INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON
NUCLEAR WAR AND PLANETARY EMERGENCIES 30th Session: ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS:THE PONTIFICALACADEMY OF SCIENCES4WlX -THE “€TIORE MAIORANA‘ FOUNDATION AND CENTRE FOR SCIENTlf IC CULTURE 4OTH - H H JOHN PAUL I1 AI’OSTOLATE 25TH - CLIMATE/GLOUAL WARMING THE COSMIC RAY EFFECT; EFFECTS ON SPECIES AND BIODIVERSITY;HUMAN EFFECTS;PALEOCLIMATE IMPLICATIONS EVIDENCT FOR GLOBAL WARMING -POLLUTION: E ” 3 I N E DISRUFflNG CHEMICALS; HAZARDOUS MATERIAL; LEGACY WASTES AND RADIOACTIVEWASTE MANAGEMENT IN USA, EUROPE, SOUTHEASTASIA AND JAPAN -THE CULTURALPLANETARY EMERGENCY: ROLE OF THE MEDIA: INTOLERANCE;TERRORISM; IRAQI PERSPECTIVE;OPEN FORUM DEBATE -AIDS AND INFEcnOUS DISEASES: R W C S IN MEDICINE;AIDS VACCINE SIIWEGIES -WATER WATER CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST -ENERGY: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; MITIGATION O f GREENHOUSEWARMING -PERMANENT MONITORING PANELS REPORTS-WORKSHOPS: LONG-TERMSTEWARDSHIPOF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL; AIDS VACCINE STRATEGIESAND ETIHICS
THE SCIENCE AND CULTURE SERIES Nuclear Strategy and Peace Technology
Series Editor: Antonino Zichichi
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International Seminar on Nuclear War - 1st Session: The World-wide Implications of Nuclear War
1982
1984 -
International Seminar on Nuclear War - 2nd Session: How to Avoid a Nuclear War
1983
International Seminar on Nuclear War - 3rd Session: The Technical Basis for Peace
1981
International Seminar on Nuclear War - 4th Session: The Nuclear Winter and the New Defence Systems: Problems and Perspectives
1985 - International Seminar on Nuclear War - 5th Session: SDI, Computer Simulation, New Proposals to Stop the Arms Race 1986
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International Seminar on Nuclear War - 6th Session: InternationalCooperation: The Alternatives
1987
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International Seminar on Nuclear War - 7th Session: The Great Projects for Scientific Collaboration East-West-North-South
1988
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International Seminar on Nuclear War - 8th Session: The New Threats: Space and Chemical Weapons - What Can be Done with the Retired I.N.F. Missiles-LaserTechnology
1989
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International Seminar on Nuclear War - 9th Session: The New Emergencies
1990 - International Seminar on Nuclear War - 10th Session: The New Role of Science 1991 - International Seminar on Nuclear War - 11th Session: Planetary Emergencies 1991 - International Seminar on Nuclear War - 12th Session: Science Confronted with War (unpublished) 1991 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 13th Session: Satellite Monitoring of the Global Environment (unpublished) 1992
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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 14th Session: Innovative Technologies for Cleaning the Environment
1992
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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 15th Session (1st Seminar after Rio): Science and Technology to Save the Earth (unpublished)
1992
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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 16th Session (2nd Seminar after Rio): Proliferationof Weapons for Mass Destructionand Cooperation on Defence Systems
1993
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International Seminar on Planetary Emergencies - 17th Workshop: The Collision of an Asteroid or Comet with the Earth (unpublished)
1993 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 18th Session (4th Seminar after Rio): Global Stability Through Disarmament 1994
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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 19th Session (5th Seminar after Rio): Science after the Cold War
1995
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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 20th Session (6th Seminar after Rio): The Role of Science in the Third Millennium
1996
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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 21st Session (7th Seminar after Rio): New Epidemics, Second Cold War, Decommissioning, Terrorism and Proliferation
1997 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies -22nd Session (8th Seminar after Rio): Nuclear Submarine Decontamination, Chemical Stockpiled Weapons, New Epidemics, Cloning of Genes, New Military Threats, Global Planetary Changes, Cosmic Objects & Energy 1998 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 23rd Session (9th Seminar after Rio): Medicine & Biotechnologies,Proliferation 8, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Climatology & El Nino, Desertification,Defence Against Cosmic Objects, Water & Pollution, Food, Energy, Limits of Development, The Role of Permanent Monitoring Panels 1999
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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies -24th Session: HIV/AIDS Vaccine Needs, Biotechnology, Neuropathologies, Development Sustainability- Focus Africa, Climate and Weather Predictions, Energy, Water, Weapons of Mass Destruction,The Role of Permanent Monitoring Panels, HIV Think Tank Workshop, Fertility Problems Workshop
2000
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InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 25th Session: Water - Pollution, Biotechnology- Transgenic Plant Vaccine, Energy, Black Sea Pollution, Aids - Mother-Infant HIV Transmission, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, Limits of Development - Megacities, Missile Proliferation and Defense, Information Security, Cosmic Objects, Desertification,Carbon Sequestration and Sustainability, Climatic Changes, Global Monitoring of Planet, Mathematics and Democracy, Science and Journalism, Permanent Monitoring Panel Reports, Water for MegacitiesWorkshop, Black Sea Workshop, Transgenic Plants Workshop, Research Resources Workshop, Mother-Infant HIV TransmissionWorkshop, Sequestrationand DesertificationWorkshop, Focus Africa Workshop
2001
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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies -26th Session: AIDS and Infectious Diseases - Medicationor Vaccination for DevelopingCountries; Missile Proliferationand Defense; Tchernobyl - Mathematics and Democracy; Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy; Floods and Extreme Weather Events Coastal Zone Problems; Science and Technology for Developing Countries; Water Transboundary Water Conflicts; Climatic Changes -Global Monitoring of the Planet; Information Security; Pollution in the Caspian Sea; Permanent Monitoring Panels Reports; Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Workshop; AIDS and Infectious Diseases Workshop; Pollution Workshop
2002 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 27th Session: Society and Structures: Historical Perspectives - Culture and Ideology; National and Regional Geopolitical Issues; Globalization- Economy and Culture; Human Rights - Freedom and Democracy Debate; Confrontations and Countermeasures: Present and Future Confrontations; Psychology of Terrorism; Defensive Countermeasures; Preventive Countermeasures; General Debate; Science and Technology: Emergencies; Pollution, Climate - Greenhouse Effect: Desertification,Water Pollution, Algal Bloom; Brain and Behaviour Diseases; The Cultural Emergency: General Debate and Conclusions; Permanent Monitoring Panel Reports; Information Security Workshop; Kangaroo Mother’s Care Workshop; Brain and Behaviour Diseases Workshop
2003 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 29th Session: Society and Structures: Culture and Ideology- Equity Territorial and Economics - Psychology -Tools and Countermeasures -Worldwide Stability - Risk Analysis for Terrorism -The Asymmetric Threat -America’s New “Exceptionalism” - Militant lslamist Groups Motives and Mindsets-Analysing the New Approach The Psychology of Crowds - Cultural Relativism- Economic and Socio-economic Causes and Consequences - The Problems of American Foreign Policy UnderstandingBiological Risk Chemical Threats and Responses - Bioterrorism Nuclear Survivial Criticalities Responding to the Threats - National Security and Scientific Openness - Working Groups Reports and Recommendations
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2004 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies- 30th Session: Anniversary Celebrations: The Pontifical Academy of Sciences 400th -The ‘Ettore Majorana’ Foundation and Centre for Scientific Culture 40th - H.H. John Paul II Apostolate 25th -Climate/Global Warming: The Cosmic Ray Effect; Effectson Species and Biodiversity; Human Effects; Paleoclimate Implications; Evidence for Global Warming - Pollution: Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals; Hazardous Material; Legacy Wastes and Radioactive Waste Management in USA, Europe; Southeast Asia and Japan -The Cultural Planetary Emergency: Role of the Media; Intolerance; Terrorism; Iraqi Perspective; Open Forum Debate - AIDS and Infectious Diseases: Ethics in Medicine; AIDS Vaccine Strategies -Water: Water Conflicts in the Middle East - Energy: Developing Countries; Mitigation of Greenhouse Warming Permanent Monitoring Panels Reports - Workshops: Long-TermStewardship of Hazardous Material; AIDS Vaccine Strategies and Ethics
THE SCIENCE AND CULTURE SERIES
Nuclear Strategy and Peace Technology
"E. Majorana" Centre for Scientific Culture Erice, Italy, 18-26 August 2003
Series editor and Chairman: A. Zichichi
edited by R. Ragaini
r pWorld Scientific NEWJERSEY
*
LONDON
*
SINGAPORE
- SHANGHAI
*
HONGXONG
- TAIPEI - C H E N N A I
Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Re. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA ofice: Suite 202, 1060 Main Street, River Edge, NJ 07661
UK ofice: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE
INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON NUCLEAR WAR AND PLANETARY EMERGENCIES 30m SESSION: ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS: THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 400m -THE 'ETTORE MAJORANA' FOUNDATION AND CENTRE FOR SCIENTIFIC CULTURE 40m-H.H. JOHN PAUL I1 APOSTOLATE 25'"- CLIMATEKLOBAL WARMING: THE COSMIC RAY EFFECT; EFFECTS ON SPECIES AND BIODIVERSITY; HUMAN EFFECTS; PALEOCLIMATE IMPLICATIONS; EVIDENCE FOR GLOBAL WARMING - POLLUTION ENDOCRINE DISRUPTING CHEMICALS; HAZARDOUS MATERIAL; LEGACY WASTES AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT IN USA, EUROPE; SOUTHEAST ASIA AND JAPAN-THE CULTURAL PLANETARYEMERGENCY: ROLE OF THE MEDIA; INTOLERANCE; TERRORISM; IRAQI PERSPECTIVE; OPEN FORUM DEBATE -AIDS AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES: ETHICS IN MEDICINE; AIDS VACCINE STRATEGIES - WATER: WATER CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST - ENERGY: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; MITIGATION OF GREENHOUSE WARMING - PERMANENT MONITORING PANELS REPORTS - WORKSHOPS: LONG-TERM STEWARDSHIP OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL; AIDS VACCINE STRATEGIES AND ETHICS
Copyright 0 2004 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, orparts thereoj may not be reproduced inanyformorby any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.
For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.
ISBN 981-238-820-6
Printed in Singapore.
vii
CONTENTS 1.
CELEBRATIONS
Marcel0 Sdnchez Sorondo The Pontifical Academy of Sciences Alan Cook Improving Natural Knowledge: The First Hundred Years of the Royal Society, 16661760
3
15
Guy Ourisson
The Acad6mie des Sciences and French Centralisation
21
Antonino Zickichi The 40th Anniversary of the ‘Ettore Majorana’Foundation and Centre for Scientific Culture
28
Arnold Burgen The Academia Europaea
41
Rocco ButtigIione The 25th Anniversary of the Apostolate of H.H. John Paul I1
2.
CLIMATE: GLOBAL WARMING
Nir J. Shaviv Climate Change and the Cosmic Ray Connection
47
A. Townsend Peterson Climate Change Effects on Species and Biodiversity
59
B.D. Santer and T.M.L. Wigley New Fingerprints of Human Effects on Climate
69
Michael E. Mann Paleoclimate Implications for Recent Human Influence on Climate
86
David Parker and Chris.Folland Evidence for Global Warming
92
viii
3.
ENDOCRINE DISRUPTING CHEMICALS
J.I? Myers, L.J. Guillette, Jx, I? Palanza, S. Parmigiani, S.H. Swan and KS. vom Saal The Emerging Science of Endocrine Disruption
4.
105
POLLUTION: LONG-TERM STEWARDSHIP OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
Carlo Giovanardi The Italian Policy for Waste Management and the Co-operation with the International Scientific Community
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James H. Clarke, Lome G. Everett and Stephen J.Kowall Containment of Legacy Wastes During Stewardship
125
William R. Fmdenburg @resented by James H. Clarke) Public Involvement and Communication in the Long-Term Management of U.S. Nuclear Waste Sites
130
AIIan G. Duncan A European Perspective on StakeholderInvolvement in Nuclear Waste Management
135
Balamurugan Gurusamy Hazardous Waste Management in SoutheastAsia
140
Tomio Kawata Responding to Fermi’s Warning: Japanese Approach to Dealing with Radioactive Waste Problems
150
Stephen J. KowaIl The U.S. Approach to the Science and Technology of Legacy Waste Management
157
5.
THECULTURAL PLANETARY EMERGENCY: FOLEOF THE MEDIA
Michael Stunner Spin in War and Peace
163
ix
6.
THECULTURAL PLANETARY EMERGENCY
Ahmad Kamal Cultural Intolerance
169
Antonio Marzano The Impact of the Planetary Emergencies on Worldwide Productivity and Cooperation with the International Scientific Community
174
Kctor Kremenyuk War on Terrorism: A Search for Focus
180
Hussain Al-Shahristani Iraq After Saddam: An Iraqi Perspective
184
7.
AIDS AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES: ETHICS IN MEDICINE
Diego Buriot Health and Security: SevereAcute Respiratory Syndrome ( S A R S ) : Taking a New Threat Seriously
191
Udo Schiiklenk Professional Responsibilities of Biomedical Scientists in Public Discourse
196
J L . Hutton Ethics, Justice and Statistics
212
Ivan FranCa-Junior Is Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment a Human Right? Lessons Learned from the Brazilian Experience
218
8.
AIDS AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES: AIDS VACCINE STRATEGIES
Jorma Hinkula, Claudia Devito, Bartek Zuber, Franco M. Buonaguro, Reinhold Benthin, Britta Wahren and UUSchroder Systemic and Mucosal Immune Responses Induced by HIV-1 DNA and HIV-Peptide or VLP Booster Immunization
229
X
Rigmor Thorstensson Pre-clinical Primate Vaccine Studies
243
Efwhia Vardas Preparing for Phase 1/11HIV Vaccine Trials in South Africa and Planning for Phase I11 Trials
247
9.
WATER CONFLICTS
Farhang Mehr The Politics of Water
255
Maher Salman and Wael Mualla The Utilization of Water Resources for Agriculture in Syria: Analysis of the Current Situation and Future Challenges
263
Uri Shavit, Ran Holtzman, Michal Segal, Ittai Gavrieli, Efrat Farber and Avner Vengosh The Lower Jordan River
275
Munther J. Haddadin Challenges to Water Management in the Middle East
289
Shad Sorek, K Borisov, A. Yakirevich,A. Melloul and S. Shaath Seawater Intrusion into the Gaza Coastal Aquifer as an Example for Water and Environment Inter-linked Actions
299
10.
THEPLANETARY EMERGENCIES: ITALIAN CIVIL PROTECTION
Guido Bertolaso The Italian Civil Protection Response to Planetary Emergencies and the Co-operation with the International Scientific Community (Kdeo)
11.
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THECULTURAL PLANETARY EMERGENCY Focus ON TERRORISM: MOTIVATIONS
Ahmad Kamal Report of the Open Forum Debate on Terrorism
3 13
xi
12.
ENERGY
Hishani Khatib Energy in Developing Countries - Is It a Special Case?
317
Bob van der Zwaan Some Perspectives on the Prospects of Nuclear Energy in the Developing World and Asia
326
Norman J; Rosenberg, R. Cesar Izaurralde and I;: Blaine Metting Applications of Biotechnology to Mitigation of Greenhouse Warming 335
13.
PERMANENT MONITORING PANEL MEETINGS AND REPORTS
Mother and Child Permanent Monitoring Panel Nathalie Charpak Panel Report
349
Limits of Development Permanent Monitoring Panel Hiltmar Schubert Panel Report
351
Albert0 Gonzalez-Pozo Urban Mobility in the Mexican Metropolis
359
K.C. Sivaramakrishnan Mobility in Megacities: Indian Scenario
374
World Federation of Scientists Permanent Monitoring Panel on Information Security Henning Wegener Panel Report
383
Henning Wegenel; Elliam A. Barletta, Olivia Bosch, Dmitry Chereshkin,Ahmad Kamal, Andrey Krutskikh, Axel H.R. Lehmann, Timothy L. Thomas, vitali Tsygichko and Jody R. Westby -Paper Toward a Universal Order of Cyberspace: Managing Threats from Cybercrime to Cybenvar
385
xii
Permanent Monitoring Panels on Floods and Unexpected Meteorological Events, Water and Climate Robert Clark Panel Report
43 6
Pollution Permanent Monitoring Panel Richard C. Ragaini Panel Report
43 9
Energy Permanent Monitoring Panel Richard Wilson Panel Report
443
Joseph Chahoud Syria’s Renewable Energy Master Plan: A Message from the Government
456
Andrei Gagarinski Status of Nuclear Energy
47 1
Mark D. Levine Energy Demand Growth in China: The Crucial Role of Energy Efficiency Programs
477
Risk Analysis Permanent Monitoring Panel Terence Taylor Panel Report
488
Andrey A. Piontkovshy The Pillars of International Security: Traditions Challenged
490
vladimir B. Britkov Safety as a Result of Providing Information
495
Reiner K. Huber Anticipatory Defense: Its Fundamental Logic and Implications
498
Desertification Permanent Monitoring Panel Andrew Warren Panel Report
512
xiii
Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals Permanent Monitoring Panel Stefan0 Parmigian i Panel Report
14.
516
LONG-TERM STEWARDSHIP OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL WORKSHOP
Stephen J. Kowall and Lorne G. Everett Monitoring and Stewardship of Legacy Nuclear and Hazardous Waste Sites
519
Elizabeth K. Hocking Achieving Stewardship and Contributing to a Sustainable Society Through Stakeholder Involvement
522
A.I. Rybalchenko Radioactive Waste of Defense Activities in the 20th Century Handling and Management
526
David K. Smith, Richard B. Knap, Nina D. Rosenberg and Andrew EB. Tompson International Cooperation to Address the Radioactive Legacy in States of the Former Soviet Union
534
Igor S. Zektser Contamination and Vulnerability of Groundwater Resources in Russia
545
15.
AIDS VACCINE STRATEGIES AND ETHICS IN INFECTIOUS DISEASES WORKSHOP Joint Working Group Report of AIDS and Infectious Diseases PMP and Mother and Child Health PMP
Seminar Participants
55 1
557
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1.
CELEBRATIONS
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THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
MARCEL0 S h C H E Z SORONDO Chancellor Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, Rome, The Vatican See: Dialogo; Specola Vaticana THE NATURE AND GOALS OF THE ACADEMY The Pontifical Academy of Sciences has its origins in the Accademia dei Lincei ('the Academy of Lynxes') which was established in Rome in 1603, under the patronage of Pope Clement VIII, by the learned Roman Prince, Federico Cesi. The leader of this Academy was the famous scientist, Galileo Galilei. It was dissolved after the death of its founder but then recreated by Pope Pius IX in 1847 and given the name 'Accademia Pontificia dei Nuovi Lincei' ('the Pontifical Academy of the New Lynxes'). Pope Pius XI then re-founded the Academy in 1936 and gave it its present name, bestowing upon it statutes which were subsequentlyupdated by Paul VI in 1976 and by John Paul II in 1986. Since 1936 the Pontifical Academy of Sciences has been concerned both with investigating specific scientific subjects belonging to individual disciplines and with the promotion of interdisciplinary co-operation. It has progressively increased the number of its Academicians and the international character of its membership. The Academy is an independent body within the Holy See and enjoys freedom of research. Although its rebirth was the result of an initiative promoted by the Roman Pontiff and it is under the direct protection of the ruling Pope, it organises its own activities in an autonomous way in line with the goals which are set out in its statutes: 'The Pontifical Academy of Sciences has as its goal the promotion of the progress of the mathematical, physical and natural sciences, and the study of related epistemological questions and issues' (Statutes of 1976, art.2, 1). Its deliberations and the studies it engages in, like the membership of its Academicians, are not influenced by factors of a national, political or religious character. For this reason, the Academy is a valuable source of objective scientific information which is made available to the Holy See and to the international scientific community. Today, the work of the Academy covers six main areas: a) fundamental science; b) the science and technology of global questions and issues; c) science in favour of the problems of the Third World; d) the ethics and politics of science; e) bioethics; and fl epistemology. The disciplines involved are sub-divided into nine fields: the disciplines of physics and related disciplines; astronomy; chemistry; the earth and environment sciences; the life sciences (botany, agronomy, zoology, genetics, molecular biology, biochemistry, the neurosciences, surgery); mathematics; the applied sciences; and the philosophy and history of sciences. The new members of the Academy are elected by the body of Academicians and are chosen from men and women of every race and religion on the basis of the high scientific value of their activities and their high moral profile. They are then officially appointed by the Roman Pontiff. The Academy is governed by a President, appointed from its members by the Pope, who is helped by a scientific Council and by the Chancellor. Initially made up of eighty Academicians, of whom seventy were appointed for life, in 1986 John Paul II raised the number of members for life to eighty, side by side with a limited number of Honorary Academicians chosen because they are highly qualified figures, and others who are Academicians because of the
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posts they hold, amongst whom: the Chancellor of the Academy, the Director of the Vatican Observatory, the Prefect of the Vatican Apostolic Library, and the Prefect of the Vatican Secret Archive. In conformity with the goals set out in its statutes, the Pontifical Academy of Sciences 'a) holds plenary sessions of the Academicians; b) organises meetings directed towards the progress of science and the solution of technical-scientific problems which are thought to be especially important for the development of the peoples of the world; c) promotes scientific inquiries and research which can contribute, in the relevant places and organisations, to the investigation of moral, social and spiritual questions; d) organises conferences and celebrations; e) is responsible for the publication of the deliberations of its own meetings, of the results of the scientific research and the studies of Academicians and other scientists' (Statutes of 1976, art. 3, 9 1). To this end, traditional 'study-weeks' are organised and specific 'working-groups' are established. The headquarters of the Academy is the 'Casina Pi0 IV',a small villa built by the famous architect Piero Ligorio in 1561 as the summer residence of the Pope of the time. Surrounded by the lawns, shrubbery and trees of the Vatican Gardens, frescoes, stuccoes, mosaics, and fountains from the sixteenth century can be admired within its precincts. Every two years the Academy awards its 'Pius XI Medal', a prize which was established in 1961 by John XXUI. This medal is given to a young scientist who has distinguished himself or herself at an international level because of his or her scientific achievements. Amongst the publications of the Academy, reference should be made to three series: Scriuta Varia, Documenta, and Commentarii. The most important works, such as for example the papers produced by the study-weeks and the conferences, are published in the Scriuta Varia. In a smaller format, the Documenta series publishes the short texts produced by various activities, as well as the speeches by the Popes or the declarations of the Academicians on subjects of special contemporary relevance. The Commentarii series contains articles, observations and comments of a largely monographic character on specific scientific subjects. The expenses incurred by the activities of the Academy are met by the Holy See. During its various decades of activity, the Academy has had a number of Nobel Prize winners amongst its members, many of whom were appointed Academicians before they received this prestigious international award. Amongst these should be listed Lord Ernest Rutherford (Nobel Prize for Physics, 1908), Guglielmo Marconi (Physics, 1909), Alexis Carrel (Physiology, 1912), Max von Laue (Physics, 1914), Max Planck (Physics, 1918), Niels Bohr (Physics, 1922), Werner Heisenberg (Physics, 1932), Paul Dirac (Physics, 1933), Erwin Schroedinger (Physics, 1933), Sir Alexander Fleming (Physiology, 1945), Chen Ning Yang (Physics, 1957), Rudolf L. Mossbauer (Physics, 1961), Max F. Perutz (Chemistry, 1962), John Eccles (Physiology, 1963), Charles H. Townes (Physics, 1964), Manfred Eigen and George Porter (Chemistry, 1967), Har Gobind Khorana and Marshall W. Nirenberg (Physiology, 1968). Recent Nobel Prize winners who have also been, or are presently, Academicians may also be listed: Christian de Duve (Physiology, 1974), Werner Arber and George E. Palade (Physiology, 1974), David Baltimore (Physiology, 1975), Aage Bohr (Physics, 1975), Abdus Salam (Physics, 1979), Paul Berg (Chemistry, 1980), Kai Siegbahn (Physics, 1981), Sune Bergstrom (Physiology, 1982), Car10 Rubbia (Physics, 1984), Rita Levi-Montalcini (Physiology, 1986), John C. Polan9 (Chemistry, 1986), Jean-Marie Lehn (Chemistry, 1987), Joseph E. Murray (Physiology, 1990), Gary S. Becker (Economics, 1992), Paul J. Crutzen (Chemistry,
5 1995), Claude Cohen-Tannoudji (Physics, 1997) and Ahmed H. Zewail (Chemistry, 1999). Padre Agostino Gemelli (1878-1959), the founder of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart and President of the Academy after its re-foundation until 1959, and Mons. Georges Lemaftre (1894-1966), one of the fathers of contemporary cosmology who held the office of President from 1960 to 1966, were eminent Academicians of the past. Under the Presidency of the Brazilian biophysicist Carlos Chagas and of his successor Giovanni Battista Marini-Bettblo, the Academy linked its activity of scientific research to the promotion of peace and the progress of the peoples of the world, and dedicated increasing attention to the scientific and health care problems of the Third World. The Presidency of the Academy is presently entrusted to the Italian physicist, Nicola Cabibbo. The goals and the hopes of the Academy, within the context of the dialogue between science and faith, were expressed by Pius XI (1922-1939) in the following way in the Motu Proprio which brought about its re-foundation: 'Amongst the many consolations with which divine Goodness has wished to make happy the years of our Pontificate, I am happy to place that of our having being able to see not a few of those who dedicate themselves to the studies of the sciences mature their attitude and their intellectual approach towards religion. Science, when it is real cognition, is never in contrast with the truth of the Christian faith. Indeed, as is well known to those who study the history of science, it must be recognised on the one hand that the Roman Pontiffs and the Catholic Church have always fostered the research of the learned in the experimental field as well, and on the other hand that such research has opened up the way to the defence of the deposit of supernatural truths entrusted to the Church...We promise again, and it is our strongly-held intention, that the 'Pontifical Academicians', through their work and our Institution, work ever more and ever more effectively for the progress of the sciences. Of them we do not ask anything else, since in this praiseworthy intent and this noble work is that service in favour of the truth that we expect ofthem'(AAS28, 1936, p. 427; Italian translation, OR, 31.10.1936). After more than forty years, John Paul II once again emphasised the role and the goals of the Academy at the time of his first speech to the Academicians which was given on 10 November 1979 to commemorate the centenary of the birth of Albert Einstein: 'the existence of this Pontifical Academy of Sciences, of which in its ancient ancestry Galileo was a member and of which today eminent scientists are members, without any form of ethnic or religious discrimination, is a visible sign, raised amongst the peoples of the world, of the profound harmony that can exist between the truths of science and the truths of faith...The Church of Rome together with all the Churches spread throughout the world, attributes a great importance to the function of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences. The title of 'Pontifical' given to the Academy means, as you know, the interest and the commitment of the Church, in different forms from the ancient patronage, but no less profound and effective in character. As the lamented and distinguished President of the Academy, Monsignor Lemaitre, observed: 'Does the Church need science? But for the Christian nothing that is human is foreign to him. How could the Church have lacked interest in the most noble of the occupations which are most strictly human - the search for truth? Both believing scientists and non-believing scientists are involved in deciphering the palimpsest of nature which has been built in a rather complex way, where the traces of the different stages of the long evolution of the world have been covered over and mixed up. The believer, perhaps, has the advantage of knowing that the puzzle has a solution, that the underlying writing is in the final analysis the work of an intelligent being, and that
6 thus the problem posed by nature has been posed to be solved and that its difficulty is without doubt proportionate to the present or future capacity of humanity. This, perhaps, will not give him new resources for the investigation engaged in. But it will contribute to maintaining him in that healthy optimism without which a sustained effort cannot be engaged in for long' ('Discorso alla Pontificia Accademia delle Scienze, 10.11.1979', inhegnumenti, II, 2 (1979), pp. 1119-1120). It was precisely in that speech that John Paul II formally called on historians, theologians and scientists to examine again in detail the Galileo case. And he asked them to do this 'in the faithful recognition of errors, by whomsoever committed', in order to 'remove the distrust that this case still generates, in the minds of many people, placing obstacles thereby in the way of fruitful concord between science and faith' (ibidem, pp. 1117-1118). A HISTORICAL SURVEY: FROM THE ACCADEMIA DEI LINCEI TO TODAY'S PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES The historical itinerary of the Academy is summarised in the articles written by Marini-Bettolo (1986) and by Marchesi (1988), and in broader fashion in the monograph by Regis Ladous (1994). As was observed at the beginning of this paper, the roots of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences are to be traced back to the post-Renaissance epoch. Its origins go back to the ancient Accademia dei Lincei, established in 1603 by Prince Federico Cesi (1585-1630) when he had just reached the age of eighteen. Cesi was a botanist and naturalist, the son of the Duke of Acquasparta, and a member of a noble Roman family. Three other young men took part in this initiative: Giovanni Heck, a Dutch physician aged twenty-seven; Francesco Stelluti di Fabriano; and Anastasio de Filiis de Temi. Thus it was that the first Academy dedicated to the sciences came into being, and it took its place at the side of the other Academies - of literature, history, philosophy and art - which had arisen in the humanistic climate of the Renaissance. The example of Cesi, and of the group of scholars led by him, was followed some years later in other countries - the Royal Society was created in London in 1662 and the AcadCmie des Sciences was established in France in 1666. Although he looked back to the model of the Aristotelian-Platonic Academy, his aim was altogether special and innovative. Cesi wanted with his Academicians to create a method of research based upon observation, experiment, and the inductive method. He thus called this Academy 'dei Lincei' because the scientists which adhered to it had to have eyes as sharp as lynxes in order to penetrate the secrets of nature, observing it at both microscopic and macroscopic levels. Seeking to observe the universe in all its dimensions, the 'Lincei' made use of the microscope (tubulus opticus) and the telescope (perspicillus-occhialino)in their scientific research, and extended the horizon of knowledge fiom the extremely small to the extremely large. Federico bestowed his own motto on the 'Lincei' - 'minima cura si maxima vis' ('take care of small things if you want to obtain the greatest results'). The Cesi group was also interested in the new scientific and naturalistic discoveries then coming fiom the New World, as is demonstrated by the most significant works of the college of the first 'Lincei' - the Rerum medicarum thesaurus novae Hispaniae, later known as the Tesoro Messicano, which was printed in Rome in 1628. This was a very extensive collection of new geographical and naturalistic knowledge, and contained in addition accounts of explorations canied out in the
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Americas. From the outset the Academy had its ups and downs. A few years after its foundation it was strongly obstructed by Cesi's father because he believed that within it activity was being engaged in which was not very transparent in character - for example, studies in alchemy. But after the death of Federico's father, the abundant economic resources which were now obtained thanks to Federico's inheritance, as well as the fact that renowned scholars such as Galileo Galilei, Giovan Battista della Porta, Fabio Colonna, and Cassiano dal Pozzo joined its ranks, enabled the Academy to progress and advance. The religious character of the Academy cannot be overlooked. It was placed under the protection of St. John the Evangelist who was often portrayed in the miniatures of its publications with an eagle and a lynx, both of which were symbols of sight and reason. It was therefore conceived as an assembly of scholars whose goal as one can read in its Rules, described as the 'Linceografo' - was 'knowledge and wisdom of things to be obtained not only through living together with honesty and piety, but with the further goal of communicating them peacefully to men without causing any harm'. Nature was seen not only as a subject of study but also of contemplation. Amongst the suggestions of the 'Linceografo' there is also that of preceding study and work with prayer - 'for this reason the Lynxes, before doing anything at all, must first raise their minds to God, and humbly pray to him and invoke the intercession of the saints' (cf. di Rovasenda and Marini-Bettblo, 1986, p. 18). Amongst the practices of spiritual piety of the members there was the reciting of the liturgical office of the Blessed Virgin Mary and the Davidic Psalter. For this reason, as Enrico di Rovesanda observes, 'the religious inspiration of the Lincei cannot be overlooked, as is done in many quarters, nor can it be reduced to an 'almost mystical glow of the school of Pythagoras', as has also been suggested. The high moral figure of Cesi acts to guarantee the sincere and loyal profession of its religious faith' (ibidem, p. 19). One of the mottoes of the Academy - Sapientiae cupidi - indicated the striving for constant research into truth through scientific speculation, based upon the mathematical and natural sciences but always located within a sapiential horizon. Like Galileo, whose great supporter he was, Cesi admired Aristotle but not the Aristotelians of the University of Padua who had refused to look at things through the telescope of the Pisan scientist. He was in addition rather critical of the university culture of his day. Federico Cesi also engaged in important activity of mediation between the Roman theological world and Galileo, reaching the point of advising the latter to not insist in his polemics about the interpretation of Holy Scripture so that he could dedicate himself in a more effective way to scientific research. Death struck Cesi down in 1630 when Galileo was about to finish his Dialog0 sui Massimi Sistemi, the manuscript of which Galileo wanted to send to Cesi himself so that the latter could organise its publication. After Cesi's death the activities of the Academy diminished to such an extent as to bring about its closure. The first attempts to bring the 'Lincei' back into existence took place in 1745 in Rimini as a result of the efforts of a group of scientists belonging to the circle made up of Giovanni Paolo Siomne Bianchi (known as Janus Plancus), Stefan0 Galli and Giuseppe Garampi. But the new Academy had a very short life. The attempt at refoundation made by Padre Feliciano Scarpellini (1762-1840) in Rome at the beginning of the nineteenth century met with greater success. He gave the name of 'Lincei' to a private academy that he had established in 1795. Despite a lack of funds and a whole series of difficulties, Scarpellini managed to keep the name of 'Lincei' alive and to
8 bring together in a single academic body the various scientists working in the Papal States such as the mathematician Domenico Chelini, the naturalist Carlo Bonaparte, the anatomist Alessandro Flajani, the chemists Domenico Morichini and Pietro Peretti, Prince Baldassarre Odescalchi, the physicists Gioacchino Pessuti and Paolo Volpicelli, and the physician Benedetto Viale (cf. Marini-Bettblo, 1986, p. 10). The authorities of the Papal States took new practical initiatives to re-found the Academy during the first half of the nineteenth century in response to the wishes of Pope Pius VII (1800-1823) and Leo XII (1823-1829), with the allocation of the second floor of Palazzo Senatorio in Capidoglio to the Academy as its headquarters. But in 1847 it was Pius IX who officially renewed the Academy with the name (which had already been suggested by Gregory XVI in 1838) of 'Accademia Pontificia dei Nuovi Lincei' ('the Pontifical Academy of the New Lynxes'), ensuring the drawing up of new statutes which envisaged, amongst other things, the presence of thirty resident members and forty correspondent members. During this period of activity famous astronomers and priests were present within its ranks, such as Francesco de Vico and Angelo Secchi. During the revolutionary upheavals of 1848 the Roman Republic sought to expel the Academy from the Campidoglio. However, the institution managed to keep its headquarters by using various bureaucratic manoeuvres. In 1870, following the fall of the independent Papal States and the unification of the Kingdom of Italy, the Academy divided into two different institutions: the 'Reale Accademia dei Lincei', which later became the present Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei with its headquarters in Palazzo Corsini alla Lungara, and the 'Accademia Pontificia dei Nuovi Lincei', which was transferred from the Capidoglio to the Casina Pi0 IV villa in the Vatican Gardens. One had to wait, as has already been observed, until 28 October 1936 for a further renewal of the institution, which took place in response to the insistent requests of the Jesuit Giuseppe Gianfranceschi. This scientist was Professor of Physics at the Gregorian University and had been the President of the Accademia Pontificia dei Nuovi Lincei since 1921. A new Pontifical Academy of Sciences was thus created by Pope XI by the Motu Proprio In Multis Solaciis (for an Italian translation see Marini-Bettblo, 1987, pp. 199-203. This work has an accurate summary of the life of the Academy for the years 1936-1986). The Presidency was entrusted to the Rector of the Catholic University, Padre Agostino Gemelli, who was seconded by the Chancellor, Pietro Salviucci, and by a Council composed of four Academicians. Annual (and later two-yearly) plenary sessions were proposed for all the Academicians. The accounts of the activities and the contributions of the members were published in the Acta Pontijiciae Academiae Scientiarum and later on in the Commentationes. The first assembly was inaugurated on 1 June 1937 by the then Cardinal Secretary of State, Eugenio Pacelli, the future Pope Pius XII. In discussing this period of the Academy reference should be made to the presence of such distinguished members as Ugo Armaldi, Giuseppe Armellini, Niels Bohr, Lucien Cuenot, Georges Lemaitre, Tullio Levi-Civita, Guglielmo Marconi, Robert Millikan, Umberto Nobile, Max Planck, Ernest Rutherford, Erwin Shrodinger, Francesco Seven, Edmund Whittaker, and Pieter Zeeman. During the years 1937-1946 the publications of the Academy had a largely Italian character, presenting, for example, the work of the Italian Academicians Pistolesi, Crocco, and Nobile on aerodynamics. But there were also papers by foreign Academicians such those as by E. Schrodinger in 1937 on quantum physics and by M. Tibor in 1937-1939 of an astronomical character. During the Second World War the
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Academy greatly reduced its activity but nonetheless found space for the publications of Jewish Italian scientists who had been marginalised by the race laws of 1938, amongst whom should be mentioned a group of mathematicians of Jewish descent including Tullio Levi-Civita and Vito Volterra, and others such as Giuseppe Levi, Rita Levi-Montalcini, E. FOB and G.S. Coen. Pius XI1 (1939-1958), who succeeded Pius X, did not fail to make addresses to the Academicians, even during the war years, such as the address of 30 November 1941 on the occasion of the inauguration of the fourth academic year. This address was dedicated to a long and profound reflection on the position of man in relation to the Creation and God (cf. Discorsi e Radiomessaggi, III,pp. 271-281). In the post-war period, at a time of sensitive reconstruction and the rebuilding of international relations, in the face of the great difficulties encountered at the level of scientific contacts and exchange, the Academy undertook the publication of the research results of greatest interest of the various fields of science which had been achieved during the war in its work Relationes de Auctis Scientiis ternpore belli (aa. 1939-1945). This publication was of marked importance in fostering the renewal of scientific contacts between the nations that had previously been at war. In 1946 Alexander Fleming (188 1 - 1955) was appointed Academician in recognition of his discovery of penicillin - a discovery that opened the way to the pharmacological production of antibiotics. During the 1950s, in parallel with the problems of reconstruction and the development of under-developed regions, the activity of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences centred around the questions and issues of applied science. In 1955 the study-week on trace elements was held, when for the first time the problem of agrarian production and food sources was addressed. After the election to the papacy of John XXIIl (1958), Padre Gemelli died in 1959. The Presidency of the Academy was then held by G. Lemaitre. The 1960s witnessed an exponential growth and development of science connected with electronics and the conquest of space. This gave new impetus to industry and technological advance but also to nuclear armaments. In astrophysics the discovery of new sensors and the development of radio-astronomy opened up the universe to new interpretations. Biology became directed towards the molecular study of genetics. In 1961 the Pontifical Academy of Sciences organised a study-week on the macromolecules of interest to biology, and in particular on the nucleoproteins, a subject which was then of major importance for international research. On that occasion, when meeting the Academicians, John XXIII reaffirmed the educational and cultural mission of the Church and the function of scientific progress in relation to the positive appreciation of the human person. The Pope recalled in addition that science is directed above all else towards the development and growth of the personality of man and the glorification of God the Creator: 'indeed, far from fearing the most audacious discoveries of men, the Church instead believes that every advance in the possession of the truth involves a development of the human person and constitutes a road towards the first truth, and the glorification of the creative work of God' ('Discorso in occasione del XXV dell'Accademia, 30.10.1961', in Discorsi, Messaggi e Colloqui del Santo Padre Giovanni XXlII, vol. III,p. 493). In 1962, at the time of the plenary session of that year, a study-week dedicated to astronomy which addressed the subject of cosmic radiation in space was held, guided in first person by the President of the Academy, Monsignor Lemaitre. In 1964, at the time of the pontificate of Paul VI (1963-1978), there appeared
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amongst the publications of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences the Miscellanea Galileiana of Monsignor Pi0 Paschini, who was Professor of History at the Lateran University. The Galileo case was slowly reopened, a development favoured by the reference made to it by Vatican Council II in n. 36 of Gaudium et Spes. This led to the address by John Paul 11 of 1979 to which reference has already been made. After the death of Georges Lemaitre, in 1966 Padre Daniel OConnell was made President of the Academy. A Jesuit and Irish astronomer, he had previously been Director of the Vatican Observatory and had been an Academician for life since 1964. He was also the author, together with other astronomers, of an important general atlas of the stars. The year 1967 was marked by the publication of the encyclical Popularurn Progressio, in which Paul VI brought to worldwide attention all the major problems inherent in the development of the Third World. This document also contained an appeal to engage in international scientific co-operation so that this could in all forms favour developing countries. It introduced the idea that scientific progress and advance must be guided by a 'new humanism': 'every advance of ours, each one of our syntheses reveals something about the design which presides over the universal order of beings, the effort of man and humanity to progress. We are searching for a new humanism, which will allow modem man to refind himself, taking on the higher values of love, fiiendship, prayer and contemplation' (n. 20). In harmony with the themes of the encyclical, the Academy thought it was necessary to open itself to collaboration with the scientists of the Third World and by 1968 it was already holding a study-week on the subject of 'organic matter and soil fertility', a subject which dealt with the application of science to agricultural production and the solution to the problems of hunger in the world. In 1972 for the first time a secular President was elected - the Brazilian Carlos Chagas, who had already been a member of the United Nations and the General Secretary of the first conference of the United Nations on Science and Technologies for Development. The new President imparted a new direction to the activities of the Academy, which were now more centred around solving the great problems of post-industrial society (cf. di Rovesanda, 2000). The scientific activity of the Academy was thus directed not only towards the subjects of science, which were more specific to Westem culture, but also began to be concerned, with the co-operation of Giovanni Battista Marini-Bettblo (who succeeded Chagas in 19SS), with the scientific and health care problems connected with the growth and development of the Third World ('development ethics'). The 1980s witnessed the development of new directions in scientific research which moved in the direction of the life sciences, the earth sciences, and ecology. Mankind had to face up to new problems, such as pollution, changes in the biosphere, energy reserves, and genetic manipulation. In 1982 the Academy committed itself at an international level to the promotion of peace with the drawing up of a document on nuclear armaments (cf. 'Dichiarazione sul disarm0 nucleare' ('Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament'), EV, 7, pp. 1811-1825) and devoted the next plenary session (of 1983) to the subject of 'science for peace'. In connection with that event, John Paul II appealed to members of governments to work in an effective fashion in order to remove the danger of a new war and invited States to engage in nuclear disarmament (cf. 'a sapere scientific0 edifichi la pace, 12.11.1983' ('Scientific Knowledge should Build Peace, 12.11.1983'), in Znsegnamenti, VI, 2 (1983), pp. 1054-1060). This document and appeal achieved a strong resonance in the United States of America and the Soviet Union. During the 1990s meetings and study-weeks were held which were
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dedicated to analysing the question of the prolonging of life; the question of determining the moment of death; the question of transplants and xenografts; and the question of sustainable growth and development. The issues of artificial fertilisation, cloning, and genetic manipulation were also considered. These were subjects which increasingly involved issues of an ethical character (bioethics) and which drew scientists, philosophers and theologians into dialogue. Although the usual practice of involving various disciplines was maintained, the research and the debates of the Academicians were directed in a special way towards reflection on the anthropological and humanistic dimensions of science. In November 1999 a working-group was held on the subject of 'science for man and man for science', and the Jubilee session of November 2000 was dedicated to the subject 'science and the future of mankind'. THE ROLE OF THE ACADEMY IN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT AND CHRISTIAN FAITH
In the relations which exist between Academies and the States in which they carry out their activities, the case of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences can be seen as a singular case, as indeed in basic terms the role of the small State which hosts it is also singular. During these long years this relationship has become very fertile. The Church has paid careful attention to the Academy. She has respected its work and fostered the autonomy of its scientific and organisational dynamics. Through the Academy, the Magisterium of the Church has sought to make the scientific world understand her teaching and her orientations in relation to subjects which concern the good of man and society, the complete human development of all the peoples of the world, and the scientific and cultural co-operation which should animate the relations between States. On the occasion of numerous addresses and messages directed towards the Academy by five pontiffs, the Church has been able to re-propose the meaning of the relationship between faith and reason, between science and wisdom, and between love for truth and the search for God. But through the Academy the Church has also been able to understand from nearer to hand, with speed and in depth, the contents and the importance of numerous questions and issues which have been the object of the reflection of the scientific world, whose consequences for society, the environment and the lives of individuals could not but interest her directly, 'given that there is nothing which is genuinely human which does not find echo in her heart' (cf. Gaudium et S p a , 1). The Pontifical Academy of Sciences has thus become one of the favoured forums for the dialogue between the Gospel and scientific culture, gathering together all the stimulating provocations but also the inspiring possibilities that such dialogue brings with it, almost thereby symbolising a shared growth - of both the scientific community and the Magisterium of the Church - of their respective responsibilities towards truth and good. The above survey, although general in character, dealing with the activity carried out over the sixty years since the foundation of the Pontifical Academy of Science, the subjects of the numerous meetings and study-weeks, and the publications which the Academy has produced, brings out all the contemporary relevance and the importance of the subjects which have been addressed. Scientists from all over the world, often co-operating closely with a group of philosophers and theologians, have examined questions and issues which have ranged from genetics to cosmology, from agriculture to the distribution of resources, fkom transplant surgery to the history of science, and from ecology to telecommunications. The speeches addressed by the
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Pontiffs to the Academicians, from Pius XI to John Paul II, have offered important elements of reflection not only in relation to the ethical and moral responsibility of their activities but also on the very meaning of scientific research, and on its striving for truth and an increasingly profound knowledge of reality. The subject of the relationship between science and faith, both at an epistemological and an anthropological level, has been the usual framework of almost all these papal addresses. The forms of language employed have been different as these decades have passed, and different emphases have been placed on the various questions and issues, but the attention paid to scientific work has been unchanging, as has been the case in relation to the philosophical and cultural dimensions which that work involves. Side by side with such dialogue, which we could call 'ordinary', international public opinion has been witness to certain 'out of the ordinary' events. From the mass media it has learnt about speeches of special importance for the relationship between science and faith, speeches given at the Academy in particular during the pontificate of John Paul II. Of these, reference should be made to the address with which, as has already been observed (see above section I), John Paul 11 spoke to the plenary session of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences in November 1979 to express his wish for, and then formally request, the establishment of a committee of historians, scientists, and theologians which would re-examine the Galileo case and present public opinion with a serene analysis of the facts as they occurred (Galileo, IV).The aim of this was not in a historical sense to recognise the inadvisability of the condemnation of the heliocentrism carried out four centuries beforehand by the Sant'Uffizio (something which had already been effected in 1757 with the removal of the works in question from the list of prohibited books), but rather to ensure that the historical-philosophical context of the episode, as well as its implications at a cultural level, were more illuminated, thereby clarifymg in a public way, which would be comprehensible to everybody, what had already been made clear in a narrower circle of intellectuals and experts. During a new assembly of the Academy, held on 3 1 October 1992, Cardinal Paul Poupard, in the presence of the Holy Father, presented the results of the committee and commented on the work which it had carried out. Four years later, on 22 October 1996, this time in the form of a message on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of its re-foundation, John Paul II once again chose the Pontifical Academy of Sciences as a qualified interlocutor to expound certain important reflections on the theory of evolution (Magistero, V.2; Uomo, Identitd Biologica e Culturale, V.3). Returning to and developing certain observations made by his predecessor Pius XII in the encyclical Humuni Generis (cf. DH 3896-3899), he now added that 'new knowledge leads the theory of evolution to no longer be considered as a mere hypothesis', thereby recognising 'that this theory has progressively imposed itself on the attention of researchers following a series of discoveries made in the various disciplines of knowledge', imposing itself also therefore on the attention of theologians and bible experts (Scienze Nuturali, Utilizzo in Teologia). It would not, however, be exact to confine only to recent years the climate of mutual listening and serene encounter on subjects of great relevance. History has also been a witness to other episodes of intense dialogue with the Roman Pontiffs in which the Academy, or some of its members, were the protagonists. This is the case, for example, of Max Planck, who wanted to make himself the interpreter in a direct way with Pius XII in 1943 on the risks of war connected with the use of armaments based upon nuclear fission (cf. Ladous, 1994, p. 144), or the close relationship between Pius
13 XI1 and Georges Lemaitre, who enabled the Pontiff to understand from closer to hand, at the beginning of the 1950s, the meaning of the new cosmological models which were by then beginning to become established in the scientific world, and the philosophical, or even theological, questions which at first sight appeared to be involved (Lemaitre, IV). In more recent years, Carlos Chagas was especially concerned in 1981 to take on the worries of John Paul II, who was still convalescing after the attack on his life, over the consequences for the planet of a possible nuclear war. He decided to himself present the studies carried out on the subject to the principal Heads of State in his capacity as President of the Academy (cf. di Rovesanda, 2000). In the letter sent to Padre George Coyne, the Director of the Vatican Observatory and a member of the Council of the Academy, a document which is certainly one of the most profound there is on the subject of the dialogue between science and faith, John Paul II observed that science has acted to purify faith and that faith has acted to generate scientific research, a truth demonstrated by the fact that modem Galilean science was born in a Christian climate with the increasing assimilation of the message of freedom placed in the heart of man. Thus, in the same letter, referring to the wider context of universities, the Pope declared that: 'The Church and academic institutions, because they represent two institutions which are very different but very important, are mutually involved in the domain of human civilisation and world culture. We carry forward, before God, enormous responsibilities towards the human condition because historically we have had, and we continue to have, a determining influence in the development of ideas and values and the course of human actions' ('Lettera a1 Direttore della Specola Vaticana, 1.6.1988' ('Letter to the Director of the Vatican Observatory, 1.6.1988'), OR 26.10.1988, p. 7.) For this to come about, the Pope stressed the importance of there being experts and places especially dedicated to such a dialogue: 'the Church, for a long time, has recognised the importance of this by founding the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, in which scientists of world-renown regularly meet each other to discuss their research and to communicate, to the wider community, the directions research is taking. But much more is required' (ibidem). And in this 'more' John Paul II saw the need, in their irreplaceable dialogue, for scientific institutions and the Catholic Church not to think in a reductive way about the settling of ancient conflicts, and also saw the more important need for mutual help in the investigation of truth and a shared growth in their responsibility for the good of the peoples of the world and their future. And it was in this logic, with this new readiness to engage in service, that the present President of the Academy, Professor Cabibbo, in his address to John Paul II on the occasion of the Jubilee plenary session on the subject of 'science and the future of mankind' (OR 13-14.11.2000, p. 6) was able to speak about the 'renewed commitment' of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences together with the Holy See to the good of the whole Church, of the scientific community, and of those men and women who search and believe. Pi0 XI, 'Motu proprio De Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, 28.10.1936: in AAS 28 (1936), pp. 421-452; Giovanni Paolo 11, 'Discorso alla Pontificia Accademia delle Scienze in occasione del 1000 anniversario della nascita di A. Einstein, 10.11.1979', in InsegnumentiII, 2 (1979), pp. 1115-1120; 'Discorso inoccasione del 500 della Rifondazione', in Insegnamenti IX, 2 (1986), pp. 1274-1285; 'Discorso in occasione della presentazione dei risultati della Commissione di
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studio sul caso Galileo, 3 1.10.1992',in Insegnamenti XV, 2 (1992), pp. 456-465; 'Messaggio in occasione del 600 della Rifondazione, 22.10.1996: in EV 15, pp. 1346-1354. BIBLIOGRAPHY For studies and works of a historical character see: E. di Rovasenda and G.B. Marini-Bettblo, Federico Cesi nel quarto centenario della nascita (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 63, 1986); G.B. Marini-Bettblo, Historical Aspects of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences (Pontificae Academiae Scientiarum Documenta, 21, 1986); G.B. Marini-Bettolo, L'attivitd della Pontijicia Accademia delle Scienze 1936-1986 (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 71, 1987); G. Marchesi, 'La Pontificia Accademia delle Scienze, luogo d'incontro tra ragione e fede', Civiltd Cattolica 139 (1988), 111, pp. 235-246; R. Ladous, Des Nobel au Vatican. La fondation de I'academie pontifcale des sciences (Cerf, Paris, 1994); P. Poupard (ed.), La nuova immagine del mondo. I1 dialog0 fra scienza e fede dopo Galileo (Piemme, Casale Monferrato, 1996); E. di Rovasenda, 'In ricordo dell'antico Presidente della Pontifica Accademia delle Scienze, C. Chagas', OR 21-22.2.2000. Some publications of the Academy on subjects referred to in this paper: P. Paschini (ed.), Miscellanea galileana, 3 vols., (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 1964); Science and Technology for Developing Countries (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 44, 1979); S.M. Pagan0 and A.G. Luciani, I documenti delprocesso di Galileo Galilei (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 53, 1984); The Artifcial Prolongation of Life and the Determination of the Exact Moment of Death (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 60, 1985); Discorsi indirizzati dai Sommi PonteJici Pi0 XI, Pi0 XI,Giovanni XXIl, Paolo VI, Giovanni Paolo II alla Pontifcia Accademia delle Scienze dal 1936 a1 1986 (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 64, 1986); The Responsibility of Science (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 80, 1988); Science for Development in a Solidarity Framework (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Documenta, 25, 1989); The Determination of Brain Death and its Relationship to Human Death (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 83, 1989); Science in the Context of Human Culture, I-II (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 85-86, 1990-199 1); Resources and Population (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 87, 1991); The Legal and Ethical Aspects Related to the Project of the Human Genome (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 91, 1993); Discorsi dei Papi alla Pontifcia Accademia delle Scienze (1936-1993) (Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, Vatican City, 1994). For all the publications of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences see Publications of the Pontijical Academy of Sciences (1936-1999) (Vatican City, 1999).
