, the reason for their choices of location is commonly related to having contacts in the area. Initial investment in the northeast had a snowball effect,

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whereby social networks laid tracks bringing South Korean capital to specific destinations. The northeast thus became a major locus of South Korean business in China. Disproportionate investment in this area continues fifteen years after South Korean firms first entered China, and despite that the region has yet to shake off the legacy of high levels of state ownership and heavy industry. By 2004, Korean companies in Jilin province totalled 1,095 and invested 400.75 million dollars, which made South Korea the top foreign investor in the province. Heilongjiang province had 1,128 Korean companies and they invested 29 million dollars, ranking second among countries investing in the province (Dongbuk Journal, Jan. 2004). Besides the presence of Korean Chinese, other factors encouraged this concentration. Looking at a map of this region, South Korean investment in China’s northeast makes sense. Proximity is certainly an advantage. In the early 1990s, Korean companies did not focus on Chinese customer markets. Machines, parts, inputs, and finished products can be easily and quickly shipped between Incheon or Pusan in South Korea and China’s Dalian port, which links up to the northeast’s railway network. South Koreans can fly to airports in the northeast in one or two hours. Another link between the northeast and South Korean entrepreneurs is made actively by Chinese local governments. In decentralized China, local governments have big incentives to lure rich South Korean firms to their jurisdictions. As discussed in chapter 3 regarding Korean Chinese government officials, local governments send Korean Chinese officials to South Korea to invite businessmen to establish operations in their locality. Korean Chinese officials can appeal to the ethnic sentiments of South Koreans and gain their trust more easily than Han Chinese could. As the large majority of counties and cities that have Korean Chinese on their staff are in the northeast, these networks also encourage South Korean businesses to locate in the northeast. For example, the Yanbian government opened an office in Seoul and Korean Chinese government officials look for South Korean investors and act as consultants for South Korean people who are interested in opening business in China. Networks unrelated to business also bring South Korean firms to the northeast. South Korean missionaries favor the northeast because their priority is often to convert Korean Chinese. For missionary work, having a common language is very important because most church organizations do not have their own Chinese speakers and cannot afford to hire interpreters. The strong overlap of church and business networks within South Korea gives businessmen exposure to missionaries and contacts in the northeast. These religious networks will be discussed more in chapter 7.


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However, the geographic proximity of the northeast has been only a secondary factor. Social factors linking South Korea to this region have been crucial. While some South Korean entrepreneurs went directly to Korean Chinese enclaves for their help or to feel more at home, others started in the northeast for different purposes. When South Koreans consider opening business in China, many often first make a research trip. How do they decide where to go when they make this trip? Many follow friends or acquaintances—and these tend to be in the northeast. But a possibly larger group travel, often with organized tours, to see sites that are of particular interest to Koreans. In this way, the cultural significance of the northeast makes it the first Chinese destination of many South Korean entrepreneurs. After touring the area, these prospective businessmen do decide on locating in the northeast. North China (Huaibohai Region) The other main region of South Korean business in China is north China, which includes the cities of Beijing3 and Tianjin, and the provinces of Hebei, Henan, Shandong, and northern Jiangsu. LG, one of the top conglomerates, was the first South Korean firm to establish workshops in Shandong. Unlike initial investments in the northeast, early decisions to locate in north China and especially Shandong were largely instrumental. The shortest shipping route between China and South Korea is from northern Shandong. Locating there minimized transportation costs. Compared with the northeast, north China in the early 1990s suffered less from problems of decrepit state-owned enterprises and some places were experiencing economic boom. Once a few South Korean companies established themselves in north China, the ethnic network was touched off. Other South Korean firms followed the early ones there. These included both firms in South Korea just entering China for the first time, as well as some relocating from the northeast. As in the northeast, social networks of South Korean businessmen drew them into north China. An entrepreneur in South Korea who is considering investing in China is more likely to know someone who is doing business in the northeast or north than anywhere else in China. Other South Koreans have moved to north China to open service sector establishments for the firms and people who first entered north China. As discussed in chapter 2, the emergence of South Korean enclaves in north China prompted a pattern of Korean Chinese following South Koreans. Korean Chinese moved in large numbers to get jobs in South Korean firms in areas that had no Korean Chinese at all before 1990. Much

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of this migration was organized, at least informally: South Korean employers drew on labor chains that led back to rural Yanbian and other Korean areas, as Korean Chinese labor bosses would recruit from their home villages in the northeast. Others and perhaps more numerous Korean Chinese moved to South Korean invested areas in north China to offer services. In this way, rural-urban migration and the pull of the ethnic network worked together. By the mid-1990s Korean enclaves had developed in north China. Unlike the northeast, where some places had long had Korean populations, Korean enclaves in north China started from South Korean businesses. South Korean businesses, Korean Chinese workers, and supporting establishments became concentrated in specific places, such as Yantai and Weihai in Shandong and particular districts in Beijing and Tianjin. South Korean preference for investing in north China instead of richer areas farther south along the coast was well established. As of the early 2000s, 83.9 percent of the acts of total investment of South Korea and 74.3 percent of the amount of total investment were concentrated in the Huaibohai region and northeast China (Export-Import Bank of Korea, 2001). The rest of areas, such as South Coast and Changjiang area, occupied less than 5 percent of the amount of total investment. Figure 4.5 illustrates that while most foreign investment in China was concentrated in the lower Yangtze region (centering on Shanghai) and in the southeast (focused on the Pearl River Delta), South Koreans operated disproportionately little in these areas. In contrast with other foreign

9.4

27.3

53.8

3 4.9

Korea

1.1

6.9

17.5

35.2

28.9

5.9 5.6

World

0

20

40

60

80

100

Northeast North Coast East Coast South Coast Changjiang Others

120

Figure 4.5 Amount of investment in China by Korean and all foreign companies by region (percent). Source: China Statistics Yearbook 2002. Note: “Others” indicate the southwest, northwest, and the middle region around the Yellow River.


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countries, which invested in each area with some balance, South Korea has attached greater importance to the north coast area. Foreign companies focused on southern China and South Korean companies, on the other hand, just directed 3 to 5 percent of investment to southern China from 1992 to 2002. Korean companies have tended to avoid those areas because they have thought that those areas are already occupied by overseas Chinese and Hong Kong businessmen. The job mobility rate of Chinese employees in Korean companies in areas with many other foreign companies is comparatively high, because Chinese employees prefer to move to other foreign companies. Aware of this situation, Korean companies look for less competitive places (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, www.kotra. or.kr. 1998). Hiring Systems When Korean entrepreneurs open their companies in China, whom they will hire is an important issue. Korean companies send several residential representatives to open branch offices in China. In the early 1990s, they arrived on Chinese land and only gradually have come to understand Chinese language and markets. Thus, these companies have needed local people to understand local markets and have friendly relations with local businessmen and government officials in particular. Korean Chinese could be trusted under the name of the same ethnic group, and many of them have bilingual skills. They could work many roles, from simple interpreters to significant negotiators with Chinese entrepreneurs and government officials. Kim Si-Joong researched 56 South Korean companies in China in 1994 and 91.3 percent of them answered that Korean Chinese played important roles in their business as employees and partners in an early stage. Only 5 percent of firms reported that Korean Chinese were unimportant. By role, 40.8 percent of firms had Korean Chinese as guides in China, who would interpret and translate for business. Another 17.3 percent of businesses had Korean Chinese research Chinese markets and gather business-related-information for South Korean employers. In addition, 13.3 percent of firms had Korean Chinese introduce them to local businessmen and government officials (Kim Si-Joong, 1994). A residential representative of Samsung also reports that Korean Chinese contributed to the fast settlement of Korean companies in China (Seoul Gyeongje, Jan. 10, 1997). Thus, the roles of Korean Chinese have been important in the hiring systems of Korean companies. South Korean employers have hired Korean

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Chinese in various roles and proportions of their workforce. In this section, I identify four types of hiring systems of Korean companies that differ according to the ethnic composition of employees. I discuss the roles of Korean Chinese in each system. Employment Composition Hiring strategies of South Korean companies can be divided according to the background of employees: all Korean Chinese, a mix of Korean Chinese and Chinese, or all Chinese employee strategies. On the basis of ethnicity, four types of employment composition can be identified, as illustrated in figure 4.6: Type I: South Korean employers + Korean Chinese employees. Type I is composed of South Korean employers who hire only Korean Chinese employees. South Korean companies send several South Korean employees and those employees take charge of branch companies or factories in China. Or, some South Koreans go to China with small capital and open their business. They tend to hire Korean Chinese. A large number of Korean companies preferred this first hiring strategy in the early 1990s. With a shortage of understanding of Chinese language and markets, Korean entrepreneurs were able to advance in their business through Korean Chinese. Small enterprises and firms in the entertainment sector favored this hiring strategy. For small enterprises, employers could expect to build companies with Korean atmosphere, using the benefits of a low cost country. In the case of the entertainment sector, firms are usually small restaurants, grocery stores, and karaoke. Service and entertainment establishments in Korea towns prefer to hire Korean Chinese employees for South Korean customers. In addition, because employers have more frequent direct contacts with Chinese customers, they need Chinese-speaking employees and Korean Chinese can fulfill that need. In a Korea town, the Wangjing district in Beijing, all stores except large restaurants and cafés tended to hire all Korean Chinese employees (fieldwork in winter, 2003). The reason is for South Korean residents’ convenience. The owner of a grocery store in Beijing who hired all Korean Chinese employees was a South Korean and Korean Chinese couple. The store was small at first and later expanded. They opened two more small sections, a Korean food delivery service and Korean drama and movie rental sections. Most customers are South Koreans. Thus, the cook should know how to


I. South Korean employers

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75

I. South Korean employers II. Korean Chinese managers

II. Korean Chinese employees (managers and simple laborers) III. Chinese simple laborers Type I

I. South Korean employers II. Chinese and Korean Chinese (university degree) III. Korean Chinese (translators, managers)

Type II

I. South Korean employers

II. Chinese employees

IV. Simple laborers (Chinese) Type III

Type IV

Figure 4.6 Composition of company.

cook Korean food and the employee who takes care of the rental section should read and speak Korean.4 The legal owner of the grocery store is the wife’s mother (the Korean Chinese wife switched her citizenship to South Korea). Her mother brought her friends’ relatives from Yanbian. (The wife moved to Beijing first, where she met her husband. After marriage, she brought her family from Yanbian and her mother brought employees from her hometown.) Relations between employers and employees in the first hiring strategy thus require strong ethnic trust and solidarity. Employers sometimes let Korean Chinese employees manage business documents. When employers

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take Korean Chinese from their hometowns, they also provide places where employees can stay. Small South Korean business entrepreneurs and service sector owners have more intimate relations with Korean Chinese as partners or employees. According to Chinese law, foreigners who are engaged in manufacturing or textile business worth less than 100,000 yuan cannot receive long-term visas and have their own business. This business circumstance also has motivated South Koreans to look for Korean Chinese as partners and supporters. Many South Korean entrepreneurs have come to depend heavily on Korean Chinese. Type II: South Korean employers + Korean Chinese & Chinese employees. The second type is the most common hiring strategy that Korean companies use. In this type, Korean Chinese work as managers and labor bosses of ethnic Chinese labor and serve as intermediaries for business negotiations. South Koreans need Korean Chinese for intermediating South Korean employers and the number of Chinese laborers. Korean Chinese play multiple roles in this strategy. They work as intermediaries between South Korean employers and Chinese businessmen and government officials. When South Korean and Chinese businessmen have negotiations, Korean Chinese function as interpreters and they translate business documents. They also work as managers and directors of Chinese employees. They play the role of communicating with South Korean employers and Chinese employees. They are hired first and they hire Chinese employees. Korean residential representatives in a textile company in Korea traveled to Yanbian and made contracts with a female Korean Chinese. Before they opened a factory, she looked for other Korean Chinese and Chinese employees (interview in Seoul, 2004). The number of Korean Chinese employees is less than Chinese in this type of firm, but their status is higher than that of Chinese. Rather large service sector establishments make use of this type. The location of the companies is also not limited to Korea towns. They target Chinese customers as well. A Korean restaurant in Dalian hired staffs that were half Korean Chinese and half Chinese. To prevent inconveniences to South Korean costumers who do not speak Chinese at all, each waiter and waitress has a wireless microphone. When Chinese waiters and waitresses do not understand exactly what Korean customers want, they can ask for help from Korean Chinese employees. A Korean Chinese manager who was scouted from another area intermediates relations between the employer and employees. This company structure is likely to give rise to complicated conflicts on the basis of ethnic divisions: South Korean employers and Korean


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Chinese employees, South Korean employers and Chinese employees, and Korean Chinese and Chinese employees. Hiring Korean Chinese employees requires extra money due to the name of bilingual ability. The higher salary of Korean Chinese compared to Chinese employees causes conflicts or even fights between employees. Chinese employees usually think that it is not fair. Chinese employees think that they work as hard as, or harder than, Korean Chinese employees. I will discuss this in the next chapter. Type III: South Korean employers + Korean Chinese & Chinese employees. The third type of hiring strategy is rather complicated. In this type, talented Korean Chinese and Chinese have important white-collar positions. South Korean residential representatives hire skilled Chinese and Korean Chinese employees. In this case, the number of South Korean residential representatives is small, sometimes even one. This hiring system can be found in companies of comparatively large scale and more professional fields. Instead of sending more South Korean residential representatives from South Korea, companies hire more local professional employees. Chinese and Korean Chinese employees at the second level have university degrees or professional skills. Companies hire Korean Chinese and give training for several years in South Korea. This method has been much faster and better than waiting for South Koreans to be China experts. For example, Daewoo hired twenty-six Korean Chinese and trained them in South Korea for one year. Those employees were sent back to China (Hanguk Gyeongje, April 20, 1995). Those at the second level are treated as equal with South Koreans in the business world (Kim Hyundong and Ju Inyoung 1999, 36–37). South Korean employers give them privileges for traveling and high salaries. Korean Chinese at the third level of these kinds of companies try to move up to the second level. Their roles are not as significant as those in the second hiring strategy. They mainly work as department representatives or as simple laborers like other Chinese laborers. Type IV: South Korean employers + Chinese employees. The fourth type of company has South Korean employers and Chinese employees, but no Korean Chinese. This arrangement is rare, but more Korean companies are recently pursuing this strategy. Companies following this type have been in China for a long term and, thus, have gained understanding of Chinese markets. In addition, these South Korean employers tend to be bilingual and professionals about China and Korea. These Korean companies do not have to rely on Korean Chinese’ bilingual skills and local connections.

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Another significant characteristic of this type is that the number of South Korean residential representatives is getting smaller. In addition, Chinese employees are more stratified across levels. Korean companies hire Chinese with professional training and who can speak Korean. The increase of this type is possible because the number of Chinese who learn Korean and study in South Korea is rapidly rising. With more experiences in Chinese markets, Korean companies tend to move from the first type to the fourth. In 1998, Sambo computer opened in Shenyang. Three years later, the number of employees went up to 1,000. Among them, only ten are South Koreans and the rest of them are Chinese. Earlier, they preferred to hire Korean Chinese, but favor Chinese now (Herald Economy, June 21, 2001). Chinese employees in this type of firm sometimes include Korean Chinese. However, they are not emphasized as ethnic Koreans, but as Chinese employees. They do not get higher salaries because of their bilingual skills as ethnic Koreans. When they use their skills, such as language ability or sales or engineering talents, for company advantages, they receive higher compensation only after the reason for differences in wages is made clear to all workers. Informal Roles for Korean Chinese Besides formal roles as employees, counselors, problem-solvers, agents, or partners, Korean Chinese also play significant informal roles for South Korean business. These jobs form more casual relations or sometimes closer relations between them. Bottari sangin Two kinds of South Koreans start to advance in the Chinese markets as bottari sangin: first, those who do not have enough capital to start their own business and, second, those who plan to start their own business, but are not sure what kind of business they will do. They would like to learn about Chinese markets before investing. Bottari sangin means packing-men literally, daigong in Chinese. They come and go to China and South Korea by ship through six ports (Qingdao, Tianjin, Weihai, Dalian, Dandong, and Shanghai) in China and the main port, Incheon in Korea. They spend approximately four to six days on the ship and the ship even has a space for putting their washing bags in the corner. They buy Korean products that are popular in China at cheap prices, from retailers and wholesalers in Korea and sell them to Chinese customers directly or deliver them to stores


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in China. They buy Chinese products in China and gain profits by selling them at much higher prices on the Korean market. The goods they buy in China are mostly agricultural products and medicines—the price gap between the two countries is approximately ten times—and whiskey and cigarettes in the duty free shop on the ship. Approximately 80 percent of the products they bring from Korea to China are cloth and clothes while 5 percent is cosmetics (and these have been increasing fast). Others are for stationery and living necessities (Yonyeong Joseon Munbo, June 18, 1999). Through this job, bottari sangin can get information about both markets, such as which products will generate the most economic benefits in the short or long term. Dogs were one of the most popular items for South Koreans (who wanted Pekinese as pets). Bottari sangin bought dogs in China and take them in the ship to sell in South Korea. The cost of Pekinese in China is approximately 11 to 18 dollars. The total costs including, a 36 dollars quarantine fee and a 22 dollars Korean customs tariff fee, is 69 to 76 dollars, which is one-third to one-half of what they sell for on the South Korean market (Dong-A Ilbo, Aug. 22, 2000). This job has been popular among South Koreans, Korean Chinese, and Chinese-Koreans.5 Chinese-Koreans have first started this business from the end of the 1980s. Korean Chinese had stepped in this business much earlier. The main business area of Korean Chinese bottari sangin was North Korea. Since the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the North Korean government has concentrated on heavy industry. The light industry has not been developed and, therefore, daily necessities have been required from outside. Most Korean Chinese who came from the northern part of Korea had relatives in North Korea and, thus, were able to visit their houses in North Korea. In addition, some Korean Chinese who had North Korean citizenship (chaoqiao) were able to cross the border. After the end of the Cultural Revolution in China in the 1970s, they started business in North Korea. At first, they sold and bought goods illegally, but in some places in North Korea, such as Namyang, Hoeryeong, and Munsan, they opened markets for Chinese products legally. Since the normalization of relations between South Korea and China, those Korean Chinese bottari sangin have headed for South Korea rather than North Korea. Young Korean Chinese joined them on the ship.6 South Koreans also got involved. A Korean Chinese woman I met worked in South Korea for several years, but the start of economic crisis led her to lose her job. She decided to be a bottari sangin. Since she had lived in South Korea for a while, she knew what Korean fashions were popular.

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Using Hallyu, she planned to sell fashionable goods to Chinese and Korean Chinese customers in China. With her friends’ help, she bought Korean accessories and clothes in retail stores at cheap prices and brought them to her hometown. Her older sister sold them. In another case, a young male South Korean started his business after quitting university in China. He thought that studying Chinese in Chinese universities could not make him as competitive as other Korean Chinese and Chinese students. He became famous among bottari sangin because the job was always regarded as one for tough people without the refinements of university education (before the economic crisis in 1997). An eighty-year-old South Korean woman was famous as well. She was one of the most capable bottari sangin. She had several assistants, and good and wide relations with retailers and stores in both China and South Korea. The number of South Korean bottari sangin escalated rapidly after the economic crisis in 1997. Unemployment growth caused more South Koreans to turn to work as bottari sangin. Travel agencies and employment associations even made programs for people who wanted to be bottari sangin. Mass media and SME associations gave people positive impressions about bottari sangin. The popularity of South Korean products, such as cosmetics, clothes, shoes, and bags, in China made the business of bottari sangin lucrative. One trade container in the ports was worth approximately 100–200 million won (830,000 to 1.7 million dollars). Every week, 100 containers left Incheon for Chinese ports (Hanguk Gyeongje, Nov. 11, 1998). The export volume by bottari sangin was approximately 3 billion dollars per year in 2000 (Hanguk Gyeongje, May 19, 2000). South Korean bottari sangin have close relations with Korean Chinese. They have to compete with Chinese-Koreans who already stepped in this business much earlier than them. In addition, Chinese-Koreans have more advantages in terms of language skills, personal connections, and experiences with this business. Thus, South Korean bottari sangin need local partners to advance in Chinese markets as fast and stable as possible. Moreover, when South Koreans get accustomed to working as bottari sangin, they would like to open their own stores near Chinese ports. Doing so requires management of the stores and locating appropriate marketing channels. They also need Chinese citizenship to legally and safely open stores in China. Relations with Korean Chinese seemed to be the easiest way to solve these problems. Personal and ethnic trust underpins relations between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. The most frequent relation in the bottari sangin world was between South Korean male bottari sangin and Korean Chinese female assistants. In a place where I stayed for one night before taking the ship, a female Korean


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Chinese assistant—other bottari sangin called her samonim (Mrs.)— explained her and her South Korean husband’s relations. Her husband was regarded as the most successful man and was the one called sajang-nim (boss) in the bottari sangin world. He had stores in Korea and China nearby ports and had more than ten assistants every time he got on the ship.7 One of the main reasons why he succeeded was his good connections in China. His wife said, I knew my South Korean husband is married in Korea. I think she knows about me over there too. I’m not sure. But we are good business partners. I need money and he needs a person he can trust and depend on in this foreign country. I do everything for him. I find good retailers, make connections with people who work in this port, and take care of products he has to carry. He also opened his own store with my name, which he can trust. While he is not here, I take care of his store. He is the really successful man here. Everyone knows him and beginners start the bottari sangin job with him first. I get fair benefits from our profits and he takes care of my two sons’ school fees. I cook for him. He can feel home here like in South Korea. After the long journey and hard working, he comes back here and takes a rest.8 Other bottari sangin also like that. As far as I know, more than 80 percent of bottari sangin has hyunjicheo (local wife in China). (Interview in Dalian, 2001) These extra events gave some social prejudices, such as “Men who have business in China cannot be trusted” in Korea and “South Korean men take female Korean Chinese from Korean Chinese men” in Korean Chinese communities.9 On the other hand, not a few bottari sangin lost money and gave up the business. They sold two- or three-year-old products or low quality products in China. South Korean companies have complained that this gives a bad reputation to Korean products in Chinese markets (Maeil Gyeongje, Aug. 30, 1997). Illegal products, such as fake brand name watches, shoes, and bags, and Viagra from China have given trouble to China-South Korea trade. Some agricultural products from China were proven to be of poor quality. Black sesame with tar, red pepper with serious pesticides, and crabs with iron from China were exposed in August, 2000. The South Korean government prohibited bottari sangin from bringing agricultural products to China. The Chinese government also did not allow them to bring Korean products. The weight limit of 80 kilograms per person was decreased to 50 kilograms on the side of South Korea and to 25 kilograms on the side

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of China (5 kilograms of agricultural products and no red pepper or black sesame) (Maeil Gyeongje, Feb. 28, 2001). The amount of trade and the number of bottari sangin have swiftly declined. Recently, bottari sangin have changed their business strategies. They are unwilling to call themselves bottari sangin. The term suggests a meaning of “illegal,” “suspicious,” and “low class business.” In addition, people do not have a good impression of them—mass media report on their dual lives in China and Korea and the collapse of their families several times. Now they call themselves professional trade businessmen ( jeonmun-muyeok-sangin). After the former South Korean president Kim Daejung emphasized their roles as important for business between China and South Korea, they have also tried to change their images (Ikonomist, Sept. 15, 1998). According to the stricter custom policy and the consequent loss of their profits, South Korean bottari sangin organized their own associations. To survive under capricious laws, they opened Internet associations and have regular meetings to exchange information. The strong propensity for solidarity has originated in difficulties of ship trade and more independence from Korean Chinese as well. With more competition inside Chinese markets and the rise of bankrupted South Korean businessmen in China, they realized that the Chinese dream cannot come true without professional knowledge. Having two lives in China and Korea resulted in more failed cases than success. Without speaking Chinese and with no direct connections to Chinese markets, the dependency of South Korean bottari sangin on Korean Chinese has taught them the lesson that they ought to be independent. Members of the association opened Chinese business classes. They also have market research, travel together, and exchange information with other Korean bottari sangin groups targeting Japan and Southeast Asian countries ( Jugan Dong-A, Feb. 5, 2004). Freelance Work Korean Chinese with more professional skills and higher education levels freely work for South Korean entrepreneurs or have their own business. They can form more independent relations with each other and avoid ethnic issues. Interpreters and travel guides are examples. While some Korean Chinese employees work as interpreters and translators in their companies, others work in freelance positions. Guiding South Korean travelers or businessmen for one or two days, they can earn much more money than one month’s salary in general companies.10


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A Korean Chinese woman who lives in Dalian got to know a South Korean businessman in Yanbian after university graduation. She worked for him and his friends as travel guides and business interpreters. Making connections, she has worked for several Korean companies. In addition, she started working as an education broker between Chinese schools and Korean parents. She introduces Chinese schools to South Korean parents and helps them whenever their children have some school problems. When she moves back and forth between Korea and China, she independently researches markets for her own business. She is realizing her dream to open china stores in Dalian, where she sells Korean china products. Conclusion: Variation across Firms in Links to Korean Chinese The South Korean-Korean Chinese network has been more important for some firms than for others. In the beginning of this chapter, three dimensions were used to describe the characteristics of Korean business in China: sector, firm size, and whether the firm produces for Chinese consumption or for export. Sectors have different talent and labor needs, and firms have varying capacities to meet those needs. For these reasons, firms rely on the ethnic network to different degrees and in different ways. Sectors. Service sector establishments run by South Koreans in China mostly cater to Korean (both Korean Chinese and South Korean) customers. This sector requires knowledge of Korean preferences and usually Korean language to deal with customers. These factors make service businesses turn to the ethnic network. Korean Chinese contribute a great deal to South Korean service endeavors in China. Because of their target market, they locate in Korean-concentrated areas, tend to follow Type I employment strategies, and get inputs from bottari sangin. Heavy manufacturing contrasts with the service sector. Firms in this sector need large numbers of employees of medium skill level, as well as some highly skilled technicians. Labor prices are not the sole determinant of location, and labor prices anywhere in China would be cheaper than that of South Korean labor. As a capital-intensive sector, firms in heavy industry tend to be richer and better able to supply themselves with their own talent. Thus, South Korean heavy manufacturers in China have been relatively disconnected from the ethnic network. They need not set up workshops in Korean areas. Automobile-producer “Qianlima,” for instance, is located on the outskirts of Shanghai. Korean Chinese could not be so helpful to them.

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Light industry represents an intermediary point between services and heavy manufacturing. Textiles, apparel, and footwear production are very much guided by labor prices. Manufacturers locate where labor is cheapest. Locating in a place with obstacles to hiring cheap labor does not make sense in this sector. Links to Korean Chinese labor networks (i.e., networks of Korean Chinese laborers or the Chinese labor networks of Korean Chinese labor bosses) lowered the costs: locating in Korean Chinese areas and with help from them provided easy access to cheap labor. These low capital firms would have had much more difficulty starting up in China had they not connected with Korean Chinese. Firm size. While big enterprises have a tendency to hire Chinese rather than Korean Chinese or hire both of them with the same condition (not emphasizing the ethnic element of Korean Chinese, but Chinese), SMEs still lean on Korean Chinese. Im Jinchul, the head of Asia-Pacific Economic and Cultural Development Research Center in People’s University in China emphasized that “except the big companies, such as Samsung and LG, SMEs should ask some help from Korean Chinese to lead successful business in China” (Joongang Ilbo, June 20, 2003). Three to four Korean small enterprises open in Shandong per day and 80 percent of Korean companies could not be opened in China without the help of Korean Chinese (The Hankyoreh, Sept. 24, 2004). In SMEs, Korean Chinese have played significant roles as employees and partners. The existence of Korean Chinese in China has contributed to the increase in the number of South Korean small and medium companies. SMEs do not have the resources to compete for the scarce South Korean personnel who can manage Chinese labor and help negotiate with local firms and government. For the same reason they also cannot produce their own qualified representatives and managers in China. They have thus had a strong tendency to locate in the northeast or north China, in places with high concentrations of Korean Chinese. For SMEs, the ethnic network has been particularly crucial in facilitating business in China. Large firms have a wider range of choices. They have other channels of information. Korean Chinese have definitely connected up to big South Korean firms, but they have played a less important role as intermediaries. Big firms have hired the most talented Korean Chinese but they have also hired more Chinese. They have broken the mold of investing in Korean enclave areas and located their establishments according to calculations based less on social networks.


