Political Parties in Turkey

BOOKS OF RELATED INTEREST TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 1774-2000 By William Hale SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC Edited by Sylvia Kedourie

POLl leAL PARTIES I

TURKEY

TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS:

200 YEARS OF DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE Edited by Mustafa Aydlll and c;agn Erhan THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF EURASIA AND TURKEY'S POSITION Edited by Blilent Aras TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS: ESCAPING FROM THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN THE AEGEAN Edited by Mustafa Aydm and Kostas Ifantis

Editors

BARRY RUBIN METiNHEPER

iSTANBUL BfLCi UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

FRANKCASS LONDON· PORTLAND, OR

First puhlished in 2002 in Creat Britain hy FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate, London NI4 5BP, England and ill the Ullited States o(America hy FRANKCASS clo International Specialized Book Serviccs, Inc. 5824 N.E. Hassalo Strcct, Portland, Orcgon 97213-3644

Copyright (0 2002 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd British Libraty Cataloguing in Publication Data Political parties in Turkcy I. Political parties Turkcy 2. Turkey government - 1980I. Rubin, Barry II. I-leper, Metin 324.2'561

Politics and

ISBN 0 71465274 1 (cloth) ISBN 0 7146 8247 0 (paper)

Contents Preface

Vll

Introduction-Turkey's Political Parties: A Remarkably BarlY Ruhin Important Issue The Democratic Left Party: Kaplkulu Politics Par Excellence

Suat Kllllkhog!u

4

The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, Alev (mar and Burak Arrkan the Nation or the Nationalists?

25

The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization Ersin Ka!ayclOg!u in a Charismatic Leader Party

41

}'e.~·i1ada

62

Oll1it Cizre

82

The Republican People's Party

Ay,~'e Ciine,~'-Ayata

102

The People's Democracy Party

Aylin Ciiney

122

Conclusion-The Consolidation of Democracy versus Metin Hefler Democratization in Turkey

138

Abstracts

147

Notes on Contributors

150

Index

153

Librmy of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Political parties in Turkey I editors, Barty Rubin and Metin I-leper. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-5274-1 (cloth) - ISBN 0-7146-8247-0 (papcrj I. Political parties-Turkcy. I. Rubin, Barry M. II. Heper, Metin. JQ1809.A795 P654 2002 324.2561-dc21 2001007614 This group of studies first appeared in a Special Issue of Turkish Studies (ISSN 1468-3849), YoU, No.1 (Spring 2(02) [Political Parties in Turkey]. Turkish Studies is a project of the Turkish Studies Institute (TSI) of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC).

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The Virtue Party From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party

Biro! A.

Preface This special issue of Turkish Studies has its origin in the idea of Barry Rubin and Metin Heper to hold a conference on Turkish political parties. The effort to strengthen and broaden democracy is one of the key issues for contemporary Turkey, but it is very difficult to achieve this goal without open and viable political parties. In general, politics is held in low repute in contemporary Turkish public and elite opinion. Parties are generally perceived as unresponsive, undemocratic, inefficient, and corrupt. We wanted to examine how accurately such views reflected reality and to see if such factors varied among the different parties. In particular, we sought to analyze problems such as those of party leadership, structure, inner-party democracy, attitudes, and abilities to gain popular support, stands on major issues, coherence, self-image, ideology, and comparison to party systems in other countries. Each of the authors was asked to examine a specific party within the context of comparison. The conference, entitled "Political Parties, Society, and Democracy in Turkey," was held at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey on April 27-28, 200 I. It was co-sponsored by Turkish Studies and by the Bilkent University Center of Turkish Politics and History. We believe the authors have produced an original and high-quality survey of Turkey's political parties and hope that you will agree. We wish to thank the following people for their help with the conference and the preparation of this book: Cameron Brown, Elisheva Rosman-Stollman, Ann Welden, Francis B. Ward III of the Public Affairs Section of the US Embassy in Ankara, and the Turkish Academy of Sciences for financial support. We would also like to thank Semiha Aleybeyi, Ba~ak ince, and Aylin Topal for helping to organize and run the conference and Vicky Johnson of Frank Cass for her assistance in publishing this project.

