Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans

James Ker-Lindsay is IAA Defence Analysis Institute Senior Research Fellow at the Hellenic Observatory, European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science and Senior Research Fellow in European and International Studies at Kingston University, London. A specialist on the politics and international relations of South East Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, his other books include Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey (I.B.Tauris) and EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus. He also has a practical background in conflict resolution, previously serving as the co-ordinator of the Greek–Turkish Forum at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI).

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11. Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans James Ker-Lindsay

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Kosovo The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans JAMES KER-LINDSAY

Published in 2009 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com Distributed in the United States and Canada Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © 2009 James Ker-Lindsay The right of James Ker-Lindsay to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Library of European Studies: 11 ISBN: 978 1 84885 012 5 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available

Printed and bound in India by Thomson Press India Ltd. from camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations List of Key Characters Chronology

vii ix xi xiii

Introduction 1. Historical Background 2. Direct Discussions 3. Status Proposals 4. Security Council Debates 5. Troika Talks Conclusion

1 8 25 45 63 81 102

Appendix A: UN Resolution 1244 Appendix B: Summary of the Eide Report Appeddix C: Security Council Statement Appendix D: Contact Group Documents Appendix E: Ahtisaari Proposals Appendix F: Comparative Autonomy Models Appendix G: Troika Final Report

127 134 140 142 147 166 175

Notes Bibliography Index

187 245 259

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to start by thanking the various diplomats and officials who provided me with insights into the events covered in this work. I am especially grateful to President Martti Ahtisaari and Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger for explaining their respective roles. My deepest thanks also go to Othon Anastasakis, Dejan Jović, Aleks Szczerbiak, Dejan Djokić and Florian Bieber for generously providing me with an opportunity to present and discuss aspects of this work. The last two also deserve a special mention for their comments and suggestions on the manuscript. Likewise, I am also extremely grateful to Sir Ivor Roberts for his comments on the text. Needless to say, I take full responsibility for any errors and omissions that remain. I should also like to thank everyone at I.B.Tauris: Liz Friend-Smith for once again being such an enthusiastic editor, and Jayne Hill for her advice on the production and layout. Lastly, and as ever, my greatest thanks go to B – a constant voice of reason and moderation.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANA DS DSS EU G8 ICTY KFOR KLA KPC KPS KVM LDK NATO OSCE PDK PfP PISG SAA SPO SFRY SRS SRSG UN UNMIK UNOSEK US

Albanian National Army Democratic Party Democratic Party of Serbia European Union Group of Eight International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Kosovo Protection Force Kosovo Liberation Army Kosovo Protection Corps Kosovo Police Service Kosovo Verification Mission Democratic League of Kosovo North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Democratic Party of Kosovo Partnership for Peace Provisional Institutions of Self-Government Stabilisation and Association Agreement Serbian Renewal Movement Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Serbian Radical Party Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General United Nations United Nations Mission in Kosovo United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo United States of America

KEY CHARACTERS

United Nations Ahtisaari, Martti Annan, Kofi Ban Ki Moon Eide, Kai Jessen-Petersen, Søren Rohan, Albert Rücker, Joachim Verbeke, Johan

Special Envoy, Kosovo Status Process Secretary-General, 1997–2007 Secretary-General, 2007– Special Envoy, Kosovo Review Special Representative, 2004–6 Deputy Special Envoy Special Representative, 2006–8 Head, Security Council Fact-Finding Mission

Kosovo Albanian Leadership Çeku, Agim Rugova, Ibrahim Sejdiu, Fatmir Thaçi, Hashim

Prime Minister of Kosovo, 2006–7 President of Kosovo, 2002–6 President of Kosovo, 2006– Prime Minister of Kosovo, 2007–

Republic of Serbia Drašković, Vuk Jeremić, Vuk Koštunica, Vojislav Milošević, Slobodan Rašković-Ivić, Sanda Samardžić, Slobodan Tadić, Boris

Foreign Minister of Serbia, 2004–7 Foreign Minister of Serbia, 2007– Prime Minister of Serbia President of Yugoslavia, 1997–2000 Head, Kosovo Coordination Centre Minister for Kosovo and Metohija President of Serbia

xii

KOSOVO European Union

D’Alema, Massimo Ischinger, Wolfgang Jones-Parry, Sir Emyr Kouchner, Bernard Rehn, Olli Sarkozy, Nicolas Solana, Javier Steinmeier, Frank-Walter

Foreign Minister of Italy EU Representative, Troika British Permanent Representative, UN Foreign Minister of France EU Commissioner for Enlargement President of France High Representative for Foreign Policy Foreign Minister of Germany

Russian Federation Alexeyev, Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko, Alex. Churkin, Vitaly Lavrov, Sergey Putin, Valdimir Titov, Vladimir

Ambassador to Belgrade Russian Representative, Troika Permanent Representative to the UN Foreign Minister of the Russia Federation President of the Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

United States of America Burns, R. Nicholas Bush, George W. Fried, Daniel Khalilzad, Zalmay Rice, Condoleezza Wisner, Frank

Undersecretary of State, Political Affairs President of the United States of America Asst. Secretary of State, European Affairs Permanent Representative to the UN Secretary of State US Representative, Troika

Other De Hoop Scheffer, Jaap

NATO Secretary-General

CHRONOLOGY

1999–2004 February 1999 March–June 1999 June 1999 October 2000 May 2001 March 2003 December 2003 March 2004

Rambouillet Conference NATO air campaign against Serbia UN Security Council Resolution 1244(1999) Slobodan Milošević ousted as Yugoslav President Constitutional Framework for Kosovo unveiled Serbian PM Zoran Djindjić assassinated in Belgrade ‘Standards for Kosovo’ unveiled Major riots occur throughout Kosovo

2005 3 June 7 October 24 October 2 November 10 November

Kai Eide appointed to review situation in Kosovo Eide Review presented to the Security Council UN Security Council endorses the Eide Review Contact Group issues guiding principles for talks Martti Ahtisaari appointed as UN Envoy

2006 21 January 31 January 10 February 14 February 20–21 February 1 March 10 March

Ibrahim Rugova dies Contact Group statement on talks Fatmir Sejdiu elected president of Kosovo Security Council debate on Kosovo 1st round of talks on decentralisation, Vienna Bajram Kosumi resigns as prime minister Agim Çeku confirmed as prime minister

xiv 11 March 17 March 3 April 3 May 4–5 May 21 May 23 May 31 May 20 June 13 July 18 July 19 July 24 July 7 August 8 August 7–8 September 7–8 September 7–8 September 13 September 15 September 22 September 28–29 October 10 November 13 December

KOSOVO Slobodan Milošević dies in The Hague 2nd round of talks on decentralisation, Vienna 3rd round of talks on decentralisation, Vienna EU suspends association talks with Serbia 4th round of direct talks of decentralisation, Vienna Montenegro votes for independence 1st round of talks on religious heritage, Vienna 1st round of talks on economic issues, Vienna Security Council meeting on Kosovo Closed Security Council meeting on Kosovo 2nd round of talks on religious heritage, Vienna 5th round of talks on decentralisation, Vienna High-Level meeting, Vienna 6th round of talks on decentralisation, Vienna 1st round of talks on community rights, Vienna 7th round of talks on decentralisation, Vienna 3rd round of talks on religious heritage, Vienna 2nd round of talks on community rights, Vienna Security Council meeting on Kosovo 8th round of talks on decentralisation, Vienna Closed Security Council meeting on Kosovo Referendum approves Serbian Constitution Parliamentary elections called in Serbia Security Council debate on Kosovo

2007 21 January 26 January 2 February 21 February 27 February 10 March 15 March 19 March 26 March 24–29 April 2 May 10 May 11 May

Serbian general elections Status proposals presented to the Contact Group Status proposals presented to the sides First phase of technical discussions, Vienna Second phase of technical discussions, Vienna Final High-Level Meeting, Vienna Proposals presented to UN Secretary-General Security Council meeting on Kosovo Proposals presented to the Security Council Security Council Fact Finding Mission to Kosovo Security Council meeting on Kosovo Security Council meeting on Kosovo Draft resolution circulated

CHRONOLOGY

xv

14–15 May 15 May 6–8 June 1–2 July 20 July 1 August 9 August 10–12 August 30 August 18–19 September 27 September 28 September 14 October 22 October 5 November 20 November 26–28 November 3 December 7 December 14 December 19 December

Condoleezza Rice visits Moscow Serbian Government formed G8 Summit in Germany Bush and Putin meet in Kennebunkport, USA Attempt to pass a UN resolution is abandoned New round of discussions announced Troika meets with the Contact Group, London 1st Troika discussions (indirect), Belgrade and Pristina 2nd Troika discussions (indirect), Vienna 3rd Troika discussions (indirect), London Troika meets with the Contact Group, New York 4th Troika discussions (1st face-to-face), New York 5th Troika discussions (2nd face-to-face), Brussels 6th Troika discussions (3rd face-to-face), Vienna 7th Troika discussions (4th face-to-face), Vienna 8th Troika discussions (5th face-to-face), Brussels 9th Troika discussions (6th face-to-face), Austria 10th Troika discussions (indirect), Belgrade and Pristina Troika presents its report European Council agrees to mission to Kosovo UN Security Council debate

17 February

Kosovo declares independence

2008

INTRODUCTION

The Dayton peace agreement, which brought the war in BosniaHerzegovina to a close in 1995,1 was widely expected to herald the end of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the start of a new more peaceful era of reconciliation and reconstruction in the Western Balkans. However, such hopes proved to be short-lived. Just three years later international attention was again focused on the region as fighting erupted between government forces and separatist Albanian guerrillas in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo. Embarrassed by their failure to prevent the death and destruction in Bosnia, Western leaders sought to bring the conflict in Kosovo under control as soon as possible – and by using all means necessary. In March 1999, after a number of failed attempts to broker an agreement between the sides, NATO launched a bombing campaign against Serbia. 78 days later Belgrade capitulated. As a result, Serbia’s direct rule over the province was terminated and a United Nations presence – the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) – was established to oversee Kosovo until a decision could be made on its long-term political future. In October 2005, the United Nations Security Council decided that the time had come to take that decision. After six years of international rule, the situation on the ground was deteriorating. The Kosovo Albanians, who made up 90 per cent of the province’s population, were becoming ever more vocal in their demands for independence and fears were growing that a new outbreak of violence could emerge at any time. Against this backdrop, the United States, Britain and France, the three veto-wielding Western members of the Security Council, privately saw no other option but to let the Kosovo

2

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Albanians go their own way.2 Forcing Kosovo back under Belgrade’s rule, even with considerable autonomy, was seen as unrealistic. To try to do so would only lead to further conflict. Significantly, even Russia, a traditional ally of Serbia, appeared to have accepted that independence was now the only viable solution. But even if this were not the case, Moscow appeared to be in no position to prevent Kosovo from achieving statehood. Just as it had been unable to stop NATO’s campaign against Serbia in 1999, few observers believed that Russia would, or could, thwart the will of Washington, London and Paris this time round.3 Under these circumstances, it was assumed that the process to decide Kosovo’s future status would be relatively straightforward and quick. After a short series of negotiations, the issue would be referred to the Security Council, which would endorse proposals for some form of ‘conditional’ or ‘supervised’ independence. As for a timeframe, few believed that it would take more than a year to settle the matter. Indeed, it was even suggested that the issue could come to the fore as early as the spring of the following year, 2006.4 Certainly, as the talks got underway, the predictions about the course of events appeared to be accurate. The Serbian Government and Kosovo Albanians immediately fell back on their familiar historical, political and legal arguments and neither Belgrade nor Pristina showed any inclination to relent on their basic positions. To the Kosovo Albanians, the case for independence was clear cut.5 Comprising over 90 per cent of the population of Kosovo, they argued that they should have the right self-determination, as recognised under the UN Charter.6 In order to lend further weight to their position, they drew on two further arguments. First of all, they insisted that Kosovo should be seen within the broader context of the break up of Yugoslavia. Just as Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia – and later, Montenegro – had all been allowed to go their own way with international blessing, so the same right should be extended to Kosovo. After all, it too had been a distinct and autonomous entity within the former Yugoslavia. Secondly, the case for self-determination had an emotional dimension. Given a long history of Serb repression in Kosovo, which culminated in the conflict of 1998–99, Belgrade had forfeited its right to exercise sovereign authority over the Kosovo Albanians. As one Kosovo Albanian explained, independence would be ‘moral compensation’ for past suffering.7

INTRODUCTION

3

Likewise, Serbia’s position was equally straightforward.8 Even though Kosovo was under international administration, it was still recognised as being a part of Serbia. In line with the UN Charter and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act,9 the territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia must therefore be recognised and respected. Furthermore, the right of self-determination leading to independence did not apply in the case of Kosovo. Under international law, the principle was in fact only applicable only in cases to colonisation, and even then was only to be exercised at the point of decolonisation. It was not viewed as right to secession by a numerical minority within an established state.10 Whatever the moral case for independence, the Serbian Government argued that there was simply no precedent, or justification, for the imposed creation of a new country on the territory of a sovereign member of the United Nations.11 As for the argument that Kosovo should be seen within the context of the overall break up of Yugoslavia, the Serbian Government argued that while Kosovo may have enjoyed many of the rights of a republic within the Yugoslav federation, it was always a constituent part of Serbia. Crucially, therefore, it did not enjoy a right to secede – a view that had previously been accepted by the international community.12 Belgrade therefore countered the Kosovo Albanian calls for independence by presenting proposals for extensive autonomy. Given these diametrically opposed views, it soon became clear that the Security Council would indeed have to take the final decision on the matter. However, as the issue moved to the UN, the process took an unexpected turn. Contrary to initial expectations, deep divisions opened up between Russia and the Western members of the Council over the future of Kosovo. While Washington maintained its view that independence was the only realistic and viable outcome for Kosovo, Moscow insisted that it would only endorse a solution acceptable to both sides. It would not allow a settlement to be imposed from outside. As a result, the status process became anything but straightforward, or quick. Rather than reaching a conclusion within twelve months, as originally hoped, the process lasted two years – eventually ending in deadlock in December 2007. The consequences of this failure to reach an agreement at the UN became clear when, just over two months later, on 17 February 2008, the Kosovo Assembly declared independence – sending out letters to all 192 members of the United Nations, including Serbia, asking for recognition.13 The first responses arrived within hours. In addition to

4

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receiving recognition from Albania, Turkey, Afghanistan and Costa Rica, the new Republic of Kosovo was officially recognised by the United States, Australia and the four largest members of the European Union – Britain, France, Germany and Italy. In the weeks that followed, a dozen other EU members followed suit, as did Canada and Japan. While many of these countries may have been uneasy about recognising independence without explicit UN authorisation, there was nevertheless a general acceptance that there was simply no other alternative. The break up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the vicious conflict in Kosovo in 1998–99, made continued Serbian sovereignty over the province impossible.14 However, many others states disagreed. Denouncing the move as ‘illegal, ill-conceived and immoral’, Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, argued that without the explicit approval of the Security Council, the declaration represented a fundamental violation of the principle of the territorial integrity of states, as protected by international law.15 Under these circumstances, any act of recognition not only undermined the authority of the United Nations, it also served as a precedent for separatist movements around the world. Many others countries agreed with the Russian position. As well as being opposed by many states of the former Soviet Union, Kosovo’s declaration of independence was also rejected by a number of countries facing threats from separatist movements; many of which had already announced their intention to appeal to the ‘Kosovo precedent’.16 Significantly, the ranks of those opposed to the declaration of independence included a number of members of the European Union. Despite repeated assurances from Washington and their European partners that Kosovo represented a unique case under international law, and could not be used as justification in other cases,17 Spain, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus all stated that they would not recognise Kosovo’s independence. In between the two main poles of opinion for and against independence, many other countries simply decided to refrain from taking a strong position one way or another. For example, China, India, South Africa, Brazil and Indonesia all made it clear that, while they would not explicitly rule out recognition in the future, they too had concerns about independence and so would not endorse statehood for the meanwhile. As a result, it quickly became clear that Kosovo would be unable to join a number of key international organisations. Most importantly,

INTRODUCTION

5

membership of the United Nations was ruled out. Even if the required amount of support could be mustered in the General Assembly, Russia would block any move by the Security Council to recommend membership, a necessary prerequisite for an Assembly vote.18 Likewise, membership of regional groups, such as the Council of Europe and the Organisations for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), both of which relied on consensus decisions on new members, appeared to be impossible given opposition from Serbia, Russia and others. Even membership of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference appeared unlikely due to concerns amongst a number of members about the wider effects of recognising Kosovo.19 But most galling of all, membership of European Union and NATO, where support for Kosovo’s statehood was strongest, appeared to be out of the question given the small, but nonetheless crucial, opposition to independence within both groups. Thus the stark reality of the situation soon became apparent in Pristina. Despite initial claims by Hashim Thaçi, the prime minister of Kosovo, that 100 states would quickly recognise Kosovo,20 in the two months following independence just 36 of the 192 UN members did so. Thereafter the number of recognitions diminished significantly. Indeed, the revised hope that half the members of the UN would recognise Kosovo by the time of the time of the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly,21 in September, was not met. By the end of 2008, the total number of countries recognising Kosovo stood at 53,22 or 28 per cent of the total membership of the United Nations. Rather than assume a universally recognised place in the community of nations, Kosovo had instead entered a grey zone of international politics. While there was no doubt that it was accorded a far greater degree of legitimacy than many other disputed territories vying for international recognition, such as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or Transdniestria, its legality was fundamentally questioned, if not disputed, by most of the world. More to the point, even though further recognitions could be expected, it appeared as though Kosovo’s status would remain contested for many years to come.23 However, all this hardly represented a victory for Belgrade. Having achieved recognition from so many Western states, it now seemed all but certain that Kosovo’s independence was irreversible. Even before Japan and Canada decided to recognise independence, thus securing the support of all the members of the G7, the world’s leading economic democracies, the states that supported Kosovo’s

6

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independence represented 65 per cent of global GDP.24 Moreover, the decision by the majority of the European Union to recognise statehood made it all the more likely that Serbia would eventually have to accept an independent Kosovo. Despite claims from EU officials eager to keep Serbia committed to EU membership that recognition could not be a requirement for membership,25 most observers believed that at some point, although certainly not immediately, Serbia would have to make a choice between Kosovo and accession. Following the decision to admit the divided island of Cyprus into the Union, in 2004, which many had regarded as a mistake, and which had complicated the European Union’s relationship with Turkey, many European leaders had signalled their determination not to import any more border disputes in the future.26 Meanwhile, in addition to the international dispute over status, the declaration of independence had also cemented the deep divisions between the Serb and Albanian communities within Kosovo. Just as the Kosovo Albanians were unwilling to accept Serbian sovereignty, so the Kosovo Serbs, especially those living in the predominantly Serb northern areas, refused to accept Pristina’s authority. Within days of the declaration of independence, the backlash began. As well as withdrawing from local institutions, many thousands of Serbs took to the streets in protest, demanding that Belgrade be allowed to administer their areas. This led to several skirmishes with international peacekeepers. The most violent of these incidents occurred in the divided town of Mitrovica a month after independence and led to the death of a Ukrainian UN police officer. While the overt anger soon subsided, in the months that followed Belgrade and the Kosovo Serbs consolidated their control over the north. As a result, many observers believed that the foundations for some form of eventual partition of Kosovo were being laid. Even if things did not go that far, it was widely recognised that a ‘frozen conflict’ had now emerged in northern Kosovo.27 Finally, despite oft-repeated claims that Kosovo’s independence was necessary for regional stability, the reality was that it appeared to have laid the foundations for other long-term problems in the region. Most notably, in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serbs saw Kosovo’s declaration of independence as an opportunity to step up their calls for statehood or union with Serbia.28 Thus the true cost of the failure of two years of status talks quickly became obvious. Rather than achieve an internationally accepted

INTRODUCTION

7

status, Kosovo’s place in the world would instead remain contested for the foreseeable future. At the same time, a host of other problems had emerged. Acrimony over Kosovo served to deepen the emerging divisions between Russia and the United States. It also appeared to exacerbate tensions elsewhere. Indeed, many directly attributed the Russian–Georgian conflict over South Ossetia, which erupted just months later, in August 2008, and the rifts it created between Moscow and Washington, to the way in which Kosovo had been managed, both in 1999 and during the status process.29 At the same time, even though the May 2008 elections in Serbia led to the election for a pro-Western government, the question of Kosovo would have a lasting effect on Serbia’s relationship with the West. Apart from affecting Serbia’s EU accession aspirations, Belgrade’s successful attempt to secure a resolution to the General Assembly calling for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of independence created tensions with those countries that had led the way in recognising Kosovo.30 For all these reasons, as General Sir Mike Jackson, the former commander of the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR), bluntly put it, the status process had ended in a ‘mess’.31 Unsurprisingly, the blame-game for this state of affairs soon began. In the view of many Western observers, the responsibility for this ‘diplomatic train wreck’ lay squarely with Russia.32 By refusing to bow to the inevitable and persuading Serbia to part with Kosovo, many even believed that Moscow had deliberately sought to sink the process for its own purposes. Others saw things differently. The outcome was the product of Washington’s determination to extricate itself from Kosovo, no matter what the costs or consequences. By so openly supporting independence, the United States ensured that the Kosovo Albanians had no incentive to compromise. Meanwhile, some even blamed the European Union for not taking a more decisive or unified position. By encouraging the two sides to focus on their European futures, and by pressing for more innovative ideas, the EU could have limited the influence of Russia and the United States. This book examines the international dimensions of the status process, explaining how and why things went so very wrong and assessing where the responsibility for the failure to reach an agreed settlement really lies.

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Like many other conflicts, Kosovo is burdened by competing, and often contradictory, historical claims. While Albanians insist that their rights over the territory are based on a presence in the region stretching back over millennia to the ancient Illyrians, the original inhabitants of the Balkans, Serbs will highlight the fact that Kosovo was the heartland of their medieval empire, thus giving it immense cultural and religious significance.1 Although such arguments are symbolically important, in reality the origins of the contemporary conflict can be traced back to the First Balkan War, at the start of the twentieth century. In 1912, the increasingly frail Ottoman Empire was attacked by the armies of the Balkan League, an alliance made up of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro. In a war lasting a little over a month, the last vestiges of six-centuries of Ottoman rule in Europe were all but swept away and the map of south east Europe completely redrawn. The new state of affairs was subsequently confirmed at a conference held in London the following year, albeit with one major change. Austria-Hungary, fearful of the growing strength of Serbia, and determined to prevent it from gaining access to the sea, called for the creation of an independent Albanian state that would unite all Albanians. While the call was supported by Italy, Russia, acting with French support, disagreed. Instead, it argued that the members of the League be allowed to retain all their conquests. In the end, a compromise was reached. In return for the creation of a relatively small Albanian state, the victors would be able to keep the lion’s share of their spoils. As a result, the territory that comprises contemporary

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

9

Kosovo fell under the rule of the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro.2 To the Serbian inhabitants of the area, the decision marked their liberation from centuries of Ottoman rule. For the Albanian population, who at this stage were already the majority,3 Serbia was seen as nothing less than a new occupier. Although the region was invaded and occupied by Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria during the First World War, it once again came under Serbian control at the end of hostilities and, on 1 December 1918, became a part of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. In the years that followed, Serbia cemented its authority over the region. As well as encouraging largescale settlement by Serb and other South Slav peasants, a process that saw many Albanians and Turks leave, mostly for Turkey and Albania,4 efforts were also made to assimilate the remaining Albanian inhabitants. One notable example of this was the decision to ban Albanian-language secular schooling, replacing them with Serbianlanguage schools.5 However, the tables were turned during the Second World War when most of the territory came under Italian occupation. As the Albanian population sought revenge against the Serbian population, tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Serbs fled and were replaced by Albanian newcomers.6 The creation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia at the end of the Second World War saw the area reincorporated into Serbia, this time as an autonomous region called Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet for short), a process that also saw the demarcation of Kosovo’s present-day boundaries. While this marked an explicit recognition of its special status, the decision did not go far enough for Kosovo’s Albanians. Over the coming years they gradually began to demand that they be recognised as a nation within Yugoslavia, and for Kosovo to become the seventh Yugoslav republic – alongside Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Such a move, which would have separated them from Serbia, but not from Yugoslavia, was not accepted by Marshal Tito, the Yugoslav leader, and the Socialist government. According to the then official Yugoslav ideology, only the South Slavs could qualify for their own republic, and be recognised as a nation within Yugoslavia. Such a status could not be enjoyed by peoples within Yugoslavia that were considered to have an external homeland or belonged to transnational stateless groups, such as the Ruthenians, Jews and Roma. In the case of Kosovo, the existence of an independent

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Albania precluded recognition as a nation. Instead, they were recognised as a ‘nationality’ – a national minority – alongside, amongst others, Hungarians, Slovaks and Italians. Although this subordinate status was effectively reconfirmed in 1963, in the latter half of the 1960s the Kosovo Albanians began to gain an increased standing in the federation, experiencing, ‘an overall national, political, economical and cultural revival and development.’7 This was most clearly symbolised by the founding of Pristina University, which lectured in both Albanian and Serbo-Croat. However, rather than dampen national sentiments, this in fact led to demonstrations, in 1968, calling for Kosovo to be recognised as a republic. While this did not occur, in 1974 Kosovo was upgraded from an autonomous region to an autonomous province of Serbia; thereby gaining equality with Vojvodina, in the north of Serbia, which had been awarded this status in 1946.8 As a result, it now came to enjoy almost all the rights and privileges granted to a republic, including its own constitution, assembly and seat on the federal council. Crucially, though, it was denied the right of self-determination – a privilege theoretically enjoyed by republics. The new status was certainly a major step forwards for Kosovo. Nevertheless, pressure for the province to be recognised as a republic continued to grow amongst Kosovo Albanians. In 1981 a series of student riots graphically highlighted the strength of feeling over the issue. Meanwhile, as many Serbs started leaving the province amidst growing anti-Serbian prejudice, as well as for economic reasons, the question of Kosovo also became increasingly politicised in Serbia. In 1985, a number of Serb intellectuals prepared a memorandum in which, amongst other things, they argued that the Serbs of Kosovo were facing ‘genocide’ at the hands of the Albanian majority and called on Serbia to reassert its authority over the province. This ‘threat’ to the Kosovo Serbs provided an ideal issue for Slobodan Milošević, a rising official within the ruling Communist Party, to enhance his political career.9 In 1989, having assumed the Serbian Presidency, he effectively removed the province’s autonomy, instituting direct rule from Belgrade. The collapse of Yugoslavia The collapse of Yugoslavia two years later transformed the debate in Kosovo. Following the examples set by Slovenia and Croatia, the

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

11

Kosovo Albanians now focused their campaign on formal statehood, holding a referendum on independence and electing Ibrahim Rugova, a firm adherent of non-violent resistance to Serbian rule, as their unofficial president, in May 1992. Meanwhile, fearful that the bloody war in Bosnia could proliferate to Kosovo, the United States warned Milošević that any attempt by Belgrade to react with force to developments in the province would meet with air strikes – a threat repeated the following year by the new Clinton administration.10 However, the Kosovo Albanian claim for independence went unrecognised by the international community. In 1992, the Badinter Arbitration Committee, a body set up by the European Union to consider the legal issues arising from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, concluded that the six formal republics of Yugoslavia were states emerging from the collapse of the federation, and thus could be recognised.11 Crucially, though, Kosovo was not mentioned. Therefore, despite its former standing as a unit within federal Yugoslavia, and the fact that it had enjoyed almost all the rights of a republic, Kosovo was nevertheless denied international recognition alongside its erstwhile partners. Although there was little desire within the international community to recognise Kosovo as an independent state, the start of peace talks in Dayton aimed at ending the civil war in Bosnia was seen by many in Kosovo as an opportunity for their own claims to be addressed. But it was not to be. Although some in the US Administration wished to raise the issue, the need to keep Milošević – who insisted that Kosovo was an internal matter for Serbia – engaged in the overall process meant that it was kept off the agenda.12 The decision severely undermined Rugova’s credibility. After following a policy of passive resistance, many now felt that the only way to secure independence was to fight for it. In February 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a mysterious new guerrilla movement, launched its first attack against a Serbian police patrol. Over the next couple of years the KLA gradually intensified its operations, focusing mainly on police, Serb refugees who had settled in the province following conflict in the other parts of former Yugoslavia and Albanians deemed to be collaborating with the Serbian authorities in one way or another.13 By early 1998 the conflict had escalated considerably. The KLA had become increasingly bold in it attacks and now appeared to be in control of parts of the province. Importantly, though, the weight of opinion appeared to be on Serbia’s

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side. Speaking in Pristina, Robert Gelbard, the US special envoy for the Balkans, famously described the KLA as a terrorist organisation.14 The comment proved to be fateful. Reading this as a green light to act, just days later Serbian security forces launched several operations against presumed KLA strongholds. The attacks left over two dozen dead, including women and children.15 The attacks marked a turning point in the conflict. Realising that a new ethnic conflict was now in the making, and this that might spread to neighbouring Macedonia, the international community realised that it was time for concerted action to address the situation. Meeting at the start of March, the Contact Group – a joint body made up of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States – demanded that formal negotiations now begin. Soon afterwards, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160. Condemning Serbia’s ‘excessive force’ against civilians and the ‘acts of terrorism’ by the KLA, the resolution made it clear that the talks should be based on autonomy and meaningful self administration.16 Responding to this, Washington initiated a peace process between the two sides. It was short lived. Although a meeting was held between Milošević and Rugova in mid-May, the process collapsed when Serbian security forces launched another major offensive against the KLA. By now, Western patience was already beginning to fray. At a meeting in June, NATO leaders authorised military commanders to begin planning for action. In Russia the news was greeted with deep concern. Given its long standing support for Belgrade, any NATO intervention against Yugoslavia would necessarily put the Russian Government in an extremely difficult position. Indeed, the prospect of NATO forces on the ground in Yugoslavia represented Russia’s ‘worst case scenario’, signifying the extent to which its influence on the world stage had declined since the end of the Cold War. Milošević was therefore summoned to Moscow. There he promised Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President, that he would scale back his activities.17 Soon afterwards, Belgrade agreed to the establishment of the 50strong Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, which was able to provide some information about developments on the ground, despite its small size.18 It was also at this time that Christopher Hill, the US Ambassador in neighbouring Macedonia, who had also been appointed to serve as the US special envoy for Kosovo, began working on a peace plan. But once again the lull in fighting was all too brief. In August,

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13

following a further series of KLA attacks, Serbian forces launched yet another counter-offensive. By September, the scale of violence was spiralling out of control. In addition to several thousands deaths, it was now reported than an estimated 230,000 civilians had been forced from their homes since the start of hostilities. In response, the Security Council now passed another resolution. Condemning Belgrade’s ‘excessive and indiscriminate’ force, and again calling for a solution based on autonomy, the Council proposed the establishment of an observer mission to oversee a ceasefire in the province.19 This came to fruition just two weeks later when the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was formed under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).20 Importantly, in addition to its primary role, the KVM was also detailed to monitor human rights, facilitate the return of refugees and assist with the implementation of a political settlement. However, even at this stage, the intention was to pursue autonomy. As Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State, emphasised: ‘We have made it clear to Milošević and Kosovars that we do not support independence for Kosovo, that we want Serbia out of Kosovo, not Kosovo out of Serbia.’21 In the meantime, to reinforce the gravity of the situation, NATO also kept up its pressure, signalling that it would be prepared to intervene if the situation did not improve. However, rather than reduce the scale of violence, this appeared to magnify the problem. Unhappy with the continued adherence to autonomy as a model for a solution, the KLA continued its attacks in the hope that this would provoke a heavy handed Serbian response, which in turn would force Western leaders to act decisively on behalf of the Kosovo Albanians.22 Milošević duly obliged. Mistakenly believing that NATO was bluffing, or that Russia would step in to prevent an attack, he ordered the continuation of counter-insurgency operations. In truth, though, Russia, while still refusing to authorise a Security Council resolution authorising force, had come to realise that it was otherwise powerless to stop NATO action. In early October, Moscow signalled that while it would denounce any attacks, it would not take active measures in the event of bombing.23 Rambouillet and the NATO air campaign In January 1999, Western patience finally ran out. The discovery of the bodies of 45 Albanians in the hamlet of Racak sparked

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international outrage and condemnation. Meeting in London, the Contact Group decided that the time had come to convene a formal conference to resolve the conflict raging in Kosovo. The various sides, including the KLA, were therefore summoned to a chateau in the French town of Rambouillet, on the outskirts of Paris.24 Emulating the coercive form of diplomacy that had brought an end to the conflict in Bosnia, the parties were told that they had two weeks to agree to the details of the peace plan developed by Hill, or else face the consequences.25 For Serbia this meant a military attack. For the Kosovo Albanians, it meant the loss of outside support.26 Both therefore appeared to have no option but to accept. Despite this, the discussions proved fruitless. Unfazed by this, on 23 February, international mediators unveiled a finalised set of proposals. Once again, the plan was based on autonomy. However, and crucially, this would be followed, three years later, by a major conference to, ‘determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each party’s efforts regarding the implementation of the Accords, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for additional measures.’27 This was enough to persuade the Kosovo Albanian delegation to accept the terms. On 18 March, at a ceremony in Paris, they signed the agreement. Milošević, on the other hand, rejected the proposals, ostensibly arguing that Yugoslavia could not accept the annexes to the agreement would not only allow NATO troops to enter Kosovo but would also give them a right to travel throughout the country at will.28 Therefore, and against all initial expectations, the process collapsed on 19 March without a deal. In the days that followed, a last desperate attempt was made to broker a deal. Richard Holbrooke, President Bill Clinton’s special envoy to Kosovo, travelled to Belgrade to meet with Milošević. However, despite warnings that an attack was now imminent, Milošević still refused to back down. The moment for action had come. Despite the fact that there was no UN Security Council resolution authorising force, on 24 March, just days after the withdrawal of the KVM, NATO launched Operation Allied Force, a bombing campaign targeting a range of strategic targets in Serbia. These targets not only included Yugoslav military forces in Kosovo, but also bridges and refineries.29 Although the initial belief was that

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15

Belgrade would quickly capitulate, this did not happen. Instead, the air campaign resulted in a full scale humanitarian crisis. In retaliation against the attacks, Milošević now ordered Serb forces to step up their operations against the Kosovo Albanian population. In the weeks that followed, approximately 850,000 Albanians fled Kosovo, taking refuge in neighbouring Albania and Macedonia. On 9 May, at a meeting in Germany, the leaders of the G8 initialled a seven point set of principles for the settlement of Kosovo issue.30 Importantly, the principles once again appeared to propose a solution based on autonomy, noting that the end of hostilities would lead to, ‘a political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region’.31 This provided Moscow, which had thus far been sidelined altogether, with the political cover it needed to help bring the air campaign to an end. Three weeks later, on 2 June, Victor Chernomyrdin, the envoy of the Russian Federation, accompanied Martti Ahtisaari, the president of Finland, who was representing the European Union, to Belgrade where they presented Milošević with a finalised set of principles.32 Informed that they were non-negotiable, and with reports that Moscow was now willing to accept an imposed solution if Serbia did not comply,33 Milošević had no choice but to accept the terms. The next day the decision was ratified by the Yugoslav parliament. Six days later, another agreement confirmed the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from the province and the deployment of UN civil mission and a security force – the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR) – under NATO control.34 While this sparked a tense stand-off between Moscow and the West as Russian forces took hold of Pristina airport and pushed to control a sector, thus effectively partitioning Kosovo, the Kremlin was soon forced to abandon its gambit.35 Serbia’s effective control over Kosovo was now at an end. The establishment of international administration On 10 June, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244 (1999). This formally brought the province under international control, authorising the creation of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Under paragraph 10 of

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the resolution, UNMIK was tasked with creating the conditions, ‘under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo’. In addition, paragraph 11 stated that the transitional administration would prepare the way for ‘a final settlement’. Importantly, however, the resolution gave no indication as to what the final political settlement would be. Nor did it define a time frame within which a decision would be made. And yet, even at this stage, the idea that Kosovo could be returned to its previous position as a Serbian province, as Milošević demanded,36 was quite clearly a ‘dead letter’.37 While international officials still saw the possibility to reach a deal based on some form of autonomy once the situation in the province had settled down,38 as far as the Kosovo Albanians were concerned, there was no going back on their demands for statehood. Having managed to secure NATO intervention to support their armed campaign against Serbia, they accepted that a limited period of time as an international protectorate was now going to be necessary prelude to independence. There could be no return to discussions over autonomy. Independence was now the only acceptable goal.39 By the end of the year, it appeared as though this had been accepted by the United States. Even though the State Department continued to insist that Washington did not support independence, behind the scenes it was already understood that it was, ‘clearly on the way’.40 Meanwhile, any hope that the Serbian and Albanian communities could live side-by-side were quickly quashed. As hundreds of thousands of Albanians returned, the Kosovo Serbs, as well as other smaller minorities, such as the Roma and Gorani, who were often seen as collaborators with the former regime, found themselves subjected to brutal revenge attacks. Overwhelmed by the flood of returning refugees, and busy trying to ensure the departure of Serb forces from the province, KFOR was powerless to prevent many of these incidents.41 As a result, many tens of thousands of Kosovo Serbs fled the province, taking refuge elsewhere in Serbia. Amongst those that stayed, many now congregated in enclaves, where their security could be better guaranteed by UNMIK). A particular flashpoint was Mitrovica. Straddling the Ibar River, the dividing line

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

17

between the predominantly Serbian parts of Kosovo and the Albanian dominated areas, the town became the centre of efforts by the Kosovo Serbs to forge their own separate administration with Belgrade’s support. Many saw this as a prelude to the eventual partition of the province. In the years that followed the town became a flashpoint for inter-ethnic hostility.42 Provisional self-government and ‘Standards before Status’ In October 2000, the whole question of Kosovo appeared to take on a new significance when Milošević was forced from power by an alliance of democratic opposition parties.43 His replacement as president was Vojislav Koštunica, the leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), who was widely seen to be a moderate nationalist committed to Serb rule over Kosovo. Meanwhile, following parliamentary elections in December 2000, Zoran Djindjić, the leader of the Democratic Party (DS), became prime minister of Serbia. Liberal and pro-Western by inclination, and determined to rebuild ties with the European Union and the United States, he attached little obvious significance to Kosovo. Instead, he concentrated his attention on a range of other, more pressing issues, such as economic development. At the same time, the Kosovo Albanian leaders made it clear that nothing had changed. As far as they were concerned, the new administration in Belgrade was little different from the previous regime.44 After all that had happened, there could be no discussions on autonomy. Independence remained the only acceptable outcome. Meanwhile, the threat of further conflict remained. In early 2001, violence erupted across the region as serious fighting erupted in both Macedonia and the Preševo Valley, an area of southern Serbia that was largely inhabited by ethnic Albanians.45 Against this backdrop of continuing tensions, in May 2001, and after four months of negotiations, the UN unveiled a Constitutional Framework establishing the Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo. Under the agreement, a full range of powers governing a wide range of areas, including economic policy, were set out for the assembly, the presidency, the executive and the judiciary – the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG).46 Importantly, however, the Constitutional Framework took no stand on the future status of the province, nor did it give any indication as to when such a decision would be taken. Nevertheless, while the Kosovo Albanians read the

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document as another step towards independence, UNMIK stuck firmly to the line that the document did not cede control over areas that might in any way be seen to take away the sovereign rights of Belgrade. Kosovo officially remained an integral part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as set down in Resolution 1244 – a point repeatedly stressed by Hans Haekkerup, the then Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) and head of UNMIK.47 This view appeared to be further confirmed when Haekkerup signed an agreement with Nebojša Čović, the moderate deputy prime minister of Serbia, which not only established a more formal process of consultation between UNMIK, the PISG and Belgrade, but also confirmed that UNMIK would not take any steps towards resolving Kosovo’s final status.48 Not unexpectedly, the Kosovo Albanian leadership were ‘outraged’ by the document.49 The impression that Kosovo’s path towards statehood was now on the back-burner only grew after 11 September 2001. As US attention became focused on the Middle East, in Europe there was a marked reluctance to deal with the status question as this could destabilise Serbia’s democratic transformation. Independence was simply not on the agenda.50 The message was reinforced in May 2002, when the Kosovo Assembly passed a resolution annulling a controversial border agreement that had been between Yugoslavia and Macedonia – despite calls from the EU and UN not to do so. Although the new SRSG, Michael Steiner, had been a strong advocate of NATO intervention in 1999, and was known to favour ‘conditional independence’,51 he could not let such an obvious challenge to Resolution 1244 stand. He therefore annulled the resolution and imposed a ban of Kosovo Albanian officials from attending a number of international meetings.52 The incident created the most serious rift between the UN and the Kosovo Albanians since the start of the UN administration of the province.53 However, it was also an important signal of the degree to which pressure for a status decision was now growing. In order to relieve some of the pressure, the UN had to give some indication that the decision would not be put off forever, but still create an acceptable reason for further delay. Steiner did this by unveiling what would become known as the ‘Standards before Status’ policy.54 Under this scheme progress would need to be made in eight key areas before the province could conceivable start to think about its final status. These were set out as follows: (1) the existence of effective,

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

19

representative and functioning democratic institutions; (2) enforcement of the rule of law; (3) freedom of movement; (4) sustainable returns of refugees and displaced persons, and respect for the rights of communities; (5) creation of a sound basis for a market economy; (6) fair enforcement of property rights; (7) normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and (8) transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in line with its mandate.55 Although the policy was applauded internationally, it did little to ease the pressure from the Kosovo Albanian leadership. In Pristina, talk continued of holding a referendum as a prelude to a unilateral declaration of independence. In response, Djindjić, who had been sounding an moderate tone on Kosovo up until this point – such as by accepting the PISG and supporting efforts to reintegrate Kosovo Serbs56 – now responded in uncharacteristically tough terms, suggesting that if this happened the Serbian community in Bosnia could respond in kind.57 This was followed by calls for Serbian troops to re-enter the province and for the convening of a conference to discuss Kosovo’s final status by June, at the latest. Rather than a new, hard-line policy, the statements instead seem to have been directed to the domestic audience in advance of early elections. Indeed, many expected him to continue to follow a moderate line after the polls, perhaps by pursuing some form of partition – an idea that appeared to be gaining ground internationally.58 However, we shall never know if this was really the line he intended to pursue. On 12 March, Djindjić was assassinated as he entered the Serbian Government offices in Belgrade. Apart from the devastating effect his death had on Serbian politics, it appeared to transform the course of discussions over the future of Kosovo. Neither of his successors as prime minister, Zoran Živković and Vojislav Koštunica, could, or would, take such a moderate view on the future of the province. Meanwhile, in Kosovo, four years of international administration had produced only limited results in terms of the standards. Leaving aside the fact that many of the Serbs who had left Kosovo had still not returned, concern was also voiced about continuing attacks against the province’s Serbs and other minority communities. In a report issued in April 2003, Amnesty International painted a very disturbing picture of the situation in Kosovo, noting that the minorities faced daily acts of intimidation that restricted their freedom of movement. Even those who had not faced attack expressed, ‘fear, frustration and isolation.’59 Nevertheless, there were some signs of

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improvement. One landmark was the opening, in Vienna, of direct technical discussions between Belgrade and Pristina, in October 2003.60 The following month, the Contact Group announced that a review of the standards would take place in mid-2005. If ‘sufficient’ progress had been made by then, a process to determine the final status of Kosovo could then begin.61 The announcement was welcomed by the Security Council.62 March 2004 riots Whatever improvements had been made towards improving interethnic relations were effectively negated in early 2004 when Kosovo suffered its worst fighting since 1999. On 16 March, three Albanian boys drowned in the Ibar. Although there was no evidence to support the story, within hours the media, including RTK, the national broadcaster, were reporting that they had been chased into the river by dogs belonging to Kosovo Serbs.63 It could not have come at a worse time. That same day a series of demonstrations were taking place to protest about the indictment of a number of KLA leaders for suspected war crimes committed in 1999. Thus the anger directed towards the UN was magnified and directed towards the Serbs as well. Despite the best efforts of KFOR to contain the violence, it rapidly spread across the province; aided in part by the ambivalence of local leaders. Rugova, who had forged his reputation on passive resistance, refused to condemn the violence.64 The impact of the riots was enormous. By the time the fighting was contained, on 19 March, it was estimated that almost 51,000 people had taken part in at least 33 separate incidents across the province. As a result, 19 people had been killed, 8 Serbs and 11 Albanians, and over a thousand injured. Over 550 homes had been burned, along with 27 monasteries and churches. This had left approximately 4,100 people displaced. This number included not just Kosovo Serbs, but also members of the other minorities, including the Roma.65 Naturally, the riots had an immensely negative effect on inter-communal relations. Whatever trust that may have been developing between Serbs and Albanians was severely undermined.66 The incidents also led to a breakdown in contacts between Belgrade and Pristina. In the aftermath of the violence, the technical talks between the Kosovo PISG and the Serbian Government stopped. However, the riots also marked a catastrophic blow to the standing

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of UNMIK and KFOR. For a start, after five years of work, they highlighted just how little headway had been made towards ethnic reconciliation between Serbs and Albanians. Kosovo was certainly not on the path to becoming a peaceful multiethnic democracy.67 It also had a profound impact on the relationship the two bodies had with both communities. The Kosovo Serbs, and the other minorities, had lost whatever trust they had in the UN to protect them.68 Meanwhile, reports of peacekeepers failing to prevent attacks, or fleeing in the face of violence, coupled with reports that the Kosovo Police Service had participated in incidents, had fatally undermined the authority of the UN in the eyes of the Kosovo Albanians. As a report by Human Rights Watch noted several months later, ‘The international community has lost tremendous ground in Kosovo as a result of the March violence: ethnic Albanian extremists now know that they can effectively challenge the international security structures, having demolished the notion of KFOR and UNMIK invincibility.’69 Matters were not helped by the fact that many of those involved in the attacks were never brought to justice or were given unduly light sentences.70 Preparing the ground for status talks The realisation that the international community in Kosovo was unable to stop the fighting transformed the whole debate over status. It was now understood that the question of Kosovo’s future could not be put off indefinitely. A decision would be needed sooner rather than later. As observers noted, ‘Violence had once again advanced the independence agenda as nothing else in the previous five years had.’71 This was seemingly proven just months later when Kai Eide, a senior Norwegian diplomat, delivered a political assessment of the situation in Kosovo to the UN Secretary-General.72 Noting the growing levels of frustration and dissatisfaction, in part caused by a 60–70 per cent unemployment rate, Eide emphasised that it was now necessary to take a longer perspective on Kosovo’s future status. To this end, despite the fact that the UN had unveiled a compressive 117-page Standards Implementation Plan just two weeks after the riots,73 the standards before status policy needed to be replaced by a ‘priority based standards policy’. Rather than insist on improvements across the board as a pre-requisite for status talks, an ‘unrealistic and unachievable goal’, attention should instead be focused on Kosovo’s most urgent needs, including those areas relating to a future status

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process. Likewise, he concluded that UNMIK was no longer the appropriate body to run Kosovo’s affairs. Instead, and assuming that any eventual status decision would see Pristina run its own affairs, it was now time for the European Union to take greater responsibility in the province.74 As two former UNMIK officials later explained, the riots had, ‘produced a paradigm shift that some might describe as accepting reality and others as giving up.’75 Although Belgrade refused to accept that the time was right for status discussions,76 it nevertheless recognised the direction things were taking. Soon after the riots, the Serbian Government unveiled its proposals for the future of Kosovo.77 In essence, it proposed that the ethnic Albanians, who were openly recognised as the majority in the province, be granted an extremely high level of self rule to the extent that what was being offered was in fact, ‘more than autonomy, but less than independence’. At the same time, it also called for the Kosovo Serbs and the province’s other communities to be granted a high degree of self-governance – in other words, as the document explained, they should be given a degree of, ‘autonomy within autonomy’. As one Serbian official explained, the end result would resemble Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb entity. However, the proposals received short shrift in Pristina. As one leader explained, Kosovo had been given autonomy under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, but this had later been rescinded. It would not happen again. ‘Independence is the only solution for Kosovo’.78 As 2005 arrived, attention was firmly fixed on the standards review. By now a number of factors seemed to make it all but certain that a decision would be taken to start status talks. Although there had been no more serious incidents of violence since the riots the previous year, the threat of further attacks was ever present. More worryingly, there was an increasing fear that in the future the violence might now be directed towards UNMIK and KFOR. Whereas once the Serbs had been viewed as the occupying power, many Kosovo Albanians, such as ‘Self-Determination’ (Vetëvendosje), a pro-independence protest movement, were now starting to view the international presence as a form of colonial occupation. This was graphically highlighted in March 2005 when Ramush Haradinaj, the prime minister, was forced to step down following his indictment on war crimes charges by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),79 which in turn led to several bomb attacks on UNMIK property. Meanwhile, patience was running out in Washington. With pressing

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concerns elsewhere, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States, which had long been keen to drawdown its presence in the Balkans and hand over to the European Union, was now growing increasingly impatient with the situation.80 The problem, however, was that while the European Union was willing to take a greater role in Kosovo,81 without a clear status any EU presence ran the risk of being seen as little more than a replacement for UNMIK, with all the dangers that this would entail. It therefore came as little surprise when, on 23 May, Annan announced in his latest report on Kosovo that he had decided to appoint a special envoy to conduct a full review of the progress made towards the implementation of the standards.82 After receiving the endorsement to the Security Council for the review, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, again turned to Eide to carry out the task. Announcing the decision, the UN explained that the review would be carried out in accordance with Resolution 1244 and other relevant statements of the Security Council in order to assess the current situation on the ground and the conditions for possible next steps in the process. Importantly, the statement emphasised that the report would not just assess the formal conditions that had been laid down for launching the future status process, it would also take into account the political realities on the ground.83 Although Annan was quick to point out that the outcome of the review was not a foregone conclusion, few believed this. The prospect of violence if a negative report was produced meant that most observers believed that the start of formal status talks was now almost certain.84 And so it was the case. On 4 October, Eide presented his review to the Secretary-General.85 The report started by noting that the record of implementing the standards had thus far been ‘uneven’. Although progress had been made in some areas, with some institutions having developed significantly, in many others fields, such as the justice system, the record was poor. The province was still subject to rampant corruption and organised crime. As for efforts to build a multiethnic society, the outlook was, ‘particularly grim’. The number of refugees returning to their homes had virtually come to a halt. Indeed, Serbs were continuing to leave the province. However, on the key question of status, he was absolutely clear. Recognising that there would never be a ‘good’ moment to address the issue, his overall assessment was that the time had come to start the process. In doing so, though, several key points should be kept in mind. First of all, any process

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would need to bring the parties together and keep them together. Secondly, given that the influence of the UN in the province was diminishing, regional organisations, and in particular the European Union, were important and powerful actors. This would have to play, ‘the most prominent role in Kosovo’. To this extent the EU should increase its activities in the province, and lay out a clear road map for the future integration of Kosovo and Serbia into European-Atlantic institutions. In conclusion, he issued a clear word of warning: Determining the future status of Kosovo will in itself be a demanding challenge. The international community must do the utmost to ensure that, whatever the eventual status, it does not become a failed status. Entering the future status process does not mean entering the last stage, but the next stage of the international presence.86 Annan immediately welcomed the report’s findings. Sending the report to the President of the Security Council, he fully endorsed the call for status talks.87 The Kosovo Albanians were jubilant at the news, leaving little doubt as to where they expected the process to lead. Speaking to the press, Rugova, who was by this point seriously ill, again insisted that independence would be the only basis for talks.88 In contrast, Belgrade was surprised and disappointed by the recommendations. Meeting with Søren Jessen-Petersen, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative, Koštunica emphasised that the review had quite clearly demonstrated that the agreed preconditions for final talks – the full implementation of UN standards – had not been met.89 However, London and Washington were adamant that the prevailing situation was no longer sustainable. It was time to decide Kosovo’s final status.90

2 DIRECT DISCUSSIONS

On 24 October 2005, the United Nations Security Council met to discuss Eide’s report.1 Opening the session, Eide announced that while there was no ideal time to start talks, especially as the situation on the ground remained ‘grim’, it was now clear that a formal status process was nevertheless needed. In making this assessment, he also took the opportunity to present the Council with some thoughts on the main factors that needed to be taken into consideration in the period ahead and offered some ideas as to how the talks should be conducted. For a start, he noted that the negotiations would have to be a different from the peace processes that had been held elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. As he explained, this was due to the fact that, ‘the negotiations concern a territory that is still a part of a sovereign State but is administered by the United Nations through provisional self-governing institutions.’ Also, despite years of administration, there was very little to build on in terms of plans and preparations. At the same time, while every effort needed to be made to bring the parties together and keep them together throughout the status process, and that the discussions could not be rushed, the talks could not be allowed to drag on indefinitely. Lastly, he stressed that the other states of the region, as well as supporting the process, should be kept fully informed about its development and be ‘reassured’ about the way in which it was being conducted. The next to speak was Søren Jessen-Petersen, the UN SecretaryGeneral’s Special Representative. He agreed with Eide’s assessment. After more than six years of UN involvement in Kosovo it was time for the province to ‘build a peaceful and prosperous future’. He

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nevertheless recognised that more work needed to be done to prepare Kosovo for the future and insisted that UNMIK would continue to focus on a number of key areas in the months ahead. The third speaker was Koštunica. Over the course of a lengthy address, the Serbian prime minister reiterated that Belgrade did not feel that the time was right for a decision on Kosovo’s status. Noting the difficult conditions faced by the Serbs and other minorities in the province, he also drew attention to the fact that 60 per cent of Kosovo’s Serbian community were now living as internally displaced persons in Central Serbia. Having said this, if the Council did decide that discussions should take place, the talks should be conducted in the form of direct negotiations between the two sides. They must also conform to established principles of international law. In accordance with the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, and adhering to the previous UN resolutions passed on Kosovo, including 1160, 1168 and 1244, he insisted that Security Council must protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of his country. Moreover, in line with the plan agreed by the G8 in May 1999, the Serbian Government would pursue a settlement based on viable autonomy. As expected, following a short adjournment to discuss the issue further the Council endorsed the call for the start of status talks. In a joint statement, the members welcomed Eide’s report and agreed that, despite the shortcomings with regard to the standards, the time had indeed come to start a process to define the future status of Kosovo, as envisaged under Resolution 1244, and reaffirmed that the objective of such talks should be a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo that would reinforce regional stability. Authorising the appointment of a special representative, and welcoming the continued involvement of the six-member Contact Group, the Council also called for regular updates on developments. Ahtisaari appointed as UN Envoy Having secured a green light from the Security Council for status talks, Annan soon announced that he had nominated Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of Finland, for the post of UN Envoy for Kosovo.2 On paper, he appeared an ideal choice. Quite apart from his knowledge of the Balkans, and his role in brokering the agreement that ended the 78-day NATO campaign against Serbia in 1999, he also had decades of experience as a peacemaker. In addition to his work as

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UN Special Representative in Namibia, he had also played a role in the Northern Ireland peace accords and, more recently, had managed to bring an end to a decades-long conflict in the Indonesian province of Aceh.3 However, the choice was not entirely without controversy. In Serbia, concern was expressed about his relationship with the International Crisis Group, a Brussels based lobby group that actively supported Kosovo’s independence.4 Despite this, Belgrade chose not to try to block the appointment. Two days later after the announcement, the Contact Group met in Washington. There they drew up a ten point set of principles that would guide the future talks. First and foremost, it was decided that any final settlement should be fully compatible with the principles of democracy, human rights and international law. Moreover, it should contribute to regional stability, to Kosovo’s European perspective and the entire region’s integration into European-Atlantic institutions. The Group also decided that any decision should result in the creation of a sustainable multi-ethnic society that would enshrine the rights of all citizens, allow for the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, ensure the participation of all communities in national and local government, and protect cultural and religious heritage. In addition, the Contact Group also laid down certain conditions shaping any solution. For a start, there could not be any return to the situation as existed prior to March 1999, nor could there be changes to the current territory of Kosovo. This ruled out the partition of the province or its union with any country or part of a country. Also, the territorial integrity and internal stability of neighbouring countries would have to be fully respected. Likewise, any solution that was unilateral in nature, or resulted from the use of force, would be unacceptable.5 With the basic underlying principles of the discussions now in place, the president of the Security Council wrote to Annan confirming Ahtisaari’s appointment as Special Envoy.6 He began work almost immediately, declaring his intention to visit Kosovo and Belgrade as soon as possible. At the same time, it was also announced that a formal administrative and support mission – the Office for the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK) – would be established in Vienna.7 This flurry of activity acted as a catalyst for both sides to lay out their respective positions. On 11 November, the Kosovo Assembly passed a resolution stating is strong belief that, ‘a stable result would come out of the negotiating process reflecting the aspirations and the

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free will of the Kosovo citizens for an independent, democratic and European state.’8 Days later, on 15 November, the Serbian Government followed suit by presenting the Parliament with a ten point plan asserting Kosovo’s place as ‘inalienable part’ of Serbian territory and rejecting independence as a possible solution.9 Given these fundamentally contradictory positions, it came as little surprise that Ahtisaari’s first visit to the region at the end of November simply served to confirm the depth of division between the two sides. Arriving in Pristina, Ibrahim Rugova, who was at that stage desperately ill, presented him with the resolution demanding independence and told him that, as far as the Kosovo Albanians were concerned, it was, ‘time to wrap up this business’.10 From there he travelled to Belgrade, where he received the Serbian plan for autonomy and was told by Koštunica that Serbia would not accept statehood for the province.11 Neither had any effect. Ahtisaari had already made up his mind about the direction the discussions would take. In his meetings with both Koštunica and Boris Tadić, the Serbian President, the UN Envoy stated that as far as he was concerned the process would lead to independence for Kosovo.12 Although the two sides remained at odds over the final status of Kosovo, Ahtisaari nevertheless stressed that the trip had been useful. Quite apart from the fact that he had been able to raise a number of core issues, such as decentralisation, refugee returns and the protection of cultural and religious heritage, the discussions had also given him an opportunity to stress to the two sides that they were expected to adopt a constructive approach to the forthcoming negotiations. In the case of the Kosovo Albanians, this meant that further steps were needed to improve standards. Likewise, the Serbian Government not only needed to engage in the process, but also encourage the Kosovo Serbs to do so as well. As for the all important question of when direct talks would start, he announced his intention to bring the sides together at some point early in the New Year. 13 Emerging international divisions At this point the first differences appeared to emerge between the members of the Contact Group over the final outcome of the process. Although the Group had agreed on a set of guidelines for the talks that the UN team believed were aimed at independence,14 Russia now appeared to signal a change in its position. After a meeting with

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Serbian officials in Belgrade, which followed the Contact Group meeting, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, stated that Moscow supported Belgrade’s call for less than independence but more than autonomy and insisted that a solution must be the result of direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina. It could not be imposed.15 Meanwhile, the United States now appeared to be more openly sympathetic towards Albanian demands for independence. As Nicholas Burns, the US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, explained to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, while Washington would not support a specific result at this stage, it believed that the final outcome should, ‘respect the basic facts of Kosovo. Today 90 percent of the people are ethnic Albanians who were treated cruelly, even viciously, by the government of Slobodan Milošević. They deserve to live in security and peace.’16 The emerging divisions between Washington and Moscow was also highlighted at a meeting of the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), held in Ljubljana, on 5–6 December when an attempts to reach a joint position on Kosovo failed following disagreements over a reference to the Helsinki Final Act in the communiqué. According to Vuk Drašković, the Serbian foreign minister, who was attending the meeting, some members objected to including the Act, viewing it a ‘barrier’ to Kosovo independence.17 This was seemingly confirmed by the Russian delegation, which issued a statement at the end of the meeting criticising the fact that some countries had refused to accept the reference.18 While not named directly, it was widely assumed that the US was one of the states involved, not least of all because Burns had used the meeting to once again stress that any decision on Kosovo must respect the views of the Albanian majority in the province.19 Despite these apparent differences, the general feeling was that the process was still on course. Behind the scenes, it was rumoured Russia and the United States had in fact already agreed to some form of ‘conditional independence’.20 This view was strengthened at the end of December when Tadić met with his French counterpart, Jacques Chirac, who echoed Ahtisaari’s words and told him that Kosovo would become independent – thus becoming the first major world leader to do so. Returning to Belgrade, Tadić sounded distinctly pessimistic about the future. While Serbia should not give up its fight to hold on to the province, it was nevertheless going to be very difficult for it to protect its legitimate interests in Kosovo. As he