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Production for local versus overseas consumption. Whether firms produce for Chinese consumption or for export seems well correlated with firm size and sector. Firms that locate in China for labor cost reasons and export their products tend to be in light industry and are medium and sometimes large. Among them there is then a mix of those that are strongly connected to the ethnic network and those who are less connected. Firms that produce for local consumption include both small, service sector shops as well as large manufacturers of heavy industry and consumer products such as electronics. The former tend to be well within the ethnic network while the latter are on its margins.


CHAPTER 5

Korean Business, Intra-Ethnic Conflict, and Adaptive Strategies

S

ince the 1990s South Korean entrepreneurs have hired large numbers of Korean Chinese and, relying on them as middlemen, pursued economic gains. Ethnic solidarity seemed a significant and positive ladder connecting the Korean market to the Chinese one. Bonacich and Light argue that ethnic resources uphold the competitive position of individual firms that coethnics own (1988, 18). Based on the ethnic trust and resources, South Korean entrepreneurs had the strong tendency to hire Korean Chinese, and Korean Chinese also preferred to work in South Korean companies. Unlike their positive expectations, the more contact between Korean Chinese and South Koreans, the more conflicts between them have appeared. Their conflicts in business activities have led to ethnic distrust. Disregarding class resources, South Koreans and Korean Chinese tried to forcefully strengthen their ethnic solidarity. However, class resources have cultural and material sides.1 Korean Chinese and South Koreans have been adapted to different cultural and material resources. Despite their common ethnicity, South Koreans and Korean Chinese have different class resources. South Koreans have a higher standard of living. Moreover, their bourgeois values and attitudes contrast greatly with the toughness that Korean Chinese have learned under decades of socialism and relative poverty. Yet, the two groups tried to overlook those differences in building cooperation on the basis of ethnic solidarity. The different hiring systems of Korean companies have produced various conflicts, not just between ethnic Koreans. I categorize the conflicts as

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between South Korean employers and Korean Chinese employees, between South Korean employers and Chinese employees, and between Korean Chinese and Chinese employees. In this chapter, I argue that these complex conflicts encouraged Korean companies to move from the first to third type of hiring system. Development of domestic markets and pursuit of localization by Korean companies have also caused changes in relations between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. Conflicts The hiring systems of Korean companies have caused conflicts between different groups. Hiring Korean Chinese as intermediaries did not generate effective results. In this section, I elaborate on conflicts between different groups. Conflicts between South Korean Employers and Korean Chinese Employees Conflicts between South Koreans and Korean Chinese as employers and employees have easily turned into ethnic issues. According to Kim Si-Joong’s interview with 56 South Korean companies in 1994, more than 50 percent said that they have conflicts with Korean Chinese employees. Among them, nearly one-third answered that the conflicts are due to money and wage problems. Of all the companies, more than 30 percent said that they experienced conflicts between Korean Chinese and other Chinese employees. In addition, more than 10 percent said that Korean Chinese employees encourage Chinese employees to start strikes in companies (Kim Si-Joong 1994). Most South Korean interviewees whom I met in China mentioned that Korean Chinese employees demand so many favors relative to their working ability and often complain about their companies and employers.2 In addition, the low qualification of some Korean Chinese employees as well as the overdependence of South Korean employers on Korean Chinese generates ethnic hatred. South Koreans often hired Korean Chinese who have bilingual abilities. The officially acknowledged reputation of Korean Chinese as having the best education and least illiteracy among China’s minority groups made South Korean businessmen hire Korean Chinese without thorough consideration.3 They hired Korean Chinese to play significant roles as business negotiators and translators (or interpreters). Believing that bilingual skills would solve all of their problems, firms disregarded the business knowledge or special skills of the Korean Chinese they hired.

Intra-Ethnic Conflict, Adaptive Strategies

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The Korean language of Korean Chinese and that of South Koreans have differences. Sometimes, Korean Chinese have difficulties accurately translating or interpreting Chinese to Korean and vice versa. This language gap caused misunderstandings in official negotiating meetings and losses of large sums of money. One time I joined a business negotiating meeting in Benxi in China. A young Korean Chinese girl played the roles of both interpreter and travel guide for South Korean government officials and businessmen. While she interpreted, the Chinese side seemed to become embarrassed, but did not say why to the South Korean side. In the end, one of the Chinese government officials suddenly started speaking Korean and interpreted between the two sides. When we had lunch together, the Chinese government official said that the young Korean Chinese girl used the wrong words and that made the Chinese side confused. The official was also Korean Chinese, but did not mention she was Korean Chinese until that moment (fieldwork in summer, 2001). Rumors, such as that Korean Chinese translators omitted several zeros for the amount of money on a contract and companies lost large amounts of money, are often heard among South Korean businessmen in China. At the same time, some South Koreans warned that Korean Chinese do not do their best to achieve the best result for business negotiations. Sometimes they intentionally omit important parts they should translate (Maeil Gyeongje, Nov. 25, 1996). In addition, while many Korean business words come from English terminology, Korean Chinese are not familiar with loan words from English. Their English is regarded as not up to standards (the English level of Korean Chinese is regarded as much lower than Han-Chinese because they studied Japanese as a second foreign language in their ethnic schools). From the perspectives of Korean Chinese, they complain that they do not understand why South Koreans use English terminology so much. Korean Chinese even think of it as a form of semicolonialism: “I don’t understand why South Koreans use English so much. It looks they love America and do not have any independent consciousness” (interview with twenty-two-year-old Korean Chinese travel guide in Shenyang, 2001). The minority group policy of the Chinese government has also given the impression that the Chinese ability of Korean Chinese is inferior to that of Han-Chinese, because of their different education system. A South Korean businessman whom I interviewed in Beijing in 2003 said that some companies even have Chinese translate Chinese documents into English, then have Koreans translate them into Korean because that way is more accurate and safer. Underqualified Korean Chinese employees are found more frequently in small and medium enterprises than in big enterprises. Big enterprises

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are able to hire qualified employees, and spend time and money to train Korean Chinese to acquire business knowledge. On the contrary, SMEs were satisfied with the bilingual abilities of Korean Chinese and gave them limited tasks. In the early 1990s, Korean companies hired Korean Chinese teachers and professors as business consultants. The more Korean companies have arrived in China, the more interpreters and translators have been needed. SMEs that cannot match the salaries offered by big enterprises hire any bilingual Korean Chinese. However, being able to speak both languages does not mean having the capability of being a professional interpreter or translator. One story I heard in a Korea town reflected this: We think the Chinese level of Korean-Chinese is about sixty percent of that of Han-Chinese. I heard from my friend that a Korean-Chinese manager translated the computer as electric brain (dian [electric]-nao [brain] in Chinese) on a document for an important business contract. When he looked through the translated contract that the Korean-Chinese manager made, he was astonished. It took time for him to figure out what “electronic brain” meant at first.4 He quickly made it again through a professional translating agency. (Interview in Beijing. 2003) In addition, South Korean companies think that Korean Chinese employees often quit the job. If they have some business conflicts with employers, they quit right away and move to other companies without giving notice. Some South Korean employers even insisted that Korean Chinese have a strong tendency for betrayal: When national holidays come close, I cannot help but be nervous. Employees go back to their hometowns and they meet friends and exchange information about receiving higher wages in other cities, mostly in the service sector. They do not come back. Of course, they do not notify me of anything. If I cannot see employees’ faces after the holiday, that means they quit. (Interview with the owner of SS company, Qingdao. 2001) However, we cannot say that Korean Chinese have a stronger betrayal tendency than other employees. In fact, it is true that they frequently encounter chances to move to other cities and companies through connection to other Korean Chinese groups in Korea towns. They can easily find other South Korean companies with better hiring conditions, such as those located in bigger cities and offering higher wages. Korean companies compete to


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acquire Korean Chinese who are accustomed to work with South Koreans. For example, Korean owners of restaurants or other companies scout Korean Chinese employees even though they know that the employees work in other Korean companies (Jung Sinchul, 2000; interviews with restaurants owners, Shenyang and Beijing). Even with 50 yuan, Korean-Chinese move to the company next door. Sometimes, I feel it is worthless to train them. As soon as they are accustomed to understanding the characteristics of the company, they disappear and I can find them working in nearby companies. (Interview with the owner of a Beijing restaurant, Nov. 2003) On the other hand, employees experience hardships in adjusting to the different working environment of South Korean companies. When employees encounter conflicts because of these different working perspectives, Korean Chinese employees are judged more harshly than Chinese employees by South Koreans. The following example displays this clearly. South Korean companies in China rush to produce as many products as possible with inexpensive labor. The first Korean term that foreign employees learn is “hurry hurry” (balli balli). It means doing tasks as swiftly as possible. To gain the highest benefits, Korean companies also apply this expectation to Chinese laborers. China has been under socialist rule for several decades. Korean companies’ practice of complete devotion to the firm on the part of employees is regarded as overworking by Chinese. Koreans characterize Chinese as “slow slow” (manmandi). Different workplace expectations by the two ethnic groups create complaints on both sides. Korean employers complain that Chinese employees are lazy and work slowly. A Korean employer complained that he has a hard time understanding employees’ work attitudes: “They clean up one window in a day. You have to see how slow they are. They are chatting and more than two people stick to a window a day. My stomach is almost burned in China” (interview in Sunday Journal, Nov. 4, 2001). Korean Chinese, despite being ethnically Korean, have also been accustomed to the socialist system and are not prepared for South Korean employers’ norms at work. However, the ethnic identity of Korean Chinese employees is emphasized by South Korean employers this time. Their slowness tends to be seen as laziness, which South Korean employers do not understand. In the eyes of South Korean employers, ethnic Chinese at least have the excuse of coming from a different culture. Korean Chinese do not have that excuse. This downgrades the working reputation of Korean Chinese. A Korean Chinese travel agent who transferred from a South

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Korean owned company to a Chinese company said, I am glad to work in a Chinese company right now. I worked in a Korean company before. But they always demanded so many things to be done in a day. If I did not satisfy them, they barked at me. And they complained that I am lazy. I tried to do my best, but it was impossible to catch up with other South Koreans. I secretly cried a lot. (Interview in Dalian, Sept. 2003) The most important reason why conflicts between South Koreans and Korean Chinese often end with more serious results than those between South Koreans and Chinese is that they become infused with ethnic overtones. Simple conflicts that any employers and employees might have turn quickly into bigger and more serious ethnic issues between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. Korean Chinese sometimes even try to gain leverage by warning South Korean employers about being prejudiced toward Korean Chinese. A Korean used-goods storeowner commented: Really wild conflicts that employers and employees face sometimes end up with weird results. They pull that classic card out of their pocket, “the ethnic card,” and throw it down in our faces. It is understandable that sometimes they complain South Koreans look down on Korean Chinese. But even in business relations, they use this card. When they start like this, I don’t know what I am supposed to say. (Interview in Beijing, Dec. 2003) A similar point was made by other scholars. Conflicts that happen between Korean Chinese and South Koreans are interpreted in emotional and ethnic ways. Provided that Korean Chinese have economic disadvantages in both Japan and South Korea, Korean Chinese particularly say that South Koreans do not have hearts and look down on members of the same ethnic group, but the similar extent of discrimination received from Japanese is not considered by Korean Chinese as significant (Im Gyesun 2003, 348). In addition, Korean Chinese roles as intermediaries between Chinese employees and South Korean employers put them in ambiguous situations. As in the old Korean saying, Korean Chinese are “slapped in the east and slapped in the west as well.” Caught in the middle, Korean Chinese attitudes and actions toward either side sometimes result in giving them a bad reputation among both sides. South Koreans easily succumb to prejudice with statements such as “In China, we realized that Korean Chinese are not Koreans, but complete Chinese.” On the other hand, Chinese employees often think the other way, that Korean Chinese are really Koreans (and I


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discuss this in the section on conflict between Korean Chinese and Chinese employees). Class resources affect their relations more than ethnic resources. Material and cultural differences between them blocked their potential ethnic solidarity. Disregarding these differences, emphasis on ethnic solidarity in companies has brought about more misunderstandings between them. Korean Chinese consider South Korean employers to be arrogant and look down on Korean Chinese. They believe these conflicts are due to their economic gap: “South Koreans judge people by money. No money means not human. We of course do not have as much money as they do now, but they behave like they naturally have that and we don’t” (interview in Beijing, Dec. 2003). On the other hand, South Korean entrepreneurs think that Korean Chinese demand so much and just want to be treated the same as South Koreans in any situation. The M textile company in Qingdao hired sixty Korean Chinese, but fifteen of them left because they had strikes to demand the same amount of salary as South Koreans: “They demanded we should be equal just because we are the same ethnic group. Making them distinguish employment from ethnic relations is difficult” (Paik Gwon-Ho and Jeong Jong-Ho 2002, 196). Korean Chinese-related issues in South Korea and problems between Korean Chinese and South Koreans also affect their relations in the business world. Different treatment toward Korean Chinese in South Korea and South Korean crimes against Korean Chinese and vice versa have resulted in more complicated conflicts.5 Conflicts between South Korean Employers and Chinese Employees South Korean employers did not have to have direct contact with Chinese employees due to Korean Chinese intermediaries. They considered that this hiring strategy would lessen potential conflicts between employers and employees. Giving essential instructions through Korean Chinese intermediaries to Chinese laborers, and receiving employees’ opinions through Korean Chinese were believed to maintain stable employer-employee relations. However, this arrangement has given rise to several disadvantages. First, their indirect relations have made Chinese employees feel less attachment to companies. A girl who works in the M textile company owned by South Koreans has worked there for three years, but she has not had any chances to have direct contact with South Korean employers so far. If she wants to make requests, she has to go through Korean Chinese managers. She does not expect to be promoted in the company. Anytime she is not needed in the company or finds another company with better

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conditions, she plans to leave (interview in Shenyang, 2002). In addition, Chinese employees think that self-improvement is impossible in Korean companies because it is hard for them to obtain promotions by their abilities. Korean companies tend not to offer high positions to Chinese and even though there are some available jobs, companies would confer with Korean Chinese who have direct relations with employers. A restaurant owner in Shenyang said that in the early days of Korean investment in China, Chinese employees did not even understand why directors or managers received more salaries than them. To them, labor compensation should be the same no matter what kind of position each employee has. They later complained that Korean Chinese employees’ salary was higher than theirs (interview in 2001). South Korean employer and Chinese employee contacts through intermediaries can cause misunderstandings or more distant relations between them. A company owner complains that when he has meetings with Chinese employees and gives instructions, Korean Chinese intermediaries omit approximately half of the contents and what he wants to say does not transfer to the employees completely. He prefers to avoid those kinds of meetings and gives short instructions to Korean Chinese intermediaries (Paik Gwon-Ho and Jeong Jong-Ho 2002, 192). Hierarchical relations, characteristic of Korean companies, have created complaints among employees toward employers. Employees complain that South Korean employers force them to follow their hierarchy system and demands for absolute obedience. Without understanding the Chinese labor system, employers force the working environment of South Korean firms onto Chinese employees. This cannot make happy stories between them. For example, Korean companies are reluctant to allow company employees to organize labor unions. Even though labor unions in China mainly help companies more than workers, South Korean employers’ strong prejudice against labor unions drives them to forbid the formation of labor union (Paik Gwon-Ho and Jeong Jong-Ho 2002, 192).6 In Tianjin, where many Korean companies are located, while 60 percent of foreign companies organized labor unions, only 10 percent of Korean companies have done so (Korea International Labor Foundation 2003, 76). In contrast with other foreign companies that solve employeremployee conflicts through labor unions, in Korean companies Korean Chinese are intermediaries between them. Dissatisfaction and inconvenience that employees feel about companies cannot be exposed through direct employer-employee discussion. Thus, even though South Korean employers and Chinese employees have not had serious conflicts with


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each other, these characteristics of Korean companies have made Chinese employees move out of Korean firms quickly. Conflicts between Korean Chinese and Chinese Employees Conflicts between Korean Chinese and Chinese employees have mainly been caused by the status and roles of Korean Chinese in companies. As the same status, employees, Chinese employees do not understand why Korean Chinese have more privileges than them. The difference in wages has first of all laid the basis for conflict. Korean companies generally give higher wages to Korean Chinese than to Chinese employees due to their bilingual ability. Korean Chinese wages start from 800 to 900 yuan per month, compared to 500 to 600 yuan for Chinese employees, despite being for the same position. Having heard no explanation for the different wages, Chinese employees complain. The fact that specific groups among employees have more privileges does not encourage compatible relations. Korean Chinese give the instructions and orders of South Korean employers to Chinese employees. In addition, as directors or managers, they manage Han-Chinese laborers. When laborers make low-quality products, Korean Chinese managers reject them and order Chinese laborers to make the rejected products again. Korean Chinese managers determine the wages of each laborer. Sometimes, this leads to conflicts or even physical fights. In one company, several Han-Chinese laborers received lower wages than other employees because they made several low-quality products. On the way back home, the Han-Chinese beat the Korean Chinese director and called him a “pro-foreigner bastard” (erguizi). To Chinese, Korean Chinese should be on their side because they are nationally Chinese. In addition, the owner of D company said that Chinese employees generally do not like to follow the orders of Korean Chinese managers (Maeil Gyeongje, Nov. 25, 1996). In Chinese society, place of birth and ethnicity also influence relations in companies. Migrants and minorities are considered as second-class citizens. The implicit hierarchy is sketched out in figure 5.1. Local employees believe that they should get more important positions than outsiders. The figure 5.1 shows the perspective of Chinese on Korean Chinese. To local people in Z town, Korean Chinese are just members of one Chinese minority group as well as migrants.7 In case employers and employees have conflicts, they can be confused about which side Korean Chinese intermediaries take. There is a Korean saying that is relevant here, “sister-in-law dissuading the scolding mother-in-law

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Local Employees (from Z town), Shandong

South Korean Employers

Employees from other areas, Shandong

Local People

Migrant and Minority Employees

Outsiders

Figure 5.1 Insiders and outsiders in the Chinese workplace. Source: Paik Gwan-Ho and Jeong Jong-Ho, 2002: 190. Note: They researched a textile company in Z town, Shandong.

is more detestable.” Korean Chinese can be perceived as the sister-in-law, no matter what side they stand for. I have discussed the various conflicts that arise among different groups in the workplace. The complex conflicts among South Korean employers (or residential representatives), Korean Chinese employees, and Chinese employees, have resulted in considerable loss and even bankruptcy for some Korean companies. Strategies for Accommodation Twenty years of experience in Chinese markets have given several lessons to South Korean business and led them to new business strategies. Creating a South Korean business atmosphere in firms with employees has caused conflicts between employers and employees. Advancing in Chinese markets without enough information and professional analysis has resulted in the collapse of companies and economic loss. South Korean entrepreneurs describe Chinese markets as moorlands. Even though they keep investing capital and effort in the land, the land demands more. Lands of opportunity have turned into dangerous swaps over this decade of investment. Randomly utilizing the “ethnic cards” to adapt to Chinese markets has been regarded as one of the main reasons why many Korean companies returned to Korea with big losses. Several changes have been made by Korean entrepreneurs who already advanced and have plans to invest in Chinese markets. First, Korean


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companies have preferred to move from the first hiring system to the third type (explained in chapter 4). The biggest change in Korean companies since the late 1990s has been to focus more on Chinese consumer markets. During the 1990s, Korean companies mostly exported products that they made in their factories in China to other countries. Since then, they have been concentrating on selling their products to Chinese and developing services for Chinese customers. The fast economic development of China and the growth of Chinese customers’ incomes have given a new direction to Korean companies, which is less to use cheap labor to produce a great many cheap goods, but to produce goods that satisfy customers in the domestic market who look for the highest quality. Korean companies learned that the more localized they become, the higher chance they have to survive in Chinese markets. These changes have ultimately led to a spatial dispersion of Korean companies and increased local activities. The tendency for South Koreans to have closer relations with Chinese society and consumers has weakened relations between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. In this section, I divide changes in business strategies of Korean companies into three categories: spatial dispersion, changed hiring systems, and localization. Examples from several Korean companies I mention here show the effects of these changes. Spatial Dispersion Even though the preference of Korean companies to focus on the Huaibohai region and north China is still strong, interest in other areas is gradually increasing. While the Korean firms prefer the Huaibohai region and north China, profits in these areas have not been as high as in other places. While South Korean companies that advanced in the Guangdong market have obtained high profits, those in northeast China and the Huaibohai region have not produced profits or even left at a loss. More various choices for location seemed to give advantages to South Koreans. Northwest and southeast areas were not popular among Korean entrepreneurs, but several advantages have turned the interests of South Korean entrepreneurs to these areas. The Chinese government bestows favors on firms that invest in the northwest, such as reducing tax and helping foreign companies settle in the area. The Southeast has higher GDP per capita and is full of customers capable of buying expensive goods. Thus, South Korean companies have dispersed their business to these areas. For example, in 2002, 29.2 percent of South Korean investment in China was in the Yangtze Delta region (Dongbuk Journal, Sept. 2003). Table 5.1 shows changes in investment across provinces.

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Table 5.1

South Korean investment in China by Province Moving-up

Jiangsu Beijing Zhejiang Hebei Anhui Hunan Guangdong

1992– 1999

2000– 2007

Change

0.108 0.078 0.025 0.013 0.001 0.012 0.042

0.277 0.141 0.038 0.017 0.004 0.014 0.042

0.169 0.063 0.013 0.004 0.003 0.002 0

Moving-down

Tianjin Shanghai Shandong Heilongjiang Jilin Liaoning Fujian

1992– 1999

2000– 2007

Change

0.143 0.120 0.262 0.032 0.033 0.096 0.005

0.076 0.060 0.230 0.007 0.010 0.075 0.004

–0.067 –0.06 –0.032 –0.025 –0.023 –0.021 –0.001

Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea, from 1992 to 2007. Note: This is proportion of South Korean investment in each Chinese province as a fraction of all South Korean investment in China.

Except for Beijing, the ratio of concentration in the northeast and the Huaibohai region of South Korean companies has been decreasing, and that of concentrating on new areas, such as Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Guangdong, has been growing.8 This change demonstrates that Korean companies are less dependent on geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula and Korean Chinese settlements. Due to the convenience of transporting products to other countries, Korean companies have now favored coastal areas and the eastern part of China. However, higher mobility can be seen among big enterprises and companies that are more professional. On the other hand, small enterprises and companies focusing on using inexpensive labor have still stuck to the old places. On the first of July in 2004, the Chinese government announced a new policy for northeast China. The government gives more benefits and takes less tax for foreign companies that invest in this area. While the economic development of the southern part of China has been proceeding quickly, the northern part has remained backward because of the large number of companies managed by the government. This new policy still encourages not a few South Korean enterprises to choose northeast China instead of going to other places. The development of the manufacturing industry in northeast China still attracts South Korean businessmen as well. In addition, for economic expansion, local governments that have traditional Korea towns actively make use of their characteristics, such as by concentrating on the development of residential


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and business functions of the Korea towns, and making annual Korea Days or business expos for Korean entrepreneurs (www.moyza.com). These advantages still affect South Koreans’ interests in the old places. New Strategies of Hiring To Korean entrepreneurs, Chinese markets are higher than the Great Wall. An owner of a company explained “To successfully jump over the Great Wall, first of all, we should have the best weapons” (Maeil Gyeongje, June 26, 2001). Continual employee problems have motivated businessmen to establish new strategies of hiring. Here I subdivide methods of how Korean companies try to decrease conflicts, by hiring more Chinese and giving up the Korean ethnic network. Diminution of the number of South Korean residential representatives. South Korean firms have recently decreased the number of residential representatives in China. This change brings several advantages to companies. Companies with fewer South Koreans can change their working environment and move away from hierarchical, Korean organization. Rigid hierarchy and distance between South Koreans and Chinese have not established smooth working circumstances. Of 239 South Koreans who work in Korean companies in China, 60 percent did not even try to have friendly relations with Chinese employees. Only 31.4 percent of Korean companies in China have policies encouraging South Korean residential representatives to have good relations with employees. The other 68.6 percent of them do not (Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, www.KorCham.net, 1998). In the early days of South Korean investment in China, qualifications for being selected as residential representatives were not related to adaptation ability and Chinese skills. Thus, although sending a South Korean residential representative costs so much money, it did not produce results as valuable as the costs.9 The fewer residential representatives that companies send, the more Chinese employees they can hire. In addition, the fewer residential representatives that companies send, the more local knowledge is required of each residential representative. In the case of a Korea company, Hansaem, in order to encourage effective localization of South Korean employees in China, the company suggested giving incentives to employees to marry Chinese (Hanguk Gyeongje, Dec. 30, 1999). Moreover, the decrease in the number of South Koreans in firms in China means more opportunities for Chinese employees to obtain high and significant positions.

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Decrease of Korean Chinese roles. Conflicts between Korean Chinese and Chinese, as well as between South Koreans and Korean Chinese, have resulted in Korean companies avoiding hiring Korean Chinese as managers and directors. The longer Korean companies have stayed in Chinese markets and the more experiences they have had, the fewer roles for Korean Chinese. Some companies avoid hiring Korean Chinese because they think hiring Korean Chinese prevents localization of their China offices. A Korean company has a branch office in Shanghai with ten employees. The company sent two South Korean employees and hired eight Shanghaiborn Chinese. They tended not to hire Korean Chinese (Hanguk Gyeongje, Aug. 17, 2000). Hyundai Autonet Company, which opened its factory in Tianjin in 1994, hired Korean Chinese as 95 percent of its workforce in 1995, but decreased them to 40 percent and hired 60 percent Chinese in 2003. The representative said that they plan to hire 90 percent Chinese by 2005 (Jeonja Newspaper, Mar. 17, 2004). In a forum on how Korean companies can succeed in Chinese markets, an interview with a chief of Sambo’s computer division shows the reluctance about Korean Chinese the most. He said that dealing with Korean Chinese causes complicated problems. These problems not only affect their relations, but also influence Chinese and Koreans’ relations. Even though he knows that sending South Koreans who are knowledgeable about China and training Chinese in Korea cost more money and take more time, he has chosen those methods. If he had no choice but to hire Korean Chinese, he would always consider the ratio of Korean Chinese in the firm first and try not to give too many advantages to them (Maeil Gyeongje, Dec. 12, 2001). However, many South Korean companies still need Korean Chinese. Not a few South Korean businessmen advise others who would like to start their business in China, “The first thing you have to be careful about in China is Korean Chinese.” Korean Chinese complain that South Korean employers treat them as slaves. Despite this ethnic distrust between them, Korean companies still hire at least one Korean Chinese employee and Korean Chinese also look for jobs in South Korean companies. Thus, South Korean companies look for Korean Chinese who are able to satisfy both bilingual needs and special skill requirements. Korean Chinese who studied at Chinese universities and developed technical skills are popular. LG, Samsung, and SK scout students at Yanbian Science University even before they graduate. The school was established by a Korean-American in 1990. They teach Korean Chinese and HanChinese. Students are required to study Korean and English. The school


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became renowned for its ability to get its graduates the best jobs in the Chinese market. Even though small and medium companies cannot compete with big ones, they are also more cautious in how they treat Korean Chinese in working environments. When some Korean companies hire Korean Chinese as interpreters, they hire two interpreters to prevent one from omitting important parts and so they can compare the two documents (Newsmaker, Jan. 01, 2004). When Korean companies work with Korean Chinese, they now have a strong tendency to treat them as Chinese, which means to emphasize their nationality instead of ethnic identity. In case employers promote Korean Chinese employees, they now consider the reactions of Chinese employees and explain the reasons, such as why he (or she) would be romoted. Lee Kwangkyu found that Korean Chinese are usually promoted faster than Chinese because of their quick adaptation to the working atmosphere. However, he emphasized that companies should show objective and public evidence to Chinese employees why he (or she) was promoted and should treat Korean Chinese employees as Chinese, not as Koreans (Lee Kwangkyu, 2002). The emergence of Xinxianzu, a new Korean group, and bilingual Chinese. The increase of Xinxianzu and bilingual Chinese has produced benefits for companies. Since the economic relations between the two countries have continued over fifteen years, companies can now more easily find Chinese who studied business in Korea and South Koreans who did in China. These new groups understand business practices in the two countries, and have professional skills. The owner of Wangjing.com company hired a Xinxianzu, who studied from ninth grade in China and graduated from Beijing University. He originally planned to hire a Korean Chinese, but hired her regardless of demanding a higher salary because she would be better in understanding Korean and Chinese, and English as well. Until the mid–1990s, Koreans who studied in China did not want to work in China because of the low salary. Due to more competition in high-education labor markets in Korea and the preference of Korean companies to hire experienced employees, the number of Xinxianzu working in Chinese companies has been increasing. Even though the Xinxianzu I interviewed said that her salary is much lower than other Koreans who work in Korean companies, she planned to work in China for several years for her working experience. In addition, the fast development of Chinese markets has been attractive to Xinxianzu.

