NGO's & global policy

Introduction 1 1 I NTRODUCTION Organizations like Oxfam, Greenpeace, Amnesty International and thousands of others ser...

Author: R. K. Gupta

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Introduction

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1 I NTRODUCTION Organizations like Oxfam, Greenpeace, Amnesty International and thousands of others serve the public on a national and international scale. Known variously as "private voluntary organizations," "civil society organizations," and "citizen associations," they are increasingly called "NGOs," an acronym that stands for "nongovernmental organizations." The United Nations system uses this term to distinguish representatives of these agencies from those of governments. While many NGOs dislike the term, it has come into wide use, because the UN system is the main focus of international rule-making and policy formulation in the fields where most NGOs operate. Charitable and community organizations, separate from the state, have existed in many historical settings, but NGOs are primarily a modern phenomenon. With the extension of citizenship rights in Europe and the Americas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, people founded increasing numbers of these organizations, as instruments to meet community needs, defend interests or promote new policies. The French writer Alexis de Toqueville emphasized the importance of what he called "political associations" as institutions of democracy, uniquely numerous and influential in the United States at the time of his famous visit in 1831. New legal rules for private corporations, emerging at this same time, provided modern juridical authority for the organizations and increased their defenses against state interference.

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NGOs and Global Policy

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The anti-slavery movement, founded in England in the late 18th century, gave rise to many such organizations and eventually led to the World Anti-Slavery Convention (1840), a milestone gathering to coordinate the work of citizen organizations on an international basis. The World Alliance of YMCAs was founded soon after, in 1855, and the International Committee for the Red Cross came into being in 1863. During the nineteenth century, independent associations of this kind addressed many issues, including women's rights, the condition of the poor, alcohol abuse and municipal reform. Trade unions emerged as a leading force in the NGO movement later in the century.

in society. Scholars working in this area have noted that NGOs can command great legitimacy, sometimes more than national authorities. An opinion poll in Germany, for example, found that considerably more respondents said they trusted the NGO Greenpeace than those that expressed trust in the German Federal government. NGOs create "public goods," needed by citizens, that are not ordinarily created in the for-profit marketplace. Economists sometimes refer to NGOs and the broader, non-profit part of the economy as the "Third Sector," to distinguish it from government and private business. In some large countries, this sector accounts for millions of jobs and billions of dollars of economic activity.

Today, NGOs address every conceivable issue and they operate in virtually every part of the globe. Though international NGO activity has grown steadily, most NGOs operate within a single country and frequently they function within a purely local setting. Some, such as legal assistance organizations, mainly provide services. Some such as chambers of commerce, concern themselves with narrowly-defined interests. And some, such as neighborhood associations, promote civic beautification or community improvement. But many important NGOs, such as those working for human rights and social justice, campaign for broad ideals. At the international level, thousands of organizations are active. According to one estimate, some 25,000 now qualify as international NGOs (with programs and affiliates in a number of countries) - up from less than 400 a century ago. Amnesty International, for example, has more than a million members and it has affiliates or networks in over 90 countries and territories. Its London-based International Secretariat has a staff of over 300 which carries out research, coordinates worldwide lobbying and maintains an impressive presence at many international conferences and institutions.

NGOs are often seen as synonymous with non-profits, but a distinction between the two is useful. Non-profits include a very wide range of organizations, including museums, universities, and hospitals, that focus on services and rarely (if ever) engage in advocacy. By contrast, NGOs always have an important advocacy mission.

Political scientists often refer to NGOs as "pressure groups" or "lobby groups," but this concept does not do justice to these organizations and their broad public influence. In the 1980s, the term "civil society" came into fashion, but it proved too broad and amorphous. For this reason, a cross-disciplinary specialty emerged in the 1990s focusing on NGOs and their role

In the field of international relations, scholars now speak of NGOs as "non-state actors" (a category that can also include transnational corporations). This term suggests NGOs' emerging influence in the international policy arena where previously only states played a significant role. Though NGOs have few formal powers over international decision-making, they have many accomplishments to their credit. In recent years, they have successfully promoted new environmental agreements, greatly strengthened women's rights, and won important arms control and disarmament measures. NGOs have also improved the rights and well-being of children, the disabled, the poor and indigenous peoples. Some analysts believe that these successes resulted from increasing globalization and the pressure of ordinary citizens to control and regulate the world beyond the nation state. NGO work on the environment led to the adoption of the Montreal Protocol on Substances Depleting the Ozone Layer in 1987. The International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, an NGO coalition, was prime mover in the Mine Ban Treaty of 1997. The Coalition for an International Criminal Court was

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indispensable to the adoption of the 1998 Treaty of Rome and another NGO mobilization forced governments to abandon secret negotiations for the Multilateral Agreement on Investments in 1998. In the late 1990s, the NGO Working Group on the Security Council emerged as an important interlocutor of the UN's most powerful body, while the Jubilee 2000 Campaign changed thinking and policy on poor countries' debt. At the same time, an increasingly influential international NGO campaign demanded more just economic policies from the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These recent NGO victories have often been due to effective use of the internet, enabling rapid mobilization of global constituencies. NGOs operate with many different methods and goals. Some act alone while others work in coalitions. Some organize noisy protests and demonstrations while others prefer sober education or quiet diplomacy. Some "name and shame" those in power who abuse citizen rights, while others work closely with the authorities. Some simplify the issues for broad public campaigns, while others produce detailed studies to inform policy makers. NGO action can be analyzed on three different levels: micropolicy, macro-policy and norm-setting. Some NGO campaigns combine all three. For example, the World Court Project, a network of NGOs opposed to nuclear weapons, successfully brought a landmark case to the World Court in 1996 on the legality of nuclear weapons. Getting the Court to accept the case was a victory in the arena of micro-policy, but the larger campaign goal included macro-policy (changing governments' strategic reliance on nuclear weapons) and norm-setting (persuading the public that nuclear weapons are immoral and a threat to real security). Governments and international organizations at times find NGOs a nuisance or even threatening to their interests. But officials nonetheless look to NGOs for innovative ideas and information. Officials also grudgingly recognize that consultation with (and support from) NGOs gives their public decisions more credibility. Former Secretary General Boutros Ghali

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affirmed that NGOs "are an indispensable part of the legitimacy" of the United Nations, while his successor Kofi Annan has said that NGOs are "the conscience of humanity." NGOs are very diverse and by no means all are equally laudable. In addition to the great organizations dealing with human rights, environmental protection and humanitarian assistance, there are NGOs representing industry associations like soap and chemicals, narrowly zealous religious organizations and advocates of obscure causes like Esperanto and space colonization. While some NGOs are fiercely independent, others are known as the creatures of governments, businesses or even criminal interests. Some have hundreds of thousands of members around the world while others speak for only a handful of people. Some have large central secretariats and some are very decentralized. With such diversity, generalizations about NGOs can be difficult. Recently, the number of NGOs has been growing rapidly. Thousands of NGOs have sprung up in such diverse countries as France, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Chile. Many observers see these trends as signs of increasing pluralism and democracy, because authoritarian and paternalistic governments have either outlawed independent NGOs or confronted them with severe administrative hurdles and harassment. Large numbers of NGOs certainly help to reflect a complex and diverse social reality and represent a rich variety of citizens' needs and concerns that governments on their own could scarcely identify or accommodate. As NGOs take an increasingly important role in political life, some critics are concerned that NGOs speak in many different and conflicting voices, that can fragment and weaken political action. Often, there are many competing NGOs in the same policy field and their mutual contest for influence can undercut political effectiveness. Many respected NGOs work hard to overcome this narrowness by operating in close partnership with others. Some NGOs themselves specialize in coalition-building. Interaction, for instance, serves as the umbrella for dozens of humanitarian organizations in the United States.

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Even the most democratic governments subject NGOs to some type of control, such as registration and financial oversight. International organizations like the UN require officiallyaccredited NGOs to pass through a review process to determine which are legitimate partners. Thanks partly to these controls and to the ethos of public service in the NGO community, NGOs are not often accused of corruption, breaches of the law, gross failure to live up to their mandate or other serious abuses. Compared with the frequent scandals of corruption and abuse of authority by officials of nation states, NGOs appear as relatively virtuous. Nonethelsss, some accuse NGOs of being structurally undemocratic and unaccountable. Elected government officials often defend themselves against NGO criticism by pointing out that NGO leaders are not elected. Though it is true that NGO leaders do not stand for election, they are held accountable by boards of directors, membership bodies, and other constituencies. They also must win voluntary financial support each year from members and donors and cannot rely on legally-enforced taxation as governments do. FINANCING

Large international NGOs may have operational budgets in the tens of millions of dollars, though most NGO budgets are considerably smaller. Compared to corporations and governments that count their annual revenue in multiple billions, even the largest NGO budgets are very small indeed. NGOs are usually financed by a combination of sources. Traditionally, membership dues have provided the main source, but today NGOs tap many other sources including grants or contracts from governments and international institutions, fees for services, profits from sales of goods, and funding from private foundations, corporations and wealthy individuals. Increasingly, relief and development NGOs like CARE and Oxfam receive large grants from governments' international assistance programs. In the 1990s, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees expressed alarm that governments were increasingly channeling funds for humanitarian assistance to

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their own national NGOs rather than to multilateral agencies. The agencies were losing their capacity to coordinate relief in large scale emergencies, as dozens of NGOs appeared on the scene. By 1994, European Union funding of NGOs had risen to about $1 billion. According to UN staffer Antonio Donini, public grants represented 1.5% of NGO income in 1970 and 35% in 1988. Such grants probably accounted for more than 40% of NGO income by the end of the century. This trend inevitably exposes NGOs to pressure from governments and limits their capacity to act independently. When NGOs take money from businesses, big foundations and rich individuals, such hefty grants can likewise create relations of influence and potentially lead NGOs away from their mandate to serve the broader public. Increasingly also, NGOs sell products or services, just like a private company. The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) is an extreme example of this tendency. In 1996 it had $3.8 billion in gross revenue for supplemental health insurance and nine mutual funds with $13.7 billion in assets. To many observers, this looks more like a financial services company than an NGO. Thousands of other hard-pressed NGOs worldwide have taken the business path -- selling credit cards, internet services, travel tours and key rings, while charging for services they once provided free. DIPLOMATIC ROLE

Though NGOs have long operated internationally, their role in the sphere of official diplomacy was relatively restricted until after World War II. NGOs won their right to a voice at the United Nations by heavy lobbying during the wartime negotiations (1943-45). Their rights were eventually guaranteed by Article 71 of the UN Charter and affirmed by many subsequent decisions. By 2000, about 2,500 NGOs had consultative status with the UN and many thousands more had official arrangements with other organs in the UN system and other intergovernmental bodies. The Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 set the pace for intense NGO participation in world conferences, with 17,000 NGO

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representatives participating in the NGO parallel forum and 1,400 directly involved in the intergovernmental negotiations. NGOs helped make the conference a success, claimed an important place in the conference declaration and played a key role in developing post-conference institutions, like the Commission on Sustainable Development. Three years later, the Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995 attracted an astonishing 35,000 NGO representatives to Beijing to the parallel forum and 2,600 to the intergovernmental negotiations. NGOs have been most effective when they work together in coalitions, pooling their resources and coordinating their lobbying efforts. There are important NGO networks on the environment and on international economic policy that allow NGOs to coordinate their actions in many countries and at international conferences and negotiations. Third World Network, based in Malaysia, is an especially active example that addresses a very broad range of policy issues. There are national networks like the Philippine-based Freedom from Debt Coalition and the German NGO Network on Environment and Development. And there are regional networks like ARENA, the Asian Regional Exchange for New Initiatives, or the Continental Network of Indigenous Women of the Americas, or AFRODAD, the African Debt and Development Network. In 1995, an international consultation of NGO networks concluded that: "Business and government are organized at the international level. There is a growing need to articulate countervailing visions . . . In the long run, we have to invent the infrastructure so citizens can participate effectively in the democratic management of the global system. Over the next decade, NGOs and their networks are one of the important precursors of an accountable global civil society." As discussions continue about democracy and accountability in global decision-making, it becomes increasingly clear that NGOs have a vital role to play. Globalization has created both cross-border issues that NGOs address and cross-border communities of interest that NGOs represent. National governments cannot do either task as effectively or as

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legitimately. In the globalizing world of the twenty-first century, NGOs will have a growing international calling. NGOs, Civil Society and Global Policy Making Oxfam, Greenpeace, Save the Children, Doctors Without Borders -- these and thousands of other private organizations serve the public on an international scale. Today, as nation states slash budgets, cut regulations and abandon social protections, such non-profit groups seem more vital than ever. At the United Nations, they are known as "nongovernmental organizations" or NGOs. They have few formal powers but growing influence. In recent years, NGOs have chalked up many important accomplishments. They put the environment on the global agenda and pressed reluctant nation states to take it seriously. They insisted that human rights deserve universal respect and embarrassed states into greater compliance. They pressed for the rights and well-being of children, the disabled, women, indigenous peoples. They forced powerful countries to come to the table on disarmament. Scarcely any recent progress in human well-being does not owe a good deal to NGOs. During the great international conferences organized by the UN, NGOs made the news as the most colorful, active and imaginative participants. NGOs shaped the conferences and moved them further than the states alone would have gone. NGOs took the lead in bringing the case for abolition of nuclear weapons to the World Court, they built momentum behind a new International Criminal Court, and they pressed states into negotiating new, tougher standards on emissions to head off global warming Day-to-day at the UN, some NGOs attract enormous respect and admiration through careful research, keen analysis and skillful lobbying. Secretariat members look to them for innovative ideas and information. Diplomats consult them and seek their support. Former Secretary General Boutros Ghali affirmed that NGOs "are an indispensable part of the legitimacy without which no international activity can be meaningful."

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NGO Differences NGOs, like nation states, are a very diverse lot. In addition to the great organizations dealing with human rights, environmental protection and humanitarian relief, there are NGOs representing industries like soap and chemicals, fundamentalist religious sects and flying saucer watchers. While some NGOs are fiercely independent, others are known as the creatures of corrupt governments, grasping businesses or other less-than-selfless interests. Some have tens of thousands of members around the world while others are no more than one or two people. Some have large central secretariats and some are very decentralized. Some lean to the left and some are definitely on the right. With such diversity, generalizations about NGOs can be dangerously misleading Recently, NGOs have been increasing in many countries. In a 1995 speech, Secretary General Boutros Ghali noted that in a short space of time, in diverse countries such as France, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Chile, thousands of new NGOs have come into being. Many observers see these trends as signs of increasing pluralism and democracy. In many countries, popular NGOs command more legitimacy and have better links to the grass roots than do political parties or governments. But some NGOs have been accused of fraud, of being nothing more than tax havens for wealthy sponsors, or of serving as vehicles for conservative or elitist policies. Recent studies in the United States have shown that people have less time for volunteer work than in decades past and devote considerably less time to non-profits, leaving paid staffers more than ever in charge. And in some countries, like Brazil, numbers of NGOs are reported to be sharply down, as foreign funding moves elsewhere and economic pressures force many organizations to close. Even authentic and honestly-run NGOs can have problematic results. Proliferating NGOs can fragment and weaken grassroots political action, by channeling concerns into narrow and often competing "interest group" lobbying. Those performing social services can be an unwitting part of the

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neoliberal assault on the state, or (at best) a desperate and inadequate response to the state's pullout from social protection. In an effort to survive and provide services for mounting needs, they can foster false hopes, promote misplaced pragmatism and block more fundamental and critical understanding of the roots of the social crisis. NGOs and Official Funding NGOs deliver valuable services and channel billions of dollars in development assistance, humanitarian aid and technical support to the world's poorest people -- estimated at over $8 billion in 1992 or more than the entire UN system. Traditionally, NGOs collected money directly from citizens to fund their aid and relief efforts, making them independent of official policies. But increasingly, NGOs serve as conduits for governments and multilateral development institutions like the World Bank. A 1996 report in the magazine of the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) expressed alarm that governments are channeling funds for humanitarian assistance to their own national NGOs rather than to multilateral agencies, undermining previous systems of coordination and cooperation in large-scale emergencies. From 1992 to 1994, European Union funding of NGOs rose 27%, to 803 million ECUs (about $1 billion). World Bank funding, also on the rise, has provoked heated controversy in the NGO community. According to UN staffer Antonio Donini, public grants represented 1.5% of NGO income in 1970 and 35% in 1988 and they probably account for more than 40% of NGO income today. Western countries used to criticize Communist governments for subsidizing and controlling their NGOs. Recent trends in the West could lead in a similar direction. Switzerland distributes 19% of its overseas development aid through NGOs. In 1993 the United States distributed 17%, a sum that lept to 30% in 1995 and is likely to rise even further under the "New Partnership Initiative" announced by the Clinton Administration at the 1995 UN Social Summit. Governments in the North fund not only their national NGOs but also NGOs in Southern countries, as service-providers

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and as counterweights to the state -- under the rubric of promoting "open society," "capacity building," "NGO strengthening" or reinforcing "civil society." Organizations like the International Executive Service Corps and World Learning have broad international programs of this kind, with large funding from USAID, the United States foreign aid agency. Private sources, notably billionaire speculator George Soros, have poured money into these initiatives, too. Such programs -- official or unofficial -- can be related to neoliberal policy goals, aimed at weakening or undermining the state, though they may have diverse purposes, not all necessarily questionable. Many NGOs distinguish between different Northern donors, preferring money from the Nordic countries, Canada, the Netherlands or even Germany, in preference to the more imperially-inclined governments like the United States, Britain or France. NGOs take money from businesses, big foundations and rich individuals, too. Increasingly, they also sell products or services, just like a private company. The US-based American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) had $3.8 billion in gross revenue for supplemental health insurance in 1996 and it had nine mutual funds with $13.7 billion in assets. To many observers, this looks more like a financial services company than an NGO. Thousands of other hard-pressed NGOs worldwide have taken the market path -- selling credit cards, internet services, travel tours and key rings, while charging for services they once provided free. NGO coalitions have been recipients of government and foundation money, too. Even corporations are getting into the game. The Eli Lilly pharmaceutical company, a major funder of conservative think-tanks, opened discussions with a UN NGO Committee in mid-1996 about substantial funding. Though these discussions eventually fell through, more deals of this type may be on the horizon. Some observers fear that funding from conservative private sources (as opposed to mass membership dues) may undermine NGOs' independence and influence them to support neoliberal policies. There is no simple answer to these dilemmas, but the most effective NGOs are

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very careful about their funding. They manage to resist financial blandishments and they remain at least relatively independent and free of narrow financial pressures. NGOs and International Organizations Internationally, NGOs have a long tradition, going back to the second half of the 19th Century, when the International Committee for the Red Cross and a number of other "world" NGO federations emerged (in practice they were largely centered on Europe). The first major intergovernmental agency, the International Labour Office, incorporated trade unions in its governing structure, but the League of Nations gave NGOs little voice. By 1939, an estimated 700 international NGOs existed. When the UN was founded in 1945, NGOs forced the governments to make provision in the Charter for "consultative" NGO status with the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). This was a great step forward, but NGOs did not win any status beyond ECOSOC. They were given no formal voice in the General Assembly or other bodies; above all, the powerful Security Council remained strictly off limits. Over the years, NGOs have won a consultative role with various specialized agencies and funds of the UN, like UNICEF and UNFPA. But the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have kept NGOs at arm's length. As the years have passed, the number of NGOs has steadily grown and three types of organizations have emerged as especially vocal and effective -- groups working on the environment, womens' organizations and human rights advocacy bodies. Groups working on humanitarian assistance and disarmament as well as religious organizations -- long influential players -- remain a strong presence. Trade unions have faded from their once-powerful place in the NGO community. In the first half of the century, the unions took the lead in many international efforts for social protection (agreements on work hours, child labor, social security, etc.) and they had some of the most highly-developed international networks. The World Confederation of Trade Unions was the most important NGO in the UN's early years. But the Cold War

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splintered the trade union movement and the neoliberal era has weakened it further. In recent years, unions seem to have lost enthusiasm for the UN and they have mostly limited their involvement to the ILO, where they have a formal place in the decision-making machinery. But the US and other governments are now cutting the ILO budget, so trade unions will have to re-think their priorities if they are not to fade still further from the UN scene. NGOs have complex relations with member states. They form temporary alliances with governments, seek to persuade and to pressure, and sometimes openly criticize or even furiously oppose them. Some NGOs tend more towards the opposition, others tend to be cozy, especially with the powerful. Governments have offered NGOs money, "access," and even some kinds of partnership. At the international conferences, governments have even invited NGO leaders to join national delegations -- though the NGO community remains skeptical about the results. NGOs won their right to a voice at the UN by heavy pressure during the wartime negotiations (1943-45). Their rights are guaranteed by Article 71 of the Charter and affirmed by many decisions since. Member states have agreed to give NGOs several different statuses and rights, a system successfully renegotiated in 1996 (click here for further information). Large, international NGOs have won the highest status. They number about 70 in 1996. Some 2,000 others, including smaller, nationally-based NGOs, have acquired more limited rights and access. But the lines between the two have always been blurred. Small NGOs with eloquent and effective representatives have wielded considerable influence. Recently, especially in the international conferences of 1990-96, small activist NGOs gained an impressively large voice. Conferences, Campaigns and Day-to-Day Lobbying Thousands of NGOs participated in the conference preparatory processes and the conferences themselves, with a real impact. Many observers thought that the NGOs had better ideas and a longer-term perspective than the governments. The

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Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 set the pace for intense NGO participation, with nearly 1,500 accredited NGO organizations. NGOs helped make the conference a success, claimed an important place in the conference declaration and played a key role in developing post-conference institutions, like the Commission on Sustainable Development. Three years later, the Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995 broke all records and attracted 35,000 NGO representatives to Beijing. NGOs' international campaigns can greatly influence the terms of the global policy-making debate. Recently the "Fifty Years is Enough" Campaign focused attention on misdeeds, secrecy and unaccountability at the World Bank. Hundreds of NGOs from every continent participated in a campaign that forced issues into the open for the first time and pressured the Bank to make concessions. Similarly, the NGO campaign on the UN's financial crisis generated great pressure on the US and other delinquents to pay up. In contrast to the the global conferences at Rio, Vienna, Cairo, Copenhagen, Beijing, and Istanbul, and the high profile campaigns like "Fifty Years is Enough," NGOs play a less dramatic role at the UN and in the day-to-day activities in the global policy-making arena. But UN agencies have long engaged NGOs as partners in important policy areas. The International Committee of the Red Cross is so vital that its head meets quarterly with the Secretary General and its representative meets monthly with each incoming Security Council President. Less grandly, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs holds regular meetings with a committee of major NGOs to discuss responses to complex emergencies. Coalitions, Committees, Working Groups and Networks NGOs have been most effective when they work together in coalitions, pooling their resources and coordinating their lobbying efforts. Examples include the NGO Committee on Disarmament, the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court, and the NGO Working Group on the Security Council and the NGO initiatives on the UN financial crisis. There are

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also important NGO networks, particularly on the environment, that allow NGOs to coordinate their actions in many countries and at international conferences and negotiations. Third World Network, based in Malaysia, is one of the most effective and visible, but there are many more. The General Assembly of European NGOs builds links among citizen groups in the European Union. They met on 1822 April in Brussels in 1996, bringing together 90 elected delegates from all 15 EU countries. They discussed common issues and agreed on 14 resolutions. Within countries, NGOs have formed important networks, too, like the German Network of Environment and Development NGOs. Over eighty NGO networks from around the world met in Manila, Philippines in November 1995 to discuss their common concerns and to plan common action. They included about a dozen networks from each of six world regions, as well as about twenty international networks. They seemed agreed on the need for an oppositional NGO voice. As the background paper for the meeting said: Business and government are organized at the international level. There is a growing need to articulate countervailing visions, societal norms and ethical and moral views at the international level. In the long run, we have to invent the infrastructure so citizens can participate effectively in the democratic management of the global system. Over the next decade, NGOs and their networks are one of the important precursors of an accountable global civil society. They are one of the few actors who try to articulate the global public interest. Clearly much work lies ahead on questions of accountability, democracy and links to social movements. At this point in time, there is a need to create more accountable processes that link national, regional and international networks to work in the global dialogue, on monitoring, agenda setting, policy development, etc. In the day-to-day work at the UN (and its agencies), NGOs suffer from a serious disadvantage because most lack the resources to maintain a representative office at UN

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headquarters. Some depend instead on part-time volunteers who often are more interested in the diplomatic ambiance than the tough work of lobbying and reporting. NGO Committees and Coalitions rarely have the funds to support regular staff either. Southern NGOs are at the greatest disadvantage and virtually never have regular representation (a few governments like Canada and the Nordics promoted democracy at the conferences by paying for Southern NGO participants at the prep-coms). In spite of these handicaps, NGOs can be very influential through quiet diplomacy, persistent effort and real international solidarity. They would be more effective if member states didn't insist on keeping the door closed when the most important policy issues come up for discussion.


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2 NGOS, UN REFORM AND GLOBAL D EMOCRACY During the intense negotiations on reform now under way at the UN, NGOs have asked government representatives for a larger voice -- both in the reform discussions and in the reformed institutions that emerge. But governments have kept the NGOs almost completely out of the reform decision-making process. Ironically, the very governments that are most verbally supportive of NGOs (the United States and the Europeans) have been most adamant in insisting that NGOs be excluded from the reform discussions and the high-level UN bodies more generally. As discussions continue about democracy and accountability in global decision-making, we need to think carefully about NGOs and their potential role. What is the best way to think about NGOs as vehicles for wider democracy? Can they legitimately "represent" anyone or do they function best as monitors and sources of ideas and information? Does a larger role for NGOs mean a more "democratic" discussion? As nation states get weaker, should NGOs take on some of the role of nations in the international arena. And what is the significance of all the money that NGOs are increasingly getting from governments and intergovernmental institutions like the World Bank? Click here for more about the Bank and NGOs. Another set of questions relates to "civil society". Reformers often talk about a new role for "civil society" at the UN, and there are proposals to create a "Forum of Civil Society." Some

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people take this term to mean just NGOs, but to others it has another wider meaning, which includes business, the media, universities and other powerful institutions. The Secretary General and other UN officials have recently favored this "civil society" approach, as a means to strengthen business support for the organization. But would reforms in this direction help to democratize the UN, or just strengthen the role of those already most powerful? The GPF website will explore these and many other questions. We are inclined to think that NGOs have a positive contribution to make at the UN (after all, GPF is itself an NGO!). But we want to look closely at the diversity of NGOs and the great differences in quality and representativity among them. As national governments and intergovernmental institutions like the World Bank increase their subsidies to NGOs, we want to monitor how these changes affect NGO independence and capacity to act as critical monitors. We will post materials on the current negotiations to broaden NGO consultative rights with the UN General Assembly. NGOs have produced a number of good papers on this subject and NGOs have also made important statements at several official recent meetings with governments. We will also post materials on the activities of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, a major initiative to promote dialogue between NGOs and the council and to monitor the council's activities. GPF is very active in both efforts. We intend to review and discuss some of the burgeoning literature on NGOs and the institutions that are emerging to study them. We will look into the boom of new university centers and other institutions devoted to study "the non-profit sector" -- like the Washington DC-based Independent Sector, the Boston-based Institute for Civil Society, and Harvard University's new (1997) Hauser Center for the study of Nonprofits. We will also consider the many extremely interesting papers have recently been written by scholars and activists about NGOs and their role. In this era when states are backing away from social responsibilities towards their citizens, NGOs

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are bound the be important and their global role is likely to grow. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will examine the interaction of NGOs in the international arena; particularly NGOs' relations with governments as well as with the UN and its bodies. I will first attempt to define NGOs, as well as the variations on NGOs. I will then focus on international NGOs (as opposed to local NGOs) and examine the development of their status vis-à-vis the UN. Finally, I will address the recent debate over GONGOs and QUANGOs. The issue of government organized or government funded NGOs has been widely debated lately, but it has intermingled with the debate over the rather recent phenomenon of NGO misbehavior at various international forums and conferences. It began with some violent NGO protests against the WTO (Seattle, Gothenburg, Genoa etc.) and the latest debate spurred over the World Conference Against Racism in Durban (September 2001), where some NGOs displayed unacceptable behavior and made use of racist or violent language. Some NGOs tried to distance themselves from these incidents, claiming that some grassroots NGOs are new and do not know the proper way of interacting with the UN. Others said that a few "rotten apples" (such as anarchist groups) gave NGOs a bad name. Either way this problem should be addressed. CONGO or other organizations should find a way of better informing NGOs that participate in conferences on how to behave. Some have suggested writing up a "code of conduct" for NGOs or "code of ethics" - or create some form of "self policing" of NGO so as not to loose the credibility of NGOs in the eyes of the public or of the governments. Some claim a more effective screening process is needed before NGOs receive any sort of accreditation, including having them adhere to some basic guidelines (such as commitment to democratic goals, human rights, or in the negative: not being allowed racist or violent agendas or language).


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The discussion may overlap at some points, and by no means will this paper endeavor to be a comprehensive examination of these issues. It will merely attempt to map out the different issues that arise form the seemingly simplistic claim that GONGOs and "badly behaved NGOs" should be kept away from the UN system and the international arena because they give the "real NGOs" a bad name. I will also try to touch upon the politics behind the question of who will decide which NGO is "worthy" of its name, and some thorny issues of cultural relativism. I will also address the common belief that all NGOs are inherently "good". This belief is the reason why so many governments and NGOs were surprised by the misbehavior of some NGOs in recent international conferences. NGOs may be political, bias, racist or violent just like any other group, and this is true of any NGO not just GONGOs or QUANGOs. This is because there is nothing inherent in the worthiness of the causes of non-governmental organizations. Although NGOs, particularly human rights NGOs, are so used to mobilizing civil society to call governments to account that they find it hard to grapple with threats to human rights from the non-governmental world. Human rights NGOs have seen other non-governmental organizations as potential allies in the struggle for human rights, rather than potential threats to respect for human rights, and therefore have been blind to political manipulations of some NGOs and have bought into the agenda of those political movements, which use the proper human rights vocabulary. This was part of the story in Durban, and this is also why many NGOs are reluctant to address the issue (for fear that it will give all NGOs a bad name), and are content with distancing themselves from the "bad apples". However, if this issue is not addressed by NGOs, there is danger that governments, hostile to NGO participation and influence in the UN, would try to legislate limitations on such NGO participation. Such voices have been heard lately, particularly after the WCAR in Durban, and even governments who are supportive of NGO activity are uneasy bout the recent events, and will find it difficult to defend the NGOs unless they address the problem themselves.


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Background on NGOs The definition of NGOs is not commonly agreed upon. NGOs are certainly part of the citizen sector, but there is no one unified definition of NGOs. Many academics and activists have tried to define them, but so far the only working definition is that of the UN, which is itself defined in the negative: nongovernmental (what it is not). NGOs generally function to serve underserved or neglected populations, to expand the freedom of or to empower people, to engage in advocacy for social change, and to provide services. NGO advocacy might be defined as an act of organizing the strategic use of information to democratize unequal power relations, aimed at influencing policy or reality itself. Apart from the function of representing people by acting of their own volition (rather than by some institutional fiat) NGOs have other defining characteristics: • They are formal organizations (as opposed to ad hoc entities). • They are or aspire to be self-governing on the basis of their own constitutional arrangements. • They are private, in that they are separate from governments and have no ability to direct societies or to require support from them. • They are not in the business of making or distributing profits. • International NGOs (that I will focus on) have transnational goals, operations or connections, and active contacts with the UN. A common terminological confusion is with non-profit organizations. Non-profits include a very wide range of organizations, including museums, universities, and hospitals that focus on services and rarely (if ever) engage in advocacy. By contrast, NGOs always have an important advocacy mission. In the field of international relations, scholars now speak of NGOs as "non-state actors" (although this category may also include transnational corporations). This term suggests NGOs' emerging influence in the international policy arena where


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previously only states played a significant role. NGO action can be in the micro-policy, macro-policy or norm setting or a mix. Not every organization that claims to be an NGO exactly fits this definition of a private citizens' organization, separate from government but active on a social issue, not profit making, and with a transnational scope. There are a number of variations that are most commonly discussed: [Gordenker & Weiss] 1. GONGO - government-organized nongovernmental organization. They achieved notoriety during the Cold War because many so-called NGOs owed their very existence and entire financial support to communist governments in the Soviet bloc or authoritarian ones in the Third World. There were also a few such 'NGOs' in the West (particularly in the US) where they were often a front for administration activities. 2. QUANGO - quasi-nongovernmental organization that receive the bulk of their resources from public funds. The staff of such organizations usually asserts that as long as their financial support is without strings attached and their own priorities rather than those of donor governments dominate, there is no genuine problem. 3. DONGO - donor-organized NGO. Both governments and the UN have 'their' NGOs for particular operations and purposes. (The UN created local NGOs in some cases) Both QUANGOs and DONGOs aim at internationally endorsed purposes and have a private status, even if their funding is public. They offer services that clearly fall within the usual range of NGO operations. History of the UN's Relationship with Civil Society & NGOs A conventional, legally based way of describing NGOs and their relationship to the United Nations begins with the formal structure that derives form UN Charter article 71. Based on the Charter provisions, both in the preamble and article 71, the United Nations has had a relationship with civil society since its establishment, and it recognizes NGOs legally and formally

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as partners within the UN system. Article 71 states that the ECOSOC may make arrangements for both national and international NGOs: The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations, which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned. (UN Charter, Article 71: Untitled; Arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations) The first NGOs were granted consultative status by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as early as in 1948. It is the only mention of NGOs in the Charter, largely an afterthought stimulated by the Soviet Union's attempt to put a GONGO on par with the International Labor Organization (ILO). Early attempts to give meaning to article 71 were heavily colored by Cold War maneuvers, but a growing list of organizations with consultative status developed around fairly restricted practices laid down by ESOSOC. The first set of rules on this relationship was adopted in 1950 by the ECOSOC in resolution 288 B(X). These rules were reviewed by the General Assembly in 1968 in the ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV), which became the basis for establishing criteria for the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at the United Nations, which remained in use for almost three decades. The resolution also provided the framework for the funds and programs of the United Nations to appoint NGO liaison officers and to have their own procedures for NGO access. This resolution refined the earlier UN principle that any international organization not established by intergovernmental agreement falls into the NGO category. The text emphasizes that NGOs that seek consultative status must have goals within the UN economic and social ambit. It also states that NGOs must have representative and international character, and


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authorization to speak for members who are supposed to participate in a democratic fashion. The process of admission to consultative status is supervised by the Committee on NonGovernmental Organizations, elected each year by ECOSOC from among its member governments, 19 of which provide the actual personnel. It is the only intergovernmental Committee in the UN that focuses exclusively on relations with NGOs, and it holds annual consultations with NGOs about this relationship, and transmits reports of such consultations to deECOSOC for action. ECOSOC also formed a Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status - CONGO. In 1993, Member States decided that the resolution 1296 needed to be reviewed in order to update and accommodate changes since 1968. The relationship between NGOs and the United Nations had developed, as NGOs had become more present, active and influential at the international level, and more directly engaged in the intergovernmental processes. The Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 set the pace for intense NGO participation in the world conferences; with 17,000 NGO representatives participating in the NGO parallel forum and 1400 directly involved in the intergovernmental negotiations. NGOs had a key role there, as well as in the 1995 Fourth Conference on Women in Beijing, were 35,000 NGO representatives to the parallel forum and 2,600 to the intergovernmental negotiations attended. The ECOSOC decision 1993/214 of February 1993 established the parameters and mandate for a review. The review process of NGO arrangements, held in 1993-96 (under the auspices of a Working Group comprised of Member States) resulted in ECOSOC resolution 1996/31, which defines the criteria and principles for establishing consultative relationships for NGOs. Resolution 1996/31 defines NGOs "any international organization which is not established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental agreement". It also says that organization refers to NGOs at the national, sub-regional, regional and international levels, except where expressly stated otherwise. The resolution establishes three categories of consultative status for NGOs. General consultative status is for large international

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NGOs whose are of work covers most issues on the ECOSOC agenda. Special consultative status is for NGOs that have special competence in a few fields of the ECOSOC activity. The third category, which is inclusion on the roster, is for NGOs whose competence enables them to make occasional and useful contributions to the work of the UN and that are available for consultation upon request. NGOs on the roster may also include organizations in consultative status with a specialized agency or other UN body. The resolution also formulated guidelines for written statements, oral statements and attendance during meetings. This resolution is the current basis for partnership between NGOs and the United Nations. In 1998, the Secretary-General elaborated arrangements and practices for NGOs in his report A/53/170. Furthermore, the Secretary-General reflected the views of Member States, members of the specialized agencies, observers, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs from all regions in another report A/54/329, in 1999. The Millennium Declaration also gave a new mandate to enhance this partnership. The 1996/31 resolution further decided that NGOs can be invited to participate in all international conferences and their preparatory processes convened by the United Nations. As a rule, NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC are accredited for participation; merely need to express their interest to participate to become accredited. Other NGOs wishing to participate can apply through the respective conference secretariat. It was decided that accreditation processes are the prerogative of Member States, exercised through the respective preparatory committee. The Growth of NGOs NGOs have been growing stronger in the last decade. Many claim that the growth of NGOs arises from demands by citizens for accountability. Their agenda is not limited to economic issues or government agendas. Citizens' groups are increasingly powerful at the corporate, national and international level. Are they leading towards an "international civil society" or do they represent a dangerous shift or power to un-elected and un-


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accountable special interest groups? Citizens' groups play roles that go far beyond political activism. NGOs do important campaigning work, but many are also important deliverers of services. As a group, NGOs now deliver more aid than the whole UN system. A growing share of development spending, emergency relief and aid transfers passes through the aid NGOs. NGOs have become "the most important constituency for the activities of development aid agencies". Between 1990 and 1994, the proportion of the European Union's relief aid channeled through NGOs rose form 47% to 67%. (the Red Cross states that NGOs now disburse more money than the World Bank). Once little more than ragged charities, NGOs are now big business. "Anybody who's anybody is an NGO these days". The advancement in technology has made a great difference. Now information can be dispersed quickly, and to a great effect, online (and cheap). New coalitions can be built online. Internet allows new partnerships between groups in rich and poor countries. This phenomenon - amorphous NGOs, linked online, descending on a target - has been dubbed an "NGO swarm". These are very hard for governments to deal with because they have no central leadership or command structure; it is multiheaded, impossible to decapitate. Also important has been the rise of "technical NGOs" which provide sophisticated analysis and information, and they can be crucial to the working of some treaties. Staffed overwhelmingly with lawyers, they become experts in the minutiae, providing training and information to delegates from poor counties. The World Bank has co-opted NGOs since 1994. they are now at the center of World Bank policy. The new World Bank is more transparent, but is also more beholden to a new set of special interests (the WTO will have a much harder time surviving this. It is inherently more controversial, and it does not distribute money for projects, making it harder to co-opt NGOs.) Backlash Against NGOs In a global world without global government, NGOs have stepped in to fill the gap. But there is now a backlash against

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their unaccountable power. This has been spurred mainly following several incident of NGO misbehavior in protests around the world against the WTO and its globalization policies (Seattle, Gothenburg etc.). This issue has been discussed, albeit in hushed voices, among the NGO community. The trouble is that aside from the concerned governments, who feel that their sovereignty is being compromised, some states have used such incidents as an excuse to promote policies limiting the range of influence of NGOs, for their own purposes (they suggests not allowing NGOs entry into UN committees etc. to avoid being criticized by those NGOs). However, some issues are valid areas of concern, and it would be better if the NGO community itself addressed them. Some of the major problems are: A. General Problems of NGOs

Accountability: NGOs are like political parties in that they depend on their members for funding and answer to them for their policies. Therefore they gear their campaigns to expand their "grassroots" support. However, NGOs, unlike political parties, are not accountable to electorate. Accountability is central to the debate about NGOs' role in global decisionmaking. Critics claim that they are a hardly democratic substitute for governments. Lately the concept of political responsibility has been widely discussed in the context of clarifying representation and accountability in transnational NGO networks. Although NGO leaders are not elected, and do not stand for election, they are held accountable by boards of directors, membership bodies, and other constituencies. They also must win voluntary financial support each year from members and donors and cannot rely on legally enforced taxation as governments do. Financing is a sensitive issue. It is complex particularly for international NGOs. In the past three decades funding from public grants and even direct government funding has become widespread among NGOs (today such grants account fro more than 40% of NGO income. This inevitably exposes NGOs to pressure from governments and might limit their capacity to at independently. However such undo influence on


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the agenda of NGOs might also exist when the funds come from businesses, big foundations and rich individuals - and NGOs must be weary. Many are discussing some form of accountability, transparency and enhancing democracy. • The Single Issue Problem: International civil society is not a homogeneous forum of altruistic groups. For all their strengths, NGOs are special interests, and they often suffer from tunnel vision - judging every public act by how it affects their particular interest. Not all single-interest groups may be the best guarantors of long-term success. They are rarely obliged to think about trade-offs in policy or to consider broad, cross sector approaches to development. They are often organized to promote a particular goal rather than the broader goal of development. • NGOs are assumed to be less bureaucratic and corrupt than governments, but NGOs may fall into bureaucracy and bad ways because they are not accountable to anyone. NGOs are also expensive. The success of aid agencies should be measured by how soon they leave, not by how long they stay. The focus should be on creating sustainability. • Some NGOs' presence may inadvertently prolong or complicate wars, where they end up feeding armies, sheltering hostages, or serving as cover for warring parties. • Some aid groups propagate western values. Many NGO lack base in the local population, and with their money coming from the outside, try to impose their ideas without debate. Some try to promote women's and children's interests as defined by western societies, causing social disruption on the ground. Example: Anti-slavery campaigns in Africa, in which western NGOs buy children's freedom have been condemned by UNICEF, because buying slaves, if that is what they are, will little to discourage the practice of trading them. Example: NGOs that carry out population or birth control projects

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are particularly controversial: some are paid to carry out sterilization programs in the poor parts of the world, because donors in the rich world consider there are too many people there. • NGOs presence brings in western living standards and purchasing power, which can transform local markets and generate local resentment. *The effectiveness of NGOs has been assisted by the Internet. The collection and communication of large volumes of information is no longer the domain of governments alone. Addressing Close Ties Between NGOs and Governments (and the UN) Known variously as "private voluntary organizations," "civil society organizations," "citizen associations," and "non-state actors" - they are increasingly called NGOs. The UN system uses this term to distinguish representatives of these agencies from those of governments. While many NGOs dislike the term, it has come into wide use, because the UN system is the main focus of international rule making and policy formulation in the fields where most NGOs operate. The tag "non-governmental organization" was used first at the founding of the UN. It implies that NGOs keep their distance from officialdom; they do things that governments will not, or cannot, do. But, in fact, NGOs have a great deal to do with governments. Not all of it is healthy, as I shall discuss. Civil society organizations and giant corporations are potentially very important partners for the UN, but there are many of them that any kind of meaningful cooperation will be a challenge. The number of global non-governmental organizations has mushroomed in recent years, and went from an estimated 23,600 in 1991 to 44,000 in 1999. (The number of giant transnational corporations is now estimated to be over 60,000.) There are a number of basic problems about keeping a close relationship between NGOs and governments:


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• Europe and US donors say that bilateral aid should go to NGOs, which are generally more open and efficient than governments. The NGOs are much more important to the UN as well. Most agencies now have hundreds of NGO partners. The main reason for the recent boom in NGOs is that Western Governments finance them. This is actually a matter of privatization: nongovernmental groups are becoming contractors for governments. Governments prefer to pass aids through NGOs because it is cheaper, more efficient, and more readily accessible than direct official aid. However, governments sometimes use this is as a way of shirking their responsibilities. • Governments also find NGOs an important source of information as they bring back reports of what is happening in different regions. Often the information the NGOs gather is unavailable from other sources, such as human rights NGOs. While this is useful, governments may sometimes exploit NGOs, particularly those working in the midst of conflict, by using them as a cover for spies. • Some NGOs take over diplomatic functions, such as negotiating ceasefires, preventing and ending conflicts, restricting arms flow. In performing such tasks NGOs must take care not to act as "instruments of government foreign policy." • Perhaps the most potent sign of the closeness between NGOs and governments, aside from their financial links, is the exchange of personnel. In developing countries government may ask NGOs to help with various functions (ex: paperwork requested from the World Bank). In the developed world increasing numbers of civil servants take time off to work for NGOs, and vice versa. This may cause problems of loyalty. (However, NGOs have been accused not only of diverting funds away from local governments, but they are often seen as directly challenging their sovereignty).

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Problems Caused by Close Relations Between NGOs and the Corporate World • NGOs can also stray too close to the corporate world. Some "business NGOs" deliberately model themselves on, or depend greatly on, particular corporations. Bigger ones have commercial arms, media departments, aggressive headhunting methods, varied private fundraising and investment strategies. As they get larger, NGOs are also looking more and more like businesses themselves. In the past they sought no profits, employed idealists for low or no wages. Today, senior staff and fund-raisers earn wages comparable to the private sector. Any division between the corporate and the NGO worlds is long gone. Governments and UN could now (in theory) ask for tenders from businesses and NGOs to carry out their programs. • Many groups have come to depend on their media presence to help with fund raising. This is very problematic. In the current crowded relief market, campaigning groups must compete for attention - media coverage. Publicity is crucial to NGOs' success, NGOs cannot grow in membership, funding or power without the media - there are many public relation temptations that may cause distortions in their agendas. Environmental groups have often been accused of stretching facts to create a greater media impact. • It could be argued that it doesn't matter that NGOs are loosing their independence because many achieve great things. The best employ local people, keep foreign expertise to a minimum, attempt precise goals, and think deeply about the long term impact of their work. The best antidote to hubris, and to institutionalization, would be for the NGO to disband when the job is done. The chief aim of NGOs should be their own abolition (not just becoming a lobby for another cause - thus perpetuating themselves). This would better insure issues of independence, accountability, transparency and devotion to the cause.


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Possible Solutions Discussed by NGOs • Self-Policing - The issue of globalization has been, in recent years, associated with 'wild' NGOs creating disturbances. Also in WCAR - Durban. Discussing creating an efficient mechanism for accreditation (consultative status), through reform in ECOSOC committee on NGOs, to better relations with UN. • Code of Conduct - An event in 1994, in which Rwandan refugees flooded Congo, brought out the problem. The dramatic plight of the refugees drew media coverage, and caused NGOs to scramble for funds, even to the point of lying about their projects. The Red Cross, fearful that the media, and then the public might loose trust in NGOs, drew up a ten-point "code of conduct" for the NGOs. Since then NGOs have been working hard to improve. More than 70 groups and 142 governments backed the 1995 code of conduct. [code - on file] • Code of Ethics - SANGOCO Code of Ethics for NGOs in South Africa. [on file] • Code of Protest - The NEF is promoting a "Code of Protest" over the internet based on a pledge to nonviolence at all times, in reaction to violent antiglobalization protesters, for the purpose of countering the bad name these groups give NGOs. [Cattaui] Recent Attempts to Limit the Role of NGOs 17 nations ("like-minded countries"), including a number of the 53 members of the main UN human rights body have officially called for the activities of NGOs to be limited. They have voiced concern at the growing role of NGOs, who are officially entitled to take part in the annual Human Rights Commission session. The Indonesian ambassador, speaking on behalf of the 17 countries, asked the UN to revise its rules on the accreditation of NGOs to the commission, to ensure no misconduct or abuses on the part of the NGOs .he also said the NGOs should not be permitted to distribute scurrilous and politically motivated material. He voiced particular concern

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with the NGOs making full use of their right to speak at the forum, particularly when they allow guests to speak in their stead (such as victims of human rights violations). The countries underline that their national sovereignty should be respected. NGO Participation in the Work of the Human Rights Commission It is important for human rights defenders to work together to denounce human rights violations, therefore the Human Rights Commission is very important for NGOs. NGOs can act both formally and informally. However, the growing number of NGOs each year has lead to some problems such as more speakers, lesser quality of intervention, and poorer NGO standards. Governments accuse NGOs of this deterioration but ironically they have control over which NGOs get access to the commission and which receive consultative status. They are the ones granting accreditation to some GONGOs, enabling them to participate in the HR commission. Because of the great increase in the number of requests from NGOs for consultative status, the NGO committee does not have the capacity to thoroughly check the quality of all applying NGOs. Thus states are trying to limit the participation of those NGOs who have consultative status. Indonesia and "like minded" states tried to undermine the role of NGOs by limiting their participation. They have tried to introduce amendments to the rules of procedures - but have not yet succeeded in doing so. The poorer quality of NGOs legitimizes the arguments of those trying to limit NGO participation. Even those countries not hostile to NGOs that only want NGOs to work better, are trying to reform rules for NGO participation. This reform could take two directions: The reform could be an exercise to think about the contribution of the NGOs to the work of the commission, while still taking into account practical and logistical solutions. On the other hand, the reform could play into the hands of states that are trying to use the problems of the quantity and quality of NGOs to bring about a reform, which would limit the work of the NGOs who criticized those


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same states. Unfortunately the second option seems more likely (because reforms in the UN may open Pandora's box). Therefore NGOs must monitor the reform process and intervene in the debate, and think of how they can exclude from the UN groups who are discrediting al the NGOs (GONGO's or bad NGOs). Independent and credible NGOs must start thinking about new propositions also for enhancing the role of NGOs in the HR Commission. GONGOs & QUANGOs Genral claims against GONGOs is that they are often set up to speak in favor of some governments (or against other governments), either as a member of the UN Human Rights Commission (a 53-member main UN human rights body) or by getting them accredited as NGOs. The experiences in mature democracies suggest that the fear of GONGOs and QUANGOs is exaggerated, and that there is no need to ban them. In fact they are often very good and useful entities. For example the state might find that the public is more than willing to bear the costs of some public institution (ex. culture center) if it is transferred to an NGO, and the state continues to provide funds etc. NGO structure allows for much more flexibility in research institutes (more than civil service rules). Although there are many appropriate roles for quasinongovernmental organizations or government organized or controlled NGOs (e.g. museums, research institutes, special lending or credit programs), great care must be taken to prevent the use of such entities to benefit government officials, directly or indirectly, either politically or monetarily. Special care must also be taken to avoid inappropriate discrimination against independent NGOs. In these situations there is a danger of conflicts of interest, self-dealing, or improper personal enrichment, therefore it is important to have clear rules about these matters and to enforce ethical standards of accountability and transparency vigilantly. There is no need to ban GONGOs and QUANGOs.

NGOs and Privatization: Throughout the world there is a strong tendency to downsize the state - privatize the economy.

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There is also a movement to transfer social services and facilities out of the government sector. These cannot be "privatized" in the same sense. The traditional ways in which NGOs work with governments - by contract and grant - are in fact way of "privatizing" government services. NGOs act as suppliers of the goods and deliverer of the services. However it is important to avoid the situation in which governments us such "privatization" moves to shirk important social responsibilities. The article stresses government-NGO partnerships for achieving social and economic development needs and alleviating poverty, but does not advocate a situation in which NGOs are forced to carry most of the social burden. IDEAS

* Environmental Activism in China One of the Problems in China is the dearth of NGOs. NGOs educate the public and create grassroots sentiment in favor o enforcing environmental laws and cleaning up the environment. There are many hurdles to setting up a non-governmental environmental organization in China. Registration procedures and requirements and the long approval process (sometimes years) hinder the establishment of such NGOs. China's government isn't supportive of independent NGOs because of competition to resources. China has GONGOs (or QUANGOs) established by almost every ministry of the central government with a claim to an environmental or social mandate. Many of these GONGOs/QUANGOs do good work but quote official government lines and will not criticize ineffective policies or practice. The government is suspect of any organized group that does not have ties to the Communist Party. The solution: found a company instead of an NGO - it works just as well.

* Alejandro Bendana, 1998 As units of analysis, "NGOs" and "civil society" are hopelessly inadequate terms. Suggests new ones. He then challenges notions about NGOs and debates the relationship between NGOs and "Civil Society". He contests the assumption that NGOs represent people's concerns, even though they may take


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government money. He welcomes debate on ethical codes of conduct for NGOs. GRO - grassroots organization defined as either locally based people's groups that work to improve their communities (territorial), or specific member groups (e.g. women), with or without global outreach or consciousness, with a memberaccountable leadership. And that are substantially self-reliant. GRSO - grassroots support organization - concerned with particular issues, that are nationally or regionally based, usually staffed by professionals, that channel funds and technical expertise to help conduct community based programs. Both GROs and GRSOs are voluntary nonprofit organizations that pursue a social mission driven by commitment to shared values.

* Kerstin Martens, 2000 Governments/NGOs/Civil Society Brings up an interesting point through the discussion of the Vienna Conference on Human Rights 1993. Although NGOs had access to the conference and felt that it was crucial for their efforts of raising consciousness, pressuring states and advancing agendas, it is overlooked that states still decide the procedures and contents of the conference proceedings, and they also determine the extent to which NGOs participate at the actual conference and to which NGOs directly influence conference outcomes. In the case of the Vienna Conference, she claims, "states clearly restricted NGO participation in conference proceedings and drafting committees. As such, states still set out the limits of the participation of (global) civil society." In addition, the Vienna Conference demonstrated the diversities within the NGO community, particularly the North-South cleavage that exists not only between states but also within civil society.