IMPROVING NATURAL KNOWLEDGE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY 1660 - 1760 SIR ALAN COOK Selwyn College, Cambridge, UK ABSTRACT
In the hundred years from the foundation of the Royal Society in 1660 to the general acceptance of Newtonian dynamics and celestial mechanics by 1760, fellows of the Society advanced theoretical and observational astronomy and biological studies. By 1760 the natural sciences were established as autonomous pursuits with their own aims and methods independent of external authority. The astronomical work of Edmond Halley and John Flamsteed and the biological studies of Leeuwenhoek, John Ray, Stephen Hales and others will be considered, as will, in particular Tycho Brahe, Kepler and Prince Federico Cesi. INTRODUCTION The Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge was founded in 1660 and by 1760 natural philosophy had taken on some of the principal features of modem science. The dynamics and celestial mechanics of Isaac Newton had become generally accepted throughout Europe; in retrospect we see them as the most spectacular feature of the new science. Newton was not alone, many other Fellows of the Royal Society contributed to develop modem science. I consider something of what they did in theoretical and observational astronomy, in biology and in establishing science as independent and autonomous. Modem science did not begin in 1660. In 2003 it is natural to recognise the achievements of the first fellows of the Accademia dei Lincei, of Galileo of course, but of others beside, and especially of the founder, Prince Federico Cesi. There were other precursors of the Royal Society. Fellows of the Society were familiar with the work of Johannes Kepler that led very directly to Newton’s achievements. If modem science began before 1660, it had not fully attained its present form by 1760. Ideas of history in particular were very far from those of today. For all the debts to the past and unresolved issues for the future, the ideas and methods of science did change greatly in the first century of the Royal Society and fellows of the Society did much to bring that about. The Royal Society was a society of independent scholars. The government neither supported nor directed it but we have a very important privilege in our Royal Charter, granted by Charles I1 in 1662. It conferred the right to print and publish despite the monopoly of the Stationers’ Company of London. Fellows of the Society took advantage of it to publish important works. The Philosophiae naturalis principia mathernatica (1687) of Newton is by far the most influential for the development of modem science, but biological works have also proved very important. Together with the journal, the Philosophical Transactions, and the extensive correspondence camed on by the first secretary of the Society, Henry Oldenburg, they made the studies of fellows of the
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Society known throughout Europe. Robert Boyle, many of whose works European scholars knew and possessed, was the fellow most admired in Europe. The public face of the Society was publishing, the private life was no less important in advancing modem science. Small groups of Fellows were wont to move to some coffee house (numerous in London) after the formal weekly meetings and there to engage in perhaps more speculative talk. Independence, important privileges, an open and sociable community, those were important characteristics of the early decades of the Royal Society when its fellows were advancing natural knowledge and laying the foundations of modem science ASTRONOMY In Rome in 1611 Galileo set up his new telescope on the Gianicolo and Prince Cesi and other Linceans saw for the first time the rough Moon, Venus like a crescent Moon, the satellites of Jupiter, and Saturn with his two ears. Galileo did indeed set astronomy on new paths, but different ways were taken in London fifty years later. London astronomers took up the challenges of understanding the results of Kepler and of improving the methods of Tycho Brahe. Kepler’s laws of planetary motion only made sense for a heliocentric solar system. By about 1680 Christopher Wren, Robert Hooke and Edmond Halley had found that both Kepler’s first law, that the orbit of a planet was an ellipse, and his third law, that the square of the period of a planet is proportional to the cube of its distance from the Sun, implied that the force between the planets and the Sun was as the inverse square of the distance. When the three of them took coffee together in January 1684 after a meeting of the Royal Society, they realised they could not show that an orbit under an inverse square law of force had to be an ellipse. More than six months later Halley visited Newton in Cambridge and put the question to him. Newton’s response became the Philosophiae naturalis principia rnathematica. Halley not only set Newton thinking, he edited the manuscript, saw it through the press and paid for it, and published and sold the book. Only Newton could have written Principia, but without Halley it would not have been born.’ We may not use Newton’s geometry today, the observations for which he had to account were limited indeed compared with the present wealth and extent of physical knowledge, but his methods are still ours - construction of an abstract model, the behaviour of which can be worked out mathematically and comparing it numerically with observation. Kepler’s laws were the challenge that stimulated Newton. John Flamsteed was gripped by the need to improve the catalogue of positions of stars that Tycho Brahe had made, and to do so using the new astronomical techniques that were coming to the fore at about the time of the formation of the Society. Adrien Auzout in Pans and Robert Hooke in London were maintaining that telescopic sights could be used to determine the directions of stars better that the open sights that Brahe (and after him Johann Hevelius) had used. Telescopes were especially effective with a micrometer in the eyepiece. At the same time clock makers in England and France were making the pendulum clock into a precision instrument. If a telescope were mounted on a wall so that it rotated in the meridian, the angle at which a star crossed the meridian, as determined with the
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micrometer telescope, gave the declination of the star, while the time of crossing, measured with a good clock, gave the right ascension. Halley had a micrometer telescope and a good clock when, as a very young man, he spent a year on St Helena and measured the positions of stars not seen from Paris or London. While he could not determine absolute positions, he produced the first catalogue with the new instruments. He became renowned throughout Europe.* Flamsteed meanwhile had been appointed His Majesty’s Astronomer Royal, the only fellow of the Royal Society paid to do science. At first the Society was not directly involved, but after Newton became President in 1704, he was appointed, together with a few other fellows, to be Visitors to oversee the work of the Astronomer Royal. Flamsteed was not pleased. Soon after Halley had come back from St Helena, Flamsteed was able to set up his mural telescope at Greenwich and then for the next forty years devoted himself to his telescopes and producing his Historia Coelestis, containing his observations and the catalogue of fixed stars derived from them. It was a great achievement. Alas, it was obsolete almost as soon as Flamsteed was dead. Halley discovered the proper motion of stars, that they move relative one to another, and James Bradley discovered the aberration of starlight, the composition of the velocity of light with that of the Earth about the Sun. The fixed stars were not fixed as Flamsteed and everyone else had supposed, and future star catalogues would have to allow for that. BIOLOGY The astronomical achievements of fellows of the Royal Society owed more to their predecessors of the north than to Galileo. Biologists among the fellows of the Society clearly took up the same topics as those to which the founders of the Lincei, and especially Prince Cesi himself, had devoted themselves. In 1624 Galileo sent Cesi a microscope, of what construction is not known. With it Cesi made many studies of the anatomy of plants, especially of fungi and seeds.3 Not until the last two decades or so have the scope and originality of his work become known. John Ray however knew about it and referred to it in his Historia Plantarum, though in how much detail is not clear. He learnt of it from a publication of the Lincei that appeared only in 1651, twenty years after Cesi had died. The book was the Mexican Thesaurus, an edited version of the account of Mexican animals and plants produced by the Spanish explorer Francisco Hernandez, to which Fabio Colonna added a note on Cesi’s microscopic studies that Ray quoted almost word for word. Ray also knew of the scheme for the classification of plants that Cesi had d e ~ i s e d .Anatomical ~ studies with the microscope, the first serious attempt at a classification based on the characters of the plants and not on such matters as medical uses, to those were added the first studies of fossils. Cesi’s estates at Acquasparta had large deposits of fossil wood. Cesi identified them as remains of once living trees and studied them microscopically. The Royal Society might be said to be the centre of microscopical anatomy, of plants and animals both, at the end of the seventeenth century. Three notable books were published with the imprimatur of the Society. The Micrographia of Robert Hooke is probably the one the best known today. It is a collection of studies of a wide variety of objects, animal, vegetable and mineral. Nehemiah Grew in The Anatomy of Plants described the structures that he had found in plants by systematic microscopical
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investigations. Marcello Malpighi of Bologna collected his microscopical studies of plants and chicken eggs in his Anatome Vegetale. Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, in the Netherlands, sent his observations to the Society, where some of his specimens still survive among his correspondence. Even John Locke, staying in Montpellier for his health, used a primitive single-lens microscope to study the eggs of insects from which a red dye was made.5 Taxonomy is the study of how living creatures are related in species, genera and so on. John Ray introduced new criteria for classification in the Historia Piscium, an account of fishes that he completed after the death of Frances Willughby.6 The many excellent illustrations made it very expensive and put the Society, which published it, in financial difficulties. Ray broke away, from old schemes based on supposedly authoritative accounts from long ago and instead used external morphology to determine relations between types of fish. That may seem primitive compared with using DNA or breeding habits to determine genetic relations, but it remains the only means by which many fossils can be classified. Later Linnaeus (who knew something of the microscopic work of Cesi) developed his well-known binomial scheme. There seems to be a clear sequence from the classification of Cesi, to that of Ray and then on to Linnaeus. Francisco Stelluti, who published Cesi’s studies of fossils after Cesi’s death, misunderstood them and suppressed or weakened Cesi’s conclusions that the fossils were remains of once-living organisms. Sir George Ent had received samples of Cesi’s wood from Cassiano dal Pozzo and they were shown at meetings of the Royal Society. John Evelyn (in Sylva) and Robert Hooke (in Micrographia) both concluded that they had once been pieces of trees. Fellows of the Royal Society were most certainly interested in fossils, especially objects such as shells that seemed to be like the shells of living creatures, and yet were not the same. John Ray, crossing the Alps from Switzerland into Italy in 1664, saw many in the alpine rocks and considered at some length various ideas about how they came to be, such as God put them there to mystify us. He concluded that they were indeed the remains of creatures that had once lived in a sea where the Alps now were. Robert Hooke in Micrographia, and Edmond Halley, who saw shells in rocks near Harwich on the east coast of England, thought the same.7 By the time of the foundation of the Royal Society, Cesi had been dead for thirty years and it is not easy to assess how well his works were known in England. Many of the drawings that recorded his microscopical studies passed into the collections of Cassiano dal Pozzo. Evelyn and Ray may have learnt of Cesi’s work when they saw dal Pozzo’s collection in Rome in 1644 and 1664 respectively.8 Sir George Ent also corresponded with Cassiano. There are copies of the Mexican Thesaurus in the Royal Society, and the British Library, but not in the University Library, Cambridge. Ray evidently knew it when he came to write the Historia Plantarum, but did he himself have a copy? As for Hooke, Grew and Malpighi, none of them mentioned Cesi. In the early decades of the eighteenth century, Stephen Hales FRS, who died in 1761, introduced new mechanical Newtonian ideas into the study of living creatures with his investigations into blood pressure and flow, published in Haemostasis, and into the rise of sap in plants, published in Vegetable Statics.’ Before him studies of living creatures were essentially anatomical, of structures, he asked how they worked mechanically.
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WHAT IS MODERN SCIENCE?
In what ways can the astronomy and biology of the first century of the Royal Society be said to be ‘modem’? In one important respect our predecessors were not modem. At the end of his life Newton had prepared a general chronology, including biblical chronology, for the personal use of Queen Caroline. After his death it came to be published and drew criticism from Etienne Souciet, a French abbe, who considered that Newton had misdated the Siege of Troy and the Voyage of the Argonauts. Halley came to Newton’s defence in two papers in Philosophical Transactions, arguing that Newton had correctly interpreted the astronomical evidence on which he had based those supposed dates. The distinction we make between myth and history was not yet clear.” What is modem science and what do we mean by it? A few characteristics that developed in the first century of the Royal Society do at least seem essential to modem science. Newly developed instruments, telescopes and microscopes, were used to look further into the heavens and probe deeper into the structures of objects living and inanimate. Clocks became increasingly reliable and precise so that time, once a psychological sensation, became a definite measurable physical variable. Mathematics was used to summarise observations, in the form of statistics, as summary formulae and in incipient set theory. Above all Newton showed how to set up an abstract analogue or model of a natural system, how to work out its behaviour and how to compare that behaviour numerically with observation. Newton and his contemporaries may not have made a clear distinction between history and myth, but they did realise that the world and its contents had not been made once and for all in the relatively recent past. Thus Halley estimated the ages of lakes and seas from their salinity and the rate at which rivers brought in salt. He also indicated that the Moon was speeding up in her orbit about the Earth, and later found the proper motion of stars.” The World was changing. Fossils too, showed that both the rocks and their contents had not always been as they are now. Those were disturbing ideas for traditional preconceptions; they aroused hostility in the 1660’s but were tacitly accepted by many in the 1760’s. New and improved instruments, new discoveries, new ideas, soon became widely known through printed publications. Prince Cesi himself had set that out as a principal aim of his new academy and the Royal Society actively followed his precepts, whether the fellows knew of them or not. The new discoveries would hardly have been made and if made, probably not published, had the Royal Society accepted the authority of the past, or of divines, or of philosophical schemes. The motto of the Royal Society is ‘Nullius in Verba’. Its exact meaning is debatable, but it might be paraphrased as ‘Do not believe text books’. Again, Cesi affords a precedent. In 1615 in a lecture in Naples, Del natural desiderio di supere, he asserted the human duty to study the natural world for itself and to make known the results. He strongly criticised all institutions (universities as well as ecclesiastical authorities and followers of Aristotle) that claimed authority over natural knowledge.12In the course of the first century of the Royal Society, its Fellows helped to establish the idea of science as an autonomous enterprise with its procedures determined by the phenomena being investigated, setting its own aims and methods, and independent of extraneous authority, whether historical, philosophical or religious.
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NOTES See Cook, Alan, Edmond Halley, Charting the heavens and the seas (Oxford, 1998),pp.147, 148. 2. See Cook, loc.cit., (note 1) Ch.3. For Cesi as botanist, see Pignatti, S and Mazzolin, G.: Federico Cesi Botanico, pp. 3. 212- 223, in Convegno celebrativo del IV centenario della nascita di FedericoCesi, (Acquasparta, 7-9 ottobre 1985) Atti dei Convegni Lincei 78, Roma, Academia dei Lincei, 1986. Ray, John, Historia Plantarurn (London, 1674), p.132; Hernandez, Francisco et al. 4. - Rerum Medicarum Novae Hispaniae Zkesaurus seu plantarium, animalium, mineralium MexicanoramHistoria. (Roma, 1651). 5. Hooke, Robert, Micrographia (London 1665); Grew, Nehemiah, Zke Anatomy of Vegetables (London 1672); Malpighi. Marcello, Anatome Plantarum (London 1675); for Locke see Lough, John,1953, John Lockes travels in France, 1675-9. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Ray, John Historia Piscium (London, 6. Evelyn, John, Sylva (London, 1664) pp.95-7. Hooke, Robert, Micrgraphia 7. (London, 1665), PP.105-7, 110-112. Ray, John 1673, Observations topographical physiological and moral (London), 499 pp. + Catalogus Stirpium ; for Halley’s comments, see Journal Book Copy, Royal Society of London, for 1 August 1688. Haskell, F. and McBurney, Henrietta, The Paper Museum of Cassiano dal Pozzo, 8. Visual Resources, 14, (1998), 1-17. The Diuiy of John Evelyn ed. J S de Beer. (Oxford, 1955) Vol 2, p.277. For Ray’s visit to the Cassiano collectiion, see Skippon, Philip, An account of a journey through part of the Low Countries, Germany, Italy and France, in A and J Churchill, 1732, A Collection of Voyages and Travels (London) pp. 361-736 and Index Hales, Stephen, Vegetable Statics (London, 1727); Haemeostaticks, vo1,II of 9. Statical Essays (London, 1733) 10. For Newton’s chronology, see Cook, Halley, loc.cit., (note 1) p. 400 11. See Cook, Halley, loc.cit., (note l), pp. 225-8,346,348-9. 12. For Cesi’s lecture, see Montalenti, Giuseppe, Introduzione a1 Convegno, in Convegno celebrativo del IV centenario della nascita di Federico Cesi, (Acquasparta, 7-9 ottobre 1985, 1oc.cit. (note 3)s. 1.
THE ACADEMIE DES SCIENCES AND FRENCH CENTRALISATION GUY OURISSON AcadCmie des Sciences, Strasburg, France INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
I hope the reader will accept a few highly personal introductory remarks, to explain why I am sensitive to the extent to which France remains defacto deeply, instinctively, Parisocentric, even in an age of global science. I was appointed to the Faculty of Sciences of Strasbourg in 1955 by the General Director of Higher Education in the Ministry. The University of Strasbourg was not consulted. He asked me to promise that I would stay there "at leastfive years", and signed the appointment letter. Fifty years later, after I have, in hundreds of scientific and administrative meetings, forcefully spoken in the name of the non-Parisians, I still meet colleagues or administrators who simply cannot believe that I still do not even have a small flat in Paris. I have been a member of the AcadCmie since 1981. My appointment was signed by the President of the Republic; it carries a pension, something that the French (among others) like very much (although its annual amount is about the monthly minimum wage, but it is drawn directly from the TrCsor Public, from the State's kitty... in earlier times it would have been drawn directly from the King's purse). In 1997, I was elected Vice-president of the Acadtmie, i.e. defacto Presidentelect, and thus in 1999-2001, for the first time ever, a "non-resident" (read: a nonParisian) occupied this exalted position since the foundation of the AcadCmie in 1666. I did in fact reside, Mondays through Thursdays, in a small studio on the premises; however, my successor being of course a Parisian, this studio was converted promptly into offices: the prospect that another "provincial" could be elected as President in the near future is negligible. The AcadCmie des Sciences is still very much a Parisian institution open to nonParisian members. WARNING I am a chemist, not a historian. I therefore feel unable to provide the eminent participants of this meeting with original and learned views, based on my own study of our Archives and revealing original documents. I have consulted our excellent Director of the Archives, Mme Florence Greffe, who gave me the titles of the books I should absolutely read if I wanted to sound informed.' This I did, and my text is based on these readings, as well as on my personal experience. This essay has therefore no historical value, but hopefully may constitute a testimony. GENERAL The word "Academie" (or "AcadCmie") leads to 246,000 Web sites through Google. Many are French sites, and lead to the 5 Academies of the Institut de France, but also to the French National AcadCmies (de MCdecine, de Pharmacie, de Technologies, etc., not part of the Institut de France), to the many regional Academies, often very poor institutions with a very rich and long history, to the US or
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Dutch Academies." The only ones we consider in this Symposium are those we regard to-day as the "National" ones: the Accademia dei Lincei, the Royal Society, the Prussian (now Berlin-Brandenburg) Academy, the National Academies US, and many others, now part of the international "families of Academies" : IAP, IAC, ALLEA.. . and of course the international ones like the Pontifical Academy or Academia Europzea. WHAT DO THESE ACADEMIES DO? One of us used to say, of course only for the French Academie : Theymeet, They vote to change their Statutes, They count their dead,"' They vote to elect new members, They vote to select laureates for their prizes, They meet, they vote, they count.. . .. . This is of course true, but largely incomplete : They also publish, They organise meetings, They prepare reports, They take part in international relations, They foster the creation of useful agencies. Thev mblish: A traditional activity of the Academie has been to publish scientific literature. With their British counterparts the Transactions, the Comptes-Rendus are one of the oldest continuously published scientific journals in the world. Since their heyday in the late XKth Century, they have progressively declined in importance as many more media became available, but they are regaining strength after what appeared to be their demise. They now publish about 10,000 pages of scientific original documents each year; we are however not happy at all with their poor performance as regards citation data. We should not forget that these journals in fact invented the modem publication procedure, where the author submits his publication proposal to one or two referees who advise for or against publication; in modem journals, refereeing is usually done under the cloak of anonymity, whereas in Comptes Rendus, tradition was that you should bring your manuscript in person to one of the members, who would read it and accept it, ask for changes, or reject it. I had to bring my first publication to the very old and powerful Marcel Delepine on a Monday, in his apartment; he asked me courteously to explain it briefly, and it was published the following Monday. I am not sure it deserved such rapid publication. Anyway, now, the process is less personal, referees are not only the Members of the AcadCmie and remain anonymous, but.. . publication takes much longer, even with electronic gadgetry. The AcadCmie also publishes reports, which are examined below. Thev meet and organise meetings: For many years, the meetings of the Academie were used to show Science. Some classical examples are : The presentation of "novel" fossils by Cuvier;
23 The demonstration of the effect of an electric current on a magnetic needle by Arago, following his description to the Academie, the preceding week, of (Ersted's results; The presentation by Pasteur of his sterile vials which he had opened in the clean air of the Mer de Glace; The presentation by Becquerel of his photographic plates which had been darkened not by light but by the "rays" emitted by uranium salts, etc, etc.; The presentation by Friedel of the discovery of radioactivity by Marie and Pierre Curie. Examples abound; but this is all past, and that fashion is apparently gone. In more than 20 years of active participation, I have never seen any experimental demonstration nor any presentation similar to the classical ones mentioned above. However, from the lectures, long or short, presented during our meetings, I have often gathered up-to-date information on the most diverse problems. From the way light passes through holes smaller than its wavelength, to the depth at which Antarctic penguins dive to catch fish; from new materials for car catalytic converters, to the disposal of fission products in a nuclear economy; from the concatenation of molecules into molecular knots or trefoils, to some news about prime numbers, etc. Reading general scientific journals, like Nature or Science, or specialised ones, is of course another way to achieve the same results, but one should not downplay the usefulness of the Academie from that point of view. It is true however that the benefit is restricted to the attendees, that the august Meeting Room is as ill-adapted as possible to presentations to the public, and that most of us have not learnt the delicate art of speaking to the public at large, journalists or TV people, or even to colleagues of other denominations. Another mode of transmission of scientific information is, in my view, much more efficient. It is linked with what has become in recent years a major contribution of the AcadCmie: the organisation of scientific meetings. Some of these are organised in the traditional way, with a roster of invited speakers and a programme leaving some time for discussions; the next one will be on "Water", and its wide-ranging programme will probably attract 200-300 participants. Some of these meetings are organised jointly with another of the National Academies, for instance, with the Academie de MCdecine on medical themes, others with a foreign Academy"'. The original advantage of the AcadCmie in organising these meetings is that it can cut across fields and disciplines more easily than the specialised scientific societies. It can also organise bi-national meetings, and has done so with the Academies of Spain, of the US, of Canada, of Russia and of China. In my personal experience, another useful activity of our AcadCmie has been to take advantage of its solemnity and undisputed seriousness to experiment with other types of meetings. I have personally invested much time in experimenting with a small number of young participants, strictly selected, and secluded in an isolated place for the duration of the meeting : The "Scientia Europa?aB"" meetings brought together 50 young" European scientists for five days, chosen from among approx. 350 nominees proposed as exceptionally good by the various European Academies (+ MPG, + CNRS, etc). "Exceptionally good" people should not require a programme; the posters they presented and discussed defined the programme. Seven such meetings have lured 350 participants from 35 European countries. Unfortunately, this highly successhl experiment
24
requires generous sponsors, and the ones we had found did not fare well on the Stock Market.. . Meetings on multidisciplinary topics, with a group of 20 young European participants, again good enough to take the shock of mixing hard scientists with archaeologists, or even with artists; there again, we met success on themes like "Physics of the isolated molecule" or "Surfaces", perhaps mostly because the good image of the Acadtmie could open the doors of a very beautiful domain in the South Alps for us, in a very generous Foundation. Meetings on organisation problems: a meeting co-organised with the German Leopoldina and the Junge Akademie dealt with a comparison of the problems encountered by young scientists in France and Germany at the beginning oftheir careers. 20 participants: 10 each from each country, 10 administrators of programmes intended to help beginning independent scientists (CNRS, MR, Volkswagen Stiftung, A. von Humboldt Stiftung, MPG.. .), 10 beneficiaries of these programmes. We shall continue. They prepare reports: In the early years of the AcadCmie, the King and his ministers considered it quite normal, as they were spending money on the AcadCmie and its Members, to ask them to contribute to the welfare of the Kingdom. A classic example of this activity has been the search, in France as in England with the Royal Society, of ways to measure longitude at sea: claims of ownership of newly discovered islands depended directly on this mastery, and this depended in turn on the development of reliable and sturdy chronometers. The presence, on the premises of the AcadCmie, of the "Bureau des Longitudes", is testimony to this activity. However, it is rather interesting that there were periods in the 19" century when a request for Reports was considered as an infringement on the real, exalted goals of the AcadCmie, and was quite efficiently resisted until the practice disappeared. Thus, it was a secular revival when, some 30 years ago, our Permanent Secretary Paul Germain obtained from the President of the Republic, Giscard d'Estaing, the request to prepare a report on "The state of mechanics in France". This led to intense work, and to the publication of the first "modem" report of the AcadCmie. In 1998 again, the President of the Republic, Jacques Chirac, asked the AcadCmie, through its then President Jacques-Louis Lions, to produce a series of reports on some general, worldwide problems. The preparation and publication of these reports demonstrated the capacity of the AcadCmie not only to mobilise its Members, but also to enlist the help of outside scientists - and not only, as some have malignantly suggested, of prospective candidates for election. Emboldened by the success of this endeavour, the AcadCmie suggested and accepted from an Interministerial Committee the charge of preparing Reports on Science and Technology each year, against a reasonable subsidy, which now constitute a major series of highly interesting publications, a sort of encyclopzediaby instalments."" They take part in international relations: Leibniz and Newton were "Membres" of the AcadCmie at its foundation. Note : not "Membres Ctrangers". Science is global ;like the other Academies, the AcadCmie tries to maintain and to enliven a vast network of inter-academic exchanges :
25
It now contains in its membership approximately 140 foreign members; it is true that, for most of them, it is only an honour, but some do take part actively in some of the activities of the AcadCmie; The AcadCmie entertains inter-academic exchanges of ”name-lectures’’ with the Royal Society, the Netherlands Academy, the Lincei; It plays an active role in the international organisations of Academies : the InterAcademy Panel ( U P ) , the InterAcademy Council (IAC), the InterAcademy Medical Panel (IAMP), the All-European Academies (ALLEA), the European Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC), the ConfCrences Amaldi, and it entertains close relations with ICSU, with the UE, with developing countries (via TWAS), and with the Scientific Unions. It is a rather recent development that the AcadCmie has strengthened its links with the French Foreign Office, in different ways: in selecting scientists to take part in international meetings; in helping some Scientific Councillors of our Embassies to evaluate scientific proposals of subsidies they receive (for meetings, for post-doctoral fellowships, etc.); in using visits of its Members to conference sites to organise informal meetings of their retinue of friends and colleagues with the Scientific Councillors, and thus to enlarge their basis of operations. It is true that the international alibi is not enough to make a useless action a good one. But it is also true that, in the scientific field, an action limited to its national dimensions is most often useless. They foster the creation of useful agencies: Like Queen Victoria (in a probably apocryphal declaration), the AcadCmie “may have little power, but is not devoid of influence”. It has used its influence to obtain the creation of informal organisations that later developed into very important agencies. LA MAIN A LA PATE: This is a programme resulting from the visionary and missionary work of Georges Charpak, Yves QuCrC and Pierre LCna, to innovate the teaching of experimental sciences in primary schools. It started as an experiment, wisely restricted to a few groups of children, and is progressively invading the whole tissue of primary education in France. This imaginative programme remains under the operational control of the Academie, but is being developed progressively, in France and in several foreign countries, notably in China, with the necessary modifications. The Ministry of Education has so far wisely refrained from appropriating this programme, which, despite its success, is still considered by its staunchest proponents as experimental - to avoid the freeze that would result from its transformation into a nation-wide official curriculum. But in a longer perspective, the destiny of La Main ci la Pite is not to be a permanent part of the AcadCmie, which has simply nurtured it, and has probably made it viable by protecting it in its infancy. The same is true of the Fondation nationale Arfred Kastler, which was set up as a service of the AcadCmie to try and improve the way foreign researchers, young or already established, were received in France: to inform them of the formalities before their arrival, to work with our foreign visitors to evaluate what may have been negative during their stay, with the research organisations and ministries to improve these sore points, to try and set up competent offices in the various Universities and
26 research centres to handle local problems, to exchange information between these centres, etc. The "FnAK" is now about ten years old; it has been remarkably successful in its endeavours, and had grown progressively into the largest service of the AcadCmie, budget- and personnel-wise. This very success has led to technical difficulties, and to the decision to find another administrative structure for the FnAK, which is now housed by the CitC Internationale Universitaire de Paris, as an autonomous component of this large organisation. In this case also, the destiny of the FnAK had not been to remain a permanent part of the AcadCmie ; however, it is quite certain that, without the protection of the Academie during the infancy of FnAK, this would not have been taken seriously by the various Ministries and agencies which have accepted to launch it and have ensured its growth. A further word about centralisation. The Academie has recognised, about the time it was getting ready to elect me as its Vice-president, that it now comprised a fair number of non-Parisian members. Our Permanent Secretary, Jean Dercourt, set up a series of meetings outside Paris. In the major Centres, the local Members are asked to set up a programme of two days, organised often in cooperation with the regional AcadCmie. Often, Members "exiled" from these Centers to Paris are invited to participate ; in some cases, their "return" is a major event for the local University and for the local newspapers. It is too early to really gauge the efficacy of these Meetings, but the effort must be pursued. Academies have to invent new ways of remaining useful, if they do not want to become dead bodies: the pride of their members in their membership is not in itself a justification for their perpetuation!
' Some sources : Roger Hahn - The Anatomy of a Scientific Institution - The Paris Academy of Sciences, 16761803, University of California Press, Los Angeles, London, 1971. Maurice Crosland - Science under Control - The French Academy of Sciences 1795-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. Elisabeth Badinter - Les Passions intellectuelles, 2 vol. , Fayard, Pans, 1999. Academie des Sciences - Rhglement, usages et science dans la France de I'absolutisme (Proceedings of a Colloquium - 1999), Lavoisier, Paris, 2002. li Also to the French regional administrative divisions of the Ministry of Education called AcadBmies, to Dance or Soccer Academies, to Billiard Academies, etc.
li' The total Membership of the Academie was defined, not the annual flux of new Members as in some other Academies. Counting the dead used therefore to be an important occupation. Now, it is the total number of Members under 80 years of age.
List of Symposia organised on the premises of the Acaddmie in 2002 and 2003: "Transferts de matiere a la surface de la terre" "Effet de sene : impacts et solutions. Quelle credihilite ?" "Cellules souches et therapie cellulaire" "L'irnmunite innee - De la drosophile a l'homme" "Chimie et nanosciences" "Les risques nucleaires" "Les risques chimiques" "La skurite sur la toile Internet" and two of the most recent inter-academy ones : "Chemistry and Mathematics : two scient$c languages ofthe 21" Century", organised by the Leopoldina with the participation of the Gattingen Academy and Academie des Sciences iv
27
"L'immunitd inn& - De la drosophile ci I'homme", organised with the Academy of Medical Sciences (UK)
" Registered trade-mark of the Academie. "I "Youth"should be defmed. I usually propose saying that "young" means no more than 5 years oldet than myself. However, in the case of the Scientia E u r o p m meetings, the limit was fixed at 40 years old.
vii
. ..
. . . .. . a
List of the Reports published by the AcadCmie. Etudes sur l'environnement - De l'echelle du territoire a celle du continent, De la transgenese animale a la biotherapie chez l'homme Les plantes genetiquement modifiees Rapport biennal sur la science et la technologie en France - Synthese 1998-2000 Systematique - Ordonner la diversite du Vivant Le monde vegetal - Du genome a la plante entiere Sciences aux temps ultracourts - De l'attoseconde aux petawatts La statistique Systemes rnoleculaires organises - Carrefour de disciplines I'origine de developpements industriels considerables La chimie analytique - Mesure et socikte Materiaux du nucleaire Radiochimie - Matiere radioactive et rayonnements ionisants Le medicament / Medicinal drugs Physiologie animale et humaine - Vers une physiologie integrative / Animal and human physiology - a step towards integrative physiology Developpement et applications de la genomique - L'aprks-genome Les neurosciences fonctionnelles et cognitives : recherches sur la physiologie et les pathologies du systeme nerveux Exploitation et surexploitation des ressources marines vivantes Stratospheric ozone Contamination des sols par les elements en traces: les risques et leur gestion / Soil contamination by rare elements: risk management L'ozone stratospherique Impact de la flotte aerienne sur I'environnement atrnospherique et le c h a t / The impact of aircraft fleets on the atmospheric environment and on the climate Aspects moleculaires, cellulaires et physiologiques des effets du cannabis / Molecular, cellular and physiological considerations appertaining to the effects of cannabis Problems associated with effects of low doses of ionising radiations Pollution atmospherique due aux transports et sante publique / Atmospheric pollution caused by transportaion and its effects on public health L'avenir de la recherche universitaire - Le devenir des docteurs des universites frangaises Valorisations non alimentaires et non Bnergetiques des produits agricoles / Development of tgricultural products for purposes other than food or energy Etat de la recherche toxicologique en France La recherche scientifique et technique dans le domaine de 1'6nergie Perspectives Bducatives des formations techniques et professionnelles. L'appareil &information sur la science et la technique Quelle place pour la m6trologie en France a l'aube du 216 Siecle ?
THE 40th ANNIVERSARY OF THE ‘ETTORE MAJORANA’ FOUNDATION AND CENTER FOR SCIENTIFIC CULTURE ANTONINO ZICHICHI CERN, Geneva, Switzerland and University of Bologna, Italy Over the course of the last 40 years, eighty-six thousand scientists from one hundred and forty nations have taken part in post-university activities that have rallied around the banner of a Science without secrets and without frontiers. This scientific community has striven to break down ideological, political and racial barriers that were invented not by Science, but by its worst enemies. The very existence of a scientific community as vast as that of Erice serves as concrete evidence that the new role of Science has already become a reality. To conduct Science means to discover the Fundamental Laws of Nature. The applications of great scientific discoveries almost always slip out of the control of Science itself. This is why technological development almost always contradicts the values instilled by Science: love for Creation and respect for life and human dignity. “Science and Faith are both gifts of God”, said John Paul 11. No Pope has ever before had the courage to put Science and Faith on pedestals of equivalent dignity, and it is out of this truth that the new role of Science is born. And it is this same truth that fathered the “Spirit of Erice”, known in the international scientific community as “The Erice Geist” (a mix of Italian, English and German). It was this “Erice Geist” that brought the greatest Defense intellects from the USA and the USSR to share the same table at Erice’s Seminars on Nuclear War. Thus it seems worthwhile to ask ourselves what happened at Erice 40 years ago. To understand what happened at Erice from 1963 on, it is first necessary to jump back nine hundred years in time. When the first University was founded nine hundred years ago in Bologna, the impetus came from a source that has still not run dry, even today. Quite the contrary. To learn the origins of the latest inventions and discoveries straight from the mouths of the inventors and discoverers themselves ... It was this possibility that pushed a group of well-educated men to establish the first University. In that era, the medical and juridical sciences were the centre of attention. To learn of the latest findings, one had to wait for the books to be drafted. The time necessary: ten years. But now books can be printed in a week. Why then should we insist on seeking the “living voice” of those who discover and invent?
28
29
Victor F. Weisskopf with Antonino Zichichi at CERN, in garden (1960).
30 While the time required to publish a volume has been reduced, our body of knowledge has expanded at an overwhelming pace. What we have learned from Galilei's time up to today is greater than everything that happened during the ten thousand years that separates us from the dawn of civilisation. And what has become of that institution called the University? Slowly and quietly it had to absorb the enormous growth of knowledge. In all fields. So, from the propulsive centre of new knowledge, it became a place of propaedeutic formation. Bringing young scholars to the threshold of new cognition, enabling them to understand what is being done in the most advanced sectors of the different disciplines through which human knowledge is articulated: that is the work of today's University. And it is not trivial work. How should we present the latest inventions and discoveries? By talking about who did them? How they were done? How the conclusions were reached? When a student opens a university text, he almost always gets the impression that the topic of study is a closed chapter. He will rarely find the space to discuss and comprehend what the open problems are in that field. Nevertheless, all fields have such problems to resolve. The expansion of human knowledge has brought university teaching to a temtory that is completely different from where it started out. Nine hundred years ago, a welleducated person could be versed in several different disciplines to their full depth. Today, the discipline of physics alone corresponds to an immense world of knowledge. There are molecular physics, atomic physics, and nuclear and subnuclear physics, to mention only a few of the largest subdivisions in the science of physics. And even if we focus on subnuclear physics alone, we find that there are at least ten recognized specialities within this field.
31
Victor F. Weisskopf, Sidney D. Drell and Antonino Zichichi (Erice, 26 May 1963).
32 In mathematics there are hundreds of sectors, each of great size and interest. Nothing changes if we shift from so-called pure Science to applied Science. To speak of medicine is to give one name to a thousand sectors. So what happens to a young student who wants to know the latest in the sector that is most fascinating to him? A single University might have, at best, only a couple of first-order superstars, and they alone certainly cannot cover all the fields of human knowledge. It is possible to locate the specialists that work on the cutting edge in any particular sector, but it would be an impossible undertaking to seek to learn directly from all of them. You would have to travel all over the world to have the privilege to meet with them and to sit in on their classes. At Erice, anyone who participates in the courses of a particular School - the oldest is that of subnuclear physics - is called a 'student'. In reality, this usually involves young scholars who have successfully completed their university studies and who come to Erice to find out what the new problems are. This happens in all fields, which are too many to enumerate here. It suffices to say that there are over one hundred schools in existence. But what distinguishes Erice the most is the spirit that animates all participants, both students and docents. The primary objective is to learn. No diplomas or degrees of any type are given out. As it was nine hundred years ago. The student listens to the lesson and then, after a break for lunch, the fun part begins. The student can ask any question of the professor. Even the most banal - it will not be punished. It is in everyone's interest to know the thoughts of young brains upon their exposure to scientific findings about which they had, presumably, already imagined many details and specifics, but rarely the same ones that are mixing around in the head of the docent. For a single problem, there are many different approaches. This is the whole point of discussion groups. When a group of scientists gathers to address themes of great scientific novelty, almost anything can happen. Once the Scientific Director of the Zurich branch of IBM came to this School. On his return to Zurich, he resigned from his directorship in order to dedicate himself to an idea that came to him during the courses at Erice. That idea led him to discover high-temperature superconductivity: he was awarded with the Nobel Prize. We are talking about Alex Muller. This is one example of how new ideas can be born at Erice.
33
The father of the Theorem of Time, Professor Eugene W i p e r (on the left in the photo) and Professor Paul Dirac (on the right in the photo), father of the equation which brought to Antimatter, with Antonino Zichichi.
34 The example cited refers to pure scientific research, even if the applications of high-temperature Superconductivity will be of enormous interest for the transport of electric energy and thousands of other activities. The idea of greatest value to come out of Erice, over the course of long years ridden by oft-ignored conflicts involving many countries, is that of the Manifesto that has been self-declared by more than ten thousand scientists from one hundred and fifteen nations. The mission of that Manifesto is the fight against secret laboratories. There will come a day when anyone who does scientific-technological research in great secrecy will be indicted for crimes against Humanity. Opening the doors of scientific laboratories, whatever type of research this action might unveil, would not only provide new impetus to scientific research in all fields of knowledge. It would also derail the insane spiral of the arms race that today, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, has no further reason to exist. Maybe it seems utopian to think that it would ever be possible to root out the secrets of the scientific-techno-military laboratories. One thing, however, is certain. If we fail to do so, sooner or later the planet is destined to go up in smoke. The project of establishing a World Lab that is open to the best intellects, without racial, ideological, political, religious or geographical (East, West, North, South) barriers, is the fruit of a promise that the scientific community - led by Erice - has made for the sake of all those who love peace not only as a word, but also as something that they wish to construct day by day out of facts. As mentioned in the beginning, the scientists of Erice have given life to a new way of conceiving international scientific collaboration: without secrets and without frontiers. This is the Spirit of Erice. As an indispensable part of this collaboration, the Voluntary Scientific Service has the objective of developing all the poor countries (Southern) that are far below the scientific and technological levels of today's industrialised countries (Northern). The Voluntary Scientific Service has leave to realise projects that would require enormous sums of money if it were not able to count on the work offered by thousands of scientists and specialists who ask nothing in terms of stipends or compensation for the work they put in. This voluntarism touches all levels, up to the highest. In fact, contributors to our projects include protagonists of global prestige from Science, Technology and Medicine, among which are many Nobel Laureates.
35
The memorable session when the putsch in Moscow destroyed Gorbachev’s attempt to bring the Soviet Union adiabatically towards democracy. All these events are closely connected with the activities at the EMCSC, with the World Federation of Scientists as the main point of reference for all problems. For example, when the putsch took place in Moscow, the Soviet scientists present in Erice received an ultimatum to return home immediately. Most of them were with members of their family and I vividly recall their terror over the possibility of seeing their common nightmare materialise, the return of a Stalinist-type dictatorship in their country. I sent a telegram to Moscow asking for confmation of the order received by my colleagues in Erice. According to official news, the new government wanted to maintain international collaboration. An order to go back was in contradiction with official statements by the new Soviet government and would have produced serious consequences in the international scientific community. That telegram allowed the USSR scientists present in Erice with their families not to immediately obey the peremptory order received. Fortunately the putsch was quickly over, and the figure above shows a picture celebrating the end of the terrible hours, when we all were convinced that the world was going to be confronted with another long period of cold war. The putsch was really a terrible surprise. In fact, before the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the scientific community participating in the Erice Seminars was optimistic enough to start considering the problems that the planet would have to face once the East-West confrontation was over. This is how the first studies on the Planetary Emergencies started.
36 The results obtained thanks to the Voluntary Scientific Service are born of the Spirit of Erice and demonstrate the importance of our promise as scientists from the industrialised countries (North) to create a scientific solidarity towards the states who are needy in every respect (South). To overcome the gap that grows bigger every year between the poor countries (South) and the rich (North), it is not enough to offer food and medicine. The poor countries (South) also need to learn how to approach and resolve with their own intellectual energy - the problems that inhibit their own development. The rich countries (North) must help them, not with wasted economic energy invested in useless projects, but intellectually and materially with concrete projects whose precise objectives have been elaborated by the scientific community in close collaboration with the best intellectual energy of the needy states themselves. Without the groundwork that the scientific community of Erice was able to establish over forty years of activity, NorthSouth relations would probably be fixed on a collision course. It is the Spirit of Erice that allows us to hope that it may be possible to avoid this. The Centre for Scientific Culture “Ettore Majorana” is neither an Academy nor a University like those familiar to everyone. It is an Institution born in the heart of the Frontiers of Science through the work of Bell, Blackett, Rabi, Weisskopf and the writer himself. We are talking about exponents of Science who will be remembered in the History of Physics of the 20th century. Patrick M.S. Blackett, Nobel Prize winner, Lord and Grand Admiral of the British Navy, discovered the first example of simultaneously produced “electron-antielectron”. In his Laboratory were discovered the first “strange particles”, so called because no-one had predicted or foreseen them. These particles would open up a new frontier in the Subnuclear Universe. Isidor I. Rabi, discoverer of the effect that bears his name, was awarded the Nobel for this; to him we owe the creation of the prestigious School of Physics of the University of Columbia in New York, and of the Scientific Committee of NATO: an enterprise of formidable originality in that it linked a military structure - with the end of defending Europe from the danger of invasion by the USSR - to the Science of free and democratic countries. It was the Laboratory of Columbia University in New York that brought in Enrico Fermi when he was unfortunately required to leave Italy because of racist laws.
37
8 May 1993, Professor Zichichi delivers to the Holy Father - on behalf of the ten thousand scientists of Erice - his welcome address.
38 Victor F. Weisskopf is a mythic figure of European Science. I was, with John Bell, at the beginning of my scientific career when Europe took its first steps towards building a structure that was capable of competing with the gigantic USA. This structure came to be called CERN (European Nuclear Research Center) and is located in Geneva. The mandate of this structure as desired by Rabi, Blackett and Niels Bohr (one of the founding fathers of Quantum Physics) was to evade the flight (the real one) of intellectuals towards the United States of America. CERN, endowed with the most advanced technological machines, was a necessary but insufficient condition for creating a global pole of attraction for the generations of European physicists who were already travelling outside of their home countries. In addition to its technological structure, CERN needed a leader. It would have to be a great scientist, an exceptional master capable of sparking new interests. Weisskopf was the first physicist in the world to calculate the “virtual” effects, in those days called the “polarisation of the vacuum”. Effects that are now the daily bread on the Frontiers of Physics. We would never have been able to reach the Supenvorld frontier if we had not been able to introduce “virtual” effects into the study of Galilean reality. Weisskopf led CERN to the centre of global scientific attention. John Bell, of my generation, became famous for discovering how to resolve the “paradox of Einstein-Podolsky and Rosen”, abbreviated as “The EPR paradox”. These giants of Galilean Science of the 20th century signed on the 8th of May, 1962, in Geneva, the constitutive act of the Foundation and Centre for Scientific Culture “Ettore Majorana”. And so was born the so-called “Erice Centre” with its intent to give new meaning to Science and its culture. Science, said Fermi, enters into society through its applications, not based on the merit of its values. This is why it is necessary to distinguish scientific culture from its vulgarisation. The Erice Centre has demonstrated how it is possible for the values of science to enter into the culture of our times. On this subject, we need to overcome the paradox that has led us to the vulgarisation called “scientific”, which does not distinguish Science from Technology and has never had the courage to denounce political and economic violence. Because it did not denounce the actual roots of the arms race and the ravages of industrialisation, the greater public was exposed to the thesis that it was scientific progress itself, along with its founding fathers, that was responsible for a planet full of bombs and 53 planetary emergencies.
39 eETTORE W O R A N A s CENTRE FOR SCIENTIFIC CULTURE
Erice Statement It is unprecedented in human history that mankind has accumulateds u c h a m i l i y power to destroy. at once,all centres of civilizationin the world and to affect some vital properties of the planet.
The dnnger of a nuclear holocaust is not the unavoidable consequence of the great development of pure Sciena. In fact, Science is the study of the Fundamental Laws of Nature. Technology is the study. of how the power of
Here are our proposals:
1. Scientists who wish to devote all of their time, fully, to study theoretically or experimentally the basic laws of Nature. shouldin nowesufferfor thisfree choice, to do only pun Science. 1. All Governmentsshddmduevery effort to redua or eliminate nstrictions on the free flow of information,ideas and people. Such restrictions add to suspicion and animosity in the world.
manldndcanbeincreased.
3.
Technology can k for peace and for war. ’Ihe choice &tween peace and waris notascientific choice. It is a cultural one: the culiure of love produces peaceful technology. The culture of hnrred produces inshuments of war. Love and hatred have existed forever. In the bronv and iron ages, notoriously pre-scientiftc. mankind inventedandbuiltmkforpaandinsuuments of war. In the so called ’modern era” it is imperative that culture of love wins.
4.
An e n o m u s number of scientists share their
AII Governmentishouldmakeeveryeffort to reduce secrecy in the technology of defensc.The practice of secrecy generates hatred and distrust. To start a ban for military secncywillcreatcgsfabiliiy than offend by deterrence done.
AU Governments should continue their action to prevent the acquisitionof nuclear weapons hy additional nations or nonnational groups.
5 . All Govanmentsshould makeevcryefforI to reduce their nuclearweaponsstodrpiles.
t i n s between pure SdEncersearchand military applications. This is a fundamental sourn for the arms race.
6. AU Govemmmts shouldmakcevery effort to reduce the causes of insecurity of nonnuclear powm.
It is necessary thata new trend develops. inside thescimtificwmmunityommunityandonanintcmationa basis.
7.
