Opposing Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys

OPPOSING EUROPE? THE COMPARATIVE PARTY POLITICS OF EUROSCEPTICISM

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Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism Volume 1 Case Studies and Country Surveys

Edited by A L E K S S ZC Z E R B I A K A N D PAU L TAG G A RT

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © The several contributors 2008 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Data available Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 978–0–19–925830–7 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Contents List of Figures List of Tables Contributors 1. Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak

vii ix xiii

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2. The Limits of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Germany Charles Lees

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3. Euroscepticism in France, 1992–2002 Gérard Grunberg

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4. Euroscepticism in Italy Lucia Quaglia

58

5. Hard but Hardly Relevant: Party-Based Euroscepticism in Belgium Kris Deschouwer and Martine Van Assche

75

6. Euroscepticism in the British Party System: ‘A Source of Fascination, Perplexity, and Sometimes Frustration’ David Baker, Andrew Gamble, Nick Randall, and David Seawright

93

7. Shades of Green: Euroscepticism in Irish Political Parties Karin Gilland

117

8. Euroscepticism and Political Parties in Spain Marga Gómez-Reino, Iván Llamazares, and Luis Ramiro

134

9. Euroscepticism in Denmark Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen

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10. The Difficult Task of Opposing Europe: The Finnish Party Politics of Euroscepticism Tapio Raunio 11. Softer but Strong: Euroscepticism and Party Politics in Sweden Nicholas Aylott 12. Euroscepticism in Austrian Political Parties: Ideologically Rooted or Strategically Motivated? Franz Fallend

168 181

201

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Contents

13. Opposing Europe or Problematizing Europe? Euroscepticism and ‘Eurorealism’ in the Polish Party System Aleks Szczerbiak

221

14. Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic Sean Hanley

243

15. Euroscepticism in the Hungarian Party System: Voices from the Wilderness? Agnes Batory

263

16. The Slovak Republic: Eurosceptics and Phoney Europhiles Karen Henderson

277

17. Emerging Party-based Euroscepticism in Estonia Evald Mikkel and Andres Kasekamp

295

18. Euroscepticism and Slovenian Political Parties: A Case of Weak Party-based Euroscepticism Alenka Krašovec and Simona Kustec Lipicer

314

19. The European Question and the Norwegian Party System since 1961: The Freezing of a Modern Cleavage or Contingent Opposition? Nick Sitter

328

20. Conclusion: Opposing Europe? Three Patterns of Party Competition over Europe Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak

348

References Index

364 395

List of Figures 2.1. German support for EU Membership, 1981–1999

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2.2. Breakdown of German support for specific aspects of EU membership, 2000–2

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5.1. Support for European Union Membership in Belgium, 1981–2003

77

6.1. British and EU-wide support for membership of the European Union, 1973–2003 6.2. If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the European Union, how would you vote?

104 104

6.3. If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should be part of a Single European Currency, how would you vote?

105

6.4. Percentage feeling that Europe is an important issue, 1974–2003 6.5. Ranking of Europe amongst other important issues, 1974–2003

106 107

7.1. Net Irish attitudes towards European integration, 1973–2002 7.2. Irish party-based Euroscepticism 8.1. Support for EU membership

120 130 138

11.1. Swedish public opinion on EU membership 11.2. Opposition to Swedish EU membership among party sympathizers

182 192

17.1. Net image of the EU in Estonia and candidate countries, 1990–2002 17.2. Support for EU membership and average rating of government 18.1. Public opinion results on EU accession in Slovenia from 1997 to 2001 (in %)

296 302 323

19.1. Party strategy and explanatory variables

335

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List of Tables 1.1. Political parties with Hard and Soft Euroscepticism in EU member states, 2002 1.2. Political parties with Hard and Soft Euroscepticism in the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 2002

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2.1. 22 September 2002, Bundestag elections (second votes and seats)

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2.2. A typology of party positions on European integration in the Federal Republic of Germany

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3.1. Eurosceptic parties

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3.2. Results obtained by Eurosceptic parties and movements between 1994 and 2002

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3.3. 2002 elections results 3.4. Presidential vote according to attitude towards French membership in Europe 3.5. Saliency of European issue in voter motivations in the 2002 Presidential election

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3.6. Attitudes of the French in regard to Europe according to voting in the first ballot of the 2002 Presidential election

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3.7. Fears generated by European integration according to vote in the first ballot of the 2002 Presidential election 3.8. Vote transfers between the first ballot of the Presidential election and the second ballot of the 2002 Presidential election

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3.9. Vote transfers between the first ballot of the Presidential election and the first ballot of the 2002 legislative elections 4.1. 2001 General elections in Italy

54 63

4.2. Summary of Eurosceptic political parties in Italy in 2002 5.1. Voting behaviour in the House of Representatives on the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice treaties 5.2. Eurosceptic parties in Belgian politics 5.3. Election results for the federal House of Representatives in 2003 5.4. Three indicators of ‘trusting Europe’ related to voting behaviour (ISPO/PIOP Electoral survey 1999)—percentages 6.1. Principal Eurosceptic parties in the British party system

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63 80 89 90 90 108

6.2. Average percentage feeling Europe is an important issue and average ranking of Europe as an important issue for each Parliament, 1974–

108

6.3. Attitudes of Conservative MPs towards European integration (1994 and 1998) 6.4. Attitudes of Labour MPs towards European integration (1996 and 1998)

113 114

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List of Tables

7.1. Europe Union-related referendums in Ireland, 1972–2002 7.2. The Nice referendums compared

119 121

7.3. The results of the 2003 Irish election

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7.4. Party positions: Direction 7.5. Eurosceptic parties in Ireland

123 131

8.1. Ideological position in the left–right dimension of parties according to the opinion of their leaders

139

8.2. Electoral results, 2000 legislative elections

142

8.3. Main Eurosceptic parties in the Spanish Parliament 8.4. Attitude towards the European integration process of each political party according to its elites

142

8.5. Pearson correlation coefficients between party evaluation of the EU, party left–right placement, and peripheral national identifications 9.1. 2002 Eurobarometer question to the Danes: Do you believe that membership of the EU is: 9.2. Denmark’s six Europe referendums 9.3. Composition of the Danish Parliament after the 20 November 2001 general election, the official European orientation of each party, and extra-parliamentarian Eurosceptic parties 9.4. ‘No’ vote in the 1986, 1992, 1993, and 1998 referendums by voters who vote for the following political parties in national elections 10.1. Distribution of votes (%) in national parliamentary and European elections since the early 1990s 10.2. Party positions in the 1994 membership referendum

147 148 153 154

158 161 170 170

10.3. Eurosceptical parties in Finland 11.1. Major parties’ positions on Europe 11.2. Eurosceptical parties and party factions in Sweden (as of late 2002), and percentage of vote in 2002 election 11.3. Euroscepticism and party sympathizers 12.1. Support for EU membership, 1995–2002

186 190 206

12.2. Parliamentary elections and governments in Austria, 1983–2002 12.3. Support for EU enlargement, 1998–2002

207 216

13.1. 13.2. 14.1. 14.2. 15.1. 15.2.

224 225 247 249 265 270

September 2001 parliamentary election results Kopecky and Mudde’s typology of party positions on Europe Parliamentary election results in the Czech Republic Eurosceptic parties in the Czech Republic Euroscepticism in the Hungarian party system in 2002 The April 2002 parliamentary elections in Hungary

16.1. Eurosceptic parties in Slovakia 16.2. Slovak election result, 20–21 September 2002

171 184

281 283

List of Tables 16.3. Support for Slovakia’s accession to the EU according to party preference October 2002 17.1. Dominant conflicts and European integration in Estonia during the transitional stage

xi 290 298

17.2. European issue in Estonia during the accession stage

300

17.3. Typology of party positions on Europe 17.4. Party positions of Eurosceptic parties in Estonia, 1999–2002 17.5. Results of the Estonian Parliamentary election and party position on EU and Europe, 2 March 2003 17.6. Levels of party-based Euroscepticism in Estonia 18.1. Results of the 2000 parliamentary elections and a classification of parties in party families 18.2. Benefits of Slovenian membership in the EU according to party preferences (averages in 2000 in %)

305 307

18.3. Results of the EU referendum according to party preferences (averages in 2000 in %) 19.1. The Norwegian parties, roughly from left to right, with percentage of votes in the 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections 19.2. Party programmatic positions on European integration, as per election programmes by year of election 20.1. Patterns of contestation over Europe in party systems

308 312 321 324 325 331 339 350

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Contributors Dr. Nicholas Aylott, Södertörn University College Dr. David Baker, University of Warwick Dr. Agnes Batory, Central European University Professor Kris Deschouwer, Free University Brussels Dr. Franz Fallend, University of Salzburg Professor Andrew Gamble, University of Sheffield Dr. Karin Gilland, University of Zurich Dr. Marga Gómez-Reino, Universidad de Salamanca Professor Gérard Grunberg, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques Dr Sean Hanley, University College London Karen Henderson, University of Leicester Professor Andres Kasekamp, University of Tartu Dr. Alenka Krašovec, University of Ljubljana Dr. Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen, University of Aarhus Dr. Charles Lees, University of Sheffield Dr. Simona Kustec Lipicer, University of Ljubljana Professor Iván Llamazares, Universidad de Salamanca Dr. Evald Mikkel, University of Tartu Dr. Lucia Quaglia, University of Sussex Professor Luis Ramiro, Universidad de Murcia Dr. Nick Randall, University of Newcastle Professor Tapio Raunio, University of Tampere Dr. David Seawright, University of Leeds Professor Nick Sitter, Norwegian School of Management Professor Aleks Szczerbiak, University of Sussex Professor Paul Taggart, University of Sussex Dr. Martine Van Assche, Free University Brussels

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1 Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak

1.1 INTRODUCTION The development of European integration has relied on a more or less compliant European population. For the most part this has been a safe assumption. European elites have been largely very supportive of European integration and they have been able to assume at least mass quiescence, if not support, on this issue for many years. But this assumption in a larger and more integrated European Union (EU) has become harder to sustain. In some member states Euroscepticism has become a visible and stable, albeit minority, seam running through public opinion. Debates in candidate states about the virtues of membership in the run-up to the 2004 enlargement revealed some important differences about how European integration was viewed. And, in the post-2004 period, referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands were widely interpreted as a sign of popular disquiet with the EU. The impact of this public opposition is felt in different ways. It has normative implications for the democratic credentials of the European integration project if a significant and growing section of the EU populace does not buy into the European project. Direct, and less theoretical, effects can be seen when European populations have a direct input into the integration process or into the EU institutions. Referendums on treaties in member states have rejected significant moves forward. European Parliamentary elections have seen Eurosceptic members of European Parliament (MEPs) elected. In indirect ways we can also see the impact of this Euroscepticism as member states’ governments in traditionally Europhilic states take positions that allow them to distance themselves from aspects of the European project while bringing them closer to Eurosceptic elements of public opinion. And, in some member states, the nature of domestic political competition has been significantly affected by the European issue. This is the first of two volumes that are an attempt to systematically map and analyse the nature of Euroscepticism in the party systems of Europe in the period around 2002. The chapters in this volume cover eleven of the pre-2004 member

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states, six of the Central and Eastern European candidate states who joined in 2004, and Norway. This range of members, ‘pre-members’, and non-members give us a great deal of comparative possibilities. The project comes out of a long-standing ‘Opposing Europe’ project which the editors initiated in 2000. The project aimed to bring together experts from across Europe to compare the way in which the European project was being contested in different national and institutional arenas. The project was initially institutionalized around the ‘Opposing Europe Research Network’ (OERN) which was run out of the Sussex European Institute and was kindly aided by a grant from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council for a series of workshops. The European Consortium for Social Research Joint Workshops in Turin in 2002 provided a valuable staging post for many of the contributors and contributions in these volumes. As the project has developed, the network has taken on a broader remit to examine the relationship between domestic politics and European integration and has become the European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN)1 and produces working papers, election, and referendum briefings. The reason for the focus on parties is that political parties are key gatekeepers in the process of political representation. They play a crucial role in the selection of key members of European institutions (most importantly the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament). They also play an indirect role in the selection of Commissioners. Parties play a vital role in referendums over European issues where they mobilize sentiment, agenda-set and structure the competition over the issues. Most importantly, political parties, although much demeaned of late, still exercise the key role in determining the shape and content of politics at the domestic level. And as it becomes harder and harder to entirely disentangle the domestic and European levels of politics, they determine the way ‘Europe’ plays out (or does not play out) as a political issue. The role of political parties is a crucial component in this process of representing Euroscepticism and that the issue of European integration provides us with a powerful lens for illuminating new aspects of party competition of Europe. Those interested in European integration need to understand party competition in member and candidate states and those interested in political parties need to understand the nature of the European issue. Marrying these two concerns means that we can begin to draw a picture of Euroscepticism and how it is manifested in party systems in party competition across Europe. And looking at both member states and candidate states provides us with a contemporary pan-European picture and a glimpse into the future politics of the enlarged EU. The chapter is divided into three sections. In Section 1.2 we review the literature on Euroscepticism. We then offer a framework for defining and differentiating Euroscepticism and give details of the guidance provided to contributors. Then we present an empirical summary of Eurosceptical parties in European states with a discussion and finally move to an outline of the chapters of the book.

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1.2 THE LITERATURE ON EUROSCEPTICISM There has been something of a flurry of research on party-based Euroscepticism in EU member states in the past few years. There have been three factors that have seen to increase the interest in Euroscepticism. First, in general, there has been a sense of the decline of the ‘permissive consensus’ and the starting point for this appears to have been the difficulties in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty. Moments of interest in Euroscepticism have come about when referendums on European issues have had negative outcomes, with the apogee of this being the stalling of the project of the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 due to the rejections in the French and Dutch referendums. The second factor stimulating an interest in, and a literature on, Euroscepticism has been the increasing tendency, in the European integration project, to resort to referendums to ratify treaties, thus giving an opportunity for the expression of Eurosceptic sentiments. The third factor is the enlargement of the EU which has increased the scope of the integration project and brought in new sets of states with a new sets of different patterns of politics and ways of perceiving and debating the European issue. These factors have invigorated interest in the phenomenon of Euroscepticism and this section lays out the literature coming out of this interest.2 An article published by one of the authors of this chapter (Taggart 1998) provided the starting point for the basis for the project that led to these volumes. In that piece, contemporary West European party-based Euroscepticism was mapped, in an attempt to develop some comparative lessons and specifically to link the nature of party systems to the expression of Euroscepticism. There have been other comparative articles looking at the basis of Euroscepticism in EU member states. The work of Gary Marks, Lisbet Hooghe, and Carole Wilson (Marks and Hooghe 1999; Marks and Wilson 2000) made use of the expert judgement survey material gathered by Leonard Ray (1999) to argue that in EU member states the party positions on European integration are more strongly related to their party families than to their national contexts. In their work, Marks and Wilson (2000) use that data to argue that traditional cleavage theory works well to account for positions on European integration and that it is a better guide than using national variations. They examine why there is variation within the social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, and conservative party families by stressing how different aspects of integration have different impacts on the parties’ constituencies in different states. Work in this vein by this group of authors has become an important point of reference for the literature on Euroscepticism. Peter Mair, in an article in a special issue of West European Politics devoted to the effects of Europeanization on domestic politics, argued that the effect of European integration on domestic party systems is limited and that, in tracing the lines of division over Europe, ‘Europe as such appears as neither a necessary or sufficient condition for that divide’ (2000: 35). The authors of this chapter have also presented the findings of a comparative workshop on Euroscepticism in Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000).

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Susan Milner (2000) in her introduction to a special issue of the journal European Integration argued that the term Euroscepticism has its roots in British political discourse and its origins as a significant political force in French and Danish referendums on Maastricht, which opened up both elite political and academic discourses to the importance of public opinion in the process of integration. Looking at long-term trends in public opinion in the EU, Milner observed differences in levels of support by countries who joined the EU at different times and suggests that a ceiling of support might have been reached in the founding states. She asserted the importance of party systems and of some social factors in determining levels of support, and argued that countries seeking‘escape’ will seek refuge in the EU while countries with sources of independence will have a propensity towards Euroscepticism. Summarizing the findings of the four case studies in the issue (the UK, the Nordic states, Germany, and France) Milner argued that embedded cultural factors are important but that these are mediated through factors such as wider social attitudes and the nature of representative structures. In their book, Political Parties in the European Union, Simon Hix and Christopher Lord (1997: ch. 2) use data from party members in EU member states to map the shape of the EU party system along the two axes of left–right and integration– sovereignty. They consider the parties in ideological groupings and conclude that the ‘question of more or less integration into a new European system is a manifest dimension of political conflict that seriously undermines the coherence of the traditional families’ (Hix and Lord, 1997: 53). Although their aim was not primarily to study Euroscepticism, this is one pole in the schema they develop and therefore becomes an important part of their analysis. This work has been continued by Hix (1999) who makes the case for seeing the way that Europe impinges into politics in terms of an Integration–Independence dimension in combination with the Left– Right dimension. Comparative work on Central and East European states is rare but the edited book by Karen Henderson (1999a) brings together a number of pieces that cover public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe (Grabbe and Hughes 1999) as well as case studies of Poland (Millard 1999), Slovakia (Henderson 1999b), Slovenia (Brinar 1999), and the Baltics (Herd 1999). There have been a number of country studies. As we might expect, these have been focused around countries with higher levels of Euroscepticism. Geoffrey Evans (1998), looking at the British case, uses the British Election Panel Study data to examine the role of the European issue in relation to voters for the Conservative Party between 1992 and 1996, and finds an increasing gap between the party’s position and the position of its voters and argues that this was costly in the 1997 elections and therefore a more markedly Eurosceptic line would be electorally advantageous for the party in the future. Stephen George (2000) argues for British exceptionalism but focuses more on the elite level arguing for the importance of the media in shaping British political elite attitudes on Europe. The theme of British exceptionalism is taken up by David Baker and David Seawright (2000) in their paper on the bases of Conservative Euroscepticism in Britain. They argue that Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party represents the dominance of a

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very particular brand of conservative ideology. Mark Aspinwall (2000) presents an analysis of ‘awkwardness’ of the British elite over Europe in which he argues that institutional factors, or more precisely the potential power of parliamentary backbench MPs by the electoral system (under certain distinct circumstances) is a better explanation of this behaviour of the elite than historical or cultural explanations that focus on British elite attitudes. For a systematic, analytical, and historical approach to the British phenomenon of Euroscepticism there is Anthony Forster’s Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics. The focus of the book is exclusively British and seeks to examine party-based Euroscepticism since 1945 (Forster 2002). The argument of the book is that it is essentially domestic factors that have shaped the nature and fate of Eurosceptical arguments. In definitional terms, Forster sees Euroscepticism as essentially multifaceted and this has hindered its success in terms of encouraging factionalism (Forster 2002: 2). Forster’s book works as a diachronic comparative study of Euroscepticism in different historical periods. This approach allows him to identify three strains of Euroscepticism: the adaptive Euroscepticism that responds to the changing shape of European integration, European institutions, and European policy foci. Secondly, he notes that the arguments have become more rigorous and intellectually robust. And finally he notes the increasing sense in which it has become difficult to identify an alternative to the current European integration project. The Nordic cases are well represented in the literature. Cynthia Kite (1996) offers a comparative work which maps intra- and inter-party conflicts in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden between 1991 and 1996. Left-wing and social democratic sources of opposition in the Nordic region are dealt with in Geyer and Swank (1997) who, using survey results from Norwegian anti-EU social democrats find that they draw from the traditionalist-materialists and from the postmaterialist-leftist groups, but significantly not from the modernizers within the party. Christensen (1996) compares the Left-Socialist parties in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway to see why they have differing stances on European integration, concluding that institutional differences within the parties and the positions of the countries in Europe account for these differences. Work on Euroscepticism conducted, as case studies, in candidate states is a rarer commodity. Aleks Szczerbiak (2001a) provides an in-depth analysis of Eurosceptic trends in Poland while work by Petr Kopecký and Peter Ucen (1998) offers case studies of the Czech and Slovak Republics. There are also a number of case studies in one edition of the Journal of European Public Policy which cover Slovenia (Brinar and Svetliˇciˇc 1999), Hungary (Agh 1999), and Poland (Stawarska 1999) as well as the chapters mentioned already in Henderson (1999a). Tibor Navracsics (1997) provides an analysis of the missing debate in Hungary over the European issue arguing that in the mid-1990s a consensus between the parties hid some very different conceptions of the European project and its implications for Hungary. What is clear is that there is not much comparative work on Euroscepticism. What work there is tends to be focused on ‘older’ member states. And the case studies are more numerous for member than for non-member states. There are

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variations in approaches such as between the quantitative (e.g. Evans 1998; Ray 1999; Aspinwall 2000; Marks and Wilson 2000) and the qualitative (e.g. Christensen 1996; Taggart 1998; Henderson 1999a). However, there does seem to be a common theme in the literature that the form of party politics in particular states does play a role in determining party positions on Europe. Our research stays within that paradigm and develops the point further. Three volumes on Euroscepticism have appeared as readers bring together writings on Euroscepticism. They are less useful than it might appear, for example, in the case of the two volumes edited by Martin Holmes (1996, 2002) they are collections of writings on the British Eurosceptic case rather than an analysis of Euroscepticism. In the case of the volume by Ronald Tiersky, it is a somewhat esoteric collection of writings mainly by politicians. In the introduction, Tiersky (2001) suggests that we differentiate between ‘Euro-skepticism, Euro-pessimism, Euro-phobia, and Eurocynicism’ but ends up drawing some rather wide, and contestable, assertions about what Eurosceptics believe. In terms of the conceptualization of Euroscepticism, we suggest there have been three major contributions to the literature. The first came from Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde (2002) who responded to our initial Hard and Soft distinction (see below) with a critique that emphasized the difference between underlying attitudes to European integration as a principle and attitudes towards the EU and came up with a fourfold distinction between Euroenthusiasts, Eurorejects, Eurosceptics, and Europragmatists.3 In a similar vein, Chris Flood and Nicolo Conti moved the categorization of Euroscepticism away from the purely oppositional pole to seeing Euroscepticism as one end of a spectrum that needs to be seen as continuous and incorporating different types of support (as well as opposition) to European integration. Flood (2002) suggests that we should see Euroscepticism as one of the poles on a spectrum that moves from rejectionism at one extreme through revisionism and minimalism and then on the positive side he suggests moving through gradualism, through reformism to maximalism. Conti (2003) has a slightly more economic taxonomy moving through Hard and Soft Euroscepticism to positive corollaries as functional Europeanism and identity Europeanism. Conti also notes that there is a category in middle where no position is taken on European integration. Both Flood and Conti offer their conceptualizations in relation to an empirical case, with Flood focusing on France and Conti using Italy. An additional attempt to conceptualize Euroscepticism comes from Jan Rovny (2004). The argument is made that there are different motivations for Euroscepticism and that these can either be ideological or strategic. Rovny then suggests that these can be combined with Hard and Soft Euroscepticism to make a twodimensional mapping of Euroscepticism. The framework is then applied to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia to demonstrate that the parties in these countries fit across the mapping in a U-shaped curve. A similar distinction is drawn by Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers (2005) in their consideration of public opinion on European integration and their differentation between instrumental Euroscepticism and political Euroscepticism where the former focuses on strategic calculation while political refers to national concerns.

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Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering (2004a) produced an edited volume which they explicitly placed in relation to the present volumes and the associated project. In terms of the debate about defining Euroscepticism the editors, in their introduction to the volume, start from the observation about the British provenance of the term and then put forward a plural line noting that their contributors have taken different positions (Harmsen and Spiering 2004b). They also suggest that the debate about definitions around the Hard and Soft categories used in these volumes has been a productive debate. They further make the case that Soft Euroscepticism should be seen in regard to positions on Europeanization rather than European integration itself (Harmsen and Spiering 2004b: 20). Despite the recent wave of interest in Euroscepticism, two things remain clear. The first thing to note is there exists very little work that systematically compares Euroscepticism in different contexts. The second observation is that it is clear that there is still the need to clarify the concept of Euroscepticism. We offer, in Section 1.3, our framework for differentiating and defining Euroscepticism.

1.3 TYPES OF EUROSCEPTICISM: HARD AND SOFT In surveying the nature of Euroscepticism across European states we face some inevitable difficulties in defining what precisely this concept consists of. The first issue is that, for our sample of states, we are addressing Euroscepticism in the different contexts of membership and candidature. The second is a more familiar comparative issue in trying to find a definition of Euroscepticism that works in all relevant national contexts. In order to address this issue, we have offered a distinction between two types of Euroscepticism, what we term Hard and Soft Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2000). The original formulation of Euroscepticism used by one of the authors of this chapter in looking at Western Europe was comprehensive and included ‘the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’ (Taggart 1998: 366). In extending this to Central and Eastern Europe, we found that it was more useful to break this into two. And it was this distinction which the contributors to these volumes have used. Hard Euroscepticism is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived. There are two shorthand methods of assessing whether a party is Hard Eurosceptic. The first is whether it is a single issue anti-EU party. We assume that a party would only mobilize solely against the EU if it were opposed to it on principle. The second is to ask whether the opposition to the EU is framed in language that stresses that it is too capitalist/socialist/neo-liberal/bureaucratic, depending on ideological position (communist/conservative/socialist/populist),

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and calls for a fundamental recasting of the terms on which their country is an EU member that is incompatible with the present trajectory of the European project. This is sometimes expressed as conditional support for EU membership but on conditions so unattainable that it is tantamount to being de facto opposed to EU membership. Soft Euroscepticism is where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory. Soft Euroscepticism can only meaningfully be said to exist where a party uses the rhetoric of contestation over the European issue as part of their political repertoire. The point of identifying Soft Euroscepticism is that it captures those positions that constitute real scepticism about the way European integration is currently developing. It is important to be aware of an assumption that we are making. We assume that the contemporary project of European integration is being pushed onwards and that the status quo, in toto, is very rarely defended as the desired form of European integration. In other words, we are suggesting that if someone supports the EU as it currently exists and opposes any further integration, they are effectively Eurosceptic because this is at odds with what is the dominant mode of ongoing integration. The usefulness of differentiating between Hard and Soft variants of Euroscepticism lies not only in nuancing the descriptive qualities of the concept but also because we strongly suspect that the different variants will have different qualities and this may inform our wider research agenda. Of course, the distinction is an ideal type that will, in some cases, become blurred but it may be useful to identify the two forms as poles on a spectrum with some parties moving between them. The way we have identified Soft and Hard Euroscepticism implicitly suggests a particular feature of Eurosceptical attitudes to Europe—‘the European issue’ is assessed by Eurosceptics in relation to an existing set of ideas or issues (whereas the same is not necessarily true for Europhiles). For Hard Eurosceptics, the EU may be opposed because it embodies some previously identified ‘enemy’ (e.g. capitalism for communists, socialism for the right, bureaucracy for populists, supranationalism for nationalists, or neo-liberalism for socialists). For Soft Eurosceptics, the EU is problematic when its development runs counter to interests, policies, or issues that they support. The opposite may not necessarily be true, in that Christian democratic and liberal ideologies both support the idea of European integration as it is constitutive of ‘European solidarity’ or ‘international cooperation’. In other words, Europhiles may support European integration as a good in itself whereas opponents oppose it because it embodies other already existing demons. In the following chapters we asked contributors to employ this framework. We also gave other guidance to our contributors in the hope of providing a standard frame of reference and some control for the comparisons and some of this guidance may be useful for readers of the following chapters.

Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe

9

The first piece of guidance we gave was to offer the definitions of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism which are laid out in Section 1.2 and we specifically asked for contributors to use and engage with the definitions and we explicitly invited criticisms of the categories within the context of the chapters. We were clear at the beginning of the process that these categories were useful heuristic devices and, as is made clear in Volume 2, we have had real reservations about their applicability when used in the context of the project, but we still feel that they have clarified some distinctions and have been useful in stimulating a debate about conceptualizing Euroscepticism. The second key point of guidance was that we asked the contributors to compare the position of their states in 2002. This was two years before the 2004 enlargement and allows us to see the dynamics of Euroscepticism in established member states as well as in candidates. The European project is a moving target and there was a need to establish a standard timing to the data. We recognize that things have changed since 2002 in two key ways. Firstly, all the candidate states have become new member states. Secondly, there has been substantial change in some party systems since 2002. However, we contend that the big picture is one of continuity in terms of the expression of Euroscepticism within the party systems we consider. In asking the contributors to consider what sort of Euroscepticism there was in their party systems, we asked them to first consider listing both parties and factions. This is particularly difficult to do in the case of factions but we felt that there was at least the possibility that Euroscepticism in some states would be more apparent in factions than in parties. The second aspect was that we explicitly asked them to deal, as far as possible, with all parties and to not only focus on parties with parliamentary representation. Again, the reason for this was that we felt it was likely that Euroscepticism would be apparent in the very marginal forces in some states. The advice we offered on measuring the dependent variable came out of discussions with contributors. We suggested that the focus be on official party positions where these exist rather than with the positions of party voters, activists, or MPs (although these are clearly important and related). In measuring how Eurosceptical a party is, we therefore suggested focusing on a party’s public statements, the parliamentary voting on key European issues (treaties), and published party programmes/manifestos. But we made it clear that what constitutes Euroscepticism in one country may not be the same as what constitutes it in another. In other words, we accepted the need for measures that are contextually sensitive. Finally, we noted from the outset that we felt there was a case to be made that there are different processes associated with (a) Euroscepticism as a broad underlying position that political parties take on Europe and (b) whether they use the European project as an issue of contestation. These are two different phenomena (with different causal mechanisms) but which have often been conflated (not least by us!) in accounts of party-based Euroscepticism. And this is why we explicitly asked contributors for indications of how salient the issue of Europe has been in

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national politics and whether it has played a part in national election or European Parliamentary campaigns. 1.4 EUROSCEPTICAL PARTIES IN EU MEMBER AND CANDIDATE STATES, 2002 The following chapters provide a wealth of data about the shape, structure, and strength of Euroscepticism in eighteen states. Putting together this data with other information about other states not covered here allows us to map the contours of Euroscepticism in party systems in a range of EU states. Table 1.1 lays out the basic data and may provide readers with the broad context that will be useful in interpreting the particularities of the states dealt with in the chapters. A brief look at the data in Table 1.1 demonstrates some obvious points. First, Hard Euroscepticism is far less common in member states than Soft Euroscepticism. Whereas five member states have no parties expressing Hard Euroscepticism, no state is without Soft Euroscepticism. Second, there is still the relative absence of parties of government from this list and where the ‘mainstream’ parties are present in the table they tend to make an appearance in factional form (cf. Taggart 1998). The exceptions to this come with the incorporation of new populist parties into government with the Freedom Party in Austria, the Northern League in Italy, and the Conservative Party in the UK which remains stubbornly exceptional to many of the wider trends we see here. Third, it is notable that many of the parties are relatively small parties. Turning our attention from the member states to the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe, we can begin to construct a pan-European understanding of how the European issue plays out through different party systems. Of course, the candidate states are interesting now as member states but they also provide us with the possibility of extending the range of our comparative understanding of the European issue and of party systems. Looking at the data presented in Table 1.2, it is clear that there are extremely similar patterns to the member states with Soft Eurosceptism absent only in one state and with Hard Euroscepticism being slightly less prominent than Soft Euroscepticism. It is also the case that most parties are not parties of government and many are smaller parties. What we see overall is that Euroscepticism permeates nearly all European party systems but that it does so primarily in the form of Soft Euroscepticism and mainly among parties that are peripheral to their party systems. 1.5 PARTY-BASED EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE CASES IN THIS VOLUME In the chapters that follow, contributors provide an overview of Euroscepticism in eighteen country cases. The chapters are a key way of breaking down

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Table 1.1. Political parties with Hard and Soft Euroscepticism in EU member states, 2002 Hard Austria Belgium

Denmark

Finland France

Germany

Flemish Block Belgian Labour Party Communist Party People’s Movement against the EU Unity List

Communist Party Forces for Change in Finland Communist Lutte Ouvrière Revolutionary Communist League National Front (Le Pen) National Movement (Mégret) Republicans German People’s Union German National Democratic Party

Greece

Communist Party

Ireland

Sinn Fein Socialist Workers’ Party

Italy

Northern League

Luxembourg

The Netherlands

Portugal Spain Sweden

Green Party Left Party New Future KALE (faction in Christian Democratic Party) Centre No to EU (faction in Centre Party)

Soft Freedom Party Francophone Christian Democrats New Flemish Alliance Front National Socialist People’s Party Danish People’s Party Christian People’s Party June Movement True Finns Citizens Movement (Chevènement) Movement for France (de Villiers) Rally for France and Independence of Europe (Pasqua) Party of Democratic Socialists Christian Democratic Union (faction) Social Democratic Party (faction) Free Democratic Party (national-liberal faction) Christian Social Party Democratic Social Movement Political Spring Synaspismos (faction) Green Party Christian Solidarity Party Socialist Party Workers’ Party National Alliance Communist Refoundation Action Committee for Democracy and Pensioners Justice The Left Green Party Socialist Party Reformed Political Federation Political Reformed Party Reformed Political League Communist Party Greens United Left Galician Nationalist Bloc Norrbotten Party Social Democrats Against EMU (faction in Social Democrats) Centre Party

(cont.)

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Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak

Table 1.1. (Continued) Hard United Kingdom UK Independence Party Socialist Labour Party British National Party

Soft Green Party Conservative Party Scottish Socialist Party Socialist Alliance Democratic Unionist Party

Sources: Contributors and chapters in this volume supplemented with information from Cas Mudde, Derek Hearl, Philip Burbidge, Agnès Alexandre-Collier, Kevin Featherstone, Dimitris Papadimitriou, Paul Furlong, John Fitzmaurice, Leonard Ray, and Florian Bieber.

the aggregate data presented above to present some very diverse pictures of Euroscepticism. Starting with the two driving forces of European integration and two states that were essential to the formation of the European project, the volume begins with the big three founding states. In the chapter on Germany, Lees demonstrates that Table 1.2. Political parties with Hard and Soft Euroscepticism in the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 2002

Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia

Hungary

Hard

Soft

None Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Miroslav Sládek Republicans Social Democratic Labour Party Christian People’s Party Republican Party Future Party Independence Party

None Civic Democratic Party

Hungarian Justice and Life Party

Latvia

Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia

Slovenia

Self Defence League of Polish Families Communist Party of Slovakia Real Slovak National Party Slovak National Party New Party

Centre Party Reform Party People’s Union Russian Party in Estonia Democratic Party Russian Unity Party FIDESZ-MPP Workers Party Latvian Social Democratic Alliance Conservative Union for Fatherland & Freedom The Centre Union of Lithuania Lithuanian Peasants Party Law and Justice Party Polish Peasant Party Greater Romania Party Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Smer Christian Democratic Movement Slovenian National Party

Sources: Contributors and chapters in this volume supplemented with information from Deyan Kiuranov, Elena Iankova, Kieran Williams, Petr Kopecký, Gunta Misane, Ruta Buienevita, and Sorin Ionita.

Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe

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in the state most intimately tied to the European project, there are elements of Euroscepticism across the party system but that there are inbuilt institutional constraints with German politics that limit the expression of such sentiments. Gérard Grunberg describes in his chapter on France how Euroscepticism also crosses the French party system and he argues for a distinction between the older Eurosceptic parties and the Euroscepticism expressed in a new generation of political parties. It is also in the new parties that Lucia Quaglia, in her chapter on Italy, sees the bulk of Euroscepticism in what has been historically a country very supportive of European integration and a state that was a party to the founding of the European project. Belgium is described by Kris Deschouwer and Martine Van Assche in their chapter as a system in which Euroscepticism is present but it is largely confined to the more marginal parties and even where it does it exist it has a very low salience in Belgian politics and so is a good case of Euroscepticism without contestation of the European issue. In stark contrast, David Baker, Andrew Gamble, Nick Randall, and David Seawright detail how British politics has provided the most fertile ground for Euroscepticism and that the European debate has been an ingrained feature of British politics both through time and across the range of parties and has become a key issue of contestation for government parties. Ireland, long seen as a beneficiary and thus supporter of European integration, rejected, in 2001, the Treaty of Nice in a referendum and, as Karin Gilland in her chapter argues, this marks a changing way in which European integration is regarded in Ireland but it still remains an electorally marginal force and largely the confine of the smaller parties. Marga Gómez-Reino, Iván Llamazares, and Luis Ramiro demonstrate how the Spanish party system is not riven with Euroscepticism and how Spanish politics does not have much contestation over Europe but how Euroscepticism has become a factor for minor regionalist forces which are becoming more important in Spanish politics. The Nordic states have provided some examples of the more sustained Euroscepticism in their party systems. Denmark offers a case where referendum rejections have highlighted popular Euroscepticism. In her chapter on Denmark, Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen describes how Danish politics has the public appetite for Euroscepticism and has party-based Hard and Soft Euroscepticism but how it is limited in the effect of the more extreme forms, by being channelled out of national politics into expression in referendums and European Parliamentary elections. In Finland, Tapio Raunio describes in his chapter how the case is very different. Raunio suggests that the conditions are there for us to expect Euroscepticism but he notes the sustained support for European integration on the part of the major parties and the marginal role of any parties that do express Euroscepticism. In contrast, Nicholas Aylott, in his chapter, notes that Swedish party politics sees the strong expression of Euroscepticism both in major and minor parties and argues that this is a consequence of the particular nature of the Swedish party system and the incentives for Euroscepticism for some parties. Looking at Austria in his chapter, Franz Fallend describes a case where there has been much change in the party system away from the traditional patterns and with

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it has come the emergence of Euroscepticism most prominently in the form of the Freedom Party. Fallend argues that there a number of factors which have played a role in the changing salience of Europe and much of this has been driven by the combination of government–opposition dynamic, party ideology, and public opinion. Turning to what are six new member states, but were candidate states in this project, we see a range of experiences that in the broad contours reflect the mapping of party systems of member states. But in the detail it becomes clear that some different types of argument and some different constellations of forces are part of Euroscepticism in these candidate states. Looking first at the largest of the candidates, Aleks Szczerbiak, in his chapter on Poland, sees evidence of Euroscepticism but argues that the context means that only one party unambiguously displays a comparable form of Euroscepticism to other states in the project. He argues that contingent form of negative positions of Polish parties usually amounts to problematizing rather than opposing Europe. In the Czech Republic, Sean Hanley sees a case where there is Euroscepticism not only at the left and right peripheries, but also, and most significantly, in the centre-right party of Civic Democratic Forum. Hanley, in his chapter, argues for the importance of ideological factors in driving the Civic Democratic Forum’s Euroscepticism with the implication of being careful about making broad inclusive assumptions about the centre-right across Europe. In her chapter on Hungary, Agnes Batory describes a country where despite general support for European integration, Euroscepticism runs through the party system on both the left and the right. Hard Euroscepticism, Batory argues, is largely seen in marginal forces, however, and she makes the case that the European issue is employed strategically by the parties espousing Euroscepticism in terms of placing themselves in relationship to the mainstream Hungarian politics. Looking at Slovakia, Karen Henderson suggests that search for nationhood as Slovakia sought to establish a new identity was a crucial factor in driving the debate about Europe, even though there was little doubt about the desirability of accession. In addition, Meˇciar’s role in galvanizing the party system while flirting with Euroscepticism had another key role in determining the lens through which the EU was viewed in the run-up to accession. Henderson suggests therefore from this the need to be sensitive to the particular experiences of states in understanding their manifestations of Euroscepticism. Estonia provides us with a case of one of the most Eurosceptic of the candidate states. In their chapter, Evald Mikkel and Andres Kasekamp argue that Euroscepticism is apparent in both the core and peripheries of the party system but that this is largely a reflection of the increasing salience of the European issue and as a response to a relatively sceptical public opinion on European integration. At the other extreme lies Slovenia, which Alenka Krašovec and Simona Kustec Lipicer describe in their chapter. Looking at the electoral programmes of the Slovenian parties they find that although there is a broad consensus in favour of accession there are still some Eurosceptic positioning among the small parties but

Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe

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Krašovec and Kustec Lipicer emphasize, in the end, the low electoral salience of the European issue in Slovenia. Our final case study is the European country that has in referendums more than once rejected the prospect of EU membership. It comes as no surprise then that in his chapter on Norway, Nick Sitter argues that the European issue has been a live one in Norwegian politics and has been faced by all the parties in one form or another. He paints a picture of a complex issue that has played a role in both interparty competition as well as intra-party factionalism and party management. In the conclusion, we return to the comparative possibilities afforded by an eighteenth-country comparison and attempt to draw out three broad patterns of competition over European integration in European party systems. NOTES 1. See http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2.html 2. We should note here that we are excluding the literature produced by participants in Opposing Europe project. 3. We deal with the critique in detail in our conclusion to Volume 2.

2 The Limits of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Germany Charles Lees

2.1 INTRODUCTION Germany is not renowned for its Euroscepticism—party-based or otherwise. In fact, the Federal Republic has traditionally been considered the Musterknabe (model boy) of the European Union (EU). It has enjoyed a stable elite consensus around the European project, with broad cross-party agreement over the desirability of pooled political sovereignty and increased economic interdependence (Paterson 1996; Rheinhardt 1997; Peters 2001). This orthodoxy tended to be bolstered by a relatively compliant media; a permissive consensus amongst the general public; institutions and norms of governance that are analogous to the EU’s; a strong manufacturing and banking sector that has benefited from the opening up of European markets; and an ingrained reluctance amongst the political class to engage in populist politics on the issue of Europe. Moreover, the German Basic Law’s constitutional constraints on the use of plebiscites and referendums serve to limit the scope for extra-parliamentary mobilization around the issue. But German unification, combined with the country’s now-entrenched high levels of unemployment, has strained—although not yet broken—the cross-party consensus on Europe. On the left of the party system, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) engaged in a brief flirtation with a more ‘sceptical’ attitude towards Europe in the mid-1990s, whilst the communist successor Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS now the Left Party) remains critical of many fundamental aspects of the integration process. At the same time, however, the Greens—in contrast to some Green parties elsewhere in Europe—have become very pro-European over the course of the last decade and a half. On the right, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) is sometimes ambiguous about European integration (reflecting the legacy of the internal split between ‘social’ and ‘national’ liberals as well as misgivings about the pace of supply-side reforms in Europe) but the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) remains broadly pro-EU. However the Christian Democrats’ Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), has resisted some elements of the integration process. As the ruling party in Bavaria, the CSU has always forged cross-party alliances at the state level in order to defend its interests and, as a result,

Limits of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Germany

17

also developed links with Jörg Haider’s People’s Party in neighbouring Austria. These moves were made under the aegis of Edmund Stoiber, the state’s MinisterPresident and failed CDU/CSU Chancellor-Candidate in the 2002 Bundestag elections. Nevertheless, it would be overstating the case to say that the cross-party consensus has broken down, and Germany remains one of the motors of the European integration process—as demonstrated by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s 2000 ‘Berlin Speech’ and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s endorsement of an SDP discussion paper on political union. But the consensus is under strain and, as a result, all the mainstream parties were anxious to keep ‘Europe’ off the agenda in the run-up to the 2002 Bundestag elections (Der Spiegel, 07/05/01). In this the parties were reasonably successful. Despite popular unease over perceived price rises after the introduction of euro notes and coins at the start of 2002—and the closeness of the election race—none of the mainstream parties chose to make the European single currency an issue. Even though, for historical reasons, retail price inflation is a highly sensitive theme for Germans, it became effectively a non-issue in the final month of campaigning. This was reflected in a drop in the salience of European issues as the election approached. At the start of August 2002, 9 per cent of Germans felt that euro-related price rises was the ‘most important’ theme in the campaign. This fell to 6 per cent a week later, then 3 per cent, before disappearing altogether from polling data by the end of the month (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2002). As it turned out, the September 2002 Bundestag elections were the closest in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany (Lees 2002b); the results of these elections are shown in Table 2.1. What is important in the context of this chapter is that well over 90 per cent of all votes cast in the 2002 elections were for political parties that, despite the differences of opinion noted above, by and large still supported the broad parameters of the pro-European orthodoxy that developed in the Federal Republic over the post-war period. Of the other 7 per cent, 4 per cent were cast for the PDS/Left Party, a party that, whilst more critical of the direction of EU integration than the other mainstream parties, does not mobilize around the kind of Hard Eurosceptic agenda found elsewhere in Europe (and described elsewhere in this volume). In so far as it does exist within the German party system, any Hard Euroscepticism (defined as the outright rejection of the integration project in its current form and opposition to their country joining, or remaining in the EU) is, at present, restricted to the fringe right-wing parties, such as the Republicans, that failed to poll more than 3 per cent between them. Moreover, as is examined later in the chapter, even these fringe parties refrain from advocating outright withdrawal in their election manifestos. So does the absence of a significant party-based Eurosceptic agenda mean that the German public are content with the long-established pro-European position of their political elites? The polling data in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 go some way to suggest that it this is not necessarily the case. As Figure 2.1 demonstrates, up until the mid-1990s, public opinion towards European integration was stable at around the EU average but then fell back to about 5–10 per cent below it. This coincided

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Charles Lees

Table 2.1. 22 September 2002, Bundestag elections (second votes and seats)∗ Bundestag elections 22/09/02

Bundestag elections 27/09/98

Bundestag elections 16/10/94

Electorate Number of votes % Turnout Valid votes

61,432,868 48,582,761 79.1 47,996,480

60,762,751 49,947,087 82.2 49,308,512

60,452,009 47,737,999 79.0 47,105,174

SPD CDU CSU Greens FDP PDS/Left Party Schill Rep NPD Others

18,488,668 14,167,561 4,315,080 4,110,355 3,538,815 1,916,702 400,476 280,671 215,232 562,920

38.5 29.5 9.0 8.6 7.4 4.0

20,181,269 14,004,908 3,324,480 3,303,624 3,080,955 2,515,454

40.9 28.4 6.7 6.7 6.2 5.1

17,140,354 16,089,354 3,427,196 3,424,315 3,258,407 2,066,176

36.4 34.2 7.3 7.3 6.9 4.4

Seats (1998 totals in brackets): SPD 251 (298); CDU/CSU 248 (245); Greens 55 (47); FDP 47 (43); PDS/Left Party 2 (36); (Total 603)

with greater public awareness of the costs of German unification and a growing uneasiness at Germany’s role as paymaster of the EU. However, let us unpack the idea of support for the EU further. Figure 2.2 uses half-yearly polling data from 2000 to 2002 and tracks the attitudes of the German public towards specific aspects of EU membership. These are: (a) membership as a ‘good thing’; (b) the benefits of membership; (c) trust in the European Commission; (d) support for the euro; (e) support for Common Foreign Policy; (f ) support for Common Defence and Security Policy; and (g) support for the eastward enlargement of the EU. Taken in the round, the data show that overall levels of support for membership are reasonably stable and that the percentage of Germans polled who regarded EU membership as a good thing has recovered since the late 1990s. Moreover, two aspects of EU policy—support for a Common Foreign Policy and a Common Defence and Security Policy—are very popular, with between 70 and 80 per cent of those polled indicating support for these policy objectives. Nevertheless other aspects—such as the benefits of membership, trust in the Commission, and support for enlargement—are only supported by a minority of the German public. So Figure 2.2 demonstrates that there is a degree of unease amongst the German public about the scope and pace of European integration. And, therefore, in a proportional electoral system like Germany’s, we might expect one or more political parties would exploit this niche within the multiparty system that has been left empty by more Euro-orthodox parties. The generally buoyant levels of support for the broad idea of European integration mean that it is unlikely that ‘relevant’ parties—that is, parties that might expect to have some

Limits of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Germany

19

100 90

EU Average Good Thing

Good Thing'

Neither Good nor Bad'

Bad Thing'

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

85 19 86 19 87 19 88 19 89 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99

84

19

83

19

82

19

19

19

81

0

Figure 2.1. German support for EU membership, 1981–99 Source: Eurobarometer 52

influence over the formation and/or maintenance of governing coalitions—would opt to mobilize around a Hard Eurosceptic agenda. However, in the light of significant levels of public unease about specific issues such as enlargement, an agenda of Soft Euroscepticism (defined as contingent or qualified opposition to aspects of the integration process) would appear to be a workable option for a party seeking to profile itself on the issue of Europe (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002: 6–7). But this has not happened. Instead one finds a clear disjuncture between elite and popular opinion (European Commission 1996; Page and Barabas 2000). Elsewhere, I have argued that this disjuncture makes Euroscepticism the ‘dark matter’ of German politics (Lees 2002a). That is not to say that parties, or factions within parties, have not occasionally tilted at the windmill of Euroscepticism. But these Eurosceptic turns have either been opportunistic and ad hoc in nature, or— where a more coherent critique of the European project has been developed— associated with flanking or extremist parties. Thus, up until now, German partybased Euroscepticism has been inchoate and ineffective. This chapter explores these themes in more detail and is structured as follows. First, the positions of each party on Europe are set out briefly in a historical context, including those instances in which the party or a faction thereof problematized the issue of Europe as political issue, and in more depth on the basis of each parties’ 2002 election manifestos (where possible with particular emphasis on those issues flagged in Figure 2.2). The analysis is sequenced on

20

Charles Lees Membership Good Thing

90

Trust in European Commission Support for Common Foreign Policy

Benefits of Membership Support for euro

Support for Enlargement Support for Common Defence/Security Policy

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Spring 2000

Autumn 2000

Spring 2001

Autumn 2001

Spring 2002

Figure 2.2. Breakdown of German support for specific aspects of EU membership, 2000–2 Source: Eurobarometer 53, 54, 55, 56, 57

a left-to-right basis: in other words the PDS/Left Party, the Greens, the Social Democrats, the Free Democrats, the CDU/CSU, the ‘Schill Party’, the Republicans, the German People’s Union (Deutsche Volksunion—DVU), and the National Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands—NPD). Finally, the chapter concludes with a review of the parties’ positions and assesses the future prospects for Eurosceptic strategies within the German party system.

2.2 THE PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM/THE LEFT PARTY As the successors of the former ruling Socialist Unity Party of East Germany (SED), the PDS/Left Party attracted opprobrium. In the past, labels such as ‘exStasi’, the ‘Eastern League’, the ‘nostalgic association’, or even ‘Red Polished Fascists’ have been used to attack the party. Paradoxically, this appears to have helped the party as much as hindered them. The party’s success in entering the Bundestag

Limits of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Germany

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following the October 1994 elections was evidence that the it had consolidated its status somewhere between that of an ‘Eastern party of protest’ (Lees 1995: 150–4) and an eastern catch-all party. Subsequent Land (regional) elections— especially their spectacular result in the October 1995 Berlin poll (where they became the biggest party in the east of the city with 36.3 per cent of the votes cast), together with their more recent participation in Land-level coalitions with the Social Democrats (so-called ‘Red–Red’ coalitions), meant that by the mid1990s the PDS/Left Party’s position was relatively secure. Although the territorial dimension to the party’s support gives it the potential to become a significant player at the national level, its poor showing in the 2002 Bundestag elections—in which the party polled 4 per cent (down from 5.1 per cent in 1998)—wiped out the its parliamentary faction and reduced its Bundestag representation to just two directly elected members or Mitglieder des Bundestages (MDBs). This result casts doubt on the party’s long-term prospects, although it still exercises influence over national politics via the second chamber (the Bundesrat), which is made up of representatives from Land governments. In programmatic terms, the PDS/Left Party remains opportunistic and oriented towards the East. The party sees itself as having been part of the reform (as opposed to opposition) movement in the former German Democratic Republic and has not explicitly rejected the aims of the former regime. It opposes what it regards as the Westernization and material and cultural dominance of capital, as represented by the ‘West German’ political settlement, and is in favour of decisive social change through both strong parliamentary representation and extra-parliamentary means. Therefore, it is logical that the party has developed a sustained critique of the European consensus within the Federal Republic. It has been a consistent critic of both the terms and, on occasion, the principle of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) project. More recently, attempts by the EU to forge a common position on European defence and security policy has led to the party adopting consistently ‘sceptical’ positions on issues such as participation by the German military in out-of-area operations, and outright opposition to the EU’s stance on the Kosovo crisis and what it regards as EU backing for US action in Afghanistan. Perhaps inevitably, given the territorial nature of the PDS/Left Party’ support and political strategy, much of the party’s European policy is embedded within a domestic—and primarily ‘Eastern German’—political discourse. Very little space was given to European issues in the party’s 2002 manifesto and those references that were included in it, by and large, dealt with the issue in a cursory and/or polemical manner rather than spelt it out in any great detail. In as far as the party’s European policy proposals dealt directly with the issues flagged in Figure 2.2, they were as follows. First, in terms of the benefits of EU membership, with the exception of a brief passage on the benefits of eastward enlargement (see below), the PDS/Left Party’s position was a critical one. Much was made of the EU’s internationalist ideals, but what might be called ‘real existing integration’ was sharply criticized for being undemocratic and too pro-business (PDS 2002: 8–25).

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With regard to the European Commission and other EU institutions, the PDS/Left Party’s position was that the EU’s institutional framework is fundamentally undemocratic and lacks transparency. The key reform that the party put forward was the strengthening of the European Parliament (EP), in order to give the peoples of Europe more decision-making influence (Einflussmöglichkeiten). In particular, the party proposed a strengthening of the EP’s co-decision powers and a new right of policy initiation along the lines of that enjoyed by the Commission. The manifesto also demanded the development of the idea of a ‘European citizenship’ (how this is would be achieved is not specified), to operate alongside national citizenships—and the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into a new constitutional settlement (PDS 2002: 18–19). Interestingly, no mention was made of the euro in the PDS/Left Party’s election manifesto. Paradoxically, however, for a party with such a strong Eastern German focus, the manifesto went into some depth in discussing the EU’s proposed Common Foreign Policy and Common Defence and Security Policy. The document argued for strong regional cooperation, including enhancing links with the countries of the former Soviet Union, in order to offset the effects of globalization. The party naturally regarded the European left as being in the vanguard of this process, which would bring about ‘a Europe of democracy and solidarity’. The document also raised the spectre of a more militaristic Europe, and argued that the EU must become a strong ‘civil power’, operating within established international frameworks such as the United Nations (UN). Interestingly, the party also argued that Europe must begin to challenge the USA in the areas of disarmament, environmental reform, and the introduction of an International Court of Justice (PDS 2002: 24–5). Finally, because of eastern Germany’s proximity to Poland and the Czech Republic, the eastward enlargement of the EU was regarded primarily in terms of its domestic economic and political impact. The manifesto welcomed enlargement because it was seen as representing a ‘new chance for East Germany’ (Ost Deutschland—note the terminology used here), not least because it would serve to shift the region from the edge of the EU to its centre. However, the manifesto also made it clear that the party felt that enlargement would only work for the region if matched by more public spending by Berlin and Brussels to improve infrastructure and human capital. EU’s structural policy was singled out for specific criticism, with the manifesto claiming that too much emphasis had been put on the idea of Trans-European Networks at the expense of local infrastructure. In as far as the renewal of ‘traditional links’ with the neighbouring countries of the former Warsaw Pact were welcomed, this was entirely in the context of the possible advantages for eastern Germany. It was also balanced by warnings that eastern Germany might suffer by becoming a ‘transit route’ between western Germany and the new markets in the new member states (PDS 2002: 8–9). Taken in the round, the PDS/Left Party’s election manifesto did not afford a particularly high level of salience to ‘European’ issues and, where they were mentioned, they were generally subsumed into other topics. In addition, with the

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exception of the party’s proposed reforms of the EU’s institutional arrangements, they were not dealt with in any real detail. Moreover, the issue of the euro was ignored completely (perhaps because it was a fait accompli). Nevertheless, in so far as it was spelt out, the party’s position was critical of key aspects of European integration including EMU. Thus, the party’s position broadly conforms to that of Soft Euroscepticism.

2.3 THE GREENS Of all the European ecology parties, the German Greens have been the most successful and the best documented.1 Despite the short-term failure of the West German Greens to enter the Bundestag following the 1990 all-German elections, the party’s continuing success has convinced most observers that they are here to stay. In the early 1990s, Raschke and Schmidt-Beck estimated their ‘core’ potential electorate to be around 5 per cent, with an additional ‘fringe’ potential electorate of around 8 per cent (of which they could count upon about a third voting Green consistently) (Bürklin and Roth 1993: 163–5). Such high levels of potential support mean that the party will almost certainly continue scaling the Federal Republic’s 5 per cent electoral barrier for parliamentary representation. Indeed, in the 2002 Bundestag elections the Greens actually polled 8.6 per cent of the vote (up from 6.7 per cent in 1998). Programmatically, the Greens were originally very much what the former Social Democrat Chancellor Willy Brandt called ‘the Social Democratic Party’s lost children’ (Markovits and Gorski 1993: 81), providing a political home for those both inside and outside the Social Democrats with left/libertarian value orientations that this party failed to cater for. However, the Greens have made the transformation decisively from an explicitly ‘anti-party party’ to a player within the political mainstream. This shift is reflected in the party’s attitude towards European integration, especially since forming government with the Social Democrats in 1998. The stance of Green Party’s Foreign Minister Joshka Fischer was at least as pro-European as that of his predecessors. In the otherwise cordial coalition negotiations between the Greens and the Social Democrats, following the 2002 Bundestag elections, he fought hard against Gerhard Schröder to prevent ‘European’ issues being stripped out of his Ministry’s remit and hived off to a new ‘Minister for Europe’ (Die Welt, 16/10/02). Unlike the PDS/Left Party, the Greens’ 2002 election manifesto did include a specific section dedicated to the EU. Interestingly, however, this was not very long and did not go into any great detail. In terms of the benefits of EU membership, the Greens’ manifesto made it clear that the party regarded EU membership as a good thing. In terms of benefits the Greens saw the EU as the platform from which the party’s long-standing ideological objectives—international peace and cooperation, social justice, environmental protection and development, and the protection of the ‘European social

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model’—could be achieved. Nevertheless, the Greens were critical of the EU’s lack of democratic accountability and transparency, as well as its failure to allow Turkey to join the accession countries (see below) (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002: 83–6). With regard to the European Commission and other EU institutions, the Greens argued for a ‘Europe of democracy and solidarity’ (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002: 83) and regarded the EP as being the most appropriate vehicle for achieving this. In this sense they were very close to the position adopted by the PDS/Left Party. The Greens’ manifesto argued that the EP’s powers should be enhanced, and include the right to elect the Commission President. In addition, it was argued that there should be a new EU Constitution, which should be voted on in a Europewide referendum (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002: 84). No mention was made of the euro in the Greens’ manifesto but, again like the PDS/Left Party, the Greens took a highly idealistic stance towards the EU’s proposed Common Foreign Policy and Common Defence and Security Policy. Like the PDS/Left Party, the Greens argued against the militarization of the EU and for a strategy of civil power. Moreover, the manifesto stated that in order to reduce the influence of the member states’ national interests, the EP and Commission should assume primary responsibility for these policy areas. The manifesto argued that the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force should not be seen as the first step to the creation of a ‘European Superpower’ (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002: 85). Finally, on the topic of the eastward enlargement of the EU, the Greens regarded this as an historic opportunity to overcome the division of Europe. The manifesto argued for a quick conclusion and ratification of the enlargement treaty, with the aim of allowing voters in the accession countries to take part in the 2004 EP elections. Moreover, the Greens argued that Turkey should be given some kind of ‘perspective’ on integration (Integrationsperspektive) as soon as its human- and minority-rights record allowed (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002: 85). To sum up, the Greens’ position on Europe was qualitatively different from that of the PDS/Left Party. Although the concerns it raised about the democratic deficit and the potential for militarism were similar ones, it accepted in principle the key policy areas associated with the European integration process, such as EMU. In addition, even where similarities existed between the two parties’ positions, they were different in terms of tone and discourse. This raises the issue of the importance of discourse in adding nuance and meaning to policy positions, which is discussed further in the conclusion.

2.4 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY The SDP is, along with the CDU, one of the Federal Republic’s two Volksparteien (‘people’s party’ or catch-all party). The party’s origins can be found in the failed revolutionary fervour of 1848. The party first came to power at the end of the First World War, and played a major role in a number of coalition governments

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during the Weimar era before being suppressed under the Nazis. Following the defeat of Hitler in 1945, the party was able to remobilize, initially under the aegis of all the occupying powers. However, in the Soviet zones it was forcibly merged with the German Communist Party (KPD) in 1946. Thereafter, the SDP was a party exclusively of the Federal Republic. At this time the party remained in many respects a Marxist-inspired party of the non-communists left. However, it slowly came to terms with the post-war settlement, the division of Germany, and the ‘social market economy’, culminating in the Bad Godesberg conference of 1959, where the party adopted a new draft of policies. The party has enjoyed two periods in government: first, between 1966 and 1982 (in coalition first with the Christian Democrats and then the Free Democrats), and second, between 1998 and 2005 (in coalition with the Greens) and since 2005 (in alliance with the CDU/CSU). Programmatically, the Social Democrats’ acceptance of the Federal Republic’s political economy has meant an acceptance of the European orthodoxy as well. However, this was a gradual process and in the early years the party remained relatively hostile to the European integration process. As Haas observes, this was especially pronounced with regard to the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty ratification process, in which ‘every aspect of the Treaty was subjected to bitter criticism’, with particular opprobrium reserved for the ‘dictatorial and capitalist-dominated High Authority’ (Haas 1958: 131). In addition, the party feared that European integration would set back what was still its goal of a unified and neutral Germany (Haas 1958: 131–8). However, from 1955 onwards the party’s position became increasingly pro-European and, during the 1970s, two Social Democrat Chancellors—Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt—oversaw Germany’s rise to become the undisputed core country within the European Communities. This was underlined by the German mark’s position as the anchor currency in the European Monetary System. Despite the SDP’s historical acceptance of the European project, it did once more flirt with a Eurosceptical policy position in the run-up to the March 1996 state elections in Baden-Württemberg, which took place during a period of high issue salience for the topic of EMU. The party was encouraged by opinion poll data that showed that as much as 80 per cent of the population harboured doubts about the stability of the European currency (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15/11/95), and attempted to mobilize around this discontent during the election campaign in the state. The state party’s candidate for Minister-President, Dieter Spöri—in a strategy encouraged by the party’s national leadership—questioned the timing and scope of the EMU process. He argued for a delay of at least five years and, in the meantime, a reintroduction of narrow currency fluctuation margins within the European Monetary System. Furthermore, Spöri cast doubt on the advisability of going ahead with EMU without the UK being on board (Südwest-Presse, 11/01/96). Many observers believed that the state party would benefit from making EMU a campaign issue but, in the event, Spöri’s criticisms of the process failed to make a positive impact. In the Land elections, the party’s share of the vote dropped from 29.5 per cent to 25.1 per cent. Analyses of the elections indicate that voters

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regarded the party’s stance on EMU as inconsistent and opportunistic, and only the far right Republican party, which had consistently opposed EMU, benefited from raising it as an issue (Rheinhardt 1997). The Social Democrats’ position on Europe can be described as one of enlightened self-interest—summed up in the phrase ‘we belong to Europe and Europe belongs to us. . . . [but] . . . Germany remains our homeland’ (SPD 2002: 14). By and large, the party’s manifesto position was an intergovernmentalist one, with the exception of its support for enhancing the power of the EP (see below). However, even this can be interpreted in ‘national interest’ terms, given that Germany returns the most members of European Parliament (MEPs) to the EP. In terms of the benefits of EU membership, much was made of the European project as a vehicle for mutual security and cooperation, but this was balanced by a discourse of national interest(s) and the ‘weight’ of Germany’s ‘voice’. Crucially, the EU was portrayed in the manifesto as a counterweight to (or constraint upon) globalization—in the Jospin/Lafontaine tradition, rather than the Blairite vision of using the EU in order to adapt to globalization. In particular, much was made of the need to preserve the European Social Model at the European level (SPD 2002: 11–17). The Social Democrats’ attitude towards the European Commission and other EU institutions was that they must be ‘democratically legitimate and politically efficient’. Two (interconnected) areas were flagged in the manifesto. First, the need to establish a European Constitution—including the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the redrawing of competencies between different levels of governance—and, second, the enhancement of the powers of the EP, to include the election of the Commission President (SPD 2002: 16–17). Unlike the PDS/Left Party and the Greens, the Social Democrats did address the issue of the euro briefly, arguing that ‘the Euro strengthens Europe and enhances the stability of world financial system, from which all domestic economies profit’. At the same time, however, this was balanced by a vaguely worded passage calling for more ‘consultation’ between the European Central Bank (ECB), business/trade union interests (Tarifvertragsparteien), and member state governments. This was obviously a pointer to Germany’s dissatisfaction with the rules governing the ECB’s monetary policy set out in the EU’s Stability Pact (SPD 2002: 15). Like the party’s Green coalition partners, the Social Democrats were very positive about developing a ‘European’ foreign and security policy identity. However, at the same time the party’s 2002 manifesto clearly states that this had to be regarded as being complementary to the transatlantic alliance with the USA, which remained ‘the foundation of European security’. Unlike the Greens, the Social Democrats placed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the core of Germany’s foreign policy interests. In addition, the party argued for the creation of a common European border police to defend the Union against ‘organized crime and illegal immigration’ (SPD 2002: 15–16). In terms of eastward enlargement of the EU, the Social Democrats, like the Greens, were positive, albeit framing this within a discourse that focused more on tangible domestic benefits (bigger markets, more jobs). Unlike the Greens,

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however, the Social Democrats’ manifesto stressed the need to maintain ‘sensible’ transition policies such as the seven-year constraints on the free movement of labour and services between most of the EU and its new member states (SPD 2002: 16). The Social Democrats’ position towards Europe was, therefore, more pragmatic than idealistic. Much was made of national interest(s) and the domestic benefits of EU integration. As such, the party’s position was qualitatively different from that of its Green coalition partners. At the same time, however, the party was defending or advocating policies/positions that were meant to become common ‘Red–Green’ coalition policy. So, to sum up, the party’s position remained part of the proEuropean consensus.

2.5 THE FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY The FDP is the liberal party of the Federal Republic of Germany. However some observers have, on the strength of content analysis of party documents, assigned the party a position to the right of the CDU/CSU (Budge and Keman 1990). This an artefact of the history of the FDP, which was the first German liberal party to achieve a modus operandi between the two conflicting wings—social and economic/national—of German liberalism. This tension was apparent in the early years of the European integration process. For instance, although the party eventually ratified the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, there was considerable internal disagreement over its provisions and the impact they would have on the German national interest. Moreover, in the late 1950s, the party temporarily rediscovered its misgivings about the European integration process, which it regarded as being antithetical to the goal of German unification (Haas 1958: 135). The tension between the two wings of the Free Democrats has a territorial dimension, with the progressives better represented in the south-western Länder and the Hansa city-states, and the national-liberal wing strongest in the Länder of Hesse, Lower Saxony, and North-Rhine Westphalia (the party is still weak in the former East Germany). The North-Rhine Westphalia party, in particular, has a disproportionate impact on national politics. In the run-up to the 2002 Bundestag elections, state party boss Jürgen Möllemann raised the temperature of the campaign with a number of pro-Arab and, some argued, anti-Semitic pronouncements. In the elections, the party polled 7.4 per cent of the vote. This was up from 6.2 per cent in 1998, but nowhere near the party’s stated target of 18 per cent. Despite the dissenting voices who put the Free Democrats to the right of the Christian Democrats, most observers have regarded the party’s programme as a centrist one, in keeping with the its role as the ‘pivot’ party in the process of coalition formation (Padgett 1993; Pappi 1994). This moderation has extended to the party’s European policy, not least because under both Social Democrat and

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Christian Democrat-led coalitions, the party has provided the foreign minister. The party’s ‘insider’ status regarding Europe, combined with working within the constraints of the Chancellor’s ‘guidelines competences’ (Richtlinienkompetenz) has meant that it has had a stake in maintaining the continuity of Germany’s stance on European issues. However with the entry of the Greens and the Party of Democratic Socialism into the national party system during the 1980s and early 1990s, the Free Democrats’ pivotal status has been reduced and the party has become part of the Christian Democrat-dominated right wing ‘bloc’ in a predominantly two-bloc system (Lees 2001b). But as long as the Christian Democrats remain pro-European in outlook there is little sense for the Free Democrats to change their stance on Europe at the national level, although individual state parties may do so. As already noted, the Free Democrats have a great deal of foreign policy competence. It is not, therefore, surprising that the party’s manifesto has the longest and most detailed section on European issues (FDP 2000: 78–82). In terms of the benefits of EU membership, the Free Democrats were proEuropean in tone, as would be expected from such an ‘insider’ party. At the same time, the 2002 manifesto was critical about some aspects of the Union— particularly the functioning of its institutions and the failure to complete some aspects of the Single Market Programme (see below). By and large the benefits of membership were framed in commercial terms. The Free Democrats’ manifesto position on European institutional arrangements was explicitly federalist. The manifesto argued that the existing institutional configuration was no longer adequate and a new constitution—setting out the division of competences between different tiers of governance—was required. The party argued that the Charter of Fundamental Rights should form the foundation of such a constitution, and that the final document should be voted on in a referendum (although it was not made clear whether this would be Europe-wide or national in nature). In addition, the party argued for more powers for the EP, particularly in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. This would be matched by an enhancement of the power of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (FPD 2002: 79–81). The euro was only mentioned in a substantive way in relation to the liberalization of European markets. The manifesto argued that the euro is not in itself a solution to Europe’s structural problems and would only work in the context of Europe-wide supply-side reforms (FPD 2002: 81). With regard to a Common Foreign Policy and Common Defence and Security Policy, the Free Democrats regarded the EU as the appropriate platform to build what it referred to as a ‘value-oriented’ (werteorientierte) or ethical foreign policy, but little detail was provided. Interestingly, more emphasis was placed upon defence and security policy. There were two strands to this. First, the party manifesto welcomed the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force, which was regarded as being complementary to NATO and the transatlantic alliance. Ultimately, the Rapid Reaction Force was seen as the precursor to a combined European Defence Force under a unified command structure. Second, these developments were

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again seen in commercial terms, with the standardization of military equipment leading to coordinated Europe-wide defence-related production and research and development (FPD 2002: 80). The Free Democrats regarded eastward enlargement as a historic opportunity to overcome the division of Europe, but argued that this had to be the catalyst for reform of EU institutions, as well as the Common Agricultural Policy and Structural funds. Finally, in keeping with the party’s neo-liberal instincts, it criticized the transitional restrictions on the movement of labour and services between existing and new member states (FPD 2002: 79–80). To sum up, the Free Democrats’ position on European integration was positive and it espoused a federalist solution to the increasing complexity of European governance. The 2002 manifesto went into a marked degree of detail, arguing for more power for the EP and ECJ. At the same time, however, the document eschewed the kind of idealistic rhetoric found in the Greens’ and Christian Democrats’ manifestos. Rather, the party’s position was a pragmatic one that stressed the opportunities presented by integration for German business and consumers. The party was clearly in favour of more commercial and personal freedom. This represented a successful synthesis of two—the economic and the social—of the three often competing ideological strands within German liberalism. It gave the party’s European position a different tone from that found in the other parties’ manifestos. Nevertheless, in substantive terms the party’s position on European integration was firmly one of pro-European orthodoxy.

2.6 THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION/CHRISTIAN SOCIAL UNION The particular circumstances of occupied Germany in the period 1945–9 were crucial in determining the character of the CDU and its Bavarian sister party the CSU. The immediate post-war years saw a widespread rejection of narrow bourgeois conservatism, because of its failure to counter fascism in the 1930s. For the same reason, there was some recognition that confessional parties, such as the Catholic Zentrum, had also conspicuously failed to hold the middle ground during the period of the Weimar Republic. The two parties were, therefore, explicitly set up as broadly based ‘catch-all’ parties. Because of its national status, the CDU can be described as a fully fledged Volkspartei. However, although the CSU performs a similar role in Bavaria, in national terms it is considered to be a regional party. The two parties operate within a single parliamentary group (Fraktion) in the Bundestag. In 2002, the Christian Democrats polled 29.5 per cent of the votes (up from 28.4 per cent in 1998) and the CSU 9 per cent (up from 6.7 per cent). Programmatically, the two parties have common policy principles with their sister parties which can be identified as a specific Christian-Democratic ‘mix’. First, they share a broad commitment to such ‘Christian’ values—based on

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Catholic social theory—regarding basic human rights, individual freedom, and the primacy of the family. Second, they support the liberal conception of democracy. Finally, they espouse an integrative function. This integrative function takes place both nationally, through the Volkspartei principle, and internationally through the processes of European integration. The two parties have, therefore, been the most pro-European of all the mainstream parties, although different factions within them have had different rationales for this position. As Haas points out, the Christian Democrats’ initial enthusiasm for the European project was not just informed by the ‘triptych of self-conscious anti-Nazism, Christian values and dedication to European unity as a means of redemption for past German sins’. It was also motivated by the desire to shake off some of the burden of Allied oversight of German affairs, including the abolition of the International Ruhr Authority, and to establish a free trade area in Europe. Politicians such as the party’s Finance Minister Ludwig Erhard confidently and, as it turned out, correctly expected German industry to dominate such a free trade area (Haas 1958: 127–8). The CDU/CSU’s long pro-European tradition notwithstanding, there have been instances when both parties have taken a more critical stance on Europe. For the Christian Democrats, the most recent example took place in 1996 and involved the dominant faction of the state party in Saxony. In June 1996, the European Commission declared that the decision of the Christian Democrat-governed state to grant a subsidy of DM779 million to Volkswagen, which operated a plant in the town of Mosel, was illegal under EU competition law. This prompted MinisterPresident Kurt Biedenkopf to issue a legal challenge to the decision. The issue was finally resolved but generated much resentment about a perceived encroachment on the rights of the German states. It is also interesting to note that when the terms and conditions of EMU were being ratified by the Bundesrat in 1998, Saxony was the only German state that abstained in the vote (all the others voted in favour)—indicating that the state government still resented what it regarded as interference from Brussels. In the end, however, Biedenkopf ’s defiance of Brussels was of limited importance because it did not involve the national party (indeed, the then Christian Democrat Chancellor Helmut Kohl put enormous pressure on Biedenkopf to back down over the dispute). A more significant example of a coherent ‘sceptic’ agenda can be seen in the CSU state party in Bavaria. At the national level, the party’s self-ascribed role is as a ‘conservative corrective’ to both the CDU’s moderate wing and also, prior to the CDU/CSU-Free Democrat coalition losing power in 1998, to the influence of the liberal Free Democrats. However, the real centre of gravity within the party lies at the state level, where the CSU pushes a more aggressively ‘Bavarian’ and ‘nationalist’ agenda (Sutherland 2001: 29). This Bavarian agenda mobilizes around the state’s sense of ‘otherness’ within the Federal Republic as well as resentment at the level of fiscal transfers between rich and poor states. Interestingly, in recent years, Minister-President Edmund Stoiber has reacted to the ongoing Europeanization of policymaking in the Federal Republic by developing a

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‘Bavarian’ position on some of the key areas of the European project as well. The catalyst for this development was the post-1989 transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, and was underpinned by two elements of realpolitik. The first was the need to stabilize the region and enhance Bavaria’s ‘security’, in the face of possible upheaval in Central and Eastern Europe The second element was to use the issue of enlargement to reform of the EU itself and, in particular, constrain what was regarded as Brussels interventionism. Over the course of the 1990s, this discourse developed to the point that it has been described as ‘an anti-interventionist position that has come close at times to UK-style Euroscepticism’ (Jeffery and Collins 1998: 91). However, in later years Stoiber moderated his state’s position on these issues, in order to position himself for his bid to become German Chancellor in 2002. The CDU/CSU is one of the historical architects of European integration. As a result, its position has been the most pro-European of the major parties. At the same time, the party has had to react to public unease about Germany’s position as the paymaster of the Union and a more general sense that Germany should exert more influence within it. The tension between these two positions is clear in the Christian Democrats’ 2002 manifesto (CDU 2000: 64–7). In terms of the benefits of EU membership, the CDU/CSU manifesto made it clear that the EU was a good thing, stating that ‘the unification of Europe is the most valuable legacy of the Twentieth Century’. At the same time, the manifesto argued that the Union had to be ‘more fairly’ financed by reforming the EU’s system of structural funds and reducing the burden on German taxpayers. Germany’s influence within Europe, which the parties argued has waned under the Schröder administration, was also to be enhanced. The manifesto also stressed that the German language—which, it pointed out, is the native tongue for more Europeans than any other language—should be given official status within the Union (see below) (CDU 2000: 64–6). The CDU/CSU’s position on the European institutions was more critical than was the case in the time of Helmut Kohl’s leadership, and closer to the position that Stoiber had spelled out in Bavaria. The manifesto argued that in order to ‘strengthen the legitimacy’ of the institutions, the European Council had to share its legal and budgetary powers with the EP. Moreover, each member state’s share of EP seats should more accurately reflect its population, thus increasing Germany’s share. In addition, as already noted, the manifesto argued that member state budget contributions should be recalculated, based on each nation’s GDP. Finally, the parties’ manifesto argued for a new EU constitution, based on the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which would set out the competences of each tier of governance. The responsibilities of the EU, the document argued, ‘must be clear, transparent, and limited’ (my emphasis) (CDU 2002: 65–6). The euro was mentioned early in the manifesto’s European section, and CDU/CSU took credit for its creation and for the Stability Pact that accompanied it. In contrast to the Social Democrats, the CDU/CSU defended the Stability Pact and argued that the independence of the ECB was all-important (CDU 2002: 64).

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Apart from a segment on the eastward enlargement of the EU there was very little of substantive importance in the CDU/CSU manifesto on either a Common Foreign Policy or Common Defence and Security Policy. However, the segment on enlargement struck a delicate balance between an ‘idealistic’ European discourse (‘enlargement as an historic opportunity’) and a more realist discourse of national interest. In particular, the issue of enlargement was linked to the rights of ethnic Germans in the accession countries, as well as the legacy of those Germans expelled from former German territories following the Second World War (particularly the Sudetenland, Silesia, and East Prussia). Finally, the manifesto defended the system of transitional controls on the movement of labour from accession countries put in place mainly at German behest over the past few years. Thus, to sum up, there was an inherent tension in the CDU/CSU’s position on European issues, as spelt out in their 2002 manifesto. The manifesto made much of the benefits of European integration but balanced this with more assertive passages about the German language, Germany’s representation in the EP, and the rights of ethnic Germans. However, whether this represented a new ‘turn’ in the parties’ position on Europe or was due more to the influence of Stoiber and the CSU in this particular campaign remains to be seen. So, for the time being, the parties’ position on European integration remains firmly at one with the proEuropean consensus.

2.7 THE RIGHT-WING FRINGE PARTIES At the level of national politics in Germany, there are no ‘relevant’ parties to the right of the CDU/CSU. This is the result of what was, and remains, a key strategic aim of the Christian Democrats who, from the Adenauer era onwards, have tried to absorb competitor parties on the political right (Klingemann and Volkens 1992: 190). As a result, although the Christian Democrats are flanked by right-wing parties, these have not posed a serious electoral threat to them at the national level of politics.2 Nevertheless, these right-wing fringe parties—ranging from the populist ‘Schill-party’ through to the extreme right-wing National Democratic Party—remain an irritant within German party politics and their positions on Europe are worthy of note. The most moderate of the flanking parties is the Rule of Law State Offensive Party (Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive, or PRO), also known as the ‘Schill Party’, because it emerged as a vehicle for the populist lawyer Ronald Schill. Schill came to national prominence in the late 1990s as a result of a hard-hitting campaign, based around the themes of law and order and zero tolerance of crime, in his native city-state of Hamburg. From 2000 onwards, the Schill Party made tentative moves to become a political force at the national level but failed to make any impact during the 2002 Bundestag elections. In 2003, Schill lost his post as Interior Minister in Hamburg and was expelled from his own party following a series

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of political scandals. In so far as the party’s current electoral programme has a position on European integration, it is subsumed into a discourse of law and order, centred on domestic politics. No mention is made of the key themes of the benefits of EU membership, EU institutions, the euro, eastward enlargement, etc. In fact, the EU is only mentioned twice in the party’s programme. First, the EU is blamed for imposing an unfair quota of asylum seekers and refugees on Germany following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia (PRO 2003: 120). More constructively, however, it also argues that the EU is the appropriate forum for the resolution of the asylum issue and the agreement of a common policy between European states (PRO 2003: 13). Second, the EU is mentioned as an arena for furthering the interests of Hamburg (PRO 2003: 13). In both of these instances, the tone of the document is one of pragmatism rather than an explicitly ‘pro-European’ one. Beyond specific references to the EU, the idea of ‘European culture’ is mentioned once, but only in terms of denigrating the supposedly nonEuropean culture of the ‘criminal foreigners’ that the party claims are the biggest threat to law and order in Germany (PRO 2003: 20). In addition, Eastern Europe is only mentioned once, in relation to what is seen as the region’s role in the illegal traffic of refugees from the developing world (PRO 2003: 10). Taken in the round, the party’s position on Europe is indistinct but it is certainly not an active supporter of the European project in the way that the Greens, Social Democrats, Free Democrats, and Christian Democrats broadly are. Nevertheless, it is not Eurosceptic either and therefore for taxonomical purposes its position on Europe is probably best classified as being (just) within the Euro-orthodox camp. To the right of the Schill Party is the Republican Party (Die Republikaner). The Republican Party was founded in Munich in 1983 by ex members of the CSU, who had left the party in protest at the decision of its then leader, Franz Josef Strauß, to agree to substantial loans to the East German government. The leadership of the new party was shared between three individuals, Franz Handlos, Ekkehard Voigt, and Franz Schönhuber. The party’s original programme was broadly conservative in tone and, although it argued for Germany to act more in its national interest, essentially pro-EU integration. However, during the 1980s Schönhuber gradually became ascendant within the party, the Republican’s ideological profile shifted further to the right, and its position on Europe became more hostile. The party enjoyed a spate of relatively good electoral performances in the late 1980s but went into decline in the 1990s. In contrast to the Schill Party, the Republicans’ 2002 federal party programme gave a high level of salience to European issues and was deeply hostile to many aspects of the integration project. The document dedicated an entire section, entitled ‘Europe of Fatherlands’, to the question of the EU and stated unequivocally that the party ‘say(s) yes to Europe but no to this EU’ (Republikaner 2002: 10). The programme went on to assert that ‘Europe’s strength lies in its diversity’ and that therefore the EU should be no more than an alliance of sovereign states, in which national law takes precedence over the aquis communautaire. The ‘Christian character’ of Europe (Christlichen Abendlandes) was also put centre stage (Republikaner 2002: 10). Specific proposals included: a

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Charles Lees

referendum on continued membership, a limit on German contributions to the EU budget, the dismantling of much of the EU bureaucracy, the ‘repatriation’ of key policy areas such as agriculture, the blocking of eastern enlargement until the Benes and Bierut decrees are declared null and void, an absolute veto on any future Turkish membership, Germany’s withdrawal from the Eurozone, and the reinstatement of the mark (Republikaner 2002: 10–11). In short, although the Republicans stopped short of advocating that Germany leave the EU in outright terms, the implications of the party’s proposals meant that in practical terms that is exactly what they were proposing. As such, the Republican Party’s position on Europe can be classified as being one of Hard Euroscepticism. Also on the far right of German party politics, the DVU was founded in 1971— again in Munich—by Gerhard Frey. Frey originally intended the DVU to be a cross-party alliance of right-wing conservatives stretching from the right wing of the Christian Democrats to the more extreme right-wing National Democratic Party. Over time, however, Frey transformed the DVU into a party in its own right and moved it to a position clearly to the right of the Christian Democrats. The party’s ideology is at the very least ultraconservative, with a tendency to blame what it would consider to be ‘un-German’ groups (such as foreigners, Jews, or leftwingers) for social problems such as unemployment. Unlike the Republicans, in the party’s 2003 programme, the DVU did not afford a high level of salience to the EU. Nevertheless, in the two sections of the document where it was mentioned the tone was generally hostile. In the first section, called ‘defending German interests’, the party castigated mainstream politicians for trying to dissolve Germany into what it saw as a multinational state (DVU 2003: 2). In addition the party argued that Foreign and Defence policy should remain a prerogative of member states alone. Finally, like the Republicans, the DVU argued for Germany’s withdrawal from the usage of euro and the restoration of the mark (DVU 2003: 2). In the second section, called ‘securing pensions and social provision’, the party argued that German contributions to the EU should be reduced as part of a general programme of withdrawal from Germany’s international financial commitments. In addition, Germany should regain control over agricultural policy and move away from what it called the ‘EU mass production’ model of agriculture (DVU 2003: 4–5). Thus, although the party was far less detailed in its proposals than those put forward by the Republicans, they are essentially the same in spirit in their consequences for Germany’s continued membership of the EU. As a result, its stance on European integration can also be classified as one of Hard Euroscepticism. Finally, at the far right of the party spectrum is the oldest of the extant far right parties, the NPD. The NPD was founded in Hanover in 1964 as result of the collapse of the ultraconservative German Reich Party. It enjoyed some prominence during the economic downturn of the mid-1960s but even then failed to scale the 5 per cent electoral hurdle in the 1965 Bundestag elections. During the 1970s and 1980s, the party operated on the fringe of the German party systems, often in alliance with the DVU. However, in the 1990s, the party underwent a process of radicalization and adopted a new strategy that included extra-parliamentary

Limits of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Germany

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action and developing close links with the skinhead scene and other neo-Nazi milieus. As a result, the Social Democrat–Green Federal government tried unsuccessfully to ban the party. The recent statements of the party’s position on European integration are its two manifestos for the 1999 elections to the EP and the 2002 Bundestag elections. A comparison of the two documents reveals that, with one interesting exception, the party’s position on Europe has remained consistent throughout the period in question. The key themes in both documents were hostility to the euro and to freedom of movement within the EU, both of which the NPD regarded as being against the interests of the German people (NPD 1999, 2002). The party’s 1999 European election programme also promised to stop the Agenda 2000 process and eastward enlargement (NPD 1999: 8), drastically reduce Germany’s budget contributions (NPD 1999: 11), and block any future Turkish membership of the EU (NPD 1999: 12). The interesting difference between the two documents, however, lies in the party’s changing attitude to the idea of a common European defence policy. Both documents were hostile to what the party saw as US imperialism, but whilst the 1999 programme was hostile to European defence co-operation and argued for a repatriation of defence policy (NPD 1999: 11), the 2002 document argued for a European defence alliance as a bulwark against the USA (NPD 2002: 2). This was not a particularly well thought out or detailed proposal and was most probably included to appeal to the rising tide of anti-US feeling in the Federal Republic in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War. Thus, it reveals the opportunistic nature of much of the German far right’s positions on European integration. To sum up, the party’s position on Europe is broadly consistent with that put forward by the Republicans and the DVU. It is opposed to eastward enlargement, and wants to reverse the Schengen provisions for open borders, restrict the movement of member state citizens within the Union, reduce Germany’s contributions to the budget, and withdrawal from the euro. As such, its position on European integration is to all intents and purposes one of Hard Euroscepticism.

2.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Table 2.2 provides a typology of party positions on European integration in the Federal Republic of Germany. The ‘national’ positions of parties are in the enclosed cells. Broadly speaking, the position of the mainstream parties at the national level can be defined as ‘European Consensual’. The one exception to this is the PDS/Left Party, which maintained a Soft Eurosceptic stance in 2002. The national domain is dominated by the European consensus. But at the sub-national or party-faction level one can see some degree of Soft Euroscepticism beyond that of the PDS/Left Party, encompassing elements of the Social Democrats’ left-wing, the ‘national-liberal’ faction within the centrist Free Democrats, parts of the CDU’s right-wing, and the dominant faction in the CSU’s state party organization (led by Minister-President Edmund Stoiber). Finally, a

36

Charles Lees Table 2.2. A typology of party positions on European integration in the Federal Republic of Germany ‘European Consensual’ Greens

‘Soft’ Eurosceptic PDS/Left Party

SPD FDP CDU/CSU∗ (PRO)∗∗

Elements of SPD left National-Liberal FDP Elements of CDU right CSU State Party

‘Hard’ Eurosceptic Republicans DVU NPD

∗

The CDU and CSU are members of a joint parliamentary faction in the Bundestag and are, therefore, effectively a single party at the Federal level.

∗∗

The PRO is in brackets because the lack of salience of the European issue in the party’s programme mean that, for taxonomical purposes, it is classed here as being ‘European consensual’ by default.

third category encompasses the three far right parties, the DVU, the NPD, and the Republican Party. This third category is less important than that of Soft Euroscepticism, because it is made up of the fringe parties of the right which, although they operate within the domain of national politics, are not represented in the Bundestag. Moreover, such is the power of the European consensus in Germany that even these parties stop short of openly advocating Germany’s withdrawal from the EU (although that is the logical consequence of their positions on the key aspects of the integration project). Returning to the ‘national’ parties, in so far as they have ‘positions’ on Europe, they are secondary to, and contingent upon, the parties’ wider ideological profiles. One can see some evidence—the Christian Democrats’ bullish commitment to promoting the German language for instance—that the parties tailored manifesto statements on Europe to popular sentiment, but this is very much at the margins. Moreover, as discussed earlier, broad public support for the EU remains respectable and even recovered a little since the late 1990s. Consequently, none of the parties problematized the issue of Europe per se, but rather adopted a technocratic discourse and concentrate on particular aspects of European integration. Much of these aspects—such as a Common Foreign Policy and a Common Defence and Security Policy—are supported by up to eight out of ten Germans, and it is perhaps no surprise that none of the mainstream parties chose to go against the grain of popular opinion on these issues. But where there are issues, such as trust in EU institutions and support for enlargement, that do seem to generate unease amongst the electorate, the parties’ manifestos became more engaged and detailed in their analysis. Thus, despite being a long way apart on their overall attitudes to European integration, both parties of the left (the PDS/Left Party and Greens) find common ground in a critique of existing institutional arrangements and all the parties argue for greater powers for the EP and—in the case of the Free Democrats—the ECJ as well. The Greens criticize the failure to encourage Turkey’s bid to join the EU and

Limits of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Germany

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the Free Democrats do not support the temporary restraints on the movement of services and labour between the EU (except Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Ireland) and accession countries. Nevertheless, by and large all the parties are broadly in favour of eastward enlargement, despite public misgivings. To sum up, there appear to be limits to the potential impact of party-based Euroscepticism in Germany. There are many reasons for this, including the historical and institutional variables mentioned at the start of this chapter and the pragmatic acceptance that Germany has benefited from ‘real existing integration’. Moreover, as already noted, there have been Eurosceptic ‘turns’ on the part of certain German Länder, but the chances of a coherent Eurosceptical agenda emerging at this level of party politics or governance is remote, not least because of the different levels of economic development between individual states and the fact that they have different economic and political agendas. To conclude, ultimately the failure of party-based Euroscepticism in Germany can be attributed to institutional constraints, the low salience of European issues in public opinion, and the fact that the political centre defines the parameters of the European debate—and, with it, the maintenance of the pro-European consensus. NOTES 1. See, for example, Lees (2000), Scharf (1994), Markovits and Gorski (1993), Kleinert (1992), Hülsberg (1988), Bickerich (1985), Müller (1984), Papadakis (1983), and Mettke 1982. 2. There have been one or two exceptions to this rule at the Land level, such as in West Berlin in 1989 when the relative success of the right-wing Republican Party was mainly at the expense of support for the incumbent CDU–Free Democratic Party coalition. This led to the coalition being replaced by a SDU–Green coalition and the Free Democrats failing to scale the city’s 5 per cent barrier to representation in the city state’s parliament (Lees 2000).

3 Euroscepticism in France, 1992–2002 Gérard Grunberg

3.1 INTRODUCTION In the course of the last decade in France, the European question has become a major political issue and Euroscepticism has increased in public opinion. The French party system was partly altered by the emergence of new parties mainly crusading against ‘Maastricht Europe’. The cleavage between pro- and antiEuropeans appeared to be threatening the dominance of the left/right cleavage in the functioning of the French political system, and Eurosceptic parties made significant electoral gains. The election sequence in the spring of 2002—first the presidential election, then legislative elections—is particularly interesting to examine from this perspective. For Eurosceptic parties, it marked at once their greatest success (presidential election) and their greatest failures (legislative elections). In Section 3.2, we will show how Eurosceptic parties developed, especially in the period initiated by the 1992 Referendum on the ratification of the Treaty on European Union. In Section 3.3 we will show how during the 2002 presidential and legislative elections, the French party system, as it was structured in the late 1970s and early 1980s around the left/right cleavage and as it still functions today, triumphantly resisted the offensive of Eurosceptic parties.

3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROSCEPTIC PARTIES In France, there have been occasions in the past when political leaders and political parties have disagreed, often vehemently, on the question of European integration. That was the case with respect to the proposed European Defence Community throughout the 1950s and with respect to the political conception of the European Community at the beginning of the 1960s, particularly between General de Gaulle and the Christian Democrats. As to the Communist Party (Parti Communist, PC), it was hostile from the outset to a ‘Europe of Capitalists’. But until 1992, European integration was not a major political issue in which French public opinion was significantly engaged. The French seemed to show a ‘façade of acquiescence’, to borrow the phrase used by Annick Percheron in one of the first French studies

Euroscepticism in France, 1992–2002

39

on attitudes with respect to Europe carried out in France (Percheron 1991). But public opinion was not yet developed in this area as the political debate had not really taken shape. European integration had essentially been a matter for technocrats and government officials. In contrast to other countries, there had been no public referendum on adherence to the European Community and French voters had never been consulted on the various phases of European integration, with the exception of the 1972 Referendum on the enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) to the UK, Denmark, and Ireland. That referendum, however, had been reduced by the opposition parties to a domestic political battle between left and right. To be sure, two European elections had taken place, in 1979 and 1984, but Europe as a specific issue of importance in those elections was extremely limited as they had essentially domestic political importance. However, the 1984 elections were marked by the success of the National Front, which obtained 11 per cent of the vote. The success of the slate headed by National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, calling itself the ‘National Opposition Front for a Europe of Nations’, constituted the first significant breach in a party system that since 1962 had been based on the division between left and right. The National Front, in fact, refused to define itself in left/right terms, and the European elections enabled it to make the first attempt use the ‘nationalism–cosmopolitanism’ as a new split able to compete with the left/right cleavage. Still, even if the national dimension was one of the elements that underlay the ideology of the National Front, its success could be explained primarily in terms of the anti-immigrant themes central to its ideology. Since the first political changeover in 1981, which brought the left to power for the first time under the Fifth Republic, the French party system has been a bipolarized multiparty system with two dominant parties and frequent changeovers between the left and the right. On the left, the dominant party is the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, PS), on the right, it is the Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République, RPR). The voting systems in effect are largely responsible for this bipolarization. In the presidential election, only the two leading candidates in the first ballot are eligible to run in the second. In the legislative elections, the two-ballot uninominal majority vote encourages parties to strike up alliances to improve their chances of winning the election. On the left, the communists, the socialists, and the radicals for instance made agreements to withdraw from the second ballot of the legislative elections. On the right, the same occurred between the two major right-wing parties, the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République, RPR) party and the centre-liberal party, the Union for French Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française, UDF). Until 1986, these two major alliances garnered most of the votes cast in legislative elections and nearly all the seats in the National Assembly. Beginning in the 1980s, the sizeable electoral gains made by the National Front (Front National, FN) slightly altered the political lay of the land. Lastly, the main ecologist groups, the Greens (Verts), after attempting in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s not to choose between right and left, decided to rally the left for the 1997 legislative elections.

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How can the positions of the various parties with respect to European issues be explained since the 1981 changeover? Taggart and Szczerbiak have rightly taken into account variables within the political system such as governing parties and parties that are anti-system or outside of the system, as well as core and fringe parties. Such an approach is quite useful (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002a). The first variable of relevance in the French context is the position of a party in relation to being in office. Since de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969, the three parties that have governed France, the Gaullist party first named UDR then rebaptized RPR, the centre-moderate party UDF, and the Socialist Party, as well as the presidents that they have spawned, have all made a decisive contribution to the process of European integration that in 1992 led to the Treaty on European Union. The right and the centre were in power from 1969 to 1981, then from 1986 to 1988; the socialists having governed from 1981 to 1986, then from 1988 to 1993. Between 1986 and 1988, during the first exercise in power-sharing, François Mitterrand, President and true leader of the Socialist Party, and Jacques Chirac, Gaullist Prime Minister and leader of the RPR, together conducted France’s European policy, despite certain disagreements. This alternation between the moderate right and the moderate left thus did not prevent a certain continuity in European policy. Despite the existence of strong anti-European factions or currents within the Gaullist party and the Socialist Party, their main leaders finally made a clear choice to involve their party in the process and dynamics of building Europe. There can therefore be no doubt that the exercise of power during this period, which saw successive enlargements of the European Community, the formation of the single market, and preparation of the Treaty on European Union, played a decisive role in the position of the two main parties which both, for different reasons, one out of Gaullist tradition—the nation first—and the other out of hostility towards the building of a Europe that was primarily a free trade zone nevertheless had certain Eurosceptic tendencies. It was increasingly difficult for a leader who wanted to exercise foremost political responsibilities to appear hostile to building Europe. François Mitterrand had waged a harsh internal battle in 1973 against opponents to capitalist Europe within his own party. Jacques Chirac knew that there were a number of important party figures who were staunchly opposed to any additional loss of national sovereignty, but the question of the state’s power being essential for him, he did not consider a change of tack, all the more so since his party, which had been in the opposition since 1988, could hope to return to power with the legislative elections scheduled for 1993. Moreover, the socialist government policy turnaround of 1983, when it abandoned a plainly socialist orientation, led François Mitterrand to outline an alternative political perspective for his party that was actually in step with his personal convictions. As for Jacques Chirac, who from 1974 to 1976 had been Prime Minister under the very pro-European President Giscard d’Estaing, and whose party’s victory depended on an agreement with the UDF—a party created to back Giscard d’Estaing’s actions and highly supportive of the effort to build the

Euroscepticism in France, 1992–2002

41

European Community—he could not let his party take an anti-European stance, which, moreover, he did not personally wish. As for the Communist Party, it was opposed to greater integration on the basis of a traditional leftist principle hostile to a capitalist and pro-US Europe that would prevent leftist governments from implementing specifically socialist policies. But, as an ally to the socialists, holding government positions from 1981 to 1984, its participation forced it to temper its hostility toward the building of Europe. After it left government, it reiterated its criticisms of European integration, but in a fairly moderate fashion because of election agreements still binding it with the socialists. Finally, due to internal divisions on the left as well as the right and the relative agreement on the basic issue of Europe between François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac, these two leaders preferred to neutralize the theme of Europe in national political debate and so not make it a central issue in the divide between the two major parties. The European question was thus not a significant element in the cleavage between left and right. Euroscepticism on a party level could thus only come from peripheral, anti-system parties or from anti-European factions that had split from the two major parties. On the fringe of the political system, the extreme parties on the left and the right were resolutely hostile to the dynamics of the building of Europe. The Front National, in particular, laid claim to the defence of French identity against the Gaullists. The extreme parties refused—and were not accepted in—the broader electoral alliances. Taking power was not their immediate goal. They had never exercised responsibilities in government. It was therefore in their best interest to try to shatter the consensus that reigned among the major parties. However, in the period leading up to the signature of the Treaty on European Union, the European issue remained conspicuously absent from the French political debate, which focused primarily on the left/right cleavage. It was also the case that the issue of immigration was working to the Front National’s advantage at the polls. The Maastricht Referendum was the catalyst that brought the European issue into the field of major national political controversies (Denni 1993; Duhamel and Grunberg 1993). The consequences of the Maastricht Referendum on the reshuffling of the French party system were as follows. The campaign surrounding the referendum is a decisive moment to examine the way in which the French party system organized and restructured in response to the European issue. The referendum in fact forced each party to take a stand in favour of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. The foundational role played by the 1992 Referendum in the establishment of the European issue as a domestic political issue makes the position taken by the political parties with respect to the Treaty on European Union, and later on the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, an essential criterion for identifying Eurosceptic parties and movements. It is also possible, as suggested by Taggart and Szczerbiak, to rely on the single-issue party criterion as well as on that of opposition to the current direction of the process of European integration (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002a).

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Table 3.1. Eurosceptic parties Political bent Far Left (Trotskyite)

Moderate Left Far Right Sovereignist

Defence of regional identities

Name of organization Lutte Ouvrière (LO) Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR) Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI) later to become Parti des Travailleurs (PT) Communist Party (PC) Front National (FN) Mouvement National Républicain (MEN) Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) later to become Pôle Républicain Mouvement pour la France (MPF) Rassemblement pour la France (RPF) Chasse Pêche Nature Traditions (CPNT)

Creation date 1968 1974 1965 1991 1920 1972 1999 1992 2001 1994 1999 1989

Two types of Eurosceptic parties can be identified—those that came about before the European issue became focal in the public debate and in election campaigns and whose Euroscepticism is not the primary component of their political platform and discourse, and those that were formed more recently as the question of Europe became a salient issue and whose Euroscepticism was one of their founding and central features (Table 3.1).

3.2.1 Old Eurosceptic parties Old Eurosceptic parties are either leftist parties, Trotskyite parties or the Communist Party, or extreme right, the Front National then the National Republican Movement (Mouvement National Républicain, MNR) founded in 1999 when the National Front split for reasons fairly unrelated to the question of Europe. For leftist Eurosceptic parties, it is clear that the European issue is not dominant among the political issue important for the parties. Hostility to European integration is but one of the aspects of anti-capitalism, and not the most important. The far left assails a ‘Europe of Capitalists’, the market economy, and economic liberalism. But it is not specifically the European question that concerns it. The election campaigns of these parties do not make this issue a central campaign theme. These parties are not in the first instance anti-European, but they are anticapitalist. As for the Communist Party, its Euroscepticism toned down considerably as of 1997 when it decided to participate once again in the new socialist government formed when the left won the legislative elections and Lionel Jospin was named Prime Minister. The constraints of the government alliance with the socialists led it to neutralize the European theme as much as possible, since Lionel Jospin, himself against the Treaty of Amsterdam, was obliged to accept it once in power. On the eve of the 2002 presidential election, the Communist Party only

Euroscepticism in France, 1992–2002

43

mentioned the building of Europe in vague and general terms. It demanded a ‘more social’ Europe, but voiced its agreement with Lionel Jospin’s proposals on European construction in 2002. On the far right, the European theme is more central, as these parties advertise and define themselves above all as nationalist parties opposed to supranational institutions and the dilution of the French nation into a cosmopolitan whole. But the themes central to it concern questions of law and order, and above all immigration. Europe, in favouring immigration or in failing to control it adequately, finds its place in the xenophobic and law and order themes of the Front National and the National Republican Movement. The European issue is therefore prominent in their themes, but the importance of immigration and law-and-order issues is even greater.

3.2.2 The new Eurosceptic parties Unlike the previously mentioned ones, some new parties were founded principally on the issue of European integration, in opposition to the federal dynamic that to their minds characterized the direction taken in the building of the Europe Union. These parties grew out of splits from the three major parties, the Socialists, the Gaullists (RPR), and the centre-liberals (UDF), during the period surrounding the 1992 Referendum. The creation and development of these parties were largely encouraged by the very high ‘no’ vote in the Referendum held in September 1992 (49 per cent). The division of France in two demonstrated that there was room in the French political space for a broader and more diversified anti-European political offer. These new Eurosceptic parties can be labelled ‘sovereignist’. The first sovereignist party came out of a split with the Socialist Party. JeanPierre Chevènement, one of the Socialist Party’s historical figures and former Socialist Party Defence Minister, resigned his post in January 1991 over his disagreement with the first Gulf War. In disagreement with the Treaty on European Union, he launched the Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) on 30 August 1992 after leaving the Socialist Party together with his followers. This new party’s platform hinged on defence of the nation and opposition to the relinquishing of sovereign functions that the new treaty implied. The party and its leader conducted an energetic campaign for the ‘no’ vote, defending the idea of a Europe of Nations. The 1994 European elections were this party’s first opportunity to toss their hats in the election ring. It won a fairly disappointing score of 2.6 per cent (Table 3.2). Jean-Pierre Chevènement decided not to run in the 1995 presidential election. In the legislative elections of 1997, allied with the socialists, he garnered 1.1 per cent of the vote. In 1999, while Jean-Pierre Chevènement was Minister of the Interior in a socialist government, he decided not to present his own slate and his associates participated in the socialist slate. However, he resigned again from the government in 2000 in disagreement with government policy on Corsica and he remained very hostile to the manner in which European integration was evolving.

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Table 3.2. Results obtained by Eurosceptic parties and movements between 1994 and 2002 1994 1995 1997 1999 2002 2002 European Presidential Legislative European Presidential Legislative elections election elections elections elections elections Hard Eurosceptic Parties Extreme-left parties Mouvement des Citoyens, later to become Pôle Républicain in 2001 Mouvement pour la France Rassemblement pour la France Front National Mouvement National Républicain Sub-total Soft Eurosceptic Parties Communist Party Chasse Pêche Nature Traditions

2.7 2.5

5.2 —

2.5 1.1

5.2 —

10.5 5.3

2.7 1.2

12.3

5

3.5

—

—

0.4

—

—

—

13

—

0.8

10.5 —

15.5 —

15 —

6 3

16.9 2.3

11.1 1.4

27.3

25.7

22.1

27.2

35

17.6

6.9 4

8.6 —

9.9 —

6.8 7

Sub-Total

10.9

8.6

Total Eurosceptic parties

38.2

34.3

9.9 32

13.8 41

3.4 4.1

4.9 1.6

7.5

6.5

42.5

24.1

He criticized the ‘current pro-capitalist European integration,’ intent on ‘eliminating the national arena in favour of regional interests’. He decried the ‘submission’ of Europe to the logic of the financial markets (Maastricht Referendum) and announced that he was ‘firmly in favour of the construction of a Europe of Nations stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals’. The Mouvement des Citoyens walked out on the plural left after the municipal elections in 2001, and in January 2002, the Pôle Républicain was founded to back Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s bid for the presidency. From this point on, the leader clearly rejected the left/right cleavage. His new party attracted Eurosceptics from both left and right. On the right, the RPR, whose Gaullist tradition favours a Europe of Nations, could not help but be unsettled by the 1992 Referendum campaign. Deep divisions soon appeared. Nearly half of the RPR group in the National Assembly followed Philippe Seguin, the leader of the fraction in favour of the ‘no’ vote. In order to resolve the crisis, Jacques Chirac, President of the RPR, left the RPR deputies free to choose their vote and declared before party leaders (Denni 1993) that he would—in a personal capacity—vote with the ayes ‘after careful consideration, without enthusiasm but without reservation’. Philippe Seguin and Charles Pasqua, another influential RPR leader, established the ‘rally for opposition to the referendum’ movement, joined by one of the deputies of the UDF, Philippe de Villiers.