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explained, ‘Unfortunately, the decision will not be made on the basis of law only, but it will also be based on reality and politics, but we have to fight for our interests till the very last moment.’21 Preparing for direct talks As 2006 began, the preparations for direct talks continued. By now the UN team had held further discussions in Belgrade and Pristina.22 Although these were useful inasmuch as they not only helped to clarify the range of matters that needed to be discussed,23 it was already obvious that the face-to-face talks were extremely unlikely to produce any major breakthroughs. In an interview with a Serbian newspaper, Bajram Kosumi, the prime minister of Kosovo, announced that he was unwilling to negotiate on the question of status. Likewise, he appeared to give little ground on the question of granting the Kosovo Serbs greater autonomy. Reflecting a widespread worry that was already emerging that Serbia would try to divide Kosovo, he also made it clear that he would reject any attempt to partition the province under the guise of decentralisation.24 Undeterred, Ahtisaari met with the Contact Group, on 16 January, and announced that the first round of direct talks would take place in Vienna on 25 January. He also presented them with a document spelling out some private messages that the members of the Contact Group should deliver to the parties. In addition to calling on both sides to ‘participate constructively’ in the talks, and calling on the Kosovo leadership to accelerate standards implementation, he also asked that representatives of the Contact Group inform the Serbian Government that, ‘the unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo’s authority in 1989, and the ensuing tragic events resulting in the international administration of Kosovo have led to a situation in which a return of Kosovo to Belgrade’s rule is not a viable option.’25 The death of Ibrahim Rugova just days later forced the UN team to postpone the talks until after a new president could be elected by the Assembly. The lull in the process provided another opportunity for the Contact Group to meet. Gathering in London on 31 January, the high-level meeting not only included the foreign ministers of the six countries, it was also attended by Ahtisaari, Javier Solana, the European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Olli Rehn, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NATO Secretary-General. Speaking

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just days before the meeting, Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, had insisted that any decision on Kosovo must be seen as a universally applicable precedent. Moscow would not accept a system whereby certain rules applied in some cases, but not in others.26 Although this demand was unacceptable to the others, it still appeared as though Russia, for all its recent statements, was still willing to accept independence. This appeared to be confirmed when the Group agreed on an eight-point vision for the status talks. In addition to emphasising the importance of multi-ethnicity, and a process of decentralisation, they also reiterated the guiding principles set out in their November statement. Importantly, however, the statement also stressed that any attempt to reach a settlement should take into account, ‘the character of the Kosovo problem, shaped by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and consequent conflicts, ethnic cleansing and the events of 1999, and the extended period of international administration under UNSCR 1244.’ It also noted that Belgrade should, ‘bear in mind that the settlement needs, inter alia, to be acceptable to the people of Kosovo.’27 As far as Britain was concerned, the meaning of this was obvious. During a trip to Pristina a week later, John Sawers, the Political Director of the Foreign Office, explicitly stated that independence was the likely outcome of the status talks.28 Unsurprisingly, the comment caused uproar amongst the Kosovo Serbs, who held a peaceful rally to demonstrate against the statement. Likewise, in Belgrade, there was considerable anger. Responding to the statement, Sanda RaškovićIvić, the head of the Serbian Government’s Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija, suggested that if this was the view of the Contact group then Serbia should reconsider its participation in the talks.29 This quickly forced the other members of the Group to distance themselves from the British remarks. The German Ambassador in Belgrade, while refusing to comment directly on the statement, noted that the position of the Contact Group had been made clear in London: UN Security Council Resolution 1244 remained the basis for a final agreement on the future of the province. Likewise, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, Alexander Alexeyev, categorically rejected any claims that a final outcome had already been decided, arguing that there would be no point to talks if a decision had already been reached. Even the US Ambassador, Michael Polt, insisted that the outcome had not been decided. All options remained on the table.30

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On 14 February, with just days to go before the start of the first round of direct talks, the Security Council convened to discuss the latest UN report on Kosovo.31 By now the differences between the members of the permanent members of the Council – four of which were also on the Contact Group – were growing ever more apparent, both in terms of the process and the outcome of the status talks. Insisting that the discussions should be open ended and could not be imposed, the Russian representative emphasised that any agreement must be in accordance with international legal norms, including Resolution 1244, and be endorsed by a Security Council resolution. Importantly, Moscow was adamant that the situation in Kosovo could not be regarded as ‘unique’. Any formula used to resolve Kosovo would have to have an affect on other conflicts. While less forceful, the Chinese representative also took a legalistic approach, arguing that Serbia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty was ‘paramount’ in the status talks. On the other hand, the British, French and American representatives all took a very different view. As well as rejecting the argument that Kosovo must be seen as a precedent, they insisted that a decision needed to be reached that year and that the aspirations of 90 per cent of the population of Kosovo could not be disregarded. This was quite clearly a coded statement in favour of independence. However, the most significant element of the debate, and the one that received the most press attention afterwards, was a comment by Tadić suggesting that the Serbian Government might eventually be willing to accept independence after a prolonged period of autonomy. Highlighting the Serbian Government’s proposals for autonomy, he noted that this would not only provide a lasting settlement of the conflict without changing borders, it would also give the Albanian and Serbian communities ‘very wide’ political autonomy, ensuring that they would be totally self-governing in most everyday matters. More to the point, the plan he suggested that the agreement could be renegotiated at some point, perhaps after a period of twenty years. Even if this did hold out the prospect of independence, the idea was immediately rejected by Pristina, which insisted on immediate statehood.32 Ahtisaari also appeared to have little time for the idea. Indeed, as he had already made clear to Belgrade, he had made up his mind that that the final result of the process would have to be some form of independence. And while he did not publicly state this, he offered various clues that this was the case. For example, in an

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interview with a German magazine, he referred to the recent Contact Group statement and argued that any final decision must reflect the will of the majority.33 Direct talks begin On 20 February 2006, direct talks finally got underway between the two sides at the Palais Daun-Kinsky in Vienna. Despite the considerable media attention, UN officials played things down, stressing that the status question would not be discussed at this stage. Instead, the first item on the agenda was decentralisation. As they explained, this was for two reasons. First of all, if the two sides could reach some sort of agreement on an indirect issue, it might help to generate goodwill for the later, more difficult, talks on status. Secondly, as noted by Albert Rohan, the deputy UN Envoy, who chaired the meeting, while the question of decentralisation might not seem significant to the outside world, it would have a profound effect on the people of Kosovo.34 However, while reports emerged that the atmosphere at the discussions was good, and some progress had been made, as expected no major breakthroughs occurred. Soon afterwards, Ahtisaari flew to Belgrade for further talks with Serbian leaders. At this stage the Serbian position was weak. Quite apart from the general concern about the consequences of trying to deny the Kosovo Albanians independence, the Serbian position was undermined by several other factors. The most important of these was Belgrade’s failure to hand over General Ratko Mladić, who was wanted for trial at the ICTY in The Hague for suspected war crimes during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Fed up with constant Serb stalling on the issue, the European Union had just given the Serbian Government a month to extradite him or face the suspension of the next round of talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which were due to start in April. If this were to happen, it would provide Pristina a golden opportunity to argue that Serbia had not turned its back on its nationalist past, as its leaders claimed.35 However, efforts to encourage the general to give himself up had so far failed. Matters were not helped by the death of Milošević in his prison cell at The Hague, on 11 March, under what many in Serbia saw as suspicious circumstances.36 A second factor affecting Serbia’s position was Montenegro. In 2003, what remained of Yugoslavia had been reconstituted as a union

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between Serbia and Montenegro. At the time, both states had been granted a right to hold a referendum on full independence after a three year period. On the same day as the EU issued its warning over Mladić, the Montenegrin Government announced that it would hold a vote on the issue on 21 May. If it did vote to separate, this would also strengthen Kosovo’s case for independence. As far as many observers were concerned, if the Montenegrins – who traditionally had ethnic, religious and cultural links with Serbia – wished to become independent, then it was wholly unrealistic to expect the Kosovo Albanians to remain a part of Serbia.37 Meanwhile, significant developments were also taking place in Pristina. On 1 March, Kosumi resigned as prime minister following his failure to unite the disparate political factions in the province.38 In his place, Fatmir Sejdiu, who had now been appointed president following the death of Rugova,39 nominated Agim Çeku, the commander of the Kosovo Protection Corps, to the premiership. Although Çeku had no political experience, he had considerable respect amongst Kosovo Albanians. Apart from his current role as head of the KPC, he had also been the KLA’s chief of staff in 1998– 99. But while the nomination may have been welcomed in Pristina, it was greeted with horror in Belgrade and by the Kosovo Serbs. Leaving aside his role in the KLA, he was wanted in Serbia on suspicion of having committed war crimes during his service as a senior officer in the Croatian army in the mid-1990s. However, Jessen-Petersen refused to block his nomination. Accepting that the Serbs had their concerns, he believed that they would eventually agree with the decision.40 Contrary to expectations, Çeku certainly appeared keen to stress his commitment to multi-ethnic state. Speaking in fluent Serbo-Croat at his swearing in ceremony, he assured the Kosovo Serbs of their future in an independent Kosovo. In the meantime, British and American efforts to build support for statehood appeared to be gaining ground. Speaking to the BBC, Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary, argued that independence was, ‘almost inevitable’.41 Reports also emerged that Washington had made a major breakthrough on Kosovo. According to US officials, during a meeting in Washington with Lavrov, Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, had managed to persuade the Russian foreign minister that Kosovo would not set a precedent for other territories, such as Chechnya. Similarly, China had been assured that Kosovo could not be seen as laying the ground for an independent Tibet. As a

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result, Moscow and Beijing had apparently confirmed that they would not block a Security Council vote granting Kosovo independence. Instead, they would abstain.42 Direct talks continue After a break of almost a month, the second round of direct talks began, in Vienna, on 17 March. Once again, discussions were focused on decentralisation. However, unlike the previous session, which had passed off relatively smoothly, the new round was marred by tensions. This arose after the Serbian side complained that the Unity Team – as the Kosovo Albanian negotiators were collectively known – was being led by Hashim Thaçi, the former head of the KLA. As they saw it, there was no place at the negotiations for a man convicted in 1997 of terrorism, and who was now wanted by Serbian authorities for questioning about war crimes. The UN noted the objection, but refused to press for his removal. After this inauspicious start, matters did not improve during the discussions. While Belgrade still insisted on strong self-government in Serbian areas, Pristina remained certain that this was a cover for eventual partition.43 Realising that any deal on eventual independence would have to include some degree of autonomy for the Kosovo Serbs, considerable pressure was now brought to bear on the Kosovo Albanians. During his first visit to Brussels, Çeku was told by EU and NATO officials that he needed to be flexible on the question of decentralisation.44 Likewise, Rohan also stressed the importance of compromise when he visited the region a few days later. Speaking in Pristina, he insisted that discussions on local governance were not a prelude to division, reiterating that this had in fact been ruled out by the Contact Group.45 This was also emphasised in a paper presented to the two sides by the deputy UN Envoy.46 As a result of all of this, there was some optimism that the third round of talks, held on 3 April, might now produce a breakthrough. However, such hopes were short lived. Once again, the session started on a sour note as the Serbian Government criticised Rohan for failing to present his ideas to the Kosovo Serbs, who had only learned about the proposals from the media.47 Likewise, the talks themselves failed to make any headway. Despite calls for flexibility, both sides stuck to their earlier positions. Just as the Serbian delegation continued to press for the creation of a Serb entity in the province, the Albanian

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team insisted that this was impossible. Whatever decentralisation was put in place must apply equally to all municipalities. There could not be special rules put in place for Serbian areas.48 Soon afterwards, the members of the Contact Group met in Athens for further discussions – where they were joined by officials from the EU, UN, NATO and the OSCE – before travelling to Belgrade and Pristina for discussions. This appeared to yield results. The Kosovo Assembly passed a resolution that encouraging greater participation by the minority communities in the organs of self-government. At the same time, Sejdiu announced that the Kosovo Albanian team had agreed to the formation of two separate communities within a single municipality in the divided northern town of Mitrovica.49 Though falling far short of Serb, and international, demands, it was nevertheless seen as some progress – a point Ahtisaari made when he met with members of the Contact Group in Vienna a few weeks later. Even so, the UN Envoy was forced to concede that the positions of the parties still remained far apart. This was proven when the talks resumed, on 4 May, to discuss municipal boundaries. Quite apart from holding widely divergent views on the number of municipalities that should be established, differences also surfaced over Mitrovica. While Pristina was willing to allow two linked municipalities within the city, overseen for three years by an international authority, Belgrade wanted the Serbian municipality in the north to unite with a neighbouring municipality. As a result, the UN team now decided to leave the issue of decentralisation to one side in future direct discussions; pursuing it instead through shuttle talks.50 By this point the talks had been running for almost three months, and still the sides remained at odds with one another. This led to considerable frustration and tension in the two camps. As far as the Unity Team was concerned, their willingness to negotiate on the municipalities had won them plaudits and that most observers blamed Belgrade for the lack of progress.51 The Serbian Government vehemently denied this, arguing that Pristina was obstructing the talks as it was only willing to discuss independence as a final status. Koštunica was also extremely critical of the way in which the UN team was handling the discussions.52 To make matters even more difficult, tensions also surfaced between Russia and the United States after Frank Wisner, the US envoy for Kosovo, suggested that talks could be completed by the end of the year. In response, Lavrov insisted that the negotiations could

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not be subject to deadlines.53 Certainly, it seemd that concluding the discussions before the end of December might be difficult – a point that even Ahtisaari was by now willing to acknowledge.54 Growing discontent in Serbia The start of the fifth round of discussions, on 23 May, once again saw Serbia under a cloud. In addition to the decision by the EU to suspend the discussions over the SAA, two days earlier Montenegro had narrowly voted for independence – thereby emphasising just how unrealistic and illogical it was to try to keep Kosovo and Serbia together.55 Despite this, the talks, which focused on religious and cultural issues, proved to be the most successful thus far. Certainly the UN was pleased with the way it went. The two sides reached an agreement in principle on the protection of religious and cultural monument, which would become protected zones and would be guarded by international forces for several years. However, while it was ‘far-reaching’, the agreement was certainly not comprehensive. There were still a number of ‘conceptual differences’ between the two sides, such as questions relating to the restitution of Church property. While the Serbian delegation wished to address this matter as part of the talks on cultural issues, the Albanian delegation insisted that the matter was essentially economic in nature, and so should be discussed in the next round of talks.56 On 31 May, for the sixth round of negotiations. As the purpose of the meeting was to discuss economic and financial issued, the meeting also included a number of experts from the European Union, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US Treasury. However, in contrast to the previous round, it quickly became clear that no progress would be made on this issue. The Serbian Government, which continued to claim control over a large number of enterprises, including factories, mines and power plants, argued that the privatisation of many of these assets by international administrators since 1999 had been illegal. It was especially aggrieved as it was still paying the debts of these firms.57 Another area of disagreement between the sides was over the apportionment of the several billions dollars of foreign debt on Kosovo. Matters were not helped by the fact that the Kosovo Albanians were also demanding reparations from the Serbian Government. By now, Serbia was growing increasingly unhappy at the way the

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discussions were being conducted. In particular, it was concerned at the way the talks seemed to be aimed at independence. To this end, Belgrade sent a letter to the six members of the Contact Group calling for an immediate discussion on question of status and demanding that other issues be left to one side until this matter had been decided.58 Responding to the letter, Rohan criticised the Serbian Government for its ‘unrealistic positions’, arguing that the letter was little more than a ‘tactical move’ by Belgrade to divert attention away from the fact that the lack of progress was largely a result of its own unwillingness to compromise. He also reiterated that any decision on the agenda and the pace of talks was solely in the hands of the UN Special Envoy.59 Relations between Serbia and the UN were not made any easier by the fact that Jessen-Petersen, who had just announced his decision to step down as SRSG, told a local newspaper that he believed that Kosovo would gain full independence by the end of the year.60 Indeed, the depth of antipathy was emphasised when the Security Council convened on 20 June to discuss the latest quarterly report on Kosovo.61 At the outset, there was an acrimonious exchange between Jessen-Petersen and Rašković-Ivić. Notably, though, the meeting did not lead to a confrontation between the permanent members over the status process. Although the Russian representative insisted that the standards must be met before a final decision was taken, the American representatives called on the sides to be ‘realistic’ about the outcome. However, the Serbian Government remained steadfast in its opposition to any effort to grant Kosovo statehood. Meeting with Tony Blair in London, Koštunica rejected any suggestion that Kosovo should be given independence. Arguing that this would undermine the very principles of international law, he announced that if this were to happen the Serbian Parliament would declare such a move null and void – even though this would, ‘place Serbia in an exceptionally difficult position, both in terms of the internal situation and relations with the surrounding area, but also regarding the widest international context’. He also stated that Serbia would not be willing to give up Kosovo even if this meant that it could lose the chance for EU membership.62 The next day, 28 June, Koštunica repeated the comments. This time, though, he was speaking in Kosovo, where he was attending a service to commemorate the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje. Speaking to the gathered crowds, he stressed that while Serbia was willing to reach a

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compromise over the province, it would never accept independence: ‘Kosovo has been and will always remain part of Serbia.’63 Emerging international differences Two days later, on 30 June, the Contact Group met in Brussels. Once again, they were again joined by officials from NATO and the EU. Despite receiving a briefing from Ahtisaari, the main focus of discussion was in fact the rising tensions in northern Kosovo.64 In recent weeks there had been several serious attacks on members on the Serbian community, which had led to an announcement by the Kosovo Serbs that they intended to form a ‘Civil Defence Service’, an unarmed force made up of former soldiers to defend against ‘extremist violence’. As far as Pristina was concerned, this was yet another step towards partition.65 The meeting also exposed strong differences within the Contact Group. The United States firmly believed, as did the UN, that the instability was being caused by the lack of clarity on status and called for the talks to be wrapped up before the end of the year.66 Moscow disagreed. While the Russian Government also wanted to see the discussions concluded soon, there was still a lot to be covered. Moreover, given the sensitive political situation in Serbia, no timetable should be imposed. As for the argument that the process should be concluded simply because of the danger of more violence, this was rejected as little more than blackmail.67 In the meantime, tensions between the UN team and the Serbian Government continued to grow. Following meetings with the communities in Kosovo, Rohan had been due to travel to Belgrade. However this was cancelled in a storm of protest when it emerged that while he had arranged to see Tadić, he had not planned to meet Koštunica. This led to accusations that the UN team was deliberately trying to bypass the Serbian prime minister. In an interview published on 10 July in a Serbian newspaper, Alexander Simić, a member of the Serb negotiating team, and a close advisor to Koštunica, heavily criticised the UN team for their handling of the talks so far. As far as he was concerned, the discussions so far had been, ‘poorly prepared, poorly conducted, the rules were not known, there are no minutes, it was not known when the next meeting would be held, what the obligations were.’ Indeed, as far as the Serbian Government was concerned, the talks had been a complete failure.68 Meanwhile, during

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a visit to Washington, Koštunica again stressed that Serbia would not back down from its opposition to independence. Meeting with Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, he insisted that statehood was, ‘out of the question’.69 On 13 July, less than a month after its latest debate on UNMIK, the Security Council met in closed session to receive an interim report from Ahtisaari on the progress made in the status talks.70 Although no formal account of the meeting was published, reports indicated that it had followed a fairly predictable line. After the UN Envoy’s presentation, Koštunica once again insisted that his government would reject any moves to change Serbia’s borders by force.71 Significantly, though, Russia’s position now appeared to be hardening. Speaking to reporters at the end of the meeting, Vitaly Churkin, the Russian representative, not only maintained that it was vital to reach a negotiated solution between the two sides, he also insisted that the international community had no, ‘legal, political or moral grounds to force Serbia into a solution’.72 Despite the warning from Churkin, Ahtisaari nevertheless argued that while it was still too early to begin talking about the end of the process, it was time for the status talks to move forward. He therefore announced his intention to call the first high-level meeting between the two sides since 1999. The decision was widely welcomed. Following a briefing from Ahtisaari a few days later, EU ministers backed the initiative.73 Likewise, G8 leaders, including Putin, also noted their ongoing support for Ahtisaari’s efforts during their meeting in St Petersburg.74 As for the two sides, Pristina quickly confirmed its participation in the talks. It also signalled that it was now willing to increase the number of Serbian municipalities. However, Kosovo Albanian leaders also stressed that there could be no concessions on the key question of statehood. The team would go to Vienna to restate that independence was the only acceptable outcome.75 In contrast, Belgrade was more cautious, writing to the UN Envoy for further information about the format, structure and conditions of the talks.76 For his part, Ahtisaari appeared keen to dampen expectations that any progress would occur. As he explained, it was really a first chance for the two sides to present their positions directly to one another. In his view, a breakthrough should not be expected until after the next Security Council meeting, which would take place in September.77 In the meantime, a further round of direct talks, held on 18–19 July, once

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again failed to produce any significant progress on either decentralisation or the protection of cultural heritage.78 High level discussions and further talks On 24 July, Tadić, Koštunica, Çeku and Sejdiu gathered in Vienna for their first formal meeting. Although the atmosphere was described by one UN official as ‘business like’, it was clear that the both sides were sensitive about being seen to be too relaxed or accommodating. Indeed, due to delays in receiving information about the process, and Koštunica’s concerns about the presence of Çeku at the talks, the Serbian side had only agreed to participate three days prior to the meeting.79 As expected, during the day-long meeting talks the two sides stuck rigidly to their respective positions. Just as Sejdiu insisted that independence was the beginning and the end of the Kosovo Albanian position, Koštunica repeated that Serbia would not give up 15 per cent of its territory, especially given the historical and cultural significance of the province to Serbia. Tadić agreed. As he explained in a press conference afterwards, ‘We are flexible and we are for a compromise, but the compromise does not include independence.’80 Despite the deadlock, Ahtisaari was unfazed; again insisting that the meeting was simply meant to provide an opportunity for the two sides to air their positions.81 The Contact Group was also satisfied with the outcome, issuing a statement thanking Ahtisaari and his team for their leadership and welcoming the meeting as a vital next step towards the development of a status proposal. They also praised the parties for meeting directly and noted that the members now looked forward to, ‘constructive engagement, flexibility and willingness on both sides to reach realistic compromise-based solutions.’82 However, the situation in Kosovo remained unstable. Just days later, the Group issued a further ten-point statement calling for Belgrade and Pristina to take ‘immediate steps’ to reduce tensions in the region, and reiterated the need for a settlement that would create ‘a peaceful, democratic and multi-ethnic society’ and ensure the safety and security of all citizens.83 Despite Serbian requests for a postponement, technical discussions resumed, on 7–8 August, with further talks on decentralisation and the new subject of minority rights.84 As usual, little progress was made on the first area. While the Kosovo Serbs argued the case for control over education, health care, security and freedom of movement, Pristina saw this as an attempt to promote ethnic separation. Such

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suspicions were seemingly confirmed just days later when RaškovićIvić controversially suggested that some form of partition might be a win-win option if an agreement was not possible.85 Meanwhile, the second day of discussions were boycotted by Kosovo Serbs after they were termed a ‘minority’, rather than ‘a constituent nation of Kosovo’.86 Responding to this, the Unity Team insisted that every citizen would be, ‘a constituent of the new Kosovo’. Recognising the depth of feeling on the issue, UNOSEK announced that in future the matter would be tackled by visits to Belgrade and Pristina.87 All the while, the steady deterioration in relations between Belgrade and the UN continued. On 14 August, Joachim Rücker, the newly appointed SRSG, who had yet to take up his post, announced that his role was to oversee UNMIK’s withdrawal and handover to a poststatus international mission.88 Then, just days later, he appeared to suggest that the final outcome of the status talks would be independence.89 While the Serbian government was furious at the comments, they proved to be little more than a prelude to a far greater spat. It now emerged that a few weeks earlier Ahtisaari had told Serbian negotiators that while the current Serbian government could not be held accountable for Milošević’s behaviour, Belgrade must understand that his actions would shape the outcome of the talks. Despite receiving a letter of protest from the Serbian Government, Ahtisaari appeared unrepentant, telling reporters that, ‘every nation carries a burden for which it has to pay…leaders in Belgrade must face a historic inheritance and accept responsibility for the past years.’ In reply, Koštunica accused the UN Envoy of overstepping his mandate and that he was obviously trying to provide some sort of pretext for independence.90 However, despite also sending a letter of protest to the UN Secretary-General, Belgrade stopped short of calling for his dismissal as such a move would almost certainly have failed. Indeed, in its meeting on 1 September, the Contact Group reaffirmed its complete support for Ahtisaari.91 By this point, the effect of these developments was seen when a further round of discussions took place on 7–8 September to discuss decentralisation and the protection of religious sites. While progress was achieved on the question of protecting Orthodox churches and monasteries, the issue of the municipalities remained a sticking point. This time the UN was more open in its criticism of the Serbian side. Speaking at the close of the meeting, Rohan praised the Kosovo Albanians for having ‘really moved’ on the issues. As he noted, they

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had made a number of concessions prior to the meeting. The same, however, could not be said for the ‘other party’.92 The Security Council discusses Kosovo With little sign of progress in the technical discussions, attention now returned to the international stage. Returning from Washington, where he had held meetings with a number of senior US officials – including Rice, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and VicePresident Cheney – Tadić explained that most of the people he had spoken to favoured independence.93 The comments sparked outrage in Serbia, where the president now faced accusations of defeatism. They also led to a wave of anti-Western feelings in the country.94 Reacting to this, Putin announced that Russia would oppose any attempt to impose a settlement against the will of the parties, and might even be willing to use its veto in the Security Council. Significantly, he also stressed that as far as Moscow as concerned there was no difference between the case of Kosovo and those of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Any decision on the former would create a ‘universal’ precedent that would be applicable to other situations; not just the South Caucasus, but also Iraq and other parts of Europe.95 On 13 September the Security Council met to discuss the latest UNMIK report.96 Once again the meeting started with an acrimonious exchange between Belgrade and the UNSR, as Rücker and RaškovićIvić disagreed over the situation in Kosovo and the timing of the status process. However, unlike the previous meeting, the differences between the permanent members of the Council were also on show. Rejecting the imposition of an arbitrary time-frame, Churkin again stressed Putin’s point that a decision on Kosovo must necessarily be ‘universal’. For this reason the Council could only accept a negotiated solution that abided by the terms of Resolution 1244. Although the French and American representatives took a relatively cautious approach, highlighting the need to reach a status decision based on the Contact Group principles by the end of the year, Karen Pierce, the British representative, directly challenged the Russian view. Again emphasising that Kosovo constituted a ‘unique and distinct’ case in international politics, she now discarded any pretence about the final outcome of the process. Openly arguing that statehood was the only way to bring lasting peace to the region, she told the assembled representatives that it was, ‘up to those who strove for

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independence to ensure that a multi-ethnic Kosovo became a reality and took its place in Europe.’ This only served to fuel the growing nationalism in Serbia, which to some observers appeared to be dangerously reminiscent of the Milošević era.97 Meanwhile, following several bomb attacks against Kosovo Serbs, Koštunica signed a joint declaration with Tomislav Nikolić, the leader of the nationalist Serbian Radical Party, calling for joint action in the event of independence.98 Worryingly, there were also indications that the discussions over Kosovo were having an effect on other countries in the region. In neighbouring Bosnia, Bosnian Serb politicians were now suggesting that if Kosovo went its own way, then they would also call a referendum on independence – comments that many believed emanated from Belgrade.99 It was against this backdrop that the Contact Group met in New York, on 20 September, for a high level meeting. In addition to Ahtisaari and the foreign ministers of the six countries, the meeting was also attended by Solana, Rehn and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NATO Secretary-General.100 By this point the status discussions had been running for seven months and the UN was now publicly conceding that it was increasingly unlikely that further talks would produce results.101 The Group therefore authorised Ahtisaari to begin preparing a comprehensive proposal for a status settlement.102

3 STATUS PROPOSALS

The decision to move to prepare formal proposals plan appeared to confirm the view that the status process was still on course to be completed by the end of the year. Moreover, in spite of the recent reticence about speaking openly in favour of independence, the end product of the talks would be some form of statehood for Kosovo. This was seemingly confirmed when, on 22 September, just nine days after its last meeting, and two days after the Contact Group had authorised Ahtisaari to begin putting together a plan, the Security Council met once again for another closed briefing on the status talks.1 Although no formal minutes of the discussions were published, the Serbian Government was evidently unhappy with the way things were going. Speaking afterwards, Drašković told reporters that the process was now taking a ‘very clear’ direction.2 However, shortly afterwards, the situation took a sudden and dramatic new course when, on 30 September, the Serbian Parliament finally agreed the text of a new constitution. This was a long-overdue move that had been spurred by Montenegro’s independence earlier in the year, Controversially, the text specifically referred to Kosovo as an integral part of the Republic of Serbia. While few seriously believed that this clause would have any real effect on the eventual outcome of the status talks – least of all Tadić, who had spoken out against the move3 – the announcement would almost certainly have an enormous effect on the timing of the process. For a start, a referendum would have to be held on the new constitution. This was scheduled for 28– 29 October. Thereafter, it was almost certain that parliamentary elections would have to be called. These would be unlikely to take place before December. Once this had taken place, a new government

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would have to be formed. Based on previous efforts, this could also be a long process, taking weeks, if not months. Given Serbian sensitivities over Kosovo, few now believed that any final moves to address the issue of status could be made until most, if not all, of these different phases had been completed. Indeed, just days later, Ahtisaari acknowledged that the unveiling of his proposals would probably have to be postponed until after the elections.4 As expected, Pristina reacted angrily to the news. As well as questioning the credibility of the negotiations and the negotiators, Kosovo Albanian leaders noted that a move away from the timetable could create further uncertainty, not just in Kosovo but also in the wider region.5 In an attempt to calm their concerns, Rücker stressed that international mediators still hoped to follow the original timetable and were more than aware of the importance of reaching an early settlement.6 Likewise, London and Washington sought to ease Pristina’s fears by noting that the recent Contact Group statement had emphasised that the end of 2006 still remained the target date for a settlement.7 Indeed, even Ahtisaari soon backtracked on his comments, announcing that unless otherwise instructed he intended to stick to the original schedule and present his ideas to the Security Council by the end of the year.8 Despite these assurances, there were still a number of indications that a decision was unlikely before 2007. One of the more obvious was Annan’s decision to extended Ahtisaari’s mandate by six months, from the end of December 2006 until June 2007.9 Meanwhile, senior EU officials, including Solana, were now willing to concede that in all likelihood a delay of some sort would be needed. Needless to say, Belgrade was delighted by this, viewing it as evidence that the European Union was now abandoning ‘fake deadlines’. Rašković-Ivić even went as far as to declare that the Serbian side had received everything it had asked for from EU ministers. Certainly, the Serbian negotiating team was more optimistic than they had been just weeks earlier. In Belgrade there was a real sense that Serbia’s position had now improved considerably.10 However, the jubilation did not last long. Meeting with members of the Contact Group in Vienna, on 21 October, Ahtisaari not only maintained that he intended to present his plan by the end of the year, he also dropped his clearest hint to date that he would propose some form of conditional independence for Kosovo. As he explained, in the course of a settlement Resolution 1244 would be superseded and

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Serbia would cease to exert effective control over the territory.11 Quite apart from its anger at the obvious reference to some form of independence, the Serbian Government was also annoyed by the fact that Ahtisaari was even considering presenting proposals at this stage given that there had been almost no direct talks between the sides. Issuing a statement rebuking Ahtisaari, Koštunica once again accused him of anti-Serbian bias.12 Tellingly, though, the Serbian premier also openly acknowledged that the proposals to be presented by the UN Envoy would probably contain some form of independence – whether conditional, postponed or limited. However, as he also pointed out, it would difficult to put this into action in light of Russia and China’s stated opposition to an imposed settlement.13 Serbia passes a new constitution On 28–29 October, Serbian voters cast their ballots in a referendum on the new constitution. Despite the fanfare surrounding the poll, and the apparent significance of the new text, turnout was low. Just 55 per cent of registered voters took part. However, of this number, 97 per cent supported the new constitution. In Belgrade, the result was warmly welcomed by Koštunica, as well as other political leaders, who seized the opportunity to stress that this was a strong reaffirmation of Serb claims over Kosovo. As far as they were concerned, the result signalled an endorsement of some form of autonomy for Kosovo.14 Notwithstanding the clause on Kosovo, the decision to enact a new constitution was widely welcomed internationally. However, as US officials were quick to stress, any further delays to the status process would not benefit anyone.15 Indeed, postponing a decision much longer could well lead to a significant destabilisation of the situation. Concerns were also raised when, during a televised debate, members of the Unity Team revealed that an action plan had been drawn up to unilaterally declare independence in the event that the Security Council blocked a settlement. According to the team, if this were to happen a document declaring independence would immediately be put to the Kosovo Assembly and then signed by President Sejdiu. Following on from this, and just hours later, the first statements of recognition would be received from the international community. Significantly, the claim were confirmed the next morning by Çeku. During a press conference he told reporters that if the status talks did not result in a firm decision supporting statehood, the province might

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indeed pursue a unilateral declaration of independence, albeit following consultations with, ‘friends and strategic partners’.16 Meanwhile, on 10 November, the Serbian Parliament officially adopted the new constitution. As expected, just hours later Tadić went on television to announce that new parliamentary elections had been set for 21 January 2007. As a result, the Contact Group, following a meeting with Ahtisaari, decided against any further action on status until after the polls.17 With any remaining hope that a decision could be reached before the end of the year now dashed, the pressure for a unilateral declaration of independence now increased considerably. However, while the earlier comments appeared to have been largely ignored by international administrators, this time the suggestions met with a firm response from UNMIK. Meeting with Çeku, Rücker issued a warning that unilateral actions were not only in contravention of the Contact Group’s guiding principles, they would also undermine support for Kosovo’s case at a crucial moment.18 While this served to rein in Kosovo Albanian leaders, it had little effect on more militant members of the community. On 28 November, 3,000–5,000 supporters of Self-Determination gathered in Pristina to protest about the postponement of a status decision and the continued presence of international officials in Kosovo. Descending on the UN headquarters, they pulled down a fence, smashed windows and threw bottles of red paint at buildings. Although the police managed to regain control of the situation fairly quickly using tear gas, the demonstration was a graphic reminder of how fragile the situation in the province was.19 Fears were further heightened by reports that armed men belonging to a group called the Albanian National Army (ANA), which the UN had branded a terrorist group, were increasingly active in the western parts of the province.20 Taken together, these events reinforced the message that some sort of settlement was needed, and sooner rather than later. Serbia and NATO, Çeku in Russia With tension rising in Kosovo, Belgrade was growing ever more worried that European opinion would galvanise in favour of independence. Although some states, such as Spain, had already spoken out against granting Kosovo statehood, Drašković nevertheless noted that the most important members of the EU – Britain, France and Germany – appeared to be broadly in favour of

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some form of independence.21 To this end, the Serbian Government increased its efforts to stave off any moves to remove Kosovo from Serbia. This included an explicit warning from Koštunica that a decision by individual states, especially NATO members, to recognise a declaration of independence would place their relations with Serbia under considerable strain.22 In light of this overt warning to NATO members by the Serbian premier, it came as somewhat of a surprise when, just days later, Serbia decided to accept an unexpected invitation from NATO leaders to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme – a decision that was widely regarded as the first full step towards eventual full membership of the organisations. Although the decision was prompted by a direct plea to the White House by Tadić, who argued that it would help to cement Serbia’s ties to the West,23 the Serbian prime minister was quick to argue that the decision had its advantages in terms of Kosovo. As he explained, joining PfP would help to guarantee Serbia’s territorial integrity.24 This was not the only surprise taking place at this time. Just as NATO was moving to strengthen its ties with Belgrade, Çeku arrived in Moscow for discussions with Russian officials. However, the Russian Government was quick to point out that the visit had been arranged with the full support and consent of Belgrade to show that it was willing to hear Pristina’s views. It should not be read to mean that there had been any change in Moscow’s thinking.25 Indeed, the various officials he met all insisted that Moscow remained committed to a solution agreeable to both sides.26 Despite this, on his return home Çeku was quick to stress that the trip had in fact been a success. As he explained, it had shown that Moscow viewed him as Kosovo’s legitimate representative in the process. More importantly, and contrary to the recent statements by Russian officials opposing statehood, he believed that the Russian Government would have little reason to block plans for independence if the final status protected Kosovo’s minority communities.27 The suggestion that Russia was willing to accept independence was swiftly and categorically denied. In fact, just days after the trip, Alexander Alexeyev, the Russian Ambassador to Serbia, insisted that Moscow would veto any status solution that was not acceptable to the two sides. Although this was the most explicit statement on Russian intentions thus far, Washington’s reacted with caution to the comments. Speaking on the margins of an OSCE conference, Burns

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suggested that the ambassador may have been misquoted. However, no official denial or retraction of the statement was issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry in the period that followed. Indeed, when questioned about the matter, Lavrov actually appeared to endorse the ambassador’s statement. Although he carefully avoided any direct reference to the veto, the Russian foreign minister seemed to suggest that any attempt to pass a resolution based on a solution unacceptable to one or other side would fail. He also posed a question back to the journalists, asking how it could be possible for the Security Council to be associated with efforts to impose a solution.28 The Security Council discusses Kosovo On 13 December 2006, the Security Council met for another quarterly debate on Kosovo.29 Yet again, the meeting was marked by a major disagreement between Rücker and Rašković-Ivić. This time, the dispute focused on the level of interethnic violence in the province. Interestingly, though, relatively little was said on the status question. Most of the permanent members appeared to want to avoid any major confrontation on the question of the eventual outcome of the process, preferring instead to repeat their by now familiar positions on the way in which the UN talks were being conducted. To this end, while France and the United States restated the Contact Group principles and reiterated the need for a quick settlement, Russia argued that the comprehensive status proposals put forward by Ahtisaari should form the basis of further negotiations without time frames. The Russian position appeared to be supported by China. The notable exception to this was the speech given by Karen Pierce, the British Representative. In the course of her address, she took an altogether more confrontational approach. Noting that while it was not for the United Kingdom to say what the eventual status of Kosovo should be, she nevertheless insisted that there was a growing international consensus that independence was the most likely outcome. As she pointed out, it was difficult to see how a sustainable outcome could be reached from amongst the other alternatives that had been suggested. Moreover, she issued a stark warning to the Serbian Government. Telling the assembled representatives that, as it was ‘clear that Belgrade does not wish to engage with us and does not wish to engage with the Status Envoy in settling the status’, the Contact Group had laid down an alternative route to a negotiated

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solution. The meaning of the remark was more than clear to everyone present in the chamber. Serbia goes to the polls As 2007 arrived, international attention was firmly fixed on the election campaign now gathering pace in Serbia. Unsurprisingly, DSS was keen to put the question of Kosovo at the forefront of their policy platform. To this end, on 1 January, Koštunica entered Kosovo under armed guard to celebrate the New Year with the Kosovo Serb community. There he promised to resist any moves towards independence and announced that he had written to the new UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, asking the United Nations to protect the territorial integrity and borders of Serbia.30 In marked contrast, Tadić’s DS sought to avoid discussion on Kosovo. Instead, it sought to emphasise its commitment to Serbia’s EU integration. When Kosovo did arise as a question, Tadić seemed keen to lower expectations about the outcome. Although he insisted that he would continue to fight for the province, he nevertheless warned voters that not only was it likely that Serbia would be unhappy about the eventual solution for Kosovo, there was a good chance that the plan put in place might not even require Serbian acceptance.31 Meanwhile, in a further effort to try to limit the impact of Kosovo on the political situation in Serbia, Tadić called on Ahtisaari to delay presenting his proposals to the Contact Group until after a new government had been formed. UNOSEK refused, insisting that the plan would be unveiled ‘immediately’ after the elections.32 Rather than reduce the effect of Kosovo on the elections, this announcement in fact provided the opportunity for yet another angry outburst from Koštunica. Noting that there had been just one meeting between the sides, the Serbian premier now accused the UN Envoy of having staged ‘simulated negotiations’. Indeed, as he explained, the last time he had even seen Ahtisaari had been six months earlier.33 At the same time, a row also broke out between Belgrade and Pristina. This followed comments by Drašković that the September 2006 Contact Group statement had made it clear that there would be another round of talks once Ahtisaari had presented his proposals.34 Sejdiu immediately rejected this, arguing that the time for talks was over. From now on the Kosovo Albanian side would speak only with Ahtisaari and the Contact Group.35 This view appeared to be

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supported by US officials, who stressed that the process was now drawing to a close. Indeed, Burns noted that he hoped that a final outcome would be reached within a month or two of the Serbian elections.36 However, others within the Contact Group disagreed with this view. Quite apart from long-standing Russian objections to the imposition of time-frames, the German Government, which had just taken over the six-month rotating presidency of the EU, appeared to be concerned that any rapid moves towards a settlement could destabilise Serbia.37 It was against this backdrop that a statement by UNOSEK that further deliberation would take place after the plan had been presented, even though it refused to say whether this would amount to formal negotiations, was seen by Belgrade as yet another victory.38 The sense of having the upper hand was further increased when Pristina, which continued to argue that it saw ‘no reason’ for further talks with Belgrade,39 was forced to accept the possibility of further discussions. Meeting with Solana in Brussels, Sejdiu was told that the European Union expected the Unity Team to engage constructively in the process led by the UN Envoy.40 However, any sense of dejection amongst the Kosovo Albanian leadership about the EU’s position was short lived. A few days later, during a speech in Rome, Rehn gave the clearest indication to date that he believed that independence was the likely outcome. Using familiar language, he told the audience that the final result of the status process would not represent a precedent.41 Although this statement appeared to signal that support for independence was growing within the European Union, Putin assured Koštunica that Russia’s ‘fundamental position’ remained unchanged. Any settlement must stem from the principle of territorial integrity and that any proposals that were unacceptable to Belgrade would be unacceptable to the Security Council.42 In an attempt to counter this, US officials now sought to reason with Belgrade. Arguing that Serbia’s future lay with Europe, and not Moscow, they suggested that the European Union would not be prepared to import an ‘unsolved conflict’.43 But Koštunica replied that such arguments would have little effect. Serbia would not give up Kosovo for EU membership.44 On 21 January, Serbia went to the polls to elect a new parliament. Although Koštunica had done his best to put Kosovo front and centre of the political debate, the main focus of the campaign had instead been on the economy and corruption.45 As a result, while Koštunica’s DSS saw a very slight decline in support, falling to 16 per

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cent, Tadić’s party doubled its share of the vote, rising to 24 per cent. Meanwhile, Drašković’s Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) failed to make the 5 per cent threshold necessary for parliamentary representation. Most importantly, the far-right nationalist Serbian Radical Party took 29 per cent of the vote. This meant that once again it would be the largest party in the parliament. It also meant that once again Koštunica would hold the balance of power. Fearing that any significant move on Kosovo at this stage could see Koštunica form a coalition with the Radicals, DS again appealed for the proposals to be delayed until after an new administration had taken office. As before, UNOSEK refused.46 Indeed, just days later Ahtisaari provided the first real details of his plan during an address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Studiously avoiding any reference to the final status, he stated that his proposals would create the foundations for a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo and would pay particular attention to the protection of minority rights. In addition to an ongoing military presence, an international civilian representative would also be appointed to supervise the implementation of the settlement and serve as the EU special representative. As for the next steps in process, he stated that he had no intention of holding further negotiations. Instead, he would launch a consultative process to see if the two sides had, ‘any new ideas’. After that, he would submit the plan to the Security Council. This would mark the ‘real end game’ of the process.47 The status proposals are unveiled On 26 January 2007 Ahtisaari finally delivered his proposals to the Contact Group at a meeting in Vienna. Although UNOSEK downplayed the significance of the event, and declined to issue a statement, reports quickly emerged that deep differences had arisen between the members of the Group. On the one hand, there was a major split between Russia and Western members of the Group. As expected, the Russian Government was not only ‘sceptical’ about the proposals, it was also concerned about the timing of any further steps. As far as it was concerned, nothing should be done until a government had been formed in Serbia.48 While the other five members were in broad agreement with the direction of the proposals, and remained keen to resolve the question as soon as possible, they also appeared to be divided over the way in

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which the process should now unfold. While Britain appeared to support Ahtisaari’s idea that there should be a consultative process leading to further small changes, Philippe Douste-Blazy, the French foreign minister, although reiterating EU support for the UN Envoy, argued that there should be a chance for further negotiations.49 In the meantime, in order to allow the Contact Group time to study the proposals in detail, it had been decided not to present the plan to the two sides for another week. Realising that this could lead to speculation about the plan’s contents, the Group asked the two sides not to comment on the document until they had it in their hands.50 Çeku agreed. Acknowledging that the proposals might not be what people, ‘anticipated, deserve or wish’, he nevertheless noted that there were grounds for optimism.51 In contrast, Koštunica appeared determined to sink the plan. As a first step, he announced that as he was only caretaker prime minister he would be unable to meet with Ahtisaari when he arrived in Belgrade to deliver his proposals. Despite pressure from the DS and moderate Kosovo Serb leaders, who did not want to ‘make an enemy’ out of the UN Envoy, he refused to back down. In the end, and rather than provoke an international incident, Tadić decided that he would meet with the UN Envoy instead.52 Following on from this, Koštunica then defied calls not to comment on the proposals until they were formally delivered, noting that they were against Serbian interests. He then announced that he would only form a coalition with parties that agreed to break off ties with any state that recognised independence; a position that DS viewed as being little more than blackmail.53 On 2 February, Ahtisaari formally presented his proposals to the two sides. Unveiling the document, first in Belgrade and then in pristine, the UN Envoy explained that it was a comprehensive plan for a viable, stable and multi-ethnic Kosovo. Included within its provisions were annexes on the new constitution, decentralisation (including the delineation of new municipalities), justice, religious and cultural heritage, external debt, property and the security sector. However, while the 58-page document carefully laid out the new structures, institutions and functions of Kosovo, and outlined the future role of the international community, it made no explicit mention of the exact final status of the province. Instead, Ahtisaari explained that he would reveal his views on this at a later stage. At this point, he wanted to focus on the technical issues within the proposals. Significantly, he also announced that a further meeting would be

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held between the sides in Vienna, on 13 February, and that he would be willing to consider ‘constructive amendments’ and integrate any ideas agreed to by the two sides.54 To emphasise the importance of this meeting, the Contact Group issued a statement calling on the two sides to continue to co-operate with the UN Envoy.55 Although the document made no mention of independence, this was seen by both sides as the natural outcome. Throwing a cocktail party for his cabinet, Çeku announced that Kosovo was now on its way to statehood and that a Security Council resolution was expected in April.56 In Belgrade, Tadić declared that the proposals were ‘unacceptable’ inasmuch as they paved the way for independence. An official statement issued by the government also accused the UN Envoy of having exceeded his mandate.57 In the meantime, a new problem now arose. Following the recent elections, the Serbian negotiating team’s original parliamentary mandate had now expired. Although it was argued that Tadić could go to the talks in Vienna on his own, he was reluctant to do so. He knew full well that he would then be blamed for the outcome. He therefore requested a ten day delay to allow parliament to reconvene. The call was immediately rejected by Ahtisaari, as well as by Pristina. However, visiting Belgrade a few days later, Solana, Rehn and FrankWalter Steinmeier, the German Foreign minister, announced that they believed that the UN Envoy would in fact be willing to make a concession on this matter.58 Ahtisaari was left with no choice but to agree to a short delay, re-scheduling the start of talks for 21 February. Still, he made no effort to hide his unhappiness at the change in the timetable, or his apparent frustration with the process as a whole, which he evidently wished to bring to a conclusion as soon as possible. As he told reporters, ‘time will not resolve this question. Even if I negotiate all my life, they will not reach agreement.’59 Meanwhile, tensions appeared to be growing in Kosovo. On 9 February, 10,000 Kosovo Serbs gathered in the northern town of Mitrovica to protest against the UN proposals.60 This was followed, the next day, by a rally in Pristina organised by Self-Determination, which was demanding immediate and unfettered independence. Although this latter event was far smaller than the Serb protest in terms of numbers, it grabbed the international headlines when marchers attempted to storm government buildings. In an attempt to fend them off, police and UN personnel used teargas and rubber bullets. This led to the deaths of two protestors, and left another two

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seriously injured. In addition, over 70 more people treated for minor wounds. As the most serious incident in the province since the March 2004 riots, the violence served to confirm the long-standing fears that further fighting could erupt in Kosovo if a status decision was not reached quickly.61 Russian opposition to the proposals As the two sides prepared for what Ahtisaari believed would be a last chance to present their positions, the focus of attention once again shifted to the international stage as the Russian Government expressed its grave misgivings about the way in which the process was now unfolding. Contrary to expectations, Moscow’s immediate reaction to the proposals had been rather muted. In an interview in the German press, Lavrov had insisted that while it would be unprecedented for a state to be created without ‘mutual consent’, Putin had never said that he would be willing to veto a resolution on Kosovo.62 However, over the course of the last few days, its position now appeared to have hardened dramatically. Returning from Washington, where he had attended a meeting of the Middle East Quartet, Lavrov told reporters that Russia and the United States did not share a ‘common view’ on the Ahtisaari proposals. As a result, any attempt to present them to the Security Council as they stood would be ‘futile and counterproductive’.63 Following on from this, and after a meeting in Brussels with Solana and Steinmeier a few days later, Lavrov insisted that the Contact Group had in fact agreed to use the proposals as a basis for drafting a solution that would be acceptable to both sides.64 Believing that these statements were indications of deeper Russian concerns that a status decision on Kosovo might set a precedent elsewhere, Rice and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU commissioner for external affairs, sought to reassure Moscow that any decision on Kosovo would not have a wider effect on Russia’s autonomous regions.65 The comments made no difference to the Russian position. Soon afterwards, Lavrov told reporters that any attempt to ‘shove’ the proposals before the Security Council would be ‘lead nowhere’.66 This led to yet another attempt to assuage Russian concerns, this time by Frank Wisner, the US special envoy for Kosovo. As he explained, no one wanted to set an artificial deadline for the Kosovo talks. However, if it was not possible to reach a decision between Belgrade

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and Pristina, the Security Council should take responsibility for the matter.67 Again, this did little to change Moscow’s view. Indeed, the Russian position appeared to be hardening. As Alexander BotsanKharchenko, the Russian special envoy for Kosovo, explained, Moscow now had ‘serious doubts’ as to whether the Ahtisaari proposals could even be a good foundation for further talks, let alone a solution, given its provisions leading to independence.68 The degree to which Kosovo was now emerging as a major bone of contention between Russia and the United States was graphically highlighted when Putin, speaking at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, an event that gathered together political leaders from over forty countries, launched a withering attack on Washington, accusing it of inciting a global nuclear arms race and destabilising international peace and security.69 Arguing that it was in the interests of the US and the EU that international law was upheld, he openly criticised Washington for attempting to impose a Kosovo settlement against Belgrade’s wishes. Arguing that this would set a precedent for conflicts elsewhere, he told the delegates that Belgrade and Pristina bore responsibility for reaching an agreement. In a particularly notable turn of phrase, he argued that no one had the right to play ‘Lord God’ and make decisions for other nations.70 Shortly afterwards, the Russian President also wrote a letter to Tadić, on the occasion of Serbia’s National Day, reaffirming Russia’s support for Serbia’s ‘legitimate demands’, which were in line with international law.71 However, for all its public show of support for Serbia, and its apparent opposition to the plan, behind the scenes Moscow emphasised to Serbian leaders that they needed to show some flexibility during the upcoming talks. Koštunica, in particular, was told that he could not rely on the Kremlin’s support if he rejected everything that was put in front of him.72 This pressure seemed to work. The Serbian Government now appeared to tone down its opposition to the plan as a whole and instead focused its criticism on key elements of the proposals. For instance, Rašković-Ivić noted that if the opening sentence of the agreement was changed to respect the inviolability of Serbia’s borders, the rest of the plan would be open for discussion.73 Such was the change in Belgrade’s tone that even US officials noticed the apparent change in Serbia’s position.74 Still, while there may have been a willingness to show some moderation in terms of negotiating the specifics of the proposals, there was no question that the basic document was unacceptable as it

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stood. Convening to renew the mandate of the negotiating team, the Serbian parliament overwhelmingly rejected the plan. Arguing that in laying the foundation for the creation of a new independent state on Serb territory, the representatives overwhelmingly decided that the proposals violated Serbian sovereignty and broke international law.75 Meanwhile, as the sides prepared for the new round of talks, attention was now increasingly focused on the European Union. Unlike the United States and Russia, the EU had yet to take a formal position on the proposals. While it was clear that senior Commission officials were in favour of the plan, there was little unity amongst the members. This was confirmed when, at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels, at least seven countries – Greece, Romania, Cyprus, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland – were reported to have expressed their reservations about the plan.76 Therefore, while the member states agreed that the Union should continue planning for a post-UNMIK mission in the province, a decision that had been reached six weeks earlier,77 their final statement took an ambiguous position on the proposals. Rather than overtly endorse the proposals as a blueprint for a settlement, as some had hoped, the members instead issued a rather tepid statement noting that the plan represented ‘a basis’ for Kosovo’s economic and political development and for strengthening regional stability.78 Attempts to refine the proposals On 21 February, the two sides gathered in Vienna to resume their discussions. By now a fuller timetable for further discussions had been laid out. Following direct technical discussions on the various elements of the proposals, which would be held across two sessions from 21 February until 2 March, a high-level meeting would take place on 10 March. Once this had been completed, the plan would be finalised for presentation to the Security Council.79 While the planned talks were more extensive than originally envisaged, the UN team made no secret of the fact that it did not believe that the extra discussions would produce any meaningful results. Indeed, as Ahtisaari noted, it would be a ‘miracle’ if an agreement was reached.80 The situation was not made any easier by the growing hostility between Belgrade and the UN. Responding to Koštunica’s recent accusations that there had been no real negotiations between the sides, Ahtisaari emphasised that UNOSEK

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had actually held 15 rounds of direct talks and that he had visited Belgrade and Pristina 26 times to confer with the parties.81 Rohan was more direct in his response. Accusing the Serbian Government of having taken a one-sided approach to discussions, he fanned the tensions by arguing that, as Serbia had not administered Kosovo since 1999, the proposals would in fact change very little.82 Responding to this, the Serbian Government insisted that the forthcoming talks were nothing more than a façade designed to allow the UN Envoy to claim to the Security Council that compromise was impossible.83 Despite the antipathy between Belgrade and UNOSEK, the Serbian team was keen to appear flexible, as Moscow had requested. As the sides convened for the first phase of discussions – focused on insignia, constitutional issues, minority rights, the judiciary, economic issues and property – Serbian negotiators insisted that while they opposed those proposals that were inconsistent with Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, they did not reject the plan as a whole. To this end, they had formulated a number of amendments based on Serbia’s proposals for extensive autonomy.84 However, this was immediately rejected by the Unity Team. Accusing Belgrade of trying to open up an entirely new round of negotiations, the again insisted that independence was the only outcome and was not subject to compromise. Indeed, one member even suggested that any attempt to prevent statehood could lead to war.85 Although no press release was issued at the end of the first phase, it was clear that little progress had been made.86 A few days later, the sides convened for further technical discussions. Despite efforts to broker an agreement, the two sides failed to bridge their differences over a range of issues relating to municipalities, such as policing and the number, authority and delimitation of Serbian councils.87 Thereafter, the talks turned to religious and cultural heritage, international administration and security. While Belgrade was willing to accept the continued presence of international forces, and the appointment of a civilian administrator, albeit under a bilateral agreement between the UN and the Serbian Government, it wanted the province to be demilitarised, and rejected any proposals for the creation of a force that would form the nucleus of a ‘future Albanian army’.88 Emerging from the final meeting, on 2 March, Ahtisaari confirmed that no further progress had been made. The two sides still held ‘diametrically opposed’ views’. To this extent, the high-level meeting on 10 March was now the last

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chance to reach an agreement.89 Despite assurances from Ahtisaari that he would look into possible changes to his proposals, neither sides believed that any further significant alterations were likely at this stage. Certainly, Belgrade held out little hope that its suggestions would be taken up.90 The Serbian side felt sure that the UN had no intention of trying to reach a negotiated solution. Russia agreed. Even while this latest round of talks had been taking place, Moscow had voiced criticism of the way in which the process had been handled. Apart from rejecting Ahtisaari’s planned timetable for discussions – insisting that the duty of the UN Envoy was to carry out the mandate laid down by the Security Council and the Secretary-General and not to decide when the time for compromise had passed – Lavrov also agreed with Serbia’s assessment that the UN team had never had any intention of taking a balanced approach to the talks by taking into account Belgrade’s concerns. Instead, the UN envoy had based his process on, ‘the inevitability of Kosovo’s independence regardless of Belgrade’s views’.91 Just days later, during a visit to Belgrade, Vladimir Titov, the Russian deputy Foreign Minister, again stated that Moscow would not be willing to support any plan that was not acceptable to both sides.92 Significantly, other members of the Council also appeared to be concerned about the prospect of forcing a settlement on Serbia. In an important boost to the Serb position, Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim nation, stressed its belief in the territorial integrity of states and stated that it would vote against the ‘disintegration’ of Serbia’.93 Belgrade was also ‘pretty certain’ that others within the Council felt the same way, including China.94 Against this backdrop, 15,000 demonstrators gathered outside the US Embassy to protest against the Ahtisaari proposals.95 Washington appeared unfazed by this, warning Serbs not to rely on Russia. Arriving in Belgrade for discussions with Serb leaders, Daniel Fried, the US Assistant Secretary of State, insisted that it was a mistake to believe that any country could obstruct a final status decision and appealed to the Serbian Government to consider the position of the Kosovo Serbs.96 However, EU officials were more concerned, expressing their fear that the discussions over Kosovo were fuelling a worrying rise in nationalism in Serbia. Efforts were therefore stepped up to emphasise Serbia’s European future. Following a meeting in Brussels with Tadić, Rehn made a surprise announcement that that

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Serbia could be awarded candidacy status as early as 2008. Although extremely ambitious, it was nevertheless the first time that a specific date had been attached to the start of Serbia’s EU accession.97 Final discussions A revised set of proposals were presented to the two sides just three days before the final summit meeting. In Belgrade the new document was greeted with anger and indignation. Quite apart from the fact that the UN Envoy had not altered the basic premise of the plan, which effectively proposed independence, the changes that had been made appeared to reflect Albanian positions. As one Serbian official noted, the new proposals were ‘even worse’ than before. Another simply called them, ‘insulting’. Meeting the next day to discuss the plan, the Serbian political parties agreed that the plan was unacceptable.98 In contrast, Pristina welcomed the new document, especially as there had been no change to the fundamental elements of the proposals.99 Despite this endorsement, Rohan suggested that the reality was that neither side was ‘enthusiastic’ about the agreement. The Serbs viewed it as a breech of international law. The Albanians saw it as a limitation on full independence. Still, even at this late stage he insisted that there was the opportunity for ‘constructive suggestions’ by the two sides to be included in the proposal, even though the aim remained for the finalised set of proposals to be sent to the Security Council by the end of the month.100 On Saturday 10 March 2007, the parties gathered at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna for what many now expected to be their final meeting. Going into the talks, it was obvious that there would be no last minute breakthrough. The sides remained firmly wedded to their positions. Just as Tadić and Koštunica again pointed out that the proposals were unacceptable to Belgrade – highlighting that independence for Kosovo would amount to, ‘the first time in contemporary history that territory would be taken away from a democratic, peaceful country in order to satisfy the aspirations of a particular ethnic group that already has its nation-state’ – Sejdiu emphasised once more that independence was the start and end of the Albanian position, and was not open to compromise.101 Emerging from the meeting, Ahtisaari confirmed that the discussions had ended in deadlock. As he told the waiting reporters, the time for direct talks was now over: ‘I regret to say that at the end

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of the day, there was no will on the part of the parties to move away from their positions…No amount of additional negotiations will change that…It is my firm conclusion that the potential of negotiations is exhausted.’102 After thirteen months of discussions, the negotiating process now appeared to be at and end. As far as Washington and many of the members of the European Union were concerned, the proposals represented a realistic compromise.103 Likewise, in Pristina there was a feeling that the way was now open for independence.104 However, Belgrade was scathing about the final negotiations, arguing that they had been cursory at best. As Slobodan Samardžić, a close advisor to Koštunica, noted, six of the twelve annexes in the document had not even been discussed.105 At this stage, though, the focus of attention was on Russia. While Koštunica was sure that Moscow would at the least delay a resolution, if not veto the proposals altogether, Tadić and Drašković were less sure, especially as reports had emerged that Russian diplomats were now admitting in private that they might opt to abstain rather than block a resolution in favour of independence. Even though Moscow denied this, rumours nevertheless persisted that Russia had accepted independence as inevitable and was already looking for a face-saving compromise that might see parts of the plan implemented under Resolution 1244.106

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On 15 March, five days after the high-level meeting, the final proposals were sent to the UN Secretary-General. As promised, they were accompanied by a report in which Ahtisaari specified his recommendation for Kosovo’s final status. Although the exact details of completed plan and the attached report were not made public at this point, Serbia was furious at the move. Koštunica immediately accused the UN Envoy of having produced ‘a one-sided’ document and again called for new talks.1 Significantly, the call for more discussions was also echoed by the Russian Government, which also launched a series of attacks on the UN. While still refusing to state openly whether or not the Russian Government would use its veto if a resolution based on the proposals was put before the Security Council, Lavrov nevertheless called for Ahtisaari to stand aside and allow a new mediator to be appointed if he did not believe he was capable of making further progress.2 The Russian Foreign Minister also insisted that, contrary to the rumours circulating, Moscow stood firmly behind Belgrade. Speaking to the Russian Parliament, he explained that any proposal unacceptable to the Serbs would be unacceptable to Russia – not only as a matter of principle, but also on ‘political, historic and spiritual’ grounds.3 The growing tensions between the Russian Government and the United Nations was apparent when the Security Council met in closed session, on 19 March, to discuss the latest UNMIK report.4 In his address to the Council, Rücker once again laid the blame for the lack of progress in the province firmly on Belgrade door and emphasised the urgent need for Kosovo to have a clear vision of its future.5 Emerging from the meeting, Vitaly Churkin, the Russian permanent