It is of vital impoltance to identify the basic factors needed to start an effective process to protect human life and culture from a third and unprscdwrtcd catastrophicwar.To acwrnplish thisitkneccssarytochmgethepccmovement fmm a uniiawal action to a mtly international one involving proposals based on mutual and m e undemandmg.
Conclusion
All Govemmnu shouldmake evcry effort to ban all types of nudear tests in w a ~
technology.
Thosescientists-inthe EastandintheWest who agree with this &rice Statemenb, engage themselves morally to do everything possible inordatomaLethenewfrcnd,outlkd in the p e n t document,komeeffectivc all the world over and as s w n as possible.
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This Statement was written in ERICE, August 1982. by Paul A.M.DlRAC. Piow ICAPTZA and Antonino ZICHICHI. During the COUM of the thrce years (1982 1985) it has been signed by Tw THOUSAND scientists, the world over.
-
The Erice Statement.
40 So phrases like “father of the atomic bomb” and “father of thc H-bomb” were coined, but without mentioning that the true fathers of these two devices were, respectively, Hitler and Stalin. It was they who gave life to the secret projects for those bombs. It is with the Erice Manifesto that justice was brought to bear on these cultural delusions, a justice that would be realised in 1989 with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. And it was always the Erice Centre that gave the example of the role of Science in confronting and resolving the problems that afflict this marvellous space ship in its voyage around the Sun. At Erice, in fact, will be founded the first nucleus of a new Laboratory with the mandate of studying Planetary Emergencies; not only the two most famous (the Greenhouse Effect and the Hole in the Ozone), but all 53. The new Laboratory is called ILSEAT (International Laboratory for Science Engineering and Advanced Technology) and has been inserted by the Governor of Sicily - Hon. Salvatore Cuffaro - into his government’sprogram. The international scientific community, grateful for the diligence that exponents like those cited - Bell, Blackett, Rabi, Weisskopf - and hundreds of other prestigious figures of Science have exhibited, has welcomed the enthusiastic interest of Governor Cuffaro for this new scientific-technological reality that is rooted in 40 years of activity at Erice. This, however, concerns the future.
THE ACADEMIA EUROPAEA
SIR ARNOLD BURGEN Downing College, The University of Cambridge, UK The creation of the Academia Europaea arose out of a suggestion made at a meeting of European Ministers of Science in 1985 that there was the need of a European Academy of Science. The proposal was developed through meetings at the Royal Society in London. These meetings led to meetings of senior European Scientists and to the creation of the Academia Europaea which held its Foundation Meeting in Cambridge in 1988. The core idea was that closer cooperation in Europe meant more than political and economic arrangements; there needed to be understanding and appreciation of the historical and social differences that focus national attitudes and that there was much to gain in bringing scholars together who might then learn to act in concert rather than in isolation or rivalry. It was agreed that the Academia should cover the whole of knowledge and include the whole of geographical Europe. These proposals need further clarification. At the time of the Academia’s foundation, the European Union represented only some of the countries of Western Europe and excluded those countries in Europe that were still within the Soviet pale and that later were undertaking reorganisation after the disappearance of Soviet control. Yet the scholars of these countries needed especially to be free to become members of any new Academy, which was to include the area that could be considered as sharing the Western heritage of ideas and culture. These features were, of course, not exclusive, having spread to the Americas and elsewhere, but could be contrasted with the cultures of the Middle East and Far East which were rising in importance. In most countries of Europe some version of a National Academy existed with varying degrees of competence, ranging from ones that were little more than social clubs to those that had control of a major area of national activity in the humanities and the natural sciences. For scholars from all these countries it was anticipated that the new Academy would provide wider horizons. The past century has been a period of unparalleled growth in knowledge in all areas but particularly in the natural sciences. The result has been both a growth in specialisation and compartmentation of new knowledge, but also in the formation of new subjects that broke away from their original affiliations and left their parent subject emasculated. In some cases, a great new idea or technology, such as molecular genetics or information technology, has drawn together contributors from a wide range of disciplines, but often at the price of incomprehensibility for those not in the know. Despite this there has been a general feeling that there were great dangers in new developments that occurred out of context, notably new developments that might affect the environment or raise serious problems for the future of mankind. These questions could best be dealt with by a program of cross-disciplinary contact and discussion. This then was the background against which the Academia Europaea was created and we now need to examine how it has tried to respond to these ideals and the problems encountered in trying to do so. The Academia now has over 2000 members elected from
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across Europe and also has some 100 foreign members, most of whom have close connections with Europe. There are no quotas for different countries, but members are elected on their merits, indeed the quality can be judged by the fact that nearly all European Nobel Prize winners are members; the size of the Academia is probably too small and there are many fine scholars who are not yet members, but a balance needs to be found between inclusiveness and the unwieldiness of excessive size. The Academia has held its annual conferences at locations in 14 countries (London, Strasbourg, Heidelberg, Budapest, Uppsala, Parma, Krakow, Barcelona, Gent, Basel, Copenhagen, Prague, Rotterdam, Lisbon and will be held this year in Graz). The theme of these meeting has always cut across disciplines; examples are "The impact of modem biology on the politics, culture and economy in Europe' (1998), "The sea in the Culture of Europe (1999), Concepts of Time (2000), "Risks" (2002), and "What makes us Human?"(2003). A problem that affects a European academy more than a National one is the ease of access of members to meetings. Whereas for a National academy, the distances that members need to travel to attend meetings may be relatively short, for the attendance at meetings of a European academy, the distances are relatively large and this has meant there was a preponderance of members from the local area where any Annual meeting was held. In 1999 the practice was introduced of inviting a group of young scholars from the host country to be the guests of the Academia, thus preventing it being only a matter of interest to older well-established scholars; this has proved to be a popular innovation. A feature of the Annual Meeting has been a keynote lecture (Erasmus Lecture) by a distinguished scholar covering such topics as "Can there be a European Law? (Emst Mestmacker), National identity and the formation of States (Alan Touraine), Power and insecurity in Europe (Lawrence Freedman) and Language and the evolution of the Human mind (Hubert Markl). Some of the difficulties of communicating across Europe can be overcome by printed publications and the European Review was designed with this in mind. It is a quarterly publication, whose aim is that the spread of the subject in every issue should be such, that there should be at least one article that appeals to the diversity of its readers, i.e., those who are not too narrow in their reading! This is not an easy objective to achieve, but it appears not to have missed the mark too often. The Review features what it terms Focuses in which a topic is explored by several authors; recent ones have been on "Quality of life for the Elderly","Risk", "China, Tradition and Modernity", "Japan and Europe, "Building social cohesions", "The future of Universities", "The Theatre" and a current one is on "History and memory" recounting how the population of various countries regard their conduct during World War I1 seen from a fifty year later perspective. The Academia has undertaken a series of special studies notably in the field of education, an area that is in a condition of stressful evolution everywhere in Europe, the old certainties being overturned by the desire to educate as many people as possible to a high level. The most recent publication is "Excellence in higher education", published this year, the result of a conference held jointly with the Wenner-Gren Foundation. Other themes have been "Psychosocial studies in Young People (1995)", "The idea of Progress"
43 (1 997), “Growing up with Science” (1997), and “The impact of electronic publishing on the academic community” (1998). In 1993 the Academia instituted a programme of Prizes to young scholars to aid the development of science and scholarship in Russia. This involves the award of twenty-five prizes each year and has gained support from the Soros Foundation, the Rayne Foundation, Amersham International, the International Science Foundation and others. It is one of the most successful activities that the Academia has initiated. These are some of the achievements of the Academia Europaea to date; there is feeling that more could have been achieved. What has inhibited a greater range of developments and impact? Two major constraints have been felt. The first is finance. It is much more costly to support a Europe-wide activity than one confined to a single country and yet it is very much more difficult to achieve financial support for an organisation that is European. It simply does not offer the local and political attractions to it support from governments that National academies can command, nor does it attract most National Foundations; we can be very grateful that some Foundations have been exceptions to this generalisation and have been such warm supporters. It would seem obvious that the European Commission should welcome such an organisation contributing so effectively to a European spirit in scholarship, but in fact its statutes have prevented its giving more than support for speakers at some of the meetings. The financial situation remains at present a serious brake on the development of new activities. The second restraint is related to the very broad perspective of the Academia. For instance, while the breadth and quality of the European Review is applauded, this puts it very low on the priorities of University and other libraries that are under intense pressure to subscribe to specialised publications which are appearing in ever increasing numbers, and in consequence its circulation is unduly restricted. It takes time for a new academic activity to make its mark on the international scene, and by the standards of the other academies represented at this meeting, the Academia Europaea is hardly into childhood! However, the time is ripe for an increase in its influence in Europe, notably through new activities now in preparation. There are so many instances in the modern world where a balanced judgement is required between interests that press their case without regard for opposing views and particularly where sound judgement is distorted by populist or political pressures; the Academia is in the position of being able to mobilise experts from across Europe to provide a balanced and well argued evaluation of the total picture.
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2.
CLIMATE: GLOBAL WARMING
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE COSMIC RAY CONNECTION NIR J. SHAVIV Racah Institute of Physics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel ABSTRACT We review the evidence linking cosmic ray flux (CRF) variations to global climate change. In particular, we summarize recent results demonstrating that the long-term CRF variability associated with galactic spiral arm passages is the dominant climate driver over geological time scales. This can be concluded from the large correlation apparent between the reconstructed CRF history and the geologically reconstructed temperature record, and the lack of any correlation with the amount of atmospheric C02. The result can be used to quantify the CRF/temperature link and place an upper limit on the atmospheric response to COz variations. In turn,we show that this can be used to resolve the faint sun paradox and understand the origin of the global warming observed over the past century. INTRODUCTION - THE ALLEGED COSMIC RAY FLUX-CLIMATE LINK Accumulating evidence suggests that solar activity is responsible for at least some climate variability. This is indicated by the numerous correlations apparent between solar activity and either direct climatic variables or indirect climate proxies over time scales ranging from days to millennia (e.g., Herschel 1796, Labitzke and van Loon 1992, Eddy 1976, Friis-Cristensen & Lassen 1991, Soon et al. 1996, Soon et al. 2000, Beer et al. 2000, Hodell et al. 2001, Neff et al. 2001). It is therefore hard at this point to argue against any causal link between solar activity and climate on Earth. Nevertheless, the above correlations do not indicate which one of several possible pathways is actually responsible for the above correlations, with probably more than one mechanism at work. The most obvious link would be through direct changes in solar luminosity. However, the climatic variability attributable to solar activity is a few times larger than could be inferred from the 0.1% typical change observed in the solar irradiance (Beer et al, 2000, Soon et al. 2000). Namely, the variability in the thermal flux itself appears to be insufficient to explain the climate variations observed. Two possible pathways were suggested through which solar activity could be amplified and more effectively generate climate variations. First, if the global climate is sensitive to the amount of tropospheric ionization, it should be sensitive to solar activity as well. This is because the solar wind modulates the CRF, and with it, the amount of tropospheric ionization (Ney 1959). A second possibility includes the large UV flux variations. Since this flux is the primary source of heat in the stratosphere, it could affect, for example, the Hadley circulation (Haigh 1996). Correlations relating CRF modulations to climate on Earth exist on two time scales. Over the solar cycle, the solar wind strength varies considerably and, as a result, the amount of tropospheric ionization changes by typically 5%-10%. Svensmark (1998, 2000) and also Palle-Bag0 & Butler (2000) demonstrated that the variations over two decades in the amount of low altitude cloud cover nicely correlates with the CRF
47
48 reachipg Earth. Both signals, of the cloud cover and the CRF, lag by typically half a year behind other solar activity indices. This implies that it is more likely that the cloud cover is directly related to the CRF and indirectly to solar activity, than directly to solar activity. The reason the CRF lags behind solar activity to begin with is because it takes a few months for the solar wind to reach the heliopause and several months for the cosmic rays (CRs) to diffuse from the heliopause to Earth. Over the short time scale of days, various correlations relate CRF variations during Forbush events to various climatic variables. These events are marked by a sudden reduction in the CRF and a gradual increase over typically a 10-day period. Tinsley & Dean (1991) have shown that the Vorticity Area Index over Oceans is correlated with Forbush decreases. Similarly, Pudovkin & Veretenenko (1995) reported a cloud cover decrease (in latitudes of 60N-64N, where it was measured) synchronized with Forbush events. Later, a link between Forbush decreases and rainfall has also been claimed. Stozhkov et al. (1995) found an average 30% drop in rainfall in the initial day of a Forbush event over 47 events recorded during 36 years in 50 meteorological stations in Brazil (statistically significant to 30). While in Antarctica, Egorova et al. (2000) found that on the first day after a Forbush event, the temperature in Vostok station dramatically increases by an average of 10°K. And last, Todd & Kniveton (2002) have recently shown that Forbush decreases are associated with global decreases in cloud cover. Since Forbush events are relatively short, they can be more easily used to separate a CRFklimate effect from other possibilities. The reason is that over the time scale of a few days, there is significantly less correlation between CRF variability and other solar activity indices, such as UV or protons. And indeed, Tinsley & Dean (1991) have shown that the correlation they obtained completely disappears when the VAI is compared with UV changes. Similarly, Egorova et al. (2000) have shown that there is no measurable signal in sync with solar proton events. Moreover, a climatic correlation with Forbush events cannot arise from hypersensitivity to U V , since the latter is absorbed in the stratosphere, which cannot significantly influence tropospheric weather on the time scale of days. Given the above evidence, it is therefore quite reasonable to claim that cosmic rays affect the global climate and the link is most likely through control of the tropospheric ionization, which modifies the cloud formation process. Although the actual link is not critical to the rest of our discussion, it is interesting that several new results indeed point to the validity of this mechanism. Two particularly interesting results should be mentioned. First, Hamson & Aplin (2001) found experimentally that the formation of cloud condensation nuclei (CCN) is correlated with natural variability in the CRF (e.g., due to statistical variability of CR air showers). In other words, this link is more than hypothetical. Second, using an advanced particle microphysics model, Yu (2002) discovered that a scenario in which the formation of CCN depends on tropospheric ionization, explains several interesting observations. Yu found that at low ionization rates, CCN formation increases with increasing ionization rates. This is because the system i s “ionization limited”. However, at large enough ionization rates, the formation of CCN decreases. This result, which at first might seem counter-intuitive, stems from the fact that if the ionization rate is large enough, condensation nuclei cannot grow quickly enough after they form, without discharging themselves through ion-ion recombination. The net result is that increasing the ionization
49
rate increases the CCN density at low altitudes, but it reduces the CCN density at high altitudes. This result is interesting as it implies that global warming induced by solar activity modulating the CRF should increase the surface temperature without changing the average tropospheric temperature by much. This offers an elegant solution as to why global warming in the past few decades was observed primarily near the surface but not by satellites and only marginally by balloons, since greenhouse gases are expected to heat the tropopause more uniformly. LONG TERM CRF VARIATIONS AND THE GEOLOGICAL RECORD An altogether independent piece of evidence linking CRF variability to temperature on Earth is the circumstantial link apparent between long-term CRF variations and geological reconstructions of climate on Earth. Long-term CRF variations arise because the solar system changes its galactic neighborhood as it revolves around the galaxy. When nearby supernova events are more numerous, more cosmic rays are accelerated in our galactic vicinity and the CRF reaching Earth is respectively higher. Moreover, studies of spiral galaxies like our own reveal that supemovae (SNe) occur predominantly in the vicinity of the galactic spiral arms. This is unsurprising considering that spiral arms harbor most of the star formation activity, and that massive stars live relatively short lives so that they are born and die within the spiral arm vicinity. The net result is that the CRF near spiral arms can be significantly higher, by a factor of a few, over the flux between the arms (e.g., Shaviv 2002b and references therein). Using astronomical data, the difference between the solar system’s angular velocity Qsun around the galaxy and the spiral arm pattern speed SZ, is found to be R,,,R,=ll.l+2.0 (km/s)/kpc (Shaviv 2002b). Since the Milky Way has 4 spiral arms, this angular velocity difference translates to a spiral arm passage every 1342~24Myr. Thus, the astronomical prediction is that the CRF reaching Earth should vary with the above period. If the CRF/climate link is real, we should see a climatic affect with the above periodicity. Figure 1 plots the predicted spiral arm passages using the astronomical data and the ensuing CRF using a model described in Shaviv (2002a,b). This is then compared with the geological sedimentation evidence for the occurrence of ice age epochs (IAEs) or warm periods (i.e., “icehouses” and “greenhouses”), as summarized by Frakes et al. (1992) and Crowell (1999). Interestingly, Frakes et al. claim that the geological data is sufficient to claim periodicity. Crowell on the other hand, claims that the data is insufficient to make the claim of periodicity and indeed his epochs occur less regularly. Irrespectively, both records are consistent with each other, but more importantly, they are consistent with the predicted CRF using the astronomical data. The correlation between astronomical and geological data suggests that indeed there is a causal link between galactic geography and climate. It does not point to the actual mechanism of the physical link. A smoking gun, which would point towards the CRF as the culprit, would be any historic record that can be used to reconstruct the CRF and, with it, show that the predicted periodic CRF variations indeed exist and that the
50 CRF varies in concordance with climate variations. Such a historic record exists in the form of exposure ages of Iron meteorites'. Figure 1: The past Eon. Panel A describes past Galactic spiral arms crossings assuming L&-Q=lO.9 (km/s)Apc. Panel B describes the CRF reaching the solar system using a CR dirusion model (Shaviv 2002b). Note that the CRF is predicted to lag behind spiral aim crossings. This is portrayed by the hatched regions, which qualitatively show the predicted occurrences of IAEs, if the CRF required to trigger them is the averagejlux. Arrows mark the middle of the spiral crossing and the expected mid-glaciation point. Panel C qualitatively describes the geologically recorded IAEs-its top ha& as summarized by Crowell (1999), and its bottom ha& as summarized by Frakes et al. (1992). By jne-tuning the observed pattern speed of the arms to best j t the IAEs, an intriguing correlation appears between the IAEs and their prediction. Note that the correlation need not be absolute since additionalfactors may affect the climate. Otherfactors that should be considered and noted in the graph are: (1) The mid-Mesozoic glaciations are signzjkantb less extensive than others. (2) It is unclear to what extent the period around 700 Myr BP was warmer than the IAEs before or since. (3) Thejrst IAE of the Neo-Proterozoic (if indeed distinct) is very uncertain. (4) Since Norma's crossing is an extrapolation@om smaller galactic radii, its location is uncertain. r f the arm's structure at smaller radii is indeed direrent (Shaviv ZOOZb), its preferred location will lag by about 20Myr. Panel D is a 1-2-1 averaged histogram of the 41Kf0K exposure ages of Fe meteorites, which are predicted to cluster around the CRF minima. The cluster-IAE correlationJitrther suggests an extra-terrestrial triggerfor the glaciations.
Using a set of exposure-dated Iron meteorites it is possible to reconstruct the CRF. This is because the CRF is the 'clock' used to exposure-date the meteorites. As a consequence, variations in the CRF translate into distortions in the exposure ages. Using a statistical method described in Shaviv (2002b) these distortions can be used to reconstruct the CRF variations. The principle behind this new method is the fact that during periods with a low CRF, when the exposure age 'clock' ticks slower, many meteorites cluster around these apparent exposure ages. This is because long real time intervals elapse while the exposure clock measures a short interval only. Thus, the prediction is that a histogram of the exposure ages of iron meteorites will show clustering around epochs with a lower CRF, when a warmer climate is expected. This clustering is indeed apparent in the data, (see figure 1) providing an independent link between CRF variations and climate variations on Earth. The climate history used in the above comparison was a qualitative reconstruction using geological sedimentation records. It could only indicate the existence of cold or
' Chondrites are not useful for this purpose, since their typical lifetime is short.
51 warm periods. More information would be learned if we could compare the CRF variations to a quantitative paleoclimatic record. At the least, it would allow the quantification of the CRF-climate link. isotope ratio measurements of fossils from tropical Using thousands of '80/'60 oceans, Veizer et al. (2000) reconstructed the temperature over the Phanerozoic2. This record was subsequently used for the quantitative comparison between CRF variations and climate (Shaviv & Veizer 2003). The results are graphically depicted in figure 2, where it is apparent that the reconstructed CRF history, using the extra-terrestrial record of meteorites, has a remarkable correlation with temperature. Since the residual in the fit bears no resemblance to the variation of atmospheric C02, an upper limit to its effect can be deduced. Using a statistical analysis, the following conclusions can be reached: CRF is responsible for 75% of the long-term (>50 M y ) variance in the 1) tropical temperature. Thus, the CRF is by f a r the most dominant climate driver over long time scales. An upper limit on the effect of C02 can be placed. At lo, the upper limit on 2) the temperature increase resulting from a doubled amount of atmospheric C02 is about 0.9"C (it is about 1.5"C and 2.6"C at the 90% and 99% confidence levels). This can be translated into a limit on the global temperature response of radiative forcing. As compared with the response of a hypothetical black body, Earth, the upper limit on the response is h 12 months) subtype A, B and C HIV-1 gp41 specific and CCRS 2"d loop peptide B--memory responses in serum. In Table 2 the frequency of HIV-1 neutralizing activity in serum is shown in the different groups at 3-12 months after last immunization. A long-term mucosal (intestinal, vaginal and lung lavage I@) response was obtained in addition to a systemic immune response. The inclusion of the HIV co receptor CCRS component in the vaccine may have enhanced the immunity also towards HIV antigens. In primates, immunization with CCR5-DNA followed by peptide booster induced high titers of CCRS-specific serum IgG and IgA capable of inhibiting CCR5dependent HIV-infection in vitro (Zuber et al. 2002). These immune responses remained in the immunized primates for over 9 months after the last immunization (not shown). In figure 1 the median vaginal IgA responses towards different HIV-1 subtypes are shown over time in animals immunized with and without
HIVgpl60/CCR5-DNA-priming.
Figure 1. Median vaginal wash IgA kinetics against gp41 subtype A and B in four groups of twice intranasaly immunized mice over a period of 12 months. 45
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Time (Months) Using the N3 adjuvant for the intranasal DNA-immunizations showed that a 1040-fold reduction of DNA could be obtained. When the N3-adjuvant was titrated for efficacy and safety we were able to show that a final concentration of 1-2% of the adjuvant was efficiently supporting the immune responses even with as little as 0.8ug DNA-plasmid (data not shown). For the presented results in this study the 2% N3 adjuvant concentration was used. Peptide immunized mice responded by developing a
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long-term gp41 specific systemic serum IgG responses but a shorter, up to 9 months long, mucosal gp41 specific IgA immunity. The possibility of using rVLP g a g a 1 2 0 instead of peptides is being tested in ongoing studies. Primary results indicate that the dosage of rVLP can be reduced 10-fold (to 2ug/immunization) when recombinant VLP was mixed with the L3-adjuvant as compared with doses needed without adjuvant. Figure 2. Fecal IgA responses against HIV-1 gp160 envelope antigen pre- and postintranasal gp41 peptide booster immunization in HIV-1 gpl60hev DNAN3 adjuvant (0-4%) immunized mice. Fecal wash dilution: 1/4.
Cell-mediated immunity Figure 3A. Release of IL4 in mice intranasally HIV-1 gpl60hev DNA-N3(04%) immunized pre- and post HIV-1 gp41 peptide booster. Gp160 antigen stimulated cells. 80
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Figure 38. Responders d F N gamma secreting cells after intranasal HIV-I gpl60lrev DNA-N3 adjuvant (04%) immunization pre- and post HIV-I gp41 peptide booster. Supernatant of rgpl60 antigen stimulated cells in vitro, IFN-gamma. I
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In Table 3 and Figures 3A and B the frequency of HIV-1 proliferative and interferon gamma responders are shown. Mice receiving the 8ug dose DNA-plasmids with N3 adjuvant and boostered with L3-adjuvant mixed peptides/proteins always responded more strongly, both as T-cell proliferative responses and as higher amounts of released IFN-gamma or IL-5 than mice receiving antigens without the adjuvants. The possibility of using rVLP gag/gpl20 instead of peptides is being tested in ongoing studies. Primary results indicate that the dosage of rVLP can be reduced 10fold (to 2ug/immunization) when rVLP is mixed with the L3-adjuvant as compared to the doses needed without adjuvant. DISCUSSION HIV-1 neutralizing serum antibodies were induced which were still present 12 months after booster immunization Serum was shown to be capable of neutralizing HIV-1 strains representing HIV clades B=A>C. HIV-1 SF2 neutralizing serum, fecal and lung IgA was detectable only in the DNA primed mouse groups. Immune responses were enhanced by using the novel N3 adjuvant for delivering DNAvaccines as demonstrated by the lower amounts of DNA-plasmid needed to evoke systemic and mucosal immune responses. In fact, it was possible to reduce the amount ofHIV-lgpl60/rev DNA to 0,8 ug DNA in a mixture with 1-2% N3 adjuvant to obtain a detectable mucosal IgA and cell-mediated (IFN-gamma) immune response. In recent years great progress has been made in the field of AIDS- and DNA-vaccination when combined with heterologous boosters with live vectors such as modified recombinant vaccinias (MVA) or adeno virus vectors (Amara et al. 2001, Robinson H.L. 2002). These vaccine candidates have efficiently induced potent and protective cell-mediated immune responses in primates in experimental settings. The general problem with the HIV-vaccines has been to evoke a potent, long-lasting
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1
236 humoral immunity preferably present at mucosal sites, the main port for HIV-1 transmission. Passive immunotherapy trials have shown promising possibilities, but similar antibodies have been very difficult to obtain by immunization. Important factors to bear in mind when aiming at functionally important antibodies is that we know relatively little of their efficacy on mucosal surfaces while studies performed by Baba et al. 2001 and others have shown that systemic antibodies can work well. At least in a number of studies, what seems to be the most prominent, broadly neutralization inducing epitopes in the HIV-1 envelope have been detected (Broliden et al. 1992, Muster et al. 1993, Burton DR. 2000, Zwick et al. 2001). The unfortunate finding when the most efficient broadly neutralizing antibodies are being characterized, has been their unusual CDR3 regions, often longer than seems possible to obtain in rodents such as mice or guinea pigs. Further, the N-linked glycosylation of the envelope seem to play an important role in hiding neutralizing epitopes which are still an important factor to take into account when selecting vaccine candidates (Scanlan et al. 2002). The only way to properly investigate the efficacy of a neutralizing, antibody-inducing vaccine will thus always be man. The aim of this study was to develop and analyze at least one HIV-I DNA prime and HIV-1 peptide booster (DNA-PEP) or virus-like particle candidate for a clinical trial. The basis and the strategy of the vaccine efforts are based on the immune study results performed on highly HIV-exposed, persistently seronegative individuals (Shearer et al. 1996, Devito et al. 2000, Belec et al. 2001, Clerici et al. 2002). The facinating finding in parts of these cohorts have been their capacity to develop an immune response specific for the HIV gp41 trans-memberane region as well as against self, such as the HIV-1 coreceptor CCRS. This kind of double-directed antibody response should logically be less sensitive to virus mutations. If it were possible to mimic this kind of antibody response by vaccination, it might result in a more robust protective immunity than when targeting the HIV envelope only. The focus would be to provide HIV-vaccines with non-live vaccine candidates but with the potential of providing the desired immune responses that can be obtained with live vaccines. The main aim of this concept of preventive vaccine would be to provide longlasting mucosal (genital, rectal) sIgA responses against conserved HIV-1 suppressinglinhibiting regions in the HIV envelope, and to understand the basic mucosal immunology behind the intranasally induced immunity. Using intranasal delivery would also often provide a systemic immunity, a second line of immunity in the blood and peripheral organs. Combining a smart vaccine delivery device with new promising adjuvants for mucosal delivery would increase and provide a more longlasting immunity than vaccination without an adjuvant. This study would propose vaccine candidates who would be based on heterologous vaccine strategies where in part circular HIV-DNA plasmids previously shown to be safe and in part synthetic peptides/proteins, and efficiently induce HIV-specific immunity in HIV-infected individuals or animals but which have never been given intranasally in man. Alternatively in our ongoing studies HIV-1 subtype-broad (subtypes A, B and C) minimalistic HIV-DNA candidates are being studied for analysis and comparison of efficacy in inducing broadly HIV subtype recognizing long-lasting memory responses (Ljungberg et al. 2002, Devito et al. 2002). One special task that we plan to address with our envelope vaccines, will be to provide humoral sIgA and systemic IgG immunity towards both phenotypes of HIV, both the rapidhigh and the commonly sexually transferred slow/Iow phenotypes. For these kinds of studies we need novel, safe and inexpensive adjuvants, such as the ones proposed in this study.
237 CONCLUSIONS Intranasal DNA-N3 prime followed by one peptide-13 booster immunization was able to induce a subtype broad humoral B-cell memory and HIV-1 neutralizing immunity for at least half of a mouse’s lifetime. REFERENCES Amara RR., Villinger F., Altman JD., et al. Control of a mucosal challenge and prevention of AIDS by a multiprotein DNNMVA vaccine. Science 2001,292:69-74. Baba TW., Liska V., Hofinann-Lehmann R., Vlasak J., Xu W., Ayehuni S., Cavacini LA., Posner MR., Katinger H., Stiegler G., Bernacky BJ., Rizvi TA., Schmidt R., Hill R., Keeling ME., Lu Y., Wright JE., Chou TC., Ruprecht F W . Human neutralizing monoclonal antibodies of the IgGl subtype protect against mucosal simian-human immunodeficiency virus infection. Nature Med. 2000,6,200-206.. Tranchot-Diallo J., Diallo MO., et Belec L., Ghys PD., Hocini H., Nkengasong IN., al. Cervicovaginal secretory antibodies to human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) that block viral transcytosis through tight epithelial barriers in highly exposed HIV-1-seronegative African women. Jhfect. Dis. 2001, 184:1412-1422. Bomsel M., Heyman M., Hocini H., Lagaye S., Belec L., Dupont C., Desgranges C. Intracellular neutralization of HIV transcytosis across tight epithelial barriers by antiHIV envelope protein dIgA or IgM. Immunity 1998,9:277-287. Broliden P.A., von Gegerfelt A., Clapham P., Rosen J., Fenyo EM., Wahren B., Broliden K. Identification of human neutralization-inducing regions of the human immunodeficiency virus type 1 envelope glycoproteins. Proc.Nat1. Acad. Sci. USA, 1992, 89,461-465. Buonaguro L., Racioppi L., Tonesello M.L., Arra C., Visciano M.L., Biryahwaho B., Sempala S.D.K., Giraldo G., Buonaguro F.M. Induction of neutralizing antibodies and cytotoxic T lymphocytes in Balb/c mice immunized with virus-like particles presenting a gp120 molecule from a HIV-1 isolate of clade A. Antiviral Res. 2002, 54, 189-201. Burton DR, Montefiori DC. The antibody response in HIV-1 infection. AIDS 1997; 11: S87-S98. Burton D.R., Parren P.W. Vaccines and the induction of functional antibodies: time to look beyond the molecules of natural infection ? Nat.Med 2000, 6:123-125. Clerici M., Barassi C., Devito C., Pastori C., Piconi S., Trabattoni D., Longhi R., Hinkula J., Broliden K., Lopalco L. Serum IgA of HIV-exposed uninfected individuals inhibit HIV through recognition of a region within the alfa-helic of gp41. AIDS 2002,6:1731-1741. Devito C., Hinkula J., Kaul R., Kimani J., Kiama P., Lopalco L., Barass C., Piconi S., Trabattoni D., Bwayo J.J., Plummer F., Clerici M., Broliden K. Cross-clade HIV-1specific neutralizing IgA in mucosal and systemic compartments of HIV-1 exposed, persistently seronegative subjects. J.AIDS, 2002, 30;413-420. Devito C., Levi M., Broliden K., Hinkula J. Epitope-mapping of B-cell epitopes in rabbits immunized with various gag antigens for the induction of HIV-1 gag capture ELISA reagents. J.Immuno1. Methods 2000, 238, 69-80.
238 Devito C. Functional properties of antibodies in resiatance against HIV-1 infection. Karolinska Institutet, Sweden, Thesis 2002. Hinkula J, Svanholm C, Schwartz S, Lundholm P, Brytting M, Engstrom G, Benthin R, Glaser H, Kohleisen B, Erfle V, Okuda K, Wigzell H, Wahren B. Recognition of prominent viral epitopes induced by immunization with human immunodeficiency virus type 1 regulatory genes. J.Viro1. 1997,71,5528-5539. Kaul R, Plummer FA, Kimani J, Dong T, Kiama P, Rostron T, Njagi E, MacDonald KS, Bwayo JJ, McMichael AJ, Rowland-Jones SL. HIV-1-specific mucosal CD8-t lymphocyte responses in the cervix of HN-1-resistant prostitutes in Nairobi. J Immunol2000 Feb 1;164(3):1602-11 Ljungberg K., Rollman E., Eriksson L., Hinkula J., Wahren B. Enhanced immune responses after DNA vaccination with combined envelope genes from different HIV1 subtypes. Virology 2002,302:44-57.. Lopalco L., Barassi C., Pastori C., Longhi R., Burastero SE., Tambussi G., Mazotta F., Lazzarin A,, Clerici M., Sicardi AG. CCR5-reactive antibodies in seronegative partners of HIV-seropositive individuals down-molulate surface CCRS in vivo and neutralize infectivity of R5 strains of HIV-1 in vitro. J.Immuno1. 2000, 164, 34263433. McMichael A.J., Hanke T. HIV vaccines 1983-2003. Science 2003,7:874-880. Muster T., Steidl F., Putscher M., Trkola A., Klima A., Himmler G., Ruker F., Katinger H. A conserved neutralizing epitope on gp41 of human immunodeficiency virus type 1. J.Viro1. 1993,67, 6642-6647. Myers G., Lenroot R. HIV glycosylation: What does it portend i AIDS Res. Human Retrov. 1992, 8, 1459-1460. Putkonen P., Thorstensson R., Ghavamzadeh L., Albert J., Hild K., Biberfeld G., Norrby E. Prevention of HIV-2 and SIVsm infection by passive immunization in cynomolgus monkeys. Nature 1991,352: 434-436. Robinson HL. New hope for an AIDS vaccine. Nat. Rev. Immunol. 2002,2,239-250. Scanlan C.N. et al. The broadly neutralizing anti-human immunodeficiency virus type 1 antibody 2G12 recognizes a cluster of alfa-2 mannose residues on the outer surface of gp120. J.Viro1. 2002, 76, 7306-7321. Schroder U., Svenson SB. Nasal and parenteral immunizations with diphteria toxoid using monoglyceride/fatty acid lipid suspensions as adjuvants. Vaccine 1999, 17, 2096-2103. Shearer G.M., Clerici M. Protective immunity against HIV infection: has nature done the experiment for us ? Immunol. Today 1996, 17-21. Zwick M.B., Labrijn A.F., Wang M., Spenlehauer C., Saphire E.O., Bilney J.M., Moore J.P., Stiegler G., Katinger H., Burton D.R., Parren P.W. Broadly neutralizing antibodies targeted to the membrane-proximal external region of human immunodeficiency virus type 1 glycoprotein gp41. J.Viro1. 2001, 75:10892-10905. Zuber B., Hinkula J., Vodros D., Lundholm P., Nilsson C., Morner A., Levi M., Benthin R., Wahren B. Induction of immune responses and break of tolerance by DNA against the HIV-1 coreceptor CCRS but no protection from SNsm challenge. Virol. 2000,278,400-41 1.
239 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was supported by research grants from the Swedish Research Council, the Karolinska Institutet Research Fund and the Swedish Medical Society
240 Table 1 : Frequency of serum, rectal and vaginal IgG and IgA responders against HIV-1 antigens in groups of mice intranasally immunized with HIV-DNA alone or with peptide booster and with and without mucosa] adjuvants N3 and L3. No. of mice Groups and immunogens
Adjuvant
No. of
immunizations
Serum ISG rgpl60
gagp24
rgpl60
gagp24
gpieo
Fectal IgA
Serum IgA
Vaginal IgA gagp24 gp!60 gagp24
8 ug HIV-1 DNA gpl60/rev
Saline
8
2
0/8
0/8
1/8
0/8
0/8
0/8
0/8
0/8
8 ug HIV-1 DNA gpl60/rev
N3
6
2
5/6
0/6
6/6
0/6
6/6
0/6
5/6
0/6
80 ug HIV-1 DNA gpl60/rev + gp41 peptides Salme/L3
6
2
6/6
N.A
6/6
N.A
6/6
NA
6/6
NA
8 ug HIV-1 DNA gpl60/rev 1 gp41 peptides
N3/L3
12
2
12/12
N.A
12/12
N.A
7/7
N.A
6/7
NA
10 ug gp41 peptides
Saline
8
2
1/8
0/4
0/8
0/4
0/8
NA
0/8
NA
50 ug gp41 peptides
Saline
5
2
2/5
0/5
1/5
N.A
1/5
NA
0/5
NA
10 ug gp41 peptides
L3
7
2
111
N.A
6/7
N.A
6/6
0/6
6/6
NA
2ugrVLPgag/gpl20
PBS
6
1
0/6
0/6
0/6
0/6
0/6
0/6
0/6
0/6
2ugrVLPgag/gpl20
L3
6
1
0/6
6/6
0/6
6/6
0/6
6/6
0/6
5/6
N3/L3
10
2
0/10
0/10
0/10
0/10
0/6
0/3
0/6
0/3
L3 or N3 adjuvant Abbreviations: N.A = Not analysed.
Table 2: Frequency of HIV-1 neutralizing serum and rectal antibody responders against HIV-1 antigens in groups of mice intranasally immunized with HIV-DNA alone or with peptide booster and with and without mucosal adjuvants N3 and L3. Neutralizing antibodies in serum Groups, doses and immunogens.
No. of mice
HIV-1 Subtype A
HIV-1 Subtype B
Adjuvant
Neutralizing antibodies rectal HIV-1 HIV-1 Subtype C SF2 Subtype B
8 ug HIV-1 DNA gp!60/rev
Saline
8
0/8
0/8
0/8
0/4
0/4
8 ug HIV-1 DNA gpl60/rev NT80%
N3
6
1/6 30
6/6 20-60
0/6 > >
Facilitate technology exchanges; Review and endorse emerging protocols and codes of conduct; Maintain standards and protocols for ultra-high bandwidth technologies;
397 Specify the conditions on which access to such ultra-high bandwidth technologies be granted; Promote the establishment of effective inter-governmental structures and public-private interaction; Attempt to coordinate international standards setting bodies with the view of promoting interoperability of information security management processes and technologies; Facilitate the establishment and coordination of international computer emergency response facilities, including taking into account activities of existing organizations; Share cyber-tracking information derived from open sources and share technologies to enhance the security of databases and data sharing. 6. Nationally and transnationally, an educational framework for promoting the awareness of the risks looming in cyberspace should be developed for the public. Specifically, schools and educational institutions should incorporate codes of conduct for ICT activities into their curricula. Civil society, including the private sector, should be involved in this educational process. 7. Due diligence and accountability should be required of chief executive officers and public and private owners to institutionalize security management processes, assess their risks, and protect their information infrastructure assets, data, and personnel. The potential of market forces should be fully utilized to encourage private sector companies to protect their information networks, systems, and data. This process could include information security statements in filings for publicly traded companies, minimum insurance requirements for coverage of cyber incidents, and return on investment analyses. 8. In parallel, to the elaboration and harmonization of national criminal codes, there should also be an effort to work toward equivalent civil responsibility laws worldwide. Civil responsibility should also be established for neglect, violation of fiduciary duties, inadequate risk assessment, and harm caused by cyber criminal and cyber terrorist activities. 9. mong the specific and concrete actions that should be considered is the possibility that commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, firmware, and software should be open source or at least be certified. 10. Information security issues should also be addressed in forthcoming multilateral meetings. Regional organizations should also add to national and international efforts to combat attacks in cyberspace in their respective regional contexts. 11. International law enforcement organizations should assume a stronger role in the international promotion of cybercrime issues. The competences and functions of Interpol and, in the European context, Europol, should be substantially strengthened, including by examining their investigative options. 12. The international science community should more vigorously address the scientific and technological issues that intersect with the legal and policy aspects of information security, including the use of ICTs and their impact on privacy and individual rights.
398 13. The international scientific community, and in particular the World Federation of Scientists, should assist developing countries and donor organizations to understand better how ICTs can further development in an environment that promotes information security and bridges the Digital Divide.
Explanatory Comments to Recommendations 1.
Because of its universal character, the United Nations system should have the leading role in inter-governmental activities for the functioning and protection of cyberspace so that it is not abused or exploited by criminals, terrorists, and states for aggressive purposes. In particular it should: (a) respond to an essential and urgent need for a comprehensive consensus Law of Cyberspace; (b) advance the harmonization of national cybercrime laws through model prescription; and (c) establish procedures for international cooperation and mutual assistance. A.
Why Should the UN Have the Leading Role in Intergovernmental Activities on Cvberspace?
The interconnected global network of 600 million online users” served by 15 million hosts” connecting nearly 200 countries presents increasingly daunting security challenges to governments, companies, and citizens. Although the Internet has brought enormous economic and social benefits, it has also ushered in a host of new problems. Negative repercussions” of the Internet boom - while not outweighing the benefits include: Computer related fraud, forgery, and theft Violations of intellectual property rights Cyber-mediated physical attacks Sabotage of data Network attacks such as distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) Malicious code (viruses, worms, and Trojan horses) Web defacements, including politically motivated hacking (hactivi~m)’~ Unauthorized interceptions of communications, intrusion, and espionage Identity theft Spoofing of IP addresses, password cracking, and theft Online sexual exploitation of children and child pornography Computer harassment and cyber-stalking. The motivation to commit cybercrime is also increasing exponentially. Ever increasing connectivity among Internet users around the globe compounds the risks because there will be more sophisticated communications infrastructure and an increased pool of bad actors and terrorists who can use technology to conspire and to commit widespread vandalism, fraud, economic espionage, and to launch attacks on networks and information systems.”
399 The already pervasive and expanding nature of the Internet and ICTs requires a universal approach to the security of data, systems, and networks. According to a recent UN report on information security: The wide and pervasive integration of computers and embedded chips into modem society is what makes it vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Computers are now deeply integrated into the management and processing of our daily actions, and embedded chips are so omnipresent today that it is virtually impossible to determine even their actual numbers and locations. This became abundantly clear during the Y2K exercise, when businesses and governments spent billions to make sure computer systems would work when the year 2000 began.25 The profound integration of computers and information technology is obviously the strength of modem life, but it is also its vulnerability. The greater the interconnectedness, reliability, and complexity, the greater the vulnerability and the ease for exploitation. Information and communications systems are not only a potential target of criminals, terrorists, and military planners; they are also portals of physical vulnerability for the vast number of physical assets with controls linked to the Internet or managed by information technology systems. These direct and indirect vulnerabilities are amplified by the relatively small number of nodal exchange points (roughly 100 or so) on the Internet network, the existence and location of which is public knowledge.26 Because the ubiquitous nature of the Internet and the built-in vulnerabilities of the global network require a global perspective, the UN is ideally suited to accept a role within its capabilities to lead inter-governmental activities regarding the security of cyberspace. Similarly, only a global consensus can address the updating of the laws of war to include the parameters of wars in c y b e r ~ p a c e .No ~ ~ multinational organization other than the UN has the membership and capability to address these issues in a meaningful way that will have global impact. Beyond security concerns, the utilization of ICTs in investigatory, tracking, and recording practices and control over communications and Internet usage poses a serious threat to international rights guaranteed under the international law of the UN, such as human rights, freedom of expression and other civil liberties. According to a senior UN official: As the only truly universal international organisation that we have today, the United Nations can provide the broadest and most neutral and legitimate platform for bringing together governments and other key stakeholders to undertake this effort. Only this institution can provide the forum for discussion and debate on the complexities of the subject, and coalesce the expertise that exists around the world for a proper drafting of relevant legislation that can fill the existing and growing void in cyber-law.28
B.
Why a Law of Cyberspace?
At the outset, one must acknowledge that the call for a body of law regulating cyberspace is not uniformly accepted in the legal community. The usual arguments are that (1) there is no consensus concerning the many possible designs or architectures that
400 may affect the functionality we now associate with cyberspace; (2) very few bodies of law are defined by their characteristic technologies; and (3) the best legal doctrine reexamines, expands, or applies existing doctrines to a new arena. Whatever the validity of such comments concerning activities within single nation states, the capability of the Internet to cut across many national jurisdictions at lightning speed argues that we look anew.29 It recommends that nations seek a comprehensive re-examination of the many relevant, sometimes conflicting legal doctrines, practices, and procedures to produce a comprehensive, universal, and uniform legal framework for handling the issues colloquially called cyber law. The Privacy & Computer Crime Committee, Section of Science & Technology Law of the American Bar Association, has recognized the need for international action to create a uniform body of law: A major component of information and infrastructure security is a nation's ability to deter, detect, investigate, and prosecute cyber criminal activities. Industrialized nations and multinational organizations have taken significant steps toward combating cybercrime. The glaring gaps in work to-date are (1) inadequate international coordination and (2) woefully deficient legal frameworks and organizational capacity in developing countries necessary to combat ~ybercrime.~' An initial framework that could serve as an excellent starting point for the development of a Model Law on Cybercrime has been developed in the Council of Europe. The CoE Convention on Cybercrime of 2001 (CoE Convention) has been signed by 36 c ~ u n t r i e s . ~Although ' civil libertarians and privacy advocates continue to express concern that the CoE Convention undermines individual privacy and is inconsistent with provisions in U.S. law, it has been endorsed by the Group of Eight (G8) as a model to be followed by other countries.32 Other important work in this area has been done by the G8, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the European Union (EU), and the Organization of American States (OAS). Furthermore, with the public revelation of President Bush's National Security Presidential Directive 16 ordering the U.S. government to develop cyber warfare guidelines and rules under which the U S . could penetrate andor disrupt foreign computer systems,33 cyber warfare has come out of the closet. As with other forms of warfare, there should be internationally accepted limitations on the form of conflict. Certainly, a meaningful codification of such activities should take place under the aegis of the international body with the widest membership, the United Nations. The PMP concludes that, on a global basis, current national and international legal frameworks are insufficient and inconsistent across national jurisdictions to address the scope and complexity of the subject of cybercrime, cyberterrorism and cyber warfare. While efforts to combat cybercrime and cyberterrorism have been valiant and even successful in many areas, more is possible. We recommend a determined effort be made to draw upon the work performed to date in order to draft and adopt a comprehensive Model Law on Cybercrime and agreement on related procedural, administrative and cooperative considerations. The UN has already performed excellent work in the development of model laws for electronic transactions and electronic signatures34 and its institutional roots are based on established international rules for conflict. Such a Model Law would have to address numerous
401
issues, ranging from technical and definitional (e.g., what is cyberspace) to substantive (e.g., legal provisions, jurisdictional issues, and standards of evidence) to procedural and administrative (e.g., international cooperation mechanisms). It would also have to balance competing interests of sovereignty, national security, civil liberties, human rights, and freedom of expression. The UN should give separate consideration to determining the rules under which nation states may engage in cyber warfare and respond to cyberterrorism. The World Summit on the Information Society may also be a forum for discussion on this subject. C.
How Comprehensive a Consensus is Needed?
Some argue that the CoE Convention on Cybercrime is adequate consensus for an international legal framework to be developed. A legitimate counterpoint, however, is that more countries would have to sign and ratify the Convention and abide by its terms in order for it to effectively deter cybercrime, significantly advance international cooperation on these issues, or lead to a harmonized global framework. Out of about 200 countries, only 36 have signed the CoE Convention. Many of the countries who have not signed the CoE Convention either do not have any cybercrime laws, or have such inadequate ones, that criminals can essentially act with impunity. Since communications utilizing packet switched technologies often travel through many countries before reaching their destination (even on local-to-local communications), the CoE Convention does not provide a comprehensive enough consensus in this area. However, despite some shortcomings, controversial points, and lacunae, the CoE Convention “no doubt constitutes a major drafting achievement by a representative cross section of the international community, and there is no private or public initiative in sight that could match it in legal status, completeness, quality and endorsement received.”35 This Convention deserves to be considered as a starting point for working toward a broader, universal agreement and Model Law.
D.
What are Some Areas of Conflictilnconsistencv?
Multiple cases have arisen where Internet activities considered to be legitimate in one country violate the laws in another.36 Additionally, one country may not have the procedural laws to enable it to perform the requested assistance or law enforcement may not have the expertise to assist in the search and seizure of electronic evidence.37 Examples of areas of conflict include jurisdictional issues, extradition disputes, extratemtorial seizures, violations of content laws, and inconsistent hacking laws. These inconsistencies alone underscore the important role the UN could play in acting as coordinator on these issues. Gelbstein and Kamal note that: Civil liberties groups have also expressed concern that the [CoE] convention undermines individual rights to privacy and extends the surveillance powers of the signatory governments. Critics in the United States indicate that the provisions of the convention are incompatible with current U S . law.38
402 For example, by defining the sending of unsolicited e-mails as a criminal activity, the Convention is claimed “to criminalize behavior which until now has been seen as lawful civil di~obedience.”~~
E.
How Might Harmonization of Cvbercrime Laws Proceed Through Model Prescription?
The UN Model Laws on Electronic Commerce and Electronic Signatures are considered to be the the global “standard” for legislation in these areas. They have been looked to and followed by industrialized and developing countries around the globe. UN action that would provide a global model law and an accompanying explanatory memoranda that nation states could use as a guide, along with an international agreement on procedural, administrative, and cooperative aspects, would make the global harmonization of cybercrime laws an achievable goal.
F.
What are Examples of Procedures for International Cooperation and Mutual Assistance?
