The Future of United States, China, and Taiwan Relations

The Future of United States, China, and Taiwan Relations

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The Future of United States, China, and Taiwan Relations Edited by Cheng-yi Lin and Denny Roy

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THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND TAIWAN RELATIONS

Copyright © Cheng-yi Lin and Denny Roy, 2011. All rights reserved. First published in 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–11278–0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The future of United States, China, and Taiwan relations / edited by Cheng-yi Lin and Denny Roy. p. cm. ISBN 978–0–230–11278–0 1. United States—Foreign relations—China. 2. China—Foreign relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations— Taiwan 4. Taiwan—Foreign relations—United States. 5. China— Foreign relations—Taiwan. 6. Taiwan—Foreign relations—China. I. Lin, Zhengyi, 1956– II. Roy, Denny, 1960– JZ1480.A57C648 2010 327.73051—dc22

2010038123

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: April 2011 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

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Contents

Foreword: Varieties of Sovereignty Stephen Krasner

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List of Contributors

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1

Introduction Cheng-yi Lin and Tom Chou

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Taiwan’s Political Development and U.S.-China Relations Jean-Pierre Cabestan

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The “ASL” as the “Anti-TRA”: The Impact of China’s Anti-Secession Law on U.S. Relations with Taiwan John J. Tkacik, Jr.

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The TRA, Cross-Strait Relations, and Sino-U.S. Relations: Searching for Cross-Strait Stability Richard W. Hu

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A Status Quo with Different Interpretations: Taiwan, China, the United States, and Security in the Taiwan Strait Cheng-yi Lin Lobbying for a “U.S.-Taiwan FTA” in the U.S. Congress: Which “Fast Track”? What Target? David W. F. Huang

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The United States as a Balancer in Cross-Strait Relations, 2000–2008 121 Jaushieh Joseph Wu

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The U.S.-China-Taiwan Relationship: New Circumstances, Persistent Challenges Denny Roy

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9 Taiwan’s Participation in the World Health Organization: The U.S. “Facilitator” Role 167 Jaw-ling Joanne Chang 10 Japan’s Perspective on U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations Yoshifumi Nakai

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U.S. Debates About Taiwan’s Security, 1979–2009 Michael Pillsbury

Index

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Foreword: Varieties of Sovereignty Stephen Krasner

Introduction The concept of sovereignty, central to Taiwan-China relations, is contested in theory and practice. Only about half of the countries in the world today meet all of the expectations commonly associated with sovereignty. The other half depart from conventional expectations in a number of ways. These derogations can best be understood by recognizing that the term sovereignty has been used in at least three different ways. These three different aspects of sovereignty—international legal sovereignty, Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty, and domestic sovereignty—are not inherently linked. One way to understand sovereignty is international legal sovereignty, which is what international lawyers mean by sovereignty: states are all formally equal and recognize each other’s right to enter into contracts. International legal sovereignty enables states to sign treaties and join international organizations. Recognition has other concrete advantages, especially for less-developed countries, notably foreign assistance provided by multilateral development banks. The second element of sovereignty is what is commonly called Westphalian sovereignty. A more accurate historical term would be Westphalian/Vattelian or even Vattelian sovereignty. The idea here is that every state is autonomous; that no state has the right to make authoritative decisions over the actions in another country; and the basic rule is nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states. This idea of Westphalian sovereignty is associated with the Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648. International lawyers

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and international relations scholars have generally thought of this as the beginning of the modern state system. The association of Westphalian sovereignty with the Peace of Westphalia is historically inaccurate. The concept of nonintervention was not articulated until more than a century later by Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss international jurist. Finally, there is domestic sovereignty, which refers to the ability of the state to regulate activities within and across its international borders. The scope of activities within the legal purview of states has for most countries increased over time from providing domestic security and conducting warfare to, in the contemporary world, implementing a wide range of social services and economic regulations. Conventional sovereigns can be defined as states that have international legal sovereignty, Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty, and domestic sovereignty. These three aspects of sovereignty are, however, not necessarily related. There is no logical or empirical link among them. The contemporary environment provides many examples of situations that do not conform to conventional sovereignty. The two most prominent examples are failed states and the European Union (EU), but there are many others. In a book published in 2003, Robert Cooper, who was Javiar Solana’s chief foreign policy advisor, captured the diversity of the present-day world.1 He argued that there are three worlds of world politics. There is a world that he called the modern world of fully sovereign states. This modern world of conventional sovereigns with all three elements of sovereignty includes the states of North America, most states in Asia, most of the European states outside of the EU, and some of the African states There are about 85 countries in this category. There is a postmodern world of Europe: members of the EU that are effectively governed and recognized but not autonomous, now numbering 27 countries. And there is what Cooper called the premodern world, the badly governed or failed states, and depending on how you measure them, this includes something between 37 and 73 countries.2 The diversity of practices suggests that while the norms and practices of sovereignty are widely understood, they are also frequently violated. This is especially true with regard to Westphalian/ Vattelian sovereignty. The norms of nonintervention and autonomy

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are widely understood, but frequently violated. That such violations would take place in the international system ought not to be surprising. Political leaders may decide that their interests are best served through strictly state-to-state relations, either diplomacy or war. But they might also decide that compromising the autonomy of their own authority structures or those of other states would better secure their economic, security, or even ideational interests. Sometimes these violations are the result of forcible interventions. In other instances, they are the product of voluntary agreement among states. Norms matter in the international system—they provide focal points and can be used to rally domestic political support—but they are not taken for granted. Political leaders can, and have, created arrangements that violate conventional sovereignty. Some examples illustrate how varied and flexible actual practices have been. The European Union The EU is the most important institutional development in the international environment in the last 200 years. The members of the EU have done away with their own Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty. At the same time, they have maintained all of the privileges of international legal sovereigns. Other members of the international community have not challenged this odd arrangement. Does it really make sense to have two members of the EU sitting on the Security Council, when both France and the UK are constrained from acting freely in some important issue areas? The Europeans have, through a set of treaties from Rome to Lisbon, voluntarily compromised their Westphalian/Vattellian sovereignty by doing two things. First, they have created ambitious supranational institutions. The two most important of these are the European Court of Justice and the European Monetary Union. The European Court’s decisions have direct effect on the member states of the EU and supremacy over national law. The Court has overturned many national laws. In the case of the European Monetary Union, the Europeans have created a central bank. Most of the members of the EU are in the Euro Zone. They do not control their own monetary policies. The Greek government, for instance, can use fiscal measures—taxation, budgetary constraint—to address the

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country’s economic crisis, but it cannot inflate or change the value of its currency. In addition to creating supranational institutions, the EU provides for qualified majority voting for about 40 issues, of which the most well known and important is international trade. European countries don’t negotiate independently on their international trade position; they have to agree first amongst themselves. Importantly, if there is a qualified majority vote in favor of a particular position on, for example, how they will conduct their international trade negotiations within the context of the WTO, member states of the EU are obligated to obey the decision even if they disagree with it. This is a violation of the traditional way in which we understand sovereignty, in which states have a right to make their own decisions and in which no state has to enter into an arrangement with which it which it disagrees. Failed States Failed states have international legal sovereignty, but they do not have domestic sovereignty; they might or might not have Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty evolved over several centuries in Europe where it displaced other institutional forms, including feudalism, empires and city—states. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, sovereignty pushed aside institutional arrangements that had existed in other parts of the world such as the Sino-centric systems concept of a tributary state. By the end of the Second World War, sovereignty was the only recognized game in town. The colonial empires staggered along for a few years after the war, but the European states accepted by the end of the 1950s that the cost of colonial control outweighed the benefits. There was a stab at trusteeships as an alternative institutional form, but this concept quickly died. Countries were given international legal sovereignty even in situations where their capacity to exercise competent domestic sovereignty was very limited. At the same time, state death has virtually disappeared.3 The threat of foreign conquest, which had been a major incentive for more effective governance, is no longer in play. No longer does the state make war and war make the state.4 Political leaders can govern badly and still have a state to govern. They might be overthrown by

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domestic rivals seeking to enjoy the spoils of state power, but they are not threatened by outright conquest. The conjucture of these two factors—sovereignty as the only recognized structure for organizing political life and the absence of state death—has led to the phenomenon of failed states. Many countries had very limited capacity when they became independent. There were only a small number of people with university training. To take one extreme example, there were only about 30 African university graduates in all of the Democratic Republic of the Congo when it became independent in 1960. Revenues were initially sparse. Revenues subsequently derived from raw materials exploitation have often led to rent seeking and pillaging of the public coffers rather than the provision of public goods. Other Examples The EU and failed states are not the only examples of derogations from conventional sovereignty. There are many others. It is worth reviewing the variety of ways in which the conventional norms and practices of sovereignty have violated to make it clear that Taiwan is not an anomalous case that stands outside of existing practices. Rather, Taiwan is but one more example, and hardly the strangest, of the variety of ways in which institutional structures have been crafted to meet particular circumstances even when these structures have not been consistent with sovereign norms. Andorra and Hong Kong: These offer examples of small political entities that enjoy full or partial international legal sovereignty even though they lack Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty. Both political entities have effective domestic sovereignty. Andorra is a small political entity in the Pyrenees Mountains between France and Spain with a population of about 83,000. It is a member of the UN and other international organizations. Andorra is well governed. It does not, however, have Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty. The heads of state of Andorra are the president of France and the bishop of Urgell, which is a bishopric in Spain. This is a result of a treaty that was signed in 1278. Two of the four judges of the constitutional court of Andorra are appointed by France and Spain. This basically medieval arrangement has not prevented Andorra from assuming international legal sovereignty.

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Hong Kong is another example of a small political entity that has effective domestic sovereignty, some international legal sovereignty, but not Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty. Hong Kong is a member of the WTO, the Asian Development Bank, the World Meteorological Organization, and other international organizations, sometimes as a regular member and sometimes in another status. More interestingly, it has a separate visa regime. Travel requirements for Hong Kong are different from those of China even though Hong is formally a part of China. These arrangements for Hong Kong were a reflection of the desire of the Chinese regime to both assert formal sovereignty over Hong Kong and at the same time to maintain Hong Kong’s economic vibrancy. If Hong Kong had simply become another province of China, its economic performance would have suffered. China would not have been able to replicate the legal regime that existed in Hong Kong. It would not have been able to reassure the business community. The arrangements for visas and international organization membership had to be accepted by other countries. They were not just the result of unilateral Chinese decisions. They involved the international legal status of Hong Kong. Logics of consequences, the desire to maintain Hong Kong’s economic position, trumped logics of appropriateness, the norms of conventional sovereignty. China, and other key actors in Hong Kong, would not have been able to maximize their economic interests within the confines of conventional sovereignty. Nested Security Arrangements: Nested security arrangements offer another example of departures from conventional sovereignty.5 Nested security involves situations in which one country voluntarily contracts its security to another. The contracting state maintains full international legal sovereignty. It may, or may not, have effective domestic sovereignty. But it has compromised its own Westphalian/ Vattelian sovereignty in an issue area, security, that is one of the core functions of the state. Monaco’s security is provided by France. The security of the Marshall Islands and Micronesia is controlled by the United States. More interesting is the case of the Solomon Islands. In 2003, the government of the Solomon Islands was losing control of the country. Armed gangs had robbed the armory for guns and the treasury for money. The political leaders of the country were

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left with constrained choices. Instead of fleeing or staying and risking death, they asked for external assistance, initially from Australia and ultimately from a group of neighboring countries. The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was established through an agreement between the Solomon Island government and 15 neighboring countries. RAMSI now controls the police, the judiciary, and the finance ministry in the Solomon Islands. Nested sovereignty, like the EU, shows how states can use their international legal sovereignty to compromise their Westphalian/ Vattelian sovereignty. The member states of the EU were motivated by a desire for the benefits of economic integration and, especially in the case of Germany, a desire for a new identity. The leaders of the states that have entered into nested security arrangements have concluded that their security needs are better served by relying on other states rather than their own resources. The Exclusive Economic Zone for the oceans offers another example of an institutional arrangement that is inconsistent with conventional sovereignty. Prior to the Second World War the oceans were recognized as being divided into two parts: the open ocean or terra nullis which was not governed by any state, and the territorial sea, generally twelve miles, which was under the full control of the littoral state. After 1945, a group of countries in South America wanted to extend their control out into the ocean. The United States and other countries opposed a simple extension of the territorial sea, which the United States in particular feared would impede freedom of navigation for both commercial and naval ships. Ultimately, the UN Conference on the Law of the Seas agreed to the creation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is an area between the territorial sea limit of 12 miles and 200 miles or the end of the continental shelf. Within the EEZ, the littoral state can control commercial activities, fishing and mineral exploitation, but it does not control shipping. The state has control over some functional areas but not over others within the same space. This arrangement is more like something that might have existed under feudalism, where different activities within the same territory were subject to different rules, than under sovereignty in which the expectation is that all activities within a given territory will be controlled by one single authority. The EEZ did, however, meet the material needs of the countries participating in the UN Conference. The United States

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got both freedom of navigation and control over mineral exploitation in its very large EEZ. Other littoral states also got the right to control commercial activity. States used their international legal sovereignty to create an institutional form inconsistent with domestic sovereignty. Understanding Plasticity The examples offered above hardly exhaust the variety of ways in which conventional notions of sovereignty have been violated. Some of these examples, such as Hong Kong, are unique. But others such as the EU and failed states characterize many countries. Sovereign norms and rules are widely recognized but also frequently violated. The variety of institutional arrangements, the plasticity of sovereignty, reflects the nature of the international environment. The international environment is extremely complex, perhaps more complex than any other environment within which human beings interact. There are many different actors: states, international organizations, NGOs, terrorists. These actors have different capabilities. They have different interests: economic, security, theological, ideological. They do not share the same understanding of the rules of the game. Norms are never taken for granted: they are never so deeply embedded that people act on them automatically. There are conflicting norms such as nonintervention versus the responsibility to protect. There is no final authority to adjudicate differences. The environment is technologically dynamic; capabilities and interests can change quickly. In such a complex environment, there is no set of rules, no specific institution that would provide optimal outcomes across all issue areas. China is the great contemporary defender of sovereignty, but it violated the rules of sovereignty to guarantee Hong Kong’s economic vitality. The member states of the EU want full representation in international organizations, including two seats on the Security Council, but they have given up their right to make independent decisions in many issue areas. Given the complexity, conflicting interests, competing norms, and lack of adjudication mechanisms, power and interests, not just rules and norms, will inevitably be important determinants of outcomes in the international system.

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Power and interests may simply result in coercion. One actor uses force or the threat of force to secure its desired outcome. But outcomes may also be the result of voluntary agreements. These agreements must be self-enforcing, and actors must believe that they are better off honoring the agreement than violating it.6 The benefits of an agreement, however, need not be symmetrical. Bargaining power matters.7 Agreements might, or might not, conform to conventional sovereignty. So long as all relevant actors (those actors that could upset an agreement) believe that their interests are better served by violating sovereignty norms rather than honoring them, alternative institutional arrangements can coexist alongside conventional norms. International organization memberships and a separate visa regime for Hong Kong served the interests of China, the Hong Kong business community, Britain, the United States, and other major countries. The EEZ satisfied American commercial and naval needs and gave poorer littoral states unambiguous control over mineral resources. The EU has furthered the security and material interests, and ideational beliefs, of its members better than conventional sovereignty could. Norms are not, however, irrelevant. Sovereignty norms can affect outcomes in two ways. First, they can serve as a focal point. In many situations there are multiple equilibria: that is, a number of different outcomes that all parties might agree upon. A commonly understood set of norms, such as those associated with sovereignty, can focus attention around one outcome rather than another. Second, international norms can be used as a means to build domestic legitimation and support. For instance, national leaders may invoke the norm of nonintervention to drum up national sentiment against an initiative proposed by external actors. Taiwan and the Plasticity of Sovereignty Taiwan has effective domestic and Westphalian/Vattellian sovereignty, and limited international legal sovereignty in the form of recognition from a relatively small number of states. The lack of formal recognition, however, has not prevented other countries from conducting what are, in fact, diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The U.S. Taiwan Relations Act, for instance, essentially creates an

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embassy, the American Institute in Taiwan, without calling it an embassy. The Act states that Taiwan is to be treated in the same way as foreign countries, nation states, and similar entities. Members of the American Foreign Service formally resign when they serve in Taiwan, but then return as regular members of the diplomatic corps when they leave Taiwan. Taiwan has prospered economically. It has withstood pressure from the PRC. Are the current arrangements for Taiwan viable over the long run despite Taiwan’s limited international legal sovereignty? Probably. The economic interests of Taiwan, the PRC, and other countries have been well served by the present arrangements. Taiwan has prospered and has become a major source of investment funds and technical knowledge for Mainland China. Military action against Taiwan would be costly for China not just militarily but economically as well. The use of coercion against Taiwan would be a signal that China is not a reliable partner, and that its peaceful rise was a slogan but not a guide for Chinese foreign policy. If the present status of Taiwan is challenged, it will be because of domestic developments in the PRC, not because the status of Taiwan is inconsistent with conventional sovereignty. Institutional arrangements associated with Taiwan, like the American Institute, are closer to sovereignty norms than those that characterize the EU and Hong Kong, whose situations are regarded as unproblematic. The political leaders of the PRC, however, might challenge the present status of Taiwan because of domestic threats to the stability of the communist regime. One China, sovereignty, and unity have become not just the slogans of the regime but also a well-understood set of beliefs embraced by the population. If there were a domestic crisis in China, its leaders might try to secure domestic political support by pressuring, even militarily threatening or attacking, Taiwan.8 Absent such domestic developments on the mainland the PRC will not forcibly challenge the status quo. This does not mean that the status of Taiwan will remain unchanged. It is possible to imagine a number of different outcomes that would satisfy both Taiwan and the PRC. China might accept Taiwan as an independent state and end its policy of blocking greater international legal sovereignty for the island. Taiwan might become fully incorporated into China, its international legal and Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty extinguished. Both would

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be consistent with conventional sovereignty norms. Taiwan might become in some sense a formal part of China but maintain the right to negotiate not only visa and trade agreements (as is the case for Hong Kong) but also security arrangements with external actors. Other arrangements, some that we might find difficult to imagine now, are also possible. The viability of any arrangement would depend not on the extent to which it conformed to conventional sovereignty but rather on whether it satisfied the material and political interests of Taiwan and China. Notes 1. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003. 2. The concepts are Cooper’s. The count of states in each category is my own. 3. Nisha Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 4. Charles Tilly. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990. 5. David A. Lake. Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009. 6. The classic statement of this neoliberal institutional argument is Robert Koehane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 7. For discussions of asymmetrical bargaining power, see Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 43: 336–66 and Lloyd L. Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 8. See Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: Norton, 2000, for a discussion of the relationship between domestic pressures and aggressive foreign policy.

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Contributors

Jean-Pierre Cabestan is Head & Professor in the Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University. Jaw-ling Joanne Chang is a Research Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. Tom Chou is a graduate student studying law at the National University of Singapore. Richard W. Hu is a Professor in the Department of Politics & Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong. David W. F. Huang is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. Stephen Krasner is a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. Cheng-yi Lin is a Research Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. Yoshifumi Nakai is a Professor in the Department of Political Studies at Gakushuin University. Michael Pillsbury is a consultant to the U.S. Department of Defense. Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu. John J. Tkacik, Jr. is a retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer who was formerly a Senior Research Fellow with the Heritage Foundation. Jaushieh Joseph Wu is a Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University. He previously served as the Deputy Secretary-General to the President of Taiwan, Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, and Taiwan Representative to the United States.

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Introduction Cheng-yi Lin and Tom Chou

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elations across the Taiwan Strait were unstable for decades prior to May 2009. Several acknowledged “crises” raised the possibility of war between China and the United States and/ or Taiwan, and at times political disputes wracked the U.S.Taiwan relationship as well. Nevertheless, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 helped maintain peace by deterring coercive actions by China against the island. With the improvement of cross-Strait relations that accompanied the ascension of the Ma Ying-jeou administration to power in Taipei, Taiwan and China have moved swiftly to deepen their economic integration. The continuation of the familiar U.S. role of acting as a protector to Taiwan, always stridently opposed by Beijing, has come under new doubts. The Institute of European and American Studies of Academia Sinica in Taiwan has conducted surveys of public opinion on Taiwan of Taiwan-U.S.-China relations since 1979 and held conferences in 1989 and 1999 commemorating anniversaries of the TRA. In March 2009, the Institute held another conference designed to reevaluate and gauge the prospects of the TRA. The conference featured ten papers and a keynote address by Stanford University Professor Stephen Krasner, a leading authority on sovereignty, which is critical to the debate surrounding the Taiwan issue. This book is based on the papers delivered and discussed at that conference.

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CHENG-YI LIN AND TOM CHOU

Taiwan Referenda and China’s Anti-Secession Law In Chapter 2, Jean-Pierre Cabestan, a professor from Hong Kong Baptist University, believes that several factors have directly shaped the outlook of Taiwan-U.S. and Taiwan-China relations and indirectly influenced China-U.S. relations: the fragile international status of the Republic of China, Taiwan’s democratization and the consolidation of Taiwanese identity, Taiwan’s growing economic interdependence and human contacts with China, and the rapid modernization of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Democracy and Taiwanese identity constitute guarantees against absorption of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), whether peaceful or violent. However, Taiwan’s growing interdependence with China and its partial integration into the PRC’s economic supply chain as well as its weakening defense have directly contributed to the changing of the mindset of Taiwanese toward their closest neighbor and major partner. From Cabestan’s viewpoint, although Taiwan’s democratization has moved Taiwan society away from mainland China, other factors have had an opposite effect. These contradictory trends have both fed political polarization on the island and constrained the main political forces’ approach to Taiwan’s relations with the United States. This paradoxical situation also impacts China-U.S. relations, particularly these two great powers’ exchanges and understanding regarding Taiwan. Cabestan further argues that Taiwan’s growing economic interdependence and human interactions with China have gradually changed the Taiwanese views about the PRC. This trend has developed simultaneously with democratization and carries far-reaching consequences for Taiwan, the United States, and China. The newly enhanced cross-Strait interdependence has increased the need for the Taiwanese government to stabilize its channels of communication and gradually “normalize” its relations with China. On the other hand, it has partly reduced the hostility of Taiwanese toward the PRC as well as Taiwan’s will to invest in defense against the possibility of an armed conflict against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In other words, interdependence has increased China’s influence over Taiwan’s elections and has narrowed Taiwan’s political choices. The changing reality is already forcing the United States to reassess its own strategy. For the United States, a neutralization of Taiwan and a

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co-management of the Taiwan issue with the PRC may not be unacceptably disadvantageous for the United States. Cabestan concludes that it also increases the chances of seeing Taiwan reunified with the Chinese mainland if and when China democratizes. In Chapter 3, John Tkacik, a former State Department official and research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, argues that Beijing’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law (ASL) marked the end of the tacit understanding that Washington and Beijing had shared since December 16, 1978. Beijing pretended to pursue a policy of peaceful unification, while Washington pretended to pursue a one-China policy. More importantly, the ASL was designed to counter American claims of a “statutory obligation” to defend Taiwan under the TRA. China needed to impress upon the United States that Taiwan was a matter of existential urgency to Beijing—an issue over which China was fully prepared to go to war, even nuclear war, if necessary. Tkacik observes that the Chinese top leadership dropped the term “unification law” in favor of “anti-national split law” because, both for propaganda as well as doctrinal purposes, a law against “cleaving the nation asunder” is rhetorically more urgent and compelling than one that “promotes unification.” In Tkacik’s view, the ASL achieved the following Chinese objectives: strengthening China’s legal claim to the right to use military force against Taiwan; forcing Washington to choose between China and Taiwan and thereby weakening the American commitment to Taiwan; and convincing the people of Taiwan that in the absence of any other guarantor of their security and freedom, they have no alternative to ultimate unification with China. China’s Perspective on the TRA and the Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait In Chapter 4, Richard W. Hu, a professor at the University of Hong Kong, argues that China has painfully learned how to live with the TRA. Beijing’s objection to the TRA is based on three arguments. First, Beijing says the normalized relationship between China and the United States is solely based on the three international agreements between the two countries, and the TRA has no role to play in stipulating the state-to-state relationship. Second, the TRA intervenes in China’s domestic affairs. Third, in the three joint

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communiqués, the United States recognized that there is only one China, that Taiwan is part of China, and that the government of the PRC is the sole legal government of China, so the Taiwan problem is China’s internal affair. After the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, however, Hu argues that Beijing has become more flexible. Enlisting U.S. support on the Taiwan issue was a 180 degree reversal of China’s earlier policy of treating Taiwan as an internal affair. Chinese leaders understand they cannot expect American support for China’s reunification, but believe it is in the common interest for both countries to prevent Taiwan from becoming de jure independent. In addition, to counter Taiwan’s independence tendency and foreign interference, China crafted its ASL to justify the right to use any nonpeaceful or military means against Taiwan’s secession from China. Washington increasingly recognizes the importance of the rising China in the Asia Pacific as well as on the global stage. The two sides have become more comfortable and confident with each other in managing contingencies across the Strait, says Hu. In Chapter 5, Cheng-yi Lin, a research fellow at Academia Sinica, argues that the Kuomintang (KMT), the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP), the United States, and the PRC have different interpretations of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The latter two parties, however, have avoided specifying the contents of the status quo. For KMT supporters, “status quo” means that Taiwan is a part of the Republic of China (ROC), which was established in 1912. To those who support Taiwan independence, “status quo” means that Taiwan is an independent sovereign state because it fulfills all of the criteria for statehood set by the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. For Hu Jintao, the status quo in the Taiwan Strait may mean that China and Taiwan are not yet unified. Beijing often avoids the term of divided nations to describe the present reality in the Taiwan Strait and rejects the application of formulas regulating the divided Germany before 1990 or the present Koreas to the settlement of disputes between Taiwan and China. Hu changed Beijing’s remarks such as “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China” into a more flexible tone such as “both Taiwan and the Mainland belong to one China.” Beijing labeled the defensive referendum and the new constitution in Taiwan as symbols of Taiwan independence and as attempts to unilaterally change the status quo. Beijing

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is concerned that a direct democracy in Taiwan through an islandwide referendum might further separate a democratic Taiwan from an authoritarian China. The United States’ position toward Taiwan’s legal status has changed several times in history, from the Korean War in 1950 to the normalization with the PRC in 1979. Washington’s Taiwan policy is also evolving with the changes in the U.S.-China power equation. The United States, however, has not legally recognized China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. Arguably, when the George W. Bush administration showed displeasure with Taipei’s move to conduct referenda, this attitude may have contradicted America’s long-standing endorsement of the universality of human rights and democracy. The TRA stipulates that “the preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.” Maintaining the status quo is a difficult task. The emergence of Taiwanese nationalism encourages the Taiwanese people to take a new look at Taiwan’s relations with China, and a rising China has increased Beijing’s capacity to force Taiwan to accept its terms either by carrot or by stick. The question that the United States faces now is, assuming that a creeping independence is a step toward changing the status quo, whether or not Taiwan’s possible unification with China also poses a challenge for future decisions in the region. Taiwan’s Economic Initiative and the Balancer Role of the United States In Chapter 6, David W. F. Huang, an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica, found that since 2002, despite persistent lobbying efforts from Taiwan to promote a U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the U.S. government continues to insist that Taiwan should liberalize its economy under the “Trade and Investment Framework Agreement” (TIFA). From the U.S. perspective, TIFA offers a “building block” for the future U.S.-Taiwan FTA. Under TIFA, the United States suggests that both should complete negotiations on a bilateral government procurement agreement, a bilateral investment agreement, and an avoidance of double taxation agreement, so as to pave the way for the eventual U.S.-Taiwan FTA.

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Since 1979, when the U.S. derecognized the ROC government on Taiwan, there have been more than 140 “agreements, memorandums, or exchange letters” signed between the U.S. and Taiwan governments. Almost all of these agreements are regarded by the U.S. government as executive agreements and hence do not refer to the Congress for ratification or implementing legislation. Therefore, there is a pre-inclination to believe that a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA would also fall into the category of a U.S. executive agreement, hence waiving congressional approval. While the economic impact of a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA is much debated, little attention has been paid to discerning key institutional players in U.S. trade policy formation, much less to understanding how these agenda setters, procedural actors, and veto players interact to shape FTA-related policies in the United States. Huang argues that the safest way for the president or the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to initiate or engage an FTA negotiation with Taiwan is to seek ex ante authorization from the Congress (such as “fast track” authorization), so as to avoid political and legal controversy. In Chapter 7, Jaushieh Joseph Wu, a research fellow at National Chengchi University and former Taiwan representative to the United States, argues that the U.S. ability to deal with the changing crossStrait environment is also restrained by two important factors. On one hand, Taiwan has to go through a democratic election cycle. On the other hand, China has a new leadership asserting more international influence at the time when the United States is occupied with international crises. It is increasingly difficult, however, for the United States to maintain its balancing act between Taiwan and China. With the United States engaging in two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a global financial crisis, Washington realizes that it must work with Beijing because of China’s growing international influence, even if China was a source of problems in the first place or cannot really deliver the solution that the United States wants. As a result, the ability of the United States to maintain a balance in the Taiwan Strait is constrained, especially after the September 11 terrorist attack. On one hand, some issues raised about Taiwan’s domestic electoral purposes became a direct challenge to China’s objectives to incorporate Taiwan and subsequently affected the United States interest at a troublesome time. On the other hand, China has also

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become more influential economically, militarily, and politically. The Chinese government under the leadership of Hu has been particularly skillful in maneuvering through different circumstances and turning them to China’s benefit. Wu concludes that under these circumstances, Taiwan needs to consider the possibility of a U.S. review of its policy toward Taiwan and that the United States no longer needs to serve as a balancer in cross-Strait interactions. The New U.S. Administration and Its Taiwan/China Policy In Chapter 8, Denny Roy, a senior research fellow at the East-West Center, argues that there is an OHuMa Triangle, referring to the relationship between the Hu Jintao, Barack Obama, and Ma YingJeou governments. The relationship between any two members is strongly influenced by their respective relationships with the third member. Therefore, a major change in any one member has the potential to change not only its own relationship with the two others, but also the relationship between the two others themselves. Roy first examines four new major circumstances. They are the relatively China-friendly approach of the Ma Ying-jeou government, the balanced policy of the Obama administration in Washington, the new level of prestige and influence attained by a rising China, and the global financial crisis. These new developments are the most significant since the DPP lost the ROC presidency in 2008. Roy believes the Ma government’s stronger economic and social links are in accord with Beijing’s long-term strategy for softening up Taiwan for reincorporation. The relative rise of China will bring correspondingly rising pressure on other governments to withhold both diplomatic and material support for Taiwan, leaving the United States increasingly isolated as a potential defender of Taiwan. Coupled with the enhancement of PLA capabilities, not only is the Chinese military threat to Taiwan becoming more credible, but also the costs to the United States of antagonizing China are growing. Since the height of the Cold War, the United States has moved from being a formal ally of Taiwan to an informal ally to a more equidistant position between Taiwan and China. Roy concludes that in terms of the overall environment, great power politics are aligning in ways unfavorable to Taiwan’s continued autonomy vis-à-vis China. Nevertheless, China’s hopes and plans for a peaceful and gradual

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absorption of Taiwan may yet face a powerful backlash from the Taiwanese. What is fairly certain is that the triangle has shifted. In Chapter 9, Jaw-ling Joanne Chang of Academia Sinica gives a detailed analysis of Taiwan’s quest for participation in the World Health Assembly (WHA) and the U.S. role in supporting this crusade. Each year since 1997, Taiwan’s diplomatic allies submitted a proposal for inclusion of a supplementary agenda item to invite the Republic of China (Taiwan) to participate as an observer in the WHA. However, up to 2009 the PRC had remained strongly opposed, with the result that the WHA’s General Committee annually rejected Taiwan’s proposed inclusion. The United States played an important role in shaping Taiwan’s efforts to be a WHA observer. The U.S. Congress had been the main propelling force in pressuring the administration to help Taiwan in obtaining observer status in the WHA. In 2002, the United States, publicly supporting Taiwan’s cause, had spillover influence on Japan, Canada, and the European Parliament, which also began to pass various resolutions to support Taiwan’s bid for WHA observer status. Additionally, from 2000 to 2008, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government formed a coalition with the United States to pressure the PRC on the issue of Taiwan’s observer status in the WHA. The inclusion of Taiwan to the International Health Regulations (IHR) system in 2009 was a result of joint efforts made by both the KMT and DPP governments since 1997. China still claims, however, that it maintains sovereignty over Taiwan because a secret memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Beijing and the WHO secretariat remains intact, and Taiwan’s accession to the WHA is also subject to an annual review process determined by Beijing. The Rise of China and Its Challenge for Taiwan, Japan, and the United States In Chapter 10, Yoshifumi Nakai, a professor at Gakushuin University (Japan), examines the implications of changes in three areas for Japan: diplomacy, development, and defense. The Japanese government has taken constructive steps to improve its relations with China since Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi left office. While Japan and China were busy with the restoration of their relations,

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the United States and China were also engaging in their strategic and economic dialogues. Nakai observes that Japanese business circles welcomed President Ma and his pro-business stance. More specifically, Ma’s advocacy of cross-Strait economic integration would greatly reduce cross-Strait political tension, a policy conducive to Japan’s economic trade with both Taiwan and China. The Japanese government, however, had its concerns. Ma’s anti-Japan posture in the past was the main source of anxiety, as Japan is aware that Ma was the leader of the “Recover Tiaoyutai (Senkaku)” movement in Taiwan. To ally Japan’s fear, Ma constantly assures groups of Japanese visitors that he will seek to become a “Zhi-Ripai (those who know Japan well)” and that his government is pursuing a special partnership with Japan. Japan’s view about the Chinese economy began to shift beginning with the so-called poisoned dumplings incident in Japan and the deaths of Chinese babies from contaminated powder milk, both of which happened in 2008. Nakai argues that these harmful products disclosed the problems of Chinese governance. More importantly, China’s huge foreign reserves are a liability rather than an asset for further growth. In the dimension of national defense, China has established maritime dominance in areas of disputed territory, such as the Paracels and the Spratlys in the South China Sea. Undeniably, Chinese naval activities in the East China Sea, near the Senkakus, are increasing. China is increasing its military capability rather rapidly, but this development is not an imminent military threat to Japan. Additionally, Japan believes that China is likely to pursue a peaceful approach toward Taiwan. China is not rushing toward unification, and since the DPP is no longer in power, China is comfortable about current cross-Strait relations. Nevertheless, Nakai is concerned that when China has attained the necessary military might, Beijing’s leaders may aspire to forcefully take over the disputed territories in the East China Sea and attack Taiwan and Okinawa. Japan will place emphasis on diplomatic tools in its foreign policy as this softens the shock of drastic change. With President Obama emphasizing cooperation and engagement in Asia, his policy is compatible with Japan’s overall direction. In Chapter 11, Michael Pillsbury, a Pentagon consultant, notes that the PRC’s rapid military modernization of its military decreases the effect of any deterrent against Beijing’s use of force toward Taiwan.

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With Taiwan’s decreasing popular concern for military matters and shrinking defense budget over the past decade, its ability to defend itself has substantially diminished. Pillsbury argues that if Taiwan’s abilities to defend itself are not significantly improved, the probability of U.S. military intervention in the strait will continue to grow since it stands as the sole explicit military ally of Taiwan. There is the additional possibility that following these trends, Taiwan will experience a deepening sense of isolation and eventually resign itself to absorption by China. The best chance of avoiding this outcome requires that the United States and Taiwan harmonize their strategies aimed at enhancing Taiwan’s defenses. Pillsbury cited the ongoing debate over the question of selling U.S. F-16 C/D aircraft to Taiwan as the most sensitive cross-Strait security issue that the United States faces under the Obama administration. If China increased spending to the same level that the United States maintained for decades during the Cold War (8 percent of GDP), and if U.S. defense spending remained steady as a percentage of GDP, China would spend an amount equal to roughly half of America’s outlays for defense. The U.S. Defense Department is worried that the PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan (invasion of Pratas, the Penghu Islands, or Itu Aba) if tensions in the Taiwan Strait reemerge. Pillsbury concludes by giving eight factors that could deter Beijing from military action if Beijing believes that the United States will intervene and if Taiwan invests sufficiently to harden its critical infrastructure and strengthen its defensive capabilities. Conclusion The TRA has been successful in its first 30 years, but this does not mean that it will be free from challenges in the next decade. The rise of China and the improvement of cross-Strait relations have created a different security environment and new kinds of challenges for policy makers in Taipei and Washington. China’s increasing strength and Beijing’s increasing ability to direct cross-Strait relations, in turn, translate to U.S. diminishing influence over the situation in the Taiwan Strait. China’s growing strength is making it increasingly complicated for the United States and Taiwan to maintain their joint strategic view and will call into question the

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United States’ ability to serve as guarantor of Taiwan’s security in the future. The United States and Taiwan are ignoring the importance of joint efforts to tackle the rise of China and the increasing crossStrait imbalance, as they compete to improve relations with China. President Ma Ying-jeou needs U.S. backing as he forges a closer relationship with China. Ironically, the United States sees fewer roles that it could play in a cross-Strait peace negotiation than in a Taiwan Strait crisis. Taiwan’s relationship with the United States waned as the political parties delayed the arms procurement process. President Ma has deliberately assured the United States of a surprise-free relationship and strives to rebuild trust between Taipei and Washington. However, President George W. Bush stepped down without giving a green light to Taiwan’s request for F-16 C/ Ds, and his successor maintained the same position. The F-16 C/ Ds’ sale would be a highly meaningful symbol of commitment in U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation. It is almost impossible for Taiwan to maintain a military balance in every category with the Chinese PLA. Moreover, declining legitimate requests by Taiwan would run counter to the spirit of the TRA. Taiwan’s campaign for participation in the United Nations (UN) specialized agencies continues regardless of who is the president. Taiwan is more flexible in its capacities when seeking membership in certain intergovermental organizations (IGOs), but this does not mean that China has ceased interfering with Taiwan’s international activities. As Ma Ying-jeou came to power in May 2008, his government has toned down the diplomatic competition with Beijing and is more willing to accept the name Chinese Taipei in joining the WHA as an observer. Diplomatic truce is a major tenet of the KMT’s policy. If successful, it will consist of an integrated plan; if not, it will be makeshift and temporary. The cross-Strait relationship is experiencing its most rapid and dramatic improvement in 60 years. Cross-Strait political, economic, military, and psychological imbalances are increasing, and this development creates a series of challenges to U.S. policy making. The general view in the United States is that the Taiwanese government is relaxing its political tension with China, but the new policy is not risk free. The question is whether, and how, the U.S. government can adjust itself to some unprecedented developments in cross-Strait

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relations, such as a cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) or a China-Taiwan peace agreement. In addition to relaxing the cross-Strait economic and political relationship, Beijing will seek to eliminate any possibility of a U.S. role in the establishment of a cross-Strait peace agreement. Beijing consistently urges Washington to discontinue its arms sales to Taiwan, but China has been silent about the proposal of U.S.-China comanagement of the Taiwan issue since May 2008. Implications of a possible cross-Strait peace agreement for the continued validity of the TRA could become a policy challenge for the United States. Therefore, some experts want the U.S. government to craft a new policy, or at least conduct a policy review and develop a response plan. This could potentially give the TRA a new meaning and a new function in the years ahead.

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Taiwan’s Political Development and U.S.-China Relations Jean-Pierre Cabestan

T

he objective of this chapter is to analyze and assess the Taiwanese domestic factors impacting Taiwan-U.S. and ChinaU.S. relations. In the case of Taiwan, it is nearly impossible to isolate domestic and international factors. Taiwan is an open society and economy, the survival of which as an independent polity has been guaranteed by the United States of America. Taiwan’s uncertain diplomatic status, as well as its peculiar relations with China, blurs the lines between the inside and the outside. Domestic factors are heavily influenced by this reality. Taiwanese domestic factors impact more directly on Taiwan-U.S. relations—and Taiwan-China relations—than on China-U.S. relations. In these latter relations, Taiwan is just one item—one “issue” Beijing would argue—among many, and both sides have tried hard to isolate it as much as possible from other items. While many trends or forces originating from Taiwan can influence these relations, I will focus on the domestic factors intermediated by political development. I refer to political development as “the development of the institutions, attitudes, and values that form the political power system of a society.”1 Among the many factors that have influenced these relations, four have probably had the largest impact: (1) the incomplete and fragile international status of the Republic of China (ROC), Taiwan’s official name; (2) Taiwan’s democratization and the consolidation of

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Taiwanese identity; (3) the weakening of Taiwanese hostility toward China and Taipei’s need to stabilize/normalize its relations with Beijing, a result of Taiwan’s growing economic interdependence and human contacts with China, as well as Taiwan economic vulnerabilities; and (4) because of the rapid modernization of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) but also owing to this growing interaction across Taiwan: Taiwan’s increasing difficulties not only to keep a military balance and a credible defense in the Strait but also to maintain its will to fight. In other words, while democratization has moved Taiwan away from Mainland China, other factors have had an opposite effect and have contrarily increased China’s influence over Taiwan. These contradictory trends have both fed political polarization on the island and constrained the main political forces’ approach toward Taiwan’s relations with the United States. This paradoxical situation also impacts China-U.S. relations, and more specifically these two great powers’ exchanges about and understanding of Taiwan. The ROC’s Incomplete and Fragile International Status At first glance, the ROC’s incomplete and fragile diplomatic status seems more an international than a domestic reality. However, every student of Taiwanese politics knows well that this issue has always occupied a large space in the island’s political debates, even before democratization, when the Chiang family dominated the ROC political system, and has constantly complicated Taiwan-U.S. relations. Chiang Kai-shek’s stubborn ambition to continue to represent the whole Chinese nation for more than two decades after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and his recurrent intention to reconquer the Chinese mainland (at least until the late 1960s) triggered many debates both within the Kuomintang (KMT), then the dominant political party in society, leading some opposition politicians such as Peng Ming-min as early as 1964 to advocate a “two-China policy” and let the PRC join the United Nations (UN). Debates intensified after the ROC had been expelled from the UN in 1971. While Chiang’s rigidity and dreams could not be openly challenged toward Taiwan, they repeatedly soured ROCU.S. relations. Since 1950, the United States has decided to freeze the situation in the Taiwan Strait, bringing only logistic support

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to the ROC military at the time of the Quemoy Crisis (1958). And far from supporting any military adventure against the mainland that the 1954 ROC-U.S. security treaty did not permit anyway, in the mid-1960s, the United States gradually moved toward a “twoChina policy.” However, having been unable to convince Chiang to embark upon such a fundamental change, in 1972, the United States drew the well-known conclusion in Shanghai: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. The United States’ normalization with the PRC and derecognition of Taiwan in late 1978, as well as the ROC’s growing international isolation, triggered not only strong anti-American feelings on the island but increased the domestic political pressure on the KMT government, both to modify its defense and foreign policy principles and to democratize. On both fronts, political debates and tensions deepened, strengthening the pro-independence cause among opposition politicians (dangwai) and sometimes negatively affecting ROC-U.S. relations. In order to reassure the “Taiwanese people,” in particular about their future security, the U.S. Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in April 1979. However, this was not perceived as enough by Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son, who reactivated a nuclear weapons program that had already been launched and then was abandoned under U.S. pressure in the 1970s (1974–1977). This decision provoked discreet but genuine tensions between Taipei and Washington until the latter forced the former in late 1987 to put a final end to the program.2 In the same period of time, the Kaohsiung incident in December 1979 and the 1984 murder of dissident writer Henry Liu, on American soil, by some elements in the KMT government because he had published an unauthorized biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, intensified U.S. pressure on Taiwan to democratize. Democratization These developments also deepened the divisions within the KMT and, in 1986–1987, convinced Chiang Jr. to ignore the opposition of most of his party’s leadership and allow both a transition toward

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democracy and a policy of careful opening to Mainland China. Taiwan’s rapidly growing diplomatic isolation and uncertain international status (in 1979, only 22 countries had official links with Taiwan) played an important role in these decisions. In other words, supported by the newly formed Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the main opposition and independence-leaning grouping, democratization and détente with the PRC were then perceived by most Taiwanese as the best way to improve the ROC’s international status. However, when martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwan was already divided about this later objective. While the KMT was contemplating a de facto “two-China policy” (one China, two governments) leading toward unification in a distant future, some influential DPP leaders started to push for a “one China, one Taiwan solution,” which they then hoped the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could accept. But the Taiwanese government’s expectations, not to mention the DPP’s, were shared neither by the PRC nor by the rest of the world, including Washington in the United States and other capitals: the “one-China policy” had been well established before Taiwan’s democratization. And no matter how welcome and fundamental this political change was, it was then not understood by third countries as a threat to this policy (or the 1972 Shanghai communiqué mentioned above). This unbridgeable but inescapable divergence should be kept in mind because it has regularly soured Taiwan-U.S. relations (also as Taiwan’s relations with every country that has normalized with Beijing). In other words, Taiwan’s democratization has created unexpected and often underestimated challenges for the United States, as well as for China-U.S. relations. The geographic and political, if not legal, identification between the ROC and Taiwan has fed a well-known assertion of Taiwanese consciousness and identity. It has led the Taiwanese government to establish in 1991 a nonofficial channel of communication with the PRC (the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF); later the same year, Beijing created the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)). It has also led to an endorsement of the DPP’s 1993 call for Taiwan to reenter the UN. At that time, Taipei was hoping to be able both to gradually “normalize” with Beijing (SEF-ARATS agreements; Singapore, 1993) and develop a pragmatic diplomacy, not only with its neighbors but with

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its major partners, including of course the United States. Although the Clinton administration reviewed the United States’ nonofficial relations with Taiwan in 1994, Clinton initially refused to grant President Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit the United States. Under the U.S. Congress’s pressure, the American government changed its position, letting Lee make a private visit to the United States in 1995. In any case, the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait, which enfolded in the aftermath of this visit, put an end to this double strategy and convinced Lee to privilege Taiwanization over détente with the PRC. While Lee’s own inclinations help us to understand these new priorities, the growing influence of the DPP, as well as the deepening interactions between China and the United States regarding Taiwan, also persuaded him to move in that direction. Nevertheless, until the end of his second term, Lee remained more cautious than many analysts realize. For one thing, Lee resumed nonofficial SEF-ARATS talks with the PRC in 1998–1999. And it was only when Beijing insisted on starting “political discussions” that he backed off and made public, in July 1999, his so-called “two states theory” (liangguolun), a statement that put an end, again, to these talks. And in this interview with the Deutsche Welle, he not only referred to ROC-PRC relations as “special state-to-state relations” but also called—for the first time—for a gradual “political integration” (zhengzhi tonghe) across the Taiwan Strait, an idea that would be reactivated less than two years later by his successor Chen Shui-bian on December 31, 2000. In spite of the Clinton administration’s negative reaction, Lee never really questioned the KMT’s “one-China principle,” according to which there is one China, which is the ROC. We remember how strongly Su Chi, then chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, reasserted that principle after Lee’s July 1999 interview. In addition, Lee did not revise the related articles of the ROC constitution nor did he recognize the PRC. Chen Shui-bian’s rather unexpected electoral victory in 2000 further complicated Taiwan-U.S. relations. I will not mention here the multiple irritants (the strongest one was the March 2004 referendum) that marred the relations between the DPP government and the best-disposed U.S. administration ever toward Taiwan. However, a number of obstacles, many of them stemming from Taiwan’s democratization, forbade Chen from destabilizing the ROC’s constitutional

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order and ambiguous international status. True, the “five no’s” that he endorsed in his inauguration speech were closely negotiated with the United States, and indirectly with China. But the KMT’s reevaluation of the verbal compromise reached by the SEF and the ARATS in 1992, now called the “ ‘92 consensus” (jiu’er gongshi), the DPP’s inability to win a majority in the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s parliament) in 2001 and in 2004, and the KMT’s own initiatives vis-à-vis China (charter flights in 2003, Lien Chan’s visit in 2005) compelled Chen to remain in the ROC framework. Although Chen never recognized the “ ‘92 consensus” (and the DPP still does not recognize it), in 2006, he agreed to resume talks with China on the basis of the “spirit of the 92 meeting” (jiu’er jingshen); he was unable to alter the one-China principle enshrined in the ROC constitution and operated with the mainland within the “statute on relations between the peoples of both sides of the Taiwan Strait” (li’an an renmin guanxi tiaoli) that considers the “mainland” and “Taiwan” as two “areas” (diqu) of the ROC. Moreover, in spite of the DPP’s strong and “voluntarist” campaign of Taiwanization, the island society has remained divided about its identity. While more than half of the Taiwanese perceive themselves as Taiwanese, about 40 percent continue to hold a dual and more complex identity: both Taiwanese and Chinese.3 It is fair to conclude from these important evolutions but also lingering differences that most ROC citizens identify the ROC with Taiwan and see themselves as politically Taiwanese while they have kept partial identification with the Chinese culture. Having said that, democratization has strengthened the ROC’s identification with Taiwan and what I personally call Taiwan’s “sovereignist consensus.” This consensus includes the following ideas: (1) the Taiwanese do not identify at all with the PRC and can neither accept Beijing’s sovereignty claim over their island nor its “one country, two systems” formula; (2) the ROC-Taiwan is already an independent nation-state; (3) because of history and PRC claims, the ROC-Taiwan is forced to keep a special bond and develop a “special relationship” with Mainland China; (4) however, the special arrangements concluded with the PRC, such as the “ ‘92 consensus,” do not and cannot weaken the sovereignty of the ROC-Taiwan but rather are merely a legal fig leaf allowing discussions and negotiations with the PRC while also underscoring the unbridgeable gap between the legal definition (or boundaries) and the political

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definition (or boundaries) of the ROC. In other words, the ROCTaiwan wishes to become a normal nation-state. It may of course be argued that this consensus remains often dormant or even a “consensus by default” that can easily be questioned by political forces that emphasize the ROC dimension of the island’s political sovereignty and long-term unification with the mainland (KMT and pan-blue camp) or, conversely, its Taiwanese dimension and eventual de jure independence (DPP and pan-green camp). Nevertheless, since neither unification nor de jure independence are understood to be credible options by the majority of the Taiwanese and their elites, the content of this consensus remains widely identical and accepted. Taiwan’s democratization, more generally, has forced not only the United States but also China to acknowledge that any solution or political agreement between Beijing and Taipei would have to be approved by the majority of the Taiwanese. Any Taiwan-China agreement, whatever its content (end of hostility, peace, unification), negotiated at the top and without consulting the Taiwanese, as could still be contemplated at the end of the 1980s by the CCP and some segments of the KMT, is today inconceivable. In other words, the 23 million Taiwanese enjoy, in theory, the same power to approve an accord across the Taiwan Strait as do the 1.3 billion Chinese. The Chinese leadership has become pretty much aware of this reality and has embarked, under Hu Jintao, on a new strategy aimed at “winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese” and privileging “peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait (liang’an heping fazhan)” and no longer “peaceful reunification,” which is now considered a long-term objective. And Taiwan’s growing interdependence with the PRC allows the latter to influence every day more strongly the former. Will Hu succeed? Domestic Consequences of Taiwan’s Growing Interdependence with China Taiwan’s growing economic interdependence and human interactions with China cannot but gradually modify Taiwanese views about the PRC. This trend has developed simultaneously with democratization and bears far-reaching consequences for Taiwan,

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the United States, and China. These consequences remain hard to evaluate, partly because there are still too few studies about the changing Taiwanese mind-set and partly because we are looking at a moving target, an ongoing reality. It is fair to propose that for the time being, this interdependence has on the one hand increased the need for the Taiwanese government to stabilize its channels of communication and gradually “normalize” (as much as possible) its relations with China. On the other hand, it has partly reduced Taiwanese hostility toward the PRC, as well as their will to invest in defense and, if need be, to fight an armed conflict against the PLA. The difference in political systems between Taiwan and China continues to offer a strong guarantee for the preservation of the status quo in the Strait. Although some dark-blue Taiwanese politicians, such as Lien Chan, deemphasize such differences for the sake of normalization, the KMT and the Taiwanese who are more ready to embrace long-term unification still see the PRC’s authoritarian system as the main obstacle to any kind of political unification. However, the increasing flow of goods, money, and people across the Taiwan Strait has contributed to improving both societies’ crossknowledge and understanding. It has also led many local Taiwanese (Minnanren) visiting China (between one-third and one-half of the island’s population) to better comprehend or even rediscover their cultural Chineseness and, generally, to nuance their Taiwaneseness or to turn it into a political rather than a cultural identity. Cross-Strait interdependence has also intensified the pressure on the Taiwan government not only to reactivate the SEF-ARATS talks but also to develop and stabilize nonofficial relations with the PRC authorities. The KMT’s initiative in 2003, while in opposition to the negotiation and imposition of Chen Shui-bian’s government, the opening of charter flights is a good illustration of such pressures. Lien Chan’s and James Soong’s visits to China two years later are another illustration. As a result, in the 2008 electoral campaign, both candidates—the KMT’s Ma Yingjeou, as well as the DPP’s Hsieh Chang-ting—promised the establishment of regular and direct sea and air links across the Strait. In this move, the pressure of the Taiwanese enterprises that had invested in China, as well as the Taiwan-based foreign business community, played an important role. While Ma’s victory in March 2008 can be attributed to many

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factors, his willingness and capacity to improve relations with the PRC (e. g., his endorsement of the “1992 consensus”) certainly contributed to it. Interdependence has increased China’s influence over Taiwan’s elections and has narrowed Taiwan’s political choices. Although many Taiwanese may be unaware of the implications of the “1992 consensus,” its endorsement by Ma and the KMT government as a precondition and a basis for talks and agreements with China (12 agreements and a more ambitious Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, or ECFA, were concluded by mid-2010) has made more difficult and unlikely any questioning of this “consensus” by future Taiwanese administrations. Hence, the DPP-led mobilization and demonstrations against Chen Yunlin’s visit in November 2008 or subsequent economic accords. Hence also, Ma’s caution and reluctance to start, at least in the coming years, political negotiations. Having said that, the line between economic and political discussions is far from easy to draw: arguably, the negotiation of numerous agreements signed since 2008 has already contributed to consolidating the political status quo and will inevitably constitute a precedent and a template for future political or security negotiations. More generally, interdependence has deepened China’s influence over Taiwan and in particular its political and economic elites, green-leaning as well as blue-leaning. Economic interests and, more recently, recession in Taiwan can only deepen this trend, forcing the DPP to moderate its policies if it wants to enhance its chances to come back to power. The second important consequence of interdependence is related to Taiwan’s security. The PLA’s threat against Taiwan has intensified under Chen Shui-bian and continued to become more formidable since Ma’s election. But the Taiwanese perception of threat has followed an opposite trend. Taiwanese hostility toward the PRC has also diminished, making the risk of war more unlikely for most Taiwanese and, in particular, the young ones.4 Between 2000 and 2008, beyond the sterile partisan fighting about the defense special budget, a lack of actual concern for Taiwan’s armed forces’ modernization and military defense was clearly perceptible not only in society but also among the political elite, be it blue or green. For instance, after having ignored Bush’s arms package for three years,