Glossary: NGO - Non-Governmental Organization GONGO - Governmental NGO


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NGOs and the United Nations

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QUANGO - Quasi NGO GRINGO - NGO with a symbiotic relationship with a government. PANGO - Party-affiliated NGO (used mostly in relation to Latin America) DONGO - Donor-organized NGO (by government, UN, or private) BINGO - Business NGO that has taken on corporate trappings even if not directly backed by businesses. INGO - International non-governmental organization IGO - Intergovernmental organization (such as ILO) CSO - Civil Society Organization

3 NGOS

AND THE

UNITED NATIONS

INTRODUCTION

NGOs have an Increasingly Vital Role to Play Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participate vitally in the international system. They contribute valuable information and ideas, advocate effectively for positive change, provide essential operational capacity in emergencies and development efforts, and generally increase the accountability and legitimacy of the global governance process. The Secretary General has frequently affirmed the importance of NGOs to the United Nations. Again and again, he has referred to NGOs as "indispensable partners" of the UN, whose role is more important than ever in helping the organization to reach its goals. He has affirmed that NGOs are partners in "the process of deliberation and policy formation" as well as in "the execution of policies." Other top UN officials, as well as many delegations, have expressed the same ideas. Germany, speaking recently for the European Union, affirmed that NGOs are "essential partners for government and the international community" and spoke of their capacity to "participate constructively in policy-making and implementation." This report assumes that NGOs will grow in importance in the years ahead and that the United Nations must find ways to be ever more open to NGO partnership. Furthermore, the partnership must be based on real practice and outlook, not on

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rhetoric and symbolism. Global policy making today and in the years to come will require new levels of participation of NGOs, if it is to be effective in a globalizing, ever more interdependent world. This partnership must be built with hard work, dedication and leadership, to overcome many substantial obstacles. NGOs do not claim to be paragons of virtue or perfect expressions of the public interest. Nevertheless, NGOs can bring to the global policy making process a vitally important voice that complements and widens the policy discourse, resulting in better and more legitimate decisions. For these reasons, it is imperative that the United Nations explore means to widen and make more meaningful the access of NGOs to the organization and its negotiation and decisionmaking processes - ways that strengthen and also transcend the framework laid down in Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 1996/31, adopting the spirit of Decision 1996/297. A Mixed Picture since 1996 Since ECOSOC adopted Resolution 1996/31 establishing new accreditation rules for NGOs on July 25, 1996, NGOs have enjoyed important advances but also suffered disappointing setbacks.

Advances On the positive side, NGOs have set new standards of positive contribution to the UN and reached further levels of access in new settings. During negotiations towards an International Criminal Court, NGOs participated informally but effectively, alongside governments, in a high-level negotiating process. They spoke, circulated documents, met frequently with delegations, and overall had a major impact on the outcome. While NGOs do not enjoy formal decision making rights, they exercise a substantial influence over outcomes through their expertise and creative policy proposals. The annual sessions of the Commission on Human Rights, held in Geneva, attracts a large number of NGO participants,


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who provide vital information and substantial input to its deliberations. The Commission has incorporated NGO participation extensively, giving NGO representatives the opportunity to speak at plenary sessions, as well as broad rights to circulate documents. Public support from the worldwide human rights movement has strengthened this process and kept it moving forward. To provide additional avenues for NGO participation, delegations and the Secretariat have recently experimented with new meeting arrangements in other forums. The panels and consultations of the Working Group of the General Assembly on Financing for Development, organized in 1999, provide a current and significant case in point. They give NGOs a framework to make presentations and to have discussions with delegations in an informal setting, outside the meetings of the Working Group, but still part of its overall process. NGOs have also experimented with informal dialogues in new policy arenas, such as the Security Council. The NGO Working Group on the Security Council, comprised of some thirty NGOs with active program work on Security Council matters, has been meeting increasingly frequently with members of the Council since mid-1997 and expects to hold over 30 sessions in 1999. At the same time, various institutions in the UN system have affirmed the importance of NGOs by establishing new focal point offices and by further opening their decision-making process to NGO voices and input. For several years, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has held important monthly meetings with humanitarian NGOs. In early 1999, the High Commissioner for Refugees consulted with leaders of about thirty major human rights and relief NGOs - a meeting that resulted in a follow-up dialogue process. The pace of such meetings across the UN system has markedly increased. The Secretariat and other agencies have also constructed excellent sites on the world wide web, making an increasing amount of UN information and documents available instantly around the globe. Additionally, the Secretariat has strengthened

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its relations with NGOs by improving some services such as the processing of accreditation applications, the NGO Resource Center and NGO training programs. Delegations have also set up useful web sites and they increasingly hold meetings and briefings with NGOs on matters of common interest.

Problems and Setbacks NGOs have also experienced serious problems and even setbacks in their relations with the United Nations, due to intergovernmental action and action by the Secretariat. Intergovernmental. NGOs are disappointed that member states could not agree to grant formal consultative rights with the General Assembly, a step that seemed a likely followup to Resolution 1996/297. Negotiations on that issue bogged down in the spring of 1997 and efforts since then have failed to obtain results, even though ECOSOC Decision 1996/297 spoke of broadening NGO participation to "all areas of work" of the United Nations. Some delegations in the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs have recently spoken of a need to place new restrictions on NGOs. NGOs feel that these critics unfairly blame NGOs generally, by exaggerating the actions of a very small number of NGO representatives. The Committee has discussed actively several proposals that would greatly harm NGO work. Member states of every region, including Cuba, Tunisia, the United States and the United Kingdom, have offered proposals of this kind. NGOs were also alarmed at a 1998 United States proposal in the Fifth Committee suggesting that NGOs pay for the cost of services they receive at the UN. NGOs have suffered immeasurable loss because the UN has sharply scaled back its global conference series. NGOs greatly profited from these conferences, which provided ease of accreditation, intense interaction with delegations in the preparatory process and outstanding networking opportunities. But after the 1996 World Food Conference in Rome, it appears that there will be very few such events in future, especially


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because of the opposition of the United States. The UN has shifted to special sessions of the General Assembly or other UN venues. NGOs have encountered serious access difficulties in these new settings. Recently, NGOs have faced deteriorating legal and financial conditions in many countries. Governments have imposed new restrictions on NGOs, narrowing NGO scope and placing limits on their ability to speak critically and independently. Funding for many such organizations has declined as well. These developments inevitably sap NGO capacity to participate effectively at the global level. Overall, then, many factors make the current environment much less NGO-friendly than the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly for Southern NGOs. In addition to domestic problems, they now find the UN more difficult to access on global policy issues. This has drained worldwide NGO interest and support for the UN at a very critical time in the organization's history. Secretariat. NGOs have been surprised to encounter negative and restrictive action by the UN Secretariat, especially in New York. The Secretariat has recently promulgated restrictive security rules that have made NGO entry to UN buildings more difficult and have closed off sections of the UN headquarters complex to NGOs. Security officers have subjected NGOs to document searches both at the perimeter entries and inside buildings. The Secretariat has changed security rules suddenly, with minimal consultation, little apparent justification, and no advance notice, disrupting the consultative process. The Secretariat has imposed onerous fees for access to electronic UN documents through the Optical Disk System and it is also considering a fee for access to the Treaty Database, now provided for free. Fee-based approaches of this kind can have an especially negative impact on Southern NGOs, who most need documents in languages other than English, found only sparsely on the web site. NGOs find many friendly and helpful staff in the Secretariat, but, too often, NGOs also encounter people that are not

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supportive and not attuned to NGO concerns. Secretariat officials fail to engage NGOs in serious consultation, even in matters of great importance to NGOs, like the Optical Disk System or security rules. NGOs have been especially disappointed at the troubled interaction they have had with Secretariat officials, as well as problems of access to Secretary General Kofi Annan. In spite of the best efforts of NGOs to explore the significance of the Secretary General's proposed "partnership," there is little evidence of a clear mandate or plan within the Secretariat or at the intergovernmental level for developing this partnership into a meaningful new reality. Contrary agendas are clearly colliding with NGO interests. Only a broad and consistent initiative, that commands the support of NGOs, delegations and Secretariat leadership, can succeed in solving the present impasse. Short-term Action and Long-Term Vision NGOs need short-term action in a number of important policy and practical areas - action that will address and solve security issues, strengthen support for NGOs within the Secretariat, maximize the availability of documents and information for NGOs, and lead to a better quality consultation and expansion of NGO access to new areas of the intergovernmental process. While considering and addressing these short-term goals, the UN community should develop a long-term vision about the role of NGOs at the UN in ten, twenty or even thirty years. In this globalizing world, with changing roles for states and non-state actors, and radical shifts in communications technology, we need to think about how NGOs will interact with a changing UN. Should there, for example, be new forums and formal arrangements for NGO input to the UN? How can Southern NGOs be brought more successfully into the UN's deliberations? Should we be planning for a greater number of NGOs in regular consultation at headquarters and how can facilities be changed to meet such a development? How can communications


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technology better engage NGOs around the world with the UN and vice versa? MAIN ISSUES

Access to Information NGOs seek the greatest possible access to UN information, including official documents. NGOs serve as primary disseminators of UN information and they need these documents for their work in monitoring and policy consultation. NGOs enjoy formal guarantees of access to UN documents in Resolution 1996/31. In the recent past, the UN has developed a large and very useful web site. The UN made an early commitment to the web, which has paid off handsomely by providing a substantial improvement in information distribution. The site is welldesigned and extremely heavily-used. In addition to news releases and other information, the site provides access to about fifteen percent of all current UN documents in English, with much thinner postings in other languages. The web site enables the UN to service NGO needs without requiring their physical presence. In this way, it has allowed the overall number of accredited NGOs to grow, while the number of NGO representatives actually in the building has stayed the same or even declined. But many documents that NGOs may need are not available on the site. NGO representatives must still obtain these documents in printed form, but they would much prefer to have electronic access, an arrangement that would save UN printing costs and reduce the number of NGO visits. When the UN made available the Optical Disk System (ODS) to member states in late 1996, NGOs asked the Secretariat for access to this system, which includes all UN public documents, in all six official languages. The Secretariat eventually decided to charge NGOs an access fee, now $1,250 per year, per computer, payable in advance, a 50% discount from the commercial rate. Secretariat staff argued that under stringent budget conditions, a fee was necessary to "charge-

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back" the cost of new computer hardware and phone lines. Recently, NGOs discovered that the new equipment cost in New York and Geneva amounted to only $30,000. To recoup a sum of about $100,000 (a larger investment would have been needed for more users), the Secretariat denied information to thousands of potential users, especially affecting Southern NGOs, operating at a distance from headquarters, which have small budgets and need documents in languages other than English. The cost of document printing, plus ODS sales costs, have probably been far more than the technology investment. The UN may be on the verge of compounding this error. The Secretariat has told NGOs that it is planning to charge a fee for access to the Treaty Database of the Office of Legal Affairs, a database that has previously been available free of charge. Many NGOs use this database heavily and they are very concerned about a future fee, which would impair their work dramatically, especially low-budget Southern organizations. The ODS is outmoded and that it should be replaced by a newer and more advanced system. Some have argued against providing open electronic data access to NGOs, on the ground that additional investment in an outmoded system would be a waste of scarce UN resources. In fact, according to technical experts in the Secretariat, computer and communications equipment are not specific to the type of database, so the access investments will work with present and future systems. The Secretariat is now planning an entirely new, more efficient document database that could be operational by the summer of 2000. After initial installation costs, the new system promises to be cheaper, faster and far easier to operate, lowering the unit costs of additional users and making free NGO service even more logical and cost-efficient. The Secretariat is now re-thinking the UN web site, to make it an even more effective vehicle for UN information. Ms. Angela Kane, Director of the Library and Publications Division of the Department of Public Information, is in charge of this project, on special leave from her regular duties. However much the web site improves, NGOs will continue to need the


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extended access to documents, especially documents in languages other than English, that the ODS database now provides. NGOs would also like access to a broadened universe of ODS documents, to include selected draft texts, non-papers and other such materials. These are now generally available only in paper form and NGOs must pick them up in conference rooms, requiring a physical presence in New York or Geneva (the documents exist in electronic form, of course, but access to them is now restricted). Electronic publication (assuming greater ODS access) would make them instantly available around the world, providing much greater opportunity for involvement by Southern NGOs that cannot afford a New York office. Delegations have improved NGOs' information access, too, by providing more briefings and by posting their own web sites. On some sites missions have posted press releases and the texts of formal speeches. They have also posted informal documents such as non-papers, speeches to General Assembly Working Groups, and Security Council presidential press statements. Delegations could greatly improve information about their work by expanding these web sites and posting more of their documents there. Access to UN Premises

Perimeter Security According to UN Chief of Security Michael McCann, the UN faces increasing challenges to its perimeter security system at headquarters in New York. He reports that there have been threats to bomb the building and that security has apprehended persons attempting to enter with concealed weapons. Controversial international events have heightened these security problems, which tend to increase during the General Debate in the early fall. But no one has alleged that NGOs have posed threats of this kind. In response to major protest demonstrations at UN buildings in Geneva in early 1999, the Swiss Army has patrolled the UN

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precinct there and ringed it with barbed wire. Delegates, staff and NGOs have often had to use just a single entrance, where all pass through the same security check. By contrast, New York headquarters presents a less ominous visage. But perimeter security has steadily tightened since about 1992, when NGOs lost their ability to "sign in" guests. Since the early fall of 1998, UN security has asked even NGOs with an annual pass to go through metal detectors and have their bags or briefcases scanned. Security has sometimes required all NGOs to enter the building by the 46th Street "Visitors' Entrance." Those with a temporary pass, including NGO representatives attending Prep Comms or conference followups, must now always enter at 46th Street. NGOs object to passing through metal detector searches when staff and delegations are not searched in this way. Security procedures imply that NGOs pose a far greater risk, diminishing NGOs' sense that they are trusted partners. UN security now asks even NGO representatives who regularly enter and leave the building to undergo rigorous metal searches, sometimes requiring removal of bracelets, belts, key chains and other articles of clothing. These searches can be time-consuming and humiliating. Furthermore, security staff have set metal detection equipment at unusually high levels - considerably higher than most airport equipment -- leading to routine hand-sweeps by security officers, because shoe tacks, metal fasteners in clothing, credit cards and the like set off the alarms. Security guards "sweep" longtime NGO representatives who must stand by a busy entrance, with hands in the air, looking like they have just been arrested for a street crime, even though they are peacefully going about their business, and in spite of the fact that they may enter the buildings two or three times each day. In two meetings with NGOs in March of 1999, neither Chief McCann, nor other Secretariat officials were able to provide evidence that NGOs pose a special threat to UN security. One official spoke several times about NGOs' recent "explosive growth" (an ominous term). This argument was not persuasive, because there was no evidence of an actual increase in the


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numbers of NGOs present at headquarters, nor was there evidence that such an increase would cause demonstrable security problems. Secretariat and delegates commonly speak in exaggerated terms about the growth in number of NGOs. Some say that member states are pressing the Secretariat to curb NGOs. This, they say, rather than real security concerns, has shaped the new policy. Whatever the cause, Secretariat officials seem to have assigned very little weight to NGO access needs and their actions fit badly with notions of "partnership."

Document Searches and Internal Security On a number of occasions in 1998, UN security staff searched NGO representatives for documents, both at the perimeter and inside the UN premises. Security personnel repeatedly insisted on the right to examine and pass judgement on NGO documents. They even refused entry or expelled NGO representatives because of the content of documents. In one well-known case, security officers denied entrance to an NGO representative because he was carrying leaflets announcing the annual vigil on the UN's financial crisis. Though Chief McCann and others later apologized for this incident, NGOs have never received a promised copy of UN policy on this matter, including assurances on freedom of speech for NGOs and a statement of circumstances under which the security department would deem document searches to be permissible. NGOs are alarmed at the potential for future security department control over the content of NGO documents and for the possible "frisking" of NGO representatives. Increasingly, in 1998 and after, UN security barred NGOs from access to the main floor of the General Assembly chamber or the lower galleries, from the Second floor hallway and meeting chambers in the Conference building, and from the Delegates' Lounge. Assistant Secretary General Sorensen asked NGO leaders on March 31, 1999 to make recommendations for administrative details of restrictive new security arrangements. In a letter dated April 7, 1999, the NGOs refused to be party to these arrangements and instead expressed sharp opposition to the new rules.

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Delegates cite recent misconduct of NGOs in both Geneva and New York as a reason for new restrictions. These incidents, however unfortunate, involved only a very small number of persons and did not pose a serious threat to delegations or UN property. Neither the Secretariat nor delegates have adequately shared information about the incidents with the NGO community, so NGOs know only details of cases discussed in public meetings. In other cases, it appears that corridor rumor has inflated the facts. Since delegates have clear means under Resolution 1996/31 for determining the facts and for imposing sanctions on offenders, they should use them, rather than writing new rules or inflicting group punishment. The overwhelming majority of NGOs has been sensitive and diplomatic, constructive and valued within the UN system. In a memorandum dated April 19, 1999 Mr. Iqbal Riza, Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary General, issued extensive new rules governing NGOs in New York. The rules now exclude NGOs from the second floor except with a special pass, or in case of ECOSOC-related meetings. The memorandum also announces a regular system of metal-detector searches, bans NGOs from going above the fourth floor in the Secretariat building without an appointment, bans NGOs from the General Assembly chamber except in the fourth floor balcony, bans NGOs from the Delegates' Lounge except in the company of a delegate or carrying a special pass, and imposes other restrictions. NGOs see this memorandum as a serious setback. And they regret that it sets forth new rules after such slight consultation (none with Mr. Riza) and with virtually no concessions to NGO concerns.

Lack of Clear and Consistent Rules In spite of the Riza memorandum, rules governing NGO physical access and conduct in the UN buildings remain vague and apparently subject to change without notice. This permits the security department to alter the "level" of security, in response to circumstances such as a visit by a head of state. NGOs understand the need for a certain degree of flexibility. But there exists far too much vagueness, obscurity and


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uncertainty in the overall security environment, so that NGOs lack clear and stable rights. When a visiting German NGO leader recently tried to distribute a statement by a large group of NGOs at the Copenhagen +5 Prep Comm in May 1999, a Secretariat staffperson confiscated the statement. Realizing the importance of the NGO networks that authored the statement, the staffperson then apologized and placed the statement on a table in the conference room. The NGO representative, who had attended many previous meetings in New York, was astonished at these events and realized that he had no benchmark of rules to consult and no clear rights to invoke. NGOs do not want to be bound by a big book of rules. But, on the other hand, an absence of rules opens to way to abuse by over-zealous security and Secretariat officers. The UN and the NGO community must jointly consider how to clearly define NGO rights, to protect against abuses in an increasingly restrictive security environment.

Consequences of the Financial Crisis The UN's financial crisis has deepened problems of NGO access. As we have already seen, it has led the UN to charge for electronic documents. Also, according to the Security Department, it has meant that the security staff cannot provide the needed coverage in all areas of the building, leading to additional restrictions on NGO circulation. Financial problems have weakened the capacity of UN offices to provide services, shortened print runs of UN documents, slowed development of electronic communications, lowered staff morale and much more that has negatively affected NGOs. The financial crisis provided the rationale for the December 1998 proposal by the US delegation in the Fifth Committee that the UN should charge fees for services provided to NGOs, including use of the UN premises, provision of documents, translation services and so forth. This proposal caused great alarm in the NGO community. Fortunately, other delegations

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rejected the proposal and the US withdrew it. It would have had an especially heavy impact on NGOs from the South and on small and low-budget NGOs from every region. NGOs and delegates took note of the irony that this proposal came from the delegation that had failed to pay its assessments and owed the UN more than one billion dollars. NGOs worry that this commercial approach to access may re-appear, since the Secretariat is preparing further information on the cost of NGO services.

1999, when a number of NGOs attended a Security Council open meeting, they discovered that none of the earpeices in the public gallery of the Council chamber were functioning. When NGOs reported this problem, Secretariat staff explained that financial constraints made it impossible to fix the earpieces in the near term. Because Council members make use of all the official languages during the course of a typical session, NGO representatives cannot exercise their full right to attend these meetings as long as the earpieces are broken.

NGOs object to a policy environment in which the financial crisis becomes the excuse for denying needed services to NGOs. If the UN is to develop a new partnership with NGOs, it must spend additional (if modest) resources in this area. When delegations insist that all spending occur "within existing resources," they block the positive development of the organization and pit NGO needs against other very urgent crises and mandates. NGOs thus have a high stake in finding a solution to the financial crisis and they are extremely unhappy at those member states most responsible for prolonging it.

The Right to Participate

Physical Facilities UN Physical facilities have a great impact on NGOs, affecting their capacity to carry out their work. NGOs suffer particularly from a lack of meeting space and office space in the UN complex and environs. The steadily increasing number of intergovernmental or government-sponsored meetings in the headquarters complex (including conference followup events) tends to squeeze out NGO meetings. NGO Committees that formerly met monthly in UN conference rooms now must find alternative venues, or risk being denied space at the last minute, making planning a nightmare. Alternate meeting space in the UN neighborhood is often simply not available. Physical facility problems at the UN reflect the organization's financial crisis, including deteriorating physical infrastructure. The earpieces, used for listening to translators during public meetings, offer a clear example. In most of the UN's public galleries, these earpieces do not work, making it difficult for NGOs to monitor the proceedings. In February

Progressive Consolidation of Resolution 1996/31 Resolution 1996/31 gives accredited NGOs considerable rights to participate in UN meetings. Secretariat personnel and government delegates must elaborate the formal texts in actual practice, to meet a wide variety of needs and circumstances. NGOs expected that Resolution 1996/31 would greatly strengthen NGO participation, given stronger language than the previous text. They hoped that, beginning in the summer of 1996, the Secretariat and delegates would work towards a "consolidation" of new practices and new precedents across the range of UN forums. In fact, NGO participation has made only modest progress overall and in some areas there has been regression. The Conference of NGOs (CONGO) has called for more consolidation, as have NGO leaders in a number of fields. Unfortunately, many delegations do not support progressive consolidation in the present political climate. But others see progress as possible and even necessary for a healthy UN.

"Existing Practices" and "Best Practices" Practice not only elaborates and amplifies rules, it sometimes precedes rules or extends them into new areas. This is especially true at the UN, where there are dozens of different forums. Since the earliest years, NGOs have participated far beyond the bounds of ECOSOC, including active consultation with the General Assembly (GA), its Main Committees, Subsidiary Bodies and a variety of other forums. NGO representatives have even spoken to the GA (though formally the session was temporarily

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suspended) and GA committees regularly find means to hear the views of NGOs. A large area of practice and regular informal participation has come to assume rule-like authority. These practices have never been codified, but they have become well-established precedents, recognized broadly in the UN system. Of course, such practices are subject to the good will of the delegates and rely on continued cordial relations between delegations and NGOs. With the steady turnover of delegations, Secretariat staff and NGO staff, institutional memory is sometimes lost and existing practices may change or diminish. At the same time, though, creative new practices arise. So the body of existing practices continues to expand the possibility of fruitful participation by NGOs and to expand the arenas of NGO access. "Best practices," can inspire progressive change and can spread from one forum to another. Nearly every committee of the General Assembly has practices for consultation with NGOs, including those committees working outside the area of social and economic policy. The First Committee, for example, has developed substantial means for consulting with the Disarmament NGOs [see the paper "Enlarging the Contribution of NGOs to the Work of the First Committee" by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, October 1996]. Another example is the Sixth Committee, which developed close working relations with NGOs during the preparations for the International Criminal Court negotiations, beginning in 1997.

Legal Interpretations by the Office of Legal Counsel The UN Office of Legal Counsel has long enunciated a restrictive approach to the question of NGO access. The Office has taken the position that only formal rules, such as the Charter or resolutions of intergovernmental bodies, can be a basis for deciding issues of NGO access. In this way, the Office has ignored fifty-four years of practice, which go considerably further than the rules. While Common Law systems place especially heavy emphasis on practice and precedent, all legal systems take such practice into account. So the Office has


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leaned unreasonably towards restriction. NGOs have expressed their concerns to officials in the Office and some NGOs believe that the Office has recently adopted a more flexible approach. But others think little has changed. It seems, therefore, that the Office's stance calls for review. NGOs will continue to press for clarification on these legal issues so that their rights of access can enjoy full support from the Office of Legal Counsel. NGOs want the Office's legal positions to reflect the perspective of partnership and rights-expansion.

NGO Access to the General Assembly Various NGOs and delegations have proposed that the General Assembly grant ECOSOC-accredited NGOs formal consultative status to its plenary deliberations, its Main Committees and Special Sessions. They see this as the most urgently-needed step in an expanded partnership of NGOs with the United Nations. But progress towards this goal has been disappointing. After consultations in the fall of 1996, GA President Razali Ismail named Ambassador Ahmed Kamal of Pakistan to chair a sub-group on NGO access of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the United Nations System. But after six months of effort, the sub-group could not even agree on its mandate. Since then, in an effort to move the issue ahead, various parties have proposed draft resolutions, including the United States, Canada, the Netherlands and the World Federalist Movement. Some proposals have included reference to "Subsidiary Bodies" of the General Assembly. But so far, member states have failed to reach agreement. At a time when conference reviews take place in General Assembly Special Sessions or even in Main Committees, NGOs badly need GA accreditation, not only to move forward but also to maintain best practices. Accreditation of NGOs to the General Assembly would affirm existing practices such as the disarmament NGOs' work with the First Committee and it would re-establish the right of NGOs to attend Committee meetings that take place in the Second Floor conference rooms.

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CONGO has proposed that the General Assembly adopt NGO consultative arrangements based on ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31. Recently, on May 3, 1999, the World Federalist Movement-INTGLIM circulated a draft resolution that could be the basis for agreement. Many NGOs hope that the General Assembly will consider a similar resolution and pass it. If so, a new era of partnership and cooperation can begin.

Conferences and Review Processes Many NGOs view the world conferences as the UN's most open and democratic process. Member states should re-consider the current restrictions on global conferences and again make use of this important process, both for defining new areas of global policy and for review and elaboration of the work of previous conferences. It seems obvious that governments should hold periodic world conferences on Women, the Environment, Social Development, Population and other topics - perhaps at ten-year intervals. The new, uniform arrangements for conference accreditation, incorporated into Resolution 1996/31, provide a good basis for NGO access to future conferences. When member states undertake a periodic review of a major conference, they should do this in the most open and accessible forum. The recent results in GA Special Sessions have not been encouraging to NGOs. NGOs have faced onerous new restrictions for six reasons: (1)the insufficiency of conference facilities at UN headquarters, (2)tighter and varying accreditation rules, (3)more limited rules of NGO access to the GA, (4)more limited physical access to the meeting chamber, (5)more irregular scheduling of meetings and (6)fewer available funds for Southern NGO participation. As a result, the Rio+5 session in 1997 disappointed many environmental NGOs, who found it to be much less open than the original event. In the summer and fall of 1998, the five-year follow-up to the Vienna human rights conference proved to be a particularly negative case. Human rights NGOs prepared carefully for this review process and even organized their own preliminary conference. They were astonished that the intergovernmental review allowed for only one NGO speech and otherwise was


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completely closed to NGO consultation. A special meeting, organized at the last minute by High Commissioner Mary Robinson outside the formal review process, provided the only substantial opportunity for NGO comment. NGOs have had access problems (though less severe) in the followups to Cairo and Beijing as well Member states should adopt the spirit as well as the rules of the original conference to insure optimum NGO access. Delegates should never hold closed events such as the Vienna review and they should work to open up followups to Cairo, Copenhagen and other summits. The European Union and others, speaking on May 24, 1999 at the Copenhagen +5 Prep Comm, called for an open process and also called for the General Assembly to adopt a standard set of rules for this type of event. That statement offered a basis for action to resolve the matter, though NGOs want to especially emphasize their right to speak at followup events. NGOs see broad consultation with the GA as the best solution for ECOSOCaccredited organizations, but they want stable rules for other NGOs as well. Since UN headquarters offers such limited space for expanded delegations and NGO participants, the UN must consider using more adequate space in New York - for example the Convention Center -- or moving the event to another city. Perhaps the UN needs to build more meeting halls in the headquarters complex area. If there is no space for NGOs, there can be no meaningful NGO participation. Advocacy and Support within the Secretariat and UN Agencies NGOs have very multifaceted relations with the Secretariat. Many NGOs maintain close and cordial relations with Secretariat offices that work on their particular area of policy specialization. NGOs also occasionally relate to high UN officials, such as the Secretary General and his Executive Office - most often in the form of letters, petitions, and other communications about policy matters. And finally, NGOs relate to offices and

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programs in the Secretariat that work on NGO affairs. The specialized NGO offices can be very helpful in providing information and assistance to NGOs. These offices also work on the process of accreditation and rule-making, the area of greatest friction and conflict.

NGO Offices of the Secretariat The NGO offices of ECOSOC and the Department of Public Information (DPI) (known in UN parlance as the "NGO Sections") have important similarities but also significant differences. Though they both supervise accreditation of NGOs, one does so through an ECOSOC intergovernmental process, while the other does so entirely through the Secretariat. The two offices' service reputations have varied in the past. In spite of the importance of these offices to the overall NGO environment, the Secretariat rarely consults NGOs about the service quality. Quality might improve if the Secretariat sought NGO input into a periodic review of these offices and their staff. At present, the leadership in these offices appears to be committed to good service and the ECOSOC office now has a bigger budget, more staff and even a sorely-needed in-house fax machine. The DPI office gets good marks for timely processing of pass requests and for overall courtesy and helpfulness. But its management of documents in the NGO Resource Center tends to be chaotic. Serious problems exist in both offices. The DPI accreditation process lacks transparency and it is subject to political pressures like that in ECOSOC. Though the threshold of admittance is supposedly set lower than in the ECOSOC process, the DPI office has been known to reject respected NGOs if they face opposition from powerful member states. DPI must address and correct this problem, particularly as regards the human rights field. Many NGOs complain that some of the notoriously bureaucratic and unresponsive behavior of the ECOSOC office in the past still persists. The office employs cumbersome and


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time-consuming procedures for issuing passes, it too often it loses accreditation letters, and its staff can be discourteous. The office imposes an unacceptable three-day wait between receipt of a letter or fax and the issuance of a pass, a wait that DPI does not require. This inexcusable wait can waste precious time during the short stay of an NGO based outside of New York, sometimes ruining the opportunity for participation at critical meetings. NGOs also find the application procedures for new accreditation in both offices tend to be bureaucratic and paperbound. Staff have lost or mislaid accreditation folders and have been inflexible in applying rules for evaluation. The NGO world is changing very fast, in terms of activities and needs, and UN offices that relate to NGOs must be change-oriented and flexible. The offices should consider a streamlined, web-based application system.

Non-Governmental Liaison Service The Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS) offers support to NGOs across the entire UN system, a very broad mandate. It has the advantage of being free of accreditation and pass-issuing responsibilities. Nor does it issue or enforce rules. Instead, it has a broad role of advocacy and information for the NGO community. Run by a small but very effective staff, NGLS has established a solid record, and it has provided a buffer between NGOs and the more intractable rules and practices of the UN system. NGOs are generally very enthusiastic about NGLS, and they appreciate its several excellent publications. NGOs are surprised to learn that NGLS is minimally funded and that senior professional staff have been on short-term contracts. One very experienced and well-regarded staff person left in early 1999 from the New York office, doubtless in part because of this situation. NGLS has recently gone through a broad evaluation process that yielded a very positive report. It is time that NGLS be given the budget and staff that it needs, to solidify and expand its activities that do much to foster the NGO "partnership" across the broad UN system.

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The Assistant Secretary General's Office The Office of the Assistant Secretary General (ASG) for External Affairs, Gillian Martin Sorensen, acts as the coordinator for NGO issues within the United Nations and also chairs the Inter-Departmental Working Group on NGOs. NGOs favor a high-level focal point in the Secretariat, and they favor system-wide coordination. However, ASG Sorensen and her office have extremely broad responsibilities in other areas, since they address the whole range of contacts with the "outside world." In this setting, NGO matters apparently do not command consistent attention in the office and contact between the office and NGOs is sporadic. This problem was clearly reflected in the fact that the office produced a report on NGO access in the summer of 1998 without any NGO consultation. Many NGOs feel that, both symbolically and practically, the NGO portfolio should not be in the hands of an office charged with "external relations," since NGOs are not external but internal to the UN system. CONGO passed a resolution on February 26, 1999 that expressed strong concern about this problem. NGOs want a focal point that can be a partner, advocate and friend. But the External Relations office has not succeeded in creating such an environment. It interacts very formally and distantly with NGOs. This has heightened misunderstandings, especially because interaction has largely focused on restrictive new rules. Relations between the ASG's office and the NGO community have increasingly deteriorated, particularly in the wake of the security restrictions of the spring of 1999. In soliciting input for the second report of the Secretary General, the ASG's office missed an opportunity to hold regular meetings with NGOs, especially NGOs visiting from the South. The office devoted only a half-hour segment of a single meeting with New York-based NGOs to this topic. It inexplicably cancelled a second meeting. Relations with the NGO community have become so strained that the ASG twice declined to have lunch with the President of CONGO to discuss matters of mutual concern in the spring


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of 1999. Somewhat earlier, the ASG declined to attend (or to send a representative to) the Stanley Foundation conference on NGOs that took place at Arden House in late February. Since a number of key NGO leaders and heads of delegations were present at the conference, it would have been an ideal time to build bridges and discuss problems informally.

The Inter-Departmental Working Group on NGOs The Inter-Departmental Working Group on NGOs was established in December 1984 to coordinate policy on NGOs within the Secretariat and the UN system. It has functioned sporadically since, sometimes meeting regularly and sometimes dormant. From the first, the Working Group invited a small number of NGO representatives, usually officers of CONGO and the DPI-NGO Executive Committee, to participate in some of its meetings. The meetings offered the possibility of wider contact and consultation between the leaders of the two main NGO umbrella organizations and UN system officials. After a period of dormancy, the Working Group resumed its meetings with NGO participation in 1993, during the Boutros-Ghali period. But since early 1998, though the Working Group apparently continues to meet, it has not invited NGO representatives to attend. A useful contact is now broken.

Role of the Secretary General Secretary General Kofi Annan is very busy and has many demands on his time. Nevertheless, it seems fair to ask what role he does or should play personally with respect to NGOs, since he often says that they are such "indispensable partners" of the United Nations. The Secretary General (SG) meets often with leaders of important international NGOs like Amnesty International or Oxfam to discuss questions within their mandates such as human rights, humanitarian relief and the like. In this regard, he is accessible and supportive of UN-NGO cooperation. He meets exceedingly rarely, however, with regular NGO representatives for the purpose of discussing the role and access of NGOs within the United Nations. He has come to only one

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CONGO board meeting in his two and a half years in office, though his two immediate predecessors regularly attended. On a number of occasions, NGOs in New York have approached the Secretary General and asked for meetings on NGO access, but to no avail. When Mr. Annan first came into office in January 1997, a group of NGOs invited him to have lunch with them to discuss broad NGO issues and concerns. After four months of effort, the organizers were told that the SG was too busy and that they should meet with Ms. Sorensen instead. More recently, when CONGO asked to meet with the Secretary General in March 1999 to express concern about access problems and deteriorating relations with the office of the Assistant Secretary General, the SG did not agree to a meeting and instead passed the matter back to Ms. Sorensen. The NGO initiative on the Optical Disk System had a similar fate. After extensive NGO efforts to work with lowerlevel Secretariat officials, a group of twelve NGOs wrote a letter and memorandum to the Secretary General on April 25, 1997 asking for urgent action. The SG never replied, but instead passed the matter along to the head of the Department of Public Information, Samir Sanbar. Mr. Sanbar finally replied on June 19, promising that "a policy review is under way." In spite of additional efforts on the NGO side, the Secretariat offered no further response. The policy review, if it ever took place, disappeared without a trace. Most recently, the Secretary General's Chef de Cabinet, Mr. Iqbal Riza, reportedly took a very strong position in favor of reduced NGO access and tighter security regulations for NGOs. This touched the core of NGO interests and has aroused great NGO concern. NGOs wonder: does this represent the position of the Secretary General himself, or is the SG unaware of the matter? Even though the issue is of enormous importance to NGOs, they are unable to discover the answer, since the SG has placed himself beyond the reach of NGO representatives who work day-in-day-out at the United Nations. NGOs expect the Secretary General to intervene occasionally on their behalf, to help decide matters that are of special


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importance and urgency to the NGO community. The Secretary General could surely find time once or twice a year to have an extensive chat with NGO representatives, to find out how the organization he heads could really, in practice, develop a partnership with them. Consultation in Administrative Decision-Making Because the UN system hinges on mandates and pressures from member states, the Secretariat understandably does not give high priority to the views of NGOs. But if NGOs are the UN's partners, some decisions must take NGO views into account. There must be regular consultation with NGOs, especially on administrative decisions that directly affect the general interests of NGOs, or the interests of an NGO subgroup. Means exists for consultation. The DPI-NGO Executive Committee and CONGO are two NGO umbrella organizations that offer points of interchange between the Secretariat and the NGO community. These are elected bodies and are broadly representative of NGO opinion. The DPI-NGO Executive Committee operates at a disadvantage, since it lacks an office or staff. Its volunteer capacities are severely stretched. Further, the Department of Public Information often acts in a controlling way over jointlysponsored activities and events. Though the Committee is not particularly active on access issues, it works in many ways to express the concerns of DPI-accredited NGOs. CONGO has a substantial budget, as well as an office and staff. In the past, many NGOs viewed it as a conservative body that was exclusively interested in the privileges of ECOSOC NGOs. But CONGO has now changed its name and taken steps to incorporate and represent all NGOs. CONGO has recently developed a useful electronic mailing list to inform the UN community about NGO access. It has organized a number of meetings on NGO access questions and has developed a statement on this question. The Secretariat has regularly consulted with the leaders of these two umbrella groups, who

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until recently participated in meetings of the Inter-Departmental Working Group on NGOs. The Secretariat also occasionally consults beyond CONGO and the Executive Committee, inviting other NGOs with expertise, special knowledge, or additional perspectives to participate in consultation sessions, as was the case with three meetings convened by ASG Sorensen in December 1998 and March 1999. In recent years, some NGOs have urged the Secretariat to develop policy-consultation groups, which could provide valuable NGO input in policy areas, like the web site and information services. Secretariat staff generally reacted negatively to this idea. In doing so, they have usually expressed two views. First, they have raised problems of representation: who would decide, and on what basis, whom they should consult? This is a valid concern, but it is one that can be solved practically if there is a will and an interest in solving it. Another Secretariat reaction is that NGO views are not relevant and do not have to be considered when policies are decided. A number of high-ranking staff expressed this view during the Optical Disk System controversy in late 1996 and early 1997. NGOs responded that they should be consulted as stakeholders . . . or at worst they should be consulted as customers. NGOs asked the estimated cost of the proposed system improvements. They asked for discussions to explore alternative pricing systems. The Secretariat refused. Sometimes, offices in the Secretariat chose to consult by means of questionnaires or by inviting written input. This sidesteps the problem of representation. Though it appears to be more open to input from NGOs based outside New York and Geneva, in practice it often yields unsatisfactory results. Secretariat offices can select the input they prefer and ignore the rest, and there is no creative interaction between NGOs and Secretariat policy makers. While "input" of various types can be valuable from time to time, it does not substitute for direct face-to-face consultation. Substantial direct discussions would have improved the current consultations on access and on web site improvements.


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The problem of consultation is most acute in the areas of access rules and security policy. In recent months, as the Secretariat has developed new rules in this area, the process of consultation with NGOs has been very unsatisfactory. NGOs were astonished that the Secretariat developed important new policies in the absence of NGOs. Then, the Secretariat issued these policies without any serious effort to present justifications. Ideally, Secretariat officials would work with NGOs to clarify problems and jointly work on how to solve them. The Secretariat additionally has a tendency to announce new rules immediately before their implementation or even after implementation has already started. The memorandum of Mr. Riza, dated April 19 and implemented about the same time, reached NGOs in the post only in late May. NGOs would appreciate timely notification, when important new rules affecting them are introduced. The Secretariat could set up a special list-serv for this purpose and it could use the UN Information Centers to relay information more quickly at the national level. The UN might save a great deal in postage costs and reach NGOs world wide far sooner. The Secretariat also might make use of the UN web site to post more information on NGO issues, including existing rules and regulations, access rights, examples of best practices and so forth. This would be a gesture in support of NGO access and an important move to increase the transparency of NGO rules. There is no magic formula for how policy consultation should work, how much of it there should be and how much NGO voices should count. Obviously, there are many pressures on the Secretariat and Secretariat officials must make complex political calculations involving the views of member states. Also there are the perceived interests of the Secretariat itself, and its officials' wish to be free from outside interference. Furthermore, consultation is time-consuming (for all parties). This must be especially burdensome in a downsized, underfunded and somewhat demoralized Secretariat, where staff are overworked and under-resourced. But in the end, better

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consultation will work better. It will strengthen relationships and produce better policy. And it certainly is an essential ingredient in partnership. Relations with Delegations NGOs' relations with the United Nations depends a great deal on their relations with the diplomatic missions of member states. Many delegations offer vital support to NGOs' quest for access to particular UN forums. Delegations provide background information and private reports on the progress of negotiations. They intervene with the Secretariat on NGOs' behalf. They promote informal access to meetings and new formal rights. And they help NGOs to meet and work with other delegations. Without such support, NGOs could not function effectively in the UN system. Cordial relations with delegations does not come to NGOs as a matter of right, but rather they result from a mixture of NGOs' diplomatic efforts, mutual NGO-delegation interest, and a sense among delegations that NGOs are indispensable partners and useful sources of information. A considerable number of delegations have recently offered more briefings, receptions and other meetings with NGOs. They actively brief NGOs on their major policy work and they seek input from selected NGOs in specialized areas of their work. The US and UK delegations, among others, have developed active and effective outreach programs of this kind. Many delegations have also established web sites, some of which are especially valuable. These make more information available to NGOs and the public than ever before. Delegations are selective in their relations with NGOs. They make strategic choices about their NGO contacts and allies. Delegations inevitably chose NGO partners whose goals coincide with their own national policies and agendas. But many delegations interact broadly with the NGO community. Sometimes, the personal commitments of individual delegates, including Permanent Representatives (PRs), have made an especially important contribution to progress in the


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work of NGOs. For the recent past, a few outstanding examples are Ambassadors Juan Somavia of Chile, Antonio Monteiro of Portugal, Razali Ismail of Malaysia, Richard Butler of Australia, Ahmed Kamal of Pakistan, Hans Dahlgren of Sweden, Paolo Fulci of Italy and Samuel Insanally of Guyana. Below the level of PR, there are very many persons who have given NGOs tremendous help, and who interact intensively with NGO representatives. The Canadian and Dutch delegations, among others, have a reputation for outstanding support for NGOs. The strong and growing network of relations between delegations and NGOs promises to solidify NGO relations with the United Nations and move it forward in the years ahead. It will continue to be the keystone of NGO action. The ECOSOC Committee on NGOs The Committee on NGOs of ECOSOC consists of 19 members, with new elections every four years. The Committee reviews applications for accreditation, conducts a quadrennial review of those NGOs already granted accreditation, and considers general policy matters and rules governing NGO access and activities. It has an extremely heavy volume of work. The Committee has held consultation meetings with NGOs from time to time in the past and it has held such meetings in December, 1998, and June, 1999. There appears to be better dialogue with NGOs than in the recent past, but Committee members usually have heavy responsibilities for other committee work and time pressure limits their capacity for lengthy interaction. NGOs are very concerned about several dimensions of the Committee's work.

Accreditation Process NGOs are concerned that the process of granting accreditation is politicized. Qualified NGO applicants can be denied accreditation if they face the concerted efforts of one or more powerful member states, or a bloc of states. Similarly, NGOs that do not adequately fill the qualifications may be accepted if they have powerful member states or blocs as sponsors. Too often, government-sponsored NGOs ("GONGOS"

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in UN parlance) achieve accreditation. The most politicized area of the Committee's work concerns NGOs in the human rights field. In early June of 1999, the Committee denied accreditation to Human Rights in China, a respected and wellestablished group. Such decisions weaken the credibility of the accreditation process in the eye of NGOs and they weaken UNNGO relations. NGOs wonder whether new means can be found to reduce the politicization of the accreditation process. For example, the Committee could invite a panel of experts to make recommendations, or the Committee could establish clearer rules that would be applied in a more even-handed manner. The Committee should act to ensure the fairest possible process for all applicants, especially those in the human rights field.

Proposals for Restricting NGO Access The Committee has recently considered proposals that would restrict the number of NGO representatives accredited to particular meetings, impose requirements that NGOs submit membership lists, place punitive regulations on the quadrennial review, and impose a new "code of conduct." NGOs have spoken on the shortcomings of these proposals to the Committee in December 1998, but a few comments are in order here. Firstly, NGOs are aware that a few cases of misconduct have occurred and that NGO consultations are not always as fruitful as they could be. Discussions between the Committee and NGOs can address these problems and seek to resolve them. But general rules of the kind that Committee members propose would seriously set back relations with NGOs and weaken the United Nations. If delegations restrict the numbers of NGO representatives at any one meeting, they would hamper the work of major international NGOs that bring many representatives from their national sections to important forums. Human rights NGOs accredit many persons, since they need a diversity of voices and expertise to address world wide conditions at the Human Rights Commission. Similarly, during the Prep Comms of the


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International Criminal Court process, some NGOs accredited many representatives, helping to provide legal expertise and diverse international views. There are many other cases of legitimate use of significant numbers of passes by single NGOs. If delegations demand membership lists as a condition of accreditation or as part of regular review, they would create impossible problems for NGOs. Large international NGOs may have millions of members in hundreds of chapters world wide. Most do not maintain centralized lists and in any case they would want to protect their members' privacy. If delegations withdraw accreditation of NGOs who are just slightly late in submitting their quadrennial review documents, they may punish those who have fallen prey to problems of postal service, unstable political conditions, or similar reasons beyond NGO control. This would obviously be unfair. Finally, if delegations impose a general code of conduct on NGOs, they will be interfering unduly in the free operation of these organizations. NGOs should consider the need for such a code among themselves, but they certainly should not be subjected to a code that is invented in an intergovernmental process. The Committee, wisely, has not passed any such resolutions. But proposals remain under active consideration. NGOs are very concerned but they are encouraged that the Committee, in its June 1999 session has decided to widen its problemsolving dialogue with NGOs. NGOs hope that after further consultation, delegates will decide to set these proposals aside and that it will turn to more positive solutions.

Other Issues Looking ahead, NGOs would like strengthen dialogue with the Committee. They would like the Committee to regularize its NGO consultation process (perhaps making it a feature of every bi-annual meeting) and to include NGOs in the agendasetting for such consultations. NGOs also urge the committee to operate more transparently and to share information on problems that it

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perceives, including details of cases of unacceptable conduct by NGO representatives. NGOs think the Committee would do well to make more use of the disciplinary process that is mandated in Resolution 1996/31, rather than considering broad new rules that negatively affect all NGOs. The Committee should develop a grievance or disciplinary procedure that affirms NGO rights and conforms rigorously to due process The Problematic of "Civil Society" We will not comment at length on the question of the developing relationship between the United Nations system and "civil society" including business corporations, a question that has far-reaching practical, ethical and political ramifications. It is worth noting, however, that NGOs are worried about the long-term implications of this new policy direction and concerned that it may hamper UN-NGO relationship. When the Secretariat increasingly uses of the term "civil society" in UN reports, interchangeably with the term "NGOs," it blurs an important distinction that is made in the UN Charter. At the very least, there should be a thorough and meaningful consultation between the Secretariat, delegations and NGOs about this issue. Office and Meeting Space As we have already noted, NGOs suffer from a serious shortage of office and meeting space. This shortage is growing more acute, as more NGOs seek access to the UN, missions expand, intergovernmental meetings increase in number, more conferences and followups take place in New York, and the local real estate market tightens. NGOs need space to carry out their work. They need reasonably priced office space and they need free or very-lowpriced meeting space. The trends suggest that this problem could get much worse in the future. It particularly affects Southern NGOs and NGOs who come to New York on a shortterm basis. The UN has made no provision for solving this problem, though its arrangements for correspondents might


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serve as a precedent and a model. Another useful precedent is the NGO office space now being developed by the canton and municipality of Geneva. It is time for urgent action in New York, before developers seize all the real estate possibilities in the neighborhood. The UN could develop a site (or part of a mixed-use site) that would be used for NGO offices and meeting areas (perhaps some provision could be made for low-budget missions as well). Such a site would ideally be contiguous with the site at headquarters - such as the "Boys' Club" site to the West or the "Con Ed" site to the South. The UN could perhaps obtain lowcost financing through the City of New York, as was done for construction of other UN buildings like UNICEF. Possibly, private foundations, individuals or governments could be interested in supporting the project. Or the space could be included in a development as a public amenity mandated by the City Planning Commission. Resulting office space could be rented to NGOs at a rate that would cover the carrying costs, a rate that would be considerably below the market level. Meeting space might also be provided at low or no cost to NGOs in the same development. The "Con Ed" site in particular lends itself to development on a multi-use basis by a private developer, with concessional space included under a plan prepared by the Planning Commission. This might burden the UN with only minimal cost and very little development planning effort. The UN must move quickly, though, since developers and city planners are already getting submissions ready for the new use of this enormous site. The Challenge of Southern Participation NGOs from the Global South have a relatively weak presence at the UN. They are represented through international NGOs, of course, but with rare exceptions "national" (single-country) NGOs are present only sporadically, at the time of major conference Prep Comms or followups. This feeds criticisms that NGOs are not adequately representative of the world's

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population and it weakens the NGO movement. NGO leaders are concerned about this problem, and in recent years they have taken steps to find solutions. Some international NGOs bring representatives of Southern affiliates regularly to New York and Geneva to important meetings. The World Council of Churches, the International Federation of Human Rights and the Coalition for an International Criminal Court are among many NGOs that actively bring affiliates to UN meetings. In any single year, NGOs spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on this effort, with grants from foundations, governments and individual donors. NGLS and other UN offices, including the secretariats of world conferences, have also used funds provided by governments to bring NGOs to UN events. All efforts of this kind pose difficult problems of selection criteria - how to get the fairest representation, the best input, the greatest diversity, geographical and gender balance and all with utmost transparency of selection. Clearly existing results do not suffice. Much more needs to be done. Visiting NGOs need help in understanding the UN system and getting quick orientation, assistance with accreditation and the like. NGLS and the Church Center for the UN have traditionally assisted visitors in such ways. But if Southern NGOs come in larger numbers, the UN will have to organize more programs of this kind. As we have pointed out earlier, there also must be space for visiting NGOs to have temporary offices and to hold caucuses and meetings. The Church Center for the UN has done outstanding work over the years in providing space for NGO secretariats and caucus meetings, but there is a great and growing space shortage. The UN must act to help resolve it. The UN and NGOs should also organize more events on a regional basis. CONGO is organizing a series of conferences in Asia, Latin America, the Arab World, Africa and Eastern Europe to promote discussion of implementation of the UN world conferences, to strengthen dialogue between regional NGOs and to improve relations with the UN system. The Secretariat


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is organizing regional hearings to solicit input into the Millennium Forum. The UN and the NGO community can do more in this area, to bring the UN out to the regions. UN bodies could have regular meetings and hearings in regions, incorporating NGO consultation. A revived ECOSOC might consider moving in this direction. Even Security Council initiatives, such as efforts to make sanctions more effective, could profitably incorporate regional NGOs into monitoring processes. The possibilities are endless. The UN could take a number of other steps, too, that could address the problem. Free access to the Optical Disk System (or the equivalent) would help. A much larger trust fund to bring NGOs to UN sessions would help. More use of video conference facilities (especially as communication costs drop) would help. So would wider UN use of list-servs and other modern communication methods. Delegations and the NGOs must stop ritual complaints about this problem and start finding solutions. The Secretary General might produce a report on the topic. NGOs and delegates might convene a special joint working group to consider options. All concerned must engage in serious and broad-based planning, followed by action. CONCLUSION

NGOs are at a critical point in their relationship with the United Nations. They can make substantial further progress or they can suffer serious setbacks. The future is open and NGOs must seize it. They must make their case to governments around the world. And they must come together for stronger, more effective, and more united action at the UN. This will require a new level of focus and organization, a much more efficient lobbying process, and a well-articulated long-term strategy. They must engage in constructive self-examination, remedial action and improved quality of NGO coordination and input into UN forums. NGOs have a great deal to contribute to the United Nations and they have made substantial strides forward in their access


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to the UN's decision-making process. Key questions are now on the table, which will have to be answered by delegations, the Secretariat and the NGO movement. Each party will bear part of the responsibility for the final outcome. With good fortune and hard work, NGOs can assume new levels of involvement with the UN system and can contribute to a strengthened UN that is needed for the new millennium. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Access to Information • Secretariat should increase the proportion of UN documents posted to the UN web site and especially the non-English document postings. It should continue with the development of this very useful information tool. • Secretariat should provide free access to the Optical Disk System in the short term to all accredited NGOs and should explore the options of a more effective document database system for the future. • Secretariat should continue to provide free access to the Treaty Database. • Delegations should agree to the posting of draft texts, non-papers and other non-public documents on a selective basis, to strengthen the consultation process, especially for NGOs not based in New York and Geneva. • Delegations should continue to develop their own web sites and to post their press releases and major documents on these sites. Access to Premises • Security department should eliminate the special screening of NGO representatives at perimeter entrance points or develop a security screening system that treats NGOs the same as delegates, press and UN staff. • Security department should set metal detectors (if they are to be used) at sensitivity levels consistent with standard airport security, not at ultra-high levels.