Euroscepticism in France, 1992–2002

45

In the aftermath of the anti-Maastricht campaign of 1992, Philippe de Villiers left the UDF and headed up a slate in the 1994 European elections entitled ‘Majority for a different Europe’, which obtained the very sizeable percentage of 12 per cent of the vote. In November of the same year, de Villiers launched a new movement referred to as Mouvement pour la France. This was the second political movement centred on the specific issue of sovereignty. His project was stated as follows: ‘The MPF will work toward a freely cooperative Europe resolutely turning its back on federalism. Our people, our nation will keep the franc, symbol of our sovereignty and our freedom, rejecting the utopia of the single currency.’ In the 1999 European elections, Charles Pasqua, who had finally left the RPR, and Philippe de Villiers, joined forces and headed up the Rassemblement pour la France slate and obtained 13 per cent, exceeding the RPR list which obtained only 12 per cent. At the same time, the UDF had a highly pro-European electoral slate that took in 9 per cent. From then on, the right was seriously divided on the European issue. In November 1999, de Villiers and Pasqua formed a new political movement, the Rassemblement pour la France. This movement ‘has as its goal to unite the French around the principles that follow from national sovereignty’. They claimed to perpetuate General de Gaulle’s legacy, adopting his statement: ‘There is a twenty-fold secular pact between France’s greatness and freedom in the world.’ Last, we must mention the birth of a new political movement during this period, a movement created for the 1989 European elections. An electoral list called ‘Chasse Pêche Traditions’ (Hunting Fishing Traditions) rose up to defend the French identity and rural way of life, opposing directives from Brussels. This movement obtained a quite respectable 4 per cent of the vote in these elections. In September 1989, the ‘Chasse Pêche Nature Traditions’ (CPNT—Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Traditions) Association was established. This association was created for the express purpose of voicing its views with respect to the European issue and considered itself to be a reaction ‘against a Europe dismissive of regional identities’. It came out in favour of a Europe ‘in the service of citizens’ and claimed a politics of ‘good life and well-being’. This movement, which does not view itself as a political party in the true sense, can nevertheless be classified as a Eurosceptic party. Not only does it field candidates in the various types of elections, but its founding programme also stipulates that ‘the building of Europe is the reason for which it solicits and will solicit your vote’. In the 1994 European elections, it again obtained four percentage points. In the 1999 European elections, the movement attained 7 per cent, equal to the vote obtained by the French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français, PCF).

3.2.3 Hard and Soft Euroscepticism Employing the useful distinction established by Taggart and Szczerbiak between Hard and Soft Euroscepticism, we can classify among the Hard Eurosceptic parties the extreme-left and extreme-right parties that are resolutely hostile to European

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Gérard Grunberg

integration for different reasons, and the three new Eurosceptic parties that are hostile to the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties as well as the euro. All these parties rejected the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties as well as the single currency (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002a). On the other hand, the Communist Party and the CPNT seem to be more inclined toward Soft Euroscepticism. With the Communist Party one needs to consider the dynamics of political movements and particularly the central aspect of political alliances. To be sure, the PCF came out against the Maastricht Treaty but once they returned to power with the socialists from 1997 to 2002, they no longer came out as such an ardent opponent to the building of Europe. The CPNT campaigns for a Europe that better respects regional identities and autonomy vis-à-vis the power in Brussels. The movement was, to be sure, created mainly to reorient the course of European integration, but its programme begins with the following statement: ‘Europe exists, we recognize the fact.’ It therefore does not seem to warrant being classified among the Hard Eurosceptic parties (see Table 3.2).

3.3 THE 2002 ELECTIONS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE LEFT/RIGHT CLEAVAGE AND THE FAILURE OF EUROSCEPTIC PARTIES The first ballot of the 2002 presidential election saw both the highest cumulated scores for Eurosceptic parties and a weakening of the left/right cleavage, particularly with the elimination of the socialist candidate and the qualification of Le Pen, the Front National leader, in the second ballot (Table 3.3). Yet if we examine the entire electoral period, we notice, on the contrary, that the Eurosceptic parties did not manage to break the mould of the French party system, and the left/right cleavage does not run the risk of being replaced by a political cleavage centred on Europe. Several reasons can explain this failure of Eurosceptic parties or rather of Euroscepticism as a political current, reasons having to do with the various factors the solidity of the left/right cleavage is based on.

3.3.1 Central parties versus peripheral parties In 2002, as they had done for the previous election, the two major left-wing and right-wing coalitions decided to neutralize the European theme in their campaigns and not structure the debate over Europe as one of the elements of the left/right cleavage. Thus, only Eurosceptic parties could wage the battle on these issues. But these parties are numerous, politically dispersed, and fairly weak at the polls compared to the two major central blocs (the moderate left and the moderate right). The highest scores for Eurosceptic parties were won by the extreme right and the extreme left in the first ballot of the presidential election, 10.5 per cent for the Trotskyite parties and 19.2 per cent for the extreme-right parties (Table 3.3). Since the RPF did not field a candidate for reasons we shall

Table 3.3. 2002 elections results Party system

Party

2002 Presidential election— First ballot Candidates

Far Left

Moderate Left

Sovereignist Moderate Right

Sovereignist

Far Right

Lutte Ouvrière (LO)∗∗ Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR)∗∗ Parti des Travailleurs (PT)∗∗ Socialist Party (PS) Communist Party (PC)∗ Verts Radical Other Left Pôle Républicain∗∗ Union Pour Un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) former RPR Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) Démocratie Libérale (DL) Other Right Mouvement pour la France (MPF)∗∗ Rassemblement pour la France (RPF)∗∗ Chasse Pêche Nature Traditions (CPNT)∗ Front National (FN)∗∗ Mouvement National Républicain (MEN)∗∗

Other Total Eurosceptic candidate and parties ∗ Soft Eurosceptic parties ∗∗ Hard Eurosceptic parties

Votes

Laguiller Besancenot Gluckstein Jospin Hue Mamère Taubira

5.7 4.3 0.5 16.2 3.4 5.3 2.3

Chevènement Chirac

5.3 19.9

Bayrou Madelin Boutin —

Saint-Josse Le Pen Mégret Lepage

2002 Presidential election— Second ballot

2002 Legislative elections— First ballot

Votes

Votes

82.2

1.2 1.2 0.3 23.8 4.9 4.4 1.5 1.4 1.2 33.4

6.8 3.9 1.2 —

—

4.1 16.9 2.3 1.9

— 17.8 — —

42.5

100

4.8 0.4 3.9 0.4 0.8 1.6 11.1 1.4 2.3 24.1

48

Gérard Grunberg Table 3.4. Presidential vote according to attitude towards French membership in Europe The fact France belongs to the European Union is:

Vote for President— First ballot

Vote for President— Second ballot

Eurosceptic candidates

Other candidates

Le Pen

A bad thing Neither good nor bad A good thing

78 60 33

22 40 67

60 32 8

Total

43

57

18

see below, Chevènement’s Pôle Républicain only garnered 5.3 per cent of the votes cast. The very evening of the first ballot of the presidential election, the fate of the sovereignist parties seemed practically sealed.

3.3.2 The lack of saliency of the European theme According to Eurobarometer 58 (2002), 52 per cent of the French feel that France’s membership in Europe is a good thing, 12 per cent believe France’s membership in Europe is a bad thing, and 32 per cent think that France’s membership in Europe is neither good nor bad. In the French election survey conducted in 2002, the percentages were slightly different, 63 per cent, 6 per cent, and 31 per cent, respectively. If opinions toward the building of Europe are taken as an indicator of Euroscepticism, a strong correlation appears between the degree of voter Euroscepticism and their votes for Eurosceptic parties—78 per cent of Hard Eurosceptic voters cast their ballot in favour of Eurosceptic candidates, compared to 60 per cent of Soft Eurosceptic voters and 33 per cent of nonEurosceptic voters. In the second ballot of the presidential election, with Jacques Chirac running against Jean-Marie Le Pen, these proportions were 60 per cent, 32 per cent, and 8 per cent, respectively (Table 3.4). These findings could lead us to assume that the European issue played an important role in the 2002 presidential election. This hypothesis, however, is not borne out. In fact, whether concerning Eurosceptic party candidates or Eurosceptic voters, the European issue does not seem to have played a major role in this election. In the first ballot of the last presidential election, the European issue was not particularly salient in the campaign for various reasons. Like the RPF, the MPF did not field a candidate, for reasons we will come to shortly. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, caught off guard by the successful introduction of the euro in France, against which he wanted to base his campaign, focused above all on the themes of the authority of the State and the unity of the French Republic. On the far left, the Communist Party hardly addressed the

Euroscepticism in France, 1992–2002

49

issue. Neither did the Trotskyite candidates, but they instead gave priority to the general theme of combating economic liberalism. Thus, only the far right parties focused on the matter, all the while emphasizing issues of law and order and the fight against crime. Saint-Josse, the CPNT candidate, mainly stressed respect for regional traditions and the problem of the imbalance between rural areas and the city, simply calling for the creation of a ‘Europe of differences’. In any event, he was a relatively marginal candidate whose campaign did not attract wide attention. Still, the presence of Le Pen in the second ballot could have provided the opportunity to develop the issue in the campaign between the two rounds of the election. But Jacques Chirac refused to debate him, finding it adequate to embody the defence of democratic values against intolerance, and Le Pen was unable to develop the theme in his campaign because of this. The entire system operated in favour of Jacques Chirac, who transformed the second ballot into a referendum on democracy—82 per cent of the votes cast went to the incumbent president. During the legislative elections, it was even less possible for the debate to focus on the opposition between Eurosceptic parties and the remaining parties. It all went off as a classic left–right confrontation. Europe as an issue was virtually absent from the campaign. Thus, while a number of Eurosceptic candidates and parties took part in the 2002 elections, they were unable or unwilling to turn the European question into a salient issue. Hence Europe was a marginal issue in these decisive elections. If the question of Europe was hardly salient in the parties’ campaigns, it was even less so in voter motivations, as we can see on examination of Table 3.5. Out of the twelve concerns tested, we have taken five for purposes of Table 3.5. The percentages correspond to voters having cited the motivation in question as among the three main motivations behind his or her vote. It should be noted first of all that, with the exception of communist voters, crime is the dominant issue Table 3.5. Saliency of European issue in voter motivations in the 2002 Presidential election∗ Vote for President, first ballot, for Eurosceptic candidates

Far left Communist Party Pôle Républicain/ Mouvement des Citoyens CPNT Far right All votes cast

Motivations for vote Immigration

Crime

Social inequality

European construction

National sovereignty

9 8 15

53 32 67

56 78 40

8 8 13

2 2 7

11 66 22

51 71 59

31 19 41

14 3 14

9 14 5

∗ Person questioned must give three main motivations out of twelve possible CEVIPOF–CIDSP Survey 2002

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Gérard Grunberg

in all voting groups. Immigration is dominant with far right voters and inequality among communist and far left voters. In contrast, motivations relating to European construction and national sovereignty have limited saliency. These surpass 10 per cent among the CPNT and Chevènement constituencies with respect to the question of European construction and among far right electors in relation to the question of national sovereignty. While not entirely insignificant, the salience of Euroscepticism in the presidential vote is therefore low. This table shows that the left/right cleavage remains alive and well among the voters for the various Eurosceptic parties. Extreme-right voters are first of all worried about matters of immigration and crime, those of the extreme-left and the Communist Party by issues of social inequality. Even more importantly, regarding the various dimensions of the European question, the left/right cleavage is also highly prominent (Tables 3.6 and 3.7). Table 3.6 shows the degree of Euroscepticism of various constituencies in the presidential election measured according to four indicators of Euroscepticism. Generally speaking, the constituencies of Eurosceptic candidates are more Eurosceptic than those of other candidates, with the exception of voters supporting Jean-Pierre Chevènement who are significantly less Eurosceptic than the average. Thus, there exists a discrepancy between the strong Euroscepticism of Jean-Pierre Chevènement and the weak Euroscepticism of his voters. Still, save for this exception, there exists a quite significant correspondence between the candidates and those voting for them with respect to Euroscepticism. However, the various voter groups are not aligned in the same manner according to the four indicators employed, with the exception of far right voters, who are consistently the most Eurosceptic. CPNT voters, close to supporters of the far right on some issues, can be distinguished by a lesser degree of hostility to France’s membership in the European Union. This can be explained by the fact that such voters, favourable to a Europe of Regions, are hostile above all to the process of European integration rather than hostile to Europe itself. Communist electors are fairly strongly Eurosceptic and are thus out of step with the Soft Euroscepticism of the Communist Party. However, it should be noted that these voters do not feel ‘just French’, in contrast to far right and CPNT voters. To a lesser extent, this is likewise the case of far left voters, also strongly Eurosceptic. One can therefore assume that leftist Euroscepticism, which goes hand in hand with an age-old internationalist tradition, can be distinguished from right-wing Euroscepticism. Table 3.7 confirms this hypothesis. Voters supporting Eurosceptic candidates of the far right and the CPNT share fears to a much greater extent than supporters of the MDC, the far left, and above all the communists, aroused by European integration, with one noteworthy exception. This exception is the fear of weakening of the social protection system. Here, we have the traditional fears of the left with respect to a Europe of economic liberalism. Left-wing and right-wing Euroscepticism are hence not similar. On the right, the concern is above all with the loss of national identity and increased immigration, whereas on the left it is the consequences of economic liberalization on the welfare state.

Table 3.6. Attitudes of the French in regard to Europe according to voting in the first ballot of the 2002 Presidential election Vote for President in first ballot

France’s membership in Europe is a bad thing

France’s membership in Europe is neither good nor bad

Subtotal: France’s membership in Europe is a bad thing or neither good nor bad

The replacement of the franc by the euro has had a very or mostly negative effect

Feels just French

Relieved or indifferent if the EU disappeared

17 9 5 5 5 2 2

47 40 37 35 30 23 18

64 49 42 40 35 25 20

55 35 42 45 31 28 22

55 12 31 47 12 18 21

71 48 61 71 32 37 28

6

31

37

39

34

52

Far Right Communist Party Far Left CPNT Pôle Républicain Centre Right Centre Left and Greens Total Source: CEVIPOF–CIDSP Survey 2002.

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Gérard Grunberg

Table 3.7. Fears generated by European integration according to vote in the first ballot of the 2002 Presidential election Vote for President— first ballot

Fears generated by the EU France pays for the other countries

Less social protection

Loss of identity

Less important role for France in world affairs

Increase in immigration

Far Right PC Far Left CPNT MDC Centre Right Centre Left and Greens

77 31 55 63 51 48 34

75 87 78 65 72 59 72

71 39 52 67 55 48 34

46 31 30 42 39 32 24

92 14 42 65 46 54 31

Total

51

69

50

33

52

Source: CEVIPOF–CIDSP Survey 2002.

These data show that a single Eurosceptic party is incapable of representing the Euroscepticism felt by the electorate, given its internal political heterogeneity. The various Eurosceptic parties cannot possibly join forces precisely because of this heterogeneity. The clearest test of this phenomenon appears from observing transfers of votes from the first to the second ballot of the presidential election (Table 3.8). In the second ballot, between 63 per cent and 79 per cent of the voters for Eurosceptic candidates voted for Jacques Chirac, hence for a non-Eurosceptic candidate, and only between 3 per cent and 7 per cent for the Eurosceptic candidate embodied by Le Pen. The Front National is primarily perceived by voters as a xenophobic party that holds values contrary to values of the republic, not as an anti-European party. In the second ballot of the presidential election, only those voters who are also xenophobic voted for Le Pen. The FN is too widely perceived as an extreme-right party to be in a position to represent the full spectrum of Eurosceptic sentiment in the second ballot. Table 3.8. Vote transfers between the first ballot of the Presidential election and the second ballot of the 2002 Presidential election Vote in the first ballot

Laguiller Besancenot Hue Chevènement Saint-Josse

Vote in the 2002 Presidential election—second ballot Chirac

Le Pen

Abstention

63 76 79 70 77

4 6 7 3 16

33 18 14 27 7

Euroscepticism in France, 1992–2002

53

The prominence of the left/right cleavage, the rejection of the Front National, and last, the lack of saliency of the European issue in the decisive national elections that are the legislative elections explains why Eurosceptic parties were eliminated in the first ballot of the legislative elections (Table 3.9). Voters for leftist Eurosceptic parties or those that grew out of the left, such as Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s Pôle Républicain, who voted in the legislative elections voted for a party on the moderate left. If Le Pen voters are the only ones to have on the whole remained faithful to his Front National party, one-quarter of them nevertheless voted for the moderate right in the legislative elections. And over one-third of the voters for Saint-Josse (CPNT) cast their ballot for the left or the moderate right in the legislative elections. Finally, Eurosceptic parties, which had garnered 42.5 per cent of the votes in the first ballot of the presidential election, only scored 24.1 per cent of them in the first ballot of the legislative elections, in other words less than the previous legislative elections. Half of the votes won by Eurosceptic parties in the first ballot of the legislative elections went to extreme-right parties. Only the Front National, although weakened with respect to the presidential election, retained a significant electorate. However, Eurosceptic parties had made an exceptional effort to be represented in the largest possible number of constituencies (577). All these parties were represented in at least 400 constituencies each, with the exception of the MPF (285) and the RPF (80).

3.3.3 The effect of election laws and rules on the failure of Eurosceptic parties Table 3.2 demonstrates that certain elections or certain voting rounds are more favourable than others to protest parties or fringe parties. This is the case, in the first instance, with the European parliamentary elections and, further, the first ballot of the presidential election. The European parliamentary elections, in addition to the fact that the stakes involved are by definition European, are held using a system of proportional voting with each nation constituting its own voting district. They present an opportunity for new or fringe parties to emerge and obtain meaningful results (Perrineau, Grunberg, and Ysmal 2002). The first ballot of the presidential election (above all in 2002, when it appeared as a foregone conclusion that Lionel Jospin and Jacques Chirac would face each other in the second ballot) functions somewhat like a proportional voting system, with the nation being the sole voting district, and voters see therein an opportunity to voice a protest against the system, especially after a period of power-sharing. The candidates still must be able to assume non-reimbursement of their election expenditures by the State if they garner less than 5 per cent of the ballots cast. They must also obtain the sponsorship of 500 elected officials required to get on the ballot. This dual constraint prevented Jean-Pierre Chevènement from running in 1995 and, to some extent, Charles Pasqua and Philippe de Villiers in 2002. Even

Table 3.9. Vote transfers between the first ballot of the Presidential election and the first ballot of the 2002 legislative elections 2002 Presidential vote—first ballot Laguiller Besancenot Chevènement Saint-Josse Le Pen

Vote in the 2002 legislative elections—first ballot Extreme-left

Moderate-left

Pôle Républicain

Moderate-right

CPNT

Extreme-right

Other and no answers

28 18 0 0 0

52 50 44 21 7

0 0 17 0 0

11 21 29 16 25

0 0 0 43 7

2 0 2 14 58

7 11 8 6 3

Source: CEVIPOF–CIDSP Survey 2002.

Euroscepticism in France, 1992–2002

55

Jean-Marie Le Pen himself appears to have had trouble obtaining the required 500 signatures in 2002. However, the legislative elections are those that present the most serious handicap for parties that are not willing to go along with the two major political coalitions. They usually have neither incumbents up for re-election nor the ability to field candidates in all districts (577). Their candidates are unknown to the voters. Lastly, and above all, the methods used for parliamentary and presidential elections are characterized by the majority principle in two ballots. The second ballot of the presidential election pits the two leading candidates in the first ballot against each other. A national sovereignty candidate (used here in the broadest sense—pro-sovereignty, nationalist, anti-federalist regionalist) would therefore have to succeed as one of the two candidates taking part in the second ballot, which is extremely difficult—but not impossible. In parliamentary elections, at least 12.5 per cent of registered voters must cast their vote for a candidate to make the second ballot, that is, approximately 18 per cent of the actual vote. The consequence of this rule is that these parties are generally absent from the second ballot and cannot therefore win seats. The sole exception has been the FN. When, exceptionally, Eurosceptic parties are present in the second ballot, being isolated from one another due to their various positions on the left–right axis and being rejected by the major left-wing and moderate-right parties, they cannot benefit from electoral alliances in the second ballot that, when other candidates step down, might perhaps have enabled them to get candidates elected. This is why, in the second ballot of the 2002 legislative elections, Eurosceptic parties had no representatives elected apart from some rare exceptions involving the RPF and the MPF. With the outcome of these elections, the situation of Eurosceptic parties seems to differ depending on whether they are parties that can be situated on the left– right axis (extreme left, extreme right, and the Communist Party) or sovereignist parties (RPF, MPF, and Pôle Républicain) that attempted to break away from the left/right cleavage. The former are probably in a position to make a comeback and rally a large number of votes—except for the Communist Party, which is on an irremediable decline—in the local elections (in particular the regional elections) and European elections in 2004. The same is probably true of the CPNT for other reasons having to do with its regionalist discourse and regional base. However, the future of sovereignist parties seems compromised indeed. Their failure illustrates the great difficulty a party has of escaping the logic of the left/right cleavage. Thus, in the year 2000, several months after its establishment, the RPF underwent a split with the departure of Philippe de Villiers. This split was largely owing to internal power struggles, but also corresponded to differences in strategy. Pasqua was intent on emphasizing a policy of neither left nor right whereas de Villiers wanted the movement to position itself to the right of the right, and this implied that he was not excluding the possibility of an accommodation with the major centre right parties. This split, exacerbated by corruption and illegal financing scandals within the RPF and the threat of judicial proceedings looming over Pasqua, has managed to deprive the movement of any credibility or future prospects. By the same token,

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the demise of the Pôle Républicain in January 2003, which was replaced by the Mouvement Républicain et Citoyen in March of the same year (for the moment a ghost party) was due to the impossibility of having leftist sovereignists and rightist sovereignists coexist within the same organization after its disastrous show at the polls in the legislative elections. Finally, the demise of the Pôle Républicain and the RPF as mergers of Eurosceptic currents that grew out of the moderate right illustrates the inability Eurosceptic parties have of escaping the left/right cleavage.

3.4 CONCLUSION The development and current situation of Eurosceptic parties in France are very closely linked to the way the party system is structured in this country. It is a multiparty system bipolarized into two dominant parties, the Socialist Party and the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), successor to the Rassemblement pour la République in 2002. These two coalitions have alternated turns in power several times since 1981. The stand adopted by the political parties on the European question is strongly related to their position within the political system and the evolution of such position. The major-leftist and moderate-right parties cannot adopt Eurosceptic positions because throughout the entire period they have been actors in the forefront of the building of Europe and because they exercise or will again exercise governmental responsibilities. As a result, given the various positions existing within both the major coalitions on the left and on the right as well as with their constituents, the major parties neutralized the European issue so as not to allow a new political division to weaken the left/right cleavage, which organizes to their advantage the functioning of the French political system. Eurosceptic parties can therefore only be peripheral parties on the left and the right (extreme left and extreme right) or parties born out of splits from the majorleft and moderate-right parties. The peripheral parties indeed adopted Eurosceptic positions. But the left/right cleavage also applies to Eurosceptic peripheral parties. They cannot agree on either their other ideas or their platforms, or even on their criticisms of the way Europe is built. Furthermore, the main Eurosceptic party in terms of the size of its electorate, the Front National, is, due to its xenophobic and authoritarian ideas, rejected by all the other parties and their voters. It therefore cannot rally enough Eurosceptic voters, even if it represents a genuine political force that is likely to last. The 1992 Maastricht Referendum created conditions for the founding of three new Eurosceptic parties, parties that define themselves first and foremost by their ‘sovereignist’ ideas. But they too are subject to the constraints of the left/right cleavage. The 2002 elections were disastrous for them for two different types of reasons; first, the difficult cohabitation within the same organization of those who totally reject the left/right cleavage and those who accept it in part; second, their very low scores. Moreover, these Eurosceptic parties were victims of another handicap, also tied to the importance of the left/right cleavage: the low level of

Euroscepticism in France, 1992–2002

57

saliency of European issues during politically decisive elections, the second ballot of the presidential election and the legislative elections. Finally, to that is added a fundamental handicap for all Eurosceptic parties, which is the two-ballot uninominal majority voting system used in the legislative elections. Barring the occasional exception, this system does not allow these parties to remain in the running in the second ballot of these elections and, even if they do, to get their candidates elected. One can conclude from all the above-mentioned observations that the nation– Europe division, while it has undeniably taken on growing importance with the appearance of new parties positioning themselves primarily in relation to this division and having enjoyed some success, cannot in the foreseeable future replace, or even pose a serious threat, to the left/right cleavage. Neither of the two main parties wishes to position itself as either a ‘sovereignist’ or federalist party, and none of the other parties, aligned with them—the UDF and Liberal Democracy on the right, the Greens and even the Communist Party on the left—is intent on breaking with its coalition partners on the European issue. It is, moreover, very unlikely that the extreme left, whatever its possible advances, can take political and electoral control of the left, however weakened the Socialist Party may be today. As for the Front National, the only powerful Eurosceptic party, it is just as unlikely to realize its dream of gaining ascendancy over the Gaullist party. Though it is true that the issue of sovereignty has taken on increasing relevance both in public policy debate and in the evolution of the party system over the last twenty years, party Euroscepticism has not been able to break the mould of the French party system. The political cycle initiated with the referendum in 1992 drew to a close in 2002 with the failure of Eurosceptic parties. A possible referendum on the ratification of European Union institutions may start a new cycle. The Socialist Party, in the opposition today, might then be tempted by a Eurosceptic discourse. But it would run considerable risks from the point of view of its governmental credibility if it yielded to this temptation.

4 Euroscepticism in Italy∗ Lucia Quaglia

4.1 INTRODUCTION With the second government of Silvio Berlusconi, developments concerning the European Union (EU) policy of the Italian government pushed the issue of Euroscepticism in Italy into the limelight. In the past, any reference to ‘Italian Euroscepticism’ would have been regarded as an oxymoron, given that Italian elites, political parties, and public opinion alike had traditionally been ‘proEuropean’, meaning pro-EU and in favour of European integration. With the appointment of the second Berlusconi government in May 2001—even though some signals had already emerged during the first Berlusconi government in 1994—Eurosceptic attitudes, at times translated into policies, appeared at the governmental level for the first time in post-war Italy. This chapter sheds light on the evolution of Italy’s EU policy and on the interaction between Italian domestic politics and EU policymaking by examining partybased Euroscepticism in Italy and focusing on the three main parties of the centreright coalition currently in office. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002b) argue that in analysing Euroscepticism in both member states and candidate countries three components should be taken into account: (1) levels of public Euroscepticism; (2) party-based Euroscepticism; and (3) Eurosceptical policy outcomes. This chapter briefly mentions point 1 and elaborates points 2 and 3. From a methodological point of view, this chapter analyses two sets of questions. Firstly, when, how, and why do parties of government move towards or away from Euroscepticism? (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001) Secondly, when, how, and why do Eurosceptic attitudes of parties of government result in Eurosceptic policies? The empirical part of this chapter mainly focuses on Forza Italia, the National Alliance, and the Northern League during the period 1994–2002 as in the parties of the right that Euroscepticism has mainly emerged in recent years. Euroscepticism in Italy has been surfacing on the centre-right of the political spectrum since the mid-1990s and, indeed, this is where the majority of criticisms of the EU are to be found in Italian politics. This assessment does not overlook the fact that on the left of the political spectrum the Communist Refoundation has also criticized the EU from time to time, as mentioned in Section 4.2. However, while there is a question mark over the Eurosceptic tendencies of the Communist

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Refoundation, and which are mentioned in Section 4.2, Eurosceptic tendencies are clearly articulated amongst certain centre-right parties. This work adopts the definition of Euroscepticism put forward by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) and distinguishes between ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Euroscepticism. According to the authors: [H]ard Euroscepticism is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived. Soft Euroscepticism is where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU trajectory.

Taggart and Szczerbiak identify these two forms of Euroscepticism as poles on a spectrum with some parties moving between them.1 The overall argument of this piece of research is that despite the remarkable changes that the Italian political system underwent in the 1990s, the pro-European attitudes of Italian public opinion remained strong, whereas Eurosceptic positions surfaced amongst centre-right political parties. The caveat is that this trend was not uniform. On the one hand, the Northern League’s embracing of Soft—and, increasingly, Hard—Eurosceptiscism is purely an electoral strategy with very few roots in the ideological base of the party and with seemingly little consensus amongst its supporters. On the other hand, the National Alliance’s abandonment of its past Soft Euroscepticism is part of a broader top-down ‘rehabilitation’ strategy, which, however, tends to clash with the ideological platform of the party and is hardly shared by its supporters. Forza Italia’s stance is very fluid because it is a large party, its electorate is composite and regionally distributed, the ideological platform is rather vague and, most importantly, the position of its leaders on EU issues is still unclear. It is also argued that under the Berlusconi governments, the bipartisan approach that defined Italy’s EU policy from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s came to an end, or, at least, it was seriously questioned. This emerging pattern bears some resemblance to what happened in the 1960s, when Italy’s EU policy was not bipartisan since it was a bone of contention between the governing parties and the opposition party, the Italian Communist Party. At that time, two key foreign policy choices for Italy, namely North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Commission (EC) membership, were ‘shelters’ that allowed the Italian governing class to concentrate on its domestic politics. Seen from this perspective, foreign policy issues in Italy were essentially symbolic and made reference to domestic issues (Vannicelli 1974). This chapter concludes that a ‘politicization’ of Italy’s EU policy is (again) under way. The main caveat is that Euroscepticism in Italy, as elsewhere, needs to be contextualized. In relative terms it still is a minor phenomenon, as compared to other countries, and this chapter deliberately looked at it with a magnifying glass, so as

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to analyse its main components and determinants. It is therefore important not to lose sight of the broader European picture. This chapter is structured in the following way. Section 4.2 presents some data concerning Italian attitudes towards European integration. It also outlines the main changes that took place in the Italian political system over the 1990s as well as the electoral results in the same period. Sections 4.3–4.5 cover the three main political parties chosen as case studies respectively. Section 4.6 analyses the material provided in Sections 4.3–4.5. Section 4.7 discusses the main features of the EU policy of the Berlusconi governments. Section 4.8 concludes the chapter.

4.2 THE CONTEXT OF ‘EUROPE’ IN ITALY: BACKGROUND INFORMATION This section briefly discusses the evolution of Italian attitudes towards the EU. It also outlines the main changes that took place in the Italian political system in the 1990s and gives an account of the electoral developments in this period. It is argued that Italian support for European integration remained strong, despite the remarkable transformation of the domestic political environment. The vast majority of Italian public opinion has generally supported the process of European integration over time, as shown by the Eurobarometer data. For example, in 2002 in a survey concerning the ‘Support for European integration’, 64 per cent of the Italian sampled thought that membership of the EU was a ‘good thing’, as compared to 54 per cent of the EU average respondents. In a survey concerning the ‘Perception of European and national identity’ amongst EU citizens, 5 per cent of the Italians sampled mentioned only their European identity (and not their national one), 69 per cent referred to their national and European identities. Only 25 per cent of the people in the sample mentioned their national identity only. In the EU, 15 on average 41 per cent of the people sampled referred to their national identity only (Eurobarometer 2001). In the past, Italian mainstream political parties have mirrored the widespread support of their electorate for European integration. To be sure, this happened from the 1970s onwards, when the Italian Communist Party came closer to the government area and Italy’s EU policy became bipartisan—up to a point.2 In the earlier period, the Communist Party, mainly for ideological reasons, had displayed hostile attitudes towards the European Economic Community (EEC) and Italian membership of it (Vannicelli 1974). On the one hand, this shift suggests an interesting comparison with the process undergone by the National Alliance during the 1990s. On the other hand, it contrasts with the experience of the Northern League during the same period. Both these trends are discussed in the following sections. It should also be noted that, Communist Refoundation, one of the two successors of the former Italian Communist Party, has some Eurosceptic tendencies, especially, if compared to the overtly pro-European party, the Democratic Left, which incorporated the bulk of the former Communist Party when it was

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dismantled in 1990. Ideologically staunchly committed to its communist past, Communist Refoundation strikes a respondent chord amongst workers, intellectuals, and young people. It has an extreme and a moderate wing (Koff and Koff 2000). The electoral fortune of the party peaked in 1996, when it had 8.6 per cent votes, and, although it did not enter the government, it was an essential part of the parliamentary majority. Such a crucial position was used by Communist Refoundation to force the hand of the Prodi government on issues perceived as politically salient for the party, such as the 35-hour working week. The uncooperative conduct of the party in the 2001 general elections is widely regarded as one of the main factors that led to the defeat of the centre-left coalition. The party statute, as well as other documents, such as press releases, criticize the macroeconomic rules of the EU for their rigidity, their limited concern for economic growth, and, above all, their emphasis on neo-liberal values.3 These views have been reflected in the attitudes of party officials (Interview with a party official, 23 July 2003, Rome). The statute goes as far as arguing that the economic determinist logic of the EU will endanger the process of European integration.4 At the same time, the limited political capacity of the EU and the political weakness of the European construction are pointed out, calling for a ‘united Europe’, which is also seen as a way to counterbalance US power. The transformation of the Italian Communist Party was one of the several transformations that the Italian political system underwent during the 1990s and which culminated with the so-called end of the First Republic. These changes concerned the electoral system, political parties and their ‘elites’, and the party system. In 1993, there was the reform of the Italian electoral system that became majoritarian ‘first-past-the-post’, whereas it had previously been based on proportional representation. Under the new system, 25 per cent of the seats in both chambers were still allocated on a proportional basis to parties that achieve the 4 per cent threshold of valid list votes. Partly as a consequence of the change in the electoral system and partly because of other contemporary factors, many of Italy’s traditional parties such as the Christian Democracy, the Socialist Party, and the Liberal party disappeared during the first half of the 1990s. Others changed name, for instance the Communist Party became the party of the Democratic Left and the Social Movement became the National Alliance. Finally, new parties such as the Northern League5 and Forza Italia were formed. This reshaping of the political landscape was coupled with a renewal of Italian political elites. For example, in 1994, 56 per cent of the senators and 66 per cent of the deputies had no previous experience in parliament and amongst the governing centre-right parties, 75 per cent members of parliament (MPs) reported no previous experience in parliament, national, or regional politics. As for the party system, the ‘old’ system, which Sartori (1976) defined as ‘polarised pluralism’,6 was transformed into a ‘bipolar system’ of centre-left and centre-right coalitions in which all parties have governing potential and compete for the median voter. Newell (2000) points out the disappearance of the old anti-system parties, of bilateral oppositions, and of a large single party at the centre. Brand and Mackie (1996) observe the

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disappearance of purely ideological parties and of the ideological bases of the party system together with the end of the traditional subcultural segmentation. Finally, the long-term Catholic tradition—in all its variants—apparently collapsed in 1992. The 1994 general elections were won by the centre-right coalition. In the north of Italy the coalition was represented by the ‘Freedom Alliance’ (Polo della Libertà) that was composed of Forza Italia, Northern League, Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD, former Christian Democrats), and Pannella. In the Mezzogiorno, it was represented by the ‘Good Governance Alliance’ (Polo del Buon Governo) that was composed of Forza Italia, National Alliance, and CCD. The centre-right coalition had an outright majority of seats in the lower chamber, although not in the Senate (Leonardi and Nanetti 1996). Silvio Berlusconi, who was the leader of the main coalition party, became Prime Minister. The government was appointed after lengthy negotiations within the winning coalition and it was plagued by several internal conflicts. These culminated in the Lega’s withdrawal from the coalition and the resignation of Berlusconi in autumn 1994. Brand and Mackie (1996) argue that the centre-right alliance was formed to win elections and not to govern because it had only a vague platform and there was no basic agreement on a programme of action. The political parties that formed the first Berlusconi government returned to opposition in early 1995. They were defeated at the 1996 general elections that the National Alliance and Forza Italia fought together in the electoral coalition Freedom Alliance (Polo delle Libertà), whereas the Northern League did not have any electoral ally. Finally, these parties were returned to power at the 2001 general elections (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). The elections were won by the centre-right coalition, the House of Freedom (Casa delle Libertà). Berlusconi became Prime Minister; the leader of the National Alliance, Gianfranco Fini, was appointed as the Deputy Prime Minister; the leader of the Northern League, Umberto Bossi, was appointed as the Minister for Federal Reforms; and the pro-European and highly experienced Renato Ruggiero was appointed as the Foreign Minister, who resigned in June 2002.

4.3 FORZA ITALIA This party was founded by the media magnate Silvio Berlusconi in November 1993 to oppose the centre-left coalition. Berlusconi is one of the richest businessmen in Italy and the company that he owns, Fininvest, had a very active role in the setting up of Forza Italia. He is also the owner of the main Italian TV network and, indeed, he has made effective use of the media, to the point where McCarthy (1996b) defines Forza Italia as a ‘virtual party’, whereas Seisselberg (1996, quoted by Koff and Koff 2000), defined it as a ‘media-mediated personality-party’. The congress that institutionalized the party took place only in April 1998 after the discussions

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Table 4.1. 2001 General elections in Italy % votes∗

Party Forza Italia National Alliance Northern League Pannella Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD)–Christian Union (CDU) Segni Dini Di Pietro Popular Party Margherita Democratic Left Communist Refoundation Socialist Party Green Others

29.4 12 3.9 2.2 3.2 — — 3.9 — 14.5 16.6 5 1 2.6 6.7

Total

100

∗

Proportional vote, lower chamber. Source: Istituto Cattaneo, www. cattaneo.org.it.

that followed its electoral defeat in 1996 and its poor record in opposition (Koff and Koff 2000). The party has a pyramidal structure with networks of clubs that operate at its base. Forza Italia has often underperformed at the local level. From the beginning of his political career Berlusconi has been able to depict himself as a self-made man. As an industrialist, he offered a different set of values by ‘selling’ ‘anti-communism’ and ‘free market’ ideas, often making explicit reference to Thatcher’s policies (Koff and Koff 2000). Religion, family, and the free market are important values for the voters of Forza Italia (Gray and Howard 1996). Furthermore, in 1994 and 2001 Forza Italia skilfully emphasized the job priority that ranks highly for a large part of the Italian electorate and predicted a ‘new economic miracle’ in Italy. Bufacchi and Burgess (1998) stress the role played by electoral mobility in explaining the success of Forza Italia in particular in 1994, but also in 2001, when it attracted many Northern League votes. Forza Italia has been able to swing the Table 4.2. Summary of Eurosceptic political parties in Italy in 2002 Party Northern League National Alliance Communist Refoundation

Type of Euroscepticism Hard Euroscepticism (Latent) Soft Euroscepticism Soft Euroscepticism

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more mobile sector of the electoral market in its favour. The electorate of Forza Italia is spread throughout Italy; however, it is concentrated in the urban north and in Sicily (Gray and Howard 1996). During the short-lived experience of the first Berlusconi government, Forza Italia seemed to take a position midway between some rather rigid stances of the National Alliance on some EU issues and the pro-European attitudes of the Northern League. There were, however, some critical statements made by Antonio Martino, chief economist of Forza Italia, member of the Thatcher-inspired Bruges group (Financial Times, 8 June 1994), and at that time Foreign Minister. Martino questioned the way in which the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) project was built because in his view ‘convergence was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for monetary unification’ (Financial Times, 28 November 1994; see also Martino 1995, 1997). He also believed in the possibility of renegotiating the convergence criteria that the member states had to fulfil in order to join EMU. Within the government there were different views on Martino’s proposals and, indeed, from time to time the Prime Minister and the Cabinet distanced themselves from Martino’s critical positions. Yet, he was their Foreign Minister. In addition, Prime Minister Berlusconi also mentioned the possibility of renegotiating the Treaty on European Union (TEU) so that Italy would be able to join EMU, even if the convergence criteria were not fulfilled (Sole 24 Ore, 17 December 1994). Overall, the short-lived experience of the first Berlusconi government in 1994 was a ‘dry run’ for the second Berlusconi government. For example, after the electoral victory of the centre-right coalition, Berlusconi pledged to ‘raise his country’s profile in the world’, to have ‘a more active role in Europe’, and ‘to state and reinforce Italy’s role as a protagonist in the European Union’ (Financial Times, 17 May 1994). Similar statements were to be repeated after the appointment of the second Berlusconi government in 2001. Between 1996 and 1998 the risk that Italy would be excluded from the first group of entrants to EMU was used by the centre-right opposition and by Forza Italia in particular as a means to discredit the centre-left government that had staked its prestige on Italy being in the first wave of countries joining EMU. This theme was prominent, for example, in the final stage of the campaign for the 1997 local elections (Financial Times, 25 April 1997). During its time in opposition, Forza Italia relaunched the idea of renegotiating the TEU so that Italy would be able to join EMU even if it did not comply with the convergence criteria. Otherwise, little reference was made to European themes, except in the statute of Forza Italia, which was approved at its first congress in 1998 and which mentioned the European and Western vocation amongst the ‘cultural pillars’ of the party.7 However, the document also stated that a change of route was needed in Europe and blamed the ‘lefts in Europe’ for the ‘poor economic performance’ in the old continent.

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In the second Berlusconi government, some rather critical statements on the introduction of the single currency made by senior figures of Forza Italia who also had important government positions, such as Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti and Defence Minister Antonio Martino, found wide echoes in the Italian and foreign press. Likewise, the Italian government decision not to participate in the pan-European programme to build the Airbus A400M military transport aircraft, a decision which is said to reflect the position of the Defence Minister, was seen as symbolic because the Airbus project is central to EU’s defence ambitions (Financial Times, 26 October 2001). Overall, the position on EU matters of the party leader, Berlusconi, is still unclear. This is despite instances, such as his pressing the case of Parma as the Italian candidate to host the EU Food Agency during the Laeken European Council in December 2001, where his actions were regarded as indicative of a more assertive stance.

4.4 THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE The Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI)–National Alliance was a right-conservative alliance formed in 1993 and led by the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement. The alliance was proposed by the then leader of the Social Movement, Gianfranco Fini, after the local election in 1993. However, when it was established in January 1994 only a few independent personalities joined (Tarchi 1996). In January 1995, the MSI was dissolved into the National Alliance which replaced it. The first congress that took place in Fiuggi in January 1995 sanctioned the fusion of the MSI apparatus with the nebula of the National Alliance clubs which had been active since July 1994. The extreme fringe of the MSI led by Rauti founded its own party called MSI—tricolour flame. National Alliance is a ‘leadership party’ (Koff and Koff 2000), meaning a party in which the leadership is crucial. The ideological base of the National Alliance has two main building blocks, namely nationalism and anti-left orientations. The creation of the National Alliance was not a sudden ideological shift (Ruzza and Schmidtke 1996). Instead, it was a strategic move that seized on the delegitimization of old parties and the fact that the MSI was untainted by corruption scandals as it had never been in power. It was a way of admitting new supporters without them having to come to terms with the old party (Ruzza and Schmidtke 1996). Whereas in the past this party had generally been described by the foreign press as neo-fascist, recently the language has changed and the party is often labelled as post-fascist. Like the Italian Social Movement, the stronghold of the National Alliance is in the south of Italy where it has attracted former Christian Democrat votes. Its voters are predominantly low- and middle-class employees, many of them in the public sector.

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The entry of the National Alliance into the first Berlusconi government in 1994 sanctioned the need to transform the party mainly because of the negative reaction of foreign press and foreign governments (Carioti 1996). On the one hand, the leader of the National Alliance, Gianfranco Fini, tried to reassure foreign observers. On the other, his polite tones often coincided with rigid stances on concrete questions, such as the dispute with Slovenia (Carioti 1996), whereby the hard position taken by the Italian government was heavily influenced by the pressure of National Alliance. European themes hardly entered the political discourse of the National Alliance during its time in opposition. However, they were mentioned in the party statute approved at the 1995 conference in Fiuggi (the so-called Fiuggi thesis) which devoted a long section to ‘Europe’. The section opened with a reference to ‘Paneurope of Coudenhove Kalergi’ and to the ‘Europe des patries of de Gaulle’, which was defined as an ‘ideal approach to European integration’.8 Yet, the document also mentioned Monnet and Schumann. Secondly, it called for the ‘development of the EU beyond the purely economic and monetary dimension’ as well as the ‘strengthening of the European pillar vis-à-vis the US’. It advocated the extension of EU competencies in several common policies. At the Verona conference in February and March 1998, the final document called for the ‘strengthening of the EU by increasing the size of its budget’ and enhancing the scope of its budgetary policy. Surprisingly, it also proposed the ‘reduction of the weight of the national government by increasing the power of the European Parliament’.9 However, the document criticized ‘measures labelled as market opening, but which jeopardize the homogeneity of national products’. A point that is worth making is that the tone used in all these documents called for a more assertive stance from the Italian government vis-à-vis the EU. At the Naples conference in February 2001 no reference was made to European themes in the final document. In the second Berlusconi government, the National Alliance adopted a low profile on EU issues. On the one hand, it displayed an accommodating stance and conciliatory attitudes towards the EU. Fini, in particular, did so. For example, on the issue of the A400, the Deputy Prime Minister Fini commented: Even if we might not need these planes, we cannot ignore the fact that this is the one panEuropean military project that is actually up and running. . . . If you even have unwarlike Luxembourg taking part in it, there’s got to be a good reason for going ahead. (Financial Times, 7 November 2001)

Yet, for example, in September 2001 he floated the idea of a review of the Eurozone’s stability and growth pact (Financial Times, 12 September 2001). On the other hand, other senior figures in the party argued in favour of a more assertive stance towards EU, as can be gathered by glancing at the party newspaper, the Secolo d’Italia. For example, the Minister for Telecommunications Maurizio Gasparri argued that ‘on one side there has to be a greater political and democratic legitimization of the [EU] institutions; on the other side, there has to be a more balanced valuation of national interests’ (Secolo d’Italia, 20 December 2001).

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4.5 THE NORTHERN LEAGUE The Northern League was initially a loose-knit federation of leagues from different northern regions. The first league was established in 1984 and the Northern League was officially set up in 1991. Koff and Koff (2000) describe it as a ‘swing party’ and a ‘leadership party’ with ‘erratic behaviour’, which has kept it in the public eye, despite contradictory statements and outbursts. The messages of the Northern League have appealed to a wide range of political forces in the north (Newell 2000). Taggart (quoted in Brand and Mackie 1996) argues that it is not a new party of the extreme right, but rather a neo-populist party outside the traditional left–right dimension. Diamanti (1996) points to the Northern League’s ability to break with the traditional bases of political identity in Italy, namely religion and class. The Northern League has replaced them with other elements that result from contradictions not addressed within the Italian state–society relation, such as the unreconciled differences between the north and the south; the centre and the periphery; and the public and the private (Diamanti 1996). Commentators often argue that the League is racist and xenophobic. Elements of success were the restricted and flexible ideological base, the widespread and flexible organization, and the strong leadership. The Leagues have traditionally appealed to the discontent of the middle class in the north after its alienation from the traditional parties. Its voters are mainly owners of small business and former Christian Democrats (Diamanti 1996). In the first Berlusconi government in 1994 the Northern League declared itself strongly pro-European. In this period, the Northern League did not display any Eurosceptic attitudes. On the contrary, one of its senior figures and MP Giancarlo Pagliarini argued that ‘The political objective of Europe is fundamental for us. . . . If we look back, the best laws put in place in Italy are the laws based on EU legislation’ (Financial Times, 7 July 1994). A survey of the parliamentary activity of the Northern League between 1994 and 1996 as reported on its website supports this assessment. For example, the League presented a proposal to the Italian Parliament for the creation of a unified diplomatic service within the EU so as to rationalize personnel and funding. Furthermore, in 1993, the League had voted in favour of the ratification of the TEU and afterwards it maintained that Italy had to do its utmost to fulfil the convergence criteria in order to join EMU.10 Of course, rhetoric has to be allowed for, especially in the case of a populist party such as the Northern League. Yet, these elements suggest that it was not fundamentally or ideologically Eurosceptic. It is also important to remember that for the federalist members of the Northern League, such as Pagliarini and Roberto Comini who in 1994 was Minister for EC Affairs, the support for European integration was also seen as a way to give more power to the regions. For example, in his speech delivered at the party’s federal congress in Bologna in February 1994, Bossi argued that ‘[the treaty of] Maastricht re-allocates power at different levels and across the territory of each member state and gives new vitality to local autonomies’.11 Likewise, in another speech delivered at the federal assembly in Turin in May 1995, Bossi referred to the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ in the TEU.12

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During the first period in opposition after the government experience in 1994 the Northern League did not display any Eurosceptic attitudes. On the contrary, it was adamant that Italy should join EMU on time. One argument used by the League was that, although the north of Italy was ready to join EMU, the south was not, and, therefore, the former would miss this historical opportunity because of the backwardness of the latter. The Economist (8 November 1997) reported the following: ‘Splitting Italy into two countries would be good for the north and good for the south’, says Giancarlo Pagliarini, the Northern League’s economics spokesman. Padania would comfortably qualify for membership of EMU, which is what its firms want. Taxes could be cut, and tax revenues spent on the things Padania needs, rather than handed over to Rome. The rest of Italy—which can keep the name—could make itself more competitive by devaluing the lira, says Mr Pagliarini. The subsidies now being diverted from the north to the south would be gradually phased out, freeing the south from its dependence on handouts from Rome—a dependence that lies at the heart of the south’s economic backwardness. In time, the south too might qualify for EMU.

The Northern League was so keen for the north to join EMU that in 1996 its leader, Bossi, wrote a letter to the EC enquiring about the possibility for Padania to join EMU (Il Sole 24 Ore, 3 September 1996). Surely this was a propagandistic move which seems, nevertheless, to have been rooted in fundamentally pro-EU attitudes. Furthermore, as the following quote from the Economist (8 November 1997) suggests, the bulk of the Northern League electorate was (and is?) pro-EU and pro-EMU: Northerners vote for the League because they want to join EMU, pay less tax and lower social-security contributions, hand fewer subsidies to ‘lazy southerners’, and enjoy a measure of devolution—more government locally. . . . The main attraction of EMU is lower interest rates. Italian firms can borrow more cheaply abroad than at home, but they incur a significant exchange-rate risk that would disappear within EMU. Exporters’ cash flows too would be less vulnerable to currency movements. And, many industrialists believe, membership of EMU would secure their access to major European markets. Massimo Cacciari, the mayor of Venice and a leading opponent of the League, thinks one reason for the slight slippage in the League’s support this year is the growing probability that Italy will be in the first wave of EMU members.

This quotation contributes to explaining the Northern League’s shift towards Euroscepticism and, indeed, it is no coincidence that starting from 1998 when Italy officially qualified for EMU membership, there was a crescendo of criticism of the EU, as Section 4.6 explains. Also, the EMU project was questioned and, for example, at the Northern League congress in Brescia in October 1998 Bossi criticized the fact that Italy’s joining of EMU had been decided without a referendum.13 From then on, Bossi’s criticisms of the EU increased and the most verbally virulent are reported in Section 4.6. In a later speech, Bossi was rather outspoken on the real motives underlying the Northern League’s stance and admitted that the joining of EMU had made the secession of Padania from the rest of Italy more difficult.14 As explained earlier, if Italy had not joined EMU in the first wave, the

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League would most likely have deployed the argument that the south had to be blamed for this failure, which would have strengthened the League’s secessionist campaign. With increasing verbal virulence since 1998 the Northern League has displayed Eurosceptic attitudes, to the extent that the Financial Times (5 June 2001) wrote that ‘this party is not Eurosceptic, it is Europhobic’. Along similar lines, Ruggiero commented in the national press that ‘the Northern League is not only Eurosceptic, but also anti-European’ (Repubblica, 3 January 2002). Bossi repeatedly attacked the EU as ‘the Soviet Union of Europe’ (Financial Times, 5 June 2001), ‘a nest of freemasons and Communist bankers’ (Financial Times, 7 July 2001), and went as far as accusing ‘European technocrats and paedophiles’ of seeking to impose their will on Italy if the left had won the elections (The Economist, 12 May 2001). The Northern League and its Justice Minister Castelli strongly objected to the common arrest warrant. Furthermore, Bossi argued ‘Everybody has seen that the music has changed and that Italy is defending its own interests. . . . We used to just go there and always say “yes”. Now it’s enough’ (Financial Times, 20 December 2001).

4.6 THE EVOLUTION OF EUROSCEPTICISM IN ITALIAN CENTRE-RIGHT PARTIES To sum up, Forza Italia, the National Alliance, and the Northern League came to power in April 1994 and returned to opposition in December 1994. They lost the 1996 general election and, finally, they returned to office in May 2001. The Northern League has expressed some Soft Euroscepticism since 1998 and moved towards Hard Euroscepticism in the latter period. However, during its first government experience in 1994 and the first period of its return to opposition in 1995, this party had not embraced Euroscepticism. In contrast, the National Alliance, which had held some Eurosceptic views in the past—to be precise, this was mainly the case of the Italian Social Movement—mitigated these positions since its first government experience in 1994. As for Forza Italia, when Berlusconi was Prime Minister in 1994 some Eurosceptic views were put forward by a few senior figures within the party. Once back in opposition, Euroscepticism disappeared almost completely, perhaps because European themes were hardly present in Forza Italia’s political discourse. Finally, Euroscepticism re-emerged stronger than before in the second Berlusconi government in 2001 (see also Quaglia 2005). The information provided in the previous sections suggests that the Northern League’s move towards Euroscepticism was and is a strategy to ‘reconstruct’ its identity as a political subject, as it has done several times in the past (see Diamanti 1996). It is also an attempt to (re)construct its electoral base after the steady electoral decline since 1994 because of the rival attraction of Forza Italia. Euroscepticism is a way to differentiate this party from other mainstream political parties and the leader of the Northern League is a cunning political operator who

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does not miss opportunities to draw attention to himself and his party. After all, this is not an unexpected move for a populist party. Yet, this assessment does not imply that it is purely a short-term strategy or tactic, since the Northern League may well decide to go down this route by consolidating its Euroscepticism. The material provided in this paper supports the view that Euroscepticism, in particular Hard Euroscepticism, is not entrenched in the Northern League’s ideological base—to the extent that it is possible to speak of an ideological base for this party. Indeed, until 1998 Euroscepticism, Hard or Soft, was not displayed by the Northern League. Since 1998, the Northern League has taken on board Soft Euroscepticism and is moving towards Hard Euroscepticism. The party leader, Bossi, is at the forefront in this operation, although other party figures are less eager to do so. The main question for the future is whether its leaders will assess this strategy as politically (meaning electorally) convenient or not. Depending on the answer to this question, the League may try to swing Italian government policy in a more anti-EU direction, as was attempted with the European arrest warrant (Financial Times, 11 December 2001). Speculating a bit further on this, it seems to be questionable whether this strategy will pay off electorally, given the predominant views of the League’s supporters. In contrast, this research suggests that the National Alliance, largely because of its origins in the MSI, has an ideological base that could make it lean towards Euroscepticism. Yet, mainly because of the political strategy pursued by its leaders—Fini, first and foremost—this has not happened so far. On the contrary, the party has kept a low profile on EU issues, up to the point that its positions often come out as more moderate than those taken by the other two parties which are subjects of this study. However, the tone is different in the lower ranks of the National Alliance. The reason why the party has adopted such a low profile on this issue given the views of its supporters needs further elaboration. Arguably, the main reason behind this choice is that the absence of Eurosceptic discourses provides this party with a ‘cloak of respectability’, in particular in the eyes of foreign counterparts. In other words, it serves the purpose of presenting the National Alliance as a post-fascist party, rather than a neo-fascist one—it is mainly a marketing operation engineered by the party leaders. Here, the question is how far Fini will manage to move the party towards a centrist, or, for that matter, Gaullist position on European matters, as well as on other issues? At the moment, the party does not seem to embrace either Soft or Hard Euroscepticism. Out of these three case studies, Forza Italia is the most difficult to assess because it is a composite party and because Berlusconi’s position is still unclear. On the one hand, there is the Soft Euroscepticism of Martino and Tremonti, even though they would most likely dismiss this term and define it as ‘Eurorealism’. On the other hand, there are pro-European figures in the party. Furthermore, it is questionable whether under the present circumstances the electorate of Forza Italia would agree with a Eurosceptic line. At the moment, the party does not embrace either Soft or Hard Euroscepticism. Two questions lie ahead. First, whether this party, or for that matter its leaders, are moving ahead of their political constituency and of Italian

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public opinion more generally? And, if this is the case, whether this will move the electorate towards Eurosceptic positions or not? Alternatively, the question is whether some Eurosceptic figures in the party are simply expressing or picking up trends of latent Euroscepticism in Italy.

4.7 MAIN FEATURES OF EU POLICY OF THE SECOND BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT A few words are needed on certain features of the EU policy of the second Berlusconi government since they can help us to understand what sort of Euroscepticism emerged in Italy. To begin with, for the first time in post-war Italy a major drift on EU policy took place within the government, as well as within governing parties. Within the government several political leaders advocated a tougher line vis-à-vis the EU and some of Berlusconi’s actions reflected this. However, other political allies, first and foremost the Christian Democrat groups, are loyal to Italy’s traditional pro-European policy and Berlusconi could not ignore them. These advocacies do not split neatly along party lines, so they coexisted within different parties of the governing coalition. There is the impression that the Prime Minister did not have an EU line of his own and his views on Europe were far from clear. Berlusconi has never given a major speech or interview on this subject in this period. As a result, the government often spoke with many voices. One important difference between the first Berlusconi government and the second is that the number of (potentially) Eurosceptic ministers is much higher later. Whereas in 1994 Martino’s point of view was isolated within the Cabinet, in the later government he was flanked, for example, by the influential Treasury Minister Tremonti, who ‘has gradually let slip his deep-felt scepticism’ (Financial Times, 4 January 2001). Ruggiero, who tried to head off the Eurosceptic tendencies of the government as well as to recompose its internal rifts, resigned in early January 2002. After Ruggiero’s resignation, the position was filled ad interim by the Prime Minister until November 2002, when Franco Frattini, a political figure close to Berlusconi in Forza Italia, was appointed as the new Foreign Minister. Secondly, the Italian government called for a more assertive stance on the world stage as well as within the EU and the argument of the ‘defence of Italian national interests’ entered political discourse. Berlusconi professes himself to be an admirer of Margaret Thatcher, the former British Prime Minister, and is clearly tempted by the idea of standing up for Italy’s interests in Europe. However, there has not yet been a clear definition of what the Italian ‘national interest’ is (i.e. when and why to say ‘no’ in Brussels) and how to defend it better (i.e. how to say ‘no’ in Brussels). It would seem that the government chose to say ‘no’ on the wrong issues. For example, the location of the Food Agency and the A400 Project were hardly vital decisions involving Italian national interests. Furthermore, it is questionable whether a more effective strategy could have been adopted to reach the preferred

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outcome. The overall impression is that in many instances there was a last-minute turnaround in Italian negotiating positions and foreign counterparts found it difficult to gather a clear understanding of the Italian government’s stance. Thirdly, within the Berlusconi government, some ministers, for example Martino and Berlusconi, professed heartfelt pro-Americanism and repeatedly showed that they had more of an affinity with the USA under the Bush administration than with the EU. They aimed to strengthen this relationship, perhaps trying to build a ‘special’ transatlantic relationship with the USA, a move that would be reminiscent of Thatcher’s policy. Yet, this enthusiasm for the USA was not shared by other members of the governing coalition, such as the Northern League and National Alliance. Lastly, Berlusconi seemed to see ‘Europe’ in terms of left and right camps (Financial Times, 16 October 2001). On the one hand, Berlusconi’s overtures to Russia (La Repubblica, 28 May 2002), which went as far as suggesting membership of the EU for Moscow, seem to run counter this interpretation. On the other hand, he is sensitive to perceptions that he is not in the European mainstream and that, beyond Aznar, he had no natural partners (Financial Times, 10 October 2001). For example, he argued in favour of EU enlargement to Eastern Europe noting that it would boost export markets and increase the number of EU governments led by the centre-right rather than the centre-left. The statute of Forza Italia, which is quoted in Section 4.3, supports this interpretation. One reason for the limited enthusiasm of the Berlusconi government for the introduction of the euro was that EMU membership was regarded as a ‘success’ of the centre-left coalition. The ‘intrusion’ of partisan politics into Italy’s EU policy is interesting because from the late 1970s this policy had been to a large extent bipartisan. It would seem that the pendulum, say, policy and politics in Italy, was swinging back in that direction.

4.8 CONCLUSIONS This chapter has argued that from the mid-1990s Soft Euroscepticism—and in the case of the Northern League increasingly Hard Euroscepticism—emerged on the centre-right of the Italian political spectrum and that this phenomenon was accompanied by the abrupt end of bipartisan consensus concerning Italy’s EU policy. For the three parties discussed here the changes in their stances on EU issues, either towards Euroscepticism—such as in the case of the Northern League—or, away from it—such as in the case of the National Alliance— are interpreted as strategic moves, rather than rooted in their ideological base. The situation is, however, fluid and the case of Forza Italia remains difficult to evaluate. In a comparative dimension, despite the changes detected and analysed in this piece of research, Italy is still a fundamentally pro-European environment. Yet, the

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breaking down of a consensus so far taken for granted seems to be a significant turning point. One important theme that comes through in this analysis and that deserves further elaboration is that in Italy (and elsewhere?), EU and foreign policy matters tend to be discussed through the prism of domestic politics. As far as EU policy is concerned, this trend strengthened in Italy when the bipartisan approach came to an end and examples include the way in which the ‘national interest’ entered political discourse or the manoeuvring over EMU issues. In Italy, there has been very little actual discussion about the overall trajectory of the European project and much of the critique of the EU seems to be an extension of domestic politics by other means. In the 1970s and 1980s any questioning of the EU had been ruled out in Italy by the widespread public and political party support for European integration, as well as by geopolitical factors. For all these reasons, ‘Europe was a taboo’ (Interview with senior figure in Forza Italia, 13 May 2000, Rome). After the watershed changes that unfolded in the international and European context as well as in the national environment in the 1990s, time would now be ripe for a wide-ranging debate about ‘Europe’. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that such a debate will be sparked off in Italy. On the contrary, it seems much more likely that Italy’s EU policy will become more politicized than it has been in the past and that it will be a battleground for party politics.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank Giorgio Giraudi, Marco Giuliani, and Gianni Riccamboni for their help with the electoral data and for useful comments. I would also like to thank Giacomo Benedetto, Niccolo’ Conti, Paul Furlong, Vincenzo Grassi, Jeff Pratt, Paul Taggart, and Aleks Szczerbiak for their comments on an earlier draft of this work. I am grateful to the interviewees who kindly gave me their time. Usual disclaimers apply. I wish to thank the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute for the Jean Monnet Fellowship in academic year 2002/3 during which work on this chapter took place. NOTES 1. The sources used for the empirical part of this research are: (a) electoral programmes, manifestos, press releases, and speeches; (b) British and Italian press coverage; (c) semi-structured interviews with officials and politicians. Almost all the quotations from newspapers are either from the Financial Times or The Economist, albeit many of them were also reported by the Italian press. When parties’ documents or Italian newspapers are quoted, they are my translation. 2. A few caveats are however needed, for example, in 1978, the Communist Party voted against Italy joining the European Monetary System. On the Italian Communist Party’s attitudes towards Europe, see Maggiorani (1998).

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3. http://www.rifondazione.it/vm/cs/2002/0208201759.html accessed on 23/7/02 at 11 a.m., http://www.rifondazione.it/vm/cs/2003/0304101820.html accessed on 23/7/02 at 11 a.m. 4. http://www.rifondazione.it/v/doc/tesi_mag.html 5. Yet, as mentioned in Section 4.3, the first League was founded in 1984. 6. This system was characterized by anti-system extremist parties (poles) at both ends of the political spectrum, whereby no party was able to win an overall majority and, hence, there was no alternative to the centrist government coalition because of the anti-system parties. It was a tri-polar format that hinged on a dominant governing centre pole and two excluded poles. 7. www.forzaitalia.it accessed on 30/12/01 at 10 p.m. 8. www.alleanza.nazionale.it accessed on 29/12/01 at 10 p.m. 9. www.alleanza.nazionale.it accessed on 29/12/01 at 10 p.m. 10. Sintesi di attività parlamentare 1994–1996 in http://www.leganord.org/frames/ links.htm accessed on 30/12/01 at 11 p.m. 11. http://www.leganord.org/a_2_discorsi_4_5_6_94.htm accessed on 28/3/02 at 10 p.m. 12. http://www.leganord.org/a_2_discorsi_28_05_95.htm accessed on 28/3/02 at 10 p.m. 13. http://www.leganord.org/a_2_discorsi_brescia98.htm accessed on 28/3/02 at 10 p.m. At present, neither the statute nor the congress reports of the Northern League are available on the Web and my enquiries concerning this material were unsuccessful. 14. http://www.leganord.org/a_2_discorsi_congressoord_2002.htm accessed on 28/3/02 at 10 p.m.

5 Hard but Hardly Relevant: Party-Based Euroscepticism in Belgium Kris Deschouwer and Martine Van Assche

5.1 INTRODUCTION Euroscepticism is not that easy to find in Belgium. The main reason for that is the lack of any serious public and political debate about the place and the role of the European Union (EU). Europe is there and has more or less always been there. It is not an issue at all. In national elections, parties do not engage in debates about their position on Europe. European elections produce a debate between European believers and even stronger believers. If both types of elections are organized simultaneously (as in 1999 and in 2004), the European elections tend to lose all their relevance. If they do not coincide with other elections, they display the well-known ‘second order’ logic (Reif and Smith 1980) and serve rather as midterm national elections. Even the right-wing populist Vlaams Belang—unlike the right-wing populists in other European countries (Taggart 1998)—does not actively mobilize a Eurosceptic position. When the treaties need to be adopted in parliament, however, there appears to be no consensus. Some parties have approved the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice Treaties, others have voted against them. That does provide indeed some evidence of debate and dissenting opinions about the European issue. Yet, this needs to be qualified immediately, since the parliamentary debates on the ratification of the treaties can hardly be labelled as important or relevant. They pass almost unnoticed. If there is Euroscepticism in Belgium, whether Soft or Hard, it is in the first instance hardly relevant. In this chapter, we will first describe the general Belgian context in which Europe is a matter of fact. Next, we look at the debates in the parliament, and try to make sense of the arguments used by parties to either support or reject the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice. We also take a look at the (tiny) parties that voiced strong Eurosceptic attitudes but that were not represented in parliament in the period up to 2003. We will see that only one significant party does display a coherent and persistent Eurosceptic position: the Vlaams Belang. Given the positive position of the other parties, we have classified the Vlaams

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Belang Euroscepticism as ‘Hard’. We conclude by trying to explain why the party is not actively mobilizing on this Eurosceptic theme.

5.2 THE EUROPEAN NON-ISSUE IN BELGIAN POLITICS

5.2.1 The early days: The obvious acceptance of Europe Belgium is one of the six original members of the EU. Belgium has been in Europe and Europe has been in Belgium since the early 1950s. That is not enough to avoid the development of Euroscepticism—France is the evident counter example (Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994; Grunberg, this volume)—but it can explain how the gradual integration of Europe could occur without any major rejection of its basic logic. The early years were actually the most difficult. The Belgian political leadership was not overly enthusiastic about the idea of creating a Coal and Steel Community. The Belgian position was rather reluctant and based on the principle that national sovereignty could not be given away just like that. The powers of the High Authority had therefore to be kept limited. The negotiations for the creation of a European Defence Community also faced a very sceptical Belgian government. The king was not convinced that the European construction was a good idea, and Foreign Affairs Minister Paul-Henri Spaak had to work hard to convince the Prime Minister Van Acker to accept and to sign the Treaty of Rome (Spaak writes in his memoirs that Van Acker accepted because they were friends, not because he liked the Treaty) (Janssens 2001). Yet, these were the early days, and very soon Belgium became a very reliable member of the club. When the Treaty of Rome had to be ratified by the parliament, the Prime Minister (then Gaston Eyskens) complained that there was no real debate and only very few members of parliament (MPs) participating in it. The debates for the ratification of the Coal and Steel Community or the Defence Community a few years earlier had been much more lively indeed. For a small country like Belgium, the European Community was objectively a very good thing, both in political and in economic terms. Politically, the voice of one member state within Europe is more important than if European Community/Union was not there. Economically, the export-led economy of Belgium could only profit from the expansion and integration of the European market. Of course, this was the very beginning of European integration, and the European project was at that time of a very different (i.e. limited) nature. Europe has changed, and these changes can be at the origin of changing attitudes. Yet, these have not been displayed in Belgium. Europe quickly became a basically ‘good thing’, and the Belgian political elite has actively defended this idea. The more important European integration became, the more highly valued it was. It is only a very vague and intuitive indicator, but it is interesting to note that the membership of the European Commission has received an increased importance in the ranking order of political positions. In the coalition formation negotiations, the Belgian

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100% 90% 80% ‘Good thing’

70% 60% 50%

56% 48%

EU Average ‘Good thing’

40% 30%

29%

‘Neither good nor bad’

20% 10% 0%

‘Bad thing’

12%

EB 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 M 46 98 50 52 54 56 58 59 60 Year 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 03 Percentage ‘don’t know’ not shown

Figure 5.1. Support for European Union Membership in Belgium, 1981–2003 Source: Eurobarometer 60

commissioner is counted as one important ministerial position since the 1980s. Former members of the Commission never came back ‘down’ to Belgian politics, but went sideways or stayed at the European level: Etienne Davignon went to the private sector, Willy De Clercq went to the European Parliament (MEP), and Karel Van Miert went to the private sector. If there ever was a permissive consensus in and about the EU, Belgium was a good place to come and witness this absence of any substantial debate about what was going on at the European level. When the European Parliament (EP) was elected directly for the first time, the Belgian campaign was extremely European. All Belgian parties presented themselves by explicitly referring to the European party federation to which they belonged. The socialist leading candidate Van Miert had a poster on which the German former Prime Minister Willy Brandt and the Dutch Prime Minister Den Uyl were presented as his fellow travellers. Only one single party campaigned explicitly against Europe: the list E-NON. It polled 0.4 per cent. There is a very strong elitist consensus about Europe being a good thing, and the first confrontation with the public did not produce a major challenge to it. At the level of the population, the Eurobarometer figures show basically a continuing support for European integration, close to the EU average (Figure 5.1). European integration is just there, not triggering any great emotions, not being the cause of many debates. The physical presence of the EU institutions in Brussels, and the quasi-official status of the city as the capital of EU have only added to this obvious and normal presence of the EU. The official discourse (at elite level of course) is indeed one that refers to the active role that Belgium should play in defending European integration, in defending the ‘deepening’ of the EU. When Belgium takes over the presidency of the EU, this is an important event, and the

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government is expected to perform well, to push the EU further towards deeper integration. There has actually never been a distinct ‘impact’ of European integration on Belgium. The Belgian constitution does not allow for the organization of a referendum. This majoritarian device of decision-making is alien to Belgian political culture. There has been one (consultative) referendum in 1950, on the question of whether King Leopold III could return to the throne. That was a rather bad experience, since 57 per cent of the population said ‘yes’, but that was composed of 72 per cent of yes in the region of Flanders, 46 per cent in Brussels, and 42 per cent in Wallonia. The referendum proved to be a very disruptive instrument indeed, and the ‘King’s Question’ was finally settled by a very consociational all-party compromise. The idea of having a referendum has however been suggested in the parliamentary debates on the treaties but the majority of the parties has always blocked this idea. If a referendum had been organized, it would probably have brought the issue into the open and would eventually have led to political debates. But all this is obviously pure speculation. The treaties have always been ratified by a vote in the parliament, after almost no debate at all. Yet, one cannot say that Europe has had no effect on Belgian politics and policies. Especially, the convergence criteria for the participation in the single currency have put an extreme high pressure on the Belgian decision-makers. When the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the budgetary deficit was 7 per cent of GDP, while the public debt was at a peak of 135 per cent. When the decision about the participation in the European Monetary Union (EMU) had to be taken, the yearly deficit had been brought down to less than 3 per cent; and the reduction of the public debt to 118 per cent of GDP was accepted as a ‘significant move towards 60 per cent’. One would expect that such a harsh reduction of public spending would lead to heated debates, and that one or more parties would blame the source of that policy. But nothing of that kind was heard (except from very marginal left extremist movements and parties). Belgium was brought into the EMU by a centre-left government, and the Liberal opposition only blamed the government for being too slow, or for presenting figures that made the situation look better (i.e. closer to the convergence criteria) than it was. Another striking example is the enlargement debate. The enlargement process was a major concern of all the parties. The Belgian population seemed to share this concern. In the second half of 2002, 26 per cent of the Belgians said they were against enlargement and 43 per cent were in favour only of a restricted enlargement. In the next Eurobarometer surveys the question was put in a slightly different way: Are you for or against enlargement? During the spring of 2003, 44 per cent of the Belgians answered that they were against while 38 per cent declared to support enlargement. In the second half of 2003, opposition remained high (45 per cent) but the number of advocates increased to 43 per cent. In October 2002, the Flemish Socialist Vice-Prime Minister said in an interview that ‘This Europe is not our Europe anymore’. He did not want to support enlargement if the EU would not reinforce its social provisions first. His obstruction to the ongoing

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enlargement process was immediately (and heavily) criticized by the major parties, including his own. His party continued following this more Eurosceptical path though, and presented itself as the advocate of a social Europe—a ‘Europe for the people’.

5.3 RATIFYING THE TREATIES

5.3.1 The voting behaviour As there is no real open debate about the European issue, there are not any clear actions by political parties that can be seen and used as indicators for Euroscepticism. There is one point, however, where parties have to make a clear choice: when treaties on the European issue need to be ratified in parliament. It should not come as a great surprise that the parliamentary debates on the ratification do not receive a lot of media attention. Only very few MPs are present and participate in the debate, because it goes without saying that Belgium will ratify. Therefore, the debate is fairly predictable and—again—not very relevant. Yet when it comes to voting yes or no, the picture does not show the expected full consensus. On the contrary, we see how some parties clearly display a Eurosceptic action by refusing to support the ratification. The Maastricht Treaty itself, and the way in which Belgium originally signed it, contained enough possibilities for criticizing its lack of legitimacy. The Belgian government that signed the Treaty in December 1991 was a caretaker government. The centre-left coalition had collapsed, and during the meeting in Maastricht the King had asked the Flemish Liberal Opposition Leader Verhofstadt to form a new government. The Treaty was then submitted to the House of Representatives on 26 May 1992 (the attempt to form a Liberal–Socialist–Green government had failed and a new centre-left government had been formed by then). The Commission of Foreign Affairs discussed and approved the Treaty, after which it was sent to the plenary session. There the discussion was scheduled on 14–15 July, which is right in the middle of the summer holiday (Deweerdt and Falter 1992). The Amsterdam Treaty has been signed by a coalition of Christian Democrats and Socialists, brought to power after anticipated elections in 1995. This government had asked and received ‘special powers’ (the possibility to govern with broad framework laws, the details of which only having to be accepted by the parliament after they have been implemented) to prepare the country for the monetary union. It managed to do so without major protest, although the budgetary policy became quite harsh. The ratification of the Treaty, on 4 June in the Senate and 9 July in the House, again passed unnoticed for the public (Deweerdt 1997). A government of Liberal, Socialist, and Green parties signed the Nice Treaty. The ratification debate took place during the Belgian presidency of the EU. This presidency was widely and actively publicized, but the parliamentary debate on

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Table 5.1. Voting behaviour in the House of Representatives on the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice treaties

Maastricht

Amsterdam

Nice

Against

Abstention

Groen Ecolo Vlaams Belang Volksunie Groen Ecolo Vlaams Belang Volksunie Front National One MP of Francophone Socialists Francophone Christian Democrats Vlaams Belang Front National One MP of Francophone Socialists

Rossem Front National

None

New Flemish Alliance Two MPs of Flemish Christian Democrats Two MPs of Francophone Christian Democrats

the Treaty hardly received any attention. The Senate accepted Nice on 7 March and the House on 28 March 2002. But each time, a number of parties voted against the ratification. Since this is the only hard evidence that can be found on party-based Euroscepticism in Belgium, we need to take a closer look at what happened. Table 5.1 gives the parties that either voted ‘no’ or that abstained during the vote in the House of Representatives (the picture in the Senate is not significantly different). One party was always on the ‘no’ side: the Vlaams Belang. The moderate Flemish Nationalist party Volksunie voted against the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam. When Nice needed to be approved, the party had fallen apart in two wings. The more nationalist wing (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie—New Flemish Alliance) is the official successor of the former Volksunie. It abstained, while the other wing (naming itself Spirit at that time) voted yes. The Front National, a Francophone right-wing populist party (but with a very high degree of internal dissidence and breakaways) did not approve any of the treaties. It abstained from Maastricht and voted against Amsterdam and Nice. Both Green parties (the Flemish Greens Groen and the Francophone Greens Ecolo) voted against Maastricht and Amsterdam, but then approved Nice. There seems to be some logic in the way the parties behave, but it is not perfect. The parties mentioned above are all so-called non-traditional parties. Belgium’s traditional parties are the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, and the Socialists. These support the EU, whether they are in government or not. The Liberals accepted Maastricht and Amsterdam, although they were in the opposition. The Christian Democrats later approved Nice while they were in opposition. Or more precisely, the Flemish Christian Democrats did so. The Francophone Christian Democrats voted (surprisingly) against the Treaty of Nice. The Green parties voted

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against the first two treaties, while they were in the opposition. They did, however, accept Nice, but by then they had become a governing party. If we count the Greens (now) as a potentially governing party, all governing parties (except for the Francophone Christian Democrats for Nice) support the treaties.

5.3.2 The debates Voting against the European treaties can certainly—with the caveat about low salience—be considered as an indicator of Euroscepticism. Yet, the motivation to vote against the treaty is not straightforwardly a rejection of the European project. As we already mentioned, the voting behaviour is to a certain extent linked to the position of the parties in the Belgian party system, with the principled opposition parties (more or less) on the negative side and the potentially governing parties (more or less) on the positive side. In order to reveal the motivation of the voting behaviour, we need to take a closer look at the parliamentary debates. The general tone of the arguments in the debates was one of agreement with the treaties as a next step in the ongoing process of integration. At the same time, many speakers deplored some important shortcomings. The perception of these shortcomings resulted mainly from comparing the treaty outcomes with the dream of a federal Europe. The Nice Treaty was mainly accepted in the prospect of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Both Houses adopted a resolution expressing their endorsement of the Maastricht Treaty but also their criticism about the shortcomings of it. When accepting Amsterdam, a resolution was passed saying that the EU should ‘deepen before enlarging’.

5.3.2.1 The Maastricht Treaty One important aspect of the Maastricht Treaty was the creation of a monetary union. Most parties criticized the absence of a fiscal harmonization policy. Most parties also deplored the fact that the monetary integration was not accompanied by real political integration. Another disappointment shared by almost all parties was the exclusion of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs from the Community framework. The so-called democratic deficit of the EU was another recurring theme in the speeches of most speakers, with references being made to topics as the lack of power of the EP, the loss of powers of national parliaments, and ‘the gap between politics and the citizens’. In this context, the complexity of the decision-making procedures, the institutions, and the protocols were also denounced. And, finally, the concept of subsidiarity popped up regularly. Both Christian Democratic parties (the main supporters of this principle) as well as the Greens warned of a misuse of this provision, potentially leading to a renationalization of policies. A general remark from several parties was that this concept needed more clarification to avoid speculations on its use in practice.

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In spite of all these shortcomings, the traditional parties (Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals) chose a continuation of the integration process in the line proposed by the Maastricht Treaty, and approved it. The Green parties and the Volksunie on the contrary argued that these shortcomings in the Treaty, among other things, did not allow them to sustain this project. They rejected the Treaty because they were in favour of deeper European integration. Besides the topics mentioned above, the Greens raised a number of other issues during the debates. The reaction of the European governments on the outcome of the Maastricht referendum in Denmark was considered to be an ill-judged and arrogant reaction to the danger of nationalism. When citizens exercise their democratic right and evaluate the integration process, the result of their judgement should not be criticized for being ‘wrong’. As a reaction to the many critics all over the EU on the Treaty, the Greens proposed to reopen the debate of Maastricht and to negotiate a new and better treaty. Another important emphasis of the Greens was, not surprisingly, the incompleteness of the environmental policy and the lack of integration of environmental considerations into other policy fields such as transport. The convergence criteria of the EMU were criticized for lacking environmental indicators. The absence of any measure related to nuclear energy was heavily criticized as well. For the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the emphasis should be on the prevention of conflicts and economic aid to countries in need. The structure of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was preferred above a new EU structure to manage these tasks. The Greens voted against the Treaty, but clearly because it was not European enough. The moderate Flemish Nationalists of the Volksunie also stressed more than once that they are not against European integration and even favour a federalist Europe for the same reason as any other regionalist party: the hope that the EU would increase the powers of the regions and decrease those of the national states. This is, however, exactly why the Volksunie did not want to accept the Treaty. It considered it as not sufficiently taking care of the regions’ aspirations. Besides the arguments used by the other parties the Volksunie speakers focused mainly on these aspects related to the role of the regions. The Committee of the Regions was considered to be ‘an empty box’ and ‘an alibi’, because it did not provide for a direct link between the European decision-making process and the regions. Several Volksunie speakers observed that the regions still did not have access to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The debates also reflected a general concern about the paragraph on culture, more precisely because culture and education had to remain, according to the party, a competence of the people. One of the debates’ preliminary themes was the compatibility of Article 8B of the Maastricht Treaty with Article 4 of the Belgian Constitution. Article 4 requires the Belgian nationality for the granting of political (and thus voting) rights. As the Treaty provided for voting rights in local elections for EU citizens, the Council of State indicated in an advisory opinion that the granting of political rights to citizens of other member states was unconstitutional. It urged a revision

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of Article 4 of the Constitution. The government parties decided to postpone this until precise rules would be elaborated at the EU level on this topic. Reactions came from three different directions. First, the opposition parties used this theme to criticize the government for its reluctance to settle the matter right away. The government did however postpone the implementation, because these local voting rights could be political dynamite. Indeed, in and around Brussels there are relatively high numbers of European citizens, for whom the Treaty would mean that they would be able to vote in the local elections. But especially in and around Brussels, the balance of power between the language groups is very delicate. In Brussels, the Dutch speakers are a minority (some 15 per cent of the Brussels voters), and if the European citizens would vote, the Dutch speakers feared that most of them would support Francophone lists. In the area around and just outside Brussels, which belongs administratively to the Flemish region and thus to the Dutch-speaking part of the country, there are a number of local municipalities where Francophones are a strong minority, and in some even a clear majority. Again, there was the fear that voting rights for the Europeans would increase the electoral power of the Francophones. The Vlaams Belang spent a lot of its speaking time on this subject. It stated that Maastricht would lead to a distortion of the relations between the language groups. Furthermore, its MPs feared that granting voting rights to non-Belgians would lead to the granting of these rights also at the national level, and—even worse—to voting rights for non-European strangers at all levels. Voting rights should, however, according to the Vlaams Belang, be inseparably connected to nationality. The Volksunie shared this concern about the position of the Dutch speakers in Brussels, and asked for a formal exception—as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty—for these local voting rights. It stressed that voting right should only be granted to inhabitants paying Belgian taxes (which is not the case for the ‘Eurocrats’) and having a sufficient knowledge of the (Dutch) language. The debate on the voting rights would come back later, since the Constitution had indeed to be changed before the local elections of 2000. That was done in extremis—in 1999—and with all the expected emotions about the language balance in and around Brussels. The Francophone Liberals and Brussels regionalists supported the government of Christian Democrats and Socialists, while the Volksunie, Vlaams Belang, and the Flemish Liberals voted against the constitutional change. The fact that one of the traditional parties did not support the change of the Constitution does however not reflect any Euroscepticism, but a simple strategic position of a party that likes to see the ruling coalition fail. But the most sceptical views overall were indeed expressed by the Vlaams Belang. It does not exclude any form of European integration, although it refers to a rather limited and narrow definition of it, at least if one compares its view to that of the other parties in Belgium. The Vlaams Belang defended the postponement of the ratification (because of the uncertainty on the position of Denmark), a referendum and a renegotiation of the Treaty. New negotiations, the party claimed, should be based on five criteria: a Europe of the people, no European citizenship,

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no European competencies in culture and education, a common foreign policy (but not as an alibi for no policy at all), and no open borders. We have mentioned already Brussels as a matter of specific concern for the Vlaams Belang. The party did not want Brussels to be (or become) the capital of Europe. Its main concern was that the town would then become a centre of the French culture and language. The party would even prefer the European institutions to leave the town. The Vlaams Belang’s general point of view can be summarized as ‘Yes to Europe, no to Maastricht’, a slogan used to promote its programme against the Treaty. In contrast to the Flemish Vlaams Belang, the (less important) Francophone right-wing extremist Front National decided not to block the Maastricht Treaty and abstained from voting. The party wanted to show that it supported the unification, although the Treaty had a lot of shortcomings. The Front National agreed with the Vlaams Belang that a referendum should be organized, an idea supported by Rossem as well. The latter said it was not against European integration but it considered Maastricht as being too vague about political integration (Rossem was a short-lived libertarian party led by the flamboyant Jean-Pierre Van Rossem, a stock exchange ‘guru’ who was convicted later for racketeering). There was indeed some discussion on the Maastricht Treaty, but one cannot say that an extremely Hard version of Euroscepticism was voiced. The Greens, the Volksunie, and the Vlaams Belang voted ‘no’, but all three did so because they did not like the type or the extent of further European integration that would be realized by Maastricht. The parties that voted in favour of the Treaty expressed exactly the same concerns. Only the Vlaams Belang went a bit further, and questioned some basic principles of the EU, yet also defending a far-reaching European integration. Given the fact that the general mood in Belgium is very much pro-European integration, the position of the Vlaams Belang can be considered ‘Hard’, although it looks rather Soft in a comparative perspective. And we need to repeat that the Vlaams Belang is not at all stressing this European position in its mobilizing activities.

5.3.2.2 Treaty of Amsterdam A lot of the criticism voiced during the Maastricht debate occurred again during the debate on the Amsterdam Treaty. It was criticized for not leading to real deeper integration in matters like economic policy, social integration, CFSP, internal affairs, and justice. The absence of fiscal harmonization was again also considered to be a major deficit in the Treaty and one of the main goals of the Amsterdam Treaty—the reduction of the gap between the EU and its citizens—was said not to be achieved at all. In this context, the lack of transparency in the EU and the complexity of the treaties were criticized as well. A second major goal of Amsterdam was the preparation for enlargement. All parties agreed that only small and thus insufficient steps had been taken here. The postponement of certain crucial decisions was condemned in great detail. The MPs asked a lot of questions in connection to enlargement and the manageability

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of the process. Several expressed the wish to be involved in the forthcoming enlargement negotiations. The initiative of the Belgian government, supported by Italy and France, and annexed to the Treaty requiring ‘deepening before widening the EU’, was praised by all parties except the Vlaams Belang. But as in 1993, this critical evaluation of the results of Amsterdam did not lead to a rejection by the three traditional party families. They voted in favour of the Treaty. One Francophone Socialist MP voted against, but his motivation was similar to the other MPs of his party who voted yes. The Vlaams Belang, the Green parties, and the Front Nouveau de Belgique (FNB), a breakaway from the Front National, rejected the Treaty. One item in the Treaty pleased the Vlaams Belang: the inclusion of the nationality principle. But the disadvantage of this principle, the party said, is that it is based on the member states and not on the European peoples. This remains the main argument of the party against the EU: Europe can only be a Europe of the peoples and not a Europe of artificial states. In contrast to the other Belgian parties, the Vlaams Belang does not want the power of the EP to be increased, because this will increase the distance to the European citizen. The power should remain in the hands of the Council, the latter being scrutinized by the national parliaments. The same argument explains its rejection of qualified majority voting. Another criticism on the Amsterdam Treaty was the increasing dominance of the large member states, mainly France. The process of integration, the Vlaams Belang says, is based on France’s national interests. France tries to limit the power of the smaller member states. This anti-French position is of course also inspired by the position of the Vlaams Belang in the internal debate on the use of language in Belgium. The Vlaams Belang also paid attention to the security problems in the EU, such as migration and organized crime. The results of the Amsterdam Treaty were very poorly regarded in this respect, certainly in the prospect of enlargement. Vlaams Belang defended a severe control of the external borders of the EU, an effective police and justice policy, and a common asylum and visa policy. In general, the tone of the Vlaams Belang was a bit harder now, and did criticize some of the central elements of the European construction. Its voting against the ratification of Amsterdam and the arguments used to do so, qualified it again as a Hard Eurosceptic party. But the caveat remains—the issue is not relevant in general and not actively communicated by the Vlaams Belang. The FNB did not participate in the debate. It is, therefore, impossible to know why the Francophone extreme-right-wing party voted against Amsterdam, since there is not any other evidence of a party position in this respect. The Greens rejected the Amsterdam Treaty as they did for the Maastricht Treaty, because it was not European enough. They criticized the lack of an integrated social, employment, and environmental policy; the lack of fiscal policy; the democratic deficit; the absence of a united CFSP; and the poor preparation for enlargement. These arguments could also be heard from the traditional parties, but for the Greens they were not an argument to support the (too) small step forward, but to reject it.

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The criticisms of the Volksunie on the Treaty were summarized in ‘11 disillusions’. Besides the generally condemned bad institutional preparation for enlargement, the ‘technocratic’ integration method, the democratic deficit, and the insufficiencies in the second and third pillar—the party also expressed its typical ‘regional concerns’. It regretted that the Committee of the Regions did not evolve towards a second parliamentarian chamber. It condemned the language agreement (for not being elaborated enough), the limitations on the subsidiarity principle, and the absence of a debate on the distribution of competences between EU and the member states. This made the Volksunie conclude that the EU and Belgium needed a ‘shock therapy’, being a referendum on the Treaty. The Volksunie introduced this idea in a resolution that was supported by the Greens and the Vlaams Belang. Moreover, the Volksunie urged for a new debate on the future of Europe. Its alternative for the current enlargement procedure would be some kind of ‘Nucleus Europe’ of member states supporting a truly federal Europe based on European regions. As for the debates on the Maastricht Treaty, we notice here a number of parties voting against the Treaty because it was too little a step towards a truly federal Europe. And we see parties voting in favour of the Treaty with exactly the same arguments to defend the little step forward. The Volksunie was a bit more critical of Amsterdam than of Maastricht, and might possibly qualify as a Eurosceptic party here. The Vlaams Belang is again the only party for which we can say that it is, compared to the other Belgian parties, fairly Eurosceptic. The only problem is that this position does not really matter.

5.3.2.3 The Treaty of Nice The Belgian parties agreed almost unanimously that Nice—once again—did not meet the expectations at all, the main concern being the insufficient preparation for enlargement. Besides this, the ‘usual deficits’ of the integration process were mentioned (e.g. social policy, fiscal harmonization, CFSP, transparency, democratic deficit), all revealing the wish to transform the EU into a real federal construction. The governing parties (Liberals, Socialists, and Greens) agreed that the results were rather poor but it was, they said, the best they could get. The Flemish Christian Democrats, in opposition after forty years of government, endorsed this observation. The main party to challenge the results of the Treaty was, surprisingly, the Francophone Christian Democratic party. It said that Nice did not represent a significant step forward. The main arguments for rejecting the Treaty were the poor institutional preparation for enlargement, being too complicated, too much in favour of big member states, and leading to an institutional imbalance benefiting the Council. By rejecting the Nice Treaty, the Francophone Christian Democrats wanted to give the Convention a real chance to succeed, because the rejection of the Treaty would leave more options open. The party was heavily criticized for this attitude by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, its sister party on Flemish side, and the other governing parties. It was blamed

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for being unfaithful to its own history and project and to its former leading politicians. While the Francophone Christian Democrats surprised some with their negative vote, the Greens—for the first time in government—presented a common front in favour of the Treaty. Just like before, the Green parties criticized the shortcomings of the results. But they concluded they had to vote in favour of the Treaty in the prospect of the Convention. The Volksunie fell apart in two parties: a left-liberal party called Spirit and a more traditional Flemish nationalist New Flemish Alliance. A number of representatives of the Volksunie also joined other parties. The MPs of the Volksunie voted in a dispersed way, and this reflects the road they took after the party split. The New Flemish Alliance (except one MP) abstained from voting. The others voted in favour of the Treaty. The Vlaams Belang once again rejected the Treaty. It condemned the reactions on the Irish ‘no’ and the lack of attention for ‘the ordinary people’ in the EU. The party regretted the discussion between Belgium and the Netherlands on the weighting of the votes in the Council. This debacle was considered to be a major diplomatic mistake of the Prime Minister. The Convention was judged to be ‘too closed’ as a method and not transparent at all. The party pleaded again for a referendum and a reopening of the debate. The Vlaams Belang voiced some fears about the enlargement process. It was based, it said, on geopolitical goals and did not have a social and economic foundation. The EU should enlarge gradually, support the candidate states economically, and limit temporarily the practice of free movement. The Vlaams Belang also reaffirmed its belief in a confederal, intergovernmental Europe where nations have their own identity. The Front National again did not participate in the debate. Its representative in the House voted against the Treaty.

5.4 MAPPING AND MEASURING EUROSCEPTICISM In Section 5.3, we focused on the parliamentary debates. The reason for doing so was the fact that this is one of the only places where a debate on the European issues can be seen, and—especially—where the political parties take different actions. The disadvantage of the method is of course that parties not represented in the parliament are not part of the picture. That is, however, only a minor problem. The Belgian electoral system is very proportional, allowing smaller parties to gain representation fairly easily. Parties not gaining representation must therefore be very small and hardly significant. Some of these minor parties do however take a very clear position on the European issue, while others do not. The largest party not gaining seats at the 2003 federal elections—Vivant—has in the very first place a programme on economic and financial issues. It defends a basic income for everybody. And it generally defends a more direct type of democracy. The word ‘Europe’ appears three times

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in the party programme, and none of these refers to the EU (VIVANT Programma 2003). This is one more illustration of the extremely low relevance of the topic in Belgian politics. On the extreme right, we already saw that the Vlaams Belang takes a more or less Hard Eurosceptic position when it has to decide on the ratification of the treaties, and we have seen how on the Francophone side the Front National says ‘no’ without any argumentation (Rea 1997). There was on the Francophone side one more extreme-right-wing party. Its name is Agir. It was rooted mainly in Liège, but was—just like the FN—internally rather divided. It called itself unitarist (referring to Belgian unity) and monarchist, and defended direct democracy. And again unlike other right-wing extremist parties in Europe, there was in its programme not one single word on Europe (Brewaeys, Dahuat, and Tolbiac 1992). Agir did not participate in the last elections. We only mention it here to illustrate how in general the right-wing extremist tendency in Belgium does not focus on the European issue. If we move to the extreme left side of the spectrum, we do find a number of parties voicing the classical leftist criticism of the European construction (Delwit and De Waele 1997). First, there is the Belgian Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid van België (PvdA)/Parti du Travail de Belgique (PTB)—PvdA/PTB). It has its roots in the student movements of the 1960s, where it originally defended the Maoist tendency. It always participates in elections, but has never reached a score above 0.6 per cent of the votes. Its position on Europe is clear: the EU is a strategy of the capitalists to withhold the people their means to fight against suppression and exploitation. All resistance against the EU should be directed towards the destruction of European institutions and its replacement by institutions of the people. The party also rejects enlargement to the east because this will be the end of what is left of socialist achievements (Martens 1988; PvdA 2002). Also on the left there is a small party of the Trotskyist tendency, the Socialist Labour Party (Socialistische Arbeiders Partij/Parti Ouvrier Socialiste, SAP/POS). Its position on Europe is basically the same as that of the PTB/PvdA: it has to be rejected for its unacceptable liberal, capitalist, and imperialist (pro-US) flavour. The Socialist Labour Party did however not participate in the 2003 elections. The same leftist Eurosceptic position is defended by the Belgian Communist Party, but it has been slowly disappearing in the course of the last decades, polling now a meagre 0.4 per cent of the votes. Looking at the European elections, we can mention the list E-NON that participated in the very first elections of 1979, realizing the low score of 0.4 per cent. In 1994, there was the list DEBOUT (standing up) that was supported by the small Belgian Labour Party. This list was presented by a labour union activist who had led the (rather violent) protest against the closing of a steel factory, and it polled 0.7 per cent of the votes. The leftist parties have presented a united list at the European elections of 1994, called ‘Regenboog’ (Rainbow). But again the score was not impressive (0.4 per cent). Table 5.2 summarizes all these findings. We list the parties that were in 2002/3 (i.e. for the ratification of the Nice Treaty or according to their party programme)

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Table 5.2. Eurosceptic parties in Belgian politics Party Vlaams Belang Belgian Labour Party Communist Party Francophone Christian Democrats New Flemish Alliance∗ Front National ∗

Family

Type of Euroscepticism

Score in 2003

Extreme right Extreme left Extreme left Christian Democracy Regionalist Extreme right

Hard Hard Hard Soft Soft Soft

11.6% 0.1% 0.1% 5.5% 3.1% 2.0%

This party did not yet exist in 1999. We gave it half of the score of the former Volksunie.

voicing Eurosceptic positions. We also categorize them as being either Soft or Hard Eurosceptics. This measurement is based on the Belgian debates alone. It means that the ‘Hard’ score given to Vlaams Blok might also be considered ‘Soft’ if compared to the way other Eurosceptic parties behave in other countries. The score for the very small leftist parties is ‘Hard’ both from a Belgian and from a comparative perspective. All this adds up to 11.8 per cent of Hard party-based Euroscepticism and 10.6 per cent of Soft Euroscepticism. The Eurobarometer measures 12 per cent of the Belgian population thinking that the EU is a bad thing (Eurobarometer 60). Table 5.2 contains one surprise—the presence of a traditional Christian Democratic party on the Eurosceptic side. It needs, however, to be qualified. As we explained earlier, the party position does not differ from the position of the parties that did vote in favour of the Nice Treaty. The position of the Francophone Christian Democrats can be explained very simply by the fact that it is now an opposition party. The Greens, who have to be classified now as Europhile, did vote against the treaties as long as they were in opposition. If we would sum up the score of all the parties that did not support one of the three treaties in the 1990s, it would be as high as 38 per cent (see Table 5.3) The other surprising feature of the Belgian story is the position of the rightwing extremist Vlaams Belang. We have labelled it as ‘Hard Eurosceptical’, because it can indeed—in the Belgian context—be situated on the most Eurosceptic side of the spectrum. But its Hard position lacks relevance, first because of the low salience of the issue in Belgian politics, and second because the party does not actually mobilize on the European issue. It has taken clear anti-European positions, but does not display a very strong Eurosceptic rhetoric. Furthermore, its European position is not central in its party programme. Whether the Vlaams Belang mobilizes Eurosceptic attitudes among the voters is difficult to say. In order to control for that, one would need election surveys asking specific questions about the European construction. Yet the election surveys in Belgium do not ask any question about European integration (which is in itself one more interesting indicator of the fact that the topic is a non-issue). We have found three indirect indicators, however, in the 1999 election survey. The first is a question about identity (meant to measure intra-Belgian identities), where Europe

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Party-Based Euroscepticism in Belgium Table 5.3. Election results for the federal House of Representatives in 2003 Flemish Liberals (VLD) Flemish Socialists (SPa-Spirit) Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) Francophone Socialists (PS) Flemish Right-Wing Populists (Vlaams Belang) Francophone Liberals (MR) Francophone Greens (Ecolo) Francophone Christian Democrats (CDH) Flemish Greens (Groen) Flemish Nationalists (N-VA) Vivant Francophone Right-Wing Populists (Front National) Communist Party (PC) Belgian Labour Party (PvdA/PTB) Others (34 smaller parties)

15.4% 14.9% 13.2% 13.0% 11.6% 11.4% 3.1% 5.5% 2.5% 3.1% 1.1% 2.0% 0.1% 0.1% 3.0%

is also included in the list of entities with which one can identify. The second is a related question, asking how often one feels like a European citizen. The third is part of a series of ‘trust’ items, asking to what extent the voters trust the EP. The results are presented in Table 5.4. For all three indicators the Vlaams Belang has the highest or the lowest score. The differences are significant, but not very high. The Vlaams Belang does attract the most Eurosceptical voters, but this Euroscepticism is not a characteristic that allow us to clearly differentiate between the voters of Vlaams Belang and the other parties. The most striking (or disturbing) element remains the fact that the party does not actively mobilize its critical view on Europe. It is disturbing, because one Table 5.4. Three indicators of ‘trusting Europe’ related to voting behaviour (ISPO/PIOP Electoral survey 1999)—percentages∗

Flemish Christian Democrats Flemish Liberals Flemish Socialists Flemish Regionalists Flemish Greens Flemish Right-Wing Populists Francophone Socialists Francophone Christian Democrats Francophone Liberals Francophone Greens ∗

Europe as first identity

Never feeling a European citizen

Not trusting the EP at all

18 20 22 20 29 16 29 37 35 35

47 49 52 51 32 57 37 28 23 22

4 6 5 6 5 16 12 7 10 7

Figures for Francophone extreme right are not shown because number of cases in survey is too low.

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would expect it to do so (Taggart 1998; Mair 2000). The party is very peripheral. As a protest party, it has put itself clearly away from the mainstream. Its opposition is not loyal, but aimed in the very first place at shooting at the heart of the system. Its extremism has lead the other parties to push it even further away from the mainstream: it is openly and explicitly kept out of any coalition formation, even in cases where it is or was the largest party (the cities of Antwerp and Mechelen, the Dutch-speaking group in the Brussels regional parliament). Although this ‘cordon sanitaire’ seems to hurt, it is also used to show how the others are afraid of the truth, how the others are ruthlessly trying to cling to the power that they have. All other parties are governing or potentially governing parties, and that distinguishes them clearly from the Vlaams Belang. All other parties—as governing parties— defend the good old Belgian strong pro-European attitude. But while the Vlaams Belang puts itself outside of the mainstream, it keeps doing so by referring only to the Belgian political system. The latter might offer the solution of the puzzle. The Vlaams Belang is indeed a right-wing extremist party, mobilizing on topics like immigration and security, but at the same time it is a regionalist party. Its origin is a breakaway from the too-moderate Volksunie, and its clearest goal is the full independence of Flanders (including Brussels) and thus the end of Belgium. Flanders can go on its own, it says, because it can simply become a member state of Europe. Flanders has six million inhabitants, and that is more than some of the other member states. In other words, the regionalist (separatist) ideology of the Vlaams Belang makes it look at Europe in a different way than the other right-wing extremist parties who defend the autonomy and identity of their national state. Regionalist parties are indeed generally more positive about Europe (De Winter 2001) since Europe is legitimizing the regional level, and because the European framework allows regions to be present in the world (in Europe to start with) without having to make a reference to their national state. Europe is a way to jump over the state level. This party ideology, or at least one aspect of it, might be an explanation for the non-mobilization of Euroscepticism. The other might of course be the general Belgian positive attitude, which makes it difficult or eventually counterproductive to go against European integration. Yet the Vlaams Belang has never tried. Whether it will do it in the future depends on the relevance of the theme in general or the relevance of one particular issue. The EU membership of Turkey for instance is one of the topics on which the Vlaams Belang was ready to mobilize in the future (interview with Party President Vanhecke in April 2003).

5.5 CONCLUSION The relevance of the European issue in Belgium is extremely low. This was both the starting point and the general context of our analysis—or rather our search for—party-based Euroscepticism. We have relied heavily on the debates and the

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voting behaviour in parliament to be able to discuss variation in positions and actions of the political parties. And actually these debates (on which the media hardly report though) revealed quite a high level of Euroscepticism. All parties participating in the debates did not agree with the ongoing integration process in certain policy fields. And the general view is that the integration process is too slow, that national states retain too much power. Yet the translation of this view in voting behaviour can be very different. The same arguments are being used for saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the Treaties. The main explanation for the voting behaviour is then not so much the degree of Euroscepticism, but rather a division line between traditional and temporarily governing parties that support the Treaties, and nontraditional parties rejecting them. Greens have changed their voting behaviour, but without changing their view on Europe. The same goes for the exception to this general rule—the Francophone Christian Democrats—who decided to vote against the Nice Treaty, with arguments not different from those deciding to vote in favour. Only the right-wing populist Vlaams Belang displays a coherent behaviour. It has indeed been during this whole period a non-traditional and opposition party. Its views on Europe are also different. The party does not like the strength of the states in Europe, but this is very much rooted in its fierce rejection of the Belgian state. In its party programme or in its political discourse, the Vlaams Belang does not mobilize on the European issue. We have tried to explain this by referring to its regionalist nature, but the main argument remains that debates on Europe are not relevant, and that, therefore, it would probably not be paying to use this theme as a mobilizing one. The Euroscepticism of the Vlaams Belang might be ‘Hard’ in the Belgian context—it is hardly relevant in this Belgian context. The data utilized in this publication were made available by the ISPO Interuniversity Centre for Political Opinion Research, sponsored by the Federal Service for Technical, Cultural, and Scientific Affairs. The data were originally collected by Jaak Billiet, Marc Swyngedouw, Astrid Depickere, and Erik Meersseman (ISPO) for the Flemish voters. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Centre bears any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here.

6 Euroscepticism in the British Party System: ‘A Source of Fascination, Perplexity, and Sometimes Frustration’ David Baker, Andrew Gamble, Nick Randall, and David Seawright

6.1 INTRODUCTION In April 2002, in a speech at Oxford University, Romano Prodi, the then President of the European Commission, remarked, ‘Britain’s attitude to Europe contrasts with that of many of its EU partners. It is a source of fascination, perplexity, and sometimes frustration for your friends elsewhere in Europe’ (Prodi 2002). Prodi’s comments accurately reflect several of the features of British Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism in Britain certainly provokes fascination, providing a burgeoning area of academic research in recent years. That it has done so owes much to its perplexing nature. British Euroscepticism has defied easy characterization; its support has waxed and waned, parties have embraced and then abandoned Eurosceptic policies, while otherwise fundamentally antagonistic politicians and organizations have formed unlikely alliances in their opposition to European integration. Moreover, while British Eurosceptics have failed to fundamentally redefine Britain’s relationship with Europe, their resistance has nevertheless been a source of frustration both for Britain’s Europhiles but also for party managers with the opening of unprecedented fissures in the British party system. This chapter will have three main objectives. First, it will map out this perplexing territory by outlining the broad trajectory of British Euroscepticism and the historical and contemporary extent of Euroscepticism in the major and minor parties in the British party system. Secondly, the chapter will examine the extent to which Eurosceptic concerns have become politically salient in the British party system. Finally, the chapter will conclude by attempting to account for this historical and contemporary pattern of Euroscepticism in British party politics.

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We can identify four distinct phases of British Euroscepticism. The first phase of British Euroscepticism can be defined as the period between the end of the Second World War and the parliamentary ratification of Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1972. At the outset of this period, Euroscepticism was the conventional wisdom amongst the British political elite. By 1972, such intellectual and political hegemony had been lost. Nevertheless, the pragmatic economic rationale presented for membership failed to undermine Euroscepticism. Indeed, an abbreviated second phase then followed until the 1975 referendum in which Eurosceptics vainly fought a rearguard action to secure Britain’s exit from the EEC through a ‘no’ vote in the referendum on Labour’s renegotiated terms of membership. The period thereafter until 1988 forms a third period in which, following the outcome of the referendum and despite developments within the Labour Party, Euroscepticism became a much more latent feature of British politics. The fourth and current phase of Euroscepticism began in the late 1980s. In this period, Euroscepticism became fundamental to the contemporary configuration of British politics and general elections. With the dynamics for closer political integration accelerating, issues of sovereignty and national identity have become central to Eurosceptic concerns, catalysing the growth of Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party and the creation of new Eurosceptic minor parties. Moreover, as monetary union has gained momentum so a new front for British Eurosceptics has opened, one upon which they have been reinforced by a new breed of Soft Eurosceptics who profess themselves to be pro-European but nevertheless vigorously oppose the single currency.