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in the summer of 2004, the DPP decided to push for the Legislative Yuan’s approval of the special budget en bloc (as a take it or leave it package) while the KMT opposed such a strategy, asking for an itemized discussion and vote on this budget. Had both camps’ politicians been more serious about Taiwan’s security and really felt threatened by China, they would not have given the public and the world such a show of partisan politicking. When in power, the DPP for its part raised the China threat card more to mobilize its core supporters than to address the national security issue, preferring to invest in social programs over defense (the defense budget decreased continuously and by around 40 percent between 1999 and 2008). And while in opposition, the KMT tended to dismiss China’s threat, arguing that as long as Taiwan does not declare independence, there was no risk of war and therefore no need to buy expensive weapons. Ma’s election has forced the KMT to become more realistic and responsible about Taiwan’s defense. During the electoral campaign, Ma presented a “hard ROC” strategy which has apparently marginalized the KMT’s appeasement and pacifist factions. And more recently, in March 2009, the National Defense Ministry has issued a Quadrennial Defense Review that should boost Taiwan’s military expenditure and accelerate the armed forces’ transition toward a professional military. However, in 2009 and 2010, Taiwan’s defense budget has decreased compared to 2008 (US$9.6 billion and 9.3 billion respectively against 10.5 billion) and remained way under Ma’s electoral promise (2.5 percent of the GDP in 2009 against 3 percent). Although these restrictions have been partly caused by the global financial crisis, and offensive weapon programs have not been abandoned, the dark-blue’s influence on security affairs is far from being eliminated, as the debate in 2008–2009 about the adoption of a “porcupine” strategy focused on strengthening the army and building civil defenses, has illustrated.5 More broadly, money allocations and weapons are important, but the human factor remains essential. Arguably, a professional military is better trained to use the sophisticated armaments it has received and more ready to fight in case of war. But the bond with the nation is vital. Can a society that is as interdependent with Mainland China as France is interdependent with Germany provide the moral support necessary for its soldiers to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty and

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de facto independence? At this stage, it is impossible to fully answer this question. Studies have shown that the U.S. support and involvement would be a decisive factor, which is not surprising.6 But it can be said that Taiwan’s political elites are far from being aware of the responsibilities they must shoulder in order to keep the bond between the military and the nation strong and healthy. What impact have these trends had on Taiwan-U.S. relations and China-U.S. relations? International Consequences of Taiwan’s Growing Interdependence with China It is obvious that the U.S. government is happier with Ma than with Chen. At the same time, it is far from certain that the new Taiwanese authorities can address all of the challenges briefly mentioned above. This uncertainty has fed a debate in America both about Taiwan’s future and U.S.-China dialogue and coordination on the Taiwan issue. For one thing, the U.S. political spectrum has almost unanimously applauded the resumption of talks and the détente across the Taiwan Strait. As the AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt indicated in March 2009, “The U.S. government feels comfortable with the direction of cross-Strait relations. . . . A drop of hostility between Taiwan and China is favorable to the U.S.”7 This evolution has indeed contributed to stabilizing the cross-Strait situation, opening the way to a large number of agreements, first in the economic realm and later, hopefully, in the political and security realms. It has also helped in avoiding incidents between Taiwan and China’s armed forces and increased the likelihood of discussions about military Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), first among experts and retired military officers and then officials.8 At the same time, however, the deteriorating military balance in the Strait and China’s growing influence over Taiwan have compelled the United States to reassess its longer-term strategic and political objectives. First, Taiwan’s security is dependent more and more on the United States. As Admiral Dennis Blair, President Barack Obama’s National Intelligence director, bluntly indicated to the U.S. Senate in February 2009: “(China) poses a greater threat to Taiwan. . . . Unless Taiwan does something about it, then we’re really

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the only other country helping them do it. That means that we’re going to have to help them some more in order to maintain a balance. . . . Taiwan should not be so defenseless that it feels it has to do everything that China says. On the other hand, China cannot be so overwhelming that it can bully Taiwan.”9 Maintaining a balance in the Strait is not out of reach for the United States, in particular if it clearly opts for an asymmetrical strategy, but at the same time, the cost of any potential war with another nuclear power is continuously increasing and may rapidly become unbearable. As Robert Sutter, professor at Georgetown University and a long-time American analyst of Asia, has argued, the United States should make some important “policy adjustments” because “the longstanding notion of U.S.-supported balance in the Taiwan Strait was no longer viable in the face of ever-increasing Chinese influence over Taiwan.”10 It is true that other American experts, such as Richard Bush and Alan Romberg, have tried to put this shared concern into perspective, emphasizing the interest of Taiwan (and the United States) in reassuring China.11 And Admiral Blair himself cautioned in February 2009: “Taiwan has to realize that its longterm security lies in some sort of an arrangement with China. It does not lie in military defense.”12 But these comments boil down to the fact that although the United States has for a long time claimed to be “agnostic” about Taiwan’s future, it today enjoys fewer options than before and must also factor in China’s growing influence over Taiwan. The United States is pleased that the de jure independence option is now dead, and détente is taking shape in the Strait. But at the same time, the evolution of the cross-Strait military balance, China’s growing ascendancy over Taiwanese political and economic elites, as well as Taiwan’s lack of determination to defend itself, put Taipei in an increasingly weak position in any future political or security negotiation with Beijing. “Democracy” is presented by Bush and Romberg as Taiwan’s “first and foremost resource” against any disadvantageous deal. Nevertheless, the changing Taiwanese mindset underscores a process not so much of “Finlandization” (for the simple reason that none of the three parties involved would accept such a “solution”) nor of “Hongkongization” (because the ROC is a nation–state), but of what I would be tempted to describe as “accommodation with Taiwanese characteristics.” This process has accelerated since 2005

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and has already affected the DPP, forcing its leadership to also adopt a more realistic and pragmatic mainland policy.13 And in the longer term, this process may lead to an agreed “neutralization” and partial disarmament of Taiwan. Is such an evolution compatible with the TRA? For the time being, the United States may favor adopting a more hands-on policy. Under the DPP government, a partial “co-management” by Beijing and Washington of the Taiwan issue took shape, aimed at keeping the situation in the Strait as stable as possible. Today, the American government can provisionally relax and let both sides of the Strait move forward. But China’s increasing assertiveness (as the intensifying U.S.-China naval competition in the South and East China Seas is demonstrating)14 and Taiwan’s deepening vulnerabilities will probably compel Washington to involve itself to a larger degree in the negotiation, both as a “strategic balancer” and a facilitator/mediator, in particular on security issues and CBMs, in spite of the “six assurances” given to Taiwan in 1982. Conclusion The ROC-Taiwan has since 1949 lived in the shadow of the PRC and, to a large extent, the trends that we have observed, and are observing, appear in retrospect as unavoidable. The ROC-Taiwan’s ambiguous but distinct international status, democracy, and Taiwanese identity constitute defenses against any alignment of Taiwan with the PRC, let alone any involuntary absorption of the former by the latter. And we have good reasons to estimate that, in the foreseeable future, these “assets” (e.g., the existence of an active and strong yet loyal political opposition) will continue to protect Taiwan against the ultimate objective of the PRC’s united front strategy: submission without a fight. But at the same time, Taiwan’s growing interdependence with China and its deepening integration into the PRC’s economic supply chain as well as its weakening defense have directly contributed to changing the mindset of the Taiwanese toward their closest neighbor and major partner. Most Taiwanese want stabilized relations and, if possible, a “normalized peace” with China; as a result, they support a more accommodating policy toward the mainland. Beijing knows this and has put its unification policy on shelf for the time being, astutely privileging “the peaceful

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development of cross-Strait relations.” This allows the PRC to spin its web around Taiwan, weaving as many agreements as possible with a Taiwanese government that abides by the “1992 consensus” (although technically, this “consensus” is never mentioned nor referred to in any of these signed documents). These accords are gradually structuring cross-Strait relations and narrowing options for both Taiwan and the United States as well as for China. This evolution is positive for the United States, but at the same time it allows China to exert more influence over Taiwan, initiating a virtuous circle from Beijing’s point of view and a vicious circle and a true dilemma not only for Taiwan’s pro-independence forces but also for the “sovereignist” majority. This changing reality is already forcing the United States to reassess its own strategy. In the longer run, a neutralization of Taiwan and a co-management of the Taiwan issue with the PRC may not be disadvantageous for the United States, even if it contributes to revising the spirit if not the letter of the TRA and to weakening a bit more Japan’s role in East Asian security. Yet, these are long-term considerations. In the meantime, the current détente in the Strait is likely to remain highly militarized, Taiwan and China will be unable to overcome their sovereignty dispute and even the chances for both sides to open formal political and security talks and to negotiate a peace agreement will remain rather low. In such circumstances, the United States and the TRA will continue to be regarded by most Taiwanese as their island’s best guarantee and strongest rampart against any “unilateral change of the status quo” by the PRC. All in all, China’s increasing assertiveness on the world stage and influence over Taiwan will probably compel the United States to be more involved rather than less involved in cross-Strait relations.

Notes 1. Peter Burnel, http://www.answers.com/topic/political-development. 2. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan’s Security in a Changing International System (Boulder, Co.: Lynn Rienner, 1997): 43. The third Sino-American communiqué of 1982 on the gradual reduction of arms sales to Taiwan also convinced Taiwan to continue this program. 3. Cabestan, Jean-Pierre, “Specificities and Limits of Taiwanese Nationalism.” China Perspectives, 62, November–December 2005: 32–43. Cf. also Cabestan,

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4.

5. 6.

7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

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Jean-Pierre and Le Pesant, Tanguy, L’esprit de défense de Taiwan face à la Chine: la jeunesse Taiwanaise face à la tentation de la Chine (Taiwan’s will to fight. The Taiwanese youth and mainland China’s temptation). Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009. According to Mainland Affairs Council surveys, the PRC’s perceived hostility toward the Taiwanese government has decreased from 80 percent in June 2000 to 43 percent in April 2010; however, in April 2010, 37 percent of Taiwanese see the PRC authorities as “friendly” toward their government against 48% percent in December 2008; cf. www.mac.gov.tw (consulted on July 21, 2010). Cf. also Cabestan and Le Pesant, L’esprit de défense de Taiwan, 2009, op. cit.; Chu, Yun-han & Yang, Philip (eds.), Taiwan minzhong dui Taihai anquan renzhi zhi diaocha (Survey on Taiwan population’s perception of the security in the Taiwan Strait). Taipei: Election Study Center, Chengchi National University, 2004; Niou, Emerson (ed.), 2005 nian liang an guanxi he guojia anquan minyi diaocha, 2005 Taiwan National Security Survey (Duke University Program in Asian Security Studies, 2005). William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review: Summer 2008. Cabestan and Le Pesant, L’esprit de défense de Taiwan, 2009, op. cit.; Shelley Rigger, “When the Going Gets Tough: Measuring Taiwan’s Will to Fight,” American Political Science Association conference, Chicago, Sept. 2, 2004. Taipei Times, Mar. 19, 2009. Glaser, Bonnie and Grosserman, Brad, Promoting Confidence Building across the Taiwan Strait. A Report to the CSIS International Security Program and to Pacific Forum CSIS. Washington, DC: CSIS, September 2008; Bonnie S. Glaser, Building Trust Across the Taiwan Strait. A Role for Military Confidencebuilding Measures. CSIS, Washington, DC, January 2010. South China Morning Post (SCMP), Feb. 14, 2009. Italics added by the author. Sutter, Robert, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States—Policy Adjustments Needed.” PacNet, 17: Mar. 5, 2009. Richard Bush and Alan D. Romberg, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States.” PacNet, 17A: March 13, 2009. SCMP, Feb. 14, 2009. I may have been among the first to have toyed with applying the concept of Finlandization to Taiwan (cf. my book Taiwan—Chine populaire: l’impossible réunification, Paris, Ifri-Dunod, 1995); However, after reading Bruce Gilley’s stimulating but provocative article (“Not so Dire Straits. How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2010) which unexpectedly gives a positive interpretation of Finlandization, I have preferred to stop using it. Obviously, there are too many differences between the Cold War era’s Finland and today’s Taiwan, among them China’s reunification objective, Taiwan’s contested international status, the de facto Taipei-Washington alliance enshrined in the TRA, and the Finns’ strong will as opposed to the Taiwanese’s much more uncertain will to resist aggression. “Taiwanization” would have been a possible

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alternative to Finlandization, if it had not acquired for so long, the exact opposite meaning: a process of identity- and nation-building distinct and more distant from China and Chinese nationalism. Emphasizing the many differences with “Hongkongization,” “accommodation with Taiwanese characteristics” attempts to encapsulate the specificities of Taiwan’s situation: its unique historical trajectory; its questioned yet genuine statehood; its independent military entirely focused on the PLA threat; as well as its proper yet ambiguous identity developed within the ROC framework, a democratic but also Chinese constitutional and cultural environment. 14. Michael D. Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 32, Spring 2010.

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The “ASL” as the “Anti-TRA”: The Impact of China’s Anti-Secession Law on U.S. Relations with Taiwan John J. Tkacik, Jr.

B

eijing’s “Anti-Secession Law”1 (ASL) of March 14, 2005, marked the end of the tacit understanding that Washington and Beijing had shared since December 16, 1978, under which Beijing pretended to pursue a policy of peaceful unification while Washington pretended to pursue a one-China policy. On the fourth anniversary of its promulgation, however, the ASL appears to have achieved its primary goal: to bolster the credibility of China’s threats to go to war over Taiwan and thereby to undermine Washington’s security commitment to Taiwan. The rest of the ASL is essentially superfluous—except as a propaganda exercise—because China’s territorial claim to Taiwan is well embedded in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.2 In fact, ironically, the only part of China that the PRC Constitution declares to be “part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China” is Taiwan—not Beijing, or Tibet or Xinjiang, or downtown Shanghai. Moreover, says the constitution, “It is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.” The idea that Taiwan is part of China’s territory is enumerated in other places as well—in China’s “Law on Territorial Sea,”3 for example. So the idea that there had to be a whole new

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“unification law” to assert China’s right to invade Taiwan is a bit of a stretch.4 The ASL’s primary purpose, it seems, was as an instrument to counter American claims of a “statutory obligation” to defend Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). One might say that the ASL was a case of statute envy: Washington had a “law”; Beijing didn’t, and China’s leaders appear to have believed that the only way to neutralize the American “law” was to counter it with a Chinese “law” that carried a mandate to “unify” Taiwan with the motherland much stronger than the American law’s mandate to “maintain the capacity to defend Taiwan.” The TRA,5 a part of the United States Code since April 10, 1979, required the United States to treat Taiwan as an independent foreign state6 and obliged the U.S. government to supply Taiwan with defensive arms7—presumably in order to maintain Taiwan’s separate status from China.8 American officials, as a matter of policy, consistently reiterated to their Chinese counterparts that, yes, America did have a “oneChina policy”—one that was consonant with the three U.S.-China communiqués and the TRA. The inconvenience of the TRA’s mandates to arm Taiwan and to “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means” to be “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States” seemed to be a cause of embarrassment to Americans. Chinese sensed this uneasiness and uniformly professed skepticism of Americans’ protestations of fealty to the “oneChina” concept—even when articulated by no less authoritative an official as the president of the United States. When meeting Chinese leaders, George W. Bush has on many occasions used the expression “opposed to Taiwan independence” (but the expression “no support for Taiwan independence” is still used in official U.S. statements) . . . However, while declaring “opposition to Taiwan independence,” the Bush administration has actually stepped up its military ties with Taiwan, vigorously elevated political relations with the Taiwan authorities, and put into effect a “twintrack policy” of simultaneously developing relations with Mainland China and with Taiwan, with the result that the Taiwan authorities, feeling secure in the knowledge that they have strong backing, are sliding ever further along the road of “Taiwan independence.”9

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Perhaps to tamp down this undue suspicion, American officials avoided explaining to the Communist Chinese that the United States had a national interest in defending democracies around the globe, and that Taiwan was—unfortunately for smooth U.S.-China relations—one of those democracies.10 Instead, they adopted an annoying habit of pointing to the TRA as one of those “obligations” with which they were saddled (as Bush National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice explained to Australian reporters on October 14, 2003: “we, of course, always remind people that we also have obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to . . . help Taiwan defend itself ” without cautioning that the survival of democracy in Asia was a core American interest).11 So, if indeed the United States could unilaterally assume an “obligation” to perpetuate the separation of Taiwan and China, then it seemed to at least some Chinese scholars that China could benefit by passing its own binding legislation to effectuate unification of China with Taiwan—immediately, if not sooner. Moreover, China needed to impress upon the United States that Taiwan was a matter of existential urgency to Beijing—an issue over which China was fully prepared to go to war—nuclear war, if necessary. From outward appearances, it seems that the Chinese leadership regarded Americans as incredulous about the prospect of war over Taiwan because China—unlike the United States—was not obliged by law to “maintain the capacity” to fight such a war. Hence, a “law” was needed, and it just so happened that a draft of such a law was already in existence. “Statute for the Promotion of National Unification (Draft)” In late 2002, one Chinese professor came up with a “Statute for the Promotion of National Unification (Draft),”12 a lengthy blueprint based loosely on unification ideas that have been floating around China since Ye Jianying’s famous September 30, 1980, elaboration of a framework for unification13 and embellished by Deng Xiaoping’s visions of “One Country Two Systems” with which China embraced Hong Kong and Macao. The Draft’s author was an obscure Wuhan Hanjiang University assistant professor of politics and law, Yu Yuanzhou. Like the American TRA, Professor Yu’s

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Draft purported to provide a legal basis for an important national interest, in this case, for Taiwan and China proper to form a unitary state while maintaining Taiwan’s social, political, economic, and defense structures within a broader Chinese state entity. According to Phoenix Weekly magazine, Professor Yu’s Draft was the fruit of a decade of legal research and the study of China’s evolving policy stance toward Taiwan.14 Professor Yu’s 1992 doctoral dissertation in international law had examined the Taiwan issue, and he had been disappointed that Deng’s strategic concept of “One Country, Two Systems” seemed predicated on “peaceful unification” and lacked a legal framework. Professor Yu’s Draft floated intriguing ideas of a “Chinese Federal Republic” (中華聯邦共和國), perhaps like one envisioned in the 1930s by Mao Zedong,15 or a less-attractive “Taiwan Special Political Region” similar to Deng Xiaoping’s “special administrative region” status for Hong Kong and Macau. But for China’s leadership in Beijing, what captured the imagination in Professor Yu’s 2002 “Unification Law” Draft was its treatment of a “nonpeaceful” unification. Yu, in fact, totally rejects the idea of a “Peaceful Unification Law” that had been circulating in academic circles, saying that that a one-sided “peaceful” unification law would undermine the possibility of resolving Taiwan’s status “peacefully.”16 Yu’s Draft also outlined three conditions under which “unification” would be “nonpeaceful”: (1) if Taiwan were to declare independence or adopt concrete measures leading toward independence, (2) if there was foreign armed interference or aggression against Taiwan, and (3) if it came to a point where the Taiwan authorities adopted a position of delaying or obstructing peaceful unification indefinitely.17 His “nonpeaceful” unification articles got specific enough to stipulate that bombardment of Taiwan “would not be limited to conventional munitions” and that the targets “would not be limited to Quemoy or Matsu.”18 Moreover, the professor’s Draft specified that “national leaders and the Central Military Commission” (國家元首和中央軍事委員會) had no need to consult further with the National People’s Congress should they determine that one of the three casus belli had presented itself. In it, he outlined various currency, finance, investment and aid issues; he suggested ways of handling foreign citizens. He also

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proposed rewards for patriotic Chinese on both sides of the Strait who contributed to unification. But he believed that Taiwan independence advocates and those who sought to “de-Sinify” (去中国 化) Taiwan must be made aware that they were breaking China’s laws and suggests harsh punishment—with a “statute of limitation of 100 years”—for those who continue to resist unification after his proposed law would come into effect. Professor Yu claimed his Draft was enthusiastically received among his colleagues and other interested persons, and that eventually it made its way to the central leadership in Beijing where the idea began to catch on. While most of Professor Yu’s Draft never made it into the final law, several sections did, including the verbiage on “nonpeaceful means” of unifying Taiwan with China. Beijing Embraces “Unification Law” The “legitimacy” of a “unification law”—and hence its authority— presumably comes from the legislative process in the National People’s Congress (NPC), the “highest organ of state power,” according to China’s constitution (although the preamble of the constitution specifies that, in fact, the entire constitution is subservient to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)).19 The NPC supposedly represents the collective will of the Chinese people, and the feelings of 1.3 billion people are not to be trifled with. The invocation of legislative mandates for unification as a propaganda tool was at the core of a new People’s Liberation Army doctrine of “Lawfare”—a component of a “Three Warfares” doctrine that developed in the Chinese military during 2003—which tended to use an opponent’s reverence for “rule of law” against him.20 But oddly enough, the idea for a “unification law” did not generate public debate either in the CCP or in the NPC. Instead, it was a “patriotic” Chinese gentleman in Great Britain who demonstrated that the broad masses of all the Chinese people under heaven were clamoring for such legislation. On May 11, 2004, during a London tea party for visiting Premier Wen Jiabao with Chinese expatriates, a 76-year-old Chinese immigrant, Mr. Shan Sheng, “demanded the Premier pass such a law soon.” To which the premier promptly replied, “Your view on unification of the motherland is very

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important, very important. We will seriously consider it.” Premier Wen’s traveling propaganda entourage saw to it that the premier’s exchange with Mr. Shan Sheng was immediately disseminated to all the Chinese newswires, and the “unification law” was on its way to becoming official policy. No doubt the premier anticipated the Chinese gentleman’s blandishment. On May 9, just two days before, the premier exhorted the Chinese Embassy staff in London that unification “is more important than our lives . . . . I deeply believe that one day Taiwan will return to the embrace of the motherland. This is a historical inevitability that cannot be blocked by any force.” The circumstantial evidence was overwhelming: The CCP had decided to move ahead with a “unification law,” but for reasons of diplomatic cover, wanted it to appear to be responding to the will of the Chinese people—not leading it.21 The Beijing propaganda machine’s efforts to publicize suggestions that China “will consider legislative steps” mandating “eventual reunification” of Taiwan with China was a sure sign that the People’s Republic intended to ratchet up the pressure on both Washington and Taipei. The reaction in Washington was noncommittal. Rather than warn against any change in the Taiwan Strait’s status quo, the State Department spokesman, Ambassador Richard Boucher could only shrug his shoulders: “There is nothing to talk about at this point because I don’t think we’ve seen any particular legislation. Obviously, it will depend on what they say.”22 Within a few days, on May 17, the Chinese probed again to see where Washington stood on its commitment to Taiwan and its independence-minded President Chen Shui-bian, reelected by a razor thin majority in March and poised to give his second inaugural address on May 20. The State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office declared that Taiwan’s leaders must choose between recognizing that Taiwan was part of China or “following their separatist agenda to cut Taiwan from the rest of China and, in the end, meet their own destruction by playing with fire.” Beijing’s English language China Daily challenged Taiwan’s president: “Taiwan’s leaders at crossroads—peace or war.”23 U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage tended to downplay China’s new choice of violent words. In an interview with Voice of America’s (VOA’s) Mandarin Service on May 18, Armitage made calm assurances that he was “quite confident” that Chen wouldn’t

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make any comments in his inaugural speech that would enflame tensions in the Taiwan Strait.”24 Surely, if the Chinese thought that the United States would take a firm stance in support of Taiwan against China’s excessive language, Secretary Armitage’s comments to the VOA were a comfort to Beijing. The only discordant note in the U.S. government reaction to China’s rhetoric was White House Press Spokesman Scott McClellan who asserted on May 19 that “Threats to ‘crush’ Taiwan or drown it in a ‘sea of fire’ have no place in civilized international discourse. And Beijing merely hurts its own case by using them . . . and they necessitate that we firmly restate our intention to fulfill our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.”25 “Unification Law” Becomes “Anti-Secession Law” The overall American reaction, however, was one of caution and general indulgence of Beijing’s fulminations. And it was a reaction that probably led Beijing to continue to push the “Unification Law” envelope. Throughout the balance of 2004, dribs and drabs of news about the “unification law” seeped out of China, giving the impression that there was some caution in scholarly circles about the effect of such a “law” on neighboring countries, or on the Taiwanese. Most of it proved insubstantial. However, there was indeed support for dropping the term “unification law” in favor of “anti-national split law” (反分裂国家法). While several analysts portrayed the change of wording from “unification law” to “anti-secession law” as a moderation of tone,26 it was nothing of the sort. What the Chinese had dubbed in English as an “Anti-Secession Law” was, in Chinese, a law “against splitting asunder the nation”—clearly much more ominous in Chinese. There are, of course, perfectly acceptable translations of the term “secession,” (脱离) for one, which sounds rather anodyne in English, but an “anti-secession law” (反脱离国家法) simply doesn’t sound like it’s dealing with a real problem. In Chinese terms, however, the image of “cleaving asunder” (分裂), the nation implies that the nation is a unitary whole as it is, whereas a “unification law” implies that the nation is already split and needs unity. In dealing with Taiwan, both for propaganda as well as doctrinal purposes, a law against “cleaving the nation asunder”

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is rhetorically more urgent and necessary than one that “promotes unification” (国家統̶促進法). This could account for the relative equanimity with which the non-Chinese speaking world faced the prospect of an “AntiSecession Law” while Chinese speakers in Taiwan were a bit more alarmed by the title. An aide to House International Relations Committee Chairman, Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL) later revealed that Chinese officials briefed Hyde indicating that China chose the words “anti-secession” for its resonance with the U.S. Civil War. The Chinese compared their opposition to Taiwan’s independence with President Lincoln’s decision to fight the U.S. Civil War, a war which the Confederates (the Rebels) at the time called the “War of Secession.”27 It is also very likely that the CCP Central Propaganda Department instructed Chinese interlocutors in Beijing and elsewhere to spin diplomats, scholars, reporters, and other interested foreigners with the “inside scoop” that a move from “Unification Law” to “Anti-Secession Law” was a sign of “moderation.” If so, it worked flawlessly. Another factor that may have played a large part in the progress of the “Unification Law” was CCCP General Secretary Hu Jintao’s ascension to the chairmanship of the PRC’s Central Military Commission (CMC), replacing Jiang Zemin on September 4, 2004. Hu was known to have been negotiating with the military about Jiang’s removal in August, and part of his negotiating tactics appear to have involved adopting a much harder line on Taiwan policy.28 In March 2003, Hu Jintao had espoused a fairly moderate Taiwan stance called “The Four Suggestions and the Three Whatevers.”29 Jiang Zemin, on the other hand, had insisted on a hard-line set of Taiwan directives on May 17, 2004 (related to the vitriolic positions noted above) that the People’s Liberation Army embraced. By December 2004, three months into his tenure as CMC Chair, Hu Jintao had nailed his colors to the hard-line mast: Hu pronounced his internal directive that “settling the Taiwan issue late is not as good as settling it earlier,” and in the words of one Taiwan analyst, Hu Jintao’s “Strike Taiwan Independence” would be much more “cold blooded,” more “targeted,” and certainly not as “weak handed” as Jiang Zemin’s approach.30

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Washington’s Flaccid Response to “Anti-Secession Law” The Bush administration, which narrowly won a second term despite monumental strategic dislocations in Iraq, was not inclined to exert any intellectual efforts to deal with China’s gathering assertiveness in East Asia, and especially over Taiwan. Outgoing Secretary of State Colin Powell—perhaps anticipating his ouster in a Bush second term—made an unscheduled and unnecessary visit to Beijing on October 25, just days before the U.S. presidential election, and took the opportunity to explain to the Chinese media what the United States meant by “dialogue” between Taiwan and China: “So both sides should show restraint, not take any unilateral actions, look for ways of improving dialogue across the Straits and move forward toward that day when we will see a peaceful unification.”31 It certainly seemed to everyone listening as though the secretary of state was doing Beijing’s work for it: “promoting unification.” If Secretary Powell thought that by preemptively reassuring China that it didn’t need a “law for the promotion of unification” because the United States would promote unification without it, he failed. The State Department, for example, simply couldn’t tell what to make of signs from Beijing that China’s NPC would indeed pass an ASL at its March 2005 Plenum. On December 10, 2004, outgoing Deputy Secretary of State Armitage (who had announced his imminent resignation a month earlier) appeared on the popular television interview program, The Charlie Rose Show, and saw fit (apropos of nothing) to explain (erroneously) that “We all agree that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China.”32 On December 11, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan elections yielded exactly one new legislative seat for the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, a massive loss for the even more pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union, and the emergence of the pro-China Kuomintang as the majority party in Taiwan’s parliament. One could argue that if there had been a need for a unification/anti-secession law earlier in 2004 (after the reelection of President Chen), things were turning around quite dramatically in Taiwan, and the urgency had subsided. But Beijing certainly didn’t see it that way. On December 17, 2004, after the formal announcement of an “Anti-Secession Law” was issued in Beijing, State Department

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spokesman Boucher ducked reporters’ questions by insisting that “We have not seen the legislation, had a chance to study it, so we are not in a position to comment in any detail.” He then repeated “our longstanding position that we’ve stated many times” that “it’s the time to focus on dialogue and not for hardening of positions”—as if “dialogue” were the panacea for Beijing’s ills. A reporter reminded Boucher that Taiwan’s minister “said they talked to the U.S. Government and got the impression that U.S. is against this law,” and asked, “I wonder can I confirm with you that?” Boucher dodged: “Well, we certainly keep in touch with all of the parties on this subject. It has come up in the last few days and we’ve kept in touch with—as I’ve said, we’ve talked to the Chinese and we’ve talked to some people in Taiwan.” But he ultimately retreated to nonjudgmental diplomatese: “We think it’s important for both sides to focus on dialogue. It’s not time to harden positions or take unilateral stances”—as if “both sides” were at fault. The exasperated reporter tried another angle: “I mean, I understand U.S. policy’s One China policy and maintaining status quo, but obviously the Chinese effort to this law is to [sic] anti-secession. So would you see this coinciding with the U.S. policy?” Bucher left the distinct impression that the ASL could indeed be coincident with U.S. policy: “We’ll have to see the actual text of the legislation.”33 Washington’s flaccid reaction because there was no “actual text of the legislation” obviously resulted in a stiffening of Beijing’s hard-line position on Taiwan. It was precisely the result that most U.S. officials wanted to avoid, according to well-informed Washington observer Christopher Nelson. His Nelson Report for December 21 recorded an unnamed Bush official “as saying that the proposed law definitely poses a threat to regional peace and stability,” and an unnamed source of his warned privately “that Beijing’s heavy-handed statements this week ‘will breathe new life into Chen’s quest for separating Taiwan from the Mainland.’ ” Nelson, however, noted that “most China professionals were inclined to try and play this one down, but, when pushed, to express some level of anxiety.” One unnamed source suggested that the

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NPC statement “almost certainly has blundered by suggesting that the ‘one country/two systems’ principle should govern all relationships. That has been a sticking point in Cross-Straits dialogue in the past.”34 (Alas, there was no “blunder.” This source’s comment is apparently uninformed by the fact that virtually all PRC statements on Taiwan place it in the “one country, two systems” category, and it is inconceivable that China’s NPC would (or could) take legislative action on Taiwan without invoking Deng Xiaoping’s “one country, two systems” principle.35) Nelson observed that the consensus in Washington was that whatever else, “from an international standpoint,” the NPC statement “suggests a willingness to alter the status quo that prompted [State Dept. Spokesman Richard] Boucher’s comments last Friday.” Another “former official” told Nelson: The problem I have with the bill is that it threatens to create an action/reaction chain that is quite unhelpful and unnecessary at the current time. With the LY election, Chen’s options, and the options of the more extreme elements pushing him, are limited. They aren’t zero, but anything approaching “juridical independence,” the presumed PRC “red line,” would seem to be foreclosed by Taiwan politics. So, why do this now!?36 Nelson’s interlocutors suggested that Washington’s best tactic would be to firebreak the NPC’s moves toward an ASL by “getting Chen to turn the other cheek,” something that would be a “major undertaking.” Nelson added, without apparently putting the two together, that the Chinese Embassy in Washington had sent several congressmen and senators a letter noting that the ASL “will give full expression to the strong resolve of the Chinese people of never allowing the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces to cut off Taiwan from the rest of China under any name or by any means.” As Nelson described it, Washington would put pressure in Taiwan “to turn the other cheek,” while China would put pressure on Congress to ignore China’s new aggressive tone.37 Of course, in retrospect, Chen did “turn the other cheek.” (The result was that China’s threats to enact an ASL went unanswered by Chen until a year later, when Chen “scrapped” the National Unification Guidelines and was harshly condemned by the Bush administration which, by then, had forgotten about Beijing’s ASL.)

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Tokyo Persuades Washington to get “Serious” About China Six weeks later, at the beginning of February 2005, the Bush administration was still studiously ignoring the ASL. As The Nelson Report put it: Worried observers say the administration needs to make more noise about this, because Capitol Hill certainly will, otherwise. And, China is compounding the bullying by trying to force trading partners to endorse the legislation, even though there’s no bill to read. Hard to see how this helps the atmosphere, and seems to indicate China is not really serious about exploring possibilities for progress, so long as Chen and the DPP are in power . . . that’s the interpretation here.38 But something had changed by February 17. Bush administration statements on China suddenly took on a firmer tone. Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith, in remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, predicted that over the coming 10 or 20 years, “the country that can be expected to have the greatest effect on international relations is China.” He then asked if China’s leaders “see that China’s long-term interests . . . hinge on its becoming a respected and responsible member of an international community, and that this will in turn require that it forego the threat or use of force to pursue reunification?”39 Typically, the new American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, was more circumspect, but she as well at least alluded to China’s attempt to change unilaterally the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.40 On the morning of February 18, The Washington Post provided clues to the identity of the forces behind the Bush administration’s new assertiveness. On the front page, it quoted Shinzo Abe, acting secretary general of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the obvious successor to Junichiro Koizumi as Japan’s prime minister, as cautioning, “It would be wrong for us to send a signal to China that the United States and Japan will watch and tolerate China’s military invasion of Taiwan. . . . If the situation surrounding Japan threatens our security, Japan can provide U.S. forces with support.”41 The Post’s report also quoted a “senior Japanese government official” as saying, “We consider China a friendly country, but it is also unpredictable,” and warning “If [China] takes aggressive action, Japan cannot just stand by and watch.” These were much more blunt

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formulations than “senior” Japanese had permitted themselves to utter theretofore—and blunter by far than their American counterparts. Moreover, the Post article came the day before the 2005 “Two Plus Two” talks between the American and Japanese foreign and defense ministers. A combination of events had so agitated Japan that it felt constrained to pressure its American ally into a joint statement of strategic interests in the Pacific, particularly vis-à-vis Taiwan. China’s military expansion was accelerating; China’s provocations in Japanese East China Sea territorial waters had increased; China’s hostility to Japan’s quest for a United Nations Security Council Seat was getting more vicious; China’s patronage of North Korea in its ambitions for nuclear arms had strengthened; and China’s clamor for a “law against splitting the nation asunder”—the ASL—that spelled heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait and regions adjacent to Japanese waters was louder. Friday afternoon, February 18, briefing reporters on U.S.-Japan strategic issues, Ambassador Boucher allowed himself a rare moment of candor about China: I didn’t say it was all rosy. Part of looking for China to adopt responsible behavior and responsible standards is . . . for example, to get them to limit their exports of missile technology. That’s been an ongoing effort. Or to look to resolve tensions peacefully. We have many times expressed our concerns about tensions on the Taiwan Straits and specifically Chinese military activity in that area.42 One reporter, unaccustomed to State Department expressions of unhappiness with China asked, “so how seriously U.S. is taking it today?” Boucher thought about it, and then answered “Forty-two,” a remark that brought laughter from the press corps—but indicated that “seriousness” wasn’t necessarily a quality of the U.S. attitude toward China’s security challenges. Boucher then reverted to traditional State Department cordiality: “we see overall China’s emergence as positive . . . But there are areas where we need to work with China on the international standards that are expected of all nations, and we hope that China will adopt those standards.” On Saturday, February 19, when the American and Japanese foreign and defense ministers, the so-called “Two Plus Two,” issued their agenda of “common strategic objectives,” prominent among them was to “encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the

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Taiwan Strait through dialogue.”43 While couched in positive terms and nestled in other “strategic objectives” that included “develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally,” the specific enumeration of Taiwan among common objectives of the U.S.-Japan Alliance was startling—indeed unprecedented. It was necessitated by China’s increasing stridency over Taiwan. But it is highly unlikely that the Bush administration would have assumed a contentious posture toward China without a forceful nudge from Tokyo. China’s reaction was intemperate, but it got the message across. On February 19, 2005, the People’s Daily published a sour commentary slamming the “Two Plus Two” agenda for “nakedly provoking and interfering in China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security.” Moreover, the United States and Japan were “encouraging the forces of ‘Taiwan Independence’ by sending the wrong signal.” China’s NPC was intent on passing the “Anti-Secession Law” precisely in the “exertion of the greatest effort to achieve peaceful unification, to oppose and block ‘Taiwan Independence’ from splitting asunder [China], and to protect the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.”44 It was at about this time (February 10) that North Korea stunned the world with its announcement that it was “compelled to suspend our participation in the [Six Party] talks for an indefinite period,” and, by the way: We had already taken the resolute action of pulling out of the NPT and have manufactured nukes for self-defense to cope with the Bush administration’s evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK. Its nuclear weapons will remain nuclear deterrent for self-defense under any circumstances. The present reality proves that only powerful strength can protect justice and truth.45 More than a week after North Korea’s bombshell, the Chinese foreign ministry was still confining itself to comments such as it was “studying the situation” and urging all sides to be “sincere” and “patient.” At a press briefing on February 18, a Foreign Ministry spokesman insisted that “just having the six-party talks in itself is tremendous progress.” That comment came after several reporters bluntly pointed out that two years of the talks—which brought together the two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia and

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Japan—hadn’t resulted in any progress and that the North Koreans had just announced they were suspending their participation.46 By February 24, a Chinese envoy had managed to get North Korea to make a show of grudgingly coming back to the Six Party Talks, and Secretary of State Rice called her Chinese counterpart with some relief—the Taiwan issue was not as important in her short and early tenure as secretary as the North Korean one was, and China seemed to be the only hope of resolving it.47 China, naturally, was playing it for all it was worth. Rice phoned Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing on Friday, March 4, and again on Tuesday, March 8, to discuss the North Korean crisis. In order to keep the United States’ eye on the North Koreans rather than the ASL, China kept the text of the law under wraps: as of March 7, it was said, “barely 100 people had seen the actual contents” of the new statute.48 The ASL Reaches the National People’s Congress But with the NPC then in session, the law’s text would have to come to light. On March 8, It was introduced to the NPC by vice chairman and Politburo member responsible for United Front Work, Wang Zhaoguo, who delivered a written “explication” (広㢝) which asserted in no uncertain terms that the “Anti-Secession Law” was absolutely necessary given the inexorable rise of “Taiwan Independence Forces” and the push in Taiwan for “constitutional” and “legal” adjustments (in the form of “referenda”) which sought to “change the fact that both Taiwan and the Mainland belong to China.” But lest someone in the NPC get the wrong idea—that somehow Taiwan and the mainland had “equal” status in “one China”–Wang reassured all that nothing had changed. The ASL had been carefully constructed within the structure of the PRC Constitution. Taiwan is a part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China. The grand mission to bring to completion the unification of the motherland is the sacred duty of all the people of China including the Taiwan compatriots.49

Wang read aloud the text of the new ASL: “If possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall (㈦) employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures

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to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. There was no legislative definition of “nonpeaceful means” or of “completely exhausted”—it was left to the State Council and the Central Military Commission to make up their own definitions, presumably in secret, and then decide on war based on them. In other words, it was not up to the NPC continuously to revisit the issue of Taiwan’s behavior, but rather, the NPC had ratified the authority of the State Council and the CMC to determine when dialogue with Taiwan was “completely exhausted” in which case, “nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures” shall be employed. (Professor Yu Yuanzhou’s anticipation—that any “unification” law would necessitate the NPC to abdicate all further responsibility for Taiwan, and leave it in the hands of the Party (via that State Council) and the CMC—is a testimony to his profound understanding of the way representative parliamentarianism really works in China.) The Politburo’s tactic of keeping the text of the ASL tightly held— even from the NPC—was no doubt a response to American pleas not to publish it. After all, the State Department routinely justified its incapacity to comment on the ASL because no one had “seen an actual text.” The tactic was effective. When the ASL’s text was sprung on the world, it was a fait accompli. It was now Chinese “law,” and nothing could be done to roll it back. Did China’s Handling of the ASL Learn from the TRA? Perhaps it was a lesson the Chinese had also taken from the TRA’s passage in April 1979. The State Department had submitted a hurriedly drafted “Taiwan Enabling Act” to Congress in January that basically dealt with the status of State Department officials in Taiwan, and secondarily with keeping some sort of legal basis for continuing “commercial, cultural, and other relations with the people on Taiwan on an unofficial basis.”50 The Chinese took State Department assurances that the “enabling” legislation would be “consistent” with derecognition of the “Republic of China” and recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China, including the transfer of Taiwan’s diplomatic real property in the United States to the Beijing regime.51 When the Congress completely rebuilt the “enabling” legislation into the TRA, which included a continuing defense commitment,

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a statement of national policies relating to Taiwan’s security, and preserved the Taipei government’s legal ownership of all properties including diplomatic real property (TRA Section 4(3)(B)), Beijing was incensed, filing two firm protests with the Carter administration on March 16 (three days after the TRA passed the Senate 90-6 and the House 345-55) and March 25.52 The Chinese had hoped that President Carter could maintain his threat to veto legislation—after all, Deng Xiaoping could do so in China—and were quite unsettled that the TRA had passed with a veto-proof margin. So, in preparing for the passage of the ASL, the Chinese leadership no doubt believed it was none of America’s business, but purposefully limited the amount of information on its contents prior to its introduction in the NPC to keep the non-Chinese speaking world in the dark, while Taiwan’s voters could benefit from the anxieties created by a year-long rumor-mongering campaign. Secretary Rice’s Anxiety over the ASL and U.S.-China relations Three days after the ASL was promulgated by China’s NPC, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution 424-4 “expressing the grave concern of Congress regarding the recent passage of the anti-secession law by the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China.”53 While the U.S. Congress complained about the ASL, the State Department was worried about other things. And even when the ASL’s legal text was published, the Department’s position on the ASL failed to get beyond the idea that it was “unhelpful.” As it happened, Secretary Rice was scheduled to visit Beijing the week after the ASL passed the NPC. On March 13, before her departure for China, she told the ABC News program This Week that the ASL “clearly . . . raises tensions and it’s not necessary or a good thing to raise tensions.” But she attempted to reassure Beijing, “We have a ‘one-China’ policy. Everybody understands that. The key is that there should be no effort on either side to unilaterally change the status quo.”54 That same day, the NPC announced a 13 percent increase in China’s military spending. Still, Rice insisted on describing U.S.

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relations with China as favorable: “And with China, I also think we’ve had the best—we have the best relations that we’ve had in some time, perhaps ever.”55 Rice’s newly nominated choice for assistant secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Christopher Hill, was a bit more pointed on the ASL: The United States must be “very vigorous in making clear to the Chinese our concern. . . . We don’t believe there is any justification for making these unhelpful statements that suggest that there are other options out there that the Chinese can use beside peaceful dialogue” with Taiwan, he said. He also insisted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “clearly any Anti-Secession Law that alludes to the legality of military means is simply not helpful.” China’s defense budget increases prompted Secretary Rice to fret en route to India from Tokyo that China’s “military spending is concerning because it is taking place at a time when the cross-Strait issue (with Taiwan) is not still resolved and in which the United States has certain commitments to a peaceful solution.” Yet, Rice continued to waffle on the ASL: It’s our responsibility to say to both the parties that unilateral moves that increase tensions are really not helpful, and the antisecession law, as it’s called, is not helpful in reducing Cross-Straits tensions and therefore we have said to the Chinese that we would have hoped that this would not have been done. Now, it doesn’t mean that they can’t continue to try to improve Cross-Straits relations, that talks shouldn’t continue on the links between Taiwan and China.56 But after she had finally arrived in China, the most that Secretary Rice would say about the ASL was that “As for the anti-secession legislation, I said to my Chinese hosts that we would hope that this would be something that having, we believe, made dialogue across the Cross-Straits perhaps more difficult, that they would take steps to reduce tensions now with Taiwan.”57 Conclusion: The ASL Exposed Weaknesses in the U.S. commitment to Taiwan The United States basically dealt with the Anti-Secession Law as a nuisance, and tended to ignore its propaganda significance: that is, the Chinese side stressed their right to subjugate Taiwan by

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“nonpeaceful means” while the United States could only say the ASL was “unhelpful.” Beijing spent a good deal of effort lobbying Powell and Armitage at the State Department as well as members of Congress, with the director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Chen Yunlin visiting Washington in January 2005. In a February visit to Beijing, National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Michael Green told Chinese counterparts that passage of the legislation would undermine cross-Strait stability. They obviously didn’t believe him, and calculated that the United States would be more concerned with North Korea and China’s willingness to rein-in Pyongyang. Rice raised the ASL with Chinese leaders, but while declaring solemnly that U.S.-China relations were perhaps the “best ever.” In April 2007, Chen Yunlin had reportedly informed Washington that some in Taiwan planned to use a “Second Republic Constitution” to achieve independence, and that if Taiwan crossed this “red line,” China “wouldn’t hesitate to invoke the Anti-Secession Law.” The “Washington source” that provided this report, said the same message had been passed to “other important” governments, including Japan, and that as a result, the February 19, 2005, listing of Taiwan among the “common strategic objectives” of the U.S.-Japan alliance was never reiterated.58 Looking back on the four years since the passage of the AntiSecession Law, one can only conclude that it achieved its objectives: to strengthen China’s legal claim to the right to use military force against Taiwan; to force Washington to choose between China and Taiwan and thereby weaken the American commitment to Taiwan; and to convince the people of Taiwan that, in the absence of any other guarantor if their security and freedom, they have no alternative to ultimate unification with China. In this sense, the ASL contributed significantly to the erosion of the American security relationship with Taiwan that was institutionalized in the TRA. It is, essentially, the “Anti-TRA.” Notes 1. “Implementation Announcement: ‘Anti Secession Law’ Complete text,” Xinhua News Agency, March 14, 2005, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ newscenter/2005-03/14/content_2694168.htm.

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2. See Preamble of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted on December 4, 1982), a version in English is available at http://english. peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html. 3. For the text of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 24th meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 25 February 25, 1992, which is deposited at the United Nations, see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf. 4. The National Defense Law of the People’s Republic of China, passed March 14, 1997, stipulates that the mission of the military is to defend the “territorial integrity” of the nation. http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-09/12/content_31176. htm. 5. Public Law 96-8, commonly known as the “Taiwan Relations Act” (TRA) at 22United States Code 48, Sections 3301–3316, was enacted April 10, 1979. Several revisions were made to Public Law 96-8 when it was codified. Sections 1 and 18 of the Public Law were omitted, as was Section 12(d). In addition, the United States Code contains a section not included in the original Act, Section 3310a. The United States Code version is the authoritative version of the Act. 6. TRA Section 3303(b)(1). 7. TRA Section 3302. It is a common misconception that this section limits the U.S. government to the supply of “arms of a defensive character,” but it is clear from the legislative record that this was in fact a requirement by the law that the executive branch supply at least “arms of a defensive character” but that the actual nature of such arms was to be determined by the President and Congress together in accordance with a “review by United States military authorities” and their recommendations as to Taiwan’s equipment and arms needs necessary for an “adequate self-defense.” 8. Both Senators DeConcini (D.–NM) and Javits (R.–NY) commented on America’s continuing “commitment to insure the continued independent existence of Taiwan, if that is the will of its people.” See Taiwan: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate for February 5,6,7,8,21 and 22, 1979. Deconcini at p. 415, Javits at p. 420. 9. Wang Jisi, “Impact of U.S. Strategic Adjustment on Sino-U.S. Relations,” Beijing Xuexi Shibao, Internet version, August 16, 2004. 10. See, for example, the difference between the State Department’s stance— Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage explaining in an August 26, 2002, news conference in Beijing, that while Taiwan is “one of the questions” where Washington and Beijing “have a difference of opinion,” the U.S. policy on Taiwan “is based on our One-China Policy, the Three Communiqués, and the Taiwan Relations Act.” 11. Defense Department Assistant Secretary Peter Rodman told a House committee on April 21, 2004, that “Taiwan’s evolution into a true multi-party democracy over the past decade is proof of the importance of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s defense. It strengthens American resolve to see Taiwan’s democracy grow and prosper.” See “The Taiwan Relations Act:

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12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26.

the next twenty-five years,” hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, April 21, 2004, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 23 at http:// www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/108/93229.pdf. See also The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002 and President George W. Bush’s Second Inaugural Address. See Yu Yuanzhou, “Law for the Promotion of the National Unification of the People’s Republic of China (Scholar’s Suggested Draft),” November 1, 2002, at http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/pubvp/2004/05/200405190839.shtml. “Chairman Ye Jianying’s comments to Xinhua reporters on implementation of the 9-point Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland and Peaceful Reunification (1981),” http://www.fmcoprc.gov.hk/chn/topic/ dtzc/zfdtzc/t45123.htm (Chinese version); http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/ Appendix%2037.htm (English version). Deng Fei, “Mainland Scholar pushes ‘Law for the Promotion of National Unification,’ ” Phoenix Weekly, Volume 148, September 4, 2004, p.15. at http://www.phoenixtv.com.cn/home/phoenixweekly/148/15page.html. See Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 96. Deng Fei. Draft. See phrasing immediately following Section 17 in Draft above. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html. In particular, this period saw the birth of the so-called “three-wars” concept— which incorporates a legal war, media war, and psychological war—under the “Peaceful Rising” banner, a strategy later endorsed by Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. For a description, see Annual Report to Congress, the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 23, 2006, p. 38, at http://www.defenselink.mil/ qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf. Benjamin Kang Lim, “China to Consider Taiwan Reunification LawPremier,” Reuters, May 11, 2004. State Department Daily Press Briefing, May 12, 2004. “Taiwan warned on independence,” BBC News Online, May 17, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3715203.stm. The Chinese language transcript reads: 阿米塔吉: 我們將問題留給陳水扁 總統去思考, 美方非常確信 在520發表涵蓋全面而立足超然的演說 是陳 總統的目標之̶. 我也非常相信他不會採取任何行動 為兩岸的緊張情勢 火上加油. See Liu Ping, “U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage: President Chen Inaugural Speech won’t enflame Strait Tensions,” Taipei Commercial Times, May 20, 2004. Press Briefing by Scott McClellan, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 19, 2004. Several print media articles suggested that the adoption of an anti-”secession” law was a sign of “moderation.” “China to enact anti-secession law,” BBC News, December 17, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asiapacific/4104909.stm; Joseph Kahn, “China’s Army May Respond if Taiwan

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27. 28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39.

JOHN J. TKACIK, JR.

Fully Secedes,” The New York Times, December 18, 2004, http://www. nytimes.com/2004/12/18/international/asia/18china.html. Philip P. Pan, “China Planning to Enact Law Against Secession,” The Washington Post, December 18, 2004, p. A24 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ articles/A8861-2004Dec17.html. “U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN . . . anti-secession law; U.S.-Japan declaration,” The Nelson Report, February 23, 2005. Arthur Waldron and John Tkacik Jr., “China’s Power Struggle,” The Wall Street Journal Asia, August 13, 2004, at http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB10 9235074074490451,00.html. See Wang Zhuozhong, Rual Leyi, Wang Mingyi, “Hu Jintao outlines Taiwan Work Policy, Four Views, Three Whatevers,” Zhongguo Shibao electronic version, March 12, 2003. See Wang Lijuan, “Unification of the Strait, Hu Jintao’s Progression on Taiwan, from ‘Four Points on Taiwan’, to the ‘May 17 Declaration’ to the Anti Secession Law, toughness is the gentle way,” Shijie Ribao (New York), December 20, 2004. “Interview With Anthony Yuen of Phoenix TV, Secretary Colin L. Powell, China World Hotel Beijing, China,” U.S. Department of State, October 25, 2004 at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/37361. htm. “Interview with Charlie Rose on PBS, Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, As Aired,” U.S. Department of State, December 10, 2004 http://20012009.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/39973.htm. The fact that this statement is in error is explored at length by John J. Tkacik, Jr., Taiwan’s “Unsettled” International Status: Preserving U.S. Options in the Pacific, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2146 June 19, 2008 at http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2146.cfm. Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, December 17, 2004 at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/39934. htm. See “CHINA-TAIWAN-US . . . loose lips . . . or something serious?” The Nelson Report, December 20–21, 2004. For example, the term “one country, two systems”—reverently credited to Deng Xiaoping—is invoked 11 times in the official PRC white paper, “The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China,” issued on August 31, 1993, by the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office under the State Council, and 7 times in the SC-TAO white paper, “The Principle of One China and the Taiwan Question,” issued by the SC-TAO on February 21, 2000. These are basic documents of China’s “Taiwan Policy.” Nelson Report, December 21, 2004. Nelson Report, December 21, 2004. “IRAQ CRITIQUED . . . action points detailed; China-Taiwan; N. Korea policy . . . misc gossip,” The Nelson Report, February 1, 2005. Text of remarks is at U.S. Department of Defense News Briefing, “Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Speech to the Council on

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40.

41.

42. 43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48. 49.

50.

51. 52.

Foreign Relations,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 17, 2005, at http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/February/2005021816324 7sjhtrop0.4401972.html. “Remarks With Dutch Foreign Minister Bot After Meeting, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Ben Franklin Room,” U.S. Department of State, February 18, 2005, at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/42473.htm. Anthony Faiola, “Japan to Join U.S. Policy on Taiwan -Growth of China Seen Behind Shift,” The Washington Post, February 18, 2005, p. A01 at http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33297-2005Feb17.html. Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, February 18, 2005, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/42480.htm. See Richard Boucher, Spokesman, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee”, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, on February 19, 2005 at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490. htm. Yu Shan, “U.S. and Japan must not add to confusion in Taiwan Strait (International Forum),” Renmin Ribao, February 19, 2005, p. 3, at http:// www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/14113/1257810.html. “N. Korea’s statement in full; The following text is the full statement released on Thursday by North Korea’s KCNA news agency. North Korea refers to itself as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),” BBC News, February 10, 2005, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/4252515.stm. For an analysis of China’s odd reaction, see John J. Tkacik, Jr. “China Is Using North Korea As Leverage,” Wall Street Journal Asia, February 21, 2005, at http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110895247121759897,00.html. Chris Buckley, “Chinese Envoy Returns From North Korea Saying It Is Open to Talks,” The New York Times, February 24, 2005, at http://www.nytimes. com/2005/02/24/international/asia/24korea.html. Wang Zhuozhong, “Only 100 people have seen Anti-Secession Law,” Zhongguo Shibao electronic version, March 7, 2005. (Emphasis added) “♿䄍㢾₼◝ⅉ㺠␀✛⦌䤓䯭⦲欕⦮䤓₏捷⒕ᇭ⸛㒟兮₏ 䯥⦌䤓⮶₩㢾▔㕻♿䄍⚛卭⦷␔䤓⏷₼⦌ⅉ㺠䤓䯭⦲勛徲ᇭ” See “␂ℝᇵ ♜⒕孑⦌⹅㽤᧤嗘㫗᧥ᇶ䤓広㢝” [Explication regarding the ‘Law Against the Cleaving Asunder of the Nation (Draft)’, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, March 8, 2005, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-03/08/ content_2666011.htm. S. 245 was introduced in the Senate by Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church (D.–ID) at the request of the administration—but the first words out of his mouth at opening hearings on the Act were, “I must say at the outset that the proposed legislation seems to me to be woefully inadequate to the task, ambiguous in language, and uncertain in tone.” See Taiwan: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate for February 5,6,7,8,21 and 22, 1979, p. 11. Taiwan: Hearings, p. 25. David Binder, “Pledge to Taiwan Upsets the Chinese; Peking’s Complaints Over Taipei Guarantees Create a Delicate Predicament for Carter First

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52

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

JOHN J. TKACIK, JR.

