Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey

POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS IN TURKEY POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS IN TURKEY EDITED BY SABRº SAYARI AND YIL...

Author: Sabri Sayari

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POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS IN TURKEY

POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS IN TURKEY EDITED BY

SABRº SAYARI AND YILMAZ ESMER

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2002 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU ©© 2002 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Politics, parties, and elections in Turkey / edited by Sabri Sayarª and Yªlmaz Esmer. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58826-022-4 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Political parties—Turkey—History—20th century. 2. Elections—Turkey— History—20th century. 3. Turkey—Politics and government—20th century. I. Sayarª, Sabri. II. Esmer, Yªlmaz R. JQ1809.A795 P67 2002 324.9561—dc21 2001058461 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America

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The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5

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Contents

Introduction Yªlmaz Esmer

1

1 The Changing Party System Sabri Sayarª

9

2 An Overview of Electoral Behavior: Toward Protest or Consolidation of Democracy? Frank Tachau

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3 Elections and Governance Ersin Kalaycªoπlu

55

4 Local Elections and Electoral Behavior Nihal ºncioπlu

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5 At the Ballot Box: Determinants of Voting Behavior Yªlmaz Esmer

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6 An Analysis of the Electorate from a Geographical Perspective Ali Çarkoπlu and Gamze Avcª

115

7 Ethnic and Religious Bases of Voting Ay≈se Gµne≈s-Ayata and Sencer Ayata

137

8 Realignment and Party Adaptation: The Case of the Refah and Fazilet Parties Birol A. Ye≈silada

157

v

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Contents

9 Conclusion Sabri Sayarª

179

Appendixes References The Contributors Index About the Book

185 217 227 229 237

Introduction Yªlmaz Esmer

The first parliament in Ottoman/Turkish history convened in 1876, though, admittedly, this was an extremely short-lived experiment. There was a second attempt in 1908, but that, too, lasted for only a brief period. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey established itself as a constitutional parliamentary system in 1923. In the eight decades that followed the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the number of years during which the country was governed without a parliament was less than five—not an easily dismissible track record for a new republic with limited economic resources and a long history of autocratic rule.1 With respect to universal suffrage, Turkey was ahead of many contemporary consolidated democracies. For instance, Turkish women were granted the right to vote in 1930. Only four years later, their right to stand for election was recognized, while French women had to wait for ten, Belgian women for fourteen, Greek women for eighteen, and Canadian women for twenty-six more years to gain unrestricted access to electoral politics. Indeed, it was the 1970s when women’s suffrage became a reality in Switzerland and Portugal.2 Neither were there any poll taxes, literacy tests, or similar restrictions on universal suffrage in Turkey. The first multiparty elections in republican Turkey were held in 1946, though there is general agreement that these were not completely free and fair. However, only four years later, the government changed hands peacefully and democratically through popular election. Thus, at the turn of the twenty-first century, Turkey could celebrate a half-century of free elections. To the casual observer, this, in itself, may not seem very significant in the post-Soviet era. But we might recall that as recently as the late 1980s, “in a world of over 160 states, there are only about 30 democracies where the government stands a real chance of being replaced through the ballot box” (Harrop and Miller 1987, 7). 1

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Introduction

The outcome of the 1950 election was rather dramatic. The party that had founded the republic was voted down, and the opposition won the election with a stunning 83.8 percent parliamentary majority. For observers of Turkish politics, this was quite an unexpected outcome that had exceeded the hopes of even the most optimistic members of the Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party, DP) who were to govern Turkey for the following decade. The DP’s ten-year rule ended with a military takeover on May 27, 1960. However, electoral politics resumed in 1961 with a new constitution and an election law that introduced proportional representation (PR). Since then, coalition governments have been the rule and one-party governments the exception. Despite a history of fourteen multiparty elections, parliamentary rule, and, most important, a peaceful change of governments through elections a number of times, Turkey has had a difficult time being accepted as a democracy by international academic and political circles.3 Clearly, in the Turkish case, Samuel P. Huntington’s (1991) “two-turnover test” was a necessary but not sufficient condition.4 Long-lasting military/personal dictatorships in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, for example, are hardly ever remembered anymore, and these countries are comfortably classified as consolidated democracies. This is not the case for Turkey—not yet anyway—though it spent much less time under military rule (with the military peacefully and willingly turning power over to civilians after its interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980). Turkish elections have been noticeably understudied—so much so that not a single book devoted to the “Turkish Voter,” if one can borrow Angus Campbell et al.’s (1960) classical title, has been published in English. This lack of academic interest is difficult to explain if for no other reason than the fact that Turkey is the only predominantly Muslim society that has succeeded in sustaining an electoral parliamentary system of government for any length of time. Hence, this volume aims to address that need. We hope that students of Turkish politics will find it to be a useful and reasonably comprehensive reference on parties, elections, and voters in Turkey. Broadly speaking, our subject matter has two main components. First, there are macro-level structural variables that include political parties and the party system, electoral laws and processes, and the rules pertaining to the functioning of formal institutions. Second, there are individuals who make decisions: They choose to vote or not to vote, and if they opt for voting, they then make a choice between available alternatives. Moreover, while some individuals have strong political attachments, others are rather fickle and can readily change their preferences. Their feelings and attitudes determine the degree of legitimacy the political system enjoys. Clearly, there is a great deal of interaction between the two components—that is, the legal-institutional framework and individual political behavior.

Introduction

3

Nevertheless, they call for different methods of inquiry and different levels of data. The present volume is a study of Turkish parties and elections from both perspectives. Readers will notice that two themes recur throughout the book. They are: (1) the center-periphery theoretical framework (Shils 1961; 1975) that was first used by ≈Serif Mardin (1973) for understanding the cleavages in Ottoman and Turkish political life, and (2) the protest-vote approach to understanding the rise of the religious and nationalist right in Turkey in the 1990s. “Society has a center,” wrote Edward Shils (1975, 3). In his view, the center is both “a realm of values and beliefs” and “a realm of actions.” Again according to Shils, the center has almost the character of the sacred. And in this sense, no matter how secular in the ordinary sense of the word, each society can be said to have a “religion.” Mardin applied this paradigm to the Ottoman society as well as to republican Turkey. Most observers agree with Mardin’s interpretation that at the beginning of the multiparty era, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP) represented the center and the DP organized the reaction of the periphery to the center. In Mardin’s words: Until 1946, the Republican People’s Party had been at most a “means for political action.” After this date, when parties emerged, it became a “medium for participation in politics,” but this transformation was not enough to entice the periphery to it. On the contrary, the electoral platform of the opposition . . . established the lines of a debate between “real populists” and “bureaucrats.” This symbolic and cultural paraphernalia— the conspicuous patronizing of mosques and religious rituals by members of the Democrat Party and the reluctant follow-up by the Republican People’s Party—laced with protests that secularism was being lost, identified the Democrat Party with the culture of the periphery. Ironically, its four official founders were just as much part of the bureaucratic “class” as other People’s Party members. (Mardin 1973, 184–185)

Many of this book’s authors refer to the center-periphery scheme in understanding Turkish elections. In Frank Tachau’s words (Chapter 2), “[T]he cleavage between the center and the periphery . . . has characterized Turkish society since the days of the Ottoman Empire.” With reference to multiparty elections in Turkey, there is unanimity in interpreting the election of 1950 as a victory by the periphery over the center. Tachau sees the May 27, 1960, coup as the coming back of the center “by means of military intervention.” Some of our authors (notably Ali Çarkoπlu and Gamze Avcª, Chapter 6) regard the center-periphery scheme still as a useful tool in understanding Turkish elections. Others, for example, Ay≈se Gµne≈s-Ayata and Sencer Ayata (Chapter 7) and Ersin Kalaycªoπlu (Chapter 3) argue that the classical center-periphery approach has been largely modified by reli-

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Introduction

gious and ethnic cleavages. If the center-periphery approach is still to be seen as a key in understanding Turkish politics (which, we would argue, is rather doubtful), then it is clear that both the center and the periphery must undergo a radical redefinition process. Chapters 6 and 7 address this problem. Support for radical or extreme parties is often associated with antisystem sentiments. It is hypothesized that membership in a group that is economically and socially underprivileged, excluded, or discriminated against greatly enhances the probability of voting for extreme parties or candidates. The latter usually represents an opposition to the system rather than opposition within the system. Thus, exclusion from the benefits of the system, provided that the situation is also perceived as such, distances the voter from the center. Analyzing the victory of the religious right in Turkey in 1995 and the nationalist right in 1999, many observers saw a confirmation of the protestvote hypothesis. Among others, Tachau and Gµne≈s-Ayata and Ayata tend to interpret the shift from the center-right to the religious/nationalist right in the 1990s as some sort of a protest vote or at least the registration of dissatisfaction with the system and/or one’s own position within the system. In contrast, Yªlmaz Esmer (Chapter 5) fails to find empirical evidence supporting any form of the protest-vote hypothesis. We begin our analysis of Turkish parties and elections with Chapter 1, where Sabri Sayarª gives an overview of parties and the party system. If a quantitative political analyst needed statistical variance, this individual would have to look no further than the history of political parties in Turkey: In Sayarª’s words, “The party system changed from bipartism (1950–1960) to moderate multipartism (1961–1980) to moderate multipartism with a dominant party (1983–1991) and to extreme multipartism with no dominant party (1991–present)”—and all of this following about three decades of a one-party system. Sayarª then tackles a difficult but crucial question: “What are the principal causes of these changes in the party system?” Clearly, there are a number of electoral as well as nonelectoral factors. The first thing that comes to mind is changes in party preferences, that is, electoral volatility. Obvious nonelectoral factors, on the other hand, are the discontinuities due to military interventions and the banning of certain parties by the Constitutional Court. However, joining many other observers, Sayarª notes that despite appreciable vote shifts among parties, the relative strengths of the left and right have remained quite stable over the years. Even in the last two elections (1995 and 1999), which have been interpreted by some as major alterations of the electoral map, the major shift has been from the center-right to the more extreme religious and nationalist right. In Chapter 2, Tachau summarizes fifty years of Turkish electoral history and offers a useful review of the literature interpreting Turkish political

Introduction

5

life in terms of elite-mass relations, demographic trends, contextual factors, and ideology. He, too, notes the peculiarity that we have mentioned above: Despite so many clean and undisputed elections and the changing of the government through democratic means, why the reluctance to classify Turkey as a democracy? According to Tachau, the major unsolved problem here is the establishment of “clear civilian authority over the military.” He is in agreement with Heath Lowry (2000) that there is “a de facto dual-track government” in contemporary Turkey where the political game is played within boundaries established by the military. From time to time, civilian politicians are “reminded” of these boundaries, sometimes implicitly, and sometimes rather explicitly. Yet one should note that the said boundaries are broadly defined and do not usually limit the actions of civilian leaders unless these are conceived as a threat to secularism and/or national integrity—two highly sensitive issues for the military. Kalaycªoπlu, in Chapter 3, analyzes the various electoral systems and laws in Turkey. Like the party system, the electoral system in Turkey has undergone numerous changes. A majority system with multiple-seat districts was used in the elections of 1946, 1950, 1954, and 1957. After 1960, Turkey has experimented with almost all possible variations of PR. Kalaycªoπlu discusses electoral rules and outcomes with special reference to fair representation and stability. Turkey has experimented with systems that have yielded highly stable governments at the expense of representativeness (1950s), as well as with a “national remainder system” (1965), which allocated parliamentary seats almost exactly according to the distribution of votes. Chapter 3, therefore, is a useful reference for those who wish to follow Turkey’s experience with electoral systems. But beyond that, Kalaycªoπlu’s analysis of the relationship between electoral systems and governability is a welcome contribution to the literature. There is no doubt that academic attention has been largely withheld from Turkish elections and voters. And yet, within this understudied field, local elections have been the most neglected topic. This is true despite the fact that Turkey has undergone very rapid urbanization since the 1970s, resulting in the increased significance (political, economic, cultural) of municipalities. The rise in the importance of local administrations has been evidenced by the noticeable rise in voter turnout in local elections in the 1990s. In Chapter 4, Nihal ºncioπlu offers an analysis of electoral patterns in local elections with an emphasis on the similarities and differences between local and national elections. ºncioπlu brings to our attention an entirely new phenomenon in Turkish elections, that is, vote-splitting. The Turkish voter is becoming increasingly more sophisticated than a blind party attachment model would allow. One can find ample evidence of this in the 1999 local and national elections, and students of Turkish electoral politics will certainly watch this trend closely.

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Introduction

In Esmer’s Chapter 5, we turn our attention more to the individual voter. Chapter 5 is a study of Turkish voter behavior based on a nationwide postelection survey conducted in 1999. A long list of independent variables is utilized to identify the factors that help to explain voting preferences for each of the major parties. The analysis points to the persisting effects of left-right ideology as a determinant of electoral behavior. An important issue that Chapter 5 attempts to address is the status of various forms of “protest voting hypotheses” used to explain the surge in religious and nationalist right votes. In Chapter 6, Çarkoπlu and Avcª provide a different approach to the determinants of election outcomes. Their macro-level perspective balances the micro-level sample survey approach of Chapter 5 and is an interesting complement to it. They use province-level data from every Turkish election since 1950 to assess electoral volatility and identify “critical elections.” Their preference to analyze ideological families of parties (center-right, center-left, and extreme right) rather than individual parties is a wise choice in the Turkish context. Additionally, their attempt to identify geographical regions that correspond to ideological orientations is a promising approach to the study of Turkish electoral history. Chapter 7 by Gµne≈s-Ayata and Ayata is a review and analysis of two important and sensitive issues in Turkish politics—secularism and ethnic identity—within the context of electoral politics. Students of Turkish society agree that, in recent decades, the dominant social cleavages have been ethnic and religious. To what extent are these conflicts reflected in electoral behavior? Put differently, and as expressed by the title of Chapter 7, What are—if any—the “ethnic and religious bases of voting?” The authors propose that these cleavages (Alevi and Sunni Muslims; Turks and Kurds; Islamists and secularists) are redefining the center-periphery, social class, and traditional-modern divisions in Turkish society. In almost the total absence of survey data relating to ethnic determinants of voting, Gµne≈sAyata and Ayata’s observations and insights provide us with an extremely useful framework for approaching this topic. Secularism, which in the Turkish context is understood as keeping Islam completely in the private realm and prohibiting it from any interference with political and legal processes, has always been the major concern of republican elites. Therefore, the emergence of pro-Islamic parties that are conceived as a threat to the secular system has never failed to cause concern and reaction. In Chapter 8, Birol Ye≈silada discusses the issue of pro-Islamic parties within the context of voter realignment and party adaptation. As concluded by the author, “It is quite paradoxical that the one political party in Turkey . . . which has a remarkable track record of successful adaptation to change and voter alignment, is not fully committed to the survival of the secular democratic political system in Turkey.” One

Introduction

7

important factor in the successful adaptation of the Islamist parties is the resemblance between the values and attitudes of their followers and their leaders and activities—a point forcefully demonstrated by Ye≈silada. Indeed, his application of Samuel J. Eldersveld’s (1998) model of electoral success or failure to the Turkish case is a significant contribution to the study of Turkish political life.

NOTES 1. The Grand National Assembly was closed down first after the May 27, 1960, military coup and again after the coup on September 12, 1980. Thus, the parliament was closed from May 27, 1960, until October 15, 1961, and from September 12, 1980, to November 6, 1983. 2. The data are from the website (http://www.ipu.org) of the InterParliamentary Union. 3. According to Kalaycªoπlu (2001, 54) eleven of these fourteen elections (the exceptions being the elections of 1946, 1961, and 1983) were “free, fair and competitive.” 4. In Huntington’s words (1991, 266–267), “One criterion for measuring this [democratic] consolidation is the two-turnover test. By this test, a democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election.”

1 The Changing Party System Sabri Sayarª

Studies on the Turkish party system have revealed a number of significant developments and trends over the years. These include the erosion of twoparty dominance and the rise of political fragmentation; increased electoral volatility and the decline of party identification among the voters; the fractionalization and the weakening of the centrist parties; the rise of an Islamist party as a major force in electoral and parliamentary politics; the transformation of party platforms and agendas; and the replacement of majority party rule by coalition or minority governments. At the same time, observers have noted elements of continuity in Turkey’s party politics, such as the exceptionally long tenure of prominent politicians as party leaders; the constancy of internal party feuds and factional splits; the frequency of party switching among parliamentarians; the strength of the centrist and moderate orientations and attitudes among the voters; and the importance of political patronage and clientelism in winning votes and maintaining control over party organizations.1 Clearly, the Turkish party system has undergone significant changes since the beginning of competitive politics with free elections and the multiplicity of parties in the aftermath of World War II. This is most immediately evident at the electoral level where the popular appeal of parties has displayed considerable volatility. In addition to the changes in voting behavior, there have been substantial changes in both the strategies and programs of individual parties and the basic format of the party system as a whole concerning the number of effective parties, dynamics of interparty competition, and patterns of government formation. With respect to these and several other variables, the party system today displays sharp differences from the party system of the 1950s. What was once a two-party system in which a single party enjoyed comfortable parliamentary majorities and governed alone has been replaced in the 1990s by a system based on a 9

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Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey

highly fractionalized parliament where there are five relatively equal parties (each with approximately 10 to 20 percent of the vote), and governments can only be formed through coalition arrangements or use of the minority government formula. In the 1950s, party competition took place within a narrowly defined political space that excluded ideological politics and explicitly religious or ethnic political parties. By the 1990s, the ideological spectrum of the party system had expanded considerably—an openly Islamist party had become a major contender for power, and an ethnically based pro-Kurdish party had altered the electoral geography of several eastern and southeastern provinces. In addition to these developments affecting party politics, the Turkish party system has experienced a gradual but unmistakable trend toward weakening in recent years. This became especially evident in the 1990s as the prestige and credibility of most political parties and their leaders sunk to a new low; party organizations, with few exceptions, displayed increased signs of weakness; and a declining number of voters identified with a political party. Moreover, rising voter volatility defied the regularity in patterns of party competition and hindered the stabilization of the party system. The weakening of the party system undermined political stability and, in turn, accentuated the problem of effective governance. At the same time, a dramatic rise in widely publicized incidents of political corruption resulting from the colonization of state-owned banks and industries by parties threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the political regime itself.

THE ORIGINS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

Political parties have existed in Turkey since the last decades of the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 2 Despite the absence of a democratic regime in Turkey until the late 1940s, parties played an important role in national politics, especially during the Second Constitutional Era (1908–1918) in the Ottoman Empire, and following the founding of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923. However, the importance and influence of parties in Turkish politics increased markedly after the transition from authoritarian rule to democratic politics in the late 1940s. The genesis of the Turkish party system within the framework of free elections and the multiplicity of parties lies in the critical regime change that took place between 1946 and 1950 (Karpat 1959). The party system that emerged in the post–World War II era displayed some continuities with the past. For example, the leadership of the two parties that monopolized electoral and parliamentary politics following the liberalization of the political regime came from the ranks of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP), which had been the official

The Changing Party System

11

party of the authoritarian one-party regime from 1923 to 1946. After controlling political power for nearly three decades, the CHP became a participant in democratic politics and functioned under ºsmet ºnönµ as one of the two major parties of the newly emerging party system. Its principal rival, the Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party, DP), was formed by a group of dissident CHP parliamentarians who split from it at the onset of the political liberalization process in 1946. Although scores of political parties were formed by political entrepreneurs during the late 1940s, most proved to be short-lived due to the voters’ tendency to support either the CHP or the DP. In the three elections held in 1950, 1954, and 1957, the two major parties collectively received more than 90 percent of the total votes and controlled 98 percent of the parliamentary seats. Historical, cultural, and institutional factors contributed to the strength of the two-party vote during Turkey’s transition from authoritarian rule to democratic politics. Historically, dating back to the initial phase of political party formations in the Ottoman Empire, there had been a trend toward political dualism, as two groups of rival elites, claiming to represent the interests and aspirations of the political “center” and the “periphery,” competed for power. The traditional center-periphery or elitemass cleavage that the Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire proved to be important in shaping the party system following the transition to democracy. The DP projected the image of a party that defended the interests of the periphery, especially those in the realm of religion, while the CHP continued to be identified by the voters with the elitist and secularist orientation of the political center (Mardin 1973).3 Social structural conditions, such as the widespread prevalence of clientelist networks based on bifactional divisions among notable families in provincial small towns, led to the rapid buildup of political loyalties behind the DP and the CHP (Sayarª 1975). Institutional factors also proved to be important: The simple plurality electoral system with multimember districts worked to the advantage of the two strongest parties, especially the party that finished first. By diminishing the electoral chances of the minor parties, the plurality system limited political fragmentation and contributed to the strength of the two-party vote. The three parliamentary elections in 1950, 1954, and 1957 resulted in victories for the DP led by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Thanks to the electoral system, its electoral victories translated into large parliamentary majorities for the DP (Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3). With respect to its mechanics, the party system in Turkey during the 1950–1960 period conformed to the basic characteristics of two-party systems: The DP and the CHP captured a large portion of the votes, governments were formed by a majority party, and the strengths of the minor parties remained very limited. However, the Turkish case differed from the other two-party systems in

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Western Europe and the United States in two important respects. First, there was no alternation in power between the government and the opposition because the DP won large parliamentary majorities in three successive elections. The absence of turnover in government between the “ins” and the “outs” for ten years between 1950 and 1960 placed Turkey at the borders between a two-party and a predominant party system.4 Second, the Turkish party system also lacked the stability that is commonly associated with the two-party systems in Western democracies. Growing conflicts between the two major parties followed the peaceful and smooth transfer of power from the CHP to the DP in 1950. The polarization between the government and the opposition did not stem from ideological conflicts between the left and the right, for both parties were close to the center on the party spectrum. Rather, the intense conflicts between the DP and the CHP were largely due to differences over the practice of democracy in a country that had a relatively long history of parties but a very short one of democratic politics. The DP grew arrogant with its electoral victories and chose confrontation, rather than cooperation and compromise, with the opposition. The CHP, on the other hand, provoked the DP into a politics of confrontation and endeavored to undermine the legitimacy of the government (Sunar and Sayarª 1986, 173–174). Turkey’s first attempt at democratic rule came to an abrupt end in 1960 when, amidst a growing political crisis and boisterous student protest demonstrations on the streets of Ankara and Istanbul, the military carried out a coup and ousted Prime Minister Menderes’s government from office.

TOWARD INCREASED FRAGMENTATION AND IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION, 1961–1980

The regime breakdown in 1960 ushered in a new phase in the evolution of the Turkish party system. When electoral politics resumed in late 1961 after nearly a year and a half of military rule, one of the two dominant parties of the preceding decade, the DP, was no longer on the political scene—it was outlawed and its leadership was banned from politics by a military edict for violating the constitution. The DP’s unnatural death, coupled with the switch from plurality to a proportional representation (PR) system in the 1961 elections, increased the level of fragmentation in the party system during the early 1960s. From 1961 to 1965, intense competition occurred among several parties for the DP’s votes. Among those seeking to become a successor to the DP, the newly formed Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, AP) eventually managed to consolidate its hold on the DP’s supporters and organizational network by the 1965 parliamentary elections. The AP, under Sµleyman Demirel’s leadership, also succeeded in winning parliamentary


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majorities in the 1965 and 1969 elections despite the use of PR (Appendix Table B.3). The AP’s ability to control the majority of the parliamentary seats and govern alone from 1965 to 1971 signaled a return to the predominant party system mode of the 1950s. However, as in the case of the DP, the AP’s tenure in office was cut short when the military forced Prime Minister Demirel to resign in 1971 through the so-called coup by memorandum.5 Between 1961 and 1980, the CHP and the AP remained the dominant forces in the party system with the AP showing remarkable electoral strength in the latter part of the 1960s and the CHP emerging as the strongest party in the 1970s. Yet there were a number of signs that the twoparty nature of the system had been significantly weakened. First, the average share of the votes received by the two major parties in the five elections held between 1961 and 1977 declined to 73 percent. The CHP and the AP still managed to control about 80 percent of the parliamentary seats. But minor parties expanded their electoral and parliamentary strengths considerably at the expense of the system’s major parties. This trend slowed down only in the 1977 elections when the combined votes of the CHP and the AP registered an increase. Second, since the 1961 elections failed to produce a majority for any one party, Turkey had its first experience with coalition governments between 1961 and 1965. The change in the governing formula from majority to coalition governments represented an important new development in Turkish political life with major consequences for political stability during the 1960s and 1970s. With the exception of the 1965–1971 period when the AP’s two decisive electoral victories in 1965 and 1969 enabled it to govern alone, Turkey experienced a series of coalition governments (1961–1965, 1974–1978) along with a minority government (1979–1980). The coalitions that came to power during the 1970s commonly included between two and four parties, and they were generally formed with the two major parties on the center-left (CHP) and the center-right (AP) providing the principal bases for two alternative coalition formulas (Sayarª 1980). The decline in the two-party vote, the change in the governing formula, and the ascendancy of the minor parties underscored the growth of fragmentation in the party system after 1961. This was due to several developments. The ban on the DP following the 1960 military intervention led to a splintering of its votes among three parties, two of which were formed after the coup. The issue of the “DP’s legacy” remained a potential source for new party formations well into the early 1970s, though the AP had clearly established itself as the DP’s true successor by the 1965 elections. Changes in the legal-constitutional framework of party politics and the partial lifting of the legal restrictions on the formation of religious, sectarian, and radical leftist and rightist parties also proved to be important in the rise of new parties and their entry into the parliament. The Marxist Tµrkiye º≈sçi Partisi

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(Turkish Workers Party, TºP), the extreme right-wing Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, MHP), the explicitly Islamist Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party, MNP) and its successor, Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, MSP), and the Alevi-based Birlik Partisi (Unity Party, BP) were representative of the expanding ideological and political spectrum of party politics in the 1960s and 1970s. These newcomers significantly altered the dynamics of the party system, especially since some played key roles in the formation and dissolution of coalition governments. More important, the switch from a plurality to a proportional system of elections in 1961 facilitated the rise of fragmentation in Turkey’s party politics. The new electoral system made it easier for the minor parties to gain representation in the parliament. The rise of several new parties, some through factional splits from existing ones, clearly reflected the effects of the electoral laws on the dynamics of the party system. Along with fragmentation, Turkey’s party politics also experienced growing ideological polarization between the political left and the right during the 1960s and 1970s. This was due both to domestic developments, such as the adoption of a new and more liberal constitution in 1961, and the effects of the Cold War tensions in world affairs that fueled strong anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet sentiments in the Turkish body politic.6 The entry into the parliament of parties on the radical left (the TºP) and the ultranationalist right (the MHP) underscored the expanding ideological spectrum of the party system. Until the mid-1960s, Turkey’s two major parties had basically positioned themselves near the center of the left-right continuum. However, the growing salience of Marxist and extreme nationalist ideologies in political life led them to modify their ideological orientations. The CHP, under Bµlent Ecevit’s leadership, increasingly moved to a more leftist position, adopted a rhetoric that was heavily oriented toward mass appeal to the workers and small peasants, and engaged in vehement criticisms of the right-wing movements and parties, especially the MHP. The AP, which saw itself as a center-right party, became a bitter opponent of leftist ideologies and moved further to the right, particularly after it assumed the leadership of the so-called Nationalist Front coalition governments between 1974 and 1977. After 1975, as the political and economic crisis in Turkey deepened along with the escalation of political violence and terrorism, the party system steadily moved—in Sartorian terms—from moderate to polarized pluralism (Sartori 1976). Highly fragmented and polarized party systems pose serious challenges to democratic regimes. This was also the case in Turkey, where the late 1970s witnessed the deepening of the country’s political and economic crisis amidst escalating violence and growing militancy of the anti-system forces at both extremes of the political spectrum. The inability or unwillingness of the two major parties to reach an accommodation to defend the


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democratic regime against the extremist parties and terrorist groups proved to be a critical factor in the intensification of Turkey’s crisis. Instead of reaching a compromise that might have saved the system, the leadership of the CHP and the AP pursued policies and tactics that further polarized their relations. This was particularly true in their efforts to blame each other for the deadly wave of political violence and terrorism that gripped Turkish society in the late 1970s. As the country’s political and economic crisis deepened, the military stepped in once again and terminated electoral and parliamentary politics in September 1980.

THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE PARTY SYSTEM, 1983–1991

Following the 1980 coup, Turkey remained under military rule until the November 1983 parliamentary elections. The 1980 coup had a stronger impact on the Turkish party system than the two previous instances of military intervention in 1960 and 1971. In 1960, the military government banned only one of the country’s two major parties, the DP, while it permitted all others to resume their activities after a relatively short interlude. As noted earlier, the banning of the DP, along with the introduction of a new constitution and electoral system, had significant consequences for party politics. The 1971 military intervention had a lesser impact on the party system: Only the small, Marxist TºP and the Islamist MNP were banned by the Constitutional Court while all other parties remained active on the political scene. But in 1980, the military engaged in a far more ambitious political engineering project. Nearly a year after assuming power, the National Security Council (NSC)—the governing military body that was formed following the coup—issued a decree banning all political parties. This draconian measure reflected the military’s decision to radically revamp the country’s party system and exclude prominent politicians and party leaders—whom the generals held responsible for Turkey’s crisis in the late 1970s—from politics. From the military’s perspective, democratic stability in Turkey required the establishment of a new system based on new parties that would have no continuity with the pre-1980 parties. According to the military’s scenario, this new party system would be based on two moderate, centrist parties, and it would exclude the extremist radical leftist, ultranationalist, and Islamist parties (Sayarª 1996/1997). The military’s efforts to create a new party system included a number of arbitrary measures prior to the 1983 parliamentary elections. The NSC vetoed the candidacy of scores of individuals, it banned two parties that were clearly recognized as the potential successors to the CHP and AP, and it permitted only three newly established parties to compete in the elec-

16


tions. According to the military’s transition scenario, one of these (headed by a retired general) would win the elections and become the governing party while the other (led by a former bureaucrat) would serve as the main opposition. When Turgut Özal, a technocrat turned politician who had been a principal economic policymaker under the military regime, formed his own Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP), the NSC allowed it to compete in the elections as well, on the assumption that it would not win enough popular support to alter the political outcome preferred by the military. However, the outcome of the 1983 elections deviated sharply from the scenario drawn by the NSC. The ANAP scored a major victory and captured 45.1 percent of the votes and 52 percent of the parliamentary seats. The results of the elections lessened the military’s ability to control the transition process and propelled the ANAP to the center of the political stage. Initially, Özal drew support from a broad segment of the electorate, though the ANAP’s ideological orientation, with its emphasis on free market economics and cultural conservatism, placed it on the center-right of the political spectrum. In the 1987 elections, the ANAP’s votes declined to 36.3 percent, but the party expanded its parliamentary majority thanks to a change in the electoral law that made the constituencies smaller, enabling the strongest party to increase its share of the parliamentary seats (Appendix Tables B.4 and B.5). As a result of its victories in the 1983 and 1987 elections, the ANAP maintained its status as the dominant force of the Turkish party system during the 1980s. The formation of durable and stable majority party governments under the ANAP’s founder and leader represented a sharp break from the preceding decade of short-lived and weak coalition or minority governments (Ergµder 1991). Just as it had erred in assessing the ANAP’s electoral chances in 1983, the military also miscalculated the staying power of Turkey’s traditional parties and their leaders. Although they were banned by the military regime, the pre-1980 parties did not disappear from the political scene. By 1983, several new parties had been formed that were clearly identified with the pre-1980 parties. Because they were not allowed to compete in the 1983 elections and their leaders remained excluded from political activity, the pre-1983 parties existed in animated suspension between 1983 and 1987. Yet the continuities with the past became evident with the re-emergence of the pre-1983 parties on the political scene organized under new names. The former leadership of the AP joined the Doπru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, DYP), the Islamist MSP was renamed Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP), and the far-right MHP first became Milliyetçi Çalª≈sma Partisi (National Work Party, MÇP) before reassuming its original name, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. The breakup of the CHP’s leadership into two rival factions prevented a similar continuity among the political forces on the center-left.


17

Instead, two parties, the Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP) and the Sosyal Demokrat Halkçª Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party, SHP), competed with each other for the votes of the former CHP supporters. Moreover, the leaders of all these parties, with the exception of the SHP, were the same politicians who the military had sought to exclude from politics. A national referendum in 1987 removed the sanctions that were imposed on the party leaders, thus enabling Bµlent Ecevit (DSP), Sµleyman Demirel (DYP), Necmettin Erbakan (RP), and Alpaslan Tµrke≈s (MHP) to return to their positions. In effect, the military’s decision to ban them from politics had the paradoxical result of freezing party leadership in place from 1980 to 1987. However, the 1980 coup did produce important changes in the party system. As in 1960, the military intervention proved to be the main force in the fragmentation of the system. The divisions within the center-left and the center-right that emerged in the 1980s and continued during the next decade stemmed largely from the shock that was administered to the party system by the military regime in 1981. The other important change that occurred following the 1980 coup was the emergence of the ANAP as a major party in Turkish political life. Through its electoral successes in the 1980s, the ANAP became the first party in Turkey’s experience with democratic politics to break into the dominance that was exercised by the two traditional parties: the CHP and the DP from 1950 to 1960, and the CHP and the AP between 1961 and 1980. Initially, the ANAP benefited from the military’s sanctions against the two major pre-1980 parties. Later, when the pre-1980 parties re-emerged in electoral politics, the ANAP did not wither away but succeeded in winning a parliamentary majority again in 1987. In addition, it also controlled many municipal and local elected offices throughout the 1980s. The ANAP’s parliamentary majorities and its ability to govern alone was similar to the experiences of the DP in the 1950s and the AP from 1965 to 1971. In all three cases, a center-right party succeeded in winning successive elections and governing alone for a relatively long duration.

THE PARTY SYSTEM IN THE 1990s

The Turkish party system was in a state of flux during the 1990s. The dominance that the ANAP enjoyed in electoral and parliamentary politics gave way to extreme fragmentation and coalition or minority governments. There was a notable weakening of the electoral support for the centrist parties, especially the two center-right political forces, the ANAP and the DYP. The three parliamentary elections in 1991, 1995, and 1999 underscored the volatility of the electorate as parties experienced significant shifts in their

18


popular appeal (Appendix Table B.4). For the first time in the history of the republic, an Islamist party (the RP) finished first in the parliamentary elections held in 1995 and became the senior partner of a coalition government during 1996–1997. The 1999 parliamentary elections witnessed an upsurge in the votes of a far-right nationalist party (the MHP) and its entry into the governing coalition. As a result of these electoral trends, almost all of the parties that won seats in the parliament after clearing the 10 percent national threshold in the elections had the potential to join the coalition governments. And the exigencies of coalition politics led to unexpected alliances between parties. All in all, the precise dynamics of the party system as well as its possible course in the near future remained unclear. Clearly, the single most important trend in the party system was the return of fragmentation to the political party landscape in full force after it was artificially contained by the military regime in the early 1980s. None of the three parliamentary elections held in 1991, 1995, and 1999 resulted in a majority party government. On the contrary, the trend was in the reverse direction: The percentage of the votes received by the party that finished first in the elections declined from 27.1 percent in 1991 to 22.2 percent in 1999 (Appendix Table B.4). At the same time, despite the use of a 10 percent national threshold for representation in the parliament, five parties managed to obtain parliamentary seats in all three elections. Moreover, the number of parties represented in the parliament increased during the course of the legislative session with new parties forming after factional splits and through party switches by parliamentarians. At one point during 1995, for example, there were eleven different parties in the parliament, though some of these had only a few seats and usually disappeared after the end of the legislative session. Still, the crowding of the political stage and the division of the parliamentary seats among many parties proved to be detrimental to the formation of stable, durable, and effective governments for most of the 1990s. Divisions within the center-right and center-left of the party spectrum were one of the main causes of fragmentation (Tosun 1999). The emergence of two different parties on the center-right—the ANAP and the DYP—and the center-left—the DSP and the CHP—stemmed largely from the banning of the system’s two traditional centrist parties—the AP and the CHP—by the military following the 1980 intervention. Once they got established, these divisions proved resistant to change despite the basic similarity in the ideologies and programs of the ANAP and the DYP on the one hand, and the DSP and the CHP on the other. This was due mainly to the reluctance of party leaders to merge into a single force and help consolidate the political forces of the center-right and the center-left. Instead of cooperation, there was intense competition and rivalry between the ANAP and the DYP on the center-right and between the DSP and the CHP on the


19

center-left. Unlike in the 1970s, when the main lines of competition in the party system were drawn between the center-left and the center-right, two decades later competition between parties of similar ideological orientation became a major source of conflict in electoral politics. This led to a nearequal splintering of the center-right votes between the ANAP and the DYP in the three elections held in the 1990s. On the center-left, the DSP gradually increased its votes between 1991 and 1999 while the CHP experienced a steady erosion in its electoral support that resulted in its failure to gain representation in the parliament in 1999. Another important reason for the increase of fragmentation was the weakening of the electoral support for the centrist parties. The four centerright and center-left parties collectively received 82.7 percent of the votes in 1991. In the 1999 elections, this was down to 56.1 percent. This dramatic decrease resulted mostly from the decline in the electoral support for the ANAP, the DYP, and the CHP. The weakening of the centrist parties stemmed essentially from their failure to deal effectively with pressing economic and social problems, particularly the country’s protracted bout with inflation. Their popularity also suffered from incessant infighting among their leaders and their involvement in several highly publicized incidents of corruption and graft. The main beneficiaries of the weakening of the political center were the extremist parties that once had controlled only a small segment of the electoral space but became key players in party politics during the 1990s. The Islamist RP experienced a notable upsurge in its votes between 1991 and 1995. Following a strong finish in the 1994 local elections when it captured municipalities in several major Turkish cities, the RP emerged as the strongest party in the 1995 elections with 21.4 percent of the votes and 158 parliamentary seats. The RP’s growing popular appeal resulted from the increased visibility and influence of Islam and religious activism in Turkey. The RP also capitalized on the shortcomings and ineffective governance of the centrist parties and reaped electoral benefits from having a wellfunctioning and effective party organization (Sayarª 1996). In the elections held four years later in 1999, the votes of the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, FP), a successor to the RP that was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1998, fell to 15.4 percent, and the party finished third behind the DSP and the MHP. The FP met its predecessor’s fate three years later when another ruling by the Constitutional Court in 2001 ended its brief existence. This led to the first major split in the history of the Islamist parties represented in the parliament. While the followers of Erbakan formed the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party, SP), a faction of dissenting former RP/FP members regrouped as the Adalet ve Kalkªnma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) under former Istanbul mayor Tayyip Erdoπan’s leadership. Despite the FP’s electoral setback in the 1999 parliamentary elections, the

20


Islamists nevertheless did well in the local elections held in 1999 and maintained their control over many municipalities, including Istanbul and Ankara. Along with the Islamists, the MHP also benefited from the electoral slump of the center-right parties. After failing to win any parliamentary seats in 1995, the MHP finished second in 1999 with 17.9 percent of the votes. The MHP’s unexpected gains in the elections reflected, first and foremost, the rising tide of nationalism in Turkey during the 1990s. This stemmed partly from the effects of the ethno-religious conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus that involved Turkic and Muslim communities and partly from the strains in Turkey’s relations with Europe over Turkey’s efforts to become a full member of the European Union. The rise of radical Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, especially the campaign of political violence and terrorism conducted by the ethnic Kurdish terrorist organization the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, by its Kurdish initials), also contributed significantly to the upsurge in the MHP’s votes. The pro-Kurdish parties, which entered electoral competition for the first time in the 1990s, similarly made gains at the expense of the centrist parties. The pro-Kurdish Halkªn Demokrasi Partisi (People’s Democracy Party, HADEP) received an average of 4.5 percent of the national vote in the 1995 and 1999 elections and could not gain seats in the parliament. Nonetheless, it managed to become the first party in a number of the eastern and southeastern provinces heavily populated by voters of Kurdish origins. In addition to being highly fragmented, the Turkish party system was also highly polarized in the 1990s. But the nature of the polarization was quite different from that which prevailed two decades earlier when Turkish politics was immersed in ideological battles between the left and the right. Polarization in party politics during the 1990s was based largely on the growing conflict between the secularists and the Islamists. The RP’s rise to power following the 1995 elections intensified the polarization between those who wished to retain the secular political and social order of the republic and those who sought to expand the influence of Islam in Turkish society and politics. Patterns of coalition alliances between parties revealed how the lines of cleavage and conflict in the party system had changed since the 1970s when coalition alliances were generally formed among parties belonging to the same political camps on the left and the right. But this was no longer the case in the 1990s: Center-right parties formed coalition governments with center-left parties in several instances. In fact, one of the longest-lasting coalitions was the one between the DYP and the SHP/CHP that remained in power from 1991 to 1995. Possibly the most significant indicator of ideological moderation in the party system was the formation


21

of a coalition government between the DSP, the MHP, and the ANAP under Prime Minister Ecevit following the 1999 elections. During the heyday of ideological polarization in the 1970s, Ecevit, then the leader of the CHP, was the staunchest critic and opponent of the MHP. However, following the 1999 elections he wasted little time in forging a coalition with the MHP that also included the center-right ANAP. A coalition between the dominant political forces of the center-left and the far-right would have been unthinkable in the ideologically polarized world of Turkish politics two decades earlier. While polarization based on rival political ideologies of the left and the right has substantially diminished, conflicts between the secularists and the Islamists have become a principal source of polarization in the Turkish party system during the post–Cold War era. Again, this change was best reflected in the formation of coalition governments. Despite finishing first in the 1995 elections, the Islamist RP/FP displayed—in Sartorian terms— limited “coalition potential,” for the pro-secular parties appeared reluctant to enter into partnerships with the Islamists.7 The only exception was the DYP, which, under Tansu Çiller’s leadership, joined the Islamist-led coalition government in 1996. The RP-DYP government, with the veteran Islamist leader Erbakan serving as prime minister, lasted for eleven crisisridden months before it was brought down by the concerted pressure of the country’s pro-secular forces led by the military. Other than this short-lived experience, the RP/FP failed to enter into alliances with other parties and participate in coalition governments. In this respect, the dilemma faced by Turkey’s Islamist parties resembled that of the Italian Communist Party, which, despite its strong electoral performances in national and local elections, was nevertheless consistently excluded from the numerous coalition governments that came to power in Italy for more than four decades after World War II because of its perceived image as an anti-system party. In addition to highlighting the ascendancy of the Islamists, the outcome of the elections in the 1990s also signaled the end of a long-term trend in Turkish politics, namely, the dominant role of the center-right parties. From the beginning of Turkey’s democratic experience, center-right parties—or coalitions in which a center-right party served as the senior partner—had formed the basis of the majority of the elected governments. First the DP, then the AP, and finally the ANAP had played a dominant role in the party system. Center-right parties (the DP, AP, ANAP, and DYP) finished first in eight of the eleven parliamentary elections held between 1950 and 1991. The 1995 elections indicated that this trend had come to an end due to the erosion of the electoral strengths of both the ANAP and the DYP. Although center-right parties shared political power in all of the coalitions that were formed in the 1990s, they were no longer the dominant forces in

22


the party system. This was further confirmed by the outcome of the 1999 elections when the ANAP and the DYP suffered additional losses in their electoral and parliamentary strengths.

SOURCES OF CHANGE IN THE PARTY SYSTEM

As this chapter indicates, the dynamics of the Turkish party system has changed considerably since the first free and honest elections in 1950. The party system changed from bipartism (1950–1960) to moderate multipartism (1961–1980), to moderate multipartism with a dominant party (1983– 1991), and to extreme multipartism with no dominant party (1991–present). The level of fragmentation has increased since the 1950s, though not in a unilinear fashion, and it has reached new heights since the 1991 elections. Some parties have disappeared from the political arena, whereas others have shown much greater capacity for survival. The center-right parties’ dominance over the formation of governments has come to an end. Most of the relevant parties represented in the parliament have acquired the potential to serve as governing parties. What are the principal causes of the changes experienced by the party system since its origins? Clearly, many factors have influenced the evolution of the Turkish party system during nearly five decades of competitive elections and multiparty politics. Changes in mass electoral behavior, especially shifts in political loyalties, constitute one important source of change.8 Electoral volatility in Turkey has not followed a unilinear trend, registering significant rises in some elections (1965, 1973, and 1995) and some decline in others (1969, 1977, 1991, and 1999). However, the volatility rates in Turkey have been much higher than those observed in Western Europe, where from 1945 to 1989 the average rate was 8.7 percent (Mair 1997, 80). In Turkey, Ali Çarkoπlu estimates that average volatility for the 1954–1995 period was 21.2 percent (Çarkoπlu 1998). Aggregate data based on the outcome of elections show that in comparison with the established democracies of Western Europe, constancy in vote and party loyalty has been substantially lower in Turkey. Do these findings indicate that the Turkish voters have been excessively fickle in their electoral preferences? Before jumping to conclusions, it would be useful to take into consideration several factors. First, our knowledge about individual, as opposed to aggregate, changes in party preferences in Turkey is still at a rudimentary stage. The only way to assess rates of change among individual voters is to have “the same panel of respondents reinterviewed at several points in time, in direct connection with more than one election” (Converse and Pierce 1986, 44). The absence of similar longitudinal studies in Turkey makes it impossible to make general-


23

izations about the stability of the vote at the individual level, especially in comparison with voters in other countries such as the United States, Britain, or France, where there is considerable empirical evidence concerning changes in party loyalties among individual voters in two or more elections. Second, when examining electoral volatility through aggregate data, it is important to note that the support given to party families on the right and the left has not changed significantly over the years. Center-right and farright parties have consistently received about two-thirds of the total votes in the eight parliamentary elections between 1961 and 1999. During the same period, approximately one-third of the Turkish voters has supported the center-left and extreme-left parties. In the two elections held in the 1970s, the average votes for the right and the left were 64 and 33 percent, respectively. Two decades later, the three parliamentary elections produced a strikingly similar result with the parties on the right and the left receiving an average of 65 and 32 percent of the votes, respectively. In other words, Turkish voters have been quite stable in their general ideological orientations and political preferences. Why, then, are there such high rates of electoral volatility? One possible explanation is that much of this volatility has resulted from the shifts in party loyalties between parties within the same ideological side of the leftright continuum. Examination of the aggregate data shows that there is a significant difference between the volatility rates of party families on the right and the left, and that volatility within the parties on the political right has been much higher than that of the left. For example, the average overall volatility for all the parties in the 1973 and 1977 elections was 22.5 percent. Volatility within the center- and far-right parties accounted for 15.5 percent while the share of the center- and extreme-left parties was 7 percent. Average volatility in the 1995 and 1999 elections was 20.4 percent. Again, there was a difference between the parties on the right and the left: The former accounted for 13.4 percent while the latter’s share was 7 percent. These suggest that much, though not all, of electoral volatility in Turkey has resulted from the exchange of votes among the center- and extreme-right parties rather than major shifts in partisan alignments across the two main ideological blocs.9 Another possible explanation concerns the patterns of voting behavior in the country’s eastern and southeastern provinces. As Çarkoπlu’s research has shown, electoral volatility has not been uniform throughout the country and that electoral instability has been considerably more pronounced in the eastern and southeastern provinces than in the rest of Turkey (Çarkoπlu 1998). Politics in these regions has traditionally been highly personalized, and political loyalties have often been formed around patron-client relationships rather than party patronage or ideology (Sayarª 1977). Politically

24


influential patrons (local notables, tribal leaders, and religious sheikhs) have frequently switched their party affiliations, and many have served in the parliament in the ranks of several different parties. Moreover, most of the independent deputies in the parliament have traditionally been elected from the eastern and southeastern provinces, which further attests to the weakness of party identification and loyalty in these areas. This trend may now be changing somewhat as a result of the strong showing of the proKurdish parties in some of the eastern and southeastern provinces in the recent national and local elections. These observations should not detract from the fact that the emotional attachments formed by voters toward specific parties in Turkey have loosened since the beginning of multiparty politics. The repeated interruptions of electoral politics and the normal evolution of the party system have not contributed to the strengthening of ties between parties and the voters. The volatility of the parties themselves—their disappearance and re-emergence under new names—has created problems for the continuity of party identifications. Rapid population growth and the entry of numerous new voters into the electoral market in each election have added to the instability in voting patterns. The weakening of the center-right parties and their poor performances in dealing with protracted economic and social problems has led many voters to search for alternatives and switch their votes from one election to the next. Patronage and clientelism are still effective tools for mobilizing support in the elections. But the increased number of political parties serving in the government and the rise and fall of coalitions have loosened and diversified political loyalties based on clientelistic ties between parties and voters. It is also possible to suggest that there is a linkage between the weakening of the party organizations and a decline of party identification. There are some notable exceptions to the weakening of Turkish parties in recent years. For example, the Islamist parties have relatively strong organizations that are staffed with dedicated cadres, male and female, who work with a missionary zeal at the grassroots level. To some extent, the MHP also maintains a strong organization that has performed efficiently in recent electoral contests. But the organizational strength of the traditional centrist parties has been on the decline. This stems partly from the impact of the military interventions, especially the bans imposed on political parties in 1981. The disarray that resulted in party politics from that drastic measure had a particularly strong impact on the organizations of the center-right and centerleft parties. The restrictions on political parties and party membership that were brought about by the 1982 constitution similarly contributed to the weakening of party organizations. The new constitution prevented parties to form youth and women’s branches, and it forbade students, academics, and civil servants from becoming party members. These measures, coupled


25

with the restrictions on the political activities of interest groups such as labor unions, limited the capability of the political parties to develop strong organizational roots in society. The heightened degree of personalism in Turkish parties and the ability of party leaders to exercise almost unlimited power and authority also attest to the weakening of party organizations. Turkish political parties have traditionally had strong leaders dating back to ºnönµ and Menderes. However, the personalistic control of their parties by Özal, Ecevit, Erbakan, Çiller, and Mesut Yªlmaz has even surpassed the authority and influence that party leaders enjoyed in earlier times (Sayarª 2002). As political parties have, for all practical purposes, turned into the personal fiefdoms of prominent politicians, party organizations have almost ceased to exist as autonomous institutions. Empowered with their ability to control the candidate nomination process in the elections and access to sources of political patronage, leaders have acted with impunity in personalizing the exercise of power and party leadership. The declining effectiveness of party organizations has not helped parties to maintain strong linkages with the voters and may possibly account for some of the volatility in electoral contests. Changes in mass electoral behavior have played an important role in the changes that have taken place in the Turkish party system between 1950 and 1999. However, nonelectoral forces have been equally important in shaping the Turkish party system.10 The most salient of these are the policies of the military and bureaucratic elites, electoral laws, and the actions of party elites. Even a cursory review of the evolution of multiparty politics in Turkey shows that the efforts of the military and bureaucratic elites to shape the party system from above periodically by banning some parties, removing their leaders from political activity, and altering the constitutional and legal context of party activities have been singularly important in the evolution of the country’s party politics. In this respect, the Turkish experience differs considerably from the historical development of parties and party systems in Western Europe. In the latter, societal forces from below rather than the actions of the state elites from above have been the principal agents of continuity and change in party politics. Consequently, social cleavages, especially class, have played a major role in political party formations and voting behavior (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In Turkey, on the other hand, social class has generally been a poor indicator of electoral choice, and political parties have traditionally had heterogeneous social bases. From its inception, the Turkish party system reflected the influence of the state elites. The transition to democracy and multiparty politics in the aftermath of World War II was largely the product of a bold initiative by President ºnönµ, the leader of the country’s one-party authoritarian regime. It was, and still remains, a classic example of democratization by fiat and

26


from above. Party formations during the initial stage of transition to democracy in the late 1940s politics took place under close supervision of the state (Karpat 1959). A number of the newly formed parties were banned by the authorities for their espousal of leftist or religious causes. At several critical points during the transition process, the fate of the opposition parties remained in the hands of President ºnönµ who, against the advice of some of his close colleagues, nevertheless chose to proceed with the liberalization of the political regime. The interruption of electoral and parliamentary politics through three military interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980 provide even more striking evidence concerning the efforts of the military and bureaucratic elites to shape the party system from above. The banning or proscription of parties, the sanctions imposed on political party elites, and the introduction of institutional changes have had a strong impact on the dynamics of the party system. For example, the banning of the system’s largest party, the DP, following the 1960 coup led to new party formations in the early 1960s. It also led to increased volatility, fragmentation, and instability in the party system. The banning of all existing parties after the 1980 coup had an even stronger impact on Turkish party politics. This drastic measure, as in 1960, also facilitated new party formations. The emergence of an important new political party, the ANAP, and the rise of two new parties on the center-left, the DSP and the SHP, were basically due to the sanctions that were imposed on the pre-1980 parties by the military leadership. As in 1960, the interruption of electoral politics in 1980 was followed by increased fragmentation and electoral volatility. Another aspect of the shaping of the party system from above by military and bureaucratic elites concerns the legal and constitutional framework of political party activities. Until the 1960s, the ideological spectrum of the Turkish party system remained limited because of legal barriers to the formation of socialist/communist parties on the left and Islamist or extreme nationalist parties on the right. Although these restrictions remained in the newly written 1961 constitution, state elites displayed greater tolerance toward the rise of new parties that espoused leftist, extreme nationalist, or Islamist ideologies in the 1960s and 1970s. However, numerous political parties have been banned by the state authorities on legal and constitutional grounds over the years, though some have been permitted to be reestablished soon afterward, usually under a different name. The most controversial cases in the 1990s concern the bans on the Islamist and pro-Kurdish parties, the former for their less than full commitment to the country’s secular constitutional order and democratic processes and the latter for their perceived separatist tendencies. The attempts by the state elites to shape the party system have had important consequences: They have disrupted the natural evolution of party


27

politics, facilitated the demise of some parties and the rise of others, and have contributed to the weakening of the party system and its low level of institutionalization. Yet these attempts have not always succeeded in achieving their intended goals. This is best illustrated by the efforts to create a new party system “from scratch” in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, which proved to be an unrealistic project. Two of the three new parties that were supposed to play key roles in this new party system failed to command popular appeal and establish organizational roots in society. More important, the traditional parties that were banned in 1981 re-emerged, along with their veteran leaders, after a relatively brief hiatus. Institutional arrangements constitute another major source of change in the Turkish party system. Among a number of institutional factors, those concerning electoral systems have been particularly influential in shaping party politics. 11 Since the beginning of multiparty politics, Turkey has experimented with both majoritarian and varieties of proportional electoral systems. In some instances, such as in the aftermath of the 1960 and 1980 military interventions, state elites played a leading role in the changes that were introduced in electoral laws. In other cases, changes in the electoral system took place through the initiatives of the political parties represented in the parliament. The use of the majoritarian plurality system with multimember constituencies was a leading factor in the emergence of a two-party system in Turkey following the transition to a democracy. Although it distorted the magnitude of the DP’s electoral victories, the plurality system facilitated the formation of majority party governments. The change from a majoritarian to a proportional electoral system in 1961 had several important consequences. Proportional representation was partly responsible for the increase of fragmentation that facilitated the transition from a two-party to a moderate multiparty format. At the same time, after 1961, with the exception of the 1965–1971 period, multiparty coalitions replaced majority party governments. The change in the electoral system also affected the internal unity of parties. The plurality formula that was used between 1950 and 1960 discouraged fissiparous tendencies within parties. After 1961, the PR system had the opposite effect. Dissenting parliamentarians within the large parties were less inhibited from leaving them and forming their own parties. As a result, both of the major parties as well as some of the minor ones experienced factional splits in the 1960s. A factional split from the CHP gave rise to a new center-right party in 1967. Three years later, a group of dissenting AP members left their party and formed another new center-right party. Turkey’s first Islamist and Alevi-based parties were similarly established in the late 1960s through factional splits from the AP and the CHP, respectively. The introduction of the 10 percent national threshold in 1983 was

28


intended to reduce fragmentation in the party system, facilitate the formation of majority party governments, and contribute to political stability. Initially, due to the limits that were placed on parties participating in the 1983 elections, this strategy appeared to be working. However, after the reemergence of the pre-1983 parties on the political stage, fragmentation once again became a characteristic feature of the Turkish party system. But the use of an excessively high threshold for parliamentary representation continued to play a crucial role in shaping party competition. Several parties that received a substantial number of votes but failed to pass the threshold (the MHP with 8.2 percent in 1995 and the CHP with 8.7 percent in 1999) were excluded from the parliament. The redistribution of their votes among those parties that met the 10 percent requirement led to unexpected parliamentary benefits for them in terms of additional seats. The high threshold used in the elections limited the potential for the representation of new parties in the parliament, which, in turn, helped most of the established parties to survive despite the decline in their votes. Studies on the effects of electoral laws on party systems note that frequent shifts in electoral arrangements can influence the stability of party systems. As Arend Lijphart notes, “[H]ealthy partisan competition requires that the electoral system—the basic rules of the democratic election game—be broadly supported and not be changed too frequently” (Lijphart 1994, 54). In the case of Turkey, the change from a majoritarian to a proportional system in 1961 has been followed by numerous changes in the electoral rules that are used in the application of the PR system. Since the 1960s, there have been few instances when the same PR system was used in two successive elections. The efforts of both the state elites and the political parties to introduce frequent changes in the electoral laws have been detrimental to the stability of the party system. Last, the party elites themselves have significantly influenced the changes that have taken place in the Turkish party system since the early 1950s. The strategies pursued by party leaders have played a key role in electoral successes or failures of their parties, in the formulation of new party programs and ideological orientations, and in the formation of coalition alliances.12 The ability of party leaders to adapt to changing social and economic conditions and transform their parties has had a major impact on the dynamics of the party system as a whole. Similarly, the strategies and tactics employed by party elites vis-à-vis other parties have contributed to the level of polarization and consensus in party competition. Moreover, while military interventions have been one of the principal agents of change in the Turkish party system, the behavior of the party elites bears a heavy responsibility for creating the strains on the democratic regime that ultimately led to its breakdown in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The actions of party elites have also figured prominently in the forma-


29

tion of new political parties through factional splits from the existing ones. In addition, the strengths of parties in the parliament have undergone frequent changes through party switching by parliamentarians. Factional splits—a group of deputies leaving their party to form a new one—have usually resulted from disputes over party leadership. Unsuccessful challengers of incumbent party leaders have often been forced to resign together with their followers and form their own parties. The departure of the factions led by Turhan Feyzioπlu and Saadettin Bilgiç from the CHP and the AP, respectively, in the late 1960s, followed by the founding of two new minor parties—the Gµven Partisi (Reliance Party, GP) and the Demokratik Parti (Democratic Party, DkP)—were typical examples of this process. Party switching has also been widely practiced by Turkish politicians. Parliamentarians quit their party and join another one for several reasons: (1) when they feel that their chances for renomination in the next election are not assured, (2) when they want access to political patronage resources that are controlled by another party in the government, or (3) when they become disgruntled with the policies pursued by the party leadership. The frequency of party switching by parliamentarians suggests that along with “floating voters,” “floating politicians” also constitute an important feature of Turkey’s party politics. The efforts of the party leaders to prevent the merger of parties sharing similar programs and policies have influenced trends in fragmentation and party competition in the 1980s and 1990s. The divisions within the centerleft and center-right and the existence of two sizable parties on each side derives, in part, from the unwillingness of party leaders to amalgamate their forces into a single party. On the center-left, Ecevit opposed a possible merger between the DSP and the SHP/CHP, insisting that such a merger could only take place under the DSP’s umbrella and his leadership. The possibility of a merger between the two center-right parties, the ANAP and the DYP, on the other hand, was repeatedly undermined because of the personal animosities and rivalries between their leaders, Yªlmaz and Çiller. Organizational pressures from party rank-and-file against possible mergers have also played a role in shaping the behavior of party leaders. In addition to contributing to fragmentation, the strategies pursued by party leaders against their ideological “neighbors” on the party spectrum have fueled intense and bitter competition between parties sharing broadly similar policy and ideological orientations.