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• Secretariat should clearly explain the need for security arrangements and should announce new rules reasonably in advance, after full consultation. • Security department should not search NGOs for documents, read NGO documents or confiscate NGO documents. • Security department should very carefully define all rules relating to searches of NGOs beyond the perimeter security zone, after full consultation, and should publishe these rules so that they are clear to all. • Secretariat should give NGOs full access to the Second Floor, including the main floor perimeter of the General Assembly Hall, the Delegates Lounge and the corridors and meeting rooms in the Conference Building. • Secretariat should allow NGOs to circulate freely in other areas of headquarters recently closed off. • To the extent that the Secretariat determines that special NGO security issues exist, it should establish a special committee of NGO representatives to engage in regular consultation with the security department so as to consider these issues and find solutions with minimum impact on NGO access. • Secretariat and NGOs should consult together to create clearer rules and regulations ensuring NGO rights and responsibilities in the UN buildings. Publication of security department instructions to its own staff on some of these issues would help promote transparency and clarify expectations on NGO conduct. • NGOs should not have to pay for access to the UN and use of UN services now provided for free, such as use of conference rooms. • Secretariat and member states should develop future budgets with considerations of expanded NGO access needs in mind. • Secretariat should look into the broad issue of NGOrelated physical facilities at the UN, including conference


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space. Earpieces should be promptly restored to working order. The Right to Participate • Secretariat, delegations and NGOs should work together to consolidate the new arrangements for NGO consultation contained in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31. • Secretariat, delegations and NGOs should work together to define "existing practices" in various UN forums and to extend "best practices," including practices of NGO consultation with the General Assembly, its Main Committees and Subsidiary Bodies. • The Office of the Legal Counsel should affirm its commitment to an expansionist view of NGO rights that takes into account not only formal rules but also wellestablished practices. • The General Assembly should pass a resolution giving GA consultative rights to NGOs already in consultation with ECOSOC. Such rights should apply at least to the General Assembly, its Main Committees and Special Sessions. Rights to Subsidiary Bodies should also be considered. • Even in the absence of new NGO consultative rights with the General Assembly, the GA should pass a resolution establishing strong and uniform rights of access to Special Sessions, especially those that undertake reviews of major conferences. All NGOs accredited to the conference should be accredited to the Special Session. • Plans for Special Sessions and other major conferences should take into account the problem of space at headquarters and should consider alternative venues, in New York City or elsewhere. Advocacy and Support within the Secretariat and UN Agencies • Secretary General should clarify his position on the matter of NGO access and security regulations and


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should elaborate the meaning of NGO partnership in this context. • Secretariat should invite NGOs to provide regular evaluations on the services provided by the DPI and ECOSOC Offices. • Secretariat must take steps to shield the DPI accreditation process from political influences, particularly in the case of applications from NGOs in the human rights field. • Secretariat should take steps to improve the service provided in the ECOSOC office, particularly the issuing of passes in a timely manner. The three-day wait for passes must be eliminated and paperwork must be better and more reliably organized. • Secretariat should improve both offices' handling of accreditation applications and consider flexible rules for evaluation of NGO work. Forms should be regularly updated and made available electronically, possibly in a web-based format. • UN and UN system agencies should substantially increase the budget of NGLS to consolidate its present work and to support an increase in its work program, including building of a web site. • Secretary General should create a new focal point office exclusively for NGOs in the Secretariat, perhaps in his Executive Office. • Inter-Departmental Working Group on NGOs should again include NGO representatives, on a regular basis in its sessions. • Secretary General should meet from time to time with working NGO representatives to consider how a partnership can best be built and how the UN can best work with NGOs, especially in its deliberative and administrative operations.


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Consultation in Administrative Decision-Making • Secretariat should increase its consultation with NGO representatives, including the use of policy-consultation groups in such areas as the web site, information services, NGO support services and physical facilities. • Secretariat should use face-to-face consultation process, as well as questionnaires and invitations for written "input." Face-to-face consultation can be organized during commissions, conference followups and other such periods, to maximize the participation of NGOs based outside New York, especially Southern NGOs.


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• Committee should take steps to de-politicize its work on accreditation, including possibly using the recommendation of an expert body. Sharper definition of accreditation criteria would also help. • Committee should drop consideration of new rules restricting NGO access, while at the same time consulting with NGOs to rectify problems of conduct or promoting more effective interaction at intergovernmental meetings. The Problematic of "Civil Society"

• Secretariat should especially consult NGOs on access and security rules that affect NGOs.

• UN should cease to use the term "civil society" interchangeably with "non-governmental organizations."

• Secretariat should announce new rules well in advance of their implementation. Last-minute announcements, or announcements after the fact are not acceptable.

• Secretariat or UN agency proposals to increase UN interaction with private business or other non-state actors should be fully and openly discussed, with an eye to its future impact on relations with NGOs.

• Secretariat should make use of list-servs and the UN web site for timely communication of information to NGOs. There remains far too much reliance on postal notices, which are both slow and expensive. • Secretariat should use the UN web site to post information about NGO access, including regulations, rights, best practices and so on. • Secretary General should consider Secretariat-wide initiatives to define and strengthen the culture of openness, accessibility and partnership with NGOs. Relations with Delegations • Delegations and NGOs should continue to build closer relations, as a key element in strengthening NGO work at the United Nations. The ECOSOC Committee on NGOs • Committee should hold a consultation meeting with NGOs during each of its bi-annual sessions and it should consider other means to increase dialogue with NGOs.

Office and Meeting Space • Secretariat should broadly consider the space needs of NGOs, both for meetings and for offices. • Secretariat should consider a site development in the area of headquarters that would serve urgent NGO space needs. The Challenge of Southern Presence • Secretariat should meet office and meeting space needs of visiting Southern NGOs • Secretariat should broaden programs for orientation and assistance to visiting Southern NGOs. • UN should organize more events in Southern venues, including regional events, special regional hearings and the like. • UN should develop a substantial trust fund to bring Southern NGOs to major meetings and conferences.


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NGOs in a Global Future

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• Secretariat should make more use of video conferences and other modern electronic technology to promote consultation with Southern NGOs. • Secretariat, delegates and NGOs should convene a working group to explore ideas and means to increase Southern NGO participation.

Conclusion • NGOs should work harder to promote their cause and at the same time they should consider means to improve the quality of their consultation with UN forums. • UN, governments and NGOs should work together more vigorously to overcome obstacles, increase opportunities for consultation, and build a strong NGO-UN partnership.

4 NGOS

IN A

GLOBAL FUTURE

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the unprecedented opportunities for civic action that global trends are creating at the dawn of a new millennium. This context is summarised in a background paper which outlines the main economic, social and political trends affecting the NGO world, and traces their implications for policy and practice. Three inter-connected themes are explored: globalisation, inequality and insecurity; the reform of international co-operation as foreign aid declines; and the dilemmas of humanitarian action in complex political emergencies. The paper argues that these trends call for major changes in NGO roles, relationships, capacities and accountabilities. Those that do not make these changes will eventually go to the wall. Globalisation generates shifting patterns of poverty and insecurity both within and between countries that call for new and international responses. As actors in an emerging global civil society, NGOs can help to create a countervailing force to the processes that exploit and exclude people by re-distributing assets and opportunities, injecting social values into market processes, and holding economic institutions to account for their actions. This represents the cutting edge of much NGO work today, and the conference provides an opportunity to reevaluate what is happening in this crucial area and chart some new directions for the future. As foreign aid declines, new forms of international cooperation are emerging to meet the realities of this changing world, with a focus on rules and standards rather than subsidised

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resource transfers. In this context, the key question is whether the regimes of the future will benefit poor people and poor countries. NGOs have an important role to play in ensuring that this happens - by building strong domestic constituencies for international co-operation, forging transnational alliances that represent poor peoples' interests in more pluralistic structures of governance, and enhancing the capacity of civic groups to participate at every level. This work is still in its infancy, but enough is happening to take stock of experience and identify the common lessons. Intra-state conflict is characteristic of the post-Cold War disorder and the insecurity that global inequalities breed. Caught between the scale of human suffering and the international community's unwillingness to tackle the politics of humanitarian intervention, NGOs have been drawn more deeply into a tangled web of tensions and dilemmas. This has led to an unprecedented period of self-examination, and a radical re-assessment of NGO roles in the humanitarian arena. A traditional relief focus has given way to a range of interconnected peace-building, conflict-resolution, advocacy and humanitarian assistance strategies that try to lever macrolevel changes as well as positive results on the ground. The conference will explore these dilemmas in detail. Underlying these three trends is the need for new forms of solidarity - or new "social contracts" - between citizens and authorities at different levels of the world system. It is these new relationships - expressed through partnerships, alliances and other forms of co-operation - that provide the framework for NGO innovations, but they also require major changes in NGOs as organisations: a move from "development-as-delivery" to "development-as-leverage"; new relationships with corporations, elements of states, the military, international institutions and other groups in civil society; and different capacities to mediate these links. When relationships and interests become more complex and diffuse, clear accountability procedures are paramount. If they are not to be marginalised as components of a global welfare state, NGOs must demonstrate that they have the right to be treated as major actors in emerging


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international civil society. In a global future, NGOs have the world at their feet. We must seize our chance. INTRODUCTION

At the threshold of a new millennium, NGOs share in the same mixture of feelings that permeates the wider field of politics, ideas and social activism. There is plenty of excitement about new possibilities, tempered by widespread anxiety about the future. In the NGO world, this feeling of excitement stems from the opportunities for civic action that global trends are creating, on a scale never witnessed before; the anxiety arises because more critical questions are being asked about the role development NGOs will play in occupying these spaces, especially aid-dependent intermediaries that lack any democratic means of governance and accountability. It is this historic confluence of possibility with challenge that our conference will explore, against the background of mounting interest in the potential of international co-operation to address the costs of a global "casino economy." The purpose of this background paper is not to provide a comprehensive review of the literature or of experience, but to suggest a framework to help participants think the issues through and make connections between their own contributions, and the wider picture. The first part of the paper looks at the changing context for NGOs in international development, and identifies some of the challenges this context throws up. Three key trends are explored, corresponding to the themes that will run throughout the conference proceedings: • globalisation, which re-shapes patterns of global poverty, accentuates inequalities, and promotes new levels of insecurity in the world. • the reform of international co-operation to deal with these developments, moving away from foreign aid to embrace a broader focus on rules, standards and interventions to protect the most vulnerable. • "complex political emergencies", which are characteristic of the post-Cold War disorder as state authority erodes and people take refuge in ethnicity and religion.

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Underlying these three, inter-related trends is the need for new forms of solidarity - or new "social contracts" - between citizens of different polities and new structures of authority at different levels of the world system. It is these new relationships - expressed through partnerships, alliances and other forms of collaboration - that provide the framework for NGO innovations in economics, politics and social policy. However, responding effectively to these challenges requires NGOs to develop different roles, relationships and capacities, and these organisational implications are explored in the second part of the paper.

uniform horizon of production possibilities across national borders, integrating markets around the world and internationalising decisions about jobs and investment. The consequences of this process in a world of unequal producers and consumers are well-known - spectacular rewards for those well-endowed with the conditions required to take advantage of these opportunities; increasing pressures on those less wellendowed to sell their labour, family life or environment cheaply in order to make a living; and rising inequality between these two groups, both within and between countries.

One might question the wisdom of launching such a wideranging, futuristic discussion at a time when so much remains outstanding from the agenda of the first two Manchester Conferences - how to achieve and measure impact, work with donors and governments without co-optation, and remain accountable to different constituencies - yet progress on these issues is taking place, albeit in piecemeal fashion. What is lacking is a broader framework that relates changes inside the NGO community to the great economic and political questions of our times. Our hope is that the conference papers and debates will generate more of this framework than we currently have, so helping us to respond more effectively to global trends to the benefit of those we seek to serve. Ultimately, it is these broader questions that will determine whether development NGOs are major players on the world stage in the 21st Century, for if they are not part of a truly "global future", then the future of NGOs - at least in their present disguise - may be bleak.

In 1998, the combined income of three billion people in the Third World was less than the collective assets of 358 multibillionaires; Bill Gates' fortune (prior to the late-summer stockmarket crash) was worth more than that of the poorest 40 per cent of the US population put together. (UNDP 1998). Rather than solid and stable blocs of 'North and South', NGOs in the 21st Century will confront a rapidly changing patchwork quilt of poverty and exclusion that requires new and genuinelyinternational responses - notwithstanding the continued presence of a hard core of absolutely-poor people in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. As recent events have demonstrated, the "new rich" (like those in East and Southeast Asia), and those previously well-provided for in social protection (like the former-Soviet Union) can become the "new poor" on an epic scale within a matter of a year. Inequality, exclusion and the insecurity they breed look set to drive global politics for the next generation and beyond.

THE CHANGING GLOBAL CONTEXT

What is Globalisation? Technology and Culture In the late-1990s, no conference is complete without a panel on globalisation. There is much disagreement on the meaning and extent of this phenomenon, but there is surely a basic reality at work which cannot be ignored. This reality is globalisation as technology-driven fact: electronic communication, declining transport costs, more flexible forms of economic organisation, and the growing importance of mobile assets (like finance and knowledge) establish an increasingly

Underlying these trends is a more controversial process of "globalisation as culture": the homogenising of values and aspirations to Western norms of individualism and consumerism - what Hobsbawm (1994) sees as the real "cultural revolution" of our century. The media - recently transformed into a truly global institution controlled by a small number of multinational corporations - now plays a key role in these cultural processes. Some commentators dismiss such conclusions as superficial capitalism has always adapted to the local context; others see culture as pivotal in the coming "clash of civilisations" as those who see themselves threatened or disempowered by cultural

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re-colonisation take refuge in ethnic or religious identity, often violently expressed. The conflicts that this process generates are considered in Section 3. Despite these divergent interpretations, all agree that there is considerable room for manoeuvre in retaining the potential benefits of globalisationas-fact, while addressing the potential costs of globalisation-asculture. The real debate is not whether globalisation exists and will continue (it does and it will), but about how its costs and benefits are distributed, and on that question there is little that is pre-ordained by technology or impervious to politics. The issue for our conference is clear: what role do NGOs have in re-shaping the processes of an evolving global capitalism so that all can enjoy the fruits of economic progress without losing what gives equal meaning to their lives? On this issue there is no consensus. Some NGOs advocate de-linking from the world economy in order to promote selfreliance and protect local cultures; others think this unrealistic and opt for various forms of constructive engagement; while the most optimistic embrace globalisation as a progressive social revolution in the making. We hope the conference will explore these positions and look at what NGOs are doing to advance each of them in practice. There are unlikely to be any universal answers here, especially since so much received wisdom has been abandoned in the post Cold-War retreat from grand theory and simplistic 'either/or' strategic choices. We are all experimenting, and learning as we go. This has important implications for the future of NGO advocacy which are taken up in Section Three. Responses to Globalisation: the Role of Civil Society Despite the diversity that characterises these debates, there remains a common thread that runs through all NGO positions: civil society can act as a countervailing force to the expanding influence of markets and the declining authority of states. Although workers have less power in integrated markets, consumers have more; and while the erosion of national sovereignty does leave some groups more vulnerable to the abuse of unaccountable power, it also opens up more possibilities


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for civic organisations to link with each-other across national boundaries in new structures of governance, especially as information technology makes it easier to move from traditional hierarchies to more flexible networks and alliances. The potential globalisation of governance and decision-making is explored in Section 2, though it is worth remembering that access to IT is also skewed toward those with more power and resources. The true extent and potential of civil society is a controversial subject, especially at the global level. Some perceive a fundamental "power shift" as state-based authority recedes, while others question the ability of non-state groups to fill the resulting political vacuum. These doubts apply especially to development NGOs because of their dependence on foreign aid and their non-representative character. Nevertheless, an increasing number of NGOs are diversifying their funding sources and generating high levels of their own income from a mixture of commercial ventures, cost-recovery and local fundraising, especially in South Asia and Latin America. In the process, they are sinking roots into their own societies and assuming more of the characteristics of a genuine civic actor, rather than a service delivery contractor. The rise of civil society in the South is uneven and in many areas slow, but it is happening, and this obviously has important implications for NGOs in the North and for the broader global civic alliances that are taking shape around the world. The Johns Hopkins Comparative Study of the "Third-Sector" found more than one million such organisations in India and 210,000 in Brazil (Salamon and Anheier 1997). These are exceptional cases, but even where the number and range of civil society organisations is smaller, individual agencies are developing a research and policy-lobbying capacity to rival those in the North, alongside their activities in service-delivery. Whatever else globalisation may be doing, it has not changed the fundamental reality of poverty of assets - the maldistribution of productive resources, skills and capacities that lies at the root of the problem. Integrated markets increase the importance of some of these assets (like knowledge and organisational

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strength), and decrease the significance of others (the fixed factors of production), but the imperative of re-distribution remains. NGOs have a vital role in advocating for it, especially where fuzzy-minded "Third-Way" thinking makes all talk of redistribution unpopular. Underlying these inequalities are the power structures that discriminate against certain groups of people. There is a danger that civil society will be seen as a new "magic bullet", now that politicians are disenchanted with both state planning and "free" markets, ignoring the fact that exclusion results from the interlocking structures of social, economic and political power in which civic associations are also implicated. Most NGOs believe that human rights standards and other social values can be mainstreamed through these power structures in order to spread their benefits and reduce their costs - whether in markets, politics or social discrimination. In that sense, the over-arching role of NGOs is to "help revision the world as an ever-growing web of non-exploitative relationships" (Fowler 1997). Translating these principles into practice at different levels of the world economy is difficult and complex, but the case for doing so is clear. Despite the disagreements and probable future fragmentation of NGOs in both North and South, all agree that there are increasing opportunities to work together across institutional boundaries in order to influence the forces that underpin poverty and discrimination, finding partnerships and synergies where few existed before, and moulding not just a strong civil society but a society that is just and civil in all that it does. Civil Society Responses at the Local Level Confronting globalisation begins and ends at the grassroots level, where NGOs are already developing a number of strategies to help poor people address the realities of their position in global markets and play a creative role in re-shaping economic forces. First, by improving the endowments of the poor so that they can compete more effectively and achieve a basic level of security, voice and equality of rights, without which economic "alternatives" are impossible. This continues the traditional


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NGO role of developing skills, confidence, capacities and forms of association, and improving access to credit, services and economic opportunities - but underpinned by a more systematic attempt to link different levels and sectors of the economy. Second, NGOs can turn market forces to the advantage of poorer groups by reducing the benefits normally siphoned off by intermediaries - using, for example, joint marketing associations like those supported by NGOs in Latin America (Bebbington 1996) or attempts by NGOs in South Africa to work with community associations to help them negotiate better contracts with commercial hunting and tourism concerns. Third, civic groups are exploring alternative modes of production and exchange which are less costly in social and environmental terms, build more "social capital" for use in market settings (qualities such as trust, co-operation, and honesty), support men and women to combine their market and non-market roles to better effect, and distribute profits with a social purpose. These deeper changes are crucial in addressing the Achilles heel of most empowerment strategies: a failure to think through what happens when people with less power obtain more of it - a fairer society in which people distribute the costs and benefits of social and economic change more equitably, or more competition against the background of existing gender and other inequalities? This challenge - the regulation of all exclusionary systems of power - is one that most NGOs have tended to ignore, but it is the key to an agenda for transforming capitalism rather than "humanising" it. Small-scale innovations may be viable at a larger scale if they can be shown to generate material advances sufficient to eradicate absolute poverty, thus building the long-term public and political support that more radical alternatives currently lack. We hope that the conference will explore this issue in detail. At the opposite extreme, NGOs continue their role as carers of last resort, operating safety-nets, and providing welfare to the casualties of globalisation, especially in countries where the transition from protected markets has been far too rapid (as in the Former Soviet Union).

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From the Local to the Global At the national level, grassroots innovations need support from pro-poor macro-economic and social policies. Although globalisation does erode state authority, the re-distributive and protective functions of states remain paramount. There is a tendency among some NGOs to focus on global advocacy to the exclusion of the national-level processes of state-society relations that underpin the ability of any country to pursue progressive goals in an integrated economy - the task of rebuilding government capacity to negotiate, monitor and regulate global regimes; the importance of pro-poor alignments in civil society and between civil society, business and government; and the role of domestic civic groups in combating corruption, pressing for institutional accountability, and preserving a social consensus in favour of economic reform. Few NGOs have given enough thought to their roles in these areas, partly because of a lingering suspicion of states in any form, and partly because of the temptation to "leap-frog" the national arena and go direct to Washington or Brussels. In sustainable development terms, this is a serious mistake. At the global level, successful strategies must be connected to supportive actions in other parts of the international system. Globalisation means, not only that NGOs must engage more strategically with market forces on a much bigger scale than before, but do so in ways which link microto macro-forces together in a coherent way. Examples include: linking alternative production systems to international fair trade networks that give them some security in open markets; holding corporations to account against minimum social and environmental standards negotiated locally but monitored across global supply chains; and altering patterns of consumption in the "global North" in ways which do not disadvantage producers in the "global South." With their international presence and connections, NGOs have a natural strength in this field, and in some areas a good start has been made, especially in helping to build a movement for more ethical consumption, investment and trading. NGOs have been key players in attempts to reform corporate accountability, test out multinational codes of conduct, re-shape


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consumer demand, and alter patterns of global trade. Inevitably, enthusiasm tends to run ahead of actual achievements - there are limits to the extent to which market economies can be reformed - but the principles involved have now been identified, and much is already known about how to operationalise them in practice. The conference provides an opportunity to take stock of what is happening with a greater degree of rigor. In the same vein, NGOs are becoming more strategic in their lobbying of the International Financial Institutions, the monitoring of international commitments (like Social Watch), and the democratization of global economic and other regimes (like the World Trade Organization and the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment). Although there has been little concrete progress in opening these regimes to civil society participation, they are likely to be the centrepiece of the global system in the 21st century and demand a concerted response. The beginnings of such a response are sketched out below. The inadequacy of the IFIs has become an issue on which there is an unusual global consensus. Their focus on ensuring that public sector finances are not overextended has led them to neglect the regulation of private financial transactions. The consequences - financial panic and massive over-exposure - are fuelling a global recession that has already cost the world 10 million formal sector jobs.4 Talk by the G7 leaders about 'a new global financial architecture' has not hidden the fact that they have little idea what this might look like, or even how new solutions might be negotiated to a more democratic (sustainable) consensus. Are NGOs any better prepared? Critiques of the World Bank and the IMF have been an easy game; redesigning the international system will require more complex analysis and more subtle proposals than the sweeping campaigns of the past. THE REFORM OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

From Foreign Aid to New forms of Governance In addition to these very broad shifts in global economics, development NGOs face another set of changes much closer to home. The decline of foreign aid (bar one or two exceptions such

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as the recent small increase in the UK aid budget) is now wellentrenched the world over. This is the consequence of persistent intellectual and communication failings in the case for aid, continued political disinterest and/or disillusion, and the emergence of new forms of international co-operation bettersuited to the realities of a global economy where private flows of capital predominate (outside Sub-Saharan Africa) and economic integration is perceived as the best motor for change - the emergence of an international system based around rules and standards rather than subsidised resource transfers. This might appear to pose a clear threat to aid-funded NGOs, but there is a positive side to these changes: even if NGOs are unsure or divided about the degree of intervention they advocate in the global economy, they can all be committed to a more democratic process of setting the "rules of the game" - what the philosopher Brian Barry calls "justice as impartiality." Already, municipalities in Latin America and elsewhere are experimenting with "dialogic politics", where civil society and business representatives share with local government in decision-making. If these experiments can be connected to more democratic structures at higher levels of the world system, the results could be revolutionary - embedding local agreements on labour standards, environmental pollution and human rights in a nested system of authorities that balance necessary roomto-manoeuvre with a core of universal principles. Currently, these linkages operate through networks of interest groups (including NGOs), rather than formal representative structures. This raises important questions about NGOs as organisations, especially their weak governance and accountability mechanisms, but the role of civil society is certain to grow as global governance becomes more pluralistic and less confined to state-based systems. We hope the conference will provide concrete examples of how this is happening in different parts of the world, and around different issues and institutions. The issue raised by this radical change in conceptions of governance is clear: how can NGOs help to ensure that the regimes of the future work to the benefit of poor people and deliver concrete benefits on the ground? This is a deeply-political


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question: who decides the relative importance of economic growth, political equality, and social benefit, within and between societies? That question take NGOs into territory way beyond their traditional roles as implementers of projects, providers of funds, and advocates on the margins of world affairs. For the first time in history, they have the opportunity to become vehicles for international co-operation in the mainstream of politics and economics - but only if they put their own house in order and seize the opportunities that will surely come their way. Even if this optimistic scenario does come to pass, it is unlikely that foreign aid will disappear, especially in the world's poorest countries. Rather, it looks set to play a supporting role in future global regimes - used more selectively to help countries meet their obligations under international agreements or smooth out the costs of structural change, for example, in addition to its traditional role in financing development expenditure for a time. The rhetoric of international agencies now converges on the need to change the way aid is provided, moving from a "supply to a demand-led" framework in which consolidated resources are placed at the disposal of local institutions who decide on and "own" the uses to which they are put - ideally through cross-society dialogues between government, business and civil society. The reality of donor practice is somewhat different, but as they gather momentum these trends will have important implications for NGOs, especially those based in the North. It may not be long before Southern NGOs can apply to their local branch of a World Development Fund and buy in technical assistance as they see fit - whether from Oxfam, UNDP or a local consultancy company. In reality, the current pattern of aid-funding to and through NGOs is confused, an assessment that is not helped by poor statistics which make it impossible to say how much of the World Bank's resources (for example) are channelled in this direction. The evidence we do have suggests a consolidation of trends already visible three years ago: high levels of funding through NGOs despite declining aid budgets, with a slowlyrising proportion sent direct to NGOs in the South, and both

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a levelling-out and a small re-distribution of resources among different NGOs in the North. There are winners and losers in this process, including "new competitors" for NGOs from business, non-profit consultancy companies, and elements of states that can demonstrate their competence in the marketplace. As multilateral and bilateral agencies decentralise their operations, one might expect Northern NGOs to lose out in this process, but thus far there is little evidence of a major break with the patterns of the past. In part, this is because donor agencies value a reliable delivery or advisory system for their funds above all else, and are prepared to see Northern organisations continue in this role so long as their Southern counterparts are seen to be weak; few small NGOs can afford the overheads necessary to deal with large-scale donor contracts. It is also a consequence of decentralisation among Northern NGOs themselves, and the development of their own capacity to raise official funding in Southern "markets" - a strange form of capacity-building but one which has a clear logic as the supply of foreign aid becomes more competitive. Third, there are few Southern NGOs with the capacity to deliver large-scale humanitarian relief. Therefore, although the financial forecast for Northern NGOs may appear pessimistic in the long run, there is little sense of a crisis in the here and now. Indeed, the absence of such a crisis is one of the reasons why change is so slow in coming. Changing Roles: Capacity-building These trends pose a number of challenges for NGOs in both North and South. First, they imply a gradual shift in roles, away from the direct implementation or delivery of aid-funded projects and services, and toward capacity-building, "leaningfor-leverage" and other measures designed to support local institutions to engage in discussions over development priorities, take part in global regimes, and operate successfully as motors for change in economic systems, governance and social policy (Fowler 1997). Traditional NGO roles do not disappear in this scenario, but like foreign aid in general they play a smaller part in a broader menu of options, administered in a different


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framework of power dynamics and South-North relationships. If there is a problem with village food security it would be odd to lobby Western supermarket chains to the exclusion of grassroots work, "developmental" funding for Southern intermediaries (with fewer strings attached than official aid), technical support, and other forms of "added value" that Northern NGOs - in theory at least - can provide. All these things are important in addressing problems of poverty and oppression, and they must be provided in a coherent way by different institutions according to their strengths and skills. What is becoming clear is that Northern NGOs are losing their supposed comparative advantage in most areas of their traditional work as Southern NGO sectors mature in their research and policy capacity as well as project-implementation and support. A similar process may be starting in the South as other groups in civil society and business take on the roles traditionally ascribed to intermediary NGOs. A logical response to this situation is for NGOs to re-focus their energies on capacity-building and institutional development - activities which are very much the mantra of the moment. Though fashionable, the record of capacity-building in practice is not impressive - though to be fair it is difficult to make an accurate assessment one way or the other given the paucity of rigorous evaluation material that exists. Concerns about quality were one of the reasons behind the formation of the International Forum on Southern NGO Capacity-Building in 1998, an international network which aims to share experience of "good practice" and foster innovation on the ground. The record of Northern agencies is particularly poor in the area of financial sustainability, despite the fact that this is probably the most important form of capacity in all civic organisations (it being difficult to be independent, enter into global partnerships, take risks or innovate while your hand is in "another person's pocket"). Micro-credit is seen as a panacea for sustainability rather than one among many possibilities; project planning procedures tend to be emphasised to the detriment of research and media skills; internal organisational issues take precedence over external linkages and bridging,

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mediation and partnering; and the ability of Southern NGOs to participate as equals in trans-national alliances is handicapped by the exclusive focus of most donors on their domestic role. Yet these areas are crucial to the future role of civil society in building coalitions for development, forming cross-society dialogues, and extending public participation in development planning. There have been some successes in strengthening the "enabling environment" for civic action (not just non-profit law and less intrusive state regulation, but improved fiscal regimes and a better climate for philanthropy), but in general capacity-building is still in its infancy. Changing Roles: Constituency-building The second challenge concerns the role of NGOs in building constituencies for international co-operation as a pre-requisite for the success of global regimes, new forms of governance, and the sacrifices required to alter global patterns of consumption and trade (especially in the North). Codes of conduct to govern multi-national corporations, for example, are of little use unless they are backed by large-scale consumer pressure to enforce them and viable alternatives on the ground. NGOs have always talked of the need to build constituencies, but have focused on problems in the Third World instead of lifestyle change at home, playing on the line that "your five pounds will make the difference." It rarely does of course - and what would make a difference (like mass-based public protest against Western indifference to genocide) - is never given sufficient attention in NGO strategy. It is too expensive or too "political", and wins few plaudits or contracts for foreign aid. Most Northern NGOs are actually dis-investing in development education, claiming that past efforts have been disappointing, which indeed they have, and for reasons which are entirely predictable. NGOs have been telling the wrong story for forty years, and the result is a donor base without a constituency for action, stagnant public support (except for child sponsorship agencies), and a widespread decline in volunteering, especially among the young. It is unlikely that this situation will be reversed with current NGO communications strategies, since they fail to engage the


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public beyond an emotional outpouring of concern when starvation hits the headlines. "Development" has proved too abstract a concept and aid is both dull and complex. At root, people want security and stability in a world that seems evermore uncertain, and they must therefore be convinced that what they want can only be achieved through new - more cooperative - structures of production, exchange, and international relations. That requires a massive investment of imagination and resources to help people connect complex global trends with simple individual responsibilities, bringing home the fact that uncooperative actions at the international level will infringe our own rights, and the rights of our children. It is here that ethical consumption and alliances with the environmental and other movements could provide a vital link for development NGOs, but there are others that deliver the necessary message, like UNDP's "global housekeeping" imagery. A clearer message and a more sophisticated communications strategy will support the process of "coming to public judgement" which underlies mass-based action far more effectively than NGO shock tactics or the hard sell of charity advertising. Constituency-building means creating an agenda for concern using diffuse channels over the long term, not just narrow policy lobbying within the international aid system. The globalisation of the media provides an opportunity for NGOs to achieve an international outreach for their messages if they can find the right mechanisms to win attention. Changing Relationships: Trans-national Civic Organising The gradual replacement of foreign aid by a wider agenda of international co-operation makes it easier for NGOs and other civil society organisations to work together, without the distorting effects of contracts, conditions and unequal access to funding. The most interesting and potentially powerful cases of trans-national civic organising are those where funding is a secondary consideration, leaving participants to focus on exchanging complementary roles and resources that are equallyvalued in support of broad but common goals. A number of examples of this kind of network will be presented at the


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conference. The case of the world-wide campaign against landmines is a useful one, albeit difficult to replicate in areas where there is less consensus and more of a conflict of interest between poor people in different parts of the world (like global trade and labour markets). In a world of "complex multilateralism" these alliances are certain to grow: over 15,000 trans-national civic networks are already active on the global stage, 90 per cent of which have been formed during the last thirty years (O'Brien et al 1998). One should not romanticise these experiences, since they continue to raise difficult questions of:

has changed profoundly over the 1990s, as our understanding of the dynamics of insecurity has evolved. Initial optimism at the end of the Cold War and the prospect of a "peace dividend" soon foundered as pre-existing "small wars" began to spread and ethno-nationalist conflicts re-appeared, often fuelled by interests bent on exploiting the political legacy of sectarian history and the financial benefits of a war economy (Keen 1994). Contemporary conflicts are fundamentally different to those that dominated the first 75 years of this century (Goodhand and Hulme 1998a).

• legitimacy : who speaks for whom, and how are differences of opinion resolved where individual participants vary in strength and resources?

These "post-nation state wars" are largely internal struggles in which clear interests are difficult to disentangle (Duffield, 1999); death and disablement are concentrated on civilians rather than combatants; and population movements take place within as well as across national borders. In 1995, around 14 million people were refugees and some 23 million were internally displaced (forced to relocate within their own country; ODI 1998:2). It is one of the great paradoxes of modern times that globalisation has been associated with increased intra-state tensions. Far from the 'end of history' predicted by liberal commentators after the collapse of communism, 'history' (or at least historical forces) has returned with a vengeance across Europe, Asia and Africa as ethnic, nationalist, religious, and cultural groups have proclaimed their identities in oftenaggressive and exclusive forms. While it has become fashionable to equate virtue with civil society, these events serve to remind us that civil society (like states and businesses) has a dark side too.

• accountability: who enjoys the benefits and suffers the costs of what the alliance achieves, especially at the grassroots level? • structure: how to deal with the challenges of genuinely international governance, decision-making and communication? • strategy: the need to develop more rigorous arguments and more credible alternatives as a contribution to policy debates. However, as the conference papers will show, all these problems can be managed, given courage and imagination. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING

The Post-Cold War Disorder In the world of long-term development, there is always some room-to-manoeuvre. In areas of conflict and complex political emergencies choices are harder and the dilemmas of the NGO world are drawn more starkly, yet such situations are characteristic of the post Cold-War disorder and the high levels of insecurity that global processes continue to generate. The shape, scale and parameters of NGO involvement in efforts to provide humanitarian assistance and resolve violent conflict

When the Cold War ended, the initial response of the international humanitarian system was to increase the use of direct military action to end civil wars, and co-ordinate relief efforts more effectively (ODI:1). However, the debacle of UNITAF in Somalia in 1993 and the 'retreat' of US forces from that country led to a rapid reversal in policies of military intervention. This change in policy had disastrous consequences in Rwanda where the UN peacekeeping force was progressively run down in early 1994 despite, clear warnings that the likelihood of genocide was high. Only 470 UNAMIR troops were stationed

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in Rwanda when the violence that killed 800,000 people in a few weeks erupted. The international community (especially the UN) looked foolish and inept, while European nations kept quiet about the role of the French government in the events leading up to the genocide. NGOs and Humanitarian Action: Tensions and Dilemmas These shifts in policy have presented NGOs with a range of complex dilemmas that have given rise to an unprecedented bout of soul-searching. Caught between the scale of human suffering on the ground and the international community's unwillingness to tackle the politics of humanitarian intervention, NGOs have been sucked, ill-prepared, into a vortex of conflicting needs and demands - all the more disturbing because the years 1990 to 1994 were bumper years for NGO relief operations (Duffield 1994). Relief budgets expanded rapidly and humanitarian efforts accounted for a steadily increasing share of development aid. The numbers of NGOs involved in emergency activities rose (there were more than 200 in the Great Lakes area by late 1994) and Northern NGOs 'prospered' as the number of Southern NGOs able to deliver relief on a large-scale remained small. Despite the self-evident need that 'something had to be done', many NGO staff returned to their homes after overseas missions in the Great Lakes, the Horn of Africa, West Africa, Angola, Central Asia, Sri Lanka and Cambodia harbouring grave doubts about the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. Did their efforts provide additional resources for "conflict entrepreneurs" to prosecute 'small wars'? Is relief activity merely a function of Western strategic interests - a 'band-aid' that allows the international system to pretend that it is taking action when in truth it has disengaged (Prendergast 1997)? How should NGOs react when the principle of voluntary repatriation is over-ridden on a vast scale and when their own governments are increasingly trying to discourage legitimate asylum seekers (ODI 1998:2)? Just as NGOs have had to develop relationships with new actors in the private sector, relief agencies now deal routinely with both local militia groups and


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foreign military personnel, raising difficult questions about mandates, competencies and co-ordination that are still being worked through. Not surprisingly, the mid-1990s have been a period of intense questioning for Northern NGOs involved in humanitarian activities. The picture with regard to NGOs in the South is less clear, in large part because they have few forums to reflect on their experiences and articulate an independent voice. Inevitably, the questions that confront NGOs vary with context and circumstance, but some common issues can be discerned. First, the importance of being clear about each agency's strategic orientation. A traditional relief focus (on which many NGOs were founded) is increasingly rare, apart from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and their focus on neutrality and the impartial provision of relief services to anyone suffering in a conflict. From the late 1980s, researchers and donors have encouraged NGOs to think beyond relief and to conceptualise their interventions along a relief-development continuum so that relief activities contribute to development programmes as peace returns. This represents a second strategic option: providing a mix of relief and development activities that provide for immediate basic needs while creating the physical, human or social capital that will raise the likelihood of economic and social development in the future. Third, there has been a rapid expansion in NGO attempts to engage directly in the processes of peace-building and conflict resolution. They take many forms - an additional component of a relief and development initiative, or a sole focus (as with Quaker Peace and Service). Such activities may concentrate on the micro-level building of 'social capital' through inclusive forums or the training of local conflict-resolution activists; macrolevel support to diplomatic negotiations or creating opportunities for the leaders of opposing groups to meet on an informal basis; or both levels simultaneously. They can be neutral and impartial - helping all parties to meet and have an open discussion - or informed by a political analysis that distinguishes perpetrators from victims and provides support only to the latter.

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At the present time there are voices in favour of all these strategies. The dictum of "do no harm" (Anderson 1998) has been especially well-developed in arguing that NGOs should adopt a carefully-analytical approach which places a high priority on ensuring that humanitarian aid is not captured by warring factions. While such incidents are well-documented in the relief literature, ODI (1998:3) argue strongly that - at worst - support to armed groups 'has probably been slight'. In contrast, some donor agencies (including, DFID in the UK) have encouraged NGOs to engage not only with relief and development but also with the active promotion of social and political processes that contribute to peace-building and/or foster conflict resolution. Whether such an approach represents good practice or simply "an increasingly selective and conditional approach by some donors in their funding of NGO humanitarian activity" is debatable (ODI 1998). What is clear is that most NGOs lack the capacity to conduct the strategic analyses necessary to success in these areas, especially in the complex and contingent environments in which they operate. While the codes of practice and evaluation studies that are presently being promoted may foster operational effectiveness and efficiency in NGO relief activities, only limited numbers of NGOs have the analytical skills and detailed local knowledge that are needed to judge the impact of NGO activity on the complex social, economic and political processes that underpin violent conflict. Humanitarian Action: New Directions Any credible analysis of the role of NGOs in humanitarian and conflict resolution work reveals that networking and influencing strategies are required to have any significant impact on reducing the suffering that occurs in complex political emergencies. Direct action may achieve laudable humanitarian gains but is likely to operate only at a token scale in relation to aggregate levels of suffering. A number of options emerging, but only a small number of NGOs have begun to explore their potential:


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• Influencing national governments to operate in ways that go beyond "realist" foreign policy considerations (e.g. monitoring the UK's "ethical foreign policy" and questioning why the US has no ethical foreign policy at all). • Monitoring the effectiveness of regional forces in peacemaking to judge whether they are an excuse for Northern countries to avoid more wide-ranging military action. • Examining how the UN might regain its credibility and develop the capacity to engage effectively in peacemaking, and co-ordinate the activities of its constituent parts. • Exploring strategies through which national and global civil societies could move beyond their current responses to complex political emergencies (charitable donations and/or public disengagement), to mobilise governments to react to emerging conflicts early in their life-cycle (not - as today - "too little, too late"). • Overseeing the private sector so that businesses who gain from war economies find that the pursuit of such profits can result in social sanctions (such as consumer boycotts or local media coverage that challenges their management decisions). Examples include traders in Angola, diamonds in Sierra Leone, timber in Liberia, the manufacturers of land mines, and international 'security' companies. Underlying all these strategies is the need for NGOs to put their own house in order by reducing dysfunctional competition in relief funding and operations; working more closely with Southern groups to build up their relief and peace-building capacity, and widen the current Northern-centric humanitarian policy dialogue; making a reality of codes of conduct by institutionalising accountability, including to beneficiaries; and developing 'peace audits' to evaluate the impact of their activities on the processes that lead to conflict (Goodhand and Hulme 1998b). NGOs have an important role to play in responding to the threefold challenge of 21st-century insecurity (Edwards,


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1999): a more systematic engagement in long-term peacebuilding and equitable development; stronger international political action on the causes of suffering; and responding more effectively with developmental relief when crises do break out. However, if they wish to gain more influence over other actors in pursuing these roles, then NGOs will need to invest in their own credibility and legitimacy by becoming more knowledgeable and transparent about the achievements of their existing humanitarian and peace-building work. ORGANISATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The changing global context sketched out above suggests four key challenges for NGOs in the next 15-20 years: • how to mobilise a genuinely-inclusive civil society at every level of the world system? • how to hold other institutions accountable for their actions and ensure that they respond to social and environmental needs? • how to ensure that international regimes are both implemented effectively and work to the benefit of poor people and poor countries? • how to ensure that gains made at the global level are translated into concrete benefits at the grassroots. These challenges raise major questions about how NGOs organise themselves to work in more global and strategic ways in the future. Four areas of organisational change seem especially important: roles, relationships, capacities, and underlying all these things - the thorny issues of legitimacy and accountability. NGO Roles Clearly, NGOs operate in so many contexts and at so many levels that generalisation is hazardous. However, some trends can be identified in relation to the need to think and act globally. It is difficult to see how NGOs could re-shape the costs and benefits of global change through stand-alone projects at


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the local level, funding, or the delivery of basic social and economic services. Instead they must build outwards from concrete innovations at grassroots level to connect with the forces that influence patterns of poverty, prejudice and violence: exclusionary economics, discriminatory politics, selfish and violent personal behaviour, and the capture of the world of knowledge and ideas by elites. In a sense this is what NGOs are already doing, by integrating micro and macro-level action in their project and advocacy activities, but the changing global context challenges us to make this our natural way of working instead of something bolted on to mainstream activities as an optional extra. Moving from development as delivery to development as leverage is the fundamental change that characterises this shift, and it has major implications for the ways in which NGOs organise themselves, raise and spend their resources, and relate to others. Despite the changing context, many NGOs appear reluctant to shed their traditional roles. Some Northern NGOs continue to be operational on the ground, and even where they work through "partners", many tend to dictate the scope and pace of work through their control over funding and procedures (Fowler 1998, Wallace 1997). There is little real evidence that Northern NGOs are handing over local-level activities to Southern groups and limiting their roles to those most appropriately played in the North. Building constituencies for international co-operation has been relegated to the margins of NGO activity. Development education is largely out of fashion; "public education" is skewed in favour of advertisements for emergencies and child sponsorship; and very few agencies try to communicate complex development messages through the media. Yet it is the media that shapes and forms opinions for all generations; the use of the media for fund-raising instead of education will be detrimental to organisations that seek an active supporter base in the years to come. In the South, some NGOs have developed a strong and independent funding base, but most remain dependent on external resources. Their roles are determined as much by donor fashion and demands as by needs and the causes of need.

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While some do pioneering work in confronting inequalities at every level, many still confine themselves to a limited role as deliverers of development according to ideas and designs imposed or imported from outside. In future, NGOs will need to find better ways of building constituencies for their work at every level; methods of working together through strategic partnerships that link local and global processes together; and a much more effective method of identifying barriers to change and points of leverage where their combined experience gives them authority and voice. By sinking roots into their own societies and making connections with others inside and outside civil society, NGOs can generate more potential to influence things where it really matters because of the multiplier effects that come from activating a concerned citizenry to work for change in a wider range of settings. NGOs have always been confused about their identity part market institution providing a cost-effective service against alternative providers, part social actor pushing for more fundamental change. The mixing together of these roles is inherently problematic, and though it can be managed more or less effectively (and can be a positive force in injecting cooperative values into the competitive world), it will eventually demand that NGOs make a clearer choice about who they are and what they want to do. Founded as charities to channel money from rich countries to poor countries, it is hardly surprising that NGOs find it difficult to adapt to a world of more equal partnerships and non-financial relationships. We think that those that fail to adapt will eventually go to the wall, or slip quietly into anonymity. Relationships Competition for resources in an ever-more tightlyconstrained funding environment is characteristic of NGO sectors in all countries. Much NGO advertising, media work and lobbying is driven by the need to gain a higher profile in the market-place in order to ensure a continued flow of resources from both the public and official donors. Donor requirements drive many of the changes that are being made in systems and


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procedures, passed down the aid-chain from Northern to Southern NGOs, and on to community-based organisations. Participatory approaches could be a countervailing force to these trends, but they are often used as a tool to involve communities in NGO-driven agendas: few NGOs have developed structures that respond to grassroots demands. Although NGOs talk constantly of "partnership", control over funds and decisionmaking remains highly-unequal. This picture is a familiar one, but it is also partial, and the changing global context opens up a world of possibilities for NGOs to relate to each-other in different and healthier ways: alliances among equals, genuine partnerships, and synergistic networks that come together and then break apart, can replace the asymmetries of power and voice that have characterised North-South relationships for so many years. Information technology helps this process along by enabling less hierarchical modes of organisation and communication - advantages already well-exploited by the business community, but not yet by NGOs. Peter Senge (1998) argues that the most successful organisations of the 21st century will look more like "democratic societies than conventional corporations." Rather than trying to impose order on a chaotic world (and making things more complex in the process), they will try to generate order out of chaos through non-authoritarian relationships between people who are genuinely interested in helping one-another to develop new learning and capacities. Jonathan Kotter (1998) likens this model to a "smaller mother ship with many more satellites and fewer organisational boundaries." These structural innovations are especially important in relation to NGO activities that stretch across national borders - like lobbying - but thus far conflicts of interest and the need for profile have retarded their development. Friction continues over who speaks for whom and on what basis: Northern NGOs still prefer to go to international forums themselves to present the case for change "on behalf of" others; Southern NGOs may "speak for" communities who are unaware of the campaign or unsure of its benefits. The move to embrace advocacy has to go hand-in-hand with alliances that can ensure that changes

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at the macro-level are actually translated into gains for people on the ground. The new global agenda requires, not only that NGOs link with each-other in different ways, but also that they forge relationships with other groups in civil society which can reach further and deeper into the mainstream of politics and economics - like trade unions, consumer groups, the women's and environmental movements, universities and think-tanks, and the news media - eventually creating a global movement for sustainable development. We need new ways of talking and relating to different sections of the public, especially young men and women, and we must loosen or manage the relationship between NGOs and official donors so that the "piper(s) do not call an inappropriate tune" for organisations that claim to respond to the voices of the people they serve. Capacities To support these roles and relationships, NGOs will need to develop a range of new skills and competencies in learning, bridging, mediation, dialogue and influencing. NGOs' current focus on narrow management issues (often borrowed uncritically from the corporate sector), acquiring skills valued by donors, and traditional concepts of lobbying, need to be replaced by a broader base of capacities which include the ability to listen to, learn from, and work with others at both local and global levels, and outside the development sector; a more strategic understanding of how and where global issues "bite" on the NGO agenda; and how organisations need to change in order to respond to new demands. NGOs need to develop ways of working that are less focused on promoting their own profile, and more concerned with building alliances, working with others, and dividing up roles and responsibilities in a collaborative way. More openness to new ideas and a greater willingness to learn will be essential in the context of new actors and problems; fast-moving and unpredictable change; the entry of corporations, churches and trade unions into development debates; and the increasing sophistication of information technology (Edwards 1997).


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These developments will challenge NGOs to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the changing context for their work, recognise the implications for their practice, and select the alliances and strategies required to address them on a continuous basis. Innovations in markets and economics will demand much greater detail from NGOs in their analysis and proposals, without losing the power of grassroots testimony and straightforward protest. Finely-nuanced judgements in complex political emergencies will require more highlydeveloped information-gathering and analytical skills. NGOs are unlikely to be able to succeed in these tasks without help from the research community, demanding a rapid expansion of academic-practitioner collaboration and new forms of coworking across institutional boundaries. Combined with the rise of civil society in the South, the absence of simple answers to sustainable development dilemmas challenges traditional approaches to NGO advocacy. Engaging with others over the long term in a process of mutual learning and innovation becomes more important than claiming that NGOs have the answers and merely wish to convert others to their point of view. This will be a major challenge to organisations who have grown used to occupying the moral high ground. In addition, the emergence of short-term conflicts of interest between groups of poor people in different parts of the world (especially in global trade) underscores the importance of building capacities across the board so that everyone can share equally in negotiating a fair deal in the regimes of the future, instead of pretending that "win-win" solutions can be plucked out of the air by NGO thinkers in North or South. Legitimacy and Accountability Underlying these changes are more fundamental questions about NGO legitimacy and accountability, for above all it is this area - the right of NGOs to do what they do and say what they say - that is being challenged by world events and the changing climate of ideas. The legitimacy of NGOs (especially those based in the North) is now an accepted topic of public debate. Much of the criticism that is emerging in newspapers and

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elsewhere is superficial, motivated more by ideology than intellectual rigor and in severe danger of "throwing the baby out with the bath-water." However, it looks set to continue, especially around the key issue of representation as global regimes mature in more pluralistic fashion. Claiming the right to speak out simply because an NGO has projects or contacts on the ground is unlikely to be acceptable to a sceptical audience in the media, among other observers, and - most importantly - a more critical local population. Southern NGOs are questioning the right of Northern NGOs to speak for them; women are questioning the right of maledominated NGOs to represent them; and as access to technology grows, communities feel they can speak for themselves through video and the internet as well as more traditional arenas such as marches and demonstrations. A recent internet conference in preparation for a UN meeting on women in Addis Ababa found that - in contrast to most internet discussion groups - over 40 per cent of contributors were women from Africa, even though they are the group most excluded from resources and technology. As poor people find more ways to access information and find a louder voice in global debates, the legitimacy of Northern-based, maledominated organisations to appropriate the voices of others will disappear completely. They will have to learn to stand aside, make space for others, and share their rich financial and technological resources, and access to power, in more democratic networks. To answer this growing chorus of criticism, NGOs must be good civic actors themselves; otherwise they will be unable to encourage co-operation and accountability in other institutions; nor will they be considered legitimate participants in an emerging international civil society. However, few NGOs have democratic systems of governance or accountability. As serviceproviders they do not need them; as social actors they certainly do. The legitimacy of a social actor comes from their rootedness in their own society, from a more engaged and supportive domestic constituency, and from the alliances they develop


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with other parts of civil society. NGOs will have to become more open and transparent in an age when institutional accountability is a condition for a seat at the negotiating table. The tradition of hiding controversial issues behind closed doors, and a persistent failure to convert NGO rhetoric about equity and participatory management into institutional practice, is hardly a good basis for persuading others of the need for reform. If NGOs are to become social actors in a global world, pushing for justice, equity, democracy and accountability, then clearly these characteristics need to be reflected in their own systems and structures The current balance of power in the NGO world is very hard to shift - as we found when organising this conference. Channels of communication and networking are far more open to those in the North, and to well-resourced NGOs in the South. Few are prepared, it seems, to back their support for broader participation with the financial resources required to promote the voices of smaller organisations and marginalised groups. Unless this changes, public questioning of NGO legitimacy and accountability will continue to mount, fatally undermining the credibility that NGOs will need if they are to play a part in global debates. CONCLUSION

Against such a huge and complex canvass, it would be unrealistic to expect any consensus to emerge from three days of discussions in Birmingham. However, the participants in the conference do represent a wide cross-section of origins and backgrounds, and bring a huge richness of ideas and experiences to the table. At the very least, our discussions will provide an opportunity to exchange ideas about civic action in the 21st century, take stock of our successes and failures in a critical yet supportive atmosphere, and identify areas for common action, research and learning. In this process of dialogue and experimentation, civic values take centre stage. NGOs are unlikely to agree on the details of how to confront globalisation and issues of conflict and

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humanitarian action, still less on their implications for NGOs as organisations. However, they would probably all agree that certain (non-market) values are crucial to our common future - co-operation, non-violence, respect for human rights and democratic process - however these things are defined and played out in different cultural contexts. Whether these are understood as "civic" or "social" values, or just values that all sectors of society can support and represent, is less important than working together to make them the bottom line in decisions over economics and the environment, social policy, and politics. NGOs must be leaders in cultivating a global moral order which finds poverty and violence unacceptable. They must be exemplars of the societies they want to create, and work much harder to mainstream civic values into the arenas of economic, social and political power. This is clearly an agenda for radical change. At present, NGOs may sense the need for such a change but are wary of the institutional consequences, so most try to defend the valuesbased approach of a global social movement inside an operational framework that drives the organisation further into the marketplace (Edwards 1998a, 1998b). The result is an unsurprising muddle, and a great deal of internal tension. It may be that these tensions are simply too great for large, aid-dependent NGOs to resolve, in which case new organisations will emerge around and alongside them one can't "change a super-tanker into a white-water raft" as Chris Roche remarked of Oxfam. The leading NGOs of today may come to be regarded as useful but temporary creations of a particular moment in history, to be gradually replaced by new forms of civic organisation more attuned to the needs and characteristics of the 21st century. The best of the NGO world will have the courage, imagination and room-to-manoeuvre to make a successful transition between the two; the rest will gradually slip from public attention, with no great loss to humankind. The fundamental question facing all NGOs is how to move from our current position - as unhappy agents of a foreign aid


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system in decline - to where we want to be - as vehicles for international co-operation in the emerging global arena. Every NGO will interpret this challenge in a different way, and they will occupy their own distinctive niche in the patterns of civic action that develop. This does not matter, so long as NGOs are transparent and accountable for what they do. Their constituencies (public and private) can then decide whether they are worthy of their support in the radically different world context that is emerging. Our contention is that global trends challenge all NGOs to rethink their mandate, mission, and strategies. Although this will demand major organisational changes and a degree of selfsacrifice in the short term, it will be a force for liberation in the longer term, both at the broad level of societies and at the narrow level of organisations and their staff. In a global future, NGOs have the world at their feet. We must seize our chance.