Certainly, one of the oldest and best known institutions for international cooperation and mutual assistance is Interpol. Founded in 1923, it has 178 member countries and maintains close working relationships with numerous intergovernmental bodies. The G8, Europol, OECD, UN, APEC, and OAS have all established mechanisms or launched initiatives to promote international cooperation and mutual assistance in the cyberspace arena.@ One of the best known practical examples of global-scale coordinated international cooperation and mutual assistance was seen in efforts to deal with the Y2K problem. The Year 2000 (Y2K) experience gave rise to new ways in which governments and critical infrastructure sectors world-wide shared information to monitor incidents as they arose.. ...The international governmental and industry organisations notable for establishing mechanisms for global monitoring of Y2K incidents affecting critical infrastructure sectors included the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO).~~ At the technical levels, there are numerous opportunities for information sharing4’ both in the public and private sectors. Information sharing can be facilitated by public sector initiatives that (a) establish centers for sharing information on an anonymous basis or serve as an intermediary where the direct sharing of information among industry is difficult, (b) create a central alert point for technical information and assistance regarding security risks and fixes, and (c) organize a public/private group comprised of all stakeholders (industry, government, academia, NGOs) to begin a dialogue on ICT security risks and develop ways to work together.43
403 In 1997, information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) were established in the U.S. to facilitate information exchange among critical infrastructure sectors. ISAC members usually “share information in a way that preserves their anonymity while providing an overview of cyber incidents within their sector not otherwise obtained individually”.” Indeed, the Commission of the European Communities notes that “urgent measures are needed to produce a statistical tool for use by all Member States so that computer related crime within the European Union can be measured both quantitatively and q~alitatively”.~~ This is important; however, there also needs to be a common methodological way to look at cybercrime, lest the quantity and quality results be slanted. Information sharing efforts, however, are hindered by national laws that deter the private sector from sharing security incident information with public sector entities. Laws such as the U.S. Freedom of Information Act and other similar national “access to information laws” cause concern within the private sector that shared confidential or proprietary information may be disclosed. Antitrust laws also deter collaborative information sharing activities. Additional concerns are raised by the sharing of security incident information with foreign governments. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines create an additional risk. Corporations worry that by sharing security breach information and seeking the assistance of law enforcement, an investigation could reveal wrongdoing by corporate insiders which could “snap back” on the company and expose it to harsh penalties under the Guidelines. Thus, there is a need to develop a consistent international framework that encourages public-private information sharing by mitigating the risks that flow from these existing laws.
2.
Working to this end, the UN should give recognition to the work already accomplished by the negotiating parties to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (CoE Convention). The CoE Convention would draw greater strength if all parties who participated in its negotiation process were to sign the Convention if they have not already done so, and those who have were to accelerate the ratification and transformation processes. Immediately subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention, signatories should take steps to nominate and notify their Authority for the handling of mutual assistance, to participate in the 2.417 network, and to take other steps to promote international cooperation in the defeat of cybercrime as the CoE Convention foresees.
Cybercrime defies national boundaries. Any effective strategy to prevent and combat the new types of cyber offenses and the new modalities of committing traditional offenses through technologies of cyberspace must, therefore, lead to transnational responses in criminal law and law enforcement. There must be no national loopholes; the present situation in which there are considerable differences of legal coverage, standards, and levels of protection is highly unsatisfactory. The case for a binding, universal international code of broad scope is ~ o m p e l l i n g . ~ ~ At the same time, shared prescriptions of this nature will be unsuitable for containing and penalizing all cyber attacks. Attacks by nation states and international terrorist groups on critical societal and economic infrastructures and the defense
404
establishment of other countries, giving rise to highly relevant threat scenarios, require different international responses, as discussed under Recommendation 3. A number of private fora and international organizations have attempted to address the substantive, procedural, and jurisdictional challenges posed by the transnational nature of cybercrime. The most extensive is the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (CoE Convention), which was opened for signature on Nov. 23, 2001 and has, up to now, been signed by 36 countries, of which four signatories (U.S., Canada, Japan, and South Africa) are “partner” countries but are not CoE members. The Convention covers substantive penal law as well as criminal procedural law and international cooperation in law enforcement, underlining the essential linkage between the three; indeed, the time-critical nature of tracking cybercrime, securing electronic evidence, and facilitating pursuit requires such linkage. All attempts at creating a consistent and universal penal framework for dealing with the cyber challenge have to face a number of inherent problems: (1) striking a balance between the privacy of communications in cyberspace and the freedom of expression and access to information on the one hand, and the requirements of national security and speedy law enforcement on the other; (2) the retarding influence that will be exercised by the need to ratify a treaty containing civil and criminal provisions and administrative and procedural requirements; (3) the need to transform treaty obligations into applicable law; (4)the need to ensure essential equivalence of these laws in the face of very general directive language in the international texts; (5) the time requirements for setting up functioning transnational cooperation mechanisms; or (6) the complex problem of including content-related cyber offenses. These are discussed in the accompanying papers.47 These difficulties notwithstanding, the CoE Convention offers great promise for moving towards a universal penal system in this field. Given the present composition of affiliated member states, it avoids the pitfall of offering a purely European focus and lends itself to a broader international audience. The ultimate objective would be to incorporate, textually, its provisions into a future Model Law on Cyberspace which is the central issue around which these Recommendations revolve. In order to enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the CoE Convention, Recommendation 2 appeals, as a first and important step, to the parties that participated in the negotiation process to ratify and implement the Convention and to establish the necessary cooperation mechanisms for the broad geographical area which they represent. Further steps to extend the number of signatory nation states to the CoE Convention would be welcome. Indeed, it would be highly desirable that a campaign to promote universal adherence get underway, at short notice, at the level of the United Nations, in the preparatory phase for the creation of a universal regulation of cyberspace. It would be important that response times for such an international appeal be kept as short as feasible, and that each signatory, in launching the process for transforming treaty obligations into national law, be mindful of the time-critical nature of defeating cybercrime and keeping pace with technology. If the CoE Convention can manage to create a critical momentum for the establishment of a universal legal framework and administrative organization regarding cyberspace, this momentum must not be lost.
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In assessing the importance of the CoE Convention, governments should also be aware of an important complementary effort by the European Union. The EU Ministers of Justice adopted the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on attacks against information systems on March 4, 2003. Consequently, they will now begin harmonizing their own national laws with this Decision.48 The Council Framework Decision contains definitions, model articles for the criminalization of major cyber attacks, and rules for cooperation among EU countries, some of which flesh out in more detail provisions from the CoE text, some more concise, but overall, in the Framework’s own professed intention, compatible with the CoE Convention. The particular level of legal and administrative cooperation that already exists among the Member States of the EU as a common legal and judicial space, but is lacking elsewhere, means that the Framework is not suitable as a model code to the same extent as the CoE Convention. The latter preserves its quality as the overriding and most complete legal instrument particularly suited for endorsement by the present Recommendation. 3.
Cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyber warfare activities that may constitute a breach of international peace and security should be dealt with by the competent organs of the UN system under international law. We recommend that the UN and the international scientific community examine scenarios and criteria and international legal sanctions that may apply.
Cyber activities that constitute deliberate hostile actions by nation states or nonstate actors operating transnationally may threaten international peace and security, yet elude penal sanctions under current legal frameworks or a future Model Law on Cyberspace. One consideration is that, under certain circumstances, the international doctrine of sovereign immunity protects nation states against legal actions. This protection could conceivably extend to offensive cyber actions taken by nation states. Other concerns relate to (1) the lack of international cooperation on a global scale, and ( 2 ) technical considerations regarding the inability to effectively track and trace Internet communications. The response to any scenario -- whether a cyber criminal activity, an act of cyberterrorism, or an intended act of cyber warfare by a nation state - requires the ability to effectively track and trace cyber attacks. A recent report from CERT/CC at Camegie Mellon University notes: The capability of a nation (or a cooperating group of nations) to track and trace the source of any attacks on its infrastructures or its citizens is central to the deterrence of such attacks and hence to a nation’s long-term survival and prosperity. An acknowledged ability to track and trace both domestic and international attackers can preempt future attacks through fear of reprisals such as criminal prosecution, military action, economic sanctions, and civil lawsuits.. .. The anonymity enjoyed by today’s cyber-attackers poses a grave threat to the global information society, the progress of an information-based international economy, and the advancement of global collaboration and cooperation in all areas of human endeavor.49
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Technical difficulties must be addressed by international standards setting bodies. The TCP/IP protocol,50 which is the current standard protocol for network communications, seriously limits the ability to track and trace cyber attacks.51 At present, “the Internet has no standard provisions for tracking or tracing the behavior of its users Because the Internet protocols were designed for a trustworthy community of researchers, it is quite easy for users to hide their tracks, making it difficult to trace the communications path. For example, because there typically is no capability for cryptographic authentication of the information in I P packets, the information in the packet can be modified and the source address can be forged. “Packet laundering” involves compromising intermediate hosts along a communication path and ho ing from host to host such that traceback attempts can be effectively thwarted!’ These vulnerabilities could facilitate, or disguise, state-sponsored cyber activities or intentionally redirect a cyber criminal act to make it appear that it came from a nation state. As noted by CERTKC’s Howard Lipson: It is clear that tracking and tracing attackers across a borderless cyber-world, and holding them accountable, requires multilateral actions that transcend jurisdictions and national boundaries. Tracking and tracing requires cooperation encompassing the legal, political, technical, and economic realms.. .. One of the most significant policy implications of the technical approaches to tracking and tracing ... is the need for intense international cooperation at a deeply technical level. This cooperation must o well beyond simple agreements in principle to share tracking data.5 f Present legal regimes are ineffective in deterring highly relevant threat scenarios that may violate international peace and security. Actions that are prohibited by nation states or considered terrorist or rogue acts against other countries require further deliberation by the United Nations. Internationally agreed standards of conduct are necessary if the Internet is to remain a backbone of economies and a primary means of global communication. In a thorough analysis of the uncharted waters in the area of cyberspace attacks, three renowned scholars in the field argue that: In particular, the status of information operations as “force” or “armed attack” is undetemined, an uncertainty which complicates diplomatic and military decision-making. In terms of the UN Charter, it is clear that a range of information attacks would constitute uses of force, and a comparable range of countermeasures would constitute legitimate self-defence.. .. Beyond these preliminary conclusions, there is far more work to be done on both international technical and legal fronts. Nations that choose to employ information operations, or that expect to be targeted by them, should facilitate tracking, attribution and transnational enforcement through multilateral treaties and, more broadly, by clarifying international customary law regarding the use of force and self-defence in the context of the UN Charter and the laws of armed conflict.55
407 Several scenarios support this conclusion and range from “cyber activists” to information and cyber warfare. On the less serious end of the spectrum, there is the April 1998 distributed denial of service attack launched against the U.S. Department of Defense by “cyber activists” who caused some Department computers to crash.56 At the other end of the spectrum are direct attacks against the critical infrastructures of one nation state by another. One of the first examples of this was seen in 1991 in Operation Desert Storm when the U.S. disabled Iraq’s communications network. Other examples of cyber warfare could include: “Means for highly accurate spotting of electromagnetic equipment and its destruction by way of rapid identification of separate components of control, recognition, guidance and fire information systems. Means for hitting components of electronic equipment and power supply thereof with a view to putting individual components of electronic systems out of action for short-term or irreversibly. Means for affecting data transmission processes with a view to terminating or disorganizing operations of data exchange subsystems, by affecting signal propagation environments and functioning algorithms. Propaganda and disinformation facilities for modifying control system data, creating a virtual picture of the situation different from the real one, changing human value systems, damaging morale of the adversary’s population.”*’ Packet inspection and modification or rerouting through platform technologies at country gateways.58 In between, lie the acts of terrorists or rogue actors that can be equally destructive, as noted in the Introduction to this Rep0rt.5~ Increasingly, nation states, either individually or collectively, are acting to protect their own networks. The range of actions that are possible is considerable, and some can have broad impact on the global network and communications capabilities. It is becoming increasingly clear that companies and countries alike must shift from the reactive mode to the active mode in dealing with cyber attacks. As noted by two World Federation of Scientists experts, “governments (and companies) need the ability to block distributed denial of service attacks, viruses and malicious worms, and protect supercritical and critical infrastructure at the core network level before they inflict their damage along backbone and customer links.”60 An international discussion and understanding regarding what types of proactive actions are acceptable or allowable is necessary to ensure one nation’s protective actions do not unduly hinder the communications capabilities of other nations. The international legal framework is especially murky in the area of cyber attacks and information warfare. The UN Charter was not drafted with the information age in mind and definitions lack clear meaning in the cyber context. The Charter, for example, forbids “acts of aggression” and limits the “threat or use of force” in peacetime. Article 41 grants the Security Council the power to enforce these Charter restrictions through the “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” Article 42 allows for action by “air, sea or land forces” as necessary to maintain or restore peace. According to one analysis, “Factors that may influence
408 whether something is an act of force include expected lethality, destructiveness and inva~iveness’~.~’ Thus, Article 41 may be interpreted as allowing some interruption of communications, if it is not done in a manner that is not lethal, destructive or invasive, but what does that mean in the cyber sense? Certainly, some acts against communication systems could be considered quite destructive and/or invasive, such as the manipulation of dam controls or power grids.62 One of the preeminent authors in this area, Walter Sharp, argues that mani ulations or attacks that cause an economic crisis could be deemed a “use of force”! And while one action, such as packet sniffing, rerouting, or content modification, may not be lethal or destructive, a reasonable argument can be made that it would be invasive. Responses to attacks on information systems could conceivably be allowed under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows states to take actions in self-defense but requires them to report such actions.64 Individual responses by states could be either overt or covert, making the reporting requirement problematic in instances of covert actions. Indeed, what types of responses might be acceptable under Article 51 is vague. Moreover, nations could engage in individual or collective cyber self-defense through NATO or other multinational alliances.65 The laws of armed conflict must also be factored into any discussion regarding cyber activities of nation states. In times of war, civilian assets that support the military (such as communication systems) may be attacked in order to obtain submission of the enemy, provided that it is limited to military objectives and civilian losses are proportional to the military advantage to be gained - and provided it avoids unnecessary suffering. Possible pre-emptive actions must be also be considered and under what circumstances these might be allowed.66 Elaborating upon this nutshell-identification of problems, Andrey Krutskih, reflecting a general line of thinking among Russian experts, has made a number of suggestions for further international law work that would aim at including cyberattacks more broadly into extant international law. They can be summarized as follows: In line with the concept67 of defining techniques of interfering with information security as “information weapons”, despite the present uncertainty on their scope, it is suggested that new, extended criteria for the definition of weapons and armed aggression should be sought, giving emphasis to the objectives of the “aggressor”, such as seeking military superiority.68 Cyber attacks on other states could then be considered acts of armed aggression under the UN Charter, and, applying the principles of proportionality and necessity, thresholds for responsive actions in self-defense could be defined, taking into account the direct as well as the indirect damage cyber attacks can cause. Further along these lines, the author proposes to establish a list of key information systems of critical relevance for national security which, as a “zone protected by international law,” would benefit of protective mechanisms, such as legitimate international emergency responses, beyond the normal rules and practices on reprisals and responses. In the list, a distinction should be made between civilian and transnational facilities, and military systems which may be subject to legitimate attacks.
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On the argument that “cyber weapons” are not currently subject to international treaties pertaining to arms control, Dr. Krutskih advances several suggestions on a negotiated adaptation of extant treaty law designed to curb the proliferation of such weapons and providing a clear legal framework relating to the aggressive use of cyber operation^.^' In an even broader sweep, Dr. Krutskih, following from earlier official projects within the UN and bilateral diplomacy, develops the idea of a comprehensive international legal regime banning the development, production and use of the “most hazardous types of c ber weapon^"^^ for which the key ideas are spelled out in catalogue form? Part of this broad approach is the establishment of an “early warning system”. The author also advocates a sanctuary concept under which “global information systems” would be defined and protected as demilitarized zones.72 Clearly, the types of cyber activities nation states may engage in, either defensively or offensively, deserve deeper discussion in a multinational forum. The PMP supports the following conclusion: As electronic information networks expand, and military and industrial infrastructures become more dependent on them, cyberattacks are bound to increase in frequency and magnitude. Interpretations of the UN Charter and of the laws of armed conflict will have to evolve accordingly in order to accommodate the novel definitions of the use of force that such attacks imply.. .. In terms of the laws of armed conflict, the potentially dangerous consequences of an unnecessary response, a disproportional response or a mistakenly targeted response argue for keeping a human being in the decision loop. Beyond these preliminary conclusions, there is far more work to be done on both the international, technical and legal fronts. Nations that choose to employ information operations, or that expect to be targeted by them, should facilitate tracking, attribution, and transnational enforcement through multilateral treaties and, more broadly, by clarifying international customary law regarding the use of force and self-defence in the context of the UN Charter and the laws of armed c0nflict.7~ Operationally, scientific studies and scenario generation exercises should be undertaken in the international legal and technical communities, involving the General Assembly and First and Sixth Committees. The International Law Commission could be tasked with developing an appropriate legal framework defining legitimate cyber actions by nation states. 4.
Within the UN framework, we recommend that a special forum undertake the synthesizing of work on cyberspace undertaken within the UN system.
Ordering cyberspace under the perspective of universality requires comprehensive involvement by the United Nations. In many ways, this challenge has already been recognized and is increasingly met by various UN offices and bodies as well as by
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members of the wider UN family. There are also global initiatives undertaken by the private sector that purport to work towards similar ends and could usefully be included in an over-all effort. These manifold, widely dispersed efforts are, however, difficult to follow and to assess in their overall impact. A central focal point within the UN itself could perform a coordinating, evaluating, and synthesizing function. Without prejudice to the mandate or autonomous policy decisions of other UN branches or outside organizations, such a forum could catalogue and assess the work done elsewhere, point to inconsistencies and duplication, identify gaps and new research requirements, and stimulate coordinated approaches. The problem is far wider than just a question of the Digital Divide. The list of UN or UN-related actors in the field is already long. Apart from a number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the UN ICT Task Force, UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the UN Center for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, the UN Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention have provided inputs in their particular field of action. Other UN entities such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU),and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have made contributions, as have the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Air Transport Association (IATA), and others. From the private sector, activities with a global perspective are undertaken, among others, by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Global Business Dialogue on Electric Commerce (GBDe), the World Information Technology and Services Alliance (WITSA), the Global Internet Project, the Global Information Infrastructure Commission (GIIC), and the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA). The special UN forum recommended here should, of course, also take cognizance of the ongoing work undertaken by the OECD (especially its recently updated Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks), the G8, the European Community, and the Council of Europe. Given the broad scope of cyberspace related problems, the forum would be best established as a special entity within the UN Secretariat or as a body reporting to the UN General Assembly. Mechanisms should be developed to incorporate all stakeholders in the work of such a body.
5.
In this context, we recommend the UN and other international entities examine the feasibility of establishing an international Information Technology Agency with the indicative mandate to, inter alia:
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Facilitate technology exchanges; Review and endorse emerging protocols and codes of conduct; Maintain standards and protocols for ultra-high bandwidth technologies; Specify the conditions on which access to such ultra-high bandwidth technologies be granted;
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Promote the establishment of effective inter-governmental structures and public-private interaction; Attempt to coordinate international standards setting bodies with the view of promoting interoperability of information security management processes and technologies; Facilitate the establishment and coordination of international computer emergency response facilities, including taking into account activities of existing organizations; Share cyber-tracking information derived from open sources and share technologies to enhance the security of databases and data sharing. The above list of possible attributions for the intended Agency appears to be selfexplanatory and sufficient to set in motion the process of examining its feasibility. The Agency is perhaps best established within the UN system, but an institutional format on the basis of public-private partnership is not to be excluded. The PMP is mindful of current UN budget constraints and the general reluctance of governments to embark on new institutional solutions. However, given the amount of work already performed in various bodies, UN and others, in the IT field, the organization chart of the Agency could be small, and some reshuffling of personnel might be possible. The point is to create a central entity that can serve as a clearinghouse and coordination center for the various initiatives and work already undertaken or developed in this area. The initiative for a feasibility study might usefully be taken by the UN Secretary General. 6.
Nationally and transnationally, an educational framework for promoting the awareness of the risks looming in cyberspace should be developed for the public. Specifically, schools and educational institutions should incorporate codes of conduct for ICT activities into their curricula. Civil society, including the private sector, should be involved in this educational process.
Rapid innovations of ICTs and the development of a wide variety of ICT products and applications has resulted in a permanently increasing and heterogeneous ICT-user community of all ages, skills, and intellectual and cultural backgrounds. ICT products are becoming more and more pervasive and ubiquitous resources of our life. More or less, all individuals use ICT products as part of their private, professional, and public life. ICTs are becoming such a part of everyday life, we are becoming as accustomed to using them as we are with other natural or technical resources. With respect to this situation, all individuals have to become aware of not only the advantages of ICT applications, but also of their consequences and - sometimes hidden risks, especially concerning safety and security. Making people aware of the risks associated with ICTs requires, at first, the development of an educational framework, and of easily accessible information systems and sources, which provide individuals with information and knowledge about data and information security risks according to their individual background, skills, and needs: + All individuals should at least have a basic understanding of the key information security properties of an ICT system, like confidentiality, data integrity, user authentication, and access control mechanisms.
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All ICT users also have to understand that besides risks for their privacy, other risks may exist for their local environment, for a larger community, or even for the public. Adequate information about technical attacking techniques (e.g. viruses, trojan horses), and of non-technical attacking possibilities (e.g. social engineering)74 should be widely available to the public. An educational program should include some general procedures for intrusion prevention, intrusion detection, damage analysis, and recovery mechanisms. All educational curricula must incorporate codes of ethical conduct for ICT activities and begin at the primary school level and extend through secondary and tertiary levels and be incorporated into training programs in the workplace, community centers, and other venues for individual citizens. The I S 0 Code of Practice for information security defines the 10 guiding principles which should be considered and presented to all ICT users according to their individual needs, skills, and b a c k g r o ~ n d . ~ ~ Along the same lines, the UN publication Information Insecurity: a survival guide to the unchartered territories of cyber-threats and cyber-security presents a detailed description of the information security problems we have to face, and it includes all relevant information for prevention and actions. Together, with the cited sources and examples, it forms an excellent framework and source for assembling educational programs as discussed above. Numerous other organizations have compiled valuable materials in this area.76 To provide all kinds of users with the required input on information security issues, educational curricula, as well as decision support and advisory information, this content should be distributed not only by printed articles and books, but also by the use of new media, ICT products, and/or the Internet. For example, educational curricula can be utilized in teleteaching and intelligent tutoring systems, enabling students to learn about this subject independent of time and location. Another technical approach could offer information security expertise via information bases, or knowledge bases, via an expert system interface. The expert system interface could be adapted according to a user's requirements, or skills, thus enabling goal-directed access to information and expertise.77
7.
Due diligence and accountability should be required of chief executive officers and public and private owners to institutionalize security management processes, assess their risks, and protect their information infrastructure assets, data, and personnel. The potential of market forces should be fully utilized to encourage private sector companies to protect their information networks, systems, and data. This process could include information security statements in filings for publicly traded companies, minimum insurance requirements for coverage of cyber incidents, and return on investment analyses.
Corporate directors and officers have a fiduciary duty of care to protect corporate assets. Since an estimated 80 percent of corporate assets today are digital:' it logically follows that oversight of information security falls within the duty owed by officers and directors in conducting the operations of a corporation. Today, it is increasingly clear
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that officers and boards of directors have a corporate governance responsibility with respect to the security of company data, systems, and networks. Hacking, denial of service attacks, economic espionage, and insider misuse of data and systems are commonplace and threaten the profitability of every business, leaving officers and directors vulnerable to lawsuits and civil and criminal penalties. To date, no shareholder suit has been brought against officers or directors for failure to take necessary steps to protect corporate systems and data, however, shareholders may have a valid basis for such derivative The majority of U.S. jurisdictions follow the business judgment rule that the standard of care is that which a reasonably prudent director of a similar corporation would have used. The recent Delaware case, Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, held that, “a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under certain circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards”. The recent Caremark case noted that officerldirector liability can arise in two contexts: (1) from losses arising out of ill-advised or negligent board decisions (which are broadly protected by the business judgment rule so long as the decision was reached out of a process that was rational or employed in a good faith effort) and (2) from circumstances where the board failed to act in circumstances where “due attention” would have prevented the loss. In the latter situation, the Caremark court noted that: [I]t would, in my opinion, be a mistake to conclude that . . . corporate boards may satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation, without assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to prove to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance. Obviously the level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system is a question of business judgment. . . But it is important that the board exercise a good faith judgment that the corporation’s information and reporting system is in concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations, so that it may satisfy its responsibility. Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 @el. Ch. 1996). The Caremark case could provide a basis for a shareholder suit against officers and directors of U.S. companies for failure to implement an information and reporting system on the security of corporate networks and data such that it could (1) determine it is adequately meeting statutory, regulatory, or contractual obligations to protect certain data from theft, disclosure or inappropriate use and (2) be assured that the data critical to normal business operations, share price, and market share is protected.80
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There are also high risk situations where higher standards apply to directors and officers, such as acquisitions, takeovers, responses to shareholder suits, and distribution of assets to shareholders in preference over creditors. In these circumstances, directors and officers are required to obtain professional assistance or perform adequate analyses to mitigate the risks that ordinarily accompany these activities. Some information assurance experts assert that a “higher degree of care will also be required of Directors and Officers regarding the complex nature of issues involved in information assurance.”” Securities laws and regulations require public corporations to adequately disclose in public filings and public communications relevant risks to the corporation and its assets. The U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires management’s attestation that information assets are protected. Additional exposure is caused by insurance companies now routinely excluding hacking and IT-related incidents from general liability policies. Also, senior management in certain industry sectors may be subject to civil and criminal penalties for inadequate security and privacy of protected classes of data. And legal actions continue to mount against corporations for security and privacy breaches. The Independent Director put this in the context of information systems by reporting that: Management of information risk is central to the success of any organization operating today. For Directors, this means that Board performance is increasingly being judged by how well their company measures up to internationally-accepted codes and guidelines on preferred Information Assurance practice.” Additionally, when an organization is a victim of an attack on its information systems, whether from an insider or an outside bad actor, previous studies have shown that this can result in a lack of confidence in the company and even a drop in the company stock price.83 Consequently, shareholders may also initiate a derivative suit for loss to stock price or market share caused by inadequate attention by officers and directors to information ~ecurity.’~ According to the SANS Institute, the seven top management errors that lead to computer securitv vulnerabilities are: “1 Assign untrained people to maintain security and provide neither the training nor the time to make it possible to do the job. 2. Fail to understand the relationship of information security to the business problem - they understand physical security but do not see the consequences of poor information security. 3. Fail to deal with the operational aspects of security: make a few fixes and then not allow the follow through necessary to ensure the problems stay fixed. Rely primarily on a firewall. 4. 5. Fail to realize how much money their information and organizational reputations are worth. 6 . Authorize reactive, short-term fixes so problems re-emerge rapidly. 7. Pretend the problem will go away if they ignore it.”85
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In parallel, to the elaboration and harmonization of national criminal codes, there should also be an effort to work toward equivalent civil responsibility laws worldwide. Civil responsibility should also be established for neglect, violation of fiduciary duties, inadequate risk assessment, and harm caused by cyber criminal and cyber terrorist activities.
Legal action taken in courts and by regulatory agencies and underwriting requirements by insurance companies are pushing civil responsibility for information security. Action taken in multinational fora is also expected to impact corporate liability and officer/director responsibility. Article 12 of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (CoE Convention) requires signatory states to establish laws that hold companies civilly, administratively, or criminally liable for cybercrimes that benefit the company and were made possible due to the lack of supervision or control by someone in a senior management position, such as an officer or director. Article 9 of the European Union’s proposal for a Council Framework Decision on attacks against information systems mirrors the CoE language. These provisions have been cited as an example of emulation for a broader international constituency in light of the need to be adapted for insertion into the new Model Law on Cyberspace.
9.
Among the specific and concrete actions that should be considered is the possibility that commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, firmware, and software should be open source or at least be certified.
The concept of “open source” is now getting wide attention from a global community of users and developers. Open source does not refer to the price of software; it may be distributed free of charge or for a fee. The concept of open source or “free software” lies in the freedom associated with the code. This freedom, however, is contained within set limitations. An open source licenses6 provides freedom to any programmer to use the code, but defines the social parameters programmers must observe regarding the code. Open source generally means that: 1. The software is developed by a community of programmers, usually from around the globe. 2. The source code is distributed or easily available either without charge or for a minimal fee.87 3. Improvements, changes, and corrections may be made to the software, but these must also be freely distributed without attempt to “privatize” the program. The license may require the source code to be distributed separately from modifications contained in “patch files”, it may completely restrict distribution of modified source code, or it may require derived works to be distributed under a different name or version number from the original. 4. The copyright is held by the original author(s). 5. The rights attached to the program must apply to all to whom the program is distributed, without restriction that it be used for only a certain business, etc. or without restriction that any other software distributed with the program need be open source.
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6. The license must be technology neutral.88 In a nutshell, open source can generally be referred to as “an approach to software development with unique licensing arrangements and a community-based method of pr~gramming”.~~ A reverse concept from commercial software licenses that restrict distribution, sale, modification, use, etc., open source provides the global community of programmers access to source code and provides “freedom” to work within a community of accepted norms with respect to how that software code is handled, modified, distributed, used, etc.” Because the term “open source” is a descriptive term, it cannot be protected by a trademark. Therefore, in order to “mark” software that is distributed under a license that conforms to the Open Source Initiative (OSI) definition, the OSI has registered a certification mark “OSI Certified” for this single purpose and has created a graphical certification mark for it. OSI maintains a list of registered license^.^' The Linux operating system is perhaps the best known open source software example. Apache, BIND, Netscape, and GNU Linux which is the open source program for Red Hat, are others.92 The OSI definition and its certification mark are not only applicable for software programs, but also for firmware programs offering an applicationoriented usage of microprocessors, and of digital control and processing units (e.g., by means of Read-only Memory (ROM’s)). An open source approach is not as easily applied to hardware. There is no standardized definition and understanding available for open source hardware, as there is for software or firmware. One obvious reason lies in the lack of an easy or inexpensive method for copying hardware, such as exists for software or firmware programs. However, in 1997, some ICT hardware manufacturers formed an Open Hardware Certification Program as a self-certification program for hardware manufacturers whose hardware is Linux or FreeBSD ready.93 Hardware with an HDL-specified hardware description (which means that a hardware device is precisely specified by a HardwareDescription-Language program) enables eas copying and distribution of the hardware’s specifications, but not of the hardware itself. With respect to ICT security considerations, open source or OSI certified programs could function in the marketplace to provide increased confidence in commercial off-theshelf (COTS) products by providing: + An approved license; + A complete and certified description of the software or firmware and its functionalities or operations; and + An understanding of its compatibilities and implementation. From the COTS developers’ point of view, however, traditional, commercially licensed software can have market advantages over open source. From the customer’s point of view, open source enables a product’s user to adjust, refine, adapt, or enlarge the product coincident with its specification and according to the customer’s specific requirements. The open source movement is gaining momentum, especially in developing countries where governments and businesses chafe against high license fees for Microsoft and other proprietary software products. The movement is still relatively young and refinements, as well as additional quality measures and specification standards, are certain to follow.
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10.
Information security issues should also be addressed in forthcoming multilateral meetings. Regional organizations should also add to national and international efforts to combat attacks in cyberspace in their respective regional contexts.
In addition to action taken in the UN and the Council of Europe, activities regarding information security and cybercrime should proceed in other fora, including regional and multilateral organizations and meetings. Regional. efforts consistent with the global developing legal framework are encouraged. Regional activities are often very productive because consensus is easier to reach within regional organizations and linkages are typically stronger than those in international fora. Additionally, certain actions that would promote information security and a harmonized global legal framework would be appropriate for discussion in the World Trade Organization Doha Round.
11.
International law enforcement organizations should assume a stronger role in the international promotion of cybercrime issues. The competences and functions of Interpol and, in the European context, Europol, should be substantially strengthened, including by examining their investigative options.
Disparities in the international legal environment greatly handicap law enforcement activities and often make it impossible to proceed in investigating cybercrime cases and bringing the perpetrators to justice. The speed and flexibility of cyber attacks (they can take place in an instant, or can be spread out over extended peiriods of time in a “low and slow” attack scenario that can be very difficult to detect) pose significant legal challenges to our traditional law enforcement environment. Particularly vexing legal issues include, but are not limited to: intercepting communications, searching and seizing electronic evidence, differing requirements for archiving logs of transactions and traffic generated at computer and communication systems, obtaining information from communication and Internet service providers, and ensuring validity of cybercrime evidence across a variety of legal jurisdictions. International law enforcement initiatives can leverage national efforts and create momentum for change. The EU has addressed the cooperation of international law enforcement with respect to c ybercrime through the European Police Office ( E ~ r o p o l ) .Headquartered ~~ in The Hague, The Netherlands, Europol is the EU’s law enforcement organization responsible for improving the effectiveness and cooperation between competent authorities in EU Member States. It was established on February 7, 1992, under the Treaty on European Union and is accountable to the Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs. Europol became fully operational on July 1, 1999. Its mandate includes preventing and combating terrorism, drug trafficking, and other serious forms of international organized crime, such as immigration networks, vehicle trafficking, trafficking in human beings including child pornography, forgery of money and other means of payment, money laundering, and trafficking in radioactive and nuclear substances.
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Europol has approximately 250 members on staff, all of whom have been assigned by various EU member nations. Approximately 45 of these staff members - known as Europol Liaison Officers (ELOs) - represent their nation’s various law enforcement agencies such as police, customs, gendarmerie, and immigration services.96 Europol recently completed the phased deployment of The Europol Computer System (TECS). The new computer system is specifically designed to facilitate the sharing and analysis of criminal data between EU member nations and law enforcement organizations in other countries. Each EU member nation has assigned two Data Protection Experts to Europol to closely monitor how personal data is stored and used. In September 2000, the EU’s Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs asked EU member nations to start responding to requests from Europol to investigate specific cases, and keep Europol informed about the status and results of the investigation. Since November 2000, EU member nations have been able to leverage the resources of Europol National Units (ENUs) on joint investigations in accordance with the Europol Convention9’ and its implementing rules. The European Police Chiefs Operational Task Force98 coordinates its activities with Europol in combating transnational crime. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) was founded in 1923 and has been located in Lyon, France since 1989. Interpol is an important link among law enforcement organizations globally.99 Interpol has 178 member countries and maintains close working relationships with dozens of intergovernmental bodies such as the Council of Europe and World Customs Organization. Interpol’s primary mission is to promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities. Interpol has a system of offices around the world referred to as National Central Bureaus (NCBs). Each of its 178 member nations has an NCB station, generally within that nation’s capital. One or more local law enforcement agencies are responsible for staffing the NCB and represent national law enforcement to Interpol. For example, in Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) staff and support the NCB in Ottawa. Should a police officer in Montreal or Winnipeg need something from the police in Gaberone, Botswana, the Montreal police would route their request through their police computer systems to the NCB in Ottawa. The RCMP staff would then forward that request via a private encrypted computer network to the Interpol Secretariat General in Lyon, France. The bureau receiving the message at the Secretariat would read the message and forward it to the necessary agency in Botswana. Each of the 178 countries participating in the Interpol system has access to special computer and telephone systems to facilitate the transfer of this information. Interpol has been actively involved in combating Information Technology Crime (ITC) for a number of years. The Interpol General Secretariat has harnessed the expertise of its members in the field of ITC through “working parties” or groups of experts. Each working party consists of the Heads or experienced members of national computer crime units. Working parties are designed to reflect regional expertise and are established in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and Africa, although each is in different stages of development. In addition, Interpol has created several handbooks and computer crime manuals that it distributes to law enforcement agencies worldwide to use as best practice guides. Interpol currently has a number of ongoing projects related to high technology crime, including information sharing mechanisms for law enforcement and a 24 hour17
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day a week point-of-contact network to allow investigators in one jurisdiction to locate and communicate with their counterparts abroad.'O0
12.
The international science community should more vigorously address the scientific and technological issues that intersect with the legal and policy aspects of information security, including the use of ICTs and their impact on privacy and individual rights.
Increasingly, we realize that the globally connected network is a multidisciplinary effort that combines scientific and technological achievements with legal and policy considerations. Over the past few years, a legal and policy framework has developed that, in large part, is responsive to both the capabilities of networked communications and the vulnerabilities of Internet protocols, software, and networks. The ability of governments and private sector entities to access, gather, and retain vast amounts of information about Internet users has raised concerns of privacy groups, consumer advocates, and civil libertarians. Likewise, they have also been alarmed by government use of the Internet and ICTs in national and global surveillance and their potential government access to Internet account and traffic data. To date, there has been little interaction and coordination between the scientific and technological communities and the 1egaYpolicy community. While generally aware of each other's endeavors, there has been minimal effort to identify critical intersection points to engage in multidisciplinary initiatives to resolve critical information security problems. It is incumbent upon the scientists and technologists to bring together stakeholders from the legal and policy realms to explain the capabilities and vulnerabilities of ICTs and to begin a dialogue to bridge the gaps in understanding. For example, legislators and policymakers are currently developing privacy and security laws, often without a clear understanding of whether they are actually addressing the issues caused by technological weaknesses and vulnerabilities or merely papering over a problem area.
A.
Technologies With Significant Legal and Policy Imdications
1. Encryption, Signatures, and Authentication Cryptography has become an integral part of seeking to assure an acceptable level of security and privacy of communications and data storage. The development and use of sophisticated, strong cryptography has a long history as a technique used by governments to protect sensitive information. The development of public key cryptography"' in 1975, and the subsequent evolution of that approach have put strong cryptography in the hands of private enterprises and the general public. Today, research and development into increasingly stronger, more efficient, and widely-usable encryption techniques continues at a high level. For years, legal and policy conflicts swirled around the public use of strong encryption technologies. The U.S., in particular, tried to regulate public use of encryption and the export of low-level encryption technologies and pushed legislative agendas mandating key escrow or embedded chips, arguing law enforcement would be stymied without such controls. Fierce resistance by industry, academia, scientists,
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technologists, and policymakers ultimately defeated these efforts and the unregulated public use of encryption became the global standard. Today, only a few countries regulate public use of encryption, although many countries control the export of powerful, dual-use encryption technologies. A few countries, such as the U.K., require assistance with decryption or demand the encryption key be given to law enforcement upon request.Io2 Overall, governments around the globe have concluded that the benefits of encryption outweigh the negative consequences of encrypted communications by criminals. As lawmakers moved away from controlling encryption, their understanding of the importance of information security resulted in the enactment of laws and regulations that promote the use of authentication and authorization technologies. There is little understanding, however, outside the scientific and technical communities regarding the capabilities to decrypt messages either real-time or offline. As more evidence mounts that A1 Qaeda terrorists are using encryption technologies to protect their communi~ations,‘~~ the old fears surrounding encryption begin to surface once more. Because innovations are constantly changing both the state of encryption technologies and the ability to decipher these communications, a continuing dialogue between scientists, technologists, policymakers, and stakeholders is critical. 2. Tracking and Tracing Internet Communications
A technology issue central to deterring cyber attacks on information infrastructures is the degree to which attacks can be tracked to their origin. With the present TCP/lP protocol, there is very little ability to track and trace Internet attacks to their source.1M For example, information in an IP packet can easily be modified, the source address can be forged, and communications can be woven through intermediary hosts prior to reaching its destination (“packet l a ~ n d e r i n g ” ) . ’ The ~ ~ critical link between technology and policy today is succinctly articulated by CERTKC’s Howard Lipson: In this high-threat, target-rich environment, the technical ability to reliably track and trace intruders (supported by international agreements on monitoring and information sharing, and by international law proscribing attacks and specifying sanctions and punishment) is an indispensable element for enabling the continued use of the Internet to provide many of the essential services that societies depend on.Io6 Even with an accommodating policy environment, ISPs are likely to require both technical assistance and financial incentives to support tracking and tracing endeavors due to the cost and burden they impose on their operations. Emerging next-generation standards and protocols from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) promise to enable improved security and significantly greater tracking and tracing of cyber-attacks. IPsec is an emerging security standard for IP that provides for packet authentication and confidentiality and can be used to cryptographically authenticate a packet’s source address. The Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) is the next generation standard protocol that is slowly replacing the current version, which is IPv4. The security features of IPsec are made available in every P v 6 implementation, although the use of IPsec features is optional. Moreover, IPv6‘s expanded header size can enable
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more tracking and audit data to be stored. Its increased address space would make it possible (though not a requirement) for every network device to be assigned a static IF' address, making it easier to link a particular IF' address with an entity or individual. The adoption of IPv6 by the user community is proceeding slowly, however, due to high conversion costs.'07 Most tracking and tracing approaches are only effective against attacks that generate large floods of attack packets. However, there is promising ongoing research focused on the capability to track even single attack packets to their source. Such a tracking capability would require the storage, for some limited time, of a digest of all packets seen by participating routers. This would require very large data storage resources, even if only a small fraction of each packet is retained. Such large-scale storage has significant privacy im lications, and is clouded with jurisdictional, legal, and law enforcement considerations. Thus, the dialogue between scientists, technologists, and policymakers is all the more critical during this time of tran':tion when cyber attacks are on the rise and our ability to track and trace them is limited. Howard Lipson wisely notes: The ability to accurately and precisely assign responsibility for cyber-attacks to entities or individuals (or to interrupt attacks in progress) would allow society's legal, political, and economic mechanisms to work both domestically and internationally, to deter future attacks and motivate evolutionary improvements in relevant laws, treaties, policies, and engineering technology.. .. However, improvements to current Internet technology, including improved protocols, cannot succeed without an in-depth understanding and inclusion of policy issues to specify what information can be collected, shared, or retained, and how cooperation across administrative, jurisdictional, and national boundaries is to be accomplished. Nor can policy alone, with only high-level agreements in principle, create an effective tracking and tracing infrastructure that would support multilateral rechnical cooperation in the face of attacks rapidly propagating across"'the global Internet. To be of value, the engineering design of tracking and tracing technologies must be informed by policy considerations, and policy formulations must be guided by what is technically feasible and practical. International efforts to track and trace cyber-attacks must be supported by intense technical cooperation and collaboration in the form of a multilateral research, engineering, and technical advisory group that can provide the in-depth technical skill and training to significantly improve the capabilities of incident response teams and law e n f o r ~ e m e n t . ' ~ ~ Anonymizer technologies can defeat tracking and tracing capabilities. These technologies are extremely controversial due to their ability to protect privacy on the one hand, while defeating the ability of law enforcement and private sector entities to track and trace attacks and illegal conduct.
IS
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3. Response and Recovery Technologies Despite the theoretical and practical advances in tracking capabilities in the future, the prudent course of action for protecting information infrastructures is to adopt selfhealing or self-mitigating architectures and operational procedures that are survivable in the face of sophisticated attacks. Survivability strategies include sophisticated schemes to simulate, detect, and respond to attacks whether from the outside or inside of the system.'" This area will require continuing technical, legal, and policy collaboration, but the rewards could be rich. 4. Multilateral, Multidisciplinary Technical Research, Engineering, and Advisory Capability
Many nations are beginning to understand that security of cyberspace requires a strategy that is linked to a nation's economic and national security interests. In February 2003, the US. released its National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. The Strategy is intended to help the U.S. protect its critical infrastructures and to reduce vulnerabilities that can be exploited in order to "ensure that such disruptions of cyberspace are infrequent, of minimal duration, manageable, and cause the least public damage"."' Other nations are similarly taking a national look at how their public and private sectors are securing critical information infrastructures and the relationship between cyber attacks and national and economic security. Numerous technical information security activities have also been undertaken by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), resulting in several government technical standards and criteria for security products. As a forerunner, in 1995, the British Standards Institution developed British Standard 7799, a Code of Practice for Information Security Management. This standard has now been accepted as an international standard, ISO/IEC 17799.II2 Although international standards setting bodies, such as the IETF and IEEE,'I3 have been working closely in the area of cyber security and infrastructure protection for years, there is a lack of multidisciplinary collaboration on technical, legal, and policy issues at the nation state level. The Internet Society (ISOC), the main governing body of the Internet, presently covers some of this ground, but it is an independent, professional membership society comprised of more than 150 organizations and 11,000 individual members from 182 countries. It is not a multinational body of nation states that collectively discusses the array of issues concerned with cyber security and reaches agreements on cooperation, legitimate actions, and penal codes. It is impossible for any country to unilaterally achieve security in a globally connected network environment. Again, CERTKC's Howard Lipson, recognizes this void: Regardless of the precise organizational structure, a multilateral technical research, engineering, and advisory capability is essential to (a) research and recommend the best tracking and tracing techniques and practices, (b) provide ongoing support for a multilateral tracking and tracing capability, (c) provide ongoing training and awareness for cooperating incident response and
423 investigatory teams world-wide, (d) make recommendations to international engineering bodies, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), for protocol improvements and standards creation in support of member states’ requirements for tracking and tracing attackers, (e) interact with those creating cyber-law and policy to ensure that the technical and non-technical approaches complement and support each other, (f) help assure that the tracking and tracing infrastructures and technologies of cooperating entities can interoperate, and (g) assess the results of cooperation already undertaken by technical and law enforcement agencies, in order to provide feedback for continual improvement.Il4
B.
Examples of Technologies Engenderinp Potential Conflict with Human Rights
1. Data mining, profiling and biometric technologies Of great concern since September 11, are information processing and retrieval technologies aimed at detecting and identifying terrorists from text-based and networkbased databases through the identification and tracking of the actions of communities, the prototyping and profiling of suspects groups and individuals, and the matching of keywords, phrases, and patterns of expression. These technologies presuppose the existence of very large searchable databases. The concern over the excessive use of data warehousing and mining is exemplified by the debate in the U.S. of the Total Information Awareness (TIA) ~ r o g r a m ”being ~ promoted by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). According to DARPA, TIA is developing: “1) architectures for a large-scale counter-terrorism database, for system elements associated with database population, and for integrating algorithms and mixed-initiative analytical tools; 2) novel methods for populating the database from existing sources, creating innovative new sources, and inventing new algorithms for mining, combining, and refining information for subsequent inclusion into the database; and, 3) revolutionary new models, algorithms, methods, tools, and techniques for analyzing and correlating information in the database to derive actionable intelligence.””6 DARPA is also developing Human Identification at a Distance ( H ~ m a n D ) ” ~ which is a suite of automated biometric identification technologies to detect, recognize, and identify humans at great distances. TIA would monitor the daily personal transactions by Americans and others, including tracking the use of passports, driver’s licenses, credit cards, airline tickets, and rental cars. Privacy groups and civil libertarian organizations immediately raised 1984 Orwellian “Big Brother” concerns over such government use of these technologies. The U.S. Congress quickly became involved. Senator Patrick Leahy noted in a letter to U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft that: Collection and use by government law enforcement agencies of such commercial transactional data on law-abiding Americans poses unique
424 issues and concerns, however. These concerns include the specter of excessive government surveillance that may intrude on important privacy interests andchill the exercise of First Amendment-protected speech and associational rights.’18 Subsequently, the U S . Congress has blocked funding for the TIA program.”’ However, this is but one small system out a vast array of government systems around the globe that uses ICTs to monitor, track, and keep information on the activities and movements of people inside their countries. Authoritarian regimes routinely block access to certain Internet sites, and because they are also usually the monopoly provider of communications, they have unfettered access to an array of communication traffic and content data. However, even democracies such as the U.S. have developed sophisticated systems to monitor email traffic. The “Carnivore” system, developed by the FBI, can be installed on an ISP to monitor all traffic moving through that provider. Although the FBI claims the system is designed to “filter” traffic and allow investigators to see only those packets the FBI is lawfully authorized to obtain, privacy and civil liberties groups remain skeptical. 120 2. Global electronic surveillance
The ECHELON system is an “automated global interception and relay system operated by the intelligence agencies in five nations:” the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, with the U S . National Security Agency at the helm.’21 A provisional report of the European Parliament confirms that “the existence of a global system for intercepting communications, operating by means of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities among the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand under the UKUSA Agreement, is no longer in doubt.”’22 The report further confirms that “the purpose of the system is to intercept private and commercial communications, and not military comm~nications”.’~~ This system and its potential for violating civil liberties of citizens has been the subject of inquiry by the legislatures of the Netherlands, Italy, and the United States among others.lZ4 3. Anonymity, privacy, and freedom of expression
Anonymity and privacy are frequently used interchangeably, especially in colloquial speech. Anonymity, seen as a part of privacy (privacy of identity), can be an important means of preserving international human rights and freedom of expression. Lack of anonymity in an expanding world of information technology makes it increasingly easy for private sector entities (with particular regard to economic interests) to gather vast amounts of information and track Internet activity and for governments to conduct widespread surveillance on individuals and groups. Lack of anonymity, combined with “passive” monitoring techniques such as “cookies” and the more intrusive “clickstream” monitoring (a page-by-page tracking as a person wanders through the Internet) allows private sector entities to assemble detailed dossiers on individuals. This erosion of privacy is compounded by the weak privacy laws and regulations in the US., but is countered by the more stringent data protection afforded by the European Union.
425 A countervailing consideration is that the “anonymity enjoyed by today’s cyber attackers poses a grave threat to the global information society, the progress of an information-based international economy, and the advancement of global collaboration and cooperation in all areas of human endeavor”.125 With respect to malicious cyber attacks by individual hackers and the more ominous case of attacks by nation states (including acts of cyber warfare),lZ6 the ability to deter attacks, obtain redress, or otherwise hold attackers accountable is directly linked to the ability to identify the sender and origin of the c o m m ~ n i c a t i o n . ’Therefore, ~~ it is imperative that interests in tracking and tracing be balanced with legitimate privacy interests and rights provided under international law.
13.
The international scientific community, and in particular the World Federation of Scientists, should assist developing countries and donor organizations to understand better how ICTs can further development in an environment that promotes information security and bridges the Digital Divide.
Much of the work in addressing developmental and digital divide issues is seen as falling within the purview of political and economic decisionmakers. However, the scientific community make significant contributions in this area because, among other reasons, of the rapid growth of peer-to-peer scientific networks which offer low-cost opportunities and solutions for developing countries. ICTs bring both opportunities and challenges to developing countries.’28 The G8, World Bank, United Nations (UN), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are each committed to bridging the global “Digital Divide”.129 The donor community130also understands that ICTs are a powerful development tool that can help boost economies, increase competitiveness, attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and raise the skill level of the workforce in developing countries. Developing countries also realize the potential impact of technology, and many are launching their own ICT initiatives and aggressively competing for donor funds to assist them. Internet growth works in their favor. Today, there are approximately 600 million people connected to the Internet. However, that online population accounts for only 10% of a world population of about 6 billion people. Since 65% of Americans are already online,131 we can expect some of the highest connectivity increases to be in the 180 developing countries around the globe. Indeed, Forrester Research predicts that by 2007, 70% of software programming will be performed in developing c o u n t r i e ~ . ‘ ~ ~ Thus, developing countries have an unprecedented opportunity to seize upon the advantages of ICTs to propel their progression toward industrialization, market economies, and social advancements. These opportunities, many of which are directly dependent on inputs from the scientific community, include: Attracting foreign direct investment to (a) build infrastructure, (b) launch ICT t projects, (c) partner with donor organizations and governments on pilot projects, and (d) tap undeveloped or under-developed markets. t Privatizing and liberalizing monopoly providers to introduce competition, lower prices, and advance the deployment and utilization of ICTs.