CONCLUSION

Since World War II, the Turkish party system has experienced a series of significant changes. The changing electoral fortunes of parties have led to

30


frequent changes in both the format and the mechanics of the party system. The dominance of two major parties in electoral politics has been replaced by a system in which votes and parliamentary seats are distributed more equally among several principal competitors. As a result of increased parliamentary fragmentation, majority party governments have given way to coalition governments and, to a lesser degree, minority governments. Electoral behavior has become increasingly volatile and fluid, and the stabilization of the electorate has remained an elusive goal. The moderation of ideological polarization in the party system has been accompanied by the growing intensity of the secularist/Islamist cleavage. While ideological moderation has facilitated increased cooperation and consensus between the center-left and the center- or far-right parties, the perceived threat posed by the Islamist parties to the country’s secular foundations has resulted in their exclusion from the majority of the coalition governments formed in the 1990s. The changing dynamics of the party system have also led parties to modify their electoral strategies. Most notably, the crumbling of the two major established center-right parties (the ANAP and the DYP) has led to a frantic effort by the far-right nationalist (the MHP) and successive Islamist parties to “conquer the center.” During the 1990s, there were growing signs pointing to the weakening of the party system and the decline of parties: The strength of party identification had decreased, electoral volatility had remained relatively high, parties increasingly became the personal tools of their leaders, and the public’s esteem of most political parties and their leaders had diminished. In recent years, political scientists have observed the weakening of parties and party systems in other parts of the world (Schmitter 1996; Pizzorno 1981; Lawson and Merkl 1988; Coppedge 1996). The decline of parties in the established democracies in the West has not created a major problem for the democratic system itself. However, in democracies that are not fully consolidated, the weakness of the party systems undermines their institutionalization. As Scott Mainwaring notes, “[I]t has become apparent that democracy can survive with weakly institutionalized party systems but weak institutionalization harms the quality of democracy and the prospects for democratic consolidation” (Mainwaring 1998, 79). Institutionalized party systems enhance the legitimacy of democratic regimes, facilitate governability, provide adequate channels for the representation of diverse social and economic interests, and strengthen political accountability (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). During the 1990s, Turkey experienced growing problems and crises with respect to governability, representation, and accountability. Governments and state institutions faced increasing problems in meeting citizens’ expectations concerning a broad range of public policy issues. The representation of popular interests was hampered by the instability of electoral competition, the weakening of


31

party roots in society, and the tendency for individualistic rather than collective representation of interests. And political accountability became a major issue in national politics due to the rising incidents of corruption involving prominent politicians and the trend toward greater personalism in the exercise of party leadership. Undoubtedly, economic and social problems have contributed to some of these crises, especially that concerning governability. However, their principal source has been the institutional weakness of the Turkish political system in which parties and the party system play a central role. As Turkey entered the twenty-first century, its party system continued to be plagued by fragmentation, electoral instability, and further decline in the popularity of traditional parties and their leaders. Undoubtedly the worsening of the country’s economic problems stemming from the two major financial crises that Turkey encountered during 2000 and 2001 contributed to growing voter disenchantment with the established parties. The absence of turnover in the leadership of parties has further increased the public’s mistrust and anger at the political machinations of party leaders. These sentiments were reflected in public opinion polls that showed an erosion of electoral support for most political parties. Whether the perceived failure of the established parties will result in a major transformation of the party system and its principal actors remains to be seen. If a large-scale change does take place, this would have to entail not only new leaders but also a transformation of leadership styles, modernization and strengthening of organizational structures, and institutional changes that would give rise to a few strong parties and limit parliamentary fragmentation.

NOTES 1. For analyses of Turkish parties and party system, see Heper and Landau (1991), Harris (1985), Tachau (1984), Çarkoπlu (1998), Kalaycªoπlu (1997), Özbudun (1987), Ye≈silada (1988), Ayata (1993a), Turan (1988), and Sayarª (1978). 2. On the origins of political parties and the party system, see Rustow (1966) and Tunaya (1952). 3. For more on the role of center-periphery cleavage in shaping party politics and electoral behavior, see Chapter 2 in this volume. 4. According to Sartori’s typology, a predominant party system is one in which opposition parties compete freely in the elections but fail to come to power because the same party “manages to win, over time, an absolute majority of seats in the parliament” (Sartori 1976, 195). For an analysis that uses Sartori’s typology and emphasizes the predominant characteristic of the party system in the 1950s and 1960s, see Sayarª (1978). 5. In March 1971, the military issued a memorandum that called for the formation of a strong government to end political violence and implement social and economic reforms. Prime Minister Demirel chose to resign rather than confront the

32


military. A new government headed by Nihat Erim and composed largely of technocrats replaced Demirel’s AP in power. 6. While the radical left (TºP) led the criticisms against U.S. policies in the world and bilateral ties between Washington and Ankara, the far-right (MHP, MSP) repeatedly denounced the Soviet Union, especially its treatment of its Turkic and Muslim minorities. The East-West rivalry between the two superpowers proved to be an important source of ideological polarization in Turkey’s domestic politics during the 1960s and 1970s. 7. Sartori explains his concept of the “coalition potential” of parties as follows: “What really weighs in the balance of multipartism is the extent to which a party may be needed as a coalition partner for one or more possible governmental majorities. A party may be small but have a strong coalition-bargaining potential. Conversely, a party may be strong yet lack coalition-bargaining power” (Sartori 1976, 122). 8. See Kalaycªoπlu (1994) and Esmer (1995). 9. In this respect, the Turkish case is similar to Western Europe where volatility within party families has been much higher than across the left-right divide. See Mair (1997). 10. For the effects of nonelectoral forces on party systems, see Mainwaring (1999). 11. On Turkey’s electoral laws and their effects, see Tµrk and Tuncer (1995), and Hale (1980). See also Chapter 3 in this volume. 12. On the impact of leadership strategies for party transformation, see Wilson (1971).

2 An Overview of Electoral Behavior: Toward Protest or Consolidation of Democracy? Frank Tachau Competitive electoral politics has survived in Turkey for half a century, give or take less than half a decade of military interregnums. During this period, government has changed hands several times as the result of free elections, easily passing Samuel Huntington’s “two-turnover test” for measuring the consolidation of democracy (Huntington 1991, 266). And yet, the common perception is that Turkey has not fully consolidated its democratic system. The major unsolved problem is the apparent failure to establish clear civilian authority over the military. Although the military gave up overt control of government fairly quickly after each of its last three interventions (1960, 1971, and 1980), residues of military involvement in politics and government remain. Most prominently, the National Security Council (NSC), consisting of top civilian and military leaders, provides opportunities for the latter to express opinions on current political issues and exerts pressure on the civilian leadership to adopt policies favored by the military. The scholarly literature reflects uncertainty concerning the stability of democratic politics in Turkey based on other factors as well. These doubts are predicated on the historical record and on analyses of electoral data and public opinion surveys. Conclusions based on these studies address such features as elite-mass relations, demographic trends, contextual factors, socioeconomic changes, and ideology. I propose to review that literature here. In doing so, I will focus on the phenomenon of protest voting. Protest voting is a danger signal for the system, for it reflects dissatisfaction and disillusionment with politics and often the political system itself. It undermines the broad consensus necessary for stable democracy, or it suggests the lack or weakness of such a consensus. Prime examples of protest voting running amok are Weimar Germany, Fourth Republic France, and post–World War II Italy. But the phenomenon is also present in such 33

34


stable and consolidated democracies as the United Kingdom, the United States, and post–World War II Germany (especially, post–Cold War Germany). While protest voting is typically associated with extremist movements, the two are not identical. Alienated voters may strengthen extremist parties, even to the point of providing them with a degree of legitimacy. Yet alienation must be deep and abiding, and the vote for the extremists must be continuing and stable before one may reasonably conclude that voters have become extremists or that the extremist movement has gained significant numbers of adherents. Thus, the pro-Communist vote in Italy, the pro-Nazi vote in Germany, the Poujadiste vote and pro–National Front votes in France, or third-party votes in the United States are not in and of themselves accurate measures of support for the ideologies espoused by these parties and movements.1 We shall consider here, among other things, the degree to which protest voting has occurred in Turkey, its relation with extremist movements, and the prospects for the future.

PARTIES AND ELECTIONS, 1950–1980

The dramatic defeat of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP) in the 1950 election introduced competitive politics in Turkey. Erik Zµrcher suggests that this is a more important historical divide than the official demise of the Ottoman Empire and establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. He maintains that the political elite and sociopolitical power structure between 1918 and 1950 remained the same as it had been during the Young Turk period. Only with the electoral defeat of that elite, in this view, can a new historical era be said to have begun (Zµrcher 1993). This interpretation is highly questionable in view of the far-reaching institutional changes enacted in a very short period of time, but it has the virtue of emphasizing the unprecedented nature of the 1950 election.2 Turkish politics in the 1950s was dominated by the Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party, DP), which consistently won clear electoral victories. Bitter partisan rivalry and increasingly authoritarian behavior on the part of the DP regime, led by Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, were more than the fledgling democratic system could bear. The result was the first military intervention in modern Turkish history on May 27, 1960. The military junta, led by General Cemal Gµrsel, who had retired from the army shortly before the coup, outlawed the DP, arrested and tried its leaders on charges of unconstitutional behavior, executed three of them on these charges, and oversaw the drafting and promulgation of a new constitution. This constitution, ratified by a razor-thin majority in a referendum in mid-1961, was designed to prevent a recurrence of the slide back toward authoritarianism,

An Overview of Electoral Behavior

35

which had brought down the DP regime. It sought to accomplish this partly by introducing greater liberalization, particularly by restraining the power of a majority party. Toward this end, a system of proportional representation was adopted. At first, it appeared that the purpose had been achieved, for in the 1961 election, no party won a parliamentary majority, and a coalition government was introduced for the first time. However, in 1965, the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, AP) won a majority of parliamentary seats because the issue of which of the new parties was the true heir of the defunct DP had been resolved: Yeni Tµrkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party, YTP) had faded away and the AP single-handedly assumed control of the government. The AP’s share of the vote was reduced in 1969, but it increased its parliamentary majority somewhat. The CHP, meanwhile, slumped to its nadir in popular votes. In 1973, however, partisan fortunes were reversed. The AP suffered great losses and was bypassed by the CHP, which took 33.3 percent of the popular vote and more than 40 percent of the parliamentary seats. At the same time, minor parties made significant inroads, apparently siphoning off much of the former AP vote. The Demokratik Parti (Democratic Party, DkP, not to be confused with the dominant party of the 1950s) formed as a splinter from the AP when forty-one of its members in the parliament left the AP in December of 1970. This new party gained 11.9 percent of the votes and 10 percent of the seats to become the fourth-largest party in the parliament. Simultaneously, an Islamist party gained a significant number of parliamentary seats for the first time. The Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, MSP), led by Necmettin Erbakan, gained 11.8 percent of the vote, and with forty-eight deputies, 11 percent of the seats.3 Finally, the ultranationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, MHP), led by former Colonel Alpaslan Tµrke≈s, which had won eleven seats in 1965 with only 2.2 percent of the popular vote, rose to 3 percent in 1969 and to 6.4 percent in 1977 (though its share of seats was severely cut in 1969 and 1973 by a change in the electoral law that worked to the disadvantage of the minor parties). The 1977 election strengthened the two major parties. The CHP garnered 41.4 percent of the popular vote, the highest ever in competitive elections, while the AP recovered some of its lost ground. The MSP also lost ground, shrinking from forty-eight to twenty-four seats, while the MHP reached its greatest strength yet with sixteen seats. The DkP virtually disappeared, winning only one seat. The CHP fell just short of achieving a parliamentary majority and thus remained in opposition for much of the term of this parliament. Polarization became the order of the day, permeating virtually all social sectors and even the government itself, including the police. Escalating violence engulfed the society, including ominous outbreaks involving ethnic and religious divisions. The crisis was deepened by

36


rampant inflation. A government supported by a clear parliamentary majority might have been able to deal with this situation, but political paralysis, exemplified by a months-long deadlock in the election of a new president, provided a capstone for the arch of crisis. The result was that on September 12, 1980, the military once again intervened.

PARTIES AND ELECTIONS, 1983–1999

The military endeavored to adjust the electoral and party system to achieve a greater measure of stability. The measures adopted reveal the junta’s analysis of the weaknesses of the system they had overthrown. They wrote a new constitution designed first and foremost to prevent these weaknesses from recurring. First, they reversed many of the liberal measures introduced by the 1961 constitution, including autonomy for such institutions as the universities. Second, all pre-existing political parties were disbanded and forbidden to reorganize. 4 The leaders of these parties were personally banned from political activity for periods of five or ten years, depending on their level of responsibility. Third, a national threshold of 10 percent of the vote was imposed that parties were required to surmount before they could claim parliamentary seats. Fourth, political parties were prohibited from maintaining ties of any sort with “associations, unions, foundations, cooperatives, and professional organizations in the form of public bodies and their superior organs” (the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 69, 39–40). Finally, the ruling NSC imposed special conditions to govern the 1983 election, the first under the new order. Every newly organized party had to undergo careful review by the NSC, including its formal organization as well as its slate of candidates. The junta reserved the right to reject parts or all of both, and it exercised this power freely, with the result that only three parties were able to compete in the election. The regime obviously had a preferred scenario: The Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party, MDP), openly endorsed by General Kenan Evren, the leader of the NSC, was favored to win; the Halkçª Parti (Populist Party, HaP) was intended to be the loyal opposition; and the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP), led by Turgut Özal, architect of the economic reform of 1980 who resigned in 1982, was not supposed to be there at all. The junta’s plan envisioned “an antiseptic type of politics that ideally would resemble a gentlemanly sporting contest in which two teams compete with one another, and in which only one can win while the other loses” (Tachau 1984, 47). The NSC seemed unable to find a credible basis for excluding the ANAP from the arena. Hence, the outcome of the 1983 election, a decisive victory by Özal, was a major setback for the military and a conspicuous


37

show of independence by Turkish voters. The ANAP won close to half the popular vote and a majority of the seats in the new Grand National Assembly (GNA). In the 1987 election, the ANAP’s share of the vote shrank to 36.3 percent, but it retained nearly two-thirds of the parliamentary seats thanks in large part to the provisions of the electoral law “which stacked all the cards in . . . [its] favour” (Pope and Pope, 1997, 201).5 A major factor underlying the loss of popular support was the re-entry onto the political stage of Sµleyman Demirel, leader of the banned Justice Party, now at the head of the new Doπru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, DYP). The election was called shortly after a referendum passed by a narrow majority, restoring the full rights of the banned political leaders. Observers suggested that Özal sought to get through the election before these competitors could get their political feet on the ground. Given the results of the election, it is conceivable that the ANAP might have suffered even more grievously if the election had been held at a later date. The downhill slide of the ANAP probably also played a role in persuading Özal to become a candidate for president in 1989, relieving him of the rigors of electoral campaigning. Indeed, the ANAP’s share of the popular vote continued to decline precipitously in the 1990s. Its downward slide was paralleled by the DYP’s decline. While these two center-right parties still commanded a majority of the popular vote in 1991, they could hardly muster the support of a quarter of the electorate by the end of the decade. Moreover, due to the poisoned personal relations between their leaders, the ANAP and the DYP were unable to combine forces to form a stable government. Their only attempt to form a coalition government in the wake of the 1995 elections collapsed only after a few months in office. The center-right parties were now being outpolled by more extreme right-wing parties, revivals of the nationalist and Islamist movements of the 1970s. The moderate center-left, led by another survivor of the pre-1980 era, Bµlent Ecevit, also outpolled the ANAP and the DYP by a substantial margin in 1999. In 1995, the Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP) emerged as the largest party, with 21.4 percent of the vote and 29 percent of the seats, closely followed by the ANAP and the DYP. Because the latter two were unable to work together, the unthinkable (from the point of view of the Kemalist elite) occurred: A coalition government between the RP and the DYP was formed in mid-1996. Erbakan had thus fulfilled two prophesies he had proclaimed several years earlier—he had transformed a marginal party into a mass party, and it had become the leading party in the government. In some respects Erbakan proved to be an adept politician. Although he had advocated anti-secularist and anti-Western values, going so far as to threaten to pull Turkey out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

38


(NATO), his government made no substantive changes in the country’s international stance.6 Erbakan satisfied himself with largely symbolic gestures toward other Islamic states, including Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Libya. He was well aware that the military strongly favored the continuation—indeed, reinforcing—of secular values and ties with the West. He could hardly avoid such awareness: The military periodically and forcefully reminded him—in closed meetings of the NSC as well as in public statements put out by the military command—and the country of these sentiments. As the government stumbled on, the military became more adamant and more voluble. The issue on which they openly confronted the government was the lengthening of mandatory education in secular schools from five years to eight.7 An even more dramatic confrontation between the military and the Islamists occurred after the Iranian ambassador delivered an inflammatory anti-Israeli and anti-secularist peroration at a public function in an Ankara suburb. When Erbakan finally resigned in June 1997 after a year in office, President Demirel took advantage of the opening to appoint the ANAP leader, Mesut Yªlmaz, who formed a coalition with the centerleft Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP). Subsequently, the Islamist RP and its leader Erbakan were banned from further participation in politics by the Constitutional Court.8 The 1999 election brought a further set of political surprises. First, a new Islamist party, the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, FP), had been organized to replace the RP. But the Islamist vote in the election fell to 15.4 percent, dropping it to third place. Second, the center-left party DSP of Ecevit forged ahead of its rival CHP to become the strongest party, with 22.2 percent of the votes. A third surprise was that the right-wing nationalist MHP came in second with 17.9 percent of the votes. The political system was thus more severely fragmented than ever. Not only did no single party stand out, but no group of parties any longer commanded either an electoral or parliamentary majority. The political spectrum was divided into three roughly equal groupings: the center-right, the center-left, and the extreme Islamist and nationalist right. This did not bode well for political stability or effective government. Nevertheless, in the year following the election, Turkey experienced a number of significant successes, including a dramatic improvement in relations with Europe, a major de-escalation of the Kurdish insurgency, and a significant détente in relations with Greece.

TURKISH ELECTORAL POLITICS: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE CENTER-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE

We turn now to a review of efforts to explain the evolution of Turkish electoral politics summarized here.9 A very insightful approach points to the


39

cleavage between the center and the periphery, which has characterized Turkish society since the days of the Ottoman Empire. This approach highlights the historic significance of the 1950 election. It was a “greening” election in which rural interests burst onto the political stage in full force, threatening to end the traditional control of the system by the centrist elite (Roos and Roos 1971).10 But this was not a simple one-dimensional change in which one political elite displaced another. The DP differed from the CHP principally in that it relied on the support of masses of rural and other voters on the periphery rather than the traditional power and prestige of the state-based civil and military bureaucracy (Tachau 1984).11 The leaders of the DP had been members of the CHP before they went into opposition (or, perhaps more accurately, were allowed to go into opposition) and thus had roots in the same centrist elite. Nor did the policies advocated by the new party diverge all that much from CHP practices of the years preceding the critical election (Çarkoπlu 1998). The pressures of competitive politics made themselves felt as soon as opposition parties were allowed to organize. In the years prior to the 1950 election, religious instruction was reinstated in the schools, a Faculty of Divinity was established at the University of Ankara, and the government failed to implement meaningful land reform, despite the enactment of a farreaching law to that effect. Clearly, the CHP was responding to the new situation in which it had to compete for the votes of the rural periphery, and it was in danger of losing its traditional support of the local notables and landowners (Sunar 1974).12 Years of virtually uncontested rule, exacerbated by the economic rigors of World War II, culminated in a situation in which critical elements of political support for the CHP regime were alienated.13 Alienation extended even into the very core of CHP power, the modernizing centrist elite, including the military. This may have been a factor forcing the regime’s hand in deciding whether to deal with the rising opposition in the mid-1940s by repressive or liberalizing measures.14 Once in opposition, the CHP had difficulty shaking off its image as the representative of a haughty and oppressive reform-minded elite that was out of touch with the average Turk, particularly in the rural hinterland. The average Turkish villager had benefited from the republican reforms in that they brought a period of peace and stability. But . . . villagers had yet to experience significant improvements in the material conditions of life or the structure of opportunities. (Tachau 1991, 104)15

The CHP had its own explanation for its weak electoral performance during the 1950s. According to this view, the party’s advocacy of reform and secularism had lost support from the crude, uneducated, uncultivated, and benighted rural population egged on by an unscrupulous party “willing

40


to cater to the most obscurantist and reactionary sentiments among the masses” (Tachau, 1991, 105). The inauguration of competitive politics had a revolutionary impact on relations between the center and the periphery. The hitherto politically inert peasantry was now a factor on the political stage, though much of it remained subject to the influence of local notables and landowners. It has been suggested that democratic politics in Turkey “was won too easily”; rather than emerging from genuine conflict and compromise among social groups, it was handed down “by fiat and with limited pressure from below . . . ; it left intact the institutions and actors of the previous regime.” Accordingly, “factional conflicts among the incumbent political elites” dominated the political scene in a pattern that has persisted into the 1990s. One consequence was that “the Jacobin institutions of the monoparty regime were taken over intact by the Democratic [sic] party . . . [and] not changed to accommodate to a democratic form of politics. On the contrary, they were put to use for purposes similar to those of the past: that is, to squelch electoral opposition and to restrict the range of debate over policy” (Sunar and Sayarª 1986, 172–173).16 Factional conflict among elites at the center found a ready echo on the periphery. Just as the elites fanned out across the country seeking masses of votes, local factions reached out to them as channels of access to political resources at the national level. Factionalism at national and local levels thus tended to reinforce one another. This substructure of the political system pushed the parties into relatively nonideological stances. More important, due to the intensity of factional cleavages at both elite and mass levels, the polity was divided into two diametrically opposed camps. This nonideological political bi-polarity precluded compromise between the two parties even on the most fundamental principles of democratic processes, gave rise to bitter government-opposition confrontation, and frequently undermined the stability of the regime. (Sayarª 1978, 43)

There was more to the DP electorate than simply rural peasants and notables voting against the old elite of the center in the form of the CHP, however. The 1950s saw the rise of a wholly new socioeconomic group, and, concomitantly, the decline of the bureaucratic-military elite that had brought the republic into being. The new group consisted of . . . the entrepreneurs, merchants, and traders who had found new opportunities in the aftermath of the development policies implemented by the Republican government in the 1930s and 1940s. (Tachau 1984, 65–66)


41

These classes were divided not only by function but also in terms of social backgrounds. Most industrialists, for example, came from nonelite, nonofficial backgrounds such as small-scale trade, artisanship, shopkeeping, or farming, while civil servants tended to be children of bureaucrats, military officers, or professionals. Thus, partisan politics came to reflect social divisions. Given the old elite’s lack of experience with sharing power, this challenge from a variety of social strata traditionally regarded as inferior was bound to be unsettling if not destabilizing. In light of these polarizing tendencies and the authoritarian propensities of parties of the past, it is not surprising that the DP succumbed to the temptation to revert to repressiveness. Moreover, it cloaked this traditional mode of behavior in the language of democracy, adopting a majoritarian concept that allowed it to portray its electoral dominance as an expression of the popular will and the opposition’s resistance as illegitimate. The CHP, in turn, also repeated a pattern of the past by emphasizing the other side of the democratic coin: the rights of the minority. ºsmet ºnönµ, the former president (1938–1950) and head of the country’s authoritarian one-party regime, became the personification of the democratic conscience of the nation.17 Although he kept his distance from the military in terms of personal contact and was not personally involved in planning or even advocating military intervention, he publicly warned of the danger of such action on several occasions in 1959 and 1960. On May 27, 1960, these warnings were realized in a military coup that brought down the DP regime and resulted in the abolition of the party, arrest and trial of its leaders (three of whom were hanged on charges of unconstitutional behavior), and the writing of a new constitution. In the words of one scholar, “[T]he army intervened and destroyed democracy in order to save it” (Ahmad 1977, 118). In other words, the central elite had struck back at the periphery by means of military intervention. The constitution promulgated under the aegis of the military junta in 1961 (and ratified by a small majority in a referendum) was designed to redress what appeared to the military as weaknesses in the political system, which had undermined democracy. One remedy designed to accomplish this was greater liberalization of the political system. Another was a set of devices aimed at restraining the power of a majority party. Principal among these was the introduction of proportional representation, intended to make it more difficult for a single party to capture an overwhelming majority of parliamentary seats, as the Democrats had. This measure seems to have had the intended effect, for in the 1960s and 1970s the share of both votes and parliamentary seats garnered by the two largest parties tended to decline significantly. No party won a majority in the 1961 election. In 1965, however, the AP

42


won an absolute majority of parliamentary seats and was thus empowered to govern alone. This situation persisted through the 1969 election. However, in 1973 and 1977 support for the AP declined precipitously, no party won a majority of seats, and coalition politics re-emerged. Although the CHP became the largest party for the first time under free competitive conditions, and almost captured a majority of seats in 1977, it had great difficulty finding compatible coalition partners and remained in opposition during most of this period. The AP, despite its weakened condition, managed to set up several right-wing coalition governments, signifying to one observer that the CHP remained the party of the center (despite its newly proclaimed left-of-center stance). Meanwhile, voters on the periphery shifted from the DP to the AP and later to the religiously oriented MSP and the far-right MHP. “[T]he essence of the game of party politics persisted: [The] CHP still functioned as the party against which all other parties organized and competed” (Kalaycªoπlu 1994, 406). In other words, the CHP continued to be viewed as representative of the center. At the same time, the entire political spectrum shifted toward the right, a trend that has continued since then (Çarkoπlu 1998). This produced a paradox: Even as the CHP moved to the left ideologically and emerged as the largest party in the system, the system as a whole was shifting in the opposite direction. The outcome was rising polarization, frustration, political paralysis, and escalating violence, paving the way for yet another military intervention. The military once again ended democracy on September 12, 1980, ostensibly to save it. The leader who came to dominate the political scene after the resumption of civilian government in 1983 was Turgut Özal. He turned out to be a remarkable politician, prompting some to call him a second Atatµrk. He presided over a period of unusual stability in Turkish democratic politics and managed to revolutionize the economy, turning it away from traditional reliance on state control and toward deregulation, privatization, and openness to foreign investment. Politically, he avoided ideological or partisan rhetoric; instead, he emphasized pragmatism. After the rigors of partisan polarization, fragmentation, and violence of the 1970s, this was a welcome relief.18 Unfortunately, it was not to last. The elections of the 1990s brought back a high level of fragmentation, as Table 2.1 shows. The number of parties winning seats rose to five in 1991 and remained at that level thereafter. More significant, the proportion of votes garnered by the largest parties declined steadily, as did their share of parliamentary seats. In 1999, the two largest parties received only 40.1 percent of the vote, while their proportion of seats also dropped below 50 percent. This meant that even if the two largest parties were to agree on a “grand” coalition, for the first time they could not command a majority of the parliament. In short, despite the best intentions of the military, fragmentation had not only returned but worsened.19

43

An Overview of Electoral Behavior Table 2.1

Party Fragmentation, 1961–1999

Year

Percentage of Vote Won by Two Strongest Parties

Percentage of Seats Won by Two Strongest Parties

Number of Parties Winning Seats

1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999

71.5 81.5 74.0 63.1 78.3 75.6 61.0 51.1 41.1 40.1

73.5 83.1 88.6 74.2 89.3 82.2 87.9 65.1 53.2 47.2

4 6 8 7 6 3 3 5 5 5

Sources: Sayarª (1978), Table 2; Kalaycªoπlu (1999), Table 1; Turan in Heper and Evin, eds. (1994), Table 5.1.

The system also manifests greater disparities of ideology and program than was the case in earlier years. Since 1991, the country has witnessed the burgeoning of an Islamist party to the point where its leader was able to become prime minister. The party emerged from the 1995 election with more votes and seats than any other party, roughly twice the highest proportion it had ever achieved in the past. This followed public declarations by the RP’s leader, Erbakan, that he would turn the party into a mainstream mass organization. 20 The extreme rightist MHP emerged as the second largest in 1999 and joined in coalition with the DSP and the ANAP. Unlike the 1970s, when extremists in the parliament were small in number and the vast majority of the voters defined themselves as centrist, parties representing antithetical political poles now sat in the parliament and participated in coalition governments. Parties appealing explicitly to Kurdish ethnic voters have also appeared. To what should these aspects of the Turkish party system be attributed? And what do they portend for the future? Ali Çarkoπlu has noted that a majority of the electorate continued to define itself as centrist (though in reduced proportions from earlier years). He asks how, in the face of this self-definition of large numbers of voters, one can explain the rising importance if not dominance of extreme parties, particularly the RP and the MHP. Among the factors he cites are, first, “frequent manipulation of the election system by the incumbents to obtain electoral gains”; and second, “the demands of the rapidly growing and fast changing Turkish society” (Çarkoπlu 1998, 552–553). Or, as Ustµn Ergµder has put it: “The party system is bursting at the seams because of rapid mobilization, and population growth” (Ergµder 1995, 71).21

44


The process of sociopolitical change, which led to extreme party fragmentation in the 1990s, first appeared in the 1960s and 1970s. One of the symptoms was a set of dramatic changes in the CHP. First, the party began espousing a new slogan with a somewhat unfamiliar ideological ring—it proclaimed itself to be a party of the “left-of-center.” Second, the party experienced a historic change of leadership with the rise of the youthful and energetic intellectual, Bµlent Ecevit, in 1972. The new slogan and leadership change triggered the resignation of a number of prominent party members. This raised the question of whether the CHP was being transformed from an instrument of the central elites into a vehicle of social protest on the periphery. As indicated above, the result was a paradox: A party espousing a platform calling for fundamental social change and greater equity for the poor continued to be treated by its rivals as an elitist organization that could not be trusted with power. In a certain sense, a role reversal occurred during the 1970s. The elitist CHP was becoming the mouthpiece of the deprived. Contrariwise, parties such as the AP, the heir of the DP of the 1950s, which had arisen as an agent of the periphery seeking to end the center’s power monopoly, now became a staunch defender of the status quo. Partly out of frustration and partly for short-term tactical reasons (to preempt smaller, more extreme parties), the CHP and AP assumed more explicit and extreme ideological positions and engaged in vitriolic rhetoric. The AP made rabid anticommunism a centerpiece of its platform and labeled its coalition with smaller rightist parties as the National Front. The CHP emphasized its determination to change the social order, evoking images of radical leftism. The partisanship extended to the personal level, with the two leaders, Demirel and Ecevit, refusing to cooperate with one another. Although a grand coalition between them would have completely dominated the parliament (with control of 89 percent of the seats), the high level of partisan and personal rivalry foreclosed this option. The situation was aggravated by the fact that, although this atmosphere emerged as an inter-elite conflict, it now spread to the masses across the country. As it did so, it sucked in a whole gamut of issues that had previously lain dormant on the periphery of society and politics, such as Kurdish-Turkish ethnic divisions, Sunni-Alevi religious differences, and secularism versus religious piety. Furthermore, such issues tended to become entangled with the overt left-right political polarity, such that the Alevi minority could be denounced as socialists or communists because of their traditional support of the CHP, while ethnic Kurds seeking greater autonomy might also be attracted to leftist ideology because of their concentration in the least-developed part of the country.22 Rivalries at the center of the system now began to permeate the periphery and became entangled with local factional divisions. This process,


45

which began in the 1950s, was observed in a subprovincial center in western Turkey, where several outspoken school teachers and civil servants “viewed politics as an important and continuous activity in which ideological posture played a significant role. This view corresponded to the growing ideological emphasis in Turkey’s national politics” (Leder 1976, 24). After the 1965 election, new young religious functionaries were placed in Saruhanlª by the national Directorate of Religious Affairs, a government agency. One of them was familiar with leftist literature and was not hesitant to engage in debate with the teachers and bureaucrats. He organized a Koranic study association that became a conduit for anti-Marxist and proIslamic rhetoric. “At one level, the conflict between the radical teachers and the religious leaders was [one of] secular or non-Marxist values versus religious or Islamic values. At the most fundamental level, however, it was a conflict over control of much of the folk’s hostility to the established order. To this extent the conflict paralleled the ideological conflict between the right and the left at the national level” (Leder 1976, 32). This case illustrates what ºlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayarª (1986) had in mind when they observed that “the incongruence between the lingering effects of the past built into the structure and political culture of the Republic and the mechanisms and rules of democracy . . . [provide] crucial insights into Turkey’s recurrent problems with democratization.” (168). It also suggests that, rather than moving in a unilinear fashion from cultural (center-periphery) to functional (class-based) cleavages (Özbudun 1995), the society was developing a more complex intertwining of these two types of cleavage. This meant that the CHP, as we have noted, was shifting from its traditional role of representing the center to a new role as a vehicle of social protest, while the DP and AP became defenders of the status quo.23 The new role of the CHP was indicated by a declaration, adopted by the party in October 1964, which dealt with land reform, social justice, social security, economic development, democratic etatism, education, secularism, the fine arts, nationalism, and youth. During the 1965 election campaign, ºnönµ used the term “left-of-center” to define the party’s position and to differentiate it from the opposition. A stormy and prolonged battle for the soul of the party ensued, with conservatives loyal to the historic leader contending against a group of younger and more radical reformers led by Ecevit. The resolution came in 1972 with the former’s resignation and election of the latter as chairman. Ecevit’s purpose was to go beyond political rhetoric or posturing for the sake of winning votes. He aimed to make the party a genuine instrument of reform and socioeconomic amelioration. This meant that it had to shed its traditional image of a distant, aloof, and disdainful elite in favor of becoming an authentic voice of the common people. In short, he sought to marshal the protest vote. His success in transforming the historic party

46


established by the great Atatµrk should be measured by its electoral achievements. The history of the AP stands in contrast to that of the CHP, perhaps because the party was new and lacked organizational links with the formative years of the republic. It initially appealed to the supporters of the defunct DP; its name was a thinly veiled call for justice in dealing with them. Its founders came from a variety of disaffected groups: military officers who had been retired in August 1960; extreme rightists, some from a pan-Turkist background; several traditional oppositionists from the 1940s and even the Young Turk period; and former Democrats (Levi 1991, 136–137).24 In 1964, Sµleyman Demirel, an engineer and former official of the State Hydraulic Works, became party leader. The party’s leadership cadre, including Demirel, rose from more humble social origins than its Democrat Party predecessors; it was, in fact, dubbed the first true grassroots party in Turkey (Sherwood 1967). Ideologically, the AP was clearly rightist, favoring free enterprise and minimal taxes, opposing extremist ideologies, especially Marxism and communism, and emphasizing the importance of economic growth. In the environment of rapid socioeconomic development, which enveloped Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s, the party became more closely identified with the burgeoning big business and industrial groups, with the more traditional agricultural interests and small businessmen and artisans of the provincial hinterland feeling left out. Partly as a result, the party, factionalized from the very beginning, splintered in the early 1970s when the DkP split off. Moreover, with the emergence of the MSP and the MHP, the AP lost its place as the only viable rightist party in the system and was pulled into more extreme rhetoric than might otherwise have been the case. It never again was able to organize a government without resorting to coalition politics. Coalition governments of the 1970s included extremist parties representing the periphery, particularly the MSP and MHP. Rather than submerging their differences in the interest of efficient government, they treated the ministries over which they had control as political fiefdoms and tried to pack them with political supporters, using their participation in government to enhance the fortunes of their party. This effectively brought the periphery into the very center of government and introduced political fragmentation into the bureaucracy, undermining the political potency of this central institution.25 Center-periphery relations have also been transformed by the continuing migration of rural villagers to major urban centers. Whereas earlier it seemed that peasants were being assimilated into urban society, if imperfectly, it now appears that the sheer numbers of what we may call urban exvillagers have brought about a kind of peasantization of the cities. Cities


47

are being overwhelmed, not only in terms of demands for basic services but also politically. This may explain why the Islamist RP was able to capture the mayoralties of the two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara, in the 1994 local elections.26 More detailed evidence of the evolution of center-periphery relations is provided by electoral studies that have been carried out in Turkey over the past twenty-five years. An overview of Turkey’s electoral experience is not complete without a survey of these studies. Voting patterns in the 1950s revealed a paradoxical pattern. The CHP, the party of the modernized, urban, official elite, actually drew its greatest voting strength from less developed rural parts of the country rather than from the cities, where one might have expected it to show its greatest strength. Contrariwise, the DP, speaking for the periphery, showed greater strength in the more modernized western part of the country than in the less developed east. This paradox has been explained by reference to the bifurcated nature of the CHP’s support, combining the urban and more modernized elite and near-elite groups with continued backing from large landowners and their client peasants in the less modernized parts of the country. Thus, the CHP’s best electoral performance tended to be in the more backward, rural eastern provinces. By contrast, the DP performed best in the more modernized western provinces. This pattern has been attributed to the DP’s successful appeal to “some urban elements and to the more developed peasantry, since it was precisely among the more mobilized sectors that the grievances against the CHP rule were more acutely felt and more freely expressed” (Özbudun 1976, 48–49, 52). These contrasting sources of support also correspond to distinct patterns of electoral participation: autonomous on the one hand, defined as “activity which is designed by the actor himself to influence governmental decision-making,” and mobilized on the other hand, defined as “activity which is designed by someone other than the actor to influence governmental decision-making” (Huntington and Nelson 1973, 2–5). In other words, peasants in less developed communities, trapped in a clientelistic relationship with landowners, were likely to vote according to the example if not the overt instructions of their patron. Although the predominant tendency was to support the CHP, in some provinces this mode of political participation led to high levels of electoral volatility, with sharp swings from one party to another or to independent candidates, depending on the political deals that the locally dominant landlord-patrons were able to make on the national scene. More developed provinces, where autonomous voting predominated, tended to show more stable electoral behavior.27 This pattern prevailed even after the military interregnum of 1960–1961, at least through the 1965 election. The election of 1973 marked a clear realignment of voters and parties, however. This realignment was

48


presaged in the election of 1969. In that election, the CHP’s poor performance tended to overshadow a significant change in the pattern of electoral support for the party. Traditional strong support in the less developed provinces began to wane, while support in the more highly developed regions, especially the large cities, rose. This new pattern accelerated in 1973, and combined with decline in support for the AP, it propelled the CHP to become the largest party in the parliament (Tachau 1973; Özbudun and Tachau 1975; and Özbudun 1976). In light of this development, the CHP’s performance in the 1977 election was truly remarkable. It received 41.4 percent of the popular vote, its best showing in competitive elections. But this still fell short of an absolute majority. The AP managed to take advantage of this failure to form a ramshackle coalition with the extreme right, and the CHP was yet once more relegated to the opposition for much of the next three years.28 But a new pattern had been set: The two major parties in the system became more directly competitive nationally, appealing to the same or similar constituencies in some areas, exchanging constituencies in others. The CHP did especially well in large urban centers, apparently drawing votes directly from the AP, more than doubling its tally in these constituencies between 1969 and 1973 (Özbudun and Tachau 1975).29 At the same time, a more pronounced ideological divergence on the left-right spectrum opened between them. As noted earlier, a proliferation of smaller parties occurred, especially on the right, where two new parties appeared on the scene. Thus, as the CHP was transforming itself from an elitist party to a more populist mode, both in rhetoric and in terms of electoral support, new parties of the right espousing nationalist and Islamist themes arose to compete with it as vehicles of protest. Electoral appeals based on protest were becoming bifurcated between the left and the right. The combination of electoral and rhetorical changes manifested by the CHP in the 1973 and 1977 elections led one observer to conclude that “the old center-periphery cleavage began to be replaced by a new functional [class-based] cleavage” (Özbudun 1995, 234). Has such a trend continued since the end of the military interregnum of the early 1980s? A series of opinion surveys conducted in the 1990s provides a basis for an answer. Ersin Kalaycªoπlu concludes that cultural cleavages persist and have contributed significantly to fragmentation of the votes and the parties. He posits a deep-seated cultural and political divide between those who adhere to a secular/modern outlook (corresponding to the old centrist elite) as opposed to those who maintain a traditional/religious perspective. This division is further complicated by the Alevi/secular bloc as opposed to the Sunni/traditional bloc, as well as Kurdish versus Turkish ethnic groups and even various Sufi mystic orders (Kalaycªoπlu 1999).30 Kalaycªoπlu adds that the collapse of the Soviet Union further compounded this picture by


49

raising other issues of ethnic identity, especially in the wake of warfare and ethnic cleansing involving groups to which Turks have traditionally felt akin in the Balkans and the Caucasus. The Kurdish conflict also challenged standing concepts of identity by raising the specter of a breakup of the Turkish Republic. Thus, parties expressing strong sentiments of religiosity (RP) and ethnic nationalism (MHP) have been quite successful in recent elections, enabling them to play leading roles in coalition governments in the 1990s. Similarly, the pro-Kurdish Halkªn Demokrasi Partisi (People’s Democracy Party, HADEP) showed considerable strength in the southeastern provinces in the 1995 and 1999 elections. Kalaycªoπlu found that religiosity, ethnicity, formal education, and gender were major factors determining party preferences among voters, overshadowing such functional cleavages as social class and place of residence. In addition, he noted that there is an ongoing realignment of voters and polarization of voters and parties. “A large bloc of voters are becoming more chauvinistic and xenophobic, on the one hand, while a much smaller bloc of voters are deepening their commitment to secular and left-of-center ideas and values, on the other” (Kalaycªoπlu 1999, 73). At the same time, the political spectrum continues to shift to the right, with many voters moving in that direction while a smaller number are moving from center to left. The conclusion is that “Turkish electoral politics seem to have increasingly come under the influence of traditional and primordial values deeply penetrated by religious and ethnic affinities. Social class appears to play a minimal role. The system has also continued to become more fragmented, polarized, and subject to a higher degree of voter volatility than ever” (Kalaycªoπlu 1999:73).

CONCLUSION

What does this portend for the future of electoral politics in Turkey? Do the trends outlined here augur more protest voting in support of parties that are innately anti-system? Can Turkish democracy survive the strain, or is it destined to follow the French Fourth Republic onto the scrap heap of history? Insofar as some of the recent shifts in voting behavior involved movement from one extreme right-wing party to another (specifically, from the RP to the MHP), there is evidence that some voters are seeking a vehicle for the expression of dissatisfaction. It is not clear whether this dissatisfaction is so pervasive as to constitute alienation from the system, or whether it is more instrumental in nature. That is to say, it is unclear whether these voters prefer the Islamist RP or the nationalist MHP because they have lost faith in the secular republican political culture (Kemalism or Atatµrkism) or whether they are casting their ballots simply to register a protest against

50


currently prevailing conditions. In other words, do these voters really harbor Islamist or irredentist nationalist views, or are they merely registering disapproval of the mainstream center-right parties and their leaders?31 In the meantime, a somewhat extraneous factor must be taken into account: the military. As was noted at the outset of this chapter, the military continues to hover in the wings, periodically issuing threats and warnings. One analyst suggests that there is “a de facto dual-track government” in contemporary Turkey in which the elected political leaders are constrained to operate within parameters maintained by the military (Lowry 2000). The military exercise power through the National Security Council, a constitutional body composed of equal numbers of civilians and officers; the latter are, however, widely perceived as dominant. This is illustrated by a set of “recommendations” endorsed by the NSC on February 28, 1997. These ranged from lengthening mandatory secular education from five years to eight, to enforcement of laws enacted in the 1920s, which regulate public displays of religious piety. The unanimous acceptance of these demands by civilian as well as military members of the NSC did not obscure the fact that they emanated from the military; indeed, the military publicly campaigned for them. Although on this issue they had the strong support of secular civilians in the media, the universities, labor unions, and among businessmen and the intelligentsia, the fact was that none of these civilian elements apparently had the political resources to promulgate such measures without the active involvement of the military (Lowry 2000). If the military felt empowered to interpret the NSC’s constitutional charge to protect “the existence and independence of the state, the unity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society” (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 118, 75) so broadly as to include matters of religious piety and education, it may be inferred that there are only weak barriers, if any, to military encroachment on civilian politics. Indeed, it has been argued that the NSC’s demands in February 1997 constituted a “soft coup,” the upshot of which was the resignation of the Erbakan government a few months later.32 A sharpening of the confrontation between the military and a growing segment of the voting public thus would not augur well for the future of Turkish democracy. From this perspective, the formation of the tripartite government led by the social democrat Bµlent Ecevit in the wake of the 1999 election is a positive development. Unlike many other contemporary party leaders, Ecevit is widely perceived to be incorruptible and principled. His commitment to democracy and nationalism is equally widely recognized. In addition, his major coalition partner, Devlet Bahçeli of the MHP, assumed a flexible and temperate stance that reflected political moderation and responsibility. Ecevit and his government were thus positioned to cultivate a new lease on life for Turkish democracy. Protest voters might still seek a vehicle for pro-


51

jecting their dissatisfactions, but the fevered temperature of the body politic might come down a few notches, and the slide toward greater extremism and confrontation might be arrested, at least temporarily. The fact that two of the three leading figures in the presiding government during the year 2000 were both erstwhile leaders of protest parties, one (Ecevit) of the left, the other (Bahçeli) of the right, may, after all, turn out to be a good omen.

NOTES 1. Sartori (1976) distinguishes between alienation and protest, noting that “voters can be protestors, while the party activists can be alienated. Likewise, the party leadership can be ideologically motivated, whereas the rank and file may simply lack bread.” He further defines anti-system parties as those that would change “the very system of government,” so that their opposition is not focused on issues but on principle. Such parties are not necessarily revolutionary, but they do pose a challenge to the legitimacy of the existing political system. The various Turkish Islamist parties seem to fit this model. Like the French and Italian post–World War II Communist parties, their electoral support probably includes the votes of many who are dissatisfied but who do not necessarily favor the ideological positions of the party, in particular the dismantling of the secular regime (132–134). 2. For a discussion of change and continuity between the Ottoman regime and the republic, see Tachau (1984). 3. The MSP replaced the outlawed Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party, MNP), also led by Erbakan. See Landau (1994). 4. In 1961, only the DP suffered this fate, fostering a perception that the military favored the CHP. The makers of the 1980 coup sought to avoid projecting such an image. This does not mean, however, that their disdain for all parties and politicians was insincere. 5. Hale (1994) asserts: “[T]he government . . . altered the electoral system so as to give an increased share of seats to the party coming top of the polls” (280). He adds that splintering of the opposition vote among a number of rival parties contributed to the skewed outcome. Kalaycªoπlu in Chapter 3 of this volume mentions the addition of a district level threshold introduced in the 1987 elections and notes that the biased results of the 1991 election helped push Özal into the relative safety of the presidency. 6. On perhaps the most sensitive issue of all, a newly spawned military alliance with Israel, Erbakan swallowed his traditional enmity toward that country and allowed the alliance to go forward. The main forum used by the military to express its unhappiness with the government was the National Security Council, whose agenda came to be dominated by this conflict. 7. This was one of a set of eighteen demands put forth by the military and unanimously endorsed by the NSC on February 28, 1997. 8. Many observers argue that Erbakan, despite his political adroitness on some issues, needlessly provoked the secularist elite and thus helped bring about the legal crackdown on his party and himself. On Erbakan, see Lowry (2000). 9. This history has been traced in detail in Karpat (1959), Ahmad (1977), Dodd (1979; 1990), and Harris (1972). Accounts of individual parties may be found in Heper and Landau (1991), and Landau (1974; 1994; 1995). An early abortive attempt at formation of an opposition party in 1930 is laid out in Weiker (1973).

52


10. The center-periphery paradigm was set forth in Shils (1961) and applied to Turkey by Mardin (1973). Heper has also applied the concept (1980). See also Sayarª (1978). 11. The centrist elite in fact did not govern alone. Allied with it were the local notables who kept the peasant masses docile in exchange for maintenance of their socioeconomic position. According to Sunar (1974), this created a paradox. While the peasant viewed the local notable as a beneficent patron, the central government continued to appear as a hostile force personified by the recruiting sergeant and the tax collector. 12. One of the top leaders of the DP, later to become prime minister, was Adnan Menderes, a landowner from the Menderes valley in western Turkey. 13. The Turkish economy was adversely affected by the war, despite the studied policy of strict neutrality adopted by the government. In an apparently desperate effort to alleviate a revenue shortfall, an “extraordinarily heavy taxation of capital (Varlªk Vergisi [wealth tax]). . . was imposed on businesses, industrial enterprises, building owners, and real estate brokers. . . . [It] was designed to weigh heavily against the profiteers, businessmen, and intermediaries who had acquired wealth through speculation and black market dealings. . . . But . . . the tax was levied in an arbitrary and harsh way,” targeting non-Muslim minorities and providing for severe penalties for those who could not make immediate payment of the levy as imposed (Sunar 1974, 80–81). Sunar (1974) contends that this tax effectively alienated urban business groups, driving them into the arms of the opposition party even before it was allowed to form. 14. Moore (1970) suggests that the outcome was far from certain, arguing that if the Western allies had lost the war, advocates of continued authoritarianism could have prevailed, led by then prime minister Recep Peker. See also Harris (1965) and Ahmad (1977) on disaffection in the military. The critical role of President ºsmet ºnönµ should not be overlooked. He was personally strongly committed to democratic principles. See Heper (1998). 15. Tachau in Heper and Landau (1991, 104), citing Sunar (1974, 87). 16. Sunar and Sayarª’s analysis follows the general argument made by Dankwart Rustow concerning democratic transitions in his “Transitions to Democracy,” Comparative Politics, 2:3 (April 1970), 172–173. 17. Sunar and Sayarª (1986) suggest that “opposition groups in Turkey had always been libertarian out of power and autocratic once in power” (172). See also Payaslªoπlu (1964) and Rustow (1966). 18. Ergµder (1995) suggests that this orientation substituted an emphasis on governmental effectiveness for the previous stress on representativeness. Özal’s economic and political engineering had its price, specifically, the further distortion of the already skewed curve of income distribution. Many achieved hitherto undreamed of personal prosperity, but others fell ever further behind. On income distribution and related issues of political economy, see Özbudun and Ulusan (1980). 19. Çarkoπlu (1998), Figure 1, 548, indicates this trend through 1995 in a somewhat different fashion. 20. Personal observation, October 1993. Çarkoπlu (1998) notes that the RP was less consistent in its programs from election to election than any other party. It tended to shift rightward or toward the center in response to similar shifts in the programs of other parties. 21. Kalaycªoπlu (1999) found the proportion of self-identifying centrist voters had declined to 60 percent. Çarkoπlu (1998) also cites military intervention in poli-


53

tics as a factor contributing to voter alienation because it produced problems of legitimacy. 22. It is probably no coincidence that the organization that assumed leadership of the Kurdish insurrection in 1984, the Kurdistan Workers Party, started out with a radical Maoist political orientation. 23. Attributes of those elected to the parliament is an aspect of electoral politics that goes beyond the limits of this chapter. During the 1960s and 1970s, members of the parliament came to resemble the society at large more closely than was the case prior to 1960, especially with regard to education, local origins, and family size. This confirms the trend manifested by electoral data—the periphery was beginning to infringe in serious ways on the center. For details, see Tachau (1980). For analysis of the 1983 parliament, see Tachau (1988). 24. Ahmad (1977) gives the former Democrats more importance than Levi, noting that they were able to revive the local and provincial organs of the DP, thus providing the new party with an instant nationwide organizational structure. 25. This practice became evident with the formation of the awkward CHPMSP coalition in 1974. A request to an aide of the prime minister (CHP) to introduce a visitor to the deputy prime minister (MSP) evoked the response that “that part of the government is like a foreign country.” Personal observation. 26. Kªray (1970) made a similar point years ago by distinguishing between what she called “de-peasantization” and “workerization.” 27. Local notables in some areas also divided their partisan loyalties among the national parties. In the southern subprovincial town of Kadirli in 1964, for example, prominent members of the local elite could be found in both the CHP and the AP. This division reflected their social origins, the CHP members being descendants of local notable families of the past, while the DP members were descended from seasonal nomad families that had been granted land titles by the Ottoman government in the nineteenth century. See Tachau (1973; 1984). 28. Çarkoπlu (1998) discusses the relationship between changes in party rhetoric and electoral performance, indicating that it is a chicken and egg problem. In the 1973 election campaign, the first that was fought under Ecevit’s leadership, his personality was heavily emphasized with the slogans “Halkçª Ecevit” (Populist Ecevit) and “Umudumuz Ecevit” (Ecevit is our hope) and the fabled heroic image of Karacaoπlan (a kind of Robin Hood folk hero) that was attached to him. Partly because of his relative newness as a national political leader (though he had been a member of parliament for more than fifteen years at the time) and partly because of the slogans of the campaign, in particular “Bu dµzen deπi≈smeli” (This [social] order must change), his campaign drew unusual interest. For example, Ecevit’s mass rally in the main square of Istanbul filled the area to overflowing and the crowd was boisterous and enthusiastic, while the Justice Party’s rally a few days later was much smaller and more muted. Personal observations. 29. Özbudun (1987) also has argued that the sharp fall in CHP votes in the 1979 partial elections was due to abstention by CHP voters who sought “to punish the poor performance of the Ecevit government” (348). 30. See also Kalaycªoπlu (1994). Another analysis based on these surveys is Esmer (1995). 31. This reading of the nature of the RP support in the mid-1990s is confirmed by opinion surveys which show that as many as half of the RP voters cited “nonideological” reasons to explain their vote, “[a] substantial number . . . cit[ing] economic problems as Turkey’s most important problem” (Özbudun 2000, 90). 32. Erbakan’s resignation was not solely the work of the military. He played a

54


significant role himself by trying to promulgate controversial policies without first securing adequate political support within hiss coalition and in the parliament. He also misread the political situation, thinking that his resignation would be followed by a simple rotation with his coalition partner, Tansu Çiller of the DYP, assuming the office of prime minister while he assumed the deputy premiership, thus preserving the government. President Demirel, however, had other ideas and appointed Mesut Yªlmaz of the ANAP, who succeeded in forming a coalition with Bµlent Ecevit’s DSP.

3 Elections and Governance Ersin Kalaycªoπlu

There have been a total of fourteen competitive parliamentary elections in Turkey between 1946 and 1999.1 Among them, the 1946, 1961, and the 1983 elections stand out as milestones of transition from varieties of authoritarianism to multiparty pluralism. Other elections of the post–World War II era have been multiparty, multicandidate contests, in which a wide spectrum of ideas and interests have been involved. In those eleven elections, all participants enjoyed more or less the same opportunity to air their views, programs, ideals, and ideas in public. Parliamentary elections in Turkey have been under the supervision of the judiciary since the 1960s. Consequently, they are considered as fairly free contests for public office. However, the fairness of the electoral rules has often been debated since the 1946 national elections. Accusations of gerrymandering (election rules that favor the largest parties) and the overall lack of representativeness of the elected assemblies have often occupied a prominent place in the Turkish media. In the 1970s, the task of government formation emerged as a major issue on the agenda of Turkish politics. By the late 1970s, electoral rules and laws had also become an important political issue again. The mood of the late 1970s influenced the authors of the 1982 constitution who tried to prevent the recurrence of the problem of government formation. Meanwhile, the parliament legislated on the electoral laws with predictable periodicity yet failed to adopt an electoral formula that would satisfy the majority of the political forces of the country. The desire for electoral reform still occupies a prominent place on the political agenda of Turkey, which will attract greater attention as the next national election approaches, most probably by 2003.