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Bilingual Chinese are increasing as well. In 2005 the number of Chinese students reached 50 percent of all foreign students in South Korea and in 2007 the figure went up to 68 percent (Overseas Koreans Foundation, http://www.korean.net/morgue/s_detail.jsp?bID=610, 2008). When I was in Korea, I became acquainted with a Korean Chinese who was finishing school in Korea and looking for a job. Whenever she introduced herself to people, she tried to hide her identity as Korean Chinese. She wanted to be a Chinese who is able to speak Korean, not a Korean Chinese who is able to speak Korean and Chinese. She was afraid that people would get the impression that she speaks both languages, but neither of them perfectly. She was sure of the fact that could give a better impression to potential employers that she speaks Chinese as a native speaker and is able to speak Korean through learning. More chances to Chinese employees. Strict regulations and rewards, and the new strategy through which Chinese employees can get promotions have made Chinese employees feel more affinity toward Korean firms. Instead of complaining that Chinese are lazy and claiming that they do not have responsibility on the basis of cultural background,10 Korean companies make use of other perceived characteristics of Chinese, namely that they follow laws and regulations well because they lived in a communist society and are sensitive about money since economic reforms. For example, if a Chinese employee who takes charge of a part in a product causes problems, that employee is fined. On the other hand, employees who work hard receive benefits. These have produced good results (Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, www.KorCham. net, 1998). In addition, high positions are not just for South Koreans and Korean Chinese anymore. Capable Chinese employees are among those selected as department directors. Long-term plans, involving training Chinese in Korea and sending them back to China, also draw more Chinese employees into applying to work in Korean companies. Hansaem, a Korean company, made a ten-year plan. They hired thirty-seven Chinese in China and trained them in Seoul. The company then sent them back to factories in China in high positions (Hanguk Gyeongje, Dec. 30, 1999).11 Four characteristics I mentioned earlier show that Korean companies tend to reduce the number of Korean Chinese employees and South Koreans, but increase the number of Chinese employees. Even though they hire Korean Chinese, they emphasize their nationality more than ethnicity. Next, I address the most significant step of Korean companies in advance into Chinese markets now, localization.


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Localization The rise of Chinese consumers as an attractive market has pulled South Korean entrepreneurs into the business of producing in China for local consumption. A group of well-to-do Chinese consumers can now be identified, and they have a taste for high end products. These products differ significantly from the ones that most foreign firms in China have been making for export. Korean firms now understand that investing in China solely for reducing labor costs is not the best long-term strategy. Instead, they realize, they ought to both produce in and for China. Although firms opened factories and branch offices in China in the early stage, they are now interested in building up independent ones from main firms in Korea or second headquarters in China. The main characteristic of Chinese business is to form close relations with local governments. Through own experiences, the faster companies localize, the faster they succeed. Social activities and cooperation with local governments and people are significant elements in business success in China. Korean companies, particularly big enterprises, have in the early 2000s made localization as their strategy for penetrating Chinese markets. This goal has changed hiring patterns. Companies prefer to hire local born Chinese employees because they understand local culture and markets. It helps when the companies have good social relations with local areas, and local governments also encourage them to hire local people. Like other foreign companies in China, Korean firms have also started hiring Chinese as managers or for higher positions. Some companies make the Chinese side (zhongfang) as intermediaries. Companies select Chinese intermediaries who are recommended by the local governments and who are born in the locality. The Chinese intermediaries hold meetings (gonghui) when companies have some troubles and issues to discuss (Paik Gwan-ho and Jeong Jong-Ho 2002, 189–190). Figure 5.2 describes the employment relations in Korean firms. Korean firms’ efforts to localize were seen first among big enterprises after 2000. For example, on the fifteenth of July in 2001, SK promised that Chinese could get promotions to high positions, and learn high skills and techniques in the company.12 SK held a large job-marketing fair to recruit Chinese students who study in Korea in 2005 (The Hankyoreh, Oct. 13, 2005). In 2003, in the magazine, Fortune, LG was selected as one of the ten most popular foreign companies among Chinese people. LG has pursued the strategy of localization. It has decreased the number of South Korean employees and Korean Chinese managers and taken on more Chinese employees.

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South Koreans

KC

Ch

Chinese Employees (including local people and outsiders)

Figure 5.2 Employment relations in Korean firms (concentrating on laboring firms). Source: Adapted from Paik Gwan-ho and Jeong Jong-Ho, 2002: 192. Note: “KC” indicates Korean Chinese intermediaries (managers and interpreters). “Ch” means Chinese intermediaries (zhongfang).

Localization of foreign companies helps to give locals more affinity for the company. For example, Samsung employs 50,000 Chinese workers in 29 factories. They are increasingly concentrating on R & D design work in China and hiring local people for top management. Their goal is to make Chinese customers feel the brand as their own (New York Times, Oct. 20, 2005). When I stayed in Beijing and Shanghai, some friends thought Samsung, called Sanxing in Chinese (which is the Chinese pronunciation of the Chinese characters that make up Samsung’s name), was a Chinese brand and, so, Samsung’s intention seems to be successful. The slogan of Samsung in China is “A company that is loved by Chinese and that contributes to Chinese society.” Companies also started giving more responsibility to Chinese employees. SK established the largest cosmetic surgery hospital and health centers in China in 2003. In negotiating for a long time, they hired a Chinese as the chief-manager with a high salary. In addition, Korean entrepreneurs have opened independent companies, not secondary or branch offices in China. When Samsung opened digital companies and museum in Beijing, they said that business in China will be solved within China. SK has a long-term plan, through which a second SK will be born in China (Herald Economy, June 21, 2001). SK


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opened a holding company in China, SK China Holding CO., Ltd. in 2004 and aims to shift from focusing on exports to localization (Money Today, Oct. 28, 2004). SK recruited 20 Chinese (11 for SK Corporation, 5 for SK Telecom, 2 for SK Networks, and 2 for SK Construction) and trained them in Korea for the purpose of “thorough localization” (Onbao News, Jan. 18, 2006). Frequent contact with local governments and people resulted in the increase of social activities. Korean companies were reluctant to participate in charitable events and public business in China before 2000 (Paik Gwan-ho and Jeong Jong-Ho 2002, 242). However, diverse social activities by big enterprises have swiftly started from 2000. For example, SK has started the SK scholarship quiz show from 2000; LG started the LG scholarship quiz show from 2004; and Samsung started the Samsung scholarship quiz show from 2000 in China (Korean Trade Association, 2006). LG established schools and an LG village in China (Herald Economy, June 21, 2001). Samsung started establishing forty-five Samsung Anycall Schools (Xiwang xuexiao) from 2005. Posco established two elementary schools in Dalian, donating 50,000 dollars in 1996, and continues to donate a large amount of money to them (Segye Ilbo, Aug. 9, 2004). Many sports events in China are supported by these major enterprises. Participating in public services creates familiarity of the companies to local customers. Meanwhile, Korean companies’ pursuit of localization has brought stronger cooperation among South Korean entrepreneurs. They would like to study others’ success and strategies, listen to experiences in Chinese markets, and get some advice and information from associations. Each local government has different laws and rules. To understand regulations of local governments and to learn how to deal with them, Korean entrepreneurs have established business associations by locality and have regular meetings. I will explain this more in chapter 7. Case Studies Here I discuss four cases of Korean enterprises that have adapted to Chinese markets. Case I. Case I comes from a company that changed its hiring strategy from the first to the third type. The owner of M clothing company in Qingdao has his main office in Daegu in South Korea and built a factory in China. At first, he brought 40 South Koreans and hired 650 Chinese employees

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(including Korean Chinese). Now, he has 2 South Korean employees and 300 Chinese employees. What you first have to be alert about in China is South Koreans and then, second, is Korean-Chinese. Some poorly qualified South Korean employees look down on Korean-Chinese and Chinese employees. Of course, it causes many problems and conflicts. Fights between South Koreans, Korean-Chinese, and Chinese employees happen all the time. Hiring a large number of employees is not the best strategy. How to manage each employee and assign each employee to the right place will lead a way to business success. (the owner of M clothing company, www. korcham-china.net, 2004) The less power Korean companies give to ethnic Koreans, the fewer conflicts they have. In addition, with the cost of hiring a South Korean employee the company can hire more than ten Chinese employees. Korean Chinese employees are also more expensive than Chinese employees. Another Korean company in Qingdao hired sixty Korean Chinese employees, but decreased to fifteen later (www.korcham-china.net, 2004). Case II. The company of case II had difficulty having close dialogue with Chinese employees and understanding the Chinese working environment in the early stage of business. Y sports gloves company opened a factory in China in February 1993. The total number of workers was 347 and the standard age was approximately 19 to 21. Most were middle-school graduates. Approximately 90 percent of them were waidiren (outsiders). The rest of them were South Korean residential representatives and Korean Chinese managers. Including the president, the factory had six South Koreans, who were in their twenties and thirties. Most management positions were held by South Koreans and Korean Chinese managers. South Koreans taught skills to Chinese. Korean Chinese interpreted for and managed Chinese employees, but this style caused not a few antipathies among Chinese employees toward Korean Chinese. Fights between them were frequent. The company had a hard time taking care of laborers. First, they opened the company hastily, and relations between South Korean employers and Chinese employees through Korean Chinese managers did not create good relations. Misunderstandings from misinterpretation and oppressive attitudes toward Chinese employees did not result in a productive company atmosphere.


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The complaints from employees became most serious during the Spring Festival. It is one of the biggest holidays and officially gives three days off. Some employees prefer to take vacation for one month. Since most of them were not local-born they demanded longer vacation, but the company followed the three days off rule. A lot of employees quit the company and did not return to the factory. After these troubles, the company changed its strategies. First, they hired people from the immediate vicinity even though they were more expensive than outsiders. Second, among the local Chinese employees, the company chose the most capable employees in each section and selected them as representatives. They became direct middlemen between Chinese and Koreans (Korean Chinese interpreted their dialogue in front of South Koreans). This strategy brought about less conflict between Korean employers and Chinese employees and, thus, conflicts were much less. Third, they gave material incentives. Preventing employees from quitting jobs so easily, employees who stayed for six months received an extra 15 yuan every month and after a year got 25 yuan more every month. An extra 10 yuan every month was given to those who stayed longer. As a result, employees preferred to work for a long term. After that, the company had a plan to decrease the number of South Korean employees. Even though the number of South Korean employees is six, their salaries occupied one-third of the whole labor bill. When the company almost collapsed in the aftermath of the Spring Festival, swift change in hiring strategies and working atmosphere succeeded in keeping the business afloat (interview in Qingdao, 2003). Case III. In Y textile company, employers and employees did not have direct relations because of the company’s complicated hiring strategies. It opened a factory, planning on producing more goods with the cheap laborers, in Shenyang in 1997. The reasons why the company chose Shenyang were that the electricity fee was cheaper than other places and skilled workers were easy to find because of the large number of state enterprises in Liaoning province. The president of the main office in Korea became the representative of the factory and the executive director became manager. They hired 146 Chinese employees and Korean Chinese as managers, and dispatched 5 residential representatives from Korea. The residential representatives taught skills to Chinese employees. Three of them went back to Korea one year later and the rest of them two years later. The representative of the factory majored in Chinese literature and studied experiences of failed and successful Korean companies that had already

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advanced in Chinese markets. He considered keeping good relations with Chinese employees as the most important strategy. To accumulate trust with Chinese employees, the factory suggested free lunches, gifts for holidays, and salary incentives. The factory adjusted to China faster than others. However, from 2000, inferior goods were produced and they were rejected on the Korean market. The factory stopped for two months and employees moved to other companies. When the factory started operating again, inferior goods were produced again. Several reasons caused these problems. First, after residential representatives returned to South Korea, most important jobs were taken by the Korean Chinese factory managers. They had hired Korean Chinese through personal connections rather than assessment of ability. A female Korean Chinese who had gotten the job in the factory first hired other Korean Chinese employees. Two months after residential representatives left, employees reported problems of machines to the Korean Chinese managers, but they ignored them. Chinese employees reported the problems again, but the message was not delivered to the representative of the factory. In addition, the South Korean executive director had a plan to start his own business in China. He did not want to be involved with troubles in the factory. Thus, the main intermediary between the factory in Shenyang and the main office in Korea became the Korean Chinese managing director. Chinese employees’ distrust of the Korean Chinese managing director grew and, eventually, ten machines were broken. Moreover, training Chinese employees was not done in an organized way. Before 1999, the factory concentrated on producing quantity. Chinese employees were trained by residential representatives by that time. After 1999, to produce high-quality clothes, they switched the cloth from a basic one to a high-quality one. The Chinese employees learned the new skills from Korean Chinese who were not themselves trained in the equipment. After these problems, the owner of the company added an additional position of executive director and he hired a South Korean who studied Chinese at Shanghai University and had business experience in Shanghai. A residential representative was dispatched to the factory and held two positions, as the department manager in Korea and factory manager in China. The Korean Chinese manager and others worked as clerical officers. The factory manager appointed several foremen among Chinese employees from each department in the factory (Korea International Labor Foundation 2003, 274–272).


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Case IV. The success of “Qianlima” in China in 2003 is an example of making use of the new business strategies well. Kia Automotive produced a small size car, Qianlima, in December, 2002 and started selling it from 2003. It became the most popular car among young Chinese people and the top selling model among small cars in 2003. Its market occupation ratio reached the first rank in the auto market. There were several strategies that Kia used, which were to try the new location, concentrating on localization, emphasizing sales and services in the domestic market, and managing employees. 1. Location. While other South Korean companies opened factories and branch offices in big cities or the northeast, Kia chose the countryside, Yancheng in Zhejiang province. It opened its plant as a joint-venture company with a Chinese company and tried to make use of parts that are produced in the joint company (71 percent of parts were produced in China and the company had a plan to increase that to 91 percent). Choosing an isolated area gave benefits as well. The Yancheng local government actively supported the establishment of the factory and helped look for local employees. 2. Localization. First, the name of Qianlima helped attract Chinese customers. The name means thousand-li (a unit of distance)-horse, referring to a fast horse in Chinese mythology. The color of the car was red, which is the favorite color of Chinese. Besides attracting Chinese by playing to their culture, Kia tried to have good relations with local people. When SARS broke out in China, most foreign employers and employees left the country, but none of the South Koreans in the company left.They stayed in the area and gave donations to local people. That was a big issue in the area and local government officials were impressed. Thus, the company established close relations with the local government, which could be the safest guarantee in the Chinese market. In addition, the company’s plan to look for parts produced nearby rather than from South Korea provided more jobs to people in the area. 3. Sales and service in the domestic market. Before they showed the car in public, they started opening local agencies all over China. Because of the low name reputation compared to other foreign cars, Chinese merchants were not so willing to open agencies. First, five businessmen joined and later ten offices and sixty-one after-service agencies were opened. They focused on local advertisements before selling the car. Contacting local people and interviewing them about what kinds of cars they prefer, they produced the second Qianlima after the big success of the first one. In addition,

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the guarantee of after-service and trial to drive in the street before buying, which are not familiar to Chinese consumers, attracted people. 4. Managing employees. In the factory, the company applied the nameresponsibility system. If a part of a car has some problems, they can track whose responsibility it was. For advertising and selling cars, South Korean and Korean Chinese employees traveled all over China together. One of the main reasons of success is the hiring of professional Korean Chinese managers (Dazhong Ribao, Jan. 24, 2003). Case V. A big enterprise has tried a new business strategy since first entering China. LG company advanced in the Chinese markets in 1994. It has thirty-four corporate companies and thirty-three branch companies in China. It established Korean branch companies first in Beijing in July 1995. Core parts of the products were brought from South Korea at first. However, they have tried to use Chinese-produced parts. They had a plan to purchase 80 percent of parts in the domestic market (Maeil Gyeongje, June 21, 1997). In addition, contrary to other Korean companies, they also established a labor union for their employees. Social activities, such as LG schools and LG village, have begun (Herald Economy, June 21, 2001). They also participate in the security markets in China. LG was in fact not so successful in the early 1990s. They decided not to depend on Korean Chinese and hired Chinese employees. They also changed sales strategies, such as visiting each house and giving advertisements by hand because the technology, such as television and radio, was not so common. Those techniques gave a strong impression about the company to Chinese customers (Maeil Gyeongje, Dec. 31, 1999). Conclusion Contrary to positive expectations, cooperation between South Korean business and Korean Chinese has led to serious intra-ethnic conflict. Although South Korean entrepreneurs called on sentiments of ethnic solidarity to settle in China, their experiences with Korean Chinese have led to ethnic distrust between the two groups. Conflicts arose from a variety of sources, including the different class values of Korean Chinese and South Koreans in China, the tendency of South Korean firms to rely on Korean Chinese in jobs they are not qualified for, and South Korean entrepreneurs’ excessive trust in co-ethnics whom they do not know well. Responding to these conflicts, South Korean firms have attempted to find strategies for conducting business in China without encountering


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problems in their relations with Korean Chinese. South Korean firms in China have started spreading across Chinese regions to target local markets and being more active to interact directly with local Chinese. They also consider how to distribute authority among employees. They have made efforts to change the personnel composition of their firms: South Korean residential representatives are recruited more selectively, and more Chinese are being hired and promoted.


CHAPTER 6

Relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans in the Service Sector

T

he fast increase in the number of South Korean settlers and travelers has resulted in the expansion of community services for Koreans in China. Services for Korean communities have provided jobs for Korean Chinese and more business opportunities to all ethnic Koreans. The main demand for services has been from South Koreans, and Korean Chinese have been the biggest suppliers. South Korean travelers look for travel guides and entertainment services. Students look for maids and tutors. Business men also look for domestic help as well as employees and partners who can guide them through shortcuts to business success. Korean Chinese have had advantages over Chinese in providing services for South Korean residents. First, they are more familiar with South Koreans’ preferences. They can cook Korean food. They know what to supply in a Korean grocery. They know the style of restaurants and bars that Koreans like. Second, familiarity with the Korean language makes them more practical for running or working in restaurants and bars for South Koreans. South Koreans who do not speak Chinese also need to be able to communicate with their housemaids. Third, ethnic trust has made South Koreans turn first to Korean Chinese. They have maintained Korean culture for at least fifty years in China, and this fact made South Koreans regard them as patriots and as the “same people” (gatteun saram) as themselves. Another factor pulling Korean Chinese into service jobs for South Koreans is demand-side. Koreans abroad have demonstrated a strong tendency to maintain their habits. When living in another country, they want to be able to eat Korean food for every meal, to sing Korean songs at karaoke

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bars, and to get Korean-style haircuts. It is not surprising that South Koreans in China have also been looking to maintain their habits. As in other spheres of Korean life in China, South Koreans have over time tried to turn away from Korean Chinese as their service providers. In many service sector interactions we can see trust breakdown between Korean Chinese and South Koreans. Their faith in Korean Chinese as fellow Koreans has led many South Koreans to depend too much—for communicating in China and evading property rules—on individual Korean Chinese of whom they have insufficient knowledge. Also contributing to breakdown in ethnic trust has been that Korean Chinese are not perfectly adapted to South Korean norms. For example, Korean Chinese often fail to live up to South Korean expectations for how service providers should act and be oriented to customers. These differences have caused the breakdown of companies involved in the service sector. In a 40 million dollar investment, Daewoo opened a big hotel in Yanji targeting South Korean travelers. Unlike the expectation that they would bring in big profits from the large number of Korean tourists in the area, 10 rooms among 250 were usually filled and, consequently, the hotel closed down. The main reason was that potential customers got wind the staff—all of whom were Korean Chinese—were not nice (Ikonomist, Mar. 11, 1997). The result of conflict between Korean Chinese and South Koreans has made South Korean service consumers turn to other alternatives. South Korean families and service sector entrepreneurs look more to Chinese instead of Korean Chinese. If language barriers can be overcome, Chinese maids or waitresses can be hired at lower costs. As service provision tends to occur between South Koreans and Korean Chinese at a household or individual level, there has been less change over time in networks in this sector. South Koreans who go to China for the first time now still need to learn basically from scratch. They need maids who can speak Korean. Families cannot adapt to living in China as easily as firms can, because they are smaller. Some word of mouth advice does make a difference, but it is less useful than in other sectors. We can trace some decline in ethnic Korean service provision networks, but it is not dramatic. Structure of the Service Industry In the service industry for ethnic Koreans in China, the main suppliers and consumers have changed. Main demand has usually been from South Koreans. Main suppliers were South Koreans for entertainment and Korean Chinese for providing services in the early times. However, main suppliers

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have been more various from South Koreans to Korean Chinese, and to Chinese. These potential suppliers have competed over service provision. There has been competition between Korean Chinese and Chinese to provide services to South Koreans and between South Koreans and Korean Chinese to have service business. The basic pattern of Korean Chinese providing services for South Koreans accounts for a large part of the service sector. However, a fuller picture includes their Chinese and South Korean competitors. Each of these groups of potential service providers brings a set of skills and resources. Korean Chinese can supply cheap labor, knowledge of Korean language, some idea of South Korean preferences, and legal advantages of being Chinese citizens. South Koreans have larger financial resources and better knowledge of South Korean preferences. Chinese have the least knowledge of what South Koreans want, but they can often provide the cheapest labor. South Koreans have been able to open more upscale restaurants and bars in China. These also tend to be better suited to South Korean tastes and can even involve bringing decorations and utensils from South Korea. A South Korean restaurant owner in Dalian explained that better results were achieved through more expensive preparations: I brought most decorations from South Korea, even the light bulbs. I tried to give the impression to customers that my restaurant is fancy and up-to-fashion. That was worth it. Koreans come here because they can feel they are in a Korean restaurant. Even though the food is a little more expensive than other places, Chinese customers also come here. (Interview in Dalian in winter, 2003) Korean Chinese restaurant and bar owners, lacking large capital, find themselves in competition with these higher end establishments. This structure of competition has changed over time. Korean Chinese who have obtained capital have started opening expensive service enterprises and, consequently, they can compete with South Korean service businessmen. When Korean Chinese are successful running services for South Koreans, it has often been those who have previously worked in South Korea or had some connection to South Koreans. From that experience they gain a better idea of what South Koreans want, they can obtain materials from South Korea, and they tend to have earned enough money to make bigger investments in their enterprises. They are also able to compete with South Korean business because of a better understanding of the Chinese market. In Qingdao, half of all Korean restaurants are operated by Korean Chinese.

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Some of them were taken over from South Koreans who failed to make their business profitable (The Hankyoreh, Sept. 07, 2007). Korean Chinese and Chinese are also competitors in providing simple services. Chinese have been able to compete with Korean Chinese because of their lower labor costs and have been hired by South Korean managers who find them easier to control than Korean Chinese. In addition, the longer South Koreans live in China, the more they tend to hire Chinese rather than Korean Chinese. Economic reasons (the difference in salary) and complications arising from personal relations with Korean Chinese make South Koreans choose Chinese service providers. In addition, the development of the service industry has brought about the urban movement of Korean Chinese, as I discussed in the second chapter. Beijing offers a good example for the transformation of Korean Chinese living patterns. According to the composition of the Korean Chinese labor force in Beijing in 2000, employment in service jobs, such as waiters and waitresses in karaoke and restaurants and clerks in stores, accounts for the second largest number of Korean Chinese workers, after agriculture. In the early 1990s, only 3 percent of Korean Chinese workers were engaged in services. By 2000, the percentage had gone up to 19 percent. In the case of Beijing, 56 percent of Korean Chinese work in the service sector. This compares with 29 percent for Han-Chinese who are in the service sector in Beijing. In 1980, the population of Korean Chinese in Beijing was 3,905, and it increased to 20,369 in 2000. In 2000, 88 percent of them live in the city and the rest in surrounding counties (Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China, 2002). In 2008, the Jilin Newspaper reported that there were 100,000 Korean Chinese in Beijing (Gilim Shinmun, Oct. 16, 2008). The increase in the availability of service jobs for Korean Chinese in recent years has been related to the increase of South Koreans’ movements to urban China. The arrival of South Korean businessmen and students in Beijing drove much of the movement of Korean Chinese into the capital and into service jobs. Figure 6.1 shows that many Korean Chinese who live in Beijing are urban migrants. It also reflects that most Korean Chinese are engaged in service sector work. The population is very young, peaking in the 20–29 age groups. Furthermore, especially in those age groups, women clearly outnumber men. Those sex ratios are a good sign of migration into service work, rather than industry or for schooling. In the next sections, I discuss each subsector of the Korean service industry in China. This includes entertainment, stores and restaurants, domestic work, education, business relations as service partners, and real estate.

Service Sector

3,500

3,259 3,047

Male Female Total

3,000

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2,391

2,500

2,046

1,956

2,000

1,538 1,500 1,072 1,000 788

669

824

650

500

533

696

532

65–69

60–64

55–59

50–54

45–49

40–44

35–39

30–34

25–29

20–24

15–19

10–14

5–9

0–4

0

years

Figure 6.1

Age distribution of Korean Chinese in Beijing, 2000.

Source: Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of Beijing Municipality, 2002. Note: Population by age group.