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Attracting data processing applications such as data entry, customer service and telemarketing operations, records processing (accounts receivable, accounts payable, general ledger, etc.), order entry, inventory control, databank development, data storage operations, remote systems administration, etc. Attracting Internet start-up companies, e-commerce operations, and software development centers. Developing telemedicine and health care centers. Using ICTs for distance learning, education, brokerage services, and building workforce skills, Using ICTs for agri-business and agricultural information and industry sector support. Attracting light manufacturing operations. Modernizing the financial sector. Fostering the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to spur job creation, innovation, flexibility, and competitiveness. Reforming and automating court administration and case management and availability of judicial information. While the contribution of the scientific community could be a force-multiplier, each of these opportunities is largely dependent upon the development of the legal and regulatory framework to support these activities. The legal framework is one of the most important factors because it touches upon all aspects of commerce, is critical to attracting investment, and is at the core of providing certainty to business operations. The term “legal framework” also includes public policy, which forms the underlying foundation of government support for ICTs and a favorable business environment. Information and infrastructure security are two of the most important components. With nearly 200 countries connected to the Internet, cybercrime has become a global issue that requires the full participation and cooperation of the public and private sectors in all countries, including the 180 developing countries around the globe. A major component of information and infrastructure security is a nation’s ability to deter, detect, investigate, and prosecute cyber criminal activities. Weaknesses in any of these areas can compromise security not only in that country, but around the globe. This is due to the global, interconnected nature of the Internet and the way in which countries must rely upon each other’s expertise and assistance in addressing cybercrime matters. The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and networks - including critical infrastructure - are central to attracting FDI and ICT operations to developing countries. The opportunities associated with ICTs are not guaranteed; they are dependent upon developing countries’ ability to effectively address the additional challenge of cyber security and to take steps to actively participate in the global community in combating cybercrime. Appropriate security laws and regulations are also important because: They protect the integrity of the government and reputation of the country. 4 They help preclude a country from becoming a haven for bad actors, such as 4 terrorists, organized crime, and fraud operations. They help prevent a country from becoming a repository for cyber-criminal 4 data.
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They instill market confidence and certainty regarding business operations and attract foreign direct investment. They provide protection of classified, secret, confidential and proprietary information, criminal justice data, personal information, and certain categories of public data. They protect consumers and assist law enforcement and intelligence gathering activities. They deter corruption. They increase national security and reduce vulnerabilities to attacks and actions by terrorists and other rogue actors. They help protect corporations against risk of loss of market share, shareholder and class action lawsuits, damage to reputation, fraud, and civil and criminal fines and penalties. They provide a means of prosecution and civil action for acts against information and infrastructure. They increase the chance that electronic evidence in physical-world crimes, such as murder or kidnapping, will be available when needed. They create an atmosphere of stability in which economic and social welfare can flourish. For the most part, developing countries are struggling with how to use e-commerce and ICTs in everyday government and business operations. The lack of an adequate legal framework - especially with respect to information and infrastructure security and computer crime - will diminish or prevent developing countries from grasping ICT opportunities. The reasons are clear: Internet and e-commerce operations require an enabling legal framework that t also provides for security of data and networks. Data processing operations require information and infrastructure security t laws for a safe operating environment and protection of data. Companies will not allow their data to be processed in countries that do not t have adequate legal protections against economic espionage, computer crime, infrastructure attacks, and misuse of telecommunications devices and equipment. t Certain laws, such as the EU data protection directive, require that countries afford equal legal protections against misuse of personal data. Much of the inadequacies in addressing these critical issues in developing countries occur because of shortages in scientific and knowledge-based resources. Much is also due to scarcities in financial resources, which in turn constrict the enormous potential inherent in the large human resource base in the developing world. By helping identify and discover low-cost solutions, and by closer coordination with other relevant partners, the scientific community can unleash these human resources, and place them at the service of the developmental effort. The role of the World Federation of Scientists would be an important catalyst in this effort. Deeper consideration of these issues is indicated in the future. The PMP intends to focus on some of these in subsequent meetings.
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List of PMP Members William A. Barletta William A. Barletta is Director of the Accelerator and Fusion Research Division and the Office of Homeland Security at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. He is an Editor of Nuclear Instruments and Methods A, an Editor of the Internet Journal of Medical Technology, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Particle Accelerator School, and Member of the Governing Board of the Virtual National Laboratory for Heavy Ion Fusion. His recent research has concentrated on cyber security and the application of neutron sources and bright ion beams to nanotechnology and medicine. Olivia A. Bosch Olivia Bosch is currently a Senior Research Fellow in the New Security Issues Programme of The Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. Previously, she worked as a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California) and at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Dmitry Chereshkin Dr. Dmitry S. Cherechkin is an Academician and Vice-president of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, where he is a Professor of Computer Sciences in the Institute for Systems Analysis. He currently acts as Deputy Chairman of the Government’s Workshop Group to elaborate the Information Development Strategy of Russia. Ahmad Kamal Ambassador Ahmad Kamal served as a professional diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan for close to forty years until his retirement in 1999. During this period, he held diplomatic postings in India, Belgium, France, the Soviet Union, Saudia Arabia, the Republic of Korea, and with the United Nations both in Geneva and in New York. He continues to be a Senior Fellow of the United Nations Institute of Training and Research. He is also the Founding President and CEO of The Ambassador’s Club at the United Nations. Andrei V. Krutskikh Prof. Dr. Andrei V. Krutskikh is a diplomat and politologist, specializing in issues of disarmament and international cooperation in the field of science and technology. He has served in diplomatic service in the Foreign Affairs Ministry (VFA) of Russia since 1973. He has been stationed at Russian embassies in the USA and Canada. Dr. Krutskikh was a member of the Russian negotiations teams for the SALT I1 and INF Treaties. At present, he serves as deputy director of the department in the MFA for security, technological, and disarmament affairs. He is a Member of the International Academies on Informatization and Telecommunication and a Professor at the Moscow State InstituteKJniversity on International Relations.
429
Axel H.R. Lehmann Prof. Dr. Lehmann received his Studies of Electrical Engineering (Dip1.-Ing.) and received his doctorate of Informatics at the University of Karlsruhe in Germany. From 1982-1987, he was research assistant and Visiting Professor at the Universities of Karlsruhe and Hamburg. Since 1987, Dr. Lehmann has been Full Professor for Informatics at the Faculty for Informatics, Universitaet der Bundeswehr Muenchen. Major positions and activities include Dean of the Faculty for Informatics (1995-1997) and member of the Academic Senate of the Universitaet. He served as Vice-president and President of the Society of Modeling and Simulation International from 1993-2000 and is a member of an Advisory Council for the Ministry of Science, Culture, and Research, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Germany. Timothy L. Thomas Mr. Thomas works at the Foreign Military Studies Office at the U.S Army’s Fort Leavenworth establishment in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Vitali Tsygichko Prof. Dr. Tsygichko is an expert of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and professor at the Institute of Systems Analyses of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The author of six scientific books and more than 200 articles, Dr. Tsygichko is a Full Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and full professor of cybernetics in the field of system analyses and decision making systems for national security problems. He is a retired colonel and received his Doctor of Technical Sciences (Cybernetics) from Moscow University. Henning Wegener Dr. Henning Wegener serves as Chairman of the World Federation of Scientists Permanent Monitoring Panel on Information Security. A German diplomat and lawyer, Dr. Wegener, received his L.L.B. from the University of Bonn, his M.C.L. from George Washington University, and his LL.M. and J.S.D. from Yale University. He has undertaken further studies at the Sorbonne in Paris. Ambassador Wegener joined the German Federal Foreign Office in 1962. From 1981-1986 he was Ambassador in Geneva, from 1986-1991 he was Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels. Dr. Wegener was Lecturer in Political Science at the Free University of Berlin from 1990-1995, and from 1991-1995 he was Deputy Secretary of the Federal Press and Information Office in Bonn. From 1995-1999 he was Ambassador of Germany to the Kingdom of Spain and to the Principality of Andorra. Since 2000, he has been a consultant in Madrid. He has published extensively on foreign and security policy.
Jody R. Westby Ms. Westby is founder and President of The Work-IT Group, specializing in privacy and security, cybercrime, and information warfare. Previously, Ms. Westby was Chief Administrative Officer and Counsel of In-Q-Tel, Inc., a corporation devoted to finding unclassified, commercial solutions to IT problems facing the U.S. intelligence community. As a practicing attorney, Ms. Westby practiced international trade,
430 technology, and intellectual property law with the New York firms of Paul, Weiss, Riflund, Wharton & Garrison and Shearman & Sterling. As Senior Fellow and Director of Information Technology Studies for The Progress & Freedom Foundation, she directed and managed IT projects on an array of cutting-edge issues. Prior to that, Ms. Westby was Director of Domestic Policy for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Ms. Westby is chair of the American Bar Association’s Privacy and Computer Crime Committee and was chair, co-author and editor of its International Guide to Combating Cybercrime, International Strategy for Cyberspace Security, and International Corporate Privacy Handbook.
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ENDNOTES In the context of the work of the PMP and the Recommendations and Explanatory Comments herein, the term “information security” is intended to encompass the broader scope of cyber security, which includes the security of data, applications, operating systems, and networks. Eduardo Gelbstein and Ahmad Kamal, Infinnation Insemti& A Survivalguide to the uncharted ternloties of qberthreats and yber-seeu$y, United Nations ICT Task Force and United Nations Institute of Training and Research, 2nded., Nov. 2002 at 1, httn://www.un.int/kamal/information insecurity (hereinafter “Gelbstein and Kamal”). 3 Howard F. Lipson, Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks:TechnicalCha/knges and GLbal PoLq Issues, CERT Coordination Center, Special Report CMU/SEI-2002-SR-009, Nov. 2002 at 10, http:/ /www.cert.or_e/arch/pdf/02sI009.pdf (hereinafter “Lipson”). 4See CERT/CC Statistics 1988-2003, u//www.cert.org/stats/. Gelbstein and Kamal at 20-21, http://www.un.int/kamal/information insecurity. Richard Power, “2002 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Swvey,” Conqufer Semrig Issues & Trendr, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Spring 2002 at 10-11, http://www.pcsi.com/ndfs/fbi/FBI2002.~df. Nationa/Strateegyf.rHo~e~nd Semtify, Offce of Homeland Security, July 2002 at 30, hnn: //www .caci.com/homeland securitv/nat strat.shtml. Jody R Westby and William A. Barletta, “Public and Private Sector Responsibilities for Information Security,” Mar. 2003 at 2-3, http://www.itis-ev.de/infosecur(citing ” Barton Gellman, “Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared,” WashingtonPost, June 26,2002, ~://www.washinmonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A507652002jun26.html) (hereinafter Westby and Barletta Public-Private Responsibilities”). Jody R. Westby and William A. Barletta, “Consequence Management of Acts of Disruption,” Aug. 2002 at 3, http://www.itis-ev.de/infosecur (citing “G-7 to Call for Police Network,” Wa//StreetJoumal,Apr. 15,2002 at A4) (hereinafter Westby and Barletta Consequence Management”). Id at 2 (citing “Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Risk to Critical Federal Operations and Assets,” GAO Testimony of Robert F. Dacey, Director, Information Security Issues, Before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, Nov. 9,2001, GAO-02-231T at 3). l 1 Id at 2-3 (citing Hanan Sher, “Cyberterror Should Be Int’l Crime,” http://www.newsbytes.com/news/OO/l57986.html). Id at 3 (citing John Lancaster, “Abroad at Home,” Nov. 3,2000, at A31, http:/ /washin~on~ost.com/ac2/wo-dvn/A4288-2OOONov2?lan~~=~rinter). I 3 Bill Miller, ‘Womes of Cyberattacks on U.S. Are Aired,” The Washington Post, Apr. 26,2002 at A26. I4 Vitali Tsygichko, “Cyber Weapons as a New Means of Combat,” Sept. 23,2002 at 4, http://wuw.itisev.de/infosecur (hereinafter “Tsygichko”). Carter Gilmore, “The Future of Information Warfare,” Dec. 28,2001, http:/ /rr.sans.or~/infowar/fi~tureinfowar.php (citing Depaxtment of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub. 1-02 at 209). Dorothy E. Denning, “Cyberterrorism,” Testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, May 23,2000..
http::Nwww.terrorism.comldocuments/dennina-testimon~.shtml. I7 Anne Marie Squeo, “US. Studies Using ‘E-Bomb‘ in Iraq,” The Wa//StreetJowna/,Feb. 20,2003 at A3, A9. Gelbstein and Kamal at 3, h t t d /www.un.int/kamal/information insecurity. Id at 8. Westby and Barletta Consequence Management at 1, hap:/ /www.itis-ev.de/infosecur (citing Global Internet Statistics: Sources & References, Global Internet Statistics (by Language), Mar. 31,2002, http://www.dobalreach.biz /elobstats/evol.html). 21 Id (citing Dave Krisula, “The History of the Internet,” Aug. 2001, http://www.davesite.com/webstation/net-history.shtml). 22 These items are described in detail in the paper by Timothy L. Thomas (with Karen Matthews), “The Computer: Cyber Cop or Cyber Criminal?” http: //www.itis-ev.de/infosecur. Dorothy E. Denning, “Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy,” Internet and International Systems: Information Technology and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking Workshop, http: / /www.nautilus.or_P/info-no~c~./workshon/naners/de~~,ht~. 24 Westby and Barletta Consequence Management at 1, http://www.itis-ev.de/infosecur. 25 Ahmad Kamal, “New Forms of Confrontation: Cyber-Terrorism and Cyber-Crime,” Aug. 2002 at 2, httn://www .itis-ev.de/infosecur. l9
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~~~~
Id. 27 The international law aspects of this statement will also be considered in the context of Recommendation 3 and considered in depth in papers by Messrs. Krutskikh and Tsygichko, httn://wa?u.itis-ev.de/infosecur. 28 Gelbstein and Kamal at 123, http://www.un.int/kamal/information insecurity. Id. 30 Jody R. Westby, ed., InternationalGuide to Combating Qberm’me,American Bar Association, Section of Science & Technology Law, Privacy & Computer Crime Committee, 2003 at 11, htto: / /www.ahanet.ore/abanuhs/books/cvbercrime/(hereinafter ‘Westby Cybercrime”). 31 Council of Europe Conventionon Qberm’me- Budapest, 23.XI.2001 (ETS No. 185) (2002), (hereinafter CoE Convention); Press Release, httn: / /con~,entions.coe.int/Treatv/Eru’/CadreListeTraites.htm “Ehdapest, November 2001: opening for signature of the fust international treaty to combat cybercrime,” The . criminal law aspects of Council of Europe, Nov. 14,2001, p information security are further developed in Recommendation 2 and the PMP paper by Henning Wegener, “Guidelines for national criminal codes and their application throughout the international community,”Jan. 2003 at 7, httn:/ /www.itis-ev.de/infosecur (hereinafter ‘Wegener Guidelines”). 32 G8 Recommendntionr on Transnational Crime, Section D High-Tech and Computer-Related Crimes, item 2, 26
.& 33
Bradley Graham, “Bush Orders Guidelines for Cyber-Warfare,”The WadingoonPost, Feb. 7,2003 at A01,
~
. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001) and Model Law on Electronic Commerce With Guide to Enactment (1996),
34
%
&
.
Wegener Guidelines at 7, htto://www.itis-ev.de/infosecur. 36 Lisa M. Bowman, “Enforcing Laws in a borderless Web,” CNET News.com, http://news.com.com/21001023-927316.html?taz+fg lede; Westby Cybercrime at 54-59, h t t u : / / w w w . a h a n e t . o r e / a b a p u b s . See aho Peter Swire, “Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: The International Choice of Law and the Internet,” 32 Int’l Law 991,1016 (1998). 37 Westby Cybercrime at 51-52, http://www.abanet.or~/abapuhs/boo h /cvbercrime / 38 Gelbstein and Kamal at 118, h tD:/www.un.n i t/knma/lnformato i n. 39 P. Meller, “EU pact would criminalize protesters who use the Net,” The New York Times,Feb. 5,2003, httu: //www.iht.com/arucles/88499.htm. Westby Cybercrime at 95-104, ~ u : / / w w w . a b a t i e t . o r e / : i l ~ a u u h s / b o o k s / c y b m e / . 41 “International Monitoring Mechanisms for Critical Information Infrastructure Protection”, Olivia Bosch, httn:/ /www.itis-ev.de/infosecur (hereinafter “Bosch Monitoring”). 42 Westby Cybercrime at 23, @: //www.abanet.ore/abanubs/books/cybercrime/. 43 Wegener Guidelines at 7 , y . Bosch Monitoring at 7, httu:/ /www.ids-ev.de/infosecur. 45 Pmposalfora Council Framework Decision on attacks against information ytems, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, Apr. 19, 2002, COM(2002) 173 final, adopted by EU Ministers of Justice Mar. 4,2003, httu://eurona.eu.iiit/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2~02/~om~~~2 0173enOl.udf. 46 Wegener Guidelines at 1-3, http://~..itis-ev.de/mfosecur; Westby Cybercrime at 1-2, httn://~.ww.;ihanet.ore/abapuhs/books/cvbercrime/. 47 Wegener at 4, 14, http://www.itis-ev.de/infosecur. &Y Pmposalfor a CouncilFramework Decision on attach against informationystemJ, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, Apr. 19,2002, COM(2002) 173 final, adopted by EU Ministers of Justice Mar. 4,2003, httu://euro~a.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/20~2/com2002 0173enOl.pdf. 49 Lipson at 3, httn: //~v\cw.cert.or~/archive/ndf/02sr009.udf. 5O TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol). Lipson at 5, I f . 51 Lipson at 5, httu: //www.cert.or~/arc~~~e/udf/O2sr009.udf. 52 Id. at 13. 53 Id. 54 Id. at 47. 55 Gregory D. Grove, Seymour E. Goodman, and Stephen J. Lukasik, “Cyber-attacks and International Law,” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3, Autumn 2000 at 100, htt~://suMval.ouniournals.org/c~/content/abstract/42/3/89 35
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(hereinafter “Grove, Goodman, and Lukasg’). Id at 90. 57 Tsygichko at 5-6, httu://wv.itis-ev.de/infosecur. 58 Westby and Barletta Consequence Management at 9, http://www.itis-ev.de/infosecur. 59 See also Timothy L. Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of ‘Cyberplanning,”’ Parameters, spring 2003, pp. 112-23. 60 Westby and Barletta Consequence Management at 8, http://www.itis-ev.de/infosecu. 61 Grove, Goodman, and Lukasik at 93, htt~://s~uvival.oupjournals.or~/c~/content/abstmct/42/3/89. 62 Id 63 Id. (citing Walter G. Sharp, Sr., Cyberspaceandthe Use oJForce, Aegis Research, Falls Church, VA 1999, at 102). 64 Id. at 95, Timothy L. Thomas (with Karen Matthews), “The Computer: Cyber Cop or Cyber Criminal?”
56
p . Westby and Barletta Consequence Management at 8. Grove, Goodman, and Lukasik at 94,97-100, /89. httu:/ /surviva~.ou~iourna~s.ore/cei/content/abstract/4~/~ 67 Andrey V.Krutskikh, “International Information Security and Negotiations,” Mar. 2003 at p. 3-4, htto://www .itis-ev.de/infosecur (hereinafter “Krutskikh”); fee also Tsygichko, http://www.itis-ev.de/infosecur. 68 Krutskdth at 3, httD://www.itis-ev.de/infosecur. 69 Krutskikh at 9-11, httn://www.itis-e~,.de/infosecur. 70 Joint US-Russia Statement on Common Security Challenges at the Threshold of the 2lsC Century, Seventh Clinton-Yeltsin Summit, Sept. 2,1998, e c u r i ~ at 14-15, httu:/ / ~ ~ ~ . c e i ~ . o r e / f ~ e s / n r o i e c t s / n ~ o / r e s o u r c e s / s u m m i t s ~ . h t m # sKrutskikh http://www .itis-ev.de/infosecur. 71 Krutskikh at 25, bttn://www.itis-ev.de/infosecur. 72 Id. at 29. 73 Grove, Goodman, and Lukasik at 100, http://sunival.oupiournals.or_e/cm/content/~bstract/42/3/89. 74 Social engineering refers to the false representation that one has system administration authorities with the intention of luring the system user into revealing critical authorization or access controls, or similar types of deceptive behavior that enables an unauthorized user access to information or infrastructure. 75 See e.g., “International Standard ISO/IEC 17799: 2000 Code of Practice for Information Security Management, Frequently Asked Questions,” Nov. 2002, http:/ /csrc.nist.~ov/uublications/secpubs/otherpubs/reviso-fao.pdf. 76 Gelbstein and Kamal, http:/ /www.un.int/kamal/information insecurity;see eg., Westby Cybercrime at 16170, http: / /www.abanet.ore/ahapubs/books/cybercrime/; Jody R. Westby, ed., International Strategyjr Cyberspace Seamy, American Bar Association, Section of Science &Technology Law, Privacy & Computer Crime Committee, ABA Publishing, to be published fall 2003. 77 See also Axel Lehmann, “Heightening Public Awareness and Education on Information Security,” httD: / /\vww.itls-ev.de {infosecur. 78 “Cybercrime,”Businesr Week,Feb. 21, 2000. 79 Jody R. Westby, “Protection of Trade Secrets and Confidential Information: How to Guard Against Security Breaches and Economic Espionage,” Inteflectual PmpersCy Counselor, dan. 2000) at 4-5. See, e.g., id.;For a general discussion on corporate liability related to board and officer responsibilities to ensure adequate information and control systems are in place, see Steven G. Schulman and U. Seth Ottensoser, “Duties and Liabilities of Outside Directors to Ensure That Adequate Information and Control Systems are in Place - A Study in Delaware Law and The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,” Professional Liability Underwriting Society, 2002 D & 0 Symposium, Feb. 6-7,2002, httu: / /~v.ulusweb.ore/Events/Do/materials/2002/Source/Duties”/a20ando~o20LiabiliU~s.~df. 81 Dr. John H. Nugent, CPA, “Corporate Officer and Director Information Assurance PA) Liability Issues: A Layman’s Perspective,” December 15,2002, httn: / /usmweb.udallas.edu/info assurance. ** Id. (citing Dr. Andrew Rathmell, Chairman of the Information Assurance Advisory Council, “Information Assurance: Protecting your Key Asset,” http://www.iaac.ac.uk). 83 A. Marshall Acuff, Jr,, “Information Security Impacting Securities Valuations: Information Technology and the Internet Changing the Face of Business,” Salomon Smith Barney, 2000, at 3-4, h t t o : / f . 65
66
434
Much of this section was taken from: Jody R. Westby, ed., Inte#ationulStrate~for CyberqaE Secung, American Bar Association, Section of Science & Technology Law, Privacy & Computer Crime Committee, ABA Publishing, to be published fall 2003. “The 7 Top Management Errors that Lead to Computer Security Vulnerabilities,” The SANS Institute, http://www .sans.ore/resources/ errors.ohQ. 86 See h t t b : / / u ~ i v . ~ b e ? i s o u ~ e , o ~ / ~ c e for n ~ eaccess s/ to an array of approved open source licenses. 87 The Open Source Initiative requires free distribution, although a license “shall not restrict any party from selling or giving away the software.. ..The license shall not require a royalty or other fee for such sale.” Open Source Initiative, The Open Source Defintion, htto://oDensource.orc./docs/def orint.oho. David McGowan, “Legal Implications of Open-Source Software,” Univ. of Ill. Law Rev., Vol. No. 1 2001 at 241 (hereinafter referred to as “McGowan”); The Open Source Defmition, Version 1.9, Open Source Initiative, http://opensource.orP/docs/def print.php. Open source licenses are not consistent in intent and meaning of traditional software licenses and have not been tested in court. Id. at 243. 87 Dennis M. Kennedy, “A Primer on Open Source Licensing Legal Issues: Copyright, CopyleFt and Copyfuture,” at 1, http:/ /www.denniskennedy.com/opensourcedmk.pdf (hereinafter “Kennedy”). 9a McGowan at 244-45, httD:/ /ooensource.ore/docs/def Drint.ohD; Kennedy at 3-4, hap: //www.denniskennedv.com/ooensourcedrnk.Ddf. 91 OSI Certification Mark and Program, Open Source Initiative, http://oDensource.ore/docs/cerdficationmark.uho. 92 McGowan at 241, http://opensource.orP/docs/def print.php Kennedy at 1 , 9 httD: / /www.denniskennedv.com/oDensourcedmk.Ddf 93 Open Hardware Certification Program, htto:/ /www.oDen-hardware.ore/. 94 Richard Stallman, “Free Hardware,” htto://features.linuxtodav.com/newsstorv.~h~3?ltsn=l999-06-22-00505-NWLF. 95 See Europol’s website at http://www.europol.eu.int/home.htm. “See htto://www .europol.eu.int/content.htm?links/en.htm for links to EU Member States’ national law enforcement websites, links to European institutions and international organizations, and links to other law enforcement agencies and organizations. 77 The text of the Eumpol Convention can be found at htto: / /www.euroDol.eu.int/content.htm!le~l/conv/eii.htm. 98 See http:/ /www.eurunion.or_p/partner/EUUSTerror/PoliceChiefsTaskForce.htm for more information on the European Police Chiefs Operational Task Force. 99 See Interpol website at httu://www. interuol.int/. Iw see htto://www .herpol.int for further information on Interpol. Much of the commentary to this Recommendation was taken from the Law Enforcement Chapter of the InternationalGuidefor Combating Cybem’me,which was co-authored and edited by Jody Westby. See Westby Cybercrime at 95-98, httD://www .abanet.ore/aha~ubs/boo ks/cvbercrime/. 101 Whitfield Diffie and M.E. Hellman, “New Directions in Cryptography,” IEEE, Trunsuctions on Injmution Theov, Vol. IT-22, Nov. 1976 at 644654. lo2 Westby Cyhercrime at 44,74, htto:/ /www.ahanet.ore/ahaoubs/bookdcvbercrimel (citing C@fograpb and L i b e q 2000:A n InternationalSumy.fEnWtion Pohy, Electronic Privacy Information Center, httD:/ /www2.e~ic.ore/reworts/ cn~t02000). 103 Timothy L. Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of ‘Cyberplanning,”’ Parameters, Spring 2003 at 112. Io4 Lipson at 5,13, httD:/ /www.cert.ore/archive/~df/02sr009.~df. Id. at 13-15. Id. at 16. lO7 Id. at 60-61. 108 Id. at 43. Iw Id. at 63-64 (emphasis added). 110 Howard F. Lipson and David A. Fisher, “Survivability-A New Technical and Business Perspective on Security,” htto: / /aww.cea.or_P/archlve/odf/busperspec.pdZWestby and Barletta Consequence Management at 9-12 httD://www .itis-ev.de/infosecur. . The NafionulStratgy to Secure Cybtmqace, cover letter from President Bush, Feb. 2003, httD:/ /www.whitehouse.vov/uciuh/. 84
I
435 112 ISO/IEC
17799:2000 Information technology -- Code of practice for information security management.
. -htm: 113 Internet E n p e e r i n g Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), http://www.ieee.org. 114 Lipson, p. 48 (emphasis in original), http://www .cert.ore/archive /odf/02sd09.~df. 115 This system is now being referred to as Terrorism Information Awareness program. See “DOD surveillance system renamed, But details of Pentagon data-gatheringproject unchanged,” htt~://www.stacks.msnbc.com/news/916028.asp. 116 “Total Information Awareness p) program being promoted by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), p . 117 “Human ID at a Distance (HumanID)”, http://www.darpa.mil/iao/HID.htm. 11* “Letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft”, US. Senator Patrick Leahy, January 10,2003, htto://www .senate.eov/-leahv/oress/200301/01 1003.html. 11’) “Terrorism spying project to e n d Personal records of millions had been targeted,” Sept. 25,2003,
t
fears, says the Pentagon,” WashingtonTimes, May 21,2003, ht 120 “The Carnivore FOIA Litigation,” http:/ /www.epic.or_e/privacv/camivore/;see ah0 “Internet and Data Interception Capabilities Developed by the FBI,” Statement for the Record of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, July 24,2000, httD://www .fbi.~ov/con~ess/con~essOO/kerr072400.htm; “Carnivore Diagnostic Tool,” Statement for the Record of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Sept. 6,2000, htto://www .fbi.eov/conmess /coneressOO/ kerr090600.htm. lZ1 “Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ about Echelon,” Feb. 7,2002, httD:/ /archive.ach.orp(echelonwatch/faa. Draj Report on the e*stence ofaglobaJ systemfor the intemption ojpnuate and commerciaJ communicafionr(ECHELON intemption system), section “Motion for a Resolution,” Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System, European Parliament, 18 May 2001, lIwww.euroDarl.eu.int/temDcom/echelonlDdf. httD: ‘23 Id lZ4 Jelle van Buuren, Hearing O n Echelon In Dutch Parliament, Heise Telepolis,Jan. 23,2001 (available at http: 1/www.heise.de/tD/) and htto: / /archrve.aclu.ore/echelonwatch/faa.html. 1zLipson at 4, http://www .cert.ore -/archve/pdf/02sr009.pdf. lZ6 A discussion of cyber attacks from an arms control perspective is presented in V. Tsygichko, “Cyber Weapons as a New Means of Combat,” http://www .itis-ev.de/infosecur. I n Lipson at 18, htt~://www.cert.ore/archive/~df/02sr009.~df. The explanatory comments for this Recommendation are, in large part, taken from the InternationalGuide to Combating Cybm’me, which was written and copyrighted by Jody Westby. The Cybm’me Guide was written to assist developing countries understand cybercrime and the steps they needed to take to become active participants in combating cybercrime on a global scale. See Westby Cybercrime at 11-17, hp://www .abanet.or~/&gubs/boo ks Icybercrime1. “Digital Divide” refers to “The gap between those able to benefit by digital technologies and those who are . . ivi . . not.” SeegThe donor community consists of aid institutions such as The World Bank Group, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USND), United Nations (UN), Canada International Development Agency (CIDA), European bank of Reconstmction and Development (EBRD), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and numerous other development banks and assistance organizations. 131 Global Internet Statistics: Sources & References, Global Internet Statistics (by Language), Mar. 31,2002, htto://www.d - obal-reach.biz/globstats/evol.html. 132 “Taking up technology,” Financial Timer,Apr. 2,2002, at 8.
RECENT ACTIVITIES OF PMPs FLOODS AND UNEXPECTED METOROLOGICAL EVENTS, WATER, AND CLIMATE
ROBERT CLARK University of Arizona, Tucson, USA Activities in 2002-2003 of the Permanent Monitoring Panels (PMPs) on Defense Against Floods and Unexpected Meteorological Events; Water; Climate, Ozone and Greenhouse Effects, assisted by the PMP on Pollution, have centered on two main topics: 1. Evaluation of the hydrologic impacts of the Gran Sasso Laboratory extension, and 2. Planning and sustainable development and operation of water and other environmental resources in the Mediterranean region. Meetings were held in Gran Sasso and Rome during the period from 3-7 June 2003 with Italian scientists concerning both topics. The World Federation of Scientists (WFS) Task Force consisted of the following: Robert A. Clark, University of Arizona, USA. Margaret S. Petersen, University of Arizona, USA. Richard Ragaini, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, USA. Soroosh Sorooshian, University of Arizona, USA. William A. Sprigg, University of Arizona, USA Aaron Yair, Hebrew University, Israel. The Results of meetings on the main topics were as follows: TOPIC 1 - GRAN SASS0 LABORATORY EXTENSION Introduction The WFS Task Force met with Italian engineers and scientists at Gran Sasso and at the offices of the Istituto Nazional di Fisica Nucleare (INFFN) in Rome to discuss potential impact of the proposed Gran Sasso Laboratory extension on water resources of the local area. Discussions centered on two major technical questions related to the Laboratory extension: 1) Potential impacts on local domestic water supplies, particularly in the Teramo area near the east portals of the A-25 highway tunnels; and 2) Potential impacts of laboratory operation on local water quality. Findings of Fact A. 1.
2.
Findings with regard to water quantity. Infiltration in the Gran Sasso varies seasonally, with about one-third occurring in the summer, indicating that snowmelt is a major contributor to ground water resources of the area. In May-June 1991, fourteen boreholes were drilled within the vicinity of the planned location of the laboratory extension project. No ground water was intercepted by these borings.
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437 3.
Time-series data show drainage outflow along the highway tunnels from the time the tunnels were bored, 1973 up to 1998. These data indicate that, after initial dewatering, the hydrogeology stabilized to the natural annual variability of the level of the ground-water table.
B.
Findings with regard to water quality. The Laboratory extension project will include provision of a water treatment plant near the west portals of the highway tunnels, and all waste-water from both the existing Gran Sasso Laboratory complex and the Laboratory extension will be carried in a pipe located in the new emergency tunnel to the treatment plant.
C.
Other discussions. Impacts of the existing Gran Sasso Laboratory and potential impacts of the proposed Laboratory extension are not completely understood by the local population.
Conclusions and recommendations A. The location of the proposed laboratory extension is within a geohydrological compartment characterized by low permeability. The expected potential impact of the proposed work on ground water quantity will be negligible. B. The new water treatment plant, included in the proposed laboratory extension located near the west portals, will improve the level of environmental protection against accidental spills in both the existing laboratory facilities and in the proposed extension. Treatment for all waste water will be provided. The new treatment plant should include a holding tank of adequate capacity so that if monitoring indicates a pollution hazard, all polluted discharges can be retained until treated. C. Adequate safeguards should be adopted to ensure that no spills or leaks of hazardous liquids could escape the Laboratory prior to operation of the new water treatment plant. D. Communications between the Laboratory and people in the Gran Sasso area need to be established so that people are given accurate and timely information as to the purpose and activities of the Gran Sasso Laboratory complex and the proposed Laboratory extension and about the potential effects of the laboratory facilities on water resources of the Gran Sasso. TOPIC 2 - SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION Introduction Discussions were held in the Enrico Fermi Institute on 6 and 7 June with scientists representing academic institutions in Sicily, Italian governmental agencies, and members of WFS Permanent Monitoring Panels (PMPs). Topics ranged from: Water and environmental protection. Floods and extreme events.
438 Soil, desertification, and remote sensing. Seismology, hazards and risk, supervision and management. It was pointed out that problems range from augmenting domestic water supply, modernizing of hydrometeorological services; training in modem technology, improved communications, flood control, and water quality improvement to impact of climate change. Discussions During the afternoon of 7 June, a separate meeting was held to discuss topics of interest to the PMPs on Floods and Unexpected Meteorological Events, Climate Change, and Pollution. A group representing the Columbia University Lamont Doharty Laboratories, concerned with the PMP on seismicity, was also present. Those attending the meeting included Guissippi Aronica, University of Messina, Sicily. Kathleen Boyer, Columbia University, USA. Robert A. Clark, University of Arizona, USA. Arthur Lerner-Lam, Columbia University, USA. Slobodan Nickovic, University of Malta, Malta. Margaret S. Petersen, University of Arizona, USA. Richard Ragaini, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, USA. Luca Rossi, Department of Civil Protection, Rome, Italy. Leonard0 Seeber, Columbia University, USA. William A. Sprigg, University of Arizona, USA. Recommendations It was proposed that a meeting of the various PMPs be held on 19 August 2003 in Erice with concerned Italian scientists to discuss possible activities by the PMPs in their specific areas of expertise. The Italian group, headed by Giuseppi Aronica, will develop a list of potential projects to be considered by the various PMPs.
POLLUTION PERMANENT MONITORING PANEL - 2003 REPORT DR. RICHARD C. RAGAINI Department of Environmental Protection, University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, USA The continuing environmental pollution of earth and the degradation of its natural resources constitutes one of the most significant planetary emergencies today. This emergency is so overwhelming and encompassing, it requires the greatest possible international East-West and North-South co-operation to implement effective ongoing remedies. It is useful to itemize the environmental issues addressed by this PMP, since several PMPs are dealing with various overlapping environmental issues. The Pollution PMP is addressing the following environmental emergencies: Degradation of surface water and ground water quality Degradation of marine and freshwater ecosystems Degradation of urban air quality in mega-cities Impact of air pollution on ecosystems Other environmental emergencies, including global pollution, water quantity issues, ozone depletion and the greenhouse effect, are being addressed by other PMPs. The Pollution PMP coordinates its activities with other relevant PMPs as appropriate. Furthermore, the PMP will provide an informal channel for experts to exchange views and make recommendations regarding environmental pollution. PRIORITIES IN DEALING WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCIES The PMP on Pollution monitors the following priority issues: Clean-up of existing surface and sub-surface soil and ground-water supplies from industrial and municipal waste-water pollution, agricultural run-off, and military operations Reduction of existing air pollution and resultant health and ecosystem impacts from long-range transport of pollutants and trans-boundary pollution Prevention and/or minimization of future air and water pollution Training scientists & engineers from developing countries to identify, monitor and clean-up soil, water and air pollution ATTENDEES The following scientists listed below attended the August 2002 Pollution PMP meeting: Chairman Dr. Richard C. Ragaini, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, USA Dr. Lome G. Everett, University of California at Santa Barbara, USA Prof. Vittorio Ragaini, University of Milan, Italy Dr. Andy Tompson, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, USA Prof. Joseph Chahoud, University of Bologna, Italy
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Prof. Ilkay Salihoglu, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey Prof. Sergio Martellucci, University of Rome, Italy HISTORICAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS OF THE POLLUTION PMP The following Erice workshops and seminar presentations have been sponsored by the Pollution PMP since its beginning in 1997 in order to highlight global and regional impacts of pollution in developing countries:
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1998: Workshop on Impacts of Pharmaceuticals and Disinfectant Byproducts in Sewage Treatment Wastewater Used for Irrigation 1999: Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between WFS and the U.S. Department of Energy To Conduct Joint Environmental Projects 1999: Seminar Session on Contamination of Groundwater by Hydrocarbons 1999: Workshop on Black Sea Pollution 2000: Seminar Session on Contamination of Groundwater by MTBE 2000: Workshop on Black Sea Pollution by Petroleum Hydrocarbons 2001 : Workshop on Caspian Sea Pollution 2001: Seminar Session on Trans-boundary Water Conflicts 2001: Workshop on Water and Air Impacts of Automotive Emissions in Mega-cities 2002: Seminar Talk on Radioactivity Contamination of Soils and Groundwater 2002: Seminar Talk on Environmental Security in the Middle East and Central Asia 2003: Seminar Session on Water Management Issues in the Middle East 2003: Workshop on Monitoring and Stewardship of Legacy Nuclear and Hazardous Waste Sites
POLLUTION PMP ACTIVITIES DURING 2003 On June 3-5, Richard Ragaini attended meetings at Gran Sasso and in Rome to discuss environmental problems at the Gran Sasso Laboratory, specifically the potential impact of the proposed Laboratory extension on water quality and water quantity resources of the local area. The general conclusion was that the expected potential impact of the proposed work on ground water quantity will be negligible. In addition, the proposed water treatment plant included in the proposed Laboratory extension will be able to detect, divert, retain and treat any future hazardous discharges. The results of these meetings are discussed in detail by Bob Clark in his PMP report. On June 6-7, Richard Ragaini attended planning meetings in Rome to discuss environmental problems in Italy and in Sicily. From these meetings came the proposal to establish a joint WFS Regional Resources Commission For Sicily, which held a meeting in Erice just prior to the International Seminars.
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POLLUTION PMP ORGANIZED ACTIVITIES AT THE AUGUST 2003 ERICE MEETING Workshop on “Monitoring and Stewardship of Legacy Nuclear and Hazardous Waste Sites” Session on “Water Conflicts in the Middle East” Participation in meeting on WFS Regional Resources Commission For Sicily Workshop on “Monitoring and Stewardship of Legacy Nuclear and Hazardous Waste Sites:” A two-day workshop on the long-term stewardship of radioactive and chemical contamination of soils and groundwater was held following the International Seminars. It included talks on the U.S. program to stabilize and monitor the Department of Energy sites in the US., which are contaminated with radioactivity. It also included talks on other international sites, including nuclear sites of the US., Soviet Union and France, such as the Nevada Test Site, Semipalatinsk, Mayak, French Polynesia, etc. Four themes were addressed: (1) Contamination, Containment and Control; (2) Monitoring and Sensors; (3) Decision Making and Institutional Performance; (4) Safety Systems and Institutional Controls. The Workshop Directors were Steven Kowall of the U.S. Idaho National Environmental and Engineering Lab, and Lome Everett of Stone and Webster Co. A final report containing conclusions and recommendations for future governmental actions will be produced. Session on “Water Conflicts in the Middle East” A special session was held on water management issues in the Middle East. Transboundary water issues are a very contentious issue in the Middle East, as well as in many other regions around the globe. The scientific topics included what is known about the subsurface water aquifers in the Middle East, the availability of surface waters, irrigation issues, issues concerning recharging the Dead Sea, issues concerning the Jordan River, technologies for producing drinking water, and technologies for cleaning up contaminated aquifers. The session organizers were Andy Tompson and Richard Ragaini of Lawrence Livermore National Lab. Meeting on WFS Regional Resources Commission For Sicily In June, Richard Ragaini attended planning meetings in Rome to discuss environmental problems in Italy and in Sicily. From these meetings came the proposal to establish a joint WFS Regional Resources Commission For Sicily, which held a meeting prior to the International Seminars. This Commission will be made up of representatives from regional Universities, from regional civil agencies and from various WFS PMPs, which are organized into several task forces. Members of the Pollution PMP along with members of the PMPs on Water, Floods, Climate and Extreme Weather Events are members of Task Force A, which is considering several potential problems, including:
442 A. Meteorology and hydrology. Flash flood forecasting for small basins. Weather radar and automatic remotely-sensed precipitation gages Pilot project for local flash flood protection in a small catchment B. Landslides. C. Ground water pollution and remediation. D. Coastal zone problems, including sewage, chemical and oil spills, heavy metals, coastal erosion, and algal blooms. E. Soil salinity and saline agriculture. F. Increased water supply for drought-affected areas of central Sicily, including water-harvesting techniques. G. Establishment of a one-year graduate-level certificate program at one (or more) Sicilian Universities for Ministry personnel, including engineers, water resources planners, environmental specialists, etc. to foster interdisciplinary resource development and to improve communications among academicians and practicing professionals.
REPORT OF THE ENERGY PERMANENT MONITORING PANEL RICHARD WILSON Mallinckrodt Research Professor of Physics Harvard University, Boston, USA INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY Last year the PMP agreed on a focus or theme for studies by PMP members in the year 200312003: "Lack of energy in developing countries and regions is a Planetary Emergency". One of the basic References is a report of the international energy agency (IEA) on "Energy and Poverty" as part of World Energy Outlook 2002. We do not believe that we have exhausted this topic so we will continue this theme for next year. This report will discuss first the progress and discussions that have taken place, followed by some discussion of other matters. There were many e-mail exchanges and reports presented at the PMP meeting in Erice on August 19'h, at the plenary meeting on August 22"d, and over many Sicilian meals and bottles of wine. I will take my task as Chairman to include an attempt to put all these thoughts into perspective and that will inevitably be biased by my own views. However I have started a web page for the PMP which is now accessible with the domain name httD:/lenerwvmu.org on which the original reports to the PMP or the main conference, papers, references and comments may be posted. Most religions insist that the rich help the poor because it is the right thing to do: others argue that it is correct pragmatically to achieve prosperity oneself. The PMP merely address how and when to do so. One of the problems we faced first is that the PMP members are almost all from rich countries. Yet the needs of the poor countries are brobably) best understood by representatives of the poor countries. For that reason, we tried to get scientists from these poor countries to join us, both at the special PMP meeting on August 19thand for a plenary session on August 22"d. In this we had limited success. It was our colleague P.K. Iyengar from India who proposed our focus and theme. But he has had a recurrence of heart problems and his physician tells him not to travel. The Chairman tried to find a good substitute, but the substitute was out of India and the Italian consulate in the US told him to apply for his visa in India! Hopefully this ridiculous behaviour of the Italian visa authorities will change. Jose Goldemberg from Brazil is a leader at thinking about helping the third world. He was at the International School on Energetics on "Energy Demand and Efficient Use" in Erice in 1980 and would have been delighted to return. But (so he told me) his visit to Erice, where he lectured on "Energy Problems in the Third World", persuaded him to go into politics and his political duties prevent him from coming. (Note that his lecture is available in the Erice volume of the school published in 1991.) Daniel Kammen from the University of California at Berkeley has done a lot of work in helping developing countries, particularly Kenya, to use renewables. His experience and wisdom on how to surmount the traps and pitfalls in working with developing peoples would have been invaluable to us. But a high fever that developed at the last moment prevented him from coming. We are very fortunate to have with us Dr. Hisham Khatib from Amman in Jordan, who is Honorary Vice President of the World Energy Council. Yesterday, August 22"d, he gave us a fine talk on the subject.