6.3 EUROSCEPTICISM AND THE BRITISH PARTY SYSTEM Any review of Euroscepticism within the British party system has to contend with the inability of the major political parties to develop stable policy commitments regarding European integration and their continued incapacity to unite around either pro- or anti-European policies. In this regard an examination of party policy commitments is illuminating. However, given the ‘permissive consensus’ on the European integration issue in the greater part of the postwar period (see later) we must also recognize that an accurate reflection of the Euroscepticism of British political parties cannot be derived solely from such a textual analysis. Accordingly, we shall supplement party policy statements by identifying, where possible, intra-party Eurosceptic organizations and the extent to which the elected representatives of the parties have been sympathetic to Euroscepticism (see Table 6.1).

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6.4 THE LABOUR PARTY Despite the existence of a vocal pro-European minority within its ranks, the Labour Party maintained Eurosceptic policies, albeit with brief interregnums between 1967–70 and 1975–80, throughout the first three of the four phases of British Euroscepticism outlined earlier. The 1945–51 Labour government had regarded European integration suspiciously, associating it with the continental political right and suspecting it would serve as a Trojan horse for European capitalism to mobilize against a Labour government. When confronted, in 1961, with Britain’s first application for membership such concerns were renewed. The party feared the federalist ambitions of integrationists and argued that entry would demand reorientation of relationships with the Commonwealth and fundamentally compromise national sovereignty, particularly in the economic sphere (Labour Party 1961). In the following year, opposition hardened further, not least following Gaitskell’s conference speech which envisioned membership as ‘the end of Britain as an independent European state . . . the end of a thousand years of history’ (Labour Party 1962: 159). Yet, within five years, the Wilson Government would issue Britain’s second application for EEC membership. It did so, moreover, without significant Eurosceptic dissent within the Cabinet, parliamentary party (just thirty-six Labour MPs opposed the application in the division lobbies), or at the party’s conference. This owed more to the expectation of a French veto, Wilson’s wily party management, and the ennui triggered by growing economic difficulties than it did to any dramatic shift in attitudes within the party. Indeed, Labour’s policies quickly reverted to Euroscepticism, with a 1971 special conference of the party opposing the terms negotiated by the Conservatives. However, when sixty-nine Labour MPs defied the Labour whip to vote in favour of entry, the division of the party on the issue became explicit, solidifying into a new cleavage which guaranteed further division in an already fratricidal party. Labour returned to office in 1974 promising a ‘fundamental renegotiation of the terms of entry’ and to present these terms for public approval in a referendum. This succeeded, temporarily, in preventing the issue from incapacitating the party and the government. Nevertheless, the divisions within the party remained stark. Thus, the Cabinet approved the renegotiated terms by a majority of sixteen to seven, yet in the Commons vote on the terms, Labour MPs were almost equally divided with 133 in favour, 145 opposed and 33 abstaining. With public endorsement of the renegotiated terms in the June 1975 referendum and with mounting economic malaise the party’s divisions faded from view. However, Labour’s Eurosceptics had not surrendered. Defeat in the 1979 general election saw the Labour Left win control of the party’s National Executive Committee and conference and abetted by this development the party’s policies reached a Eurosceptic apogee with the party’s October 1980 conference voting by five million to two million votes to withdraw from the EEC.

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However, following its 1983 election defeat the party’s conference anticipated Britain’s increasing integration into the EEC and accepted that withdrawal should no longer be an irrevocable objective but contingent upon the EEC’s future trajectory (see Labour Party 1983: 13, 1984: 9). Thereafter, party policy adopted a de facto but grudging acceptance of membership which nevertheless maintained that EEC interference in the economic strategy of a future Labour government would not be countenanced. From 1988, however, party policy rapidly shifted to an explicitly pro-European position. In that year, Neil Kinnock formally and unequivocally disavowed withdrawal while in 1989 the party’s Policy Review confirmed that ‘Britain’s future is in the European Community as it develops’ (Labour Party 1989: 180). Thereafter, party policy increasingly focused upon the opportunities which Europe provided, through the pooling of sovereignty, for pursuit of the party’s rediscovered social democratic objectives. However, the post-1989 enthusiasm of party documents has not been indiscriminate or uncritical but tempered by cautiousness and pragmatic calculations of national advantage. Accordingly, since 1989 the party has continued to repudiate ambitions to construct a Federal Europe seeking instead ‘a Europe which is a union of independent member states, coming together because they share common interests, not because they want to submerge themselves in a single European government’ (Labour Party 1995: 1). British vetoes over defence, security, immigration, budgetary policy, and international treaties have also remained nonnegotiable (Labour Party 1997: 37, 2001: 38). Furthermore, although the party embraced membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1990 and the principle of British participation in the single currency in 1991, it has insisted that Britain would only participate if membership proved to be in the national economic interest, an approach embodied since 1997 in the preconditions for entry established by the Treasury’s five economic tests. Nevertheless, Labour’s policy is now at its most pro-European and ‘excepting only Edward Heath’s government, this Labour government can lay claim to being Britain’s most pro-European administration’ (Heffernan 2001: 181). However, as Austin Mitchell has reportedly commented, Labour Eurosceptics ‘may be a dying breed, but . . . are not extinct yet’ (Britain in Europe 2001). Eurosceptic organizations within the Labour Party have been both less numerous and more tepid than their Conservative counterparts, largely due to the strength and durability of factional organization within the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP). However, in the mid-1980s as the Tribune Group was transformed from ‘the light cavalry of the Parliamentary Labour Party’ (Harris 1984: 171) to ‘a badge, a style accoutrement, rather than a political body’ (Marr 1993) it ceased to be an effective factional exponent of Euroscepticism. The Socialist Campaign Group however continues to assert Eurosceptic positions although it attracted the support of just twenty-seven MPs in 2002. The most prominent Eurosceptic organization within the contemporary party is now the Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign. This organization was originally founded as the Labour Committee for the Five Safeguards on the Common

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Market in 1962 and changed name and relaunched several times before assuming its present title in 1995. Despite its changes in nomenclature, however, it remains opposed in principle to European integration. More recently dedicated anti-single currency organizations have also emerged within the party. In March 1996 the People’s Europe Campaign was founded to oppose the single currency and in April 2002 a new body, Labour Against the Euro (LATE), was formed. However, LATE did not attract substantial support with just thirty-seven Labour MPs and Peers joining the organization. In July 2003 a further Eurosceptic organization emerged from within Labour’s ranks, Labour for a Referendum, to campaign for a plebiscite on the proposed EU Constitution. However, this organization could only draw upon thirty MPs as sponsors, few of whom were not already supporters of LATE.

6.5 THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY In the initial years of the post-war period while ‘Strasbourg Tories’ such as Macmillan and Sandys advocated British involvement in European integration, the majority of the Conservative Party and its policies, like those of Labour, were resolutely Eurosceptic. Harold Macmillan’s 1961 announcement that Britain would open negotiations for EEC membership might have therefore been expected to trigger intense resistance within the party. Certainly there was no profound enthusiasm for membership, and in some quarters overt disquiet. This was signalled by the formation of the Conservative Common Market Committee to marshal opposition on the Conservative backbenches and the Anti-Common Market League to lead a grassroots campaign against membership. Yet, Macmillan dealt with the issue adroitly, downplaying the political consequences of membership for its economic advantages, leaving the opposition that was mustered ‘remarkably feeble’ (Morris 1996: 126). Just one junior ministerial resignation followed and in the Commons debate on the application just twenty Conservative MPs abstained while only one voted against the government. When a Conservative government next faced the issue, the response of Eurosceptics was once again stunted. In reaction to Heath’s negotiations for entry a new Eurosceptic grouping, the 1970 Group, emerged and given the government’s slim majority were conceivably poised to defeat the European Communities Bill. Yet, amidst complex parliamentary dynamics Eurosceptic opposition ‘proved in fact much weaker than everyone expected’ (Ashford 1980: 107). Although thirtynine Conservative MPs voted against membership in October 1971 they were more than counterbalanced by the Labour rebels. In subsequent divisions, Conservative Eurosceptics reduced the government’s majority but were unable to prevent Britain’s accession. Renegotiation and the referendum provided Conservative Eurosceptics with a second opportunity. Again the Conservative Eurosceptics organized, this time as

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Conservatives against the Treaty of Rome. However, such opposition again proved ineffective. Eighteen Conservative MPs abstained and just eight voted against the renegotiated terms in the Commons. As such, the party’s domestic reputation as the ‘party of Europe’ seemed secure. In the first term of the Thatcher government, the Prime Minister’s determination to obtain a rebate on British contributions to the Community’s budget could not fail to win the endorsement of the party’s Eurosceptics, nor could her truculent approach to other member states. Yet, in April 1986, when the Single European Act came before the House of Commons, Eurosceptic opposition was once again meek with only ten Conservative MPs voting against and a further twelve abstaining. From the late 1980s onwards, however, Euroscepticism within the party gathered strength, such that within a decade Euroscepticism would become the defining characteristic of the Conservative Party’s identity and enshrined in its policies. A bewildering variety of Eurosceptic organizations now emerged. The Bruges Group, formed in February 1989 in support of Mrs Thatcher’s anti-European integration sentiments expressed in a speech at the College of Europe, was the first of this new epoch. It has chiefly served as a Eurosceptic think tank for the party and together with the European Foundation and the European Research Group accounts for the growing intellectual vitality of Euroscepticism within the party. In addition, older Eurosceptic organizations reinvigorated themselves, particularly Conservatives against the Treaty of Rome which relaunched itself in 1992 as Conservatives Against a Federal Europe. Furthermore, both old and new internal party groupings representing broader tendencies within the party made Euroscepticism central to their positions including the No Turning Back Group, the 92 Group, and Conservative Way Forward. However, perhaps the most remarkable grouping was the Fresh Start Group which emerged after an attempt to remove Bill Cash from the chairmanship of the Conservative backbench committee on European Affairs in November 1991. This grouping became the organizational core of the Conservative rebellions on the Maastricht Treaty. Indeed, the prolonged intra-party guerrilla warfare during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty saw Conservative Eurosceptics develop a hitherto unknown organizational skill and vehemence which peaked with forty-one Conservatives voting against and five abstaining to defeat the government’s motion on Britain’s opt-out from the Social Chapter (see Gorman and Kirby 1993). John Major subsequently won a vote of confidence to overturn the Eurosceptics victory and ratify the Treaty. In the past, this would have been the signal for Eurosceptics to retreat to lick their wounds. Major, however, found himself under their continual assault for the remainder of the parliament. Major attempted to stem the Eurosceptic advance, removing the whip from eight Conservatives who voted against increases in the EU budget in November 1994 and resigning and recontesting the party leadership in July 1995. But increasingly Major was impelled to trim toward Eurosceptic positions, responding to the EU’s ban on British beef exports with a campaign of non-cooperation and in April 1996 accepting a referendum on any future decision on the single currency.

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After the 1997 election, however, under the leadership of William Hague, Major’s prevarication was terminated by the swift adoption of overtly Eurosceptic policies. This was most evident in policy towards the single currency. In October 1997, Major’s policy of ‘negotiate and decide’ was replaced by opposition to British membership for the remainder of the parliament and the duration of the next, a position subsequently endorsed in a ballot of party members by 84.4– 15.6 per cent. However, the growing Euroscepticism of the party went beyond this. The party’s 1999 European Parliament manifesto introduced proposals for a new treaty provision permitting countries to decline to participate in any European legislation beyond the single market (Conservative Party 1999: 5). Indeed, by the 2001 election, the party not only pledged to renegotiate the Nice Treaty to regain British vetoes but also proposed amendments to British law to introduce ‘reserved powers’ protected from the encroachments of EU law (Conservative Party 2001: 29). Following the party’s 2001 election defeat and Hague’s resignation, the election of Iain Duncan Smith, a former member of the Fresh Start Group and distinguished Maastricht rebel, guaranteed a continued Eurosceptic ascendancy. Indeed, his appointment of a Shadow Cabinet, even more Eurosceptic than his predecessors clearly comforted Eurosceptics within the party such as the Conservatives against a Federal Europe who suspended their activities upon Duncan Smith’s victory.

6.6 THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS In contrast to Labour and the Conservatives, Euroscepticism has gained comparatively little ground amongst Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats inherited a tradition of enthusiasm for European integration from their forebears in the Liberal Party (Clarke and Curtice 1998). Developments in the 1980s further solidified this enthusiasm. First, although the Labour MPs who left Labour in 1981 to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP) were not all militant pro-Europeans (Crewe and King 1995) the Liberal’s partner in the Alliance shared and bolstered their pro-European predisposition, even if there were disputes over the desirability of a federal Europe (see Butt Philip 1993). Secondly, when the two parties merged in 1988 the presence of Eurosceptics within the new party diminished as many of those who departed in opposition to the merger were also Eurosceptics. Indeed, the reconstituted Liberal Party where many relocated has consistently called for Britain to withdraw from the EU since its formation. However, Euroscepticism is not totally alien to the Liberal Democrats. For an extended period, Nick Harvey enjoyed the status as the party’s sole parliamentary Eurosceptic, a status confirmed by his votes against the Maastricht Treaty and for Bill Cash’s 1996 Referendum Bill. However, Harvey has recently revised his position to accord more closely with the party’s policy. In his place, Liberal Democrat Euroscepticism in the Commons come to be overtly expressed by John Burnett

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MP, the Vice Chair of the New Europe Group, and Paul Marsden MP, both of whom voiced reservations over the single currency until their departure from the Commons in 2005.

6.7 THE ETHNO-REGIONALIST PARTIES The fate of Euroscepticism in Britain’s ethno-regionalist parties follows a similarly complex trajectory. After a period of Eurosceptic ascendancy since the 1960s, support for European integration has now become central to Scottish and Welsh nationalist discourses and programmes. Euroscepticism has become a marginal force (see Baker, Randall, and Seawright 2002) in these parties despite the potentially negative consequences of contemporary developments within the EU for ethno-regionalist parties (de Winter 2001: 4–9).

6.7.1 The Scottish National Party (SNP) The SNP was an early advocate of European integration, endorsing European unity at its 1943 and 1948 conferences (Mitchell 1998: 110). However, enthusiasm diminished as a new generation of members joined the party in the early 1960s, such that the 1962 SNP conference passed a resolution deploring the Conservative government’s support for European integration (Mitchell 1996: 194). Thereafter, a distinctively nationalist critique of European integration took hold. This focused primarily upon how membership would compromise Scottish sovereignty and the party’s objective of Scottish independence. But, in addition this nationalist critique also claimed that entry would be detrimental given Scotland’s status as a primary producer in the fishing, agricultural, and, after the discovery of North Sea oil, energy industries. Following a virtually unanimous decision at a special conference in January 1975, the SNP campaigned for a ‘no’ vote in the 1975 referendum on EEC membership. However, during the 1980s under the influence of figures including Gordon Wilson, Jim Sillars, and Winnie Ewing, SNP policy gradually sloughed off its Euroscepticism. First, in 1983, the party abandoned its outright opposition to membership. However, as support amongst the Scottish public for membership increased and as the conviction grew that far from threatening regional empowerment, European social and regional development policies would provide Scottish gains, the party adopted a policy of ‘independence in Europe’ in 1988. This saw the party return to a wholehearted embrace of European integration, hereafter viewing it both as the most appropriate context for Scottish modernization and as a potent response to accusations that secession from the UK would prove economically untenable. In so far as Euroscepticism surfaces within the contemporary SNP, it does so primarily in the ‘Soft’ form of opposition to the single currency which SNP policy

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has supported in principle since 1991. Jim Sillars has emerged as a fierce critic of the single currency and joined forces with the former Conservative Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind to launch the Scottish Business for Sterling campaign in July 2000. Likewise, Alex Neil MSP, John Swinney’s principal opponent in the party’s 2000 leadership contest also opposed the single currency. Neil openly called for the SNP to campaign for a ‘no’ vote in any referendum on the grounds that ‘the constitutional and economic arguments for Scotland voting no in the UK Euro referendum are overwhelming, particularly for Nationalists aspiring to maximize Scottish independence in Europe’ (Neil 2001).

6.7.2 Plaid Cymru Like the SNP, Plaid Cymru was also an early adherent of European integration, not least given the influence of figures within the Welsh nationalist movement such as Saunders Lewis who had asserted in 1927 that ‘To bring political and economic unity to Europe should be one of the first priorities of our century’. From ‘its very beginning, Plaid looked to Europe as the natural political context for a small nation like Wales’ (McAllister 2001: 145). However, as in the SNP, the looming prospect of membership during the 1960s triggered a change in perspective. Utilitarian anxieties over the impact of membership upon Welsh economic interests (particularly in steel and hill farming) combined with criticisms of the democratic shortcomings of the EEC persuaded the party’s 1969 conference to oppose signing the Treaty of Rome. Such concerns persisted in the short term and led the 1975 conference to endorse a ‘no’ vote in the referendum. However, in its aftermath and that of the 1979 devolution referendum Plaid reconsidered its approach. By 1983, outright opposition to Europe was supplanted by agnosticism with a commitment to a referendum on Welsh EEC membership in which Plaid would campaign neither for nor against membership. Shortly thereafter, however, in the 1984 European election campaign Plaid could be found endorsing the EEC as a platform to bypass rule from Westminster. By 1989, in tune with developments within the SNP, Plaid had also adopted a policy of ‘independence in Europe’.

6.8 THE MINOR PARTIES However, Euroscepticism thrives amongst Britain’s minor parties. Seventy-three parties registered with the Electoral Commission stood candidates in the 2001 election. If we exclude those already considered earlier, those which polled less than 500 votes, and single-issue parties like the Pro-Life Alliance, approximately half of the remainder stood on programmes which incorporated Euroscepticism. For example, the Green Party has expressed distaste for European integration since its foundation and although it has softened its Euroscepticism by

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abandoning explicit references to withdrawal in its programmes since 1997 it nevertheless continues to hold profound misgivings about the EU. The party continues to attack the centralization, remoteness, and unaccountability of the EU; its promotion of the interests of multinational corporations; and its failure to promote environmental sustainability. As such, the party demands extended powers for the European Parliament, provision for a multi-track Europe and opposes the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the single currency. Amongst left-wing minor parties, Euroscepticism is a general if far from even predisposition. The Socialist Labour Party (SLP) has adopted a Hard Euroscepticism evocative of the Labour Party of the early 1980s. For the SLP, ‘the European Union is a capitalist club that makes it easy for multi-national companies to exploit workers’ (Socialist Labour Party 2001: 27). Accordingly, the SLP opposes British participation in the single currency and calls for Britain to completely withdraw from the EU as ‘the only way Britain can begin to regain control of its economy, sovereignty and its political powers’ (Socialist Labour Party 2001: 27). While the Socialist Alliance and its Scottish counterpart, the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP), do not advocate withdrawal, they also regard the EU as an instrument of capital. For example, the Socialist Alliance inveighs against ‘the Europe of the bosses, the unelected European Central Bank, and the creation of “Fortress Europe” as a bastion of racism and exploitation’ (Socialist Alliance 2001: 19). Both parties are principally troubled by the impact of European initiatives on the working class, particularly European pressures to impose spending cuts, privatization, and deregulation. Yet, both are equivocal on the single currency, the Socialist Alliance choosing to ‘neither advocate the euro nor defend the pound’ (Socialist Alliance 2001: 19), while the SSP proposes only that ‘any future referendum on the Euro will be determined first and foremost by the interests of the working class and the poor’. On the far right, however, there is no such equivocation. Like the National Front it has now eclipsed, the British National Party (BNP) has been committed to the Hard Eurosceptic position of withdrawal since its foundation in 1982. For the BNP, European integration has left the British Parliament as ‘a glorified parish council’ and a ‘museum of British democracy’ (BNP 1999). The party believes that membership has choked British enterprise and prohibited necessary protectionist policies for British industries while the single currency would serve as ‘the symbol and the instrument of our annexation by the European Empire’ (BNP 1999). However, in contrast to many other EU party systems, Britain has recently witnessed the emergence of new parties whose primary purpose has been to express Eurosceptic political positions. The first of these was the UK Independence Party (UKIP), formed in September 1993 by members of the Anti-Federalist League, an organization itself founded in November 1991 to stand anti-Maastricht candidates in the 1992 general election. Since its foundation, the UKIP has advocated a Hard Euroscepticism premised upon Britain’s withdrawal from the EU and irrevocable opposition to the single

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currency. It characterizes the EU as ‘centralised, bureaucratic, unaccountable, and corrupt, eroding our independence and imposing by diktat policies that we would never vote for in an election’ (UKIP 2001). Such policies include the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)—condemned respectively as ‘incompatible with the survival and prosperity of agriculture’ and ‘the most illogical, grotesque and wasteful use of one of Britain’s most valuable natural resources’ (UKIP 2001). Likewise, the party condemned ‘moves to abolish the British constitution and replace it with rigid EU law’ which would further erode parliamentary sovereignty and ‘balkanise our country into “regions” answerable largely to Brussels’ (UKIP 2001). Corpus Juris and Europol are deemed ‘indicators of the EU’s totalitarian direction’ as is the EU’s ‘brainwashing of children, so that they grow up believing uncritically in the “European ideal”’ (UKIP 2001). Withdrawal would not only nullify these threats but would save billions of pounds a year and allow Britain to fulfil its vocation as a truly global political and economic actor. With the demise of the Referendum Party, the 2004 European Parliament elections saw the UKIP’s best electoral performance, winning 16 per cent of the vote and twelve seats. Nevertheless, the UKIP has endured longer than the other expressly Eurosceptic party to emerge in the 1990s. The Referendum Party was founded in October 1995 by Sir James Goldsmith with the sole objective of forcing a referendum on Britain’s relationship with Europe, after which it pledged to dissolve itself. Although Goldsmith claimed that the party had no agenda beyond a referendum, the party was nevertheless clearly Eurosceptic. It contested 547 seats in the 1997 election, standing aside only where incumbent MPs were known Eurosceptics. On an average, Referendum Party candidates secured 3.1 per cent of the vote and all but forty-two of its deposits were lost. However, this still represented the best performance of a minor party in any post-war general election. In the event, however, the party never got the opportunity to improve upon this performance. Shortly after the 1997 election Goldsmith died and his creation transformed itself into a more conventional pressure group, renaming itself as the Referendum Movement before merging with the Euro Information Campaign to become the Democracy Movement in January 1999.

6.9 THE ELECTORAL SALIENCE OF EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE BRITISH PARTY SYSTEM It is clear that Euroscepticism has had persistent, if oscillating support within the British party system throughout the post-war period. This finds its corollary in the attitudes of the British public (Baker 2002). British levels of affective support for European integration have been persistently lower than the average amongst member states (Figure 6.1). At its extreme, as Figure 6.2 shows, this manifests itself in high, if fluctuating, support for the Hard Eurosceptic option of withdrawal

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80 UK ‘Good Thing’

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0

Figure 6.2. If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the European Union, how would you vote? Source: Mori (http://www.mori.com/europe/mori-eu-ref.shtml)

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Figure 6.3. If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should be part of a Single European Currency, how would you vote? Source: Mori (http://www.mori.com/europe/mori-euro-ref.shtml)

from the EU. Evidence of public support for ‘Soft’ Euroscepticism is even clearer, particularly in regard to the single currency which, as Figure 6.3 shows, has been consistently opposed by the British public by a margin of two to one since 1991. Yet, in further confirmation of the perplexing character of British Euroscepticism we discover that despite the Euroscepticism of the British public and the frequency with which party divisions on Europe have coincided with the traditional left–right partisan electoral divide (Mair 2000: 35–6) European issues have rarely been electorally salient. Writing in 1974, Butler and Kavanagh observed that the European issue in British politics has persistently been ‘the subject of “a great debate” between, and not during, election campaigns’ (Butler and Kavanagh 1974: 90–1). As an issue of ‘high politics’ the debate on Britain’s relationship with Europe has typically and consciously been conducted amongst its political elites. With the significant exception of the 1975 referendum, British politicians have rarely attempted, or needed to engage the British public on the issue of Europe. Rather, for the majority of the post-war period a ‘permissive consensus’ existed in which a compliant British electorate regarded Europe as a second-order issue and happily accepted the parties’ presentation of European integration as an esoteric process best dealt with by technocratic and bureaucratic expertise.

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For much of the post-war period, therefore, British political parties avoided employing the European issue as a partisan weapon in general election campaigns both to preserve their scope for autonomous action when in office and to avoid exposing potentially damaging intra-party disputes to the electorate’s attention. Membership of the EEC failed to surface as a significant electoral issue in the 1964, 1966, and 1970 general election campaigns (See Butler and King 1966: 114; Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971: 159). In the 1974 elections, Labour’s commitment to a referendum and Enoch Powell’s and Shirley Williams’ comments in the February and October elections respectively lent the issue a higher profile. Nevertheless, the Conservative and Liberal leaders were anxious to downplay Europe as an issue (Butler and Kavanagh 1974: 90), while Labour sought not to capitalize on the public popularity of a referendum for fear of exposing the ambiguities and divisions within its own camp. In the 1979 general election, Europe once again failed to register during the campaign (Butler and Kavanagh 1980: 173) and aside from a brief spat over a Daily Mail story that alleged Labour’s policy of withdrawal from the EEC would lead Nissan to withdraw its planned investment in the UK, neither Labour nor their opponents drew attention to their European policies in 1983 (Butler and Kavanagh 1984: 92). In the following two elections Europe did not surface as a significant issue in the campaigns Butler and Kavanagh 1992: 110). In the 1997 and 2001 British general elections, however, political conflict over European issues spilled over from the period between elections into the campaigns 50 45 40

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Figure 6.4. Percentage feeling that Europe is an important issue, 1974–2003 Source: Mori (http://www.mori.com/polls/trends/issues.shtml)

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Figure 6.5. Ranking of Europe amongst other important issues, 1974–2003 Source: Mori (http://www.mori.com/polls/trends/issues.shtml)

themselves. That it has done so is the product of a number of factors. First, the British public’s interest in Europe has appeared to grow. Figure 6.4 shows that public concern with Europe as an issue has been volatile. Nevertheless, it shows a general trend towards increased political salience since the late 1980s. In addition, the relative importance of Europe amongst broader public concerns exhibits the same tendency (Figure 6.5). However, the clearest indication of this increased salience is presented in Table 6.2 which averages these trends for each parliament. In both the 1992–7 and 1997–2001 Parliaments, public concern over Europe rose significantly. In addition, two new Eurosceptic parties emerged in this period. Despite their modest electoral returns these parties guaranteed an overt Eurosceptic presence in the 1997 and 2001 elections and prevented the main parties from ignoring Europe as an issue. Indeed, the Referendum Party through the personality of James Goldsmith, adroit and extensive advertising, and its determination to contest all seats where incumbents failed to explicitly declare in favour of a referendum made a significant mark on the 1997 campaign. Not only did it attain a much higher profile in the campaign than might have been expected of a newly formed singleissue party, but it also succeeded in exacerbating the Conservative Party’s own internal conflicts on Europe and thereby drew further attention to the Eurosceptic cause. Two other developments are particularly significant. First, the pro-European consensus amongst the British press which had begun to fracture as early as 1975 collapsed into a pronounced and populist Euroscepticism in the 1990s (Wilkes

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Conservative Party UK Independence Party Green Party Scottish Socialist Party Socialist Alliance Socialist Labour Party British National Party

Form of Euroscepticism

Share of British vote in the 2001 General Election (%)

Soft Hard Soft Soft Soft Hard Hard

32.7 1.5 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2

and Wring 1998) which had grown to encompass 58 per cent of British newspaper circulation by the 2001 election (Seymour-Ure 2002: 136). With this development, Europe became the most prominent issue in front page lead stories and editorials in both the 1997 and 2001 campaigns (Butler and Kavanagh 1997: 175, 2002: 168) placing Conservative policy and divisions on Europe in particular under scrutiny. The Conservative Party itself, by a combination of accident and design, ensured Europe’s electoral salience in both campaigns. In 1997, the capacity of the party to hide its divisions on Europe before the electorate collapsed. The persistent rebellions witnessed in office carried over into the campaign as Major’s policy of ‘negotiate and decide’ on the single currency was rejected by Conservative candidates on an almost daily basis, over 200 of whom were gleefully collated in daily lists of Eurosceptics by The Times and the Daily Telegraph. In the 2001 campaign, the party better preserved a semblance of unity, but the European issue again escaped its control. Although, Conservative strategists contrived to avoid the issue of the single currency until the third week of the campaign, reserving the last week for apocalyptic warnings of the threat to the pound, media anticipation, and the party’s almost total introspection on their European policy over the prior four years served to create the perception of a Conservative fixation with Europe. Table 6.2. Average percentage feeling that Europe is an important issue and average ranking of Europe as an important issue for each Parliament, 1974– Parliament

Average percentage

Average ranking

1974–9 1979–83 1983–7 1987–92 1992–7 1997–2001 2001–

10 9 4 7 16 24 11

7 7 10 11 6 4 8

Source: Mori (http://www.mori.com/polls/trends/issues.shtml).

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However, despite the Euroscepticism of the British electorate this attention on Conservative European policy brought no electoral bonus. As Evans (1998) has argued, any advantage which the Conservatives might have hoped to gain from their Euroscepticism in 1997 was undone by the perception of intra-party division which accompanied it. In 2001, despite greater surface unity, Euroscepticism again failed to return electoral benefits. Although Europe had grown as an issue of public concern, it still ranked behind asylum and immigration, trade unions, public transport, taxation, economic management, education, law and order, and health as an issue. In view of this, shortly after the election, the new party leader Iain Duncan Smith declared his determination to ‘turn down the volume’ on the European issue. Accordingly, the Conservative Party attempted to put its Eurosceptic Pandora back in the box in favour of addressing more electorally salient issues in pursuit of a Conservative electoral renaissance. After replacing Duncan Smith as party leader in 2003, Michael Howard did no show any more willingness than his predecessor to jeopardize the party’s electoral prospects by drawing unnecessary attention to its divisions on European integration.

6.10 ACCOUNTING FOR EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE BRITISH PARTY SYSTEM Finally, we must address perhaps the most perplexing aspect of British Euroscepticism. How are we to account both for the persistently high levels of Euroscepticism in the British party system and the oscillating commitments of the two major political parties to Euroscepticism? In accounting for the persistent appeal of Eurosceptic ideas in the British party system we should be cautious about appealing to British exceptionalism, both in general (Thompson 1965) and in regard to Britain’s relationship with Europe (Garton Ash 2001). Nevertheless, several distinctive features of the British polity and society have serviced a predisposition toward Euroscepticism within the British polity. First, British Euroscepticism bears the imprint of Britain’s distinctive historical geopolitical experiences. Britain’s island heritage and geographical seclusion, its progress from isolation to victory during the Second World War, and, initially in the post-war period, its imperial legacy and relationship with the Commonwealth, have all served as essential themes behind British Euroscepticism. But Britain also came to exercise hegemony in the global economy of the nineteenth century through an open seas policy emphasizing free trade and free movement. This historical attachment of the British political elite to a liberal open seas policy has endured. It has become a central policy tradition in the British polity and has led many British Eurosceptics to identify Britain with a global rather than European volition. Moreover, the post-war revival of an open seas

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policy under US auspices, subsequently reinforced by the Cold War, has sustained a powerful policy tradition of ‘Atlanticism’ in Britain. This has provided British Eurosceptics with an alternative system of political alliance and trade to that of Europe. These embedded traditions of external political economy are reinforced by the legacy of Britain’s role as the pioneer industrial nation. Britain, unlike its continental counterparts who embraced a developmental role for the state, created a domestic free market under minimal government. This nineteenth-century policy regime also subsequently came to be viewed in Britain as an ideal and embedded itself in the organization and roles of British industry, finance, and commerce. Indeed, the British economy can be seen to be the embodiment of a distinctive Anglo-US model of capitalist organization. This sits uncomfortably with the more dirigiste Rheinisch model of social partnership of most other member states. This allows British Eurosceptics to portray European integration as the imposition of an alien economic model fundamentally inimical to Britain’s competitiveness in international markets. In addition, the construction of the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983) of Britain also left legacies hostile to European integration. Thus, a British national identity arose from fears that the Catholic nations of Europe threatened the mainly Protestant traditions and institutions of British national life (Colley 1996); a threat now transformed for many British Eurosceptics into a perfidious ‘FrancoGerman’ axis similarly menacing to British national interests. Moreover, this process of nation building saw the institutions and customs of Westminster, including parliamentary sovereignty and independence, become reified; its 700year history coming to symbolize Britain’s independence, liberty, and democratic evolution. Accordingly, [T]he core of British nation state identity comprises meanings attached to institutions centring around a particular understanding of national sovereignty which is hard to reconcile with a vision of a European political order going beyond functional co-operation over borders. (Marcussen et al. 1999: 626)

As such, the British political elite and public have come to regard national sovereignty in zero-sum terms as ‘something indivisible, either you have it or you don’t’ (Pappamikail 1998: 217). The broader characteristics of the Westminster model also contribute to the resilience of British Euroscepticism. Britain’s historically centralized and unitary state, majoritarian electoral system, and associated adversarial party system and political culture are considerably removed from, and for many British Eurosceptics categorically superior to, the communautaire approach of coalitions, compromise, and networking (Wilks 1996). The institutional configuration of the British State has a further consequence for British Euroscepticism. As we have seen, until the 1997 election the two major parties were the principal electoral outlet for Euroscepticism in the British party system. One reason for this is that Britain’s ‘first past the post’ electoral system makes it exceedingly difficult for political parties without geographically

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concentrated support to win parliamentary seats. Thus, for British Eurosceptics to gain influence on executive power they have had a powerful incentive to work within either of the two major political parties rather than establishing independent Eurosceptic parties. As the introduction of a party list system for the 1999 European Parliament elections and the election of UKIP members of European Parliament (MEPs) and adoption of an Additional Member System for elections to the Scottish Parliament and the election of Green and SSP members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs) has shown, a different structure of opportunities exists for the election of Eurosceptics outside the major parties under different electoral systems. In addition, this electoral system has also contributed to the two major parties organizing themselves as ideologically inclusive ‘broad churches’. The concomitant demand upon party managers to preserve party unity and accommodate ideological diversity has typically meant that Eurosceptic opinion has been tolerated within the major parties even during their episodes of Euro-enthusiasm. Indeed, as the creation of the SDP and more recently the formation of the ProEuropean Conservative Party have shown, the option of ‘exit’ from the major parties over European policy has been one exercised principally by disgruntled Europhiles. These factors account for the predisposition to Euroscepticism in the British party system, establishing a set of commonplace assumptions about Britain’s instrumental and material interests in relation to Europe which are routinely reproduced in British Eurosceptic discourses. However, if we are to understand the dynamics of ideological changes such as the rise and decline of Euroscepticism as a party policy commitment we need to consider a wider range of factors both exogenous and endogenous to each political party (see Randall 2003). Space does not permit us to explore the full period or all the parties discussed in this chapter. Rather, we shall focus on the period from the mid-1980s and the shift of the Conservative Party toward Euroscepticism and the Labour Party’s parallel retreat from Hard Euroscepticism. A concatenation of circumstances conspired to trigger the Conservative Party’s shift toward Euroscepticism. First, as the trajectory of European integration shifted from the single market to political and economic union, Conservative Euro-enthusiasm came under profound strain. The Conservative Party was now placed into a situation of ideological dissonance. The disingenuous claim of the Heath government that ‘There is no question of any erosion of essential national sovereignty’ would not now bear repetition. The nascent European order now much more directly, overtly, and fundamentally threatened British parliamentary sovereignty and thereby the British nation state than previously. The defence of both had long been central to both Conservative discourses and electoral hegemony (Gamble 1970, 1995; Lynch 1999). The new trajectory of integration therefore ran increasingly counter to core Conservative ideological axioms. Given the instrumental and utilitarian tradition of British foreign policy towards the alliances best suited to the successful pursuit of British interests, the EU has been predominantly perceived as a community of convenience. However,

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the end of the Cold War placed the convenience of European integration as an anti-Communist bulwark under question. As such, the question of Britain’s military and political alliances was reopened just as European integration threatened to tie Britain more closely to one alliance. It is in this period also that discourses of globalization truly embedded themselves in British politics. With it, a ‘hyper-globalist’ analysis sympathetic to the traditions of British political economy became dominant amongst Conservatives. This perspective regarded low taxes and spending, deregulation and privatization, and the maintenance of the nation state as guarantor of national identity and independence as the only viable response to globalization. Viewed from this paradigm, the federalist and protectionist characteristics of the EU were a wholly inappropriate model for competitiveness in the new global economy (Baker Gamble, and Seawright 2002). However, while such exogenous developments placed the Conservative commitment to Europe under duress, they did not of themselves inevitably drive the party to Euroscepticism. Key changes were also underway within the Conservative Party itself, which were to confirm the party’s Eurosceptic responses. First, the parliamentary party’s ethos was changing with the deference to the leadership which had minimized Eurosceptic dissent for Macmillan and Heath now fading, not least because many sections of the party came to be convinced that a Europhile cabal was responsible for Mrs Thatcher’s fall and the contemporary misfortunes of the party. More fundamentally, however, as our 1994 and 1998 survey data reveals (Table 6.3), Eurosceptic sentiments were increasingly entrenched within the parliamentary party. Amidst growing uncertainty and dismay over the benefits of EU membership (Statement 3.5) nearly two-thirds of Conservative MPs agreed that ‘sovereignty cannot be pooled’ (Statement 3.1). Indeed, by 1998, such was the concern over the impact of membership on British sovereignty that 69 per cent of Conservative MPs advocated restoring parliament’s ultimate supremacy over EU legislation (Statement 3.2). ‘Hyper-globalist’ reservations about integration were also evident: 56 per cent of Conservative MPs in 1998 denied that globalization made EU membership imperative for the UK (Statement 3.3), while fears that membership of the single currency would fundamentally compromise British sovereignty grew significantly from 48 per cent in 1994 to 66 per cent of Conservative MPs in 1998 (Statement 3.4). Thus, it was that this increasingly powerful and well-organized Eurosceptic body of Conservative parliamentarians first impelled Major to negotiate British opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty. The Conservative government’s slim parliamentary majority after the 1992 election then further empowered them to advance this Eurosceptic policy trajectory. After the 1997 election, this policy momentum was confirmed with the election of two overtly Eurosceptic leaders while the diminishing minority of Europhiles within the parliamentary party were rendered increasingly impotent. The dynamics of Labour’s retreat from Euroscepticism are similarly complex. We saw earlier that the changing trajectory of European integration from the

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Table 6.3. Attitudes of Conservative MPs towards European integration (1994 and 1998)

Sovereignty cannot be pooled An Act of Parliament should be passed to establish explicitly the ultimate supremacy of Parliament over EU legislation The globalization of economic activity makes EU membership more, rather than less necessary for the UK Joining the single currency will signal the end of the UK as a sovereign nation The disadvantages of EU membership have been outweighed by the benefits Britain should withdraw from the EU

Strongly Agree/Agree (%)

Neither (%)

Strongly Disagree/Disagree (%)

1994

1998

1994

1998

1994

1998

62 50

61 69

7 17

6 7

31 33

33 24

—

32

—

12

—

56

48

66

11

6

41

28

60

37

8

21

32

41

—

26

—

11

—

63

Source: Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) R000231298 and R00022397.

mid-1980s provoked disquiet in the Conservative Party. However, the same developments were perceived differently within the Labour Party. Historically, Labour had been as enthusiastic as the Conservatives to uphold the sovereignty of the British Parliament (Jones and Keating 1985). However, Labour’s commitment to parliamentary sovereignty had always been more instrumental than that of Conservatives, viewing a parliamentary majority as a necessary and sufficient basis for the unfettered implementation of its policy commitments. However, developments in Europe undermined the perception that Europe was a ‘capitalist club’ that would frustrate a future Labour government. Indeed, where the Conservatives opposed the emergence of a ‘social dimension’ and the Delors presidency ‘as socialism by the back door’, for Labour these developments were welcomed and the conviction grew that Europe represented a potent and useful ally against neoliberalism and Thatcherism. As in the Conservative Party, the growing perception of a nascent globalized economy also catalysed changes to Labour’s European policy. For Labour, the macroeconomic failures of previous Labour governments and the failure of the Mitterrand experiment in particular seemed to confirm the redundancy of national Keynesianism and triggered a search for a new economic strategy. Simultaneously, this perception of the new constraints upon national economic management placed the party’s Euroscepticism under question. Labour’s 1983 commitment to withdraw from the EEC had been premised upon the incompatibility of membership with its dirigiste and protectionist Alternative Economic

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Table 6.4. Attitudes of Labour MPs towards European integration (1996 and 1998) Strongly Agree/Agree (%)

Sovereignty cannot be pooled An Act of Parliament should be passed to establish explicitly the ultimate supremacy of Parliament over EU legislation The globalization of economic activity makes EU membership more, rather than less necessary for the UK Joining the single currency will signal the end of the UK as a sovereign nation The disadvantages of EU membership have been outweighed by the benefits UK should withdraw from the EU

Neither (%)

Strongly Disagree/Disagree (%)

1996

1998

1996

1998

1996

1998

30 18

22 12

11 18

17 9

59 64

61 79

88

85

2

6

10

9

21

10

5

7

74

83

52

54

11

10

37

35

7

3

3

1

90

96

Source: Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) R0000222397 and R00022397.

Strategy (AES). With the repudiation of the AES, withdrawal was no longer such an economic imperative. Indeed, while the Conservatives were drawn to hyper-globalism, the ideological traditions, interests, and strategy of the Labour Party drew it toward an ‘open-regionalist’ perspective which viewed the EU as an indispensable means of exercising governance and regulation over the global economy, compensating for the economic competences lost by the nation state (Baker, Gamble, and Seawright 2002). However, for the party’s Euroscepticism to be abandoned, change also had to occur within the Labour movement itself. Given their veto capacity within the party’s policymaking machinery, the support of trade union affiliates was essential and forthcoming, after a parallel process of Europeanization with the union movement (see Rosamund 1998; Strange 2002). Within the parliamentary party the mounting reluctance to express dissent towards the party leadership facilitated the abandonment of Eurosceptic commitments, but was also accompanied by a substantive shift in Labour parliamentarians’ attitudes. As Table 6.4 shows Eurosceptics have now become a marginal and diminishing force within the PLP. Few Labour MPs (30 per cent in 1996 and 22 per cent in 1998) now adopt an absolutist approach to sovereignty (Statement 4.1) and there is no fervent desire to restore parliamentary sovereignty (Statement 4.2). In line with the open-regionalist perspective adopted by the party, political economic critiques of the EU also garner little support. All, bar a tiny minority of Labour MPs

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(10 per cent and 9 per cent), view the EU as an appropriate counterweight to economic globalization (Statement 4.3). Correspondingly, Labour MPs’ fears over the threat to British sovereignty presented by the single currency (Statement 4.4) are also in retreat. However, the clearest evidence of the transformation of Labour MPs’ attitudes is that by 1998 just 3 per cent supported the Hard Eurosceptic option of withdrawal from the EU (Statement 4.6) which had been advocated by the party fifteen years earlier.

6.11 CONCLUSION If we are to characterize British Euroscepticism, we are inevitably drawn to the conclusion that Euroscepticism has been an engrained feature of the British party system from the end of the post-war period to the present, some three decades after Britain’s entry into the EEC. Yet, equally the fortunes of Euroscepticism have ebbed and flowed over this period. Of the major political parties, only the Liberal Party and its successors have consistently eschewed Euroscepticism. In contrast, European policy has consistently divided the Labour Party and Conservatives with Eurosceptics intermittently, if only temporarily, able to commit these parties to both ‘Soft’ and ‘Hard’ Eurosceptic policies. For observers from other member states of the EU, such as Romano Prodi, the unwillingness of British political parties to irrevocably repudiate Euroscepticism must seem perplexing, especially given that a permissive consensus on European issues was maintained between British political parties and the British electorate until recently. However, as we have sought to show in this chapter, a powerful predisposition to Euroscepticism exists within the British polity which has been generated by Britain’s distinctive geopolitical, economic, and constitutional interests and traditions. Yet, the fact that the European policies of the major parties have fluctuated so frequently and widely between Euro-enthusiasm and Euroscepticism should signal that these interests and traditions are not wholly inescapable. Indeed, as we have seen, the current Labour Government has created the political space to fashion a broadly pro-European prospectus compatible with the axioms of Atlanticism, Anglo-American capitalism, and the Westminster model that are fundamental to the British political weltanschauung. Equally, however, the Blair government’s hesitations over the single currency and truculence over British national vetoes demonstrates the residual purchase of such beliefs, which, combined with the constraints of a latently Eurosceptic public and intra-party divisions, imply a cautiousness towards European integration which continues to distinguish Britain from other EU states. The fluctuating fate of Euroscepticism in the British party system has therefore been one forged by the dialectical relationship between the geopolitical, economic, and constitutional structures of British politics and the agency of

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actors within political parties interpreting and responding to the opportunities and constraints that this exogenous context provides (Baker 2003; Baker and Sherrington 2004) As such, as Britain’s relationship with Europe develops and this complex dynamic between predisposition and contingency continues to operate, Romano Prodi and others might be best advised to contemplate further fascination, perplexity, and frustration from British Euroscepticism for the foreseeable future.

7 Shades of Green: Euroscepticism in Irish Political Parties Karin Gilland

7.1 INTRODUCTION Ireland joined the European Union ((EU) or, as it was then, the European Economic Community (EEC)) in 1973, and since then has often been considered something of a ‘model member’ as well as a fine example of how membership can augment economic development. Until the new millennium, European affairs was a peripheral and low-priority issue in Irish politics, but in 2000/1 its salience grew. There are several reasons for this. First of all, Ireland’s strong economic development in the 1990s set it on a collision course with the European Commission in its efforts to manage the Euro-zone economy. Segments of the Irish political establishment responded to the Commission’s pressure with disdain, and the socalled Boston versus Berlin debate about whether Ireland is closer to the USA or to Europe ensued. Furthermore, the referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001 made it appear as if Irish public opinion had swung from broad support for, to opposition to, European integration. Moreover, the 2002 general election showed that, for the first time, political parties that did not share in the pro-EU consensus that existed among all mainstream parties could realistically be part of a government coalition. However, although the early years of the new millennium at times seemed like a dramatic juncture in Ireland’s EU membership, the lasting impact of the events that took place at this time period remains uncertain. The result of the 2001 Nice referendum was not primarily a manifestation of growing Euroscepticism among the Irish public, and Eurosceptic parties in Ireland do not question their country’s EU membership. What is more, even if one of these parties were included in a future government coalition, it may agree to modify its stance or ‘keep a low profile’ on the EU as part of the coalition deal. Therefore, as this chapter will argue, the early years of the new millennium seemed more like a time of upheaval than it actually was, in terms of the long-term impact of these events on Ireland’s membership of the EU as well as in terms of how the EU as a political issue continues to play out in the Irish domestic political setting.

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This analysis of Irish parties draws on Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2002b) conceptualization of Soft and Hard Euroscepticism. They define Soft Euroscepticism as: NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU trajectory. (2002: 7)

Taggart and Szczerbiak furthermore assume that parties holding the view that the integration process has gone far enough and needs to go no further (i.e. defend the status quo) are Soft Eurosceptics because it is in the nature of European integration to be an incremental, ongoing process. Hard Euroscepticism is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived. (2002: 7)

Parties that are single-issue anti-EU parties are clearly Hard Eurosceptics, as well as parties that seek renegotiated, clearly unrealistic membership terms for their country. (Sometimes this may be couched in terms that make the party appear Soft Eurosceptic, but the membership terms sought are so unrealistic that the party is de facto opposing membership). Moreover, Hard Eurosceptics may also formulate their criticism of the EU as a manifestation of some long-standing ‘enmity’ such as capitalism for communist parties, supranationalism for nationalists, or neoliberalism for socialists, and so on (2002: 8). Taggart and Szczerbiak realize that it is not always easy to distinguish between Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, and that sometimes it is not easy to tell apart Soft Eurosceptic parties and parties that are essentially not Eurosceptic but which may make the odd critical remark about the EU. The Irish case exemplifies these two conceptual weaknesses, but also demonstrates that they can be adequately overcome. The first weakness, distinguishing between Hard and Soft Euroscepticism, occurs when different pieces of evidence point to the same party sometimes appearing to be a Soft, and other times a Hard Eurosceptic party. The judgement made depends on which piece of evidence is prioritized, or is considered weightier. The second conceptual weakness, the danger of classifying non-Eurosceptic parties as Eurosceptic due to the odd EU-critical remark, is an issue regarding the analysis of parties that are clearly committed to the EU’s current trajectory and the current terms and conditions of their country’s EU membership, but which nevertheless occasionally criticize the EU in some respect. The lack of analytical clarity in these instances is resolved by looking at whether the party in question uses contestatory rhetoric about the European project itself rather than criticizing bits and pieces of the overall package of EU membership. This would include parties that support membership but nevertheless contest the EU’s current development and do not wish integration to proceed beyond the status quo (2002: 35).

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Table 7.1. European Union-related referendums in Ireland, 1972–2002 Referendum

Year

Yes %

No %

Turnout %

FF

FG

L

PD

DL

GP

WP

SF

Accession SEA Maastricht Amsterdam Nice Nice

1972 1987 1992 1998 2001 2002

83.1 69.9 69.1 61.7 46.1 62.9

16.9 30.1 30.9 38.3 53.9 37.1

70.9 44.1 57.3 56.2 34.5 48.5

+ + + + + +

+ + + + + +

− ± + + + +

∗ + + + + +

∗ ∗ − + ∗ ∗

− − − − − −

− − − − − −

− − − − − −

‘FF’ Fianna Fáil; ‘FG’ Fine Gael; ‘L’ Labour; ‘PD’ Progressive Democrats; ‘DL’ Democratic Left; ‘GP’ Green Party; ‘WP’ Workers’ Party; ‘SF’ Sinn Féin. ‘+’ Party favoured treaty; ‘−’ Party opposed treaty; ‘±’ Party internally split; ‘∗’ Party did not exist. Sources: Sinnott (2001); Gilland (2002a, b).

In sum, in this analysis, Euroscepticism has been treated as a continuum where Irish parties deemed to be Eurosceptic have been located close to the Soft or the Hard end, or in between, on the basis of the criteria discussed here.

7.3 THE CONTEXT Ireland’s application for EEC membership in 1961 was part of a general overhaul of the country’s economic policy that started in the 1950s. At that time, policymakers turned towards foreign direct investment, started to develop agricultural export markets, and to industrialize Ireland. In this vein, EEC membership was sought explicitly on the basis of rational calculations as to how a small state with an open (or opening) economy and a sometimes overbearing (and historically difficult) neighbour could best deal with the challenges of its external environment. EEC membership can even be seen as the culmination of Ireland’s economic overhaul, aimed at achieving average European standards of living in Ireland by access to the common market (including the potential it held for trade diversification away from the UK) and the Common Agricultural Policy. Table 7.1 shows that since accession a majority of the voting public, as well as a majority of parties, favoured the further development of the EU, as set out in successive treaties. It is also worth noting that the parties favouring integration, especially Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, are the largest parties whereas parties campaigning against European treaties tend to be small and peripheral, with few or no seats in parliament. Irish public opinion towards the EU has been consistently positive since the country joined in the early 1970s; even in 2001 when the Irish people voted against the Nice Treaty. Figure 7.1 shows a very comfortable margin of support for the EU among the Irish public. These figures may disguise a certain level of ‘hidden’ public Euroscepticism, but if so, it was small and dormant: no party managed to exploit Euroscepticism for electoral gain, and Europe was never an election issue.

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90 Benefit 80 70 Membership

Unification 60 50 Regret

40 30 20 10 0 1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Figure 7.1. Net Irish attitudes towards European integration, 1973–2002 (Net = Support-opposition. DK = ‘no’ response not shown.) The questions asked were: Benefit: ‘Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?’ Membership: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?’ Regret: ‘If you were to be told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry, indifferent, or relieved?’ Unification: ‘In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for this, or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent against or very much against?’

The result of the 2001 referendum on the Nice Treaty gave the appearance of growing Euroscepticism in Ireland, but the level of turnout, as well as the lacklustre nature of the ‘yes’ campaign, also suggested a large measure of indifference rather than Euroscepticism. When the 2001 and 2002 referendums on the Nice Treaty are compared, it is quite clear that the ‘no’ camp has a small but keen vote base that it successfully activated in 2001 and 2002. In contrast, the ‘yes’ camp has a much larger but also much more complacent vote base, that it did not manage to activate in 2001. Table 7.2 shows that the number of yes votes was twice as high in 2002 as it was in 2001 (accounting for the main increase in turnout from 2001), whereas the number of no votes was roughly the same in the two referendums. In summary, Ireland joined the EU for primarily utilitarian reasons and, although (as this chapter will show) in the first years of the new millennium, Ireland’s relationship with the EU acquired more nuance through the openly critical party discourse and the result of the 2001 Nice Treaty referendum, in fact there is little to suggest a Eurosceptic beckoning. The trajectory of the Labour Party’s position on Europe merits further mention at this stage since it provides a good case study of a journey from Euroscepticism

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Table 7.2. The Nice referendums compared Referendum Nice 2001 Nice 2002

Yes (%)

Yes (no.)

No (%)

No (no.)

Turnout (%)

Turnout (no.)

46.13 62.89

453 (461) 906 (202)

53.87 37.11

529 (478) 534 (887)

34.79 49.47

997 (826) 1,446 (588)

to a pro-EU profile. Labour opposed EEC membership in the 1972 referendum and was internally divided over the Single European Act in 1987, on a socialist and nationalist basis. There was also an element of party political posturing, a deliberate distancing from the Fianna Fáil–Fine Gael pro-EU consensus. However, Labour was loath to share any platform with the anti-EU Sinn Féin, and this toned down Labour’s critique of the EU. The high turnout and clear margin in favour of accession, moreover, created a democratic imperative for Labour to work the membership to Ireland’s advantage, if that was what the people wanted. Membership also increased Labour’s contacts with its sister parties across Europe, which was to prove important in attempts to evolve a socialist-based position on Europe. However, since there were both pro- and anti-European parties in the socialist party family there was no clear guidance to be found in that ideology (the socialist perception of the EU as a ‘capitalist rich man’s club’ competed with the possibility of using the EU to advance socialist goals). The Single European Act referendum (1987) brought internal party divisions over Europe to the fore, and forced the party to take a neutral position (Holmes 1998). Labour, nevertheless, quickly adopted a pro-integration position after 1987: the posturing vis-à-vis the two larger parties had not paid off electorally; although the fears that the party had for the impact of accession on domestic industry (cars and footwear) had been realized, the benefits of membership more than compensated for that; and the party’s interpretation of sovereignty had changed from a fear of European decision-making to an understanding that it also meant having a place at the table where decisions are made (Anthony Brown, personal communication). In the earliest years of the new millennium, it is rather the Progressive Democrats and Fianna Fáil that have developed a tendency to behave in a seemingly Eurosceptic way, although neither is a Eurosceptic party. Three events are relevant here: first, the so-called Boston versus Berlin debate (stirred by the Progressive Democrat Tánaiste’s (Deputy Prime Minister’s) critique of the EU’s high-taxation, high-regulation social model, in favour of the US low-taxation, low-regulation model) (Harney 2000); secondly, a Fianna Fáil minister’s public statement that the EU ‘is not the cornerstone of what our nation is and should be’ (De Valera 2000: 1), and that Ireland should ‘exercise a more vigilant, a more questioning attitude to the European Union’ (De Valera 2000: 2), and thirdly, a row between the Irish government (Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats) and the European Commission over the December 2000 Irish budget. These events were unusual in the Irish context because they displayed tension over the EU

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Table 7.3. The results of the 2003 Irish election Party

Votes (n) Votes (% total) Seats (n) Seats (% total) EU Survey Score

Fianna Fáil Fine Gael Labour Progressive Democrats Green Party Sinn Féin Socialist Party Christian Solidarity Party Workers’ Party Socialist Workers’ Party Independents

770,748 417,619 200,130 73,628 71,470 121,020 14,896 4,741 4,012 3,333 176,305

41.5 22.5 10.8 4.0 3.8 6.5 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.2 9.5

81 31 21 8 6 5 1 0 0 0 13

48.8 18.7 12.7 4.8 3.6 3.0 0.6 0 0 0 7.8

7.4 8.0 7.0 8.5 5.5 3.0 2.6 2.2 3.9 2.4 5.2

Sources: Columns on votes and seats from Gallagher, Marsh, and Mitchell (2003: 248–50). Column on EU Survey Gilland (2004). Figures are candidate averages for each party, on a 0–10 scale. The survey questions included in the scale were: Ireland’s membership of the EU is a bad thing; Ireland’s membership of the EU is a good thing; European unification has already gone too far; European integration should be pushed further; Ireland should do all it can to unite fully with the EU; Ireland should do all it can to protect its independence from the EU.

within parties belonging to the mainstream, pro-EU consensus. However, these events do not make these two parties Eurosceptic. Neither the value of membership, nor the incremental development of the EU was questioned. Moreover, as Table 7.3 shows, the strong indications that by the general election of 2002 Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats would be among the most pro-EU parties in Ireland.

7.4 MANIFESTATIONS OF EUROSCEPTICISM IN IRISH PARTIES The Irish party system in 2002 is summarized in Table 7.3, which also contains the results of a survey of election candidates in the 2002 election (Gilland 2004). The survey serves as a reasonable snapshot of party positions on the EU in 2002. On the scale from 0 (anti-EU) to 10 (pro-EU) candidates of the large mainstream parties were on average firmly pro-EU, whereas the smaller parties scored low, anti-EU scores. The exception is the Green candidates, whose mean score of 5.5 is rather more positive about the EU than might have been expected. However, as we shall see, this fits in rather nicely with the conclusion that the Greens are quite Soft Eurosceptics. Moreover, the Socialist Party will turn out to be particularly interesting; despite its low anti-EU score here, its one and only member of parliament (MP) argued in favour of the Nice Treaty in 2002. Table 7.4 shows the results of a content analysis of the parliamentary debates relating to the referendums on the Single European Act (1987), the Maastricht Treaty (1992), and the Amsterdam Treaty (1998). This allows us to explore how party positions have developed over time on European institutions and policies

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Table 7.4. Party positions: Direction Label

Fianna Fáil

Fine Gael

Labour

Prog. Dem.

Institutions/Policies 1987 Values/Identity 1987 Material Output 1987 Institutions/Policies 1992 Values/Identity 1992 Material Output 1992 Institutions/Policies 1998 Values/Identity 1998 Material Output 1998

0.37 −0.1 0.97 0.27 0.06 0.98 0.08 0.24 1

0.38 0.2 0.76 0.56 0.45 0.88 0.4 0.2 0.95

0.49 0.64 0.25 0.05 0.15 0.13 0.33 0.67 0.63

0.64 0.36 0.8 0.34 0.36 1 — — —

Work. Party −0.26 −1 −0.25 −0.29 0 0 — — —

Green Party — — — −0.07 −1 0 0.03 −0.8 NA

Sinn Féin — — — — — — 0.09 −0.66 NA

Dem. Left — — — — — — 0.31 0.54 1

Note: Scale range from −1 to 1, where −1 = anti-EU and 1 = pro-EU. The data comes from three content-analysed parliamentary debates, where each ‘mention’ of institutions/policies, values/identity, and material output were scored −1 (negative mention), 0 (neutral mention), or 1 (positive mention). The values in Table 7.3 are the means of each party’s ‘mentions’. Negative values in Table 7.3 indicate an anti-EU position; values close to zero indicate neutrality; and positive values indicate a pro-EU position.

(e.g. the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Common Agricultural Policy, structural funds, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the single currency); values associated with Europe and identity feelings (such as associating the EU with freedom, equality, justice, democracy—and feeling ‘European’, or the opposite); as well as how they view the material consequences of Ireland’s EU membership (e.g. has Ireland gained or lost from membership, in pure cost–benefit terms?).1 Each party’s ‘mention’ of an institution, policy, value, etc., was recorded as −1, 0, or 1 depending on whether the mention was negative, neutral, or positive, respectively, and average party positions were derived for each party; so that in Table 7.4 a negative score indicates opposition to the EU, a score of zero or thereabouts is neutral, and a positive score indicates a proEU position. Hence, −1 is the most anti-EU position possible, and 1 the most pro-EU. In terms of how these scores fit in with the definition of Euroscepticism outlined above, it might be tempting to say that the closer to −1 a score is, the ‘harder’ the Euroscepticism it reflects. In one sense this is obviously true: Hard Eurosceptics are expected not to have scores that suggest they are more or less neutral about the EU (e.g. scores close to zero). Yet, a Soft and a Hard Eurosceptic party may be equally opposed to a particular European institution or policy, etc, but one of them may still have an overall profile that makes them much ‘harder’ than the other. Therefore, the analysis of Eurosceptic parties in Section 7.5 depends not only on the parties’ scores in Table 7.4, but also on other factors that are part of the broader definitions of Soft and Hard Euroscepticism. These include whether or not a party opposes Ireland’s EU membership and whether there is some ideologically based enmity vis-à-vis the EU (such as a communist party opposing the EU as a manifestation of capitalism). Unfortunately, the data in Table 7.4 does not cover the 2001 and 2002 Nice Treaty debates, but textual

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excerpts from the 2002 debate are included in Section 7.5 in order to give a flavour of Euroscepticism in the Irish parliament, the Dáil. Table 7.4 shows that the Eurosceptic parties, those with negative scores, are the Workers’ Party, the Greens, and Sinn Féin (for comparative purposes, the Table also contains the scores for pro-EU parties). The Workers’ Party spokesmen, who consistently disliked European institutions and policies, were alternately deeply opposed to or non-committal about any values associated with Europe together with any notion of a European identity, and questioned whether Ireland benefited from EU membership. The Green and Sinn Féin spokesmen were not quite as opposed to European institutions and policies. In fact, the Greens and Sinn Féin were, at times, not unlike some of the pro-European parties regarding institutions and policies (e.g. scores hovering just above or just below zero). But, they were unwavering in their abhorrence of notions of European values and identity, and cool in their assessment of Ireland’s benefits from EU membership. These parties tended to focus their criticisms on a limited number of issues: primarily the consequences of the EU’s developments for Ireland’s policy of military neutrality and for the protection of human rights within and beyond the EU, together with the failure of the EU to protect the environment. They were also concerned about the implications of integration for Irish democracy and independence especially in the context of the single currency and the relative weakness of the European Parliament. These scores are clearly not pro-EU, but how Soft or Hard are the various shades of Euroscepticism that they indicate? An examination of some of the things that parliamentarians representing these parties said helps to clarify matters. All these parties used the EU to contest Irish politics during the first years of the new millennium, through the prism of the two Nice Treaty referendums in 2001 and 2002. They and other groups formed the umbrella organization ‘No to Nice’, which campaigned heavily and successfully in the sense that its small but highly motivated support base among voters went out and voted. Campaigning against treaty reform is a clear sign of parties contesting the European project itself, rather than criticizing a policy here or an institution there. The baseline for this analysis is consequently that these parties are at least Soft Eurosceptics: what remains to be determined is whether there are also some instances of Hard (or ‘harder’) Euroscepticism. The Workers’ Party’s rhetoric in the referendums combined heavy criticism of the EU as a capitalist project with a strong nationalist element (Gilland 2002c). The Workers’ Party has long invoked a sense that by ratifying each act or treaty, and thereby entering a deeper process of integration, Ireland is selling out its interests. But despite this, the European integration project is also seen as having the potential for advancing the Workers’ Party’s left-inspired political goals (Tenth Amendment of the Constitution Bill (1987), Dáil Éireann Official Report). Euroscepticism in the Workers’ Party tends towards the Soft end of the continuum, in so far as the party supports EU membership. However, it also has a ‘harder’ aspect in that the party also views the EU of today as an ideological enemy (as distinct from its potential in terms of advancing the party’s left-wing ideology). On

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balance, the Workers’ Party is located in the middle of the Hard–Soft continuum, with the potential to become either ‘softer’ (if the EU becomes more left wing) or ‘harder’ (if the EU becomes more capitalist). Green Party parliamentarians made plenty of statements during the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaty debates emphasizing that their party was not an introverted party opposed to the whole project of European integration, and assumed this position again during the 2001 and 2002 Nice referendums. One Green parliamentarian called Maastricht ‘a sell-out of Irish neutrality and independence’ (Mr R. Garland, TD. Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill (1992), Dáil Éireann Official Report). The same speaker also contested the ongoing and deepening nature of European integration, as well as Ireland’s part in those processes— a defining feature of Soft Euroscepticism: ‘Ireland went into the Community in 1972, which I opposed; went in further in 1987, which I also opposed; and is now going in further again in 1992 (Mr. R. Garland, TD. Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill (1992), Dáil Éireann Official Report). Yet, the party has never advocated secession, which takes the hard edge off the Green Euroscepticism, especially since the Greens also fully acknowledge that the European level is the appropriate one for dealing with certain important political issues.2 The continued focus on neutrality is nevertheless one aspect of the Green Party’s position that can be interpreted as a nationalist objection to European integration, given the history of this policy as a mark of independence vis-à-vis Britain during the Second World War. In parliamentary debate on the EU, the Greens stress their internationalist outlook and strong support for European and international cooperation, as well as democratic control of decision-making, leading to a demand for decentralization and subsidiarity (Eighteenth Amendment of the Constitution Bill (1998), Dáil Éireann Official Report). However, the Greens’ position comes across as nationalistic regarding questions of democracy and independence, though the Greens are fervent supporters of the European Parliament—‘internationalism in one country’ sums up the position quite nicely. When debating the Nice Treaty in 2002, the Greens restated their commitment to Europe but also underlined their continued grievance with the EU’s development curve—a typical sign of Soft Euroscepticism: We are also committed to Europe and are part of the federation of green parties. However, we cannot accept the vision of Europe expressed in the treaty, which follows a pattern familiar from previous treaties, namely, creeping federalism. . . . I know from my attendance at the convention on the future of Europe along with Deputy John Bruton that the impetus is moving away from the partnership of states model towards the superstate or federal state model. At the most recent meeting on subsidiarity and defence, the phrase, ‘Europe is an economic giant, but a political dwarf ’, was repeated at least three times by members. It is clear that the aim of this treaty and the 2004 treaty currently being drawn up is to make Europe into a political giant. The problem is that democracy and accountability for citizens will be trampled on by this new political giant. (Mr. J. Gormley, TD. Twenty-Sixth Amendment of the Constitution Bill (2002), Dáil Éireann Official Report)

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In one sense, the Greens are quite Soft Eurosceptics as they do not advocate Ireland’s secession from the EU, but they are also quite Hard Eurosceptics in that they provide an ideologically driven critique of the EU and the terms of Ireland’s EU membership. This critique is not primarily environmental, but nationalistic, in the sense that the core concern is about Ireland’s independence to determine its own fate, and the quality of Irish democracy. These issues are, of course, not contrary to environmentalism, but they are not the primary defining features of it either. Moreover, the Greens oppose the extension of EU competencies in so far as this involves greater use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, which is an indication of Hard Euroscepticism rather than Soft. On balance, then, the Greens have Soft and Hard elements to their Euroscepticism, which augment their location in the middle of the Euroscepticism continuum. Sinn Féin’s single parliamentary representative focused his party’s opposition to Amsterdam very narrowly on the implications of the EU’s CFSP. These were seen as wholly negative in that the policy was felt to undermine Irish neutrality and democracy, and the EU was in any case not viewed as a suitable and legitimate actor in regional security. These concerns were articulated with lengthy references to Irish historical figures of nationalist (Wolfe Tone) and socialist (James Connolly) character. According to the definitions of Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, drawing on an ideological position is something that Hard Eurosceptics do. There is further evidence of the ‘hard’ edge that there is to Sinn Féin’s Euroscepticism in the following citation, which also illustrates that in Ireland foreign policy is a key identity carrier—at least for Sinn Féin: My party stands firmly for Irish national sovereignty. Vital elements of that sovereignty are military neutrality and an independent foreign policy. It is ironic that on the anniversary of 1798 the Government is seeking to dilute again the degree of sovereignty we have retained in the 26 counties. Wolfe Tone was the first to make the case for an independent foreign policy, and that has been a principle of all progressive movements in our history. It is supported overwhelmingly by the people. (Mr. C. O’Caolain, TD. Eighteenth Amendment of the Constitution Bill (1998), Dáil Éireann Official Report)

However, Sinn Féin does not present itself as an isolationist party either, rather as Europeans who do not agree with the EU’s particular way of creating bonds between states. A socialist critique (e.g. the reference to James Connolly) of the EU is advanced: I speak as a concerned European. It is entirely consistent to support the maximum possible constructive co-operation between the peoples of Europe and, at the same time, to defend Irish sovereignty and Irish neutrality. James Connolly, who has been mentioned already in the debate, said: ‘the internationalism of the future will be based on the free federation of free peoples’. (Mr. C. O’Caolain, TD. Eighteenth Amendment of the Constitution Bill (1998), Dáil Éireann Official Report)

Though O’Caolain claims to speak as a ‘concerned European’, he is not (in notable contrast to the Greens) supportive of the European Parliament as an institution that is likely to be (at least potentially) democratically legitimate, if it is given more

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competencies. The anti-militarist theme continued in the 2002 parliamentary debate on the Nice Treaty, where Sinn Féin spelt out an alternative vision of Ireland’s relationship with the EU that focused entirely on the details of foreign, security, and defence aspects of membership (too lengthy to cite in full here): There is an alternative to the direction in which Nice would take the European Union. It is neither the break up of the Union nor a futile attempt to create a giant European Union democracy. Peace and democracy in Europe can be served by maximum co-operation between sovereign democracies, with respect for diversity within and between nations. The alternative to Nice as advocated by Sinn Féin includes the European Union as a partnership of equal sovereign states to be the basis for a new treaty to replace the Treaty of Nice. (Mr. C. O’Caolain, TD. Twenty-Sixth Amendment of the Constitution Bill (2002), Dáil Éireann Official Report)

The question is whether any (realistic) treaty would satisfy Sinn Féin? In analytical terms, it is important to determine whether Sinn Féin’s alternative vision indicates Soft or Hard Euroscepticism? Is it a sign that Sinn Féin accepts the EU in principle but wishes to change its course (i.e. Soft Euroscepticism), or is it a thinly veiled form of Hard Euroscepticism, which the party is manifesting by seeking membership terms so unrealistic that it is de facto opposing membership (one of the stated definitional features of Hard Euroscepticism)? It is a close call, but overall Sinn Féin is clearly the party with parliamentary representation with the ‘hardest’ Euroscepticism, but even this brand of Euroscepticism is not extremely Hard in that the party’s statements have not included an explicitly stated preference for Ireland leaving the EU. However, in these citations Sinn Féin did come close to portraying itself as a party ‘whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived’, to restate Taggart’s and Szczerbiak’s words cited earlier. The quantitative analysis of Sinn Féin (Table 7.4), nevertheless, tempers this conclusion by indicating that, on balance, the Sinn Féin view was much less emphatically opposed to European integration than these selected quotations suggest. This is particularly interesting, since Sinn Féin, along with the Green Party, is potentially ‘coalitionable’ in future elections, and therefore might have the possibility of influencing or even shaping future government policy on Europe. But, the reverse may also happen: they might find it prudent to modify their positions on Europe in order to be invited into a government coalition (as Labour did in earlier decades). In any case, these positions are clearly more than simple party posturing—in times when opposing Europe was deeply unfashionable in Ireland they plugged the same message in the full knowledge that this would not advance their prospects. They have unswervingly stuck to their Eurosceptic positions: since Ireland joined in 1973 both the EU and Ireland have changed significantly but these parties’ opposition has been constant. The Socialist Party had one parliamentary representative in 2002 when the Nice Treaty was being debated for the second time, in preparation for the second referendum. This party represents perhaps the most interesting kind of Euroscepticism in Ireland today. Mr Higgins, the Socialist member of parliament, actually argued

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for a ‘yes’ vote in the 2002 referendum—not because he agreed with the Treaty as such, but because this would be, in his view, the most expedient result vis-à-vis changing the nature of the European project into line with the party’s left-wing ideological stance: I am a critical advocate for a ‘Yes’ vote for a number of reasons. The fastest route possible for the largest number of countries is facilitated by a ‘Yes’ vote. . . . I want these applicant countries to be part of a struggle within the European Union for a social model that will stand as a real alternative to the market fundamentalism of people like the Minister for Finance, Deputy McCreevy, and others—the Boston rump of the Cabinet, which includes the Minister of State, Deputy de Valera, the Tánaiste, Deputy Harney, and the Minister for Finance. (Mr. J. Higgins, TD. Twenty-Sixth Amendment of the Constitution Bill (2002), Dáil Éireann Official Report)

Here is a critical party that renounces the EU as currently constituted, but which does not have a problem with further internal market regulation (i.e. more Europeanization) in order to reach its ideological left-wing goal. Enlargement is seen as a positive step on the way to achieving this objective: The nature of changes taking place all over Europe is very interesting. There is a destruction of social security. There is little less than a war going on regarding what is happening in security and the protection of workers’ lives and jobs. . . . I favour countries joining as fast as possible so that they can be invited to participate in the argument for a socially secure Europe. (Mr. J. Higgins, TD. Twenty-Sixth Amendment of the Constitution Bill (2002), Dáil Éireann Official Report)

The party even sees Europe as being a driving force in realizing these goals: The years 1947 to 1977, following the Second World War, have been described in literature as 30 glorious years. They are described as such because it was the time of Keynesianism when capitalism was saved from itself by welfare states and public health systems with adaptations built on a type of Keynesian model. From 1977 to 1997 many inequalities in terms of poverty, housing and health opened up right across the economies. I can translate this into something small. What is happening among the public in relation to Europe? People are not stupid and they know it was Europe that pushed an equality agenda and an environmentally responsive agenda. (Mr. J. Higgins, TD. Twenty-Sixth Amendment of the Constitution Bill (2002), Dáil Éireann Official Report.)

The question is whether this discourse is Hard or Soft Euroscepticism? Is the aspiration for a socialist Europe so unrealistic so as to be impossible and therefore representing a de facto aim for Ireland to leave the EU; or should it be read as an indication of Soft Euroscepticism on the basis that the party seems to view the EU as ‘reformable’ and thus potentially advancing the party’s socialist goals? The same question was asked of Sinn Féin above: what (realistic) treaty would satisfy this party? None, probably. Yet, the Socialist Party clearly does not want Ireland to secede from the EU. The Socialist Party is difficult to place on the Euroscepticism continuum: it clearly rejects not only the status quo, but also potentially the EU’s development curve (unless it takes a sharp left turn). Instead, it argues for a level

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of integration (in some policy areas, notably market regulation) that goes beyond that advocated by the non-Eurosceptic parties in Ireland—albeit in a totally different direction than what those parties want as well as in a different direction than the EU is actually taking! The Socialist Party is, on balance, deemed to be located between the Soft and the Hard end of the Euroscepticism continuum: there is a willingness to ‘work the EU’, and the party sanctions Ireland’s membership. In contrast, there is ample and sustained criticism of the EU of today. There are other Eurosceptic parties that have never had parliamentary representation (an indication of their peripherality to Irish politics), or at least not during the time when a parliamentary bill on EU treaty reform passed through parliament.3 Such parties are more difficult to analyse, simply because there is no comparable record of their position and discourse. These parties are, in particular, the Socialist Workers’ Party and the Christian Solidarity Party. The only data that is available is the record of their participation in the two Nice Treaty referendum campaigns of 2001 and 2002, where they acted on the ‘no’ side. The Socialist Workers’ Party was part of the ‘No to Nice’ umbrella organization, and the source of its resistance to European integration is its left-wing, antiglobalization, and anti-capitalist ideology coupled with the perception that the EU stands for all these things that they oppose. The Socialist Workers’ Party opposed all traditional structures which are seen as oppressive because they supposedly ‘divide workers, giving an impression that one section of workers has a common interest with the capitalist rulers. The EU is seen very much in this vein. The party’s opposition to Nice was both nationalistic and socialist, referring to the neo-liberal agenda perceived to define the EU. Though the Socialist Workers’ Party does not explicitly advocate Ireland’s secession from the EU, everything the party does say points toward it belonging towards the Hard end of the Eurosceptic spectrum: the ideological critique, the absence of even any terms under which the EU might become acceptable, or even a positive part of the political system. The Christian Solidarity Party also participated in the ‘No to Nice’ umbrella campaign group, and the party’s campaign material outlined several grounds for opposition to the EU. These included the proposed institutional reforms which, it was felt, would make Ireland a second-class member state; the Treaty would further undermine Ireland’s military neutrality and force it to join a European army; Nice would give the EU control over the Irish economy; and it contained no provision for seceding from the EU. Setting the question of the accuracy of some of these claims to one side, the Christian Solidarity Party does not explicitly oppose EU membership, but opposes the EU’s current and expected future course, highlighting broadly the same aspects of the EU as other Eurosceptic parties in Ireland. The Christian Solidarity Party advanced no particular ideological critique of the EU, except the same nationalist overtones as the other parties. On balance, the defining elements of Hard Euroscepticism are absent from this party’s argumentation, making it the ‘softest’ Eurosceptic party in the Irish political system.

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SF

WP SP GP

Hard Euroscepticism

CSP

Soft Euroscepticism

Figure 7.2. Irish party-based Euroscepticism Note: SWP = Socialist Workers’ Party; SP = Socialist Party; SF = Sinn Féin; GP = Green Party; CSP = Christian Solidarity Party

At this point the Eurosceptic Irish parties can be arranged along the continuum (Figure 7.2). At the Hard end of the spectrum is the Socialist Workers’ Party. Less and different types of data were available about them, but on the basis of what was it emerged as a Hard Eurosceptic party because its opposition is ideologically driven and there is no realistic possibility of reforming the EU or Ireland’s membership thereof to meet their approval. Nor does there seem to be any drive within the party to attempt to do so. There were no Soft aspects of Euroscepticism here, but no call for secession from the EU either. What differentiates Sinn Féin from the Socialist Workers’ Party is that Sinn Féin’s profile as a Hard Eurosceptic party was tempered by the quantitative analysis (although if similar data had been available on the two small left-wing parties, the same may have been true of the Socialist Workers’ Party). On balance, Sinn Féin is nevertheless also closer to the Hard end of the continuum rather than the Soft end. The Workers’ Party and the Socialist Party display a mixture of evidence pointing to both Soft and Hard Euroscepticism. The Workers’ Party opposed the Nice Treaty but explicitly states its support for EU membership. The Socialist Party’s ‘yes’ to the Nice Treaty as a subversive means to bring about change that may make the EU a harbinger of socialism makes it an unusual Eurosceptic party, but nevertheless one that fits on the continuum. The Greens’ Euroscepticism is also ‘medium’, made Soft by the willingness to work the European institutions and support for subsidiarity, but made Hard by its nationalist critique of the EU. Finally, the Christian Solidarity Party has the ‘softest’ Irish Euroscepticism: no calls for secession, no ideological EU critique.

7.5 REFLECTIONS ON EUROSCEPTICISM Categorizing parties as softer or harder Eurosceptic depends crucially on what information is available about them. As we have seen, this can vary from party to party, and it can make it difficult to compare the degree of Hard or Soft Euroscepticism within two or more parties. Yet, on the basis of the available data a tentative comparison of Irish Eurosceptic parties is possible, and at this point

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Table 7.5. Eurosceptic parties in Ireland Party

Ideological Party Family

Hard or Soft Euroscepticism

Christian Solidarity Party Green Party Sinn Féin Socialist Party Workers’ Party Socialist Workers’ Party

Traditionalist Green/New politics Nationalist Extreme left Extreme left Extreme left

Soft Medium Hard Medium Medium Hard

Candidates— Seats

Votes (%)

23–0 31–6 37–5 5–1 8–0 7–0

0.3 3.8 6.5 0.8 0.2 0.2

Source: For the ‘Candidates–Seats’ column Gallagher, Marsh, and Mitchell (2003: 250).

the broad features of Irish party-based Euroscepticism can be summarized and compared to some broad features that have been found in other political systems. Irish party-based Euroscepticism is summarized in Table 7.5. Each party’s broad party family is indicated in the second column from the left, followed by an indication of the nature of the parties’ Euroscepticism. The two columns on the right indicate the parties’ ‘size’ in the party system: how many candidates they fielded in the 2002 election, and their vote share (the latter information is also presented in Table 7.3, but repeated here for the sake of completeness). These two columns demonstrate that there is no sizeable group of voters who support the Eurosceptic parties but whose preferences are stymied by an electoral system with a distorting effect; in fact, the Irish electoral system of the single transferable vote in multi-member constituencies is highly proportional. A previous analysis that included only the Greens, the Socialist Party, and Sinn Féin concluded that there were no Hard Eurosceptic parties in Ireland (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002: 23), which is obviously at odds with the data presented here in so far as some Hard elements have been found especially vis-à-vis Sinn Féin. One explanation for this discrepancy is that the authors of that study subsequently added a postscript to their study, which contained some revisions to the concepts of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism, and it is these revised concepts that the present study has relied on. Taggart and Szczerbiak’s comprehensive study of EU member and accession states offers some broad themes about contemporary Euroscepticism. In many ways, the Irish case fits in very well with generalizations about other EU member states. For example, the two authors stipulate that Eurosceptic parties in the member states tend to have low levels of electoral support (2002: 16); that Soft Eurosceptic parties tend to be more important in the party system than Hard ones (2002: 16); that they tend to be located on the left of the political spectrum (2002: 17); that Soft Eurosceptic parties tend to be more successful electorally than Hard ones (2002: 22); and that ‘coalitionable’ parties tend to soften their stance when they enter government (2002: 26). All these claims appear to be true of the Irish case: the first claim is clearly so, though Euroscepticism may not be the reason why people do not vote for these parties. Further, the claim about Eurosceptic parties

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tending to be left wing is also correct in the Irish case: the parties considered here have a clear left-wing agenda, with the exception of the very small Christian Solidarity Party whose ideology is socially conservative in a Catholic vein. The next claim referred to Soft Eurosceptic parties being more important than Hard ones. This is clearly true in so far as the ‘softest’ Eurosceptic party of consequence (the Greens) is one of the two most important, whereas Sinn Féin would have been expected to be somewhat ‘softer’ given its importance, although at least the very Hard Eurosceptic party (the Socialist Workers’ Party) is, in accordance with the broader European pattern, extremely peripheral in Irish electoral politics. The Christian Solidarity Party is an exception here: it is the ‘softest’ party, yet also at least as peripheral as the Socialist Workers’ Party. Moreover, the Greens provide some support for Taggart and Szczerbiak’s suggestion that Soft Eurosceptic parties generally tend to be more successful than Hard ones in Ireland, although the Christian Solidarity Party and Sinn Féin do not fit with that suggestion. Furthermore, the one and only example of an Irish Eurosceptic party entering government is the Labour Party pre-1987, which supports the proposal that parties tend to soften their Euroscepticism when offered the chance to obtain office. A future coalition including the Greens or Sinn Féin would shed very interesting light on the validity of this particular proposition. Some further broad points. The existence and manifestation of Euroscepticism in a political system depends not least on the political opportunity structures that exist. The low salience of the EU as a political issue means that a party wishing to profile itself on Euroscepticism would not easily find an entry point. If the EU’s salience increased and public opinion shifted away from the EU among voters, the opportunity structures may, of course, change, and Ireland’s highly proportional electoral system would make it comparatively easy for such a party to enter parliament, even if its electoral support base was rather small at the outset. What is more, the Irish case shows quite clearly that the ideological constraints on parties’ EU positions can be quite severe, and also that ideology and strategy can blend quite effectively. The small, extreme left-wing parties draw heavily on their ideology when they define their position on the EU, as do Sinn Féin and the Greens. Interestingly, the Socialist Workers’ Party appears to share the antiglobalization ideology of the Socialist and the Workers’ Parties, but ends up with a ‘harder’ brand of Euroscepticism (though this may be due to the differences in data available). Since none of these parties have been offered a coalition deal it is unknown whether and how much they would be prepared to shift from their current positions, in a way which might create a tension between ideology and strategy. What is clear is that in the 2002 general election the Greens claimed that they would not enter a coalition unless part of the deal was a renegotiation of the Nice Treaty. Since that is not within the scope of any Irish government, it can only be assumed that either the Greens did not want to enter government, or that they did not understand that their demand was pointless, or that they were intending to break this promise if offered a chance to be in government. A different but related general point is that Euroscepticism tends to exist within peripheral parties. The question is whether Euroscepticism leads to peripherality,

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or whether peripherality leads a party to espouse Euroscepticism as a way of challenging the political mainstream. This point is related to the one on ideological constraints because: (a) contemporary parties that are very ideologically driven tend to be peripheral, and (b) in cases of ideologically driven Euroscepticism it has to be assumed that the ideology, and thus the peripherality, existed prior to the Eurosceptic position.4 Consequently, and the Irish case exemplifies this proposition, there is no evidence that Euroscepticism leads to peripherality, but rather that parties taking up Euroscepticism tend to be peripheral, and they do so because in Euroscepticism they have a fine tool for killing two birds with one stone: it affords them an opportunity to articulate their ideology while at the same time challenging the mainstream.

7.6 CONCLUSION The first few years of the new millennium saw more Euro-drama in Ireland than the preceding two and a half decades of membership. At the level of political parties, European affairs and Ireland’s role in Europe became periodically contested questions, while public opinion seemed, at times, to be less clearly pro-EU than it had previously appeared. Still, the dedication and effort that went into securing a ‘yes’ vote in the second Nice referendum, and the decisive result of that referendum, augmented the return of normality—at least for that moment. NOTES 1. I content analysed three European Union-related constitutional amendment bills (pertaining to the ratification of the Single European Act (1987), Maastricht Treaty (1992), and Amsterdam Treaty(1998)), using QSR NUD∗ IST version 4 to code text units as pro-European, neutral, or anti-European, and thereby derive quantitative mean party positions on Institutions/Policies, Values/Identity, and Material Output. 2. The Greens view of which issues are most appropriately handled at the European level is, however, mostly at odds with the current reality of European integration. 3. If they did, no representative for these parties spoke on the bill in question. 4. The obverse would be that a party became, for instance, extremely left-wing or ethnonationalist as a consequence of its Euroscepticism. This seems rather unlikely.

8 Euroscepticism and Political Parties in Spain Marga Gómez-Reino, Iván Llamazares, and Luis Ramiro

8.1 INTRODUCTION Southern European parties and public have been often considered as strongly pro-European. The incorporation of Mediterranean countries into the European Union (EU) was preceded, accompanied, and followed by a wide consensus on the positive effects of European integration. According to this view, ideological convergence regarding European integration would be one of the key features of the Southern European party systems. However, this general description of Southern European party systems focuses mainly on the larger national parties, and does not take into account the articulation and channelling of criticisms towards the EU by minor political parties. In countries like Spain, where sociocultural political divides are strong, and where the Communist Party and organizations close to it have played important historical roles, it becomes particularly important to draw the Communist left and peripheral nationalist groups in the analysis. After all, minor political forces play significant roles structuring electoral competition, the formation of parliamentary and government coalitions, and, consequently, public policies at the regional and national levels. The importance of these parties is reinforced by the growing strength of regional governments in Spanish politics. For these reasons, the study of party positions towards the EU cannot leave aside minor political forces. In this chapter, we present first two alternative descriptions of the characteristics and evolution of the Spanish party system regarding the process of European integration: one that emphasizes consensus and another that underlines conflict and politicization. In the second place, we focus on those political parties that have displayed traces of either soft (Sections 8.2 and 8.3) or hard (Section 8.4) opposition towards certain aspects of European integration: the national, leftwing coalition United Left (IU), the Galician left-wing nationalist group Galician Nationalist Block (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, BNG), the Basque independentist left, and the Spanish radical right. Finally, we analyse the positions of parties towards the EU (Section 8.5), drawing on data provided by a survey conducted among Spanish politicians by a University of Salamanca research group.1 In this section, we also explore some of the main sources and correlates of Eurosceptic

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positions among Spanish politicians. In particular, our analyses show the importance of ideological positions, peripheral national identities, and party system characteristics conditioning the strategic choices of political parties in accounting for dissatisfaction with the EU. Two of these political parties (the IU and the BNG) clearly display ‘contingent and qualified’ rather than ‘outright and unqualified’ critical positions regarding the EU (Taggart 1998). That is, these two groups are Soft Eurosceptic because they show ‘scepticism about the way European integration is currently developing’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002b: 7) and consider that the current development of the EU ‘runs counter the interests, policies or issues they support’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002b: 8). Even if some of their statements resemble Hard Eurosceptic arguments, their European policy is guided more by reformist appeals than by principled opposition to the EU. The orientations of these two political parties must be distinguished from that of some minor forces that hold reformist views of the integration process without falling into the category of Euroscepticism.2 These parties would be reformist but not Eurosceptic. This means that they disagree with the status quo of the EU, as many other parties do, and propose strong reforms in some policy areas without expressing a clear qualified rejection of the current model of the EU. The position of the Basque independentist left and the Spanish far right is related to more central components of the current integration process, and in this sense they are closer to the polar type of Hard Euroscepticism. Even if these groups do not propose withdrawal from the EU, their institutional and economic preferences are so distant from the characteristics of the current integration process that it is impossible to envision them supporting the EU without the latter experiencing quite dramatic changes. It must be taken into account, however, that the borders between reformist, Soft-Eurosceptic, and Hard Eurosceptic parties are sometimes difficult to draw, even if we consider that Euroscepticism must be understood as a continuum ranging between the Soft and Hard poles (Sitter 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002b). In some cases the distinction is especially blurred, as Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002b: 35) recognize. In this vein, the distinction between Soft Eurosceptic parties that are critical of the current development of the EU because it is not sufficiently democratic or integrationist and other parties that criticize certain policy areas and propose a programme of reforms can be a matter of slight nuance. As in other countries, in Spain, the Soft version of Euroscepticism is better represented than the Hard one. The Spanish case is also similar to others in that the Soft Eurosceptic parties are not government parties and their share of votes is limited. They occupy less central and pivotal positions in the Spanish party system. In this same line, the most relevant Eurosceptic parties in Spain represent the leftwing type of Soft Euroscepticism, defending in their platforms a combination of traditional left-wing stances with new left issues, and, in one case, also with peripheral nationalist claims.

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8.1.1 The Spanish party system and European integration Spanish political parties are traditionally considered pro-European. According to some authors, there would be no traces of polarization or even programmatic distance among political parties regarding integration into the EU (Álvarez-Miranda 1994). The main reason for this consensus would relate to the net benefits that Spain—a comparatively less developed economy and society with a history richer in authoritarian than democratic experiences—would extract from being incorporated into Europe. In this context, the modernization of the Spanish economy and society, and the development of a political safety net, would be two of the main rationales for the wide Spanish consensus on European integration. ÁlvarezMiranda analysed party documents, political speeches, and voting behaviour in Parliament, and concluded that all parties from left to right, including the Communist Party, were pro-European. Over time, this pattern would have become even stronger, party positions being more similar in 1988–90 than in 1974–7 (Álvarez-Miranda 1994: 166). This perspective has been criticized more recently. Some authors argue against this consensual view of party politics because, although voting for EU incorporation was unanimous in parliament, political divisions on economic and institutional issues were visible in the Spanish legislative assembly (Quintanilla 2000). The Communist Party and some nationalist forces were among the groups that introduced more amendments to the Spanish treaty of integration into the EU. The IU, an organization created by the Communist Party in 1986, was later very critical of both the Maastricht and Amsterdam agreements. In addition, Quintanilla (1999: 22) argues that differences among parliamentary groups on European matters have become more intense rather than disappeared. Thus, Quintanilla’s analysis points in the opposite direction to the findings of ÁlvarezMiranda. Our argument in this chapter is that attitudes towards European integration must be analysed by single political parties. Although the two main Spanish national political parties show similarly positive attitudes towards the EU integration process, our evidence shows that Eurosceptic positions are far from absent in the Spanish party system. The chapter examines different kinds of critical orientations being channelled by some left-wing and peripheral nationalist political parties. Soft Eurosceptic orientations are especially present in the cases of the BNG and the IU. The BNG and the IU were opposed to the Maastricht Treaty. Both groups maintained a critical interpretation of the way in which the EU was being constructed. At first, the IU and the BNG thought that the creation of the EU was reflecting capitalist interests and adjusting to neo-liberal projects. In addition, the BNG judged that the process of European integration was taking place without considering the interests of ‘nations without states’ (among them Galicia). Moreover, there are also significant pockets of Hard Euroscepticism among those political forces that have confrontationally opposed—even if with unequal electoral success—the Spanish constitutional framework, that is, the Basque independentist left and the Spanish radical right. They are moved by opposite

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political–institutional and socio-economic projects, but they coincide by the intensity of their nationalist orientations, and severely question the current process of European integration.3 In order to assess the conditions of Euroscepticism among political parties it is necessary to examine the evaluations of the Spanish public opinion towards European integration. We have done this by exploring the evolution of Spanish public opinion towards the EU in the Eurobarometers since Spanish entry into the EU. The picture we get when we look at public opinion data reveals both the prevalence of positive evaluations of the EU and the presence of a significant percentage of citizens holding critical views of the Spanish membership in the EU. As shown in Figure 8.1, whereas the percentage of citizens supporting Spanish membership of the EU has rarely gone below the 50 per cent threshold (only at certain moments from 1994 until 1995), negative opinions of the Spanish EU membership have rarely gone over the 10 per cent level (just in the period from 1992 till 1997). However, the persistent presence of a significant percentage of citizens holding negative views of the EU membership (ranging most usually from 5 to 10 per cent), and moreover, the experience that this figure may rise very rapidly following specific combinations of domestic and international circumstances (as it happened in the mid-1990s, when negative views reached 28.5 per cent), clearly reveal the presence of Eurosceptic orientations and suggests that some political parties might play a significant role in channelling and strengthening them. Party positions relate not only to their distinct ideological profiles in both the socio-economic and political–territorial dimensions, but also to their different placement in electoral competition and political institutions (Table 8.1). The proEuropean stance of the Socialist Party and the centre-right Popular Party (PP) is hardly surprising considering their programmatic preferences, their centrist orientations, and the characteristics of the Spanish economy (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2001). As far as the Socialists are concerned, the relatively backward economic situation of Spain, the limited development of its welfare state, and the institutional position this political group enjoyed as a government party from 1982 to 1996 explain quite well its strongly pro-European orientations (Gillespie 1996). The benefits derived from the cohesion and structural funds were an additional reason to wholeheartedly support Spanish integration into Europe. As for the PP, during the period in which the Socialists governed, it went through a process of ideological moderation with the aim of increasing its electoral competitiveness. Even though it was the main party in the opposition, it hardly ever expressed intense nationalist grievances against the Socialist policy towards the EU. Furthermore, as it searched for the median voter, the PP had to combine liberalizing and deregulating agendas with the compromise of maintaining the welfare state. Neither traditional Spanish nationalism nor open retrenchments of public and social expenditures were acceptable options for Spanish conservatives. Finally, after reaching the national government, the leaders of the PP discovered new avenues to advance their liberalizing goals, at least to the extent that they have been able to ally to other European governments aiming at similar economic and institutional aims.

0

Figure 8.1. Support for EU membership Eurobarometer−Year

EB55-2001

EB54-2000

EB52-1999 EB53-2000

EB50.0-1998 EB51.0-1999

EB49-1998

EB47.2-1997 EB48-1997

EB47.1-1997

EB46.1-1996 EB47-1997

EB45.1-1996 EB46.0-1996

EB44.1-1995

EB43.1B-1995 EB44.0-1995

EB43.0-1995 EB43.1-1995

EB42-1994

EB41.0-1994 EB41.1-1994

EB40-1993

EB38.1-1992 EB39.0-1993

EB37.0-1992 EB38.0-1992

Good Thing

EB36-1991

EB35.0-1991 EB35.1-1991

EB33-1990 EB34.0-1990

EB32B-1989

EB31A-1989 EB32A-1989

EB31-1989

EB29-1988 EB30-1988

EB27-1987 EB28-1987

EB26-1986

EB24-1985 EB25-1986

Percentage 90

80 Bad Thing

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

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Table 8.1. Ideological position in the left–right dimension of parties according to the opinion of their leaders (ranging from 1—the far left, to 10—the far right). Differences of means are significant at the 0.01 level Party Popular Party (PP) Socialist Party (PSOE) United Left (IU) Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC) Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) Galician Nationalist Block (BNG) Basque Solidarity (EA) Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) Aragonese Council (CHA)

Mean

N

Standard deviation

5.8 3.8 2.9 5.1 5 4.9 3.2 4 3.2 2.9

74 88 19 13 9 15 13 6 9 9

0.61 0.84 0.40 0.86 0.70 0.70 0.83 0 0.44 0.3

Source: University of Salamanca Survey, 2001–2.

Parties that occupied less central positions in the Spanish party system embraced different orientations towards European integration. After a strong moderating process during the democratic transition process in the 1970s,4 and following the Socialist victory in 1982, the Communist Party and the Communistsponsored IU, made a continuous effort to stress their programmatic differences with the Socialist Party. These differences also concerned international politics, especially incorporation into North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, after incorporation into the EU, some of the policies and agreements of European integration. As for peripheral nationalist parties, there have been two critical influences affecting their attitudes towards European integration (De Winter and GómezReino 2002). On the one hand, these parties have a tendency to adopt Eurosceptical views because they have a reduced access to the EU decision-making processes, and in some cases, also because they consider that the process of European integration reduces the power of the nations without state. On the other hand, they also show pro-European positions to the extent that EU regional policies provide new opportunities for the empowerment of regional actors and regional political institutions. The presence of other dimensions of competition other than that of the center–periphery (i.e. the left–right), may also have a determining impact on the final position of these parties. The position of the BNG is a result of the combination of these factors.