55

56

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey VOTING BEHAVIOR AND THE OUTCOME OF LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN TURKEY

With the introduction of multiparty politics in the aftermath of World War II, the center-periphery cleavage that was inherited from the republican era contributed to a simple divide of the electorate into two major political parties. The Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP) represented the center of the republican political system, while the Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party, DP) emerged to oppose it as the representative of the periphery.2 The majoritarian electoral formula also contributed to a game of politics in the 1940s and 1950s that was built around the confrontation, contests, and clashes of those two political parties. The two-party structure gradually gave way to a multiparty moderate pluralist party system (Sartori 1976) by the 1970s. The 1960 military coup led to the demise of the DP but failed to halt the stellar rise of the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, AP) to replace it by 1965. The new constitution and the electoral laws of the 1961–1980 era not only enabled the survival of smaller parties but also provided them with the added power of coalition potential. The Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, MSP) and the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, MHP) became credible coalition partners. Therefore, by the 1970s the CHP, AP, MSP, and the MHP emerged as the front-runners in a party system replete with many political parties that represented all shades of the left-right spectrum.3 Simultaneously, from the 1960s onward, sociocultural cleavages started to gain new dimensions with the addition of secular and religious, Sunni and Alevi, ethnic and civic nationalists, as well as the Kurdish and Turkish nationalist fault lines (Kalaycªoπlu 1999). The emerging voting blocs contributed to the fragmentation of the vote among the supporters of the four major political parties by the 1970s. After the military interregnum of 1980–1983, a party system with a moderate pluralist structure emerged. However, it evolved into a highly fragmented party and polarized system in the 1990s that palpably rendered government formation difficult (Kalaycªoπlu 1999).4 Musical chairs of coalitions undermined government stability, and as government policies wavered and shifted between different coalitions, or even within the same coalition, arguments about erosion in the quality of governance flourished. Overwhelmed by a lack of policymaking and the instability of governments, the political elites, pundits, and the media started to search for an electoral “solution” to government formation. Although it is not clear whether the electoral laws and rules were perceived as part of the problem, they were considered as part of the solution to the problem of government stability and good governance. An examination of the election rules, related laws, and the distribution

Elections and Governance

57

of the parliamentary seats per election should help us to assess how far the overall state of representativeness and government stability depend on the election rules and laws. Let us proceed with the analysis of election results from the perspectives of representativeness and governability.

TURKISH ELECTIONS: REPRESENTATIVENESS AND GOVERNABILITY

Representativeness Representativeness entails the reflection of the proclivities, tendencies, ideas, and interests represented by various political parties in the national legislature. If the election system produces a representative outcome, there is proportionality between the vote shares of the political parties in the national elections and their corresponding seat shares in the parliament. To measure representativeness of a parliamentary body formed after a general election, students of electoral behavior suggest using disproportionality indexes (Lijphart 1994, 58–62). Disproportionality indexes measure the extent to which the results each party gets at the elections are reflected onto their seat shares in the legislative assemblies where they are represented. More specifically, disproportionality indexes measure the extent to which there is amplification or attenuation of the election shares of the parties and the seat allotments made to them in the legislative assembly. Table 3.1 presents disproportionality indexes calculated from the results of the parliamentary elections held between 1950 and 1999. The indexes (Lijphart 1994, 58–62) are based on the relationship between the national vote and seat shares of only those political parties that have coalition and/or blackmail potential.5 The larger values per column of Table 3.1 indicate disproportionately higher percentages of assembly seats obtained by the political parties with the highest percentage of the votes. For example, the 1950, 1954, 1957, and 1987 elections produced gross amplification of seat shares of the political parties with the highest percentages of the national vote in Turkey, whereas the 1965, 1983, and 1991 elections provided for relatively proportionate distribution of seat shares of political parties in the parliament, in comparison to their vote shares in the national elections. In short, Table 3.1 shows that throughout the 1950s there was gross overrepresentation of the party with the most votes, namely the DP, and concomitantly, an appalling underrepresentation of the main opposition party, the CHP. Although the structure of the party system looked as if there were two major political parties vying for power, the party system functioned more in line with what Sartori calls the predominant party system

58 Table 3.1

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey Disproportionality in Parliamentary Elections, 1950–1999 Da

Ib

LSqc

LDd

Re

1950 1954 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1983 1987

31.05 35.05 21.54 2.55 1.45 13.45 10.50 10.20 7.30 18.90

20.70 17.53 10.77 1.28 0.48 3.36 2.63 2.55 4.87 12.60

29.85 33.13 18.34 2.32 0.94 8.79 6.78 6.41 6.79 20.86

32.90 36.60 22.20 2.40 1.00 10.30 7.80 5.70 7.70 28.60

1991 1995

9.40 16.10

4.68 6.44

9.30 9.78

12.50 7.30

1999

15.90

6.36

9.28

8.70

1.51 1.46 1.30 0.36 0.12 1.14 0.93 1.03 0.41 1.13 (1.79)f 0.50 0.51 (1.34)f 0.20 (1.31)f

Elections

Sources: Kalaycªoπlu (1999, 48). Data for the table are based on the parliamentary election results from 1950 to 1999. Notes: a. Loosemore-Hanby index (Lijphart 1994, 58). b. Douglas W. Rae index (Lijphart 1994, 60). c. Least squares index (Lijphart 1994, 60–61). d. Largest deviation index (Lijphart 1994, 62). e. Range index = maximum S/V – minimum S/V (suggested by the author). f. Includes those parties that participated in the national elections but could not obtain more than 10 percent of the national vote, such as the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP) and the MHP in 1987, the Halkªn Demokrasi Partisi (People’s Democracy Party, HADEP) and the MHP in 1995, and the HADEP and the CHP in 1999. Only those political parties that have obtained seats in the parliament are included in the above-presented disproportionality calculations.

(Sartori 1976, 192–201). The DP received the majority of the national vote in the 1950 and 1954 elections. But the DP’s share of the parliamentary seats was exaggerated by about 1.6 times of its vote share. Although more than one out of three voters had voted for the CHP in the 1954 elections, the main opposition party was diminished in the parliament to a mere 5.6 percent of the seats. A plurality electoral system based on voting for party lists in multimember districts contributed to this disproportionality. The conversion of the district level electoral support into parliamentary seats was based on simple plurality. The party list of candidates, which obtained the plurality of the votes in a district, ended up winning all the parliamentary seats in it. Hence, a zero-sum game was in effect per electoral contest in the administrative provinces, which coincided with the electoral districts. “The winner gets all, and the first runner-up gets nothing” formula provided for safe parliamentary majorities and party govern-


59

ment. Yet the zero-sum game electoral contest also contributed to the development of tense, abrasive relations, and even warlike confrontations between the two major parties of the country. A political culture of intolerance toward opposition also facilitated the development of a “no-holdsbarred-war[like]” situation (Frey 1975, 65) in the Turkish political system. When the DP started to lose ground by 1957, the democratic regime of the country came under such stress and strain that it broke down in May 1960. The main opposition party of the 1950s, the CHP, had been calling for improved representativeness of the electoral system throughout that decade. The 1960 military intervention provided the CHP with the opportunity to help craft a new constitution and an electoral system that would introduce fairness of representation in Turkish electoral politics. Indeed, the Turkish electoral system was overhauled in 1961: The plurality formula of the 1950s was jettisoned, and proportional representation (PR) based on d’Hondt’s largest average formula was adopted (TBMM 1982, 101). The first application of the d’Hondt formula in the 1961 national elections also incorporated a quota per electoral district and enabled the voters to register their preferences for the candidates across the lists. The quota was defined as the minimum number of votes required to elect a candidate from an electoral district, which coincided with the administrative provinces. Therefore, those party lists that failed to obtain as many votes as the quota required failed to receive any parliamentary seats from the corresponding electoral district (province). The results of the 1961 elections showed that the outcome was much more representative than the previous decade (Table 3.1). The main contenders were the CHP and the successor of the DP—the AP. The other two parties that took part in the elections were the Cumhuriyetçi Köylµ Millet Partisi (Republican Peasant Nation Party, CKMP) and the Yeni Tµrkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party, YTP). They obtained 14 percent and 13.7 percent of the national vote, respectively, and 12 percent and 14.4 percent of the parliamentary seats in return. The YTP was somewhat overrepresented and the CKMP underrepresented. However, no political party managed to control the majority of the seats in the parliament. Hence, a period of coalition governments emerged. After forming a grand coalition during 1961–1962, the two major parties, the CHP and the AP, became the senior partner of several coalition governments that they established with the minor parties until the 1965 elections. The electoral formula was slightly amended in the 1965 elections. The electoral districts were now divided into two broad categories of provincial electoral districts and a single “national electoral district.” The election quota was altered so that it would not work as a barrage but only as a minimal requirement for the election of a candidate from a party list or as an

60


independent. The votes obtained by a political party that would not go over the quota would no longer be wasted. They would now be transferred to the national district. The vacant seats, which could not be filled in the electoral districts, would also be transferred to the national district as the seats of that constituency. A new quota for the latter would then be determined by dividing the valid ballots transferred to the national district by the number of seats allotted to it. Those parties whose residual national votes went above the level of the quota would have their number of votes divided by the number that constitutes the quota to determine their share of the seats. If there still remained any vacant seats, the remaining votes of the parties would be ranked and the seats distributed across the parties according to the magnitude of their remaining votes in the national district. The outcome of the 1965 elections provided for continued representativeness of the party government. The AP obtained the majority of the national vote and formed the cabinet alone. The distribution of the parliamentary seats across the six parties that participated in the elections was highly proportionate to their shares of the national vote. Therefore, in 1965 Turkey adopted an electoral system that seemed to offer the prospects of both representativeness and stable government. However, the debates over the electoral process and the election law failed to subside. The AP had been critical of the national electoral district and the pooling of the remainder of the district votes into a national district. Hence, in 1969, a mere seven months before the national elections, the APdominated parliament amended the electoral laws once more (TBMM 1982, 109). In the meantime, the Constitutional Court had declared the district quota as unconstitutional (TBMM 1982, 109). The final version of the election law turned out to be the largest average formula of d’Hondt, which served the goals of the AP, by favoring the front-runner in the electoral competition. Indeed, the AP received the plurality of the votes in the 1969 elections. However, its national vote share dropped from 52.9 percent to 46.5 percent (Appendix Table B.2). The AP had won 240 seats out of the 450 seats in the parliament in 1965. Four years later, it obtained 256 out of the 450 parliamentary seats. The electoral outcome of the 1969 elections was the least representative of the 1960s. Still, it was much more representative than the elections of the 1950s. Its control of a parliamentary majority enabled the AP to form a party government in the aftermath of the 1969 elections. However, governmental stability was undermined within a year: A group of dissident deputies split from the ranks of the AP and formed the new Demokratik Parti (Democratic Party, DkP) at a time when the world economic recession started to take its toll in Turkey (TBMM 1982, 109). The blissful state of elections that provided both for representativeness and stable party government lasted for five years. In 1971, Turkey experienced


61

another military intervention that led to a period of technocratic governments that lasted until 1973. Following the resumption of electoral politics, the first elections were held in 1973 under the same electoral formula used in 1969. Although the results turned out to be somewhat more representative in 1973 than in 1969, the largest parties were again rewarded with extra seats in the parliament. However, no party could obtain enough votes or seats to form the cabinet alone. A series of coalition governments were established between 1973 and 1977. The 1977 elections were similar to those of 1973 in terms of their representativeness and their failure to produce a stable government. The pattern of short-lived coalition governments persisted until the military coup of September 12, 1980. The military regime of 1980–1983 designed a new constitution and established new rules for electoral competition. The 1983 national elections were part of a transition process from authoritarianism to multiparty pluralism. They were neither free nor fair, as the ruling junta permitted only three political parties to take part. The Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP) emerged as the front-runner of the three by obtaining 45.1 percent of the national vote and 53 percent of the parliamentary seats. The outcome of the 1983 elections was not significantly less representative than the earlier results of the elections in the 1960s and 1970s (Table 3.1). The new electoral rules incorporated a national quota of 10 percent, which the party lists needed to gain representation in the parliament. Among those party lists that qualified, the seats were distributed according to the classical formula of d’Hondt. As political normalcy gradually returned to Turkey in the latter part of the decade, the ANAP government tried to tinker with the election laws so as not to lose its grip on power. Thus, in the 1987 national elections, a district level quota over and above the national quota of 10 percent was introduced. Therefore, for any candidate to win a seat in the parliament, their party needed to gain more than 10 percent of the national vote, and the party list had to obtain more than the district level quota as well. The district level quota was calculated by the simple proportion of the valid votes to the parliamentary seats per district. But the number of seats per multimember district varied, and those districts with a few seats had a very high threshold for the party lists to qualify: In three-member districts, the quota was as high as 33.3 percent; in fourmember districts it was 25.0 percent; and in five-member districts it was as low as 20 percent of the valid district level vote. In those districts where only one party list won slightly more votes than 20 percent, it received all of the five seats, whereas those parties that won slightly less than 20 percent obtained no seats. In short, the 1987 elections constituted one of the least representative elections in Turkish history.

62


The 1987 elections also enabled the ANAP to form the government by itself, yet this failed to resolve the legitimacy crisis that engulfed the ANAP government. In the aftermath of the 1987 elections, the main focus of opposition became the election law. The main opposition parties of the centerright, Doπru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, DYP), and center-left, Sosyal Demokrat Halkçª Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party, SHP), repeatedly questioned the fairness of the electoral system and the legitimacy of the government. There was hardly any public address in which the DYP and the SHP spokespersons failed to argue that the ANAP unfairly won the full tally of seats in a variety of districts. They questioned the fairness of the ANAP’s control of 65 percent of the seats in the parliament even though it had only obtained 36 percent of the votes. The bias in the election laws was so favorable to ANAP’s candidates that the outcome of the elections lost all credibility in the eyes of the main opposition. The media, trade unions, and various pressure groups in the country joined forces with the opposition parties in their criticism of the ANAP government between 1987 and 1991. The activities of the opposition became so intense after the resounding defeat of the ANAP in the 1989 local elections that ANAP’s leader and prime minister, Turgut Özal, felt the pressure to resign from his posts. Özal then announced his candidacy for the presidency of the country. The vote of an absolute majority in the parliament was enough to elect him the next president, and Özal, in effect, took refuge in the presidential quarters of Çankaya in Ankara. Under intense criticism, the new ANAP government of Prime Minister Mesut Yªlmaz amended the election laws once more to eliminate the district level quota in 1991. The national threshold of 10 percent was preserved, and a preferential vote within the district level party list was adopted as the major novelty of the election system in 1991. However, these changes failed to stop the continued erosion of the ANAP’s votes. In the 1991 parliamentary elections, the ANAP suffered a major defeat, and its eight-yearlong tenure in government came to an end. The representativeness of the 1991 election outcomes improved over those of the 1987 elections, but Turkey reverted back to coalition governments because the voters started to split their support across a wider spectrum of political parties. The fragmentation of the national vote further increased in the latter half of the 1990s (Çarkoπlu 1998). Yet the representativeness of the national election outcomes improved throughout the 1995 and the 1999 national elections. In the meantime, the election rules were again amended and the preferential vote was eliminated by the 1995 elections. Nevertheless, the 10 percent national threshold along with the classical d’Hondt formula, which applied to multimember districts for those party lists that obtained more than the national quota, remained in effect in the 1995 and 1999 elections. Ironically, the 10 percent national threshold was fully embraced by the


63

same political parties that had strongly criticized it while they were in the opposition. A further examination of Table 3.1 reveals the highly disproportionate reflection of the votes won by the major parties and the seats they won in the parliament in the 1950s. The 1960s witnessed an improvement in proportionality of votes and seats. The overall situation of representativeness deteriorated in the 1970s, and this trend was further exacerbated in the 1990s, after a brief lull in the early 1980s. The 1987 elections bore the most disproportional results in recent Turkish history. In the 1990s, the representativeness of the parliament had slightly improved over the 1987 elections. The electoral laws have contributed to the oscillations in the representativeness of the parliament after each election since the 1950s. These laws initially downgraded the importance of representativeness. However, the lack of representativeness did not result in effective governance. Its main contribution had been the production of overwhelming parliamentary majorities for one party in the 1950s. In a version of the Westminster model of democracy that Turkey adopted during the 1946–1960 era, with virtually no institutional or legal checks and balances on the rule of the parliamentary majority, what developed was tantamount to a one-party hegemony over the political system. The 1961 constitution emphasized the representativeness of electoral outcomes and introduced a host of other legal and institutional checks and balances (such as the Constitutional Court, independent judiciary, autonomous media, and state universities). Although the 1982 constitution paved the way to the supremacy of the executive branch, the value of representativeness of the electoral outcomes had become so well established in the Turkish political culture that a return to the electoral rules of the 1950s was no longer possible. In the 1970s, lengthy negotiations and bargaining between political parties preceded the formation of coalition governments. In the eyes of many citizens, coalition governments undermined the stability of both the economy and the polity. Thus, many people perceived governability as a pressing problem by the end of the 1970s. The 1982 constitution and the electoral laws of the era were designed to provide a compromise between representativeness and governability. The introduction of a very high quota of a 10 percent national threshold and the adoption of the largest average formula of d’Hondt for those political parties that managed to clear the threshold were intended to facilitate the formation of majority party governments.

Governability The relationship between electoral rules and type of government is presented in Table 3.2. The early years of democracy in Turkey incorporated a majoritarian electoral system and a two-party structure. With the adoption

64 Table 3.2 Election Year

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey Turkish Election Laws and Type of Government Election Law

Type of Government

1950

Multimember Majority (plurality)

Constituency

Party

1954


Constituency

Party

1957


Constituency

Party

1961

Multimember Constituency PR (largest average, d’Hondt with district-level quota)

Coalition

1965

Multimember Constituency PR (largest average, d’Hondt with national remainder)

Party

1969

Multimember Constituency PR (largest average, classical d’Hondt)

Party

1973


Coalition

1977


Coalition and minority

1983

Multimember Constituency PR with national quota (d’Hondt)

Party

1987

Multimember Constituency PR with national and district quota (d’Hondt)

Party

1991

Multimember Constituency PR with national and district quota (d’Hondt with preferential vote)

Coalition

1995


Coalition and minority

1999


Coalition

Sources: T.C. Ba≈sbakanlªk Devlet ºstatistik Enstitµsµ (DºE) (1991); and Sertel and Kalaycªoπlu (1995, 28).

of the largest average formula of d’Hondt in the 1960s, the representativeness of the system improved, yet party government became increasingly difficult. Consequently, a period of coalition governments emerged. In the 1980s, the high level of the national quota and other restrictions kept the number of parties that obtained seats in the parliament low enough to


65

enable the formation of party governments. But by the 1990s, electoral politics reverted back to its former pattern and coalition governments once again became the norm. The PR rules seemed to be correlated with fragmented parliamentary party systems that produced not only coalition governments but also an average of four governments per tenure period of the parliament. In the 1950s, governmental shuffles were less frequent: The 1950 and 1954 parliaments witnessed two Menderes cabinets each, and the 1957 parliament had a single cabinet headed by Menderes. After the adoption of the PR rules for national elections, the 1965, 1969, 1983, and 1987 parliaments provided for single-party governments each. The average tenure of the governments and the time it took to form them after the national elections are presented in Table 3.3. Both the majoritarian and the PR formulas have yielded periods of party government. However, with one notable exception, all of the party governments have been the products of the majoritarian formula and all the coalitions were formed when the elections were held under the PR system. It is worth noting that in 1965 with a PR formula that increased the chances of even the smallest parties to win parliamentary seats, AP leader Demirel managed to form one of the most stable governments in Turkish electoral history. The coalition governments have survived an average of approximately 314 days, and the party governments have survived more than twice as long, a period of 688 days (Table 3.3). There have also been instances of coalition governments that have failed to receive a vote of confidence from the parliament. The most notorious of those was the Sadi Irmak government of 1974, which failed to receive a vote of confidence when 358 of the 450 deputies opposed it. Nevertheless, the government had to stay in office for a period of four months, for no other coalition arrangement could be forged during that time. It is, therefore, no wonder that a perception of coalition governments as unstable, frail, and dangling on the verge of illegitimacy has developed in the eyes of many Turkish voters. Stable and strong government seems to be associated with electoral formulas that stress either plurality or majoritarian systems in Turkey. The PR formulas enhance representativeness but promote coalition governments, which are short-lived, unstable, and often perceived as frail. Is that perception warranted? What does the lack of governmental stability entail for the overall socioeconomic performance of governments in Turkey?

GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY

If one major goal of governments is good governance, which may be defined as effective management of the economy and ability to cope with

66 Table 3.3

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey Government Tenure Period and Formation Difficulty by Government Type

Government Type Party 1950 Menderes I Menderes II 1954 Menderes III Menderes IV 1957 Menderes V 1965 Demirel I 1969 Demirel II Demirel III 1983 Özal I 1987 Özal II Akbulut Yªlmaz I Average Coalition 1961 ºnönµ VIII ºnönµ IX ºnönµ X ˜rgµplµ 1973 Ecevit I Irmak Demirel IV 1977 Ecevit II Demirel V Ecevit III Demirel VI 1991 Demirel VII Çiller I Çiller II Çiller III 1995 Yªlmaz II Erbakan Yªlmaz III Ecevit IV 1999 Ecevit V Average

Tenure (days)

Formation Difficulty (days)

317.0 1,164.0 671.0 717.0 908.0 1,467.0 117.0 20.0 1,468.0 688.0 563.0 150.0 687.5

7.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 29.0 17.0 22.0 0.0 37.0 22.0 0.0 0.0 12.4

212.0 183.0 57.0 249.0 295.0 134.0 812.0 30.0 171.0 676.0 304.0 58.0 467.0 25.0 127.0 114.0 367.0 557.0 135.0 — 289.3b 313.6c

36.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 104.0 (no confidence)a 134.0 (no confidence)a 46.0 0.0 0.0 32.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 70.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 22.2b 24.8c

Sources: Data are compiled from http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ambar/hukumet and Çarkoπlu (1997, 96). Calculations are made by the author. Notes: a. Failed to obtain vote of confidence in the parliament. b. The Ecevit V government is excluded from this average. c. The Ecevit V, Irmak, and Ecevit II governments are excluded from this average.

the pressing social issues and problems, what consequences do types of government and governmental stability have for good governance? One popular argument in Turkey is that coalition governments undermine the management of a macroeconomic policy. If these speculations are correct,


67

then we should expect to find some evidence that the type of government and the relative length of governmental tenure correlate with such macroeconomic indicators as gross national product per capita, the level of wholesale prices, unemployment, exports, imports, and trade deficits. If governmental stability is crucial for good governance, we should expect to find some correlation between the type of government and the frequency of change of government with such human development indicators as gross national product per capita, literacy, life expectancy, and infant mortality rates. Table 3.4 contains the results of the correlation analysis of data for the period 1950–1998. The results indicate that there is hardly any systematic relationship between either type of government (coalition versus party) or governmental tenure, on the one hand, and the government’s handling of macroeconomic policy, on the other. The magnitude of those correlations that are statistically significant are too low to make an argument either for or against party government. In fact, the correlations in Table 3.4 seem to indicate that coalition governments are slightly more successful in boosting economic development but less successful in coping with inflation and boosting exports. Moreover, the longer the length of tenure of governments, the higher the level of unemployment in the country. However, the length of government tenure seems to be unrelated to any other economic indicator. A more refined time-series analysis of the relationship between government types and tenure as independent variables and economic indicators as dependent variables further corroborate the findings of Table 3.4. The Box-Jenkins time-series analysis indicates that there is a minimal amount of influence of the length of government tenure on unemployment: As the length of government tenure increases, the overall level of unemployment increases slightly. However, the magnitude of that rise is so small (0.005) that it may as well be considered zero.6 Government type seems to have no influence on any economic indicator. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that neither the type of government (party versus coalition) nor the length of governmental tenure made a major impact on the management or performance of the Turkish economy between 1950 and 1998. The results presented in Tables 3.4 also show that there is no relationship between government tenure and human development indicators for the same period. A weak relationship exists between type of government and life expectancy, which indicates that party government leads to longer life expectancy. However, there is no systematic relationship between type of government and the human development indicators. Based on the evidence examined so far, it may be argued that, although there may be a disruption in the production and distribution of some services in the short-run, neither the type of government nor the length of gov-

68 Table 3.4

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey Governmental Stability, Type of Government, and Governance in Turkey, 1950–1996 Government Type

Government Tenure

Macroeconomic policy GNP per capita Wholesale price inflation Unemployment Exports Imports Foreign trade deficit

0.35a –0.22a –0.06 –0.42a –0.43a 0.41a

–0.07 –0.03 0.47a –0.10a –0.10a 0.11a

Human development policy GNP per capita Literacyb Life expectancyb Infant mortalityb

0.35a –0.02 –0.34a 0.31

–0.07 0.13 0.04 –0.07

Sources: DºE (1996b, 82–83, 501); http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dptweb/istatistikler.html; http://www.die.gov.tr/istatistikler.html; and the sources listed in Table 3.3. Notes: a. Statistically significant at a 0.95 level of significance. b. Annual values (extrapolated from the census data). Data presented are Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficients. Row variables are annual rates, unless specified otherwise. Inflation of wholesale prices, exports, imports, and foreign trade deficits are monthly rates, and so are the corresponding type of government and length of government indices. Government type is measured as coalition governments (= 2) and party governments (= 1). Military interregna are omitted. Government tenure was measured as the length of days a government survived for the corresponding year. If a party or coalition government stayed in office for the whole year, it was coded as 365; if it served only part of that year, then the average days in office per government for that year was calculated (e.g., Çiller I government survived for 213 days, Çiller II government for 25 days, Çiller III government for 127 days during 1995, and the average for that year is calculated as [213 + 25 + 127]/3 = 122 days).

ernmental tenure matters much in determining the performance of the major macroeconomic or human development indicators. We may further conclude that government stability seems to be unrelated to both indicators of good governance, namely the management of macroeconomy and human development, in the Turkish experience. Therefore, it makes good sense to focus more on the issues of representativeness of electoral results and of the overall political legitimacy of the elections than on governability. However, the amendment of Article 67 to the 1982 constitution in 1995 has rendered such a proclivity impossible. The new form of Article 67 compels the authorities to seek a compromise between representative fairness and stability of governments in the design of new electoral laws.7 Therefore, a seemingly unwarranted emphasis will be put on governmental stability in the drawing up of the new electoral legislation in the future unless the constitution is amended again.


69

As several other chapters in this volume emphasize, most voters in Turkey have lost their strong party identification since the 1980s. They have also divided their political allegiances across two or more political parties that share the same or similar ideological space. Under these circumstances, an electoral system that permits the voters to register all their preferences will do a better job of representing the will of the electorate than the current one, which only permits them to register their most preferred choice of candidate or party. An electoral system similar to the single transferable vote or the alternate vote may better address the issue of representativeness of the election results. Otherwise, the issue of representativeness will continue to play a major role in assessing the legitimacy of future governments. Furthermore, a slight change in the vote tally renders the system even less representative. Under the current system, 35 percent of the national vote enables a party to obtain about 65 percent of the parliamentary seats, as was the case in the 1987 elections. Unless this problem is addressed, every election carries the risk of precipitating a crisis over the representativeness of the electoral results that might eventually trigger a crisis over the legitimacy of the government. As noted earlier, Turkish politics from 1987 to 1991 was dominated by such a legitimacy crisis. Unless a more representative electoral design is adopted, Turkey may, once again, experience a similar crisis.

CONCLUSION

Constitutional, political, cultural, economic, and international factors have rendered coalitions necessary in Turkish politics (Kalaycªoπlu 1997). The party system has become so fragmented and polarized that no governmental structure can survive without a major agreement or compromise built across disparate political forces and voting blocs. The preferences of the voters have also become split across and over two or more political parties. Short of an electoral system that provides an opportunity to have those divided preferences registered in the elections, the political choices of the electorate will fail to be reflected in the distribution of the parliamentary seats. An application of the single transferable vote or another system of voting that enables the voters to rank their preferences of parties or candidates can provide a solution to the problem of representation. It may even be possible to establish some form of coalition-building process, which directly emanates from the choices of the voters through such preferential voting as well. It is not yet clear whether such electoral designs make coalition government formation any easier.

70


This chapter presents evidence that the Turkish political elite has shown considerable political acumen in governing the country by means of coalition governments. Indeed, the record of coalition governments indicates that they have not undermined the performance of the economy or the social development of the country any more than party governments. The vicissitudes of the electoral systems may have contributed to the emergence of the coalition governments, but the latter do not seem to be a major source of problem for the performance of the country’s democratic regime. A new pattern of relatively stable coalition politics is developing in Turkey. Tampering with that development by engineering new electoral formulas that would enforce party government and governmental stability seems to be highly unwarranted on the basis of the findings presented here. Any electoral formula that undermines representativeness for the sake of presumed improvement of governmental stability, with the presumption that such a government may yield an improved performance of the economy, seems to be a misguided effort. Chances are that such an initiative will be more likely to undermine both the representativeness and the legitimacy of the government. It is highly dubious that this, in turn, will contribute to the overall stability of the political system.

NOTES 1. Until 1960, the Turkish parliament had a single chamber. The 1961 constitution introduced a second chamber, or Senate, to the legislative system. This twochamber system remained in effect until 1980. The newly drafted 1982 constitution abolished the Senate, and the format of the parliament reverted to its original arrangement with a single chamber. All the references in this chapter are to elections for the lower house of the parliament. 2. For more on the impact of the center-periphery cleavage on electoral politics, see Chapter 2 in this volume. 3. For details, see Chapters 1 and 2 in this volume. 4. See Chapter 1 in this volume for a more detailed analysis. 5. Sartori (1976, 122–123) suggests that for a party to be considered as relevant, it should have either the potential to participate in coalitions and/or the power to intimidate (blackmail potential). 6. Time-Series Analysis of Governance and Macroeconomic Policy, 1950–1998 GNP/cap = 56.11 – 0.086 (GTEN) + 45.40 (GTYP) Infr = 0.007 – 0.0004 (GTEN) + 0.247 (GTYP) Unemp = –0.02 + 0.0005a (GTEN) – 0.024 (GTYP) Exp = 1308229938.10 + 3827323.78 (GTEN) + 182055722.61 (GTYP) Imp = 2011308033.98 + 4886112.16 (GTEN) – 2108397180 (GYTP) Def = –736267416.41 – 381497.49 (GTEN) + 1760656503 (GYTP)


71

The dependent variables in the preceding equations are: GNP/cap: gross national product per capita (annual) Infr: monthly rate of wholesale price inflation Unemp: annual unemployment rate Exp: monthly exports (values in thousand Turkish liras) Imp: monthly imports (values in thousand Turkish liras) Def: monthly foreign trade deficit The independent variables in the preceding equations are: GTEN: government tenure GTYP: type of government Sources: The data collected are from the same sources listed in Table 3.4. Calculations of the indices and the equations were made by Gµne≈s Tetik of Boπaziçi University, and the data analyses were carried out by the author of this chapter. Note: a. Statistically significant at a 0.95 level of significance. 7. Article 67 of the 1982 constitution as amended on July 23, 1995, reads: “Seçim kanunlarª, temsilde adalet ve yönetimde istikrar ilkelerini baπda≈stªracak biçimde dµzenlenir” (Electoral laws must be designed so as to reconcile the principles of fairness in representation and governmental stability). There is no official justification mentioned as to why such a sentence was introduced in the amended form of the article in the minutes of the Grand National Assembly. It is also unknown as to why the deputies in the parliament insisted on reconciling the irreconcilable, that is, the norms of representativeness and governability in the electoral laws. In theory and practice these two norms are inversely related. When the electoral laws approach one of these norms, they deviate from the other. Representativeness of election results is enhanced whenever each political ideology, interest, or community in the country is represented in the parliament. However, that usually means a large number of parties are being represented in the parliament, which renders the forming of governments more difficult.

4 Local Elections and Electoral Behavior Nihal ºncioπlu

The importance of local elections in Turkish politics has increased significantly since the 1970s. This stems largely from the rapid growth of urbanization that has radically transformed the social, economic, and political landscape of the country’s major cities. Between 1960 and 1997, the share of urban dwellers in Turkey’s total population increased from 25 to 65 percent. Today, more than 40 million of the country’s 65 million citizens live in cities. According to the 1997 census, there are ten cities with more than half a million inhabitants (DºE 1999a, 13). With a population of nearly 9 million people, Istanbul ranks as one of the largest cities in Europe. Ankara (3.6 million), ºzmir (3.1 million), Adana (1.6 million), and Bursa (1.9 million) have all experienced rapid growth rates. These and other large cities not only have a sizable share of the country’s total population, but they contain a large share of the electorate as well. For example, Istanbul, Ankara, and ºzmir collectively accounted for close to one-third of the eligible voters in the parliamentary and local elections held in April 1999. Given the large concentration of voters in urban areas, political parties have increasingly viewed local elections as crucial in expanding their electoral popularity in the national political arena. Control of the municipalities of sprawling metropolises such as Istanbul, Ankara, and ºzmir provides a party with considerable political influence and visibility in national politics. It also enables the party to gain access to new sources of political patronage (through municipal jobs, zoning regulations, contracts for street repairs, etc.) that can be utilized to recruit new activists and supporters. The growing importance of local elections, especially those concerning municipal administrations, is further underscored by the fact that the mayors of large metropolises have become more influential in national politics than many legislators serving in the parliament in Ankara. In the past, becoming a mayor was generally viewed by many as a stepping stone for 73

74


entry into the parliament. Today, aspiring leaders are likely to prefer the top political position in a city with millions of inhabitants to serving as a parliamentarian in Ankara—especially if the prospects of becoming a cabinet minister or entering into the party’s executive organs appear to be limited. This chapter will examine the characteristic features of local elections and electoral behavior in Turkey in the 1990s, with special emphasis on the April 1999 elections. The principal goal is to address a number of questions concerning the relationship between national and local elections: Does the outcome of the local elections follow or diverge from national electoral patterns? Do political participation rates vary between local and national elections? Has holding the national and local elections simultaneously in 1999 for the first time in Turkey had a noticeable impact on electoral patterns? Local elections in Turkey cover different layers of local administration. Here, the focus will be on the municipal elections. There are several reasons for this choice. First “local administration” generally denotes “municipality” in Turkey. Second, both the political parties and the voters assign greater importance to municipal elections than the elections for other levels of local administration. Third, electoral politics in the 1990s showed that, among different levels of local politics, it is the municipal elections that can act as the most significant indicators of the emerging trends in voting patterns.

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN TURKEY

Local administration in Turkey is composed of three administrative and political layers: precincts and villages, municipalities, and provincial administrations.1 Political parties are not allowed to form and maintain organizations at the precinct and village levels. 2 The elections for the administrative positions of these units—that of the village headman (muhtar), village councils, and executive committees—are held on an individual and, at least formally, on a nonpartisan basis. The municipalities (mayors and municipal councils) are locally elected bodies. The provincial councils are also elected but headed by a governor appointed by the central government in Ankara through a decision taken by the Council of Ministers. Provincial administration in Turkey is composed of a provincial council, elected by popular vote for a period of five years, and an executive committee, elected by the provincial council and headed by a governor. In the Turkish administrative system, governors are civil servants appointed by the central government in Ankara, and they act as the representatives of the state. The elections for the provincial councils are conducted according to the proportional representation (PR) system and are held simultaneously

Local Elections

75

with the municipal electoral contests. Except for the fifteen provinces with large metropolises, the electoral districts for provincial council elections are the same as those used for the parliamentary elections. In three provinces (Istanbul, Ankara, and ºzmir), there are several electoral districts in parliamentary elections but only one for the provincial council elections. Provincial councils in Turkey are endowed with a wide range of formal functions and responsibilities. In reality, however, the actual powers and activities of the provincial administrations are quite limited. The top political authority in the provincial administrative machinery is the governor who has the right to approve or veto the implementation of the decisions taken by the provincial councils. The organization of Turkey’s approximately 3,000 municipalities includes mayors, municipal councils, and municipal executive committees. Aykut Polatoπlu (2000, 163) estimates that 80.7 percent of the municipalities have fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. Both the mayors and the members of the municipal councils are elected by the voters for five-year terms. The municipal executive committees are headed by the mayors, and they include members elected by the municipal councils and appointed members from the staff of the municipal administration. The organizational structure of the municipalities underwent a major change in 1984 with the introduction of a two-tier system called the “Greater City Municipality” in the country’s three largest cities, Istanbul, Ankara, and ºzmir. The first tier consists of a number of district municipalities that are responsible for the provision of basic municipal services in their areas of administration. They are headed by district mayors. The second tier, or the Greater City Municipality, is charged with implementing larger projects involving strategic planning and investment, transportation networks, and major public facilities. The top elected officials of the Greater City Municipalities are the metropolitan mayors. Since 1984, twelve additional large cities have also adopted this two-tier system of municipal administration.3 A PR electoral system is used in the elections to the municipal councils. Mayoral races, both at the Greater City and the district levels, are decided through the use of the plurality electoral formula. The main objective of the 1984 local government reform was to make the municipalities more responsive to citizens’ needs through some degree of decentralization, which, in turn, would lessen their dependence on the central government (Heper 1985; 1987; Köker 1995). Historically, the Turkish administrative system has had a strong centralist orientation that reflected the relative weakness of the local institutions vis-à-vis the state. Burdened with the excessive administrative and financial controls exercised over them by the central government, and endowed with only limited financial autonomy and resources, municipalities remained weak and dependent on Ankara. Because the stakes involved in municipal politics were relative-

76


ly small, parties and voters generally did not attach much importance to the local elections. Turkey’s highly centralized administrative system did not face significant challenges until the rapid rise of urban growth through migration to the cities from the villages and small towns in Anatolia. The fast-paced migratory flows from the countryside to the cities increased the strains on municipal administrations in Istanbul, Ankara, ºzmir, and other large urban centers. Municipal administrations in large metropolises encountered growing problems in meeting the demands of the newly arrived migrants for housing and basic services such as water, transportation, and electricity. As a result, the 1970s witnessed the rise of urban concerns, problems, and demands as major issues in Turkish politics (Danielson and Kele≈s 1985). This was also a period when the mayors of the large cities actively began to campaign for the transfer of power and resources from the central government to the locally elected bodies. The rise of the so-called municipal movement that sought greater local autonomy represented an important new trend in Turkey’s municipal politics (Finkel 1990). The 1984 local government reform was carried out in response to the growing pressures for change in municipal administrations. The reform was spearheaded by the center-right Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP), which was a strong advocate of administrative decentralization in the governance of the cities. The ANAP’s rise to power with a large parliamentary majority in 1983 enabled it to pass the reform legislation. In addition to creating a two-tier system of municipal governance in the country’s largest cities, the 1984 local government reform increased the financial resources of the municipal administrations and expanded the scope of their activities. Most important, the establishment of the Greater City Municipalities significantly enhanced the political status and power of the metropolitan mayors, as a great deal of authority and resources were concentrated in their office (Kalaycªoπlu 1989). Coupled with the growing size of the electorates in the country’s major urban centers, the changes brought about in 1984 increased the importance of local elections, especially the metropolitan mayoral races in major Turkish cities (Köksal and Kara 1990).

THE 1994 LOCAL ELECTIONS: UPSURGE OF THE ISLAMIST VOTE

The 1994 local elections witnessed several significant new trends, including an increase in the participation rate, growing differentiation in electoral preferences between national and local elections, and the emergence of the Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP) as the strongest party in several major metropolises for the first time in Turkish electoral politics. With 90.5

77

Local Elections

percent of the eligible voters going to the polls, the 1994 local elections marked a record-high voter turnout. Participation rates in local elections had lagged behind national elections until the 1990s (Table 4.1). Between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s, the average rate of participation for local and parliamentary elections was 66.9 and 76.7 percent, respectively. The relatively higher rates of abstention in local elections, in comparison with parliamentary elections, was particularly noticeable in 1973 and 1977, when polling took place for the municipalities and the parliament in the same year. Since the 1980s, voter turnout in municipal elections has increased substantially. The average participation rate in the four local elections since 1984 has been 84.8 percent—or 25.4 percent more than the average for the four elections held between 1963 and 1977. However, this increase has not followed a unilinear trend: The increases in 1984 and 1994 were followed by declines in 1989 and 1999. Nevertheless, it is evident that Turkish voters show greater interest in the outcome of the municipal elections today than they did in the 1960s or 1970s. As a result of increasing voter turnout in the local elections, the gap between national and local participation rates has narrowed. In fact, during the 1990s, the average participation rate in local elections (87.5 percent) was slightly higher than the average for the elections to the parliament (85.4 percent). There is no empirical evidence, based on public opinion surveys, concerning the causes of increased voter turnout in local elections in recent years. But it is possible to suggest that with the rapid growth of the cities and the rise of major problems in urban living, voters have become more concerned about the quality of municipal governance. Greater voter interest is also possibly due to the fact that political parties have begun to assign

Table 4.1

Participation in the Municipal and Parliamentary Elections

Municipal Elections (Mayor)

Parliamentary Elections

Year

Percentage of Eligible Voters

Year

1963 1968 1973 1977 1984 1989 1994 — 1999

69.3 59.4 56.0 53.1 85.6 78.0 90.5 — 85.2

1965 1969 1973 1977 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999

Sources: Computed from DºE (1996a; 1999d).

Percentage of Eligible Voters 71.3 64.3 66.8 72.4 92.3 93.3 83.9 82.3 87.1

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much greater importance to the outcome of the local electoral contests than was done previously. Parties have realized that control of the large metropolises can be an important political asset in their bid for power at the national level. In this respect, the electoral strategies pursued by the Islamist RP have proved to be particularly significant. The RP’s political ascendancy in the 1990s began with its impressive performance in the 1994 local elections when it captured the city halls in several major cities, including Istanbul and Ankara. The political momentum that the Islamists got from the 1994 local elections figured prominently in their ability to win a plurality of the votes in the 1995 parliamentary elections. The RP’s efforts to win control of the municipalities at a time of growing polarization between Turkey’s secularist and pro-Islamist forces was also a major reason for the record-high participation rate in the 1994 local elections. Growing differentiation in political party preferences both in the elections for different local administrative levels, and between municipal and parliamentary elections, constitutes a second important trend that emerged from the balloting in 1994. Until the 1990s, the outcome of local elections largely paralleled national electoral patterns. Parties that did well in the national elections for the parliament often did so in the local elections as well. In fact, many observers viewed local elections as a fairly reliable indicator of a party’s national electoral strength and popularity (Çiftçi 1989, 85). For example, when the national and local elections were held in the same year in both 1973 and 1977, the center-left Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP) received the plurality of the votes in both elections. A similar trend occurred in the center-right ANAP’s electoral performance in the early 1980s when it received 45.1 and 44.8 percent of the total votes in the 1983 parliamentary and 1984 local elections, respectively. The ANAP’s votes in 1984 also showed that there was not a large variation in its votes at different levels of the local electoral processes: It received 50 percent of the votes in the metropolitan mayors contests, 43 percent in the municipal district mayors races, and 41.5 percent in the elections for the seats in the provincial councils. When the ANAP’s electoral fortunes declined at the national level toward the end of the decade, its electoral strength decreased in the local election, too. The 1994 elections marked a change toward greater diversity of voter preferences at different levels of the local elections (Figure 4.1). The RP, which came first in the mayoral races for the Greater City Municipalities, was the third party both at the level of the provincial councils and district municipalities. The center-right Doπru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, DYP) emerged as the winner of the provincial council elections but lagged far behind its competitors in the elections for the metropolitan mayors of the largest cities. The reverse was true for the center-left Sosyal Demokrat Halkçª Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party, SHP), which did consider-

79

Local Elections Figure 4.1

Percentage of Votes in the 1994 Local Elections

1994 Provincial Council 1994 Greater City Municipality 1994 Municipal

ably better in the races for the metropolitan mayors than in the contests for seats in the provincial councils. These variations reflected the urban-rural differences in the strengths of the political parties in the national elections. For example, the DYP has traditionally been stronger in rural electoral constituencies, especially in Turkey’s western regions, and relatively weak in the large cities. This was also evident in its strength in the local elections for the provincial councils and its poor showing in the municipal races in 1994. Similarly, in national elections for the parliament, the SHP’s strongholds were the country’s major cities. In 1994, the party did much better in the municipal elections than in the polling for the provincial councils. Yet a third important trend in the 1994 local elections was the emergence of the Islamist RP as the strongest party in Turkey’s major cities. Until the 1990s, the electoral strength of the pro-Islamist parties in the urban areas remained limited. The local elections of 1994 signaled that this had changed, as the RP finished first in the large metropolises. The upsurge in the Islamist vote was owed largely to the fact that most of the urban poor, living in the squatter (gecekondu) districts formed by the newly arrived migrants in the peripheries of the cities, tended to support the RP. This marked a big change in the electoral loyalties of the urban poor who had voted for the center-left parties in large numbers two decades earlier. Other factors, including the alienation of the voters from the mainstream centerright and center-left parties, also made a substantial contribution to the success of the RP in the cities.

80


Moreover, the 1994 local elections took place under the shadow of the growing polarization between the secularists and the Islamists and the intensification of the Kurdish problem. Both of these issues helped the RP to increase its votes in the municipal contests. National political issues and developments, therefore, exerted strong influence in structuring the vote in the local elections. A comparison of the votes in the local and parliamentary elections in 1994 and 1995, respectively, shows close parallels in the strengths of most, though not all, of the political parties (Figure 4.2).

THE 1999 ELECTIONS: DIVERGENCE FROM NATIONAL PATTERNS

On April 18, 1999, national and local elections were held on the same day for the first time in Turkish electoral history. The voters had to choose parties and candidates for the parliament, provincial councils, mayors, municipal councils, and metropolitan mayors for the country’s fifteen largest cities. Participation rates in the national and local elections were both high and varied only slightly—87.1 percent and 85.2 percent of the eligible voters cast their ballots in the national and local elections, respectively. Although there was a decline in voter turnout for local elections from 1994, the 1999 participation rate was much higher than those for the municipal and provincial elections in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1999 elections took place in a political environment that was shaped by several important developments in Turkish politics. These included the continuing tensions between the secular and pro-Islamist forces, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan—leader of the Kurdish separatist organization Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, by its Kurdish initials)—in February 1999, and growing allegations of political corruption involving

Figure 4.2

Percentage of Votes in the 1994 Greater City Municipal and 1995 Parliamentary Elections

1994 Greater City Municipality 1995 Turkish Grand National Assembly

ANAP

CHP

DSP

DYP

MHP

RP

SHP

HADEP OTHER

Local Elections

81

officials and politicians. The ouster of the Islamist-led coalition government in June 1997 under strong pressure from the secular forces led by the military marked the high point of the growing polarization between the country’s secularist and the Islamist political forces. The campaign against the Islamist RP resulted in its dissolution by a Constitutional Court decision in 1998. Shortly before the 1999 elections, the Islamists reconstituted themselves in the newly formed Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, FP). The banning of the RP appeared to have undermined popular support for the FP. The capture of the PKK’s leader, Öcalan, also had a strong political impact. It contributed to the popularity of Prime Minister Bµlent Ecevit and his center-left Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP). The capture and imprisonment of Turkey’s most wanted terrorist leader also helped fuel nationalist sentiments against the PKK as well as countries such as Greece and Italy that were perceived to be protecting Öcalan. The allegations of political corruption against the leaders of Turkey’s two main center-right parties—ANAP’s Mesut Yªlmaz and DYP’s Tansu Çiller—coupled with the infamous Susurluk incident that exposed the ties between officials, politicians, and underworld figures, brought the corruption problem to the forefront of Turkish politics.4 These developments played an important role in structuring the national vote in 1999. The chief beneficiaries of the rising tide of nationalism and discontent with corruption incidents were Ecevit’s center-left DSP and the far-right Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, MHP) that came in first and second, respectively, in the parliamentary vote. Tainted by corruption and the continued infighting among their leaders, the two centerright political parties, the ANAP and the DYP, did poorly in the elections. The Islamists, too, witnessed a decline in their popularity from 1995 and finished third in the national elections. The staunchly secularist center-left CHP, which had been in a state of decline, suffered a further electoral blow by failing to get into the parliament because it did not clear the 10 percent national threshold. The same was true for the pro-Kurdish Halkªn Demokrasi Partisi (People’s Democracy Party, HADEP), which, despite a strong showing in the eastern and southeastern provinces, failed to send any representatives to the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. As it had been the case in the past, most of the candidates for the municipal elections, both for metropolitan and district mayors, were selected by party leaders rather than through elections within party organizations. During the campaign, political parties emphasized local issues and problems, especially municipal problems. In large urban metropolises, transportation and traffic, water supply, relations between the metropolitan mayors and district mayors, and political corruption in municipal administration received considerable attention from the mayoral candidates. The most striking feature of the 1999 elections concerned the changing relationship

82


between national and local elections. Unlike in the past, many Turkish voters, when asked to cast their ballots simultaneously for the local and parliamentary elections, tended to split their votes. For the first time in Turkish politics, the outcome of the local elections did not closely parallel the national electoral patterns. This was best reflected in the votes cast for the Islamist RP. The party did well in the municipal contests, finishing first in both the metropolitan and district mayor balloting, with 23.3 and 18.4 percent of the votes, respectively. However, although the RP remained the strongest party in the municipalities, it finished third in the parliamentary elections with 15.4 percent of the total votes. In other words, there was nearly an 8 percent difference between its strength in the local elections for the metropolitan mayors and its votes for elections to the parliament. Clearly, while a significant number of voters were willing to lend their support to the Islamist mayors, they were reluctant to back the RP in its bid for power in national politics. There were similar variations in the votes received by most of the other political parties in national and local elections in 1999. For example, the far-right MHP did surprisingly well in the parliamentary elections and came in second with 17.9 percent of the total votes. But its strength in the large metropolises lagged behind as the party managed to win only 10.3 percent of the votes. In the CHP’s case, it was the opposite: It won 16.5 percent of the votes in the metropolitan mayors’ contests but received only 8.7 percent national vote and failed to get representation in the parliament (Figure 4.3). The difference in the votes received by political parties in the national and local elections in 1999 represents a major new trend in Turkish electoral politics. Unlike in past elections, large numbers of voters practiced vote-

Figure 4.3

Percentage of Votes in the 1999 Local and Parliamentary Elections 1999 Turkish Grand National Assembly 1999 Provincial Council 1999 Greater City Municipality 1999 Municipal

Local Elections

83

splitting by casting their ballots for one party in the municipal contests and another party in the parliamentary elections. Local elections in Turkey no longer seem to be simply a reflection of national electoral patterns. The weakening of the linkage between national and local electoral patterns underscores the growing importance of the quality of municipal governance and the performance of individual mayors in shaping voter preferences. The widespread discontent and declining level of trust toward the centrist political parties was another factor that shaped the newly emerging voting trends.5

MUNICIPAL VOTING IN 1999: SELECTED CASES

The outcome of the 1999 parliamentary and local elections showed that there was considerable variation between national and municipal voting in different parts of Turkey.6 In forty-seven large cities, the municipal election results diverged significantly from the results of the contests for seats in the parliament. The tendency of many voters to engage in ticket-splitting was particularly pronounced in the case of the large cities that use the twotiered Greater City Municipality system. In nine of these fifteen sprawling urban centers, there was a significant difference between the votes that the parties received in the parliamentary and municipal electoral contests. However, thirty-three other cities displayed a basic similarity in voting patterns at the two levels, with the same party finishing first in both the national and local elections.

Istanbul Turkey’s largest city with more than 5 million registered voters, Istanbul has experienced significant shifts in electoral trends in recent years. Until the 1990s, municipal politics in Istanbul was largely dominated by the center-right and center-left parties. This changed in the 1994 local elections when the Islamist RP finished first in the municipal elections. Since then the top elected official in Istanbul, the metropolitan mayor, has been from the ranks of the RP, and after it was banned in 1998, the FP. Moreover, the Islamists have had a strong presence in Istanbul’s municipal council. The variations in the electoral strengths of the parties in the parliamentary and municipal elections underscores the fact that many voters in Istanbul tended to cast their ballots for different parties at the national and local levels.7 The FP’s candidate for the metropolitan mayor, Ali Mµfit Gµrtuna, won the election with 27.5 percent of the votes (Table 4.2). However, in the parliamentary elections, the FP’s votes in Istanbul declined to 21.3 percent. The center-left DSP, on the other hand, came in third in the mayoral election with 20.2 percent of the vote. But the party did consider-

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Table 4.2

Percentage of Votes in Istanbul in the 1999 Municipal and Parliamentary Elections

Candidate/Party for Metropolitan Mayor

Votes

Party for Parliament

Votes

Mµfit Gµrtuna/FP Ali Talip Özdemir/ANAP Zekeriya Temizel/DSP Adnan Polat/CHP Ahmet Vefik Alp/MHP Yalçªn Özer/DYP

27.5 22.4 20.2 13.9 7.3 3.8

DSP FP ANAP MHP CHP DYP

29.7 21.3 15.8 10.0 9.5 5.4

Sources: Computed from DºE (1999b; 1999d).

ably better in the elections to the parliament with nearly 30 percent of the voters in Istanbul casting their ballots for Bµlent Ecevit’s party. The ANAP’s votes also displayed significant variation in 1999: The party’s candidate, Ali Talip Özdemir, finished second after Gµrtuna, and the ANAP was supported by a larger segment of the electorate in the municipal race than in the competition for seats in the parliament. In Istanbul, the electoral victory of the FP’s candidate Gµrtuna reflected both the popularity of the Islamists in administering the city and the division of the pro-secular votes between the ANAP, the DSP, and the CHP. The Islamists built up strong support among Istanbul voters, particularly the urban poor living in the gecekondu areas, by providing better municipal services and reducing the level of corruption. Gµrtuna also benefited from the popularity of his predecessor, Tayyip Erdoπan, who served as Istanbul’s first Islamist metropolitan mayor after the 1994 local elections. The splintering of the pro-secular votes proved to be important in Gµrtuna’s election as well. Despite considerable pressure from the secularist voters and the media, the two center-left parties, the DSP and the CHP, proved unwilling to unite their forces behind a candidate supported by both parties.

Ankara The map of local electoral politics in Ankara changed radically in 1994 when the RP emerged as the strongest party and captured the metropolitan mayoral post in Turkey’s capital and the second most populous city. The 1999 elections for metropolitan mayor in Ankara witnessed an intense competition between the FP and the CHP (Table 4.3). The FP’s candidate and current mayor, Melih Gökçek, managed to win with a slight margin over CHP’s Murat Karayalçªn, who had served as mayor of Ankara from the

85

Local Elections Table 4.3

Percentage of Votes in Ankara in the 1999 Municipal and Parliamentary Elections


Votes


Votes

Melih Gökçek/FP Murat Karayalçªn/CHP Hµseyin Erdem/MHP Doπan Ta≈≈sdelen/DSP Vahit Erdem/ANAP Halil ≈Sªvgªn/DYP

33.8 32.0 11.8 10.6 6.6 2.6

DSP MHP FP CHP ANAP DYP

23.1 21.5 17.7 13.4 10.8 7.3


center-left SHP from 1989 until 1994. Both mayoral candidates received more votes in their quest for the top elective municipal position in Ankara than their parties did in the parliamentary elections. The difference between Gökçek’s vote in the municipal elections and that of the FP in the national balloting partly stemmed from the banning of its predecessor, the RP, in 1998, which underscored the party’s extremist tendencies and caused many voters to distance themselves from the Islamists in the 1999 parliamentary elections. Despite his party’s declining electoral fortune in national politics, Gökçek also owed his success to building up electoral support by using the patronage resources available to the metropolitan mayors in Turkey. In the case of Karayalçªn and the CHP, the striking difference between the two levels of voting reflected his popularity and name recognition as a former mayor and party leader.8 In addition, unlike in Istanbul, the majority of the pro-secular voters lent their support to his candidacy. Consequently, the CHP outpolled the DSP in Ankara by a large margin.

ºzmir The results of the local and national elections in Turkey’s third-largest city showed less variation than in Istanbul and Ankara because the party that won the mayoral contest also captured the plurality of the votes in the national elections (Table 4.4). Public opinion polls taken during the campaign showed the DSP and its leader, Ecevit, riding on a wave of increasing popularity in ºzmir. The DSP’s candidate for metropolitan mayor, Ahmet Piristina, clearly benefited from the DSP’s strength in ºzmir—he defeated his closest rival from ANAP by a comfortable margin after receiving 30.5 percent of the votes. The DSP also finished first in the elections to the parliament ahead of the ANAP and the MHP. The candidates put up by the

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ANAP (Kutlu Akta≈s) and the CHP (Yµksel Çakmur, mayor from 1989 to 1994) received more votes in the contest for the metropolitan mayor race than their parties in the parliamentary elections.

Bursa The chief competitors in the 1999 municipal elections in Turkey’s fourthlargest city were the center-left (DSP) and center-right parties (ANAP and DYP) (Table 4.5). The DSP’s candidate for metropolitan mayor, Erdoπan Bilenser, defeated his closest rival from the ANAP with a comfortable margin after receiving 28.9 percent of the votes. The results of the municipal and national elections in this city showed less variation than in Ankara and Istanbul, as the winners in both were the same party. However, the DSP, which finished first in the national and local balloting, did receive more votes in the contests for the seats in the parliament. The reverse was true for the ANAP and the DYP: Their candidates for municipal mayors did better than their parties in the parliamentary elections.