Protest Since Ties Set Up ‘Close and Friendly Relations,’ ” The New York Times, March 26, 1979, p. A13. H. CON. RES. 98. referred to the Senate March 17, 2005. Senate Resolution S. RES. 220 sponsored by Lindsey Graham (R.àSC) died in committee in July 2005. “Interview on ABC’s This Week with George Stephanopoulos, Secretary Condoleezza Rice,” U.S. Department of State, March 13, 2005, at http://20012009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43342.htm. “On-the-Record Briefing, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, En Route to Tokyo, Japan,” U.S. Department of State, March 17, 2005 at http://2001-2009.state. gov/secretary/rm/2005/43637.htm. “Remarks en Route to India, Secretary Condoleezza Rice,” U.S. Department of State, March 15, 2005, at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43465. htm. “Remarks to the Press in China, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, China World Hotel, Beijing, China,” U.S. Department of State, March 21, 2005, at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43678.htm. Liu Ping, “China informs U.S.: Won’t hesitate to use ‘Anti-Secession Law,’ ” Zhongguo Shibao electronic version, May 5, 2007.

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The TRA, Cross-Strait Relations, and Sino-U.S. Relations: Searching for Cross-Strait Stability Richard W. Hu

Introduction

T

hirty years ago, the TRA was enacted by the U.S. Congress to create legal bases and arrangements to govern American economic, cultural, and military relations with Taiwan, following the Carter administration’s decision to switch diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing. Motivated by Congress’s unhappiness to cede Taiwan policy to the White House, the TRA was intended to reassert a congressional role in U.S. policy toward Taiwan and cross-Strait relations. Therefore, the TRA not only deals with legal, technical, and logistical issues of how to maintain “unofficial” ties with Taiwan after Washington’s established formal diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, but also serves as a political statement of intent, expressed in the form of congressional legislation, which the United States vests strong interests in its future relations with Taiwan. For that purpose, the TRA also justifies continued arms sales to Taiwan and requires consultations between the executive branch and Congress to determine an appropriate response in the event that Taiwan’s security is jeopardized. In this regard, the TRA was an unprecedented document, which has

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stirred up political controversy not only between the United States and China, but also in American domestic politics. In U.S. politics, the TRA was a case in which Congress asserted a role for itself in a foreign policy issue. It created an institutional framework and legal basis for Congress to step in owing to the conduct of U.S. security and economic relations with Taiwan after its formal diplomatic relationship with Taipei was severed in 1979. Taiwan supporters on Capitol Hill believed that the TRA could prevent the administration from selling out Taiwan under pressure from China. For the administration, however, the TRA provides the legal basis for the U.S. government to conduct relations with the people of Taiwan in an absence of a formal diplomatic relationship. Meanwhile, the TRA has also become an important pillar for U.S./ China/Taiwan policy. According to the U.S. State Department, the TRA, as a domestic legal authority, “provide(s) the legal basis for the unofficial relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan, and enshrines the U.S. commitment to assisting Taiwan maintain its defensive capability.”1 Under the requirement of the TRA, the administration needs to strike a careful balance in its conduct toward China policy, Taiwan policy, and policy toward cross-Strait relations. On one hand, the United States recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China and acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of it. On the other hand, because of the TRA, the U.S. administration needs to handle U.S.-China relations not only on the basis of its one-China policy and the three joint communiqués with Beijing, but also in line with the legal requirement of the TRA. This makes the conduct of its China and Taiwan policies often come into conflict with the Chinese position that the China-U.S. relationship should be solely based on the requirements of the three China-U.S. joint communiqués. There is no doubt that the TRA has become an important component of U.S. policy toward Beijing, Taipei, and cross-Strait relations since its entry into force. The TRA is a unilateral way on the part of the United States to reframe the “rules of the game” with Beijing after the normalization of relations and reconfirm its obligation toward Taiwan over Beijing’s strong protest. By this law, both the U.S. Congress and administration have conveyed a strong political commitment to the future of Taiwan. As a result, Washington

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is able to use this domestic legal authority to guide and manage its relations with both Taiwan and Beijing in its favor. According to the State Department, the conduct of U.S. relations with Taiwan and Beijing is based on the balance of three policy objectives: (1) one-China policy and not supporting Taiwan independence or unilateral moves to change the status quo; (2) opposing any nonpeaceful resolution of disputes across the Taiwan Strait, and viewing any use of force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan with grave concern; and (3) maintaining a credible Taiwan military capability through continuous sales of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taipei. In that regard, all U.S. administrations since Nixon believe the TRA has assisted in “crafting a policy that has been critical to maintaining peace and stability in the western Pacific while also helping to ensure Taiwan’s prosperity and security.”2 China’s position on the TRA is understandably negative. Beijing has opposed this law from the very beginning. But on the other hand, it could do little to have it abolished. From the Chinese perspective, the TRA is a domestic law of the United States, but Washington has used it to override its international obligation spelled out in the three joint communiqués. From the Chinese view, the Taiwan issue is a domestic affair issue of China, and the TRA violates the noninterference principle in international relations by stepping into China’s domestic affairs. Since the political intention of the TRA directly contradicts Washington’s “one-China” policy, Beijing has strongly opposed it from the outset and repeatedly requested its abolishment. There is no doubt that the TRA has been a source of dispute in China-U.S. relations. Yet, although Beijing and Washington have completely different views on the TRA, China-U.S. relations have seemed never come to the point of collapsing over the TRA dispute since 1979. It is even interesting to note that the both sides have learned ways of managing the conflict over the TRA and developed relatively stable relations despite the disagreement over Taiwan. As the cross-Strait relationship has become more relaxed since 2008, the Taiwan Strait is no longer an urgent “flashpoint” in Sino-U.S. relations. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait resumed substantive relations after the Kuomintang returned to power in 2008. Although maintaining a long-term peace and stability across the Strait remains a challenge, the triangular relationship between

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Beijing, Taipei, and Washington has become more stabilized today than 30 years ago. Over the last three decades, the three parties have gradually learned to live with each other as “stakeholders” in the triangular relationship. They have come to terms with one another on where is the other’s bottom line and how to move toward what Donald Zagoria calls “a relatively manageable equilibrium” among the three parties,3 especially between Beijing and Washington over the Taiwan issue. This chapter examines the role of the TRA in China-U.S. relations and cross-Strait relations. The role of the TRA in China-U.S. relations has evolved over the last 30 years as Beijing and Washington sought a more manageable relationship between themselves and more stable relations across the Taiwan Strait. The United States and TRA is an important factor affecting cross-Strait relations and Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan. Thus, I will analyze the role of the TRA in the context of the evolving triangular relationship between China, the United States, and Taiwan over the last three decades. I will focus my analysis on how Beijing and Washington have come to terms with each other over the TRA dispute over the last three decades as both have moved up on the learning curve toward a “manageable equilibrium” in cross-Strait relations and China-U.S. relations. I will also take stock of the lessons learned by both countries in handling the Taiwan issue. China and the TRA: Managing to “Live with it”? The Chinese objection to the TRA has been consistent over the last 30 years. Beijing strongly opposes the TRA, arguing that it is a domestic law of the United States, and the law conflicts with U.S. international obligations in the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués. The antipathy is repeatedly lodged within Washington, and the latest instance was the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s protest against a resolution in U.S. Congress that marks the thirtieth anniversary of the TRA. In the Chinese view, “the so-called Taiwan Relations Act, enacted unilaterally by the United States, gravely violates basic norms guiding international relations. It also violates the United States’ serious commitment to China and interferes in China’s internal affairs.” Thus, China “urges the U.S. to abide by the basic norms guiding international relations and the principles enshrined

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in the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués, not to deliberate and pass the resolution in any form, and properly and prudently handle the Taiwan question.”4 Beijing’s reasoning against the TRA has its legal foundation and political considerations. Legally, Beijing argues that the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations is solely based on the international agreements between the two countries. In the three China-U.S. joint communiqués, it is established that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China; the United States recognizes the PRC government as the sole legal government of China; and within that context, the United States only maintains unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The TRA, as a U.S. domestic law, interferes in China’s domestic affairs. The three joint communiqués and the U.S. one-China policy require Washington to respect Beijing’s sovereign right over Taiwan. By this logic, the resolution of the Taiwan problem is a pure domestic issue of China, and it is China’s internal affair with regard to how to solve the problem in the future; the United States should have no role on this matter. Politically, the Taiwan issue concerns its sovereignty and has extremely important implications for the Chinese leadership. It is also an especially sensitive issue concerning China’s national dignity because of its past experience with Western infringements on its national unity and territorial integrity since the mid-nineteenth century. By enacting and putting the TRA into effect, Washington asserts for itself a decisive role in cross-Strait relations, and this is unacceptable for any leaders in Beijing. Washington’s role and its possible intervention in cross-Strait disputes, as stipulated by the TRA, could seriously constrain Beijing’s options of eventually solving the Taiwan problem and impede China’s national unification course. This is something that no Chinese leaders can afford to accept. It would be politically suicidal if any Chinese leaders allowed foreign infringement over China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Beijing’s opposition to the TRA is not just because of Taiwan’s political and economic importance to the mainland, but also owing to its concern of Washington’s strategic intention to use Taiwan as a check on the rise of China in the Asia Pacific region as well as onto the world stage. Many Chinese analysts subscribe to the view that Washington sees Taiwan as an important strategic asset in containing the rise of China in the region. During the Cold War, Taiwan

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was seen as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” at China’s doorstep in the west Pacific. After the Cold War, Washington needs to develop a constructive and cooperative relationship with Beijing while continue to hedge against a rising China from becoming a threat to the United States and its allies. Viewed from that perspective, the TRA can be used as part of a broader U.S. strategy (including its security alliances with Japan and South Korea) to foster close relations with others in East Asia to block China’s emergence as a great power. From time to time, there have been intense disagreements between Beijing and Washington about Taiwan, especially over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Put it into a broader regional perspective, since the TRA reassures the U.S. interest in Taiwan’s security and peace and stability in the west Pacific, it highlights an uneasy reality of the strategic competitive relations between Washington and Beijing and the two militaries in the region. Looking back on the last 30 years, however, it is interesting to note that Beijing seems to have managed to live with the TRA despite its objection to this law. China-U.S. relations did not collapse over Taiwan. China and the United States seem to have managed to develop and maintain a stable and constructive relationship despite their disagreement over the Taiwan issue. Why is it the case? Some people in the United States believe that it is attributed to Washington’s skillful conduct of its Taiwan policy in U.S.-China relations. In Washington’s vocabulary, vague terms such as “one-China” policy, the “peaceful resolution,” “status quo,” and “acknowledge vs. recognize” have glossed over the fundamental disagreement between the two sides. They also successfully appealed to Beijing’s pragmatic willingness to “agree to disagree.” Yet, to the Chinese, glossing over the disagreement can hardly solve the dispute. The Chinese clearly understand the rationale of the U.S. Taiwan policy and know what they want from the United States in relation to the Taiwan issue. Beijing’s objective in cross-Strait relations is clear, and it will never accept the reality of Taiwan becoming de jure independent. Chinese leaders, regardless of their generation, will never give up on the historical mission of reunification with Taiwan. They could push the task of reunification toward the back of the agenda for the time being when other higher priority issues need to be addressed first. But no Chinese leaders can afford to let Taiwan permanently secede from China. Throughout the Chinese official documents, Beijing’s

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story and position on the legal status of Taiwan has remained consistent, though its strategy and policy toward Taiwan could show some flexibility. Beijing’s basic stance on the TRA has remained consistent. The Chinese do not like the TRA, but they have to live with it. They have to accept the reality of the TRA when China’s national power is still in an inferior position vis-à-vis that of the United States. To explain why and how China has managed to live with the TRA, we need to examine the Chinese debate about Sino-U.S. relations and the Taiwan issue. There are three major issues deserving in-depth analysis. These issues are first, which one is more important—the Taiwan problem or the China-U.S. relationship? Second, besides the disagreement on the resolution of the Taiwan problem, do Beijing and Washington have any common interest in Taiwan and particularly in containing Taiwan’s de jure independence? Third, how could Beijing minimize Washington’s influence in cross-Strait relations if it is not conducive to China’s unification goal? The Taiwan Problem and the China-U.S. Relationship

Since the open-door and economic reforms in 1978, Beijing’s Taiwan strategy and its relations with the United States have been two key elements in its grand strategy and national development policy. Yet, the two tasks cannot be achieved at the same time, owing to the TRA and other obstacles presented by the United States. A stable international environment and a cooperative relationship with the United States are vitally important for China’s national development strategy. National unification and solving the Taiwan problem is a noble historical mission for the Chinese people, and, without reunification with Taiwan, Chinese believe the Chinese nation can never be rejuvenated and strong in the modern international community. In recent years, with the unification task shelved, how to prevent Taiwan independence has become a more urgent issue in China’s strategic debate. In the debate about what is the best strategy to deal with Taiwan and its eventual independence, Chinese elites have touched on some fundamental issues of national strategy. These issues include China’s national interests, China-U.S. relations, Taiwan policy, and the relationship between economic development and national reunification.

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In the debate, the “liberal” side argues that the resolution of the Taiwan issue through military means would be too costly and unthinkable. The resolution of the Taiwan issue should be viewed as a long-term task and as part of the process of China’s modernization and national rejuvenation. So the basic means to achieve national reunification should not be military force. Instead, China’s own economic development and modernization will automatically take care of the historic task of national reunification.5 Many policy elites believe that, by this logic, a stable China-U.S. relationship is more important for China at the present than pressing hard to solve the Taiwan problem. Taiwan has become a sensitive issue and a sticking point in Sino-U.S. relations. It would be almost impossible to avoid a head-on conflict with the United States if Beijing uses military force in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese government thus should now consider preserving a good relationship with the United States as a more important task than recovering Taiwan. On the other side of the debate, some “hard liners” argue that China must prepare for the worst-case scenario in the Taiwan Strait and that a military solution may become necessary if Taiwan declares independence or indefinitely refuse to discuss unification with the mainland. They believe that since Washington will never let Taiwan go and will continue to use it as a check against the rise of China, a military solution is inevitable. Some of them even believe the earlier the better to solve the problem militarily. But this view has not prevailed. It seems that from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zeming to Hu Jintao, the consensus within the top leadership has not changed. The Chinese leadership is still holding the view that at the present time and in the foreseeable future, it is in China’s best interest to preserve a good relationship with the United States, rather than engage in a confrontation over Taiwan with Washington. A stable and healthy Sino-U.S. relationship is essential for China’s economic modernization and integration into the world system. The first two decades of the twenty-first century are considered a period of “strategic opportunity” for China’s peaceful rise in the world. China cannot afford to fight a war with the United States over Taiwan and lose the strategic opportunity for the peaceful rise of China in world affairs.

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A Sino-U.S. Co-Management in the Taiwan Strait?

To Beijing, the TRA could be an impediment for China’s nonpeaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, but the Chinese also know it is not in the best interest of the United States, either, to see any unilateral change of status quo across the Strait. Thirty years ago, the TRA was designed to deter Beijing’s unilateral action of using force to solve the Taiwan issue, not Taiwan’s unilateral action of moving toward independence. Thus, with the situation in the Strait dramatically changed, it is not impossible for Beijing and Washington to join forces in containing Taiwan independence and maintaining stability across the Strait. Since the founding of the PRC, Beijing has spent decades framing the Taiwan problem as a matter of China’s internal affairs. Yet, as the Taiwan independence movement kept pushing the envelope, Beijing began to seek Washington’s support for containing Taiwan independence. Enlisting U.S. support over the Taiwan issue was a 180-degree reversal of its earlier policy of treating Taiwan as an internal affair. The impetus for this policy change was not avoiding conflict with the United States. Rather, it was a reflection of China’s greater emphasis on containing Taiwan independence forces after the regime change in Taiwan in 2000 made the containment strategy more urgent than promoting unification. The Chinese leaders know that they cannot expect to enlist American support for China’s reunification, but the two sides do share common interests in containing Taiwan independence. The danger of Taiwan de jure independence would gravely disrupt peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as well as security in the whole Asia Pacific region. How to Minimize Washington’s Influence?

To put up with something that you don’t like does not mean that you accept it. Chinese leaders know that if they want to reduce U.S. leverage in the Taiwan Strait, they have to work on the people of Taiwan. In the end, the resolution of the Taiwan issue depends on whether the Chinese on both sides of the Strait can find solutions themselves. Beijing understands very well that the best way to reduce Washington’s influence and intervention in cross-Strait relations is to develop “inter-Chinese” relations across the Strait and

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put the Chinese in charge of the course of cross-Strait relations. In recent years, Beijing’s Taiwan policy has become more flexible. In order to not get entangled with Washington over the TRA, Beijing has increased its efforts in winning the Taiwanese people’s hearts and minds. One of the lessons the Chinese leaders learned from the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis is that military coercion may have effects on Taiwan’s electoral politics that are counterproductive to China. The use or threat to use of force would only drive the Taiwanese public further away from the mainland. If the two sides of the Strait could develop a virtuous cycle of positive interactions instead of a vicious cycle of independence, this would considerably cut into the American influence in the Taiwan Strait. Anti-Secession Law: To Counter, but Not Be a Counterpart of the TRA To counter Taiwan’s independence tendency and foreign interference, CNP’s Congress ratified the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) on March 14, 2005. It is written into the Chinese national law that any move by Taiwan toward de jure independence justifies China’s right to use nonpeaceful or military means against Taiwan’s secession from China. In some sense, the ASL is another way for China to counter, but not be a counterpart of, the TRA. The ASL and the TRA are both domestic laws concerning the issue of Taiwan, a territory that both Beijing and Washington now do not have effective control of but claim to have rights over. For China, it is the sovereign right, and for the United States, it is for historical ties and moral obligation. Article 2 of the ASL states that “Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means.” This is strong language that separates the ASL from the TRA in terms of the source of legitimacy and legality. Under the ASL, the PRC’s right to use force against Taiwan “separatism” stems from Beijing’s claim to its sovereignty over Taiwan. The PRC’s legitimate right has been acknowledged by the United States by adopting the one-China policy, although it did not clearly state its support of the legality of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. According to the TRA, however, the United States conceives the object of protection under the law as the “Taiwanese

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people,” not the state or sovereignty of a state. So its commitment, based on historical ties and moral obligation to Taiwan is an ambiguous one. Its ambiguity lies in making sure the resolution of the dispute with “the Chinese on the other side of the Strait” is peaceful, and does not specify what the form the resolution of the Taiwan problem will take. In comparison, the TRA focuses on the rights of the people living on Taiwan while the ASL emphasizes China’s sovereign right over the territory of Taiwan. They are not counterparts, but the ASL was clearly designed to counter the influence of the TRA as well as to prevent Taiwan’s de jure independence. Beijing has long sought a means to counter the TRA. Starting from the late 1990s, Beijing began to seriously discuss and weigh different strategies to contain Taiwan’s independence. The deliberation became more urgent when Chen Shui-bian was elected in the 2000 presidential race and embarked on what many Chinese interpreted as a single-minded course to push for a formal separate status for Taiwan. The ASL was a response to Chen’s independence agenda in two important ways. First, learning from the experience of the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the lack of leverage for influencing Taiwan’s electoral politics, the Chinese leaders came to understand that military coercion may sometimes be counterproductive in influencing public opinion on the island. Inspired by the TRA, Beijing decided to use domestic law to codify the oneChina principle into law and draw a clear “red line” to deter Taiwan’s attempted move toward formal independence. Codifying the oneChina principle into domestic law would place Beijing’s Taiwan policy on a more affirmative and legal basis. It would also increase Beijing’s countervailing ability vis-à-vis any foreign intervention in the resolution of the Taiwan issue. So in that sense, the ASL is a message to Washington as well, to counter the influence of the TRA. Article 3 of the ASL stipulates that “Solving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is China’s internal affair, which subjects to no interference by any outside forces.” This article is an answer to the TRA. Second, the ASL demonstrated Beijing’s determination to take a proactive rather than reactive stance on Taiwan independence issues. Since the 1990s, Beijing found itself increasingly losing influence over political dynamics in Taiwan. In the latter years of Lee Teng-hui’s presidency and especially after Chen Shui-bian was elected, Taipei kept pushing the envelope from

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separatist rhetoric to referendum and constitutional amendment. Beijing lacked effective countermeasures to stop the pro-independence tendency. The ASL helped to increase the mainland’s deterrence power by drawing the “red line” clearer. And in that sense, the law made Beijing more confident in coping with any potential crisis across the Strait. The United States and the TRA: The Challenge of Balancing Taiwan Policy and China Policy The role of the TRA can also be viewed from the angle of how the U.S. administration manages its Taiwan policy and its policy toward cross-Strait relations. The TRA spells out what the U.S. obligations to Taiwan are and its security, but it does not adequately spell out what is its expectation of Taiwan’s obligation to the United States in return. That puts the U.S. administration in a position that it must balance different interests and requirements when conducting relations with Taiwan and the PRC. Managing U.S.-Taiwan relations and U.S. policy toward crossStrait relations requires a balancing act among different policy constraints and considerations. For the administration, these constraints and considerations include the one-China policy, the three communiqués, the TRA, and the growing importance of U.S.-China relations. The one-China policy and the three communiqués require that the United States cannot support Taiwan’s de jure independence or secession from the “one-China” because this unilateral move would change the status quo across the Strait. Any movement toward de jure independence would provoke armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which would endanger U.S. interests in the region. The TRA requires the administration to provide defensive weapons to Taiwan and ensure a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait disputes. The peaceful resolution means no use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan on the part of Beijing, and to facilitate the peaceful resolution, the United States will continue the sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan in accordance with the TRA, and view any use of force against Taiwan with grave concern. Yet, to strike a balance among different policy limits and maintain stable relations with China has not proven to be an easy job.

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There were serious lessons we could draw from the last 30 years of experience. The administration’s handling of Taiwan affairs and cross-Strait relations in the 1980s and 1990s was not very successful. There were policy shifts—like a pendulum—during this period. For example, after signing the August 17 communiqué in 1982, the Reagan administration sent an envoy to Taipei to give six assurances to Taiwan.6 In 1995–1996, Beijing strongly reacted to the Clinton administration’s decision to issue a visa to the then-Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to visit his alma mater in the United States. In the aftermath of the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, President Clinton personally articulated a new “Three Noes” policy when he visited China in 1998. The “Three Noes” included not supporting independence for Taiwan; not supporting two Chinas or one Taiwan, one China; and not supporting Taiwan’s membership in any international organization for which sovereign statehood is a requirement. To maintain stable relations with both China and Taiwan, it is a challenge for the administration to act in a balanced way within the established policy parameters. This is especially the case when it comes to dealing with a rising China and a more turbulent political situation in Taiwan. As Michael Swaine argues, a successful U.S. policy toward cross-Strait relations must be built on a stable triad. The TRA codifies in U.S. domestic law two of the three pillars of the U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan.7 The first pillar is the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and that the U.S. will regard with grave concern any use of nonpeaceful means to resolve Taiwan’s status. The second pillar is the TRA’s requirement that the U.S. government maintain a credible military capability of Taiwan to counter a PRC attack through providing appropriate defensive weapons. However, as Swaine argues, the TRA is only part of the reason for this policy’s success. A U.S. commitment to a peaceful solution could not have succeeded without an equally strong assurance to the PRC that the United States will not use its military power and arms sales to Taiwan to encourage Taiwanese independence or to shield any Taiwanese movement toward independence, which is the third central pillar of U.S. cross-Strait policy. Without such a U.S. assurance, Beijing could not tolerate what it views as the challenge to China’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.8

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Based on this logic, one of the big lessons is that the success of the TRA depends on how well the U.S. could assure China of its oneChina policy commitment and how far Beijing would accept such a promise. The United States has to continuously assure Beijing that Washington has no intention of challenging the PRC’s one-China stance and is committed to containing any unilateral movement on the part of Taiwan toward formal independence. Yet, the balancing act is easier to say than to it is to operate. After Taiwan started its democratization process in the late 1980s, it subsequently began to challenge PRC’s “one-China” principle and the one-China paradigm for cross-Strait relations. Chen Shui-bian’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power in 2000 with an active pro-independence agenda. That put Washington in an awkward position. How could Washington maintain a balance with its policy objectives? To what extent would Taipei’s unilateral action justify Washington’s policy shift? As a result of the changing “status quo” across the Strait, should the United States readjust its one-China policy in favor of recognizing the new reality that a democratic Taiwan is moving toward more independence? If so, such a policy change would fundamentally undermine the foundation of the U.S.-Taiwan policy and Sino-U.S. relations. Beijing would be bound to forcefully respond to the policy shift, and cross-Strait relations would be drastically destabilized. In the end, that would leave Washington with no other choice but to militarily defend Taiwan. And the TRA would eventually turn from a policy assurance to a defense treaty. Fortunately, that was not what happened in Washington. The administrations from Bill Clinton to George W. Bush have managed severe challenges across the Taiwan Strait since the mid-1990s. In deciding its policy options, Washington has learned the importance of a rising China in the Asia Pacific as well as on the global stage. Washington and Beijing have become more comfortable and confident with each other in managing contingencies across the Taiwan Strait. As Washington comes to appreciate the rising power of China, the importance and urgency of the Taiwan issue in the bilateral agenda seems to decline. U.S.-China relations have moved away from the emphasis on strategic competition and toward constructive cooperation.9 There are several themes emerging from the recent developments in U.S.-China relations. First, Washington is telling China that it is

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not going to contain China’s growth. Rather, it wants China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system. Second, the United States does not see China’s growing influence in other parts of the world as a zero-sum game vis-à-vis U.S. national interests. China is even asked to share the burden in managing global governance and regional security problems. Third, Washington is prepared to go beyond the traditional disputes with China over human rights and of Taiwan, and to forge a more cooperative relationship in addressing the common problems of the global financial crisis, climate change, and regional security. During Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Beijing in February 2009, human rights and the Taiwan issue were characterized as important but not urgent issues between the two countries. Given the current state of Sino-U.S. relations and the emerging global financial crisis, the sustainable stability in Taiwan and across the Taiwan Strait would best serve American national interests. Cross-Strait relations from 2000 to 2008 were in upheaval, largely driven by Taiwan’s domestic politics. The George W. Bush administration’s Taiwan policy has swung from one of “whatever it takes to defend Taiwan” to being very harsh on the Chen Shui-bian government. The policy shift occurred because the Chen government consistently ignored U.S. interests and kept pushing the envelope in cross-Strait relations, from the “one country on each side” statement in 2002 to the referendum in 2003 and the 2007 campaign for the UN membership in the name of “Taiwan.” In contrast, current Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeong’s campaign and his cross-Strait policy put the sovereignty issue aside and focused on practical issues and economic links with the mainland. After his inauguration, Ma called for greater space for Taiwan in international society, but not for pushing the envelope on joining the UN. Washington seems happy with Ma’s policy of interchange and reassurance of the mainland, and encourages Beijing to reciprocate Taiwan’s accommodation. Conclusion From the U.S. perspective, the TRA has become an important part of the American policy framework for its conduct of Taiwan and China policy. The TRA over the last three decades has served U.S. interests well, but there were also serious lessons learned.

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The experience of the TRA has shown that, if the conduct of Washington’s policy toward Taiwan and cross-Strait relations is not balanced with the U.S. one-China policy of assurance to Beijing, it would invite unilateral change of the “status quo” across the Taiwan Strait. The TRA spells out the U.S. obligations to Taiwan, but not Taiwan’s obligations to the United States and to the stability and status quo across the Taiwan Strait. This could provide opportunities for the Taiwan independence forces on the island to “push the envelope.” If so, it would have disastrous effects on China-U.S. relations as well as cross-Strait relations. The TRA language governing arms sales to Taiwan and any U.S. response to the PRC threats against Taiwan are also vague. It creates room for maneuver but also a challenge for prudent handling. From the Chinese perspective, China’s objection to the TRA has not changed in the last 30 years, and it is not likely to change in years to come. The TRA is viewed as interference in China’s domestic affairs and a violation of U.S. commitment since the three joint communiqués. But even though the Chinese do not like the TRA, they have to live with it. In March 2005, the Chinese NPC enacted the ASL to counter, but not to act as a counterpart to, the TRA. Although China cannot make the United States abolish the TRA, the ASL and China’s rising power status make Beijing feel more confident in dealing with Washington over Taiwan. Looking back at the last 30 years, when the TRA was enacted in 1979, Congress and the White House were more concerned about the mainland attacking Taiwan for the purpose of unification, rather than Taiwan taking risky moves toward de jure independence. Yet the past 30 years have seen tremendous changes in the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. Cross-Strait relations have greatly transformed, and the “status quo” across the Strait has evolved. Thus, the U.S. conduct of its Taiwan policy and policy toward cross-Strait relations has to adapt to the changing reality in cross-Strait relations as well as China-U.S. relations. And the role of the TRA in the next 30 years is bound to change also. Notes 1. U.S. State Department website, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/ bgn/35855.htm.

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2. Assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mr James Kelly’s testimony, in “Taiwan Relations Act: the Next Twenty-Five Years,” Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, Apr. 21, 2004, p. 13. 3. Donald Zagoria, “The U.S.-China-Taiwan Triangle: Towards Equilibrium,” Analysis of Northeast Asian Project (April 2006), National Committee on American Foreign Policy, available at http://www.ncafp.org/projects/northeast_asia/analyses/US_china_taiwan.pdf. 4. Xinhua News Agency, “China opposes U.S. commitment to ‘Taiwan Relations,’ ” February 26, 2009. 5. See, for example, Zhang Nianchi, “Guanyu Guojia Tongyi de Benzhi Sikao” (Essential Thinking on Our National Reunification), Zhongguo Pinglun (China Review), no. 32 (August 2000), pp. 15–20. 6. The six assurances were given by the Reagan administration to Taipei after it signed the August 17 Communiqué with Beijing. The six assurances are (1) The United States would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan, (2) The United States would not consult with China in advance before making decisions about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, (3) The United States would not mediate between Taiwan and China, (4) The United States would not alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, (5) The United States would not alter its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan, (6) The United States would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China. 7. Michael Swaine’s testimony, in “Taiwan Relations Act: the Next Twenty-Five Years,” Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, April 21, 2004. 8. Swaine, ibid. 9. Tom Christensen, “Shaping China’s Choices: Some Recent Lessons for the Next U.S. Administration,” speech at the University of South California, October 13, 2008, available at http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=1217.

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5

A Status Quo with Different Interpretations: Taiwan, China, the United States, and Security in the Taiwan Strait Cheng-yi Lin

Introduction

T

he conflict between the Pan-Green camp and the Pan-Blue camp in Taiwan did not end after the 2004 presidential election. In fact, it continued after the 2008 presidential election, with cross-Strait relations being the main focus of contention between the two main parties. The Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP) have different interpretations of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. “One China, two Taiwans” is a concept that was proposed by some academics in Taiwan to depict the real struggle of the two major parties in their policies toward China. In addition to these two interpretations of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, the United States and the People’s Republic of China (China, PRC) have their own versions, although they often shy away from specifying the real contents of their policies. Without exception, Taiwan, China, and the United States each proclaim that their cross-Strait policies are based on the principle of maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, but they are not always satisfied with the policies adopted by the other two countries. Although

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the United States and the PRC have at one time or another exerted joint efforts to contain the direction of the DPP government during 2000–2008, they also competed for the right of interpreting what the status quo meant. Therefore, questions that emerge when we discuss the issue of the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait include how the United States, Taiwan, and China define it; what year it is based on; and whether or not the status quo can be maintained. This paper intends to answer these questions. Taiwan’s Interpretations For almost two decades, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) has sponsored different institutes to conduct a series of public opinion polls, with “status quo” being the key word in the questionnaire. The scenarios specified in these polls include “status quo now and unification later,” “status quo now and independence later,” “status quo now and deciding on independence or unification later,” “maintaining the status quo indefinitely,” “unification as soon as possible,” and “independence as soon as possible.”1 To most people in Taiwan, “status quo” means that Taiwan is neither a part of the PRC nor an independent sovereign state. To some people in Taiwan, “status quo” means that Taiwan is a part of the Republic of China (ROC), which was established in 1912. To those who support Taiwan independence, “status quo” means that Taiwan is an independent sovereign state because it fulfills all of the criteria for statehood set by the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. These three ways of thinking compete for support among the people of Taiwan. For a long time, the Taiwan and U.S. governments did not differ too much over the definition of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, although Taiwan’s democratic development over the past two decades challenged such a consensus. After all of the senior legislators and national assemblymen who were elected in Mainland China in the 1930s were forced to step down, and the new central representatives in the legislature were elected from Taiwan and “the free areas” in the early 1990s, and particularly after the people of Taiwan directly elected their president for the first time in 1996, the political ties between the island and the continent were cut. The idea that Taiwan is an independent sovereign state based on the concept of popular sovereignty emerged among

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the people of Taiwan, against which President Lee Teng-hui defined cross-Strait relations as “a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship,” in his interview with Deutsche Welle on July 9, 1999.2 The election of the first non-KMT president, Chen Shui-bian, increased both Chinese and American concerns regarding the situation in the Taiwan Strait. President Chen Shui-bian in his first inaugural address made the “four noes” pledge: so long as the PRC does not use force against Taiwan, there will be no declaring of independence; no changing of Taiwan’s formal name; no enshrining a “state-to-state theory” in the Constitution; and no endorsing of a referendum to change the status quo on independence or reunification.3 For some DPP members, President Chen’s pledge backtracked from the spirit of the Resolution on Taiwan’s Future adopted by the DPP in May 1999, which stated that “Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country. Any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all the residence of Taiwan by means of plebiscite.”4 The resolution also declares that Taiwan’s jurisdiction covers Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, its affiliated islands and territorial waters, and that Taiwan, although named the Republic of China under its current constitution, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the PRC. President Chen was cautious in formulating Taiwan’s Mainland China policy before the approaching of the presidential reelection campaign in 2003–2004. Chen first surprised the United States and the PRC in August 2002 when he committed to bringing forth the legislation of a referendum law and claimed that there existed one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait, which he believed was the status quo between Taiwan and China.5 President Chen and the DPP have long pushed for legislation of a referendum procedure related not only to Taiwan’s future relationship with China but also to any controversial public policy. In November 2003, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, dominated by the KMT and its ally the People’s First Party, adopted the Referendum Law and blocked the DPP government from initiating a consultative referendum on three major issues: downsizing the number of legislators, the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant, and World Health Organization (WHO) membership. Immediately after the passage of this legislation, President Chen decided to hold a defensive referendum according to Article 17 of the Referendum

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Law.6 Ten days later, President George W. Bush admonished that the United States opposed the actions and deeds that President Chen had taken. These remarks created a domestic fuss and stirred the already tension-prone Taiwan Strait. In terms of the regulations, Article 17 implies that a referendum on independence might be possible one day, although President Chen had ruled out holding a referendum on independence. In reality, from the very beginning of the referendum campaign, the DPP, out of fear of strong opposition from both Beijing and Washington, had no plans to conduct referenda on changing Taiwan’s official name, the ROC, or its national flag. Therefore, the Chen government argued that if the PRC renounced the use of force against Taiwan and redeployed the missiles targeting Taiwan, this might result in the canceling of the referendum proposed for March 20, 2004. Furthermore, President Chen decided to add an additional referendum issue regarding cross-Strait negotiations under the principle of parity to defuse the sensitivities of the missile referendum. After the fuss over Taiwan’s first nationwide referendum and President Chen’s reelection, in April 2004, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly did not directly challenge President Chen’s definition, but rather indicated that on the basis of not supporting Taiwan independence, Washington had a different definition of the status quo. Kelly stated that U.S. support for constitutional revision of the ROC was limited, and Washington had concerns about the motivation behind the planned revision. Therefore, the Bush administration wanted to reserve the right of interpretation but avoided stating clearly what the status quo meant and where the red line of U.S. support was.7 Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Mark Chen immediately responded by saying that Taipei and Washington needed greater communication regarding the disputed definition of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.8 To counterbalance the DPP’s movement toward the direction of Taiwan independence, Beijing enacted the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) in March 2005. Taipei accused Beijing of using the terms “nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures” to package its threat to use military force against the island. Taipei has argued that not only does the law take direct aim at Taiwan; it also has repercussions for the implementation of the U.S.-Taiwan Relations Act. As the DPP believed the ASL was a breach of status quo in the Taiwan

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Strait, party leaders mobilized the populace to stage a demonstration to protest Beijing’s actions. For the DPP government, Washington, which had repeatedly criticized Taiwan over its “defensive referendum,” should also criticize China’s ASL, so as to maintain the balance between the two sides. To the DPP’s disappointment, highlevel Bush administration officials registered their strong concern about the legislation but did not go far enough to declare the law as changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.9 In response to China’s ASL, President Chen in January 2006 stated that he would consider abolishing the National Unification Council (NUC) and its Guidelines for National Unification. After strong opposition from Beijing and Washington, President Chen announced that the NUC would cease to function, and the Guidelines would cease to apply after January 2006. However, he also argued that “Taiwan has no intention of changing the status quo and strongly opposes its alteration by non-peaceful means,” and the decision “did not involve changing the status quo.” He went on to argue that “a sovereignty issue that strays from constitutional proceedings not only fails to contribute to maintaining the status quo, but also should be disregarded.” Finally, he pledged that Taiwan would actively fortify its determination and ability to defend itself because “this will help protect the status quo and Taiwan’s democracy, freedom and peace from being unilaterally altered.”10 The threshold of revising the ROC constitution became stricter after the June 2005 constitutional amendment. Accusations of corruption against President Chen and his family members further weakened his ability to forge ahead with a new constitution as he had pledged during the reelection campaign. Therefore, the bottom-up approach of a nationwide referendum for Taiwan’s entry into the UN became another viable option for President Chen and the DPP. For President Chen, although the UN referendum plan might further strain the relationship with the United States, it would not do fundamental damage to U.S.-Taiwan relations in the long term. President Chen was prepared to step down on May 20, 2008, and the United States was ready to cooperate with any new Taiwan president as long as he was duly elected. The DPP and the KMT have fought each other in almost every dimension of Taiwan’s public policy, but they coincided with each other in the referendum on Taiwan’s participation in the UN. In

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the 2008 presidential election, the twin UN referenda were divided simply on the name and the status under which the island should apply for UN membership. According to public opinion polls conducted in Taiwan, more than 70 percent of respondents favored using the name “Taiwan” to apply for UN membership. The KMT was flexible on the name, proposing a return to the UN “under the name ROC, Taiwan, or other name that upholds the nation’s dignity.” Regretfully, the KMT called for a boycott of the UN referendum, including its own version, telling its supporters not to cast votes on joining the UN under the name of Taiwan, calling this an independence referendum. These two referenda were invalid because only about 36 percent of Taiwan’s electorate cast their votes.11 To pass, a referendum requires affirmative votes from at least 50 percent of Taiwan’s eligible voters. From the perspective of the KMT, the status quo differs from that of the DPP. For example, then-KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou argued in the United States in 2006 that “the One China means the Republic of China. This is the status quo, and the majority of Taiwanese people support the maintenance of the status quo.”12 Ma also said that “neither unification nor independence is likely for Taiwan in the foreseeable future, and that therefore the status quo should be maintained.”13 In his 2008 inaugural speech, President Ma pledged that “[u]nder the principle of ‘no unification, no independence and no use of force,’ as Taiwan’s mainstream public opinion holds it, and under the framework of the ROC Constitution, we will maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.” In his interview with the New York Times in June 2008, Ma again pledged to seek a status quo policy, stating that he “will not pursue de jure independence.”14 The DPP, which become the opposition party as of May 20, 2008, claims that President Ma is changing the status quo of Taiwan by moving too close to China and surrendering Taiwan sovereignty. DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen once observed that there seemed to be a consensus among the opposing political parties in Taiwan on maintaining the status quo, but questioned, “[W]hat is the status quo? Can there be two different definitions of the status quo?”15 She concluded that “the most pragmatic solution is accepting the tenuous, undefined status quo.”16 The DPP is also critical of the KMT government being unable to protect the sovereignty of Taiwan while practicing a policy of economic overdependence on China.

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Chairwoman Tsai states that the DPP’s position on sovereignty issues is as follows: “(1) All options are open, with no foreclosure of any option; (2) People in Taiwan have the right to make their own decisions; and (3) Decisions are to be made solely by the people of Taiwan.”17 The Ma government’s policy of “no reunification, no independence” does not deviate from the second point of the DPP’s position, but in keeping with its image as a pro-unification political party, the KMT is less willing to state squarely the more sensitive issues, such as the DPP’s third point. Both Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou speak in the same terms of the status quo but pursue different policies toward China and have different perceptions of cross-Strait relations. Ma criticized Chen for breaking the mutual trust with the United States. Therefore, he commits to not seeking de jure independence, but he also takes a more lenient policy toward the PRC, including the acceptance of one China with different interpretations or the so-called 1992 consensus. Taiwanese public opinion polls show that a majority would choose to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In 27 surveys carried out by the MAC between 2000 and 2008, most respondents in each case were in favor of maintaining the cross-Strait “status quo.” Among them, an average of 39.5 percent favor maintaining status quo now and deciding on independence or unification later, while 20 percent favor for the status quo indefinitely. Only 6.7 percent favor independence as soon as possible, while 15 percent favor maintaining the status quo now and declaring independence later. Broadly speaking, 80 percent of the people of Taiwan favor maintaining the status quo rather than developing closer political ties with China.18 Since the KMT regained its status as the ruling party of Taiwan, more people than ever hold this view, while those calling for quick unification still account for just 2 percent. China’s Interpretation For the leaders in Beijing, the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is an unfamiliar concept created by the United States. They seldom use the term in their policies toward Taiwan. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao prefer the terminology of preserving peace, rather than the status quo, in the Taiwan Strait. For Beijing, the “one country, one China” principle that Taiwan is a part of China and China has

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sovereignty over Taiwan is the definition of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.19 After the United States frequently reminded the Chen Shui-bian administration of its commitment to no unilateral change of the status quo through taking unilateral action toward Taiwan independence, the leaders in Beijing began to emphasize the importance of this stance in their dialogue with their U.S. counterparts. Beijing has adjusted its approach to unification with Taiwan. From 1949 through the 1960s, China followed a militant approach. It wanted to “liberate” Taiwan through its armed forces. After its rapprochement with the United States in 1971, China changed its strategy toward Taiwan by promoting the third KMT-CCP cooperation to reach unification by negotiations, adopting the “one country, two systems” formula for unification in 1984. It should be noted, however, that Beijing has never renounced the use of force to take over Taiwan. In fact, after President Lee’s trip to Cornell University in 1995, and especially after the DPP became the ruling party in 2000, Beijing began to show its impatience toward the approach of peaceful unification,20 increasing its military intimidation toward Taiwan. In its admonition of May 17, 2004, Beijing stated that Chen Shuibian had “put out a timetable to move the island to independence through the making of a new constitution, thus pushing cross-Strait relations to the brink of danger.” In March 2005, President Hu Jintao stated his four-point position on Taiwan. He argued that “[a]lthough the mainland and Taiwan are not yet reunified, the fact that the two sides belong to one and the same China has remained unchanged since 1949. This is the status quo of cross-Strait relations. This is not only our stand, but also what can be found in the existing regulations and documents in Taiwan. Since Taiwan and the mainland belong to one and the same China, there shall be no such question as to who annexes whom between the mainland and Taiwan.”21 In announcing the enactment of the ASL on March 14, 2005, China stressed that it was done for the purpose of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Hu also argued that efforts to strive for peaceful reunification would not be abandoned and that the guideline of pinning their hopes on the Taiwanese people would never be changed. While Beijing has stressed that the law is not a war law, it has authorized the State Council and the CMC to make

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the decision on executing military action against Taiwan. From the Chinese perspective, it was Taiwan under the Chen Shui-bian administration that sabotaged the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, so Beijing needed to take precautions to safeguard the motherland through a legislative approach with the aim of assuaging the domestic outcry regarding the Taiwan issue. The law also reflects the Chinese attitude that the urgent task is forestalling Taiwan independence rather than promoting the reunification of China. In his political report to the Chinese Communist Party 17th Party Congress in October 2007, Hu made a similar statement that even though “the Mainland and Taiwan are yet to be reunified, the fact that they belong to one and the same China has never changed.” He omitted using the term “status quo.” Instead, Hu warned that the Taiwan issue cannot be determined solely by the 23 million people of Taiwan: “China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division, and any matter in this regard must be decided by the entire Chinese people including our Taiwan compatriots.”22 Beijing was pleased with Washington’s opposition to the UN referendum, so Hu in his report to the 17th Party Congress mentioned that he is ready to achieve a peace agreement with Taiwan under the one-China principle and halted his words of intimidation regarding Taiwan’s UN referendum. In December 2008, Hu raised with Taiwan his six-point peace proposal, in which he argued that reunification of China and Taiwan does not mean the re-creation of sovereignty or territories, but an end to political confrontation. He continued by saying that “[a]lthough the two sides of the Strait have been split since 1949 by a civil war, the political confrontation between them did not change the fact that they belonged to one China.”23 For Hu Jintao, the status quo in the Taiwan Strait may mean that China and Taiwan are not yet unified. Beijing often avoids the term “divided nation” to describe the present reality in the Taiwan Strait, and rejects the application of formulas applied to the divided Germanys before 1990 or the present Koreas to the settlement of disputes between Taiwan and China. Beijing claims that the mainland and Taiwan belong to the same country or belong to one China. Beijing also initiated the concept of co-management with the United States into its Taiwan policy as a means of further isolating Chen Shui-bian’s political moves. Beijing accused Chen Shui-bian of taking actions of creeping independence and urged President Bush

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to restrain Taipei’s moves. The Bush administration did not disappoint Beijing. President Bush and other U.S. officials time and again committed to President Hu that the United States was opposed to unilateral change of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.24 Compared to Jiang Zemin, Hu changed Beijing’s position that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China” into the more flexible notion that “both Taiwan and the Mainland belong to one China.” Beijing labeled the defensive referendum and the new constitution in Taiwan as symbols of Taiwan independence that were unilaterally changing the status quo. Any referendum in Taiwan strikes a nerve for the PRC. Symbolically, it is the direct exercise of Taiwanese democracy, underscoring the difference between Taiwan and authoritarian Chinese. Substantively, China fears that the referendum process in Taiwan is designed to lead to a vote for independence. Right before the Taiwan legislature adopted the Referendum Law, the People’s Liberation Army even warned that “Taiwan independence means war,” and that Beijing was willing to risk diplomatic isolation, economic recession, a loss of foreign investment and the 2008 Olympics to prevent independence.25 Nevertheless, Beijing adopted a lenient attitude toward Taiwan’s proposed referenda on the construction of the nuclear power plant and reduction of seats in the Legislative Yuan, while indicating less tolerance toward the planned WHO referendum. Beijing indicated it could accept a referendum in Taiwan as long as it did not change the national name or national flag. Responding to Taiwan’s criticism of the ASL, Li Jiaquan, a senior researcher with the Institute of Taiwan Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, claimed that “[b]oth the legislative purpose and main contents of the law have clearly demonstrated its aim to safeguard the cross-Strait status quo.”26 In 2007–2008, China did not take the law into its own hands when the DPP decided to push forth a UN referendum under the name of Taiwan. Premier Wen Jiabao said in a news conference before the Taiwan presidential election that if Taiwan’s UN referendum passed, it would create a change of the status quo that states that Taiwan and Mainland China belong to the same China.27 Additionally, Beijing praised the United States for opposing the DPP’s UN referendum. For Beijing, to main-

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tain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is not only the PRC’s task but also that of the United States.28 Beijing has long maintained that the Taiwan issue is an internal affair brooking no international intervention. However, after Taiwan held a defensive referendum in 2004, Beijing came to believe that Washington, rather than Beijing itself, exerting pressure on President Chen Shui-bian was the most effective way to restrain him from crossing the red line. Starting from Chen’s second term, Beijing’s leaders tried to strike an accord with Washington for jointly managing the Taiwan issue, particularly in matters such as referenda that Beijing considered pro-independence. Beijing was not completely satisfied with Sino-American tacit cooperation in containing the Chen government and sometimes complained that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait could not be singlehandedly interpreted by the United States. Wang Fan, a professor at China Foreign Affairs University, argues that the U.S. policy of maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is another version of strategic ambiguity, designed to control the crisis rather than solve it. Although the status quo policy could improve Sino-American relations, Taiwan could utilize the policy to have more bargaining power vis-à-vis China. Wang also believes that “[b]y deterring use of force from Mainland China and preventing the independence of Taiwan, the U.S. hopes to play an exclusive role in constraining the potential crisis across the Taiwan Strait.”29 Ding Shichuang of the People’s Liberation Army College of International Relations also argues that U.S. status quo policy in the Taiwan Strait is trying to prevent China from reunification and Taiwan from independence, aiming to control Taiwan while counterbalancing China.30 U.S. Concerns and Interpretation The U.S. position toward Taiwan’s legal status has changed several times in history. Washington supported the return of Taiwan to the Republic of China in both the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945. After the outbreak of the Korean War, President Harry S. Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to “neutralize” the Taiwan Strait and declared that “the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration

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by the United Nations” on June 27, 1950. President Truman’s declaration created the argument that Taiwan’s legal status is still undecided for those who advocate an independent Taiwan. They argue that Taiwan’s future should be decided by the residents of the island. Nancy Tucker, professor of history at Georgetown University, once noted that “[t]he entanglement of Washington with Taiwan that led to the concept of strategic ambiguity began in 1950.”31 The United States restored full diplomatic relations with the ROC a few years afterward, signed the USA-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty in December 1954 thus implying the recognition of ROC sovereignty over Taiwan, and continued to support Taipei representing the China seat in the UN for three decades. But after the United States began to improve its relations with the PRC in 1971, Washington gradually retreated from its position on Taiwan’s legal status. In the Nixon-Chou Shanghai Communiqué on February 28, 1972, Washington “acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It affirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” It did not legally “recognize” China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. Washington switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing on January 1, 1979, and promised to Beijing that it would only maintain “cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” Legislative Yuan elections in Taiwan were postponed for almost two years until 1980. Coincidently, the U.S. Congress promptly took action to patch any possible breaches in bilateral ties owing to the lack of formal relations with Taiwan, and President Carter signed the legislation introducing the Taiwan Relations Act in April 1979.32 Washington changed its position on Taiwan again when it signed the August 17 communiqué with China in 1982, which sharply differs from the 1979 TRA.33 In June 1998, President Clinton made his “Three Noes” policy toward Taiwan during his dialogue with Chinese scholars in Shanghai. The Three Noes are “not to support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan, one China” and “not to believe that Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which statehood is a requirement.”34

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Over the past six decades, especially after the United States and the PRC signed the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, Washington gradually changed its position on Taiwan to meet Beijing’s requirement. After the DPP came to power in 2000, Washington frequently served as Beijing’s surrogate to stop Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence. The Clinton administration dispatched special envoy Lee Hamilton, then a just-retired congressman (D.-Indiana), to attend President Chen’s inauguration for a fact-finding mission to understand the DPP government’s new China policy. President Chen, in his first presidential inaugural address, assured Washington through his Four Noes commitment. Furthermore, President Chen stated that “the abolition of the National Reunification Council or the Guidelines for National Reunification will not be an issue.”35 It was not until August 2002, when President Chen stated that one country exists on each side of the Taiwan Strait, that the Bush administration got its first surprise.36 After hearing MAC Chairwoman Tsai Ingwen’s explanation in Washington, the Bush administration did not interpret the remarks as a unilateral declaration of independence,37 but this episode might be the first occasion on which the Bush administration reevaluated its strong support for the Chen Shui-bian administration. Responding to President Chen’s plan to hold a defensive referendum, President Bush sent his special envoy James Moriarty, senior director of East Asian affairs, National Security Council, to Taipei in November 2003 to dissuade Chen from holding a referendum that might provoke Beijing. The mission turned out to be a failure. On December 10, 2003, President Bush publicly told visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that “he [Chen] may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo.”38 Much to the disappointment of the Taiwanese people, the United States moved closer to the PRC in its position regarding a defensive referendum in Taiwan. The Bush administration showed displeasure with Taipei’s move to conduct referenda, particularly on matters that might be related to the sovereignty of Taiwan. This attitude may contradict America’s long-standing endorsement of the universality of human rights and democracy, specifically in the 1979 TRA, which stipulates that “the preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.” Washington supports the exercise

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of referendum in many countries, but it could hardly justify a denial of chance for Taiwan to express its dislike for the Chinese missile threats. While engaging the United States in two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, President Bush subordinated the interest of promoting human rights in Taiwan to a candid, constructive, and cooperative relationship with China. Officials in Washington argued that they did not see a compelling need for Taiwan to conduct a defensive referendum. The Bush administration indicated firmly that the United States opposes any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. Washington did not go further to modify its long-time position from “no support” to “opposition to Taiwan independence,” which Beijing would like President Bush to take. From Taipei’s perspective, if the Bush administration stated U.S. opposition to Taiwan independence, then Washington might change its view on the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. If this were so, then the United States would need to adjust its Taiwan policy to conform to this revised principle. The United States would also be expected to take additional measures to restrain Taiwan’s democratization. Ambiguities and room for maneuverability in the TRA might also be challenged. Some American China-hands believe that President Bush was taking correct measures of preventive diplomacy to stop President Chen from crossing the brink in the wording of questions in the defensive referendum. However, some members of the U.S. Congress argue that President Bush overreacted to Taiwan’s first-ever defensive referendum. In 2004, only 45 percent of voters cast votes on whether or not Taiwan should increase its missile equipment and conduct negotiations with the PRC.39 The turnout rate was 5 percent short of being considered valid. The referendum was not a vote on the independence of Taiwan, but in the eyes of Washington, this simply was not the case. Contrary to the predictions of some military analysts in the United States or in overseas Chinese communities, Beijing did not take military action against the island in response to Taiwan’s defensive referendum. Beijing did adopt the ASL one year later as a preventive measure to deter President Chen from drafting a new constitution after the defensive referendum. The Bush administration was prompt to caution Taipei that there were limitations with respect to its support of Taiwan’s future constitutional revision. Kelly stressed the importance of maintenance

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of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. He mentioned that “President Chen defined the status quo as being one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait, once again sparking criticism from Beijing and his domestic opponents.”40 In the beginning of 2006, Washington’s trust in President Chen further deteriorated when it dispatched special envoy Dennis Wilder, acting director for Asian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, to Taipei to restrain the DPP government from abolishing the NUC. After consultations with U.S. envoys, Taipei accepted the milder wording of “cease to function” instead of “abolishing” the NUC. When meeting with President Hu in April 2006, President Bush did not criticize Taiwan as he did when meeting Chinese Premier Wen in December 2003. Instead, Dennis Wilder responded to a question on whether Chen’s move constituted a change of status quo, by saying that under President Chen’s executive powers, he “had the ability to place that organization in abeyance,” and the United States “did not, in any way, make a determination if that was a change to the status quo.”41 Learning from the bitter experience of 2003–2004 in dealing with President Chen, the Bush administration became straightforward in responding to Taiwan’s UN referendum in 2007 and went a step further by warning President Chen and his administration from taking further steps toward Taiwan independence. In August 2007, Wilder stated that neither Taiwan nor the ROC is a sovereign state, even though Taiwan still enjoyed diplomatic ties from 24 sovereign countries at that time. What made the situation worse was that Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, in August 2007, sided with Beijing’s tone and prejudged that the UN referendum in Taiwan was “a step towards a declaration of independence of Taiwan,” and in December 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice labeled the referendum as “provocative.”42 The press release of the U.S. Pentagon also perceived the planned 2008 referendum on Taiwan’s membership in the UN as an independence referendum. It was only after Taipei’s protest when the Pentagon made corrections in their coverage on the website.43 While the PRC was nervous about Taiwan’s UN referendum, it was Taiwan’s staunch supporter—the United States—which exerted pressure on Taipei’s move to conduct the referendum. Although the United States might have been aware that the most likely outcome was that neither version of UN referendum would pass, the Bush

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administration was anxious to give the Chen government a stern warning. Before the process of the UN referendum was finalized by the Central Election Commission, U.S. government officials such as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Christensen directly appealed to Taiwanese voters that it was in Taiwan’s interest to block the referendum from taking place and, once it was put on the ballot, to vote against it. Christensen said in September 2007: Some Taiwan leaders in recent years have asserted that Taiwan Independence is the status quo that should be defended. . . . . [W]hile U.S. opposition to Chinese coercion of Taiwan is beyond question, we do not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, and we do not accept the argument that provocative assertions of Taiwan independence are in any way conducive to maintenance of the status quo or peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. For the reasons I have given above, in fact, we rank such assertions along with the referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan as needless provocations that are patently not in the best interests of the Taiwan people or of the United States.44 The Bush administration was annoyed by President Chen’s proposed UN referendum but did not block already committed arms sales to Taiwan. For example, Washington notified the U.S. Congress on September 12, 2007, of the sales of SM-2 Standard air-defense missiles and P-3C maritime patrol aircraft to Taiwan. However, the State Department registered its displeasure with Chen in the logistics arrangements for his transit stop in the United States in September 2007 on his way to Central America. Stephen Young, American Institute of Taiwan (AIT) Director in Taipei, once told an audience in Taipei that “there is a price to be paid in mutual trust” between Taipei and Washington.45 The United States cares about Taiwan’s national security, but it has no intention and is less capable of helping Taiwan expand its international space, particularly in the UN and its specialized agencies. By exerting pressure on Taipei’s UN referendum, the Bush administration made itself a collaborator with Beijing in co-managing tension in the Taiwan Strait through the approach of sacrificing Taiwan’s interest in expanding its international space. With respect to the future of Taiwan, the U.S. government has taken no position on specific proposals such as Taipei’s special stateto-state relationship or Beijing’s one country, two systems formula.