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representative, made no attempt to hide his anger at the Special Representative’s comments. Speaking to waiting reporters, he accused the UN Special Representative of having exceeded his mandate by reading the Council a pro-independence ‘sermon’.6 With growing Russian support for its position, the Serbian Government was already confident that further talks would have to be convened.7 Others disagreed. Apart from openly expressing their support for Ahtisaari and his efforts, a number of Western officials insisted that there was simply no justification for further discussions. The two sides had plenty of chances to negotiate, but had failed to bridge their differences – a point made clear to Serbian officials by Philippe Douste-Blazy, the French foreign minister, during a visit to Belgrade.8 In response to this claim, Alexander Alexeyev, the Russian Ambassador to Serbia, accused Washington and its partners of looking for someone to blame for the current situation, rather than seeking solutions to the problem.9 The final status proposals are unveiled On 26 March, the UN Secretary-General presented the final version of the status proposals to the President of the Security Council. As promised, attached to the document was a separate report in which Ahtisaari delivered his long-awaited final verdict on the status of Kosovo. The result came as no surprise. Given the recent history of Kosovo, the current realities on the ground and the way in which the negotiation process had unfolded, the UN Envoy concluded that Kosovo’s reintegration into Serbia was not possible. As he explained, ‘Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia – however notional such autonomy may be – is simply not tenable.’ Under these circumstances, he had therefore reached the conclusion that, ‘independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo.’10 Importantly, in his accompanying letter, Ban expressed his full support for the package of proposals, including the report recommending ‘supervised independence’.11 Now that the final proposals were officially out in the open, the way was clear for various countries to announce their positions. Within hours, Washington, London and Paris had all endorsed the plan for supervised independence. So too did the German Government, which issued a statement in its capacity as EU president expressing its strong

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support for the plan.12 The proposals were also greeted with jubilation in Pristina, where the unveiling of the plan was hailed by Sejdiu as an ‘historic day for Kosovo’.13 In contrast, and as expected, the Serbian Government announced that it was completely opposed to the proposals. In a telephone conversation with Nicholas Burns, Koštunica referred to them as an ‘absolute’ violation of the UN Charter, international law and the Serbian Constitution. Calling for more talks between the two sides – a call strongly supported by Tadić – the Serbian prime minister stated that he was certain that if the proposals came before the Security Council Russia would cast a ‘historic’ veto, and that this would lead to new talks with a fresh mediator.14 Even now, this threat was looking increasingly plausible. While Moscow remained tight-lipped on whether or not it would go so far as to use its veto in the Security Council, it had no hesitation in making known its wholehearted opposition to the plan. Arguing that independence was ‘fraught with serious complications’ for European stability, the Russian Government declared that the proposals were unacceptable.15 Even though his government had spoken out against independence, Churkin deliberately chose not to take a direct stance on the proposals when the Security Council met for its first informal deliberations soon afterwards. Calling on the Council to consider the significance of the decision they were facing – possibly its most important decision in a decade – he noted that the members should ensure that they had all the information they could possible have before considering the proposals. Tied to this, they should also examine the implementation of Resolution 1244 and the standards. He therefore suggested that following Ahtisaari’s briefing to the Council, which had been scheduled for 3 April, the members should carry out a fact-finding mission to Belgrade and Pristina. In an attempt to allay concerns that this was simply a stalling tactic, he stressed that this need not be a long process. It could be completed quickly. The idea received a mixed reception. Some members, such as Britain and the United States, regarded it as a little more than a ploy to postpone the inevitable. They therefore argued that the time had come to end the process. In contrast, others within the Council, such as South Africa, which harboured deep reservations about independence, thought that a mission to the region was a good idea.16 Two days later, the political directors of the Contact Group met for their latest round of discussions. Emerging from the meeting,

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Rosemary DiCarlo, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, acknowledged the depth of differences with Moscow over the issue. While the US wanted to solve the issue by June, she accepted that more talks would be needed with Russia, as well as with other members of the Security Council.17 The strength of Russian feeling on the issue was further emphasised when, during a telephone conversation with Bush just hours after the meeting, Putin reiterated Moscow’s opposition to the Ahtisaari proposals and once again insisted that any solution must be acceptable to Belgrade and Pristina.18 The difficulty of gaining support within the Security Council was also recognised within the European Union. As Solana noted, in addition to ‘certain problems’ with Russia, China also had its concerns.19 More to the point, the future status of Kosovo had also led to deep division within the EU itself. Despite pleas for unity by Solana and Rehn, the European Union remained divided over the proposals – as highlighted during a meeting of EU foreign ministers in the German town of Bremen.20 Buoyed by all this, the Serbian Government once again called for more talks. But, as before, this was rejected by the United States.21 Rohan also rejected the call. After a year of negotiations, he argued that further discussions would not lead to any progress between the sides. The time had come for a decision.22 Meanwhile, Pristina appeared unfazed by the emerging international divisions on the future of Kosovo. Even without a UN resolution, they believed that a declaration of independence would still be recognised by a number of important countries – including the US, Britain, France, Germany and Italy. To this end, it emerged that plans were already being made for the establishment of a formal constitution, a flag, an armed force, a foreign ministry and a network of embassies.23 Indeed, even Kosovo’s Serbs seemed to have accepted the direction in which events were going. Despite Belgrade’s optimism, they too believed that the province was destined for independence. Reports suggested more and more were now leaving.24 The Security Council discussions begin On Tuesday 3 April, the Security Council convened for its first formal debate on the Ahtisaari proposals.25 As expected, it was a closed event. However, speaking afterwards, Ahtisaari said that he was pleased at the way his presentation had been received. He also roundly

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rejected Serb claims that the negotiations had been a ‘useless exercise’. As he explained, it would have been impossible to formulate the proposals that had been presented had there not been discussions between the two sides.26 This was flatly denied by Koštunica, who once again accused Ahtisaari of bias throughout the process. Repeating Belgrade’s offer of the, ‘highest level possible of autonomy to Kosovo’, he called on the Council to reject a set of proposals that could have no legitimacy under international law.27 Emerging from the meeting Churkin was evidently pleased at the way things had gone. While he was careful not to dismiss the plan altogether, arguing that it contained some ‘important and useful points’, he insisted that ‘only three or four’ countries supported the proposals as they stood. Significantly, China, as well as a number of African and Asian countries, shared Russia’s worries about changes to the territorial integrity of states.28 Koštunica was also upbeat after the session. Arguing that things had not gone ‘smoothly’ for the countries that supported Ahtisaari’s proposals, he noted that they had even been rejected by some of the European members of the Council. The claims that there was widespread opposition to the proposals within the Council were dismissed by Sir Emyr Jones-Parry, the British representative, who had chaired the meeting. However, he did concede that a number of states that were concerned about the implications of the dismemberment of a state and therefore wanted more information before taking a decision. Accepting these worries, and acting with the support of the US and French representatives,29 Jones-Parry now announced that the Russian proposal for a factfinding mission to the region had been accepted.30 The decision provoked mixed reactions in Belgrade and Pristina, as well as from the UN. UNMIK saw little reason for the visit, arguing that it provided the Council with regular reports on the situation. Meanwhile, the Kosovo Albanian leadership viewed it as evidence that Belgrade was conspiring with the Russians to block the Ahtisaari plan and rob Kosovo of its independence – even though the province’s assembly had just overwhelmingly endorsed the plan.31 On the other hand, Russia and Belgrade were delighted with the news. As far as the Serbian Government was concerned, the decision was further evidence that plans to impose independence quickly had now failed and that new negotiations would have to take place.32 Seeking to capitalise on the situation, Belgrade also announced that it would step up its diplomatic campaign to persuade the other

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members of the Security Council to support its case. As well as a high profile mission to South Africa, delegations would be sent to Ghana, Indonesia, Qatar, Panama, Peru and the Congo. As Drašković explained, there was still everything to play for. Leaving aside the possibility that Russia and China might veto a resolution, if Italy and Belgium sided with the United States, Britain and France a resolution in favour of the plan would still be four votes short of the nine needed to pass.33 Despite having accepted the need for a mission to the region, Washington remained steadfast in its opposition to more talks. During a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, in Washington, Burns argued that Belgrade’s proposals for autonomy were a decade too late. The outcome was now clear. The White House would, ‘support a declaration of independence by the people of Kosovo.’34 Reading this to mean that the United States would support a unilateral declaration of independence, Belgrade immediately issued a strong warning that such a move would be in direct contravention of the UN Charter and would immediately be referred to the Security Council.35 The next day, in testimony given before the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Burns clarified that this was not the case. As he explained, moves to recognise Kosovo’s independence would in fact be based on a UN resolution lifting the legal and political impediments to independence. This would then allow the United States, and others, to recognise the new state. As for the threat of a Russian veto, he remained confident that this would not happen. As he had recently told Vladimir Titov, the Russian deputy foreign minister, Washington now believed that independence was, ‘inevitable.’36 However, Lavrov strongly disagreed with the US position. Arriving in Belgrade for two days of talks with Serbian officials, he declared that the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo had failed. Comparing it to the Annan Plan for the reunification of Cyprus, which had been defeated in a referendum three years earlier, he noted that in both cases the failure was the result of the international community to adopt unilateral decisions and ignore the interests of all concerned sides. And while he still refused to be drawn on the veto – as the Russian foreign ministry noted, there was nothing to veto at this stage – he again insisted that any imposed solution would be ‘unacceptable’. Importantly, he repeated the same message a few days later when he visited Brussels for meetings with EU officials.37 Belgrade was delighted by this, especially as it appeared to be

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winning support elsewhere. In addition to Russia and China, the Serbian Government now announced that it had secured the support of an unnamed fifth non-permanent member of the Council and that a battle was taking place over a sixth.38 Security Council fact-finding mission On 24 April the fifteen ambassadors to the UN Security Council began their fact-finding mission. After receiving a briefing from UN officials in New York, they travelled to Brussels. There they were told by NATO officials that while the situation was ‘calm, but tense’, the status quo was untenable. Any further delays could lead to more outbreaks of violence. This message was also echoed by EU officials, who also stressed that the entire EU strategy on Kosovo was now resting on the Security Council. A united European position on Kosovo, and the legitimacy of the future EU mission, depended on a clear decision by the Council.39 Next, the team travelled to Belgrade. There they were presented with Serbian proposals for ‘supervised autonomy’. Under this scheme, all legislative, executive and judicial powers would be devolved to the province, except for those relating to foreign, defence, customs and monetary policy as well as the protection of Serb cultural sites in the province. Moreover, the Kosovo Albanians could also have representatives in the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the National Bank of Serbia. As for security, apart from border forces, Kosovo would be demilitarised, with international forces safeguarding peace and security.40 Under questioning from the delegation, the Government rejected suggestions that Serbs and Albanians could not live together. Apart from the Albanians living in southern Serbia, who had participated in the recent elections, there were an estimated 10,000 Albanians living in Belgrade, and who faced no problems.41 As the meetings wound up, Serbian officials were evidently pleased with the outcome. As they saw things, at least one member, South Africa, now recognised that the choice was not simply between independence and a continuation of the status quo.42 That evening the delegation was flown by a French military transport plane to Pristina. Under tight security, they met with local leaders the next morning. There both Sejdiu and Çeku presented the case for independence. Stressing that there was a genuine

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commitment to the preservation of minority rights, not only for Serbs, but for all the minorities in Kosovo, the team also received a briefing on standards implementation.43 Like the Serbian Government, Pristina was pleased to have an opportunity to present its case, and was particularly heartened by British and US determination to see Kosovo become independent.44 Thereafter, the team travelled north to the divided town of Mitrovica to meet with local leaders. This was followed, the next day, by visits to other parts of the province, including trips to locations where there had been fighting between the two communities.45 Finally, the team travelled to Vienna to meet with Ahtisaari. As the delegation travelled back to New York, both the Russian and American representatives felt that the trip had won members over to their side. As Churkin noted, while there had been progress in the social and administrative spheres, the overall situation in Kosovo remained unsatisfactory. He would therefore be very surprised if the members stuck to positions that had been based on UNMIK reports.46 In contrast, Zalmay Khalilzad, the new US representative to the Council, was confident that a settlement would be reached within weeks.47 Indeed, it was even revealed that work had started on a draft resolution, despite ‘Russia’s grave objections’.48 Meanwhile, quite apart from Moscow’s position, the depth of divisions within Europe over Kosovo was now becoming more pronounced. This was highlighted during a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Oslo when it was decided, following pressure from a number of members, that further changes could in fact be made to the plan to accommodate Kosovo Serb concerns – even though Ahtisaari had warned against tinkering with his proposals. Denying that the decision amounted to a U-turn, Washington announced that it was amenable to legitimate suggestions for amendments, as long as they did not change the fundamental principles of the plan.49 On 2 May, the Council received a short summary of the trip from Johan Verbeke, the Belgian permanent representative to the UN, who had led the fact-finding mission. This was a prelude to a full debate, which would be held the following week once a final report had been produced.50 Although Churkin again reiterated the need for a ‘real discussion’ on Kosovo, the supporters of independence believed that they were now winning the debate. Despite Belgrade’s claims that it had won over a number of the non-permanent members, Britain and the United States believed that 11 or 12 members were now on their

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side.51 This confidence was particularly evident when the Contact Group reconvened, in London, for further talks. As Burns explained to reporters, the main purpose of the meeting was to persuade the Russian Government to accept the plan and work on presenting a resolution within the next 30 days that would pave the way for independence.52 The seriousness of efforts to draft a resolution was signalled just days later when the members of the Security Council met for an informal discussion at the offices of the French permanent representation. There they discussed a 13-point set of principles outlining the possible elements of a resolution that had been put together by the United States and Germany; which although not a member of the Council was acting in its capacity as EU president.53 According to these principles, a resolution calling for the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan would be presented under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, dealing with, ‘Actions with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’. In doing so, the resolution would also note that Kosovo amounted to a ‘special case’ by virtue of ‘the violence and repression of the 1990s’, which made continued Serb rule over Kosovo impossible.54 At the same time, in order to try to ease Russian concerns, and in line with Burns’ earlier statements before the US House of Representatives, the resolution would not proclaim Kosovo to be an independent state – a move that was outside the power of the UN. Instead, the proposed resolution would open the way for Pristina to declare independence. This could then be legally recognised by others.55 It was hoped that this formula would provide Russia with the face-saving exit strategy that many Western diplomats believed it was still looking for.56 On Thursday 10 May the UN Security Council met again for a public debate on the finalised report on the recent fact-finding mission.57 After receiving a summary by Verbeke, in which it was noted that despite improvements more still needed to be done to improve the implementation of the standards, Churkin insisted that the talks had been hastily and prematurely suspended and that the Ahtisaari plan could not provide the basis for a final settlement of the Kosovo issue from within the Security Council. Instead, it would provide a negative and dangerous precedent in international politics, by rewarding separatism. In Russia’s view the elements of the proposals that were acceptable to both sides should be implemented, but that talks aimed at reaching a compromise should continue.

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Likewise, China also expressed its belief that talks should continue in an attempt to narrow the differences between the two sides. In contrast, the British, French and American representatives all insisted that the mission had confirmed the UN Envoy’s view that the positions of the two sides were irreconcilable. With confidence still running high that an agreement on a resolution could be reached in a matter of weeks, the next day a draft text of a resolution based on the 13-point memorandum was circulated to the Council.58 However, despite hopes that Moscow would be prepared to accept the decision to omit a formal statement endorsing independence, the Russian Government immediately rejected the document. Indeed, speaking on Russian television, Churkin acknowledged for the first time that a scenario whereby Russia would have to use its veto was becoming ‘more and more likely’. However, as he explained, a final decision would be deferred until after a forthcoming visit to Moscow by Rice.59 Rice visits Moscow While Kosovo was certainly an important item on the agenda of the meetings between Rice and Russian officials, over the previous few months tensions had been growing between Russia and the United States over a number of other key issues. These included US plans to construct a missile defence shield in Europe and NATO’s growing ties with former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine and Georgia. As a result, concerns were growing that a new cold war was now emerging. Arriving in Moscow, Rice sought to downplay such fears, albeit noting that it was not an easy period in the relationship and that some ‘intensive diplomacy’ was needed.60 As a result, during their discussions both sides agreed to tone down their general rhetoric. On the question of Kosovo this meant calling for efforts to continue to reach a settlement acceptable to all sides.61 Despite this apparent agreement to find a mutually acceptable arrangement over Kosovo, Rice nevertheless continued to insist that Kosovo could not be a part of Serbia again. Even more significantly, she announced that if the Security Council blocked a decision Washington would be willing to recognise a unilateral declaration of independence anyway.62 Realising that this could upset relations with Moscow so soon after an apparent agreement to ease their language on key issues, Fried quickly stepped in to try to correct any wrong

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impression that this statement may have created. Explaining that although Rice had been unable to make any progress on Kosovo in Moscow, Washington saw no advantages by acting outside of the Security Council – even though independence now appeared to be on its way, ‘one way or another’.63 But just as the United States appeared to be determined to see Kosovo become independent, Russia’s resolve on the issue was also hardening. Meeting with representatives from a number of Russian NGOs just prior to her departure, Rice was explicitly warned not to underestimate the depth of Russian feelings on Kosovo.64 The Security Council discussions continue As the talks were taking place between Moscow and Washington, news emerged that after three months of highly charged discussions between Tadić’s DS and Koštunica’s DSS a new government had at long last been formed in Serbia.65 Once again, Koštunica would serve as prime minister. Speaking at the swearing in ceremony, he stressed that Kosovo would be one of the five key priorities for the new government – alongside EU membership, cooperation with the Hague tribunal, social and economic reforms and fighting crime and corruption. In order to emphasise the importance of Kosovo, which remained, ‘an integral and inalienable part’ of Serbian territory’, he also announced that a new Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija had been established. Replacing the Kosovo Coordination Centre, this new ministry would be led by Slobodan Samardžić; a key member of the Serbian negotiating team, and a close ally of Koštunica.66 While there was international relief at the news that Serbia now had a new government, various officials in Washington and Brussels insisted that the United States and the European Union remained determined to press ahead with independence.67 However, the new Serbian Government quickly emphasised that it had not changed its position on the Ahtisaari proposals. Meeting with Rehn, who had flown to Belgrade to meet with the incoming government, Vuk Jeremić, the new foreign minister, emphasised that while EU accession was a priority for the new administration, Serbia would never accept an independent Kosovo.68 Likewise, European attempts to change Moscow’s views were failing to produce any results. Following an extremely acrimonious meeting in the southern Russian town of Samara, where tensions between the

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EU and Russia had surfaced over a variety of issues, Lavrov again stressed that a solution must be decided by the ‘Serbian people’. Indeed, as he explained, anyone who believed that it could be solved by the EU, the US and Russia were obviously burdened by ‘colonial instincts’. On top of this, he also reiterated that if Kosovo were to become independent it would inevitably become a precedent, whether or not anyone wanted it to be so.69 The strength of Russian feeling on the issue was further emphasised to European leaders just days later when Putin travelled to Austria and Luxembourg and delivered a further warning against any moves to grant Kosovo statehood.70 The fact that the differences were not getting any narrower was openly acknowledged by Russian officials after yet another meeting of the Contact group.71 However, as technical discussions on the draft resolution continued at the UN, Western officials insisted that changes could still be made to the draft to make it more acceptable to all Council members.72 By now reports were emerging that several key members, such as Indonesia and Slovakia, appeared to be reconsidering their position – especially if a resolution confirmed Kosovo unique position in international law and that it would not be a precedent.73 Likewise, high-level efforts were being made to win Chinese support for the proposals.74 Against this backdrop, hopes that an agreement might be reached between Russia and the United States grew with the announcement that Putin and Bush had agreed to put Kosovo on their bilateral agenda at the forthcoming G8 summit, in early June.75 However, any such optimism was quickly quashed. During a tense meeting of G8 foreign ministers in Potsdam, a week prior to the main summit, Steinmeier appealed to Russia to give up its objection to Kosovo’s independence. Once again, Lavrov refused – asking why other, longer-standing issues, such as the Western Sahara and Palestine, were not being dealt with first.76 Meanwhile, a revised draft resolution, which was circulated to the members of the Security Council by Britain, was immediately rejected by Churkin. Arguing that no substantial changes had been made, only words and terms, he gave the clearest indication to date that Russia would be willing to use its veto if the resolution was formally presented to the Council.77 By this point, neither Russia nor the United States showed any indication that it would be willing to back down. In an interview on Albanian television, and meeting with Kosovo Albanian leaders in Prague, Bush insisted that the Ahtisaari plan was the only way forward

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to ensure regional peace and stability and that ‘accelerated steps’ were being taken to pass a resolution.78 In contrast, speaking to foreign journalists, Putin again repeated the call for further negotiations, and questioned the reasons why various countries appeared to want to reach a solution in such a hurry.79 The G8 Summit On 6 June leaders from Germany, France, Britain, Canada, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States met for their annual summit in the German resort of Heiligendamm. However, as Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, readily acknowledged, given the meeting between the foreign ministers the previous week there was little chance that there would be a breakthrough on Kosovo The situation was not helped by the fact that there were a particularly large number of major international issues on the agenda, such as climate change, development, and international trade. Indeed, Kosovo was just one of a number of foreign policy matters – including counterterrorism, Iran, Darfur, Afghanistan, Lebanon and North Korea – that were discussed over lunch on the second day.80 To add to this, relations between the United States and Russia had deteriorated significantly over the previous days over the planned US missile defence shield in Europe.81 Realising that no agreement between Washington and Moscow was possible at the moment, and that Russia was all but certain to veto a resolution presented at this stage, Nicolas Sarkozy, the new French President, came up with a radical suggestion. Calling on Russia to accept the ‘unavoidable prospect’ of independence, he proposed that a resolution be delayed for six months to allow for further talks to take place. If, after that, no agreement had been reached, the Ahtisaari plan would be implemented. While the call for new talks was certainly welcome, Moscow was unwilling to accept that independence would be the inevitable outcome of the process. Therefore, speaking at the end of the summit, Putin announced that Russia’s stance on Kosovo had not changed. Quite apart from the precedent it would set, he once again reiterated that there could be no final decision on the status of Kosovo without Serbia’s agreement. However, Sarkozy was unbowed by this. As he explained, a delay of some sort was nevertheless worth pursuing, if only to try to ensure European unity over Kosovo.82 The outcome of the summit was greeted with deep disappointment

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in Pristina. As one newspaper noted, it had even exceeded the very worst expectations of the Albanians.83 Rather than softening its stance on Kosovo, Western diplomats were now forced to concede that Russia’s position was in fact hardening.84 This was again highlighted just days later when Putin met with Koštunica in St Petersburg and again reaffirmed Moscow’s opposition to independence.85 However, just as Russia was sticking to its guns, so too was Washington. On 10 June, during the first visit to Albania by a serving US president, Bush announced that his administration was committed to statehood, regardless of the current deadlock. As he told cheering crowds, ‘at some point in time, sooner rather than later, you’ve got to say enough is enough, Kosovo is independent. And that’s the position we’ve taken.’86 In Kosovo, there was delight at the news. As far as Çeku was concerned, it amounted to a de facto declaration of independence.87 However, Belgrade dismissed the statement. In a blunt rebuttal, Koštunica stated that while the United States had the right to support other states and people in accordance with its interests, it could not offer them something that did not belong to it: ‘the United States has to find some other way to express its love and affection for the Albanians instead of giving them Serbian territory as a present.’88 Proposals for new talks gain ground By this point there was no disguising the depth of the problem that now existed. Quite apart from the divisions between Russia and the United States, there also appeared to be a difference of views between the European members of the Contact group. This was graphically illustrated when the political directors of the five Western members of the Contact Group – the so-called ‘Quint’ – met in Paris on 12 June. During the meeting there were heated discussions as to how to proceed. The French proposal for a delay was discussed at length, but without agreement. It was also reported that the discussion had looked at ways of opening up the Ahtisaari package and only use the parts that concerned a future European presence in Kosovo. In the end, however, the group issued a statement reiterating their support for the Ahtisaari proposal, but also called for further discussions at the Security Council.89 This call for more talks at the UN did little to mollify Russia, which was livid that it had been excluded from the meeting. As far as Moscow was concerned, ‘private discussions’ of

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this sort not only undermined the Contact Group’s stated desire to reach compromise solutions, they also lent credence to Russian concerns that preparations were being made for ‘unilateral scenarios’.90 While it now appeared to be the case that the United States, and Britain, had come to terms with the possibility that it might not be possible to gain UN support for independence, there were still many European states that opposed any efforts to solve the issue without Security Council approval. This was again shown during a meeting of NATO defence ministers, when a number of members called for a Security Council resolution.91 As a result, it now became obvious that some further discussions between Belgrade and Pristina would need to take place. Even if this did not succeed in ending Russia’s veto, it would help to show these countries that every attempt had been made to reach a settlement and the Moscow was preventing a solution in the UN for its own reasons. It was with this in mind that Wisner travelled to Pristina on 15 June to break the news to the Kosovo Albanian leaders that more talks might be needed. Recognising that the process was taking longer than anyone would like, the US envoy called for ‘calm and discipline’; reassuring them that as far as the United States and the European Union were concerned, independence remained the only possible outcome. He also reminded that that a UN resolution would allow them to join the EU and NATO. Meanwhile, that same day, Massimo D’Alema, the Italian foreign minister, broke the news to Belgrade that further talks could take place. But, as he explained, independence would be the their ‘final goal’.92 Both sides immediately rejected the idea. As far as Çeku was concerned, the time for discussions was over. The Ahtisaari proposals were non-negotiable. As for Belgrade, it called the idea of discussions with a pre-defined final result an ‘insult to common sense’.93 However, support for the idea continued to grow within the European Union. Speaking at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels, Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister, and a former UN special representative to Kosovo, again pressed the case for a short delay in order to achieve a peaceful solution. While some countries, notably Britain and Denmark, saw no purpose to more talks, there was clearly a growing resistance to the idea of pursuing a unilateral solution. In the end the ministers adopted a statement accepting that the Ahtisaari plan provided the basis of a Security

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Council resolution, which would also be the basis for a future EU and international presence in Kosovo.94 In response to this, Serbia clarified that it would support new talks, as long as they did not lead to independence.95 However, and importantly, with the possibility of further discussions now growing, Ahtisaari made it clear that he did not believe that he would have a part to play in any new process.96 On 20 June a third version of the resolution was circulated that explicitly called on the UN Secretary-General, or his representative, to hold a further negotiations within 120 days of the resolution. However, if no agreement had been reached by the end of this period, the Ahtisaari plan would automatically come into force – unless the Security Council expressed otherwise after having conducted an evaluation based on a report by the Secretary-General or his representatives.97 Immediately, the US and British representatives sought to allay the concerns in Pristina by insisting that the final outcome of the process would remain the same.98 It was precisely for this reason that Churkin rejected the new text. It simply would not provide sufficient incentives for the two sides to negotiate seriously. As Titov noted, Russia remained committed to new discussions without artificial timeframes, and which would not automatically implement ‘postponed’ decisions on Kosovo’s independence.”99 As Belgrade thanked Russia for blocking this new resolution, there now appeared to be a real danger that Pristina might press ahead with a unilateral declaration of independence. As Sejdiu and Çeku explained, Kosovo could not be held hostage to Russia. If there was no way to reach an agreement in the Security Council then there would be no choice but to act without UN authorisation. In response, EU officials immediately issued a stern warning that any attempt to pre-empt a decision by the Security Council would carry grave consequences for Kosovo’s future.100 Although certain states would be willing to recognise independence without UN authorisation, if needs be, many others were adamant that they would not do so without a Security Council resolution – as was again highlighted when EU leaders met in Brussels for the European Council on 21 June.101 In the meantime, efforts to try to broker an agreement at the UN continued. Despite a plea by the UN Secretary-General for the members to reach an agreement, differences remained over the draft resolution. While Churkin reiterated that the current document removed all incentive to negotiate, Karen Pierce, the British representative continued to insist that as the Kosovo Albanians would

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not accept anything other than independence. To this end, it was pointless for Belgrade to offer anything else.102 With this in mind, a fourth draft presented soon afterwards made no attempt to change the underlying logic of the previous text. Instead, a few tweaks had been made to the language, noting that Kosovo was a special case due to its history and that it could not be regarded by the Security Council as a precedent. Once again, Russia rejected it.103 Given the deadlock at the UN, many now believed that a meeting between Bush and Putin at the Bush family residence in Kennebunkport, Maine, on 1–2 July, would be the last chance to reach a deal. Certainly, Belgrade and Pristina viewed it as such – with both certain that their position would win the day.104 However, such hopes again proved to be misplaced. Even before the meeting started it was obvious that little would be achieved. Just as Russian officials continued to press the case for further talks aimed at a compromise that would not set a precedent, US officials maintained Kosovo’s independence was inevitable. Moreover, against the backdrop of serious disagreements on a range of other far more major issues, such as missile defence and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it hardly seemed surprising that Kosovo was not even mentioned in the joint press conference held at the end of the talks. Instead, White House officials later explained to journalists that the two leaders had decided that discussions would continue between Rice and Lavrov on the matter.105 The end of Security Council discussions It was now obvious that any further attempts to persuade Russia to change its position would fail. To this end, Washington appeared to revise its strategy. Abandoning all talk of any immediate recognition of independence, US officials suggested that a resolution may even have to be held over until the NATO Bucharest summit, the following year. As one anonymous senior European political figure was quoted as saying, ‘Britain and the U.S. thought the Russians would go along with this…Now the entire strategy has blown up in their face.’106 In real terms, this now meant that Washington and those EU states in favour of independence now accepted that a further round of talks was necessary; if only to prove to those European states that harboured concerns over independence that all options had been investigated.107 However, none of this signalled a retreat from independence. As Daniel Fried, the Assistant Secretary of State for

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European and Eurasian Affairs, explained to Serbian officials during a visit to Belgrade, any new talks would not extend beyond 120 days and that the final outcome of the process would be independence.108 By now, though, it was apparent that this view had few supporters within the Security Council; even amongst those that essentially favoured the Ahtisaari proposals. Italy, for instance, was reported to have reservations about suggesting a predetermined outcome to the talks.109 The latest version of the resolution, released on 11 July, therefore made no mention of the Ahtisaari proposals, let alone independence. ‘Welcoming’ the help of the Contact Group, it noted that after 120 days of discussions the Council would review the situation further.110 The crucial addition to this draft was a clause stating that following the end of the talks UNMIK would be replaced by an EU mission to Kosovo. While this new text certainly represented a major change to previous drafts, it nevertheless remained unacceptable to Moscow. As Lavrov explained, the problem was that the new draft had not taken the Ahtisaari plan, or independence, off the agenda.111 Interceding on behalf of the sponsors of the resolution, Sarkozy and Kouchner explained to the Russian Government that while they still saw the Ahtisaari plan as a basis for an eventual settlement, the new resolution did not envisage the automatic implementation of the proposals.112 Moscow was unmoved. As far as it was concerned, the suggestion that the UN be replaced by the EU, which was also a provision contained in the Ahtisaari proposals, was designed to pave the way for Kosovo to gain independence by the back door. As Churkin told reporters, the new text therefore had ‘zero’ chance of passing.113 Despite Russian objections to the text, the latest draft resolution was officially circulated to the members of the Council on 18 July. However, when the Council convened two days later, on 20 July, it was obvious to all concerned that Russia had decided to cast its veto if it went to a vote. The sponsors of the resolution therefore had no choice but to suspend their efforts. After four months of debate in the Security Council, it was agreed that further discussions on the future of Kosovo would continue within the Contact Group – and, crucially, between Belgrade and Pristina.114

5 TROIKA TALKS

The decision by the United States, Britain and France to shelve the resolution was widely regarded as a hard fought diplomatic victory for Serbia and Russia.1 Certainly Moscow saw it as such. Welcoming the announcement, the Russian Government reiterated that only the Security Council could take a legitimate decision on Kosovo and that any attempt to bypass the UN would not only destabilise the Balkans it would also negatively affect conflicts elsewhere. Belgrade was also delighted by the decision. Even though Tadić pointed out that the status question had still to be answered, and Serbia was still not in a ‘brilliant’ position,2 there was no doubt that the situation looked better than it had done at any point since the process began. Capitalising on this development, the Serbian Parliament now passed another resolution – by 217 votes to 12, with 3 abstentions – restating that Kosovo was Serbian territory and that independence would have ‘unforeseeable consequences’ for regional stability.3 In Pristina, the decision to abandon the resolution was met with anger and disappointment. Although Sejdiu took a pragmatic line, arguing that a Russian veto at this stage may have discouraged a number of European states from recognising Kosovo’s independence, and thus it was better to avoid a vote and look for alternatives, Çeku made no attempt to hide his frustration. After a meeting with Rücker, during which he accused the UN Security Council of failing to act on Kosovo, he called on the Kosovo Assembly to prepare a resolution paving the way for a declaration of independence on 28 November, Albanian Flag Day. However, the United States quickly stepped in to quell such talk. During a meeting with the Unity Team in Washington, a few days later, Rice warned Pristina not to try to ‘short-circuit’ the

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diplomatic process. This had the desired result. The Team stressed that Pristina would continue to work closely with the EU and US, and would not declare independence without prior consultations with its key partners.4 The Troika is formed In the meantime, efforts to forge a united European position continued without success. Meeting on 23 July, EU foreign ministers again failed to agree on a common stance on the Ahtisaari proposals. They did, however, reach one important decision. Following a proposal from Germany, the ministers agreed that the forthcoming talks between Pristina and Belgrade should be conducted by a mediating Troika, made up of senior diplomats from Russia, the United States and the European Union.5 Two days later, at a meeting of the Contact Group in Vienna, both Russia and the United States agreed to the idea. So too did Ban Kimoon, the UN Secretary-General. On 1 August, the UN officially announced the start of a new round of status talks. These would be held under the auspices of the Contact Group, which would then report back to Ban by 10 December.6 And while UNOSEK would be ‘associated’ with the process, standing ready to provide information and clarifications, the talks would be officially be chaired by three senior diplomats from Russia, the United States and the European Union. Within days, the three officials were officially named: Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko and Frank Wisner, the Russian and American special envoys for Kosovo respectively, and Wolfgang Ischinger, the German Ambassador to London.7 Belgrade and Pristina immediately stressed that their basic positions remained the same. Pressing the case of a settlement based on extensive autonomy, Serbian officials reiterated that while the Ahtisaari Plan was unacceptable, as was a confederation between Serbia and Kosovo, the Serbian Government would be willing to allow Pristina to develop some direct links with international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank. It was also prepared to allow Kosovo to have its own representation in certain sports and cultural organisations, in a similar manner to the Faroe Islands in Denmark and Scotland in Great Britain.8 However, Pristina refused to even consider autonomy. Arguing that independence remained the only possible outcome of the process, all talk of changes to the

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Ahtisaari Plan was off limits – as was any suggestion of some form of partition. Indeed, Çeku insisted that the Unity Team would walk away from the table if an attempt was made to discuss anything other than statehood. As he explained, the sole purpose of the talks was to provide those countries that had yet to decide to recognise Kosovo’s independence more time to change their position.9 Meanwhile, Washington and Moscow held firm to their respective positions. Although Jeremić insisted that Rice had assured him that the outcome of the process should not be fixed in advance, US officials explicitly stated that the forthcoming negotiations would be the last chapter in the process and that independence remained the final outcome.10 As well as insisting that the Ahtisaari proposals for supervised independence had been rejected by the Security Council, and so would not form the basis of the forthcoming talks, BotsanKharchenko told journalists that the discussions would not be the final negotiations. As he explained, the Secretary-General had not set a deadline for the process. Instead, he had simply given a date for when the Troika should report its findings.11 It was against this backdrop that the Troika met in London, on 9 August, for its first meeting. This, in turn, seemed to produce some agreement on basic principles. Emerging from the meeting, Ischinger told reporters that while the Ahtisaari plan did in fact remain on the table, even though it had not been ratified by the Security Council, the Troika would not be presenting any specific solutions to the sides. Instead, the purpose of this new process was to facilitate dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina in the hope that they might be able to arrive at a compromise solution of their own. As for the question of the deadline, he confirmed that 10 December would be the end of talks held under the auspices of the Troika – thus leaving open the possibility for further talks in a different format at a later stage.12 The next morning the three diplomats travelled to Belgrade to begin their mission in earnest. As expected, Tadić and Koštunica presented them with Serbia’s proposals for autonomy and once again emphasised that while it was committed to a negotiated solution, the Serbian Government would not allow Kosovo to secede. Nor would it accept any changes to border. Likewise, in Pristina, the Unity Team was equally clear about its positions. While the members also spoke of their commitment to constructive dialogue, they also insisted that independence was not open for negotiation. And, like Belgrade, they would not accept any changes to established boundaries.13

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This emphasis on boundaries was significant inasmuch as the Troika quickly made it clear that its commitment to exploring all options meant that it would not rule anything out at this stage. This led to a major controversy when, responding to a question during a press conference, Ischinger appeared to suggest that even partition would be acceptable if the two sides agreed to it – despite the fact that it had previously been ruled out as a solution by the Contact Group. If this was truly the case, it would open up the possibility of a whole new direction in the status process. Despite its outward rejection of any proposal that would see Kosovo gain independence, there had nevertheless been occasional hints from Belgrade that partition might in fact be acceptable compromise if put on the agenda. However, the idea was immediately and strongly condemned in Pristina, where Çeku again warned that the Unity Team would leave the discussions if some form of division or territorial adjustment was raised. In response, Ischinger and Botsan-Kharchenko both insisted that partition was not on the agenda.14 Indirect talks between the sides On 30 August the two sides gathered at the Austrian Foreign Ministry in Vienna for the first round of indirect discussions. As expected, little was achieved. Samardžić and Jeremić again presented Serbia’s proposals for autonomy, albeit backed by international guarantees. Similarly, the Unity Team remained insistent that it would only accept statehood, emphasising that if a negotiated agreement on this could not be reached by 10 December they would simply go ahead and declare independence anyway.15 Meanwhile, further suggestions that Belgrade might be amenable to some form of partition now emerged. According to reports, Koštunica had sent an envoy around Europe to sound out various governments on the idea. While this was vehemently denied by Belgrade, Serbian officials nevertheless hinted that some form of division might be acceptable on the grounds that that reaching a compromise solution was more important that having a solution imposed.16 However, all such talk was again quickly quashed; this time by international officials. Speaking on the issue, Olli Rehn, the EU Enlargement Commissioner, insisted that the European Union would reject any form of division, even if the parties had agreed to it.17 Whether this was actually the case was unclear as the EU had still

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not reached a joint position on Kosovo. In the run up to a meeting EU foreign ministers met in the Portuguese town of Viana do Castelo, on 7 September, Bernard Kouchner and David Miliband, the French and British foreign ministers, issued an appeal for Europe to stand together, arguing that Kosovo was a major test of the Union’s common foreign and security policy.18 However, it did little to change any opinions. In addition to the outright opposition to independence from Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain, a number of other members, including Germany, continued to harbour serious concerns about bypassing the United Nations.19 Washington, on the other hand, had no such worries. As Kurt Volker, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, now explained, if an agreement was not reached between the sides by 10 December, the United States would be willing to recognise a unilateral declaration of independence. Although the US Embassy in Belgrade issued a statement insisting that Volker’s statement had been misinterpreted, the comments were roundly condemned by Russia and the European Union. Both Botsan-Kharchenko and Solana noted that the members of the Contact Group had all agreed to support the process and refrain from statements that that could undermine the talks. In Belgrade, the comments were seen as yet further evidence that the United States was in fact trying to form a ‘NATO puppet state’ on Serbia’s territory – a claim levelled the previous month by a close advisor to Koštunica, and vigorously denied by US officials.20 Indeed, Koštunica even wrote to the President of the Security Council to complain of US threats to Serbia.21 In what may have been an attempt to limit the fallout from Volker’s comments, Ischinger stoked further controversy by now suggesting that independence was not in fact the inevitable outcome of the process. In an interview with a British newspaper, he insisted that if a realistic solution was to be found it would require the two sides to move away from labels. There was simply no way to overcome ‘independence versus autonomy’ gap. However, one thing that both sides could agree on was international supervision. To this extent, he therefore preferred to leave the question of independence open, and instead concentrate on a ‘strong supervised status’. As for the argument that Pristina would go it alone and declare independence unilaterally if it did not get what it wanted, he made it clear that he had little time for this line of thinking. As he explained, the independence label was ‘worth nothing’ without international

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support. Given Kosovo’s dependence of foreign aid, he asked where Pristina would get its income from if it broke ties with the international community.22 Once again, the Kosovo Albanians were incensed at the comments. However, despite claims in the Kosovo media that Ischinger had telephoned Sejdiu to say that he had been misinterpreted, no official retraction, clarification or denial was issued.23 On the afternoon of the 18 September, the members of the Troika held a two hour meeting with Serbian team at the Foreign Office in London. This time Jeremić suggested that Hong Kong – with its own police, judiciary and currency – might be worth exploring as an autonomy model for Kosovo. However, the Unity Team had ideas of its own. Meeting with the Troika the next morning, they presented the mediating team with a draft treaty of friendship which would be signed by Serbia and an independent Kosovo.24 Despite the continued differences between the sides on the very essence of status, the Troika nevertheless announced that that time had come to start direct talks. In doing so, however, Ischinger also issued a plea to Belgrade and Pristina to come to the discussions with new ideas and realistic proposals.25 Although the new discussions had failed to produce any breakthroughs, as far as Tadić was concerned a compromise solution was still possible if only the United States and certain EU members would stop encouraging the Kosovo Albanians to declare independence.26 The call went unheeded. Soon afterwards, Rice repeated Washington’s commitment to the Ahtisaari plans and once again stressed that there would be no reunification between Serbia and Kosovo. The two were now separate and would remain so. Referring to Pristina’s suggestion of a treaty of friendship, she even went as far as to state that the Troika discussions would have no affect on the outcome of the process. Instead, they were simply aimed at easing relations between Kosovo and Serbia following independence.27 This sparked yet another angry response from Lavrov, who accused the US of deliberately hindering a deal by removing all incentive for Pristina to compromise. He also reiterated that any decision to recognise a unilateral declaration of independence would be contrary to international law.28 Meanwhile, during a meeting with a panel of foreign experts, Putin appeared to endorse Belgrade’s proposals for autonomy with a limited degree of international recognition in certain spheres. However, while some degree of support for cultural and

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economic status ‘could be acceptable’, Russia would not accept any form of political recognition. Moreover, the Russian President also insisted that the state of uncertainty in Kosovo since 1999 was still better than, ‘an unacceptable solution’.29 Direct talks begin On 27 September, the foreign ministers of the Contact Group met for an hour-long high-level meeting on the margins of the UN General Assembly, in New York, where they were joined by Ban, Solana and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NATO Secretary General. Despite the acrimony that had emerged over Kosovo, David Miliband, who had chaired the meeting, afterwards insisted that the talks had been extremely constructive.30 Certainly there was little evidence of division in the joint statement issued afterwards. Urging the parties to engage in the process in a constructive manner and ‘in a spirit of compromise’, and refrain from any actions that could destabilise the situation, the Group reaffirmed that the principles of a settlement should be based on the Group’s November 2005 statement and on UN Resolution 1244, but also repeated that any solution should also be acceptable to the people of Kosovo. The statement also noted that, ‘Ministers underlined that any future status settlement should focus on developing the special nature of the relations between the two sides, especially in their historical, economic, cultural and human dimensions.’ And while it did not refer to the 10 December as a deadline for the talks, it did note that it would mark the end of the Troika process.31 The next day, 28 September, the two sides met for their first direct talks since the resumption of negotiations. As expected, there was no meeting of minds at this initial session. During the course of their discussions, which lasted two hours, the two sides once again repeated their standard positions. Just as Belgrade called for a solution based on autonomy, Pristina pressed the case for the establishment of good neighbourly relations between two independent and sovereign states. And although the atmosphere inside the meeting was described as cordial by observers, little of this was apparent as the two teams emerged and immediately blamed one another for the lack of progress.32 Despite this, it was announced that a second round of direct talks would be held in Brussels on 14 October. Meanwhile, in Kosovo, fears were once again growing about the

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security situation. In recent weeks pictures had emerged of black-clad members of the outlawed Albanian National Army (ANA) posing with automatic weapons and sniper rifles. In response to this, Belgrade announced that while it had no intention of invading Kosovo, it would be increasing its forces close to the boundary.33 Such concerns were also highlighted in the latest UNMIK report, which emphasised that there was a real danger that the progress made since 1999 was now at risk.34 This in turn prompted Ban to urge the Council to consider how to deal with the situations in the event that the two sides were unable to reach an agreement.35 However, the growing tensions in Kosovo did little to change matters at the UN. Both Washington and Moscow were determined to hold their ground. At a closed meeting of the members of the Council to discuss the report, Churkin and Khalilzad again clashed over the timing of the status talks. While the Russian insisted that they must continue until an agreement was reached, the US representative insisted that the longer they went on the greater the threat to stability in the province. They must end on 10 December.36 Meanwhile, following a meeting with British officials, in London, Çeku reiterated that Kosovo would declare independence after 10 December – with or without UN authorisation.37 On 14 October the teams met at the EU headquarters in Brussels. There they were told that the talks were no longer exploratory. Rather, the negotiations had entered a decisive phase and the time had come to make some ‘painful decisions’. But yet again the discussions failed to yield any results.38 By now, Serbian frustration at the way in which the Kosovo Albanians appeared to be stonewalling the discussions was becoming increasingly evident, as was its anger at Washington’s behaviour. Accusing the United States of deliberately trying to prevent a compromise solution from emerging, Koštunica now went as far as to suggest that Washington and NATO had launched their attacks against Serbia in 1999 with the specific intention of giving Kosovo independence – a charge rejected by the State Department.39 At the same time, tempers were also beginning to fray in Pristina, where Çeku was now openly suggesting that Kosovo could declare independence unilaterally if no agreement was reached. As he explained, it was better to ask for forgiveness for an action rather than permission. This time it was the turn of the Albanian Government to rein him in. Tirana stressed that any steps must be coordinated with the US and the other members of the Contact Group.40

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By now the talks had passed the half way stage and it was obvious that a more proactive approach was needed. Therefore, when the sides met again on 22 October, this time in Vienna, the two sides were presented with a 14-point document outlining areas of potential agreement.41 Significantly, the text deliberately omitted the word ‘independence’. It also avoided any reference to foreign or defence issues. However, it did state that Belgrade would not re-establish a physical presence in Kosovo. Despite the obvious lack of any reference to statehood, the document won support from Pristina, which viewed the 14-points as being broadly in line with the own views on the future relationship between Serbia and Kosovo. In contrast, Belgrade was unhappy with the points. For a start, it explicitly ruled out any role for the Serbian Government in Kosovo. At a minimum, Serbia must retain control over external affairs and the borders. Likewise, it made no reference to Resolution 1244. In response, Botsan-Kharchenko attempted to ease Serbian concerns by noting that the 14-point memorandum was not a solution proposal. It was simply an unofficial document designed to stimulate discussion and find areas where the two sides were not so far apart.42 Growing European acceptance for statehood Even at this stage, Ischinger was now openly conceding that it was increasingly unlikely that the two sides would reach an agreement.43 This admission in turn opened the way for US officials to begin lobbying even more heavily for European support in the event that a decision was blocked by the Security Council. Robert Gates, the US Defense Secretary, insisted that while Washington was giving the Troika a chance, everyone had to be realistic and prepare for what would happen after 10 December. Likewise, reports suggested that Wisner had told the representatives of EU members at the UN to be ready for ‘important decisions’ on Kosovo in January.44 Importantly, while some countries still held reservations about circumventing the UN, following Ischinger’s admission that the talks were failing, the German Government was now willing to accept that there might be no alternative to recognising independence without UN authorisation if needs be.45 As officials explained, while this decision might not be strictly according to the letter of Resolution 1244, it would nevertheless be taken in the spirit of the resolution,

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which envisaged an eventual decision on Kosovo’s status.46 At the same time, EU officials had also concluded that it would be possible to create an EU mission to succeed UNMIK without a further Security Council resolution. Instead, the legal powers of the UN would simply be ‘cascaded down’ to the European Union.47 Realising that the EU’s main members were all now lining up in support of statehood, with or without a Security Council resolution, and that they appeared to be preparing to send a mission to support the implementation of the Ahtisaari proposals, Moscow issued its sternest warning to date that any move to recognise a unilateral declaration of independence would carry serious implications elsewhere. In a particularly worrying development, the Russian Government even went as far as to suggest that it might be prepared recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in retaliation.48 However, EU leaders quickly made it clear that they were undeterred by such threats and would press on regardless. At a summit meeting with Russia just days later, they insisted that after 10 December the status process would enter a new phase and that an EU mission to replace UNMIK could be on the ground within 90 days. In response, Putin again asked why the EU was so keen to settle the matter so quickly, even if it meant subverting international law.49 In the meantime, Washington appeared to be growing increasingly concerned about the deterioration in its relations with Russia. Such fears had been heightened by the fact that Moscow signalled its intention to pull out of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe – a key arms control agreement – in retaliation against US plans to establish a missile shield in Europe. To this end, reports suggested that Washington was now exploring the possibility of forging some sort of ‘grand bargain’ with Russia over a range of issues – including Kosovo.50 Specifically, it was rumoured that US officials were considering the idea of freezing the status issue for 12 years, after which a referendum would be held on independence. In the meantime, billions of dollars of aid would be pumped into the province’s economy. Such a move, referred to as a ‘white peace’, would ensure that no one could claim a political victory. Although the State Department quickly denied the reports, the idea was immediately rejected in Pristina, where Kosovo Albanian leaders insisting that they could not be bought off or cheated out of independence.51 More concretely, another option now being explored by Ischinger was to create an accord based on the 1972 agreement normalising

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relations between East and West Germany. However, despite the fact that this was an idea that was particularly favoured by the German diplomat, who saw it as providing a real opportunity for Belgrade and Pristina to agree to disagree, the Serbian Government quickly rejected this idea, arguing that it was too similar to Kosovo Albanian proposal for a treaty of good relations between independent states.52 On 5 November the sides held a fourth round of direct talks. Although Ischinger still sought to encourage the sides to view the ‘status-neutral’ 14-points as a basis for some sort of agreement, the Troika was still willing to consider proposals acceptable to the parties themselves.53 In reply, Belgrade repeated its call for the sides to examine Hong Kong’s autonomy, arguing that it represented a ‘successful, sustainable, stable and functional’ model for a settlement. However, as before, the Unity Team refused to discuss the idea, insisting that it was entirely inappropriate for Kosovo given the different histories of the two territories.54 Recognising that the talks had all but come to an end, Ischinger now sought to press ahead with his ideas for an agreement that would allow Belgrade and Pristina to co-operate across a range of areas, such as trade, independently of any status decision.55 By now, however, the tide had turned against the idea, with both sides now rejecting the initiative. As far as the Serbian Government was concerned, the proposal was little more than another attempt to secure independence for the province. Kosovo, as an integral part of Serbia, could not have a ‘neutral status’. Meanwhile, Pristina insisted that the Kosovo Albanians could not accept any proposal that excluded independence, either openly or tacitly.56 Certainly, with just a month left before the deadline, there now appeared to be little reason for Pristina to negotiate over independence by this point. The recent suggestions that Washington was willing to put a status settlement on hold in order to do a deal with Moscow now appeared to be entirely unfounded. Indeed, the United States seemed to be ever more convinced that a solution would have to be found outside of the United Nations if Russia continued to block a settlement. Speaking before Congress, Burns reiterated his hope that the sides would reach an agreement, but if not the US would have to, ‘step up and make the right kind of decisions.’57 At the same time, reports suggested that the majority of the European Union had accepted the US view.58 These developments all contributed to a growing belief in Kosovo

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that independence was now, and at long last, inevitable. Speaking at a rally just before parliamentary elections, Hashim Thaçi, the leader of the main opposition Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), and a former KLA leader, told cheering crowds that he had received numerous assurances that an independent Kosovo would indeed be recognised internationally.59 Days later, following his party’s win in the polls, he went even further, telling jubilant supporters that Kosovo would declare independence immediately after 10 December.60 The comments brought a swift rebuke from EU foreign ministers, who warned the new leader not to take any action without prior coordination with the international community.61 By now, though, there appeared to be no choice but to accept a unilateral declaration of independence. As Ischinger explained in a briefing to the ministers, 100 days of ‘genuine and intense’ discussions had failed to reach a successful conclusion – even though it had explored, ‘almost every humanly-known option for squaring off the circle of the status question’. In his view, there was simply no further possibility of compromise between the two sides.62 Despite blaming Washington and Moscow for the impasse, noting that both had stifled the spirit of compromise,63 most of the ministers were now left with little doubt about the decision the European Union must now take. With the danger of instability in Kosovo growing, some sort of decision was now needed – even if it was made without Security Council approval, and even if it meant that Russia would be ‘unhappy’.64 Serbian proposals for autonomy On 20 November, the two sides met in Brussels for the fifth round of direct discussions. Despite the growing view that a compromise solution would be impossible to reach, Belgrade continued to press the case for autonomy, this time presenting a comparative assessment of several models, including Hong Kong and the Åland Islands, a Swedish-speaking autonomous area of Finland.65 At the same time, the Serbian team returned to a suggestion made by Tadić eighteen months earlier that the ‘essential autonomy’ on offer could be subject to a new Security Council resolution and set for a period of 20 years. By implication, this would hold open the possibility of full independence in the longer term. Although the talks lasted for four hours, Pristina continued to insist

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that immediate independence was the only outcome it was willing to accept. As Thaçi had stated in a newspaper interview a few days earlier, there was simply no room for compromise between the two sides on the question of statehood. Any and all proposals for autonomy – be they based on Hong Kong and China, or Cyprus – would fail.66 Emerging from the meeting, the two sides once again sought to lay the blame for the impasse on one another. While Jeremić emphasised that the Serbian side had again come to the table with ‘fresh ideas’, as had been requested by the Troika at the start of the process, the Unity Team accused Belgrade of simply trying to drag out the process, ‘until hell freezes.’67 With time now rapidly running out, Ischinger announced that a final round of direct talks would be held between the sides a week later. In the meantime, the Troika would continue to explore ways to forge relations between Belgrade and Pristina, regardless of the outcome of the status process.68 Even though the United States and most of the EU now appeared determined to press ahead with a status decision, Russia continued to insist that the process would continue after 10 December. Meeting with Jeremić in Moscow, Lavrov argued that the date was only a deadline for the Troika to offer solutions. It did not mark the end of all negotiations. He also launched a scathing attack on Western policy. Arguing that the United States and the European Union had succumbed to threats of violence by the Kosovo Albanians, he warned that any decision to grant independence in the face of blackmail would have wider repercussions elsewhere. If the West pressed ahead with recognising Kosovo as an independent state, Russia would act in full accordance with international law.69 Welcome as all these Russian statements of support were, by this point it was more all too obvious that events were inevitably leading towards a declaration of independence. With this in mind, the Serbian Government now began to prepare for the worst. An order went out to all government ministries to draw up a set of contingency measures in the event that the ‘blackest scenario’ did indeed come to pass. While Belgrade refused to divulge the details of these plans, observers believed that the measures could include the establishment of road blocks between Serbia and Kosovo, the imposition of trade embargoes, steps to cut off the electricity supply to the province and moves to create Serb controlled areas.70 Somewhat more ominously, it was also suggested that the Defence Ministry was drawing up

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contingency plans in the event that significant violence erupted in the province.71 Final discussions On Monday 26 November, the sides met for a sixth and final round of direct discussions at the Schloss Weikersdorf Hotel, a 13th Century Castle situated in the small Austrian spa town of Baden, near Vienna. Arriving at the talks, which were scheduled to last three days, the members of the Unity Team announced that the talks were a pointless waste of time. As Skënder Hyseni, the spokesman of the Unity Team, told reporters a few days earlier, the Albanian side would have to be ‘creative’ in order to find ways to exhaust the three days. In reply, Samardžić accused the Kosovo Albanians of acting as though independence had been promised to them. They clearly had no motive for further negotiations. However, Koštunica was also adamant about that Serbia would hold firm to its position. Arguing that Serbs and Albanians had to accept to live together and that a compromise was still possible, he nevertheless insisted that Serbia would not allow ‘even an inch’ of its territory to be taken away.72 As the talks got underway, Belgrade once again presented its autonomy proposals. Noting that it would only seek control over foreign and defence police, border control and the protection of Serbian heritage, it was, however, willing to allow Pristina to forge links with a number of international financial institutions, such as the IMF, and let it use a range of symbols normally reserved for sovereign states. Yet again, all this was rejected by the Unity Team, which saw the proposals as being based on the past, and not the future. This fed a growing sense of frustration within the Serbian delegation, which argued that the Kosovo Albanians were not even attempting to negotiate. As Samardžić noted, the Serbian Government had filed over 500 amendments to the Ahtisaari Plan, whereas Pristina had not even put forward a single suggestion on Belgrade’s proposals.73 It came as no surprise when the Troika announced at the end of the three days that no agreement had been reached between the sides.74 However, they were quick to point out that the talks had not been an utter failure. For a start, Belgrade and Pristina had given assurances that they would not resort to violence in the period ahead. The discussions had also served as an important confidence building exercise, at least at some level. Although Koštunica had boycotted the

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joint dinners, the meals had provided Tadić, Thaçi and Çeku with a chance to hold several lengthy, and off-the-record, discussions.75 Emerging from the talks, the Kosovo Albanian team now announced that independence would take place soon. This prompted an angry response from Serbian officials, who insisted that only the Security Council could take a decision on the matter.76 The comments also sparked further condemnation from Russia. Speaking from Annapolis, where he was attending the Middle East Summit between Palestinian and Israeli leaders, Lavrov again accused Washington of having undermined the negotiation process by constantly stating that independence was inevitable.77 Two days later, at an OSCE meeting in Madrid, he argued that any attempt by the US and EU to bypass the UN would lead to further instability in the Balkans.78 Such claims were dismissed by Burns, who called on Russia to behave ‘responsible’, accept the reality on the ground and persuade Serbia to compromise.79 Although the direct talks were now at an end, the Troika had not quite completed its work. On 3 December, the three diplomats travelled to Belgrade and Pristina for their final meetings with the two sides before submitting their report to the Secretary-General. Repeating their call for more talks, Serbian leaders also pressed the Troika to recognise their flexibility throughout the process. Specifically, they asked that the Troika acknowledge that while Serbia had developed many good proposals over the four months, the Albanian side had refused to discuss these ideas, instead focusing on some post-status issues and waiting for the talks to end.80 In Pristina, the Unity Team once again emphasised that there could be no further discussions. The time had come for independence.81 Fearing that this might mean a declaration of independence immediately after the deadline expired, several EU leaders issued yet another call for patience. As Romano Prodi, the Italian Prime Minister explained, a precipitous act at this stage could irreparably damage attempts to forge a united European position. In reply, Sejdiu again promised that no moves would be made without prior coordination with the EU and US. When the declaration came it would not take anyone by surprise.82 Meanwhile, concern was now growing about Belgrade’s possible response to a declaration of independence following a statement by a close advisor to Koštunica that, under the UN Charter, war was a legal means of defending national sovereignty. While the comments were immediately dismissed by a number of senior members of the Serbian

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Government, who reiterated that Serbia had no intention of fighting over Kosovo,83 NATO emphasised that it was not willing to take any chances. Noting that KFOR had prepared for all contingencies, senior commanders also announced that further units had been moved up to the Serbian border.84 The Troika presents its report On 7 December, three days earlier than had been originally envisaged, the Troika e-mailed its report to the Secretary General. In their relatively short report, Ischinger, Wisner and Botsan-Kharchenko detailed the discussion process and the ideas explored, including confederation and partition, but noted that it had not been possible to reach an agreement. As they explained, despite having urged the two sides to develop fresh ideas and compromise, and although both Belgrade and Pristina were fully engaged in the process, ‘neither side was willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo.’85 With their work now concluded, the public unity between the members of the Troika – which had already shown signs of fraying when the team had travelled to the region a few days earlier86 – now disappeared entirely. As far as Ischinger was concerned, any further delays over status would simply harden the positions of the two sides and lead to further instability. If Russia did not give up its threat to veto a resolution on independence, a status decision would have to be taken on the basis of existing resolutions. However, this was roundly rejected by Botsan-Kharchenko. Calling it a ‘monstrous mistake’ to end discussions just as the two sides had held their most prolonged direct talks since 1999, he argued that it was ‘preposterous’ to argue, as many in the EU were now attempting to do, that Resolution 1244 provided the basis for independence. Moreover, any move to reintroduce the Ahtisaari plan would be completely unacceptable, ‘even strange’, given that it was the failure of the Security Council to agree on these proposals which had led to the formation of the Troika in the first place.87 At the same time, the delivery of the report also led to a new round of recriminations between Moscow and Washington. Just as Rice restated Washington’s full support for supervised independence and accused Russia of ignoring the realities on the ground, Lavrov once again repeated the call for further negotiations and accused various

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Western states of encouraging Albanian separatism. Visiting Cyprus, he once again asserted that any move to recognise independence would have grave consequences elsewhere.88 As 10 December at long last arrived, several thousand protestors took to the streets of Pristina calling for independence. However, as expected, there was no declaration of independence. Instead, the Kosovo Albanian leadership announced that an intensive period of consultations and coordination would now begin. Meanwhile, speaking from Brussels, Rehn stated that, as far as he was concerned, a formal of declaration should not be expected until the spring, perhaps even as late as April.89 All the while Belgrade continued to prepare its plan of action for the moment when the declaration occurred. Stressing that Serbia would resist independence by all non-violent means available, Tadić now raised the possibility of a legal challenge before the International Court of Justice.90 At the same time, Serbian officials were adamant that it would not be willing to strike a deal in return for recognition. Serbia would not trade Kosovo for some sort of guarantee for EU accession, or even an accelerated membership process. In reality, though, signs now emerged that the Serbian Government was in fact laying the foundations for some sort of eventual partition. In a move widely believed to be a prelude for some attempt to ensure that the northern parts of Kosovo remained under direct Serbian control, the Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija opened up an office in the divided town of Mitrovica – a move condemned by UNMIK.91 The EU discusses next steps Meanwhile, as preparations were being made for a Security Council debate on the Troika’s report, the main focus of attention switched to Brussels, where EU leaders were meeting for the December European Council. By now, efforts to reach a joint position on status had all but been abandoned. Although a majority of members had accepted that there was no alternative but to bypass the UN Security Council, a number of members were adamant that they would not be prepared to recognise independence without the explicit authorisation of the UN. Instead, European leaders now focused their attention on proposals to send an EU mission to Kosovo to replace UNMIK. The problem was that even this idea was strongly opposed by Serbia, which viewed any attempt to impose a mission without a Security Council resolution

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as an attempt to introduce the Ahtisaari proposals by the back door.92 As a result, a number of states, most notably Cyprus, raised objections to this idea as well. However, opposition to the proposal proved to be short lived. The fact that Washington was determined to press ahead with recognising independence, with or without EU support, meant that European leaders realised that they had no choice but to agree in principle to create an 1800-strong mission, composed of police officers, judges and customs officers. Either they could accept to put in place an EU mission or face the prospect that, following a declaration of independence, UNMIK would become completely powerless, in which case Kosovo would be left without any international oversight whatsoever.93 Even though the EU sought to ease Serbian objections by pledging some sort of accelerated process towards candidacy, Belgrade immediately rejected plans for an ‘unlawful’ EU mission to Kosovo, suggesting that the decision could undermine all the progress that had been made in EU–Serbian relations since 2000.94 Moscow was also angry at the decision. In a statement denouncing the United States and some EU members for deliberately encouraging ethnic separatism and undermining the UN, the Russian foreign ministry argued that the Kosovo issue could evolve into an ‘uncontrollable crisis’ and called on the permanent members of the Security Council, the Contact Group and the European Union to refrain from taking decisions that could have a wider precedent.95 In an attempt to keep the momentum for discussions going, the Russian Government even proposed drawing up some sort of road map for Kosovo, modelled on the road map created for Israel and Palestine, which would take into the ‘reasonable interests of the two sides’.96 Churkin also circulated a document containing some key elements of a Security Council statement in favour of continued talks and calling on the parties to refrain from destabilising unilateral decisions. But none of this appeared to have any chance of succeeding. Just as Moscow could prevent a Council vote in favour of independence, Washington could block Russian initiatives to keep the talks going. As Khalilzad stated, the negotiation process had been exhausted. The time had come for a decision.97 As thousands of Serbs rallied in the northern Kosovo town of Mitrovica to protest against independence, Rice again insisted that the ‘reality’ that Kosovo and Serbia would never be one again and hoped that Russia was as committed to a stable outcome in the Balkans as the United States.98

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Likewise, the European Union would not be deterred from its decision to establish a mission in Kosovo. As Maxime Verhagen, the Dutch Foreign Minister, noted, while it was certainly preferable to have a new resolution accepted by the Security Council, if this was not possible the European Union would have to work on the basis of Resolution 1244.99 End of the process On 19 December, the Security Council met in closed session to discuss the Troika’s report.100 The importance of the occasion was all too apparent – a point highlighted by the fact that the meeting was chaired by Massimo D’Alema, the Italian foreign minister. Moreover, in a major break with precedent, Sejdiu was allowed to address the meeting directly – albeit in a personal capacity – along with Koštunica.101 As expected, the debate produced few surprises. Stressing that Kosovo should not be seen as a case of ethnic separatism, but as part of the collapse of Yugoslavia, Sejdiu insisted that Pristina was ready to implement the Ahtisaari Plan.102 Meanwhile, noting that the Security Council was the last place that one expected to hear that compromise was not possible, Koštunica criticised those countries that wanted to change Resolution 1244 ‘piece by piece’, and once again warned that independence for Kosovo would inevitably serve as a precedent for other separatist groups.103 The familiar divisions between the two sides were also echoed amongst the permanent members of the Council. Again insisting that further talks should be held, Churkin emphasised that a unilateral declaration of independence would send ‘shockwaves through the international system’. He also warned that Moscow would oppose any unilateral declaration of independence, as would a number of other member states who also believed that Kosovo would set a precedent.104 Following on from this, the Chinese representative also called for further talks to be held between the two sides. However, the United States was unbowed. Khalilzad dismissed Churkin’s argument that recognition would be illegal. Calling on Moscow to ‘embrace’ the plan as the ‘sensible way forward’, and noting that any prolongation of the status quo posed a threat to European peace and stability, he reiterated that Washington was ‘determined’ to press on with the implementation of the Ahtisaari

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Plan.105 Sir John Sawers, the British permanent representative, agreed. While it was regrettable that the UN had failed to reach an agreement, the time had nevertheless come to settle Kosovo’s status, and Resolution 1244 provided the necessary legal basis by which to do this.106 This view was widely shared. Emerging from the meeting, and flanked by Khalilzad and the various European representatives on the Council, Johan Verbeke, the Belgian permanent representative, read out a joint statement by the United States and the European Union: We have just taken part in an important debate of the future of Kosovo. The presentations by the two parties confirmed that their view remained irreconcilable on the fundamental question of sovereignty. The Contact Group report to the Secretary-General about the Troika negotiations has also made that point. It is clear in our view that further negotiations in this, or any other format, will not make a difference. We therefore endorse the view of European Union and US negotiators in the Troika that the potential for a negotiated solution is now exhausted. Numerous other Council members expressed the same view in today’s debate. The Contact Group foreign ministers agreed in September, and the European Union confirmed last week, that the status quo is unsustainable and that we need to move to a solution. As reaffirmed in the European Council conclusions, the European Union stands ready to play a leading role in implementing a settlement defining Kosovo’s future status. The will be a continuing need for an international civilian and military presence to help promote stability, human rights and development. We would have liked the Security Council to play its role. But, as today’s discussions have once again shown, the Council is not in a position to agree on the way ahead. We regret this, but we are ready to take on our own responsibilities. We will work with the European Union and NATO in a careful and co-ordinated manner towards a settlement for Kosovo. We underline our shared view that resolving the status of Kosovo constitutes a sui generis case that does not set any precedent. We are convinced that its resolution is important, indeed necessary, for European and regional security and stability.107 As far as the United States and the European Union were concerned, there was nothing further to be gained from more talks. The time had

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finally come to act. Indeed, in comments made immediately after the meeting, EU diplomats noted that preparations had already started for a series of coordinated actions between the EU, NATO and the Kosovo Albanians authorities over the coming month, all of which would lead to a declaration of independence.108 Likewise, speaking in Brussels the next morning, Dimitrij Rupel, the Slovenian foreign minister, insisted that the status process could not be held back.109 After two years of discussions, the search for a negotiated status settlement under UN auspices was now at an end.