8.2 THE SOFT EUROSCEPTICS, THE GALICIAN NATIONALIST BLOCK, AND THE UNITED LEFT The IU is a left-wing organization founded by the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) in 1986, in cooperation with other minor parties and groups. The creation

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of the IU was one of the consequences of the important failure of the PCE in the 1982 general elections. The IU was originally created as an electoral coalition, but it very soon began a process of organizational development and institutionalization through which its role was reinforced, and the internal weight of the parties integrated was reduced. In spite of this, the PCE did not disappear, and has maintained a very prominent role in the leadership of the IU and in the definition of its political and organizational strategies. In fact, the IU is currently only formed by the PCE, some other minor factions, and independent people affiliated with the IU.5 The BNG is a peripheral nationalist party that acts only in Galicia (in the northwest of Spain). It was founded in 1982 by two small Galician communist and socialist parties (the Union of the Galician People, UPG and the Galician Socialist Party, PSG) and later other nationalist organizations joined. Organizationally, the original model of the BNG and the IU were not very different. From the beginning, the BNG adopted an organizational model close to that of electoral coalitions or federations of parties. This model is internally known as one of ‘front organization’. This structure has essentially survived until now.6 Within the BNG one group, the Communist UPG has always been the largest internal actor. However, there have been several internal checks and balances (e.g. the BNG leader has been a non-UPG member since 1982) and the recognition of the different factions and parties within the front that have somehow checked the power of the UPG. The BNG and the IU have attempted to maintain strong linkages with social organizations and movements. The BNG has traditionally had very close connections with left-wing, nationalist, and Galician social movements and organizations. The linkage has been especially strong with the Galician left-wing nationalist union (CIG union) in which the BNG and the UPG activists participate and occupy relevant positions. The BNG has also supported the organization and mobilization of a Galician agricultural union (Comisions Labregas) and students groups. The IU has had, through the Communist Party, very friendly relations with the Comisiones Obreras (CC OO) union (one of the two biggest unions in Spain) and has traditionally supported the workers’ mobilizations and the union’s policies. However, since the mid-1990s the relations between the IU and the Communists, and CC OO have suffered a deterioration and the previous relationship of solidarity between them is now more distant. Besides this, the IU has emphasized the importance of its relations with the environmental groups, maintaining periodical contacts with them and supporting their demands. In accordance with its left-wing and nationalist nature, the BNG has stressed during its history certain political issues which express this multiple appeal. The BNG platforms have traditionally emphasized such classical left-wing policies as labour groups’ rights, employment, social welfare, public health, and education. In addition, the BNG has articulated nationalist demands and projects, calling for a reform of the Spanish constitutional framework that would recognize the national status of Galicia and establish a confederal political system in Spain. The BNG political positions can be better grasped by following its mobilizations and demands during its short history. For example, the BNG has strongly defended

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the Galician industrial sectors which have been in crisis, it has supported union mobilizations, and it has defended Galician agriculture and fishery (against the EU policies). The BNG originally adopted anti-system positions rejecting the Spanish Constitution and the Galician Statute of Autonomy, but this position experienced a significant shift towards in a more pragmatic direction. The party programme includes classical demands, such as a more prominent role of the Galician language and Galicia’s right to self-determination. The BNG broke with its political isolation recently also by coordinating its efforts with Catalan and Basque nationalist parties in demand of a reform of the Spanish State, later translated in the formal Declarations of Barcelona, Vitoria, and Santiago in 1998. The initial goal of the IU was to represent a combination of traditional left-wing stances and classical New Left issues (environment, peace, and feminism, among other similar issues). The electoral platforms of the IU reflect the mixture of these concerns, through the combination of more materialist issues (workers’ rights, unemployment, defence of the public economic sector, etc.) with others related to a more post-materialist approach (minority rights, defence of the environment, women’s rights, increase of democratic control, and accountability of the policy process, etc.). The IU has emphasized, as well, the defence and strengthening of the welfare state. The BNG has experienced an almost continuous trend of electoral growth since its foundation in 1982. It has become a very relevant actor in the Galician party system. Since 1997 the BNG is the second party in the Galician regional parliament (where it is in the opposition to the centre-right PP regional government) and it is also currently represented in the European and the Spanish parliaments. The BNG has extended its influence very remarkably at the local level. In 1999, it attained its best results, and since then it participates in the government of five of the seven largest Galician cities.7 The evolution of the IU was also one of growth until its electoral crisis in 1999 and 2000. The party increased its electorate at the national level from 5 per cent in 1986 to 10 per cent in 1996, returning to its original levels again in 2000. IU is currently the third nationwide party in Spain, but its presence has been very damaged in some regions after its poor results in the last electoral cycle (1999 local, regional, and European elections, and 2000 general elections—see Table 8.2). The IU currently participates in two (out of seventeen) regional governments (Balearic Islands and Basque Country) and presides over the city council in only one provincial capital (the city of Córdoba, one of its traditional strongholds).8

8.3 THE LEFT-WING AND THE PERIPHERAL NATIONALIST POLITICAL PARTIES AND EUROSCEPTICISM IN SPAIN The IU and the BNG are Soft Eurosceptic parties (Table 8.3). Both support the idea of European integration but are critical of and sceptical about the current model of development of the EU, and were against the Maastricht Treaty.9

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PP PSOE IU CiU PNV BNG CC PA ERC ICV EA CHA

Votes

% Votes

MPs

10,321,178 7,918,752 1,263,043 970,421 353,953 306,286 248,261 206,255 194,715 119,290 100,742 75,356

44.52 34.16 5.45 4.19 1.53 1.32 1.07 0.89 0.84 0.51 0.43 0.33

183 125 8 15 7 3 4 1 1 1 1 1

Besides this, the IU was the only Spanish relevant party strongly divided around the European issue in 1992 when the Maastricht Treaty had to be approved in the Spanish Parliament. An internal faction campaigned in favour of voting ‘yes’ in Parliament against the more critical official stance of the IU.10 The IU is in favour of European integration but it supports a model of the EU that guarantees a European social model and the economic and social rights associated to the welfare state, political independence from the USA, and solidarity with the Third World countries. In the documents of its 6th Federal Conference (2000), IU stated that The currently dominant model of European construction . . . is being directed by economic proprietors and hegemonized by neoliberal policies. The European Union that is being built corresponds to the rhythms and policies that benefit the industrial and financial European capital without taking into account the aspirations of the workers, of the workers’ movement, of the feminist movement, of the social movements and, in general, of the citizens (IU 2000a).11

For the IU, the current model of European integration is endangering some of the traditional social rights historically conquered by the working class, while it is constraining the democratic functioning of the European and national political Table 8.3. Main Eurosceptic parties in the Spanish Parliament

United Left (IU, Izquierda Unida) Galician Nationalist Block (BNG, Bloque Nacionalista Galego)

Party family

Type of Euroscepticism

% Votes (2000)

Radical Left

Soft Eurosceptic

5.45

Radical Left, Peripheral Nationalist

Soft Eurosceptic

1.32

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systems. The IU has also shown its rejection of the independence of the European Central Bank, since it means, from its point of view, a clear attack against the people’s sovereignty (IU 2000b). In contrast, IU defends a democratization of the EU, a common foreign policy guided by the principles of peaceful conflict resolution, and solidarity with the Third World countries, a stronger emphasis in the social aspects of integration, and a common fiscal policy that limits free capital circulation. The IU is in favour of the EU enlargement, although it is critical of the way in which this process is being carried out.12 The BNG argues that the model of European integration defined in the Maastricht Treaty implies the financial and commercial subordination of the economies of the EU member states to the interests of the financial cores of the European ‘central’ states (France, Germany, and the Benelux). For the BNG, the content of the Maastricht Treaty showed the democratic deficit of the union and the antiwelfare state spirit that guided the dominant model of European integration. For Galician nationalists, the EU has had a negative impact on Galicia, but not only because the entry negotiations between Spain and the European Economic Community (EEC) resulted in a non-beneficial outcome, but also because the general model of European integration damages the position of ‘economically dependent and peripheral regions’ as Galicia. From the point of view of the BNG, some of the EU policies have had a very negative impact on some of the most crucial economic sectors in Galicia (fishery, shipbuilding, and milk production). The BNG defends a more democratic and socially advanced model of Europe, where the ‘nations without state’ could obtain full representation and recognition of their right to self-determination (the ‘Europe of the peoples and the nations’), and that would protect welfare state institutions.13

8.4 THE HARD EUROSCEPTICS: THE BASQUE INDEPENDENTIST LEFT AND THE SPANISH RADICAL RIGHT In the Spanish party system, two political–ideological strands represent Hard Eurosceptic positions—the Basque independentist left and the Spanish far right. Although polar opposites in many ideological and political dimensions, both political streams share their hostility towards the EU, in both cases determined by the dominant role that radical nationalist themes and demands play in their respective projects. Although a minority group in the Basque country and Navarre, its frontal opposition to the Spanish Constitutional framework, its presence in local and regional institutions, and its shared goals with the terrorist organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), have assigned the independentist left a key role in Basque politics. By contrast, after the failure of the 1981 military coup attempt, the Spanish radical right has been electorally a marginal political force. However, the prominence that far-right groups have attained in other European countries, and

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the potential role that radical nationalist forces might play channelling nationalist and Hard Eurosceptic views, justify paying attention to the space of Spanish rightwing radicalism. The most important political force radically rejecting the core elements of the current European integration process is the Basque left-wing independentist movement, self-labelled as the Basque patriotic left.14 Although experiencing important changes in its degree of electoral success, the Basque radical independentist movement has maintained a significant presence in the Basque and Navarrese party systems. In the Basque autonomous community, and over the last decade, this political leaning attained its best electoral results in 1998, under a truce by ETA (17.9 per cent of the valid votes for Basque Citizens). In the 2001 Basque autonomous elections, after ETA had returned to its campaign of political killings, Basque Citizens dropped to 10.1 per cent of the valid votes. In Navarre, where Basque nationalism is a minority movement, but the People’s Unity and then Basque Citizens have been its most successful representatives, the latter attained 15.6 per cent of the valid votes in the 1999 regional elections (also under the ETA truce). In 1995, the People’s Unity attained 9.2 per cent of the valid votes. Until the year 2000, the Basque independentist left had always attained some seats in the Spanish Parliament. However, in 2000, the independentist left stopped fielding candidates in the Spanish general elections in order to emphasize its rejection of the Spanish political framework. The opposition of Basque left-wing independentism against the European integration process must be understood in light of three key determinants. Two of them relate to core components of its ideological and strategic project, and another one to the practical implications of European integration for the terrorist organization ETA. A first reason for the opposition towards the current integration project relates to the main component of the ideology of Basque radical independentism, that is, its search for independence and unification of all the Basque territories, which in their view are split in two oppressing nation states (France and Spain), and, in the case of Spain, in two autonomous communities (the Basque country and Navarre). From this perspective, the European integration project must be rejected because it is based on existing European nation states, does not open avenues for secessionist projects, and maintains the split of the Basque people between France and Spain. In addition, Basque radical independentism, which defines itself as a socialist movement, rejects the European integration project for being based on what it defines as neo-liberal principles and policies. In sum, this political leaning judges the current European integration process as incompatible with core components of its strategic goals, that is, the economic and political sovereignty of the Basque nation.15 Another key reason for the rejection of the current integration project relates to the increasing judicial and police cooperation among European countries and the difficulties that ETA and its militants are experiencing as a result of it. Basque radical independentist groups have consistently rejected international police and judicial cooperation against ETA, which they characterize as an attempt to impose a repressive solution on the Basque conflict. According to the declarations and

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official statements of the radical Basque independentist political groups, ETA would just be an expression of such conflict, which has consistently opposed the Basque nation and the Spanish and French states. The only way to overcome this conflict and thus put an end to the killings and violence practiced by ETA would be to implement the unification of Basque territories under a sovereign entity, that is, the fulfilment of ETA’s political goals. A political leaning that could be expected to voice Hard Eurosceptic orientations, and also condition the political debate on European integration, is the Spanish radical right. The Spanish far-right has been characterized by both its organizational fragmentation and electoral marginality. Its fragmentation is partly connected to its ideological diversity: different types and subtypes of reactionary, fascist, and modernizing radical nationalist groups, not necessarily getting along well together, coexist in the far-right landscape. This fragmentation has been favoured by the fact that no rightist force has been able to become dominant in this political space. Consequently, bandwagon processes, in which militants and leaders of other extremist forces join the winning rightist group, have not taken place. Furthermore, the persistence and comparative strength of the historical identities and projects of the Spanish radical right, linked to the Falange or other far-right fragments of the Francoist regime, such as Fuerza Nueva (New Force), may have been a severe handicap for the development of a strong radical right coalition. Instead of moving towards a renewed articulation of authoritarian and nationalist themes with pro-market principles, the Spanish radical right has attached itself to the corporatist, statist, and rhetorically anti-capitalist ideas of the fascist movements of the interwar period, thus limiting its electoral appeal.16 Finally, the critical role that the ‘unity of Spain’ has played in the ideological articulation of both Spanish conservatism and right radicalism has not helped the extreme right to build a successful electoral coalition: the PP has managed to channel and represent Spanish nationalist themes and demands in a project compatible both with democracy and a strongly regionalized state, thus hindering the success of radical Spanish nationalist forces. The results of the 2000 national parliamentary and 1999 European elections showed both the electoral failure of the Spanish radical right and the dominance of those groups directly or indirectly linked to the historical versions of Spanish fascism. In the 1999 European elections, the most successful far-right group, the Independent Spanish Falange, attained 0.07 per cent of valid votes at the national level. Other far-right groups, such as the Alliance for the National Unity, and the Spanish Falange attained 0.06 and 0.05 per cent, respectively. In the 2000 national parliamentary elections, the most successful far-right group, The Falange, attained 0.06 per cent of the national valid votes. All together, the far-right groups did not even reach 0.2 per cent of the national valid votes in the 2000 national parliamentary elections. It must also be kept in mind that all these political forces are directly or indirectly connected to different brands or currents of the Falange, the Spanish historical fascist organization. Groups trying to rebuild a radical nationalist coalition under new ideological bases have proved even weaker or finally merged with the more traditional brands of right radicalism.17

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Although with different intensities, both traditional and modernizing radical right groups have taken a negative stance towards European integration. National Democracy, an organization that has tried to refashion the ideology of the Spanish far right, rejects European integration, both in political and economic terms, and defends the Spanish national sovereignty. This rejection is however compatible with the proposal of a geopolitical alliance of European nation states against the USA. From this perspective, national states are the only instrument to resist economic and cultural globalization, the most pervasive and threatening contemporary social and political phenomenon. The traditionally oriented Spanish Falange, Independent Spanish Falange, and New Force, as well as the recently created Spanish Front, also position themselves in defence of the sovereignty of the national states, and defend a renegotiation of the Spanish agreements with the EU, but put less emphasis on the importance of the globalization and European integration processes for the redefinition of their political projects.18

8.5 SPANISH SOFT EUROSCEPTICISM: SURVEY EVIDENCE FROM INTERVIEWS TO REGIONAL POLITICAL LEADERS It is possible to cross-examine some of the characteristics and correlates of Eurosceptic positions by analysing a survey conducted among politicians in seven Spanish autonomous communities by a University of Salamanca research group.19 Our survey data provides quantitative results consistent with the qualitative evaluations we included earlier. Thus, if we look at how regional politicians perceive the positions of their respective political parties towards the EU, we find that, at the national level, only the IU is placed in Eurosceptic positions (see Table 8.4). In a 1–5 scale in which 1 indicates disagreement and 5 indicates agreement with the current integration process, IU politicians place their party at 2.3.20 At the subnational level, BNG is the only other party that displays, according to the party politicians, clearly negative views of the current process of European integration, even more markedly than in the case of the IU (with a mean position of 1.5 and a comparatively low standard deviation). These figures contrast with the quite positive views hold by the two main national parties. Our data allow us also to explore the plausibility of different explanations regarding the sources of these Eurosceptic positions. In this regard, both ideological and political–institutional arguments could help explain the Eurosceptic orientations of the IU and the BNG. Left-wing parties could be more deeply concerned with the potentially damaging effects of the European economic integration process for the welfare state, and perceive the current integration process as driven by a pro-market and pro-capitalist agenda that would eventually erode the welfare state, increase competition among workers, and drive salaries down.21 As we pointed out before, another important factor conditioning the orientation of BNG towards the EU relates to its nationalist ideology. As in the cases of other peripheral nationalist parties, the fact that the EU has not opened real

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Table 8.4. Attitude towards the European integration process of each political party according to its elites (ranging from 1—very unfavourable, to 5—very favourable). Means by political party. Differences of means are significant at the 0.01 level. Party Popular Party (PP) Socialist Party (PSOE) United Left (IU) Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC) Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) Galician Nationalist Block (BNG) Basque Solidarity (EA) Republican Left of Catalonia (ER) Aragonese Council (CHA)

Mean

N

Standard deviation

4.3 3.9 2.3 4.1 3.6 3.1 1.5 3.3 2.9 3.4

74 91 19 13 9 15 13 7 9 9

0.69 0.70 0.75 0.86 1 1.2 0.66 0.76 0.93 0.56

Source: University of Salamanca Survey, 2001–2.

institutional channels for peripheral nations could provide the Block with more grounds for the reluctance of Galician nationalists towards the EU. Finally, strictly ideological arguments can be complemented with other arguments relating to the position of these parties in the institutional system and the dynamics of party competition. In the first place, their lack of institutional power, both at national and regional institutions, could reinforce their reluctance towards the EU. In the second place, having to compete for votes with the centre-left socialists, it would not be surprising that both parties strategically choose a more reluctant or critical profile towards the European integration process, particularly in so far as they can present the dilemmas of European integration as linked to other divisions concerning social and economic policies. The fact that, as we pointed out before, there are significant pockets of citizens unsatisfied with the integration process underscores the rationality of this behaviour. Our survey data is consistent with both the ideological and institutional explanations that we point out above. There are modest but significant linear associations between the left–right placement of parties and their orientations towards the EU: the more leftist one party is perceived to be by its elites, the more likely it is to display Eurosceptic positions (see Table 8.5).22 Also, at the ideological level, though on the political–territorial dimension, peripheral nationalist identifications are negatively associated with the orientations towards the EU, peripheral nationalists being more reluctant towards the EU integration process.23 It is also possible to draw conjunctural inferences on the comparative strength of the associations between orientations towards the EU, ideological positions, and party membership by conducting multivariate analyses. Linear multiple regression on attitudes towards the EU using the two ideological variables we identified above plus membership in the IU and membership in the BNG leaves us with the interesting result that both ideological and membership variables have

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Table 8.5. Pearson correlation coefficients between party evaluation of the EU, party left– right placement, and peripheral national identifications Party left–right placement

Peripheral national identification

0.38∗∗ 267

−0.39∗∗ 266

Party Evaluation of the EU N ∗∗

Coefficients significant at the 0.01 level. Source: University of Salamanca Survey—2001–2.

statistically significant effects on our dependent variable.24 Most probably, this indicates that both party system and strictly ideological considerations play a role explaining the positions of these two parties.

8.6 CONCLUSIONS In this chapter, we have explored the distribution, characteristics, and correlates of Eurosceptic orientations in Spanish political parties. Far from presenting the image of an encompassing political consensus on the European integration process, our analysis emphasizes the fact that critical orientations towards the EU are clearly present in the Spanish party system. In particular, our analysis has identified two main Soft Eurosceptic actors (the IU and the BNG) and two other political groupings that display Hard Eurosceptic orientations, the Basque independentist left and the Spanish radical right. The presence of different types of Eurosceptic forces is hardly surprising if we consider the historical structuring of the Spanish party system. After all, Spain has consistently displayed a moderate multiparty system in which sources of political competition are not only socioeconomic, but also cultural and territorial. Furthermore, the Communist Party or alliances built around that party have played quite significant roles in the national and regional political arenas at different historical moments. In this sense, the presence and articulation of Euroscepticism in Spain is strongly conditioned by the historical characteristics of the Spanish party system. Both our qualitative and quantitative analyses show that orientations towards the current process of European integration are strongly conditioned by the ideological views of party politicians. More specifically, radical left and peripheral nationalist politicians are more likely to display dissatisfaction with the European integration process. This kind of Soft Euroscepticism is connected to fears that the integration process will decrease public expenditure and damage the welfare state. In addition, when we control for socio-economic preferences, peripheral national identifications have a significant impact on orientations towards the EU, peripheral nationalists being more likely to embrace Eurosceptic orientations. Finally, our analysis is also consistent with the idea that the position of parties in the party system affects their degree of Euroscepticism.

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Euroscepticism among left-wing nationalist parties is related to the view that the current process of European integration is implementing the neo-liberal project of competition among territories and economic-institutional regimes, and thus leading towards further reductions in public expenditure and social protection. The fact that Spain is a country in which, as a result of its socioeconomic characteristics (which include comparatively low levels of per capita income and a weaker development of its welfare state), experts tend to assume a general consensus on European integration, makes these results more interesting. In addition to this, in the case of peripheral nationalist groups, Euroscepticism is connected to what these parties perceive as totally unsatisfactory channels for the representation of stateless nations in the EU. Both types of ideological bases might be strengthened by the constraints and incentives that electoral competition places on parties having to compete with a statewide, overall much stronger Socialist Party. Since Eurosceptic orientations are, although minor, clearly present among the Spanish public, it may be rational for these parties to emphasize their criticisms on the EU. Therefore, this combination of ideological–programmatic and electoral–strategic considerations might underlie the critical positions adopted by Soft Eurosceptic parties in Spain.

NOTES 1. Our quantitative data is based on a survey conducted in 2001 and 2002 among 278 politicians in six Spanish regions or autonomous communities: Asturias, the Basque country, Castile-Leon, Catalonia, Galicia, and Madrid. This survey, which covers regions with different economic and political–institutional configurations, was made possible by the support lent by the Spanish Ministry for Science and Technology to a scientific project based at the Universidad de Salamanca (Ref. SEC99-0623). Respondents to this survey were selected among regional parliamentarians, elected representatives in city councils, and regional political leaders. 2. Among these groups are the center-left nationalist parties Basque Solidarity (EA) and Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), the left-wing nationalist party Aragonese Council (CHA), and the Catalan left-wing/ecologist party Initiative for CataloniaGreens (ICV). 3. In this chapter we do not analyse the role of party families in shaping attitudes towards European integration. We limit the analysis to individual parties and groupings. However, there is a growing body of literature that looks into the effects of party families in determining the attitudes of individual political parties towards European integration. Thus, early research by Hix and Lord (1997) mapped the position of party families in a bi-dimensional space formed by the left–right dimension and a European dimension. The Communist party family exhibits anti-European features, and the family of ethno-regionalist can be classified as clearly pro-European. See also results by Ray (1999), and recent work by Marks, Wilson, and Ray (2001), and Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2001) on national parties and European integration. 4. Among other things, during the late 1970s, this process led to key changes in the programme, symbols, and political actions of Spanish Communists. Thus, the Communist Party renounced Leninism and democratic centralism, accepted the Spanish

150

5.

6.

7. 8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

14.

Marga Gómez-Reino et al. Monarchy and its symbols, encouraged moderation among trade unions, and socioeconomic pacts among unions, employers, and centrist governments. In 1986, it was formed by seven parties that have already abandoned IU, some of them protesting against the Communist control of it. Together with the Communist Party, although much weaker, the most important internal group in IU is the Alternative Space faction. On the evolution of IU, see Ramiro (2000). The most important groups within the BNG are the UPG, the Socialist Collective, the Galician Nationalist Party (a centrist party integrated in 1991), Nationalist Left (formed in 1992 by some independent activists of the BNG), Inzar (a very small formerly communist extreme-left group) and Galician Unity (a social-democratic nationalist party). The BNG leads the local governments of Vigo, Pontevedra, and Ferrol, and takes part in the Socialist-led governments of Lugo and Santiago. Besides Cordoba, IU has participated in the government of other four provincial capitals in the 1999–2003 period. In the case of the BNG, it is only in the 1990s that we can speak properly of ‘Soft’ Euroscepticism. Europe appeared in the list of main political enemies in the BNG 1982 Basic Political Principles. The BNG was then against both NATO and the European Community. The BNG opposition against the European Community remained unaltered in the party programs during the 1980s. As the last resort to try to avoid the breach of voting discipline in the Parliamentary Group, the IU leadership offered to the ‘yes’ faction (called New Left) that the official position could be to abstain even if the leadership was very critical of the content of the Maastricht Treaty and preferred to reject it. However, half of the IU MPs finally voted ‘yes’ while the other half, loyal to the party leadership, abstained according to the position of compromise promoted by the leaders. IU also voted ‘abstention’ in the Spanish Parliament in relation to the approval of the Amsterdam Treaty because it was considered not federalist enough. For a very similar view, see IU (1996). For a complete catalogue of the IU proposals for the reform of the EU, see IU (1999). BNG specific policy proposals at the European level include: (1) a single Galician electoral district for European elections; (2) Galician representation in the Council of Ministers; (3) self-management of European Commission structural funds; (4) participation in policymaking in matters that pertain to Galician’s powers (subsidiarity); (5) capacities to propose new legislation to territorial governments; (6) the right to appeal before the Court of Justice; (7) direct application of all policies regarding the Galician–North of Portugal Euro-region; (8) recognition of Galician as an official language (BNG 1999). In the last two decades, this political leaning has been articulated in the electoral and institutional arenas by the People’s Unity (Herri Batasuna, HB). HB has its origin in the formation in 1978 of a coalition among several small radical left-wing Basque nationalist parties that rejected the Spanish Constitution and the Basque Statute of Autonomy. However, since 1998, denominational and organizational changes have been quite frequent in the Basque independentist left. In 1998, during ETA’s truce, HB organized the electoral coalition Basque Citizens (Euskal Herritarrok, EH) which aimed at broadening its former base of electoral support. After ETA’s resumption of terrorist violence in 1999, and due to the increasing legal and judicial pressure suffered by HB, the Basque radical independentist movement reorganized itself as Unity (Batasuna) in 2001 However, in 2003, Basque left-wing independentism faced

Euroscepticism and Political Parties in Spain

15.

16. 17.

18. 19.

20. 21.

22.

23.

24.

151

again a refoundation scenario, once the illegalization process of Unity was accelerated by Spanish judicial and political instances. Statements of this type can be found in the programmatic and ideological texts of Basque Citizens, the electoral coalition organized by the People’s Unity to compete in the regional elections held in the Basque country and Navarre from 1998 to 2001. On the characteristics of the ‘winning formula’ for radical right parties in advanced capitalist democracies, see Kitschelt (1996). As it is the case of Spain 2000 (España 2000), now forming part of the Spanish Front (Frente Español), an alliance created by this group, the Spanish Falange and New Force. On the ideological positions of these groups, see for instance http://www. democracianacional.org/, http://www.falange.es/ or http://www.frente-espanol.es/ Unfortunately, this survey does not include data on the Basque independentist left (members of this coalition declined to answer our survey) or the Spanish far right (none of its parties enjoys representation at the parliaments of the autonomous communities). The main characteristics of this survey are described in note 1. Therefore, responses and mean values under 3 must be considered as negative. However, in order to ascertain the positions of parties towards the European integration process, it is necessary to take into account the economic characteristics (and in particular the distribution regimes) of each country (Marks 2004) Thus, in countries in which the welfare state is weak, it is possible that left-wing politicians would perceive the integration process as less inimical to their economic projects. The nature and implications of these interactive mechanisms can only be ascertained through cross-national comparative analyses, which clearly lie beyond the scope of this contribution. In addition to this, politicians of leftist parties have more pessimistic views of the risks posed by the European integration process for public expenditure and the welfare state. By contrast, broad orientations towards European integration do not seem to play a role in explaining these parties’ positions, particularly in the case of the IU. Politicians of this group are not less pro-European than politicians from other parties. They are even more favourable to the creation of a strong European government than are the members of the most pro-EU political party in our survey, the Popular Party. All these predictors are significant at the 0.01 level. The Adjusted R Square for this model equals 0.43.

9 Euroscepticism in Denmark Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen

9.1 INTRODUCTION According to the Eurobarometer, Danes generally cherish their European Union (EU) membership. In 2002, it showed that 68 per cent of Danes found EU membership to be advantageous, and only 17 per cent rejected this postulate (European Commission 2002d: 12). More than one-third of Danes believe that the EU has a neutral image, 32 per cent believe that the EU has a positive image, while 6 per cent estimate that the EU has a very positive image (see also Table 9.1). However, the perception of the EU among Danes as captured by the Eurobarometer—true as it may be—captures poorly the extent to which Euroscepticism has been a manifest part of the political landscape of Denmark throughout the three decades of Community/Union membership. Euroscepticism is apparent in several ways. There have been seven Europe referendums: six in mainland Denmark, and one in Greenland. Eurosceptics won three of them: the Euro referendum in 2000, the one on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and the 1982 referendum in Greenland (Table 9.2). The latter referendum led to the withdrawal of Greenland from the European Community (EC), and hence it became the first state to do so.1 During the other four referendums, the campaigns of the Eurosceptics successfully managed to set the tone of the debates, constantly pushing the pro-EU parties onto the defensive. In the rejected referendums in 1992 and 2000, there was a comfortable majority in parliament in support of the proposed legislation, as indeed there was among the broad ‘establishment’ including the press and intellectuals. Interestingly, the voting pattern is different in the EU-related referendums, in the European Parliament (EP) elections, and in the national elections. Whereas there has always been a high turnout in Europe referendums, the turnout in EP elections is low. However, at least a quarter of those who do vote in EP elections, vote for Eurosceptics. Hence, there is a striking contrast between their significant appearance in EP elections and the referendums, and the fact that Eurosceptics have never been in government in Denmark, and have always been poorly represented in the national parliament (Table 9.3). In spite of the fact that Denmark’s governments are often coalition, minority ones, they have never changed over European issues, not even in the wake of rejected referendums against the will

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Table 9.1. 2002 Eurobarometer question to the Danes: Do you believe that membership of the EU is: a good thing a bad thing neither a good nor a bad thing don’t know

60% 16% 21% 3%

Source: European Commission (2002a).

of the current government. First, an important factor is that whereas the establishment at large—that is, the large majority of the political parties and mainstream media—is broadly pro-EU, they have accepted a nuanced, Soft Eurosceptic approach to the EU since the early 1990s. Secondly, the two one-issue Eurosceptic parties, the People’s Movement Against the EU and the June Movement, have never attempted to impact the domestic political scene in non-EU matters.2 In effect, a dual party system has developed, one for national elections and one for EU referendums and EP elections (Nielsen 2001a). The purpose of this chapter is to review the scene of Euroscepticism in Denmark.3 It will explore the political cleavages that exist over the issue of the EU, which are unparalleled in other policy areas. This unusual political situation can best be understood against the background upon which the tradition of referendums arose, where a marginal group of political activists came to set the tone of the subsequent political debates in the country. The political lessons that were subsequently drawn by the political establishment in the wake of the victories of the Eurosceptics have forced a nuanced, essentially Soft Eurosceptic, view by all the main parties on the EU.

9.2 THE ORIGINS OF EUROSCEPTICISM AND EUROPE REFERENDUMS

9.2.1 The historical narrative and Euroscepticism Interestingly, Euroscepticism in Denmark is not based on an outright rejection of the EU. The post-war period brought other political alternatives to joining the Germano-Latino Union (Engberg 1986: 67), namely the option to enter into closer collaboration with the other Nordic countries over economic and political issues (Laursen and Olesen 2000; also Hansen 1969; Lehman Sørensen 1976, 1979; Ingebritsen 1998). The attraction of the Nordic option was seen as twofold. Firstly, as a bulwark against German domination of Danish political and economic life. In fact, the preference for belonging to the Nordic community dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, then defined in response to the aggressions of the Prusso-German nation state that had taken its significant toll on Denmark’s

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Table 9.2. Denmark’s six Europe referendums Referendum issue

Date

‘No’ votes of total (%)

‘Yes’ votes of total (%)

Turnout (%)

Parties in government

Common European currency (EMU)

28 Sept. 2000

53.2

46.8

87.6

Amsterdam Treaty

28 May 1998

44.9

55.1

76.2

Maastricht Treaty with Edinburgh Agreement Maastricht Treaty (TEU)

18 May 1993

3.3

56.7

86.5

2 June 1992

50.7

49.3

83.1

Single European Act (SEA)

27 Feb. 1986

43.8

56.2

75.4

EC membership

2 Oct. 1972

36.6

63.4

90.1

Social Democrats and Social-Liberals∗ Social Democrats and Social-Liberals∗ Social Democrats and Social-Liberals Conservatives, Liberals, Social-Liberals, Christian Democrats∗ Conservative, Liberals, Social-Liberals, Christian Democrats∗ Social Democrats∗

∗

Minority government (Svensson 2002).

Source: Europaudvalget (2001).

southern territories (Østergaard 2000). Illustratively, most maps of Denmark dating from that period onwards depict Denmark in context with Sweden’s west coast and the southern tip of Norway, cutting off Germany at the bottom of the map. The purpose was to illustrate that Denmark belongs in a Northern context, not a Southern European one. In the post-war period, such illustrations supported well the outright anti-German sentiments advocated by many groups. The fear of Denmark’s large southern neighbour was also echoed in the cold war rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s on rearmament and nuclear weapons, and it continued after the reunification of Germany (Lammers 2000). Secondly, in the post-war period, the Nordic option was boosted through ideas of Nordic social equality and the cradle-to-grave Nordic welfare model, coupled with the institution of a permanent dialogue between the social partners at the labour market. Although the Nordic welfare model was promoted most effectively by the Social Democratic Party, all major political parties and socio-economic organizations adhered to it. The pro-Nordic and anti-German arguments became central to the narrative of the Danish nation state as a sovereign, unitary actor. The often reiterated notion of ‘giving up sovereignty’ to the EU subsequently looked like an attack on the fundamental historical narrative, and Eurosceptics—Hard and Soft—have successfully resorted to one or several of these arguments in their campaigns.

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This is where Euroscepticism originates, and all Danish Eurosceptic arguments essentially depart from the grand historical narrative sketched above. The question of national identity is closely linked to the way in which the grand historical narrative is constructed (Hansen and Wæver 2002). The way it which it is constructed has resulted in a broad conception of European integration as a zero-sum game, and therefore also as an attack on the Danish historical heritage (Borre and Goul Andersen 1997: 287f). Eurosceptics across the board have applied slogans of ‘more Europe’ as meaning something negative for Denmark, whereas ‘less Denmark’ is an argument that has primarily been applied by nationalistic right-wingers. When the non-EU Nordic option effectively waned after the 1995 accession of Sweden and Finland to the EU, some Eurosceptics were left slightly confused over their arguments and allegiances (Friis 2002). It has, nevertheless, been observed that the Nordic argument has been used more intensively by Eurosceptics in the 1990s than in the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) campaign (Laursen and Olesen 2000: 68–70).

9.2.2 The constitutional procedure Referendums have been applied as a means of direct democracy in relation to EU matters (Svensson 2002: 733f). The 1953 Constitution stipulates that participation in foreign policy cooperation that demands the surrender of constitutional powers of the parliament can take place only if a majority of more than five-sixths of the 179 members of parliament approves it, that is 150 members in favour. However, it takes only one-third of parliamentarians to call a referendum (Danmarks Riges Grundlov 1953, sections 20 and 42). In the first 1972 and SEA referendums, the government in office fell nine votes short of the necessary five-sixth majority in parliament, and so these referendums were constitutionally required. However, referendums have been held on European issues more often than required by the Constitution because political circumstances have made it necessary. Once called, the referendum requires a simple majority to pass the legislation. In the 2000 and 1992 referendums, there was a simple majority of the votes cast against the legislation proposed.

9.2.3 Resorting to referendums Denmark’s accession to the Community was accepted by the electorate in a referendum in 1972. The constitutional procedure had to be enacted, but the political situation of the Social Democratic minority government was fragile, and the party was deeply divided internally over the issue of EC membership.4 In this party, the membership issue was framed squarely as a choice between gaining privileged access to important export markets which was important for maintaining a high rate of employment on the one hand, and on the other hand joining a common market that would eventually pressure Denmark to give up the hard-fought, high

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Danish welfare standards and labour market protection. The split of opinions over the European issue was so serious that the Social Democratic leadership willingly stepped back from the responsibility of decision, and presented the electorate with the 1972 referendum The smaller Social-Liberal Party was equally divided over the membership issue, whereas the government’s other supporting party, the Socialist People’s Party completely rejected membership of the capitalist EC club. The internal party divisions within the Social Democratic and Social-Liberal parties remained for decades to come, though the management of the former party suffered more from this divide than the latter (see later). The bourgeois parties were in favour of membership from the outset. The first referendum was held just a week after the first Norwegian rejection of membership in October 1972, and the campaign was very heated. Content-wise, it was a mix between pragmatic economic arguments and arguments referring to the two key elements of the grand historical narrative. Any analysis of the prospect of membership expected that Denmark stood to gain considerably economically from membership, and studies have shown that this was the primary motivating factor for many ‘yes’ voters. Little was said in this campaign about the political implications of joining the ever-closer union (Petersen and Elklit 1973: 18), an omission that was to haunt the subsequent referendum campaigns.

9.2.4 The new channel for Euroscepticism In the run-up to the referendum, an amalgamation of political activists created the People’s Movement against the EC. It was the first directly anti-EC political organization to be born (Hix and Lord 1997: 45). It included groups that were promoting the Nordic alternative and socialist factions connected to the peace-cum-anti-nuclear grass-roots movements—where the discussion on a nuclear-equipped Federal Republic (and nuclear-powered Sweden) was hot— to nationalistic-founded post-war anti-German resistance groups. The People’s Movement spread across the political spectrum although it had a left-wing bias. The grass-roots culture became fundamental to organized Danish Euroscepticism, yet the active groups were so different in their approach to political life that the survival of the People’s Movement at times seemed more miraculous than an act of political strategy (Hein Rasmussen 1997). Nevertheless, advocating the Nordic alternative, the anti-German sentiments, and the zero-sum scenario as arguments against EC membership appealed to a broad spectrum of the population. The People’s Movement managed to place Euroscepticism as a valid, popular argument in the Danish population and politics. The People’s Movement led a quiet life after the 1972 referendum, though the activists within it kept it alive and working as a pressure group. However, the decision to run for the first direct EP election in 1979 paid off enormously. The People’s Movement here became the single list that received the most votes: about 29 per cent of all votes cast. Considering the low turnout, this election result showed clearly that membership was still widely contested in the population.

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The primary goal on the agenda of the People’s Movement was the annulling of Danish EC membership. From then on, EP elections became the main activity of the Movement, and the one that kept the internally still fragmented party from splitting up in the decades to come. It constantly held one-quarter of Danish members of European Parliament (MEP) seats, and used EP campaigns to assure members of a financial basis in the years to come. When the government decided to issue a referendum on the SEA, the People’s Movement led the Eurosceptics. In the 1992 referendum campaign, it received domestic political recognition equal to other parties in terms of broadcasting time during campaigns by national publicservice broadcasters. In the wake of the political turbulence after the Eurosceptic victory in the 1992 Maastricht referendum, however, the People’s Movement split into two. Veterans, along with Eurosceptics from various political parties, stood behind the new June Movement whose initial goal was to hinder the lingering attempts in parliament to formulate a broad political compromise over the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and to hinder a second referendum from being called. Subsequently, the June Movement ran for EP elections, and the Eurosceptic voters became divided between these two parties. The June Movement took a Soft Eurosceptic line, whereas the People’s Movement continued its Hard Eurosceptic argumentation. Characteristic of both these movements is that their veterans are not necessarily national parliamentarians or aspire to career political jobs. They combine people of all political and social backgrounds. Their structures are similar, based on networks of relatively autonomous local committees, and the membership bases count individuals, political parties, and various organizations.

9.3 EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT The national election of November 2001 occurred just one year after the painful defeat by the government and major parties in the 2000 Euro referendum. Interestingly, the change of government from the Social Democratic-led one that had been in power since 1993, to a minority Liberal-Conservative coalition had little to do with the Euro referendum. The EU assumed low salience in the election campaign, and both parties in the new government coalition were traditionally strongly in support of the EU, even more so than the previous government coalition parties (Bille 2002: 944). In this election, about three-thirds of the population cast their votes for parties officially in full support of the EU, and about one-fifth for parties with a Soft Eurosceptic programme. Table 9.3 illustrates that Euroscepticism is represented in the parliament throughout the political spectrum. The small, far left-wing Unity List is the sole Hard Eurosceptic party representing merely 2.4 per cent of the electorate, which is little compared with the People’s Movement’s 16.1 per cent in the EP in 1999. Parties with a declared Soft Eurosceptic stand represent 20.7 per cent, and are

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Table 9.3. Composition of the Danish Parliament after the 20 November 2001 general election, the official European orientation of each party, and extra-parliamentarian Eurosceptic parties∗ Political party

Christian People’s Party Conservative People’s Party Danish People’s Party Liberals Social Democratic Party Socialist People’s Party Social-Liberal Party The Unity List Eurosceptic parties outside the National Parliament People’s Movement against the EU June Movement

Share of total votes (%)

Seats gained

Official orientation towards the EU

2.3

4

Soft Euroscepticism

9.1

16

Full support

12.0

22

Soft Euroscepticism

31.2 29.1

54 52

Full support Full support†

6.4

12

Soft Euroscepticism

5.2 2.4 Percentage of total votes, EP 1999

9 4

Full support† Hard Euroscepticism

16.1

—

Hard Euroscepticism

7.3

—

Soft Euroscepticism

∗

This table does not include the four overseas representatives in the Danish Parliament, or the two members of parliament currently without party alliance. † There exists an organized, extra-parliamentary Eurosceptic group within this party. Source: Adapted from www.folketinget.dk, and Nielsen (2001b: 68).

made up of the Socialist People’s Party on the left wing, the Christian People’s Party at centre-right, and the Danish People’s Party on the far right.

9.3.1 Soft Eurosceptics The Socialist People’s Party currently advocates a Soft Eurosceptic approach, and is actively and constructively engaged in shaping the parliament’s policy towards the EU. During the last decade, however, the party has been through what is perhaps the most radical transformation of any political party in its EU orientation in Denmark. Unlike most other European socialist parties, the Danish one was strongly critical of EU membership during the first two decades. For a long time it played an important role in the People’s Movement against the EC. Central to its rejection of the EU was the doctrinaire view that the EU was echoing the voice of large capitalist interests. The party played an important role in the 1992 campaign that led to the rejection of the TEU, yet, paradoxically, the

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159

party leadership was afterwards instrumental in facilitating the broad political compromise—the ‘national compromise’ as it was called—with a list of Danish exceptions from the TEU.5 Consequently, this party largely brokered and facilitated the political outcome that led to the second Danish referendum on the TEU in 1993. This political turn was part of a more complex internal struggle inside the party between young reformers and older party members. The early 1990s was an important period of transition for this party with strong roots in the post-1945 communist movement, and the collapse of the European socialist bloc called for a redefinition of the party’s international orientation. Indeed, the party had already become Soft Eurosceptic in embryo during the late 1980s. When the Danish electorate endorsed the SEA, against the advice of the Socialist People’s Party and the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People’s Party decided to drop the demand for Denmark’s withdrawal from the EC from its daily political rhetoric. At the time of the 1989 EP election, the party was actively promoting the EP’s abilities for creating and enforcing common European standards in central areas of the party’s programme such as in environmental matters and consumer protection (Worre 1993: 216). At the time of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Hard Eurosceptics won the official party line, whereas the rejection of Danish participation in the euro was based on broad—though not unanimous—agreement within the party. The party leadership accepted the Nice Treaty because it saw this treaty as paving the way for enlargement of the EU with central and eastern European countries. This acceptance was essentially the reason why parliament was not forced to call a referendum on this treaty. In 1999, a majority within the party decided to drop the demand for Denmark’s withdrawal of the EU altogether from the official party programme. The small Christian People’s Party advocates a Soft Eurosceptic line. It was in full support until the 1992 referendum. The parliamentary group had initially supported the TEU, just as it had supported the SEA. At the 1992 party congress, however, it appeared that the parliamentary group was in minority. A hefty internal debate resulted in a party recommendation of a ‘no’ to the TEU. It was in particular issues such as the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), increased powers to supranational institutions, and European citizenship that was rejected because they were seen as too large an erosion of Danish sovereignty. Since then, it has defined its EU policy on a case-by-case basis, and hence campaigned against the euro in 2000. It supports issues such as a common defence policy and the Constitutional Convention, as well as the general EC cooperation. It is, therefore, clear that the party wants to advocate a positive Soft Eurosceptic line. The Danish People’s Party advocates a right-wing nationalistic type of Euroscepticism. The party’s official progamme and general statements about the EU is full of anti-EU rhetoric and its campaigns are bursting with negativesounding ‘less Denmark’ statements. In principle the party would prefer Denmark’s withdrawal from supranational organizations. The Danish People’s Party can agree only to ‘pure’ intergovernmental cooperation and economic market integration, but it argues that it has accepted its parliamentarian responsibility to the extent that it works from the assumption that Danish EU membership is

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not about to end. It accepts EU’s institutions and works to reform them in an intergovernmental direction. It accepted one of the two Danish parliamentary posts in the Constitutional Convention when the government decided to give one of the positions to a Eurosceptic party. The party is in principle against an EU Constitution, and works to assure that the Danish Constitution stands above a European one. The Danish People’s Party in particular works for Denmark’s immediate withdrawal from the Schengen Agreement, arguing for the restoration of Danish borders, and an independent asylum and immigration policy decided solely by the Danish Parliament. In contrast to the Socialist People’s Party and the Christian People’s Party, however, the articulation of the Soft Eurosceptic policy line of the Danish People’s Party comes across as being more obstructionist, resistant, and in opposition to the EU because it fundamentally believes that Denmark’s sovereign position should be secured outside supranational organizations.

9.3.2 Hard Eurosceptics The only Hard Eurosceptic party is the Unity Party, also called the Red/Greens. It is a coalition of small left-wing parties that for many years individually remained too small to reach the 2 per cent threshold to assure parliamentary representation on their own. Hence, the Unity Party rests on a strong tradition of anti-capitalist rhetoric, and has had parliamentary representation since 1994. The party wishes not only for Danish withdrawal from the EU, but for the termination of the EU as an organization. Their rejection of the EU is founded in a strong leftist ideological tradition; it advocates a similar view on organizations such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund, and is an active player in the anti-globalization movement. Its relatively small size does not suggest that it has received important groups of voters from for instance the Socialist People’s Party. Hence, the only Hard Eurosceptics in parliament is this party, often characterized as an identity party, whose politicians and voters adhere to creating a different world order altogether.

9.4 THE EU POLITICAL CLEAVAGE AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY

9.4.1 The political cleavage over the EU The representation of Europscepticism in the Danish Parliament as a result of the 2001 national election is at odds with the results of events in the prior two years: The rejection of the euro in the 2000 referendum, and the 1999 EP election where Hard and Soft Eurosceptic parties received a total of 37 per cent of the votes (Nielsen 2001b: 68). Indeed, Danish electoral experts have pointed to the dilemma

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Table 9.4. ‘No’ votes in the 1986, 1992, 1993, and 1998 referendums by voters who vote for the following political parties in national elections

Socialist People’s Party Social Democratic Party Social-Liberal Party Liberals Conservatives

1986

1992

1993

1998

85 77 25 2 2

94 61 50 13 15

80 41 30 12 14

81 45 30 17 20

Source: Haahr (2001). Figures in italics indicate that the party advocated a ‘no’ in that referendum.

that while Eurosceptic voters often opt for Eurosceptic candidates in EP elections, they often vote for pro-EU parties and candidates in national elections (Worre 1987). Table 9.4 indicates the past ‘no’ votes by voters that would normally vote for the current major pro-EU parties. Although the cleavage is becoming increasingly clear for all pro-EU parties, it is in particular clear in the Social Democratic Party, where 45 per cent of voters went against the recommendation of that party in 1998—down from 61 per cent in 1992. That has been seen as a problem for this traditionally largest party in Denmark, which usually receives around one-third of all votes in national elections. The problem of the Social Democratic Party of defining its EU orientation is instructive of how this cleavage has been managed, and how Euroscepticism has marked Danish politics. The internal divisions within this party continued after accession, and the leadership decided that a rejection of the SEA was the safest recommendation to give. The electorate thought otherwise when a majority endorsed the SEA in 1986. Against this background, and the experience of being in opposition for most of the 1980s, the party leadership subsequently redefined the European policy radically. It recommended a ‘yes’ for the first time in the 1992 referendum, yet this time the electorate rejected the TEU, hence another defeat for the party, not least because more than 60 per cent of Social Democratic voters had rejected the TEU. Opinion polls showed, however, that most of these voters still favoured EC membership, they just did not want ‘more Europe’, and they certainly had said ‘no to the Union’ (Worre 1993b: 223f). For the electorate as a whole, opinion polls showed a similar picture: 67 per cent still favoured membership. Even large parts of the then-Hard Eurosceptic Socialist People’s Party voters declared themselves in favour of membership itself, which in turn formed an important reason for this party’s leadership to embark on its brokering role in 1992 (Worre 1993: 187f). The nuanced voters’ view of the EU was also part of the reason why some activists from the Hard Eurosceptic People’s Movement decided to form the new Soft Eurosceptic June Movement. Generally, the ‘no’ votes to the TEU had been triggered by broad concern for future political involvement in economic and political union (Ingebritsen 1998: 124), issues that had hitherto been suppressed in the political debate on the EU. Fifty-eight per cent of all the voters were specifically reluctant to participate in

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the monetary union, the foreign common and security policy, and the prospect European citizenship (Worre, 1993b: 223f). Subsequent electoral studies largely agree that the Edinburgh exemptions was the reason why the electorate endorsed the TEU in the second referendum in 1993 (Siune, Svensson, and Tonsgaard 1994a: 112ff, 1994b; Svensson 2002: 743). Interestingly, the supporting majority in parliament managed to prevent the term European Union from appearing on the 1993 referendum ballot, and European Community was preferred because this had more positive connotations (Borre and Goul Andersen 1997: 294). The phrasing of the referendum ballot, along with the mere calling of the second referendum over the TEU, led to accusations from the People’s Movement and the June Movement of a conspiracy against the Eurosceptics by the major political parties which now included seven of eight parties in parliament (Branner and Kelstrup 2000b: 19). In the 1994 EP election, the two Movements received 25 per cent of the votes (Nielsen 2001b: 68), and the dual party system over the EU has worked fairly smoothly since then. The broad political acceptance in the domestic political system of a more nuanced European approach—the Soft Eurosceptic approach from 1992–3 onwards—created an environment for coexistence between Eurosceptics and supporters in domestic politics, which importantly brought some of the previous Hard Eurosceptic actors into the forwardlooking EU debate rather than continuing the obstructive line. In this political environment, Hard Eurosceptics found it increasingly difficult to gain ground in the domestic political arena, and voters have generally accepted the dual party system.

9.4.2 Eurosceptics in pro-EU parties The almost consensual pro-EU rhetoric in parliament has brought some dispute within all the parties, especially up to the 2000 Euro referendum, but in particular within the Social Democratic Party (Qvortrup 2000; Skjalm 2000). When the party leadership worked to create a stronger pro-EU profile, it left a group of members worried about this cleavage. They formed the Social Democratic Network Europe in November 1999, a Eurosceptic network with the view of furthering debate within the party, and to not accept a uniform party line over the EU. It was modelled on a similar initiative by Social-Liberals in June 1997 named EU-Critical Network of Social-Liberals. Both these groups are Soft Eurosceptics, adhering to maintaining the Edinburgh exemptions from the TEU. The relationship of the Eurosceptic Social Democratic Network to the mother party is, however, somewhat more problematic than for the critical Social-Liberals. The latter received a net sum of money from the main party for its anti-euro campaign, but a similar request from the critical Social Democratic Network was initially rejected from the main party.6 It is also worth noting that there is no link from the Social Democratic Party’s website to the Network’s website, nor does a search of the website of this Party show any references to the Network. The Social-Liberals seem

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to communicate better about this. In fact, the Social-Liberal Network’s visible role during the 2000 referendum probably enforced the credibility of that party as a whole with the Eurosceptics among its voters rather than harming the party’s general interests.

9.4.3 Managing the cleavage Several ways exist in which the EU cleavage is managed within the political system, which may to some extent explain why the cleavage has not erupted into general popular discontent. Examples range from the European committee in parliament, to the broad financing of EU campaigns, and the role of the two national television stations. Firstly, the parliament’s European committee7 which existed since the first Danish application, and was based on a tradition of foreign policymaking initiated back in the 1970s whereby the parliament was engaged in daily foreign policymaking, and hence was enabled to survey closely the government’s foreign policy (Fitzmaurice 1996; 239f). All the decisions relating to the EU must go through this committee which meets at least once a week, but can be summoned with brief notice when necessary. It is made up of high-ranking party spokespersons. Needless to say, the importance of the Committee has increased greatly since it was first created, and so has its prestige in parliament corridors. It is a political rather than a technical body. Committee meetings and documents are practically closed to the public and it does not issue minutes of meetings or have to report to the parliament. The daily political purpose of the committee is to supply the government with a broad mandate in all matters relating to the EU. The special position of the committee has also been respected in the political system, so it is widely agreed, with a view of respecting the Euroscepticism articulated already during the 1972 referendum, as a form of minority protection whereby divergent opinions within parliament over the EU are discussed (Bregnsbro 1993; von Dosenrode 2000). Yet, to what extent the European committee has actually bridged the cleavage remains ambiguous. The committee has received the reputation of being relatively proEuropean, and it has been repeatedly suggested that the socialization of longstanding committee members has led to a gap between the committee members and their parliamentary party groups. This has erupted into temporary conflicts in some of the political parties from the mid-1980s onwards (Laursen 1992; Petersen 1993). For instance, the Christian Democratic Party parliamentary group became out of touch with the general party over the European issue, as we saw earlier. Until then, there had not really been much public debate about the political aspects of Community membership, and it practically took many Danes by surprise to realize that they had opted for membership of something with more than a convenient economic purpose. Hence, there has been a tendency for the European committee to add another EU cleavage to Danish politics in its attempt to smooth out the existing differences. Yet, it is also clear that conflicts erupt only periodically, as they do in most policy areas, and that continuous dialogue within the Committee does

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serve the purpose of engaging Soft and Hard Eurosceptics closely in the governing of Denmark’s EU policy. The second point to note is that Eurosceptics are granted a number of privileges which are not proportionate to their (lack of) representation in parliament, as the Danish political system is relatively generous in its treatment of minorities. The parliament financially supports Eurosceptics and Euro-supporters beyond the political parties through the EU Board. This grants equal access to financing EU-related information with a debate-creating purpose over the issue, regardless of the European orientation. Each year, parliament allocates a lump sum of money towards this purpose, and has granted special appropriations during all referendum campaigns. The political parties in parliament and the two extra-parliamentarian Eurosceptic parties usually get a fixed share of the annually allotted amounts. Individual initiatives are invited to apply for financial support by the EU Board through large advertisements in all the main daily newspapers, to inform as broad a spectrum of the population as possible about this funding option. The 2000 euro campaign alone was given DKR25 million in special appropriations.8 This has encouraged an increasing number of Eurosceptic initiatives formed with the purpose of influencing particular events such as the European constitutional convention. Thirdly, the role of the two national public-service TV stations has received some attention in the Eurosceptics’ ability to reach the broad population. All Danish households have access to these stations, and they hold a dominant position on national political news. In the stations’ efforts to be as ‘democratic’ as possible, and to represent both sides of the European debate during referendum campaigns, the People’s Movement was invited in 1992 as an equal discussion partner with leaders of parties who have parliamentary representation. In the later referendums, the June Movement also took part. It has been suggested that in doing so, the national public-service news providers created a bias in favour of the Eurosceptics. This biased, and essentially incorrect, picture of the parliamentary representation of Euroscepticism was partly responsible for the outcome of the referendums (Siune, Svensson, and Tonsgaard 1992).

9.4.4 The question of legitimacy The continuous cleavage that exists in Danish politics over European integration has led scholars to question the legitimacy of Danish parliamentarians and governments. It has been argued that Europe referendums are really judgements on the government, or genuine opposition policies, that is, so-called second order elections, or the so-called Franklin thesis (Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994; Franklin, van der Eijk, and Marsh 1995). Against this, scholars have argued that studies show that Danish voters, for instance in the 1993 referendum, expressed clearly that the exemptions presented in the Edinburgh agreement did indeed influence what they voted for (Siune and Svensson 1993). Other considerations in support of this are that none of the government changes after the lost referendums

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in 1992 and 2000 had anything to do with the EU. Opposition parties have never used the EU campaigns to topple or oppose governments in power; rather they have observed a ‘civil peace’ over the issue (Svensson 2002). Moreover, Danish governments are often minority, coalition governments which makes it difficult for voters to assess the popularity of a single party in a referendum vote. Hence, European referendums in Denmark reasonably should be seen as more than tests of government popularity, especially as the EU is an issue often debated due to the frequent referendums. Hence, here is a relatively high awareness among the electorate on the European issue (European Commission 2002e; Franklin 2002: 752). So, in spite of the EU cleavage, Danes actually show great satisfaction with their political system. In 2002, 88 per cent were satisfied with Danish democracy, and only 2 per cent were not satisfied at all. This is much above the average level of satisfaction with national democracies in the EU which do not muster more than around 50 per cent satisfaction (European Commission 2001c, 2002e). This has led to the argument that the EU cleavage is somehow less ‘problematic’ than other types of cleavages. Or, in other words, that the traditional concept of legitimacy of government should be reviewed, considering the Danish case, because this illustrates that legitimacy can remain high even when an issue cleavage seems to endure (Friis 1999; Pedersen 2002).

9.5 CONCLUSION The Danish population seems happy as long as the membership pays off. However, it dislikes talks about European economic and political union essentially because it contradicts the grand historical narrative of Denmark’s position in Europe and its role as a sovereign, unitary state. Euroscepticism in Denmark has not always been articulated as a direct criticism of the EU, but the longing for something else: Nordic unity, for being better (Friis 2002: 380). Yet, although the Nordic model of regional integration has served as a cue in Eurosceptic campaign rhetoric, it was never seen as a serious political alternative by any Danish government since 1973. The historical fear of Germany also penetrated Eurosceptic rhetoric. Oddly, the Danish–Germany argument is different to other small states bordering Germany who regarded European integration as a way of entrapment of their large neighbour. Grand historical narratives are constructions. Neither the narrative nor its assumptions need to be correct for it to have an important effect in the way people view their country. It has been suggested that the way in which the fear of Germany has been phrased has more to do with a sense of Danish inferiority than with the fact that Denmark and the Federal Republic has a continuous record of amicable relations during the past half century (Lammers 2000). Ultimately, the referendums showed that Danes have voted for the EU out of positive economic reasons, and against the EU for political reasons.

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Euroscepticism is accepted as a democratic form in Denmark, and parliament makes sure that it lives on by financing Eurosceptic activities. This is in itself likely to reduce tensions. The cleavage in domestic political life over the EU has been a constant feature, yet it has not greatly affected the electorate’s choices in national elections (Borre 1987; Bille 1991, 2002; Saurberg 1991). The EU does not fall into traditional party categories, Euroscepticism is not a left–right situation, and in national politics there exists no one-issue anti-EU party. At the conceptual level, the Danish case shows that it makes sense to divide Euroscepticism into Hard and Soft at the conceptual level, keeping in mind that such divisions say little about the divergent reasons behind these opinions. The People’s Movement takes a Hard Eurosceptic line, embedded in the way it was born. It is difficult to see what the veteran MEPs of the People’s Movement would do with themselves if their goals were achieved, after having made a solid career as a Eurosceptic in the EP. The Hard Eurosceptics in the national parliament, in the Unity List, however, have made the EU part of a larger protest against the dominant world order, and tend to be very unconstructive in their approach to EU issues in general. The concept of Soft Euroscepticism needs further definition. One suggestion has been to make a distinction between forward- and backward-looking visions of Europe (Henderson 2001: 13). The Danish Soft Eurosceptic parties would fit such categories. The Danish People’s Party has a backward-looking view of Denmark in the EU—‘less Denmark’; it views the EU as fundamentally a wrong construction, and sees the picture as a zero-sum game: the EU versus the nation states. The forward-looking Soft Eurosceptics take active and constructive part in the daily work over the EU and only in referendums really differ considerably from the line taken by pro-EU parties. The question of issue salience is difficult to determine, as none of the venues for Euroscepticism should be seen in isolation. The strong participation in referendums and the important position of Eurosceptics in EP elections form important backgrounds to national elections where the EU seems to have, at a first glance, low salience. It has been broadly accepted that daily EU policymaking takes place away from the public debate, in the European committee—initially conceived as a foreign policy issue—and so appears only marginally in the voters’ short-term view. Moreover, the decision of the Eurosceptic parties to not compete in national elections has also diverted some of the tensions away from the domestic political scene. This picture of the EU as something remote from everyday domestic politics is obviously an illusion, but then again politics are often conducted in an illusionary way. Hard Eurosceptics have difficulty gaining ground in national politics, essentially because Soft Eurosceptics are more in line with the population at large. Hence, all pro-EU parties have been forced to accept a Soft Eurosceptic approach during the last decade. In that respect, the broad ‘national compromise’ and the Edinburgh agreement was a significant new development. Indeed, the Eurobarometer has acknowledged that it is increasingly difficult to deal with Euroscepticism en bloc, as people’s opinions are more nuanced than pro or con (European Commission 2002e: 25). Throughout the EU, issues such as asylum policy, combat of

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international crime, common currency, EU’s common foreign and defence policy, and the euro, have different attractions to different people (European Commission 2002d, 2002e). Intended or not, Danish politicians and voters were the first to formulate such a nuanced view, slightly tinted by Euroscepticsm, and to acknowledge that the EU had indeed reached ‘a new stage in the process of European integration’, as the preamble to the TEU worded it. NOTES 1. Greenland has home-rule status within the Danish Kingdom and adheres to Danish foreign policy in all other areas. It should be noted that the circumstances surrounding Greenland’s referendum are particular due to its remote location and special economic structure (Rasmussen and Rüdiger 1990: 331ff.). Primary attention in this chapter will be given to Euroscepticism in mainland Denmark. 2. Although the two Movements specifically define themselves as ‘movements’, arguing that they do not adhere to a rigidly defined set of procedures for operation (Hein Rasmussen 1997: 76ff.), they do fulfil the functional definition of political parties, and will be so treated in this chapter. 3. The terms Hard and Soft Euroscepticism will be applied here as defined by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002a: 10). 4. It was particularly the powerful labour unions of metal workers (Dansk Metalarbejderforbund) and unskilled workers (Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark, SID) that opposed the continental model because they feared that the free movement of labour would in the EC would mean added competition from the south, and possibly endanger the hard-fought Danish social model (Engberg 1986). 5. The ‘national compromise’ that was created in parliament over the TEU included Danish exclusion from participation in the common foreign and security policy (pillar 2), justice and home affairs cooperation (pillar 3), the third phase of the monetary union, and European citizenship. These exceptions were accepted at the European Council meeting in Edinburgh, December 1992. 6. ‘Syltning af ansøgning utilfredsstillende’, Pressemeddelelse 14, April 2000, www.s-ne.dk. 7. This was initially called the Market Committee. 8. Letter from the Chairman of the European Committee (Europaudvalgets formand) to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 21 August 2001, J.nr. 225/EUU.

10 The Difficult Task of Opposing Europe: The Finnish Party Politics of Euroscepticism Tapio Raunio

10.1 INTRODUCTION Considering the divisive nature of the European Union (EU) membership referendum held in 1994, the traditionally state-centric political culture, and low public support for European integration, Finland would seem to have all the key preconditions for Eurosceptical parties. Yet, the situation is very much the opposite. Finnish parties have been remarkably solid in their support for integration. The main parties are in broad agreement about how to develop integration and no party represented in the parliament has since the start of membership demanded that Finland should leave the EU. New specifically anti-EU movements have remained marginal, and opposition to European integration manifests itself primarily through individual members of parliament (MPs) and members of European Parliament (MEPs). The Finnish case is therefore in line with other European countries, where according to Taggart (1998: 373) ‘there is very little relationship between levels of Euroscepticism and electoral support for Eurosceptical parties’. In fact, Finland appears to be the only EU member state with high levels of public Euroscepticism and low levels of party-based Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002b). True Finns, with three MPs (1.5 per cent), is the only Eurosceptical party represented in the Eduskunta, the unicameral national parliament. Formed on the ruins of its populist predecessor, the Rural Party, True Finns has adopted its Eurosceptical stance primarily in order to distance itself from the mainstream parties. The other Eurosceptical parties, the Communist Party of Finland and Forces for Change in Finland, have no representation in the parliament. However, all the established pro-integrationist parties, particularly the Centre Party, include minority sections that are against further integration. What explains this weak presence of Eurosceptical parties? The argument put forward in this chapter emphasizes the importance of two structural properties of the Finnish political system. First, the consensual style of politics and bargaining involved in forming coalition governments facilitate inter-party cooperation both among cabinet parties and in the parliament, with the corporatist nature

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of the political system further reducing the likelihood of ideological conflicts. Second, the system of formulating national integration policy, especially the goal of ‘speaking with one voice’ in Brussels, is specifically designed to manufacture national consensus over integration, with the parliamentary opposition accorded a strong role in the process. This mechanism produces an ideological convergence about Europe and defuses competition between parties over European integration. Considering the distribution of preferences—with the main parties and interest groups in favour of membership before the referendum and supportive of further integration since then—these systemic factors reduce the likelihood of parties adopting Eurosceptical positions. And with the partial exception of True Finns, there are no ideologically extremist or populist parties that adopt antiintegrationist positions as part of their strategy of distancing themselves from the mainstream parties. This chapter is structured as follows. Section 10.2 introduces the Eurosceptical parties in Finland in the period under consideration and their electoral performance. Section 10.3 analyses the levels of dissent over integration among the parties represented in the Eduskunta. Section 10.4 examines the reasons behind the pro-EU partisan consensus. The concluding discussion in Section 10.5 looks ahead at the prospects of Eurosceptical parties in Finland.

10.2 EUROSCEPTICAL PARTIES Measured by the effective number of parliamentary parties, Finland’s party system is relatively highly fragmented.1 Table 10.1 shows the distribution of votes between parties in national parliamentary elections held since the early 1990s. No party has since the declaration of independence (1917) alone controlled the majority of seats in Eduskunta. The core of the Finnish party system consists of the Social Democratic Party, the agrarian Centre Party, and the conservative National Coalition. Governments are as a rule formed around two of these main parties. However, no Eduskunta party is non-coalitionable. A five party, oversized coalition government, bringing together the Social Democrats, National Coalition, Left Alliance, Swedish People’s Party, and the Green League, took office after the 1995 elections, and this so-called rainbow government renewed its mandate in the March 1999 elections. Following the latest election held in March 2003, the Centre Party, the Social Democrats, and the Swedish People’s Party formed the government. While electoral volatility has increased and the party system has become more fragmented, the three core parties have consolidated their positions during recent decades, especially as the vote share of the radical left or former communist parties has declined since the 1970s (Sundberg 1999). The left–right dimension has constituted the main axis structuring party competition, but since the early 1990s the rural–urban or centre–periphery divide has become the second main cleavage,

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Table 10.1. Distribution of votes (%) in national parliamentary and European elections since the early 1990s Party

Party family

Centre Party Social Democratic Party National Coalition Left Alliance Green League Swedish People’s Party Christian Democrats Rural Party Young Finns True Finns Others

1991 1995 1996 EP 1999 1999 EP

Agrarian/Centre 24.8 Social Democrat 22.1 Conservative 19.3 Radical left 10.1 Greens 6.8 Ethno-regionalist/Liberal 5.5 Christian 3.1 Agrarian/Populist 4.8 Conservative/liberal Agrarian/Populist — 3.5

Total

100

19.8 28.3 17.9 11.2 6.5 5.1 3.0 1.3 2.8 — 4.1 100

24.4 21.5 20.2 10.5 7.6 5.8 2.8 — 3.0 0.7 3.5 100

22.4 22.9 21.0 10.9 7.3 5.1 4.2 — 1.0 1.0 4.2 100

21.3 17.8 25.3 9.1 13.4 6.8 2.4 — — 0.8 3.1 100

2003 24.7 24.5 18.6 9.9 8.0 4.6 5.3 — — 1.6 2.8 100

Note: The right-wing Young Finns Party was formed in 1994 and won two seats in the 1995 elections. Four years later, the Young Finns failed to win any seats and the party was subsequently disbanded. Source: Statistics Finland (www.tilastokeskus.fi).

partly because integration and foreign policy issues have entered internal party debates, having previously been the almost exclusive domain of the president. Table 10.2 shows party positions on membership before the referendum held in October 1994 and the share of party supporters voting in favour of Finland joining the EU.2 In the Centre Party, the voting behaviour of its supporters contradicted the official party line, with just above one-third (36 per cent) of party supporters favouring membership. Two parties, Left Alliance and Green League, were so divided internally that they deliberately left their position open in order not to antagonize their supporters. The only Eduskunta parties that resisted membership were the Christian Democrats and the Rural Party. In both parties, the leadership and the voters were almost unanimously against membership. Table 10.2. Party positions in the 1994 membership referendum Parties Social Democratic Party Centre Party National Coalition Left Alliance Green League Swedish People’s Party Christian Democrats Rural Party/True Finns

Official party line

Voters supporting membership (%)

Yes Yes Yes No position No position Yes No No

75 36 89 24 55 85 10 20

Source: Party documents, voters’ figures from Paloheimo (2000: 58).

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Table 10.3. Eurosceptical parties in Finland Party

True Finns Communist Party Forces for Change in Finland

Soft/Hard Euroscepticism

Support in the last election (%, 2003)

MPs (%)

Soft Hard Hard

1.6 0.8 0.4

1.5 — —

Examining the impact of European integration on national party systems, Mair (2000: 30) concluded that out of over 120 parties established in EU member states (excluding Greece, Portugal, and Spain) to contest national parliamentary elections after the first direct European Parliament (EP) elections held in each country, only 3 were formed ‘with the explicit and primary intention of mobilizing support for or against the EU’. Party members, at least on the elite level, have therefore decided not to defect to other parties despite the differences of opinion over Europe. The same applies to Finland. The existing national parties have successfully absorbed the new EU dimension into their policy profiles without suffering any major vote losses or defections to other parties. To be sure, integration matters have produced heated debates within most parties, but the basic shape of the Finnish party system has not been altered as a result of European integration. Eurosceptical parties and movements have remained marginalized in Finnish politics (Table 10.3). The only Eurosceptical party that has won seats in the Eduskunta since Finland joined the EU is the True Finns (Perussuomalaiset), which can be categorized as a Soft Eurosceptical party. The True Finns are for all purposes a successor to the centre-right Rural Party, albeit with somewhat less populist tendencies. Rural Party was effectively a family enterprise, founded by Veikko Vennamo in 1959 as the Smallholders’ Party. Vennamo senior passed the party leadership on to his son Pekka, and the party was disbanded following its meagre showing in the 1995 elections. The ideology of True Finns is rather nationalistic, and the party was against EU membership in 1994, then as the Rural Party. True Finns wants the EU to be an association of independent nations and is against the deepening of integration. In the 2003 elections, the party won 1.6 per cent of the votes and three seats (1.5 per cent) in the national parliament. In the first round of the presidential elections held in January 2000, the True Finns’ candidate, Ilkka Hakalehto, won 1 per cent of the votes. Hakalehto was the only anti-EU candidate. In its programme for the 2003 Eduskunta elections, the True Finns stated that they are against making Finland a part of a European federal state. All Treaty amendments leading to transfer of sovereignty to the EU should be subject to a national referendum. True Finns are also against the EU’s constitution, as this would be a step towards a federation. The two anti-EU membership movements established prior to the 1994 referendum, League for Free Finland (Vapaan Suomen Liitto) and Alternative to the EU (Vaihtoehto EU:lle), won between them 2.7 per cent of the votes in the 1996 elections to the EP, but neither participated in the 1999 EP elections

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nor have they fielded any candidates in Eduskunta elections.3 The League for Free Finland established in October 2002 together with another registered party, Vaihtoehtoväki, and three civic organizations a new party, Forces for Change in Finland (Muutosvoimat Suomi), as a party that aims at offering a home to all that are against the EU. However, the leadership and the supporters are primarily leftwing people who are disappointed with the market-friendly and pro-EU policies of the Eduskunta parties. The EU is seen as a neo-liberalist project that erodes the sovereignty of its member states and the freedom of its peoples. Forces for Change in Finland won 0.4 per cent of the votes in the 2003 elections. The party demands that Finland should leave the EU, and thus Forces for Change in Finland is a Hard Eurosceptical party. The third Eurosceptical party is the minor Communist Party of Finland that has no representation in Eduskunta. In the 2003 elections, the party captured 0.8 per cent of the votes. The Communist Party was originally formed in 1918, and the communists and their successors enjoyed a strong presence in the Finnish party system after the Second World War. The Communist Party was re-entered into the party register in February 1997, and in 2002 the party had according to its own estimates (www.skp.fi) approximately 4,000 members and nearly 200 local branches. The party is an old-fashioned communist party and argues that EU defends the interests of supranational capital at the expense of workers, democracy, and the environment. In its programme for the 2003 parliamentary elections, the party demanded that the future constitution of the EU should be subjected to a referendum, in which the Finnish citizens would have the opportunity to vote in favour of withdrawing from the EU. Instead of developing towards a neo-liberal federal state, Europe must be based on democracy and solidarity that respects the sovereignty and rights of its citizens. The Communist Party is therefore categorized as a Hard Eurosceptical party. Eurosceptical parties are marginal actors in the Finnish party system. With only three MPs in the parliament, and a combined share of under 3 per cent of votes in national elections, Eurosceptical parties are not able to influence government policy. However, more important in this respect are the Eurosceptical MPs and groups within the traditional mainstream parties, a topic we shall turn to in Section 10.3.

10.3 POTENTIAL FOR EUROSCEPTICISM WITHIN THE MAIN PARTIES While Eurosceptic parties have remained marginalized in Finland, European integration has nevertheless had an impact on the cohesion and ideology of parties. This section outlines briefly the European policies of parties represented in Eduskunta after the 2003 elections and examines the level of party unity in EU matters, focusing on the potential for Euroscepticism within the parties represented in the Eduskunta.4

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Potential for Euroscepticism is highest in the Centre Party. The Centre draws most of its support from the countryside, and support in the urban areas remains modest. As the leading governing party in 1991–5, the Centre Party was a key player in making the decision to apply for membership. The party itself, both the elite and the supporters, was far from united. The actual membership application met resistance within the parliamentary group, with twenty-two out of fiftyfive Centre MPs voting against the application in Eduskunta in 1992. The party congress decided (by 1607 votes to 834) in June 1994 to support membership only after the Prime Minister (and Party Chairman) Esko Aho had threatened to resign if the Centre opposed membership. Nevertheless, only 36 per cent of the supporters followed the party line in the referendum. The party leadership has faced a tough challenge in balancing the often outright opposition to membership that prevails among large sections of the party electorate and the need to maintain the Centre’s credibility as a potential governing party. The Euro-critics have not formed their own organization, and the opposition has mainly centred on Paavo Väyrynen, an MEP and former party chairman and foreign minister. The main agricultural interest group closely attached to the party, The Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners, was against membership and remains critical of integration. This is not surprising considering the destructive impact of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on the farming sector. Like fellow European agrarian parties, the Centre Party emphasizes the intergovernmental nature of the EU. Even though the party is a member of the strongly pro-integrationist European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party, the Centre has very little in common with the Euro-liberals’ vision of Europe. It explicitly rejects a federal Europe and argues that the EU should be developed as an association of independent member states. An additional party congress held in September 1997 decided against Finland’s European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership. However, the party indicated in spring 1998 that it respects the outcome of the Eduskunta vote, and will not seek exit from the EMU in the future. Another party with a significant Eurosceptic minority is the Christian Democratic Party. The party draws most of its support from rural areas. It changed its name from Christian Union to Christian Democrats in the party congress held in May 2001. The Christian Democrats favour a Europe where independent nation states practice wide-ranging cooperation. The party does not want to increase EU’s powers, and the June 1997 party congress decided against EMU membership despite the proposal by the party chairman Bjarne Kallis to postpone the issue. Integration matters have stimulated fierce debates within the Left Alliance. The contrasting opinions of the leading party figures have attracted much media attention. This rivalry has centred between successive party chairs Claes Andersson (1990–8) and Suvi-Anne Siimes (1998– ) and MEP Esko Seppänen, with the latter very critical of integration. The Eurosceptics have not organized themselves. The party supporters and interest groups close to the party are internally divided over integration. This ambivalence is mainly explained by ideology: the market-driven logic of integration is rather distant from the world view of the average Left

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Alliance voter. As a result, only 24 per cent of the party’s voters were in favour of joining the EU in the 1994 referendum. In government from the 1995 elections to 2003, the party was forced to balance the Euroscepticism of its electorate with the responsibility of being a junior partner in a government committed to further integration. The party did an ideological U-turn on EMU. Against EMU in the Euroelection manifesto adopted in April 1996, the party leadership organized in November–December 1997 an internal party vote on whether Finland should join EMU. The wording of the question aroused much controversy, as the party executive linked the issue to whether the party should continue in the government. The turnout was 67.1 per cent, with 9,253 out of 13,790 enfranchised party members casting votes; 52.4 per cent were in favour, 41.5 per cent against, and 5.9 per cent left the decision to the party leadership. The Green League did not take a decision on membership before the referendum, and 55 per cent of party supporters voted in favour of membership in the referendum. While the Greens have remained divided over integration, the party has avoided factionalization and open leadership disputes. In comparison with most European Green parties, the Finnish Greens are ideologically moderate and definitely belong to the pragmatic wing of the green movement.5 Its European policy has within a short time become strongly pro-integrationist, a change which arguably owes much to former party chairperson MEP Heidi Hautala and to active transnational cooperation in the context of the European Federation of Green Parties. Of the Finnish parties, the Greens have probably been most influenced by such transnational party activities. The Greens argue that the priorities of the EU do not reflect the needs of the citizens and the environment. But, the cure is increasing EU’s powers and making its decision-making structures more democratic. On EMU, the Green League was in the same position as the Left Alliance. Supporters and the party elite were divided over the issue, but the party was a junior member in a government committed to entering the third stage from the start of 1999. The party first favoured the postponement of EMU, but a joint meeting of the party council and the Green MPs held in January 1998 decided in favour of Finland’s participation. The voting result was thirty-one in favour and thirteen against, with the party chairperson Satu Hassi on the losing side. In its party congress held in May 2001, the Green League adopted as the first party in Finland a statement in favour of a federal Europe. The Greens’ vision was one of decentralized federalism, that is ‘a strong Europe of regions’, with the Charter of Fundamental Rights incorporated as the first section of the EU’s new constitution. The Social Democratic Party, the National Coalition, and the Swedish People’s Party have been relatively united over integration. The Social Democratic Party adopted a pro-membership line in 1991. In the referendum, 75 per cent of its voters were in favour of joining the EU. A section of the party supporters campaigned against membership under their own organization. The Prime Minister (1995–2003) and Party Chairman Paavo Lipponen was throughout his premiership determined to lead Finland into the inner circle of the EU. While a section of the party elite was much more reserved, the party

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leader did not meet any strong resistance as the Eurosceptics did not organized themselves. The National Coalition decided in June 1991 that Finland should apply for EU membership. While the party ideology emphasizes traditional conservative values, including national sovereignty, the party elite and the overwhelming majority of the party supporters are in favour of EU/EMU membership and of developing closer links to the West. In fact, 89 per cent of the party supporters voted in favour of joining the EU in the membership referendum. In line with other conservative parties in the European People’s Party, the National Coalition does not support a federal Europe. The party argues that, on the whole, the EU should do ‘less but better’. The Swedish People’s Party came out in favour of membership in 1991, and in the referendum, 85 per cent of the party voters were in favour of membership. However, there was a geographical and urban–rural split within the party: farmers, in particular those from the Ostrobothnia region, opposed membership, while those residing in southern Finland were in favour. The clear majority of the leadership and voters continue to be supportive of further integration. With the exception of the True Finns, all Eduskunta parties are thus either in favour of status quo or of deepening integration. Referring to the principle of subsidiarity, parties and individual politicians often demand that decisions are taken closer to the citizens. However, apart from CAP and regional policy, parties have not really put forward any concrete proposals for reducing EU’s powers. While the 1994 referendum revealed significant differences within parties, EU issues have not led to any notable factionalism in Finnish parties.6 The parties have prevented defections or factionalism by tactical manoeuvres ranging from allowing internal dissent to linking EU questions to domestic political issues. In general, EU issues have remained in the background in national politics, particularly during election campaigns. While parties have adopted European programmes and individual politicians have tried to stimulate debate on integration, parties have chosen to keep a low profile on EU matters. European integration did not feature prominently in the 1995, 1999, or 2003 elections. National EU debate has primarily focused on security issues and on agricultural policy—two policy areas that are highly salient in Finnish politics even without integration. A key factor explaining the lack of organized factions is arguably the strongly candidate-centred electoral system, with elite-level Euroscepticism so far based on prominent individual MPs or MEPs. The candidate selection process is decentralized and voters choose between individual candidates in both national and EP elections. This mechanism facilitates intra-party protest based around individual persons and reduces the probability of establishing organized factions. Survey data show that the electoral system is reflected in citizens’ voting behaviour in EP elections. The personal qualities of candidates weigh heavily in people’s minds when making their voting decisions. The electoral system leads to more competition within than between parties. Individual candidates from the same party list pursue personal campaigns, with party programmes almost completely in the background (Martikainen and Pesonen 1999; Pesonen 2000; Raunio 2001).

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Considering the potentially divisive impact of European integration on party unity, party leaders have good cause to support the existing rules of the electoral game. Protest or dissenting opinions get channelled through individual candidates, whereas in member states with closed lists organized factions often appear to contest the official party line. Parties have also co-opted opposition by a strategy of accommodation. The Left Alliance and Green League left their position open on membership prior to the referendum in order not to alienate the anti-EU voters, with individual senior party figures campaigning both for and against membership. Immediately after the referendum the Centre Party and the Left Alliance made it clear that opponents of the EU would be welcome to their ranks. With the exception of some behindthe-scenes moves, party leaders have refrained from applying any direct sanctions against the Eurosceptics. In fact, the situation is largely the opposite. In the hope of maximizing their vote share, parties have in EP elections deliberately included in their pool of candidates, people with diverging views on integration, notably in the Centre Party, the Left Alliance, and the Green League. Parties have left individual candidates to run their own campaigns, with little if any interference from the party leadership. Perhaps the only proper example of sanctions or threats was the case of the Centre Party adopting its pro-EU position in 1994 only after Prime Minister and Party Chair Aho had threatened to resign were his party to oppose membership. But what explains the broad pro-EU consensus among Finnish parties? Why are there hardly any Eurosceptical parties?

10.4 EXPLAINING THE PRO-EU CONSENSUS The argument presented in this section for explaining the moderate presence of Eurosceptical parties focuses on two attributes of the domestic political system: the consensual style of politics and bargaining involved in forming coalition governments and the system of formulating national integration policy. As long as the influential actors in the domestic policy process—the main parties and interest groups—are convinced about the desirability of membership and further integration, it is difficult for Eurosceptical parties to gain support. Because the argument rests on systemic factors of the political system maintaining or facilitating the broad pro-EU consensus, it is important to first map the initial preferences of the key actors. Very soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union a broad majority of the national decision-making elite—interest groups, political parties, media, state bureaucracy—emerged in favour of EU membership. Finland is heavily dependent on trade, and beginning from the 1980s, the industry (particularly the influential wood-processing sector) had expressed its preferences by increasing its investments in Western Europe. As barter trade with the Soviet regime had accounted for about one-fifth of national trade, the demise of the communist bloc increased

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trade dependence on the then EC countries. The heavy recession of the early 1990s further convinced the industry and the trade unions about the importance of joining the EU. The only significant interest group campaigning against membership was The Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners. Economic factors were of course not the only motive behind the pro-EU stances. The rather uncertain political situation in Russia brought security concerns to the fore, and in general there was a broader cultural argument about (re-)joining the West (Arter 1995; Archer 2000). Of the parties, Social Democrats, National Coalition, and the Swedish People’s Party adopted a pro-membership line in 1991, with the Centre Party delaying its formal decision until 1994. By the time of the referendum held in October 1994, a broad majority of the political elite was thus in favour of membership. With the referendum result clear (56.9 per cent in favour, 43.1 per cent against), the support for membership changed to support for deeper integration. This broad elite-level pro-EU consensus is sustained primarily by two factors, the consensual style of politics and the system of forming national integration policy.7

10.4.1 Consensual style of politics The Finnish political system is often characterized as both consensual and elitist (Ruostetsaari 2003). This applies particularly to foreign policy matters in which maintaining amicable relations with the Soviet Union was of overriding importance during the cold war. Even though the range of actors involved in making foreign and security policy has broadened, largely the same logic continues to guide decision-making, with emphasis placed on achieving national unity and avoiding public cleavages. Decision-making in other policy domains is likewise broadly inclusive and based on extensive consultation with key interest groups. The shape of the Finnish party system, with no party as a rule winning more than around 25 per cent of votes in parliamentary elections, together with the rather corporatist nature of the polity, also facilitates ideological convergence between all the parties aspiring to enter the government. The fragmented nature of the party system forces parties to make concessions. The parties and their leaders are engaged in an almost constant process of negotiation and the art of building compromises and package deals is an essential feature of party politics. The dividing line between government and opposition has increased in significance as a result of a series of constitutional reforms that have brought Finland closer to a standard parliamentary democracy, but the pragmatic and consensual style of politics still prevails, particularly so in European and foreign policy matters. The programmatic adaptation and ideological moderation implied by government formation, short- and long-term interests in maintaining government status, and mutual commitments agreed to between the parties in the cabinet explain largely why Finnish parties supported EMU and are in broad agreement over national integration policy. The elite-level bargaining also sustains the gap between public and party Euroscepticism. The broad partisan consensus on EU

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is not replicated among voters, with citizens remaining far less supportive of integration than their elected representatives. In order to be considered as realistic and trustworthy coalition partners, parties have adopted positions that have been at least partially contradictory with the mood among their voters. When faced with hard choices, parties have after the referendum held in 1994 almost invariably ended up supporting deeper integration. The Left Alliance and the Green League, both internally badly divided over European integration, came out in favour of EMU in 1997–8, after initial rejections or doubts, and both parties took part in the five-party government headed by Lipponen and appointed in 1995 that was committed to taking Finland into the inner core of the EU. The Centre Party, in opposition from 1995 to 2003, has carefully formulated its strategies and policies that have maintained it as a credible future party of the government.8 In the Left Alliance, Green League, and to a certain extent also in Social Democrats the policy moderation and ideological compromises, definitely not least in integration matters, implied by multiparty coalition governments have gradually reduced the influence of more radical left-wing sections that also were against the EU membership and remain more sceptical about the benefits of integration. Within the Centre Party, this has resulted in the marginalization of the EU-critical section of the party, a section that arguably represents the views of the majority of the party’s voters. With the partial exception of the rightwing True Finns, the pragmatic style of politics is also reflected in the lack of ideologically extremist or populist parties that normally adopt anti-integrationist positions as a part of their strategy of distancing themselves from the mainstream parties.

10.4.2 National EU coordination system The inter-party bargaining characteristic of domestic politics is further enhanced by the system established for formulating and coordinating national integration policies. While the overall aim ‘is to speak with one voice on all levels of decision shaping in Brussels’ (Stubb, Kaila, and Ranta 2001: 306), the importance attached to achieving such consistency varies between policy areas and individual legislative initiatives. When a proposal is perceived as having significant national repercussions the matter is debated at the highest political level in the Cabinet EU Committee, a ministerial committee for European matters where all the government parties are represented. The coordination system is based on a wide consultation among both public and private actors. The goal is to manufacture broad (elitelevel) societal backing for national positions, including the parliament, relevant interest groups, and government representatives. In important matters the permanent representative in Brussels also often informs all Finnish MEPs of the national position. Particularly noteworthy has been the lack of conflict, or of even tension, between the government and the Eduskunta on the one hand, and between the government and the opposition on the other hand. The government is usually criticized by individual MPs from both opposition and government parties rather

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than by a united opposition or even by unitary party groups. The lack of conflict and the pro-European consensus is again explained by the institutional rules of the coordination system. In the Eduskunta, the emphasis is on pragmatic examination of EU’s legislative initiatives in the committees, with relatively few partisan ideological debates about national integration policy or the overall development of integration. Committee scrutiny of European matters differs in one important respect from domestic legislation: the government–opposition dimension does not play the only significant role in either the Grand Committee (the equivalent of an EU committee) or in specialized committees. Granting the opposition a larger role in European matters, especially on more important issues such as treaty amendments, increases the legitimacy of the decisions as all or nearly all parties are involved in policymaking. The multiparty coalition governments, together with the role accorded to the opposition in the Grand Committee, facilitate broad backing for governmental action at the European level. As the opposition parties are involved in forming national policies, they also simultaneously share the responsibility for the outcome. This reduces the likelihood of the main features of Finnish integration policy being altered after each parliamentary election (see Raunio and Wiberg 2000; Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003: chs. 4 and 5).

10.5 CONCLUSION Looking forward into the future, it is unlikely that the overall direction of Finnish integration policy and the European policies of the Eduskunta parties will undergo major changes. The factors that led Finland to apply for EU membership—trade dependence, security concerns, and consolidating Finland’s place in the West— remain by and large unaltered. The Finnish parties are solidly pro-EU without, however, explicitly embracing the concept of a federal Europe. All the parties are divided over the future of integration, but the share of Eurosceptical MPs has decreased since the early days of EU membership. Euroscepticism will most probably continue to be channelled through individual candidates in (EP) elections and through marginal parties or movements that fail to make much impact on national politics. Nevertheless, the issue is in reality far less settled than it appears, and European integration will also in the future cause problems for parties represented in the national parliament. Of the main parties, the potential for Euroscepticism is highest within the Centre Party.9 The negative attitude of Centre supporters towards integration is both instrumental, with CAP and the single market having a negative impact on primary producers, and more ideological due to the value placed on national community typical of agrarian parties. In the Left Alliance and the Green League, internal divisions are likely to continue to trouble the party leadership as sections of party voters view the EU as too exclusive and market-friendly. Overall, institutional questions have so far proven more controversial than the division of powers between the EU and member states. This is understandable, for strengthening the powers of supranational institutions at the expense of intergovernmental decision-making

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will at least numerically further limit national independence and sovereignty— two strongly emphasized values in Finnish society. Nevertheless, European integration has added a new significant cleavage to the Finnish political system. The integration–independence dimension is entwined with the centre–periphery or rural–urban cleavage, and considering the ideological convergence on the dominant left–right dimension, EU matters may become more important in structuring voting behaviour in national parliamentary elections. So far, the national parties have adapted to integration with relatively little difficulty, but the low level of public support for the EU is a reminder of the Eurosceptic potential among the voters. NOTES 1. For information on the Finnish party system, see Arter (1999: 50–142, 224–44), Sundberg (1996), and Borg and Sänkiaho (1995). 2. For analyses of party positions in the referendum, see Paloheimo (1994, 1995), Sänkiaho (1994), Listhaug, Holmberg, and Sänkiaho (1998), and Jahn (1999). 3. For more information, see the websites of Alternative to the EU (www.kaapeli.fi/ ∼veu/) and League for Free Finland (www.vapaansuomenliitto.fi). 4. For analyses of party positions on integration, see Johansson and Raunio (2001), Raunio (1997, 1999, 2000), and Raunio and Tiilikainen (2003: ch. 3). The European programmes of the parties are available at their websites: Social Democrats (www. sdp.fi), Centre Party (www.keskusta.fi), National Coalition (www.kokoomus.fi), Left Alliance (www.vasemmistoliitto.fi), Green League (www.vihrealiitto.fi), Swedish People’s Party (www.rkp.fi), Christian Democrats (www.kristillisdemokraatit.fi), and True Finns (www.perussuomalaiset.fi). Most programmes are available also in English. 5. On the policy profiles of the Greens and the Left Alliance, see Zilliacus (2001). 6. Interestingly, the retrospective expert survey of parties’ EU positions carried out by Ray (1999: 293) showed that ‘record levels of internal dissent are found primarily in nations which have had referenda, and occur in parties across the political spectrum’. 7. The lack of resources is another effective factor against the rise of anti-EU parties. Political parties, both their extra-parliamentary organizations and parliamentary groups, receive public funding based on the share of seats won in the most recent parliamentary election. Parties not represented in the Eduskunta are not entitled to public funding. 8. A nice illustration of the impact of government formation was in December 2001 when the party council of the Centre Party adopted the new European programme. Vice-Chair Anneli Jäätteenmäki explicitly stated that the party ‘must have such a EU policy that it can be either in the opposition or in the government’. Marjo Ollikainen, ‘Keskusta: Suomi vahvasti mukaan EU:n kehittämiseen’, Helsingin Sanomat (26.11.2001). 9. According to the expert survey conducted by Ray (1999: 293), the Centre Party was in 1996 one of the most conflict-ridden parties in the EU in integration matters, with only the Social Democrats and Socialist People’s Party in Denmark, Social Democrats and the Centre Party in Sweden, and the Conservative Party in Great Britain also evenly split on the issue of integration.

11 Softer but Strong: Euroscepticism and Party Politics in Sweden Nicholas Aylott

11.1 INTRODUCTION 1 If the term is used in a relative sense, Sweden is a Eurosceptical country. By autumn 2002, across the European Union (EU),2 just one in ten citizens was estimated to believe that his or her country’s membership of the EU was a ‘bad thing’. In Sweden, it was nearly one in four. On this and other measures, Sweden reported the largest group of negatively inclined respondents in any member state (European Commission 2003c). Although public hostility to EU membership has declined, as Figure 11.1 shows, Swedes’ doubts about the process of integration as a whole were illustrated in their emphatic vote to reject participation in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the referendum of September 2003. It is thus not surprising to see Euroscepticism reflected in the party system. Still, a look at Sweden’s neighbour, Finland (see Raunio, this volume), shows that ‘high levels of public Euroscepticism do not necessarily translate into high levels of support for parties expressing Euroscepticism’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002b: 22). Why, then, do Swedish popular doubts about the EU find fairly strong representation in Swedish party politics—and, indeed, in government office? This chapter focuses on the representation of Eurosceptical preferences across and within parties in Sweden. The research objective is largely descriptive, for the purpose of building cross-national data sets. But, it also seeks to develop ideas about causation. In other words, while no particular hypotheses are tested, the chapter does tackle the question of why parties and intra-party factions in certain contexts take a Eurosceptical position. Section 11.2 offers some brief background information about the case, reviewing Sweden’s historical relationship with the European Community (EC) and EU, and the depth of public reluctance. It also surveys the party political landscape for signs of organized Euroscepticism. Then, in Sections 11.3 and 11.4, using a simple framework based on the basic goals that parties pursue, I examine the incentives and pressures that have driven Eurosceptical parties and factions. In this, I include a variable that is hard to model, but which has undeniable importance: leadership. The concluding Section 11.5

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50 Good Thing

Bad Thing

45 Percentage of electorate

43 41

40 38

35 30 27

25 23

20 17

15

03 Sp

rin g

20 rin g Sp

20

02

01 Sp

rin g

20 rin g Sp

rin g Sp

20

00

99 19

98 19 Sp

rin g

19 rin g Sp

Sp

rin g

19

97

96

10

Figure 11.1. Swedish public opinion on EU membership Source: European Commission (1996–2003)

summarizes the character and causes of Swedish party-based Euroscepticism, and discusses some of its effects. Throughout the chapter, I distinguish between two varieties of Euroscepticism, Soft and Hard (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002: 7). Soft Eurosceptics are not opposed to the EU as such, but they are doubtful about aspects of it, or of further political or economic integration. In the Swedish context, opposition to the EMU, coupled with acceptance of EU membership, is a useful indicator (though not the only conceivable one) of Soft Euroscepticism. Hard Eurosceptics, meanwhile, are either explicitly opposed to Sweden’s membership of the EU, or they advocate changes to it so fundamental as to be unrealistic, thus implying that they would rather that Sweden withdraw than participate.

11.2 THE EUROSCEPTICAL LANDSCAPE: PUBLIC OPINION AND PARTIES Sweden was a reluctant European (Miljan 1977) from the start of the continental collaboration that lead to the Treaty of Rome. Like Denmark and Norway, Sweden was concerned about keeping its access to the market of another non-participant, Britain. But, unlike those two Scandinavian neighbours, but similarly to Finland, the major reason for Sweden’s reluctance was its neutrality, which had become more inflexible during the cold war (Huldt 1990: 169). Sweden was by no means

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isolationist, however, and, apart from joining the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), it made enquiries with the EC in the late 1960s and 1980s about some sort of semi-membership, without political encumbrances. Then, from 1989, the collapse of the communist bloc removed the main reason for neutrality, and with it the biggest obstacle to full EC membership. Sweden, with Finland and Austria, joined at the start of 1995. The referendum in 1994 that approved Sweden’s terms of accession was closerun. The winning margin was just 52.3 per cent to 46.8 per cent, or 294,589 votes out of a total of nearly 5.5 million. For a long time thereafter, Swedes were unconvinced that they had made the right decision. Support for the EU collapsed immediately after the referendum, and, according to the national statistics agency, only seven years later those favouring Swedish membership again outnumbered the opponents (Statistics Sweden). Such negative public opinion was the main reason, among several others, why the government announced in June 1997 that Sweden would not take part in EMU when it was launched in 1999.3 This hostility to the EU is visible in the party system, which, after some turbulence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has settled down to a moderately fragmented pattern of seven main parties, all of which are relevant in terms of government formation. Of these, all but one, the Greens (a relatively new party, formed in 1982), belong to one of two loose, informal alliances. On the left, there is the socialist bloc, comprising the Left Party and the Social Democrats. The Left was previously a communist party; the word was only dropped from its name in 1990. The Social Democrats, meanwhile, are Sweden’s dominant party, with intimate and enduring ties to the powerful trade unions. Its average score in parliamentary elections between 1945 and 2002 was 44.2 per cent, far ahead of its rivals, and it was out of government for just nine-and-a-bit years since 1932. On the centre-right, there is the ‘bourgeois’ or non-socialist bloc, comprising four parties. The Centre Party was formed in 1913 to represent the interests of Swedish farmers, and, while its share of the vote has declined in rough tandem with the proportion of the population engaged in the primary sector, it remains a strong political and social institution in many rural areas. Of the two other old parties in the bloc, the Moderates had, by the 1970s, largely discarded their social conservativism in favour of, increasingly, an internationalist brand of neo-liberalism, while the Liberals, who have a diverse traditional base of urban intellectuals and religious and temperance movements in the countryside, have offered a more centrist, social liberalism. The fourth bourgeois party, the Christian Democrats, is newer, having first won parliamentary seats on their own lists in 1991. Like other Christian parties in Protestant northern Europe, it is based on a reaction against society’s secularization. All these seven parties bar the Liberals are against the EU becoming a federation. But the Left and the Greens can be classified as Hard Eurosceptics. They were against accession and still declare that they want Sweden to leave the EU. The Centre can be called a Soft Eurosceptic. It supported a ‘yes’ in the EU membership referendum, and by 2001 it saw the EU, albeit in ‘leaner but more effective’ form, as ‘Europe’s most developed organization for promoting cooperation, the most

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Table 11.1. Major parties’ positions on Europe

Left Party Social Democrats Greens Centre Party Liberals Christian Democrats Moderates

EU membership, 1994

EU membership, 2002

EMU membership, 2002

Expert survey, 1992–6∗

Vote in 2002 national election

against for against for for for for

against for against for for for for

against for against against for for for

1.43 6.07 1.00 4.93 7.00 6.34 6.79

8.3 39.9 4.6 6.2 13.3 9.1 15.1

∗ Data from the expert survey is taken from Ray (1999). The figure is an average of two estimates of the parties’

positions, in 1992 and 1996. The scale is 1–7, from most to least Eurosceptical. Note: Positions on EU and EMU membership are those stated in party programmes or decided at the party congress.

effective means through which [the party’s] vision can become reality’ (Centre Party 2001). But it had also decided to oppose EMU. These indicators of Euroscepticism, plus the placing of the Swedish parties’ positions on Europe in Ray’s (1999) expert survey, are summarized in Table 11.1. As can be seen, both party blocs are divided by Europe; the implications of this are discussed later. While Soft Eurosceptics can be found in all the parties,4 three—the Social Democrats, the Centre, and the Christian Democrats—contain organized Eurosceptical factions.5 Such ideological factionalism is unusual in Swedish parties, but its cause is straightforward: the three parties have significant proportions of members and supporters who think that their leaderships’ official positions are too EU-friendly. Social Democratic Eurosceptics have developed through various incarnations. Social Democrats Against the EC were formed in early 1993 and, although their organization was officially disbanded after the 1994 referendum, its sympathizers remained in contact through a network of ‘Social Democratic EU-Critics’. Then, in October 2002, the Social Democratic executive—and, in effect, the Swedish government—ended a long period of speculation by deciding to hold a referendum the following September on whether Sweden should join monetary union.6 A few days after the decision, EU-Critics metamorphosed into Social Democrats Against EMU. They can be called Soft Eurosceptical. By 2002, there were almost no Social Democrats who wanted Sweden to renounce its membership of the EU entirely. A comparable faction exists in the Centre Party, although both the party and the faction stand nearer the Eurosceptical pole of the spectrum. ‘Centre No to the EU’ was formed in autumn 1992, its initiators frustrated with the party congress’s decision to support Sweden’s application for EC membership. It was soon credited by party officials with effectively organizing the Centre’s Eurosceptics (Dagens Nyheter, 22 June 1993). Despite its clear institutional structure,

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‘Centre No’ characterizes itself as a network ‘that bases its activity on the Centre’s party programme . . . to promote debate and discussion on the EU’, and denies that it constitutes ‘an organization within an organization’. Nevertheless, it works for ‘Swedish departure from the EU and for pan-European and international cooperation between independent states’ (Centre No to the EU undated), which goes much further than the Centre’s opposition only to EMU. So too does a third major Eurosceptical faction, ‘Christian Democrats for an Alternative EU Policy’, or KALE, its Swedish acronym. It was formed by Christian Democratic opponents of the party’s rapid warming to the EC after it first won parliamentary representation (and government office) in 1991, and it is Hard Eurosceptical. It is, of course, difficult to measure the influence of a faction on its party. Clearly, none of these three groups has a decisive impact on the respective party leaderships. But all have some sort of presence, albeit informal, in the parties’ national executives and national parliamentary groups. The Social Democratic group’s standing in such forums is considerably more significant that that of Centre No or KALE. One type of party that Sweden, unlike Denmark, has barely seen is that built specially to run on a Eurosceptical ticket.7 In national elections at least, the obvious reason, which can be seen in many other countries, is that European integration has low salience: it gets voters much less excited than it does certain political activists. In a Swedish television survey after the 1998 election, voters put ‘EU/EMU’ fourteenth of fifteen election issues in order of importance to them; after the 2002 election it was fifteenth (see Dagens Nyheter, 21 September 1998, 16 September 2002; also Aylott 2003). Table 11.2 summarizes the foregoing review and depicts the Eurosceptical groups active in Swedish party politics. As can be seen, they are spread across the political spectrum. The extremes oppose the EU for predictable reasons. For the tiny Marxist parties on the far left, it is a capitalist club designed to suppress the working class and smother democracy. For those on the far right, including the Sweden Democrats, whose vote (particularly in southern municipal elections) grew powerfully in 2002,8 the EU is a threat to national independence and identity. Away from the margins, however, we see that Swedish Eurosceptical parties and factions are found largely, though not exclusively, on the left. They represent general fears about European integration that are distinct from those in, say, Britain or France, but which are found elsewhere in Scandinavia. This uneasiness is less about formal sovereignty, and more about threats to a perceived model of society—an egalitarian democracy, with a big public sector and high taxes. In the rest of this chapter, we focus squarely on the main Eurosceptical parties, the Left and the Greens, and intra-party factions in the Social Democrats, the Centre, and the Christian Democrats. Our next task is to try to explain why these organizations give organized expression to Euroscepticism in the party system.

Table 11.2. Eurosceptical parties and party factions in Sweden (as of late 2002), and percentage of vote in 2002 election Party family

Radical left

‘Soft’

‘Hard’ Left Party 8.3 Socialist Party 0.1

Social Democratic

Green

Single-issue Eurosceptic

(Social Democrats Against EMU)

Ethno-regionalist

Agrarian-based

Liberal

Christian

Conservative

Radical right

Norrbotten Party 0.3 Centre Party 6.1

Greens 4.6 New Future 0.2

(Centre No to EU)

(KALE)

Sweden Democrats 1.4 National Democrats 0.2

Parties in bold type crossed the threshold for winning parliamentary seats (4 per cent nationally or 12 per cent in a single constituency) in the 2002 election. Those in normal type failed this hurdle, but won at least 0.1 per cent (rounded to one decimal place), that is, 2,700 votes. The figure after the party name is its percentage of the vote. Names in brackets denote organized factions within mainstream parties. Notes: Five other parties received more than 1,000 votes in 2002. Three—on the far left, the Communist Party of Sweden and the Socialist Justice Party and, on the far right, New Democracy—are Hard Eurosceptics. The ethno-regionalist Scania Party (Skånepartiet) is pro-EU and pro-EMU. The Pensioners’ Interest Party has no official position. Source: Election Authority, party and group websites, personal correspondence.

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11.3 THE DYNAMICS OF EUROSCEPTICAL PARTY POLITICS Why do some parties oppose European integration and others support it? A burgeoning literature grapples with this conundrum. Taggart (1998) found little ideological regularity between Eurosceptical parties, and concluded that ‘The European issue therefore provides us with a potential touchstone of domestic dissent’ (1998: 384)—that is, a way for parties strategically to express their dissatisfaction with, and distinguish themselves from, the mainstream. Sitter’s (2001: 26) argument that the Eurosceptical Scandinavian parties are pursuing the ‘politics of opposition’, in which ‘patterns of competition shape the translation of the European question into party politics’, is a variation on the party-strategy thesis. Other, more quantitative analyses have, on the other hand, found that ideological identity—or, more accurately, association with a particular cross-national party family—is actually a more powerful predictor of a party’s attitudes towards the EU than are other variables, such as national location or role in the national party system, although they too have some impact (Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002: 590–2). The basis of this alleged causal relationship between party family and EU orientation is ‘cleavage theory’. Party ideologies are rooted in old and deep-seated patterns of socio-economic conflict, and these still shape parties’ interpretation of and reaction to modern issues, such as European integration. The Swedish case, not least because it is just one case, does not raise fundamental doubts about either of these approaches—strategy or ideology—to explaining parties’ positions on the EU. But there are peculiarities about Swedish party-based Euroscepticism that permit comment on the explanatory value of these theories. In this section, I discuss the ideological and strategic incentives that Swedish party leaderships have faced since 1990 in framing their European policies. This is hardly a novel exercise. Johansson and Raunio (2001: 228–31), for example, list seven factors—basic ideology, public opinion, factionalism, leadership influence, party competition, transnational links, and the development of integration—that they argue combined to shape Finnish and Swedish parties’ positions. Here, however, I adopt a more parsimonious approach, based on the four basic goals of a mainstream political party, as identified in the literature on party behaviour. These goals are policy, votes, office and unity (Harmel and Janda 1994; also Müller and Strøm 1999b).

11.3.1 Parties’ ideologies and European policy preferences Policy positions are usually driven either by material interests or values that a party is trying to represent. Is there, then, something in certain Swedish parties’ or factions’ basic ideologies that predisposes them to Euroscepticism? In other words, are they Eurosceptical for policy-seeking reasons? Support for neutrality was the main reason why the Social Democratic, Left, and Centre parties opposed EC membership in the 1960s and 1970s (Kite 1996: 118–31). Indeed, as late as 1988, ‘none of the main parties . . . risked being accused

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of no longer defending the nation’s basic pillar—neutrality’ (Gidlund 1992: 44). But, for some, especially on the left, neutrality went beyond a security strategy. In addition, it embraced a model of society that was different from, and superior to, the models pursued by the rival power blocs—namely, raw US capitalism and Soviet dictatorship. This sense of specialness, in which Sweden was the conscience of the rich world and the champion of the Third World, took on a ‘hegemonic character’ among Social Democrats (Stråth 1992: 201). At the same time, probably even more powerful in creating the party’s image of Sweden and of itself were its governments’ success in combining impressive economic growth with an evermore encompassing welfare state. Naturally enough, this led many in the party to ask openly what Sweden had to gain from engagement with continental states that were not only poorer, but also socially and politically less developed (see e.g. Ekström, Myrdal, and Paulsson 1962). This self-perception sustained a double blow around 1990. The end of the cold war was celebrated in Sweden, as elsewhere. But, in removing the fundamental basis of Sweden’s neutrality, it also removed one aspect of Swedish distinctiveness, something in which the left had taken no little pride. An even more significant development was the onset of a major economic crisis. As unemployment began to climb at the start of the 1990s, obituaries were penned for the vaunted efficiency of the Swedish ‘model’ of political economy. Desperately looking to steady a sinking currency, the Social Democratic government suddenly declared in October 1990 its intention to apply for EC membership. After decades of official Social Democratic Euroscepticism, and a few months of cautious kite-flying about possible future reorientation, the party’s position was turned on its head, with very little internal debate, and announced in a government package of spending cuts. Perhaps this shows how Social Democrats inevitably learn that European integration is useful for promoting their goals (Marks and Wilson 2000: 443–8); but the manner of the party leadership’s epiphany was hardly propitious for convincing the rank-and-file of the EC’s benevolence (Aylott 1999: 127–32). For many in the Swedish labour movement, Europe became associated with political and economic failure. According to Social Democratic Eurosceptics, the single currency presents two main threats to their policy preferences (Social Democrats Against EMU undated). First, there was the political danger: EMU represents the transfer of further policy levers to an institution, the European Central Bank, that is not accountable to the Swedish people. This violates a deeply held association of democracy with the nation state, captured in the term folkstyre, or popular rule. The second danger is that EMU could have damaging consequences for Swedish macroeconomic policy in general, and particularly for the maintenance of full employment. Without the flexibility of a national monetary policy to offset the business cycle, and a floating exchange rate to adjust relative prices, the fear is that the labour market could bear the brunt of economic shocks. This remains a particular worry for sections of the major component of the Social Democrats’ organization and support, the bluecollar trade unions. More abstractly, many in the labour movement wonder if subsequent fiscal integration would force Sweden to reduce its very high tax burden,

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and thus cut back its public spending.9 Indeed, Social Democratic Eurosceptics can usually, though not always, be found on the left of the party, among its ‘traditionalists’, whereas the party’s ‘modernizers’ are much more enthusiastic about the EU (Aylott 1999: 66–101, 169–74; 2001: 161–5). The two Hard Eurosceptical parties share much of this ideological world view. According to the Left’s programme (2000: 5), ‘Sweden’s political democracy is closely connected to our national autonomy.’ The party casts itself as the champion of the public sector, and thus it, too, depicts the EU as a potential threat to this model of political economy. Moreover, its ideological legacy also militates towards Euroscepticism for another reason. It was only in the 1960s that it broke away from fairly slavish support for the Soviet Union, which was highly critical of the EC; and the Left’s continuing ties with the communist parties of Eastern Europe were frozen as late as mid-1990 (Christensen 1996: 537). Despite a programmatic modernization in subsequent years, many in the party, even at higher levels, continue to call themselves communists. The Greens, meanwhile, might be expected to favour supranational environmental regulation, as do most similar parties in the EU. But the Swedish party, in addition to their strong commitment to decentralized decision-making and folkstyre, also champions neutrality. Its programme declares: ‘We think that building up an EU state and an international great power is a dangerous path for Europe and the world’ (Greens 2002: 16). The EU has posed few ideological problems for the Liberals and the Moderates. With the Social Democrats dominating government, Europe seemed to many in these parties like the promised land of lower taxes and freer markets. However, the two other bourgeois parties, as we have seen, contain Eurosceptical factions. In the 1960s the Centre’s Euroscepticism was informed by its insistence that EC membership would threaten Sweden’s agricultural self-sufficiency, and thus neutrality (Kite 1996: 119–20). The Centre also acquired a more radical, ideological character during its heyday in the 1970s. The urban–rural cleavage in the Swedish electorate has also, to some degree, the character of a centre–periphery divide, and the Centre exploited its strength in the countryside as it profiled itself as chief opponent of the Social Democratic state’s centralizing tendencies, and as protector of the environment, particularly against the perceived danger of nuclear power. The Centre’s contemporary Eurosceptical faction reflects both traditional support for neutrality and this more recent, ideological radicalism. Centre No declares itself in favour of ‘decentralization, solidarity, folkstyre and national sovereignty’ (Centre No to the EU undated), and it can be placed on the left of the party. Swedish Christian Democracy is confessionally distinct from its continental equivalent, which was founded to defend the Catholic church against the encroachments of state power. In much of the EU, Christian democracy is strongly associated with support for European integration. In stark contrast, it is not unknown for fundamentalist Protestants in Scandinavia to argue that the EU is a Catholic plot, to be resisted at all costs. KALE does not go so far. But it does want to ‘protect the Swedish folkstyre, our national freedom and right to make our own decisions’, and rails especially against the liberal drug and alcohol policies that the EU would purportedly foist on Sweden. It declares that ‘the negative consequences

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of [EU] membership and the EU’s continued development towards a European superstate make it impossible for Sweden to take part fully in this future Union’ (KALE undated).

11.3.2 Euroscepticism and vote-seeking If ingrained ideological preferences affect the way that parties interpret and react to certain issues, many of their supporters, sharing that ideology, are likely to interpret and react in the same way. But two caveats apply to this reasoning. First, disjunctions can develop between the preferences of a party and those of its supporters. Second, a party may be keen to go beyond its existing electorate and recruit new supporters. In this subsection, I discuss the EU-related preferences of the Swedish parties’ sympathizers, and what this has meant for the parties’ voteseeking strategies. There have been, as Table 11.3 shows, plenty of electoral incentives for the Left and the Greens to take Eurosceptical positions. Most of their supporters were against EU membership in the 1994 referendum, and more modest majorities were, by late 2002, against EMU. Moreover, there was a tempting pool of Eurosceptics among supporters of the party to which both the Greens and the Left lie closest, the Social Democrats. In fact, this underlined two basic problems for the Social Democrats: first, Eurosceptics are overrepresented among the party’s natural supporters—the working class, northerners, women, public-sector workers (Gilljam 1996); and, second, ‘the days of party loyalty are gone’ (Svåsand and Lindström 1996: 214), which makes traditional Social Democratic supporters an even more inviting target for other parties. Such vote-seeking logic was apparently confirmed in Sweden’s first two elections to the European Parliament, in 1995 and 1999. The Left and the Greens did spectacularly well in both, and the Social Table 11.3. Euroscepticism and party sympathizers

Left Party Social Democrats Greens Centre Party Liberals Christian Democrats Moderates

Sympathizers voting no to EU membership, 1994 (%)∗

Sympathizers opposed to joining EMU, Nov. 2002 (%)∗∗

Vote in European elections compared to national (%)†

85 46 79 54 20 44 13

62 34 52 43 20 38 16

+5.5 −13.5 +8.7 +0.3 +0.9 −2.6 +1.8

Note: A party’s sympathizers are defined as survey respondents who identified that party as their current preference. † The parties’ average scores in national elections (in 1994, 1998, and 2002) are subtracted from their average scores in European elections (1995 and 1999). Source: ∗ Holmberg (1996: 226), ∗∗ Statistics Sweden, † Election Authority.