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Nevertheless, Taipei sees the United States as having moved closer to China’s position on China’s unification by repeatedly stressing that Taiwan or the ROC is not a sovereign state. President Clinton’s 1998 announcement of his Three Noes policy was one example.46 President Bush’s chastisement of the DPP government for its efforts in pushing forth a UN referendum further endorses the exclusion of Taiwan from international governmental organizations. From the viewpoint of Taiwan, this policy contradicts the spirit of the TRA, which states that “[n]othing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization.” Any policy adopted by the U.S. government becomes critical to the thinking of the leaders in both Beijing and Taipei. After the issuance of Beijing’s White Paper on Taiwan in February 2000, President Clinton insisted on a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue and the principle that any cross-Strait agreement must have the assent of the people on the island.47 The Bush administration deviated from long-standing U.S. policy regarding the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. After President Chen’s plan to cease the function of the NUC, President Bush modified this policy by stating that the United States has an interest in “a peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences in a manner that is acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.”48 This U.S. position was similar to President Hu insisting that any matter related to the Taiwan issue “must be decided by the entire Chinese people including Taiwan compatriots.” Ironically, both the 2008 Republican and Democratic Party Platforms moved back toward a position more favorable to Taiwan. The Democratic Party Platform stated that the United States “will continue to support a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues that is consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan.”49 The Republican Platform went even further, saying that “all issues regarding the island’s future must be resolved peacefully through dialogue and be agreeable to the people of Taiwan.”50 The United States has taken preventive diplomatic measures to soothe tensions between Taiwan and China since the deterioration of cross-Strait relations. Beijing welcomed Washington’s proclamation and did not take disproportionate actions against the island when it held two nationwide referenda. It created an expectation

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that Beijing could have room to co-manage the Taiwan issue with Washington. Co-management of the Taiwan issue with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is not well received by American policy makers because the United States is hardly justified in collaborating with an undemocratic country such as China in constraining political development of another democratic entity such as Taiwan. The proposal might also question America’s long-time commitment to the defense of Taiwan. In Sepember 2007, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Christensen denied there was a co-management strategy by stating that “no USG official at any level spends any amount of time coordinating our policies toward Taiwan with Beijing.”51 The Bush administration constantly urged Beijing to enter into direct talks with Taiwan’s democratically elected government. Washington also suggested both sides resume dialogue or negotiation without Taiwan’s acceptance of the precondition of one China.52 Given their differences on these issues, the United States and China cannot wholeheartedly collaborate to bring about peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Whether there is a true and deliberate concerted effort or just a mere coincidental effort between the two countries toward the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait merits further study. Not all in Washington agreed with President Bush on Taiwan’s referendum issue. For example, congressmen such as Gary Ackerman (D.-NY), Tom Lantos (D.-CA), and Nancy Pelosi (D.-CA) and senators such as George Allen (R.-VA), Jon Kyl (R.-AZ), and Joseph Lieberman (D.-CT) supported Taiwan’s plan to hold a defensive referendum. U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman even blasted President Bush for “turning his back on Taiwan,” which he said was an “outrageously unprincipled position for a president of the United States to take.”53 An editorial in the Washington Post accused President Bush for kowtowing to Beijing because of his belief that “China’s ‘comments and actions’—from invasion threats to missile deployments— were of considerably greater concern than a proposed exercise in voting booths.”54 However, the support of the above-mentioned congressmen and senators for the DPP’s UN referendum quickly waned. In general, there was little sustained congressional criticism of President Bush’s stance regarding Taiwan. The ASL draws red lines around Taiwan and thus limits the role that the United States is able to play in cross-Strait relations.

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Beijing has emphasized that it needs a “sovereignty law” (i.e., the ASL) in order to counteract an “intervention law” (i.e., the TRA). Congressmen were more vocal than the Bush administration in branding the ASL as an act of changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Congressman Steve Chabot (R.-OH) initiated a concurrent resolution (House Concurrent Resolution 70) with almost 30 cosponsors indicating that they “strongly oppose the anti-secession legislation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as it will alter the status quo in the region, and thus is a grave concern to the United States.”55 The ASL affects the U.S. calculation of intervention in a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Facing a Chinese deployment of military forces combined with legal, psychological, and media warfare, the United States finds the prospect of intervention increasingly difficult. Senator Dianne Feinstein was concerned about the fluid and unstable situation in the Taiwan Strait, particularly with the rise of China. Therefore, she urged the Bush administration to have the United States play the role of a “counterbalancer” in the region, while shaping and defining the “status quo.”56 To stabilize the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, some American policy makers or academics have proposed formulas such as an interim agreement (Kenneth Lieberthal), interim arrangements (Stanley Roth), or a modus viviendi (Harry Harding) for Taipei and Beijing to consider.57 Both Taipei and Beijing have proposed negotiating a peace agreement or building a framework of peace and stability for future cross-Strait relations, but they have not found the way to start in the process. These proposals intend to freeze the status quo for at least three to five decades to come, and most of them address Taiwan’s security concerns of international status, such as participation in international organizations in exchange for its pledge of not declaring de jure independence. For example, Iain Johnston, a Harvard University professor, suggested: Taiwan should be allowed into all international organizations, such as the United Nations and its agencies, as a special non-sovereign state participant or observer. The specific condition is that if it declares formal independence it would forfeit its status and get expelled from the organization. [For China, t]he renunciation of force would have to be verified through confidence building measures, such as the demilitarization of parts of eastern China opposite Taiwan.

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The U.S., for its part, would publicly pledge, unambiguously, that it would not support or defend a Taiwan that declared formal independence from an entity called the Republic of China. It would pledge to reduce arms transfers to Taiwan, gearing this reduction to the over-all demilitarization of eastern China.58 While the United States pointed fingers to Taipei and Beijing for their deeds and words possibly destabilizing the Taiwan Strait, Washington did not specify the real meaning of the status quo. However, Washington’s past practice shows that actions taken by Taiwan that imply the pursuit of de jure independence include the abolition of the NUC; holding a national referendum on crossStrait relations; and amending the ROC Constitution, which might change the national name, flag, and the scope of ROC territory. But Washington has frequently overreacted and hurt Taiwan’s democracy. At the same time, China’s military actions or threats against Taiwan are also regarded by Washington as dangerous moves threatening the status quo. Can the Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait be Maintained? As mentioned above, Washington, Taipei, and Beijing have their own definitions of what the status quo is in the Taiwan Strait. Over the past seven decades, Washington has changed its position toward Taiwan’s legal status several times. The emergence of Taiwanese nationalism encourages the Taiwanese people to take a new view of Taiwan’s relations with China, and a rising China has increased Beijing’s capacity to force Taiwan to accept its terms either by carrot or by stick. What we analyze above are only the legal and political sides of the question of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. These aspects alone involve considerable variability. If we take into consideration the military, economic, social, and diplomatic aspects, cross-Strait relations appear even more dynamic, and maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait appears impossible. First of all, there were no people-to-people exchanges before 1987 because the ROC Government regarded the CCP as a rebellious group and adopted a “no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise” policy toward China. But Taipei lifted its ban on visits to China on November 2, 1987. By January 2010, the Taiwanese had accumulated more than

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56 million visits to China, while more than 3.3 million mainland Chinese had paid visits to Taiwan.59 Second, after the ROC relaxed its restrictions on developing Taiwan economic ties with China in late 1980s, cross-Strait trade and Taiwan’s investment in China increased dramatically, with China becoming Taiwan’s largest trading partner. Cross-Strait two-way trade amounted to about US$105 (Taiwan’s estimate) to US$129 (China’s estimate) billion in 2008.60 From 1991 to 2009, Taiwan’s investment in China accounted for more than 58 percent of Taiwan’s total foreign investment.61 Taiwanese businessmen estimate that Taiwan has invested more than US$100 billion in China, but government statistics indicate about US$82.7 billion from 1991 to 2009.62 There are more than one million Taiwanese living and working regularly in China, and by April 2010, there were more than 318,000 cross-Strait marriages (including Hong Kong and Macao).63 Taiwan has been gradually absorbed into “the Greater China Co-prosperity Sphere,” and Beijing could easily use these ties to bring both economic and political pressure on Taiwan.64 Since coming to power in May 2008, President Ma has made a great effort to promote closer economic ties between Taiwan and China by lifting almost all of the restrictions on cross-Strait economic relations. The Ma government initially considered signing a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with China, which was renamed by President Ma the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Many Taiwanese feared this policy was a major step toward unification with China.65 The KMT government argues that the ECFA could prevent Taiwan from being marginalized in the Asia Pacific, help Taiwan’s foreign economic and trade relations to become more internationalized, and open up possibilities of signing free trade agreements with other countries. Distrustful of President Ma’s China policy, the DPP has been a staunch opponent of the ECFA with the PRC. The DPP is concerned that the ECFA will merge the two sides of the Taiwan Strait into a single Chinese market through scrapping tariffs; trade and investment barriers; and expediting the free flow of people, labor, capital, and merchandise. The DPP calls for expanded debate, parliamentary supervision, and a national referendum on the ECFA, but these calls have been given the cold shoulder by the KMT

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government. One can say that cross-Strait exchanges have changed the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Third, the diplomatic balance between Taiwan and China has leaned toward China’s favor since the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, which allowed the PRC to replace the ROC in the China seat in October 1971. Before that, the ROC on Taiwan had legitimacy in the international community because more countries recognized the ROC than the PRC. When Washington switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing on January 1, 1979, only 22 countries, including South Africa, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia still maintained diplomatic ties with the ROC. Currently, the ROC maintains diplomatic ties with only 23 countries, while 171 countries (including Palestine) recognize the PRC. Moreover, Taiwan was forced to leave most intergovernmental organizations. Militarily, the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait has changed in favor of China. Taiwan still had the advantage in the Taiwan Strait area in the 1990s, but China has increased its defense budget by two-digit percentages annually since 1989, and much of China’s new military strength is deployable in a Taiwan scenario. Taiwan can no longer match China’s armed forces in terms of both quantity and quality of weapons. The U.S. Pentagon believes that the Chinese military buildup is also changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The rise of China highlights the fact that Taiwan cannot compete with the PRC in military modernization and could not stand by itself without intervention by the United States and Japan. The 2004 Pentagon annual report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China warns that “the cross-Strait balance of power is steadily shifting in China’s favor,” and the 2005 edition suggests that the PRC’s military modernization and strategic capabilities “could pose a credible threat to other modern militaries in the region.”66 In February 2006, the Quadrennial Defense Review confirmed this estimate by emphasizing that “the pace and scope of China’s military buildup already puts regional military balances at risk.”67 In March 2006, Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman said in a testimony to the United States-China Economic and Security Commission that China’s continuing military buildup “changes that status quo and requires us to adapt to the new situation.”68 In June 2007, Richard Lawless, deputy assistant secretary of defense,

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repeated this position by saying that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait was jeopardized because of China’s rapid buildup of its ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan.69 In addition, the Bush administration opposed the dropping of the EU ban on weapons sales to China. The DPP government saw no difference with this U.S. evaluation and believed that the PRC is developing a swift military capability either through decapitation or unconventional military threats to render the islands defenseless.70 Ironically, the DPP was not able to persuade the KMT to supporting the special arms procurement package until the end of 2007 and watched the military balance shift against Taiwan. President Chen could only urge the international community not to leave Taiwan alone in confronting China’s military threats.71 This also weakened Chen’s credibility with the United States, which saw him as both raising tensions and being unable to beef up militarily to strengthen deterrence. Overall, there have been sea changes in cross-Strait economic, cultural, social, and military relations between Taiwan and China in the past six decades. Therefore, maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is unlikely because cross-Strait relations never stand still. Conclusion President Chen’s inaugural speech in May 2000 tried to assure Beijing and Washington through the Four Noes commitment of not changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In May 2004, President Chen chose not to repeat word for word his Four Noes commitment, nor did he repeat the controversial statement “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait.” During the Chen Shuibian presidency, Taiwan was able to conduct six referenda simultaneously on the days of three nationwide elections, two of which were especially controversial, namely, the defensive referendum in 2004 and the UN referendum in 2008. The abolition of the NUC by President Chen was a direct breach of his commitment to the United States and thus was regarded as an unequivocal move toward changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Compared to China and the United States, it was Taiwan under the DPP government that became the most volatile player in terms of shaping a new

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environment in the Taiwan Strait. The United States, rather than the PRC, became the party most directly involved in the political development of Taiwan in the name of maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s further steps toward democratic maturation include the right of conducting referenda, and preventing Taiwan from being absorbed by the PRC would help maintain a favorable balance of power in the Asia Pacific. Nonetheless, in the context of the post911 global antiterrorist campaign and when Beijing’s assistance in the discontinuation of North Korea’s nuclear program was deemed indispensable in the eyes of U.S. decision makers, Taiwan had little choice but to adjust itself in the face of pressure. For some in Taiwan, it is a matter of assuaging accusations of troublemaking simply because the United States cannot afford to have another foreign policy crisis in the Taiwan Strait. In this sense, it was Taiwan, rather than the PRC, that was forced to constrain itself in the pursuit of selfdetermination for the island. In their attempts to maintain their own version of the status quo, Taipei and Beijing were caught up in a vicious cycle of action and counteraction from 1999 to 2008. Taipei has long been unsatisfied with its international status and seeking to gain a better position rather than being downgraded into a local government or special autonomous region of the PRC. From Lee Teng-hui’s special stateto-state relationship with Mainland China to Chen Shui-bian’s one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait, Beijing and Washington realized that democratization in Taiwan might create a worst-case scenario that these two giants do not want to face. China’s decision to introduce its ASL demonstrates the frustration of its Taiwan policy and its need for a law to coerce the island from further drifting toward de jure independence. It remains to be seen whether Beijing continues to hold Taiwan’s acceptance of the one-China principle as the defining feature of the status quo. The Chinese military buildup has surpassed Taiwan’s ability to keep pace and tipped the balance in China’s favor. Therefore, China’s military buildup is regarded by Taiwan and the United States as a change of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The Bush administration believed that the Chen Shui-bian administration tried to use brinkmanship tactics in pushing the envelope toward independence, which might draw the United States

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and China into a military confrontation that both countries did not want. Therefore, the Bush administration took preventive measures and stated its opposition to President Chen Shui-bian’s UN referendum campaign. The Bush administration persistently told Taipei that it did not have a single and final solution regarding the future of Taiwan. The actual way in which the United States defines the status quo seems to be quite flexible, and this allows Taiwan and China considerable scope to offer their own dynamic interpretations. With the end of Chen’s presidency and with a moderate Ma Yingjeou and anti-independence KMT government in place, Beijing and Washington are relieved to see better cross-Strait relations taking shape, with emphasis on the maintenance of the status quo. Beijing regards the remaining three years of Ma’s first term as a period of golden opportunity to develop cross-Strait relations because it cannot be sure whether Ma will win reelection in 2012. When Taiwan was under the DPP administration, Beijing could only hope to reverse the trend or stop the momentum of de jure Taiwan independence. It did not have the luxury to think about cross-Strait unification. President Ma’s new policy toward China has given Beijing new hope concerning unification within the foreseeable future. Beijing has proposed that Taipei and Beijing soon enter into political negotiations. The question that the United States faces now is, assuming that a creeping independence is a step toward changing the status quo, whether or not Taiwan’s creeping unification with China also poses a challenge for the desired future balance of power in the region. Notes 1. For the information about these public opinion surveys, please visit http:// www.mac.gov.tw/english/index1-e.htm. 2. Huang-chih Chiang and Jau-yuan Hwang, “On the Statehood of Taiwan: A Legal Reappraisal,” in Peter C. Y. Chow, The “One China” Dilemma (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 61; David M. Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 344. 3. “President Chen’s Inaugural Address,” News Releases, Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), May 20, 2000, cited in http://www.president. gov.tw/en/ 4. “Resolution on Taiwan future,” May 1999, cited in http://www.taiwandc.org/ nws-9920.htm.

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5. “President Chen Delivers the Opening Address of the 29th Annual Meeting of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations via Live Video Link,” News Releases, Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), August 3, 2002, cited in http://www.president.gov.tw/en/. 6. The final legislation forced President Chen to turn to Article 17, the only provision that allows a DPP president to hold a referendum on the presidential election day, March 20, 2004. Article 17 allows Taiwan’s president to call a referendum on “national security” if the island were faced with a clear foreign threat that could erode Taiwan’s territorial integrity. 7. U.S. Congress, The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next Twenty-Five Years, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, Second Session, April 21, 2004 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), pp. 14–15. 8. Zhongguo shibao (China Times), April 23, 2004, p. 2. 9. Testimony of Randall G. Schriver, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, in China’s Anti-Secession Law and Developments Across the Taiwan Strait, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, first Session, April 6, 2005 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 9. 10. “President Chen’s Concluding Remarks at National Security Conference,” News Releases, Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), February 27, 2006, cited in http://www.president.gov.tw/en/. 11. Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “The Impact of Taiwan’s 2008 Elections on CrossStrait Relations: A Game-Theoretical Analysis,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2008), p. 166. 12. “A Conversation with Ma Ying-jeou,” Council on Foreign Relations, cited in www.cfr.org/bios/14/jerome_a_cohen. html. 13. Mo Yan-chih, “Ma Pushes ‘Status Quo’ in Article,” Taipei Times, February 8, 2006, p. 8. 14. “Transcript of Interview with The New York Times and International Herald Tribune,” News Release, June 18, 2008, cited in http://www.president.gov.tw/ en/. 15. Jimmy Crowell, “Taiwanese Progressive Leader Speaks Of Nation’s Independence from China,” Cornell Daily Sun, September 4, 2008. 16. Laura Janka, “Taiwan party head and CU alum details island’s tense relations with China,” Cornell Chronicle, September 8, 2008, cited in http:// www.news.cornell.edu/stories/Sept08/Taiwan.demo.lj.html. 17. Ing-wen Tsai, “Policy Briefing Session for Diplomats and Foreign Representatives,” September 26, 2008, cited in http://www.dpp.org.tw/. 18. “Unification, Independence, or Status Quo?” Mainland Affairs Council, December 2008, cited in http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/pos/9712/ 971225c.pdf. 19. Sheng-liang Sun, “Taiwan Independence is the Real Threat to Peace in the Taiwan Strait,” January 22, 2004, cited in http://tw.people.com.cn/ BIG5/14811/14869/2307779.html.

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20. Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 243–44, 437–38; Arthur S. Ding, “The Lessons of the 1995–1996 Military Taiwan Strait Crisis: Developing A New Strategy toward the United States and Taiwan,” in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel (eds.), The Lessons of History: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003), pp. 391–94. 21. “Four-Point Guideline on Cross-Straits Relations Set forth by President Hu,” People’s Daily, March 5, 2005, cited in http://english.peopledaily.com. cn/200503/05/eng20050305_175645.html. 22. “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress,” cited in http://news. xinhuanet.com/ english/2007-10/24/content_6938749_9.htm. 23. “Six proposals offered for cross-strait relations,” China Daily, December 31, 2008, cited in http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-12/31/ content_7357490.htm. 24. Brian Knowlton “Bush Warns Taiwan to Keep Status Quo: China Welcomes U.S. Stance,” International Herald Tribune, December 10, 2003; “Hu: Bush Staunchly Opposed Any Change of Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait,” September 6, 2007, cited in http://www.china.com.cn/ news/txt/2007-09/06/ content_8828069.htm. 25. “PLA: Chen Shui-bian is to Blame if War Breaks Out,” People’s Daily, December 3, 2003, cited in http://english.people.com.cn/ 200312/03/ eng20031203_129595.shtml. 26. “Researchers Defend Anti-Secession Law,” China Daily, March 17, 2005, cited in http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/ffl/123152.htm. 27. “Wen: Taiwan’s ‘UN Membership Referendum’ to Cause Tension,” Xinhua, March 18, 2008, cited in http://tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14810/7013856. html. 28. “China ‘Values’ U.S. Opposition to Taiwan Referendum,” Xinhua, December 12, 2007, cited in http://big5.chinataiwan.org/sy/yw/200712/ t20071212_499956.htm 29. Wang Fan, “An Analysis of American Policy of Maintaining the Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait,” International Forum (Beijing), No. 3 (2006), pp. 55–60. 30. Ding Shichuan, “US’s Maintaining Status Quo Policy in the Taiwan Issue and China’s Strategic Choice,” International Survey (Shanghai), No. 4 (2004), pp. 33–38 31. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?” in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (ed.), Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 188–89. 32. Jian Yang, Congress and US China Policy, 1989–1999 (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2000), pp. 17–19, 62–67; Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 18, 70; Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act,” China Quarterly (2001), No. 165, pp. 151–52.

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33. June Dreyer, “The Fictional ‘Status Quo,’ Part One,” Taipei Times, December 20, 2006, p. 8. 34. Quoted in Larry M. Wortzel, “Why the Administration should reaffirm the ‘Six Assurances’ to Taiwan,” Backgrounder, Heritage Foundation, No. 1352, March 16, 2000. 35. “President Chen’s Inaugural Address,” News Releases, Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), May 20, 2000, cited in http://www.president. gov.tw/en/. 36. Ralph A. Cossa, “No Surprise?” PacNet (Pacific Forum CSIS), No. 31, August 6, 2002. 37. Charles Snyder, “U.S. Reacts to ‘One Country on Each Side,’ ” Taipei Times, August 9, 2002, p. 1. 38. Brian Knowlton, “Bush Warns Taiwan to Keep Status Quo: China Welcomes U.S. Stance,” International Herald Tribune, December 10, 2003. 39. It was not Beijing’s coercive actions that prevented voters from casting the vote on defensive referendum; it was party electoral tactics which sabotaged the first nation-wide referendum. The losers of this outcome were the DPP and the United States. The Patriot III missiles package was obstructed by the KMT simply because it was legally bound by the referendum outcome in March 2004. After three years of obstruction, the KMT agreed to upgrade the existing PAC-2 in June 2007 and the Patriot III missiles in December 2007. 40. James Kelly, “Overview of US Policy toward Taiwan,” April 21, 2004. 41. Press Briefing by Deputy National Security Advisor Faryar Shirzad and National Security Council Acting Director Dennis Wilder on the President’s Meeting with President Hu of the People’s Republic of China, April 20, 2006, cited in http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64312. 42. Shirley A. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, CRS Report for Congress, August 17, 2009, p. 75. 43. “Washington Clarifies Pentagon Statements,” China Post, November 7, 2007. 44. Thomas Christensen, “A Strong and Moderate Taiwan,” September 11, 2007, cited in http://www.ait.org.tw/en/officialtext-ot0715.html. 45. Press Conference Stephen M. Young, Director, American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, November 9, 2007, cited in http://www.ait.org.tw/en/news/officialtext/viewer.aspx?id=2007110902. 46. The other two noes are that the United States does not support Taiwan independence and that the United States does not support one China, one Taiwan. 47. “Transcript: Clinton Urges Business to Support China WTO Deal,” Washington File, February 24, 2000. 48. “No Changes in U.S. Policy Toward China, Taiwan, State Dept. Says,” January 30, 2006, cited in http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2006/Jan/31-671973. html 49. “U.S. Democratic and Republican Party Platforms and China, 2008,” cited in http://china.usc.edu/ ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=1167.

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50. Ibid.; Charles Snyder, “Draft of Republican party platform supports Taiwan,” Taipei Times, August 29, 2008, p. 1. 51. Thomas Christensen, “A Strong and Moderate Taiwan,” September 11, 2007, cited in http://www.china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=803. 52. Kerry Dumbaugh, U.S.-China Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, September 22, 2006, p. 9; Kelly, “Overview of U.S. Policy toward Taiwan,” April 21, 2004. 53. “Bush Failed Taiwan: Lieberman,” Taipei Times, January 8, 2004, p.1. 54. “Mr. Bush’s Kowtow,” Washington Post, December 10, 2003, p. A30. 55. “Expressing the Sense of Congress that the United States Should Strongly Oppose China’s Anti-secession Legislation with Respect to Taiwan,” cited in http://thomas.loc.gov/ cgi-bin/ query/z?c109:H.CON.RES.70. It also claimed that “the future of Taiwan should be resolved by peaceful means and with the consent of its people.” 56. Dianne Feinstein, “China’s Rise: Economic Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy and the Asia Pacific Region,” Asia Society’s Second Annual Dinner, San Francisco, June 4, 2005, cited in . 57. Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, DC : Brookings Institution Press, 2005), pp. 280–81; Harry Harding, “Toward a Modus Vivendi,” in Jaw-ling Joanne Chang and William W. Boyer (eds.), United States-Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years after the Taiwan Relations Act (Baltimore: Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 29–397; Stanley O. Roth, “The Taiwan Relations Act at Twenty and Beyond,” in The Legacy of the Taiwan Relations Act (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1999), p. 184. 58. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Solving the China-Taiwan Standoff: A Modest Proposal,” cited in http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~johnston/Taiwan_ proposal.pdf. 59. “Table 20 Number of Mainlanders Visit Taiwan,” Mainland Affairs Council, cited in http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/06217202050.pdf; and “Table 19 Number of Taiwan Tourists to Mainland China,” Mainland Affairs Council cited in http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/06217201178. pdf. 60. “Table 5 Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China,” Mainland Affairs Council, cited in http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/06217182538. pdf. 61. “Table 13 Taiwan Approved Outward Investment by Country (Area),” Mainland Affairs Council, cited in http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/ Attachment/06217192658.pdf. 62. “Table 10 Taiwan Investment in Mainland China,” Mainland Affairs Council, http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/0621719445.pdf. 63. “Exchanges of Visits,” Mainland Affairs Council, January 2009, cited in http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/06716425871.pdf. 64. Murray Scot Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), pp. 2–3.

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65. Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Taiwan, China Negotiating a Landmark Free Trade Agreement,” Washington Post, February 21, 2009, p. A9. 66. Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2004, May 2005, p. 46; The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2005, July 2005, Executive Summary and pp. 12–14. 67. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006, p. 29. 68. “China’s Growing Power Forces U.S. Rethink,” China Daily (Beijing), March 17, 2006. 69. Charles Snyder, “China Changing ‘Status Quo’: U.S. Defense official,” Taipei Times, June 15, 2007, p. 1; Byron Weng, “The Status Quo in the Taiwan Straits Has Changed,” in Chih-cheng Lo (ed.), Taiwan Perspective (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 2004), pp. 71–74. 70. 2006 National Security Report (Taipei: National Security Council, 2006), p. 39. 71. “President Chen’s Teleconference with Experts in Berlin, Germany,” News Releases, Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), April 25, 2007, cited in http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews. php4?_section=3&_recNo=38m.

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Lobbying for a “U.S.-Taiwan FTA” in the U.S. Congress: Which “Fast Track”? What Target? David W. F. Huang

Introduction

S

ince 2002, despite persistent lobbying efforts from Taiwan to promote a U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the U.S. government remains insistent that Taiwan should focus on liberalizing its economy under the “Trade and Investment Framework Agreement” (TIFA). From the U.S. perspective, TIFA offers a “building block” for a future U.S.-Taiwan FTA. Under TIFA, the United States suggests that the two sides complete negotiations on a bilateral government procurement agreement, a bilateral investment agreement, and an agreement to avoid double taxation, so as to pave the way for the FTA. From the Taiwanese perspective, TIFA is merely a consolation prize for not having a U.S.-Taiwan FTA, even though Taiwanese officials have generally agreed to pursue this building block approach under TIFA. Moreover, since 2002, because of an acceleration of regional integration in East Asia in the form of signing bilateral FTAs, there has been serious “competitive liberalization” pressure on Taiwan to negotiate FTAs with its major trade partners. Not only would a U.S.-Taiwan FTA benefit the industries of both, but it would also provide a positive example

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to those who might fear retaliation from China, encouraging them to follow suit.1 Therefore, “lobbying beyond TIFA” so as to put a “U.S.-Taiwan FTA” on the U.S. trade negotiation agenda has always been a most important foreign policy objective for Taiwan. However, there were many reasons why the United States has been reluctant to engage in FTA negotiations with Taiwan. First, some analysts argue that the likely contribution to the U.S. economy of a U.S.-Taiwan FTA would not be substantial, with benefits mainly accruing to the U.S. agricultural sector and specific industries. Therefore, Taiwan is not on the list of U.S. priorities regarding trade negotiations. Second, the United States insisted that Taiwan should comply with its WTO obligations before engaging in “WTO plus” discussions. Third, the United States believed that the normalization of cross-Strait trade is essential to enhance the anticipated benefits of a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA. Without progress on the cross-Strait’s three links, the U.S. business community has no interest in pressing the U.S. government to negotiate an FTA with Taiwan. Fourth, given the political disputes between the George W. Bush and Chen Shuibian administrations regarding Taiwan’s referendum issues, the U.S. government had no political appetite to respond to Taiwan’s request for a U.S.-Taiwan FTA. Finally, the U.S. government was constantly divided with the presidency and the Congress controlled by different parties, making it very difficult to open new FTA negotiations. Divided government increases the difficulties for the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in obtaining “fast track” authorization from the Congress, such as that conveyed by the 2002 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Act. Without TPA, there is little incentive for the USTR or its trade partners to engage in serious talks concerning any FTA.2 Of course, one could argue that where there is a will (of the president or the USTR), there is a way to overcome such obstacles. But what if there is no political will in the United States to promote a U.S.-Taiwan FTA? In this paper, I take the lack of political will in the U.S. government as a given and ask what can be done to better promote a U.S.-Taiwan FTA. Without prejudicing against other factors inimical to a U.S.Taiwan FTA, in this paper I shall focus only on identifying the U.S. institutional rules and players that would facilitate the USTR engaging in FTA negotiations with Taiwan. My assumption is that

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unless these institutional rules and players in the United States are observed, analyzed, and utilized, Taiwan will not be able to direct its limited resources toward effectively lobbying for a U.S.-Taiwan FTA. Essential to Taiwan’s lobbying efforts is identifying which “fast track” would best serve a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA, and which congressional players should be targeted in order to win congressional authorization. I shall answer these two fundamental questions, first, by reviewing the existing literature on U.S. trade policy formation. Second, I examine various rules and procedures of the U.S. government that steer its trade policy making as well as various institutional veto points that should be identified. Third, given that choosing a legislative route will determine what kind of trade agreement can be reached, I investigate the routes that the USTR will most likely may adopt if it chooses to engage in FTA negotiations with Taiwan. I submit that the chosen legislative route must, at least, be made compatible with the provisions and spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Once a legislative route is chosen, key institutional veto holders could, theoretically, be identified. It is these key institutional players and their constituent interests that should be targeted by Taiwan’s lobbyists. Fourth, in order to show how my theoretical conjecture can be used for practical purposes, I shall explore a few methods that could identify the names of these key veto players in U.S. trade policy making. Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings in the conclusion. Making Sense of U.S. Trade Policy Formation After completing field interviews with trade officials of Asia-Pacific countries, Christopher Dent concludes, “the U.S. has the most society-centric approach to trade policy formation. USTR officials themselves admit that while government strategic thinking (e.g., competitive liberalization) provides some crucial backbone to U.S. trade policy, it essentially acts in response to the lobbied demands of various domestic interest groups, be they from the business or civil society sectors.”3 Given that U.S. trade policy is often “captured” by various domestic interests, it is not surprising to find that numerous studies focus on the demand side (i.e., social preferences) of U.S. trade policy making. For example, Rogowski argues that competitions

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between the abundant factors of production that favor trade liberalization and the scarce factors of production that favor protectionism determine the outcome of trade policy.4 Frieden contends that trade policy is determined by competitions between sectors or industries that are internationally competitive and those that are not.5 However, Gourevitch reminds us that at any given time, trade or economic policies will reflect only a subset of social or business preferences.6 What, then, determines which interest group wins the competition over U.S. trade policy? The existing demand-side literature on trade policy is incomplete because it pays little attention to the intermediating role of domestic political institutions. By controlling access to decision making, institutions affect how much influence a particular interest group has.7 This plausible conjecture has been thoroughly investigated by many studies on U.S. trade policy. For example, Haggard assesses the institutional impact of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) on trade policy making.8 Goldstein examines the interaction between ideas and institutions in the making of U.S. trade policy.9 Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast discuss the institutional roots of American trade policy.10 Rogowski demonstrates a logical link between free trade preference and the proportional representation (PR) system.11 Milner and Rosendorff show that information provided by lobbyists to Congress for the ratification of trade agreements can be very positive, unless there is a divided government.12 Indeed, recent studies have often focused on the impact of divided government on U.S. trade policy. On one hand, some scholars argue that divided government in the United States inhibits trade liberalization and impedes international trade agreements.13 Cross-national studies also confirm that institutional fragmentations reduce commercial openness, contribute to smaller changes in both tariffs and nontariff barriers, and make capital controls policy reform less likely.14 Meanwhile, other scholars either find no such effect of divided government on trade liberalization, or contend that divided government led to lower U.S. tariffs in the postwar period.15 The inconsistencies of the above empirical findings are usually attributed either to a sample selection bias or to inadequate assumptions about partisan and institutional preferences in divided

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government. For example, Coleman points out that throughout the years surveyed (i.e., the postwar period), divided government was neither evenly distributed nor correlated with increased protection in subsets of them.16 In addition to sample selection bias, the preferences of divided government may be misconstrued. In her original reasoning, O’Halloran argues that under divided government, fewer members of Congress are of the president’s party, so the president is less likely to be empowered by the Congress with authority over trade liberalization. As a result, divided government may be associated with higher levels of protection than unified government.17 However, O’Halloran’s argument can be misleading, because it does not separate party from policy preferences. As Sherman contends, “Although postwar Democratic Congresses are more protectionist than Republican Congresses, Democratic presidents are less protectionist than their Republican counterparts. The ‘divide’ in divided government is not across party lines but within them: Congressional and presidential preferences over trade policy are more alike when government is divided than when it is unified.”18 In other words, even though institutions matter, party and policy preferences embedded in institutions must be taken into account in order to generate plausible hypotheses. It is for the above reason that we have to distinguish institutional veto points from partisan veto players when analyzing U.S. trade policy making. Institutional Veto Points in U.S. Trade Policy Making In the United States, trade policy initiatives have been contested by the U.S. Congress and the president, both of which are vested with constitutional powers to block policy change. Congress may authorize “fast track” procedures, which restricts its ability to amend a trade agreement, but this does not change the fact that a majority in both Houses must ratify trade agreements. The power to ratify U.S. trade agreements can be regarded as a form of veto power wielded by Congress, but it does not automatically make every member of Congress a veto player. Conceptually, institutional veto points are “strategic points of uncertainty that arise from the logic of the decision process itself.”19 If any proposed trade policy change is to succeed and become law, it must win support at all of these decisive points where its occupants wield veto power over such proposals.20

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In other words, veto points are “institutions” where policy proposals are voted on, and veto players are “individuals or collective actors” who occupy veto points. Tsebelis defines the concept of veto player as “an individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo.”21 He argues that a large number of partisan veto players (i.e., parties in a governing coalition) increases the stability of the existing status quo, hence making policy change less likely. However, he notes that the mere existence of a large number of veto points does not necessarily preclude policy change. If preference congruence exists among partisan veto players, policy change can be facilitated even when there are multiple veto points. In the realm of U.S. trade policy making, for example, if the democratic president and the republican Congress held the same preference on trade liberalization, then divided government would not necessarily preclude the initiation and ratification of FTAs. What are the institutional veto points in U.S. trade policy making? We need to pay attention to the essential features of U.S. lawmaking: separation of powers, heterogeneous preferences, and multistage collective choice.22 A bill is first introduced either by the president or Congress to the floor of the House. Then, the median voter (together with half of the other members of Congress who hold a similar position) in the House will decide whether to pass the bill or vote it down. If the bill is voted down, the game is over, and the status quo persists. If the bill is passed by the majority of members of Congress in the House, then it is referred to the Senate for consideration. Or the Senate may introduce its own version of the similar bill. However, before senators hold a vote on the bill, according to the Senate’s Rule 22, each senator has the right to engage in extended debate (filibuster) subject to a 3/5 vote to end debate (invoking cloture). If more than 2/5 of the senators decide to mount a filibuster, the status quo would be preserved. If the Senate overcomes the filibuster and passes the bill, it is sent to the president for signing. If the president signs the bill, it becomes a law. If the president decides to veto the bill, it is sent back to the Congress, where both the Senate and the House require the votes of more than 2/3 of their members to override the president’s veto. If the Congress fails to override the president’s veto, the status quo is preserved.

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We can identify various institutional veto points. The median voters in both the House (HM) and the Senate (SM) are required to pass the law, so they constitute veto points as a result of a simple majority rule. In the Senate, the filibuster (together with 2/5 of senators) is another veto point, because members can prevent a vote from being held in the Senate. The resident presents another veto point, as he or she can veto the bill passed by the Congress. Finally, 2/3 of the members of Congress who can override the president’s veto are also occupants of veto points. Another important factor to consider is the policy preference of the veto players, whether they tend toward the Left (preferring trade liberalization) or the Right (preferring trade protection) of the ideological spectrum. If all American veto players prefer no foreign trade barriers and all foreigners (F) prefer no trade barriers in the U.S. trade regime, the question is how much trade liberalization (e.g., tariff concession) should be offered to foreigners in order to maximize U.S. access to foreign markets. Previous studies often showed that the House was more protectionist than the Senate, which was more protectionist than the president.23 In the following discussion, I borrow from Robert Pahre’s analysis.24 The U.S. Constitution prescribes two routes to enact trade or foreign economic policy. First, the policy may be passed by the Congress as a normal bill, subject to the president’s veto. In the second route, the president may negotiate a treaty, which is then subject to a two-thirds majority vote of the Senate ratification. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) in 1934 added the third option, in which the Congress delegates its authority to the president for negotiating a circumscribed set of trade agreements without subsequent referral to the Congress. While the RTAA delegates negotiation authority ex ante, it can be modeled as ex post ratification. This is because any trade agreement must be acceptable to the Congress ex post, otherwise it will be undermined through its implementing legislation. Moreover, knowing that the Congress could have “delegated” a very specific negotiation mandate, such as the House median’s ideal point ex ante, the president would not dare to overstep his mandate if allowed any discretion in it. Therefore, the RTAA can be regarded as a straightforward ratification game.

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If there were no need for ex post ratification or ex ante authorization, such as those of executive agreements, the win-set (i.e., a set of policy outcomes that would defeat the status quo) would be where the preferences of the president and foreigner actors meet. When ratification or ex ante authorization is necessary, the addition of players with veto power such as S67 and/or HM may reduce the size of the win-set. Here, the president negotiates as liberal a trade agreement as possible, until S67 or the House median is indifferent between the trade agreement and the status quo. When S67 or HM prefers the president’s ideal point to the status quo, then ratification or the RTAA reduces the win-set. The president prefers the reduced win-set to the full contract curve, because any bargaining outcome in that reduced win-set would make the president no worse off, while at the same time strengthening his bargaining power vis-àvis his negotiation counterpart. This is exactly the situation where an executive might want to tie his hands, as proposed by Thomas Schelling.25 However, as the ideal point of S67 or HM shifts the win-set to the Right, the president may or may not prefer a ratified treaty to a nonratified executive agreement. Several implications can be derived from the above game. First, when S67’s or HM’s preference moves Leftward, the president will be more likely to seek Senate ratification or the ex ante negotiation mandate prescribed in the RTAA. Second, any player would like to add a veto player to the game if this veto player is slightly more protectionist than he or she is. This is true even for S67 whose ideal point may be slightly more liberal than HM, but S67 prefers the RTAA when the HM reduces but does not change the win-set. Third, adding a meaningful veto player (whose preference does not shift the win-set to such an extent that the other veto players find it unacceptable) makes foreigners worse off, as the win-set is moved further away from their ideal point. The second route for the United States to enact trade policy is through “normal bills.” Before 1934, Congress dominated U.S. trade policy by setting tariffs through normal bills. Moreover, Congress exerted sole authority to change U.S. law over nontariff barriers in normal bills (Pahre, 2004: 203).26 In the process of passing a normal bill, any legislation that goes to the floor under an open rule can be amended, hence giving agenda-setting power to the last-mover on the floor. The House Rules Committee has some power to prevent

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floor amendments by choosing or blocking changes to the rules. In the Senate, S41 can filibuster more protectionist amendments so as to prevent them from coming to a vote. But the major constraints on how liberal a trade bill could be comes from HM and S67, one of whom always favors the maximal protection. Under the procedures governing passage of a normal bill, neither the Senate nor the House wants the other chamber to amend its bill, and each proposes a bill that is sufficiently attractive to veto players in the other chamber to block amendments. For example, the median senator would propose her ideal point if all other players prefer this point to the status quo and if it can avoid amendment in the House. The House amendment can be avoided if the SM bill lies between the ideal point of the median House member and House Rules Committee. Otherwise, the Senate would propose the ideal point of the House Rules Committee (HR), which is slightly more protectionist but remains closer to the ideal point of SM. By doing so, the Senate ensures that the HR will block any House amendment to the bill. Likewise, the House would propose a bill designed to prevent S41 from filibustering. Here, HR and S41 arguably have veto power over normal bills but not over treaty or trade agreements. The logic of avoiding amendments is what prompts the Congress to install “fast track” rules in its subsequent trade acts. For example, the 1974 Trade Act grants the president authority for five years to reduce tariffs and nontariffs barriers. Any trade agreements under the Act’s authority require congressional approval under “fast track” procedures, which prohibit amendment. However, each chamber retains its constitutional rights to pass its own internal rules, which can suspend “fast track” if it so chooses. When either chamber of the Congress suspends the “fast track” rule, a conference committee must reconcile the House and Senate versions of the bill before resubmitting it to both chambers. Under the “fast track” procedure, the president would submit a bill supported by a coalition in each chamber so as to prevent the “fast track” rules from being suspended. This coalition would include the HR Committee, which guards the rules in the House, and S41, who can filibuster any motion to suspend “fast track” rules. The result of “fast track” rules is no different from that of Senate ratification or the RTAA, if S67 (or HM) is so protectionist that the president has no choice but to negotiate a bill as least liberal

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as possible in order to satisfy the holder of that veto point. In this case, procedural actors like S41 and the HR Committee matter little, since their blocking power in procedures does not affect the chosen location of the president’s proposed bill. If the president’s bill is still less liberal than what HR and S41 would prefer, HR and S41 will block suspension of “fast track authority” so that more protectionoriented members do not amend the bill Rightward relative to the status quo. If the chamber medians are sufficiently liberal, the president can negotiate a bill that is more liberal than that preferred by any congressional players. Both S41 and HR must choose between the president’s proposed bill in the win-set and the reconciled bill in the conference committee (CC). In this combination of players’ preferences, the president can negotiate the most liberal agreement, so that both HR and S41 prefer it to the conference bill, while still claiming his hands are tied by Congress. Under the “normal bill” procedure, the outcome should be no more liberal than that of the most liberal congressional actor. Under the “fast track” rules, the president can do better than that. It is no wonder that the president (or the executive) always prefers “fast track” rules to the RTAA, Senate ratification, or normal bill procedures. Subsequent revisions of “fast track” rules do not change the basic contours and logic of the game. For example, the 2002 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Act retrieves the power of the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee to veto the president’s proposal for trade negotiations. But it retains provisions of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act for both committees to initiate a joint disapproval resolution to suspend “fast track” rules during negotiations. So these congressional committees as well as the HR are still playing the role of gatekeeper with regards to those procedural resolutions. One implication derived from the above discussion is that, under “fast track” rules, the president need not confront Congress with a choice between a trade agreement and the status quo, but is often constrained by the procedural actors’ choice between the agreement and the anticipated outcome of a conference committee. This procedural constraint may significantly reduce the range of feasible bargaining options over which the president and foreigners can negotiate. For a country such as Taiwan, which aims at “lobbying beyond TIFA,” the above details and implications of U.S. trade policy-making rules and procedures cannot

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be ignored. In particular, choosing which rule and procedure to push through a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA will ex ante determine to whom (e.g., which key veto players, agenda setters, or procedural actors) to approach and what incentives should be offered to these key players. Which “Fast Track” Should be Opted for the Potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA? Since the 1979 U.S. derecognition of the ROC government in Taiwan, there have been more than 140 agreements in the form of “agreements, memorandums, or exchange letters” signed between the governments of the United States and Taiwan. Almost all of these agreements are regarded by the U.S. government as executive agreements and hence do not involve the Congress for ratification or implementing legislation. Therefore, there is reason to believe that a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA would also fall into the category of a U.S. executive agreement, hence making congressional approval unnecessary. But such a presumption may prove incorrect because nowhere does the TRA preclude congressional scrutiny over agreements signed between the U.S. and Taiwanese governments. Moreover, an important bill like an FTA is of great concern to many social and business interests in the United States. Therefore, proper congressional scrutiny is unavoidable. Which route of U.S. trade policy making, then, is more likely to apply to the case of a future U.S.-Taiwan FTA? Let me first refer to provisions of the TRA for some clues of the potential legal base of a U.S.Taiwan FTA. The purpose of the TRA is “to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan” (TRA, Sec.2 [2]). Moreover, in TRA Sec.4.b (2), Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to foreign countries, nations, states, governments or similar entities, the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized to conduct and carry out, in accordance with section 6 of this Act, such programs, transactions, and other relations with respect to Taiwan (including, but not limited to, the

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performance of services for the United States through contracts with commercial entities on Taiwan), in accordance with the applicable laws of the United States. In addition, TRA Sec. 6 (b) specifies that Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to enter into, perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan, such agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed, and enforced, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, by or through the Institute [i.e. American Institute in Taiwan, AIT]. However, according to TRA Sec.4.b (8), “No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the laws of the United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic relations or recognition shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan.” Several implications about how the U.S. government conducts negotiations with Taiwan can be derived from the above provisions of the TRA. First, the TRA authorizes the U.S. government to continue its commercial, cultural, and other relations with the people in Taiwan. It is debatable whether the executive could use such general authorization under the TRA to initiate trade negotiations with Taiwan. But the purpose of the TRA is clearly to enhance the commercial relationship between the United States and Taiwan. Second, whenever the U.S government is authorized to carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with Taiwan, it should carry them out in a similar manner as it does when it engages other foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities in accordance with the applicable laws of the United States. In other words, the TRA regards Taiwan as a legal entity capable of doing business with the United States. While Taiwan as a legal entity should be treated by the U.S. government as if it is equivalent with other foreign countries or states, Taiwan is not recognized by the United States as a sovereign state. Therefore, U.S. laws relevant to the maintenance of diplomatic relations or recognition should not be applied to Taiwan. One may argue that the above interpretation of Taiwan’s legal status, in fact, prevents any agreements signed between Taiwan and the United States from being regarded as treaties or international agreements defined by the U.S. Constitution, hence avoiding the treaty ratification procedure by Congress.

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Third, when the U.S. government is authorized or required by law to enter into, perform, or enforce an agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan, such an agreement or transaction should go through the AIT. In other words, the AIT plays the role of gatekeeper with respect to all existing and potential U.S. agreements with Taiwan. The AIT should follow the direction of the U.S. president, or to be more specific, the guidance of the State Department. In the case of lobbying for a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA, the opinion of AIT and the State Department cannot be ignored, even though the Department of Commerce and USTR are the leading agencies in dealing with trade issues. Finally, the status of the TRA as a U.S. domestic law, whose legal effect is equivalent with that of other domestic laws, indicates that the TRA, in itself, is insufficient to authorize the executive to engage in trade negotiations with Taiwan. The delegation of trade negotiation power must either derive from the existing law or from congressional approval if “fast track” rules are scheduled to apply. Alternatively, the president or the USTR can initiate trade negotiations with Taiwan based on a variety of reasons, but the resultant U.S.-Taiwan agreement should be subject to the approval of Congress under the procedure of a “normal bill.” The president or the USTR may argue that a U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement (or FTA) should be treated as a pure executive agreement as with all other U.S.-Taiwan agreements signed previously. Or from the AIT perspective, all trade-related agreements signed between the AIT (on behalf of the United States) and TECRO (on behalf of Taiwan) should be regarded as private contracts.27 But in practice, the president or the USTR will take into account congressional preferences when initiating and engaging in FTA negotiation with Taiwan, because Congress could ex post block implementing legislations, hence making the potential U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement unenforceable in the United States. Therefore, the safest way for the president or the USTR to initiate or engage in an FTA negotiation with Taiwan is to seek ex ante authorization from Congress (such as “fast track” authorization) so as to avoid political and legal controversy. Politically, having Congress on board with the executive may alleviate pressures stemming from China’s objections. Moreover, ex ante authorization ties the hands of USTR with congressional preferences, and hence gives it more bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Taiwan.

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Legally, the Congress’s authorization may either take the form of the RTAA in 1934 or the TPA in 2002. The RTAA format requires both chambers of Congress to pass a resolution to authorize the president to negotiate a trade agreement without subsequently referring it back to Congress for approval. The TPA format authorizes the president to negotiate a trade agreement under “fast track” rules, which prohibit amendment on the resulting agreement. Both formats of power delegation can fit into the TRA framework, in which a U.S.Taiwan trade agreement is regarded as a “pure” executive agreement enacted under ex ante authorization of Congress. Even though the USTR currently prefers the TPA’s “fast track” format, I argue that in terms of political feasibility, the 1934 RTAA format would work better for the U.S.-Taiwan context. This is because under RTAA, a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA need not refer back to Congress for approval, and the Congress’s ex ante authorization (with more specific guidelines) is sufficient for the USTR to conclude a “pure” executive agreement with Taiwan. Under the TPA format, a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA is subject to the approval of Congress using “fast track” rules. Such an approval process may generate political controversy on the Hill with regard to the question of the legal status of a U.S.-Taiwan FTA. To be compatible with provisions of the TRA, the U.S. government would by all means avoid the impression that a U.S.-Taiwan FTA is a treaty or an international agreement. But the TPA format with ex post approval may create just that kind of impression. To be fair, the question regarding the legal status of a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA will be raised in the RTAA format as well. But this question could be resolved, or perhaps ignored, before Congress authorizes trade negotiations. Once Congress delegated its power to the USTR, it could negotiate this potential FTA with Taiwan with as low of a profile as possible, hence avoiding political pressures from China. Nevertheless, a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA agreement is subject to the regulation of GATT Article 24. It is disputable whether it can be regarded by the U.S. government as a purely executive agreement. Given that the RTAA format would best serve the purpose for a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA, I shall turn to identifying key institutional veto players under the RTAA format, even though TPA may be currently preferred by U.S. officials. The legislating process

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under the RTAA starts with the president (hereafter standing for the executive branch), who may or may not tip or hint his intention to seek authorization of trade negotiations from Congress. In fact, the 1934 RTAA does not require the president to notify Congress of his intent. So, more precisely, the game should start with a move by either chamber of Congress. But for the sake of presentation, I start with the president’s move, followed by the House’s move, then by the Senate’s move, and so on. When a resolution that authorizes the president to engage in trade negotiations reaches the House floor, the House median can decide whether to adopt or reject it. If the resolution is rejected, the status quo persists. If the House passes the resolution, then it will be referred to the Senate for consideration. In the Senate, if no majority votes exist or filibuster continues, the status quo persists. If the Senate overcomes the filibuster and passes the resolution, the president would obtain a mandate for negotiation. With congressional ex ante authorization, the president may still fail to negotiate a deal with foreigners, so the status quo persists. But if the president succeeds in concluding an agreement with foreigners, the new agreement will be adopted without referring back to Congress for approval. The status quo means no new trade agreements. But it does not mean that the president cannot initiate trade negotiations. Rather, it means that if trade agreements were to be concluded by the president and foreigners, they have to be referred to the Senate for treaty ratification. The agenda setter is the president, since he can promise in advance to Congress to negotiate a trade agreement that would satisfy the HM and the S61. By doing so, the president can ensure an ex ante authorization by Congress. The veto players in this scenario are HM and S61, because the authorization bill would not be passed without their agreement. If the ex ante authorization bill were to go through the “normal bill” procedure under open rules, the HR could prevent amendments, and S41 could prevent a vote by filibustering Rightward amendments. Both HR and S41 are procedure actors under open rules. But if closed rules were adopted, HR’s and S41’s preferences would not matter. If either chamber amends the authorization bill, then members of a conference committee become conditional agenda setters, since they can propose a new “compromised” bill to replace the existing authorization bill. But members of the conference committee are appointed by the House

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and Senate leaders, so in fact, the House and Senate leaders are conditional agenda setters. To sum up, if the RTAA format is chosen, then we should pay great attention to the preferences of the president (agenda setter); HM and S61 (veto players); and potential procedural players like HR and S41, as well as the House and Senate leaders (conditional agenda setters). Concluding Remarks Lobbying beyond TIFA for a U.S.-Taiwan FTA is clearly Taiwan’s foreign policy objective. While the economic impact of a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA is much debated,28 very little attention has been paid to discern key institutional players in U.S. trade policy formation, much less to understand how these institutional agenda setters and veto players interact to shape FTA-related policies in the United States. Without in-depth knowledge about how these key institutional players act strategically, would-be lobbyists have no idea where to launch their efforts and what to do in order to cater to these key players’ preferences and their constituent interests. As a result of ignorance about how U.S. institutional players interact, outsiders tend to respond directly to whatever U.S. actors demand, even though such a response may have no overall effect on promoting a U.S.-Taiwan FTA. For example, in 2003, the United States announced six criteria for its FTA partner selection: country readiness (e.g., political will, trade capabilities, and rule of law); economic and commercial benefit (e.g., macroeconomic and sector benefits); benefits to the U.S.’s broader trade liberalization strategy (e.g., supporting U.S. trade goals); compatibilities with U.S. interests (e.g., support for U.S. foreign and security polices); Congressional and private-sector support; and U.S. government resource constraints.29 Since this announcement in 2003, Taiwan has made tremendous efforts to address or respond to these six U.S. criteria. In Taiwan’s lobbying leaflet entitled “Building on a Strong Partnership—The Proposed U.S.-Taiwan FTA,” Taiwan argues that it passes the U.S. litmus test.30 For example, there was already strong bipartisan support for a U.S.-Taiwan FTA, and Taiwan has provided wide ranging liberalization following the 2002 WTO accession. Thus, Taiwan should have met the U.S. criterion of “country readiness.” On

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economic benefits, Taiwan claimed that a U.S.-Taiwan FTA would increase U.S. exports to Taiwan, and that the overall welfare gain to the U.S. economy would be greater than that of 10 other current or potential FTA partners of the United States. Thus, Taiwan should have met the U.S. criterion of “economic and commercial benefits.” In addition, Taiwan has been a strong supporter of the U.S. trade liberalization agenda, often coordinating with Washington in the WTO venue. Taiwan has supported the U.S. war on terrorism through various cooperative programs such as the Cargo Security Initiative. Taiwan has solicited strong support from Congress with the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Max Baucus, repeatedly calling for the United States to negotiate with Taiwan. In addition to congressional support, Taiwan is supported by 35 state senates and assemblies, U.S. farmers, and leading U.S. companies. Taiwan has better labor and environmental standards and better IPR (intellectual property rights) protection than many other countries in Asia. Therefore, the United States should grant Taiwan a chance to become its FTA partner. However, the U.S. government did not seem to agree with Taiwan’s claim that it was meeting its criteria. For a variety of reasons outlined at the beginning of this paper, the United States not only ignored Taiwan’s request but also hinted at preconditions, such as implementation of the cross-Strait’s three links and, more recently, lifting the ban on U.S. beef. It will take time for Taiwan to meet the U.S. preconditions. But if the United States were to continue to add new preconditions, it would be impossible for Taiwan to launch FTA talks with the United States. I believe one day things will change in favor of Taiwan’s request. But before that day arrives, Taiwan should plan carefully its lobbying strategy to address U.S. demands. I believe the first step is to understand the rules and procedures of U.S. trade policy formation, identifying its key institutional players, and analyzing their strategic interactions. In this paper, I first show that the interaction among agenda setters and veto players may shape the outcome of U.S. trade agreements. Depending on the constellation of players’ relative positions of ideal points, “fast track” rules do not always work in favor of the president’s preferred outcomes. When the House median and S67 are protectionist enough, the result of “fast track” rules is no different from that of Senate ratification. However, when HM and S67 are sufficiently liberal, the

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president can negotiate a trade agreement that is more liberal than any key congressional players would want. Second, when “fast track” rules apply, procedural actors like the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee become agenda setters, whose joint decision may force the Congress to choose between the president’s bill and the conference committee bill. In addition, when a conference committee is called on, the leadership of Congress gain influence over the content of trade agreements. Third, because choosing which legislative route to go through will affect the final outcome of a trade agreement, I discuss what would be the most likely legislative route for a potential U.S.Taiwan FTA if the USTR should choose to launch a negotiation with Taiwan. Despite the USTR’s position in favor of “fast track” rules, I argue that the RTAA format in 1934 works better for the current political and legal contexts between the United States and Taiwan. Finally, given that the RTAA format would best serve the purpose for a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA, I identify agenda setters and veto players under this format. Through in-depth analysis of U.S. trade ratification procedure, I hope my academic analysis may shed some light on lobby practices for a potential U.S.-Taiwan FTA. Notes 1. Liu Da-Lien, “The prospect of establishing a U.S.-Taiwan FTA,” Chung-Hua Institute of Economic Research, Taipei, 2008. 2. N. R. Lardy and D. H. Rosen, Prospects for A U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2004). 3. C. M. Dent, New Free Trade Agreements in the Asia Pacific (New York: Palgrave, 2006), p. 153. 4. R. Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). 5. J. Frieden, “Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940,” International Organization, vol. 42, no. 1 (1988), pp. 58–90. 6. P. A. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crisis (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986). 7. S. Steinmo, K. Thelen, and F. Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 8. S. Haggard, “The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934,” International Organization, vol. 42, no. 1 (1988), pp. 9–1119.