Table 4.4

Percentage of Votes in ºzmir in the 1999 Municipal and Parliamentary Elections


Votes


Votes

Ahmet Piristina/DSP Kutlu Akta≈s/ANAP Yµksel Çakmur/CHP Burhan Özfatura/DYP Melih ºnan/MHP Kamil Duman/FP

30.5 19.1 18.0 16.3 6.8 3.4

DSP ANAP MHP CHP DYP FP

40.3 15.8 11.1 9.7 9.6 4.9


Table 4.5

Percentage of Votes in Bursa in the 1999 Municipal and Parliamentary Elections


Votes


Votes

Erdoπan Bilenser/DSP Erdem Saker/ANAP ºsmail Tatlªoπlu/DYP Fevzi Uncu/FP ºsmail Hakkª Sayªoπlu/CHP

28.9 20.7 19.7 15.9 2.6

DSP ANAP FP MHP CHP

32.1 15.9 15.3 14.5 3.8


87

Local Elections

Konya The central Anatolian city of Konya, with a strong tradition of Islamic activism, has long been a stronghold of conservative parties in Turkish politics. The Islamist parties, the RP and the FP, have managed to win large pluralities in the parliamentary and local elections in Konya during the 1990s. In the 1999 elections, the FP’s mayoral candidate, Mustafa Özkafa, amassed a large plurality by winning almost half of the votes that were cast in the municipal elections. The FP did almost equally well in the elections for the parliament, and there was only a slight difference in its votes between the two contests. The far-right MHP, the FP’s main competitor in Konya, came in a distant second in both the national and local balloting. The DSP, ANAP, and DYP all did very poorly in Konya, and their votes were considerably below their national averages for the parliament and municipal elections (Table 4.6).

Diyarbakªr Diyarbakªr, a city located in the southeast with a predominantly Kurdish population, saw its electoral politics radically change in the 1990s. The center-right and center-left parties that used to be the key players in local politics have seen a steady decline in their electoral fortunes. Their place has been taken over by a succession of pro-Kurdish parties. The latest of these, HADEP, was the dominant party in both the municipal and national elections in 1999. The HADEP’s candidate for mayor, Feridun Çelik, won 62.5 percent of the votes, easily outdistancing his closest rival from the Islamist FP (Table 4.7). The pro-Kurdish party also obtained a large plurality in the elections to the parliament in Diyarbakªr. However, because it managed to receive only 4.8 percent of the total votes nationwide, the party failed to gain representation in the parliament in Ankara. While the center-

Table 4.6

Percentage of Votes in Konya in the 1999 Municipal and Parliamentary Elections


Votes


Votes

Mustafa Özkafa/FP Kamil Uπurlu/MHP Ahmet Kart/DYP Sermet Öten/DSP Bestami ºnan/ANAP

48.5 6.4 9.9 5.0 4.1

FP MHP DYP DSP ANAP

30.1 26.0 13.8 10.7 7.2


88


Table 4.7

Percentage of Votes in Diyarbakªr in the 1999 Municipal and Parliamentary Elections


Votes


Votes

Feridun Çelik/HADEP Ahmet Bilgin/FP Nedim Alhas/ANAP Mustafa Yakut/DSP Baran ºnceoπlu/DYP

62.5 24.1 3.5 2.4 2.4

HADEP FP DYP ANAP DSP

45.9 14.6 11.2 11.1 4.9


right and center-left parties lagged far behind in the municipal and the national elections, the FP came in a distant second to the HADEP.

CONCLUSION

Until the 1990s, local elections in Turkey were characterized by low participation rates and similarities in the strength of the political support that the parties received in the contests for the parliament and the local elective offices. This was due mainly to the weakness of local administrations, especially the municipalities, as instruments of self-government. The local government reforms of the early 1980s strengthened the municipalities financially and widened their scope of activities. Moreover, the creation of a Greater Municipal City system through these reforms for the country’s largest cities facilitated the emergence of the metropolitan municipality mayors as influential figures in local and, in some cases, even in national politics. The increased political role and authority of the metropolitan mayors and the rapid growth of Turkey’s large cities significantly heightened the importance of municipal elections in Turkish politics in the 1990s. Unlike in previous years, when municipal contests generated little interest, mayoral contests nowadays witness intense campaigning by political parties and their candidates who attract a good deal of media attention and coverage. Whereas local elections in the past used to revolve around national issues and interparty conflicts, campaigns for the municipal elections have increasingly involved local issues and projects. Candidates for the metropolitan mayors’ office have become much more focused on issues concerning municipal services than before, and in the election campaigns they have begun asking the voters to cast their ballots on the basis of their perceptions of local issues and projects, such as transportation, traffic, unchecked urban growth, and pollution, rather than those that enter into interparty competi-

Local Elections

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tion at the national level. Nevertheless, the issues that are on the agenda of Turkish politics, especially the polarization between the secularists and the Islamists, continue to exert considerable influence on voters’ choices in the local elections. As noted earlier, one of the hallmarks of the 1999 elections concerns the emergence of significant ticket-splitting among the Turkish voters regarding their choices for national and municipal elections. A comparison of municipal and parliamentary elections in some of Turkey’s largest cities shows that the divergence between the national and the local vote was particularly pronounced where the fragmented secularist vote in the parliamentary elections coalesced around a pro-secular candidate facing a strong Islamist opponent. This was the case, for example, in cities such as Gaziantep and Ankara, where the metropolitan mayoral candidates from the staunchly secularist center-left CHP did extremely well and received more than twice the percentage of votes than their parties did in the balloting for the parliament. In some other cases, most notably in Istanbul, Adana, Antalya, and Samsun, divergence between the local and national results appeared to be more strongly influenced by the fragmented vote structure in the elections for both municipal mayors and the seats in the parliament than by a polarization between the secularists and the Islamists. However, the tendency of the voters not to engage in ticket-splitting in the 1999 elections seemed to be especially strong under several conditions. First, this was the case in cities such as Konya, Kayseri, and Erzurum, where the competition in both the national and local elections was between the FP and the MHP and where the center-left and center-right parties were weak. Second, local and national electoral preferences tended to parallel each other in such cities as ºzmir, Bursa, and Eski≈sehir, where the competition was largely between the candidates of the DSP, the ANAP, and the DYP without a strong challenge from the FP. Third, there was very little ticket-splitting in Diyarbakªr, where the great majority of the voters lent their support to the HADEP in both the parliamentary and the municipal elections. The political and social forces that propelled municipal elections to the center of the political stage in Turkey in the 1990s are likely to continue in the coming decades. The calls for greater democratization in the country assign an important place to the decentralization of the administrative system. At the same time, migration from the countryside to the cities, which has radically changed Turkey’s social and political landscape, is likely to continue at its breakneck pace in the near future. In all probability, greater transfer of power from the central to the local administrative bodies, coupled with the expanding size of the country’s urban voters, will significantly enhance the importance of the local electoral processes in Turkey in the first decades of the twenty-first century.

90

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey NOTES

1. On the organizational structure of local administration and government in Turkey, see Kele≈s and Yavuz (1989), Danielson and Kele≈s (1985), and Polatoπlu (2000). 2. Village and precinct level party organizations were abolished in the aftermath of the 1960 military intervention in an apparent attempt at political demobilization. The official reason for this policy was that party organizations had contributed to factional conflicts and polarization in the rural areas during the 1950s. See Sayarª (1976, 195–196). 3. These cities include Adana, Bursa, Gaziantep, Konya, Mersin, Kayseri, Eski≈sehir, Diyarbakªr, Antalya, Samsun, Izmit, and Erzurum. 4. The Susurluk political scandal took place in November 1996. A car accident near the town of Susurluk in western Turkey revealed that a high-ranking security official, an important Kurdish tribal chief and DYP parliamentary deputy, and a well-known right-wing militant who was involved in a number of assassinations were all in the same car. 5. According to a survey conducted in May 1999, the percentage of protest and undecided votes was 30 percent (T˜SES 1999, 105). For declining level of trust to the political parties in the 1990s, see Esmer (1999a). 6. Because the electoral districts are different in the municipal and parliamentary elections, the difference between the local and national votes, and the degree of ticket-splitting, can only be figured out by comparing the distribution of votes in the districts within the borders of the metropolitan municipalities. 7. The official electoral statistics at the district level in the parliamentary elections for some cities including Istanbul and ºzmir have not yet been published. Hence, the figures used for these cities are at the province level. See DºE (1999b). 8. Following his service as the mayor of Ankara, Karayalçªn was elected leader of the SHP and served in that capacity until its merger with the CHP.

5 At the Ballot Box: Determinants of Voting Behavior Yªlmaz Esmer

Studies of voting behavior based on microdata date back to the 1920s (Merriam and Gosnell 1924). In the 1930s and 1940s, the scene was dominated by election polls rather than academic surveys. The polls of the era, however, were conducted without any appreciable knowledge of probability sampling; the Literary Digest “poll,” predicting that Alfred Landon would defeat Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936, is now a classic example in all survey handbooks and textbooks. And quite rightly so, as the prediction was based on a “sample” size of no less than 2.35 million! The pollsters were wrong once again in 1948 when they picked Thomas Dewey as their winner.1 On the academic side, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues were setting a new trend with panel studies. They first published The People’s Choice (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944) based on seven interviews at different times with the same sample of 600 in Erie County, Ohio. This was followed by another panel study in Elmira, New York, resulting in a book called Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954).2 The People’s Choice and Voting are the first examples of what may be referred to as the “rational interest” model of voting. Also called the “social determinist model” (Denver 1994, 27–29), this approach explains voter preferences as a rational calculation based on social and economic variables. In the 1960s, two seminal works were published by the “Michigan group” based in Ann Arbor. The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) was a detailed study of Americans’ voting behavior in the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections and was followed by Elections and the Political Order (Campbell et al. 1966). These studies emphasized the role of party identification and the socialization processes that produced party identification as the most significant determinants of voting behavior. Nowadays, the study of voter behavior is an academic field in its own 91

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right. In the United States, the National Election Studies Project has been conducting detailed surveys immediately after each presidential and midterm election since the 1950s.3 Presently, researchers have access to a longitudinal and nationally representative data set covering twenty-three U.S. elections. Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden—to mention but a few other nations—all have their own longitudinal election studies, and all are based on postelection surveys. In addition, a recent comparative design aims at studying the relationships between individual voting behavior and macrolevel systemic variables such as constitutional regime, electoral system, party structures, and the like.4 With respect to Turkey, I have noted elsewhere that “one would be hard pressed indeed to come up with more than a couple of contributions to the literature in this field. Published studies that explore electoral behavior are few in number and depend, almost entirely, on aggregate data” (Esmer 1995, 77). More than a decade ago, ˜stµn Ergµder and Richard Hofferbert (1988, 90) wrote, “It would be most useful to have a series of surveys to identify the bases of individual partisanship and persistence of electoral behavior. Unfortunately, such data are not available in anything approaching consistent form.” Today, after five general elections, one would find it very difficult to argue that the situation has been rectified to any appreciable degree. The only notable exception is the series of three surveys carried out in December 1993, June 1995, and April 1996.5 However, in addition to the fact that the time lag between the last two is only about ten months, unfortunately none of these surveys was conducted immediately before or after an election. Therefore, one should regard them as studies of mood or intention rather than an actual vote. Nevertheless, both the data and the two major publications based on it (Erder et al. 1995; Kardam and Tµzµn 1998) are certainly a most welcome contribution to our understanding of political behavior and party support in Turkey. Finally, and before moving on to the analysis of our data, let me note the two important articles by Ersin Kalaycªoπlu (1994; 1999) based on individual-level data. The latter is particularly noteworthy because the author employs a discriminant analysis model to test the relative weights of cultural and socioeconomic sources in explaining party preferences. The chapter that I wrote (Esmer 1995) also represents an attempt to draw the profiles of the supporters of major parties using data obtained from a number of surveys.

UNDERSTANDING THE TURKISH VOTER

The outcomes of the December 1995 and April 1999 elections deeply astonished and surprised most observers of Turkish politics. The first shockwave came in 1995 when the Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP) captured 21.4 percent of the votes, thus winning a plurality and defeat-

At the Ballot Box

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ing centrist parties both on the right and the left. Actually, the first signals of an Islamist victory had been visible in the local elections of the preceding year when the RP candidates won the mayoralties of more than a third of the province centers. In nationwide local elections on March 27, 1994, the Islamist Welfare Party took over 19 percent of the popular vote and captured 26 of the 72 metropolitan municipalities in the country, including Istanbul and Ankara. In Istanbul the party’s vote was just over 26 percent. Suddenly, Islam was on the verge of making a serious bid for power in a country regarded as a fortress of secularism in the Middle East. (Margulies and Yªldªzoπlu 1997, 144)

No postelection survey data were available to delineate the factors behind this surge in the support for the Islamists. Nevertheless, a number of explanations, some based on macrolevel analyses and others on pure speculation, were offered. If the details are disregarded, the two major competing hypotheses were: 1. Protest vote hypothesis. According to the proponents of this hypothesis and its variants, the rise in the support for the RP was mainly due to social and economic inequalities. Those who felt deprived, powerless, and oppressed had turned to this radical movement after having lost all hope with the mainstream parties. A particularly important factor was the rapid growth in the populations of major cities caused by internal migration and the resulting increase in the number of squatter settlements. Serious adjustment and adaptation problems, coupled with poverty, provided fertile grounds for radical politics. Thus, the RP supporters were mainly protesting the “system” and its representatives. Because it was not ideologically based, this vote was volatile and could change its course anytime. 2. Rise in Islamism hypothesis. Those who advanced this hypothesis argued that this shift in electoral support from the center to the religious right was basically due to the rise in religiosity and religious values. Although the supporters of the RP were not necessarily Islamists in the political sense, they were, by and large, moved by religious motives rather than relative deprivation. Of course, relative deprivation could be a factor contributing to the rise in religious values but was not seen as the immediate cause of voting for the RP. Based on religious ideology, the Islamist support had to be regarded as a stable phenomenon rather than a passing fancy. While the analysts were struggling with this issue and were far from coming up with a confirmation or disconfirmation of either hypothesis, they had to deal with a second surprise. On the evening of April 18, 1999, it

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became clear that the Turkish voter was now giving considerable support to the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, MHP)—so much so that the political party of the “gray wolves” (a legendary symbol of the extreme Turkish nationalists adopted by the MHP, particularly its youth organizations) had more than doubled its share of the votes, from 8.2 percent in 1995 to 17.9 percent in 1999.6 They had not come out as the first party: Bµlent Ecevit’s Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP) won a plurality with 22.2 percent. But they were the second, both with respect to the number of votes and parliamentary seats, which enabled them to have a very strong voice in the formation of the new coalition government. Between 1995 and 1999, the RP had been closed by the Turkish Constitutional Court for advocating a regime based on religious principles, and its leaders had been banned from politics. Although another party, the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, FP), was quickly formed to replace the RP, the elections came too soon and the difficulties associated with entering the elections with a caretaker leader and demoralized cadres were only too obvious.7 Consequently, the FP came out with only 15.4 percent of the vote, a decrease of six percentage points from 1995. What had happened to the “Islamist vote?” And what had caused this enormous rise in the support for the MHP? Was there a major realignment in the Turkish political scene or was this a rather temporary phenomenon? Who was changing ranks and why? It was easy to adapt what has been called the protest-vote hypothesis to the new situation: Having been disenchanted with the performance of the RP in the government, the protestors had now turned to another extreme party to express their anti-system sentiments. It was also argued that the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party terror that had resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands during the decade and a half preceding the elections had contributed significantly to the success of the MHP, which represented the “hawks,” advocating uncompromising tough-line policies in dealing with this issue. However, it was further argued that economics was the crucial factor in bringing about this outcome—an argument mostly based on the geography of the election results.8 It is obvious that these and many other important questions can only be answered by systematic microlevel data—a rare species in the study of the Turkish voter, though very common in all Western democracies.

DATA AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Immediately after the April 1999 elections, a postelection survey was conducted with a lengthy questionnaire covering a wide range of issues. To the

At the Ballot Box

95

best of my knowledge, this was the first data-collection effort held immediately after a national election in Turkey’s fifty years of electoral history. Indeed, for the first time in Turkey, it was possible to relate numerous demographic, behavioral, attitudinal, and value variables to the actual vote rather than to a hypothetical “if elections were held today” question. We know that there can be significant differences in the distributions of answers to a hypothetical situation as opposed to actual behavior. In addition, this survey enabled researchers to trace the direction and magnitude of the shifts in the electoral support of the parties between two elections as well as the factors affecting vote change. The study had a somewhat limited sample design and was carried out in ten provinces with a total sample size of 1,741. 9 Five southeastern provinces were excluded from the sample because of practical difficulties involved in conducting field research in that region. The data were weighted to reflect the final election results.10 Interviewing was completed on April 25, exactly one week after the elections. The analyses presented here are based on these data. In the following sections of this chapter, I shall first try to gain an understanding of the Turkish voter and then trace the changes in voter preferences between 1995 and 1999. I begin by looking at some simple bivariate tables to draw basic sketches of the voter profiles of parties. Next I embark on a multivariate analysis to identify those variables that have a significant effect on voter choice. I use the logistic regression technique to assess the effects of a number of independent variables on voting, repeating the analysis for each one of the six major parties.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

A myriad of factors may affect voter preferences, and it is clear that we could not even hope to be able to account for the total variance in this variable. However, various theoretical approaches emphasize certain groups of independent variables over others. As an example, Martin Harrop and William Miller (1987) distinguish three models of voting: psychological, economic, and sociological. Each model generates different hypotheses that need to be tested. Fortunately, at least for the 1999 elections, our data allow us to consider the confirmation status of all major models. The instrument used in the postelection survey allows us to test for the effects of a wide range of independent variables that are thought to have theoretical import and/or have been found to be significant empirically elsewhere. Therefore, initial equations include a wide range of independent variables that could be expected to affect voters’ choices. These are:

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1. Demographic characteristics: age, gender, level of/years of formal schooling 2. Place of residence: urban or rural 3. Economic status A. Material well-being • Total household income • Additive index of household items owned (telephone, mobile phone, dishwasher, automatic washer, personal computer, private car, summer house) B. Subjective well-being/relative deprivation • Income needed (desired) for comfortable living for a family like the respondent’s • Position on an 11-point “realization of wishes and desires scale” • Position on an 11-point “power and efficacy scale” 4. Religious values A. Practice • Does the respondent perform daily prayers? If yes, how many times the day before the interview (minimum –1, maximum 5)?11 B. Belief • Does the respondent favor Qur’an courses outside the school system? • Newspapers should give priority to religious values (as opposed to national, moral/traditional, human rights/democratic, or secular values) • Respondent feels part of the Islamic world (as opposed to the Turkic world, Europe, or the whole globe) C. Modernism versus religiosity • Position on an 11-point fatalism scale • Is science or religion more helpful to understand the complexities of the world and the universe? • Is it a sin for women to wear swimsuits on the beach? D. Secularism versus political Islam • Religion and worldly affairs should/cannot be separated • Secularism index (additive index of responses to “Should rules pertaining to the educational system, adultery, government affairs, inheritance laws, abortion, parent-child relations, criminal law, and interest on capital be based on religious principles?”) 5. Political values A. Democratic culture (tolerance) • Additive index of tolerance for different/deviant people as neighbors (11 items)

At the Ballot Box

B. C.

D.

E.

F.

97

• Newspapers should give priority to human rights/democratic values (as opposed to national, moral/ traditional, religious, or secular values) Left-right ideology • Position on 11-point left-right scale Nationalist ideology • Respondent feels part of the Turkic world (as opposed to the Islamic world, Europe, or the whole globe) • Newspapers should give priority to national (as opposed to moral/traditional, human rights/democratic, religious, or secular values) • Preference for nationalist as opposed to religious or secular slogan12 Evaluation of/satisfaction with the political system • Position on a 4-point “satisfaction with the way democracy works in Turkey” scale • Position on a 5-point “awareness of parliamentarians about citizens’ needs” scale • Position on a 5-point efficacy scale (Does your vote make a difference?) Evaluation of the electoral system • Position on a 5-point “election fairness scale” • Does the composition of the parliament reflect people’s will accurately or is the system unfair for some parties? Parties and party identification • Position on 5-point scale of “responsiveness of political parties” • An 11-point scale of party evaluation (How much does the respondent like each party?) • Parties’ perceived positions on the 11-point left-right scale

With such a long list of independent variables, it is clear that within the limitations of sample surveys in general and our design and implementation in particular, we can gain considerable insight into the people’s choice as well as consider various rival hypotheses.13

THE GREAT MARCH TOWARD THE RIGHT

In a nutshell, this is what happened in the elections of April 1999: 1. The far-right gained significant ground. But unlike 1995, this time the prize went to the nationalist rather than the religious right. 2. The center-right lost considerable support. Between the two major

98


parties of the center-right, the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP) and the Doπru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, DYP), there was no clear winner. Both were “losers.” 3. The center-left maintained its position. However, one of the centerleft parties, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP), failed to meet the 10 percent threshold and thus was forced to stay out of the parliament. Hence, unlike the center-right, on the center-left there was a clear winner.14 Turkey’s three elections in the 1990s clearly point to a move toward the right of the political spectrum. Table 5.1 rearranges the figures in Appendix Table B.4 from this viewpoint to draw the point home. This flight from the two center-right parties has generally been attributed to the parties’ failure in meeting voters’ expectations, particularly regarding economic issues, leadership problems, and corruption and scandals, which eroded voter confidence both in these parties and their leaders. Our data show that all of these factors indeed contributed in varying degrees to the demise of the center-right in Turkey. However, one should keep in mind that this shift in voter preferences was very much in alignment with the changes in the ideological mood of the Turkish electorate as well. A number of surveys at various points in time asked respondents to place themselves on a 10- or 11-point left-right scale. Table 5.2 summarizes the findings of the Turkish Values Surveys of 1990 (Ergµder, Esmer, and Kalaycªoπlu 1991) and 1997 (Esmer 1999a) and finally the 1999 postelection survey with respect to the left-right scale positions of the respondents. With these data, an ideological move from the center to the far-right seems all too obvious. Turkey is not unique in this respect, though. HansDieter Klingeman (1995, 191), for example, talks about the “universal movement towards the right, on average, by all party families during the 1980s.” His comments pertain to the political parties of Western Europe, but an increase in the proportion of those who position themselves on the

Table 5.1

Performance of the Right and Left in the Elections of the 1990s

Radical Right RP/FP + MHP + BBP Center-right ANAP + DYP Center-left SHP/CHP + DSP

1991

1995

1999

16.9

29.6

34.8

51.0

38.8

25.2

31.6

25.3

30.9

Source: Election results given in Appendix Table B.4.

99

At the Ballot Box Table 5.2

Left-Right Positions During the 1990s (percentage of respondents)

Far-left (1–2)a Center-left (3–4) Center (5–6) Center-right (7–8) Far-right (9–10)

1990

1997

1999

8 17 50 15 11

8 11 35 19 24

14 9 31 18 28

Note: a. The 1990 and 1997 Turkish Values Surveys used a 10-point scale (1 to 10), with the lower end representing the left. In the 1999 survey, a 0-to-10-point scale was used. Therefore, the results are not strictly comparable. For the 1999 survey, the far-left is the sum of respondents who placed themselves on 0, 1, or 2, as opposed to just 1 or 2.

right is observed for the populations of many non-European countries, too (Esmer 1999a, 54–55). Needless to say, self-placement on the left-right ideological scale will not automatically convert into a vote for any given party. We know that voting behavior is far too complex to be explained by a single-cause model. However, in the following sections, we shall observe that the left-right ideological position is one of the leading indicators—if not the most important one—of voter preference. In addition, the electorate’s assessment of the ideological positions of parties is rather accurate and consistent. 15 Therefore, an attempt to match the position of self with the perceived party position is to be expected. If this is true, then the signs of the increase in support for religious and nationalist-right parties were becoming evident in surveys of political values conducted long before the elections.

BASIC VOTER PROFILES

Before discussing the findings of the multivariate regression analysis, I look at some simple bivariate tables to answer our core question: “Who voted for which party?” I begin by examining the relationships between party choice and some of the variables from the list of independent variables above.16 Table 5.3 summarizes how voter preferences change according to three major demographic variables: gender, level of schooling, and age. Except for the ANAP and the MHP, gender does not seem to have any appreciable effect on the choice of party. The ANAP is disproportionately favored by females and the MHP is predominantly a male party. Erder et al. (1995) reached similar conclusions for these two parties, although the gender effect they reported for the ANAP was much less pronounced.

100 Table 5.3

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey Percentage Voting for Major Parties According to Gender, Education, and Age

Gender Male Female Level of education No formal schooling Primary school Junior high school High school University graduate University student Age 18–22 23–34 35–49 50+

ANAP

CHP

DSP

DYP

FP

MHP

9.1 17.6

9.4 8.3

20.6 23.5

13.8 10.8

13.8 16.4

21.6 14.4

21.1 11.8 11.7 14.2 12.4 16.4

5.0 5.1 10.6 13.0 17.6 18.2

20.0 22.4 20.7 20.7 26.1 21.8

15.0 14.8 8.4 8.9 7.8 9.1

20.0 18.5 16.2 11.4 3.9 3.6

11.7 19.7 25.1 20.7 7.8 12.7

11.0 12.5 13.7 15.7

11.6 7.3 10.1 7.8

22.1 20.3 23.2 22.7

7.7 9.6 11.2 20.1

13.3 13.2 15.9 17.2

20.4 24.6 14.8 11.6

Table 5.3 suggests that the DSP vote is more or less equally spread over all age groups whereas the MHP support seems to be negatively and the DYP support appears positively correlated with age. Once again, this is not a surprising finding—especially the increasing popularity of the MHP among young voters, which had been observed by many political analysts. Of the three independent variables in Table 5.3, the level of education is the one most closely associated with voter choice. It has been repeatedly found that education is positively related to leftist orientation. 17 Postelection survey results from 1999 are interesting from this perspective. We have seen that, of the six major parties included in our analysis, the CHP is perceived to be at the farthest left. The correlation between the level of education and the CHP vote is crystal clear. While only 5 percent of voters with no formal schooling reported having voted for the CHP, the proportion among university graduates was almost 18 percent. This pattern is completely reversed for the FP, where the differences are even more pronounced. For the MHP, the effects of education seem to be curvilinear. This party seems to be unpopular among the least and the most educated. Support for both the ANAP and the DYP decrease as the level of education increases. It is also worth noting that the DSP, the winner of the 1999 election, managed to get—at least for the 1999 elections—roughly equal proportions of vote from males, females, and all education and age groups. This success should largely be attributed to the popularity and credibility of its leader. Table 5.4 allows us to explore the protest vote hypothesis that was discussed earlier. Included in Table 5.4 are measures of economic well-being

101


Percentage Voting for Major Parties According to Economic WellBeing and Relative Deprivation ANAP

Income group Lower (< 70 million) 8.5 Lower middle (70–149 mill.) 12.5 Upper middle (150–200 mill.) 14.3 Upper (< 200 million) 17.6 Household items owned 0–1 Items 7.8 2 Items 12.4 3 Items 12.7 4 Items 15.5 5–7 Items 22.1 Overall satisfaction with income Very satisfied 14.6 Somewhat satisfied 16.6 Not satisfied 8.3 Not at all satisfied 9.9 Overall happiness respondent feels Very happy 16.8 Somewhat happy 12.5 Not very happy 12.8 Not happy at all 9.9 Position on realization of wishes scale 0–2 12.6 3–4 10.2 5 13.3 6–7 17.9 8–10 12.4 Position on power/efficacy scale 0–2 9.7 3–4 10.3 5 16.7 6–7 15.3 8–10 17.0

CHP

DSP

DYP

FP

MHP

2.4 5.0 11.8 16.0

18.9 22.8 23.4 23.1

17.5 14.6 9.3 8.4

20.8 17.6 11.8 10.1

21.6 21.6 17.7 11.2

3.7 6.7 10.3 13.4 15.2

19.6 23.0 20.1 24.0 24.8

15.9 13.7 9.3 10.3 9.0

19.1 17.3 16.1 13.0 5.9

21.8 18.7 18.6 15.6 11.8

5.7 10.2 7.5 8.4

15.3 21.8 23.2 25.4

19.1 11.0 11.4 12.5

13.4 15.5 16.1 14.0

17.2 15.9 22.8 18.5

6.3 9.8 10.4 10.3

20.4 22.0 23.2 23.6

15.6 11.4 9.0 11.8

15.6 15.4 13.3 14.8

17.2 18.8 17.5 16.3

7.4 10.2 9.0 11.8 5.6

21.0 23.9 20.2 22.9 24.4

9.7 9.5 14.4 10.0 17.9

16.8 14.4 13.3 14.0 15.8

21.0 21.6 16.5 16.5 14.1

6.9 8.5 8.8 13.9 7.5

23.8 22.2 22.3 20.8 17.0

11.6 12.2 12.9 9.3 22.6

20.1 16.4 12.2 12.0 9.4

19.4 17.7 17.9 17.1 11.3

and relative deprivation. For the protest vote hypothesis to be confirmed (i.e., to conclude that the RP/FP and later the MHP votes are nonideological) one would expect an association between party preference and relative deprivation. Put differently, one should actually feel deprived, oppressed, marginal, powerless because being poor, unless it is perceived as such, should not be expected to affect behavior in any significant way. We see from Table 5.4 that both measures of economic status are negatively related to the MHP and especially to the FP vote, lending some support to the economic deprivation hypothesis. Yet a similar pattern is observed for the DYP, a party that cannot be perceived as anti-system by any stretch of the imagination. Thus, we may be observing a spurious cor-

102


relation here—a possibility that will be explored in the following sections. However, the CHP and the ANAP votes are positively associated with economic well-being. No clear pattern emerges from Table 5.4 to lend strong support to the relative deprivation hypothesis. The proportion of the FP or the MHP supporters who are not at all satisfied with their incomes is about the same as the proportion who are very satisfied. Likewise, there is no correlation between subjective happiness and the vote for these parties. But the power and efficacy scale seems to be somewhat related, negatively, to the FP and possibly the MHP vote. It is clear that a decision on the effects of economic status and relative deprivation calls for a more thorough analysis with additional indicators and control variables. Our questionnaire contained numerous indicators of ideology and particularly religiosity, Islamism, and nationalism. Table 5.5 reports the findings related to only one of those questions, and the results are not surprising. The CHP support was less than 1 percent among those who chose religious values over other alternatives and more than 18 percent among those who picked secularism as the most important value. The FP support was the highest among those who chose religious values and lowest among those who chose secularism. Nationalist values, not surprisingly, were the favorite among the MHP voters. If we consider the column rather than the row percentages in Table 5.5—in other words, if we regard party choice as the independent variable—we observe that 86 percent of those who voted for the CHP chose either human rights/democracy or secularism as the first priority value, a highly consistent outcome for a party of the left. This proportion was slightly more than two-thirds for the second center-left party, the DSP. Yet for 44 percent of the FP voters, religious values took priority, to be followed by human rights and democracy (24 percent). However, somewhat unexpectedly, among those who voted for the MHP, only 31 percent picked nationalist values over others. In Figure 5.1, we give the arithmetic means of the left-right scale for

Table 5.5

Religiosity, Nationalism, and Voter Preference (percentages) ANAP

The press should give first priority to Nationalist values 10.5 Religious values 11.0 Traditions and moral values 17.4 Human rights, democracy 15.6 Secularism 12.8

CHP

DSP

DYP

FP

MHP

4.3 0.7 3.2 14.0 18.1

15.1 9.9 20.0 29.1 32.2

15.1 13.4 12.9 9.3 16.1

13.6 32.9 18.7 8.6 4.0

31.8 20.2 25.2 10.6 12.8

103

At the Ballot Box Figure 5.1

CHP

Mean Score on Left-Right Scale by Party Choice (lower scores indicate left of the scale)

DSP

ANAP

DYP

MHP

FP

Overall

the voters of each party. The differences are very substantial with the difference between the CHP voters on the far-left and the FP voters on the farright of the scale being more than 1.7 standard deviations. In the face of these data, it is very hard to confirm the frequently expressed argument that, in the 1990s, the left and the right have lost their meanings and have become devoid of their traditional contents. From another perspective, of the 534 respondents who placed themselves on the right end of the scale (scores 8, 9, or 10), only two reported voting for the CHP. Similarly, among the 176 who positioned themselves on the left (0, 1, or 2 on the scale), no more than three voted for the FP. Do we need any further evidence on the impact of the left-right ideology, as perceived by the individual, on voter preferences?

PREDICTING VOTER BEHAVIOR

Can we identify the variables that have a significant (both statistically and substantively) effect on voter behavior, and how much success can we expect to have in predicting the individual vote? These are the questions that I shall try to tackle in this section. My independent variable, then, is the individual’s self-reported vote. More specifically, I examine the effects of my independent variables for each one of the six major parties included in the analyses.18 With a logistic regression technique, one can assess both

104


the statistical and substantive significance of the model and the relative importance of independent variables. Furthermore, the proportion of cases correctly classified by the model provides an intuitively meaningful measure of the “success” in prediction. The first equation I estimate includes all thirty-two independent variables. Among them, the scale asking how much the respondents like a given party can provide a test of the party identification hypothesis. Indeed, for every one of our six parties, I find this variable the most relevant of all.19 However, I agree with Harrop and Miller (1987) that the validity of the party identification model outside the United States is somewhat doubtful. They write: Party identification has now been measured in at least 15 countries but in nearly all of them its role differs in two main ways from the United States. First, outside the United States a much larger proportion of those who change their vote also change their identification. Secondly, outside the United States, far fewer voters think of themselves as independents. Together, these findings cast doubt on whether non-American electorates do in fact distinguish party allegiance from current voting. (Harrop and Miller 1987, 138)

This seems to be the case in Turkey as well—that is, party identification and vote are basically the same variable. The questionnaire allows us to assess the relationship between party identification and voting preference. Respondents were asked whether they felt close to a political party and, if yes, which one(s). Among those who voted, the identification with and voting for a given party are highly correlated but not identical. For example, 91 percent of those who identified with the ANAP voted for that party. The corresponding figures were 89 percent for the CHP, 79 percent for the DSP, 85 percent for the DYP, 82 percent for the FP, and 78 percent for the MHP. These figures also give a clue as to which parties “borrowed” votes from nonpartisans more than others. For the purposes of this chapter, it would be rather uninteresting to elaborate on the inevitable conclusion that the more strongly a person identifies with a party the more likely they are to vote for that party and that this variable explains most of the variance in voting behavior. Thus, I continue the analysis without this variable in the equation in order to assess the impact of the remaining independent variables. Accordingly, at step one, all independent variables except party identification indicator were entered into the equation for each party. As expected, only a few of these independent variables had significant effects. I then selected those variables with coefficients significant at the 0.05 level or better and estimated the logistic regression parameters with only those variables. In this second set of runs,

At the Ballot Box

105

some variables that were significant at the first step ceased to be so. The full results are reported in Table 5.6. First and foremost, we note that only one variable proves to be significant for all six parties: respondent’s self-reported position on the left-right scale. And the effects conform to expectations. With higher scale values indicating positions more to the right, the logistic regression coefficients are positive for parties perceived as right wing (the ANAP, DYP, FP, and MHP) and negative for left-wing parties (the CHP and DSP). In addition, for the ANAP, DYP, FP, and MHP, the respondent’s evaluation of the given party’s position on the scale is also significant. In any case, it is clear that left-right ideology is a crucial variable—if not a direct cause, at least an indispensable intervening variable—in understanding Turkish voter behavior.

REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS IN TABLE 5.6 FOR EACH PARTY

The ANAP We have already seen that the ANAP was much more popular among females than males. This finding shows up in the regression analysis, too. In addition, the more well-to-do a person (as measured by the number of household items owned), the more likely that person is to vote for the ANAP. Education (years of schooling), in contrast, has a negative effect, with the likelihood of voting for the ANAP decreasing as the level of education increases. The secular values index, significant for most parties as we shall see below, is not so for the ANAP. Instead, the binary-coded “separation of religion and world affairs” variable is included in the equation. The secular approach to that question (being in favor of separation) is positively related to voting for the ANAP. Finally, the more satisfied a person is with the way democracy works in the country, the less likely they are to vote for the ANAP— not an unexpected outcome for the supporters of a “loser.”

The CHP One big surprise with respect to the results pertaining to the CHP is the failure of the education variable to be included in the equation. It seems that the education effects—highly pronounced in bivariate tables—are picked up by other independent variables, most probably by the left-right scale, secularism, and income. The secularism scale has, as expected, a

106 Table 5.6

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey Logistic Regression Results for Six Major Parties

Variable with Significant Effect

B

ANAP Gendera –.46 Household itemsb –.32 Left-right scale (R’s position)c .13 Left-right scale (ANAP’s position)c .31 Satisfaction with democracy –.31 Separation of religiond .58 Years of schooling –.06 Model chi-square Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit chi-square CHP Left-right scale (R’s position) –.32 Income (natural log) .40 Secular values index .32 Parliamentarians’ awareness –.25 –1.70 Do elections reflect people’s will?e

St. Error

.19 .06 .03 .05 .10 .21 .03

.05 .15 .07 .09 .32

Sig

.02 0.63 .00 0.73 .00 1.14 .00 1.36 .00 0.73 .01 1.78 .02 0.94 130.7 (sig.0.000, df.7) 9.1 (sig. 0.333, df. 8) .00 .01 .00 .00 .00

Variables included initially but excluded from final equation Wearing swimsuit a sinf Elections fairness scale Responsiveness of political parties scaleg Model chi-square Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit chi-square DSP Urban/rural residenceh .63 Left-right scale (R’s position) –.29 Secular values index .14 Priority to democratic valuesi –.35 Elections fairness scale –.20 Do elections reflect people’s will? .78 Years of schooling –.06

0.73 1.49 1.38 0.78 0.18 (prob >.05)

228.1 (sig. 0.000, df. 5) 1.7 (sig. 0.989, df. 8) .19 .03 .03 .17 .06 .18 .02

Variable included initially but excluded from final equation Personal power scale Model chi-square Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit chi-square DYP Age .02 .01 Wearing swimsuit a sin .55 .25 Left-right scale (R’s position) .17 .04 Elections make a difference .17 .07 Do elections reflect people’s will? .44 .20 Left-right scale (DYP’s position) .24 .05 Variables included initially but excluded from final equation Preference for nationalist sloganj Fatalism scale Model chi-square Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit chi-square

Exp(B)

.00 .00 .00 .04 .00 .00 .00

1.87 0.75 1.15 0.71 0.82 2.18 0.94

(prob. >.05) 215.5 (sig. 0.000, df. 7) 9.7 (sig. 0.283, df. 8) .00 .03 .00 .02 .03 .00

1.02 1.74 1.19 1.19 1.55 1.28 (prob >.05)

107.8 (sig. 0.000, df. 6) 16.8 (sig. 0.032, df. 8) (continues)

107


(continued)

Variable with Significant Effect

B

Left-right scale (R’s position) Daily prayers (–1 to 5)k Secular values index Feels part of Islamic worldl Wearing swimsuit a sin Left-right scale (FP’s position) Do elections reflect people’s will?

.11 .21 –.22 –.80 1.34 .18 –.87

St. Error

Sig

Exp(B)

FP .04 .05 .04 .23 .46 .06 .22

.02 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

Variables included initially but excluded from final equation Personal power scale Satisfaction with democracy Elections make a difference Model chi-square Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit chi-square MHP Age –.03 Urban/rural residence –.45 Left-right scale (R’s position) .20 Wishes and desires scale –.10 –.68 Feels part of Turkic worldm Priority to nationalist valuesn –.64 Left-right scale (MHP’s position) .16 Preference for nationalist slogan –.92

(prob >.05)

286.1 (sig. 0.000, df. 7) 4.03 (sig. 0.854, df. 8) .01 .17 .03 .03 .17 .19 .05 .18

Variable included initially but excluded from final equation Income needed for comfortable living Model chi-square Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit chi-square

1.11 1.24 0.81 0.45 3.80 1.19 0.42

.00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

0.97 0.64 1.22 0.91 0.51 0.40 1.18 .040 (prob >.05)

210.8 (sig. 0.000, df. 8) 1.42 (sig. 0.994, df. 8)

Notes: a. Coding: female 0; male 1. b. Reverse coding with higher lower values indicating ownership of more items. c. For both left-right scales (respondent’s position and party’s position as perceived by respondent), the higher the scale value, the more to the right the position is. d. Coding: Religion and world affairs should be separated 1; they cannot be separated 0. e. Coding: People’s will reflected 1; elections unfair to some parties 0. f. Coding: It is a sin 1; it is not a sin 0. g. Higher values indicate parties being perceived as nonresponsive to people’s views and ideas. h. Coding: Rural 0; urban 1. i. Coding: Newspapers should give priority to human rights/democratic values 0; otherwise 1. j. Coding: Preference for nationalist slogan 1; religious or secular slogan 0. k. Those who do not perform daily prayers are coded as –1; those who do were asked “How many times yesterday?” and the answers are coded 0 to 5. l. Coding: Respondent feels part of Islamic world 0; others 1. m. Coding: Respondent feels part of Turkic world 0; others 1. n. Coding: Newspapers should give priority to nationalist values 0; otherwise 1.

108


highly significant effect on the CHP vote. By most accounts, the CHP was the biggest loser in the 1999 elections. Consequently, the CHP voters have a negative view of both the parliamentarians (question: “Are parliamentarians aware of the people’s wishes and desires?”) and the outcome of the elections (question: “Do the results reflect people’s will or is the electoral system unfair to some parties?”). As noted earlier, the CHP is regarded by the electorate as the most leftist of all major parties. Plus, the CHP supporters place themselves, on average, to the left of all other major party voters. And yet, the coefficient for income is positive for the CHP equation, namely, the more well-to-do a person, the higher the probability of voting for the CHP. This seeming contradiction was noted before (Esmer 1999a, 59) in the context of the 1997 Turkish Values Study. There it was found that 40 percent of those in the highest income group placed themselves to the left of the scale, whereas the figure was only 16 percent for the lowest income group. It is clear that in Turkey, leftism is not the ideology of the uneducated lower classes. Indeed, postelection survey data show positive, albeit modest, correlations between leftism and both education (Pearson r = 0.22) and income (Pearson r = 0.18 with natural log of income).

The DSP We already know from election returns that the DSP is mainly a party of urban centers and more urbanized regions, and this shows in our regression analysis as well. Like the CHP, the secular values index is positively related to the DSP vote. Quite unexpectedly, however, education has a negative impact on voting for the DSP. It seems that the relatively less educated voters among the urban, left-leaning, and secular groups preferred the DSP— an interesting and noteworthy finding. Also interesting is the negative evaluation of the electoral system by the DSP voters. Although this party was the winner in the elections, both indicators of the electoral system evaluation (“Were the elections fair?” and “Do the results reflect people’s will?”) have significant negative impact on the DSP vote.

The DYP It was a common observation before and after the elections of 1999 that the DYP had become a party of the older age groups and that the MHP was preferred by young voters. Indeed, despite the young, energetic image of its leader, who was not only young but also a woman, the older generations find the DYP more attractive and the effects of age are significant in multivariate analyses as well. In addition to age and the left-right position, fac-

At the Ballot Box

109

tors affecting the DYP vote are efficacy and religiosity. To the DYP voters, elections do make a difference and can bring very positive changes. Nevertheless, they tend to think that the people’s will is not reflected in electoral results. And an interesting indicator of religiosity has an effect on voting for the DYP: “Is it a sin for women to wear swimsuits on the beach?” Answering this question positively increases the probability of voting for the DYP.

The FP Seven variables have significant effects on the FP vote and none of them are indicators of economic well-being, efficacy, or relative deprivation. These findings make it very difficult to argue that the FP vote is an anti-system protest vote. Not a single one of the personal power, subjective income, or happiness variables proved significant. What is very significant, though, is religiosity. Of the seven variables in the equation, four are indicators of religiosity, two are left-right scales, and the last one has to do with the evaluation of the electoral system. The last variable, as we have seen, is also included in the equations for mainstream parties (the CHP, DSP, and ANAP). It would not be incorrect to state that if one wishes to predict the FP vote, one has to look at no place other than religiosity (practice, belief, and attitudes).

The MHP The equation for the MHP is dominated by indicators of nationalism. In addition, two demographic variables (age and rural residence) are found to have an impact on choosing the MHP; in short, the younger, the more rural, and the more nationalist, the higher the probability of voting for the MHP. However, we should also note that one indicator of relative deprivation, the wishes and desires scale, has a significant effect on the MHP vote—and only on the MHP vote. Although this, by itself, is not sufficient evidence to confirm the oppression/protest-vote hypothesis, at least it gives us one justification to look more in that direction.

ELECTORAL VOLATILITY

Finally, in this section, I present a table of stability and change in voter preferences from 1995 to 1999 (Table 5.7).20 Needless to say, official election results tell us the direction and magnitude of changes in each party’s vote. However, these are only the final tallies and give no indication of

110 Table 5.7

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey Changes in Voter Behavior, 1995–1999 (percentage of votes)

From ANAP CHP DSP DYP RP MHP Others First-time voters

ANAP

CHP

DSP

DYP

FP

MHP

Others

41.2 7.0 4.2 7.7 3.1 4.0 6.5 10.3

0.4 56.9 6.0 4.1 0.0 1.0 5.2 11.8

22.9 20.8 73.8 14.0 4.5 5.0 7.8 22.7

6.1 1.5 3.0 47.5 6.7 6.9 2.6 7.4

6.4 2.3 4.0 5.9 63.4 1.9 5.2 13.8

14.0 2.3 5.4 18.1 14.7 77.2 2.6 24.6

9.0 9.2 3.6 2.7 7.6 4.0 70.1 9.4

Note: The diagonal entries give the proportion of votes each party was able to retain from 1995.

details. How successful was each party in preserving its 1995 vote? Where did the additional votes come from and to whom did the party lose? Once again, these questions call for individual-level data on voting behavior. An examination of the diagonal entries in Table 5.7 shows that the DSP and the MHP, the two winners of the 1999 elections, kept 74 percent and 77 percent of their 1995 votes, respectively. The corresponding figure for the ANAP, which lost heavily to the DSP and the MHP, was only 41 percent. Although considerable numbers of voters changed their parties between 1995 and 1999, the traffic between the right- and left-wing parties was noticeably light, both ways. Of those who voted for the RP in 1995, 0 percent chose the CHP in 1999, and of those who voted for the MHP in 1995, a mere 1 percent chose the CHP. The last row in Table 5.7 is of particular interest. Among the first-time voters (a great majority of whom are young people who had not reached voting age in the previous elections), the most popular party is the MHP, followed by the DSP. One out of every four newcomers voted for the nationalist right. The big loser among the young voters was the DYP, followed by the ANAP. The CHP’s vote in this group was about three percentage points above its national average.

CONCLUSION

Based on a survey of 1,741 voters interviewed immediately after the April 1999 elections, the most important predictor of voter behavior in Turkey was the left-right ideology. Measured on an 11-point scale, this variable proved to have a significant effect for every one of the six major parties

At the Ballot Box

111

included in our analysis. In fact, it was the only variable with a statistically significant coefficient in all of the six equations. A shift toward the right, and particularly the far right, among Turkish voters had become evident in earlier studies starting at the beginning of the decade. Those findings, together with the crucial role of left-right ideology in determining voter preferences, help us understand the substantial gains by the religious right in 1995 and nationalist right in 1999. Two important conclusions can be drawn. First, the “party identification model of voting” is perhaps not very meaningful in parliamentary systems where changing party identification is very often accompanied by a parallel change in voting preferences. If an intervening variable is present between socioeconomic and demographic background variables and voting behavior, in the Turkish context, one would be well-advised to look at the left-right position. The second conclusion relates to the relative deprivation hypothesis intended to explain the surge in religious (the RP/FP) and nationalist (the MHP) votes. By and large, the large number of indicators of relative deprivation, subjective class, efficacy, as well as indicators of economic wellbeing failed to produce any tangible effects on either the FP or the MHP vote. Instead, ideology seemed to steal the show. In addition to left-right position, religious values for the FP and nationalist values for the MHP proved to be much more important than relative deprivation, income, or wealth. Secularist values are crucial for predicting the center-left vote. In the equations for both the CHP and the DSP, the secularism index has a positive significant impact. This is not surprising for the CHP given its staunch secularist stand. However, the DSP, and especially its leader, are known to be more compromising. Indeed, it was Bµlent Ecevit (founder and leader of the DSP since its inception) who coined the slogan “secularism respectful of religious sentiments” to explain his party’s position. Nevertheless, secularism is still an important issue for the DSP voters. In all bivariate analyses, education seems to be the most significant of all socioeconomic and demographic background variables. Yet it is observed that the effects of schooling are mostly mediated by values rather than determining voter preferences directly. Finally, survey data suggest that large proportions of Turkish voters change their preferences between elections (at least this was the case between 1995 and 1999). Indeed, the two major center-right parties, the ANAP and the DYP, were able to retain less than half of their 1995 votes in 1999. Clearly, a change within the extreme right and the center-right is much more likely than a shift between the right and the left. However, the latter is not totally impossible. Selfplacement on the left-right scale being as important as it is, the DSP man-

112


aged to shift a sizable proportion of the center-right vote to itself between 1995 and 1999.21

NOTES 1. To my knowledge, the only organization that correctly predicted the outcome of the 1948 U.S. presidential election was the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Their design employed a probability sample whereas all others had opted for quota samples. 2. This work also contains an excellent appendix summarizing major election studies between 1940 and 1948. 3. Actually, for the presidential elections, both pre- and postelection surveys are available. 4. This ambitious, long-term, comparative project known as the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems combines postelection survey data with macrolevel variables and is the first of its kind. 5. All three surveys were supported by the Turkish Social Economic and Political Research Foundation (T˜SES). Fieldwork and data collection were carried out by Veri Ara≈stªrma, a private research company. 6. Percentages were calculated over valid votes cast. 7. The Fazilet Partisi shared the same destiny with its predecessor, the Refah Partisi. It, too, was banned from politics by the Constitutional Court in 2001. The FP gave birth to two parties: (1) The traditionals and the “old guard” reorganized under the name of Saadet Partisi (translated as “felicity” or “bliss,” SP); and (2) the younger generation within the party formed the new Adalet ve Kalkªnma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP). 8. See Chapter 6 in this volume. 9. Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Erzurum, Istanbul, ºzmir, Kayseri, Kµtahya, Samsun, and Trabzon were the ten provinces, or primary sampling units (PSU). With Istanbul as a “self-representing” unit, the rest of the provinces were selected after a first-level stratification of provinces (roughly) according to geographical region. The southeastern provinces of Batman, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, and ≈Sªrnak were not included in the original design. Together, they accounted for less than 2 percent of the total population of registered voters. It is well documented that such a small number of PSUs increase the variance of the standard error considerably. But then again, all designs represent a compromise between technical requirements and available resources. 10. The lowest weight is .69 and the highest 1.92, with the latter being assigned to a small minority who reported to have voted for parties other than the seven major ones. The exclusion of the southeastern provinces no doubt resulted in the underrepresentation of the HADEP (coded in the “other” category). In addition, the DYP voters seem to have been undersampled. It has to be kept in mind, however, that the aim of this survey is not to estimate marginal distribution of the vote (already known at the time of the survey) but rather to study relationships and delineate factors affecting voter choice. 11. A –1 indicates that the respondent does not perform daily prayers (namaz) at all. 12. Respondents were read three widely known slogans used by Islamists, nationalists, and seculars and were asked to choose the one they felt closest to.

113

At the Ballot Box

13. We are, however, unable to assess the effects of ethnicity and religious denomination because these questions were not included in the survey instrument. 14. Some may object to our classifications of the CHP and the DSP as centerleft, the ANAP and the DYP as center-right, and the FP and the MHP as far-right on various grounds. These classifications, however, are based on voters’ evaluations of party positions. 15. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 represents the far-left, the sample mean scores for major parties (in order from left to right) were as follows: the CHP 1.85, DSP 2.96, ANAP 6.02, DYP 6.41, FP 7.77, and MHP 8.48. Voters have a clear perception of the ideological positions of these parties. 16. Because space limitations do not allow us to consider all of the thirty-two independent variables in the list, only those that appear to be the most relevant have been selected. 17. See, for example, Esmer (1995; 1999a). 18. Thus, we have a dichotomous (dummy) dependent variable with a value of 1 if the individual voted for the given party, and 0 otherwise. Ordinary least squares regression is not appropriate for dichotomous dependent variables. Instead, a logistic regression model and the maximum likelihood estimation offer a meaningful alternative. Two very useful references on logistic regression applications are Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) and Menard (1995). 19. In other words, when variables are entered stepwise, the scale is the first variable included for every party, indicating that it reduces the log-likelihood ratio more than any other one of the remaining thirty-one variables. 20. Briefly, the entries in Table 5.7 were calculated as follows: The starting point was the number of votes received by each party in the elections of 1995. Obviously, for various reasons (death, emigration, sickness, failure to register, etc.), a certain proportion of the 1995 voters did not vote in 1999. Using crude death rates and roughly adjusting this figure for attrition due to other causes, it was estimated that around 1 million of the 1995 voters failed to cast a ballot in 1999. Further assuming that the attrition rate was proportional to the percentage of votes received by each party in 1995, the number of votes each party would have gotten in 1999, had there been no gains or losses, was found. At this point, the focus turned to survey data, and based on respondents’ reporting of their votes in 1995 and 1999, the changes for each party were calculated. Again, according to survey data, 14.7 percent of those who voted in 1999 had not or could not cast a ballot in 1995. Because voter turnout in 1999 was 87 percent, this meant that 14.7 percent of the 87 percent of total number of registered voters were new in that they had not voted in the previous elections. With data concerning the voting behavior of these new voters, the estimated 1999 vote for each party was thus calculated. These estimated figures were extremely close to the actual results: Percentage of Valid Votes

ANAP CHP DSP DYP FP MHP

Estimated from Survey Data

Actual 1999 Vote

Deviation

12.07 8.70 22.15 12.34 16.81 17.87

13.22 8.71 22.19 12.01 15.41 17.98

–1.15 –0.01 –0.04 0.33 1.40 –0.11

114


21. No doubt, the popularity of its leader, Bµlent Ecevit played an important role in this outcome. However, the shift was made easier by the fact that the DSP’s leftism was perceived as very moderate. In fact, this party was seen by some as “left nationalist.” Furthermore, as noted above, the DSP’s position with respect to secularism was perceived to be mild and more understanding of religious sentiments. These ideological factors, coupled with the image of its leader, contributed to the DSP’s victory in 1999.

6 An Analysis of the Electorate from a Geographical Perspective Ali Çarkoπlu and Gamze Avcª

Although recent studies have identified the dynamics of change in the Turkish party system, they have not provided an account of changes along geographical lines between 1950 and 1999.1 This chapter investigates the patterns of party politics in Turkey over time by focusing on ideological party families and their geographical performance. First, we present an analysis of voting patterns across Turkish provinces to determine the stability of votes in successive elections at the province level. Using distributions of electoral support across Turkish provinces over the entire multiparty elections period, we derive five dimensions of electoral competition. This enables us to identify general patterns of geographical regionalization for different parties from 1950 to 1999. Finally, we examine the outcome of the April 1999 parliamentary elections in light of the findings presented in the first two sections of this analysis.