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444 I had invited Dr. Xiao Dadi of China, because of China's remarkable success in energy development. He had to cancel at the last moment, but Dr. Mark Levine of Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory valiantly stepped into the breach and told us yesterday, August 22"d, of China's remarkable achievements. Dr. Adnan Shihab-Eldin from Kuwait is not from a developing country but is from a third world country. He has also been at the School of Energetics in Erice 23 years ago, and would love to come back. Indeed he talked on "Energy Needs of the Less Developed Countries". But he is now Research Director of OPEC, and at this moment has special duties which prevent him coming. I hope that the explicit reason will be made clear to all at the forthcoming OPEC meeting at the beginning of September. In addition to Dr. Mark Levine, two Americans on the PMP have reported to us on end use efficiency: Dr. Arthur Rosenfeld of California Energy Committee and Dr. William Fulkerson. Their full reports to the PMP meeting are on the website, but some of the message they bring is incorporated below. We also had a report in the August 19" PMP meeting by Joseph Chahoud on Syria's Energy Plans and from Dr. Diop of Senegal (who reported for Dr. Vivargent in Dr. Vivargent's regrettable absence). The abstracts are also listed below with the full reports on the website The Chairman cannot resist quoting from memory an American, Benjamin Franklin, who was interested in this subject 225 years ago. "Wherever I have travelled, I find that when men have neither coal, nor wood, nor turf, they live in miserable hovels and have nothing comfortable about them. But when they have an adequate supply of fuel, and the wit to use it wisely, they are well supplied with necessaries and live comfortable lives". I note the two phrases of italics which would now be phrased: energy supply and end use eficiency. Both are important Dr. Khatib told us of the great need for energy, what it has done so far for the third world and what it can continue to do. This emphasized the supply side. Dr. Rosenfeld emphasized, with his example of refrigerators, how the US has increased end use efficiency in the last 20 years. Dr. Levine yesterday also emphasized the end use side in the Chinese economy. Dr. Fulkerson went further and set out a model whereby developed countries can take positive action to help developing countries in improving end use. The PMP will certainly be discussing this further over the next year. The discussions have mostly centred around electricity use. This is because electricity is extraordinarily useful and as such is often the symbol for energy. Over the years, many authors have identified three stages in improving the lives of people by electricity use. Firstly, when there is enough electricity for a 60-watt light bulb (20-watt with a modem efficient one) so that the family does not have to limit activities to daylight hours. Next, when there is enough electricity to allow the use of small hand tools. I wonder whether at this stage we should now include enough electricity to obtain internet access and learn and teach the world. Thirdly, when there is enough electricity for refrigerators, electric stoves, heaters, television sets "and all that jazz". There are in the world 1.6 billion people without electricity. This is half the Indian population. No wonder Iyengar is interested! Figure 1 (figure 13.5 from the IEA Energy and Poverty report) describes a link between Poverty and Electricity Access. Electricity access seems to be related to the fraction of the population that
445 lives on less than $2 per day. A physicist knows how to draw a straight line on such a graph and link the two. But even physicists realize that they don't know which comes first - the chicken or the egg. Does poverty cause a lack of electricity access? Or is the lack of electricity a cause of poverty? The PMP does not know, but are devoting themselves to trying to help access to electricity with the full realization that it is only a part of the problem. ENERGY AND GDP People have looked at the relationship between Energy and Gross Domestic Product (often called Gross National Product in the USA) for many years. It is important, when discussing developing countries, to realize that Energy means "Commercial Energy" and not the wood and turf (peat) (now called renewables) collected by poorer peoples. Figure 2 shows one such relationship for years up to 1980, with projections beyond, fiom a IIASA report of the 1980s. The "conventional wisdom" before 1975 was that energy demand was directly proportional to GDP, that Energy Demand would rise steadily with GDP and that a failure to meet this demand would result in a failure for GDP to rise. Indeed, in the 1960s, President John F. Kennedy called for a cheap energy policy to help developing countries. Oil prices and electricity prices were falling and were expected to go on falling. Few people (I was a crazy exception) would make investments in end use efficiency, even with a 5-year estimated pay-back, when in 5 years the price would go down. But in 1975 this changed and end use efficiency became important. The emphasis is now on the relationship of the ratio E/GDP with time or with GDP. It was higher in developed countries and fell with time, with a plateau in the 1960s. It has fallen in the US since then largely due to energy efficiency improvements, some of which were discussed by Rosenfeld and Levine. This is reflected in the IIASA projections. The Chairman has not seen this curve with the more recent data superimposed. One notable point pointed out by IAASA is that USSR (line I1 SUEE on the graph) had values of E/GDP which were 1 54 to 2 times those of USA or Western Europe. This was widely attributed to a failure of "Centrally Controlled Economies" as opposed to "Market Oriented Economies". China seemed to be going along this path. The chairman notes that the improvement in E/GDP in China since 1980 is still a result of "Central Control". But a more intelligent "Central Control". Those who fear the "Big Brother" of George Orwell suggest that the mechanism by which China achieved this outstanding success may not be universally applicable. HOW CAN THE WORLD HELP? How can the world help the developing countries and regions to develop, and in particular to make electricity and energy universally available? Can such help enable the developing countries to keep the E/GDP low and avoid the path taken by developed countries where E/GDP was high? Fulkerson, Levine and Rosenfeld insist that if we can do this, we, and they, save money AND limit adverse environmental impact. Without taking a poll of the PMP it seems that individual members are in full agreement. This is the point in the argument where the Chairman regrets most the absence of P.K. Iyengar and others in third world countries. P.K. briefly described his views in e-mails. The Indian Government notes the apparent connection between poverty and
446 availability of electricity and wants to expand availability and quantity of electricity. The statistics are interesting. In 1947 when the British rule ended, India generated only 5,000 Mwe. In 2003, India generates about 100,000 Mwe. This is still only a few % of US use, with a much larger population and amounts to only about 100 We per person. P.K. argues that a technical base exists in India for a rapid expansion of electricity production. There are experienced personnel for operation. Most hardware is now made in India. But, so P.K. says, capital formation is the limit. What does this mean? The phrase is used in many ways. We believe that it means that India has no way of charging enough for electricity to get back the initial capital investment. There are political constraints. India presently generates 35% of its electricity from hydropower, and plans a 70,000 MWe increase in 10 years. They have plenty of coal and lignite, but this is of poor quality. This suggests to us that help for efficient electricity generation using conversion to gas with combined cycle generation may be important. P.K. Iyengar notes that the Indian Nuclear Power programme is now "mature". But he grumbles at the lack of help from IAEA. He suggests (predicts) that in the absence of competition from the "west", Russia and China will dominate the nuclear power market. The NonNPT countries (India, Pakistan and Israel) are not helped by the weapons states to develop nuclear energy. P.K. also comments that there is too much attention to safety, to non-proliferation and so on. Such complaints have also been made, particularly of over regulation, in the west. The Chairman expects this lack of help will continue in view of the strong opinions about WMD from the developed world and in particular the weapons states. Dan Kammen, who as noted above could not be present, is a well known proponent of the view that developing countries can be taught to use renewable sources of energy more effectively than in the past. He has shown that people can be taught to use solar ovens for cooking, albeit with some problems of acceptance, and also suggests that photovoltaic (PV) electricity can be a vital source, particularly to generate that first 60(20) watts that is so essential. PV can continue to expand, certainly until an electricity grid arrives. Kammen's points tend to be forgotten when E/GDP is plotted. E usually means "commercial energy" and leaves out wood and turf, and renewables used at the local level. The Chairman felt that there was a general consensus in the PMP to go beyond the traditional aid that the World Bank and US AID have given to developing countries in massive generation projects - of which the Three Gorges in China is perhaps the most obvious example (although not funded by the World Bank). Generation efficiency, Use of Renewables and End Use Efficiency must also be brought into play. This is harder. Unlike a big dam, it cannot just be put in position by a few engineers from "above", whether foreigners, or experts from the same nation. It needs many people at all levels in the developing countries who are educated in these matters. Mark Levine this pointed out in his talk, and is proud of the education LBL has given and continues to give to those from developing countries. As the PMP develops its ideas further, this may well be a point that an "Erice Statement" and perhaps an "Erice Conference" may be helpful. THREE LOGICAL PROBLEMS In a setting where Dirac and Wigner have expressed their views, it seems desirable that attempts be made to relate one's recommendations to fundamental
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principles. Mathematicians might insist that one distinguish clearly between dependent and independent variables. Economists might argue that energy is only an "intermediate good". Indeed Admiral Zumwalt declared in 1973, in words apposite in 2003, that the purpose of nuclear energy is to power US nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines to defend the oil supply lines from the Middle East! Adnan Shihab Eldin pointed out in a comment circulated before the meeting (and now posted on the website), that automatically calling expanded oil use bad is illogical. With carbon sequestration what appears to be bad, may become good. Without clarity of understanding we might not have a clear, sustainable policy. Cost Benefit Analysis (and Risk Benefit Analysis) can be used easily to make decisions on the most cost effective strategy, with a given technology. It is far harder to use cost benefit analysis to discuss the benefits of a new unknown technology. It is, in the US, conventional to talk about a "Market Economy" with little realization of what that means. But a "Market Economy" is supposed to address the problem by providing an incentive for an enterpreneur to make money by inventing a new technology, patenting it, and reaping millions of dollars. There are many examples where this has proved inadequate and government action has been used in what is called "technology forcing". Just to show Arthur Rosenfeld that he is not alone in requesting government action to persuade people to make money by using energy efficiently, the Chairman lists 2 other situations: (i) It has been clear since 1910 that the benefit in medical diagnosis of X rays far exceeds the hazards. Few people took care to reduce the hazard even though it was possible, and even easy. The X ray dose for a chest X ray 50 years later was still 900 millRem, but was reduced, by enactment and enforcement of standards, within a few years by a factor of 100. (ii) Although the fuel efficiency of automobiles can save the buyer money, the improvement in kilometres per gallon only came about with the adoption of a complex system of CAFE standards federally enforced upon the manufacturer. The use of a " Market Economy" to get the most "bang for the buck" cannot work to get the best policy if: (1) Externalities are not included; (2) Consumers have inadequate information (including price): (3) Societies do not find it politically possible to charge full price. There is inadequate agreement on costing these externalities which have been and will be extensively discussed at Erice such as: global warming, pollution, energy resource exhaustion, nuclear proliferation, waste generation and disposal, etc. Societies have struggled to make sensible decisions when the full analytic procedure including externalities has not been accepted. Should one in the (supposed) spirit of Dirac and Wigner try to logically relate these paths? The PMP has not yet addressed these problems in the formal way that the Chairman and at least one other member would wish. They remain problems for next year when the Chairman intends to hold the noses of the PMP to the grindstone. OTHER ENERGY (FUEL) SOURCES While it is not directly connected with help to developing countries, we had reports on the status of fusion power. It was agreed that development is far off - 50 years at minimum, but they interested the PMP in the context of R and D funding noted below. Similarly, Dr. Bob van de Zwaa.n talked about nuclear energy and the conclusions that seem important for the theme of the PMP are that:
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There is adequate fuel supply for the once through cycle for the foreseeable future (50 years). Recycle in a light water reactor is more expensive than once through. A breeder reactor is more expensive still. While development of a breeder reactor might be a sensible long-term approach for a developed country, it seems to have no place in the plans for a developing one. R. AND D. FUNDING The PMP completely agreed with the report of one of its members, Dr. Bruce Stram, that the scientific community has failed to communicate effectively an appropriate valuation of energy R and D. But the PMP as a whole has not discussed what, if anything, to do about it. For example, how does one compare short-term needs and long-term needs? Fusion is an extreme example. Whether it will ever work or be economical is unclear. If it works, it is extraordinarily attractive. But it has no short-term potential. It cannot help developing countries (yet). But individual PMP members feel it is underfunded, particularly in the US. Adequate (international) fimding for fusion might include: Enough funds to build ITER. Enough funds to keep one smaller machine (JET) going till ITER is finished. APPENDICES Avvendix 1: Summary of the fusion session in the Energy PMP Erice, 19 August 2003. Prof. Palumbo, who was the director of the EU fusion programme for over 25 years, exposed his latest developments on determining optimised magnetic configurations. Starting from first principles, he demonstrates that possibly only one magnetic configuration is able to stably confine a plasma. The work needs further developments and if the first findings can be confirmed, experiments could be initiated to verify the proposal. Jef Ongena summarized recent progress in magnetic fusion research in Europe, mainly on JET (Oxford, UK), in preparation of ITER, the next step device after JET. He also summarized the present status of the ITER negociations. 1. JET has recently made several important steps towards ITER. A. The baseline operational mode (the so-called ELMy H-Mode), has been further optimized by adapting the magnetic configuration towards higher triangularity. This results in a drastic increase in the plasma density (30%), without losing, but quite on the contrary, further increasing simultaneously the confinement time (10%). Also for the so-called operational modes, progress has been obtained, by optimizing the temperature profile (maximum closer to the optimal bum temperature, i.e. 200 million degrees, accompanied by an increase in size of the high temperature zone) and a further increase in the density. Both in the ELMy H-Mode and in the advanced modes, this has led to a drastic increase in the fusion reactivity of the plasmas obtained.
449 Mitigation of heat loads on the first wall by creating a radiating boundary with well-dosed injection of impurity gas (Ar).This mimics the chromosphere of the sun: a hot centre accompanied by a colder plasma edge. The reduction of the temperature in the edge leads to a drastic lowering of the first wall temperature in JET (from lOOOC to 200C) and will lead to a reduction of wall damage due to erosion, sputtering and sublimation. C. Increasing the pulse length of the fusion pulses. In JET, we have been able to run pulses in the divertor configuration up to 50s long. The divertor configuration is an elongated elliptical plasma cross-section, with open field lines at the plasma edge, in order to pump away impurities, and is the configuration foreseen for ITER. These JET pulses are the longest divertor discharges ever produced in a tokamak, and there is potential for even longer pulses in this configuration, well over a minute. This will allow the effect of long time wall and plasma constants to be studied, in preparation for ITER. 2. On Tore Supra, a French tokamak with super-conducting coils, pulse lengths have been obtained up to 4 min 25s, in the limiter configuration (circular plasma cross-section). This is nearly half the pulse length as foreseen for ITER starting phase (500s). This has been obtained by applying noninductive plasma generation by means of the Lower Hybrid Heating System (GHz e.m. waves) and spontaneous generation of plasma current by the socalled ‘bootstrap’ current. 3. Status of ITER negotiations and plans. The ITER collaborative effort has recently been extended from the initial 4 to 7 partners: Europe, Japan, Canada, Russian Federation, China, South Korea and USA. There are actually 4 sites proposed for ITER: Canada (Clarington near Toronto), France (Cadarache near Marseille), Spain (Vandellos near Barcelona) and Japan (Rokkasho in N-Japan). All sites have been assessed by a specialized team and the final decision on siting for ITER is expected in the first half of 2004. A final international decision is expected in the first half of 2004 and, once this decision taken, the construction of ITER will start, foreseen to take about 10 years. First plasmas on ITER are thus to be expected in 2014. JET can play an important role in optimising and accelerating the high performance phase of ITER. In addition, JET would thus allow (i) to maintain the advanced know-how in plasma physics needed to efficiently run a large tokamak like ITER, and (ii) to prepare a young and well experienced international team ready to start ITER operations. Prof. Miyahara (former director of the National Institute for Fusion Science, Nagoya, Japan) gave an overview of progress on fusion in Japan and the position of Japan with respect to ITER. His conclusions are as follows: 1. ITER is a nice project situated between the large tokamaks (TFTR in the USA, JT-60 in Japan and JET in Europe) and a real Thermonuclear Reactor. However, it requires large budgetary allocations in Japan to cover the cost of building the device and for plasma operations of ITER. This results in a reduced budgetary attention for other important work in fusion, as the study of Helical Systems and the behaviour of Tritium in Fusion Reactor Materials. Prof. Miyahara expresses his womes that this budgetary conflict will introduce serious difficulties for the future sound developments towards fusion reactors. B.
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On the theory side, there are very important recent developments in the understanding of plasma physics, as recently documented by Dr.. Kr Itoh et al., in their review paper on “Theory of Plasma Turbulence and Structural Formation - Non linearity and Statistical View - J.Plasma Fusion Res. Vol 79, No 6 (2003) pp 608-624). According to their opinion, the subjects described in this article are useful for ITER operations and the progress in the understanding of turbulence and formation of turbulent structures in plasmas illustrates the advancement of plasma physics as an important branch of modem physics.
Appendix 2: Energv Situation in West Africa Dr.. Mbareck Diop for Marcel Vivargent General Figures on ECOWAS. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is composed of 16 states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo). The regional population is estimated at 246.8 mil; Nigeria has 123 mil. Per Capita GDP is $306/yr. 2. Energy Overview: Nigeria is the region’s only net energy exporter, and its exports are enough to make the whole region a net exporter. In 2001, the region consumed 1.46 quadrillion btu (Quad) and produced 5.4 quad. Nigeria consumed .92 quad and produced 5.49 quad. Commercial energy resources in the region are primarily oil and natural gas, and are concentrated in coastal and offshore regions. Electricity is provided by thermal (58.8%) and hydro (41.2%). Natural gas has the potential to take a more significant role in the region’s energy sector as fields in Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal are developed. Due to the region’s relatively small urban population (33.9%) and the lack of infrastructure, access to commercial energy sources is limited. 2.1 Petroleum: Nigeria, West Africa’s only significant oil producer, lifted off 2.1 mil bbl per d in 2002, and has reserves of 31.5 bil bbl. This is 96% of the region’s reserves. Smaller reserves are located in the Gulf of Guinea, in the Atlantic (offshore Mauritania and Senegal), and in landlocked Niger. 2.2 Natural Gas: There are significant reserves of natural gas in West Africa. Field discoveries have been confirmed and reserves proven in Benin (43 BCF) Cote d’Ivoire (1.1 TCF), Ghana (840 BCF), Nigeria (124 TCF) and Senegal (106 BCF). West Africa contains approximately 32% of Africa’s natural gas reserves. Nigeria lacks gas infrastructure and flares 75% of the gas it produces. In has a $3.8 bil LNG facility on Bonny Island, completed in 1999. The West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) project is a 630-mile facility throughout West Africa, from Nigeria to Benin, Togo and Ghana. The $500 mil WAGP will initially transport 120 mmcBd of gas to Ghana, Benin and Togo beginning in June 2005. Gas deliveries are expected to increase to 150 mmcBd in 2007, 210 mmcBd in 7 years and be at 400 m m d d when the pipeline operates at full capacity 15 years after construction. The pipeline is expected to save $500mil in energy costs for Benin, Ghana and Togo over 20 years (World Bank estimate), will foster associated industrial development and permit electric power development ($600 mil in development is expected for new and renovated power 1.
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facilities). The WAGP may be extended to included Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal. 2.3 Electricity: West Africa’s total installed electric generating capacity was 9.4 gigawatts (GW) in 2001. Generation was 33.8 bil kwh; Nigeria (14.6 bkwh), Ghana (8.8 bkwh) Cote d’Ivoire (3.0 bkwh) and Senegal (1.4bkwh) were the largest consumers. In 2000, 14 ECOWAS members signed an agreement to create a project to boost power supply in the region. The West African Power Pool (WAPP) Agreement reaffirmed the decision to develop energy production facilities and interconnect their power grids. According to the agreement, WAPP will be accomplished in two phases and completed by 2005. 2.4 Development of River Basins in West Africa. 2.4.1Niger Basin Authority (NBA): the long term objective of NBA is to promote cooperation among the member countries and to ensure integrated development of the basin in all sectors through development of resources, notably in the fields of energy, water, agriculture, livestock, fishing, fishfarming, forestry, transport and communications and industry. 2.4.2 Organization for Development of the River Gambia (OMVG): The objectives of OMVG are: i) increasing power generation at competitive costs, ii) Placing emphasis on development of agriculture; iii) ensuring optimum management of natural resources of the three basins (KolibdCorubal, KayambdGeba, and Gambia). 2.4.3 Organization for the Development of the River Senegal (OMVS): OMVS was mandated to implement an infrastructure programme for regulation of the river, including anti-salt protection, river transport, and power generation, and to contribute to integrated sectoral development in agriculture, transport and health fields in the basin area. The anti-salt dam was built in 1986 in Diama, and the Ranantali dam was completed in 1988, with a hydropower station generating since 2001 800 G W y r shared by Mali (42%), Senegal (33%) and Mauritania (15%). 2.4.4 Conclusion: Globally, West Africa has an important energy potential, but Nigeria is the main producer and exporter of petroleum and gas. The WAGP will be a good step toward a more integrated energy system involving Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana and Senegal. The challenge is to make more interconnections between Nigerian and other West Afiican countries that suffer from energy shortages. Hydropower is located only in Ghana and the OMVS. High Hydro potential exists in the Cote d’Ivoire, in the Niger Basin, and the Gambia Basin, but needs to be developed and to be inter-connected in the next decade. Appendix 3A: A Global Programme for Energy Eficiencv in Developing Countries. Mark D. Levine, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Little progress has been made in the transfer of knowledge and market experience of industrialized countries to improve the energy efficiency of developing countries. This is a serious problem, for a variety of reasons. From the point of view of developing nations, energy efficiency can serve as an engine of industrial modernization. The diversion of capital resources into energy efficiency can enable investment in essential infrastructure and services, while maintaining or even
452 increasing energy services. Such investment in energy efficiency is also a highly costeffective way of improving the environment. There are clear benefits to industrialized countries as well. The developing world will dominate energy growth in the foreseeable future, assuming that their economies achieve continued growth (as is widely expected). This means that most of the pressure on global energy resources - with oil of particular concern - will come ftom the growth of demand in the developing world. It also means that most growth of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions will be from the developing world. (IPPC results in the Special Report on Scenarios (2002) suggest that >80% of the increase in carbon dioxide emissions will come from developing countries over the next 50 to 100 years across a wide range of scenarios.) If such expansion of energy efficiency in developing countries is so desirable (to both the developing and industrialized world), why does it not just happen? The simple answer is that markets and associated governmental policy systems work poorly in most developing countries most of the time. As such, there is no way for the private sector in advanced countries, or such as it is in most developing countries, to make a profit from large-scale investments in energy efficiency. Unless a solution to this problem is found, the world will suffer. There will be no way to reduce the growth of greenhouse gas emissions significantly, as energy efficiency is the only affordable way to do this on a massive scale in developing countries. As such, no control of future greenhouse gas emissions is possible until greenhouse gas free energy supply is widely available (not soon). Further, in the opinion of the author, improving energy efficiency is essential if the developing world is to advance their economic performance for a long period of time (i.e. sustainably). This paper presents an approach to addressing this global problem on the scale that it deserves. The proposed programme would substitute energy efficiency for half of the energy demand growth in the developing world. As such, it both recognizes the need for continued growth on the supply side in the developing world, while also stressing the major role that energy efficiency must play. The proposed approach involves a major coordinated effort in eight of the ten most energy consuming developing nations, representing 75% of developing world energy consumption. This will cost $2B/year, to be allocated to (1) training, project management, and evaluation for energy efficiency projects and (2) institution building; development of prefeasibility studies for energy efficiency projects and programmes; and energy efficiency policy formulation and implementation in developing countries. The approach will create a new international centre of learning and training on energy efficiency with a "student body" of approximately 1000 participants from developing countries. The primary objective of the $2B/year global programme will be to attract $25B/year of private investment for energy efficiency. A programme such as proposed is essential for sustainable economic development in developing countries and control of greenhouse gas emissions in the coming decades. A small programme just $2B per year - if implemented properly - has the potential to make a large difference in addressing these problems. Avuendix 3B: Sustainable, Efficient Electricity Service for One Billion Peoule William Fulkerson and Mark Levine
Our purpose in this paper is to examine how electricity services can be brought to one billion people who currently have no access to such services. We postulate a 20-year goal, and further we require that the electricity should be sustainable with
453
respect to climate to attract support from the developed world. We try to answer the questions: What is needed? How much will it cost? Who might pay? How important is efficiency? We estimate that the customers for electricity will require of the order of 0.025kWlperson or about 220 kWpersordyear if end-use technology is efficient. We assume the developed world might be willing to pay the extra cost of sustainable generation and the extra cost of efficient end use technologies compared to least first cost technologies. We assume that sustainable electric generation will cost in the order of $lOOO/kW more than non-sustainable generation. Further, we assume that the extra cost of efficient end-use technology will be paid back in 2.5 years on average by the cost of electricity saved. The developed world would need to spend about $88/person, broken down into $50 for sustainable generation, and $33 for efficient end-use technology. The total cost to provide electricity to the un-electrified 1 billion would be $88 billion spread over 20 years, or $4.15B/y for 20 years, plus an estimated 15% more for training and institution development. This cost is about $12 billion less than for a system with sustainable generation but inefficient end-use technology. We suggest that these incremental costs of sustainable electricity are borne by four equal partners. The United States, The European Union, Japan and OPEC. Each partner would pay $1.19B/y. Consumers of the electricity would pay on average approximately $14/person per year for electricity plus about $15/person per person per year for end-use technology at the cost of the least first cost. This would provide a family of 6 with refrigeration, lighting, communications, TV and services for small motors like fans and sewing machines. There are serious questions involving this scheme. Can a utility or electricity service organization make money on this subsidized system? Can a poor rural family afford $29/person per year? Can a consortium of partners be persuaded to pay for sustainable service? Can sustainability be maintained for a long period of time? The authors suggest it is worth finding out the answers to these questions. Appendix 4: Status of the Hydrogen Economv: Does Hvdrogen Have a Practical Future as a Transportation Fuel? Carmen Difiglio, Ph.D., International Energy Agency
Mr. Carmen Difiglio showed that transport is largely responsible for world oil demand. Policies aimed at reducing problems from growing oil consumption therefore need to address motor-vehicle transportation. In the short-term, policies are needed to improve the efficiency of new vehicles, improve system efficiency and encourage the use of high-occupancy travel. But the inevitable high worldwide growth of motorvehicles use may eventually require a more sustainable transport system that features near-zero carbon emissions from secure sources of energy. To achieve this, there are now three known approaches: biofuels, electric vehicles and hydrogen-powered vehicles. Biofuels are important but are incapable of being supplied in sufficient quantity to replace petroleum in the transport sector. Past experiences with electric vehicles show that even significantly improved electric vehicles cannot be expected to meet consumer needs. Hydrogen is increasingly seen as the next generation of motor vehicle technology as evidenced by product development in the motor-vehicle industry and major new government programmes in the US, Japan and the European Union. Difiglio outlined the energy use and carbon emissions for several motor-vehicle and fuel technologies including hydrogen, electric, biofuels, hybrid and conventional
454
vehicles. He also provided 2020 cost estimates for several alternative technologies that can be used to produce hydrogen without C02 emissions including gas and coal with carbon sequestration, several renewable technologies, and nuclear power. Difiglio showed, using expected future cost estimates, that hybrid and fuel cell vehicles would be a costly way to reduce C02 emissions - two orders of magnitude higher than the economic incentives emerging from the Kyoto process. Several challenges facing a transition to hydrogen were outlined, including needed technology development on fuel cells, on-board hydrogen storage and hydrogen production approaches. Difiglio suggested that it would be difficult to supply the substantial quantities of hydrogen needed to displace a significant percentage of transport oil before 2050 unless carbon sequestration is applied on a large scale, since only fossil fuels could achieve this at a reasonable cost. Any feasible increase in renewable or nuclear electricity before 2050 would be best used to reduce COz emissions in the power sector. Cogeneration of hydrogen in a high-temperature gas reactor (HTGR) was shown to be a promising but uncertain technology. There would also be a difficult transition period in which there would be insufficient hydrogen refuelling available to inspire consumer confidence and insufficient hydrogen vehicles to make the investment in hydrogen refuelling equipment a reasonable business proposition. Substantial government intervention over a long period of time would be required to overcome this and other transition barriers. Nonetheless, increasing concern over global climate change could require that the future energy economy achieve extremely low net CO2 emissions. Widespread hydrogen use might be the only practical way to achieve this in the transport sector. Avuendix 5 Syria: Renewable Energv Master Plan 2001-201 1 Joseph Chahoud A secure and reliable supply of energy to the different sectors of the economy is one of the main concerns of the government of Syria, being aware of the finite and limited conventional resources available. For Syria to move towards greater sustainability, future energy developments must reduce expected GHG emissions; some reduction may be achieved through the use of renewable energy technologies. To this end, a Plan has been prepared in order to induce an increasing contribution fiom renewable energy sources in the national overall energy balance, thereby reducing dependence on fossil fuels and leading to environmentally sound and sustainable development. The Plan has two main components: an energy development programme and accompanying policy measures. Energy development is predicated on a series of proposals refemng to specific renewable energy technologies that fall into six categories: solar thermal, photovoltaic, wind, biomass, hydro, and hybrid systems. The accompanying policy measures are recommendations for Syrian institutions including the elimination of barriers to renewable energy such as subsidies to the conventional energy sector. Thus Syria will be more open to private investment in renewable energy. R & D, pilot projects, and bankable projects are three phases of the Plan, depending on the level of maturity and commercialisation of the respective technologies. The R & D programme consists of 20 components, most of which focus on application systems, and the others on system components. The overall cost of the R & D programme is estimated at $11 mil, two thirds of which goes to solar energy.
456 Pilot projects involving 12 renewable energy technologies and systems are proposed with an overall cost of $90 mil, 80% of which will go to biomass projects and 15% to wind. Finally, it is envisaged that 21 energy technologies and systems will reach commercial stage during the period. The financial resources that will be required for this stage will be about 1.36 billion, 44% wind, 22% for biomass, 18% for solar, 13% for hybrid, and only 3% for mini-hydro that have minimal environmental impact. By the end of the period of the Master Plan, the contribution of renewable energy technologies is estimated at more than 1 mil TOE, 4% of the total primary energy demand of Syria. Economic analysis, based on the life cycle cost of each project as compared to similar costs for corresponding baseline technologies, suggests that the renewable technologies will have an economic advantage as well as environmental and social benefits.
SYRIA’S RENEWABLE ENERGY MASTER PLAN: A MESSAGE FROM THE GOVERNMENT JOSEPH CHAHOUD Physics Department, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Syria enjoys both conventional and renewable energy resources. Currently, oil makes the largest contribution to the primary energy supply, followed by gaseous fuels. As a result of national strategy, the share of oil in the energy mix has been declining steadily in favour of gaseous fuels. (For example the share of oil in electricity generation in Syria is, as of the year 1998, only 40% while natural gas contributes about 45%). GHG emissions are, in terms of GDP, higher than the regional and global levels, and are projected to increase. For Syria to move towards greater sustainability, future energy developments must reduce expected GHG emissions, some of which may be achieved through the use of renewable energy technologies. A secure and reliable supply of energy to the different sectors of the economy is one of the main concerns of the Government, being aware of the finite and limited conventional energy target. Hence, the Government has had to adopt strategies and plans focusing on: Energy efficiency; 0 Linking grids with neighbouring countries; 0 Enhancement of the utilization of renewable energy resources; Institutional restructuring of the renewable energy sector. To achieve this purpose, a Renewable Energy Master Plan has been developed by the Ministry of Electricity under the guidance of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) with local coordination undertaken by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Damascus. Successively, by mid-June 2003, and in order to implement this Master Plan, the Syrian Government has enacted legislation that establishes the National Centre for Energy Studies and Research. The strategic role of the Centre should involve renewable energy, energy efficiency and integrated resource planning programmes. It is the hope of the Government of Syria that the Master Plan will be of great value and will serve as a useful document to be referred to by all sectors in dealing with energy issues. The purpose of the Plan is to induce an increasing contribution of renewable energy sources in the national energy balance, thereby reducing dependence on fossil fuels and leading to environmentally sound and sustainable development. SUMMARY: This purpose becomes appropriate in the current global scenario where interest and investments in renewable energy technologies have grown significantly, and it is quite likely that they will supply an increasing share of global primary energy during the forthcoming decades. Technologies such as photovoltaic are witnessing sustained high annual growth rates that are driven by large-scale market development programmes. This increased development, primarily in Europe and Asia, results in large-scale manufacturing and
456
457
component development initiatives, of which Syria can take advantage to boost the development of its small PV industry. Another renewable energy technology that has witnessed large-scale development is wind energy where very large European developments are driving the market. Also solar thermal technologies, especially solar water heating (SWH), are considered mature with large markets. Relevant technologies such as solar heating, cooling, drying, and electricity generation need to be demonstrated in the Syrian context. The global trend in is towards developments in the form of mini hydro power plants whose relative environmental impacts are minimal. Such an option can be pursued in Syria through small hydro and canal drop schemes. The biological and thermo-chemical routes for biomass energy conversion could play an important role in the Syrian energy mix and needs to be pursued. The Syrian renewable energy industry is in the early stages of development but capacity exists in SWH, photovoltaic and wind energy. The industry is largely in the public sector. Several barriers exist currently to the path of renewable energy developments in Syria: subsidies to the conventional energy sector, dominance of the public sector, limited awareness of the benefits, lack of favourable policies, tariffs and incentives, underdeveloped human resources, inadequate official assistance and limited interface of the RD&D institutions. However, the biggest barrier was, until now, the absence of an organisational set-up that should act as a driving force with clear responsibility to develop policy, legislation and regulatory evolution. The Syria: Renewable Energy Master Plan has two main components: Energy development plan; Accompanying measures plan. Energy develoDment plan The energy development plan consists of a series of proposals and activities refemng to specific renewable energy technologies. These fall into six categories: Solar thermal; Photovoltaic; Wind energy; Bio-energy; Hydro energy; Hybrid systems. The proposed activities began in 2002 and will continue until the end of the M P period in 201 1. Depending upon the level of maturity and the commercial stature, the renewable energy technologies pass through more than one of the phases of the energy development plan, namely RD&D, Pilot Projects and Bankable Projects. In 2011, the final year of the M P , the contribution of renewable energy technologies is estimated at 1.012 ktoe, which will represent 4,3% of the primary energy demand. The share of different renewable energy technologies is shown in the following table:
458
Wind
Bio
50,23 %
25,84 %
Solar thermal 16,61 %
Hybrid*
Hydro
Photovoltaic
3,62 %
3,41 %
0,30 %
1. Research, Development and Demonstration The proposed RD&D programme consists of 20 components that will have to be implemented in the period 2002 to 201 1. Most of the tasks focus on application of renewable energy systems; however, some focus exclusively on the system Components.
RD&D Programme Solar Thermal Space Heating Systems Solar Thermal Space Cooling Systems Solar Dryers
Domestic Hot Water Systems
Solar Thermal non-domestic Hot Water Systems Solar process heat for industries Solar Thermal absorber R&D PV pumping for urban water supply PV Health and Education systems PV pumping systems
Programme Description
Demand assessment, engineering design study, design validation, testing and demonstration. Demand assessment, engineering design study, design validation, testing and demonstration. Market survey/assessmcnt, prototype development, demonstration, quality control, economic evaluation. Technology & policy review. Prototype development and testing. Design optimisation. Marketkost analysis and industrial development. Market prospects for Hamams, use of concentrating collectors.
Field survey, design, prototype testing, demonstration. R&D of absorber materials, designs and coating. Market survey, technology development, testing & demonstration. Demonstration of health and education sector systems totalling 8 kWp. Demonstration of PV pumping systems totalling 45 kWp.
Implementation Period
cost (US%)
2002-2007
300.000
2003-2005
350.000
2002-2006
400.000
2002-2004
450.000
2005-2007
200.000
2003-2004
1.500.000
2002-2004
250.000
2004-2008
350.000
2003-2004
150.000
2004-2006
350.000
459 Demonstration of professional application of PV totalling 200 kWp.
PV professional applications
2003-2005
2.000.000
55oror 55oror Share of R D W Resources The share of each of the 20 components of the RD&D programme in the 11.000.000 US$ funding is shown in the table below. Solar 67%
I
Hybrids 22%
I
Bio
Wind
5%
4%
Hydro 2%
Research should be carried out in order to apply the technology to Syrian conditions or to carry out additional technology developments. 2. Pilot Proiects Some of the renewable energy technologies and systems that have been included in the Master Plan, although proven in other locations, do not have any significant track record in Syria. Pilot projects involving these technologies are proposed in order to build confidence and prepare the industry and financiers for the commercial development stage. Private sector participation is envisaged in several of these pilot projects. The key features of the pilot project being proposed in the Master Plan are:
460 Pilot projects involving 12 renewable energy technologies and systems are proposed. The required financial resources will be about 90 US$ over the 10 years period of the Master Plan. Bio-energy technologies, which have not had a significant track record in Syria so far, will require the major share of the pilot project resources; followed by wind electricity generation and solar energy. Pilot Projects: share of resources Bio-energy Wind 81 % 15 % Pilot Project Plan Pilot Project Solar thermal space cooling systems Solar process heat for industries PV village electrification
Description 50 pilot systems in commercial & office spaces
1
(*I
Solar home systems for Bedouins PV-Diesel hybrids PV-wind Hybrids Briquetting and gasification Urban solid waste projects Small scale biogas systems Institutional biogas systems Grid connected wind electricity generators (**) Stand-alone wind electricity generators
Solar 4%
1
20 pilot systems in process industries 5 to 10 un-electrified villages with total household sizes of 300 to be provided with stand-alone PV systems; 6 villages with a centralized mini-grid 250 Bedouin households to be provided with SHS 10 systems to be deployed in selected locations 30 systems to be deployed in - selected locatibns 10 systems to be deployed in ago-processing industries Pilot waste-to-energy plant in Aleppo Piloting of 400 small family size systems 8 systems to be implemented in government cattle farms
Hybrid ---
Implementation Period
Cost (us$)
2006-2007
218.750
I 2005-2006
I
1
1.833.333
2004-2005
1,48,000
2004--2005
46667
2007-2008
1
95.000
2007-201 1
199.556
2008-2009 2003
175.000 19.166.667
2007-2008
39.728.571
2007-2008
13.242.857
5 MW wind farm
2003
4.750.000
10 MW of off-grid WEGs piloted
2004-2005
8.750.000
TOTAL
89.762.401
461 a
a a
a
a
3.
Conduct site-specific analyses of physical suitability, verification of solar and wind characteristics, dispersion of local population, etc., at selected sites; Develop a technical specification for product supply, installation and service, issue calls for tender to local and international suppliers; Install 2 systems inclusive of data logging systems and monitor performance, reliability and users receptivity over a 2-year period, Review existing wind energy assessment and feasibility studies and prepare a plan for further assessments using the latest technologies such as GIS, SODAR, Ultrasonic Anemometry; Identify most promising sites; Study tour of Syrian experts from various bodies to countries with relevant wind energy development; Feasibility studies to be camed out at the most promising sites (with at least one year data); Involve the private sector and identify resource mobilisation options; Develop at least one grid-connected wind farm which demonstrates different technologies: geared, gearless, pitch-regulated, three-bladed, twobladed, AC-DC-AC conversion systems, asynchronous and synchronous generators, different unit sizes: 300 kW, 500 kW, 750 kW, 1 MW. Bankable Proiects
Over time, several renewable energy technologies and applications will mature to a stage of being appropriate for further growth and development in a quasi or fully commercial framework. These are classified here as Bankable Projects. At this stage, little or no financial grants or subsidies are necessary to encourage market expansion. At this stage of commercial or near commercial phase, the market development will generally be driven by the industry as opposed to the government during the RD&D and pilot stages. Nevertheless, government should still play an enabling role by way of fiscal and financial incentives and policies to encourage market development in renewable energy. The key features of the Bankable Projects being proposed under the Master Plan are: It is envisaged that 21 renewable energy technologies & systems reach a commercial or quasi-commercial stage during the Master Plan period. The financial resources that will be required for the development of these technologies will be about 1,36 billion US$ over the 10 years. Wind energy and bio-energy technologies will require the major share of the resources. The earliest of the bankable projects start in 2003 and the latest in 2009, the bankable phases should continue beyond the Master Plan horizon. Key technologies, which will drive the commercial developments, will be wind electric generation, solar systems and biogas systems.
bankable project share of resources Wind 44 %
I
Bio-energy 22 %
I
Solar 18 %
Hybrid 13 %
Hydro 3%
462 Bankable Projects Plan Bankable Description of commercial Projects Developments proposed 1.600 systems in new buildings Solar thermal Space heating systems Solar thermal 1.550 systems in hotels, offices and Space cooling systems lar e houses Solar domestic hot 300.000 systems in houses and apartment blocks Solar non-domestic 800 systems in the commercial sector and light industries hot water systems Solar dryers 100 systems in agro-processing industries Solar process heat 730 systems in process industries PV village 3.700 stand-alone PV systems electrification 114 mini grid systems Solar home systems 4.750 Bedouin households to be for Bedouines provided with SHS PV pumping systems 100 systems for urban water supply 500 systems for micro-irrigation PV health and 500 health & education systems education systems PV professional 25 drinking water systems applications 200 street lighting systems
PV-Diesel hybrids Integrated solar combined cycle power plant Hydro power projects Urban solid waste Projects Small scale Biogas systems Institutional biogas systems Wind farms Stand-alone wind electric generation Wind pumps Dekosting wind machines
40 systems Integrated solar field of 30/40 MW in agas combined cycle power plant totalling 150 MW Small hydro developments totalling 48 MW and 10 canal drop schemes 3 projects possibly in Damascus, Homs and Hama 1.900 small biogas in f m s - systems and households 27 large biogas systems in government farms
90 MW of off-grid WEGs 200 systems in farms and communities 300 systems in farms TOTAL
I
start year 2008
I
2008
cost (US$) 6.194.444 5.972.222
2005 135-22-222 2008 4.305.556
1 I
1
2007
2.133.333
2007 2006
60.666.667 15.560.000
2006
1.772.000
2009 2007 2005
5.272.500
2006
2.308.333
2009 2008
1.179.167
I
1
260.000 180.000.000
2007
36.944.444
2004
52.500.000
2009
200.828.571
2009
I
47.571.429
2000 67,125,000 2006
4.172.711
2003
830.083
I 1.349.818.683
463 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION The Syrian COz emissions in terms of GDP and energy consumption (per TOE) are higher than the global, continental and middle-eastem levels. These emissions are also expected to increase considerably if the current energy mix remains predominantly fossil fuel based. The Renewable Energy Master Plan will not stop or reverse this trend but will be able to make significant reductions. There will be a reduction of 2.600.000, 32.400, 17.200 and 26.300 tonneslyear of C02, SOX, NOx and CO respectively by the year 2011. The shares of different renewable energy technologies in GHG reduction are shown in the following table. Wind 50 %
Bio 26 %
Solar 17 %
Hybrid 4%
Hydro 3%
The societal costs avoided by these reductions are more than 351 million US$. This estimate is based on data from the Stockholm Environmental Institute that say: 32$, 10.473$, 636$ and 2.194$ for each tonne of COz, NOx, CO and SOX respectively. The emerging financing mechanisms such as Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and Tradable Green Certificate (TGC) could actually help internalise some of the external costs. This could be especially true in the case of C02 emissions reduced mitigation. However, the cost of Certified Emission Reduction (CER) and Emissions Reduction Units (ERU) are likely to be much below the societal costs (the likely costs for CERs are in the range 1-lO$/tonne). ECONOMIC ANALYSIS Detailed economic analysis was carried out for each of the energy technologies being considered under the Master Plan. Since a large number of technologies were being used to provide heat and power for a variety of applications, no single baseline was found suitable to cover all developments. Therefore, five different baselines were used to analyse all energy system components: Diesel water heaters were considered as baseline for technologies involving supply of hot water such as domestic and non-domestic solar water heating systems; Electricity was considered as a baseline for solar thermal technologies for space heating and cooling as well as for industrial process heat; Butane gas lamps were considered as baseline for lighting in rural and decentralised areas, this baseline was used also in solar home systems for the Bedouins; Gas based electricity generation and grid extension was used as the baseline in the analysis of wind electric generation, hydro electric, hybrid electric, solar thermal electric and waste-to-energypower plants; Gasoline generators were used as the baseline for off-grid professional applications of PV, PV pumping, health and education systems etc. Internationally accepted values were assumed for the lifetime, capital costs and operating costs of the systems. Inflation was assumed as 5% and the discount rate was taken as 9%. The cost of electricity and hydrocarbon fuels was taken from the current Syrian market prices. The following table gives the details of the economic analysis for each of the technologies.
464 Energy Technology
Solar thermal space heating systems Solar thermaI space cooling systems Solar hot water systems Solar dryers for agriculture Industrial process heat PV village electrification systems Solar electrification for Bedouins PV pumping systems PV professional systems PV health & education systems Wind electric generation Wind pumps Defrosting wind machines Hydro-power Hybrid systems Integrated Solar Combined Cycle Power plant Bio-gas systems Gasification plants Urban waste-to-energy plants TOTAL
Baseline
life cycle costs life cycle cost Million uss US$ milion of Baseline business Million US$
Electricity
11,60
13,13
Electricity
11,60
13,13
253,33
868,60
Diesel water Heaters Electricity Electricity Gas based electricity Butane gas lumps Gasoline generation Gasoline generation Gasoline generation Gas based electricity Gas based electricity Gas based electricity Gas based electricity Gas based electricity Gas based electricity Gas based electricity Gas based electricity Gas based electricity
4.00
601
142,09 33,75
175,25 59,16
375
421
9,88
15,33
4,32
5,05
2,68
2,25
1.507,68
2.827,86
10,32
1,46
2,05
19,96
91,38 4,34
I
209,04 3,35
409,22
187,88
564,60
791,17
0,33
1,13
115,53
403,41
3.190,70
5.637,14
Note: meeting the equivalent energy demand through the conventional route would involve initial investments of only 410 million US$ compared to the 1,48 billion US$ required to implement the Master Plan. However, the life cycle costs of the conventional option works out to 5,6 billion US$ compared to 3,2 billion for the renewable energy Master Plan. A sensitivity analysis, based on petroleum derivatives
465
price reductions by 10% steps, showed that the conventional hydrocarbon option becomes economically convenient only at not less than 70% price reduction. This affirms the economic attractiveness of the renewable energy option. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS Considering that the renewable energy Master Plan offers a clear, economically viable option compared to the hydrocarbon intensive baseline, besides the social and environmental benefits, and considering the current state of development trends and the interest and support of the Syrian government, two alternative scenarios are also presented. Accelerated growth scenario:
If there are larger resources available from the government, matched by the international development assistance community, and larger contributions from the industrial sector, more physical achievements can be made. For such a scenario to be realised, the accompanying measures need to be fast-tracked and there should be increased policy support, especially to encourage private sector investments. Some of the characteristics of this accelerated scenario are: A large increase in solar thermal and bio-energy achievements and increase in wind and hybrid systems; Faster completion of the accompanying measures, especially the institutional developmentshpgrades and the studiedmarket research; Major policy initiatives to mainstream renewable energy developments and increase private sector participation; The energy contribution from renewables increases to 6,73% of the primary energy demand in 201 1; The total cost of implementation increases to 2,4 billion US$ and the life cycle cost increases to 5,25 billion US$. The investment and life cycle costs of the conventional corresponding option are 668 million US$ and 8,93 billion US$ respectively. Focused mowth scenario In the case of constraints in resources and time owing to lower levels of support from the donors, as well as delays in implementing the accompanying measures, the Master Plan may need to focus on a set of high priority technologies and limit developments in others. A list of such high priority technologies to be focused upon is: Domestic and non-domestic solar hot water systems; PV village electrification - stand-alone and mini-grids; Solar home systems and lanterns for Bedouins; PV pumping systems for irrigation; PV health and education systems; Small and mini-hydro and canal drop hydro; Wind electricity generation grid connected and stand-alone. The energy contribution from the focused growth scenario will be 2,85% of the primary energy consumption in 201 1. The cost of implementation will be 81 1 million US$, and the major share will be borne by the private sector.
466
Energy contribution in 201 1 Total investment costs US$ Total life cycle costs US$ Emissions reduction
COz (tonneslyear) NOx (tonnedyear) CO (tonnedyear) SO2 (tonnedyear) Employment generation (units)
Renewable Energy Master Plan
Accelerated Growth Scenario
Focused Growth Scenario
4,31 % 1,48 billion
6,73 % 2,4 billion
2,85 % 845 million
3,2 billion
5,2 billion
1,9 billion
2.604.200 17.200 26.300 32.400 7.225
4.069.600 26.900 41.100 50.600 11.014
1.722.350 11.400 17.400 2 1.400 6.301
CONCLUSIONS The energy development under the Master Plan will be dominated by wind, bio-energy, solar and hybrid systems developments. The specific technologies which will make large contributions are wind. electric and solar water heating systems: The RD&D phase will be dominated by solar and hybrid systems while the pilot phase will be dominated by bio-energy and wind; The key technologies comprising of the bankable projects will be wind. bio-energy and solar thermal; The energy development plan will need a set of accompanying measures involving institution and capacity building, promotion and studies, uumading of higher education: Large-scale employment opportunities will be generated. Increasing the renewable energy contribution in the urimarv energy balance bringing significant social and environmental benefits.
467 ELECTRICITY WORLDWIDE Production amount
Capacity factor
3.300 GW
14,s E6 GW-hr
0,5 1
Distribution by source:
Fossil fuels 64,5%
Installed Capacity
Consumption KW-hr per capitaly 2.400
mucles 7.0%
hydro 18,5%
Installed capacity /capita: 0,54 kW Or 0,72 kW if we consider that 1,G E9 people have no access to electricity ELECTRICITY W G-8 COUNTRTES* Installed capacity GW
Population Million
1.750
850
Average installed capacity KW per capita 2,OG
Production
Consumption
GW-hr
KW-hr per capitdy
8 E6
9.300
* Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK, USA. It should be noted that more than 50% of the installed capacity worldwide is in the G8 Countries. G-8 Countries also consume more than 50% of the worldwide electricity production. Consumption per capita goes from 4.500 kW/hr in Italy up to almost 18.000 k w h in Canada. WIND ENERGY CONTRIBUTION Installed power in wind farms:
Germany Spain Denmark Italy The Netherlands Total Europe
12.000 MW 5.000 MW 2.900 MW 785 MW 677 MW 562 MW 22.330 MW
USA India China Japan Total World
4.710 MW 1.700 MW 400 MW 350 MW 30.400 MW
U.K.
468
ELECTRICITY ACCESS IN 2000 - Regional Aggregates*
64,2 34,3 67,3 86,6 91,l
Population without electricity Million 1.644,5 1.634,2 522,3 i.o4i,4 55,s 14,7
Population with electricity Million 4.390,4 2.930,7 272,7 2.147,3 359,9 150,7
99,5
198
351,s
99,2
875
1.108,3
Electrification rate
World DC Africa Asia Latin America Middle East
Transition economies OECD**
% 12,8
* From IEA World Energy Outlook 2002. ** OECD figures aggregate some important regional variations. The electrification rate for Mexico and Turkey is about 95%. All other Member countries have 100% electrification. One comment: In more than 30 countries, totalling about 500 million population, the average electricity consumptiodcapitdy (residential and non) does not exceed the very modest figure of 50 kW-hr. Moreover, in some 45 countries, with a total population about 3.300 million, the electricity consumption is in the range 100 to 1.000 kWhdcapitdy, against the worldwide average of 2.400 kW/hr. Summing up, we could say that almost 4 out of 5 of the World population that have access to electricity suffer from a shortage of electricity. Situational Analysis of North Africa
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, The Sudan, Tunisia
Population
Population projection
2002
2020
180 million
240 million
Average consumption KW-hdcapitdy
750
469 Situational Analysis of Middle East (Arab League + Iran) Group 1
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar 1 UAE Total
Population
Consumption GW-hrly
0,672 million 2,253 million 0,606 million 1 3.550 million 1 1 7,081 million I
5.775 30.515 8.200 31.390 75.860
Group 2 Population
I
Consumption GWhrly 112.690 10.672
I
Consumption ~w-hr/~ 9.010 19.500
23,370 million 2,522 million
Saudi Arabia _Oman Group 3
Population Lebanon Libya
Consumption Average consumption kW-hr per capitajy per ca$tdy 9.700 16.850 14.100 1 13.340 1 I 1 10.700 kW-hr
3,680 million 5,370 million
Consumption kWhr per capitdy 5.580 4.480
I
( Consumption kW-
/
I
hr per capitaly 2.920 3.655
55oror Group 5
Population Somalia The Sudan Yemen
1
7,760 million . , .million . .. . . . .. -. 37,100 19,500million 19,500 million
( Consumption GW- ( Consumption kW- ( I hr hi- per nnr capitdy r,a its/ hr/y
- -
1
278 1.345 .2.510
4
30 48 150
Note: average consumption per capita = 1.495 kW-hrly which amounts to almost 62% of the World average. Residential consumption amounts to almost 70 % of the total.
470
Distribution by source
55oror Syria The Sudan Tunisia UAE Yemen
6,000 0,606 2,290 5,710 0.810
86,4 29,4 99,2 100 100
13,6 70,6 0,s
-----
Note: globally almost 95 % of the electricity produced in the Region comes from burning fossil fuels.
STATUS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
A. GAGARINSKI Russian Research Centre “Kurchatov Institute”, Moscow, Russia Below is a brief overview of the present-day status of the world’s nuclear power production, as well as the state of the world nuclear community’s opinions concerning the perspectives of nuclear energy’s contribution to a sustainable solution of the energy challenges faced by the mankind. The overview was prepared for the Energy Monitoring Panel at the 30thsession of the International Seminars on Nuclear War, Planetary Emergencies and Associated Events (Erice, August 18-24,2003). STATUS OF THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY For the 50 years of its existence, nuclear energy sources have reached the level of producing about 7% of primary energy consumed by mankind, thus outdistancing hydro-energy and considerably outstripping all the other renewable sources. Nuclear power plants are operating or being built in only 33 of the almost two hundred countries of the world. However, two-thirds of the planet’s population lives in these “nuclear” states. The United States and Russia initiated the peaceful use of nuclear energy and were later joined by other developed countries, which have accumulated considerable experience in the development, construction and operation of nuclear power facilities intended for various applications, along with nuclear fuel cycle enterprises. Just in the USA and Russia, the total number of nuclear units that have been built for land, sea and space applications is close to a thousand. Today “the baton was handed” to the developing world, including China and India (i.e., 40% of mankind), which has made the nuclear option an integral part of its sustainable development strategy for the XXI century (Table 1). According to the IAEA, by the end of 2002, the world operated the total of 441 nuclear power reactors (Table 2) with a total net capacity of 358.6 GW, with another 33 reactors under construction in 12 countries in the world (22 in Asia, 10 in Europe and 1 in the South America)’. Of 22 nuclear power units put into commercial operation in the last 5 years, 70% were built in Asian countries (Republic of Korea, China, India, Pakistan). Against the background of steadily developing major nuclear programs in the developing countries of Asia (Republic of Korea, China, India and others), and political declarations about the new positive nuclear power policies in Russia and the USA, some West-European countries (Sweden, Germany, Belgium) have announced a gradual phase-out of nuclear power - which today makes an important contribution in their electricity generation (30-60%). Two NPP units have already been closed for purely political, not technical, reasons (Barseback-1 in Sweden and Chernobyl-3 in Ukraine). In many countries nuclear power development plans face strong public opposition. On the whole, on the global scale, the world’s nuclear power industry has demonstrated steady growth in recent years (with a rate of about 3%, Table 3), exceeding the growth rates of the world power industry as a whole. However, nuclear contribution to world electricity production over the next 20 years is expected to decrease from today’s 17% to 15%.
471
472 Estimates of this situation made by the world’s nuclear specialists vary from “stagnation” to stable development, with the generally accepted thesis about the end of the “first nuclear era”. Here the presumption is that “the present phase of the nuclear power development has confirmed its viability. Key technical issues have been identified, the principal ways to solve these problems are already known, and after their realization in the current century, the start of the new phase of nuclear energy use - large-scale nuclear power development - will become possible””. STATE OF OPINIONS ON THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY Probably, the most concentrated representation of present-day opinions on nuclear energy’s future was made at the large International Conference of the IAEA, dedicated to innovative technologies for nuclear power and fuel cycle (Vienna, June 2003), which gathered leading specialists and nuclear program managers ffom 40 countries and 10 international organizations. The well-known arguments forming the basis for the supposition of the coming of the “second nuclear era” were stated at this meeting: Resource constraints and growing competition for non-renewable resources; Crisis factors related to highly uneven distribution of fossil fuels and dependence on unstable energy exporting regions; Global and regional environmental limitations; Nuclear energy’s ability to become a factor of stability for economic development, as well as an environmentally acceptable part of the energy option. At the same time, the Conference summed up the first results of perhaps the most important event of the last period in the field of forming the nuclear future “transition from words to deeds”, i.e., organization and development of the two major international programs on new nuclear power systems. Having started at the beginning of 2000, the project of the International Forum “Generation-IV” (GIF) has united ten developed and developing, but “nuclearadvanced” countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Switzerland, UK, USA), which intend to propose to the world community new nuclear power systems suitable for commercial operation by 2030. GIF is focused on advanced nuclear power technologies; it has already selected (after considering over 100 concepts selected internationally) six systems, which were considered to be the most promising (gas-, sodium- and lead-cooled fast neutron reactors, molten salt system and thermal reactors: water-cooled reactor with supercritical parameters and gas-cooled high-temperature reactor), and launched the research on four of the six selected concepts. The IAEA’s International Project INPRO, launched a year later, has the purpose of uniting not only the countries possessing nuclear technologies, but also potential nuclear power consumers. 15,European, Asian and South American countries have become members of INPRO”’. The goal of INPRO is to identify the necessary national and international activities needed to ensure the important contribution of nuclear energy in sustainable satisfaction of the energy demand in the XXI century. Consequently, INF’RO from the very beginning is oriented towards the interests of the entire world community, including less developed states. It includes the analysis of international-dimension issues: fuel and NPP leasing, international nuclear fuel cycle centers, etc.