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5 NGO ACCESS

AT THE

UN

INTRODUCTION

In an era of rapid globalization, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) increasingly operate in a global policy environment. Amnesty International, Doctors Without Borders, Oxfam, Greenpeace, and many others, seek to influence the great international decisions of the day. So they need to interact with global institutions. They want to participate in the process where policies are decided. The United Nations, the main global policy body, has been unusually open to NGO input over the years. Nation states are usually the decision-makers, but NGOs seek "access" to information and to those that make the decisions. This can mean many things. NGO representatives want physical access to the conference halls where official meetings take place, so that they can observe, interact with delegates and monitor proceedings. NGO representatives want to circulate their own documents, to speak to meetings, to have access to documents and to gain entry to informal, preparatory meetings and the like. NGOs also want access to administrative offices in the Secretariat and other agencies, and the right to be consulted in the administration's policy-formulation and policyimplementation process. In some (rare) cases, NGOs aspire to official voting status in the decision-making process itself, as is the case in the International Labour Organisation. At the United Nations, NGOs have had some access from the beginning. But recently those rules of access have seemed

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outmoded and in need of change. NGO importance soared with the global conferences of the 1990s, especially the great environmental conference at Rio in 1992, with over ten thousand NGO representatives participating. Never before had NGOs been so prominent, so full of energy and ideas, and so central to the intergovernmental negotiating process. Subsequent conferences in Vienna (1993), Cairo (1994), Copenhagen (1995) and Beijing (1996) confirmed this new level of NGO dynamism and influence. The UN and its agencies also began to subcontract many services directly to NGOs -- including provision of emergency relief, demining, reconstruction, governance training and more -- further magnifying NGO status. The "NGO Review" at ECOSOC: Negotiations 1993-96 After the Rio conference, NGOs called for increased rights at the United Nations. The UN Charter, in Article 71, provided for "suitable arrangements for consultation" between NGOs and the Economic and Social Council. Over the years, some major international NGOs had developed considerable access. But with changing times, NGOs wanted broader and more flexible access. Many member states agreed. So, on July 30, 1993, less than a year after the Rio conference, the Economic and Social Council decided (in resolution E/1993/80) to open intergovernmental negotiations, aimed at expanding NGO rights. Agreement was not as easy to reach as some had hoped. On the government side, there were mixed feelings about NGOs. Many governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America found the proddings and exposés of the human rights NGOs to be annoying or even a threat to their sovereignty, while powerful governments in Europe, North America and East Asia were not particularly keen on NGOs that pressed for economic justice, disarmament and global democracy. So behind a rhetoric of enthusiasm for NGOs lurked profound disquiet. Delegations feared changes that might weaken or even eventually sweep away nation-states' monopoly of global decision-making. On the NGO side, also, there was neither unity nor complete enthusiasm for the changes under way. Some major

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international NGOs, with a strong presence at the UN, worried that a flood of new, purely "national" (i.e. based in a single country) NGOs would undermine NGO legitimacy and open the way for narrowly-based and government-influenced organizations to pour into the UN. Members of the Conference of NGOs in Consultative Status with the UN, known by its acronym CONGO, tended to represent this critical viewpoint. On the other hand, thousands of new, dynamic national NGOs , many of unquestioned legitimacy and effectiveness, pressed for a widening of the admission gates and viewed the older NGOs as a privileged elite. Each perspective had a certain validity, but the divisions were real and sometimes even acrimonious. Negotiations dragged out for a long time - almost exactly three years. Many NGOs followed the process closely and lobbied delegations intensively. Eventually, under the able chairmanship of Amb. Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan, negotiations came to fruition on July 25, 1996. In exchange for concessions allowing more unrestricted representation for human rights NGOs, governments of the South won agreement that national NGOs would enjoy enlarged rights and that the General Assembly would take up the possibility of NGO representation in "all areas of work of the UN system." The new ECOSOC resolution governing consultative status (E\1996\31) was paired with an ECOSOC decision (E\1996\297) that called on the General Assembly to explore wider arrangements. The two documents were adopted simultaneously. In spite of misgivings by some, there was widespread relief and enthusiasm among NGOs that a long and difficult process was over. Many thought - or at least hoped that a new era for NGOs was dawning. Short-Lived Euphoria on General Assembly Access (September-December 1996) Following the summer ECOSOC victory, many NGOs hoped to press forward for expanded rights. In particular, they hoped that they could obtain consultative rights with the General Assembly where informally NGOs had long enjoyed quite


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considerable access. On this project, the two wings of the recently-divided NGO movement were united, though there were some disagreements among NGO groupings over strategy for the new campaign. NGO were especially optimistic because they saw an ally in the incoming president of the General Assembly, Amb. Razali Ismail of Malaysia, who took office in September 1996. Razali was a longtime representative of unusual dynamism and intelligence, who had strong ties to many NGOs, particularly those in the environmental field. He opened his presidency with an unprecedented lunch with NGOs at the Malaysian mission and his presidential office was always open to NGO input. He assured his NGO friends that he would do his best to promote a decision for wider NGO access at the earliest possible moment. Under the leadership of the World Federalist Movement and CONGO, the access issue gained considerable headway in the early fall. NGO strategists hoped that the General Assembly would adopt a quick resolution, giving NGOs consultative status with the Assembly, including access to the main committees, subsidiary bodies and special sessions. After that, it was hoped that more difficult and controversial negotiations would get under way regarding still wider NGO rights. But with few exceptions, member states were cool towards further progress. The issue soon bogged down in procedural questions: how would the General Assembly even take up the question? Would it be in a Working Group or some other forum? And would the discussions be in private or in an open forum to which NGOs would have access? In an effort to get the issue moving and to assuage NGO concerns about government secrecy, President Razali asked Ambassador Kamal to convene "hearings" - some of which were open to NGOs and some for delegations only. The hearings allowed many NGOs to make comments and express their hopes - and for member states to comment as well. The most concrete proposal came from the World Federalists, who circulated a draft text on access to the General Assembly.

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Finally, in late 1996, faced by governmental opposition to more NGO-friendly arrangements, President Razali created a special Sub-Group of the General Assembly Working Group on the Reform of the UN System. Kamal, a candidate favored by NGOs, agreed to serve as the chair. NGOs were assured that they would have periodic, though not necessarily regular, access. The Kamal Sub-Group (January-July 1997) Under the chairmanship of Kamal, the Sub-Group held dozens of meetings, from January to July 1997. In a few cases, the meetings were open to NGOs. Kamal brought to bear all his diplomatic skill and his considerable knowledge of the issue, but to no avail. In spite of active cajoling from Razali and in spite of serioius efforts of a few pro-NGO delegations, the group could not even reach accord on the most basic matter - its own mandate. A number of Southern states argued for a very broad mandate, while the US and the Europeans insisted on a narrow mandate. The standoff seemed to serve the interest of most delegations. By summer, the fruitless negotiations collapsed. In late 1996 and early 1997, a clash between the Secretariat and NGOs signalled that the Secretariat was not as NGOfriendly as the Secretary General's statements had led some to believe. Caught in a financial crisis, the UN had reduced its printing of documents and instead offered government delegations access to digital texts stored in its Optical Disk Sytem (ODS). At the same time, the UN was rapidly expanding its site on the world wide web. When NGOs asked for open access to the ODS system, the Secretariat responded with an offer of access -- but, for a fee of $1,125 per computer station per year, payable in advance. NGOs rejected the proposal, pointing out that governments increasingly make their documents freely available and noting that this decision would be especially harmful for poor, Southern-based NGOs. The NGOs called for immedicate free and open access, arguing that the web site, however welcome, was insufficient to their needs. By coincidence, Amb. Kamal of Pakistan was also Chair of the intergovernmental body with special responsibility for this question - the Technical Sub-Group of the Working Group on


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Informatics of ECOSOC. NGOs sought to enlist his support in their cause, but discovered that he and his committee did not have sufficient influence over the powerful decision-makers in the Secretariat (particularly, it seems, the office of Under Secretary General Joseph Connor) to change the decision. UN budget managers saw a pay-as-you-go approach to NGOs as a symbol of their market-driven approach to reform. Finally, on April 25, 1997, a group of twelve major NGOs presented a long and carefully-argued memo to the Secretary General asking for free ODS access. But the SG turned the issue over to lower officials and the NGO group never received any substantive response. Privately, Secretariat officials argued that funds were scarce (though they never said what the new service would cost) and they advised that the decision would not be reversed. In spite of the rhetoric of "partnership," the Secretariat never consulted NGOs about their information needs or even asked for their opinions as "consumers" of this new service. The US Vetoes Global Conferences (Spring 1997) Secretary-General Kofi Annan was under intense pressure from the United States, which demanded various policy changes at the UN as conditions for paying its regular dues and mounting arrears. As the UN's financial crisis deepened, UN leadership felt it had little choice but to make concessions to US policymakers, including the conservative majority in the US Congress. Among other things, Congress demanded that the UN hold no further global conferences, claiming that these were a waste of time and money. But these conferences were a popular and important means of NGO access. Because they brought together NGOs and press from the whole world, many observers considered the conferences the UN's most open and democratic forum. When the Secretary General announced his new reform "package" in the spring of 1997 he bowed to US pressure and said that he would oppose any further conferences. This came as a serious blow to NGO status at the UN.

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The US Proposals and the Canada-Netherlands Initiative (Summer-Fall 1997) In the summer of 1997, at ECOSOC meetings in Geneva, the United States introduced a draft resolution (E/1997/L.51), proposing some extension of NGO rights to the General Assembly. But the initiative offered too little and it satisfied no one, including NGOs. After several drafts, it died from lack of broader support. By the fall of 1997, the issue appeared to be seriously bogged down and no NGO had the capacity to follow-up and push it forward. Thanks to a few friendly governments, notably Canada and the Netherlands, there were informal negotiations on a draft text dated December 9, 1997 that was a possible basis for NGO access to the GA. After a brief flurry of meetings, including meetings between NGOs and delegations, it became clear that the proposal did not have the necessary backing. Instead, the General Assembly adopted a decision (A/52/L.71) calling for a study by the Secretary General on NGO access. This, NGOs hoped, could be the basis for future action. Incidents and Rumors (1998) At the UN, a movement to roll back NGO rights gained force. The flashpoint was the meeting of the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in March, 1998. Several incidents incited government ire, especially delegations of the South. The Transnational Radical Party, a political party with NGO status, accredited a large number of unaffililiated persons to the CHR - as many as seventy according to some accounts. A number of these were from Cuban emmigré groups that sharply criticized the Cuban government. The Cuban delegation responded indignantly with a proposal to limit the NGO accreditation process, by imposing a numerical limit per organization and by requiring accreditation on an annual basis only. A Cuban draft resolution began to circulate in Geneva and it was immediately apparent that it would severely damage the legitimate activities of many major NGOs. A second incident at the CHR involved a person accredited by the FIDH - the International Federation of Human Rights


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Leagues. The Algerian ambassador was talking to an Algerian accredited by FIDH when two other Algerians came up and hostilely accosted the diplomat. The ambassador accused the FIDH representative of complicity in the incident, though UN security later absolved this person. A chance encounter at UN headquarters in Geneva, also during the Commission, set off the most serious storm of all. The Indian delegate, Arundhai Ghose, spotted a person with an NGO pass who he identified as Anup Chetia, leader of an Indian sepratist group, the United Liberation Front of Assam. This group had recently taken responsibility for the kidnapping of Ghose's nephew. Outraged that such "criminals" should be allowed into the UN precincts, Ghose began a personal campaign to restrict NGOs' access and especially their physical proximity to delegates. In August, the New York Times picked up the story -- a sure sign that official favor was turning against NGOs.. Then, on September 21, during the opening day of the General Debate at the General Assembly, an Iranian dissident was dragged by security guards from the gallery after causing an incident in the General Assembly chamber while the Iranian president was speaking. This person allegedly carried accreditation from the International Council of Women. News of these incidents and a number of others made its way around the diplomatic grapevine, leading many delegations to harden their position towards NGOs and to fear that greater NGO access might lead to more nasty encounters, embarrassment and even possibly physical danger to delegates. NGOs responded by insisting that they should not be punished as a group for the alleged misdeeds of a handful. NGO leaders also pointed out that delegations were blaming organizations without a fair process for review of allegations. Some also said that an open and democratic process must accomodate a certain amount of disruption as a necessary accompanyment of free speech and protest. Surely, they insisted, the UN must adopt new approaches as it ceases to be an exclusive venue for diplomats and becomes a place where the hurly-burly of society increasingly intrudes.

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Second thoughts about NGOs were not limited to delegations from the South. Rumors circulated of restrictive proposals being floated by major Northern delegations as well. According to well-informed sources, the United Kingdom delegation was privately proposing a "code of conduct" for NGOs, while the United States was suggesting that if NGOs did not submit their quadrennial reports on time they should be immediately stripped of their accreditation. A sign of the times, a number of influential pundits and publications began to reflect on a "lack of accountability" of NGOs. The influential New York Times ran an article that underscored these "problems" with NGOs and bracketed them with emerging mercenary companies, seeing them both as irresponsible "non-state actors," undermining governments whose "traditional functions they usurp." These developments shocked the NGO community and showed how difficult further progress was likely to be. The Committee on NGOs and the Lobby Campaign (MayJune 1998) In May-June, 1998, the Committee on NGOs of ECOSOC (a 19-member intergovernmental body that oversees the accreditation and regulation of NGOs) held its regularlyscheduled meetings at UN headquarters in New York. One of the items on its agenda was the Cuban resolution, calling for a number of serious restrictions on NGO access. A few dozen major NGOs organized to oppose this measure. CONGO came forward with a lengthy statement and a group of human rights NGOs issued a joint statement as well. They argued that after the important progress achieved in 1996, governments would be mistaken now to retreat and to restrict NGO access. The NGOs lobbied delegations and closely followed the meetings of the Committee. In the end, the Cubans substantially re-drafted their resolution and then decided to take it off the table. But the Cubans and their allies informed NGOs that the resolution would almost certainly be re-introduced at the Committee's meeting in December.


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The Secretary General's Report (July 1998) On July 10, 1998, the long-awaited report of the Secretary General on NGO access was finally released. Though many months had passed since the General Assembly had mandated the report, NGOs were unhappy that the office of Assistant Secretary General Gillian Sorensen had written it with virtually no NGO consultation. Not surprisingly, the report was weak and bland from an NGO point of view. On the positive side, it affirmed the importance of NGOs to the UN system and contained a useful compendium of Secretariat and UN System offices' practice in the field of NGO relations, including information about operational partnerships in relief efforts and other activities. The report had many shortcomings, though. It offered little information about the practice of intergovernmental bodies like the GA Main Committees and not enough about the Global Conferences. It said virtually nothing about the question of NGO access to the General Assembly or any other kinds of enlarged access. While noting the sharply-increased numbers of accredited NGOs, it made no effort to assess the actual numbers of NGOs active at UN headquarters. Delegations' concerns about NGOs and security also passed without comment. NGOs were deeply disappointed that the Secretary General had opted for caution and not taken a more vigorous initiative, in line with his own rhetoric. It was obvious that negative member state pressures -- North and South alike -- had substantially influenced the end result. The challenge facing NGOs was now clearer than ever. An Inauspicious Moment (September-December 1998) The 53rd Session of the UN opened inauspiciously. The Non-Aligned Movement at its meeting in South Africa had just issued a communique containing bad news for NGOs. Buried in the lenthy NAM statement, dated September 2, was a brief paragraph bluntly opposing expanded NGO access to the General Assembly, affirming that ECOSOC was the appropriate framework for NGO relations with the UN.

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There soon followed a sharp conflict between NGOs and the Secretariat over heightened security during the General Debate, a two-week period beginning in late September when the President of the United States and many other heads of state and government address the General Assembly. UN security closed the most commonly-used NGO entrance, required NGOs to pass through a special metal detector, and subjected NGOs to unprecedented document searches. NGOs protested loudly. Soon the Chief of Security offered apologies for the document searches and officials assured NGOs that security would again be relaxed at the end of the General Debate (which it was). But security arrangements never returned to the previous norms. The Delegates' Lounge, a key meeting place, remained officially closed to NGOs until the end of the GA session in December and the NGO metal detectors stayed in place. NGOs had reason to fear a new era of restrictions and hostility. These fears seemed confirmed when the General Assembly's Third Committee shut out NGO human rights representatives in early November from its five-year review of the Vienna Conference on Human Rights. Once again, NGOs organized on an emergency basis. And again, they won a partial victory when Human Rights High Commissioner Mary Robinson convened a special meeting to hear NGO views. NGOs were also troubled by a rumor that the UN would begin to impose a fee for access to its important web site on international treaties, long available for free and a crucial research tool for many NGOs. Canada's Helping Hand, the US Bombshell and Developments in ECOSOC (December 1998) As the General Assembly considered the Secretary General's report on NGO access, NGO status seemed uncertain at best. But thanks to a timely initiative by Canada, the GA finally passed a Decision (A/53/L.68) on December 17, 1998 that asked the Secretary General to submit a second and broader report that would incorporate the views of governments, specialized agencies, observers, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. This gave NGOs the opportunity for substantial input


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and it allowed time to press for a more progressive and forwardlooking report in 1999. The United State delegation dropped a bombshell on NGOs in early December by introducing a motion in the Fifth (Budget) Committee that would charge NGOs for all "costs," such as documents, use of meeting rooms, even library access. In a recently-issued report, the United Nations had estimated that such NGO costs represented 3.2% of the Conference Services budget, or some $400,000 per year to the organization. The fact that the United States, with unpaid dues of $1.3 billion, wanted to squeeze hard-pressed NGOs was greeted with outrage by the NGO community and by many member states as well. The resolution, made suddenly and secretly -- and apparently against the wishes of many in the US Mission itself -- was soon withdrawn. But the US substituted a motion asking the Secretariat to provide further and more detailed information on the cost of NGOs. The issue remained threateningly alive and the text of the US proposal remained a closely-held secret that no delegation would risk revealing to NGO friends. The Cuban proposal came up again in the intergovernmental Committee on NGOs, meeting in early December. Government delegations friendly to NGOs persuaded the Committee to meet with NGO representatives. A meeting then took place on December 11. NGOs were surprised to discover that a list of alleged security problems had been circulating among committee members. And NGOs listened as some delegations complained about "unfortunate incidents," "disorderly" NGOs and "unmanageable" numbers. But on the whole the meeting was friendly. The Committee seemed ready to engage in a dialogue with NGOs and to postpone further consideration of the Cuba proposal and other restrictive measures. The Committee meeting nonetheless demonstrated the breadth of negative ideas that NGOs confront. While the Cubans and other G-77 delegates continued to urge the need for numerical and other restrictions, the United States delegate reaffirmed the need for a "code of conduct" for NGOs, as a "means for NGOs and states to understand one another better."

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At the very end of the Committee's meetings, in the final hour on the afternoon of December 18, the Chairman sought to get hasty approval for his summary of the meeting with NGOs and, stapled to the back, behind another document, a draft on "Rights and Responsibilities" of NGOs that had never been discussed. Luckily, in spite of the Chairman's efforts, the Committee refused to give its approval. Again, a negative step was just barely averted. On a somewhat more positive note, CONGO celebrated its fiftieth anniversary on December 3, with a major meeting at headquarters, addressed by UN luminaries, delegates and NGO leaders. Congratulation was the order of the day, as speakers reviewed progress over a half century. The very next day, December 4, Assistant Secretary General Gillian Sorensen held a meeting with NGO leaders, in an unusually broad effort to consult and to invite input into the new report mandated by the pending Canadian resolution. At the time, it seemed that the Secretariat was responding to the need for new forms of consultation and partnership. But this was to prove a sad illusion. Storms in Early 1999 In mid-February, the prestigious Stanley Foundation organized a conference on the subject of NGO access to the UN. About two dozen participants gathered in Arden House, the Harriman estate located north of New York City, for a long weekend of debate and discussion. Present were some important delegates, some key figures from the Secretariat, and a number of NGO leaders, though Assistant Secretary General Sorensen was not in attendance. For a weekend the participants talked together, took meals together, and pondered the future for NGOs. At the end, there emerged a positive conclusion that cooperation and partnership were necessary, even though the path forward would at times be rocky. Not long after the Arden House conference, on February 25-26, CONGO held a board meeting at which members expressed serious concern about the new relations between the UN and private business. Members also discussed strained


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relations with the Secretariat and especially problematic relations with Assistant Secretary General Sorensen. Eventually, the board adopted a resolution on these issues and requested a meeting with Secretary General Annan to discuss them. But when CONGO president Afaf Mahfouz wrote to the SG requesting a meeting, he did not respond directly, instead forwarding the matter to ASG Sorensen. Meanwhile, conscious of the need to provide input to the second report of the Secretary General on NGO access, a number of NGOs met privately to discuss initiatives and draft declarations. CONGO announced that it was preparing a text, and Global Policy Forum circulated a draft as well. NGOs wondered what was their best strategy, how should they frame their "input" and what issues should be raised. The Secretariat memorandum called for "comments" on the previous report, limited to four pages in length. But some NGO leaders felt that a more proactive approach and greater length would be required. At UN offices in Geneva, Kurdish protest demonstrators broke into the premises and occupied offices in late February. The Geneva police, unable to control the situation, called in the Swiss army. The army ringed the Palais des Nations with barbed wire and patrolled the area with soldiers and heavy weapons, turning the UN into an armed camp. NGOs, along with UN staff and delegates, were subject to metal detectors and close searches. Protests on the Kosovo crisis a few weeks later would further intensify the atmosphere of security threat, having an inevitable effect on security thinking in New York. On March 3, at a meeting of the Commission on the Status of Women, a Secretariat official prevented a Canadian NGO woman of Tibetan origin from speaking, in anticipation of objections from the Chinese delegation. When another NGO woman informed the plenary about what had taken place, the chair did not allow any further NGO speakers for the remainder of the session. A number of NGOs protested vigorously at this access setback, based on a clear principle of censorship. On March 2, ASG Sorensen called in about a dozen NGO leaders in New York for further consultations. Discussions

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mainly focused on input to the Secretary General's report and plans for the Millenium Assembly and Forum. At another NGO meeting organized by Ms. Sorensen on March 31, Chief Michael McCann of the UN Security Department spoke about security problems and the need for broad new restrictions. NGOs repeatedly asked McCann wheither he had evidence that NGOs are a real security threat, but he did not provide any convincing response. ASG Sorensen informed NGO representatives that whether they liked it or not, new restrictions would be put in place. She then asked NGOs to help devise a method for distribution of special tickets for access to the second floor of the conference building and asked for input in a few days' time. On Friday, April 9, NGOs participating in the Sorensen discussions delivered a letter to the ASG expressing their firm opposition to the new rules and refusing to be implicated in the new system by helping to devise some of its minor details. A third meeting at the ASG's office on April 14th was especially tense. NGOs made it clear that they were very unhappy and that they felt they were being treated in an overbearing and unproductive manner. One senior NGO representative said gently but firmly that, in terms of conflict resolution, the Secretariat approach was a total failure. The meeting ended awkwardly and a meeting scheduled for the following week to solicit input to the Secretary General's report was inexplicably cancelled. In a memorandum dated April 19, the Secretary General's Chef de Cabinet Iqbal Riza sent NGOs the new security regulations. Many new rules limited NGO access -- by subjecting NGOs to searches, preventing NGOs from circulating in certain areas of the building and so on. Many NGOs were already aware of these regulations, but all were shocked at the blunt and completely unapologetic way in which they were issued. Further, according to reliable sources, Riza was issuing the rules in large part because of pressure from delegations, not because of security "threats" at all. Some said that the tough new approach was related to the SG's campaign to be reelected to a second term.


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The Commission on Human Rights greatly influences UN policy towards NGOs. The Commission meetings, taking place from 22 March to 30 April 1999 drew a large number of NGOs, and conflicts with governments again arose. Especially problematic, an NGO called Christian Solidarity invited John Garang, the leader of a Southern Sudanese rebel group to speak to the Commission under its auspices. Garang inevitably annoyed the Sudanese government. And by speaking in the name of his rebel group, not the accredited NGO, he broke the Commission's rules and opened the way for rule-based reprisals. Many other delgations were annoyed at more ordinary NGO critics, who again pointed out abuses in countries world wide. In 1999, with Amnesty International highlighting the human rights abuses in the United States in its special annual report, even those delegations usually supportive of human rights NGOs were inclined to find fault. Soon after the end of the Commission session, two ambassadors seen as "NGO friendly" took surprisingly negative steps. Ambassador Paolo Fulci of Italy, President of ECOSOC, and Ambassador Anne Anderson of Ireland, the Irish representative to the UN in Geneva and Chair of the Human Rights Commission, both wrote letters to the Chairman of the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs calling for steps to limit NGO access at the Commission, so as to make its deliberations more efficient and orderly. Human rights NGOs quickly obtained these texts and reacted with hurt and astonishment. Particularly annoying to the NGOs was the claim made by Amb. Anderson that 1,800 NGOs had "attended" the Commission. NGO research discovered that, while that number of passes had been approved, the number of passes actually issued was much smaller and that at any single session only a couple of hundred NGOs were typically present. Clearly, exaggeration on NGO numbers had become a standard means of expression govenment fear of excessive NGO influence. A Contradictory Picture The situation of NGOs at the end of the century is very contradictory, with movement both backward and forward. In

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many countries, under pressure from the political right, national legislatures changed laws, restraining the areas of legitimate NGO activities and restricting the tax-exempt status so vital to NGOs' funding base. Further, after a few years of rapid increases in government funding of NGOs, new rules and restrictions choked off the financial flows that many NGOs had come to depend on. During 1996-98 at the UN there were also many NGO setbacks. In addition to the loss of global conferences and the ODS debacle, NGOs working in some fields found their access reduced, while others found that programs in their area suffered severely from the UN financial crisis. Disarmament NGOs, for example, faced a far more closed and less welcoming environment during the Conference on Disarmament than they had in the past. Environment NGOs felt that the status they had achieved at Rio was substantially eroded. Women's NGOs watched in frustration as many womens' programs at the UN took budget cuts. But at the same time, in certain areas, NGOs continued to move ahead and set new precedents for participation in the intergovernmental process. Outside the UN system, NGOs proved their growing influence by engineering a new international treaty on the abolition of land mines (signed at an intergovernmental conference in Ottawa in December 1997) and by torpedoing negotiations towards a Multilateral Agreement on Investments (abandoned -- for the time being at least -- by governments in the summer and fall of 1998). At the UN, during negotiations towards an International Criminal Court, NGOs achieved unprecedented access and influence and many observers hailed them as key to the eventual success of the negotiation process, as the treaty was adopted in Rome in July of 1998. At a more informal level, the NGO Working Group on the Security Council in New York opened up an effective channel for regular dialogue between NGOs and the Council -- a step that had seemed impossible only a short time before. Even in the inner-sanctum of the intergovernmental process, NGOs


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were proving the importance of their presence -- and were being treated by delegations as necessary and even welcome partners. The NGO movement has many potential resources and its global grassroots base appears stronger than ever. Reinforced by the internet and woven together in networks of cooperation and joint action, the NGO community is clearly not going to be an easy target for hardliners on the government side. Furthermore, governments are far from being consistently hostile to NGOs. While inclined to keep NGOs "in their place," they are also keenly aware that NGOs are valuable partners, sources of information, links to the public, sources of ideas and analysis. In short, NGOs are annoying but indispensable. So delegations are constantly closing the door, only to open it again still wider. With the right kind of organization and mobilization, and with an enlightened approach from delegations, NGOs could well take another significant step forward on access to UN decision-making at the dawn of the new Millenium. AID EFFECTIVENESS: THE MYTH OF NGO SUPERIORITY

Recent research suggests that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from donor countries do not provide better targeted or more efficient aid than state-run development agencies. They do not seem to even try to outperform the latter by focussing on the neediest or by working in particularly difficult environments. It is easy to lament the stinginess and selfishness of official donors, as Kishore Mahbubani did in D+C/E+Z 2/2008. Those donors provide critics with the data needed to expose the flaws of official development assistance (ODA). It is different with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). NGO aid is certainly relevant, but its allocation has hardly been mapped, let alone explained. The main reason is that sufficiently detailed data are hard to come by. After all, NGOs probably do not want critical analysis to tarnish their image of being superior donors.

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NGOs are often believed to provide well-targeted aid. They are said to be particularly close to the poor, as many of them directly cooperate with local target groups, circumventing recipient governments with a reputation of corruption. Accordingly, the argument goes, they are better aligned to poor people's needs, and suffer from less leakage. Moreover, it is said that NGO aid is less distorted by donor governments' commercial and political interests, such as export promotion or political alliances. Donor governments seem to share that favourable view. To a large extent, they channel ODA through NGOs. In some donor countries, the share of such ODA is as high as 20 %. The total of aid granted by NGOs from OECD nations amounted to almost $ 15 billion per annum in 2005 and 2006. That sum exceeded bilateral ODA from every individual donor country except for the USA. Some critics, however, suspect that the case for NGO aid largely rests on ideological grounds. The view that NGOs have a clear focus on the poor first came under attack in the 1990s. Critics believe that NGOs probably prefer the quiet life of implementing their national governments' agendas to risking failure in attempts to outperform state agencies. This seems all the more likely as some NGOs financially depend on official "backdonors". The cases of Sweden and Switzerland Such criticism is hardly supported by empirical research so far; and that is something it has in common with the widespread faith in high NGO performance. NGOs only rarely support scholars who collect data. Doing research on German NGOs, for instance, therefore tends to be frustrating. By contrast, two relatively small donors - Sweden and Switzerland - offer reasonable data to compare NGOs and state agencies by analysing the following three questions: • Do NGOs focus more strongly than ODA on those countries where need is most pressing? • Do NGOs engage in particular where the policy environment is difficult, so government-to-government transfers are unlikely to work?


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• Do NGOs behave more altruistically than state aid agencies, which may be pursuing hidden agendas? Research done at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy in cooperation with the KOF Swiss Economic Institute in Zurich and the Radboud University in Nijmegen has led to only preliminary results so far, but they do reinforce the sceptics' view on NGO aid. The answer to the first question is clearly "no" if one judges recipients' need for aid by average per-capita incomes. The increase in Swiss NGO aid for countries with lower average income, for instance, was slightly less pronounced than the increase in Swiss ODA. In striking contrast to Swedish ODA, Swedish NGOs completely ignored the income position of recipients, spreading their aid almost equally over low and middle-income countries. The poorest 25 % only received 27 % of Swedish NGO funds, whereas the wealthiest 25 % received 22 %. The picture is more favourable for Swiss NGOs if need is measured in terms of absolute poverty (share of the population living on less than one or two dollars per day). Swedish NGOs hardly differ from state agencies in this respect. As for institutional environments, we found interesting differences between Sweden and Switzerland, but they did not follow the NGO-government divide. Both Swedish and Swiss NGOs tended to mirror their governments. This is in conflict with advice by the World Bank which is echoed in many policy documents both at UN and national levels. Accordingly, official donors should focus on better governed countries in order to render ODA more effective, whereas NGOs should become active predominantly where governance is bad. Just like the state-run agencies, Swedish NGOs were not particularly active in challenging settings. Swiss NGOs did allocate more funds to countries with weak institutions - but so did the Swiss government. It thus seems that Swiss NGOs were accommodating government policy rather than trying to excel in places where governance was particularly troubled. As for donor countries' own interests, neither Swedish nor Swiss NGOs seemed to be pursuing any hidden agenda. The notable exception was that Swiss NGOs resembled their government in providing more aid to countries that voted in

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line with Switzerland at the UN. Switzerland's neutrality may be at the root of this finding; both the government and NGOs may feel that developing countries that take a similar stance deserve support. On the other hand, countries with commercial relevance to both Sweden and Switzerland, for instance as export markets, did not get significantly more NGO aid. Once again, however, NGO performance did not differ much from their governments'. Comparisons among OECD countries typically show that Sweden and Switzerland belong in the "altruistic" camp of countries that do not use ODA to promote exports. NGOs based in various OECD Countries NGOs may have better chances to excel in less altruistic donor countries. OECD nations that are known for more selfsearching development policies include big donors like France, the USA and Japan. To assess NGO aid tentatively for a broader donor sample, our Dutch co-author, Dirk-Jan Koch, collected data on some 60 OECD-based NGOs. Together, these NGOs spent $ 5.7 billion on aid to almost all recipient countries in 2005. That was nearly as much as the four Scandinavian countries spent on ODA that year. One may, of course, doubt the representativeness of the sample. Moreover, the data only refer to one year. Nonetheless, it is striking that the aid allocation of the seven German NGOs included in the sample was actually biased against poorer countries. Brazil and South Africa were among the top-10 recipients of German NGO aid in absolute terms, even though the per-capita income of both countries ranged in the highest quartile. The top-10 with respect to aid per capita included four countries in the upper income half (Botswana, Cape Verde, Namibia and Swaziland). The whole group of 60 NGOs granted more aid to needier countries, however. The impact of local institutions on NGO aid from all OECD countries together remained inconclusive. It seems that many NGOs were torn between favouring better governed countries and allocating aid in accordance with the comparative advantage NGOs might have in working under difficult local conditions.


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NGOs from all donor countries taken together have a strong tendency to replicate the aid allocation of official backdonors. This indicates the limits to autonomous decision-making of NGOs that depend on government funds. Moreover, NGOs tend follow their peers, probably in order to control risks by hiding in the crowd. In any case, NGO aid is clustered, and NGOs are deepening the divide between so-called donor darlings and aid orphans. All in all, our findings point to NGO aid not being a panacea for providing better-targeted aid and boosting aid effectiveness. In contrast to what one might expect, NGOs seem to prefer to keep a low profile. They did not try to distinguish themselves from state aid agencies by outperforming the latter in terms of focus on the neediest, or by entering uncharted waters where ODA is likely to fail. The preliminary nature of the findings reported in this short account of ongoing research must be stressed. Future research will have to look into what exactly is driving NGOs to replicate both official donors and peers. It must also be understood to what extent NGOs that rely strongly on official backdonors behave differently from those that are truly independent. To assess these matters, it would certainly help if NGOs became more transparent and opened their books to research. STEPPING BEYOND CIVIL SOCIETY: PROSPECTS FOR THE MULTITUDES OF RESISTANCE

The correlation between free market capitalism and the democratic organization of society through civil society institutions and their members is steadily declining. The post 9/11 political order, seen as an accelerated mode of democratically unchecked globalization, is marked by increased militarization and repression of social organizations and democratic rights. Increasingly traditional civil society is relegated to a marginal, merely nominal role in the greater scheme of things. The discussion of civil society, its roles, functions and relevance

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for social order might be near the final frontier of meaningful advances in a democracy under the spell of globalization. The concept of civil society has become fixated on representative democracy and subservient to established political elites and economic hierarchies. By helping these elites to maintain antiquated institutions and processes of political order, civil society is draining itself of its democratic potential. While civil society is still alive in the global arena, it is hardly well. In spite of such predicaments, new opportunities for democracy have arisen in the wake of the anti-globalization movements, set in motion by a multitude of actors who are exploring, developing, and advancing protest and challenges to today's imperial mode of globalization. Now the universal ideal of democracy finds itself between the proverbial rock and a hard place: it cannot take root on the wastelands of imperial globalization, yet there is still little nurturing soil to be found on the fields of possibility. For now, civil society remains the vehicle of choice for social change. However, it will need to step out and beyond itself in order to create sustainable development and unconditional democracy. The Nutshell All hands are raised in support of civil society. This is the fitting cover photo for Michael Edwards' short book on the theory and practice of civil society. More often than not, civil society is a confusing concept, but Edwards is able to provide welcome clarity while covering a lot of historical ground in just 138 pages (Edwards, 2004). In essence, Edwards' holistic approach to civil society aims for consensus. It is a constructive approach, one that evolves into an agenda for 'nurturing connections between civil society theories'. At its base is the recognition that "civil society is simultaneously a goal to aim for, a means to achieve it and a framework for engaging with each other about ends and means" (Edwards:110). The critical shortcoming of Edwards' synthesis is its inability to provide a suitable basis for challenging today's rule of neo-imperial globalization. Analytically mechanic, the holistic approach offered by Edwards remains stuck in political


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theory that is dependent upon a state system no longer in tune with the constantly shifting and emerging social and political constellations, coalitions and networks of public sphere actors and stakeholders. However this is equally true of his critics, such as Neera Chandhoke, who praise "Civil Society" as readable and finely nuanced. However, they cannot contrive anything beyond Edwards' positive assessment of the prospects for civil society apart from resurrected party politics alongside rights-oriented citizens' campaigns. (Chandhoke, 2005) The state today is frequently a root cause of inequality and an institutional roadblock for advancing democratic civil society. The very concept of representation is no longer adequate to give expression to the multitude of societal voices, ideas and interests increasingly defined by cross-cultural and transnational identities. Most importantly, the notion of "sovereignty" is at odds with democratic aspirations and interactive practices expressed outside and beyond the classical nation state. In "Multitude," Michal.Hardt and Antonio Negri critically examine how the crisis of democracy is at heart a crisis of the concept of sovereignty. They call for a new science of democracy: "Sovereignty in all its forms inevitably poses power as the rule of the one (society reduced to an artificial unity or 'social body') and undermines the possibility of a full and absolute democracy. The project of democracy today must challenge all existing forms of sovereignty as a precondition for establishing democracy" (Hardt and Negri, 2004:353). In order to understand new evolving organizational forms and political modes of expression, current conceptualizations of civil society obviously no longer provide satisfactory analytical frameworks. Post-civil society is not a merely advanced or updated civil society form that exists alongside or in conjunction with our current political and economic systems. These systems of neo-imperial globalization impose bourgeois restraint and 'civility' upon civil society as a global enterprise and therefore inhibit, undermine and suffocate democratic alternatives with global demands and aspirations.

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A Global Arena Only when understood as the anti-thesis to globalization's unsustainable and in essence, undemocratic systems, will civil society be able to live up to its global potentials and step outside of the boundaries of formally democratic and pro-forma representative, imperial-agenda driven consumerist society. Seen as an emerging multitude of interests committed to sharing and sustainably managing the global commons, society can be organized in all-inclusive manners, thereby stepping outside of the present realities of nation-state bound civil society. Yet even the notion of global civil society only partially overcomes the limitations civil society at the national level faces with regard to ensuring development and democracy. Laxer and Halperin have noted that "Like globalization, global civil society is mainly a normative and 'strategic concept', not an accomplished reality" (Laxer and Halperin, 2003). Globalized capitalism to date, has failed to deliver most of its promises in its own homelands; it has delivered even less in most poor countries. The failure is clear enough by simply restating that the "Rich keep getting richer and the poor poorer", when Forbes magazine celebrates more billionaires in our world this year compared to last year but never takes note of the parallel of more slum dwellers today than ever before in human history. It is precisely at this point where democracy theory needs to formulate a viable global project, one that is viable across economic regions and throughout different forms of social organization. In the age of today's Empire, established national civil societies are constantly losing independency and capacity to challenge Empire-supporting political systems. German political economists Altvater and Mohnhaupt have pointed out that global governance has emerged as an attempt to regulate ecological and social limits of capitalist globalization, limits that are far harder to define than boundaries of nation states (Altvater and Mohnhaupt,1996). Historically, rights, freedoms and civic responsibilities have been associated with the nation state. Globalization in fact redefines territory-based relationships between citizens and states. Once unrestrained


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globalization reaches and exceeds ecological limits, it becomes hard to dispute its direct impacts on the lives of billions of people trapped in cycles of poverty. It becomes apparent that globalization runs on an unsustainable course counterproductive to its own reproduction. Coming back to mainstream thinking on civil society, considerable theoretical shortcomings emerge when trying to explain trans-nation state dimensions of civil society. Authors like Chandhoke and Edwards do have a vivid sense of the current crisis of representation that is choking and frustrating democracy around the world. However, instead of lamenting the inefficacies of governments and how they often fail to meet their responsibilities in society, a critique of the state and its instrumentalization by capitalist globalization is called for. Clearly, a 'good society' cannot be brought about by depending on the good will of states with little or no interest in sharing resources and power or embracing multi-level and dimensional accountability practices. In a divided world, contradictions persists, even flourish as democratic social change happens only in leaps and bounds, with traditional and new stakeholders work alongside as well as diametrically opposed to one another. On the one hand, "The powers of the nation state continue and formal representative democracy has expanded throughout the globe. Yet nation states currently display a very frail form of democracy because although everyone in principal has an equal voice it is a weak voice" (Diane Perrons, 2004). To his credit, Edwards does point to the potential of global civil society to form networks for collective action. However he regards this only as a distant possibility. In part this hesitation is due to his view of global civil society as mechanically emerging, as an addition of new layers of non-state actors and their associations. Global civil society for Edwards, however desirable, remains an embryonic social movement and is too often merely issue-driven. Likewise when discussing critical theory, Edwards also misses the political practice inspired by the theory: the revolutionary momentum of 1968 to which critical theory contributed is not recognized, the immanent threat to the survival of bourgeois civil society that arose, is not acknowledged.

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In a reductionist manner, Edwards equates Habermas with critical theory, seemingly unaware that as a second-generation critical theorist, Habermas strayed considerably from the revolutionary political philosophy of Adorno and Marcuse. While Adorno can prove to be quite a hard read, his critical analysis of capitalist society remains surprisingly relevant today. "No one was better than Adorno at dissecting the psychic and emotional brutality of capitalism's regimes of commodification and the increasing pressure it exerts on individuals to define themselves through consumption. This, he argued, led to the compulsion to shut off one's capacity for empathy, whether with working people whose labor produces commodities (how could we shop at Wal-Mart otherwise?) or those whose homes, lives and futures are being sacrificed in the name of a marketfriendly abstraction called 'Iraqi freedom.'" (Jamie Daniel, 2005) Critical theory challenged the straightjacket of alienating political representation; it did not settle for communicating about the forms, processes and degrees of exclusion from democracy. Thus it is only in the last sentences of the book where Edwards comes to acknowledge that 21st century manifestations of global civil society action (such as the World Social Forum in Brazil in 2002, followed-up on in 2005 and in 2007) are expressions of alternative forms of politics,"a new kind of society"(Edwards:111). In order to understand evolving organizational forms and political modes of expression of this new society, current conceptualizations of civil society can no longer provide satisfactory analytical frameworks. Post-civil society is not a merely advanced or updated civil society form that exists alongside or in conjunction with our current political and economic systems.


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and their networks rests upon their ability to promote grassrootslevel activities that often stand in opposition to state-led or sponsored development work. As many developing country governments still lack vital resources and essential local capacities to implement well-intended policies, civil society organizations such as development NGOs often play pivotal roles in meeting persistent basic human needs. Implementing aid programs in response to locally defined agendas becomes as much an exercise in service delivery as a balancing act in meeting multiple, frequently conflicting development agendas. Since the mid-1990s, NGOs active in development cooperation work have increasingly embraced notions of good governance and civil society strengthening in their program portfolios and implementation approaches. Enhancing locallevel capacities to design, manage, implement and evaluate aid is the essence of local ownership and is generally considered essential for attaining aid effectiveness. Clearly, effective forms of development cooperation depend on the successful adoption of partnership approaches in aid relationships, on "ownership", and "mutuality and shared identities" as best practices demonstrate. (Jennifer Brinkerhoff, 2002).

First Steps Beyond the Arena

NGOs are often expected to "fill in the gaps", even to mediate between citizen expectations and state unwillingness (and/or inability) to deliver stability, equality and social progress. Where these NGOs work in consort and in networks with likeminded global partners, they frequently do succeed in promoting forms of democratic global civil society. Global commons, such as natural resources, human rights and democracy, can be claimed by global civil society actors; but in terms of asserting this claim, NGOs may simply lack the political muscle to safeguard and expropriate global commons from the fangs of predatory globalization.

In the lopsided arena of North-South relations, development NGOs and their networks of partners have been stepping up to this challenge, not only to consolidate and defend developmental gains, but also to explore avenues for advancing global civil society and democracy. To no small degree, the critical contribution of partnership-oriented development NGOs

Global civil society actors and their networks have an increasingly political role to play as actors of "the multitude", as contributors to the possibility of democracy on a global scale. This is an open and expansive role, one that steps beyond the jealously guarded power spheres of nation states and their sovereignty preoccupations. It is a role that is irreconcilable

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with an understanding of civil society and NGOs as depending on some ill-defined goodwill and benevolence of nation states. NGOs, which through their global networks of partners endeavor to defend, promote and most importantly, extend democracy beyond the limits imposed by sovereignty obsessed nation state systems, are challenged to reduce dependency on states to function and flourish, to define political agendas rather than be subjected by them. Contested Ground, Imagined Spaces With regard to culture and related identities, the modern nation state model that originated in the 18th century has already proven incapable of furthering the democratic ideal and associated political identities. It seems strangely archaic to assume that cultural differences or commonly attributed cultural identities neatly coincide with the nation states of today. Most, if not all nation states are home to a variety of broad-based cultures and a multitude of sub-cultures. These cross-cut and intersect through time and space, interacting randomly or on selected occasions. To define culture in relation to a nation state is an increasingly futile academic exercise. Cultural confrontation appears more of a political construction, with an assigned political purpose than it is associated with genuine conflict between populations adhering to particular sets of cultural traditions, norms and interpretations of society. Thus, it is not far-fetched to see the typical nation state of today as deeply entangled in the fangs of armed globalization: it is far more of a functional necessity to the economic interests aligned with armed globalization, than it is in any way an ally to a democratic project on a global scale. Crumbling Arena In the "homelands" of globalization, the power elites are continuously trying to propagate ad infinitum the myth of a natural link between free markets and democracy. From the perspective of democratic global civil society, this is nothing new and indeed political resistance must take aim at rejecting and persistently opposing such claims. Correspondingly, the


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economic structures and relationships that reproduce below one-dollar-a-day inhuman existence for half the world, while upholding extremely consumerist lifestyles for less than a tenth of global citizens, eventually harm all. Discontent with the contemporary globalization regime constantly arises and latently provides an explosive basis for social revolt. Hardt and Negri speak of "economic grievances" and observe: "In each nation state, poverty is distributed unequally along lines of race, ethnicity and gender. . The construction of the global market and the global integration of national economies has not brought us together but driven us apart, exacerbating the light of the poor. .. Non-profit and religious charity organisations provide enormous assistance for those in need, but they cannot change the system that produces and reproduces poverty." (Hardt and Negri:278f.) Civil disobedience today needs to seek forms of internationalization that take aim at state systems which discourage, often even criminalize any insistence on civil liberties and the historic promise of socialist democracy. Yet it remains short-sighted to assume that a global civil society will succeed in asserting itself on par with the power elites that drive globalization. Such a view is counterproductive for advancing a global democratic project, as it can be convincingly argued that ".contemporary conceptions of 'civil society' are based in idealistic notions of states, markets, freedom, rights, and citizen power and therefore, hinder rather than facilitate the attainment of deeper forms of democracy." (Laxer and Halperin: 63) The choices at hand in most parliamentary democracies are harrowingly few. Often more opinionated rather than truly knowledgeable about the inter-relatedness of political struggles around the world, citizens have begun to equate democratic freedoms with freedom of movement. Across the "free world" citizens too easily overlook the deepening social and political divides; they tend to accept the picture of freedom presented to them at face value. Only when personal experiences of suspension and limitation of democratic freedoms mount does discontent form and occasionally lead to political protest from

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within. Such protest has increased in the wake of the aggressive unilateralism, "...or, rather, the exception posed by the United States within the global system, (which) thwarts all.reform proposals." (Hardt and Negri: 304) Emerging from the WTO protests movements against robber-baron globalization, and intensifying in response to the outright assault on civil rights in the post-9/11 world, a new mix of personal and collective experiences of political protests and resistance has taken root. While such resistance is often issue-driven, it likewise takes on a network-type of organizational form. Its actions maintain a high degree of spontaneity but are increasingly formalized in event form or cross-national action campaigns. The most important should be mentioned, staying plugged in to how, when and where they take on form and shape is almost a civic necessity. The World Social Forum (WSF) that took place in Nairobi, Kenya this year is certainly a central movement of political dissent. Toward Freedom ran a report on this event in January (Dan Morrison, 2007). The MakePovertyHistory campaign against poverty and injustice will again be making its voice heard at the summit of the G8 states, this year held in early June in Germany. In North America, The MidWest Social Forum (MWSF) will hold an annual gathering in late June in Atlanta. The MWSF, a gathering of grassroots organizations, community activists, workers, educators, students, artists, and many others, sees itself as an open space for exchanging experiences and information, strengthening alliances and networks, and developing effective strategies for progressive social, economic, and political change. The online portal Idealist, a project of Action Without Borders, links to over 59,000 non-profit and community organizations in 165 countries. It has recently stared an effort to launch a global network of people interested in social and political change, starting at the community level. Some 84 start-up meetings in over 30 countries are planned in the coming weeks. The Al Gore movie on climate change has allowed the debate to make its way into the world of Hollywood. And on the 7th of July, the issue will be propelled onto a global


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music stage through LiveEarth, bringing together more than 150 of the world's top musicians for 24-hours of music from 7 concerts across all 7 continents. Another, more "established" key driver of civil society in its many manifestations is, of course, Civicus. It will hold its next World Assembly, one of the largest annual civil society conferences, in Glasgow, Scotland, from the 23 - 27 of May, 2007. Equally established and a driving force, the global network of Oneworld, brings together more than 1,500 organizations from across the globe - to promote sustainable development, social justice and human rights. Hopefully the momentum these and other democratic ventures generate will prove to be significant enough to permanently dismantle the neo-liberal globalization project. There are promising signs that the walls of the house of globalization are already crumbling even before the roof has been built. Some parts of the edifice may succeed in providing some shelter from today's political storms, but temporary abode is little more than hidden homelessness. Rather than continuing to search for approaches to further spread and embed current forms of globalization, a new foundation for a completely new design of global relations and development are needed. Civil society, nationally and globally can no longer be satisfied with helping out to fix the leaking roof. It is time to move on and let the arena crumble like Rome's coliseum. NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT

The phenomenal growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at both international and national levels is due to the changing attitude of donor agencies about development assistance and the increased demand for NGO services in Third World countries. NGOs are non-membership support organizations involved in relief, rehabilitation, or community development work in developed and, especially, developing or Third World countries. Considered part of the civil arena in society which also includes trade unions, people's associations and membership organizations, cooperatives and religious-based

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charities, NGOs provide a third approach to development between market-led and state-led strategies. In the post-Cold War era, governments in Third World countries are experiencing a steady decline in both fiscal support and public credibility.4 On the other hand, markets globally are on the ascent in terms of ideological and resource support, while those in the Third World are still nascent or in decline. As I argue later, the prevalence of weak states and declining markets in the Third World inevitably leave developmentoriented NGOs as the only alternative to promote grassroots development. Hence development-oriented NGOs are not simply located somewhere between the state and market in terms of institutional space, but are emerging as a critical "third or middle sector" fostering the development of marginalized segments of the population. As one observer recently pointed out, developmental NGOs are "needed to cater for those groups whose place at the state or market table is not reserved." All NGOs share several characteristics including dependency on donor funding; the need for self-financing, transparency or accountability to donors and clients; and targeting the needy or marginalized segments of the population or operating in various sectors of society depending on the needs to be met as well as resources available in the local community. This paper is organized in three sections. The first section discusses the major reasons behind the changing attitude of the international donor community towards development assistance and its impact on NGO growth or expansion. The second critically examines how the failure of both governments and markets in Third World countries to deliver economic development has led to an increasing reliance on the NGOs to fill the "void" created. The final section analyzes the emerging significance of NGOs as an alternative approach to grassroots development in the Third World. THE CHANGING ATTITUDE OF THE INTERNATIONAL DONOR COMMUNITY AND NGO GROWTH

The phenomenal growth of NGOs on the world scene has been aptly described as "a global associational revolution." The


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number of development-- oriented NGOs registered in countries of the industrialized North "grew from 1,600 in 1980 to 2,970 in 1993". It is also reported that "over the same period, the total spending of these NGOs rose from US$2.8 billion to US$5.7 billion in current prices . . . " By 1993 there were an estimated 28,900 international NGOs worldwide, with approximately 20,000 of these in Third World countries.10 The growth of the NGOs on the global scene is associated with the changing attitude of the international donor community about development assistance. Such a change of attitude has been influenced by the end of the Cold War, the dwindling development aid from leading industrialized countries, and a new emphasis on targeting aid to benefit marginalized segments of society. With the end of the Cold War, "development policy and aid transfers have come to be dominated by . . . a new policy agenda.11 Such a policy agenda "is driven by . . . liberal economics and liberal democratic theory." Also, recent developments in economic and political thinking about roles of markets and states in promoting economic development have been heavily influenced by neoliberal economic and democratic theory. As a result of such thinking, markets and private sector initiatives are considered the most efficient mechanisms for achieving economic growth and providing most services, including social services (via privatization) to most people. In contrast, governments whose role within the economy is being reduced, are expected to create an "enabling environment" or a legal and policy framework for the private sector provision of goods and services. Under the New Policy Agenda, NGOs are seen as vehicles for democratization as well as for providing goods and services in Third World countries where markets are inaccessible to the poor or where governments lack capacity or resources to reach them. In the eyes of the international donor community, NGOs are both cost-effective in reaching the poor and are considered "the preferred channel for service provision, in deliberate substitution for the state." For most Western industrialized countries including the United States, the end of the Cold War has meant an end to using foreign aid to "buy"

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allies in the Third World to support it against the former Soviet Union. As a result, the strategic and military importance of development aid has diminished. In addition to the post-Cold War considerations, the declining aid levels to the Third World have forced the donor community "to ensure that the developmental impact of scarce aid resources is maximized."14 According to the 1998 World Bank Report: "Net official development finance, consisting of loans and grants from government agencies and multilateral institutions, has declined by almost 50 percent in real ( ...) terms since the early 1990s." The decline in aid has been due to several factors including "the pressing need for fiscal consolidation in most [industrialized] countries, the declining strategic and military importance of development aid since the end of the Cold War, and weak public support for aid in some major donor countries, due in part to skepticism about its effectiveness." Increasingly, many donors "want to fund projects and programs that have a greater chance of being sustainable and of standing on their own." As a result, capacity building and sustainability are now the watchwords for donor-supported development projects. In order to maximize the impact of scarce development aid, many donors are channeling an increasing share of their overseas development aid (ODA) through NGOs. For example, in 1980, funding from the international donor community "accounted for less than 10 percent of NGO budgets, [but] by the 1990s their share had risen to 35 percent." As a result of increased donor funding, NGOs in some African countries "now provide or implement more than a fifth of total aid flows, compared with less than one percent fifteen years ago." Increasingly, a large number of NGOs in the Third World are funded by a small number of donors such as the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The World Bank not only encourages member governments to work with NGOs on development projects, but also directly funds the NGO projects. It is reported that, "from 1973 to 1988, NGOs were involved in about 15 [World] Bank


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projects a year. By 1990 that number had jumped to 89, or 40 percent of all new projects approved." And in 1997, approved World Bank projects in Third World countries involving NGOs were: 84 percent in South Asia, 61 percent in Africa, and 60 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean. USAID is said to funnel 20 percent of its funds through NGOs. The Inter-American Foundation Survey of North and Latin America "revealed that most of the multilateral banks, the United Nations, USAID, and advocacy organizations in the United States and Europe favored a restructuring of aid away from traditional government-to-government approaches toward people-to-people programs." Furthermore, the public sentiment in the United States and Europe seems to be "in favor of NGO participation in the development process and against governmental foreign aid." The shift toward people-oriented programs and NGO participation in the development process is a result of declining foreign aid and the failure of many large-scale development projects funded by multilateral agencies and Third World governments. Major donors now view NGOs as potentially effective agents of development assistance, especially aid targeted to benefit the poor, women, and children. The donor community's concern with people-centered development projects has led to considerable rethinking about cost-effectiveness and impact on the beneficiaries. As a result, donor agencies now favor new and innovative development strategies such as the "minimalist cost-effective approach" (used by microfinance institutions), "assisted selfreliance" or "participatory development." NGOs appear well suited to adapt the use of new and innovative strategies because of their small scale, flexibility and wide-ranging capacity to mobilize resources and to organize people to solve their own problems. The new development strategies, which are considered to be "people-friendly" engage grassroots energies, resources and talents and perceive people as active participants of their own development. Finally, the objectives of the new development models can be achieved much more cost-effectively through NGOs.