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9. J. Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). 10. M. Bailey, J. Goldstein and B. Weingast, “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy,” World Politics, vol. 49, no. 3 (1997), pp. 687–717. 11. R. Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). 12. Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, “Trade Negotiations, Information and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups,” Economics and Politics, vol. 8, no. 2 (1996), pp. 145–89. 13. Milner and Rosendorff, pp. 145–89; S. Lohmann and S. O’Halloran, “Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence,” International Organization, vol. 48, no. 4 (1994), pp. 595–632. 14. S. L. Kastner and C. Rector, “International Regimes, Domestic Veto-Players, and Capital Controls Policy Stability,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 1 (2003), pp. 1–22; R. O’Reilly, “Veto Points, Veto Players, and International Trade Policy,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 38, no. 6 (2005), pp. 652–75; W. Henisz and E. Mansfield, “Votes and vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness,” International Studies Quarterly, no. 50 (2006), pp. 189–211. 15. D. R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991); John J. Coleman, “American Political Parties and Trade Policy Conflict Since 1947,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March, 13–15, 1996, Tucson, Arizona; D. Karol, “Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado About Nothing?” International Organization, vol. 54, no. 4 (2000), pp. 82544; R. Sherman, “Delegation, Ratification, and U.S. Trade Policy: Why Divided Government Causes Lower Tariffs,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 35, no. 10 (2002), pp. 1171–97. 16. Coleman, “American Political Parties.” 17. Sharyn O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). 18. R. Sherman, “Delegation, Ratification,” p. 1172. 19. E. M. Immergut, “The rules of the Game: The Logic of Health Policy-Making,” in Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics, p. 66. 20. W. B. Heller, P. Keefer and M. D. McCubbins, “Political Structure and Economic Liberalization: Conditions and Cases from the Developing World,” in P. Drake & M. D. McCubbins (eds.), The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 146–78. 21. G. Tsebelis, “Veto Players And Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis,” American Political Science Review, vol. 93, no. 3 (1999), p. 593. 22. I borrow here from Krehbiel’s diagram in his general theory of U.S. law-making. Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of US Lawmaking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 24.

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23. Rogowksi, Commerce and Coalitions; Edward D. Mansfield, and Marc L. Busch (1995). “The Political Economy of Non-Tariff Barriers: a Crossnational Analysis,” International Organization, vol. 49, no. 4 (1995), pp. 723–49. 24. R. Pahre, “House Rules: Institutional Choice and United States Trade Negotiations,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol. 21, no. 3 (2004), pp. 195–213. 25. T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960). 26. Pahre, “House Rules,” p. 203. 27. AIT official, telephone interview with author, Mar. 23, 2009. 28. Lardy and Rosen, Prospects; Chiao-Hsia Tu and Andrew MacIntyre, “U.S.Taiwan FTA: Cost-benefit Analysis and Promoting Strategy,” Chung–Hua Institute of Economic Research, Taipei, 2007. 29. General Accounting Office, “International Trade: Intensifying Free Trade Negotiating Agenda Calls For Better Allocation of Staff and Resources,” GAO report number GAP-04-223, Washington, D.C., 2004. 30. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, “Building on a strong partnership—The proposed U.S.-Taiwan FTA,” Taipei, 2008.

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The United States as a Balancer in Cross-Strait Relations, 2000–20081 Jaushieh Joseph Wu

Introduction

T

he international environment has changed substantially in the years between 2000 and 2008, causing subtle changes in relations among the United States, Taiwan, and China. In Taiwan, the long-ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) government was voted out of office for the first time in 2000 in a democratic election, and a peaceful transfer of power took place. In 2004, the independence-inclined and ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won another victory by defeating the opposition alliance of the KMT and the People First Party (PFP). However, the DPP failed to gain a majority in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s Parliament, during the years it was in power, and politics in Taiwan was unstable as a result. During those same years, China’s situation was a clear contrast to Taiwan’s. When Jiang Zemin gradually passed national power to Hu Jintao beginning in 2002, China’s national power had been on the upward swing with its economic, political, military, and diplomatic influence rising steadily. China’s rise in national power and influence are particularly evident with the United States caught in wars in the Middle East and various other international crises.

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These developments have changed Taiwan-China relations in an unprecedented manner: the two have become ever closer economically, but at the same time, China has acquired much more leverage vis-à-vis Taiwan diplomatically and militarily. Despite severing its diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979, the United States remained the most important supporter of Taiwan, particularly in the area of security cooperation through the sale of defensive weapons. Nevertheless, the United States, as a sole superpower in the post–Cold War era, faced some serious challenges after the September 11 terrorist attacks. President George W. Bush decided to launch wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, which dragged on and cost the United States dearly. In addition to the two wars, the United States in these years also found itself having to deal with the nuclearization of North Korea and Iran, the humanitarian disaster in Sudan’s Darfur region, and the trend of rising anti-U.S. sentiment in its own backyard. All these international problems forced the United States to work with China, and the original policy adopted by Bush regarding China as a competitor and a potential threat has changed substantially into a more cooperative mode. In cross-Strait relations, the United States is certainly not the only factor, but it is an important actor trying to balance the relationship and to prevent a tilt in either direction to maintain stability and the status quo. On the one hand, Washington tries to keep Taiwan strong by providing Taiwan with defensive weapons and maintaining good economic relations with this small country. On the other hand, when there is a possibility of conflict, the United States also applies pressure to either side, or both sides, to prevent uncontrollable escalation. But the role that the United States has been playing seems to face increasing challenges because of the responsibility of the United States as a sole superpower to deal with international crises. At the same time, the U.S. ability to deal with the changing cross-Strait environment is also restrained by two important factors. One is that Taiwan has to go through the democratic election cycle; and another is that China has a new leadership, asserting more international influence at a time when the United States is busy over international crises. These two factors, Taiwan’s democratization and China’s rise in influence and assertiveness, have been strong correlating factors that make it more difficult for the United States to react to events across the Taiwan Strait. This chapter will discuss

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the changes in Taiwan’s domestic politics and the rise of China to explain the growing difficulties for the U.S. balancing role. As this chapter will demonstrate, China’s hostile actions, particularly in the area of diplomatic offensives; and statements toward Taiwan, along with united front tactics to cause Taiwan’s domestic controversies, when the DPP was in power, were undeniably key factors in raising tension over the Taiwan Strait. These factors have forced Taiwan to respond by seeking a stronger position on Taiwan identity to raise the domestic and international awareness of Taiwan’s situation. The paper also argues that the United States has overextended itself in the post-September 11 period in dealing with numerous international crises, and it has become increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain its traditional balancing role in dealing with the cross-Strait issues. Taiwan’s Democratic Cycle as an Independent Variable In the long years of ups and downs in cross-Strait relations, one of the key variables is the internal dynamics of Taiwan and China. The greatest factor of change related to Taiwan, undoubtedly, is its democratization process beginning from the late 1980s to reach the first direct presidential election in 1996. It can be seen as a success of American policy to bring democracy to this country, but at the same time, democracy also brings uncertainties to Taiwan’s crossStrait policy.2 Because of democratization, political parties and politicians need to make their stance on national issues public and to make adjustments during periodic elections, a situation dramatically different from that of authoritarian rules where leaders give unquestionable directives on where the country should go. Since Taiwan-China relations have been a salient issue in Taiwan’s elections, policies on how to deal with China are subject to electoral debate so that political parties and their candidates can attract support in electoral campaigns. When the DPP was voted into power for the first time in 2000, it was an entirely new experience for the United States and China as well as for Taiwan itself. It was a particularly different experience for China since China has never had any democracy itself. The international community often questioned whether the DPP was pursuing de jure independence from China, which China has

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warned may cause a cross-Strait war. Nevertheless, anyone who wants to understand the DPP’s position on cross-Strait relations will need to examine the historical background that gave birth and success to the DPP. The party was established in 1986 as the country’s first democratic party. It was grown in Taiwan and had no historical connection with China, in contrast to the KMT, which had ruled China and fled to Taiwan in 1949 because of the defeat in the Chinese Civil War and continued to rule Taiwan until 2000. The KMT’s official ideology still views Taiwan-China relations as a continuation of the Chinese Civil War, as explained by the newly elected President Ma Ying-jeou in his interview with an Indian journal.3 DPP supporters, on the contrary, generally view historical Taiwan-China relations beginning from the 1895 SinoJapanese War, which ended in the ceding of Taiwan to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki.4 Since then, the People’s Republic of China on the Mainland and the Republic of China on Taiwan ruled the two territories separately and the two have no jurisdiction over each other except for the irredentist territorial claim. DPP supporters’ collective understanding of Taiwan’s history includes the status quo of separation and Taiwan’s de facto independence, which have been maintained for 60 years; the abrogation by President Lee Teng-hui in July 1991of the emergency period, viewed by the DPP as a long-overdue end of the Nationalist government’s sovereignty claim over China; and the massacre that took place in the quelling of the Taiwanese uprising in 1947, which remains a scar among the Taiwanese people. The DPP’s collective anxiety is that the KMT still intends to eventually unite Taiwan with China. Accordingly, the party tries to strengthen Taiwan’ own identity to prevent the KMT’s “sell out” of Taiwan. Nevertheless, since China has been an overwhelming factor for Taiwan to deal with and the issue of crossStrait relations has been the salient issue in Taiwan politics, DPP supporters also recognize the need to strengthen their own defense and search for additional international support in order to increase their own strength and leverage in dealing with China, and at the same time to seek opportunities for reconciliation to reduce the chances of armed conflict. In the first years after the DPP came into existence, it stated explicitly in its party platform that it would pursue the establishment of an independent “Republic of Taiwan.”5 Nevertheless, considering

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the internal and external environment of Taiwan, the DPP National Party Congress adopted a “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future” on May 8, 1999, to revise its formal position. The Resolution states that “after the parliamentary and presidential elections, Taiwan has already become an independent country and Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China do not have jurisdiction over each other. This is a historical reality and the status quo.”6 The position that Taiwan is already de facto independent avoided the thorny proposition of a formal declaration of independence, which might invite China’s invasion. This moderation was apparently welcomed by the public and helped Chen Shui-bian’s election in 2000. This resolution was reaffirmed by the National Party Congress in 2001 and was further upgraded to the same status as party platform and thus nullified the “Republic of Taiwan platform.” China and many people in Taiwan continue to call the DPP position “fundamentalism on Taiwan independence.” But judging from the moderation process of the party, this view may not be the best approach to understand the party and therefore the best approach to formulate a policy to engage it. Under the framework of the “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future,” the DPP gradually developed a policy framework for dealing with China in a more pragmatic and practical manner based upon the party’s basic position that Taiwan and China do not have jurisdiction over each other. When the DPP came to power in 2000 amid cross-Strait uncertainties, it proposed “goodwill and conciliation, active cooperation, permanent peace” as its cross-Strait policy guidelines. It started to make goodwill gestures toward China after President Chen was inaugurated by announcing a conciliatory posture that the DPP government would not pursue formal independence and would seek joint resolution of the “future one-China issue.” President Chen also announced that his government would pursue social and economic integration with China leading up to political integration. But unfortunately, the Chinese government, even though it recognized that goodwill would defuse any immediate cross-Strait crisis, never took the possibilities of a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations with the DPP government seriously.7 In addition to the verbal goodwill designed to reduce Chinese hostility, the DPP government came up with policies to formulate a national consensus in order to improve cross-Strait ties. The first effort came soon after the new government came to office, and an

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interparty task force was created to discuss cross-Strait policies. It failed because the opposition boycotted the formation, and it could not function without the opposition participation. The second effort was to hold the National Special Economic Development Conference in 2001 to discuss the most pressing economic issues facing the nation. One of the key issues was how to deal with the growing interdependence across the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The conclusions reached in the conference included relaxation of controls over Taiwanese investment in China, including granting permission for three computer chip manufacturing companies to invest in China, opening Taiwan to Chinese tourists and journalists, and allowing chartered cross-Strait flights, among others. Taipei made efforts to implement the conference’s conclusions. Nevertheless, the issues that required negotiations with China, such as full-scale Chinese tourism and chartered flights, did not move forward as planned because China still resisted direct negotiation with the DPP government, and consequently, there was only partial implementation in President Chen’s first term, including the first Lunar New Year flight into China and indirect visits to Taiwan by Chinese tourists. After the second inauguration of the DPP administration, Taiwan renewed its call for direct negotiations for chartered flights in October 2004. Initially, the Chinese side still responded by insisting on preconditions such as the one-China principle, the 1992 consensus, and treating cross-Strait matters as Chinese internal affairs. In January 2005, the Chinese side finally agreed to talk to Taiwan about the issue and the negotiation terms, using the “white glove” of the Taipei Airline Association, and met in Macao to work out the first direct, bilateral chartered flights for the Lunar New Year holiday. Using a private association as a white glove but having officials directly in charge of aviation negotiating with each other was subsequently termed the “Macao Model” by the media and academics. It went successfully even though the Chinese side was already in high gear for the adoption of the Anti- Secession Law (ASL), which turned up the cross-Strait temperature again. Nevertheless, the experience of the early 2005 negotiation in Macao was deemed successful by both sides and resumed quietly again in fall 2005 negotiations for the 2006 Lunar New Year chartered flight. Soon after the implementation of the 2006 chartered flight,

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the two sides continued to negotiate expanded chartered flights to cover the four main festivals celebrated by both Taiwan and China. Other than the main festival chartered flight, there were also special case cargo chartered flights, and emergency and humanitarian flights. The agreements were reached in June 2006 amid the opposition’s call for the impeachment and recall of President Chen. The two sides then moved on to the question of more frequent weekend chartered flights. In addition, the two sides also started the negotiation, by using a model similar to what was used for Macao flight negotiations, for direct Chinese tourist visits to Taiwan. The negotiation went smoothly until early 2007, when Taiwan’s presidential election fever geared up. This certainly demonstrates that when Taiwan is not in an election cycle, a more pragmatic approach can be possible in a DPP administration. Even though China’s insistence on the one-China principle is hard for the DPP administration to swallow, and even though forging an internal consensus regarding Taiwan’s status and Taiwan’s future relations with China is immensely difficult, the DPP government tried after the 2004 election to allow the country to gradually come to a basic common understanding that Taiwan’s future should be decided by the people in Taiwan, but at the same time, reaffirm no pursuit of formal independence. In March 2005, when President Chen met with James Soong of the PFP, this became one of the consensual points signed agreed by the two.8 Nevertheless, the meeting and agreement by Chen and Soong were too much for their respective supporters to take, and internal politics prevented a national reconciliation to take root. In addition to China’s mistrust of Taiwan’s democratic elections, the heated presidential election campaign season in Taiwan is also a time for key parties and key candidates to propose bold ideas that would add to China’s misunderstanding of Taiwan’s real intentions. Less than one year before the first direct presidential election, President Lee Teng-hui undertook a trip to Cornell University, defying Beijing’s demand that no high-level Taiwan officials should visit the United States. China angrily responded by severing cross-Strait connections and also resorted to tests of ballistic missiles and large-scale military exercises that continued into the 1996 election.9 But the Chinese actions caused a backlash, and the candidates, including President Lee himself, lashed out at

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China. President Lee, consequently, received a landslide victory by being firm on China. Roughly half a year prior to the 2000 presidential election, President Lee used an interview with German media to announce that relations between Taiwan and China were “special state to state relations.” This formula, despite causing China’s anger, became the KMT formal position when Lien Chan was running for the presidency as the KMT candidate. On the DPP side, Chen Shui-bian announced that his formula was “state to state special relations” with China. At the same time, James Soong proposed “quasi-international relations” to describe his formula for cross-Strait relations. Of course, all these formulas caused China’s great anxiety, particularly when there was a distinct possibility that the DPP might win the election. This situation led the Chinese leadership to publish a white paper on “The One China Principle and the Taiwan Question” before the polling day to set up the conditions for using force against Taiwan as a response.10 Although the DPP had moderated in 1999 through the adoption of the “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future,” its presidential campaign for the 2004 election was aimed at mobilizing the core supporters of the party who were undoubtedly pro-independence. Prior to the election, President Chen proposed to revise Taiwan’s constitution and also proposed to have a referendum for the first time. The two proposed topics for the referendum were the procurement of additional missile defense capabilities and a framework on peace and stability, issues far less sensitive than Taiwan’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, the referendum turned out to be a key issue in the election debate. Of course China, along with the Bush administration, was upset by the action and the rhetoric during the campaign. China released a May 17 declaration right before President Chen was inaugurated for the second time as a response to the postTaiwan election period. On the U.S. side, which also worried about Taiwan’s intention, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly made Washington’s policy clear by opposing either Taiwan or China making any unilateral change in the status quo (as understood by the United States).11 In 2005-–2006, the opposition KMT/PFP interactions with China intensified. In addition, internal political clashes intensified when the opposition blocked the government budget and began

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campaigning to oust President Chen through a recall motion in the Legislative Yuan and mass protest on the street. Even though the cross-Strait negotiations for chartered flights were not interrupted, President Chen reacted to the serious domestic challenge by moves designed to increase domestic support, including the announcement that the National Unification Council and Guidelines “cease to function” and the renaming of Taiwan’s state-owned enterprises and Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. In addition, President Chen also rephrased his “four noes” formula into “four imperatives.” While these actions might have excited the core supporters of the DPP, they caused the Americans and Chinese heartburn over the question of where Taiwan was heading. In 2007, the year before the scheduled presidential election, the DPP proposed to enter the WHO as a full member under the name Taiwan. Soon afterward, another initiative to enter the UN as a full member under the name Taiwan was also proposed. In the fall of 2007, the DPP also began a referendum signature drive in support of Taiwan’s UN membership campaign. The signature drive was so successful that it prompted the KMT to put forward its own initiative with a very similar topic: reentering the UN under the name “Republic of China” or some other “practical” title. For fear of giving the DPP and Chen credit in the election and not willing to give any hint that China was still willing to engage with the DPP government when it was pursuing policies that were not in China’s interests, China halted all talks and contacts on practical issues. During the presidential election campaign, a national consensus developed around the notion that “Taiwan’s future should be determined by the people of Taiwan” as the core of cross-Strait policy. To keep the KMT camp competitive, Ma Ying-jeou incorporated this phrase into his campaign platform. Certainly, the Chinese were not happy about this development, and Chinese academics continue to point to it as evidence that Ma cannot be fully trusted. This clearly shows that Taiwan’s election dynamic takes on its own tempo, one that may not be understood by a Chinese leadership that does not experience democratic elections themselves. From the above recollection of events during Taiwan’s major elections and the periods after the election, it can be seen that even though elections have become routine and normal in Taiwan, electioneering and election politics may spark unnecessary

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controversies in Taiwan’s relations with China or the United States. And since Taiwan will continue to go through its national election cycle, Taiwan’s policy in dealing with China will continue to be a matter for other players to reckon with. Although democracy itself is a proud achievement of Taiwan’s political development, and the United States repeatedly praises Taiwan for it, the operation of it can be a challenge because of the uncertainty embedded in the system. China’s Leadership Style as Another Independent Variable In 2000, when Taiwan was experiencing its election cycle, China’s leadership was going through its succession cycle. President Jiang Zemin gradually passed his leadership in the party, government, and the military to the younger Hu Jintao, beginning in 2002. During this period, some tangible changes in China’s policy and policy-making style dealing with Taiwan could also be observed, even though the Chinese long-term objective over Taiwan remained the same: to unify Taiwan through peaceful means, to uphold the one-China principle on the sovereignty issue, and be prepared to use force if necessary. Hu has been seen as more proactive and more effective in policies related to Taiwan, and this makes it much more difficult for Taiwan to deal with. Hu’s government consequently might present Taiwan with more opportunities, and, at the same time, more challenges. When Jiang was still in power, he did not seem to be directly involved in the policy-making process and allowed bureaucracies to operate on their own. The result was a very slow process that had difficulty formulating policies to deal with new events. For instance, after Lee Teng-hui visited the United States in 1995 and returned to Taiwan, China’s deputy chief of the Association for the Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Tang Shubei still carried out his visit to Taiwan to arrange for his chief Wang Daohan’s visit to Taiwan. It was not until several weeks later that the Chinese government decided to get angry over Lee’s visit to the United States.12 The Chinese academics visiting Taiwan in recent years revealed that China’s announcement of the “One China Principle and the Taiwan Question” white paper was a response to Lee’s announcement of “special state to state relations.”13 But Lee’s interview was about five months earlier. Some informed Americans also revealed

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that in 2001, when the crisis of the American EP3 radar plane incident took place over the South China Sea, the Chinese reaction to the quest for resolution to the crisis was like a huge but slow-moving dinosaur, and it took a long time before the sense of the body could reach the brain and before the brain’s order for action could reach the body. After the DPP came to power in 2000, Taiwan’s new government sent out goodwill gestures to China hoping that the Chinese side would respond to the call for reconciliation. Nevertheless, the reaction from the Chinese side was “listen to the words and observe the deeds” rather than a positive response. Worse still, China continued to harass Taiwan’s international participation and build up its military deployment targeted at Taiwan. It even humiliated President Chen himself by luring away one of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in July 2002, on the day when Chen assumed the chairmanship of the DPP. This led Chen to announce “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” a few days later as a response to China’s humiliating action. It would be difficult to expect any improvement in cross-Strait relations under these circumstances. Nevertheless, when Hu gradually assumed power beginning in 2002, China’s Taiwan policy and policy-making style started to go through some subtle but visible changes. These changes, as described by China’s scholars, can be summed up as “the tough gets tougher and the soft gets softer.” There has always been a two-prong approach in China’s policy toward Taiwan—a tough approach and a soft approach, drawing from the analogy of “carrot and stick” in explaining American foreign policy. Under Jiang Zemin, the two approaches were not considered effective or successful by the observers of the cross-Strait relations. On the tough approaches, China under Jiang continued to threaten Taiwan with force and in 1995–1996 resorted to large-scale military exercise and missile tests hoping to sway the Taiwanese voters away from supporting Lee. But the Taiwanese people responded by giving Lee a landslide victory as a response. In 2000, with China’s tough position taken in the “One China Principle and Taiwan Issue” white paper, along with then Premier Zhu Ronggi’s overt threat, the DPP was voted into office for the first time. On the soft side, the Chinese officials continued to offer “one country two systems” as a gesture to attract the Taiwan

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people’s support for unification. Public opinion polls, however, continued to show very low public support for unification and “one country two systems.” When Hu gradually assumed full power, however, changes started to take place, and the Chinese initiatives and responses to events and issues became much more timely and effective. Policy statements that came out of Hu’s government included the “May 17 Statement” in 2004, which was only three days before Chen’s inauguration for his second term and gave the Chen government little time to respond. And in 2005, soon after the first Lunar New Year direct chartered flight, China’s NPC adopted the ASL, which defined the conditions for using nonpeaceful means against Taiwan. The latest document released by Hu was his New Year’s Eve sixpoint statement that summed up China’s policy toward Taiwan. As of mid-2009, the international audience was still waiting for a response from the KMT government. The adoption of the ASL brought upon China waves of international criticism and concerns over the legalization of “nonpeaceful means” against Taiwan. But Hu’s government quickly turned the situation around by inviting Taiwan’s opposition leaders for historic visits to Beijing and turned the tide in China’s favor. Consequently, the DPP government was quickly cornered by a seeming KMT/ PFA and CCP coalition, a classic united front tactic. In addition to this tactic, the Chinese government also announced measures that would benefit the Taiwan people, including buying Taiwan’s agricultural products, fishing products, sending tourists to visit Taiwan, allowing Taiwanese to take part in China’s national examinations for educational certificates, and so forth. All of these were clear examples of successful propaganda and were painful memories for the DPP government of what the Chinese government is capable of doing: gestures that appear friendly to the international community but are, in essence, harmful to Taiwan’s position both internally and externally. Refusing these propositions would earn Taiwan a negative image of stubbornly rejecting goodwill from China and would allow the opposition chances to argue that the government does not care about those who might benefit from China’s proposals. But accepting the proposals would definitely drag Taiwan into the prescriptions of ASL. Taiwan government was indeed caught in a serious dilemma.

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The Chinese government has also been very successful in turning around its relations with the Bush administration on the Taiwan issue since Hu came to power. Not long after the United States started its wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, China started expanding its cooperation with the United States and has spared no opportunity to reiterate its position on the Taiwan issue in high-level dialogues with U.S. officials. China also tried to appear “restrained” and “responsible,” to portray Taiwan as making trouble, and to denounce Taiwan’s maneuvers among the international community as a dangerous pursuit of Taiwan independence. Even though China under Hu continued to build up its military targeted at Taiwan and to hold joint exercises with Russia, Beijing has not taken drastic actions such as what took place during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. During his September 2005 visit to New York for the UN General Assembly, Hu met with Bush and raised the idea of “co-managing” stability in the Taiwan Strait. Even though the Bush administration did not seem to be enthusiastic about the idea, the notion of China and the United States joining hands to contain a troublemaking Taiwan was confusing to the international community and made the DPP government quite nervous.14 China’s military deployment targeted at Taiwan has also been increasing at a faster pace since Hu assumed the position of chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2005. Considering the short-range ballistic missiles alone, China deployed roughly 300 short-range M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles in several bases along southeast coastal region in 2001. This deployment was estimated to be increasing at a rate of about 50 to 75 per year up to 2005, but after 2005, the rate of increase was estimated at 100–120.15 By 2008, China was already estimated to have deployed 1,400 short-range missiles targeted at Taiwan and about 1,500 in early 2009 in spite of warming cross-Strait ties.16 Other than the short-range ballistic missiles, China has also been intensifying its cruise missile deployments such as the TH-10 type,17 long-range anti-ship missiles such as the YJ-62A type,18 and the long-range air-defense SAM-300PMUIII type.19 These various types of missiles can cover the air and sea operations in the entire Taiwan Strait region and put Taiwan’s security in greater jeopardy than ever before. Moreover, China has also been intensifying its submarine deployment and related activities. The increasing number of

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survey ships intruding into Taiwan’s water has been seen as intensification of the Chinese military preparation for hostile submarine operations.20 Other than intensifying military deployment aimed at Taiwan, the Chinese Liberation Army has also been advancing its operational tactics by holding joint military exercises with the other countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China has also been practicing operations against Taiwan, including building a runway simulating Taiwan’s Chingchuankang Airport in Taichung. The Chinese military, learning from its lesson in 1996 that the United States is serious about the possibility of intervening militarily in a cross-Strait conflict, has also been designing anti-access capabilities to increase the cost for the United States to intervene. Moreover, China has also been preparing cyber, space, legal and propaganda warfare to increase its military preparedness against Taiwan.21 Some active members of the Washington policy community have been conveying messages to the Chinese decision makers that military pressure against Taiwan may be counterproductive to Chinese objectives over the Taiwan issue, but their conclusion is that the Chinese have not been moved by these warnings.22 A fair opportunity for international participation has been an emotional issue for the people of Taiwan. In this regard, China has not loosened its grip on Taiwan. Taking away Taiwan’s diplomatic allies has been a Chinese method of undercutting Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty and international space. Beginning from 2002, the Chinese government began investing a huge amount of money to lure away Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, including Nauru (which later re-recognized Taiwan), Grenada, Dominique, Senegal, Chad, Costa Rica, and Malawi.23 After Hu took over as the paramount leader in China, and particularly after the ASL was adopted in March 2005, China mounted campaigns designed to further isolate Taiwan by legalizing the one-China principle in international organizations, governmental or nongovernmental alike, in an effort that can be seen as “de jure unification.” In nongovernment international organizations, China called for boycott if the organizations did not change Taiwan’s name to “Taiwan, China,” “Taipei, China,” “Taiwan Province of China,” or “Taiwan Province of the PRC.” China’s effort succeeded in either changing Taiwan’s title of participation or forcing Taiwan

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participants to withdraw. In many cases, “Chinese Taipei” became a compromise. From the recorded incidents, 2005, the year that Hu assumed the full leadership and ASL was adopted, marked the beginning of a period in which China’s actions in this regard became rampant.24 These actions were obviously very damaging to Taiwan’s international status of not being under China’s jurisdiction. China’s actions were particularly damaging to Taiwan with regard to major international intergovernmental organizations after the ASL was adopted. In that year, Chinese officials began negotiating with the World Health Organization (WHO) for a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on Taiwan’s participation in the organization’s activities under the tight control of the Chinese government. Up until today, the content of the MOU is still a myth since neither China nor the WHO released the text of it. Nevertheless, Taiwan was able to obtain a copy of the implementation of the MOU, which describes in detail the conditions of WHO’s interaction with Taiwan, either in the case of Taiwan experts participating in WHO-related activities or WHO’s emergency assistance to Taiwan.25 The action by the Chinese government on the WHO clearly is to put Taiwan’s participation under the one-China framework. This also put Taiwan in a serious dilemma: on one hand, it will suffer more by participating in the WHO-related activities and thereby falling under China’s sovereignty; on the other hand, if it rejects this opportunity, Taiwan will not be able to gain access to the WHO. China’s political motivation is so obvious that it made the claim that the Chinese government is taking good care of the Taiwan people’s health needs very ironic.26 China’s operation to prevent Taiwan from making any progress in its quest for a place in the UN is also visible. In early 2007, when Taiwan was going through one of its diplomatic allies to make a deposit of its ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Chinese pressured the UN secretariat to respond in a letter stating that “In accordance with the Resolution [referring to Resolution 2758 adopted on Oct. 4, 1971], the United Nations considers Taiwan for all purposes to be an integral part of the People’s Republic of China.”27 The interpretation of the resolution by the UN secretariat went beyond the words and spirit of the text of the resolution, which only states that the PRC represents China, not Chiang Kai-shek, and there is not a word about the representation of Taiwan in the world body.

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Furthermore, when Taiwan applied for membership in the UN in July 2007, the UN threw the case back by noting that “the United Nations considers Taiwan for all intents and purposes to be an integral part of the People’s Republic of China.”28 China’s manipulation is obviously an attempt to institutionalize and legalize the one-China principle that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China. In addition, China in 2007 also tried to push for a resolution in the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) to recognize that “there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese’ territory, and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing all China.” In the same resolution, China also pushed to change Taiwan’s status from full membership to “non-sovereign regional member” and Taiwan’s title to “Taiwan, China.” After the effort of the United States and “like-minded states,” the resolution was toned down to “noting” the Chinese position of adhering to the one China principle and the changing the title of Taiwan to “Chinese Taipei.”29 Nevertheless, Taiwan’s original full membership is changed to “nonsovereign regional member.” Of course, this result upset the DPP government. All the above examples highlighted the actions of the Chinese government under the leadership of Hu Jintao to force key international organizations to recognize China’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan. These actions, considered to be on the extreme hard side of China’s Taiwan policy, revealed a more active and forceful approach and at the same time have been effective in bringing more threat and damage to Taiwan’s sovereignty and de facto independent status than occurred under Jiang. Together with increasing its military pressure against Taiwan and forming a united front with Taiwan’s political opposition, China under Hu has made the DPP government very vulnerable. However, China under Hu has also carried out policies on the soft side. In January 2005, the Chinese government was willing to engage Taiwan in Macao to negotiate for the first bilateral nonstop charter flight during the Lunar New Year holidays without the Taiwan side accepting the Chinese demand on preconditions. In 2006, Beijing also authorized the follow-up negotiations to extend the chartered flights to cover four major festivals and other areas

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at a time when Taiwan’s opposition was launching an effort to oust President Chen. The two sides also established white-glove organizations to launch negotiations for Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan. Moreover, China also came up with initiatives to buy agricultural products from Taiwan and other offers such as panda bears to demonstrate goodwill to the people of Taiwan. Even though the actual benefit for those goodwill initiatives might not be meaningful in a material sense, they were very good propaganda tools against the Taiwan public. They were quite effective particularly because the media environment in Taiwan has not been friendly to the DPP government. As Hu put it frequently, China would do “whatever is good for the Taiwan people.” This sounds very soft indeed, and was definitely much softer than the official lines when Jiang was in power. Increasingly Difficult Balancing act for the United States The U.S. formal position regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty, after the Shanghai Communiqué was signed in 1972, has been ambiguous. On the one hand, the United States does not recognize the “Republic of China” but maintains good unofficial relations with Taiwan. On the other hand, the United States maintains official relations with China and “acknowledges” its position that it represents the whole of China, but the United States also maintains a position that it does not recognize or accept the Chinese sovereignty claim over Taiwan.30 In addition, the U.S. Congress also passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979 to safeguard the relations between Taiwan and the United States and to ensure that Taiwan could survive and prosper under the communist threat as if the defense treaty still existed. It has also been a long-term U.S. policy to maintain a strong military presence in East Asia through sets of bilateral defense relations to ensure that it has the ability to respond to any emergency situation. Among the documents the United States holds as the foundation of its relations with Taiwan and China, the TRA is of particular importance to Taiwan-U.S. relations. Under the Act, the United States declares “peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interest of the United States, and are matters of international concern.”31 The United States also considers “any effort

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to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern of the United States.”32 Under the Act, the United States also needs “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive nature,” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”33 All of these important articles and clauses were set out in Section 2 of the Act to make clear continuing U.S. interest in Taiwan even though the United States no longer maintains diplomatic relations and a defense treaty with the island country. But to China, the various communiqués, including the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, the Communiqué to establish diplomatic relations in 1978, and the August 17 Communiqué in 1982 to end military sales to Taiwan, are more important. The government of China has continued to remind the U.S. government to follow what has been prescribed by the three communiqués. The TRA, on the contrary, has always been an irritant to Chinese foreign policy makers for it stands in the way of China’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan and its national objective of reunification. To the Chinese government, the actions of Congress to pass the TRA or any actions related to Taiwan were interference in China’s internal affairs. Over the years, the United States has maintained an ambiguous one-China policy but stressed the peaceful resolution of the crossStrait dispute, as described in the TRA. Nevertheless, official statements vary and carry some subtle changes over time in order to balance the situation. For example, the Clinton administration after 1998 not only stressed the peaceful resolution over the Taiwan issue, it also added that the resolution must have “the assent of the Taiwan people.” It did so to balance President Clinton’s public statement in 1998, considered a minor defeat for Taiwan, that the United States does not support Taiwan independence, one China and one Taiwan, or Taiwan’s membership in major international organizations. After President George W. Bush took office, the U.S. official line was changed from the “assent of the Taiwan people” to “agreement of the people from both sides.” At the same time, the Bush administration sought better security relations with Taiwan by offering a major arms sale to the island country. In 2004, after the DPP government

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held the first referendum in the presidential election, the Bush administration formulated a new statement that opposes “unilateral change of the status quo” by either side without referring to the specifics of the status quo.34 These official statements were clearly balancing acts to prevent U.S. policy from being seen as siding overly with one side or another and thereby adversely affecting overall U.S. interests. Under the formula of “strategic ambiguity” and undeclared security relations with Taiwan, the United States has been able to maintain a flexible posture in cross-Strait interactions in order to uphold U.S. interests—such as deterring aggression—in different situations. In 1996, for example, when China mounted a large-scale military exercise to threaten Taiwan, the United States dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait area to prevent China from further military adventure. The United States subsequently found that Taiwan’s military ability, because of long years of isolation after the defense treaty was severed along with diplomatic relations in 1979, was inadequate for its own defense. The United States then began an effort to help Taiwan modernize its military. On the overall national security level, a high-level contact was established between the secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council and the deputy national security adviser of the White House. This channel of communication has been institutionalized after long years of practice. In the years following 2004, the United States has also sent high-level national security officials to Taiwan for the same purposes, and it has become a very important mechanism in the Taiwan-U.S. exchanges. Nevertheless, the United States stopped sending national security officials to Taiwan after the second half of the Bush administration’s second term. Beneath the national security level channel of communication, there is also a general strategic dialogue between Taiwan’s military and security agencies and their counterparts in the United States. There are frequent contacts between the services of the two sides, and the United Sates has also begun to send an active duty U.S. military officer to Taiwan to serve as military attaché in the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto American embassy in Taipei. All these are important developments in Taiwan-U.S. security relations and can be seen as important aspects of American balancing acts to prevent Taiwan from being taken over by China

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through nonpeaceful means in the absence of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In the years after President George W. Bush came to power in 2001, other than the agreement to sell a large package of arms including PAC-III, diesel-powered submarines, and P3C anti-submarine aircraft, the Bush administration also agreed to provide Taiwan with C4ISR capability (Boshen project) to strengthen joint defense capability. The Bush White House agreed to sell additional munitions such as Standard II air defense missiles for the Kidd-class destroyers, anti-ship Harpoon missiles, and Maverick missiles. Programs for Taiwan air force training on U.S. bases and Taiwan military academy cadets studying in the U.S. military academies have been strengthened during the same period. Although it maintains a policy of not supporting membership for Taiwan in major international organizations where statehood is required, the United States has been helpful to Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international arena. Other than the U.S. support for Taiwan’s participation in the WHO, the U.S. secretary of health also openly supported Taiwan’s observership and wrote letters to the director-general of the WHO in support of Taiwan. Former Secretary of Health Tommy Thompson even got into an argument with a Chinese official in support of Taiwan. In May 2008, U.S. support for Taiwan’s participation in the WHO remained at the same level as in the previous year and was not affected by the turbulence of Taiwan-U.S. relations because of Taiwan’s actions in seeking membership in the WHO and the UN, together with a referendum on Taiwan’s membership in the UN. In 2007, when the UN secretariat issued a letter in response to Taiwan’s CEDAW bid that Taiwan is considered for all purposes by the UN as an integral part of the PRC, the United States realized that it was not in line with its long-standing policy regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty. The United States then mounted an effort to register to the UN secretariat its position and declared that the United States might have to openly disagree with the UN statement if it did not change its position.35 It should be specially noted because this took place when Taiwan was preparing an application to enter the UN as a member under the name Taiwan and relations between Taiwan and the United States were at a low point. U.S. officials also told the Taiwan side that the United States consistently conveyed to China

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the message that China’s suppression of Taiwan’s international participation is a source of tension between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and China should stop doing so.36 Nevertheless, the United States is not always as one sided and unconditional in its support of Taiwan as Taiwan desires. In 1999, when then President Lee Teng-hui made his statement of “special state to state relations,” the United States sent envoys to both Taiwan and China to try to restrain both from any further escalation. In 2004, before Taiwan was about to hold the first referendum, the Bush administration sent a senior White House official to Taipei to tell President Chen strongly and directly to call off the planned referendum. Beginning in 2006, President Chen initiated a series of actions designed to strengthen Taiwan’s national identity. U.S. officials made a series of strong statements admonishing Taiwan,37 including the year-end press conference by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who described Taiwan as pursuing a provocative policy. Moreover, the transit of President Chen to Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Latin America in 2007 also suffered a serious downgrade as a consequence. He was only able to transit through Alaska for refueling and did not have permission to stay overnight. The harsh criticism of the Taiwan leadership and the downgrade of transit treatment embarrassed Taiwan’s leadership, and this might have cost the presidential election for the DPP in 2008 since most people in Taiwan treasure the country’s relations with the United States. The September 11 terrorist attack was an important turning point, for the world order started to undergo subtle but substantial change. The Bush administration decided to use military means against the “origin” of terrorism and launched attacks against Afghanistan and Iraq. Under the pressure of two wars and various international crises, the United States realized that it had to work with China because of its growing international influence, regardless of whether China was a source of problems in the first place or whether it could deliver any substantial assistance of the kind the United States needed. On the Korean Peninsula, China worked with Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill through the mechanism of the Six-Party Talks to forge an agreement with North Korea and dismantle a major nuclear reactor. The United States considered China’s assistance as crucial and thanked China publicly.38

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On the Darfur issue, China has been a key trading partner of the Omar Bashier regime in the Sudan, purchasing crude oil and supplying arms. China was requested to apply pressure on the Sudanese government. China finally agreed to send unarmed peace-keeping forces to Darfur, gaining a significant ground presence in Africa. As to the issue of Iran’s missile and nuclear program, the United States requested China’s cooperation in a boycott against the Islamic regime. However, China continued to trade with Iran. It looks as if China has been creating and sustaining international problems in order to present itself as influential and being helpful to the United States. Under the circumstances of the U.S. entanglement in major international troubles and the need for China’s assistance while China’s international influence has been increasing substantially, the ability of the United States to maintain a balance in cross-Strait relations was thus constrained. During Bush’s final year in office, there was discussion in the Washington policy community that an intentional U.S. freeze on the arms sale accounted for the delay Taiwan noted in the administration’s expected notification to Congress of the impending sale. Even though President Chen’s referendum on the UN issue was mentioned as one of the reasons, the China factor was also a consideration for the United States. Many suggested that President Bush would need to speak directly to Hu Jintao on the sale when he traveled to Beijing for the Olympic Games to avoid angering China since the Bush administration considered the North Korean nuclear crisis a key issue in East Asia, and China’s cooperation on the issue was considered essential. In the final years of President Bush’s term, American officials increasingly appeared restrained by China in matters related to Taiwan. When Admiral Timothy J. Keating, commander of U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific region, addressed an audience at Heritage Foundation in July 2008, he did not deny the notion that there was a freeze on American military sales to Taiwan. Furthermore, he revealed that he had spoken with high-level Chinese military officials about the military sale issue.39 This is a possible violation of one of the six assurances which states that the United States would not negotiate with China on arms sale to Taiwan. When the notification was finally sent to the Congress on the very last day of the congressional session in October 2008, the package was scaled down

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from the weapons systems originally sought. The total value of the sale was only half of what was requested and expected by Taiwan.40 The Taiwan side has also requested F-16 C/D models since 2006, but the Bush administration did not act upon the request. Some in Taiwan debated whether the sale and the statements of the highest American commander in Asia Pacific are in line with the TRA.41 In exchanges with the Taiwanese side, American officials revealed repeatedly that the United States only has one vote in organizations such as the WHO, and that it could not do much except for voicing support. They requested the Taiwanese not to push for a vote in the World Health Assembly event because, as the American officials put it, the United States did not want to be placed on the opposite side of China and did not want to be seen as being defeated. Members of the Washington policy community have also frequently reminded the Taiwan side that the United States is already spread thin because of the two wars and other crises and that Taiwan should not expect the United States to give Taiwan the same level of support as in the beginning years of the Bush administration. Certainly, the events in Taiwan that fall into the election cycle would add to American difficulty in dealing with China. Consequently, there is little debate that the rapprochement between Taiwan and China after the KMT came back to power should be welcomed by the Bush administration publicly, for it relieved the attention that the United States needed to pay to a possible cross-Strait crisis, even though the rapid development of the cross-Strait situation may alter U.S. interests in the region. Conclusion The United States has always played a very important role in Taiwan-China relations and in the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait region. Because of the important role the United States plays, both Taiwan and China have different expectations of what the United States can do for their respective interests. Both Taiwan and China considered Washington the closest distance to the other side, and both went through the United States in attempts to achieve their policy objectives. Even though the Taiwan side never wanted the United States to serve as a mediator or to push Taiwan for talks with China, during the period when the DPP was in power, it wanted the United States to serve

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as a “facilitator” of cross-Strait talks. During the second term of the Bush administration, Taiwan requested Washington officials to urge China to agree to talk on practical issues such as chartered flights. China, on the other hand, wanted to work with the United States to “co-manage” the Taiwan problem during the years when Hu Jintao assumed top leadership and made public that President Bush was “against Taiwan independence,” thanking the United States for firmly opposing Taiwan independence.42 Nevertheless, the United States has its own objective and has sought to maintain its role as a “balancer” in cross-Strait relations but not as a mediator between Taipei and Beijing. But the U.S. role as balancer in cross-Strait relations has come under increasing challenges, especially after the September 11 terrorist attack. On the one hand, some of the issues raised in democratic Taiwan for domestic political purposes became a direct challenge to China’s objectives to incorporate Taiwan, and subsequently affected U.S. strategic calculations at a time of numerous international troubles. On the other hand, China has also become more powerful and influential economically, militarily, and politically. The Chinese government under the leadership of Hu was particularly skillful in maneuvering through different circumstances and leveraging to China’s benefit. When the Bush administration had to face international difficulties, its ability to balance the crossStrait situation and its ability to keep Taiwan strong in the face of a growing Chinese challenge was restrained. The United States will continue to face challenges in dealing with Taiwan-China relations in the future on both grounds. As a young and vibrant democracy, Taiwan’s political forces will continue to wrestle with each other over fundamental issues that may cause concern to the United States. The United States has limited options in dissuading democratic Taiwan from adopting policies that are not in line with U.S. goals, as domestic interests may be a stronger driver than external considerations in a normal democracy. At the same time, China’s growing economic, military, and political influence does not seem to be winding down. The Obama administration, like the Bush administration in its final years, initially chose to emphasize the issues on which America seeks China’s cooperation and not to let divisive issues such as human rights, Tibet, and Taiwan affect overall U.S.-China relations.

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Under such circumstances, Taiwan needs to consider the possibility of a U.S. review of its policy toward Taiwan and a conclusion that the United States no longer needs to serve as a balancer in cross-Strait interactions. This has become a topic of discussion in Washington, DC, policy circles, and is also a topic for Taiwan decision makers to seriously think about.43 Notes 1. Chapter reprinted from American Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 32, no. 2 (May–June 2010). 2. Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot, Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), pp. 142–98; Kerry Dumbaugh, “Taiwan, Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress, June 8, 2006, p. 2. 3. September 3, 2008 news release by Taiwan’s Presidential Office, www. president.gov.tw 4. For the Shimonoseki Treaty, please see Appendix I, in Lin Chia-lung , Lee Ming-chun, Lo Chih-cheng (ed.), Unlocking the Secret of Taiwan’s Sovereignty ᧸屲栚♿䋲⃊㶙䱧䭋᧺, 2008, Taipei: Taiwan Thinktank, pp. 127–39. Taiwanese intellectuals continue to cite the top Chinese official Li Hung-zhang’s words during the time that Taiwan was a place where “birds do not sing, flowers do not bloom, men have no affection, women have no loyalty,” and China could cede it to Japan without regret. 5. DPP Platform, see www.dpp.org 6. www.dpp.org 7. Mainland Affairs Council, Olive Branches, Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 2005. 8. See www.libertytimes.com.tw/2005/news/feb/25/today-fo.htm. 9. Richard C. Bush, op.cit., 1. 10. Talks by Yu Keli, head of Taiwan Institution at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, September 25, 2008, at Institute of International Relations. 11. Shirley A. Kan, “China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ‘One China’ policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei,” September 7, 2006, CRS Report for the Congress, pp. 77–78. Full translated text of Kelly’s statement was also published in Taiwan; see United Daily News, April 23, 24, p. A13. 12. Richard Bush, op. cit., p. 1. 13. Talks by Yu Keli, head of Taiwan Institution at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, September 25, 2008, at Institute of International Relations. 14. United Daily News, September 15, 2005, p. A2; Cheng, Tuan-yao, “How does Taiwan deal with Bush-Hu encounter?” United Daily News, September 15, 2005, p. A15. 15. Liberty Times, March 30, 2008, p. A1. Tseng Hsiang-ying, “Need for Improvement in Taiwan’s Anti-Missile Capability,” Taiwan’s National Security

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16. 17.

18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23.

24.

25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32.

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Policy Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, Spring 2005, pp. 88–117. Also see Robert S. Ross, “Comparative Deterrence, The Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds, New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 20–21. Ralph Jennings, “China Increases Missiles Pointed at Taiwan to 1,500,” Reuters, February 15, 2009. China Times on the net, www.tw.news.yahoo.com/040921/19/10271.html; also see Liberty Times, www.libertytimes.com.tw/2004/new/sep/21/todayfo4.htm. United Daily News, November 11, 2008, udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/ NAT1/4603785.shtml. Ming Bao (Hong Kong), July 2, 2008, www.mingbao.com/htm/ News/20080702/nea01.htm. Liberty Times, January 12, 2006, January 20, 2006; Cheng, Da-chen, “MND Underestimate the Chinese Submarines,” Liberty Times, November 28, 2006, commentary. Tseng, Hsiang-ying, op. cit. Bonnie Glaser and Brad Glosserman, “Promoting Confidence Building Across the Taiwan Strait,” Pacific Forum CSIS, September 2008. The public figures include US$137 million to Nauru, US$250 million to Grenada, US$600 million to Senegal, and US$430 million to Costa Rica. As revealed by Minister James Huang, China promised Malawi US$6 billion to secure its diplomatic ties. Ministry of Foreign Affairs website documents on China’s interference of Taiwan’s international participation, www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/lp.asp?ctNo de:1382&CtUnit=53&BaseDSD=7&mp=1. Author’s own collection of WHO documents. Mainland Affairs Council website document, www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/ch960511.htm; www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/ch960429.htm; also see Liberty Times, May 22, 2006. Author’s own collection of UN documents. Author’s own collection of UN documents. Author’s own collection of OIE documents. This was the fifth point included in the six assurances that President Ronald Reagan gave to President Chiang Ching-kuo on July 14, 1982. Other points included that the United States would not specify a date to terminate arms sale to Taiwan; the United States would not agree to China’s request for prior consultation on arms sale to Taiwan; the United States has no intention to play mediator between Taiwan and the PRC; the United States would not agree to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; and the United States would not accept China’s request that the United States should end its military sales to Taiwan within a certain period of time. See Fredrick Chien, “President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan and Their Meaning Today,” Heritage Foundation event, October 3, 2007, www.heritage.org/Press/Events/ev100307a.cfm Taiwan Relations Act, Section 2 (b) (2). Taiwan Relations Act, Section 2 (b) (4).

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33. Taiwan Relations Act, Sections 2 (b) (5) and (6). 34. Shirley A. Kan, op. cit. 35. Liberty Times, September 6, 2007, www.libertytimes.com.tw/2007/new/ sep/6/today-p1.htm. 36. Liberty Times, November 10, 2007, www.libertytimes.com.tw/2007/new/ nov/10/today-p8.htm. 37. Liberty Times, September 10, 2007, www.libertytimes.comn.tw/2007/new/ sep/13/today-p2.htm. 38. Christopher Hill, “Update on the Six-Party Talks,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Statemen’s Forum, July 1, 2008. 39. Admiral Timothy J. Keating, “A Combatant Commander’s Perspective on the Asia-Pacific,” Heritage Foundation event, July 16, 2008, www.heritage. org/press/events/ev071608b.cfm. 40. Liberty Times, October 5, 2008, www.libertytimes.com.tw/2008/news/oct5/ today-fo3.htm. 41. Arthur Ding, “Observation on American Military Sale to Taiwan,” Strategic and Security Analyses, Vol. 42, October 2008, pp. 18–9. 42. Richard C. Bush, op. cit., p. 250. 43. Robert Sutter, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States—Policy Adjustments Needed,” PacNet Number 17, Pacific Forum CSIS, March 5, 2009.

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8

The U.S.-China-Taiwan Relationship: New Circumstances, Persistent Challenges Denny Roy

T

he strategic, political, and economic context of cross-Strait relations has undergone undeniably important changes that bring into view the possibility of permanently taking the Taiwan Strait off the list of global “flash points,” a position it has occupied for decades. Achieving peace in the Strait, nevertheless, faces many familiar obstacles. Achieving the kind of peace that satisfies all of the parties involved will be even more difficult. Recent developments at the start of what is being called a new era in cross-Strait relations favor China and those in Taiwan who believe that Taiwan is ultimately part of China, raising questions about the reaction of “green”-oriented Taiwanese and the new U.S. administration.