CONCLUSION

On 10 June 1999, following a military campaign to end the fighting between Serb forces and KLA guerrillas in Kosovo, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 placing the province under international authority. Although the resolution deliberately remained vague as to the eventual status of Kosovo, there was little doubt in the minds of the Kosovo Albanian population that they had taken a step closer towards their long-held wish for independence. Even though western leaders repeatedly insisted that the purpose of their intervention had been purely humanitarian and not aimed at statehood, very little attempt was made to counter this view in the months and years that followed. Even after Slobodan Milošević was forced from power, in October 2000, few steps were taken to try to reconcile the two sides. With international attention firmly fixed on Afghanistan and the Middle East, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, there was little interest in the Balkans. As a result, the pressure for statehood continued to grow amongst the Kosovo Albanians. Responding to this, in December 2002, UNMIK formally presented a series of eight key areas where tangible results would need to be achieved before a decision on the ultimate status of the province could be made. While this seemed to mark a major step forward, it did not dampen the calls for independence, which were now being fuelled by the growing belief that the chronic economic and social problems in Kosovo were the result of its ambiguous status. All this in turn contributed to the major riots that took place in March 2004. As a result of this outbreak of violence, it now became clear that the status quo was not sustainable. In the middle of 2005, a report

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commissioned by the UN Secretary-General on the situation in the province concluded that although very little progress had been made on the eight standards, maintaining the current state of affairs served very little purpose. With this in mind, the UN Security Council convened on 23 October 2005 and authorised the Secretary-General to start a process to determine the final status of Kosovo. Shortly afterwards, the Contact Group – a body made up of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States – laid down a fundamental set of principles to be followed during the discussions. First and foremost, they agreed that there could not be a return to the situation that existed prior to 1999. Kosovo could never return to direct rule by Belgrade. Likewise, Kosovo could not be partitioned, nor could it unite with any other state. Once these parameters had been laid down, the way was finally open for the status talks to begin in earnest. In November, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, announced that he had appointed Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of Finland, to serve as UN Special Envoy for Future Status Process for Kosovo. Establishing his mission in Vienna, Ahtisaari started work immediately. Flying to Belgrade and Pristina for consultations with the two sides, he was already clear as to where the talks would lead. In his first meeting with Serbian leaders, he announced that independence would be the final outcome. Having decided that Kosovo would gain statehood, Ahtisaari now decided to focus his efforts on ensuring that an independent Kosovo would be a multi-ethnic and democratic country. Therefore, over the following three months he and his team held numerous meetings with the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian authorities in an attempt to map out the various positions of the sides on a number of key issues relating to minority rights and decentralisation. Meanwhile, at a meeting in January 2006, the Contact Group further clarified their principles by adding a provision that any settlement must be acceptable to the people of Kosovo – thereby seeming to confirm, in Ahtisaari’s view, the inevitability of independence. On 20 February 2006, the two sides met in Vienna for their first face-to-face meeting. Having decided that there was little point engaging directly on talks on status, the UN team instead continued to focus their discussions on local governance, minority and community rights, economic issues and the protection of religious and cultural sites. However, over the course of the following months, little

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progress was made. For both sides, the status issue remained paramount. While the Kosovo Albanians insisted that there could be no negotiations over independence as the final outcome of the process, Belgrade was adamant that it would only be willing to accept some form of extensive autonomy for the province. With this in mind, the UN team decided to focus more openly on the status question and convened a high-level meeting between the political leaders, held on 24 July. As expected, this did little to help as both sides stuck to their respective and familiar positions. With no chance of an agreement being reached between the two sides on the various issues relating to governance, let alone on the final status of Kosovo, the Contact Group authorised Ahtisaari to begin preparing a set of status proposals. As the autumn began, and the talks continued, there still appeared to be good chance that the process would be completed before the end of 2006. However, these hopes were dashed when a new Serbian constitution was unveiled at the end of September, and passed in a referendum a month later. Following on from this, parliamentary elections were called in Serbia for January 2007. Fearing that a decision on the future status of Kosovo could negatively affect the vote in Serbia, Ahtisaari reluctantly agreed to postpone unveiling in his plan until after the elections. However, calls for a further delay to allow a government to be formed were rejected. On 26 January 2007, just days after the Serbian elections, Ahtisaari finally revealed his proposals to the Contact Group. A week later, on 2 February, he delivered his plan to the two sides. While the 54 page text made no specific reference to sovereignty or statehood, it was nevertheless obvious that the plan was a blueprint for a form of ‘supervised’ independence. To this end, although Pristina warmly welcomed the proposals, Belgrade insisted that it would contest any provisions challenging Serbian sovereignty over the province. Insisting that there could be no changes to the fundamental principles of the proposal, the UN team convened a further two rounds of technical discussions in Vienna at the end of February. Finally, on 10 March, a high level summit was held between the leaders of the two sides to try to iron out any remaining issues. After sixteen months, Ahtisaari’s mission was now at an end. Days later, a new phase in the status process started when the proposals were officially presented to the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, who then passed them on to the Security Council.

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Importantly, and as promised, Ahtisaari also attached a short report to the proposals that specifically stated that his recommendation for the final status of Kosovo was independence – albeit supervised. Despite hopes in London, Washington and Paris that a UN resolution could be relatively quickly passed endorsing the proposal, it soon became clear that there was a greater degree of concern about the proposals within the Security Council than had been expected. In addition to Russia, which led the criticisms of the Ahtisaari plan, many other members of the Council appeared to have serious reservations about the idea of sanctioning statehood for Kosovo against the wishes of the Serbian Government. To this end, a Russian proposal for a fact-finding mission to Kosovo was accepted. Visiting Brussels, Belgrade, Pristina and Vienna the fiftenn permanent representatives had a chance to learn at first hand about the situation in the province and the proposals that had been put forward. Believing that the trip had swayed a number of members in favour of statehood, in mid-May a draft resolution was presented to the Security Council by the United States and Germany proposing that Kosovo be awarded supervised independence in accordance with the Ahtisaari proposals. However, Russia objected. Arguing for renewed talks, Moscow insisted that it would not accept any imposed solution and rejected several attempts to redraft the proposed text. Even direct talks between Presidents Bush and Putin on the issue during the G8 summit in Germany failed to bridge the differences. Seizing the initiative, France therefore proposed that a further round of talks should be held between the Belgrade and Pristina, after which Kosovo would become independent. While the idea was a step forward, Moscow nevertheless dismissed it on the grounds that it had a predetermined outcome. Meanwhile, yet another meeting between Presidents Bush and Putin failed to produce an agreement. It therefore became clear that an alternative approach would have to be taken. In late July, it was announced that efforts to try to pass a resolution had been shelved for the meantime. Instead, it had been agreed that a further period of talks would be held between the two sides – without a predetermined outcome. The decision by the Contact Group to hold a new round of negotiations under the auspices of a Troika of leading diplomats from Russia, the United States and the European Union, effectively marked the final chance to reach a compromise solution. However, right from the start, there were no real expectations that the two sides would be

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willing to reach an agreement. A declaration by President Bush that the United States supported independence, which was endorsed by leading EU member states and senior EU officials, effectively ensured that there was no incentive for Pristina to back down on its demands for statehood. Despite this, efforts were nevertheless made to explore a range of potential options. To this end, Serbia presented a number of interesting and innovative ideas for various forms of autonomy. These included suggestions based on Hong Kong’s relationship with China and on the Åland Islands in Finland. However, these ideas were all rejected out of hand by Pristina, which remained adamant that it would not negotiate independence. Instead, it countered by unveiling its own proposals for a treaty of friendship between Serbia and the new Kosovo state that was based on recognising one another’s sovereignty. This was unacceptable to Serbia. Meanwhile, efforts by Wolfgang Ischinger, the EU representative on the Troika, to introduce some form of status neutral model, which was essentially based on the relationship between East and West Germany during the Cold War, and which would focus on establishing working relations between Kosovo and Serbia, was also rejected by both sides. For the Kosovo Albanians it fell short of full independence, whereas the Serbian government viewed it as independence by another name. Under these circumstances it came as little surprise when after the last round of discussions, held in Austria on 26–28 November, the Troika was forced to concede defeat. Delivering their report to the UN Secretary-General on 7 December 2007, the Troika announced that their four month effort to broker an agreement, which had resulted in six face-to-face meetings between the two sides, had failed to deliver a breakthrough. As they noted, the two sides had failed to bridge their differences over the fundamental notion of sovereignty. As expected, a Security Council meeting held on 19 December to discuss the report failed to produce a last-minute compromise. After two years of effort, hopes of reaching a negotiated agreement were now over. Just weeks later, on 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared independence. The rationale for independence Looking back over the process, two things are clear. First of all, there was never going to be an agreement between the two sides if they were left to their own devices. Secondly, there was never any other

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realistic and viable alternative to some form of independence for Kosovo, whether it was recognised by the UN or not. However, and importantly, the two points are not as directly linked as might first appear. If independence was the only possible outcome in the case of Kosovo it is because it was allowed to become so. It is certainly disingenuous to argue that independence was the only outcome because of the zero-sum positions adopted by the parties – as many diplomats, politicians and analysts tried to do throughout the process and in the period since the declaration of independence. Applying this logic, all separatist or secessionist conflicts are necessarily beyond resolution. One cannot blame the Kosovo Albanians for wanting independence. Neither can one blame the Serbian Government for opposing the loss of part of its territory. They were simply acting in exactly the same way as protagonists in any number of ethnic or secessionist conflicts behave. Indeed, and despite all the rather spurious claims that Kosovo represents a unique case in international affairs, at a substantive level the underlying issues and dynamics of the Kosovo conflict are in fact no different from countless other cases of such conflict the world over. The difference is that in almost every other case of separatist fighting the international community has argued that a compromise solution is not only possible, but necessary. And yet, this did not happen in the case of Kosovo. Unlike other conflicts where the international community has sought to encourage reconciliation there was no real external pressure from the key external actors – specifically, the United States – for the parties to put the past behind them and reach an agreement that, while not meeting all the demands of either side, was nevertheless acceptable to both. Instead, it was argued that as Belgrade and Pristina could not reach an agreement the only option was to grant Kosovo independence. To understand why this was the case one must look back to 1999. Regardless of the rights and wrongs of the intervention, with the benefit of hindsight 1999 would have been the time to solve the issue of Kosovo by granting it independence. This is a view that has been taken by many observers, such as Paddy Ashdown, the former High Representative in Bosnia.1 Capitalising on Serbia’s defeat, and Russia’s geopolitical weakness, Western decision makers would almost certainly have had been in a stronger position to impose independence at that stage. Although it may not have been entirely easy to engineer given that Russia would still have been able to block a Security

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Council resolution recognising the move, it would certainly have been far easier to explain, and justify, than a decision to do so taken a number of years later. Indeed, by failing to act at that time, NATO created a troubling paradox that was neatly summed up by Sir Ivor Roberts, the former British Ambassador to Yugoslavia, It is hard to explain to Serbs why, when Milošević was still in power, a settlement was imposed which left Kosovo legally and formally part of Serbia. But having overthrown Milošević and lived according to the rules of the international community for the last seven years, the Serbs now face being punished by losing nearly 20 per cent of their territory.2 The reason why a decision was not taken in favour of independence at that stage was that many still believed that some form of autonomy might be possible to achieve.3 The problem was that in rejecting moves to create an independent Kosovo at that time, policy makers also failed to lay the foundations for some sort of settlement based on extensive self-government. If there was this hope, if not intention, than the two sides should have been sent a clear message to this end. However, this did not happen. In large part this was because Milošević remained in power in Belgrade. Given the severity of the events in Kosovo over the preceding decade, it would have been unrealistic to have expected the Kosovo Albanians to have negotiated with him – even though one must also recognise that they had also lost a great deal of moral authority by their behaviour towards Kosovo Serbs in the aftermath of the intervention. Nevertheless, steps could have been taken to prepare the ground for compromise and reconciliation once Milošević had gone. However, the other reason why no effort was made to pave the way for autonomy was that Kosovo quickly dropped off the international agenda following the establishment of a UN administration in the province. Certainly, it had almost no significance in US foreign policy once Clinton left office. The Bush Administration appeared to have little interest in the Balkans.4 More to the point, whatever little highlevel interest there was vanished in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. As Washington’s attention became focused on the Middle East, and pressure grew to withdraw troops from the Balkans,5 US policy on Kosovo was left to lower order officials in the State Department, many of whom supported the idea of independence.6

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Meanwhile, the impression that Kosovo was heading for independence was further encouraged by UNMIK. Quite apart from the fact that several UN Special Representatives were known to be in favour of statehood, the unveiling of the standards policy – although officially status neutral – appeared to leave little doubt that preparations were being made for the creation of an independent Kosovo. Moreover, the longer a decision was deferred, the greater the weight of expectations became. As a result, by 2004 the pressure for a decision was becoming unbearable. There was simply no way that the Kosovo Albanian people would be willing to accept anything less than statehood. Indeed, even advocates of independence accepted that any attempt to try to delay independence – let alone abandon the idea altogether, or impose autonomy instead – could have led to violence in the province.7 This time, however, violence would not have been directed against Serbia, but against UNMIK and KFOR. Indeed, by the summer of 2004 the widespread view in Kosovo was that the international administration was no longer opening the way to independence, but was now an obstacle to that goal.8 Needless to say, the consequences of violence against UNMIK and KFOR would have been devastating on a number of levels. For a start, it would have been difficult for those leaders who had advocated intervention just five years earlier to explain to their electorates why the very people they had saved were now shooting at them. More importantly, what would have been a viable policy to manage the situation? There was no way that the international community could have walked away and handed the problem back to Serbia. Likewise, if NATO and UNMIK stayed they would have been viewed as an illegitimate neo-colonial administration by the local population. This could well have led to the emergence of an organised armed insurgency akin to the KLA campaign against Serbia. Under these circumstances, the international community needed to be able to declare victory and leave Kosovo to run itself, as its inhabitants wanted. The realisation of this unpalatable fact helped to sway the opinion of many who would otherwise have opposed independence. Recognising the strength of feeling within the Albanian community, many outside observers accepted that statehood, while undesirable, was nevertheless the least bad outcome of an unappetizing set of options.9 As a result of international neglect that had led to rising expectations, poor administration that had fed

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popular frustrations and, it must be said, a political culture that had been given ample proof that violence, or the threat of violence, could be used to achieve political aims, Western policy makers were left with no option but to accept independence for Kosovo – regardless of the wider consequences of the decision.10 By the time the negotiation process started, the required outcome was therefore widely understood – although not openly stated. Indeed, as talks got underway, many were confidently predicting that independence would be achieved relatively quickly. The widespread view was that an independent Kosovo would exist by the end of 2006. The Ahtisaari status talks Even if one can accept that by the time the status process started there was little alternative to independence, it is also important to recognise that the subsequent handling of the situation left a lot to be desired. In retrospect, one of the first mistakes made was the decision to appoint Martti Ahtisaari as the UN Envoy. On paper, Ahtisaari appeared to be an ideal candidate for the post. His experience and expertise in managing conflict was almost unparalleled on the world stage. In the course of his career he had served as the UN Special Representative for Namibia, had served as a member of the verification mission in Northern Ireland and, more recently, had successfully brokered a deal granting the autonomy to the Indonesian province of Aceh, thus ending a 30-year separatist conflict. In reality, however, his appointment was problematic. Quite apart from the fact that he had delivered the ultimatum to Milošević ending the NATO bombing, Serbian officials noted that he had also served as the chairman of the International Crisis Group, a think tank was a leading advocate of independence for Kosovo. This undermined his credibility from the very start. But even this need not have been so troublesome, had it not been for the fact that once Ahtisaari took up his appointment he made almost no attempt to hide the fact that he believed that independence was the only outcome of the process. Unlike the later Troika process, which actually tried to examine a range of different possible outcomes – such as partition, autonomy and a status-neutral treaty – Ahtisaari instead framed his whole approach, from the very outset, on trying to formulate a blueprint for a new independent state.11 In this sense, one can argue that Ahtisaari was less a mediator than

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an arbitrator. He did not seek a compromise between the parties on the question of status, believing that one was not possible, but instead sought to use the talks as a means of drawing up proposals for a multiethnic and independent Kosovo. To this extent, while the plan that eventually emerged was certainly a viable blueprint for a state, it had no legitimacy in the eyes of Serbia – which, correctly, argued that there had never been any real discussions of status itself.12 Of course, at this point it is important to note that this is not to say that the Ahtisaari plan does not offer benefits to the Kosovo Serbs. Given that the plan was designed to reflect the prevailing view that independence was the only outcome, it is quite clear that the proposals do protect their position. However, this does not change the fact that the Ahtisaari proposals were not arrived at through a meaningful, let alone fair, mediation process over status. This situation was hardly helped by the fact that Ahtisaari appeared to have little time for diplomatic niceties. He made absolutely no attempt to pander, at least symbolically, to Serbian sensitivities over the issue.13 Indeed, Ahtisaari has openly stated that in his first meeting with Tadić he told the Serbian president that the process was leading towards independence. On another occasion, he implied that Serbs were guilty as a nation for what had happened in Kosovo. Indeed, he appeared to be rather dismissive of the Balkans in general. As he stated in May 2007, ‘I have worked in Africa and Asia and I have never seen as big attitude problems as the ones we have in the Balkans…This will be the last European question that I want to have anything to do with.’14 Significantly, even those who accepted, if not openly supported, independence have been willing to concede that Ahtisaari did not handle the talks with as much diplomacy and tact as he could have.15 Naturally, this does not mean for one moment that the Serbian side behaved well during the process. While Tadić has received considerable praise for his constructive approach to the discussions, Koštunica adopted a petulant and obstructive stance throughout. (Certainly, Ahtisaari found him difficult to work with – even more so than Milošević.16) However, as a supposedly neutral mediator, Ahtisaari should have adopted a more appropriate tone in his dealings with Serbian officials, especially the more moderate ones. This rather brusque manner was a direct consequence of the fact that Ahtisaari simply wished to complete the process as quickly as possible. As the outcome was clear in his mind, the point of the

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process was to reach the ‘solution’ with the minimum of delay. As he explained, he was not in the ‘business of perpetuating a frozen conflict.’17 Likewise, there was simply no point in even bothering to hold discussions about alternative status proposals, such as autonomy, when such ideas were inherently objectionable to the Kosovo Albanians. As far as he was concerned, it was far better to get the whole thing over with as soon as possible.18 While such an approach may have been rational, one cannot help but feel that the UN Envoy had nevertheless lost the patience required of mediators dealing with deep-rooted, and seemingly intractable, conflict. It certainly contrasted with his approach to Namibia, which took 13 years to resolve. Indeed, it was also telling that when the Annan Plan was presented for Cyprus, in April 2004, he argued that the proposals, ‘owed their strength in part to the very length of the negotiations. Talks over the shape of a future Cyprus state have been going on for decades, rather than the much briefer time in which the former Yugoslav states have endeavoured to settle their constitutions. The effort has clearly paid off.’19 In the end, this approach in fact proved to be counterproductive. All things considered, one is left with no choice but to conclude that the Ahtisaari process was anything but a fair and transparent discussion over the future status of Kosovo. Instead, it was, from the very start, a process aimed at defining the structure of an independent Kosovo. The widespread claim by officials from countries that strongly favoured independence that Serbia had the opportunity to present its own ideas and proposals for a status settlement, but failed to do so, is not true. The UN Envoy had made up his mind from the outset as to the end result and was simply following a predetermined path towards independence, regardless of Serbia’s position. Interestingly, as a result of this approach, Ahtisaari has faced criticism not only from those who oppose independence, but also from those who support it. Opponents have been able to argue that his process was nothing more than a fix, designed to secure an outcome decided elsewhere. As one diplomat commented, ‘Martti went one step farther than necessary…Washington, London and Brussels planned this outcome, and he rubber-stamped it. There is a groundswell of opinion against him.’20 Indeed, even many of Ahtisaari’s supporters now recognise that his methods were ultimately counter-productive. By failing to conduct open and fair talks on status, the UN envoy has in fact made it much more difficult to secure

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international support for his proposals. As one senior European official acknowledged, in deciding to avoid any discussions on possible status options, Ahtisaari had, ‘made a mistake, an avoidable tactical mistake.’21 All things considered, Kosovo was certainly not Ahtisaari’s finest hour. The Russian position Even the predetermined nature of the status process, and the evident disdain for Serb sensitivities, might not have been so problematic had it not been for the fact that Russia’s potential role had been so disastrously underestimated. Indeed, this is perhaps the single most important element in this whole story. Almost all observers accept that when the process started there was little reason to suspect that Moscow would stand in the way of a settlement. As observers later noted, the expectation had been that even if it did raise some objections, it would soon fall into line.22 To be fair, such views appeared to be justified. Quite apart from the fact that it had essentially stood aside and allowed NATO to bomb Serbia in 1999, there were numerous other signals that Moscow was willing to accept an independent Kosovo. For instance, it signed up to the January 2006 Contact Group statement noting that any settlement must be acceptable to the people of Kosovo. Similarly, it agreed to allow Ahtisaari to draw up a status proposal, despite the fact that they must have known full well what his eventual suggestions would entail. Certainly, these could have been taken as signs that Moscow was willing to acquiesce to an independent Kosovo. However, if one examines both of these key incidents more carefully, it becomes clear that neither should never have been read as an automatic endorsement of independence. Russian officials consistently noted in their pronouncements that any settlement must be based on two key principles. In the first instance, it must be acceptable to both sides. To this extent, Russia would be willing to accept independence, but only if Belgrade did. As several senior ministers pointed out at various points in the process, Russia would not be more Serbian than the Serbs.23 Secondly, the talks should not be managed according to timetables. There should be no rush. Moscow also made it clear that, while the UN Envoy was authorised to draw up proposals as a basis for a settlement, he was never given carte blanche to present a comprehensive plan that would then be

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subject only to minor tweaking – as eventually happened. And yet, despite these frequently stated provisos, Western decision makers consistently misread the Russian position.24 Even after Putin’s tough warning over Kosovo – and a number of other issues – in Munich in early 2007, officials still appeared to believe that he was bluffing. Consequently, or so Richard Holbrooke has argued, there was no real planning for the possibility that the Russian president was serious about his threat.25 A number of theories have been put forward to explain Russia’s strong reaction to independence. One obvious explanation is that Moscow’s position was based on power politics and malice.26 Certainly, one cannot discount the argument that the desire to provoke a confrontation with Washington may have played a part in the process. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has sought to reassert its regional and international authority and the discussions over Kosovo took place against a backdrop of growing tensions between Russia and the West. However, it should also be borne in mind that Western policy over Kosovo was also criticised by many Russians who were known to be more liberal, or to take a generally more pro-Western approach towards international affairs.27 Neither can one dismiss the view that Moscow may also have been trying to exact some sort of revenge on the United States and NATO for the events of 1999.28 However, while this may be the case, one can also argue that Russian intentions may not have been as destructive and negative as this. For example, it has been suggested that it may well have been the case that the Russian Government, having been so obviously sidelined in 1999, had little inclination to help NATO out of its self-made predicament.29 Other arguments ventured included the view that Russia was acting out of some form of Slavic solidarity, or was attempting to gain commercial and economic advantages in Serbia, especially in the energy field.30 All these views are certainly plausible, and should not be rejected as contributing factors. However, they nevertheless fail to recognise that Russia harboured serious and legitimate concerns about the consequences of recognising an independent Kosovo against the will of the Serbian Government. After all, such a move that would be unprecedented in modern international affairs. Having been recognised as Serbian territory under Resolution 1244, any attempt to end Belgrade’s rule over the territory without Serbian consent would necessarily undermine international law and have an effect on a range

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of conflicts elsewhere. The stark reality is that, on the question of Kosovo, Russia’s position was actually far more in tune with long-standing principles of international relations and international law than the position adopted by those states that were pushing for independence for purely practical reasons. In the debate between the legal ‘constitutionalists’ and the political ‘pragmatists’ in the international arena,31 Russia was the champion of the former position, whereas the United States led the latter camp.32 As one senior diplomatic figure noted, many in the West did not understand that when it comes to matters of international law, and the authority of the UN, Moscow is not in fact a rogue actor. If anything, it is an arch-conservative.33 The uncomfortable truth, therefore, is that the Russian position on Kosovo was in fact the stance that the West would have adopted had it not injected itself into the mess and now needed to extricate itself. After all, it is once again worth stressing the earlier point that throughout the 1990s, and even after the establishment of UNMIK, in 1999, many Western officials still wished to pursue some sort of autonomy arrangement for Kosovo. However, there is another major explanation for the Russian position that needs to be factored into the discussion. In addition to its genuine concerns regarding international law, Moscow was also deeply concerned about Russian public opinion. Kosovo was a far more important issue for Russians than many outsiders realised. Although there was an element of Slavic solidarity, the whole issue also touched on Russian attitudes towards other regions in the former Soviet Union. If the Russian Government was seen to allow Kosovo to become independent due to pressure from the United States, how could it not then respond by recognising the independence of South Ossetia, Abkhazia or Transdniestria? This point appeared to be overlooked, wilfully or otherwise, by Western policy makers. This, in turn, had serious consequences. Just months later, in August 2008, Russia used the case of Kosovo – and the apparent changes in international law arising from its declaration of independence – to question Georgia’s territorial integrity.34 The US response to Russia Regardless of the precise factors shaping Moscow’s view of the situation, in the face of growing Russian opposition to the imposition

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of independence, the United States chose not step back and reconsider its position. Instead, Washington stood by its commitment to support independence and opted to take an even more vocal approach on the issue. The most profound example of this was, of course, President Bush’s declaration in Tirana that Kosovo would become independent. While the comments may have been made in error – a ‘gung-ho’ misstatement of official US policy, as one British official put it35 – it was nevertheless clear that the decision by Moscow to block the Ahtisaari proposals did not lead the United States to reconsider its stance. It did not even try to engage with the Russian Government over the issue,36 perhaps with a view to a trade off of some sort. Instead, in the face of strong Russian opposition to an imposed settlement, a decision appeared to be taken to try to steamroller independence – one way or another. Once again, there are several explanations as to why this might have been the case. It could be argued that the decision was taken because the key figures dealing with Kosovo were ideologically and morally committed to an independent Kosovo. While such accusations are certainly credible, and cannot easily be dismissed as wild Serbian conspiracy theorising, it obscures the simpler argument that US decision makers appeared to have no choice but to press ahead with supporting independence. Had Washington sought to step back from supporting independence at this stage it may well have sparked just the type of rioting and conflict that the push towards independence was seeking to prevent. In this sense, Russian accusations that the US was reacting to threat of violence would appear to be accurate. Still, one must also consider that there may well have been an element of miscalculation involved.37 Perhaps it was reasoned that if Russia was so keen to maintain the authority of the UN, and was aware of the willingness of the US to work outside of the Security Council, then Moscow would cave in at the last moment and accept a resolution proclaiming Kosovo to be a special case; thus preserving UN authority. Then again, it is also worth considering the argument that part of the reason why the dispute over Kosovo eventually became so heated between Moscow and Washington was because it was regarded as relatively insignificant. As one US diplomat explained, ‘Kosovo is the least important of the contentious issues in relations between the United States and Russia. That is actually why both sides are playing it so hard – there’s little to lose.’38

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Whatever the reason for its decision, having committed itself so publicly to independence, with or without Security Council support, the United States in fact ensured that Russia became even more steadfast in its opposition to independence. This in turn helped to feed the growing animosity over a range of other issues. As one commentary put it, What began as a humanitarian mission to stop ethnic cleansing has become part of a new balance of power in Europe…Kosovo’s future is linked to the Czech and Polish missile defence-shield dispute, energy supplies and a basket of issues on which a revitalized Kremlin tests the will of the EU and the U.S.39 This was not lost on US decision makers. Speaking in December 2007, as the process drew to a close, Daniel Fried, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, noted that many US officials were troubled that Russia had an ‘enemy image’ of the US and the West and that they were uncomfortable about the degree to which the discussions could be kept at the level of, ‘a disagreement over Kosovo rather than a crisis over Kosovo.’40 The obvious question that emerges from this statement is whether this enemy image might not have become so entrenched had US policy makers not taken so determined a line on Kosovo’s independence, completely ignoring any and all Russian concerns on the issue – even those legitimate concerns that were based on principles relating to international law. As several former senior US policy makers observed in an editorial written soon after the process ended, ‘perhaps the most troubling aspect of the current [US policy on Kosovo] is the dismissive attitude displayed toward Russia’s objections’.41 In trying to disengage from the problem of Kosovo in such an uncompromising manner, US officials ensured that Kosovo became a part of a far bigger problem with Russia. The Troika negotiations More importantly, however, US support for independence also ensured that the Troika talks, the last chance to reach and agreement between the sides, were doomed to failure even before they had started.42 Armed with a cast-iron commitment from Washington in support of statehood come what may, which was reaffirmed on

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numerous occasions throughout the talks, and with the support of many EU member states, there was simply no reason for the Kosovo Albanians to compromise. Even before the process started, Pristina openly stated that it had agreed to further talks under sufferance and would not negotiate away independence. Nevertheless, to its credit, the Troika tried to explore a range of possible alternative options for Kosovo. Taking the lead as the de facto neutral member of the three-man team, Wolfgang Ischinger, the European Union’s representative, believed that he might be able to break the deadlock by forcing the two sides to confront their ultimate declared goals. Therefore, rather than focus on what the two sides thought they wanted, he asked them to think about what they would do if they actually achieved their declared aims. The purpose of this exercise was to try to persuade the two sides to take a realistic view of the situation and explain how they saw the development of key practical issues the day after a status decision.43 For example, he asked the Albanians to consider what would happen if they achieved independence from Belgrade, but then found that the Serbian Government imposed a trade blockade and cut off electricity supplies. How would Kosovo survive? Moreover, how would they expect the Kosovo Serbs to accept their authority? However, none of this seemed to make an impression. In the minds of most Kosovo Albanians, the idea of independence was by now so deeply ingrained that no logic could have swayed them from their course. The fact that they would receive the support of the US seemed to be all that mattered. There was certainly no real consideration of the wider consequences, either in terms of its relations with Serbia or the fact that Kosovo would be blocked from entering most international organisations. Again, many of those most closely watching the events believed that there was no chance by this stage to abandon independence. To do so would have invited violence.44 Likewise, the Troika also pressed the Serbian Government to really consider the implications of preventing independence and then having to maintain some sort of control over a province inhabited by two million people who did not accept Serb rule. And what if they decided that they wanted autonomy, but with representation in Central Government. How would Belgrade integrate a significant number of Kosovo Albanians in the parliament and government? These were extremely significant points, much more so than Belgrade perhaps realised. To its credit, the Serbian Government did

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show a high degree of engagement with the process and a genuine willingness to explore a full range of ideas for extensive autonomy. As the Troika talks progressed, the Serbian Government revealed a series of ever more inventive ideas. Apart from its proposals to emulate the relationship between China and Hong Kong, Serbian officials also suggested adopting the Åland Islands model, whereby the Swedish speaking inhabitants had complete autonomy from Finland. This was followed by another idea whereby Kosovo would be given autonomy, which would then be reviewed 20 years later. Still, one must still question whether these ideas really went far enough. While Serbia may have been willing to offer Kosovo ‘more than autonomy, but less than independence’, it was also apparent that Belgrade had little desire to try to integrate Kosovo Albanians into the central institutions of national governance at all levels. This was a vital element that needed to be addressed if the autonomy proposal was to have had even the slightest hope of succeeding.45 As for the argument that the Serbian proposals came far too late in the day to make any real difference, it is worth recalling, for instance, that Serbia had formulated autonomy proposals right at the start of the talks. Also, Tadić had specifically raised the idea of a 20 year review when he addressed the Security Council in March 2006. To be sure, there are grounds to argue that Serbia could have, and should have, taken a far more active role in trying to flesh out its ideas for autonomy at the earliest possible stage in the status process. While Ahtisaari had no desire to explore variations on autonomy, time and time again observers called on Belgrade to elucidate its ideas more systematically and more thoroughly. It did not do so. Then again, it seems unlikely as to whether more far-reaching ideas could have changed the outcome. Certainly, by the time of the Troika talks the United States was committed to independence and had made it more than clear that it would not change its mind. To this extent, it seems almost certain that a declaration of independence would have taken place regardless. However, had Belgrade taken a far more active approach throughout, and had it been bolder in its proposals, it may just have allowed more states to rally to Serbia’s defence. This in turn may have strengthened Belgrade’s hand as it appeared to search for a face saving way out. It would also have made it less likely that so many EU member states would have recognised Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008.46 But what of other options? Despite consistently hard line adopted

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by Koštunica, whose overall attitude towards the Troika was just as unrelentingly negative as it had been towards Ahtisaari,47 there appears to be good evidence that Serbia would have been willing to accept independence under certain circumstances. Specifically, there is evidence to suggest that partition – which, after all, was a form of independence, albeit with a territorial adjustment to leave Serbia with the northernmost 15 per cent of the province – was seen as a possible option by Belgrade. Likewise, for all its opposition to the idea, Pristina may have been willing to sign up to some form of territorial readjustment in return for Serbian consent for independence. While many have suggested that this was not the case, it is worth remembering that Serbian acceptance would have ensured UN membership and international recognition. Moreover, it was also accepted by many, if not most, observers that the chances of Pristina controlling the Serbian inhabited areas of northern Kosovo were as bleak as Belgrade’s hopes of reasserting authority over the Kosovo Albanians. Therefore, under the right conditions, including pressure from outside parties and the full recognition of independence by Belgrade, the option may have found wider support amongst the Kosovo Albanians. To be sure, the idea of partition had a number of international advocates. In addition to the numerous pieces published supporting the idea,48 it was actually rather telling just how often the idea was indirectly floated as an option, and just how much support it seemed to attract from seasoned observers and those most involved in the process.49 Time and time again, when questioned about this option, international figures closely involved with the process, including all three members of the Troika, obliquely confirmed that some form of division was a potential option by overtly stating that they would be willing to accept any solution acceptable to the parties themselves. If partition was one such option, then so be it. Indeed, the Troika even noted that it was discussed in the process, albeit briefly. Interestingly, though, its failure to gain traction had less to do with the fact that the idea had been ruled out by the Contact Group, or that it was opposed by Pristina, which had even threatened to walk out of the talks if the idea was raised. Instead, the problem was that while many Serbian politicians may been willing to accept it as a facesaving compromise, no one was willing to put their name to an idea that would mean having to accept the loss of the rest of the province.50 Therefore, even though partition was seen by many as the

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‘best’ compromise solution in theory, in reality it required a degree of political unity amongst the ruling coalition that was simply not there at the time. No single figure could have been expected to take such a monumental decision. It would have to be a joint decision. This is where, for example, pressure from Russia may well have yielded some concrete results. Despite this, the idea of partition has not vanished entirely. A good many observers believe that a form of division may well be revisited at some point in the future.51 The Troika and European unity Even though the Troika negotiations were destined to fail from the outset, European officials noted that the Troika process had nevertheless served another useful purpose. It had proved to many of the members of the European Union that everything possible had been done to try to secure an agreement between the sides. Indeed, as far as many were concerned, including Ischinger, building European unity was actually the second main goal of the process.52 On this score, the Troika process worked extremely well. By the time the three diplomats had completed their mediation in December there was certainly a much greater degree of European unity over the issue than there had been in the summer.53 As the Ahtisaari process ended, and throughout the Security Council debates, it was clear that the EU was deeply divided over Kosovo. Speaking at the time, Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister, who had also served as a UN Special Representative in Kosovo, described the issue as one of the most difficult problems ever encountered by the EU.54 Another official put it even more bluntly. There was a ‘chaotic mess’ in the European Council.55 For some countries, objecting to independence without a clear UN authorisation was based on self-interest. The governments of Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece and Cyprus were all genuinely worried about the implications of granting independence to Kosovo without UN authorisation would have on their own countries. For Cyprus, in particular, recognising Kosovo without a UN resolution posed the risk that it might open the way for the eventual recognition of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’. In addition to the core of states that harboured fears about the implications of independence for their own territorial integrity, there were many other members who were uneasy about taking a path that

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seemed to go against established principles of international law and would almost certainly undermine the authority of the United Nations. Such concerns were undoubtedly fed by worries that Ahtisaari had not tried everything in his power to reach a compromise between the two sides, which had given Russia a legitimate reason to block a resolution. Significantly, Germany appeared to be one of the countries that appeared to be facing such a problem. Indeed, it was the fear that the German Government could face a very difficult time explaining a decision to recognise Kosovo’s declaration of independence before the parliament that explained Ischinger’s appointment as the EU representative on the Troika.56 The Troika talks helped to redress this problem, especially as regards the second group of states. By openly attempting to explore almost every option – as Ischinger stated, the motto of the talks had been, ‘leave no stone unturned’57 – the Troika talks provided an opportunity for those countries that harboured concerns based on legal principles to argue that it had been proven that a mutually acceptable agreement could never be reached between the two sides. Therefore, in light of the argument that the status quo was unsustainable, which many read to mean the threat of Albanian violence,58 and the continuing Russian veto in the Security Council, there was no choice but to take a decision to recognise Kosovo as a unique case and accept independence. In other words, the Troika process provided a vital fig-leaf to those states that needed a strong case to justify their decision to circumvent the UN Security Council. While the search for European unity in favour of independence was a major reason for the talks, this should not be taken to mean that the Troika process was predetermined in the same way as the Ahtisaari talks had been. It was not. Unlike the previous talks, Serbia was given plenty of opportunities to put its ideas on the table, even if the Kosovo Albanian leadership refused to discuss them. Notably, Tadić and Jeremić both acknowledged that the Troika talks had been conducted fairly.59 The fact that they seemed predestined to open the way for a declaration of independence was due to Washington’s position. It was not the default position of the mediators as a group. The EU, the United States and Russia The role of the Troika in forging European unity over Kosovo serves to raise a broader question over the European Union’s role in the

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process as a whole. It is rather telling that, for an issue that was seen by Eide in his October 2005 report as being a matter for the EU, the Union was such a minor actor in the whole process – certainly as compared to the United States and Russia. The reason for this lies in the fact that, as is so often the case, the European Union was divided over the issue. It was therefore unable to formulate an alternative approach of its own that may have opened the way for some sort of compromise between Belgrade and Pristina. In essence, European disunity ensured that Washington and Moscow controlled the debate. In meetings with their European counterparts, US officials made it clear that the United States was intent on recognising independence. Europe could either agree, or live with the consequences.60 Importantly, neither side attempted to hide that this was happening. As one US official stated, ‘While some European countries, notably members of the EU, may feel themselves obligated to join us in recognizing Kosovo’s independence, a number of those countries would do so reluctantly because of Washington’s inflexibility and insistence.’61 Likewise, as one European official explained, ‘The cake has been baked because the Americans have promised Kosovo independence. And if Washington recognizes Kosovo and European nations do not follow, it will be a disaster.’62 When faced with a situation created by Washington, albeit with the support of key members of the European Union, such as Britain and France, the wavering members of the European Union were left with little alternative but to take a pragmatic, and largely reluctant, decision to recognise a declaration of independence as the only way to preserve stability on the ground.63 In this sense, the widespread view that most of the European Union was in full alignment with the United States on the issue of Kosovo is not true. While some members of the EU may have supported independence for ideological reasons, the vast majority did not. Unlike the United States, the EU was not determined to recognise independence come what may. However, blame for what had happened cannot be attributed to the United States alone. European officials appeared to be angry at the way in which both Washington and Moscow had manipulated the situation for their own ends. As one EU official put it, ‘Russia has simply decided to stop short of doing anything that would lead to real pressure on Serbia to strike a deal…At the same time, Washington’s long-standing pledge to recognise Kosovo’s declaration of independence has always been in the back of the Kosovars’ minds.’64

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Certainly Massimo D’Alema, the Italian foreign minister, was willing to criticise both Russia and the United States, noting that both countries had fed the intransigence of the two sides by taking positions that often appeared to be stronger than those expressed by the parties themselves.65 The realisation that the situation had so obviously been shaped by Washington and Moscow left many in Europe embarrassed by the EU’s failure to manage what was so very clearly and essentially a European issue. As Alberto Navarro, the Spanish Minister for Europe, stated after the declaration of independence: ‘I’m really frustrated that the future of Kosovo has been decided in Washington and to some extent in Moscow, and not in Europe.’66 Another observer put the case even more strongly: ‘the international significance of a debacle that reflects poorly on all participants is…very clear: Russia and the United States have combined to humiliate the European Union.’67 ‘Europeanisation’ and the future of Kosovo Notwithstanding the fraught circumstances under which the decision to support independence was reached, the move by most of the European Union to recognise Kosovo’s statehood was widely perceived to have served a vital role in redressing the situation in Europe’s favour. Simply put, it was seem as a first step towards the ‘Europeanisation’ of the Kosovo issue. In view of the deadlock that existed between Belgrade and Pristina, EU policy makers always realised that the way to manage the problem of Kosovo in the long-term was to bring Serbia and Kosovo within the European Union.68 This would, or so it was hoped, render the problem meaningless in the context of Europe’s open borders and shared sovereignty. However, in order to reach that stage, a number of steps were required. First and foremost, the European Union would have to take over from the United Nations in Kosovo, albeit in a smaller and less overt manner. Once there, and supported by a continued international security presence on the ground, the long process of preparing Kosovo for eventual EU membership could start. In order to achieve this, though, the European Union could not simply replace UNMIK. Pristina would have to acquiesce to its presence. Given that Washington was determined to support

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independence, this handover from the UN to the EU would only be accepted if the Kosovo Albanians understood that most of the EU also recognised Kosovo’s statehood. This was explicitly acknowledged by Gernot Erler, the German Deputy Foreign Minister, who stated that there was a real fear that the EU mission would not be seen as legitimate by Kosovo’s 90 per cent Albanian majority if the bloc did not recognise their independence first.69 As another EU official also explained, ‘if we want to stabilize Kosovo, there is no alternative but to establish a state’.70 Be that as it may, by the time of the declaration of independence few in Europe were under any illusions as to what this would mean in real terms. In taking the decision to recognise what was eventually termed a ‘controlled’ or ‘coordinated’ declaration of independence, many members accepted that Kosovo would not, even with their recognition, be able to join many international organisations. Nor would it be recognised by many other states around the world. In effect it would fall into a state of quasi-recognition faced by numerous other entities – even if it lay at the ‘more legitimate’ end of the spectrum. As Janez Janša, the Slovenian prime minister put it soon after his country took up the EU presidency: ‘The EU is sending a security mission to Kosovo. You do not send such missions to independent states.’71 Such sentiments appeared to be echoed by Ischinger in an interview on German radio just days after the Troika report had been submitted, in which he acknowledged that Kosovo would not be an independent state like ‘France or Germany’.72 For all these reasons, one cannot help but conclude that the decision to recognise Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not taken by most of the European Union in order to ‘solve’ the status question once and for all. Again, by the end of the process it was clear to all observers that a declaration of independence would lack widespread international legitimacy. Nor would it not ease regional tensions or enhance stability in the Balkans – contrary to the statements made by those states that supported independence. While it would almost certainly ease the potential for violence within Kosovo, or at least from within the Kosovo Albanian community, it was obvious that it would create a whole new set of regional and international complications that did not exist while Kosovo remained under both formal and actual UN administration – a state of affairs that was, after all, recognised and accepted by all the members of the United Nations, including Serbia. Instead, the decision to recognise

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Kosovo was made in response to decisions made elsewhere and in the hope that it would open up another, longer-term process by which the issue would eventually be settled by the region’s European integration. Of course, as noted earlier, this emphasis on the ‘Europeanisation’ of the problem was nothing new. It was always front and centre of the overall strategy for Kosovo. Just as Eide had noted that EU integration would play an important role in stabilising the region in his report, in October 2005, so the same point was also made by the Troika in their final report, in December 2007. As Ischinger explained in a piece written for the BBC just days after the Troika process ended, ‘One thing is clear: both Serbia and Kosovo share the ultimate goal of accession to EU membership. It is their shared European aspiration which, in the long run, will bring them together.’73 The trouble is that while this emphasis on ‘Europeanisation’ is logical and worthy in an abstract sense, and the EU mission in Kosovo is likely to improve justice and governance on the ground, in the aftermath of the ‘mess’ created by the failed status process it is now far from apparent how European integration will occur in real terms. The question of sovereignty will remain a fundamental bone of contention for the foreseeable future and will inevitably complicate the efforts of Serbia and Kosovo to join the European Union. Therefore, while it is possible that EU membership may eventually create the conditions for peaceful coexistence between Kosovo and Serbia, in whatever form, it is also important to recognise that reaching that point has now become that much more difficult. The one thing that can be said for certain at this stage is that with such deep divisions over the issue within the international community, and amongst the members of the European Union, the question of Kosovo’s final status has yet to be resolved conclusively.

APPENDIX A UN RESOLUTION 1244 10 June 1999

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting on 10 June 1999 The Security Council, Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999, Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions, Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes, Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party, Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo, Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and

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welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper, Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2, Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo, Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2; 2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation; 3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized; 4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2; 5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences; 6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international

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security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner; 7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below; 8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment; 9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include: (a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2; (b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below; (c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; (d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task; (e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task; (f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence; (g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required; (h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations; 10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo; 11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:

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(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); (b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required; (c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections; (d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities; (e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); (f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; (g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction; (h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid; (i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; (j) Protecting and promoting human rights; (k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo; 12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid; 13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date; 14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; 15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-

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General; 16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences; 17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation; 18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution; 19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise; 20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution; 21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex 1 Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999 The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis: – Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; – Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; – Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives; – Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a

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peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; – The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; – A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA; – Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

Annex 2 Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis: 1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. 2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable. 3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives. 4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. 5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo. 6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions: – Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence;

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– Marking/clearing minefields; – Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; – Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations. 8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions. 9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.

APPENDIX B SUMMARY OF THE EIDE REPORT 7 October 2005

This report contains a comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo with the aim of assessing whether the conditions are now in place for initiating and conducting the future status process. The review has also been used to seek progress on the ground and to contribute to an environment conducive to taking the political process forward. Following a period of political stagnation and widespread frustration, Kosovo has entered a new period of dynamic development. A political process is under way and is gaining momentum. It is based on a comprehensive political strategy, which includes the prospects for a future status process. The standards implementation process is an important part of this dynamic. The record of implementation so far is uneven. Particular progress has been made in the development of new institutional frameworks. After the end of the conflict in 1999, there was a total institutional vacuum in Kosovo. Today, a comprehensive set of institutions has been established which includes executive, legislative and judicial bodies at the central as well as the local levels. Much progress has also been achieved in the development of a sustainable legal framework. The legislative work of the Assembly, the Government and UNMIK has been ambitious, covering essential areas of public life and the economy. Systems providing public services have been put in place across most of Kosovo. A civil service is taking shape. Over the recent period, a significant transfer of competences has occurred. The local leaders have gradually assumed ownership of their own institutions. The development of new institutions is undermined by a strong tendency among politicians to see themselves as accountable to their political parties rather

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than to the public they serve. Appointments are, therefore, regularly made on the basis of political and clan affiliation rather than competence. The Kosovo Serbs have chosen to stay outside the central political institutions and maintain parallel structures for health and educational services. The Kosovo Serbs fear that they will become a decoration to any central-level political institution, with little ability to yield tangible results. The Kosovo Albanians have done little to dispel this fear. The interests of the Kosovo Serbs would be better served if their representatives returned to the Assembly. The Kosovo Albanian parties should stimulate such a process. The time has also come for Belgrade to abandon its negative position towards Kosovo Serb participation. With regard to the economy, significant progress has been made. Economic structures have been established and modern legislation exists in many essential areas. Nevertheless, the current economic situation remains bleak. The unemployment rate is still high and poverty is widespread. Grave problems exist with regard to lack of public income as well as an antiquated energy sector. To improve the situation, serious efforts must be undertaken. There are, however, positive longer-term prospects. The privatization process is well under way. It could have a direct and positive impact on the economy in Kosovo as many of the socially owned enterprises have been idle. However, the privatization process could lead to discrimination in employment along ethnic lines and affect the sustainability of minority communities. It is important to avoid such negative effects. Kosovo also has valuable and unexploited natural resources, which would turn Kosovo into an energy exporter in an energy-hungry region. If a future status process is launched, this will certainly have a positive effect on the economy of Kosovo. However, the Kosovo authorities must understand that they cannot depend on the international community to solve their problems. They must take steps to ensure that shortcomings are addressed. Investment and integration will depend not only on status, but also on a predictable and stable Kosovo, where the rule of law is respected. Today, the rule of law is hampered by a lack of ability and readiness to enforce legislation at all levels. Respect for the rule of law is inadequately entrenched and the mechanisms to enforce it are not sufficiently developed. The Kosovo Police Service (KPS) is gradually taking on new and more demanding tasks. However, crimes of a more serious nature or with ethnic dimensions remain difficult for the KPS to address. The Kosovo justice system is regarded as the weakest of Kosovo’s institutions. The civil justice system is of particular concern, its increasing backlog of cases now stands at several tens of thousands. Combating serious crime, including organized

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crime and corruption, has proven to be difficult for the KPS and the justice system. It is hindered by family or clan solidarity and by the intimidation of witnesses and of law enforcement and judicial officials. For inter-ethnic crime, the law enforcement mechanism is also weak. Organized crime and corruption have been characterized as the biggest threats to the stability of Kosovo and the sustainability of its institutions. These are widespread phenomena, but their level is difficult to assess. The government has not taken the necessary administrative and legislative action to fight organized crime and to prevent corruption in provisional institutions. The Kosovo police and judiciary are fragile institutions. Further transfer of competences in these areas should be considered with great caution. In a deeply divided society, which is still recovering from post-conflict trauma, the establishment of ministries of justice and the interior could lead to the impression that they have fallen under the control of one political party or one ethnic group. The transfer of competences in such sensitive areas cannot work without a firm oversight, intervention and sanctioning policy. In the light of the limitations of the police and judicial systems, there will be a need for a continued presence of international police with executive powers in sensitive areas. The current ongoing reduction in the number of international judges and prosecutors is premature and should be urgently reconsidered. With regard to the foundation for a multi-ethnic society, the situation is grim. Kosovo leaders and the international community should take urgent steps in order to correct this picture. The overall security situation is stable, but fragile. The level of reported crime, including inter-ethnic crime, is low. However, on the ground, the situation is complex and troubling, especially for minority communities. There are frequently unreported cases of lowlevel, inter-ethnic violence and incidents. This affects freedom of movement in a negative way. To correct this situation, it will be important to prosecute crime more vigorously. When perpetrators remain at large, a sense of impunity prevails. Belgrade should abstain from inflammatory comments, which could contribute to an insecure environment. Respecting property rights is one of the most urgent challenges with regard to ensuring a truly multi-ethnic society. At present, property rights are neither respected nor ensured. A great number of agricultural and commercial properties remain illegally occupied. This represents a serious obstacle to returns and sustainable livelihoods. The overall return process has virtually come to a halt. The general atmosphere in many places is not conducive to return. Multi-ethnicity is often not seen as a goal. While overall statistics are hard to find, there is a widespread view that currently as many or more Kosovo Serbs are leaving

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Kosovo than are returning. A viable return process will require support and attention over a longer period of time, in particular to facilitate access to services and repossession of land. Greater attention will also be needed to those who have remained. The return process is hampered by the fact that assistance is only provided to those who return to their home of origin. A more flexible policy of assistance should be considered to support the return of people to where they can live and not only to where they have lived. However, it must be ensured that a more flexible policy is not misused for political manipulation. The continued existence of camps inside Kosovo is a disgrace for the governing structures and for the international community. The Roma camps in Plementina and Zitkovac are particularly distressing. They should be dealt with on an emergency basis. The Serbian Orthodox religious sites and institutions represent a critical element of the spiritual fabric of Kosovo Serbs. They are also part of the world cultural heritage. There is a need to create a “protective space” around these sites, with the involvement of the international community, in order to make them less vulnerable to political manipulation. To achieve sustainable return and viable minority communities, a wider decentralization process will be required. It could envisage enhanced competences in areas such as the police, justice, education, culture, the media and the economy. It could allow for horizontal links between Kosovo Serb majority municipalities. It would also facilitate the absorption of parallel structures into legitimate entities. However, it should not endanger central institutions in Kosovo or weaken Pristina’s authority. The international community must stand ready to assist in the establishment of arrangements for wider decentralization. There will not be any good moment for addressing Kosovo’s future status. It will continue to be a highly sensitive political issue. Nevertheless, an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that the time has come to commence this process. The political process, which is now under way, must continue. Based on a comprehensive strategy, it has provided Kosovo with a political perspective. Kosovo having moved from stagnation to expectation, stagnation cannot again be allowed to take hold. Further progress in standards implementation is urgently required. It is unlikely that postponing the future status process will lead to further and tangible results. However, moving into the future status process entails a risk that attention will be focused on status to the detriment of standards. It will require great effort to keep the standards implementation process on track. During the future status process, the international community will have a

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strong leverage to move standards implementation forward. That leverage must be fully exploited. Provided the future status process is properly handled, it can bring about further progress in standards implementation. There is now a shared expectation in Kosovo and in Belgrade, as well as in the region, that the future status process will start. During this comprehensive review, there has been a gradual shift in the preparedness for such a process among the interlocutors. Furthermore, all sides need clarity with regard to the future status of Kosovo. It is of great importance that the future status process takes place at a time when the international community is still present in Kosovo in sufficient strength. The future status process must be moved forward with caution. All the parties must be brought together – and kept together – throughout the status process. The end result must be stable and sustainable. Artificial deadlines should not be set. Once the process has started, it cannot be blocked and must be brought to a conclusion. The international community will need strength to carry the future status process forward. The United Nations has done a credible and impressive job in fulfilling its mandate in difficult circumstances. But its leverage in Kosovo is diminishing. Kosovo is located in Europe, where strong regional organizations exist. In the future, they – and in particular the European Union (EU) – will have to play the most prominent role in Kosovo. They will have the leverage required and will be able to offer prospects in the framework of the European integration process. A future status process should be accompanied by a clear expression by the international community that it is determined to stay and support this process as well as its outcome. The EU should, in the near term, consider stepping up its presence on the ground. When status has been determined, the EU will be expected to play a more prominent role, in particular with regard to the police and justice and in monitoring and supporting the standards process. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will also have to continue its presence. A United States contribution to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is essential in order to provide a visible expression of continued engagement. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has a valuable asset in its field experience and expertise. This presence will continue to be required. A high representative or a similar arrangement should be considered, firmly anchored in the EU and with the continued involvement of the broader international community. A “Bonn Powers” arrangement could be envisaged in areas related to inter-ethnic issues. A road map for integration into international structures would provide

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Kosovo with real prospects for the future. Belgrade will also need incentives for integration into Euro-Atlantic frameworks of cooperation. The EU decision to start negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro for a stabilization and association agreement represents a milestone in this respect. Determining the future status of Kosovo will in itself be a demanding challenge. The international community must do the utmost to ensure that, whatever the eventual status, it does not become a failed status. Entering the future status process does not mean entering the last stage, but the next stage of the international presence. Source: ‘Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, Security Council Document, S/2005/635, 7 October 2005.