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This is primarily because NGOs tend to be flexible vehicles for meeting a variety of human needs including: self-expression or empowerment, promoting equity, self-help, participation and mutual assistance. Increasingly, donors believe that many of their aid priorities in the post-debt and post-Cold War era can be effectively implemented through a variety of NGOs found in virtually all Third World countries. The aid priorities of the international donor community include: " . . . developing the private sector, alleviating poverty, encouraging more equitable income distribution, supporting women, and promoting participatory development approaches and modalities that stress individual action and collective initiatives." Despite donor interest in channeling development aid through NGOs, critics contend that funds from such powerful donors as the World Bank or USAID are likely "to compromise the independence and effectiveness of NGOs in achieving their social goals." FAILURE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD AND NGO GROWTH

As noted in the previous section, donor agencies increasingly support NGOs in providing services to the poor in Third World countries where markets are inaccessible and where governments lack capacity or resources to reach the poor. In most Third World countries including those in Africa, both states and markets are weak or in decline. In Africa, the persistence of the dual crises of weak states and nascent or declining markets pose a classic dilemma for proponents of either market- or state-led economic development. The failure of both markets and governments in Africa to deliver economic development has contributed to the rapid growth and expansion of NGOs on the continent. Evidence accumulated over the past three decades shows "the inability of the African State to deliver on its development promise." In fact, the African State is now perceived as "the inhibitor of social, economic, and political development." The demise of the African State has inevitably given rise to the ascendancy of NGOs to fill up the "development vacuum" that


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has been created. The expansion of the NGO sector in Africa is most clearly reflected at the country level. For example, in Kenya there are about 500 NGOs and in Uganda there are more than 1,000 registered foreign and indigenous NGOs. Similarly, other African countries have a large number of active NGOs. These countries include: "Zambia with 128, Tanzania with 130, Zimbabwe with 300, and Namibia with over 55." The growing role of NGOs in all sectors of development is an indication of the decreasing capacity of the African state to undertake meaningful development. Besides increases in NGO numbers, the amount of development resources they receive or handle for development purposes has grown over the years. It is estimated that "official aid to Kenyan NGOs amounts to about US$35 million a year, which is about 18 percent of all official aid received by Kenya annually [and] . . . in Uganda, NGOs disburse an estimated 25 percent of all official aid to Uganda." The weakening financial situation of Uganda and Kenya, like that of other African countries, is due to a combination of huge external debts, corruption and the effects of structural adjustment programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In particular, the structural adjustment programs have "strained the ability of the African states to provide services and has attracted more NGOs to cushion the adverse shortterm effects of adjustment programs, such as by providing affordable healthcare services." Given the prevailing political and economic conditions in Uganda and Kenya, as well as elsewhere in Africa, the role and contribution of NGOs to the development process is expected to increase. Donor agencies increasingly funnel development assistance through NGOs and other non-state institutions because the states in Sub-Saharan Africa are considered both inefficient and corrupt. As Dicklich observes, the "failure of the [African] state to provide for basic services has led to many official donors to use NGOs rather than the local state to provide services." In Uganda, a succession of inefficient, violent and corrupt regimes since 1971 has contributed to the emergence of over 1,000 indigenous NGOs to provide self-help solutions

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to the poor. Most "ordinary Ugandans have had to fend for themselves, relying on organizations outside of the state rather than on the state itself to provide basic necessities." In general, most service-oriented NGOs have generally "moved into service provision where the state has moved out." No doubt, NGOs have been necessary in Uganda and other African countries to fill up the "developmental gaps" caused by the weak postindependence state. While African States have become increasingly weak, formal markets have steadily declined and in some cases have been replaced by informal or parallel markets. According to Callaghy, most African economies are faced with "declining or negative rates and stagnating or falling per capita income figures; balance of payments and debt problems (which have become more severe (since) the 1980s, requiring IMF and the World Bank programs with their attendant conditionality packages and consequences. Many (export) commodity prices remain low while most import prices remain high. In many countries, agricultural production is falling while aid levels stagnate. Health and nutrition levels are falling while informal or magendo economies (have) become more important as states weaken and formal markets decline. 'Socialist' states have performed poorly and 'capitalist' ones are not significantly better. Hopes for economic growth and development have shriveled on all sides." In Uganda and other African countries, authoritarian regimes "induced an 'exit' from the formal economy [as well as] a general avoidance of state institutions by a wide range of groups and occupations." Furthermore, economic restructuring due to structural adjustment programs and privatization contributed to the retreat of African states from their responsibilities of promoting economic development and providing "basic social services such as health care, education, sanitation and basic security,. . . " Given the weak private sector and the state withdrawal from the provision of basic economic necessities and social services, "many NGOs are being pressurized into dealing with poverty alleviation (not eradication), and the provision of basic social services . . ."


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Thus, NGOs increasingly fill in social and economic spaces created by weak markets or retreating states. As a result, "NGOs have been heralded as . . . new agents with the capacity and commitment to make up for the shortcomings of the state and market in reducing poverty." Some critics of NGO participation in economic development contend that such involvement provides legitimacy and support to governments that have failed to deliver economic development or provide basic social services to their citizens. Other critics charge that NGOs save "donors money and allow them to avoid addressing implementation difficulties, while also allowing them [the donors] to retain ultimate control over activities." The absence of viable states or markets in most Third World countries including African states has left NGOs as the most important alternative for promoting economic development. Thus, the failure or inability of both states and markets to meet the basic needs of the majority of the people in the Third World has given rise to the growing importance of the NGO sector in the development process. Such inability has also exposed the inherent limitations of the state or private sector as major agents of promoting economic development in the Third World. NGOS AS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD

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The rapid growth and expansion of NGOs worldwide attest to their growing critical role in the development process. At the international level, NGOs are perceived as vehicles for providing democratization and economic growth in Third World countries. Within Third World countries, NGOs are increasingly considered good substitutes for weak states and markets in the promotion of economic development and the provision of basic services to most people. NGOs are seen by their proponents as a catalyst for societal change because they are responsive to the needs and problems of their clients, usually the poor, women and children. Because of targeting and being responsive to marginalized groups in

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society, NGOs are being heralded as "important vehicles for empowerment, democratization and economic development." In fact, some NGOs are "driven by strong values and . . . interests . . . , geared toward empowering communities that have been traditionally disempowered." International donor agencies see NGOs as "having the capacity and commitment to make up for the shortcomings of the state and market in reducing poverty." Perhaps the greatest potential NGOs have is to generate self-help solutions to problems of poverty and powerlessness in society. This is based on the view of NGOs as independent, "efficient, less bureaucratic, grassroots oriented, participatory and contributing to sustainable development in grassroots communities." But for NGOs to remain independent of donor or elite control and achieve their social and economic goals, they have to work diligently toward capacity building and financial sustainability. NGOs are increasingly playing an important role in the development process of most Third World countries as discussed in section three of this paper. The growing importance of NGOs in the development process is attributed to the fact that they are considered suitable for promoting participatory grassroots development and self-reliance, especially among marginalized segments of society-namely, the poor, women and children. In fact, some NGOs seek to organize and involve the marginalized groups in their own development. And sometimes, they try to link their clients to the powerful segments of society by providing access to resources that are normally out of reach to the poor. For example, within development-oriented NGOs, microfinance institutions (MFIs) try to contribute to the economic improvement of the poor by: "bringing in new income from outside the community, preventing income from leaving the community, providing new [self] employment opportunities and stimulating backward and forward linkages to other community enterprises." As stated earlier, most development-oriented NGOs in the Third World use new and innovative development strategies such as the "minimalist costeffective approach (favored by microfinance institutions/poverty lending programs), "assisted self-reliance" or "participatory development." Overall, NGOs


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appear well suited to adapt the use of such innovative strategies because of their small-scale of operations, flexibility and great capacity to mobilize resources and to organize people to solve their own problems. The new development strategies perceive people as active participants of their own development. These "bottom-up" development strategies stand in sharp contrast to the "topdown" capitalist and state socialist models of development. Both the capitalist model based on "trickle-down" and the state socialist model of "egalitarian development" based on central/state planning of economic activity have failed to meet basic needs of the poor, women and children and have not helped these marginalized groups to solve their own problems. Both models offer no real choice to the poor about immediate local problems faced or needs. Both forms of institutionalized "top-down" directed development discourage popular citizen participation and de-emphasize people-centered development activity. And finally, both models stress largescale, capital intensive projects that are susceptible to elite control, corruption, and inefficiency. CONCLUSION

As we start the 21st century, NGOs hold a great promise to provide self-help solutions to problems of poverty and powerlessness in many Third World societies. They are increasingly making up for the shortcomings of the state and market in reducing poverty in Third World countries. Furthermore, their future role in development is expected to increase precisely because of favorable international donor support. In fact, since the launching of the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) in 1997, NGOs are increasingly influencing economic and social development policy in Third World countries. SAPRI provides a framework for joint evaluation of economic reform by the World Bank, Third World governments, and one thousand civil society organizations including NGOs. But despite their growing role and expected contribution to Third World development, NGOs should neither be considered a panacea nor the "magic bullet" for solving the problems of development.


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Civil Society's Role in Global Policymaking

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WHO IS INVOLVED IN GLOBAL POLICYMAKING?

6 CIVIL SOCIETY'S ROLE IN GLOBAL P OLICYMAKING Today global decision-making is more far-reaching than ever before. Because so many crucial areas of life are affected, all sectors naturally want to be part of this decision-making including civil society. This issue of Alliance addresses the question of how civil society engages in the global political arena. This article starts by looking at why civil society should be engaged, why this engagement is controversial, what form engagement has actually taken, and how effective it has been so far. Since the founding of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions, most nation-states have been engaged in collective negotiation to resolve global problems and create a global market. These negotiations require the ceding of sovereignty. Today, the issues under global negotiation include the deployment of peace keepers, judicial procedures for war criminals, protection of the seas and air, accounting standards, food safety standards and internet policy. There is hardly a field that is not at least touched upon by global decision-making. At the national level, different countries have different political systems for negotiation when the inevitable trade-offs between competing goals have to be made. In an increasing number of countries, these issues are negotiated through a democratic system that includes state forces, political parties, civil society and the private sector. At the global level, no one system of negotiation prevails. The ground rules have to be negotiated for each institution and each new contested issue.

At the global level, where the rules of political engagement are not set, each sector of society that has a stake in the outcomes has tried to gain representation. The nation-state has the most authority in the global political arena as most institutions have been created by and for nation-states. However, the private sector is often at the table, either by invitation of nation-states or through the power of its considerable financial resources. Political parties, on the other hand, are almost completely absent from the global political arena. And that leaves civil society. Some civil society organizations (CSOs) are present in the global political arena - religious organizations, thousands of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and a handful of social movements such as the Campaign to Ban Land Mines or Jubilee 2000. However, the presence of civil society is still very thin, its powers are limited to persuasion, and its presence is heavily contested. The lack of agreed standards for civil society participation is a further complication. Every time the WTO, the World Bank or a UN Summit begins to negotiate a policy or statement, the wheel of civic participation has to be reinvented. Though the UN has a vast array of expertise in this area, the lessons do not extend to new issues and arenas. Today, civic actors interested in information technology are starting from scratch to negotiate with the UN agencies and member governments on civic engagement in the World Summit on the Information Society. Actors from all sectors have entered this fresh negotiation space with suspicion and hostility towards one another. WHY DOES CIVIL SOCIETY NEED TO BE ENGAGED?

There are at least five good reasons for civil society to be engaged in global governance. Conferring Legitimacy on Policy Decisions First, civil society can confer legitimacy on policy decisions made in the global political arena. While governments have

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authority, they do not necessarily have legitimacy. This point has been recognized since the beginning of multilateralism. From the 1920s the International Chamber of Commerce was heavily engaged in trade negotiations, in the League of Nations and even in the failed International Trade Tribunal. The UN was established with a whole host of NGOs mobilized to explain the need for the UN back home. National governments have long recognized the need for the public to 'own' the outcomes of political deliberations. This is no less true at the global level. International negotiators need political support both to quell nationalistic tendencies and to generate consent for the outcomes. Increasing the Pool of Policy Ideas Second, civil society engagement increases the pool of competing policy ideas. Competition is not always a positive force, but in searching for a best possible outcome for the broadest range of people, it is enormously helpful. Many of our current global problems are highly complex. Climate change, for example, requires an understanding of biological forces that is not the first specialty of most government negotiators. In recognition of this, global climate change negotiators established the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change, a committee of scientists to provide evidence and options. CSOs often make it their business to analyse the impact of policy options on the constituency that they are most closely involved with. Third World Network, for example, looks at the impact of trade negotiations on a vast range of development issues and proposes the least harmful of these options to trade negotiators. Supporting Less Powerful Governments Third, all governments are not created equal. The dizzying array of negotiations that are now handled at the global level (17 simultaneous negotiations are under way under the auspices of the WTO alone) put smaller and poorer states at a disadvantage. Civil society can help to rectify these imbalances either by providing data and analysis to smaller states free of charge or by acting as their eyes and ears in the expensive


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cities in which most of these negotiations take place (Geneva, New York, Washington DC). Many smaller states have developed symbiotic relationships with NGOs based in these cities, such as the South Centre, which works on trade, environment and a host of other issues. Countering a Lack of Political Will Fourth, CSOs help government negotiators keep their eye on the prize, so to speak. The level of inertia in the global political arena is high, and public officials are often risk averse. CSOs can continually remind negotiators of the stakes. This happened with the Campaign to Ban Land Mines, where there was no political will to tackle the matter at a global level. Similarly, governments operating collectively were unable to find a reason to address the debt crisis faced by most developing countries until Jubilee 2000 mobilized hundreds of thousands around the world to remind them of a moral imperative. Helping States Put Nationalism Aside Fifth, there is a difference between a nation's interest and people's interests, though states are often loath to acknowledge this. For example, cleaner air is in the best interest of all people but difficult to resolve through a national lens. CSOs can propose sensible global solutions without having to prioritize national borders. Civil society is often able to help states find a rationale for putting nationalism aside. Why is civil society participation controversial? Good reasons notwithstanding, civic participation is controversial. Why? The Representation Question The most commonly expressed reason for contesting civic engagement in the global political arena is the lack of representation. 'Who do these NGOs represent?' is a common refrain among government officials and bureaucrats that work for multilateral institutions. Governments often claim to represent their people and thus argue that there is no need for

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alternative sources of public representation. Multilateral officials claim to represent the collective interests of their government shareholders and thus cloak themselves in a 'representative' legitimacy. While some NGOs do represent vast numbers of members (like Consumers International), others do not rest their legitimacy on representation at all, but on expertise, popular support (eg Amnesty International) or moral imperatives that transcend national borders (such as animal welfare). These differing sources of legitimacy are rarely acknowledged by those who wish to limit civic engagement in global governance. Political systems the world over allow for bodies of experts to advise or otherwise participate in the political process, so it is not clear why the global political arena should be exceptional in recognizing only one form of legitimacy, especially when forms of representational democracy are increasingly questioned at the national level. State Prerogative Some states still assume that the global political arena is an international political arena within which only states have the right to bargain. This has never been true but is a powerful myth that continues to serve nationalistic interests. As noted above, CSOs have played an important role throughout the history of the UN. The history of the Bretton Woods Institutions is similarly laced with civic participation, as is the history of global trade negotiations. Imbalances within Global Civil Society Unfortunately, the bodies that make up a burgeoning global civil society (20,000 networks and associations in the last 30 years) and that most closely follow the development of global public policy are predominantly based in the global North. In part this imbalance occurs because of the high barriers to entry to the global arena. To be an actor requires very high levels of education and mobility, proficiency in English and ideally other languages, etc. The expectations that are born from varying political backgrounds are another important factor. Citizens of


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democratic countries believe that they have a right to participate in governance processes while others do not assume such a right. The lack of participation of vast populations is a weakness that will threaten the legitimacy of global civil society until it is rectified. The Elitist nature of Global Civil Society The above three areas of concern are most often articulated by governments. In my view, two other genuine reasons for questioning civic engagement in global governance are an elitism that seems to be pervasive throughout the entire global political arena and an unwillingness to address power and process within civil society coalitions. In addition to the imbalance in global civil society between North and South, mentioned above, there is a lack of genuine grassroots participation in transnational networks, especially from the global South. Operating globally can encourage elitist attitudes and strain or sever ties to national and local politics. Grassroots leaders may lose their links to their original constituents. NGO representatives on the global conference circuit may have no local links in the first place. Weak ties to national and local organizations, and the specialized knowledge required in the global arena, can give some groups a feeling of privilege once they have gained a seat at the negotiating table. The second problem is that networks rarely address their own internal power relations or reflect on the way they are organized. For example, when working in a network power manifests itself in who has access to information, who is well resourced, who is in close proximity to decision-makers, who has access to communication technologies, etc. One cannot assume that global civil society is entirely democratic. The roles it plays are premised on well-developed privileges of citizenship, as defined in a national political context. While civil society has been adamant in extending the rights of citizenship into the global political arena, it has been less forthcoming in defining the responsibilities that go with them. Extending democratic principles in global governance requires

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that all global actors acknowledge a balance between the rights and responsibilities to multiple stakeholders, including network partners, that are inherent to participation.

practice or show governments how it can be done, but they do not have the power to establish public policy. They fall into the persuasion category along with public protest.

HOW IS CIVIL SOCIETY ACTUALLY ENGAGED?

Formal Interaction with Multilateral Institutions

In spite of resistance from many quarters, civil society is actually engaged in policy formulation, through a variety of formal and informal approaches.

A third method of engagement is through formal interaction with the multilateral institutions where policies are devised. While the actual deliberations of the WTO and the World Bank are closed, both have advisory panels that include civic actors. It is through these panels that they determine which issues are of concern to civil society and test policy ideas. For example, the now defunct World Bank NGO Committee had a longstanding discussion on participation in development projects which helped the World Bank develop new participatory practices. Michael Moore of the WTO established an advisory panel with a handful of NGOs to help him. These efforts may be seen as controversial by those actors in civil society that are excluded from the process. Often, critics view the engagement as an attempt by the multilateral institution to look more transparent than it actually is.

Campaigns and Public Protest The greatest tool in the civic arsenal is persuasion. Civil society often uses public mobilization to persuade policymakers to address an issue. The PRSP story, for example, begins with global public mobilization on the issue of debt cancellation for developing countries. Through street demonstrations, global letter-writing campaigns, the engagement of world religions and some skilful lobbying, civil society created a space for a new public policy on sovereign debt. Similarly, the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines proposed a new global treaty to eliminate land mines. Periodically, governments and intergovernmental organizations need to be reminded that there is a vast public interest in their deliberations. This role is often served through protest, in the absence of any mainstream process for collecting public views on global issues. Without protest, civic organizations are often not heard, regardless of the merits of their arguments. Multi-stakeholder Dialogues Another method employed by civic organizations is to create conditions for and then participate in multi-stakeholder dialogues. These are a good way to operate outside official channels but nevertheless affect official willingness to develop global public policy. Civic actors create conditions for such a dialogue through a variety of advocacy tactics. One of the more celebrated such efforts was the creation of the World Commission on Dams, which included members of the affected public, industry officials and global financiers of dams like the World Bank. Multi-stakeholder dialogues can help develop good

It is very rare for civil society to have real power in policy formulation and negotiation, but it does happen. The Convention on Biological Diversity has a number of negotiating committees that include NGOs. Periodically, an NGO representative will be seconded to a multilateral agency to work through the nittygritty of a policy. The World Bank has a programme through which CSO representatives can actually work for the Bank for two years. Convincing National Governments One of the most effective ways to be engaged in global public policy creation is to work through governments, which still have a central role in creating global public policy. Generally, if a public policy is to succeed, it ultimately needs government champions. Canada was the government champion for the land mine treaty and the UK is widely seen as one of the first to acknowledge that the debt burden was unrealistically high and thus start us down the road to the PRSPs.

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Governments often lend NGOs some of their authority by placing them at the negotiating table, as happened in the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 when the US added NGOs to its delegation. However, this privilege is more often afforded to the private sector than to civil society. When the private sector is given privileged access to documents or other negotiating instruments, civil society has been known to sue in national courts for the same privilege. However, this does not always serve the cause well as it can often place the same national constraints faced by governments on the NGO. Starting Locally While CSOs often focus on actual policy negotiation, many grassroots organizations start in the local space and try to influence the actual intervention of a multilateral organization. Shackdwellers International, for example, concentrates specifically on the interventions of global organizations in the housing markets in urban areas. They assume that policies will derive from practice, while others assume that practice will be governed by policy. Perhaps the most effective civic alliances occur when the two different types of organization operate in tandem. HOW EFFECTIVE IS THIS ENGAGEMENT?

The actual effects of civic policy interventions are sometimes relatively easy to measure. The debt campaign, for example, led to the dismissal of $34 billion of debt. The Campaign to Ban Land Mines led to a global protocol. Most CSOs engaged in policy dialogue can point to the successes and failures of their advocacy efforts. One question for CSOs is whether the policy outcome actually reflects their interventions. Members of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for example, might be understandably upset over the way strong national interest's coloured acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol. For the institutions engaged, success is often measured in the culmination of a policy and its relative acceptance among the public. Sadly, whether the policy actually resolves a problem is rarely used as a measure of success. The IMF, for example,


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continues to champion structural adjustment even though it has failed to stimulate growth or alleviate poverty. Recent actions by the WTO and government negotiators, however, suggest that they agree that the trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreement was a policy failure because it failed to take into account the public impact of drug pricing in poor countries, and incidentally, gave too much leeway to global bullies. It is difficult to determine whether the various other actors engaged in global public policy formulation would argue for or against civic engagement in future. Regardless, the genie is out of the bottle. As global governance grows, so will global civil society and with it demands for transparent and accountable governance processes. My ultimate yardstick for measuring success would not be the policy outcomes achieved, but the 'thickness' of participatory and direct democracy mechanisms that actually take hold and begin to shape the process of global governance. Ultimately, my highest aspiration is to see democracy prevail in the global political arena. The PRSP Process Many of the articles in this issue of Alliance focus on the PRSP. This is thus far the most prominent policy outcome of Jubilee 2000's campaign to alleviate debt burdens in developing countries. While many radical economists have long argued that debt burdens keep developing countries poor, most national negotiators accepted that developing countries need access to capital and that access would be threatened by any attempt to alleviate debt burdens. The World Bank and IMF worried about their own bond ratings slipping should they agree to write off portions of the debt. Jubilee 2000 changed the terms of the debate. A NorthSouth coalition, a strong religious following and some skilful lobbying prompted a change in political will among developed country governments and provided political space for development lobbyists to present proposals for change. While Jubilee is widely credited for creating this space, it was Oxfam, Bread for the World, ActionAid, Christian Aid and other

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specialist development organizations that are familiar with the international financial institutions and finance ministries that negotiated the terms of the PRSP and its application to heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC).

willingness to outsource services is creating a context in which this could happen. Can Thai NGOs avail themselves of these opportunities? One challenge they will need to come to grips with if they are to do so is that of financial sustainability.

Today, most members of what was Jubilee 2000 believe that HIPC and PRSP are an inadequate solution to the debt crisis. Jubilee members either focus on developing new mechanisms - like bankruptcy procedures - or continue to drum up public support for real debt relief through protest and public campaigning. The details of this story and the role of civic engagement in the creation of this global public policy follow.

Development NGOs are by no means the only civil society organizations (CSOs) in Thailand. Other categories include older CSOS like the Thai Red Cross, the Foundation for the Blind and other health CSOs, and some newer ones - and charitable associations that focus primarily on social welfare activities.

1 Consumers International follows the impact global health and safety standards will have on consumers and proposes policy options that will benefit consumers most. 2 Devesh Kapur, John P Lewis and Richard Webb (eds) (1997) The World Bank: Its first half century Washington DC: Brookings Institutions Press. Steve Charnovitz, 'Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and international governance' in Michigan Journal of International Law Vol 18, No 2, Winter1997, pp183-286. 3 See Michael Edwards and John Gaventa (eds) (2001) Global Citizen Action Lynne Rienner. 4 There was also a silly argument put forth in unbelievably solemn tones about the moral hazard of allowing poor countries to abdicate from their global responsibilities. 5 Jubilee members have since split into two groups which mirror choices in favour of a policy engagement insider strategy or an outsider strategy of focusing on the illegal nature of the debt. CENTRAL ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT FOR THAI NGOS?

As in many countries, development NGOs in Thailand are regarded with some suspicion by many people. Yet their experiences and values make them ideally suited to take a lead in social development. Current government downsizing and

The total number of CSOs and CBOs (community-based organizations) in Thailand is anyone's guess. It has been estimated that there are at least 20,000. Many CSOs have a very short life span, fading away as quickly as they surface. Intermediary organizations that work as civil society resource organizations to support the sector are few and far between. There are some NGO coordinating networks and consortia. Most intermediary organizations also implement activities and work in the field. The Centre for Philanthropy and Civil Society at the National Institute of Development Administration was probably the first formal institution with the specific purpose of strengthening the third sector. Emergence of CBOs CBOs are a relatively recent phenomenon in Thailand. Most have sprung up almost overnight in the past decade or so. In reality, some are largely the fruit of the development activities of NGOs and state agencies that have worked at grassroots level to organize local groups and to mobilize them to carry out certain activities. Given that state predominance in development activities has thwarted local autonomy and participation over the past hundred years or so, the emergence of CBOs is a good sign. Irrespective of their maturity and preparedness to embark on sustainable activities, it is a positive development that people at community level are beginning to overcome barriers and to take initiatives to come together to improve their lives.

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Some notable successes are savings groups in the south and east of Thailand. Village savings groups have mobilized villagers to save regularly. The groups use their savings as credit for members to borrow, and interest on loans is given back to members as interest on their savings or as welfare payments. Internal control and sanctions make loan default virtually nonexistent. Low transaction costs enable the village credit system to thrive, unlike banks and financial institutions that face both high overhead costs and loan defaults. Inherent in the success of these savings groups is their small size, which makes them manageable at the local level by villagers who are not professionals. Other CBOs engaging in community business meet with mixed results. The Funding Challenge Funding is one important issue that most NGOs and CBOs face, particularly in the past few years. After the Student Revolution in 1973, and particularly after the student activists from the 1970s were reincorporated into Thai society, the NGO movement took off with strong support from foreign donors. The availability of foreign funds in the early years may have inadvertently prevented Thai NGOs from seeking funding locally. It was only when Thailand was declared by foreign donors to be 'well on its way', 'comfortable', 'high growth', etc, that Thai NGOs awoke to the harsh reality of withdrawal of donor support. As a result, some NGOs embarked on mobilizing local resources, with mixed results; others attempted to develop sources of earned income, while others downsized or shut up shop altogether. The public perception of NGOs is a problem here. Many Thais have great misgivings about NGOs, seeing them as agents of foreigners aiming to undermine Thai society and the Thai way of life. Fingers are quick to point at NGOs that engage in social movements and social advocacy, though it is often difficult to categorize NGOs as either strictly advocacy organizations or service deliverers. As long as NGOs are perceived as 'marginal', 'troublemakers' and 'foreign agents', it will be difficult for them


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to raise funds from the public. Thai people in fact give quite generously to philanthropic and social causes, but the lion's share goes to charitable organizations and elite-based CSOs and not to development NGOs. How well have NGOs communicated their vision, activities and achievements to the public? Some have done quite well. Many have been too internally focused. Most have not yet addressed or created a local constituency. NGOs working with children appear to have less problem in raising funds simply because the plight of children is easily understood and empathized with. The success of some CBOs notwithstanding, most are struggling for sustainability. Many were helped initially with 'seed money' from external sources, including government agencies. External interventions from NGOs, development workers and others help contribute to CBOs' success. There are currently a number of PhD dissertations being carried out on CBOs, and these should shed more light on this very understudied topic. Human Resources Issues Human resources is another issue that CSOs need to address. Although there is some stability and continuity at the leadership level, the sector faces a problem of sustaining capable younger staff members. Younger recruits often move on to other jobs, preferring more mainstream jobs with more clearly defined career paths, so the sector finds itself constantly needing to train new staff members. The still prevailing view that nonprofits should be staffed with volunteers, with paid staff kept to a minimum, also contributes to the less than ideal state of pay and career advancement in the sector. A widespread lack of management and financial skills means that CSOs are often not as effective as they could be, particularly the smaller ones. Some CSOs are beginning to address this problem. One partial solution to this skill gap could be to recruit volunteers from the business sector. This is an area in which companies could make a real contribution to social

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development. Just as Thai corporations were beginning to address issues of corporate social responsibility, the economic crisis of 1997 hit. As expected, companies retreated to address core business and survival issues. Their readiness to engage in big social development projects reduced significantly. Although the corporate sector still contributes to social causes, it is unlikely that it will be a very strong and active partner in the foreseeable future. Government and CSOs Although partnership between government and non-profits CSOs is much talked of, in reality nothing much has happened yet. Government may outsource activities to some service delivery CSOs or give funding support to others. However, the current government's campaign promises on pro-poor programmes, and the speed with which it is trying to implement them after coming into office, do bode well for CSOs. Some CSO leaders have come out in open support of the government, and of the Prime Minister in particular. To many CSOs, the prospect of becoming 'mainstream' and of having a real role in policymaking is a welcome one. The current administrative reforms spell out clearly the intention to downsize state agencies and to outsource activities to CSOs if possible. The administrative decentralization process already under way also points to the need for local administrations to work with citizens' groups. The legal frameworks and political processes are creating a more open environment in which CSOs could assert themselves. Whether or not CSOs will be able to seize these opportunities is still uncertain. Can they achieve the right balance in working with other sectors? Can they make the necessary compromises in partnering with others? Will government agencies and officials be able to adjust to a new role as partners with CSOs? Shifts in mindset, values and behaviour are needed on both sides. Prospects for Development NGOs Development NGOs will continue to be a strong force in the development landscape of Thai society. More will be expected


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of them as the state retrenches. Given their understanding of problems on the ground, strong service orientation and commitment to reduce poverty and injustice, they could take on the role of leaders and trainers for social development actors in other sectors. If they can communicate their experiences and values clearly and powerfully, they could have a very positive impact on Thai society. If they are to fulfill this role, there are many challenges they must meet. One is achieving financial sustainability. Developing business activities to help support their development activities, seeking government funding, and support from foreign funders are all options. Local fundraising remains a source to be tapped. A healthy mix of funding from different sources will ultimately serve development NGOs well into the future. Overreliance on state financial support could be as problematic as over-reliance on foreign funding. THE ROLE OF NGOS IN THE AGE OF A DEMOCRATIC CIVIL SOCIETY

It is indeed a great pleasure to be in Seoul again, in the City which hosted the 1999 Seoul International Conference of NGOs: Inspire, Empower, Act! which gave such a boost to the NGO culture far beyond this region. The Conference of NGOs (CONGO) under the then President Afaf Mahfouz was privileged to be a Co-Convener with DPI and Kyung Hee University, and I am tremendously pleased to see us here together again. (I remember fondly,albeit with some frustration, my role as coordinator of the health section) On behalf of the CONGO delegation I would like to thank the organizers, particularly Dean Choue for the invitation to today's important gathering, for the very warm welcome and the challenge to be one of the presenters. However, let me acknowledge from the start that I stand here as a person with much to learn. I am reminded of the story concerning a famous professor of science who was a koryphäe in a rather obscure area of the subject. Being a world expert, she was invited to all the universities in the country to give a lecture on this subject. Being famous, she had a chauffeur who used to travel with her.

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After a year of travelling with the Professor, the chauffeur turned to her in the car one night and said 'You know, I have heard this lecture so many times that I think I could give it as well as you'. The professor had a sore throat that night and so she said, 'Alright, you act the part of the Professor and I'll act the part of the chauffeur'. They arrived at a prestigious university and found a packed lecture hall. The chauffeur, acting the part of the professor, stood up and gave the most brilliant lecture. But being a little nervous, he rushed through, leaving time for questions at the end. One student stood up and asked a most difficult question. The professor broke out into cold sweat, because she knew the chauffeur could not answer it. But the chauffeur looked at the student and said, 'I am surprised they let people like you into university these days. That question is so simple, I am going to ask my chauffeur to answer it!' I feel like being the chauffeur in the midst of academia experts. Yet I trust that this conference will be more than an academic exercise, that it will lead us into a vibrant discussion: how can we as NGOs help to make the world a better place and advance the cause of peace, justice and freedom? Context This International Peace Conference is being convened in commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the UN International Day of Peace. It could not be more timely as we are still dumbfounded by what happened on that International Day itself, the 11th September, and stunned by the scale of human tragedy, and when we still do not know what all the consequences of that day, the Economist called: "The day the world changed..", will be. NGOs and NGO Networks sent floods of messages to express their sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims. Many, including we as CONGO, organized moving events, vigils and candle light marches to express our solidarity. Voices from all over the world were heard which warned against unmeasured retaliation to prevent more bloodshed of innocent people. Many also pointed to underlying causes, of which the following is an


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example 1: "…There is no patent remedy for terrorism. The only remedy is to remove its causes. One can kill a million mosquitoes, and millions more will take their place. In order to get rid of them, one has to dry the swamp that breeds them. And the swamp is always political. A person does not wake up one morning and tell himself: Today I shall hijack a plane and kill myself. Nor does a person wake up one morning and tell himself: Today I shall blow myself up in a Tel-Aviv discotheque. Such a decision grows in a person's mind through a slow process, taking years. The breeding ground of the decision could either be national or religious, social or spiritual or any combination of these. No underground fighters can operate without popular roots and a supportive environment that is ready to supply new recruits, assistance, hiding places, money and means of propaganda. An underground organization wants to gain popularity, not lose it. Therefore it commits attacks when it thinks that this is what the supporting public segments want. Terror attacks always testify to the public mood. The reality of today is that the globalization of problems must lead to the globalization of their solutions. Not in the abstract, by fatuous declarations (in the UN), but by a global endeavor to resolve conflicts and establish peace, with the participation of all nations, (with the US playing a central role). Instead of the destroyed New York edifices, the twin towers of Peace and Justice must be built." And that is what we are here for... I cannot help but make the link to lessons learned for and by the NGO Community at the World Conference against Racism, which came to a close only a few days before the tragedy happened... But before doing so, allow me to recall for a moment the rise and recent development of NGOs.... Looking Back...the Rise of NGOs There has been an explosive growth in the number, size and reach of the transnational NGO movement, especially since the end of the Cold War when the process of democratization

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encouraged the growth of NGOs. For many countries in Africa and Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, the rise of civic organizations and NGOs had been one of the most startling developments since the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. International NGOs had blossomed already into 28,900 by 1993, and over 20,000 transnational networks are already active on the world stage, most of them were formed during the last two decades. The story is the same for developing countries, except those with repressive regimes. In Nepal, the number of NGOs registered with governments grew from 220 in 1990 to 1,210 in 1993; in Tunisia, from 1,886 in 1988 to 5,186 just three years later. In 1996, the largest ever survey of the non-profit sector found over a million such groups in India, and 210,000 in Brazil.2 NGOs in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations have surpassed 2000 this year. The real change in their influence, however, has come in the last decade, as they have moved from being what Michael Edwards describes as "simply instruments to pick up the pieces of state and market failure" to becoming "a force for transformation in global politics and economics". Outstanding examples include the Jubilee 2000 debt relief campaign, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines as well as the current campaign for affordable medicines to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other killer diseases. But whether their focus has been on economic development, health and education, human rights and gender, the environment or conservation, NGOs have been increasing sharply in number and popularity. Some scholars see this as evidence of a fundamental 'power shift', an 'associational revolution', as profound as the rise of the nation state in the eighteenth century. This change is irreversible. Many Governments around the world have come to realize this. They have recognized that the State is the servant of its people, and not vice versa. Civic organizations have always been at the forefront of the political struggle against authoritarian rule while, at the same time, the process of democratization has in turn led to a remarkable growth in the number of NGOs and the scope and


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the diversity of their activities. NGOs have fought for constitutional guarantees such as freedom of expression and association and are now at the forefront of wider social reform, peace and economic justice movements. This has been most noteworthy in Korea, (in your country), and we recall that your President Kim Dae-Jung addressed us at the 1999 Conference as "an NGO activist". The proliferation of Korean NGOs at all levels - national, regional and local - and the sheer diversity of the issues they deal with are proof of the profound impact democracy had had on Korean society. In the wake of the Seoul Conference, a number of them have gained consultative status and we as CONGO, through our outreach program, are looking forward to have a closer relationship with Korean NGOs and to facilitate their awareness also of international concerns addressed at the United Nations. Kyung Hee's plan for the new NGO Complex in the University is one further visionary/prophetic step to support international NGO cooperation in a sustainable way. Linking Research with Graduate Study.... UN World Conferences and Empowerment of NGOs When we came to Seoul in 1999, we came in a way to celebrate all this NGO success. We came to assess human progress in the broadest sense, and in particular to examine closely progress of the remarkable cycle of the UN World Conferences held throughout the 1990's in which thousands of non-governmental organizations played a crucial part (e.g.17,000 NGO representatives were at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, 30,000 at the Women 's Conference in Beijing in 1995). Assisted by new ways of communication they had networked worldwide from local to regional and then to global level and had became partners with the UN in helping to shape an ambitious worldwide agenda from Conference to Conference, including on children, environment, human rights, population, social development, women, food and habitat. The Beijing Conference in particular had empowered women the world over to claim women's rights as human rights.

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In all their diversity, NGOs had found some communality and the capability for consensus building, (even between international, regional and national NGOs). The United Nations had played a harmonizing role and catalyst for this to happen by providing a forum where diverse points of views were aired, proposals debated and where, most importantly, political consensus was achieved. And CONGO has helped during these Conferences and 5 year follow up appraisal sessions to facilitate NGO participation in the most integrated way. Millennium Forum and NGO Power The Millennium Forum held last year at UN Headquarters itself reinforced the power of NGOs and was a further step in the evolving process for civil society to find its collective voice in a manner widely representative of the world's peoples. Organized by CONGO, DPI and a Millennium Executive it brought together some 1350 NGOs from the Global North and South. Despite the diverse views expressed at the meeting, the NGOs found again common ground to adopt a Declaration and Agenda for Action without a vote. While the various UN Conferences zeroed in on specific themes, the Millennium Forum was unique because it covered all the cross-sectoral issues in a single five-day meeting. It had vision for inclusion and addressed the most urgent issues of our present time. The Forum achieved to project an NGO vision for the 21st Century and delivered it directly to the Millennium Summit (of Heads of States). And Kofi Annan declared that "...If the global agenda is to be properly addressed, a true partnership between civil society and the United Nations is not an option; it is a necessity." The Declaration underscored the impact of globalization on the poor and described the growing new phenomenon as a process of economic, political and cultural domination by the economically and militarily strong over the weak. "Globalization should be made to work for the benefit of everyone: eradicate poverty and hunger globally; establish peace globally; ensure the protection and promotion of human rights globally.... We see a strengthened and democratized United Nations and a


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vibrant civil society as guarantors of this accountability....And we issue a warning: if the architects of globalization are not held to account, this will not simply be unjust; the edifice will crumble with dire consequences for everyone...." In retrospect, this part holds a macabre foreboding. Nevertheless, all the above showed the steady rise of NGOs with and around United Nations activities, often supported by UN Agencies through partnership programs. And Governments, except for repressive ones, have, at least until recently, viewed this development with a benign eye, because the general public, their voters, see NGOs as uniformly altruistic, idealistic, trustworthy and independent. Governments also find NGOs useful for aid distribution, because less costly, and as sources for information, e.g. in some benighted parts of the world, sometimes only NGOs can reveal what is going on. Seattle and aftermath However, in the aftermath of violent clashes in Seattle, Prague, Quebec and Genova, voices/questions critical of NGOs - and they were always there - have become louder. Some just challenge the right of NGOs to occupy such a prominent place in policy debates, while others raise issues such as legitimacy: • Who - if anyone - do NGOs represent? • Are they maybe just unaccountable interest groups? • Who speaks for whom in an NGO alliance? • Whose voice is heard, and which interests are ignored? Others touch on accountability: • To whom do NGOs report on their activities, constituencies? (the poor) donors? Still others criticize NGOs about accuracy: • They are supposed to often be simplistic, driven by fashion and sensation rather than loyalty to facts. Some UN officials have said that it is no accident that questions about legitimacy are being raised at a time when

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NGOs have started to gain real influence on the international stage. In that sense they are victims of their own success. As CONGO we are less concerned by these questions for ourselves, because we and most of our members are governed by strict rules, bylaws or codes of conducts. However, we are concerned for our members and NGOs in general about backlash attitudes of some governments against NGO participation which translates into a general deterioration of access to the UN machinery, especially in New York. A last question has to do with the problems of disconnection - are global NGOs in touch with local communities? This question brings me (back) to the World Conference against Racism This first UN Conference in the new Century had set out with an ambitious agenda to adopt a declaration and plan of action which would provide the standards, the structure, the remedies - in essence, the culture - to do away with 'Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance' (so the full title) and ensure full recognition of the dignity and equality of all, and full respect for their human rights A Vision Statement, issued by Mary Robinson and Nelson Mandela and signed by may heads of States, declared further: "..We all constitute one human family. This truth has now become self-evident because of the first mapping of the human genome, an extraordinary achievement which not only reaffirms our common humanity but promises transformation in scientific thought and practice, as well as in the visions which our species can entertain for itself. It encourages us toward the full exercise of all its inventive, creative and moral cacpacities, enhanced by the equal participation of men and women. And it could make the twenty-first century an era of genuine fulfillment and peace. We must strive to remind ourselves of this great possibility. Instead of allowing diversity of race and culture to become a limiting factor in human exchange and development, we must refocus our understanding, discern in such diversity the potential for mutual enrichment, and realize that it is the interchange between great traditions of human spirituality that offers the


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best prospect for the persistence of the human spirit itself.. For too long such diversity has been treated as threat rather than gift...." But while the process was unfolding and NGOs and Civil Society around the world were mobilized through various regional and preparatory meetings, it became evident that this Conference had embarked on a process not so much oriented towards a visionary tomorrow but rather to an examination of a painful past. The NGOs who came from all corners of the earth and from all walks of life - many came for the first time to an UN meeting- spoke with the voices of victims, of excluded, marginalized, discriminated and minority parts of society. The deep wounds left by of slavery, colonialism, ethnic oppression, cast and class discrimination and treatment of indigenous peoples were opened again. NGOs spoke with hurt and anger and demanded apologies and reparations and did not use much diplomatic or UN parlance. And while some of them expressed some solidarity with each other during the preparatory process, it seemed that, when we came to Durban to the NGO Forum, every group was only interested to focus narrowly on its own cause with the loudest voice possible. Political maneuvering and manipulation became easy. Consensus building among each other, or for that matter with the official Conference did not really take place. In the end, the NGO Forum was not an event to impact positively on the Government Conference. It remained a Conference on its own. However, all the victims' voices were heard, and this for the first time in such a global event. This marks a beginning, however tumultuous and chaotic, to recognize the 'other' as also belonging to the one human family. Many lessons were and still need to be learned. What was striking was the victims' deep distrust of everything international, of international NGOs in particular. International or global NGOs have not yet connected, or not meaningful enough, to these groups and communities.

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The Way/Vision Forward

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN NGOS

In the meantime comments have been made, including by Mary Robinson, which linked what happened in Durban with the tragedies of the 11th September. We need to be aware of the underlying causes and listen to the excluded and make our societies more just and inclusive. But at the same time we need to be vigilant that we do not create new innocent victims.

Summary and Key Recommendations

As CONGO we tried in Durban to connect caucuses and voices again at briefings during the Government Conference. We also organized a panel to recall the vision for the Conference to connect at a much deeper level of our humanity. We were reminded that the roots of racism and xenophobia is a major "crisis of identity", and that there is a need to focus on our individual and collective identity. "To connect the disconnected we must re-establish the grounds of our human identity in all its dimensions, and provide new foundations to bring about the true values and human strength of our social, political, religious, cultural, racial and spiritual diversity. This human identity is just not sold in a supermarket." NGOs have been in the past on the forefront of political and social reform. They can become now the connector, the social/human glue, to add the social, human and spiritual dimension to the current globalization process. They can help to connect the local with the global and develop this New Social Architecture based on equality, social justice, tolerance, respect and shared responsibility, as expressed in the Millennium Summit Declaration. We as CONGO are committed to pursue intensively the attainment of the international development goals signed by all countries in the Millenium Summit last year. And I propose to integrate the Durban agenda into the road map which will guide us through the different stages of our outreach program to our next General Assembly and Millennium Forum follow up event. 'I have a dream' said Archbishop Tutu in Durban. 'I have a dream that we enter this new Millennium in which my humanity is bound up with your humanity, in which I AM BECAUSE YOU ARE.' We share this dream.

• The creation of a structured civil dialogue, to complement the existing political and social dialogues, should be an important goal for the reform of European governance. • The European NGO community makes a rich, diverse, and powerful contribution to the development of European society. • European NGOs play an important role in linking the public with the political process, and are key actors in building a structured civil dialogue between citizens and governments. • NGOs should be representative of their mandate, accountable, transparent, and effective. European NGOs and the Commission should together examine ways of elaborating these, and other standards, and NGOs themselves should develop guidelines in this area. • We call for the establishment of a structured civil dialogue between the different Institutions and organised civil society to complement the political and social dialogue, and support the establishment of a Treaty Article, or at the minimum a Council Regulation, establishing a legal base for this dialogue. • We believe that the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) must be reformed if it is to play a role in developing a meaningful civil dialogue, particularly in light of its redefined role within the Treaty of Nice. • Civil society can only play a meaningful role in European Governance if information and documents relating to European decision-making are made available in an open, accessible, and prompt manner to the general public. • The Nice Treaty is inaccessible and incomprehensible to most citizens, and was drafted through a flawed and closed process. We call for the next Treaty revision, in 2004, to be drafted by a public Convention incorporating

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Parliamentarians and governmental representatives, and which would undertake consultation with organised civil society.

• NGOs represent public interests towards decisionmakers, channelling concerns, viewpoints and values within the political process.

Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, has announced that a White Paper on European Governance will be published in mid-2001. Speaking to the European Parliament, he stated that this initiative would, 'propose a new division of labour between the Commission, the other institutions, the Member States and civil society.' (Speech to European Parliament, 15 February 2000)

• NGOs ensure the development and implementation of EU policies, by providing expertise to policy-makers, and by identifying new issues which need to be tackled and proposing appropriate measures to address them.