The OHuMa Triangle The relationship between the Hu, Obama, and Ma governments is a triangular one—call it the “OHuMa” Triangle. The triangle analogy is not to imply that all three parties are equal in capabilities, nor that their relationships with each other are equidistant. Rather, this is a triangle in the sense that the relationship between any two members is strongly influenced by their respective

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relationships with the third member. Therefore, a major change in any one member has the potential to change not only its relationship with the two others, but also the relationship between the two others. In this case, the new government in Taiwan changes the relationship between China and the United States, and the new government in the United States potentially changes the relationship between China and Taiwan. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship at the outset of the Obama-Ma era is strongly conditioned by the recent experience of bilateral relations during the Bush and Chen presidencies. Bush entered office with a relatively strong stance in support of Taiwan. In 2001, the Bush team offered Taiwan an unusually large $11 billion arms sale package. The package included submarines, a potentially offensive weapon that no American president since Nixon had been willing to give Taiwan. The Bush administration allowed higher-level bilateral contacts than its predecessors, including an informal meeting of the U.S. deputy secretary of defense and the Taiwan minister of defense in 2002—the highest level meeting between U.S. and Taiwan officials since Washington de-recognized the ROC in 1979. Bush himself publicly committed in 2001 to do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan in the event of a cross-Strait military conflict. Chen, however, eroded this initial U.S. support with a series of acts that both Beijing and Washington viewed as provocative. American officials soon concluded that Chen was taking advantage of America’s interest in Taiwan’s security as cover for his domestic political agenda of distancing Taiwan from China. In the eyes of many American observers, Chen was exposing the United States to the risk of an unwanted conflict with China. Taiwan became a source of grief for the Bush administration and drew public rebukes from American officials as well as a renewed American commitment to the oneChina policy with the oft-stated elaboration of U.S. government opposition to “unilateral changes in the status quo.” Although Beijing still objects to much of U.S. policy toward Taiwan, particularly the arms sales, American willingness to take over much of China’s role of deterring (what could be perceived as) moves toward separatism by Taipei makes it easier for China to take a more relaxed posture toward cross-Strait relations. Washington’s performance during the test provided by the Chen government showed the Chinese that the Americans recognize

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and are willing to accommodate a vital Chinese security interest. This provides strong assurance to Beijing that should allow the Chinese to demonstrate equanimity in their reaction to setbacks in their cross-Strait agenda. If, conversely, the Chinese believed the Americans would seize any opportunity to make Taiwan’s separation from China permanent, Chinese leaders would have little scope for flexibility in their semi-official negotiations with Taiwan’s government. American recognition of the growing importance of China as an economic and political actor in the region and beyond feeds Taiwan’s anxiety of being “sold out” by the United States in an effort to gain Chinese cooperation on some other issue in SinoU.S. relations. These other issues are many, ranging from strategic problems such as the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis to economic matters such as China’s purchase of large amounts of U.S. Treasury Bills. Officials often deny that U.S.-Taiwan relations are linked to other issues of interest to China, but the idea is irresistible from a Chinese point of view, so suspicion on the part of Taiwan is both inescapable and understandable. America’s need for China tends to reinforce a U.S. policy of restraining Taiwan from moving toward independence. It is possible that in the future, China could also ask for American help in not just preventing Taiwan independence, but also in pressuring Taiwan to unify with China. For Taiwan, a highly cooperative Sino-U.S. relationship is a psychological asset for the Chinese in cross-Strait relations, constraining Taiwan’s freedom of maneuver because of tighter limits on what policies by Taipei the Americans can be expected to support. In the past, China’s sending of belligerent signals to Taiwan had the potential to sour an otherwise cordial U.S.-China relationship. The context of a small democracy threatened by a large “communist” bully increases the salience of American ideological solidarity with Taiwan. This is not a purely emotional impulse, but also has a hard strategic edge. According to the “democratic peace theory” in which Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both professed belief, the larger the amount of the political world that goes democratic, the closer the world is to making war obsolete. An authoritarian China’s violent absorption of a free Taiwan would be a major setback to this project. Washington must also consider the

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consequences for American leadership in Asia of failing to defend a friendly country from a Chinese military threat. On the other hand, cross-Strait détente clears the way for a constructive American relationship with China. While peace in the Strait does not guarantee stable Sino-U.S. relations, it sidelines the single most troublesome bilateral flashpoint. Taiwan’s lowered tensions with China also improve Taipei’s credibility with Washington, demonstrating a shared commitment to stability. New Circumstances The forces bearing on this triangle are never static. Recent changes are the most significant since the Democratic Progress Party captured the ROC presidency in 2000. The major new circumstances are the relatively China-friendly approach of the Ma Ying-jeou government, the balanced policy of the Obama administration in Washington, the new level of prestige and influence attained by a rising China, and the global financial crisis. Of these developments, continuation into the medium term is highly likely for the rise of China but questionable for the others. Cross-Strait Reconciliation Under the Ma Government In terms of immediate impact, the most dramatic and important of the new circumstances is the change in cross-Strait policy from the Chen Shui-bian government to the Ma Ying-jeou government. While the Chen government sought to distance Taiwan from China—tolerating if not welcoming the resulting rise in tensions with the PRC—and was cautious about deepening economic ties with China, Ma’s policy embraces economic integration, ceases deSinification, and tries to avoid antagonizing the Chinese. Taipei’s acceptance of the one-China principle (albeit in the indirect formulation of the “1992 consensus”) and welcoming of stronger economic and social links with the mainland are in perfect accord with Beijing’s long-term strategy for softening up Taiwan for reincorporation. These shifts also go a great distance toward assuring Chinese leaders that the drift toward independence they perceived under the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian governments has been reversed.

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Some credit is due to Chen for shifting the ground of cross-Strait relations. Chen’s testing of Beijing’s red lines outraged mainland Chinese and dismayed those on Taiwan who believe the island’s ultimate destiny is to be part of China. In doing so, however, Chen very likely forced the Chinese leadership to lower its expectations for unification with Taiwan and may have forced the Chinese leadership to change their goal from unification to avoiding Taiwan independence. Chen’s de-Sinification campaign pushed Beijing to reach out to the then-opposition Kuomintang and adds to the pressure on China to meet Ma’s government halfway. The previous DPP government also did most of the work that allowed for the 2008 agreements on greater cross-Strait interaction. Chen’s government was unsuccessful, however, in preventing the continued economic integration with China that many DPP-affiliated officials feared. Meanwhile, Chen’s policies of de-Sinification and refusal to espouse the one-China principle as a precondition for cross-Strait talks left Taipei without an institutional channel for managing cross-Strait business activities. Chen also failed to significantly expand Taiwan’s international opportunities. With Beijing perceiving Chen as a determined “separatist,” China’s countervailing efforts were stronger than ever. Several countries diplomatically de-recognized the ROC, and China successfully blocked even Taiwan’s attempts to join the World Health Assembly. In sum, the Chen presidency had an impact on China’s present calculations that should not be underestimated, demonstrating to China’s leaders what might happen should the opposition pan-Green recapture the presidency in a future election. New U.S. Administration In 2001, the newly installed Bush administration demonstrated a relatively strong ideological commitment to Taiwan with its offer of an unusually large arms package and George W. Bush’s public commitment to do “whatever it took” to defend Taiwan if China attacked the island.1 That initially high level of support for Taiwan cooled considerably as Washington came to view the Chen government as insufficiently sensitive to American interests that were impacted by Chen’s cross-Strait policies. The U.S. government eventually moved to restrain Chen, to China’s approval. In terms of international relations theory, the United States turned a case of

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“offensive chain-ganging” (a country being drawn reluctantly into a conflict by a more aggressive ally) into a case of “defensive chainganging” (restraint of the aggressive ally).2 There have always been two major vulnerabilities in the U.S.Taiwan relationship. The first is that the interests of the U.S. government and those of the Taiwan government have never been exactly the same. Certain circumstances had the potential to move the relationship beyond the overlapping interests and to expose the two governments’ differing agenda. The second vulnerability stems from the asymmetry in geopolitical weight between Taiwan and China. If China had more to offer than Taiwan in Washington’s pursuit of American interests around the globe, the United States could find it difficult to side with Taipei against Beijing’s wishes on crossStrait issues. Both of these vulnerabilities broke through the surface during the Chen presidency. U.S. officials felt compelled to publicly warn Taiwan not to attempt “unilateral changes in the status quo,” by which Washington meant moving from de facto independence to de jure independence—a rejection of Chen’s position that formalizing Taiwan’s independence was merely consolidating rather than changing the status quo. James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said in the context of proposed changes to the ROC constitution that might cut important symbolic links to China that “There are limitations with respect to what the United States will support,” implying that Chen should not take U.S. intervention for granted if his independence agenda sparked a war with the PRC.3 As Taipei prepared a 2008 referendum that asked voters whether they approved of joining the UN under the name “Taiwan,” U.S. officials said the idea was provocative, counterproductive, and demonstrated disrespect for U.S. interests.4 The agendas of Chen and Bush were openly at odds. The Obama administration appeared to enter office with a Taiwan policy roughly where the Bush administration left it. In December 2008, the American Institute in Taiwan Director Stephen Young said Obama would demonstrate a “tremendous amount of continuity” in Taiwan policy.5 In February 2009, new Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said U.S. policy toward Taiwan “remains as it has been,” with the continuation of arms sales as well as the U.S. position in favor of reduced cross-Strait tensions.6 Continuity means not only the one-China policy, which pleases China, but also continued

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U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which Beijing seems to find increasingly intolerable. Continued Rise of China The costs to the United States of antagonizing China are growing. The Chinese military threat to Taiwan is becoming more credible. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is building an array of capabilities through which to strike Taiwan, including cyber-warfare and electromagnetic pulse blackout as well as the more traditional methods of air-sea blockade, bombardment (with missiles and bomber aircraft), and invasion. In the recent past, Chinese forces did not have the wherewithal to neutralize Taiwan’s defenses, transport sufficient numbers of soldiers across the Strait quickly enough to win a foothold, or put a U.S. carrier battle group in jeopardy of missile or torpedo strikes. The Chinese are purposefully engaged in turning these previous weaknesses into strengths. Although even the steadily growing PLA budget is dwarfed by U.S. military spending, a much higher proportion of China’s defense expenditures goes toward forces, personnel, and facilities that would be involved in a cross-Strait conflict than is the case on the U.S. side. In a China-vs.-U.S. Taiwan Strait scenario, China would also have the easier job of area denial in a region close to home, compared to the difficulties the United States would face in sending a naval task force across the Pacific. The enhancement of PLA capabilities increases the possibility that U.S. forces would suffer serious losses in a military intervention in a Taiwan Strait war. This changes the U.S. calculation in the question of whether to intervene. In the event of such a conflict, an intervening United States would wish for support from its allies, friends, and as many other governments as possible. But with China’s burgeoning political and economic weight, the willingness of other countries to side with the United States in support of Taiwan against the PRC is undermined. This is already visible in China’s ability to marshal opposition to attempts by Taiwan to increase its participation in international organizations and regimes. The relative rise of China will bring correspondingly rising pressure on other governments to withhold both diplomatic and material support for Taiwan, leaving the United States increasingly isolated as a potential defender of Taiwan.

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Financial Crisis The financial crisis may have significant long-term effects that would make it harder for the United States to remain the world’s financial superpower while uplifting China toward that position, in what would amount to a hegemonic reversal through economic turmoil rather than war.7 The financial crisis contributes indirectly to the rise of China. Since poor U.S. management of the American financial system is widely blamed as the trigger for the crisis, the international attractiveness of the American economic and political model is reduced. Accordingly, U.S. “soft power” and moral authority are reduced, and U.S. influence declines with them. This opens the field wider for an alternative model. Of the rival contenders for this role, China is among the leaders (along with democraticsocialist Western Europe), with its remarkable record of economic growth and poverty alleviation of the past two decades. China, of course, continues to demonstrate deep-seated problems with corruption, environmental degradation, and failure to uphold basic political rights for its people, but for the large number of governments around the world that view orderly economic development as their highest priority, China’s accomplishments are enviable. The U.S.-China economic relationship is gradually moving away from U.S.-dominant asymmetry. The crisis that began in late 2008 finds the United States buying less from China because of recession, while the U.S. need for China to buy treasury bonds and support the dollar as the international currency is greater than ever. America is becoming relatively more economically dependent on China than China is dependent on America. This trend would increase U.S. vulnerability to Chinese influence and pressure on international political questions. In a sign of the times, during her trip to Asia in February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made clear that traditional U.S. concerns about the protection of human rights in China would be subordinate to America’s need for Chinese cooperation in containing the global economic crisis and meeting the challenge of degradation of the natural environment. As for Taiwan, the financial crisis semed to deal a serious blow to Ma Ying-jeou’s “6-3-3” program: achieving the milestones of 6 percent annual economic growth, an annual average per capita GDP of

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US$30,000, and unemployment under 3 percent. Before the crisis, Ma said he would need until the year 2016 (when he would finish his second presidential term if reelected) to reach these goals. Early in 2009, economists were projecting less than 1 percent growth in Taiwan for the year. By mid-2010 however, improved economic performance suggested that the 2012 presidential election would be Ma’s to lose. Persistent Challenges These contextual changes allow for a political and strategic reset. One possible and much-desired outcome of such a reset is permanent peace in the Strait, but this remains challenging. Taiwan Divided

Taiwan’s people remain divided over the island’s ultimate relationship with mainland China. This is the single most important variable in cross-Strait relations. Obviously, the Taiwan “question” would disappear immediately if Taiwan’s people decided they were united in support of unification. Less obviously, the question might also disappear (if not immediately) if the island’s inhabitants were united in favor of independence and distinct nationhood and willing to fight for these outcomes. Such opposition a couple of decades ago when China did not have the strength or influence to bend Taiwan to Beijing’s will would by now have been consolidated into an alternative status quo. China’s Taiwan policy has two pillars: preventing movement toward formal independence and implementing strong economic and social cross-Strait linkages. A key premise of PRC policy is that these linkages will break down Taiwan’s resistance to unification: the substantial portion of Taiwan’s people that now oppose unification will gradually warm to the idea of political union with China when they see the economic and diplomatic benefits of associating with China and the glorious progress that China has made since the early days of CCP rule. It is far from clear, however, that the PRC’s premise is correct. Converting Taiwanese nationalism to Chinese nationalism is no easy matter. First, the strong negative reaction from many Taiwanese

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to the perception that the Ma government is moving too quickly toward political accommodation and economic integration with China underscores the reality that a significant number of Taiwan’s people, perhaps 40 percent, do not believe that prospective economic benefits are worth the risk of locking Taiwan into a course of eventual unification. Second, another large component of the Taiwan population is willing to accept stronger economic ties and a policy that tries to avoid confrontations with Beijing, but is not interested in unification in the medium term, if ever. This is roughly the platform on which Ma successfully campaigned for the presidency. Once the objectives of improved economic prospects and stabilized cross-Strait relations are achieved, it does not necessarily follow that this group of Taiwan’s people will acquire a desire for unification. Finally, given public sentiment on Taiwan, a necessary condition for any realistic possibility of serious unification negotiations is a convergence of political systems between Taiwan and the PRC. Taiwan’s people will not voluntarily put their hard-won democracy in jeopardy by relinquishing their autonomy to a Chinese government that shows no interest in relaxing either the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on political power or the brutal enforcement of strict limitations on certain political liberties. Is the Cross-Strait Détente Sustainable?

The DPP could recapture power in 2012 or 2016. Disillusionment owing to the Chen Shui-bian corruption scandal was a factor in the DPP losing the race for president in 2008, but the main reason was the DPP government’s poor performance managing economic development. Chen’s government focused on distancing Taiwan from China instead of gaining economic benefits from China. Taiwan’s economic growth under CSB was only half of what it was previously, and unemployment was higher. The Ma government’s clear successes in cross-Strait relations thus far have been in lowering tensions with China and deepening economic integration with China. These two areas are of course related; China is pleased with Ma’s policies because they are steps in the direction of unification, China’s ultimate goal, even if Ma maintains there will be no bilateral negotiations about unification while he is president. A large segment of Taiwan’s population, the ideologically centrist group

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likely to determine the winner of the next presidential election, did not vote for Ma because they want unification with China, but mainly because they wanted to give the policies that Ma advocated a chance to make Taiwan prosperous again. They will judge the Ma government’s success or failure based on the performance of Taiwan’s economy under Ma’s watch. China: Not Winning Hearts and Minds

Official Chinese statements, particularly in recent years, evince an understanding of the importance of Taiwan public opinion in cross-Strait relations. It is certainly not China’s preference to reincorporate a Taiwan full of hostility toward China. Even in his famous Eight Points Speech in 1995, PRC President Jiang Zemin said he recognized that “The lifestyles of our Taiwan compatriots and their desire to be masters of their own country should be fully respected. All their legitimate rights and interests must be protected.”8 This was followed, unfortunately, by ham-fisted PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan’s people into submission during the island’s presidential election campaigns of 1996 and 2000. In both cases, Chinese pressure failed to bring about the electoral results Beijing wanted. By the end of the decade of the 2000s the Chinese leadership appeared to have absorbed the lesson that threatening rhetoric and gestures toward Taiwan tend to galvanize pro-independence sentiment. The realization that bellicosity could be counterproductive was a necessary, although not sufficient, part of the explanation for less strident and apparently pro forma Chinese reactions to attempted de-Sinicization in the latter part of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency. It was also important that a strong KMT position in the Legislative Yuan prevented Chen from making deep and permanent changes in Taiwan’s formal relationship with China and that the United States took a clear and public stance against Taiwan independence. Based on statements by Chinese leaders and governmentaffiliated analysts, Beijing now understands better than ever the need to win hearts and minds on Taiwan. The question is how far Chinese leaders are willing to go to meet this objective, which takes flesh out of the hide of other basic Chinese goals for crossStrait relations.

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The Chinese are at risk of trying so hard to prevent something that they cause it to happen. Beijing’s very negative experience with the Chen Shui-bian presidency creates a sense of partnership with the KMT and a pressure to help Ma succeed. This should lead to a willingness to make substantial enough concessions to win the favor of the people of Taiwan. Unfortunately, however, the memory of the Chen years also simultaneously acts as a restraint against China making substantial concessions. The fear that a future, independence-minded DPP government would exploit any PRC concessions made to today’s KMT government works to make the Chinese cautious and conservative. Without bold action to address Taiwanese concerns, however, the Chinese may be unintentionally helping to lay the groundwork for another change in the ruling party in Taiwan, the outcome Beijing dearly wants to avoid. The PLA missiles arrayed on China’s side of the Strait symbolize Beijing’s over-caution. Redeploying the missiles would be easy. Since the missiles are on mobile launchers, once moved further inland, they could be moved back to the coast opposite Taiwan in a matter of days. The largely symbolic gesture of withdrawing some or all of the missiles threatening Taiwan would directly address one of Taiwan’s most pressing concerns and demonstrate Chinese goodwill. It would mean a substantial political gain for the Chinese for virtually no strategic cost (as these missiles would simply go into storage, available for quick repositioning should a cross-Strait crisis break out). Drawing down the missiles does not fall into the category of a permanent concession that a future pro-independence Taiwan government could take advantage of. There was speculation that the Chinese might pull back some of the missiles even before Ma’s inauguration. Yet as of mid-2010, the Chinese have still been unwilling to take this step. A Win-Win (-Win)? By the end of 2008, both Beijing and Taipei spoke of aiming for a “win-win situation.” Superficially, this appears possible with a Ma government committed to the one-China principle. Exploring the possibility more deeply requires an identification of the fundamental interests of not only Taiwan and China, but also of the

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United States, and an inquiry into whether these interests are indeed compatible. In negotiations with Taipei, Beijing will evaluate Taiwan’s preferences against the principle that no PRC concession can be construed as condoning separate sovereignty for Taiwan or for “two Chinas.” This principle appears to set one of the limits of China’s negotiating position. Taiwan’s fundamental interests in cross-Strait relations upon which there is a consensus in Taiwan include the following: (1) economic prosperity; (2) security; (3) “dignity,” i.e., symbols of sovereignty; and (4) international space, which involves implications and benefits of statehood. The part of cross-Strait relations that is clearly “win-win,” where the interests of both sides overlap, is limited to cooperative economic prosperity. Even in this case, the crossStrait economic ties culminating in the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010 are controversial toward Taiwan, as a large minority of Taiwan’s people complained that overly rapid integration threatened to mortgage the island’s political future. As both sides recognize, future steps in cross-Strait accommodation will be harder because they touch on the more difficult political and security questions. Thus, it is unclear that cross-Strait détente will deepen much further than the level achieved in Ma’s first year. During his December 2008 speech, Chinese President Hu Jintao signaled readiness to seriously discuss the issue of confidencebuilding measures—the highest-level public endorsement from Beijing up to that time. The idea of establishing procedures that could prevent an accidental, unauthorized, or unnecessary use of military force on or over the Taiwan Strait is certainly sound and worth pursuing if both sides recognize its independent merit. Many observers also believe a cross-Strait peace agreement is feasible in the new political environment, especially in light of PRC Premier Wen Jiabao’s March 2009 speech indicating Beijing’s receptivity to such an agreement. The crafting, ratification, interpretation, and enforcement of such an agreement raise many thorny problems. My view is that a peace agreement is would be an epi-phenomenal superstructure. It would be possible only under the conditions of a much-improved political situation, which conditions would make such a formal agreement unnecessary; and the agreement would not survive the deterioration of those conditions. Thus, a peace

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agreement is probably not worth the difficulty and the expenditure of political capital (particularly in Taiwan) that would be required to realize it. Are improved cross-Strait relations also a “win” for the United States? Despite suspicions to the contrary, the U.S. government has maintained that its principal interest in cross-Strait relations is stability. This means that for Washington, the advantages of a peaceful and voluntary unification between Taiwan and China—including the removal of the single greatest problem in U.S.-China relations— outweigh the loss of whatever advantages might accrue from keeping Taiwan and China politically separated. U.S. officials have said they can accept any China-Taiwan political arrangement that Taiwan’s people agree to.9 This suggests Washington will not attempt to use its influence to prevent Taiwan-China unification should this outcome appear close to realization, although some observers will remain wedded to the notion that America’s true, hidden objective is to keep China divided and weak to perpetuate U.S. domination of the Asia-Pacific region. Strategic trends are moving not in favor of alleged American imperialism in the Asia-Pacific, but rather away from it. The danger to Taiwan of abandonment by the United States, specifically of the Americans trading away a policy supportive of Taipei in exchange for securing Chinese assistance on an unrelated issue, is growing. The strongest obstacle against the United States openly taking this step is the perception of China as an authoritarian or even a “communist” country combined with the perception of Taiwan as a democratic success story. The traditional self-appointed U.S. role as a champion of global democratization is not easily put aside, being a deeply ingrained feature of the national self-image. The George W. Bush administration enshrined this idea in the 2006 National Security Strategy: “To protect our Nation and honor our values, the United States seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy.”10 The Obama administration may choose to downgrade that principle, but it cannot disregard it without leaving itself vulnerable to stinging criticism from the U.S. public and many members of the U.S. Congress. The democratization imperative will continue to weigh heavily on U.S. policy makers, but is less likely

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to increase than is the push-back from China. Perhaps the greatest danger to an independence-minded Taiwan is that China and the United States reach a private understanding that involves a U.S. concession regarding Taiwan that retains plausible public deniability. There is scope, for example, for adjustment in the packages of arms that the United States regularly offers for sale to Taiwan. The U.S. government could bargain with China to hold back some of the more advanced weapons systems it might otherwise offer Taiwan (such as F-16C/D aircraft or Aegis class warships) without suffering mortal political damage from pro-Taiwan U.S. politicians and opinion leaders. Of course, if Taiwan and China remain on the present path of gradual integration and continued low bilateral tensions, this issue will fade. Outlook This chapter yields two important expectations. The first is that great power politics are aligning in ways unfavorable to Taiwan’s continued autonomy vis-à-vis China. The second is that China’s hopes and plans for a peaceful and gradual absorption of Taiwan may yet face a powerful backlash from the Taiwanese. The interaction of these two trends raises many uncertainties. The continued growth of China’s relative power along with further cross-Strait integration might erode the forces of resistance toward Taiwan. Alternatively, a shift in Taipei’s cross-Strait policy away from accommodating China might ultimately elicit either backing or abandonment by the United States. Taiwan has two long-standing worries about its relationship with Washington. The first is that the United States ultimately does not want unification for strategic reasons and therefore will try to disrupt the process if Taiwan and China move too close together. The second, nearly opposite worry is that because China is more important than Taiwan, there is a danger that Washington will bargain away its support for Taiwan’s interests to improve or maintain U.S.China relations, and thereby acquiesce to unification on China’s terms. The first continues to be a false fear. The second fear, however, is increasingly well founded. Certain political reasons for U.S. support of an autonomous Taiwan may remain relevant: the “unsinkable aircraft carrier”

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between eastern China and the Pacific Ocean, Taiwan’s membership in the democratic “zone of peace,” and the test of American credibility among other Asia-Pacific states. Sentimental American support for Taiwan, however, is weaker this century than in the previous one. The economic rationale for a de facto independent Taiwan is also weaker as a result of China’s thoroughgoing engagement with the global economy—i.e., the present arrangement of the United States having economic access to both China and Taiwan would not be expected to change if Taiwan unified with China. The triangle has shifted. Since the height of the Cold War, the United States has moved from formal ally of Taiwan (although this partnership had frequent and substantial disagreements) to informal ally to a more equidistant position between Taiwan and China. This trend stems from the relative growth of Chinese power, which is projected to continue. In the meantime, the new détente greatly favors China with respect to the cross-Strait military balance. A war with China is practically Taiwan’s only military contingency. The size and shape of the ROC military is expected to track the threat posed by China. The PRC, by contrast, is a large state with increasingly global interests. China shares land and maritime borders with many countries that have been adversaries in recent history. China can and does credibly argue that it must have the military capability of a great power, matching its growing economic strength and political influence. Improved cross-Strait relations create downward pressures on Taiwan’s armed forces. Taiwan has already demonstrated reluctance to enter into an arms race with the Chinese. Many politicians in the ruling party accept the notion that China would only attack if Taiwan declares independence, so if Taiwan does not intend to declare independence, it does not need excessively large military forces, particularly when public spending is badly needed elsewhere. Beijing will continue to call for a cessation of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a means of improving both cross-Strait and U.S.-China relations. China is under no equivalent pressure to curtail the enhancement of its forces, only to cease deploying them in ways that signal belligerence toward Taiwan. Thus, it is much easier for China than for Taiwan to continue the buildup of its military forces in an era of more relaxed cross-Strait relations. This will quietly increase China’s medium-term leverage over Taiwan, moving the relationship

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toward a military imbalance so clearly in China’s favor that even pro-independence groups must recognize that Taiwan could not fight off a PLA attempt to seize control of the island. Notes 1. Kelly Wallace, “Bush pledges whatever it takes to defend Taiwan,” CNN, Apr. 25, 2001, http://edition.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/24/bush. taiwan.abc/, accessed Feb. 25, 2009. 2. Dominic Tierney and Amy Oakes, “Offensive and Defensive ChainGanging,” International Studies Association conference paper, San Francisco, CA, March 2008, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252735_index.html, accessed Feb. 6, 2009. 3. “Kelly Says Taiwan Relations Act Key to West Pacific Stability,” America.gov, Apr. 21, 2004, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/April/2004 0421180231ASesuarK0.6475794.html, accessed Feb. 6, 2009. 4. Stephen M. Young, “Opportunities and Challenges in U.S.-Taiwan and CrossStrait Relations,” Dec. 3, 2007, American Institute in Taiwan web site, http:// www.ait.org.tw/en/news/officialtext/viewer.aspx?id=2007120302, accessed Feb. 6, 2009. 5. Ralph Jennings, “Obama to uphold U.S. Taiwan policy, says envoy,” Reuters News Service, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/ idUSTRE4B31EI20081204, accessed Jan. 22, 2009. 6. China News Agency, “U.S. policy on arms sales unchanged, Clinton says,” Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/02/ 18/2003436390, accessed Feb. 23, 2009. 7. I credit my colleague Dr. Chris McNally for this observation. 8. “Jiang Zemin’s Eight-point Proposal,” Jan. 30, 1995, posted on the web site of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, government of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=JiangE P&title=Jiang+Zemin’s+Eight-point+Proposal&m_id=3, accessed Jan. 29, 2009. 9. For a representative statement, see the press conference by Stephen M. Young, American Cultural Center, Taipei, Nov. 12, 2008; posted on American Institute in Taiwan web site, http://www.ait.org.tw/en/news/officialtext/ viewer.aspx?id=2008111203, accessed Jan. 27, 2009. 10. The White House, National Security Strategy, March 2006, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionII.html, accessed Feb. 27, 2009.

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9

Taiwan’s Participation in the World Health Organization: The U.S. “Facilitator” Role* Jaw-ling Joanne Chang

Introduction

S

ince 1997, Taiwan’s attempt to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA) has been unsuccessful because of Beijing’s obstruction. On April 28, 2009, Taiwan’s health minister, Yeh Ching-chuan, received a formal invitation from Margaret Chan, the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), to attend the 62nd WHA in Geneva as an observer under the name of “Chinese Taipei.” The issuance of the invitation was widely seen as the result of improving relations across the Taiwan Strait since President Ma Ying-jeou took office in May 2008. That outcome, however, had much deeper roots that also involved other countries, principally the United States, as well as interactions between China and previous Taiwan governments. This study examines the background of Taiwan’s inclusion as an observer in the annual WHA, reviews the “facilitator” role of the United States, discusses support from other countries, and finally considers the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) posture concerning Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. Background of WHA Participation Taiwan was expelled from the WHO in 1972. In 1997, Taiwan launched a campaign to participate in the WHA. Each year since

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1997, Taiwan’s diplomatic allies submitted a proposal for the inclusion of a supplementary agenda item to invite the Republic of China (Taiwan) to participate as an observer in WHA. The PRC, however, has opposed these proposals, ensuring that the WHA’s General Committee would annually reject Taiwan’s inclusion for lack of a consensus. The WHO Constitution and its Rules of Procedure do not explicitly establish a form of observer status at the annual WHA. But according to past practices, there were generally two ways to be an observer at the WHA. One was through the invitation of WHO’s director-general. In the early 1950s, the Holy See (Vatican) and the Order of Malta were invited as observers by the director-general. The other was by a resolution of the WHA. In 1974, WHA passed a resolution granting a “liberation movement” observer status. In 1975, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attended WHA as an observer.1 Currently, observer status is categorized into three types. The first type is a sovereign state such as the Holy See or Liechtenstein; the second pertains to quasi-sovereign states such as the PLO; and the third concerns nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of the Red Cross, the Red Crescent Societies, and the Interparliamentary Union (IPU). Apart from being members or observers, “associate members” are defined in Article 8 of the WHO Constitution as follows: “territories or groups of territories which are not responsible for the conduct of their international relations may be admitted as Associate Members by the Health Assembly upon application made on behalf of such territory or group of territories by the Member or other authority having responsibility for their international affairs.” Currently, there are two associate members in the WHO: Puerto Rico and Tokelau; their associate memberships were granted by application of the United States and New Zealand, respectively. Associate membership in the WHO is not an option for Taiwan. Moreover, nongovernmental organizations also send delegates to the WHA, but participation as an NGO is also not an option for Taiwan. Although the WHO Constitution does not mention observer status, according to the Rules of Procedure of the WHA, observers are entitled to the following rights: (1) WHA participation, (2)

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WHA plenary meetings’ participation, and (3) access to the nonconfidential documents. In addition, with the invitation of the president and the consent of the Health Assembly or Committee, an observer may make a statement about the subject under discussion, have access to nonconfidential documents and such other documents as the director-general may see fit to make available, and may submit memorandums to the director-general.2 Beginning in 1997, China opposed Taiwan’s participation in the WHA as an observer, associate member, or NGO.3 Beijing welcomed Taiwan’s participation as a member of a Chinese delegation, but Taiwan declined to accept.4 Taiwan stressed that the 23 million people of Taiwan had the right to participate in the WHA in a direct and separate manner.5 Taiwan remained shut out until the breakthrough of 2009. In his inaugural address, President Ma Ying-jeou made a “three no’s” pledge—no unification, no independence, and no use of force. President Ma also called for the resumption of cross-Strait negotiation based on the “1992 consensus”—one China, respective interpretations. “Only when Taiwan is no longer being isolated in the international arena can cross-strait relations move forward with confidence,” Ma stated in the speech.6 Cross-Strait tensions have been reduced greatly since President Ma took office in May 2008. After inauguration, the Ma administration established a WHA task force chaired by National Security Secretary-General Su Chi. Also on the task force were the Department of Health, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mainland Affairs Council. Their efforts finally yielded positive results. On March 20, 2009, President Ma disclosed that negotiation with the mainland would be conducted at an undisclosed location outside Taiwan in April.7 President Ma also pledged to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty and dignity while seeking observer status. “Of course, we will not return to international society as part of the mainland China delegation because it would be belittling our sovereignty,” Ma stressed. “We will not accept any arrangement to join that world body as an associate member,” Ma declared.8 Andrew Hsia, vice foreign minister of the Republic of China (ROC), stated on April 29, 2009, that “health officials of both sides of the strait have exchanged pragmatic views on related issues,” but he declined to divulge details of the cross-Strait negotiations.9 Hsia declared that there was no hidden agenda or condition in the

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discussions between Taiwan and Mainland China. Vice Minister Hsia also pointed out that in 2009, no country submitted a proposal for the inclusion of a supplementary agenda item to invite Taipei to participate as an observer in WHA. Many important countries, however, communicated with the WHO to support Taiwan’s participation as an observer at the WHA. Support from the international community was important to Taiwan’s success. Dr. Yeh led a 15-member delegation to the 62nd WHA in May 2009. In a brief speech at a plenary session of the WHA, he said, “The participation of Chinese Taipei in the WHA is imperative as the world is witnessing the threat of a possible H1N1 pandemic influenza at this juncture of time.” He described Taiwan as a forerunner in viral hepatitis control and tobacco control and e-health and said that the inclusion of Chinese Taipei in WHO activities will undoubtedly strengthen the world’s ability to deal with public health emergencies.10 Dr. Yeh held bilateral talks in Geneva with his counterparts from the United States, Japan, Canada, the European Union, and China; Yeh’s meeting with China’s Health Minister Chen Zu was considered a historic encounter. Ma attributed this success to three reasons: first, the efforts of all Taiwan sectors, regardless of political affiliation; second, the goodwill of Mainland China; and third, the strong support of the international community. The U.S. Role On January 1, 1979, the United States terminated official diplomatic relations with the ROC. It enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to preserve and promote commercial, cultural, and other relations between the United States and Taiwan. Section 4 (d) of the TRA specifically states: “Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any financial institution or any other international organization.” U.S. administrations and Congress later secured Taiwan’s seat in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the 1980s and supported Taiwan’s efforts to become a member of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002.

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In September 1994, the U.S. Department of State issued a report of the U.S. Policy Review toward Taiwan, which was the first such review by any administration since 1979. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Pacific Winston Lord promised Congress that the U.S. administration would support opportunities for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in such organizations in which its membership was not possible.11 Limited Support from Clinton

On June 30, 1998, President Clinton in Shanghai announced the U.S. “Three No’s Policy”—(1) “not to support independence for Taiwan”; (2) “not to support two Chinas or one Taiwan, one China”; and (3) “not to support Taiwan’s membership in any international organization for which statehood is a requirement.”12 Clinton’s “Three No’s” pledge was a major setback in U.S.-Taiwan relations. With the third pledge, the United States in a way foreclosed the possibilities of Taiwan’s membership in the UN and other international organizations based on statehood. The United States, nevertheless, still played an important role in shaping Taiwan’s efforts to become a WHA observer. Since 1997, Washington has undergone several stages of policy changes pertaining to Taiwan’s bid for WHA observer status. Each has had different consequences. From the year that the Clinton administration issued the “Three No’s” pledge to 2000, the support of the U.S. administration for Taiwan’s observer bid in the WHA was very limited. In May 1997, when Taiwan first applied to be an observer, the U.S. delegate in Geneva expressed the judgment that the General Committee of the WHA was not an appropriate place to discuss Taiwan’s proposal. Although the United States maintained that the WHO should offer an opportunity for Taiwan to make a contribution, the United States voted to abstain on the inclusion of a supplementary agenda item to invite the Republic of China (Taiwan) to attend the WHA as an observer. The Assertive Role of Congress

With Taiwan’s continuing efforts, the U.S. Congress finally responded positively. On February 12, 1998, U.S. Congressman

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Sherrod Brown (D.–Ohio) submitted H. Con. Res. 219, which stated that Taiwan and its 21 million people should be represented in the WHO and that it should be U.S. policy to support Taiwan’s representation in the WHO.13 Before the end of the Clinton administration, at least six resolutions supporting Taiwan’s WHO bid were submitted in Congress.14 Among them, H. R. 1794 became Public Law 106-137 on December 7, 1999. It mandated that the U.S. secretary of state submit a report to Congress no later than January 1, 2000, on efforts to fulfill the commitment made in the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review to support Taiwan’s participation in the WHO more actively. In January 2000, based on U.S. Public Law 106-137, the Department of State issued a report on Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. The report indicated that since the U.S. Policy Review of Taiwan in 1994, there had not been much progress. Moreover, the PRC remained adamantly opposed to Taiwan’s attempts at membership or participation in international organizations. Most international organizations make decisions based on consensus, it noted, and Taiwan had only 28 diplomatic allies, a very limited number. Besides, there are relatively few international organizations whose charters do not include statehood as a prerequisite for membership. Thus, Taiwan’s participation in international organizations has been extremely limited. Given that Article Three of the WHO Constitution requires statehood for membership, the report asserted that the United States does not support Taiwan’s quest to become a member of the WHO. The administration did conclude, however, that the people in Taiwan should be able to contribute to as well as benefit from the work of the WHO. The Clinton administration, according to the report, made recommendations for Taiwan to participate in the work of the WHO, maintaining that: ●

●

Through the American Institute in Taiwan, the administration has consulted frequently with Taiwan on modalities for participation in international organizations, including the WHO. We have suggested that Taiwan’s NGOs and medical community explore participating in WHO activities through international nongovernmental organizations such as the World Medical Association, which have relations with the WHO.

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We have raised with [the] WHO Secretariat our interest in finding appropriate ways for Taiwan to benefit from as well as contribute to the work of the WHO. Specifically, we have proposed to the PRC, Taiwan, and the WHO Secretariat that Taiwan health experts and physicians be invited to attend the WHO expert meetings and conferences in their professional capacity.15

The year 2000 was the last year of the Clinton administration. Given President Clinton’s 1998 “Three No’s” pledge to China, it is understandable that there was no proactive support from his administration. Without U.S. support, Taiwan’s bid for observer status at the WHA made very little progress. In 2000, during the U.S. presidential election, the Republican Party platform asserted that “we support Taiwan’s accession to the World Trade Organization, as well as its participation in the World Health Organizations and other multilateral institutions.”16 Proactive Support from Bush

When President Bush came to power, much proactive support was given for Taiwan’s efforts to be an observer at the WHA. On March 7, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that “there should be ways for Taiwan to enjoy full benefits of participation without being a member.”17 The U.S. Congress continued to play an assertive role to pressure the administration to help Taiwan obtain observer status in the WHA. On April 24, 2001, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 428, and President Bush signed it as U.S. Public Law 107-10 on May 28. This law authorized the secretary of state to initiate a plan to endorse Taiwan at the WHA in May 2001 and to instruct the U.S. delegation in Geneva to implement the plan. Congress required that the secretary of state submit a written report to Congress in unclassified form containing the plan no later than 14 days after the date of the law’s enactment.18 On April 4, 2002, President Bush signed a similar Public Law 107-158 to support Taiwan’s observer status in the WHA.19 On May 14, 2002, Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson announced for the first time in a speech made

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at the World Medical Association in Geneva that the United States supported Taiwan to obtain observer status in the WHA. On June 10, in his speech before the Asian Society, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the United States takes its responsibilities under the TRA “very, very seriously,” and he called Taiwan “not a problem but a success story.”20 In 2002, moreover, 23 U.S. states passed similar resolutions supporting Taiwan’s participation in the WHO, and 13 U.S. governors sent letters to the Bush administration and the WHO Secretariat supporting Taiwan’s WHO bid as an observer.21 Facilitator Role in 2003 and 2005

The year 2003 was critical for Taiwan’s participation in the WHO because of the global panic over the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which had been concealed by China. As a result, Taiwan became a key victim, sacrificing 73 lives and garnering the renewed attention of the international community, including the United States, which played a vital role as a facilitator in Taiwan’s initial interaction with the WHO. On May 29, President Bush signed another act (S. 243) into Public Law 108-28 to support Taiwan’s observer status in the WHA. On February 26 and March 28, 2003, a total of 94 members of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus sent joint letters to Secretary of State Powell supporting Taiwan’s WHA observer status. With the full support of Congress, Secretary Thompson sent a letter to WHO Director-General Lee Jong-wook on May 14, 2003, urging that the WHO factor all SARS-affected countries and areas, including Taiwan, into WHO’s SARS related plans and activities and stating that the United States supports Taiwan’s participation in WHO, including its observer status. Thompson also publicly pointed out, for the first time in a general discussion of the WHA, that the United States strongly supports Taiwan’s participation in the fight against SARS and other diseases. Furthermore, from March to May 2003, the State Department issued four press releases to support Taiwan. On May 27, 2003, the WHO Committee A passed a SARSrelated resolution. Item 7 of Article 2 of the resolution requested the WHO director-general to “respond appropriately to all requests

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for the WHO’s support for surveillance, prevention and control of SARS in conformity with the WHO Constitution.”22 This resolution provided a legal basis for the WHO to assist Taiwan in conducting SARS control operations. Sha Zukang, head of the permanent mission of the PRC to the UN in Geneva, made a statement claiming that the PRC is not satisfied with the contents of the resolution. He threatened to take measures to punish countries that supported Taiwan. After Sha’s comment, the U.S. delegate nevertheless took the floor in the WHA to express the strong support of the United States for the resolution and to urge the director-general of the WHO to overcome political barriers and respond to “all requests” to combat SARS in keeping with the WHO constitution and “the ideal of pursuing the highest possible level of health for all peoples.”23 As the originator of that resolution, the United States intended initially to propose the SARS resolution during the UN meeting and to include language inviting all affected parties to all infectious disease operations of WHO, including those related to SARS.24 Later that proposal was initiated instead by the WHO Secretariat itself. Before the resolution was passed, the WHO sent two experts to Taiwan on May 3, 2003, to assist its SARS control operations. Between May 3 and July 7, the WHO sent three more experts to Taiwan. Seeing that as an accomplished fact, China’s Vice Premier and Minister of Health Wu Yi stated in WHO’s General Committee that China “approved” WHO’s sending such experts to Taiwan and approved, moreover, of Taiwan’s own experts attending the SARS conference scheduled for June 17–18, 2003, in Kuala Lumpur. In 2003, although the joint efforts of the United States and Taiwan had not achieved the goal of making Taiwan an observer, significant progress nevertheless was made. The WHO sent five experts to Taiwan to observe the disease, while officials of the Health Department in Taiwan attended the SARS international conference held by the WHO for the first time. WHO also included Taiwan in the Outbreak Verification List (OVL). Although China’s Vice Premier and Minister of Health Wu Yi had claimed that Taiwan’s participation in the WHO was “illegitimate, unreasonable and out of context,” pressure from the international community compelled China to save face by expressing its “approval” in public for what the WHO had done.

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On April 1, 2004, the United States and Taiwan held a joint meeting to discuss Taiwan’s participation in the WHA. On April 21, in a congressional hearing on Taiwan, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Pacific James A. Kelly stated that if Taiwan’s observership issue in the WHA comes to a vote, Taiwan can certainly count on the United States to favor it.25 U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson wrote to the WHO director-general on May 1, 2004, clearly stating that the United States fully supports Taiwan’s observer status in the WHA and pleading that the WHO strengthen its collaboration with Taiwan to ensure its participation in the WHO for the sake of global disease control and prevention. President Bush signed another bill (S. 2092) into law (Public Law 108-235) on June 14, 2004, requiring the secretary of state to submit a report to Congress on efforts made to promote Taiwan’s bid to obtain observer status and steps that the secretary of state will take to endorse and obtain observer status at the next WHA. Between 1998 and 2004, the U.S. Congress passed five bills that became U.S. public laws to support Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. Apart from the U.S. Congress, 18 states in 2004 passed resolutions to support Taiwan’s proposal. In addition, 48 governors sent letters to President Bush and the WHO director-general to support Taiwan’s observer status in the WHA.26 In 2005, the United States continued to hold bilateral discussions with Taiwan regarding the WHA observer issue. New Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael Leavitt wrote a letter to WHO Director-General Lee Jong-wook in May 2005, expressing support for Taiwan’s participation in the WHA as an observer. In the House of Representatives, Henry Hyde (R.–IL), Tom Lantos (D.–CA), and four cochairs27 of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus—together with eleven senators, including Richard Lugar (D.–IN), George Allen (R.–VA), and Tim Johnson (D.–SD)—wrote to WHO Director-General Lee Jong-wook to support Taiwan’s bid of WHA observership in 2005. In 2005, during the WHA session, the wording “universal application” was included in the amendment of the International Health Regulations (IHR). The original version of the regulations, revised in 1969, encompassed the guideline made by the international community to prevent the spread of disease. At that time, only yellow fever, plague, and cholera were included in the notification system.

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In 1995, the WHA passed a resolution calling for the revision of the IHR. In 2003, the so-called Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome broke out. In order to prevent the global spread of SARS and avian flu and to respond to nuclear, biological and chemical leaks, the WHA requested the director-general to establish an Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) on the Revision of the IHR.28 On May 23, 2005, the WHA adopted the revision of the IHR and enacted it officially on June 15, 2007.29 IHR (2005) consists of a preface, 10 parts, 66 articles, and 9 amendments.30 Currently there are 194 signatory countries. IHR (2005) serves as an international legal instrument comprising legal rules that commit all countries worldwide to disease surveillance, alerts, and response management. The principle of “universal application” in the IHR (2005) has provided legal ground for Taiwan to participate in the IHR mechanism. The United States, together with all countries that supported the principle, once again played the role as facilitator for Taiwan’s final breakthrough as an observer at the WHA and inclusion in the IHR in 2009. Support from Other Countries As a leader of the world’s democratic community, the United States has played an important role in supporting Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. Before the United States expressed its support for Taiwan’s WHA observer status, no other country publicly supported Taiwan except its diplomatic allies. In 2002, the fact that the United States publicly supported Taiwan to become a WHA observer spurred spillover influence with respect to Japan. In addition, the Canadian and the European parliaments began to pass various resolutions to support Taiwan’s WHA observer status. Japan

On May 14, 2002, Secretary Thompson stated that the United States supported Taiwan as a WHA observer in Geneva. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, on the same day and for the first time, publicly stated support for Taiwan’s bid. Fukuda said that Japan was well aware of Taiwan’s medical development, which is

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geographically close to Japan; he added that he hoped that Taiwan would participate in the WHO as an observer. On April 6, 2003, in a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi stated that the Japanese government supported Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. Minister Kawaguchi reiterated that support when meeting with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi on May 12, 2003. In addition, on May 11, Japanese Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare Chikara Sakaguchi in Tokyo publicly expressed his support of Taiwan’s participation in the WHO as an observer. On May 19, during the general discussion at the WHA, Japanese Vice Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare Yoshio Kimura stated that SARS had strikingly reminded everyone that a local problem can spread quickly to affect neighboring areas and concluded that “we cannot afford to exclude any part” of the globe from beneficence of the WHO.31 In 2004, Japan, together with the United States, voted for Taiwan’s observer status for the first time in the WHA. In 2007, neither Japan nor the United States supported Taiwan’s application for membership in the WHO, but both offered explanatory statements claiming that they supported observer status for Taiwan at the WHA and expected that Taiwan’s participation in technical meetings would be further improved.32 Canada

On May 27, 2003, the House of Commons in Canada in a vote of 163 to 67 passed a motion to support Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. In the same year, the Canadian Senate adopted Motion No. 116, affirming that the Canadian government supports Taiwan’s efforts to obtain WHO observer status. In 2004, Canada did not vote for Taiwan’s bid but issued an explanatory statement recommending that the issue of Taiwan’s participation in the WHO should be handled pragmatically. Canada encouraged the WHO to take all measures to assist Taiwan to obtain the contact channel with the WHO. On May 3, 2005, the Canadian Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons voted for a report to support Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. The Canadian Senate passed a resolution

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supporting Taiwan’s participation in the WHA on June 15, 2005. After the WHA ratified the IHR Amendment, the Canadian delegate endorsed the “universal application” of the IHR.33 On May 17, 2006, the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development unanimously approved a resolution to support Taiwan’s participation in the WHO as an observer. One hundred fifty-one members of the Canadian Parliament sent a joint letter to Director-General Lee Jong-wook to support Taiwan’s participation in the WHA as an observer. From 2003 to 2006, the Canadian Parliament approved at least five resolutions to that effect. In May 2006, the Canadian government spoke in the WHA, supporting Taiwan’s meaningful participation in WHO activities. In 2007, Canada did not support Taiwan’s application as a WHO member but issued an explanatory statement in support of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the WHO and stated that Taiwan should be covered under the “universal principle” of the IHR.34 European Parliament

In May 2002 and 2003, the European Parliament twice passed resolutions calling for Taiwan to be granted observer status at the 55th and 56th annual WHA in Geneva. The resolution also called on the Commission and the member states to support Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. In addition, the European Parliament instructed its president to forward the resolution to the Council, the Commission, the member states, the government of the PRC, the U.S. government, the government of Taiwan, the United Nations, and the WHO.35 In July 2005 and May 2006, the European Parliament again adopted resolutions to reiterate its call to support Taiwan’s application for observer status in the WHO and to ensure Taiwan’s access to and participation in all technical meetings of the WHO. The 2006 resolution also called on the director-general of the WHO to include the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (Taiwan CDC) immediately as an official participant in the WHO Global Outbreak and Alert Response Network (GOARN).36 On February 5, 2009, the European Parliament passed a resolution on Trade and Economic Relations with China, welcoming

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the rapprochement between China and Taiwan and stressing support for Taiwan’s participation as observers in relevant international organizations wherein statehood is not required, for example, in the International Labor Organization (ILO). The European Union has issued 11 statements in support of Taiwan’s WHA bids over the years.37 Moreover, the parliaments of New Zealand, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands also passed similar resolutions to support Taiwan’s WHA observer status. China’s Response From 1997 to 2003, Taiwan engaged in a low-profile campaign for WHA observer status. In 2002, although Taiwan sought observer status in the capacity of a “health entity,” China still rejected Taiwan’s bid. In 2003, the sudden outbreak of SARS, which caused the death of 774 people throughout the world, alarmed the international community.38 The WHO decided to send experts to Taiwan in May 2003 to control the disease. Facing that new development, China had to change its position toward Taiwan’s participation. China declared that the central government “agreed to WHO sending experts to Taiwan to investigate the outbreak” and “would readily consider requests from Taiwan for further information and technical assistance from WHO.”39 The 2005 Memorandum of Understanding

On May 14, 2005, before the annual WHA, the director-general of WHO and the minister of health of the ROC signed a secret memorandum of understanding (MOU). The entire contents have yet to be publicized, but some implementation rules are: ●

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Requests to invite Taiwanese medical and public health experts shall be sent as early as possible and no later than five weeks before the beginning of the technical activity or meeting in question. Should the request not appear justified, the focal point will inform the technical unit accordingly.

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The Chinese Mission in Geneva shall inform the Secretariat of the Ministry of Health’s (MOH’s) agreement or disagreement with the proposed invitation within two weeks from the receipt of the request from the Secretariat. As to the geographic expression to be included in the mailing address for any correspondence with invited Taiwanese experts, the use of “Republic of China” or “Taiwan” is not acceptable. Technical units should only indicate the name of the city of the addressee, without indicating a “country” of destination, and invitations should as much as possible be sent by telefax to avoid problems with the regular mail. Only experts under the level of “director-general” in their respective institutions or agencies may be invited.40

Although this secret MOU allows Taiwan to attend some meetings about technical activities, in fact, Taiwan has been localized as part of China. The problems involved include the following: (1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

The final decision about whether Taiwan experts will attend the technical meetings is to be made by China, which suggests that it exercises sovereignty over Taiwan. Between 2005 and the end of 2008, the WHO organized thousands of technical meetings concerning infectious diseases, but Taiwan attended only 21 meetings. Accordingly, Taiwan has not been able to participate in the WHO “meaningfully.” On September 12, 2007, the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN) of the WHO, instead of contacting Taiwan directly with important information on epidemic prevention, requested that China relay to Taiwan information concerning the Shigella sonnel pathogen. Taiwan, however, did not receive the information from China until 10 days later. On December 14, 2007, the IHR Authorized Ports List publicized by the WHO included Taiwan’s eight ports as Chinese ports under the name of China. This action tended to confuse international shipping companies. In September 2008, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs voiced strong objections to the WHO and asked it to revise

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its IHR Authorized List that included Taiwan ports under China. In September 2008, Taiwan notified the WHO that papaya milk powder and coffee powder, produced by Taiwan’s Chun Chiao Food Industrial Company with contaminated melamine from China, had been sold to Hong Kong. The WHO replied to Taiwan by e-mail requesting further information. The official copy was sent to China’s Ministry of Health, and the duplicate copy was forwarded to Center for Disease Control (CDC), Taiwan. The Taiwan government stated its objection through various channels.