473
In its first stage, which was completed in the middle of 2003, the system of criteria for comparing and selecting innovative nuclear power system concepts has been developed for the following topical areas: Resources, demand and economy; Environment, fuel cycle and waste; Safety; Non-proliferation; Cross-cutting requirements. It should be noted that this orientation of INPRO has made it possible for Acad. E. Velikhov to call the project “a navigator in the turbulent world”. In its energy demand analysis, INPRO refers to the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) commissioned by the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) and published in 2000. The SRES presents 40 reference scenarios, grouped according to four storyline families, extending to 2100. Global primary energy grows between a factor of 1.7 and 3.7 from 2000 to 2050, with a median increase by a factor of 2.5. Electricity demand grows almost 8-fold in the high economic growth scenarios and more than doubles in the more conservational scenarios at the low end of the range. The median increase is by a factor of 4.7. Moreover, nuclear energy plays a significant role in nearly all the 40 SRES scenarios. The next phase in the INPRO development will consist of analysis of the specific nuclear power systems for satisfying the identified criteria and user requirements. The following countries “volunteered” to propose their designs: Argentina (small NPP with PWR for electricity production and desalination), India (advanced heavy-water reactor with thorium cycle) and Russia (sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor). Returning to the results of the IAEA’s “innovative” conference, it should be noted that, despite the comprehensive overview of multiple concepts and the variety of opinions of the nuclear future, several common positions shared by practically all the world community have been identified. They include: 0 The perspective of the need to close the fuel cycle, which would eliminate resource constraints, but raise the problem of constructing international nuclear fuel cycle centers; 0 The need for wide involvement of nuclear energy in non-electrical applications, and, first of all, in hydrogen (Table 4) and potable water production; 0 A wide capacity range of nuclear facilities (including small and medium capacity systems), to adequately satisfy national and regional demands; A key role in proliferation resistance by involving new countries in the sphere of peaceful use of nuclear energy and avoiding misuse of this sphere for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons by applying intrinsic (technical design) and extrinsic (states’ decisions and undertakings) measures; The growing role of governments in adopting long-term strategic energy decisions, forming policies and investment in technologies; The comparatively short historical period (5-10 years) for the adoption of the above decisions, coupled with the crisis of human resources and the issue of knowledge preservation in the area of nuclear energy. This last factor may become the decisive one, and even the next few years will show how much the “great expectations” of nuclear professionals have to do with reality.
474 It should be noted that the overwhelming majority in the world’s nuclear park belongs to thermal neutron reactors cooled with light water (Table 2). ii From the report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories (USA) and Russian Research Centre “Kurchatov Institute”, April 2002. I” It should be noted that Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Republic of Korea and Switzerland participate both in GIF and INF’RO.
475 Table 1.
Nuclear power reactors in operation or under construction in the world (IAEA data as of December 2002).
tors in
5 5oror 5 5oror Note:
The total includes the following data in Taiwan, China: - 6 units, 4 884 MW(e) in operation; 2 units, 2 700 MW(e) under construction; 34.09 TW(e)h of nuclear electricity generation, representing 21.57% of the total electricity generated there; - 128 years 1 month of total operating experience.
476
Table 2.
World nuclear park (by reactor types)*.
55oror 5 5oror 5 5oror * **
Atomwirtschaft, No 5,2003. Including BN-600, Monju, Phoenix
Table 3.
World energy development.
Table 4.
State and projection of the world's annual consumption of hydrogen, million tons.
Year 1 1978 1 1985 Hydrogen consumption, million 1 11.5 1 13.6 tonslyear Energy required for hydrogen 1 production, million TOE: minimum (3 kWh/m3) medium (4.5 kWh/m3) 100 120 Minimum thermal capacity of 1 110 1 130 high-temperature reactors required for hydrogen production with their use, GW Source: Assessments of RRC "Kurchatov Institute"
1
1
1 1
1 1
2000 50.0
520 460
ENERGY DEMAND GROWTH IN CHINA: THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS MARK D. LEVINE Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, USA INTRODUCTION China faces a wide array of energy issues. Among the most important of these concerns the nature and rate of energy demand growth. Issues regarding the nature of energy demand growth include (1) the relative growth in urban versus rural areas; (2) the relative growth of commercial energy demand to substitute for the inefficient and nonsustainable use of traditional fuels (biomass in the form of agricultural wastes and forestry); (3) the relative growth of industrial, residential, service, transportation, and agricultural energy demand. The most important issue regarding the rate of energy demand growth concerns the linkage between energy and economic growth. China has been remarkable among developing countries in cutting the growth of energy demand to less than half that of gross domestic product (GDP)for more than two decades. This experience is especially significant because most developing countries, during periods of expanding economic output (as China has done at a torrid pace over this period), increase energy use per unit of GDP as a result of employing more modem technology that substitutes energy for other inputs. But China has shown, not only that energy intensity need not increase to accompany modernization, but that substantial decreases are possible. All of this is part of a continuing saga. As China has changed its economic system, many of the policy structures designed for a centrally planned economy are no longer functional. This is, to some extent, the case for many of the energy efficiency programs developed originally in the early 1980s. Thus, China faces many challenges moving forward in assuring that energy efficiency continues to be effective. These challenges, and the manner in which they will be addressed, are of great importance for the economic and environmental evolution of China and for the rest of the world that is concerned about prospects of limiting the growth of greenhouse gases. ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE OVERALL CHINESE ECONOMY Phase I: “Soviet Style” Energy Policy (1949-1979) In the early years after the Communist control of China, the main role of energy was to support the development of industry and primarily heavy industry. The model was that of the Soviet Union. The goal was to increase energy supply rapidly from a very small base. This goal was achieved, as energy supply grew at rapid rates: an average of 18% per year from 1949 to 1957. The Great Leap Forward, from 1957 to 1960, produced growth that was not sustainable (and much of which undoubtedly existed only on the data entries of government officials, as “backyard” coal mines reported illusory coal production). The growth rate from 1962 to 1979 averaged 9% per year, about the same rate as officially reported growth in GDP and perhaps one percent per year higher than actual GDP. Energy demand in these periods is shown in Figure 1.
477
478
This growth in energy supply and demand was spurred by subsidized energy prices for all forms of energy - coal, oil products, and electricity. A central allocation system made certain that the preferred heavy industry obtained sufficient quantities of energy (generally coal), although frequent shortages often put pressure on the system. During this period, essentially no attention was paid to the environmental consequences of producing, transporting, transforming, and using energy. This is very similar to the process that the Soviet system initially used to achieve rapid growth rates of heavy industry. At the time of the Soviet and later Chinese industrialization, it was widely believed that the development strategies of the two countries could serve as a model for other developing countries. The advantages of the approach were thought to be that heavy industry would serve as a source of growth for the entire economy and that low energy prices would provide essential services to all citizens in addition to spurring energy-intensive industry. The environmental devastation that accompanied such development is now apparent, as is the unbalanced nature of industrial development in which natural resources are very heavily subsidized. In spite of these criticisms, the focus on heavy industry, and the subsidization of energy for this industry, did achieve the goal of promoting initial industrialization where it had not previously existed. Today, however, most development economists support other approaches for spurring industrializationin developing countries. Phase 11: Deng's Initial Reforms (1980-1992) Deng Xiaoping transformed energy policy in China, although not without strong encouragement from energy experts in universities and research institutions. There were many consequences to Deng's firm target of quadrupling GDP in twenty years. One of the most important was the recognition that energy growth needed to be substantially below that of GDP growth. A quadrupling of energy over twenty years would cause very serious problems for the Chinese economy and for the environment. A quadrupling of energy supply and demand would starve the economy of capital for essential infrastructure projects because of the high capital costs of energy supply. It would also have intolerable environmental consequences, since energy systems in China are essentially uncontrolled and are responsible for a very large portion of environmental impacts on air, land, and water. The initial reforms were implemented quickly. Within one year (1981, the first year of the 6" 5-Year Plan), fully 11% of the national energy investment was devoted to improving the efficiency of energy use (Figure 2). In previous years, a small (probably negligible) percentage of energy investment was devoted to energy efficiency, as no attention had heretofore been given to energy end-use. A whole range of energy policy reforms were rapidly implemented beginning in 1981. These are summarized in Table 1. In addition to incentives for investments in energy projects - which in the early years involved allocation of direct government funds but evolved over time to low interest loans -the reforms consisted of: 0 Quotas on energy use of key industries (those consuming more than 10,000 tonnes of coal per year), 0 A monitoring network for energy use in industry, with the requirement that the key industries have staff in place for the monitoring,
479
Creation of a national network of energy conservation service centers serving all major cities and some less urban areas, A widespread public information campaign supporting energy saving, including an annual energy conservation week in November, Additional financial incentives for energy efficiency, including a sharing of the benefits of energy savings with the company achieving them (when energy use declined to lower than quota), Authority of officials to close state-run operations (equipment, plants, and whole factories) that were outmoded and highly inefficient, with procedures spelled out for such closures, An exploratory research, development, and demonstration program, and Institutions of government to run these programs. The decision to create this wide array of programs was made in 1980. Most of them were up and running within one year, not as trial or pilot programs but as fully operational entities. This is strongly indicative of the importance that China placed on moving aggressively to reduce energy intensity and improve the efficiency with which energy is used. Available evidence suggests that many or most of these programs were successful. As we will see in the next section, the aggregate national data demonstrated success in reducing the growth of energy as compared with GDP growth. Phase 111: Effects of Economic Reform on Energv Efficiency Policy (1993- present) By the early 1990s China had begun a process of reducing the role of central planning in its economy. Most new enterprises were not owned or controlled by the state. Over time, increasing quantities of goods and services were produced and sold in markets that were largely free of government control. Initially, central control over industries such as energy supply was not relaxed, as the government did not intend to relinquish authority over essential activities. Earlier efforts to increase energy prices had met with stiff resistance from ministers with responsibility for industrial outputs (especially heavy industry); the government was unable to achieve energy price reform until taking swift and effective action in the late 1990s. Because the changes to the energy supply industry greatly affects energy demand and energy efficiency programs - the subject of this paper - we need to summarize such developments. In brief, the middle to late 1990s saw fundamental changes in the operation and control of the energy supply industries. A fundamental change involved increases in oil prices to world levels and the deregulation of domestic prices of coal, natural gas, and electricity. This is a profound development in the market for energy products. It represents the recognition that central control of prices - even of products essential to the economy - was no longer appropriate and that markets would play the major role in balancing energy supply and demand in China. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this reform of the energy system in China. The period also saw organizational changes in the energy supply industries, with ministries formally divesting control of most energy sectors. This has worked out differently in each of the energy sectors. In electricity, for example, the decision in the late 1990s to “divest” the State Power Corporation (SPC) from the government
480 represented only a partial change in the institutional authority and oversight of SPC. SPC decision makers continued to have great influence on government decisions, government authorities continued to have great influence on SPC decisions, and SPC continued to be a state-owned company. This arrangement was satisfactory neither to government officials, who often felt that their hands were tied (especially in attempts to foster reforms within the power industry), nor to SPC staff, who felt that the government was meddling in their affairs. This is now in the process of rapid reform through the creation of entirely new institutions to regulate electric utilities, as well as through the break up of the SPC into at least six different electric utilities. Each of the energy industries has undergone changes, not necessarily as significant as those affecting the electricity industry, but nonetheless of considerable import during the late 1990s through the present (2003). Energy efficiency policy has not escaped these reforms. The system of quotas for large industries was abolished, as more and more companies were no longer state-owned and could not be so closely controlled. The energy monitoring system was largely disassembled, as companies were no longer mandated to do the work of government. The low interest loan program for energy efficiency investments was no longer widely available, in large part because such favorable loan programs were often found to show favoritism to certain clients and, in many sectors, encouraged corruption. The energy conservation service centers were, in many cities and localities, starved of government support and permitted to wither if they could not find support from a variety of sources. In short, through the middle and late 199Os, elements of the most successful energy efficiency program in any developing country were substantially weakened. At the same time, a new energy conservation law - debated for more than a decade by the Peoples’ Congress - was finally passed in 1997. This defined the authority of the government over energy efficiency, and stipulated a wide variety of standards and regulations for the government to formulate and for which implementation mechanisms were to be established. It is also important to note that the prevailing structure for energy efficiency programs was only partially disestablished. The large national loan program was ended, but other decentralized programs took its place. The energy conservation service centers no longer received strong government support, but many of them survived and thrived by gaining other sources of support. Energy efficiency standards for household appliances and air conditioners were promulgated in this period. Inefficient factories continued to be closed, and outmoded energy-using equipment in other factories was replaced. Of particular importance were several new programs supported with major funds from the World Bank’s Global Environmental Facility: Green Lights, which resulted in very large improvements in the reliability of compact fluorescent lamps (and other efficient lighting equipment); a major program to support the manufacture of energy-efficient refrigerators; and an effort to create firms to offer energy efficiency services relying on the private sector. The Packard Foundation created a fund to support energy efficiency policy reform in China, administered by the Energy Foundation.
481
Impact of Energy Efficiency Programs in China Figure 3 shows the results of the energy efficiency and related programs to reduce the growth of energy demand relative to GDP. Official figures for GDP (upper curve) suggest that energy demand in 2002 is one-third of what it would be if energy had grown at the rate of GDP since 1977. A corrected estimate of GDP, with adjustments for likely overstatements of GDP growth, suggests that energy demand in China would be twice today’s levels if these policies and programs, and the practices that they encouraged, had not been put in place. As noted earlier, this is a remarkable achievement. Virtually all other developing countries have shown a pattern of energy growth during periods of industrialization in which energy rises faster than GDP. In China, it has grown less than half as fast as GDP, over a period of 25 years. Figure 4 shows that Chinese emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) have grown to about two-thirds of those of the United States. Since GHF emissions are proportional to energy use (assuming no major shift of energy sources), GHG emissions of China would today be twice that, or one-third larger than that of the United States, if China’s energy demand had grown at the growth rate of GDP. Of course, energy would not have grown so fast, as such growth would have starved the economy of capital and suffocated China from environmental impacts. Thus it is clear that the energy efficiency policy has been a crucial element in enabling China’s economy to perform at such high levels (averaging more than 9% real growth) for such a long period (more than two decades). It is also clear that the world is much better - in terms of reductions in GHG emissions - as a result of such policies. THE FUTURE It is extremely difficult to predict, or even project, future demand growth in China (or any other nation). Figure 3, for example, shows drops in the absolute demand for energy (not just growth) in 1999 and continuing through 2001. These reductions in demand were entirely unexpected, especially considering the continuation of a strong economy. The years 2002 and 2003 showed a recovery of energy demand greater than might have been expected based on past trends. Some of this peculiar behavior may be accounted for by inaccuracies in data, brought about by the underreporting of production and use of coal from mines that were shut down by law but not in fact closed. In spite of the difficulty of producing accurate energy demand projections, there are patterns presently visible that make it possible to formulate some predictions about the future of energy efficiency in China. First, and of greatest importance, is the observation that China has rededicated its efforts to promote energy efficiency. The initial stages of market reform signaled a transition in energy efficiency programs to eliminate policies that were geared to a centrally planned economy. In some instances the transition appears to have gone too far (e.g., in the weakening of the energy monitoring system and in failing to take full advantage of the 20,000 staff members of the many energy conservation service centers throughout the nation). However, very few essential elements of the energy efficiency apparatus have been lost. Importantly, the present leadership in the National Development and Reform Commission (the powerful organization that replaces the State Development Planning and the State Economic and Trade Commissions) is clearly committed to reviving the energy monitoring systems and
482 the energy conservation service centers as well as developing new policy approaches to stimulate energy efficiency. These approaches will take full advantage of markets whenever possible, and thus in many instances may be more effective than past approaches. Secondly, there continue to be opportunities to improve the energy performance of all sectors. Underemphasized sectors - buildings and transportation - are already receiving greater attention. The increased wealth in China has made possible demonstrations of advanced technologies in industry. Energy standards, for appliances and buildings, are moving forward. New approaches to providing energy efficiency services, such as privatized energy service companies, are being pursued and are likely to come into being. Third, major new programs, with support from important donors outside China, are being designed to strengthen energy efficiency policy and implementation. The UNDP, through the Global Environmental Facility, is providing support for a major enhancement of energy efficiency policy in China. The European Community, World Bank, and Packard Foundation are continuing their support of the energy efficiency policy in China. A key reason for this outside support is that the government of China continues to place high priority on energy efficiency both internally and in terms of requests from donors. This does not mean that increasing end-use energy efficiency in China will be easy. Nor is it certain that the emphasis on energy efficiency will continue unabated. But I believe that the next twenty-five years of energy efficiency in China will mirror the past twenty-five years. That is, it is my expectation that China will continue its commitment to energy efficiency, will continue to achieve major successes, and will continue to be an example to the world that a major developing country can sustain rapid economic and industrial development while cutting the growth of energy demand to half that of GDP or possibly less.
Figure 1. China Energy Supply and GDP (1950 to 1980)
500
EmNatural Gas
400 m
300
0
5 200
.E-
Energy Output and GDP, 19501980
a 100
1950
1955
Source: NBS
1960
1965
1970
1975
0 1980
A
483
484
c
c
v)
s
Share of Total Investment
s 0 r
s 0
-. .
Figure 3. Energy Use, Actual and Projected at 1977 Intensity, 1952-1999
4,500 n
5P
4,000 3,500
’F
Z 3,000
0 Consumption at 1977 Intensity, Reported GDP
Consumption at 1977 Intensity, Adjusted GDP H Actual Consumption
* 2,500
I5 5
2,000 1,500
.gn 1,000 500
0 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997
Energy Use, Actual and Projected at 1977 Intensity, 19524999 Source: NBS
485
Figure 4. Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 1950-1997.
1600 1400
1
486
/ USA
1200 r
1000
0
5 0
I
ormer Soviet Union
800 600 400 200
0 1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
Carbon Dioxide Emission, 1950-1997 Source: ORNL
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Table 1. Energy-conservation policies & measures in Phase I1
Energy Management -factory energy consumption quotas -factory energy conservation monitoring -efficient technology promotion -close inefficient facilities -controls on oil use
Financial Incentives -low interest rates for efficiency project loans -reduced taxes on efficient product purchases -incentives to develop new efficient products -monetary awards to efficient enterprises
RD&D - funded strategic technology development - funded demonstration projects
Information Services - national information network - national, local, and sectoral efficiency technical service centers
Education & Training - national, local, and sectoral efficiency training centers - Energy Conservation Week - school curricula
487
RISK ANALYSIS PERMANENT MONITORING PANEL MEETING 21-22 AUGUST 2003
Dr. Terence Taylor International Institute for Strategic Studies - U.S., Washington, USA PARTICIPANTS William Kastenberg Genevieve Lester Jean Savy Terence Taylor (chairman) Eileen Vergino Henning Wegener
FOLLOW-ON WORK During the PMP follow-on meeting, Henning Wegener presented a paper entitled “Shifting Ground: Some Recent Sociological Findings on Risk” for consideration by the group (see attached). Additionally, the group reviewed and prioritized the tasks set out as a result of the first PMP meeting in May, 2003. The following were considered to be of highest priority and should be undertaken as soon as is possible: Develop a working definition of risk in the context of the objective of the PMP as stated in the first PMP report (see the report of the May 2003 meeting) [task led by W. Kastenbergl Conduct an analysis of how perceptions of risk impact high-level decision making, and how perceptions can be incorporated in risk methodologies [task led by R.van der Zwaan] Develop a comprehensive understanding of the nature of risk in order to enhance high-level policy development (Henning Wegener to develop an outline of a paper to be presented at the next PMP meeting) [task led by J. SavI Develop a better understanding of how high-level decision making for national and international security policy is conducted [task coordinated by E. Vergino with input from Lehman/Taylor/Wegener] Provide continuous review, update and cataloging of risk analysis methodologies employed by the case study areas above. [task coordinated by G. Lester with input from Savyl Conduct case studies that will illuminate the objective as stated above. [coordinated by PMP] CASE STUDIES Case studies explored during the course of the PMP should adhere to the following criteria: One or more of the studies must be cases where risk was considered in the decision process, whether ongoing or complete, including a full understanding of the methodologies used and their effectiveness.
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489 One or more of the cases should illuminate a decision process where either risk analysis was not employed, or where different risk analysis methodologies might be applied, and explore possible outcomes if an appropriate, or different methodology has been incorporated. Case studies should include a clear elucidation of the criteria used for the decision process. Only cases that are well documented will be considered. The studies undertaken should reflect a diverse set of national and international cases. All cases must involve the highest appropriate levels of decision-making (whether regional, state, or international). Taking the above criteria into account, and drawing from the cases identified in the first PMP report, the following were considered as early candidates: Transportation - “Prestige” Oil Tanker disaster in 2003 off the coast of Northern Spain, that involved not only transportation but also hazardous materials. Public Perception - The May 2003 referendum in Switzerland on the future of nuclear energy, and the communication of risk. Epidemiology - Examine the 2002-2003 S A R S epidemic and the national and international decision processes as well as the implications for risk assessment in future public health policy development. Nuclear - Examine the decision and policy development for nuclear waste disposal with respect to the identification and final selection of Yucca Mountain. Progress on these case studies will depend on identification and selection of individuals who can complete work on these studies in the next 12-18 months. NEXT MEETING The date of the next PMP meeting is proposed for three days during the week of 10 May 2004. The core group will develop a work plan and agenda by 30 September 2003.
THE PILLARS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: TRADITIONS CHALLENGED
ANDREY A. PIONTKOVSKY Strategic Studies Center, Moscow, Russia Summary: In the author’s opinion, the Iraqi crisis has shown the >agility of the modern-day international security architecture and the inability of existing international organizations to adequately react to challenges that the world community is now facing. It is possible that the time has come to strengthen international security by altering the existing world order.
THE “YALTA SYSTEM’ COLLAPSE The widely spread opinion that, since Yalta and until March 20,2003, there existed a certain international security architecture consecrated by international law and effective international institutions is a profound delusion. The bi-polar world that had existed from Yalta up to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, in 1989, was based on the currently fashionable term - “the law of the fist ” - of the two top-ranked players - the USSR and the USA. The UN and the Security Council were a kind of stage on which the world’s top stars, together with a crowd of extras, competed with each other in propagandistic declamations and ideological arguments. The real issues of security, war and peace were resolved in a different place - where the two superpowers’ dialogue took place. Let us remember for example, the most dramatic conflict of the half-century of confrontation - the Cuban missile crisis. The Security Council session, where Adlai Stevenson displayed photographs of Soviet missiles in Cuba, was quite spectacular and turbulent. However, the actual process of resolving this conflict, the record of which is now known not only day by day, but also hour by hour, had nothing to do with the Security Council. The two nuclear superpowers learned a lot from the Cuban crisis. The result of this event was the development of a series of bilateral nuclear agreements - the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, SALT-1 and SALT-2 (never ratified, yet observed by both parties), and the creation of permanent institutions to support these agreements. The goal of these agreements was the codification of the fimdamentally hostile relations between two entities and preventing tensions between them from escalating into military, and potentially even nuclear, conflict. War became impossible because both parties accepted the concept - nowhere openly verbalized, yet implicit throughout those entire agreements - of mutually assured destruction (MAD). The parties developed their strategic forces so as to allow both of them to maintain the potential of delivering an unacceptable degree of damage to their adversary through a retaliatory strike. Hence, the launching of a nuclear war (a first strike on enemy territory) would have automatically meant mutual self-annihilation. The MAD concept (and not the UN Charter) was the true cornerstone of the international security system during the cold war period. This system prevented a direct super-power clash that would have been fatal for the
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world, yet it failed to avert dozens of local conflicts and wars in various regions of the world that destroyed millions of lives. In many of these, directly or through intermediaries,either the USSR or the U.S. -or both - were involved. The nostalgic refrain about the inviolability of national sovereignty, supposedly effective in those happy days of the post-Yalta architecture of international security, certainly sounds strange to our ears. National sovereignty was violated to the left and to the right, including by the Soviet Union. It should suffice to remember ventures into Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan. However, it is important to note for future reference that there were circumstances when the breach of sovereignty was clearly a good thing, in the eyes of the world. The Vietnamese troops’ invasion of Cambodia was a clear breach of the latter’s sovereignty, but it saved a further third of the Cambodian population from annihilation by an insane regime. THE NEW THREATS Collapse of the bi-polar world generated certain illusions with regard to security, the extreme manifestation of which was the Fukuyama concept “the end of history.” Very soon it turned out that it was not the end of history, but the beginning of many new and unpleasant histories - the painful disintegration of Yugoslavia, conflicts in the former territory of the USSR, in Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, etc. Finally, the events of September 11* demonstrated a new, all-out challenge posed to civilization by international terrorism. The world community found itself unprepared for all these challenges - both institutionally and conceptually. The illusions about security institutions such as the UN and the SC have already been discussed above. Another widespread fallacy was the belief in certain norms of international law - standards that would guide all nations. If that were so, all the world’s problems would have boiled down to defining an action as being legitimate or illegitimate. If only it could be that simple. Let’s review a few commonly recognized principles of international law, recorded in dozens of declarations, charters and treaties: Sovereigntyand territorial integrity of a nation; The right of nations to self-determination; Human rights formulated in the UN Declaration and reiterated in the laws of the majority of nations, including Russia; The right of states to self-defence. If we now look at any serious international problem, at any of a few dozen smouldering or flaring local conflicts, we will see how wildly contradictory those principles are. Actually, all conflicts and problems are preeminently generated by these contradictions. Anyone who took at least an elementary course in logic would know that if a system of axiomatic statements contains mutually conflicting assertions, A and non-A, any arbitrary conclusion can be derived. Contemporary international law represents exactly such a system, and because of that, practically any action of a state in the international arena (as well as its opposite) may find validation in one of the norms of international law.
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Most advanced politicians understand this very well. Here is what RF President Vladimir Putin said during his press conference at the closure of the St. Petersburg summit of April 12, 2003: “However, in recent times many imperfections in the sbucture of international law have revealed themselves, as well as inherent inconsistencies in which, in my view, a serious potential for conflict is concealed.” He continued, “Politicians and state leaders rely on effective legal mechanisms. The inadequacy of those mechanisms may be fraught with serious implications. I am convinced that if clearly functioning legal mechanisms for crisis resolution were set up in time, far more effective solutions to the most complex world problems could be found.” Let’s now dwell in greater detail on this principle and the specifics of its application in the world after September 11th. As mentioned above, nuclear security during the cold war was based on a principle of containment, where each party was aware that its potential adversary was not suicidal. How can this principle operate now when we are dealing with suicide bombers? A new potential menace has appeared in the world terrorists with access to WMD - for which the containment principle does not work, and which can be countered only by preventive measures. The principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty has never been absolute, and, all the more, cannot be so in the contemporary world. Initially the concept of a preventive strike was very clearly and straightforwardly formulated in the “New U S . National Security Doctrine” published in September 2002. The declaration by the US, of the right to conduct preventive strikes as an intrinsic extension of the right of a nation to self-defense, has been repeatedly criticized in the Russian press. Yet, here are two quotes: ‘Tf anyone tries to use weapons commensurate with weapons of mass destruction against our countiy, we will respond with measures adequate to the threat. In all locations where the terrorists, or organizers of the crime, or their ideological orfinancial sponsors are. I underline, no matter where they are. ” ”Insuch cases, and I officially confirm this, we will strike. i%is includes preventive strikes. ” Who are these hawks, preaching a concept of preventive strikes violating the sacred principle of national state sovereignty? Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfovitz, Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice? The first quote comes from President Vladimir Putin’s speech at the October 28, 2002 session of the government. The second is a statement by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, made even earlier, on September 22,2002. Vladimir Putin’s declaration was an official order by the Supreme Commander-inChief to the appropriate government agencies to develop a new Russian military doctrine that would include the concept of preventive strikes in response to threats against which the traditional deterrence concept proved ineffective. It looks as if each nation, taken alone, would adopt for itself, with ease and enthusiasm, the concept of preventive strike, derived from the principle of the right to self-defense, yet would be rather critical of the readiness of other nations to adopt a similar concept. Who indeed, will, in this case, define whether the preventive strike is legitimate, and the extent of its validity in regards to the actual threat? The Security Council? Has the Security Council ever defmed anything? During the Cold War, when its uselessness
493 was obvious, or in the subsequent decade, when it demonstrated its helplessness, having not been able to prevent or stop any of the conflicts that mowed down hundreds of thousands of lives in the former Yugoslavia, the former USSR, Rwanda, Somalia or Afghanistan?
W O K D GOVERNMENT IS AT HAND The increasingly chaotic character of the modem world, the challenges of radicalism, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction generate an objective demand for some form of non-fictitious (UN, SC) but real world government. Demand gives rise to supply. After September 11, 2001, the U S . has been attempting to play this role. This situation doesn’t seem to satisfy anyone, including the Americans themselves. Confiontation with the U.S. and the formation of various anti-American axes will only lead the U.S. government to become more intransigent and, at the same time, less efficient (with negative implications for the world at large) the more their isolation increases. Pleas to return to a certain “system of international security,” allegedly destroyed by the Iraqi crisis, are totally vain, be they sincere or false. There never was such a system; there were not even conceptual approaches adequate to the challenges of the contemporary world. More and more, the world community should focus on the development of both the concept and the institutions for a new world order. First of all, it is necessary to turn to the problem of conflict within the various principles of international law and try to develop some reasonable rules of balance between them. Yet there should be clear awareness of the fact that, even with every potential improvement to the norms of international law, the solution to the problem cannot be purely legalistic. It will always be political. It is impossible to invent an abstract scheme suitable for the resolution of any emerging conflict, in which both democratic nations and totalitarian regimes bent on obtaining nuclear arms are equal actors. Only an alliance of responsible world powers, united by a common vision of the problems and challenges facing the modem world, sharing common values and having the resources - political, economic and military - to implement their joint policy, can perform the role of efficient world government. The structure best able to meet these requirements is the Group of Eight. Russia, having become a full member of this framework, has an objective interest in the G8 expanding its area of responsibility into the sphere of international security. Because of the traditionally informal and confidential nature of discussions within the G8, it is the most useful forum for the realization of joint decisions on key issues of world politics. The U.S. will remain a leader within this eight (and in the future, maybe, nine or ten), yet constructive and open discussion of the current key policy issues would allow the leading powers to develop a culture of consensus. It is in the common interest of the world community not to alienate the U.S. but to convert it into a responsible leader accounting for the interests and concerns of its partners.
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The United Nations, with its enormous bureaucratic structure, certainly will not disappear. It could play the role of organizer of joint decisions made by the leading powers. Such a transformation of the G8 into a leading international security institution is impossible without Russia’s participation. Full participation in the G8 is a very important political resource for Russia. In our opinion, it is much more important than Russia’s permanent membership on the Security Council - a position based on inertia, exaggeration of our diplomatic attributes, and inherited after the disintegration of the USSR superpower. The G8, as an institution for global security, would simply be ineffective without Russia, which is geographically adjacent to the sphere of instability that poses the worst potential threat to the world. For the same reason, Russia will not be able to maintain its security outside an alliance with the leading industrial nations.
SAFETY AS A RESULT OF PROVIDING INFORMATION VLADIMIR BRITKOV Institute for Systems Analysis (Russian Academy of Sciences) Moscow, Russia ABSTRACT The current stage of the information revolution is characterized by a large increase in the information being stored on computers. By some estimates, this volume of information doubles every 9 months. Important and responsible decisions are being taken on the basis of computer information and information technology. People will make decisions that depend on the information to which they have access. On the other hand, this raises an ensemble of problems and creates a real threat to information safety in the sense of dangers resulting from incomplete, unauthentic and undue information. Consideration of information safety, from this point of view, necessarily means resolving the following problems. ENSURING OPERATION OF THE FREE INFORMATION MARKET Restricting the spread of information provides broad possibilities to manipulate human behavior. Presenting information &om a specific point of view allows the owner of the information flow to bias people to his own profit. Consequently, it is necessary, in broad sense, to put a stop to the possibility of monopolization of the information media. A particularity of modem times is the huge role played by the Internet, which allows the creation of information resources in the most democratic and independent way. It is thus possible to draw the conclusion that comprehensive Internet expansion is one of the ways to increase the level of information safety. THE DANGER OF USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN SUCH BRANCHES OF HUMAN ACTIVITY AS THE STOCK MARKET Over the last years, financial crises have occurred repeatedly (the Asian crisis and others), as well as sharp collapses in the stock market (the dot.com companies crisis). There are many hypotheses as to the cause of these crises. From our point of view, the main reason for these crises is information technology. The stock exchanges define the main direction of production development. Therefore it is expected that probable success will occur on the stock exchange, as a result of adding the necessary direction and values (the velocities of the motion in this direction) to the most promising technological development. During recent years, fantastic tools have appeared in network communications, and have become readily available tools for the achievements of financial mathematicians, and provide intellectual help for computer systems. Since scientific technical achievements are practically all alike, all brokers receive the same information on the sales results and, armed with the same methods, they take the same decisions. As a result of so-called positive feedback, collapses occur. If all the passengers on a steamship go to the same side of the boat, the steamship will capsize.
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496 METADATA SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT, AS A METHOD OF INCREASING THE VOLUMES OF INFORMATION FOR PROBLEM SOLVING It is necessary to develop improved data inventories; to work out integrated databases, including different data types (factographic, spatial, textual, graphical) and metadata; to standardize metadata and co-ordinate programs and nations in this field. Proposals for organizing of metadatabases on several levels (local integrated databases, static and dynamic pages of Web sites) are given. PROVIDING INFORMATION FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Emergency situations caused by natural or anthropogenic reasons, including terrorism, such as the S A R S problem, occur often in our lives. The particularity typical of the studies, as presented in the report, is a system of approach to considering a problem, through which the whole cycle of information handling is searched, from the input flow to the final decision-making. We have named this approach the “Information Modeling Method”. The latest achievements in the development of knowledge-based systems (the artificial intelligence systems, expert systems), and decision-making computer methods have settled the problem of making the systems, (allowing for a reduction of the miscellaneous consequences of that type in an emergency situation), by integrating decision-making, management and undertaking action into the conditions of an emergency situation. In the paper, we consider methodological issues of information technology use with Knowledge Based Systems, Data Mining, KDD (Knowledge Discovery in Databases) technologies for the development of multidisciplinary integrated methods, algorithms for the efficient use of large volumes of information. In the paper, methods of the decision making system development are considered, based on knowledge for use in emergency situations. Specifically proposed methodologies are included in a multidisciplinary approach to the creation of an intellectual decision support system allowing the realization of efficient methods for exhibits in the field of emergency management, characterized by a greater volume of information analyzed, little formalized procedure for the inference for decision making and difficulty of the use of the traditional multi-criteria optimization methods. The emergency situations, such as terrorism, high water and floods, which have created the most problems recently, require the development of the existing methods of decision-making and management. INFORMATION DANGER AND SAFETY AS A RESULT OF THE ACCUMULATION OF INFORMATION ON PEOPLE’S BUSINESS ACTIVITIES AND PERSONAL ACTIVITIES As a result of active informatization in computers, a huge volume of personal information has accumulated: Concerning financial and bank activity; In telephone companies and other organizations. This information can, on the one hand, be used in criminal investigations. On the other hand, unless a way is found to provide for its secrecy and safety, the possibility remains that this information may be used maliciously against clients.
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INCREASING SAFETY LEVELS THROUGH THE USE OF INTELLECTUAL TOOLS BY PROCESSING A GREATER ARRAY OF INFORMATION There are methodological issues to be considered in the use of the system approach using the Knowledge Based Systems, Data Mining KDD (Knowledge Discovery in Databases) technologies for development multidisciplinary integrated methods, and algorithms for the efficient use of large information volumes. THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SOCIETY (TIEMS) ACTIVITY The International Emergency Management and Engineering Society was created with the purpose of bringing together users, planners, researchers, managers, response personnel and other interested parties to exchange information on the use of innovative methods and information technologies to improve our ability to avoid, mitigate, respond to, and recover from natural and technological disasters. Since 1966 TIEMS conferences have all engaged in these important and far reaching subjects of emergency management, and the international conferences are arranged in order to address these complex issues.
ANTICIPATORY DEFENSE: ITS FUNDAMENTAL LOGIC AND IMPLICATIONS
REmTER K. HUBER Institut fiir Angewandte Systemforschung und Operations Research Fakultat fiir Informatik, Universifat der Bundeswehr Miinchen Neubiberg, Germany ABSTRACT The notion of preemption is one of the core elements of the new National Security Strategy (NNS) of the United States. There, the traditional definition of preemption as the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack is extended to encompass prevention, i.e., the use of force without evidence of a clear and present danger to national security in order to eliminate a potential threat to the United States before it materializes. While the preemptive use of force is supported by international law and the just war tradition, because of the potential implications for international order, critics consider the inclusion of preventive military action under the category of preemption as womsome. Therefore, the question arises as to the conditions when preventive military action would be the only alternative to protect one's security, in which case it would present an act of anticipatory defense. In this paper an attempt is made to separate the discussion of anticipatory defense from the discussion of the NSS by analyzing a simple mathematical model of threat perception in order to investigate the fundamental military-strategic logic, and some of the problems underlying the concept of anticipatory defense in general, regardless of whoever may consider its implementation. The model assumes that threat assessment involves a three-stage process of assessing the aggressive intentions of the party in question, its military risk attitude, and the capability of one's own defense in case of an attack. An analysis of the model shows that it is the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and stealthy means and mechanisms for their delivery - such as terrorists or ballistic missiles (BM) in the absence of an effective anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system - that have the potential for bringing about conditions in the real world which are without a military alternative to anticipatory defense. In order to minimize the fallout for international order and civilian populations, the legitimacy of the preventive use of force should be made contingent to at least three conditions being met: (1) clarity of protective/defensive purpose; (2) capability to keep collateral damage to a minimum; (3) obligation to restore whatever damage the operation may have caused.
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INTRODUCTION The notion of preemption is one of the core elements of the new National Security Strategy (”S) of the United States. There, the traditional definition of the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack is extended to encompass preemption by using force without evidence of a clear and present danger to national security in order to eliminate a potential threat to the United States before it materializes. In her Wriston Lecture, delivered to the Manhattan Institute on 1 October, 2002, Condoleezza Rice pointed out that the NNS considers preemptive military action only after all other means, including diplomacy, have been exhausted: “Preemptive action does not come at the beginning of a long chain of effort. The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of action”. [Ric 021 Nevertheless, the preventive actions taken by the United States in Afghanistan and, in particular, Iraq have led to considerable irritations in transatlantic and, one should add, inner-European relations as well. Whatever may have motivated some of Europe’s leaders to denounce U S . actions against Iraq, public response suggests that most Europeans did not regard the threat as very grave and, therefore, preventive action simply as a “war of aggression” rather than an act of anticipatory defense. In the public debate before and during the war, attempts to explain the rationale underlying the concept of preemption were mostly met by assertions about presumed American motives and inappropriate historical analogies. Therefore, an attempt is made in this paper to separate the discussion of anticipatory defense from the discussion of the NSS by analyzing a simple analytical model of threat perception in order to investigate the fundamental military-strategic logic and some of the problems underlying the concept of anticipatory defense in general regardless of whoever may consider its implementation. In considering the analysis presented below it should be remembered that analytical models represent more or less abstract replications of systems andor processes in the physical world. They cannot capture, explicitly and in detail, the complexity of systems and processes that are essentially social in nature such as anticipative defense which involves not only military-strategic and technological dimensions but a host of ethical, legal, political, technological, and economic dimensions as well. Nevertheless, analytical models are well suited for analyzing certain fundamental aspects of real world issues and their implications. To this end, it may not even be necessary to explicitly model some of the processes involved as long the model’s variables capture them implicitly, and can be estimated based on empirical evidence or expert judgment in case the model is used to perform computational experiments.” Most critics of the use of analytical models for the analysis of social systems and socio-political processes tend to forget that it is not the model that produces results but the analyst who uses the model as one tool among others. Besides, critics are rarely aware of the fact that the so-called verbal analysis methods they favor are based on models as well, albeit unstructured ones residing in the minds of analysts who conjure them up either on the basis of historical evidence or in the context of a specific contemporary issue in the real world.’” In contrast to computational experiments with formal models, the results of mind experiments are not reproducible and, therefore, conclusions may hardly be generalized and tend to be anecdotal in nature. In addition, mind models do not permit clear separation of facts from value judgments which is one reason why debates of strategic and societal issues often get
500 caught in emotional ideological exchanges while a detached discourse of pros and cons based on reproducible data would be needed to qualify value judgments. THREAT PERCEPTION MODEL The threat perception model analyzed in this paper was first proposed by an international study team commissioned by NATO to investigate hypotheses related to conventional military stability in Central Europe. The core question was how military organizations in a region must be sized, structured, equipped, deployed, and operated so that no party to the regional international system had a reason to perceive its security to be threatened by the other parties. Particular attention was to be paid to strengthening crisis stability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact by uncovering conditions that might provide either side with military incentives for preemptive use of force in a crisis [RSG 18 and Hub 961. The model assumes that the threat assessment of a party - a state or an alliance - vis-a-vis another party basically implies a three-staged process that may be captured by a simple binary scheme as depicted in Figure 1. Accordingly, the military situation between the two parties is considered as stable if unilateral assessments by each of the two parties arrived at the conclusion that the other party denoted by X either: Had no intention to attack or Was not inclined to take high military risks or Could be repelled if it were to attack. Of course, it goes without saying that in most cases threat assessments will not arrive at definite answers - yes or no - as suggested by Fig. 1. Rather, they must be expected to be characterized by some degree of uncertainty that may be expressed in terms of probabilities (defined in terms of values between 0 and 1) as shown in Figure 2. intent to attack by X
military risk aversion of X no success of defense against X no attack
attack repelled Fig 1 :Threat Perception vis-&vis Party X
unstable situation
501 intent to attack by X
military risk aversion of X
success of defense against X
attack repelled
unstable situation
Fig 2: Probability Tree of Threat Perception vis-2-vis Party X.
If it is assumed that the security requirements of the party assessing the threat posed by party X are satisfied if the probability for the unstable state does not exceed a certain threshold value K, then the following condition holds: 1 - PIG(PA)(l- W ) 2 K
(1)
1;P, 2 P* G W = { O;P, < P *
with the notations: K = threshold probability satisfying security requirements PI = probability that party X intends to attack probability of attack by party X succeeding P? = P = minimal attack success probability required by party X (risk threshold) probability of successful defense against party X. W= Condition ( 1 ) is satisfied if either PI= 0 (there are no aggressive intentions perceived on part of X) or G(PR) = 0 (military risk associated with attack by X is perceived to be to too high since PA< P*). If, however, PI # 0 and X must be regarded as not being risk-averse (G(PR) = l ) , i.e., there is uncertainty about the value of the risk threshold P* demanded by X, or the value of P* is low enough to satisfy the condition PA 2 P*, the minimal probability of repelling an attack by X that meets the security requirements vis-i-vis X results by solving equation ( 1 ) for Was
w 21-- 1-K
= W*. PI Equation (3) holds as long as PI> 1 - K*. Otherwise FV= 1.
(3)
Fig. 3: Shows that the threshold value W* is largely insensitive to variations of PI if security requirements are high (e.g. K 2 0.95). Thus, in that case there is no need
502 for the notoriously difficult assessment of an opponent's intentions by assigning a value to the probability PI. Moreover, if a party were certain that it would be attacked by X if an opportunity arose (i.e. PI = l), condition (3) simplifies to
W>W*=K.
(4)
As envisaged at the time, conventional stability required that the threat assessments of both parties - NATO and WP - anived at the conclusion that the mutual conventional force structures and operationalhactical doctrines meet condition (1). Therefore, it is safe to state that the military situation in the Central European region was not very stable during most of the Cold War, in particular in crisis situations.'" The apparent Cold War stability was lastly due to the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, which involved the risk that military conflict between the two camps might escalate ending in mutual destruction of both sides.