INTRODUCTION

Turkey's Political Parties: A Remarkably Important Issue BARRY RUBIN

The Turkish political party system stands as a key issue in that country's strange mixture of successes and failures during the half-century in which Turkey has been a multi-party democracy.~ ~On the one hand, Turkey has retained its basic democratic form. Yet, on the other hand, this structure has repeatedly broken down due to a perception that either a ruling party was breaking the rules of the system, or that bickering parties and leaders were unable to form a stable government, or that radical parties threatened the regime's very existence, or that incompetent parties were unable to make the decisions needed by the country's interests and people~ ...jI'fiicaliii/eri Ordu,l'u (Army of the IslamiC Freedom Fighters~­ TiMO) 3, istallhu/ Kiiltiir Om.!;1 Is/a/ll Kurtu/u~ Ordusu (Islamic Freedom Army of Islamic Hearth of Culture .. -·iKO)

Turkish Gcncral Staff, Tiirki,l'e'de Allllr,)'i I'C 7£'I'I)riill Ge/i,>llIesi v(' Gilt'ell/ik KUl'vefll'rillce (jll/ellll/esi (Tlie Rise of'AII{/rclil' alit! Termr alld flidr Prevelltioll ill'tlte 5'ecllri/y Force ill 7llrke,l') (Ankara: C;cnel Ku;'may Ba~kanltgl, 19S I), '

67

Erbakan and his team acted rationally in forging coalition governments with both the center-left, and later center-right, political parties. During "J this time, the MSP used its position in government to organize an extensive network of activist groups (known as the Raiders-Akll1cilar) that were to become the grass-roots organizations for the future. Figure 1 provides the organizational breakdown of the AkmCl organizations. In addition to these grass-roots organizations, the MSP successfully infiltrated public bureaucracy and positioned its supporters in key positions in such crucial ministries as the ministry of the interior and the ministlY of education. During this time, the Nak~i and Nurcu clites were in serious competition for control of the Central Administrative Board (CAB) of the party. Soon after the party's third national congress, the Nak~i members, backed by Sheikh Kotku, emerged victorious, and the Nurcu group bcgan to leave the MSP. Paksu resigned from his post as the minister of labor and member of the party's CAB. Within two months of his resignation, 16 Nurcu parliamentarians resigned from the party. In the national elections of 1977, the Nurcu followers gave their suppOli to Demirel's AP and Ti.irke~' Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetri Hereket Partisi-MHP). This resulted in a substantial loss of votes for the MSP and from then on the MSP drew its support primarily from the Nak~ibendi order and its followers. Other smaller tarikats did support Erbakan, but their number was dwarfed next to that of Nak~ibendi. The MSP experiment ended with the coup of 1980 when the generals banned all political parties. During the next three years, the militmy rewrote Turkey's Constitution and tightly controlled new political party formation and the transition to civilian rule that occurred in October 1983. 7 Since the transition from militmy rule in 1983 onwards, Islamists have followed a multi-track strategy in re-entering political life. Under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, the Motherland Pmiy (Anavatan PartisiANAP) initially attracted many former MSP followers. However, the return of Erbakan ended thc Islamist voters' mass support of ANAP. Starting with the 1991 national elections, Erbakan and the RP began the gradual process of writing a success stOlY. The party leadership expressed views and policy positions sympathetic to the conservative and disenchanted voters and created a nation-wide network of devoted activists and elites. The party succeeded beyond its leaders' wildest dreams in the 1995 national elections and local elections. Yet, this initial success was SOOI1 followed by their downfall. The party leaders failed to prevent junior party officials and activists from pronouncing provocative statements. As if

68

Political Parties il1 Turkey

The Virtue Party

drunk with electoral victory and coming to power in a coalition with the True Path Party (Dogrll Yol Partisi-DYP), the irresponsible actions of some Refah members led to the "soft coup" of 1997 and the subsequent closure of the party on January 16, 1998. Following the RP's closure, Erbakan's closest allies in the party established the FP, and atten1J)ted to tone down their criticism of secular reforms by embarking on a cm~paign to present a new image for their party. The younger elites of the party, led by individuals such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the former Mayor of Istanbul, and Abdullah Glil, went so far as to emphasize the need for a system-oriented political party and openly challenged the old guard led by Recai Kutan, the then leader of the FP. However, it was quite clear that Erbakan, although banned from politics for five years, continued to call the shots in the party. Erbakan's influence on the FP became clear during the first grand congress of the party in May 2000. Fed up with the old guard's tight control of the party and its unwillingness to consider the new ideas of a young generation of dynamic leaders, Reformists (Ycnilik(?iler), led by Abdullah GiiI, challenged Kutan for the leadership of the party. These individuals were upset by the Traditionalists' (Gclcnck(?iler) domination of the pmiy's CAB and by Erbakan's continuing control of the appointment of new members to the FP. In 1999, a number of leading reformists (Giil, Cemil (:iJ To be a legitimate system-oriented political party, party leadership must carry out far deeper reforms within the future [slamist political party (e.g., increased mobility channels for junior elites to attain leadership positions) and rid themselves ofintluences of hostile, and often radical, religious orders and congregations as well as some isolated members. Perhaps the Reformists will make this change and contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.