Since China signed the MOU with the WHO Secretariat in 2005, Beijing has continued to localize Taiwan by various means. Taiwan’s future participation in the WHA or WHO, therefore, faces serious challenges. The new Kuomintang (KMT) government must respond carefully. On December 31, 2008, President Hu Jintao offered six proposals to promote the peaceful development of the Cross-Strait relationship in a speech to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of China’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.” Hu stated that the mainland is willing to discuss with Taiwan “proper and reasonable arrangements” for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, as long as that does not create a scenario of “two Chinas” or “one China and one Taiwan.”41 On January 1, 2009, President Hu said that “we will seize opportunities to improve cross-strait relations.42 Inclusion in IHR

Mainland China began to show flexibility toward Taiwan’s WHO participation in 2009. On January 13, 2009, Taiwan’s CDC received a letter from Dr. Bernard P. Kean, executive director of the WHO Office of the Director-General, notifying Taiwan that it was included in the IHR 2005 system. Taiwan designated CDC as its focal point of contact. Accordingly, Taiwan can now interact directly with the WHO on major disease outbreaks without having to go through Beijing. At the end of March 2009, Taiwan’s CDC received a password to access via the internet the IHR Event Information portal, formally

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completing Taiwan’s accession to the global health management framework. In addition, the WHO committed to dispatch experts to Taiwan and invite Taiwan’s representatives to attend the WHO Emergency Committee in the event that public health issues arise. Taiwan has been invited to designate a public health specialist for the IHR roster of experts. It is now able for the first time to contact the world health body directly and receive first-hand information about avian flu prevention and control, food security, and the spread and control of epidemic diseases. There are many difficult cross-Strait issues that need resolution. The name issue is only one of them. On January 13, 2009, Dr. Bernard Kean sent a letter to Director Steve Kuo of Taiwan’s CDC; the letter was addressed to “CDC Director in Taipei”; “Taiwan, China” did not appear in Kean’s letter.43 On January 23, 2009, Kuo used “Director of Taiwan CDC” in his reply letter.44 The “name issue” was thus skillfully avoided. Taiwan’s Health Minister Yeh attended the 62nd WHA as an observer under the name of “Chinese Taipei” in May 2009. According to WHO spokesman Thomas Abraham, the name Chinese Taipei and other issues have been “mutually agreed to by both parties across the Taiwan Strait.” He added that “There is no negotiation with the WHO. The WHO was not involved at all.”45 In May 2009, Taiwan’s confirmed influenza A (H1N1) cases were tallied as part of China’s. After protests and communication with the WHO, on May 25, 2009, Taiwan’s cases of H1N1 were listed as a separate entry at the bottom of WHO’s statistical table under the name “Chinese Taipei,” rather than pooling under China’s.46 The change indicated that WHO had taken Taiwan’s position into consideration. The name issue, however, is not yet resolved. For example, the IHR Authorized Ports List of WHO still includes Taiwan’s eight ports as Chinese ports under the name of China. Taiwan will continue to insist that it will participate in the WHA or WHO in a direct and separate manner. Conclusion Taiwan was invited to attend the 62nd WHA at an opportune moment. The world was being threatened by the outbreak of a

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dreadful swine flu. WHO’s inclusion of Taiwan in the IHR system in 2009 is considered a significant step for Taiwan’s management and control of communicable diseases. But the IHR (2005) is only one of six WHO mechanisms; Taiwan will continue its efforts to participate in the other five information mechanisms, including the WHO’s International Food Safety Authorities Network, the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, the Stop TB Partnership, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), and the International Medical Products Anticounterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT). Arthur Lall pointed out in his book Modern International Negotiation (1966) that “the only power a weak state has in negotiation with a strong one is a function of another strong nation’s power.”47 From 2000 to 2008, Taiwan pursued the strategy of forming a coalition with the United States to pressure the PRC on the issue of Taiwan’s observer status in the WHA. In addition, Ma tried to improve relations with both the PRC and the United States in order to gain benefits from both sides. The mutual trust achieved between Taiwan and Mainland China has created more space for Taiwan than it had in the past.48 The inclusion of Taiwan in the IHR system and as an observer of the WHA in 2009 was a result of joint efforts made since 1997 by both the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administrations. The support of the United States and many other countries played an important part in Taiwan’s attaining WHO participation. It is obvious that without goodwill from the PRC, Taiwan would not have been included in the IHR system in 2009 or be participating in the WHA as an observer. With regard to future negotiations, if Taipei and Beijing have the necessary will, creative solutions should be found. The key to all solutions will be to allow each side the freedom to make its own interpretation. Notes * This article was first published in the American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 32, No. 3 (May–June 2010), pp. 131–46. Reprinted with permission. 1. “Taiwan Participation in the World Health Organization (WHO),” State Department Report, Requested by Public Law 106-137, Fiscal Year 2000.

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2. 3.

4. 5.

6.

7. 8. 9. 10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

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Retrieved from http://www.fapa.org/who/106thcongresscampaign/TWPR0105.html. World Health Organization, Constitution of the World Health Organization. (Geneva: WHO, 2005), pp. 123, 127, 134. World Health Organization, “Summary Records of Meetings of Committees,” General Committee First Meeting (May 19, 2003), p. 4; “Summary Records of Meetings of Committees,” General Committee First Meeting (May 17, 2004), p. 5; “Summary Records of Meetings of Committees,” General Committee First Meeting (May 16, 2005), p. 5; “Summary Records of Meetings of Committees,” General Committee First Meeting (May 22, 2006), p. 4; “Summary Records of Meetings of Committees,” General Committee First Meeting (May 14, 2007), p. 4. World Health Organization, “Summary Records of Meetings of Committees,” General Committee First Meeting (May 19, 2003), p. 4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROC), “MOFA of ROC Calls on PRC to take substantive steps to assist Taiwan to participate in the WHO on an equal footing, instead of using hypocritical language to deceive the international community,” Press Release (April 20, 2005). Office of the President, Republic of China, “President Ma’s Inauguration Address,” News Release (May 20, 2008). Retrieved January 12, 2010, from http://www.president.gov.tw/en/. Mo Yan-chih, “Ma affirms diplomatic efforts,” Taipei Times (March 21, 2009), p. 3. David Young, “Ma Will Consider Meeting with Wen if ECFA Is Signed.” The China Post (March 21, 2009). China Post News Staff, “Taiwan Gains WHA Observer Status,” The China Post (April 30, 2009), p. A3. Department of Health (Executive Yuan), “Participation in The World Health Assembly, Advancing the State of Global Health,” DOH news (May 21, 2009). Winston Lord, “Taiwan Policy Review—Statement Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 27, 1994.” In U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 5, No. 42 (October 27, 1994), pp. 705–06. United States Information Agency, “President Clinton’s Visit to China, June 25 to July 3, 1998.” Retrieved November 30, 2008, from http://www/suia/gov/ regional/ea/uschina/previsit.htm. “Relating to Taiwan’s Participation in the World Health Organization,” H. Con. Res. 219, 105th Cong. (February 12, 1998). Retrieved from http:// thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:h.con.res.00219:. The six resolutions are H. Con. Res. 334; H. J. Res. 126; H. Con. Res. 219; S. Res. 26; H. R. 1794; H. J. Res. 70. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from http:// thomas.loc.gov/. “Taiwan Participation in the World Health Organization (WHO),” State Department Report Requested by Public Law 106-137, Fiscal Year 2000. Retrieved from http://www.fapa.org/who/106thcongresscampaign/TW-PR0105. html.

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16. “Principled American Leadership,” Republic Party Platform of 2000. Retrieved November 30, 2008, from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R2000. 17. Charles Snyder, “Powell Supports Taiwan’s Presence in WHO,” Taipei Times, March 9, 2001, p. 1. Retrieved from http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ archives/2001/03/09/76786. 18. “An Act Concerning the Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization,” Public Law 107-10, 107th Cong. (May 28, 2001). Retrieved November 30, 2009, from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ bdquery/z?d107:h.r.00428:. 19. “An Act to Amend Public Law 107-10 to Authorize a United States Plan to Endorse and Obtain Observer Status for Taiwan at the Annual Summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2002 in Geneva, Switzerland, and for Other Purposes,” Public Law 107-158, 107th Cong. (April 4, 2002). Retrieved November 30, 2009, from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ bdquery/z?d107:h.r.02739:. 20. Colin L. Powell, “Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner,” June 10, 2002. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/asoc_ spch02/poc01.html. 21. Legislative Yuan (ROC), Gazette of Legislative Yuan, 91: 28 (May 4, 2002), p. 401. 22. Ibid. 23. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROC), “Taiwan welcomes the SARS resolution passed by WHA, and expressed gratitude to the relevant countries for their assistance.” Press Release (May 29, 2003). 24. Legislative Yuan, Gazette of Legislative Yuan, Vol. 92, No. 36 (May 29, 2003), p. 4.ᇭ 25. U.S. Department of State, “Overview of U.S. Policy toward Taiwan” (April 21, 2004). Retrieved from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/china/kelly. htm. 26. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The ROC Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004, Chapter 2. Retrieved November 30, 2008, from http://multilingual.mofa.gov. tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac/almanac2004/07/07_01.htm. 27. The four cochairs of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus include Steve Chabot (R. –OH), Robert Wexler (D. –FL), Sherrod Brown (D. –OH), and Dana Rohrabacher (R. –CA). 28. World Health Organization, “Revision process of the International Health Organization.” Retrieved November 30, 2008, from http://www.who.int/csr/ ihr/revision/en/index.html. 29. World Health Organization, “Revision of the International Health Regulations,” 58th World Health Assembly, p. 3. Retrieved January 6, 2009, from www.who.int/csr/ihr/IHR_2005/en/index.html. 30. The original content of IHR (2005) is available at http://www.who.int/csr/ ihr/IHR_2005/en/index.html. 31. Legislative Yuan, Gazette of Legislative Yuan, 92: 36 (May 29, 2003), pp. 5–6. 32. Legislative Yuan, Gazette of Legislative Yuan, 96: 50 (May 30, 2007), p. 166.

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33. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROC), The ROC Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005, Chapter 3. Retrieved November 30, 2008, from http://multilingual.mofa. gov.tw/web/web_UTF8/almanac/almanac2005/WebPages/MICO/08/08_02. htm. 34. Legislative Yuan, Gazette of Legislative Yuan, 96: 50 (May 30, 2007), p. 166. 35. “Taiwan’s Observer Status at the 56th World Health Assembly.” Journal of the European Union, Vol. 47, 17 March 2004, C 067 E, pp. 307–09. 36. European Parliament, “European Parliament resolution on the observer status of Taiwan in the World Health Organization.” Document symbol B6-0285/2006(May 18, 2006). 37. Rachel Chan, “Taiwan thanks EU for backing its bid to join World Health Assembly,” The China Post (May 11, 2009). 38. World Health Organization, “Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003.” Retrieved February 23, 2009, fromhttp://www.who.int/csr/sars/ country/table2004_04_21/en/index. html. 39. World Health Organization, “Summary Records of Meetings of Committees,” General Committee First Meeting (May 19, 2003), p. 3. 40. “Implementation of Memorandum of Understanding between the WHO Secretariat and China”, July 12, 2005. 41. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (PRC), “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” Headlines (January 1, 2009). Retrieved Jan. 1, 2009, from http:// www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=headlines&title=Headlines& m_id=973. 42. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (PRC), “Chinese Mainland to seize opportunity to promote cross-straits peaceful development,” Headlines (Jan. 1, 2009). Retrieved January 1, 2009, fromhttp://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=headlines&title=Headlines&m_id=975. 43. Jenny Hsu, “Taipei gets direct link to WHO unit,” Taipei Times (January 23, 2009), p. 1. 44. Ellen Ko, “Island to join health alert system,” Taiwan Journal, 26: 11 (February 6, 2009). 45. Y. C. Jou, “WHO welcomes Taiwan’s participation in World Health Assembly,” Central News Agency (May 2, 2009). 46. World Health Organization, “Influenza A (H1N1)—update 38.” Retrieved May 26, 2009, from http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_05_25/en/index. html. 47. Arthur Lall, Modern International Negotiation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), cited from William M. Habeeb, Power and Tactics in International Negotiation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 4. 48. Office of the President, Republic of China, “President Ma Holds Press Conference and Delivers Statement on Invitation to Taiwan by WHA,” News Releases (April 30, 2009).

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10

Japan’s Perspective on U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations Yoshifumi Nakai

Introduction

J

apan’s political leadership changed five times in the latter half of the decade. Perhaps this is the right time to evaluate how Japan’s perspective of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations has changed since Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro voluntarily stepped down. This paper uses the Koizumi administration (April 2001–September 2006) as the point of reference to identify change and continuity.1 How did the successive administrations of Abe Shinzo (September 2006–August 2007), Fukuda Yasuo (September 2007–August 2008), and Aso Taro (September 2008–September 2009) face the rise of China and its challenges? The waning years of the LDP dynasty, after the five and a half years of the Koizumi administration, displayed what Japan could do to adapt to the changing external environment within the framework of the LDP politics. What would the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leadership be likely to do? The analysis of Japan’s foreign relations during the transitional years prior to the DPJ victory in 2009 provides a solid foundation for further inquiry. In the following sections, this paper reviews three aspects of Japan’s perspective on U.S.-China-Taiwan relations: diplomacy, development, and defense. These three keywords beginning with the letter “d” constitute the key components of the foreign policy of the

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Obama administration. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently used these three “d” terms in her keynote speech before she took off for her Asia tour, during which she visited Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and China in that order.2 In the last section, this paper will summarize these three aspects. This paper argues that three changes occurred in Japan’s perspective of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations. First, diplomacy returned to normal. Japanese diplomacy departed from the tense crisis mode and resumed its standard operating procedures for peacetime. No prime minister since Koizumi made a surprise visit either to North Korea or to Yasukuni Shrine. Bilateral communication with China at the top level resumed and showed remarkable improvement. On the other hand, Japan did not make spectacular diplomatic breakthroughs. No abduction victims came home. Japan quietly dropped its bid to join the permanent membership of the UN Security Council and stopped talking about the creation of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity. Japanese diplomacy, in short, became more balanced, incremental, and modest. A second change happened in the area of development. Japan came to doubt if China could keep up its economic growth. Until recently, Japan took it for granted that the globalization of the economy would benefit everyone. Japanese big businesses, in particular, had no reservations about investing in and trading with China. They thought they were playing a win-win game, in which they were promoting China to become a responsible stakeholder in the global economy. Now they have begun to reconsider, with acute pain, such a rosy assumption. China’s close integration with the U.S. economy proved dangerous. In addition, the structural weakness of the Chinese economy surfaced. The growing GDP only enriched the state sector and the Party. After two decades of economic growth, it turns out that China still has tens of millions who have relatively little opportunity to improve their living standards. China faces not only the economic question but also the political one. In short, China’s troubles largely offset the image of China as the great rising power. Third, defense no longer occupies the central position in Japanese domestic politics. The promotion of the Japanese Defense Agency to ministry status in January 2007 proved a watershed. Then Prime Minister Abe failed to convince Japanese voters that the revision of

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the Constitution, among all the articles related to the right of collective defense, was necessary to guarantee the security of Japan. Although North Korea under Kim Jong-Il remained dangerous, Japanese voters felt reasonably safe. No terrorist attacks occurred in Japan. No Self Defense Forces (SDF) personnel got killed in Iraq. Instead, two Japanese fishermen were killed in Tokyo Bay by the naval accident in February 2008. An SDF Aegis destroyer returning from joint exercises with the U.S. Navy hit and sank the small fishing boat. Adding embarrassment to the Defense Ministry, the former vice minister of defense was arrested for bribery. In March 2008, the convincing victory of the Nationalist Party in Taiwan lowered the threshold of military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. Japan-China relations Three actions taken by the Japanese government contributed to the improvement in Japan-China relations. The first action was Prime Minister Abe’s visit to China in October 2006, soon after his appointment to prime minister. By that time, Koizumi had declared that he would not return to any leadership positions. China, however, did not believe him. To most Chinese observers, an influential politician in Japan would never retire. In fact, most of the former prime ministers in Japan, like Yoshida Shigeru, Tanaka Kakuei, and Takeshita Noboru, maintained some influence in politics. The Chinese observers might have believed that Koizumi would keep on influencing Japan’s foreign policy, just like their former bosses Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin did in China. Abe’s visit assured China that the Koizumi nightmare would not come back, at least for a while. Abe, whose political orientation was more conservative than that of Koizumi, did not become pro-China overnight. Abe as prime minister simply made a realistic decision to release one of the many burdens on his shoulders. Abe knew well that he could not antagonize China any further. Many carry-over issues were waiting for him. All of them were big issues, such as the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea, the logistic support of the so-called antiterrorism campaign abroad, and the revision of the Constitution. Abe had an ambitious foreign policy agenda in mind, including the so-called total reassessment of postwar politics (sengo seiji no sokessan). What he meant by those lofty words was

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the revision of the present Japanese Constitution so that Japan could have its own defense forces and reduce its dependence upon U.S. military forces.3 China welcomed Abe’s visit to Beijing. Abe made it clear to his counterpart that he intentionally chose China as the first destination of his first overseas trip as prime minister. Top-level bilateral communication resumed after a five-year break. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) insisted that Abe had made no promise of not visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. Certainly, there was no such provision in the joint declaration. The Chinese counterpart, however, took Abe’s visit as a de facto guarantee not to visit Yasukuni Shrine. Abe might have visited the Yasukuni Shrine if he had time. But his tenure was too short to reveal his real intention. The second move by the Japanese government that helped to improve Japanese-Chinese relations was the timely dispatch of a Japanese rescue team to Sichuan Province in May 2008 after the earthquake. China had a favorable view of Fukuda Yasuo, who became prime minister in September 2007. He is the son of Fukuda Takeo, who was Prime Minister when Deng Xiaoping visited Japan and signed the peace treaty in October 1978. China knew well that the Fukuda junior, who served as cabinet secretary of the first Koizumi administration, was critical of Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. China felt fairly certain that the junior Fukuda, unlike Koizumi, would not seek to irritate China diplomatically. When the earthquake struck Sichuan province, Prime Minister Fukuda moved quickly to send a Japanese rescue team. Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, disclosed to a Japanese delegation, who happened to be visiting Beijing at that time and of which I happened to be a member, that the Chinese government made a decision to let the Japanese rescue team be the first to enter China. The Japanese rescue team received a hearty welcome. Although the team did not save any lives, the Chinese media reported the rescue mission in an unusually positive light. Pictures of the Japanese rescuers silently praying for the victims appeared in many newspapers and television news. There was a limit, however, to China’s welcome of Japanese goodwill. Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura proposed to China that Japan dispatch SDF cargo planes to Sichuan for the delivery of food and medicine. If the Chinese government accepted the offer,

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it would have been the first occasion on which Japanese SDF planes landed on the Chinese soil, a diplomatic breakthrough. After some hesitation, the Chinese government declined the offer. The Sichuan rescue operation greatly reduced the hard feelings among the Chinese and the Japanese over the torch relays for the Beijing Olympic games. The Dalai Lama came to Japan in early April right after the violent riots in Tibet. Thousands of Chinese residents in Japan assembled in Nagano city to protect the torches and their national pride. The Japanese citizens in Nagano, a very peaceful city in the mountains, felt that those Chinese displayed too much nationalism. A majority of Japanese thought that such a strong show of nationalism did not accord with the ideal of the Olympic Games. The Chinese government proposed dispatching their security guards for the torch relays to prevent disturbances. The Japanese Police Agency declined. Eighty runners joined the torch relays. More than 300 Japanese policemen guarded the relay runners. Five people were arrested on minor charges. The third move by the Japanese government to improve bilateral relations was the resumption of a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs). Most of those measures, such as the joint study of modern history, cooperation in maritime safety measures, and the exchange of students and cultural missions, had a long history. Koizumi did not drop those measures, but his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and China’s criticism of the visits overshadowed those measures. Koizumi’s budget cut put an end to the Japanese yen loans to China. When a series of anti-Japan demonstrations broke out in Beijing, Shanghai, and other major cities in the spring of 2005, a record number of Japanese answered in the monthly survey that they did not like China.4 Both Abe and Fukuda tried to stop the vicious cycle of mutual hatred. They revived the CBMs toward China and emphasized the importance of those nonconfrontational measures. Fukuda was planning to host the G8 summit in Japan. He chose an apolitical issue, the global warming, as the main topic of the summit. China had no opposition to the choice. President Hu Jintao came to Japan in July 2008 for the second time in the same year. Hu’s visits, the first one as the state guest in May 2008 and the second one as a participant in the Hokkaido Summit in July 2008, marked a clear departure from the tense Koizumi days.

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China took full advantage of Koizumi’s departure. Three initiatives of the Chinese government helped revive relations between Japan and China. First, Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan in April 2007. Six and a half years had passed since his predecessor, former Premier Zhu Rongji, visited Japan in October 2000. Wen engaged in a series of symbolic, though important, activities. He met the emperor, spoke at the Diet, and played catch with Fukuda. Wen’s visit brought more than friendly gestures. China made two concessions on long-standing issues. First, Wen remarked in the Diet speech that China positively recognized the apologies made by the previous Japanese leaders about atrocities committed during the war. In contrast to former President Jiang Zemin, who never admitted that Japan had ever apologized to China, Wen officially recognized that Japan had apologized not once but many times. The second concession concerned Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China. One of the reasons why Koizumi decided to end the yen loans to China was that the Chinese government had never thanked to Japan for the economic assistance. During his visit to Japan, Wen thanked the Japanese government and the Japanese people. Wen announced that the Japanese assistance greatly helped China’s modernization.5 Second, China and Japan agreed on the joint development of the natural gas fields in the East China Sea. China had already built several platforms along the border zones. Some of the test wells struck prospective underwater natural gas reserves. Japan protested that those excavations would endanger the natural gas reserves within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Japan. The issue heated up during the Koizumi administration. Both China and Japan had shown little interest in making concessions. It turned out, however, that compromise was the only realistic choice. The gas was too expensive and too little of an amount to transfer to China. Japan was the only prospective buyer. China and Japan reached an agreement in June 2008 by shelving the sovereignty issue. Although Wen and Abe agreed to solve this issue through dialogue in April 2007, it took more than one year for both governments to sign the final agreement. The third initiative of the Chinese government was the hosting of the Beijing Olympic Games. The Japanese MOFA sent a special team to Beijing for possible contingencies. Japanese TV crews

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were ready to telecast any disturbances or protests around the stadiums in Beijing. They expected some sort of trouble, such as street demonstrations by Tibetan monks or synchronized booing against the U.S. and Japanese teams. To the credit of the Chinese authorities, however, China managed the games successfully despite prior doubts that outsiders raised about security and logistics. China joined the ranks of Olympic hosts, which includes Japan (1964) and South Korea (1988). The fears that the Beijing Games would resemble the Olympics hosted by Hitler and Brezhnev did not materialize. Asian nations appreciated the success of the Beijing Games. Most of the Western leaders showed up in the opening ceremony, including Fukuda. U.S. President George W. Bush stayed in China for five days. Even Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro, one of the opinion leaders of conservative and anti-China sentiment, visited Beijing and congratulated the Chinese government. Relations with the United States Koizumi cared little about formulating any lofty slogans about the future of Japan. Abe and his advisors were different. Abe’s slogan “Towards a beautiful country” (S. Abe 2006) implied that Japan should seek genuine independence for its security and prosperity. Abe proposed to review critically the whole post–World War II system. The Japanese voters got the message: Abe wanted to revise the constitution. The U.S. government suspected that Abe wanted to downgrade the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Chinese thought Abe would try to contain the rising China. If any right-wing politician within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had shouted such a slogan, Japanese voters would likely have dismissed it. But Abe was prime minister and the LDP held a twothirds majority in the Lower House. Both the Japanese voters and the U.S. government demanded further elaboration. China wanted to make sure that Abe would not change Koizumi’s assessment that China was not a threat. The Abe administration was in a quandary even before he made any concrete decision. Many Japanese voters, especially the business circles, feared that Abe might disturb the present sensitive balance of power in the Asia Pacific region. China was rising rapidly, and the United States began paying much more attention to China. Trying to reverse the

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verdicts at the Tokyo War Tribunals against the winners, China and the United States, did not seem feasible. Koizumi’s insistence on visiting the Yasukuni Shrine had prevented top-level communication with the Chinese leaders for five years. Koizumi, however, managed to maintain healthy economic relationships with both China and the United States. How would Abe balance business interests with his desire to establish genuine independence? Abe and his advisors thought Japan should break free from the United States and should seek a semi-super power status in the world. The July 2007 Upper House election showed that most Japanese voters did not agree with Abe. The LDP and Komei coalition lost badly. The DPJ achieved a simple majority in the Upper House. Abe resigned after hesitating almost two months. The LDP needed two weeks to choose its next president. Fukuda’s first job was, therefore, to apologize to the Japanese citizens for the political hiatus of two weeks. Fortunately, nothing significant happened during those two weeks. Most of the Japanese people did not notice the absence of the prime minister. If they did notice the absence, they did not mind. The July 2007 Upper House election shattered Abe’s dream of making Japan more beautiful. Japanese voters showed little interest in revising the constitution. They were concerned, as usual, with bread and butter issues, on which Abe made very little impact. Unlike Abe, Fukuda did not irritate U.S. lawmakers much. His moderate stance on foreign policy was well known. He would not dare to revise the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, either. Fukuda, however, could deliver little in three foreign relation issues. First, relations with North Korea continued to deteriorate. Abe, a hawkish negotiator with the North Korean government, could not deliver much in terms of the return of the Japanese abductees. The Six Party Talks continued without much success. North Korea had stopped talking directly with Japan since Koizumi refused to send the Japanese abductees back to North Korea. Fukuda had no other option than relying on the indirect talks with North Korea in the Six Party Talks. China offered little help in resolving the North Korean issues. Wang Jiarui, the top Chinese official dealing with North Korea, told the Japanese delegation in Beijing in May 2008 that China had many difficulties talking to North Korea. China did not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons, which would invite U.S. intervention and

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strong reactions both in South Korea and in Japan. China, however, failed to prevent North Korea from testing atomic weapons. Second, Fukuda had to face strong domestic opposition in the Lower House over security cooperation with the United States. Fukuda had to bypass the Lower House in order to pass the legislation on the Maritime SDF’s operation in the Persian Gulf in January 2008. Abe’s devastating loss in the 2007 Upper House election made the revision of the constitution and the legalization of collective defense virtually impossible. Without the right of collective defense, Japan will have to rely on special legislation in order to work with the U.S. armed forces. This arrangement takes time and is certain to irritate many U.S. lawmakers. The dispatch of the SDF to foreign lands such as Afghanistan and Somalia must face strong opposition in the Upper House. Third, Fukuda found that Japan’s influence in global relations was declining. While Japan and China were busy with the restoration of their relations, the United States and China were engaging in their strategic dialogues. The United States surpassed Japan as the number one trading partner of China in 2007. Japan was facing the prospect of “Japan-passing.” Relations with Taiwan China-Japan relations in the post-Koizumi years brought both good news and bad news for Taiwan. The good news was that Wen Jiabao did not push Abe too hard on the issue of Taiwan. The bad news was the Japanese Supreme Court’s final judgment on the Guanhua Dormitory case. Making a judgment on the 20-year-old case right before Wen’s visit to Japan, the Supreme Court rejected Taiwan’s appeal. Feeling the gradual improvement in its relations with China and expecting turbulence in its domestic politics, Japan did not wish for any drastic change in Taiwan. In the March 2008 election, however, the Nationalists won in a decisive manner and retook the presidency. During Taiwan’s presidential campaign, the Japanese press was rather sympathetic to the Democratic Progress Party (DPP). Asahi Shinbun, the leading Japanese paper, for example, predicted the DPP had a good chance to win because it had strong grassroots support. In Japan, the Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate Ma

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Yingjiu was often depicted as a cold bureaucrat who had an impeccable resume but little gut feeling. Japanese business circles welcomed Ma and his pro-business stance. They liked his support of cross-Strait business. They believed that such economic integration would greatly reduce the political tension between Taiwan and China. The Japanese government, however, had some worries. Ma’s anti-Japan posture in the past was the main source of anxiety. It is well known in Japan that Ma’s topic of his dissertation at Harvard was the “Tiao-Yu-Tai (Senkaku) Islets.” It is also well known in Japan that Ma was the leader of the “Recover Tiao-Yu-Tai” movement in Taiwan. It would be a nightmare for Japan if, as president, Ma continued to lead such a movement. Ma tried to assuage such worries. He visited Japan and offered assurances that he would not antagonize Japan. Meeting with a group of Japanese scholars, including the author, in July 2008, Ma said he would try to become a member of the “zhi-Ri pai” (those who know Japan well). He did not, however, want to become a member of the “qin-Ri pai” (pro-Japan faction). The latter term, he said, was tainted by bad connotations. Japan-China Economic Issues What was wrong with the economic relations between Japan and China during the Koizumi administration? Not much. The macroeconomic indices showed fairly sound growth both in trade and investment. Big businesses in Japan fared well during the Koizumi administration. Some of them, like Toyota, New Nippon Steel, and most of the major trading companies, made record profits in 2007. Koizumi knew too well that what the Japanese voters most wanted their leader to do was to bring about economic recovery. He had no intention to sacrifice the booming China market. Trade between China and Japan grew rapidly. Direct investment into China also increased until 2005 in spite of the loud criticism of Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine. Investment from Japan declined in 2006 and further in 2007. This drop was at least partially due to the anti-Japan demonstrations in April 2005. The overall increase in foreign direct investment (FDI), however, largely offset the impact of the decline of Japanese investment.

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The inflow of Chinese people into Japan continued increasing during the Koizumi administration and after Koizumi. In 2007, the number of Chinese residents in Japan surpassed the Korean residents. The so-called poison dumplings incident in February 2008 highlighted a major problem in Japan-China economic relations. Ten Japanese people, including a few school-age children, got sick after they had eaten frozen dumplings imported from China. None died. Police found a lethal amount of strong pesticides in those dumplings. Since those pesticides were no longer available in Japan, the Japanese police suspected that the contamination occurred in the process of production in China. The Chinese local firm let Japanese TV crews film the facilities. The company promised a thorough investigation. Japanese police went to China and collected data. But the investigation bogged down and, as a result, the importation of Chinese food dropped sharply. Wen’s visit to Japan in April 2008 seemed to put an end to this incident. Wen promised that China would make every effort to make their exports safe. The Chinese local authorities, however, denied the possibility of contamination in China. They said they made a thorough investigation and concluded that the contamination must have happened in Japan. This news angered Japanese consumers, in particular those young mothers who purchase Chinese dumplings for their children. The Chinese accused Japan of making Chinese imports an excuse for trade protection. The truth about the poison dumplings came out by accident. A few months later, some Chinese got sick after they ate frozen dumplings. The local company had not dumped all the suspected dumplings, but rather sold more contaminated dumplings to the local market. To Japanese consumers, this poison dumpling incident marked a sad recognition of the depth of the problem of food safety in the Chinese economy. It soon became clear that the poison dumplings incident was not an isolated exception. Tens of Chinese babies were killed by fake powdered milk containing a harmful chemical substance. The national media did not report the incident for a long time. Meanwhile, the number of victims increased. Thousands of victims filed a lawsuit in the local court. The local courts, however, did not accept those lawsuits saying that they were not authorized to make a judgment on such a case.

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In March 2010, after nearly two years, the Chinese authorities arrested a suspect in connection with the dumplings incident. How local authorities found new evidence after such a long time remained a mystery. The arrest could have something to do with the Japanese government’s tenacious insistence that the Chinese government should take responsibility in guaranteeing the safety of its food exports. The MOFA and Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry are not always cordial partners. In this case, however, both ministries voiced strong protest against the Chinese government. They stressed that the importation of food from China would seriously decline if this dumplings incident remained unsolved. Economic integration with China exposes Japanese to China’s problems of governance. The Chinese central government has little control over local economic activities. The market mechanism won’t work because there is little flow of information. The judicial system won’t work because it has no independence. In short, China lacks the fundamentals that make the market work. The recent financial crisis, the so-called Lehman Shock, revealed another weakness in the Chinese economy. China’s huge foreign reserves turned out to be a liability tying the Chinese economy closely and dangerously to Wall Street. Unlike the so-called Asian financial crisis in 1997, China could not stay in the sidelines. The Chinese government had to act to save its stakes in the global market. When exports shrank, China had few options to boost local consumption. The shift from an export-oriented economy to an open-market economy could take generations. Japan has been trying to do so since the mid-1980s, with arguably little success. Japan has been experiencing a deflation spiral in recent years. The Japanese economy is not free of troubles. Japan is, however, in a better position than China because Japan has a free press, freedom of movement, a convertible currency, and an independent judiciary. Japanese Defense Policy Security played little, if any, part in Koizumi’s ascension to power. Actually, since the end of the Cold War and the end of the LDP monopoly in the early 1990s, security has never become a contentious issue in Japan.6 Almost all of the political parties except the Japan Communist Party (JCP) accept the status quo in security.

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Security remains a bipartisan issue in Japanese politics. Prime ministers in the past have taken pains to reach a compromise on highly contentious security matters, such as the role of the SDF and the right of collective defense. Koizumi was unique. Unlike his political rivals, Hashimoto Ryutaro and Ozawa Ichiro, for example, Koizumi never showed much interest in security questions. He did not even try to devise his own security policy before he became prime minister. Despite his initial indifference to security matters, Koizumi had to make tough decisions on security issues after he took office in 2001. Koizumi’s security policy is an accumulation of makeshift decisions. By September 2005, Koizumi had made a series of decisions regarding security. Although each decision had a negative consequence, Koizumi’s security policy had silenced the opposition and gained unspoken support of the Japanese voters. The LDP won 296 seats out of 480 total seats in the Lower House in the September 2005 Lower House election. Together with 31 seats won by the Clean (Komei) Party, the LDP-Komei coalition came to occupy 327 seats, a two-thirds majority of the Lower House that enabled the LDP-Komei coalition to overrule Upper House decisions. To Koizumi, the outcome of the September 2005 Lower House election was proof that the Japanese voters not only supported his reform agenda but also endorsed his previous decisions regarding security. Despite the renewed attention to security among the Japanese general public, Koizumi kept on cutting the military budget. The cut was not steep, but stood in remarkable contrast to China, where military expenditures continued growing more than 10 percent annually for a decade. The Japanese defense budget surpassed 1 percent of national GDP only three times: in 1987, 1988, and 1989. Since then, the Japanese defense budget remained around 0.96 percent of national GDP in the early 1990s. The Japanese defense budget, however, grew rapidly right after the Taiwan Strait Crisis in March 1996 and the subsequent “re-definition” of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact. In 2003, Koizumi started cutting the defense budget 0.7 percent annually. During the five and one-half years of Koizumi, the proportion of the defense budget dropped from 0.956 percent in 2001 to 0.937 percent in 2006.7

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To China, Koizumi’s budgetary cut turned out to be a mixed blessing. The Chinese government welcomed the cut in the Japanese defense budget. But the cuts went beyond the defense budget. Koizumi became the first prime minister who cut the Japanese ODA to China. The previous prime ministers never touched the ODA to China because they knew well that it was one of the few political levers they could use on China. To Koizumi, however, the budget cut was a matter of crucial importance. China was increasing its military budget. According to the Japanese ODA guidelines, Koizumi insisted, the Japanese government could not give ODA to such a country. Koizumi offered “carrots” to the Japanese defense establishments. What political leaders could give to military men without much cost was prestige and status. Koizumi knew that the Defense Agency had been longing to become a full-scale ministry. The reorganization did not contradict Koizumi’s “structural reform” policy because the two defense-related agencies, the Defense Agency and the Defense Facilities Agency, could be merged into a single ministry. Koizumi approved the merger but left the formal implementation to the hands of his successor. The inauguration of the new Defense Ministry became Abe’s first job. What went wrong with Abe? Apparently, lots of things went wrong. Major Japanese news agencies commonly pointed out a simple reason: there was a “gap (zure)” between Abe’s intention and people’s needs. Let us examine if such a gap existed in Abe’s security policy. (1) “We are with you”: But which of you? The U.S. Department of Defense published its Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) in February 2006. The QDR report named three countries, India, Russia, and China, as “key factors in determining the international security environment of the 21st century.”8 Among these three countries, China received much attention because “China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States.”9 Bush’s assessment of China as being a “strategic competitor” made a comeback. Abe supported the transformation of the U.S. forces in Asia Pacific because such a transformation was supposed to “achieve

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greater integration of defensive systems among its international partners.”10 In practice, the transformation meant that the main fighting forces like the 8,000 Marines in Okinawa would move out of China’s attacking orbit. In October 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense disclosed that the bases in Guam would be reinforced. The reinforcement would include the deployment of advanced attack nuclear submarines and a nuclear powered aircraft carrier battle group. At the same time, another kind of transformation was happening within the United States. This transformation was political in nature. The Republicans lost badly in the midterm election in November 2006. The Democrats won the majority in both Houses. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who had endorsed the QDR Report nine months previously, quit. The new Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s first job was not to prepare for a potential threat from China but to clean up the mess in Iraq. In April 2007, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) published a report on China titled “U.S.–China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course.” As the title of the report indicated, the report proposed a different approach toward China. The report endorsed former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s September 2005 statement in which he called on China to act as a “responsible stakeholder.” The report recommended that the United States should focus on “an affirmative agenda of integrating China into the global community.”11 Abe felt much familiarity with the QDR approach. He found, however, that the CFR approach was gaining strength within the U.S. administration. By that time, it became obvious that the Bush administration’s new business team was eager to “engage” China. U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, former chief executive officer of Goldman Sachs, took charge of the “strategic economic talks” with China. Abe followed the U.S. initiative of engaging China further. Wen visited Japan in April 2007. (2) “China is not a threat”: Taking a closer look Abe had trouble coping with this notion. If China is not a threat, what is a threat to Japan? Aso Taro, then the minister of foreign affairs of the Abe cabinet, stated in December 2005, “Our

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neighboring country has one billion people and its military spending has been growing 10 percent a year for the last 17 years. There is little transparency. It is becoming a threat.”12 The 2006 QDR Report offered timely help: you do not have to regard China as a threat. You should, however, hedge your security against the possibility that China might become aggressive. In order to implement the effective hedging strategy, you must understand China’s will and capability in its military ventures. Let us look into several key areas, in which the China challenge is likely to happen. Defense Budget

A comparison of the Japanese defense budget with the Chinese, the Indian, and the Russian defense budgets13 reveals the following: (1) China is increasing its defense budget rapidly. It surpassed Japan in 2007. (2) Japan’s defense budget remained the same level until 2006. It started rising in 2007. (3) India and Russia are increasing their defense budgets rapidly. Russia’s increase is as steep as China’s. One may argue that China’s official budget covers only the small portion of the total military spending. At the same time, however, one must take into account that China has a population of 1.3 billion, about ten times that of Japan. China’s growth in defense budget itself is not a threat. The lack of transparency is. Nuclear Force

China is modernizing its ICBMs and short- and medium-range missiles. China is likely to have a few nuclear attack submarines. These developments were the reasons why the QDR took up the China challenge seriously. The transformation of the U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific was the U.S. response. Japan is likely to assist the United States with the transformation. Unless China came to have many submarines with nuclear missiles, Japan’s shield by the U.S. SLBMs is not likely to be jeopardized.

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Space Warfare

This was another area of concern that the 2006 QDR Report stressed. China shot down one of its own satellites with a land-based missile in January 2007. The U.S. Defense Department complained that such an act would destabilize the peace in space. In February 2008, the United States shot down a satellite with a missile shot from an Aegis warship, showing the world that the United States was still the leading player in space warfare technology. Japan’s role would be limited but important. Japan is supposed to control the illegal transfer of the military-related technology. Air Force

China is modernizing its air force rapidly. Is the Chinese air force a threat to Japan? Scrambles (emergency takeoffs) by the Air SelfDefense Forces (ASDF) against Chinese aircraft are increasing. But these are still a small portion of the total scrambles. There was no scramble against the North Korean aircraft. There was one scramble against a South Korean plane and three against Taiwanese planes in 2007.14 Navy

Is China building a “Blue Water Navy”? It appears that China is. Since the declaration of the Maritime Law in 1992, the Chinese Navy has been trying to push its line of defense away from its coastlines. How far China could go remains a contentious issue. China seems to have established maritime dominance in the areas of territorial disputes, such as the Paracel and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The Chinese Navy’s activities in the East China Sea, in which are found Japan’s Senkakus, are increasing. The Chinese Maritime Safety Agency’s activities in the Japanese territorial waters are also increasing. China seems to have finished refurbishing a huge and rusty aircraft carrier in the dock of Dalian. The first Chinese aircraft carrier may be deployed soon. But does it matter? You cannot do much with a single carrier. The Chinese aircraft carrier can become a menace to those countries that do not have effective

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countermeasures. It can change the power balance in the Taiwan Strait. China may be able to attack Taiwan from the east and may be able to better counter U.S. naval intervention. To Japan, however, the impact of the Chinese aircraft carrier is limited. The risk to Japan is that China may feel as it had enough capability to venture into dangerous operations, such as the forceful takeover of the disputed territories in the East China Sea and an open attack on Taiwan and Okinawa. Taiwan

Both the 2006 QDR Report and the 2007 CFR Report did not dare to predict the course of Taiwan politics. At the time of this writing, Chinese leaders seem to be appreciating the outcomes of their “peaceful approach” toward Taiwan. China invited the Nationalist Party leaders to Beijing in May 2005. China abstained from conducting any massive military campaign before the presidential election in March 2008. China felt very comfortable seeing its archenemy, the DPP in Taiwan, lose not only the presidential seat but also the majority in the Taiwan legislature. China is likely to continue using the peaceful approach toward Taiwan for the time being. When Hu Jintao did away with the timetable for Taiwan reunification in 2005, it looked like a small change in China’s posture toward Taiwan. It turned out that a small change could bring in big changes. China succeeded in dropping the Taiwan issue from the imminent threat lists of the concerned countries. By simply suggesting that Hu and his colleagues are not hurrying the program for Taiwan reunification, the Chinese government seems to be gaining quiet, if reluctant, compliance from its neighbors, including Japan. Summary and Prospects Diplomacy is likely to remain Japan’s key foreign policy tool—not because it is powerful but because it softens the shock of drastic change. The drastic change happened in August 2009 when the LDP lost the majority in the Lower House election. The DPJ came to power. The election result was almost the reversal of what happened in the previous Lower House election in 2005. The DPJ won

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308 seats this time, compared to 112 in the previous election. The LDP won 119, compared to 303. A loss by the LDP, however, is not likely to change Japan’s foreign policy overnight. Abe and Fukuda, and to a certain extent, Aso, succeeded in putting Japanese diplomacy back on track. Japanese diplomacy has taken a peacetime shift. U.S. President Barack Obama’s approach to Asia emphasizes cooperation and engagement. It suits well Japan’s overall direction. These transitional leaders showed the limitations of Japan’s foreign policy. The successful management of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations did not help them much. Instead, the successful operation of foreign policy in the previous administration became the burden for a new administration. Japanese voters took Koizumi’s flashy diplomacy for granted and would not settle for less. Hatoyama committed the same mistake as Abe and Aso. Instead of settling the small but important issues, he engaged in discussion of the lofty ideals, such as the Fraternal World (yuai sekai) and the Asian Community. He raised the expectation of the Japanese general public to a much higher level than his predecessors. Hatoyama was an intelligent person who could communicate with world leaders in English. Most of the Japanese voters felt that such a competence was absolutely necessary for Japan to survive in the now globalized world. Just like Abe and Aso, Hatoyama suffered from the gap between what he thought he could do and what he could actually do. He did not have much time. He did not have a magic formula (fukuan). He failed to gain trust. His handling of the Futenma base issue disappointed virtually everyone. Kan should learn from Hatoyama’s failures. At the time of this writing, Kan seems to be taking a modest and cautious approach in his foreign policy. We can no longer take China’s development for granted. China is facing huge challenges in its economic management. China’s fast growth strategy is showing systematic fatigue. China needs to reform its political structure, reform which the previous leaders have neglected. Defense is not the central issue in Japan today. Koizumi’s security policy proved to be fairly sturdy over time. It withstood the post-9/11 challenge. China’s rise has little impact on Japan’s security. Unless Japan fell in a sudden crisis, Japanese voters would not discard the tried and true Koizumi policy. Abe’s failure in winning

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over Japanese voters indicates, as an American observer succinctly points out, “Japanese voters favor candidates who care about bread and butter issues over those whose concern is Japan’s greatness and military might.”15 To our neighbors in Asia, Japan may look overly inward looking and self-satisfactory. That is the price of Japan’s peaceful and low profile approach in dealing with the outside world, including rising China. Notes 1. I have written several articles about the foreign relations during the Koizumi administration, including Yoshifumi Nakai, “Japan’s Views on the Rise of China and Its Implications,” in Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao and Cheng-yi Lin (eds.), Rise of China: Beijing’s Strategies and Implications for the Asia-Pacific (London: Routledge, 2009). 2. Hillary Clinton, “U.S. and Asia: Two Transatlantic and Transpacific Powers,” Remarks at the Asia Society, New York, February 13, 2009. 3. Shinzo Abe, Utsukushii Kunihe (Towards a beautiful country) (Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2006). 4. Kazuko Mouri, Nitchu Kankei (The Japan-China Relations) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2006), p. 195. 5. Chugoku Soran 2007–2008 (2008) (Tokyo: Kazankai, 2008), p. 153. 6. Hideo Otake, Nihon seiji no tairitsu jiku (The Axis of the Japanese Politics) (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 1999). 7. Defense of Japan 2007, p. 395. 8. Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006, p. 28. 9. Ibid., p. 29. 10. Ibid., p. 30. 11. (CFR 2007, 6). 12. Shinzo Abe, Utsukushii Kunihe (Towards a beautiful country) (Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2006), p. 5. 13. The Military Balance 2003–2008. 14. Asagumo, April 24, 2008. 15. Robert Dujarric, “Nationalism isn’t an issue in Japan.” The Japan Times, July 30, 2008.

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11

U.S. Debates About Taiwan’s Security, 1979–2009 Michael Pillsbury

Introduction

T

he purpose of this paper is to identify the most important security and military issues that have surrounded the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).1 Since 1979, many former American officials have testified to the Congress or written papers for various think tanks about these controversial security issues. It may be many years before the internal records of the U.S. government are declassified for historians to study these controversies inside the U.S. government. However, in the meantime, by examining the debates among former officials, at least some indirect knowledge of the range of policy options can be glimpsed. To my knowledge, these debates have not been drawn together in one place to provide a guide to security issues and controversies that have surrounded the TRA. This paper does not attempt to explain the origins of these issues or why former officials differ in their views. Retired Admiral Eric McVadon, former defense attaché in Beijing, has testified that how one characterizes China’s military and security influence is often a function of whether one leans toward “China bashing” or “Panda hugging.”2 There may be many other factors as well. These security issues are in the background today as Taiwan pursues cross-Strait engagement, but as AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt said recently to the press in Taipei, “What would make the U.S.

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uncomfortable would be a breakdown in cross-Strait negotiations and reaching an impasse that could lead to tensions re-emerging.”3 The paper concludes with a section on the implications of these debates in which I offer my reasons for cautious optimism about the future security situation for Taiwan. Three Sets of Issues in 1979, 1999, and 2009 The first set of controversial issues emerged in 1979 at the congressional hearings that preceded the actual drafting of the TRA and included whether Taiwan’s arms sales requests were being held up for political reasons, Taiwan’s military value to the United States, and how the Mutual Security Treaty should be replaced with less binding but still similar language in the TRA. The second set of issues to be addressed emerged in the late 1990s and included whether the United States should increase the intensity of its extremely restricted defense dialogue with Taiwan, whether the United States had kept the promises of the TRA or not, and what role the U.S. Defense Department should play in recommending defense reforms to Taiwan’s military leaders. Sophisticated specialists on Taiwan are aware of some of these debates, and the paper recapitulates the important findings of Taiwan’s Academia Sinica in 1999 from three papers presented at a conference on the twentieth anniversary of the TRA that included discussion of some of these issues. A third set of issues has emerged only in recent months, and includes not only enduring issues from 1979 and the late 1990s, but also new issues involving the desirability of Taiwan building armed forces with preemptive capabilities and offensive weapons, interoperability with the United States, and whether the cross-Strait military balance is no longer favorable to Taiwan and therefore a “porcupine” strategy should be developed with less reliance on naval and air forces. My conclusion spells out the implications for future policy choices of these many controversies. This is not a policy advocacy paper, but rather an attempt to create a scholarly inventory of the key issues by providing excerpts or summaries in enough detail to fairly represent what former U.S. officials have advocated and to illustrate the key differences in viewpoints, most of which have persisted since 1979. It is probably difficult for Taiwan’s authorities

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to be sure they fully understand how the U.S. government decides its policy toward Taiwan’s defense from within the wide-ranging policy debate that occurs in public. Enduring Issues Raised in the 1979 TRA Debate In February 1979, there were striking differences among the witnesses before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Taiwan legislation that President Jimmy Carter had submitted. Professors Doak Barnett and Kenneth Lieberthal were the only two witnesses against adding any security clause to the legislation.4 Lieberthal agreed with Barnett that the United States should be sensitive to Beijing’s political sensitivity toward security issues, and told the committee that the normalization legislation adequately provided for the security of Taiwan without adding additional language. As will be detailed, the administration witnesses minimized the strategic importance of Taiwan and did not reveal Taiwan’s recent requests for sophisticated U.S. weapons. The former head of the Taiwan Defense Command from 1974 to 1977, retired Admiral Edwin Snyder, boldly detailed contradictions in the Carter administration’s positions on Taiwan’s strategic importance and Taiwan’s requests for arms sales. Admiral Snyder told the committee that Taiwan’s Air Force would be neutralized within two to three weeks in the event of a Chinese attack, and that Taiwan’s Navy was no match for China’s patrol boats and modern destroyers. He concluded that the Chinese submarine force in concert with its surface and air forces could totally disrupt the lines of communication to Taiwan in short order should they ever get the order to do so. The admiral testified that several vital weapon systems that Taiwan had secretly requested had been withheld for political reasons. When asked by Senator Charles Percy about Taiwan’s strategic importance, Admiral Snyder said he considered Taiwan a very important military asset, equivalent to ten aircraft carriers. He added that Taiwan had been a hub of the American communication system in the Far East, and stood astride the oil routes from the Middle East to Japan. His testimony was considered significant and inserted in the record of the hearings, as was the alarming testimony from Taiwanborn U.S. citizen Professor Parris Chang, who detailed a number of scenarios for coercion that China might use against Taiwan that

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were discounted by the Carter administration witnesses. Parris Chang’s testimony appears to have led to Congress inserting specific language in the TRA about boycotts and embargoes. It is safe to say that 30 years later, debate in the United States still continues on some of the fundamental issues that emerged in 1979, including the need for the United States to consider China’s sensitivity to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and cross-Strait military balance, Taiwan’s strategic value to the United States, and whether the executive branch was withholding information about Taiwan’s arms sales from the Congress and blocking such sales for political reasons. These were not, however, the only issues raised in 1979 that continued to resonate. For example, the role of Congress as Taiwan’s “friend” began to take shape. Former CIA Director and future President George H. W. Bush provided an article to the Washington Post on December 24, 1978, attacking the terms that President Jimmy Carter had agreed to in the normalization agreement. A former State Department China desk director also published an article in the Washington Post a few days later criticizing President Carter for yielding too much of a compromise on terms that the United States had previously insisted upon during the Nixon administration. Already in 1979, an enduring pattern of debate was emerging in which those concerned with protecting Taiwan appealed to the Congress, while the executive branch was more sensitive to Beijing’s concerns. Another key issue in 1979 that was to resonate for three decades was the quality of military contact that Taiwan and the United States should have. For many years in the Warsaw Talks, China had insisted that America remove all its forces from Taiwan and, by implication, cease all military contact with Taiwan.5 As part of the normalization agreement of December 1978, the United States had decided to shut down both the Taiwan Defense Command and the military assistance advisory group inside the U.S. Embassy in Taipei, each of which was headed by a U.S. general or admiral. The issue of whether the USA could have operational contact or provide direct military advice to Taiwan would be raised again in the late 1990s, as will be discussed in detail. From 1979 to 1999, such contacts were apparently held to a minimum, and Taiwan’s military leadership grew isolated in contrast to the years from the 1950s to 1978, when U.S. forces (including nuclear weapons until 1974) were deployed on Taiwan, two U.S. flag-rank officers and their staffs were

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located there, and the two sides jointly planned for military contingencies and conducted military exercises. It is important to keep in mind, as Taiwan’s Ambassador Stephen Chen pointed out in December 2008, that the low point in U.S.Taiwan defense relations was zero. As Chen states about U.S. policy in 1949–1950: Secretary of State Dean Acheson, citing the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Declaration, said: “Therefore, the President says, we are not going to use our forces in connection with the present situation in Formosa. We are not going to attempt to seize the island. We are not going to get involved militarily in any way on the island of Formosa. So far as I know, no responsible person in the Government, no military man has ever believed that we should involve our forces in the island.”6

During the debate on Taiwan’s strategic importance in 1979, two American officials presented views in sharp contrast to those of Snyder. On February 8, 1979, Michael Armacost, deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asian affairs, and General Richard Lawson, director for plans and policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified on Taiwan’s minimal strategic role. Armacost said, “The rationale that led us to establish a U.S. military presence in Taiwan is no longer valid. . . . U.S. forces on Taiwan would not be wellpositioned to counter these components of the Soviet threat in Asia.” A joint letter from the State Department and the Pentagon to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee minimized Taiwan’s strategic importance to the United States: “In summary, the removal of U.S. forces and installations from Taiwan would not significantly affect either our regional military posture or strategy. Specifically, they will not directly affect our ability to counter the most likely threats to peace in Asia.”7 It was similar to Dean Acheson’s tone in 1950 that “no responsible person” ever believed the U.S. should involve our forces on the island. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Roger Sullivan revealed the State Department had considered several actions Taiwan might take, including developing nuclear weapons, declaring independence, or negotiating with China toward reunification. In response to the questions of Senator Joseph Biden, Sullivan said that any Taiwan effort to go nuclear would cause the United States to reassess its intention to continue selling arms to Taiwan.

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The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, testified about the strategic significance of Taiwan to the United States. He considered it “less than our interest of South Korea to Japan, Thailand to Southeast Asia, and the Philippines with the Southeast Asian nations.” General Jones said Taiwan could be of only marginal help in providing logistics support should conflict erupt in Korea. “You Can’t Be More Catholic than the Pope”: Taiwan Spurns the Conservative Coalition The Heritage Foundation entered the debate on Taiwan’s importance and the value of preserving the Mutual Security Treaty. A coalition of conservative groups had formed to oppose normalization. In late January 1979, Senator Gordon Humphrey, six congressmen, and a group of conservative leaders made a two-day visit to Taiwan to show their support. Under tremendous pressure from the administration, Taiwan had decided to accept the normalization agreement. The conservative coalition thought Taiwan would gain more by fighting back. They wanted Taiwan to insist on government to government relations and continuation of the Mutual Defense Treaty. They criticized Taiwan’s timidity and willingness to cave in to State Department demands. Edwin Feulner, executive director of the Heritage Foundation, said, “you can’t be more Catholic than the Pope. You can’t tell them to go for the whole loaf if they’re willing to go for half.” Many amendments that this group proposed to the TRA draft bill failed by a few votes. Academia Sinica Retrospective Assessments in 1999 on 20 Years of the TRA The old issue of U.S.-Taiwan defense relations and contacts was raised in 1999. Joanne Chang Jaw-Ling’s research concluded that the United States had not lived up to either the letter or spirit of the TRA in three ways over 20 years. First, the Aug. 17, 1982, communiqué undermined the provision of the TRA for necessary and sufficient arms sales.8 The 1994 Taiwan policy review banned visits to the United States of Taiwan’s top political leaders. President Clinton’s three no’s pledge to China in 1997–1998 created a new

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ban on Taiwan’s membership in any international organization based on statehood, which also ran against the language of the TRA. All three changes were to Taiwan’s disadvantage. She pointed out that President Jimmy Carter had considered vetoing the TRA, but decided otherwise because it had been approved by more than two-thirds of the Congress, ensuring his veto would have been overridden. She recounts that the first Taipei-based director of the American Institute in Taiwan, Charles T. Cross, received instructions not to do anything that would “affect our relationship with the PRC.” Senator John Glenn, chairman of the Senate East Asian and Pacific affairs subcommittee when the TRA became law, stated in 1982 that the August 17 communiqué undermines the spirit and intent of the TRA: “The communiqué. . . . discards that very carefully crafted framework, the heart of the TRA, in favor of an arms sales formulation negotiated under Chinese threats of retrogression of United States-PRC relations.” She also quotes Natale Bellocchi that U.S. policy from 1979 to 1995 was not to respond to questions of support or nonsupport of independence for Taiwan. The three no’s statement of President Clinton represented a change of policy from the past, she concluded. She warned that Taiwan should be aware that exploitation of the TRA’s ambiguities by different U.S. administrations can foster situational and/or inconsistent applications of the TRA. She recommended that the United States should take concrete steps to improve U.S.-Taiwan military communication. During the same 1999 conference, Lin Cheng-Yi pointed out that Taipei has been “constantly complaining that the USA does not provide Taiwan with militarily necessary state of the art weapons systems.”9 Taipei has been alarmed to discern certain arguments against U.S. arms sales to Taiwan by a few American China experts. He gave two examples: articles by Ronald Montaperto of the National Defense University in 1998 and by Chas W. Freeman, Jr. in Foreign Affairs, also in 1998. Freeman wrote that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “bolster the view that Taiwan can go its own way, regardless of history, geography, and the views of Chinese across the strait.” Dr. Lin, like Joanne Chang, recommended, “The United States should reconsider its policy of not conducting substantive military dialogue with Taiwan.” He concluded, “Taipei, Beijing and Washington have identical interests in seeing both sides of the Taiwan Strait conduct direct contacts and talks leading to a reduction of tensions in the

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region.” Conference participant Song Yann-Huei concluded that the United States has two Taiwan policies: one from Congress and one from the administration. Therefore, actual U.S. policy is the outcome of the interactions between Congress and the administration. These two branches of the federal government assess the situation of U.S.-Taiwan relations differently, Song concluded, with Congress usually favoring Taiwan more.10 Rise of the Colorful “Blue Team,” 1999–2000 A new set of issues arose in 2000, when media reports exposed the operations of the “Blue Team”: a loose alliance of members of Congress, congressional staff, think tank fellows, Republican political operatives, conservative journalists, lobbyists for Taiwan, former intelligence officers, and a handful of academics: all united in the view that a rising China poses great risks to America’s vital interests. Interviews suggest that the Blue Team members did not believe Taiwan supported them, just as Taiwan had not supported the conservative coalition in 1979 that complained, “You can’t be more Catholic than the Pope.” According to a Washington Post article,11 which is quoted at length: Though little noticed [until 2000], the Blue Team had considerable success. By attaching riders to legislation in Congress, it restricted the scope of Chinese-American military relations, forced the Pentagon to report [publicly and annually] to Congress in detail on the China-Taiwan military balance, and compelled the State Department to take a harder line on China’s human rights and religious rights abuses. . . . The core of the alliance consisted of Capitol Hill aides who drafted China-related legislation and tried to operate as anonymously as possible. Several of the congressional aides were brought together [in 1999] by a small think tank, the Project for the New American Century. . . . The study group was organized by Mark Lagon, a political scientist [then on] the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. . . . Strong language and with-us-oragainst-us judgments . . . . [were aimed at its rivals, who were called the “Red Team.” Blue Team allies derided] “panda-huggers” and “the Relationship Police,” referring to those who seek a close and cooperative U.S. relationship with Beijing. Scholars who have been targets of Blue Team scorn told the Washington Post there was an

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increasingly politicized atmosphere among Sinologists. “It’s not as much fun as it used to be,” said Ronald N. Montaperto, a professor at the National Defense University whom the Blue Team considered soft on China.