NGOs working at the European level welcome the launching of a wide debate on governance and democracy by the President of the Commission, particularly in the framework of the preparation of the 2004 Inter-Governmental Conference. Three distinct forms of dialogue exist at a European level; the political dialogue, the social dialogue, and the civil dialogue. Whilst the first two of these dialogues have a structured format, the third, civil dialogue, does not, although an ad hoc dialogue with the Institutions does exist. We believe that the creation of a structured civil dialogue to complement the political and social dialogues should be one of the essential principles of a reformed governance process. This call for the creation of a structured civil dialogue, however, does not in any way detract from the political dialogue, which has a unique importance. Indeed, the strengthening of the political process is a necessary corollary to the development of a structured civil dialogue. In this context, this brief paper seeks to outline the value of NGOs, and, as a key part of organised civil society, the role which they can play in the development of new forms of governance at a European level. NGOs, Civil Society, and European Governance The European NGO community makes a rich, diverse, and powerful contribution to the development of European society. In our various organisations, we fight for many ideals, causes, and interests. There is heterogeneity to our actions, but there are certain common features to our contributions:

• As the Commission has itself acknowledged, 'European citizens have little sense of ownership over the structures that govern their lives' ('Shaping the new Europe', COM (2000) 154). NGOs help to reduce the gap between the governing and the governed by awareness raising with the public concerning the purpose, policies, and actions of the European Union. • Furthermore, NGOs can act to reduce the starkness of this 'governing vs. governed' dichotomy, by encouraging and enabling people to empower and involve themselves in the political processes and decisions which have an impact upon their lives. • NGOs are created by and composed of active members of society, and contribute to building social solidarity, creating community, and fostering social awareness. • NGOs thus play an important role in linking the public with the political process, and are key actors in building a structured civil dialogue between citizens and governments. • Furthermore, NGOs are often key service-providers, whether in the form of practical support, information, advice, health and social services, or advocacy. • NGOs also act to set best practices in their specific fields, developing standards indicators, and targets. • Finally, NGOs act as guardians or 'watch-dogs' of public interests, whether environmental, social, developmental or humanitarian. We monitor and assess the performance of political and economic players upon our areas of interest, and respond to their action or inaction

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The Representativeness of NGOs When considering the role of NGOs within European governance, there is one issue which is raised more and more often by national governments and European institutions: that of the representativeness of NGOs. The demand for NGOs to be 'representative' arises in virtually all discussions and policy papers concerned with the relations between NGOs and governments. As NGOs seek to make an input to policy-making, and to influence the political process, answering the question: 'for whom do you speak?' is both reasonable and necessary. Yet the answer to this seemingly simple question of identity varies widely between different NGOs, as the following illustrations make clear. • Many NGOs are directly representative of particular groups, whether of other NGOs or of citizens. • All European 'umbrella' NGOs directly represent their national member organisations or platforms. Similarly, many disability NGOs are run by, and work to represent, persons with disabilities. • Other NGOs advance the interests of those unable to do so themselves. • Human rights NGOs, for example, represent the interests of victims of human rights abuses, many of whom are not in a position to speak for themselves. • Yet more NGOs 'represent' or advance public interests, ideas, issues or values. Environmental NGOs represent the interests of the environment because it has no voice. With such a diversity of functions, it is impossible to create a single standard of 'representativeness' which can be used to measure all NGOs. 'Representativeness' must therefore comprise a judgement, made on qualitative and quantitative grounds, of the extent to which NGOs represent their mandate. Representativeness alone is not a sufficiently precise or appropriate standard to measure good NGO practice. We believe that NGOs should be judged on the basis of their transparency,


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accountability, representativeness, efficiency and effectiveness in carrying out their mandate - all qualities which are identified as necessary for good governance in the Work Programme for the White Paper on Governance. • We therefore propose that the Secretariat General of the Commission should, together with European NGOs, examine the criteria applied in relation to NGOs in the framework of the structured civil dialogue, with regard to representativeness, transparency, accountability, and track-record. • We propose that NGOs establish a set of guidelines of good practice in relation to their governance, transparency, accountability and representativeness. The Civil Dialogue and NGOs 'It is time to realise that Europe is not just run by European institutions but by national, regional and local authorities too and by civil society', Romano Prodi, Speech to European Parliament, 15 February 2000 European NGOs welcome Romano Prodi's recognition of the value of civil society to Europe. However although it is unquestioned that we are an important part of the economy and have found ways of making our voices heard, we would argue that it would be more correct to say that we participate in the organisation of society, rather than being involved of the running of society. We believe that the development of good government necessitates the full participation of its citizens at all stages, and the establishment of a structured dialogue between organised civil society and the different levels of government. Such a structured civil dialogue should not detract from the importance of the political dialogue, nor from the necessity of taking action to strengthen political structures and institutions. There is no contradiction between the objective of having a strong Parliament and Commission and the support for what the Commission has called "the right to be involved". The articulation of such a right must support the strengthening of

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the political process and be seen as a positive step towards enhancing the effectiveness of policy-making and the legitimacy of the European Union, as well as restoring the faith of European citizens in their leaders. However, any such articulation must ensure that the "right to be involved" is formulated in an inclusive manner. The development of the structured civil dialogue must not result in the creation of a hierarchy within civil society which would have the effect of privileging some voices over others. What is important is to develop mechanisms which allow organised civil society to contribute at all stages of the policy-making and legislative process. This involvement should include many different forms of consultation (from electronic fora through to large-scale public meetings, for example) as well as more formal and structured forms of dialogue. Clearly, in order for organised civil society to be able to make an effective contribution, it is necessary for a dialogue to be established at an early stage of policy-development, and for this to be continued right through the process, culminating in the eventual evaluation of the action. At the moment there are many good examples of the consultation of civil society by the European Institutions, particularly by the Commission and the Parliament and of late also by Council. However, such examples of civil dialogue are currently contingent upon the good will of individual actors within the process, whilst in other areas dialogue with civil society is limited, non-existent, or expost facto. Furthermore, whilst the establishment of 'ad hoc fora' such as the Social Forum can provide interesting encounters between civil society and the Institutions, they are no substitute for a structured civil dialogue or for that matter either for the social dialogue or the political dialogue. The structured civil dialogue between the Institutions and organised civil society needs a legal base in the Treaties. The Nice Treaty for the first time recognises the concept of organised civil society in the Article on the Economic and Social Committee. This is an important and most welcome first step which now needs to be complemented by a Treaty Article which will give a legal base to the structured civil dialogue and legitimate the


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various initiatives taken by the Commission to instigate a civil dialogue. • We call on the European Commission to propose a Treaty Article, or, at the least, a Council Regulation, in order to provide a legal base for the structured civil dialogue. Such a legal base, applying to all NGO sectors, should establish the accreditation of European NGOs and the creation of a horizontal unit within the Commission Services to manage the relationship with NGOs. The legal base should also prescribe an annual conference with NGOs on civil dialogue, and a provision encouraging Directorates-General to form framework agreements with NGOs in their sector, as well as encouraging the creation of a general Commission framework covering cross-sectoral dialogue with NGOs. • We call on all European Commission Services to publish, in consultation with the relevant European NGO groupings, their procedures for the consultation of organised civil society. Furthermore, the Commission already uses de facto lists of NGOs associated with the civil dialogue process, and it would promote transparency if such lists were made public. • We call for the organisation of an annual meeting of organised civil society with the Commission, to review the effectiveness of consultation with civil society and to discuss improvements to the process. • We believe that the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) can play a role in developing a meaningful structured civil dialogue, particularly in light of its redefined role within the Treaty of Nice. However, various reforms are necessary before this can happen. • Group 3 (the 'Various Interests' group within the ESC) must be restructured so that its members are drawn only from NGOs, nominated by Member States in consultation with civil society, and should no longer include organisations which are more correctly defined as employers' organisations.

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Learning to Live with NGOs

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• The ESC's reports must encompass divergent views on the same issues. Failing this civil society organisations will always prefer to present a more coherent view directly to the Commission, Parliament or Council. • The ESC must become more proactive and innovative in its contribution to the future governance of the European Union, rather than intervening after the publication of Commission documents. • Civil society can only play a meaningful role in European Governance if information and documents relating to European decision-making are made available in an open, accessible, and prompt manner to the general public. • We therefore call for general principles of open access to EU documents to be established and incorporated within the proposed Regulation regarding public access to European Parliament, Commission, and Council documents. Such principles should be based upon the Aarhus Convention provisions on access to environmental information. The process by which changes are made to the Treaties is flawed, as was evident in Nice. The Inter-Governmental Conference was characterised by closed meetings and a lack of consultation, followed by last-minute negotiations and shabby compromise which did not reflect the priorities for the future of the European Union. Furthermore, the current Treaty is unclear and inaccessible to most citizens. " We therefore call for the next Treaty revision to be prepared through a Convention, which would include European and National Parliamentarians, and representatives of national governments, who would meet in public on a regular basis, and who would undertake full consultation with civil society and a structured civil dialogue with European NGOs before presenting recommendations to the European Council for revisions to the Treaties.

7 LEARNING

TO

LIVE

WITH

NGOS

In the summer of 1994, U.S. environmental advocacy groups were getting ready to celebrate. The United States was about to join almost 90 other nations in ratifying the Convention on Biodiversity, which enjoyed broad support from U.S. environmentalists, agro-business groups, and the biotechnology sector. After hearings characterized in the press as a "love fest," members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were almost unanimously prepared to back the treaty. Then a group of agricultural and trade nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) previously uninvolved in the debate weighed in, warning that ratification could, in effect, destroy U.S. agriculture. As the Chicago Tribune reported in September 1994, evidence later surfaced that some of this opposition was based on a virulent misinformation campaign claiming, among other things, that treaty advocates were all foes of farming, logging, and fishing. But by then, the biodiversity treaty had been relegated to the back of a long line of treaties competing for congressional attention. At a time when NGOs are celebrating their remarkable success in achieving a ban on landmines and creating an International Criminal Court (ICC), it may seem churlish to recall a four-year-old episode that many would likely regard as a defeat. But amid the breathless accounts about the growing power of NGOs, the failure of the biodiversity treaty is a useful reminder of the complexity of the role that these groups now play in international affairs. Embracing a bewildering array of beliefs, interests, and agendas, they have the potential to do

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as much harm as good. Hailed as the exemplars of grassroots democracy in action, many NGOs are, in fact, decidedly undemocratic and unaccountable to the people they claim to represent. Dedicated to promoting more openness and participation in decision making, they can instead lapse into old-fashioned interest group politics that produces gridlock on a global scale. The question facing national governments, multilateral institutions, and national and multinational corporations is not whether to include NGOs in their deliberations and activities. Although many traditional centers of power are fighting a rearguard action against these new players, there is no real way to keep them out. Instead, the real challenge is figuring out how to incorporate NGOs into the international system in a way that takes account of their diversity and scope, their various strengths and weaknesses, and their capacity to disrupt as well as to create. Why NGOs Matter Defining NGOs is not an exercise for the intellectually squeamish. A 1994 United Nations document, for example, describes an NGO as a non-profit entity whose members are citizens or associations of citizens of one or more countries and whose activities are determined by the collective will of its members in response to the needs of the members of one or more communities with which the NGO cooperates.This formulation embraces just about every kind of group except for private businesses, revolutionary or terrorist groups, and political parties. Other popular substitutes for the term NGO (private voluntary organizations, civil society organizations, and the independent sector) are likewise almost terminally vague. A better approach to understanding NGOs and what they are would focus on their respective goals, membership, funding sources, and other such factors. Yet although there may be no universal agreement on what NGOs are exactly, there is widespread agreement that their numbers, influence, and reach are at unprecedented levels. In 1948, for example, the UN listed 41 consultative groups that


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were formally accredited to cooperate and consult with the UN Economic and Social Council (ecosoc); in 1998, there were more than 1,500 with varying degrees of participation and access. Until recently, NGOs clustered in developed and democratic nations; now groups sprout up from Lima to Beijing. They are changing societal norms, challenging national governments, and linking up with counterparts in powerful transnational alliances. And they are muscling their way into areas of high politics, such as arms control, banking, and trade, that were previously dominated by the state.In general terms, NGOs affect national governments, multilateral institutions, and national and multinational corporations in four ways: setting agendas, negotiating outcomes, conferring legitimacy, and implementing solutions. Setting Agendas NGOs have long played a key role in forcing leaders and policymakers to pay attention. In the early 1800s, U.S. and European bodies such as the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society were driving forces behind government action on the slave trade; by the turn of the century, groups such as the Anglo-Oriental Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade were leading an influential antidrug movement that culminated in the 1912 Hague Opium Convention. In 1945, NGOs were largely responsible for inserting human-rights language in the UN Charter and have since put almost every major humanrights issue on the international agenda. Likewise, NGO activism since the 1960s and 1970s successfully raised the profile of global environmental and population issues. Instead of holding marches or hanging banners off buildings, NGO members now use computers and cell phones to launch global public-relations blitzes that can force issues to the top of policymakers' "to do" lists. Consider the 1997 Nobel Prizewinning campaign by NGOs to conclude a treaty banning landmines over the objections of the United States. The selfdescribed "full working partnership" between the Canadian government and a loose coalition of more than 350 humanitarian and arms-control NGOs from 23 countries was key to the

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negotiations' success. But what seized the attention of the public and policymakers was the coalition's innovative media campaign using the World Wide Web, faxes, e-mail, newsletters, and even Superman and Batman comic books. Treaty supporters won the signatures of 122 nations in 14 months. When several coalition members announced plans for a follow-on campaign against small arms, the U.S. government sprang into action, meeting with 20 other countries in July 1998 to launch official talks on a possible treaty. Negotiating Outcomes NGOs can be essential in designing multilateral treaties that work. Chemical manufacturing associations from around the world helped set up an effective verification regime for the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention that could be supported by industries and militaries. Throughout the various sessions of negotiations on climate change, groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development have helped craft compromise proposals that attempt to reconcile environmental and commercial interests; meanwhile, NGOs have been instrumental in helping government negotiators understand the science behind the issues that they seek to address. NGOs can also build trust and break deadlocks when negotiations have reached an impasse. In 1990, a sole Italian NGO, the Comunità di Sant'Egidio, started the informal meetings between the warring parties in Mozambique that eventually led to a peace settlement. During talks in 1995 to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NGOs from several countries working with the South African government delegation helped forge a compromise that led to the treaty's permanent extension. Conferring Legitimacy NGO judgments can be decisive in promoting or withholding public and political support. The World Bank learned this lesson in the early 1990s, albeit the hard way. After decades of watching the bank do business with only a handful of NGOs


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and brush off demands for change, more than 150 publicinterest NGOs took part in a sustained campaign to spur greater openness and accountability and to encourage debt reduction and development strategies that were more equitable and less destructive to the environment. Today, partly as a result of this high-profile pressure, about half of the bank's lending projects have provisions for NGO involvement-up from an average of only 6 percent between 1973 and 1988. The bank has even included NGOs such as Oxfam International in once sacrosanct multilateral debt relief discussions-against the wishes of many World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) officials. Even the IMF is beginning to change its tune. In June 1998, the IMF Board of Directors met with several NGO leaders to discuss their proposals to increase the fund's transparency. Making Solutions Work NGOs on the ground often make the impossible possible by doing what governments cannot or will not. Some humanitarian and development NGOs have a natural advantage because of their perceived neutrality and experience. The International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, is able to deliver health care to political prisoners in exchange for silence about any human-rights violations that its members witness. Other groups such as Oxfam International provide rapid relief during and after complex humanitarian disasters-with and without UN partners. Moreover, as governments downsize and new challenges crowd the international agenda, NGOs increasingly fill the breach. Willy nilly, the UN and nation-states are depending more on NGOs to get things done. Total assistance by and through international NGOs to the developing world amounted to about $8 billion in 1992-accounting for 13 percent of all development assistance and more than the entire amount transferred by the UN system. International NGOs also play critical roles in translating international agreements and norms into domestic realities. Where governments have turned a blind eye, groups such as Amnesty International and the Committee to Protect Journalists call attention to violations of the UN Declaration on Human

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Rights. Environmental NGOs police agreements such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, uncovering more accurate data on compliance than that provided by member nations. Perhaps one of the most vital but overlooked NGO roles is to promote the societal changes needed to make international agreements work. Signatories of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's 1997 Bribery Convention, for example, are counting on the more than 80 chapters of Transparency International to help change the way their societies view bribery and corruption. Increasingly, however, NGOs operate outside existing formal frameworks, moving independently to meet their goals and establishing new standards that governments, institutions, and corporations are themselves compelled to follow through force of public opinion. The UN moratorium on driftnet fishing in 1992 and the U.S. International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1994, for example, largely codified changes in fishing practices that NGOs had already succeeded in promoting and then winning from commercial fisheries. More recently, even as governments and multilateral institutions slowly begin to consider measures to promote the sustainable use of forests, the environmental NGO Greenpeace led a European consumer boycott that persuaded a leading Canadian logging company to announce that it would change the way that it harvests trees. The Rise of the "Global Idiots?" Despite the demonstrated capacity of NGOs to do good, their growing power on the ground has exposed them to heightened criticism, some of it justified. As salutary as international attention has been to the recent turmoil in Chiapas, Mexico, for example, it is hard to believe that the arrival there of 4,500 foreigners from 276 different organizations necessarily represents an unalloyed good. One recent study on NGOs and peacebuilding in Bosnia criticized the use of advertising (from signboards to t-shirts) by NGOs to promote their reconstruction programs to potential donors. Such advertising, the study noted, had the effect of denigrating local


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rebuilding efforts and raising questions about where NGOs were actually putting their money. In the Sudan and Somalia, NGOs have subsidized warring factions by making direct and indirect payments to gain access to areas needing assistance. In other conflict settings such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, NGOconstructed roads and camps for civilian assistance have instead been used by combatants. Other longer-term concerns loom for these service-delivery NGOs. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees warned in 1996 that if national governments continue to favor NGOs over multilateral agencies in donor assistance, they may undermine important systems of coordination and cooperation in largescale emergencies. Intense competition among NGOs in the relief sector has also pushed the sector toward a form of oligopoly that threatens to crowd out smaller players, especially local NGOs in developing countries. Eight major groups now control about 50 percent of the relief market (see box on page 92). But on balance, the record for such NGOs is surely no worse than that of governments. NGOs are increasingly aware of these weaknesses and are moving to address them by adopting codes of conduct and pledging to "do no harm." Moreover, given their origins as grassroots groups, NGOs tend to be wary of organizations that become too big; this innate suspicion can serve as a mechanism for self-regulation. Yet, the greatest challenges created by the growing influence of NGOs are not in the field but in the arena of public opinion and the corridors of power. Today, in a phenomenon that one environmental activist bemoaned as the "rise of the global idiots," any group with a fax machine and a modem has the potential to distort public debate-witness the demise of not just the biodiversity treaty but the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (mai), which for all its apparent shortcomings still deserved more reasoned consideration than it received. [See Stephen Kobrin's "The mai and the Clash of Globalizations" on page 97.] Even legitimate, well-established groups sometimes seize on issues that seem designed more to promote their own image and fundraising efforts than to advance the public interest: In 1995, for example, Greenpeace continued to attack

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the Royal Dutch/Shell Group for its plans to sink an oil rig (the Brent Spar) in the North Sea, even after independent scientific analyses showed that the environmental effects of doing so would be inconsequential. Steeped in a culture that encourages adversarial attitudes to the powers that be, many NGOs seem best suited to confrontation, a characteristic that some U.S. policymakers seized on in noting that the NGO coalition against landmines might have won U.S. support (and hence a stronger treaty) if it had been more patient and willing to compromise. The Limits of Democracy Governments, multilateral institutions, and corporations face inherent dilemmas in trying to work with NGOs. At their most fundamental level, these dilemmas hinge on two key questions: Who should participate, and how? On the one hand, opening up the floodgates to allow equal access to every group would frustrate decision making. More than 1,500 NGOs were accredited at the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, for example. Trying to include them all was impossible, so in the final days of the conference, government delegates increasingly retreated behind closed doors. On the other hand, narrowing the field fairly is extraordinarily difficult because no one algorithm or set of criteria can objectively rank the worth of an NGO to a participatory process. Should the World Trade Organization (WTO) consult and share information with groups that have large memberships but are sworn enemies of the WTO's existence? When seeking to devise a treaty on persistent organic pollutants, should negotiators insist that groups be representative of, and accountable to, large constituencies and thereby exclude reputable, experienced groups that represent future generations or nonhumans (the International Fund for Animal Welfare, for example)? Some traditional centers for power have done a better job than others at tackling these kinds of questions about participation. Among nation-states, Canada stands out for its role in forging an alliance with NGOs on the landmine ban. As Foreign


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Minister Lloyd Axworthy has said, "Clearly, one can no longer relegate NGOs to simple advisory or advocacy roles. . . . They are now part of the way decisions have to be made." And nations such as Norway helped fund the NGO coalition for the ICC. (On the other side of the funding fence, nations such as Sierra Leone and Bosnia received help at the ICC negotiations from legal advisers provided by the NGO No Peace Without Justice.) The U.S. record in working with NGOs is mixed: generally good in areas such as the environment and relatively poor in areas such as arms control and regional issues. China represents another extreme, having chosen to banish NGO delegates at the Fourth International Women's Conference in Beijing in 1995 to a site one hour's drive away from the main negotiations. Most multinational corporations are still struggling to figure out how to handle NGO participation. One 1996 poll of 51 major European corporations found that although 90 percent of them believed that the impact of "pressure groups" would stay the same or increase over the next five years, only 20 percent had formal procedures in place for dealing with such groups, and only 12 percent for evaluating them. Still, there are grounds for optimism: A 1998 survey of 133 NGOs found that while many rated their current relationships with corporations as "antagonistic" or "nonexistent," most predicted the development of cooperative relationships in the future. The changing attitude toward NGOs of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group may be a case in point. Stung by fierce NGO campaigns on the Brent Spar episode and its operations in Nigeria, where its ties to the dictatorship of General Sani Abacha made it a target for humanrights groups, Shell has adopted a new Statement of General Business Principles that includes commitments on human rights and the environment; in regions such as Latin America, it now consults with NGOs to ensure that its oil operations take environmental and social factors into account. The impact of NGOs on multilateral institutions (and national governments) may well be cyclical. As Yale professor Steve Charnovitz has observed, NGO involvement seems to depend on two factors: the needs of government and the

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capabilities of NGOs. During the nineteenth century, for example, governments had little experience with nonpolitical treaties and therefore needed NGOs; although the young League of Nations later saw NGOs as allies in forming new international organizations, NGO participation diminished in the 1930s as the league's influence declined and governments garnered more practical experience in NGO-oriented issues. The same pattern holds true for the post-World War II years: an early burst of enthusiasm, followed by a gradual decline during the 1950s that reversed itself as issues such as the environment, development, population, and food aid became part of the international agenda. Today, in the wake of a powerful postCold War boost in NGO activity, the receptivity of multilateral institutions to NGO participation varies greatly, from relatively open ECOSOC bodies such as the Commission on Sustainable Development to the more closed UN Security Council and General Assembly, and from an increasingly receptive World Bank to the still recalcitrant IMF and WTO. At bottom, however, the search for a form of perfect democracy that encompasses all NGOs makes about as much sense in the international system as it does in, say, the United States. Instead, institutions and NGOs should strive to create formal but flexible systems during negotiations to foster dynamism and self-adjustment. ECOSOC is a case in point. It ranks NGOs according to three tiers of status: Category 1, Category 2, and Roster. The small percentage of those with Category 1 status, or top access, have more opportunities to attend meetings, submit written advice, and occasionally speak at conferences. The selection process deliberately favors NGOs operating in more than one country, without barring national NGOs that cannot afford to travel; it also favors groups that are of a representative character but is ambiguous enough to allow in groups that represent perennial values and scientific truths, not members. In 1998, more than 100 NGOs have top status, with nearly 1,500 enjoying some form of consultative status at ECOSOC,versus 978 in 1995, and 41 in 1948. NGOs want more, governments want less, but the system generally works.


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Some advocates want to push more UN decision-making forums in the direction of the International Labor Organization (ILO), which gives formal voting rights to business and labor delegates as well as governments. A handful of variations on the ILO model exist that work well, particularly on technical issues and the setting of standards. (The International Organization for Standardization, or ISO, for example, is a hybrid NGO that brings together representatives of industry, government, consumer, and other bodies together on equal footing to resolve global standardization issues.) But trying to win voting rights for NGO representatives in more UN forums is by no means a sure way to improve the representative character of institutions. The unique ILO system works fairly well because national employer and labor umbrella groups already exist, making the identification of representative employer and labor delegates simpler than in other fields. But it is doubtful in most cases that such systems would actually improve the representative character of institutions; even if NGOs elected their own representatives from among themselves, there would be insufficient guarantees that the pool of electors was truly representative of society or the public interest. Perhaps most important in the long run are systems to formalize existing means of two-way communication between decision-making institutions and "stakeholders." Although NGOs still see much room for improvement at the World Bank, it has produced better decisions and is rated accountable by more NGOs because it no longer simply provides a sounding board mechanism for selected groups to air their views. The bank now disseminates more detailed information about its decisions and activities so outside groups can weigh in. And it uses a variety of techniques to elicit feedback and track NGO expertise-including surveys, advisory groups, public meetings, and private meetings with staff. Consequently, the bank is more apt to consult and partner with the right groups when designing and implementing specific projects. Because the system is more open, groups that cannot participate directly are more likely to judge the decision-making process as accountable-even if they disagree with the results.

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Letting NGOs Be NGOs Many governments and institutions-including the WTO, IMF, and several UN bodies-will continue to resist more public participation, arguing that their issues require great secrecy. But history offers a powerful argument that the holdouts suffer from a failure of imagination. Half a century ago, the architects of the postwar international trading system did not contest NGO involvement. The proposed charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO) included the very same language as the WTO charter, providing for "consultation and cooperation" with NGOs. The ITO framers had a different interpretation than their latter-day successors, however; they envisaged that commercial and public-interest NGOs would maintain regular contact with the ITO Secretariat, receive unrestricted documents, propose agenda items, and participate as observers and occasional speakers at conferences. The spirit of these proposals faded away when the ITO failed in favor of an interim solution, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT. Ironically, most multilateral institutions today face requests from NGOs that could be met by adopting the standards for participation that the ITO's framers proposed.The challenge facing NGOs is more subtle but no less important. As these groups acquire the access and influence that they have long sought, they must not lose the qualities that have made them a source of innovation and progress. Some analysts already fear that formerly independent NGOs may become more beholden to national governments as they come to rely more on public-sector funding-which now accounts for around 40 percent of NGO budgets versus only 1.5 percent in 1970. And many of the schema for increasing NGO involvement may simply foster predictable and bureaucratic behavior among civil society representatives, potentially dulling the passion and richness of views that can emanate from narrowly focused groups. They may also cut off NGOs from the informal channels through which they have traditionally been most influential. Instead, NGOs, governments, and multilateral institutions need to devise systems of public participation that draw on the


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expertise and resources of NGOs, their grassroots connections, sense of purpose and commitment, and freedom from bureaucratic constraints. Those NGOs that have seen the most rapid growth in their power will have to contend with inevitable limits on their influence and access. Those governments and institutions that have resisted the advance of these new players will have to permit an unprecedented level of public scrutiny and participation. Over time, this messy process of give-andtake promises to transform the way that international affairs are conducted. Yet as it plays out, both sides may realize that the new system that they have sought to create or resist is in many respects no different from the clash of competing interests that has characterized democracies since their inception. MAKING NGO'S MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

Registered Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), variously known as 'Private Voluntary Organizations', 'Citizens Associations', 'Civil Society Organizations', but also increasingly called "NPOs", an acronym that stands for "Non Profit Organizations" are on the rise world wide. This is re-shaping politics and economics both at domestic and global levels, a phenomenon almost equal to the rise of the nation-state at the end of the nineteenth century. Today, NGOs address every conceivable issue and they operate in virtually every part of the globe. NGOs create public goods needed by citizens that are not ordinarily found in the profit oriented market place. It is commonly accepted fact that NGOs form a distinct third sector separate from business and governments. This sector provides essential social services and the profit in this case is primarily social progress. One of the biggest successes of the last decade was the campaign to outlaw landmines where hundreds of NGOs in concert with the Canadian government pushed through a ban in a year. NGO activities are not confined to governments agenda alone. For example, NIKE has been targeted for poor labour conditions in its overseas factories. In short, NGOs are increasingly playing a vital role as lobbyists and activists at the

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corporate, national and international levels and their criticisms sometimes lead to reassessment of policies. NGOs play roles that go far beyond political activism. Many are important deliverers of services especially in the developing countries. Some of the biggest NGO's such as CARE or Medecins San Frontieres are primarily humanitarian aid providers. As the initial optimism at the end of the cold war and the prospect of a "peace dividend" faded with the flaring up of ethno nationalist conflicts across Europe, Asia, and Africa, unleashing humanitarian catastrophe in an unequal proportions, the role and importance of humanitarian aid and relief providing NGOs became even more critical. In 1995, it was estimated that around 14 million people were refugees and some 23 million people were internally displaced. This provided fertile grounds for the rise of NGO activities in this area. In most cases, NGOs responded more effectively to these crises as the international organizations and states grapple with the issue of humanitarian intervention. Their operations have helped changed lives during and after conflicts. It has been argued that to make NGOs even more effective, they should think beyond relief and conceptualize their interventions along a relief-development continuum so that relief activities contribute to development programs as peace returns. The second strategic option involves providing a mix of relief and development activities that provide for immediate basic needs while creating the physical, human or social capital that will raise the likelihood of economic and social development in the future. NGOs are partners in development or should be, especially those operating in developing countries. Many are engaged in development projects, providing technical assistance to help improve the lives of the rural poor. Through the increasing participation of NGOs in the design, consultation, operation and evaluation of projects, they are acting as agents to empower people at lower levels of society to improve their own lives thus reducing poverty. NGOs tend to be more sensitive to the needs and aspirations of the poor communities, minorities, and women thus commanding more legitimacy in their eyes than most governments. It is expected that NGOs with proper coordination


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to avoid dysfunctional competition will assume many of the conventional mandates that are usually undertaken by governments and specialized UN agencies. A case in point is the fact that in an era of decreasing foreign aid, the amount of aid being channeled through NGOs operating in developing countries is going up. According to the World Bank, today NGOs in Africa manage nearly $3.5 billion in external aid compared to under $1 billion in 1990. It is against this background that I see recent reports of corruption within some NGO's in Ghana as very troubling development. It is highly unfortunate that some people see NGO's as a business albeit making illegal money for themselves through fraudulent means. Some people use non existing NGO names to solicit money abroad and then divert them for their selfish gains. There has been a number of reports of such nature in the newspapers and on the internet lately that raise serious questions on the credibility of some of these NGO's operating in Ghana today. This is tarnishing the image of the country both at home and abroad and needless to say, NGO's must be made to keep proper accounting of all monies received and disbursed and have such accounts audited periodically and made public. In spite of the few bad nuts in the NGO's in Ghana, some are doing a real good job. Every single day, they are helping to put tools in people's hands, hope in their hearts, and bringing back the smiles on their faces. Some of the greatest strengths of NGOs over governments lie in advocacy and participatory models of development that focus on human development. They are very effective in demonstrating that poverty, no matter how endemic can be tackled by involving project beneficiaries in planning, implementation and sustainability of the projects. According to a 1997 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) working paper, the strength of NGOs lies in their "proximity to their members or clients, the flexibility and the high degree of people's involvement and participation in their activities, which leads to strong commitments, appropriateness of solutions and high acceptance of decisions implemented. For example in Africa, many donors view NGOs

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as an important part of Africa's democratization process, acting as watchdogs and advocates for human rights and good governance. NGOs often tackle issues that governments are unable or unwilling to take up. They provide efficient, innovative and cost effective approaches to difficult social and economic problems. In some cases, they provide leadership and inputs in producing and advocating public policy, and operate in spheres where government officials are constrained by bureaucratic or political considerations.

advantage of the poorer groups by reducing the benefits normally siphoned off by intermediaries. An example is an attempt by NGOs in South Africa to work with community associations to help them negotiate better contracts with commercial hunting and tourism concerns thus eliminating middlemen who would take huge consulting fees from the process of contract negotiations. All over the world, NGOs are acting as agents of change and empowering many of the disadvantaged to improve their lives.

It is one of the greatest paradoxes of our time that globalization has been associated with increased intra-state tensions, and has exacerbated a host of worries; over the environment, labour rights, human rights, consumer rights, and so on. NGOs have and do play an important role in highlighting and addressing these concerns. Through the power of the internet, NGOs provide network services, by building coalitions through a network of contacts domestically and internationally providing information on important issues to concerned interest groups and individuals. Through these networks and coalition building they can organize to demonstrate against or even derail the gathering of any organization whose operations they feel detrimental to the environment, labour rights, poverty reduction etc. as happened in Seattle during the 1999 WTO meeting.

In the field of international relations, scholars now speak of NGOs as non state actors (a category that can also include transnational corporations). This term suggests NGOs emerging influence in the international policy arena where previously only states played a significant role. The former United Nations Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan, has called them "the conscience of humanity" and technical NGOs have been consulted on relevant issues by the World Bank and other UN agencies before policies are implemented and treaties drafted. It is certain that their role will grow as global governance becomes more pluralistic and less confined to state based systems.They will continue to be a beacon illuminating the way forward as the World rises to confront new challenges.

NGOs are confronting globalization not only by demonstrations at the international level but also at the grassroots level, where NGO's are already developing a number of strategies to help poor people address the realities of their position in global markets and play a creative role in re-shaping economic forces. First, by improving the endowments of the poor so that they can compete more effectively and achieve a basic level of security, voice and equality of rights, without which economic alternatives are hard to come. This continues the traditional role of NGOs in developing skills, building capacities and institutions, and increasing access to credit facilities and economic opportunities but also underpinned by a more systematic attempt to link different levels and sectors of the economy. Secondly, NGOs can turn market forces to the

Who Else Will Do the Work? There is a consensus that NGOs were the big thing for the 1990's. There is no consensus on how this came about. There is no one single factor to credit, but a multiplicity of interdependent and intertwined trends. According to Mary Kaldor, some of the factors involved include the end of the cold war, the reduction of the welfare state, the legacy of the ReaganThatcher ideology of anti-statism in international relations, the increased role of multilateral institutions (notably the United Nations) in global governance, big ideas like Robert Putnam's on social capital, which in turn led to the resurrection of Tocqueville's associational life, and the success of social movements such as Solidarnost in Eastern Europe. The result was a tremendous growth in the resources available to NGOs. In addition to becoming the preferred

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deliverers of aid, these organizations were expected to promote democracy (and at the same time were considered an indicator of the health of democracy), to step in during emergency situations, to help wrought regime change, to foster social integration of marginalized peoples and communities, and a lot more. Some of the numbers are indicative. For example, over 90 percent of the European Union's humanitarian funding in the 1970's was channeled through governments, and none of it was channeled through NGOs. Thirty years later, governments account for but 6 percent of the recipients, while NGOs account for 37 percent. According to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.), 13 percent of all development assistance, which amounted to $8.3 billion in 1992, was channeled through NGOs. The figure was a mere 0.2 percent in 1970. Before long, indications started appearing also of agglomeration vs. fragmentation on the opposite end of the pendulum. Andrew Natsios, still the chief administrator of USAID, the American development agency, has been arguing, with particular reference to emergency and relief work, that 10 U.S. and 10 European NGOs spend 75 percent of all the public funds that go to complex emergencies. Scholars speak of the "big 8," meaning the eight largest humanitarian NGOs, which account for the lion's share of the market, or of oligopoly. As NGOs grew in numbers, they grew in power. Their capacity to influence international relations soon became obvious. Former U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali once said that NGOs were "an indispensable part of the legitimacy" of the United Nations. Kofi Annan has called NGOs "the conscience of humanity." A series of "colored" revolutions over the last several years, in which NGOs played prominent roles in mass civic protests, put the democracy work of these civil society organizations in the spotlight. Several governments responded with restrictive legislative measures to curb the possibility of civil society organizations involving themselves in political affairs.


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Every action faces a reaction. The unprecedented popularity and leverage of global civil society organizations started to be challenged by claims that they lack legitimacy, accountability, and transparency. Far too often, they were compared to businesses or an industry, and an unregulated industry at that. Governments started saying that NGOs do not have a democratic mandate, that they are not elected. Many critics of civil society organizations argue that they are not accountable to anyone but their donors. At present, NGOs are under intense scrutiny. The debate looms large and it is difficult to imagine it not having an impact on their scope and influence. At the very least, it will undercut their funding. In the same way that NGOs grew from a handful of groups to a strong global phenomenon, they can easily start to recede, perhaps over a longer period of time. The withdrawal of one type of funding can lead to a reduction in another, and eventually a trend will emerge. Today, NGOs are mobilizing, defending their work, thinking of self-regulation, creating standards of proper conduct, and essentially reforming. Some of the donors are perhaps thinking about the alternatives. Is it better to go back to channeling the aid directly through governments? Or should they just give it to the big multilaterals? Still, with all the criticism going around - and some of it is definitely warranted - NGOs are well positioned to do things that nobody else can do effectively. Here are a few examples: Recently, an NGO fighting for the rights of people with disabilities embarked on a national campaign in Macedonia and collected almost 20,000 signatures. Its aim is to put through parliament a new, modern law protecting the rights of the disabled. Who else could have done such a thing? The government? If the government cared, it would have passed the law in the first place. Can one imagine a donor subcontracting such a deal to a company? In another example, from the same European neighborhood, a couple of years ago several environmental groups fought the government of Montenegro in court over its plan to build a

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power plant in the canyon of the river Tara, a wonderful nature area. And they won. Perhaps it can happen elsewhere, but in the Balkans, it is difficult to see small groups telling governments what to do. In Albania, the youth movement Mjaft has played a remarkable role in fighting government corruption over the past years. They contributed tremendously to building a responsible citizenship. Who else could have done this? And the same goes for the thousands of unknown groups that deliver services every day in impoverished communities, ghettoes, slums, and other places too small for bulky governmental systems to address. They make sure Roma children do their homework and stay in school, drive up to remote villages and fight female illiteracy, fight discouragement in young people who are unable to find employment by enhancing their skills and employability. These are all tasks that should fall under the mandate of governments. That much is clear. Who else can Succeed where Governments have Failed? World politics has undergone a radical and often-overlooked transformation in the last fifteen years, resulting neither from the collapse of the Soviet Union nor the rising tide of fundamentalism, but from the unprecedented growth of nongovernmental organizations around the globe. NGOs or Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have moved from backstage to center stage in world politics, and are exerting their power and influence in every aspect of international relations and policymaking. NGOs have been a positive force in domestic and international affairs, working to alleviate poverty, protect human rights, preserve the environment, and provide relief worldwide. Few, therefore, have felt the need to take a critical look at the effectiveness and accountability of these organizations. After 9/11, however, the specter of terrorists using NGOs as a front for their operations and some highly publicized cases of abuse have made this a critical issue that needs to be addressed by the NGO community.2 In addition, the increasing power of NGOs has prompted scholars, governments, and the media to raise questions about the roles and responsibilities of


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these new global, non-state actors. Fundamental questions include: how many NGOs actually exist, and what are their agendas? Who runs these groups? Who funds them? And, perhaps most significantly, to whom are NGOs accountable, and how and what influence do they actually have on world politics? This article will attempt to address these questions and suggest some ways in which NGOs can become more transparent and accountable as a means of protecting the credibility and independence of these vital organizations. New Actors and Agendas Organizations such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines have helped bring non-governmental organizations the international recognition that has made "NGO" a household word. Some NGOs gained notoriety by organizing large-scale protests that captured international headlines due to the violence and disruption they caused. Still others have organized meetings to coincide with the official gatherings of the G-8, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund with the intent of challenging their legitimacy. Milestones in this largely non-violent NGO revolution include the Solidarity Movement's role in the 1980's political transformation in Poland; the influence of environmental activists on the outcome of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro; the international coalition of groups led by the South Council that developed the 1994 "Fifty Years is Enough" campaign directed at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund; and the labor, anti-globalization, and environmental groups that derailed the 1999 Seattle WTO meeting. The effectiveness of these efforts stunned the major multilateral institutions and governments worldwide and forced them to develop ways to engage and involve NGOs in their deliberations and decision making. With their place in world politics now firmly established, the majority of NGOs have moved from protesting on the streets to contributing to policymaking in the boardrooms of the United Nations, World Bank, World Trade Organization, and the International

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Monetary Fund. International relations were once the exclusive domain of diplomats, bureaucrats, and states; however, today's policy-makers must consider a diverse set of international actors when formulating policy, including organizations as varied as CNN, al-Jazeera, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, al-Qaeda, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). While these actors were not born of globalization, they have been empowered by it. The diffusion of information, technologies, and power have leveled the playing field and enabled NGOs large and small to organize locally and have a global impact. Jessica Mathews, Lester Salamon, and others have written extensively about the dramatic proliferation of NGOs and the impact these institutions are having on world politics.3 The current body of literature, however, has not examined the problems created by what can be called a crisis of transparency and accountability, an issue that looms on the horizon for the entire NGO sector. As we will see, NGOs as an international community lack the transparency and accountability in terms of finances, agenda, and governance necessary to effectively perform their crucial role in democratic civil society. NGO Proliferation and Power The term "non-governmental organization" describes a wide variety of organizations variously known as "private voluntary organizations," "civil society organizations," and "nonprofit organizations." The dramatic proliferation in the number of NGOs and the growth in public and private grants and contracts flowing to these organizations have enabled them to become a powerful force in world politics. Because so many types of organizations are subsumed under the acronym NGO, the scope and breadth of this sector's typological landscape is lost. Our inability to accurately gauge the size and range of this sector is one of the critical problems that needs to be addressed jointly by the public (first sector), private (second sector), and NGOs (third sector) around the world. Despite these limitations, a variety of efforts at estimation provide a glimpse into the scope


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of NGO proliferation. The Economist estimates that the number of international non-governmental organizations rose from 6,000 in 1990 to 26,000 in 1996.4 According to the 2002 UNDP Human Development Report, nearly one-fifth of the world's thirtyseven thousand INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) were formed in the 1990s. The Independent Sector, a non-profit organization that serves and tracks developments in the third sector of society, estimates that there are currently 1.5 million non-profit organizations in the United States. Similarly, India was estimated to house more than one million NGOs. NGOs have not only increased in numbers but also in membership, with many organizations more than doubling their member base at a steady rate.5 Recent figures from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) emphasize the growth of NGO budgets, many of which have reached millions of U.S. dollars. USIP states that the 160 INGOs associated with InterAction have a combined annual revenue of $2.3 billion, almost all of which comes from private donors. USIP also echoes the point that "sheer growth in the number of INGOs in recent years has been dramatic," noting that more than 1,500 INGOs are registered observers of the United Nations. The real story is not the proliferation of NGOs, but how these organizations have effectively networked and mobilized their members to reshape world politics. This point was graphically illustrated by the significant NGO presence at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, where 17,000 NGO representatives staged an alternative forum to the UN-sponsored meeting, while 1,400 were involved in the official proceedings. Emboldened by their success, an even larger group converged in Beijing for the Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995. There, an astonishing 35,000 NGOs organized an alternative forum and 2,600 NGOs participated in the official multilateral negotiations. Understanding the Paradigm and Power Shift The growth of non-state actors has in large part been fuelled by the perceived inability of both domestic and

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international institutions to respond to the social, economic, and political consequences of rapid advances in science and technology, growing economic interdependence, and political fragmentation. In addition, a growing number of transnational threats (pandemics, global warming, and the proliferation of WMDs) that require a coordinated response have created a need for new partners and approaches to solving global issues. As the NGO sector grows, however, it is also facing a new array of organizational challenges that it must address. We have identified six interrelated forces that we believe have propelled the remarkable growth of NGOs, and here look at both the problems and possibilities that each of these represents: 1. increased democratization, and recognition of the importance of civil society in promoting democracy; 2. an increased demand for independent information and analysis; 3. the growth of non-state and inter-state actors; 4. improved communications technologies; 5. the globalization of NGO funding, especially from North to South; and 6. what can be called "a crisis in confidence." Democratization and the Civil Society Ideal The addition of more open societies has been a necessary condition for the creation of an environment conducive to the proliferation of independent, issue-driven, and action-oriented NGOs. The emergence of the civil society movement has put political pressure on governments, which in turn have created the space and demand for NGOs in the political landscape. The work of civil society theorists, such as Robert Putnam of Harvard University, and the dramatic social laboratories of Poland, the Philippines, and South Africa have served to advance the perception that democracy cannot prosper unless a society contains an extensive network of organizations that promote civic engagement, dialogue, and trust among both acquaintances and strangers. NGOs are perhaps the most natural and effective


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response to this need. Furthermore, according to civil society proponents, such organizations are critical to promoting the protection of freedoms and social needs as well as the quality of public information and political interaction. It is important to remember that many NGOs do not fit the mold of the grassroots, mass-participation vehicles idealized by many theorists. However, NGOs often come the closest to engaging directly with those citizens most affected by but least heard in policy decision-making. The growth in interest in civil society has thus stimulated interest in NGOs as an alternative source of information on issues of national and international concern and as a potential critic of government policy that can, in theory, speak with a uniquely objective voice independent of either governmental or business interests. Growing Demand for Information, Analysis, and Action In an increasingly interdependent and information-rich world, governments, policy makers, and citizens face the common problem of bringing expert knowledge to bear on decision making. Policy makers need basic information about the societies they govern--about how current policies are working, possible alternatives, and their likely costs and consequences. Citizens increasingly demand the same, and NGOs have grown to be an integral part of the response to this increased demand for information. Both policy makers and the general public, however, are often besieged by more information than they can possibly use. The problem is that this information can be unsystematic, unreliable, and/or tainted by the interests of those who are disseminating it. NGOs have an important role to play in monitoring and facilitating the collection of reliable data needed to make informed decisions - a role that is particularly important in developing and transitional countries, where such information often does not otherwise exist. Furthermore, NGOs, which tend to focus on a relatively narrow range of issues, are often much more expert on a given topic than a general policy maker could possibly be and therefore provide a bank of experience and knowledge to which officials can turn.

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Even when providing reliable information, however, NGOs are hardly neutral on issues of policy formation. Due to their varied nature, NGOs often play the interesting dual role of providing information and acting as an agent of political pressure on the government, leading to potential conflicts of interest. Transparency and the disclosure of interests and funding sources here are crucially important, but there are often few mechanisms to ensure compliance, especially on an international scale. Growth of States, Non-state, and Inter-state Actors The latter part of the twentieth century has seen unprecedented growth in the number of nation-states, as well as in governmental and non-governmental organizations. In 1950 there were only fifty nations and approximately sixty inter-governmental organizations. We now have four times as many nation-states and inter-governmental organizations and, as noted earlier, an almost exponential growth in the number of NGOs. The forces that drove the expansion of all non-state actors also led to the astounding proliferation of NGOs. No factor is as significant as the global trend toward increased democratization and decentralization, which began with the increase in the number of nation-states after World War II, and the creation of a host of inter-governmental organizations (such as the UN, World Bank, and WTO) to which certain powers and functions were delegated. While the grand vision of a world government was never fully realized, a seamless web of organizations and activities, most notably in the areas of low politics, has helped reduce conflict and facilitate bilateral and multilateral relations. In our current system of global governance, intergovernmental institutions work with what The Economist identifies as "an enormous weakness"--they are limited by the treaties and states that created them, and therefore subordinated to the national interest of states, making decisive and responsive action difficult. The embattled public image developed by these large, centralized bureaucracies has made them easy targets of "NGO swarm," as NGOs eagerly move to


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fill the vacuum in global governance.7 Partly in response to the mass meetings and protests described earlier, World Bank president Jim Wolfensohn gave some of the Bank's harshest critics a role in the majority of the Multilateral Development Banks' work. Over half of World Bank projects are currently executed in partnership with NGOs. This move, however, has not only "co-opted" some of the Bank's former critics but also created a situation in which "NGOs are at the center of World Bank policy, and moreover often determine it. While the current World Bank is more transparent, it is also more beholden to a new set of special interests." The ultimate legitimacy and impact of NGOs, therefore, even in work with institutions such as the World Bank, are still compromised by the lack of transparency that exists in the NGO community today. This translates into an increased incentive for organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations, which work extensively with NGO partners, to support the development of a set of standard policies and best practices to improve third sector transparency and accountability. Improved Communications Technologies Extraordinary changes in the technology of communication have also helped transform the world of NGOs. The widespread diffusion of knowledge made possible by improvements in information and telecommunications systems, plus the nearubiquity of electronic facsimile machines by the early 1990s, made it possible to transmit documents almost instantly to virtually anywhere in the world. The growth of the Internet has furthered an instant, inexpensive, and almost entirely unregulated flow of information. NGOs, whose goals for impact often outstrip their budgets, have benefited greatly from the information age and have found that they can have a tremendous impact with a small staff. Leaders in the NGO community agree that NGO growth has been greatly facilitated by the increased ease in collaboration, and the dissemination of information across vast distances.9 International consortia of like-minded NGOs have

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sprung up across cyberspace to share ideas and coordinate efforts to push for their adoption into policy. Contributing to the growth of NGOs has been the fact that the nature of the present information age makes it increasingly difficult for authoritarian governments to restrict the inflow of information and opinions they would prefer to exclude. Increasingly, the only options are to allow untrammeled access or to bar access to the Internet entirely. However, the issue of accountability rises again when discussing NGOs' increasing reliance on cyberspace, a forum in which there is almost no means for quality control of information. Sham NGOs can easily be created online and disseminate their views at low cost in a manner that might prove convincing to an unsophisticated viewer. Thus, in the cyber-age as in the age of NGOs, the caveat emptor principle is more appropriate than ever before for those seeking reliable information. Globalization of NGO Funding Although the market for ideas is well established and expanding, even the most prominent NGOs require constant inflows of money in order to operate. In both Western countries and the developing world, many organizations operate with small budgets and minuscule staffs. Thus, the issue of funding trends and sources is crucial to the discussion of trends in the development of NGOs because it is the globalization of funding that has helped create and sustain many of these institutions. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, particularly, NGOs often lack critical tax incentives for donors that foster philanthropic traditions and in turn encourage local support. As a result, much of the impetus for NGO activity growth in developing and transitional economies has been the flow of money from industrialized countries. Many donors have chosen to work through NGOs out of a concern that their funds may otherwise be misused. While international funding has dramatically increased the resources available to NGOs, it clearly poses problems of its own. Foreign funding can raise questions about the credibility of an organization's activities: if foreign donors are providing


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money for an NGO, might they be dictating its goals as well? This can be distorted and exploited, and may even serve as an excuse for an authoritarian leader to shut down organizations, which was the experience of some East European affiliates of the Open Society Institute in the 1990s. Less extreme controversies have also occurred in industrialized nations. Critics have expressed concern that the use of foreign money to support the work of U.S.-based NGOs may come with strings attached, or at least cause institutions that accept money from foreign corporations and foundations to mute any criticism of the donor country's foreign or domestic policies. The issue of funding and accountability becomes even more complex when an NGO operates across national boarders, at which point the need for NGO transparency and accountability becomes most clear. It is often almost impossible to accurately track the funding of NGOs based outside the United States, Europe, Japan, and Australia. Most NGOs in the developed world have at least achieved financial transparency as a result of a mix of public and private oversight, regulation, and accreditation. Every NGO in the United States, for example, must file its finances annually with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the federal agency in charge of taxation. Once filed and processed, these reports are accessible to the public. In addition, every U.S. NGO must register with the state in which it is resident and is required to publish an annual report. Charitable organizations throughout Europe, Japan, and Australia are also required to register with their governments; beyond registration, however, further accountability in terms of governance and programs is not uniform, and in many cases is not required. Given the current concerns about security, it is essential to understand where international NGOs get their funding in order to understand exactly whose interests they may be, even inadvertently, promoting. This lack of transparency in the NGO sector is perhaps their greatest vulnerability, and must be addressed internationally in order to ensure the integrity and continuity of the work of NGOs. Unlike a true democratic mandate, however, funding for NGOs is almost impossible to track. Echoing Steve Rudolph, Peter Tavernise



points out that many foundations do not probe deeply into what exactly is being done with grant funds in both developed and developing countries.

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Grant makers' trustees, who are volunteers, often do not even read grant proposals, and program officers are often "too busy" with grant applications to read reports on projects' impact. Thus, while funders are in a prime position to demand accountability from NGOs, this opportunity is often lost. Paralysis and Poor Performance of the Public Sector While the challenges to the governments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were swift and dramatic, there has been a more gradual erosion of confidence in the leaders and institutions of governments across the globe. The paralysis and poor performance of policy makers as well as the seemingly endless stream of scandals involving public officials and a bloated, unresponsive bureaucracy have led the public to question the very legitimacy of their governments. We live in a period when the nation-state is distrusted, or more precisely, its institutions are considered ineffective and unreliable. Similar to their role in international governance, NGOs operating on a local level have emerged in an effort to address the deficiencies of nation-states and the lack of leadership shown by government officials. It is important to note, however, that the rapid proliferation of NGOs has not always resulted in a clearer policymaking scenario. Rather, as John Paul Lederach, director both of the International Conciliation Service of the Mennonite Central Committee and the Conflict Analysis and Transformation Program at Eastern Mennonite University points out, NGO proliferation has resulted in the development of myriad qualified institutions to focus on issues in "hitherto inaccessible and neglected parts of the world." While this is positive, Lederach also points out that this "has also complicated relief efforts by creating an extraordinarily complex system which makes medieval Europe look centralized and ordered by comparison."

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True international accountability is for the moment an elusive goal, one that first requires a comprehensive definition and an answer to the complicated question, accountability to whom? There is no global method to ensure that NGOs are accountable to anyone, a fact that leaves their mandate compromised if NGOs do not as a sector prioritize the achievement of transparency and accountability. There is a need, therefore, at the very least, for committed action on the part of NGOs towards organizational and systemic transparency that is in line with their role in impacting policy and engaging the public in dialogue on the challenges facing our world. In a period of intense scrutiny of governments and corporations, it is only logical that NGOs should be closely examined. NGOs have proven their effectiveness in holding large institutions and governments accountable and exposing them to public scrutiny. In terms of accountability from the reverse perspective, however, neither the policy nor academic communities have systematically analyzed the funding, transparency, and accountability of NGOs. No international mechanism currently exists in which a meaningful dialogue about these critical NGO components can take place. This fact both weakens the credibility of NGOs that, as a sector, cannot claim to be anything close to models for transparency, and also leaves NGOs as a group vulnerable as no "industry-wide" standards for transparency and accountability are in place. Kumi Naidoo, president of CIVICUS, a civil society advocacy group, captures the importance of this issue when he addresses civil society organizations (CSOs): In seeking to improve our accountability and transparency, we need not be defensive or apologize for our work. [CSOs must] think critically about long-term viability, especially when some government and business leaders are questioning the legitimacy of CSOs, and when CSOs operating in new conditions of political instability are increasingly being asked to be transparent, legitimate, and accountable.