78

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

Starting in 200 I, the FP party attempted to present a less confrontational and more reform oriented stance than its predecessor, the RP. Initially, Kutan attempted to hold things together until Erbakan could rejoin the party. When it became clear that the secular establishment were in no hurry to pardon Erbakan for his anti-secular activities, Kutan became the "new" leader and "caretaker" of the Traditionalist group in the FP. This group faced a serious challenge from the "Reformists," led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Giil. The closure of the party by the Constitutional Court further complicated this picture. As compared to the SP, is the AKP truly a Reformist party? Or is this an internal struggle for control between the followers of different religious groups portraying an image of being reformists? If the latter is true than we have nothing more than another dissimulation. There is no simple answer to this dilemma. Only the future actions of the players will tell us if indeed a system-oriented Islamist party has emerged in Turkey. In the meantime, it is important to note how the

79

NOTES

I. Samucl.!. Eldcrsvcld. PolilicalParlies ill Americall Sociely (Ncw York: Basic Books. 19X2); Robert Michels. Political Por/les: A Sociological SllId), or Ihe Oligarchical 71'IU/ellcies ill Modem Democracies (Ncw York: Dover. 1959. lirst published in Gcrman in 1911): and Elmer Schattschncldcr, PariI' (JOl"('rIllllelll (New York: HoI!, Reinhart and Wiston. 1941 I. 2. Much has been written abo~lt the roots of thc religiOUS parties 111 Turkey. Sec. for example. I-[oward Reed, "[slam and Educallon in Turkey: Their Roles 111 National Development:' Tllrkish SllIdil's Associalioll BIII/elill, Vo1.l2. No.1 (March 19RR). pl'.3-4: Unci Heyd. "Revmil of [slam 111 Modern Turkey," Ullil'(!rsilics Field SlaflR(!porl (March I96X). \1p.I-27: MustHill [-[aki Okutlicli. /slik(/mel Serial: Refitfl I'ar/isi (Dir"clioll Sheri '0: 711l' Rr:fidl 1'01'1.1')

80

Political Parties ill Turkey (Istanbul: Yeryiizli YaYll1lan, 1(96); Sabri Sayari, "Turkey's Islamic Challenge," Middle Easl Quarler~v, VoU, No.3 (Sept. 1(96), pp.35-43; Mchll1et Ali Soydan, Diilldell Bugiille Tt'irk~ve 'llill

3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9 10. II. 12. 13.

14.

15.

Re/iTiI G Another issue she campaigned on was the abuse of religion by the Welfare Party (RP) for its own political and economic interests: "They have maintained their politieal supper by exploiting religion ... the more Turkey is distanced from Europe and pushed into loneliness and Middle Easternized, the more these people could act with success."" In stark contrast to her vocation of integrating with Europe and despite her strong attacks on the RP that went so far as accusing the party of collaborating with the PKK," she formed a coalition government with the RP on .June 28, 1996, with the RP's leader as prime minister and herself as deputy prime minister and foreign minister. The forging of this coalition was the beginning of the party's and the leaders' debacle.

WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY

The escalated war against thc PKK and the prospective entry into the Customs Union opened windows of opportunity for (iller as a politieal entrepreneur. She began her leadership with a permissive outlook toward Kurdish cultural expressions. During a meeting with Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of ANAP, a month after she became the leader of the DYP and prime minister, (iller was reported to have suggested broadcasting in Kurdish on the state radio for one hour a week, making Kurdish language an elective course in high schools, and producing civilian solutions to the problem in parliament. When Yllmaz offered to take the issue to the MGK (iller responded: "What have issues on domestic politics and foreigl~ policy got to do with the MGK?"" A month later, she denied any initiatives along these permissive lines. V When she sensed that scoring a decisive military victory against the PKK would help greatly assist her political fortunes, she became the architect of an uncompromising stand with regard to the Kurdish problem that had lasting effects on the quality of Turkish democracy, the economy, and social life. Involving 30,000 security forces and absorbing 20 percent of the national budget, the escalated scale of the armed conflict exacerbated a chronic inflation and helped set the precedence of security forces collaborating with ultra-nationalist crime syndicates to hunt down the PKK sympathizers. Connected with the Kurdish problem, (iller's approach to the military represented a radical departure from the traditional party line. As she hoped to score a political victory on the Kurdish issue by a military gain, she abandoned any pretense of supporting civilian control over the I military. Indeed, (iller refrained from undertaking any initiative that , would displease the high command and, instead, endorsed their wishes on any issue. Dogan Giire~, the chief of general staff who was later elected as deputy on the DYP ticket (1995), has reiterated the accord between his prime minister and the high command: "The armed forces has regard for the prime minister because she acts like a tiger. I worked with ease with all prime ministers, with Ozal, Akbulut, Yllmaz, and Demirel. But with (iller I worked with more ease."'" The result was that the civilian initiative on the Kurdish question was relegated to the sidelines. Moreover, while the defense and security expenditures rose to 17.3 percent of the 1996 budget, the ratio for education was half of that figure and health spending was three-four percent. 25 Similarly, after the historic signing of the Customs Union with the EU

93

REFAHYOL COALITION: DEMISE OF THE LEADER AND THE PARTY

The Refahyol era (the popular name for the DYP-RP coalition) ended in disaster for both coalition partners when, on Februmy 28, 1997,' the MGK handed the government a list of measures to clamp down political Islam, causing its eventual resignation. ,·vi Sendika/an Kor?!edara,\)'onu-DiSK). It invited them to participate in policy discussions, providing a medium for presenting their demands. It aimed to carry these demands to election platforms. However, as the party shrunk, unions found less means of direct representation amongst the party leadership. This made the unions adopt an equal-distance policy both to the DSP and the CI-IP. As for the business organizations, neither direct representation nor a policy convergence were possible on most issues. The leader of the small business organization, Confederation of Turkish Craftsmen and Tradesmen (nirkiye Esnaj've Sanatkarlar KOI!tedara'~Tollu- TESK) is a leftist himself, but his membership structure does not allow for a Social Democratic Policy. The

115

Political Parties in Turkey

The Republican People :\' Party

Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Trade and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Tiirkiye Ddalar ve Borsalar Birligi-TOBB) is known for its center-right inclinations, the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (Tiil'kzve Sanayicilel' ve i,wdamla,., DernegiTOSiAD) is appealing to the CHP for its commitment on European Union and democratization, but the cconomic policies and the nature of the organization's membership make them incompatible, The CHP established very close ties with some of the identity groups, and supported each other on many issues, It had close ties with secular women's associations, such as the Association for the Support of Contemporary Lifestyle «(:agda,>' Yc/~'aml Destekleme Dernegi-CYDD), and parts of the women's movement. Being a strong defender of women's rights, the party was very active in women's associations and frequently invited feminists from the movement to its platforms, committees, and public meetings, The CHP participated in the "Women's March against Shari' a" in 1996 organized by secular women's groups and, since 1991, has been trying to promote the demands from the feminist movement in the parliament and government, including changes in the Civil Code, The Alevis' relations with the CHP/SHP had been supportive until the 1993 Sivas events, The Alevi groups saw the CHP's secularist policies as a safe haven that protected them from fundamentalist threat. Lately, the Alevis have been organized under associations differentiated on the basis of ethnicity and class, However, all of these aim at the preservation of their identity, which they claim to be closely associated with communitarianism, humanism, and leftism, They have argued that these were the basic ideological principles of the left and the CHP, The party has a considerable proportion of Alevi members and activists, and had quite a few Alevimember parliamentarians when it was in the parliament. The frustration of the 37 deaths in Sivas has led many Alevis to search for a new political representation, including a party of their own. The CHP had full sympathy for the identity search amongst the people of Kurdish origin, even though it tried to demonstrate a clear distinction between ethnic separatism and identity politics. The SI-IP's attempt at political representation of Kurdish identity by allowing the People's Work Party (Halkll1 Emek Partisi-HEPr; candidates on its own lists failed, Soon after the HEP group entered parliament, these candidates withdrew from the party and created their own group, Many of them were later charged with Kurdish separatism and some were even sent to prison. However, as described above, the CHP continued to allow for identity politics. Recently the political representation of Kurdish identity has been

through the People's Democracy Party (Hal/all Dell/okrasi PartisiHADEP), but the CI-[P's sensitivity to human rights has continued to attract some urban middle-class Kurdish votes to the party.