STABILITY OF PROVINCE-LEVEL ELECTORAL SUPPORT IN THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Turkish party system is the very high level of electoral volatility. Sabri Sayarª (1978), ˜stµn Ergµder (1988), ˜stµn Ergµder and Richard Hofferbert (1988), and Ali Çarkoπlu (1998) note that in the elections during the decade following the 1960 military coup, nearly one-fifth of the electorate shifted from one party to another. At the same time, fragmentation of the party system has steadily risen. In other words, the Turkish electorate has not only frequently switched parties, but it also has increasingly tended to divide its votes among greater number of parties. The lack of stable partisan support amid increasing fragmentation can be interpreted as the lack of a “party system” or “electoral 115

116


epoch” (Archer and Taylor 1981; Campbell et al. 1960; 1966; Key 1955; 1959; Pomper 1967; Schattschneider 1960). An electoral epoch or party system reflects a salient set of issue cleavages around which durable but competing coalitions are mobilized. These coalitions function as political parties organized for the purpose of seeking electoral offices. Changes from one party system to another are signaled by electoral alignments, which may or may not be associated with the demise of specific party labels. . . . Such changes in party systems shift the electorate’s attention to new sets of differing divisive issues. Electoral alignments generally are associated with distinctive shifts in the geography of elections, for the new issues are likely to cut across localities, states, and sections in newly divisive ways. (Archer, Shelley, and White 1986, 38)

The identification of different electoral epochs has always been problematic. V. O. Key (1955) has argued that, in what he called “critical elections,” voting results reveal a sharp alteration of preexisting cleavages in the electorate. Following Key’s discussion of critical elections, political scientists have associated the rise of new issues, charismatic leaders, or other factors that prompt a reshuffling of partisan loyalties with turning points in party systems (Pomper 1967). Because the core issue is shifting partisan loyalties among different sections of the electorate, the diagnosis of critical elections is primarily a microlevel problem. However, long-term, comparable, individual-level survey data on partisanship are very rare. Moreover, even when such data are available, national surveys typically do not pay attention to the issue of geographic variations in partisanship. Usually, the survey questionnaires do not even address subnational attachments to politically relevant issues or personalities but instead solely focus on nation-level attachments. Accordingly, the diagnosis of critical elections has focused on the shifts in aggregate-level patterns in election outcomes from a geographical standpoint. A basic technique used to diagnose critical turning points is simple correlation analysis. To illustrate how this technique works, a comparison of the performance of parties in one election vis-à-vis another is presented in Figure 6.1, where each axis represents the vote shares of the Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP) in the 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections for all of Turkey’s provinces. If the party in question obtains the same vote share for both 1995 and 1999 elections in all provinces, then all observations would fall exactly on the forty-five-degree line. All observation points below the forty-five-degree line represent provinces where the party in question has experienced a drop in its electoral support. In contrast, all points above the line are those provinces where the party has increased its share of the votes. For example, as shown in Figure 6.1, the DSP has

Figure 6.1

Scatter Diagram for DSP’s Vote Share in 1999 and 1995

118


experienced a drop in its vote share in only two provinces, Karaman and Iπdªr. The larger the vertical distance between the observed point above the line, the larger the increase is in the DSP’s share of votes from 1995 to 1999. The same analysis performed for the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP), for example, would show that it experienced a loss in its vote share in most provinces in 1999 compared to the previous election. An important question concerning the 1999 election results is the degree to which parties were able to hold on to their 1995 electoral support. This question can be addressed by presenting the correlation between a given party’s votes across provinces in the 1999 and 1995 elections. By correlating the votes for both elections, we can thus obtain a measure of similarity concerning their relative strengths throughout Turkey’s provinces.2 A given party’s vote share over two consecutive elections is expected to have a positive correlation with each other. As the correlation between a party’s vote shares in two consecutive elections approaches unity, the relative strength of that party across provinces in two consecutive elections tends to remain the same. A low correlation indicates a change in the bases of parties’ support (an increase or decrease) whereas a high correlation indicates geographical similarity of support bases. Consequently, the correlations measure persistence in the geographical distribution of parties’ strength, and these are not affected by changes in their absolute strength. In established democracies where a given party survives throughout the whole period of analysis, the application of the correlation technique described above is relatively simple. In that case, a single party’s vote shares across geographical units (for instance, provinces in Turkey or states in the United States) are correlated across pairs of consecutive elections. However, in the Turkish case, there has been considerable discontinuity in the party system with several major and minor parties disappearing from the political stage largely as a result of the bans imposed on them following the military coups in 1960 and 1980. Taking this characteristic of the Turkish party system into consideration, we created three groups of party families and traced the stability of their geographical support bases. We aggregated the vote shares of the center-left (CL), center-right (CR), and pro-Islamist/nationalist (PIN) parties over each of the thirteen elections between 1950 and 1999 at the provincial level.3 We calculated the correlations for these party families for the twelve consecutive election pairs of the thirteen elections during this period. Figure 6.2 shows the vote correlations for election pairs from 1950 to 1999. High correlations indicate “maintaining elections”; low correlations indicate deviating or realigning elections for the three party groups that we have formed. Looking at the average correlations across party groups over half a century of multiparty elections (Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2), we see signs of

An Analysis of the Electorate Figure 6.2

119

Vote Correlations for Election Pairs

increasing geographical consistency. For both the CL and CR sparties, the average degree of geographical consistency increased slightly. The PIN party group had a very low degree of geographical consistency during the 1960s. However, starting with the 1991 elections, the PIN parties established the highest degree of geographical consistency in their electoral bases with an overall average correlation of 0.86. In other words, the Islamic and nationalist parties successfully fortified their geographical bases by increasing both their votes and their geographical consistency. The obvious break in the correlation profile of the PIN group occurred in the aftermath of the Demokrat Parti’s (Democrat Party, DP) closure by the military regime of 1960. Prior to the military coup of May 1960, the marginal parties of the far-right, such as the Cumhuriyetçi Köylµ Millet Partisi (Republican Peasant Nation Party, CKMP), showed the highest geographical consistency in the party system, obtaining a support that was slightly over 7 percent nationwide. Clearly, these PIN parties were exploiting pockets of electoral support in the small Anatolian provinces such as Kastamonu, Kªr≈sehir, Sinop, Çankªrª, Erzurum, and U≈sak. The correlation coefficients for the PIN parties in election pairs of 1965–1969 and 1969–1973 indicate that there was no geographical consistency in these two election pairs. The turmoil in electoral politics following the banning of the DP in 1960 appears to have lasted for more than a decade. In the 1977 elections, the PIN group obtained a correlation of about 0.78, showing a high degree of geographical consistency in its electoral bases and enjoying nearly 15 percent of electoral support.

120 Table 6.1

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey Average Correlations for Ideological Party Families Center-Left

Pre-1960 1961–1977 Post-1980

0.45 0.62 0.72

Center-Right 0.55 0.56 0.68

Pro-Islamist/Nationalist 0.82 0.38 0.86

We also observe that the geographical consistency of the PIN party group survived the interruption of the 1980 coup. The correlation coefficient for the PIN party group of the 1977 and 1987 elections was 0.79, second only to the CL group of parties that year. In the parliamentary elections from 1991 to 1999, the electoral support of the PIN group of parties rose and their geographical consistency remained well above that of the CR group. With the exception of the 1999 elections, it exceeded the consistency of the CL group as well. For the CR party family, two breaks occurred: the first one in 1965 and the second in 1983. The 1965 election was the only one in the post-1960 Turkish electoral history where a single party—the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, AP)—received a majority of votes (52.9 percent) under the proportional representation electoral system. The rise of the AP clearly broke the geographical consistency of the CR parties’ electoral bases. The correlation coefficient between the 1961 and 1965 elections suggests that for CR parties 1965 was a realigning election. The three elections following 1965 also seem to have continued along the geographical patterns set by the 1965 elections, as the correlations for 1969, 1973, and 1977 are consistently above 0.65. Electoral politics in the immediate aftermath of the military regime of 1980–1983 was shaped by the constraints imposed by the officers. The banning of all political parties, including the major center-left and center-right parties of the pre-1980 period, left only three newly formed parties to contest the 1983 elections: the Halkçª Parti (Populist Party, HaP) of the centerleft, along with the Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party, MDP) and the ANAP, both of the center right. The geographical consistency of these two center-right parties’ support with the electoral bases of the CR party family in the 1977 elections represents a second low in the CR tradition with a correlation coefficient of 0.31. Ever since the 1983 elections, however, the CR parties have shown a very stable degree of consistency reflected in correlation coefficients of about 0.68. Considering that during this period the CR party group experienced a continuous decline in its electoral support, one may conclude that the electoral bases of the center-right party family have been steadily shrinking in terms of its geographical distribution.

An Analysis of the Electorate

121

Our analysis shows that the center-left parties have experienced three breaks in their geographical consistency: one in 1954, another in 1969, and the last in 1995. The lowest consistency for the CL parties occurred in the 1954 elections. This is a clear indication of a realigning election, for it implies that there was no correlation between the 1950 and 1954 election results of the CL parties—in this case the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP)—across provinces. Although we have no way of comparing this election with the level of consistency prior to the 1950 elections, it is possible to suggest that the rise of political support for the DP in the rural constituencies has significantly shifted the electoral bases of parties throughout the country. In 1965 and 1969, the CHP received its lowest share of the total votes during the entire 1950–1980 period. Although the 1965 election showed a consistent geographical pattern compared to 1961, the decrease in electoral support observed in 1969 occurred in a geographically inconsistent pattern compared to 1965. In 1973, as the CHP recuperated from its losses of the 1960s, obtaining 33.3 percent of the vote and becoming the largest party in the system, it once again shifted its geographical bases by receiving a low correlation coefficient of 0.52. In the aftermath of the 1973 elections, the center-left parties obtained the highest degree of geographical consistency. In 1991, the CL was slightly below the PIN group in its level of consistency, but in 1995 its consistency plummeted. As the DSP began to dominate the center-left group, its geographical basis shifted in 1995 in comparison to 1991. However, in 1999, when the DSP became the largest party and the CHP failed to meet the nationwide threshold of 10 percent imposed by the electoral law, the CL group’s geographical consistency reached an all-time high with a correlation coefficient of 0.95. Correlations between consecutive election pairs have been widely used to diagnose critical elections. Nevertheless, there are still problems in this particular mode of analysis. For example, as Clark Archer, Fred Shelley, and E. R. White (1986) note, in some odd cases, one could obtain negative correlations that are difficult to interpret. Moreover, analyses of only consecutive election pairs in a bivariate correlation framework ignore long-term patterns that may be present in the system. As we noted above, for the PIN parties a ten-year break occurred in the Turkish party system. However, despite this institutional break, we observe a high degree of consistency between PIN parties’ geographical electoral support pattern in 1977 compared to the 1987 elections. Similarly, long-term consistent patterns might be present in other party groups as well. One could calculate all possible bivariate correlations for our three party groups. This would mean a correlation matrix of twelve by eleven for one group, and the interpretation of such large correlation matrices would be quite cumbersome.

122

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey FACTOR ANALYSIS AND ELECTORAL EPOCHS

For the analysis of party systems and associated electoral epochs, we have used the T-mode factor analysis.4 The T-mode factor analysis uses the correlation matrix that comprises correlations among election results for different parties over geographical constituencies, in our case different provinces. Ergµder and Hofferbert (1988) conducted a similar T-mode factor analysis with orthogonal rotation to diagnose patterns of party performance in the Turkish provinces. More specifically, they sought to trace the continuities in electoral patterns in the 1965–1977 period with those in the first elections that were held following the return to electoral politics in 1983. Unlike Ergµder and Hofferbert (1988), we have followed Rudolph Rummel (1970) and Clark Archer and P. J. Taylor (1981) in our analysis and employ a T-mode principal axis factor model, which allows for a redefinition of the factors derived that are correlated with one another.5 Similar to the method used by Ergµder and Hofferbert (1988), we have grouped together several minor personalistic right-wing and center-left parties. These small parties usually have had geographically skewed performances and account for a small share of the total votes. Besides the minor left- and right-wing parties, we included all major parties with credible blackmail or coalition potential (Sartori 1976) in our analysis as separate parties. Consequently, our analysis includes the totality of the Turkish party system in thirteen parliamentary elections held between 1950 and 1999. Table 6.2 shows factor loadings of different parties’ geographical distributions of electoral support over the 1950–1999 period.6 Five interpreted oblique T-mode factors account for 64 percent of the total geographical variance generated by popular voting in general elections between 1950 and 1999. The party vote shares in different elections that have the highest loading on each factor are taken as the best indicators for these factors, and they are used to identify the underlying meanings of these factors.7 Our results are quite similar to the ones obtained by Ergµder and Hofferbert (1988) for the 1965–1977 period. Our first three factors are comparable to the structure of the factors reported by Ergµder and Hofferbert (1988). However, they include observations from the period preceding 1965 elections as well as from the post-1977 elections. Consequently, they require a slightly different interpretation. Moreover, with our oblique rotation, we diagnose two other factors that significantly add to the explanatory power of our analysis. Looking beyond the detailed statistics summarized in Table 6.2, we offer a theoretical explanation of the five factors that we delineate.

123

An Analysis of the Electorate Table 6.2 Factors DSP99 DSP95 CHP77 DSP91 CHP73 SHP87 MINLFT99 DSP87 HP83 DYP95 CHP69 CHP95 AP73 AP69 AP65 CHP99 AP77 MINLFT95 AP61 ANAP99 DYP91 MINLFT91 CHP54 DP57 MINPER91 MINLFT65 CHP61 SHP91 MINLFT69 DP54 ANAP91 IND83 CHP65 CHP50 DYP87 DYP99 MINLFT77 DP50 MINPER50 ANAP95 MINPER57 MHP73 MHP99 CHP57 MHP95 ANAP87 MINLFT73 MDP83 MINPER54 MINPER95 HADEP95

Factor Solution (T-Mode), 1950–1999 1 0.818 0.753 0.723 0.693 0.645 0.617 0.613 0.554 0.548 0.516 0.467 0.435 0.414 0.403 0.397 0.387 0.377 0.374 0.353 0.264 0.264 0.245 0.186 0.171 0.165 0.137 0.093 0.064 0.054 0.052 0.041 0.040 0.029 0.019 0.009 –0.002 –0.006 –0.006 –0.015 –0.016 –0.040 –0.082 –0.091 –0.103 –0.108 –0.123 –0.161 –0.164 –0.190 –0.192 –0.245

2 CHP54 MINLFT69 CHP57 CHP61 CHP73 CHP99 CHP77 CHP65 SHP87 CHP95 MINLFT77 MINLFT73 HP83 MINLFT65 MINLFT99 SHP91 CHP69 MINPER91 MINPER99 CHP50 MHP77 MINLFT95 FP99 MINPER95 RP95 MCP87 ANAP87 IND83 MSP73 DP50 DSP87 DSP91 RP91 HADEP95 ANAP91 DSP95 DSP99 MINLFT91 MHP73 HADEP99 MSP77 AP61 MHP99 MINPER87 RP87 MINPER69 ANAP95 MHP95 MINPER77 MINPER61 DP54

0.745 0.723 0.714 0.691 0.684 0.660 0.653 0.628 0.617 0.587 0.558 0.551 0.545 0.504 0.442 0.426 0.400 0.292 0.248 0.217 0.191 0.138 0.129 0.126 0.096 0.095 0.054 0.050 0.049 0.019 0.015 0.004 0.003 –0.013 –0.017 –0.030 –0.034 –0.034 –0.045 –0.052 –0.073 –0.087 –0.104 –0.107 –0.113 –0.119 –0.124 –0.127 –0.133 –0.139 –0.146

3 MHP99 MHP77 MCP87 MHP95 MHP73 ANAP83 MINPER57 RP91 ANAP87 CHP95 MINLFT73 MSP73 CHP99 MINLFT69 RP95 MINLFT99 FP99 AP65 DP50 MINLFT77 AP69 CHP77 CHP54 MINPER50 MINPER54 MINLFT95 AP61 AP77 CHP73 CHP69 DSP91 DYP91 DYP87 ANAP95 IND83 MINPER61 DSP99 DSP95 DYP95 CHP57 SHP87 AP73 CHP61 MINPER65 MINPER99 MINPER91 HP83 CHP65 ANAP91 DYP99 MINLFT65

0.902 0.800 0.790 0.773 0.725 0.607 0.508 0.470 0.396 0.396 0.386 0.385 0.349 0.329 0.325 0.310 0.298 0.239 0.186 0.185 0.156 0.156 0.153 0.145 0.130 0.119 0.094 0.093 0.022 0.019 0.018 –0.012 –0.016 –0.025 –0.036 –0.050 –0.062 –0.067 –0.068 –0.086 –0.099 –0.123 –0.124 –0.132 –0.145 –0.150 –0.154 –0.154 –0.164 –0.171 –0.194

4 MINPER91 SHP91 MINPER95 MINLFT95 MINPER99 MINPER77 HP83 MINPER65 HADEP99 HADEP95 MINLFT91 MINLFT69 MINPER69 SHP87 DYP99 CHP95 CHP99 MINPER61 MINLFT65 MINPER73 MINPER87 MINLFT77 MINPER57 CHP54 MHP95 DYP95 MINLFT73 MINPER54 CHP73 DYP87 RP87 DP50 DSP87 CHP57 MCP87 DYP91 CHP50 MDP83 MINPER50 MHP77 MHP73 MINLFT99 CHP77 MSP77 RP91 MHP99 MSP73 RP95 CHP65 CHP61 AP61

0.620 0.604 0.576 0.563 0.428 0.405 0.357 0.346 0.340 0.330 0.329 0.329 0.327 0.307 0.301 0.301 0.297 0.237 0.226 0.204 0.201 0.201 0.191 0.189 0.153 0.101 0.099 0.067 0.058 0.057 0.056 0.033 0.028 0.020 –0.010 –0.014 –0.014 –0.027 –0.027 –0.028 –0.029 –0.033 –0.043 –0.066 –0.073 –0.099 –0.107 –0.109 –0.111 –0.163 –0.191

5 AP65 0.850 AP69 0.808 AP61 0.698 AP77 0.694 DP50 0.679 AP73 0.663 DP54 0.656 DYP91 0.651 DYP87 0.592 DYP95 0.573 ANAP83 0.517 DP57 0.441 DSP99 0.408 DSP95 0.355 DSP91 0.278 MHP99 0.269 DYP99 0.209 CHP95 0.164 ANAP99 0.143 CHP69 0.134 MINLFT99 0.134 IND83 0.123 MINLFT73 0.120 ANAP95 0.068 MINLFT77 0.042 CHP77 0.030 MHP95 0.013 CHP54 0.007 MINLFT65 –0.004 CHP99 –0.008 CHP73 –0.030 MCP87 –0.033 CHP57 –0.053 MINLFT69 –0.053 ANAP87 –0.056 MSP73 –0.069 ANAP91 –0.074 CHP65 –0.083 CHP61 –0.085 MHP73 –0.087 MHP77 –0.098 FP99 –0.108 SHP87 –0.145 MINLFT95 –0.154 DSP87 –0.170 RP95 –0.174 RP91 –0.202 MINPER91 –0.229 MINPER87 –0.269 HP83 –0.285 MINPER57 –0.292 (continues)

124 Table 6.2 Factors HADEP99 MHP77 ANAP83 MDP87 MINPER61 MINPER87 MINPER65 MINPER73 MINPER99 MINPER77 MINPER69 MSP73 FP99 MSP77 RP91 RP87 RP95

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey (continued) 1 –0.325 –0.328 –0.351 –0.365 –0.373 –0.403 –0.414 –0.432 –0.447 –0.502 –0.557 –0.776 –0.786 –0.800 –0.817 –0.827 –0.856

Percentage of variance 21.9

2 AP65 MINPER65 ANAP83 ANAP99 DP57 MINPER73 MINPER50 MDP83 DYP95 AP69 MINPER57 MINPER54 AP73 DYP99 AP77 DYP91 DYP87

–0.180 –0.187 –0.188 –0.222 –0.265 –0.275 –0.275 –0.357 –0.398 –0.402 –0.432 –0.437 –0.452 –0.506 –0.536 –0.545 –0.580

16.0

3 MINLFT91 MSP77 DP54 RP87 SHP91 MINPER87 MINPER69 DSP87 MINPER73 CHP50 ANAP99 MINPER95 MINPER77 DP57 MDP83 HADEP95 HADEP99

–0.216 –0.230 –0.269 –0.280 –0.296 –0.308 –0.310 –0.312 –0.334 –0.336 –0.360 –0.364 –0.497 –0.561 –0.562 –0.634 –0.670

13.4

4 AP69 ANAP83 AP73 DP54 DP57 DSP99 FP99 DSP95 AP77 AP65 DSP91 IND83 ANAP99 ANAP87 CHP69 ANAP95 ANAP91

-0.212 –0.216 –0.227 –0.229 –0.270 –0.275 –0.279 –0.299 –0.309 –0.336 –0.360 –0.417 –0.516 –0.543 –0.566 –0.668 –0.737

7.1

5 RP87 –0.305 MINPER99 –0.344 MDP83 –0.348 MINPER50 –0.398 CHP50 –0.422 MINPER77 –0.433 SHP91 –0.444 MINPER95 –0.450 MINLFT91 –0.464 HADEP95 –0.517 MINPER73 –0.523 MSP77 –0.525 HADEP99 –0.535 MINPER54 –0.614 MINPER61 –0.649 MINPER69 –0.711 MINPER65 –0.782

5.6

Notes: Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: oblimin with Kaiser normalization. Component correlation matrix. All entries are factor loadings from the structure matrix. Total percentage of variance = 64.0.

Factor One High positive loadings on this factor are mostly associated with center-left parties, although the AP and the Doπru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, DYP) of the 1960s and 1970s also have positive and significant loadings. Negative loadings come primarily from the Islamist parties. In addition, the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, MHP) in 1977 and the ANAP in 1983 are situated at the negative end. Even though the pattern emerging from this factor seems to resemble the center-periphery-cleavage concept used by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan in their analysis of the development of Western European party systems (1967) and applied to Turkish political history by ≈Serif Mardin (1973), there are differences. It would be more appropriate to interpret this first dimension as the religious periphery poised against the center left of the post-1965 period.

Factor Two Center-left parties of both the 1960s and the post-1980 period have high positive loadings on this factor. However, with the CHP of the 1954 and


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1957 elections having the highest factor loadings, this factor most closely represents the bureaucratic center. The high negative loadings of the DP (the original representative of the periphery in the 1950s) and also of the AP and the DYP (the followers of the DP tradition) confirm this interpretation. We identify this factor as the center-periphery cleavage in Turkish electoral politics.

Factor Three The third factor shows yet another aspect of the underlying centerperiphery cleavage—one that emphasizes the electoral tension between the extreme Turkish nationalists and the ethnic separatist Kurdish elements represented by the MHP on the one hand and the Halkªn Demokrasi Partisi (People’s Democracy Party, HADEP) on the other. With the MHP dominating the positive and the HADEP (whose support comes almost exclusively from the ethnic Kurds of the east and the southeast) the negative ends, the third factor can be interpreted as the ethnic dimension in electoral competition.

Factor Four Minor personalistic parties and the HADEP occupy the positive end of this factor. The other end of the spectrum is dominated by the larger parties of the 1990s. As such, it can be said to represent electoral marginalism in the party system.

Factor Five This factor highlights the tensions and the contradictions that exist among the parties of the political right. The DP-AP-DYP tradition dominates the positive end of this dimension. The minor right-wing parties mostly counterbalance them. We label this factor as mainstream centerright versus the minor and personalistic far-right cleavage in Turkish politics. As is almost always the case with exploratory factor analysis, the five dimensions we derive leave considerable room for interpretation. However, we feel that the emerging pattern fits into a center-periphery framework. Nevertheless, despite the underlying presence of this theoretical approach, there are important exceptions to be reckoned with. With this caveat, we propose that the factor analysis we have carried out fits well into Mardin’s (1973) analysis. In addition, it diagnoses several latent dimensions of the underlying cleavages.

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Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey AN ALTERNATIVE LOOK AT CRITICAL ELECTIONS

Factor loadings for the parties that we included in our analysis over thirteen elections can be used to diagnose any critical elections along the five different dimensions of electoral competition. Sharp turns in factor loadings of different parties in a given dimension show the changing correlations of a party’s votes across provinces with the unobserved electoral dimension reflected by the factor in question. Such changes then can be taken as an indication of shifting electoral coalitions and commitments. As we noted above, the 1969 election seems to have been a turning point for the Turkish center-left. The factor loading of the CHP sharply rose in 1969. Similar sharp turns were also observed in the 1991 and 1995 elections. The other half of the center-left, the DSP, however, was consistently highly loaded with a slightly increasing trend. On the other end of this dimension, the religious right parties have had a stable pattern of loadings over time. The center-right AP of the 1960s and 1970s also seems to have had a geographical pattern that placed it closer to its competitor on the center-left than its competitors on the center-right. The two center-right parties of the post-1980 period, the DYP and the ANAP, were also closer to their competitors on the left than on the right. The ANAP entered into politics in 1983 with a clear religious right tendency in its geographical form. Since then, it has steadily moved toward a geographical position that is more similar to the constituency of the center-left. Our findings indicate that the center-periphery axis clearly differentiates parties in the Turkish context. Similar to our previous discussion, breaks in the CHP tradition occurred in the 1954, 1969, 1991, and 1995 elections. The periphery tradition of the DP, the AP, and the DYP slowly shifted away from the geographical constituencies of the traditional center parties as reflected by the increasing distance between their factor loadings over time. An interesting pattern that emerges from the factor loadings of our third factor concerns the minor nationalist parties on the right. Over the years, they have moved closer to eastern and southeastern constituencies, reflecting a geographical base increasingly more similar to that of the HADEP of the 1990s. In other words, the minor right seems to have moved to a geographical base that highly negatively correlates with the electoral bases of Turkish nationalists. In contrast, the minor parties of the left have taken an opposite turn and have found electoral support in a geography of constituencies that is more similar to that of the nationalist right. We also observe the ANAP moving from a predominantly nationalist geographical base to one that is closer to constituencies, giving significant support to the HADEP, which is predominantly supported in eastern and southeastern provinces. The electoral base of the Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party,


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RP) and the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, FP) also seems to have moved from one that was similar to areas generating Kurdish support in the east and southeast to constituencies that are predominantly nationalist in orientation and closer to the position of the MHP. Loadings of the parties in the CHP tradition on the fourth factor show a considerable shift over the years toward areas that give significant support to marginal parties. Although in 1969 the CHP was perhaps the mainstream party in its geographical base, it has continuously approached the marginal end of this dimension. High factor loadings indicating high correlations of the CHP electoral base with the marginalism factor reflect a relocation of the CHP support in areas that support marginal parties. While the AP of the pre-1980 period remains most distant from the marginal regions, its successor, the DYP, seems to have consistently found support in areas of marginalist electoral support. For the post-1980 period, both the DSP and the ANAP have remained distant to geographical areas where marginalist support seems to flourish. The DP-AP tradition appears to have stayed away from areas where minor right-wing parties found electoral support, especially in the 1999 election. Yet the DYP has approached the geographical bases of the minor right-wing parties. The DSP, the MHP, and to a lesser extent the ANAP, however, look like they have done just the opposite and have distanced themselves geographically from the minor right-wing party bases.

REGIONALIZATION ALONG DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION

An advantage of our method of analysis is that it allows a pictorial analysis of regionalization patterns. Factor scores obtained from our T-mode analysis are descriptions of the derived factor in terms of the observed variables, that is, the distribution of parties’ support across Turkish provinces. Factor scores for any one of the factors derived above are linear combinations of the party vote shares across all elections, weighted by their factor loadings for every province in our analysis. Thus, a high positive score in our first factor representing the center-left versus the religious-right cleavage does not reflect a lack of religious electoral support in that province. Rather, it shows that the relative weight of the center-left support over the entire period of analysis has been greater than the weight of a religious electoral support element in the system. To demonstrate the geographical distribution of different levels of factor scores across Turkish provinces, we conducted a simple hierarchical cluster analysis.8 We derived five clusters of provinces for five different factors, which we obtained from our analysis summarized above. We

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grouped Turkish provinces into five clusters that represent different combinations of typical scores over the five factors. Table 6.3 provides a summary of these five clusters. For every cluster of provinces, it provides the mean factor scores of the provinces included in the cluster across five factors. For example, in the first cluster of provinces, where we have seventeen provinces, the mean factor score for the first factor that represents the center left versus the religious right cleavage is –0.40, which indicates that a net religious-right-party vote-share influence is observed in these provinces. Similarly, these provinces seem to have supported the periphery parties more than the center, and the personalistic right-wing parties got more support than center-right parties. There is very little support for marginal parties, whereas the Turkish nationalists clearly are preferred over the Kurdish nationalists. Figure 6.3 shows the geographical location of provinces that belong to these five different clusters. Cluster 1 includes provinces such as Kµtahya, U≈sak, and Burdur of the inner Aegean region; Konya, Niπde, Kªr≈sehir, Çankªrª, Çorum, and surrounding northern central Anatolia provinces; Erzurum of the east; Giresun and Gµmµ≈ s hane of the Black Sea; and Kahramanmara≈s of the Mediterranean region. The electoral characteristics of cluster 1 are summarized in Table 6.3. They are predominantly Turkish nationalist, more personalistic right wing than center right, more peripheral than central, and show no tendency toward marginalism. The second cluster includes both Istanbul and Ankara, as well as Adana, ºçel, and Hatay of the Mediterranean region. Also included in this cluster are Gaziantep of the southeast; Sivas of central Anatolia; Tokat, Ordu, Amasya, and Trabzon of the Black Sea; Kars of the east; and Sakarya of the Marmara region. This is the least geographically compact among all derived clusters, and its main electoral characteristic is that it displays a strong tendency to support the center against the periphery. It is also more

Table 6.3

Factor 1 2 3 4 5

Cluster Solution for Five Electoral Dimensions Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster 1 2 3 4 5

Center-left vs religious right –0.40 Center vs periphery –0.62 Turkish nationalist vs Kurdish support 0.97 Marginalism 0.02 Center-right vs minor personalistic right-wing –0.24 Number of provinces in each cluster 17

0.10 1.25 0.49 –0.29 –0.13 14

0.72 –0.24 –0.36 –0.31 0.90 21

1.64 2.44 –0.73 4.64 –1.62 1

–1.14 –0.43 –1.52 0.55 –1.14 10

Note: The analysis includes only sixty-three provinces that continuously existed over the period of analysis.

Figure 6.3

Cluster Solution for Five Electoral Dimensions, 1950–1999

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Turkish nationalist than Kurdish, antimarginal, and more center-right in its patterns of electoral support. The third cluster is quite compact and covers all of the Marmara region provinces except Istanbul and Sakarya, all coastal Aegean provinces, and Isparta; Eski≈sehir from central Anatolia; and Bolu, Zonguldak, Samsun, Rize, and Artvin from the coastal Black Sea region. With the exception of the three coastal eastern Black Sea provinces, this cluster consists of the relatively more developed western provinces. It has more support for center-left and center-right parties as opposed to religious and personalistic right-wing parties. These provinces have strong antimarginal electoral support. However, they also display a slight tendency to support the peripheral parties of the DP tradition as opposed to the center represented by the CHP tradition. The fourth cluster consists of only Tunceli, where marginal parties have traditionally been quite powerful. The fifth cluster contains ten provinces of the east and southeast Anatolian regions. This is the most geographically compact cluster that comprises south of Aπrª, Bingöl, and Mu≈ s and west of Adªyaman and ≈Sanlªurfa. The predominant electoral characteristic of all of the provinces that belong to this cluster is support for the pro-Kurdish and personalistic right-wing parties. Having identified different groupings of Turkish provinces according to the nature of their electoral support, one needs to find out the underlying socioeconomic and party system characteristics for these patterns. The data requirements to address this issue are very demanding and, at the present time, even prohibitive. But several suggestive patterns underlining the socioeconomic basis of geographical clusters in election outcomes can be found in Çarkoπlu’s (2000) analysis of the 1999 elections.

GEOGRAPHY OF THE APRIL 1999 TURKISH ELECTION

The map of seven clusters of provinces identified by Çarkoπlu (2000) bears significant similarities to the map shown in Figure 6.3 above for the entire multiparty elections period. The clusters of provinces identified in Çarkoπlu (2000) are reproduced in Table 6.4. These clusters differ significantly in their party system characteristics. The predominantly central Anatolian cluster 2 has on the average the highest level of volatility from 1995 to 1999 elections. About 25 percent of the electorate in cluster 2’s provinces shifted from one party to another from 1995 to 1999. The MHP is the dominant party in the largest cluster of provinces where the level of party competition is the lowest and the level of electoral volatility is the highest. It seems that electoral preferences have

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An Analysis of the Electorate Table 6.4

Cluster Solution for 1999 General Election Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Number of cases in each cluster 7 ANAP 10.5 DSP 4.6 DYP 12.4 FP 13.4 MHP 6.3 CHP 5.6 HADEP 38.1

35 11.3 13.8 14.0 18.3 26.6 8.5 1.7

5 14.2 7.0 16.2 20.8 10.9 6.8 13.6

2 6.9 4.9 7.5 24.9 16.7 9.6 3.6

25 15.2 29.9 14.7 8.6 16.0 8.3 2.3

2 33.6 17.1 11.7 17.7 10.1 4.5 2.2

4 13.5 6.9 16.8 9.7 4.8 8.2 21.2

Note: Only major parties are reported despite the fact that all parties were included in the cluster analysis.

dramatically shifted in cluster 2 provinces largely toward the MHP—a trend that has undermined the competitive strengths of the other parties. In the western Anatolian provinces of cluster 5, where the DSP is dominant, the level of party competition is higher but electoral volatility is lower than in cluster 2. The eastern and southeastern provinces that compose clusters 1, 3, 4, and 7 show, on the average, the highest level of party competition but also the lowest level of electoral volatility because the region’s electoral preferences did not change significantly from 1995. The high level of fractionalization (and thus the larger number of effective parties in the eastern and southeastern provinces) is due to the strong showing of the HADEP. In short, the party system across Turkish provinces shows a clear division into three effective regions. The east and southeastern provinces are characterized by significant fragmentation between the Kurdish nationalist HADEP, the Islamist FP, and the center-right parties. The MHP-dominant central Anatolian regions of cluster 2 have the lowest number of parties and thus the lowest level of competition. However, the level of volatility or the shift from one party in 1995 to another in 1999 has been the greatest there. One suspects that the shift in these provinces was from the RP in 1995 mainly to the MHP in 1999. The DSP-dominated western provinces are characterized by relatively high levels of competition together with a sizable level of electoral volatility. Çarkoπlu (2000) writes that these clusters are significantly different from each other in terms of their socioeconomic characteristics. The first pattern that emerges from his analysis is that the western Anatolian provinces of cluster 5 have higher average life expectancy, literacy, and enrollment rates; a higher income; and a higher value for the composite human development index. Not surprisingly, the provinces of cluster 2—

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mostly made up of provinces in central Anatolia—rank above the eastern and southeastern provinces of clusters 1, 3, 4, and 7 but below cluster 5 in all socioeconomic variables except life expectancy. The eastern and southeastern provinces of clusters 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7 are more or less the same with respect to life expectancy. For all other variables, eastern and southeastern provinces of clusters 1, 3, 4, and 7 have the lowest values. The seven clusters derived on the basis of election results not only have a distinct political systemic pattern that separates them from each other, but they are also distinct from each other in socioeconomic terms. The main patterns that were described in the writings of Paul Magnarella (1967), K. S. Srikantan (1973), and Melvin Albaum and C. S. Davies (1973) hold true after nearly three decades of social change and economic development. An important pattern that emerges from the two maps, one representing the electoral clusters of ideological groupings for the 1950–1999 period and the other focusing solely on the 1999 election, is about the socioeconomic variation among the Turkish provinces. The least developed eastern and southeastern provinces remain intact over the whole multiparty period with a distinct set of anti-systemic, personalistic, and marginal preferences. The central Anatolian region can be divided into two subregions for the entire 1950–1999 period. However, it emerges as a single compactly conservative, center-right region in the April 1999 election. These central Anatolian provinces exhibit a high degree of volatility at least for the last elections. The relatively stable, central ideological tendencies of the western, Marmara, and scattered Black Sea provinces also appear the same in the overall pattern when compared to the last election. Yet these more modern, politically less volatile and less fragmented provinces are fewer in number for the most recent elections, as several of them have joined the central Anatolian conservative cluster. In other words, the center-right ideological orientations of the peripheral electoral groups have expanded in the five decades of the multiparty period.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding sections, we have identified the critical turning points and patterns over thirteen general elections in Turkey from 1950 to 1999. We distinguished between critical elections for the center-right, center-left, and the pro-Islamist/nationalist party families and placed these elections into the general political context. We focused on general electoral patterns for the whole multiparty period and identified geographical regions of different ideological orientations. We concluded the chapter by concentrating on the April 1999 general election. Our analysis revealed considerable support for the center-periphery


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paradigm in Turkish politics. The geographical patterns that emerge make room for an interpretation that emphasizes the salience of the centerperiphery framework while leaving some important exceptions unaccounted for. We take note of the exceptions and offer significant qualifications to the center-periphery theme. One important pattern that emerges from our analysis of different electoral dimensions is that the peripheral forces are quite heterogeneous and that they display pro-Islamist and nationalist tendencies along with the continuing influence of the more centrist DP tradition. An important latent dimension is the role of the Kurdish vote behind the HADEP in recent elections that define both the nationalist as well as the centrist electoral forces. The most recent elections reveal several important characteristics of the Turkish electorate and also signal the following trends in Turkish politics. First, there is continuing electoral fluidity and fragmentation of partisan support. Second, the electoral bases of the extreme-right, made up of the Islamist and nationalist parties, have grown and experienced notable shifts. Third, electoral support for the mainstream center-right parties has steadily declined. The regional patterns that emerge from the 1999 elections reveal groupings that are very much in line with the development levels of provinces. The regional patterns of electoral support also demonstrate that the anti-systemic and personalistic voting behavior in the eastern and southeastern provinces have been among the major characteristics of Turkey’s electoral politics since the transition to democracy in 1950. Clearly, this long-term trend has undermined the nationalization of electoral forces in Turkey. Furthermore, we observe that the western Aegean, Marmara, and a number of Black Sea coastal provinces display a relatively well-established pattern of electoral support for the centrist parties of the left and the right. Over the years, these regions have offered only limited support for the antisystem and far-right parties. Pro-Islamist and nationalist elements in the Turkish party system find electoral support in the inner-Anatolian peninsula and western parts of eastern Anatolia. The long-term stability of this support base for the Turkish extreme right appears to be growing and moving, geographically speaking, into the inner Aegean region. These long-term trends, as revealed most recently in the outcome of the 1999 elections, parallel the social and economic disparities that exist between these three regions. In other words, as long as developmental problems and disparities continue, the electoral bases of anti-systemic, nationalist, and pro-Islamist parties will most likely stay intact if not expand over the next elections. Finally, our analysis demonstrates that—despite all claims to the contrary—the April 1999 parliamentary elections were “uncritical” in that they sustained the recent trends in Turkish party politics rather than display decisive changes in electoral alignments. From a geographical perspective,

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we see that the pattern that emanated from the most recent elections is in accordance with past patterns of ideological groupings across provinces.

NOTES 1. See Çarkoπlu (1997; 1998), Esmer (1995), and Kalaycªoπlu (1994; 1999). 2. The Pearson correlation coefficient r varies between +1.0 and –1.0, both extremes indicating a perfect relationship between variables, and 0 representing the absence of a linear relationship. The size of the correlation coefficient indicates the strength of the relationship. As the vote share of a given party in 1999 approaches its vote share in 1995, the points on the scatter diagram approach the form of a straight line, and thus the correlation coefficient approaches unity. The sign of the correlation coefficient indicates the direction of a relationship. A positive (negative) sign indicates that high scores on one variable (party vote shares across provinces in a given election) tend to be associated with high (low) scores on the other variable. 3. We acknowledge here the difficulty of classifying the CHP of the 1950s and early 1960s and even for later periods as a left party in the modern Western sense. The tradition of the CHP is more suitably classified as “center” in the sense that Mardin (1973) uses the term. Nevertheless, for our purposes the group of center-left parties represents a compact and comparable group across the multiparty election period. Similarly, the center-right and pro-Islamist/nationalist parties represent two branches of the peripheral electoral coalitions, and they remain as a compact party group throughout our period of analysis. 4. See Archer and Taylor (1981), Shelley and Archer (1984), and Osei-Kwame and Taylor (1984). In the first stage of T-mode factor analysis, the researcher computes bivariate correlations between all variables, the vote shares of different parties in different elections in our case. The correlation matrix resulting from these calculations is then used as input in the factor analysis procedure. The extraction of different factors is based on the identification of common variation between these variables. It is assumed that variables representing a single dimension will be highly correlated with that dimension. 5. The statistical assumptions underlying the direct Oblimin rotation we adopted allow for decomposition of the areal variance of any election into its latent constituent elements or factors that may be correlated with each other. The factors are linear recombinations of the observed data to identify general relationships. Usually, areal returns from a given election are highly correlated with those from several other elections, indicating high levels of common variance among these elections. T-mode factor analysis identifies these common variance components, or factors, and groups of elections represented by a factor identify elections belonging to a normal-vote, maintaining sequence. . . . An oblique rotation strategy allows for several, perhaps correlated, maintaining or normal voting patterns to be reflected in any specific election. This may be appropriate since new electoral cleavages are unlikely to completely destroy all manifestations of older electoral cleavages at one time. (Archer, Shelley, and White 1986, 43–44) 6. A factor loading is similar to a correlation coefficient. It varies between –1


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and +1 and can be interpreted as the correlation between a given variable and the latent dimension of geographic variation in electoral support. 7. Factor loadings of 0.3 or below are considered to be too weak to represent a factor. See Kline (1994, 52–53). Accordingly, to simplify the exposition we only reported those with a loading greater than 0.3 in absolute value. 8. In a cluster analysis, observations (in this case support for different parties across provinces) are grouped in such a way that observations within each group are similar to each other with respect to a certain characteristic. In our case, this would be electoral support for parties, where each group is different from the other groups with respect to the same criteria. See Sharma (1996, 185), and Hair et al. (1995, 420–483).

7 Ethnic and Religious Bases of Voting Ay≈se Gµne≈s-Ayata and Sencer Ayata

Students of Turkish politics generally agree that the party system in Turkey has been undergoing major structural changes, some of which parallel the changes taking place in European party systems. In Turkey, as in a number of countries in Europe, increasing political fragmentation and voter volatility are highly visible trends (Sani and Sartori 1985). As the established parties lose ground, there is growing antiparty sentiment and electoral volatility. At the same time, new protest parties are gaining support (Anderson 1998)—a trend that is a major deviation from Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s (1967) hypothesis concerning the “freezing” of party systems in post–World War II Western Europe. As a result of the fundamental changes taking place in the economic and social structures of European societies—such as revolutionary changes in the speed and modes of communication, increasing flexibility in economic activities, the shrinking of the industrial work force, and reductions in social welfare spending (Ware 1987)—the traditional cleavages based on class, religion, and center-periphery are being profoundly transformed. In many European countries, party loyalty and identification have declined (Ware 1996), and political parties find it increasingly difficult to rely on a core group of readily available supporters. Developments such as increasing degrees of realignment, volatility, and fragmentation are also being closely associated with the rise of postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1977; 1990). For instance, J. Willey (1998) argues that while old parties try to adjust to the new system, new parties arise as a result of the increasing strains between the agendas of the old parties and the new demands of society. Growing voter dissatisfaction increases protest voting, and this, in turn, feeds the fragmentation and volatility trends. The recent developments in Turkey’s party system display a number of similar features, though there are also considerable differences regarding 137

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the political context in which the Turkish and the European parties function. In Western Europe, unlike in Turkey, democratic regimes are fully consolidated and political systems are highly stable. Furthermore, unlike in Europe, changes associated with the transition to postindustrial society have had a minimal impact on the evolution of the Turkish party system. The distances between national political systems and processes have narrowed under the increased influence of global forces. Nevertheless, there are still significant differences due largely to different degrees of economic development and variations in the specific attributes of national political cultures. The decline in party identification has been a prominent feature of the changing European party systems. As several studies in this book suggest, party identification in Turkey has also been on the decline. Election results of the 1990s have shown that Turkey’s centrist parties suffer significantly from high electoral volatility and that they are less able to count on the votes of their hard-core supporters. Election results also indicate that the nationalist and religious parties in Turkey are able to maintain—and even increase—the number of their hard-core members and enjoy high levels of supporter/voter ratios. This, however, can be a disadvantage for them because being identified with specific groups may limit their appeal to larger sections of the electorate. In Western Europe, both religion and ethnicity have had paradoxical effects on politics and voting behavior. Whereas some religiously oriented parties have faced an erosion of voter support due to socioeconomic changes and secularization, the religious platforms of others, often interwoven with neonationalist discourses, have competed successfully with social class as determinants of electoral behavior (Beyme 1983). In Turkey, by contrast, religiosity and religious voting have become entrenched, often overlapping with class as well as ethnic and regional motives and identities. Issues concerning identity, along with shared feelings of discontent and deprivation (Urwin 1983), have played a major role in the rise of ethnic and religious voting in Europe in recent years. In the Turkish case, the overlapping of cleavages are reinforced by the reaction from the periphery against the homogenizing, standardizing, and centralizing pressures of the modern state. We argue in this chapter that ethnic and religious voting in Turkey lie at the very core of such conflicting tendencies and coinciding cleavages.1 The analyses of ethnic and religious voting in Turkey have to rely mainly on inferences from aggregate-level data, for data on individual voting behavior is very scarce. This is particularly true for those who wish to study the effects of ethnicity on voting. Since 1965, questions on religion and ethnic identity have been excluded from the national censuses. In this chapter, we support our arguments mostly by macrolevel data such as the

Ethnic and Religious Bases of Voting

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regional distribution of votes and socioeconomic characteristics of constituencies, yet we also refer to the findings of public opinion surveys whenever possible.

ETHNIC AND REGIONAL VOTING, KURDS, AND THE HADEP

Because the Kurds constitute the second-largest ethnic group in Turkey, discussions about the ethnic basis of voting focus almost exclusively on them. However, the Kurds in Turkey are not a homogenous population. On the contrary, there are significant linguistic and religious-sectarian variations within the Kurdish community. For instance, the religious difference between the Alevi and the Sunni Kurds is a major source of variation in voting behavior. Depending on different estimates, ethnic Kurds constitute anywhere between 12 and 20 percent of Turkey’s total population (Andrews 1989). Although ethnic Kurds are concentrated mainly in southeastern Turkey, massive migration in recent decades has caused a major drift of the Kurdish population toward the country’s western provinces. In fact, the majority of the Kurds now live in western rather than southeastern Turkey. It is also important to note that large numbers of Turks as well as members of smaller communities, such as ethnic Arabs, also live in eastern and southeastern Anatolia. The votes received by the major pro-Kurdish political party, Halkªn Demokrasi Partisi (People’s Democracy Party, HADEP), in the 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections and the municipal elections in 1999 is a significant indicator of Kurdish ethnic voting in Turkey. Ethnically based political parties are legally forbidden; therefore, the program and election manifestos of the HADEP emphasize democratization and cultural pluralism but do not contain any references to Kurdish ethnic or national identity. Nevertheless, the Kurdish nationalist tendencies of this party are well known. Furthermore, the HADEP’s friends and foes alike perceive it as having close ties with the Kurdish ethnic separatist organization Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers Party, PKK). The leaders of the HADEP often find themselves under pressure both from their supporters for the promotion of a collective Kurdish identity and from the state and judicial authorities to abandon Kurdish nationalist propaganda. With respect to its voter base, the HADEP still remains a highly localized party. In the 1999 local elections, it won thirty-six mayoralties out of a total of 540 in eastern and southeastern Turkey, that is, a mere 6.6 percent. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, the party polled 4.8 percent of the national vote. However, the percentages were 18.5 for the southeastern and

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12.2 for the eastern provinces (Tuncer 1999). In the Mediterranean region, which received considerable Kurdish migration in the 1990s, it scored slightly above its national average by getting 5.1 percent of the votes. Even in the east and the southeast, the biggest electoral prizes went to the religious Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP) and its successor, Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, FP), which received 31.5 percent and 28 percent of the votes in the southeast and the east, respectively, in 1995. Their share of the vote was somewhat lower for 1999—19.9 percent and 18.8 percent, respectively. Nevertheless, the Islamist FP was able to come out with a plurality of the votes in these two regions. Given the estimates about the number of ethnic Kurds in Turkey and assuming that the source of the HADEP’s voter support is exclusively Kurdish, we can infer that anywhere between onequarter and one-third of ethnic Kurds tend to vote for the HADEP. In the cities, poor Kurdish migrant families usually live in squatter housing (gecekondu) areas, where people of similar backgrounds, often from the same village or tribal origin, tend to cluster, forming socially isolated and solidaristic communities (Gökçe et al. 1993). In these neighborhoods, the existence of widespread unemployment and highly insecure living conditions foster feelings of resentment and a sense of deprivation among the Kurds. Because they usually perceive social inequality in terms of ethnicity, the Kurds place greater emphasis on their ethnic bonds and identities (Özdaπ 1995). Consequently, the Kurdish ethnic community becomes an easy target for political mobilization and ethnic block voting. In fact, this form of mobilization and voting becomes the fundamental means of asserting communal solidarity and protest against the security forces and the government. The authorities suspect the Kurdish population in the cities and often see them as a security threat, as the relatives of some of the Kurds take part in the activities of the PKK. Religious and tribal affiliations among Turkey’s Kurdish citizens are also major sources of communal political mobilization, although these tend to benefit other political parties as well as the HADEP. The outcome of the municipal elections in 1999 shows that the HADEP vote tends to be higher in urban centers compared to rural areas. Earlier, M. ≈Seker (1997) had estimated that two-thirds of the HADEP’s votes come from Turkey’s urban centers. The major exceptions are either those provinces where the Kurdish population is overwhelmingly rural or those where the city population is predominantly non-Kurdish. Examples for the latter would include Mardin and Erzurum. But in the provinces of Iπdªr and Aπrª, where the urban population is roughly split equally between ethnic Kurds and others, the votes are divided mainly between the Kurdish nationalist HADEP and the Turkish nationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, MHP). The HADEP votes in these cities are strongly indicative of ethnic-communal mobilization. This often creates a


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backlash from the non-Kurdish voters who tend to support those parties that emphasize Turkish nationalism. Because the Islamist RP/FP claimed the largest share of the votes—and most probably ethnic votes—in the heavily Kurdish-populated provinces in the southeast in the last two general elections, their electoral support is significant for understanding trends in ethnic voting in Turkey. ≈Seker (1997) and Nejat Erder (1996) estimate that one-fourth and close to one-third, respectively, of the ethnic Kurds voted for the RP in 1995. However, in the 1999 elections, the FP got 11.6 and 7.8 percentage points less than the RP in the east and the southeast, respectively. In all probability, the HADEP was the main beneficiary of the decline in the support received by the Islamist FP. Turkey’s eastern provinces have a well-established tradition and history of religious conservatism. This is best illustrated by the profound influences of leaders and social networks based on religious orders, sects, and tarikats (brotherhoods). During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, religious institutions played a crucial role in integrating a society that was deeply divided along tribal lines. Thus, the religious leaders have always commanded respect and authority in this region. In a nationwide survey (Erder 1996), 35.2 percent of the ethnic Kurds stated that they wanted sharia rule to be established in Turkey.2 In a survey conducted in Ankara (Gµne≈s-Ayata 1993b), 40 percent of the respondents who identified themselves as ethnic Kurds also claimed to be religiously conservative while 11.0 percent of them favored the establishment of an Islamic state in Turkey. Despite serious setbacks since the early 1980s, the center-right parties and especially the Doπru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, DYP) still claim a significant share of the votes in the east and southeast. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, the DYP received 12 and 16 percent of the votes in these two regions, respectively. The main basis of support for the center-right parties is tribally mobilized bloc voting. This is the case, for instance, with tribal groups that receive cash and weapons from the state to help the security forces in their fight against the PKK. When the DYP was the senior partner of a coalition government from 1991 to 1995, it sought to forge an alliance with some of the influential Kurdish tribal leaders. The influence of the center-left parties in the southeast and the east has gradually waned. Bµlent Ecevit’s Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP) has categorically rejected the existence of a “Kurdish problem.” It has argued that seemingly ethnic grievances, in fact, reflect deeprooted social class inequalities, especially the exploitative nature of the feudal relations and repressive landlordism. The other main center-left political force, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP), has adopted a more liberal policy, arguing for the recognition of a

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Kurdish subidentity under the primary identity of Turkish citizenship. The predecessor of the CHP, the Sosyal Demokrat Halkçª Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party, SHP), had even gone as far as making an electoral alliance with the pro-Kurdish Halkªn Emekçi Partisi (People’s Labor Party, HEP) in the 1991 parliamentary elections. As a result, twenty-two HEP candidates were elected to parliament on the CHP ticket. Relations between the two parties, however, became increasingly acrimonious and finally broke off with the expulsion of the HEP members from the parliament.3 Since then, the CHP has steadily lost votes to the HADEP in the region. In the ten provinces stretching along Turkey’s borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, the high rate of ethnic protest voting among the ethnic Kurds has enabled the HADEP to become the strongest party in electoral contests. In these areas, the share of the ethnic Kurdish votes varies between one-third and one-half of the total electorate. In this leastdeveloped part of the southeast and the east, the votes for the HADEP in the 1999 parliamentary elections varied between a low of 22.1 percent in Siirt and a high of 46 percent in Hakkari. Detailed election results for all provinces are given in the Appendix Table B.18. Suffice it to note here that in the three provinces situated in the southeastern tip of Turkey— Diyarbakªr (symbolically and ideologically the center of the Kurdish ethnonationalist movement), Batman, and Hakkari—the HADEP votes reached record high levels in 1999. In the municipal elections of the same year, the HADEP received 62.5 percent, 57.2 percent, and 56.1 percent of the votes in Diyarbakªr, Batman, and Hakkari, respectively. All of these three provinces, especially Diyarbakªr and Batman, became the main centers of an inflow of migrants as a result of socioeconomic changes in the outlying rural areas, political turbulence, and the evacuation of the villages by security forces. Hence, between 1995 and 1999, the number of eligible voters increased by 44 percent in Batman and 40 percent in Diyarbakªr. The second major HADEP stronghold is the cluster of provinces along Turkey’s eastern border where the party’s votes vary between 30 and 35 percent. Finally, in the three relatively small southeastern provinces of Mardin, ≈Sªrnak, and Siirt, the electoral support for the HADEP is between 20 and 25 percent. This is considerably lower than the other two clusters but much higher than the western provinces of the southeastern region. The differences of support for the HADEP in the region where large numbers of ethnic Kurds live are striking and need further elaboration. One important factor is the religious sectarian divisions in Turkey. The Alevis, and mainly the Kurdish Alevis, who are concentrated in the central eastern provinces, tend to vote for the leftist rather than Kurdish nationalist parties. The second factor concerns the differences between the Hanafi and the ≈Safi schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. The majority of non-Kurds in


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Turkey belong to the Hanafi school while the followers of the largely Kurdish ≈Safi school are mostly concentrated in eastern Anatolia. Kurdish nationalism has wider appeal among the ≈Safi as evidenced by the roughly 45 percent HADEP vote in 1999 in Hakkari, Diyarbakªr, and Batman. In the northeastern provinces where the Hanafi are more numerous, the FP has stronger electoral support. Finally, the presence of a sizable ethnic Arab population in such provinces as Mardin, Urfa, and Siirt has a negative impact on the HADEP votes. According to ˜mit Özdaπ (1995), the proportion of ethnic Arabs is as high as 36 percent in Mardin and 39 percent in Siirt. The difference in the HADEP’s votes between Hakkari, Diyarbakªr, and Batman on the one hand, and Siirt, Mardin, and ≈Sªrnak on the other is influenced by the relatively large number of ethnically Arab voters in the latter. Tribal loyalties, too, cut across ethnic identities and loyalties, as rival tribes have traditionally tended to support opposing political parties. Consequently, where tribal solidarity is strong, politics usually cuts across ethnic group identities. The leaders of the powerful Kurdish tribes are well integrated into the mainstream of Turkish society and politics. Due to their ability to control the political loyalties of their followers, the HADEP votes remained at only 13.7 percent in Bitlis and 12.8 percent in Bingöl in the 1999 parliamentary elections. The western half of southeast Anatolia is a distinctive region both in terms of its voting patterns and socioeconomic characteristics. Largely as a result of the massive irrigation and dam construction involved in the Gµneydoπu Anadolu Projesi (Southeast Anatolian Project, GAP), the western half of the southeast has experienced rapid economic and social changes in recent years. In Gaziantep, Urfa, and Adªyaman, where better economic prospects have created a mood of optimism among the people, the HADEP receives considerably fewer votes than its regional average despite the existence of a sizable ethnic Kurdish population. The province of Urfa—which happens to be both the hometown of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and the economic and administrative center of the GAP—is illustrative of this trend. With 16.5 percent in 1999, Urfa has the highest proportion of the HADEP votes in the western half of southeast Anatolia. Yet this is only one-third of the votes that it received in the neighboring province of Diyarbakªr. In Gaziantep and Adªyaman where large populations of ethnic Kurds live, the striking fact is that the HADEP’s support (in 1999, 5.4 and 7.6 percent, respectively) is not only very low but that it actually declined between 1995 and 1999. Election results in the GAP region indicate that socioeconomic development has a profound impact on ethnic identity and voting behavior: It tends to reduce ethnonationalist sentiments and fosters more diversified political loyalties. It is also important to note that although the southeast is

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often seen as a monolithic political and social entity, it is, in fact, a diverse rather than culturally and politically unified region. Its western and eastern parts display two different and contrasting political tendencies. Hence, statements about the HADEP emerging as the strongest party in the southeast region overlook the fact that the party’s average votes in the western half is only about 10 percent as opposed to 40 percent in the eastern half. The three major cities of the Mediterranean region, Adana, Mersin, and Antalya, have become major destinations for Kurdish migration during the 1990s. As a result, the ethnic Kurds in these three provinces constitute a considerable proportion of urban populations (GAP 1994). In all these provinces, the HADEP votes increased between 1995 and 1999. In fact, in ºçel, the party came very close to winning the metropolitan mayorship with 17.5 percent of the votes in 1999. The HADEP’s success in mobilizing the ethnic vote stemmed largely from the expectations of the ethnic Kurds that they would get preferential access to municipal patronage resources such as jobs, services, and business contracts in return for supporting the party. Since nearly one-third of the population in Adana, Mersin, and Antalya are of Kurdish origin, approximately one-quarter to one-third of the Kurdish voters tended to cast their ballots for the HADEP in these cities. A sociologically distinctive aspect of Kurdish migrant communities in cities of the Çukurova basin is that the vast majority live in ethnically segregated residential areas. Kurdish migrants in these cities typically live in the squatter settlements; the majority have access only to marginal jobs that provide meager incomes and suffer from the absence of social security and adequate municipal services. Economic deprivation and social isolation reinforce both communal solidarity and the politicization of ethnic identities, which, in turn, paves the way for protest votes that favor the HADEP (Gµndµz and Yetim 1997). The major HADEP strongholds in cities such as Adana and Mersin are the culturally isolated and ghettolike settlements where the Kurdish population is heavily concentrated. Turks, Arabs—a sizable proportion of whom are Alevi—and Kurds constitute the three major ethnic groups in the Çukurova basin. The increased visibility and the politicization of the Kurdish population in the Çukurova cities have created a backlash from many Turks, Arabs, and Turcomans who have increasingly tended to support the extreme Turkish nationalist MHP. Since the 1970s, Turkey’s most developed regions such as Marmara and the Aegean and their leading metropolitan centers have attracted large numbers of Kurdish migrants from the southeast and the east. For instance, in 1990 the population from east and southeast Anatolia—although most certainly all of whom are not ethnic Kurds—had reached 25 percent in Istanbul, 24.4 percent in ºzmir, and 12 percent in Ankara (GAP 1994). By the end of the decade, the estimated ethnic Kurdish population in Istanbul and Ankara had reached approximately 1.5 million and half a million,


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respectively. Today, more of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens live in the country’s western provinces than in its eastern provinces, and Istanbul has more ethnic Kurds than Diyarbakªr (Sönmez 2000). In large metropolitan centers such as Istanbul and ºzmir, voting patterns among ethnic Kurds show great variation. In these cities, as well as the rest of western Turkey in general, migrants of Kurdish origin, who are by and large unskilled and low-paid laborers, typically live in the gecekondu settlements. Many tend to live close to their relatives and those from the same village or town. Thus, they form closely knit neighborhood clusters. However, compared to the east and the southeast, in large cities lifestyles are more diverse, traditional mechanisms of social control are weaker, the ethnic Kurdish communities are more stratified, and interaction with nonKurds are more frequent both in the workplace and in public. Although ethnic identity is also a significant dimension of social interaction in everyday life, social and economic problems can be as significant as ethnic identity in influencing voting behavior. This is also reflected in the HADEP’s appeals to the voters that emphasize issues such as poverty, unemployment, and housing shortages in a style similar to those of the leftist parties. Voting by ethnic Kurds who have migrated to the large cities in western Turkey displays a number of characteristics. The HADEP received 4.3 and 4 percent of the total votes in ºzmir and Istanbul, respectively, in the 1999 parliamentary elections. However, despite the heavy Kurdish influx into these cities in the late 1990s, the HADEP’s votes increased only marginally between the 1995 and 1999 elections. Electoral outcomes in 1995 and 1999 suggest that the majority of the Kurds who live in large cities in western Turkey tend to vote for political parties other than the HADEP. For instance, while the Kurdish poor tend to vote mainly for the Islamist FP, the educated middle-class Kurds prefer leftist parties such as the CHP. On the whole, then, the Kurds in metropolitan cities vote in accordance with age, class, and gender as much as ethnicity. Factors such an upward social mobility, religious community affiliations, workplace networks, clientelistic ties, and the development of new identities and loyalties in the urban context tend to divide the ethnic Kurds’ votes among various competing political parties.