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Civil society organizations must meet this challenge head on by making themselves more accountable and transparent. Maintaining public trust in CSOs is critical for ensuring active, participatory democracy, which can enrich our public life at the national and global levels. We should not be afraid to ask who holds groups working in the public interest accountable or, as a New York Times article put it, "Asking Do-Gooders to Prove They Do Good."11 In the final analysis, the NGO community must be willing to practice what they preach or they will risk losing both their credibility and their independence. The diversity of the NGO sector is, in many cases, a source of disorganization. Observations such as John Paul Lederach's thus represent a further call to NGOs to ensure that their work is not jeopardized by weaknesses in their sector. The kind of dialogue and coordination that would be necessary for NGOs to achieve significant advances in terms of the creation of norms for transparency and a framework for discussion of accountability would also have the attractive benefit of creating an NGO sector that is more selfaware, cohesive, and therefore effective. Bridging the Credibility Gap The proliferation of NGOs is challenged by the fact that the impact, nature, and interests of these organizations can each become almost impossible to measure.12 Despite the fact that NGOs have always played a role in "sustaining an independent civil society," their proliferation and the increased scope of their role in every aspect of society now requires better monitoring and regulation so that they can function effectively and protect the integrity and independence of the entire third sector.13 The NGO community holds one of the most significant roles internationally in maintaining accountability in the private sector, public sector, and international bureaucracies. It is therefore vital that the NGO community commit itself to developing a set of credible and verifiable standards that can be universally applied. The path toward achieving increased transparency must begin with systematic international dialogue on the topic within


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the NGO community. A primary objective of such dialogue would be a consensus regarding the state of transparency in the NGO community and the establishment of realistic goals for the sector on this issue. These goals must include an approach that focuses on making the finances, governance, and programs of NGOs more transparent. These recommendations will take skill to craft, given the great diversity that exists in the third sector, but proactive steps in this area are necessary and can serve as a prudent safeguard against the potential loss of the public's trust. Private donors, national governments, and international organizations should actively encourage this effort and provide the resources necessary to help the NGO community define and implement the principles of transparency for NGOs worldwide. Once NGO transparency norms are drafted, a series of fora should be created to promote their adoption and discuss the importance of transparency to the NGO sector. The application of the standards need not be inflexible and must take into consideration the social and political environments in which NGOs operate, but the basic principles of transparency must not be compromised if the effort is to be successful. On transparency, an ideal next step would be committed, coordinated action toward a plan of action intended to achieve specific goals regarding transparency as defined by NGOs. This can only be realized if we create a transnational culture of accountability and greater transparency within the NGO community that is based on a set of international best practices and minimum standards that make all NGOs accountable for their integrity and performance. These standards and best practices must be developed, implemented, and monitored through an international inter-sector partnership. NGOs have been vested with great power, and with that power comes a profound responsibility to all the citizens of the world. As "the conscience of the world" they must be beyond reproach so that they remain the keepers of the public trust. 'We the Peoples,' Not the States The United Nations system is founded on the principle of sovereignty, designed to maintain peace in the world by

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protecting states from foreign intervention. So how did such a peculiar and questionable idea as the right of humanitarian intervention emerge within that system? It happened step by step. In the 1960s human rights advocates argued that the rules defining foreign intervention as an illegal violation of sovereignty did not apply to them, because they related only to relations between states. Later, instead of denying that their actions violated sovereignty, humanitarian organisations began to justify their interventions in foreign countries on the basis of their motives, grounded in the principles of human rights. It was not long before some began to claim that this motivebased rationale could also be applied to states. On 8 December 1988 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that it regarded as a limited, prudent measure to reduce pressure in this controversial matter. Resolution 43/ 131, "Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations", authorised NGOs and intergovernmental organisations to intervene in a humanitarian capacity. Single states were not granted this right of intervention but, in practice, powerful countries - those with the resources to mount a large-scale intervention - have used it amply. In the former Yugoslavia and in Iraq (in 1990-91), they were able to charge in with UN backing. After the Dayton accords in the former Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council put Nato in charge of peacekeeping, the purpose for which the UN had been created. The Peace Implementation Forces were placed under Nato command, in blatant violation of article 53 of the UN charter. In this way, the supposed right of intervention, in practice available only to the most powerful states, ended as just an acceptable modern disguise for the oldstyle imperialism it reintroduced. Yet the people of the South, especially in Africa and Latin America, continue to regard the upholding of national sovereignty as a priority in the struggle against social injustice and the imperial designs of powerful neighbours and patrons. The African Social Forum is campaigning for popular control of national resources and strengthening the state as a protective


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public power. The state remains, at least potentially, the prime instance of democratic decision-making and popular sovereignty. It can also be an important check on the influence of transnational businesses. Where a state is strong and resolved to defend its citizens' rights, it actively resists the corporate invasion, as demonstrated by recent measures taken by Latin American governments against oil and water multinationals. Where a state is badly organised and ineffective (as across much of Africa), corporations are put off by the unstable and unpredictable political situation; this is why the free market and the organisations and political leaders that serve it push for institutional stabilisation in "weak" states, while encouraging "strong" states to hand more responsibilities over to non-state bodies. One state, the US, still seems to exercise all the features of full sovereignty. There is a crucial distinction to be made about sovereignty: does it belong to the state, or to the people? Where this is not specified, the principle carries little weight. In 1789 the French national assembly made its choice clear: "The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation". The following two centuries saw a drift towards the affirmation of a different principle, state sovereignty. This change can mostly be ascribed to colonial conquests of the 19th and 20th centuries: the colonisers claimed to bring the benefits of state structures to peoples unable to develop them for themselves. Despite its famous preamble - "We the peoples of the United Nations" - the UN charter effectively endorses the view that sovereignty resides in the state. Articles 3 and 4 suggest that the body is a community of states, not of peoples. The UN's founding texts move between the words "peoples", "nations" and "states" almost indiscriminately. Their authors cannot have been unaware of the debate about the definition of these terms but they chose not to worry about it. The ambiguity had its advantages: it avoided having to rule on the question of colonised peoples and indigenous minorities. Precisely because the UN's members are states its charter contains the provisions of article 2, paragraph 7: "Nothing

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contained in the present charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Article 53 declares that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies". The ban on all infringement of sovereignty is clearly understood as referring to state sovereignty, and applies even to the UN (except in the case of chapter 7: action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression). The gap between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty is underlined wherever sovereignty is relinquished. States are now more willing to give up certain prerogatives, but these are not passed to democratic bodies. Governments are generally less hesitant about handing powers over to the World Trade Organisation than to the UN or to international human rights courts. Many European Union directives make it harder for states to support their public services. These result from governmental concessions to non-democratic institutions and to market principles. States are not giving up their own sovereignty but that of their populations, who are left with less control over the world taking shape around them. At the heart of the European project is a challenge to the right of peoples to determine their own fates. This does not mean that the world is condemned to a future of face-offs between states that have steadily drained themselves of genuine sovereignty. New players have appeared on the world stage: associations, social movements and NGOs. Their role is growing within the UN (where around 2,000 NGOs now have official accreditation via a three-tier system operated by the Economic and Social Council). They are especially present at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. As François Crépeau wrote in 1997: "The state, in its traditional, Enlightenment conception can no longer claim to be the only legitimate site of political debate and collective action". But though NGOs, unions and associations can make an important contribution to resisting neoliberal globalisation, civil society is by definition heterogeneous and unequal. Since it


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does not represent a cross-section of the population, it should not be taken to represent the population. Yet it would be wrong to see an opposition between civil society and the state, with the latter the true representative of the nation. The two need to work together. In 2003 the vast popular demonstrations against the AngloUS invasion of Iraq provided crucial support for those governments that did not wish the international community to go to war. They may not have prevented the war from happening, but they did prevent it from happening with full UN approval. As this episode showed, the UN's legitimacy does ultimately depend on the peoples of the world. 'New Superpower' Seeks 'Better World' U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's characterisation of civil society as ''the world's new superpower'' reverberated through the corridors of McGill University here this week as 350-plus representatives of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) met to hatch strategies to prod world governments on crucial political, social, and economic issues that plague the world's poorer nations. ''After decades of undemocratic and ineffective global governance on key global issues -- ranging from development and environment to human rights, trade, and security -- now is the time to privilege and highlight the visions and views of civil society leaders around the world,'' said James Riker of the University of Maryland, USA. Playing an important role in this new vision for a better global society should be the estimated 40,000 international NGOs who comprise today's civil society, he said. NGOs have increased in numbers and have begun to fill essential gaps in global leadership on key issues, he added, citing successes including the international campaign to ban landmines and the Kyoto Protocol to curb global warming. Riker said that civil society also played a watchdog role by mobilising to oppose secret negotiations over proposed rules governing foreign direct investment through the Multilateral

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Agreement on Investment. They also undertook advocacy campaigns that compelled global institutions to act on debt relief and acknowledge serious problems in their backing for dams. Kathryn Mulvey, executive director of the U.S.-based Corporate Accountability International, said the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which came into force last February, also was a major NGO achievement. More than 200 NGOs were directly or indirectly involved in the entire three-year process, she said. ''The FCTC is the first global health and corporate accountability treaty that challenged the abusive practices by transnational corporations,'' Mulvey told IPS. The treaty, backed by civil society organisations as well as countries from Asia, the Caribbean, Middle East, and Pacific, was a collaborative effort that ultimately will save millions of lives and change the way tobacco giants like Altria, British American Tobacco and Japan Tobacco International operate globally, she added.


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integration to enhance the role of civil society on issues relating to debt, hunger, development assistance, the environment and changes they say are needed at multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The first test will come June 23-24 when the United Nations hosts two days of civil society hearings to discuss poverty eradication and U.N. structural reforms. ''We should treat the U.N.'s civil society hearings as a prototype of an annual global civil society forum we seek to institute at the United Nations,'' said Rob Wheeler of the Association of World Citizens, a U.S.-based association claiming affiliates in at least 30 countries. The NGO hearings will precede a U.N. summit meeting of world leaders scheduled to take place in midSeptember.

The World Social Forum (WSF) -- held annually since 2001 in Porte Allegre, Brazil and Mumbai, India -- drew over 75,000 people and hundreds of NGOs last January. Created in response to the World Economic Forum held annually in Davos, Switzerland -- which represents the world's big business interests -- the WSF has continued to spearhead the campaign against what participants call corporate-led globalisation, which they say has had a devastating impact on the economies of developing nations.

Benton Musslewhite of One World Now, a group promoting international studies among high school students in the Seattle, USA region, said that he, along with Wheeler, planned to establish an NGO steering committee to campaign to revise the U.N. charter and make it what activists groups would consider a more responsive instrument of global governance. He challenged -- but did not disagree with-- the U.S. neoconservative view that the United Nations had to be written off as ''irrelevant.'' ''Frankly, it is hard to disagree with that view when it comes to really dealing with our global problems in an effective way. But this is not the fault of those who run the present United Nations,'' he added. The people who have run the United Nations for the last 60 years have done wonderful things, he said, adding, ''look at the U.N. children's agency UNICEF and the vaccination of millions of children.'' But the fact remains that the present United Nations ''simply does not have the power to take globally effective steps to deal with global warming, save rainforests, protect oceans, keep the peace, generate disarmament, end poverty, prevent terrorism, stop genocide, control pandemics, provide aid when natural disasters occur, and address the many other serious global problems we face,'' he said.

Cashing in on their collective track record, the NGOs meeting in Montreal this week agreed to promote regional

Phyllis Bennis of the Washington-based think tank Institute for Policy Studies said there is ''a big challenge ahead within

Rajesh Tandon, chair of the Montreal International Forum, said that while NGOs should continue to critique governments and their policies, ''we should also look for opportunities to collaborate because you cannot move forward without collaboration.'' Asked if he was confident that civil society could successfully link up with governments on public policy issues, Tandon said yes, ''because there is more maturity in the NGO movement now than five years ago.''

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the anti-globalisation and peace movements around the world''. And that challenge, she told IPS, is to educate people about why ''the United Nations is not simply an inevitable 'tool of U.S. foreign policy' like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), even if it often gets used in that way.'' She emphasised that ''we have to reclaim the United Nations, not destroy it.'' Nigel Martin, president of the Montreal International Forum, which organised this week's talks here, said that NGOs increasingly are mobilising their resources to campaign for a better global society, as evidenced at the WSF meetings in Brazil and India. He also singled out the rising interest of youth in political, social and economic issues. ''We had to turn down over 100 youth volunteers worldwide who wanted to participate in our seminar,'' Martin said. ''They came with extraordinary understanding of the issues we were going to discuss. The demand was overwhelming. We plan to tap this source and this energy for the future,'' he added.

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8 THE NGO PHENOMENON When a disaster like the Asian tsunami strikes, an enormous industry surfaces to provide relief. In the United States, the companies that make up this industry might be called aid groups or charities or nonprofits. Most of the rest of the world refers to them as NGOs - nongovernmental organizations. The image - in some cases carefully constructed, usually reinforced by the media - is of straightforward charity, feeding the hungry, housing the homeless, treating the sick, in a handson, handout fashion resembling so many Mother Teresas dispensing aid and kindness. The reality is that disaster relief is only the tip of the NGO iceberg. In fact, the organizations are as richly diverse in their goals and methods as private corporations. Many have specialties, ranging from trade policy to environmental concerns, democracy building to disaster relief. Others are multifaceted organizations that try to coordinate a variety of activities to sustain long-term solutions to problems that are both chronic (poverty, disease, corruption) and acute (natural disasters). "In addition to saving lives, NGOs promote democracy and civic participation," says I.M. "Mac" Destler, director of the Program on International Security and Economic Policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. "They have really had a significant role in a number of situations. The Ukrainian election is the most recent." An event like the tsunami puts the NGOs in an intense spotlight where they must perform for an audience that will

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sustain them financially. But few in the audience will have a long-enough attention span to learn which NGOs perform well. The best of the NGOs know that the kind of relief effort going on in Asia is an unglamorous calling - hard work that continues long after the spotlight has moved elsewhere. The worst of them look at disasters as little more than fund-raising opportunities and relentlessly follow the spotlight to keep the donations coming in. "During disasters, there is such a public relations frenzy," says John Hammock, an associate professor of humanitarian aid at the Fletcher School of Tufts University. "Everybody is trying to get on TV with their T-shirts on. And for good reason: That translates into dollars [….] For me, the key is to give money to organizations that are committed to stay there over the long term. Some organizations come in and leave when the money dries up," he says. Such long-term commitment is seen as the way to turn relief into sustainable development that can make communities devastated by these disasters flourish again. "NGOs need to move beyond charity to address broader issues like of governance and accountability," says James V. Riker, associate director of the Democracy Collaborative at the University of Maryland, College Park."I think many groups that started in Asia, in Bangladesh after its floods, in India and Sri Lanka, addressing dramatically the needs of hunger and health care, realized as time went on that they needed to go farther than addressing the symptoms, that they needed to get into community building and rehabilitation projects that would have a longer-term impact," Riker says. A group handing out food to tsunami victims today, for example, might put pressure on international trade organizations next month in an effort to aid economic development in the devastated countries. Many of today's NGOs got their start in the aftermath of World War II, aiding refugees in war-ravaged Europe. The CARE package is a symbol of what might be termed the romantic image of these NGOs. For a generation of Americans, CAREwhich originally stood for Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe - will always be connected with the package that

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carried its name, originally a box of military surplus foodstuffs that was delivered to the war refugees amid the devastation of Europe. A later version that included tools and seeds was promised to poor countries around the world in fund-raising appeals that aired during the early years of television. Some 100 million CARE packages were distributed over two decades. The growth of NGOs in the post-World War II decades paralleled the growth of international awareness. The United Nations was created and helped focus attention on problems across the globe. It contracted with many NGOs to deal with those problems, a symbiotic relationship that still exists. Television brought pictures of disease and destruction, famine and flood, into the comfortable living rooms of industrialized societies. Improved transportation allowed meaningful responses to the problems. Charity was not as it once was, giving money to a local group for the poor of your community - it was now responding to an outstretched hand halfway around the world. As the NGOs grew, their roles became more complex and sophisticated. Now the term "CARE package" has slipped into the vernacular as a box of goodies delivered to anyone in need - such as a college student facing exams - not as an instrument of disaster relief. Atlanta-based CARE no longer delivers them. Contracting out Relief CARE - which now stands for Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere - is a $500-million-per-year operation with a wide variety of projects in the developing world. Most of its money does not come from the individuals who once bought CARE packages for specific recipients, but from governments and U.N. groups. It contracts out the business of relief. This is not true of all NGOs, as some large operators, such as Oxfam and Baltimore-headquartered Lutheran World Relief, continue to rely primarily on private funding, in part to insure their independence. But, like CARE, many of the most admired NGOs, such as Baltimore-based Catholic Relief Services, get a great deal of

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their money from government and U.N. contracts. Certainly they cherish small donations - the outpouring of generosity after the tsunami has had a huge impact on NGO budgets but they no longer depend on them. "There is still a very significant private fund-raising effort in international relief," says Lester M. Salamon, who studies the nonprofit sector at the Institute for Policy Studies at the Johns Hopkins University. "But it is the case that governments provide major parts of the money. It's cost-effective to do it that way. It is really hard to keep a major organization going through private donations." With all these groups, personnel who once might have been handing out those old CARE packages are now engaged in very unromantic work. That often means trying to run huge freight transportation companies under difficult conditions - finding trucks and drivers and passable roads in order to get the basics of life from the places where they are plentiful to the places where they are needed. "They are still romantic in their objectives," Salamon says of the NGOs. "But they are very concrete in their content." The story of the nuts-and-bolts work at the core of NGO operations is coming out in the tsunami disaster probably more than ever before, in large part because of the intense media concentration on the disaster. Still, newspapers and television are filled with the kinds of stories that perpetuate the traditional image of NGOs - stories that tell of an individual from the developed world enduring hardships and risking his or her health for a small paycheck to help pitiful victims of floods and famines, earthquakes and, now, tsunamis. Often these stories resonate with memories of bygone colonial eras, with all their racist underpinnings. "Look at most of the images of famines in Africa," says Hammock, former head of Oxfam America. "It's always a white nurse feeding a black African. There's always the native victims and the white person comes in to save the day. It's like a morality play." The media play their parts in this image-making dance, usually arriving at the scene in tandem with their peers from the NGO community, often sharing quarters with the aid

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workers. These First World visitors certainly live in a rough environment, but it is almost always one that offers protection from whatever disaster is at hand - disease or hunger or homelessness. It is not surprising that these Western reporters seek out stories of their peers dispensing aid, nor that the NGOs encourage this approach, knowing it is grist for the fundraising mill. Hammock and others say the long-term success of these operations depends on getting away as soon as possible from that handout relationship - though it plays well in the heartstring-tugging news stories and donor appeals - and instead taking advantage of the tremendous capabilities that disaster victims possess. "Any organization that defines its mission as just giving stuff has got it wrong," says Hammock. "You might save a person's life by sending stuff, but what you have to save is their livelihood. "It is true in Asia right now, that most people are going to survive on their wits, not on foreign aid," he says. "Most of these people are not victims, they are people like you and me. They do not want aid. They might need it for a bit of time, but then they want to make it on their own." That means not setting up large camps stocked with donated food that might provide good photo-ops but also foster a culture of dependency. Instead, it means getting people back in their homes - exactly where they want to be - as soon as possible, and figuring out what help they need to stay there and flourish. Bangladesh Example Bangladesh is considered a case of how to do it right. The country was born in 1971 in a man-made disaster - a horrific war as Pakistan tried to retain control of its eastern province on the other side of India. That drew the attention of Beatle George Harrison, whose Concert for Bangladesh focused a spotlight on the nascent country, about to face a famine, and raised $9 million in relief funds. The first of such concerts - now de rigueur after any disaster - it helped bring the international NGO community to a new level of awareness and importance

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on the world stage. "It was the classic case of a country doomed not to survive," Tariq Karim, former ambassador from Bangladesh to the United States, says of his native land. "One phrase from the early '70s got it all - Bangladesh was a 'bottomless basket case.'" But what happened is that the international NGOs that descended on Bangladesh just primed the pump. Bangladeshis began forming their own organizations that focused on education, industry and other fundamental development work. One, called BRAC, is now considered the largest NGO in the world. "These NGOs went into empty spaces that the government could not cover," says Karim, who is a senior adviser at the IRIS Center (Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector) at the University of Maryland. The result, he says, is a growing economy, a declining birth rate, a fairly stable democracy and tremendous progress on the problems of famine and flooding that used to draw the world's attention on a regular basis. Karim contrasts what happened in Bangladesh, a Muslim country, with its former ruler, Pakistan, where the government kept the international NGOs out and saw the growth of madrasses, fundamentalist Islamic schools that are seen as incubators of the fanaticism that leads to terrorism. "This confirms my theory that no space remains vacant, that it will be occupied by some agent or another, benevolent or malevolent," Karim says. Salamon says that the Bangladesh experience has been repeated in many other countries where people frustrated by corrupt governments and inefficient economies formed NGOs as the best way to have a positive effect on their societies. "I think there has been a global association revolution, a massive upsurge around the world of private nonprofit activists," Salamon says. "It is striking in its dimension and its breadth. And it is not limited to individual countries as networks have formed among organizations on international levels, among environmental groups, human rights groups, major development organizations. "To call it an industry comes with unfortunate pejorative implications, but it is certainly now a major economic and

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major political force," he says. "These are vehicles in which people take the initiatives and change the lives of their countries. It is an absolutely massive worldwide phenomenon." Kyoto Protocol Ratification The Japanese government's decision to ratify the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to combat global warming on June 3 was a major victory for nongovernmental organizations that lobbied long and hard for the treaty's approval. "Citizens and NGOs have made a significant impact on negotiations to ratify the treaty," declared Mie Asaoka, a lawyer who is president of the Kiko Network, a Japanese NGO working on environmental issues. She has attended every international climate conference since 1997, researching the activities of participating countries. When Tokyo's resolve wavered after the U.S. announced its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in May 2001, Asaoka and other NGO leaders went directly to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to stress the significance of the treaty. Asaoka is disappointed that the final version of the pact falls short of its original principles, but she still considers ratification a "turning point" for civilization. "While the U.S. sentenced the treaty to death, the rest of the world has made a great leap toward a common objective," she said. When the treaty goes into effect, Japan will be obligated to cut greenhouse-gas emissions by 6% from 1990 levels in 2008-2012. NGOs will play a part in meeting the targets. "Participation by citizens will be necessary to achieve the target," Asaoka said. "We have to make bottom-up efforts, including rallying public opinion and implementing local government measures based on regional concerns." International NGOs have played a key role in the Kyoto Protocol since negotiations in 1997, where the groups drew attention for their ability to gather information. "The information network of global NGOs made a great impact on the climate talks," said Yurika Ayukawa, senior officer of the World Wide

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Fund for Nature Japan, the Japanese chapter of the Switzerlandbased NGO. NGOs released the latest information on a regular basis independent from governments during international conferences on global warming. European and U.S. NGOs, such as the World Wildlife Fund, sometimes published the news before the Japanese government obtained it. In Europe, NGOs have a significant influence on governments and have made great strides in building relationships based on trust. At a conference in Bonn in 2001, a European government delegation even asked a Japanese NGO what the Japanese government wanted. Mitsutoshi Hayakawa, managing director of the Citizens' Alliance to Save the Atmosphere and the Earth (CASA), a Japanese NGO, said, "Continued monitoring by citizens led to the government's ratification of the treaty." On May 29, Hayakawa was invited to the upper house as a witness during deliberations on amending the law on emissioncutting measures. "Global warming measures have reached the stage for action, and we need to establish appropriate domestic laws," Hayakawa said. He also argued that the amendment was not sufficient to achieve a 6% emissions cut required by the Kyoto Protocol. CASA estimates that Japan would be able to achieve a 9% emissions cut by adopting new industrial and transportation systems and popularizing carbon-dioxide emission reduction techniques. "NGOs need to maintain a level of analytical expertise equal to that of the government in order to continue their influence," Hayakawa said. Nongovernmental Organizations Show Their Growing Power Since the end of the cold war, private aid organizations have mushroomed across Africa, addressing every conceivable need in seemingly every corner of the world's poorest continent.

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To supporters, the groups - better known in the diplomatic world as N.G.O.'s, or nongovernmental organizations - are essential to Africa's burgeoning democracy, giving communities the money and power to take part in their own development and circumvent ineffective or corrupt governments. To critics, they are new colonialists who instill dependency among Africans, and their contributions to Africa's development are hard to measure. Whatever the reality, the central role played in foreign aid by these organizations is acknowledged by their prominent place this week at the poverty and development conference in Monterrey, Mexico. An estimated 25,000 such organizations operate around the world. "Five years ago, 50 percent of World Bank projects had N.G.O. involvement," said William Reuben, coordinator of the bank's N.G.O. and civil society section. "Now that figure is 70 percent." Since last year, the organizations have assumed an important policy-making role in 32 developing countries that have qualified for debt reduction. Those countries have agreed to consult with private aid groups on how to use money freed up from the debt reduction. Most of the organizations involved in those efforts are local, not branches of international ones, Mr. Reuben said. Increasingly, he said, Western donors are financing local groups directly, instead of going through international structures. "It's becoming a trend and that has made the international N.G.O. community think about their role," Mr. Reuben said. The first rethinking about aid to Africa took place with the end of the Cold War. Until then, rich nations gave money directly to African governments and mostly financed the buildup of infrastructure. But in the early 1990's, as the West tied aid to democratization, the independent organizations began flourishing. Foreign N.G.O.'s were respected for their skills in carrying out development projects that would actually benefit ordinary Africans; the local groups, meanwhile, were the foundation of a civil society necessary for democracy.

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"That shift was much more beneficial and had more impact," said Chris Conrad, the programs director for southern and western Africa for CARE, one of the biggest independent aid groups. Mr. Conrad, who has worked in Africa for 25 years and is now based in Johannesburg, pointed to community-sponsored schools in Mali. With the Malian government unable or unwilling to build schools, many communities have started their own, with the help of private aid groups.

African governments or businesses cannot match, experts say. Many organizations that do not focus on development, but are advocates for human rights and other causes, are simply businesses that collect grants from Western donors, critics say. In Nigeria, some of these organizations participated fully in the fight against past military regimes, but others appear to do little except to insert their names occasionally in a newspaper article.

Some critics say the organizations have created dependency among Africans and their governments, which rely increasingly on them to provide services that would ordinarily be filled by the state. At one extreme, relief groups are providing so many services in places like Angola and southern Sudan that the authorities there can use their resources for long-running wars.

"In Africa, a $10,000 grant buys you an N.G.O., so these groups have multiplied exponentially," said Marina Ottaway, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "One of their main characteristics is that they have three people: a director, a secretary and a driver. They do not have members. Their usefulness in promoting democracy is very limited."

But even in a peaceful country like Mali, does helping a village build a school absolve the government of its real responsibility? Bruce Wilkinson, a senior vice president for World Vision in Washington who spent 15 years in West Africa, rejects that criticism. "Creating dependency is a problem," he said. "But what's the alternative? If vaccination coverage is 5 to 10 percent in a specific area and there is no N.G.O., that vaccination coverage will continue at those levels for the next generation. How many children will die?" Careful decisions, however, can limit dependency, Mr. Wilkinson said. After a drought in Mali, he said, food was supplied to herders. "We saved many lives," he said. "But we stayed too long, and they didn't return as quickly as they should have to their herding or other income-generating activities." Critics of the groups say they have so much power that the good they do is undermined by the side effects of their presence. The groups are a new way for Western governments to perpetuate their influence in Africa, these critics say, and are in reality not accountable to Africans. The groups that provide relief are a big business that thrives on disasters. Often, they hire away the most-talented Africans, lured by salaries that

NGOS AS GLOBAL ACTOR: PROMISE AND PITFALLS

Today, there is much talk about the emergence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or civil society organizations (CSOs) as major international actors. CSOs have elicited criticism from some quarters. For instance, Martin Wolf, the columnist of the Financial Times, has called them "uncivil society" and attacked them for opposing the project of globalization advanced by the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, saying that that their stands on various issues stem from ignorance and simplistic interpretations of a complex world. More liberal quarters, however, have acknowledged that their criticisms have some justification, for instance, on the issue of the dangers posed by genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and globalization. Both corporations and governments have moved to initiate "dialogue" with NGOs, oftentimes with the purpose of coopting them into corporate or government agendas by conceding some of their criticisms while rejecting others, particularly their more fundamental critiques of the processes of corporate globalization. The elite World Economic Forum that meets in Davos, Switzerland, every year now assigns top priority to consulting NGOs to ensure that the alleged

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benefits of globalization are spread more widely. When we examine the problems and promises posed by civil society organizations (CSOs), an important thing to remember is that they are not invariably a progressive phenomenon. While we are familiar with CSOs that are liberal or belong to the left, the right also has its CSOs, such as business associations, trade groups, and conservative religious formations--for instance, the formidable Opus Dei in Catholic countries. Oftentimes, as influences on political and economic actors, these CSOs on the right are far more influential than CSOs on the left. This influence is, however, sometimes not noticed because it is covertly exercised via the many different networks in which members of conservative CSOs participate. In contrast, progressive CSOs or NGOs are oftentimes more public and transparent, so that the press has an easier time chronicling their activities. Despite this greater visibility, however, the civil society organization of the right is generally much more influential than the civil society organization of the left. They are, to borrow Gramsci's famous term, more "organic" to the class structure. Promise of CSOs Having flagged this, one can now turn to the promise of progressive CSOs in the creation of a more just and equitable order at home and abroad. First of all, CSOs are quickly emerging as a third or fourth actor in the formulation and implementation of macro-political and macro- economic decisions. In many Asian countries, for instance, real decisionmaking power used to be monopolized by politicians, technocrats, and the business elite. That is increasingly less and less possible in the face of the mass mobilization by labor groups, environmental groups, and human and social rights groups, often working in coalitions. Coordination, even of a rough sort, among a variety of CSOs, has become more pronounced after the Asian financial crisis, which underlined the hopeless corruption of the old order and the necessity of constantly monitoring and checking the old elites outside the usual governmental institutions and processes.

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Second, CSOs are crucial not only as checks on elites. They are also the key to the evolution of democracy. Representative democracy has always suffered from what Rousseau saw as its tendency to develop a "corporate will" separate from the General Will, thus perverting the purposes of representation. The development of the US democratic system into a plutocratic system, where Republicans and Democrats in Congress have been subjugated by corporate money, is the best example of the Rosseauean dilemma of large-scale representative democracies. With their constant pressure on bureaucrats and parliamentarians to be accountable, CSOs are a force for more democracy. By organizing the energies of millions of citizens to impinge on the daily political scene, CSOs are a force pushing the evolution of more direct forms of democratic rule. CSO activity, combined with advanced applications of information technology that allow citizens and citizens' groups to instantaneously communicate with one another, may be the key to the emergence of direct democracy in contemporary mass societies. Finally, CSOs are a force for effective internationalism that can check the power of politically hegemonic forces like the US government and transnational corporations. The power of states and thus of counter- hegemonic alliances among states has been eroded by corporate-led globalization. But the combination of citizens' resistance to globalization and communications technology has created global citizens' movements that can assemble and meet the "enemy" at a moment's notice. The "Battle of Seattle" in November 1999 and, more recently, the "Battle of Washington," are examples of the new transborder activist movements. The development of civil society, in short, presents opportunities for democracy both vertically and horizontally. It is the route to a more humane, more participatory, more equitable future. Pitfalls There are, of course, major obstacles that need to be surmounted if this vision is to become a reality.

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First of all, there is the North-South divide among NGOs. Many Northern NGOs are, oftentimes, focused on single issues, such as the environment or human rights and carry agenda that are filtered through the lens of these particular issues. Southern NGOs, on the other hand, are more comprehensive in their concerns. They are concerned almost equally with the environment, social equity, development, national sovereignty, and democracy. Thus, while NGOs in the North working on climate change are sometimes solely concerned about bringing down the level of greenhouse gas emissions, Southern NGOs want to make sure that bringing down CO2 levels in the South does not conflict with the legitimate aspirations to development of their countries. Similarly, they are concerned that environmental standards in the North do not become a protectionist screen against the entry of products from the Third World. Second, there is the question of compromising with or fundamentally opposing corporate-led globalization. For some CSOs, both in the North and the South, corporate-led globalization is inevitable; the main task is to humanize it. For instance, some labor and environmental NGOs see the World Trade Organization as a fact of life and focus their energies on attacing "social" or "environmental" clauses to WTO agreements. Others see the WTO as fundamentally problematic and push for abolishing or radically reducing its powers. Third, there is the question of working with governments. Some CSOs adopt a stand of maximizing cooperation with governments so as to get governments to adopt some of their agenda. Many environmental NGOs in the North, for instance, worked with the US government to ban imports of tuna and shrimps to the US if these were not caught with methods specified in US government legislation. In the South, some NGOs have strongly supported the nationalist policies of certain governments, while muting their criticisms of other aspects of their governments, like the bad record of these governments in the area of human rights and democracy. Other NGOs in both the North and the South, in contrast, have made it a point to limit working relationships with governments to a minimum,

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while maximizing their critical stance. A fourth problem is that competition and intrigues among CSOs are often just as intense and destructive as conflicts in the political and business worlds. Among NGOs in the North and the South, a source of intense competition that can quickly make allies into adversaries is funding. Indeed, some observers contend that nothing has proven more problematic in terms of building common fronts and common programs among CSOs and NGOs than fights over funds which often mask as fights over principles or politics. In any event, pluralism will continue to mark global civil society. This is its source of strength. But it can also be a source of fatal weakness, one which will prevent the emergence of a working unity of CSOs, whether at the national or global level. The challenge is how to ensure that differences in strategies and tactics do not become the sources of permanent and bitter divisions. The challenge is how to keep dialogue going so that differences on some issues do not prevent coming together in solidarity on other issues. To take a very current issue, can CSOs that found themselves on different sides of the battle on the question of the US's granting of permanent normal trade relations to China work together to radically reduce the powers of the WTO. Corporations, governments, and multilateral organizations that carry the pro-corporate globalization project are waiting to seize on divisions among CSOs and NGOs. It is important to make sure that even as CSOs disagree among themselves, they do not play into the hands of forces with a different agenda. NGOs are Fighting and Winning Social, Political Battles In Bangladesh, a shop owner receives a $175 "micro loan" to expand his business. In Kenya, a woman joins the activist "green belt" movement to fight deforestation. In the western United States, churches join forces to save salmon and redwoods. Around the world, private, nonprofit organizations are fightingand winning - major social and political battles. Most are small, grassroots groups working at the neighborhood or village level. Others are spread across continents with hundreds of thousands

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of members and a variety of sophisticated organizational structures. But in virtually every part of the world, these nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are having a major impact on governments, corporations, official international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank, and - most importantly - the lives of people and the health of the planet. Working together, individuals and private groups around the world have had major impact on international trade pacts like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), on security and safety matters such as the use of land mines, and on such economic issues as the new requirements that forest products in some parts of the world be certified as environmentally friendly. "The past few years have seen a remarkable growth in the number and prominence of such groups and their ability to precipitate change," says Curtis Runyan, who studies NGOs for the Worldwatch Institute in Washington. "They have cajoled, forced, joined in with, or forged ahead of governments and corporations on an array of actions as disparate as the decommissioning of nuclear reactors, brokering cease-fires in civil wars, and publicizing the human rights abuses of repressive regimes." It's hard to put an exact figure on the number of such groups. Some - such as those fighting slavery, women's suffrage organizations, humanitarian associations like the Red Cross have been around for more than 100 years. But the numbers have accelerated rapidly in recent years. The Yearbook of International Organizations reports that there now are more than 26,000 international NGOs - more than four times as many as existed just 10 years ago. Runyan estimates that there are about 2 million grassroots citizens' groups in the United States, at least two-thirds of them created within the past three decades. Lester Salamon, a political scientist at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore who specializes in alternatives to government, calls this phenomenon "a global association

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revolution that may prove to be as significant ... as the rise of the nation-state." There are two reasons behind this rapid growth: First, governments around the world are becoming more democratic and less authoritarian and, second, advancing means of communication allow citizens and activists around the world to share information and strategies. Many of these groups deal with environmental issues or more broadly - the "sustainability" movement encompassing economic development, environmental protection, social justice and quality of life. "Numbers themselves ... do not convey the power of this movement," says Paul Hawken, a successful business entrepreneur and author of several books on sustainable business practices. "What does are the underlying mental models and frameworks that inform it." In a recent Internet discussion moderated by the Sierra Club, Hawken said, "In the past, movements that became powerful (Marxism, Christianity, Freudianism) started with a set of ideas and disseminated them, creating power struggles over time as the core model was changed, diluted, or revised. "The sustainability movement (estimated by Hawken to include 30,000 groups in the US and 100,000 worldwide) does not agree on everything, nor should it. "But, remarkably, it shares a basic set of fundamental understandings about the earth and how it functions, and about the necessity of fairness and equity.... This shared understanding is arising spontaneously, from different economic sectors, cultures, regions, and cohorts. And it is absolutely growing and spreading worldwide, with no exception. No one started this worldview, no one is in charge of it, there is no orthodoxy." Paul Ray, a sociologist and market researcher who focuses on values, calls people who share such interests "cultural creatives." Such folks - about 44 million in the United States alone, Ray estimates - take a more global view of economic and social issues and tend to be more altruistic and less cynical than other segments of society. They also are more likely to be involved in volunteer activities. "A major change has been growing in American culture," Ray wrote in American Demographics magazine. "It is a comprehensive shift in values,

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world views, and ways of life.... They are eager to rebuild neighborhoods and communities, committed to ecological sustainability, and believe in limits to growth. They see nature as sacred, want to stop corporate polluters, are suspicious of big business, are interested in voluntary simplicity, and are willing to pay to clean up the environment and stop global warming." This philosophical outlook and willingness to engage in activism - which is growing in other parts of the world as well as in the U.S. - was evident during the protests at last fall's World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle. Aside from the handful of anarchists who trashed some buildings and got most of the media coverage, there was a large network of environmentalists, human rights activists, labor organizations and others concerned about the economic and social impact of the secretive, government-sponsored WTO. While it may have appeared to TV viewers that spontaneous protests caught local officials by surprise, NGOs around the world had spent months developing strategies for expressing their concerns in Seattle. As a result, a broad nonpartisan effort - one that saw consumer advocate and Green Party presidential candidate Ralph Nader team up with conservative Republican-turned-Reform-Party-candidate Pat Buchanan - was able to slow the WTO negotiations to a halt. The spread of global communications in recent years has made it possible for activists like those in Seattle to find out quickly about each other's work and to join forces for maximum impact - often in a way that lessens the traditional power of governments. "The most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of states and the rise of non-state actors is the computer and telecommunications revolution," Jessica Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine. "Widely accessible and affordable technology has broken governments' monopoly on the collection and management of large amounts of information and deprived governments of the deference they enjoyed because of it. In every sphere of activity, instantaneous access to information and the ability to put it to use multiplies the number of players

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who matter and reduces the number who command great authority." A major point in the growth of NGOs was the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (the "Earth Summit") in Brazil in 1992. More than 100 governments were represented - largely due to the pressure of nongovernmental advocacy groups, some 1,500 of which were accredited by the U.N. to take part in the discussions. A coalition of about 350 humanitarian and arms-control groups from 23 countries pushed through an international treaty banning the manufacture, distribution and use of landmines. Jody Williams, head of the U.S.-based International Committee to Ban Landmines, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. Her main weapon, she said, was e-mail. Over the years, the World Bank often funded programs that disrupted indigenous people and promoted industrial development at the expense of the environment. Under pressure from NGOs, the World Bank backed away from massive dam projects in India, Malaysia, and China. The bank has begun working closely with such groups as Oxfam International. Today, more than half of all World Bank projects involve input from NGOs. Nongovernmental organizations also have influenced major international corporations. Nike has been pressured to improve working conditions for its overseas employees. After years of criticism, Home Depot recently announced that it would shift to lumber products that are independently certified as having been harvested "sustainably." Chevron oil company is working with the World Wildlife Fund to ensure that its operations do not harm the environment. Such influence, say political scientists Margaret Keck at the Johns Hopkins University and Kathryn Sikkink at the University of Minnesota, is the direct result of what they call "transnational advocacy networks." "What is novel in these networks is the ability of nontraditional international actors to mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories and to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations," they write in their recent book "Activists Beyond Borders."

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"Activists in networks try not only to influence policy outcomes, but to transform the terms and nature of the debate." From relatively wealthy American suburbanites to African villagers to residents of "megacities" in South Asia, the ability to communicate rapidly and affect change is expected to continue growing. "Both in numbers and in impact, non-state actors have never before approached their current strength," observes Mathews of the Carnegie Endowment. "And a still larger role likely lies ahead." Activist Groups Gain Influence in Global Body They call themselves the "third sector" of global government or, in their loftier moments, "global civil society." The first two sectors, business and government, call them pests. Their generic name is non-governmental organizations, or NGOs for short. As the demonstrations at the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle this week show, some formerly marginal NGOs have burst into the global economy in a big way and are becoming a serious force in the way the world is run in the global era. All this is new, a child of the post-Cold War world and the communications revolution. It's a work in progress, but as the global society takes shape, NGOs are in the thick of it. At stake is a battle to write the rules that will govern the new global economy. This economy is powered by global markets, global corporations and global communications, all of which have escaped the laws and frontiers of individual nations. This process is shifting power to international organizations such as the WTO and the International Monetary Fund. Until now, the rules of these organizations have been set, often in private, by governments and by the global corporations themselves. The usual democratic instruments-- parliaments, political parties, the press and courts--are national in character and cannot follow this new governance as it expands over the world. The emerging NGOs--mostly small, nimble and at home in cyberspace--can and do jump national borders. In the past two or three years, they have learned how to become a potent voice

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in the framing of this new global government. "What has changed since 1990 is that we are in the economic political mainstream," said Charles Arden-Clark of the World Wide Fund for Nature, an environmental NGO. "International organizations are learning they have to talk to us at the beginning (of negotiations)." The Seattle demonstrations involve tens of thousands of people from at least 700 organizations, but they are only the tip of the iceberg. An estimated 30,000 NGOs operate internationally. Some are huge: Amnesty International has a bigger budget than the United Nations human-rights monitors. Most are small, little more than two economists and a filing cabinet. But they all have computers and modems and have become expert at using the Internet to form ad hoc coalitions that can leverage their strengths. In the '90s, NGOs working together have played major roles in writing the international treaty banning land mines, in turning global warming and Third World debt relief into major issues, in establishing an international criminal court, and in defeating attempts by the 29 leading industrial nations to frame ground rules for global investment. Some NGOs, such as Doctors Without Borders, deal with health issues, or like Human Rights Watch, fight political and legal battles. But an increasing number focus on economic causes, such as labor, poverty and the environment. The WTO, the international organization overseeing world trade, is a lightning rod for their concerns about the global economy. NGOs sometimes are called non-profit organizations. Both names tell only what they aren't. They aren't part of government, nor of business. They are private organizations, usually devoted to a single cause, funded by contributions, often from foundations. Some big foundations, such as Ford and the Chicago-based MacArthur, have become powerful behind-thescenes figures in the global economy through their targeted funding of NGOs. "What the Ford and MacArthur program officers think is important has huge importance for us," said John Cavanagh, director of the left-leaning Washington-based

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Institute for Policy Studies, which relies on funding from "30 or 40 foundations" to fulfill its mandate "to work on behalf of the poorer half of humanity, to help build a global civil society." "Something new is being born," said one of those program officers, the Ford Foundation's Larry Cox. "There is a new global movement. We are right now having to work out global principles that transcend nations." All this is part of "a shifting economic and political architecture worldwide--as most visibly manifested by the end of the Cold War, rapid economic globalization, the increasing power of international corporations, and the proliferation of cheap communication technologies," wrote Curtis Runyan, assistant editor of World Watch magazine. In this process, the Internet has been crucial. The same communications technology that created global markets and global corporations has empowered the NGO-led backlash. Critics charge that NGOs are anti-business, antiglobalization, anti-capitalism and anti-almost everything. The fiercely pro-trade British magazine, The Economist, scornfully lumped them together as a "rag-bag." Some NGO members, like the more raucous demonstrators who touched off the clashed in Seattle on Tuesday, might fit that description. Others are more sedate. But others have become a true third party in global governance. The NGOs who helped write the land-mine and international court treaties are examples. The UN has accredited 1,500 NGOs, and the World Bank has a set it recognizes. Both bodies keep these NGOs briefed on issues under debate and often ask their advice and their help in areas, such as the environment, where the NGOs might have expertise. The IMF and WTO remain uncomfortable with NGOs. The WTO has begun informal briefings for NGOs at the trade organization's headquarters in Geneva, but both sides admit that mutual suspicion has prevented much genuine cooperation. NGOs can be constructive and destructive, according to Cavanagh of the Institute for Policy Studies. Most believe the WTO has too much power and want to restrain, reform or

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destroy it, he said. But other NGOs, such as the ones that are helping to create an international criminal court, recognize the power of the global economy and want to build a new web of global environmental, labor and economic regulations to replace what they see as outmoded national codes, he said. NGOs cut their teeth on political issues, such as voting rights and torture, and political groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have become the biggest and best-known NGOs. "But now the debate is changing," said Michael Posner, executive director of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. "The original focus was on state-sponsored violence, on civil rights regarding torture, disappearances and the like. This is still important. "But now we're in a post-Cold War world, with issues relating to workplace or economic rights, such as sweatshops, abuse of children and mistreatment of women. With a growing global market and growing disparity, and with global companies going to poorer countries, these issues will continue to rise," Posner said. Critics of NGOs point out that they are non-elected organizations, beholden not to voters but to their financial backers, and so are no more democratic than the WTO and other global organizations. Defenders such as Lori Wallach, director of Global Trade Watch for Public Citizen, argue that NGOs often insist that the global economy abide by national laws and regulations, forged in the democratic process. "On a global scale, democratic accountability is lost," said Wallach, whose Washington-based consumer organization was founded by Ralph Nader. "The true role of international rules is to ensure that nation-states remain robust." A Force Now in the World, Citizens Flex Twenty years ago social activists could identify only one independent organization working to protect the environment in Indonesia. Today there are more than 2,000, an environmental network based in Jakarta reports. Citizen organizations have been similarly emerging across much of the world. In Slovakia, there were a handful of such organizations active in the 1980's; now there are more than 10,000. In the Philippines, registered

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nonprofit organizations grew from 18,000 to 58,000 between 1989 and 1996. And in the United States, aside from religious groups and private foundations, 70 percent of nonprofit organizations filing returns with the I.R.S. are less than 30 years old; a third are less than 15. To some economists and social scientists the astonishing growth of citizen-led organizations signals a new kind of global revolution. "It is reshaping politics and economics both at the domestic and global levels," said Lester M. Salamon, the director of the Center for Civil Society Studies at Johns Hopkins University. "I believe it is as important a development to the latter part of the 20th century as the rise of the nation-state was at the end of the 19th century." Consider recent events in which citizens' groups were major players: the defeat of apartheid in South Africa; the end of the dictatorship in Chile; the political transformation in the Philippines; the overthrow of Communist regimes in Central Europe; the creation of an international treaty prohibiting land mines; the establishment of an international criminal court. Organizations founded by private individuals have historically played a vital role in democracies. Writing in the 1830's, Alexis de Tocqueville remarked that nothing was more deserving of attention than America's associations. Women's suffrage, organized labor, civil rights, consumer protection, environmental protection, gay liberation and the rights of the disabled are all movements pioneered by citizen organizations. What is different today, however, is not only the increasing number of these groups worldwide, but also the view that they are a distinct sector, one that, like government, serves essential social functions, but that has many of the entrepreneurial qualities of business. The profit, in this case, is primarily social progress. "This new sector really is competitive like business," said William Drayton, the president of Ashoka, an organization, named for an altruistic emperor of India, that supports people working to bring about social changes in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Central Europe. "It's got open entry. Organizations

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are competing for money, for recognition, for staff." Mr. Drayton and others hold that the citizen sector is leading the social half of society through the same type of changes that transformed the European economy three centuries ago. "In the early business environment, the right to conduct different businesses was given by the crown," said Sharon Oster, a professor of economics at the Yale School of Management. "That monopoly model fell apart and became a competitive model." As controls on economic enterprises were loosened in the 17th and 18th centuries, new players flooded the field of business. Just as trade and manufacturing were monopolized centuries ago, colonial and authoritarian Governments pretty much monopolized the social arena. The viceroys in India, the Communists in Central Europe the generals in Latin America and Africa had little tolerance for citizens who tried to engineer broad social change. As colonies gained independence and democracy spread, opportunities opened up for what Mr. Drayton called social entrepreneurs. These people, he said, have vision, practical ability and drive, they cannot rest until they have solved social problems not just locally, but systemwide. Think of Florence Nightingale, who developed modern nursing; Ralph Nader, who Pioneered the consumer, movement, or Muhammad Yunus', who founded the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and spread the idea of microcredit - small loans to fight poverty - around the world. At the same time, such breakthrough movements as Gandhian self-reliance and nonviolence, civil rights, liberation theology and feminism have helped prime hundreds of millions of people for social engagement.- And the growth of the middle class has increased the pool of potential recruits. Mr. Drayton sought to catalyze the citizen sector by adapting the venture-capital approach. The idea was to search for budding innovators to supply them with seed money and connect them in a global fellowship. In 1980 he created Ashoka, which has its headquarters in Arlington, Va., and now supports nearly 1,000 social entrepreneurs , in 33 Countries. Among them are

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Vera Cordeiro and Wojciech Onyszkiewicz. Ms. Cordeiro has built a program in Rio de Janeiro to help prevent recurring illnesses by providing post-hospitalization assistance to poor children and their families. Mr. Onyszkiewicz built an unusual food bank in Poland, through an exchange in which farmers donate food to the urban poor and rural children are taken on educational trips to Warsaw. Mr. Drayton said that the business sector had grown in productivity because it developed a beneficial competitive approach that rewarded innovation. He believes competition in the social sector could generate the same kinds of productivity increases. "When there is a critical mass of institutions, people and ideas, and they feed on one another and strengthen one another, the competitive revolution begins to set in," Mr. Drayton said. "You begin to get a culture that says: 'This is great. We're proud to be doing this. We admire people who do this well. We reward them.' It happened in business and it's exactly what you're seeing at the moment in the citizen sector." J. Gregory Dees, who teaches social entrepreneurship at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University, said: "I'm seeing two broad trends. One is a shift away from the idea of this sector being primarily about charity and the transfer of wealth to being about a desire to find more systemic and sustained solutions to social problems. And the other is an increased openness to experimenting with business methods and market-based approaches." These days, donors are more apt to stop financing organizations that cannot demonstrate their effectiveness. Some winning ideas, on the other hand, are rewarded. The Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, a citizen organization, have been so successful in alleviating poverty and educating millions of villagers that they have attracted hundreds of millions of dollars of financing from around the globe. More than a thousand development programs worldwide are emulating their experiences. Some activists fear too, much competition, arguing that groups can be more effective

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by forming coalitions. "We need to find better ways to cooperate with one another if we are going to advocate effectively," said Laurie Regelbrugge the chief operating officer of Civicus, an international network of citizen organizations. Barry Nalebuff, a management professor at the Yale School of Management, points to a different kind of problem: that growth does not necessarily lead to productivity gains unless accompanied by market discipline. "There are too many nonprofits today and the reason is simply the difficulty in getting them to merge," Mr. Nalebuff said. "In the for-profit sector, if an organization is doing poorly, somebody can, take it over. There is no such thing as a nonfriendly acquisition in this sector. You need to be in bankruptcy, before you lose control, the result, being that we have much redundancy. And Christine W. Letts, executive director of the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard, said that to deliver the goods - i.e., social change - "at a cost that is appropriate for its performance," this new sector needs to develop better information systems and standards. "The issue is how much is wasted," she added. Still, the advocates are optimistic. "There has been a general questioning of the capacity of the state to carry out a whole host of functions," Mr. Salamon said. "This sector represents another way of organizing the common business of society." Past experience and a faster rate of change mean that in 20 years the citizen sector "will be almost unrecognizably more mature," Mr. Drayton said. Many of the institutions that took business 300 years to develop will be well on their way to development," he predicted. Scaling Up: Thinking Through the Issues The World Hunger Program is part of the Watson Institute of International Studies at Brown University. The 1970s and 1980s have witness ed a dramatic growth in the number, the size and the level of activity of non-profit/non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Third World. They include peasant associations, neighborhood associations, people's movements,

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community initiatives, urban a ction committees and intermediary NGOs, filling the ranks of what is often referred to as the "associative sector." This phenomenon parallels a slow but profound change in the international aid system. Since the middle of the 1970s, donor agencies have be come increasingly preoccupied with the issue of participation and have looked to Northern and Southern NGOs as the vehicles for carrying forward an agenda of participation. As a result, both the numbers of international and local NGOs and the number of do nor funded projects that have a participation component within them have grown remarkably over the past ten years. This growth in size, number and activities of organized participatory initiatives has become recognized within the development community as" scaling-up." It constitutes an objective, or desire, of many funders, field practitioners and scholars alike. However, some important questions about scaling-up need to be answered. What role do the participants that expand the ranks of the scaled up organizations play within these organizations or within their funded projects? Is there a relationship between donor support of scaling-up and constituent participation? In what way will this new interest in scaling-up affect the rank and file of the parti cipation movement? Has the redirection of development assistance toward scaling-up initiatives been effective? As Edwards and Hulme stated it: "how can [NGOs] increase their development impact without losing their traditional flexibility, value-base and effectiveness at the local level?" Together, these questions constitute a research agenda that, to date, has not received adequate attention. Indeed, most of the literature on grassroots development movements is no rmative in nature; the rest is largely anecdotal. It is as if the usual laws of scientific inquiry, verification and experimentation do not apply when dealing with organizations whose social goals have often eluded the same rigors of measurement administe red among the bottom lines of government and forprofit organization. This article proposes a first scientific look at scaling up. It does not present any grand theory of scaling up, nor is it the result of detail ed comparative field research.