I also show how relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans have formed in the service industry and how they have influenced the ethnic enclave community. Entertainment Since 2000 China has been the top destination for South Korean tourists. Figure 6.2 shows the acceleration of Korean tourism in China, which is seen clearly in contrast with the steady numbers traveling to Japan. Previously, Japan was the favored destination for Korean tourists. In 2001, China overtook Japan for the top spot. Cheap shopping attracts South Koreans to China. Traveling in northeast China, they can enjoy cheap prices in Korean restaurants and entertainment spots, such as saunas, bars, and karaoke. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the area has been especially popular among South Koreans because they are able to see firsthand the lives of Korean Chinese, meet North Koreans in North Korean restaurants,1 and see the North Korean land standing near the border of the northeast. In the big Korea towns, such as Xita (Shenyang) and Yanji (Yanbian), entertainment and other service

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6,000,000

Japan China

5,000,000

4,000,000

3,000,000

2,000,000

1,000,000

0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007

Figure 6.2 The number of Korean travelers in Japan and China. Source: Korea National Tourism Organization, www.knto.or.kr, 2006 Segye Yeohaeng Shinmun (Global Travel News), Jan. 05, 2009. Note: The economic Crisis from 1997 to 1999 caused a temporary decrease in traveling abroad.

businesses have driven prosperity. Yanji has the highest number of entertainment services, such as cafés, bars, and restaurants compared to its population in China (Kim Doosub 2003, 140).2 Going to a karaoke in China costs 3 dollars per hour, in contrast to more than 10 dollars in Korea. Eating bibimbap costs 1 dollar in China and 5 dollars in Korea. Thus, the increase of South Korean travelers has resulted in the expansion of the entertainment markets in Korea towns since 1992. Recently the entertainment markets in Beijing are even led by ethnic Koreans. For example, there were 180 karaoke bars in Beijing in 2003. Among them, 160 were owned by Korean Chinese (www.yanji.net, May 24, 2003). Entertainment businesses targeting South Koreans in China need Korean-speaking staff. Korean Chinese were the natural candidates for these jobs. To Korean Chinese, being a waitress or bartender in a South Korean-oriented establishment was a good opportunity. In this ethnic sector, they could get higher wages than they would for the same work outside the ethnic sector, because their language abilities were needed.

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But many Korean Chinese perceived other benefits in working for or near South Koreans. They hoped to make connections through South Korean customers that would help them find better Korean jobs or a way to get to South Korea. These Korean Chinese had personal interests in emphasizing their Korean identity, which they saw as a means to emigration. This instrumental approach to ethnicity was one seed for problems with South Koreans, who are often not enthusiastic about helping Korean Chinese move to South Korea. Korean Chinese seeking to get more out of their employment have often created conflicts. A South Korean owner of a small snack bar in Wangjing, Beijing said she had difficult relations with the Korean Chinese delivery man. The delivery man wanted to go to South Korea and asked her to help out many times. She turned him down and after that, he would ask customers who came to the store. She warned him harshly and it resulted in uncomfortable relations with him (interview in Beijing, Jan. 2004). These kinds of relations easily lead to ethnic conflicts. The growth of entertainment services has provided more jobs to Korean Chinese. On the other hand, problems have arisen from this. Young Korean Chinese easily give up their schooling and take jobs in merry-making places. South Korean consumers present a temptation to young Korean Chinese to make easy money rather than continue their education. The service sector jobs were an easy route to a more comfortable life. But these jobs have little long-term potential. They think about the short term and, consequently, their labors are limited to simple jobs. One Korean Chinese respondent described this problem: I was not good at studying anyway. I thought it would be not so difficult to find jobs in cities. I went to Harbin first and then Yanji. I worked in a sauna and karaoke that South Koreans owned. I haven’t thought about my future seriously. But I definitely won’t be a waiter forever. I wanna make a lot of money. I don’t know how to do it now and don’t have any clear plans. But I know it’s time to think about that. (Interview in Dalian in winter, 2003)3 Contact with service sector opportunities has lowered Korean Chinese interest in education. The expansion of the ethnic enclave market has also opened the young Korean Chinese generation to business. The chief of the Korea department in J hotel in Dalian said that most young Korean Chinese are interested in making money and want to give up studying. In his office, playing the role of middlemen between South Korean employers and Korean Chinese applicants, he had seen many young Korean Chinese give up school

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and move to the city (interview in Dalian in fall, 2003). Consequently, the gap between Korean Chinese with high and low levels of education could widen. The issue of leaving school for South Korean-targeted entertainment jobs illustrates the relationship between the ethnic sector and the non-ethnic sector. For most young Korean Chinese their future lies outside of their home community and in Chinese society. For Chinese, non-Korean, career options are far more numerous and promising, and so, they and their parents have less reason to emphasize their Korean ethnicity. Speaking Korean is not essential. However, the arrival of South Koreans has provided a set of incentives in the opposite direction. The rise of South Korean communities in China has created demand for a large number of low-skill entertainment workers. In the short term, young Korean Chinese can do better than they could do by taking this work in Chinese jobs. Although South Korean service employers offer higher pay than similar jobs outside the ethnic sector, they also discourage Korean Chinese from the longer-term opportunities outside this sector. In other words, the ethnic sector gives a short-term opportunity that is quite possibly not in the long-term interests of Korean Chinese people. Entertainment businesses usually prefer to hire young female employees. Thus, Korean Chinese women had more chances to find jobs in cities. A result of this was an unbalanced sex ratio in Korean Chinese villages. Young women moved to cities more than men because more jobs were open to them. According to Lee Hyesun’s research, the sex ratio in Korean Chinese villages can reach twenty to one. In 1996, it was forty to one in a Korean Chinese village in Yanbian. In 1997, the ratio was even fifty-seven to one in a village in Longjing (Kim Hyundong and Ju Inyoung 1999, 63; Lee Hyesun 1999, 265). In 1990, Yanbian had 82,455 women in the age group of 20–29. By 2000, this figure decreased to 48,465 (Kim Doosub 2003, 137). These trends have sped up the collapse of small Korean Chinese villages. The growth of migration in China has been linked to the growth of prostitution (Davin 1999, 133). The connection is worth considering in the Korean Chinese case as well. There is some evidence that many prostitutes are migrants from rural areas. A survey of prostitutes held in the Urban Re-education Centers between 1989 and 1992 showed that more than a quarter of them were peasants (Davin 1999, 134). Understandably, migrants search for ways to maximize their incomes. Female migrants who work long hours in industry or domestic service for comparatively small wages may well be tempted by sex work that could bring them a month’s salary in two or three nights. Working in restaurant all day, they can make 1,000–1,200 yuan per month.4 Working in a karaoke or bar,

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they can make 500–1,000 yuan per night. The biggest fortune is made from “permanent contracts” with men, such as entrepreneurs or high officials, who set them up in apartments. Encountering South Korean businessmen (or Japanese businessmen) and saving money to have their own business, such as a grocery store, cosmetic store, or beauty shop, is the best luck they can have. The number of Korean Chinese women involved in entertainment work is high. In the spring of 2003, there was a campaign to wipe out crime in Beijing. One-third of prostitutes who were arrested were Korean Chinese (www.yanji.net, May 24, 2003). Women who lived in rural areas move to cities or South Korea as the representative of the family to make money. Some of them work as entertainers and do not go back to their families. Sometimes they get wrapped up in materialism. The owner of Korean cosmetic stores in Beijing and an investor in the Hanguo-cheng department in the Wangjing district said that costumers who look for expensive cosmetics and clothes are mostly Korean Chinese (interview in Beijing in winter, 2003). Some of them run into South Korean swindlers. Not a few Korean Chinese women committed suicide because they lived with South Korean men who promised to take them to South Korea. The promise was never kept or later they discovered the man was already married in South Korea. Humiliation drives them to give up their lives. Even worse, some men take money from them. The mid-1990s was the worst time, and some South Korean and Korean Chinese activists established Korean Chinese victim associations to prevent increasing victims. Choi Woogil (2003) estimated that according to his research 20 percent of the whole population of Korean Chinese has at some point been tricked by South Koreans. Stores and Restaurants Not only entertainment businesses, but also stores that sell Korean products have been increasing in China. South Koreans have demonstrated a preference for Korean-made products. An increasing number of stores sell and deliver Korean food. The number of Korean stationery stores, clothing stores, and cosmetic stores has also gone up. A big department store called Hanguo-cheng “Korea-town” is easy to find in cities in northeast China and big cities in other areas. The stores have all kinds of products made in Korea and are located near Korean communities. These stores need employees who are able to speak Korean for South Korean customers and Chinese for Chinese customers. This has raised demand for Korean Chinese employees. Korean Chinese in small Korean

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Chinese villages moved to cities in northeast China and cities that have South Korean-led towns. Ethnic networks that link South Korean employers to Korean Chinese workers have appeared, and they offer several ways to find jobs. Fliers with job information can be found anywhere in Korea towns. In Beijing, the Chinese government allowed only one Korean periodical, a biweekly called Economic Life. However, illegal magazines have constantly come out and they are all circulated freely. They can be easily picked up in Korean restaurants and grocery stores. In addition, job introduction offices have appeared. Hotels in big cities and cities in northeast China have offices called Hanguk-bu “Korea department,” literally. They manage information for Korean Chinese jobs seekers, as well as arrange travel guides for South Korean travelers or businessmen. Korean small and medium enterprises ask the department for help finding employees and Korean Chinese look for jobs in these places as well. There are also professional job introduction service centers (Kim Hyundong and Ju Inyoung 1999, 30; fieldwork, 2003–2004). For safety, before leaving their hometowns, some Korean Chinese would like to use personal connections. Korean Chinese who already found jobs in cities introduce friends from home or relatives to other stores. South Korean employers also exchanged information with each other. A young Korean Chinese manager in a restaurant in Dalian worked in a South Korean-owned sauna in Yanji before moving to the South Korean-owned restaurant. When the restaurant owner looked for a trustworthy Korean Chinese manager, the sauna owner recommended him. The sauna owner knew that this man had always wanted to go to Dalian. The owner was about to switch his business to a new one. So, he sent his Korean Chinese employee to the restaurant owner. The Korean Chinese was not only promoted to managerial position and to act as a mediator between Chinese and Korean Chinese waiters and waitresses, but also in charge of the restaurant when the owner was not there. Within a workplace, Korean Chinese and Chinese employees are often segregated. In one restaurant, Korean Chinese and Chinese employees ate separately. The Korean Chinese manager could only respond by eating alone to maintain his neutrality. While they socialized along ethnic lines, he decided that he should not be close to any of them (interview in Dalian in winter, 2003).5 South Korean employers are aware of these divisions, but are more caught up in conflicts between themselves and Korean Chinese. Many feel that Korean Chinese do not work as hard as Chinese, even though they are paid more. South Korean restaurant owners say that Korean Chinese frequently ask for raises and complain too much. They also apparently quit

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and move on to other jobs with great frequency. Owner of B restaurant in Beijing said, I feel bad when salary time comes. A Chinese employee works really hard, but I give less money to her than the Korean-Chinese employees. She is the one who opens the restaurant every morning and works late night. I am trying not to let her know that her salary is much lower than other Korean-Chinese employees. But if I give the same salary to her, other Korean-Chinese will be angry. Korean-Chinese are so difficult to handle. Even though I do not want to use Korean-Chinese waiters and waitresses, it is impossible not to use them. Most of our business is delivering food too. Korean people order food by phone. Who will take the phone all the time? Who will serve the food to Korean costumers? We need Korean-Chinese employees anyway. If Korean-Chinese delivery men or employees threaten to quit right now, we don’t have any idea how we can find other employees. Moreover, it takes a long time to train them and make them familiar with this area. I have to check their moods all the time. I never expected this would give me so much stress. (Interview in Beijing, Jan. 2004) On the other hand, good cooperative relations—that avoid employment problems related to ethnicity—between South Koreans and Korean Chinese in the service sector are able to create better situations for their business. A South Korean man who was married to a Korean Chinese woman opened a Korean snack bar in a Korea town in Beijing. The legal owner of the snack bar is the wife by law, and in practice she does act as the manager. The owners do not have to get involved in employment conflicts and complicated legal problems and can even save labor costs by hiring Chinese employees. Despite these advantages, this strategy is rare in the service sector activities targeting South Korean customers. These kinds of companies can have difficulties, because Korean customers who do not speak Chinese at all sometimes encounter inconvenience. The Korean Chinese wife in the snack bar takes care of the business and she hired two young Chinese female cooks and one male waiter who are all from Sichuan. Her mother taught the employees how to cook Korean snacks. The employees do not speak Korean at all. This store is popular among Korean students. The Korean Chinese wife appears at the store during limited hours because of her children, but her husband is not involved with the shop at all. While the two girls cook the food, the boy takes care of serving the food and receiving the money (all of them were about twenty years old). One day, he disappeared to smoke for a moment. Customers who did not speak

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Chinese at all wanted to pay the bill. The two girls could not speak Korean and had a hard time. When the male waiter came back, they had a huge fight. Even though these kinds of events happen sometimes, the owner said that she does not want to hire Korean Chinese because Chinese employees work harder. In addition, if she wants to hire Korean Chinese, the salary will start from 1,000 yuan. But for Chinese employees, the salary will start from 500 yuan. She also provides housing and food to employees. Her family and employees live together and have good relations. Because they work hard, the owner said that she raised their wages to 650 yuan per month. In addition, the Chinese employees learn simple Korean phrases and, thus, the problems should decrease in the future (interview in Beijing, Dec. 2003). The growth of the number of Chinese people who learn Korean in China will give more possibilities for South Korean employers to pursue this strategy. Domestic Work: Maids and Cooks Although young Korean Chinese women are common in entertainment jobs, middle-aged women are popular as maids and cooks. The increase of South Korean students has created employment for Korean Chinese. At the end of 2002, foreign students in China numbered approximately 550,000, and South Korea was the country sending the largest number of students. The Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development in Korea announced that 28,126 South Koreans went to China for school from March 2002 to March 2003. More than 50 percent of all foreign students in China are South Koreans.6 The number has been growing fast (Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development, Dec. 2003). In 2007, 42,269 South Koreans went to China for receiving tertiary education and by early 2008 the figure went up to 57,504 (Overseas Korean Foundation, www.korean.net, April 2008). These students have significantly influenced the employment of Korean Chinese. Most young students go to China by themselves. Some live in dormitories, but most of them rent rooms off campus. Because of language barriers and their age, they need both patrons—who should have Chinese citizenship— and maids. They cook Korean food for the students, do other chores, and act as legal guardians of young students. In Beijing, most Korean students stay in the Wudaokou area. Korean Chinese middle-aged women easily find jobs there. They use a room of the house and students are in school all day. Being a maid has become very popular among Korean Chinese middle-aged women. The job is not hard and pay is much higher than other jobs. To the middle-aged women who have difficulty finding low-skill work, being a

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maid is a good opportunity. When maids hear that students are looking for a maid, they bring their relatives from the same hometown and introduce the job to them. Korean restaurants also need Korean Chinese middle-aged women as chefs.7 They also provide food and a place where they can stay. Recently, a number of Korean Chinese have started boarding houses where South Korean students can stay. The younger the students, the more money they can request from parents because they insist that they have to watch the young students more cautiously. In addition, South Korean families also hire Korean Chinese maids. Unable to speak Chinese, South Korean housewives hire Korean Chinese maids to do their shopping and to interpret between Chinese teachers and South Korean parents. The cheap labor price attracts South Koreans, and some families even hire two maids. On the one hand, this change has provided jobs to Korean Chinese and South Koreans adapted to China easily because of Korean Chinese. On the other hand, conflicts between Korean Chinese and South Koreans as maids and employers have arisen. South Koreans believe that Korean Chinese maids tend to trick them and are lazy. Korean Chinese maids say that South Koreans are so spoiled. Maids and students live together and students give salary and shopping money to them. Students explained that maids always complain that they are short of money to buy goods outside and demand more money. When Korean Chinese are hired at first, they are nice and cook good food. However, students are usually outside and after some time maids do not clean up or cook regularly either. According to students’ explanations, many maids enjoy exclusive daytime access to the family television and meet other Korean Chinese maids. It is also easy to discover that their relatives or friends are also working as maids in the same districts. They socialize with each other and do not take care of house work. When students bring their friends, maids ask them to give more money because they have to do extra work. In addition, maids look down on students, saying that they think South Korean students are not smart, cannot enter Korean universities, and, thus, they ran away from Korea (fieldwork in Dalian and Beijing, 2001 and 2003). When students first arrive in China and cannot speak Chinese at all, they hire Korean Chinese maids. As their Chinese improves and as conflicts with maids accumulate, they hire Chinese and ask them to learn how to cook Korean food. Hiring Korean Chinese maids is much more expensive than Chinese maids. Chinese maids have their family nearby them and, thus, they do not have to live with students in the same house. Thus, students prefer to have Chinese maids because it gives more freedom to them.

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Having the best maid is also competitive among South Koreans and some maids make use of this situation. In Dalian, South Korean students live in the development district (kaifaqu). Finding good Korean Chinese maids is especially difficult because it is a new city and there are no Korean Chinese towns nearby. Students’ parents live in Korea and sometimes come to China. They are very concerned to hire maids who they can trust to take care of their children. A South Korean woman lives in Dalian with two sons. She sent her sons to an international school in Dalian, but the dormitory fee was expensive for foreign students and the food was not good. She rented a house for them and hired a maid. Two years later, she also moved to China because of the problems of looking for maids. Her husband still lives in Korea.8 She has been learning Chinese and now has a Chinese maid after going through several problems with Korean Chinese maids: I asked my friend who lives in Shenyang whether I can find a good maid for my sons. She looked and sent one to me. She was young and really nice. I hired her instantly and she stayed here. With a comfortable mind, I went back to Korea. But one day my sons called me and said she left. I couldn’t believe it. She was there for three months and made a promise that she could be there more than six months. According to the explanation of one of my sons, she said she met a South Korean guy and will marry him. I was angry, but it was understandable. Being a South Korean man’s wife is the best dream for them. But several days later, my son called me and I heard an unbelievable thing. He said he saw her at his friend’s house. His friend didn’t know she worked in my house. She said she was looking for a maid, and our maid visited the house and said she could work right away. We gave her 1,000 yuan per month, but my son’s friend said she promised to give 1,200 yuan. It was the best deal they could find. After that, my son had to find another maid, but they too left as soon as they found better deals. We were tired of looking for Korean-Chinese maids. They are expensive, but do not work hard at all. Ordering them to do something is not easy because they don’t like hard work and I know they complain behind our backs that they think we treat them like slaves even though we are the same ethnic group. Everything is difficult. After hiring a Chinese maid, everything is good. I’m able to speak basic Chinese now and the maid does the things that I request. (Interview in Dalian in winter, 2003) Educational Sector: Tutors Korean Chinese university students and teachers are hired as tutors for South Korean students. Using Chinese students as tutors starts from 1.20 dollars

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per hour, but Korean Chinese cost 2.70 to 3.20 dollars per hour. Despite the higher price, they are popular because South Korean students have to prepare for the HSK, the Chinese language test that must be passed to enter Chinese schools. With Korean Chinese tutors South Korean students can study Chinese grammar in Korean and also practice listening. Korean Chinese. Studying Chinese as a foreign language in Korea is popular now. Because studying Chinese in China is much cheaper than in Korea, parents send their children to China on vacation. Getting a tutor in Korea means spending 17 to 20 dollars per hour. Offices introducing Chinese teachers to students have opened in China as well as in Korea. Korean Chinese also work as mediators. However, South Korean students do not use Korean Chinese for a long period. Their jobs are threatened by Chinese and South Koreans. South Koreans who stay in China for a long time, such as Xinxianzu, take over this work from Korean Chinese. These South Koreans are both better at explaining in Korean and have gone through the experience of learning Chinese. In addition, students who can understand some Chinese and start to speak prefer Chinese tutors because of the price, better pronunciation, and chances to contact Chinese. Many Korean Chinese speak Chinese with an accent different from the standard, Beijing accent. Korean students hire tutors who speak standard Chinese. In addition, when their Chinese improves to a certain level, they prefer to have conversations entirely in Chinese, not mixing Korean and Chinese together. Business Relations South Koreans who know little about Chinese markets and would like to start business with a small amount of money prefer to open restaurants (Yonyeong Joseon Munbo, June 18, 1999; interview with a Korean restaurant owner in Dalian in winter, 2003). As they get more familiar with business in China, they start other businesses. Some people report that the second step is a grocery store or karaoke. With development of many small Korea towns, the South Korean entrepreneurs think that the most stable business in China is in the service sector. The Chinese government has put strict limitations on foreign business ownership, as well as residential property ownership. Foreigners could not open individual businesses with less than 30,000 dollars.9 Even when they do open, tax problems are complicated. Foreign-owned-stores pay more taxes than Chinese. A South Korean restaurant owner in Shenyang said that he feels he is confronted with a new tax everyday (interview in Shenyang in winter, 2001). The increase of Korea towns and the growth of the service

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sector have made South Koreans look for alternatives. The easiest and fastest way that they can set up companies is to use the national citizenship of Korean Chinese. Most South Koreans who know Korean Chinese use their names as the owners of their business. Having the business formally in the name of local people can lead to safer business in China. However, this response often involves South Korean owners putting too much trust in people they do not know well. In some cases, Korean Chinese took their South Korean friends’ companies—and there was nothing illegal about doing so. The vice president of the China-Korean Association in Beijing said that more than half of the karaokes officially owned by Korean Chinese are actually run by South Koreans. Under the law, the stores belong to Korean Chinese. Some of them take stores from the South Koreans. Despite the risk, South Koreans have not stopped opening their businesses under the names of Korean Chinese. Some South Korean men are married to Korean Chinese and open their business under their wives’ names. If the wives change to South Korean citizenship (most of them do), they use the names of wives’ relatives. In the Wudakou area in Beijing, there was a “university street” (daehangno). In 2004 this alley had nine stores: one grocery store, one snack bar, four restaurants, one bar, one coffee shop, and one Internet room. Seven of them were owned by South Korean and Korean Chinese couples. All of them were formally owned by Korean Chinese wives or their parents. One restaurant was managed by Chinese-Koreans.10 Another restaurant was managed by a South Korean couple. They borrowed the name of a Korean Chinese woman who has two restaurants and a bar in her name. They were reluctant to answer when I asked about ownership because they did not want other people to know about that. Real Estate As mentioned in chapter 4, the real estate sector suddenly became popular among South Koreans in China, and real estate agencies have recently appeared in Korean residential areas in China. Foreigners are allowed to buy houses and buildings in limited zones—the Chinese government has gradually approved of foreign ownership in the last few years. The Korea town in Wangjing, Beijing appeared after this. For foreigners, renting a house in China can get expensive. To foreigners who plan to stay in China, purchasing a house seems to be beneficial in the long term. It is also regarded as a safe investment. South Koreans have adapted to changing property ownership laws fast because they think that purchasing a house is a significant investment and paying a monthly rental fee is wasteful.11

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Chinese open real estate agencies and hire Korean Chinese to attract South Korean customers. Some Korean Chinese also open agencies. The law is complicated and strict. Investors need a person who will pay the money on the payment date12 and stay up-to-date on changes in property policies. South Koreans have been enthusiastic about real estate investment in China since it became an option for them. Most Korean investors look for South Korean-owned real estate agencies instead of Korean Chinese or Chinese (interview in Beijing, winter 2003). Conclusion: Cooperation, Conflicts, and Less Adjustment Service-related activities have brought about relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans that parallel those in other situations. As in factory and office settings, South Koreans and Korean Chinese in neighborhoods have had powerful reasons to come together. Korean Chinese have helped South Korean families adjust to life in China. South Korean communities, in turn, have provided nurturing grounds for Korean Chinese entrepreneurs. But the terms of this cooperation have made disrespect and resentment endemic. This drama can be seen in households, shops, and restaurants in any urban Korean area in China. South Korean families and service sector employers can adjust to these conflicts over time, as their familiarity with life in China improves, by switching to ethnic Chinese housemaids, tutors, and employees. But the continuing flow of South Korean families into China ensures that these conflicts will be reenacted. This contrasts with the trend in business, where South Korean business as a whole has made some adjustments over time. The service sector also has a high turnover rate, with new shops, restaurants, and karaokes replacing others very often. This gives small entrepreneurs not enough time to make adjustments in light of intra-ethnic conflict.


CHAPTER 7

Community Networks and Activities

C

ommunity networks in Korea towns abroad have played significant roles in forming Korean ethnic enclaves and strengthen the ethnic solidarity. Illsoo Kim describes how the emergence and success of the Korean community in the New York Metropolitan Area is due in part to extensive and well-organized support systems, such as churches and information networks (1981, 184–190). During the communist period in China, Korean Chinese formed spatially concentrated communities and held community activities in groups based on their original hometowns. The maintenance of traditional festivals and the persistence of ethnic schools have functioned to sustain a cohesive community. South Koreans since the 1990s have moved to cities and Korean Chinese communities. They have expected to take advantage of the existing ethnic networks. South Koreans tried to join or support community organizations in Korean Chinese settlements. They established new associations and welcomed Korean Chinese. Although South Koreans and Korean Chinese attempted to form integrated communities with cooperative activities in the early 1990s, they have more recently separated into district communities. Ethnic distrust, control by the Chinese government, and the gap of class resources, particularly on the material side, have limited their cohesive community activities. Over a short period, South Koreans have set up Korea towns in Chinese cities. A large number of Korean Chinese has moved to new Korea towns and has established their own associations as well. South Korean community networks and activities have developed fast for their own survival in Chinese society. Without understanding Chinese

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markets and environment, South Koreans have been disadvantaged and, consequently, the number of associations with specific purposes, such as education and business, has been fast increasing. Their activities are based on exchanging information. South Korean associations are organized at the city level. The cultural, educational, religious, business, and sports organizations of each area have strong connections with those in South Korea as well as with each area in China. The online network also strengthens their solidarity. Community networks of Korean Chinese have weakened and disappeared because of the movement of population to urban areas. On the other hand, Korean Chinese who moved to urban areas have started a variety of networks based on their hometowns in China and on status, such as businessmen and students. The online network, a new trend, strengthens their bonds. This chapter discusses how Korean ethnic networks are divided into South Korean-led and Korean Chinese-led communities. The division is based on class resources and the control of the Chinese government. I analyze characteristics of South Korean-led settlements and Korean Chinese-led settlements first. I outline the functions and influence on Korean ethnic networks: local associations, business networks, church activities, educational groups, sports festivals, mass media, publishers, and cultural activities, and online network community. I focus on why the numbers of certain kinds of organizations has been growing up faster than others, what roles each association has in the community, what relations Korean Chinese and South Koreans have in the community networks, and whether Korean ethnic organizations and the local Chinese government cooperate. Korean Chinese-Led Settlements and South Korean-Led Settlements One cultural characteristic of ethnic Koreans abroad is the strong inclination to build geographically dense ethnic Korean networks. Where they migrate, they soon form a community known as a “Korea town.” They organize a wide scope of networks to adapt to strange lands. They settle down together and buy Korean products and keep contact with Korean mass media, such as Korean movies and drama shows. Finding various sizes of Korea towns abroad is easy. Korean movements to China before the 1950s and after the 1990s have resulted in two kinds of Korean ethnic communities: Korean Chinese-led settlements and South Korean-led settlements. Korean Chinese-led settlements are old towns that have existed since at least the 1950s. They are all located in the three northeastern provinces and the scale is flexible according


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to cities and countryside. In the early 1990s, many South Koreans followed these Korean Chinese settlements. At the same time, South Korean-led settlements of small size have been established since the early 1990s. They are located not only near the three northeast provinces, but also in big cities beyond the northeast area, such as Qingdao, Shanghai, and Beijing. They have been well organized with the increase of the South Korean population. Korean Chinese urban migrants have followed South Korean settlements. Besides these two settlements, there are combined areas of two groups, such as Shenyang. Korean Chinese and South Koreans are more integrated in the combined areas.1 Comparison of Korean Chinese and South Korean Communities South Korean-led communities have been developing fast and organized well and, on the other hand, Korean Chinese-led communities have been weakened. The decline of Korean Chinese community can be explained, first, by the spatial dispersion of the population and limitation of their community activities as migrants and a minority group. Korean Chinese outnumber South Koreans in even new Korea towns in cities.2 They understand China better than South Koreans and speak better Chinese. However, the duration to move to cities is not long enough and, thus, they do not understand the new area very well and do not have any connections (guanxi). In addition, because the economic status of Korean Chinese in cities is not high, their residential area is also dispersed rather than congested. South Koreans come to China as business owners or managers. They start with higher status in their new places than do Korean Chinese. On the other hand, Korean Chinese start as simple laborers or use connections to South Korean employers. South Koreans prefer to live near Korea towns. Korea towns are the business areas and residential areas for them. Even though Korean Chinese live near Korea towns, the district is divided. A church minister’s wife in the Wangjing district, Beijing mentioned, “I live in C apartment. Most of South Koreans live in D apartment. All my neighbors are Korean Chinese. C apartment is much cheaper than D apartment” (interview, Dec. 2003). In addition, the emergence of South Koreans made land prices higher in special areas in China. New urban Korean Chinese sojourners have been finding alternatives for their residential areas. For example, in Changchun, there were no conglomerated Korea towns for Korean Chinese. There were just a few small Korean Chinese villages and a few Korean Chinese grocery stores and restaurants. The increase of South Korean students, visitors, and