ELECTORAL PREFERENCES OF THE ALEVIS

It is estimated that the Alevis, who are ethnically divided among the Turks, Kurds, and Arabs, make up nearly 20 percent of Turkey’s population. Traditionally, rural east-central Anatolia has been the homeland of the Alevis and only a fraction of them lived in the cities. Until recently, the Alevi population was very small in most other parts of Turkey. The Turkish

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Alevis were concentrated mainly in the east-central provinces of Sivas, Mara≈s, Çorum, Amasya, and Tokat, though pockets of Alevi settlements did exist in some of the west-central provinces as well. The Kurdish Alevis, on the other hand, who make up nearly one-fifth of the total Alevi population, were largely settled in those provinces that are farther to the east, such as Tunceli, Erzincan, and Adªyaman. Finally, the Arab Alevis, who are numerically much less significant than the other two communities, were found mainly in the southern provinces of Hatay, Adana, and ºçel, near Turkey’s borders with Syria (Andrews, 1989). Over time, the number of Alevis living in the urban areas increased significantly as a result of migration to the cities in the south and to the large metropolitan centers in the west (Shankland 1996). The Alevi identity, regardless of ethnicity, emphasizes the values of secularism, democracy, and, for many, left-wing politics and ideologies. Thus, the Alevis regard Kemal Atatµrk very highly and see him somewhat as the contemporary manifestation of the Caliph Ali, the spiritual leader and mentor of the Alevis. Similarly, Alevi intellectuals and politicians draw parallels between the egalitarian, solidaristic, and participatory aspects of their culture and the ideas and principles of a democratic society. Moreover, they place special emphasis on gender equality as having an important place in the cultural life of their community. Until the 1990s, the Alevis tended to vote overwhelmingly for the CHP, for they viewed it as the main repository of the ideals of Kemalism, secularism, democracy, and, in general, the left (Schµler 1998). In the 1960s and again in the late 1990s, pro-Alevi parties were founded. However, neither proved successful in attracting enough votes necessary for political survival. In the 1990s, the Alevi votes were split among different political parties. Consequently, no single party was able to claim their representation in politics as it had been the case with the CHP in the past. The role of ethnicity in shaping the electoral preferences of the Alevis has always been weak. A survey carried out in Ankara in 1993 (Gµne≈sAyata, 1993b) showed that 96 and 88 percent of the Kurdish and Turkish Alevis, respectively, voted for the social democratic left. Similarly, 90 percent of the Kurdish and 77 percent of the Turkish Alevis stated that they had always voted for the CHP/SHP. The eastern province of Tunceli, where the Kurdish Alevis constitute the majority, supported the CHP/SHP overwhelmingly in the parliamentary elections between 1950 and 1991. However, this trend changed in the 1990s when the CHP’s votes declined to 23.3 percent in 1995 and then dropped further to 18.3 percent in 1999. One possible reason for this drop is the change in the ethnic and religious composition of Tunceli resulting from a heavy out-migration accompanied by an increase in the number of public employees and security officers who moved to the province. In addition, the HADEP was also able to


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claim a share of the Kurdish Alevi votes in Tunceli in the 1990s. The Kurdish Alevis who live in large cities in the west such as Istanbul and ºzmir continue to vote mainly for the parties of the left, although some of the younger voters tend to support the HADEP. Voting patterns in those central and eastern provinces where the Alevis have traditionally lived clearly reflect the strong secularist and leftist tendencies prevalent among the Turkish Alevis.4 A comparison of the electoral results between the provinces with large Alevi populations, such as Amasya, Çorum, Erzincan, Hatay, Kªr≈sehir, Malatya, Sivas, Tokat, and others where there are smaller numbers of Alevis shows that the CHP votes are higher in the former. Because the Sunni population of central Anatolia tends to vote overwhelmingly for parties of the center and far right, the high proportion of the CHP votes is an indication of the Alevi support for the left. Despite the heavy Alevi out-migration and the virtual disappearance of the CHP in many other central Anatolian provinces, the party has continued to score higher than its national averages in those provinces where there are still sizable numbers of Alevis. Election results in the 1990s show that—in addition to some of the central and eastern provinces—the Alevi votes are concentrated in a few large cities in the west. The metropolitan center that has the highest proportion of Alevi population is Ankara where one-fourth of the residents are estimated to be Alevis. In the 1989 local elections when the social democrats won all of the metropolitan municipalities, half of the elected mayors were of Alevi descent. Although 35.5 percent of the Alevis in the large cities reported to have voted for the CHP in the 1995 elections, the support for this party has gradually declined since the political preferences of the Alevi community have increasingly become diversified (Erder 1996). Faced with what they perceive to be the threat of Sunni-based Islamic fundamentalism, the Alevis have begun to organize in associations to defend their interests. The increased politicization of the community, however, has created significant differences in approach and strategy among the competing groups and viewpoints (Çakªr 1999; Vorhoff 1999). In the 1999 parliamentary and local elections, the differences in political tactics and strategy resulted in a major split of the Alevi votes between the CHP, the DSP, and the center-right parties. A minority of the Alevis continued to support the CHP for its defense of the Kemalist principles of secularism. The majority, however, voted for other parties such as the DSP, which, they believed, was more likely to come to power and act as a bulwark against the political ascendancy of the Islamists. Unlike the Kurds, the Alevis were among the earliest migrants to the cities. As a result of this extended period of residence in the urban centers, the Alevi community became more stratified internally due to widening differences in education, income, and status. According to Baha Ak≈sit (1985),

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the upwardly mobile Alevis tend to leave the squatter housing areas and move to more modern and comfortable apartment houses where they adopt middle-class values and lifestyles. Social class differentiation and residential separation reduce interaction among the members and weaken community ties. Consequently, the Alevi community can no longer be regarded as a cohesive voting bloc as had been the case in the past.

RELIGIOUS VOTING AND ISLAMIST POLITICAL PARTIES

The Islamist RP emerged as the leading party in the 1995 general elections after winning 21.4 percent of the total votes. This was a sharp increase from 1991 when, in an electoral alliance with the MHP, it had received 16.9 percent. Islamic parties have existed in the Turkish political scene since the late 1960s. In the 1970s, the RP’s predecessor, the Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, MSP), participated in a number of coalition governments. Until 1994, however, the Islamists received their highest vote (11.8 percent) in the 1973 elections. The RP’s first major victory came in the 1994 municipal elections when the party gained 19.1 percent of the votes and won the mayoral contests in several major cities, including Istanbul and Ankara. The results of the 1994 local elections demonstrated that, in addition to its strongholds in central, eastern, and southeastern Anatolia, the Islamists had made major advances in Turkey’s most industrialized and urbanized areas. This became even more apparent in the 1995 parliamentary elections when nearly one-quarter of the voters in Istanbul, and one-third of the electorate in Kocaeli and Sakarya, voted for the RP. The expansion of the party’s constituency from small towns and the peripheral provinces to the metropolitan centers was primarily due to its success in appealing to the recent migrants and the urban poor in the cities. In the 1999 elections, however, the Islamist vote declined to 15.4 percent, and the FP finished third behind the DSP and the MHP. The drop in the RP/FP votes was not uniform throughout the country. The most significant losses were in those provinces where the party had scored the highest in the 1995 elections. The decline in the RP/FP votes reached 12.6 percentage points in the east, 7.8 percentage points in the southeast, and 7.5 percentage points in central Anatolia. In central Anatolia, the FP lost its votes mainly to the MHP. The FP experienced similar losses in the southeast and the east. The principal beneficiaries of this shift in voter preferences were the Turkish and Kurdish nationalists. In the provinces where ethnic Kurds constitute a significant proportion of the electorate, the FP’s votes went largely to the HADEP. In the more ethnically mixed constituencies, marked


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by hostilities between the HADEP supporters and their opponents, the latter tended to vote for the MHP. Despite these losses, however, the FP still managed to retain its leading position in eastern Anatolia and it came in second in the southeastern and central Anatolian regions (Tuncer 1999). There are several reasons for the decline of the FP electoral support in 1999. One important factor was a major swing of the religious and conservative votes from the Islamists to the extreme nationalist MHP. The conservative voters who were disappointed with the performance of both the mainstream center-right parties and the Islamists lent their support, as an alternative, to the MHP. The MHP’s new leader, Devlet Bahçeli, who became the party’s chief after Alpaslan Tµrke≈s’s death in 1997, proved highly successful in maintaining his party’s organizational cohesion and mounting an effective election campaign. More significant, however, is that the RP/FP was unable to strike a balance between the conflicting demands of its Kurdish and non-Kurdish constituencies. In other words, under increased ethnic tensions, the Islamic umbrella of the RP/FP that offered a supra-identity that transcended the tribal, ethnic, and national identities was shattered. Another major reason for the FP’s loss of electoral support was its confrontation with the military and the secularist groups. This gave the impression to the voters that the party’s uncompromising policies generated political conflict and instability. Coupled with the speculation that the FP would not be allowed to come to power even if it won the elections, this image drove away many potential voters. The performance of the Islamists when they were the senior partner of a coalition government during 1996–1997 was yet another factor. The RP failed decisively in two areas that it had extensively politicized while in the opposition, namely, foreign and economic policy (Daπª 1998). Finally, external pressures on the party by the authorities played a role: The RP was closed and its charismatic leader, Necmettin Erbakan, was banned from politics by the Constitutional Court in 1998. With Erbakan’s departure, intraparty ideological differences, disputes, and factional feuds surfaced (Schmuelevitz 1999). It was no longer possible for the FP to convey to the voters the image of a united and solidaristic party as it had done successfully in the past. Who, then, votes for the RP? In the first place, overall, the RP voters are the most religious segment of the electorate in Turkey (Esmer 1995). A major survey conducted in 1996 revealed that those who live in the rural areas (26.9 percent), the young (25 percent), and males (29.2 percent) were more likely to vote for the RP. Groups that supported the RP the least were the women in the urban centers, especially those who were gainfully employed. The party’s vote showed a steady decline with the increase in the levels of education. For instance, while about one-fourth of those with no formal education reported to have voted for the RP, this proportion was

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only 15 percent among the high school and university graduates. In terms of occupational groups, the RP had its widest appeal among small farmers, small businessmen, and industrial workers while it received very little support from professionals and bureaucrats (Erder 1996). In the Aegean, Mediterranean, and east central Anatolian regions where most provinces have relatively higher per capita incomes than the rest of the country, the performance of the RP/FP has been poorer. As a matter of fact, the party has generally been least successful in those provinces where per capita incomes and education levels are higher and secular lifestyles are more widespread. Also, the towns and cities along the Mediterranean and the Aegean coast have developed a growing tourism economy that provides livelihood for a significant proportion of the population. Many voters in this area fear that the Islamists’ opposition to tourism could undermine their economic well-being. The cases of Istanbul and Kocaeli, the two most highly industrialized provinces, where the RP/FP votes have been noticeably high, are exceptions to the negative correlation between socioeconomic development and support for the Islamists. This may be explained by the fact that both provinces have attracted large numbers of migrants from all over the country. Included among them are ethnic Kurds who vote heavily for the RP/FP to protest their socioeconomic conditions as poor migrants. The same can also be said about the most recent migrants from other regions, especially for the large numbers of people from the Black Sea who are renowned for their piety and religious conservatism. Both the Black Sea and central Anatolian provinces are among the RP/FP strongholds, and migrants from these regions often bring their political attitudes and preferences with them when they move to the large cities (Gµvenç 1999). Furthermore, in Istanbul and its immediate hinterland, the extremes of affluence and poverty along with the incidences of corruption and crime tend to be particularly pronounced. These create widespread distress, dissonance, and alienation among the urban poor. The RP’s ideological appeal to the voters emphasized the party’s commitment to the establishment of a “just order” in Turkish economy and a political regime that would be based on “right rather than might.” To demonstrate its commitment to these ideals, the party’s organizational cadres and the municipalities that it controlled effectively attended to the needs of the urban poor by delivering them goods, services, and other tangible benefits. Finally, the RP/FP has benefited from Istanbul’s rich Islamic heritage with its network of Islamic associations built around the city’s major mosques, circles of religious scholars, tarikats, and pious foundations with a long tradition of organized protest against Westernization and modernization. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, the FP won 20.5 percent of the


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votes in central Anatolia. The Islamist party had its strongest support in Konya—a historically important center of Islamic activity and Erbakan’s own constituency—where it managed to receive 30.1 percent of the votes. The electoral performance of the RP/FP has been above average in all of the central Anatolian cities with the exception of Kªr≈sehir, which has a sizable Alevi population. The RP/FP has built for itself a strong popular base among the deeply conservative voters of rural central Anatolia. In a 1996 survey, 27 percent of the rural population of this region stated that they would vote for the RP while the national average was 22.6 percent (Erder 1996). One major reason is that the rapid exodus of people from the rural areas to the cities left behind an older and highly religious population. Moreover, the rural population has suffered both in absolute and relative terms from the shortcomings and poor quality of government services. The RP/FP has appealed to these voters who felt isolated, neglected, and trapped. The Alevi-Sunni differences and the escalating tension between these two communities also made the RP/FP more attractive to the Sunni voters. In the past, the two communities existed more or less in isolation from one another in their separate villages. Rural to urban migration has brought them together in close neighborhoods in the cities. Some Alevis achieved considerable upward mobility through education and employment in Europe and became active in the organizational ranks of the secularist center-left parties. A number of factors have created resentment and hostility among the Sunnis toward the Alevis: (1) long-standing and deeply rooted prejudices against the Alevis, (2) differences in religious persuasion and practices that became more manifest in urban environments, (3) the Alevis’ support for the secularist and leftist elements of Turkish political life, and (4) the Alevis’ claim for a share of local government resources. Both the RP/FP and the MHP have capitalized on the anti-Alevi sentiments of the Sunnis. In such cities as Sivas, Çorum, Tokat, and Amasya, where the two communities live side by side, voting for the RP/FP became a marker of identity for the Sunnis. In 1999, the FP performed somewhat better in the municipal elections than in the polling for the parliament.5 The party won 16.4 and 18.2 percent of the votes in the elections for the provincial and municipal councils, respectively. More important, it succeeded in finishing first in the mayoral elections with 18.4 percent of the votes. Because the mayoral elections are conducted in the single-member, first-past-the-post constituencies where personalities matter a great deal, the FP candidates seem to have done better in presenting themselves as more efficient and less corruptible than their opponents. In general, the Islamist mayors have managed to provide more efficient and honest administrations for their communities than their predecessors from the traditional centrist political parties.

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Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey VOTING PATTERNS AND IDENTITY POLITICS

The rise in religious and ethnic voting in Turkey takes place in a political context characterized mainly by the following changes: • Increased political fragmentation and voter volatility • The declining strength of the center-right parties • The decreasing saliency of ideological divisions between the left and the right • The growing regionalization of political party support • The widening influence of patronage ties and clientelistic networks in political parties • An increase in the incidences of political corruption Turkey has a highly fragmented political culture marked by deeprooted cleavages and tensions between religious sects, ethnic groups, the center and the periphery. In the 1990s, cultural fragmentation was reflected primarily in the form of increased political fragmentation of voting patterns (Çelebi 1996; Çarkoπlu 1998; Tosun 1999). Thus, Turkish and Kurdish nationalism, secularist and Islamist forces, the Alevi protest and splinter groups found expression, voice, and an electoral base in the expanded political space of party politics though not necessarily through representation in the parliament. The heightened levels of consciousness and activity on the part of religious and ethnic groups and their interactive dynamics and relations with the state have become core issues in Turkish politics. For instance, in the 1999 general elections the total votes cast for political parties espousing Islamist, Turkish nationalist, and Kurdish nationalist views reached 40 percent of the total votes. To these we might also add the Alevi protest votes that went mainly to the leftist parties. Thus, ethnic and religious voting has become the most important source of fragmentation in Turkish politics. The ethnic and religious parties that managed to maintain organizational unity and disseminate party propaganda effectively have benefited significantly from the increasing weaknesses of the centrist political forces, especially the center-right parties. The public image of the center-right parties has deteriorated due to their tendency to distribute government resources in a strictly partisan way to favor their own members and loyal followers. Furthermore, they have frequently faced allegations of corruption involving shady relations with the so-called Mafia underworld organizations. At the same time, the center-right parties have abandoned their historical claim to represent the interests of the periphery, if not in their rhetoric then in terms of their actual policies. The influence of the “new money” and the adoption of nouveau riche values and lifestyles among their leaders and cadres have


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led to the erosion of the egalitarian ethos that had been one of the main pillars of the politics of the Turkish right. Similarly, the incessant feuds between the two rival center-right parties and their leaders, factional squabbles, and the pursuit of political activity primarily for the sake of economic gain have created a wedge between the center-right parties and their traditional voters. All of these factors have benefited the religious and nationalist parties whose votes have increased largely at the expense of the centerright parties. A salient feature of politics in Turkey in the 1990s was the decline of the left-right ideological and political divide.6 Since the 1999 elections, all of the coalition governments, except the short-lived RP-DYP coalition in 1996, were either formed between the center-left and center-right parties or, as it happened during 1998–1999, when the two center-right parties supported a minority center-left government. The increasing similarity in their programs and economic policy orientations, together with growing emphasis on dialogue, negotiation, and compromise between the centrist parties have narrowed the left-right ideological divide in Turkey’s party politics. However, the adoption of neoliberal economic policies that de-emphasize social welfare spending has distanced the centrist parties, especially those on the center-right, from large numbers of voters who have faced growing economic problems. The religious and the nationalist parties have appealed with considerable success to the excluded and the underprivileged voters through their seemingly leftist economic discourses. The parallelism between the decline of the left-right division and the rise of religious and ethnic voting has now become a well-established trend in Turkish politics. The social and economic transformations since the early 1980s have also had a profound impact on party politics in Turkey. The displacement of the rural populations and the massive rural-urban migration have brought the people and the culture of the periphery, with all its religious and ethnic diversity, to the city where differences in language, sect, and values have become apparent to many. Furthermore, the migrant groups tend to compete fiercely among themselves for the scarce urban resources such as municipal services, jobs, building permits, and public contracts. Access to these is provided mainly by political parties. However, the centrist parties have largely closed their ranks to the recently arrived migrants to the cities. Consequently, the poor migrants have only limited access to the patronage resources of the center-right and the center-left parties. The RP/FP, HADEP, and MHP have expanded their voter base among the urban poor in large Turkish cities who resent their economic and social exclusion. Another important dimension of voting based on ethnic and religious identity concerns economic and regional inequalities that have become more pronounced in the 1990s. The polarity between the industrializing and relatively more prosperous western Turkey and central and eastern

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Anatolia has resulted in growing differences in regional income distribution (World Bank 2000).7 The relationship between low regional socioeconomic development and a high level of protest voting that becomes increasingly manifest in identity politics underscores the importance of social class in Turkey’s political life. The politicization of the economic rent distribution in the 1990s has led to a growing sense of inequality and exclusion among diverse groups in society. In the Turkish economy, the state continues to maintain its role as a fundamental agent of resource distribution through its control over interest rates, foreign currency parities, business contracts, and employment opportunities in the large public sector. The tendency of the center-right parties to favor the interests of the older and more established big business groups has alienated some members of the new entrepreneurial and middle classes (Öni≈s 1997; Buπra 1998). The Islamist parties, and more recently the HADEP, have capitalized on their resentment against the government in their efforts to promote identity politics.

CONCLUSION

In the 1990s, Turkey has experienced the intensification of the major social and political cleavages between the Alevi and Sunni Muslims, Turks and Kurds, and Islamists and secularists. These cleavages have reconstituted the previous center-periphery, social class, and traditional-modern divisions in society in highly complex ways. Since the center-right parties that had traditionally defended the religious sensitivities of the periphery became less interested in representing their claims, the void created in populist politics was filled mainly by the RP/FP and the MHP. The Islamists and the Kurdish nationalist elites as well as the MHP leadership have capitalized on themes and concepts built on the long-standing center-periphery cleavage in Turkish society and politics. Ethnic and religious parties have found a large electoral base among the urban poor in large cities, the rural masses, and inhabitants of the Anatolian towns that have not received the benefits of economic development in recent decades. Hence, in their ideologies and propaganda, the ethnically and religiously based parties have adopted many of the familiar themes and economic objectives of the political left. Finally, it should be noted that because the identities based on class, ethnicity, and religion tend to cut across each other, they affect voting behavior in a complicated way. Islamist parties that emphasize an Islamic identity above ethnicity, tribe, and nation often find themselves challenged by the pro-Kurdish and Turkish nationalist parties. Equally important is the Alevi-Sunni division that has minimized the Alevi support for the Islamists,


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which, in turn, has made the RP/FP an almost exclusively Sunni party. The Alevi community, in contrast, despite its powerful leftist bent, began to vote for different political parties in the 1990s. At the same time, Kurdish nationalism and the HADEP suffered from the Alevi-Sunni division, as the Alevi Kurds tended to vote mostly for the parties of the secularist left.

NOTES 1. For a different opinion on the social class dimension of religious voting, see Chapter 5 in this volume. 2. It should be noted, however, that the concept of sharia rule remains ambiguous, and people seem to attribute to it a variety of different meanings. See Çarkoπlu and Toprak (2000). 3. The chain of events that led to their expulsion began during the nationally televised swearing-in ceremony of the new parliament in 1991, when one newly elected SHP deputy (Hatip Dicle) stated that he was taking the oath under duress, and another deputy (Leyla Zana) used a sentence in Kurdish when taking her oath. 4. As shown in Appendix Tables B.17 and B.18, in the central and eastern provinces of Amasya, Çorum, Erzincan, Hatay, Kªr≈sehir, Malatya, Sivas, and Tokat, the CHP votes were consistently higher compared to its overall performance in the country. 5. For a more detailed analysis, see Chapter 4 in this volume. 6. For a different view on the salience of the left-right ideology in Turkish political culture and voting behavior, see Chapter 5 in this volume and also Esmer (1999a). 7. For a detailed discussion of the geography of Turkish elections, see Chapter 6 in this volume.

8 Realignment and Party Adaptation: The Case of the Refah and Fazilet Parties Birol A. Ye≈silada For more than a century, political parties have played an important role in the development of the Turkish political system. Parties have been instrumental in transforming the Ottoman system during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic and its transition to multiparty representative liberal democracy in 1950, and in progress toward the consolidation of this democracy thereafter. Yet this process of adaptation has not been smooth or stable. Periods of political instability and military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 have raised serious questions about the health of Turkey’s party system and the future of its democratic order.1 Among the overriding concerns of the country’s secular elites, the rise of religious fundamentalism along with organized religious political parties rank high. Since 1968, four such political parties have emerged onto the political scene, and three were closed down for activities against the secular republic. This chapter provides an overview of voter realignment and political party adaptation in contemporary Turkish politics with a special focus on the case of the Islamist parties Refah (Welfare Party, RP) and Fazilet (Virtue Party, FP). It attempts to identify periods of adaptation and realignment, shifts in the voter support base, and the impact of these changes on the parties’ abilities to carry out the basic functions of parties in democracies.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

According to Elmer Schattschneider (1941) and Robert Michels (1959), political parties provide a crucial link between elites and masses and between the government and the public. Following in the path of these monumental works, Samuel J. Eldersveld (1982) has argued that function157

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ing democracies need parties to fulfill a number of important tasks that include organizing public participation in politics, control and recruitment of elites, conflict management, competition management, policy innovation, and socializing the public to system consensus. The importance of political parties is echoed by Samuel P. Huntington who observed that the party “is the distinctive institution of the modern polity. . . . [T]he function of the party is to organize participation, to aggregate interests, to serve as the link between social forces and government” (Huntington 1968, 89, 91–92). As such, parties are central institutions in the survival of the political systems. Given the important role parties play in modern democracies, it is crucial to note that their survival depends on the ability of party elites to successfully adapt to their changing environment and electoral realignment. In other words, party adaptation and realignment are at the heart of how and why some parties succeed and others fail. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan emphasized this issue in their celebrated essay when they asked, “[H]ow [are] parties able to survive so many changes in the political, social, and economic condition of their operation?” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 51–54). Their study clearly demonstrated the complex relationship between the emergence of societal cleavages as a result of economic, cultural, and political changes and the subsequent development of party alignments in Western Europe. Political party adaptation and realignment require systematic examination of complex issues. In the analysis presented here, a conceptual model based on Eldersveld’s research (Figure 8.1) is employed for the study of realignment and party adaptation. This model assumes that systemic developments characterized by social, cultural, and economic changes in the country affect mass political behavior and party adaptation. Systemic changes refer to socioeconomic development broadly defined. This spills over to political development in the form of civic society practicing its political choice in the electoral process. As individual citizens’ attitudes, beliefs, and values change, their participation in the political process reflects these changes. If they are satisfied with the policies and views of the political party they support, we can expect this support to continue. In this case, the political party in question is one that is adapting to the changing position of its support base. If the party fails to make these adjustments, the voters are likely to move on to other political parties that are more in line with their new position(s). This relationship between voter realignment and party adaptation is a complex one to operationalize and test. Nevertheless, studies by Eldersveld and others provide considerable guidance in this regard. As the first step in operationalizing party adaptation, one can take Samuel Eldersveld and Hanes Walton’s (2000) criteria of party adaptation, which include:

Realignment and Party Adaptation Figure 8.1

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A Conceptual Model of Realignment and Party Adaptation

Source: Adapted from a model by Eldersveld (1998, 323).

1. The type of leadership selected by a party as its candidates for public office 2. The organizational form and process that the party adopts, whether very democratic and decentralized internally, or hierarchically controlled from the top down, or an in-between “stratarchical” structure with considerable autonomy in decisionmaking at all levels of the party 3. The social base of support for the party, or the character of its social group coalition 4. The ideological line and direction of the party in the context of public opinion shifts 5. The strategies and tactics used in campaigns that will activate those loyalties, floating voters, and apathetics to ensure victory 6. The party activists at the middle and lower levels of the organization, the “working elites” at the base of the system, upon which the party relies heavily Party leadership is a very important component of adaptation. Leaders ought to recognize not only the policy needs of the country but also see the changes in the party’s support base and implement reforms that reflect these changes within the party structure. Charisma is also an important attribute of successful leadership in terms of broadening the party’s electoral base. Organization is equally important for success or failure of the party. Centralized parties tend to be less open to dissent among the rank and file. And these parties are more likely to work as a single unit during times

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when they face difficult challenges. It is necessary for the party organization to maintain close contact with the constituents who will contribute to party adaptation. In this regard, change in the party’s social class support base is the other side of that relationship. Furthermore, one needs to pay attention to how the party keeps in touch with the voters to maintain its political support and perform well in the elections. How does the party maintain loyalty among its supporters? How does it address the needs and demands of its constituents? What mobility channels are available for the people to get involved in party politics? These are the key organizational questions that go to the heart of points three, four, and five in the Eldersveld-Walton criteria listed above. Finally, the role of party activists in this relationship is crucial. Eldersveld (1982) defines party activists as working elites because they carry out important tasks in the party’s life. They are the infantries of the party and, in time, many will become top elites. The quality of these individuals, their commitment to the party’s goals, and their willingness to work toward achieving these aims are necessary for adaptation and success. These characteristics of party adaptation show how one should conceptualize the response of political parties to their changing environment, which includes realignment of the electorate. It is worth noting, however, that realignment means different things to different people. The position taken here is that realignment is the basic shift in the pattern of public support underlying the party system. As such, “it can be described as a series of changes taking place in the society” (Eldersveld and Walton 2000, 400).2 Party realignment could occur through dynamic evolution or abrupt interruption. In the institutionalized party systems of North America and Western Europe, realignment is largely the product of a dynamic evolution. According to V. O. Key (1955) and Eldersveld (1982), the dynamic process of realignment occurs through the following channels: (1) loosening of existing ties between voters and parties, (2) a shift in the issues that are central to party competition, (3) polarization between parties on these new issues, (4) increase in voter interest in politics, and (5) a shift in the enduring alignment of various social groups to political parties (Ye≈silada 1999, 125). 3 In contrast, abrupt realignment involves such events as military coups, revolutions, and the closure of political parties by the new elites. If and when transition to a democratic political system takes place, old parties may be permitted to re-enter political life, new parties may be formed, or both could take place simultaneously.4 To determine, therefore, whether realignment has occurred or is occurring, the above criteria should be addressed. The previous list of six types of party adaptation will, in turn, illustrate how parties respond to their changing environment. Parties that are successful learn to adapt efficiently, and those that do not fail to survive. In this regard, critical elections can be

Realignment and Party Adaptation

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an important sign of adaptation and realignment. As Key noted, critical elections are those “in which a sharp and durable realignment between parties occurs in the relations of power within the community” (Key 1955, 4). Such elections can serve as a guide for researchers of realignment and party adaptation. In developing political systems like those in Brazil, Spain, and Turkey, recent research has focused on how to establish dynamic democratic political parties and other institutions that will endure challenges from the authoritarian elements in the system.5 Turkey’s democratic experience provides an important case study for political party adaptation and realignment. Since the beginning of multiparty democracy in 1946, the Turkish political system has experienced a turbulent history characterized by political party fragmentation, elite polarization, political instability, military interventions, and voter realignment. Since the last military coup in 1980, transition back to civilian rule has also experienced internal and external pressures for democratization. National elections during the 1990s provide important evidence to observe and analyze voter realignment. Whether political parties will successfully adapt to this changing environment and survive the challenges or fail will undoubtedly shape the future of Turkish democracy.

ELECTORAL REALIGNMENT AND RELIGIOUS PARTIES’ ADAPTATION SINCE 1983

Because the objective of this chapter is to analyze how the religious parties have responded to voter realignment in the 1980s and 1990s, only the most recent developments pertaining to this issue will be addressed. It is also beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an in-depth analysis of how the officers controlled the new party system formation in post-1980 Turkey. In an earlier study (Ye≈silada 1988), I offered a detailed account of party formation, the controlled transition to civilian rule in 1983, and the gradual opening up of the bureaucratic authoritarian order starting with the 1987 national elections. Others have also made important assessments of the changes in Turkey’s electoral and party politics. 6

SYSTEMIC CHANGES

Since 1983, Turkey has undergone dramatic political, economic, social, and demographic transformation. Political transformation witnessed the gradual return of a pluralist political system soon after the 1983 national elections. The bureaucratic authoritarian system that the generals sponsored did not

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survive the challenges from the voters and interest groups. Yet the return to pluralism did not mean a return to liberal democracy. Many limitations on individual civil and political rights remained in place due to the provisions of the 1982 constitution. However, with the end of the Cold War and Turkey’s subsequent signing of a Customs Union (CU) agreement with the European Union (EU), Turkey did manage to reform some of the provisions of this draconian constitution in the summer of 1995. At that time, the European parliament insisted in seeing political reforms in Turkey before it would ratify the CU agreement. While the Turkish parliament did ratify important changes in the constitution—namely, the right of trade unions to engage in political activity and the right of civil servants to join trade unions were restored— other key restrictions remained intact. These include the government’s power to ban labor strikes, and Article 8 of the Law for the Suppression of Terrorism makes it easy for the officials to arrest anyone who is perceived as being a radical Kurdish nationalist or a supporter of the Kurdish separatist organization, the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers Party, PKK). Despite its shortcomings, Turkish democracy seems to be moving further toward liberalization. As the government prepares the country for eventual EU membership, it is an inescapable fact that Turkey’s constitutional order must conform to liberal constitutions of the other member states. In terms of economic changes, the Turkish economy has become one of the ten most dynamic emerging markets in the world. Since 1980, it has been following an outward orientation with greater emphasis on international competitiveness characterized by the privatization of the state economic enterprises, export promotion, liberalization of the investment regime, and integration with global financial markets. Turkey’s economy has grown at an average pace higher than most other member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and that has dramatically transformed the structure of Turkey’s economic life. For example, in 1998, forestry, fishing, and agriculture accounted for 12.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) while this figure was 23.9 percent in 1980. Industrial production accounted for 29 percent of GDP compared to 21.5 percent in 1980. And services accounted for 58.3 percent of GDP in 1998 while this figure was 53.6 percent in 1980.7 However, these achievements were not without their setbacks. The liberalization policies of the 1980s resulted in unfinished economic reforms that increased the income gap between the rich and poor. During this time, the middle class eroded in the Turkish society, and wage earners saw their share in national income fall to about 20 percent. In contrast, the national factor income share for individuals and firms (economic agents) earning rent, interest,


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and profit increased from 40 to 65 percent (Ye≈ s ilada and Fisunoπlu 1992). Furthermore, there is no doubt that serious economic imbalances left behind by the policies pursued by Turgut Özal and his Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP) governments from 1983 to 1991 added to economic problems experienced during the first part of the 1990s. In 1994, Turkey was hit by a serious financial crisis that forced the government to undertake dramatic austerity measures. Since then, the economy has been growing in a more balanced fashion, resulting in improved unemployment rates, a falling inflation rate, and a significant increase in the inflow of foreign funds into the economy. Two decades of economic reforms have led to a major restructuring of Turkish society. In particular, massive migration from the rural areas to the cities has dramatically expanded the country’s urban population and has increased the income discrepancy between the rural and urban classes. Turkey has also witnessed the emergence of sharp societal cleavages along the lines of tradition-modernity, the center-left/religious right, the centerperiphery, and Turkish nationalism/Kurdish nationalism.8 One important result of this socioeconomic change was the growth of the urban poor in Turkey with a very young population base. The urban poor became a recruiting ground for the extreme nationalist and Islamist parties during the 1970s. During the 1980s, the religious organizations increased their presence among the urban poor and, with the aid of the growing Islamist capital, attracted new supporters for their party.9 With a relatively young population base, the future of Turkey to a large degree depends on how the governing elites will respond to the rising aspirations of its youth. Election results show that a voter realignment is in progress and is likely to continue altering the future of the Turkish political scene. As the next section shows, one outcome of these changes was a significant voter realignment in Turkey. During these critical years of social and economic transformation, political Islam reasserted its presence in Turkish politics as a serious challenge to the Kemalist secular system.

VOTER REALIGNMENT

Election results in the 1980s and 1990s suggest that there have been significant shifts in voter support for political parties since 1987 (Appendix Table B.4). First, there is a significant drop in the combined vote share of the moderate right parties represented by the ANAP and the Doπru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, DYP) from 55.4 percent in 1987 to 25.2 percent in 1999, with a steady decline in between. The ANAP’s votes fell steadily starting in

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1987: 36.3 percent in 1987 and 13.2 percent in 1999. The loss in parliamentary seats was dramatic: from 292 out of 450 in 1987 to 88 out of 550 in 1999 (Appendix Tables B.4 and B.5). The initial decline in the ANAP votes coincided with Sµleyman Demirel’s return to politics as the head of the DYP in 1987. During the 1987 and 1991 elections, electoral losses of the ANAP were coupled with crucial gains by the DYP. However, the DYP quickly began to lose voter support when Demirel became Turkey’s president in 1993 and no longer led the party in the elections. With Demirel out of the picture, the post-Özal and post-Demirel leaders of the ANAP and the DYP tried to capture the votes that were mostly controlled by the centerright’s dominant political force until 1980, the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, AP). However, they both failed and, in the process, only increased the level of fragmentation of the center-right votes. On the moderate left, represented by the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP) and the Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP), one observes an increase to 30.9 percent in the last general elections. In this camp, the rise in the DSP votes from 8.5 percent in 1987 to 22.2 percent in 1999 has been at the expense of the CHP. The most significant observation, however, is on the extreme right of the political spectrum where the ultra-right-wing Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, MHP), a much smaller nationalist Bµyµk Birlik Partisi (Great Unity Party, BBP), and the Islamist Refah and its successor, the Fazilet, are found. This group’s combined share of the national votes jumped from a mere 10.1 percent in 1987 to 33.3 percent in 1999. Onethird of the Turkish voters now support the ultra-right-wing political parties. The Islamist share in these figures is 7.2 percent in 1987, 21.4 percent in 1995, and 15.4 percent in 1999. In comparison, the ultranationalist votes were 2.9 percent, 8.2 percent, and 17.9 percent, respectively. This is an alarming development for the center-right because consolidation of these votes in the extreme right political parties means that the moderate right could not rely on the support of its traditional religious and nationalist supporters. This continuous voter realignment is also apparent in geographic terms. The ANAP’s dominance in the 1987 national elections, when it did relatively well in most regions of Turkey and was particularly strong in the major cities, rapidly disappeared in the 1990s. In the 1991 elections, the DYP led by Demirel re-emerged as the strongest party in the Aegean and southern provinces. The RP captured inner Anatolia and the center-left Sosyal Demokrat Halkçª Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party, SHP) won many of the heavily Kurdish-populated southeastern provinces as well as the country’s capital, Ankara. The ANAP maintained its control in Bitlis,


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Istanbul, Hakkari, Gµmµ≈shane, Malatya, Giresun, Rize, and Trabzon. In the subsequent elections in 1995 and 1999, the clear winners were the RP and the DSP, respectively. The split of the mainstream right and left voters among the four parties (ANAP-DYP and CHP-DSP) weakened the chances of these camps from capturing the majority of the provinces. One important observation in the 1995 elections is the CHP’s declining electoral support in the southeast. With the departure of the nationalist Kurdish parliamentarians from its ranks and the subsequent formation of explicitly pro-Kurdish parties such as the Halkªn Demokrasi Partisi (People’s Democracy Party, HADEP), the Kurdish vote in the southeast left the CHP. If one examines the information on which party finished the elections as the leading political party by each province in 1995 and 1999, a clear picture of voter realignment is again apparent. In the provinces where the RP lost its firstplace ranking, the MHP won most of the time. At the same time, the DSP took away a significant number of provinces from the DYP, and it took Istanbul and Ankara from the RP. Additional information on the 1999 general elections and postelection survey studies provide key insights into this voter realignment. In the first major postelection survey study ever carried out in Turkey, Yªlmaz Esmer (1999c) outlined what percentage of a given political party’s votes went to other political parties between the 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections. Some 22.9 percent of the ANAP, 14 percent of the DYP, 20 percent of the CHP, 4.5 percent of the RP, 5 percent of the MHP, 7.8 percent of other parties, and 22.7 percent of new votes went to the center-left DSP in 1999. The DSP kept 73.8 percent of its previous voter support from the 1995 elections. In contrast, the far-right MHP took a larger percentage of the electorate (14.7 percent) away from the RP. The MHP also took away support from other parties: 14 percent from the ANAP, 18.1 percent from the DYP, 5.4 percent from the DSP, 2.3 percent from the CHP, 2.6 percent from other parties, and 28.4 percent of the new voters (Esmer, 1999c). In another study, A-D Research of Istanbul analyzed the breakdown of the new electorate’s support for parties and changes in public opinion about political parties following the April 1999 elections. This was the first parliamentary election where a large number of new (young) voters cast their votes for the first time since the voting age was lowered to eighteen in 1995. The breakdown of the votes of the new electorate was 28.6 percent for the MHP, 22.7 percent for the DSP, 13.8 percent for the FP, 11.8 percent for the CHP, 10.3 percent for the ANAP, 7.4 percent for the DYP, and 5.4 percent for other parties. This translates into 42.2 percent on the far-right, 17.7 percent on the moderate right, and 43.5 percent on the moderate left of the political spectrum.10 Both public opinion surveys support the observation that since 1995, a

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major realignment of the Turkish voters has taken place. The problem is that there are two parties competing in each of the three major blocs in the party system: the DSP and the CHP for the moderate left, the ANAP and the DYP for the moderate right, and the FP and the MHP for the extreme right votes. But how solid is this realignment of the Turkish voters? Before answering this question, it must be emphasized that the decline in the votes of the FP in the 1999 elections does not necessarily translate into a permanent loss of voter faith in this party. If one considers that the FP was formed just after the closure of the RP in 1998, the banning of its leader Necmettin Erbakan from political life for five years, and persistent and effective criticism from the secular establishment, then the party’s performance in 1999 is not necessarily that bad. The FP entered these elections with a relatively unknown leader, Recai Kutan, and justifiably displayed characteristics of a party trying to avert yet another possible blow from the Turkish military. Furthermore, the FP remains the strongest party in local elections and holds mayoral seats in the greater metropolitan municipalities of Ankara, Istanbul, and several other large urban centers. With regard to changes in mass public’s attitudes, values, and beliefs, the World Values Surveys (WVS) in 1990 and 1996 and Esmer’s study (1999c) provide valuable insights about the Turkish electorate.11 Figure 8.2

percent votes

Figure 8.2

The Changing Turkish Electorate on the Left-Right Spectrum

1990 1995 1999

Sources: Tabulated from the 1990 and 1996 World Values Surveys and Esmer (1999c).


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shows how the respondents identified their political positions on a 10-point scale, with 0 being the extreme-left and 10 being the extreme-right. Three observations can be made about this figure. First, the political center and, to some degree, the far-left are on a decline. Second, the centerright is greatly reduced. And third, there is a significant increase in the percentage of those who identify their political positions as being on the right. This shift to the political right follows a trend that has also been observed in Western Europe, but the degree of rise in Turkey is higher. The overall result of this development is that the entire bloc of voters has shifted to the right since 1991. To understand how this realignment has benefited the Islamist parties, it is helpful to examine survey results from the abovementioned studies. What are the Refah/Fazilet voters like? This is particularly important in addressing the Eldersveld-Walton criteria on the social support base of a political party and the dynamic process of realignment discussed by Key (1955) and Eldersveld (1982; 2000). Table 8.1 provides information about the partys’ supporters in the elections and their background characteristics in 1996 and 1999. As the data indicate, those who voted for the RP in 1996 and the FP in 1999 had, on average, a lower level of education than the supporters of the parties of the political left. Religious voters place their ideological position clearly on the extreme right on the political spectrum. As Table 8.2 shows, this is true for both the 1996 WVS and 1999 postelection study of Esmer. The percent of voters identifying themselves as being on the far-right is 34.3 and 39 percent in 1996 and 1999, respectively. The figure for the RP/FP supporters is 64.1 percent in 1996 and 68.3 percent in 1999. As for the center-right, the RP/FP supporters report 14.9 percent in 1996 and 12.7 percent in 1999. In comparison, the survey averages are 15.4 and 11.7 percent, respectively. No RP supporter identified with the center-left and farleft in 1996, and this situation did not change in 1999, where only 3.2 percent of the FP’s voters identified with being on the political left. Religious voters in 1996 also emphasized the significant role that the Islamic values played in their lives far more than those who followed the mainstream political parties. When this information is analyzed (where on a 10-point scale 1 = not important and 10 = very important), those respondents who identified the RP as their first choice group was around 8 to 10. On a relative measure of conservatism (new ideas versus old ideas as being best desired), the RP’s supporters chose older ideas by 41 percent, while 31 percent said that new ideas were needed. The average for the survey sample for these two responses was 33.2 and 36.3 percent, respectively. In comparison, the followers of the most leftist political party on the political spectrum, the CHP, responded with 32 percent in favor of old ideas and 47 percent in favor of new ideas.

5.0 5.1 10.6 13.0 18.2 17.6

17 40 15 18 1 11 5 62 13 13 1 7

12 9

1996

DSP

20.0 22.4 20.7 20.7 21.8 21.6

20.6 23.5

1999

20.0 18.5 16.2 11.4 3.6 3.9

15 65 8 8 1 3

1996 1999

5 Center

4 (2.2) 8 (4.5) 8 (4.4) 5 (3.0) 45 (24.9) 60 (33.6) 53 (36.0) 61 (51.5) 51 (34.7) 26 (21.6) 28 (19.0) 28 (23.7) 48 (29.8) 68 (23.9) 56 (34.8) 58 (20.2) 36 (22.4) 115 (40.2) 1 (0.5) 10 (6.0) 4 (2.0) 2 (1.0) 35 (17.0) 41 (23.9) 0 (0.0) 3 (1.4) 0 (0.0) 4 (1.8) 53 (21.4) 31 (15.9) 1 (0.9) 6 (2.5) 2 (1.8) 3 (1.4) 16 (14.0) 44 (17.8) 164 189 188 190 418 358 10.6 14.2 12.2 8.2 27.1 26.9

1999

1996

1996

1999

3-4 Center-left

0-2 Extreme-left

21.1 11.8 11.7 14.2 16.4 12.4

9.1 17.6

1999

40 (22.1) 5 (3.4) 9 (5.6) 52 (25.1) 37 (14.9) 22 (19.3) 240 15.4

1996

42 (23.1) 1 (1.0) 19 (6.5) 15 (8.9) 25 (12.7) 40 (16.2) 155 11.7

1999

6-7 Center-right

Political Party Choice and Self-Identification on the Left-Right Spectrum

8 60 11 15 1 9

10 13

1996

ANAP RP

20.0 18.5 16.2 11.4 3.6 3.9

13.8 16.4

1999

FP

84 (46.4) 10 (6.8) 13 (6.3) 113 (54.6) 159 (64.1) 72 (63.2) 528 34.3

1996

64 (35.8) 2 (2.1) 27 (9.3) 102 (60.2) 134 (68.3) 154 (62.1) 518 39

1999

8-10 Extreme-right

17 58 8 12 1 2

16 17

1996

Note: Significance level for Pearson, Likelihood Ratio, M-H test for linear assocation = 0.0000 for both studies.

ANAP CHP DSP DYP RP MHP Other Total

Table 8.2

1999 13.8 10.8

DYP

9 7

1996

Sources: World Values Survey for 1996 and Esmer (1999c) for 1999.

9.4 8.3

1999

9 10

1996

CHP

Voter Profile in 1996 and 1999

Gender Male Female Educational Level No formal schooling Primary school Junior high school High school Some university University

Table 8.1

11.7 19.7 25.1 20.7 12.7 7.8

21.6 14.4

1999

181 (11.7) 147 (9.5) 161 (19.4) 207 (13.4) 248 (16.1) 114 (7.4) 1542 100

1996

179 (13.5) 118 (8.9) 287 (21.6) 170 (12.8) 196 (14.7) 249 (18.7) 1329 100

1999

Row Total

2 52 24 20 2 5

10 3

1996

MHP


169

The RP’s voters also seem more optimistic about the future of the country than the rest of those surveyed. When asked how they viewed the state of the country ten years ago, today (1996), and ten years from now, RP supporters classified the present and future as being “fine” and “very good.” Furthermore, the RP’s supporters consistently identified democracy as the most desired form of government and the most likely system for egalitarian economic growth and public order. This is a significant point because the RP did not have an organizational structure that necessarily promoted internal party democracy. The voters who support the RP also display strong attitudes toward other political parties. Keeping in mind that about a quarter of the Turkish voters indicate that there is no other political party they would not consider voting for, 22 percent of the RP’s supporters identify the CHP as the one party they would not vote for. When the DSP is also taken into account, the figure increases to 31 percent. In contrast, the survey average for rejecting the CHP as an alternative choice is 8.7 percent. Finally, about half of the RP’s voters identified the ANAP and the DYP as the party of their second choice. For the MHP this was 10.7 percent. Only 6 percent of the MHP supporters stated that they would support the RP as their second choice. Given this profile of the religious voters in Turkey, it can be concluded that they are not simply the uninformed and marginal elements in Turkish society. Rather, their political preferences reflect serious changes within the mosaic of the Turkish electorate. In terms of Eldersveld (1982) and Key’s (1955) voter realignment criteria, the RP’s supporter is the prime example of such change among the voters. The next issue that needs to be addressed concerns the attitudes and organizational strategies of the Islamist parties’ leadership. Do attitudes, values, and beliefs of party elites correspond to those of party supporters? And how successful were the organizational and strategic changes of the elites in securing a successful party adaptation over time?

ANALYSIS OF PARTY ADAPTATION

According to the Eldersveld-Walton (2000) model, the analysis of party adaptation involves reviewing the organizational, ideological, strategic and tactical, and attitudinal changes in the party that correspond to voter realignment. The six points explained by this model provide a road map for operationalizing and testing party adaptation. To learn more about the health of Turkey’s party system, surveys of the Refah party elites will be examined to see whether elites and followers share similar attitudes and beliefs. This is important for determining the extent to which elites adapted to changes in their constituency as well as the larger public. The surveys

170


were carried out during my field trips to Turkey in 1997–1998. The samples included party elites and activists in Ankara and Istanbul. Forty-five party leaders were interviewed along with sixty-six party activists. The review of the surveys will be followed by an analysis of the Islamist parties’ organizational structures, strategies, and tactics to complete the adaptation test of Eldersveld-Walton (2000).

Attitudes and Beliefs The party elites were first asked about their perception of the seriousness of Turkey’s problems. Table 8.3 presents the results. An overwhelming majority of elites and party activists indicated that there were serious to very serious problems in social welfare, unemployment, poverty, education, pollution, the economy, and the preservation of religious values. It is important to note that no one stated that the last issue was not a concern This supports the view that religion is a central issue for the RP/FP elite. On most issues, the activists’ views were more indicative of serious concern than those expressed by the party elites. The elites were then given a set of statements to respond to. The purpose of this survey was to map their views about the role of parties in the political system and also to find out their perceptions about different political styles. The results are presented in Table 8.4. When the activists’ responses are compared to those of the elites, it becomes clear that the former, who represent the newest recruits into party organization from the support base, are a more committed group to rigid party organization. This is observed in their responses to party support and support of the party’s candidates. Both groups view social conflict as the

Table 8.3

Perceptions of Elites and Activists on the Seriousness of the Country’s Problems (percentage of respondents) Not Serious

Welfare and social security Unemployment Poverty Education Pollution Economy Preservation of religious values

Serious

Very Serious

Elites Activists

Elites Activists

Elites Activists

11.1 4.4 0 17.8 26.7 22.2 0

55.6 66.7 26.7 44.4 22.2 33.3 22.2

33.3 28.9 73.3 37.8 51.1 44.4 77.8

19.7 6.1 0 3.0 18.2 7.6 0

Note: Sample size: elites (n = 45) and activists (n = 66).

54.5 16.7 37.9 28.8 10.6 31.8 12.1

25.8 77.3 62.1 68.2 71.2 60.6 87.9

171

Realignment and Party Adaptation Table 8.4

Elite Attitudes and Beliefs Disagree

Neutral

Agree

“Generally speaking, in political controversies, extreme positions should be avoided, since they can damage party’s image.” Elites Activists

4 36

18 10

23 20

“It is social conflict that brings about progress in modern society.” Elites Activists

0 0

9 3

36 63

“The strength and efficiency of government are more important than its specific programs.” Elites Activists

12 21

20 25

13 20

“Only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause does life become meaningful.” Elites Activists

0 0

4 0

41 66

“Islam is the one ideal that can emancipate individuals from the chains of current problems in the country.” Elites Activists

0 0

0 0

45 66

“If you disagree with the stand of your party, you should stop working for it.” Elites Activists

3 0

13 6

29 60

“A good party member must support any candidate nominated by the party.” Elites Activists

0 0

4 5

41 61

“The government has the responsibility to see that nobody lives well while others are poor.” Elites Activists

7 —

16 —

22 61

“In every situation the poor people should be given more opportunities than the rich.” Elites Activists

0 0

38 7

7 54

“The state should have a strong presence in the national economy.” Elites Activists

0 2

Note: Sample size: elites (n = 45) and activists (n = 66).

5 8

40 56

172


catalyst for change and strongly agree on the need to devote one’s self to an ideal, preferably to Islam, for achieving a meaningful life. Again, we see the centrality of religion (Islam) in the lives of these individuals that is very much in line with the earlier observation of party followers. Finally, the elites and activists strongly support heavy state involvement in the economy that goes against the current trend in Turkey’s economic reforms.

Organization, Strategies, and Tactics The RP/FP phenomenon in Turkey is truly a success story in party organization at the national level through hard work and patience. Against the backdrop of the Kemalist state, the religious political elite continued grassroots organization under the guidance of religious clergy and entered the political arena during the liberal democratic period in the 1960s.12 Since then, the success of the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party, MNP), the Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, MSP), the RP, and the FP in reorganizing after each closure, under a new name, owes much to Necmettin Erbakan’s sheer determination and strategic skill in building a network of nationwide supporters. Since the late 1960s, he has been the political leader and the dominant personality of the Islamist parties. Despite being banned from political life for five years in 1998, Erbakan has still managed to control the FP. The RP appeared to receive most of its votes from the urban poor and the electorates in the midsize towns of Anatolia, but this all changed in 1994. In the words of the party leaders, “they [the RP’s elites and activists] targeted disenchanted voters of the center-right and the center.”13 They emphasized Islam as a total and complete ideology that was a clear alternative to a decades-old Western orientation, called for collectivism and collective action, rejected nationalism and stressed the need for milli görµ≈s (national view), and pushed for a new version of etatism based on a vague concept of adil ekonomik dµzen (the just economic order). It is significant to note that these concepts were not new. They were developed in the late 1960s and 1970s under the MNP and the MSP and are a testament to the persistence and patience of the Islamist party leaders’ efforts to present alternatives to the secularist elites’ ideas about economic and political development. Adil dµzen and its economic doctrine rejected imitation of the West, opposed capitalism, called for the establishment of an Islamic common market, and stressed the need for an independent foreign policy that advocated Turkey’s withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Ye≈silada 1999). Erbakan’s program further called for (1) a balanced economic structure between private and public sectors, (2) elimination of interest and introduction of a profit-sharing scheme, (3) rejection of


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monopolies, (4) a single tax system, (5) an increase in social security and welfare spending, (6) state ownership of basic services such as public utilities as well as the infrastructure, and (7) the introduction of Islamic banking as provisions for favorable partnership-based economic activities. According to Erbakan, these views were based on fundamental “Godgiven” rights of the individuals found in the Quran and Hadiths.14 In comparison, milli görµ≈ s placed heavy emphasis on domestic peace, unity between the state and nation, the revival of the bµyµk millet (great nation), individual’s spiritual growth, and improved personal wealth and comfort. Taken in its entirety, these views closely follow the typical RP/FP voter’s attitudes and beliefs discussed above. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that in terms of attitudinal and conceptual adaptation, the party did succeed. But how were the elites able to carry their message to the people? The formal and informal organizations of the party played key roles in this regard. Like all other political parties in Turkey, the RP and the FP were formed in accordance with the organizational requirements that are specified in the country’s Political Parties Law. The membership in the Islamist parties increased from a mere 180,000 in 1991 to more than 4 million in 1995 (Ye≈silada 1999, 134). However, it is the informal organizational structure of the party that explains its success in adaptation and attraction of voter support. An important point to remember is that the RP/FP elites are not new to this organizational expertise. Their expertise dates back to the MNP and the MSP. There are several important organizational characteristics of the Islamist parties. First, the informal party organization that relies on a tightly controlled network of activists and volunteers to spread the message is quite extensive. In every district, the party maintains a divan (council) comprising fifty regular and fifty alternate members. These individuals meet on a regular basis and evaluate the party’s activities in their area of responsibility. Moreover, there are neighborhood representatives who maintain an information database on everyone living in that area down to the level of each family unit. In some areas, the concentration of representatives is so extensive that each apartment building has a party volunteer. These neighborhood representatives pay visits to the households and spread the party message through dialogue and distribution of audio and videocassettes manufactured in the party’s centers in Western Europe. There is also a network of headmasters and teachers, known as the hatipler ve öπretmenler (preachers and teachers), who engage people in discussion at the local teahouses and other gathering places. During the 1995 national elections, the RP had more than 300,000 such volunteers working for the party, but the number fell to less than a quarter million during the 1999 elections (Ye≈silada 1999).15 The party’s recent growth is also a product of a long-term commitment

174


to increase the number of graduates from the imam-hatip okullarª (preacher and prayer leader training schools). These schools were shut down by Kemal Atatµrk but reopened after the Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party, DP) came to power in 1950. Since 1951, the number of these schools, which are the traditional hotbeds of anti-Kemalist indoctrination, gradually increased, reaching alarming levels by 1995. Some 492,809 students were enrolled in 561 such schools at that time (Harp Akademileri Komutanlªπª 1998, 118–120). The significance of these institutions for the religious parties is that they attract many new members from the graduates of imam hatip schools. Finally, Turkey’s Islamist parties draw strong support from religious orders known as the tarikats.16 Among these orders, the Nak≈sibendi, and in particular the ºskender Pa≈sa congregation, has had very strong ties with the RP and the FP. In fact, Erbakan entered politics in the late 1960s with the encouragement of the congregation’s religious leader, the late Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku. The party’s connection to the religious orders is important on two levels. First, these orders provide bloc votes for the party. Second, they work closely with the party organization in perfecting takiye (religious dissimulation). It is no secret that most religious orders have always opposed Atatµrk’s secularist reforms. Throughout Turkey’s republican history, important sheikhs voiced their discontent with secularism and called for a return to an Islamic way of life. Many Refah/Fazilet leaders are on record for expressing similar views and thus causing the closure of the previous religious parties by the Constitutional Court. Takiye strategy emphasizes the need to conquer the state from within by aligning religious political forces with other powerful sources of capital and political groups. This is one fundamental reason why religious parties are willing to enter into many forms of coalition governments in order to penetrate state institutions. As I wrote in a previous study, “according to takiye any action of a member aimed at [achieving this goal] but that might violate Islamic code is acceptable because the state of war exists between the believers and [their] enemies” (Ye≈silada 1999, 139). Over the years, many prominent Nak≈sibendi leaders attained key positions in the Islamist parties. The organizational development of the RP/FP suggests that this party has fared rather well in adapting to voter realignment in Turkey. Not only did party leadership express views and policy positions sympathetic to the conservative and disenchanted voters, but it also created a nationwide network of devoted activists and sub-elites. The party’s organization, strategies, tactics, elite-mass relations, and the presence of the “elders” in party leadership positions led by Erbakan demonstrated a high degree of conformity with adaptation criteria outlined in the Eldersveld-Walton model. The party succeeded beyond its leaders’ wildest dreams in the 1994 local


175

and 1995 national elections. Yet their initial success in the 1995 elections led to their downfall as party leaders failed to keep junior party officials and activists within the confines of takiye. The radical antisecularist views expressed by some of the RP members, coupled with a number of symbolic moves made by Erbakan (state visits to Iran and Libya, the invitation of prominent tarikat and religious sect leaders to an official reception in Ankara, etc.), led to the party’s ouster from power under military pressure in June 1997 and its subsequent closure in January 1998. Since then, the FP has toned down its criticism of secularism and has even embarked on a campaign to present a new image for itself as a pro-system party. The younger elites of the party, led by such individuals as Tayyip Erdoπan and Abdullah Gµl, have recently begun to emphasize the necessity of having a system-oriented political party and have openly challenged the leadership of the old guard. It remains to be seen whether they will succeed in achieving their objective.