APPENDIX C SECURITY COUNCIL STATEMENT 24 October 2005

The Security Council welcomes the report prepared by the United Nations Secretary-General’s Standards Review envoy, Ambassador Kai Eide, on the Comprehensive Review of the implementation of Standards, as well as of the overall situation in and relating to Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro), forwarded by the Secretary-General on 7 October 2005 (S/2005/635). The Council pays tribute to Ambassador Eide’s work in compiling his important report. The Security Council recalls the Secretary-General’s report of 23 May 2005 (S/2005/335) in which he initiated the Comprehensive Review conducted by Ambassador Eide. In light of the findings in Ambassador Eide’s report, the Council stresses that further, more sustained progress is required, and that the implementation of Standards in Kosovo must continue with undiminished energy and a stronger sense of commitment, as underlined by the Secretary-General in his letter. It urges Kosovo’s leaders to increase their efforts to ensure the implementation of standards at all levels, allowing tangible results to be delivered to all Kosovo’s citizens. Particular and timeconscious attention should be given to protecting minorities, developing further the process of decentralization, creating the necessary conditions to allow sustainable returns, preservation of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo, and promoting reconciliation. The Council also urges the authorities in Belgrade to do their utmost to facilitate this process, and to engage constructively. The Council reaffirms its full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr Søren Jessen-Petersen, and UNMIK in their continuing work to support the implementation of Standards, which must continue during the Future Status process and will be

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an important factor in determining the degree of progress. The Security Council agrees with Ambassador Eide’s overall assessment that, notwithstanding the challenges still facing Kosovo and the wider region, the time has come to move to the next phase of the political process. The Council therefore supports the United Nations Secretary-General’s intention to start a political process to determine Kosovo’s Future Status, as foreseen in Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). The Council reaffirms the framework of the resolution, and welcomes the Secretary-General’s readiness to appoint a Special Envoy to lead the Future Status process. It looks forward to an early appointment. The Council offers its full support to this political process, which would determine Kosovo’s future status, and further reaffirms its commitment to the objective of a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo, which must reinforce regional stability. The Security Council welcomes the intention of the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) to remain closely engaged in the political process that will be led by the United Nations, and to support the SecretaryGeneral’s Future Status Envoy. The Council calls upon interested regional and international organisations to cooperate closely in the process to determine Kosovo’s future status. The Council also supports the meaningful involvement and cooperation of countries in the region. The Security Council requests that the Secretary-General provide regular updates on progress in determining Kosovo’s Future Status, as defined by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), and will remain actively seized of the matter.

APPENDIX D CONTACT GROUP DOCUMENTS November 2005 & January 2006

Contact Group, Guiding Principles, 2 November 2005 The Contact Group has considered the Secretary-General’s letter and Ambassador Kai Eide’s report on the comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo contained therein that were submitted to the Security Council on 7 October 2005. The Contact Group supports the recommendation by the SecretaryGeneral to the Security Council based on this report to launch a process to determine the future status of Kosovo in accordance with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). It welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Envoy to lead this process. The Contact Group looks forward to supporting the efforts of the Special Envoy and his team. A negotiated solution should be an international priority. Once the process has started, it cannot be blocked and must be brought to a conclusion. The Contact Group calls on the parties to engage in good faith and constructively, to refrain from unilateral steps and to reject any form of violence. Those advocating violence will have no role. The Special Envoy can take appropriate action within his United Nations mandate to suspend or exclude any individual or group, if he judges that their actions are not conducive to progress. The Contact Group calls on all parties to establish unified negotiating teams and agree on common positions. The process should provide for the effective participation of the Kosovo Serbs and other Kosovo citizens and communities. Regional neighbours and other interested parties should also be consulted as necessary. The progress of the status process will depend not only on the level of

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engagement by the parties but also on the conditions on the ground. The implementation of the standards laid down by the United Nations must continue during the status process and will be a factor in determining progress. The Contact Group reaffirms the importance which it attaches to constructive and sustained dialogue at all levels between Belgrade and Pristina and between the different communities in Kosovo. It asks the authorities in Belgrade to actively encourage the Serbs of Kosovo to take their place in Kosovo’s institutions. The Security Council will remain actively seized of the matter. The final decision on the status of Kosovo should be endorsed by the Security Council. The Contact Group therefore informs all the involved parties that the outcome of the status process should be based on the principles set out below: 1. The settlement of the Kosovo issue should be fully compatible with international standards of human rights, democracy and international law and contribute to regional security. 2. The settlement of Kosovo’s Status should conform with democratic values and European standards and contribute to realizing the European perspective of Kosovo, in particular, Kosovo’s progress in the stabilization and association process, as well as the integration of the entire region in EuroAtlantic institutions. 3. The settlement should ensure multi-ethnicity that is sustainable in Kosovo. It should provide effective constitutional guarantees and appropriate mechanisms to ensure the implementation of human rights for all citizens in Kosovo and of the rights of members of all Kosovo communities, including the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety. 4. The settlement should provide mechanisms to ensure the participation of all Kosovo communities in government, both on the central and on the local level. Effective structures of local self government established through the decentralization process should facilitate the coexistence of different communities and ensure equitable and improved access to public services. 5. The settlement of Kosovo’s status should include specific safeguards for the protection of the cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. This should include provisions specifying the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s institutions and sites and other patrimony in Kosovo. 6. The settlement of Kosovo’s status should strengthen regional security and stability. Thus, it will ensure that Kosovo does not return to the pre-March

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1999 situation. Any solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be unacceptable. There will be no changes in the current territory of Kosovo, i.e. no partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country. The territorial integrity and internal stability of regional neighbours will be fully respected. 7. The Status settlement will ensure Kosovo’s security. It will also ensure that Kosovo does not pose a military or security threat to its neighbours. Specific provisions on security arrangements will be included. 8. The settlement of Kosovo’s status should promote effective mechanisms to strengthen Kosovo’s ability to enforce the rule of law, to fight organized crime and terrorism and safeguard the multiethnic character of the police and the judiciary. 9. The settlement should ensure that Kosovo can develop in a sustainable way both economically and politically and that it can cooperate effectively with international organizations and international financial institutions. 10. For some time Kosovo will continue to need an international civilian and military presence to exercise appropriate supervision of compliance of the provisions of the Status settlement, to ensure security and, in particular, protection for minorities as well as to monitor and support the authorities in the continued implementation of standards.

Contact Group Statement, London, 31 January 2006 1. Contact Group Ministers together with the EU High Representative, the EU Presidency, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, the NATO Secretary-General and UN representatives including the UN Special Status Envoy and SRSG met on 31 January in London. Ministers express their profound regret over the loss of President Ibrahim Rugova, who had won the world's respect for his principled advocacy of human rights and democracy. 2. Ministers emphasise the importance they attach to a lasting Kosovo status settlement that promotes a multi-ethnic society. This would immeasurably enhance regional stability, as well as the European and Euro-Atlantic perspectives of Serbia, Kosovo and of the region as a whole. Ministers recall that the character of the Kosovo problem, shaped by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and consequent conflicts, ethnic cleansing and the events of 1999, and the extended period of international administration under UNSCR 1244, must be fully taken into account in settling Kosovo’s status. UNSCR 1244 remains the framework for the ongoing status process, with the Security Council and Contact Group continuing to play key roles.

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3. Ministers believe that all possible efforts should be made to achieve a negotiated settlement in the course of 2006. To this end, Ministers strongly support the work of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. They call on Belgrade and Pristina to work constructively with him to find realistic solutions to the many difficult issues that need to be addressed. These should include, inter alia, freedom of movement, transparent and constructive links between local communities in Serbia and Kosovo, mechanisms for resolving the fate of missing persons and a specific package of measures for the protection of religious communities and sites. Arrangements for good relations between Belgrade and Pristina and within the region must also be part of a settlement. 4. Ministers stress that effective provisions for the decentralisation of government will be crucial to the status settlement. Decentralisation can ensure that minority communities remain a vital part of Kosovo's future and give impetus to the return of displaced persons who should be able to choose where they live in Kosovo. Ministers call on the parties to engage seriously on this issue. 5. The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, alongside all communities in Kosovo, must do much more to ensure that the UN Security Council-endorsed Standards are implemented. Their commitment is crucial to the prospects for a sustainable status settlement that enables all communities to live and thrive in safety. Ministers also call on Kosovo's Serbs and other minority communities to seize the opportunity of the status process to ensure their concerns are fully addressed. 6. The Contact Group Guiding Principles of November 2005 make clear that there should be: no return of Kosovo to the pre-1999 situation, no partition of Kosovo, and no union of Kosovo with any or part of another country. Ministers re-state the international community’s willingness to establish, for an interim period after a settlement, appropriate international civilian and military structures to help ensure compliance with the settlement’s provisions. Day-to-day governance, which must be conducted on a multiethnic basis, should rest with Kosovo’s duly-elected representatives. Ministers recall NATO's continuing commitment to maintain a safe and secure environment through KFOR. 7. Ministers look to Belgrade to bear in mind that the settlement needs, inter alia, to be acceptable to the people of Kosovo. The disastrous policies of the past lie at the heart of the current problems. Today, Belgrade’s leaders bear important responsibilities in shaping what happens now and in the future. The Contact Group, the EU and NATO stand ready to support Serbian democratic forces in taking this opportunity to move Serbia forward.

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Ministers welcome the arrest of Jovo Djogo but reiterate that the leadership must fulfil their repeated pledges to co-operate fully with ICTY, notably in respect of Mladic and Karadzic. Ministers equally urge Pristina to recognise that a multi-ethnic settlement is the only workable option and that the more the vital interests of minorities are addressed the quicker a broadly acceptable agreement can be reached. Ministers warn those seeking to use violence that they will undermine their own cause. 8. Lastly, Ministers emphasise that a negotiated settlement is the best way forward. It will help to create the circumstances in which a settlement can be made to work for the benefit of all. Constructive engagement by the parties will also pave the way for a European and Euro-Atlantic future. Ministers urge leaders in Serbia and Kosovo to show the political courage and vision necessary to come forward with realistic and far-sighted proposals for the future of both Kosovo and Serbia. They have asked the Status Envoy and the SRSG to keep them updated on progress and undertake to return to the issue at their request or if the situation warrants.

APPENDIX E AHTISAARI PROPOSALS

Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status (S/2007/168) Recommendation: Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised by the international community

1. In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed me as his Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. According to my terms of reference, this process should culminate in a political settlement that determines the future status of Kosovo. To achieve such a political settlement, I have held intensive negotiations with the leadership of Serbia and Kosovo over the course of the past year. My team and I have made every effort to facilitate an outcome that would be acceptable to both sides. But after more than one year of direct talks, bilateral negotiations and expert consultations, it has become clear to me that the parties are not able to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s future status. 2. Throughout the process and on numerous occasions, both parties have reaffirmed their categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of independence. Even on practical issues such as decentralization, community rights, the protection of cultural and religious heritage and economic matters, conceptual differences – almost always related to the question of status – persist, and only modest progress could be achieved. 3. My mandate explicitly provides that I determine the pace and duration of the future status process on the basis of consultations with the Secretary-

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General, taking into account the cooperation of the parties and the situation on the ground. It is my firm view that the negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse. 4. Nevertheless, resolution of this fundamental issue is urgently needed. Almost eight years have passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999) and Kosovo’s current state of limbo cannot continue. Uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty only leads to further stagnation, polarizing its communities and resulting in social and political unrest. Pretending otherwise and denying or delaying resolution of Kosovo’s status risks challenging not only its own stability but the peace and stability of the region as a whole. 5. The time has come to resolve Kosovo’s status. Upon careful consideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which sets forth these international supervisory structures, provides the foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and dignified existence.

Reintegration into Serbia is not a viable option 6. A history of enmity and mistrust has long antagonized the relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This difficult relationship was exacerbated by the actions of the Milosevic regime in the 1990s. After years of peaceful resistance to Milosevic’s policies of oppression – the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, the systematic discrimination against the vast Albanian majority in Kosovo and their effective elimination from public life – Kosovo Albanians eventually responded with armed resistance. Belgrade’s reinforced and brutal repression followed, involving the tragic loss of civilian lives and the displacement and expulsion on a massive scale of Kosovo Albanians from their homes, and from Kosovo. The dramatic deterioration of the situation on the ground prompted the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), culminating in the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999) on 10 June 1999. 7. For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in

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Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), and its assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout Kosovo, has created a situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. This is a reality one cannot deny; it is irreversible. A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia – however notional such autonomy may be – is simply not tenable.

Continued international administration is not sustainable 8. While UNMIK has made considerable achievements in Kosovo, international administration of Kosovo cannot continue. Under UNMIK authority, Kosovo institutions have been created and developed and have increasingly taken on the responsibility of managing Kosovo’s affairs. This has set into motion a dynamic political process, which has reinforced the legitimate expectations of the Kosovo people for more ownership in, and responsibility for, their own affairs. These expectations cannot be realized within the framework of continued international administration. 9. Further, while UNMIK has facilitated local institutions of self-government, it has not been able to develop a viable economy. Kosovo’s uncertain political status has left it unable to access international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy or attract the foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure and redress widespread poverty and unemployment. Unlike many of its western Balkans neighbours, Kosovo is also unable to participate effectively in any meaningful process towards the European Union – an otherwise powerful motor for reform and economic development in the region and the most effective way to continue the vital standards implementation process. Kosovo’s weak economy is, in short, a source of social and political instability, and its recovery cannot be achieved under the status quo of international administration. Economic development in Kosovo requires the clarity and stability that only independence can provide.

Independence with international supervision is the only viable option 10. Independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. Only in an independent Kosovo will its democratic

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institutions be fully responsible and accountable for their actions. This will be crucial to ensure respect for the rule of law and the effective protection of minorities. With continued political ambiguity, the peace and stability of Kosovo and the region remains at risk. Independence is the best safeguard against this risk. It is also the best chance for a sustainable long-term partnership between Kosovo and Serbia. 11. While independence for Kosovo is the only realistic option, Kosovo’s capacity to tackle the challenges of minority protection, democratic development, economic recovery and social reconciliation on its own is still limited. Kosovo’s political and legal institutions must be further developed, with international assistance and under international supervision. This is especially important to improve the protection of Kosovo’s most vulnerable populations and their participation in public life. 12. Kosovo’s minority communities – in particular the Kosovo Serbs – continue to face difficult living conditions. The violence perpetrated against them in summer 1999 and in March 2004 has left a profound legacy. While Kosovo’s leaders have increased their efforts to reach out to Kosovo Serbs and to improve implementation of standards, protecting the rights of minority communities requires their even greater commitment. At the same time, Kosovo Serbs need to engage actively in Kosovo’s institutions. They must reverse their fundamental position of noncooperation; only with an end to their boycott of Kosovo’s institutions will they be able to protect effectively their rights and interests. 13. I therefore propose that the exercise of Kosovo’s independence, and its fulfilment of the obligations set forth in my Settlement proposal, be supervised and supported for an initial period by international civilian and military presences. Their powers should be strong – but focused – in critical areas such as community rights, decentralization, the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the rule of law. These powers should be exercised to correct actions that would contravene the provisions of the Settlement proposal and the spirit in which they were crafted. Recognizing Kosovo’s current weaknesses, the international community’s intensive engagement should extend also to institutional capacity-building. I envisage that the supervisory role of the international community would come to an end only when Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in the Settlement proposal. 14. Notwithstanding this strong international involvement, Kosovo’s authorities are ultimately responsible and accountable for the implementation of the Settlement proposal. They will succeed in this endeavour only with the commitment and active participation of all communities, including, in

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particular, the Kosovo Serbs.

Conclusion 15. Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary. 16. For over a year, I have led the political process envisaged in resolution 1244 (1999), exhausting every possible avenue to achieve a negotiated settlement. The irreconcilable positions of the parties have made that goal unattainable. Nevertheless, after almost eight years of United Nations administration, Kosovo’s status must be urgently resolved. My recommendation of independence, supervised initially by the international community, takes into account Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and the need for political and economic stability in Kosovo. My Settlement proposal, upon which such independence will be based, builds upon the positions of the parties in the negotiating process and offers compromises on many issues to achieve a durable solution. I urge the Security Council to endorse my Settlement proposal. Concluding this last episode in the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia will allow the region to begin a new chapter in its history – one that is based upon peace, stability and prosperity for all.

Annex Main provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement I. General 1. The aim of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is to define the provisions necessary for a future Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable. It includes detailed measures to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of communities and their members, the effective decentralization of government, and the preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. In addition, the Settlement prescribes constitutional, economic and security provisions, all of which are

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aimed at contributing to the development of a multiethnic, democratic and prosperous Kosovo. An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provided for a future international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability throughout Kosovo. The provisions of the Settlement will take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo.

II. Provisions of the Settlement 2. Kosovo’s governance. The Settlement defines the basic framework for Kosovo’s future governance. Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically and with full respect for the rule of law and the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. Kosovo shall adopt a constitution to enshrine such principles. While the Settlement does not prescribe a complete constitution, it defines key elements that must form part of that constitution. Kosovo shall have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the right to seek membership in international organizations. 3. Rights of communities. With respect to the protection and promotion of community rights, the Settlement addresses key aspects to be protected, including culture, language, educations and symbols. Albanian and Serbian shall be the two official languages of Kosovo, while other community languages – such as Turkish, Bosnian and Roma – shall have the status of languages in official use. To ensure adequate representation of communities in public life, the Settlement defines specific representation mechanisms for key institutions. Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo shall continue to be guaranteed representation in the Kosovo Assembly. To protect their rights in the legislative process, the Settlement also provides that key laws of particular interest to communities may only be enacted if a majority of their representatives present and voting in the Kosovo Assembly agree to their adoption. 4. Decentralization. The extensive decentralization provisions are intended to promote good governance, transparency, effectiveness and fiscal sustainability in public service. The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needs and concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which shall have a high degree of control over its own affairs. The decentralization elements include, among other things: enhanced municipal competencies for Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (such as in the areas of secondary health care and higher education); extensive municipal autonomy in financial

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matters, including the ability to receive transparent funding from Serbia; provisions on inter-municipal partnerships and cross-border cooperation with Serbian institutions; and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb majority municipalities. 5. Justice system. The Settlement includes specific provisions to ensure that the justice system is integrated, independent, professional and impartial. It provides for mechanisms to achieve a justice system that is inclusive of all communities, and in which the judiciary and prosecution service reflect the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo. Moreover, the Settlement provides for, and is premised upon, the access to justice of all persons in Kosovo. 6. Protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage. The Settlement places great emphasis upon ensuring the unfettered and undisturbed existence and operation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. The Church and its internal organization shall be recognized explicitly by the Kosovo authorities, its property shall be inviolable, and it shall enjoy tax and customs duty privileges. Protective zones shall be created around more than 40 key religious and cultural sites. Without prejudice to ownership of the property in protective zones, specific restrictions shall apply to activities within those zones to guarantee the peaceful existence and functioning of major religious and cultural sites. NATO shall also provide additional physical security for selected sites, until such time as the military presence decides the conditions have been met for a transfer of their protection responsibilities to the Kosovo Police Force. 7. Returns/protection of property. All refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo shall have the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions based upon a voluntary and informed decision. The Settlement reaffirms the principle that displaced persons shall be able to return to a place of their choice in Kosovo, and not only to their original place of residence. The Settlement also calls upon Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate fully with each other and the International Committee of the Red Cross to resolve the fate of missing persons. 8. Economy. The Settlement includes specific provisions designed to promote and safeguard sustainable economic development in Kosovo. The Settlement prescribes transparent procedures to settle disputed property claims and for a continued privatization process, both with substantial international involvement. In addition, the Settlement defines mechanisms to determine Kosovo’s share of Serbia’s external debt, and to address the issue of property restitution. 9. Security. The Settlement provides for a professional, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo security sector, encouraging significant local ownership

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in its development, while retaining a level of international oversight necessary for ultimate success in this sensitive area. The Kosovo Police Force shall have a unified chain of command throughout Kosovo, with local police officers reflecting the ethnic composition of the municipality in which they serve. In Kosovo Serb majority municipalities, the Municipal Assembly shall have enhanced competencies in the selection of the police station commander. A new professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force shall be established within one year after the end of the 120-day transition period envisaged in the Settlement. It shall have a maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members. The Settlement stipulates that the current Kosovo Protection Corps shall be dissolved within one year after the end of the transition period. 10. Future international presence. In general, Kosovo shall be responsible for the implementation of the Settlement. To safeguard and support such implementation, the Settlement defines the role and powers of the future international civilian and military presences. 11. International Civilian Representative. The International Civilian Representative, who shall be double-hatted as the European Union Special Representative and who shall be appointed by an International Steering Group, shall be the ultimate supervisory authority over implementation of the Settlement. The International Civilian Representative shall have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall have strong corrective powers to ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. Among his/her powers is the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she determines to be inconsistent with the Settlement. The mandate of the International Civilian Representative shall continue until the International Steering Group determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement. 12. European Security and Defence Policy Mission. The European Security and Defence Policy Mission shall monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo. It shall have the right to investigate and prosecute independently sensitive crimes, such as organized crime, interethnic crime, financial crime, and war crimes. In addition, it shall have limited executive authority to ensure Kosovo’s rule of law institutions are effective and functional, such as in the areas of border control and crowd and riot control. 13. International Military Presence. The International Military Presence shall be a NATO-led military mission. It shall continue the current task of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide a safe and secure environment throughout

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Kosovo, in conjunction with the International Civilian Representative and in support of Kosovo’s institutions until such time as Kosovo’s institutions are capable of assuming the full range of security responsibilities. 14. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Kosovo. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with an extensive field presence in Kosovo, is requested to assist in the monitoring necessary for a successful implementation of the Settlement.

III. Implementation 15. Upon the entry into force of the Settlement, there shall be a 120-day transition period during which the existing mandate of UNMIK remains unchanged. 16. During the transition period, the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative, shall be responsible for approving a new constitution and the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Settlement and the establishment of the new Kosovo institutions it calls for. The constitution and legislation shall become effective immediately upon the conclusion of the transition period. 17. At the end of the transition period the UNMIK mandate shall expire and all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK shall be transferred en bloc to the authorities of Kosovo, in accordance with the Settlement. 18. Finally, general and local elections are to be held within nine months of the entry into force of the Settlement.

Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement Article 1 – General Principles 1.1 Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, which shall govern itself democratically, and with full respect for the rule of law, through its legislative, executive, and judicial institutions. 1.2 The exercise of public authority in Kosovo shall be based upon the equality of all citizens and respect for the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the promotion and protection of the rights and contributions of all its Communities and their members. 1.3 Kosovo shall adopt a Constitution. The Constitution of Kosovo shall prescribe and guarantee the legal and institutional mechanisms necessary to

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ensure that Kosovo is governed by the highest democratic standards, and to promote the peaceful and prosperous existence of all its inhabitants. The Constitution shall include, but not be limited to, the principles and provisions contained in Annex I of this Settlement. 1.4 Kosovo shall have an open market economy with free competition. 1.5 Kosovo shall have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the right to seek membership in international organizations. 1.6 The official languages shall be Albanian and Serbian. 1.7 Kosovo shall have its own, distinct, national symbols, including a flag, seal and anthem, reflecting its multi-ethnic character. 1.8 Kosovo shall have no territorial claims against, and shall seek no union with, any State or part of any State. 1.9 Kosovo shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in the implementation of and undertake all obligations under this Settlement. Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia are encouraged to cooperate in good faith on issues pertinent to the implementation and realization of the terms of this Settlement. 1.10 The international community shall supervise, monitor and have all necessary powers to ensure effective and efficient implementation of this Settlement, as set forth in Annexes IX, X and XI. Kosovo shall also issue an invitation to the international community to assist Kosovo in successfully fulfilling Kosovo’s obligations to this end.

Article 2 – Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 2.1 Kosovo shall promote, protect and respect the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols. Kosovo shall take all necessary measures towards ratifying the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols. 2.2 All persons in Kosovo are entitled to human rights and fundamental freedoms, without discrimination of any kind on grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with community, property, birth or other status. All persons in Kosovo are equal before the law and are entitled, without any discrimination, to equal protection of the law.

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2.3 The principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law shall be applied and respected in particular in the areas of employment in public administration and public enterprises, and access to public financing. 2.4 The Constitution of Kosovo shall prescribe the legal and institutional mechanisms for the protection, promotion, and enforcement of human rights of all persons in Kosovo, as set forth in Annex I of this Settlement. 2.5 Kosovo shall promote and fully respect a process of reconciliation among all its Communities and their members. Kosovo shall establish a comprehensive and gender-sensitive approach for dealing with its past, which shall include a broad range of transitional justice initiatives. 2.6 All competent authorities of Kosovo shall cooperate with and provide unrestricted access to internationally recognized human rights monitoring mechanisms or organizations.

Article 3 – Rights of Communities and Their Members 3.1 Inhabitants belonging to the same national or ethnic, linguistic, or religious group traditionally present on the territory of Kosovo (hereinafter referred to as Communities) shall have specific rights as set forth in Annex II of this Settlement, in addition to the human rights and fundamental freedoms provided for in Article 2 of Annex I of this Settlement. 3.2 Kosovo shall guarantee the protection of the national or ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of all Communities and their members. Kosovo shall also establish the constitutional, legal and institutional mechanisms necessary for the promotion and protection of the rights of all members of Communities and for their representation and effective participation in political and decision-making processes, as set forth in Annexes I and II of this Settlement. 3.3 The authorities of Kosovo shall be guided in their policy and practice by the need to promote a spirit of peace, tolerance and intercultural and interreligious dialogue among all Communities and their members.

Article 4 – Rights of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 4.1 All refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo shall have the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions in accordance with domestic and international law. 4.2 Kosovo shall take all measures necessary to facilitate and to create an atmosphere conducive to the safe and dignified return of refugees and displaced persons, based upon their free and informed decisions, including

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efforts to promote and protect their freedom of movement and freedom from intimidation. 4.3 Kosovo shall cooperate fully with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who will assist the competent authorities in extending protection and assistance to returnees, and who will, inter alia, undertake periodic assessments and issue public reports on the conditions of return and the situation of the internally displaced within Kosovo, and shall also extend the cooperation to other organizations involved in the return process.

Article 5 – Missing Persons 5.1 Kosovo and Serbia shall, in accordance with domestic and international norms and standards, take all measures necessary to determine and provide information regarding identities, whereabouts, and fates of missing persons, in full cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other relevant international partners. 5.2 Kosovo and Serbia shall continue to take part meaningfully, effectively, and without undue delay in the Working Group on Missing Persons established in the framework of the “Vienna Dialogue,” and chaired by the ICRC, or a similar successor mechanism as may be established. Kosovo and Serbia shall strengthen their respective governmental institutions charged with contributing to this effort with the legal mandate, authority, and resources necessary to maintain and intensify this dialogue, and ensure the active cooperation of all administrations concerned.

Article 6 – Local Self-Government and Decentralization 6.1 Municipalities shall form the basic territorial units of local selfgovernment in Kosovo. 6.2 Local self-government in Kosovo shall be based upon the principles of good governance, transparency, and efficiency and effectiveness in public service, having particular regard for the specific needs and concerns of nonmajority Communities and their members. 6.3 Municipalities in Kosovo shall have the right to inter-municipal and cross-border cooperation on matters of mutual interest in the exercise of their responsibilities, as set forth in Annex III of this Settlement. 6.4 New municipal boundaries shall be delineated in accordance with the Attachment to Annex III of this Settlement.

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Article 7 – Religious and Cultural Heritage 7.1 Kosovo shall ensure the autonomy and protection of all religious denominations and their sites within its territory. 7.2 The Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo (SOC), including its clergy and their affiliates, activities and property shall be afforded additional security and other protections for the full enjoyment of its rights, privileges and immunities, as set forth in Annex V of this Settlement. 7.3 The SOC shall be the sole owner of its property in Kosovo, with exclusive discretion over the management of its property and access to its premises, as set forth in Annex V of this Settlement. 7.4 An Implementation and Monitoring Council (IMC) shall be established by the International Civilian Representative (ICR) to monitor and facilitate full implementation of the special arrangements and protections accorded to the SOC and Serbian religious and cultural sites, as set forth in Annex V of this Settlement.

Article 8 – Economic and Property Issues 8.1 Kosovo shall pursue an economic, social and fiscal policy necessary for a sustainable economy. To support, in particular, a sustainable system of public accounts, Kosovo shall establish with the European Commission, and in close cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, a fiscal surveillance mechanism. Kosovo, in preparing its budget, shall consult with the ICR. 8.2 Any international debt of the Republic of Serbia apportioned to Kosovo as a result of the debt reconciliation process, as set forth in Annex VI of this Settlement, shall be deemed to be a financial liability of Kosovo. 8.3 Immovable and movable property of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia located within the territory of Kosovo at the time of this Settlement shall pass to Kosovo. 8.4 Publicly owned enterprises (POEs) and related obligations, and socially owned enterprises (SOEs) and their assets, currently under the jurisdiction of the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA), shall be regulated as set forth in Annex VII of this Settlement. 8.5 Kosovo shall recognize, protect, and enforce the rights of persons to private movable and immovable property located in Kosovo in accordance with established international norms and standards. Claims regarding private immovable property, including agricultural and commercial property, shall continue to be addressed, where appropriate, by the Kosovo Property Agency (KPA), in accordance with Annex VII of this Settlement. Kosovo

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shall address property restitution issues, including those related to the Serbian Orthodox Church, as a matter of priority, in accordance with Annex VII of this Settlement. 8.6 Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia shall strive to settle directly any claims between them, which are not otherwise addressed by this Settlement, by mutual agreement, taking into account relevant international norms and standards. Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia are expected to ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of property and financial claims of each other’s citizens, and shall ensure fair and non-discriminatory access to their jurisdictions and claims resolution mechanisms.

Article 9 – Security Sector 9.1 Except as otherwise provided in this settlement, Kosovo shall have authority over law enforcement, security, justice, public safety, intelligence, civil emergency response and border control on its territory. 9.2 Kosovo security institutions shall operate in accordance with internationally recognized democratic standards and human rights, and shall ensure equitable representation of all Communities throughout their ranks. 9.3 The International Civilian Representative (ICR) and the International Military Presence (IMP), in accordance with provisions of this settlement and in line with their respective mandates, shall supervise and guide the development and evolution of the Kosovo security institutions. 9.4 A new professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force (KSF) shall be established, and shall develop a lightly armed component capable of specified security functions, in accordance with Annex VIII of this Settlement. 9.5 Kosovo shall establish a civilian-led organization of the Government to exercise civilian control over the KSF, in accordance with this Settlement. 9.6 The KPC, having accomplished its goals, including the facilitation of Kosovo’s post-conflict recovery, shall be disbanded within one year after the entry into force of this settlement. 9.7 All organizations not authorized by law to conduct activities in Kosovo in the security sector shall cease to operate.

Article 10 – Constitutional Commission and Elections 10.1 Immediately upon the entry into force of this Settlement, the President of Kosovo, in consultation with the Presidency of the Assembly, shall convene a Constitutional Commission to draft a Constitution, in consultation

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with the International Civilian Representative (ICR), in accordance with this Settlement. 10.2 The Constitutional Commission shall be composed of twenty-one (21) Kosovan members, who shall possess the relevant professional qualifications and expertise necessary for this purpose, and who shall reflect the diversity of Kosovo society. Fifteen (15) members shall be appointed by the President of Kosovo, in consultation with the Presidency of the Assembly. Three (3) members shall be appointed by the Assembly members holding seats reserved for the Kosovo Serb Community, and three (3) members appointed by the Assembly members holding seats reserved for other Kosovo nonAlbanian Communities. 10.3 The Commission shall establish meaningful mechanisms to inform members of the public about its work. The ICR shall appoint representatives to assist the work of the Commission, including in developing its rules of procedure and evaluating available international models for constitution drafting. 10.4 The Assembly may not formally approve the Constitution until such time as the ICR has certified it as in accordance with the terms of this Settlement. The Assembly shall formally approve the Constitution within 120 days of the entry into force of this settlement by the current members of the Assembly of Kosovo with a two thirds majority of those members present and voting, following appropriate consultations with Assembly members of Communities who are not in the majority in Kosovo. Upon formal approval, the Constitution shall be deemed adopted by they Kosovo Assembly and shall enter into force on the first day immediately following the end of the transition period, as defined in Article 14.1 of this Settlement. 10.5 No later than 9 months from the entry into force of this settlement, Kosovo shall organize general and municipal elections in accordance with the terms of this settlement and the new municipal boundaries, as defined by Annex III of this Settlement. The elections shall be certified by a competent international authority as having met international standards.

Article 11 – International Civilian Representative 11.1 An International Steering Group (ISG) comprising key international stakeholders shall appoint an International Civilian Representative (ICR), and will seek UN Security Council endorsement of the appointment. The ICR and the EU Special Representative (EUSR), appointed by the Council of the European Union, shall be the same person. 11.2 The ISG shall support and give guidance to the International Civilian

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Representative in fulfilling his/her mandate. 11.3 The ICR shall have overall responsibility for the supervision, and shall be the final authority in Kosovo regarding interpretation of this Settlement, as set forth in Annex IX, in particular Article 2, of this Settlement. 11.4 As set forth in Annex IX of this Settlement, the ICR shall be entrusted to exercise certain powers to ensure and supervise full implementation of this Settlement including the power to take measures, as necessary, to prevent and remedy breaches of this Settlement. Powers shall also be conferred to the ICR in his/her capacity as EUSR, as set forth in Annex IX of this Settlement. 11.5 The ICR shall have the overall coordinating role over the activities of other international organizations in Kosovo insofar as they relate to ICR’s responsibility to monitor and ensure full implementation of this Settlement, as set forth in Annex IX of this Settlement. 11.6 The mandate of the ICR shall continue until the International Steering Group determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of this Settlement. The ISG shall provide direction on the ultimate phase-out of the ICR. 11.7 The ISG shall conduct its first review of the mandate of the ICR, on the basis of the state of implementation of this Settlement, no later than two years after the entry into force of this Settlement.

Article 12 – International Support in the Area of Rule of Law 12.1 The European Union shall establish a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) Mission in the field of rule of law. 12.2 The ESDP Mission shall assist Kosovo authorities in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent judiciary, police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and in accordance with internationally recognized standards and European best practices. 12.3 The ESDP Mission shall support implementation of this Settlement and shall provide mentoring, monitoring and advice in the area of the rule of law generally, while retaining certain powers, in particular, with respect to the judiciary, police, customs and correctional services, under modalities and for a duration to be determined by the EU Council, in accordance with Annexes IX and X of this Settlement.

Article 13 – International Military Presence 13.1 NATO shall establish an International Military Presence (IMP) to

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support implementation of this settlement, as set forth in Annex XI of this Settlement. 13.2 This IMP shall be a NATO-led force and shall operate under the authority, and be subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council through the NATO chain of command. NATO’s military presence in Kosovo does not preclude a possible future follow-on military mission by another international security organization, subject to a revised mandate. 13.3 The IMP shall cooperate closely with, and support the work of, the ICR, the ESDP Mission, and other international organizations as may be present in Kosovo, to monitor and ensure full implementation of this Settlement. 13.4 The IMP shall be responsible for pproviding a safe and secure environment throughout the territory of Kosovo, in conjunction with the ICR and in support of the Kosovo institutions, until such time as Kosovo’s institutions are capable of assuming responsibility, on a case-by-case basis, for the security tasks performed by the IMP. Kosovo, supported by the ICR and the IMP, shall develop a process to provide a transition plan for handover of IMP security responsibilities over time. 13.5 The IMP shall have overall responsibility for the development and training of the Kosovo Security Force, and NATO shall have overall responsibility for the development and establishment of a civilian-led organization of the Government to exercise civilian control over this Force, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the ICR, as set forth in Annex IX of this Settlement.

Article 14 – Transitional Arrangements and Final Provisions 14.1 Upon the entry into force of this Settlement, there shall be a 120 day transition period: a) During the transition period, UNMIK shall continue to exercise its mandate in accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative (ICR). The ICR shall have the authority to monitor implementation of the Settlement during the transition period and to make recommendations to UNMIK on actions to be taken to ensure compliance with the Settlement. b) The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government and other applicable laws shall remain in effect until the end of the transition period to the extent not inconsistent with this Settlement. c) The Assembly of Kosovo shall formally approve a new Constitution

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before the end of this transition period, in accordance with the terms of this Settlement. d) If, by the end of the transition period, the new Constitution has not been formally approved, UNMIK shall amend the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, in accordance with the terms of this Settlement. The amended Constitutional Framework for Provisional SelfGovernment shall remain in force until such time as the new Constitution is adopted by the Assembly. e) During the transition period, the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the ICR, shall formally approve the necessary legislation, in particular as set forth in Annex XII of this Settlement, to fully implement the terms of this Settlement. Such legislation, which shall not require the further approval of, or promulgation by UNMIK, shall be deemed formally adopted by the Kosovo Assembly and shall become effective immediately upon the conclusion of the transition period, if in accordance with this Settlement and the new Constitution or Constitutional Framework as amended by UNMIK. Until such legislation has become effective, competent authorities in Kosovo shall take all measures necessary to ensure that no actions are taken that contravene the provisions of this Settlement. f) During the transition period, UNMIK and the ICR, or his/her representative, shall co-chair working groups to formulate with Kosovo the details and modalities of the transfer of authority. g) At the end of the transition period, UNMIK’s mandate shall expire and all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK shall be transferred en bloc to the governing authorities of Kosovo, unless otherwise provided for in this Settlement. At this time, the ICR and IMP shall assume full responsibility for the exercise of their respective mandates, as set forth in this Settlement. h) The legal regime governing the resolution of all residual responsibilities of UNMIK shall be established during the transition period by agreement between the UN (UNMIK) and Kosovo, in consultation with the ICR. 14.2 In close cooperation with the ICR, UNMIK shall ensure an orderly transition of the legal framework currently in force to the legal framework established under this Settlement. 14.2.1 UNMIK Regulations promulgated by the SRSG pursuant to UNSCR 1244, including Administrative Directions and Executive Decisions issued by the SRSG, and laws adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo shall continue to apply, unless otherwise provided for in this Settlement, until their validity expires, or until they are revoked or replaced by legislation regulating the same subject matter in accordance with the provisions of this Settlement.

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14.2.2 Kosovo shall continue to be bound, on the basis of reciprocity where appropriate, by all international agreements and other arrangements in the area of international cooperation that were concluded by UNMIK for and on behalf of Kosovo, and which are in effect on the date of the entry into force of this Settlement. Financial obligations undertaken by UNMIK for and on behalf of Kosovo under these agreements or arrangements shall be respected by Kosovo.

APPENDIX F COMPARATIVE AUTONOMY MODELS

‘Comparative Overview of the Cases of Hong Kong, Åland Islands, and the Serbian Status Proposal for Kosovo and Metohija’, State negotiating team for Kosovo-Metohija, 20 November 2007 Basic Features of the Cases Hong Kong • In 1997 returned to China’s sovereignty – after 155 years of British colonial rule • Ethnic majority – Chinese (95%) • HK Basic Law stemming out from the 1984 Sino–British Joint Declaration Åland Islands • After Russo–Swedish War (1808-1809) Russia gains Finland and ÅI • Ethnic majority – Swedish (95%) • In 1917 Finland independent • After 1917, 96.2% of adult population signed the petition for unification with Sweden • In 1921 the League of Nations decides that ÅI remains within the sovereignty of Finland, with a high degree of autonomy • Current constitutional-legal framework: Act on the Autonomy of Åland in accordance with Article 120 of the Constitution of Finland

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Kosovo and Metohija • Since June 1999 (8 years) under UN administration • Ethnic majority – Albanian (81%) • Current constitutional-legal framework: UN SC Res 1244, Constitution of Serbia, and Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo • Proposal: internationally guaranteed status agreement on KM, new UN SC Res, Constitution of Serbia, and Constitution of KM; 20-years timeframe

Constitutional-Legal Definition of Territory Hong Kong • Upholding national unity and territorial integrity and taking account of the history of HK and its realities, the PRC has decided to establish, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the PRC, a HK Special Administrative Region upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over HK. (Sino–British Joint Declaration, Article 3.1) • The HK Special Administrative Region will be directly under the authority of the Central People’s Government of the PRC. The HK Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People’s Government. (Sino–British Joint Declaration, Article 3.2) • The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People’s Congress in the light of the specific conditions. (PRC Constitution, Article 31) • The HK Special Administrative Region is an inalienable part of the PRC. (HK Basic Law, Article 1) Åland Islands • The sovereignty of the ÅI is recognised to belong to Finland. (Decision of the Council of the League of Nations on the ÅI, Article 1) • The territory of Finland is indivisible. The national borders can not be altered without the consent of the Parliament. (Constitution of Finland, Section 4) • The ÅI have self-government in accordance with what is specifically stipulated in the Act on the Autonomy of the ÅI. (Constitution of Finland, Section 120) • The ÅI are autonomous, as hereby enacted. (Act on the Autonomy of Åland, Section 1)

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• Åland comprises the territory it has at the time of the entry into force of this Act and the territorial waters directly adjacent to its land territory according to the enactments in force on the limits of the territorial waters of Finland. • If the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the State are extended beyond the limits of the territorial waters the jurisdiction and sovereignty of Åland may be likewise extended, as agreed by the State and Åland. (Act on the Autonomy of Åland, Section 2) Kosovo and Metohija • […] the Province of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of the territory of Serbia, that it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia and that from such status of the Province of Kosovo and Metohija follow constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign political relations […] (Constitution of Serbia, Preamble) • In the Republic of Serbia, there are the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. The substantial autonomy of the Autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija shall be regulated by the special law which shall be adopted in accordance with the proceedings envisaged for amending the Constitution. (Constitution of Serbia, Article 182.2) • Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2, […] (UN SC Res 1244, Preamble) • Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo, […] (UN SC Res 1244, Preamble) • "Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, […] (UN SC Res 1244, Annex 2, Point 5)

Competences Hong Kong • Exclusive competences of China: foreign policy, defence, supervision of legislation • Exclusive competences of HK: all other

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Åland Islands • Exclusive competences of Finland: foreign policy, defence, immigration policy, fiscal policy, supervision of legislation • Shared competences: foreign trade, criminal and labour law, health • Policy area of co-operation: civil defence • Exclusive competences of ÅI: domicile, public order and safety, additional and municipal taxes, collective contracts with ÅI public servants, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, protection of religious and cultural heritage, education Kosovo and Metohija • Reserved competences of Serbia: foreign policy, border control, protection of Serbian religious and cultural heritage • Defence: reserved competence of Serbia not to be applied in KM; • Policy areas of co-operation: monetary policy, customs policy • Exclusive competences of KM: all other (budget, economic policy, agriculture, media, education, environmental protection, youth, sport, fiscal policy, home affairs, health, energy, infrastructure, employment...)

Separation of Power Hong Kong • HK has legislative power in areas of its exclusive competence, but the Chinese National Congress may invalidate legislation enacted by the HK Legislative Council • PRC participates in the process of electing the Chief Executive (head of HK territory and government) • HK has its own independent and complete judicial system Åland Islands • ÅI have legislative and executive branches • Governor of ÅI represents Finland, appointed by the President of Finland in agreement with ÅI Speaker • Åland Delegation is joint Finland–ÅI authority. Resolves certain types of disputes • ÅI parliament (Lagting) has legislative power in areas of ÅI’s exclusive competence • Finland’s Ministry of Justice, Åland Delegation, and President of Finland participate in the supervision of legislation

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Kosovo and Metohija • KM autonomously elects and regulates its own institutions – without Serbia’s involvement; • KM has legislative power in areas of KM’s exclusive competence and in other areas as per agreement; Serbia cannot revoke or invalidate KM legislation; • KM has executive branch • KM has its own independent and complete judicial system with jurisdiction over cases from KM’s exclusive competences and over other cases as per agreement; interim EU oversight; international judges.

Participation in Central Authorities Hong Kong • HK citizens participate in China’s parliamentary elections (MPs Chinese National Congress in Beijing) Åland Islands • ÅI citizens participate in Finland’s parliamentary elections (MPs in Helsinki) Kosovo and Metohija • Participation in executive (MFA) and judicial authority (Constitutional Court of Serbia’s special panel for constitutional appeals from KM)

Foreign Policy Hong Kong • China – subject of international law • In areas of HK’s exclusive competence, HK negotiates with other states and international organisations • HK has own international economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications, tourism, cultural, and sports relations. • In areas of China’s competence, HK not included in international negotiations and preparation of agreements; • HK – 33 trade/economic offices abroad (in places of HK’s own interest) • HK – member of regional initiatives and international organisations that allow non-sovereign territories to be members • China – provides consular protection to all citizens • China’s MFA liaison office in HK

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• Status of foreign diplomatic and consular offices in HK – up to the General Consulate level Åland Islands • Finland – subject of international law • ÅI Government may suggest international negotiations on a certain agreement to relevant Finland’s authorities • ÅI Government will be informed on international agreement related to ÅI competences • If there is a special reason, ÅI Government may participate in international negotiations as a part of Finland’s delegation Kosovo and Metohija • Serbia – subject of international law • In areas of KM’s exclusive competence, KM negotiates with other states and international organisations. Preparation of agreements in consultation with Serbia. Formal signatory Serbia, co-signatory KM. if Serbia is rendered liable for not fulfilling KM’s international obligations, KM would be held liable vis-à-vis Serbia • In areas of Serbia’s reserved competence, KM representatives included in international negotiations and preparation of agreements; signatory – Serbia • KM – trade/economic offices abroad (in places of KM’s own interest) • KM – member of regional initiatives and international organisations that allow non-sovereign territories to be members • Serbia – provides consular protection to all citizens; KM consular affairs offices within Serbia’s diplomatic and consular missions abroad • Serbia’s MFA liaison office in Priština; • Status of foreign diplomatic and consular offices in Priština – up to the General Consulate level.

Defence Policy Hong Kong • Responsibility of the PRC • People’s Liberation Army HK Garrison Åland Islands • Responsibility of Finland • ÅI demilitarised

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Kosovo and Metohija • Temporary international military presence • Demilitarisation of KM

Policing Hong Kong • HK Åland Islands • ÅI Kosovo and Metohija • KM

Border Control Hong Kong • HK Åland Islands • Finland Kosovo and Metohija • Borders Crossing Points (land and air) – Serbian Police Service

Monetary Policy Hong Kong • HK has its own central bank and currency Åland Islands • Finland Kosovo and Metohija • KM has its own central bank and currency • Gradual harmonisation of two systems according to EU requirements

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Customs Policy Hong Kong • HK has its own customs service Åland Islands • Finland Kosovo and Metohija • KM has its own customs service • Gradual harmonisation of two systems according to the EU standards • Serbia to monitor

The Final Instance of Human Rights Protection Hong Kong • HK Åland Islands • Finland Kosovo and Metohija • Constitutional Court of Serbia; special panel for appeals from KM • EU Mission engagement in judicial reform in KiM

Cultural Policy Hong Kong • HK Åland Islands • ÅI Kosovo and Metohija • Exclusive competence of KM, except in reconstruction and protection of the Serbian religious and cultural heritage – Serbia sets reconstruction and protection policy and implements reconstruction • Physical protection of the Serbian religious and cultural sites in cooperation with international military forces and KPS

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Hong Kong • N/A Åland Islands • The relation of ÅI to EU legal system regulated by a special protocol which is a part of Finland’s accession agreement. This protocol can be changed only with consent of all EU member states • ÅI parliament (Lagting) decided that ÅI should join EU • ÅI Government has the right to participate in preparing Finland’s position before the decision making process in EU • In case that Finland and ÅI do not reach common position, ÅI position to be presented along with Finland’s Kosovo and Metohija • KM continues STM until the start of SAA negotiations, at which moment Serbia is to be involved on issues falling into Serbia’s reserved competences • Serbia and KM sign SAA for KM as an annex to Serbia’s SAA • Further process of KM’s EU integrations (status of a candidate and accession negotiations) will be co-ordinated with Serbia

APPENDIX G TROIKA FINAL REPORT

Letter dated 10 December 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council Recalling my statement of 1 August 2007, in which I welcomed the initiative by the countries of the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America) to establish a Troika comprising representatives of the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States to lead a period of further negotiations on the future status of Kosovo, I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the European Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo conveyed to me by the Contact Group at the completion of the Troika’s mandate (see enclosure). I should be grateful if you would bring this document to the attention of the members of the Security Council. (Signed) Ban Ki-moon

Report of the European Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo, 4 December 2007 Summary 1. We, a Troika of representatives from the European Union, the United States and the Russian Federation, have spent the last four months conducting negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina on the future status of Kosovo. Our objective was to facilitate an agreement between the parties. The negotiations were conducted within the framework of Security Council

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resolution 1244 (1999) and the guiding principles of the Contact Group (see S/2005/709). In the course of our work, the parties discussed a wide range of options, such as full independence, supervised independence, territorial partition, substantial autonomy, confederal arrangements and even a status silent “agreement to disagree”. 2. The Troika was able to facilitate high-level, intense and substantive discussions between Belgrade and Pristina. Nonetheless, the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final status of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo. This is regrettable, as a negotiated settlement is in the best interests of both parties. Background 3. A political process to determine the future status of Kosovo, the last major issue related to Yugoslavia’s collapse, has been under way for over two years. The United Nations Secretary-General appointed Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy in November 2005 to undertake the future status process envisioned in Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). After 15 months of United Nations-sponsored negotiations, President Ahtisaari prepared a Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which included measures to protect Kosovo’s non-Albanian communities, and a recommendation that Kosovo should become independent subject to a period of international supervision. Pristina accepted the Ahtisaari Settlement in its entirety; Belgrade rejected it. 4. After a period of discussions in the Security Council, the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) proposed that a “Troika” of officials from the European Union, the United States and Russia undertake yet another period of negotiations with the goal of achieving a negotiated agreement. On 1 August 2007, the SecretaryGeneral welcomed this initiative, restated his belief that the status quo was unsustainable and requested a report from the Contact Group on these efforts by 10 December 2007. The United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for the Kosovo Future Status Process (UNOSEK) would be associated with the process by standing ready to provide information and clarification on request (see annex I). The Troika’s mission 5. Upon our appointment as Troika representatives, we vowed to “leave no stone unturned” in the search for a mutually acceptable outcome. In pursuit of this goal, we explained to the parties the principles that would guide our

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work. First, we reaffirmed that Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the November 2005 guiding principles of the Contact Group would continue to be our operating framework. Second, we noted that while the Ahtisaari Settlement was still on the table, we would be prepared to endorse any agreement the parties might be able to reach. Both sides were repeatedly reminded of their responsibility for success or failure of the process. 6. We also explained that the Troika had no intention of imposing a solution. Instead, the burden was on each party to convince the other side of the merits of its position. Although our role would be primarily to facilitate direct dialogue, we also intended to take an active role in identifying areas of possible compromise. Working schedule 7. During the four months of our mandate, we undertook an intense schedule of meetings with the parties (see annex II). This schedule comprised 10 sessions, six of which consisted of face-to-face dialogue, including a final intensive three-day conference in Baden, Austria, as well as two trips to the region. During the process, Belgrade was represented by President Boris Tadić, Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić and Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzić. Pristina was represented by the “Team of Unity” composed of President Fatmir Sejdiu, Prime Minister Agim Çeku, President of the Assembly Kolë Berisha, Hashim Thaçi and Veton Surroi. The Troika appreciated the fact that both delegations were represented at the highest possible level, underlining the importance they attached to the process. In addition to the joint sessions we arranged separate meetings with the parties in order to consult with them individually. Our sessions were long and often difficult, as we confronted a legacy of mutual mistrust and sense of historical grievance about the conflicts of the 1990s. The Contact Group supported our work, and its foreign ministers urged the parties to approach the negotiations with “creativity, boldness and in a spirit of compromise” (see annex III). We also sought, and received, pledges from the parties that neither would engage in provocative acts or statements during the process (see annexes IV and V). 8. As we began our work, we first explored the well-established positions of each side. Pristina restated its preference for Kosovo’s supervised independence and reconfirmed its acceptance of the Ahtisaari proposal. Belgrade rejected the Ahtisaari proposal and restated its preference that Kosovo be autonomous within Serbia. As a result, there was no discussion of the Ahtisaari proposal nor any discussion that it should be modified. Both sides employed historical, functional, legal and practical arguments to support

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their preferred outcome. Belgrade elaborated its model of substantial autonomy to enhance the powers of an autonomous Kosovo and reduce those that it would reserve. It asserted that there would be no return to the pre-March 1999 situation. Pristina presented a draft “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation”, which describes how Kosovo and Serbia, as independent states, could cooperate on issues of mutual concern, establish common bodies, enhance their commitment to multi-ethnicity and support each other’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. 9. Despite our repeated call for fresh ideas and a spirit of compromise, neither side was able to convince the other to accept its preferred outcome. Encouraged by the Contact Group’s Ministerial Statement of 27 September (annex III), we undertook a more active approach. We developed our assessment in the form of the “Fourteen Points” of possible overlap in the parties’ positions (see annex VI). The parties responded to these points, without accepting them fully. 10. Under our guidance, the parties reviewed outcomes ranging from independence to autonomy, as well as alternate models such as confederal arrangements, and even a model based on an “agreement to disagree” in which neither party would be expected to renounce its position but would nonetheless pursue practical arrangements designed to facilitate cooperation and consultation between them. Other international models, such as Hong Kong, the Åland Islands and the Commonwealth of Independent States, were discussed. While it was broached, we did not dwell on the option of territorial partition, which was deemed unacceptable by both the parties and the Contact Group. None of these models proved to be an adequate basis for compromise. We concluded face-to-face negotiations between the parties at a high-level conference in Baden, Austria, from 26 to 28 November, where we again encouraged both sides to find a way out of the deadlock. Conclusions 11. Throughout the negotiations both parties were fully engaged. After 120 days of intensive negotiations, however, the parties were unable to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s status. Neither side was willing to yield on the basic question of sovereignty. 12. Nevertheless, despite this fundamental difference on status, which the Troika was unable to bridge, we believe this process served a useful purpose. We gave the parties an opportunity to find a solution to their differences. Under our auspices, the parties engaged in the most sustained and intense high-level direct dialogue since hostilities ended in Kosovo in 1999. Through this process, the parties discovered areas where their interests aligned. The

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parties also agreed on the need to promote and protect multi-ethnic societies and address difficult issues holding back reconciliation, particularly the fate of missing persons and the return of displaced persons. Perhaps most important, Belgrade and Pristina reaffirmed the centrality of their European perspective to their future relations, with both sides restating their desire to seek a future under the common roof of the European Union. 13. While differences between the parties remain unchanged, the Troika has nevertheless been able to extract important commitments from the parties. In particular, both parties have pledged to refrain from actions that might jeopardize the security situation in Kosovo or elsewhere and not use violence, threats or intimidation (see annex VII). They made these commitments without prejudice to their positions on status. Both parties must be reminded that their failure to live up to these commitments will affect the achievement of the European future that they both seek. 14. We note that Kosovo and Serbia will continue to be tied together due to the special nature of their relationship, especially in its historical, human, geographical, economical and cultural dimensions. As noted by Contact Group Ministers at their meeting in New York on 27 September, the resolution of Kosovo’s status is crucial to the stability and security of the Western Balkans and Europe as a whole. We believe the maintenance of peace in the region and the avoidance of violence is of paramount importance and therefore look to the parties to stand by their commitments. We, furthermore, strongly believe that the settlement of Kosovo’s status would contribute to the fulfilment of the European aspirations of both parties.

Annex I Statement by the Secretary-General on the new period of engagement on Kosovo, 1 August 2007 The Contact Group has briefed me of its engagement on the modalities for further negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade. This effort will be led by a Troika comprising representatives of the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States. I welcome this initiative by the Contact Group, I hope that the new period of engagement will lead to agreement on Kosovo’s future status, which remains a priority for the United Nations. The international community must find a solution that is timely, addresses the key concerns of all communities living in Kosovo and provides clarity for Kosovo’s status. The status quo is not sustainable.

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The United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK) will be associated with the process by standing ready to provide information and clarification on request. The United Nations will continue to play a constructive role in the new period of engagement and continue its major role on the ground in Kosovo. The Contact Group will report back to me by 10 December.

Annex II Troika events 9 August: First meeting of the Troika with the Contact Group (London) 10–12 August: First meeting of the Troika with the parties (Belgrade and Pristina) 30 August: Second meeting of the Troika with the parties (Vienna) 18–19 September: Third meeting of the Troika with the parties (London) 27 September: Meeting of the Troika with the Secretary-General, the EU Secretary-General/High Representative, the NATO Secretary-General and the Contact Group Ministers (New York) 28 September: Fourth meeting of the Troika with the parties – first face-toface meeting (New York) 14 October: Fifth meeting of the Troika with the parties – second face-toface meeting (Brussels) 22 October: Sixth meeting of the Troika with the parties – third face-to-face meeting (Vienna) 5 November: Seventh meeting of the Troika with the parties – fourth faceto-face meeting (Vienna) 20 November: Eighth meeting of the Troika with the parties – fifth face-toface meeting (Brussels) 26/27/28 November: Ninth meeting of the Troika with the parties – sixth face-to-face meeting (Baden, Austria) 3 December: Tenth meeting of the Troika with the parties (Belgrade and Pristina)

Annex III Statement on Kosovo by Contact Group Ministers New York, 27 September 2007 Contact Group Ministers, together with the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, EU High Representative, the European Union Presidency, European Commissioner for Enlargement and the NATO Secretary-General

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met in New York on 27 September to discuss the Kosovo Status Process. They heard a report from the European Union/Russian Federation/United States Troika. A representative of UNOSEK was also present. Ministers reiterated that an early resolution of Kosovo’s status is crucial to the stability and security of the Western Balkans and Europe as a whole. Ministers reaffirmed their resolve to seek a negotiated settlement endorsed by the Security Council. Ministers expressed their appreciation for the continued efforts by UNMIK and KFOR to contribute towards a multi-ethnic, peaceful and democratic Kosovo. They endorsed fully the United Nations SecretaryGeneral’s assessment that the status quo is not sustainable. It has damaging consequences for Kosovo’s political, social and economic development and for the underlying stability of the region. A solution therefore has to be found without delay. When they met in New York in September 2006, Contact Group Ministers encouraged the United Nations Special Envoy to prepare a comprehensive proposal for a status settlement. The proposal, submitted after 14 months of negotiations, has been accepted by Pristina and rejected by Belgrade. As a further effort to achieve a negotiated settlement, the Contact Group established a Troika whose task would be to facilitate a period of further discussion between the parties. The Troika process will be concluded by the Contact Group reporting to the United Nations Secretary-General by 10 December. Ministers expressed full support for the Troika process and welcomed the quick pace of activity and the constructive atmosphere of the first rounds of talks. Ministers reiterated their view that the Contact Group’s guiding principles of November 2005 should continue to set the framework for the status process, which is based on Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). The next step in the Troika process will involve direct talks between the parties in New York on 28 September. Contact Group Ministers welcomed this move to face-to-face discussions. Ministers urged both sides to approach the remaining negotiations with creativity, boldness and in a spirit of compromise. Furthermore, any settlement needs to be acceptable to the people of Kosovo, ensure standards implementation with regard to Kosovo’s multi-ethnic character and promote the future stability of the region. Ministers underlined that any future status settlement should focus on developing the special nature of the relations between the two sides, especially in their historical, economic, cultural and human dimensions. Ministers urged the parties to take seriously the opportunity created by the Troika process to secure a negotiated settlement. The onus is on each of the parties to develop realistic proposals. Although the Special Envoy’s

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Comprehensive Proposal remains on the table, the Contact Group is ready to support any agreement reached between the parties. Ministers reiterated that striving for a negotiated settlement should not obscure the fact that neither party can unilaterally block the status process from advancing. Ministers supported the continued engagement of the United Nations, and welcomed NATO and EU readiness to play a leading role in the implementation of a status settlement for Kosovo and to continue the necessary preparations for these responsibilities. Ministers welcomed the active approach adopted by the EU in the light of the European perspective of the Western Balkans region. Ministers noted and welcomed the undertakings made to the Troika by both sides to refrain from provocative words and actions and call on the parties to honour these commitments. Political developments in Kosovo and Serbia should not interfere with the parties’ constructive engagement in the Troika process. They expressed their hope that elections, due in Kosovo on 17 November, would take place with full participation of all communities and against a calm and orderly background. All those present at the meeting will remain closely engaged with the process and fully supportive of the Troika’s efforts.