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Democrats performed disastrously. Clearly, voters who were disappointed with the material benefits of EU membership, despite what they felt they had been promised in the run-up to the 1994 referendum, were taking the opportunity of a second-order election to protest against a Social Democratic government. On the other side of the party system, meanwhile, the Centre had even more compelling electoral reasons to adopt a mild Euroscepticism. Although the main farmers’ union, with which the party previously had close ties, was pro-EMU, many of the Centre’s supporters were opposed to the euro, and, indeed, to European integration in general. Moreover, the party has a history of innovation in order to appeal beyond its core, but shrinking, constituency (Christensen 1997: 295–7). It is the least committed member of the bourgeois bloc, and likes to see itself as Sweden’s other real ‘popular movement’ party, the main one being the Social Democrats. This gave the Centre scope to attract Eurosceptical Social Democratic voters, especially in rural districts, where the Left and the Greens are weaker. At the same time, the bourgeois parties are known for their electoral ‘cannibalism’ (i.e. taking each other’s votes rather than winning new ones from the socialist bloc), and Europe presented the Centre with an opportunity to continue this tradition. Through profiling itself as the only bourgeois party with any real doubts about the EU, it sought to attract similarly Euro-hesitant supporters of the other parties on the mainstream right. This vote-seeking logic, then, pushed the Centre towards a Soft Euroscepticism: cautiously positive towards aspects of the EU, but cautiously negative about the euro—in other words, a defence of the Swedish status quo. Given the Christian Democrats’ own significant proportion of Eurosceptical supporters, the same logic might also have applied to them. But the explanation for the Christian Democrats’ pro-EU position probably lies elsewhere, in its leadership’s own preferences (see below). The electoral incentives for certain parties’ Euroscepticism are thus clear. But they have diminished with time. As Figure 11.2 shows, all the parties’ supporters have mellowed towards the EU. In 1996, a majority of the supporters of not just the Hard Eurosceptical parties, but also the three parties with Eurosceptical factions, indicated opposition to membership. By the end of 2002, it was only the Hard Eurosceptical parties who had a majority of supporters against, and for one of those parties, the Greens, it was a bare majority. The obvious reason for this was that, after nearly eight years of it, Swedes had simply got used to being in the EU, and saw departure as increasingly unrealistic. In addition, the Swedish economy had improved, unemployment had fallen and some of the public-spending cuts implemented in the mid-1990s had been reversed, making Social Democratic supporters in particular more inclined to look sympathetically at the EU. The Social Democratic government used rather effectively the Swedish presidency of the EU’s Council of Ministers in 2001 to raise awareness and support for the EU (Aylott 2002a: 220–2). In short, then, the advantages of pushing Euroscepticism for a vote-seeking party were, by the end of 2002, becoming more limited. Swedes have gradually become more accepting of the political fact of EU membership. Above all, though,

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Percentage against EU membership

90

82

70

Nov. 1996

79

80

Nov. 1999

Nov. 2002

67 62 58

60

54

53

50 37

40

33

33

32

30

25

22

20

15

10 0 Left

Social Democrats

Greens

Centre

Liberals

Christian Moderates Democrats

Figure 11.2. Opposition to Swedish EU membership among party sympathizers Source: Statistics Sweden

and despite the evidence from the European elections, there is little evidence to suggest that, in first-order national elections, Swedes allow their views on the EU to influence their vote to any great extent. They have higher priorities.

11.3.3 Euroscepticism and office-seeking In this subsection, we ask whether the need for deals with other parties has promoted or, more likely, constrained the hostility to the EU of the Eurosceptical parties, and whether office-seeking has affected the parties with Eurosceptical factions. Various issues have divided the bourgeois parties over the years, Europe included. As the collapse of the communist regimes put EC membership firmly on the agenda, the Centre—the only party to have shared power with the Social Democrats (in the 1930s and 1950s)—was much more cautious than the Liberals and the Moderates about the EC, and this led to sharp exchanges between these supposed allies in mid-1990. But an election was looming, the Social Democrats were looking vulnerable, and the Centre’s leadership soon decided to keep its policy options open (Aylott 1999: 118–19). Clearly, such a situation of policy compromise induced by office-seeking was likely to have sparked rebellion among the party’s more intensely Eurosceptical elements—which is what later led to the formation of Centre No. Something similar applied to the Christian Democrats. What of the parties that belong and, in the Greens’ case, half-belong to the socialist bloc? Since Sweden joined the EU, Social Democratic governments have

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struck formal deals on parliamentary cooperation with the Soft Eurosceptical party (the Centre) and both Hard Eurosceptical parties (the Left and the Greens). Why has this not pulled the Social Democratic leadership towards a more Eurosceptical position? Alternatively, and perhaps more pertinently, why have the support parties not been pulled more towards a less Eurosceptical position, as has happened in Finland and, to a lesser extent, Denmark (Christensen 1996: 540)? The answer may lie in the institutions and patterns of competition within Swedish democracy. The rule of government formation is ‘negative parliamentarism’. This means, essentially, that a prime minister does not require the active backing of a parliamentary majority in order to be seen to enjoy the confidence of parliament. Instead, all he requires is that a majority does not support a vote of no confidence in him or his government. Thus, abstention is interpreted as passive support for prime ministerial candidates in votes of investiture, and for sitting prime ministers in votes of confidence and no confidence (Bergman 2003). This has, inter alia, two effects. First, it permits fairly stable minority governments. Second, these governments are likely to be run by the party with control of the ‘median legislator’, or the central seat in parliament on the left–right scale. This is because a majority alliance of the parties on either side of the median party is, in Sweden’s bloc-based party system, highly unlikely. The party in control of the median legislator has usually been the Social Democrats—one reason why they have dominated government so comprehensively. After the 1994 election, the Social Democrats needed support in parliament, and the following year they persuaded the Centre to cross bloc boundaries and agree to formal cooperation. After the 1998 election, the Social Democrats again needed support, and this time turned to the Left and the Greens. (Indeed, the Greens might even be said to have taken control of the median legislator from the Social Democrats.) This contract between the three parties, again falling short of coalition, was renewed after the 2002 election. The key point is that in none of these instances could the Eurosceptical support parties credibly threaten to bring down the government if their policy demands were not satisfied, because no alternative majority was plausible. The Left would not cooperate with the bourgeois parties in order to bring down a Social Democratic government.10 The worst it could realistically threaten was to withdraw cooperation, which would weaken the government, but not kill it. The Greens did, in fact, threaten to form a government with the middle bourgeois parties after the 2002 election. But basic policy differences—not least over the EU and EMU—made such an eventuality unlikely, and it did not happen (Aylott 2003: 4–5). Thus, the Social Democrats were in a sufficiently strong strategic position to refuse to allow the support parties into a governing coalition. It is true that the Prime Minister, Göran Persson identified European policy as a main reason why the Left and the Greens could not be admitted to government (GöteborgsPosten, 19 July 2002). The Swedish Constitution requires that the entire cabinet takes responsibility for all government policy, he argued.11 But, ultimately, he insisted on keeping power exclusively in his party’s hands not because of policy,

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but because the combination of bloc politics and negative parliamentarism meant, quite simply, that he could afford to.12 Understanding this basic reality, the two Hard Eurosceptical parties have had little incentive to risk internal controversy by compromising on their own European positions.

11.4 EUROSCEPTICISM, PARTY UNITY, AND LEADERSHIP Voters tend not to like divided parties, so maintaining party unity is an extremely important function of the leadership. Needless to say, balancing a party’s multiple and sometimes conflicting goals is never easy, and it becomes very difficult when the party is divided over an important issue. In such circumstances, the impact of individual leaders can be decisive. Leadership is, of course, a tricky variable to incorporate into analysis. Clear thinking and charisma, for example, are impossible to measure. But in this subsection, we consider the role of leaders in the Swedish parties’ positioning themselves vis-à-vis European integration, with special focus on EMU. We concentrate on the three more divided parties, in which conflicting incentives may have made the role of leadership especially important. Leaders of parties with internal opposition can choose either (a) to tolerate the dissidents, (b) to ignore them or (c) to marginalize them. The main, if not the only, determinant of which broad strategy the leadership adopts is the dissidents’ strength—and, if toleration is a reflection of their strength, the Eurosceptical dissidents in the Centre and Social Democratic parties have been pretty strong. Indicators of both party leaderships’ keenness to avoid confronting their Eurosceptical factions are numerous. Soon after the issue of EC membership arose in 1990, the Social Democratic leadership decided to appoint two party committees, one to advocate a ‘yes’ in the referendum, the other to back a ‘no’. Social Democrats Against the EC were permitted to fill the positions in the No committee, and all party members, from the grass roots up to cabinet ministers, were allowed to campaign for either side (Aylott 1997). Later, in the European election of 1995, the party ran two lists (with certain regional variations in each). On one list, pro-EU Social Democrats were prioritized; on the other, Eurosceptics occupied the higher places. The Centre tried the same tactic. It ran three lists, with one headed by its most prominent Eurosceptic and another by its most prominent supporter of European integration.13 (The party’s campaign slogan was a less than inspiring ‘Yes and no [nja] to Europe’.) For the 1999 European election, the Social Democratic leadership felt obliged to give an electable place on its list to Maj Britt Theorin, the leading sceptic among the party’s existing members of the European Parliament (MEPs). All these conciliatory measures served to maintain party unity in the Centre and the Social Democrats, but also to institutionalize and legitimize the Eurosceptics. The Christian Democratic leadership was less concerned with appeasing its dissidents.14 From the mid-1990s, then, the three divided parties developed differently in terms of both policy positioning, especially regarding EMU, and internal issue

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management. Why? If we start by looking at the more similar parties, the Centre and the Christian Democrats, more variables can be held constant and the explanatory variable may become clearer. After all, the two parties had plenty in common. Having lost power in 1994, these coalition partners had fewer officeseeking incentives to moderate their Euroscepticism, and, moreover, they had similar vote-seeking incentives to accentuate it. Why, then, did the two adopt such divergent EU strategies?15 Leadership may be the explanation for this difference. The Christian Democrats’ vote-maximizing strategy, in which the party’s appeal was broadened from its religious core, established them as a fixture in the party system, but it was far from inevitable. Nor was the decision to locate the party definitively in the bourgeois bloc. Credit for these strategies—and thus the authority to pull the party’s policy away from Euroscepticism—can probably be attributed to its leader of over thirty years, Alf Svensson, who was consistently shown to be one of Sweden’s most liked party leaders. Moreover, KALE has not found a well-known leading figure.16 In contrast, the Centre’s five leaders since 1979 have been under the constant pressure of overseeing the party’s vote dwindle for eight consecutive elections until a small upswing in 2002. Any leader under those circumstances would probably have been more vulnerable to pressures from the factions—and Centre No had the advantage of a well-known chair, Hans Lindqvist, who was also chair of the European Alliance of EU-Critical Movements (TEAM). His influence in the party probably reached its zenith in 1995, when he was elected to the European Parliament, and in 1996, when he and the then party leader jointly wrote a fiercely anti-EMU article (Johansson and Lindqvist 1996). The two subsequent party leaders have been less indulgent of the Eurosceptics. Indeed, the Centre’s national council relegated Lindqvist to third place on its 1999 European election list, which scuppered his chances of retaining his seat (Widfeldt 2000: 75). But the Centre’s opposition to EMU—albeit presented as contingent and on economic grounds, rather than as a point of ideological principle— remained. On the left, Social Democratic leaders had little option but to tolerate the party’s Eurosceptics. This was due partly to the sceptics’ numbers, but also to their association with the traditionalist wing of the party, which is still influential. Opponents of EU membership in 1994 were to be found mainly at the sub-elite level, but later there were plenty of Soft Eurosceptics in elevated party positions, even in the cabinet. Two ministers, Margareta Winberg and Marita Ulvskog, were prominent in the No campaign in 1994; they and three others, including Leif Pagrotsky, the trade minister, made their opposition to EMU clear before and after their party’s election victory in 2002. Thus, the Social Democratic strategy of toleration continued as Sweden began to contemplate a referendum on EMU. However, for whatever reason (cabinet responsibility, the party’s tradition of loyalty to its leader, lack of personal ambition), none of the party’s leading Eurosceptics sought to present him- or herself as the leader of a faction, never mind as a leadership challenger. The formation of Social Democrats Against EMU did push into a leadership role its chair, Sören Wibe, a university economist, a former MEP and, since 2002, an MP. He was a popular figure, at least on his

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own patch, in the north. But whether he or his group would want to campaign actively beyond the referendum on the euro in 2003 was unknown and perhaps unlikely. In fact, even as the Eurosceptics were tolerated, the Social Democratic leadership succeeded in moving the party towards an increasingly pro-European policy stance. The influence of Ingvar Carlsson, party leader for a decade from 1986, has been given much credit for changing Social Democrats’ views of integration (Gustavsson 1998: 193; Johansson 1999: 154). Persson replaced him as party leader and prime minister, and as late as 1997 he was sounding decidedly sceptical about EMU (Aylott 1999: 198–9). But, after a difficult start, he grew increasingly into his positions at the head of the party, of the government and, for six months in 2001, of the EU’s Council. By 2002, he was being called ‘President Persson’ in the media, so strongly had his authority become entrenched. It is far from implausible to suggest that his experience of politics at the EU level had had a socializing effect, erasing his previous doubts about the EU, and that Persson’s unchallenged authority in his party allowed him to pull it towards his policy preference. By the end of 2002, at least, it began to look as if Persson’s dominance in the Social Democrats was persuading him to lean towards ignoring rather than tolerating its Eurosceptics.17 Indeed, the party’s increasingly institutionalized connections with social democrats elsewhere, both through Nordic associations and the Party of European Socialists, may have had a similar socializing impact on a broader group at the top of the party. Something similar might be said of the Christian Democrats, despite confessional differences with their continental equivalents. By contrast, the Centre, in the absence of many agrarian-based parties in Europe, may have sought solace in international forums with Eurosceptics from different party families (Jerneck 1997: 151–3; also Johansson and Raunio 2001: 242).

11.5 CONCLUSIONS AND PROGNOSIS In this chapter, we have mapped the presence of Euroscepticism—Hard and Soft, prominent and marginal—in the Swedish party system. Clearly, antipathy towards either the EU in general, or to a significant component of European integration (such as EMU), finds considerable ventilation. Of the seven parties in parliament in 2003, two still officially wanted Sweden out of the EU. A third party was happy with EU membership, but, like the two Hard Eurosceptics, opposed Sweden’s participating in EMU. This party, plus two others, including the dominant one, have Eurosceptical factions. The identities of these parties broadly confirm hypotheses about party-family association and EU orientation (Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002: 587), though the Christian Democrats are more positive to the EU than that model predicts. Not surprisingly, given its generation on the basis of Scandinavian data, the politics-of-opposition model (Sitter 2001) also stands up. Neither model can capture the dynamics and nuances of changing ideological

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and strategic calculations in a particular case, however, never mind the impact of leadership in shaping party strategy. This is what has been attempted in this chapter. The basic reason for the relatively strong presence of Euroscepticism in the Swedish system is not mysterious. Despite big changes in their country’s international role and in their own society, Swedes remain deeply orientated towards the nation state. Considering the peace and prosperity that they have enjoyed over the last century (at least until harder economic times in recent decades), together with their much longer-established sense of national identity, their lack of enthusiasm for supranational institution-building is predictable. Moreover, and put crudely, left-leaning electors, who comprise well over half the total, are proud of their welfare state, and fear that engagement with countries that lack similar structures might pose a threat to what almost continuous labour-dominated government has achieved. The ‘no’ to EMU in the referendum of 2003, by 55.9 per cent to 42.0 per cent, was an expression of this lack of enthusiasm for supranational integration. But, as other cases show, the translation of such popular sentiment into partybased Euroscepticism is not automatic. I have reviewed the decisions that mainstream Swedish parties have made about how to position themselves on Europe in a way that balances the pursuit of different party goals. We saw that the ideological characters of the Left and the Centre parties have pulled them strongly in a Eurosceptical direction; that the Social Democrats have a similar but weaker inclination; and that the Christian Democrats and the Greens also have a Eurosceptical ideological tinge. We saw, too, that these ideological predispositions are visible in the parties’ supporters, with similar variations in intensity. This has offered plenty of vote-seeking incentives for the Left and the Greens, not least because they hope to attract some votes from the big pool of Social Democratic sympathizers. The same applies to the Centre, which has the added attraction of presenting itself as the one Eurosceptical bourgeois party. These electoral incentives should not be exaggerated, though. Outright opposition to EU membership has declined across the electorate and, in any case, Eurosceptical voting in second-order European elections is unlikely to be repeated to first-order national elections. I argued that incentives for Euroscepticism would have weakened considerably faster had it not been for the prevailing features of the party system and Swedish parliamentary democracy. The combination of negative parliamentarism, which gives minority governments the scope to survive stably, and the constraints of bloc politics, which have dissuaded the other parties from forming a government without the Social Democrats, allowed that party to retain its exclusive grip on power after 1994. This blunted the incentives for congenitally Eurosceptical parties to tone down their views in order to promote their suitability for governing coalitions. Conversely, the Social Democrats’ continuing domination of power has probably accentuated their leaders’ socialization into EU circles, and thus their inclination to pull their party towards a pro-integration position. In turn, this has provoked a reaction within the party, manifested in a Eurosceptical faction. Something similar has happened with the Christian Democrats, with a Eurosceptical faction standing up to its long-serving, vote- and office-seeking leadership.

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As a final comment, we may postulate that one other crucial factor has served to preserve Euroscepticism in the party systems. This is the strategy, adopted more or less by all the party leaders, of handling the EU issue through ‘compartmentalization’ (Aylott 2002b). It has two main components. The first is the resort to referendums to decide significant European questions. There was no legal requirement for a referendum on either EU or EMU membership.18 Rather, referendums have been used in Sweden largely as a tool of party management— that is, as a way of keeping together a governing party by passing on the issue over which it is divided to someone else (the electorate), and thus quarantining the issue from ‘normal’ electoral, parliamentary and intra-party politics. The second main component has been a tolerant approach to EU dissidents within the party, in which the norms of party unity and discipline are suspended. Again, this is designed to isolate the issue, and to prevent intra-party opposition on it from becoming a general challenge to the authority of the party leadership. The early cross-party acceptance, confirmed at the 2000 Social Democratic congress, that the euro would be subject to a referendum seemed to signal that Sweden—like Denmark, but unlike Finland, where the decision to join EMU was made in parliament alone—was establishing a norm of EU-related referendums, and continuing the strategy of compartmentalization. If such a norm does develop, it is bound to affect the presence of Euroscepticism in party politics. On one hand, the ‘hardness’ of the phenomenon is likely to decline further, for at least two reasons. First, even though referendums will weaken residual party loyalty even further, the confinement of European issues to this special compartment of the electoral arena should, in fact, make anti-EU platforms less electorally profitable for the Eurosceptical parties. For example, a voter could safely support a pro-EU party in a national election, knowing that this would not prevent him or her voting against integration come the referendum. Second, the EMU campaign gave the Eurosceptical parties a tactical reason to come to terms with the reality of EU membership. Once they had decided to prioritize their opposition to the euro, it made sense for them to stop being anti-EU altogether, for fear of scaring off voters who were wary of the single currency but who were resigned to or supportive of EU membership. By 2002, most representatives of even the Left and Green parties had stopped talking about a Swedish exit from the EU. On the other hand, compartmentalization may also preserve the vitality of the Eurosceptical intra-party factions. There is a strong tradition of party loyalty in most Swedish parties, particularly the Social Democrats. But unity and discipline become much harder for leaderships to demand on questions for which they have ‘abdicated’ responsibility (Lindström 1994: 72) by deferring to referendums. Members and activists understand that the whole point of accepting and rallying behind the party line—namely, to enhance the credibility of promises that the party makes to voters—disappears when the party passes decisions back to the electorate. In this case, there is little logical alternative to a party leadership tolerating, even legitimizing, a reasonable-sized Eurosceptical faction. The leaderships can only hope that such internal dissidence withers with time. That will surely be the case in Sweden regarding the EU membership, which, despite the ‘no’ to

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the euro in 2003, is now settled. But other, more contentious European issues— rebalancing the powers of states and institutions, security-policy integration and, above all, monetary union, which will surely reappear on the political agenda— could well keep a Softer Euroscepticism in business, within the three divided parties and across the party system. Swedish Eurosceptics, like their Danish and Norwegian counterparts, know now that referendums on integration can be won. NOTES 1. Many thanks to Magnus Blomgren and Svante Ersson for very useful comments on a draft of this chapter. However, responsibility for its content, including translations from Swedish-language sources, is mine alone. The analysis stops at the end of 2003. 2. A note is required about nomenclature. I refer to the EC in contexts before November 1993, when the Treaty on European Union came into force, and to the EU in contexts thereafter. Quite inconsistently with this approach, I use only the political parties’ modern names (in English), even when I discuss a historical period in which a party may have been called something else. I hope this strikes a reasonable balance between accuracy and clarity. 3. An economic rationale was provided by a state commission (see Calmfors et al. 1997). 4. One Moderate MP was expelled from the party for running his own Eurosceptical list in Sweden’s post-accession election to the European Parliament in 1995. 5. They are organized in the sense that they have designated executives, membership lists and websites. Hine (1982) might prefer the term ‘issue group’ instead of faction, as the group is motivated by a single issue. But, as far as Eurosceptical groups are concerned, the encroachment of the EU into so many policy fields arguably blurs this distinction between factions and issue groups. 6. This decision was confirmed by the party’s national council the following month. This, in turn, was the execution of authority delegated by a special party congress in March 2000, which had agreed to support EMU, subject to a referendum, once two conditions—the construction of counter-cyclical policy tools, and greater discipline in Swedish wage formation—had been satisfied. 7. Talk of common Eurosceptical lists in European elections, and even pan-Nordic coordination of Eurosceptical forces (Dagens Nyheter, 15 Nov. 1994), came to nothing. Otherwise, there has been only the odd attempt to set up more or less singleissue parties. A list of Free EU-Critics ran in the 1995 European election, but won just 0.69 per cent. New Future, founded and led by a fundamentalist former Christian Democrat, garnered 0.17 per cent in both the 1998 and 2002 national elections. 8. The Sweden Democrats can be compared ideologically to the French National Front (Lawson 2002). 9. Swedish trade unions are divided on Europe, with a clear (though not uniform) fault line running between those representing public-sector workers, such as the Municipal Workers’ Union (Sweden’s biggest), which tend to be Eurosceptical, and those representing workers in the private, export-orientated sector, such as the metal workers, which are keener on integration. The blue-collar confederation, LO, has been paralysed by this split: it took no position in the 1994 EU referendum, a decision that in spring 2003 it repeated vis-à-vis EMU. Thus, LO’s influence in the Social Democrats, which is often considerable, has been limited on European questions.

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10. In 1990 the Left did actually vote against a Social Democratic government in a vote of no confidence. But it was not prepared to see a bourgeois replacement. Within a week a new Social Democratic administration was formed. 11. EU policy was explicitly excluded from the deals on cooperation between the Left, the Greens and the Social Democrats in 1998 and 2002. 12. This rigidity in the party system can be contrasted with the situation in Finland, where cross-bloc coalitions have become common. Thus, office-seeking has become a real incentive for Finnish parties to downplay their Eurosceptical inclinations (Johansson and Raunio 2001: 235–41). 13. The multiple lists tactic was not repeated in the 1999 European election. The Social Democrats, at least, decided that it had not stemmed their large loss of support in 1995. The main reason, however, was that the introduction of preference voting allowed voters to favour pro- or anti-EU candidates on party lists, making different lists unnecessary. 14. By the end of 2002, Social Democrats Against EMU were tolerated to the extent that they were afforded a link on the party website, but they did not use the party server for their own pages. The situation between the Centre Party and its faction was the reverse. Neither privilege was extended to KALE by the Christian Democrats. 15. The Centre congress of 1996, its first with Sweden in the EU, confirmed the party’s opposition to EMU. In 2000, the Christian Democratic executive reversed its previous position and agreed to support EMU. 16. KALE’s chair was Leif Danielsson. The group was associated with an MEP, Lennart Sacrédeus, who did have more of public profile, having garnered enough personal votes in 1999 to elevate him to an electable position on the party list. 17. That changed in spring 2003, however. Six months before the referendum on EMU, and with opinion polls giving a big lead for the No side, Persson and other ministers tried unexpectedly to insist that party representatives in government desist from actively supporting Social Democrats Against EMU. 18. Even constitutional changes can be decided by parliament alone, as long as less than a third of its members do not insist on a referendum (Ruin 1996: 172).

12 Euroscepticism in Austrian Political Parties: Ideologically Rooted or Strategically Motivated? Franz Fallend

12.1 INTRODUCTION Austria belongs to those members of the European Union (EU) where enthusiasm for European integration is comparatively low. For example, in the spring 2002 Eurobarometer survey only 37 per cent of the Austrians declared EU membership to be a ‘good thing’ compared with an EU average of 53 per cent, with only UK having a lower level of diffuse Euro-enthusiasm (European Commission 2002a: 21, Fig. 3.1b). These figures confirmed a trend that has been visible in opinion polls ever since Austria’s accession to the EU in 1995; a majority of the people may be classified as Eurosceptics. Hence, the question arises of whether, to what extent, and in what ways have the political parties exploited this Euroscepticism to improve their chances in inter-party contestation? In the period since the end of the 1980s, when Austria applied for membership in the European Community (EC), Eurosceptic attitudes have, above all, been exhibited by the right-wing, populist Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) and, at least until the national referendum on Austria’s accession to the EU in 1994, by the Green Party (Grüne Alternative, GA). The formerly Eurosceptical position of the Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ) had already diminished, following a change of party leadership and strategy in the mid-1980s. The Christian Democratic People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP), on the other hand, can be described as the strongest pro-European party in the long run. This chapter examines the Eurosceptic positions of the major Austrian political parties since the 1980s. In order to get a more precise notion of the observable Euroscepticism, a distinction suggested by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002b: 7) is applied: with ‘Hard Eurosceptics’ being those parties who show ‘a principled opposition to the EU and European integration’, who ‘think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is

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currently conceived’. ‘Soft Euroscepticism’ on the other hand can be seen ‘where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that “national interest” is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory’. Following this line of reasoning, opposition to non-fundamental aspects of European integration will not be understood as evidence of Euroscepticism. Besides, it will be necessary to differentiate between Euroscepticism as a broad underlying, ‘ideological’ position and the simple use of ‘Europe’ as a useful issue in party contestation. As parties and their positions do change over time and as they are not usually homogenous entities the historical dimension as well as the intra-party perspective will be included where appropriate. I will start in Section 12.2 with an analytical framework that outlines the factors that are usually considered as possible causal explanations for party positioning in European matters. In Section 12.3 the specific national context, which further reduces the room for manoeuvre of political parties, is presented, in particular the major historical steps in the relationship between Austria and Europe, trends in public opinion, and the political salience of the ‘European’ issue. The major part of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the positions of the Austrian Eurosceptic parties. I begin by describing their general, programmatic direction (Section 12.4). In Section 12.5, the domestic debates in selected, controversial policy areas are depicted in order to show how the programmatic or strategic positions of the respective political parties are (or are not) transformed by interparty contestation. The conclusion (Section 12.6) will discuss the significance of the explanatory factors in the case of Austria. In addition to the secondary political science literature, this chapter draws on party programmes and election manifestos (for the 1996 and 1999 European Parliament (EP) elections) as primary source material.

12.2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: EXPLANATORY FACTORS In the political science literature, several independent variables have been identified to explain party responses to European integration. This section highlights five alternative, but not necessarily incompatible factors, which shall guide the subsequent empirical analysis of the Austrian case: (1) ideology, (2) position in the party system, (3) government participation (versus opposition), (4) public opinion, and (5) the stage of European integration.

12.2.1 Ideology According to one line of thought, political parties assimilate the new issue of European integration into their historically rooted ideologies. Social Democratic parties are, on the one hand, opposed to economic integration, which intensifies

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competition, privileges mobile capital over immobile labour, and threatens the national welfare state; on the other hand, they favour political integration, which offers the prospect of a kind of ‘Euro-Keynesianism’. Similarly, left-of-centre liberal radicals are in favour of political integration, whereas right-of-centre liberal conservatives prefer economic integration. Christian Democratic parties are, consistent with the anti-national bias of Catholicism, in general decidedly proEuropean. However, there is also a variant upholding national sovereignty and traditional values, which is less favourably oriented towards Europe (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002).1

12.2.2 Position in the party system Besides the left–right dimension of politics, the position of a party either inside the established circle of (usually governmental) parties or at the periphery of a party system also has to be considered. ‘Extreme’ parties, usually excluded from the ‘cartel’ of parties in the political centre (Katz and Mair 1995), share a Eurosceptic stance, whereas the centrist parties—including most Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, and liberal parties—are, in general, more supportive of European integration. New right parties, who perceive European integration as a threat to the national community and sovereignty, are by far the most radical Eurosceptic parties. They reject further political integration and favour at most an intergovernmental EU with the retention of the national veto. Green-alternative parties are driven more by specific policy goals; they strongly support a European environmental policy. Almost all of them have moderated their former Eurosceptic attitudes. However, their concern about the lack of democracy and transparency in the EU undermines their general support for European integration (Hix and Lord 1997; Taggart 1998; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002).

12.2.3 Opposition to government The explanatory approach that stresses the position in the party system is connected with another argument, namely that party-based Euroscepticism should be understood primarily in terms of a ‘politics of opposition’. Principled Euroscepticism is not expected to characterize centrist or cartel parties, as European integration is largely a government-driven process. However, when a mainstream party has to leave government and move to the opposition benches, internal dissent may intensify and push the party towards more criticism of pro-European government initiatives. On the other hand, in cases when former peripheral or protest parties move into the political mainstream and aspire to—or actually participate in—government, they will face a strategic dilemma. In other words, government participation and coalition politics are likely to soften their Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2000: 8; Sitter 2001: 26–7, 32–3).

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12.2.4 Public opinion Remarkably, public opinion is rather neglected as a decisive factor determining party positioning on Europe. Marks and Wilson (2000: 435) assume that most voters lack clear ideas as to where their interests lie in the case of European integration, so that party leaderships are relatively free to formulate their positions in a top-down manner. This view is contested by Johansson and Raunio (2001: 228–9), who believe that parties do have to pay respect to their core supporters and to interest groups associated with them. Nonetheless, it should not come as a surprise that in all EU member states, political elites are more in favour of European integration than the masses (Hix 1999b: 159, Table 5.6).

12.2.5 Stage of European integration Last, but not least, party-based Euroscepticism may depend on the stage that the European integration had reached at the time when that country entered the EC/EU. Parties may re-evaluate their position on European integration depending on whether they view the EC/EU as a threat to or as an opportunity for their interests. In particular, the Social Democratic parties in the ‘old’ member states have increasingly come to favour political integration, as the EU has come to wield authoritative powers in a range of policy areas relevant to them, above all social and cohesion policy. In the ‘new’ member states, on the other hand, Social Democratic parties have remained more sceptical for longer. In a similar way, the position of most Green parties has become more pro-European over time (Marks and Wilson 1999: 446; Johansson and Raunio 2001: 230).

12.3 THE NATIONAL CONTEXT: AUSTRIA’S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH EUROPE, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE POLITICAL SALIENCE OF THE EUROPEAN ISSUE Before the relevance of the five explanatory factors is investigated with reference to the Austrian case, the national context, which offers further indications for party positioning on the European issue, is explored. Three factors seem to be of primary importance here: (1) the history of Austria’s relations with Europe after 1945, (2) the development of public opinion towards ‘Europe’, and (3) the political salience of the European issue.

12.3.1 Austria’s rapprochement with Europe Austria’s relations with Europe after the end of the Second World War were, for a long period, restrained by external circumstances.2 After ten years of occupation by the Allied forces, Austria regained its national sovereignty on the condition

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that it would commit itself to a status of permanent neutrality following the Swiss model. Article 4 of the Independence Treaty (Staatsvertrag), signed on 15 May 1955, precluded any political or economic association (Anschluss) with Germany. On 26 October 1955 the Austrian Parliament adopted a constitutional law in which Austria declared ‘by its free will’ to remain permanently neutral. As membership in the EC, founded in 1957, was generally regarded as incompatible with neutrality, Austria looked for other alliances and became a founding member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. In 1972 Austria finally signed a free trade agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC), in spite of criticisms by the Soviet Union, the former occupation power. In the 1980s, the EEC’s Internal Market Programme, which promised significant prospects for economic development, revived the internal debate in Austria on a rapprochement with the EC. The Christian Democrats and the Freedom Party pressed for intensified cooperation. The crisis of the nationalized industries and the election of the former banker Franz Vranitzky as new party chairman also drove the Social Democrats to moderate their historical Euroscepticism. After international lawyers had declared EC membership to be compatible with Austrian neutrality, the path was cleared: a government report recommended membership under the conditions of upholding neutrality, federalism, the welfare state, environmental standards, small-scale agriculture, and a solution to the problem of truck transit through the Alpine regions. In 1989, the national Parliament mandated the government to apply for EC membership by a majority of 175 to 7 (only the Greens opposed the decision). From the beginning of 1993 onwards, Austria participated in the European Economic Area (EEA), which already required the implementation of about 60 per cent of EC law (acquis communautaire). Parliament passed the EEA treaty with the votes of the two governing coalition parties—the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats, while the two opposition parties—the Freedom Party and the Greens—voted against it. In the 1993–4 negotiations on EC membership, agriculture, the sale of land to foreigners, and vehicle transit proved to be the most controversial issues, whereas, surprisingly, the issue of neutrality did not really feature. As accession to the EC (now the EU) required a so-called basic revision of the federal constitution, a national referendum was obligatory. Amazingly, 66.6 per cent of the electorate voted ‘yes’ to EU membership in the referendum held on 12 June 1994. The expectation of economic advantages, a fear of being isolated, and a general advocacy of the European unity were the main reasons why people voted ‘yes’ (Plasser, Sommer, and Ulram 1995: 350).

12.3.2 Public opinion on the European Union The surprisingly high level of support for EU membership expressed in the 1994 referendum is generally attributed to the high consensus between and engagement in the ‘yes’ campaign demonstrated by the governing parties (together with the corporatist interest organizations, the so-called social partners). However, many people’s expectations were not fulfilled, so their initial positive feelings towards

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Franz Fallend Table 12.1. Support for EU membership,∗ 1995–2002 Year

1995 spring 1995 autumn 1996 spring 1996 autumn 1997 spring 1997 autumn 1998 spring 1998 autumn 1999 spring 1999 autumn 2000 spring 2000 autumn 2001 spring 2001 autumn 2002 spring 2002 autumn

Support in Austria (%)

Support in EU15 (average, %)

Rank of Austria among EU15

40 29 27 31 30 31 41 38 36 42 33 38 34 44 37 46

56 53 48 48 46 49 51 54 49 51 49 50 48 54 53 55

14 15 15 14 14 14 13 13 13 13 14 13 13 12 14 12

∗

People who think that EU membership is a ‘good thing’. Source: Eurobarometers 43–58 (www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion).

the EU began to fade away soon (Ulram 2002: 66–7). In fact, support for EU membership in Austria has been constantly lower than in most other member states (see Table 12.1).

12.3.3 The low salience of the ‘European’ issue A sceptical public opinion, though, does not imply that the issue of European integration necessarily plays a significant role in inter-party contestation. It appears that because membership came much later in Austria, more people seemed to pay attention to EU news than they do in the other EU15 countries (the spring 2002 figures are 84 and 69 per cent respectively; see European Commission 2002b: 11, Fig. 2.1.b). In spite of that, compared to other issues the salience of ‘Europe’ does not even reach mid-levels in Austria (Ulram 2002: 67). An opinion poll in spring 1996, a few months before the first Austrian elections to the EP, revealed that for 55 per cent of respondents national issues had a greater influence on their voting decision than European issues. At 67.7 per cent, voter turnout clearly exceeded the average of the EU12 (56.5 per cent) in 1994, but was far below the respective figure for the 1995 national parliamentary elections (86 per cent) (Plasser, Ulram, and Sommer 1997: 58, 60). During the next EP elections, held in 1999, interest decreased even further: this time only 49 per cent of the electorate went to the polls (almost the same as the EU15 average). This low level of voter turnout confirmed the usual characterization of EP elections as ‘second-order national

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Table 12.2. Parliamentary elections and governments in Austria, 1983–2002∗ Year of election 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 2002

Seats in Parliament∗∗

Votes (in %) GA

SPÖ

ÖVP

FPÖ

LF

GA

SPÖ

ÖVP

FPÖ

LF

— 4.8 4.8 7.3 4.8 7.4 9.5

47.7 43.1 42.8 34.9 38.1 33.2 36.5

43.2 41.3 32.1 27.7 28.3 26.9 42.3

5.0 9.7 16.6 22.5 21.9 26.9 10.0

— — — 6.0 5.5 — —

— 8 10 13 9 14 17

90 80 80 65 71 65 69

81 77 60 52 53 52 79

12 18 33 42 40 52 18

— — — 11 10 — —

∗

Only parties that won seats in parliament are included in the table. The parties are ordered along the left–right dimension, which is the one that primarily structures party competition (Müller 2000: 87). ∗∗ The figures in bold indicate the parties represented in government. Parties FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria) GA Grüne Alternative (Green Alternative) LF Liberales Forum (Liberal Forum) ÖVP Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People’s Party) SPÖ Sozialistische/Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Socialist/Social Democratic Party of Austria)

contests’ (cf. Hix 1999b: 180). As such, they offered a good opportunity for voters to settle accounts with the governing parties (Plasser, Seeber, and Ulram 2000: 100). Therefore, in line with trends in other EU member states, the opposition parties received a higher share of the votes in the 1996 EP election compared to the national parliamentary election of 1995: the Freedom Party vote rose from 21.9 to 27.5 per cent, while the Greens went up from 4.8 to 6.8 per cent. In 1999, the Freedom Party put all its efforts into the national parliamentary elections due in the same year; so its vote fell to 23.4 per cent, while the Greens won 9.3 per cent.

12.4 EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE AUSTRIAN PARTY SYSTEM In Section 12.3 we have seen that the Austrians are less Europhile than the populations of other EU member states. The questions, therefore, arise of whether, to what extent, and in which way Austrian political parties have attempted to use this popular Euroscepticism for their own purposes? Table 12.2 shows the results of the general elections, and the composition of governments, in the period 1983–2002. At first sight, it is striking that the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats—that is, the two parties which are located in the political centre, have been represented in government for most of the period, and who have adhered to pro-European positions—have, all in all, lost a significant number of votes and seats (at least until 2002, and with the minor exception of the 1995 elections). In contrast to this, the combined share

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of votes and seats of the peripheral or opposition parties, the Freedom Party and the Greens, who have (at least temporarily) attacked the EC/EU and the government’s pro-European policies, has increased steadily.3 However, the low salience of ‘Europe’ in inter-party contestation (as discussed earlier) makes it impossible to regard the European issue as the or even a major explanatory factor for these changes in party electoral strengths. Let us now take a closer look at the degree and forms of Euroscepticism of the Austrian parties. The Christian Democrats are not included in the following account for the obvious reason that since the 1960s they have built up an image as the ‘European party’ of Austria (Schaller 1997: 54–6; Pollak and Slominski 2002: 181). Currently, only the Freedom Party may be classified as a Eurosceptic party (whether it is ‘Hard’ or ‘Soft’ is more difficult to say, though), so the major part of this section will be reserved for this grouping. The Social Democrats and the Greens, on the other hand, have only become clearly ‘pro-European’ in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively; so they will be discussed first.

12.4.1 The Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) The Social Democrats were for a long time a predominantly Eurosceptic party. Party Chairman Bruno Pittermann (1957–67) perceived the EEC as a ‘project of cartel capitalism’ (Hehemann 1993: 341–2). Besides the neutrality problem, protectionist interests (in favour of nationalized industries and a regulated labour market) inhibited an opening up of the party towards Europe. This Euroscepticism was somewhat moderated in the 1970s (with the signing of a Free Trade Agreement with the EC by a Social Democratic one-party government in 1972), but was only finally overcome in the 1980s when a ‘modernization’ wing, led by the new (since 1986) Party Chairman and Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, came to power. The party had lost its absolute majority in the 1983 elections, owing to declining trust in its economic policy. The turn to the EC can be interpreted as party strategy to regain economic credibility; the EC was portrayed as a potential ally in the fight for international competitiveness, against ‘protected’ structures in the economy as well as against intra-party veto players (particularly the trade unions). In 1989, the Social Democrats supported the decision to apply for EC membership (Schaller 1997: 54–7) and campaigned for a ‘yes’ vote in the 1994 referendum, with 73 per cent of the party sympathizers following their leaders (Plasser, Sommer, and Ulram 1995: 346). Like their counterparts in the other new member states, Finland and Sweden, the Austrian Social Democrats became strong supporters of deeper European integration in the 1990s, which points to the relevance of the argument that the stage of integration that the EU had reached when the country joined is an important explanatory variable for party Euroscepticism. This did not rule out a kind of Soft Euroscepticism in the sense that the Social Democrats demanded the establishment of a ‘social Union’, which should pursue an active employment policy in their new 1998 party programme4 and in the 1996 and 1999 EP elections (Fallend 1997: 318; 2000:

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326). The Social Democrats’ preference for more EU competencies in the political field (as a reaction to its predominantly economic character) corresponds to the broader ideological dilemma that Social Democratic parties face with respect to European integration.

12.4.2 The Greens The Green Party, which entered the national parliament in 1986, was the only party (besides the Communists) opposing EC membership in the 1980s. All the members of the party’s parliamentary group (except one) voted against handing over the Austrian letter of application in 1989. In the same year the party passed a European manifesto titled ‘Yes to Europe—No to the EC’, in which the internal market was condemned as a project sacrificing all social and environmental concerns and argued that EC accession would have terrible consequences for democracy (Pollak and Slominski 2002: 179, 181). A party congress held in May 1994 confirmed that the Greens supported European integration, but rejected the ‘Maastricht Europe’; 87 per cent of the delegates approved a resolution which recommended a ‘no’ vote in the referendum. They argued against: the ‘fortress Europe’, the dominance of the agricultural industry and ‘dirty growth’—and regarded the negotiated treaty as ‘treason’ and a betrayal of national interests. A small minority, including one member of parliament (MP) and a town councillor from Vienna, dared to articulate a different opinion, which led to heavy intraparty criticisms (Schaller 1994b: 56, 81–2). Finally, 62 per cent of the party’s supporters voted against EU membership in the referendum (Plasser, Sommer, and Ulram 1995: 346). Confronted with the overwhelmingly pro-EU vote, the party made a remarkable shift in policy and immediately committed its parliamentary group to agree to the accession treaty. The clear result was interpreted as a mandate of the people binding not only upon the government, but also the opposition. The option to change the EU from outside did not exist any more. Instead, the new option was to struggle for Green interests from within (see Voggenhuber 1995: 404–6). The majority of Green MPs followed this recommendation; only one MP voted against the ratification, with two abstaining (Pollak and Slominski 2002: 182, 195, note 11). The Greens’ support was secured more easily because, at their demand, the Austrian Parliament was bestowed with extensive information and co-decision rights in EU affairs (Dolezal and Müller 2001: 483–90). This was important because the consent of the Greens was necessary for any constitutional amendment after the coalition of Social and Christian Democrats had lost its twothirds majority in the 1994 elections. The new party programme of 2001 reaffirmed this new approach: ‘The Greens respect the vote of the Austrians to enter the European Union, without giving up their criticisms regarding the predominantly economic orientation and the insufficiently democratic constitution of the EU.’ As a response, the Greens demanded that European Monetary Union should be expanded to include binding social and employment criteria and the reduction of the dominance of the national

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governments in the EU law-making process by enhancing the position of the EP.5 In line with this, the Greens launched a heavy onslaught on the EU in their campaign for the 1996 EP elections. They criticized its unrestricted economic neo-liberalism and the socially devastating European Monetary Union, and argued strongly for decentralizing and democratizing the EU. In 1999, their slogans were similar although they also campaigned for: a European social union, neutrality, an immediate enlargement of the EU, greater accountability, and, of course, environmental protection (Fallend 1997: 318; 2000: 326). So the Greens, formerly ‘Eurosceptics’ like the Social Democrats, gradually became supporters of European integration—in so far as the EU becomes more democratic and its provisions are extended to social and environmental aspects. Once again, the stage of European integration that has been reached seems to be an important explanatory variable, while the ‘opposition logic’ was discarded, as the party’s proEuropean turn after it ‘lost’ the 1994 referendum clearly demonstrates.

12.4.3 The Freedom Party (FPÖ) Until 1991–2, the Freedom Party was clearly in favour of European integration. Its predecessor party, the ‘League of Independents’ (Verband der Unabhängigen, VdU), which was founded in 1949 as a collecting point for German Nationals, had previously seen the integration of Austria into Europe as a compensation for the impossibility of Anschluss with Germany. Consequently, the Independents opposed the declaration of neutrality in 1955. The Freedom Party, founded in the same year, continued this course and mounted a noisy opposition against the decision of the ‘grand’ coalition government of People’s Party and Social Democrats to join the EFTA in 1960 (Riedlsperger 1998: 32). From 1955 onwards, the Freedom Party constantly promoted full EC membership. The party supported the 1972 Free Trade Agreement with the EC, but only as a first step towards more integration (Pollak and Slominski 2002: 180). The party’s pro-European stance was still continued in the first years after Jörg Haider had been elected as party chairman in 1986 and transformed the Freedom Party into a populist protest party with unclear boundaries to the extreme right. In 1987, the Freedom Party parliamentary group urged the government to start accession talks with the EC as soon as possible. The Freedom Party also supported the application for EC membership in 1989. Only in 1991/2 did Haider begin to use the European issue in order to blackmail the government coalition parties. He declared that the Freedom Party would only back their decision to enter the EC/EU if they did their ‘homework’ (Hausaufgaben) properly. This reorientation of the party was less motivated by ideology, but rather by strategic reasons. In 1991, following his notorious comment on the ‘proper employment policy of the Third Reich’, Haider was removed from his office as Provincial Governor (Landeshauptmann) of Carinthia by a no-confidence vote passed by the Social Democrats and People’s Party. As a consequence, he moved to Vienna to take over the chairmanship of his party’s parliamentary group in the national parliament

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(replacing a declared pro-European MP). As opposition leader, of course, he picked up the important questions of Austrian politics at the national level and the most important of these was EC/EU membership. Realistically, one could not expect that the Freedom Party would back the government on such an important matter. It had been treated as a pariah by Social Democrats, Greens, and Liberals, but also by large segments within the Christian Democrats, and had been excluded from the coalition game ever since 1986. Simultaneously, Haider sensed that opposition to EC/EU could improve support for his party among the electorate, which was largely insecure about what EC/EU membership would bring in the future (Reiter 1995: 436–40). Therefore, the (new) stance of the Freedom Party in European matters after 1991/2 may be explained less by an ideological repositioning, but by a deliberate strategy to look ‘different’ from the governing ‘old parties’ (Altparteien) or cartel parties (Müller 2002: 156). With its new anti-European position, however, the party aggravated its political exclusion even further (Khol 1996; Müller 2002: 173–4). In an attempt to reconcile its new orientation with its traditional pro-European stance, the party proclaimed that it was not against the goal of European integration as such, but only its form as ‘Maastricht Europe’ established in 1993 (Reiter 1995: 439). Two months before the referendum on EU membership, the Foreign Minister (from the People’s Party) and the State Secretary for European Affairs (from the Social Democrats) were invited to a Freedom Party congress in April 1994. Not surprisingly, they were not able to convince the party delegates, 85.5 per cent of whom supported a proposal submitted by Chairman Haider to instruct the party’s MPs to vote against EU membership. After the congress the Freedom Party engaged in a vigorous campaign (‘against 70,000 additional unemployed’, ‘voting rights for foreigners’, ‘unlimited criminality’, the ‘transit hell’, and the like), not hesitating to use increasingly implausible arguments (e.g. Haider warned of lice in Spanish yogurts). As a consequence, several Freedom Party politicians opposed the official line (Schaller 1994b: 56–8, 80–1). The split going through the party was highlighted by the fact that only 59 per cent of the party’s sympathizers followed the ‘no’ recommendation in the referendum (Plasser, Sommer, and Ulram 1995: 346). Over the years, the Freedom Party’s position towards European integration became increasingly negative. The new party programme, passed in 1997,6 is based on the principle of ‘Austria first’ (the explicit title of Chapter III). Article 4 of Chapter III reads: ‘We reject the politics that ends in—especially since Austria’s entry into the EU—massive efforts to standardize and level down, to the detriment of Austria’s intellectual and cultural substance.’ Chapter VI (titled ‘Europe—a common destiny’) includes the following statement: The term ‘Europe’ cannot be reduced to a mere geographic concept nor to the supranational organization of the European Union. . . . Europe’s wealth lies in its diversity of peoples and ethnic groups. The Christian, western community of values assigns the freedom of the individual and the freedom of the peoples a particularly high position (higher than that of other cultures).

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And: ‘The European Union is just a part of the European reality. The European Union shall not become a European federal state but a confederation.’ When Austrian MPs were asked in 1997/8 how much they trusted that the EU decisions are taken in the interest of their country, 70 per cent of the members of the Freedom Party answered they have ‘rather little’ trust, and 30 per cent they have ‘none at all’ (Dolezal and Müller 2001: 509, Table 11.24).7 The Freedom Party parliamentary group had obviously internalized its chairman’s anti-EU position. Yet the party’s MPs also showed the highest mean deviations of all parties regarding the actual issues arising from European integration, indicating that not all of them had taken the implications of the party’s policy full on board (Müller, Philipp, and Jenny 2001: 210, Table 5.6). In its electoral campaigns the Freedom Party connected the European issue openly to the issue of ‘over-foreignization’ (Überfremdung) and immigrant criminality (Luther 2001). In the 1996 EP campaign, the party concentrated on the same issues as the Greens (Fallend 1997: 318). In 1999, the party’s campaign focused on control and accountability; the Freedom Party proclaimed to be the only party that would protect Austrian interests, particularly in the face of the prospective enlargement of the EU to include East European countries (Fallend 2000: 326). As a result of the party’s critical stance towards the EU, 50 per cent of all the voters who thought joining the EU had been a wrong decision voted for the Freedom Party in 1996 (the number went down to 41 per cent in 1999) (Plasser, Seeber, and Ulram 2000: 103, Table 26). Somewhat paradoxically, the ‘new’ Freedom Party’s Eurosceptic attitude seemed to find justification in the reaction of the other EU member states to the formation of the centre-right coalition in Austria between People’s Party and the ‘Freedomites’ in February 2000. The other member states imposed unfriendly diplomatic measures (referred to as ‘sanctions’ in the Austrian national debate) on the new government, lowering bilateral contacts to a technical level, as long as the Freedom Party participated in government or did not change its nature. As the ‘sanctions’ had a fragile basis—no breach of common European values could reasonably be claimed before the government had even started to work— they increased the solidarity between the governing parties, who used them to stir up nationalistic feelings against foreign interference and disrespect for a democratically legitimated government. However, the coalition parties’ attempt to form a ‘national’ alliance against the ‘undemocratic’ EU14 failed because the Social Democrats and Greens refused to join, and were reproached of being ‘disloyal’ to Austria. After three ‘wise men’ had evaluated the situation and come to the conclusion that the Austrian government, including the ministers from the Freedom Party, was committed to common European values, and that the ‘sanctions’ had become counterproductive (see Report 2000), they were lifted (Falkner 2001a; Fallend 2001; Merlingen, Mudde, and Sedelmeier 2001). The opposition parties welcomed the decision, longing for the ‘comeback of domestic politics’. It is not easy to classify the current Freedom Party along the definitions of Hard versus Soft Euroscepticism as proposed by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002b; cf. Section 12.1). On the one hand, the anti-EU reorientation at the beginning

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of the 1990s was chiefly motivated by strategic considerations in the context of the government–opposition confrontation; and the party does not demand a withdrawal from the EU. On the other hand, it rejects enlargement of the EU in the near future which, in a strict sense, might be interpreted as ‘being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived’. The picture is further complicated by the fact that all the parties’ electorates are divided on the issue of European integration; the number of voters with negative attitudes towards Europe is considerably higher than the share of Freedom Party voters alone (Müller 2002: 166). The great test for the ‘European’ character of the Freedom Party came with the preparations for the enlargement of the EU, which intensified at a time when the Freedom Party was in government (see Section 12.5).

12.5 MAJOR ISSUES OF PARTY CONTESTATION ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS Sections 12.5.1 and 12.5.2 contain a more thorough analysis of two European issues with high salience in domestic party contestation during the last few years: security policy and the enlargement of the EU. The aim of these sections is to demonstrate more accurately how the general positions of the parties on Europe, which have been described in Section 12.4, are translated into debates and conflicts over specific issues.8

12.5.1 Issue 1: Neutrality versus Common Foreign and Security Policy For a long period, Austria’s status of neutrality and membership of the EC were regarded as incompatible.9 One would have expected this to be the case even more after the EC/EU member states agreed to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. Indeed, Austria was the only applicant country to include a reservation clause relating to neutrality (Sweden and Finland, which could also have referred to a tradition of non-alignment, had not done so). In the 1993/4 membership negotiations, the EU contested the Austrian reservations fearing that permanent neutrality could jeopardize the CFSP. Hence, it came as a great surprise that the security ‘chapter’ was actually closed very quickly. The reason for this was that the Austrian negotiators had reduced the concept to its military core: not participating in wars, not entering military alliances, and not allowing foreign military bases on Austrian territory. This fundamental reinterpretation of neutrality enabled the Austrian representatives to sign a declaration that, from the time of accession, their country would be ready and able to participate fully and actively in the CFSP (Luif 1995: 304–12). It was the People’s Party and the Freedom Party, in particular, who had pressed for this reinterpretation of neutrality (Schaller 1997: 57). At the same time, the opinion polls showed that the majority of the Austrian people still wanted the country to remain neutral—although the results seemed

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very much to depend on the wording of the question (Giller 1996: 458). In October 1998, for example, only 32 per cent of the Austrians judged neutrality to be anachronistic, and as many as 73 per cent rejected joining North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Fallend 1999: 333). The Social Democrats and the Greens relied on the widespread support for neutrality and argued in favour of preserving it in their 1996 EP election campaigns. The Greens argued that the EU’s security policy was too restricted to categories of military power and armaments; they even wanted to dissolve the NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). Interestingly, the Freedom Party actually preferred to join NATO (Fallend 1997: 318). Its position on security policy, thus, stands in contrast to the common allegation that the party only picks up popular issues; the new party programme (1997) likewise demands full membership of NATO and the WEU (Luif 2001: 152). These conflicts lingered on. In spring 1998, just before Austria was due to take over the EU presidency, the coalition parties, the Social and Christian Democrats, were unable to reach an agreement upon an ‘options report’ about Austria’s future security policy. While the Christian Democrats advocated an intensive dialogue with the ultimate goal of joining NATO, the Social Democrats wanted Austria to stay neutral and suggested building up a European security organization within the United Nations (UN) or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). At most, they wanted to take part in NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’ programme (Luif 2001: 145–6). The opposition parties and Federal President Thomas Klestil criticized the government’s confusing security policy and called for a referendum on the issue. The debate started anew when in June 1998 the Austrian Parliament ratified the Treaty of Amsterdam, which enables the EU (i.e. the WEU, using NATO resources) to carry out humanitarian tasks including peace-enforcing operations without a UN mandate. The treaty was ratified with the votes of the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Liberals, while the Freedom Party and the Greens voted against it (Luif 2001: 144–5). The opposition denounced this virtual, but unofficial, abolition of neutrality and especially the hypocritical position of the Social Democrats, who had offered assurances that Austria would still be neutral and only participate in operations with a UN or OSCE mandate (Fallend 1999: 333). In spite of these criticisms, the Social Democrats, profiting from the tarnished NATO image after the Kosovo war and the rising public support for neutrality, once again made security policy the core issue of their 1999 EP election campaign. In line with their new party programme (1998),10 they argued for the development of a flexible ‘European security structure under the conditions of Austrian neutrality’. They saw the future of neutrality in measures of peaceful conflict mediation, early warning, and cooperation. A similar concept was proposed by the Greens.11 Both parties vehemently attacked the People’s Party and its minister of defence for allegedly preparing Austria’s membership of NATO. Once more, the other parties reproached the Social Democrats for their ‘neutrality lie’, that is, for defending neutrality for populist reasons at home but going along with all the EU’s moves towards CFSP in Brussels (Fallend 2000: 326). Hence, the government prohibited transit flights of NATO planes across Austrian territory, as the NATO

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had started bombing in Kosovo and Serbia in 1998 without a mandate by the UN Security Council. At the same time, however, Chancellor and Social Democratic Party Chairman Viktor Klima supported an EU Summit statement that ‘the use of severest measures, including military action’ had been ‘both necessary and warranted’.12 Austria’s behaviour during the Kosovo war prompted strong criticisms from other countries and international newspapers: it was accused of acting like a ‘free rider’, equipped with an effective veto on European security policy (Luif 2001: 149–51). This section has demonstrated the relevance of public opinion for party positioning in European affairs. The positions of both the Social Democrats and Greens regarding security policy seem to have been determined, to a great degree, by populist considerations. Although neutrality has obviously lost some of its sense after the end of the cold war, both parties still defend it; yet, they are unable to present convincing alternative security concepts outside the WEU (i.e. EU) or NATO contexts. The position of the Social Democrats contrasts with the expected pro-EU commitment of mainstream parties; it can be explained by the still existing adoration for the ‘active neutrality policy’ of former Chancellor and Party Chairman Bruno Kreisky in the 1970s. Equally surprising is the fact that the Freedom Party has not taken a populist stance, in the case of security policy by fighting for upholding neutrality, but rather preferred for Austria to join the WEU and NATO.

12.5.2 Issue 2: Sponsoring or blocking eastward enlargement of the EU? Before the negotiations with the Central Eastern European (CEE) states over accession to the EU started, Austrian representatives had always declared their support for the unification of Europe. They had announced over and over again that their country, because of its traditional relations with its neighbours since the days of the monarchy, could play a major role in this process. Moreover, the Austrian Institute of Economic Research assured that all in all Austria would profit more from EU enlargement. When looking at the domestic debate concerning EU enlargement, therefore, one is surprised to notice that reluctant or even negative comments prevail. Once again, one feels tempted to believe that the parties echo the predominant feelings among Austrians, who have been less convinced of the advantages of enlargement than people in most other EU member states (see Table 12.3). The Greens have struggled most intensively for the immediate admission of the CEE countries to the EU, which is seen as ‘a historic step to overcome the separation of Europe’. According to their new party programme only human rights and democracy should be regarded as indispensable preconditions for accession.13 At the same time, the Greens warned in their manifesto for the 1999 EP elections that eastward enlargement must not be misused for more deregulation, or social and environmental dumping in the CEE countries. Instead, they called for a ‘Marshall plan’ to help the CEE countries to increase their social and environmental

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1998 spring 1998 autumn 1999 spring 1999 autumn 2000 spring 2000 autumn 2001 spring 2001 autumn 2002 spring

Support in Austria (%)

Support in EU15 (average, %)

Rank of Austria among EU15

33 30 29 35 30 32 33 46 36

44 42 42 43 38 44 43 51 39

14 14 15 14 14 15 15 13 13

Source: Eurobarometers 49–57 (www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion).

standards. Transitional regulations in these areas should not exceed seven years, they argued. The Social Democrats had to take into account the position of the powerful Trade Union Congress (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, ÖGB), which is officially independent, but actually dominated by the Social Democratic faction. In 1999, the Federal Congress of the Trade Union passed a resolution saying that the CEE countries could only be accepted for EU membership after their income had reached 80 per cent of the EU level (which would have delayed accession for 20 years or more). Moreover, 42,000 immigrant workers were expected after accession. On several occasions, the president of the Trade Union Congress argued that the concerns of Austrian employees should be treated ‘seriously’; otherwise, the greatest peace and stability project undertaken on the European continent would fail.14 Following the same line of reasoning, the new Social Democratic party programme (1998) affirmed that EU enlargement ‘must be forthcoming step by step, after careful preparation and a period of approximation of the social and environmental standards’.15 The Freedom Party has traditionally expressed the most extensive reservations against EU enlargement. In a survey carried out in 1997/8 among national MPs, Freedom Party deputies proved significantly more critical towards EU enlargement than MPs from the other parties.16 Yet, the preamble to the coalition agreement, which the party chairmen of the Christian Democrats (Wolfgang Schüssel) and the Freedom Party (Jörg Haider) had to sign before the new government was sworn in by Federal President Thomas Klestil in February 2000, contained an unambiguous commitment to EU enlargement. However, as the prospect of eastward enlargement grew imminent, the Freedom Party, who had suffered electoral losses in several provincial elections held since February 2000, reactivated its populist roots from opposition times. In particular, they attempted to argue that the Temelin nuclear power plant near the Czech– Austrian border was a threat to the safety of the Austrian people. In spite of the fact that the Austrian representatives in the EU negotiations with the Czech Republic

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had agreed to close the energy chapter, the Freedom Party stipulated that the plant be shut down. Otherwise, they argued, the Austrian government should veto the Czech Republic’s entry into the EU. The Freedom Party was driven primarily by former party chairman Haider, who had resigned in April 2000 (obviously in order to take pressure off the new government), but still wielded considerable influence over the party as charismatic leader and Provincial Governor of Carinthia. Knowing that many Austrians viewed EU enlargement quite sceptically, the Freedom Party started a people’s initiative (Volksbegehren), with the aim of introducing a law that would oblige the government to veto the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU as long as the nuclear power plant was still running. The Freedom Party’s policy put its coalition partner, the Christian Democrats, and the coalition government under stress. The Christian Democrats had always stressed the historic dimension of, and their support for, EU enlargement and rejected the idea of using a people’s initiative to exert pressure on a foreign government. Nevertheless, the Christian Democratic party leadership assisted the Freedom Party in stating that the energy chapter should be reopened in case the Czech government should not fulfil its obligations concerning safety standards as laid down in an agreement between the EU Commission and the Czech and Austrian governments. In January 2002, 15.5 per cent of the electorate (exactly 914,973 people) signed the initiative. Immediately afterwards, the Freedom Party, stepping down from its original promise to strictly implement the ‘mandate’ of the people, announced that it would be satisfied with a legally binding commitment from the Czech government to close down Temelin in the near future. On the other hand, it added that it would insist on the so-called Benes decrees (sanctioning the expulsion and expropriation of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia after 1945) to be lifted before the Czech Republic could join the EU. The opposition parties were not able to make much out of the difficulties that the coalition parties had in finding a common position on the Temelin issue. Both were of the opinion that the government had compromised too much in the negotiations with the Czech government on the energy chapter; however, they condemned any veto policy and opposed the Freedom Party’s initiative. Alexander van der Bellen, chairman of the Green party, called it ‘totally the wrong instrument to reach the right goal’ (The Guardian, 16 January 2002). Chancellor Schüssel clearly stated that for the Christian Democrats EU enlargement would be more important than coalition maintenance. The issues of EU enlargement and Temelin/Benes were partly responsible for the intra-party conflicts in the Freedom Party which finally led to the breakdown of the centre-right coalition in September 2002. Haider and other party representatives had opposed the pragmatic course of the new Party Chairwoman and Vice-Chancellor Susanne Riess-Passer, who had agreed with the Christian Democrats to postpone the promised tax reform and to proceed with EU enlargement. Riess-Passer, together with the Freedom Party-nominated finance minister and the chairman of the Party’s parliamentary group resigned, whereupon Chancellor Schüssel called for premature elections. The (rest of the) Freedom Party kept the issues of the Temelin power plant and the Benes decrees on

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the agenda during the election campaign. Without success, though: the Christian Democrats, who tried to convince the voters to see also the chances (and not only the risks) of EU enlargement and resolved to solve the problems of Temelin and Benes by diplomatic means, won an impressive victory at the cost of the Freedom Party. In the end, Chancellor Schüssel approved the decision of the European Summit in Copenhagen on 12–13 December 2002 to open the EU’s doors to ten new members, including the Czech Republic, without using his veto power (although the problems of Temelin and Benes are still unresolved from the Austrian perspective). Like the neutrality issue, the issue of EU enlargement confirms the importance of public opinion for party positioning in European affairs. Many Austrians have feared negative effects from the accession of CEE countries which had considerably lower economic, social, and environmental standards compared to their country. Correspondingly, all Austrian parties have favoured transitional periods for sensitive areas, such as access to the labour market for workers from CEE countries. However, the methods the parties have used to pursue national interests have differed greatly. The Freedom Party has gone as far as threatening to veto the historic EU enlargement in the event that they should consider Austrian interests to have been neglected. This has been consistent with its character as a ‘new right’ or protest party since 1986; although, it has hardly fitted with its role as government party since 2000. The coalition with the Christian Democrats has moderated the party’s Euroscepticism, but only in so far as the governmental team has been concerned. The party ‘base’ has grown increasingly discontented with the government’s EU policies, which have been criticized as being not radical enough. Thus, the issue of EU enlargement offers evidence for the relevance of both the ‘position in the party system’ approach (‘extreme’ parties of the right are especially anti-EU) and the ‘moderating effect of government participation’ approach (although showing its limits at the same time). The example of EU enlargement also illustrates the way the Greens have moved with respect to European integration. While they have upheld their scepticism regarding the dominating economic character of the EU, they have wholeheartedly supported the goal of uniting Europe under the EU umbrella. In the case of the Temelin nuclear power plant, they have resisted playing the veto card, although, as an opposition party, they would not have risked very much by doing so. Yet, several NGOs have reproached them for betraying ‘green’ principles if they do not envisage all the possible methods that are available to them to achieve their objectives.

12.6 CONCLUSIONS Let us now compare the empirical evidence of the Austrian parties’ positions on EU affairs, presented in Sections 12.4 and 12.5, with the five explanatory factors, listed in Section 12.2.

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(1) Ideology certainly plays a dominant role in party positioning, at least as far as the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats are concerned. The Christian Democratic People’s Party has always supported European integration, mainly its economic dimension. The Social Democrats have come to favour European integration in the light of the declining scope for action of the national welfare state and, at the same time, press for deeper integration to create a ‘social Union’. In a similar way, the Greens have moderated their former Eurosceptical stance and now demand an effective environmental policy at the EU level. (2) Before 1986, when Jörg Haider was elected party chairman and started to transform the party into a populist protest party, the position of the Freedom Party with regard to Europe could also be explained by ideology, that is, by the party’s liberalism in economic matters. Since 1986, the position in the party system, that is the position as an anti-establishment or ‘anti-cartel’ party, seems to have greater explanatory power. The Freedom Party has amply used the European issue to accuse the former coalition parties, the Social and the Christian Democrats, of betraying their nation. The approaching eastward enlargement of the EU was particularly well suited for the purposes of the Freedom Party to present itself as the only party that listens to the people and takes their concerns seriously. Admittedly, the issue of neutrality disturbs the picture: here the Freedom Party has not acted in accordance with the will of the majority of the people, but has demanded that Austria join NATO. (3) Whether government participation softens the attitude of Eurosceptic parties cannot be answered easily. The Social Democrats have moved towards a more proEuropean stance less as a result of government participation than as a consequence of the economic problems of the nationalized industries. The Greens did so (albeit to a lesser degree) without participating in government; the prospect of implementing environmental regulations at the EU level seems to have been decisive for them. As far as the Freedom Party is concerned, which entered the government in February 2000, experience seems to tell us that transformation from a right-wing populist party into a government party having to take over responsibility for unpopular decisions (e.g. EU enlargement) is very difficult, if not impossible. (4) Public opinion has played a significant role in shaping party positions on European matters. This holds true for the policy of neutrality, which is still widely valued among the population as whole and which is, therefore, (at least in part) upheld by the Social Democrats and the Greens. And it also holds true for the issue of EU enlargement, where parties can earn cheap political gains by exploiting the widespread fears of the people. (5) As European integration grows to encompass many policy fields and has moved beyond mere economic integration, the stage of European integration that has been reached also influences party positions. While Christian Democrats seem to be satisfied overall with the degree of economic integration and do not want further policy areas, such as employment or environmental policies, to become

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further integrated, the Social Democrats and the Greens hope that exactly this might happen in the near future. NOTES 1. The general arguments presented by Marks and Wilson (2000) and Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002) here and in the following paragraphs seem plausible, although it is doubtful whether the methodology they used to test their propositions (statistical analysis based on expert surveys) is fully reliable. 2. For accounts of Austria’s path towards European integration see Gehler and Steininger (1993), Schaller (1994a, 1997), and Falkner (2001b). 3. I am ignoring the Liberals who split from the Freedom Party in 1993 due, among other reasons, to the party leadership’s anti-EU position (Frischenschlager 1994). They were the only opposition party that recommended a ‘yes’ in the 1994 referendum and took an almost unambiguously pro-EU stance in the following years. However, they disappeared from the political scene after they lost all their parliamentary seats in 1999. 4. See the party homepage (www.spoe.at), ‘SPÖ-Grundsatzprogramm’, section III.11. 5. See the party homepage (www.gruene.at), ‘Grundsatzprogramm der Grünen’, section 5.2 (author’s translation). 6. See the party homepage (www.fpoe.at) for an official translation of the party programme. 7. The MPs from the other parties gave the following answers: Social Democrats 13 per cent ‘rather little trust’ (0 per cent ‘none at all’), People’s Party 14 (2), Liberals 20 (0), and Greens 40 (0). 8. The issue of truck transit—which, to some extent, emerged as a significant one during the European Summit meeting in Copenhagen on 12–13 December 2002 where the accession negotiations with ten Central Eastern European states were successfully finished—will not be discussed here, as it is characterized by (more or less) common positions by the parties. 9. For a history of Austria’s neutrality policy see Luif (2001). 10. See ‘SPÖ-Grundsatzprogramm’, section III.11 (note 4). 11. See also ‘Grundsatzprogramm der Grünen’, section 5.3 (note 5). 12. Chairman’s Summary of the Deliberations on Kosovo at the Informal Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the European Union in Brussels on 14 April 1999. Press release 14 April 1999 (German Presidency). Quoted in Luif (2001: 158, n. 64). 13. See ‘Grundsatzprogramm der Grünen’, section 5.2 (author’s translation). 14. See ÖGB News, 8 November 2000, 15 June 2001 (www.oegb.at). 15. See ‘SPÖ-Grundsatzprogramm’, section III.11 (note 4). 16. See Dolezal/Müller 2001: 505, Table 11.18. Asked (on the basis of a 7-rank scale from 1 = ‘very much in favour’ to 7 = ‘very much against’) to what extent they favoured EU enlargement within ten years, the MPs of the five parliamentary party groups displayed the following averages: Liberals 2.6, People’s Party 2.7, Greens 2.8, Social Democrats 2.9, and Freedom Party 5.3(!).

13 Opposing Europe or Problematizing Europe? Euroscepticism and ‘Eurorealism’ in the Polish Party System Aleks Szczerbiak

13.1 INTRODUCTION For much of the 1990s Poland enjoyed both a high level of elite consensus in favour of, and one of the highest levels of popular support for, European Union (EU) accession among the post-communist candidate states. However, the end of the decade saw the emergence of a significant bloc of anti-EU public and elite opinion and parties highly critical of, or openly opposed to, Polish EU membership were relatively successful in the September 2001 parliamentary election. Having previously been considered something of an oxymoron the concept of ‘Polish Euroscepticism’ became the object of increasing academic and media analysis (Szczerbiak 2001a, 2003a).1 Although Poles ended up voting overwhelmingly to join the EU in June 2003 with most parties urging a Yes vote, criticism of the EU remained an important feature of the Polish party system. However, whether it was correct to categorize these parties as ‘Eurosceptic’—comparable to, say, the British Conservative Party or (closer to home) the Czech Civic Democrats—is a more problematic question. This chapter examines the phenomena of principled and contingent opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU in the Polish party system. The empirical focus is on the four parties previously categorized as Hard or Soft Eurosceptic according to a working definition developed with Paul Taggart (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002b). I categorized two of ´ these, the Catholic nationalist League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) and the agrarian populist Self-Defence (Samoobrona), as Hard Eurosceptic. This is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002b: 7).

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I categorized the other two, the conservative Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwo´sc´ , PiS) and the agrarian Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe: PSL), as Soft Eurosceptic. This is where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU trajectory. (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002b: 7)

The main data sources for this chapter are the parties’ September 2001 election programmes, supplemented where necessary by any major programmatic documents or statements that key representative leaders made subsequently in the lead up to the June 2003 accession referendum. The chapter begins by examining briefly the shifts in public opinion on the European issue at the end of the 1990s and emergence of opposition to, and criticism of, EU accession in the Polish party system. This culminated in the September 2001 parliamentary election that some commentators (erroneously) argued represented a ‘Eurosceptic backlash’. The chapter then moves on to examine each of the four parties’ European policies in detail before concluding with reflections on the broader implications of the Polish case for the study of party-based Euroscepticism. The chapter argues, firstly, that built on a definition of party-based Euroscepticism that relates to attitudes towards the substance of European integration it was probably only correct to categorize one of these parties, the League of Polish Families, as unambiguously Eurosceptic. This is because the other three had simply not gone into the detail required on issues of substance in order to be able to categorize them in this way, choosing instead to focus virtually all their critique of the EU on the conduct of the accession negotiations. Secondly, if the lack of data about party attitudes towards the substance of European integration to be found in the Polish case was typical of other non-member states, this raises serious questions about the possibilities of comparing Euroscepticism across a wider Europe. Thirdly, party attitudes towards EU membership at any given time are not necessarily emblematic of a party’s broad, underlying policy on European integration and can be more the product of short-term tactical–strategic calculations. Fourthly, parties may raise the European issue in a critical way in inter-party competition in response to electoral-strategic or coalition-tactical considerations or the imperatives of maintaining party unity without necessarily changing their broad, underlying stance on the issue.

13.2 CHANGING POLISH PUBLIC AND ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARDS EU MEMBERSHIP EU membership was a top priority of Polish foreign policy for over a decade, and pursuit of accession overshadowed all other aims since the country gained North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership in March 1999. Poland signed an EU Association Agreement in 1991, formally submitted its membership

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application in June 1994, and began accession negotiations in March 1998. Eurobarometer polls taken throughout the 1990s showed Poland to have one of the highest levels of support for EU membership among the post-communist candidate states (Grabbe and Hughes 1999). This was matched by an overwhelming political elite consensus in favour of EU membership. However, once the accession negotiations began and the issue developed a higher political profile, support for EU membership started to decline and, for the first time, a significant segment of anti-EU public opinion began to emerge. Figures from the CBOS polling agency showed that Polish support for EU membership fell steadily from nearly 80 per cent in June 1994 to between 55 and 60 per cent in the middle of 1999. During the same period, the number of opponents of EU membership increased from a negligible 5 per cent to a more substantial 20–25 per cent bloc of the population. The number of ‘don’t knows’ remained steady at around 15–20 per cent (Szczerbiak 2001a). In fact, from the middle of 1999, public opinion stabilized at this relatively high level of support and, in the event, Poles voted overwhelmingly to join the EU by 77.45 per cent to 22.55 per cent on a 58.85 per cent turnout in the June 2003 accession referendum (Szczerbiak 2003b). Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s a sizeable bloc of anti-EU public opinion had emerged. There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, given the existence of an overwhelming pro-EU consensus among political elites, Polish opponents of EU membership may have been reluctant to identify themselves and the earlier polling data may have artificially overstated the true levels of public support. Secondly, since there was also very little serious debate about the potential costs and benefits of EU accession; the previous very high levels of support may not have represented conscious and considered positions. Levels of support were always in danger of falling once it became apparent that conforming to EU norms would involve negative economic and social consequences as well as benefits. Thirdly, in the light of the difficult issues that needed to be tackled, the accession negotiations themselves inevitably focused to a large extent on the concessions that had to be made by the Polish side. This, in turn, raised the profile of the European issue in Polish politics in a very negative way. Fourthly, the beginning of the accession negotiations also saw the development of a crack in the previously overwhelming pro-EU elite consensus and the subsequent politicization of the debate on EU membership. This was seen in both the emergence, for the first time, of significant anti-EU political forces and, perhaps even more importantly, divisions among the pro-EU camp about the effectiveness of respective governments in processing the accession negotiations or securing the most favourable membership terms (Szczerbiak 2001a). After failing to make any impact on party politics initially, this shift in Polish public opinion appeared to feed into the emergence of a substantial vote for Eurosceptic parties at the September 2001 parliamentary election. As Table 13.1 shows, two parties that were openly hostile to Polish EU membership and that (as noted earlier) I categorized as Hard Eurosceptic—Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families—won 10.2 per cent (53 out of 460 parliamentary seats) and 7.87 per cent (38 seats) of the vote respectively. Two other parties that were broadly pro-EU but highly critical of the conduct of the accession negotiations and that I

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Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union (SLD-UP) Civic Platform (PO) Self-Defence (Samoobrona) Law and Justice (PiS) Polish Peasant Party (PSL) League of Polish Families (LPR)

% vote

Seats

41.04 12.68 10.20 9.50 8.98 7.87

216 65 53 44 42 38

Source: Rzeczpospolita (19 October 2001) and Polish State Electoral Commission.

categorized as Soft Eurosceptic—the Law and Justice party and the Polish Peasant Party—also won 9.5 per cent (44 seats) and 8.98 per cent (42 seats) of the vote respectively. Indeed, some (mainly Western) commentators interpreted the success of these parties, particularly Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families, as symptomatic of a broader ‘Eurosceptic backlash’ in Poland.2 In other words, it was argued that the increase in public opposition to EU membership that had emerged over the last couple of years had finally found expression in the party system, as some commentators had previously predicted that it would (Kolarska´ Bobinska 1998; Bachman 2000).3 This was far too simplistic an interpretation. The September 2001 election outcome certainly meant that critical voices were better represented in parliament and that, for the first time, the anti-EU political groupings had a significant platform from which to put forward their case. However, the two most successful groupings in the September 2001 election— the ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD), which fought the election in coalition with the smaller social democratic Labour Union (Unia Pracy, UP) party, and the liberal conservative Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO)—were also the most supportive of EU membership. As Table 13.1 shows, these groupings won 41.04 per cent (216 seats) and 12.68 per cent (65 seats) of the vote respectively. Moreover, although the issue had a much higher profile than in any previous parliamentary election, by virtually any measure EU membership was not a particularly salient campaign issue. Most parties devoted very little time to it in their campaigning (e.g. Self-Defence said virtually nothing about it in its TV campaign) and very few Poles (3–7 per cent) cited it as a major factor in determining their voting behaviour. Supporters of EU membership were a majority among the voters of all parties, except for the League of Polish Families, but including Self-Defence. However, the League’s electoral success was probably due more to the support of the ‘religious right’ electorate mobilized by the influential Catholic-nationalist broadcaster Radio Maryja than its anti-EU stance (Szczerbiak 2002).4 Another reason why it is incorrect to characterize this result as a ‘Eurosceptic backlash’ is that the initial working definition of Eurosceptic parties elaborated in Taggart and my Hard–Soft conceptualization was cast too broadly and too

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Table 13.2. Kopecký and Mudde’s typology of party positions on Europe Euroenthusiasts (pro-integration and pro-trajectory) Eurosceptics (pro-integration, anti-trajectory)

Europramatists (anti-integration, pro-trajectory) Eurorejects (anti-integration, anti-trajectory)

Source: Author’s adaptation.

inclusively. This was one of the core arguments contained in an important critique of our Hard–Soft definition developed by Kopecký and Mudde (2002).5 In particular, Kopecký and Mudde argue that our definition of Soft party-based Euroscepticism was too inclusive and all-encompassing or, as they put it, ‘defined [Euroscepticism] in such a broad manner that virtually every disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included’ (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 300). Implicit in their argument was also the idea that it is attitudes towards the substance of the European integration project as embodied in the EU, both in principle and in terms of optimism or pessimism towards the EU’s current and planned trajectory, that is the key to determining a party’s position on Europe, and, therefore, whether or not a party should be categorized as Eurosceptic. On this basis, Kopecký and Mudde developed a fourfold typology of party positions on Europe as given in Table 13.2. Intriguingly, the four parties examined in this chapter that I had previously defined as Eurosceptic were all located in different categories by Kopecký and Mudde. The League of Polish Families were classed as Eurorejects; Self-Defence as oscillating between the Euroreject and (rather contrived) Europragmatist category; the Law and Justice party as Eurosceptics; and the Polish Peasant Party as Euroenthusiasts. The rest of this chapter is devoted to a closer examination of these four parties’ policies on Europe and a revision of my earlier categorization based upon the Kopecký–Mudde critique. In particular, this chapter acknowledges that it is attitudes towards the substance of European integration both in principle and in terms of whether a party is optimistic or pessimistic about the EU’s current or future trajectory, that determine whether or not it should be categorized as (Hard or Soft) Eurosceptic.

13.3 EUROSCEPTICS OR EUROREALISTS?

13.3.1 The League of Polish Families The most openly and unambiguously anti-EU grouping of these four parties was the League of Polish Families. The League was formed as a fairly disparate coalition of various right wing and mainly Catholic nationalist parties and organizations in mid-2001. However, it formally registered as a single party in the run-up to the

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September 2001 election in order to avoid the higher threshold for securing parliamentary representation that applied to electoral coalitions (8 per cent instead of 5 per cent). Subsequently, a number of individuals and groupings that lost out in post-election leadership struggles broke away from the League amid signs that it was reorganizing itself into a more coherent political grouping. However, critical to the League’s initial success was the backing of the fundamentalist Catholic nationalist broadcaster Radio Maryja whose charismatic director, Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, had always used its airwaves to convey a strong anti-EU message. Radio Maryja had 2.7 million listeners (Rzeczpospolita, 11 December 1998), was closely aligned to the ‘Our Daily’ (Nasz Dziennik) newspaper, and formed the hard core ‘religious right’ electorate in Poland. In a previous paper, I have argued that Radio Maryja’s support was probably a necessary condition for the emergence of a significant anti-EU party in Poland (Szczerbiak 2001b). A good illustration of ´ this was the October 2000 presidential campaign of Jan Łopuszanski, whose Polish Agreement (Porozumienie Polskie, PP) party went on to join (and then, in 2002, leave) the League of Polish Families. In spite of a campaign that focused heavily ´ failed to secure Radio Maryja’s on opposing Polish EU membership, Łopuszanski backing and received a derisory 0.79 per cent share of the vote. Although the League accused the EU of ‘conducting a policy of economic colonialism towards Poland’, in its short 2001 election programme, the party focused its attention primarily on the need to renegotiate Poland’s EU Association Agreement. This, it was argued, had led to a $10 billion trade deficit and created more than one million new jobs in EU countries at Poland’s expense. With the connivance of previous Polish governments, who behaved ‘as if some of them were directed by the interests of foreign capital’, the Association Agreement also meant that, ‘an important segment of our national assets has been given away while the remainder is (now) being taken over’ (LPR 2001). However, the party went into more detail about its European policy in a programmatic statement agreed to by its June 2002 Congress. This appeared to locate it fairly unambiguously as a party fundamentally opposed to the European integration project as embodied by the EU regarding it as a clear threat to Poland’s continued sovereign statehood. The programme stated that: We recognise the sovereignty of the state as the essential basis for the development of every country. All attempts to limit the independence of nations to the advantage of supranational structures are alien to us. We support multilateral co-operation between free and sovereign states, but with respect for their rights and freedom. (LPR 2002)

This was not simply opposition to the conduct of the accession negotiations, the deal that Poland was being offered by the EU, or pessimism about some aspect of the EU’s current or future trajectory. This was an apparently unambiguous statement of opposition in principle to the European integration project. On the basis of this, the League of Polish Families could be categorized as a clear-cut case of a (Hard) Eurosceptic party, or falling into Kopecký and Mudde’s Euroreject category.

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The League was extremely effective at using its new platform to convey its Eurosceptic message and its presence in parliament led to an important shift in the terms of the Polish Euro-debate. Initially at least, it put the pro-EU opposition parties in an awkward position through, for example, its attempts to sponsor a referendum specifically on the new government’s concessions on the issue of the sale of Polish land to foreigners. The League’s young deputy leader, and subsequent leader, Roman Giertych, emerged as the main spokesman for the anti-EU cause, providing it with a figurehead that it had previously lacked. Indeed, it was the League more than any other grouping that spearheaded the No campaign during the June 2003 referendum with Giertych as its most high profile public advocate (Szczerbiak 2003b). However, it is important to note that the League’s (Hard) Eurosceptic stance may not have been as clear-cut as its programme implies and there was also evidence of internal debate within the party that indicated a shift away from this kind of principled objection to European integration. The clearest examples of this were some of Roman Giertych’s own statements. For example, in a speech that he gave in February 2003, he stated that: [The League of Polish Family’s] disagreement with the European Union does not emerge from ideological premises . . . but from a pure economic calculation. . . . The League of Polish Families believes . . . that in its current economic state Poland should not join such a bureaucratised and expensive structure. We must first strengthen ourselves economically, and this process will last some ten years, and then we can think about entering international structures which will strengthen Poland’s position. (Paradowska 2003)

This implied opposition to EU membership on the basis of an economic cost– benefit analysis rather than principled objection to the European integration project. Similarly, in another interview immediately prior to the June 2003 referendum he stated that: ‘It is not at all questions of morality and culture that are the causes of my opposition towards us joining the Union, but the economy. . . . We will cope with morality, as we coped under the partitions and under the Germans’ (Rzeczpospolita, 2 June 2003). Similarly, in an interview immediately after the referendum Giertych argued that if the EU reverted back thirty years to being the EEC, ‘a group of independent economically confederated states,’ the League ‘might even stop fighting for Polish withdrawal’ (Gazeta Wyborcza, 13 June 2003). Clearly, these quotes implied a shift away from a Hard Eurosceptic/Euroreject principled opposition to the very idea of European integration to a more conditional opposition to the EU’s current or future trajectory, much closer to the kind of (Soft) Eurosceptic positions held by the British Conservatives or Czech Civic Democrats. However, they also stood in contrast to the principled opposition that the extracts from the League’s programme cited earlier clearly suggest. They also contradicted statements made by other leading League figures, not least Roman’s father Maciej, who was one of the party’s most important ideologues at the time. Maciej Giertych described the EU as a ‘Masonic, Godless idea for destroying

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religion, national identity . . . in the interests of the Germans, “who” hate Poles and there is no secret about this’ (Lizut 2003).6 However, although some of Roman Giertych’s statements suggested that the basis of the League’s opposition to Polish EU membership stemmed from an economic cost–benefit calculation, most of his other statements implied this is really a debate about what kind of Eurosceptic party (principled or contingent) the League was going to be. The fact that the League was a Eurosceptic party appeared to be in little doubt.

13.3.2 Self-Defence The other political grouping that secured parliamentary representation in 2001 and that I originally categorized as Hard Eurosceptic was Self-Defence led by the controversial Andrzej Lepper. Self-Defence was formed as both a political party and farmers’ union in the early 1990s and Lepper came to public prominence following a campaign of direct action to prevent the enforcement ´ of debt foreclosures against farmers (Sabbat-Swidlicka 1992). As Lepper faded from public view in the middle of the decade he performed progressively worse in successive parliamentary and presidential elections. However, he re-emerged as a public figure at the head of a campaign of farmers’ road blockades at the beginning of 1999. His relatively high 3.05 per cent of the vote in the October 2000 presidential election gave a hint that Self-Defence was capable of garnering a more a sizeable electorate. Indeed, although opinion polls did not detect any significant public backing for Self-Defence (nor, indeed, for the League of Polish Families) until the last fortnight of the campaign, the party gained support very quickly to emerge as the third largest grouping in the new parliament. Both Self-Defence and its leader (the two are inseparable for analytical purposes) were widely perceived to be strongly Eurosceptic by both the Polish public and political commentators alike. For example, a survey conducted by the Polish Institute for Public Affairs in the run-up to the October 2000 presidential election found that Lepper was identified as the most Eurosceptic of all the candidates, even ´ more so than Jan Łopuszanski, whose campaign was almost entirely focused on opposition to EU accession (Kucharczyk 2001). Indeed, it was as much the success of Lepper’s party as it was the high vote obtained by the League of Polish Families that led some commentators to develop the idea of the September 2001 election as a ‘Eurosceptic backlash’. This was not altogether surprising. Self-Defence was fiercely critical of the EU, often resorting to extremely bitter invective. The following extract from a European policy statement adopted by the party’s May 2003 Congress, that set out in great detail why the party would not be supporting EU accession in the forthcoming referendum, exemplifies this: [A]ccession to the EU on the negotiated conditions permanently marks Poland down for the role of a third category country. A country that, in a semi-colonial way, will provide a young cadre of workers to the ageing society of the EU and a market for the EU countries’

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surplus production. It is this objective that is served by the placing of restrictive quotas, an average reduction of production in Poland by 60 per cent, including the liquidation of whole sectors such as fishing, the textile industry, the machine industry, the shipping industry, road and building machine industry etc. The so-called financial advantages of Poland joining the European Union are, on the negotiated conditions, a simple mirage and balloon falsely blown up by pro-Union propaganda . . . according to the negotiated conditions Poland will be a permanent net contributor to the EU, in other words it is us with our own, modest assets that we will have to finance the economies of Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain and other EU members (Samoobrona 2003).

However, unlike the League of Polish Families, Self-Defence did not state explicitly that it was against Polish EU membership during the September 2001 election campaign.7 Indeed, its main campaign leaflet contained only one rather oblique (albeit very negative) reference to the EU. It argued that: [T]hey (the Democratic Left Alliance, Polish Peasant Party, Solidarity Electoral Action, Freedom Union and their chums in the [Civic] Platform) are implementing the same programme of making Poland dependent on the West, selling our national assets together with the liquidation of jobs. They have all gone mad about Brussels. But the truth is brutal—no one will give us something for nothing. It is the European Union that is exporting more than $16 billion worth of goods to us annually. Our total imports add up to $48 billion. It is we who are supporting two and a half million jobs in the West, jobs that we lack here.8

Moreover, in a subsequent January 2002 statement of its position on the EU, Self-Defence spoke in warm terms about the European integration project as ‘an opportunity for the whole of Europe to overcome the historical political divisions and cast out the demons of the “Cold War”’ (Samoobrona 2002). Indeed, although, like the League of Polish Families, Self-Defence came out against EU membership in the June 2003 referendum, the party claimed that it was not against the principle of European integration through the EU nor, under certain circumstances, Polish accession. As the party’s May 2003 European policy statement put it Self-Defence, ‘is not an anti-European party, as they are attempting to present us to public opinion’. As ‘Eurorealists’ the party did ‘not automatically reject the possibility of Polish accession to the European Union’ and argued that EU membership ‘could be advantageous for Poland on the basis of equal rights and partnership’ (Samoobrona 2003). Rather, the party claimed to be against the ‘deal’ being offered to Poland—the specific accession terms negotiated by the current Polish government as embodied in the Athens Treaty.9 Significantly, Self-Defence ran a much less high profile anti-EU campaign than the League of Polish Families on the rather enigmatic slogan, ‘The Choice is Yours’ (Szczerbiak 2003b; Olczyk ´ and Smiłowicz 2003). In other words, in spite of the party’s often bitterly anti-EU invective, its opposition to EU membership was couched in instrumental terms of the basis of an economic cost–benefit analysis. It was not on the basis of principled opposition to the European integration process as a threat to Polish national sovereignty,

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identity, or moral values. Indeed, it claimed to be broadly in favour of this project. The following section from the party’s May 2003 EU policy statement probably best summarized the party’s position: Self-Defence of the Polish Republic is not opposed to the European Union. Equally, we are not opposed to Polish accession to European structures but we regard it as an instrumental matter that our membership should not be conditional, should not be something worse, but based on equal rights. . . . Meanwhile, the accession treaty does not fulfil these requirements. That is why we are for its rejection, on the basis of the disadvantageous membership conditions that were included in it. We believe that one needs to re-negotiate it, in other words once again look through the adopted clauses and change them in such a way that Poland would be a member of the European Union with full rights. (Samoobrona 2003)

On this basis, it is difficult to categorize Self-Defence as a Hard Eurosceptic/Euroreject party. However, the fact that Self-Defence focused almost exclusively on the deal that Poland secured in the accession negotiations, meant that it had made virtually no meaningful statements about its views on the EU’s current or future trajectory. This in turn, makes it very difficult to determine the party’s position on the substance of the European integration process (other than the fact that it did not appear to oppose it in principle and was not, therefore, a Hard Eurosceptic/Euroreject party) and certainly not do so with any precision. On the only occasions when the party addressed its views on the future shape of the EU, as in a January 2002 EU policy statement, it argued rather obliquely, that it was in favour of ‘the French principle determined by General de Gaulle of a “Europe of nations” ’. This, it argued, meant that ‘every country should retain its identity and its distinct national and cultural traditions within the framework of the Union’ (Samoobrona 2002). In its May 2003 European policy statement, the party contrasted this concept with the idea of Euro-regions which, it argued, led ‘to the blurring of national borders to the advantage of economically and politically stronger states, [and] does not [therefore] conform to Polish interests’. It continued: We reject the theory of limited sovereignty and national identity for a common European doctrine. We are for uniting European states, in the form of a union of independent, sovereign subjects, recognising common objectives of international co-operation, without damaging anybody’s political independence and the conditions that are essential to the development of specific nations (Samoobrona 2003).

But other than this rather general statement in favour of a broadly intergovernmentalist approach to the European integration, the party did not really elaborate its views in any greater detail. So we are unclear whether it believed that the EU was broadly developing on the right lines or not. We cannot, for example, deduce from this whether Self-Defence believed that the EU was right to pursue Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a Common Foreign and Defence Policy, or a European Constitution as envisaged by the Convention on the Future of Europe. There

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is, therefore, insufficient data to determine whether the party was optimistic or pessimistic about the EU’s current trajectory. If one accepts that attitudes towards this are critical in determining the party’s broad, underlying position on Europe, it is extremely difficult to know whether one could even categorize the party as a (Soft) Eurosceptic party.

13.3.3 Law and Justice party The third political grouping that adopted a critical tone towards the EU in its 2001 election programme and campaign rhetoric, and that I initially categorized as Soft Eurosceptic, was the Law and Justice party. Law and Justice party was formed in ´ April 2001 by the right-wing post-Solidarity politician Jarosław Kaczynski. It was an attempt to construct a ‘renewed right’ from the remnants of the disintegrating Solidarity Election Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarno´sc´ : AWS) conglomerate that had won the September 1997 parliamentary election, by capitalizing on the ´ popularity of Kaczynski’s brother, Lech. Although he was not a member of any ´ Solidarity Electoral Action-affiliated party or grouping, Lech Kaczynski served as Justice Minister in the AWS minority government from June 2000 to August 2001 and was incredibly popular due to his tough anti-crime and anti-corruption rhetoric. Law and Justice fought the election in coalition with the Polish Alliance (Przymierze Polskie: PP) grouping. This short-lived party was also set up in April 2001, by a group of defectors from two Solidarity Electoral Action affiliates: the ´ Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrze´scijansko-Narodowe: ZChN) and the Conservative People’s Party (Stronictwo Konserwatyno-Ludowe: SKL). Law and Justice and the Polish Alliance formally merged at beginning of 2002 with the united grouping adopting the former’s name. Law and Justice adopted a broadly supportive if somewhat ambiguous and poorly elaborated position on European integration in the run-up to the September 2001 election. Its programme described EU membership as one of the party’s two foreign policy priorities but then went on to criticize a negotiating strategy based on attempting to secure a specific (early) target date for Polish accession. The party argued that: [S]triving for an appropriate position for Poland in the Union, in other words one worthy of a large European country, cannot be pursued effectively, when the method and speed of the negotiations are determined by successive, apparently unrealistic, entry dates. The quality of our membership, and therefore a determined defence of our interests, is what is most important. (PiS 2001; emphasis added)

Moreover, Law and Justice comprised substantial elements who went beyond the rather sparse official policy set out in the party programme and took a more overtly Eurosceptic stance both during the 2001 campaign and subsequently. Most of these were drawn from the Polish Alliance grouping, particularly the former leaders of the Christian National Union party, whose policy stance could be

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categorized as (Soft) Eurosceptic (Szczerbiak 1999). For example, Marian Piłka, who was Christian National Union leader between 1996 and 2000 and subsequently elected as a Law and Justice deputy, argued that, ‘Poland should oppose the bureaucratisation of the EU and prevent the liquidation of the nation-state formula’ (Rzeczpospolita, 5 June 2001). Similarly, speaking in July 2002, former Christian National Union General Secretary (and self-proclaimed ‘Euroscepticon-the-Vistula’ (Zawisza 1998)) Artur Zawisza summed up the balance of forces within Law and Justice thus: ‘A certain scale of sensitivity exists (within the party). Some are more Euro-enthusiastic, others are more Eurosceptical, but the party programme, which everyone accepts, is Euro-realistic’ (Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 July 2002). The impression that Law and Justice contained a substantial Eurosceptic element—and, indeed, that this tendency was becoming more predominant within the party—was reinforced following some of the party leaders’ statements towards the end of 2002 during the EU accession negotiation endgame. This ´ begun in November when party leader Jarosław Kaczynski threatened to support a No vote in the forthcoming accession referendum if the membership package being offered by the EU was not substantially improved at the December 2002 ´ Copenhagen summit. Kaczynski, who had previously been seen as one of the more Euro-enthusiastic party members, argued that: You have to reject the dogma that we have to accede to the Union in 2004. In my opinion, we should not join on these conditions. . . . I am a determined supporter of (European) Union accession and a determined opponent of joining on these conditions. . . . In this situation you have to present the matter in a very tough way—either they change the conditions, or we discuss a different date. (Rzeczpospolita, 12 November 2003)

´ Kaczynski followed this up by signing a highly critical statement with a number of other politicians that argued, among other things, that ‘the countries of the European Union are offering us second class membership’ (Gazeta Wyborcza, 16–17 November 2002).10 The party then went on to launch what commentators described as ‘four Eurosceptic initiatives’. These were: a parliamentary resolution instructing the government to significantly improve the conditions of Polish accession; constitutional changes to unambiguously clarify that Polish law was superior to international law; the resubmission of a parliamentary declaration of state sovereignty in the fields of morality and culture that the party had previously submitted in April 2002; and an attempt to secure the passage of a ‘land turnover law’ which would, it was argued, protect Polish farmers from foreign land speculators (Rzeczpospolita, 18 November 2002; Gazeta Wyborcza, 18 November 2002). Interestingly, although all this was widely interpreted by commentators as evidence of a ‘Eurosceptic turn’ by the party, its leaders rejected this tag and continued to describe themselves as ‘Eurorealists’ (Olczyk, Gawry´s, and Zdort 2002). They were right to reject this epithet. First, the party’s rhetoric at the end of 2002 did not mark a shift in its underlying policy on the substance of European integration. Rather, it simply represented giving a higher profile to a

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stance that the party had already articulated for some time, as the earlier citation from the party’s 2001 election programme illustrates.11 This was a clear statement to illustrate that the party felt that the accession negotiations should prioritize the terms of the accession package being offered rather than ensuring that Poland was included in the first wave at all costs (which, it implied, other political forces where in favour of).12 Secondly, adopting the definition of a Eurosceptic stance as one that relates to the substance of the European integration, this kind of rhetoric cannot be properly categorized as ‘Eurosceptic’. As with the case of Self-Defence discussed earlier (although using somewhat less bitter invective), the Law and Justice party’s Euro-criticisms related to the deal that was being offered by the EU and, implicitly, being cravenly accepted by the Polish government. They did not represent principled (or even contingent) opposition to the project of European integration per se. However, unlike Self-Defence, the Law and Justice party did eventually come out in favour of a Yes vote in the June 2003 referendum with the slogan ‘A Strong Poland in Europe’ (Szczerbiak 2003b), following a 237 to 24 (13 abstentions) vote at a special party congress in January 2003 (Zdort 2003a). The party argued that the membership terms had been significantly improved at the December 2002 Copenhagen summit; due, they claimed, in no small part due to their own aggressive critique!13 It is interesting to dwell for a moment on why the party chose to give this issue a higher profile at precisely this time because this helps to shed some important light on the broader comparative debate about what causes parties to use the European issue in this way. In fact, the party’s so-called Eurosceptic turn highlights the factors that cause a party to use the European issue in a critical way in inter-party competition rather than adopt a particular policy stance on the substance of the European integration project. The party’s decision to give its (previously well documented) doubts about the conduct of the accession negotiations a higher profile was linked to both electoral-strategic and coalition-tactical factors with the proximate cause being the results of the October–November 2002 Polish local elections. During these elections, the two radical groupings, Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families, won a substantial share of the overall national vote, obtaining 16 per cent and 14.5 per cent respectively. This was only slightly less than the score obtained by Law and Justice, which fought the election in coalition with the more liberal Civic Platform grouping and whose combined 16.5 per cent of the vote nationally fell considerably short of their combined September 2001 vote of 22.2 per cent. It was after these elections that Law and Justice decided to give the European issue a much high profile (although, as noted above, its underlying position remained broadly unchanged). ´ Kaczynski’s Eurocritical stance was, therefore, determined partly by a desire to send a signal to the League of Polish Families that it would be prepared to consider abandoning its liberal ally if the Catholic nationalist party softened its anti-EU rhetoric. It was also partly to demonstrate to the League’s new voters that Law and Justice was also a congenial home for those who had misgivings about the ´ EU. As Kaczynski put it, the party had to: ‘find a formula that will allow you to also turn to these voters. To talk to the League of Polish Families. I don’t rule out

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that our voters went over to them’ (Waszkielewicz 2002; Waszkielewicz and Zdort 2002). In fact, Law and Justice quickly abandoned this attempt to create new alliances with the League and win over anti-EU voters after the Copenhagen summit. Party leaders realized that the League had no intention of moderating its strong anti-EU position, which it regarded as a vote-winner. They also came to the conclusion that if Law and Justice pursued its Eurocritical rhetoric too vigorously, it was in danger of both marginalizing itself from other centre-right forces and alienating its existing voters. The latter held broadly similar (indeed, even slightly more pro´ 2002).14 Indeed, after the EU) views to those of the rest of the electorate (Wronski Copenhagen summit the tone of the party’s statements on Europe (although, to stress, not the substance of the party’s policy) changed once again (Zdort 2003a). Interestingly, however, although Law and Justice eventually came out in favour of a Yes vote, party leaders also made a strategic–tactical decision to ensure that the misgivings of its anti-EU minority were also aired publicly. This was in order to continue to send appropriate signals to these elements of its actual (and potential) electorate. Indeed, they encouraged those who held the minority position to articulate their views at the January 2003 Congress (Zdort 2003b). The fact that the party was divided on this issue was also reflected in its low key and reserved referendum campaign that was aimed primarily at reassuring its own supporters ´ (Olczyk and Smiłowicz 2003; Szczerbiak 2003b). The way that Law and Justice left the decision about whether it would support a Yes or No vote in the accession referendum hanging in the air for several months is also very interesting. It suggests that a party’s stance on this issue at any giving time is not emblematic of its fundamental approach to the question of European integration. This is noteworthy because, as noted earlier, Paul Taggart and I used party attitudes towards a country’s EU membership as an important distinction between Hard and Soft Eurosceptics. The Law and Justice party’s approach, on the other hand, implied that this was often a strategic–tactical decision reached on the basis of a pragmatic cost–benefit analysis of the membership terms on offer at any given time that determined a party’s stance on EU membership. For example, Law and Justice Deputy, Artur Zawisza, argued in July 2002 that: ‘The Law and Justice party’s stance towards European integration is a positive one. [But] the integration process is one thing and accession to the European Union submitted to a vote in a specific referendum proposed by a given government at a specific time is another’ (Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 July 3002). Similarly, the party’s spokesman, Adam Bielan, argued in December 2002 that: ‘I do not know if we will appeal for a Yes or No ´ 2002). As will be argued later, the Polish vote, but we are a pro-EU party’ (Wronski Peasant Party approached this particular question in a very similar way. Turning to the substance of the Law and Justice party’s policy on European integration—and, therefore, whether or not it could be categorized as Eurosceptic party—as with Self-Defence, it was actually rather difficult to determine this with any precision. This was because most of what the party said about the EU also related to the detail of the accession negotiations and its statements on the substance of European integration were rather opaque. In its September 2001

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election programme, for example, the party stated in a rather broad-brush and imprecise way that: A basic condition of [our] belonging to an integrated Europe must be maintaining nationstates. Only a strong, unitary state will enable us to realise our interests and protecting future generations’ values such as: the existence of the nation and its development. The nation state is also a basic condition for the functioning of democracy (PiS 2001).

The party subsequently elaborated on this, most notably in a more detailed policy statement passed by its January 2003 Congress.15 Here the party declared that: In the debate on the shape of the Union we present the idea of a Solidaristic Europe of Nations, which best expresses the sense and role of the Union. . . . The Union should remain a strong solidaristic union of nation states. The Union’s strength and legitimation stem from the mandate and the will to co-operate of sovereign states. That is why we are also in favour of strengthening those institutions of the Union that represent forums of co-operation between nation states, in the first instance the Council of Ministers.

It continued: We declare ourselves to be against a federalist understanding of the role of the European Parliament and giving it competencies in the sphere of choosing the Union’s executive branch. The European Parliament has an informational and audit role to fulfil, through which it can influence the limiting of the Union’s bureaucracy. Law and Justice is against building up the position of the European Parliament at the expense of nation states, that is why we support a national and proportional model of the electoral law for the elections that will take place in 2004. (PiS 2003a: 113)

This was a more detailed statement of the kind of model of European integration favoured by the party than that elaborated by Self-Defence. However, even this represented little more than a statement in favour of a broadly intergovernmentalist approach to European integration with an enumeration of the institutions that the party would like to see strengthened (or not). In order to be able to categorize this party as (Soft) Eurosceptic with a greater degree of precision one needed to have clearer sense of whether these were simply expressions of concern about a possible EU trajectory or pessimism about what was deemed to be the EU’s actual or likely future trajectory. More specific enumeration of what kinds of planned extensions of EU sovereignty were acceptable and those that were not would also help in this task. In the absence of this kind of clarification in official policy, one is forced to turn to party leaders’ statements for further guidance. However, these were also ´ inconclusive. In a June 2003 interview, for example, Lech Kaczynski appeared to adopt a broadly Eurosceptic interpretation of the EU’s current trajectory when he argued that: ‘I am for the Union, but will never support the concept of a federation that is beginning to predominate in Europe. [We] did not regain independence in order to give up after 10–20 years to a common foreign, defence, monetary policy, common passport—these are the classical characteristics of sovereignty? (Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 June 2003; emphasis added)

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On the other hand, in June 2002 one of the party’s key foreign affairs spokespersons, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski argued that: Nothing indicates that (the EU) will transform itself into a federal state on the ruins of the old nation-states. The Amsterdam and Nice conferences . . . did not fulfil either the dreams of the federalists nor the fears of the Union’s most zealous opponents. The Union will find a constitutional formula nearer a confederation than federalism and even the euro will not eliminate the national factor in the political organization of Europe (Ujazdowski 2002).