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businessmen has developed a downtown district and ethnic Korean stores have consequently been growing. The congested area has been characterized as a Korea town. South Koreans and Korean Chinese have gathered in this area, but the increase of land prices because of South Koreans has made this area a business area for Korean Chinese, not a residential area. Korean Chinese local government officials planned to make a residential area for Korean Chinese separately (Gilim Shinmun, Sept. 28, 1999). In Beijing, a new Korean Chinese area in the Shunyi district is being established for education, residential, and business advantages of their own (www.moyza.com, 2004). Another difference is that South Koreans have more privileges than Korean Chinese. As foreigners, they can organize ethnic schools and various associations. Some parts are still under the limitation of the Chinese government. Organizing Korean associations in each area was officially allowed in 2000. The establishment of small and large organizations and regular meetings strengthen their ethnic or local solidarity. On the other hand, Korean Chinese cannot start organizations without the permission of the Chinese government or have to meet strict conditions. As a minority group, they also have limitations on activities and establishing organizations. There was a sports festival for Korean Chinese university students in Beijing every year, but it was prohibited in 1995 by the Chinese government (Jung Ingap 1999, 159). Due to the rapid increase in the number of Korean Chinese in Beijing, in 2004 and in 2008 the “Beijing Korean Chinese Sports Event” was held. Moreover, since South Korea-China diplomatic relations opened, the Chinese government gives several privileges to South Koreans. They encourage South Koreans to establish Korea towns. Local Chinese governments expand Korea towns and support South Korean investment in those areas.3 However, the Korean Chinese community has not had these kinds of benefits. In addition, their ethnic benefits as a minority group are unclear outside of northeast China. Their social and political status in other areas is not as high as in northeast China. Consequently, South Koreans play active roles in Korea towns, but Korean Chinese are passive participants. Korean Chinese-led Settlements The Korean Chinese-led communities were established based on their hometowns in the Korean peninsula. The size of Korean Chinese villages was not big except for the main city of each of the three northeast provinces. They worked mainly in agriculture. Even though Korean Chinese villages were mixed with other ethnic groups, they lived densely together in a part of the villages (Yoon Injin 2004, 70). They have kept Korean house


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styles and cultural characteristics. They have held Korean traditional holiday festivals every year. Local government officials in the villages were also Korean Chinese, and their agricultural achievements and cooperation with the Communist Party helped them avoid conflicts with the Chinese government. In the Korean autonomous region, Yanji, all buildings and stores have used both Korean and Chinese languages on their boards. A big change to Korean Chinese community has come from the decrease of the population, and the arrival of South Koreans and their culture. The South Koreans who preferred to move to Korean Chinese towns were small and medium enterprises (SMEs) employers and students. Korean Chinese communities where they could find ethnic Koreans, Korean language and stores everywhere seemed safer to them than other areas. Main cities in northeast China, such as Shenyang and Yanji, have been more crowded with South Korean businessmen, students, and visitors. While Beijing and Shanghai have the kaifaqu (development districts) where foreigners including Koreans mostly live, Korean Chinese and South Koreans in Shenyang and Yanji did not have separate areas for residing.4 Thus, they have had more physical contacts in these towns than in any other areas of China and influenced each other more. As Hallyu (Korea Wind) has infused South Korean culture in these towns, Korean Chinese colors have been weaker. With the decrease in the number of Korean Chinese villages and weakening of Korean Chinese culture, a new campaign by Korean Chinese leaders in northeast China has come out in the 2000s. Pessimistic views about going to South Korea to earn money since the late 1990s have been growing and some Korean Chinese and South Koreans insisted on making new concentrated villages for Korean Chinese in China. Educational opportunities, proximity of cities, and industrial development are required in building a new Korean Chinese town. In terms of education, the village built up new schools, which are not behind regular Chinese schools. South Korean associations offered support by helping with English and computer classes. For economic advantages, foreign companies, such as Korean and Japanese companies, have offered employment opportunities. Some Korean Chinese local leaders have been applying for new environmental agricultural systems from South Korea. For the residential area, they have built new apartments and 1,000 families have already registered for settling in the residential area. In Jinfeng village in Jilin, 500 households satisfied with the benefits of education, industrial conditions, and employment have moved in as well. A Korean Chinese village in Heilongjiang built houses in the place of an old Korean Chinese middle school. Korean Chinese have come back and settled down. The population went up to 15,000 (The Hankyoreh, Jan. 14, 2003).5

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Following the urban migration of Korean Chinese, a new categorization of residential zones has been born. While northeast China is considered as the “first residential zone” for Korean Chinese, other popular destinations are categorized as the second residential zone, including Qingdao, Yantai, and Weihai in Shandong Province; the third residential zone of Beijing and Tianjin; the fourth residential zone with Shanghai, Suzhou, and Nanjing in the Huadong (East China) region; and the fifth residential zone with Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Dongguan in Guangdong Province (Korean Chinese 3040 Generations, www.korean3040.com). They are popular destinations among South Korean entrepreneurs. Table 5.1 in chapter 5 shows that the popular residential zones for Korean Chinese are places where more South Koreans are moving. South Korean-led Settlements Despite being new, South Korean-led settlements have spread quickly in China’s main cities and in the Huaibohai region, such as in Qingdao, Tianjin, and Weihai. Students prefer to move to big cities due to their schools. Following the regional economic growth of China, entrepreneurs also favor big cities for business. In any city in China, it is easy to find areas where South Koreans gather. In China, the government designates specific areas where foreigners may live. This has given South Koreans even more chances to be spatially compact. Moreover, some local governments recently allowed foreigners to buy houses in some sanctioned areas. The real estate investments of South Koreans in China have been rapidly growing. Chinese real estate companies supported by the Chinese government establish Korea towns and encourage South Koreans to buy houses.6 Concentrated in the permitted areas in each city, Korea towns have expanded. Each Korea town also has a big department store, Hanguocheng (Korea town). For example, Zhongcheng real estate company established a “Korea residential town” in Shanghai in the late 1990s. Near the area they opened a Korea department store in 2003. On the first floor, they sell cosmetics, gifts, jewelries, and Korean products stores. On the second floor, there are clothes, shoes, and hats. On the third floor, there are furniture, electricity stores, music, bookstores, and cosmetic surgery hospitals. All the products sold here are from South Korea or made in Korean factories in China (Economic Life, Dec. 2003). For the convenience of South Korean settlers in China, ethnic product grocery stores and service stores have been developing. These community facilities cater to the well-paid employees and employers of Korean companies and their families. At the same time, social, cultural, and recreation infrastructure has been built with schools, kindergartens,


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chamber of commerce, and leisure clubs. They offer all the basic services for an ethnic enclave, and the expatriate community members strengthen their exclusive life fenced off from the Chinese society. South Koreans with businesses and services covering daily necessities recreate Korean environments in China. This tied Korean community is composed of three smaller subgroups by migratory intentions. The first consists of Korean students and their family. Young students often move with one parent, usually the mother. The second subgroup includes entrepreneurs and employees in multinational companies. Most of them form a transient community. Recently, some employees of Korean multinationals who resigned from their companies or quit in them have begun their own businesses as consultants or run their own import-export enterprises. They are inclined to bring all family members to China. Third, Korean Chinese who are engaged in service sectors make up another part of this community. These groups can be seen in Korea towns in Beijing. Beijing has four Korean concentrated districts: Wudaokou, Wangjing, Yansha, and Yayuncun. The oldest area is the Wudaokou district. It has been bigger since the early 1990s, when a large number of South Korean students started to come to Beijing to study Chinese for one or two years or to enter in Chinese universities. Near the Wudaokou district there are more than forty universities, including Beijing and Qinghua University. The district has a big board, “university street” written in Korean. The Yansha and Yayuncun districts have been officially permitted as residential areas for foreigners. The areas are famous for foreign embassies and companies. The housing rental prices in these places were comparatively higher than any other places.7 Well-paid employees in big enterprises and government officials could afford the areas. The Wangjing district, the newest developed one, is characterized as a residential area for businessmen and their families. The Beijing government permitted foreigners to buy houses. Since the announcement of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, South Koreans have eagerly begun to buy newly built apartments. Approximately 70 percent of moving supplies originating in South Korea and going to China are bound for Wangjing (interview, Dec. 2003). Before the 2000s, the Wudaokou district was the most popular area for South Koreans. Korean stores and restaurants filled this area. However, the fast growth of Korea towns in the Wangjing district has made the Wudaokou area weaker. The Wangjing district, where most businessmen and their families live, are more consuming area than the Wudaokou district, where most students live. In addition, Koreans who have plans to stay in China in the long term prefer to live in the Wangjing district.8 What a restaurant owner

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in the Wudaokou district said shows the different functions and characteristics of the two Korea towns: I really regret opening the restaurant here. Every weekend, this area was full of Koreans, but now all of them go to Wangjing. That place has more things to do for fun and is getting bigger. Every time I visit there, I am surprised so many new stores open so fast. This place is for students. Of course, they don’t spend as much money as businessmen or families. If I got the information that the government would let foreigners buy houses over there earlier, I wouldn’t have opened my restaurant here. (Interview, Oct. 2003) Qingdao and Tianjin also have similar stories. Korea towns in Qingdao and Tianjin developed earlier than those in Beijing. While in the early times the Korean community in Beijing was developed concentrating on students, Qingdao and Tianjin were popular places among entrepreneurs because of the geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula, similar weather with home, and geographical advantages for trade. Not a few South Koreans have plans to settle down there. The dean of the Qingdao Korea association said that among 20,000 South Koreans in Qingdao, more than 5,000 planned to settle down in China and that number would increase (interview in 2003). Migration status has changed from transient to a more permanent stay. In 2009, 60,000 Koreans stayed in Qingdao with 6,000 enterprises (KoreanChina Cultural Exchange Association, www.shtong.co.kr, June 13, 2009). When Gunther Glebe researched a Japanese community in Dusseldorf in Germany, he described their exclusion from host society (2003, 110–111). Although the Korean community seems to be excluded from Chinese society, they are careful to have friendly relations with local governments (jiedao) because of their comparatively important influence. The jiedao governments also welcome South Koreans to settle down in their areas because it causes land prices to rise in the short term and develops the community environment. The Wangjing-Korea-Association started publishing a local newspaper with the jiedao government in Korean and Chinese from 2003. Chinese can learn Korean through the newspaper and South Korean and Chinese residents can get information about local events. They have small residential festivals to understand each other, such as kimchi festivals, Korean fashion festivals, athlete tournaments, and English classes. They endeavor to increase cooperative activities and solve conflicts between Korean and Chinese residents.9 The establishment of Korea towns has brought about the development of social networks and group interaction within the ethnic boundaries. By


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joining these communities, members can obtain opportunities to socialize, escape social isolation, and decrease mistakes as strangers in the area. The networks also provide various kinds of social and occupational advantages and connections. In offering support to each other as members of the same ethnicity, South Koreans and Korean Chinese attempted to hold joint social activities. Differences in class resources and government-imposed restrictions on joint activities between South Koreans and Korean Chinese gave rise to divided spheres of activities. The next sections describe how South Koreans and Korean Chinese have related to each other in community organizations. Local Associations South Korean associations in China started the focus on business. South Korean businessmen are the organizers or founders of the Association of Koreans in China (Jaejung haninhoe). This has given them a leadership role in the South Korean community in China. The main office of the Korean associations in China is located in Beijing. Regional Korean associations have increased from thirteen associations in 2006 to fifty-four associations in 2009. Except for three associations (Kunming, Xian, and Wuhan), all ten were in the Huaibohai region and northeast China in 2006. Although most of them are still located in those popular regions, Urumqi and Chengdu are added as new destinations for South Koreans. The special circumstances of China—unstable Chinese government regulations and different and flexible regulations of each provincial and local government—have encouraged strong cooperation of locally based networks of Koreans. The expansion of Korea towns in cities in China and the ease of communication by the Internet and transportation have driven cooperation between the linked associations. Each local association has its own Internet homepage and is connected to other associations of Koreans in China. Korean associations in northeast China also established their own “Three Northeast China Provinces Alliance” following “South China Provinces Alliance” and “East China Provinces Alliance.” All local activities and festivals are supported by associations of Koreans in China. They are linked to local associations of Koreans in China. When some events happen in a Korea town, they also become the main issues in other Korea towns through local newspapers and Web sites. Executives of local associations are mostly owners of SMEs or residential representatives of big enterprises. Some of them hold extra positions in business associations. In addition, support for social events comes from enterprises. In other words, Korean business networks comprise the

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broadest form of community and other associations are, in effect, subsets of them. However, while old places where South Koreans started living right after the normalization of relations between the two countries established business associations first and later Korean associations have been opened separately or within the business associations, places where South Koreans more recently became interested in moving tend to have Korean associations first. For example, the Korean Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, which started from 1993, opened the Korean association as the subcommittee in 2004; the Korean Chamber of Commerce in Weihai that started in 1993 takes charge of the Korean Association in Weihai and two organizations share one chairman. Between 2006 and 2009, whereas the number of Korean associations in China has increased from thirteen to fifty-four, the number of Korean Chambers of Commerce in China has gone up from thirty-one to forty-seven. On the other hand, Korean Chinese local associations have focused mainly on cultural activities. Group meetings require approval from local Chinese governments. Traditional dancing and singing associations by locality or Korea towns participated in events and festivals for minority groups. Recently, small and local Korean Chinese associations have decreased and weakened. First, local organizations encouraged by the Chinese government have disappeared or become less active. Women’s associations and local security committee do not play their roles anymore. Associations that were organized by local people are especially getting weaker because of the increase of the urban movements of Korean Chinese. Associations also reacted to changes after the economic reforms. Old men made associations to teach younger generations about traditional manners and ethnics. Old women started an association, which is called dokbojo. The main members are women more than fifty years old and should be nonChristians. They started in order to be against the Jesus Christ Association that their daughters-in-law made. Reading Korean and Chinese newspapers and discussing current issues are the main purposes of these associations (www.kcw21.com). Associations preventing the collapse of their traditional perspectives and family structure are increasing in Korean Chinese villages. South Korean local associations financially support Korean Chinese schools or public centers in localities, but they do not have joint activities. The extent of their relations leans on local characteristics. For example, Shenyang and Yanji have South Korean and Korean Chinese local associations separately. When they have cultural festivals or events, they


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support each other. On the other hand, Beijing has South Korean and Korean Chinese local associations separately and they do not have any contacts with each other. While South Korean local associations in cities are well-established, Korean Chinese tend to follow South Korean strategies to build up networks and associations. Diverse associations for Korean Chinese in new residential zones, such as Korean Chinese women’s associations and Korean Chinese students’ clubs as networks for exchanging information, have been growing quickly since the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Business Associations Business associations of South Koreans were established earlier than any other associations in China. After the 1992 diplomatic normalization between the two countries, the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry in China (KCCIC) was established in 1993. Subchambers of Commerce and Industry by regions and small business associations by fields have also appeared. The development of the KCCIC has focused on the Huaibohai region and northeast China as figure 7.1 shows. Approximately 80 percent of them are concentrated in the popular areas for Koreans. Those in the southern areas have been established more recently. These associations have been organized to promote friendship and communication as well as the interests of members. At first, the major goal was to prevent disadvantages of Korean entrepreneurs and merchants in Chinese markets. They are not familiar with Chinese markets and, capricious regulations of Chinese markets have troubled a large number of Korean businessmen. When novices in Chinese markets would like to obtain accurate business information and trust worthy advice, business networks play significant roles. Moreover, the KCCIC has been supported by the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI). Before entrepreneurs and merchants leave for China, they are able to get background information on Chinese markets. In addition, the South Korean government and the KCCI support regular seminars and conferences to give instructions on safe investment in China.10 In addition, one significant function of KCCIC is to establish friendly relations with Chinese businessmen and local governments. For example, the Chaoyang KCCIC helped set up meetings between the Chaoyang local government and businessmen and Korean entrepreneurs in July 2004.

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Figure 7.1

Distribution of Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Source: www.korcham-china.net, 2004. Note: Korean Chamber of Commerce has also increased from 31 to 47 local offices between 2004 and 2009.

All local business associations have their own Internet Web sites and have intimate relations with each other. They emphasize more organized and cooperative relations. Their rapid growth has been caused by the success of overseas Chinese business networks. A large portion of foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing into China has been occupied by overseas Chinese. They account for 60 to 80 percent of the total distribution. In 2000, the amount of FDI by overseas Chinese was 20.32 billion dollars and, on the other hand, that of Japan was 2.92 billion and United States was 4.38 billion dollars (Chinese Foreign Trade Yearbook, 2001). The well-organized overseas Chinese associations, on the basis of their solidarity, have frequent contact through the Internet and biannual meetings. In another role, Korean business networks have provided material support for South Korean and Korean Chinese communities. They financially support annual cultural and sports festivals, and play a leading role in establishing Korean schools. In the case of the Tianjin KCCIC (established in 1992), they established schools, including a kindergarten, and clinics for Korean Chinese in 1995. An international school for South Korean students


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in 2001 and affiliated associations, such as golf clubs, have also been built with their support. They opened the Tianjin Korea Association as a separate association in 2001. In business associations, South Koreans and Korean Chinese have separate activities. The number of Korean Chinese businessmen is comparatively small and their emergence has only been recent. They also organize Korean Chinese business networks by region. For example, one hundred Korean Chinese businessmen opened an association in Shenyang with the two goals of mutual cooperation and support for Korean Chinese networks in Shenyang. Compared to the new local associations of Korean Chinese in the new residential zones, business associations of Korean Chinese more strongly demand cooperation and networks. From 2007, Korean Chinese business associations also established Korean Chinese Business Alliances in the three northeast China provinces and annually hold an official forum. The forum invites Korean Chinese entrepreneurs from other provinces and cities as well. Cooperation between South Korean and Korean Chinese entrepreneurs in these three northeast Chinese provinces is emphasized and active. Church Networks Max Weber viewed religion mainly as a response to the basic needs of human beings. His perspective can be clearly seen in the roles of Christian churches in overseas Korean communities. Churches in Korean Chineseled-settlements as well as in South Koreans’ play the main activities to strengthen Korean ethnic networks. Korean church activities in China can be contrasted with the characteristics of Korean churches in America. Church activities in Korean communities in America are significant. Nearly 75 percent of Korean immigrant families in a Korean community are affiliated with Korean churches (Hurh and Kim 1990). The nonreligious functions and activities of Korean churches particularly attracted the Korean immigrants. The main activities start after the worship service. The popularity of Korean churches is due to their providing a place of social interaction and various kinds of information and services that new immigrants’ need for their initial orientation and adjustment to the foreign country. Religious leaders also counsel on employment, business, housing, healthcare, social security, and children’s education (P. Min 1996, 42). These functions of churches strengthen the link of Korean ethnic networks. The extent of religion activities in China is different from other countries. The main reason why large numbers of Korean missionaries go to China is to introduce Christianity and to convert Chinese. Social activities

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of Korean ethnic networks in churches are secondary. Korean missionaries have especially focused on converting Korean Chinese. The extent of religious activities is strictly controlled by the Chinese government. Thus, Korean missionary activities and government regulations caused conflicts. This section discusses what conflicts and consequent results Christian activities have produced. The conflicts between Korean missionary activities and government regulations and internal conflicts between South Korean and Korean Chinese Christians have suggested alternatives of their new relations. I argue that religious relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans also encouraged separate activities. My research for this section is mainly based on the activities of Protestantism, which has sent the most missionaries and built churches. First, I describe the general background to the church activities of Korean missionaries in China, and relations between them and the Chinese government. Second, I discuss the new strategies of South Korean churches toward China and Korean Chinese. After that, I analyze the functions of church organizations in South Korean community on the basis of four categories: fellowship, maintenance of the native tradition, social services, and social status and positions. The Meaning of Religion in China and Korean Church Activities China officially has religious freedom and has had churches since the communist period. There are two kinds of churches: government churches and straw-roofed-churches. Official churches in collusion with the government are called sanzi churches (three selfs: self-administration [zizhi], self-raising [ziyang], and self-propagation [zichuan]) (Kukmin Ilbo, Nov. 20, 1997; Na Yukyung 2000, 14). The Chinese government has emphasized the independent churches that are not intervened by Western theology. Straw-roofed-churches are underground, featuring small groups of people who meet regularly. Sanzi churches were prohibited during the Cultural Revolution, but they were allowed to open again after the fall of Gang of Four.11 In northeast China, there were not a few Korean Chinese churches because Korean missionaries played significant roles under Japanese imperialism. Approximately 70 percent of Korean Chinese churches in that area are built on the basis of the old churches (Kim Sangsu 2000, 57; Kim Choong-Kyu 2003, 48). Since the economic reforms in China, a large number of Korean missionaries have moved to China with the purpose of converting Chinese. Even though the Chinese law clearly states that foreign missionary activities and meetings are prohibited, South Korean missionaries have headed to China under several guises as students, businessmen, travelers, and researchers.


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In the 1990s, they focused particularly on northeast China. Most of them went to convert Korean Chinese. In 1997, more than one-third (36 percent) of the total number of missionaries are specialized in converting Korean Chinese (Na Yukyung, 2000: 24). Each sect of Christianity sent approximately two hundred missionaries for Korean Chinese in China (Kim Sangsu 2000, 84). South Korean missionary activities have caused several troubles in China. A Korean newspaper suggested four problems with church activities: ignorance, arrogance, exaggeration, and mutual abuse (Kukmin Ilbo, Aug. 8, 1994). First, they did not try to understand the circumstance of religion in China. South Korean missionaries mainly supported the straw-roofed-churches instead of going through the sanzi churches. As they believed that sanzi churches work for the communists, they were reluctant to have contact with those churches. Hiding their real purpose in coming to China, they organized meetings with the straw-roofed-churches and supported them financially. Consequently, they became illegal activists against the laws of China. In addition, Korean churches sent a large amount of money to churches in China. They were busy building churches, especially with the “100 church buildings construction campaign” (Kukmin Ilbo, Nov. 4, 1999). The sudden appearance of material support has caused several problems in the Korean Chinese community. First, some Korean Chinese made use of this chance. Several Korean Chinese sent a picture, showing them praying in a humble house, to South Korean churches and asked them to send money to construct a church (Kim Sangsu 2000, 84). South Korean churches especially focused on building churches in Korean Chinese villages. In a small agricultural Korean Chinese village, new church buildings towered like castles over farmers’ huts. Some Korean Chinese attended service to obtain economic advantages and South Koreans have come to have the prejudice that Korean Chinese are interested only in money (Kim Sangsu 2000, 66; Kim Choong-Kyu 2003, 76). Moreover, South Korean churches promised to rebuild a new church in a Korean Chinese village. Local people destroyed the church and waited for the support from the Korea churches, but they did not send the money (Kim Choong-Kyu 2003, 79). Contacts between South Korean and Korean Chinese Christians unintentionally created hierarchies based mainly on material support. These relationships caused internal conflict in Korean Chinese churches. A strawroofed-church in a small Korean Chinese village had a chance to contact South Korean churches. The church originally had several ministers who managed service every weekend in a humble house and a female minister

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generally took charge of services. South Korean churches heard about this place and several South Korean ministers visited the church. Later, South Korean Christians sent a large amount of money to build the church building and built an extravagant church building. After that, the ministers started having conflicts. All of them wanted to be the representative of the church. One male minister had close connections with a famous sanzi Korean Chinese church in a city in northeast China. He was adopted by the head-minister of the sanzi church. Even though most Korean Chinese in the church followed the female minister, the male minister obtained power over the new building. The female minister did not attend service in the new building and held her own service in the old place. Some churchgoers chose the humble house instead of the new building. In the end, the two ministers had a physical fight and followers of the female minister were seriously injured (fieldwork in 2001–2002). Missionary competition inside Korean churches has also made Korean Chinese confused. As a matter of fact, Chinese Christians were not divided in sects. South Korean Christian sects compete to expand their power and convert more people. They criticize each other. This showed the ugliness of South Korean Christians to Korean Chinese (Na Yukyung 2000, 89). Korean missionaries’ religious approach to Chinese did not bring good relations with the Chinese government, and sometimes they caused diplomatic conflict between the two countries. Korean missionaries liked to emphasize ethnic identity to highlight common characteristics among South Koreans and Korean Chinese. The Chinese government asked the South Korean government to have South Korean missionaries, travelers, and businessmen avoid talking about ethnic consciousness and the northeast Asian land on the basis of historical evidence. Consequently, invitations for Korean Chinese to attend public events in South Korea were canceled (Kyunghyang Ilbo, Oct. 4, 1995). Historical arguments between South Korea and China about the area of northeast China have also influenced church activities. Research by South Korean scholars in northeast China did not produce only scholarly debates between the Korean and Chinese researchers. Instead, South Korean research on relics of the ancient kingdom of Korea and contacts between South Korean researchers and Korean Chinese residents in the area seemed to make Korean Chinese more conscious of the ethnicity. In one place, where South Korean scholars visited, the local government did not allow Korean Chinese students, who were converted to Christianity by South Korean missionaries, to attend school. South Koreans’ visit to the local Korean Chinese church was also prohibited.12


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In addition, underground activities of South Korean religious groups to help North Korean refugees, through the cooperation of Korean Chinese, have caused diplomatic conflicts between the South Korean and Chinese governments, and North Korean and Chinese governments as well. Chinese government control became stricter because of these religious groups’ activities. A university missionary team was arrested in Heilongjiang province and had to pay a 1,000 dollar fine (Kyunghyang Ilbo, Sept. 4, 1994). Korean Chinese Protestant leaders in China tend to have separate religious activities or to build up their own meanings as Christians who are ethnic Koreans and Chinese nationals. Korean Chinese missionaries now place emphasis on their distinction from South Korean missionaries. They have identified several priorities in this regard. First, Korean Chinese Christians should be independent from South Koreans. Second, Korean Chinese should not consider building churches as the most important activity. Third, Korean Chinese Christians should not focus on gaining material support or other practical benefits from South Korean missionaries. Fourth, Korean Chinese Christians should have their own missionary activities toward North Korea directly, not as middlemen for South Korean missionaries (Park Pi-deuk). New Strategies of South Korean Churches toward China and Korean Chinese Ethnic Korean church activities in China have changed in two ways recently: localization and separate and public events. First, Korean missionaries now focus on converting Chinese. Beyond northeast China, they spread across other areas as well. Church activities for Chinese were led by Korean missionaries before, but by Chinese now. Instead of contacting Chinese directly, they send Chinese missionaries, including Chinese-Koreans and Korean Chinese, who have legal right to conduct missionary activities (Kukmin Ilbo, Mar. 3, 2000). The Korean Chinese who stay in South Korea attend churches in Garibong, a Korean Chinese town in Seoul. Churches play most significant roles in ensuring Korean Chinese security, which is at risk due to their often-illegal status. “If you have problems, instead of heading to the police, go to the church” is what Korean Chinese learn in South Korea. They exchange information about jobs and news from their local hometowns in China. Some Korean Chinese who are converted to Christianity become professional missionaries and return to China. They attend Korean Chinese churches and influence the religion of their family.