114

THE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The CHP is known to be the party of congresses, political struggles, and internal strife. The reasons for this quarrelling image can be found in the pre-1980 CHP, the foundation of the SHP, and the changing forms of politics since 1980. After the 1976 Congress, when some leftist groups began to play an active role, the CHP was faced with the problem of defining where it stood within the left of the political spectrum, This was more of an organizational than ideological problem. While the party was getting bigger, the organized leftist groups, some of which had even been involved in street fights, sought refuge in the party. There were two basic routes to this infiltration. One was through family members, fathers being members of the CHP and sons being involved in ultra-left activities, Fathers would expect the party to provide a safe haven for their sons, arguing for democratic rights of speech and political participation of all groups. Secondly, these organized groups were mobilized by party activists against their rivals within the party. Some of the groups had informal links with MPs, local patty leaders, or even the members of top leadership, As many of these leftist groups had significant Alevi participation and the CHP also had parallel Alevi support, such alliances were seen as part of daily politics. The power struggle within the party center after 1976 also made use of these groups, Associating them with ideological cleavages, groups fought for power in the National Congresses. The 1980 coup was harsh on these groups in the center and the periphery, and put many of them in prison. When the SHP was founded in 1983, it too became a shelter for these leftist groups. It has already been argued that clientelistic politics were extended after 1972, Many groups saw the party politics as a means of partIcipating in resource allocations with preferential treatment. As soon as the parties were allowed to ti.ll1ction, these people joined the SI-IP in order to ensure their share of future resources, However, a very important change took place amongst the active members in the periphelY during the period of the military regime (1980-83), Until the 1980 coup, a local politician could survive through his/her ties with the state, When the party was close to or

116

117

Political Parties in Turkey

The Republican People :S' ParOl

in power many local politicians were able to find jobs in and around political offices. For example, they became Mayors and municipal council members, were employed in the state economic enterprises, or were given positions within the bureaucracy. The military regime not only sacked them but also persecuted them. After this experience, local politicians began to distance themselves from the state and many became small entrepreneurs. This embourgeoiscment had major consequences for the future of the party, and radically altered the resources and their allocation patterns. The SHP was founded as an umbrella party, where the groups agreed to coexist, as by that time Ecevit would allow neither clientelism nor ideological groups to take part in his party. The SI-IP did not attempt to propose a new participation model that would overcome the old weaknesses. On the contrary, as the party lost votes, the problcms became more profound and acute. In general, factionalism is closely associated with clientelism. 2(' Clientelistic groups within afi'amework of rivalry can easily develop into factions, closing their boundaries and strengthening internal loyalties with extra measures such as personal bondage, tribalism, and ethnicity. In the case of the C I-I P, factions and ideological wings coexist, sometimes leading into tactical alignments; however, factionalism, rather than ideological debate, is the predominant factor. The domination of factionalism is due to two factors: first, the existence of a strong factional leader, Baykal, and second, the increasingly ficrce intraparty competition due to the shrinking of the party. A shrinking party means fewer positions, less access to resources, and less power. The logic off11ctionalism in this case is to limit the potential demand by defining a limited in-group, rather than trying a more risky solution by increasing the resources to be distributed to everyone. The in-group is defined through strengthened loyalty that is secured with internal control, gossip, espionage, and by developing extra bonds through traditional means. Here family ties and ethnic and religious bonds become significant. Many members originate from the same family; ethnic and religious groups are mobilized to be part of local party organization.27 In the case of the CI-IP, the Alevi groups provide a readily available political community. The problem here is that once the party begins to draw predominantly from one ethnic group, then the others are alienated and this in turn creates the image of an ethnic party. Even though the party was out of power most of the time, the 1991-95 coalition of SHP-DYP and many municipalities provided good sources of funds for the party rank and file. The majority of party members saw this