´ Party Leader Jarosław Kaczynski occasionally hinted that he shared his twin brother’s apparently more pessimistic outlook. For example, speaking in the July 2002 parliamentary debate on the Convention on the Future of Europe he expressed fears that the so-called ‘constructivist passion of the European elite aiming towards forming . . . a European federation without any real basis’ would triumph in the European Convention (Sejm 2002b). However, on other occasions he simply repeated the official party mantra that the EU must reject federalism and maintain and strengthen intergovernmental institutions without elaborating on whether he was pessimistic or optimistic about the most likely future scenario (PiS 2003b). The tentative and interim conclusion of this brief survey must, therefore, be that the Law and Justice party could have taken a (Soft) Eurosceptic stance in the future. Its policy statements at the time certainly provided a reasonable basis for deducing that this is the direction that it was likely to take. However, more definitive judgements had to await the party adopting a formal stance on issues such as Polish membership of the euro or whether or not to support the proposed European Constitution.

13.3.4 Polish Peasant Party The other party that secured parliamentary representation in September 2001 and whose spokesmen frequently referred to the EU in negative terms was the Polish Peasant Party. In previous papers I also characterized this party as Soft Eurosceptic. The Polish Peasant Party was formed in May 1990 as the direct organizational successor to the communist satellite party, the United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, ZSL), although it attempted to locate itself within the (anti-communist) traditions of the earlier Polish agrarian movement that dates back to the nineteenth century. As noted earlier, the Peasant Party was the ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance’s coalition partner from 1993 to 1997. Its then leader Waldemar Pawlak served as premier from October 1993 to February 1995 (having earlier served briefly as caretaker premier in June 1992), and during this time Poland formally submitted its application for EU membership. At the 1997 election the party’s share of the vote was halved and seat share slashed. But, having increased its vote and seat share slightly, it returned to office in 2001 as the former communists’ junior coalition

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partner in government until it was forced out of the government in March 2003. During the 2001 election campaign, the party adopted what its Vice-President Marek Sawicki termed a ‘Euro-realist’ position (Rzeczpospolita, 5 June 2001). In its election programme, the party argued that: [Poland’s] relations with the EU should be based on strengthening [our] national interests as part of the process of integration, and not just passively joining a larger community. It is necessary to be aware that, in spite of the disproportion that exists in the levels of income among its member states, the EU is a ‘rich man’s club’ and not inclined to give in to the demands of the poor candidate states from the East.

The party also argued that the EU ‘must . . . take into account our expectations and aspirations’. A precondition of this was ‘the inclusion of Polish agriculture in the Common Agricultural Policy, from the moment when Poland joins the EU, (with Poland) entitled to the same direct payments and structural funds, on the basis of principles that have operated in the Union up until now’ (PSL 2001a: 35–7). In its shorter election declaration, the party criticized the previous Solidarity Electoral Action led government for creating ‘a noticeable asymmetry in Poland’s relations with European Union states to our disadvantage’. This, the party argued, had been one of the main factors accounting for why ‘foreign firms (were) taking control of strategic segments of the Polish economy, the enormous deficit in trade and the emergence of a substantial lobby for foreign interests in Poland’ (PSL 2001b: 4). Owing to this critical approach to the EU, it was widely assumed that the return of the Peasant Party to office would make it considerably more difficult for the new government to fulfil its objective of speeding up the accession negotiations. The party did acquiesce in the softening of the government’s negotiating stance on the sale of Polish land to foreigners and Polish access to Western labour markets in November 2001. However, it did so extremely reluctantly and only on the basis of guarantees from its leader and Agriculture Minister Jarosław Kalinowski, that it would be able to protect Polish ownership of land as a result of his proposed ‘land turnover law’. Moreover, Kalinowski reacted in an extremely hostile fashion to the European Commission’s January 2002 proposal that Polish farmers should only receive 25 per cent of the level of subsidies paid to those in existing member states with full payments being phased in over the first nine years of membership (Rzeczpospolita, 31 January 2002). The party’s Eurocritical rhetoric continued and intensified in the run-up to the December 2002 Copenhagen summit with the party threatening to leave the coalition if the deal that Poland was being offered on agriculture was not substantially improved.16 In the event, the EU agreed that agricultural subsidies would be paid at 55 per cent, 60 per cent, and 65 per cent of the level paid to West European farmers during the first three years of membership. The shortfall between this and the EU’s original proposal would to be made up by switching funds from the rural aid budget and allowing the Polish government to top up the subsidies from the state budget. In fact, the Peasant Party appeared to view the whole issue of European integration solely through the prism of the accession negotiations and its ‘scepticism’

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was really about the deal that was being offered to Poland, particularly Polish farmers. In the event, the party determined its attitude towards the June 2003 referendum on the basis of a cost–benefit analysis of the terms negotiated and made its support for Polish EU membership conditional upon the government implementing three specific items of legislation affecting farmers and rural areas. These were the guaranteed provision from the state budget for ‘top up’ financing of agricultural subsidies agreed at Copenhagen together with the passage of the land turnover law and a law on the organization of the biofuels market that would ´ be advantageous to its core rural–agricultural electoral constituency (Smiłowicz 2003a, 2003b; Rzeczpospolita, 14 March 2003). In other words, as in the case of the Law and Justice party, this suggested a highly instrumental approach to the question of support for, or opposition to, EU membership and that it was not the ideological litmus test that Paul Taggart and I implied that it was in our initial Hard–Soft conceptualization. Eventually, the party’s Supreme Council came out in favour of a Yes vote by 58 to 7 (with 2 abstentions) after only one of these conditions had been met: the passage of the land turnover law (Rzeczpospolita, 16 April 2003, 12 May 2003). Given its internal divisions, as with the Law and Justice party, the party adopted a fairly low key approach to the June 2003 referendum aimed at reassuring its own supporters with the rather half-hearted slogan ‘Don’t fear the Union. We are with you’ (Rzeczpospolita, 27 January 2003; Olczyk and ´ Smiłowicz 2003b; Szczerbiak 2003b)! But what was the party’s policy on the substance of European integration (which is what one needed to know in order to be able to categorize it as a Eurosceptic party or not)? As noted earlier, in contrast to my earlier categorization of the Polish Peasant Party as Soft Eurosceptic, Kopecký and Mudde defined the party as belonging to its Euroenthusiast category (pro-integration in principle and optimistic about the EU’s current/future trajectory). However, the problem with arriving at any accurate definition of the Peasant Party’s position on Europe is that, like Self-Defence and (although to a lesser extent) Law and Justice, it actually said very little about its views on the substance of the European integration project. The party made no reference whatsoever to these issues in its April 2001 programmatic statement. The only relevant reference in its short 2001 election declaration was to say that: ‘It (the Polish Peasant Party) is in favour of a Europe of nationstates maintaining their national and cultural identity’ (PSL 2001b) Referring to earlier party policy documents does not help very much either. The resolution on European integration agreed by the party’s 2000 Congress stated merely that: We are in favour of that kind of model of the European Union that guarantees the maintenance of the national identity of member states and their participation in the taking of the most important decisions relating to their future on the basis of equal rights, constructing at the same time a Europe of fatherlands (Europa Ojczyzn) (PSL 2000: 74).

Statements by individual party leaders also provided little help in clarifying the party’s European policy. For example, speaking in the July 2002 Sejm debate on the Convention on the Future of Europe, Peasant Party representative Andrzej Grzyb argued that,

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We are convinced that the maintenance of the position of nation states in the European Union in the future is essential. In this area neither the principle of subsidiarity, nor a directly election Chairman of the European Commission nor the actual Commission being elected by the European Parliament are sufficient.

He went on, ‘we must understand that we cannot question the position of nation states. A whole generation grew up with a feeling of the value of what the nation state is and we cannot take that feeling away’ (Sejm 2003b). A statement by the party’s then spokesman Janusz Dobrosz during the March 2002 Sejm debate on Polish foreign policy was a little less ambiguous: ‘For the Polish Peasant Party the concept of a federalized Europe, a Europe of united states modelled on the USA is unacceptable. This scenario of a future Europe is currently being written in Berlin’ (Sejm 2002; emphasis added). However, it is unclear how representative Dobrosz really was of the position of the party (he was one of the seven who voted against EU membership in the Supreme Council and in October 2003 defected to the League of Polish Families) and, indeed, whether he thought that this alleged German-federalist scenario was actually likely to dominate the EU’s future trajectory. In other words, the party’s statements on the substance of European integration amounted to little more than a broadly intergovernmentalist approach to the European project. This could have provided the basis for a Eurosceptic policy stance in the future. However, as in the case of Self-Defence and the Law and Justice parties, there was insufficient hard evidence as to whether the Polish Peasant Party was optimistic or pessimistic about the EU’s actual trajectory. Nor was there any data on what stance the party was likely to take on specific issues such as Polish membership of EMU, the development of EU Common Foreign and Defence Policy, or a future European Constitution. In other words, there was simply not enough data available at that time, either from the party’s published policy statements or from statements by its representative leaders, to be able to categorize the party as being Eurosceptic or not.

13.4 CONCLUSION On the basis of this analysis of Euroscepticism in the Polish party system, it is possible to draw a number of tentative comparative conclusions.17 First, based on a definition of party-based Euroscepticism that relates to attitudes towards the substance of European integration it was probably wrong to categorize three of the four parties examined here as Eurosceptic. It was certainly possible to categorize the League of Polish Families in this way. Indeed the only question in this case is really what kind of Eurosceptic party it was: Hard (Euroreject) or Soft? However, it is questionable that the Law and Justice party, Polish Peasant Party, and even a party as seemingly unambiguously anti-EU as Self-Defence could really accurately be categorized as Eurosceptic’, in the sense that one would apply this label to,

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say, the British Conservative Party or the Czech Civic Democrats. Interestingly, it was a self-definition that all three parties avoided, in favour of the less pejorative Eurorealist. This is because an examination of their European policies reveals that their critique of the EU was not aimed at the substance of the European project. Generally, they paid very little attention to this. Rather, their critique of the EU was really about problematizing Europe rather than opposing Europe: criticizing the conduct of the accession negotiations and the membership package being offered to the Poland, rather than necessarily questioning either the principle or trajectory of the European integration project as embodied by the EU. This could, of course, change as these parties were forced increasingly to spell out in greater detail what kind of model of EU development that they are actually in favour of. Indeed, the evidence presented here suggested that the Law and Justice party was already doing this to a limited extent and that its European policy would end up a (Soft) Eurosceptic one. It was also probable that Self-Defence and possible that the Polish Peasant Party would also end up adopting a similar approach. But, at the time of writing at least, it was incorrect to label these three parties in this way. Secondly, and more broadly, the Polish case also raises fundamental questions about the possibility of comparing party-based Euroscepticism across a wider Europe, particularly between EU member and non-member states (Henderson, volume 2). It is clearly theoretically possible for parties in the latter to adopt both Hard (Euroreject) and (Soft) Eurosceptic stances that are analogous to those that we traditionally find in West European member states, with the (Soft) Eurosceptic Czech Civic Democratic Party being a case in point. However, based on the evidence presented here, lack of data about party attitudes towards the substance of the European integration project, made categorizing these parties in non-member states a particularly difficult exercise. This was especially true in the case of (Soft) Eurosceptic stances, as these required both a degree of detail and precision about party’s attitudes towards specific policies and a fairly clear expression of whether or not they are optimistic or pessimistic about the EU’s current or future trajectory. In most cases these kind of statements did not exist; indeed, unless they are anti-EU membership, parties in candidate states are (logically), almost inevitably, likely to be optimistic about the EU’s current or future trajectory if they are in favour of their country joining the organization! Thirdly, the Polish case suggests that party attitudes towards whether or not their country should be a member of the EU are not necessarily emblematic of a party’s broad, underlying policy on European integration and can be more the product of an instrumental cost–benefit analysis or short-term tactical–strategic calculations. In other words, paradoxically, whether or not party is pro- or antiEU membership at any given time is not the caesura that Taggart and I originally assumed when first developing our Hard–Soft conceptualization. This can be seen from the way that both the Law and Justice party and the Polish Peasant Party played ‘fast and loose’ with this issue at the end of 2002 and beginning of 2003. Both parties appeared to make their support for, or opposition to, EU membership conditional upon the precise terms of the membership package on offer, rather

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than whether or not they thought that European integration through the EU was a good or bad thing in principle. Fourthly, evidence from the Polish case suggests that parties may raise the European issue in a critical way in inter-party competition in response to electoral-strategic or coalition-tactical considerations or the imperatives of maintaining party unity without necessarily changing their broad, underlying stance on the issue. The best example of this in the Polish case is the Law and Justice party’s ‘Eurosceptic turn’ at the end of 2002. In fact, the party did not depart substantially from its previous statements on the European issue. It simply chose to give a higher profile to its critique of the EU accession negotiations in response to a particular (and contingent) strategic and tactical opening created by the relative success of the Hard Eurosceptic League of Polish Families in the 2002 local elections. Another example of this was how both the Law and Justice and Peasant parties decided to adopt a fairly low key approach to the June 2003 referendum campaign in order not to exacerbate their internal divisions on this issue. In other words, the factors that determine a party’s broad underlying approach to the issue of European integration (or perhaps any issue) are different from those that determine whether or not (and how) a party will use the European (or any other) issue in party competition. This is a significant finding worthy of further exploration by comparative party theorists, including those not necessarily interested in European integration.

NOTES 1. For other interesting analyses of the impact of EU accession on Polish domestic ´ politics in the 1990s see: Blazyca and Kolkiewicz (1999), Kolarska-Bobinska (1999), and Millard (1999). 2. See, for example, Reed (2001). 3. Cf. Grabowska (1999). ´ 4. Cf. McManus-Czubinska et al. (2003). 5. An earlier (slightly different) version of this paper appeared as Kopecký and Mudde (2001). 6. In an article posted on the LPR website Maciej Giertych also argues that it is the threat that EU accession poses to Polish sovereignty, culture, and morality rather than pure economic calculations that are the key reasons why the LPR opposes Polish accession (Giertych undated). 7. Indeed, the working definition developed by Taggart and me was modified to include parties such as Self-Defence that did not formally oppose the idea of their country being EU membership but appeared to make it conditional upon securing an unachievable set of conditions. 8. Extracts taken from the main Samoobrona election leaflet. 9. During the December 2002 debate on the EU’s Copenhagen summit where these were finally agreed, Lepper compared Democratic Left Alliance Premier Leszek Miller and President Aleksander Kwa´sniewski to Judas accusing them of selling Poland for fifty euros (Stankiewicz 2002)! 10. See also Rzeczpospolita (16–17 November 2002).

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11. See also the statements by Jarosław’s brother Lech who was party leader throughout most of 2002 and expressed very similar sentiments, see, for example, Rzeczpospolita (25 February 2002, 21 June 2002) and Gazeta Wyborcza (12 April 2003). 12. In this sense, the party’s shift in rhetoric was related as much to domestic politics and particularly a critique of the government, as it was to the EU. 13. The government claimed it had obtained a number of concessions but two of them were particularly significant. First, Polish farmers would be paid higher agricultural subsidies, although this would be partly financed from the Polish domestic budget (discussed in the chapter). Secondly, more money would be transferred from regional funds to ease the strains on the Polish budget and ensure that Poland did not end up a net contributor in its first years of EU membership. 14. As the figures on the low salience of this issue among voters cited above suggest, this was probably not the reason why voters decided to support the League of Polish Families anyway, although it is unclear how detailed a psepholigical analysis PiS leaders undertook when determining their stance on this issue. For a critique of this tactic from a broadly sympathetic centre-right commentator see Wildstein (2003). 15. This was, in fact, the founding congress of the newly fused party. 16. See, for example, the party’s threat to leave the governing coalition over this issue (Rzeczpospolita, 29 November 2002). 17. Some of these ideas are elaborated on in much greater detail in Chapter 10, conclusion to Volume 2.

14 Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic Sean Hanley

14.1 INTRODUCTION Following the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 1989, many commentators saw the democratic traditions, political stability, and successful economic reform programme of Czechoslovakia—and latterly the Czech Republic—as making the country a prime candidate for membership of the European Union (EU). These expectations were largely confirmed by the Czech Republic’s inclusion in 1997 amongst the first CEE states invited to begin accession negotiations and the successful conclusion of these negotiations in December 2002. In June 2003, a 77 per cent referendum vote in favour of joining the EU on these terms provided further confirmation of the Czech Republic’s smooth passage towards full EU membership in mid-2004. However, despite consistent majorities in favour of accession to the EU among both public and political parties, levels of Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic are significantly higher than in most other applicant states in the region (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002b; Kopecký 2004). This is puzzling given that Czechoslovakia’s ‘Velvet Revolution’ in 1989 seemed to mark a clear reaffirmation of the traditional Czech orientation towards Western Europe. This chapter examines this paradox, tracing the development of Czech party debates on European integration since 1989 and analysing in detail the positions of the three most significant Eurosceptic groupings in the Czech Republic: the Communists, the Republicans and other groups on the far right, and the centre-right Civic Democratic Party of former Prime Minister Václav Klaus. It concludes with an assessment of the evolution of the Czech debate on Europe and the underlying causes of the party-based Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic.

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14.2.1 Czech national identity and Europe Despite the existence of a minority Slavophile tradition looking to Russia, the dominant trend in Czech political thought historically was to seek to link the Czech lands with western democratic states. This stance—frequently contrasted by nationalist thinkers with the (supposedly) imperial, authoritarian, and centralizing traditions of the Austro-German world (Bradley 1984; Pfaff 1996)— was given practical expression after 1918 in the foreign policy of the newly independent Czechoslovak state, enjoying the broad support of all Czech parties, with the exception of the Communists (Gellner 1994; Baer 2000). However, the August 1938 Munich Agreement, which resulted in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany with the acquiescence of Great Britain and France, prompted a rethinking of the traditional Czech identification with Western Europe. Ideas developed by the Czech and the Slovak politicians during and after the Second World War instead stressed on the role of a restored Czechoslovakia as a ‘bridge’ between the USSR and the West (Beneš 1940; Hodža 1942). The establishment of communist one-party rule in February 1948 took the post-war shift in Czech European alignments to its logical end, incorporating Czechoslovakia into a set of socialist bloc institutions centring on the USSR. Czechoslovakia’s position within this bloc was largely taken for granted by both opponents and supporters of the regime until the mid-1970s, when new thinking about Europe started to emerge among Czech intellectuals both in exile and within independent non-socialist groups, such as Charter 77. However, these thinkers focused on geo-strategic issues (Dienstbier 1990), philosophical critiques of modernity in both East and West (Havel 1989), or the distinct historical character of Central Europe (Kundera 1984) and largely ignored processes of integration taking place in Western Europe. Indeed, to many the European Community (EC) appeared at best an irrelevance, and at worst an obstacle, to reducing Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.

14.2.2 Europe and post-communist transformation After the collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia in the ‘Velvet Revolution’ of November 1989 the development of closer relations with Western Europe was an ideal endorsed across the political spectrum. However, re-establishing ties with ‘Europe’ was understood largely in symbolic terms as an affirmation of the Czechs’ and the Slovaks’ historical affinity with the West and commitment to democracy and the market (Bugge 2000: 3–7). Political divisions in the immediate posttransition period were instead dominated by issues of domestic reform, such as economic transformation, decommunization, the reform of Czechoslovak federalism, and the relationship of political parties to civil society. To the limited extent that ‘Europe’ became a matter of mainstream domestic political dispute—it did so

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as part of the emerging Czech right-wing critique of the ‘civic’ politics of former dissidents such as Dienstbier and Havel. The main force on this new Czech centreright was the Civic Democratic Party (Obˇcanská demokratická strana, ODS) of Czechoslovak Finance Minister Václav Klaus, which had emerged from the Civic Forum movement in April 1991. Although the right’s critique focused mainly on issues of domestic transformation, it extended to Dienstbier’s foreign policy, whose early equivocations were seen as a dangerous reworking of reform communist aspirations of the 1960s to find a Third Way between Soviet-style communism and Western liberal capitalism (Hanley 1999, 2002a).

14.2.3 Václav Klaus and the emergence of Czech Euroscepticism The June 1992 elections in Czechoslovakia produced diametrically opposite results in the country’s two national republics, bringing to power Klaus’s centre-right Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Republic and the left-wing, nationalist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, HZDS) in Slovakia. This led to the division on 1 January 1993 of the Czechoslovak federation into two new independent states: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The centreright coalition government, which took office in the Czech Republic, under the premiership of Civic Democratic Party leader Václav Klaus, retained the commitment of its Czechoslovak predecessor to rapid integration with Western Europe and eventual membership of the EU. In other respects, however, its approach to European integration was very different. Having dispensed with the less reformminded and geographically (and supposedly culturally) less Western Slovaks, the new government believed its radical reform policies would quickly mark the Czech Republic out as an early candidate for admission to the EU. Accordingly, the Klaus government gave priority to integrating the Czech Republic into the global economy through membership of bodies such as Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), delaying the Czech Republic’s formal application for EU membership until 23 January 1996, and downplaying the importance of regional cooperation. Parallel to this, from 1992 onwards, Prime Minister Klaus also took up his characteristic high-profile Eurosceptic stance, criticizing the EU as overregulated and inefficient. However, Euroscepticism did not feature strongly in either the programme or the campaigning of Klaus’s party at this time (Hanley 2002a) or in wider Czech political debates, which both tended to view Czech participation in European and international integration as simply a corollary of the progress of domestic reform.

14.2.4 The rise of a pro-European centre-left From mid-1990s, however, Klaus’s pronounced public Euroscepticism was increasingly challenged by opponents on the centre-left as an additional aspect of their critique of Klaus’s increasingly vulnerable record as a reformer. At this

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ˇ time, the main opposition party, the Czech Social Democrats (Ceská strana ˇ sociálnˇe demokratická, CSSD), as well as the Christian Democrats (Kˇrest’anská ˇ ˇ a demokratická unie–Ceskoslovenská strana lidová, KDU–CSL), an increasingly restive junior partner in the Klaus government, began stressing the need for a more positive approach to EU accession and an acceptance of trends towards greater European political integration (Chalupa 2000). Internal opponents within the Civic Democratic Party itself, who in early 1998 broke away to form a new party, the Freedom Union (Unie Svobody, US), enthusiastically embraced Euro-federalism as a means of distancing themselves from Klaus (Banot 2000; Mareš 2000a). Divisions over European integration also came to inform the clash between the Prime Minister and President Havel, a persistent feature of Czech politics throughout the 1990s (Bugge 2000). In the June 1996 elections, the Klaus-led centre-right coalition narrowly failed to retain its parliamentary majority and was forced to continue as a minority administration ‘tolerated’ by the opposition Social Democrats until November 1997, when it finally collapsed over party financing scandals in the Civic Democrats and its smaller coalition partner, the Civic Democratic Alliance (Obˇcanská demokratická aliance, ODA).1 In early elections in June 1998, the Czech Social Democrats overtook Klaus’s Civic Democrats to become for the first time the largest party in parliament, but failed to win an outright majority. Although the parties of the outgoing centre-right coalition regained a theoretical majority, such were the tensions between them that Civic Democrat leader Václav Klaus opted to support a minority Social Democratic administration under Miloš Zeman on the basis of a written pact (the ‘Opposition Agreement’). This pact, intended to maintain political stability and introduce constitutional changes that both parties deemed necessary, was partly justified by its authors as a bipartisan attempt to ensure that preparations for EU membership were not delayed. However, although the bulk of the Czech Republic’s accession negotiations were conducted by the minority Social Democratic government,2 domestic debate was increasingly acrimonious and was, again, largely defined by the growing Euroscepticism of Klaus’s Civic Democrats. The ‘Opposition Agreement’ between Klaus’s party and the minority Social Democratic government endured until scheduled parliamentary elections in June 2002 (see Table 14.1). These were won by the Social Democrats under a new leader, Vladimir Špidla, who became prime minister. Špidla abandoned cooperation with the Civic Democrats to work with the smaller ‘Coalition’ grouping uniting the liberal Freedom Union and the Christian Democrats. These parties became junior partners in a coalition government with a narrow parliamentary majority. A shared commitment to rapid Czech accession to the EU and opposition to domestic Euroscepticism were important unifying factors for parties otherwise significantly divided over issues such as macroeconomic management and social policy. In the 2002 elections, EU accession became a significant campaign issue for the first time. This was largely because of the stress given to it by Klaus’s Civic

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Table 14.1. Parliamentary election results in the Czech Republic June 2002

Civic Democratic Party (ODS) Czech Social Democratic ˇ Party (CSSD) Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia ˇ (KSCM) ‘Coalition’ Freedom Union (US) Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party ˇ (KDU-CSL) Independents

June 1998

No. of votes

% of vote

No. of seats/200

No. of votes

% of vote

No. of seats /200

1,166,464

24.47

58

1,665,550

27.74

63

1,439,797

30.20

70

1,928,660

32.32

74

882,477

18.51

41

658,550

11.03

24

680,420 — —

14.27 — —

31 (8) (21)

— 513,596 537,013

— 8.60 9.00

— 19 20

—

(2)

—

—

—

—

Democrats. Moreover, the campaign saw the re-emergence of the Beneš Decrees— the post-war emergency measures expelling Czechoslovakia’s 2.5 million strong German Sudeten population in 1945–6 (Brown and Hahn 2001; Naegle 2002)— as an issue and its linkage with EU accession. The issue of the Decrees was taken up with particular enthusiasm by the two principal Eurosceptic parties, Klaus’s Civic Democrats and the Communists. In April 2002, these two parties worked together to table a parliamentary resolution—passed unanimously by all 169 deputies present—asserting that the Decrees were an unchangeable feature of Czech law (Korecký and Bílek 2002). However, after the publication in October 2002 of a legal opinion commissioned by the European Parliament, which found that the Decrees were not an obstacle to Czech accession, both the Decrees themselves and the wider issues of European integration rapidly faded in importance. Indeed, despite the unexpected election of Václav Klaus as new Czech President by parliament in February 2003, in party-political terms the 2003 accession referendum campaign was curiously muted with both the Communists and the Civic Democrats choosing to downplay its importance (Hanley 2003).

14.2.5 Czech voters and Europe Despite a marginal decline in support for accession towards the end of the decade, surveys of Czech public opinion throughout the 1990s consistently recorded clear majorities in favour of entry to the EU (STEM 2003). The result of the 2003 referendum, although arguably to some extent overstating the level of support for accession (Hanley 2003), confirmed this. As elsewhere in CEE, support for entry

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into the EU, including voting in the accession referendum, was higher among younger, more educated, urban voters and those employed in the private sector, and lower among older, less educated voters, and residents of small towns in rural areas (Mišoviˇc 2000). Both EU and Czech polling suggested that the key factors motivating those who rejected EU membership were economic concerns over possible rises in the cost of living or increases in unemployment that they personally would find difficult to adjust to. More diffuse fears that the Czechs would have a ‘second class’ membership also appeared as a secondary factor (European Commission 2002; STEM 2003).3 There is contradictory evidence as to the importance of Czech–German relations in shaping Czech voters’ perceptions of European integration and the EU. However, short-term fluctuations and regional variations in support for accession do in some cases seem to be correlated with the emergence of the Beneš Decrees as a ‘European’ issue.4 In political terms, this was reflected in the fact that supporters of centre-right, free market parties such as Klaus’s Civic Democrats and the liberal, Europhile Freedom Union overwhelmingly supported accession to the EU, while supporters of the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats showed slightly lower majorities in favour. Only among Communist Party supporters were a majority opposed to accession—exit polling from the 2003 accession referendum suggested that 63 per cent of Communist voters who had participated in the referendum voted ‘no’ (Lidové noviny 2003). In comparative terms, excluding the traditionally Eurosceptic Baltic states, levels of support for EU membership in the Czech Republic were lower than for other CEE accession states (European Commission 2002). This appears to correlate with the presence in the Czech party system of parties and an electorate on the radical right and left hostile to integration with Western Europe and also— in Klaus’s Civic Democrats—a mainstream party whose support for accession has at best been lukewarm. Although there seems little overt support for the Civic Democrats’ specific anti-integrationist arguments among mainstream Czech voters,5 its coherent and well-established Eurosceptic discourse may have had some impact on public opinion, without altering voters’ fundamental preferences.

14.3 EUROSCEPTICISM ON LEFT AND RIGHT IN CZECH POLITICS There are currently three parties or groups of parties in the Czech Republic, which can be described as Eurosceptic: the far right Republicans (Republikáni Miroslava Sládka, RMS) and similar groups, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia ˇ ˇ (Komunistická strana Cech a Moravy, KSCM) and the Civic Democratic Party. While the Communists and the Civic Democrats are important electoral and political actors in the Czech party system, the far right has gradually become a marginal force despite being represented in parliament between 1992 and 1998. It is, nevertheless, included here both because of its marked Euroscepticism and

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Table 14.2. Eurosceptic parties in the Czech Republic Party

Party family

Position on European integration

Civic Democratic Party (ODS) Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia ˇ (KSCM) Miroslav Sládek Republicans (RMS)

liberal-conservative

Soft Eurosceptic

24.47%

communist

Hard Eurosceptic— tendency towards Soft Euroscepticism Hard Eurosceptic

18.51%

extreme right populist

Support at most recent election (2002)

0.97%

as a point of comparison with other national cases. Sections 14.3.1–14.3.3 review each party’s understanding of European integration generally and its more specific positions on the accession process and the Czech Republic’s prospects in an enlarged EU. Each section concludes by examining a party’s position in terms of the distinction between ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Euroscepticism developed by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002; see Table 14.2).

14.3.1 The Republicans and the far right For much of 1990s, the principal force on the Czech far right was the Association for the Republic–Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro republiku– ˇ ˇ Formed in February 1990, the Republikánská strana Ceskoslovenska, SPR–RSC). Republicans were initially one of a plethora of small, obscure anti-communist groups. However, in late 1990 the party and its charismatic leader Miroslav Sládek came to wider public attention, when they started to promote conspiracy theories alleging that the Velvet Revolution had been jointly stage managed by communist and dissident elites. The Republicans successfully combined radical anticommunism with anti-Soviet nationalism and took up a number of a populist demands for larger social benefits, greater law and order, and less bureaucracy. These campaigns were often linked with vitriolic attacks on the Czech Republic’s Romany minority. However, by 1992, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern and Central Europe, the dissolution of Soviet bloc institutions and of the USSR itself, and the break-up of the Czechoslovak federation had made the party’s anti-communism and demands for a Greater Czechoslovakia less relevant. The Republicans therefore refocused their campaigning on the more traditional nationalist concern of Czech–German relations, seeking to defend the Czech Republic against the (supposed) claims of Germany and Sudeten German organizations in Germany and Austria. In doing so, the party also attacked the Czech government as traitors comparable with wartime collaborators for supposed plans to abolish the Beneš Decrees and return former Sudeten German property (Pehe 1991; Stroehlein 1998; Mareš 2000b).

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The Republicans’ mix of outrageous rhetoric and provocative, well-publicized demonstrations enabled them to mobilize enough support to enter the Czech Parliament in both 1992 and 1996, polling up to 8 per cent of the national vote. However, by 1997, Sládek’s autocratic management of his party and the use of its funds to finance a lavish lifestyle had led to internal splits. In the June 1998 elections, the Republicans unexpectedly failed to re-enter the Czech Parliament, losing votes to the resurgent Czech Social Democrats (Kreidl and Vlachová 2000). The party subsequently disintegrated and was declared bankrupt in 2001, but was quickly replaced by a small successor organization, the Miroslav Sládek Republicans (Republikáni Miroslava Sládka, RMS). The RMS, however, have remained politically marginal, polling only 1 per cent in the June 2002 parliamentary elections. Despite the Republicans’ lack of clear policies in many areas, a clear ‘Hard’ Eurosceptic position can be identified in the programmes of the both the SPR-RSCˇ and the RMS and in the extensive published writings and speeches of party leader Miroslav Sládek. The Republicans flatly reject Czech membership of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU as a violation of national sovereignty and a grave threat to national identity comparable to Czechoslovakia’s earlier incorporation into the Soviet bloc. As early as 1995, Sládek (1995: 178) thus argued for a ‘resolute no’ to EU membership, demanding the withdrawal of the Czech Republic’s application for membership (which had, in fact, not yet formally been submitted), and the breaking off of negotiations with the EU. This position has been consistently maintained. A recent Republican manifesto, for example, rejected membership of the EU, claiming that [The EU] denies the very existence of sovereign nations and is creating a single multinational, multiethnic unit from them . . . the concept of the EU is in many ways similar to the philosophy of communism . . . national traditions will completely disappear and the citizens of Europe’s former nations will become a single mass without a past or future.(RMS 2001)

The Republicans have also sometimes used more a qualified rhetoric of costs and benefits, national economic sovereignty, and absolute political independence to oppose EU membership. The party claimed that EU membership would be too costly; would bring little economic and strategic benefit; was irrelevant to the Czech Republic’s needs; and was being forced on Czechs at a time when it would be politically and economically disadvantageous, given the disparity between Western and Eastern Europe. As Sládek (1995: 178), put it ‘[O]ur nation has been given no pause for breath during which we might calmly consider our past . . . and draw up future plans. We are being driven without a break from one inglorious adventure in so-called international co-operation into another.’ In his view ‘. . . until an economically and politically strong Czech Republic has been built up, which will be able to reopen the issue as a partner fully equal to the EU’, accession should be ruled out (Sládek 1995: 178). As an alternative perspective compatible with absolute national sovereignty, Republican writings on occasions revived the post-war (left-wing) nationalist discourse of Czechoslovakia as a state linking East and West, but independent of both.

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A draft of the party’s 1998 programme, for example, argued that ‘. . . our nation should at last be itself. We consider a one-sided orientation, first towards the East and now towards the West, incorrect. . . . We see the task of the Czech Republic in building bridges between East and West. A Europe of sovereign and equal nation states’ (cited in Mareš 2000b). However, more recently, beyond advocating a ‘Europe of nations’ and noting their support for the positions of the Euronat grouping sponsored by the French Front National (RMS 2001), the Republicans have presented no clear alternative to EU accession. In the period preceding the June 2003 Czech accession referendum, a number of other groups on the fragmented Czech radical right also profiled themselves as ‘Hard’ Eurosceptics. In November 2002, several small groups with a neo-fascist orientation appealed for state funding for Citizens Against the EU, an organization they had formed to campaign for a ‘no’ vote in the accession referendum (Radio Prague 2002). In early 2003—in combination with another far right fringe grouping, the National Party (Národní strana, NS)—and two other right-wing Eurosceptic campaign groups, this grouping launched a joint ‘no’ campaign. Analysis of the National Party’s materials suggests, that, although presented more prominently, these far right groups’ Euroscepticism is similar to that of the Republicans in viewing European integration as a negation of both national sovereignty and national identity and serving the interests of German big business (Edelmannová 2001). Other less extreme groupings on the extra-parliamentary right have also embraced ‘Hard’ Euroscepticism. The Czech Right grouping, for example, which contested the 2002 parliamentary elections polling 0.04 per cent, rejects the EU as a ‘system of central socialistic commandment imposed against the will of majority of European citizens’ and ‘an unnatural anti-European unit’, whose goal was to ‘gradually abolish the constitutional sovereignty of European democratic states’. It therefore considers Czech EU membership unacceptable and instead, like the Republicans, advocates ‘free cooperation between absolutely independent ˇ European states’ (Ceská pravice 2002).

ˇ 14.3.2 The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) Unlike many other former ruling communist parties in Eastern and Central Europe, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia has not transformed itself into a social democratic party, but into a hard-left communist party comparable with small orthodox communist parties in countries such as France, Italy, Portugal, and Greece (Hanley 2001; Grzymala-Busse 2002). Although the party has, both in principle and in practice, accepted multiparty democracy and the idea of a market economy, it remains committed to radical left-wing policies and seeks to create an economy with a dominant public sector and substantial state ˇ was regarded as a political pariah by all control. During the 1990s the KSCM other Czech parties, as well as by President Havel, because of its failure to condemn unambiguously communist one-party rule before 1989. It was, therefore, excluded from coalition discussions at all national, regional, and—with the exception of

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small towns and villages—local levels. For much of the 1990s the party polled between 10 and 14 per cent of the national vote. However, in 2002, it significantly increased its vote to 18.5 per cent, benefiting from both a low turnout and disillusionment among some Social Democratic voters. This has helped the party win greater political acceptability and influence. With the agreement or support of the Social Democrats, by the end of 2002 the Communists had, for example, gained the chairmanship of a number of parliamentary committees, a deputy speakership in parliament, and executive positions in a number of important municipalities in the east of the Czech Republic. Given its self-identification as a radical, anti-capitalist, anti-system alternative, the Communist party has unsurprisingly been critical of current patterns of European integration. Since its foundation in March 1990, the Communist party has consistently advocated pan-European political and security structures, which it sees as a means of retaining ties with the former Soviet Union and China. The party has also repeatedly stressed that rapid integration with existing West European institutions could pose a threat to the Czech Republic’s national traditions and national sovereignty and leave the country vulnerable to economic exploitation (Bugge 2000; Mareš 2000a). However, whilst vehemently hostile to membership of NATO, which the Czech Republic joined in March 1999, the party’s views on the EU and the prospect of Czech accession were surprisingly vague and equivocal. In part this was because, between 1997 and 2002, the party did not publish any substantial materials dealing specifically with European integration and largely ignored the issue in campaigning.6 However, this concealed more fundamental ambiguities and divisions over European integration. Despite the absence of up-to-date policy documents, the Communists’ views on the European integration and the EU can be reconstructed in some detail from more general programmatic statements. Despite fears over the position of the Czech Republic as a small state within an enlarged EU, the Communist party has no objection in principle to European integration and views the decline of ˇ n.d.). The party’s national sovereignty as to some extent inevitable (ÚV KSCM position on possible Czech EU membership is summed up in the formula used in the manifesto A Better Path for Our Country adopted at its December 1999 Congress. This states that while ‘we reject the current form of the EU’, the party did so because the Czech membership should be conditional on ‘equitable conditions of entry and an enhanced economic, political and defence role for Europe’ (ÚV ˇ 1999a). The Communists’ willingness to contemplate EU membership in KSCM certain circumstances has led them to formulate detailed critiques of EU policies and structures. In institutional terms, the Communist party has advocated the democratization of the EU through strengthening the powers of the European Parliament, but opposed the development of any strong central authority, calling, for example, for a reduction in the powers of the European Commission (ÚV ˇ n.d.). The party also appears critical of many aspects of the current acquis KSCM communautaire and in particular of its possible extension, opposing steps towards tax harmonization and a European defence capability and wishes to postpone

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ˇ 2001). The party is concerned with Czech adoption of the euro (ÚV KSCM the effect of the Single Market on prices and wages, employment in the Czech Republic, and on the position of Czech industrial and agricultural producers, as well as the possibility of a ‘brain drain’. Its leaders therefore sought unspecified ‘protection’ and ‘guarantees’ to protect Czech interests logically implying substantial (transitional) exemptions from the acquis (Grebeníˇcek 2002). However, certain aspects of the EU and acquis have been viewed positively. A Communist party Central Committee strategy document on a possible accession referendum, for example, recommended ‘acceptance of EU demands concerning reform of public administration, labour protection, the judiciary and the struggle with economic criminality and corruption’ (ÚV KSCM 2001). Moreover, despite the Communists’ complaints that farmers in candidate states will receive ‘discriminatory’ levels of subsidy under transitional arrangements for the Common Agriˇ 2002a), the CAP is not dissimilar in conception cultural Policy (CAP) (ÚV KSCM ˇ from the highly subsidized model of agriculture favoured by the party (ÚV KSCM 2002b). Czech Communists have also frequently suggested that alternatives to EU membership should be considered, but have rarely developed such scenarios at any length. Alternatives proposed have typically centred on some form of renegotiated association with the EU or the renewal of traditional links with the former USSR, China, and the developing countries (Formánek n.d., Svobodová 2003.). However, more recent strategy and discussion documents have described such non-EU ˇ 2001) and more likely to leave the Czech scenarios as ‘unrealistic’ (ÚV KSCM Republic in a ‘neo-colonial’ position with regard to transnational and US capital ˇ Praha 10 2002). (Formánek n.d.; OV KSCM The Czech Communists’ position on the question of accession itself is equally ambiguous. At its fifth Congress in December 1999, the party rejected the Czech government’s ‘policy of overhasty, unconditional accession to the European Union, which could have unfavourable effects on the country and lead to a major ˇ 1999a). In May 2002, it reaffirmed this economic and social upheaval’ (ÚV KSCM view criticizing the Czech government’s pursuit of EU membership ‘under any conditions’, demanding that the chapter on agriculture be reopened. ‘Accepting such an unequal accession’, it argued, would put the Czech Republic in a ‘secondˇ 2002a). However, the class position’, which would be ‘unacceptable’ (ÚV KSCM party deliberately postponed adopting an explicit position until March 2003 when the majority of its executive opted for a ‘qualified no’ position of ‘not recomˇ 2003a). This position was justified on the mending’ EU membership (KSCM grounds that the terms of entry—and in particular the nature and balance of agricultural subsidies and regional aid and the power of the EU bureaucracy— were unacceptable, that the Czech Republic was unprepared for the rigours of the ˇ 2003b). Single Market, and that the future shape of the EU was uncertain (KSCM Nevertheless, immediately after the 2003 referendum vote for accession, the party accepted the Czech EU membership as a reality and unveiled a political strategy ˇ seeking to use regulatory aspects of the acquis to gain political leverage (KSCM 2003a).

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The Communists’ belated, but explicit, rejection of accession clearly qualifies it as a ‘Hard’ Eurosceptic formation. This is reinforced by the nature and extent of the exemptions from the Single Market implied by its well-established demands, which appear in practice to be incompatible with membership of the EU. Nevertheless, the party’s Eurosceptic discourse is highly equivocal and contains substantial elements more typical of a ‘Soft’ Eurosceptic position. These include (limited) positive evaluation of some aspects of the current acquis, a failure to rule out membership in the longer term, and a tendency to regard accession as a fait accompli. Communist ambiguity towards EU accession reflects a number of factors. Firstly, despite the obvious ideological distance between the Communist party’s policy and existing EU practice, much of the ‘social’ and regulatory aspect of the acquis are acceptable, and even attractive to the party. Secondly, party leaders were clearly aware that, given the balance of political forces and public opinion in the Czech Republic and the country’s geopolitical position since 1989, they were unlikely to be able to prevent Czech accession to the EU. Indeed, paradoxically, the Communists may even gain politically from it. Links with other communist and left-wing parties in the European Parliament and the greater willingness of EU actors and institutions to deal with the party as ‘normal’ could contribute to its increasingly successful efforts to break out of its domestic political isolation. The party is additionally politically well represented in a number of Czech regional authorities, which will benefit from EU structural funds, which could offer it a springboard for greater national influence. Finally, the (officially unresolved) question of the party’s attitude to EU accession in 2004 has already become an issue opposing pragmatists and conservatives, reflecting deeper divisions over the extent to which the party should modify established positions to gain allies and broaden its appeal (Formanek n.d.; see also Hanley 2001). In July 2002, and in the aftermath of the June 2003 accession referendum, conservatives in the party made fierce public criticisms of party Deputy Chairmen Miroslav Ransdorf and Jiˇrí Dolejš for openly advocating Czech EU accession (Kundra 2002; Götzová 2003). A desire to avoid potentially destructive splits has thus provided a further incentive for the Communists to downplay the issue of EU accession.

14.3.3 The Civic Democratic Party The Civic Democratic Party is the principal party of the centre-right in the Czech Republic. In the early to mid-1990s the Civic Democratic Party was the dominant force in Czech politics and the linchpin of the 1992–7 centre-right coalition governments that implemented many key policies of post-communist transformation. However, its electoral support has decreased steadily from a peak of 32 per cent in 1992 to the 25 per cent it received in 2002. However, notwithstanding the recent decline in its electoral fortunes and loss of office nationally in 1997, it retains a strong centralized national organization and plays a key role in governing large municipalities and regional authorities.

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The Civic Democratic Party has consistently supported Czech accession to the EU as a key priority for Czech foreign policy (ODS 1992, 1996). In the early 1990s, however, its leader Václav Klaus developed a high-profile ‘Thatcherite’ Eurosceptic position, arguing that the EU was too bureaucratic and too economically interventionist as a result of its origins in post-war West European social and Christian democracy (Klaus 1997a). This was arguably the first Czech discourse on Europe after 1989 to deal with the EU directly, rather than as part of the broader geopolitical context. It was also significant because it combined criticism of existing West European institutions with an underlying commitment to integration with Western Europe. With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EU, Klaus believed, had departed from its original economic goals in favour of unrealistic political ambitions to create a federal European superstate rivalling the USA. The euro, Klaus argued, lacked an objective economic basis, as the diverse economies of Europe did not constitute an optimal currency zone. Moreover, a politically integrated EU ‘state’ based on a common currency would, he believed, be unworkable because of the absence of a strong common European identity, which would be politically essential to underpin necessary redistribution between poorer and richer regions (Klaus 1997b). This judgement was, in his view, confirmed by the contrasting experiences of Germany and Czechoslovakia after 1989. Whereas the former East Germany was successfully integrated with West Germany on the basis of a common national identity, in Czechoslovakia the divergent national identities of the Czechs and Slovaks doomed attempts to maintain an economically and politically integrated federation to failure (Klaus 1997d). The national state should, Klaus believed, therefore be the sole building block of European integration, as both a ‘natural’ product of human development and a guarantee of democratic accountability (Klaus 1997a). In pushing ahead with political integration and limiting national sovereignty, the EU was, he claimed, ignoring the historical sensitivities of Eastern and Central European candidate states, which had always been historically dominated by supranational structures imposed by more powerful neighbours (Klaus 1997c). More significantly, he suggested, the wholesale transfer to the region of West European political and economic structures—and, in particular, the abolition of national currencies—could lock it into a cycle of backwardness, by preventing its countries adjusting economic policies to suit local needs, for instance, by competitive devaluation (Klaus 1997b, 1997e). It is worth noting that, despite the occasional toughness of its rhetoric, Klaus’s Euroscepticism during this period remained very squarely within the limits of a ‘Soft’ Eurosceptic critique. At no time did he or other Civic Democratic Party leaders call into question, even in hypothetical terms, the necessity or desirability of Czech membership of the EU. Nor was it suggested that any of the EU’s fundamental institutions or aspects of the acquis, should be reformed or rejected. Indeed, in most speeches and writings during the 1990s, Klaus presented his views on European integration as sceptical reflections, which did not draw explicit political conclusions.

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However, after losing office in 1997, the Civic Democrats as a party developed a considerably more strident and wide-ranging Eurosceptic critique; making detailed criticisms of EU institutions and the acquis and focusing more narrowly on the concept of the Czech ‘national interest’. The party’s revised stance on European integration first emerged in mid-1999 (Klaus 1999; Zahradil 1999a, 1999b). However, it was most fully developed in its 2001 Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism, drafted by a team led by its Foreign Affairs spokesman, Jan Zahradil. The ideas of the Manifesto featured prominently in a more abbreviated form in its 2002 election programme (ODS 2002). As before, the Civic Democratic Party was highly critical of many of the policies and institutions that made up the acquis, which it saw as imposing inappropriate and over-exacting standards on Eastern and Central European states that were likely to undermine their long-term competitiveness and prosperity. It firmly opposed any further erosion of national sovereignty, any enhancement of the powers of the European Parliament or the European Commission, and any extension of the system of qualified majority voting (QMV) among national governments, considering that current levels of political integration should be frozen (Zahradil et al. 2001; Klaus 2002a). It continued to be sceptical about the euro, whose introduction in the Czech Republic it considered should be subject to a specific referendum, and anticipated that ‘if the circumstances require, [we may] keep the tools of monetary policy in our own hands’ (Zahradil et al. 2001: section 3). The Civic Democratic Party also opposed the development of a European defence capacity as unnecessary, impractical, and undermining of NATO (Neˇcas 2001). It was highly critical of EU regional, structural, and labour policies, which it saw as restricting the free market, and its agriculture spokesman went so far as to suggest that in an enlarged EU the CAP should be abolished and replaced by a low-subsidy free-market regime (Kuˇcera 2001).7 Both Václav Klaus and other Civic Democratic Party leaders generally welcomed the positive effect that EU accession might have in spurring the muchneeded reform of the Czech legal system. However, they expressed strong criticism of EU’s emphasis on civil service reform as an aspect of the pre-accession process. In Klaus’s view, the European Commission, like all bureaucracies, was seeking to expand its influence by creating subordinate national public administrations based on values of hierarchy, seniority, and status, holding back the development of a much-needed enterprise culture in the Czech Republic. Given the gulf between public- and private-sector salaries and the fact that most officials had been trained under communism, Klaus argued, it was in any case unrealistic to expect rapid improvement in public administration or the courts, other than by reducing regulatory burdens (Klaus 2001). To a considerable extent the Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism and other Civic Democrat documents of this period merely elaborated Klaus’s earlier views on the nature of the EU more systematically. However, in its view of the enlargement process and Czech accession strategy, the new ‘realist’ doctrine developed by Zahradil and his collaborators represented a more radical departure. The Manifesto depicted European integration as a maelstrom of conflicting and unequal

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interests, in which existing member states and powerful interest groups in Western Europe had no strong interest in extending membership to Eastern and Central Europe. The process, it claimed, was not aimed at the fastest possible accession of the candidate countries, but rather at the exploitation of the pre-accession process for the benefit of the present members: The EU sees the candidate countries, above all, as markets for its products and as an advantageous outlet for its surplus experts. The candidate countries are also seen as a source of raw materials and a qualified and cheap local labour force, as well as a potential buffer zone against the political and security risks of the East or the Balkans (Zahradil et al. 2001: section 2).

For the Civic Democrats, this suggested that enlargement would be delayed until approximately 2010, either directly or through the granting of a ‘second-rate membership’ characterized by significant transitional restrictions on, for example, the rights of Central Europeans to work in other EU states (Zahradil et al. 2001). Given these pressures, the Civic Democrats suggested that the key focus of the Czech accession strategy should be on the quality and conditions, rather than the rapidity of Czech entry to the EU (Klaus 2002b, 2002c). To meet this anticipated delay, and because it feared that the Czech Republic might be marginalized in an expanded EU or have vital national interests overruled, the party contemplated a number of scenarios for Czech non-membership of the EU in the Manifesto. These centred either on participating only in the Single Market through membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and European Economic Area (EEA) on the Norwegian model, or through bilateral treaties with the EU on the Swiss model. The Manifesto also advocated closer Czech links with the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) (Zahradil et al. 2001). As well as a general concern with loss of sovereignty, the Manifesto also expressed fears that the national interests of the Czech Republic might be unacceptably overridden in a number of specific ways, which might lead a future Czech government to ‘review’ EU membership. These included the possibility that the Czech Republic might, as part of the EU, be forced to follow an anti-US foreign policy or to repeal the Beneš Decrees. The taking up of the issue of the Decrees reflected a growing tendency on the part of the Civic Democratic Party to link its ‘Anglo-Saxon’ neo-liberal Euroscepticism with the more traditional nationalist paradigm of asserting Czech interests against Germany. A veiled anti-German undercurrent can be detected in many Civic Democratic Party statements on European integration of the 1990s (Bazin 1999). However, from 1999 the party explicitly linked the federalist trends in European integration it was opposed to with German designs for and interests in the EU. It also chose to link the perceived clash of Czech and German interests in contemporary Europe with the emotive, historical issue of the Beneš Decrees. The rhetoric of historical Czech nationalism also coloured Civic Democrat interventions against political opponents in debates on Europe at this time. In a speech to party gathering in June 2000, Klaus, for example, accused Czech Europhile politicians of having a ‘Protectorate mentality’ in automatically deferring to stronger

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neighbouring powers (Klaus 2000)—a reference to the collaboration of some Czech politicians with the Nazi occupation of the Czech Lands in 1939–45. During the 2002 election campaign, the Civic Democrats further emphasized their determination, if necessary, to put such ‘national interests’ ahead of EU accession. In May 2002, Václav Klaus made it clear that his party would not support EU entry unless the EU guaranteed the status of the Decrees after Czech accession (Klaus 2002d, 2002e). The Civic Democrats position after 1999 represented a clear shift in the direction of ‘Hard’ Euroscepticism. For the first time the party advocated Czech non-membership of the EU in certain circumstances. Moreover, in making Civic Democrat support for EU entry conditional on the guaranteeing of the Beneš Decrees, Václav Klaus was presenting demands which were impossible or unlikely to be met—a feature of ‘Hard’ Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, despite such hypothetical rejections of membership, the party’s formal commitment to achieving EU membership through the current accession process leads one to continue to classify it as a ‘Soft’ Eurosceptic formation. However, a change of leadership following the 2002 elections has thrown the party’s position on Europe into considerable doubt. For the Civic Democrats, the 2002 election results were a major reverse, representing the failure of the party’s realignment since losing office in 1997. Internal recriminations focused on Klaus, whom many powerful regional party organizations felt had become an electoral liability. In October 2002, Klaus announced that he would not stand for re-election as party chairman at its December 2002 congress, to facilitate his campaign for the Czech presidency, due to be vacated by Václav Havel in February 2003. Unexpectedly, the congress elected as Klaus’s successor Senator Miroslav Topolánek, a pragmatic politician with a strong regional power base. At the same time, however, Jan Zahradil, who was elected to the influential new position of party First Deputy Chairman, continued as the Civic Democrat’s principal foreign affairs spokeman, retaining a strong commitment to ‘Eurorealism’ (Zahradil 2002). This was followed by the unexpected election of Václav Klaus as President of the Czech Republic by a joint session of the Czech Parliament in February 2003, with the support of Communist deputies attracted by Klaus’s resolute defence of the Beneš Decrees and promise to normalize relations with their party, further complicated the situation in Civic Democratic Party. The 2003 accession referendum campaign thus saw the Civic Democrats appear divided and ambivalent over EU membership. While the party and its key leaders, including Topolánek and Zahradil, supported accession and called for a ‘yes’ vote, their lack of enthusiasm was palpable. The Civic Democratic Party thus refrained from any public campaigning in connection with the referendum, restricting its activity to an internal ideological conference on European integration and leaflet explaining that the future form of the EU mattered more than accession itself (ODS 2003). However, a small number of Civic Democrat figures—including two of the coauthors of the Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism and two party Shadow Ministers, ˇ Ivan Langer and Martin Ríman—stated publicly that they would vote against accession (Kundra 2003). Meanwhile, President Klaus, although insisting on his right as head of state to co-sign the Athens Treaty in April 2003, refused either

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to call publicly for a ‘yes’ vote in the accession referendum or to reveal how he himself had voted, in order to emphasize the neutrality of his office.

14.4 CONCLUSIONS

14.4.1 The Czech debate on Europe: In search of ‘national interests’ As elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe, debates on European integration in the Czech Republic have moved from a ‘politics of symbols’ to a ‘politics of interests’ in the course of the 1990s (Henderson 2001). This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the evolving Eurosceptic discourse of the Civic Democrats. However, in the Czech Republic the debate has remained at the level of a general ‘national interest’, with relatively little attention paid to specific interest groups such as farmers, who lack the social or demographic weight that they have in other countries in the region. However, as the Czech case clearly demonstrates a discourse of ‘national interests’ need not automatically be associated with ‘Soft’ or ‘softening’ Euroscepticism. Rather, it appears, concepts of ‘national interests’ can be constructed to justify a range of positions, including a distinct ‘hardening’ in a party’s Euroscepticism. Conversely, the Czech case suggests that a Euroscepticism based on broad ideological objections to the EU, whether neo-liberal or neocommunist—can sustain a ‘Soft’ or ‘softening’ stance. The Czech case also highlights how well-established historical discourses can inform contemporary debates about European integration. Czech Eurosceptic discourses, even if they draw on West European political ideologies, have shown a growing tendency to frame integration in terms of revised historical nationalist paradigms. The reworking of historical nationalist paradigms in debates on European integration has resulted in a growing tendency to view accession and enlargement in terms of Czech–German relations or in a clash between ‘AngloSaxon’ or ‘Central European’ respect for diversity and national sovereignty and ‘German’ centralism and federalism. This can be seen most clearly in the emergence in 2002 of the Beneš Decrees as a symbolic focus for Czech anxieties about national identity and national sovereignty in an enlarged EU—a focus (and anxieties) shared by all three, very different, Eurosceptic parties analysed here.

14.4.2 The radical left and right: A Euroscepticism of disempowerment and radical dissent Scholars are currently divided over the extent to which party-based Euroscepticism reflects the views of a party’s electorate constituency (Henderson 2001); the influence of party ideology (Batory 2002; Kopecký and Mudde 2002); and the competitive incentives a given party system offers party strategists (Sitter 2002). Moreover, as Sitter (2002) observes, although some generalizations can be made,

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the exact pattern of causation for Euroscepticism will vary on a party-by-party basis. Applied to the Czech Eurosceptic parties, in two cases these alternative explanations converge, but markedly diverge in the third. The Euroscepticism of the Communists and the Republicans can be explained in terms of social constituencies, ideology, and party competition, with each factor reinforcing the others. Both parties represent electorates of transition ‘losers’ for whom European integration represents a continuation of processes of post-communist transformation, which have economically and culturally disempowered them (Kreidl and Vlachová 1999, 2000; Hanley 2001). Both parties are committed to radical ideologies, challenging both the current political establishment and the legitimacy of the post-1989 system. As Taggart (1998) argues, for such parties, scepticism towards the emerging European order is in many ways a logical continuation of domestic radicalism. In a Czech (and Central European) context such tendencies are reinforced by the strong nationalist discourses associated with radical left and right, both historically and since 1989. Viewed in terms of party system dynamics, both the Republicans and the Communists, as parties located at the fringes of the Czech party system with little prospect of holding government office, had weak incentives to moderate their Eurosceptic stances. However, in the case of the Czech Communists, competitive incentives have clearly had a limited effect. There is a significant disjuncture between the views of the Communists’ supporters, the overwhelming majority of whom reject EU membership (Mišoviˇc 2000; Lidové noviny 2003), and the more nuanced position of the party itself. This is explicable partly by the Communist elites’ more sophisticated grasp of the geopolitical realities of post-cold war Europe. However, it also reflects strategic dilemmas and divisions within the party. The Communists’ recent electoral success and growing political influence have exacerbated a debate between modernizers and conservatives in the party, in which European integration seems to have become a touchstone issue (Hanley 2001). Modernizers wish the party to pursue a catch-all strategy, seeking new voters and alliances on the centre-left with the more etatistic wing of the Social Democrats and, where necessary, moderating its more radical positions including its ‘Hard’ Euroscepticism. Conservatives, by contrast, remain committed to a policy of radical opposition to the current political and economic establishment, including radical opposition to the EU.

14.4.3 The Civic Democrats: Euroscepticism as ideological fillip? Of the three Czech Eurosceptic parties, the Civic Democratic Party is by far the most significant case. This is both because of its size and importance and because its position on European integration fits poorly with many explanations of partybased Euroscepticism. During the 1990s, the party was both the dominant force in Czech politics and the key vehicle for policies of post-communist transformation. As such, it has consistently drawn on an electorate of transition ‘winners’— younger, wealthier, more educated, and urban voters—the large majority of whom

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have favoured EU membership (Herzmann 2000; Mišoviˇc 2000; Lidové noviny 2003). The Civic Democrats’ Euroscepticism cannot, therefore, be viewed as a response to the expectations and interests of its electorate or a reflection of cleavages opened up by post-communist transformation. The party’s hardening Euroscepticism also lacks a clear rationale when viewed in terms of party system dynamics and party competition. As both a broad catch-all formation seeking to maximize its electorate, and a major potential party of government seeking alliances with other parties, the Civic Democrats should, analysts suggest, have adopted a pro-European or non-committal position when in office, shifting perhaps to moderate Euroscepticism when in opposition (Sitter 2002). Instead, the party developed an increasingly high-profile Eurosceptic agenda, which in opposition took it to the verge of a Hard Eurosceptic position, alienating other centre-right groupings and undermining its own coalition potential in the process. If we broaden the notion of electoral competition, the party’s Euroscepticism can perhaps be interpreted as a strategic attempt to realign the Czech electorate around the issue of ‘national interests’, thus winning over more Eurosceptic voters on the centre and left (Hanley 2002a). However, as both early polling (Herzmann 2000) and the results of the 2002 elections themselves confirmed, the issue of European integration lacked salience for the majority of Czech voters. The Civic Democrats’ Euroscepticism, therefore, predictably failed to attract left-wing or centrist voters, and may even have lost it supporters on the right not already committed to Klaus and his party (Hanley 2002b). It, therefore, seems that the Civic Democrats’ Euroscepticism has been primarily driven by the party’s ideology. This appears true in two senses. First, Civic Democrat leaders, and in particular Václav Klaus, had a well-established commitment to neo-liberalism dating back to their emergence as a counter-elite in communist Czechoslovakia (Hanley 1999). As Marks and Wilson (2000) argue, neo-liberals have found the political integration and social market elements of the post-Maastricht EU increasingly unacceptable, leading them to reverse their earlier enthusiasm for European integration as a project centring mainly on the creation of a Single Market. Secondly, however, the Civic Democrats’ preoccupation with Euroscepticism reflected the search for a durable centre-right ideology. The Civic Democrats were a party largely formed in response to the imperatives of post-communist transformation. However, as the polarized politics of largescale transformation receded at the end of the 1990s, the party increasingly lost its ideological coherency (Hanley 1999). Euroscepticism seems to have offered it a means to redefine itself ideologically, combining its earlier neo-liberalism with more traditional nationalist paradigms. Whilst clearly suboptimal as an electoral strategy, this nevertheless represented a coherent ideological position capable of rallying neo-liberals, neoconservatives and local interest groups within the party. The case of the Civic Democrats highlights an important difference between centre-right parties in some Eastern and Central European applicant states and their counterparts in Western Europe, which may have implications for their responses to the issue of European integration. Conservative and Christian Democratic parties in existing member states are typically de-ideologized, catch-all

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formations with historically well-established party identities. However, centreright groupings in Eastern and Central Europe, such as the Civic Democratic Party, by contrast, as successors to movements opposing communist rule, are often highly ideologized formations, which have largely defined themselves in terms of regime change and post-communist transformation. As such, they typically lack a stable identity or coherent ideology extending beyond the tasks of transforming the old regime. Similar ‘post-transitional’ identity crises to that of the Civic Democrats appear to have contributed to the recent electoral and political decline of a number of new centre-right parties in Eastern and Central Europe.8 The emergence of European integration as a political issue in the late 1990s may, therefore, provide the Central and Eastern European centre-right with a new context in which—or perhaps, against which—to redefine itself. This may give rise to a broader and potentially more significant Euroscepticism than the familiar ‘Europhobia’ (Henderson 2001) of radical left and right. NOTES 1. ODA effectively disintegrated in early 1998 as a result of the scandal and has not contested subsequent elections to the lower house of the Czech Parliament. It was a member of the ‘Coalition’ grouping but withdrew in early 2002. 2. The Czech Republic was, however, represented at the bilateral conference of 30 March 1998 which launched the accession process by a caretaker government of technocrats and independents, headed by Josef Tošovský, the Governor of the Czech National Bank. 3. An additional factor cited by Czech authors is that popular scepticism of, and indifference towards, momentous historic change are said to be characteristic of Czech political culture and variously described as ‘provincialism’, a ‘Little Czech’ mentality, or ‘Švejkism’ (Holy 1996; Pehe 1996). 4. Two polls (CVVM in April 2002 and TNS Factum in June 2002) attributed falls in the percentage of respondents supporting EU entry during the election campaign to the re-emergence of the Beneš Decrees as an issue and its linkage with EU accession. The TNS Factum poll even indicated a clear majority against EU membership if accession were made conditional on the abolition of the Beneš Decrees. 5. Large majorities of Czech Eurobarometer respondents in October 2001 were willing to accept European-level decision-making across a large number of policy areas and wished to see their country make more rapid progress to the EU accession (European Commission 2002c). 6. The Communists’ 2002 election programme, for example, concentrated on demands for increased social spending and the expansion of public services, and devoted less ˇ 2003b). than a page to European integration (KSCM 7. However, interestingly, unlike many Eurosceptic parties in CEE, the Civic Democrats rejected (transitional) restrictions on the sale of land to non-nationals as unnecessary and anti-competitive. See Kuˇcera (2001). 8. For example, the defeat of Fidesz-MPP in Hungary in elections in 2002; the disintegration of Election Action Solidarity (AWS) after 1997, and the subsequent splintering and electoral defeat of the centre-right in Poland in 2001; and the electoral defeat in 2001 and partial disintegration of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) in Bulgaria.

15 Euroscepticism in the Hungarian Party System: Voices from the Wilderness? Agnes Batory

15.1 INTRODUCTION After its last enlargement, the European Union (EU) expanded again in 2004.1 Citizens of a number of post-communist countries participated in the European elections held in June of that year. On the level of international relations, the accession of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries in 1995 and the aspirations of Central and Eastern European governments for EU membership have common historical roots: they were both made possible, and to some extent triggered, by the end of the cold war. On the one hand, the demise of Soviet power allowed the neutral countries of Western Europe to re-evaluate their relations with the twelve countries that then made up the European Community, prompting their neighbours to follow suit. On the other hand, emerging from four decades of communist rule, the countries of the former Soviet bloc were finally given the chance to shape their foreign policies freely, which resulted in the emergence of the idea ‘returning to Europe’ as a key foreign policy objective across the region. However, there the similarities between the previous and the most recent rounds of enlargement appear to end. The 1995 entrants were wealthy, wellestablished democracies, the incorporation of which was expected to give a boost, rather than deal a blow, to the Community budget. However, the endorsement of membership by the Austrians, Finns, Swedes, and Norwegians could not be taken for granted. The long-term impact of European integration on the Scandinavian and Austrian blends of the welfare state was not necessarily seen to be positive, while concern over the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ contrasted sharply with the value that these countries attached to their domestic practices and traditions of government (Pedersen 1994). Accession was meant to enable these countries to project greater influence as parts of the EU, but would also to limit their independence and sovereignty. The pros and cons of membership were thus carefully weighed up and it was only following heated domestic debates, which strongly polarized public opinion as well as political parties, that referendums in Austria, Finland, and Sweden resulted in a ‘yes’ vote for EU membership, in the

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latter case, with a very slight majority (Svåsand and Lindström 1996). Replicating the outcome of their first referendum on accession in 1972, Norwegians decided to go it alone and stay outside the EU for the foreseeable future (Sogner and Archer 1995). In contrast, in the early 1990s, EU accession was seen as the ultimate prize for the post-communist countries, considered a seal of approval by ‘the West’ on democratic transitions. EU membership was also seen as a source of muchneeded investment and assistance, a facilitator of economic reforms, and a provider of a ‘soft’ security guarantee. Political elites generally saw no alternative to European integration, accession being, as a study on Eastern enlargement put it in 1998, ‘one of the few generally uncontested aims in national parliaments’ (Grabbe and Hughes 1998). Public opinion also strongly backed their governments’ attempts to secure entry into the EU. However, the EU, preoccupied with its internal transformation and confronted with the economically least developed and largest number of applicants in its history, reacted disappointingly slowly from the Central and Eastern Europeans’ perspective (Wallace 2001). Unlike in the case of the EFTA countries, where reluctance about enlargement was more likely to characterize domestic views in (some of) the candidates, the Central and Eastern European countries’ acceptance by the existing members of the club was generally assumed to be far more controversial than their own aspirations to join. There were thus compelling reasons to expect fervent Euro-enthusiasm to persist in the post-communist applicants and, more broadly, attitudes to Europe to differ fundamentally in these countries from those in earlier entrants. This assumption may explain the tendency of studies of Euroscepticism, with few but significant exceptions (e.g. Henderson 1999a; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001c; Kopecký and Mudde 2002), to neglect the domestic politics of EU accession in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, various forms of Euroscepticism have clearly been present in the region for some time. While public opinion has been largely supportive of accession (in 2002, 67 per cent of Hungarians, 52 per cent of Poles, and 43 per cent of Czechs considered EU membership as ‘a good thing’, for instance), indifference, indecision about, and opposition to the EU were also relatively widespread according to a 2003 Eurobarometer survey (European Commission 2003a). Perhaps more importantly, considering the EU as ‘necessary evil’ may well be as common a source of pro-membership views as genuine enthusiasm for the European idea. As for the political elite, political parties have increasingly debated whether, and at what price, integration into the EU is desirable or, indeed, acceptable, particularly since the opening of the accession negotiations. This chapter examines the evolution of party-based Euroscepticism in one of the accession countries, Hungary. This country has traditionally featured a strong pro-membership majority, with the positive outcome of the EU accession referendum never seen to be seriously in doubt (European Commission 2003a). Despite high levels of public support for the general notion of ‘Europe’,

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Table 15.1. Euroscepticism in the Hungarian party system in 2002 Party

Fidesz-MPP Hungarian Justice and Life Party Workers Party

Party family

Type of Euroscepticism

National-Conservative National-populist

Soft Eurosceptic Hard Eurosceptic

Communist

Soft Eurosceptic (until 2000–1, Hard)

Share of votes (%) and seats in April 2002 41.1 (164) 4.4 (—) 2.2 (—)

Note: Share of votes refers to party lists in the first round of the April 2002 parliamentary elections. Fidesz-MPP contested the election with a joint list with its small ally and former coalition partner, the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Source (election results): National Election Office (www.valasztas.hu).

the Hungarian party system features both Soft and Hard Eurosceptic parties (see Table 15.1 below), as Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000) labelled these attitudes. As for the first category, the major centre-right Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Párt, Fidesz-MPP) at times voiced reservations about particular EU policies and contingent or qualified objections to the conditions or timing of accession while generally supporting EU membership per se.2 The two Hungarian parties that have a history of principled opposition to the country’s EU membership and/or the European project more broadly, and thus qualify (or qualified according to the original definition) as Hard Eurosceptic, are the national-populist Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP) on the extreme right and the communist Workers Party (Munkáspárt, MP) on the extreme left, both currently outside parliament. While Hard Euroscepticism has remained a marginal political force in Hungary, the argumentation that these parties employ increasingly finds its way into mainstream political debate. The phenomenon is therefore more important politically than the electoral support of the Justice and Workers Parties alone would suggest. Despite their distance on the political spectrum, an analysis of the two radical parties’ rhetoric reveals remarkable similarities in the basis of, and motivations behind, their attitudes towards the EU in the 1990s. The radicalism of their claims has, however, varied over time. In the case of one of the parties, a reversal of policies on EU membership occurred recently: the Workers Party now qualifies as ‘merely’ Soft Eurosceptic. As will be discussed later, these changes in the parties’ rhetoric were driven primarily by their efforts to be(come) acceptable for potential, or desired, allies on the centre-right or centre-left. The chapter is structured in the following way. Section 15.2 briefly reviews the existing literature. Section 15.3 begins by giving an introduction to the Hungarian party system, and then analyses the changing attitudes of Fidesz-MPP, the Justice Party, and the Workers Party to the EU. The concluding Section 15.4 sums up the findings and conceptual implications of the Hungarian case study.

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Traditionally, European integration was seen as a technocratic, elite-led project removed from the political process within the member states. Consequently, until relatively recently ‘[c]omparative European politics has passed over the effects of and insights possible from the processes of European integration’, whereas European studies focused on the process of integration rather than on the politics of Europe (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001c: 5). However, ‘[t]he difficult passage of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) politicized European integration in a manner that was not evident in the past . . . [as] “Europe” has become a powerful and contested issue of political debate’ (Laffan 1996: 82). Domestic party political aspects have thus increasingly received attention in the literature, if largely in the form of case studies of individual parties or countries, dealing, inevitably and understandably, mainly with Western Europe. Research of a conceptual and explicitly comparative nature has been more scarce, and focused on definitions and categorizations of Euroscepticism—otherwise a rather imprecise, journalistic term—and on the causal mechanisms operating behind its occurrence. Among the definitions and categorizations perhaps the most influential is the, gradually reformulated, distinction between Soft and Hard Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2000; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001a, 2001c) adopted in this volume. According to an early definition by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001c: 4): Hard Euroscepticism is . . . a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and can therefore be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently perceived.

‘Soft Euroscepticism’, in contrast, does not involve principled opposition to the EU or European integration, but includes cases ‘where concerns on one (or a number of) policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that “national interest” is currently at odds with the EU trajectory’. This definition of Euroscepticism is rather broad in that it may also include the acceptance of the EU in its existing form if coupled with opposition to further, or ‘ongoing’, integration, which Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001c: 5) describe as ‘the dominant mode of integration’. It has thus been argued that this definition exaggerates the phenomenon of party-based Euroscepticism (Kopecký and Mudde 2001, 2002). Moreover, in the context of candidate countries the dividing line between Soft and Hard Euroscepticism is at times rather ambiguous. As the example of Fidesz–MPP illustrates later, it is perfectly possible—and has, indeed, been quite common—for parties to lobby for EU accession in Brussels while at the same time expressing opposition to, or reservations about, particular aspects of membership and/or integration at home. This problem is addressed by Kopecký and Mudde’s (2001, 2002) alternative, more complex, typology that differentiates between ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support for European integration—that is, attitudes to European integration and to the EU as such—thereby yielding a fourfold

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scheme of Euroenthusiasm, Europragmatism, Euroscepticism, and Eurorejection. This scheme clearly has the advantage of accommodating pro-EU membership parties that are at the same time expounding ideologies at odds with the foundations of the process of integration or voicing reservations about certain aspects of it (Europragmatism), which would fall under Taggart and Szcerbiak’s ‘Soft Eurosceptic’ label. Kopecký and Mudde’s Eurosceptic category is somewhat more problematic. Although it is perfectly possible for a party to ‘support the general ideas of European integration . . . [while being at the same time] pessimistic about the EU’s current and/or future reflection of these ideas’ (Kopecký and Mudde 2001: 8), this view finds no obvious policy outlet in countries outside the EU and is therefore difficult empirically to identify. Bearing this in mind, the distinction between Hard and Soft Euroscepticism is nonetheless useful for capturing a qualitative difference between a more ideological or general opposition to the European project on the one hand, and specific reservations or shifting national interest rhetoric on the other, with these attitudes marking, as Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001c: 5) suggest, ‘two poles on a spectrum with some parties moving between them’. The distinction also offers sufficient flexibility to categorize party attitudes beyond, and without recourse to, the binary opposition of ‘yes/no to the EU’, the policy relevance of which can be expected to diminish with accession effectively removing the question of membership as such from the political agenda. As for the factors that give rise to Euroscepticism, ideology clearly plays a part. To put a complex relationship simply, parties that object to a market economy or subscribe to nationalist principles are unlikely to welcome the process of European integration—a project built on the idea of a single European market, the pooling of sovereignty, and transnational political representation (e.g. Hix 1999a; Raunio 1999; Marks and Wilson 2000). The various political groupings that tend to take the most radical positions on these issues thus share an ideological propensity for (Hard) Euroscepticism (Taggart 1998). The extent to which this propensity is translated into policies, and changes in the parties’ positions is, however, structured by strategic incentives: the choices politicians make between the, at times, conflicting goals of policy, office, and votes (Laver and Schofield 1990; Müller and Strøm 1999a). Electoral competition in the context of evolving public opinion, or opinion among core constituents, on Europe and the positions of competitors and potential coalition partners thus condition the expression of Euroscepticism (Sitter 2001; Sitter and Batory 2004). From a party system perspective, nowhere is opposition to Europe more likely to occur than on the fringes, that is, among the parties with the smallest chances of winning office, largely as a form of protest against ‘the establishment’ (Taggart 1998). These parties are not, or considerably less, constrained by considerations of a prospective governmental role in tapping into public discontent with the EU. In contrast, parties of government need to defend the compromises they negotiate on the European level, whether specific initiatives or the terms of accession, implying a de facto endorsement of the European project (Sitter 2002: 12). This, however, does not preclude the use of a Soft Eurosceptic rhetoric—emphasizing

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reservations about some aspects of integration and/or conflicts of interest between the national capital and Brussels—by mainstream parties, especially when they move into, or are in, opposition, in the presence of perceived electoral incentives. Indeed, as Sitter (2001, 2002) argues, much mainstream Euroscepticism results from a ‘government–opposition dynamic’. Office-seeking in multiparty systems like Hungary implies not only a quest for votes, but also efforts to be acceptable as a potential coalition partner to other parties in the system or, in other words, the achievement of a degree of ‘coalition potential’ (Sartori 1976: 122). Provided that the mainstream parties support EU membership/accession and attach some importance to this policy, Hard Euroscepticism is likely to rule out or significantly diminish coalition potential. Moreover, in the candidate countries the conditionality of EU membership has reinforced the political mainstream’s resolve: a coalition partner deemed unacceptable in Brussels could have blocked accession altogether. The result is, as Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000: 8) point out, that ‘[p]rotest parties that [seek to] move into the political mainstream are likely to abandon Hard Euroscepticism.’ On the other hand, the electoral appeal of the political extremes depends, in large part, on their success in projecting a non-compromising, ideological image—provided that a party chooses to focus on keeping the loyalty of its core supporters by advocating the hard-line policies they expect rather than to (attempt to) broaden its base by approximating its position to public opinion at large. Consequently, if the centre-left and centre-right parties converge on a moderate pro-EU stance (Hard) Euroscepticism can be usefully employed in vote seeking as a ‘touchstone of dissent’ (Taggart 1998) or an expression of the ‘politics of opposition’ (Sitter 2001). Torn between the need to please their potential allies in the hope of an eventual governmental role on the one hand, and the need to accommodate their core voters’ preferences on the other, the actual stances of parties on Europe represent uncomfortable choices between the pressures of office- and vote-seeking at any given time.

15.3 EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE HUNGARIAN PARTY SYSTEM Before these propositions are examined in relation to Euroscepticism in Hungary, a few words about the country’s party system and the origins of the parties are in order. The twelve years since the 1990 founding elections have been characterized by considerable fluidity as far as individual parties’ fortunes are concerned, but the ideological dimensions of the party system have proved to be remarkably durable. These dimensions were shaped during the democratic transition and in the first freely elected parliament (1990–4) primarily by the competition of the two dominant parties, both rooted in the democratic opposition of the former regime: the Christian-conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF)—the leading force of the first post-communist government, and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, SZDSZ)— the largest opposition party at the time. Unlike in most other countries of the

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region, where a confrontation between ‘communists’ and ‘anti-communists’, or new parties and successors, determined the outcome of the founding elections, by 1990 the larger successor Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) was only one of the electoral contenders in Hungary (Henderson and Robinson 1997). ‘Left’ and ‘right’ on the Hungarian political spectrum thus came to express liberal versus conservative, individualistic versus communitarian values as much as, or rather more than, a regime change divide or preferences about the role of the state in the economy (Körösényi 1999). Hungarian conservatism, in particular, emphasizes national and Christian values, while socialists and liberals are generally seen to be secular and more ‘cosmopolitan’ in outlook. Different degrees of national orientation go some way in explaining why (some) centreright parties may consider the process of integration as a threat to national identity and thus express Soft Euroscepticism, while the centre-left has remained consistently Europhile (Batory 2002b). Government formation in the post-communist period reflected these ideological divisions in the party system, with the electoral pendulum swinging from centre-right (the Forum-led coalition of 1990–4) to centre-left (the Socialist–Free Democrat coalition of 1994–8), then back again in 1998. However, by that time the dominant force on the centre-right was no longer the Democratic Forum, which had used up its electoral capital in the early 1990s, but the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party. Fidesz, originally an alternative, liberal youth movement, affected a spectacular ideological transformation in the mid-1990s, ‘espousing conservative and nationalist values at least as much as liberal ones’ (Lomax 1999: 114) and thereby occupying the Democratic Forum’s previous place in the party system. After the tenure of the 1998–2002 centre-right coalition—consisting of Fidesz, the Democratic Forum, and the agrarian Smallholder Party—came to an end in 2002, a second Socialist–Free Democrat government entered office. Of the six parliamentary parties of the 1998–2002 legislative term, which included the far-right Justice and Life Party, only four gained representation in April 2002: the Socialists and the Free Democrats in government, and Fidesz-MPP and the Democratic Forum in opposition. The election results (see Table 15.2) confirmed the status of the Socialists as the major force of the centre-left, and Fidesz-MPP of the more fragmented centre-right. Party positions on European integration and EU membership had little discernible impact on election outcomes in the 1990s. Despite the ideological differences in the parties’ attitudes to European integration that were later to surface, the broad consensus in favour of ‘Europe’ and what it was felt to symbolize— democracy, the market economy, and prosperity—outlasted the first parliamentary term. This lack of any real controversy resulted in campaigns that, beyond declaring parties’ general pro-EU views, tended to neglect the issue. This situation only changed significantly when the first political force openly to question the desirability of EU membership, the Justice Party, entered parliament in 1998— a breakthrough that occurred not so much as a result of the Eurosceptic ticket than the (relative) popularity of the party’s general anti-system protest message. Moreover, as discussed later, as the accession negotiations began, the conditions of membership and the government’s ability to ‘get a good deal’ in Brussels

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Agnes Batory Table 15.2. The April 2002 parliamentary elections in Hungary Parties (and seats), 1998

Share of first round list votes (%)

Seats (%)

42.1 (joint list) 41.1

168 (46.1) 164 (42.5) 24 (6.5) 20 (5.2) — — — —

Hungarian Socialist Party (134) Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party (148) Hungarian Democratic Forum (17) Alliance of Free Democrats (24) Independent Smallholder Party (48) Hungarian Justice and Life Party (17) Workers Party (0) Centrum Party (—)

5.6 0.8 4.4 2.2 3.9

Note: Approximately half the mandates are decided in single member districts with run-off second rounds and for the list votes an electoral threshold of 5 per cent applies. Source: National Election Office (www.valasztas.hu).

became the subject of a more intense inter-party debate. Public interest was, however, relatively slow to follow. Indeed, even with the referendum on EU membership taking place in April 2003, the salience of EU accession, and of specific issues arising from the domestic party discourse on Europe, seems to have remained rather limited. Accordingly, turnout in the referendum, which produced an overwhelming majority of ‘yes’ votes, was disappointingly low at 45 per cent (Fowler 2003).

15.3.1 Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party In the early 1990s, Fidesz was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Hungary’s ‘return to Europe’—even considering that all significant political forces backed the Democratic Forum-led government’s bid for EU membership in 1994. The basic commitment to EU accession survived the Fidesz strategists’ subsequent manoeuvres, turning the initial liberal youth organization into a major nationalconservative catch-all party and, following its 2002 electoral defeat, even a popular front-type structure.3 However, the shift to the right that accompanied the party’s organizational innovations clearly left a mark on its attitudes to Europe. Whereas its 1994 manifesto had unequivocally stated Hungary’s fastest possible integration into the EU as Fidesz’s primary foreign policy objective, a centrepiece of its programme for the 1998 elections was standing up for the national interest in the accession negotiations that started around that time. This shift partly reflected a new phase of relations with the EU, with Hungary moving from applicant to negotiator status. It may also have been part of a strategy to discredit the foreign policy of the then governing Socialist–Free Democrat coalition, pictured by Fidesz as overly servile towards the EU. Hard bargaining with ‘Brussels’, however, also became a key component of the party’s rhetoric in government from 1998, particularly towards a domestic audience. Indeed, by commenting that ‘there [was] life outside the Union’ (Népszabadság, 18 September

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2000) and making other controversial statements, Fidesz leader and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán earned himself a reputation as one of the most outspoken critics of the EU among the leaders of accession countries. At the same time, the government made considerable progress in the accession negotiations between 1998 and 2002, suggesting that it was not necessarily unyielding with the EU in practice. It was, for example, the first of the Visegrad countries to cave in on the issue of restricting access to Western labour markets to workers from postcommunist states in the years immediately after EU accession. The question of foreigners’ land ownership, which is currently banned under Hungarian law and emerged as perhaps the most salient EU-related issue in political domestic discourse, also illustrates the duality of the Orban cabinet’s approach. Similarly to most other negotiating countries, the government accepted a transition period following which EU nationals will be entitled to buy farmland in Hungary. Yet, Fidesz-MPP’s 2002 election programme, focusing on the party’s achievements in office, stated under the heading ‘Hungary at the heart of Europe’ that it had ‘succeeded in protecting Hungarian land, which foreign persons or corporations cannot buy’ (Fidesz-MPP 2002). There is some indication that the national interest card could have served Fidesz well in the run-up to what turned out to be an exceptionally tight electoral contest in April 2002 (Batory 2002c). The party leadership appear to have judged it most effective for tipping the balance in favour of the Fidesz-MPP–Democratic Forum alliance to appeal to the sympathizers of the radical right. Orbán’s campaign, in particular, was not free of a rhetoric usually associated with the Justice Party; warning, for instance, that a Socialist government would seek the favours of Western investors and big businesses rather than the good of the people (Economist, 25 April 2002). However, Fidesz—the leading force in the government that had negotiated the deal with the EU, hoping for a second term in office—was not in a position to replicate the Justice and Smallholder Parties’ radicalism on Europe. Both of the latter parties ruled out allowing foreigners to acquire land in Hungary unconditionally, with a slogan of the Smallholder Party, for instance, being ‘The motherland is not for sale’. In the aftermath of the elections, won by the Socialist–Free Democrat coalition, the Justice Party went further, calling on its supporters to reject EU membership in the May referendum and pledging to initiate a referendum to rule out the liberalization of the land market in June. This time, however, the potential contradictions between a de facto pro-EU policy in Brussels and a Eurosceptic rhetoric at home no longer constrained Fidesz-MPP in adopting a similar agenda—albeit one that did not question the objective of EU accession per se. Fidesz too proposed to initiate a referendum to prevent the liberalization of the land market and Orbán warned that EU membership may put thousands of Hungarian farmers out of business (Magyar Nemzet, 22 July 2002). Early in the 2002–6 term, Fidesz made its support for EU-related constitutional amendments conditional upon the government’s acceptance of part of its own economic programme, which they saw as essential for Hungary’s preparation for accession. In contrast with earlier times, when an EU-critical stance was at

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best secondary to more salient, primarily domestic, concerns, Europe seemed to play a key role in Fidesz-MPP’s strategy to expose the rather confident new government. ‘Orbán’s EU conditions’, as they became known in the domestic discourse, took centre stage in the electronic and print media and appeared to give, at least temporarily, a boost to Fidesz’s popularity (Political Capital 2002, Vision Consulting 2002). Despite high levels of public support for the general idea of accession, this may well have reinforced the Fidesz leader’s Soft Eurosceptic tendencies, positioning his party between the pronouncedly pro-EU governing parties and the Justice Party’s rejection of European integration. While advising their supporters to back EU entry, it was thus a ‘yes, but’ stance that characterized Fidesz politicians’ statements in the run-up to the referendum on EU membership.

15.3.2 The Hungarian Justice and Life Party Since its foundation in the early 1990s, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party has sought to portray itself as the only truly radical, ‘national’ alternative to the club of parliamentary parties. The party (2002) identified ‘communist internationalism’ and ‘cosmopolitan liberalism’ as threats to the purity of the nation and, nine years after its foundation, continued to pledge in its 2002 manifesto ‘to serve primarily the survival of the Magyars of the entire Carpathian basin’. It gained parliamentary representation in 1998 for the first time, when quarter of a million voters helped it cross the 5 per cent threshold set by the electoral law. High turnout in the 2002 elections, however, caused the nearly 250,000 votes that it once again received to translate into a smaller share (4.4 per cent), and the Justice Party dropped out of parliament. The Justice Party actively campaigned against Hungary’s NATO membership and left little doubt about its lack of enthusiasm about European integration, seen as an expression of a broader (unwelcome) phenomenon: globalization. ‘The EU is not an end, but a means of manipulation, which makes it possible to “liquidate nations” with globalism [sic]’—was how a Hungarian daily summarized the message of a March 2000 party rally (Magyar Hirlap, 16 March 2000). Yet, until relatively recently, the Justice Party’s leadership was careful not to rule out EU membership explicitly. Instead, they proposed to postpone a final decision to the distant future, as in a parliamentary debate in 1999, and insisted in the party’s 2002 programme on conditions for Hungary’s entry, such as a full guarantee that Hungarian land remains in Hungarian ownership or wage parity with the existing member states, that were unlikely to be met. At the same time, the Justice Party signed a formal declaration in September 2000 expressing the parliamentary parties’ support for accession, and its 2002 election manifesto stated that it ‘does not object to accession [provided that it] guarantees national survival, the upholding of Hungarian culture and national independence, and [is] economically advantageous’ (MIÉP 2002).

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This relative restraint can be explained by the Justice Party’s presence in parliament between 1998 and 2002 and, most importantly, its efforts to achieve a degree of coalition potential with a view to the 2002 elections. Although the Justice Party defined itself as a ‘constructive’ opposition party, it supported the Fidesz– Smallholder–Democratic Forum government’s programme when it was presented in Parliament in 1998 and subsequently often voted with the coalition rather than the opposition Free Democrats and Socialists. The party’s strategists appear to have hoped that this loyalty and their concessions on the EU among other issues would earn them governmental status in the following term, especially as polls indicated a close race between Fidesz and the Socialist Party for 2002, which could have designated the Justice Party as kingmaker. Thus, having predicted that Fidesz-MPP and his party together would secure more than 50 per cent of the votes, the party leader stated his readiness already in 2001 ‘to begin . . . talks with national forces’ on forming a ‘right-wing government’ with the Justice Party’s participation following the 2002 election (RFE/RL Newsline, 8 June and 23 April 2001). While Fidesz did not actively encourage these expectations, statements of the then Prime Minister Orbán on the question of the Justice Party’s acceptability were somewhat ambiguous. In any case, as it had announced well in advance, the Justice Party called on its followers to support Fidesz-MPP’s candidates in the second round of the April 2002 elections to ensure the victory of the—hopefully expanded—right-wing coalition. However, Fidesz and its ally, the Democratic Forum, did not reciprocate. (On the contrary, Orbán’s campaign appeared to aim precisely at winning over the Justice Party’s traditional electoral base.) Disappointed in its hopes of cooperation with the centre-right parties and finding itself outside parliament again following the 2002 elections, the Justice Party’s tone changed: gone was the conciliatory rhetoric and the party’s traditional radicalism quickly returned. The leadership believed that a perception of the party as a ‘support-team’ for Fidesz was to blame for its relatively poor showing (although, as stated earlier, its electoral support did not decrease in absolute terms) (Magyar Hirlap, 1 June 2002). The Hard Euroscepticism that had been hitherto kept at bay by the party’s aspirations for power not only found free expression, but also became an important way of emphasizing that it would not sell out to the club of moderate parties. Outbidding Fidesz’s own critical stance on Hungary’s EU accession pushed the Justice Party towards increasing hostility to the European project, expressed in a campaign for the ‘no’ side during the April 2003 referendum.

15.3.3 The Workers Party Founding a communist party amidst the collapse of communism is no simple task and, as the record of the Workers Party since 1990 shows, not a rewarding one. In this case ‘founding’, of course, may not be the appropriate term: when the former state-party (the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party) split in 1989,

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diehard members cast their ballots for organizational and ideological continuity and, for some time, they even retained the party’s original name. The successor of the reform wing, the Socialist Party, quickly ‘social-democratized’ itself (Waller 1995; Ishiyama and Bozóki 2001), applying for membership of the Socialist International as soon as 1989, and went on to win elections in 1994 and 2002. In contrast, the Workers Party only had the dubious pleasure of being the largest extra-parliamentary party in the 1990s and was beaten even to that title in 2002. The Workers Party defines itself as the party of the losers of regime change, trying (and apparently failing) to capitalize on a nostalgia for the pre-1989 period. As one would expect in the case of a communist party, it emphasizes policy objectives such as full employment, the (re)nationalization of strategic sectors, discouraging foreign investment, and reinforcing the active, direct economic role of the state. Like the Justice Party, the Workers Party campaigned against NATO membership and took a similar, although less forceful, stand on the issue of EU accession for much of the 1990s. In its 1998 election manifesto, for instance, it stated that ‘Hungary should develop mutually beneficial relations with the EC as an outsider.’ What ultimately differentiates the ‘Reds’ from the ‘Browns’—otherwise united in their common opposition to liberalism, capitalism, and globalization—is nationalism. Despite its classic Marxist ideology, the Workers Party’s outlook is not particularly ‘international’. Nonetheless, in its rejection of the ‘foreign capitalist’ the emphasis is on capitalist, rather than foreign. Thus, until relatively recently, accession for the Hungarian communists represented a compromise in which ‘the Hungarian bourgeoisie acknowledges that its foreign policy is decided in Brussels . . . [i]n return [for which] it can rule at home’ (Workers Party 1999). However, during the third (1998–2002) legislative term, this stance underwent a remarkable transformation. Failing for the third time in 1998 to gain parliamentary representation, the need to open up towards the political centre by projecting a more moderate image became abundantly clear. This was manifested in 2000 and 2001 in the party’s reluctant acceptance of EU membership as inevitable. While the 2002 election programme fell short of a positive endorsement of European integration, it merely called for remaining Hungarian within the EU. At the same time, the Workers Party leadership repeatedly approached the Socialists, initiating cooperation for the parliamentary elections and expressing a willingness to enter into a coalition in the new parliament. The April 2002 election showed this to be wishful thinking, the Socialists having left the Workers Party’s initiatives without a response. However, unlike the Justice Party, which decided to focus on its dedicated supporters and go it alone, the Workers Party was left with little choice but to continue pursuing close(r) links with the centre-left and, correspondingly, a softer line on Europe. While the party continues to consider the EU as a capitalist club, it recommended voting for accession in the 2003 referendum with an argumentation that may be summed up as ‘if you can’t beat them, join them’ (Workers Party 2003). However, given the party’s record to date, this message is unlikely to prove a credible selling point either in relation to the Socialist Party and moderate left-wing voters or to the party’s ever-shrinking group of core supporters.

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15.4 CONCLUSION The changing rhetoric of the Hungarian Justice and Workers Parties traces a delicate balancing act between two goals that have, at times, come into conflict. On the one hand, office seeking prompts parties to adapt their policies to the expectations of potential coalition partners. Given the strong support for joining the EU at the core of the Hungarian party system, this translates into incentives to abandon Hard Euroscepticism—albeit to different degrees for the two parties, as discussed later. On the other hand, keeping the loyalty of their traditional electoral base may require upholding a radical, non-compromising image, which Euroscepticism is part of. The two parties have thus been stuck between a rock and a hard place: they could either opt for a high-risk strategy of opening up towards the centre in the hope of increasing electoral support and acceptance by the mainstream parties, or choose to accommodate their core supporters’ preferences. However, taking the latter route they would continue to confine themselves to the political wilderness and a narrow electoral niche. The Hungarian case has provided evidence for both patterns. Judging—or, as it happens, misjudging—its chances of a future governmental role to be promising, the Justice Party refrained from explicitly rejecting EU accession between 1998 and 2002, although its rhetoric left little doubt about its hostility to the European project. When the concessions it made to its desired allies on the centre-right did not pay off, the party returned to the Hard Euroscepticism that naturally complements and reinforces its trademark nationalist rhetoric. As it can rely on a not insignificant, dedicated group of followers, this strategy may help the party over the current legislative term, which it is set to spend outside parliament. Given furthermore that Fidesz-MPP—which proved to be the Justice Party’s most important competitor, rather than the hoped-for ally—uses a shifting Soft Eurosceptic rhetoric as part of ‘the politics of opposition’ (Sitter 2001), there is little to counterbalance the perceived electoral incentives for saying ‘no’ to the EU. In contrast, in accordance with Taggart and Szczerbiak’s propositions, the Workers Party’s dependence on the pro-EU centre-left for survival—however limited hopes for such favours might be—prompted it to revise its policies in so far as EU membership itself is concerned. Its reluctant endorsement of accession reflects efforts to project a more moderate image rather than a change of heart on the ideas underpinning European integration, which the party continues to find unwelcome. Altogether, the case of the Justice and Workers Parties illustrates that the rejection of the EU results not merely from the ideology of the extreme-left and extreme-right but also, in large part, from their evolving relationships with the political mainstream. The desire to end their isolation gives them incentives for approximating their positions on salient issues to the moderate parties’ policies. Changes in the stances of parties at the centre of the party system are thus transmitted towards those on the fringes. At the same time, the Eurosceptic agenda of the political extremes may find resonance in the rhetoric of (otherwise) moderate parties as they attempt to gain additional electoral support by appealing to radical

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voters from time to time. Shifting Soft Euroscepticism thus reflects contingent strategies of vote seeking. These patterns observed in the Hungarian case suggest a greater degree of convergence between Western- and post-communist Europe in the causal mechanisms of party-based Euroscepticism than may have been expected. NOTES 1. An earlier and shorter version of this chapter has appeared as Batory (2002a). 2. The agrarian Independent Smallholder Party (Független Kisgazdapárt, FKGP) also has a history of Soft Euroscepticism, but in the wake of a series of internal battles, it disintegrated and, having received merely 0.8 per cent of the votes in the 2002 elections, now appears largely defunct. The evolution of the party’s attitudes to Europe until early 2002 is reviewed in Sitter and Batory (2004). 3. Reflecting these recent changes, in May 2003 Fidesz was renamed as Fidesz Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz Magyar Polgári Szövetség).

16 The Slovak Republic: Eurosceptics and Phoney Europhiles Karen Henderson

16.1 INTRODUCTION The Slovak Republic presents one of the most convoluted case studies of Euroscepticism in contemporary Europe. In some respects, it has resembled many postcommunist states that aspired to membership of the European Union (EU), as its relationship to ‘Europe’ underwent a transformation as membership drew nearer. Both earlier simplistic longings for a ‘return to Europe’ and communistera prejudices against Western capitalism were gradually replaced by a growing awareness of the complex realities of negotiating national and party interests within a highly sophisticated multinational framework. Yet, in the Slovak case, the trajectory of this learning process was complicated by other factors that have had a strong impact on the nature of Euroscepticism. The major complicating factor was Slovakia’s own road to statehood. When the Czech and the Slovak Federal Republic divided at the end of 1992 and Slovakia finally became an internationally recognized independent state, its domestic political scene underwent a period of minor turbulence and instability which, by 1997, appeared to threaten its chances of European integration (Henderson 1999b). There were even question marks about whether the new state was actually headed on a democratic trajectory at all (Zakaria 1997; Fish 1999). Yet it must be emphasized that Slovakia was by no means the only EU candidate that had recently undergone the transition to being a nation state rather than a republic within a federation. Such an experience was, in fact, the norm rather than the exception among the first ten post-communist states to apply for EU membership. What differentiated Czechoslovakia from the other communist federations was that it did not disintegrate into its constituent republics at the time of the exit from communist rule. Slovakia did not obtain its independent statehood in a heroic struggle against authoritarianism. The Czechs and the Slovaks overthrew communism together in November 1989, only to flounder in the next three years when their inexperienced democrats had, for the first time in history, to renegotiate their mutual relationship in conditions of genuine freedom. For the Czechs, who comprised two-thirds of the population of Czechoslovakia, dealing with the

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‘Slovak problem’ was peripheral to their own project of recreating the democracy and modern market economy that they had enjoyed in the period between the two world wars. Yet for the Slovaks, asserting their decision-making rights within the federation was a central political question that polarized both the elites and the population as a whole. This polarization was to continue to be a dominant force both in the Slovak party system, and in Slovak attitudes towards the EU, throughout the 1990s and into the third millennium. Slovakia’s situation was complicated even further in July 1997, when the European Commission’s avis (opinion) on its application to join the EU declared that it had failed to meet the political criteria established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 (European Commission 1997a) and the Commission president pointed out that this was the sine qua non for the EU to begin accession negotiations. Slovakia, which had been one of the more economically developed parts of the communist world, was thereby temporarily relegated to the company of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania—states which were excluded from the ‘first group’ of post-communist applicants largely on the grounds that they would be unable, in the medium term, to meet the economic criteria established in Copenhagen. Slovakia’s failure was compounded by the fact that it had also been separated from the other ‘Visegrad Four’ countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—when, in July 1997, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made its decision on its first wave of eastern enlargement (NATO 1997; Bútora and Šebej 1998). Since the government in power in Slovakia from 1994 to 1998 was dominated by the same party that had negotiated Slovak independence in 1992— Vladimír Meˇciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, HZDS)—the country’s exclusion from the European integration process inevitably underlined its failure to anchor the new Slovakia in the democratic Western world. Meˇciar’s failure was all the more acute because he claimed to support EU accession and had himself handed over the country’s application to join (Wlachovský 1996), while his political opponents were subsequently able to restore Slovakia’s international reputation when they entered government (Bilˇcík et al. 2001; Leška 2002). The ability to achieve EU membership thereby became the touchstone of success or failure on the domestic political scene in Slovakia. This had a profound effect on both the meaning, and the salience, of the EU issue in Slovak domestic politics. It is against this complex background that the pattern of party-based Euroscepticism in Slovakia must be viewed.

16.2 THE NATURE OF SLOVAK EUROSCEPTICISM In most states in Europe, the hallmark of Euroscepticism is either opposition to the EU and the European integration process (Hard Euroscepticism), or concerns about the EU’s stance in specific crucial policy areas (Soft Euroscepticism) (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002b). However, in Slovak political discourse on the EU neither

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has been particularly prominent. The overriding ‘EU question’, most notably in the period from the debacle of EU rejection in 1997 until the 2002 parliamentary elections, was not whether Slovakia wanted to join the EU, and what sort of EU it wished to be a member of, but—rather—whether the EU wanted Slovakia to join and, if not, whose fault this was (Henderson 2001). This inevitably turned the debate inward rather than outward. What was crucial was not the Slovaks’ judgement of the EU and its policies, but rather the EU’s judgement of Slovakia. Euroscepticism as normally understood relates to the former and not the latter. In Slovakia, however, hostility to the EU has tended to be framed in terms of rejecting the EU’s criticisms of Slovakia, rather than articulating substantive criticisms of the EU’s aims and structures. There is widespread support for EU membership, but this has been aptly characterized as ‘consensus without a discourse’ (Gyárfášová 2001). Attitudes to ‘Europe’ are therefore particularly difficult to gauge within the framework of normal concepts of Euroscepticism. This inversion of the ‘EU question’ is particularly relevant when we look at party-based Euroscepticism. Parties not only lead but also respond to popular opinion about the EU, and differentiating the two factors can be a complex matter. At the elite level, political actors in Slovakia have differing perceptions both of the benefits of EU membership and of the EU’s criticisms of Slovakia. Europhiles tend to be dedicated to the political and economic reform programme linked both with Slovakia’s escape from communism, and to acceding to the EU and the wider economic community, since these are processes which demand largely similar approaches to reform (Henderson 2001). At the same time, they fully accept the EU’s negative attitude towards Slovakia in 1997, and direct their ire at the government then in power that they feel merited such criticisms. Other politicians may be termed ‘phoney Europhiles’. Strategically, they want Slovakia to ‘join the club’ and be viewed as an equal with other states in the international community, but tactically they are reluctant to face the fact that this has implications for the way that domestic politics must be conducted. They are generally hostile to EU criticisms of Slovakia, and believe that the country is inherently worthy of membership without needing scrutiny from outsiders. Hence, they demonstrate a degree of ‘Europhobia’, because they fear an engagement with the realities of Western democratic principles. Yet, they are hard to classify as either ‘Hard’ or ‘Soft’ Eurosceptics because they have not fully engaged with the realities of the EU’s agenda. Others still are more inclined to a Europhobia that is based on aversion to many aspects of Western capitalism. Their attitudes have a strong resemblance to conventional Hard Euroscepticism, since, while certainly hostile to EU criticisms of Slovakia, they also have fundamental objections to the whole political and economic project of European integration. Yet, at the same time, this is often based on a Europhobic aversion to the consequences of post-communist transition on Slovak society and politics. Similar differences in views can be found among the electorate. Some voters are deeply committed to the ‘return to Europe’ and the perceived advantages it will bring them. They are clearly Europhile and endorse the EU’s criticisms of

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Slovakia because these reinforce their own arguments against the policies of their political opponents. Others, however, have misgivings about outsiders dictating to their country, and feel that foreigners may not understand all the aspects of their country’s political and economic life. These people, while generally pro-EU in a period when accession is sought, also have the potential for ‘Soft Euroscepticism’ once membership has been achieved. These attitudes, in turn, can be exploited by parties wishing to profile themselves in domestic political competition. Another group of voters has ‘Europhobic’ attitudes to the EU because they are insecure and are fearful of external influences that could be detrimental to their everyday lives, which have already been radically changed within a very short period by the exit from communism. They are likely to reject EU interference in Slovakia’s internal affairs, without having strong views about details of how the EU functions. When EU membership becomes an integral component of everyday life, they may incline to either Soft or Hard Euroscepticism. Finally, some voters are Hard Eurosceptic for all the myriad reasons that are voiced in West European member states: xenophobia, deep-rooted fears for national and cultural sovereignty, or dislike of a bureaucratic European superstate. In real life, neither politicians nor voters divide neatly into closed groups, and perceptions of Europe are not static. Post-communist transition societies are constantly in motion, particularly in new states like Slovakia. The proximity of EU membership acts as a magnet that attracts both poles, though in the Slovak case—unlike in the Czech Republic and Poland (Szczerbiak 2001a, 2002; Bielasiak 2002; Hanley 2002b)—it has been pro-EU attitudes that were strengthened. Slovak minds are strongly focused on the demands of the EU accession process because of the shock of the 1997 rejection that led to its demotion from the group of leading post-communist states. Hence the unusual predominance of the ‘do they want us?’ question. This underlying dynamic must be borne in mind when mapping the shifts in Slovak attitudes to the EU during the first ten years of independence. The aim of this chapter is to clarify the constellation of Eurosceptic attitudes towards Europe in Slovakia in the run-up to its accession. Attention is paid not only to the forms of Europhobia that existed in the party system during the 1990s, but also to the broad Europhile coalition that supported EU membership, whose diversity left it vulnerable to fragmentation when the major tasks of post-communist reform were nearing completion. When Slovaks finally began to focus on the nature of the EU itself rather than on EU attitudes towards Slovakia, new forms of Euroscepticism began to emerge.

16.3 EUROSCEPTIC PARTIES IN SLOVAKIA Slovakia was rather unusual among candidate states because the referendum on EU accession in May 2003 took place without any ‘no’ campaign. All relevant

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Table 16.1. Eurosceptic parties in Slovakia Party

Party family

Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) Real Slovak National Party (PSNS) Slovak National Party (SNS) Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) Smer (‘Direction’)

Degree of Euroscepticism

2002 election result (%)

Communist Far Right/Nationalist Nationalist Populist/Nationalist

Hard Hard Hard ‘Phoney Europhile’

6.32 3.65 3.32 19.50

Christian Democrat/Nationalist Left/Populist

Soft

8.25

Soft

13.46

political parties supported membership, at least at a declaratory level. It may seem surprising, therefore, that when party-based Euroscepticism is summarized in tabular form (see Table 16.1), both Hard and Soft Eurosceptic parties are present, and account for more than half of the vote in the 2002 election. As will be seen later, this apparent contradiction is accounted for by two factors: party stances on EU membership may be determined by domestic political factors rather than attitudes towards European integration; and both public and elite understanding of the complexity of EU issues is still relatively undeveloped.