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Rather, it represents what can be called a "pre-theory:" the development of some clear definitions and taxonomies, which can constitute the basis for scientific investigation and discussion. Indeed, only when there is an und erstanding of the dimensions of the concept of scaling up can donor and beneficiary, participant and observer, scholar and practitioner, begin to communicate in a way that can address the questions above. This article will also supply the interested reade r with a foray into the existing literature, suggesting paths for further reading. The History of Scaling-up Schematically, since the 1960s, two basic organizational paradigms for promoting development have dominated th e scene. The first is the top-down, usually state-led model. In it, the central government, with support from the aid system, through its policies, programs and projects, attempts to set in motion development. The population will follow suit, as will `dev elopment.' For most of the last thirty years, this model has been dominant, with Third World governments, the development aid system and most development scholars. Yet, it also has been the subject of severe criticism. Time has shown the central state often to be very inefficient in `creating' development: too far away from the population, rigid and bureaucratic, often controlled by elite interests and characterized by a condescending attitude towards the poor and the peasants, it does not respond very well to the needs of the majority of its population. Subject to internal rivalries and external pressures, plagued by poor budgets and staffed by badly trained and underpaid civil servants, it is a fertile ground for vested interest, rent taking and fac tional enrichment. Hence, the state has proven in most cases to be a poor organizational device to implement effective and just development strategies. Similarly, top-down projects, even if not implemented by the stat e, were proven to be largely unsustainable because of a lack of local institutional involvement.

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The second model for organizing development is a reaction against the perceived deficiencies and injustices of the t opdown model. Its origin dates from the 1960s by NGOs and engaged scholars, but it gained only broad acceptance in the second half of the 1980s. The bottom-up, grassroots model seeks to organize development from below. It seeks to increase the capacity o f poor people and communities to take their fate in their own hands, to change the conditions of their lives; in short, to èmpower' themselves through `participation' in their own development. This paradigm of participation centers on the creation and th e strengthening of NGOs and community based, grassroots organizations. They are to tap the latent energies of the poor in fostering endogenous development and social transformation. For various reasons, this strat egy became increasingly accepted by the development community in the 1980s, most of all on the level of discourse, but also, and increasingly so, in practice. The above described limits of the previous statecentered, top-down development strategy were be coming increasingly evident. Project and sectoral evaluations all through the 1980s revealed that projects that were not appropriated by local institutions tended to be much less successful and less sustainable than those in which local communities played a central role. As one Asian Development Bank researcher states it: "NGO provision of services is an effective and growing response to some of the problems that projects have faced in the past." Moreover, a deep econ omic and financial crisis hit most Third World governments in the 1980s. It necessitated that new, internal, sources of financing and investment be found: tapping the financial and human resources of local communities were the evident alternative. Finally, the dominant global ideology of the 1980s was strongly in favor of anything that was not public: private enterprise for the creation of wealth, and private association for its distribution. Hence, reasons of cost ef ficiency and ideological appeal combined to make the more fiscally conservative managers of development aid march down the same road as the more politically liberal advocates of economic and social transformation and popular empowerment.

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This "new" participatory, bottom-up, NGO-led, strategy is not without its detractors. Common critiques among many development specialists are that: most NGO-led programs are too small, underfunded, poorly staffed, slow and localized in the face of the daunting size of the problems of poverty, hunger and environmental degradation, often NGOs actions do not match their rhetoric, for example in the fields of community participation, innovation, costeffectiveness, reac hing the poorest, most existing NGOs are unable to absorb the massive quantities of money needed to make a difference, the anti-state attitude of most NGOs limits both their capacity to change some of the root causes of underdevelopment (policy level causes) or to have a large impact. Existing NGO programs were thus considered to be only actions at the margin, capable of providing local relief and service, but not able to tackle the real issues of the eradication of hunger and poverty for hu ndreds of millions of people. Following this, at the beginning of the 1990s, a new model has been emerging, drawing on the best of both previous strategies. It holds that the state remains necessary, for only it h as the capacity to enable and coordinate the work of NGOs and private initiative on the scale that will make a difference. It can do this by providing certain public services, enabling legislation and subventions in the forms of entitlements. Interacting with the state should be a new breed of large, well managed and competent NGOs that are capable of mobilizing the participation of large numbers of people and channeling large sums of money to large-scale activities. At the state side of the equation, thi s involves a willingness and a capacity to take a partnership position with civil society, to create an "enabling environment" for private initiative. At the NGO side, it implies the need for "scaling-up," i.e. to increase their size, complexity, i mpact and interaction with the state. Presently, much money is poured by development assistance organizations into promoting such scaling-up of Third World NGO activity. It is already clear that the basic, as yet unanswered, issue concerning scaling up will be the one of its relation with

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participation. It can be put like this: How can a development initiative move beyond the local level and make a larger impact while continuing to foster participation? Can a participatory, bottom-up program, or the or ganization managing it, scale up while avoiding the problems of cumbersome and overstaffed organizations, detached from their grassroots bases, becoming mere sub-contractors of the foreign aid system or of the state, unaccountable to the communities who t hey claim to represent? This paper will not supply an answer to that question; it will, however, provide some clear terms allowing to address it.

may make manag ement decisions, the strategic, goal-setting decisions continue to remain in the realm of the executing or funding agency. The next level -- participation in policy-making -- indeed puts decision making around program goals into the hands of the community (also called participation in design). The highest level of participation is ownership by target group members over the resources of the organization or program. Ownership can take many forms including worker-owned companies, producer or consumer coopera tives, land trusts, and limited equity housing schemes.

The Concept of Participation

It appears that, for maximum effectiveness, each of these elements sits along a continuum that is inclusive of the elements below. For example, ownership of a program is preferable when the owner s are not absent from making policy. They make better policy if they have experience managing the programs. Program managers make better decisions when they have acquired relevant skills. Relevant skills are best learned when they are directly related to a participant's hands-on working experience. And workers are most motivated when they directly benefit from the programs in which they are working. In other words, the higher forms of participation are only superior if the lower forms are present too; if not, they can be meaningless (f.ex. cooperative ownership without decision-making power or capacity)

The term "participation" has become one of t he most debated terms used in the development community. It has been used to explain a broad host of activities that have been done to, for and by NGO constituents. What is a participatory organization becomes nothing short of a philosophical question. We wish to define the term participation more precisely here, presenting a hierarchy of elements that can be identified in the way an organization conducts its affairs that enhances the participatory nature of that organization. At the bottom (zero-level) of the hierarchy we find participation by the target population as program beneficiaries -- the stated objective of every development program. Immediately above that, we find organizations seeking constituent part icipation in the costs and the work of their programs. This appears to be the most common form of participation supported by development institutions such as the World Bank, or by many Third World governments. On a higher level, we find people's participation in training that permits the transfer of organizational, managerial and technical capacities to members of the target community; supposedly, this will prepare them for taking over after the program or project departs. This is also a prelude to the next level of participation whereby target groups participate in the management of development programs, making routine decisions over the day-to-day operations of the program (also called participation in implementation). While the community

This paper deals with those organizations and/or programs in which program beneficiaries are engaged at least in the management of their programs, i.e. making decisions about the day-to-day operations and the ways to attain operational program objectives. We do not consider programs or organizations that allow for the lower levels of participation to be truly participatory ones. This, then, is q uite a high cut-off point, designed to exclude the many cases of participation in rhetoric, "that do not go beyond taking advantage of cheap local labor for construction of public works, or, for example, involve token consultation with village chiefs in o rder to gain the acquiescence of the population." Examples of the latter include the socialist-type of participation, most rural cooperatives, or the World Bank type of participation.

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This definition does not mean, however, that participatory programs have been initiated solely by the target group, nor that they are entirely funded or managed by it. This would be unrealistic and self-de feating. No meaningful development comes without outside contact; given the size of the needs of the poor and the hungry in the Third World, local (financial and human) resources alone are not sufficient to respond successfully to the many challenges faci ng Third World communities. The defining criterion for bottom-up development is not that there is no external funding or expertise, but rather that the people concerned are engaged in the decision-making concerning these resources. In this paper, we de fine NGOs, approximately following Salamon & Anheier, as those organizations that are formally constituted, non-governmental, non-profit, not overly partisan (in a party political sense) and participatory. This is a broad definition including internat ional, national, regional and local membership organizations; funding, operational and advocacy NGOs; community associations, cooperatives, networks, service providers and intermediary NGOs. In much of the American literature, the term NGO is used only for intermediary organizations, i.e. those non-governmental organizations (mainly from the North) that provide financial and technical assistance to grassroots organizations; in the US, the term PVO (Private Vol untary Organization) is also used for them. As can be seen, we employ the term NGO in its larger, generic meaning. If organizations, and the programs they run, are characterized by high levels of participation in policy-making and management or even ownership, then they really constitute cases of self-help, i.e. people taking care of their own problems through their own actions, maybe receiving some outside support. Hence, in this paper, following Koenraad Verhagen, we will often use the term self-help, distinguishing between two types of organizations: "self-help organizations" (SHOs -membership organizations searching to advance their own interests through their own activities) and "self-help promotion organizations" (SHPOs -- intermediary organizations working at the behest of self-help organizations). SHOs tend to be local

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and membership based (but they can form national coalitions), while SHPOs can exist on any geographic level and are usually not membership based. A Taxonomy of Scaling-up Different definitions of scaling-up have been used in the literature. In a recent USAID evaluation of tw o innovative Freedom From Hunger credit projects in Africa, the term scalingup -- the focus of the study which is explicitly mentioned in its title -- is equated with èxpansion', or, more precisely, the need to "reach several times the actual number of members" in the countries concerned. This definition of scaling-up as expansion of membership or target group is probably the most commonly used one. Social scientists tend to propose more complicated definitions. Robert Berg, for example, talks about scaling-up organizationally, management-wise and financially, while Goran Hyden differentiates between scaling-up organizationally and functionally or activity-wise. "Organizationally" is defined by both authors as "serving larger constituencies," i.e . the same organization, keeping the same goals, grows in size. This, then, is the same meaning of the term as èxpansion.' "Functionally" means that the same organization increases or diversifies its range of activities, regardless of size. Howes and Sattar talk about "intensification," referring to the addition of new activities to existing programs. Clark, in his book on NGOs, makes a different distinction among three types of scaling-up: project replicatio n, building grassroots movements and influencing policy reform. The first two are linked to expansion, but the latter is new. Fisher also defines scaling up as the process of influencing policy; she uses the term "scaling out" to describe expansion. Although he does not use the term scaling-up in this context, Korten clearly discusses a similar type of scaling-up where he advocates socalled "third generation" NGOs. The latter are distinct from first and second generation ones by their concerns for "bridging the gap between micro and macro" (i.e. quitting the local level) and their desire to attack the (political) root causes of

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underdevelopment, and not its manifestations. This involves the development of relationships with governments as well as international partnerships. Therefore, for Korten, Clark, Fisher and many others, influencing politics is considered to be an important form of scaling-up. Finally, coming fr om a different tradition, Bernard Lecomte, a French grassroots specialist with decades of field experience in Africa (and co-founder of the "SixS" movement) writes about different phases in the maturing of self-help organizations -- phases mainly charact erized by increased capacity to innovate, generate local resources and improved organizational capacity.[20] His scaling-up is a matter of autonomy, self-reliance, independence. All in all the literature of scaling-u p is reminiscent of the Loch Ness monster. It has been sighted enough to make even the most skeptical give it a measure of respectability; and its description is as varied as the people who have written about it. We believe that this variety of def initions is important. It allows us to look at the phenomenon in a number of different ways, giving us some insight into the complexity of the associative sector itself. It also suggests that there are different types of scaling-up, which often go togethe r but are not identical. In the typology below, we look at scaling-up in terms of either structures, programs, strategies or resource base. Structure The first type of scaling-up is where a program or an organization expand s its size, through increasing their membership base (in the case of grassroots organizations) or their constituencies (for SHPOs) and, linked to that, their geographic working area or their budgets. This is the most evident kind of scaling-up, equaling 'growth' or 'expansion' in their basic meanings. We call it quantitative scaling-up. It happens when participatory organizations draw increasing numbers of people into their realm. Programs A second type of scaling-up is where a community-based program or a grassroots organization expands the number and

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the type of its activities. Starting in agricultural production, for example, it moves into health, nutrition, credit, training, literacy, etc. This we label functi onal scaling-up. It takes place when participatory organizations add new activities to their operational range. Strategy The third type of scaling-up refers to the extent to which participator organizations move bey ond service delivery and towards empowerment and change in the structural causes of underdevelopment -- its contextual factors and its socio-politicaleconomic environment. This will usually involve active political involvement and the development of rela tions with the state. This process, similar to a graduation to higher generations in Korten's parlance, we call political scaling-up. Resource Base Finally, community-based programs or grassroots organizations can increase their organizational strength so as to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their activities. It can be done financially, by diversifying their sources of subvention, increasing the degree of self-financing, creating activities that genera te income (cooperative enterprises, consultancy), or by assuring the enactment of public legislation earmarking entitlements within the annual budgets for the program. It can also be done institutionally, by creating external links with other development actors, both public and private (including the enterprise sector), and by improving the internal management capacity of the staff (such as through training or personnel development) allowing the organization and its programs to grow, to be flexible, to be sustainable. This we label organizational scaling-up. These different types of scaling-up form part of the dynamics of successful community based development, in all sectors. Take the case of the fight against hunger. In that context, quantitat ive scaling-up essentially refers to the strategy for community mobilization employed by community-based programs: how did these organizations bring about community

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self-help in the field of food and hunger? How did they draw increasing numbers of people into their programs? How did they manage their expansion? The case of functional scalingup asks the question of the type of activities organizations have undertaken to combat hunger. This is the more "technical" question on what type and sequence of acti vities organizations or programs undertook against hunger: increase food production or income, organize credit systems, cereal banks, etc. The analysis of political scaling-up asks to what extent have organizations attempted to influence local, regional, national and international factors that cause hunger? Do programs attack the political and economic forces that often underlie hunger such as unequal landholding, unequal access to credit and inputs, corruption and clientism, or the exploitation of ethnic groups, women and children? Finally, the question of organizational scaling-up leads us to the issues of civil society and sustainability. To what extent have organizations created legitimate and diverse social structures, allowing local communities to m anage their own affairs in a sustainable manner? Can existing programs continue, even after the (gradual) withdrawal of foreign aid? Are leadership and management capacity being built that can serve as the starting point for action in other fields? This is a most important question, often neglected in the usual project approach to development or hunger eradication.

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into them. It can happen at any level of participation: ownership, decision-making, policy-making. It can also take place, and often does, without any external interference in th e form of development projects, etc. It is most typical for grassroots organizations and for community-based programs, growing from a handful of villages working together around one charismatic leader to peasant organizations with tens of thousands of mem bers in hundreds of villages -- as has been well documented for some Senegalese grassroots organizations. replication: a successful program (methodology and mode of organization) is initiated else-where. Of ten, in the case of so-called pilot programs, this process is deliberate: a model approach is tested on a small scale, and, if successful, promoted on a larger scale. Replication can be done either by the original or ganization or by another one -- in which case it is akin to integration (see below).

We distinguish five basic paths for quantitative scaling-up, i.e. for increasing the size of NGOs and their programs. Each of these different paths of quantitative scaling-up, as well as the way the development aid system see ks to support them, presents its own problems. Schematically, they are:

Replication is very popular with Northern and Southern NGOs, and, to a lesser extent, official bilateral and multilateral development cooperation agencies. For some, r eplication of pilot programs offers the potential of a more scientific approach to development, whereby programs (or various approaches to one program) are first "tested" in the field before more money and people are committed to it. For others, replication represents a possible solution to a deep seated conflict within the NGO community. On the one hand, NGOs have a strong philosophical commitment to participatory, community based development; on the other hand, the y need to respond to external pressures for a controllable, fast, results-guaranteed, mode of functioning. NGOs do not have the time to sit and wait until well-developed grassroots organizations, capable of dealing with external resources and mobilizing l arge internal energies, present themselves. Thus, so as to save time and to encourage development faster, they take recourse to the duplication of models that they have used successfully elsewhere.

spread: increasing numbers of people spontaneously adhere to the organization and its programs, perceiving them to serve their interests/ preferences. Spread is the almost o rganic process of growth of organizations or programs by drawing more people

The two most famous cases of replication are probably both from Bangladesh: the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) for in-house, controlled replication of pilot programs, and the Grameen Bank, whose methodology and

Following the taxonomies laid out above, we will now look more closely at how scaling-up occurs. QUANTITATIVE SCALING-UP

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mode of organization have been replicated by tens of different organizations (including governments) throughout the world. The Grameen Bank even publishes a newsletter essentially devoted to the promotion and discussion of replication experiences in the rest of the world. In a recent analysis of th ree such cases of replication (in Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Malawi), David Hulme concludes that successful replication is possible, if it is done in a "learning process" manner, i.e. not the taking over "as is" of a foreign blueprint of poverty lendi ng, but rather the "use of the Grameen Bank as the initial model for a small scale action research project that can be gradually modified to suit different socio-economic and physical environments." Indeed, replicati on as a path for scaling up is only likely to work if it is done flexibly, without undue copying of structures and procedures from elsewhere -- replication must not mean duplication. The same structures and procedures that encouraged participation in one place can stifle it elsewhere, if copied mindlessly. nurture: a well staffed and well funded outside agency (can be a public one), using a specific incentive-based methodology, nurtures local initiatives on an increasingly large scale. Nurture is a strategy for promoting scaling up that is often employed by bilateral and multilateral organizations and some of the larger NGOs. The popularity of nurture-type programs with these organizations can be explained by a mix of ideological commitment and need for efficiency. On the one hand these organizations are increasingly attached to community involvement, but on the other hand they are characterized by a top-down mode of organization behavior, large budgets to be spent within fixed time periods, the availability of highly trained personnel, the obligation to work in large areas, aiming to touch many people. For such organizations, nurture-based schemes are the solution, for, on paper, such programs allow them to achieve large-scale community participation while spending their available money and employing their experts. Nurture-based paths of scaling-up have been employed by a variety of agencies. The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme in Northern Paki stan, for example, typically follows such an

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approach, and, indeed, in some years managed to involve approximately 300,000 farmers. Communities are asked to organize and decide on the construction of a public infrastructure (school, road, hospital, bridge) they wish to undertake with AKRSP co-financing. Afterwards, the programme will continue working with the newly created community organizations in other fields of rural development. Multilateral institutions that wish to work in a participatory manner of ten take recourse to nurture-based schemes too. In all these cases, community organization is undertaken as a precondition for external support, whether in the form of credit, grants, technical assistance, etc.; a degree of community participation in the daily management of the activities undertaken is usually allowed too. Finally, some Third World governments, especially in Asia, have sought to use nurture-based strategies for development. Aggregation: a number of distinct organizations combine their resources. This can involve both horizontal processes, through partial or full merger of activities and resources, and vertical ones, through the creation of federative structures, that represent them on high er geographic levels and/or deliver services to themselves. There are few cases known of real fusion between previously independent non-governmental organizations (unlike in the for-profit sector), and more of instances of collaboration, coordination, joint representation, joint programs, etc. The main reason for that has to be sought in the fierce ideological and financial competition that reigns between NGOs. Integration: a program is integrated "into existing structures and systems and in particular government structures after it has demonstrated its potential." Integration can come about as a result of demand by the NGO, which persuades a government agency to take over a successful program it launche d, or as a result of independent state action. Such integration, although going against the ideological and organizational dynamics of most NGOs, is important in the light of both increasing impact and assuring sustainability, i.e. the capacity of the program to continue after the departure of the NGO. "Integration" is mainly

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an option for SHPOs, such as BRAC in Bangladesh or the Savings Development Movement in Zimbabwe. It is difficult to achieve, but desired by increasing numbers of NGOs, for it offers the fastest possibility of significant scaling up. To be successful, it requires that the bureaucracy adopts a clientcentered, learning-process approach, similar to the one NGOs use. Integration can take place even in situations where the political regime is authoritarian, if relatively high-up civil service individuals are willing to take the risk. Grassroots organizations can pass through more than one of these processes during their lifetime of quantitative scalingup. In a case study of farmer irrigation associations in Indonesia, for example, scaling-up began with spread. The original a ssociation, being successful in furthering its members' interests, attracted more members of the village; neighboring villages visited it and joined it. This is the usual process of almost organic growth, in which program success and direct experience are the main motors for scaling-up. After some years, however, a new path of scaling-up came into being as the organization that had started the program (a university center in this case) replicated the same approach used in the original association in other regions of the same country. Finally, at some point the original organization became too burdened with the managerial demands of the rapidly growing farmers' associations and their new needs for training and lobbying. So it transformed itself into a full -time national farmers' union -- a case of organizational scaling-up for the university center and aggregation for the farmers' associations. Functional Scaling-up Organizations and their programs take on new activ ities because of push factors: their constituents, and the programs they have been running, demand it. We refer to a "push" situation, when an organization expands to take on new projects as a result of member or client demand: the organization's members or constituency requires new programs or services. Sometimes such demand emanates from groups who are not (yet) members of the NGO. Hence, for example, development

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NGOs move into the human rights field, while at the same time human rights NGOs take on women's activities. Pull factors: new sources of funding are available. Organizations expand as a result of a "pull" by forces external to the clients or membership of an organization -- mainly the availability of funds. From the point o f view of the development aid donors and governments, the rationale for pulling a grassroots organization in new activities lies in the fact that the organization already has an administrative structure in place with a concomitant track record. In many ca ses, a structure already in place is half the battle in initiating a new activity. This is particularly true in regions with a dearth of trained and experienced program administrators. There exists a strong temptation on the part of the organization to ta ke everything on that comes along; particularly if the funding will help it sustain itself. Often little or no planning lies behind such an approach other than that of responding to targets of opportunity. This can have devastating effects. Sometimes even the creation itself of NGOs or of SHOs is the result of such pull factors. In so doing, like private enterprises, grassroots organizations can grow through horizontal integration: add new activities to existing programs, such as adding a housing component to an income-generating program, or, in a more "integrated" manner, linking agriculture to forestry or to livestock or to health and education. The BRAC experien ce demonstrates the importance of horizontal integration, adding institution building and training to income generation activities. vertical integration: add other activities related to the same chain of ac tivities as the original one, for example when an organization, after years of managing soup kitchens, develops an alternative food purchasing and distribution network ("downstream integration"), or when a program working to improve the techniques of rura l artisans helps them to build retail outlets ("upstream integration"). The most common case of vertical integration is the addition of savings and credit mechanisms to the original mobilizing efforts of grassroots o rganizations, responding to the lack of access to credit by the rural poor in the Third World.

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The issue of functional scaling up is relevant for the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations (or their clients or members) to achieve the goals that they have set out for themselves: undertaking the "right" kind of activities or programs is of course as crucial for any grassroots organization as it is for any government or international organization. But the functional scaling up issue is also crucia l for the sustainability of any organization, i.e. its capacity for long-term survival. Indeed, as Gray states it for the case of Paraguayan farmers' organizations: "if small farmer organizations are to be sustainable they must ultimately work to d eliver significant economic improvements for their members and their region, and be able to generate at least a respectable portion of their own operating costs." This means that, whatever the objective and the ideol ogy of the organization, if it is to survive it must undertake activities that improve its members' or clients' economic fate, and that increase its own capacity for selffinancing. Those participatory organizations programs that fail to do so are doomed to cease to exist. Political Scaling-up Political scaling-up consists of the deliberate building a political power base for furthering the goals of an organization or organizations through the politic al process. It is usually based on the assertion that "to stem the mounting tide [of poverty] necessitates attacking the root causes of poverty at the macro-level." The reasons for political scaling up can be more mi nimal and reformist too. Gudrun Lachenman, for example, in her excellent article on peasant movements in Senegal, argues that "the Senegalese peasant movement consciously aspires to influence other spheres [than the grassroots -- PU] mainly in order to be able to work at the grass-roots level without being `disturbed' by the state." Finally, it should be observed that political scaling up is not limited to attempts to influence national governments, but also regional or local government structures; in many countries, given the "soft state" nature of government, the lower levels are more important determinants of local outcomes than the central level.

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To a certain extent, NGO s, even if they are not politically scaling up, are always in contact with the state, through registration requirements, import exonerations or taxes, legal harassment or protection, benign or malign neglect, confrontation of friendship with its officials , etc. Moreover, "psychologically," the state is the point of reference for almost all NGOs: whether it is being combated, or its deficiencies are being compensated, or its objectives implemented, "in the end the state acts as the fundamental referent." What political scaling up refers to, then, is to a conscious strategy to interact with the state so as to address state-level variables of local problems. This involves developing strategies to go from the micro to th e macro-level with the objective to bring about governmental policy changes (or the implementation of existing policies). More and more people believe that political scaling up is the main challenge awaiting NGOs, be they grassroots, membership organiz ations in the South, or intermediary organizations throughout the world. It can take place through a variety of paths, which we will discuss below. The path chosen will depend strongly on the original objectives and strategy of the NGOs, and on the nature of the state they are dealing with. Clearly, if NGOs came into being to provide relief to children, for example, their willingness and capacity to work with the state will be different from if they were born to figh t human rights violations. In Latin America, there exist many NGOs whose mandate is to help the poor to link up to the services of government. Similarly, if the government, and the coalition of interests that back it, is repressive and strongly anti-developmental, the style of collaboration will be different from the case of an open, democratic, development oriented state. Finally, if the NGO works "in territory unoccupied by the government," or if the goals and the programs of the NGO are consistent with national policies and structures, easier and more fruitful interaction is to be expected than if this is not the case. Information and mobilization: mobilization of the members or communities so as to bring them to participate in the body

274


politic. It is designed to create general public awareness and sympathy for the propositions of an organ ization, and hence to put pressure on politicians. Such mobilization can be done through letter writing, through the organization of meetings, conferences and workshops, through the distribution of documents and brochures and through the media. More on th e grassroots level, methods employed by NGOs, such as Participatory Action Research, seek to conscientize poor people of the local, regional and national causes of their poverty, and bring them to organize and act. I n Africa, such forms of community mobilization are rare. In Asia and Latin America, on the other hand, there exist a large number of participatory organizations that are created explicitly for this function: to mobilize people and lobby for change (land reform, dam construction, indigenous rights, etc.). Few Northern NGOs like to put resources into the strengthening of the capacities of Southern NGOs and SHOs to scale up politically. Instead, they prefer to fund projects. There are various reasons for that. One is their fear that their position vis-a-vis governments will be endangered if they engage too openly in politics. Southern governments could expel them, while Northern governments could withdraw their advantageous tax-free status. Another is tha t they usually prefer visible concrete actions in the field. It attracts more funds from the general public. Yet, since some years, Northern NGOs increasingly serve as lobbyists and public relations agents for their southern partners, working together wit h them to lobby for policy change. Northern NGOs only have some capacities to pressurize their own governments, and, to a lesser extent, international organizations: they can do this either by mobilizing their members, if they have any, or by public educa tion campaigns. In the future, development education and direct government lobbying will likely become the most important functions of Northern NGOs. Ideally, in so doing, they collaborate with Southern NGOs. This, then, brings us to the next form of political scaling up -- networking. Networking: non-permanent collaboration between various organizations on political issues of joint interest, involving the

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creation of links, usually between Third World NGOs, but also between them (or coalitions of them) and Northern ones, for the purpose of influencing the body politic. The links are sustained through meetings, newsletters, e-mail, or exchange of personnel. One of the oldest forms of such networking was in the field of human rights, with Amnesty International, or FIAN (located in Germany, and dealing with the right to food) as typical examples. One interesting case outside of the human rights sector is the Philippine Development Forum, described by David Korten describes as an NGO of the "fourth generation." Its originality is that it is composed of organizations of both the U.S. and the Philippines who employ their various resources (financial, managerial, access to policy-makers at all sides) for the achievement of commonly defined objectives. It has a very small administrative body; rather it draws upon the resources of its membership. The usual form of networking, however, is less structured and more of an ad-hoc nature than this. Haitian NGOs pass information about disappearances and torture since the coup d'Etat to their Northern partners who publish them so as to influence public opinion; Oxfam lobbies the World Bank to suspend a planned dam in Brazil; the UUSC lobbies US senators to sponsor legislation for cleanup of former military bases in the Philippines.[50] Some organizations have come into being that concentrate on the facilitation of political networking. Examples incl ude IRED and FIDA (both located in Switzerland). In the US, among others, InterAction and World Resources Institute (through its publication The NGO Networker) are active in this field. Finally, this practice of networking for advocacy has beco me standard practice at the level of international conferences: at the UNCED in Rio, for example, there were 1,418 officially registered NGOs present, and hundreds more had participated in various regional preparator y meetings. This was partly due to the work of international networking NGOs such as, among others, the Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC), based in Manila, with 20 members, most of which are national NGO coalitions them selves, or the Environment Liaison Center International, based

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in Nairobi, with 340 NGO members. This whole process of networking has become facilitated by the spread of information and communications technology, esp ecially e-mail and its connected services. aggregation: creation of federative structures designed to influence policy making, based on the principle that "l'union fait la force." Grassroots organizations create regional structures; regional organizations create national structures, and even, in some regions, national organizations create international structures. Examples include Euronaid, a coalition of European NGOs, ASOCORE (Association of Peasants in Central America) which brings together seven national farmers' organizations for the purpose of influencing governments' strategic planning as it impacts upon small farmers or CONCERTATION which is a regional coaliti on representing more than one hundred intermediary organizations from seven countries; INTERACTION in the US or EURONAID in Europe, ANGOC in Asia, and so on. The most advanced case must be the Philippines, where the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (COD E-NG), created in 1990, is composed of 10 national networks, each composed of regional unions and hundreds of small NGOs. In total, 1300 NGOs belong to CODE. Among its main objectives are advocacy and influence of po litics. direct entry into politics: whereby (a) grassroots organization(s) either creates a political party or joins an existing one. This is the last and least traveled road to political scalingup. It can be done on an individual basis, with the leader of an organization, based on his personal prestige, entering the political arena with a program along the lines of his work with the organization. Hence Ari Aryaratne of Sarvodaya Shramadana movement in Sri Lanka, or Abdoulaye Dioup of the "Ami cale du Wallo" in Senegal are both cases of grassroots leaders who entered the national political arena. It can also be done on an organizational level, with a grassroots organization, usually in coalition with other organizations, creating a political pa rty. Such processes have been documented in various Latin American countries, where NGOs and grassroots organization coalitions have created political parties that have successfully

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competed in local and national elections. Similar to the latter is another variant, whereby organizations put up candidates from their own ranks, possibly within existing political parties, usually at the local level, but, in the case of important and large organizations with a region al or national impact, even on the higher levels. Such is the case of AJAC-COLUFIFA in the Casamance region of Senegal, which systematically puts up candidates in local elections at the level of the 'conseil rural' -- not with any intent of gaining politi cal control in the region, but rather to assure sympathetic (or at least non-obstructive) attitude from the powers-that-be and gaining a degree of participation in the decision making process. A slightly less ambitious and visible version of the forme r is the one where grassroots or NGO leaders enter into high positions in the public administration. In Chile, for example, after the restoration of democracy under Allwyn, many NGO and grassroots leaders entered in high civil service positions, some even becoming ministers. In many countries, governments have extended invitations to successful leaders of communitybased organizations to enter into the civil service. This is linked to "integration" as a path to quant itative scaling up. One final remark: to a certain extent, it can be said that grassroots organizations, as well as intermediary NGOs, are, by their very existence outside the state and its top-down development interventions, political statements. The French political scientist Bayart talks in this respect of "popular modes of political action" at the local level: the act of organizing, of conceiving another development, is by definition political, and as such often considered a threat by the powers-th at-be. If successful, development NGOs are agents of redistribution and empowerment, which cannot fail to have political repercussions, on the local, regional and national levels. Organizational Scaling-up Organizational scaling-up addresses the issues of sustainability of the organization, assuring that when an organization grows, it is able to sustain its programs without complete dependence upon non-renewable resources (fi nancial,

278


technical and physical). This requires the assurance of strong management procedures (financial, organizational, personnel and programmatic) that allow organizations to handle unanticipated consequences that are waiting to confound work (i ncluding, for example, such events as the death of the founding father) and the creation of structures that allow for flexibility, participation and accountability on a large scale. In short, the objective of organizational scaling-up is financial and managerial autonomy. It is an objective not measured in terms of full achievement but, rather, by degrees of approximation. It is the corollary of, or requirement for, all other types of scaling up. As Hodson sta tes it: "there is no escaping the organizational reality that any attempt to scale up impact, whatever the strategy, has serious and difficult organizational implications." Failing to realize this can lead to serious organizational problems if not destruction. Generally, we can distinguish several objectives/paths of organizational scaling-up. One of the first objectives many organizations set is to diversify and stabilize their funding sources, to go beyond the major donor who supported them at the beginning. This is often as much a matter of quantitative scaling-up as it is one of organizational scaling-up. As important as the number of funding sources is their type: What are the strings attached? How secure is the funding? The best objective one can hope for in funding grassroots organizations is building a portfolio of long-term, stable, non-discretionary program funds (endowments, for example, or public entitlemen ts). Standard donor practice, however, is rather the opposite, favoring shortterm, discrete, project-related infusions of cash. More recently, a potentially large source of funding has become the government: often u nder pressure from donor ideologies in favor of NGO action, and sometimes resulting from a realization of the comparative advantages of NGOs, Third World governments are increasingly implementing and funding programs, usually of a service delivery type, t hrough local NGOs. This represents an important opportunity for NGOs: clearly, the resources that can become available from governments are much larger and more stable than those most NGOs can mobilize by themselves.

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Another objective or target many organizations eventually adopt is to increase their degree of self-financing. This can among other ways be done by the creation of lucrative activities such as joint ventures, cooperative or other enterprises, fee-forservice activities (including sale and rental of materials), consulting to other actors such as the government and foreign aid agencies, or by subcontracting to the state or the foreign aid system. As quite some NGO leaders are recognized as expert s in their fields (community health care, rural extension, micro-enterprise, literacy campaigns, etc.), they are increasingly asked to act as consultants or subcontractors in publicly and aid funded projects. On a different level, grassroots organizat ions that scale up have to promote skills development. This involves both managerial skills (on which most foreign NGO's assistance focuses) and the much more neglected technical skills. NGOs need to strengthen their capacity to manage large organi zations. They have to adopt policies of hiring, training, motivating, paying and promoting personnel, of managing and controlling budgets, of decentralization and innovating management, and of avoiding or overcoming dependency on one leader. This seems ev ident: what started as the initiative of one dynamic leader in one village with one activity cannot be managed in the same way once it has become an organization touching, say, 50,000 persons in 120 villages, with tens of different activities. Yet, very o ften, few changes in management procedures are made. NGOs also need to improve their technical skills: as they deal with more people and their varied needs, as they take on more activities, as their public visibility increases and they interact with gover nment, as they take on consulting for foreign agencies, they need to have at their disposal a variety of technically competent people. This is sometimes difficult, for it necessitates going beyond ideological attachment to professionalism -- all the while keeping participation alive. Moreover, it is generally recognized that NGOs, in order to expand their impact (and even just so as to simply survive), must develop procedures and structures allowing for organizational learning. This involves procedures of monitoring

280


and evaluation -- serious, critical evaluation, and not the type used to fill fundraising brochures -- and feeding the lessons learnt back into action. Thi s implies the need for quality documentation and archival systems, computerization, standardized procedures of programming, monitoring and evaluation, self-criticism and openness, etc. These are not easy to achieve, and indeed, even Northern NGOs, staffed by welltrained professionals, with large budgets and in easy contact with research institutions, still score badly on this point. Fifth, organizations that scale up have to create institutional variety,b oth internally and externally. Internally, they have to diversify their structures of self-help, going beyond the original mode of organization and into other realms. This will make the self-help process more resilient to external threats and more capable of responding to new challenges. In the case of some Senegalese farmers' associations, for example, the original village structures have been complemented by federative structures up to the national level, commercialization cooperatives, rural banks and, most recently, a variety of rural enterprises. Externally, they have to build operational links with a large variety of other actors: local, regional and national government, other NGOs of various types, training and research institutions, private enterp rises, and banks. Already in Uphoff and Esman's famous study of 1974, a comparison of 18 Asian NGOs concluded that horizontal and vertical linkages between institutions were the key to the strength of these organizations. This is not always easy, given the ideological differences between NGOs (and between them and the private for-profit and public sector) and the fact that all these actors are often in competition for the same scarce resources. Finally, the greate st organizational challenge of all for NGOs, whether working at the grassroots or on the intermediary level, whether scaled up quantitatively, functionally or politically, is to maintain participation and accountability. Indeed, all types of scalin g up (including the other aims of organizational scaling up), in various ways, have a tendency to promote institutionalization, formalization, professionalism, bureaucratization, distance between leaders and rank-and-file

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members, increased outside influe nce. These tendencies are quite unavoidable and necessary, if organizations want to move beyond the highly local, spontaneous, level and impact on large levels -- indeed, some of these processes, such as institutiona lization and professionalism, we have explicitly argued for in the previous paragraphs. Yet, all these processes strongly risk decreasing participation and accountability if no explicit attention is devoted to maintaining and reinventing forms, procedures and fora for beneficiary participation and control. There are no simple or universal rules as to how to do that. In the case of intermediary organizations, the issue of organizational scaling-up takes on a parti cular twist. Indeed, for SHPOs, whether from the South or from the North, the aim for them is ironically not so much to scale up but to "scale down," i.e. to attempt to become superfluous, or redundant, or, in the words of Fowler, to "build the management and institutional capacity of intended beneficiaries" and not of the SHPOs. Foremost, SHPOs shall strengthen the capacity of their clients (SHOs) to diversify funding sources and increase self-financing, for example, and not primarily their own. To meet this challenge, at least two conditions are needed. One is a coherent and shared vision or ideology of what is to be achieved in terms of grassroots development and empowerment. The second is what Fowler calls "management for withdrawal", i.e. the development of structures and practices that are geared not at perpetuating or enhancing the hold of SHPOs over the communities, but rather a program of phased disengagement. Of course, in the short run , also SHPOs need to diversify funding sources, increase self-financing, develop skills and management techniques, etc., i.e. scale up organizationally. CONCLUSION

This paper in no way pretends to present the definitive word on scaling-up and participation. Rather, it provides some basic definitions of what is meant by scaling-up, forms it may take and strategies for making it happen. There are many NGOs with serious community development agendas who have experienced considerable scaling-up. How well they have faired

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in scaling-up while maintaining a strong commitment to participation will be a primary interest of future research. Alongside, the role of government is clearly c rucial: it comes back, in different manners, in every type of scaling up. Here too, more research is needed. During the next two years, the World Hunger Program wants to sponsor a series of case studies that, using the terminology developed in this paper, looks at various organizations related to food and hunger and attempts to learn from them. We invite anybody who wants to share in this research venture to do so.

Bibliography

283

B IBLIOGRAPHY Antti Pentikaiinen: Creating Global Governance - The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the United Nations, Helsinki, Finnish UN Association 2000. Aptekar, Lewis. Street children of Cali, Durham, Duke University Press,1988. Catholics for a Free Choice: Bad Faith at the UN: drawing back the curtain on the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, Washington, DC: Catholics for a Free Choice, 2001. Gabriel, Marie Cruz: Children of the street, New York, Penguin Books, 1994. Global Policy Forum: NGOs and the United Nations, New York, Global Policy Forum, 1999. Harold K. Jacobson: Networks of Interdependence: international organizations and the global political system, New York, Knopf, 1984. Harry J. Steiner: Diverse Partners: non-governmental organizations in the human rights movement, Cambridge, Harvard Law School and Human Rights Internet, 1990. John Boli and George Thomas: Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999. John Clayton Thomas: Public Participation in Public Decision: New Skills and Strategies for Public Managers, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995. John Ehrenberg: Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea, New York, New York University Press, 1998. John Foster with Anita Anand: Whose World is it Anyway? Civil Society, the United Nations and the multilateral future, Ottawa, United Nations Association of Canada, 1999.

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Jonathan A. Fox and L. David Brown: The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998. Julie Fisher: The Road from Rio: sustainable development and the nongovernmental movement in the Third World, Westport, Praeger, 1993. Marcos Arruda: NGOs and the World Bank: Is It Possible to Collaborate Critically?, Rio de Janeiro: PACS, 1995. Mary Anderson: Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996. Paul J. Nelson: The World Bank and NGOs: The Limits of Apolitical Development, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Paul Wapner: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, Albany, SUNY Press, 1996. Peter Willetts: Pressure Groups in the Global System, London, Francis Pinter, 1982 Thomas Carroll: Intermediary NGOs: the supporting link in grassroots development, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1992. Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker: NGOs, the UN & Global Governance, Boulder, Lynne Riener, 1996. Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger: Environmental NGOs in World Politics, London, Routledge, 1994. Yolanda N. Kakabadse and Sarah Burns: Movers and Shapers: NGOs in International Affairs, Washington DC, World Resources Institute, 1994.

Index

285

I NDEX A Advantages, 107, 223, 278. Agency, 12, 13, 26, 79, 148, 163, 206, 217, 227, 261, 268, 269. Approach, 19, 52, 54, 55, 102, 112, 119, 127, 128, 131, 136, 146, 149, 153, 154, 190, 221, 233, 253, 254, 266, 267, 269, 270, 271. Arrangements, 7, 22, 24, 25, 26, 41, 44, 49, 56, 70, 75, 76, 115, 116, 118, 124, 224. Association, 7, 12, 89, 175, 210, 227, 234, 244, 258, 270, 276.

B Business, 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, 22, 27, 32, 38, 48, 70, 79, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 107, 126, 158, 168, 169, 170, 171, 189, 192, 197, 199, 201, 203, 213, 219, 226, 231, 238, 240, 243, 245, 246, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255.

C Civil Society, 1, 2, 8, 9, 12, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 29, 30, 36, 37, 38, 70,

79, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 104, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 171, 176, 177, 179, 181, 182, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 200, 206, 207, 28, 210, 212, 213, 219, 220, 224, 225, 226, 227, 237, 239, 240, 241, 243, 248, 250, 252, 259, 266. Commissions, 78. Commitments, 66, 91, 197, 203. Committees, 15, 17, 28, 37, 52, 53, 54, 55, 76, 117, 123, 163, 256. Community, 1, 2, 6, 11, 13, 14, 28, 37, 39, 44, 50, 51, 59, 60, 63, 66, 73, 84, 89, 100, 107, 109, 122, 125, 131, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 154, 167, 168, 173, 181, 182, 183, 205, 208, 210, 215, 220, 221, 223, 225, 230, 231, 232, 233, 237, 238, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 264, 265, 267, 268, 269, 274, 277, 279, 281.


286 Conferences, 2, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 25, 26, 42, 56, 70, 72, 76, 79, 80, 84, 115, 119, 123, 130, 145, 175, 176, 198, 200, 236, 274, 275. Connections, 22, 83, 90, 106, 136, 201. Cooperation, 11, 30, 56, 61, 126, 131, 133, 141, 175, 194, 195, 200, 206, 242, 250, 267. Corruption, 6, 90, 132, 151, 155, 194, 203, 208, 229, 240, 266.

D Democracy, 1, 5, 8, 10, 16, 17, 18, 29, 111, 115, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 160, 165, 174, 175, 181, 182, 190, 196, 198, 206, 212, 220, 229, 230, 234, 237, 239, 241, 242, 253, 277. Democratic Civil Society, 137, 171, 210. Development, 6, 8, 11, 15, 16, 20, 27, 29, 36, 39, 41, 44, 51, 52, 56, 71, 74, 79, 82, 83, 84, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 131, 134, 136, 138, 140, 141, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 160, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 192, 193,

196, 197, 198, 202, 206, 211, 215, 216, 225, 227, 230, 234, 239, 241, 242, 245, 252, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, 262, 265, 266, 267, 269, 271, 273, 274, 275, 277, 279, 281. Diplomatic Role, 7.

203, 218, 237, 247, 257, 264, 270, 276,

E Economic development, 36, 147, 150, 152, 153, 174, 230, 245. Evaluation, 59, 77, 95, 155, 186, 202, 263,

146, 154, 102, 280.

F Finance, 31, 84, 148, 166.

G Global Democracy, 18, 115. Global Policymaking, 156. Global policymaking, 157. Governance, 39, 82, 83, 87, 91, 92, 94, 96, 98, 110, 115, 133, 138, 141, 157, 160, 161, 165, 181, 182, 184, 185, 188, 204, 205, 210, 214, 215, 217, 218, 221, 225, 227, 230, 248, 250.

I IMF, 91, 151, 152, 164, 193, 198, 200, 227, 250. Implementation, 39, 65, 78, 94, 95, 114, 153, 183, 203, 222, 260, 273.

165, 228, 72, 141, 240,

Index

287

Implications, 70, 81, 84, 86, 87, 93, 104, 105, 109, 112, 234, 278. International Donor Community, 146, 147, 148, 150. Intervention, 34, 82, 92, 99, 100, 164, 202, 222.

J Justice, 2, 92, 111, 115, 145, 172, 173, 175, 180, 197, 245.

L Laws, 36, 130, 236, 248, 256. Leaders, 6, 14, 28, 41, 53, 61, 63, 72, 91, 112, 121, 126, 127, 170, 171, 186, 191, 215, 218, 219, 223, 227, 235, 276, 277, 280. Leadership, 27, 37, 40, 58, 117, 119, 169, 218, 225, 266. Limitations, 21, 138, 153,

251, 49, 101, 161, 193, 225, 279, 44, 204, 210.

M Management, 8, 16, 58, 108, 111, 169, 246, 255, 260, 261, 262, 265, 266, 269, 278, 281. Methodology, 267, 268. Monitoring, 16, 45, 73, 103, 213, 220, 236, 279, 280.

103, 253, 263, 279,

91, 240,

O Organization, 4, 19, 23, 24, 25, 30, 36, 37, 38, 39,

40, 52, 63, 73, 91, 125, 131, 135, 138, 173, 194, 196, 199, 203, 204, 206, 209, 211, 232, 233, 239, 242, 246, 248, 249, 252, 254, 255, 256, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266, 267, 268, 269, 271, 272, 274, 276, 279, 280.

120, 164, 200, 210, 240, 251, 260, 265, 270, 277,

P Partners, 6, 15, 24, 30, 31, 39, 48, 61, 63, 66, 105, 131, 140, 141, 142, 162, 170, 175, 193, 202, 212, 215, 274, 275. Policy, 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 49, 52, 54, 56, 57, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 78, 81, 84, 87, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 112, 114, 119, 127, 129, 132, 133, 147, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 170, 177, 183, 184, 186, 204, 205, 210, 213, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 226, 227, 229, 232, 237, 248, 250, 259, 261, 262, 263, 267, 273, 274, 275, 276. Political Space, 165. Politics, 21, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 92, 93, 100, 105, 108, 112, 137, 140, 161, 174, 190, 191, 201, 208, 209, 210, 211, 214, 243, 252, 264, 274, 276.


288 Project, 4, 46, 71, 95, 105, 117, 137, 138, 142, 143, 144, 145, 176, 203, 224, 239, 243, 258, 260, 263, 266, 268, 278. Public Relations, 230, 274.

R Relationships, 25, 66, 81, 82, 84, 88, 95, 97, 100, 104, 106, 107, 108, 138, 141, 143, 159, 197, 236, 242, 264. Research, 2, 9, 35, 87, 95, 109, 111, 124, 129, 131, 132, 133, 135, 175, 256, 268, 274, 280, 282.

S Social Capital, 89, 101, 202, 205. Social Justice, 2, 145, 180, 245. Society, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 12, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 29, 30, 36, 37, 38, 70, 79, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 104, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 121, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164,

165, 167, 168, 175, 176, 177, 182, 183, 185, 188, 190, 191, 201, 202, 206, 210, 211, 212, 219, 220, 224, 227, 228, 237, 241, 243, 245, 252, 253, 255, Superiority, 131.

170, 179, 186, 199, 207, 213, 225, 239, 248, 259,

171, 181, 187, 200, 208, 217, 226, 240, 250, 266.

Traditions, 142, 178, 216. Transparency, 29, 32, 35, 58, 65, 72, 75, 146, 184, 185, 187, 193, 194, 207, 210, 214, 215, 217, 219, 220, 221.

V 105,

112,

W Welfare, 82, 89, 160, 167, 168, 196, 205. World Bank, 4, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 27, 31, 91, 133, 148, 149, 150, 152, 155, 157, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 193, 199, 204, 208, 210, 214, 219, 220, 232, 241, 249, 251, 256, 259, 261, 265, 274, 276, 282.

289

C ONTENTS Preface 1. Introduction

T

Violence, 33, 100, 209, 251.


1

2. NGOs, UN Reform and Global Democracy

18

3. NGOs and the United Nations

39

4. NGOs in a Global Future

81

5. NGO Access at the UN

114

6. Civil Society's Role in Global Policymaking

156

7. Learning to Live with NGOs

189

8. The NGO Phenomenon

229

Bibliography

283

Index

285

NGOS

AND

GLOBAL POLICY

NGO's & global policy

NGOs, Africa and the Global Order

Global Media and Communication Policy

Alternative Energy: Global Public Policy & Regulatory Challenges Fall 2007

Global Media and Communication Policy

Women's NGOs In Pakistan

Handbook of Global International Policy (Public Administration and Public Policy)

Global Economy, Global Justice: Theoretical and Policy Alternatives to Neoliberalism

Global Imbalances, Exchange Rates and Stabilization Policy

Global Banking (Economics & Finance)

Global Imbalances, Exchange Rates and Stabilization Policy

Innovation Policy in a Global Economy

Global Competition and EU Environmental Policy

Geography of Power: Making Global Economic Policy

Science into Policy: Global Lessons from Antarctica

Handbook of Global Environmental Policy and Administration

Global Change and East Asian Policy Initiatives

Housing Policy Matters: A Global Analysis

Global Change and East Asian Policy Initiatives

Global Finance & the Macroeconomy

The Power and Limits of NGOs

Enterprise & Small Business: Principles, Practice & Policy, 2nd Edition

Clinical Guidelines: Law Policy & Practice

Flexibility & Lifelong Learning: Policy, Discourse, Politics

Encyclopedia of Public Administration & Public Policy

Child Social Work Policy & Practice

Environmental Justice: Law, Policy & Regulation

Inclusive Education: International Policy & Practice

The Power and Limits of NGOs

NGOs and Environmental Policies: Asia and Africa

NGO's & global policy

NGOs, Africa and the Global Order

Global Media and Communication Policy

Alternative Energy: Global Public Policy & Regulatory Challenges Fall 2007

Global Media and Communication Policy

Women's NGOs In Pakistan

Handbook of Global International Policy (Public Administration and Public Policy)

Global Economy, Global Justice: Theoretical and Policy Alternatives to Neoliberalism

Global Imbalances, Exchange Rates and Stabilization Policy

Global Banking (Economics & Finance)

Global Imbalances, Exchange Rates and Stabilization Policy

Innovation Policy in a Global Economy

Global Competition and EU Environmental Policy

Geography of Power: Making Global Economic Policy

Science into Policy: Global Lessons from Antarctica

Handbook of Global Environmental Policy and Administration

Global Change and East Asian Policy Initiatives

Housing Policy Matters: A Global Analysis

Global Change and East Asian Policy Initiatives

Global Finance & the Macroeconomy

The Power and Limits of NGOs

Enterprise & Small Business: Principles, Practice & Policy, 2nd Edition

Clinical Guidelines: Law Policy & Practice

Flexibility & Lifelong Learning: Policy, Discourse, Politics

Encyclopedia of Public Administration & Public Policy

Child Social Work Policy & Practice

Environmental Justice: Law, Policy & Regulation

Inclusive Education: International Policy & Practice

The Power and Limits of NGOs

NGOs and Environmental Policies: Asia and Africa

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