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In addition, Korean missionaries tend now to work with sanzi churches. In 2000, Korean missionaries who work with sanzi churches occupied 5 percent, suggesting that Korean missionaries’ activities were mostly illegal (Kukmin Ilbo, Aug. 26, 2002). Through research papers from theology schools over time, I could see that they have an inclination to highlight the positive characteristics of sanzi churches. They also tend to have good relations with the Chinese government. For example, the Yanji and Tumen local governments suggested that if Korean churches will give financial support to build and manage a retirement home, Korean missionaries can have legal worship service in the building (Kukmin Ilbo, Aug. 25, 1998). Intra-ethnic conflicts and the control of religious activities by the Chinese government have also resulted in separate activities for Korean Chinese and South Korean church networks. This change is shown in the oldest ethnic Korean Christian church in the Korea town in Shenyang. The church was originally opened by a Korean missionary in 1913. It is located right next to the biggest Korea town in Shenyang. It reopened after the economic reforms in 1979 and has become the fastest developing and most prosper church in northeast China, with support from South Korean churches. At first, the worship service for ethnic Koreans was opened without distinction between Korean Chinese and South Koreans. It provided a place for both public and private meetings. However, people used the church activities for their own sake. Korean Chinese wanted to have connections with South Koreans, especially for finding ways to go to South Korea or getting work. South Koreans were reluctant to be close to Korean Chinese because of the difference in cultural resources. “No matter how intimate our relations, there is a limitation Korean Chinese cannot overcome. When we talk about small common things or jokes, they cannot join our conversation and close their mouths because they don’t understand. Being absorbed in our culture completely is impossible for them. That’s what I learned since I dealt with them” (interview with a church minister’s wife, 2003). In addition, love affairs, business tricks, and conflicts from cultural misunderstanding between South Korean and Korean Chinese church goers have resulted (interview with a travel agent in the Shenyang church, 2001). These relations have caused conflicts and an awkward atmosphere between them. Eventually, the worship times were divided into one for South Koreans and the other for Korean Chinese separately. They use the same building, but the service time for South Koreans is Sunday morning and that for Korean Chinese is in the afternoon. The Chinese government also limits religious meetings between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. The number of Korean Chinese who have


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converted to the Christianity has rapidly increased. Protestantism came to be regarded as the ethnic religion of Korean Chinese. To the rapid increase of Christian Korean Chinese, the Chinese government has responded by not allowing ethnic Koreans to have religious meetings together and recently put strict limits on the number of Korean churches in each place. When South Korean church groups put advertisements for praying meetings and social activities on local flyers and in newspapers, they intentionally have to add a sign to indicate that the meeting is limited to South Koreans, not for non-South Koreans at the bottom of the advertisement (interview with minister’s wife, 2003; Shenzhen church Web site, www. szsch.org). Religious relations between South Koreans and Korean Chinese thus have involved nonreligious activities, such as supporting the Korean Chinese community, as an indirect means of pursuing the purpose of conversion. South Korean religious groups have built service organizations, such as the center for handicapped or poor Korean Chinese in Yanbian. Yanbian Science University was also established by support from Korean churches. New Activities of Churches in South Korean-led Settlement Church activities in Korean networks abroad range from worship services to community development activities and member meetings. Some Koreans in foreign countries participate in ethnic churches for religious purposes. Others do so for practical purposes, such as meeting with other Koreans, acquiring useful information about the new place, exchanging news from the motherland, and celebrating together on traditional holidays. As South Korea towns in China are recently increasing and their size is getting larger, the number of Korean churches has also been increasing and the range of their activities has been expanding. Church activities for Korean Chinese and North Korean refugees in the early 1990s have turned for the purpose of South Korean community later. Church activities have connected community members to the motherland and provided them new positions in the community. This section analyzes the functions of Korean churches in China. I discuss four general and major social functions of churches in Korean communities in China. 1. Fellowship. Meeting other Koreans who went to China for the same purpose or any other reasons, maintaining social interactions, and forming friendships are the most important social functions of Korean ethnic churches. Scholars generalize that the main function of ethnic churches is

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coping with alienation in a foreign environment and replacing nostalgia. The ethnic church is also an ideal place to associate with co-ethnic members. Fellowship is important in Korean churches in China too. The general saying, “United, we stand; divided, we fall” captures the strength of Korean network interactions and the increase of associations in China. I especially argue that Korean churches in China exert important effects on forming business connections. Churches in Korean networks abroad are the center of social life and interaction. It acts as newspaper and intelligence bureau. People exchange information and get to know each other. Its frequent and regular meetings allow people to accumulate friendships. During worship service every weekend, new visitors stand up and give brief greetings. They have a fellowship hour (alternatively called coffee or snack hour) after the Sunday service. During the fellowship hour, church members exchange greetings and enjoy informal chatting with fellow church members. New members introduce themselves. Churches have extra activities separated by age, such as youth meetings and children’s meetings. Meals are usually prepared by one church member group on a rotating basis. Extra meetings rather than regular service take much longer time (fieldwork, 2001). As Illsoo Kim points out, the ethnic church plays the role of “a pseudo-extended family” for Koreans (1981, 199). These extended church activities include business relations. What Koreans commonly say, “to start business, the first step is to go to church,” shows the practical role of Korean churches. Korean businessmen can extend their business relations faster and wider through church activities and friendships. The church links strongly influence business success. A restaurant owner in the Wudaokou district in Beijing attends a church in the Wangjing district. Even though she knows there is a Korean church near the Wudaokou district, she goes to the other one by taxi every weekend. Rather going to the church which is filled with students in the Wudaokou district, forging friendly relations in the Wangjing church, which has many businessmen, brings more benefits to her restaurant. After the service, the lunch time and coffee meeting offer a chance to introduce their businesses to each other. In a church in Shenyang, all young and old presbyters are restaurant owners or travel agents. People travel through the travel agency and have after-service-meetings in the presbyter’s restaurants. A teacher in the Korean language school that is led by a Korean church in Shenyang took me to a restaurant in the Korea town, Xita for interview. It was the second time for me to visit the restaurant with her. I asked why she likes the place rather than others despite the number of Korean restaurants


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in Shenyang. She replied, Whenever we have church meetings or even private meetings with friends, we prefer to come to the deacon’s restaurant. On the one hand, we know each other and, so, I can help his business. On the other hand, we can have better service here and develop better relations with each other as members of the same church. (Interview, Shenyang, 2001) On the other hand, the strong solidarity and mutual support of Protestantism gives a hard time to non-protestants. A restaurant owner who believes in Buddhism has a difficult time keeping his business because of reluctance among Christians. He says that to maintain business in Korea towns, entrepreneurs should show their faces at church first (Wolgan Joongang, July 2002). 2. Maintenance of native traditions. Social activities of churches support the maintenance of the cultural characteristics of the ethnic community. Even though South Korean churches in China do not have a strong role in this way because of the recent beginning of South Korean community in China, it is easy to predict that they will play this in the near future. On traditional Korean and religious holidays, Korean churches hold parties after worship services to celebrate. They make holiday foods. Many Hangeul (Korean language) schools are run by church groups in Korea towns: Shenyang, Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Shenzhen, and Dalian. In Dalian, with the support of Christian groups, South Koreans built a Korean international school that uses the South Korean education curriculum in the kaifaqu.13 The church-run language school not only concentrates on learning the Korean language, but also teaches Korean history, folk dance, traditional games, computer, and traditional manners. In addition, during worship service times, Korean church pastors frequently talk about the latest news from South Korea and pray for people in need in South Korea. That prevents people from feeling distant or isolated from the homeland. Most Korean churches in China have connections or sister relations with churches in Korea. Pastors from Korea frequently visit and preach in churches in China. These connections plant consciousness of ethnicity and cultural characteristics as Koreans in Korean community members in China. 3. Social services. Korean ethnic churches abroad play important roles in social services for the Korean community. Korean pastors usually help to solve two major problems: the language barrier and the difficulty of finding a job. P. Min (1996) emphasizes the activities of Korean church members as social workers. Listening to young people’s problems,

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parent-child tensions, and juvenile delinquency is a significant role of Korean churches. Limitations on public activities of churches in China make Korean churches do less. Compared to Korean churches in American society, which have various kinds of social institutions inside, Korean churches in China seem to have nothing except Korean language school and small classes. In addition, most Korean churches in China are small and do not have their own buildings. This creates difficulties in establishing formal programs, because of the lack of financial resources and manpower. The number of church organizations has been increasing for South Koreans, but establishing church buildings is strictly limited by the Chinese government. They have to rent rooms in hotels of more than three stars every weekend and can use only limited times for worship service—due to financial shortage, some churches started worship services in restaurants. Thus, on weekdays, they hold service in their houses in small groups separately (most Korean Christian groups have meetings everyday for different reasons and earlymorning service). Under these characteristics, church social services are developed especially by the Internet. Advice sections for South Korean students, and business counseling and local information sections are found on church Web sites. They make small social groups by age, their status, and hobbies in church Web sites and meet separately. The personal connections that people make in churches thus have the function of social services, such as finding jobs and houses, and solving language problems. 4. Social status and positions. One function of Korean churches abroad is to provide social status and positions to Korean communities. Min (1996) writes that social status and positions that community members obtain from churches give consolation to them, especially those experiencing downward mobility in American society. Satisfactory professional, managerial, and administrative positions in churches affect their status in the Korean community. A survey of Korean immigrants in Chicago indicates that Korean male immigrants who hold staff positions in ethnic churches show a lower level of depression and a higher level of life satisfaction than those who do not (Hurh and Kim 1990, 30–34). The titles indicating church positions, such as elder, exhorter, or deacon, are used outside as well as inside the church. They bring out respect from people. These church statuses also give advantages to their lives outside the church. They are directly connected to the practical benefits in Korean communities in China. For example, Elder Kim in a church in Shenyang was still Elder Kim outside the church. He participated in church activities as an elder and as women and youth chorus’ conductor. He owned a bakery


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and a restaurant. His stores were called Elder Kim’s stores instead of being called by the real names of stores (fieldwork in 2001). When I had fieldwork in Beijing for three months in 2003, I rented a room that a South Korean Christian couple lends to South Korean travelers and students. They were called deacon and presbyter by Christians. Everyone called them according to these titles. Despite not being a religious person, I could not help but call them with these titles. Lending rooms in several apartments to Korean travelers and students with the cooperation of Chinese residents is one of their businesses. They could easily find renters through the introduction of members of their church. People trusted them because of their church titles and their religiosity seriousness. Festivals Annual ethnic festivals play a key role in strengthening community solidarity in Korean networks. Cultural and sports festivals among ethnic Koreans in China began in the early twentieth century, and their ethnic and cultural characteristics have been maintained through the festivals. During my fieldwork, I found that while these kinds of festivals tended to connect Korean Chinese and South Koreans through joint activities in the beginning of the 1990s, they are held separately by the two groups at present. Conflicts at the festivals and control over their joint activities in public by the local Chinese government divided them into two different Korean networks. Compared with the sports festivals, the cultural festivals rather involve more cooperation between Korean Chinese and South Koreans. Active cooperation from local Chinese governments in particular also has resulted in the annual expansion of business involvement in cultural festivals. In this section, I show that conflicts in ethnic sports festivals reflect that the differences in cultural resources of the two groups were greater than the unity of their ethnic resources. Unlike sports festivals, cultural festivals show that cooperation among three actors—Korean Chinese, South Koreans, and local Chinese governments—on the basis of economic benefits can bring out different results. Sports festivals Sports festivals have traditionally been used to affirm the solidarity of the Korean community. Every year the Korean communities hold a sports festival. Playing games, such as soccer and Korean traditional athletic games, having singing and dancing contests, having lunch together, and giving gifts

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to winners make ethnic Koreans gather together and develop their ethnic solidarity. The history of sports festivals in the Korean community in China dates back several decades. Under the Japanese colonial rule, Koreans organized sports games in China. In 1926, the first soccer game opened in Didongcun, Longjingxian. Han Junguang gives an example of a small Korean village, one in Sanchaqu, Dongningxian in northeast China: Some Koreans first moved to that place in 1948. They were poor and brought nothing, except thin clothes. But as soon as they settled down in the village, they made a ball and played sports. Even though they were tired of working all day, they always gathered together and had sports games. (1989, 18) Playing sports together was one of the main activities of Korean groups. No matter how small, each Korean village had an athletic team. They held periodic intercommunity competitions, often three or more times per year. Korean restaurants or stores provided food for players. Not only soccer and baseball, they also introduced traditional sports, such as wrestling for men and seesaw and swing games for women. Competitors could win a cow or a straw rice sack. Games were accompanied by folk music and dance festivals. Traditional sports festivals of Korean Chinese weakened during the communist period and became a small section in cultural festivals. The increase of the South Korean population in China has created a boom in sports festivals again. Sports festivals in South Korea are basic places for socializing in companies, schools, and local groups in the fall every year. They participate in them with their families for the purpose of maintaining friendly relations with others as well as enjoying the sports. Playing traditional sports games and spending a day together in China, ethnic Koreans have explored their ethnic unity and formed cooperative relations. However, ethnic sports festivals, contrary to expectations, have revealed economic gaps between Korean Chinese and South Koreans rather than ethnic solidarity. In the early 1990s, the financial supporters of sports festivals were South Koreans (mainly companies and associations) and the managers were Korean Chinese. Prizes for winners in the games and in the contests are TV, shoes, bicycles, and refrigerators from Korean companies. Gifts for attendants are also many, including towels, free lunch, and bags. These affluent prizes brought out the serious competition from Korean Chinese in particular. South Koreans complained that the competitive attitude of Korean Chinese to win the games and contests ruined the real purposes of


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the sports festivals, such as enjoying the day, gathering together, and building ethnic solidarity. Korean Chinese rivalry to obtain the prizes sometimes caused small fights. Game competition between the Korean Chinese and South Korean teams turned into real dislike of each other. For example, the annual sports festivals for ethnic Koreans in Beijing and Dalian were held together in the 1990s. The size then grew and it became filled with abundant prizes supported by South Korean associations and companies. In Dalian, the annual sports festival for the first six years was held downtown, where Korean Chinese and South Koreans mostly lived. The festival started with the support of South Koreans. With the recent increase of the South Korean population in the kaifaqu, South Koreans have switched the festival location to the kaifaqu in 2003. Instead of holding the festival on Sunday, they also moved it to Saturday due to pressure from Korean churches (interview, Sept. 20, 2003). Most attendants in the festival were South Koreans and only a few Korean Chinese (serving food). The organizer said that they did not give special notice about changing the location to Korean Chinese. All events for the festival were organized by South Koreans. They invited the local Chinese government officials of the kaifaqu and prepared lots of prizes supported by Korean associations from other areas and companies. Korean sports teams from other South Korea towns were also invited for having friendly games. The kaifaqu sports team and the downtown sports team competed with each other. The Korean community in Beijing has also transferred the location of the sports festival to the Wangjing district. Korean Chinese did not attend. The festival brochure said that the qualification for attending the festival was being South Koreans. Like the Dalian sports festival I attended, the Beijing sports festival also received donation money as well as cooperation from other South Korean towns. In the case of areas that have bigger and more developed Korean Chinese towns, such as Shenyang and Yanbian, the sports festivals were held by South Koreans and Korean Chinese together, but South Koreans manage most events now. These separate activities have also been affected by the control of the Chinese government. The Korean Chinese university students in Beijing started the sports festivals in the late 1980s. However, it has been prohibited in 1995 because South Korean and North Korean students also participated and it caused diplomatic problems. Since the Korean Chinese population in Beijing has increased to approximately 100,000, the sports festival has been revived and it has been held in 2004 and 2008. Thus, conflicts about who leads the festival and differences about how to enjoy sports festivals have brought about separate sports festivals between the two groups. The growth of the South Korean-led settlements

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and increase of South Korean-led associations have contributed to the materially prosperous and well-organized annual sports festivals in South Korean towns. When a South Korean town in a local area holds a sports festival, other South Korean towns financially support them and participate in the festival. South Korean sport clubs of all South Korean towns in China eventually established the Jaejungguk Daehan Cheyukhoe (Korea Sports Council in China). All local sports clubs are connected to this association. One interesting discovery is that in 2005 the Korean Chinese business association in Shenyang donated 100,000 yuan for the South Korean Sports Festival. South Korean associations have usually been the money givers, but the division of their roles seems to be becoming unclear. In 2007, in the formal session between the South Korean Association in Shenyang and the Korean Chinese business association in Shenyang, the chairman of the South Korean Association emphasized the close relations between them for cooperation and asked active participation and support from the Korean Chinese entrepreneurs for a coming Korean event in Shenyang (Onbao News, April 22, 2007). Korean Chinese are also disposed to hold their own sports festivals in places where the number of urban migrants is high. Festivals for Korean Chinese also tend to follow those for South Koreans. In Beijing, Qingdao, and Guangdong—places that have new, large populations of Korean Chinese and have regional Korean Chinese business associations ( Joseonjok Gieopga Hyeophoe)—sports festivals have recently become operated regularly through financial support from Korean Chinese enterprises. Cultural Activities Korean ethnic traditional festivals and cultural activities since the economic reforms have been trying to bring out economic profits. After the founding of the PRC, each Korean village established its own cultural club and organized local cultural festivals.14 The cultural club played a significant role in forming the center of the local Korean community. It organized a professional dancing and singing group in each village, as well as performances and regular festivals. Moreover, the Chinese government generally allowed the festivals that the cultural club managed. As a result, the cultural club took a significant role as the mediator between the Korean community and the Chinese government.15 Korean ethnic festivals had been categorized into two kinds, public and private festivals. Public festivals, such as the Spring Festival, Labor Day, Children Day, and Women Day, the Korean Autonomous Region Birthday, and Old People’s Day (to celebrate their role in liberation from Japanese


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imperialism) were allowed and supported by the Chinese government (Kim Seonpung 1997, 324). However, private festivals, such as traditional holidays for Koreans—Lantern Festival and Mid-Autumn Festivals—were managed by Korean Chinese cultural clubs. Private festivals, therefore, better characterized the expression of ethnic culture. These private festivals have developed fast since the increase of South Korean population. Today’s festivals take place on a much larger scale, involve North Korean groups as well as South Koreans, and are oriented toward business purposes, but are based on traditional and cultural characteristics. The more Korean Chinese towns are developed, the bigger and more organized cultural festivals are. Thus, most big cultural festivals are held in the main cities in northeast China. The case of Yanji in Yanbian Autonomous Region illustrates how these festivals have been used in ways different from the old festivals. At the Yanji Korean Cultural Festivals, traditional folk performances and sports events continue to be held. In recent years, the festival has become geared toward tourism and business. The Yanji festival also expanded from three or four days to a month in both 2001 and 2002. The 2002 festival featured a Folklore Tourism Exposition, where a wide variety of folk handicrafts, souvenirs, medicine, foodstuffs, musical instruments, and clothing were on display. It also included the Tumen River International Culture Week, with performing artists from the Korean peninsula, Russia, Mongolia, and Japan, international sports tournaments, outdoor food markets, and Yanbian Korean customs and culture tours (to Mt. Paekdu and the border areas of North Korea and Russia). As a result, the number of tourists increased by 30 percent in 2002. By the end of 2002 Yanji attracted investors from 12 countries and regions, and signed 641 projects involving a total foreign investment of 270 million dollars (Yanji Annual Statistics, 2003). Dandong is also a good example that shows changes in the characteristics of the festival. In May, 2001, North Koreans, South Koreans, and Korean Chinese held a Korean cultural festival with support from the local Chinese government. North Korean groups participated in the performances and athletic events with the South Korean and Korean Chinese groups. At the same time, each group introduced products and accomplished not a few business negotiations. After that festival, the North Korean government announced the new status of Sinuiju, right across the border from Dandong, as a special administrative city and negotiated business cooperation with South Korea and China. Thus, the Chinese government strongly encourages the festivals for economic development. The local Chinese government sponsors Korean cultural festivals. Under their permission, Korean Chinese plan and manage

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the festivals and South Koreans offer financial support. With support from the Chinese government, Korean Chinese organize the festivals and Chinese government officials send Korean Chinese government officials to South Korea for advertising. For example, Shenyang did not have any cultural festivals for ethnic Koreans in public. The cultural festival has started since 1995. Since 2000, the festival has followed the theme, “Korea Week” (Hanguozhou). Here Korea refers to South Korea. Most new Korean ethnic festivals show this trend, emphasizing South Korea. The festival involves more events related to South Korean culture and business. To help local business, the Shenyang City Government even designated it as a national event in 2007. Another example is the Kimchi Festival. It is held every year in Shenyang. The managers are the Korean Kimchi Committee. The sponsors are South Korean, Korean Chinese, and Chinese companies, associations, and mass media. South Koreans support the festival financially. In addition to introduce Korean products and show cultural festivals, business negotiations are accomplished during the festival. Compared to the other ethnic festivals and other business expositions, these annual Korean ethnic festivals have several characteristics. First, in comparison with other minorities in China, Koreans in China have maintained traditional customs under their own autonomous prefecture and, as a result, their annual festivals have a long history. Today’s festivals have developed out of this history. Second, the cultural festivals are by-products of ethnic Koreans inside China and those outside. Other minority groups do not have this kind of international link.16 The rapid increase of business relations with the Korean peninsula—based on ethnic ties—has sparked Korean Chinese interest in business and in the necessity of maintaining Korean customs. To develop their own local areas, the Chinese local governments support the Korean ethnic cultural festivals. While the Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture has operated festivals to spur local businesses and to obtain profit, such as through pear festivals, apple festivals, flower festivals, and so on, cultural performances of ethnic Koreans have come with them. Hence, these triple relations have important effects on the combination of cultural activities and business fairs in the Korean ethnic festivals. Finally, making use of nonbusiness activities, such as sports games and art performances, in the festivals, they encourage amicable relations and business negotiations. On the other hand, residential representatives of big enterprises ( Jujaewon) do not have a good reputation in Korean networks. They live in expensive apartments that companies provide in places separate from Korea towns, such as the kaifaqu. They have their own sports clubs or organizations.


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They send their children to international schools, not Korean international schools or regular Chinese schools. Some have two maids for their houses. They do not attend ethnic Korean activities: Most who attend the festivals and activities in the Korean community are self-employed. Jujaewon think that they are guijok (nobility) and stepping in the Korean community causes too much hassle. They don’t care about the Korean network because they will not stay here for a long time. But when they decide to stay in China and open their own business, the whole story becomes different. They don’t want to go back to Korea. With their salary, they could live like kings here. Having two maids and playing golf every day are possible here, but in Korea? No way . . . When they have to go back to Korea, they are not even sure they can get the same or higher position over there. A lot of people quit and, with retirement money, they start their business in China. (Interview, 2003) The reasons why they do not go back to South Korea are for better material lives with the same amount of money in China and for their children. They send their children to international schools and private institutes for catching up in mathematics and other classes. Companies pay the tuition fee for children and, thus, they prefer to send them to international schools. Sending them to international schools means the children will learn English and Chinese. However, their mathematics skills are lower than Korean students in South Korea. To prepare their children for going to Korean universities, they send their children to private institutions established by South Koreans: All children who come to our institutes are jujaewon’s. If they stay abroad for several years, they can get the qualification to attend the special examination for Korean universities. That gives a lot of advantages to them and they can go to good universities easily. Studying in international schools with foreign students and teachers here guarantees that they are bilingual. The problem is their mathematics ability is a little bit lower than Korean students and they should be familiar with Koreanstyle examinations. We are preparing for that. (Mathematics teacher in private institute in the Wangjing district, Nov. 2003) Educational Organizations As I mentioned in the introduction, one of the main reasons why a large number of South Koreans has moved to China for the short term is for

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education benefits. Bilingual skills of Korean and Chinese or trilingual skills including English, gained through studying abroad in a place cheaper than other countries, and yielding potentially better benefits due to the rapid development of China have given another kind of China dream to South Koreans. The movement of a large number of Korean students to China has also led some parents to accompany them (excluding university students). Following this wave, many Korean schools and institutes have been established in China. At first, South Korean parents sent their children to Korean Chinese schools to lessen the cultural shock and provide an adaptation period in China. Some Korean Chinese schools even made several classrooms to accommodate more South Korean students. However, the number of Korean Chinese schools has been decreasing, but that of South Korean schools has been increasing in South Korean-led settlements. The urban movement of Korean Chinese has resulted in the decline of Korean ethnic schools, which are mostly located in northeast China. South Koreans who studied in Korean Chinese schools have moved to South Korean schools, which are commonly called Korean international schools, or to Chinese schools. This section shows educational divisions between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. By educational goals of South Korean students, there are several subeducational sectors inside. I discuss the increase of educational networks in Korea towns and the new trends of Korean Chinese schools. Background to the Development of Educational Organizations for South Koreans As Korean students have increasingly moved to China to receive Chinese education, educational organizations have taken significant roles. Official Korean schools for Korean students, private institutes in Korea towns, and school entrance information exchange meetings have been established. The education of South Korea has been focused on entering the university. This trend resulted in Korean students with different purposes in studying in China. I divide three kinds of Korean students on the basis of the countries where they would like to be university students.17 First, some Korean students aim at entering Chinese universities. Second, other students have plans to study in Korean universities. Third, they look for studying in western universities (Canada or United States). Most students consider two options at the same time, such as Chinese or western universities, Korean or Chinese universities, or Korean or western universities. Some elementary school students even stop school in Korea and move to China without knowing any Chinese. South Korean parents are especially obsessed


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with their children’s education. Selling cows for children’s education when the country was agricultural was a common scene. For children’s education, giving up the basic element of family—the shared home—is not unusual in Korean society. Children go abroad to study and mothers sometimes follow to take care of them. Father stays in Korea sending money. America and Canada were the most popular places where children were sent even a couple of years ago. Recently, parents turn their educational passion for their children toward China instead of the former. The cheaper living and tuition expenses, geographical proximity, and the growth of the Chinese economy seem to strongly guarantee bright futures for their children. Depending on which university students aim for, the education that they would receive in China is different. Students who have plans to study in Chinese universities tend to attend regular Chinese schools or ethnic Korean schools. To enter Chinese universities, they have to get specific scores on the HSK, which has the same function as the TOEFL. As a matter of fact, Chinese universities give benefits to foreigners to be accepted universities when they take tests. Foreign students are divided from Chinese students and have different kinds of examinations. Thus, entering universities in China is easier than in Korea. Some Chinese universities also take foreign students with conditional status, which they can take the HSK examination any time before their graduation. Most Korean students choose to major in Chinese, and some universities arrange a separate department for them. Parents should send their children to Chinese schools that are allowed by the Chinese government to admit foreign students. Their tuition fee is usually three times more expensive than other students. In addition, most of them do not take classes with Chinese students. The schools organize other classes for Korean students because they are afraid that the grade of schools would be low by adding Korean students’ grades. They take different classes for entering Chinese universities because they have a different entrance examination from Chinese high school students (Kim Hyejin, 2002). For the purpose of sending their children to western universities and study two important languages, English and Chinese, Korean parents send them to international schools that were established through the cooperation of western and Chinese schools. The main purpose of going to school in China is to learn Chinese, but they prefer other areas for professional fields. Most students whose fathers work as residential representatives of big South Korean enterprises in China go to these schools. These schools have sister relations with universities in Canada and the United States. The parents calculate that sending their adolescent children to a close country, having