Annex IV Vienna non-paper On the occasion of the meeting with the Troika on 30 August in Vienna, both parties reaffirmed their statements regarding the security situation. The Belgrade delegation reaffirmed its willingness to do all within its power to ensure peace and stability during this process. The Serbian side and its institutions will exercise special vigilance in this regard. The Pristina delegation reaffirmed its willingness to do all within its power to ensure peace and stability during this process, taking into account KFOR’s mandate for the overall safe and security environment of Kosovo and the respective mandates of UNMIK Police and the Kosovo Police Service. Both sides promised to abstain from any acts or statements that might be regarded as provocative in the delicate atmosphere during the current period of engagement. Both sides agreed that these mutual commitments should serve as confidence-building measures at the beginning of the period of engagement with the Troika. Read to both delegations on 30 August and confirmed in the presence of all the members of the Troika.

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Annex V New York Declaration (28 September) At their meeting with the Troika on 28 September in New York, both delegations welcomed the first direct talks between the parties held under Troika auspices. The parties reiterated their commitment to engage seriously in these talks. The Troika reminded the parties of the Secretary-General’s statement of 1 August that the status quo is not sustainable. The two delegations were informed of the statement of the Contact Group at its Ministerial Meeting in New York on 27 September. Ministers reiterated, inter alia that an early resolution of Kosovo’s status is crucial to the stability and security of the Western Balkans and Europe as a whole. Ministers reaffirmed their resolve to seek a negotiated settlement endorsed by the Security Council. Contact Group Guiding principles should continue to set the framework for status process, based on Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). Ministers also urged both sides to approach the remaining negotiations with creativity, boldness and in a spirit of compromise. They urged the parties to take seriously the opportunity created by the Troika process to secure a negotiated settlement. They also reminded the parties that the onus was on each of them to develop realistic proposals and that neither party could unilaterally block the process from advancing. Ministers underlined that any future status settlement should focus on developing the special nature of the relations between the two sides, especially in their historical, economic, cultural and human dimensions. Acknowledging that violence, provocation and intimidation would constitute a grave risk for the Troika process as well as for the stability and security of the region, both parties reaffirmed their commitment, as expressed in the Vienna document of 30 August, to refrain from any activities or statements that might jeopardize the security situation. Both parties understand that the Contact Group will report to the United Nations Secretary-General by 10 December 2007. In this regard, they welcomed the Troika’s intention to intensify its work programme with a view to reaching agreement before the Troika’s mandate concludes. Accepted by both delegations at the first Troika-led direct meeting in New York City on 28 September and confirmed in the presence of all members of the Troika.

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KOSOVO Annex VI Troika assessment of negotiations: principal conclusions

The Troika has reviewed the positions of the two parties. Without prejudice to the positions of both parties on status, the following principles can open a path to a solution: 1. Belgrade and Pristina will focus on developing the special nature of the relations existing between them especially in their historical, economic, cultural and human dimensions. 2. Belgrade and Pristina will solve future problems between them in a peaceful manner and not engage in actions or dispositions that would be regarded as threatening to the other side. 3. Kosovo will be fully integrated into regional structures, particularly those involving economic cooperation. 4. There will be no return to the pre-1999 status. 5. Belgrade will not govern Kosovo. 6. Belgrade will not re-establish a physical presence in Kosovo. 7. Belgrade and Pristina are determined to make progress towards association and eventually membership of the European Union as well as to move progressively towards Euro-Atlantic structures. 8. Pristina will implement broad measures to enhance the welfare of KosovoSerbs as well as other non-Albanian communities, particularly through decentralization of local government, constitutional guarantees and protection of cultural and religious heritage. 9. Belgrade and Pristina will cooperate on issues of mutual concern, including: a. Fate of missing persons and return of displaced persons b. Protection of minorities c. Protection of cultural heritage d. Their European perspectives and regional initiatives e. Economic issues, including fiscal policy and energy, trade and harmonization with EU standards and development of a joint economic growth and development strategy in line with regional economic initiatives f. Free movement of people, goods, capital and services g. Banking sector h. Infrastructure, transportation and communications i. Environmental protection j. Public health and social welfare k. Fight against crime, particularly in the areas of terrorism, human-,weapon-

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and drug-trafficking and organized crime l. Cooperation between municipalities and the Government of one of the two sides m. Education. 10. Belgrade and Pristina will establish common bodies to implement cooperation. 11. Belgrade will not interfere in Pristina’s relationship with international financial institutions. 12. Pristina will have full authority over its finances (taxation, public revenues, etc.). 13. Kosovo’s EU Stabilization and Association Process (Tracking Mechanism) will continue unhindered by Belgrade. 14. The international community will retain civilian and military presences in Kosovo after status is determined.

Annex VII Troika press communiqué: the Baden Conference Baden, Austria, 28 November 2007 The European Union/United States/Russian Federation negotiating Troika has completed an intensive conference with the delegations from Belgrade and Pristina to discuss Kosovo’s status. The Troika brought together leaders of both sides in Baden, Austria, for nearly three days of intense talks. The Baden Conference marks the end of Troika-sponsored face-to-face negotiations. Over the course of the talks, the Troika urged the parties to consider a broad range of options for Kosovo’s status. The Troika explored together with both sides every reasonable status outcome for Kosovo to determine where there might be potential for a mutually acceptable outcome. Regrettably, the parties were unable to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s future status. Nevertheless, the Troika believes that the parties benefited from this period of intensive dialogue. It was an opportunity for them to build trust and to identify shared interests, in particular their desire to seek a better future through achievement of a European perspective. The Troika-led negotiations provided the parties six occasions to discuss directly the final status of Kosovo. The negotiations created an opportunity to engage in dialogue at the highest levels. These meetings have permitted the Troika to reiterate the importance of maintaining peace, avoiding incitement to violence and jeopardizing security in the region. The parties have accepted these principles repeatedly, most recently during the Baden Conference. Both

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sides made it clear they wish to avoid violence. This commitment to peace must continue after the Troika completes its work on 10 December. The Troika calls on Belgrade and Pristina to maintain communications without prejudice to their positions on status. It is up to Belgrade and Pristina to sustain their commitment to peace and dialogue on issues of mutual concern. The Troika will now begin to draft the report which will be submitted no later than 10 December to the Secretary-General by the Contact Group. During the Troika’s visit on 3 December to Belgrade and Pristina, it will review this report with the parties. After the Contact Group submits the report to the Secretary-General, the Troika’s mandate will conclude.

NOTES

Introduction 1 2

3

4 5

6 7 8

‘The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 14 December 1995. ‘UN council endorses start of Kosovo status talks’, Reuters, 24 October 2005. ‘International community knows “Kosovo will become independent” – Slovene leader’, STA News Agency, 27 October 2005. Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Independence for Kosovo: Yielding to Balkan Reality’, Foreign Affairs, Volume 84, Number 6, November–December 2005, p.20. Tim Judah, ‘Defining Kosovo’, ISN Security Watch, 10 October 2005. See, Agim Çeku, ‘Kosovo’s Turn’, Wall Street Journal, 8 June 2006; ‘‘Respect and Rights’ Newsweek Interview with the Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Çeku’, Newsweek, 3 May 2006; ‘Agim Çeku: Meeting: The Future Of Kosovo’, Chatham House, London, 12 October 2006; Agim Çeku, ‘Kosovo’s Moment’, International Herald Tribune, 18 January 2007; Veton Surroi, ‘Kosova and the Constitutional Solutions’, in Thanos Veremis and Evangelos Kofos (editors), Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War (Athens: ELIAMEP and the University of Athens, 1998) Article 1(2) and Article 55, Charter of the United Nations. ‘Even in Eager Kosovo, Nation-Building Stalls’, Christian Science Monitor, 22 September 2004. See, Vojislav Koštunica, ‘Serbia’s European Integration’, Royal United Services Institute, 27 June 2006; Vuk Jeremić, ‘Serbia’s Path to Europe Through Regional Peace and Reconciliation’, Chatham House, London, 19 September 2007; Boris Tadić, ‘Opportunity in the Balkans’, Washington Post, 7 June 2006; Vojislav Koštunica, ‘Justice for Serbia’,

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11 12

13

KOSOVO Washington Post, 12 July 2006; ‘Politically, historically and legally Kosovo-Metohija is and will remain part of Serbia’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 6 January 2007; Slobodan Samardžić, ‘Should Kosovo-Metohija Remain a Part of Serbia/Yugoslavia? A Plea for a Just Solution’, in William Joseph Buckley (ed.), Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B Eerdmand Publishing, 2000). The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1 August 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (Helsinki Declaration). For a discussion of some of these points in the context of Kosovo see, Alain Pellet, ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples’, European Journal of International Law, Volume 3, Number 1, 1992; Marc Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, International Affairs, Volume 5, Number 2, April 1999; Alexis Heraclides, ‘Ethnonational and Separatist Conflict Settlement’, in Vermis and Kofos (eds.), Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War, pp.389–443. For a debate on this issue after the declaration of independence, see, ‘Kosovo: International Law and Recognition’, A Summary of the Chatham House International Law Discussion Group meeting held on 22 April 2008. ‘Kosovo deadlock puts Balkans on the brink’, The Times, 29 November 2007. The Badinter Arbitration Committee – a commission formed in 1991 by the European Union under the chairmanship of Robert Badinter, the president of the French Constitutional Court, to consider the legal implications of the break up of Yugoslavia –stated that while the right of secession was open to the republics, it was not applicable to minority communities within the republics. As Kosovo was not listed amongst the republics, the position of the Kosovo Albanians was seen to be analogous to the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia, and to other minority communities throughout the republics: ‘self-determination in this context was reduced in content to human and minority rights, and to autonomous structures of governance in areas where Serb constituted a local majority.’ See, Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, p.214; and Bartram S. Brown, ‘Human Rights, Sovereignty, and the Final Status of Kosovo’, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Volume 80, 2005, p.239. The opinion of the Committee can be found in Pellet, ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee’. ‘Bush Recognizes Kosovo’s Independence’, Associated Press, 18 February 2008.

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14 Bernard Kouchner and Carl Bildt, ‘Why Serbia will join the EU’, The Times, 12 March 2008. The same argument had been put forward the previous year by ten former foreign ministers: Madeleine Albright (United States), Lloyd Axworthy (Canada), Jan Eliasson (Sweden), Gareth Evans (Australia), Joschka Fischer (Germany), Bronislaw Geremek (Poland), Niels Helveg Petersen (Denmark), Lydie Polfer (Luxembourg), Jozias van Artsen (Netherlands), Hubert Vedrine (France). However, it was significant that the principle of selfdetermination was almost entirely avoided as a justification. Indeed, as one British official told the author, the word ‘self-determination’ was being avoided at all costs. Kosovo was not a case of self-determination. It was a unique case devolving from the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. However, speaking on the margins of a UN Security Council debate in December 2007, Sir John Sawers, the British permanent representative at the UN, stated the following: ‘You have the principle of territorial integrity. You also have the principle of self-determination. There are times when those principles are in tension with one another, and the principle of territorial integrity is qualified by the principle of self-determination.’ ‘Media Stakeout: Informal comments to the Media by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Sir John Sawers KCMG, on the situation in Kosovo and other matters’, Webcast, UN Website, 19 December 2007. When questioned by the author about this afterwards, another British official said that the comment was certainly not a reflection of British opinion and that, luckily, it appeared to have gone unnoticed. 15 ‘Kosovo breakaway illegal, says Putin’, The Guardian, 15 February 2008. 16 See, for example, ‘Push at U.N. for Kosovo independence could bolster secessionist demands around the world’, Associated Press, 17 May 2007; ‘The independence precedent: If Kosovo goes free’, The Economist, 29 November 2007; ‘Breakaway regions look to Kosovo precedent’, Reuters, 9 December 2007; Mark Almond, ‘Unrecognized States’, International Herald Tribune, 6 December 2007; ‘Kosovo's looming independence raises question: Why not Scotland or Vermont?’, Associated Press, 15 February 2008; ‘Kosovo report linked to Transnistria independence’, The Tiraspol Times, 27 March 2007; S. Sathananthan, ‘What lessons could Tamils draw from the Kosovo experience?’, NorthEastern Monthly, May–June 2007; ‘Turkish Cypriots eye Kosovo for own future’, Turkish Daily News, 27 December 2007. ‘Kosovo “will boost Karabakh recognition drive”’, Reuters, 16 February 2008. ‘Georgia rebel region seeks recognition after Kosovo’, Reuters, 5

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20 21 22

23 24

25 26 27

KOSOVO March 2008. As one commentator noted in response to the claim that Kosovo was a special case, ‘Kosovo is unique, and there will be more Kosovos.’ Timothy Garton Ash, ‘The Kosovo Precedent’, Los Angeles Times, 21 February 2008. ‘Bush Administration tells Congress recognizing Kosovo was an exception’, Associated Press, 12 March 2008. Charter of the United Nations, Chapter II, Article 4, paragraph 2. Although the Secretary-General of the 57-member Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) issued a statement supporting the declaration of independence (‘OIC Declares Solidarity with Kosovo’, OIC Newsletter, Number 8, 20 February 2008), in the month after independence just five Islamic states recognised Kosovo in its first month. While there was sympathy for the Kosovo Albanians across the Islamic world, many Muslim countries – such as Azerbaijan, Indonesia and Sudan – expressed serious concern about endorsing independence and prevented a joint statement endorsing statehood. ‘Kosovo Recognition by “100 States”’, Balkan Insight, 8 February 2008. ‘Kosovo searches the world for friends to back independence’, The Times, 20 March 2008. In date order, from 17 February until 31 December 2008, the 53 states recognising Kosovo were: Costa Rica, Afghanistan, Albania, France, Turkey, United States of America, United Kingdom, Australia, Senegal, Latvia, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Denmark, Luxembourg, Peru, Belgium, Poland, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Netherlands, Iceland, Slovenia, Finland, Japan, Canada, Monaco, Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Liechtenstein, South Korea, Norway, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Burkina Faso, Lithuania, San Marino, Czech Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Colombia, Belize, Malta, Samoa, Portugal, Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia and the Federated States of Micronesia. Jonathan Eyal, ‘Is Kosovo Really Independent?’, RUSI Commentary, 18 February 2008. As Peter Feith, the EU representative in Kosovo, noted, the emphasis was on the ‘quality’ of the states that had chosen to accept Kosovo, and not the quantity that had done so. ‘Kosovo searches the world for friends to back independence’, The Times, 20 March 2008. ‘“Kosovo no condition for EU bid”’, B92, 4 August 2008. ‘Serbia’s slow road to the EU’, Brussels Blog, Financial Times, 22 July 2008. ‘Border clashing’, The Economist, 19 March 2008.

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28 ‘Bosnia: Kosovo sparks Serb demand for independence’, Oxford Analytica, 26 February 2008. 29 In the coverage of the conflict, many sources cited Russia’s actions as being a direct response to the way in which it had been sidelined over the question of Kosovo’s status. See, for example, ‘Early Lessons from South Ossetia Conflict’, BBC News, 11 August 2008; ‘The Stakes in the Caucasus Conflict are Huge – For All Parties’, VOA News, 15 August 2008; ‘As Russian Tanks Roll, Europe Reassesses’, New York Times, 15 August 2008. A number of observers also drew parallels between Moscow’s decision to intervene, and launch widespread attacks on Georgian military and civilian infrastructure, and NATO’s 78-day campaign against Serbia in 1999, which also saw attacks launched against a range of strategic targets. Tim Marshall, ‘Russia eats the Kosovo cake’, SKY News, 12 August 2008; Stephen Glover, ‘Yes, this war is wrong but after Iraq, the West’s moralising is an outrage’, Daily Mail, 14 August 2008; George Jonas, ‘Georgia’s crisis looks a lot like Kosovo’s’, The National Post, 15 August 2008; Mike Jackson, ‘Georgia: Let’s not start World War III’, Sunday Telegraph, 17 August 2008. 30 ‘Serbia seeks World Court ruling on Kosovo independence’, AFP, 16 August 2008. The British Ambassador in Belgrade called the move ‘a mistake’, arguing that it constituted, ‘a direct challenge to the EU…[and would] only make cooperation and Serbia’s integration into the EU more difficult.’ ‘ICJ Move Direct Challenge to the EU’, B92, 3 August 2008. 31 Mike Jackson, ‘There’s a minefield just ahead in Kosovo’, Sunday Telegraph, 9 December 2007. 32 ‘Interview: Kosovo Independence Declaration Could Spark Crisis’, International Herald Tribune, 5 December 2007.

Chapter 1 1

2

For a background history of Kosovo, see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, 2nd Edition (London, Pan Books, 2002); Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). See the bibliography for a more general range of sources on aspects of Kosovo’s history, as well as the history of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Malcolm, Kosovo, p.256; Mark Mazower, The Balkans: From the End of Byzantium to the Present Day (London: Phoenix, 2001), p.110; Jason Tomes, King Zog: Self-Made Monarch of Albania (Stroud: Sutton

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6

7

8

KOSOVO Publishing, 2007), pp.20–21. It must be noted that the exact nature of Kosovo at this point is contested. See Noel Malcolm, ‘Is Kosovo Serbia?’, The Guardian, 26 February, and Dejan Djokić, ‘Response: For Kosovo, history depends on which historian you ask’, The Guardian, 4 March 2008. According to the 1921 census for the area, which recorded language and religion, but not nationality, out of the total population of the area, which was 439,000, there were approximately 288,910 Albanian speakers and 109,090 Serbo-Croat speakers. Of this, 92,190 (21 per cent) claimed to be Eastern Orthodox. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that in 1921 the region was home to 289,000 Albanians and 92,000 Serbs, with the remainder being made up of other communities. This equates to a ratio of approximately 3:1. Ten years later, in 1931, the figures were: 149,000 Orthodox Serbo-Croat speakers and 331,000 Albanian speakers. In 1948, the figures were 200,000 Serbs and 498,000 Albanians. Figures provided to the author by Dejan Djokić from a comprehensive study undertaken by the Yugoslav statistician, Bogoljub Kočević, Zrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji [Casualties in the Second World War in Yugoslavia] (London: Naše Delo, 1985). Malcolm estimates that during the 1918–1941 period between 90,000 and 150,000 Albanians and other Muslims left Kosovo, citing also two other figures – 77,000 and 240,000 – which he dismisses as two extremes. As for how many colonists settled, he believes that just over 13,000 families, or perhaps 70,000 people in total, came to the region as colonists. Malcolm, Kosovo, p.282 and p.286. Denisa Kostovicova, ‘‘Shkolla Shqipe’ and Nationhood’, in Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fisher (editors), Albanian Identities: Myths and History (London: Hurst, 2002), pp.157–158. Although he discounts the high-end figures, Pavlowitch nevertheless notes that the number of Serbs departing up until 1944 is in the range of 70,000–200,000. Likewise, the estimates for the numbers of Albanians settling in Kosovo vary between 150,000 and 300,000. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia (London: Hurst, 2008), p.81. Ramadan Marmullaku, ‘Albanians in Yugoslavia: A Personal Essay’, in Dejan Djokić (editor), Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918–1992 (London: Hurst, 2003), p.307. For an overview of the position of the Kosovo Albanians see, Hugh Poulton, ‘Macedonians and Albanians as Yugoslavs’, in the same volume. Significantly, and as a further concession to the Kosovo Albanians, the

NOTES

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10 11

12 13

14 15 16

17

18 19 20

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term ‘Metohija’ was dropped from the official name of the province. This term, which roughly translates as ‘Land of the Monasteries’ in Serbian, and refers to the Western part of the province, was widely resented by Kosovo Albanians as a throwback to Medieval Serbia. Under the Constitution, Serbia continues to refer officially to the province as ‘Kosovo and Metohija’, often shortened to ‘Kosmet’. ‘Constitution of the Republic of Serbia’, 30 November 2006. For more about the role of intellectuals and the rise of Milošević, see, Jasna Dragovic-Soso, Saviours of the Nation: Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism (London: Hurst, 2002). Richard Caplan, ‘International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo’, International Affairs, Volume 74, Number 4, 1998, p.753. The opinions of the Commission can be found as appendices to Alain Pellet, ‘Appendix: Opinions No. 1, 2 and 3 of the Arbitration Committee of the International Conference on Yugoslavia’, European Journal of International Law, Volume 3, Number 1, 1992. Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p.65. Robert Thomas, Serbia under Milošević: Politics in the 1990s (London: Hurst, 1999), p.404. For an account of the rise of the KLA and the subsequent conflict in Kosovo see Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 2nd Edition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). ‘The KLA – terrorists or freedom fighters?’, BBC News, 28 June 1998. ‘The KLA – terrorists or freedom fighters?’, BBC News, 28 June 1998. ‘Statement on Kosovo adopted by the members of the Contact Group, meeting in London on 9 March 1998’, S/1998/223; and ‘Statement on Kosovo issued by members of the Contact Group in Bonn on 25 March 1998’, UN Security Council Document, S/1998/272. UN Security Council Resolution 1160(1998), 28 March 1998. Oleg Levtin, ‘Inside Moscow’s Kosovo Muddle’, Survival, Volume 42, Number 1, Summer 2000, p.130. Levitin, an official with the Russian Foreign Ministry throughout the period, is extremely critical of Russian policy on Kosovo throughout the 1990’s, arguing that Moscow could have taken many steps to prevent the crisis from escalating, but failed to do so. Tim Youngs, ‘Kosovo: The Diplomatic and Military Options’, House of Commons Research Paper 98/93, 27 October 1998, p.11. UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998), 23 September 1998. Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Missions signed in Belgrade, on 16 October 1998, by the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE

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23 24

25 26

27 28

KOSOVO and the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (CIO.GAL/65/98/Corr.1). This was also endorsed by the Security Council in UN Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998), 24 October 1998. ‘In Balkans Again, Promises, Promises’, New York Times, 14 October 1998. As one KLA leader stated, ‘all solutions but independence are not acceptable to the K.L.A.’, ‘In Balkans Again, Promises, Promises’, New York Times, 14 October 1998. ‘The KLA brought NATO to Kosova: An Interview with Hashim Thaqi’, in William Joseph Buckley (editor), Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Intervention (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2000), p.287. Judah, Kosovo, p.183. For an account of the Rambouillet talks see, Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Lessons Unlearned: Why Coercive Diplomacy Failed at Rambouillet’, International Peacekeeping, Volume 7, Number 2, Summer 2000, pp.95– 114; and, Marc Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, International Affairs, Volume 75, Number 2, April 1999. ‘Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana’, 30 January 1999. Ivo H. Dalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: Brooking’s Institution, 2001), pp.85–86. As one observer put it, both sides were told to ‘sign or die’. Judah, Kosovo, p.197. ‘Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, February 23 1999’, Chapter 8, Article 3. Judah, Kosovo, p.220. As noted, Milošević believed that NATO forces could be used either to detach Kosovo from Serbia, or to depose him. While this issue has often been cited as the main reason why Milošević rejected the agreement, many have viewed it as little more than a smokescreen to disguise his overall opposition to the deal. However, in a review of the events surrounding Kosovo, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British House of Commons concluded that, ‘whatever the actual impact of the Military Annex of the Rambouillet proposals on the negotiations, NATO was guilty of a serious blunder in allowing a Status of Forces Agreement into the package which would never have been acceptable to the Yugoslav side, since it was a significant infringement of its sovereignty.’ ‘Kosovo’, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Commons, 4th Report, Session 1999– 2000, para.65.

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29 Richard Boudreaux, ‘War-Battered Serbs Face Huge Rebuilding Job’,

LA Times, 12 June 1999. 30 The agreement was reached three days earlier by G8 foreign ministers.

31 32

33 34

35

36

37 38 39

40

‘G8 nations draw up peace plan’, The Guardian, 6 May 1999. The members of the G8 are United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan and Russia. Annexe 1, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. Annexe 2, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. The full text of Resolution 1244, including the two annexes, can be found as an appendix in this volume. ‘Moscow Set To Back UN Resolution on Kosovo’, International Herald Tribune, 3 June 1999. ‘Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia’, 9 June 1999. ‘Russia Ready for Rematch over Kosovo’, Reuters, 22 February 2008. For an examination of Russian attitudes during and after the conflict, see Mary Buckley, ‘Russian Perceptions’ in Buckley, Mary and Sally N. Cummings (editors), Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath (London: Continuum, 2001). The volume also contains a number of essays on the perceptions of a range of other actors, including Britain, France, Germany, Italy, China and the United States, as well as a number of regional neighbours. At the Congress of the Serbian Socialist Party in February 2000, less than a year after the end of fighting, Milošević called for NATO and UN withdrawal from Kosovo. ‘Milošević tells West to quit Kosovo’, BBC News, 17 February 2000. ‘Kosovo: A long way to go’, BBC News, 13 April 1999. British official, comments to the author, 2007. As one leading political figure stated, the Kosovo Albanian leadership, ‘understood that Serbia cannot just get out, and the process of independence for Kosovo cannot be initiated without the presence of NATO, the, and the OSCE. A Western protectorate, and later independence through a referendum, is the national strategy of the Albanians of Kosova.’ Blerim Shala, ‘Because Kosovars are Western, There Can be No Homeland without a State’, in William Joseph Buckley (editor), Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2000), p.187. ‘Report: U.S. officials expect Kosovo independence’, CNN, 24 September 1999.

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41 For an analysis of violence committed by both sides, see ‘Under

42

43

44 45

46

Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo’, Human Rights Watch, New York, 2001; and, ‘Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004’, Human Rights Watch, Volume 16, Number 6(D), July 2004, pp.7– 8. Despite efforts to try to bring Mitrovica under full international administration, the northern part of the town remained outside of the control of UNMIK, which led to allegations that NATO forces were effectively aiding and abetting Serbian attempts to ethnically cleanse the area and supported their efforts to break away from the rest of Kosovo. ‘Serbs Thwart Plan to Reopen Mitrovica Bridge’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 30 June 2005; ‘A year later ethnic hatred still divides Kosovo’, CBC, 11 November 2000; ‘Kosovo: Serbs Fight their Corner’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 26 April 2002. Milošević was eventually arrested in April 2001 and later extradited to the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in The Hague, where he had been indicted. See ‘Milošević: Kosovo: Second Amended Indictment’, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, 29 October 2001. ‘Reaction in Kosovo to Koštunica’s Victory’, International Crisis Group, 10 October 2000, p.2. In the case of southern Serbia, the problems arose following a series of attacks in early 2000 by a group called the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB). Clearly modelled on the KLA, and advocating the unification of all Albanian areas of Serbia within an independent Kosovo, it was widely believed that it received arms and support from Kosovo, aided in large part by 5-kilometre deep ‘Ground Safety Zone’ that had been established between Kosovo and the rest of Serbia under the 9 June 1999 agreement. Although designed to prevent Serbia from re-entering Kosovo, this also effectively prevented Yugoslav forces from fighting the guerrillas. Following the fall of Milošević, the new Serbian Government openly supported negotiations and actively enlisted the help of NATO to tackle the movement, which had notably failed to gain international support for its cause. In the end a deal was brokered that led to the disbanding of the UCPMB, allowed Serbian forces back into the GSZ and opened the way for municipal elections. ‘Presevo valley tension’, BBC News, 2 February 2001. ‘Southern Serbia: The second Kosovo?’, AIA, 21 February 2006. Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001. The range of competencies

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50 51

52 53 54 55

56

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covered were listed as: (a) Economic and financial policy; (b) Fiscal and budgetary issues; (c) Administrative and operational customs activities; (d) Domestic and foreign trade, industry and investments; (e) Education, science and technology; (f) Youth and sport; (g) Culture; (h) Health; (i) Environmental protection; (j) Labour and social welfare; (k) Family, gender and minors; (l) Transport, post, telecommunications and information technologies; (m) Public administration services; (n) Agriculture, forestry and rural development; (o) Statistics; (p) Spatial planning; (q) Tourism; (r) Good governance, human rights and equal opportunity; and (s) Non-resident affairs. ‘Haekkerup believes that Kosovo is still within the FRY’, UNMIK Press Summary, 2 August 2001. ‘UNMIK–FRY Common Document’, 5 November 2001. ‘Kosovo's unconventional new chief’, BBC News, 14 February 2002. Iain King and Walt Mason, Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (London: Hurst, 2006), pp.122–123. Tom Gallagher, The Balkans in the New Millennium: In the Shadow of War and Peace (London: Routledge, 2005), p.154. ‘Kosovo’s unconventional new chief’, BBC News, 14 February 2002. King and Mason, Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo, p.175. Steiner was regarded in a bad light in Belgrade precisely because he was seen as laying the foundations for eventual independence. For instance, in a meeting with Nebojša Čović, the head of the Serbian Government’s Kosovo Coordination Centre, Steiner was reported to have said that the, ‘rules of the game are clear: Pristina is not Belgrade. I do not interfere in Belgrade’s affairs and Belgrade should not interfere in Kosovo’s affairs.’ ‘Kosovo: Mixed Feelings at Steiner Exit’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 6 June 2003. ‘Kosovo: Mixed Feelings at Steiner Exit’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 6 June 2003. ‘UN vetoes Kosovo border resolution’, BBC News, 23 May 2002. Congressional Research Service, ‘Kosovo’s Future Status Policy and U.S. Policy’, CRS Report for Congress, January 27, 2005, p.2. The basic standards had in fact been initially presented by Steiner to the Security Council in April 2002. However at this stage, they were explicitly linked to a final status. ‘Djindjić: Territorial Autonomy for Kosovo Serbs’, UNMIK Press Summary, 2 August 2001; ‘Kosovo Serbs Blackmailed?’, Transitions On Line, 7 October 2002. ‘Djindjić Launches Battle for Kosovo’, Institute for War and Peace

198

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58 ‘Djindjić Launches Battle for Kosovo’, Institute for War and Peace

Reporting, 10 February 2003. 59 Amnesty International, ‘Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo/Kosova):

60 61 62

63

64

65 66

67

Minority Communities: Fundamental Rights Denied’, Amnesty International, EUR 70/011/2003, 1 April 2003. Press Release, UN Security Council Document, SC/7901, 16 October 2003. ‘State's Grossman, UN's Holkeri Discuss Kosovo Strategy’, USINFO, 7 November 2003. ‘Security Council Presidential Statement, Expresses Support for ‘Standards for Kosovo’, Welcome Launch of Review Mechanism’, Press Release, UN Security Council Document, SC/7951, 12 December 2003. The exact requirements were set out in, ‘Standards for Kosovo’, UNMIK, 10 December 2003. As an OSCE report stated, ‘without the reckless and sensationalist reporting on 16 and 17 March, events could have taken a different turn. They might not have reached the intensity and level of brutality that was witnessed or even might not have taken place at all.’ ‘The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo’, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Vienna, 2004, p.3. A full account of the events can be found in, ‘Failure to Protect: AntiMinority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004’, Human Rights Watch, Volume 16, Number 6(D), July 2004. ‘Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004’, Human Rights Watch, Volume 16, Number 6(D), July 2004, p.7. Despite the breakdown in ties caused by the riots, just a few months later, leaders of the two communities issued a joint call for cooperation across a number of areas, such as rebuilding schools and houses, giving new impetus to the returns process, and the establishment of a ministry for community matters, human rights and returns. ‘Joint Declaration’, Pristina, 14 July 2004. Importantly, as was noted by Kai Eide in his report a few months later, the agreements was signed in the presence of officials from the US and EU. No one from UNMIK was present. As Albert Rohan, the deputy UN Envoy for the Kosovo status process, later noted, in the case of Kosovo multi-ethnicicity meant a situation whereby the two sides were not attacking each other. It would take several generations, if ever, before Kosovo Serbs and Albanians would be able to live side-by-side within a functioning democratic state. Albert Rohan, ‘International Conflict Resolution: The Case of Kosovo’, University of Kent, 19 October 2007.

NOTES

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68 ‘Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004’,

69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76

77 78 79 80

81 82

83

84

Human Rights Watch, Volume 16, Number 6(D), July 2004, p.3; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Security Council Document, S/2005/335, 23 May 2006, paragraph 10. Out of the 4100 that had been forced to flee from their homes, a year later over 1600 had yet to return to their rebuilt houses, an operation conducted by the UN. This was on top of the tens of thousands that the UN noted had already been displaced since 1999. ‘Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004’, Human Rights Watch, Volume 16, Number 6(D), July 2004, p.3. ‘The Response of the Justice System to the March 2004 Riots’, Report, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, December 2005, p.4. King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, p.191. ‘The Situation in Kosovo: Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations’, Brussels, 15 July 2004. Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, UNMIK, 31 March 2004. Kai Eide, ‘Kosovo: the way forward’, NATO Review, Winter 2004. King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, p.189. ‘Serbia and Montenegro: Foreign Minister Says Kosovo Now A ‘Ghetto Of Suffering’ For Serbs’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 May 2004. ‘Plan for the political solution to the situation in Kosovo and Metohija’, 2004. ‘Kosovo: Independence or the Broadest Autonomy?’, RFE/RL Reports, Volume 7, Number 12, May 2005. ‘Haradinaj et al.: Initial Indictment’, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-04-84-I, 24 February 2005. This was nothing new. As far back as 2001, Donald Rumsfeld had wanted to withdraw US forces from peacekeeping in the Balkans. ‘Rumsfeld seeks exit from Bosnia’, The Guardian, 19 May 2001. ‘A European Future for Kosovo’, Com (2005) 156, European Commission, Brussels, 20 April 2005. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Security Council Document, S/2005/335, 23 May 2005. ‘Secretary-General Appoints Ambassador Kai Eide of Norway as His Special Envoy to Undertake Comprehensive Review of Kosovo’, SG/A/927, 6 June 2005. Congressional Research Service, ‘Kosovo’s Future Status Policy and U.S.

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Policy’, CRS Report for Congress, January 27, 2005, p.4. 85 The Full text of the report can be found as an annexe to a letter sent by the UN Secretary General to the Security Council President. ‘Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Security Council Document, S/2005/635, 7 October 2006. 86 ‘Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Security Council Document, S/2005/635, 7 October 2006, p.5. 87 ‘Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Security Council Document, S/2005/635, 7 October 2005. The UN Secretary-General was careful not to prejudge the outcome of the process, simply noting that, ‘the question of autonomy and independence has been raised, and we have to talk to Belgrade and Pristina.’ ‘Kosovo set for ‘breakaway’ talks’, BBC News, 7 October 2006. 88 ‘Kosovo set for ‘breakaway’ talks’, BBC News, 7 October 2006. 89 ‘Kosovo set for ‘breakaway’ talks’, BBC News, 7 October 2006. 90 ‘Kosovo set for ‘breakaway’ talks’, BBC News, 7 October 2006. ‘Launch of Process to Decide Kosovo’s Final Status: Statement by RT Hon Douglas Alexander MP’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 8 October 2005.

Chapter 2 1

2

3

4 5 6

5289th Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV5289, 24 October 2005. 5290th Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV5290, 24 October 2005. The statement can be found as an appendix to this text. ‘Letter dated 31 October from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, United Nations Security Council Document, S/2005/708, 31 October 2005. For a full biography, see, ‘Secretary-General Appoints Former President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland as Special Envoyfor Future Status Process for Kosovo’, United Nations Secretary-General Document, BIO/3714 (or SG/A/955), 15 November 2005. ‘Rašković-Ivić: Not Ahtisaari, By Any Cost’, B92, 6 October 2005. The Contact Group principles can be found as an appendix to this text. ‘Letter dated 10 November 2005 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General’, United Nations Security Council Document, S/2005/709, 10 November 2005.

NOTES 7

8 9

10 11 12

13 14

15 16

201

As Weller notes, ‘Housed on the top floor of a modest office building in the centre of Vienna, this body consisted of expert advisers drawn mainly from the foreign ministries of the Contact Group states and some other governments or organizations. It was noticeable that the core team of advisers appeared to be carefully balanced, giving the key Contact Group states a direct voice and representation in the process. The legal drafting work of the secretariat was also supported by very experienced legal advisers from other expert institutions, including in particular the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Secretariat of the Council of Europe Venice Commission.’ Marc Weller, ‘The Vienna Negotiations on the Final Status of Kosovo’, International Affairs, Volume 84, Number 4, 2008, p.664. ‘Ahtisaari: no set timeline on Kosovo talks, EU’s role vital in negotiations’, Associated Press, 11 November 2005. ‘Serbia Set To Reject Kosovo Independence At Talks Next Month’, Associated Press, 15 November 2006. The proposals were published as, ‘Resolution of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on a Mandate for Political Talks on the Future Status of Kosovo and Metohija’, Government of Serbia, 14 November 2005. ‘Ethnic Albanian Leaders Insist on Independence for Kosovo’, Associated Press, 22 November 2005. ‘Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Kosovo Status Talks – Martti Ahtisaari’, Press Conference, Belgrade, 25 November 2005. Martti Ahtisaari, ‘Kosovan Questions: National, Regional, International’, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, 9 September 2008. Recounting this episode at a talk in London, a senior Serbian official noted that Tadić had emerged from the meeting absolutely furious at the way in which Ahtisaari had behaved. ‘Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Kosovo Status Talks – Martti Ahtisaari’, Press Conference, Belgrade, 25 November 2005. Martti Ahtisaari, ‘Kosovan Questions: National, Regional, International’, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, 9 September 2008. ‘Serbs offer Kosovo own household under same roof’, Reuters, 7 November 2006. ‘Hearing on Kosovo: A Way Forward? R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Remarks as prepared before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’, Press Release, US State Department, Washington, DC, November 8, 2005

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17 ‘No consensus reached on Kosovo in OSCE ministerial meeting’, Xinhuanet, 6 December 2006. 18 ‘Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation’, Second day of the Thirteenth Meeting, MC(13), Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 6 December 2005. 19 ‘Burns Says US Opposes Division of Kosovo’, Associated Press, 6 December 2005. 20 Tim Judah, ‘Kosovo: behind-the-scenes hard talk begins’, ISN Security Watch, 24 December 2005. 21 TV Pink, 21 December 2005. 22 For an account of these meetings, see: ‘Press Briefing by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Deputy Albert Rohan after their first visit to Belgrade’, UNOSEK, 25 November 2005; and ‘Press Briefing by UN Deputy Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Albert Rohan’, UNOSEK, 14 December. 23 ‘UN, Serbia plan direct Kosovo talks next month’, AFP, 15 December 2005. 24 ‘We won’t even talk about Kosovo’s status with Serbia’, Associated Press, 4 January 2006. Other agreed. As Nexhat Daci, the speaker of the Assembly noted, Pristina would not be willing to accept the Serbian proposals for the creation of separate municipalities and institutions in areas where the majority of inhabitants were Serbian. Other agreed. ‘Kosovo assembly speaker flatly rejects formation of Serb entity’, DPA, 11 January 2006. 25 ‘Suggested Private Message from Contact Group Representatives on the Kosovo Status Process’, document provided to the author by Martti Ahtisaari, September 2008. 26 ‘Decision on Kosovo status should be applicable to other areas – Putin’, Interfax, 30 January 2006. 27 ‘Kosovo Contact Group Statement’, 31 January 2006. The text is an appendix to this volume. 28 ‘Kosovo can win independence, says British diplomat’, Reuters, 6 February 2006. A few days later, Sawers gave an interview to B92 in which he appeared to backtrack slightly, noting that independence was an ‘option’. ‘Independence is an option’, B92, 31 January 2006. 29 ‘Serbs told Kosovo will be independent – negotiator’, Reuters, 6 February 2006. 30 ‘‘Solution to be Sought in Scope of Resolution 1244, Zobel’, Tanjug, 8 February 2006. ‘Russia Advocates Negotiations on Kosovo Status’, Tanjug, 8 February 2006; No Decision Reached on Status of Kosovo,

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Says Polt’, Tanjug, 8 February 2006. 31 5373rd Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5373, 14 February 2005. ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’, UN Security Council Document, S/2006/45, 25 January 2006. 32 ‘Kosovo Opposition Leader: Talks Must Lead To Independence’, Associated Press, 15 February 2006. 33 ‘Serbs, Albanians open direct talks on Kosovo’s fate’, Reuters, 19 February 2006. This was confirmed by Albert Rohan, the deputy UN Envoy, who noted that the Contact Group statement had, in the view of the UN team, left little doubt that independence would have to be the final outcome. Albert Rohan, ‘International Conflict Resolution: The Case of Kosovo’, University of Kent, 19 October 2007. Serbian officials also insist that in his first meeting with Tadić, Ahtisaari had stated that the eventual outcome of the talks was obviously independence. For example, the meeting was recounted by Vuk Jeremić, the Serbian Foreign Minister, at a presentation he made at Chatham House on 18 September 2007. The comment was recounted in the media soon afterwards. ‘Drifting from promise of independence’, The Guardian, 20 September 2007. However, British officials insist that while the Serbian Government have made the same claim to them, they have never found any evidence to support the claim. British official, comment to the author, December 2007. 34 ‘Kosovo Parties Report Positive Results from First Round of Talks’, Washington File, 23 February 2006. 35 See, for example, Scant Gains Raise Chance of Imposed Solution in Kosovo’, New York Times, 9 April 2006, and ‘Mladić may weaken Kosovo position’, B92, 17 April 2006. Even if handing over Mladić would probably not be enough to stop independence for the province, it would certainly give Serbia a much stronger hand in discussions over decentralisation. 36 ‘No traces of Milosevic poisoning’, BBC News, 17 March 2006. The conspiracy theories were further fuelled by the fact that Milošević’s death occurred just days after another prominent inmate, Milan Babić, the former leader of the Krajina Serbs, had been found hanging in his cell. 37 At this stage it was unclear whether the vote would be for independence. Latest polls showed that while just over 40 per cent supported statehood, a third opposed it. ‘Montenegro independence vote May 21, says opposition’, Reuters, 28 February 2006.

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38 ‘Kosovo Ditches Its Prime Minister’, Balkan Insight, 3 March 2006. 39 Although similar to Rugova in temperament, Sejdiu, who was a lawyer, was nevertheless considered to be more realistic than his predecessor. ‘Fatmir Sejdiu: Ibrahim Rugova's Spirit to Guide Kosovo’, AIA, 13 February 2006. However, he quickly made it clear that he was just as committed to independence as Rugova. Speaking after his election, he insisted that statehood was ‘non-negotiable’, and that his priority was to ensure a successful outcome to the status talks by the end of the year. Despite this, Tadić welcomed the election of Sejdiu and stressed that his door was always open for direct discussions. ‘New president elected in Kosovo’, BBC News, 10 February 2006. 40 ‘Serbia’s request to block Kosovo’s PM appointment rejected’, DTTNet, 5 March 2006. ‘Kosovo’s Likely Leader Wanted for War Crimes’, Christian Science Monitor, 10 March 2006. 41 ‘New Kosovo PM wants independence’, BBC News, 10 March 2006. 42 ‘Russia and China ‘pledge not to block new Kosovo’’, Financial Times, 15 March 2006. 43 ‘Serb objections mar second round of Kosovo talks’, Reuters, 17 March 2006. 44 ‘Kosovo must act now to protect Serb minority – EU’, Reuters, 22 March 2006. 45 ‘Serb hopes of own entity in Kosovo dashed’, Reuters, 30 March 2006. 46 ‘Press Briefing by Mr Albert Rohan after the third direct talks on decentralization held in Vienna’, UNOSEK, 3 April 2006. 47 ‘New round of talks in Vienna’, B92, 3 April 2006. 48 ‘Press Briefing by Mr Albert Rohan after the third direct talks on decentralization held in Vienna’, UNOSEK, 3 April 2006. 49 In another indication that attitudes might be changing, Sejdiu also visited the Decani Monastery as part of the Orthodox Easter celebrations – the first such visit by a senior Kosovo Albanian leader. Although security was tight, the decision was warmly welcomed by Serbian leaders in the province, with one even stating that it might open up a ‘new page’ in Serbian-Albanian relations. ‘Kosovo Serb hails Kosovo president's visit to Orthodox monastery’, AFP, 24 April 2006. Such moves to try to promote better relations between the communities were seen as particularly important given recent reports that the UN High Commission for Refugees and the World Health Organisation had drawn up plans for the exodus of up to 40,000 Serbs from Kosovo following a status decision. ‘UNHCR and WHO to displace Serbs’, B92, 19 April 2006.

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50 ‘Press Briefing by UN Deputy Special Envoy Albert Rohan after the fourth round of direct talks held in Vienna’, UNSOSEK, 5 May 2006. 51 ‘Kosovo president takes aim at Serbia ahead of talks’, AFP, 2 May 2006. 52 ‘US Envoy: Kosovo’s Status Should Be Resolved in 06’, Associated Press, 22 May 2006; ‘Serbian prime minister urges EU members to help his country maintain its borders’, Associated Press, 15 May 2006. 53 ‘US Envoy: Kosovo’s Status Should Be Resolved in 06’, Associated Press, 22 May 2006. 54 ‘UN chief says Kosovo talks could drag on’, AFP, 17 May 2006. 55 In the end, 55.4 per cent voted to end the State Union with Serbia and declare independence. ‘Montenegro chooses independence’, BBC News, 21 May 2006. 56 ‘Press Briefing by Mr. Albert Rohan after Vienna round of talks on the protection of religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo’, UNOSEK, 23 May 2006. 57 ‘Serbs, Albanians argue over money in Kosovo talks’, Reuters, 31 May 2006. 58 Boris Tadić, ‘Opportunity in the Balkans’, Washington Post, 7 June 2006. 59 ‘“Unrealistic” Serb positions on Kosovo, charges UN envoy’, UN Press Release, 31 May 2006. 60 ‘U.N. envoy: Kosovo independence this year’, UPI, 13 June 2006. In an interview published just prior to his departure from Kosovo in February, Lawrence Rossin, the deputy head of UNMIK, also noted that he thought that 2006 would be the year in which the province would become independent. ‘Kosovo to become independent this year (UN deputy envoy)’, DTT-Net, 22 February 2006. 61 5470th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.5470, 20 June 2005. ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’, UN Security Council Document, S/2006/361, 5 June 2006. 62 Vojislav Koštunica, ‘Serbia’s European Integration’, Royal United Services Institute, 27 June 2006. 63 ‘U.N. to allow Serbia’s prime minister to visit Kosovo’, Associated Press, 26 June 2006. In part the decision was based on the fact that permission had been given to Drašković the previous year to visit Kosovo on the same occasion. ‘Serbia’s PM Insists Serbs Will Never Give Up Kosovo’, Associated Press, 28 June 2006. 64 ‘Meeting of Contact Group Political Directors’, Media Note 2006/645, Office of the Spokesman, State Department, 30 June 2006.

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65 ‘Kosovo Serbs recruit ex-soldiers for defence’, Reuters, 20 June 2006; and ‘Serbs in northern Kosovo say they have formed own security units’, Associated Press, 12 June 2006. 66 ‘US Criticizes Serbian Premier Over Claims to Kosovo’, Associated Press, 30 June 2006. 67 ‘Russia delays West’s date for Kosovo independence’, Reuters, 3 July 2006. 68 ‘Rohan’s assessments do not stand’, Politika, 10 July 2006. 69 ‘Serbian prime minister meets Rice; is firm on Kosovo’, AFP, 11 July 2006. His approach was heavily criticised in the United States. Soon afterwards, the Washington Post published an editorial criticising Belgrade for its ‘intransigence’, and noting that Koštunica sounded, ‘disturbingly like Slobodan Milošević’. ‘Serbia’s Intransigence’, Washington Post, 24 July 2006. 70 ‘Official Communiqué of the 5485th (Closed) Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5485, 13 July 2006. 71 ‘Russia challenges UN power to impose Kosovo ruling’, Reuters, 13 July 2006; ‘Kosovo president to ask UN to back independence for province’, AFP, 11 July 2006. 72 ‘Russia challenges UN power to impose Kosovo ruling’, Reuters, 13 July 2006. 73 ‘EU hails Serbian plan to arrest war criminals, but pre-membership talks remain suspended’, Associated Press, 17 July 2006. Significantly, the ministers also received a briefing from Rehn and Solana about plans for the European Union’s post-status role in Kosovo. See, ‘Summary note on the joint report by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, and Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, on the future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo’, S/200/06, July 2006. 74 ‘Chair’s Summary’, G8, St Petersburg, 17 July 2006. 75 ‘Serb Municipalities in Kosovo May Raised – Official’, Associated Press, 17 July 2006; ‘Ethnic Albanian leaders to take part in top Kosovo status meeting’, AFP, 17 July 2006. 76 ‘UN expects top level Kosovo meeting by end-July’, Reuters, 12 July 2006. 77 ‘No Breakthrough Seen At Next Week’s Kosovo Talks – UN Envoy’, Associated Press, 17 July 2006. 78 ‘Press Briefing after Second Vienna round of talks on the protection of religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo’, UNOSEK, 18 July 2006; ‘Press Briefing after Fifth Vienna round of talks on decentralization’, UNSOSEK, 19 July 2006. It was also worth noting that the discussions

NOTES

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80 81

82 83 84

85

86

87

207

on decentralisation were not held face-to-face. Instead, the UN adopted a proximity format, whereby officials went between the two delegations located in separate areas. While he was deeply concerned about any Serbian official being seen meeting with Çeku, who was wanted in Serbia for suspected war crimes, Koštunica was also aware that if the Serbian Government did not attend it would hand Pristina a default victory. As a result of these concerns, there were no handshakes between the delegations. Koštunica also decided to boycott a joint lunch for the delegations. ‘Serbia says yet to decide on Kosovo status talks’, Reuters, 18 July 2006; ‘Kosovo bids for independence; talks deadlocked’, Reuters, 24 July 2006. ‘Ethnic Albanians, Serb leaders far apart on Kosovo’s future’, Associated Press, 24 July 2006. ‘Press Conference by UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari after the High-level meeting in Vienna’, UNOSEK, 24 July 2006. ‘High Level Meeting on the Future Status of Kosovo’, Contact Group Statement, 24 July 2006. ‘Contact Group Statement on the Situation in Northern Kosovo’, 3 August 2006. ‘Ahtisaari considers postponement of Vienna talks’, B92, 2 August 2006. The Serbian team argued that minority rights and the constitutional question were inextricably linked and that discussing them would necessarily prejudice the final status question. ‘Change of heart in team for negotiations’, B92, 4 August 2006. Although, it was unclear what exactly she meant by this, particularly as she insisted that no Serbian leader would ever sign an agreement granting Kosovo independence, others within the Serbian government dismissed the comments arguing that they had been taken out of context. She was talking about the proposals for essential autonomy, and not independence. ‘Serbia considers Kosovo Partition’, BBC News, 11 August 2006. ‘Serbia won’t allow division of Kosovo, says Minister’, B92, 13 August 2006; ‘Serbia may have Plan B for Kosovo’, B92, 14 August 2006; ‘Understated envoy offers hope for future of Kosovo’, Financial Times, 28 August 2006. ‘Kosovo Serbs boycott Vienna talks’, AFP, 8 August 2006. Tensions also grew with the presence of Fatmir Limaj, who had controversially been acquitted of war crimes by the ICTY, on the Unity Team. ‘Press encounter by Mr. Schlagheck after the first round of talks on minority rights’, UNOSEK, 8 August 2006.

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88 ‘New UN chief rules out Kosovo partition’, Reuters, 15 August 2006. Unlike his predecessors, the 55-year old German was already based in Kosovo, where he was in charge of the province’s economic development. The former mayor of a German town, he had previously served in Bosnia as well. ‘New UN mission chief for Kosovo’, BBC News, 15 August 2006. 89 ‘Ruecker hints at Kosovo solution’, B92, 25 August 2006; ‘Understated envoy offers hope for future of Kosovo’, Financial Times, 28 August 2006. 90 ‘Ahtisaari: A burden to pay for’, B92, 26 August 2006; ‘Ahtisaari ends Kosovo visit’, B92 25 August 2006; ‘Ahtisaari comment draws fire in Serbia’, South East European Times, 30 August 2006; ‘Government will ask Annan to clarify Ahtisaari’s statement’, Beta, 31 August 2006; ‘Koštunica: Ahtisaari’s message is clear’, B92, 29 August 2006. Belgrade quickly seized on a bomb attack in Mitrovica that wounded seven Serbs, a British policeman and a Dutch woman, as evidence that the comments had given the Albanians a justification for attacking Serbs. ‘Bomb explosion in Kosovska Mitrovica’, B92, 26 August 2006. Drašković also argued that, if history mattered, it was worth noting that since NATO’s arrival in the province, ‘over 200,000 Serbs had been expelled from the province, 150 churches and monasteries demolished, 40,000 Serb houses levelled to the ground, and more than 1,000 civilians, including children, killed.’ ‘Negotiations Serbia’s Only Weapon’, Tanjug, 1 September 2006. 91 ‘Solution by year’s end’, B92, 2 September 2006. 92 ‘Press Briefing by UN Deputy Special Envoy Albert Rohan after the 7– 8 September round of direct talks held in Vienna’, UNOSEK, 8 September 2006. 93 Tadić wraps up Kosovo visit’, B92, 9 September 2006. 94 ‘Serbia revives Milošević-era policies over Kosovo’, Associated Press, 19 September 2006. 95 ‘Putin says Russia may use veto right regarding Kosovo resolution’, ITAR–Tass, 13 September 2006. 96 5522nd Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV5522, 13 September 2006. Also, 5522nd Meeting of the Security Council, SC/8827, Department of Public Information, 13 September 2006. ‘Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’, UN Security Council Document, S/2006/707, 1 September 2006. 97 ‘Serbia revives Milošević-era policies over Kosovo’, Associated Press, 19 September 2006.

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98 Soon afterwards, in a highly inflammatory statement, Nikolić called on the Serbian army to prepare for war. The idea of a Serbian attack was immediately dismissed by Çeku, who argued that Serbia lacked the courage to invade Kosovo, ‘Interview: Kosovo’s premier says Serbs lack courage to invade again’, Associated Press, 20 September 2006. 99 ‘Troubling Times’, The Economist, 5 October 2006; ‘Serbs invoke Bosnia breakup in bid to keep Kosovo’, Reuters, 18 September 2006. Such a view was not entirely without justification. Koštunica hinted several months earlier that if the international community was not prepared to abide by international law and respect Serb sovereignty, then Serbia would have little reason to abide by such rules elsewhere. Comment by Vojislav Koštunica following a presentation on, ‘Serbia’s European Integration’, Royal United Services Institute, 27 June 2006. 100 ‘Kosovo Contact Group Ministerial Statement’, New York, 20 September 2006. 101 ‘U.N. envoy says progress on Kosovo talks looking 'increasingly slim'’, Associated Press, 15 September 2006. 102 ‘Stake-out by UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari after his briefing to the UN Security Council in New York’, UNOSEK, 22 September 2006.

Chapter 3 1

2 3

‘Official Communiqué of the 5531st (Closed) Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5531, 22 September 2006. This meeting was also attended by representatives from Albania, Germany, Italy and Finland. ‘Security Council discusses Kosovo’, B92, 22 September 2006. While the move to include a reference to Kosovo had been strongly supported by Koštunica, it had been opposed by Tadić, who argued that the status talks had their own dynamic and would not be affected by this move. In his view, it was far better to focus on reasoned diplomatic persuasion and emphasise Serbia’s important role in the region. ‘Kosovo will never be independent for Serbia – Koštunica’, AFP, 12 September 2006. ‘Tadić not giving up on talks’, B92, 16 September 2006. Interestingly, it was later claimed that this decision did in fact have an negative effect on Serbia’s position. As Sir John Sawers, the British representative at the UN later stated, ‘When, in the middle of the final status process, the government of Serbia changed its constitution to exclude any future for Kosovo outside Serbia it

210

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6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

KOSOVO effectively ended any chance of a negotiated settlement.’ 5839th Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008. ‘Serbian polls could delay Kosovo plan – Ahtisaari’, Reuters, 3 October 2006. Rather unexpectedly, the Serbian Government was furious at Ahtisaari’s comments. Speaking to journalist, Koštunica stated that the UN envoy had absolutely no right to deal with issues relating to when a ‘sovereign country’ holds elections, announcing that Ahtisaari, ‘has already encroached upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia beyond his mandate. He has also done so on this occasion.’ ‘Serbian premier “astonished” at Kosovo envoy's statement on elections’, FoNet, 4 October 2006. ‘Kosovo says Serb polls must not delay independence’, Reuters, 4 October 2006. ‘Stop talk of Kosovo delay, say Western powers’, Reuters, 5 October 2006. ‘Ahtisaari to submit status proposal by year’s end’, B92, 16 October 2006. ‘UN Extends Kosovo Envoy’s Mandate into Next Year’, Voice of America, 19 October 2006. ‘Ahtisaari rejects postponement proposal’, B92, 18 October 2006; ‘Serbia’s Kosovo position has improved’, B92, 19 October 2006. ‘Ahtisaari proposal by end of year’, B92, 19 October 2006; ‘What was said in Vienna’, B92, 23 October 2006. ‘Koštunica: Ahtisaari contradicts Nobel Peace Prize spirit’, B92, 21 October 2006. ‘Kosovo independence’, Associated Press, 22 October 2006. ‘Constitution gives government clear mandate’, B92, 6 November 2006. ‘US Official Says Delay on Kosovo Status Helps No One’, Voice of America, 31 October 2006. ‘Kosovo: Ethnic Albanians ‘Ready to Declare Independence’, AKI, 9 November 2006. ‘UN delays report on Kosovo future’, BBC News, 10 November 2006. ‘Kosovo: UN envoy urges leaders to avoid ‘unilateral actions’ after delay on final status’, UN News Centre, 13 November 2006. ‘Kosovo: Pro-independence protestors attack UN headquarters; no injuries’, United Nations News Service, 29 November 2006; ‘UNMIK headquarters in Pristina attacked by protesters’, South East European Times, 29 November 2006.