opportunity as a ehanee to obtain some tangible benefits such as jobs, licenses for building houses, or legalizing buildings in squatter settlement areas. In times of great resources, this could go mainly unnoticed, but as the country was experiencing economic difficulties, favors for party members attracted the attention of neighbors and created the image of a party of favoritism. The embourgeoisement of local leadership after 1980 added corruption to this problematic mix. There developed a list of contractors who were active party members with the ability to mobilize votes in local congresses. They demanded that mayors and cabinet ministers gave them contracts in return for power. Thus, after 1991 there came a wave of corruption allegations, the most well known being that against the Istanbul Water and Sewerage Agency (istanbul Su ve Kanalizm:von Maresi-ISKi). The same trend continued until the 1999 elections when the party lost all its parliamentary scats. Nowadays it is limited to a few municipalities. The above problems had been anticipated by BUlent Ecevit, and encouraged him to establish a new model when founding his partyminimal party organization. Deniz Baykal has also come to recognize the defects of the party organization. In his case, minimal organization is difficult because the CHP already has an elaborate formation and network. He is now attempting to form a party without any internal opposition, where his faction, strengthened with bonds of loyalty, will become the party. The role of this organization will be limited to internal elections, which may include the primaries. Baykal believes that vote mobilization will be accomplished by the leader through the extensive use of the media. The old forms of the door-to-door campaign canvassing, meetings, and rallies are considered passe. Baykal is developing a model of organization working exclusively for the leader, instead of Ecevit's minimal organization. CHANGING ENVIRONMENT AFTER 1980 AND THE CliP

Since 1980 the SHP/CHP tradition has remained mainly in the opposition, except for the four-year period between 1991-95. While both in power and in opposition, the main emphasis of the social democrats has been on liberties, and particularly on lifting those restrictions imposed by the military government. Since its establishment the SI-IP has made human rights the primary focus of its discourse, attacking sllch violations of human rights as the torture of convicted persons and long detainment by the police. One of the primary legal changes passed by the party when in power was an alteration

119

Political Parties in Turkey

The Republican People :\. Party

of the Penal Code that rendered the police more accountable and liberalized rules of detainment. The SHP has also tried to appeal for the rights of minorities and attempted an electoral alliance that would enable the Kurdish identity to be represented in the parliament. Furthermore, the party played a crucial role in amending the Constitution and expanding the right to participate in political parties for groups such as women, youths, university lecturers, and union activists. Since the 1970s, the CHP has played a very important role in the consolidation of "the left" as part of the political spectrum in Turkey. The legitimacy of being on the left had been secured by ismet inonii, one of the founding fathers of the Republic, declaring himself to be on the left of center. This was reinforced by the nationalist deeds of Ecevit, and the democratic struggles of Erdal inoni.i. Even the military government of 1980s, after allowing the political parties to open in 1983, proposed that one of the parties should be on the left. This legitimacy enables groups from the left to argue for more egalitarian policies without facing the old accusation of Communism. The new CI-IP has played another positive role in consolidating secularism. In the! 990s, which saw the significant rise of political Islam, the CHP became the stronghold of secularism. The party not only brought the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to the forefront in the 1991 and 1995 election campaigns, but also promoted the civil society movement against the 1996-97 RP-DYP (True Path Party) coalition. The central and local party organizations took active part in the anti-fundamentalist protests, including such activities as "Women's March against the Shari'a." This is why the greatest worry came from secularist groups, when the party could not enter the parliament in 1999. Although the SHP/CHP tradition was able to playa significant role in improving the process of democratization in Turkey, it was unable to replicate similar positive input in the area of political economy. The decisions made on January 24, 1980 started a new era in Turkish politics. This was the first of a chain of changes that would alter the form of political participation in Turkey. In the past, participation meant taking part in decisions for resource allocation. In a growing economy, the parties would compete for more resources to be distributed to voters. Since then the resources to be distributed decreased because of the shrinking economy and the concentration of available resources for a limited few. Political parties with extensive networks like the DYP and the CHP found it extremely difficult to cope with this new situation. The role of party organization was also altered by the communications revolution. Media, especially television, replaced the role of local