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them adapt to being abroad, and then having them go to western universities with better educational curricula can be a more successful route. In addition, even though the tuition fee of international schools is much higher than regular Korean schools and Chinese schools, it is much cheaper than western schools. Others who think about going back to Korea for university have a tendency to join Korean international schools, which have recently been established in big cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Yantai, Yanji, and Dalian. They follow the curriculum of the Korean educational system, which prepares them for the Korean university entrance examinations, and additionally study Chinese and English. The purpose of establishing schools for Korean students is also that some students who studied in Chinese and foreign schools could not adapt to their circumstances and deserted the schools. Korean communities established Korean international schools with the support of Korean associations in China and of the South Korean government. The main financial support was from business associations or churches. The increase of whole families of Korean migrants has also affected the Korean international schools. While in the early 1990s, students who studied in China came by themselves, the whole family movement has recently been increasing. Thus, it is possible to make more organized schools. For example, Beijing International School started as a Hangeul School and was not approved as a public school in 1992. The purpose was to prevent Korean students who stay in China from forgetting the Korean language and national history. In 1998, the school expanded and became the Beijing International School with support from the Korean community in Beijing and the Korean government. It includes grades from kindergarten to high school. In order to get in the school, the students’ parents should live in Beijing and the students should be Koreans. Classes are mostly conducted in the Korean language. It is located in the Korea town, Wangjing district. The purpose of the school is for Korean students not to forget their identity and also to study three languages: Korean, English, and Chinese. Even though they are in China, they still have a strong connection with South Korea. It has two courses for high school students. The first is for students who will go to Korean universities and the other is for students who will stay in China after graduation. Their courses are different. For students who will apply to Korean universities, there are twenty-four hours of Korean language classes, sixty hours of English language classes, and forty-two hours of Chinese language classes per month. For students who will apply for Chinese universities, there are eighteen hours of Korean language classes, sixty hours of English language classes, and sixty-six hours


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of Chinese language classes. The school also provides private tutor hours after school. It has extra houses in the Wangjing district and students get together there to have extra study after school and in the weekends. In 2009, there were nine Korean schools in China that are accredited by the South Korean government. They were all established by financial support from local Korean communities. Various private institutes have also increased in Korea towns. Students who have a plan to go to Chinese universities go to institutes to study Chinese. A new kind of private institute that teaches mathematics and science has recently appeared. Students prepare for Korean university examination in the institute. They are all from international schools (interview, Dec. 2003). Educational conferences providing information about Chinese universities have opened in Korean communities. Korean students who are already in Chinese universities share their experiences. Admission requirements and examinations are different in each university and change over time. Along with the increase of young Koreans in China, these kinds of meetings are increasing. Korean language schools (Hangeul Hakkyo) for Korean students who live in China are in Korean towns and have increased to thirty-five. They open on Saturday for Korean children who have been in China for a while and go to regular Chinese schools. They teach the Korean language and history for about two hours. Teachers are parents and Korean university students. The Link between Korean Chinese and South Koreans in the Educational Sector Direct relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans in schools have been decreasing. In the early times, some South Korean students studied in Korean Chinese schools, but the number has been rapidly decreasing because parents avoid sending their children to Korean Chinese schools due to the slow language development and difficult adaptation to Chinese society. Korean Chinese schools tend not to mix students together. A teacher in a teaching school in Shenyang said that When we had a lot of South Korean students, we made classrooms for them, but, after the number decreased—three students are left now—, we got rid of the classroom and they usually take separate classes for studying Chinese to take the HSK examination and they randomly join other classes. But they cannot follow other students. Even though they do not attend other classes, we do not care. It is hard for them because the

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education that they and our students take is far too different. (Interview in winter, 2001) In the educational organizations of Korean Chinese since the economic reforms, ethnic characteristics have been deemphasized and more practical subjects have been stressed. Among two options, Korean Chinese or Chinese schools, Korean Chinese have tended to attend Chinese schools since the 1980s. They prefer to combine schooling with learning Chinese. On the other hand, a new trend among educational organizations for Korean Chinese with connections to South Koreans has appeared. Yanbian Science University was established for the benefit of Korean Chinese students by the financial support of several South Korean churches. It concentrated on teaching IT, business, and engineering as well as studying Korean and English. Korean Chinese government officials and businessmen have established IT colleges and plan to open the Beijing Green Economy University specializing in business, environment, and IT for Korean Chinese students in People’s University in China. They get lectures from South Koreans, and South Korean enterprises have offered financial support. The increase of Korean Chinese who study in South Korea has been consistent as well and many of them get scholarships from South Korean organizations. Online Community The Internet is an important tool driving globalization. However, it also has the function of keeping local identities and forming global villages. South Korea is one of the highest users of the Internet. Koreans in China create online forms of community. Development of the computer network has significantly broadened the scope of the Korean ethnic community. The online community has played the very significant roles of strengthening the Korean Chinese community as well as the South Korean community. The Internet connects families, friends, activities in Korea, and news. South Koreans also make their own associations in China. Most Korean business, such as restaurants, real estate agencies, stores, and entertainment activities, have their own homepages and keep in contact with other Koreans. Korean associations and Korea towns in big cities also have their own homepages and exchange information. Most of the activities of associations, festivals, and conferences are put on the Internet right away. The development of cooperation among local organizations has been possible through the Internet. The growth of the online community has strengthened group solidarity in Korean networks by identity as well as age, job status, and location.


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Managing the online community has also become an independent business. For example, the Wangjing.com company opened in 2003. With the increase of the Korean population in the Wangjing district, a South Korean who studied in a Chinese university and has stayed there for ten years opened the Internet service, focusing on the Wangjing district. Establishing small clubs, friendly meetings, educational lectures, district festivals, and publishing a monthly district brochure with the Chinese local government are all organized on the Internet. Some online communities have provided places where Korean Chinese and South Koreans can discuss their identities. The number of Internet users among Korean Chinese has been rapidly increasing. While the age of the South Korean users of the online community vary, Korean Chinese users tend to be young people. Here, they share Chinese culture and Korean culture together. Kim Kyungil notes that compared to the older generation, the younger generation has a weak concept of “ethnic community,” but absorbs culture from South Korea much easier. The first generation has a strong “return to the hometown” desire, but young people do not. On the other hand, they are much more easily integrated into South Korean popular culture. The characteristic of the Korean ethnic online community is that both Korean Chinese and South Koreans participate in community activities. It provides a place for discussion between them. Events that happened between them regarding business, ethnic conflict, and social issues are among the issues they discuss. The online networks for Korean Chinese also play the role of global village. Since they have moved to other countries, they have organized Internet activities in South Korea and Japan. They exchange their experiences abroad. Their solidarity comes from recognizing themselves as Chinese nationally and Koreans ethnically. They emphasize that their permanent settlement would be in China, not in Korea. They provide news of both sides and mostly use Korean. They also exchange information about jobs, residential areas, and even arranged meetings. The dispersion of the Korean Chinese population has promoted the development of Internet activities. In addition, they share their private experiences emerging from their dual status as nationally Chinese and ethnically Koreans. The Internet sites discuss their collective history and current problems. For example, www.200man.com, which I mentioned in a previous chapter, is a homepage for Korean Chinese who would like to get information, such as recruiting news in companies and business markets, general history of Korean Chinese, and current news about Korean Chinese and South Korea.

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Conclusion The activities of Korean ethnic associations in China that I have discussed in this chapter show the distinction between Korean Chinese and South Koreans. Potential conflicts, differences in economic and social status, and control by the Chinese government have led them to have separate activities. In addition to division by ethnic and national issues, one important division is by economic status. Associations’ activities support the solidarity of Korean ethnic networks. Local associations have linked together and formed cooperative relations. The growth of the online network has made this possible. Unfamiliarity with the new land has encouraged the emergence of ethnic associations and, consequently, they have maintained South Korean solidarity. This tendency has been shown among Korean Chinese as well. By the fast increase in their urban population, Korean Chinese also organize local associations as well as Internet communities. Because establishing associations online is not as restricted, these activities have been more active.18

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

I

n 1996 a South Korean fishing vessel, the Peskama, left for Southeast Asia with six Korean Chinese aboard. The Korean Chinese had worked as teachers in China and were looking for an opportunity to get to South Korea, the land of their dreams. In China they had found a broker who could get them aboard the South Korean fishing ship. According to the agreement, the Korean Chinese would be taken to South Korea, but in return they had to work on the fishing vessel for a certain period before landing. This system of indentured servitude created conflicts on the ship. The South Korean fishermen were compensated according to their catch, but the Korean Chinese had no incentive to be productive. This arrangement angered the South Koreans on board, resulting in mistreatment of the Korean Chinese, who were beaten and sworn at. The harsh conditions made the Korean Chinese want to leave, but they could not because they were in debt to the broker. Frustrated with their situation, the Korean Chinese murdered seven South Koreans and three Indonesians on board. They were soon caught in the Japan Sea and taken into custody in South Korea. The Peskama massacre became a major symbolic issue in South KoreanKorean Chinese relations. The tragedy was the most extreme case of ethnic and employment conflict between the two groups. Korean Chinese felt humiliated by South Koreans and made each group think about the boundary among Koreans. The Korean Chinese on the ship had been respectable intellectuals, and not criminals, in China, but their encounter with the South Korean fishermen debased them. Korean Chinese faulted South Korean policy, which makes it difficult for Korean Chinese to move to the country legally. Instead, the laws forced them to turn to brokers, who

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treated them poorly. Korean Chinese believed that their ethnic brethren should help them fulfill their South Korean dreams. The understatement of economic and cultural differences between South Koreans and Korean Chinese has been at the heart of the interactions between the two groups that this book has discussed. At least in the early years after the establishment of formal relations between South Korea and China, Korean Chinese proved important for South Korean and Chinese business partnership. The ethnic network has been a key conduit for channeling South Korean investment into China. The book has shown how Korean Chinese have shaped South Koreans’ entry into Chinese business and society. Korean Chinese helped them overcome language, cultural, and political barriers to working and living in China. South Koreans also provided more economic opportunities to Korean Chinese when China opened its market to other countries. Although contacts with South Koreans in China have produced several problems for Korean Chinese, the interaction has also taught them how to build up their networks and to do business. More than other minorities in China, Korean Chinese networks in cities as well as in their original places of residence has been rapidly developing. However, the separation of Korean Chinese and South Korean communities over several decades created cultural and material differences that both groups underplayed to celebrate—and utilize—their solidarity. Moving too quickly to depend too much on each other, South Koreans and Korean Chinese have found themselves in bitter intra-ethnic conflict. Their interactions revealed divergent economic expectations and cultural habits, which chipped away at the ethnic solidarity that underpinned their cooperation and gave way to “split ethnicity.” My interpretation of Korean ethnic networks in China stands at odds with major models of how ethnicity and economic behavior interact. Discussions of the “ethnic enclave economy” hold that the ethnic sector fosters ethnic solidarity, but in the Korean case ethnic separatism and distrust have been produced more than solidarity. The theory of the “segmented labor market” assumes the ethnic sector to be a lower skill one where employment is unstable, but this too is not the case in the Korean sector in China. Starting wages are higher and there are opportunities for career advancement within the sector. Will South Koreans and Korean Chinese continue to try to work together? Will they continue to have conflicts, or will they solve those problems? This book has documented the twists and turns of their interactions over a decade and a half. Should we expect their relations to continue in the same pattern or is a new one emerging? With a possible scenario of reunification on the Korean Peninsula, will South Koreans and North Koreans who have been

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apart for more than half a century follow the same path that South Koreans and Korean Chinese have? I expect that South Koreans and Korean Chinese will continue to work together under the limited conditions. The Chinese economy shows no signs of slowing down, and the South Korean economy is ever more dependent on it. We should expect South Koreans to maintain their interest in China over the near and long term. The numbers of South Korean students studying in China is still increasing, and businesses are going to China in larger numbers. In the South Korean service sector in China, I anticipate that the ethnic network will remain important and that conflicts will continue to emerge. South Korean students heading to China for the first time will still hire Korean Chinese housemaids and South Koreans residing in China will patronize Korean restaurants operated by Korean Chinese. South Koreans and Korean Chinese will run into the same frustrations in these areas, because of different material and cultural expectations. In business activities, however, I expect that South Korean dependence on Korean Chinese will decline. Where South Korean firms have the resources to do so, they have tended to change their organizations from employing Korean Chinese as employees and managers to hiring only high-skilled Korean Chinese or Chinese as managers. Large firms are able to develop the human capital for avoiding the ethnic network, which becomes a burden when it gives rise to intra-ethnic conflict. These firms recruit South Koreans with Chinese language skills and experience in Chinese society. They also groom top Chinese and Korean Chinese graduates for careers in South Korean enterprises in China. Even though South Korean entrepreneurs hire Korean Chinese employees and partners, ethnic issues will not arise as they will be taken as Chinese nationals rather than Korean ethnics. In addition, the economic dependence of Korean Chinese on South Koreans will also decrease as well. Rather than continuing as employees or service providers within the ethnic boundary, the inclination and ability to step into mainstream Chinese society among Korean Chinese will be stronger. In a poll, 15 percent of Korean Chinese graduates answered that they would like to work in South Korean companies while 14 percent of them preferred Chinese companies. However, 13.5 percent of Korean Chinese students who would graduate 2 years later preferred Korean companies and 24.3 percent favored Chinese companies (Heungnyongang Shinmun, June 26, 2009). Moreover, their relations as employees and employers will increasingly turn into relations as business partners or as entrepreneurs, as I introduced in several cases. However, small firms of South Koreans will remain more dependent on Korean Chinese than large ones. When starting out in the Chinese market,

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they will have little local knowledge and will be unable to tap into the top human resources. The most professional brokers of entry into Chinese business will be recruited by large firms, and smaller firms will not have the resources to train themselves for independence from Korean Chinese. They will continue to look to Korean Chinese to help them adjust to the Chinese environment. In doing so, the failure for cooperation between South Koreans and Korean Chinese to live up to unrealistic expectations will lead to the persistence of conflict. Another challenge to the Korean ethnic network in China will come from within the Korean Chinese community. Opportunities in the South Korean sector in China are only one small portion of the opportunities available to Korean Chinese in the Chinese economy. As the country develops, they will be surrounded more and more by chances for advancement offered by mainstream Chinese society. The period from the 1990s to the present has been a point of transition in the Korean Chinese community. The traditional solidarity brought about by living in villages and towns isolated from Chinese society has been one force keeping the Korean Chinese community together. But with rising migration of Korean Chinese out of their northeastern strongholds and with increasing migration of HanChinese to those areas, Korean Chinese solidarity is declining. Parents have fewer and fewer reasons to teach their children Korean language or send them to Korean Chinese school. It would not be surprising to see the near demise of Korean Chinese identity over the next decades, as the basis of traditional solidarity is washed away. Most likely, they will become fully integrated into the Chinese nation. Lingering Korean resources (especially language) within this population may be useful for conducting business with South Koreans, but the Korean Chinese of the future will not bring expectations of “one ethnicity” to such interactions. It will take time for South Koreans and Korean Chinese to figure out how much and when ethnicity should be emphasized and to recognize when nationality cannot be ignored. Even though Korean Chinese are currently acknowledged as jaeoe dongpo, differential treatment based on nationality among jaeoe dongpo teaches them to recognize their nationality. In New York, the Korean American Association of Greater New York, which South Koreans established, intentionally did not include Korean Chinese in the 2009 election of the chairman of the association, because of the condition that voters should be Koreans who have had a South Korean passport, or possess or have possessed a US passport. Even though Korean Chinese were allowed to attend association events and to vote in the past, the new condition does not include them anymore. With the rapid increase in the population of the Korean Chinese in New York, the Korean American Association of

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Greater New York seems to distinguish Korean Chinese from them (New York Today, Feb. 20, 2009).1 Stories of Korean Chinese and South Koreans suggest possibilities for the future of relations between South Koreans and North Koreans after unification of the Korean Peninsula. They will emphasize their common “blood” but cultural and economic differences will be discovered. Even though they share the same language and traditions, physical distance has led to differences between them.2 The experience of Korean Chinese with South Koreans suggests that relations between North Koreans and South Koreans might not be as smooth as expected. The possibility of intra-ethnic conflict darkening the early days of a unified Korea has not been adequately recognized. After conflicts with South Koreans, Korean Chinese are coming to find solidarity among themselves. If, in post-unification Korea, similar conflicts develop then North Koreans and South Koreans might also retreat from one another and emphasize their separate identities as “northerners” and “southerners.” Such an outcome would be a disappointment to the hopes of a unified Korean nation. Still, measures can be taken so as to minimize intra-ethnic conflict between South and North Koreans after unification. The experience of Koreans in China teaches some lessons for how that tension can be alleviated. The encounter with Korean Chinese has challenged the simple premise of a single way of being Korean and made many aware of the possibility of various Korean identities. There is no one way of being Korean. South Koreans should be open to different styles of “Korean-ness.” If Koreans from the North and South are able to recognize diversity among Korean identities, then a unified Korea will be able to avoid some of the problems South Koreans and Korean Chinese have encountered. This book offers an understanding of globalization that differs from both convergence and conflict perspectives. Ethnic identities have been a support for interaction across borders rather than an impediment, as the flows of capital and people across borders have been underpinned by ethnic links across countries. At the same time, however, those identities have been transformed by the process of globalization, for South Koreans and Korean Chinese turned out not to have as much in common as they thought. As people move across international borders in ever-larger numbers, we can expect many of them to form overseas communities that neither integrate into their host societies nor remain identical to their home countries. Even groups that emigrate at different times, as in the case of Korean Chinese and South Koreans in China, will exhibit large differences. These split ethnicities will interact in fascinating ways that reflect neither convergence to a single way of living nor the entrenchment of traditional differences.


Notes

1

Introduction

1. In coining this term, Bonacich drew from the terms of other scholars, such as “middleman trading peoples,” “migrant intermediation,” and “marginal trading peoples” and “permanent minorities” (1973, 583). 2. When I was doing fieldwork in China, I accompanied a South Korean businessman to a big Korean Chinese market in Dandong, where I could see the land of North Korean closely. In a Korean Chinese store, he contacted North Korean government officials who had a business trip in China. He looked for goods from North Korea, such as mushroom and horticultural products, and they exchanged their business cards. I asked the South Korean businessman several times whether the phone is really able to go through to Pyongyang (fieldwork in China, 2001). 3. According to Do Hungryol’s research on Korean Chinese in 1992, 58.4 percent of them said that they regarded South Korea as their mother country while 8.3 percent answered North Korea. Approximately 21.1 percent of them stated that the reason was the economic wealth of South Korea (1992, 182–183). According to another source, Korean Chinese even said that between the two Koreas, the “wealthy one” is their motherland (Kwon Tai-Hwan and Han Sang-Bok 1993, 100).

2 Korean Migrations to and within China 1. See, for example, Bonacich 1973, 584. 2. A seventy-six-year-old Korean Chinese interviewee in the Seniors’ Club in Dalian said,Who could have imagined the Korean peninsula would become divided and closed off from each other until now? I wouldn’t have stayed here if I knew going back to my hometown would be impossible for such a long time (Interview in Dalian, Nov. 2003). 3. In January of 2001, Kim Jungil visited China and said that he was impressed with the success of Chinese economic reform. He implied that North Korea would follow the strategy. His positive impression seemed to strike South Koreans and to influence South Koreans’ investment in China.

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4. An interviewee who owned several cosmetic stores in Beijing is an example. She went back to South Korea after finishing her course of study, but could not get a job because of the economic crisis and her age. She returned to China and started her own business (Interview in Beijing, Dec. 2003). 5. The reason why ethnic Koreans who stayed in China fought for the Communists and against the Nationalists (Guomindang) was that the Nationalists treated ethnic Koreans as non-Chinese and threatened them to give up their land and go back to the Korean peninsula. In addition, sometimes, pro-Japanese and fugitive soldiers in cooperation with the Nationalists attacked ethnic Koreans. In comparison with the Nationalists, the Communists in Northeast China emphasized Koreans and Chinese as a union against Japan. More than 62,900 ethnic Koreans participated in the civil war as soldiers of the communist army and 3,550 died (Yoon Injin 2004, 52). 6. During fieldwork in 2001 and 2003, the more countryside in northeast China I saw, the more I found familiar scenes that I have seen in the countryside of South Korea. The design of houses on both the outside and inside, including house structure and people’s living customs, is almost the same. 7. Approximately five months after diplomatic relations between China and South Korea started, a great number of Korean students headed for China and it became one of the main social issues in Korea ( Joongang Ilbo, Jan. 31, 1993). The mass media criticized this trend as an imprudent decision by Korean parents would harm their children in the long term, because the students are not mature enough to lead independent lives in unfamiliar circumstances and can easily fall into extravagant foreign lives. And, indeed, some students who are not able to enter in Korean universities move to China. In 2003, a Korean professor wrote that Korean students who were not accepted to Korean universities and who go to study at Beijing and Qinghua Universities have an academic level of only one-twelfth to one-fifth of regular Chinese students. His column in the newspaper for Korean residents of China could not be continued because Korean parents reproached him harshly and demanded the newspaper to stop his column (fieldwork, 2003). 8. In summer in the mid-1990s, 1,600 South Koreans per day took the airplane to go to Yanji to climb Mt. Baekdu (Hanguk Gyeongje, Aug. 24, 1995). 9. The number of Korean travelers in Yanbian has been thirty to thirty-five times more than that of other foreigners since 1996 (70,098 in 1996 and the second highest number, Japanese travelers, was 1,552; 74,034 and 1,990 in 2001) (Tabulation on Jilin Statistics, 2002). 10. Korean Chinese have tended to migrate in two steps. Korean Chinese who are from countryside first move to cities, such as Shenyang, Changchun, and Yanji, in northeast China. After working there for some years, they move to bigger cities, such as Qingdao, Beijing, and Shanghai (Hanguk Gyeongje, Aug. 24, 1995). 11. Three Korean Chinese moved to Mexico through a smuggling ship in 2002. They crossed the border and went to Los Angeles. Visiting the J Korean

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newspaper company in Korea town, they insisted that they were North Korean refugees and asked for legal status to stay in America or South Korea. J company asked them to sing a North Korean song, which all North Koreans should know, and they did not know the song. After several questions, they confessed that they are Korean Chinese (Interview with a J company employee in summer, 2002). Korean Chinese who have relatives in South Korea can apply for visa after receiving a visiting letter from South Korea. Their age should be more than fifty-five years old. Among 289,239 illegal status foreigners in 2001, more than half of them (149,346) were Chinese and 53 percent (80,000) among them were Korean Chinese (I. Choi, 2003). This issue has also created several conflicts between Korean Chinese and South Koreans. Most South Korean farmers who could not marry applied for this arranged marriage and married Korean Chinese women. After receiving legal status as South Koreans, not a few Korean Chinese women have run away. Some were already married in China, but used this method to get legal status in South Korea. On the other hand, some Korean Chinese women met South Korean men who hide their problems, such as being handicapped, mentally disabled, and much older than the women. A Korean Chinese woman I met on a ship from Dalian to Incheon said that the first time, she was deceived by the broker and lost money. The second time, she finally could go to South Korea through a marriage introduction office and lived with a South Korean man, but he was alcoholic and beat her. She had to wait for three years to get South Korean citizenship and divorce him. In fact, she was a married woman in China (Interview in Dalian, Oct. 2001). According to Kim Sungja’s interview with Korean Chinese in South Korea, 10 percent of them paid brokers less than 5 million won (approximately $4,700) to go to South Korea, 62 percent more than 7.5 million won (approximately $7,000), and 25 percent more than 10 million won (approximately $9,700) (Kim Sungja 2003, 98). Even though some South Korean employers did not pay salaries to them, Korean Chinese could not sue them because of their illegal status. More than 50 percent of Korean Chinese who stay in South Korea said that they had experienced nonpayment of wages (Kim Sungja, 2003). Korean Chinese who would like to go to South Korea for manual labor are not able to obtain F-4 visas. Those who have professional jobs and have received graduate degrees at Korean colleges are able to obtain F-4 visas. The statistics also show that 34,728 Korean Chinese married South Koreans. It is still the highest number followed by Chinese (33,619) and Vietnamese (29,526). There are many stories about the arrests of swindlers who organize sham marriages between Korean Chinese in China and South Koreans in South Korea, as well as about fake marriages made in order for Korean Chinese to go to South Korea (www.korea86.com, Aug. 25, 2009).

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19. Most Korean Chinese who are engaged in service sectors do not register their long-term sojourn in local offices and keep their original hukou and, thus, the real number would be higher than reflected in the formal census. 20. When I started traveling in China in the late 1990s, it was common to hear some people half joking and half warning that women should be careful going to the countryside alone because of frequent kidnapping incidents by single men who have not found wives. 21. The rapid decrease of Korean Chinese and rapid increase of Han-Chinese between 1952 and 1965 were also due to the 1958 annexation of one area, Dunhua, where many Han-Chinese lived, to the Yanbian autonomous region by the decision of the Chinese government despite the objection of Korean Chinese (Lee Jaehyun and Chae Baek 1998, 48). Other ethnic groups, such as Mongolians, have occupied a small percentage in this area (approximately 2 percent: 2.4 percent in 1953 and 2.9 percent in the 1990s [Jang Kongja 2003, 296]). 22. Even though the Chinese governments hired government officials from the minority group in the minority autonomous region, the real power of the communist party committee (dangweiyuanhui) has been always controlled by the Han-Chinese (S. Kim 1994, 21–23). 23. Korean Chinese also use the North Korean grammar system. In 1962, Zhou Enlai enacted a law making Pyongyang Korean the standardized language of Koreans in China.

3 Ethnicity or Nationality? Korean Identities in China 1. China has 116 autonomous areas, including 5 Autonomous regions, 31 Autonomous prefectures, and 80 autonomous counties (J. Nam 1989, 5–6). 2. In the 1950s, the Chinese Communists implemented their ethnic classification system. Linguists, ethnologists, archaeologists, economists, and experts in literature and the arts worked developed the system. By 1979, officials designated fifty-five minorities and, with the Han-Chinese, this made for fifty-six nationalities in China (Harrell 1994, 23). 3. Before 1910, Koreans who lived in the northern part of Korea moved to China and after 1910, Koreans in the southern part of Korea moved to China. The latter had to move north further than the former migrants to look for available land and because Japan sent a large number of Koreans to unexplored areas in the northern extremes of China (Kim Si-Joong 1994, 66). 4. In the 1970s, the population of Han-Chinese in this area increased six times more than that of the 1950s. Mao Zedong encouraged a large number of Han-Chinese to move to Inner Mongolia in the 1950s and 1960s (Lee Minja 2003, 123–148). The Chinese government was especially harsh to Mongolians. Against the policy, Mongolians had several independent movements, In the Cultural Revolution, 346,000 Mongolians were imprisoned. Among them, 329,778 were executed (Heberer 1989, 27–28).