CONCLUSION

It is quite paradoxical that the one political party in Turkey, Refah/Fazilet, that has a remarkable track record of successful adaptation to change and voter realignment is not fully committed to the survival of the secular democratic political system in Turkey. The rise of this Islamist political party is a success story because despite constant attacks from the secular establishment, especially from the military, it keeps returning to politics albeit under a new name. The analysis presented in the preceding sections demonstrates that as the Turkish voter showed signs of realignment, party elites responded strategically to attract these people to the RP/FP camp. There are strong similarities between the attitudes and beliefs of the party’s voters and its elites and activists. The religious elite also benefit from the fact that the entire spectrum of the Turkish voter is gradually shifting to the political right and that the center-right is collapsing. As explained in the previous section, all of these developments make the task of party adaptation that much easier. The causal relationship between voter alignment and party adaptation worked in both directions. As the voters moved away from the traditional power centers of the political spectrum—the center and centerright—the RF/FP leadership was there to attract these voters to their party in large numbers. At the same time, the structure of the party and successful strategies pursued by party elites and activists served as a magnet in drawing new supporters to the RP/FP camp. In this regard, party adaptation to a changing political milieu has been carried out carefully and effectively through the official and unofficial network of volunteers and activists. The

176


choice of party leaders is possibly one area where the RP/FP can be criticized in not meeting the criteria of successful adaptation outlined by Key (1955; 1959) and Eldersveld (1982; 1998; 2000). Despite their track record of causing serious troubles for the party’s cause, the older guard still holds the key to the party’s future. This, however, is in accordance with the tarikat concept of obedience and respect. The Refah/Fazilet organization does not allow for dissent. It calls for total submission to party hierarchy very much like the one found in the tarikat. Therefore, there is a reasonable answer to this apparent shortcoming in adaptation, but it does not violate the philosophy behind the Islamist version of patron-client relations within religious organizations and informal networks. What is truly ironic is that while political parties are considered essential for democracy, the RP/FP seems to use democratic politics to end Western-style parliamentary democracy in Turkey. Its leaders are on a long mission, and the current problems associated with the closure of the Refah and the formation of the Fazilet are just a repeat of their previous experiences.

NOTES 1. During the military intervention in February 1997, known as a “soft coup,” the military pressured the Islamist prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, to resign and then have President Sµleyman Demirel give the task of forming a new government to the ANAP’s Mesut Yªlmaz. In the months leading to Erbakan’s resignation, the military openly criticized the RP-DYP coalition in public forums and published reports to mobilize the secularist interest groups, media, and civil society organizations against the government. 2. For extended discussion of the theory of realignment, also see Burnam (1970), Sundquist (1973), Petrocik (1981), Lawson and Merkl (1984), Miller and Shanks (1996), and Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1976). 3. For additional works, see Pertocik and Brown (1999), Beck et al. (1999), and Rochon (1999). 4. For example, see Ye≈silada (1999), Bunce (1999), and Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli (1999). 5. See, for example, Bermeo (1994), Putnam (1993), and Sayarª (1996). 6. See Tµnay (1993), Heper and Landau (1991), and Kalaycªoπlu (1994). 7. Data from State Planning Organization 2001, available at http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dptweb/esg/esg-i. 8. See Chapter 6 in this volume. 9. For a detailed discussion, see Ye≈silada (1999), Okutucu (1996), and Sayarª (1996). 10. A month after the elections, the A-D Research Group surveyed 2,448 individuals and asked which political party they would vote for if the elections were held in May 1999. The results of this survey showed the following breakdown of voter support among the three leading parties: 32 percent for the DSP; 31 percent for the MHP; and 12.5 percent for the FP. 11. The 1990 and 1997 surveys are part of the Global Values Survey project


177

led by Ronald Inglehart. The former was carried out in Turkey by ˜stµn Ergµder, Ersin Kalaycªoπlu, and Yªlmaz Esmer and was funded by T˜SIAD and the University of Michigan. The sample size of the survey was 1,030 individuals. The 1997 survey was carried out by Kalaycªoπlu and Esmer and involved a sample size of 1,907 individuals. Primarily the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of Germany funded this study. The survey data are available from the ICPSR at the University of Michigan. The postelection data for the 1999 survey was provided by Esmer (1999c). 12. Much has been written about the roots of the religious parties in Turkey. For key works in this area, see Reed (1954), Heyd (1968), Okutucu (1996), Sayarª (1996), Soydan (1994), and Ye≈silada (1999). 13. From interviews conducted in Turkey during 1996–1997. 14. For a detailed discussion, see Erbakan (1991). 15. Also see the Adenauer Foundation (1996) and Okutucu (1996). 16. For a detailed examination of the religious orders, see Harp Akademileri Komutanlªπª (1998), Eyµboπlu (1987), and Ye≈silada (1989).

9 Conclusion Sabri Sayarª

The preceding chapters have provided a rich store of data and analysis on how Turkish voters vote, why they choose particular parties, and what their choices imply for the evolution of the country’s party system. The contributions to this volume make it quite clear that Turkey’s electoral and party politics have witnessed significant changes since 1950. Possibly the most important of these is the trend toward greater electoral volatility and fluidity. During the initial decades of electoral politics, up to 80 to 90 percent of the voters supported the country’s two major centrist political parties. But as of the 1990s, the parties that finish first and second in the parliamentary elections tend to collectively receive only about 40 percent of the total votes. Therefore, it makes little sense nowadays to talk about the dominant role of any single party in electoral competition. Volatility is a key indicator of stability and change in the analysis of party systems. High volatility is associated with sharp decline in the strengths of some parties and increase in others between elections. Although a similar long-term trend has also been observed in Western European democracies, volatility rates in Turkey, especially among the voters supporting center-right and far-right parties, have been considerably higher than in Europe. There are several possible sources of high electoral volatility rates in Turkey. They include the impact of military interventions on the stability of party competition; the weakening of party organizations and the ties between parties and voters; the instability within the party families on the right and the left; the declining electoral appeal of the centrist parties; and a high degree of personalist politics based on traditional patron-client networks—rather than deep loyalties to parties—in the country’s relatively less developed eastern and southeastern regions. As noted in Chapter 1, high volatility rates have had significant implications for Turkish politics. The fluidity of electoral competition has under179

180


mined political stability, effective governance, and policy continuity. During the 1970s and again in the 1990s, Turkey experienced protracted periods of parliamentary gridlock and policy paralysis amid serious political crises that threatened the viability of democratic institutions. Electoral instability also contributed to the weakness of the party system and impeded its institutionalization. Party building and institutionalization require that parties have strong and stable roots in society. This is best secured through strong party identification and well-developed grassroots organizations. The high degree of voter mobility in Turkey, together with the declining organizational capacity of the traditional centerist parties, has impeded the institutionalization of the party system, which, in turn, has hampered the strengthening of mechanisms for governability, representation, and accountability. Barring major reversals in electoral trends, volatility is likely to remain a major characteristic of voting behavior in Turkey in the near future. Another important change in electoral and party politics in Turkey concerns the geographical bases of political party support. During the initial phase of competitive politics in the 1950s, there were significant regional differences in the electoral strengths of the two major parties. For example, in the 1950 and 1954 elections, the governing Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party, DP) generally did better in the more developed western regions of Turkey while the major electoral strongholds of the opposition Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP) were in some of the less developed eastern provinces. More recently, the electoral geography of party competition in Turkey has become considerably more complex and differentiated. As discussed in detail in Chapter 6, the emerging geographical configuration again shows a strong relationship between levels of socioeconomic development and the strengths of political parties. However, in the 1990s, this relationship has also acquired an important new dimension, namely, a distinction between those parties that support the democratic system and others that display anti-system tendencies. The analysis of the election results shows that the centrist pro-system parties do significantly better in the relatively more developed western Aegean, Marmara, and several Black Sea coastal provinces than in other parts of Turkey. The electoral strongholds of the Islamist and extreme nationalist parties in the 1990s, on the other hand, are in central Anatolia, although both seem to be expanding their electoral bases westward toward the Aegean region. Moreover, there is also a significant change in the electoral geography of the southeastern and eastern regions. In the past, centrist parties commanded the political loyalties of large numbers of voters in these areas. Yet electoral trends in the 1990s displayed a notable shift from the centrist political forces to the ethnic Kurdish parties in a number of eastern and southeastern provinces. It remains to be seen whether the electoral geography of party

Conclusion

181

competition in Turkey will stabilize or undergo further significant changes during the early twenty-first century. What influences the electoral preferences of the Turkish voters? Several contributions to this study offer varied appraisals of the main determinants of voting behavior in Turkey. Although these explanations rule out a definitive answer, they provide future researchers with important insights and findings. One major explanation focuses on the importance of the longstanding center-periphery cleavage that the modern Turkish republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Clearly, this social cleavage, based on a sharp cultural, political, and economic divide between the “ruling” elites and the “subject” masses, had a major impact in shaping partisan attachments during the formative phase of the party system in the late 1940s and early 1950s. While the DP projected the image of a party that championed the interests of the periphery, many voters identified the CHP as representing the center’s policies and orientation. However, whether the center-periphery cleavage still influences voting behavior, and if so, what the “center” and the “periphery” actually mean today in view of the broad social and political changes that have taken place, remain a matter of scholarly debate and discussion. For example, according to Frank Tachau (Chapter 2) and Ali Çarkoπlu and Gamze Avcª (Chapter 6), the center-periphery cleavage remains an important source of electoral choice in contemporary Turkish politics. However, other observers such as Yªlmaz Esmer (Chapter 5) do not share this view and offer alternative explanations concerning the principal sources of voting behavior in contemporary Turkish politics. Protest voting hypothesis constitutes a second possible explanation of voting behavior. As discussed by Tachau and Esmer, it views political choice largely as the product of social and economic disparities and grievances felt by the voters who, in their attempt to express their dissatisfaction with existing conditions, cast their ballots for parties that promise to alleviate social and economic problems through radical change. The protest voting approach to electoral behavior has gained considerable following among the analysts of Turkish politics in recent years in view of the political ascendancy of the Islamist and nationalist parties and the weakening of the centrist political forces. In particular, many have viewed the support received by the Islamists in the 1990s as an expression of protest by the urban poor against the failure of the centrist parties to deal effectively with pressing social and economic problems. A third explanation differs fundamentally from the preceding two. It singles out left-right ideology as the principal determinant of electoral choice and party support. Based on the findings of a major survey that was carried out in the immediate aftermath of the April 1999 parliamentary elections, Esmer’s analysis shows that the left-right ideological divide among the Turkish voters is a better predictor of electoral choice than the

182


protest voting hypotheses. The survey results also show that the correlation between left-right attitudes and party preferences is much higher than for social and economic characteristics and indicators of relative deprivation. Despite the fact that left-right polarization in the party system is significantly lower than was the case in the early 1980s, the ideological images that the parties project to the voters still carry considerable weight in the electoral decisions of many voters in Turkey. The analysis of the religious and ethnic bases of the voting by Ay≈se Gµne≈s-Ayata and Sencer Ayata (Chapter 7) suggests yet another possible explanation for what makes the voters in Turkey vote the way they do. According to this perspective, based mostly on aggregate electoral statistics rather than survey research, religious and ethnic cleavages have become increasingly important in structuring the vote in the 1990s. The secularist/Islamist polarization and the Sunni-Alevi divide have made religion a critical determinant of electoral behavior. At the same time, the intensification of the Kurdish problem has generated political support for both the pro-Kurdish and extreme nationalist parties. However, what the authors of Chapter 7 refer to as “the new identity politics” is complicated by the influence of other social and economic variables as well as overlapping cleavages such as the tendency of the Alevi Kurds to vote for the secularist left rather than the pro-Kurdish parties. The preceding chapters also highlight a number of issues concerning the relationship between electoral systems and governmental stability, the ability of political parties to adapt themselves to changing social and political conditions, and the growing importance of local elections. The Turkish case underscores the influence of electoral laws in shaping party systems. As Sabri Sayarª (Chapter 1), Tachau, and Ersin Kalaycªoπlu (Chapter 3) note, the introduction of proportional representation in 1961 contributed to increased fragmentation in the party system and made it difficult, though not impossible, to have majority party governments. Coalition or minority governments in the 1970s and 1990s have generally proved to be shortlived and unstable. Yet the conventional wisdom regarding the ineffectiveness of the coalition governments is challenged by the findings presented by Kalaycªoπlu, which show that the performance of the coalitions with respect to social and economic policies has not been any worse—or better—than that of majority party governments. The Turkish case is also instructive in revealing the importance of party adaptation for success in the elections. As Birol Ye≈silada’s analysis (Chapter 8) demonstrates, the ability of Turkey’s Islamist parties to successfully adapt to their environment and devise new organizational strategies to attract potential voters played a significant role in their emergence as major contenders for power in the 1990s. Expanding on this theme, it is possible to argue that the inability or the unwillingness of the traditional

Conclusion

183

centrist parties to engage in a similar process of adaptation has cost them dearly at the polls in recent years. Finally, Nihal ºncioπlu’s analysis (Chapter 4) highlights the emerging trends in local elections. It also underscores how the contests for local elective positions have grown in importance in national politics in the 1990s. In particular, municipal elections in large Turkish cities, with their overwhelming size and population, have become important indicators of the strengths and weaknesses of political parties. While urban problems—and the perceived success or failure of parties to deal with them—influence electoral choice at the local level, major conflicts in national politics, such as those over the issue of secularism, also affect voting patterns in the municipal elections. The preceding essays show that elections and electoral processes have played a central role in Turkey’s experience with democracy since 1950. With the exception of the 1957 parliamentary elections when there were serious irregularities in vote counting, electoral contests have been honest and fair with voters freely choosing by secret ballot among parties and candidates representing different policies, ideologies, and programs. Despite a promising beginning in 1950, Turkey experienced three breakdowns of its democratic regime in later years. However, the military interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980 were all followed by the resumption of electoral politics. The Turkish case offers an important example of how electoral processes have played a critical role in the opening of the political system after each military intervention. Although the military has tried to control the transition back to democracy—most recently following a three-year military regime from 1980 to 1983—its efforts to restrict the voters’ choice through artificial measures have been largely unsuccessful. The outcome of the 1983 elections lessened the military’s ability to control the transition process and exposed the artificial nature of the party system that was created from above by the generals. It also proved to be a singularly important development for creating a political opening that facilitated the beginning of the redemocratization process. Despite the problems that it has encountered in its experience with democracy, Turkey has shown a basic commitment to democratic institutions and processes. Located in the Middle East, a region of the world where democracy has been the exception rather than the rule and where varieties of authoritarianism still prevail despite the worldwide trend toward democratization, Turkey’s relatively long and continuous experience with democratic politics represents a significant deviation from this regional pattern and a notable achievement. Nevertheless, the democratization process that began in the late 1940s has not yet resulted in the consolidation of Turkish democracy. The complex tasks of strengthening political institutions and increasing accountability, implementing the much needed

184


constitutional and political reforms, and limiting the military’s role in politics still lie ahead. In all likelihood, party and electoral politics will play a major role in Turkey’s ability to meet these important democratic challenges in the first decades of the twenty-first century.

Appendix A: Abbreviations of Political Parties Represented in the Parliament, 1946–1999 PART 1: 1946–1980

Center-Right AP

DP

DkP GP

YTP

Adalet Partisi (Justice Party). A center-right party that was formed in 1961. It succeeded in capturing the electoral support of the banned DP and remained one of the two major parties in electoral politics for the next two decades, heading a number of governments in the 1960s and 1970s either alone or through coalitions with other parties. Led by Sµleyman Demirel for most of this period, it was banned following the 1980 military coup. Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party). Formed in 1946 by four former CHP members, it became the main opposition party during the transition to democracy in the late 1940s and came to power following its electoral victory in 1950. Led by Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, it was Turkey’s governing party for the next ten years. It was banned in the aftermath of the 1960 military coup. Demokratik Parti (Democratic Party). A minor party that was formed as a result of a factional split from the AP in 1970. Gµven Partisi (Reliance Party). A minor party that was created in 1967 by a dissident group of CHP parliamentarians. Later renamed Cumhuriyetçi Gµven Partisi (Republican Reliance Party). Yeni Tµrkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party). A minor center-right party that was formed in 1961. It participated in several coalition governments during 1961–1965.

185

186

Appendixes

Center-Left BP CHP

HP

Birlik Partisi (Unity Party). A minor party that was formed in 1966 to appeal primarily to the Alevi voters. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party). Founded by Kemal Atatµrk in 1923, it functioned as the one-party regime’s official party. Following the transition to democracy, it became the main opposition party in the 1950s under its veteran leader ºsmet ºnönµ. During the 1960s and 1970s, it was one of Turkey’s two major parties. In the 1970s, with Bµlent Ecevit as its leader, it developed a more discernible leftist discourse. The CHP was banned in the aftermath of the 1980 coup along with the rest of the parties. Hµrriyet Partisi (Freedom Party). Formed in 1955 by dissidents from the DP. It merged with the CHP in 1958.

Right CKMP Cumhuriyetçi Köylµ Millet Partisi (Republican Peasant Nation Party). A minor nationalist party that was formed in 1957 after a merger between the Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi (Republican Nation Party, CMP) and Köylµ Partisi (Peasants’ Party). It served in several coalition governments in the early 1960s. MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party). Turkey’s main extreme-right party was created in 1969 by Alpaslan Tµrke≈s after he captured the leadership of the CKMP in 1965 and renamed it four years later. During the mid-1970s, it participated in several Nationalist Front coalition governments. The MHP was banned in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. MP Millet Partisi (Nation Party). Created in 1948 by a group of dissenting DP members. It was outlawed in 1953, but many of its activists took part in the founding of the CMP a year later. It reappeared on the political scene in 1962 following a factional split from the CKMP. MSP Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party). An Islamist party, it was founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1972 after his former Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party, MNP) was disbanded by the Constitutional Court in 1971. It participated in the coalitions that were formed both by the center-left CHP and the centerright AP between 1974 and 1977. It was banned following the 1980 military coup.

Appendixes

187

Left TºP

Tµrkiye º≈sçi Partisi (Turkish Workers Party). Formed in 1961 by a group of labor union leaders, it was the first Marxist party to win seats in the parliament. It was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1971.

PART 2: 1983–1999

Center-Right ANAP Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party). A moderately conservative party that was created in 1983 by Turgut Özal with a broad populist appeal. After governing alone as a majority party from 1983 to 1991, it participated in a number of coalition governments during 1996–1999 under the leadership of Mesut Yªlmaz. It is one of the two main center-right parties in Turkish politics. DYP Doπru Yol Partisi (True Path Party). A predominantly center-right party that was formed in 1983 to carry on the legacy of the AP. Since then, it has been one of Turkey’s two main center-right parties, heading the coalition governments between 1991 and 1995, and serving as the junior partner of the RP-DYP coalition during 1996–1997. Its leadership passed from Sµleyman Demirel to Tansu Çiller after Demirel became Turkey’s president in 1993. MDP Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party). Established in 1983, it had close ties with the outgoing military regime. It failed to develop a popular following and merged with the ANAP in 1985.

Center-Left CHP

DSP

Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party). The CHP re-emerged on the political scene in 1992 under its original name but without its pre-1980 leader, Bµlent Ecevit. It remained one of the two main center-left parties in electoral politics in the 1990s. Beset by factionalism and leadership struggles, it failed to enter the parliament in the 1999 elections. Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party). A moderate centerleft party that was created in 1985 by Bµlent Ecevit who assumed its leadership in 1987. After initially failing to gain representation in the parliament, it steadily increased its electoral support during

188

HaP

SHP

Appendixes

the 1990s. It emerged victorious in the 1999 elections and became the senior partner of the coalition government. It is the larger of the two center-left parties in the Turkish party system. Halkçª Parti (Populist Party). Founded in 1983 with the goal of developing a popular following among the center-left voters, it failed to achieve this objective and merged with the Social Democracy Party (SODEP) in 1985 to create the SHP. Sosyal Demokrat Halkçª Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party). It was formed in 1985 through a merger between the HaP and the SODEP. It was the second-largest party in the parliament from 1987 to 1995 and shared political power with the center-right DYP through a coalition arrangement for four years after the 1991 elections. It merged with the CHP in 1995.

Right BBP

Bµyµk Birlik Partisi (Great Unity Party). It was formed in 1993 following a factional split from the MHP. It managed to enter the parliament in 1995 through an electoral coalition with the ANAP but failed to gain parliamentary representation in the 1999 elections. MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party). The MHP reemerged first in 1983 as the Nationalist Labor Party, and then adopted its original name in 1993. Upon Tµrke≈s’s death in 1997, Devlet Bahçeli assumed its leadership. It formed a coalition partnership with the DSP and the ANAP following the 1999 elections. RP/FP Refah Partisi/Fazilet Partisi (Welfare Party/Virtue Party). Created in 1983 as the successor to the MSP, the RP emerged as a major political force in the party system in the 1990s. Under Erbakan’s leadership, it finished first in the 1995 parliamentary elections and became the senior partner of the RP-DYP coalition during 1996–1997. After the RP was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1998, it re-emerged as the FP. (In 2001, the Constitutional Court also banned the FP. Former FP members subsequently split into two rival groups and formed two new Islamist parties: Saadet Partisi [Felicity Party, SP] led by Erbakan’s followers, and Adalet ve Kalkªnma Partisi [Justice and Development Party, AKP] under former Istanbul mayor Tayyip Erdoπan.)

Appendix B: Parliamentary Elections in Turkey, 1950–1999 Table B.1

Participation in Parliamentary Elections, 1950–1999

Year

Registered Voters

Total Ballots Cast

Participation Rate (%)

1950 1954 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999

8,905,743 10,262,063 12,078,623 12,925,395 13,679,753 14,788,552 16,798,164 21,207,303 19,767,366 26,376,926 29,978,837 34,155,981 37,495,217

8,051,650 9,095,617 9,250,949 10,522,716 9,748,678 9,516,035 11,223,843 15,358,210 18,238,362 24,603,541 25,157,089 28,126,993 32,656,070

90.4 88.6 76.6 81.4 71.3 64.3 66.8 72.4 92.3 93.3 83.9 82.3 87.1

Sources: DºE (1999b; 1999c); Tµrk and Tuncer (1995).

189

190 Table B.2

Appendixes Percentage of Votes Won by Party in Parliamentary Elections, 1950–1977

Party

1950

1954

1957

1961

1965

1969

1973

1977

CHP DP MP CMP HP AP CKMP CGP DkP TBP TºP YTP MHP MSP Independents Others

39.9 53.3 3.0 — — — — — — — — — — — 3.8 —

35.3 57.5 — 4.8 0.6 — — — — — — — — — 1.8 —

41.1 47.9 — 7.1 3.8 — — — — — — — — — 0.1 —

36.7 — — — — 34.8 14.0 — — — — 13.7 — — 0.8 —

28.7 — 6.3 — — 52.9 2.2 — — — 3.0 3.7 — — 3.2 —

27.4 — 3.2 — — 46.5 — 6.6 — 2.8 2.7 2.2 3.0 — 5.6 —

33.3 — — — — 29.8 — 5.3 11.9 1.1 — — 3.4 11.8 2.8 0.6

41.4 — — — — 36.9 — 1.9 1.9 — — — 6.4 8.6 2.4 0.5

1973

1977

Source: DºE (1999c).

Table B.3 Party CHP DP MP HP AP CKMP CGP DkP TBP TºP YTP MHP MSP Independents

Parliamentary Seats Won by Party, 1950–1977 1950 69 408 1 — — — — — — — — — — 9

Source: DºE (1999c).

1954 30 490 — 5 — — — — — — — — — 10

1957 173 419 — 4 — — — — — — — — — 2

1961 173 — — — 158 54 — — — — 65 — — —

1965 134 — 31 — 240 11 — — — 14 19 — — 1

1969 143 — 6 — 256 — 15 — 8 2 6 1 — 13

185 — — — 149 — 13 45 1 — — 3 48 6

213 — — — 189 — 3 1 — — — 16 24 4

191

Appendixes Table B.4

Percentage of Votes Won by Party in Parliamentary Elections, 1983–1999

Party

1983

1987

1991

1995

1999

CHP MHP ANAP HaP MDP DSP DYP RP SHP HADEP FP Independents Others

— — 45.1 30.5 23.3 — — — — — — 1.1 —

— 2.9 36.3 — — 8.5 19.1 7.2 24.7 — — 0.4 3.9

— — 24.0 — — 10.8 27.1 16.9 20.8 — — 0.1 0.4

10.7 8.2 19.7 — — 14.6 19.2 21.4 — 4.2 — 0.5 1.6

8.7 17.9 13.2 — — 22.2 12.0 — — 4.8 15.4 0.9 4.9

1999

Sources: DºE (1999c; 1999d).

Table B.5

Parliamentary Seats Won by Party, 1983–1999

Party

1983

1987

1991

1995

CHP MHP ANAP HaP MDP DSP DYP RP SHP FP Independents

—

—

—

49

211 117 71 — — — — — —

292 — — — 59 — 99 — —

115 — — 7 178 62 88 — —

132 — — 76 135 158 — — —

Sources: DºE (1999c; 1999d).

— 126 88 — — 134 83 — — 102 9

Table B.6 Province Adana Afyon Aπrª Amasya Ankara Antalya Artvin Aydªn Balªkesir Bilecik Bingöl Bitlis Bolu Burdur Bursa Çanakkale Çankªrª Çorum Denizli Diyarbakªr Edirne Elazªπ Erzincan Erzurum Eski≈sehir Gaziantep Giresun Gµmµ≈shane Hakkari Hatay Isparta ºçel ºstanbul ºzmir Kars Kastamonu Kayseri Kªrklareli Kªr≈sehir Kocaeli Konya Kµtahya Malatya Manisa K.Mara≈s Mardin Muπla Mu≈s Niπde Ordu Rize Samsun Siirt Sinop Sivas Tekirdaπ Tokat Trabzon Tunceli ≈S.Urfa Van Yozgat Zonguldak

Parliamentary Election Results by Province, 1950 (percentage of valid party votes) CHP

DP

MP

29.2 33.7 35.5 46.6 42.1 35.3 42.1 43.3 41.4 46.0 61.3 55.7 31.3 22.3 41.3 34.1 25.8 34.5 40.3 47.2 41.1 46.5 60.4 35.7 34.6 41.4 37.6 37.3 100.0 52.2 40.1 37.1 26.1 41.4 58.2 39.7 32.0 46.1 32.5 36.2 40.3 37.0 59.4 41.4 33.1 32.6 44.9 48.7 43.2 50.0 30.0 41.9 41.0 62.8 45.7 40.5 44.4 48.5 41.3 48.1 43.2 42.4 36.5

34.3 57.0 64.5 53.4 49.1 64.7 54.4 54.7 58.6 54.0 32.6 27.8 65.4 45.9 58.7 65.7 61.5 65.5 59.7 52.8 54.1 53.5 39.6 64.3 60.6 58.6 62.4 46.3 0.0 47.8 59.9 62.0 56.6 56.7 41.1 43.9 66.9 53.9 35.7 59.2 59.2 51.6 40.6 58.6 44.8 32.7 55.1 51.3 55.4 50.0 70.0 57.5 59.0 10.8 54.3 58.9 55.6 46.3 58.7 51.9 35.1 57.6 63.5

1.3 9.3 0.0 0.0 8.8 0.0 3.5 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 17.2 1.8 0.0 16.4 1.1 0.0 26.8 4.6 0.0 11.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 26.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Table B.7

Parliamentary Election Results by Province, 1954 (percentage of valid party votes)

Province

CHP

CMP

DP

HP

Adana Afyon Aπrª Amasya Ankara Antalya Artvin Aydªn Balªkesir Bilecik Bingöl Bitlis Bolu Burdur Bursa Çanakkale Çankªrª Çorum Denizli Diyarbakªr Edirne Elazªπ Erzincan Erzurum Eski≈sehir Gaziantep Giresun Gµmµ≈shane Hakkari Hatay Isparta ºçel ºstanbul ºzmir Kars Kastamonu Kayseri Kªrklareli Kªr≈sehir Kocaeli Konya Kµtahya Malatya Manisa K.Mara≈s Mardin Muπla Mu≈s Niπde Ordu Rize Samsun Siirt Sinop Sivas Tekirdaπ Tokat Trabzon Tunceli ≈S.Urfa U≈sak Van Yozgat Zonguldak

45.7 26.5 28.4 40.1 39.2 35.0 35.6 32.9 34.7 39.3 26.1 22.4 25.5 39.7 30.3 31.6 28.0 33.5 42.4 35.5 34.7 37.7 47.9 28.2 26.8 41.2 32.0 42.1 23.8 38.4 37.0 36.0 26.6 38.7 49.1 29.2 33.7 35.4 22.9 30.1 34.8 25.9 54.1 32.4 36.3 35.2 39.3 25.2 30.4 44.8 25.3 37.5 29.0 41.5 44.3 34.2 44.8 35.4 53.5 38.9 40.3 35.5 33.2 27.4

1.2 15.1 0.0 4.8 9.8 0.0 0.0 2.2 2.8 2.6 14.3 0.0 4.5 0.0 6.2 2.3 12.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 1.6 0.0 12.0 6.9 0.0 6.5 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.0 8.0 0.0 11.4 10.3 4.3 2.0 42.3 5.9 9.9 9.3 0.3 3.1 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 5.2 2.2 0.0 23.9 3.2 2.5 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 5.7 5.8

49.2 58.2 69.6 54.9 50.1 61.5 59.1 64.7 62.1 54.1 31.7 67.2 69.7 57.2 62.9 60.9 50.7 60.4 57.5 61.1 61.3 57.4 51.4 59.6 63.1 58.1 61.3 49.9 54.4 60.0 62.3 53.2 62.7 61.2 38.1 59.1 61.7 62.3 30.0 63.0 53.6 64.2 44.3 64.5 54.9 47.8 60.6 38.0 55.0 55.2 69.5 60.3 65.8 34.7 52.5 63.2 55.2 61.8 46.5 49.4 43.0 64.5 58.0 66.8

3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 3.1 7.2 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.8 0.1 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

194 Table B.8

Appendixes Parliamentary Election Results by Province, 1957 (percentage of valid party votes)

Province

CHP

CMP

DP

Adana Adªyaman Afyon Aπrª Amasya Ankara Antalya Artvin Aydªn Balªkesir Bilecik Bingöl Bitlis Bolu Burdur Bursa Çanakkale Çankªrª Çorum Denizli Diyarbakªr Edirne Elazªπ Erzincan Erzurum Eski≈sehir Gaziantep Giresun Gµmµ≈shane Hakkari Hatay Isparta ºçel ºstanbul ºzmir Kars Kastamonu Kayseri Kªrklareli Kªr≈sehir Kocaeli Konya Kµtahya Malatya Manisa K.Mara≈s Mardin Muπla Mu≈s Nev≈sehir

55.1 37.7 29.9 41.4 45.2 45.8 40.7 40.0 34.8 35.1 41.0 36.4 37.4 38.5 30.8 29.0 35.6 37.5 34.2 44.4 29.8 37.3 44.4 56.0 32.3 38.6 47.3 42.5 49.5 30.7 46.9 31.7 44.1 41.1 41.9 58.5 40.4 43.1 38.9 11.5 39.2 40.9 31.2 65.6 33.5 45.2 53.1 43.5 31.0 28.7

2.2 0.3 21.9 8.4 7.4 13.4 1.1 0.6 2.2 1.6 3.2 6.9 1.2 7.4 0.3 5.3 4.3 24.6 17.8 1.4 0.8 6.6 3.7 11.3 13.7 5.1 1.6 9.9 1.2 0.0 2.0 0.7 1.4 4.3 1.2 0.8 11.7 5.8 3.3 62.9 5.9 10.5 11.0 0.3 1.7 12.8 0.6 0.2 8.3 28.9

42.4 49.8 48.1 50.2 46.3 37.4 51.1 49.7 60.8 54.7 48.8 41.4 60.9 54.1 32.8 58.1 55.8 35.5 45.5 51.1 49.6 53.2 41.8 32.0 50.2 54.1 48.0 43.9 47.8 67.8 45.5 44.1 47.0 52.1 54.7 36.8 44.8 48.8 53.3 25.6 50.7 44.3 52.3 32.9 57.3 42.1 46.3 55.5 44.5 42.4

HP 0.3 12.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 3.4 7.1 9.7 2.3 8.6 7.0 3.8 0.4 0.0 36.0 7.5 4.3 2.5 2.5 3.1 19.8 2.9 10.1 0.7 3.8 2.2 3.1 3.6 1.4 1.5 5.6 23.5 7.5 2.5 2.2 3.9 3.1 2.2 4.5 0.0 4.1 4.3 5.5 1.2 7.5 0.0 0.0 0.8 14.5 0.0 (continues)

195


(continued)

Province

CHP

CMP

DP

HP

Niπde Ordu Rize Sakarya Samsun Siirt Sinop Sivas Tekirdaπ Tokat Trabzon Tunceli ≈S.Urfa U≈sak Van Yozgat Zonguldak

40.7 51.4 30.8 28.6 44.7 43.4 37.1 53.0 41.4 48.8 44.3 53.5 51.9 41.9 56.7 32.7 37.0

18.6 4.3 18.5 5.2 4.9 0.7 24.9 7.4 7.0 4.4 6.4 0.0 2.5 24.9 1.2 23.3 8.3

40.3 43.1 50.7 58.9 48.2 49.5 37.9 39.6 51.6 44.9 47.6 34.8 45.4 32.8 42.1 43.8 53.2

0.5 1.2 0.0 7.3 2.1 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.7 11.7 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 1.5

196 Table B.9

Province Adana Adªyaman Afyon Aπrª Amasya Ankara Antalya Artvin Aydªn Balªkesir Bilecik Bingöl Bitlis Bolu Burdur Bursa Çanakkale Çankªrª Çorum Denizli Diyarbakªr Edirne Elazªπ Erzincan Erzurum Eski≈sehir Gaziantep Giresun Gµmµ≈shane Hakkari Hatay Isparta ºçel ºstanbul ºzmir Kars Kastamonu Kayseri Kªrklareli Kªr≈sehir Kocaeli Konya Kµtahya Malatya Manisa K.Mara≈s Mardin Muπla Mu≈s Nev≈sehir

Appendixes Parliamentary Election Results by Province, 1961 (percentage of valid party votes) AP

CHP

CKMP

51.3 2.9 28.4 11.0 54.0 19.8 61.2 45.8 64.7 58.5 50.8 0.0 0.0 23.2 36.3 63.1 31.1 14.2 52.7 56.4 19.2 26.3 42.2 4.8 7.3 37.4 29.4 2.8 26.8 3.1 21.7 51.1 55.5 41.8 55.1 21.7 9.3 44.7 14.4 10.6 44.8 23.2 34.2 4.2 59.9 52.0 0.0 59.4 20.4 32.5

43.9 37.5 25.0 32.4 38.8 38.7 35.1 44.2 31.0 35.7 41.5 31.1 30.8 28.8 43.7 29.3 35.0 23.2 29.6 40.0 32.8 38.5 35.3 48.5 28.1 35.2 47.0 34.8 37.8 41.3 37.3 33.6 41.2 38.2 39.6 47.8 30.7 41.6 40.3 25.8 38.8 34.6 27.4 67.3 32.6 38.9 43.3 38.5 31.3 31.9

4.2 10.7 45.4 34.3 7.3 35.6 3.8 10.0 3.8 4.2 7.7 11.7 22.3 19.0 0.0 5.6 9.9 62.4 16.1 1.8 5.2 10.1 21.9 2.0 18.7 24.7 2.7 23.4 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0 3.3 12.4 3.1 0.0 25.5 8.0 8.6 63.6 14.1 25.4 36.2 5.4 7.0 6.0 21.8 2.1 4.3 35.5

YTP 0.0 48.9 1.2 22.3 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.6 0.0 54.6 46.9 28.9 20.1 2.0 24.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 42.8 24.4 0.7 44.3 45.3 1.8 20.9 39.0 35.4 25.3 34.1 15.4 0.0 3.3 1.5 30.4 34.6 4.7 36.7 0.0 2.4 16.8 2.2 23.1 0.0 2.0 34.9 0.0 43.9 0.0 (continues)

197

Appendixes Table B.9 Province Niπde Ordu Rize Sakarya Samsun Siirt Sinop Sivas Tekirdaπ Tokat Trabzon Tunceli ≈S.Urfa U≈sak Van Yozgat Zonguldak

(continued) AP

CHP

CKMP

YTP

29.5 24.6 53.4 38.4 58.3 0.0 26.2 4.8 6.9 15.9 51.5 0.0 20.6 20.6 7.9 12.2 55.7

30.8 40.5 31.6 28.0 36.8 47.7 37.2 39.2 36.4 38.2 39.5 35.1 42.9 42.0 32.6 32.7 31.8

35.5 6.9 13.5 12.4 5.0 0.0 36.6 9.8 7.3 5.7 6.8 7.1 6.1 37.4 21.4 44.2 12.5

4.1 28.0 1.5 21.0 0.0 51.0 0.0 43.9 49.4 40.2 2.3 35.4 30.4 0.0 38.0 10.1 0.0

198 Table B.10



CHP

CKMP

MP

TºP

53.9 41.8 62.3 20.9 42.4 46.5 66.6 60.8 72.3 62.9 56.9 25.3 49.2 59.3 52.1 68.6 63.4 56.4 50.7 61.7 28.8 56.4 48.6 43.8 55.8 59.6 51.7 55.0 41.1 5.5 57.5 63.8 59.5 53.2 62.2 37.3 61.5 54.3 60.6 24.9 55.5 54.2 63.7 31.0 65.2 48.2 22.7 61.9 18.3 47.3

35.6 26.7 18.5 18.6 20.6 30.2 25.7 38.5 21.0 28.4 31.2 35.7 17.4 22.3 36.7 23.1 26.8 16.0 24.2 31.2 23.2 30.6 39.6 28.8 25.5 26.9 37.8 30.5 28.6 37.5 31.2 23.0 32.2 29.7 29.8 34.3 19.9 34.3 31.0 19.3 29.8 25.0 19.5 51.2 25.1 23.9 22.5 32.5 19.1 25.6

2.3 0.0 3.3 11.8 1.7 2.5 2.1 0.0 0.0 1.4 3.8 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 1.8 3.5 6.0 4.2 0.0 3.4 1.8 3.3 0.0 2.6 2.3 1.5 1.9 0.0 0.8 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.1 0.0 5.1 3.0 1.3 4.9 1.4 1.9 3.2 2.9 0.0 0.0 1.8 2.6 18.0 0.0

3.5 0.0 11.5 0.9 21.6 14.2 3.0 0.0 3.0 3.5 4.8 3.8 1.4 8.4 0.0 3.1 4.2 19.9 12.7 3.0 1.7 6.6 0.0 0.0 7.7 6.3 2.6 5.3 0.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 4.2 4.9 2.8 2.9 9.7 6.2 4.0 50.8 8.7 9.4 11.0 3.5 6.3 9.8 0.0 0.0 8.0 27.1

3.2 2.8 1.9 4.9 5.7 4.3 2.5 0.0 3.7 2.4 3.1 2.1 0.0 1.8 4.3 2.2 2.1 0.0 0.0 1.9 8.0 3.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 2.7 3.4 1.8 0.0 0.0 4.6 0.0 2.8 7.9 3.9 6.0 0.0 2.2 3.1 0.0 3.3 2.2 0.0 3.8 2.6 2.0 1.7 2.8 3.7 0.0

YTP 1.3 12.0 1.9 42.8 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 30.9 10.4 5.8 4.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 6.8 1.6 23.1 1.6 4.0 3.9 5.9 1.9 3.0 5.1 7.1 55.1 3.2 13.2 1.3 0.9 0.0 9.7 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.6 2.3 2.9 0.0 3.5 12.3 0.0 13.6 0.0 (continues)

199


(continued) AP

CHP

CKMP

MP

TºP

YTP

45.6 53.2 62.3 57.3 56.0 36.7 34.7 39.4 56.6 50.0 53.8 26.8 34.9 55.1 30.2 40.1 65.6

25.4 36.2 22.6 21.1 31.2 35.8 26.9 33.2 31.6 36.6 37.4 33.5 30.6 33.1 45.2 25.9 24.6

10.3 3.1 3.7 1.8 1.7 0.0 8.2 3.7 1.2 2.9 1.1 0.0 0.0 11.7 0.0 4.6 1.9

10.8 0.0 9.5 6.8 7.7 2.0 15.1 7.1 3.9 0.0 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.0 4.0

2.5 3.5 0.0 2.2 2.5 2.0 0.0 2.6 6.5 4.0 1.2 5.8 3.2 0.0 2.6 5.3 2.2

4.2 3.9 1.9 10.5 0.0 14.8 0.0 5.0 0.0 6.6 0.0 21.8 9.1 0.0 19.7 2.2 1.4

200 Table B.11



TBP

CHP

CGP

MHP

MP

TºP

42.5 28.1 58.8 36.2 44.7 42.3 60.8 49.9 62.4 56.3 55.3 14.2 42.0 58.1 50.0 64.3 58.2 52.5 46.6 55.0 35.5 50.8 35.1 42.2 55.7 57.8 35.3 40.2 37.6 27.8 39.5 81.4 48.1 47.8 53.2 42.9 50.6 48.3 47.3 28.0 52.4 51.3 60.1 14.5 57.8 32.0 27.8 56.4 10.3 53.4

3.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 24.1 4.3 2.7 0.0 1.4 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.9 1.2 0.0 0.0 3.3 13.1 0.0 2.5 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 5.3 2.9 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 3.0 11.8 2.4 6.2 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0

33.7 31.2 18.2 26.0 20.6 34.0 24.9 26.1 26.0 28.2 32.1 12.2 32.2 24.3 28.5 25.0 27.0 15.2 17.7 29.4 7.3 32.8 26.8 30.3 22.0 26.3 33.8 23.3 30.9 34.0 30.1 14.2 30.7 33.9 35.1 33.3 22.7 19.5 30.6 23.1 33.0 22.5 21.1 41.4 28.0 17.6 12.0 29.7 16.9 19.9

6.6 2.1 10.3 31.1 5.4 3.8 5.8 10.5 3.8 5.5 4.7 7.0 1.7 5.2 13.3 3.5 3.1 5.3 6.1 7.1 3.0 5.7 8.0 3.1 6.9 4.9 11.6 5.5 9.8 37.1 4.4 2.5 6.0 2.3 3.9 4.0 12.8 24.6 4.7 3.3 3.5 11.1 4.8 2.3 4.0 3.9 8.0 8.2 5.2 4.2

8.6 1.2 3.8 1.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 0.0 1.7 1.6 4.6 0.0 0.0 2.6 3.7 2.9 3.7 5.8 3.9 3.2 0.8 1.6 5.4 4.5 2.5 2.4 3.5 5.7 1.5 0.2 2.7 0.0 6.2 2.6 1.1 5.8 5.1 3.0 0.7 1.9 1.4 3.1 3.4 2.7 2.1 1.2 0.2 1.6 0.0 1.2

0.7 0.4 5.8 3.0 1.2 7.6 0.9 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.3 0.0 3.1 0.8 1.4 1.1 8.4 4.9 0.8 7.9 3.3 0.8 1.1 3.5 2.2 0.9 3.5 1.6 0.0 0.4 0.6 1.2 2.7 1.1 1.6 5.6 1.9 2.6 40.8 5.9 1.1 5.3 0.5 3.1 5.0 0.7 0.8 0.4 19.4

2.1 8.6 2.3 1.7 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.2 1.4 1.6 0.8 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.4 2.3 2.8 5.1 1.7 1.4 1.9 2.9 1.3 1.7 0.9 0.6 3.7 1.0 1.7 5.8 2.9 8.3 2.4 2.7 5.4 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.2 5.2 2.4 1.9 0.2 1.6 3.7 1.8

YTP 0.4 5.1 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.5 22.5 23.4 2.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.5 0.8 0.6 26.4 0.8 2.9 0.7 7.4 0.7 0.4 2.3 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.6 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.2 12.1 0.5 14.3 0.0 (continues)

201


(continued) AP

TBP

CHP

CGP

MHP

MP

TºP

YTP

46.0 30.1 52.9 53.5 49.7 25.3 37.2 29.3 48.5 34.8 48.6 23.3 43.5 43.5 27.2 41.3 55.6

0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 17.7 0.0 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0

25.1 33.0 29.1 28.5 36.7 18.5 26.9 30.8 24.8 17.6 34.5 18.9 22.5 36.7 10.4 22.1 30.7

9.1 7.3 4.3 4.6 3.4 15.6 5.9 3.0 20.2 9.1 7.9 1.1 8.2 12.7 23.6 5.2 6.9

10.2 5.3 3.2 3.3 1.8 0.0 3.7 6.3 1.1 3.9 3.4 0.0 0.5 2.9 9.4 2.3 1.5

5.5 1.3 9.1 3.4 1.7 0.5 20.3 4.1 0.9 1.0 2.9 0.5 0.8 1.8 0.0 12.2 1.8

2.6 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.2 4.6 3.0 4.0 1.8 1.0 16.8 2.0 2.4 1.2 2.5 2.1

1.6 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.0 24.2 1.4 1.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 14.9 9.4 0.0 12.1 0.7 1.1

202 Table B.12



CHP

CGP

DP

MHP

MP

MSP

23.1 28.7 36.2 15.5 25.8 27.8 39.2 34.3 34.7 47.1 44.0 20.6 40.6 41.5 25.6 50.7 44.2 38.7 19.0 34.0 20.7 41.6 25.5 25.6 22.9 40.6 17.7 27.3 36.5 33.0 23.3 62.1 29.4 28.5 39.3 15.0 39.3 27.3 42.0 14.1 32.3 13.5 43.0 13.8 42.3 17.9 18.8 36.2 9.4 35.4

39.8 32.7 19.1 15.5 28.1 41.9 29.5 43.7 30.1 32.1 31.7 23.3 15.5 15.0 30.8 28.0 35.6 14.5 30.7 33.6 30.4 44.2 29.5 45.3 19.7 31.9 37.0 31.7 19.5 35.4 37.5 14.4 39.2 48.9 44.1 45.5 21.6 23.3 43.7 31.1 33.6 20.9 17.4 44.1 31.4 32.9 17.7 35.2 17.3 26.0

3.9 10.3 7.3 18.3 12.9 3.0 3.5 6.6 1.1 3.0 3.2 0.5 2.3 18.4 12.6 2.2 1.8 3.0 4.1 2.7 5.6 3.0 2.3 2.7 3.4 4.2 10.9 2.9 1.7 3.8 6.5 2.7 1.9 2.8 2.4 5.2 14.0 18.0 2.5 6.2 3.6 9.6 4.9 4.8 1.9 2.0 10.3 5.1 6.4 4.8

12.6 3.9 14.0 8.7 5.7 9.4 17.0 6.3 28.8 5.9 3.8 10.5 1.1 4.8 14.3 7.7 9.7 17.2 17.9 22.5 12.2 6.4 7.7 2.8 10.7 8.1 15.5 20.2 2.4 25.7 15.0 11.5 15.7 7.1 7.9 13.4 10.5 5.2 7.7 12.7 9.5 33.9 14.6 4.5 10.9 10.8 17.6 18.4 6.0 5.2

8.1 1.6 5.2 6.2 4.6 4.7 4.1 0.0 1.6 1.7 2.0 0.3 0.0 1.6 7.3 1.4 1.5 7.5 2.8 1.6 3.0 1.4 4.2 4.6 3.3 3.9 4.6 8.0 4.0 0.0 5.1 1.6 7.1 1.8 1.1 2.5 6.8 7.5 1.4 7.5 1.2 4.0 3.4 1.8 2.9 5.6 0.5 1.2 0.5 5.6

0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 1.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.7 0.7 0.0 5.4 0.5 1.1 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5

8.2 22.1 16.4 14.8 17.8 9.3 5.6 7.9 3.0 8.6 14.4 25.5 11.3 17.3 9.3 9.4 5.5 16.3 21.7 5.3 18.5 2.2 27.8 16.1 29.5 9.2 11.6 8.7 24.9 2.1 6.4 7.1 2.8 8.4 4.2 7.7 6.1 16.5 2.6 13.8 18.1 16.5 14.3 19.9 9.3 26.7 12.1 3.6 14.7 18.4

TBP 1.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 5.1 1.7 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.9 1.6 1.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.7 3.4 1.5 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.4 1.8 0.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 (continues)

203


(continued) AP

CHP

CGP

DP

MHP

MP

MSP

TBP

25.3 15.8 29.7 29.3 38.3 16.4 24.7 16.9 40.2 19.3 25.1 14.3 33.5 33.0 22.4 17.5 38.2

22.4 29.9 31.1 24.7 30.7 14.2 30.8 32.9 34.4 29.8 35.0 70.0 29.0 39.0 10.3 27.0 39.8

7.9 3.4 2.2 3.4 2.6 23.8 4.4 1.9 11.9 3.9 4.8 0.5 1.9 4.3 52.3 2.9 3.3

22.3 21.4 12.3 20.8 10.3 11.0 13.5 6.7 8.4 13.1 15.8 0.9 17.1 13.6 1.4 15.7 6.9

8.9 5.1 2.3 2.5 1.9 0.6 4.5 4.5 1.8 4.9 3.5 0.5 0.9 3.3 0.7 10.8 1.7

0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.0 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.0

11.4 7.3 21.9 18.2 13.4 9.5 7.7 25.7 3.3 18.2 15.1 2.6 17.6 6.7 7.0 21.5 8.2

0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 10.8 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0

204 Table B.13

Province Adana Adªyaman Afyon Aπrª Amasya Ankara Antalya Artvin Aydªn Balªkesir Bilecik Bingöl Bitlis Bolu Burdur Bursa Çanakkale Çankªrª Çorum Denizli Diyarbakªr Edirne Elazªπ Erzincan Erzurum Eski≈sehir Gaziantep Giresun Gµmµ≈shane Hakkari Hatay Isparta ºçel Istanbul ºzmir Kars Kastamonu Kayseri Kªrklareli Kªr≈sehir Kocaeli Konya Kµtahya Malatya Manisa K.Mara≈s Mardin Muπla Mu≈s Nev≈sehir


CHP

CGP

DkP

MHP

32.0 28.7 52.3 21.0 37.7 30.5 54.1 45.8 51.7 51.7 49.0 29.6 34.3 55.4 43.2 51.7 50.2 46.8 37.5 43.9 26.1 39.5 20.1 27.9 43.1 46.1 32.4 40.3 40.4 43.4 28.6 69.6 38.8 28.4 39.7 18.6 48.4 31.8 46.4 20.5 40.0 28.2 61.0 17.0 48.6 27.8 16.5 50.3 18.0 41.4

46.5 41.9 27.3 12.3 45.2 50.7 34.1 44.4 38.5 37.5 39.2 25.4 17.1 28.3 39.8 36.7 38.7 22.5 36.1 43.5 34.8 53.8 28.8 45.4 21.7 41.6 44.7 37.0 28.5 36.5 55.1 21.3 44.8 58.2 52.7 52.9 31.5 31.3 48.5 45.5 43.8 31.3 23.3 52.3 38.7 36.1 21.2 42.4 16.4 34.5

1.1 0.7 1.9 10.2 1.4 1.3 1.7 0.0 1.3 1.7 1.6 2.0 0.7 3.3 1.8 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.0 1.1 0.5 1.3 0.6 1.0 1.5 1.4 1.2 2.6 0.0 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 5.1 13.0 1.0 1.4 1.1 4.2 1.9 0.0 1.1 0.8 7.4 1.2 0.3 1.5

2.0 3.8 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.5 2.3 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.7 1.8 4.5 1.1 1.8 1.0 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.2 2.0 1.3 0.9 0.7 0.9 2.2 1.2 1.4 3.7 2.4 0.9 1.5 6.5 2.2 5.8 1.6 1.1 2.3 2.6 0.5 2.0 0.7 1.6

11.3 5.1 8.7 6.4 6.3 8.5 4.2 2.3 2.9 2.8 2.8 1.1 0.3 3.4 6.7 2.9 2.2 17.0 12.7 3.7 1.1 1.4 18.7 18.8 12.9 5.1 11.1 9.2 14.9 0.0 9.0 3.1 9.1 2.7 1.7 8.3 8.0 13.2 1.0 14.2 1.8 10.7 4.9 9.2 3.7 16.3 0.1 1.7 0.2 11.0

MSP 6.3 19.2 8.2 6.3 7.3 6.1 3.1 5.8 2.8 4.8 6.4 25.4 27.3 9.5 6.8 5.5 4.9 10.0 8.3 3.2 17.9 2.2 14.0 5.9 15.5 4.2 8.5 8.9 14.9 18.5 5.1 3.8 2.6 6.6 2.9 9.9 4.6 9.0 1.5 11.9 10.6 19.7 7.0 20.3 5.2 16.4 23.2 2.2 17.9 9.9 (continues)

205


(continued) AP

CHP

CGP

DkP

MHP

MSP

37.8 29.6 45.7 44.3 44.1 17.2 38.1 23.5 44.0 31.2 39.0 8.2 32.9 40.6 15.4 29.3 42.9

35.1 47.4 32.0 36.1 41.2 15.9 44.2 42.9 47.0 42.2 39.9 66.4 33.5 47.4 19.4 30.1 45.7

1.7 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.7 0.5 2.8 1.4 3.1 2.4 1.6 0.4 1.1 1.3 11.8 2.1 2.0

3.1 2.9 2.0 3.2 1.8 0.4 3.1 1.4 1.7 1.6 3.1 0.4 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.6 2.0

13.0 9.6 6.0 4.2 3.7 0.6 4.1 13.2 1.3 10.6 6.3 4.7 6.0 3.1 2.8 22.9 2.4

9.3 7.9 12.4 10.6 6.2 22.0 7.7 14.0 2.5 10.4 10.0 1.0 19.5 5.9 20.4 13.0 5.0

206 Table B.14


Appendixes Parliamentary Election Results by Province, 1983 (percentage of valid party votes) ANAP

HP

40.5 37.6 61.1 33.3 49.8 51.4 50.8 40.3 40.2 45.2 48.5 44.2 27.8 56.0 53.1 47.4 45.4 56.8 44.8 42.7 32.7 37.4 58.6 49.1 58.8 51.1 41.7 47.2 55.7 16.1 34.1 66.2 43.4 45.5 34.5 24.7 42.3 56.9 36.0 40.3 43.9 56.6 57.4 53.7 42.9 48.8 39.8 37.4 45.8 49.9

36.9 31.1 20.4 33.7 37.2 29.7 22.9 26.4 29.6 27.6 28.5 29.2 5.3 19.4 31.3 26.6 26.7 17.2 32.1 31.4 42.0 41.3 22.0 36.6 16.6 29.3 34.4 22.4 23.4 51.1 36.4 19.8 36.2 34.0 37.2 34.4 21.1 23.2 37.0 34.7 38.5 21.7 17.4 32.7 30.4 24.5 23.7 31.7 18.8 31.3