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20 ‘Armed group surfaces in Kosovo’, Reuters, 8 December 2006. Çeku called on the groups to cease their activity, noting that it was damaging the image and security of Kosovo. 21 ‘‘EU to cut Bosnia troops despite Kosovo worries’, EU Observer, 14 November 2006; Independence support wavering?’, B92, 14 November 2006. 22 ‘Koštunica: Independence is violence’, B92, 17 November 2006. 23 ‘Serb’s letter persuades U.S. to drop opposition to Belgrade’s special partnership with NATO’, International Herald Tribune, 30 November 2006. 24 ‘PfP Preserves Serbia’s Territorial Integrity: Serbia’s PM’, Focus News Agency, 29 November 2006. ‘Serbia: Politicians Exalt at NATO Invitation’, AKI News, 29 November 2006. Although NATO’s final communiqué on Kosovo did not mention a preferred final status, it nevertheless supported Ahtisaari’s efforts to conclude his process and called for a settlement that would not only enhance regional stability, but would also be acceptable to the people of Kosovo. ‘Riga Summit Declaration’, NATO Press Release, 2006(150), 29 November 2006, paragraph 9. 25 The Russian Government insisted that the visit was not official. The invitation had been issued by the Russian parliament, although the Duma denied this, and the most senior official Çeku would meet would be Vladimir Titov, the deputy foreign minister. ‘Kosovo: Premier to Visit Moscow’, AKI, 17 November 2006. ‘Duma denies inviting Kosovo PM to Moscow’, Interfax, 17 November 2006. ‘“Diplomatic struggle for Kosovo”’, B92, 18 November 2006. 26 ‘Russia Hems and Haws on Kosovo Independence’, The Moscow Times, 1 December 2006; ‘Kosovo PM tries to win Russia over on independence’, Reuters, 30 November 2006. 27 ‘Çeku: Russian visit successful’, B92, 2 December 2006; ‘Kosovo PM tries to win Russia over on independence’, Reuters, 30 November 2006. 28 ‘Russian ambassador: Compromise or veto’, B92, 4 December 2006; ‘Burns surprised by Russian veto announcement’, B92, 5 December 2006; ‘Fate of Serbia's breakaway region of Kosovo sparks U.S.–Russia tug-of-war’, Associated Press, 6 December 2006. 29 5588th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.5588, 13 December 2006. ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’, UN Security Council Document, S/2006/906, 20 November 2006. 30 ‘Serb PM vows to prevent Kosovo’s secession’, Associated Press, 1

212

31 32 33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40

41

42 43

44 45

KOSOVO January 2007; ‘Serbian PM asks U.N. border protection’, UPI, 3 January 2007. ‘Serbia: PM and President Differ on Makeup of Future Government’, AKI, 2 January 2007. ‘U.N. plan for Kosovo should not be presented until Serbia forms new government, president says’, International Herald Tribune, 5 January 2006. ‘Politically, historically and legally Kosovo-Metohija is and will remain part of Serbia’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 6 January 2007. ‘Vuk Drašković: There will be Another Round of Talks between Belgrade and Pristina for Kosovo’, Focus News, 7 January 2007. The same view had been put forward a few days earlier by Leon Kohen, another member of the Serbian negotiating team. ‘Ahtisaari’s proposal on Kosovo status not a binding sketch for solution’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 4 January 2007. ‘New negotiation round pointless’, B92, 7 January 2007. ‘U.S. envoy: Serbian Kosovo status by April’, UPI, 11 January 2007. ‘Merkel: Kosovo decision must reconcile autonomy with supporting Serbian democracy’, International Herald Tribune, 7 January 2007. ‘Kosovo talks could continue’, B92, 13 January 2007. ‘Ahtisaari’s office won’t confirm further talks’, B92, 14 January 2007. ‘Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, met Fatmir Sejdiu, President of Kosovo’, Press Release, S010/07, 12 Brussels, 15 January 2007. Mr Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, ‘The European perspective for the Western Balkans’, Western Balkans Panel at the International Conference Hall organised by Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 16 January 2007. ‘Putin reassures Belgrade over territorial integrity’, Financial Times, 16 January 2007. ‘Current Policy Towards Russia, Serbia, and Kosovo, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Interview With Ivana Kuhar’, VOA Eurasia Division, Washington, DC, January 16, 2007; ‘U.S. says Kosovo hampers Serbia’s EU entry’, UPI, 17 January 2007; ‘EU expects conflict with Russia over Kosovo’, B92, 18 January 2007. ‘Austria, Romania Back Serbia’s Pro-European Politicians’, Associated Press, 17 January 2007. Despite evidence to the contrary, a number of news reports identified Kosovo as a major, or even the main, issue in the elections. ‘Kosovo looms large in Serb poll’, BBC News, 18 January 2007.

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46 ‘Divisions in Serbia as Kosovo decision looms’, Reuters, 23 January 2007; ‘U.N. Kosovo proposals to preview Friday’, UPI, 23 January 2007. 47 ‘Statement by Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo before the 2007 Ordinary Session of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly’, Council of Europe, 24 January 2007; ‘U.N. envoy says plan for Kosovo focuses on minority rights protection’, Associated Press, 24 January 2007. 48 ‘Russia and West divided on U.N. Kosovo plan’, Reuters, 26 January 2007. 49 ‘Ahtisaari Presents Kosovo Plan, Serbia Postpones Meeting’, DPA, 26 January 2006. 50 ‘Kosovo’s Çeku meets with Contact Group representatives, urges patience’, Southeast European Times, 29 January 2007; ‘U.N. Envoy Briefs Allies on Kosovo Plan’, Associated Press, 26 January 2007. 51 ‘Serbia in Suspense before U.N. Proposal’, Associated Press, 2 February 2007; ‘Kosovo senses “whiff” of independence’, Reuters, 2 February 2007. 52 ‘Serbs begin talks on forming new government’, Associated Press, 29 January 2007. As Oliver Ivanovic, a moderate Kosovo Serb leader, explained, it was not in the interests of Serbia to, ‘make an enemy out of Ahtisaari.’ ‘“No one to meet Ahtisaari”’, B92, 29 January 2007. 53 ‘Serbian officials say U.N. plan for Kosovo is against Belgrade’s bid to keep province’, Associated Press, 1 February 2007; ‘Koštunica’s party edges closer to Radicals’, Southeast European Times, 1 February 2007; ‘Kosovo Recognition Raises Problems’, Associated Press, 31 January 2007. 54 ‘Press Conference by UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari, in Belgrade’, UNOSEK, 2 February 2007; ‘Press Conference by UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari, in Pristina’, UNOSEK, 2 February 2007. 55 Kosovo Contact Group Issue Joint Statement, 2 February 2007. 56 ‘Kosovo says Yes to U.N. plan, Serbia says No’, Reuters, 2 February 2007; ‘Sejdiu says Ahtisaari’s proposal lays foundation for declaring independence’, Makfax, 2 February 2007; ‘Ethnic Albanians say UN plan backs independence, Serbia warns of secession’, Associated Press, 3 February 2007. In the days that followed, Çeku also defended the plan provisions for the Kosovo Serbs and other minorities. ‘Çeku: Serbs to live “with dignity” in Kosovo’, Southeast European Times, 5 February 2007. But evidently not wanting to appear to keen to accept all the

214

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58 59 60

61 62 63

64 65

66 67 68 69

70 71 72

KOSOVO proposed terms while further talks were on the agenda, over the next few days he expressed his concern that elements of the proposals were too restrictive. ‘Kosovo PM warns Serbs against breakaway’, Reuters, 4 February 2007. Ahtisaari’s proposal for Kosovo illegitimate’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 2 February 2007; ‘Tadić: Independence unacceptable’, B92, 2 February 2007. ‘EU Offers Serbia More Time Over Kosovo’, Balkan Insight, 8 February 2007. ‘U.N. mediator postpones talks on Kosovo plan by a week after Serb request’, Associated Press, 9 February 2007. ‘Kosovo: Serbs organise mass protests as UN moves ahead with independence plan’, AKI, 9 February 2007; ‘10,000 rally in Kosovska Mitrovica’, B92, 9 February 2007; ‘‘Occupied’ Serbs would resist’, The Washington Times, 9 February 2007. ‘Kosovo leaders urge calm after clashes kill two’, Reuters, 11 February 2007. ‘Lavrov says Russia and US still at odds on Kosovo’, Reuters, 3 February 2007. ‘U.N. Kosovo Plan Shows Deep Fault Lines’, Associated Press, 3 February 2007. See also, ‘RF, US stance on Kosovo differ in principle, Sergei Lavrov says’, ITAR–TASS, 3 February 2007. ‘EU-Russia: Belgrade and Priština to decide’, B92, 5 February 2007. ‘Kosovo status not precedent for breakaway republics – FerreroWaldner’, Interfax, 5 February 2007; ‘U.S. assures Russia on backing of Kosovo’, The Washington Times, 8 February 2007. ‘Russia urges time out in Kosovo status process’, Reuters, 9 February 2007. ‘“Martti Ahtisaari Is Not a Magician”’, Kommersant, 12 February 2007. ‘Top Russian diplomat criticizes Ahtisaari plan’, Associated Press, 15 February 2007. ‘Putin Accuses U.S. of Sparking Arms Race’, Associated Press, 11 February 2007. Senator John McCain, who was also at the event, described the speech as the, ‘most aggressive speech from a Russian leader since the end of the Cold War.’ ‘Putin rails against US foreign policy’, Financial Times, 10 February 2007. ‘Putin urges Western politicians ‘not to pose as Lord God’’, Interfax, 12 February 2007. ‘Putin sends support to Tadić’, B92, 14 February 2007. ‘Serbs look for unity as ground shifts on Kosovo’, Reuters, 5 February

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2007. 73 ‘Ahtisaari postpones Vienna talks for February 21’, B92, 9 February 2007. 74 ‘Ahtisaari in UN today’, B92, 8 February 2006. ‘The Capital Interview: Serbs Urged to Accept Kosovo Plan to Gain ‘European Future’’, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 February 2007. 75 ‘Serbian Parliament votes against UN proposal to give Kosovo virtual independence’, Associated Press, 14 February 2007. The final result was 225 votes to 15, with 4 abstentions and 6 absentees. The 15 votes cast against the resolution came from the Liberal Democratic Party, whose leader, Čedomir Jovanović, urged his fellow lawmakers to, ‘accept the reality that Kosovo has not been under our control since 1999.’ ‘Serbia rejects U.N.'s Kosovo plan’, Associated Press, 15 February 2007. 76 ‘European foreign ministers condemn weekend violence in Kosovo’, Associated Press, 12 February 2007. 77 ‘EU to oversee Kosovo police, judiciary, once final status resolved’, Associated Press, 20 December 2006. 78 Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations: External Relations’, 2780th Council Meeting, Press Release, 6039/07 (Presse 18), 12 February 2007. 79 ‘Final round of Kosovo talks scheduled for March 10’, DPA, 13 February 2007. 80 ‘Press Conference by UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari, in Vienna’, UNOSEK, 21 February 2007. 81 ‘Press Conference by UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari, in Pristina’, UNOSEK, 2 February 2007. 82 ‘Koštunica: UN will block Kosovo’s independence’, B92, 19 February 2007. 83 ‘Serbia lines up wholesale rejection of Kosovo plan’, Reuters, 20 February 2007. ‘“We will propose amendments”’, B92, 17 February 2007. 84 ‘New round of Vienna talks on Kosovo’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 21 February 2007;‘Serbs oppose U.N. Kosovo plan as last talks start’, Reuters, 21 February 2007; ‘Envoy says Serbs, ethnic Albanians remain deadlocked on U.N. plan for Kosovo’, Associated Press, 21 February 2007. 85 ‘Warning of war if Kosovo self-rule denied’, The Washington Times, 20 February 2007. As Veton Surroi, the leader of the Unity Team, memorably put it, ‘It’s like Groundhog Day. You wake up and find exactly the same proposals from Belgrade…For us, this chapter has

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88

89

90 91

92 93 94 95

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KOSOVO ended and this book has been closed.’ ‘Serbs oppose U.N. Kosovo plan as last talks start’, Reuters, 21 February 2007. ‘Belgrade rejects succession principle’, B92, 23 February 2007. ‘Belgrade demands increased jurisdiction for Serb municipalities in Kosovo-Metohija’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 27 February 2007; ‘Negotiating team demands formation of Serbian entity in KosovoMetohija’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 27 February 2007. ‘State negotiating team requests demilitarisation of Kosovo’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 1 March 2007. ‘Vienna: Security provisions stumbling block’, B92, 1 March 2007. ‘Stake-out by UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari and his Deputy Albert Rohan after the Vienna discussions’, UNOSEK, 2 March 2007. ‘Kosovo: First round of status talks in Vienna ends’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 2 March 2007. ‘Russia Says No Imposed Solution For Kosovo’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 22 February 2007; ‘Serbs tell America: Hands off Kosovo’, Reuters, 27 February 2007. ‘Serbia has unified and grounded position on future status of Kosovo’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 1 March 2007. ‘RI voices support for Serbia in Kosovo spat’, The Jakarta Post, 1 March 2007. ‘Resolution of Kosovo status to be put-off’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 6 March 2007. ‘Serbs tell America: Hands off Kosovo’, Reuters, 27 February 2007. The Embassy released a statement supporting the right of peaceful protest, and emphasising that the US supported a stable and secure future for all the people of Kosovo, including the Kosovo Serbs. ‘Serbs rally against plan for Kosovo independence’, Associated Press, 27 February 2007. ‘Fried: Kosovo Serbs must be secured’, B92, 6 March 2007; ‘Kosovo secession plan best available option, US official’, Associated Press, 6 March 2007. ‘Serbia Vows War-Crime Hunt, to Seek Kosovo Solution’, Bloomberg, 6 March 2007. ‘Belgrade Rejects, Pristina Welcomes, Revised Kosovo Plan’, DPA, 7 March 2007; ‘Kosovo: mixed Reactions to Top U.N. Envoy’s Final Status Proposal’, AKI, 8 March 2007; ‘New proposal of Martti Ahtisaari not acceptable for Serbia’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 8 March 2007.

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99 ‘Serbia Braces For Kosovo Diplomatic Showdown’, DPA, 9 March 2007. 100 ‘U.N. envoy: Talks on Kosovo’s status close in deadlock’, Associated Press, 10 March 2007; ‘“Amended version likely final”’, B92, 9 March 2007. 101 ‘Serbia appeals to UN to reject Kosovo plan’, Reuters, 10 March 2007. ‘Serbia advocates compromise, just solution of Kosovo-Metohija’s status’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 10 March 2007; ‘Year of contentious Kosovo talks ends in bitter deadlock on U.N. plan’, Associated Press, 10 March 2007. ‘Serbia appeals to UN to reject Kosovo plan’, Reuters, 10 March 2007. 102 ‘Press Conference by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari following the High Level meeting held in Vienna’, UNOSEK, 10 arch 2007. 103 ‘EU urges swift settlement of Kosovo future’, Reuters, 11 March 2007. 104 ‘Year of contentious Kosovo talks ends in bitter deadlock on U.N. plan’, Associated Press, 10 March 2007. 105 ‘Serbia expects continuation of negotiations on future status of Kosovo’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 12 March 2007. The Serbian press was also indignant about the outcome, with at least one major newspaper arguing that it appeared as though the plan had been based on the calculation that the Serbs can make less trouble than the Albanians. ‘Imposed Solution “Trap without Exit”’, B92, 11 March 2007. 106 ‘Serbia appeals to UN to reject Kosovo plan’, Reuters, 10 March 2007; ‘UN to decide Kosovo’s fate as talks end deadlocked’, Reuters 10 March 2007; ‘“Russia never promised to use veto”’, B92, 9 March 2007; ‘Serbs Push for Russia’s Veto on Kosovo Independence Plan’, Kommersant, 12 March 2007; ‘Ahtisaari’s decision to cut short Kosovo talks premature’, ITAR–TASS, 13 March 2007; ‘Russia looks to delay and dilute U.N. plan for Kosovo’, Reuters, 15 March 2007.

Chapter 4 1 2

3

‘Serbia Demands New Talks on Kosovo’, Balkan Insight, 16 March 2007. ‘Russia wants more Kosovo status talks, but eases veto threat’, Southeast European Times, 19 March 2007. ‘Report: New Kosovo U.N. Envoy Sought’, Associated Press, 18 March 2007. ‘Russia Seeks New Mediator in Kosovo Talks’, Reuters, 17 March 2007. ‘Russian foreign minister criticizes U.N. plan for Kosovo’, Associated

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9

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KOSOVO Press, 21 March 2007. Serbia (Kosovo), S/PV5640, 19 March 2007. ‘Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’, UN Security Council Document, S/2007/134, 19 March 2007. ‘Kosovo: SRSG Joachim Rücker addresses the UN Security Council’, Press Release, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), UNMIK/PR/1652, 19 March 2007. ‘Russia objects to UN plan for Kosovo statehood’, International Herald Tribune, 20 March 2007. However, he later denied reports that he had stormed out of the meeting in protest. ‘Churkin: I did not leave Security Council session’, B92, 20 March 2007. Meanwhile, the US rejected the accusations made against the SRSG. Alejandro Wolff, the acting US representative called Rücker’s ‘balanced’ and ‘objective’ and again noted that the US had ‘tremendous confidence’ in Ahtisaari. ‘Kosovo: Russian Ambassador Storms out of Security Council’, AKI, 20 March 2007. ‘US opposes replacing Ahtisaari as Kosovo mediator’, Helsingen Sanomat, 20 March 2007; ‘Russian call for more Kosovo talks rejected’, Reuters, 19 March 2007; ‘Top Serbian officials call for continued talks’, B92, 23 March 2007. ‘“Imposed solution won’t pass Security Council”’, B92, 22 March 2007. Alexeyev soon appeared to backtrack on the statement, insisting in another interview that while Russia would not allow any attempt to impose a solution, the use of the veto could not be the goal of any country. ‘Russia favors continued Kosovo talks’, B92, 23 March 2007. ‘Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status’, UN Security Council Document, S/2007/168, 26 March 2007. ‘Secretary-General, receiving report on Kosovo’s future status, supports proposal’, Press Release, United Nations Secretary-General, SG/SM/10923, 26 March 2007. ‘Proposals for Kosovo’s Final Status’, Press Statement, US Department of State, 2007/230, 26 March 2007; ‘EU Presidency Statement on the submission today to the UN Security Council’, 26 March 2007; ‘U.N. envoy recommends supervised independence for Kosovo, official says’, Associated Press, 22 March 2007. ‘UN urges independence for Kosovo’, International Herald Tribune, 27 March 2007. ‘Serbia rejects Ahtisaari’s proposal for status of Kosovo-Metohija’, Press release, Government of Serbia, 27 March 2007; ‘‘Koštunica: Russian veto

NOTES

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17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28 29

30 31

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historic’, B92, 27 March 2007; ‘U.N. envoy recommends independence for Kosovo’, Associated Press, 26 March 2007. ‘Kosovo independence would damage European stability – Russian Foreign Ministry’, Interfax, 27 March 2007. ‘Russia urges Security Council to visit Kosovo and Belgrade before deciding on status’, Associated Press, 27 March 2007; ‘Russia Wants FactFinding Mission Sent To Kosovo’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28 March 2007. ‘Kosovo: Independence Plan Could Face Rough Ride in Security Council’, AKI, 29 March 2007. ‘Putin warns Bush against imposing Kosovo solution’, AFP, 28 March 2007. ‘Kosovo: Independence Plan Could Face Rough Ride in Security Council’, AKI, 29 March 2007. ‘EU splinter group emerges on Kosovo’, EU Observer, 1 April 2007. ‘US Won’t Accept Renegotiation of UN’s Kosovo Proposals’, Associated Press, 27 March 2007. ‘Starting real negotiations on Kosovo is only way out’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 28 March 2007. ‘Albert Rohan rules out further talks on Kosovo between Belgrade and Pristina’, Focus News Agency, 28 March 2007. ‘Kosovo readies for “inevitable” independence’, Reuters, 28 March 2008. ‘Serbs dig up their dead in Kosovo’, Reuters, 29 March 2007. ‘Communique: 5654th Meeting of the United Nations Security Council’, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5654, 3 April 2007. ‘Security Council president says delegation will visit Kosovo this month’, UN News Centre, 4 April 2007. ‘Address by Prime Minister of Serbia Vojislav Koštunica to the UN Security Council, New York, 3 April 2007’, Government of Serbia. ‘Ahtisaari’s plan for Kosovo finds little support at UN – Russia’, RIA Novosti, 4 April 2007. ‘U.S. and key European nations support Kosovo independence but Russia sympathizes with keeping the province part of Serbia’, Associated Press, 3 April 2007; ‘U.N. to Send Mission to Kosovo’, Associate Press, 5 April 2007; ‘Kosovo: UN Security Council Begins Final-Status Debate’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4 April 2007. ‘Analysis: U.N. council ponders Kosovo’, UPI, 4 April 2007. ‘Reactions to first UN SC Kosovo session’, B92, 5 April 2007. ‘Ruecker opposes arrival of separate UN mission to Kosovo’, Makfax, 5 April 2007. ‘‘Hardliners’ threaten Kosovo’s independence’, Daily

220

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33

34 35 36

37

38 39

40

KOSOVO Telegraph, 9 April 2007. The Kosovo Assembly voted in favour of the proposals by 100 votes to 1, with 19 abstentions. The 19 abstentions were from Serbian members, who did not attend the vote. The lone dissenter was a Bosniak lawmaker, who supported independence, but opposed the plan because the rights of non-Serb minorities were not fully respected. ‘Kosovo’s Bosniak lawmaker a lonely naysayer to U.N. plan’, Associated Press, 5 April 2007. ‘UN Security Council mission to leave for Kosovo next week – Lavrov’, Interfax, 16 April 2007. ‘Solution to Kosovo should be sought within framework of international law and preservation of Serbian borders’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 5 April 2007; ‘Substantial autonomy for Kosovo-Metohija within Serbia only possible compromise’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 7 April 2007. ‘“The diplomatic offensive is not too late,” Vuk Drašković’, B92, 11 April 2007. Following meetings with Drašković, the South African foreign ministry announced that Pretoria would take an ‘informed decision’ on whether to support Ahtisaari’s proposals. ‘SA mulls over Kosovo independence proposal’, BuaNews, 15 April 2007. ‘U.S. diplomat says support for independent Kosovo should not preclude good relations with Belgrade’, Associated Press, 17 April 2007. ‘Serbia warns U.S. against unilaterally recognizing Kosovo independence’, Associated Press, 17 April 2007. ‘The Outlook For The Independence Of Kosovo’, R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of Political Affairs , Statement Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, April 17, 2007. Press Release, US Department of State, 18 April 2007. ‘Serbia warns Europe over Kosovo independence’, Reuters, 18 April 2007; ‘Ahtisaari’s plan on Kosovo failed – Russian FM’, RIA-Novosti, 19 April 2007; ‘Russia warns against Kosovo split’, BBC News, 19 April 2007. ‘Russia and Kosovo clash over independence plan’, Reuters, 24 April 2007; ‘Russia Warns on Kosovo Independence’, Associated Press, 23 April 2007; ‘Russia threatens to veto UN Kosovo resolution – dept. FM’, RIA Novosti, 24 April 2007. ‘Serbs start diplomatic offensive to scuttle Kosovo independence’, AFP, 18 April 2007. ‘5672nd Meeting of the United Nations Security Council’, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5672, 2 May 2007; ‘NATO urges U.N. Security Council to quickly resolve Kosovo status’, Associated Press, 25 April 2007. ‘Monitored autonomy for Kosovo-Metohija only possible solution’,

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Press Release, Government of Serbia, 28 April 2007. 41 ‘UN ambassadors meet Koštunica’, B92, 26 April 2007. It is worth noting that just days prior to this the British Ambassador, Stephen Wordsworth, had been in these areas and had insisted that they were a part of Serbia. ‘British Ambassador: South is part of Serbia’, B92, 25 April 2007. 42 ‘Serbs say South Africa sympathetic on Kosovo case’, Reuters, 26 April 2007. 43 ‘U.N. Security Council Visits Kosovo’, Associated Press, 27 April 2007; ‘Kosovo poised for independence, UN envoys told’, AFP, 27 April 2007. 44 ‘Kosovo Albanians Satisfied with UN Delegation Visit’, Balkan Insight, 27 April 2007. ‘Kosovo leader expects independence by end of May’, International Herald Tribune, 29 April 2007. 45 ‘Feature – Kosovo offers UN envoys macabre misery tour’, Reuters, 26 April 2007. However, and controversially, the mission did not visit the administrative boundary between Kosovo and Serbia, where, several thousand Serb refugees had gathered. ‘Kosovo’s Serbs stage UN protest’, BBC News, 26 April 2007. 46 ‘Hasty decision on Kosovo’s sovereignization-counterproductive – Lavrov’, ITAR–TASS, 29 April 2007. ‘Verbeke: No deadlines for decision’, B92, 29 April 2007. 47 ‘UN Security Council ends visit to Kosovo with ‘differences narrowed’, says head of delegation’, Associated Press, 28 April 2007. 48 ‘Fried: Resolution by end of spring’, B92, 28 April 2007. However, suggestions made by Richard Holbrooke at the same event that the US might recognise a unilateral declaration of independence if a decision could not be reached in the Security Council were quickly condemned by Carl Bildt, the Swedish Foreign Minister, who argued that such a move would be tantamount to ‘playing with fire’, both in terms of the Balkans and with the transatlantic relationship ‘U.S. says Kosovo to be independent with or without U.N.’, Reuters, 28 April 2007. ‘Bildt Rejects Kosovo Suggestion’, Sveriges Radio International, 30 April 2007. 49 ‘Conciliatory talk but no East–West shift on Kosovo’, Reuters, 27 April 2007. 50 ‘5672nd Meeting of the United Nations Security Council’, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5672, 2 May 2007. 51 ‘Serbian FM fears U.S., EU will seek new Kosovo status voting late May’, RIA Novosti, 2 May 2007. ‘US and EU warn Russia not to veto independence proposal for Kosovo’, Financial Times, 7 May 2007.

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52 ‘Diplomats head to London talks on Kosovo’, AFP, 3 May 2007. 53 ‘Opening Statement at Press Roundtable in Berlin: R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs’, American Embassy, Berlin, Germany, May 9, 2007. Notably, there was still no European unity on the issue. A few days later the question of Kosovo had to be removed from the agenda of another meeting of EU foreign ministers as there was still no common line. ‘Divided EU Stalls Debate on Kosovo’, Balkan Insight, 9 May 2007. 54 ‘West, Russia present rival U.N. plans on Kosovo’, Reuters, 8 May 2007. ‘Security Council mulling text on Kosovo’s future’, AFP, 8 May 2007. 55 ‘Opening Statement at Press Roundtable in Berlin: R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs’, American Embassy, Berlin, Germany, May 9, 2007. 56 ‘U.S. wants U.N. vote on Kosovo resolution in May’, Reuters, 9 May 2007. 57 ‘5673rd Meeting of the United Nations Security Council’, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5673, 10 May 2007. ‘Report of the Security Council mission on the Kosovo issue’, S/2007/256, 4 May 2007. 58 ‘UN Security Council Gets Kosovo Independence Draft’, Voice of America, 11 May 2007. ‘UN draft proposal for Kosovo state’, Reuters, 12 May 2007. 59 ‘Western powers submit Kosovo independence draft at UN’, AFP, 11 May 2007. ‘Russia objects to elements of UN Kosovo document’, Associated Press, 13 May 2007. ‘Russia may veto U.N. Kosovo resolution: Churkin’, Reuters, 12 May 2007. 60 ‘Rice: Not an easy time for U.S.–Russia ties, but not new Cold War’, Associated Press, 14 May 2007. 61 ‘Russia, U.S. agree to tone down rhetoric – Lavrov’, Interfax, 15 May 2007; ‘EU barters with Serbia as Kosovo tensions mount’, EU Observer, 17 May 2007. 62 ‘Interview With Sergey Buntman of Ekho Movsky: Secretary Condoleezza Rice’ Moscow, Russia, May 15, 2007’, US Department of State. 63 ‘Washington will not act unilaterally on Kosovo independence’, Makfax, 16 May 2007. 64 ‘Rice, Putin talks end, EU–Russian summit announced’, DPA, 15 May 2007. 65 As an indication of just how fractious the process had been, Tomislav Nikolić, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), was elected parliamentary speaker with the support for Koštunica’s DSS in an

NOTES

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67

68 69 70 71 72 73

74 75

76

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attempt to put pressure on Tadić and DS. Despite the fact that Nikolić stepped down five days later, following a deal between DS and DSS, the behaviour of Koštunica and the DSS during this period did considerable damage to their domestic and international standing. Whatever remaining claim they had to be part of the reformist, proEuropean bloc in Serbia was effectively lost. ‘Serbia’s parliament elects hardline speaker’, Reuters, 8 May 2007. ‘New Serbian government voted, eyes EU talks’, Reuters, 15 May 2007; ‘Serb PM-elect warns Kosovo against unilateral independence’, AFP, 16 May 2007. ‘Kosovo may be independent by end of month: US’, AFP, 11 May 2007. ‘EU Officials Urge South European Leaders to Boost Reforms’, Voice of America, 11 May 2007. ‘EU welcomes new Serb leaders, with terms’, Associated Press, 16 May 2007. ‘EU–Russian talks end in acrimony’, BBC News, 18 May 2007; ‘Lavrov: No hurry in Kosovo case’, B92, 20 May 2007. ‘Putin stays tough on EU–Russian relations’, DPA, 23 May 2007. ‘Positions on Kosovo at UN Security Council still widely differing’, ITAR–TASS, 24 May 2007. ‘Possible Changes To Kosovo Resolution’, HINA, 23 May 2007. ‘Indonesia faces dilemma over Kosovo’, B92, 23 May 2007. ‘Slovak FM fears independent Kosovo could trigger ethnic Hungarians to demand autonomy’, Associated Press, 24 May 2007. ‘Europe seeks to pressure China at EU–Asia meeting’, AFP, 28 May 2007. ‘Russia calls for more talks on Kosovo’, Washington Post, 29 May 2007. A sensational report in the Croatian press suggested that Russia would be willing to accept independence on three conditions: 1) it would be allowed to station a small contingent of peacekeeping troops in Northern Kosovo; 2) a two-year moratorium would be placed on Kosovo being allowed to join the United Nations; and 3) NATO would not invite Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance. ‘Russia and West may be ready for Kosovo compromise’, Reuters, 28 May 2007. Despite grabbing international attention, the story was quickly denied by Churkin, who insisted that nothing had changed and Moscow’s call for more talks was gaining ground. ‘Russia denies report of deal with West on Kosovo’, Reuters, 29 May 2007. ‘Russia worried over UN plans for Kosovo independence’, International Herald Tribune, 30 May 2007; ‘Russia, U.S. spar on Kosovo, missile

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shield’, Reuters, 30 May 2007. 77 ‘Russia rejects new Kosovo draft’, BBC News, 1 June 2007. ‘Kosovo resolution in UN today?’, B92, 31 May 2007. ‘Russia rejects Western concessions on Kosovo’, Euronews, 1 June 2007. For instance, instead of ‘endorsing’ the Ahtisaari Plan, the Council would be ‘supporting’ it. Rather than ‘underscores the importance’ of respecting minority rights, the new text ‘demanded’ that minority rights be respected. Likewise, the explanation that Kosovo represented a ‘unique case’ was replaced by the term ‘sui generis’. Indeed, the only major change in the document was a proposal to appoint a special envoy for minority rights. 78 ‘Bush: Ahtisaari plan leads to peace’, B92, 2 June 2007; ‘Bush meets Kosovo leader on independence bid’, Reuters, 5 June 2007. 79 ‘Interview with Newspaper Journalists from G8 Member Countries’, Transcript released by the Government of the Russian Federation, 4 June 2007. 80 ‘Press Briefing by National Security Adviser Steve Hadley’, 6 June 2007. 81 ‘“No decision on Kosovo from G8”’, B92, 4 June 2007; ‘Putin warning over US missile row’, BBC News, 4 June 2007; ‘Bush criticises Russia on reform’, BBC News, 5 June 2007. 82 ‘G8 agrees to delay in UN Kosovo vote’, AAP, 7 June 2007; ‘G8 agrees $60 billion package, focus on Africa’, Reuters, 8 June 2007; ‘Russia blocks G8 moves on Kosovo independence’, Reuters, 8 June 2007; ‘G8 fails to reconcile Russia and West on Kosovo’, AFP, 8 June 2007; ‘Putin dashes hopes for Kosovo breakthrough’, Financial Times, 8 June 2007. 83 ‘Kosovo leaders under pressure to strike out alone’, Reuters, 9 June 2007. 84 ‘Putin dashes hopes for Kosovo breakthrough’, Financial Times, 8 June 2007. 85 ‘Russia will not change stance on Kosovo’, Reuters, 10 June 2007. 86 ‘President Bush Participates in Joint Press Availability with Prime Minister of Albania, Dr. Sali Berisha, Courtyard Council of Ministers, Tirana, Albania’, Office of the Press Secretary, June 10, 2007. 87 ‘Kosovo Leadership Hails Bush’s Support for Independence’, Balkan Insight, 10 June 2007. 88 ‘Serbian government: Kosovo’s future is in hands of UN not US’, Associated Press, 10 June 2007; ‘Serbs “disgusted” by Bush Kosovo pledge: premier’, Reuters, 11 June 2007; ‘Koštunica: Act of injustice and violence’, B92, 11 June 2007. 89 ‘U.S. open to new talks on independence for Kosovo’, Associated Press,

NOTES

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94 95

96 97

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15 June 2007; ‘EU Ponders Kosovo Mission Without UN Mandate’, Balkan Insight, 19 June 2007; ‘Contact Group, minus Russia, favors UN resolution on Kosovo’, B92, 13 June 2007. ‘Quintet talks on Kosovo unacceptable for Russia – FM’, ITAR–TASS, 13 June 2007. ‘NATO prepared to deal with possible civil disturbances in Kosovo’, Associated Press, 15 June 2007. ‘U.S. says more Kosovo talks possible’, Reuters, 15 June 2007. ‘Serbia rejects controlled negotiations, use of force in resolving Kosovo-Metohija status issue’, Government of Serbia, 18 June 2007; ‘Kosovo Leaders Reject More Negotiations’, Balkan Insight, 18 June 2007. ‘EU wants ‘timely’ UN resolution on Kosovo’s status’, AFP, 18 June 2007. ‘EU ministers favor quick Kosovo solution’, B92, 19 June 2007. ‘French foreign minister to push ahead plan on 6-month delay on Kosovo status talks’, Associated Press, 18 June 2007; ‘Serbian FM urges new talks on Kosovo, says ready to make deal’, Associated Press, 19 June 2007. ‘Ahtisaari expects Kosovo independence by year-end’, Reuters, 19 June 2007. ‘Russia rejects new Western plan for Kosovo’, Reuters, 20 June 2007. At the same time, it made a number of other changes. For instance, with regard to the International Civilian Representative, the resolution called for the appointee, before ending his mandate, ‘to consider carefully Kosovo’s achievement of internationally-endorsed standards, progress on creating the conditions in which displaced persons can return, resolution of the fate of missing persons, promotion of a spirit of interethnic reconciliation, protection of the rights, security and culture of ethnic minorities and other criteria.’ Moreover, rather than ‘underscoring’ the need to meet the provisions of the Ahtisaari plan on minorities, the new text ‘demanded’ that these provisions be met. At the same time, the paragraph that had previously called Kosovo a ‘special case’ and listed the various reasons why this was so, had now been shortened to refer to, ‘the specific circumstances that make Kosovo a case that is sui generis resulting from the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.’ ‘Revised U.N. resolution would delay independence for Kosovo for 120 days to allow time for talks’, Associated Press, 20 June 2007. ‘US, Europeans Revise Kosovo Independence Plan, Russia Renews Veto Threat’, Voice of America, 20 June 2007.

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99 ‘Revised U.N. resolution would delay independence for Kosovo for 120 days to allow time for talks’, Associated Press, 20 June 2007; ‘Russia opposes artificial deadlines for Kosovo settlement’, RIA Novosti, 21 June 2007. 100 ‘Serbia Praises Russia’s Rejection of New Draft Resolution’, Balkan Insight, 21 June 2007; ‘Koštunica Urges Withdrawal of Latest UN Draft Resolution on Kosovo’ VOA News, 21 June 2007; ‘EU Warns Kosovo Leadership Against Unilateral Action’, Balkan Insight, 21 June 2007. 101 ‘EU unity in question over US–Russian row over Kosovo, officials say’, Associated Press, 21 June 2007; ‘EU Wants More Talks on Kosovo’, Balkan Insight, 22 June 2007. 102 ‘Ban urges action on Kosovo’s political future’, DPA, 22 June 2007; ‘Russia Digs In Heels Against West's Kosovo Plan’, Reuters, 22 June 2007. 103 ‘Putin to push for more Kosovo talks’, B92, 29 June 2007. 104 ‘“Chances of new approach to Kosovo”’, B92, 1 July 2007. 105 ‘Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, Colony Hotel, Kennebunkport, Maine’, Office of the Press Secretary, July 2, 2007. 106 ‘Kosovo independence will probably face delay’, Associated Press, 8 July 2007. 107 ‘West presses for U.N. Kosovo decision in next week’, Reuters, 9 July 2007. ‘UN Chief Regrets Delays in Resolving Kosovo’, Balkan Insight, 10 July 2007. 108 ‘U.S. offers Serbs “orderly” path to Kosovo secession’, Reuters, 10 July 2007. 109 ‘New U.N. draft glosses over Kosovo independence’, Reuters, 11 July 2007. ‘New Kosovo U.N. draft may keep independence route’, Reuters, 10 July 2007. 110 ‘New U.N. draft glosses over Kosovo independence’, Reuters, 11 July 2007. 111 ‘Russia dismisses new Kosovo resolution’, Reuters, 12 July 2007. 112 ‘EU seeks aid from Sarkozy on Kosovo’, Associated Press, 12 July 2007. ‘France Sees Ahtisaari Plan As Basis For Kosovo’, Balkan Insight, 12 July 2007. 113 ‘Russia rejects West’s U.N. plan on Kosovo’s future’, Reuters, 17 July 2007. ‘EU–U.S. debate whether to call vote on Kosovo at U.N.’, Reuters, 18 July 2007. 114 ‘U.S. and Britain say Kosovo question won’t go to the UN Security Council’, Associated Press, 20 July 2007. ‘Supporters of Kosovo resolution avoid U.N. vote, to take matter outside Security Council’,

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Associated Press, 20 July 2007.

Chapter 5 1 2

‘Out with the UN, in with the EU’, The Economist, 26 July 2007. ‘Supporters of Kosovo resolution avoid U.N. vote, to take matter outside Security Council’, Associated Press, 20 July 2007. ‘Serbia hails Russia for blocking UN Kosovo resolution’, Associated Press, 21 July 2007. 3 ‘Seventh Extraordinary Sitting of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia in 2007’, 24 July 2007. 4 ‘Kosovo tells U.S. it will not declare independence’, Reuters, 23 July 2007. ‘Kosovars Promise Not to Declare Independence Unilaterally’, Balkan Insight, 24 July 2007. 5 ‘EU considers key role to break Kosovo deadlock’, Reuters, 23 July 2007. 6 ‘UN Secretary-General welcomes agreement on new Kosovo initiative’, UN Press Release, SG/SM/11111, 1 August 2007. 7 Ischinger had considerable experience of the Balkans, having dealt with both Bosnia and Kosovo in earlier appointments at the German foreign ministry. While Belgrade refused to comment on the appointment, Pristina welcomed the news, arguing that he had good relations with the US as a result of his time as German ambassador in Washington from 2002 until 2006 and favoured independence. ‘Ischinger appointment met with positive reactions’, B92, 30 July 2007; ‘Ischinger Appointment to Kosovo Talks Welcomed’, Balkan Insight, 30 July 2007. 8 ‘Serbia ready to compromise and make speedy agreement with Kosovo ethnic Albanians’, Press Statement, Government of Serbia, 6 August 2007. 9 ‘Kosovo warns of mounting tension as new talks open’, Reuters, 8 August 2007; ‘Kosovo’s Çeku warns of possible pullout from status talks’, Southeast European Times, 9 August 2007. 10 ‘Set clear roadmap for Kosovo, U.N. urges’, Reuters, 25 July 2007; ‘“Serbia, U.S. share common strategic interests”’, B92, 28 July 2007. ‘Rice tells Serbs to cooperate on Kosovo’, Reuters, 28 July 2007. 11 ‘United States supports period of intensive engagement on Kosovo’, Tom Casey, Deputy Spokesman, US Department of State, 1 August 2007. ‘“Talks will not be based on Ahtisaari plan”’, B92, 8 August 2007. 12 ‘US, EU and Russian Envoys Meet Serbian Officials on Kosovo’, VOA News, 10 August 2007. ‘Kosovo independence plan still alive: EU envoy’, Reuters, 9 August 2007.

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13 ‘US, EU and Russian Envoys Meet Serbian Officials on Kosovo’, VOA News, 10 August 2007; ‘U.S., EU, Russia envoys in Kosovo talks meet Serbian officials’, Associated Press, 10 August 2007; ‘US, EU, Russian envoys driven by urgency in Kosovo talks’, Associated Press, 11 August 2007; ‘Kosovo tells envoys expects independence in 2007’, Reuters, 11 August 2007. 14 While Serbian officials insisted that Serbia would never give up territory, it was nevertheless noticeable that the idea was not ruled out altogether. Indeed, many saw it as the most logical and viable option. ‘Serbs Mull Over Partitioning Kosovo’, Balkan Insight, 16 August 2007. 15 ‘Belgrade announces Kosovo team’, B92, 27 August 2007. ‘Serbia to present proposal regarding Kosovo status as first article on the agenda’, Press Statement, Government of Serbia, 28 August 2007. ‘Kosovo asks Serbs to accept separate, cordial future’, Reuters, 30 August 2007. ‘No Progress at Last-Ditch Kosovo Talks’, Associated Press, 30 August 2007. 16 ‘Serbs deny hint at Kosovo split as U.S. leaves it open’, Reuters, 11 September 2007; ‘Kosovo Election Boycott Means Partition’, Reuters, 13 September 2007. 17 ‘EU Says “No” to Partitioning Kosovo’, Balkan Insight, 5 September 2007. 18 ‘UK and France say Kosovo a test of EU foreign policy’, Reuters, 6 September 2007. 19 ‘No Progress at Last-Ditch Kosovo Talks’, Associated Press, 30 August 2007. 20 ‘“Ahtisaari plan would make Kosovo NATO-state”’, B92, 9 August 2007. ‘Serbia accuses US of wanting to create ‘satellite state’ out of Kosovo’, Associated Press, 15 August 2007. ‘U.S. commander denies “NATO state” Kosovo plan’, Reuters, 16 August 2007. ‘US Denies Serbian Allegations of Turning Kosovo into NATO-Puppet State’, VOA News, 16 August 2007. 21 ‘EU under pressure to devise Kosovo ‘plan B’’, AFP, 8 September 2007; ‘Serbia warns US against recognizing Kosovo’s independence’, Associated Press, 8 September 2007; ‘Serbia warns EU as Russia aims at U.S. over Kosovo’, Reuters, 12 September 2007; ‘Belgrade calls on Kosovo’s Serbs to boycott elections’, AFP, 12 September 2007; ‘U.S. embassy: Volker misinterpreted’, B92, 10 September 2007. 22 ‘Independence for Kosovo is off the agenda, envoy reveals’, The Independent, 18 September 2007. 23 ‘Çeku to ask Ischinger to “clarify remarks”’, B92, 18 September 2007; ‘Priština paper: Ischinger was misinterpreted’, B92, 19 September 2007.

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24 ‘Kosovo’s status could be solved according to the Hong Kong model’, Makfax, 21 September 2007. ‘Kosovo will be independent, the province’s prime minister says’, Associated Press, 18 September 2007. 25 ‘Troika meets with Belgrade and Pristina Delegations’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 19 September 2007. 26 ‘Tadić: No “EU for Kosovo” trade’, B92, 19 September 2007. 27 ‘Interview With the Reuters Editorial Board, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Waldorf-Astoria, New York, New York, September 24, 2007’, US State Department. 28 ‘Russia calls for assistance to Kosovo status definition’, ITAR–TASS, 25 September 2007. 29 ‘Putin: Kosovo status quo better than unacceptable solution’, B92, 17 September 2007. 30 ‘Britain: Kosovo meeting “extremely constructive”’, DPA, 28 September 2007. 31 ‘Statement on Kosovo by Contact Group Ministers’, 28 September 2007. 32 ‘No Breakthrough as Serbs, Kosovar Albanians Hold Talks’, RFE/RL, 29 September 2007; ‘No breakthrough in Kosovo meeting, more talks in October’, AFP, 29 September 2007; ‘Serbia and Kosovo hold ground as direct talks start’, Reuters, 28 September 2007; ‘Kosovo agreement impossible, says Thaçi’, B92, 30 September 2007. 33 ‘Fears of violence in tug-of-war over Kosovo’, Reuters, 4 October 2007. See also, ‘Albanian Armed Group Re-emerges From Shadows’, Balkan Insight, 15 October 2007; ‘Serbia Has No Plans to Invade Kosovo, Official Says’, Balkan Insight, 4 October 2007. 34 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Security Council Document, S/2007/582, 28 September 2007. 35 ‘U.N.’s Ban urges no delay in settling Kosovo status’, Reuters, 3 October 2003. By now it was clear that the possibility of violence was being taken seriously. According to reports in the Croatian media, US officials had already enquired whether Zagreb would be able to take in refugees in the event of further fighting. ‘U.S. asks Croatia to take any Kosovo refugees: paper’, Reuters, 4 October 2007. The fact that a NATO exercise, centred on a scenario of fighting in a breakaway Balkan province, was held in Croatia days later only added to the speculation. ‘Croatia hosts major Nato exercise’, BBC News, 10 October 2007. 36 ‘U.S. and Russia clash at U.N. over Kosovo’, Reuters, 9 October 2007.

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37 ‘US diplomat says December deadline for negotiating Kosovo settlement must be met’, Associated Press, 9 October 2007. ‘Kosovo PM: Independence Soon’, Associated Press, 9 October 2007. Given that the comments were made in the Foreign Office, Belgrade read this as proof that Britain directly endorsed the threat to declare independence. However, reports suggested that British diplomats had in fact told the Kosovo Albanian leaders to ‘cool off’ while London, Paris and Washington attempted to win round the other EU members that were still concerned about recognising independence without UN authorisation, particularly Italy and Germany. ‘UK looks to avoid unilateral Kosovo moves’, B92, 10 October 2007. 38 ‘Talks fail to break Kosovo deadlock’, Reuters, 14 October 2007; ‘Serbia wants more time for Kosovo talks’, Reuters, 15 October 2007; ‘EU envoy urges Serbia, Kosovo to accelerate status talks’, AFP, 14 October 2007. 39 ‘United States blocks Kosovo deal, says Serbian PM’, Reuters, 16 October 2007; ‘“Kosovo negotiations won’t end on Dec. 10”’, B92, 14 October 2007. 40 ‘Serbia warns of “frozen conflict” if Kosovo splits’, Reuters, 18 October 2007. ‘Albania PM Warns Kosovo against Unilateral Moves’, Balkan Insight, 22 October 2007. 41 The 14-points can be found in Appendix G of this volume. 42 ‘Botsan-Kharchenko: 14-Item List Is Not Solution Proposal’, Focus News Agency, 23 October 2007. 43 ‘Kosovo Albanians Slam Vienna Talks’, Balkan Insight, 23 October 2007; ‘Talks on Kosovo’s Future Sour Amid Spat’, Associated Press, 22 October 2007; ‘Serbia: New talks on Kosovo set for November’, AFP, 22 October 2007; ‘Kosovo independence ‘established’, Kosovo Premier says’, DPA, 22 October 2007; ‘New Round of Kosovo Talks Concluded’, Balkan Insight, 22 October 2007. 44 ‘Talks on Kosovo’s Future Sour Amid Spat’, Associated Press, 22 October 2007; ‘Kosovo – Example for secessionists’, B92, 22 October 2007. 45 ‘Reports: EU has Plan B for Kosovo’, B92, 27 September 2007; ‘EU countries poised to recognise Kosovo – German politician’, AFP, 25 October 2007. 46 This was later explicitly elucidated in the document placing an EU mission in Kosovo, which stated that, ‘Acting to implement the final status outcome in such a situation is more compatible with the intentions of 1244 than continuing to work to block any outcome in a

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48 49

50 51

52

53 54

55 56

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situation where everyone agrees that the status quo is unsustainable.’ ‘Legal furore over Kosovo recognition’, BBC News, 6 February 2008. ‘EU commissioner hits out at Russian ‘unilateralism’ over Kosovo’, AFP, 4 October 2007. ‘EU readies Kosovo mission as talks drift on’, Reuters, 8 October 2007. ‘Moscow warns Kosovo may serve as precedent for Abkhazia’, AFP, 24 October 2007. ‘Troika mandate ends, new phase starts after Dec. 10’, B92, 2 November 2007. ‘Kosovo problem solution requires patience – Putin’, Interfax, 25 October 2007. ‘U.S. pushes to get Russia on its side’, International Herald Tribune, 29 October 2007. ‘US Ponders Freezing Kosovo’s Status until 2020’, Balkan Insight, 29 October 2007; ‘Kosovo PM: Independence not for Sale’, Balkan Insight, 30 October 2007; ‘Kosovo Albanians Reject Delay on Status’, Balkan Insight, 29 October 2007. ‘Serbia Rejects German Model for Kosovo’, Balkan Insight, 30 October 2007. Significantly, the idea was also rejected by Russia. While the reasons for this are not entirely clear, especially as Botsan-Kharchenko had appeared to endorse them, Iscinhger suspected that it was related to the growing tensions between Moscow and Washington and Russia’s concern about sending the wrong message at a time when the US was pressing Russia on other issues. Wolfgang Ischinger, comments to the author, December 2008. Indeed, Ischinger notes that the failure of the 14-points was his one big disappointment during the talks. Nevertheless, despite the rejection of the proposals during the Troika talks, Ischinger believes that they still represent the best hope for building dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo on practical issues and that they will therefore re-emerge at some point in future. ‘Talks on Kosovo’s future to continue in Austrian capital’, Associated Press, 5 November 2007. ‘‘Serbia rejects framework for “independent” Kosovo’, Reuters, 5 November 2007; Serb officials suggest studying Hong Kong model to settle Kosovo’s status’, Associated Press, 5 November 2007. ‘Kosovo mediators will not solve status – EU envoy’, Reuters, 14 November 2007. ‘Rival camps reject ‘neutral status’ for Kosovo’, AFP, 15 November 2007; ‘“Neutrality, another term for independence”’, B92, 18 November 2007. ‘U.S.–Greece Relations and Regional Issues’, Committee on Foreign

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62 63 64 65

66 67

68 69

70

KOSOVO Affairs, US House of Representatives, Serial Number 110–139, 14 November 2007, pp.23–24. ‘EU Countries Prepare to Recognise Kosovo Independence’, Balkan Insight, 7 November 2007. ‘Thaçi: West will recognize Kosovo independence’, B92, 12 November 2007. ‘Kosovo election favorite promises independence’, Reuters, 17 November 2007; ‘Ex-guerrilla wins Kosovo election before showdown’, Reuters, 18 December 2007. ‘EU urges Kosovo leader not to rush to independence’, Associated Press, 19 November 2007. ‘Serbia, Kosovo fail to make breakthrough in status talks’, AFP, 20 November 2007. ‘EU ministers warn Kosovo over independence’, AFP, 19 November 2007. ‘Troika to begin final push on Kosovo’, Financial Times, 25 November 2007. ‘EU ministers warn Kosovo over independence’, AFP, 19 November 2007. ‘Comparative Autonomy Model Analysis’, Government of Serbia, 20 November 2007. It was pointed out that the Åland Islands, a group of islands with 27,000 inhabitants, were a Swedish-speaking autonomous province of Finland that had not only been demilitarised, and its inhabitants exempt from conscription in Finland, but also been granted the right to its own flag, raise taxes and customs, issue its own postage stamps, administer its own police force, and retain full language and cultural rights. ‘Kosovo’s likely premier expects no compromise with Serbia’, DPA, 19 November 2007. ‘Kosovo Albanians reject Serbs’ latest autonomy offer in status talks’, Associated Press, 19 November 2007; ‘Kosovo leader sees early independence move’, Reuters, 20 November 2007; ‘Details emerge of Belgrade’s proposal’, B92, 21 November 2007; ‘Serbia, Kosovo fail to make breakthrough in status talks’, AFP, 20 November 2007. ‘EU’s Kosovo envoy pessimistic on deal with Serbs’, Reuters, 21 November 2007. ‘Russia backs traditional ally Serbia over Kosovo’, Associated Press, 22 November 2007; ‘Russia’s Lavrov blames West for fuelling dispute over Kosovo’, RIA Novosti, 26 November 2007. ‘Serbs, Albanians totally opposed on Kosovo’, Reuters, 26 November 2007.

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71 ‘Defense source: Ministry has contingency plans for Kosovo’, B92, 24 November 2007. 72 ‘Kosovo talks set to limp to a close in sleepy spa town’, Reuters, 23 November 2007; ‘Compromise unlikely as Kosovo talks open in Austria’, RIA Novosti, 26 November 2007. 73 ‘Stalemate in Kosovo talks after Serbia proposal rejected’, AFP, 27 November 2007; ‘Kosovo fate is for U.N. to decide, says Serbia’, Reuters, 27 November 2007; ‘Albanians reject latest Belgrade offer’, B92, 27 November 2007. 74 ‘Kosovo Troika Press Communique: The Baden Conference’, Baden, Austria, 28 November 2007. 75 ‘Kosovo Status Talks Fail, Advancing Chances of Split’, Bloomberg, 28 November 2007. In response to the news that the leaders had spoken to one another in Serbian, one Kosovo Albanian journalist memorably, and wryly, remarked that, ‘We’d speak Japanese if we thought it would make them understand.’ ‘Witness – Sound bite war sabotages “secluded” Kosovo talks’, Reuters, 27 November 2007. 76 ‘Envoys say no deal in last hour of Kosovo talks’, Reuters, 28 November 2007; ‘Fears grow as Kosovo talks fail’, The Guardian, 29 November 2007; ‘Independence for Kosovo closer as talks fail’, DPA, 28 November 2007. 77 ‘Russia Lashes Out at the US for Stepping Back’, Kommersant, 28 November 2007; ‘New tensions as Kosovo talks fail’, AFP, 28 November 2007. 78 ‘Russia’s Lavrov spotlights one-sided group interests in OSCE’, ITAR– TASS, 29 November 2007. 79 ‘State Dept.: “Certain decisions” must be taken’, B92, 29 November 2007. 80 ‘Samardžić hopes for “realistic” Troika report’, B92, 2 December 2007. 81 ‘Envoys bemoan failed Kosovo talks’, AFP, 3 December 2007. 82 ‘Italy’s premier urges Kosovo Albanians not to declare independence unilaterally’, Associated Press, 3 December 2007; ‘Kosovo envoys make last visit, EU urges decision’, Reuters, 3 December 2007; ‘Kosovo independence non-negotiable: PM’, AFP, 4 December 2007. 83 ‘PM’s adviser: Legal means include war’, B92, 5 December 2007. ‘Jeremić calls for negotiated solution’, B92, 5 December 2007. ‘Kosovo mediator seeks retraction of Serb comment’, Reuters, 6 December 2007. The comments caused absolute fury in certain quarters of the Serbian Government. As one official stated, ‘We are working hard to avert any thought of a conflict, we repeat all the time that Serbia will use only

234

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86

87

88

89

KOSOVO political and diplomatic means, and then he comes up with such a stupidity…I cannot say if he [Simić] is insane or not, but with such statements that man is a major liability for us.’ ‘Serbian Parties Slam PM's Adviser’, Balkan Insight, 6 December 2007; ‘NATO force in Kosovo prepared for unrest: commander’, AFP, 4 December 2007. ‘Report of the European Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo’, UN Security Council Document, S/2007/723, 10 December 2007. ‘Mediators display U.S.–Russia division on Kosovo’, Reuters, 3 December 2007. Differences had already arisen over what would happen once the report had been submitted. While Wisner insisted that it would be up to individual governments to decide on the next steps, Botsan-Kharchenko argued that the process must end in the Security Council, where it had started. As for Ischinger, although he left the door open for further talks between the two sides, albeit under a different format, he believed that a co-ordinated declaration of independence was the likely outcome given that the status quo was unsustainable. ‘EU envoy warns against further delays to Kosovo status decision’, Associated Press, 6 December 2007; ‘Clock ticks for likely Kosovo independence bid’, Reuters, 9 December 2007; ‘Russia: Kosovo decisions outside UN illegal’, B92, 11 December 2007. ‘US backs talks towards Kosovo’s independence’, AFP, 10 December 2007; ‘EU still “weeks” away from finding unity over Kosovo’, DPA, 10 December 2007. ‘Russia says Kosovo could trigger “chain reaction”’, Reuters, 10 December 2007; ‘Russian foreign minister accuses West of encouraging Kosovo independence’, Associated Press, 9 December 2007; ‘Kosovo tensions mount as Russia warns of new instability’, AFP, 8 December 2007; ‘NATO and Russia Clash Over Kosovo Status’, Associated Press, 8 December 2007; ‘Remarks at NATO Headquarters’, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Brussels, Belgium, December 7, 2007. ‘EU–US showdown with Russia over Kosovo’, Daily Telegraph, 11 December 2007; ‘EU still divided as crisis looms over Kosovo independence’, The Guardian, 11 December 2007; ‘EU expects Kosovo decision to be delayed until spring’, EU Observer, 13 December 2007. This was seemingly confirmed by Thaçi in an interview with a German newspaper at this time. ‘Kosovo will coordinate independence with US, EU’, AFP, 14 December 2007.

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90 ‘Serbs to take West to International Court on Kosovo’, Reuters, 10 December 2007. 91 ‘Kosovo vows to declare independence from Serbia early next year’, Associated Press, 10 December 2007; ‘UN accuses Serbia of “provocation” in north Kosovo’, Reuters, 12 December 2007; ‘Separation cannot wait, says Kosovo despite dire warnings from Russia’, The Times, 11 December 2007. 92 ‘Serbia pins blame of any Balkan flare-up on US’, AFP, 1 December 2007; ‘Serbia to call for continuation of negotiations on Kosovo at UN SC session’, Press Release, Government of Serbia, 7 December 2007. 93 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, European Council, 16616/07, 14 December 2007; ‘Kosovo talks over and time to decide status: EU powers’, Reuters, 7 December 2007; ‘EU Vows to Prevent Balkan Chaos After Kosovo Deadline’, Bloomberg, 10 December 2007. ‘Kosovo moves toward independence as EU nears unity’, Reuters, 10 December 2007. ‘EU summit gambles on huge Kosovo mission’, The Guardian, 15 December 2007; ‘Mission agreed to stabilise independent Kosovo’, Financial Times, 15 December 2007; ‘E.U. Pledges Assistance to Kosovo on Path Toward Independence’, Washington Post, 15 December 2007; ‘Tensions rise as EU agrees Kosovo mission’, The Independent, 15 December 2007. 94 ‘EU holds off on fast-track to EU membership for Serbia’, Associated Press, 14 December 2007; ‘Jeremić: Still no EU unity over Kosovo’, B92, 16 December 2007. 95 ‘Statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kosovo Settlement’, 2033-17-12-2007, 17 December 2007; ‘Russia says EU mission to Kosovo illegal without UN authorization’, Associated Press, 17 December 2007. 96 ‘Russia proposes new UN Kosovo talks, fears crisis’, Reuters, 17 December 2007. 97 ‘West opposes Russian push for more Kosovo talks’, Reuters, 12 December 2007. Speaking afterwards, Churkin insisted that the Russian points had some support, despite the fact that some members of the Council had ‘declared them dead’. ‘Russia urges Security Council to support new talks on Kosovo but US and Europe say no’, Associated Press, 13 December 2007. 98 ‘Serbia, Kosovo ‘never going to be one again’: Rice’, AFP, 13 December 2007. 99 ‘Dutch FM says EU security mission in Kosovo needs no new UN mandate’, Associated Press, 18 December 2007.

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100 ‘Official communiqué of the 5811th (closed) meeting of the Security Council’, UN Security Council Document, S/PV/5811, 19 December 2007. 101 The question of whether Sejdiu should be allowed to speak at the session sparked a serious debate amongst the members. While Britain, France and the United States all favoured this, arguing that the Kosovo Albanians had been a party to the negotiations, the move was strongly opposed by Russia and China, with Churkin noting that this very issue had been solved back in April. In the end, facing defeat on the issue, Russia capitulated in return for a closed meeting. ‘UNSC at odds over December 19 session’, B92, 13 December 2007. 102 ‘Security Council fails to break Kosovo stalemate’, AFP, 20 December 2007; ‘Kosovo deadlock talks fail’, Associated Press, 19 December 2007; ‘UN Security Council Kosovo Talks End in Stalemate’, VOA News, 19 December 2007. 103 ‘Kosovo deadlock talks fail’, Associated Press, 19 December 2007; ‘UN Council divided as Kosovo debate kicks off’, Reuters, 19 December 2007. ‘UN Security Council Takes Up Kosovo’, Associated Press, 19 December 2007. 104 ‘Security Council fails to break Kosovo stalemate’, AFP, 20 December 2007; ‘Russia warns UN it will veto independence for Kosovo’, Scotsman, 20 December 2007; ‘Kosovo deadlock talks fail’, Associated Press, 19 December 2007. ‘UN Split on Kosovo as Precedent, Russia Speaks of Shockwaves and China of Disaster’, Inner City Press, 19 December 2007. 105 ‘UN rift at west’s plan for Kosovan nation’, Financial Times, 20 December 2007. ‘Security Council fails to break Kosovo stalemate’, AFP, 20 December 2007; ‘Kosovo: Security Council Offers Little Suspense on Kosovo’, RFE/RL, 20 December 2007. 106 ‘UN rift at west’s plan for Kosovan nation’, Financial Times, 20 December 2007; ‘Russia warns UN it will veto independence for Kosovo’, Scotsman, 20 December 2007; ‘Kosovo: Security Council Offers Little Suspense on Kosovo’, RFE/RL, 20 December 2007. 107 ‘Informal comments to the Media by the Permanent Representative of Belgium, Ambassador Johan C. Verbeke, the Permanent Representative of France, Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert, the Permanent Representative of Italy, Ambassador Marcello Spatafora, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Sir John Sawers KCMG, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, the Permanent Representative of Slovakia, Ambassador Peter Burian and the Permanent

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Representative of Germany, Ambassador Thomas Matussek on the situation in Kosovo.’, UN Website, 19 December 2007. 108 ‘UN Council divided as Kosovo debate kicks off’, Reuters, 19 December 2007. 109 ‘Kosovo independence process cannot be stopped – EU’, Reuters, 20 December 2007.