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5. Korean Chinese with a college-level education was 19.6 out of 1,000, which was the highest of the 56 nationalities and more than 3 times that of the national average of 6 out of 1,000 (Yun Ho 1993, 34). 6. In 1992, 96 percent of Korean Chinese in the countryside were able to speak Korean and 74 percent in cities in Yanbian. This percentage is getting lower in other areas. 7. Melissa Brown emphasizes that intermarriage is a primary means for cultural change. She writes, “Intermarriage between Chinese and non-Chinese is an important means both for introducing cultural change toward (and of) Chinese models and for claiming Chinese identity” (1996, 68). She continues, “I consider the process of ‘becoming Chinese’ at the level of individuals, where interaction with ‘society’ occurs. . . . At this level, cultural change is a process; boundaries for identification are neither clear nor always important and are frequently opportunistically employed; here ‘becoming Chinese’ is best seen in retrospect” (43). 8. Chinese identity cards report the minzu (ethnicity) and guoji (nationality). 9. The North Korean government tried to maintain close relations with Korean Chinese to prevent this improvement of relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans. They established the North Korean-Korean Chinese friendship association in 1993. It was led by the North Korean government and Korean Chinese who had North Korean citizenship (Joongang Ilbo, Jan. 6, 1993). Kim Jungil also visited northeast China in that year. 10. Asian Wall Street Journal reported that Asians rush for South Korea in order to have plastic surgery. It stated that Hallyu gives young people a strong desire for faces similar to Korean actors and actresses. One example was an actress in Hong Kong who went to Korea to have plastic surgery because she loved one Korean actress’ face (Asian Wall Street Journal, Oct. 21, 2005). 11. “White-clothing people.” Koreans traditionally wore white clothes. 12. In addition, forty-five Chinese universities changed Korean language textbooks from North Korean standardized language to South Korean. The South Korean government donated 400,000 dollars for the change (Maeil Gyeongje, May 17, 1996). 13. An owner of N company in Qingdao hired a Chinese secretary because she does not have the North Korean accent that Korean Chinese tend to have. He said that he is not comfortable listening to that accent (Paik Kwan-Ho and Jeong Jong-Ho 2002, 199). 14. After the first demonstration, the participants had to check whether their families were fine or not in China. They were criticized by their family and relatives because their activities could lead to bad treatment of their families in China. The campaign was organized and led by a South Korean Protestant minister who has been known to fight for rights of Korean Chinese. His action was criticized because he challenged a sensitive issue to the Chinese government and did not consider other ethnic Koreans who live in China. Some Protestant priests said that after the first demonstration, sixteen

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Chinese government officials came to South Korea to investigate the incident and talked with the Korean government regarding the issue (www.newsnjoy. co.kr, Dec.8, 2003), http://www.newsnjoy.co.kr/news/quickViewArticleView. html?idxno=6660 The Chinese government appointed four dangerous minority groups that are Tibetans, Mongolians, Muslims, and Korean Chinese since the economic reforms. Due that they have independent mother countries, the Chinese government was afraid that the open policy could bring them out the recognition of ethnic identity and the request of their freedom from China (Lee Jinyoung 1999, 280). Local governments in other areas as well as northeast China sent Korean Chinese government officials as representatives to advertise their local areas to South Korean investors. Whenever those officials have interviews with South Korean newspapers, they start talking about their ancestors and their private lives as ethnic Koreans first, and then explain how good their local areas are for investing capital (Joongang Ilbo, 1992–1995). In the World Cup in 2002, the Korean mass media made an article reporting that Korean Chinese were on the side of the Chinese soccer team a big issue. That disappointed and angered South Koreans. Through Internet sites, young Korean Chinese and South Koreans argued over this issue. The South Korean customer was seriously beaten by Korean Chinese waiters in the restaurant. He tried to sue the restaurant, but the Chinese police ignored it and took the side of the restaurant. The victim put his story on an Internet site that Korean students in Beijing made. It became a huge issue and Koreans in the local Korea town asked the Beijing-Korea Association to revoke the owner’s status as a member of the association, in which he had a high status. People were angry with him because he did not apologize to the victim and did not compensate him either. Later, people got to know he was Korean Chinese (who had changed his nationality from Chinese to South Korean). South Koreans’ anger turned toward Korean Chinese more generally and criticized him as a “greedy Chinese.” The campaign against the restaurant spread through the media and eventually Korean newspapers brought the story to Korea (Information from Beijing Korean Students Association, 2004).

4 South Korean and Korean Chinese Business Relations in China 1. The economic crisis in South Korea fueled a decrease of Korean investment toward foreign countries. SMEs were especially hurt. 2. In 2001, 60.9 percent of investment by Korean companies abroad was for local markets. Export toward Korea occupied 13.7 percent and that to third countries was 25.4 percent (Export-Import Bank of Korea, 2002). 3. Compared to other big cities, Beijing is one of the latest cities in which South Korean entrepreneurs advanced. Since the announcement of the 2008

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Beijing Olympics, a large number of South Korean entrepreneurs has moved to Beijing and the number and size of Korea towns has been rapidly expanding. Big enterprises prefer Beijing and SMEs Shandong now (The Hankyoreh, Sept. 24, 2004). The section employee has to know recent programs from South Korean mass media. He has to record shows and drama programs that were shown in the previous week on South Korea television. When Korean residents ask him, he has to record programs on CD or VCD tapes and deliver them to their houses (Interview in Beijing, 2003). Approximately 80 to 90 percent of the ship passengers were bottari sangin in the heyday of this occupation (before 1999). Among them, 56.1 percent is Koreans, 36.3 percent is Taiwanese and Chinese-Koreans, and 7.2 percent is Chinese. Korean Chinese are included as Koreans or Chinese (Yonyeong Joseon Munbo, June18, 1999). Newspapers mentioned the increase of Korean Chinese bottari sangin. They guess that the number would be much higher than the statistics show because those who have South Korean citizenship tend to take up this job (Munhwa Ilbo, May 8, 2000). I took the ship four times and he was the highest rank each time. He had Korean Chinese, Chinese, and South Korean assistants and before taking the ship, bottari sangin slept in his house. He also hired South Korean students who take the ship to go to South Korea on vacation (it is two or three times cheaper than the airplane). If students show up in the port, bottari sangin buy tickets for students and use their baggage tickets (one passenger can carry two bags; the weight was always different depending on the custom policy). In the 1990s, bottari sangin paid the whole price of students’ tickets, but since 2000, they pay half price because their profits decreased under stricter customs policies. It became popular among students too in the 1990s, but after one student was arrested because his bags had drugs and this seems to have happened repeatedly, it became less popular. They bought tickets for me two times and I worked for him. My job was to give him two baggage tickets accompanying my ship ticket and take care of two big bags, two boxes of cigarettes, and two bottles of sesame oil and whiskey. One time, the customs examiners took one box of cigarettes and a bottle of whiskey from my belongings (fieldwork, 2002–2003). Bottari sangin take the ship from China to Korea for 15 hours. As soon as they go through the strict customs procedures for 1–2 hours, they transfer their bags to their partners in South Korea. Their partners give them new bags to carry back to China. They take a rest in the port for four hours. After that, they take the same ship to go back to China with the new bags. When I stayed in the bottari sangin’s house, a Korean Chinese maid made our lunch boxes to eat on the ship. She was from Heilongjiang province. Her first son lived in Shenyang after quitting middle school and the second one is with her mother in hometown. She was waiting for replies from South Korea, while she was working as a maid. Her husband was dead and she applied to an international

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marriage office for an appropriate South Korean man as a mate. She was rejected several times because she was not good looking. She said that a bottari sangin’s wife is a chosen one and she envies her. Other female Korean Chinese bottari sangin said that it would be difficult for her to find a husband because she is so obviously from the countryside and not good looking [I stayed in a house with four female bottari sangin. They married South Korean men and divorced after getting South Korean citizenship] (Interview in Dalian, 2001). 10. When a Korean Chinese girl guided three South Korean men from Shenyang to Beijing for three days, it was 1,200 yuan in 2001. The standard monthly salary was approximately 800 yuan in cities at that time.

5

Korean Business, Intra-Ethnic Conflict, and Adaptive Strategies

1. Bonacich and Light categorize class resources: “On the material side, class resources are private property in the means of production or distribution, personal wealth, and investments in human capital. On the cultural side, class resources of entrepreneurship are bourgeois values, attitudes, knowledge, and skills transmitted intergenerationally in the course of primary socialization” (1988, 19). 2. Korean Chinese employees are generally characterized as frequently demanding improvement of the working environment and increases in salary (Paik Gwon-Ho and Jeong Jong-Ho 2002, 195). 3. Due to Korean Chinese’s reputation of having the highest percentage of university degree-holders and literate population, South Koreans have considered Korean Chinese to be well-educated. They also associate success in schooling with Korean ethnicity more generally, and so emphasizing education has been a way of identifying with Korean Chinese. 4. The Korean word for computer is “keom-pyu-teo,” a loan word from English. 5. Civic associations in South Korea researched cases of Korean Chinese who were swindled by South Koreans from September in 1995 to November in 1996 in the three northeast provinces. Over 40 days, 10,400 households reported crimes and the amount of money lost was approximately 3.3 billion won (Maeil Gyeongje, Nov. 28, 1996). Most of them were deceived by South Korean brokers who promised to send them to South Korea. With the increase of these kinds of deception, Korean Chinese lost trust in South Koreans. Some Korean Chinese criminals started targeting South Korean travelers and businessmen. Three South Koreans were kidnapped in a week by Korean Chinese (Seoul Gyeongje, Mar. 20–27, 1997). One was murdered by Korean Chinese in Tianjin. Approximately 200 crimes targeting South Koreans happened in Beijing in 1997. Most cases were related to Korean Chinese. They kidnapped South Koreans or took money after having relations as business partners. Jugan Hankook (Weekly Hankook) ran an article claiming that crimes toward South Koreans in China (kidnapping and murder, mainly) always have three elements: Korean Chinese, alcohol, and women ( Jugan Hangook, Mar. 16, 2000).

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6. In the 1970s to 1980s, in South Korea, there were a large number of strikes and demonstrations that labor unions led. Labor union culture was strongly established in Korean society at that time. During the peak of student demonstrations, student associations had cooperative relations with labor unions and they led numerous demonstrations together. The Korean government pressured them and warned that their demonstrations could seriously damage the economic development of Korea. Therefore, labor unions have been perceived as violent and economically detrimental. 7. When I interviewed a Korean Chinese restaurant owner in Beijing, he said that local Chinese people think of waidiren (outsiders) as bugs and minorities as something inferior to bugs (Interview in Beijing in winter, 2003). 8. Southeast parts of China were not popular among Korean companies because they have been already occupied by Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan companies (Lee Kangyeol 1999, 53). 9. The salary of a South Korean residential representative in China is approximately 100,000 to 150,000 dollars per year (Hanguk Gyeongje, Aug. 23, 1997). The cost now would be more expensive than 1997. 10. The South Korean businessmen whom I met usually say that Chinese employees are lazy. Chinese workers are 60 to 70 percent as productive as Korean workers. However, Chinese workers can be compensated at one-tenth or one-twentieth the cost of Korean workers (Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1998; Boston Consulting Group, 2004). Thus, Korean businessmen do gain from locating in China. 11. Big companies had advantageous positions in training Chinese over the long-term duration. Posco already started hiring Chinese employees to train them in Korea from the early 1990s. With the positions, they went back to China to take charge of branch offices and factories (Segye Ilbo, Aug. 9, 2004). 12. They were interviewed in a Chinese newspaper and said their slogan was “for Chinese customers by Chinese managers and services (you Zhongguoren guanli, wei Zhongguoren fuwu de Zhongguoren de)” (Herald Economy, June 21, 2001).

6 Relations between Korean Chinese and South Koreans in the Service Sector 1. Several North Korean restaurants are run by the North Korean government in China. South Korean travelers are the main guests. 2. Yanji is ranked number one in several parts: the highest number of taxis— higher than Shanghai and Shenzhen, and the highest alcohol consumption per person. 3. Many Korean Chinese students in a teaching school where I taught English wanted to get jobs instead of going to university (fieldwork, 2001–2002). 4. That case is for Korean Chinese. Chinese start from 600 to 800 yuan in Beijing.

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5. South Korean employers, following their Chinese counterparts, usually provide a dorm or other place where employees can stay together, because most come from the countryside and do not have local homes. 6. This number includes only university students. A large number of Korean students from kindergarten to high school have also left for China for education. 7. Because Korean men do not cook usually, they look for women. 8. This kind of family is called a “wild goose family” (gireogi-gajok) and the father is called a “wild goose-father” (gireogi-abba). Korea has many of these “wild goose families.” Parents send their children abroad for education. The father stays in Korea to earn money and send it to the children, and the mother also moves abroad to take care of the children. The father lives by himself. This has become a big social issue because of suicides of gireogi-abba due to loneliness and financial problems, as well as family collapse. 9. This law changed in late 2003. Foreign businessmen with less than $30,000 are allowed to open individual businesses. 10. Like Koreans who moved to China decades or centuries ago, Chinese have also moved to Korea. They still keep Chinese citizenship due to the impossibility of obtaining Korean citizenship. Thus, they do not have problems opening business in China as Chinese citizens. 11. In South Korea, housing is most commonly paid through a lump sum deposit. Paying monthly rent is more expensive and less common. 12. If investors miss the payment date three times, the ownership of the house naturally transfers to the Chinese government.

7 Community Networks and Activities 1. Shenyang has a Korea town that is well mixed with South Koreans and Korean Chinese together. It has been the main Korean Chinese town since the 1950s. This place has been developed from the earliest time when South Korea and China had economic relations. Small and medium enterprises and service business by South Koreans and Korean Chinese have preferred to open their business in Shenyang. This caused not only cooperation, but also huge conflicts and serious crimes. Korean Chinese and South Koreans have made efforts at cooperation and joint cultural activities. The Shenyang local government noticeably supported South Korean settlements. They hold “Korea Days” every year. Social activities, such as festivals and establishment of schools and organizations, between Korean Chinese and South Koreans have helped improve friendly relations. 2. The representative of the Wangjing-Korea Association in Beijing estimated that two to three Korean Chinese work for one South Korean. In Beijing, two hundred thousands of South Koreans and five to six hundred thousands of Korean Chinese live (Interview, Dec. 2003). 3. The Harbin, Changchun, Beijing, Shenyang, and Dandong governments announced expansions in the size of Korea towns, especially by promoting their economic development (www.moyza.com, June 2004).

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4. China has the kaifaqu (development districts) in several big cities, such as Shanghai and Dalian. New apartments and buildings are established rapidly. Foreign investors and businessmen prefer to live there because the facilities are new and modern. South Korean residents mainly gather together in this area. However, with the development of real estate in China, South Koreans who are obsessed with making money by buying land or houses have been investing in the kaifaqu in each province of China. 5. In the end, the plan failed due to difficulty in finding investment. In late 2007, the Jinfeng Village launched the new plan, “Korean-Chinese Ecology and Sightseeing Village” for the purpose of spurring growth in the town again (Gilim Shinmun, Nov. 22, 2008). 6. A Korean Chinese entrepreneur established a corporate real estate company with South Koreans. He encourages South Koreans to invest money for real estate in China. His background, having big buildings in several cities and being educated in America, seems to affect potential South Korean investors. When the Chinese government permitted foreigners to buy houses, he occupied main sections of newspapers. 7. Some South Koreans were not able to afford to live in these places. One family who lived in China since the 1990s talked about their hardship at that time: We came to China and looked for a house to live in, but houses for foreigners were incredibly expensive. Other people who lived there did not have to worry about that because companies or governments paid for them. But we were a different case. We lived in Wudaokou without letting the Chinese government know. We rented an apartment from Chinese. The house owner agreed about our staying because we paid more money than Chinese. Whenever the government investigated illegal sojourners because of some diplomatic conflicts among the two Koreas and China, we lived like hermits. We turned the lights off early and did not make any sound. We were just like dead people. In the end, the Chinese house owner became scared and begged us to leave. We had to live separately for a while. (Interview in Beijing, Dec. 2003) Despite the government policy, a large number of South Koreans lived in apartments in Wudaokou. The government officials knew about that, but they did not intervene too much because Chinese people who got houses from their danwei—the apartment was distributed to government officials in the 1970s— could lend their houses with high rent to South Koreans. It became a popular business for them. Some Chinese quit work and bought cars for driving South Korean students to schools, churches, and stores, and travelers in Beijing. This also became a very popular job among them. They could make money several times more than their original salaries. All these illegal events enabled South Koreans to live there despite the government law. Now it is possible for foreigners to live there, but not to buy. When I walked in the apartment area, I felt like I was still in South Korea because there are so many Korean residents and stores. When I rented one room in the apartment and lived with the Chinese

184

8.

9.

10.

11. 12.

13.

14.

15.

●

Notes

house owner for three months in 2003–2004, the house owner was also a government official, but she quit and became a driver. She wakes up early to send Korean students off to schools and sometimes drives around Beijing when South Korean travelers come. Most of the time she does not work. Despite the easy job, she makes a lot of money and saves money for her daughter to study abroad. The Wudaokou district absorbs lots of money from South Korean students. A representative of Wangjing.com said that after the decision of the 2008 Olympics, more South Koreans decided to settle down in China. When he came to China in 1992, most Koreans had plans to stay in China for several years and go back to Korea. Recently, sojourners planning a long-term stay have been increasing (Interview, Dec. 2003). With the increase of South Koreans in the Wangjing district, some Chinese residents are happy about the increase of land prices, but others do not like it. An elderly Chinese lady used a megaphone and screamed to kick South Koreans out of the district two times (Interview in Beijing, Dec. 2003). Small and big fights between Koreans and Chinese have often happened in Korea towns. In recent years, by the recognition of the significant functions of overseas Koreans in South Korea, especially in economic activities, overseas Korean associations have become significant resources helping South Korean economic development (Im Gyesun 2003, 50). The Gang of Four refers to the main figures (Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan) during the Cultural Revolution. When I visited the church in the small town, I had to go at night without letting other people know. The town was famous for relics of the ancient Korean kingdom, and South Koreans scholars conducted research there several times. Based on what they found there, they held a conference in South Korea. And the conference did not make the Chinese government happy. It was one of the hardest times for missionaries since the historical arguments between Korea and China started. The minister said that some Korean Chinese students who were converted to Christians were kicked out of school a couple of days before and the local government strictly prohibited the visit of South Koreans in that church (fieldwork in summer, 2001). In the early 1990s, most South Koreans in Dalian favored living downtown, but those who have moved to Dalian in recent years reside in the kaifaqu (fieldwork in Dalian in 2003). Shenyang and Harbin in 1949, Wushun in 1951, Anshan in 1952, Dalian in 1954, Xinbin in 1956, and Changchun in 1958 opened cultural clubs and then, established the ethnic Korean dancing and singing groups (Lee Kwangkyu 1996, 160). According to the Lee Kwangkyu, each of the three northeast provinces in China has twelve cultural clubs, for a total of thirty-six cultural clubs. In addition, each township has a dancing and singing group. On the basis of the cultural club, schools, hospitals, and churches are founded. The roles of the cultural

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club are not only to organizing the festivals, but also to introducing potential marriage-partners from Korea or China, and making relations between China and Korea (1996, 164). 16. This situation can be compared to Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia, where the traditional festival of Nadam is held every year. At the time of the festival, tourism is the main business. However, the inner and outer Mongolians do not have any cooperative relations with each other and have separate festivals. In addition, the Chinese government changed the name of the festival to the “Nadam Grassland Tourist Festival” inside China. 17. I exclude university students even though there are Korean students associations in each Chinese university, because their characteristics and activities do not concentrate on education.

8

Conclusion

1. The number of Korean Chinese who live in the United States is forty thousand and they established their own Korean Chinese association. Most of them are from Northeast China; Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang (Yeonbyeon Ilbo, July 7, 2008). 2. Linguistic differences between them have been researched in South Korea and dictionaries of the North Korean language have been published.


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Index

assimilation of Korean Chinese into Chinese society, 23–24, 44–46 of Korean Chinese into South Korean society, 46–48, 56–59 automobiles, 83, 109–110 Beijing, 22, 29, 32–33, 45–46, 116–117, 121–122, 128, 133–134, 137–138, 141, 150, 155, 162, 178, 179, 182 Beijing Korean Chinese Sports Event, 33 Bonacich, Edna, 5 bottari sangin (daigong), 78–82 business associations, 61–62, 131–132, 139–143 entertainment, 118–120 Korean Chinese, 88–90, 143 Partnership, 168–169 Changchun, 133–134, 184 Chaoqiao (North Korean citizenship), 79 Chaoxianzu (Korean Chinese), 4, 55, 58 Chaoyang, 141 Christianity, 143–144, 148–149 church network, 143–144, 149–153 sanzi, 144–146, 148

citizenship, 21, 53, 128 communism, 41–43 Communist Party, 135, 174 community network, 131–132 Korean-Chinese, 36–39, 135, 141, 170 South Koreans, 136–139 Cultural Revolution, 24, 43 Dalian, 15, 29, 126, 155 Dandong, 157–158, 173 diplomatic relations (Korea-China), 2, 134, 141, 147, 174 economic crisis, 21, 67, 79–80 economic gap, 49, 116, 131–133 education bilingual, 88–90, 101–102 Chinese school (Han Chinese school), 3, 14, 45, 160 HSK, 127, 161, 163 Korean Chinese school (ethnic Korean school), 14–15, 26, 35–36, 38, 43–45, 48, 160–161, 170 South Korean school (international school), 160–163 Tutor, 26, 126–127 Enclave, 4–5, 71–72, 168 enterprises large, 64–66, 89–90, 169–170 small, 61, 64, 74, 84, 98

196

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Index

enterprises—Continued small and medium, 61, 64, 84, 101, 169–170 state-owned, 71, 107 entertainment, 21–22, 74, 117–120 ethnic distrust, 1, 87, 100, 110, 131, 168 ethnic enclave economy, 4–5, 119–120, 168 ethnic festival, 156–158, 185 ethnic solidarity, 93 ethnic trust, 1, 27–29, 87, 170 ethnicity split, 8–9, 168, 171 family extended, 34 pseudo-extended, 150 separated, 34 wild-goose (gireogi-gajok), 182 festival kimchi, 138, 158 foreign direct investment, 2, 62, 142 globalization, 1, 164, 171 Guangdong, 97, 136 Guanxi, 133 Hangeul school (Korean language school), 151, 162, 163 hangukin (South Koreans), 14 Hanguo-cheng (Korea-town), 121, 136, 158 Heilongjiang, 30, 36, 70, 135, 147 Hong Kong, 62, 66 HSK, see education Huaibohai (North China), 71–72, 97–98, 139, 141–142 Hukou, 25, 31–32, 176 Hyundai, 100 immigrant economics, 4–5

Internet associations, 82, 139 chat rooms, 13 online community, 164–165 jaeoe dongpo, 30, 53, 58, 170 Japan Japanese colonial rule, 20, 27, 154 Japanese community, 6–7, 9, 138 Japanese imperialism, 19, 41–42, 144, 156–157 Jiedao government, 138 Jilin, 30, 54, 70, 135 kaifaqu (development district), 126, 135, 155, 183 Korea Week (Hanguozhou), 158 Korean Chamber of Commerce, 140–141 Korean Chinese business associations ( Joseonjok Gieopga Hyeophoe), 58 Korean Chinese in South Korea, 29–31 Korean language school, see Hangeul school Korean-ness, 171 labor cost, 61, 94, 97, 99–100, 103, 106, 114, 115–116 labor force, 94, 95, 100, 115–116 LG, 71, 103, 105, 110 Liaoning, 107 Localization, 99–100, 103–105, 109 Maids, 124–126, 159, 179 mediator, 122, 127, 156 middlemen, 5–6, 10, 50, 173 migration chain, 27–28 emigration, 19, 20, 21, 119 Immigration Act, 21 rural-urban, 24, 27, 72 urban, 24, 33–36, 61, 116, 133–136, 160

Index minority group, 4–6, 24, 36, 41–42, 43, 44–45, 95–96, 133, 134, 140, 158 middleman minority, see middlemen policy, 34, 37–38, 89, 176 Mongolia, 23, 43, 176 motherland, 47, 52, 149, 173 Mt. Paekdu, 157 normalization, 2, 13, 55, 62, 79, 140, 141 North Korean refugees, 147, 149, 175 northeast China, 4, 22–23, 24–25, 27–28, 32–33, 48, 69–72, 98, 117, 121–122, 133–136, 142–143, 160 Olympic Games 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, 13, 47 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, 22, 137, 179, 184 overseas ethnic networks, 6–8, 142 overseas Koreans, see jaeoe dongpo People’s Republic of China (PRC), 20, 156 Peskama, 167 popular culture films (videos, television programs), 21, 47 Hallyu (Korea Wind), 21, 47, 135, 177 music, 21, 47, 136 population, 20, 22, 23, 24–25, 27–28, 31–32, 34–37, 50, 52, 116–117, 135, 154–155, 170, 176 Portes, Alejandro, 4–5 prejudice, 81, 92, 94, 145 property, see real estate prostitution, 120–121 Protestantism, 144, 147, 149, 177 pseudo-extended family, see family

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197

Qianlima, see automobiles Qingdao, 29, 57, 93, 105–106, 115, 138, 177 real estate, 64, 128–129, 136, 183 Republic of China on Taiwan (Taiwan), 2 rotational community, 6 Samsung, 66, 73, 84, 100, 104–105 sanzi church, see church segmented labor market, 4, 168 Seoul, 31, 48, 147 Shandong, 29, 71, 96 Shanghai, 29, 100, 108, 140 Shenyang, 15, 29, 54, 107–108, 143, 148, 150, 156, 158, 182 Shunyi, 134 Sinuiju, 157 Small and medium enterprises (SMEs), see under enterprises split ethnicity, 8–9, 168, 171 sports Beijing Korean Chinese Sports Event, 33 clubs, 156–158, 184 Dalian sports festival, 155 festival, 132, 134, 153–156 games, 58, 153–154 Korea-China soccer games, 58 Korea Sports Council in China ( Jaejungguk Daehan Cheyukhoe), 156 Taebek Soccer Association, 48 Yanji Korean Chinese Soccer Association, 48 Tianjin, 94, 100, 138, 143–143, 180 TOEFL, see under education tourism, 117–118, 157, 185 trade (Korea-China), 2, 62–63, 82 tutor, 26, 126–127 urbanization, 31–32, 44

198

●

Index

Wangjing, 74, 137–138, 162–163, 184 Weber, Max, 143 Weihai, 140 Wudaokou, 124, 137, 183 xinxianzu (new Koreans), 14–15,55, 101 Xita, 54

Yanbian, 4, 9, 23, 24–25, 34, 36–37, 38, 43, 54, 68–69, 120, 157–158, 174 Yanbian Science University, 100, 149, 164 Yanji, 24, 36, 54, 69, 157, 181

International Ethnic Networks and Intra-Ethnic Conflict: Koreans in China

Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China

Ethnic Groups in Conflict

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: ethnic conflict and international intervention

Handbook of Ethnic Conflict: International Perspectives

Ethnic conflict and international politics in the Middle East

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia

Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation

The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict

Social networks and intergroup conflict

The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective

The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict

Leaders and International Conflict

Mutual Accommodation: Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation

Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India

Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan

Addressing Ethnic Conflict through Peace Education: International Perspectives

Addressing Ethnic Conflict through Peace Education: International Perspectives

Contested Cities in the Modern World (Ethnic and Intercommunity Conflict)

Education in Divided Societies (Ethnic and Intercommunity Conflict)

Evolutionary theory and ethnic conflict (Praeger studies on ethnic and national identities in politics)

Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Conflict (Praeger Studies on Ethnic and National Identities in Politics)

Japan and China: Cooperation, Competition and Conflict

Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Communist World

Japan and China: Cooperation, Competition and Conflict

Democracy and Ethnic Conflict: Advancing Peace in Deeply Divided Societies

Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation

International Ethnic Networks and Intra-Ethnic Conflict: Koreans in China

Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China

Ethnic Groups in Conflict

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: ethnic conflict and international intervention

Handbook of Ethnic Conflict: International Perspectives

Ethnic conflict and international politics in the Middle East

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia

Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation

The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict

Social networks and intergroup conflict

The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective

The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict

Leaders and International Conflict

Mutual Accommodation: Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation

Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India

Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan

Addressing Ethnic Conflict through Peace Education: International Perspectives

Addressing Ethnic Conflict through Peace Education: International Perspectives

Contested Cities in the Modern World (Ethnic and Intercommunity Conflict)

Education in Divided Societies (Ethnic and Intercommunity Conflict)

Evolutionary theory and ethnic conflict (Praeger studies on ethnic and national identities in politics)

Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Conflict (Praeger Studies on Ethnic and National Identities in Politics)

Japan and China: Cooperation, Competition and Conflict

Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Communist World

Japan and China: Cooperation, Competition and Conflict

Democracy and Ethnic Conflict: Advancing Peace in Deeply Divided Societies

Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation

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