branches for information dissemination. Consequently, a new role model for the peripheral party was not developed. The political environment became slippery once the Soviet Union was demolished, bringing a totally new world into existence. Globalization means outside forces have a highly effective impact on changing the country. In this new context, the CHP could not develop a New Turkey vision. For example, it never discussed the role of Turkey in Europe, within its own region, or what kind of an integration with the European Union (EU) was appropriate. The CHP does not have a clear worldview on globalization; there is an oscillation of ideas in the leadership that range from xenophobic perspectives to full integration with the globe, even abolishing the borders of the nation-state. For a long while, the party remained oblivious to economic problems. The decisions of January 24 were almost disregarded because the party was trying to make up for the loss of democratic rights, which accompanied the neo-liberal reforms. The "opposition" to the party had been defined in the political realm. Even though there have recently been attempts to formulate an economic program, the party has already established an image of disinterest in the chores of daily life. In a country where the income distribution is distorted almost daily and where there is large-scale unemployment and poverty, it is difficult to understand the existence of a "social democratic" party that does not even tackle the questions of social justice, equality, and social welfare. In this non-policy stance, the CHP has been under the influence of the media, which has criticized all distributive mechanisms as '''populism.'' Not being able to propose a new distribution policy itself, the CHP refrained from talking about poverty or social justice so that it would not be a target for the media. Thus, the CI-IP could not be a spokesperson for the losers of thc post-1980 structural adjustment programs. The party did not speak up for them, so they lost faith in thc party and gave their votes largely to the DSP, which gave the impression of defending the subaltern. As noted, as the party got smaller, its organization beeame more closed, there were fewer resources, which made sharing more difficult. A close scrutiny of who constitutes "us" became the criterion to deterl11l11e who qualified to benefit from resources. This alienated new groups from participation in the party and the CI-IP found itself in a vicious circle. Yet it is not alone in this vicious circle. The parties of the center, on both the left and the right, have found it difficult to adapt to the new world and new forms of politics. The effective new actors in Turkish pol itics, from social movements to the media, have developed outside the realm of political

118

120

parties. The proposed structural adjustment reforms and changes in the fiscal policies of the state will add further difficulty. The old forms of political participation cannot continue because the form of state intervention in the economy will no longer be the distribution of resources to the voters. None of the existing political parties realize what is in store for them. The CI-IP is in danger of further marginalization if, like all the parties of the center, it cannot find a way of restructuring its ideology, support bases, and organizational structure together with the forms of participation. The CHP has some advantages in this struggle. but old forms of cleavage are very important in Turkey. The CI-IP has an organization that can speak up for some of the class interests, religious groups, and a welfare economy, and it also has links with the new identity groups, such as ethnic minorities and feminists. However, it could neither achieve an organizational reform to articulate these interests nor formulate a new ideology. The CHP was reborn in 1972, and saw its votes increase from 27 percent in 1969 to 42 percent in 1977. Whether it still retains that kind of a potential remains to be seen. If not, it will certainly be a glorified party of modernization in history books.

NOTES I.

2.

3. 4.

5. 6.

7.