16.3.1 Hard Euroscepticism Hard Euroscepticism exists among parties of the left and the right in Slovakia, just as in current member states (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002), but like many Hard Eurosceptic parties in Western Europe, they are on the fringes of the party system. No Hard Eurosceptic party in Slovakia obtains more than 10 per cent of the vote. The marginality of Hard Eurosceptic parties was far from obvious in the first elections after Slovak independence in autumn 1994. The Association of Workers of Slovakia (Združenie robotníkov Slovenska, ZRS) on the left, which obtained 7 per cent of the vote, and the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS) on the right, with 5 per cent of the vote, became junior members of a governing coalition led by Meˇciar’s dominant Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, which gained 35 per cent of the vote. Yet the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was reluctant to join with such fringe parties, and the nationalist ‘left–right’ coalition was only formed more than two months after the 1994 election, when the party realized it had no alternative route to power, as more pro-reform parties refused to join it in government. However, the more extreme parties of the left and right gradually became completely uncoalitionable. The Association of Workers of Slovakia was a ‘one election

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wonder’, and the far left did not enter parliament again until the 2002 elections, when the Communist Party of Slovakia (Komunistická strana Slovenska, KSS) crossed the 5 per cent threshold necessary for entry into parliament for the first time since 1989. They had previously been a fairly insignificant party of hardline communists who split from the mainstream of the communist-era Communist Party of Slovakia in 1991, when it embarked on a more social democratic path under the new name Party of the Democratic Left (Strana demokratickej l’avice, SDL’). The Communists’ electoral success in 2002 was largely a result of economic despair among the most unfortunate of Slovakia’s ‘transition losers’, who were unhappy with the performance both of the nationalist coalition that had been in power from 1994 to 1998, and of the Party of the Democratic Left, which had been a partner in the largely centre-right government from 1998 to 2002. Yet, it was clear in advance of the 2002 election that the Communists would be shunned by all as coalition partners. The right-wing Slovak National Party did manage to enter parliament in 1998, increasing its share of the vote to 9 per cent. However, without a left-wing fringe party in parliament, and with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia vote reduced to 27 per cent, there was no way a Meˇciar-led government could be formed through a coalition with the Nationalists. By the time of the 2002 elections, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was quite explicit that it would not renew it alliance with the Slovak National Party, citing in particular the latter’s hostility to NATO. The Slovak National Party had, meanwhile, itself split into two parties, with a Real Slovak National Party even more hostile to European integration than the original. Divided, they fell, and neither set of nationalists managed to cross the 5 per cent threshold necessary to enter parliament (see Table 16.2). Consequently, by 2002, Slovakia had to some extent converged with the EU member states. Hard Euroscepticism had become a largely ‘costless stance’ as such parties were unlikely to enter government and were thus in little danger of having to face the realities of negotiating with the EU (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001a). The programmes of the parties that have been classified as Hard Eurosceptic in this chapter bear some similarity to those of Hard Eurosceptics elsewhere. Nationalists emphasize the importance of national identity, while criticizing ‘globalism’ and ‘anti-national elements’ in the process of European unification, and rejecting federalism and ‘centralist bureaucrats’ (SNS 2002). Slovakia, they opine, should only enter the EU as a sovereign, equal partner, since it has already for centuries been an integral part of Europe’s traditional Christian civilization. They also draw attention to the risks of uniting a still weak Slovak economy with the EU before it is ready, while ignoring the likelihood that economic differences are far more likely to be reduced by Slovakia obtaining membership. Although at some point the 2002 Slovak National Party programme stated that it supports ‘the full integration of Slovakia into international European and geopolitical structures’ (SNS 2002), it also contains ‘Hard’ Eurosceptic elements in terms of its general hostility to a globalized economy, and an emphasis on the ethnic Slovak nation which very

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Table 16.2. Slovak election result, 20–21 September 2002

Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) Smer (‘Direction’) Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) Real Slovak Natioal Party (PSNS) Slovak National Party (SNS) Movement for Democracy (HZD) Social Democratic Alliance (SDA) Party of the Democratic Left (SDL’) Party of the Greens in Slovakia (SZS) Others (Total 12)

% vote

Seats

19.50 15.09 13.46 11.16 8.25 8.01 6.32 3.65 3.32 3.28 1.79 1.36 0.98 3.78

36 28 25 20 15 15 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Source: Statistics Office of the Slovak Republic, available at www.statistics.sk.

thinly veils a underlying xenophobia and an almost paranoid fear of Hungarian irredentism. However, the Nationalists’ major preoccupation in the run-up to EU accession was their own internal problems. Attempts to rejoin the Slovak National Party and the Real Slovak National Party into a United Slovak National Party, so that the Nationalists had some hope of again overcoming the 5 per cent threshold for parliamentary representation, were complex. This was in part because of the prominence of the personal dispute between their two leaders. The likelihood that Real Slovak Nationalist Party leader, Ján Slota, would resume his former role as party chair did not bode well for the party’s international links. While Slota had notoriously invited French National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen to Slovakia, his successor as Slovak National Party leader, Anna Malíková, had led efforts to make the party appear more respectable internationally. In 2002, it was immensely proud of its links with the Union for Europe of the Nations, one of the European Parliament’s seven political groups (SNS 2002). In the run-up to accession, the Communists were also not openly opposing EU membership, in part because fighting against what was viewed as a fait accompli appeared a politically fruitless task. They, therefore, restricted manifesto pronouncements to promoting Slovak national interests in the negotiating process, and—like the nationalists—they emphasized that Slovakia should only enter the EU when ready, so that the population would not suffer the ill effects of the shock encounter of a weak and strong economy. The Hard Euroscepticism in their political position derived largely from the total incompatibility of their economic programme with the principles of EU policy, as well as their immense hostility to capitalism in general, which they blamed for the ‘general devastation of Slovakia’ since 1989 (KSS 2002). In the end, they supported EU membership in the 2003 referendum by arguing that in the state to which Slovakia had been reduced by its

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non-communist governments, staying outside the EU would be even worse than joining.

16.3.2 Phoney Europhiles Definitional problems are more acute when searching for Soft Euroscepticism in Slovakia. The prime candidate for the category of ‘Soft Euroscepticism’ at first appears to be Meˇciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. Since it was the largest single party in four successive national elections, and also the party most obviously targeted by EU criticism of Slovakia, its position is worth examining in some detail. It had led the Slovak government both in the months prior to the division of Czechoslovakia in 1992, and in the years leading up to publication of the European Commission’s 1997 opinion on Slovakia’s application to join the EU that was damning about the state of Slovak democracy. Newspapers close to the party (Slovenská republika, Nový deˇn) often made hostile, sarcastic, and even paranoid statements about the EU, and these views tended to be shared by many of the party’s voters. Yet the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was not itself overtly Eurosceptic in any normally accepted meaning of the word. It is for this reason that the term ‘phoney Europhile’ has been coined. This is similar to the ‘Europragmatist’ label used by Kopecký and Mudde (2002) to describe parties that are ideologically Europhobe, but endorse EU membership for strategic reasons. The third Meˇciar-led government, formed in December 1994, had committed itself to European integration as the first point of its government programme of January 1995 and applied to join the EU in June 1995 (Národná obroda 1995). Even when the Commission issued its negative opinion on Slovakia in July 1997, the government reacted by challenging details of the opinion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997), and trying to raise hopes that the European Council meeting in Luxembourg in December 1997 could still invite Slovakia to join (OMRI 1997). After 1998, when in opposition, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia publicly maintained its support for EU membership, and from 2000 onwards was vocal in advocating NATO membership. Its 2002 election manifesto emphasized the party’s achievements in promoting Slovakia’s integration into Europe, with photos from 1995 and 1996 showing the then prime minister, Meˇciar, promoting EU, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or NATO membership during meetings with influential members of the international community (HZDS 2002). The party thereby publicly endorsed the view that European integration was a good thing though, arguably, it was primarily interested in countering domestic accusations that it represented a hurdle to the achievement of these aims. The party’s major difficulty was that it had failed to fulfil its ambitions of European integration because its domestic policies had been unacceptable to all three international organizations. Its often crude attempts to concentrate power, and its confrontational style at all levels of politics (including relations with the

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country’s 10 per cent Hungarian minority) were major focuses of EU criticism (European Commission 1997b). Economically, the opaque privatization process pursued in the 1994–8 period was frequently dubbed ‘cronyism’ (Fish 1999) or ‘clientalism’ (Mikloš 1997). Although the government managed to obtain surprisingly good short-term macroeconomic results, it avoided much of the basic restructuring that would both have made economic progress sustainable in the long term and created economic institutions compatible with the ‘functioning market economy’ demanded by the EU. The party suffered a problem with style as well as content. Its diplomatic skills on the international stage were deficient. Slovakia, as a new and small state, generally lacked much experience in this area (Bombík 1995; Wlachovský 1996), and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in particular had problems mastering the steep learning curve in its early days. Its international contacts were constrained by the fact that it did not belong to any international party organization, which was heavily emphasized by its opponents (Mesežnikov 1995). When foreign party representatives attended meetings of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, they were frequently from other pariah states. Yet, in spite of the heavy international criticism to which Slovakia, and more particularly Meˇciar and his party, were subjected, this impacted mostly on the party’s attitudes to the EU on the declaratory level, and did little to alter its political behaviour. After the defeat in the 1998 elections, the party formed an extremely unconstructive opposition in parliament. It went on to relabel itself the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-People’s Party at what was supposed to be a ‘transformation conference’ in March 2000, but party declarations of support for EU and NATO were often contradicted by the speeches of its leading politicians (Gyárfášová 2001). It declared itself a centre-right people’s party that wanted to join the European Democratic Union and European People’s Party, but neither of these organizations accepted it. In fact, the conference had increased the power of its leader, Meˇciar (Haughton 2001), thereby exacerbating the problem of concentration of power that had led to such heavy criticism in the public sphere. This led to a damaging internal split in the party in the run-up to the 2002 elections, when it emerged that Meˇciar had omitted several of his most prominent colleagues from the party’s list of 150 candidates. In a remarkably rapid response, the former parliamentary speaker, Ivan Gašparoviˇc, who was also the party’s second most popular politician, formed his own Movement for Democracy (Hnutie za demokraciu, HZD). While the breakaway party obtained only 3.28 per cent of the vote—insufficient to enter parliament—it caused a more significant decline in the support for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. This episode demonstrated that confrontation and lack of transparency were still hallmarks of the party’s modus operandi both internally as well as externally. After the 2002 election, Meˇciar toned down his aggressive style markedly, but his party had already been hit by a further wave of defections and ceased to be the largest party in parliament. What is most significant in trying to position the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia on a scale of Euroscepticism is that it protested its support for Slovakia’s

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European integration efforts so loudly more because of domestic party interests than Slovakia’s foreign policy needs. The party’s abject failure to secure membership negotiations with either NATO or the EU in 1997 made it appear ineffective, and it remained uncoalitionable. Most other parties were determined to secure EU accession, and the EU made it as clear as diplomatic niceties allowed that Slovakia would never join with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in government. Lack of coalition partners was, in a proportional representation electoral system like Slovakia’s, enough to exclude any party permanently from power. This was a particularly bitter lesson for the Movement, since in both 1998 and 2002 it claimed to have ‘won’ the parliamentary election because it obtained more votes and seats than any other single party. However, this left it way short of real victory since it could not enter government and exercise real power at the national level. While it is not unusual, throughout Europe, for parties to react to domestic cues and priorities in forming their attitudes towards the EU, it is highly unusual for a country’s largest political party to be subjected to such strong pressure on any EU-related issue. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, therefore, remains hard to categorize. It cannot be considered a pro-EU party because it did so much to damage Slovakia’s chances of joining the EU, and much of its recent rhetoric in support of Slovakia’s integration attempts remains a superficial coating to much more ambivalent feelings. Yet it can hardly be considered ‘Eurosceptic’, and certainly not ‘Hard Eurosceptic’, because of its programmatic support for EU membership. The ‘Soft Eurosceptic’ label, which is often applied to parties in the middle ground who selectively oppose some aspects of EU policy while still wishing to retain membership, is also barely appropriate, since the party is still emerging from an earlier stage of development where the shaping of the domestic political scene takes priority over understanding the complexities of the EU.

16.3.3 Soft Euroscepticism Soft Euroscepticism, where parties support EU membership in general, but criticize the EU on specific issues, is a relatively new phenomenon in Slovakia, but one which is gradually taking over from the debate about who is responsible for hindering the country’s accession attempts. The two major strands of Soft Euroscepticism represented at parliamentary party level are both to some extent characteristic of attitudes found elsewhere in the post-communist world. The first strand is represented by the Christian Democratic Movement (Krest’anskodemokratické hnutie, KDH). The party was a staunch supporter of European integration throughout the 1990s, in which cause it fully exploited its good links with larger Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe. Like the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, it has been one of the rare constants in the Slovak party scene. Founded just after the Velvet Revolution by the Catholic ˇ dissident Ján Carnogurský, it has crossed the 5 per cent threshold and entered parliament in every election since 1990, albeit leading the broad five-party Slovak

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Democratic Coalition (Slovenská demokratická koalícia, SDK) in 1998. The Christian Democratic Movement has also been a partner in all non-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia governments that have held office since the first postcommunist elections: 1990–2, 1994, 1998–2002, and again after the 2002 elections. ˇ On two occasions, it has provided the prime minister: Carnogurský from 1991 to 1992; and, from 1998 onwards, Mikuláš Dzurinda, a leading Christian Democratic Movement politician who headed the Slovak Democratic Coalition in the 1998 election campaign and thus assumed the prime ministerial role after its electoral success made it the largest partner in the new ‘coalition of coalitions’ governˇ ment. Disagreement between Carnogurský and Dzurinda about the future of the Christian Democratic Movement eventually led to a split in the Slovak Democratic Coalition in the wake of the 1998 election. Some members of parliament (MPs) reverted to their original Christian Democratic Movement membership, while Dzurinda and most of the Slovak Democratic Coalition ministers supported the continuation of the successful coalition arrangement, and formed a new party called the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (Mesežnikov 2001). It was this split in the Christian Democratic Movement that opened the way to the party developing a narrower and rather traditional, rural Catholic profile which was prone to forms of Soft Euroscepticism. The clearest demonstration of this was its initiative in getting the Slovak Parliament to pass, in January 2002, the ‘Declaration of the National Council of the Slovak Republic regarding the sovereignty of the member states of the European Union in Cultural and Ethical Issues’ (KDH 2002). Under the guise of wishing to protect national identities within the EU, the declaration was a thinly veiled attack on abortion, referring explicitly to ‘the protection of life and the dignity of the human being from conception to death’. The report accompanying it also supported traditional family values; attacked Council of Europe recommendations that same-sex partnerships should be registered; and, most extraordinarily, repeated the contentious Christian Democratic Movement assertion that ‘homosexuality can be treated’ (KDH 2002). Only 15 of the parliament’s 150 deputies dared vote against the resolution (Sme, 15 February 2002), presumably fearing a pre-election backlash from the more conservative elements in Slovak society. It was, however, an unfortunately clumsy first attempt by Slovak legislators to express an opinion on EU competencies. Later in the year, the Christian Democratic Movement was able to join other Catholic parties in demanding a place for Christianity in the new European Constitution. However, during the course of 2003, what had begun as a discussion of Slovakia’s place in Europe ended up as a domestic political argument about the role of Catholic Church in Slovakia, and the country’s national identity, as arguments over abortion and relations with the Vatican came close to pulling the governing coalition apart. The second strand of Soft Euroscepticism is formed by a party which is in many ways the diametric opposite of the Christian Democratic Movement: Smer (which, in translation, means ‘Direction’). In stark contrast to the Christian Democrats, Smer was founded only in November 1999, and fought its first national election in 2002. It is broadly centre-left, though frequently described as ‘populist’ (Haughton

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2002), and was initially created to fulfil the personal than ideological ambitions of its leader, Robert Fico. Fico was a dynamic young MP from the Party of the Democratic Left who was overlooked for ministerial office by his own party in 1998, despite the fact that the preferential votes in the election indicated he was the single most popular politician in the party. He proceeded to form a party of his own which consistently obtained strong public opinion poll support prior to the 2002 elections. The reasons for this were fairly clear. For many voters, he represented a middle way between the more nationalist parties which had been foreign policy failures in the 1994–8 period, and the post-1998 coalition government parties which had disappointed the electorate by failing to produce instant economic success in domestic politics. Most significantly, Fico and his Smer party were pragmatic and prepared to pursue critical stances towards the EU in order to profile themselves in the electoral competition. While clearly Europhile in their attitude to EU membership, they also targeted the middle ground in their wish to pursue Slovak national interest both at home and abroad. In the 2002 election campaign, this may have damaged their chances of electoral success. Smer was considered highly likely to become the largest single party in parliament after the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, or even the largest party outright, with Fico thereby becoming prime minister of a coalition government. However, in a country obsessed by the need to catch up in the race for EU accession, his Euroscepticism proved to be premature. When Fico raised the topic of reopening some of the chapters in the accession negotiations that had already been closed, some potential voters were alarmed. Smer unexpectedly placed third in the 2002 elections, behind not only the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia but also the new party of the incumbent prime minister, Dzurinda. Given the decline in support for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the elimination from parliament of the nationalists, electoral arithmetic enabled Dzurinda to form a new government of four centre-right parties without Fico. This left Smer as the major political force that was neither linked to the failed Meˇciar government of 1994–8, nor to the less popular of the Dzurinda governments’ policies. As an opposition party, it had a fairly free hand to criticize any government concessions to the EU, and promote any element of Slovak national interest—whether economic or political—that needed to be defended against Brussels. Its scope for Soft Eurosceptic policies was therefore considerable.

16.4 THE SALIENCE OF THE EU ISSUE: PARTIES AND PUBLIC OPINION When analysing the salience of the EU issue in Slovak politics, in terms of both influence on the electoral choices of voters and impact on the development of the party system, two diametrically opposed hypotheses can be put forward.

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The first is that in Slovakia, where the political scene was problematically polarized during the 1990s in the wake of independent statehood being achieved at the end of 1992, the EU issue was to a great extent domesticized. Attitudes towards the EU among both politicians and voters were dominated by stances on the burning questions of Slovak domestic politics. The answer to any question about the EU was predetermined by underlying beliefs about the desirable direction of Slovak politics, and assessment of the policies or structures of the EU was either secondary or entirely lacking. The second hypothesis is that the issue of EU membership has, gradually, become a crucial factor in shaping the structure of the Slovak party system, thereby eventually contributing to the stabilization of a seemingly chaotic process of party formation and party system change. This is of theoretical interest, since existing literature suggests that the issue of ‘Europe’ has a limited impact on national party systems (Mair 2000). Slovakia might prove an exception to this general principle, both because EU membership is crucial for internal political and economic development in post-communist states, and because the party system in Slovakia was still very much in flux in the late 1990s. This was precisely the period when EU membership was on the agenda and Slovakia was, exceptionally, singled out for rejection by the EU because of domestic political failings in 1997.

16.4.1 Domestic political influence on party stances towards the EU This can be analysed first by looking at the demand for Eurosceptic policies among the Slovak electorate. Slovaks’ support for EU membership has tended to correlate with voting intentions. A look at support for EU membership in the month after the 2002 elections (see Table 16.3) shows that the views of the parties’ supporters split the parties into broad groupings very similar to the categorization of parties by degree of Euroscepticism. Most of the government parties’ supporters were overwhelmingly pro-EU. The two Soft Eurosceptic parties, the Christian Democrats from the government, and Fico’s Smer from the parliamentary opposition, are a significant 10 percentage points lower, in line with the fact that they support EU membership but have some reservations on EU policy. Significantly lower in their support, hovering around 50 per cent, are the Hard Eurosceptics (both sets of nationalists and the Communists), as well as supporters of Meˇciar’s ‘phoney Europhile’ Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. This tends to support the view that official Movement for a Democratic Slovakia support for the EU is a declaratory stance intended for external consumption, while the party itself is far more lukewarm on EU membership. However, the nationalist stance is ambivalent, since 50 per cent support for EU membership does not indicate wholesale aversion to the EU and all its stands for. It is also significant that the Communists are the most Eurosceptic party in terms of the views of their supporters. This clear division on the EU issue between government and opposition supporters was also evident during the third Meˇciar government from 1994 to 1998. Supporters of the three government parties were distinctly less favourably inclined towards the

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Percentage support

Government parties Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK)

95 90 83 80

Opposition parties Smer (‘Direction’) Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS)

79 45 40

Non-parliamentary parties Slovak National Party (SNS) Real Slovak National Party (P SNS)

59 55

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, Vstup Slovenska do NATO a Európskej únie oˇcima obˇcanov, available at www.statistics.sk/webdata/slov/infor/ uvvm/uvm1102a.htm.

EU than those of the opposition parties (Bútorová, Gyárfášová, and Kúska 1996; Bútorová and Bútora 1998). The views of party supporters on the EU issue must, however, also be viewed in the light of the demographic profiles of the parties’ voters. Certain social groups— such as the less educated, the elderly, and women, together with workers, farmers, and the unemployed—have consistently been less well disposed towards the EU, both in Slovak surveys (Gyárfášová and Velšic 2000; ÚVVM 2002) and in the European Commission’s ‘Eurobarometers’ covering all candidate states (European Commission 1998). These strata of society are overrepresented in more rural political parties, most notably the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, but also the Christian Democrats and the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (Gyárfášová and Kúska 1999; Krivý 1999). The latter represents most ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, who tend to live in the rural, agricultural areas of southern Slovakia, and have less access to higher education (Bakker 1997). The real difficulty, however, is in defining what the ‘EU issue’ really means to voters. In post-communist societies, the shock of the transition to the market economy has fallen much more heavily on some social groups than on others. The EU is impressionistically perceived to be an embodiment of a threatening outside world that has removed the banal, oppressive, but often securely predictable realities of everyday life under communism. This is a far cry from more complex debates on intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism which (together, admittedly, with purer elements of xenophobia) form the mainstream of Eurosceptical discourse elsewhere in Europe. However, demand for Eurosceptic policies is not the only issue in analysing party-based Euroscepticism in Slovakia. The willingness to supply them on the part of party leaders is equally important. Superficially, there was a strong

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exogenous influence on Slovak political parties on the more nationalist side of the political spectrum to desist from inflaming the Eurosceptic tendencies of some of their voters, and to declare public support for EU membership (Pridham 2002). The EU’s strict application of democratic conditionality in deciding not to open detailed accession negotiations with Slovakia in 1997, as well as NATO’s negative verdict, was crucial in determining the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia’s strategy of heavily emphasizing its support for EU and NATO membership during its period in opposition after 1998. Yet even Slovakia’s international rejection had become domesticized in party political competition. For sure, in the run-up to the 2002 elections, the international community was quite explicit about the fact that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia’s attempts to reshape itself were not considered credible, and that its participation in a future government would exclude Slovakia from EU and NATO membership. However, this pressure would have been far less effective if it had not been exploited to the full by the governing coalition. They used the negative international view of Meˇciar and the nationalist parties to project themselves as guarantors of Slovakia’s path to Europe.

16.4.2 EU influence on the Slovak party system While the general profile of party political support for EU membership has remained fairly static throughout the long accession process, there have also been shifts in Slovak attitudes to EU membership. Since the mid-1990s, the percentage of Slovaks who favour EU membership has gradually increased, according to figures from the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, from 52 per cent in June 1995, when the country applied to join, to 68 per cent in October 2002, when the European Commission recommended that it should be invited to join in May 2004 (ÚVVM 2002). Slovaks as a whole reacted favourably to the 1997 debacle in their country’s European integration hopes, and the European Commission’s 1998 Eurobarometer survey showed a very strong improvement in Slovak attitudes towards the EU over the previous year (European Commission 1998). It proved to be a lasting opinion shift, and in 2001 and 2002, Slovaks had the most strongly pro-EU views to be found in any state destined for accession in the first wave of eastern enlargement with the exception of Hungary (European Commission 2001a, 2002c). External influence at a more subtle level can also be found in the reshaping of the party system that took place during the 1998–2002 parliamentary term. Counting the number of significant parties in Slovakia in this period is complicated. Although only six parties entered parliament in 1998, the largest government ‘party’ was the five-party Slovak Democratic Coalition, which, despite Dzurinda’s best efforts, proceeded to split into its constituent parts, so that the 1998–2002 parliament effectively contained ten or more political parties. However, what is notable is that, aside from the coalition problem, all five of the parties that had both existed under the same name for a decade and at some point

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provided government ministers—Meˇciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, the Slovak National Party, the Christian Democrats, the Party of the Democratic Left, and the smaller Democratic Party—split during this four-year period. There was an underlying logic behind the splits which, despite the façade of chaos, heralded a stabilization of the Slovak party system. All the parties that split did so along the same basic divide: between those politicians who were prepared to adapt to the exigencies of the modern world—which meant an integrated, forwardlooking Europe—and those who were not. This cleavage between forward-looking and backward-looking politicians did not necessarily correlate with their parties’ success or failure in the 2002 elections. Smaller parties split with both their successors destined for exclusion because of Slovakia’s 5 per cent threshold for obtaining parliamentary representation (the governing Party of the Democratic Left and Democratic Party, and the opposition Slovak National Party). The larger Movement for a Democratic Slovakia easily got into parliament, while its smaller and more Europhile offshoot Movement for Democracy failed. The division of the Christian Democrats ended up with both successors in the new parliament, helped by the fact that Dzurinda’s new Slovak Democratic and Christian Union merged with the similarly Europhile Democratic Union. The end result of all the splits, plus the advent of two new parties, was a far more structured Slovak political space. The new four-party centre-right government formed in October 2002 was not ideal. Dzurinda’s Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, the largest partner, contained both former Christian Democrats and successive early-1990 waves of liberally minded defectors from more nationalist parties. The Party of the Hungarian Coalition was ethnically defined, albeit also a strong supporter of both post-communist reform and European integration. The liberal Alliance of the New Citizen (Aliancia Nového Obˇcana, ANO), while strongly supportive of both EU membership and economic liberalism as well, was a new party whose future and behaviour as a coalition partner could not be guaranteed. The Christian Democrats suffered from ‘Soft Euroscepticism’. Nevertheless, the country finally had a programmatically coherent government able to join the EU as a confident and reliable partner. Although there were also question marks over the opposition, it too was gradually taking a coherent shape. Meˇciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was in October 2002 still the largest single party in Slovakia, but with a ‘phoney Europhile’ profile and an ageing charismatic leader, as well as steadily decreasing public support and a renewed tendency to fragment, its future was uncertain. Fico’s Smer inclined towards ‘Soft Euroscepticism’, and, while it was the sole parliamentary representative of nascent social democracy in Slovakia, it had yet to gain international acceptance as such, because of its recent and populist roots. Finally, the Communists were ‘Hard Eurosceptic’, and also a new entrant into parliamentary politics. Yet this was the first time that there had been a strong leftwing opposition to government in Slovakia, thereby adding to the sense of that the Slovak party system was slowly stabilizing.

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The underlying problem for analysing party-based Euroscepticism in Slovakia was that, while the influence of the EU—as a concept and a aspiration rather than an issue—on party politics in Slovakia had certainly been strong, political actors had largely been reacting to the overwhelming need of Slovakia, as a small and young state, to gain EU membership. Attitudes towards the EU in Slovakia are still strongly underpinned by domestic issues, and the real questions of what sort of EU the various parties wish to belong too are only gradually beginning to be addressed.

16.5 CONCLUSION It remains difficult to classify Slovakia in terms of normal concepts of Euroscepticism. The major variables determining party-based attitudes towards the EU are distinctly post-communist but also distinctly Slovak. Its development has been through several stages. At first, in the mid-1990s, attitudes towards the EU were largely dependent on attitudes towards post-communist reform in general, and the founding of the independent state in particular. Reformist governments were enthusiastic about membership, and nationalists who believed that Slovakia could find its own path in the post-communist transition process formally professed allegiance to the goal of membership, but had no underpinning for it in policy or ideology. Later, after 1997, politicians and public alike were influenced by the shock of Slovakia’s initial exclusion from the European integration process. They became aware that, for better or worse, sacrifices had to be made to assure the country’s EU accession because, quite simply, there was no alternative. Neither nationalists nor communists could provide a persuasive and attractive competing image of the country’s future. It is only now, when the country has emerged from these stages in the early years of the new millennium that politicians of all parties have begun to focus on the intricacies of what EU membership actually entails, and the struggles in which it will be engaged once membership is secured. The major lesson from the Slovak case is that states seeking EU membership produce different forms of Euroscepticism from member states, and that the salience of the EU accession issue is higher in modern post-communist states with traumatic pasts who have no other viable option for securing their development in the era of globalization. In Slovakia, the imperative of attaining EU membership closed in on domestic politics and formed a straitjacket constraining the area in which it had to operate. This produced the bizarre phenomenon of intrinsically Europhobic parties, whose own power interests would clearly be better served by international isolation, endorsing EU membership. Hard Euroscepticism must therefore be detected by identifying incompatibility of political programmes with the aims of EU membership, rather than by analysing party leaders’ professed views on the subject. The discourse on EU issues has also been distorted by a national party consensus that membership is desirable and that in the field of European integration governments can only be criticized for failing to achieve

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accession, or proving incompetent in practical negotiations with the EU. ‘Eurorespectability’, and more recently ‘Eurocompetence,’ are the key issues in the EU debate. They have become an intrinsic part of government–opposition contestation. Both are inward looking. This leaves Slovakia particularly open to shifts in the way Euroscepticism is expressed once membership is secured and the national imperative of gaining membership has disappeared. What is already becoming noticeable is a difference between ideologically based Euroscepticism, as manifested by the Christian Democrats, and Euroscepticism used as a political tactic for attacking the government, as in the case of Smer. Since the Slovak desire for ‘Eurorespectability’ puts a high premium on political parties belonging to European party groups, Slovak Euroscepticism may intensify if disagreements occur at a European level that have genuine resonance with domestic political concerns. An authentic political debate on Europe will replace the Europhobia of the early post-communist years, and Hard Euroscepticism will become more firmly the preserve of the far left and right. However, until the party system stabilizes further, and familiarity with European institutions increases, forms of Euroscepticism will also remain in flux.

17 Emerging Party-based Euroscepticism in Estonia Evald Mikkel and Andres Kasekamp

17.1 INTRODUCTION Estonia provides researchers with an intriguing case study because it has consistently been one of the most Eurosceptic of the post-communist candidate countries (see Figure 17.1). Public opinion in the three Baltic states of Estonian, Latvia, and Lithuania has, in general, been the most Eurosceptic in all of Central and Eastern Europe, but Estonia has consistently been the least enthusiastic even among these three (Ehin 2001; European Commission 2001b, 2002a). At the same time, paradoxically, Estonia was one of the most consistently successful countries in the accession process. Thus, we have the unusual situation of one of the frontrunners of the accession process also being the greatest doubter. This chapter has two main aims. The first is to map the formation of partybased Euroscepticism in Estonia. The second is to discuss various explanatory models and factors, which frame the European Union (EU) accession issue in Estonia. The initial phase of transition is characterized by a different logic in the interaction patterns of actors, organizational behaviour, and institutional performance than the following stages. The general framework set out here attempts to combine various approaches during the different stages of the postcommunist transition and consolidation process. Our research reveals the patterns of interaction and key factors behind the formation of party-based Euroscepticism in post-communist systems. In this context, the transition period is analysed according to the dominant conflicts where the European issue plays a secondary role. After the decline of the mobilizing power of the crucial issues of independence and decommunization, the EU accession process has been gaining attention among the general public as well as momentum among various political actors. From this perspective, during the following stages the main focus moves to the key aspects of European integration and EU membership itself. The theoretical framework is then tested on the basis of Estonia’s progress towards EU membership.

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Net image of the EU (%)

50

Estonia

Candidate countries average

40 30 20 10 0 1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Figure 17.1. Net image of the EU in Estonia and candidate countries, 1990–2002

17.2 THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF EUROSCEPTICISM IN ESTONIA

17.2.1 Historical legacies For all three Baltic nations, the legacy of history plays an extremely important role in determining their attitudes towards the EU. Their first brief period of independence from 1918 to 1940 remains an important symbol and reference point. It is important to note that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, unlike the other newly independent Soviet Socialist Republics, do not consider themselves to be successor states of the USSR, but restored states. Legal continuity with the prewar republics and the non-recognition of the Soviet annexation is a cornerstone of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian national identities. Thus, the Soviet occupation is regarded as an aberration—an era of alien leadership. The leaders of the Communist Party of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic were not natives, but imported from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. This historical legacy is responsible for the resonance of the most popular Eurosceptic cliché of going from ‘one union to another union’ and of having taken orders from Moscow earlier and now having to fulfil commands from Brussels. Creating an identity between the Soviet Union and the EU is a powerful, emotive rhetorical device. In addition, the three Baltic states, unlike the Warsaw Pact satellite countries, were wiped off the map and fully incorporated into the USSR. They did not maintain even a nominal independence like Poland or Bulgaria. Thus, giving up their precious newly won sovereignty is psychologically much more difficult. Perhaps the most lasting consequence of Soviet rule was a drastic demographic shift: at the end of Second World War, more than 90 per cent of the population was ethnically Estonian, but by 1989 the Estonian share of the population had decreased to only 61.5 per cent. Estonia’s high living standards relative to the

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rest of the USSR and the Soviet policy of developing heavy industry contributed to a massive influx of Russians and other Soviet nationalities. To Estonians this seemed to be part of an intentional policy of assimilation. Thus, concern for ethnic survival was one of the primary factors in the drive for independence in the late 1980s (Raun 1991: 233). Estonian citizenship and language laws were adopted with this situation in mind and with the aim of the protecting the Estonian language and culture. However, these laws have been criticized for being discriminatory by both Russia and the West. EU member states, the European Commission, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) constantly pressured Estonia to amend its legislation to accommodate the Russian-speaking minority (Smith 2001: 101–3). This has made Estonians suspicious of the West for appearing to do Russia’s bidding in expanding the rights of Russian-speakers. This, in turn, has led to fears of losing national identity within the EU and is also one probable explanation why support for EU accession has consistently been greater amongst ethnic Russians than ethnic Estonians (Mikkel and Kasekamp 2000: 70). Other explanatory factors for the difference in the level of support for EU membership between ethnic Estonians and Russian-speakers are that:

r Baltic Russians have always felt more Western than their compatriots in Russia.

r They are less concerned than Estonians about the dangers to national culture or sovereignty.

r They are eager to enjoy higher the living standards which accompany membership.

r They have benefited from EU pressure on Estonia to liberalize its language and citizenship policies.

r They were more likely to make use of free movement provisions within the EU to settle abroad.

r They would prefer being citizens of the EU rather than a minority in a small country.

r In many cases, they would prefer to deal with bureaucrats in Brussels than those in Tallinn (Järve 2002: 252).

17.2.1.1 European integration: 1987–95 The Move towards Independence: 1987–91 The dominant conflicts in Estonia during the transition stage (1987–95) can be seen in Table 17.1. During the first half of the transitional stage, the drive towards independence which lasted between 1987 and 1991, the dominant conflict was between the Estonian Communist Party and the majority of Russian settlers who wanted to remain part of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the majority of ethnic Estonians who favoured outright independence. Within this latter group, the main cleavage was between the reform Communists who stood behind the

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Table 17.1. Dominant conflicts and European integration in Estonia during the transitional stage Period Dominant conflict Dominant political actor(s) European integration EU membership

1987–91 • Pro-independence vs. anti-independence • Communist Party Popular Front • Return to independence • Relations with Soviet Union/CIS —

1991–5 • Moderate vs. radical decommunization • Radical reformers (new elite networks)∗ • Return to world • Return to Europe • Enhancement of security • Support for EU accession by all parties

Source: Authors’ estimates. ∗ Formed in reaction to the current dominant conflicts/issues, hence less related to previous networks.

Popular Front which formed the first democratically elected government in 1990; and the radical nationalists who convened the Congress of Estonia in 1990 as an alternative to Soviet institutions and sought to restore the Republic of Estonia based on its the pre-war citizenry (Taagepera 1993: 171–7). De-communization: 1991–5 In the second half of the transition stage, which we term decommunization, the momentum was in the hands of the triumphant restorationists who supported the government of Mart Laar (1992–4). Laar instituted a decisive break with the past by bringing young people in their twenties and early thirties into government and implementing a radical market liberalization programme of ‘shock therapy’ and rapid privatization (Smith 2001: 83). The period until the end of 1990s followed the imperatives of liberalization and entailed fast and massive institutional changes. In terms of political culture, this was a long period of extraordinary politics1 entailing domination by elites (Steen 1997). The national elites were a peculiar mixture of radical nationalists and ex-communists; the Russian-speaking minority was largely excluded. The constitutional and electoral arrangements resulted in an institutional design which provided for a relatively stable political framework and the domination of parliamentary parties and the government. Externally, during this phase, the primary goal was securing the final withdrawal of all the remaining Russian troops on Estonian soil and membership of all the main Western and international organizations that it could, including the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations (UN), and Council of Europe. The dominant discourse was of a ‘return to Europe’ or ‘return to the Western World’. However, this had little to do with the EU as such, and was primarily a reaction to fifty years of international isolation and an attempt to distance Estonia from its former imperial overlord as much and as quickly as

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possible. During this period, Estonian trade was completely reoriented from the former Soviet Union to Western Europe.

17.2.1.2 European Union accession: 1995–2002 Euro-enthusiasm: 1995–9 An important turning point corresponding to the beginning of the democratic consolidation stage was the accession of Estonia’s neighbours, and most important trade partners, Finland and Sweden, to the EU in 1995. It is no coincidence that Estonia formally applied for EU membership later that year. One of the key moments was the recognition in 1996 by the new Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves that the inclusion of Estonia in the first round of NATO enlargement was extremely unlikely and that the country should concentrate on obtaining EU membership. If NATO could not guarantee Estonia’s security, then the ‘soft security’ provided by the EU was the best option available. Estonian efforts were rewarded in 1997 with the EU’s decision to begin negotiations with Estonia, alone of the three Baltic states (Arnswald 2000: 39). EU accession now became the highest political priority of the Estonian government. At first, it was seen mainly as a foreign policy issue, but it soon came to be understood as having an all-encompassing nature and being central to internal reforms and the domestic political process as well. Successive governments headed by Tiit Vähi (Coalition Party) 1995–7, Mart Siimann (Coalition Party) 1997–9, Mart Laar (Fatherland Union) 1999–2002, and Siim Kallas (Reform Party) 2002–3 maintained a focus on the harmonization of Estonian legislation with the EU’s and concluding accession negotiations as rapidly as possible. When cabinet turnovers or elections brought the opposition to power, policy towards obtaining EU membership has remained consistent. If anything, the key importance of the preparations for EU membership received increased attention with each change of government. Indeed, every new government started its term of office with pledges to strengthen the EU accession effort. During this stage, public support for EU membership was relatively low, but opposition was even lower. Public opinion was dominated by the ‘don’t knows’ since accession was perceived as a distant prospect and information on the nature of the EU was limited. EU membership was not an issue of debate amongst or within the political parties: all the parties represented in parliament were in favour. One might also note that in the parallel enlargement of NATO eastwards, Estonia was one of the most enthusiastic candidates for membership of the transatlantic defence alliance. Here we can readily detect the importance of the issue of security and of the historical legacy. As security (i.e. fear of Russia) is one of the overriding concerns of the Estonian public, NATO and its umbrella of ‘hard security’ is more appealing than the EU, which can only provide ‘soft security’. While the significance of ‘soft security’ has grown recently (particularly after 11 September), for the public it remains a much more complex idea to grasp than the traditional collective defence approach embodied by NATO.

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Table 17.2. European issue in Estonia during the accession stage Period Main pattern on European issue Dominant actor(s)

European integration EU membership

∗

1995–9

1999–2002

• Euro-enthusiasm

• Emerging Euroscepticism

• Maturing elite networks rooted in Soviet era ties (Coalition Party and Rural Union) • Nearly unanimous support • Soft security • Best student in the class strategy for EU negotiations • One of the highest priorities since 1996 • Party platforms supporting EU membership • First wider public anti-EU feelings in 1996 • Estonian Future Party as first anti-EU party

• Elite networks formed in the transition era (Fatherland Union, Reform Party, Moderates)∗ • Overwhelming support • Increasing perspectives for EU and NATO accession • Decreasing fear of Russia • Consensus among elites on benefits of EU • Drop in public support for EU from early 2001 • Social Democratic Labour Party as first parliamentary anti-EU party • Other parliamentary parties show concerns about EU negotiations • Several marginal and emerging parties focusing on anti-EU stances

The core of the coalition had already formed a government in 1992–4.

At this point, the first political party which attempted to make opposition to EU membership an electoral issue, the Estonian Future Party (EFP), appeared on the political scene. The Estonian Future Party had initially been known simply as a radical nationalist splinter party. But in 1997, when Estonia was invited to begin negotiations for EU membership, the party appeared to have decided quite consciously to capitalize on the available ‘market niche’ in order to raise its electoral profile and differentiate itself from other nationalist parties. The party was, however, perceived as eccentric and its leaders as cranks. Partly due to a split in the leadership, the party failed to be registered in the 1999 parliamentary elections and has since disintegrated completely. The case of the Estonian Future Party, however, signals the dominant approach of the period when the rational–instrumental calculations of political actors in combination with other factors start to play a significant role in framing the European issue (see Table 17.2). Emerging Euroscepticism: 1999–2002 Generally, all the manifestos of the parties in the 1999 general election stressed the necessity of EU membership, but to a greater or lesser extent emphasized the need to negotiate a fair deal and uphold national interests. There also appeared to be unanimous support for conducting a referendum on the question of membership.

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The rise of Euroscepticism, higher volatility of public attitudes towards the EU, together with the surprising victory of an underdog Presidential candidate, Arnold Rüütel, in September 2001 raised serious concerns among ruling elites in relation to the framing of the expected outcome of the referendum. As a firm pledge had already been made to hold such a referendum there was no way back on this, and the only discussion related to the appropriate timing of the referendum and the wording of the question. A notable feature of the Estonian political landscape is that all the parliamentary parties across the ideological spectrum supported EU accession in general terms. In contrast to the general East-European pattern, the left–right dimension has no bearing on party positions vis-à-vis Europe in Estonia. Estonia’s strategy in its negotiations with the EU was that of attempting to present itself as ‘the best student in the class’, that is, agreeing to implement the acquis in full by the date of accession. Estonia’s negotiating position was initially weak and it did not have much room for manoeuvre because its overriding concern was to distance itself as quickly as possible from Russia. Estonia was a little-known, tiny country with apparently not much to offer the EU and suffered from the stigma of being the only one of the first-wave candidates to have been part of the Soviet Union. Unlike Poland and Hungary, Estonia constantly had to prove its worthiness to be in the first group. The only way Estonia could stand out and shine was to be the most eager and willing candidate country and to be the quickest and best in ‘doing its homework’ and not present any awkward problems (Mikkel and Kasekamp 2000: 68). In late 2001, the country’s strategy towards accession negotiations appeared to change. No longer was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs trumpeting the number of negotiating chapters that had been successfully closed, but a new rhetoric of quality rather than quantity surfaced. This was partly because the ‘second-wave’ candidates, particularly Latvia and Lithuania, had caught up in the race to close chapters quickly and also because the most difficult issues had deliberately been left to the final stages of the negotiations. For instance, news of the European Commission’s position that new members would only receive 25 per cent of the level of funds that the old members receive from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) incensed Estonians more than any other negative stories about the European issue had in the past. The prospect of the further deepening of the European integration process also caused uneasiness within Estonia. High-profile statements by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and other European statesmen in 2000–1 outlining their visions of a restructured EU were received with alarm and interpreted in the press as evidence of plans to create a European superstate (Postimees, 2 May 2001). The debate in the Convention on the Future of Europe launched in 2002 compounded these fears. For example, the proposals for a creation of an elected EU President, dual citizenship within the EU, or changing the name to ‘The United States of Europe’ all attracted highly critical responses in the Estonian press (Bahovski 2002; Raig 2002). For a country that suffered forcibly imposed harmonization and standardization within the USSR, the

Evald Mikkel and Andres Kasekamp Support for EU membership Rating of government

7

10

1

0

0 Dec. 2002

2

Sept. 2002

20

June 2002

3

March 2002

30

Dec. 2001

4

Sept. 2001

40

June 2001

5

March 2001

50

Dec. 2000

6

Sept. 2000

60

June 2000

Support for EU membership (%)

70

Average rating of government

302

Figure 17.2. Support for EU membership and average rating of government

prospect of deeper integration provoked an allergic reaction conditioned by recent history. As Figure 17.2 illustrates, the level of public support for EU membership in 2000–2 can also be linked to the popularity of the government. As the government’s ratings slid during the 2000 and the first half of 2001, so did popular backing for EU accession. When the government improved its standing in the second half of 2001, approval for EU membership also grew. Since European integration was identified as one of the government’s key goals, public approval/disapproval of the government was reflected in the public opinion on the European issue. Lack of confidence in the government was voiced by the public in falling levels of support for EU accession, while greater confidence in the government bestowed more legitimacy on its European aspirations. Interestingly, subsequent developments showed an upswing in public support for EU membership. This was quite clearly related to two political changes: the election of a new president in October 2001 and the formation of a new coalition government in January 2002. The dark horse candidate Arnold Rüütel won with the votes of electoral college members representing rural regions and the ‘losers of transition’; in other words, with the support of the typically more Eurosceptic segments of the population. Having their champion in office made these people more amenable to EU accession, particularly since Rüütel adopted a pro-EU stance (Ideon 2001). Similarly, the change in government with the previously most vehement opposition party, the Centre Party, coming into power demonstrated that EU integration was not exclusively a project of the dominant elites. Like Rüütel, the Centre Party’s base had been transition losers who had always been those most inclined to oppose EU accession. This further confirms our assertion

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that public opinion on the European issue is directly related to the popularity of the government in power. External factors also impacted upon attitudes towards the EU. The most intriguing example in the Estonian case was the victory of the Estonian contestants in the Eurovision song competition in May 2001 after which the steady decline in support for EU membership was reversed (Mattson and Korv 2001). Though the pop contest has nothing to do with the EU, in the public mind the triumph signalled a breakthrough—a new acceptance of Estonia by Europe! A further positive factor, this time directly related to EU accession, was the implementation of the Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) in summer 2001, which had a highly tangible as well as symbolic impact on the most Eurosceptic group among the population— farmers (Seaver 2001). There were also external factors which had a negative impact on public opinion towards EU accession including the support that Estonian Eurosceptics had received from anti-EU groups in the neighbouring Nordic countries, particularly Finland. Thus, it is not surprising that many of the anti-EU arguments and examples were taken from Finland. Since many Estonians are keen on economic integration, but wary of closer political cooperation, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) or the European Economic Area (EEA) are sometimes suggested as less demanding forms of cooperation which would be more appealing for a country with an extremely liberal trade regime like Estonia.

17.2.1.3 The realization of EU membership 2002– In December 2002, Estonia along with most of the other Central and Eastern European candidate countries completed the accession negotiations with the EU at the Copenhagen Summit. The success of the negotiations undoubtedly contributed to increased enthusiasm for the EU now that the prospect of membership was finally assured. On 2 March 2003, parliamentary elections were held in Estonia. The campaign was dominated by proposals to reform the income tax system, and levels of financial support for young mothers, as well as by calls to combat corruption. The issue of EU membership did not play any role at all in the campaign (Mikkel 2003; Postimees, 28 February 2003). The anti-EU parties once again failed to win any seats and their message did not reach the public, as their campaign funds were minuscule in comparison to those of the mainstream parties. However, the debate over the Convention on the Future of Europe did make the parties feel obliged to take some sort of a position. This was more or less restricted to simply a rejection of ‘federalism’, very much in line with the sensibilities of the general public and also the official position of the government. As, unsurprisingly, no party came out in favour of giving greater powers to Brussels, no debate or controversy ensued. In the 2003 parliamentary elections, both the governing parties not only maintained their popularity, but even slightly increased their share of the votes. This

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was unprecedented as, previously, voters had always punished the parties in power at election time. One reasonable explanation here is probably related to the government’s relatively short period of incumbency that lasted barely fifteen months. While it was widely expected that the Centre Party, the party receiving the most votes, would form the next government, this calculation was upset by the unexpectedly strong showing of Res Publica, a party formed just over a year earlier. Res Publica championed law and order and the fight against corruption, but also internal party democracy and transparency. Though in some senses it could be classified as a populist party, Res Publica was also solidly pro-EU. Its leader, the former state auditor, Juhan Parts, became prime minister in April 2003 in a coalition with the Reform Party and the People’s Union.

17.3 THE FORMATION OF PARTY-BASED EUROSCEPTICISM IN ESTONIA

17.3.1 Theoretical framework 17.3.1.1 The European issue The turbulent initial phase of transition from the Soviet system to a free market democracy has left the European issue in a secondary position, overshadowed largely by the dominant conflicts dividing society on the basis of the logic of nation/state-building, their relationship to the decommunization process; together with cultural or socio-economic issues (Kitschelt 1995: 61–4; Mikkel 1998). However, the European issue has been gradually emerging on the basis of the broader cultural dimension of politics (Mikkel and Kasekamp 2002). Several authors have analysed various factors that purport to explain the origins of Euroscepticism in specific party systems. Taggart and Szczerbiak have developed the concepts of Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, which we will not elaborate on as they have discussed in detail in the Introduction to this volume (in Chapter 1). Kopecký and Mudde’s (2002) general framework, on the other hand, divides the European issue into two main dimensions: European integration and EU membership (see Table 17.3). The first ‘diffuse orientation’ is related to ‘attitude(s) toward the ideas of European integration’ while the second ‘specific orientation’ is linked to ‘attitude(s) toward the general practice of European Union’ (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 300). The European integration dimension produces Europhiles and Europhobes while the EU dimension separates EU-optimists and EU-pessimists. Combining these dimensions produces four categories. Kopecký and Mudde have identified Europhile–Euroenthusiasts and Eurosceptics with EU-optimist and EU-pessimist positions respectively; and Europhobe–Europragmatists and Eurorejecters positions with EU-optimism and EU-pessimism respectively.

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Table 17.3. Typology of party positions on Europe Attitude to European Integration Europhile Attitude to EU EU-optimist EU-pessimist

Euro-enthusiasts Eurosceptics

Europhobe

Euro-pragmatists Eurorejects

Source: Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 303.

In our view, both main approaches have their strengths and weaknesses as their perspectives and their focuses differ. Hence, we would prefer to combine the two frameworks depending on the particular angles and issues we are examining.

17.3.1.2 European Union accession The European issue was among the new emerging divisions within politics with a strong potential to further frame emerging post-communist party systems. In what follows, therefore, we will focus precisely on the European dimension and examine other issues only if they pertain directly to parties’ European discourse. Several recent studies have attempted to aggregate all those various factors that potentially contribute to the framing party positions on the European issue. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001c, 2002b) have proposed a comprehensive framework relating party-based Euroscepticism to six important variables: left–right ideological affiliation, party position in a party system, levels of public Euroscepticism, prospects for EU membership, nature of Euroscepticism (Hard or Soft), and state experience. Johansson and Raunio (2001) have found seven important elements to consider: ideological orientation, public opinion, intra-party factionalism, the role of leadership, inter-party competition, transnational party links, and level of European integration. Using these ideas as a basis, we identify nine main factors that can be used fruitfully to evaluate the level of party-based Euroscepticism in post-communist systems. 1. Ideological affiliation: Parties’ orientations on the left–right scale do not, it is argued, automatically produce clear positions on Euroscepticism. The EU project is easily attacked from both flanks, namely, by the extreme left as being too capitalist and the far right as being too socialist. 2. The dynamics of competition within a party system tends to increase the strategic incentives for consensual/differential behaviour. Thus, 3. Oppositional parties tend to be more Eurosceptic than governing parties. 4. Peripheral parties tend to be more Eurosceptic than core parties.

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5. Levels of party-based Euroscepticism tend not to be strongly connected to public opinion. However, significant sudden changes in levels of popular Euroscepticism may produce temptations among parties to adopt Eurosceptic positions. 6. Perspectives for accession: Euroscepticism is most likely to be strongest when accession is perceived as a more immediate prospect than if it seems more distant. 7. State origin: Newly independent states, facing crucial issues related to the (re)gaining of independence, such as state- and nation-building, tend to pay less attention to the European issue, show higher levels of party-based Euroscepticism. 8. The nature of integration: Euroscepticism related to the process European integration per se is likely to be less evident than Euroscepticism related to EU membership. 9. The EU deepening process draws parties’ attention to EU issues and provides a basis for increasing the level of Euroscepticism. 10. The linkage between government policies and EU membership influences levels of public trust in and the legitimacy of the government and the EU. 11. The external dimension tends to increase the tactical and strategic incentives for consensual/differential behaviour in relation to Euroscepticism. Specific external events and transnational party links and membership of international organizations may have a significant impact on the patterns and levels of Euroscepticism.

17.3.2 Party-based Euroscepticism 17.3.2.1 Mainstream Euroscepticism The Estonian political party landscape is quite remarkable in that, until 2001, there was not a single party represented in parliament that was against EU membership. The fact that the parties combined this with diffuse pro-European attitudes means that, according to Kopecký–Mudde’s framework, all Estonian mainstream parties would fall into the Euroenthusiast group and only Taggart– Szczerbiak’s model allows us to still classify some of the dominant parties as Soft Eurosceptics (see Table 17.4). In early 2001, the ex-communist Social Democratic Labour Party declared itself against EU accession, but it had only one seat in parliament at the time. Unlike elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, the communist successor party has played a negligible role in Estonian politics and won a seat in parliament for the first time only at the 1999 elections (and this was only thanks to their electoral alliance with an ethnic Russian party). There is, however, little continuity between this party and the Soviet-era Communist Party. The men leading the Social Democratic Labour Party were inconsequential

Table 17.4. Party positions of Eurosceptic parties in Estonia, 1999–2002 Party

Party Family

Left–right location

Electoral success 1999/ votes %

Core–periphery position

Government– opposition position

Soft and Hard Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002)

Position on Europe (Kopecký and Mudde 2002)

Centre Party

Populist

C

23.4

Parliamentary

Soft

Euroenthusiasts

R C L

15.9 7.3 6.1†

Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary

Opposition∗ / Government∗∗ Government Opposition Opposition

Reform Party People’s Union Social Democratic Labour Party Christian People’s Party Russian Party in Estonia Democratic Party Future Party Independence Party Republican Party Russian Unity Party

Neo-liberal Agrarian Social Democratic

Soft Soft Hard

Euroenthusiasts Euroenthusiasts Eurosceptics

Nationalist/Christian

R

2.4

Peripheral

—

Hard

Eurosceptics

Ethnic

L

2.0

Peripheral

—

Soft

Euroenthusiasts

Populist Populist/anti-EU Nationalist/Conservative

C R R

1.6 ‡ —

Peripheral Peripheral Peripheral

— — —

Soft Hard Hard

Euroenthusiasts Eurosceptics Eurosceptics

Nationalist/Conservative Ethnic

R L

— —

Peripheral Peripheral

— —

Hard Soft

Eurosceptics Euroenthusiasts

Source: Author’s estimates. ∗ March 1999–January 2001. ∗∗ January 2001–April 2003. † In electoral coalition with the United People’s Party. ‡ The Estonian Future Party failed to be registered for the 1999 elections and has disappeared from the political scene.

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Table 17.5. Results of the Estonian Parliamentary election and party position on EU and Europe, 2 March 2003 Votes %

Seats

Soft and Hard Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002)

Position on Europe (Kopecký and Mudde 2002)

Parliamentary Parties Centre Party Res Publica∗ Reform Party∗ People’s Union∗ Fatherland Union Moderates

25.4 24.6 17.7 13.0 7.3 7.0

28 28 19 13 7 6

Soft Eurosceptics Euro-optimists Euro-optimists Euro-optimists Euro-optimists Euro-optimists

Euroenthusiasts Euroenthusiasts Euroenthusiasts Euroenthusiasts Euroenthusiasts Euroenthusiasts

Parliamentary parties total

25.4

0

95.0

101

Unsuccessful Parties United People’s Party of Estonia Christian People’s Party Independence Party Social Democratic Labour Party Russian Party in Estonia Independents

2.3 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.4

0 0 0 0 0 0

Euro-optimists Hard Eurosceptics Hard Eurosceptics Hard Eurosceptics Soft Eurosceptics

Euroenthusiasts Eurosceptics Eurosceptics Eurosceptics Euroenthusiasts

Unsuccessful parties total

5.0

0

2.1 + 0.2

2.1

∗

Government coalition party. Source: Estonian National Electoral Committee 2003.

figures in the Communist Party hierarchy. The leading party figures all retired or went in private business. In the 2003 elections, however, the party failed to secure a mandate, thus returning the parliament to the situation where not a single deputy represented a Eurosceptic party, according to the Kopecký–Mudde criteria. The People’s Union is the main party representing the rural population of Estonia. Its leadership mainly consists of Soviet-era collective farm managers. The party was in government during 1996–9, but as a rather ineffective junior member of the coalition. The party failed to get any of its major policies adopted by the government, notably imposing tariffs on imports of food and agricultural products. The party achieved its only big success in the surprise election of its honorary chairman, Arnold Rüütel, to the state presidency in 2001. This had the effect of somewhat moderating popular Eurosceptic sentiment. Although, compared to his predecessor Lennart Meri, President Rüütel was rather low-key in promoting EU accession. He was generally supportive of European integration and being extremely popular in the countryside he had a strong impact on the attitudes of average Estonians. The People’s Union maintained its level of support in the March 2003 parliamentary elections and became a junior partner in the new governing coalition (see Table 17.5).

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The People’s Union’s general ideological orientation is national-conservative, particularly after it absorbed the Estonian Pensioners’ and Family Union. The party platform was supportive of EU membership, but was at pains to insist that Estonia must get a fair deal in the accession negotiations and that the EU must guarantee the survival of Estonian culture (Eestimaa Rahvaliidu programm). A speech by one of its key leaders, Janno Reiljan (2002), in the European Parliament, sums up the three major issues of concern to the party regarding the EU: the fear that developments in the European Convention were leading to federalism and the creation of a ‘United States of Europe’; the ungenerous package that the EU was offering to the new member states on CAP; and, finally, the need for candidate countries to be given larger agricultural production quotas. These points accurately reflect the concerns that form the basis for current Eurosceptic sentiment among many Estonians. They also illustrates how the party, which originally was ambivalent in its attitude towards EU membership, instead shifted to focusing on obtaining the best possible benefits for its electorate from the EU. The perennial outsider of Estonian politics, the Centre Party shifted from its Eurosceptic rhetoric of the need to put national interests first and its criticism that the government was too compliant to EU demands, to a position of Euroenthusiasm, once it entered office in 2002. Despite the party’s pro-EU policies in office, its authoritarian leader, Edgar Savisaar, pointedly avoided taking a position on EU membership during the 2003 election campaign, obviously angling for potential Eurosceptic voters who had no other alternatives among the mainstream parties. As Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001, 2002) have postulated, the expression of Euroscepticism is linked to the position of parties in their party systems. The Reform Party, which headed the government until March 2003, also shifted to a Euro-enthusiast position after taking over the reins of power in January 2002, though it had previously exhibited some elements of Euroscepticism. In March 2002, Reform Party prime minister, Siim Kallas, complained that the previous government had painted too rosy a picture of the state of the EU negotiations and that Estonia was falling behind the other candidate countries (Piirsalu 2002). However, although his party contained factions who believed that joining the allegedly overregulated EU would slow down Estonian economic growth—which has been achieved through devout application of liberal free market principles2 — once Kallas took over the premiership he urged the country to push forward and complete the EU accession negotiations as quickly as possible.

17.3.2.2 Peripheral Euroscepticism Some new parties outside parliament used Euroscepticism to raise their profiles, particularly following the shift in the public mood in early 2001. The Christian People’s Party, which was formed immediately prior to the 1999 elections but received only 2.4 per cent and thus failed to clear the 5 per cent threshold to secure parliamentary representation, is the main example of this. While initially emphasizing the need for honesty and moral integrity in public life,

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the party also began to stress its opposition to the EU as a major element in its platform. In the 2003 elections, the party failed to make any impact, receiving only 1.1 per cent of the vote. A group that rallied the remnants of the Estonian Future Party and gathered together a motley crew of nationalists is the Independence Party. The party’s secretary-general and its chief ideologue, Vello Leito, believes that Estonia should be a neutral ‘peace state’ between the other major global power blocs. He perceives international banks and multinational corporations as the major threat to Estonian independence. Leito claims that the International Monetary Fund and the EU have engaged in a ‘neocolonization’ strategy whereby foreign capital has conquered Estonia. Following a crude anti-globalization argumentation, the Independence Party proposes economic autarchy as the answer and dreams of reopening the Russian market for Estonian producers (Leito 2000; Eesti Iseseisvuspartei poliitiline doktriin 2002; Eesti Iseseisvuspartei programm 2002). Though formed in 1999, it first contested elections only in 2003. Although it was the only party campaigning primarily on an anti-EU platform, it failed to make an impact, receiving only 0.4 per cent of the vote. A lesser known group also trying to claim the anti-EU mantle is the Republican Party, founded by an economics student at Tartu University, Kristjan-Olari Leping. Estonian law requires a political party to have at least a thousand members in order to be officially registered. The Republican Party managed to recruit new members through an advertising campaign involving sticking posters around universities simply saying ‘Want [free] beer?’ alongside Leping’s telephone number. The Republican Party defined itself plainly as a ‘nationalist right-wing antiEuropean party’. Its main policy goal was to stop Estonia from joining the EU, which it viewed as a dangerously socialist entity that stifled the free market. The Republicans combine this economic argument with a jingoistic element playing on fear of immigrants pouring into the country after EU accession (Vabariikliku partei programm 2002). The Republicans participated in the October 2002 local elections in only one district where they received 1.1 per cent of vote (Estonian National Electoral Committee 2002). They did not field any candidates in the 2003 parliamentary elections. Some of the more vocal Eurosceptics abandoned these fringe parties and shifted to the more mainstream ones represented in parliament with the evident hope of being able to better influence the public debate. For example, Uno Silberg, a key leader of the Future Party and then the Independence Party, as well as Soviet-era dissident Tiit Madisson, who had been involved in several protest parties including the Independence Party, both stood as candidates in the October 2002 local elections on the People’s Union ticket. This party also attracted other anti-EU activists, including student rabble-rouser Arne Otter. While the People’s Union (described earlier) could not be considered anymore as an Eurosceptic party (according to the Kopecký–Mudde criteria) on the basis of the 2003 electoral campaign and participation in the subsequent government, these anti-EU activists clearly saw the greatest likelihood of their views having an impact within that particular grouping.

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17.4 CONCLUSIONS The objectives of this chapter have been threefold. First, to integrate the European issue into a broader framework of post-communist transition and consolidation. Second, to develop a further framework of explanatory factors for the development of party-based Euroscepticism. Third, to follow the evolution of the European issue and to measure the formative process of party-based Euroscepticism in the Estonian case. The European issue should be analysed both in its own complexity and as an element in a broader post-communist transition framework. On the one hand, we have to consider the dynamics of the whole post-communist transition and, therefore, the changing patterns of interactions between various actors, institutions, and issues. During the initial phases of the transition, the general public and main actors were occupied with existential issues of independence and decommunization, leaving other issues aside. Only later on, with the diminution of these critical conflicts related to state- and nation-building and the beginning of a consolidation phase, did the European issue as such begin to move gradually to the fore. On the other hand, different aspects of the European issue should be considered systematically. First, we have to distinguish between the two general dimensions of European integration in general and the specific development of the EU. All Estonian actors have continuously shown strong pro-European orientations from the very beginning of the transition. The EU issue has risen in its importance only later on, showing a clear pattern of increasing concerns about the EU. Secondly, a combination of specific subdivisions over the issues of European integration and EU accession has hence provided the first signs of a shift from the dominant pattern of Euro-enthusiasm to emerging elements of Euroscepticism. However, recent developments, particularly the successful completion of the accession negotiations and further steps toward realization of full membership, have once again raised relative levels of Euro-enthusiasm among the Estonian public as well as among political elites. It will take some time before it becomes clearer what the real impact of these important events will be on European and EU stances in a longer-term perspective. Various factors shape parties’ positions on the European issue in different ways. In this chapter, we have identified nine main sources of party-based Euroscepticism. These relate to: ideological orientations, party positions in parliament and the party system, the impact of the public mood, prospects for accession, statebuilding processes, the nature of European integration, the EU deepening process, linkage between government policies and EU accession process, and external factors. Table 17.6 provides an overview of the characteristics of party-based Euroscepticism in Estonia based on the factors discussed earlier. Is Estonia a deviant case in terms of party-based Euroscepticism compared to the rest of the post-communist world? Definitely not. Most Estonian party responses to the European issue fit quite well into the general framework. The relatively higher level of public Euroscepticism is mainly a consequence of specific

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Table 17.6. Levels of party-based Euroscepticism in Estonia Sources of party-based Euroscepticism Party position on the left–right dimension Party position in parliament (government/opposition) Party position in party system (core/periphery) Party orientation in relation to public opinion Prospects for accession Logic of state-building Nature of European integration

EU deepening Linkage between government and EU membership

External impact

Pattern • No clear pattern • Opposition parties tend to be more Eurosceptic • Peripheral parties tend to be more Eurosceptic • Significant/consistent change in popular level of Euroscepticism produces corresponding reactions by parties • Proximity to EU accession tends to increase opposition • Newly (re)emerging states tend to face higher levels of Euroscepticism • Euroscepticism is evident only among peripheral parties; parliamentary parties tend to be Euro-enthusiasts • Further EU integration processes tends to increase Euroscepticism • In a case of successful linkage of government policies with EU issues attitudes toward governmental success/failure tends to be spread to attitudes on EU issues • Important events frame Euroscepticism (Eurovision Song Contest victory; events in Russia; completion of accession negotiations and further steps toward full membership); • Links with interest groups and parties in Nordic countries potentially increase Euroscepticism

Source: Authors’ compilation.

historical legacies, proximity, and connections with the Nordic countries and a general feeling of good prospects for fast accession (especially in comparison to its Baltic neighbours). Some divergence is related to the stronger impact of public opinion on the party orientations where a clear pattern of rising public Euroscepticism in the first half of 2001 provided for a corresponding adaptation at the party level. The main explanatory factor in this case is related to the development of a clear connection between the government and the EU accession process. Growing dissatisfaction with government policies and a general perception that the government did not take popular opinion into account forced the public to demonstrate its displeasure using various available means. A general recognition that EU membership was one of the government’s highest priorities turned the public against EU membership, as a means of castigating the government. Political actors, depending on their positions within a party and in the party system, behaved strategically; manipulating the EU issue in the hope of gaining public attention and potential support in the electoral process.

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Is a new party realignment emerging in Estonia? It is certainly too early to speculate on the formation of new party division. Developments, in particular the election of a new President and the formation of a new government coalition, have led the public to view EU accession in a more positive light. Crucial geopolitical realities may provide even stronger grounds for EU-optimism. Strategically behaving Estonian political actors are very flexible in adapting to changing conditions. Taking all this information into account, it should not have come as a complete surprise that after the formation of a new government at the beginning of 2002 by the former opposition Centre Party together with the Reform Party, both new governing parties began to exhibit clear Euro-enthusiast stances in contrast to some previously voiced Euroscepticist doubts.3 NOTES 1. The period of ‘extraordinary politics’ refers to the period immediately following the collapse of the communist regime, when the citizenry is still united by a broad anticommunist ideology. Orientation towards the ‘common good’ provides the leadership with the necessary legitimacy for the implementation of radical reforms and builds a basis for significant sacrifices by the whole population. The length of the period depends upon the initial conditions and orientations. However, the period of extraordinary politics ends sooner or later due to the discrepancy between the high expectations and real social costs, and the growing importance of diverse interests (Balcerowicz 1994: 84–7). 2. Law Professor Igor Gräzin has been the most high-profile opponent of the ‘socialist’ EU (Gräzin 2002a, 2002b). 3. A similar pattern could also be seen with the People’s Party once it entered the government after the 2003 elections.

18 Euroscepticism and Slovenian Political Parties: A Case of Weak Party-based Euroscepticism Alenka Krašovec and Simona Kustec Lipicer

18.1 INTRODUCTION Academic and research practice in the last few years (e.g. Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001c, 2002b; Kopecký and Mudde 2002) has shown that the study of Euroscepticism as a type of citizen’s attitudes to Europeanization processes is very lively in both Western Europe and the post-socialist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. A synthesis of existing theoretical results on Euroscepticism is found in Taggart and Szczerbiak (2000, 2001c, 2002b) and Kopecký and Mudde (2002) and opens up a wide variety of aspects when studying this relatively new concept. When studying Euroscepticism the authors mainly concentrate on microanalysis from the political parties’ points of view. Taggart and Szczerbiak found that Euroscepticism in political parties can be analysed from different points of view or in connection to different existing comprehensions of how political parties function. For example, in their contribution ‘Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union the Euro and Europeanization’ (2000) they study Euroscepticism from the Katz and Mair perspective in the area relating to (internal) party organizational characteristics. Similarly, Euroscepticism in political parties may be analysed with the help of the left–right or liberal–conservative continuum. The issue of electoral support for those that support Euroscepticism can also be opened. The authors placed the differences in these aspects within the context of studying Euroscepticism as it ‘expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’ (Taggart 1998: 366). Further, they state that Euroscepticism can appear in different shapes and intensity and they therefore distinguish between two types of the concept: (1) Soft Euroscepticism and (2) Hard Euroscepticism.

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For Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001c: 10), Hard Euroscepticism implies an outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to a country joining or remaining a member of the European Union (EU). In practice, this would describe a principled objection to the current form of European integration in the EU. On the contrary, the authors see Soft Euroscepticism as a process that involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration and can, in turn, be further subdivided into ‘policy’ Euroscepticism and ‘national-interest’ Euroscepticism. In our opinion, it is also very worthwhile and interesting to study the theoretical idea of Euroscepticism in Slovenia, as a candidate-state case. Following the described theoretical preconditions, we claim that some more precise methodological aspects should also be identified for the Slovenian case. By defining these criteria, we seek to emphasize the concrete aspects of Euroscepticism examined in the Slovenian case on one hand, while also seeking to set the criteria for its intensity. These indicators are described in detail later and are also used to provide the structure of our contribution. We start with the presumption that in the Slovenian case we cannot talk of Euroscepticism among political parties in the traditional sense, as shown by Taggart and Szczerbiak, since almost all leading (parliamentary) political parties have consciously and officially decided that joining the EU is the country’s most important mid- and long-term goal and they therefore support this process. The indicators we use to analyse the existence of Euroscepticism among political parties in Slovenia are as follows: 1. Despite the decision to study Euroscepticism at the micro level we cannot avoid the issue of Europeanization of the Slovenian political system in general so we use it as our first important criteria to understand the existence of Euroscepticism in Slovenia. We emphasize the importance of the historical continuation of the Europeanization of Slovenia’s political system from the political parties’ point of view. 2. As an important (narrower) indicator of studying Euroscepticism, we also focus on political parties’ attitudes to the EU during the parliamentary elections in 2000. Firstly, we analyse the existence of Euroscepticism through a content analysis of parties’ electoral programmes at points where EU issues were in question. In addition, we also examine the parties’ positions on EU issues through an analysis of TV confrontations among representatives of different parties. 3. As our third important indicator for studying the concept of Euroscepticism we look at public opinion support for Slovenia’s accession to the EU. Further emphasis is put on the comparison between the mentioned public support and electoral support for parliamentary parties at the parliamentary elections of 2000.

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Alenka Krašovec and Simona Kustec Lipicer 18.2 THE PROCESSES OF EUROPEANIZING SLOVENIA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM

Slovenia is one country that faced the unique dual task of simultaneously transforming its political and the economic systems, something that had never happened before in world history (von Beyme 1997: 17).1 These processes may be seen as the need to establish democratic political system and political institutions, together with the market economy system. In Slovenia, similarly to other Central and Eastern European countries, the debate on returning to Europe became crucial. Consequently, this debate was impersonated during Slovenia’s cooperation with and accession to the EU. In fact, the European ideology became an autonomous force of legitimizing the newly emerging political elite as well as a mobilizing force for the economic, political, and legal changes seen in these countries (Fink Hafner and Lajh 2002: 5). As Fink Hafner and Lajh (2002: 7) concluded, Europeanization even became a substitute ideology of development where the old communist ideology lost its legitimacy. After the rapid development of political events in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s, Slovenia’s EU membership became one of the most important strategic goals of Slovenian foreign policy, ‘even before Slovenia’s formal independence declared on 25 June 1991’ (Fink Hafner and Lajh 2002: 10). The first institutional relations between Slovenia and the EU were established in 1993 when the Cooperation Agreement between Slovenia and the European Economic Community was signed. In 1995, negotiations over the European Agreement on Accession between Slovenia and the European Communities and their Member States operating within the Framework of the EU or so-called European Agreement started. The agreement was signed late2 due to (mainly) Italian opposition. In negotiations on the European Agreement, Italy disputed the prohibition on the purchase of land by non-Slovenian citizens found in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia of 1991 (Article 68). This Italian demand related to its demands for the restitution of Italian citizens’ property confiscated after the Second World War. Italy succeeded in enforcing the argument that the Slovenian property legislation was not in line with the European legislation.3 Consequently, the EU required a change in the so-called real estate clause in Slovenia’s Constitution as a (pre)condition for signing the European Agreement. Slovenia accepted the compromise between the EU and Slovenia after negotiations on the European Agreement had been postponed several times (Brinar and Svetliˇciˇc 1999: 819).4 This compromise is known as the Spanish Compromise since it was signed under the auspices of the Spanish presidency (it is formally part of the European Agreement—Annex XIII). It was passed by the National Assembly in April 1996 after heated discussions. Despite the controversy, the National Assembly passed it with a big majority of forty-nine to fourteen votes (voting against were all the three members of parliament (MPs) from the Slovenian National Party, some

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MPs from the Slovenian People’s Party, the United List of Social Democrats, and the Democratic Party). On 14 July 1997, the National Assembly changed the Constitution with eighty-one to one votes (voting against was an MP from the Slovenian National Party, two MPs from the Slovenian National Party were absent at voting time, and one MP from that party did not vote).5 The following day (the last day allowed by the EU)6 the National Assembly also passed the Law on Ratification of the European Agreement with seventy to three votes (voting against were two MPs from the Slovenian National Party—one did not vote, the other was not present at the time of voting, and one MP from the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia). In 1997, the Slovenian government accepted the Strategy for Slovenian Accession to the EU while the country’s EU membership in the first round of enlargement became a formal priority goal of government foreign policy. As stated in this strategy, the aim of entering the EU derived from the close political, economic, and cultural cooperation between Slovenia and the EU and also from the cultural and civilization position in the European area that was symbolized by the EU. Important reasons for Slovenia’s inclination to enter the EU also included security ones. Slovenia was convinced it could resolve the questions of national security and defence more efficiently in the frame of the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition to establishing the required referendum majority to enter the EU, the Slovenian government also formulated a special communications strategy led by the Government Public Relations and Media Office. When analysing different communications programmes, Kustec (2000: 113, 114) found that the biggest deficiency of this strategy lay in the overly narrow focus on the groups that opposed the EU.7 At the end of 1999, the Slovenian National Assembly accepted the Declaration on Slovenian foreign policy in which Slovenia’s full EU membership was also defined as an indicative priority of Slovenian foreign policy. This decision is particularly important because of the National Assembly’s role in Slovenia’s accession to the EU. Slovenia is the only one of the candidate countries where the parliament has to discuss, complement and also confirm the negotiating starting-points for the harmonisation with the acquis communitaire. The National Assembly co-operates in the negotiating processes in practice, while it gives the negotiation authorisation to the government and also ratifies the international treaties (Zajc 2002: 672).

Given the above we may conclude that EU accession and later EU membership became the highest political priority of the Slovenian government and National Assembly, where quite a clear consensus between the (important) political actors involved could be traced. Now we shift our focus from the broader aspect of Europeanization to the narrower one, specially oriented to the standpoints of political parties and their (potential) voters.

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18.3 POLITICAL PARTIES AND EUROSCEPTICISM IN SLOVENIA We can claim that Europe and Europeanization first emerged within political parties in Slovenia as a 1989 slogan used by the reformed League of Communists of Slovenia. This party accepted the document ‘Europe now—for the European quality of living’, prepared for its congress in autumn 1989. The document’s fundamental characteristic was the discontinuity with everything that could smell of real socialism and the withdrawal from the enchanted circle of the past with European democratic measures (Balažic 2002: 563). According to Balažic (2002: 563), the document should not be treated a classical political programme but more as an attempt to legitimize the Slovenian Communist Party at the first democratic elections in 1990, in which the reformed LC participated with the slogan ‘Europe Now’.8 The next important event regarding political parties’ attitudes to the EU happened eleven days before the Constitution was changed in July 1997. Almost all parliamentary parties, and the representatives of the Hungarian and Italian minorities, decided to sign an Agreement on Cooperation in the Accession Process with the EU. At the beginning, all leaders of parliamentary parties and representatives of the Hungarian and Italian minorities agreed to sign the agreement but ‘just before it was to be signed the leader of the Slovenian National Party decided not to sign it’ (Fink Hafner and Lajh 2002: 14). Hence, all Slovenian parliamentary parties from the ideological spectrum, except for the Slovenian National Party, and despite their other differences and conflicts formally reached a consensus to support the country’s rapid membership in the EU. Together with the Agreement on Cooperation in the Accession Process with the EU permanent coordination between the parliamentary parties was established as a way of expressing their consensus on the Slovenian EU accession process. This coordination remained intact until the end of 2000. Even though the Slovenian National Party did not sign the Agreement on Cooperation in the Accession Process with the EU, party leader Jelinˇciˇc did attend some meetings of the abovementioned parliamentary coordination. Events connected to the European Agreement’s acceptance and intensification of these events in both the Slovenian political arena and the public represented a point of at least partial change in the attitude of some parties and some public towards accession. Euroscepticism slowly emerged after negotiations on signing the European Agreement, especially when the issue of foreigners’ ownership of real estate was in question in mid-1997 (Fink Hafner and Lajh 2002: 15). In this period we can trace the emergence of the New Party and changes in attitudes of the Slovenian National Party to Slovenia accession ‘since it became aware of the real nature of the EU’ (Jelinˇciˇc 2002: 76). One aspect that has a huge influence on possible election results of new parties is their orientation to issues that are important to some voters and at the same time not stressed by the existing parliamentary parties (Lucardie 2000: 175). Following Lucardie’s statement it is especially non-parliamentary parties that can take advantage of the gap between the politics of almost all parliamentary parties and

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public opinion when Slovenia’s accession to the EU was in question, and use this issue as a way of entering parliament. Classical conceptions of party competition assume that all competitors take positions on the same set of issues (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994: 22). It can be expected that due to the importance of Slovenian accession to the EU all parties would define their position on the issue. Since the details of parties’ programmes and orientations are mainly presented to voters only during election campaigns, when parties usually present themselves in the media, we decided to analyse the content of the parties’ electoral programmes competing at the parliamentary elections of 2000. We will examine whether parties declared their stand on EU issues and what their related attitudes were. As pointed out by Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge (1994: 29) election programmes seem to at least indirectly respond to issues affecting the entire national electorate. Unless these programmes avoid taking any precise positions or making any definite statements it is also true that these documents at least generally present parties’ views on some issues and emphasize the importance and priority given by these parties (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994: 24, 25). The Centre for Political Science Research at the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana collected the electoral programmes for the parliamentary elections in 2000 which we analyse in our contribution. There were sixteen parties and seven independent candidates competing at the elections in 2000. According to current experience, we know especially for independent candidates that in the 1990 to 2000 period they had no success whatsoever. Quite a few candidates competed in this period, yet none was elected (Krašovec 2000: 87). Only twelve election programmes of the sixteen parties that had competed at the elections in 2000 will be analysed since the remaining four parties’ programmes are not accessible via a website nor through personal requests (Fink Hafner and Boh 2000: 4). In addition, these four parties did not even participate in TV debates between party representatives on national or the biggest commercial TV station that also had the highest audience ratings.9 Consequently, an assessment of these parties’ attitudes to the EU issue is also impossible. In the election programmes, most parliamentary parties (Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, Social Democratic Party of Slovenia, United List of Social Democrats and Slovenian People’s Party + Slovenian Christian Democrats) emphasized the need for, and fast speed of, accession to the EU. Some even took the stance of facilitating the fastest possible accession. The Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia did not mention the EU issue in its election programme. Still, we can quite easily locate this party as lying between parties in favour of accession since it made positive declarations for EU accession during the said TV debates and the fact the party signed the mentioned agreement between the parliamentary parties. In its election programme, the Slovenian National Party emphasized that it is the only party that would not allow Slovenia to be sold due to EU accession. At the same time, this is also the only area that could show a party’s declaration for or against Slovenia’s EU accession. The party also showed its opposition to the accession process on its promotional billboards on which the party president

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held a plucked chicken surrounded by EU stars. The picture’s purpose was to emphasize that it was better for Slovenia to enter the EU later and unwise to join quickly given the prevailing EU conditions and that it was better and nicer for the citizens to live in Slovenia as it was than to be part of the EU. If we also consider the fact that the Slovenian National party did not sign the mentioned agreement between the parliamentary parties in 1997 and the written viewpoints of its leader in the National Assembly’s publication in 2002, we can define it as a Eurosceptical party. The opposite applies to those parties formed before the 2000 elections and after they became parliamentary parties—New Slovenia and the Youth Party of Slovenia. Both parties declared themselves in support of quick accession to the EU, which in their respective opinions was necessary for Slovenia. The electoral programmes of three non-parliamentary parties10 are more cautious of Slovenia’s EU accession. For example, the Democratic Party declared itself in favour of Slovenia’s accession, but favoured the advantages of associate over full membership. Their representatives also declared their party as being Eurorealistic during the TV debates. Greens United also declared themselves in favour of Slovenia’s accession in their election programme, but not at any price and not overnight. In TV debates their representatives were convinced that Slovenia should enter the EU when it negotiated good positions. In contrast with the Democratic Party and Greens United that already had representatives in the National Assembly in 1990–2 and 1992–6 and then underwent several cleavage and unifying phases, the New Party was formed in 1996. The New Party has, since its inception, been one of the few social organizations to emphasize the importance of Slovenian restraint over accession to the EU. In its election programme prepared for the 2000 parliamentary elections, the party stressed the importance of searching for an EU alternative. The EU is based on the discriminatory principle, that means that some countries are invited to the feast and others have to feverishly and recklessly prepare themselves in a side room to suit the demands, and again the third group of countries can only watch this situation from far away. That is why Slovenia has to rethink the meaning of current ways of accessing the EU. Our future is in Europe, since we are physically in it. Europe is much more than the EU and that means that Slovenia has to behave in a European way. That means difference and at the same time equality.

In the TV debates, New Party representatives emphasized their disagreement with basic principles of the EU’s functioning and used them as the main reasons why Slovenia had to search for other alternatives. They frequently stressed that the New Party was in fact Eurosceptical, but more precisely it was EU critical. The above descriptions were used to present the attitudes of Slovenian parties on Slovenia’s EU accession. On this basis, we see that Euroscepticism can only be found in two Slovenian parties—the Slovenian National Party and the New Party. We now present the electoral results of the parties11 at the parliamentary elections in 2000 and their classification within selected party families.

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Table 18.1. Results of the 2000 parliamentary elections and a classification of parties in party families

Liberal Democracy of Slovenia Social Democratic Party of Slovenia United List of Social Democrats Slovenian People’s Party + Slovenian Christian Democrats New Slovenia Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia Slovenian National Party Youth Party of Slovenia Democratic Party Greens United New Party Voice of Women of Slovenia Land Party of Štajerska Communist Party of Slovenia Forward Slovenia Party of Democratic Action of Slovenia

% of votes

Number of seats

Party family

36.21 15.80

34 14

Liberal∗ Conservative∗

12.07 9.53

11 9

Social democratic∗ Conservative∗

8.76 5.16

8 4

Conservative∗ Social democratic∗∗

4.38 4.33 0.75 0.90 0.59 0.44 0.07 0.18 0.31 0.30

4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Populist Liberal/Social democratic∗∗ Liberal/Social democratic† Liberal/Social democratic† Liberal/Social democratic† n.a. n.a. n.a n.a. n.a.

∗ Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, Social Democratic Party of Slovenia, United List of Social Democrats, Slovenian People’s Party + Slovenian Christian Democrats, New Slovenia are classified in a particular party family according to their membership in EU parties. ∗∗ Since the Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia and the Youth Party of Slovenia are primarily based on a generational concept and almost exclusively emphasize the issues of the retired or youth, we only make an assessment of their classification in a particular party family. † We only give an assessment of their classification in a particular party family since based on the analysis of short

election programmes and their self-determination during TV debates for the 2000 elections we cannot list them with them with confidence. n.a. These parties competing at the 2000 elections could not be classified in party families since it was impossible to obtain their election programmes (the only exception is the Voice of Women of Slovenia, but in its programme it mainly emphasized the issue of women’s representation in political life and gender equality) and they also did not present themselves during the TV debates.

As Table 18.1 shows, both parties (in boldface in Table 18.1) that emphasized Euroscepticism at the 2000 parliamentary elections together attracted just 4.97 per cent of all votes.

18.4 PUBLIC SUPPORT AND THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS ‘It is quite normal for the parties that they (in some extent) adapt or at least respond to the demands of their environments. Their environments are in the biggest extent represented by their party members and their (potential) voters’

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(Müller and Strøm 1999a: 306). In case the members and (potential) voters have the same demands, there are no problems but, on the other hand, problems arise when both of them have different demands. Müller and Strøm (1999a: 307) found that in this case parties usually significantly adapt policies to the demands of (potential) voters. This means parties adapt themselves to the issues and demands of their environments or certain parts of them if they of course assess that a certain issue is relevant to party competition. At the same time, it is also important that a certain issue, exposed by (part of) the environments or (part of) the party, is relevant to voters’ decisions at the elections. Voters evaluate issues differently when they assess and decide which party to vote for (Deegan Krause 2000: 23). Evaluating the importance of these issues is very important for voters when deciding on which party they would like to support, and is important for the party itself (Deegan Krause 2000: 24, 25). Euroscepticism in Slovenia generally first emerged in public opinion. Therefore, it was expected that some political parties would take advantage of the existing situation and focus their programmes on this issue. Alongside the parliamentary Slovenian National Party, some non-parliamentary parties were also trying to take advantage of this ‘opportunity’. Such parties tried to use Euroscepticism to boost their profiles and chances of entering parliament, especially because longitudinal public opinion poll data also shows that a relatively huge group of citizens had concerns about (quick) EU accession. The graph in Figure 18.1 confirms this and shows oscillations in the potential support of Slovenian citizens for EU accession. We note that the share of citizens who would vote for EU accession is on average above 50 per cent, with the exception of the 2001 data where we can observe the first significant negative trend in March. In that month, support according to the public opinion polls fell for the first time below 50 per cent (48.3 per cent). On the basis of the presented data, we could predict that the referendum on Slovenia EU accession would be positive since after 1997 on average 57 per cent of all citizens would vote for it.12 Data for following years also show that on average the level of support was highest in the 2000 parliamentary year (60 per cent), yet it dropped drastically by 10 per cent in the next year. The highest monthly levels of support can be seen in April and October 1998 and in August 2000, when the share of those supporting EU membership reached more than 63 per cent. In general, the Slovenian public was in favour of the country’s EU accession even though support had tended to fall during the long process of negotiations. The Spanish Compromise (Italy), shutting down in 2000 of duty-free shops on road border crossings (Austria), and transitional periods for the free movement of labour (Austria and Germany) are the key points that led to more negative public attitudes to Slovenia’s EU accession. ‘On these points Slovenians recognize that the EU is not an ideal association and that different national interests still prevail over the interests of the EU as a whole. So Slovenians now look at the EU more realistically’ (Brinar and Svetliˇciˇc 2002: 814).

Euroscepticism and Slovenian Political Parties

2002

against

1998

1997

for

2000

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

323

Figure 18.1. Public opinion results on EU accession in Slovenia from 1997 to 2001∗ (in %) ∗

The graph does not include data on undecided or undefined, who on average represent around 18 per cent of respondents. The missing data (two for each year) are data in summer when the survey is not usually conducted. Source: Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre (2000). Politbarometer.

On the other hand and as Figure 18.1 shows, 20–30 per cent of Slovenians consistently said they were against EU membership, suggesting that a not insignificant segment of the population was receptive to the Eurosceptic message. The second part of the analysis in this segment of the chapter presents voter support of selected parties regarding the EU and related issues. The attitudes of voters of selected parties to EU accession can be one of the factors determining voters’ decisions on which party to vote for. In some cases, these can reveal the importance of the issues exposed. This analysis is made on the basis of public opinion poll data since the activation of issues connected to EU accession is also usually and normally transferred to the citizen level. The results of the opinion polls in the contribution are made on the basis of correlation analysis, where the dependent variable is the voter’s party preference (the question was: If elections to the National Assembly were to be held next Sunday, for which party would you vote?) and two independent variables: possible benefit of Slovenia’s EU membership and voter’s behaviour at a referendum (the questions were: Do you think Slovenia would benefit or not from being a full EU member; If next Sunday a referendum on Slovenia’s accession to the EU were to be held how would you vote? For accession or against accession to the EU?). We analysed public opinion poll data from the monthly Politbarometer, which is conducted by the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana. We could only analyse data for existing parliamentary parties since the survey does not in fact collect data for non-parliamentary parties. Data in Table 18.2 show that a large share of voters of all parliamentary parties thought that EU membership would be beneficial for Slovenia. The biggest group of voters thinking Slovenia would benefit from EU membership were supporters

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Table 18.2. Benefits of Slovenian membership in the EU according to party preferences (averages in 2000 in %)∗ Political party/answer in % Liberal Democracy of Slovenia Social Democratic Party of Slovenia United List of Social Democrats Slovenian People’s Party∗∗ Slovenian Christian Democrats ∗∗ Slovenian People’s Party + Slovenian Christian Democrats∗∗ New Slovenia† Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia Slovenian National Party

Would benefit Would not benefit Do not know

Total

65.0 62.3 55.3 56.0 61.9 61.5

22.0 23.6 28.6 24.4 20.6 24.1

13.0 14.1 16.1 19.7 17.4 14.4

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

62.5 59.7

12.5 24.8

25.0 15.5

100.0 100.0

47.5

41.5

11.0

100.0

∗ Since the Youth Party of Slovenia was formed just before the elections it was not included in the public opinion poll. ∗∗ The Slovenian People’s Party + Slovenian Christian Democrats was founded in April 2000 after the unification of the Slovenian People’s Party and Slovenian Christian Democrats. † The party was founded in August 2000 after the split of the Slovenian People’s Party + Slovenian Christian

Democrats. Data are only available for November 2000 and are incomparable to other data. Source: Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre (2000). Politbarometer.

of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia. In contrast, ‘only’ 47.5 per cent voters of the Slovenian National Party thought that EU membership would be beneficial. We also notice that more than 50 per cent of voters of parliamentary parties saw EU membership as beneficial. On average, this percentage is closer to 60 per cent. The only exception involves supporters of the Slovenian National Party. Very similar trends are found in Table 18.3. The most interesting fact is that more than 50 per cent of voting supporters of the Slovenian National Party who were less in favour of voting for EU accession would vote for it at a referendum. This share is even very similar to the yearly average citizen’s support, excluding party preferences, which is 59.63 per cent. As we can see voters for particular parties had different views on the benefit of Slovenia’s EU membership and the referendum decision on EU accession. On the other hand, we could also claim that voters of the analysed parties do not have any significantly different views on either question. We can also see that Slovenia records a quite similar pattern to Finland, Poland, and Lithuania, where we can talk of a gap between low support for Eurosceptic parties and high support for Euroscepticism in public opinion (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002: 17). According to Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002b: 15), this shows that in those countries we cannot talk about an automatic shift of high Euroscepticism in public to high support to the Eurosceptic parties’ and the reasons for this vary.

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Table 18.3. Results of the EU referendum according to party preferences (averages in 2000 in %)∗ Political party/answer in %

For

Against

Do not know

Total

Liberal Democracy of Slovenia Social Democratic Party of Slovenia United List of Social Democrats Slovenian People’s Party∗∗ Slovenian Christian Democrats∗∗ Slovenian People’s Party + Slovenian Christian Democrats∗∗ New Slovenia† Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia Slovenian National Party

72.1 69.1 64.2 65.0 69.0 69.9

18.9 22.7 25.7 23.9 22.8 20.9

9.0 8.3 10.1 11.1 8.2 9.2

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

71.9 67.8 56.8

12.5 21.5 36.4

15.6 10.7 6.8

100.0 100.0 100.0

∗ Since the Youth Party of Slovenia was formed just before the elections it was not included in the public opinion poll. ∗∗ The Slovenian People’s Party + Slovenian Christian Democrats was founded in April 2000 after the unification of the Slovenian People’s Party and Slovenian Christian Democrats. † The party was founded in August 2000 after the split of the Slovenian People’s Party + Slovenian Christian

Democrats. Data are only available for November 2000 and are incomparable with other data. Source: Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre (2000). Politbarometer.

18.5 CONCLUSION In seeking to draw a conclusion based on the analysed data we must say that the voters’ decisions on which party to vote for at the 2000 elections were probably mostly not based on the EU issue, with the possible exception of the Slovenian National Party. This means the issue was probably not critical in the voters’ decisions at the elections. It could also be said that the issue was probably very marginal for party competition (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002b: 25). This can also at least partly help us explain the relatively big gap between the relatively high level of public Euroscepticism and failure of Eurosceptical parties at the 2000 elections. Put differently, the issue of Slovenia’s EU accession was very exposed in public opinion as a single issue, while at the same time it was not in the broader context of party and electoral competition. The important reason underlying the relatively high proportion of Euroscepticism in the public not being reflected in the significant success of Eurosceptical parties at the elections can be found on the voters’ or party side. Despite the importance of different policies for a voter’s decisions at elections, at least one other characteristic is important. This is the question of party candidates and should be considered in a more in-depth analysis of the factors influencing a voter’s decisions to vote for particular parties at elections (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994). At the end some questions relating to the findings in the chapter emerge, including the question of the comparability of Euroscepticism in Eastern and Central European Countries with Western democracies given their different historical,

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ideological, economic, and political backgrounds. Also we suggest that there may new, even softer types of Euroscepticism, maybe a ‘latent’ type of Euroscepticism that can be indirectly seen in some parties’ activities while it cannot be seen in their official standpoints or normal activities. We notice that Euroscepticism can be seen as a consequence of more concrete situations connected with real experiences of European ‘policymaking’ and not so much at the point where ‘policy-taking’ alone is in question. NOTES 1. The democratization of Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Slovakia was followed by independence and nation-building, but these was not intended goals in the mentioned countries throughout the 1980s (Harris 2002: 11). 2. On that day, Slovenia also formally applied for EU membership. In the same year, the National Assembly passed a declaration on the conducting of a referendum before Slovenia’s membership in the EU. 3. The original text of Article 68 read as follows: Aliens may acquire ownership rights to real estate under conditions provided by law. Aliens may not acquire title to land except by inheritance, on the condition of reciprocity. 4. This great sensitivity to land ownership is partly historically rooted and partly the result of an awareness of Slovenia’s smallness and the fear that foreigners would buy up most of the country’s real estate (Brinar and Svetliˇciˇc 1999: 811). 5. The amended Article 68 reads as follows: Aliens may acquire ownership rights to real estate under conditions provided by law or if so provided by a treaty ratified by the National Assembly, on the condition of reciprocity. Such a law and treaty from the preceding paragraph shall be adopted by the National Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote of all deputies. 6. On the very day, the European Commission announced the first group of countries eligible for EU membership (Brinar and Svetliˇciˇc 1999: 819). 7. Kustec (2001) emphasized the programme’s following weaknesses: concentration (usually by the government) only on selected groups of actors while, on the other side, minority groups like opponents, farmers, youth, and business are still not taken into account; poor official goal definitions since the analysis of governmental documentation showed there are no obvious or officially set goals for individual communication programmes; a shortage of qualitative contextual elements, especially those relating to strong, logical, and respectful context argumentation that should be used as the most powerful tool that an individual programme can offer; the lack of any objective external dimensions of the effectiveness and efficiency of the strategy implemented; and a lack of instrumental and programme cooperation which is also obvious from the conclusion of the Parliamentary Committee for European Affairs. 8. This text does not present a line to Slovenian independence starting from Yugoslavia and then to accession to Europe, but its main aim is to emphasize that Slovenia has to start working and living as the most demanding European countries. 9. The commercial TV station chose for the debates only those parties that, according to their public opinion polls, had the best chances of entering the National Assembly. On the other hand, the national TV station demanded that interested parties send in a written application in time and parties had candidates in all electoral units. The first condition was not met only by the Communist Party of Slovenia, while other

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parties not analysed in this chapter did not fulfil the second condition (Boh 2002: 107). 10. The Voice of Women of Slovenia did not define its positions on the analysed issue in their election programme. Since the party did not have candidates in all electoral units, it did not participate in the TV confrontations, which also prevents us assessing its position on EU accession 11. The election results for independent candidates are not presented in Table 18.1 but we can add here that their electoral shares were between 0.01 per cent (75 votes of all voters attending the elections) and 0.06 per cent (697 votes of all voters attending the elections). 12. The EU accession referendum was held in March 2003. Support for Slovenia’s accession was unexpectedly high and also belied public opinion poll data from previous years. The share of ‘yes’ votes was 89.6 per cent while 10.4 per cent were ‘no’ votes. It is also interesting that on the same day the referendum to join NATO was also held, and events around the former were completely overshadowed by the latter.

19 The European Question and the Norwegian Party System since 1961: The Freezing of a Modern Cleavage or Contingent Opposition? Nick Sitter

19.1 INTRODUCTION When Norwegian voters rejected membership of the European Union (EU)1 for the second time in November 1994 both party competition and voter alignments reflected, with few but significant exceptions, the patterns established two decades earlier. The distribution of voters was, if anything, slightly more polarized in 1994 than in 1972. It is tempting to see this as a modern cleavage, one that emerged and was politicized in the 1960s and has subsequently frozen into place. Hence, this paraphrasing of Lipset and Rokkan’s often cited ‘freezing hypothesis’ (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Mair 1997). Lipset and Rokkan’s central observation (1967: 50), strictly speaking not a hypothesis, held that ‘the party systems of the 1960’s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920’s’. However, the ‘significant exceptions’ in the present case concern changes in party strategy, as the parties that suffered the worst divisions over the 1972 referendum have sought to learn from their mistakes. The image of the European question as a single issue, let alone a cleavage and a frozen one at that, is deceptively simple. The question is both complex and dynamic. The development of the debate on how and to what extent Norway should participate in European integration owes as much to party strategy and coalition politics as voter alignments. Below the seemingly frozen surface, party-based Euroscepticism has evolved considerably over the more than four decades since made its appearance in Norwegian party politics. In what follows, the issues that have been raised in connection with the European question in Norway are identified and analysed in the proper party system context, with a view to providing a dynamic explanation of patterns of party-based Euroscepticism in Norway. Section 19.2 breaks down the question of European integration into its constituent issues, and these have of course evolved considerably since the 1960s. Section 19.3 addresses the party system context, particularly the dimensions of competition that have shaped the translation of questions about European integration into party politics. Section 19.4 provides

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analysis of the changing patterns of party-based Euroscepticism in Norway over four decades.

19.2 THE EUROPEAN QUESTION IN NORWAY The question of how and to what extent Norway should participate in European integration has been the most important new issue in national politics since the Second World War. To be sure, questions related to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership have divided the left, and post-materialist issues have provided a basis for the modification of party platforms, but no other set of questions have affected the party system as much as those related to the membership of the EU. It split the Labour party and has wreaked havoc with coalition politics on the centre-right. Four governments have resigned over European integration, and the question hangs like Damocles’ proverbial sword over the both the centre-right and centre-left coalitions of the 2005. A ‘suicide clause’ in the 2001–5 coalition agreement provided for its termination if the membership question was as much as put on the agenda. But what are the central components of this question, or rather set of questions? Although it has proven remarkably persistent, the aggregate term ‘European question’ actually denotes a range of issues that can be grouped together in a set of economic questions and a set of questions related to national identity, sovereignty, and democracy. It is, therefore, far more disparate, not to mention contingent, than the divisions that are usually classified as cleavages (Rae and Taylor 1970; Bartolini and Mair 1990). At best, is could be compared to ‘non-structural’ cleavages of the kind sometimes associated with regime change (Daalder 1966; Allart and Pesonen 1967). Given the range of issues that shape parties’ stances on European integration, Euroscepticism is, however, better analysed as a broader term that ‘expresses the idea of contingent or qualified, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’ (Taggart 1998: 336).

19.2.1 An inescapable question—Norway, EU enlargement, and party positions The European question has proven remarkably persistent in Norwegian politics since the question of joining the EU was first raised when the UK applied to join in 1961. It has been raised in the context of every wave of EU enlargement since, except the Mediterranean enlargement of 1982–6, and has emerged on the agenda once again in the context of eastern enlargement. Whereas Denmark and Ireland quickly followed the UK’s lead in July 1961, the Norwegian Labour government prevaricated until May 1962. Even then, it proceeded to send mixed messages as to how prepared it was to accept the Treaty of Rome without exemptions (Frøland 1998). De Gaulle’s veto on UK membership put a premature end to the debate in

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January 1963, as it would when the issue was raised again in 1967. The UK’s third effort at joining the EU, after de Gaulle’s departure in 1969, inevitably propelled European integration to the top of the political agenda again in Norway, where it remained until the referendum in September 1972. Although the Mediterranean enlargements in the 1980s did not set off another membership debate in Norway, developments in the EU at the time prompted a European Report in 1987 that established the Labour government’s intentions to adapt Norwegian legislation to Single European Market rules as far as possible. When communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, and with the Swedish governing Social Democrats coming out in favour of EU membership in October 1990 the question came back on the Norwegian agenda during negotiations toward the EU–European Free Trade Association (EFTA) agreement that would eventually become the European Economic Area (EEA). The 1994 referendum only silenced the debate temporarily, and the prospect of eastward enlargement inevitably reactivated it. Once again this is driven as much by external as domestic developments, in this case the potential catalyst is Iceland’s renewed EU debate. In short, the question of Norway’s association with the EU not only refuses to go away, it returns with persistent regularity in successive rounds of EU enlargement. Moreover, every political party has been confronted with, if not divided by, the European question (see Table 19.1). In 1961, the Labour (Det norske Arbeiderparti, DNA) government eventually came out more or less in favour of membership, but the same was hardly the case for the party. The September election had seen the neutralist Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF), which broke away from Labour over its policy towards NATO, gained two seats in parliament. In 1975, it would metamorphose to the Socialist Left (Sosialistisk Venstreparti, SV), building on the left-wing anti-EU movements’ success in the referendum and drawing Eurosceptic voters from Labour. Meanwhile the nonsocialist bloc was divided over the question of membership, initially with the Conservatives (H) and Liberals (V) favourable, but the Christian People’s Party (Kristelig Folkeparti, KrF) and agrarian Centre Party (Senterpartiet, Sp) divided if not negative. Rokkan (1966) argued at the time that this prevented them from challenging the Labour minority government until after de Gaulle’s first veto put the issue on ice. Only in 1963 did the Socialist People’s Party bring down the government and usher in the first, short-lived, post-war non-socialist government. Although the Conservatives and Labour have since then tended to favour membership, the latter has not been free from internal dissent over the issue. While the Centre Party soon came out as the party that, together with the Socialist People’s Party and other left socialists, most strongly and consistently opposed EU membership, the other two centre parties, the Liberals and the Christian People’s Party, went through considerable internal debate before settling down as ‘Soft’ Eurosceptics. The Socialist Left and the Centre Party continue to oppose EEA membership, while the Liberals and the Christian People’s Party favour it. On the far right, the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP), which was established in 1973 as an anti-tax protest party and originally named Anders Lange’s Party, gradually came out in favour of Norwegian participation in European integration but has returned to a more ambiguous stance since the 1994 referendum.

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Table 19.1. The Norwegian parties, roughly from left to right, with percentage of votes in the 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections Party and election results 1997 and 2002 Socialist Left (SV/SF) 1997: 6.0 2001: 12.5 2005: 8.8 Labour (DNA) 1997: 35.0 2001: 24.3 2005: 32.7 Centre Party (Sp) 1997: 7.9 2001: 5.6 2005: 6.5 Liberals (V) 1997: 4.5 2001: 3.9 2005: 5.9 Christian People’s Party (KrF) 1997: 13.7 2001: 12.4 2005: 6.8 Conservatives (H) 1997: 14.3 2001: 21.2 2005: 14.1 Progress Party (FrP) 1997: 15.3 2001: 14.6 2005: 22.1

Position in the 1960s

Position in the 1970s

Position in the 1980s

Position in the 1990s

Eurosceptic

Eurosceptic

Eurosceptic, against EEA

Pro-EU, but initially ambiguous

Pro-EU, but very divided

Pro-EU, but focus Pro-EU, but on EEA internal dissent

Eurosceptic, but moderate

Eurosceptic

Eurosceptic, against EEA

Pro-EU, but ambiguous

Very divided, Eurosceptic, turns Pro-EEA Eurosceptic, splits Uncertain, leaning Moderately Eurosceptic, to Eurosceptic divided, turns Pro-EEA Eurosceptic

Eurosceptic, against EEA

Eurosceptic, against EEA

Eurosceptic, Pro-EEA

Eurosceptic, Pro-EEA

Pro-EU

Pro-EU

Pro-EU, EEA insufficient

Pro-EU, EEA insufficient

N/A

Ambiguous

Pro-EU

Increasingly ambiguous since 1994

Source: The Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics; Party programmes 1961–2001.