MDP 21.7 31.2 15.6 33.0 13.0 18.0 24.8 30.4 29.4 26.1 23.1 26.6 65.6 21.8 15.6 25.9 25.1 26.0 23.1 23.2 25.3 18.4 19.4 12.5 24.6 17.6 23.9 28.7 21.0 32.8 29.5 12.5 20.5 19.8 27.2 33.5 33.4 17.1 27.1 25.0 17.5 19.4 22.9 9.5 26.7 25.3 33.6 29.3 35.3 18.8 (continues)

207


(continued) ANAP

HP

MDP

44.2 45.1 40.0 49.5 46.3 34.2 20.7 46.4 39.5 48.3 50.0 16.3 34.5 41.3 31.8 53.4 36.9

28.6 34.5 19.0 27.7 28.4 29.5 44.8 35.3 37.2 32.8 26.5 63.6 27.6 35.2 23.9 23.8 38.9

27.1 20.3 31.4 22.8 23.3 36.3 34.5 18.3 23.2 15.6 20.4 20.2 38.0 23.5 44.4 22.7 24.2

208 Table B.15



DSP

DYP

MCP

RP

33.9 32.9 37.4 36.7 33.2 39.6 32.5 28.9 41.1 37.7 40.6 28.4 43.8 47.2 41.3 36.8 40.5 44.0 39.0 35.2 22.9 26.1 23.6 39.6 40.9 41.4 36.4 42.2 48.7 36.0 30.8 19.3 36.0 39.7 35.8 36.9 37.0 44.7 33.4 41.4 27.1 38.4 36.2 58.6 33.4 29.5 27.8 33.7 34.1 33.2

10.0 4.6 7.8 13.6 7.0 6.1 4.1 6.1 6.8 8.2 6.3 2.3 3.8 8.3 7.3 8.9 7.7 8.1 7.3 8.3 9.4 21.3 3.6 4.1 4.7 5.9 5.3 7.5 4.7 17.9 6.7 3.0 4.4 10.1 9.2 12.1 12.5 6.6 9.2 7.0 9.5 6.6 6.9 3.2 8.6 3.2 5.2 7.3 4.6 5.4

19.2 23.1 25.3 17.2 21.1 14.5 32.5 28.3 21.4 23.0 20.3 29.6 15.7 20.1 25.3 26.0 22.5 23.2 15.1 24.1 13.3 20.1 31.1 9.6 26.1 19.5 16.7 16.7 19.2 11.0 20.1 60.2 17.6 11.9 15.7 7.9 24.7 14.7 18.3 8.9 20.0 17.1 27.0 4.6 28.0 22.6 21.3 25.8 18.3 22.8

3.8 2.2 3.9 1.1 4.2 5.0 2.1 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.1 1.6 1.7 2.8 1.7 1.2 5.6 6.8 2.0 0.7 0.9 3.7 8.6 7.6 1.6 3.2 3.7 3.7 0.4 3.1 2.8 3.5 1.2 1.0 1.9 4.5 6.9 0.9 6.0 1.8 4.6 3.5 2.0 1.5 10.0 0.4 1.2 0.9 6.4

5.5 11.4 6.5 14.1 5.3 4.2 3.1 3.7 3.1 4.8 3.5 22.2 21.1 7.5 3.6 6.3 2.7 6.8 6.4 2.9 24.5 2.1 17.6 4.0 9.8 2.9 6.4 6.7 13.2 2.8 6.1 3.4 4.0 6.9 2.3 4.1 3.7 9.3 2.0 6.1 13.2 15.0 9.1 6.0 4.3 13.8 17.0 1.9 13.6 10.7

SHP 26.9 24.3 16.1 15.3 28.4 29.6 24.9 30.8 25.2 23.9 26.9 15.1 13.2 14.4 18.6 19.3 24.8 10.2 24.1 26.7 25.5 29.0 18.9 33.6 9.5 27.6 31.1 22.1 9.5 31.5 32.7 10.6 33.9 29.8 35.6 34.2 16.2 17.0 35.7 29.2 27.6 17.0 15.8 24.9 23.6 20.2 27.7 29.5 19.3 20.8 (continues)

209


(continued) ANAP

DSP

DYP

MCP

RP

SHP

36.8 39.8 31.0 34.6 30.7 27.9 30.1 39.5 33.6 34.1 36.8 19.1 36.0 39.8 25.4 45.1 24.6

8.9 12.1 9.4 10.2 11.0 4.8 17.0 5.9 12.9 7.5 11.1 19.0 6.8 9.5 9.7 6.0 26.9

21.8 16.6 24.0 26.7 30.8 22.9 22.6 7.4 19.0 17.8 18.8 4.1 18.5 14.4 14.1 9.5 24.9

4.4 1.9 2.6 2.9 2.6 0.7 1.9 7.1 0.8 5.9 4.2 1.0 1.0 2.1 4.1 10.8 1.4

8.1 6.4 14.3 10.6 6.0 24.1 5.0 12.7 2.1 8.7 11.2 1.4 11.9 3.9 17.4 8.1 5.0

19.2 21.7 18.3 14.3 17.9 17.3 22.2 26.1 31.1 24.4 17.0 54.8 15.0 29.3 14.0 18.1 16.5

210 Table B.16



DSP

DYP

RP

21.2 20.3 22.0 26.6 22.9 23.6 20.1 27.6 29.7 24.8 25.9 17.8 31.2 28.3 21.2 27.8 24.6 25.2 20.0 24.4 14.0 19.1 18.8 28.8 19.9 22.6 19.2 36.3 28.6 43.0 19.3 12.1 24.0 27.5 25.6 16.9 25.9 22.8 25.5 22.3 19.6 19.4 25.1 41.1 23.1 18.5 18.5 25.7 17.2 22.0

11.7 2.2 7.3 2.5 6.1 10.4 4.2 5.1 9.6 12.8 9.3 1.3 2.9 11.6 10.9 14.7 13.6 5.9 6.5 11.1 2.6 25.4 2.4 2.7 3.4 13.3 7.2 6.3 3.5 1.0 6.2 2.9 6.8 17.6 15.5 17.2 15.4 7.6 16.6 8.6 15.2 7.2 6.7 2.9 8.8 2.0 1.3 6.3 1.3 6.7

30.0 24.9 36.1 28.2 24.5 23.3 43.3 31.4 33.8 34.7 33.0 27.6 14.0 32.5 38.8 31.2 34.2 32.5 21.9 35.4 20.0 31.1 33.7 12.8 30.2 34.1 27.5 24.5 25.2 29.6 28.4 62.6 31.8 18.8 27.6 27.0 36.2 22.0 27.1 14.3 25.5 26.6 35.2 6.6 37.3 25.8 17.2 39.5 14.9 28.5

14.7 24.9 19.1 22.2 20.0 17.6 8.8 8.9 6.7 10.2 10.2 35.0 29.1 18.0 12.2 13.6 6.4 29.2 27.9 7.2 12.1 3.8 29.3 22.0 37.0 10.2 17.7 16.3 30.4 6.3 13.7 12.4 8.7 16.7 6.0 7.1 13.2 31.6 3.7 23.5 22.1 33.0 20.2 22.8 9.9 34.5 8.7 4.0 24.3 26.4

SHP 22.1 27.2 15.0 15.3 26.1 24.6 23.2 26.3 19.7 17.1 21.3 17.9 21.9 9.2 16.4 12.3 20.8 6.7 23.2 21.2 49.9 20.3 15.5 33.3 9.0 19.6 28.0 16.1 11.9 19.0 32.0 9.5 28.1 18.8 24.5 31.1 8.4 15.7 26.5 30.9 17.2 13.3 12.3 26.2 20.4 18.8 53.9 24.0 41.8 15.9 (continues)

211

Appendixes Table B.16 Province Niπde Ordu Rize Sakarya Samsun Siirt Sinop Sivas Tekirdaπ Tokat Trabzon Tunceli ≈S.Urfa U≈sak Van Yozgat Zonguldak Aksaray Bayburt Karaman Kªrªkkale Batman ≈Sªrnak Bartªn

(continued) ANAP

DSP

DYP

RP

SHP

20.2 31.4 47.6 25.9 21.9 18.2 23.2 17.7 24.5 19.5 31.5 10.7 26.6 24.2 26.3 22.9 18.6 22.7 31.7 20.8 21.1 15.9 19.6 21.9

8.7 15.8 4.7 12.3 13.5 1.8 14.0 7.2 19.1 6.1 11.6 1.6 2.6 11.8 1.8 4.8 24.0 6.5 3.3 8.0 7.7 0.9 1.1 25.1

28.2 21.1 19.8 28.0 33.3 19.0 26.8 13.3 30.6 21.7 21.0 3.4 31.3 22.6 26.5 15.1 30.1 27.8 19.1 18.3 26.7 14.7 14.6 36.9

20.0 14.0 19.8 23.3 16.1 20.6 13.7 38.3 5.0 28.9 22.2 5.6 18.4 12.8 22.5 39.5 11.9 26.9 40.5 29.7 22.2 15.3 2.5 7.1

22.5 17.0 7.8 10.1 14.8 39.6 21.2 23.0 20.4 23.4 13.2 57.9 20.7 28.0 22.3 17.1 14.9 15.6 5.0 22.7 21.9 52.7 61.2 8.4

212 Table B.17



CHP

DSP

DYP

16.6 14.8 18.1 18.4 17.0 21.6 14.7 28.2 22.4 19.5 16.5 14.4 23.1 23.6 21.6 21.7 21.1 21.4 13.6 20.3 13.8 14.2 12.0 10.4 15.2 15.8 17.0 37.6 25.8 12.2 14.5 13.8 18.6 22.0 18.9 12.3 19.0 14.3 19.0 20.9 16.0 13.3 21.9 23.0 19.8 19.8 22.3 21.0 16.5 18.7

7.9 10.9 8.3 3.6 17.4 16.9 23.2 15.4 10.3 9.2 10.5 5.2 2.5 5.3 10.3 5.9 11.2 4.6 19.2 13.3 2.0 12.2 7.9 26.7 4.5 11.0 10.4 9.3 7.3 2.7 21.9 7.6 14.4 11.6 13.9 9.4 5.6 6.7 14.2 11.6 10.5 5.9 5.0 14.0 9.8 9.3 4.5 14.2 4.3 10.2

18.8 2.9 9.2 1.7 10.2 14.2 6.8 9.3 16.1 19.5 16.7 1.0 2.7 17.9 16.3 21.1 18.3 5.3 5.3 14.6 2.6 33.7 1.9 1.8 2.9 24.8 16.2 9.2 2.7 2.0 7.7 4.4 13.3 18.3 24.4 16.4 19.7 10.6 27.8 8.3 18.7 8.4 11.7 4.0 18.0 2.7 1.7 13.4 2.9 7.1

17.4 18.6 28.0 13.6 17.0 13.1 26.5 22.6 28.9 28.9 32.2 12.8 15.1 18.0 26.3 24.6 31.1 19.6 15.7 30.6 10.8 28.9 24.0 10.0 15.6 23.1 13.7 14.1 15.4 19.0 19.2 40.3 17.7 15.4 23.9 18.4 27.6 14.6 25.8 14.5 13.5 14.4 24.4 8.1 26.7 16.6 19.7 35.3 11.2 16.6

HADEP MHP 6.7 9.5 0.7 17.9 1.0 2.5 1.9 1.5 3.2 1.0 0.7 7.1 10.0 1.0 1.0 1.4 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.4 46.3 0.8 3.9 1.2 5.9 0.7 6.7 1.4 1.0 54.2 3.2 0.6 7.9 3.6 3.7 6.8 1.2 0.9 0.9 4.2 2.6 2.5 0.9 2.9 2.3 2.7 21.9 1.4 16.7 0.9

14.3 6.8 11.6 5.5 12.2 9.2 12.2 6.4 8.8 5.5 6.5 5.4 7.6 5.5 9.0 5.4 5.7 18.7 11.5 7.3 2.0 3.8 6.9 14.7 14.0 8.9 10.1 4.9 13.9 2.2 13.2 15.7 15.9 3.7 5.6 12.1 12.4 17.8 6.0 19.9 5.4 12.0 9.7 8.3 8.7 10.5 5.4 8.3 5.8 16.6

MP 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 1.1 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5

RP 16.7 32.6 22.2 30.7 23.3 20.9 13.3 14.5 8.7 15.0 15.8 51.6 29.0 26.5 13.3 18.8 10.0 27.2 30.4 10.3 18.8 5.3 41.8 32.3 38.7 14.5 23.8 21.2 32.1 6.0 18.5 16.1 10.7 23.9 8.4 20.5 10.9 33.1 4.9 18.6 31.7 41.7 24.5 37.2 13.1 36.8 20.0 5.1 29.7 28.4 (continues)

213

Appendixes Table B.17 Province Niπde Ordu Rize Sakarya Samsun Siirt Sinop Sivas Tekirdaπ Tokat Trabzon Tunceli ≈S.Urfa U≈sak Van Yozgat Zonguldak Aksaray Bayburt Karaman Kªrªkkale Batman ≈Sªrnak Bartªn Ardahan Iπdªr Karabµk Kilis Yalova

(continued) ANAP

CHP

DSP

DYP

13.1 29.9 54.5 24.8 22.4 14.2 21.3 23.4 19.3 15.9 33.4 9.1 17.1 16.7 16.6 22.0 17.4 18.1 28.2 12.5 22.3 15.5 13.9 19.6 9.9 5.5 16.1 12.8 24.5

11.9 7.6 3.4 4.6 7.9 8.6 8.8 14.2 9.8 15.9 6.5 23.4 2.3 12.8 2.3 10.2 7.7 7.6 3.3 9.9 9.4 1.7 8.9 6.6 17.3 7.0 6.6 9.5 8.6

9.3 21.2 3.5 13.8 17.8 2.1 19.1 3.9 33.3 5.1 11.1 3.8 1.9 23.9 2.0 3.8 38.6 8.2 1.4 16.7 9.4 1.5 2.8 33.2 15.2 14.2 17.9 5.7 16.1

23.8 12.9 10.9 19.5 19.3 10.0 19.3 10.6 24.9 15.5 12.8 16.8 25.0 20.4 9.9 11.0 16.6 18.5 14.5 13.8 12.9 14.3 29.3 21.7 26.8 19.8 24.9 37.2 23.0

HADEP MHP 0.8 1.5 0.9 1.2 1.0 26.6 1.8 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.8 16.9 13.7 1.0 28.0 1.1 0.9 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.8 37.2 25.9 1.1 6.5 21.7 0.8 0.9 2.8

16.7 6.8 1.9 6.1 7.8 6.9 8.4 5.8 3.7 12.9 7.7 5.5 3.7 9.4 7.1 13.9 2.9 14.9 11.8 11.4 13.6 1.5 4.3 3.3 7.7 15.1 10.0 6.7 5.2

MP

RP

0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2

22.6 17.9 23.9 28.2 22.2 28.0 17.9 39.3 7.0 30.7 26.3 2.7 26.2 14.0 23.7 36.0 14.3 29.6 38.5 33.4 30.2 25.8 8.3 12.4 13.2 9.4 21.9 25.7 18.9

214 Table B.18

Appendixes Parliamentary Election Results by Province, 1999 (percentage of valid party votes)

Province

ANAP

BBP

BP

CHP

DSP

DYP

FP

Adana Adªyaman Afyon Aπrª Amasya Ankara Antalya Artvin Aydªn Balªkesir Bilecik Bingöl Bitlis Bolu Burdur Bursa Çanakkale Çankªrª Çorum Denizli Diyarbakªr Edirne Elazªπ Erzincan Erzurum Eski≈sehir Gaziantep Giresun Gµmµ≈shane Hakkari Hatay Isparta ºçel ºstanbul ºzmir Kars Kastamonu Kayseri Kªrklareli Kªr≈sehir Kocaeli Konya Kµtahya Malatya Manisa K.Mara≈s Mardin Muπla Mu≈s Nev≈sehir

11.82 10.48 12.17 9.21 10.37 10.81 13.16 16.66 16.45 13.86 14.37 9.70 20.48 14.15 9.60 15.99 16.31 6.82 5.87 15.05 11.13 14.89 6.56 7.48 7.50 11.37 9.93 14.81 16.38 9.43 12.19 17.13 10.88 15.79 15.82 16.34 15.30 7.37 17.64 9.90 10.78 7.19 10.24 7.20 10.63 9.29 16.44 16.61 11.10 13.35

0.74 3.61 1.21 1.68 2.48 1.60 0.65 0.76 0.51 0.65 0.85 5.11 2.51 1.20 1.36 0.69 0.55 1.76 2.31 0.87 1.02 0.41 1.90 2.18 2.90 0.95 1.74 2.01 1.55 0.75 1.04 1.51 0.54 1.02 0.56 1.17 1.12 2.41 0.53 0.00 1.23 2.12 1.81 2.57 1.21 3.83 0.81 0.46 1.40 1.94

0.27 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.19 0.30 0.36 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.39 0.00 0.31 0.28 0.16 0.22 0.26 0.57 0.00 0.52 0.49 0.41 0.77 0.00 0.16 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.53 0.00 0.30 0.24 0.28 0.62 0.00 0.18 0.23 1.59 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.26 0.35 0.23 0.22 0.38 0.30

7.96 12.08 7.39 4.13 12.10 13.44 12.34 11.05 7.41 6.17 10.02 5.61 2.02 3.86 7.30 3.80 7.73 2.71 15.20 9.67 3.02 9.37 4.98 18.90 4.73 6.99 13.99 6.58 3.21 5.84 19.56 5.48 12.31 9.56 9.77 8.19 3.83 5.34 12.32 13.20 10.04 5.29 3.30 14.29 7.35 7.96 2.86 11.60 4.59 7.68

25.90 6.33 12.60 2.75 17.28 23.13 20.14 19.35 29.06 31.15 23.89 2.23 4.72 21.83 23.25 32.04 31.20 8.49 9.44 26.83 4.98 45.57 3.84 8.09 4.70 36.23 19.52 21.48 5.81 4.79 13.97 9.89 19.35 29.66 40.27 16.96 23.56 16.20 38.39 18.34 22.90 10.68 16.34 5.91 25.29 5.96 9.03 29.77 9.12 10.21

9.35 16.96 15.49 12.67 12.76 7.32 19.28 19.78 14.66 18.38 17.84 14.52 14.03 12.14 18.84 12.79 16.26 17.04 13.92 17.96 11.19 11.23 9.02 13.71 16.63 13.52 10.32 13.32 13.85 18.11 11.55 23.13 10.97 5.44 9.57 11.82 19.45 9.54 10.36 8.81 11.59 13.86 24.15 5.95 19.06 17.61 19.22 16.73 11.70 12.43

10.27 27.54 11.39 12.79 15.65 17.07 6.25 8.74 4.88 9.50 11.05 24.37 20.82 19.54 10.32 15.37 6.51 19.84 17.89 5.76 14.57 3.51 24.48 18.67 28.28 9.73 15.85 16.38 23.24 9.92 12.19 9.58 5.21 21.29 4.89 9.78 7.47 23.24 3.49 9.52 22.74 30.17 17.00 25.28 8.35 23.07 11.81 3.38 10.91 18.37

HADEP MHP 7.37 23.57 7.52 10.61 1.12 28.00 33.73 7.67 0.89 24.27 1.57 21.56 2.48 22.25 1.29 16.70 3.74 19.86 1.04 15.95 1.06 18.03 12.87 11.15 13.70 11.36 1.16 21.02 0.89 24.00 1.72 14.51 1.05 16.94 0.73 38.04 0.76 29.76 1.92 18.38 45.90 2.76 1.13 9.22 4.94 13.64 1.06 25.04 6.17 26.18 0.85 17.38 5.48 20.00 1.09 20.63 1.18 32.52 46.08 2.04 2.57 22.15 1.09 29.32 8.84 28.38 4.03 10.09 4.36 11.08 17.50 12.84 1.49 22.91 1.06 32.78 1.03 12.76 2.49 33.21 3.08 14.76 2.45 26.00 0.79 22.64 2.32 19.78 3.56 20.99 1.76 28.18 25.26 1.93 1.58 16.05 31.80 4.36 0.93 31.74 (continues)

215


(continued)

Province

ANAP

BBP

BP

CHP

DSP

DYP

FP

Niπde Ordu Rize Sakarya Samsun Siirt Sinop Sivas Tekirdaπ Tokat Trabzon Tunceli ≈S.Urfa U≈sak Van Yozgat Zonguldak Aksaray Bayburt Karaman Kªrªkkale Batman ≈Sªrnak Bartªn Ardahan Iπdªr Karabµk Kilis Yalova Osmaniye

9.46 21.44 43.42 13.82 14.20 12.57 18.69 5.48 17.77 8.05 20.17 8.11 13.98 10.64 9.76 10.81 14.70 10.54 21.71 6.40 16.99 10.51 16.93 19.75 16.31 12.05 14.25 9.21 23.73 8.73

1.16 1.22 0.75 1.14 1.76 1.18 1.15 17.00 0.52 3.24 1.04 0.62 1.40 1.14 2.13 2.62 1.25 3.06 1.52 1.66 2.29 0.84 0.81 0.87 1.04 0.63 1.56 1.28 1.09 1.44

0.38 0.47 0.00 0.21 0.32 0.31 0.65 0.00 0.00 1.21 0.00 1.81 0.29 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.37 0.00 0.41 1.09 0.57 0.00 0.25 0.20 0.28

10.72 6.16 3.34 4.31 6.12 6.51 6.08 11.11 7.70 13.15 5.07 18.33 6.05 11.17 5.08 8.86 7.54 8.12 1.29 9.15 4.88 4.08 5.14 4.13 10.68 12.41 6.45 6.18 5.66 8.20

14.74 23.49 9.84 19.33 21.57 5.09 25.75 8.14 41.17 9.32 17.76 8.95 4.59 29.64 4.12 5.97 39.30 9.92 2.20 16.49 11.49 2.42 4.54 36.51 20.16 4.14 19.46 20.36 24.27 10.14

18.39 12.01 9.76 15.29 15.34 22.09 15.24 7.93 11.59 11.87 10.77 15.56 23.78 10.74 11.07 8.24 10.20 14.58 18.44 10.92 14.12 14.11 10.23 15.92 21.52 7.97 17.14 23.04 13.59 13.04

14.17 12.29 20.77 24.36 15.00 13.36 12.25 27.76 5.61 20.36 19.94 2.41 21.41 7.27 18.87 21.09 9.66 16.83 26.57 19.85 15.30 13.87 11.14 8.18 7.98 12.93 13.88 15.44 14.53 13.34

HADEP MHP 0.89 1.76 1.14 1.47 0.99 22.12 1.79 0.68 1.69 0.70 0.78 13.37 16.56 1.30 35.71 0.95 1.19 1.08 1.45 0.79 0.94 43.40 24.08 1.40 7.84 29.75 1.18 0.85 3.23 1.62

26.61 16.61 9.02 17.62 20.93 5.01 11.91 18.99 10.81 29.18 21.91 7.18 8.49 23.36 8.04 38.91 11.75 32.96 24.95 31.57 27.89 2.07 4.99 7.38 8.16 17.00 22.12 21.05 11.15 40.87

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WEBSITES http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ambar/hukumet http://www.die.gov.tr/istatistikler.html http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dptweb/istatistikler.html http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dptweb/esg/esg-i

(Grand National Assembly) (State Institute of Statistics) (State Planning Organization) (State Plannining Organization 2001, “Economic and Social Indicators”)

The Contributors

Gamze Avcª (Ph.D., University of Georgia) is an assistant professor of political science at Boπaziçi University in Istanbul. She has published several articles on electoral processes, immigration and citizenship issues, and Turkey’s relations with the European Union. Ay≈se Gµne≈s-Ayata (Ph.D., Kent University, England) is a professor of political science at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara. She has published widely on political parties and gender issues. She is the coeditor of Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society, and Gender and Identity: Women of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Turkey. Sencer Ayata (Ph.D., Kent University) is a professor of sociology at the Middle East Technical University. A recognized expert on the Islamist movement in Turkey, he has written numerous journal articles and chapters in edited books on religion and politics, social change, and urban political issues. Ali Çarkoπlu (Ph.D., State University of New York, Binghamton) is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Boπaziçi University. His research has focused on international political economy, the quantitative analysis of voting behavior, and political parties. He has published widely on these issues and is the coauthor of The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East. Yªlmaz Esmer (Ph.D., Stanford University) is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Boπaziçi University. One of Turkey’s leading public opinion analysts, he has conducted several national surveys and participated in international collaborative research projects utilizing survey data. He is the author of Devrim, Evrim, Statµko: Tµrkiye’de Sosyal, Siyasal, Ekonomik Deπerler (Revolution, Evolution, and Status Quo: 227

228

The Contributors

Social, Political, and Economic Values in Turkey) and the editor of Human Development Report 1996: Turkey. Nihal ºncioπlu (Ph.D., Ankara University) is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Bilgi University in Istanbul. Her research interests include political parties and party systems, politics of local administration, and regime changes. She has published numerous articles on Turkish politics and politics in the Turkic republics. She is the editor of Siyasal Rejim Tartª≈ s malarª (Discussions on [Turkey’s] Political Regime). Ersin Kalaycªoπlu (Ph.D., University of Iowa) is a professor of political science at Boπaziçi University. A student of comparative politics, he has specialized in issues concerning political participation and representation. He has written extensively on political parties, party systems, electoral laws, and legislative politics. He is the coeditor of several books, including Tµrkiye’de Politik Deπi≈ s im ve Modernle≈ s me (Political Change and Modernization in Turkey), Tµrkiye’de Siyaset: Sµreklilik ve Deπi≈ s im (Turkish Politics: Continuity and Change), Tµrk Siyasal Hayatª (Turkish Political Life), and Turkey: Political, Social, and Economic Challenges in the 1990s. Sabri Sayarª (Ph.D., Columbia University) is the executive director of the Institute of Turkish Studies in Washington, D.C., and a visiting professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He has published extensively on Turkey’s domestic politics and foreign policy. He is the coeditor of Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy and Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey. Frank Tachau (Ph.D., University of Chicago) is a professor of political science at the University of Illinois in Chicago. He has published and edited numerous monographs and books on Turkish politics, the Middle East, and the Third World, including Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy, and Development; Electoral Politics in the Middle East; and Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa. Birol A. Ye≈silada (Ph.D., University of Michigan) holds the Turkish political economy and trade chair at Portland State University. Until 1998, he taught at the University of Missouri where he also served as the chairman of the Political Science Department. He has written extensively on Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy. He is the coauthor of The Emerging European Union, the editor of Comparative Political Parties and Party Elites: Essays in Honor of Samuel J. Eldersveld, and coeditor of The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey.

Index

Adalet Partisi, 12, 19, 185; abolition of, 18; anticommunism platform, 44; center-right position, 14; coalition with Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 59; decline in support for, 21, 31n5, 35, 42, 46, 48; defense of status quo by, 44; domination of parliament by, 59; factional split from, 27; increase in support for, 35; interparty conflict and, 15; origins of, 12, 13, 56; parliamentary seats for, 35, 41–42; periphery support for, 42; re-emergence as Doπru Yol Partisi, 16; rightist platform, 46 Adana: population growth in, 73 Alevi Muslims, 6, 139, 142, 144, 145–148; hostility toward Sunni Muslims, 151; voting behavior, 48 Anavatan Partisi, 16, 36, 62, 187; age and, 100tab; center-right position, 16, 17, 81, 86, 98; in coalition government, 21; coalition with Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, 43; decline in support for, 19, 21, 22, 30, 37, 62, 81; as dominant force, 16; economic problems and, 163; education and, 100, 100tab, 168tab; electoral volatility and, 110, 110tab; failure to deal with economic issues, 19; gender and, 99, 168tab; geographical consistency in, 131tab; ideology and voter preference, 102tab; increase in support for, 61; left-right identification and,

168tab; in local elections, 79tab, 80fig, 84tab, 87; local government reform and, 76; in national elections, 80fig, 84, 84tab; parliamentary defeat of, 62; parliamentary seats for, 37; political dominance of, 17; political victories of, 16; predicting voter preference for, 105; shifts in voter support, 163, 164, 166; wellbeing/deprivation factors, 101tab Ankara: Alevi population in, 147; electoral districts in, 75; migration to, 76; population growth in, 73; Refah Partisi in, 78; share of electorate in, 73; voting patterns in, 84–85 Atatµrk, Kemal, 45, 146, 174 Avcª, Gamze, 3, 91–112 Ayata, Sencer, 3, 4, 137–155 Bahçeli, Devlet, 49, 50, 51, 149 Bayar, Celal, 34 Behavior: authoritarian, 34; determinants, 91–112; electoral, 22, 25, 33–51; political, 3; predicting, 103–105; unconstitutional, 34; voting, 23, 25, 30, 56–57, 91–112 Bilgiç, Saadettin, 27, 29 Brotherhoods, 141 Bureaucracy, 3 Bursa: in local elections, 86tab; in national elections, 86tab; population growth in, 73; voter turnout in, 86tab; voting patterns in, 86

229

230

Index

Çakmur, Yµlse, 85–86 Caliph Ali, 146 Çarkoπlu, Ali, 3, 115–134 Çelik, Feridun, 87 Center-periphery framework, 3, 6, 11, 38–49, 56, 132–133, 181; modification by ethnic/religious cleavages, 3–4 CHP. See Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Çiller, Tansu, 21, 25, 29, 54n33 Cleavages: center-periphery, 11, 38–49; class-based, 45; cultural, 45, 48; elite-mass, 11; ethnic, 6; ethnic/civic nationalism, 56; factional, 40; functional, 45, 48, 49; religious, 6; secular/religious, 30, 56, 78; social, 6, 25, 158, 163; sociocultural, 56; transformation of, 137 Clientelism, 9, 11, 23, 47 Communism, 46 Competition: electoral, 30, 33, 60, 127–130; international, 162; interparty, 9, 10, 12, 18, 19, 37, 44, 48; management, 158; regional, 127–130 Conflict: ethno-religious, 20; factional, 40; interparty, 12, 18, 19, 37, 44; Kurdish, 49; secular/Islamist, 20, 21 Constitutional Court, 15, 19, 38, 59, 81, 149; abolition of parties by, 4 Constitution of 1961, 41 Constitution of 1982, 55, 70n1, 71n7 Corruption, 10, 31, 79, 81 Coup: by memorandum, 13; military, 12, 13; soft, 176n1. See also Military interventions Cultural: cleavages, 45, 48; conservatism, 16; divisions, 48; fragmentation, 152 Cumhuriyetçi Köylµ Millet Partisi, 59, 186; geographical consistency in, 119 Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), 38, 186, 187; abolition of, 18; advocacy of reform by, 39–40; age and, 100tab; Alevi support for, 146, 147; alienation of political support for, 39; center representation by, 3, 18, 42, 56, 98; changes in, 44; in coalition government, 20; coalition with Adalet Partisi, 59; coalition with Milli Selamet Partisi, 53n25; decline in support for, 19, 34, 35, 48, 53n30, 81, 146, 164, 165; disproportional representation in parliament, 57, 58;

as dominant force, 13; education and, 100, 100tab, 168tab; electoral volatility and, 110tab; elitist support for, 39; factional split from, 27; failure to deal with economic issues, 19; failure to gain representation in parliament, 19; favored by military; gender and, 100tab, 168tab; geographical consistency in, 131tab; ideology and voter preference, 102tab; increase in support for, 35, 42; interparty conflict and, 15; Kurdish support for, 145; left-right identification and, 168tab; in local elections, 79tab, 80fig, 84tab; minority support for, 41; in national elections, 80fig, 84tab; as opposition party, 42, 59; origins of, 10, 11; predicting voter preference for, 105, 108; reform platform, 44; regional support, 141–142; rural support for, 47; secularist interests and, 11; secular views of, 39–40; shifts in voter support, 164, 166; social change platform, 44; urban support for, 48; as vehicle of social protest, 45; voter support for, 11; well-being/deprivation factors, 101tab Demirel, Sµleyman, 12, 13, 17, 31n5, 37, 38, 44, 46, 54n33, 164, 176n1 Democracy, 25–26; consolidation of, 30, 33–51, 138; by fiat, 40; institutionalization of, 30; transition to, 27 Demography, 5, 96 Demokratik Parti, 29, 185; formation of, 35; origins of, 46, 59–61 Demokratik Sol Parti, 17, 187; age and, 100tab; Alevi support for, 147; center-left position, 18, 81, 86; in coalition government, 21; coalition with Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, 43; decline in support for, 164; domination by, 38; education and, 100tab; electoral volatility and, 110tab; formation of, 26; gender and, 100, 100tab; geographical consistency in, 131tab; ideology and voter preference, 102tab; increase in support for, 94; left-right identification and, 168tab; in local elections, 79tab, 80fig, 84tab, 87; in national elections, 80fig, 84tab; predicting voter preference for, 108;

Index regional support, 141; shifts in voter support, 164, 166; vote shares of, 118, 116, 117fig; well-being/deprivation factors, 101tab Demokrat Parti (DP), 2, 185; abolition of, 12, 13, 15, 26, 34, 41; authoritarian behavior of, 34; decline in support for, 21; disproportional representation in parliament, 57, 58; domination by, 34; geographical consistency in, 119; origins of, 11, 46; parliamentary majorities for, 11; periphery representation by, 3, 11, 42, 56; repressive behavior of, 41; rural support for, 39; urban support for, 47; voter preference for, 11 Deregulation, 42 d’Hondt formula, 59, 61, 62, 64, 64tab Dicle, Hatip, 155n3 Directorate of Religious Affairs, 45 Diyarbakªr: in local elections, 87–88, 88tab; in national elections, 88tab; voter turnout in, 88tab; voting patterns in, 87–88 Doπru Yol Partisi, 16, 187; age and, 100; center-right position, 17, 62, 78, 81, 98; in coalition government, 20, 21; coalition with Refah Partisi, 37; decline in support for, 19, 22, 30, 37, 81; education and, 100, 168tab; electoral volatility and, 110tab; failure to deal with economic issues, 19; gender and, 168tab; geographical consistency in, 131tab; ideology and voter preference, 102tab; left-right identification and, 168tab; in local elections, 78, 79, 79tab, 84tab, 87; in national elections, 84tab; predicting voter preference for, 108; regional support, 141; shifts in voter support, 163, 164, 166; well-being/deprivation factors, 101tab DP. See Demokrat Parti Ecevit, Bµlent, 14, 17, 21, 25, 29, 37, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 53n29, 53n30, 81, 84, 85, 94, 114n21, 141 Economic: changes, 162; crises, 14, 15, 19; development, 45, 138; growth, 46; imbalances, 163; inequalities, 153; recession, 60; reform, 31n5, 162, 163 Economy: free market, 16; management

231

of, 65; neoliberal policies in, 153 Elections, local, 5; divergence from national elections, 78, 80–83; electoral behavior and, 73–89; electoral patterns in, 5; importance of, 73; increase in Islamist vote, 76–80; mayoral positions in, 73; organization of municipalities and, 75; political influence from, 73; urbanization and, 73; voter turnout in, 77, 77tab, 80, 80fig, 82fig; vote-splitting in, 82 Elections, national, 5, 61; disproportional representation in parliament and, 58tab, 63; divergence from local elections, 78, 80–83; free, 9, 33; geographical factors in, 115–134, 180; gerrymandering and, 55; governability and, 63–65; governance and, 55–70; “greening,” 39; judicial supervision of, 55; legislative, 56–57; multiparty, 1, 2; parliamentary, 17, 18, 55, 75; plurality formulas and, 59; popular, 1; proportional representation and, 14; representativeness, 57–63; right-left ideology in, 97, 98, 98tab, 99tab; rural interests and, 39; vacant seat distribution, 60; voter participation in, 5, 189tab, 190tab, 191tab, 192–216tab; voter turnout in, 77, 77tab, 80, 80fig, 82fig; vote-splitting in, 5, 82 Electoral districts: national, 59; provincial, 59, 75 Electoral epoch. See Party system Electoral system: bias of election laws in, 62; disproportionality and, 57, 58, 58tab, 63; election laws and, 64tab; gerrymandering in, 55; governability and, 63–65; majoritarian, 63, 65; plurality, 58, 61; preferential votes within districts in, 62; quotas and, 59, 61; representativeness in, 57–63; ten percent threshold and, 27–28, 36, 61, 81; voter preferences and, 69, 181; voter satisfaction with, 97; zero-sum issues in, 58, 59. See also Proportional representation Electoral volatility, 6, 9, 22, 32n9, 109–110, 137, 152, 173; causes of, 23; military intervention and, 26; province-level electoral support and, 115–121

232

Index

Elites: attitudes and beliefs of, 170, 171tab, 172; bureaucratic-military, 40; consensus in party competition and, 28; formation of new parties and, 28–29; lack of power-sharing experience, 41; party system policies and, 25, 26, 28; polarization and, 28; political, 40; secularist, 51n8 Erbakan, Necmettin, 17, 21, 25, 35, 37, 38, 43, 49, 50, 51n6, 51n8, 53n33, 149, 172, 176n1 Erdem, Hµseyin, 85tab Erdem, Vahit, 85tab Erdoπan, Tayyip, 19, 84 Erim, Nihat, 31n5 Esmer, Yªlmaz, 1–7, 91–112 Evren, General Kenan, 36 Factionalism, 40 Fazilet Partisi, 19, 38, 188; abolition of, 112n7; age and, 100tab; decline in support for, 149; education and, 100, 100tab, 168tab; electoral volatility and, 110tab; gender and, 100tab, 168tab; geographical consistency in, 131tab; ideology and voter preference, 102tab; Kurdish support for, 145; in local elections, 84tab, 87; in national elections, 84tab; predicting voter preference for, 109; as reconstitution of Refah Partisi, 81, 94; regional support, 141; wellbeing/deprivation factors, 101tab Felicity Party. See Saadet Partisi Feyzioπlu, Turhan, 27, 29 Floating voters/politicians, 29 Gender, 99; party preference and, 49, 168tab Gökçek, Melih, 84, 85, 85tab Government: absence of turnover in, 12; authoritarian, 55, 61; changing hands, 33; coalition, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 30, 35, 37, 42, 46, 59, 61, 64tab, 65, 66tab, 69, 148; difficulty of formation, 66tab; dual-track, 5; formation of, 9, 56; human development indicators and, 67, 68, 68tab; influence on economic indicators, 67, 68, 68tab; legitimacy of, 12, 62, 65; life expectancy and, 67, 68tab; local, 73–89, majority, 11; minority, 9, 13, 17, 30, 64tab; multiparty, 55, 61;

party, 64tab, 65, 66tab, 67; stability of, 5, 68, 68tab; survival of, 65; technocratic, 61; tenure periods, 66tab, 67, 68, 68tab; tripartite, 49, 50; unemployment and, 67 Grand National Assembly, 1, 7n1, 71n7, 81 Greater Cities Municipalities, 75, 76 Greece, 38, 81 Gµne≈s-Ayata, Ay≈se, 3, 4, 137–155 Gµrsel, General Cemal, 34 Gµrtuna, Mµfit, 83, 84tab Gµven Partisi, 29, 185 Halkçª Parti, 36, 120, 186, 188 Halkªn Demokrasi Partisi, 20; Alevi support for, 146–147; decline in support for, 81; geographical consistency in, 131tab; increase in support for, 141, 144, 145; Islamic support for, 148; in local elections, 80fig, 87; localization of, 139; in national elections, 80fig; platform appeals, 145; pro-Kurdish position, 49, 139; regional support, 141, 143; urban support, 140 Hanafi Muslims, 142, 143 Identity: Alevi, 145–148; ethnic, 6, 49, 145; Kurdish, 139–145; party, 9, 10, 24; political party, 91, 104 ºncioπlu, Nihal, 5, 73–89 ºnönµ, ºsmet, 11, 25, 26, 41, 45, 52n14 Institutions: autonomous, 25, 36; democratic, 30; formal, 2; local, 75 Interest groups, 25 Iran, 38 Irmak, Sadi, 65 Islam, 2; conflict with secularism, 20; fundamentalism in, 147; increased influence of, 19; increase in support for, 45; in local elections, 76–80; sharia rule, 155n2 Israel, 51n6 Istanbul: electoral districts in, 75; Islamic vote in, 150; Kurdish voting patterns in, 145; migration to, 76; population growth in, 73; Refah Partisi in, 78; share of electorate in, 73; voting patterns in, 83–84 Italy, 81 ºzmir, 75; Kurdish voting patterns in,

Index 145; in local elections, 86tab; migration to, 76; in national elections, 86tab; population growth in, 73; share of electorate in, 73; voter turnout in, 86tab; voting patterns in, 85–86 Justice Party. See Adalet Partisi Kalaycªoπlu, Ersin, 3, 55–70 Karayalçin, Murat, 84, 85, 85tab, 90n8 Konya: in local elections, 87tab; in national elections, 87tab; voting patterns in, 87 Kurdish issues, 6, 139–145 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), 20, 80, 81, 94, 139, 162; insurrection and, 53n22 Kurds: economic deprivation of, 144, 150; ethnically segregated residential areas of, 144; insurgency by, 38; migration of, 139; population, 139; radicalism and, 20; social isolation of, 144; urbanization and, 140; voting behavior, 48, 139–145 Law for the Suppression of Terrorism, 162 Left-right ideology, 6, 181–182 Liberalization: democratic, 162; electoral, 35; investment, 162; policies, 162; political, 11, 41 Libya, 38 Malaysia, 38 Marxism, 14, 15, 46 Menderes, Adnan, 11, 12, 34, 52n12, 65 Migration: Alevi, 147; fast-paced, 76; Kurdish, 139, 140, 144, 145; peasantization of cities, 46–47; rural-urban, 46, 76, 151 Military interventions, 2, 7n1, 12, 15, 36, 41, 42, 47, 173, 176n1; abolition of political parties and, 15; attempt to control transition process, 16; boundaries for civilian politics and, 5, 33; civilian authority and, 5, 33; decision to revamp party system and, 15; demise of Demokrat Parti and, 56; discontinuities due to, 4; fragmentation of party system and, 17; impact on political parties, 24; new constitu-

233

tions and, 59, 61; outlawing of parties by, 34; periodic warnings from, 49, 50; political interruptions by, 26; secular education and, 49, 50; secularism and, 38; support for, 49, 50; technocratic governance and, 61 Milli Nizam Partisi, 14; abolition of, 15; party adaptation and, 172 Milli Selamet Partisi, 14, 186; coalition with Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 53n25; coalition with Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, 56; denouncement of Soviet Union by, 32n6; origins of, 46; parliamentary seats for, 35; party adaptation and, 172; periphery support for, 42; re-emergence as Refah Partisi, 16; replacement for Milli Nizam Partisi 51n3 Milliyetçi Çalª≈sma Partisi, 16 Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi, 36, 119, 187 Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, 14, 186, 188; age and, 100, 100tab; in coalition government, 21; coalition with Anavatan Partisi, 43; coalition with Demokratik Sol Parti, 43; coalition with Milli Selamet Partisi, 56; denouncement of Soviet Union by, 32n6; education and, 100tab, 168tab; electoral volatility and, 110tab; ethnic nationalism of, 49; far-right position, 18, 81, 87; gender and, 99, 100tab, 168tab; geographical consistency in, 131tab; ideology and voter preference, 102tab; increase in support for, 20, 30, 38, 43, 94, 164; Islamic support for, 149; left-right identification and, 168tab; in local elections, 79tab, 80fig, 84tab, 87; in national elections, 80fig, 84tab; nationalist position of, 144; organizational strength, 24; origins of, 46; parliamentary seats for, 35; periphery support for, 42; predicting voter preference for, 109; re-emergence as Milliyetçi Çalisma Partisi, 16; shifts in voter support, 164; urban support for, 140; well-being/deprivation factors, 101tab Motherland Party. See Anavatan Partisi Municipal administration: Greater City Municipality system, 75; municipal councils, 75; organizational structure

234

Index

of, 75; proportional representation and, 75; urbanization strains on, 76 National Front, 44 Nationalism, 3, 45, 48; increase in, 20; Kurdish, 20, 143 Nationalist Action Party. See Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Nationalist Democracy Party. See Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi Nationalist Front Coalition, 14 National Order Party. See Milli Nizam Partisi National Salvation Party. See Milli Selamet Partisi National Security Council, 15, 36, 38, 51n6; pressure by, 33; support for, 49, 50 National Work Party. See Milliyetçi Çalª≈ßma Partisi New Turkey Party. See Yeni Tµrkiye Partisi North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 37–38, 172 Öcalan, Abdullah, 80, 81, 143 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 162 Ottoman Empire, 1, 10; center-periphery issues and, 11 Özal, Turgut, 16, 25, 36, 42, 52n18, 62, 163 Özdemir, Ali Talip, 84, 84tab Özer, Yalçªn, 84tab Özfatura, Burhan, 85 Özkafa, Mustafa, 87 Pakistan, 38 Party adaptation: activists and, 160; attitudes and beliefs on, 170–172; criteria of, 158–159; leadership and, 159; operationalizing, 158; organizational factors, 160, 172–175; realignment and, 157–176; strategies, 172–175; tactics for, 172–175 Party realignment, 157–176; channels of, 160; critical elections and, 161; right-left ideology in, 166, 166fig, 167; systemic changes and, 161–163 Party switching, 29 Party system: alteration in dynamics of, 14; bipartisan, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 22;

change in, 9–31; electoral law changes, 28; elitist policies and, 25, 26; evolution of, 24; fragmentation in, 9, 11, 12–15, 14, 18, 19, 22, 26, 28, 38, 42, 43tab, 44, 56, 69, 115; ideological spectrum of, 10; institutional arrangements in, 11, 27; internal unity of parties and, 27; legitimacy of, 10; militancy of anti-system forces and, 14; military policies and, 25; minor parties in, 13; multiparty, 4, 22, 61; one-party, 4; origins of, 10–12; party switching in, 29; plurality system in, 11, 27, 61; polarization in, 12–15, 20, 21, 35; predominant party in, 13, 57, 58; proportional electoral system, 12, 27; recent issues, 17–22; restructuring of, 15–17; sources of change in, 22–29; stability of, 10, 28; ten percent threshold and, 27–28, 36, 81; weakening of, 10, 27 People’s Democracy Party. See Halkªn Demokrasi Partisi Personalism, 25 PKK. See Kurdistan Workers Party Polat, Adnan, 84tab Political: accountability, 31; allegiance, 69; behavior, 3; corruption, 10, 31, 80–81; crises, 14, 15; culture, 59; development, 158; divisions, 48; dualism, 11; elites, 40; fragmentation, 9, 11, 12–15, 14, 18, 19, 22, 26, 28, 38, 42, 43tab, 44, 62, 137, 152; liberalization, 11, 41; loyalty, 11, 22, 23; mobilization, 140; paralysis, 36, 42; participation, 3; patronage, 9, 24, 25, 29, 73, 144; polarization, 49, 80; resources, 40; stability, 10, 12, 13, 28, 33; transformation, 161; violence, 15, 20, 31n5, 35, 42 Political parties, 2, abolition of, 15, 24, 26, 36; adaptation of, 157–176; Alevi-based, 27; alliances between, 18, 20; banned, 4; barriers to, 26; center-left, 20, 26, 38, 79, 81, 86, 186, 187; center-right, 4, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, 30, 37, 38, 81, 86, 97, 152, 167, 185, 187; as central institutions, 158; centrist, 9, 15, 17, 19; coalition potential of, 32n7; confrontation among, 12; decline in sup-

Index port for, 25; disappearance of, 22; disproportional representation in parliament, 57, 58, 63; ethnic, 10; extremist, 15, 26, 30, 37, 38, 43, 46; factional splits from, 27, 29; families, 119; far-right, 18, 30, 37, 81, 87, 97, 167; feuds among, 9; as fiefdoms, 25; fragmentation, 69, 115; functions of, 158; identification, 91, 97, 104, 138; ideological spectrum of, 14; Islamist, 6, 7, 9, 10, 18, 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 30, 35, 43, 45, 48, 76–80, 148–155, 173–174; leftist, 187; legal/constitutional framework of activities by, 26; loyalty to, 5, 22, 23; maintaining support for, 160; mergers, 29; minority, 13; nationalist, 4; organization, 25; personalistic, 25; preferences, 4, 23, 78, 181; proKurdish, 20, 26; protest, 137; radical, 4, 15; re-emergence of, 16; religious, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 18, 19, 24, 27, 30, 43, 45, 167; representativeness and, 57–63; rightist, 186, 188; secular, 21; shifts in popular appeal, 18; survival of, 158; ten percent threshold and, 27–28, 36, 81; ultranationalist, 35; views on local elections, 73; volatility of, 24. See also Party adaptation; Party realignment Politics: coalition, 18; competitive, 39–40; of confrontation, 12; electoral, 12, 19, 26, 38–49; ideological, 10; multiparty, 24, 56, 61; national, 10; parliamentary, 26; party, 13, 26–27; personalized, 23 Populism, 3 Populist Party. See Halkçª Parti Pristina, Ahmet, 85 Privatization, 42, 162 Proportional representation, 12, 14; adoption of, 35; d’Hondt formula and, 59, 61, 62, 64, 64tab; electoral rule changes and, 28; fragmentation and, 27, 62, 65; intent of, 41; introduction of, 41; origins of, 59 Protest-vote framework, 3, 4, 33–51, 90n5, 93, 94, 137; extremist movements and, 34 Provincial administration: electoral districts for, 75; provincial councils, 74, 75

235

Quotas: district level, 61, 62; national, 59, 61; ten percent threshold and, 27–28, 36, 61 Rational interest voting model, 91 Refah Partisi, 16, 188; abolition of, 19, 38, 85tab, 94, 112n7, 149; in coalition government, 21; coalition with Doπru Yol Partisi, 37; demographics of vote for, 149–150; dissolution by Constitutional Court, 81; domination by, 37; education and, 168tab; gender and, 168tab; growth of, 18; increase in support for, 19, 43, 76, 77, 78, 84, 148, 164; Islamic support for, 149; left-right identification and, 168tab; in local elections, 79, 79tab, 80fig, 82, 83, 84, 87; mayoralties won by, 47; in national elections, 80fig, 82; organizational characteristics, 173–174; party adaptation and, 172, 174; party organization, 19; regional support, 141; religiosity of, 49; rise to power, 20; shifts in voter support, 164; strength in major urban areas, 79 Reform: economic, 31n5, 162, 163; electoral, 55; land, 39, 45; local government, 75, 76; social, 31n5 Reliance Party. See Gµven Partisi Republican Peasant Nation Party. See Cumhuriyetçi Köylµ Millet Partisi Saadet Partisi, 19; as replacement for Fazilet Partisi, 112n7 Sayarª, Sabri, 4, 9–31, 179–184 Second Constitutional Era, 10 Secularism, 6, 26, 44; conflict with Islam, 20; mandatory education and, 38, 50; military interventions and, 38 Social: change, 44; class, 6, 25, 41, 49, 148; cleavages, 6, 25; control, 145; divisions, 41; equality, 140; interaction, 145; isolation, 144; issues, 66; justice, 45; protest, 44; reform, 31n5; security, 45 Social Democratic Populist Party. See Demokratik Sol Parti Social determinist voting model, 91 Society: cleavages and, 45; demands of, 43; postindustrial, 138; rapid growth of, 43; restructuring, 163

236

Index

Sosyal Demokrat Halkçª Parti, 26, 188; center-left position, 62, 78; in local elections, 78–79, 79tab, 80fig; in national elections, 80fig Southeast Anatolian Project, 143 State: control, 42; intervention in politics, 26; legitimacy, 2; privatization of, 162 Sufis, 48 Sunni Muslims, 6, 139, 142, 151; hostility toward Alevi Muslims, 151; voting behavior, 48 Susurluk scandal, 90n4 Tachau, Frank, 3, 4, 5, 33–51 Temizel, Zekeriya, 84tab Terrorism, 15, 20, 81, 162 Tourism, 150 True Path Party. See Doπru Yol Partisi Tµrkes, Colonel Alpaslan, 17, 35, 149 Turkey: anti-U.S. sentiments in, 14; austerity in, 163; changes in party system in, 9–31; in Customs Union, 162; as democracy, 5; economic crises in, 14, 15, 19; economic development in, 52n13, 162; elections in, 55–70; establishment of parliamentary system, 1; ethnic voting issues, 137–155; European Union and, 20, 162; financial crisis in, 163; founding of Republic of, 10–12; geographical factors in voting, 115–134, 180; governance in, 55–70; Grand National Assembly in, 1; local administration in, 74–76; local elections in, 73–89; neutrality policy, 52n13; North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, 37–38, 172; party adaptation in, 157–176; political parties and party systems, 157–161; population growth, 43; relations with Europe, 20, 38; relations with Greece, 38; religious activism in, 19; religious voting issues, 137–155; Second Constitutional Era, 10; socioeconomic development in, 46; transition from authoritarian rule, 11, 26, 27, 61; voting behavior determinants in, 91–112

Turkish Workers Party. See Tµrkiye º≈sçi Partisi Tµrkiye º≈sçi Partisi, 13–14, 187; abolition of, 15; denouncement of United States by, 32n6 Unemployment, 67, 140 Urbanization, 5, 46–47; Kurds and, 140; local elections and, 73; poverty and, 163 Vefik, Ahmet, 84tab Virtue Party. See Fazilet Partisi Voters/voting: of Alevi Muslims, 145–148; autonomous, 47; behavior, 23, 25, 30, 56–57; block, 140; clientelism and, 9; concerns with urban living, 77; demographic factors, 96; diversity in, 78; economic factors in, 95, 96; ethnic factors, 137–148; fragmentation of, 48, 56, 62; gender and, 99; geographical factors, 6, 115–134, 180; independence of, 37; of Kurds, 139–145; left-right ideology in, 6, 181–182; in local elections, 77; low constancy in, 22; mobilized, 47; in national elections, 77; party identification and, 69; polarization of, 49; political factors, 96–97; preferences, 6, 91, 99–103, 181; protest, 4, 90n5, 93; psychological factors in, 95; rational interest model, 91; realignment, 6, 49, 163–169; religious factors, 96, 148–155; residential factors, 96; rise in Islam hypotheses of, 93; social determinist model, 91; sociological factors in, 95; stability of, 23; volatility of, 17; vote-splitting, 5, 82 Welfare Party. See Refah Partisi Xenophobia, 49 Yeni Tµrkiye Partisi, 35, 59, 185 Ye≈silada, Birol, 6, 157–176 Yªlmaz, Mesut, 25, 29, 38, 54n33, 62, 81, 176n1 Zana, Leyla, 155n3

About the Book

The Turkish party system has undergone significant changes since the 1940s, moving from a two-party system to one encompassing a multiplicity of parties—and resulting in a highly fragmented parliament. The contributors to this volume assess the intertwined effects of party fragmentation and voter volatility in Turkey. Presenting a wealth of data, they illuminate the trajectory of democratic consolidation, as well as underlying issues of representation, participation, and governability. Sabri Sayarª is the executive director of the Institute of Turkish Studies at Georgetown University. His publications include Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (coedited with Alan Makovsky). Yªlmaz Esmer is a professor of political science at Boπaziçi University, Turkey. He is the author of Revolution, Evolution, and Status Quo: Social, Political, and Economic Values in Turkey.

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Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey

Political Parties in Turkey

Political parties and democracy in Turkey

Elections, Parties, Democracy: Conferring the Median Mandate (Comparative Politics)

Southern parties and elections: studies in regional political change

Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe 1990-2003

Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term Perspective

Islands in Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji

Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics

American Political Parties and Elections. A Very Short Introduction

British Politics and European Elections, 1999

Headscarf Politics in Turkey: A Postcolonial Reading

Turkey Since 1970: Politics, Economics and Society

Mandates, Parties, and Voters: How Elections Shape the Future (Social Logic of Politics)

Democracy and elections in Africa

States, Parties, and Social Movements (Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics)

Elections and Democratization in Ukraine

Democratization and the Politics of Constitution Making in Turkey

Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Religion and Global Politics)

The Politics and Poetics of Translation in Turkey, 1923-1960

Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Religion and Global Politics)

Democratization and the Politics of Constitution Making in Turkey

Local Elections in Britain

State and Class in Turkey

Islam and Modernity in Turkey

Turkey

Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey (Politics, History, and Culture)

Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes

Mysticism and Magic In Turkey

Free and Fair Elections

Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey

Political Parties in Turkey

Political parties and democracy in Turkey

Elections, Parties, Democracy: Conferring the Median Mandate (Comparative Politics)

Southern parties and elections: studies in regional political change

Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe 1990-2003

Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term Perspective

Islands in Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji

Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics

American Political Parties and Elections. A Very Short Introduction

British Politics and European Elections, 1999

Headscarf Politics in Turkey: A Postcolonial Reading

Turkey Since 1970: Politics, Economics and Society

Mandates, Parties, and Voters: How Elections Shape the Future (Social Logic of Politics)

Democracy and elections in Africa

States, Parties, and Social Movements (Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics)

Elections and Democratization in Ukraine

Democratization and the Politics of Constitution Making in Turkey

Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Religion and Global Politics)

The Politics and Poetics of Translation in Turkey, 1923-1960

Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Religion and Global Politics)

Democratization and the Politics of Constitution Making in Turkey

Local Elections in Britain

State and Class in Turkey

Islam and Modernity in Turkey

Turkey

Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey (Politics, History, and Culture)

Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes

Mysticism and Magic In Turkey

Free and Fair Elections

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