H. 9. 10.

The Republican

Political Parties ill Turkey

For a further discussion of anticipated changcs in political partics, sec Alan Ware, Political Parlies alld PilrZI' '~I'SICIIIS (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Prcss, I (96); Richard Hof'tCrberl, Parlies alld DCllloc/'{/c:1' (Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, 1998); Klaus von BeYlllc, Polilicol Parlies ill Wesll'1'II DClllocracies (Aldershot: Gowcr, 1985). Elizabeth C)zdalga, "On thc Footstcps of Atallirk" (unpublished Ph.D. thcsis, Goteborg UniverSity, 1978); Suna Kili, 1960-1975 Diil/emil/de CIIIII/lllr~)'cl Halk Parlisi 'lIde Cieli,I'IIIe/er-S~)'asel [Mill1i Arlsllldalll3ir il/celelllc (Istanbul: 13ogazi9i Oniversitesi YaYllllan, 1(76). Clllllllllr(l'el Halk Parli.l'i Prograllli (Ankara: l1.p., 1977). p.12. ilhan Tekcli and Ra~it Giik"cli, 1973 I'C 1975 Se(,ill1leri Sq:ill1 Cograji'{/.I·I (j;:cril/l' HiI' Del/ellle (Istanbul: MiIIiyet YaYllllan, 1977), pA2. Ergun C)zbudun, "TUrI(\yc'dc Sosyal Dcgi~llle vc Siyasal Katllllla," AI/kol'll (jlliversilesi 1111fillk FalaUlcsi }J:IYIIII, No.363 (1975). Ay~c Glinc~-Ayata, CHP-(}rglll 1'(' idcol(!ii (Ankara: Giindogan YaYllllan, 1(92); Ay~c Glinc~-Ayata, "Idcology, Social Bases and Organizational Structurc in the Post 19S0 Political I'm-tics," in Birol Yc~ilada (ccL), Polillcal al/d Socio-ecollolllic 7hllls/i}/'/l/alillll (IF 71ll'kcy Sil/ce 1980 (Prcager, 19(3), pp.3 I--5 I. Harald Sehlilcr, "Alcvilcr ve Sosyal DCllloknltlann ittifilk AraYI~I: DilscI vc DinscI Tanlllllal1llll~ Gruplann Sosyal DCl1lokrat-Laik Ortam vc PartiIIerdekl Rolli," III Stcphanos Ycrasllllos (ccL), 7l'irkil'e 'de SiI'i1 7bpllllll I'e Mil/(I'CI('ilik (Istanbul: ileti~11ll YaYll1lan, 19(9), pp. I 33-84_ Ay~c Glinc~-Ayata, "Wolllcn as Idcntity Markers: The Case of Urban Alevi in Turkcy," Zeilscllriji ill 7ilrkeisllldiclI, No.1 (2000), pp.57-69. Glinq-Ayata (1992). Ernl Tuncer, SCPIII '99-18 Nistlll 1999 Millcll'ekili Gellel .)'''rim/eri Sa),lslIl I'e S~\'as{/I Dc.~e,.lelldi,.mc (Ankara: TESAY Yakfl, 1999), p.93.

I I. 12.

13. 14. 15.

16.

I7

IS. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

People:~

Party

121

Erol Tunecr and Co~kun Kasapba~, Se('illl'99-~I(I Nisall 1999 il Gencl Meclisi 1'1' Belediy!! Serimlai-SaYI.l'(//l'c S~\'osol DeiJ,erlellllil'mc (Ankara: TESAV Vakfl, 20(0), pp_IO 1--28. Neiat Erdcr. Sczgin TUzlin. Ahlllct Kcrdclll and Filiz Kcrdclll, Tiil'kiyeye Sil'ilSI l'al'lilel'ill Se('mellleri I'e Sosyal Demokrasillill Toplumsal Tahmll (Ankara: TUSES YaHI, 1995), pp.42-58. Erdcr (1995), ]1.141. Ncjat EHlcr, Tiil'kiye 'de S~\,{lsi Pal'li SI'('1I1I'III1'l'illill Nil1'liklel'i, Kimliklel'i I'e 1:/J,ilimf,!l'i (Istanbul: TOSES Yakfl, 1996), p.155. Hasan BUlcnt Kahraman, "OGUncU Yol Politikalan, Klircscl1e~mc vc TUrk Sosyal DClllokrasisi," in Murat YalGlIltan (ccL), (jriillcii Yol Al'llYI.)·lol'I Fe Tlll'kiye (Istanbul: BUkc YaYllllan, 20(0), pp.115-33_ Erdogan Y lid Il'I Ill, CHP ve DSP' Sosyal Delllokrasill;1I 'Belil'sdik SOruIlU' (Ankara: Birikim YaYllllan, 1996). Andrcw Mango, "The Social Dcmocratic Populist Party, 1983---1989," in Mctin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (cds.), Polilical Pal'lies olld Dem()cl'll(l' ill 7lirkey (Ncw York: 1.13. Taw'is, 1991), pp.170-XS; Aylin Chman and Simten Co~ar, "1990'larda TUrkiyc\le Sag ve Sol Siyasetin C)ncliIleri," Bil'ikim, No_139 (2000). pp.1 I 1--20; Hasan Blilent Kahraman. Sos,l'al Dcmokrasi. 7l'il'kil'e I'e ['ol'lila; (Ankara: Imge YaYlllcvl, 1993). Taml Bora and N~cmi Erdogan, "CHI' vc DSP'de Solun Bal(lyesi Ncdir? ," Hil'ik;m, No. I 20 (1999), pp.28-35. Cumlluriye/ Halk POl'lisi Pmgl'(JI11I (1993). Murat Bclgc, "Sol uk Anadolu Yolu," Radikal (Istanbul daily), Fcb. I I, 200 I ;Hasan I3lilcnt Kahralllan, "Baykal'lIl