Congressional Action toward China, 1998–2000 The Blue Team raised controversial issues, and the media credited them with six actions taken by Congress, almost always over the Clinton administration’s objections, that still continue to impact China policy.12 The same Washington Post profile of the Blue Team just quoted above also listed these six actions: (1) China Military Power Report: Public Law 106-65 requires that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “on the current and future military strategy of the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development on the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts, through the next 20 years.”13 (2) “Limiting military exchanges: [the fiscal 2000 defense authorization bill limited] the kinds of weaponry and exercises that the U.S. military can show to visiting People’s Liberation Army officers. It also mandates detailed reports to Congress on contacts with the Chinese military.” (3) “A new NDU center: A provision in [the 1999] defense authorization required the administration to send Congress a plan for a Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the National Defense University in Washington. The provision’s authors hope for more critical analysis of China and greater access to intelligence for Congress.” (4) “Tibet envoy: Friends of Tibet in Congress pressed for the appointment of a U.S. ambassador to Tibet, even though the United States considers the region part of China. To avoid passage of the bill, the administration named a special envoy.” (5) “Religion report: Congress passed a measure requiring the State Department to issue an annual report on religious

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freedom around the world. Critics of China supported the measure, assuming that the report would name Beijing. The first report listed China among the worst offenders.” (6) “Taiwan Security Enhancement Act: The House [in 2000] passed this measure, which would affirm support for Taiwan’s security, establish direct communications between the U.S. and Taiwanese militaries, and require the administration to share with Congress the list of weapons Taiwan seeks to buy each year.” [It was never brought to a vote in the Senate. Many of its provisions were implemented by the DoD in 2000–2004.]14 Debate on Increasing U.S. Defense Relations with Taiwan, 1997–2004 For several years, many U.S. experts on China publicly warned that to improve military talks with Taiwan would amount to reestablishing the Mutual Defense Treaty and therefore provoke Beijing. They lost the debate. The seeds of enhanced defense talks were planted during the administrations of President Clinton and of Lee Teng-hui, the Democrats and the KMT. Republican President George W. Bush and Chen Shuibian made more remarkable progress, but they had a solid foundation on which to build. Some U.S. China experts who opposed a vigorous U.S. role in Taiwan’s defense reform have been rejected repeatedly, but their opposition continues. Some were pessimistic that Taiwan could improve.15 The First Step—The Monterey Talks, 1997

The first breakthrough was a decision to meet in Monterey, California, in December 1997 with Taiwan’s military and civil leadership for strategy discussions, but to avoid discussing arms sales. “Software, not hardware,” was the slogan. Annual rounds of these Monterey Talks continued. Participants on both sides have said that remarkable progress was made in mutual understanding and that defense reform was an important subject. In 1997, key roles were played by Kurt Campbell, Randy Shriver, and Mark Stokes in taking this first, vital step. On the Taiwan side, Lieutenant General Herman Schwai, Generals Fu Taixing and Liu Xiangbin, Yu Hsiaopin, and several civilians made significant efforts.

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The Second Step—The Talks on the Strategic Planning Process, 1998

In 1998, the second major step was the quiet visit of a special DoD delegation to Taiwan headed by the deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy. General Tang Fei invited this DoD team to present to a group of more than 70 Taiwan military officers key U.S. concepts of the role of civilians in developing military plans and the process of developing national military strategy. Concepts of Net Assessment [Integrated Threat Assessment] and strategic planning were discussed in detail. It was apparent from the personal sponsorship of General Tang Fei that Taiwan would one day set up these two offices. Today they exist, and both are an important part of defense reform. The Third Step—The Survey Teams, 1999

In 1999, the third major step came after a shift in U.S. thinking about how to obtain information about Taiwan’s defense priorities. A simple but brilliant idea was to send U.S. military “operators” to talk to Taiwan’s “operators” in the field and at bases, free of policy constraints or prejudices about Taiwan’s capabilities to master new systems. These U.S. military teams began in 1999 and focused on Taiwan’s three key war fighting areas—air defense, anti-submarine operations, and counter-landing operations. Eventually we saw the dispatch of more than a dozen highly sophisticated DoD military survey and assessment teams to assess Taiwan’s weaknesses and military needs in all relevant sectors. They left their recommendations with Taiwan military authorities as well. Over time, nearly 300 such recommendations accumulated, which Taiwan began to address as a part of reform. Prior to this initiative to send so many first-time military survey teams to Taiwan, it is a little mysterious how decisions to deny or delay weapons sales had been made since the passage of the TRA in 1979. In spite of the TRA, which requires maintaining Taiwan’s self-defense capability, it was well known that many, perhaps even the majority, of Taiwan’s requests to purchase expensive U.S. weapons had been denied, in some cases for many years, and without explanation to Taiwan or to the U.S. Congress. For example, the sale of 150 F-16s that finally occurred in 1992 had come only after a decade of urgent requests from Taiwan, without a single U.S. survey team visiting the island. Similarly, diesel submarines had been called “offensive” and denied for a decade, until

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after the visit of an expert survey team in 2000, and the subsequent approval of submarines in 2001.Taiwan’s request for Apache attack helicopters had been seen as unnecessary and “offensive,” but this finding too was reversed after a survey team visit. More than a dozen teams of U.S. military officers met extensively with Taiwan military officers at their bases and units. These were real surveys rather than conference room seminars or abstract policy discussions. Both sides said that this had not been done before. Taiwan had been too isolated. Synergy Among the First Three Steps, 1997–2000

There was a synergy among these three steps. All three required much closer and more frequent consultations between the U.S. military and the Taiwan military of a type that some U.S. China experts had argued should be ruled out of bounds by the terms of the normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC in 1979. This view was rejected. Now, these initiatives may sound in retrospect like common sense, but many opposed them at the time. It is important to note that these DoD initiatives in 1997–1998 were taken in spite of the calls of many U.S. China experts for a multiyear moratorium or at least a pause in major arms sales, and clear limits on too-frequent contacts with Taiwan military. This recommendation was clearly rejected. The view was seen as silly that such contacts would somehow restore the Mutual Security Treaty with Taiwan from which the United States had withdrawn in 1979. The Fourth Step–Reforming the Arms Sales Process, Raising Civilian Control, 2001

In April 2001, the United States took the fourth major step in its role of supporting defense reform for Taiwan. It announced that arms sales would not just be discussed for one day a year, but on a rolling basis, as needed. At the same time, the United States decided to approve most major weapons systems that Taiwan had requested in prior years in a single dramatic batch. In a related development, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz flew to Florida to meet privately with Defense Minister Tang Yaoming at a conference of the U.S. Taiwan Business Council.

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The Fifth Step—Recommending Defense Priorities—C4ISR and Missile Defense 2003

Gradually in 2003, a fifth step became apparent. The United States publicly recommended that Taiwan focus on certain key priorities in its defense spending. These priorities were specific. This had never happened before. For example, take the controversy over missile defense for Taiwan. Several senior U.S. officials between 1995 and 1998 were publicly skeptical. Eventually, the U.S. DoD officials publicly urged that investment into a basic missile defense architecture become a defense priority for Taiwan. A second example of the United States publicly and directly urging a new priority for Taiwan’s military occurred in the January 2003 speech by the senior DoD manager for Asia who recommended a new command and control system to enhance the jointness among all of Taiwan’s forces. Was U.S.-Taiwan Military “Interoperability” Restoring the Mutual Security Treaty? In 2004, a senior DoD official testified publicly that Taiwan’s own interoperability among its forces in command and control would bring a major new benefit—the ability of Taiwan to begin to cooperate with the U.S. forces and other potential security partners, if necessary, in wartime. Once again, the advice of some U.S. China experts had been rejected who had wrongly invented a false straw man, crying wolf that interoperability would somehow be equivalent to restoring the Mutual Security Treaty with Taiwan and deeply offend Beijing. The DoD public testimony of February 6, 2004 stated clearly, “We also suggest that Taiwan enhance interoperability among its Services, and with the United States and other potential security partners.” Debate on Enhancing the U.S. Role in Taiwan’s Defense Public testimony by DoD suggested several reasons the debate had emerged: (1) The PRC’s ambitious military modernization casts a cloud over Beijing’s declared preference for resolving differences with Taiwan through peaceful means. Taiwan faces an

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(3)

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increasingly powerful PRC with an accelerated military modernization program aimed at improving its force options versus Taiwan, and deterring or countering United States military intervention. As the PRC rapidly modernizes its military in order to provide its leadership with credible options for the use of force, Taiwan’s relative military strength will deteriorate, unless it makes significant investments into its defense. As the PRC accelerates its force modernization program, Taiwan remains isolated in the international community, especially in the area of security cooperation. Although several states quietly collaborate with Taipei on security matters, the United States stands alone in its political courage, strategic imperative, and sense of moral responsibility in assisting the security of Taiwan’s democracy. Taiwan’s defense establishment faces a wide array of other challenges as it attempts to keep pace with developments across the Taiwan Strait. Opinion polls consistently indicate a lack of popular concern about attack from China, so Taiwan is faced with an increasingly constrained defense budget. Over the last 10 years, Taiwan’s defense budget has shrunk in real terms and as a proportion of its gross domestic product (GDP). Taiwan’s challenges are serious, but not insurmountable. Our defense relationship with Taiwan seeks to reverse negative trends in its ability to defend itself, possibly obviating the need for massive U.S. intervention in a crisis, and allowing Taiwan’s political leaders to determine the island’s future from a position of strength. If deterrence fails, Taiwan, supported by the U.S. and its allies, must be prepared to swiftly defeat the PRC’s use of force. The PLA’s growing sophistication, including its efforts to complicate U.S. intervention, calls for more consistent strategic harmonization between the U.S. and Taiwan to improve Taiwan’s ability to defend itself and reduce the danger to U.S. forces should intervention become necessary. New Issues in 2009

Preceding the May 2008 Taiwan presidential elections, the increased rhetoric from China regarding its concerns about potential moves

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toward Taiwan independence appeared to signal a greater willingness by Beijing to use force. Although the rhetoric from China decreased after the election of Ma Ying-jeou, there have been no signs that China’s military dispositions have changed significantly. This continuing threat has stimulated several controversies. Sophisticated recommendations about Taiwan’s security were put forward in a report sponsored by the Center for a New American Security, a think tank that Pentagon policy chief Michèle Flournoy led before joining the Obama administration.16 The center crafted the report with the Center for Naval Analyses, the Institute for Defense Analyses, the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Pacific Forum. The report notes the most delicate issue likely to arise in the foreseeable future regarding U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is the island’s pending request for F-16C/D aircraft. “The wisdom of such a sale is hotly debated both in Taiwan and in the United States,” the report states. “The action that could defuse the issue would be meaningful steps by Beijing to reduce the military threat facing Taiwan, thus alleviating some of the pressure on Taipei to proceed with such a purchase. The problem of the aging Taiwan air force will still need to be addressed, but a reduction in the direct military confrontation could make other options appear more feasible.” The report also urges Taiwan to fulfill its promise to increase its military budget to buy purely defensive capabilities. The authors advise Taiwan to avoid procuring high-profile items that make little contribution to the island’s defense. “Offensive capabilities are to be played down,” the report says. “And when Taiwan signals that it wants to buy weapons from the United States and Washington approves, it should purchase them. The United States expends considerable political capital each time it agrees to sell weapons to Taiwan. To pay that price merely to demonstrate its bona fides to Taiwan is an abuse of America’s trust.” CSIS-Sponsored Debate Between Robert Sutter and Richard Bush, March 2009 Former officials Richard Bush and Allan Romberg have disputed the proposals of Robert Sutter for a major U.S. Taiwan policy

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review that would survey the merits of ending U.S. support for the cross-Strait military balance.17 Sutter believes that consultations among policy experts in and out of U.S. government and recent developments suggest that the long-standing notion of U.S.-supported balance in the Taiwan Strait is no longer viable in the face of ever-increasing Chinese influence over Taiwan.18 Sutter finds that policy experts in the camp of presidential candidate John McCain and others argued for a robust buildup of U.S. support for Taiwan to counter what they viewed as adverse trends toward greater asymmetry between Taiwan and China. Sutter argues that this approach has been overshadowed by more pragmatic concern in Washington to avoid disruptions in cross-Strait relations. Sutter states that some officials and policy specialists in Washington privately say that recent easing of tensions and cross-Strait trends work well for longer-term U.S. interests regarding Taiwan. They assert that support for those trends should supersede traditional U.S. concern with sustaining a balance. Sutter feels that this case is not yet well understood by many congressional officials as well as media and others with an interest in U.S. policy toward Taiwan who still see U.S. interests based on seeking an appropriate balance that is influenced by the United States. Against this background, Sutter recommends adjustments in U.S. policy to include taking account of China’s markedly increased influence over Taiwan along with the perceived benefits of reassuring Beijing in the interests of cross-Strait stability. Sutter states that the United States needs to put aside the long-standing U.S. emphasis on sustaining a balance of influence in the Taiwan area favorable to and heavily influenced by the United States. U.S. policy makers need to consult closely with, educate, and persuade congressional, media, and other representatives with a stake in U.S. Taiwan relations on the benefits of the new approach. Robert Sutter suggests specific questions that merit quoting in full from Sutter’s article: (1) “Would U.S. efforts to shore up support for Taiwan militarily, diplomatically and/or economically be more or less likely to prompt Beijing to ease diplomatic and military pressure against Taiwan? And would they be welcomed by a Ma

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administration focused on reassuring China in cross-Strait relations?” (2) “Would . . . recognition of China’s growing influence in the Taiwan area affect broader U.S. strategic plans to work with Asia-Pacific allies, notably Japan, and other regional partners in constructing contingency plans to hedge against the possibility that rising China may become aggressive or disrupt the regional order?” (3) “Does greater U.S. acceptance of China’s powerful influence over Taiwan open the way to policy options of U.S. mediation and closer interchange with China over the future of Taiwan which have been eschewed by U.S. policymakers since the negative experiences of Patrick Hurley and George Marshall in the 1940s?”19 Questioning the Hedge Strategy Robert Sutter’s second question mentioned above raised doubts about the need for constructing contingency plans to hedge against the possibility that a rising China may become aggressive. Other voices such as John Tkacik have supported Taiwan’s defense through what the media calls a “hedge strategy” based in part on enhancing U.S. forces in Guam.20 The United States is building up forces in Guam with an eye toward a future conflict with China, Pacific forces commander Admiral Timothy Keating told the press recently. Keating told a group of defense reporters on Jan. 28, 2008 that the issue of the strategic buildup in Guam, which has been underway for the past three years, was not raised by Chinese military officials during his recent visit to China. Asked if the Chinese are monitoring the buildup, Keating said: “I kind of hope they do. We’ve got a number of B-2s in Guam now. I’m hoping they notice. We’re doing our best to make sure they do. We want them to understand that we’re going to continue to course around the Pacific in ways apparent and maybe not quite so apparent, but we’re going to utilize all the arrows in our quiver, if you will, and B-2s in Guam, continuous bomber presence writ larger in Guam and elsewhere. We’ve been told to do it by Defense Policy Guidance, and we’re most assuredly doing it.”

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Guam is being upgraded by the Pentagon as a central strategic operating base in the Pacific and would be used in case of a future conflict with China over Taiwan or other issues, or as a base for operations for a war in Korea. Additionally, Guam is being beefed up to better project power to the strategic oil-producing region of the Middle East. Enhancements have included hardened storage facilities for B-2 bombers, additional attack submarines, and better communications and infrastructure. AEI Scenarios on the Finlandization of Taiwan Former Bush administration officials have published pessimistic warnings about Taiwan’s future at AEI.21 Dan Blumenthal and Aaron Friedberg are worth citing in extenso: “After a promising start in 2001, relations between Washington and Taipei deteriorated sharply, leaving a residue of suspicion and mistrust. The end result is that for the past eight years, even as China has continued to advance, Taiwan has not done nearly enough to improve its defenses. Nor has America done all it could to improve Taiwan’s self defense and deter Chinese temptations toward aggression . . . It is also conceivable that a deepening sense of isolation and hopelessness could at some point cause the Taiwanese people and their government to simply give up, accepting whatever terms they could get from a triumphant mainland. The “Finlandization” of Taiwan by the current Chinese regime would run directly counter to America’s long-range aim of helping to build an Asia that is free and at peace.”

Debate on the Cross Strait Balance in 2009 Does the Air and Naval Balance Now Favor China?22

One school of thought is that China is deterred from the use of force against Taiwan due to a favorable military balance of power.23 The opposing view sees the balance turning against Taiwan. For example, regarding the naval balance, Bernard Cole concludes that the PLA Navy would be effective against Taiwan’s forces, even if the United States were to intervene. He writes that the maritime balance of power in the Taiwan Strait in 2005 “rests with the PRC.”24

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In terms of air power, Cole’s analysis indicates that the PLA Air Force has made steady improvement over the past decade and, probably, has eroded Taiwan’s air advantage. As is the case with naval forces, he concludes, “Geography, force modernization, and force size favor mainland airpower.” Cole believes “China’s ground forces face a significant problem when arriving on the battlefield against Taiwan’s Army.” Ground combat against Taiwan would require a major amphibious invasion supported by special operation and airborne forces. Cole is not optimistic about the likelihood of Taiwan’s Army and Marine Corps putting up that “determined defense.” Cole reports of “low morale throughout Taiwan’s military” and a significant reluctance in the civil population to support military spending. He concludes his assessment with the warning that Taiwan’s military capability is declining, and there is not much popular will for a stronger deterrent force. Cole’s recommendation for Taiwan is to “reverse the decline in its military spending, increase the professional skill of its military, and shore up the will of its civilian government and people.” Can Taiwan’s Vulnerable Navy and Air Force Be Protected? The Porcupine Concept

William Murray concludes that China either already has or shortly will have the ability to ground or destroy Taiwan’s air force and eliminate the navy. This prospect fundamentally alters Taiwan’s defense needs and makes the intended acquisition from the United States of diesel submarines, P-3 aircraft, and PAC-3 interceptors ill advised. Murray’s detailed argument merits a long quotation: “Taiwan would be far better served by hardening, and building redundancy into, its civil and military infrastructure and systems. In that way the island could reasonably hope to survive an initial precision bombardment, deny the PRC the uncontested use of the air, repel an invasion, and defy the effects of a blockade for an extended period. Many of these actions, in fact, would be consistent with recent efforts by Taiwan to improve its defenses. . . . A porcupine strategy would restore the United States to unequivocal adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, since Taiwan would be in the market only for defensive systems.”

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Murray also recommends specific military improvements, which again are worth quoting at length: “A surprise, long-range, precision bombardment on Taipei’s navy while it is in port seems a clear choice. Beijing would need sufficient weapon accuracy, availability, and reliability, as well as targeting information, but all of these are now within the PRC’s technical ability. . . . Accurate weaponry is useless without knowledge of the precise location of targets, but targeting Taiwan’s surface combatants in port is increasingly easy. In the age of Google Earth, the latitude and longitude of naval piers at Tsoying, Suau, and Taiwan’s other naval bases are easy to determine exactly, and these piers are finite in number. Moreover, many of Taiwan’s naval bases are also commercial ports, suggesting that direct observation of surface ships within them would be a simple matter.”25

U.S. and Japanese F-22s to Prevent Launch of Chinese Missiles and Fighters In contrast to the porcupine concept, the Project 2049 Institute recommended in 2008 a list of specific preemptive preparations to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. The key measure is for the United States to make the Lockheed F-22 available to Japan. This would not only confer high status to our Japanese allies, as Tokyo would be the first foreign military recipient, but also significantly impact the cross-Strait military balance. Mark Stokes and Randall Schriver argue that the F-22, in both U.S. and Japanese hands, could target Chinese air defenses, critical nodes within the PLA’s theater command system that control offensive air and missile operations, airbases, staging areas, and logistics centers. Stokes and Schriver argue for “fighter aircraft that provide stealth, speed, agility, and avionics to conduct interdiction missions to force a cessation of hostilities.” They argue that this capability is a “critical enabler” for air superiority in the Taiwan Strait. In the event of an actual conflict, rapid and stealthy penetration, along with air-to-ground munitions capable of destroying air defense systems, may allow the F-22 to disrupt or destroy an enemy air defense network in support of follow-on friendly forces entering enemy airspace on strike missions.26 Stokes and Schriver do not want to wait for a Chinese attack before F-22s are used. “If left unchallenged on the ground, the PRC

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would be able to conduct air and missile strikes against neighbors with impunity. Preventing the launch of PLA aircraft and missiles prior to employment would be the most cost effective and efficient means of countering a PRC coercive aerospace campaign.” U.S. and Japanese attack operations would seek to prevent the launch of PLA aircraft and missiles by destroying them and their overall supporting infrastructure prior to employment. Stokes and Schriver conclude that, given the severe nature of the PLA conventional ballistic and land attack cruise missile threat, attack operations appear to be “imperative.” However, they add that China’s improving air defense systems are making U.S. attack operations increasingly risky without the F-22. In order to defend against PRC offensive attacks, suppressing PLA air defenses along the coast could be a critical capability. Over the last decade, the PLA has deployed an advanced air defense system that poses challenges for “unstealthy” aircraft. Debate on Chinese Nationalism and Potential Miscalculations in the Use of Force

How rational would the PRC leadership be if cross-Straits talks break down? Is it feasible to build trust across the strait? Will Chinese nationalism lead to miscalculation and the use of force against Taiwan if the current negotiations break down and an impasse begins? Optimists look to the military balance as one factor favoring Taiwan. Interestingly, one study shows that Taiwan’s younger generation differs from its elders in having more confidence in dealing with the PRC. This study argues that Taiwanese public opinion is increasingly favorable to peaceful relations in the Taiwan Strait. Using generational analysis, it shows that younger Taiwanese tend to be pragmatic, moderate, and open minded about China. For those born after 1950, loving Taiwan does not mean hating China. If the PRC refrains from acting in ways that provoke negative reactions from young Taiwanese, current trends suggest that Taiwan’s public will demand better relations between the two sides in the future.27 Optimists about building trust with China could also point to Chinese positive assessments that pre-date the Ma Ying-jeou administration and therefore bode well for the reconciliation process. The November 2008 issue of the Chinese official journal Banyuetan

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from the CPC Propaganda Department and Xinhua had an article about the May 28 meeting of the heads of the Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao and the Nationalist Party Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung. Interestingly, the background notes in the article revealed the increases in cross-Strait exchanges over the past three years. Exchanges increased sharply, especially during the last three years of Chen Shuibian’s administration. ●

●

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As of the end of 2007, there had been a cumulative total of 1.63 million mainland resident visits to Taiwan and 47 million Taiwan visits to Mainland China. During 2005–2007, the total of visits from Taiwan residents to the mainland was 14 million, just in those three years totaling one-third the number in the previous 17 years. As of the end of 2007, the PRC had approved 75,000 investments by Taiwan residents in the mainland, and Taiwan businesspeople had actually invested a total of over US$ 45 billion. In 2006, cross-Strait trade exceeded US$ 100 billion for the first time, reaching US$107.84 billion. As of February 2007, PRC institutions of higher education had enrolled cumulatively over 20,000 students from Taiwan.

Optimists could also point to Chinese military writings that their threat focus is Taiwan independence, which President Ma Ying-jeou has explicitly ruled out. No less a PLA figure than Lieutenant General Zhao Keshi, commander of the Nanjing Military Region, wrote in 2008: “Faced with the complicated and stern situation over the Taiwan Strait, our armed forces have continued to take the military struggle preparations against ‘Taiwan independence’ as the most important, most practical, and more pressing strategic task. Centering around the strategic objective of ‘opposing and checking Taiwan independence by military means,’ we have made systematic planning and scientific organization, explicitly determined targets, tasks, and time nodes, continued to improve the action plans, greatly enhanced the building of combat forces, and stepped up preparations in all aspects by doing downto-earth work. In the 30 years of reform and opening up, our armed forces . . . effectively deterred the ‘Taiwan independence’

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separatist forces by organizing major war readiness actions and military exercises.”28 Some PLA analysts have explored the geopolitical value of Taiwan in extending China’s maritime “defensive” perimeter and improving its ability to influence regional sea lines of communication. For example, Generals Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi in the PLA Academy of Military Science text Science of Military Strategy (2000) state: If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, not only [would] our natural maritime defense system lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to outside forces, but also a large area of water territory and rich resources of ocean resources would fall into the hands of others. . . . [O]ur line of foreign trade and transportation which is vital to China’s opening up and economic development will be exposed to the surveillance and threats of separatists and enemy forces, and China will forever be locked to the west of the first chain of islands in the West Pacific. The Role of Miscalculations and Chinese Nationalism if Cross Strait Talks Break Down There are many studies by former U.S. officials suggesting that nationalism and other factors may make China prone to miscalculation about the use of force, or prefer to use military surprise and shock as part of diplomacy. Indeed, China has for years warned about somewhat vague “red lines.” The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned it would use force have evolved over time in response to Taiwan’s declarations of political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and Beijing’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances, or “red lines,” have included: ● ● ● ● ●

●

Formal declaration of Taiwan independence. Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence. Internal unrest in Taiwan. Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification. Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

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Somewhat vaguely, Article 8 of the March 2005 “Anti-Secession Law” states that Beijing will resort to “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces . . . cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China”; if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur; or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The ambiguity of these “red lines” appears deliberate, allowing Beijing the flexibility to determine the nature, timing, and form of its response. Added to this ambiguity are political factors internal to the regime that could affect Beijing’s decision calculus. The extensive research on China’s approach to using force needs to be taken into account. Susan Shirk suggests “the real danger” lies not in China’s astonishing growth but in the “deep insecurity of its leaders.”29 She warns that “we face the very real possibility of unavoidable conflict with rising China.” Shirk argues that “because of China’s political fragility and secretiveness, moreover, doubts remain about whether its leaders will be able to keep a steady hand on the tiller.” She concludes, “Preventing a war with a rising China is one of the most difficult foreign-policy challenges our country faces.” Chinese nationalism can be dangerous.30 During the 1999 summer seaside session of the leadership, Shirk states that the party leaders had “strong sentiment in favor of some dramatic military gesture against Taiwan, to show that China would not be pushed around.” China’s president “managed to postpone any use of force against Taiwan” by appeasing the military with budget increases. She describes the negative image the United States and China have of each other. “The way America approaches China’s rise “can either reinforce its responsible personality or inflame its emotional one.” Richard Bush argues that “centralization can foster misperceptions about an adversary’s intentions, as can political orthodoxy that excludes certain lines of analysis. Both are at work in how Beijing’s leaders view Taiwan.”31 Robert Suettinger in Beyond Tiananmen makes a telling judgment about how the new Chinese leadership would cope in a future crisis by asking whether the decision-making system that is “opaque, noncommunicative, distrustful, rigidly bureaucratic, inclined to deliver what they think the leaders want to hear, and strategically dogmatic, yet susceptible to political manipulation for personal gain—will be up to the task of giving good advice.”

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Managing Sino-American Crises-Case Studies and Analysis is an extensive analysis.32 It suggests China has “sometimes escalated suddenly, rapidly, and asymmetrically to establish a virtual fait accompli.” The Chinese side most often has escalated asymmetrically to shock the opponent into reversing its behavior. Chinese leaders apparently believed that, as with an initial use of force in general, shock actions would not result in a dangerous escalatory spiral to war. Swaine argues that China sought escalatory “shocks” in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian clash of 1962, and the Sino-Vietnam border war of 1979.33 In past political–military crises, the authors argue, China’s use of force is often intended to shape, deter, block, or reverse a crisis situation or to prove and test intentions. China has also used force to “produce psychological shock and uncertainty” as part of a larger strategy designed to seize the political–military initiative by deception and surprise. Thomas Christensen argues the Chinese have “on several occasions . . . used force to affect and shape long-term political and security trends in the region and at home, not to resolve security problems permanently.” Christiansen’s highly praised book Useful Adversaries concludes that Beijing could promote aggression or be capable of rash action: “Mao was also almost paranoid in his feeling of insecurity about threats to his nation, as was demonstrated by his constant fear of foreign and domestic enemies. This type of leader is extremely difficult to deter. If one shows too little resolve, as the United States did by excluding South Korea from the defense perimeter in early 1950, the leader will promote aggression . . . but if one shows too hostile a posture, as the United States did by intervening in the Taiwan Straits, the leader will become panicky, difficult to reassure, and capable of rash action.”34 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai argue that the Chinese military has well-studied “lessons”—“Beijing has enshrined and encoded the historical experience from the Korean War 1950–1953, the first and second Quemoy Crises, the Sino Indian border conflict (1962), the Sino-Soviet border battles (1969), and the Sino Vietnamese border (1979). This summing up is used to make each succeeding crisis or actual military action fit and update previous standardized war summaries or ‘models,’ and so long as the future appears to fit the pattern, Chinese responses will have a certain order and predictability.” Lewis calls the leadership in 1969 “paranoid,” a word also

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used in Allen Whiting’s book China’s Calculus of Deterrence. Lewis sees the Chinese leadership as highly centralized, operating out of several underground bunkers in Elephant Nose Valley near the CMC’s advance command post in Beijing’s western hills. Lewis asserts that “Machiavelli methods and personalistic politics remain firmly in place.”35 Andrew Scobell identifies a “second generation” of Americans who specialize in China who he asserts have dropped the first generation’s assumption that China is a Confucian, pacifist nation.36 Scobell argues that Western studies of China’s use of force all note a degree of culture-based “Chineseness.”37 The first generation of China studies, without access to internal Chinese documents, concluded that China’s strategic outlook traditionally has been pacifistic, averse to conflict, and resorting to war only after all else fails.38 Such claims fit with official Chinese claims to be a peace-loving culture that has never committed aggression; that abhors any search for hegemonic domination; and that, in fact, claims to be even more peace loving than other nations. Scobell argues that the new generation of scholars has since the mid-1990s portrayed the Chinese as either two-faced in their claims, or paranoid. Scobell cites the work of Abram Shulsky, who concluded that the Chinese were less than cautious. Shulsky concluded that successful deterrence of China has often required the threat of “very high levels” of violence. In the 1954–1955 Taiwan Strait Crisis, for example, the United States resorted to threats of nuclear attack to deter further Chinese use of force. Similarly, to deter the Chinese instigation of border conflicts in 1969, the Soviets resorted to implicit nuclear threats and to a threat to “destabilize” Xinjiang by supporting Uighur nationalism.”39 Shulsky notes that China may miscalculate, and that its military postures and actions have “often been structured to favor achieving surprise (and the psychological shock it can produce) rather than enhancing the effectiveness of deterrence.”40 Debate About China’s Long-Term Potential Military Power Some specialists doubt China’s economic growth rate is sustainable; a few even predict a coming collapse of China. On the other hand, if China’s rate of growth is sustained, and if its GDP alone

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directly translated into military power, in the 2030s, China would have the capacity to afford military forces equal or superior to current U.S. capabilities. And while one must temper such calculations by per capita measures, even by conservative calculations it is easily possible that by the 2030s, China could modernize its military to reach a level of approximately one quarter or more of current U.S. capabilities, without any significant impact on its economy. What would this mean?41 First, throughout the Cold War, the United States sustained military spending levels, as a percentage of GDP, at about twice current levels, or roughly 8 percent of GDP, without damaging the economy. If China increased spending to the same level that the United States maintained for decades during the Cold War (8 percent of GDP), and if U.S. defense spending remained steady as a percent of GDP, China would spend an amount equal to roughly half of America’s outlays for defense. During that period, the Soviet Union proved that a nation can maintain substantially higher rates of military spending for some time before serious economic consequences ensue—the Soviet Union’s collapse was due more to the nature of its economic system than to defense expenditures. A similar effort by China could see the Chinese equal U.S. defense expenditures for a multidecade period. The China-will-collapse school of thought would dispute this. Implications of the Debates for U.S. Policy Identifying the issues that former U.S. officials have debated over 30 years after the 1979 drafting of the TRA helps to provide context for the decisions that U.S. policy makers announce in often shorthand terms. Some of the same military and security issues remain, including whether Taiwan’s arms sales requests are held up for political reasons, the extent of Taiwan’s military value to United States, how the United States should conduct its defense dialogue with Taiwan, and what role the U.S. Defense Department should play in recommending defense reforms to Taiwan’s military leaders. Old issues that remain are the types of armed forces Taiwan should build, what degree of interoperability the forces should have with the United States, and what steps make sense if the cross-Strait military balance is no longer favorable to Taiwan. Implicit in these

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issues is what may happen if President Ma’s efforts at détente with China break down and tensions reemerge. It is fortunate that the Obama administration has already made clear its views about Taiwan security issues. The American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Raymond Burghardt has described U.S. policy recently in a meeting with the press.42 Burghardt said the United States was “truly enthusiastic” about the detente, but that the level of cross-Strait engagement should be decided by Taiwan and China alone. “There is not a view in Washington that there is some kind of red line in terms of cross-strait engagement. There is not a concern that moving beyond economic issues into the political and military realm is threatening to us,” Burghardt told the press. “We are comfortable with what’s happening and where it seems to be going. What would make the U.S. uncomfortable would be a breakdown in cross-strait negotiations and reaching an impasse that could lead to tensions re-emerging.” He said the United States is continuing what it has done in the last 30 years under the TRA, which is to provide Taiwan with military support. Burghardt cited equipment and training as examples of military support and said the United States had contingency plans for what ifs. DoD has spelled out its concerns about what could happen if tensions reemerge. DoD states that “the PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-held islands such as the Pratas, Penghu Islands, or Itu Aba. . . . ”43 Four other possibilities that DoD has described are worth keeping in mind as feasible options for Beijing if the current talks break down: Maritime Quarantine or Blockade. DoD states that “Beijing could declare that ships en route Taiwan must stop in mainland ports for safety inspections prior to transiting on to Taiwan. [China] could also attempt the equivalent of a blockade by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in approaches to ports, with the effect of closing port access and diverting merchant traffic. China used this method during the 1995–96 missile firings and live-fire exercises.” Limited Force or “No War” Options. Such a campaign, according to DoD, could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear on

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Taiwan and degrade the populace’s confidence in the Taiwan leadership. “Similarly, PLA special operations forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct sabotage and attacks against leadership targets.” Air and Missile Campaign. “Such a campaign would degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s military and political leadership, and possibly break the Taiwan people’s will to fight.” Amphibious Invasion. Publicly available Chinese writings describe different operational concepts for amphibious invasion. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air and naval support, and electronic warfare. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to split, seize, and occupy key targets and/or the entire island.44

As I pointed out ten years ago, the U.S. Taiwan military relationship needs to be clear and follow the intent of the TRA.45 I still believe this approach is correct. I am cautiously optimistic that President Ma can continue his approach because the military balance has not turned sharply against Taiwan yet. Deterrence needs to be strengthened, but it is still working well. Eight Factors that Deter Beijing from Military Action In my view, eight factors still deter China from taking military action against Taiwan and provide President Ma the opportunity to pursue his effort as long as Taiwan’s deterrence is also strengthened.46 (1) China does not yet possess the military capability to accomplish with confidence its political objectives on the island, particularly when confronted with the prospect of U.S. intervention. Moreover, an insurgency directed against the PRC presence could tie up PLA forces for years. (2) A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would also affect the interests of Japan and other nations in the region that advocate a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait dispute, and would likely result in a fundamental re-ordering of the East Asian security architecture.

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(3) A war could severely retard Chinese economic development. Taiwan is China’s single largest source of foreign direct investment. (4) International sanctions could further damage Beijing’s economic development. (5) China’s leaders recognize that a conflict over Taiwan involving the United States would lead to a long-term hostile relationship between the two nations—a result that would not be in China’s interests. (6) Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military maneuvers. (7) An invasion of Taiwan would strain China’s untested armed forces and almost certainly invite international intervention. (8) Taiwan’s investments to harden infrastructure and strengthen defensive capabilities could also decrease Beijing’s ability to achieve its objectives. Notes 1. Disclaimer: This paper does not represent the U.S. Defense Department. It is the author’s personal view. 2. Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, U.S. Navy (Retired), Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, March 4, 2009, Washington DC. 3. Jenny W. Hsu, “U.S. Comfortable With Détente,” Taipei Times, March 19, 2009. 4. This section draws on David Tawei Lee, The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act (Oxford University Press, 2000). Citations for the quotations may be found in former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee’s authoritative book. 5. Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating With the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953–1967, McGraw-Hill, 1968. 6. Stephen S. F. Chen ,”The Foreign and Cross-Strait Policies of the New Administration in the Republic of China,” Chatham House, London, December 8, 2008. 7. David Tawei Lee, The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act, Oxford University Press, 2000. 8. Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang, “Managing U.S. Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years After the Taiwan Relations Act,” United States-Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years after the Taiwan Relations Act, University of Maryland School of Law 2000, edited by Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang and William W. Boyer. 9. Cheng-Yi Lin, “The U.S. Role in Taiwan China Security Relations,” United States-Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years after the Taiwan Relations Act,

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10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

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University of Maryland School of Law 2000, edited by Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang and William W. Boyer. Yann-Huei Song, “The Second Decade of the Taiwan Relations Act: U.S. Congressional Involvement in the Implementation of the Law,” United StatesTaiwan Relations: Twenty Years after the Taiwan Relations Act, University of Maryland School of Law 2000, edited by Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang and William W. Boyer. Robert G. Kaiser and Steven Mufson, “Blue Team Draws a Hard Line on Beijing: Action on Hill Reflects Informal Group’s Clout,” Washington Post, February 22, 2000, p. A1. Robert G. Kaiser and Steven Mufson, “Blue Team Draws a Hard Line on Beijing: Action on Hill Reflects Informal Group’s Clout,” Washington Post, February 22, 2000, p. A1. China consistently objects to the annual “Report on the Military Power of the PRC” published by the U.S. Department of Defense, asserting that the report reflects a Cold War mentality and is filled with groundless accusations against China. Robert G. Kaiser and Steven Mufson, “Blue Team Draws a Hard Line on Beijing: Action on Hill Reflects Informal Group’s Clout,” Washington Post, February 22, 2000, p. A1. Many forecast that Taiwan’s military would not be able to keep pace with China’s military modernization efforts. See David Shambaugh, “A Matter of Time: Taiwan’s Eroding Military Advantage,” Washington Quarterly, 23 (Spring 2000), 119–33; and Thomas E. Ricks, “Taiwan Seen Vulnerable to Attack: Pentagon Study Says Isolation Keeps Defense Weak,” The Washington Post, 31 March 2000, p. Al. Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, Michael A. McDevitt, Nirav Patel, James Przystup and Brad Roberts, The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration, 2009, p. 49. Available at www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CossaPatel_US_Asia-Pacific_ February2009.pdf. Richard Bush and Alan D. Romberg, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States”—A Response to Robert Sutter, Pacific Forum CSIS, Number 17A, March 12, 2009. Bush and Romberg wrote, “There is in Sutter’s analysis a lurking fear that the mainland’s power will lead to PRC intimidation and Taiwan submission. We cannot rule out that the people of Taiwan will someday decide that unification on terms dictated by Beijing is an acceptable outcome. But the odds of that are not high because Taiwan has resources that will encourage PRC restraint. It remains an open question whether Beijing will be willing to make the sort of concessions that prove Ma’s case with respect to dignity and security. . . . What is not open to question is that Taiwan voters have the clear option of punishing Ma and the KMT. . . . ” Robert Sutter, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States—Policy Adjustments Needed,” Pacific Forum CSIS Honolulu, Hawaii, Number 17, March 5, 2009.

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19. Robert Sutter, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States—Policy Adjustments Needed,” Pacific Forum CSIS Honolulu, Hawaii, Number 17, March 5, 2009. 20. “U.S. making no secret of its strategic buildup on Guam,” East-Asia-Intel. com, March 6, 2008. 21. Dan Blumenthal and Aaron Friedberg, An American Strategy For Asia—A Report Of The Asia Strategy Working Group, AEI, January 2009. 22. An early assessment of the shifting military balance was John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s Submarine Challenge, March 1, 2006, WebMemo #1001, Heritage Foundation, Washington DC. 23. See, for example, Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25, no. 2, Fall 2000, pp. 51–86; Michael A. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan,” International Security 28, no. 4, Spring 2000, pp. 125–60; Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations,” International Security 27, no. 2, Fall 2002, pp. 48–85; and David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy, RAND, 2000). 24. Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects. New York: Routledge, 2006. 25. William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2008. 26. Mark Stokes and Randall Schriver, Evolving Capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army: Consequences Of Coercive Aerospace Power For United States Conventional Deterrence, Project 2049 Institute Report, August 2008. 27. Shelley Rigger, Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and “Taiwanese Nationalism,” East-West Center, Washington, DC., 2006. 28. Lieutenant General Zhao Keshi, Commander of the Nanjing Military Region, “Theoretical Innovations and Scientific Practice in Improving the Armed Forces’ Combat Capabilities by the Communist Party of China Leadership Since Reform and Opening Up,” May 2008, China Military Science, pp. 47–56. 29. Susan Shirk, China -Fragile Superpower—How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 139. 30. A growing list of articles and books on nationalism include Peter Hayes Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy, University of California Press 2004. James Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, January 1992. Edward Friedman, “Chinese nationalism: challenge to U.S. interests,” in The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition, edited by Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti, Washington: National Defense University Press, 2003; Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and its International Orientations,” Political Science Quarterly, Spring 2000; “To Screw Foreigners is Patriotic: China’s Avant-garde Nationalists,” China Journal, July 1995; “China’s Textbooks

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34.

35. 36. 37.

38.

39. 40. 41.

42. 43.

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Twist and Omit History,” NY Times, December 6, 2004, p. A-10; Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations, Cambridge University Press 1999; Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950– 1953 (University Press of Kansas, 1995); Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958, Cornell University Press, 1992. Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot—Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Brookings, 2005. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng with Danielle F. S. Cohen. Carnegie, Managing Sino-American Crises-Case Studies and Analysis, 2006. See also Michael D. Swain, “Chinese Crisis Management: Framework for Analysis, Tentative Observations, And Questions for the Future,” in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., Chinese Decisionmaking under Stress, Army War College Press, 2005. Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 254. See also Chen Youwei, “China’s Foreign Policymaking As Seen Through Tiananmen,” Journal of Contemporary China, November 2003, pp. 715–22. Foreign Ministry defector Chen Youwei identifies several pathologies in Beijing’s decision making: reading the worst intentions into an adversary’s actions, ideological ossification, divorce from reality, faulty intelligence, and what he calls the “celestial mentality” that assumes an air of self-importance. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies—China Prepares for Uncertain War, Stanford University Press, 2006. Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, Cambridge University Press, 2003. A “Chineseness” pioneer was Edward Dreyer, “Military Continuities: The PLA and Imperial China,” in William Whitson, editor, Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s, New York, Praeger; 1972, pp. 8–11. Scobell’s examples of the first generation include Lucian Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics, MIT Press, 1965, p.vii; John Fairbank, editor, The Chinese World Order, Harvard University Press, 1968; Richard Solomon, Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture, University of California Press, 1971; and Lucian Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s Political Culture, University of Michigan Press, 1988. Abram N. Shulsky, Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior, Rand, 2000, ch. 6. Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force, Rand, 2000. Christopher Pherson, Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power, Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy, Army War College, July 2006, Part II: The Contextual World. Jenny W. Hsu, “U.S. Comfortable With Détente,” Taipei Times, March 19, 2009. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress, Department of Defense, released March 3, 2008.

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44. Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering The Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies And Their Implications For The United States,” RAND Corporation, 2007; Chung Chien, “High Tech War Preparation of the PLA: Taking Taiwan Without Bloodshed, Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 1, October 2000, pp. 141–62. 45. Michael Pillsbury, “The Taiwan Relations Act and U.S.-Taiwan Military Relations,” April 9–10, 1999; International Conference on U.S.-Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years after the Taiwan Relations Act, sponsored by Institute of European and American Studies, Academica Sinica. Reprinted in TRA 20 A Compendium of Authoritative 20th Anniversary Assessments, Government Information Office, Taipei by C.J. Chen Director General. 46. Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51–86; Michael A. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan,” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 125–60; Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations,” International Security 27, no. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 48–85; David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000); Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5–40; Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 161–-96; Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects (London: Routledge, 2006); Shirley Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: CRS, 5 July 2005), pp. 1–722; Denny Roy, “Taiwan Perilously Ponders Its Strategic Missile Force,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 6, no. 20, available at jamestown.org/china_brief.

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Index

Abe Shinzo, 40, 189–197, 202–203, 207 American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), xvi, 112, 113, 139, 154, 172, 215, 236 Andorra, xi Anti-Secession Law (ASL), 3–4, 29–52, 62–64, 68, 74–75, 78, 80, 88–89, 94, 126, 132, 134–135, 232 Asian Development Bank, xii, 170 Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), 2, 17–18, 20, 130 “Blue Team,” 216–217 Blumenthal, Dan, 226 Burghardt, Raymond, 23, 209, 236 Bush, Richard, 24, 223, 232 Bush Administration, 5, 11, 21, 30, 34–35, 37–39, 40–42, 66, 67, 74–75, 79–80, 83–89, 93–95, 102, 122, 128, 133, 138–144, 150, 153–154, 162, 173–174, 176, 195, 202–203, 212, 218 Chang, Parris, 211–212 Chang Jaw-Ling, Joanne, 214–215 Chen, Stephen, 213 Chen Shui-bian, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 34, 38, 39, 40, 63, 66, 67, 73–75, 77–79, 81, 83–87, 93–95, 102, 125–129, 131–132, 136–137, 141, 142, 150, 152–154, 158, 159, 160, 218, 230 Chen Yunlin, 21, 47 Chiang Ching-kuo, 15

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Chiang Kai-shek, 14, 15, 135 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 16, 19, 33, 34, 36, 78, 79, 90, 132, 157, 158, 200 Christensen, Thomas, 86, 88, 233 Clinton Administration, 17, 65, 66, 82, 83, 87, 138, 151, 171–173, 214–215, 217, 218 Cole, Bernard, 226–227 communiqués, three, 4, 16, 30, 54–57, 64, 65, 68, 82, 138, 214, 215 confidence building measures (CBMs), 23, 25, 89, 193 Congress, U.S., 6, 8, 17, 39, 44, 45, 47, 53–54, 56, 68, 82, 84, 89, 138, 142, 162, 170, 171–173, 212, 216–218 and the issue of WHO membership for Taiwan, 170–174, 176 and trade policy, 101–120 Consensus ‘92, 18–19, 21, 26, 77, 126, 152, 169 defense of Taiwan, 22–24, 92–93, 133–134, 140, 142–143, 155, 164–165, 209–242 democratic peace theory, 151 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 4, 7, 8, 9, 16–22, 25, 37, 40, 66, 71–72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 83, 85, 87, 88, 91, 93, 95, 121, 123–129, 131–133, 136–138, 141, 143, 152–153, 158, 160, 184, 197, 206 Democratic Republic of the Congo, xi democratization in Taiwan, 2, 5, 13, 14, 16, 17–19, 25, 31, 66, 80, 84, 94, 122, 123, 130, 144, 158, 162

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244

INDEX

diplomatic recognition rivalry, 11, 16, 53, 54, 82, 85, 92, 131, 134, 153, 172 direct cross-Strait airline flights, 20, 126–127, 132, 136, 144 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), 12, 21, 91, 161 EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone), xiii–xiv Emmerich de Vattel, viii European Union, 8, 156, 177, 179–180 F-16s, 10, 11, 143, 163, 219, 223 F-22s, 228–229 financial crisis, impact on U.S.-ChinaTaiwan relations, 156–157 “four noes,” 73, 83, 93, 129 free trade agreement (FTA), 5, 6, 91, 101–120 Friedberg, Aaron, 226 Fukuda Yasuo, 177, 189, 192–197, 207 Hatoyama Yukio, 207 Hong Kong, xi–xii, 24, 31, 32, 91 Hu Jintao, 4, 7, 19, 36, 60, 77, 78, 79, 80, 85, 87, 121, 130, 131–137, 142, 144, 149, 161, 182, 193, 206, 230 independence, Taiwan, 4, 5, 15, 19, 22–24, 26, 30, 32–34, 36–37, 39, 47, 55, 59–66, 68, 72–74, 76–86, 89–90, 94, 95, 121, 125, 127, 128, 133, 138, 144, 151, 152, 154, 159, 164, 223, 230–231 Japan, 8, 9, 26, 40–43, 47, 92, 124, 170, 177–178, 189–208, 214, 225, 228–229, 237 Jiang Zemin, 36, 60, 77, 80, 121, 130, 131, 136, 159, 191, 194 Keating, Timothy, 142, 225 Kelly, James, 74, 84, 128, 154, 176

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Koizumi Junichiro, 8, 40, 189, 190–202, 207 Kuomintang (KMT), 4, 14, 37, 55, 71, 121, 153, 182 Lee Teng-hui, 17, 63, 65, 73, 78, 94, 124, 127–128, 130, 131, 141, 152, 218 Legislative Yuan, 18, 22, 37, 73, 80, 82, 121, 129, 159 Lewis, John W., 233–234 Li Jiaquan, 80 Li Zhaoxing, 43, 178 Lien Chan, 18, 20, 128 Lin Cheng-yi, 4, 215 Ma Ying-jeou, 1, 7, 9, 11, 20, 21, 22, 23, 67, 76–81, 91, 95, 124, 129, 149, 150, 152, 153, 156, 157, 158–161, 164, 169, 170, 184, 197–198, 224–225, 229, 230 Macao model, 126–127 Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), 72, 77, 169 missiles threatening Taiwan, 74, 84, 88, 93, 127, 128, 131, 133, 155, 160, 204, 221, 228–229, 236 Monterey Talks, 218 Murray, William, 227–228 Mutual Security Treaty, U.S.-Taiwan, 210, 214, 221 National Unification Council/ Guidelines, 75, 85, 87, 90, 93, 129 Nelson Report, 38–40 North Korea, 41, 42–43, 47, 94, 122, 141, 142, 151, 190–191, 196–197 Obama Administration, 7, 9, 10, 23, 67, 144, 149, 150, 152, 154, 162, 190, 207, 223, 236 one China principle/policy, 3, 4, 15, 16–18, 29, 30, 37, 43, 45, 54–55, 57, 58, 62–66, 77, 79, 80, 82, 88, 94, 125–127, 130, 133, 134–136, 138, 150, 152–154, 160, 169, 171, 182

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INDEX

Peace of Westphalia, vii–viii Peng Guangqian, 231 People First Party (PFP), 121 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 2, 7, 10, 11, 14, 20, 21, 33, 36, 80, 155, 165, 204–206, 217, 222, 226–231, 236, 237 referenda in Taiwan, 4–5, 17, 43, 64, 67, 73–76, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84–88, 90, 91, 93–95, 102, 128, 129, 139–142, 154 Rice, Condoleezza, 31, 40, 43, 45–47, 85, 141 Schriver, Randall, 228–229 Scobell, Andrew, 234 Shirk, Susan, 232 six assurances, 25, 65, 142 Snyder, Edwin, 211 Song Yann-Huei, 216 Soong, James, 20, 127, 128 sovereignty issue, vii–xvii, 1, 5, 8, 18, 19, 22, 26, 42, 44, 57, 62, 63, 65, 67, 72, 75, 76, 78, 79, 82–83, 89, 124, 128, 130, 134–138, 140, 161, 169, 181, 194 state-to-state theory/relations, 3, 17, 73, 128, 130, 141 status quo in the Taiwan Strait, 4, 5, 20, 21, 26, 34, 38, 39, 40, 45, 55, 58, 61, 64, 66, 68, 71–100, 106, 108–110, 115, 122, 124, 125, 128, 139, 150, 154, 157, 200 Stokes, Mark, 228–229 Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), 16, 17, 18, 20 Su Chi, 17, 169 Suettinger, Robert, 232

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245

Sutter, Robert, 223–225 Swaine, Michael, 65, 233 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), xv, 1, 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 15, 25, 26, 30, 31, 44, 45, 47, 48, 53–59, 61–68, 74, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 103, 111–114, 137, 138, 143, 170, 174, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 219, 227, 235–237 Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995–1996), 4, 62, 63, 65, 127, 131, 133, 201 Thompson, Tommy, 140, 173, 176 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), 5, 91, 101–102, 110, 116 Tsai Ing-wen, 76, 77, 83 United Nations, 11, 14, 16, 41, 67, 75–76, 79, 80, 82, 85–89, 92, 93, 129, 135–136, 140, 154, 171, 175, 179, 190 Wen Jiabao, 33, 34, 80, 83, 85, 161, 194, 197, 199, 203 Westphalian sovereignty, vii World Health Assembly/ Organization, 8, 73, 135, 143, 153, 167–187 World Trade Organization, x, 102, 116, 117, 170, 173 Xue Litai, 233 Yao Youzhi, 231 Young, Stephen, 86, 154 Yu Yuanzhou, 31–32, 44 Zhao Keshi, 230–231

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