Conclusion 1

2

3

4

5 6

Paddy Ashdown, comments made during an interview on Sky News, 9 December 2007. Another observer put the case more harshly: ‘Fault for the war, originally, lies with local actors on the ground. However, fault for this perverse non-peace and for much of the nonsense that has prevailed within it belongs to the international actors who waged a war without the guts to dictate clear terms afterwards.’ Eric Jansson, ‘The Wages of War as Waged by Wimps’, Balkan Insight, 6 December 2007. Ivor Roberts, ‘Partition is the best answer to the Kosovo question’, The Independent, 5 December 2007. The same point was also made by Tadić at the UN Security Council meeting following the declaration of independence. 5839th Meeting of the Security Council’, UN Security Council Document, S/PV/5839, 18 February 2008. As one British official stated to the author, in 2007, there was still a hope that after the situation had settled down the two sides may have been able to negotiate some form of autonomy. Richard Holbrooke argues that it was not down to indifference in the Bush Administration that prevented the issue from being tackled at that stage, but intense dislike of the Clinton Administration. ‘But the new Bush team hated anything it had inherited from Bill Clinton – even (perhaps especially) his greatest successes – and made no effort to advance policy in Kosovo until 2005 and ignored Bosnia.’ Furthermore, he argued that the window of opportunity for a ‘soft landing’, by which he meant independence, closed in 2004. Richard Holbrooke, ‘Back to the Brink In the Balkans’, Washington Post, 25 November 2007. ‘Rumsfeld wants to cut US presence in Kosovo’, Financial Times, 3 February 2006. For instance, John Bolton, who had served as the US permanent representative to the UN throughout 2006, noted on several occasions the deep rooted anti-Serbian attitudes within the State Department and argued that the United States should not recognise a unilateral declaration of independence. The comments were made in an interview

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with Voice of America in October 2007. He had also made the same comments about State Department bias and the dangers of recognising UDI in an interview with the Serbian service of the BBC a few months earlier. ‘SAD za nezavisno Kosovo’ [USA for an Independent Kosovo], BBC Serbian Service, 11 May 2007. See also, James Lyons, ‘Kosovo trainwreck warnings’, The Washington Times, 2 January 2008. Admiral Lyons was commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations. 7 ‘ICG urges independence’, Reuters, 18 February 2005. This was also explicitly stated by Ahtisaari in his final report. ‘Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status’, UN Security Council Document, S/2007/168, 26 March 2007, para.7. 8 ‘Even in Eager Kosovo, Nation-Building Stalls’, Christian Science Monitor, 22 September 2004. ‘Kosovo Loses Patience with UN as Economy Flags’, New Scotsman, March 29, 2005. 9 See, for example, Jacques Rupnik, ‘Yugoslavia after Milošević’, Survival, Volume 43, Number 2, Summer 2001 and Niek Biegman, ‘Look at Ukraine’, Transitions Online, 4 March 2005. 10 As Sir John Sawers, British representative at the UN stated, ‘The international community cannot be party to a settlement that is opposed by over 90 per cent of a territory’s population. Apart from anything else, it would be contrary to our overriding priority of upholding peace and security.’ ‘Serbia denounces Kosovo move at UN’, Financial Times, 18 February 2008. 11 This was explicitly stated by his deputy, Albert Rohan, who explained that the need for independence became clear in January 2006 when the Contact Group insisted that any solution must be acceptable to the people of Kosovo. As statehood was the only acceptable settlement to the Kosovo Albanian, who made up the vast majority of the population, from that moment onwards, and given the irreconcilable and zero-sum positions of the two sides, the UN team led by Ahtisaari decided to opt for independence. Albert Rohan, ‘International Conflict Resolution: The Case of Kosovo’, Public Lecture, University of Kent, 19 October 2007. Again, this was explicitly stated by John Bolton, who was the US permanent representative to the UN. ‘SAD za nezavisno Kosovo’ [USA for an Independent Kosovo], BBC Serbian Service, 11 May 2007. 12 Indeed, the view that the Ahtisaari process had been less about negotiations between Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders, and more about talks between Ahtisaari and the two sides, appeared to be

NOTES

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14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26

27

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supported by the Troika, which noted in its final report that its process had been the ‘most sustained and intense high-level dialogue’ between Belgrade and Pristina since 1999. ‘Report of the European Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo’, UN Security Council Document, S/2007/723, 10 December 2007. Other observers also noted the way in which Ahtisaari appeared to be dismissive of Serb sensitivities. One US diplomat explained to the author, in 2007, how he had been rather shocked to hear just how little regard the UN Envoy had shown towards Serbian concerns when he had briefed US officials about his efforts. ‘Ahtisaari says Kosovo has to stick to his plan’, Reuters, 7 May 2007. British official, comments to the author, December 2007. Martti Ahtisaari, comment to the author, September 2008. Martti Ahtisaari, ‘Kosovan Questions: National, Regional, International’, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, 9 September 2008. Martti Ahtisaari, comment to the author, September 2008. Martti Ahtisaari and Gareth Evans, ‘Cypriots should seize the moment’, Cyprus Mail, 21 April 2004. ‘Peace Prize Comes With Criticism’, The Nation, 30 November 2008. Senior European diplomat, comments to the author, autumn 2008. Janusz Bugajski and Edward P. Joseph, ‘Seize the Opportunity with Russia on Kosovo’, Washington Post, 24 October 2007. ‘Russia Seeks New Mediator in Kosovo Talks’, New York Times, 18 March 2007; ‘The Russian speech we didn’t hear about’, The Independent, 12 February 2008. Morton Abramowitz, ‘Putin’s Balkan mischief’, Guardian Unlimited, 29 January 2008. Richard Holbrooke, ‘Back to the Brink in the Balkans’, Washington Post, 25 November 2007. See, for instance, ‘Here Comes Kosovo’, Washington Post, 10 November 2006. Morton Abramowitz, ‘Putin’s Balkan mischief’, Guardian Unlimited, 29 January 2008. For example, in an article published in the Russian press, Mikhail Gorbachev called Kosovo a ‘dangerous precedent’ that would be capable of ‘detonating’ conflicts elsewhere in the world. Like many other Russians, he was also scathing of the decision by the EU and NATO to pursue a settlement outside of the UN Security Council: ‘This is an unprecedented step, without foundation in political, never mind moral terms…For the first time in history, two organizations are

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31 32

33 34

35

KOSOVO trying to assume responsibility for the future of a country – Serbia – which is not a member of either of them…By destroying the international law and replacing it with poorly disguised tyranny, the proponents of this approach have certainly miscalculated the outcome of their actions.’ ‘Gorbachev: Kosovo unrelated to EU, NATO’, UPI, 29 December 2007. ‘Wisner: Russian Opposition to Kosovo Independence ‘Unbelievably Regrettable’’, Council on Foreign Relations, February 12, 2008. Ian Traynor, ‘A Russian puzzle’, Guardian Unlimited, 29 March 2007; ‘Analysis – Kosovo offers Russia a chance to avenge 1999 defeat’, Reuters, 12 February 2008. ‘Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan’, International Crisis Group, 12 May 2007. Serbia and Russia signed a major energy agreement in January 2008. ‘Serbia deal tightens Russia’s grip on European energy’, International Herald Tribune, 22 January 2008. ‘Leading article: Local passions and the desire to divorce’, The Independent, 5 December 2007. See, for instance, ‘Enter, pursued by the bear’, The Economist, 13 September 2007; Edward P. Joseph, ‘It’s time for some brinkmanship’, International Herald Tribune, 28 June 2007; Janusz Bugajski and Edward P. Joseph, ‘Seize the Opportunity with Russia on Kosovo’, Washington Post, 24 October 2007. Retired senior diplomat from an EU member state, November 2006. As Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian President, stated during a press conference with President Sarkozy: ‘You were right in asking if the Ossetians and Abkhazians can and want to live within Georgia. This is a question for them to ask of themselves and it is they who will give their own clear answer. It is not for Russia or any other country to answer this question for them. This is something that must take place in strict accordance with international law. Though, over these last years international law has given us numerous very complicated cases of peoples exercising their right to self-determination and the emergence of new states on the map. Just look at the example of Kosovo.’ ‘Press Statement following Negotiations with French President Nicolas Sarkozy’, The Kremlin, Moscow, 12 August 2008. As one British official told the author, London certainly was not forewarned about the comments, as would be expected if it was a major policy announcement. Instead, it appears as though Bush had briefed that there was an ongoing process to determine the future of Kosovo

NOTES

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43

44

45 46 47

48

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that appeared likely to lead to some form of statehood, but that he had simplified this to, ‘independence is coming!’. ‘Holbrooke: Kosovo Independence Declaration Could Spark Crisis’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 December 2007. ‘Hopes Dim for U.N. Solution for Kosovo’, New York Times, 20 December 2007. ‘Analysis: Kosovo: the smallest of chips in the US–Russia poker game’, DPA, 3 July 2007. ‘Kosovo threatens to be flashpoint again’, Toronto Star, 10 December 2007. ‘US fears diplomatic effects of Putin power’, Financial Times, 14 December 2007. John Bolton, Lawrence Eagleburger and Peter Rodman, ‘Warning Light on Kosovo’, The Washington Times, 31 January 2008. Ivor Roberts, ‘Partition is the best answer to the Kosovo question’, The Independent, 5 December 2007. Ischinger was not much more optimistic. As he explained, he placed the chance of success at less than one tenth of one per cent, but that it was nevertheless worth trying. Wolfgang Ischinger, comments to the author, December 2008. Diplomat from an EU member state, comments to the author, September 2007. Botsan-Kharchenko noted that he felt that the talks had helped to prepare the ground for direct negotiations. Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko, comments to the author, September 2007. As Ferenc Gyurcsány, the Hungarian prime minister, memorably put it, ‘the emancipation of Kosovo is an unstoppable process. If Kosovar Albanians lose hope of independence in the near future, then we will be faced with a crazy security challenge within a week.’ ‘Diplomats to visit Kosovo, seeking new talks’, International Herald Tribune, 9 August 2007. Wolfgang Ischinger, comments to the author, December 2008. Wolfgang Ischinger, comments to the author, December 2008. As Ischinger explained, Koštunica was ‘horrible’ to work with and made life as ‘miserable’ for the Troika as he had done for the UN team. Wolfgang Ischinger, comments to the author, December 2008. There were a number of articles published by scholars and regional analysts arguing that while partition was not necessarily the optimal solution, it should have been considered as a logical compromise. See, for instance, Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Independence for Kosovo’, Foreign Affairs, November-December 2005; Margaret Blunden, ‘Kosovo: it’s not too late to reconsider partition’, Financial Times, 25 January 2007; Timothy Williams Waters, ‘The wrong solution’, International Herald

242

49 50 51

52 53 54 55 56

57

KOSOVO Tribune, 1 February 2007; Tihomir Loza, ‘Uniquely the Same’, Transitions Online, 25 March 2007; Hurst Hannum, ‘A better plan for Kosovo’, Christian Science Monitor, 7 May 2007; Stavros Lygeros, ‘Unequal partition’, Kathimerini, 29 November 2007; James Ker-Lindsay, ‘The Unmentionable Solution’, The Guardian, Comment is Free, 9 August 2007; Ivor Roberts, ‘Partition is the best answer to the Kosovo question’, The Independent, 5 December 2007. Even after the process ended, the idea that partition might still be a sound way forward was mooted by a number of observers, including General Sir Mike Jackson, the former commander of KFOR. Mike Jackson, ‘There’s a minefield just ahead in Kosovo’, Sunday Telegraph, 9 December 2007. See also, ‘Partition Kosovo’, Daily Telegraph, 8 December 2007. ‘Kosovo Drifts towards Partition’, Balkan Insight, 20 September 2007. British official, comments to the author, December 2007. Indeed, Albert Rohan, the deputy UN Envoy, openly acknowledged that some form of partition appeared to be the most likely ‘solution’ to the Kosovo situation, albeit after a suitable period of time had elapsed. Albert Rohan, ‘International Conflict Resolution: The Case of Kosovo’, Public Lecture, University of Kent, 19 October 2007. Misha Glenny, ‘Black cloud over the Balkans’, New Statesman, 6 December 2007. Wolfgang Ischinger, comments to the author, December 2008. ‘Troika to begin final push on Kosovo’, Financial Times, 25 November 2007. ‘EU seeks unity in face of growing U.S.–Russian tensions over Kosovo’, Associated Press, 23 July 2007. Wolfgang Ischinger, comments to the author, December 2008. Wolfgang Ischinger, comments to the author, December 2008. As Ischinger explained, the German Government would not usually have nominated one of its own nationals to such an appointment. However, it recognised that if the decision to support independence without UN authorisation ran into difficulties before the parliament, it was far more likely that representatives would accept the assessment of a senior German official than the assurances of an envoy hailing from a small EU member state. In this regard, his appointment was quite clearly intended to try to ensure German support for the independence, if that would in fact be the final outcome. Wolfgang Ischinger, comments to the author, December 2008. Ischinger also noted that in order to build European unity he also made himself available to all the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the EU and that he regularly briefed EU officials on what was taking place.

NOTES

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59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

243

Indeed, he notes that he travelled 100,000 kilometres over the course of the four months meeting with European leaders. Wolfgang Ischinger, comments to the author, December 2008. As one leading figure noted, few were willing to state openly exactly what this meant. ‘The West is fond of the mantra that the status quo is not sustainable. What they really mean is that Kosovar Albanian expectations of imminent independence have been raised to such an extreme that any frustration of independence will lead to violence against the Nato forces. So we must give Kosovo its independence quickly.’ Ivor Roberts, ‘Partition is the best answer to the Kosovo question’, The Independent, 5 December 2007. ‘Policy of peace Serbia’s goal – Tadić’, B92, 1 December 2007. ‘Jeremić, Rupel discuss SAA, Kosovo’, B92, 12 January 2008. Diplomat from an EU member state, comments to the author, 2007. John Bolton, Lawrence Eagleburger and Peter Rodman, ‘Warning Light on Kosovo’, The Washington Times, 31 January 2008. ‘U.S. and Germany to recognize Kosovo independence, diplomats say’, International Herald Tribune, 10 January 2008. Misha Glenny, ‘Black cloud over the Balkans’, New Statesman, 6 December 2007. ‘Troika to begin final push on Kosovo’, Financial Times, 25 November 2007. ‘Hopes Dim for U.N. Solution for Kosovo’, New York Times, 20 December 2007. ‘EU Splits on Kosovo Recognition’, BBC News, 18 February 2008. Misha Glenny, ‘Black cloud over the Balkans’, New Statesman, 6 December 2007. See for instance, Timothy Garton Ash, ‘The best answer for Kosovo is EU membership – and for Serbia too’, The Guardian, 6 December 2007. ‘Interview – Germany warns of vacuum if EU wavers on Kosovo’, Reuters, 9 January 2008. ‘EU proposal lays out steps on Kosovo independence’, International Herald Tribune, 12 December 2007. ‘Slovenia to assume EU presidency’, Daily Telegraph, 4 January 2008.’ ‘EU will recognize Kosovo if it splits from Serbia: German diplomat’, DPA, 10 December 2007. Wolfgang Ischinger, ‘Viewpoint: Time to decide on Kosovo’, BBC News, 13 December 2007.

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Bieber, Florian and Zidas Daskalovski (editors), Understanding the War in Kosovo (London: Routledge, 2003) Buckley, Mary and Sally N. Cummings (editors), Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath (London: Continuum, 2001) Buckley, William Joseph (editor), Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2000) Clark, Wesley, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) Dalder, Ivo H. and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2001) Djokić, Dejan (editor), Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918–1992 (London: Hurst, 2003) Dragovic-Soso, Jasna, Saviours of the Nation: Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism (London: Hurst, 2002) Gallagher, Tom, The Balkans in the New Millennium: In the Shadow of War and Peace (London: Routledge, 2005) Judah, Tim, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 2nd Edition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) Judah, Tim, Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) King, Iain and Walt Mason, Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (London: Hurst, 2006) Knudsen, Tonny Brems and Carsten Bagge Laustsen (editors), Kosovo Between War and Peace (London: Routledge, 2006) Malcolm, Noel, Kosovo: A Short History, 2nd Edition (London, Pan Books, 2002) Mazower, Mark, The Balkans: From the End of Byzantium to the Present Day (London: Phoenix, 2001)

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Pavlowitch, Stevan K., Hitler’s New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia (London: Hurst, 2008) Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie and Bernd J. Fisher (editors), Albanian Identities: Myths and History (London: Hurst, 2002) Thomas, Robert, Serbia under Milošević: Politics in the 1990s (London: Hurst, 1999) Tomes, Jason, King Zog: Self-Made Monarch of Albania (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2007) Veremis, Thanos and Evangelos Kofos (editors), Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War (Athens: ELIAMEP and the University of Athens, 1998) Vickers, Miranda, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)

Articles and Chapters Bellamy, Alex J., ‘Lessons Unlearned: Why Coercive Diplomacy Failed at Rambouillet’, International Peacekeeping, Volume 7, Number 2, Summer 2000 Brown, Bartram S., ‘Human Rights, Sovereignty, and the Final Status of Kosovo’, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Volume 80, 2005 Buckley, Mary, ‘Russian Perceptions’, in Buckley, Mary and Sally N. Cummings (editors), Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath (London: Continuum, 2001) Caplan, Richard, ‘International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo’, International Affairs, Volume 74, Number 4, 1998 Heraclides, Alexis, ‘Ethnonational and Separatist Conflict Settlement’, in Thanos Veremis and Evangelos Kofos (editors), Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War (Athens: ELIAMEP and the University of Athens, 1998) Kostovicova, Denisa, ‘‘Shkolla Shqipe’ and Nationhood’, in Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fisher (editors), Albanian Identities: Myths and History (London: Hurst, 2002) Kupchan, ‘Charles A., Independence for Kosovo: Yielding to Balkan Reality’, Foreign Affairs, Volume 84, Number 6, November–December 2005 Levtin, Oleg, ‘Inside Moscow’s Kosovo Muddle’, Survival, Volume 42, Number 1, Summer 2000 Marmullaku, Ramadan, ‘Albanians in Yugoslavia: A Personal Essay’, in Dejan Djokić (editor), Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918–1992 (London: Hurst, 2003) Pellet, Alain, ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples’, European Journal of International Law, Volume 3, Number 1, 1992

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Hugh Poulton, ‘Macedonians and Albanians as Yugoslavs’, in Dejan Djokić (editor), Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918–1992 (London: Hurst, 2003) Rupnik, ‘Jacques, ‘Yugoslavia after Milošević’, Survival, Volume 43, Number 2, Summer 2001 Samardžić, Slobodan, ‘Should Kosovo-Metohija Remain a Part of Serbia/Yugoslavia? A Plea for a Just Solution’, in William Joseph Buckley (editor), Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B Eerdmand Publishing, 2000) Shala, Blerim, ‘Because Kosovars are Western, There Can be No Homeland without a State’, in William Joseph Buckley (editor), Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2000) Surroi, Veton ‘Kosova and the Constitutional Solutions’, in Thanos Veremis and Evangelos Kofos (editors), Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War (Athens: ELIAMEP and the University of Athens, 1998) Weller, Marc, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, International Affairs, Volume 75, Number 2, April 1999 Weller, Marc, ‘The Vienna Negotiations on the Final Status of Kosovo’, International Affairs, Volume 84, Number 4, July 2008 Weller, Marc, ‘Kosovo’s Final Status’, International Affairs, Volume 84, Number 6, November 2008

Reports Amnesty International, ‘Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo/Kosova): Minority Communities: Fundamental Rights Denied’, EUR 70/011/2003, 1 April 2003 Chatham House, ‘Kosovo: International Law and Recognition’, A Summary of the Chatham House International Law Discussion Group meeting held on 22 April 2008 Congressional Research Service, ‘Kosovo’s Future Status Policy and U.S. Policy’, CRS Report for Congress, January 27, 2005 Human Rights Watch, ‘Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo’, New York, 2001 Human Rights Watch, ‘Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004’, Volume 16, Number 6(D), July 2004 International Crisis Group, ‘Reaction in Kosovo to Koštunica’s Victory’, 10 October 2000 International Crisis Group, ‘Serbia’s Constitutional Referendum: A Question of Validity’, 30 October 2006

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International Crisis Group, ‘Kosovo Status: Delay Is Risky’, Europe Report No.177, 10 November 2006 International Crisis Group, ‘Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan’, 12 May 2007 Youngs, Tim, ‘Kosovo: The Diplomatic and Military Options’, House of Commons Research Paper 98/93, 27 October 1998

United Nations Documents Security Council Resolutions UN Security Council Resolution 1160(1998), 28 March 1998 UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998), 23 September 1998 UN Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998), 24 October 1998 UN Security Council Resolution 1239 (1999), 14 May 1999 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), 10 June 1999 Security Council Meetings 5289th Meeting, S/PV.5289, 24 October 2005 5290th Meeting, S/PV.5290, 24 October 2005 5373rd Meeting, S/PV.5373, 14 February 2005 5470th Meeting, S/PV.5470, 20 June 2005 5485th Meeting (Closed), S/PV.5485, 13 July 2006 5522nd Meeting, S.PV5522, 13 September 2006 5531st Meeting (Closed), S/PV.5531, 22 September 2006 5588th Meeting, S/PV.5588, 13 December 2006 5654th Meeting (Communiqué), S/PV.5654, 3 April 2007 5672nd Meeting, S/PV.5672, 2 May 2007 5673rd Meeting, S/PV.5673, 10 May 2007 5811th Meeting (Closed), S/PV.5811, 19 December 2007 5839th Meeting, S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008 Reports of the Secretary General on UNMIK S/2005/335, 23 May 2005 S/2006/707, 1 September 2006 S/2006/45, 25 January 2006 S/2006/361, 5 June 2006 S/2006/906, 20 November 2006 S/2007/134, 19 March 2007 S/2007/582, 28 September 2007

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UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001 ‘Djindjić: Territorial Autonomy for Kosovo Serbs’, UNMIK Press Summary, 2 August 2001 ‘Haekkerup believes that Kosovo is still within the FRY’, UNMIK Press Summary, 2 August 2001 ‘UNMIK–FRY Common Document’, 5 November 2001 Standards for Kosovo, 10 December 2003 Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, UNMIK, 31 March 2004 ‘Kosovo: SRSG Joachim Rücker addresses the UN Security Council’, Press Release, UNMIK/PR/1652, 19 March 2007 UN Office of the Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo (UNOSEK) ‘Press Briefing by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Deputy Albert Rohan after their first visit to Belgrade’, 25 November 2005 ‘Press Briefing by UN Deputy Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Albert Rohan’, 14 December 2005 ‘Press Briefing by Mr Albert Rohan after the third direct talks on decentralization held in Vienna’, 3 April 2006 ‘Press Briefing by UN Deputy Special Envoy Albert Rohan after the fourth round of direct talks held in Vienna’, UNSOSEK, 5 May 2006 ‘Press Briefing by Mr. Albert Rohan after Vienna round of talks on the protection of religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo’, UNOSEK, 23 May 2006 ‘Press Briefing after Second Vienna round of talks on the protection of religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo’, 18 July 2006 ‘Press Briefing after Fifth Vienna round of talks on decentralization’, 19 July 2006 ‘Press Conference by UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari after the High-level meeting in Vienna’, 24 July 2006 ‘Press encounter by Mr. Schlagheck after the first round of talks on minority rights’, UNOSEK, 8 August 2006 ‘Press Briefing by UN Deputy Special Envoy Albert Rohan after the 7–8 September round of direct talks held in Vienna’, 8 September 2006 ‘Stake-out by UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari after his briefing to the UN Security Council in New York’, 22 September 2006 ‘Press Conference by UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for

250

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Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari, in Belgrade’, 2 February 2007 ‘Press Conference by UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari, in Pristina’, 2 February 2007 ‘Discussions start in Vienna on all aspects of the Comprehensive draft proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement’, 21 February 2007 ‘Stake-out by UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari and his Deputy Albert Rohan after the Vienna discussions’, 2 March 2007 ‘Press Conference by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari following the High Level meeting held in Vienna’, 10 March 2007 UN Press Releases ‘Press Statement on Kosovo by Security Council President’, UN Security Council Document, SC/7901, 16 October 2003 ‘Security Council Presidential Statement, Expresses Support for ‘Standards for Kosovo’, Welcome Launch of Review Mechanism’, UN Security Council Document, SC/7951, 12 December 2003 ‘Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Kosovo Status Talks – Martti Ahtisaari’, Press Conference, Belgrade, 25 November 2005 ‘“Unrealistic” Serb positions on Kosovo, charges UN envoy’, UN Press Release, 31 May 2006 ‘UN Secretary-General welcomes agreement on new Kosovo initiative’, UN Press Release, SG/SM/11111, 1 August 2007 Troika Documents ‘Kosovo Troika Press Communiqué: The Baden Conference’, Baden, Austria, 28 November 2007 ‘Report of the European Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo’, Security Council, S/2007/723, 10 December 2007 Other documents ‘Secretary-General Appoints Ambassador Kai Eide of Norway as His Special Envoy to Undertake Comprehensive Review of Kosovo’, SG/A/927, 6 June 2005 ‘Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Security Council Document, S/2005/635, 7 October 2005 ‘Letter dated 31 October from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, United Nations Security Council Document, S/2005/708, 31 October 2005

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‘Letter dated 10 November 2005 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General’, United Nations Security Council Document, S/2005/709, 10 November 2005 ‘Secretary-General Appoints Former President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland as Special Envoy for Future Status Process for Kosovo’, United Nations Secretary-General Document, BIO/3714 (or SG/A/955), 15 November 2005 ‘Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status’, UN Security Council Document, S/2007/168, 26 March 2007 ‘Secretary-General, receiving report on Kosovo’s future status, supports proposal’, Press Release, United Nations Secretary-General, SG/SM/10923, 26 March 2007 ‘Report of the Security Council mission on the Kosovo issue’, S/2007/256, 4 May 2007

Official Documents Contact Group ‘Statement on Kosovo adopted by the members of the Contact Group, meeting in London on 9 March 1998’, UN Security Council Document, S/1998/223 ‘Statement on Kosovo issued by members of the Contact Group in Bonn on 25 March 1998’, UN Security Council Document, S/1998/272 ‘Guiding principles of the Contact Group for a settlement of the status of Kosovo’, 2 November 2005 ‘Statement by The Contact Group on The Future of Kosovo’, London, 31 January 2006 ‘High Level Meeting on the Future Status of Kosovo’, 24 July 2006 ‘Contact Group Statement on the Situation in Northern Kosovo’, 3 August 2006 ‘Contact Group Ministerial Statement’, New York City, 20 September 2006 ‘Joint Contact Group Statement’, 2 February 2007 ‘Statement on Kosovo by Contact Group Ministers’, 28 September 2007 European Union ‘A European Future for Kosovo’, Com (2005) 156, European Commission, Brussels, 20 April 2005 ‘Summary note on the joint report by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, and Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, on the future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo’, S/200/06, July 2006

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‘Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, met Fatmir Sejdiu, President of Kosovo’, Press Release, S010/07, 12 Brussels, 15 January 2007 Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations: External Relations’, 2780th Council Meeting, Press Release, 6039/07 (Presse 18), 12 February 2007 ‘EU Presidency Statement on the submission today to the UN Security Council’, 26 March 2007 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, European Council, 16616/07, 14 December 2007 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ‘Milošević: Kosovo: Second Amended Indictment’, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, 29 October 2001 ‘Haradinaj et al.: Initial Indictment’, Case No. IT-04-84-I, 24 February 2005 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1 August 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (Helsinki Declaration) ‘Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Missions signed in Belgrade, on 16 October 1998, by the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE and the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (CIO.GAL/65/98/Corr.1) ‘The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo’, Report, Vienna, 2004 ‘Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation’, Second day of the Thirteenth Meeting, MC(13), Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8, 6 December 2005 ‘The Response of the Justice System to the March 2004 Riots’, Report, December 2005 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ‘Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana’, 30 January 1999 ‘Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia’, 9 June 1999 ‘Riga Summit Declaration’, Press Release, 2006(150), 29 November 2006 Republic of Serbia ‘Resolution of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on a Mandate

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for Political Talks on the Future Status of Kosovo and Metohija’, 14 November 2005 ‘Constitution of the Republic of Serbia’, 30 November 2006 ‘Ahtisaari's proposal on Kosovo status not a binding sketch for solution’, Press Release, 4 January 2007 ‘Politically, historically and legally Kosovo-Metohija is and will remain part of Serbia’, Press Release, 6 January 2007 ‘Ahtisaari’s proposal for Kosovo illegitimate’, Press Release, 2 February 2007 ‘New round of Vienna talks on Kosovo’, Press Release, 21 February 2007 ‘State negotiating team requests demilitarisation of Kosovo’, Press Release, 1 March 2007 ‘Belgrade demands increased jurisdiction for Serb municipalities in KosovoMetohija’, Press Release, 27 February 2007 ‘Negotiating team demands formation of Serbian entity in Kosovo-Metohija’, Press Release, 27 February 2007 ‘Serbia has unified and grounded position on future status of Kosovo’, Press Release, 1 March 2007 ‘Kosovo: First round of status talks in Vienna ends’, Press Release, 2 March 2007 ‘Resolution of Kosovo status to be put-off’, Press Release, 6 March 2007 ‘New proposal of Martti Ahtisaari not acceptable for Serbia’, Press Release, 8 March 2007 ‘Serbia expects continuation of negotiations on future status of Kosovo’, Press Release, 12 March 2007 ‘Serbia rejects Ahtisaari’s proposal for status of Kosovo-Metohija’, Press release, 27 March 2007 ‘Starting real negotiations on Kosovo is only way out’, Press Release, 28 March 2007 ‘Address by Prime Minister of Serbia Vojislav Koštunica to the UN Security Council, New York, 3 April 2007’ ‘Substantial autonomy for Kosovo-Metohija within Serbia only possible compromise’, Press Release, 7 April 2007 ‘Monitored autonomy for Kosovo-Metohija only possible solution’, Press Release, 28 April 2007 ‘Serbia rejects controlled negotiations, use of force in resolving KosovoMetohija status issue’, 18 June 2007 ‘Seventh Extraordinary Sitting of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia in 2007’, 24 July 2007 ‘Serbia ready to compromise and make speedy agreement with Kosovo ethnic Albanians’, Press Statement, 6 August 2007

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‘Serbia to present proposal regarding Kosovo status as first article on the agenda’, Press Statement, 28 August 2007 ‘Comparative Overview of the Cases of Hong Kong, Åland Islands, and the Serbian Status Proposal for Kosovo and Metohija’, State negotiating team for Kosovo-Metohija, 20 November 2007 ‘Serbia to call for continuation of negotiations on Kosovo at UN SC session’, Press Release, 7 December 2007 Russian Federation ‘Interview with Newspaper Journalists from G8 Member Countries’, Transcript released by the Government of the Russian Federation, 4 June 2007 ‘Statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kosovo Settlement’, 2033-17-12-2007, 17 December 2007 ‘Press Statement following Negotiations with French President Nicolas Sarkozy’, The Kremlin, Moscow, 12 August 2008 United States of America ‘Understanding the Rambouillet Accords’, US Department of State, 1 March 1999 ‘Hearing on Kosovo: A Way Forward? R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Remarks as prepared before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’, Press Release, US Department of State, Washington, DC, November 8, 2005 ‘Meeting of Contact Group Political Directors’, Media Note 2006/645, Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, 30 June 2006 ‘Proposals for Kosovo’s Final Status’, Press Statement, 2007/230, 26 March 2007 ‘The Outlook For The Independence Of Kosovo’, R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of Political Affairs , Statement Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, April 17, 2007, Press Release, US Department of State, 18 April 2007 ‘Opening Statement at Press Roundtable in Berlin: R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs’, American Embassy, Berlin, Germany, May 9, 2007 ‘Interview With Sergey Buntman of Ekho Movsky: Secretary Condoleezza Rice’ Moscow, Russia, May 15, 2007’, US Department of State ‘Press Briefing by National Security Adviser Steve Hadley’, 6 June 2007 ‘President Bush Participates in Joint Press Availability with Prime Minister of Albania, Dr. Sali Berisha, Courtyard Council of Ministers, Tirana, Albania’,

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255

Office of the Press Secretary, June 10, 2007 ‘Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, Colony Hotel, Kennebunkport, Maine’, Office of the Press Secretary, July 2, 2007 ‘United States supports period of intensive engagement on Kosovo’, Tom Casey, Deputy Spokesman, US Department of State, 1 August 2007 ‘Interview With the Reuters Editorial Board, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Waldorf-Astoria, New York, New York, September 24, 2007’, US Department of State ‘U.S.–Greece Relations and Regional Issues’, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, Serial Number 110-139, 14 November 2007 ‘Remarks at NATO Headquarters’, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Brussels, Belgium, December 7, 2007 Other Documents ‘The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 14 December 1995 ‘Statement by Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo before the 2007 Ordinary Session of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly’, Council of Europe, 24 January 2007 ‘Launch of Process to Decide Kosovo’s Final Status: Statement by RT Hon Douglas Alexander MP’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 8 October 2005 ‘Troika meets with Belgrade and Pristina Delegations’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 19 September 2007 ‘Kosovo’, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Commons, 4th Report, Session 1999–2000, para.65. ‘Chair’s Summary’, G8, St Petersburg, 17 July 2006 ‘OIC Declares Solidarity with Kosovo’, Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), OIC Newsletter, Number 8, 20 February 2008

Official Speeches and Articles Ahtisaari, Martti, ‘Kosovan Questions: National, Regional, International’, School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), University College London, 9 September 2008. Çeku, Agim, ‘Kosovo’s Turn’, Wall Street Journal, 8 June 2006 Çeku, Agim, ‘The Future of Kosovo’, Chatham House, London, 12 October 2006 Çeku, Agim, ‘Kosovo’s Moment’, International Herald Tribune, 18 January 2007 Eide, Kai, ‘Kosovo: the way forward’, NATO Review, Winter 2004

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Jeremić, Vuk, ‘Serbia’s Path to Europe Through Regional Peace and Reconciliation’, Chatham House, London, 19 September 2007 Koštunica, ‘Vojislav, Serbia’s European Integration’, Royal United Services Institute, 27 June 2006 Koštunica, Vojislav, ‘Justice for Serbia’, Washington Post, 12 July 2006 Kouchner, Bernard and Carl Bildt, ‘Why Serbia will join the EU’, The Times, 12 March 2008 Rehn, Olli, ‘The European perspective for the Western Balkans’, Western Balkans Panel at the International Conference Hall organised by Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 16 January 2007 Rohan, Albert, ‘International Conflict Resolution: The Case of Kosovo’, Public Lecture, University of Kent, 19 October 2007 Tadić, Boris, ‘Opportunity in the Balkans’, Washington Post, 7 June 2006

Published Interviews ‘‘Respect and Rights’ Newsweek Interview with the Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Çeku’, Newsweek, 3 May 2006 ‘Fried: Serbs Urged to Accept Kosovo Plan to Gain ‘European Future’’, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 February 2007 ‘Holbrooke: Kosovo Independence Declaration Could Spark Crisis’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 December 2007 ‘Wisner: Russian Opposition to Kosovo Independence ‘Unbelievably Regrettable’’, Council on Foreign Relations, February 12, 2008

Commentary Articles Abramowitz, Morton, ‘Putin’s Balkan mischief’, The Guardian, 29 January 2008 Ahtisaari, Martti and Gareth Evans, ‘Cypriots should seize the moment’, Cyprus Mail, 21 April 2004 Biegman, Niek, ‘Look at Ukraine’, Transitions Online, 4 March 2005 Blunden, Margaret, ‘Kosovo: it's not too late to reconsider partition’, Financial Times, 25 January 2007 Bolton, John, Lawrence Eagleburger and Peter Rodman, ‘Warning Light on Kosovo’, Washington Times, 31 January 2008 Bugajski, Janusz and Edward P. Joseph, ‘Seize the Opportunity with Russia on Kosovo’, Washington Post, 24 October 2007 Djokić, Dejan, ‘Response: For Kosovo, history depends on which historian you ask’, The Guardian, 4 March 2008

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257

Eyal, Jonathan, ‘Is Kosovo Really Independent?’, RUSI Commentary, 18 February 2008 Garton Ash, Timothy, ‘The best answer for Kosovo is EU membership – and for Serbia too’, The Guardian, 6 December 2007 Garton Ash, Timothy, ‘The Kosovo Precedent’, Los Angeles Times, 21 February 2008 Glenny, Misha, ‘Black cloud over the Balkans’, New Statesman, 6 December 2007 Stephen Glover, ‘Yes, this war is wrong but after Iraq, the West’s moralising is an outrage’, Daily Mail, 14 August 2008 Hannum, Hurst, ‘A better plan for Kosovo’, Christian Science Monitor, 7 May 2007 Holbrooke, Richard, ‘Back to the Brink In the Balkans’, Washington Post, 25 November 2007 Ischinger, Wolfgang, ‘Viewpoint: Time to decide on Kosovo’, BBC News, 13 December 2007 Jackson, Mike, ‘There’s a minefield just ahead in Kosovo’, Sunday Telegraph, 9 December 2007 Jackson, Mike, ‘Georgia: Let’s not start World War III’, Sunday Telegraph, 17 August 2008 Jansson, Eric, ‘The Wages of War as Waged by Wimps’, Balkan Insight, 6 December 2007 Jonas, George, ‘Georgia’s crisis looks a lot like Kosovo’s, The National Post, 13 August 2008 Joseph, Edward P., ‘It’s time for some brinkmanship’, International Herald Tribune, 28 June 2007 Ker-Lindsay, James, ‘The Unmentionable Solution’, The Guardian, Comment is Free, 9 August 2007 Loza, Tihomir, ‘Uniquely the Same’, Transitions Online, 25 March 2007 Lygeros, Stavros, ‘Unequal partition’, Kathimerini, 29 November 2007 Malcolm, Noel ‘Is Kosovo Serbia?’, The Guardian, 26 February 2008 Marshall, Tim, ‘Russia eats the Kosovo cake’, SKY News, 12 August 2008 Roberts, Ivor, ‘Partition is the best answer to the Kosovo question’, The Independent, 5 December 2007 Simes, Dimitri K., ‘Who Will Laugh Last in Georgia?’, The National Interest, 14 November 2006 Traynor, Ian, ‘A Russian puzzle’, The Guardian, 29 March 2007 Williams Waters, Timothy, ‘The wrong solution’, International Herald Tribune, 1 February 2007

258

KOSOVO News Sources

AIA, AFP, AKI, Associated Press, B92, Balkan Insight, BBC News, BBC Serbian Service, Beta, Bloomberg, BUA News, CBC, Christian Science Monitor, CNN, Daily Telegraph, DPA, DTT-Net, The Economist, EU Observer, Financial Times, Focus News Agency, The Guardian, Helsingen Sanomat, HINA, The Independent, Inner City Press, Interfax, International Herald Tribune, ITAR-TASS, ISN Security Watch, The Jakarta Post, Kommersant, LA Times, Makfax, The Moscow Times, New York Times, North Eastern Monthly, Oxford Analytica, Politika, Reuters, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), RIA Novosti, Scotsman, Southeast European Times, STA News Agency, Sunday Telegraph, Sveriges Radio International Toronto Star, Tanjug, The Times, Tiraspol Times, Transitions On Line (TOL), Turkish Daily News, UN News Centre, UPI, USINFO, VOA News, Washington File, Washington Post, Washington Times, Xinhua

INDEX

Abkhazia, 90, 115 Aceh, 26, 110 Afghanistan, 4, 23, 75 Ahtisaari, Martti 1999 conflict, 15; analysis of role, 110-12, 119; appointed UN Envoy, 26-7; attitude towards Serbia, 111; Contact Group, 30, 36, 39, 44, 46, 48; discussions on status proposals, 58-9;European Union, 40; high-level meetings, 40-1, 61; mandate extended, 46; meetings with the sides, 28, 33; no further role in status process, 78; rejects further talks, 55; Security Council, 40, 66; Serbian responsibility for 1999, 42; submits status proposals, 63; support for independence, 32, 64; timeframes, 46, 55; UN factfinding mission, 70; unveils status proposals, 53-4; warns against changes to proposals, 70 Åland Islands, 92, 119 Albania, 4, 8-10, 15, 76 Albanian National Army (ANA), 48, 88

Albright, Madeleine, 13 Alexeyev, Alexander, 31, 49, 64 Amnesty International, 19 Annan, Kofi, 23-4, 26-7, 46 Ashdown, Paddy (Lord), 107 Australia, 4 Austria-Hungary, 8, 9 Azerbaijan, 190 Badinter Arbitration Committee, 11, 188 Balkan League, 8 Balkan Wars (1912-13), 8 Ban Ki-moon, 51, 64, 78, 82, 87, 88 Battle of Kosovo Polje (1389), 38 Belgium, 68 Blair, Tony, 38 Bolton, John, 237 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1, 2, 6, 11, 19, 22, 44 Botsan-Kharchenko, Alexander, 57, 82-5, 89, 96 Brazil, 4 Britain Contact Group, 12; draft resolution, 74, 78, 81; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 86;

260

KOSOVO

Britain continued G8, 75; Kosovo as a unique case, 43; opposes new talks, 77; reaction to status proposals, 64; recognises independence, 4; Security Council discussions, 32, 43, 50, 70, 72; support for independence, 1, 31, 34, 66, 68, 70; support for US position, 123; timeframes, 46; welcomes status talks, 24 Bulgaria, 8, 9 Burns, Nicholas Contact Group, 71; conversation with Koštunica, 65; Russian role, 95; Russian veto, 49; status process, 29; support for unilateral action, 68, 91; timeframes, 52 Bush, George, 66, 74, 76, 79, 116 Canada, 4, 5, 75 Çeku, Agim appointed prime minister, 34; Bush statement on independence, 76; discussion with Tadić, 95; high-level meetings, 41; opposes new talks, 77; partition, 84; reaction to status proposals, 54-5; threat of unilateral action, 47, 78, 81, 88; Troika process, 83; UN factfinding mission, 69; visits EU and NATO, 35; visits Moscow, 49 Chechnya, 34 Cheney, Dick, 43 Chernomyrdin, Victor, 15 China, 4, 34, 47, 50, 60, 66, 67, 69, 72, 74, 93

Chirac, Jacques, 29 Churkin, Vitaly calls for further talks, 70-1, 98; criticises Rücker, 63; Kosovo as a precedent, 43; opposition to draft resolution, 74, 78, 80; opposition to unilateral action, 99; Russian veto, 72; Security Council discussions, 67; status process, 40; Troika process, 88 UN fact-finding mission, 65, 70 Clinton, Bill, 14, 108 Congo, 68 Constitutional Framework, 17 Contact Group disagreements, 52; Kosovo Crisis (1998-99), 12, 14; meeting with Ahtisaari, 36; meetings, 35, 39, 44, 46, 48, 65, 71, 87; partition, 35, 120; presented with status proposals, 53; pressure on the sides, 55; principles, 27, 30; reaction to July 2006 high-level meeting, 41; role in status process, 26; standards review, 20; status process, 80; supports Ahtisaari, 42; Western members ‘Quint’, 76 Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija, 31 Costa Rica, 4 Council of Europe, 53 Council on Foreign Relations, 68 Čović, Nebojša, 18, 197 Croatia, 2, 9, 10 Cyprus, 4, 6, 58, 68, 85, 93, 98, 112, 121 D’Alema, Massimo, 77, 99, 123 Darfur, 75

INDEX Dayton Agreement, 1, 11 de Hoop Scheffer, Jaap, 30, 44, 87 Decentralisation, 30, 33-6, 40-2, 54, 59 Democratic Party (DS), 17, 51, 53, 54, 73 Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), 92 Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), 17, 51-2, 73 Denmark, 77, 82 DiCarlo, Rosemary, 66 Djindjić, Zoran, 17, 19 Douste-Blazy, Philippe, 54, 64 Drašković, Vuk, 29, 45, 48, 51, 53, 62, 68 East Germany, 91 Eide, Kai, 21, 23, 25, 26, 123, 125 Erler, Gernot, 124 European Union 1999 conflict, 15; concerns over unilateral action, 78; Contact Group, 36; criticises US support for unilateral action, 85; discussions on Kosovo, 58, 66, 77, 82, 85, 92; divisions over Kosovo, 70, 77, 122-4; European Commission, 58; European Council (December 2007), 97; European Council (June 2007), 78; future of Kosovo, 124-5; hosts Troika meeting, 88; Kosovo's membership prospects, 5; mission in Kosovo, 58, 90, 97; opposes partition, 84; pressure on Kosovo Albanians, 35; reaction to status proposals, 62; relations with Kosovo Albanians, 18; role in Kosovo, 23-4; role in

261 status process, 7; SAA with Serbia, 33; Serbian membership prospects, 6; status talks, 37; support for Ahtisaari, 40; support for independence, 90-1; support for new talks, 79; Troika process, 123; UN fact-finding mission, 69 Faroe Islands, 82 Ferrero-Waldner, Benita, 56 Finland, 92, 119 First World War, 9 France Balkan Wars (1912-13), 8; Contact Group, 12; draft resolution, 81; G8, 75; proposes new talks, 75; reaction to status proposals, 64; recognises independence, 4; Security Council discussions, 32, 43, 50, 72; support for independence, 1, 66; support for US position, 123 Fried, Daniel, 60, 72, 79, 117 G7, 5 G8, 15, 26, 40, 74-5 Gates, Robert, 89 Gelbard, Robert, 12 Georgia, 7, 72, 115 Germany concerns about bypassing the United Nations, 85; Contact Group, 12; draft resolution, 71 EU presidency, 52; G8, 75; proposes Troika process, 82; reaction to status proposals, 64; recognises independence, 4; status process, 31; support for independence, 66, 89;

262

KOSOVO

Germany continued timeframes, 52 Ghana, 68 Gorani, 16 Greece, 8, 58, 85, 121 Gyurcsany, Ferenc, 241 Haekkerup, Hans, 18 Haradinaj, Ramush, 22 Helsinki Final Act, 3, 14, 26, 29 Hill, Christopher, 12, 14 Holbrooke, Richard, 14, 114 Hong Kong, 86, 91-2, 119 Human Rights Watch, 21 Hyseni, Skender, 94 Ibar River, 16, 20 India, 4 Indonesia, 4, 26, 60, 68, 74, 190 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 7, 97 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 22, 33, 73, 196 International Crisis Group, 27 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 37, 82, 94 Iran, 75 Iraq, 23, 43 Ischinger, Wolfgang 14-point document, 90-1; appointed EU representative on the Troika, 82; approach to talks, 118; call for new ideas, 86; EU role in Kosovo, 125; European Union, 92; final discussions, 93; independence, 125; lack of progress, 89; partition, 84; purpose of the Troika process, 83; questions inevitability of

independence, 85; submits final report, 96; support for independence, 96 Italy Balkan Wars (1912-13), 8; Contact Group, 12; G8, 75; occupation of Kosovo, 9; recognises independence, 4; support for independence, 66, 68; support for new talks, 80 Jackson, General Sir Mike, 7 Janša, Janez, 125 Japan, 4, 5, 75 Jeremić, Vuk, 73, 83-6, 93, 122 Jessen-Petersen, Søren, 24-5, 34, 38 Jones-Parry, Sir Emyr, 67 Khalilzad, Zalmay, 70, 88, 98, 99, 100 Kosovo 1968 demonstrations, 10; 1981; riots, 10; autonomy in; Yugoslavia, 9-10; Badinter Arbitration Committee, 11; Balkan Wars (1912-13), 9; Dayton Agreement, 11; EU and NATO membership, 5; interwar period, 9; March 2004 riots, 20-1; precedent, 4; Second World War, 9; status review, 23; UN administration, 16; unable to join the UN, 5 Kosovo Albanians 14-point document, 89, 91; approach to talks, 118; case for independence, 2; decentralisation, 36; demands for independence, 16-17, 32, 84; failure of draft resolution, 81;

INDEX final meeting with the Troika, 95; high-level meetings, 40; partition, 120; Rambouillet accords, 14; reaction to status proposals, 55, 62; reject autonomy, 59; reject autonomy proposals, 82, 92; reject further talks, 55, 77; relations with Ischinger, 86; relations with UNMIK, 18, 21, 48; reparation demands, 37; threat of unilateral actions, 19, 78; timeframes, 46; treaty of friendship, 87; Troika process, 82; UN fact finding mission, 67, 69; welcome revised status proposals, 61 Kosovo Assembly annuls border agreement, 18; declares independence, 3; independence process, 47; resolution on independence, 27; resolution on minorities, 36 Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, 12 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 11-14, 20, 34, 35, 92 Kosovo Police Service (KPS), 21 Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), 19, 34 Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR), 7, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 96, 109 Kosovo Serbs decentralisation, 41; establish own administration, 17; leaving Kosovo, 66; March 2004 riots, 20; reaction to status proposals, 54-5; relations with UNMIK, 21; situation in Kosovo, 10, 16, 26; status process, 35; status proposals, 111

263 Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), 13, 14 Koštunica, Vojislav addresses Security Council, 25, 99; approach to talks, 111, 119; becomes Yugoslav president, 17; Bush statement on independence, 76; conversation with Burns, 65; criticises Ahtisaari, 36, 42, 47, 63, 67; criticises US, 85, 88; final Troika discussions, 94; high-level meetings, 41, 61; January 2007 elections, 52; Kosovo and EU membership, 52; meeting with Blair, 38; meeting with Putin, 76; meeting with Rice, 39; meeting with Troika, 83; new constitution, 47; opposes status talks, 24; partition, 84; policy on Kosovo, 19, 73; reaction to status proposals, 54; Security Council, 40; visits Kosovo, 38, 51; warned by Russia, 57; warning to NATO, 49 Kosumi, Bayram, 30, 34 Kouchner, Bernard, 77, 80, 85, 121 Lavrov, Sergey calls for talks to continue, 96; criticises Ahtisaari, 60, 63; criticises EU, 93; criticises US, 86, 93, 95-6; discussions with Rice, 34, 79; G8, 74; meetings with Serbian Government, 68; opposes deadlines, 36; opposition to draft resolution, 80; reaction to status proposals, 56, 74; status process, 28; UN veto, 50

264 Lebanon, 75 Liberation Army of Preševo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB), 196 Macedonia, 2, 9, 12, 15, 17, 18 Merkel, Angela, 75 Middle East Quartet, 56 Miliband, David, 85, 87 Milošević, Slobodan, 10-17, 33, 42, 108 Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, 73, 97 Missile defence shield, 72, 90, 117 Mitrovica, 6, 16, 36, 55, 70, 97, 98 Mladić, Ratko, 33 Montenegro, 2, 8-9, 33, 37, 45 Munich Conference on Security Policy, 57 Namibia, 26 National Bank of Serbia, 69 NATO 1999 conflict, 1, 12-14, 88, 114; Bucharest Summit (2008), 79; Contact Group, 36; defence ministers discuss Kosovo, 77; foreign ministers discuss Kosovo, 70; Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR), 15; Kosovo's membership prospects, 5; Partnership for Peace (PfP), 49; pressure on Kosovo Albanians, 35; relations with Kosovo Albanians, 109; relations with Ukraine and Georgia, 72; tensions in Kosovo, 69; threat of fighting, 96 Navarro, Alberto, 124

KOSOVO Nikolić, Tomislav, 44 North Korea, 75 Northern Ireland, 26 Office for the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK), 27, 42, 51-3, 58-9, 82 Operation Allied Force, 14 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 5, 13, 29, 36, 95 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 5 Ottoman Empire, 8 Palestine, 74 Panama, 68 Partition, 6, 17, 30, 35, 41, 84, 120 Peru, 68 Pierce, Karen, 43, 50, 78 Poland, 58 Polt, Michael, 31 Preševo Valley, 17 Pristina University, 10 Prodi, Romano, 95 Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernment (PISG), 17 Putin, Vladimir condemns declaration of independence, 4; criticises the United States, 57; G8, 74-5; Kosovo as a precedent, 30; meeting with Bush, 79; meeting with EU leaders, 90; meeting with Koštunica, 76; need for negotiated solution, 52; opposes independence, 74; reaction to status proposals, 66; support for Serbia, 57, 86; UN veto, 43

INDEX Qatar, 68 Racak, 13 Rambouillet talks (1999), 14 Rašković-Ivić, Sanda, 31, 38, 41, 43, 46, 50, 57 Rehn, Olli call for European unity, 66; Contact Group, 30, 44; declaration of independence, 97; rejects partition, 84; Serbian EU candidacy, 60; support for independence, 52; further talks, 55; visit to Belgrade, 73; Republika Srpska, 22 Rice, Condoleezza discussions with Lavrov, 34, 79; meeting with Jeremić, 83; meeting with Koštunica, 39; meeting with Tadić, 43; rejects continuation of talks, 98; Russian concerns, 56; support for independence, 86, 96; visit to Moscow, 72-3; warning to Unity Team, 81 Roberts, Sir Ivor, 108 Rohan, Albert, 33, 35, 38-9, 42, 59, 61, 66 Roma, 9, 16, 20 Romania, 4, 58, 85, 121 RTK, 20 Rücker, Joachim, 42-3, 46, 48, 50, 63, 81 Rugova, Ibrahim, 11, 12, 20, 24, 28, 30 Rumsfeld, Donald, 43 Rupel, Dimitrij, 101 Russia 1999 conflict, 12-15; analysis of role, 113-14;

265 apparent support for independence, 2, 29; Balkan Wars (1912-13), 8; conflict with Georgia (2008), 7, 115; Contact Group, 12, 76; criticises European Union, 98; criticises US support for unilateral action, 85; denies agreement over status, 31; discussions on status proposals, 60; draft resolution, 72; G8, 75; Kosovo as a precedent, 32; opposes Kosovo’s UN membership, 5; opposition to draft resolution, 74, 79; opposition to imposed settlement, 47; presented with status proposals, 53; reaction to status proposals, 56-7, 62; relations with the United States, 72, 75, 90; role in status process, 7; role of the Security Council, 81; Security Council discussions, 32, 38, 50, 70-1; status talks, 39; support for Serbia, 69; tension with the United States, 7; Troika process, 83; UN veto, 34, 63, 65, 74, 107; warning to Serbia, 57; warns against unilateral action, 90 Samardžić, Slobodan, 62, 73, 84, 94 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 75, 80 Sawers, John, 31, 100, 189 Scotland, 82 Second World War, 9 Sejdiu, Fatmir addresses Security Council, 99; becomes president, 34; decentralisation, 36; failure of

266

KOSOVO

Sejdiu, Fatmir continued draft resolution, 81; high-level meetings, 41, 61; independence process, 47; meeting with Solana, 52; reaction to status proposals, 65; rejects further talks, 51; threat of unilateral action, 78, 95; UN fact-finding mission, 69 Self-Determination (Vetëvendosje), 22, 48, 55 Serbia 14-point document, 89, 91; accepts Ahtisaari's appointment, 27; Albanian community, 69; appeal to the ICJ, 7; approach to talks, 119; autonomy proposals, 28, 32, 69, 82, 84, 87, 91-4, 119; Balkan Wars (1912-13), 8-9; case against independence, 3; criticises Ahtisaari, 59; criticises European Union, 98; criticises Kosovo Albanian side, 35; criticises Rohan, 35; criticises US, 85, 88; decentralisation, 36; discussions on status proposals, 59; EU membership prospects, 6; final meeting with the Troika, 95; final Troika discussions, 94; further talks, 77; high-level meetings, 40; Kosovo privatisations, 37; May 2008 elections, 7; new constitution, 45, 47; opposes status talks, 22; parliamentary resolutions on Kosovo, 27, 81; partition, 30, 41, 84, 120; reaction to status proposals, 57, 61-2; rejects tradeoffs on Kosovo, 97; relations with UNMIK, 42; responses to independence, 38, 93;

Security Council discussions, 26, 32, 38, 40, 43, 45, 50, 67; seeks international support, 67-8; status in Yugoslavia, 9; status talks, 37; tensions with UNOSEK, 39; thanks Russia, 78; Troika process, 82; UN factfinding mission, 67, 69; warns US, 68 Serbian Radical Party (SRS), 44, 53 Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), 53 Simić, Alexander, 39 Slovakia, 4, 58, 74, 85, 121 Slovenia, 2, 10, 58 Solana, Javier call for European unity, 66; Contact Group, 30, 44, 87; criticises US support for unilateral action, 85; meeting with Lavrov, 56; pressure on Kosovo Albanians, 52; Russian and Chinese reactions to status proposals, 66; supports further talks, 55; timeframes, 46 South Africa, 4, 65, 68-9 South Ossetia, 7, 43, 90, 115 Spain, 4, 48, 58, 85, 121 Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), 33, 37 Standards before Status, 18-19, 65, 109 Standards Implementation Plan, 21 Steiner, Michael, 18 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 55-6, 74 Straw, Jack, 34 Tadić, Boris addresses the Security Council, 32; approach to talks, 119; call

INDEX for further talks, 65; discussions with Thaçi and Çeku, 95; failure of draft resolution, 81; high-level meetings, 41, 61; International Court of Justice (ICJ), 97; January 2007 elections, 51; meeting with Ahtisaari, 111; meeting with Chirac, 29; meeting with Troika, 83; meetings with US officials, 43; new constitution, 45, 48; Partnership for Peace (PfP), 49; reaction to status proposals, 55, 62; role of external parties, 86; Troika process, 122 Thaçi, Hashim, 5, 35, 92-5 Tibet, 34 Tito, Josip Broz (Marshal), 9 Titov, Vladimir, 60, 68, 78 Transdniestria, 5, 115 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 90 Troika 14-point document, 89, 91; analysis of role, 117, 121-2; direct discussions, 87-92; final discussions, 94; final report, 96 first meeting, 83; indirect discussions, 84-6; meetings with the sides, 83, 95; partition, 120 Turkey, 4, 6, 9 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 5, 121 Ukraine, 72 UN Charter, 2, 3, 26, 68, 71, 95 UN General Assembly, 5, 7, 87 UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 1; attacked, 22, 48, 55; criticises

267 Serbia, 97; established in 1999, 15; post-status position, 98; protection of Serbs, 16; relations with Kosovo Albanians, 21, 22, 109; replacement by EU mission, 90; responds to threats of unilateral action, 48; support for independence, 109; UN factfinding mission, 67; UN Resolution 1244, 18; UNMIKFRY Joint Document, 18 UN Resolutions 1160 (1998), 12, 26; 1168 (1998), 26; 1199 (1998), 13; 1244 (1999), 15, 18, 23, 26, 31, 32, 43, 46, 62, 65, 87, 89, 96, 99, 100, 114 UN Security Council briefed on status talks, 45; discusses status proposals, 65-6, 71; discusses status talks, 40; discusses Troika report, 99; endorses status review, 23; endorses status talks, 25-6; factfinding mission, 67-71; meetings, 80; standards review, 20; status process, 1; UNMIK discussions, 31, 38, 43, 50, 63, 88 United States analysis of role, 115-17; Contact Group, 12; Dayton Agreement, 11; draft resolution, 71, 78, 81; foreign policy, 18, 108; instability in Kosovo, 39; pressure on Serbia, 52; reaction to status proposals, 56, 62, 64; recognises Kosovo, 4; relations with Russia, 72, 75, 90; role in status process, 7; Security Council discussions, 32, 38, 43, 50, 70, 72; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,

268

KOSOVO

United States continued 29; situation in Kosovo, 23; State Department, 16, 108; support for independence, 1, 3, 16, 29, 66, 68, 70, 77; support for new talks, 79; support for unilateral action, 91; tension with Russia, 7; timeframes, 46-7; Treasury, 37 Troika process, 83; warns Milošević over Kosovo, 11; warns Serbia about Russia, 60; welcomes status talks, 24 Unity Team autonomy proposals, 91; complaints from Serbia, 35; criticises Serbia, 93; discussions on status proposals, 59; final meeting with the Troika, 95; final Troika discussions, 94; meeting with Troika, 83; minority and citizenship issues, 42; negotiation position, 36; pressure from EU, 52; reject autonomy proposals, 59, 94; threat of unilateral action, 47, 84; treaty of friendship, 86; US warning, 81

Verbeke, Johan, 70-1, 100 Verhagen, Maxime, 99 Vojvodina, 10 Volker, Kurt, 85 West Germany, 91 Western Sahara, 74 Wisner, Frank, 36, 56, 77, 82, 89, 96 World Bank, 37, 82 Yugoslavia 1974 Constitution, 10, 22; break up, 2-4, 10; Federal People’s Republic, 9; Hungarians, 10 Italians, 10; Jews, 9; Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 9; Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 9; Kosovo’s status, 9, 10; nations and nationalities, 9; Ruthenians, 9; Slovaks, 10; State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 33 Živković, Zoran, 19