19.2.2 A controversial question—economic and political issues Opposition to membership of the EU is often cast in terms of a combination of interests and values. Interest-driven opposition implies an analysis of the economic costs and benefits to specific groups, and value-based opposition is based on identity, concepts of democracy, self-rule and sovereignty, and foreign policy (Petersen, Jensen, and Listhaug 1996; Saglie 2000a). Although both terms cover a multitude of questions pertaining to opposition to European integration, the dichotomy is a useful staring point in the analysis of the bases of Norwegian party positions on this issue. It facilitates analysis of the relatively new questions related to European integration in the context of the older cleavages that are usually identified as the bases for the party system. The opposition of the nineteenth-century old left (the Liberal Party and its twentieth-century daughter parties—the Centre

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Party and Christian People’s Party) to the central administration and urban elite has been mirrored in opposition to European integration since the 1960s (Rokkan 1966; Nelsen 1993). Its focus on Norwegian identity, national self-government, and sovereignty has been upgraded from opposition to the 1814–1905 Union with Sweden to the EU. The rural–urban cleavage was, and still is, reflected in primary industry’s concerns about the economic costs of membership, but also in fear that membership would adversely affect regional policy. In addition, scepticism towards participation in a Western and capitalist system provided new political and economic arguments on the socialist left, and protection of the welfare state and public sector employment added new broader economic issues. In short, the question of how to deal with European integration has touched on most of the central issues, or even basic cleavages that form the basis for competition between political parties in Norway. But it also draws on new questions related to foreign policy and environmental protection. It is therefore both diffuse and controversial. The economic issues are relatively easy to identify, in as much as opposition to European integration draws on those sectors that face increased uncertainty or decreased subsidies under EU rules. Risk aversion alone forms a basis for opposition to exposure to a more free market-oriented regime, although Norway has in fact gone with the European flow in terms of liberalization (Claes and Tranøy 1999; Müller-Graff and Selvig 1999). Agricultural and fisheries policies have repeatedly proved major obstacles to membership, primarily because of high agricultural subsidies and reluctance to open Norwegian waters to EU fishing boats (Barnes 1996). During the EEA negotiations, the Labour party’s Eurosceptic Fisheries minister was famously nicknamed ‘No-Fish Olsen’ because of his policy of ‘not conceding a single fish’, thus putting a lie to the suggestion that economic questions are relatively easily negotiable. Fears that integration might undermine Norway’s regional (or ‘district’) policy that entails both economic transfers and positive discrimination in the form of tax breaks and other financial incentives provides further economic grounds for opposition. Finally, opposition to membership of the EU has been stronger in the public than private sector and among voters concerned that internationalization or globalization might undermine the Norwegian welfare state (Nelsen 1993; Jensesen and Valen 1995). In short, most parties on the left or in the centre have long had constituencies that are sceptical toward participation in European integration because they fear that the economic costs exceed the benefits. Value-driven opposition to European integration is, if anything, even more multifaceted than opposition based on economic interests. A combination of what Smith (1986) calls an ethnic approach to nationalism and a concern to protect ‘national self-rule’ has produced an opposition to foreign influence. This can be traced to the emergence of parliamentary democracy in the nineteenth century, in a context where rule by the people meant rule by the Norwegian people as opposed to a government and administration responsible to the Swedish king under the 1814–1905 Union (which followed the break-up of Denmark–Norway). The change of nomenclature to the European Union was of course rapidly seized

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upon to invoke comparisons (Köber 2001). It is telling that the term invoked by Eurosceptics tends to be folkestyre (roughly: people’s rule or self-rule) rather than the imported words suverenitet (sovereignty) or demokrati (democracy). In this context, local opposition to the (Swedish) ‘King’s men’ in Oslo (then Christiania) also drew on religious and cultural dissent and resistance to the more cosmopolitan conservatives and the established elite-controlled Church (Madeley 1989). In terms of identity, religion, and culture, resistance to Danish cultural influence (e.g. on written language) and Swedish administration, transmitted through the Oslo elite, and thus formed a basis for resistance to Europeanization as a threat to the country’s ‘moral–cultural heritage’ in the second half of the twentieth century (Madeley 1994; Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser 2001). This has since been extended to a debate on whether European integration represents a threat to democracy, fuelled by the ‘democratic deficit’ and ‘subsidiarity’ debates in the EU (Kristinsson 1994; Sæther 1996). The notion that Brussels represented an extension of the threat from the central bureaucracy and mainstream (cosmopolitan) culture in Oslo was succinctly summed up in the 1972 slogan ‘It is far to Oslo, but further to Brussels’ (Madsen et al. 2001). The ‘No to the EU’ campaign’s 1994 slogan centred on three key words— environment, solidarity, and national rule—all of which were threatened by the ‘union’ (Jenssen and Valen 1995). In addition to the value-based opposition discussed in the preceding paragraph, two other dimensions have developed over the last four decades that are based on policy but do not directly invoke economic costs and benefits—foreign policy and environment protection. The Socialist People’s Party broke away from Labour over the NATO question, and has since (also as the Socialist Left) extended this to opposition to the EU as a Western capitalist club. The result has been opposition to most actual regional arrangements but not international cooperation as such (Christensen 1996). Hence the advocacy of Norwegian solutions to international problems—which could facetiously be labelled ‘internationalism in one country’—and the rejection of both Atlantic military integration and European economic integration. During the 1994 campaign, the Socialist Left dismissed EU eastward enlargement as unlikely. Weary of association with the radical left, the pro-NATO centre parties have distanced themselves from this. However, the Christian People’s Party has repeatedly focused on international aid outside the EU framework, and emphasized that Europe is more than the EU, and argued that developments in EU foreign, security, and defence policy might undermine NATO (although this is now played down) (Bondevik 1994; KrF 2001). Environmental policy, or more specifically the argument that EU membership would dilute Norwegian environment protection, played a significant role in the 1994 campaign. Ironically, the main consequence of membership of the EEA (since January 1994), has been to strengthen Norwegian environmental policy in as much as EU rules require a more formal regime (Dahl 1999; Hagen 1999). Nevertheless, it remains a central point on some Eurosceptic agendas. In short, both foreign policy and environmental dimensions continue to provide some, albeit decreasing, basis for an opposition to European integration that draws on broader values.

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19.2.3 An evolving question—persistence and change in the European debate Although the question of Norway’s participation in European integration is multifaceted and has evolved along with the EU, party positions have remained relatively stable on the surface. Yet this is somewhat deceptive, and reflects that fact that, once positions were established during the 1960s and at the time of the first referendum in 1972, most parties have eschewed the European debate. Only the Hard Eurosceptic Centre Party, the most united party on the European questions, faces electoral incentives to mobilize voters on this issue. For most other parties, the issue is either internally divisive or pits the party against its coalition partners. At the same time, however, the European question has never disappeared far below the surface of public debate. Changing balances of power within parties and developments in the European integration project repeatedly force the question back on the agenda. Domestic public sector reform has narrowed the differences between Norway and the EU, thus raising questions about the implications of membership for the centre-left. The EU’s eastward enlargement has prompted a reassessment on the socialist left, but not (yet?) a change in position. Security and defence developments raise awkward questions for the centre parties, which have favoured Western military integration but opposed economic integration, but they remain Eurosceptic. Although developments in market regulation associated with Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have not yet caused revision of the free market right’s policy as they have in some other countries, this has contributed to tempering the far right’s enthusiasm for European integration. Party stability on the European question thus coexists with internal debates and intermittent reappraisals of policy. The key question about party-based Euroscepticism in Norway is, therefore, as much about the dynamics of change as about stability. Starting from the assumption that parties have a degree of freedom in translating issues (or even cleavages) into party politics, Section 19.3, therefore, turns to the question of how the European issue has been accommodated in party competition. A dynamic explanation of party-based Euroscepticism suggests that party positions are the product of how the issue affects the four central goals of a political party—the survival and continuity of the party, the pursuit of a set of policy goals, maximizing votes, and the quest for office. Unless a party is at the brink of extinction (e.g. falling below the threshold for representation), the first goal is not usually a major concern. The exception is when a party faces important divisions that may cause a major split, as the Labour and Liberal parties did in the 1970s. The second goal, pursuit of policy, is often the central focus in the literature on Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 1998; Hix 1999a; Gabel and Hix 2001). However, given a few significant cases of parties changing or modifying their positions on European integration, the third and fourth goals, the quest for votes and the dynamics of party competition in office and in opposition, are increasingly valuable as explanatory variables (see Figure 19.1; Saglie 2000b; Sitter 2001).

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Coalition Politics Party Organization

PARTY STRATEGY

Electoral Appeal

Policy Goals

Figure 19.1. Party strategy and explanatory variables

19.3 ACCOMMODATING THE EUROPEAN QUESTION IN PARTY COMPETITION If the Norwegian political parties’ elaboration and adaptation of stances on European integration is the product of efforts to avoid major splits, their broader economic and non-economic policies, vote-maximizing efforts, and quests for executive office—the balance of these priorities is hardly the same, or even very similar, for all parties. The party system reflects at least three dimensions of opposition, so defined because the parties differ fundamentally in their strategies for pursuit of votes and office. To be sure, this also reflects their historical and organizational origin and policy goals to a considerable extent. However, parties enjoy a considerable degree of freedom in choosing and adapting strategies, a continuous source of tension within most parties. The three types of opposition are: (a) competition between two largest parties, which defines the left–right dimension of the party system; (b) cross-cutting competition based primarily on other issues, the ‘third party’ or parties in many party systems; and (c) competition on the flanks of the system, by new left or far right parties. Each dimension has accommodated the European question differently.

19.3.1 The catch-all parties—Labour and the Conservatives Although all Norwegian parties have become more ‘professionalized’, only two of them warrant the classification of catch-all parties in Kirchheimer’s sense— Labour and the Conservatives (Kirchheimer 1966; Svåsand 1994). Dating back to the introduction of parliamentary rule in the 1880s, these parties come close to their West European ideal types of a conservative party on the right that adopts a free market position and a social democratic left that eventually plays down ideology in the pursuit of votes. In a country where territorial cleavages have been salient, both parties have been associated with the Oslo elite. Their competition has defined the left–right spectrum in Norwegian politics, reflecting strategies that pit the two parties against each other as the main opponent and entails a focus on socio-economic issues. In line with their economic and foreign policy, both have come out in favour of close Norwegian participation in European integration, including full EU membership. However, Labour has been more divided on the issue, as its left wing has harboured strong anti-EU dissent from the party leadership’s line (Christensen 1996, 1998).

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Neither party faces strong incentives to play up the European issue. There is little or no indication that emphasizing the quest for membership attracts voters in national elections. On the contrary, both parties have lost out to Eurosceptic opponents, Labour particularly in the early 1970s and the Conservatives in the 1990s. Moreover, Labour has long been divided on the question of EU membership. Its severe divisions in the early 1970s have since prompted more cautious approaches, for example, focusing on the EEA arrangements in the 1980s until the membership question became all but inevitable in the early 1990s. Although they have not been hit severely by internal dissent, the Conservatives’ preference for coalitions with the centre-parties has forced the party to play down or freeze the question of EU membership when in government. On the other hand, the two parties perceive each other as their main opponents, and their own role when the other is in office therefore entails a degree of opposition to the other’s initiatives. Hence Labour’s criticism of the centre-right government’s timid position on European integration in the second half of the 1960s and the Conservatives’ similar criticism of Labour during the EEA negotiations in the early 1990s. The parties have thus defied the more usual West European pattern of adopting slightly more Eurosceptic positions when in opposition than in government, largely because of their need for support from Eurosceptic parties when in office, whether in coalitions or as minority governments.

19.3.2 The interest parties—the Christian Peoples Party, the Liberals, and Centre Party The term ‘interest party’ is invoked here to denote parties that by and large have eschewed catch-all strategies in favour of an electoral appeal that focuses on a more strictly delineated section of the electorate. This is not to say that these parties have not modernized in terms of changing organizational structure, finance, or the respective roles of leadership, mass membership, and party professionals. Rather they have chosen to focus on a limited range of specific issues, often designed to appeal to a defined section of the electorate. In Norway this strategy has been facilitated by the origins of the centre parties, which can best be described as ‘territorial opposition’, a combination of economic and cultural interests associated with primary industry and the peripheries, combined with opposition to administrative centralization (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). Three parties have roots in the nineteenth-century (pre-socialist) left, or territorial opposition. The Liberals represent direct continuity in name and organization. The agrarian Farmers’/Centre Party and the Christian People’s Party were both formed from during the interwar period, when representatives of clearly delineated constituencies left the Liberals. Taking advantage of the 1919 electoral reform to a list proportional system, the National Union of Farmers formed the Farmers’ Party to protect this particular group’s economic interests. Despite the 1959 name change to Centre Party, reflecting cautious efforts to expand its target electorate, the party has remained more focused on its core voters and interests than other Nordic agrarian

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parties (Kristinsson 1991; Christensen 2001). The Christian People’s Party was formed as a regional party in a conflict over nominations for the Liberal list in Hordaland in the south-west in 1933, building its base in the lay pietist Lutheran dissident movement that had been part of the left. It went nationwide in 1945. Although it has deliberately expanded its appeal beyond the movement’s traditional focus on religion and moral questions, including alcohol prohibition, its religious roots retain a strong influence on party policy (Madeley 1994). Lacking a similarly distinct basis, save regional elites in the south and south-west, the rump Liberal party has transformed itself into the closest thing Norway has to an environmental party (Knutsen 1990). Whereas the two newer parties are more homogeneous and avoided major divisions over the EU issue, the Liberals split over this at their party congress after the 1972 referendum, when the pro-EU party leader left to found the New Peoples Party (Det Nye Folkeparti, DNF, but since 1980 the Liberal Peoples Party—Det Liberale Folkeparti, DLF). For sixteen years, until reunification in 1988, it ran against the Liberals, producing some of the most openly pro-EU party manifestos in Norway, and returning one MP in the 1973 election. Operating on this second dimension of opposition, with interest-oriented rather than catch-all strategies, has insulated the three parties against incentives to move towards pro-EU platforms. Although moves towards catch-all-like electoral strategies inevitably involve revisiting the parties’ positions on Europe, such moves have so far been limited. On the other hand, both the Centre Party and the Christian People’s Party appeal to Eurosceptic electorates, and both have been able to attract Eurosceptic Labour and Conservative voters. Given the economic and cultural questions discussed earlier, the parties face both policy and electoral motives for Euroscepticism. In the Centre Party’s case this has yielded Hardprincipled Euroscepticism which combines economic and value-based rejection of supranational integration, as opposed to the softer contingent or qualified opposition found in the Christian People’s Party and the Liberals (which have been more internally divided). Although divisions among the non-socialist parties on this question has inhibited and broken up coalitions, the effect of coalition politics on the centre parties’ Euroscepticism has been limited. Given that EU membership questions are settled by referendum, the main effect has been that parties in governing coalitions put the question on ice or, failing that, break up. Of the three parties, the Christian People’s Party has faced the strongest pressure to moderate its Euroscepticism, partly because of its mid-1990s move towards a more catch-all-like strategy (it began to use the English translation ‘Christian Democratic Party of Norway’ parallel to ‘Christian People’s Party’).

19.3.3 The flanking parties—the Socialist Left and the Progress Party The alternative non-catch-all strategy, the third pattern of opposition, is found on the flanks of the party system in the younger Socialist Left Party and Progress Party. Again the difference with other parities lies more in party strategy than

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organization, as both parties have opted for opposition on the flanks of the system rather than catch-all strategies or territorial interest-based opposition. Until 2005 neither party had been in government. However, after, in 2005, the Socialist left joined a ‘red-green’ coalition with Labour and the Centre Party; and the Progress Party has its sights set on participation in a centre-right coalition in 2009. The Socialist Left’s roots in Labour’s neutralist, anti-NATO and anti-EU leftwing makes modification of its Hard Eurosceptic stance difficult both from a policy standpoint and in terms of its electoral appeal. Its opposition to European integration provided the main unifying platform in the early 1970s. The party’s somewhat softer stance on European integration in the early 1990s arguably cost it votes in the 1993 election, when it lost out to the Centre Party (Ardal 1994). More recent attempts by the leadership to reopen a debate on Europe have been met with hostility by the party grass roots. However, the coalition with Labour and pressure for modification of the party programme, the growth in the party’s support in the early 2000s brought a number of pre-EU voters into its ranks. On the far right, the free-market low-tax orientation of the Progress Party has provided a modifying factor for a party that might otherwise be expected to oppose European integration given its hardline stance on immigration. The party’s founders included both opponents and advocates of EU membership, and it has, therefore, lacked the unity on international affairs that has characterized the Socialist Left. Although the Progress Party came out in favour of EU membership in the 1994 referendum, it has since returned to a more ambiguous stance. At the same time, the party has developed into a serious challenger to the Conservatives on the right flank, and the two parties are therefore adapting to each other’s platforms (Harmel and Svåsand 1997). As it faces few incentives for or against Euroscepticism at the electoral level, where it has recently made deep inroads into the Conservatives’ electoral base, the party’s main drivers on the European question are policy and coalition politics. Its recent more protectionist and interventionist stance may be driving the party away from its earlier EU-enthusiasm. However, its quest for participation in a non-socialist coalition continues to generate incentives not to antagonize the Conservatives over an issue in which there appear to be few votes to be gained. The Progress Party has recently gained considerable strength at the expense of its main competitor, and it consigned the conservatives to a poor third place in the 2005 election (Sitter 2006). Both flanking parties’ leaderships are flirting with more conventional catch-all strategies that move them closer to mainstream government–opposition competition.

19.4 THE EVOLUTION OF NORWEGIAN EUROSCEPTICISM The combination of the issues that affect party unity and shape policy preferences together with electoral and coalition incentives thus provides a dynamic model of party-based Euroscepticism in Norway. The two parties that have faced major divisions over the European question, Labour and the Liberals, have since been

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Table 19.2. Party programmatic positions on European integration, as per election programmes by year of election

Soc Lab Cent Lib Chr Con Prog

1961

1965

1969

1973

1977

1981

1985

1989

1993

1997

2001

Neg Fav Neg Fav SQ Fav —

Neg Fav Fav Fav SQ Fav —

Anti Pro None SQ SQ Pro —

Anti SQ Anti SQ SQ Pro None

Anti SQ SQ None None Fav Fav

Anti SQ SQ SQ None Fav None

None Fav SQ Neg SQ Fav None

Anti Fav Anti Anti SQ Pro Pro

Anti Pro Anti Anti Anti Pro Pro

Anti Fav Anti Anti Anti Pro SQ

Anti Pro Anti SQ Anti Pro SQ

Anti—indicates explicit opposition to EU membership (in the case of Sp and SV after 1993 also advocacy of withdrawal from the EEA) Neg—indicates implicit negative attitude to participation in European integration SQ—indicates explicit defence of the status quo None—indicates no reference to European integration, explicit or implicit Fav—indicates explicit favourable attitude to participation in European integration Pro—indicates explicit support for (application for) membership of the EU Source: Party programmes 1961–2001.

more careful to play down the issue and accommodate internal dissent. Yet they remain respectively pro-EU and Eurosceptic. The main driver of party positioning on Europe has been policy positions, with the centre parties’ and the Socialist Left’s stances being reinforced by their predominantly Eurosceptic electorates. As long as their party strategy remains distinct from catch-all competition, the interestoriented territorial opposition and flanking parties face few incentives to modify their Euroscepticism. The Conservatives’ and Labour’s exclusion of the Progress Party and Socialist Left from coalition games until 2005 thus far prevented coalition concerns from affecting the latter’s positions on European integration, and like the centre parties the Socialist Left tends to prioritize Euroscepticism over coalition survival. Changes in the parties’ platforms away from their policy-driven stances on European integration tend to reflect efforts to avoid disunity (which temporarily moderates their stance), efforts to move toward catch-all type strategies, or efforts to keep centre-right coalitions together. Since the question first emerged on the agenda in the context of the first enlargement effort in 1961, the debate on EU membership has gone through five broad stages. The impending eastward enlargement is inaugurating a sixth stage. The first five include: (a) the parties’ early positioning in the 1960s, (b) a period of polarization in the run-up to the first referendum, followed by (c) a period of limited debate after the first ‘no’ vote. This was broken by: (d) the new debate in the early 1990s, while the aftermath of the 1994 referendum produced (e) a shorter ‘freezing’ of the European question. In the late 2000s, this is giving way to an emerging new EU debate. Table 19.2, summarizes the persistence and change in the parties’ programmatic positions on European integration. Although these positions are sometimes the product of efforts to paper over differences within the party over European integration, and sometimes simply avoid any reference to

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this issue, they provide some indication of the evolution of the parties’ formal positions. ‘Neg’ and ‘Anti’ denote Eurosceptic stances that entail respectively a negative stance toward European integration or outright rejection of EU membership. ‘SQ’ indicates explicit defence of the status quo, and ‘none’ a lack of references to European integration. Both can mask Eurosceptic as well as pro-EU stances. ‘Fav’ and ‘Pro’ indicate respectively favourable stances toward and explicit advocacy of Norwegian EU membership or application for this. As the table indicates, the decade before the 1972 referendum saw gradual polarization on European integration, while the next decade and a half yielded far more moderate programmes. The renewed and stronger polarization in the run-up to the 1994 referendum has not been followed by the same kind of programmatic caution, except for by the Progress Party.

19.4.1 The 1960s—elaboration and prevarication When the European question was raised seriously for the first time with the UK application for EU membership in July 1961, Norwegian political parties were confronted with the challenge of how to integrate a new issue into their political profiles. The brief period up to the election, set for September 1961 as part of the fixed four-year election cycle in a country where parliament cannot be dissolved early, left little time for the parties to elaborate positions on European integration through party conferences. Labour returned to power, but now as a minority government at the mercy of the Socialist People’s Party’s two MPs (who opposed European integration as a capitalist imperialist project). Although its 1961 programme favoured integration of the EU and EFTA, the government and party prevaricated for the better part of a year before settling on a course toward EU membership. Even though the leadership of both the Labour party and its youth organization was predominantly pro-EU, de Gaulle’s veto and its effective postponement of the whole question was welcomed as a relief by many in the party (Nordli 1985). The veto also ended the truce with the pro-EU Conservatives, the first evidence of the indirect effect of the European question on coalition politics. A short-lived minority ‘bourgeois’ (Conservative, Centre, Liberal, and Christian People’s Party) coalition broke the sequence of Labour governments for a month in the summer of 1963, but come 1965 the four non-socialist parties would be in a position to form a majority government. The four bourgeois parties were far from united on the European question in 1962, when ambiguities about the possibility of ‘association’ as an alternative to full membership obfuscated the debate but facilitated compromise. These divisions soon came back to haunt the 1965–9 government, which included four cabinet ministers that had opposed the 1962 decision to apply for membership, a fact that Labour exploited by vigorously criticizing the government over its timid approach to the EU question (Lyng 1976). The only party without a ‘no’ member in the cabinet, the Conservatives, had established their pro-EU stance early even though explicit advocacy of EU membership would not replace more diffuse calls

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for integration in the party programme until 1969. Though divided between the conservative southern and radical urban Oslo wings, the Liberals eventually came out in favour of membership in 1962 (Jensvold 1979). The Christian People’s and Centre parties were more ambiguous, but despite the latter’s opposition to membership it accepted association with the EU in order to distance itself from the socialist left and communists (Knudsen 1989). The 1965–9 period became the first and only time these parties would give up their opposition to application for EU membership in order to maintain a coalition government, and even then the 1967 resolution in favour of joining the UK in a second effort to apply was somewhat ambiguous. De Gaulle’s second veto probably saved the government (Lyng 1976).

19.4.2 The run-up to 1972—radicalization and polarization The bourgeois four-party coalition’s election victory was undermined by the radicalization of the three centre parties, and particularly their youth wings, in the late 1960s (e.g. over the Vietnam War and the 1968 protests in Europe), a challenge that was also of growing concern to the pro-EU Labour leadership. Although the formal catalyst for this lay in an obscure scandal over leaks, it was the EU question that brought the government down in early 1971. The Conservatives’ lack of internal dissent on the EU question is amply illustrated by their need to find a ‘devil’s advocate’ at the 1972 party conference (Lund 1989). Meanwhile, the three centre parties’ barely addressed European integration in their 1969 manifestos, but would all take explicit decisions to advise their voters to reject EU membership in the September 1972 referendum. The party of outgoing Prime Minister Per Borten, the overwhelmingly anti-EU Centre Party, was now free to openly reject membership. It has not looked back since. The Liberals’ divisions between the radical Eurosceptic and conservative pro-EU wings were by now so severe that it split after the referendum, and has since failed to surpass the three MPs the party and its offshoot returned in the 1973 election (even after the 1988 merger) (Holst-Jæger 1997). Christian People’s Party leader Lars Korvald stuck to a waitand-see formula until the party conference adopted a ‘no’ stance in April 1972, but had declared himself for the ‘noes’ to the radical former youth leader and future Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik the year before (Rimhaug 1997). Although the party leadership was almost evenly divided, its members and voters opposed EU membership by a four-to-one margin and some of its MPs were defying the party line in votes on Europe (Sæther 1989). The European question would cast a shadow over non-socialist coalition efforts for the next three decades, setting the catch-all Conservatives apart from the three centre parties’ ‘territorial opposition’. On the left, the Labour leadership was firmly committed to EU membership, as advocated in its 1969 manifesto, although the party was increasingly divided over the question. Although the party leadership (by 33 votes to 3) and conference (212 votes to 71) came out strongly in favour of membership, the pro-EU former Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen drew considerable criticism for emphasizing

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the acceptability of dissent within the party (in stark contrast to his own earlier treatment of NATO dissenters) (Nyhammar 1983). Trygve Bratteli, Prime Minister in the incoming Labour minority government, ruled out cooperation with Eurosceptics and promised to resign in the event of a referendum defeat, which the government duly did in October 1972. The EU question prompted organized factions within Labour for the first time, in the shape of the Labour Movement Information Committee (Arbeiderbevegelsens informasjonskomité AIK). Henceforth, efforts to accommodate internal opposition would be the main force moderating the leadership’s otherwise pro-EU predilections. Meanwhile, on the socialist left, Euroscepticism provided the uniting cause for the creation of a Socialist Electoral Federation for the 1973 election that brought together the Socialist People’s Party, the AIK, the communists, and the independent socialists in what would become the Socialist Left in 1975. Its initial central aim was to defend the 1972 referendum victory, and (although the communists did not join the new party in the end) its most radical criticism of European integration in terms of imperialist capitalism would soften only in the 1980s (Erikstad 1989).

19.4.3 1972 to 1990—the big freeze The 1972 referendum was followed by a decade-and-a-half-long truce on the European question, during which no party manifesto (except the Liberal breakaway DLF) explicitly called for Norway to join the EU. Only in 1989 did strong pro- and anti-EU positions return. The immediate consequence of the referendum was Bratteli’s resignation and the establishment of Norway’s first Eurosceptic government, a minority coalition of the Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party, and the Liberals, led by Lars Korvald from the Christian People’s Party, charged with negotiating a bilateral agreement with the EU. Although this government did not survive the 1973 election, after which Labour returned to power for two full terms, it captured the way that European integration would shape non-socialist coalition games for the next three decades. When the EU issue is salient, the bourgeois alternative is at best fragile or at worst a non-starter. To be sure, bourgeois cooperation worked reasonably well under Kåre Willoch’s Conservative 1981–3 minority government and the subsequent Conservative–Christian People’s Party– Centre coalition, until the Progress Party brought down the minority coalition in 1986. However, the return of a Conservative–Christian People’s Party–Centre government under the Conservative Jan P. Syse after the 1989 election, when negotiations toward the European Economic Area were well underway, would be short-lived. With the Centre Party and Conservatives at odds over how far to integrate the EFTA states into the EU’s Single Market, the coalition’s collapse was all but inevitable. It came in November 1990, after which the Centre Party would lend support to a minority Labour government. During the 1980s, until the 1989 election, the Liberals and Christian People’s Party all but banished references to the EU from their manifestos, and even the Centre needed not go further than references to maintaining the status quo. On the far right, the Progress

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Party maintained silence on the European question, broken only occasionally by favourable noises, until the internal party debate got underway in 1987. By 1988 the party had concluded that membership was attractive, the benefits of free trade, lower taxes, market access, and cheap imports outweighed the dangers of limited freedom of action and EU-driven protectionism (Simonsen 1989). Labour likewise did little by way of advocating EU membership during this period, its pro-EU leadership preferring to focus on ever-closer cooperation with the EU (reflected in its programmes throughout the period). The Bratteli, Nordli, and Brundtland governments (1973–81) hardly addressed the question until 1979, and then only in economic terms (Bull 1989). However, Gro Harlem Brundtland’s 1986–9 government took a far more active role, driving forward the ‘Luxembourg process’ (dating back to 1984) of closer EU–EFTA association that would eventually produce the EEA. For the two parties that were most divided over European integration, and for whom policy incentives were mixed, Labour and the Christian People’s Party, the EEA provided an attractive compromise. Unsurprisingly, Christian People’s Party leader Kjell Magne Bondevik proved Brundtland’s closest ally, whereas the other parties criticized the EEA alternative as too limited (the Conservatives) or going too far (the Centre and Socialist Left) (Brundtland 1998). On Labour’s left flank, the Socialist Left maintained opposition to any form of closer integration with the EU, although the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist language of its 1970s programmes was toned down.

19.4.4 The run-up to 1994—the false thaw The party programmes of 1989 sent unambiguous signals as to how party positions would develop on the European question over the next five years. Although the prospect of a second referendum reopened the debate in each Norwegian party, and thus re-evaluation of party positions on European integration, most of these debates were swiftly settled along the battle lines drawn in 1972. By the time of the 1993 election, Labour, the Conservatives, and the Progress Party explicitly favoured EU membership, while the three centre parties and the Socialist Left expressly rejected it. All would stick by these positions in the November 1994 referendum. Both the Centre Party and the Socialist Left extended their opposition to the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, a position that remains in their current party programmes. The ‘no’ camp was therefore somewhat divided between the pro-EEA Liberals and Christian People’s Party on the one hand, and the Hard Eurosceptics in the Centre Party and the Socialist Left on the other. Among the latter, the Centre Party took the most uncompromising stance, hinting that it would try to bloc membership in the parliamentary vote even in the event of a ‘yes’ in the (formally only consultative) referendum. This contributed to it outperforming the Socialist Left in the 1993 election (Ardal 1994; Saglie 2000b). The Socialist Left was not only less united than the Centre Party, but also regarded the EU question as more complex (although it dismissed the prospects for eastward enlargement). With about half of the electorate against EU membership and a

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Labour–Conservative–Progress Party vote of some 70 per cent in 1989, and the EU question topping opinion polls as the single most important issue, the Christian People’s Party and the Liberals faced considerable incentives to attract Eurosceptic voters. Neither mentioned their pro-EEA stance in their 1993 programmes, and the Liberals went as far as advocating continuous review of the EEA. In this context the bourgeois alternative was dead, the four parties being ‘hardly on speaking terms in this election’ (Ardal 1994: 175). Although both the Conservatives and Labour faced incentives to play down their pro-EU stances in the 1993 election so as to keep their Eurosceptic voters, this had very limited effects. To be sure, they drew less attention to their positions on European integration than their Eurosceptic rivals (Saglie 1998). However, only Labour needed to combine this with the challenge of internal dissent. Saglie’s analysis of their handling of this question suggests that the party had learned considerably from its problems in 1972, as the leadership arranged a ‘contract of disagreement’ with its internal ‘semi-legitimate fraction’ Social Democrats against the EC (Sosialdemokrator mot EU SME) (Saglie 2000c). Analysis of the SME reveals three strands of internal opposition on the Labour left: the traditional trade union left, the post-materialist new left, and the rural wings of the party (Geyer and Swank 1997). Meanwhile, on the far right, the Progress Party developed its pro-EU position into a stance summed up in the 1993 slogan ‘Yes to the EC, not to the Union’. This foreshadowed its return to ambiguity after the referendum and captured its misgivings about EMU and the EU’s social dimension.

19.4.5 After 1994—the little freeze? The 1994 referendum result reflected, without significant exceptions, the results of 1972 (Petersen, Jenssen, and Listhaug 1996). However, the consequences for the Norwegian party system were far less severe. Labour remained in power, with Thorbjørn Jagland taking over from Brundtland a year before the 1997 election. That election corrected some of the distortions of the ‘EU election’ of 1993, which had seen the Centre Party more than double its vote (Madeley 1998). To be sure, in 1997, Norway got its second Eurosceptic government, a Christian People’s Party– Centre–Liberal coalition led by Bondevik from the Christian People’s Party, barely controlling a quarter of the seats in parliament. But it owed less to the European question than to Jagland’s threat to resign if Labour polled less than it had in 1993 (it dropped from 36.9 to 35.0 per cent, thereby illustrating that defeat is in the eye of the beholder). Bondevik’s government fell over a partly EU-related question connected to gas power plants in March 2000, giving way to a Labour minority government led by Jens Stoltenberg. The main surprise was not the government’s collapse, but how long it remained in place given that the pro-EU majority in parliament forced Bondevik’s Eurosceptic cabinet to swallow a pro-integration stance on EEA-related questions. No Norwegian government has used the veto that the EEA agreement provides for, and given the provisions for suspension of

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the relevant section of the agreement it is doubtful whether the veto can be used at all (Arnesen, Graver, and Sevrdrup 2001). In contrast to the post-1972 era, the EU question did not recede into obscurity after the 1994 referendum. Although European integration inevitably disappeared from the front pages, it retained its place in the party programmes. Apart from Labour’s softening of its pro-EU language in 1997, only the Progress Party and the Liberals have modified their stances significantly. The Progress Party adopted an explicitly ambiguous position, and the Liberals’ 2001 programme allowed for (but did not welcome) a new EU debate. The Christian People’s Party’s 2001 manifesto’s Euroscepticism was barely softer than four years earlier, while both the Socialist Left and Centre Party retained their calls for Norway to leave the EEA. The Conservatives similarly maintained explicit advocacy of EU membership in 1997 and 2001. Even the 2001 Labour manifesto suggested that membership might soon be possible, presenting arguments in favour of, and barely falling short of calling for immediate, membership. Given these strategies, and the prospect of eastward enlargement, the second ‘freeze’ was set to be far shorter than its predecessor.

19.4.6 The 2000s and beyond The Conservative–Christian People’s Party–Liberal minority government that took office after the 2001 election was as divided over European integration as its bourgeois predecessors, and the ‘red-green’ coalition (Lcbuw, the Socialist Left and the Centre Party) that replaced it in 2005 was no different in this respect. The very existence of the government is contingent on the question of EU membership not being raised. However, in addition to the EU’s impending eastward enlargement, efforts to keep the issue off the agenda are being marred by the increasing likelihood of a new Icelandic application for EU membership and renewed debates about the viability of the EEA as a vehicle for Norway’s participation in European integration. Across the political spectrum, the EU question, continues to shape coalition politics. In the centre the Christian People’s Party’s efforts to challenge the Conservatives and widen its electoral base places it in a dilemma between its more traditional interest-based territorial opposition and a more catch-alloriented strategy. The Progress Party’s main aspiration is to join a centre-right coalition but it remains beyond the pale for the Christian People’s Party. Like the Christian People’s Party, the Progress Party is increasingly ambiguous, albeit coming from a pro-EU stance, and faces few electoral or policy-driven incentives to play up the EU issue. On the centre-right, the balance between electoral politics and coalition games appears to be the key to how Euroscepticism plays out in the late 2000s. However, the Conservatives have indicated that they are unlikely to join another coalition that rules out EU membership altogether. Until 2005 coalition politics never had the same impact on the centre-left, where policy and party unity determined changes and continuity in Euroscepticism.

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Labour’s position remains pro-EU on policy grounds, but as long as open cooperation with the Conservatives is ruled out this means relying on Eurosceptic parties when in government. The recent rise of the Socialist Left presents a major challenge, and Labour has prioritized coalition government over the EU question in the medium them. The coalition with the two Hard Eurosceptic parties Means that the EU issue may come to shape coalition politics on the left as it has done the right. Without reading too much into the Socialist Left’s 2001 electoral gains and entry into coalition government, the party faces the classic dilemma of whether to abandon its protest-origin for a more catch-all like appeal. Recent leadership efforts to reopen the internal European debate, and more ambiguous statements on EU policy, illustrate the point. Only the Centre Party therefore faces no incentives to alter its Eurosceptic strategy. While the 1972 result yielded a long period of little development in the European question, the 1994 ‘no’ in the context of EEA membership has, on the other hand, not allowed the parties the luxury of quietly burying the European question.

19.5 CONCLUSION: THE FREEZING OF A MODERN CLEAVAGE OR CONTINGENT OPPOSITION Although Norwegian voters and parties have remained relatively faithful to the stances in favour of or against Norwegian membership of the EU that they adopted in 1972, this picture of stability masks the more complex effect of the European question on Norwegian party politics. The way the question has played out, and the changing nature of party-based Euroscepticism, is the product of explicit party strategy decisions that reflect a combination of efforts to maintain party unity, to integrate the European question and other policy goals, to mobilize voters, and to gain access to executive office. Among the more united and committed parties, the Conservatives on the pro-EU side and the Socialist Left and Centre Party on the Eurosceptic side, coalition politics and the quest for votes has not generally exercised significant moderating effects (although the recent rise of the Socialist Left has now prompted some internal debate). Although the Conservatives and Centre Party have, at times, been able to set aside their differences, as often as not their coalitions collapse over the European question. This dilemma has now appeared on the Socialist Left’s horizon too. Two parties, the Labour and the Liberals, have split over European integration and, consequently, at times modified their policy-driven respective pro- and anti-EU positions in the interests of party unity. However, they have hardly modified their platforms in pursuit of votes, save the Labour’s playing down the EU issue after the referendums. Internal divisions, unsurprisingly, make European stances somewhat more contingent. Perhaps the most interesting cases as far as the debate in the late 2000s is concerned are the parties that stand to face both electoral- and coalition-driven incentives to modify or play down Euroscepticism. The Christian People’s Party’s invoking Christian democracy is a case in point, even if this is done in the context of ‘Norwegian

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Christian Democracy’, and several challenges in the shape of EU-related questions. On the flanks, the Progress Party and Socialist Left’s current strong positions in opinion polls inevitably prompt questions as to how to exploit this and the implications for electoral appeal and efforts to render themselves more attractive coalition partners for respectively the Conservatives and Labour in 2005. In short, the factors that shape party-based Euroscepticism are far from stable. Euroscepticism is hardly a single issue in Norwegian party politics, and the deepening and widening of the EU inevitably forces the question of membership back on the political agenda. Despite the strength of Hard Euroscepticism in the Centre Party and much of the Socialist Left, party-based opposition to European integration is far more contingent than the continuities between 1972 and 1994 might at first suggest. Its ‘freezing’ and change is linked to party competition and party system stability, particularly in terms of the distinction between proEU catch-all parties and the more Eurosceptic (except the Progress Party) parties on the flanks or engaged in territorial opposition. Although the European question has, therefore, been integrated with existing dimensions of opposition, it has exercised a disruptive influence on coalition politics on the centre-right and party unity. Somewhat paradoxically, the shake-up of the party system that the Europe-dominated 1993 election provided may also have begun to undermine the dimensions of opposition that secured a prominent place for Euroscepticism in the party system in the first place. How this plays out in the next decade or so depends primarily on changes in or continuity of party strategy. NOTE 1. Hereafter the EU. For the sake of simplicity this term is used also to refer to its European Economic Community and European Communities predecessors.

20 Conclusion: Opposing Europe? Three Patterns of Party Competition over Europe Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak

20.1 INTRODUCTION Looking across Europe at the different patterns of Euroscepticism allows us to examine the nature of this phenomenon. It also allows us to discern the way that this issue fits into party systems. The European issue is, therefore, a useful lens allowing us to learn about the nature of European party systems. In this chapter we take the data provided in the previous chapters and set out a comparative overview of the patterns of competition over Europe in European party systems. Looking at party systems and the patterns of contestation and competition over the European issue is not the same as analysing all aspects of Euroscepticism. For a full and comprehensive review of Euroscepticism, we would also have to take into account the structure of public opinion (Gabel 1998; McLaren 2006) and the role of non-party actors such as movements and interest groups (Usherwood 2005). However, the nature of party competition is a good starting point to examine the wider phenomenon of Euroscepticism due to the generally low salience of the European issue in public opinion and the importance of elites in the European integration process. The shape of a party systems and the way in which it deals with the European issue is, therefore, a useful guide to the politics of European integration in the country concerned. This chapter attempts to draw together the previous chapters by proving a framework for analysing the way that the European issue is integrated into party systems and then looking at how the cases covered in the volume fit that framework. The chapter concludes with some observations about the utility and limits of the framework that we outline in this chapter.

20.2 THREE PATTERNS OF COMPETITION Looking at the way in which the European issue is contested in European party systems we suggest that three patterns of contestation characterize party systems in Europe.

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We can make three observations about systems of limited contestation. The first is that the major parties in the party system (in other words, those with the experience or prospect of government participation), will display a pervasive commitment to the European project. The second feature of such systems follows on from this and is the fact that European integration is not an issue of party competition among the major parties. This is hardly surprising as where there is widespread consensus over an issue it becomes difficult to really fit in party competition, as it gains no advantage for parties pushing it. Systems of limited contestation have little space for, and therefore usually a very limited historical record of, Euroscepticism. The third aspect of systems of limited contestation is that the major party consensus over European integration does not necessarily imply the complete absence of Euroscepticism within the party system. It means that such Euroscepticism is confined to the peripheries of the party system and perhaps to limited party factionalism. There are three characteristics that we are using to identify systems of open contestation. The first, and most important, is that one or more parties of government have taken a position of Euroscepticism (whether Hard or Soft). This characteristic is very different for party systems where only two parties have usually been in government from those where coalition governments are the norm and where, therefore, more parties have had the experience of government. The second feature is that the issue of European integration has been an important component in party competition. This is not the same as saying that the issue has necessarily had electoral salience, but it is to say that the parties have defined themselves at some time, at least partially, in relation to each other in terms of their position on European integration. The final characteristic of the systems of open contestation is where the European issue has played a role in determining either the make-up of a government or has played an important role in determining the leadership of a major party. We put this forward with some caution as it does not feature in all the cases we identify. However, we suggest that it is important as it has occurred in some cases and because it would, if it occurred in the future, be a clear indication of open competition. This is important because if the European issue determines the make-up of government or the leadership of important parties, it is relevant to both the positions taken by political parties and the relationship between them, and so lies at the core of our understanding of what a party system is. The final category, systems of constrained contestation, covers party systems in which European issues play a role and where Euroscepticism is certainly present, but where there appears to be less likelihood of European issues affecting domestic party competition directly. This is because issues of European integration are framed within a constraining context of the inevitability of involvement in the European integration process. It is no coincidence that the cases making up this category are all the new European Union (EU) member states of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. The cases in this category are where there are parties that have expressed hostility to European integration but where the European issue has such low importance, or where there is such inevitability about participation in the European

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Open contestation

Constrained contestation

France Germany Italy Belgium The Netherlands Luxembourg Spain Portugal Finland Ireland Slovenia

UK Greece Sweden Austria Malta Czech Republic Denmark Norway

Poland Hungary Slovakia Latvia Lithuania Estonia

project, that any hostility is of marginal importance. For many post-communist Central and East European states the choice about whether or not to join the EU is seen as no choice at all. The perception is that there really is no alternative and, although there may be doubts about some specific aspects of European integration, the larger project of a ‘return to Europe’ inevitably involves EU membership (Henderson 1999a). We now turn to look at how the cases included in this volume fit the patterns outlined here. Table 20.1 previews how our cases fit these categories. In doing so, our objective is to integrate the material from the individual cases into a comparative context, rather than simply bringing the case studies together. We are however faced with a paradox of scale and method in doing this. And this paradox is one that must increasingly characterize the study of the EU as it is enlarged. The present volume is a large one and represents a difficult feat in bringing together comparative qualitative data from a large number of cases where that data is gathered in a comparable and systematic way. But even the present volume is not comprehensive and does not cover all the possible cases. Simply limiting our examining to existing EU member states would already make this a major project, but we also argue that candidate states and even non-candidates are potentially useful comparative cases. As the European project progresses and the EU continues to enlarge, it becomes increasingly more difficult to study its domestic effects comparatively in a systematic fashion. The paradox is that the harder we have to work, as comparativists, to gather systematic data on the enlarging EU, the harder it becomes to be comprehensive or comparative in the use of that data.

20.2.1 Systems of limited contestation Most European party systems are characterized by limited instances of Euroscepticism. The dominant type of party system in Europe is therefore one of limited contestation over the European issue. In one sense, this reflects the fact that the

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history of the European integration project has been characterized by the issue being contested in a limited way. Germany provides perhaps the paradigmatic example of a system of limited contestation. What characterizes the four main parties of its party system is a powerful commitment to the European project. This can be of little surprise given the role of the German Christian Democracy in driving forward the process of European integration. While, as Lees demonstrates in Chapter 2, some Euroscepticism has emerged in factional form in the major parties, it is clear that the Christian Democratic, social democratic, and liberal democratic core of the party system have historically been important standard-bearers for the European project and there has been little space for the contestation of Europe between these parties. Where Euroscepticism does emerge, it is at the peripheries of the party system. Its presence on the far right and in the Party of Democratic Socialism demonstrates this. The highly marginal and marginalized status of the far right allows such forces to advocate what Lees (2002a) describes as the ‘dark matter’ of German politics. The Party of Democratic Socialism as the competitor party of the left and as the representative of eastern Germany (Hough 2001) also has more ability to advocate Soft Euroscepticism. But perhaps the clearest example of the link between party system marginality and Euroscepticism lies in the story of the German Greens who have moved away from Euroscepticism as they have moved towards the core of the party system and, eventually, to actually being a party of government. In the case of France, the other country most clearly identified along with Germany as being at the heart of the European integration project, it is hard not to see the unusual nature of the party system as playing a crucial role in enabling, constraining, and shaping the emergence of Euroscepticism. It would be hard to argue that France has had no clear debate about European integration or that manifestations of Euroscepticism have not permeated parts of French politics. But equally it would be hard to argue that any of the major parties of government have taken Euroscepticism as a salient and resonant position. The fluctuating nature of the party system, the importance of personality, and the phenomenon of rally politics (Graham 1993) mean that Euroscepticism appears to bubble up through the party system emerging in fissures within parties or is carried by particular personalities such as Pasqua, de Villiers, and Chevènement, rather than being evident in clear, unequivocal positions taken by the major parties. As Grunberg points out in Chapter 3, the phenomenon of linking Euroscepticism to marginalized parties works most clearly with the National Front on the far right but also extends to the far left with the array of parties there including the Communist Party. Grunberg also shows how the dynamic and changing nature of the French party system also offers a clear space and opportunity for breakaway movements and forces from the major parties to take and push Eurosceptic positions. What limited contestation in the French case illustrates is that, despite Euroscepticism emerging throughout the party system, the dominant pro-European consensus means that it has not resulted in any of the major parties in the two blocks taking a consistently Eurosceptical position, nor have European

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issues played a decisive role in determining domestic political outcomes. What the French case illustrates for the nature of limited contestation system is that the configuration of the party system plays an extremely important role in shaping how ‘Europe’ emerges as a political issue. Even in Italy, traditionally seen as a country with an extremely deep and powerful commitment to the European project, there is evidence that, while the pro-European consensus of the party system does prevail, changes in the party system since the early 1990s have enabled the issue of Europe to emerge as a lever for populist parties of the right and left but never within the core of the party system. As Quaglia argues in Chapter 4, persistent public support for European integration has not ruled out the possibility of Euroscepticism emerging within the fundamental changes of the party system. It is the new populist parties of the right that have, in recent years, offered a sustained Eurosceptic position, while even Forza Italia has been hard to categorize in terms of its European position. But it is clear that, like the German Greens, as Berlusconi’s party has shifted from being a protest movement to a party of government it has tempered whatever tendencies it occasionally had towards Euroscepticism. In contrast, the other party of the populist right, the Northern League, moved towards Hard Euroscepticism as it competed for a similar space with Forza Italia. As Raunio points out in Chapter 10, in Finland, we have the case of marginal Euroscepticism in the party system with the True Finns, a very small party, being the only party represented in parliament taking a Eurosceptical position but where there is factional conflict within some of the more major parties. The Centre Party and the Christian Democratic Party both contain factions that are clearly Eurosceptical and Raunio also points out the wider potential for Eurosceptical tendencies within other major parties. However, he also suggests that the mobilization of this tendency is very much dependent upon particular individuals within the parties taking the lead, and is—therefore—partly a function of the candidate-centred nature of party politics in Finland. Raunio also argues that Euroscepticism is prevented from becoming an issue of competition between the major parties partly by virtue of the consensual nature of Finnish politics. In Finland, we, therefore, have an interesting case of limited contestation. The three major parties—the Social Democratic Party, the National Coalition, and the Swedish People’s Party—have all been relatively united in their support for European integration. Competition between them has not been on the European issue and parties at the periphery of the party system are the only ones that unequivocally manifest Euroscepticism. What is striking about Raunio’s analysis is the implication that conflict over the European issue is not absent and remains as a potential characteristic of party competition, but that the structures of Finnish politics limit its manifestation. In their contribution (Chapter 5), Deschouwer and van Assche suggest that Belgium is the archetypal case of the permissive consensus. Popular support for the EU has provided a context where Europe rarely impinges on party competition. Parties that have expressed single-issue Euroscepticism have secured less than negligible support in elections. Deschouwer and van Assche stress that European

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issues are contested at the elite level in respect to key moments of wider European development—such as the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice—but that this does not translate into wider debate because of the low salience of the European issue in Belgian politics. Looking at the relative positions of Belgian parties, it is possible to identify Soft and Hard Eurosceptic stances, but these are evident in parties that are mainly oppositional, peripheral, or extremist parties. The only party with a record of sustained Euroscepticism was the extreme right Vlaams Blok but it is clear that this position was not an important component of its electoral or ideological identity. It is vital that in the comparative consideration of partybased Euroscepticism we include cases such as Belgium where it is difficult to find evidence of this phenomenon in the party system. Belgium, therefore, provides us with perhaps an extreme case of limited contestation and the archetype of a case where Euroscepticism is not a feature of party competition. As with Belgium, Ireland provides us with a case where we might think that we could expect to find very little party-based Euroscepticism given the public support for the EU and the benefits that this country has derived from membership; although the 2001 rejection of the Nice Treaty in a referendum should give us some pause for thought. In Chapter 7, Gilland, however, suggests that the 2001 referendum result should not be taken as evidence of Euroscepticism and that, as in Belgium, Europe is of extremely low salience in Irish politics. Where it is manifested, Euroscepticism is embedded in the oppositional politics and positioning of minor, peripheral parties. Euroscepticism in Ireland does not trouble the core of the party system and is confined to Green, nationalist (Sinn Féin), and extreme left parties. Spanish politics has seen an absence of Euroscepticism among the major parties but as Gómez-Reino, Llamazares, and Ramiro argue in Chapter 8, this is to neglect the regional dimension and to ignore the Euroscepticism of those parties that are not at the heart of the Spanish party system. Soft Euroscepticism is present in the party system in the United Left as a far left force growing out of the communist party and the Galician Nationalist Block. They also suggest that Hard Euroscepticism is present but only at a regional level with the Basque independentist left and in the electorally insignificant form of the Spanish far right. The Spanish case demonstrates that the European issue, for those parties that express Euroscepticism, is embedded in wider debates and that it is instructive to look beyond the national level, especially in states with significant sub-national governance structures and movements. Unusually for one of the post-communist candidate states, Slovenia’s party system fits into the category of limited contestation. As Krašovec and Kustec Lipicer demonstrate in Chapter 18, Slovenia has seen a very broad and abiding consensus among the major parties about the advantages of EU accession. Only the populist Slovenian National Party and the New Party have displayed Eurosceptical tendencies. The lack of substantial competition over Europe was not, Krašovec and Kustec Lipicer argue, for lack of popular Euroscepticism among the voters. But it is clear that only minor parties felt that it made sense to break with the strong pro-EU consensus that existed among the major parties.

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The inclusion of Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium in the category of limited contestation is indicative of how the European issue has only been contested in a limited way in the six founding states of the EU. Although not included as cases in this volume, patterns of party competition in the Netherlands and Luxembourg would also fit this category. This observation can be read in two ways. It means either that long-term membership of the EU has the effect of either creating or reinforcing limited contestation, or that the EU’s formation and initial construction took place in states particularly given to contesting the European issue in a limited way. We would need to be doing a different and far more historical comparative study than we are here to establish if it is the case that all six founding states have seen consistently limited contestation since the formation of the EU. It seems much more likely that the party systems and structures of public opinion in the EU founder states means that these are states particularly given to only contest the issue of European integration in a limited way. It is not only the founding states that are characterized by limited contestation. The cases of Spain, Finland, and Slovenia also covered in this volume also usefully span more recent phases of enlargement from 1986 through 1994 to 2004, illustrating effectively that the EU was not only founded by states with limited contestation of Europe in their party systems but also continues to bring in new members states whose party systems see Europe contested in a limited way. It is, perhaps, as a consequence of this that we can observe that the most common pattern of party competition over Europe is that of limited contestation. There is a paradox in the prevalence of limited contestation of EU politics compared with the importance of European integration for post-war Europe. Clearly the European project is of great importance to post-war Europe but the fact that it is not a key issue in the domestic politics of most European states is at odds with this. This either speaks to something in the nature of the European issue that makes it hard to contest in the way that domestic political issues are regularly contested. Or it says something about the nature of most domestic European political systems and the difficulty they have in dealing with non-domestic issues.

20.2.2 Systems of open contestation The least common type of party system is one where there is what we term open contestation over the European issue. It is significant that this is the least common type of party system as it reinforces the point that the European issue is rarely the central defining one of party competition in most European party systems. But the spectacular nature of the cases where there is open contestation means that we are sometimes tempted to give more prominence to these cases than they numerically deserve. The British case serves as the pre-eminent case of a party system in which Europe has featured as an issue of contestation and in which there has been a wide range of opinions on European integration. Britain is unusual in having the two major parties of government both embracing—albeit at different times—policies

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towards Europe that can unequivocally be described as Eurosceptic. While the Labour Party has become an advocate of European integration, the Conservatives have come to embrace—and, in recent years, can almost be defined by— Euroscepticism. In Chapter 6, Baker et al. show that Euroscepticism in the major British parties has also appeared in the form of factional conflicts. While they argue that the European issue has not been an issue of great electoral salience, they also demonstrate that it has been an important one for party competition both between and within the major parties. It was also an important factor in precipitating a change of leadership in the Conservative party on more than one occasion. Furthermore, Baker et al. demonstrate that Euroscepticism in Britain is not confined to the major parties and show how it has also emerged in the peripheries of the party system and in single-issue Eurosceptic parties. In short, in terms of Euroscepticism, the UK has had it all: major party Euroscepticism, factional Euroscepticism within major parties, Euroscepticism within peripheral parties, Europe as an issue of importance in party politics, and single-issue Eurosceptical parties. Two cases that are not included in this volume but which would also fit the categorization of open contestation are Greece and Malta. Although Greece has experienced extremely high levels of both public and party support for European integration in recent years, if we look retrospectively, we see some similarities to the British case. In Greece, a major party has switched from being Eurosceptic to being a party supportive of European integration. The major party of the left, Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), has shifted from a position of opposing European integration when it was founded in 1974 to a pro-EU position from the late 1980s onwards. The source of the party’s original hostility came from an anti-Western orientation together with a desire to attain full Greek ‘independence’, which they felt was incompatible with EU membership (Featherstone 1988: 175–7). A hard test of the party’s position came when PASOK opposed Greece’s application to join the then European Community in 1975. Moving into power, however, changed the party’s position and this shift was reinforced by the changed ideological context brought about in Greece by the end of the cold war. PASOK moved to an entirely different position and the party now remains solidly within the pro-EU consensus of European social democratic parties (Verney 1996). In the Maltese case, open competition over European integration is not simply historical. The 2003 Maltese accession referendum saw the lowest level of support for EU membership among the candidate states that joined in the 2004 enlargement. This may reflect the fact that in this two-party system the Labour Party has consistently pushed for a Eurosceptical position and the very issue of EU accession was always important to both parties and voters in Maltese electoral politics (Cini 2003a, 2003b). The Czech case provides us with a useful example of a mainstream party, the Civic Democratic Party, taking a Eurosceptic position in an East European candidate state. As Hanley argues in Chapter 14, the position of the Civic Democrats’ and their founder and erstwhile leader Vaclav Klaus regarding

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European integration represented a distinct strategy in the search for a centreright path for parties in this region. The Civic Democrats’ Euroscepticism marks a contrast with the relatively de-ideologized and pro-European stances of West European Christian Democratic parties. However, it does not offer a clear example of strategic-position-taking on the European issue, as the party’s position did not seem to chime with its natural electorate, rather it appeared to be at odds with it. It is certainly clear that Klaus’ role has been central to the Civic Democrats’ Euroscepticism and that it is important to understand the party’s stance on Europe as a part of a wider historical context of Czech politics. The aspiration to develop an Anglo-Saxon neo-liberal ideology reminiscent of Thatcherism in the UK means that it is not entirely coincidental that Czech Civic Democrats and the UK Conservatives seem to be unusual mainstream parties advocating Euroscepticism. The continuities between the UK and the Czech Republic extend farther than the mainstream and take in the peripheries of the party system, where extreme right and left parties have both taken Eurosceptical positions. As Knudsen points out in Chapter 9, in Denmark we have a case of a state where Euroscepticism has maintained itself as part of the party system but where, in contrast to the UK and the Czech Republic, it has not been expressed by the mainstream parties of government but rather by the more radical parties and singleissue anti-EU parties in European Parliament (EP) elections. The Euroscepticism of the Danish People’s Party on the radical right and of the Socialist People’s Party on the radical left represents the space in Danish politics in which Euroscepticism can develop but it is perhaps no coincidence that these parties are both in competition with more centrist and electorally successful parties on their respective sides of the ideological spectrum. There are two notable features to the manifestation of Euroscepticism in the Danish context and which are important to the context of understanding Denmark as a system of open contestation around European issue. The first is that Euroscepticism is absent from the heart of the party system. It is notable that the major core Danish parties—the Conservatives, Liberals, and Social Democrats— do not express Euroscepticism. The second feature of note is that Denmark is unusual in the way that it has compartmentalized the European issue so that the party system for EP elections is different from that for domestic electoral competitions. Indeed, the key difference lies in the role of single-issue Eurosceptic parties contesting the EP elections but not national ones. The other way in which Denmark differs is in the extensive use of referendums to decide European issues. This has the effect of insulating the national parties from the clearly high levels of public Euroscepticism. Moreover, this tendency may well be increased through the role of the European Committee in the national parliament serving as a venue to compartmentalize the European issue and to allow Eurosceptic opinion an institutionalized role. Knudsen’s argument is that Hard Euroscepticism is a minor component of public opinion but that the Danish political system has tended to overrepresent such minority opinions. This, combined with features such the European Committee of the Danish Parliament and the undoubted influence of Danish European

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referendum results in the larger European project, mean that open contestation over Europe is clearly a feature of the Danish party system. Sweden represents a case where Euroscepticism has permeated the party system, in factional forms as well as in overall party positions. As Aylott argues in Chapter 11, the Greens and the Left Party have Eurosceptical positions and factional Euroscepticism has featured over the years in the Social Democrat as well as the Centre and Christian Democratic parties. This means that Euroscepticism emerges, as in the Danish case, at the ‘sides’ of the party system and, in factional form, even at the centre. The explanation offered by Aylott is, however, that the wide public pool of Euroscepticism is not an unequivocal incentive for party positions as the divisive nature of the European issue works against the need for parties to maintain unity for electoral and coalitional reasons. Austria is a case where, as Fallend argues in Chapter 12, we might expect open contestation over European integration. What is interesting is how much movement there has been on the issue of European integration. One of the major parties, the Social Democratic Party, has moved historically from Euroscepticism through to strong support. The Greens have also moved away from Euroscepticism. The Freedom Party has moved in the opposite direction with the party finding grist to its mill in 2000 when the other EU states condemned the participation of the Haider’s Freedom Party in government. Fallend demonstrates that the role of ideology and the nature of party competition in terms of a government– opposition dynamic has been a key to understanding the shifting terms of the European debate in Austria. An additional state that has a party system of open contestation of the European issue is Norway, a non-EU member state. However, the fact that the country is a non-EU member does not mean that the EU issue has been neglected in Norwegian politics. As Sitter notes in his contribution (Chapter 19), Norwegian voters have been consulted repeatedly in referendums on EU membership but have rejected the option continually. It can come as no surprise, then, that Euroscepticism is both manifest in the major parties and is an issue of contestation between those parties. Euroscepticism can be seen, at least at some point, in all the major parties with the exception of Labour and the Conservatives. Euroscepticism, therefore, spans the Socialist Left, Liberal, Centre, Christian People’s, and Progress parties, Sitter suggests that there has been much change within the types of Euroscepticism expressed by the parties and that this is a function of the ‘government–opposition dynamic’ and the different types of strategies pursued by the different parties. It is clear that Europe is an issue of contestation between the parties and that this contestation has had both a popular resonance and profound impact on Norway’s EU relations. Euroscepticism is, from the point of view of its hardest exponents, given effective expression through Norwegian popular rejection of EU membership. The stuff of politics is contestation, conflict, and competition. Looking for this in terms of EU politics in domestic party systems points us squarely to the states included in this category of open contestation. And fore square at the front of this group is the British case, the EU’s ‘awkward partner’ with a long history of difficult

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relations with the EU as well as, in more recent years, a turbulent interaction between and within its main parties over the European issue. Adding in the cases in this volume of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway gives the impression of a northeastern dimension to open Euroscepticism in party systems. But once we add in the Czech Republic and other cases not covered in this volume, such as Greece and Malta, the similarities between these cases seem less apparent. What we suggest is that looking at the cases of open contestation reveals that the nature of and reasons for open contestation over Europe are very much emblematic of the particularities of respective party and political systems. The unusual nature of the Civic Democrats in the Czech Republic means that this case stands out from the other post-communist states. The unusual nature of the Danish separation between European (parliamentary) and national party systems means that Denmark has a distinctive pattern of European contestation. The factional nature of European competition in the Swedish party system means that this case has no clear equivalent elsewhere in Europe. The Norwegian pattern of public opinion over Europe and party competition between government and opposition, combined with the frequent resort to referendums, seems to generate open contestation. Following on from this we would posit three tentative observations about the patterns of open contestation. First, that there is some evidence that party systems that are more given to alternation and have a tendency to binary competition are more likely to exhibit open contestation of the European issue. Britain, Malta, Greece, and—to a less extent—the Czech Republic have party systems that have tended to be more bipolar than multipolar. The second observation is that, taking our cue from Baker et al.’s contribution to this volume looking at the British case, the interaction of domestic party politics, the actual nature of European integration (particularly changes in the European project), and wider geopolitical factors may come together to create conditions particularly conducive to open contestation over the European issue. However, the final, and more important, observation is that in the case of open contestation we are increasingly convinced that it is specificities of the cases rather than the similarities between them that generate such contestation. In short, open contestation over Europe in party systems appears to occur for different reasons in different states. The domestic politics of European integration, therefore, depends heavily on domestic as much as European conditions.

20.2.3 Systems of constrained contestation The set of cases that we examine in this volume indicates that we are, for obvious reasons, particularly sensitive to the post-communist candidate states that constituted the vast bulk of the 2004 enlargement. The particularity and simultaneity of their wider political and economic transition experiences from communism mean that we consider them almost as a category in themselves. The fact that we construct this category of constrained contestation, which is only made up

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of post-communist states (but is not made up of all of them), is indicative of our reluctance to artificially (as we felt it would be) lever them into either the categories of limited or of open contestation. Poland as the largest of the most recent candidate states to enter the EU serves as a good starting point for illustrating the nature of constrained contestation. As Szczerbiak argues in Chapter 13, while Polish Euroscepticism is sometimes exaggerated, it is clear when the picture is examined in detail that only one party, the League of Polish Families, maintained an unambiguously Eurosceptical position. Szczerbiak argues that a number of other parties flirted with the ideas of Euroscepticism but were not either clear, consistent, or particularly visible in the pursuit of a Eurosceptic agenda. These parties are the Law and Justice party, Self Defence, and the Polish Peasant Party. What Szczerbiak argues is that, in the case of these parties, while there have been Eurosceptical bursts of rhetoric or statements, there was a marked absence of clear explicit Eurosceptical statements about the respective party’s positions on European integration. What there was, argues Szczerbiak, was the potential for these parties to assume Eurosceptical positions in the future. The Polish case demonstrates that, in states with constrained competition over Europe, there is a clear space, and in the case of candidate states the reason, for parties to talk about the European issue. However, it seems that space for such discussion is constrained in the way that it is likely to prevent the outright expression of sustained and consistent Euroscepticism. As Szczerbiak argues, where Euroscepticism is expressed, it is more the consequence of short-term strategic and tactical considerations of party competition and less the result of deep-seated anti-European ideological considerations. It is also notable that the parties that flirted with Euroscepticism were not the largest vote-winners, in the 2001 election at least. In other words, there is evidence that the European issue is, in a highly constrained manner, the tactical territory of parties attempting to differentiate themselves from the pro-European core of the party system. Even Estonia, with its unusually high levels of public Euroscepticism among the post-communist candidate states, illustrates the constrained nature of European contestation. As Mikkel and Kasekamp demonstrate in Chapter 17, on the ‘supply’ side, forces emerge with Eurosceptic agendas such as the Future Party and can even be seen as primarily focusing on Euroscepticism as a defining feature of their identity. But on the ‘demand’ side they also show how European issues did not feature as being particularly salient in domestic elections in 2003. Parties such the Independence Party, that also attempted to campaign on the issue of Euroscepticism, fared extremely poorly and, as Mikkel and Kasekamp show, Euroscepticism was a strong leitmotif only among the more peripheral parties. In contrast, the shifting of the Centre Party’s position from Eurosceptic to pro-European as it entered government once again illustrates the role that governmental participation seems to have on constraining Eurosceptical position taking. According to Mikkel and Kasekamp the particular history of Estonia, and particularly its relationship to the USSR, goes a long way to conditioning the way that the European issue plays out in Estonia. Seeking refuge from its post-war history also pushes Estonia firmly into

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the European integration process and this, therefore, constrains the way in which Euroscepticism manifests itself in the party system fundamentally. Looking at Slovakia, Euroscepticism was present in both Hard and Soft variants across the range of parties but, as Henderson argues in Chapter 16, this was a function of domestic party competition and of the undeveloped conceptions of Europe. Henderson goes so far as to tag Meˇciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia as a ‘phoney Eurosceptic’ party arguing that programmatic support for EU accession must be understood in its de facto record of making that accession problematic when it was in power. In the case of the peripheral parties taking Eurosceptic positions, Henderson demonstrates that, in marked contrast to many other states, the two parties of the right and left that took Soft Eurosceptic positions—the Christian Democrats and Smer—were both parties of the mainstream centre-right and centre-left rather than on the extremes of politics (although Smer has a somewhat populist profile). This was in addition to the nationalist and communist parties also adopting harder Eurosceptical positions. The fluid nature of the Slovak party system, and particularly the legacy of Meˇciar’s period of power, appears to have had the effect of opening up the space for Euroscepticism as an oppositional strategy but one that has purchase towards the centre of the ideological spectrum as well as at the extremes. Hungary has, as Batory contends in Chapter 15, a strong pro-European predisposition on the part of both public and parties. At the heart of the party system, Fidesz and particularly the leadership of Viktor Orbán has become associated with a Hungarian voice for Soft Euroscepticism but, as Batory suggests, the image of Euroscepticism and the progress towards Hungarian EU membership demonstrated the strategic way in which the European issue was used. Hard Euroscepticism has, however, been present at the peripheries of the party system as manifested on the right in the national-populist Hungarian Justice and Life Party and on the left in the communist Workers Party. For the Justice and Life Party, Europe was an issue that allowed it to play both parts of a constructive opposition—not ruling out EU membership allowed it to be constructive (and potentially coalitionable) and yet being instinctively sceptical allowed it to reinforce its credentials as oppositional. Yet, in the end, it opposed EU membership in the accession referendum. In an entirely different pattern, the Workers Party moved from apparently wanting Hungary to be outside the EU to being supportive in the accession referendum. Two observations can be made about the nature of constrained contestation from looking at Hungary. The first is that the contestation over the European issue that took place in the party system seems fundamentally conditioned by the overriding sense of the inevitability of Hungarian EU membership. The other observation is that only the Justice and Life Party actually ended up, at the decisive moment, opposing membership, so reinforcing the impression that Europe could only really be an issue of contestation when such contestation did not have any significant impact on the prospects for Hungarian EU membership. Not all post-communist candidate states had party systems of constrained contestation; Slovenia had limited contestation and the Czech Republic had open

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contestation. Even among those post-communist states included in this category it is clear that there were very different paths to and explanations of constrained contestation. Whether it was Estonia’s singular relationship with the USSR or Slovakia’s split from the Czech Republic, it is clear that placing these party systems in the same category of simply being defined in terms of being post-communist is both inadequate and misleading. Our contributors have shown that historical circumstances have played a key role in shaping the way in which Europe plays out as in issue in their different party systems. The category of constrained contestation may well be a transitional category itself. We expect that as these candidate states become integrated in the fullest sense of the word into the EU as full member states that their party systems will tend to reveal more characteristics of either open or limited contestation. It could be the case that the constrained character of the European issue continues but, on the basis of the cases in this volume, it is hard not to see the constraints as being connected to candidacy. Both these possibilities could occur and we can see this through charting change in the cases currently under consideration, and by examining cases like Croatia as they move through a period of candidacy, to see if that pattern is similar to the cases considered here.

20.3 CONCLUSION In this chapter we have not revisited the issue of the definition of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism laid out in the introduction as we return to questions of classification in the conclusion to Volume 2 (Chapter 10, ‘Theorizing Party-based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality’). In many ways we have elided the two in the foregoing analysis to talk of party-based Euroscepticism in its broadest terms. This is a deliberate choice and reflects the fact that we feel the country cases have, in different ways, suggested the difficulty of talking in consistent language in the range of empirical cases about a conceptual distinction that is hard and fast. We have found the debate about how to conceptualize Hard and Soft Euroscepticism to be useful and has changed our thinking in the process (see conclusion to Volume 2). The contributions to this volume have, in another way and at our behest, engaged with the Hard and Soft distinctions. They have done so in different ways and with different degrees of fit to the cases under examination. We see this as evidence that the Hard and Soft distinction has been a useful heuristic exercise and perhaps a necessary one for a wide-ranging comparative project such as this. However, we feel that the sheer range of responses and the very different meanings attached in different contexts to the same conceptual language of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism is indicative of the need for caution in applying them. The work done by our contributors indicates that we feel Hard and Soft Euroscepticism, as we have conceptualized them, may be useful in certain contexts and may have some descriptive purchase, but we do not now believe them to be universally

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applicable conceptual tools for fully explaining or illuminating the phenomenon of Euroscepticism across an inclusive and comprehensive comparative range. As a comparative exercise we have attempted here to make broad-brush and inclusive categorizations of the party systems under consideration. However, while we would defend the utility of the exercise, it has become clear that two important factors that are exogenous to the process of synchronic comparisons play key roles in determining the way in which ‘Europe’ emerges (or does not emerge) as an issue of party competition. The first factor that works against simple inclusive statements is the particularity of party systems. While we can use existing typologies of party systems such as Sartori’s (1976), these can only offer partial explanations of how issues work through the different types of party systems. Whether it be the constantly changing nature of the French party system, the consequences of the Italian revolution in the party system in the early 1990s, the particular (and peculiar) strategic vision for the centre right elaborated in the Czech Republic, or the dualism and adversarialism of the British party system, it is impossible to ignore these specificities— historical, institutional, or otherwise—and their role in shaping the form that the European issue plays in a country’s party system. The second exogenous variable that we are conscious of is the different historical or structural positions of different European countries with respect to the EU and the European project. Simply put, different countries have different experiences of relationships with the EU. Obviously there is the difference between membership and candidacy (or neither), but there is also the factor of duration of membership. However, we have also found that we cannot simply look at how long countries have been members but we also need to consider their relative positions within the EU. France and Belgium have the same length of EU membership—as do Poland and Malta—but they occupy very different positions with the European integration project. One of the lessons in using the European issue to illuminate the characteristics of party systems is that, as soon as we engage with a wide range of cases taking a truly pan-European scope, typologies of party systems that assume the systems to be static are fundamentally misplaced. What may make much more sense is to view party systems as being permanently dynamic and located somewhere between ideal types rather than firmly in fixed categories (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002c). Using the three categories elaborated here, we might, therefore, expect to characterize any one party system as being located somewhere between limited and open contestation. In certain cases, we might see the need to introduce another dimension and ideal type, as is the case with the recent post communist candidate states that fall between open or closed contestation and represent the additional pole of constrained contestation. As the EU and the European integration project develop, it is tempting to characterize European politics as seeing a growing tide of Euroscepticism. Moments such as the 2005 double rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in referendums in the Netherlands and France reinforce that temptation. The evidence of this volume, taking a snapshot of European party politics at one point in time, gives

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us reasons to resist this temptation. The spectacular nature of politically charged moments of Euroscepticism such as these should be tempered by two conclusions that we can draw from the material presented in this volume. Firstly, that Euroscepticism is incorporated in very different ways into the different polities that make up Europe. We can trace some patterns or similarities but we should be aware of how differently ‘Europe’ is constructed and integrated into domestic polities. The second conclusion is that, if we are to draw a broad generalization, the pattern of limited contestation is the most prevalent and that states with patterns of constrained contestation, especially during their transition from being candidates to full member states, may well change into states characterized by limited contestation. It is vital that we pay attention to the reality of quiet, sustained patterns of limited contestation rather than to the more spectacular moments of Euroscepticism when we characterize the generality of the way in which European integration plays into the party politics of European states.

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Index Action Committee for Democracy and Pensioners’ Justice (Luxembourg) 11 Agir (Belgium) 88 Aho, Esko 173, 176 Alliance of Free Democrats (Hungary) 268, 269, 270, 271 Alliance of the New Citizen (Slovakia) 283, 290, 292 Alternative Space (Spain) 150 Alternative to the EU (Finland) 171 Amsterdam, Treaty of 41, 42, 46, 75, 79, 80, 81, 84–6, 119, 122, 136, 150, 154, 159, 214, 353 Anderson, Claes 173 Anti-Federalist League (UK) 102 Aragonese Council (Spain) 139, 147, 149 Aspinwall, Mark 5 Association of Workers of Slovakia (Slovakia) 281–2 Austria 11, 13–14, 17, 183, 201–20, 263, 322, 350, 357 Basque Nationalist Party (Spain) 139, 147–8 Basque Solidarity (Spain) 139, 147, 149 Belgian Labour Party (Belgium) 11, 88, 89, 90 Belgium 11, 13, 75–92, 350, 352–3, 354, 362 Benes Decrees 34, 217, 218, 247, 248, 249, 257, 258, 259, 262 Berlusconi, Silvio 58, 59, 62, 63, 69, 71–2, 352 Biedenkopf, Kurt 30 Bielan, Adam 234 Bondevik, Kjell Magne 341, 343, 344 Borten, Per 341 Bossi, Umberto 62, 67–9, 70 Brandt, Willy 25, 77 Bratteli, Trygve 342 British National Party (UK) 12, 102 Bruges Group (UK) 98 Brundtland, Gro Harlem 343, 344 Bulgaria 12, 278, 296 Burnett, John 99 Carlsson, Ingvar 196 ˇ Carnogurský, Ján 286, 287 Cash, Bill 98 Catalonia-Greens (Spain) 149 Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners (Finland) 177

Centre No to the EU (Sweden) 184–5, 186, 189, 192, 195 Centre Party (Estonia) 12, 302, 304, 307, 308, 309, 313, 359 Centre Party (Finland) 168, 169, 170, 173, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 195, 352 Centre Party (Norway) 330, 331–2, 334, 336–7, 338, 339, 340, 341, 343, 345, 346, 347, 357 Centre Party (Sweden) 11, 180, 183–4, 185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 200, 357 Centre Union of Lithuania (Lithuania) 12 Centrum Party (Hungary) 270 Charter of Fundamental Rights 22, 26, 28, 31, 174 Chasse Pêche Nature Traditions (France) 42, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55 Chevènement, Jean-Pierre 11, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50, 53, 54, 351 Chirac, Jacques 40, 41, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53 Christian Democratic Movement (Slovakia) 12, 281, 283, 286, 287, 289, 290, 292, 294, 360 Christian Democratic Party (Sweden) 11, 183, 184, 185, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 200, 357 Christian Democratic People’s Party (Austria) 201, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220 Christian Democratic Union (Germany) 11, 16, 17, 20, 25, 27, 29–32, 36, 351 Christian Democratic Party (Finland) 170, 173, 352 Christian Democratic Union (Czech Republic) 246, 247, 248 Christian Democrats for an Alternative EU Policy (Sweden) 185, 186, 189–90, 195, 200 Christian National Union (Poland) 231, 232 Christian People’s Party (Denmark) 11, 158, 159, 160 Christian People’s Party (Estonia) 12, 307, 308, 309–10 Christian People’s Party (Norway) 330, 331, 332, 333, 336–7, 338, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 347, 357 Christian Social Union (Germany) 11, 16, 17, 20, 25, 27, 29–32, 36, 351

396

Index

Christian Solidarity Party (Ireland) 11, 122, 129, 130, 131, 132 Citizens Against the EU (Czech Republic) 251 Citizens Movement (France) 11 Civic Democratic Party (Czech Republic) 12, 14, 221, 227, 240, 243, 245–7, 248–9, 254–9, 260–2, 355–6, 358 Civic Democratic Alliance (Czech Republic) 246, 262 Civic Platform (Poland) 224, 229, 233 Coalition Party (Estonia) 299, 300 Comini, Roberto 67 Committee of the Regions 82, 86 Common Agricultural Policy 103, 119, 173, 175, 179, 237, 253, 256, 301, 309, 332 Common Fisheries Policy 103, 332 Common Foreign and Security Policy 18, 22, 28, 32, 36, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 102, 167, 213, 214, 231, 239 Communist Party (Austria) 209 Communist Party (Belgium) 11, 88, 89, 90 Communist Party (Finland) 11, 168, 171, 172 Communist Party (France) 11, 38, 41, 42–3, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48–9, 50, 51, 52, 55, 57, 351 Communist Party (Greece) 11 Communist Party (Portugal) 11 Communist Party (Slovakia) 12, 281, 282, 283, 290, 292 Communist Party (Spain) 134, 136, 139–40, 148, 149–50 Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Czech Republic) 12, 243, 244, 247, 248, 249, 251–4, 260, 262 Communist Party of Italy (Italy) 59, 60, 61, 73 Communist Party of Slovenia (Slovenia) 321, 326 Communist Party of Sweden (Sweden) 186 Communist Refoundation (Italy) 11, 58–9, 60–1, 63 Connolly, James 126 Conservative Party (UK) 10, 12, 94, 97–9, 100, 106, 107, 111, 112, 113, 115, 180, 221, 227, 240, 355, 356 Conservative Common Market Committee (UK) 97 Conservative People’s Party (Denmark) 158 Conservative People’s Party (Poland) 231 Conservative Union for Fatherland and Freedom (Latvia) 12 Conservative Way Forward (UK) 98 Conservatives (Denmark) 161, 356 Conservatives (Norway) 330, 331, 335–6, 338, 340–1, 342, 343–7, 357 Conservatives Against a Federal Europe (UK) 98, 99

constrained competition (party systems) 349, 358–61 Conti, Nicolo 6 Convention on the Future of Europe 81, 86, 87, 159, 230, 238, 301, 303, 309 Council of Ministers 2, 31, 126 Cristiano Democratico (Italy) 62, 63 Croatia 361 Czech Republic 5, 6 12, 14, 22, 216–17, 218, 243–62, 264, 277–8, 280, 326, 350, 355–6, 358, 360–1, 362 Czech Right (Czech Republic) 251 Czech Social Democratic Party (Czech Republic) 246, 247, 248, 252, 260 Danielsson, Leif 200 Danish People’s Party (Denmark) 11, 158, 159–60, 166, 356 Davignon, Etienne 77 De Clercq, Willy 77 de Gaulle, Charles 38, 40, 45, 230, 329–30, 340, 341 de Villiers, Philippe 11, 44–5, 53, 55, 351 Democracy Movement (UK) 103 Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (Spain) 139, 147 Democratic Left (Ireland) 119 Democratic Left (Italy) 60, 61, 63 Democratic Left Alliance (Poland) 224, 229, 236, 241 Democratic Party (Estonia) 12, 307 Democratic Party (Slovakia) 292 Democratic Party (Slovenia) 320 Democratic Party of Retired Persons (Slovenia) 319, 320, 324, 325 Democratic Social Movement (Greece) 11 Democratic Union of Catalonia (Spain) 139, 147 Democratic Unionist Party (UK) 12 Denmark 4, 5, 11, 13, 152–67, 182, 198, 329, 332, 350, 356–7, 358 D’Estaing, Giscard 40–1 Dobrosz, Janusz 239 Dolejš, Jiˇrí 254 Duncan Smith, Iain 99 Dzurinda, Mikuláš 287, 288, 291 Ecolo (Belgium) 80, 85, 90 Economic and Monetary Union 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 43, 64, 67, 68, 72, 73, 78, 81, 82, 94, 96, 98, 102, 112, 115, 159, 167, 173, 174, 177, 178, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 200, 210, 230, 239, 253, 255, 256, 334 E-NON (Belgium) 77, 88 enlargement 3, 9, 21, 22, 24, 26–7, 29, 31, 35, 78, 81, 84–5, 128, 143, 159, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 333

Index Erhard, Ludwig 30 Estonia 4, 12, 14, 295–313, 350, 359–60, 361 Estonian Communist Party (Estonia) 297 Estonian Future Party (Estonia) 300, 310 Estonian Pensioners’ and Family Union (Estonia) 309 Euro, see Economic and Monetary Union European Alliance of EU-Critical Movements 195 European Commission 2, 22, 24, 25, 26, 117, 239, 252, 256, 278, 284, 301 European Court of Justice 28, 29, 82 European Foundation (UK) 98 European Free Trade Association 183, 205, 210, 257, 263, 264, 303, 330, 340, 343 European integration, public opinion on 1, 6, 17–19, 37, 38, 48, 60, 77–9, 103–9, 117, 137–8, 152, 182, 197, 201, 204, 205–6, 216, 219, 223, 247–8, 262, 264, 291, 302, 315, 322–4 European Liberal, Democrat, and Reform Party (European Parliament) 173 European Parliament 2, 22, 24, 26, 28, 31, 36, 66, 77, 81, 85, 101, 126, 141, 159 , 235, 252, 254, 256 European Parliamentary elections 1, 10, 99, 103, 111, 152, 156–7, 159, 161, 166, 171, 190–1, 197, 200, 202, 206–7, 208, 212, 214, 356 European Parties Elections and Referendums Network 2, 15 European People’s Party (European Parliament) 285 European Research Group (UK) 98 Euroscepticism, definitions of 6, 7 Euroscepticism, Hard and Soft 6, 7–12, 13, 17–19, 45–6, 59, 89, 118–19, 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 135, 166, 167, 182, 196, 201–2, 212–13, 221, 224–5, 234, 238, 240, 249, 266–8, 278–80, 304, 306, 314–15, 361–2 Euroscepticism, Hard 7, 17–19, 34, 35, 36, 63, 69, 70, 72, 75, 84, 85, 88, 89, 92, 102, 103, 111, 115, 123, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 143–6, 154, 157, 158, 160–2, 164, 166, 172, 183, 185, 186, 191, 193, 194, 221, 223, 225, 227, 230, 241, 251, 254, 258, 260, 261, 265, 267, 273, 275, 279, 281, 282, 283, 286, 289, 292, 293, 294, 307, 334, 337, 347, 352, 353 Euroscepticism, literature on 3–7 Euroscepticism, Soft 8, 23, 36, 59, 63, 70, 72, 84, 89, 94, 100, 105, 115, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 141–2, 148, 149, 150, 153, 154, 157, 158–60, 164, 166, 171, 183, 184, 191, 193,

397

195, 199, 208, 221, 225, 227, 231, 232, 236, 254, 255, 258, 259, 265, 267, 269, 276, 279, 280, 281, 284, 286, 287, 289, 292, 307, 330, 353, 360 Eurovision Song Contest 303, 312 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) (Spain) 143–5, 150–1 EU-Critical Network of Social-Liberals (Denmark) 162 Evans, Geoffrey 4 Ewing, Winnie 100 Exchange Rate Mechanism 96 Falange (Spain) 145–6, 151 Fatherland Union (Estonia) 299, 300, 308 Fianna Fáil (Ireland) 119, 121, 122 Fico, Robert 288 Fine Gael (Ireland) 119, 121, 122 Fidesz-MPP (Hungary) 12, 262, 265, 266, 269, 272, 273, 275, 276, 360 Fini, Gianfranco 62, 65, 66, 70 Finland 11, 13, 155, 168–80, 182, 183, 198, 208, 263, 303, 324, 350, 352, 354 Fischer, Joschka 17, 23, 301 Flemish Block (Belgium) 11, 75, 80, 83–4, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 353 Flemish Christian Democrats (Belgium) 80, 90 Flemish Liberals (Belgium) 90 Flood, Chris, 6 Forces for Change in Finland (Finland) 11, 168, 171, 172 Forster, Anthony 5 Forward Slovenia (Slovenia) 321 Forza Italia (Italy) 58, 59, 61, 62, 63–4, 69, 70–1, 72, 352 France 4, 11, 13, 38–57, 85, 244, 350, 351–2, 354, 362 Francophone Christian Democrats (Belgium) 11, 80, 81, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91 Francophone Socialists (Belgium) 90 Francophone Liberals (Belgium) 90 Free Democratic Party (Germany) 11, 16, 25, 27–9, 36, 351 Free EU Critics (Sweden) 199 Freedom Party (Austria) 10, 11, 14, 17, 201, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210–13, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 357 Freedom Union (Czech Republic) 246, 247, 248 Freedom Union (Poland) 229 Fresh Start Group (UK) 98 Frey, Gerhard 34 Front National (Belgium) 11, 80, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90 Front Nouveau de Belgique (Belgium) 85 Future Party (Estonia) 12, 307, 310, 359

398

Index

Gaitskell, Hugh 95 Galician Nationalist Bloc (Spain) 11, 134, 136, 139, 140–3, 146, 147, 150, 353 Galician Nationalist Party (Spain) 150 Galician Socialist Party (Spain) 140 Galician Unity (Spain) 150 Gašparoviˇc, Ivan 285 George, Stephen 4 Gerhardsen, Einar 341–2 German Communist Party (Germany) 25 German National Democratic Party (Germany) 11, 20, 32, 34–5, 36 German People’s Union (Germany) 11, 16, 20, 34, 36 Germany 11, 12–13, 16–37, 153, 154, 165, 244, 249, 255, 257, 322, 350, 351, 354 Giertych, Maciej 228, 241 Giertych, Roman 227, 228 Goldsmith, James 103, 107 Gräzin, Igor 313 Greater Romania Party (Romania) 12 Greece 11, 350, 355, 358 Green League (Finland) 169, 170, 174, 176, 178, 179, 180 Green Party (Austria) 201, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209–10, 212, 214, 215–16, 218, 219, 220, 357 Green Party (Ireland) 11, 119, 122, 124, 125–6, 127, 130, 131, 132, 353 Green Party (Netherlands) 11 Green Party (Sweden) 11, 183, 184, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191, 193, 197, 198, 200, 357 Green Party (UK) 12, 101–2, 111 Greenland 152, 167 Greens (Belgium) 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91 Greens (France) 39, 47, 51, 52, 57 Greens (Germany) 20, 23–4, 25, 36, 351, 352 Greens (Italy) 63 Greens (Portugal) 11 Greens United (Slovenia) 320, 321 Grzyb, Andrzej 238 Hague, William 99 Haider, Jörg 17, 210–11, 216, 217, 219, 357 Handlos, Franz 33 Harmsen, Robert 7 Harvey, Nick 99 Hassi, Saturday 174 Hautala, Heidi 174 Havel, Vaclav 245, 246, 251, 258 Heath, Edward 112 Herri Batasuna (Spain) 150 Hix, Simon 4, 149, 203, 267, 334 Hooghe, Lisbet 3, 149, 220, 281, 334 Hue, Robert 47, 52

Hungarian Democratic Forum (Hungary) 265, 268, 269, 270, 273 Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Hungary) 12, 265, 269, 270, 271, 272–3, 275, 360 Hungarian Socialist Party (Hungary) 269, 270, 271, 274 Hungary 5, 6, 12, 14, 263–76, 278, 301, 350, 360 Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Traditions (France), see Chasse Pêche Nature Traditions (France) Iceland 330 Ilves, Toomas Hendrik 299 Independence Party (Estonia) 12, 307, 308, 310, 359 Independent Smallholder Party (Hungary) 269, 270, 271, 273, 276 Inzar (Spain) 150 Ireland 11, 13, 117–33, 329, 350, 353 Italian Social Movement (Italy) 65 Italy 11, 13, 58–74, 85, 316, 322, 350, 352, 354, 362 Jäätteenmäki, Anneli 180 Jagland, Thorbjørn 344 Jospin, Lionel 42–3, 47, 53 June Movement (Denmark) 11, 153, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164 KALE see Christian Democrats for an Alternative EU Policy (Sweden) ´ Kaczynski, Jaroslaw 231, 232, 233, 236, 242 ´ Kaczynski, Lech 231, 235, 242 Kalinowski, Jaroslaw 237 Kallas, Siim 299, 309 Kallis, Bjarne 173 Kinnock, Neil 96 Kite, Cynthia 5 Klaus, Václac 243, 245–7, 255, 256–9, 261, 355–6 Klestil, Thomas 216 Klima, Viktor 215 Kohl, Helmut 30, 31 Kopecký, Petr 5, 6, 12, 225, 264, 266–7, 304 Korvald, Lars 341, 342 Kreisky, Bruno 215 Laar, Mart 298, 299 Labour Against the Euro (UK) 97 Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign (UK) 96–7 Labour Movement Information Committee (Norway) 342 Labour Party (Ireland) 120–1, 122, 132 Labour Party (Malta) 355

Index Labour Party (Norway) 329, 330, 331, 333, 334, 335–6, 338, 339, 340, 341–7, 357 Labour Party (UK) 94, 95–7, 102, 106, 111, 112–15, 355 Labour for a Referendum (UK) 97 Land Party of Štajerska (Slovenia) 321 Langer, Ivan 258 Latvia 4, 12, 278, 296, 301, 350 Latvian Social Democratic Alliance (Latvia) 12 Law and Justice Party (Poland) 12, 222, 224, 225, 231–6, 238, 239, 240, 241, 359 Le Pen, Jean-Marie 11, 39, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 283 League for Free Finland (Finland) 171, 172 League of Communists of Slovenia (Slovenia) 318 League of Independents (Austria) 210 League of Polish Families (Poland) 12, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225–8, 229, 233, 239, 241, 242, 359 Left (Luxembourg) 11 Left Alliance (Finland) 169, 170, 173–4, 176, 178, 179, 180 Left Party (Germany) see Party of Democratic Socialism (Germany) Left Party (Sweden) 11, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 193, 197, 198, 200, 357 Leito, Vello 310 Lepper, Andrzej 228, 241 Lewis, Saunders 101 Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (Slovenia) 319, 321, 324, 325 Liberal Democrats (UK) 99–100, 106, 115 Liberal Forum (Austria) 207, 211, 214, 220 Liberal Party (Denmark) 158, 161, 356 Liberals (Norway) 330, 331, 334, 336–7, 338–9, 340, 342, 344, 345, 346, 357 Liberals (Sweden) 183, 184, 189, 190 Ligue Communist Révolutionnaire (France) 42, 47 limited contestation (party systems) 349–54, 362–3 Lindqvist, Hans 195 Lipponen, Paavo 174, 178 Lithuania 4, 12, 278, 296, 301, 324, 350 Lithuanian Peasants Party (Lithuania) 12 LO (Sweden) 199 ´ Łopuszanski, Jan 226, 228 Lord, Christopher 4, 149, 203 Lutte Ouvrière (France) 11, 42, 47 Luxembourg 11, 350, 354 Maastricht, Treaty on European Union 3, 4, 38, 41, 44, 46, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81–4, 86, 98, 119, 122, 136, 141, 143, 158, 159, 213, 255, 266, 353

399

Macmillan, Harold 97, 112 Madisson, Tiit 310 Mair, Peter 3, 91, 105, 289 Major, John 98, 99 Maliková, Anna 283 Malta 350, 355, 358, 362 Margherita (Italy) 63 Marks, Gary 3, 149, 187, 202–3, 204, 220, 267, 281, 334 Marsden, Paul 100 Martino, Antonio 64, 65, 71, 72 Meˇciar, Vladimír 14, 278, 284–5, 289, 291, 360 Mègret, Bruno 11, 47 Meri, Lennart 308 Miller, Leszek 241 Milner, Susan 4 Miroslav Sládek Republicans (Czech Republic) 14 Mitterrand, François 40, 41 Moderates (Estonia) 300, 308 Moderates (Sweden) 183, 184, 189, 190, 192, 199 Möllemann, Jürgen 27 Mouvement des Citoyens (France) 42, 43, 44, 49, 50, 51 Mouvement National Républicain (France) 44, 47 Mouvement Républicain et Citoyen (France) 56 Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Slovakia) 12, 278, 281, 282, 283, 284–6, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 360 Movement for Democracy (Slovakia) 283 Movement for France (France) 11, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 53, 55 Mudde, Cas 6, 12, 225, 264, 266–7, 304 Municipal Workers’ Union (Sweden) 199 National Alliance (Italy) 11, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65–66, 69, 70, 72 National Coalition (Finland) 169, 170, 174, 175, 177, 352 National Democrats (Sweden) 186 National Front (France) 11, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 199, 251, 283, 351 National Party (Czech Republic) 251 National Movement (France) 11, 42 Nationalist Left (Spain) 150 NATO 26, 28, 59, 139, 150, 214–15, 219, 222, 250, 252, 256, 272, 274, 278, 282, 284, 285, 286, 291, 298, 299, 300, 317, 327, 329, 330, 333, 342 Neil, Alex 101 Netherlands 1, 3 11, 87, 350, 354 New Democracy (Sweden) 186

400

Index

New Europe Group (UK) 100 New Flemish Alliance (Belgium) 11, 80, 87, 89, 90 New Force (Spain) 145, 146, 151 New Future (Sweden) 11, 186, 199 New Party (Slovenia) 12, 318, 320, 321 New Peoples Party (Norway) 337 New Slovenia (Slovenia) 320, 324, 325 Nice, Treaty of 13, 75, 79–80, 81, 86–7, 88, 89, 92, 99, 117, 119, 123, 127, 132, 159, 353 Norrbotten Party (Sweden) 11, 186 Northern League (Italy) 10, 11, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 67–9, 72, 73, 352 No Turning Back (UK) 98 Norway 5, 15, 154, 156, 182, 257, 263, 328–47, 350, 357, 358 open contestation (party systems) 349, 354–8, 362–3 Opposing European Research Network 2 Orbán, Viktor 271, 272, 273, 360 Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (France) 42 Organization for Secuirty and Cooperation in Europe 82 Otter, Arne 310 Pagliarini, Giancarlo 67, 68 Pagrotsky, Leif 195 Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Greece) 355 Pannella (Italy) 62, 63 Parti des Travailleurs (France) 42, 47 Parts, Juhan 304 Party of Democratic Socialism (Germany) 11, 16, 17, 20–3, 35, 36, 351 Party of European Socialists (European Parliament) 196 Party of Democratic Action of Slovenia (Slovenia) 321 Party of the Democratic Left (Slovakia) 282, 283, 288, 292 Party of the Greens in Slovakia (Slovakia) 283 Party of the Hungarian Coalition (Slovakia) 283, 290, 292 Pasqua, Charles 11, 44, 45, 53, 55, 351 Pawlak, Waldemar 236 Pensioners’ Interest Party (Sweden) 186 People’s Europe Campaign (UK) 97 People’s Movement Against the EU (Denmark) 11, 153, 156–7, 158, 161, 162, 164, 166 People’s Union (Estonia) 12, 304, 307, 308–9, 310, 313 Persson, Göran 193, 196, 200 Pittermann, Bruno 208

Plaid Cymru (UK) 101 Poland 4, 5, 6, 12, 14, 22, 221–42, 264, 278, 280, 296, 301, 324, 350, 359, 362 Pôle Républicain (France) 42, 44 , 47, 48, 49, 51, 53, 55, 56 Polish Agreement (Poland) 226, 231 Polish Peasant Party (Poland) 12, 222, 224, 225, 229, 234, 236–9, 240, 359 Political Reformed Party (Netherlands) 11 Political Spring (Greece) 11 Popular Party (Spain) 137, 139, 145, 147 Popular Party (Italy) 63 Portugal 11, 350 Powell, Enoch 106 Prodi, Romano 93, 115 Progress Party (Norway) 330–1, 337–9, 340, 342–3, 344, 345, 347, 357 Progressive Democrats (Ireland) 119, 121, 122 public opinion see European Integration, public opinion on Radical Party (France) 47 Radio Maryja 224, 226 Rally for France and Independence of Europe (France) 11 Rally for the Republic (France) 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 53, 55 Ransdorf, Miroslav 254 Ray, Leonard 3, 12, 149, 184, 187 Real Slovak National Party (Slovakia) 12, 281, 282, 283, 290 Red/Greens see Unity List (Denmark) Referendum Party (UK) 103, 107 referendums 1, 24, 34, 39, 78, 84, 101, 102, 103, 119, 152, 153, 154, 155, 164–5, 166, 198, 199, 200, 301, 326, 356–7, 362 Referendum, Austrian Referendum on EU Membership 201, 205, 209, 210, 211, 263 Referendum, Czech Referendum on EU Membership 243, 248, 251, 253, 254, 258 Referendum, Danish Referendum on Amsterdam Treaty 154 Referendum, Danish Referendum on Common European Currency 152, 154, 155, 160, 163, 164–5 Referendum, Danish Referendum on EC Membership 154, 155–6 Referendum, Danish Referendum on Maastricht Treaty 82, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 161, 164–5 Referendum, Danish Referendum on Maastricht Treaty with Edinburgh Agreement 154, 159, 162, 164 Referendum, Danish Referendum on Single European Act 154, 155, 157

Index Referendum, Dutch Referendum on Constitutional Treaty 1, 3, 362 Referendum, Finnish Referendum on EU Membership 168, 170, 173, 174, 175, 263 Referendum, French Referendum on Constitutional Treaty 1, 3, 362 Referendum, French Referendum on Maastricht Treaty 38, 41, 43, 56 Referendum, Hungarian Referendum on EU Membership 264, 270, 271, 273, 274, 360 Referendums, Irish Referendums on Nice Treaty 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 129, 130, 133, 353 Referendum, Irish Referendum on Accession 119, 121 Referendum, Irish Referendum on Single European Act 119, 121, 122 Referendum, Irish Referendum on Maastricht Treaty 119, 122 Referendum, Irish Referendum on Amsterdam Treaty 122 Referendum, Norwegian Referendum on EC Membership 1972 264, 330, 334, 337, 340, 342, 346 Referendum, Norwegian Referendum on EC Membership 1994 330, 333, 338, 339, 340, 343–6 Referendum, Polish Referendum on EU Membership 221, 232, 233 Referendum, Slovakian Referendum on EU Membership 280–1, 283 Referendum, Swedish Referendum on Economic and Monetary Union 181, 184, 197, 198, 199 Referendum, Swedish Referendum on EU Membership 183, 198, 199, 263–4 Referendum, UK Referendum on EEC Membership 94, 97, 100, 105 Reform Party (Estonia) 12, 299, 300, 304, 307, 308, 309, 313 Reformed Political Federation (Netherlands) 11 Reformed Political League (Netherlands) 11 Reiljan, Janno 309 Reiss-Passer, Susanne 217 Republican Left of Catalonia (Spain) 139, 147, 149 Republican Party (Estonia) 12, 307, 310 Republicans (Germany) 11, 17, 20, 25, 33–5 Republicans (Czech Republic) 243, 248, 249–51, 260 Res Publica (Estonia) 304, 308 Revolutionary Communist League (France) 11 Rifkind, Malcolm 101 Rifondazione Comunista, see Communist Refoundation

401

ˇ Riman, Martin 258 Romania 12, 278 Rome, Treaty of 76, 98, 101, 182, 329 Rossem (Belgium) 80 Rovny, Jan 6 Ruggiero, Renato 62, 71 Rule of Law State Offensive Party (Germany) 32–3 Rural Party (Finland) 168, 170, 171 Rural Union (Estonia) 300 Russia Party in Estonia (Estonia) 12, 307, 308 Russian Unity Party (Estonia) 12, 307 Rüütel, Arnold 301, 302, 308 Rydzyk, Tadeusz 226 Sacrédeus, Lennart 200 Savisaar, Edgar 309 Sawicki, Marek 237 Scania Party (Sweden) 186 Schengen Agreement 160 Schill, Ronald 32 Schmidt, Helmut 25 Schönhuber, Franz 33 Schröder, Gerhard 17, 23, 301 Schüssel, Wolfgang 216, 217, 218 Scottish Business for Sterling (UK) 101 Scottish National Party (UK) 100–1 Scottish Socialist Party (UK) 12, 102, 111 Seguin, Philippe 44 Self-Defence (Poland) 221, 223, 224, 225, 228–31, 233, 234, 235, 238, 239, 240, 359 Seppänen, Esko 173 Siimann, Mart 299 Siimes, Suvi-Anne 173 Silberg, Uno 310 Sillars, Jim 100, 101 Single European Act 98, 119, 121, 122, 155, 161 Sinn Féin (Ireland) 11, 119, 121, 122, 124, 126, 130, 131, 132, 353 Sládek, Miroslav 249–50 Slota, Ján 283 Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (Slovakia) 283, 287, 290 Slovak National Party (Slovakia) 281, 282, 283, 290, 292 Slovakia 4, 6, 12, 14, 277–94, 326, 350, 360, 361 Slovenia 4, 5, 12, 14–15, 314–27, 350, 353, 354, 360–1 Slovenian Christian Democrats (Slovenia) 319, 321, 324, 325 Slovenian National Party (Slovenia) 12, 316–17, 318, 319–20, 321, 322, 324, 325 Slovenian People’s Party (Slovenia) 317, 319, 320, 324, 325

402

Index

Smer (Slovakia) 281, 283, 287, 288, 289, 290, 294, 360 Social Chapter 98 Social Democratic Alliance (Slovakia) 283 Social Democratic Labour Party (Estonia) 12, 300, 306, 307, 308 Social Democratic Network Europe (Denmark) 162–3 Social Democratic Party (Austria) 201, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216, 219, 220, 357 Social Democratic Party (Denmark) 154, 156, 158, 159, 161, 162, 180, 356 Social Democratic Party (Finland) 169, 170, 174–5, 177, 178, 352 Social Democratic Party (Germany) 11, 16, 21, 24–7, 36, 351 Social Democratic Party (Sweden) 11, 180, 183, 184, 185, 187, 190, 191, 192–3, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 330, 357 Social Democratic Party (UK) 99, 111 Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (Slovenia) 317, 319, 320, 324, 325 Social Democrats Against the EC (Sweden) 184, 186, 187, 194, 195, 200 Social Justice Party (Sweden) 186, 188–9 Social Liberal Party (Denmark) 156, 158, 161, 162 Socialist Alliance (UK) 12, 102 Socialist Campaign Group (UK) 96 Socialist Collective (Spain) 150 Socialist Electoral Federation (Norway) 342 Socialist International 274 Socialist Labour Party (UK) 12, 102 Socialist Labour Party (Belgium) 88 Socialist Left (Norway) 330, 331, 333, 337–9, 342, 343, 345, 346, 347, 357 Socialist Party (France) 39, 40, 43, 47, 56, 57 Socialist Party (Ireland) 11, 127–9, 130, 131 Socialist Party (Italy) 63 Socialist Party (Netherlands) 11 Socialist Party (Sweden) 186 Socialist Party of Spain (Spain) 137, 139, 147 Socialist People’s Party (Denmark) 11, 156, 158–9, 160, 161, 180, 356 Socialist People’s Party (Norway) 330, 333, 340 Socialist Workers Party (Ireland) 11, 122, 129, 130, 131, 132 Solidarity Electoral Action (Poland) 229, 231, 237, 262 Spaak, Paul-Henri 76 Spain 11, 13, 134–51, 350, 353, 354 Špidla, Vladimir 246 Spiering, Menno 7 Spirit (Belgium) 87, 90

Spöri, Dieter 25 Stoiber, Edmund 17, 30–1, 35 Strauss, Franz Josef 33 Svensson, Alf 195 Sweden 5, 11, 13, 154, 181–200, 208, 263, 330, 333, 350, 357, 358 Sweden Democrats (Sweden) 185, 186, 199 Swedish People’s Party (Finland) 169, 170, 174, 175, 177, 352 Swinney, John 101 Synaspismos (Greece) 11 Syse, Jan 342 Temelin nuclear power plant 216–18 Thatcher, Margaret 98, 112 Theorin, Maj Britt 194 Tone, Wolf 126 Topolánek, Miroslav 258 Tošovský, Josef 262 Trade Union Congress (Austria) 216 Tremonti, Giulio 65, 71 True Finns (Finland) 11, 168, 169, 170, 171, 175, 178, 352 Turkey 24, 34, 36, 91 Ucen, Peter 5 UK Independence Party (UK) 12, 102–3, 111 Union for Europe of the Nations (European Parliament) 283 Union for French Democracy (France) 39, 40, 43, 57 Union of Democratic Forces (Bulgaria) 262 Union of the Galician People (Spain) 140 Ulvskog, Margareta 195 Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (France) 56 United Kingdom 4–5, 12, 13, 25, 93–116, 244, 329, 330, 350, 354–5, 357–8, 362 United Left (Spain) 11, 134, 136, 139–43, 146, 147–8, 150, 353 United List of Social Democrats (Slovenia) 317, 319, 320, 324, 325 United Peasant Party (Poland) 236 United People’s Party of Estonia (Estonia) 308 Unity List Red-Greens (Denmark) 11, 157, 158, 160, 166 Vähi, Tiit 299 van der Bellen, Alexander 217 Van Miert, Karel 77 Väyrynen, Paavo 173 Vennamo, Veikko 171 Vivant (Belgium) 87–8, 90 Vlams Blok see Flemish Block (Belgium)

Index

403

Vlams Belang see Flemish Block (Belgium) Voice of Women of Slovenia (Slovenia) 321, 327 Voigt, Ekkehard 33 Volksunie (Belgium) 80, 82, 86, 87, 89 Vranitzky, Franz 205, 208

Workers Party (Hungary) 12, 265, 270, 273–4, 275, 360 Workers Party (Ireland) 11, 119, 122, 124–5, 130, 131 Workers’ Struggle (France), see Lutte Ouvrière (France)

Western European Union 214, 215 Wibe, Sören 195–6 Williams, Shirley 106 Willoch, Kåre 342 Wilson, Carole 3, 149, 203, 204, 220, 267, 281 Wilson, Gordon 100 Wilson, Harold 95 Winberg, Margareta 195

Young Finns (Finland) 170 Youth Party of Slovenia (Slovenia) 320, 321 Zahradil, Jan 256, 258 Zawisza, Artur 232, 234 Zeman, Miloš 246 1970 Group (UK) 97 92 Group (UK) 98