Fig. 3: Minimum Defense Success Probability W* vis-b-vis state X required at a given security level K* as a function of the estimated Probability PI that X harbors aggressive intentions. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE MODEL Even though the model was originally designed to develop easily reproducible criteria for assessing conventional stability in a well defined bipolar context, it does, nevertheless, capture the essential ingredients for assessing, in numerical terms, the degree of potential threat posed by any type of antagonist, provided there is reasonable historical evidence to estimate the military risk threshold P*, and the dependent variables PA and W in equation (1) on the basis of expert judgments, historical evidence, and computational or simulation experiments." Short of numerical
503 results obtained from such sources in the context of a defined threat, however, the model does provide a structure for deriving the principal options that parties have for meeting their security requirements given the nature of the international security environment. In a cooperative international environment, the majority of parties share the common objective of acting in a manner that is conducive to international stability. Cooperative security environments are characterized by parties which are either not perceived to harbor any aggressive intentions (PI = 0) or agree on confidence building measures and negotiate, and conclude, formal agreements on arms limitations and force deployment constraints so that the security requirements of all parties captured by the conditions W 2 W* (security criterion) or PA < P* (sufficiency criterion) are met."' In an uncooperative security environment (PI 4 l), however, parties are forced to satisfy their security requirements unilaterally. And if the environment is outright hostile, parties are inclined to perceive many an action on part of presumed opponents as attempts to increase their offensive potential vis-a-vis themselves to the degree that PA2P*and W+ 0. Such a perception by parties who consider themselves as potential victims of aggression would be justified if there is strong evidence that the respective opponents: A building up their arms inventories; Develop means and procedures for surprise attack, and Pursue policies to reduce the victim's defense potential by subversion and/or through policies of alienating allies from the victim. Excluding the option of appeasement, the potential victim's response options are aimed at strengthening its own defensive potential so that W 2 WY and, at the same time, reducing the offensive potential of opponents to the degree that PA< P*. There are essentially five principal categories of options for responding to perceived threats: Limiting the offensive potential of opponents through agreements, with the governments of like-minded countries, on export limitations of crucial technologies and arms (arms export controls and counter-proliferation policies) including arms embargos; Increasing the active defense potential for defeating threats in a reactive manner; Reducing the vulnerability of the active defense potential and of high value targets as well as populations; Deterrence by threatening punishment in case of aggression, and Preemptive/preventive counter-force attacks to neutralize and/or destroy threat potentials. The first three categories include the traditional options of defense-oriented (status quo) parties for responding to emerging threats. They are legitimized by international law and Article 5 1 of the Charter of the United Nations and, therefore, are not controversial, at least in principle. However, their implementation to a degree that satisfies the security criteria may involve economic costs and expenditures that the parties cannot or may not be willing to shoulder."' Moreover, they may be of limited effectiveness, especially in the case of threats posed by non-state actors and governments of rogue states. This is also true for deterrence because essential prerequisites for it to work seem to be missing in those cases."'" That leaves preemption and prevention in order to mitigate or eliminate the threat before it becomes effective. The difference between preemptive and preventive
504 response is that the former is directed against an immediate threat, i.e. a clearly identified threat in the process of being activated for attack, and the latter against an emerging threat that may become an immediate threat sometime in the future unless dealt with now. Both make good strategic sense and are in many cases superior in cost-benefit terms to not acting or waiting until an attack has begun. However, while preemption is supported by international law and the just war tradition, prevention has no basis in current international law.” Thus, since it implies both preemptive and preventive use of force, the concept of anticipatory defense is bound to cause controversy. Therefore, an important question to be answered is under which circumstances anticipatory defense must be considered the only option that a potential victim has left to meet its security requirements and bring about some degree of stability. Figure 2 suggests that this would be the case if the values of both the probability of successful defense W and the attacker’s risk threshold P* were to become small which implies that the value of the victim’s security threshold K must be small as well (K -+ 0) in order to satisfy condition (1). In other words, the threat perception model tells us that there is no security for the victim when W -+ 0 and P* -+ 0. He is prepared either to live with the unstable situation and surrender once the threat materializes, or use force in a preventive manner in order reduce the threat potential to a degree that his security requirements are met. If we interpret an attack not as large scale aggression of one state or alliance against another - as was implied when the model was originally formulated -but as a massive attack against soft targets such as the one on September 11, 2001, it is the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and stealthy means and mechanisms for their delivery - such as terrorists or ballistic missiles (BM) in the absence of an effective anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) system - that have the potential of bringing about conditions in the real world which correspond to W + 0 and P* + 0 in our model. Therefore, a closer look will be taken at both threats.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM It is not individual terrorists or groups of terrorists that would be the object of preemptive and preventive defense by military means but their staging areas, supply and training infrastructure, and shelter available to them in weak and failed states as well as states and factions that support them. The trends of global demographic, environmental, economic, societal, and technological developments - as identified, for example, by the United Kingdom’s “Project Insight” [Ham 991 or Germany’s project “Armed Forces, Capabilities and Technologies in the 21St Century’lx - suggest that the terrorist problem will most likely worsen as the number of weak and failing states must be expected to grow. This is because, in addition to Islamic fundamentalism, a fundamental change in warfare has taken and still is taking place. Wars between states as in the first part of the last century are increasingly being replaced by intra-state (civil) wars between ethnic and religious factions and groups interested in ongoing conflict for economic reasons, and by international terrorism and organized crime. The observation that only 15-20 percent of all wars and warlike conflicts since 1945 were conducted between states has led political scientist Herfried Muenkler to propose the hypothesis of “privatization of war” [Mue 011. As a consequence, the world will increasingly witness situations characterized by what von Johannes Kunisch (1973) refers to as “small wars” similar in nature to those fought in the European middle ages with
505 feudal levies and short-term contract mercenaries (condottieri) before standing armies emerged [Kun 731.” Thus, the state as the only legitimate party for conducting war is about to be replaced by non-state actors such as warlords, guerrilla groups, and criminal organizations which live on war and, therefore, have no interest in ending war and violence. Muenkler considers the terrorist attacks of September 11 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as dramatic manifestations of that trend, the consequences of which may be dire indeed if weapons of mass destruction (WMD) come into play. Unless appropriate means of prevention are developed, failing and weak states like the Taliban’s Afghanistan will be used and even hijacked by such actors to provide staging grounds for their operations. And rogue states may not resist the temptation to supply such groupings with know-how and WMD, or even employ them, unwittingly or covertly, as mercenaries in the hope of avoiding discovery and evading retaliation [Hub 031. In order to cope with these trends, preemptive and preventive military intervention to eliminate WMD and deny terrorists the use of weak and failing states as platforms for their purposes must be considered the immediate mission of anticipatory defense. However, the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq both underscore that post-war “nation building”, i.e. the provision of security and technical and financial assistance for rebuilding the economic and social infrastructure of the target countries, is an important element of military, intervention operations within the framework of a preventive defense strategy.”” Also, intervention operations that ultimately are aimed at providing stability in a region would offer little opportunity for international legal controversy because their objectives are, to a large degree, humanitarian since the target states are either unwilling or too weak to protect the elementary human rights of their citizens.x111 Another important element of a preventive defense strategy in the face of WMD was proposed by Paul Davis in form of a credible declaratory policy threatening anyone who even tolerates WD-related terrorism. “Not only active supporters (should be punished), but even those states and factions that merely tolerate the terrorists or indirectly facilitate their acquisition of WMD. The purpose would be to so alarm heads of state and sub-state organizations that they would work actively to get rid of elements that might bring destruction upon them.” [Dav 02, pp. 401. Davis also concludes that terrorists themselves, while not to be individually deterred in the traditional sense, may be “influenced” to eventually give up by forcefully and relentlessly holding at risk and attacking, not necessarily by military means, what is dear to them. To this end he recommends to develop an orchestrated “Broad-Front Strategy” that cuts across all of the normal boundaries of war - military, diplomatic, economic, and law enforcement. BALLISTIC MISSILES Other than the five declared nuclear powers, nearly 25 states have acquired, or are about to acquire, ballistic missiles (BM) and/or the know-how and technology required for their domestic production ([Rum 981, [Wil 001, [Sch 011). Most notable among them are India, Pakistan, and the rogue states North Korea, Iran, Syna and Libya. Even though today’s delivery accuracy of ballistic missiles produced in emerging missile states may be rather low, in conjunction with nuclear, bacteriological, or chemical warheads they represent a formidable threat to urban targets and military facilities alike. Most of the current arsenals of rogue states consist
506 of SRBM (Russian Scud and Scud improvements) with ranges up to about 600 km. However, there are several indigenous IRBM development programs such as the north Korean Taepo-dong and the Iranian Sahab. If launched from North Africa, the 2,000 km range (presumably operational) Taepo-dong-1 and the Sahab-4 would be sufficient to cover most of Southern Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey. The IRBM Taepo-dong-2 and Sahab-5 expected to become operational about 2005 will have a range of 5,000-6,000 km capable of reaching, from the Middle East, targets anywhere in Europe, Western Siberia, Central and South Asia and North and Central Afiica. North Korea and Iran are suspected of developing ICBMs with ranges of up to 12,000 km that could become operational within 10-15 years. From the viewpoint of international law, BM present a particularly challenging problem for anticipatory defense. This is because, in order to preserve its security, the country which perceives itself as a potential victim of missile attacks has only the option of a preventive attack against the BM andor its WMD warheads and their production and storage facilities unless, of course, it has deployed an effective ABM system.xivIt must be remembered, that an operational BM system represents a threat not only for a particular country, but for the entire region within its range. Which country is being targeted will only be known sometime after the missiles have been launched so that their trajectories can be determined. And even if launch preparations were discovered early, and countries were willing to preempt on the suspicion of being targeted, it would probably be too late. Nevertheless, despite the fact that all of them may, in a not too distant future, be within range of BM from the Middle East, Europeans show little enthusiasm as yet about both deploying ABM systems and considering preventive response as an option. For one thing, besides being rather expensive, development and procurement of ABM systems is still a controversial issue even though the debate has abated as the public begins to realize that none of the dire predictions about the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty have materialized so far. On the other hand, an effective preventive response may very likely require new and even more controversial weapons (such as low-yield nukes) as production and storage facilities of BM systems, in particular of their WMD-warheads, will be relocated into deep underground bunkers. CONCLUSIONS From the above analysis we can conclude that anticipatory defense must be regarded as an important, and in many cases the only, effective countermeasure allowing states to provide security for its citizens in the face of observed global trends related to international security and the availability of WMD. However, unless exercised in a prudent manner, there is the risk that preemptive and preventive military actions may generate highly adverse consequences for international order. That is why critics suggest that priority should be given to addressing root causes of terrorism and uncooperative behavior of governments rather than focusing on controversial countermeasures. In terms of the model discussed above, focusing on root causes means trying to reduce the value for the probability PI of the intention to attack. With a view to the characteristics of terrorist and ballistic missile threats in conjunction with WMD, however, the model tells us that high security requirements on the part of potential victims of attack are not satisfied as long as PI + 0. In other words, feeling secure requires that the root causes and motivations underlying the aggressive attitudes of
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threatening parties must be practically eliminated, Whether this is at all possible is open to question. In any case, addressing root causes may take significant intellectual, political as well as economic efforts and, above all, time, during which there is no alternative to countermeasures unless societies are willing to live with the risk of becoming victims of WMD. Thus, there is a need to address both countermeasures and root causes with priorities shifting from the former to the latter as the success of countermeasures becomes evident."' In addition, the standards of current international law"" will have to be modified to account for non-state and asymmetric threats that states will increasingly face in the future. To this end, the scholar of international law Armin Steinkamm [Ste 031 distinguishes two principal approaches that might be pursued: Adapting the %-year old Charter of the United Nations to cope with the threat of international terrorism and WMD; Evolving international law based on the practice of preemptive military actions by states which consider such practice as legitimate in fighting terrorism and WMD. The first approach requires a broad debate and consensus in both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. However, the difficulty with this approach is underlined by the fact that the United Nations has been grappling with the issue of terrorism for close to forty years. So far, the multilateral forum was unable to agree even on a definition of terrorism. Whether the new issue of WMD will accelerate that debate and bring forth a consensus is not certain. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that nations that feel most threatened by international terrorism prefer the second approach.xv" Irrespective of the preferred approach, however, it is not unlikely that the process of adaptation will be delayed considerably if no WMD are found in Iraq. Jeffrey Gedmin, the current director of the Aspen Institute in Berlin, suggests that this could even imply the end of the "Bush Doctrine", of preemptive military intervention, because it will be highly unlikely that Congress and the American public would support another preemptive operation unless the issue of the Iraqi WMD threat is resolved [Ged 031. One can only hope that it will not take an act of massive WMD terrorism before the international community becomes convinced that international law needs to acknowledge the legitimacy of defensive preemption when faced with the threat of WMD while at the same time not providing a pretext for inter-state aggression. In order to minimize the fallout for international order and civilian populations, this author proposes that the legitimacy of the preventive use of force be made contingent on at least three conditions being met: (1) Clarity of defensive purpose, Capacity to keep collateral damage to a minimum, and (2) Obligation to restore material damage caused by military intervention. (3) REFERENCES [Arm 931 Armitage, Michael: History of Airpower. In: Dupuy (Ed.): International Military and Defense Encyclopedia. Washington-New York 1993: Brassey's, pp.8293
[CBP 021: NATO Code of Best Practice for C2 Assessment. Washington, D.C., 2002: CCRF' Publication (www.dodccrp.org)
508 [Cla 841 Carl von Clausewitz: On War, Book Eight, Chapter Three. Indexed Edition edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton 1984: Princeton University Press [Dav 031 Davis, Paul K. and Brian Michael Jenkins: Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism - A Component in the War on a1 Qaeda. Santa Monica 2003: RAND [Ged 031 Gedmin, Jeffrey: Dann ware die Doktrin von der Praemption tot. Franllfurter Allgemeine Nr. 174 I 3 1 D, Mittwoch, 30. Juli 2003 [HFL 991 Huber, Reiner K., Friedrich, Gemot and Jaroslav Leszczelowski: A New Paradigm for Estimating Russian Force Requirements? On Tsygichko’s Model of Defense Sufficiency. European Security, Vol.8, No.3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 101-123 [Hub 961 Huber, Reiner K.: Military Stability of Multipolar International Systems: Conclusions from an Analytical Model. In: Models for Security Policy in the PostCold War Era (R.K. Huber and R. Avenhaus, Eds.). Baden-Baden 1996: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 7 1 - 8 1 [Hub 021 Huber, Reiner K.: Ballistic Missile Defense: A Risk for Stability and Incentive for New A r m s Races? In: International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies 26Ih Session (A. Zichichi and R. Ragaini, Eds.), Singapore 2002: World Scientific Publishung Co., pp. 71-84 [Hub 031 Huber, Reiner .K.: The Transatlantic Gap: Obstacles and Opportunities for Closing it. In: Transforming NATO Forces: European Perspectives (C.R. Nelson and J.S. Purcell, Eds.), Washington 2003: Atlantic Council of the United States, pp. 59-78 [HuS 931 Huber, Reiner K. and Otto Schindler: Military Stability of Multipolar Power Systems: An analytical concept for its assessment, exemplified for the case of Poland, Byelarus, the Ukraine and Russia. In: International Stability in a Multipolar World: Issues and Models for Analysis (R.K. Huber and R. Avenhaus, Eds.). BadenBaden 1993: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 155-179. [Kue 991 Kiihne, Winrich: Humanitiire NATO-Einsatze ohne Mandat? (TeilI). Reader Sicherheitspolitik IV.3. Bonn 1999: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung [Kun 731 J. Kunisch, J.: Der Kleine Krieg: Studien zum Heerwesen des Absolutismus. Frankfurter Historische Abhandlungen. Wiesbaden 1973: Steiner [LAR 021 Lieber, Keir A. and Robert J Lieber: The Bush National Security Strategy. Foreign Policy Agenda. Washingto 2002: US. Department of State, pp.32-35 [Mue 021 Muenkler, H.: Die brutale Logik des Terrors: Wenn Diirfer und Hochhauser zu Schauplatzen von Massakem werden - Die Privatisierung des Krieges in der Modeme. SZ am Wochenende,Nr. 225,29./30 September 2002, p. 1 [Pay 971 Payne, Kieth: Diplomatic and Dissuasive Options (Counter-Proliferation, Treaty based Constraints, Deterrence and Coercion). In: Ranger (Ed.): Extended Air Defence and the Long-Range Missile Threat. Bailrigg Memorandum 30, 1997: Lanchester University, Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, pp. 3843 [Ric 021 Rice Condoleezza, : A Balance of Power that Favors Freedom. Foreign Policy Agenda. Washington 2002: U S . Department of State, pp. 5-9
509 [RSG 181 Research Study Group 18 on Stable Defence: Stable Defence - Final Report. Panel 7 on The Defence Applications of Operational Research. Brussels 1995: North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Defence Research Group [Rum 981 Rumsfeld, Donald H. et al: Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. Washington 1998 httu ://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missiles/rumsfeld/index.html [Sch 011 Schilling, Walter: Die Proliferation von ballistischen Raketen und Massenvemichtungswaffen. Europuische Sicherheit Nr. 5 , Mai 2001, pp. 49-5 1 [Ste 031 Steinkamm, Armin: Der Irak-Krieg - auch volkerrechtlich eine neue Dimension. Neue Ziiricher Zeitung Nr. 112, Freitag, 16. Mai 2003 [Tsy 971 Tsygicko, Vitali N.: A Model of Defense Sufficiency for Estimate of Stability in a Multipolar World. In: Proceedings of the International Seminar on Nuclear War and Global Emergencies, 22“d Session (Goebel, Ed.). Singapore 1997: World Scientific, pp. 168-171 [Will 001 Wilkening, Dean A,: Ballistic-Missiles Defence and Strategic Stability. AdeZphi Paper 334, London 2000: The International Institute for Strategic Studies
FOOTNOTES
‘ Extended version of an invited paper presented at the HSS-Workshop ,,Anticipatory Defense: Basic Principles, Regional Priorities; Military Implications”, Kreuth, 27-28 May 2003 ‘I A well known and easily understood example of an analyhcal model of this kind is the second (square) law of Lanchester. It represents the closed-form solution of a system of two coupled differential equations describing the attrition suffered in a firefight between two homogeneous military units. By introducing victory conditions, the solution illustrates the role of numerical superiority in battles between symmetric opponents which, in turn,underscores the importance of maneuver to concentrate forces even though maneuver or movement of units is not modeled by the differential equations. Similarly, by properly rearranging the variables of the closed-form solution, and entering empirical values about breakpoints for attacker and defender and the relative defense advantage, one obtains analytical proof for the well known rule that, in order to be successful, a direct attack of defense positions requires that the initial attackerdefender force ratio is at least 3:l(see [Hub 801, p. 146). “‘ Note that verbal analysis methods are not necessarily the same as soft analysis methods which are based on expert opinion, judgment, and interaction obtained directly or through role playing. While soft tools may be sufficient to provide an answer in some cases, most often they provide input for quantitative analysis tools including analytical models (see [CBP 021, p. 188). I” NATO analysts concluded that the vast numerical superiority and force structure assured WP forces a probability of success when attacking NATO’s fairly static “Forward Defense” that exceeded the high operationaVstrategicrisk threshold (P* = 0.9) of the traditionally risk-averse Soviet forces. On the other hand, Soviet analysts interpreted the numerical inferiority of the heavy-amor ground forces of NATO in conjunction with the small operational depth of NATO territory as an indication that NATO was preparing for a preemptive attack in a serious crisis. In their assessment, surprise and moving forward to gain the operational depth for an efficient employment of armor against a numerically superior enemy, east of the demarcation line, were the essential elements of “Forward Defense”. Thus, a high degree of crisis instability has apparentIy persisted during the Cold War because the Soviets had come to the conclusion that they must be able to preempt NATO’s presumed preemption in a serious crisis (statement of a Soviet participant at a 1986 Pugwash meeting in Stamberg). ” The reader is referred to Huber et al. [HFL 991 for an example of estimating - in response to an assessment of the security risk associated with NATO enlargement by Professor Vitaly Tsygichko of the Russian Academy of Science [Tsy 971 - the relative degree to which Russia’s national security may be impaired by regional threat potentials along the periphery of its territory.
510 "' The security criterion is appropriate in situations when there is no evidence to assume that the military risk aversion of the potential opponent in question is high. The sufficiency criterion is adequate if there is overwhelming evidence that the opponent in question is highly reluctant to take military risks. Huber and Schindler have shown that it is impossible to satisfy every party's security requirements in a multi-state international system on the basis of the security criterion if the situation is characterized by distrust among parties. However, military stability of a multi-state international system is entirely feasible on the basis of the sufficiency criterion especially when nonmilitary relationships among the risk-averse states are cooperative [HuS 931. P,= 0 for all parties characterizes an international system which has overcome the use of military force for settling conflicts between them, because the political, social and economic root causes and motivations for going to war have disappeared, such as in North America and the regions of Northern and Western Europe. vii For example, arms control suffers from the difficulties of achieving agreement among potential supplier states on technology limitations. These difficulties are related to: economic competition and differences in political goals and interests; problem of enforcing compliance with agreed-upon limitations if rewards of non-compliance exceed possible sanctions by some significant margin; and the declining efficacy of controls as the technologies spread beyond the group of signatories to the acontrol agreement [Pay 971. n'' Deterrence is considered to be inherently unreliable vis-A-vis proliferating states in the post-Cold War era. It is difficult to establish reliable rules for deterrence with governments of proliferating states whose cultural and social environment are not well understood in most cases, and whose behavior is evidence of their unfamiliarity with the essential prerequisites of effective deterrence which emerged during the Cold War: rational behavior of antagonists; mutual understanding of motives; effective communication between antagonists; credibility of threats [Pay 971. The NNS does not distinguish between preemptive and preventive use of force. Rather, it extends the meaning of preemption to encompass military action "even ifuncertainty remains as to time and place of attack', i.e. preventive use of force. Because of its possible implications for international order, critics consider this aspect of the NNS as worrisome [LAR 021. ' The "Zentrum fuer Analysen and Studien der Bundeswehr" (ZAS - Center for Studies and Analyses of the Bundeswebr) was commissioned by the German Ministry of Defense in 1999 to analyze what type of military would required in the 21'' Century. It was supported by experts of the relevant scientific fields as well as industry and the military. A synopsis of the findings is available from ZAS. See also the treatise by Carl von Clausewitz on the aims a belligerent party adopts, and the Iesources it employs [Cla 84, pp.585-5943. xii This is very likely what German Defense Minister Struck had in mind when he explained Germany's new defense policy guidelines by stating that Germany is also defended in the Hindu Kush. '"' Among others, this has been the case in Somalia, Bosnia, Ruanda, and Haiti, where interventions were mandated by the UN Security Council upon request by the USA and others under Article 39 of the UN Charter, because the situations there was considered to threaten international peace. Even though the situation in Kosovo was similar, the legal controversy surrounding the NATO intervention in 1998 was due to the fact that it took place outside the UN framework, because Russia and China threatened to veto a resolution for military intervention. While the USA and UK took the position that the intervention was justified because the Security Council had acknowledged that international peace was threatened [Kuen 991. Unless armed with WMD-warheads, BM are not very effective weapons. Therefore, production and storage facilities for WMD-warheads are high priority targets for preventive attack. The fust and only successful operation of this kind in history was carried out in 1981 by Israel on the Osiraq reactor nearing completion at the Tuwaitta nuclear research center near Baghdad. Camed out with devastating precision by 14 attack aircraft, the raid had been carefully planned and rehearsed for some time [Arm 931. The international reaction at the time was quite negative. However, today one wonders what course history would have taken had this raid failed as Iraq would have been in possession of a few nuclear weapons when it occupied Kuwait in 1991. '"The borderline between addressing countermeasures and root causes is quite fuzzy. As was pointed out before, preemptive military intervention as a countermeasure includes both the neutralization of the threat and the provision of security and technical and financial assistance for rebuilding the infrastructure of the target countries. In practical terms, shifting priorities might imply reducing the military presence in favor of nonmilitary assistance as the security situation in the region improves. xvi It protects states and governments, even those that deprive their citizens of elementary human rights.
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In fact, Steinkamm suggests that the United States may have fought the war against Iraq as a first step in advancing a new international law that eventually recognizes U.S. convictions about the legitimacy of defensive intervention. xvii
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DESERTIFICATION PMP ANDREW WARREN University College of London, London, U.K. The WFS Desertification PMP at the Erice meeting in 2003, by including Sicilian scientists, became the prototype of a WFS Regional Resources Commission for Sicily. The meeting was the second of this prototype Commission, the first having taken place in Rome in June 2003. Both meetings focused on the preparation of a project. The outline of this project, therefore, is the substance of the report of the PMP for 2003.
A PROJECT TO PROVIDE BETTER INFORMATION FOR MANAGING DESERTIFICATION IN SICILY THE PROBLEM There is evidence for actual and potential loss of income, biodiversity and amenity, in short, of unsustainable development in Sicily that is caused by the loss, destruction, impoverishment of soils, the salinisation of waters and soils and the loss of vegetative cover (among other related problems). This is occurring, and may, probably will, accelerate in the face of climatic and economic change. ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF AN APPROPRIATE PROJECT Sicily has a complex environment: geologically, climatically, biologically, economically, and culturally. The meeting heard an introductory lecture on these issues from Professor Carmello Dazzi. But we were building on many strengths: an established scientific community, which has already begun to address many of these problems, some good data bases, on soils, vegetation, erosion (among other things). In short: Sicily is an excellent place for the first regional resource commission on Desertification. The need is to bring these into an integrated, widely available, easily analysed format: Which supports diverse modelling approaches, aids analysis and synthesis, overcomes scaling issues; Within which relationships (environmental and economic processes) are properly understood; Which is focused on problems as seen by farmers, environmental groups, and the administration; And which supports decision making. THE PROPOSAL The proposal consists of three essential, closely connected elements:
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Element I. Databases This will be built by collating and integrating existing databases from Sicily with data from new and existing remote sensing. The relevant software has been improving very quickly, as has the range and precision of data available from remote sensing, the ability to integrate modelling, GPS and GIs, and systems of Internet delivery. In the spirit of Erice, these data will be available in a transparent system that will be made publicly available, with powerful software to interrogate them. The system will preferably be dispersed throughout Sicily, encouraging participation and ownership, and will be available through the internet to land users, NGOs, government organisations, University, State and National Governments, in other words, to anyone interested in the Sicilian environment and its management. This is an extremely important and innovative part of the proposal. It is an essential precursor to the third element (see later). It could be the basis for planning in the other WFS Regional Resource Commissions for Sicily. We are fortunate that there has already been experimentation with this approach for Sicily, which provides many lessons about the choices needed to improve information systems of this kind. Systems like these have very great strengths. Relationships between different kinds of data can be subject to almost infinite kinds of analysis. These analyses can reveal areas that seem more damaged, or vulnerable; they allow Island-wide comparisons; and so on. But they do not provide a full understanding of the interrelations and processes that have created the patterns they show. One of their roles is to provide hypotheses about the environmental processes that underlie the patterns they reveal. Sound prescriptions need a deeper understanding of these processes. Furthermore, without more control, IT systems may be providing data that are irrelevant to problems or not providing data that could be relevant. Hence two other elements are needed: Element 11: Site Studies These are analyses of processes at a finer scale. They are expensive, and yield reliable results in years, not months. There cannot be many of them. To be useful in controlling the management of the Information Systems of Element I, and in order not to postpone environmental prescriptions, they need to begin at an early stage. We propose about four sites, selected from a prioritised list, chosen to represent the process that creates problems, and of sizes and shapes appropriate to those problems (salinisation, soil erosion, soil deterioration.. .). The data and models developed for the processes at these sites, when suitably quality-controlled, will be incorporated in the larger database and made publicly available, to form the basis of debates about evaluation and management. The site studies will include measurements of soil, hydrology, sediment-transport, ecological, meteorological, and socio-economic processes. As with the IT element, we are on a cusp o f many new developments for site studies, as in instrumentation, sampling, socio-economic modelling and so on. But scientific enthusiasm about site studies, like that about databases, needs to be kept in check. A third element is vital and must be integral.
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Element 111. Consultation Local organisations, public and private, and government bodies will contribute to a management panel that will make decisions about the foci of the project, and will provide input on the choice of data in the database, about the construction of hypotheses and models, and, ultimately about the prescriptions. The element will also include studies of the legal, sociological and economic means for moving Sicily towards greater sustainability. It will develop a monitoring system for environmental problems, which will allow early warning, and the design of better response systems. PARTICIPANTS Soil, hydrological, remote-sensing scientists in the Universities of Palermo, Catania and Messina (we have already met many of these, either in Rome or in Erice). These include Professors Dazzi, Rossi, Benffatello, Raimondi, Pumo, Santoro; Representatives of agricultural and environmental NGOs; and of govemment departments associated with these issues (as yet not identified); Existing members of the WFS Desertification PMP (and others co-opted according to need). In Erice in 2003 were Paul Bartell (USAID), Gray Tappan (USGS), Larry Tieszen (USGS), Andrew Warren (University College London), Aaron Yair (Hebrew University of Jerusalem). TIME FRAME Element I to begin on January 1 2004, with the production of a publicly available, integrated data-base system by April 2004, ready for a meeting of representatives of all elements to review the progress of the integrated data system, debate priorities, chose study sites, and approaches. Implementation of study sites by December 2004. Twice yearly meetings of representatives from all elements to review progress and redirect the next phase. Prescriptions becoming available from December 2006. Major project review, December 2007. We believe we have outlined a prototype for many other regional resource commissions in the desertification area. It uses state-of-the art information and monitoring systems, and the wide, informed consultation that these allow.
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS Paul Bartell
[email protected] Gugliemo Benfratello Geufra@,idra.uni& Carmello Dazzi dazzi@,unipa.it Dominic0 Pumo
[email protected] Salvatore Rainmondi sraimondiainipait Guiseppe Rossi grossi@,dica.unict.it
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Mario Santoro
[email protected] Gray Tappan tatwan@,usgs.gov Larry Tieszen tieszen(iiusgs.gov Andrew Warren
[email protected] Aaron Yair
[email protected] REPORT OF PMP ON ENDOCRINE DISRUPTING CHEMICALS STEFAN0 PARMIGIANI University of Parma, Italy Other members of the panel in attendance: Lou Guillette, Pete Myers, Shanna Swan, Fred vom Saal The PMP on Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals met during the session on Planetary Emergencies in Erice, August, 2003. This was the first meeting for this new panel. PURPOSE OF THE PMP There are contaminants present in the environment that can disrupt the functioning of critical regulatory molecules required for normal development of the brain and other organs, with the result that permanent disruption can occur even at very low levels of exposure. This poses a threat to the health of individuals, and destabilization of populations of wildlife and humans throughout the world. FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF THE PANEL During the next year the panel proposes two workshops: 1. The panel proposed a workshop relating to mechanisms of endocrine disruption to be held in May, 2004. The topics covered at the workshop will be: Epigenetic modification of gene activity by EDCs. Different effects of exposure to EDCs on gene activity during and after development. Consequences of fetal exposure to EDCs for adult disease and abnormal organ function.
2. A second workshop was also proposed for August 2004. This workshop would bring together a group of scientists from Italy and members of the PMP to develop a collaborative research program. The aim of the research would be to determine the health of people and wildlife living in a habitat in Italy where there is high exposure to EDCs in comparison to similar species of people and wildlife in a habitat with much lower exposures, since little research on EDCs has been conducted on people or wildlife in Italy.
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14. LONG-TERM STEWARDSHIP OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL WORKSHOP
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MONITORING AND STEWARDSHIP OF LEGACY NUCLEAR AND HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES WORKSHOP STEPHEN J. KOWALL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental laboratory, Idaho Falls, USA LORNE G. EVERETT Chancellor, Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Canada PROBLEM STATEMENT With the demise of the Soviet Union and declassification of cold war records, the scale of the nuclear weapons waste legacy in the United States was determined to be enormous. Even after cleanup of the most hazardous materials, government stewards will still be responsible for ensuring protection of environmental resources and humans from residual contamination that cannot be dealt with because of technology challenges or costs. Estimates of the amount of nuclear and hazardous material remaining after cleanup of this legacy exceed over 75 million cubic meters of contaminated soils and 1.8 billion cubic meters of contaminated waters. The scale of similar legacies in the Former Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, Europe and Asia are still being evaluated, but probably dwarf the US numbers. The scale of the commercial industrial problem is also huge. The monitoring and stewardship of this legacy is an intractable problem given the current state of regulations, and the state of science and technology in the 21'' Century. This mortgage to future generations will test our concepts of sustainable development. Experts from several countries assessed the problem of how the state-of-the-practice compares with state-of-art knowledge. They have made the following recommendations to the international community on how to develop and share monitoring and stewardship science and technology to address this daunting legacy. SPECIAL SESSION I Stakeholder Involvement in Stewardship-Recommendations Achieving Stewardship and Contributing to a Sustainable Stakeholder/Scientist Involvement Moderator: Elizabeth Hocking, Argonne National Laboratory
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Society through
Mutual trust among government and public stakeholders is necessary in processes developing stewardship policies and projects. Scientists contribute to developing trust when they are credible, acknowledge uncertainty, and communicate effectively in ways understood by all stakeholders. Stewardship processes must be sensitive to cultural traditions, governance systems, and differing levels of stakeholder education and experience that could inhibit
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meaningful participation; stakeholder capacity must be developed to support meaningful participation in the stewardship process. Stakeholder involvement must begin early in the stewardship process to build trust in relationships. Rules of engagement must clarify who makes decisions, how they are made, what limits constrain the stewardship process, and the goal of the stewardship process. Stewardship processes affecting sustainability of future generations must take intergenerational equity into account.
SPECIAL SESSION I1 Containment of Legacy Wastes During Stewardship-Recommendations Near-Surface Containment of Legacv Wastes Requiring,Long-Term Stewardship Moderator: James Clarke, Vanderbilt University 1.
Development of arrangements for long-term stewardship may benefit more from application of goal-based regulations than from regulation on the basis of fixed technical prescription (i.e., allows engineers to take advantage of state-of-art developments and shared experience and it relieved rule/standard-makers of liability for failure of facilities that comply with prescriptions). 2. Need for near source monitoring and source term diagnostics (risk vs time). 3. Subsurface science needs. Monitoring the condition of the containment system (health of the system). 4. 5. Design the system to accommodate monitoring now and in the future. Ability to monitor should be a design requirement. 6. Arrangements LTS will necessarily depend upon monitoring. 7. We need to end our sole reliance on groundwater monitoring as an indicator of system performance. 8. Design should accommodate/consider the potential for failure of critical system components. 9. Definition of “failure” consequences and responses. 10. Time horizonslmilestones, where are we? SPECIAL SESSION I11 Monitoring of Legacy Wastes and Burial Sites-Recommendations Ensuring Monitoring Svstem will Derform as Designed Moderator: Andrey Rybalchenko, FGUP VNIPI Promtechnologii, Russia
1. Address Component Failures Before System-Wide Failures 1.1 Monitoring of local legacy waste sites and burial sites (repositories) must include control observations of the characteristics of hypothetical failures.
521 1.2 The choice of characteristics for observations, networks and equipments must be
carried out using analysis of event-failures and mathematical models of the behavior of waste, environments and the geological formation. 1.3 The design of local legacy waste sites and burial sites (repository) must include all essential equipment, buildings, staff, personal and cost evaluations.
2. Reduce life cvcle costs 2.1 Maximum volume of observations, as part of the monitoring system, must be camed out during the construction and operational phase and a few years after shutting down the sites. 2.2 Volume of observation may be reduced after obtaining observation and investigation data from the first years of operation and after verification of the models of waste behavior in the geologic formation and the environment. 2.3 Monitoring of local legacy waste sites and burial sites after shut down and after a limited time of observation must be forwarded to a geological service or analogous organizations for observations as a part of a federal (regional) monitoring program. This will reduce the life cycle expense for monitoring. 3. Outimize data collection 3.1 Data for local legacy waste sites and burial sites (repository) must be organized in a computerized database supplementing all phases of investigation, design, construction, operational and shut down. 3.2 Database must be used for the substantiation of models of waste behavior (migration model), geological formation and the environment. Database and models must be used for safety evaluation, optimization of operational and monitoring observations. 3.3 Database must include the results of modeling and prediction results obtained during site operations. 3.4 Database must be accessible to stakeholders. 4. Prediction of performance 4.1 Predictions of consequences of waste burial and transformations in the environment
and the geological formation must be carried out in all phases of the critical operational and shut down of sites. 4.2 Predictions made during the preliminary investigation help to optimize the volume and methods of investigation. 4.3 Predictions made during design provide the basis for technical decisions for site network observations and safety criteria. Prediction results are necessary to satisfy stakeholders. 4.4 Optimization must be camed out using modeling techniques.
ACHIEVING STEWARDSHIP AND CONTRIBUTING TO A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY THROUGH STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT ELIZABETH K. HOCKING Environmental Assessment Division Argonne National Laboratory, Washington DC, USA INTRODUCTION Many sites around the world are contaminated with radioactive or hazardous residuals. They are contaminated because (1) they were chosen as disposal sites, or (2) they became contaminated through use but cannot be completely remediated for economic or technological reasons. Stewardship of these contaminated sites will be required as long as the residuals pose a potential harm to human health or the environment. The tasks of stewardship are to allow access to contaminated lands and resources only for uses that have been approved on the basis of a risk assessment, and to protect surrounding communities from exposure to contaminants. The goal of stewardship should be to accomplish these tasks while contributing to a sustainable society by allowing approved land uses. In general, there is a bias against letting land lie unused. Property law is largely built on the basis of the transferability of land to keep it available for appropriate use. Even though some uses would be constrained for land with residual contamination, the land may be approved for other appropriate uses that can contribute to sustainability. For example, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in the southwestern part of the United States is the burial site for transuranic radioactive waste. The waste is placed 2,150 feet underground in a 2,000 foot-thick salt formation. Resource mining on the site is foreclosed; however, the surface of the disposal site will be used for cattle grazing when all the waste has been placed in the repository. Other sites with residual contaminationin the United States are being used as wildlife refuges. Using land under stewardship for its approved purposes may even forestall unapproved uses because land users will generally protect their interest in the land. Working toward achieving the goal and tasks of stewardship requires meaningll involvement by the stakeholders affected by the contaminated lands. Meaningful stakeholder involvement requires identifylng and engaging the right stakeholders, establishing rules of engagement for the stakeholder process, building and maintaining trust, and protecting intergenerationalequity. Although the following discussion is oriented toward establishing stewardship programs for existing contaminated sites, many of the principles and suggestions also apply to activities such as selecting a disposal site or establishing a stewardship regulation or policy. IDENTIFYING AND ENGAGING THE RIGHT STAKEHOLDERS Involving stakeholders in a meaningful way in stewardship decisions first requires that the appropriate stakeholders be identified. The appropriate stakeholders are those
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523 who represent the diverse and divergent interests affected by the site or activity, have standing in the affected area, and agree to abide by the rules of engagement established for the stakeholderprocess. The integrity of the stakeholder process depends significantly on the willingness of decision makers to engage stakeholders with viewpoints that vary from their own. However, the stakeholders must truly and legitimately represent the interests affected by the activity or site and therefore have the standing within the affected community to participate in the stakeholder process. Identifying the right mix of stakeholders requires understanding the concerns, issues, and objectives associated with the goal of the stewardship process. When the goal of the stewardship process is clearly described and adhered to, it will be easier for a facilitator and the stakeholders themselves to identify who is a legitimate stakeholder. If the goal of the stewardship process is to design a stewardship plan for a specific site that has been formerly contaminated through nuclear weapons development, stakeholders whose only objectives are to ban the use of such weapons might not be the right stakeholders for this site-specifictask. Once the stewardship process goal is clearly defined and the right stakeholders are identified, rules are required to effectively engage them. ESTABLISHING AND ADHERING TO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT Rules of engagement for the stewardship process will reduce conflict and confusion and contribute to more effective stakeholder involvement. As with any group process, the basic rules of honest and open communication and respect among stakeholders are vitally important. Adhering to those basic rules will be much easier if all stakeholders clearly understand the limitations that apply to the process, who is responsible for making the final decision, how decisions are made, and the goal of the process. Most stewardship processes will have to function within some limits that are beyond their control. These limits could be legal, financial, or temporal in nature. Because they impact the scope of the stewardship process, limitations must be made clear from the very outset so that all stakeholders understand them and the reasons behind them. Two of the most important limits relate to stewardship decisions. Stakeholders must have a clear understanding of who is responsible for making the final decision and how decisions are made within the group process. The decision maker for some stewardship processes will be mandated by a law or regulation; in most cases, however, who makes the final decision will depend upon the nature of the goal of the process. In either case, the identity of the final decision maker must be made clear to avoid any stakeholder misconceptions that they are the ultimate decision makers. The procedure for making any decisions within the stewardship process will also need to be defined before the process begins. Voting may be used in some stewardship processes; in others, the procedures might entail developing a general consensus of stakeholders’ opinions or just getting a sense of stakeholder attitudes. Adhering to the accepted rules of engagement can reduce the conflict that arises in most group processes and is especially important in a stewardship process because it often begins with a trust deficit.
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BUILDING AND MAINTAINING TRUST
The obstacles to building and maintaining trust among stakeholders in the stewardship process arise from an entangled environment of mistrust, frustration, and uncertainty. Much has been written about the mistrust directed at government officials by non-government stakeholders. The mistrust may be mutual. Government officials may see stakeholders as intruders, irritants, and problem creators. Frustration for all stakeholders can stem from the seemingly intractable nature of the problem under consideration. Mistrust and frustration can also arise from the need to chart difficult but necessary choices in a sea of uncertainty. There may be considerable uncertainty about the characterization of the site being considered for stewardship. There may be additional uncertainty about the longevity and reliability of the planned contaminant containment systems, the monitoring systems expected to detect containment system failure, the land use controls expected to ensure that land is only used for approved purposes, and the system to provide information about the site to succeeding generations. The best course of action for building and maintaining trust in such an environment is acknowledging uncertainty, communicating information, and building stakeholder capacity. These actions must continue throughout the stakeholder process. In the face of uncertainty, some people may unrealistically react by rehsing to acknowledge any uncertainty and hold rigidly to their beliefs that everything that needs to be known about the stewardship of a site is known. Other people, in the same atmosphere of uncertainty, may unrealistically reject what is known. Acknowledging uncertainties and developing plans for how to act in light of them can help reduce their negative impact on the stewardship process. The trust that is necessary for stakeholders to accept uncertainty and certainties stems from appropriately communicating information. Information must be objectively presented, and it must be presented in forms that are understandable to stakeholders. For example, highly technical and complex scientific data will be desired and appreciated by some stakeholders. Stakeholders who do not have a scientific background may desire and benefit more from visual representations that portray information such as geologic formations, contaminant intensity and migration, or containment system design. Conveying information in user-compatible formats can build trust and enhance stakeholder participation. The capacity of stakeholders to participate meaningfully in the stewardship process is often complicated by the fact that they come to the stewardship process with widely varying degrees of formal and informal education and experience with group processes. The prevailing governance or cultural system may also impede stakeholders from fully participating if the system inhibits questioning authority figures. Training in the group process, the fundamentals of stewardship, and communication techniques can help level the playing field among stakeholders. A well-trained and experienced group facilitator can ensure that the playing field remains as level as possible during the stewardship process and that trust is maintained - even though it may be strained at times. The information communication that is so important to building and maintaining trust must continue through time because stewardship will be required for as long as
525 residual contaminants pose a potential threat to human health or the environment. Stewardship may be required for several generations, and the interests of future generations should be taken into account when stewardship programs or decisions are being developed. PROTECTING INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY Intergenerational equity is defined here as the fairness of access to resources across generations. Resources can be natural as well as cultural. Natural resources include sensitive ecosystems, water bodies, minerals, and fossil fuels. Cultural resources include things such as sites, buildings, objects, plants, graves, and rock carvings that have cultural, historical, or archeological significance. Because stewardship will limit some use of land and its resources to protect against the release of potentially h a d 1 contaminants, future generations will have restricted access to those lands and resources. A second aspect of intergenerational equity and stewardship is that the risks and costs of stewardship programs devised by the present generation are borne, knowingly or unknowingly, by future generations. Stewardship will always impose some resource use restrictions and some cost and risk obligations on future generations. The stewardship process should incorporate principles for intergenerational decision making to minimize these impositions. In 1994, the U.S. Department of Energy requested advice from the National Academy of Public Administration on how it could integrate a fair, intergenerational balancing of the risks, costs, and benefits associated with its decisions into its decision making processes. In response, the Academy identified the following four principles for intergenerational decision making: Trustee Principle: Every generation has obligations as trustee to protect the interests of future generations. Sustainability Principle: No generation should deprive future generations of the opportunity for a quality of life comparable to its own. Chain of Obligation Principle: Each generation’s primary obligation is to provide for the needs of the living and next succeeding generations. Precautionary Principle: Actions that pose a realistic threat of irreversible harm or catastrophic consequences should not be pursued unless there is some compelling countervailing need to benefit either current or future generations.’ Stakeholders need to keep these principles in mind when participating in the stewardship process to ensure that future generations have access to the information needed to understand and deal with the obligations passed on to them.
’
National Academy of Public Administration, “Deciding For The Future: Balancing Risks, Costs, and Benefits Fairly Across Generations,” April 1995.
Work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy under contract W-31-109-Eng-38. The submitted manuscript has been created by the University of Chicago as Operator of Argonne National Laboratory (“Argonne”) under contract No. W-3 1-109-ENG-38 with the U.S. Department of Energy. The US.Government retains for itself, and others acting on its behalf, a paid-up, nonexclusive, irrevocable worldwide license in said article to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public, and perform publicly and display publicly, by or on behalf of the Government.
RADIOACTIVE WASTE OF DEFENSEACTIVITIES IN TKE 20"'"CENTURY - HANDLING AND MANAGEMENT A.I. RYBALCHENKO All-Russia Designing and Research Institute of Production Engineering Moscow, Russia INTRODUCTION Implementation of defense programs on the production of nuclear materials in the second half of the 20" century resulted in the formation of large radioactive waste quantities. In the beginning radioactive waste was handled similarly to industrial waste, i.e. the waste was dumped into the surface water basins, trenches, and collector pits. The practice gave rise to the accumulation of hazardous radioactive waste and, consequently, to the increased radioactive waste impact on human beings, animal life, and vegetation. Governments in countries of the radioactive waste origin are forced to implement full-scale programs aimed at the prevention of harmful impact of the defense waste. To do that they have to provide for the corresponding expense items in the State budget thus diverting vast funds from the other important social issues such as eradication of poverty, health care, education, etc. This makes a political issue out of handling the radioactive heritage of the 20" century, which is debated in parliaments, in press, and in public environmental organizations. The issue is the most acute for the Russian Federation and for the new FSU states who appeared to be in possession of the defense radioactive waste. In the process of changing the forms of ownership, new enterprises evolved out of the former defense plants rejecting the radioactive heritage. Other defense enterprises are out of business and the remaining radioactive waste has to be managed by the State or it would belong to nobody. Complications in the settlement of the former defense radioactive waste handling issues are associated with the following: with difficulties in the economic development of the new States; with the ongoing creation of the waste handling legislation; with the broad involvement of public in the discussions; with the use of difficulties in resolving the radioactive waste issues by the political parties in opposition. In this context, the paper presents the discussion of the issues of handling radioactive waste of the former defense activities in the USSR as applied to the Russian Federation being the major radioactive waste owner. This paper does not deal with handling nuclear materials that could be used in industry and therefore are not considered as waste including highly enriched uranium and plutonium; with the remediation of territories contaminated as a result of the Chemobyl accident; with the release of waste into environment. The following areas of activity are proposed for discussion to resolve the issue of the accumulated radioactive waste generated earlier: Waste inventory; 0 Assessment of the potential waste hazard; Practical measures on the harmful waste impact prevention; Funding of the waste handling activities; Legal basis of waste handling; 0 Release of the information to the public and population.
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527 WASTE INVENTORY Data on the quantity, composition, waste form, and waste location are necessary to make an optimum decision on waste handling; the assessment of the potential waste hazards; the justification and development of the projects for practical measures and on the determination of the amounts involved. Waste generated was inventoried throughout the entire production period of nuclear materials in the USSR. The data were accumulated in the authorized agencies under the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (former Ministry of the Medium Machinery Construction of the USSR). During recent years, a number of international projects were arranged for the creation of a waste cadastre and database for the Russian Federation using modem computer technology and posting data on the Internet. It is worth mentioning the ISTC projects “Radleg” #245 and “Radinfo” #2097, the latter being the development of the “Radleg” project. The database contains data on the USSR defense activity waste as well, however there is no clear distinction between the USSR defense waste and the waste generated later. In September 2003 the database-associated conference “Radioactive waste in the USSR and Russia” will be held in Moscow. Information on the waste cadastre and database may be obtained on the website http://www.kiae.ru/gis-radleghdex.htm. Basic sources of radioactive waste during the implementation of defense programs were uranium production and enrichment, fuel fabrication, nuclear reactors, and fuel reprocessing, fleet. Radioactive waste generated in the USSR during the uranium mining and radioactive ore processing is stored as solid waste in mine tailing repositories located both in the Russian Federation and in the new States of Kirghizia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The activity of that waste is not high and is defined by natural radionuclides, the total waste volume being estimated at 600 - 700 mln tons. Management of liquid radioactive waste is extremely complicated. The total volume of liquid radioactive waste is more than 550 mln.m3. 50 mln.m3 are isolated in deep geological formations using deep well injection. Other waste is located in open surface ponds, basins and lakes. The majority of the radioactive waste inherited from the USSR (counted by activity) is located at the plutonium-producing enterprises. Among those are the Combine “Mayak” located in Oziorsk City, Chelyabinskaya Oblast; Siberian Chemical Combine of Seversk City, Tomskaya Oblast; Mining and Chemical Combine of Zhleznogorsk City, Krasnoyarsk Territory. Waste was generated in the form of solutions, which were stored in special facilities (tanks); in natural and engineered ponds and pits; and were injected into deep porous geologic formations (reservoir horizons). At Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk more than 90% of liquid radioactive waste was injected in deep porous geologic formations (reservoir horizons) through bore wells. These wastes are isolated from the environment. Gross activity of the accumulated waste was estimated at 1.7 billion Curie [ 11. Part of the liquid waste at the Combine “Mayak” was solidified, and all the enterprises under discussion also have radioactive waste of solid origin. The total quality of solid radioactive waste of Russia is about 180 million tons and 90% of it is mining and mill tailings.
528 In the Northern territories of the Russian Federation, some USSR Navy waste is located in the decommissioned submarines and in shore repositories. The major part of that waste is in solid form, however liquid radioactive waste repositories exist also. Radioactive substances from decommissioned nuclear facilities also belong to the defense radioactive waste. Those facilities are located in many research centers of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, the soils, rocks, and construction elements contaminated by radioactive substances as a result of nuclear explosions do not belong in the category of radioactive waste. The issue of categorization and successive handling of that waste is yet to be solved. Territories have been contaminated by radioactive waste around open surface storages. Total contaminated areas are estimated at 452 km2 of which contaminated areas in the vicinity of" Majak" represent 94%. Equipment for the reprocessing of radioactive waste was developed in Russia and used very successfully. The total volume of reprocessed waste is about 150 million m3. The technologies of cementation, bituminization, converting into glass and others are applied. ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL WASTE HAZARDS Selection of a technique for handling the radioactive waste, the work schedule, and expenses are largely defined by the hazard that the waste represents to the population and environment. Obviously, the most hazardous waste and waste locations must be neutralized first of all. Different systems of criteria are proposed for the waste hazard assessment. Irradiation of the population induced by radioactive waste is the fundamental criterion for the waste hazard evaluation. The irradiation value is characterized by the collective dose and by the maximum individual dose of irradiation as obtained from a single member of the population. The extent of contamination of the ground surface, vegetation, and living creatures in the locations of the accumulated waste is used for the waste hazard evaluation as well, for it defines the irradiation dose of the population. On the basis of comparing the results of monitoring and measurements made in the locations of the accumulated waste, with the criteria-defined values, conclusions are made as to whether the waste is hazardous or safe. Numerical characteristics of the criteria or irradiation and contamination norms are established in the appropriate regulatory documents. At present the radioactive waste condition could be assumed as safe, due to the measures taken to prevent contact of the population with the waste which is surrounded by an assigned protective zone; and due to measures taken to prevent radioactivity migration across the protective zone borders. However the migration of radioactivity across the protective zone borders is possible in the future as the result of natural processes, elemental forces, and other unanticipated interference. In this case the criteria are used to deal with expected (predicted) values of the irradiation, with the moment of the irradiation occurrence in the future, and with the probability of the irradiation occurrence. For the disposal of waste in geological formations, a localization criterion is also used. The waste disposal is assumed to be safe in cases where the waste exists within the predetermined borders of the allocated range (allotment).
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Thus far, the methodology is established for the safety assessment of locations of the accumulated waste, waste storage, andor disposal. Safety assessment assumes the following basic phases: Gathering and preparation of data on the waste and, if necessary, the investigation of waste, determination of the waste quantity, composition and physicochemical speciation; Determination of the conditions for the waste locations and connections with the environment (climatic, physical-geographic, geologic) and socialeconomic conditions of the waste disposal location; Determination of the territory contamination around the waste location, actual irradiation doses for the population; Substantiation of mathematical models for the formation of irradiation doses and for radionuclide migration from waste locations; Forecasting the behavior of waste in the future and the release of radioactivity from waste disposal locations based on the mathematical model studies (simulation), determination of characteristics of an anticipated impact; Analysis of the results obtained, formulating conclusions on the extent of the waste hazard or safetv. Utilization of such methodology for Russia shows the former defense waste accumulated at Combine “Mayak” to be the most hazardous. Radioactivity of the waste is rather high; a significant part of waste in the liquid state exists in open ponds and basins connected by underground water, and it contaminates adjacent locations by the ejection of aerosols. However the total activity of liquid waste is not the governing safety criterion. At the Siberian Chemical Combine in Seversk City, Tomskaya Oblast, the liquid radioactive waste was injected into the deep reservoir horizons [ 2 ] . Waste with gross activity several times as high as that existing in open lakes and ponds at Combine “Mayak” is localized within the predetermined borders of the geological medium and does not affect the population, animal life, and vegetation. According to the assessment data published by Russian specialists and international experts [3, 4, 51 injection of waste into the deep reservoir horizons is assumed to be safe. Injection of the liquid radioactive waste allowed to begin starting the closedown of open liquid radioactive waste storage (ponds and basins) at the Siberian Chemical Combine, created as a result of defense activities. The closedown of the open liquid radioactive waste basins is under way at the Mining and Chemical Combine of Zheleznogorsk City, Krasnoyarsk Territory where they have also injected liquid radioactive waste into the deep reservoir horizons. Potential hazards of waste generated as a result of defense activities depend not only on the gross radioactivity, but on the geographic position as well. In Middle Asia, Kirghizia, some low-level radioactive waste repositories are located in a dammed canyon. Destruction of the dam would cause a mud avalanche that would flood the settlements located lower down. Potential hazard of that waste in spite of the low radioactivity is rather high especially with regard to high seismic activity in the region.
530 PRACTICAL MEASURES ON THE HARMFUL WASTE IMPACT PREVENTION Practical measures of handling radioactive waste, formed as a result of the defense programs implementation, pursue the prevention of harmful waste impact on the population and environment. The goal could be achieved in various ways as follows: by converting radioactive elements into non-radioactive ones using nuclear technology; by converting all waste into solid, mineral-like forms followed by the disposal thereof in deep impermeable geologic formations; by dispatching waste into space. The ideal is supposed to be a waste location restored to its natural condition as it existed prior to the appearance of waste in the area - the “green meadow” concept. For a small waste volume and quantity this seems to be quite feasible. However, for the inherited defense waste, the task for upcoming decades should be treated as a fantasy. Therefore “green meadow” will be postponed for a long while and other approaches are used ensuring, first of all, the reliable protection of humans i%om irradiation by waste. The simplest way to prevent a harmful waste impact is to arrange protective measures in the accumulated waste locations, to enclose and guard waste, to forbid the admittance to the accumulated waste locations by unauthorized persons. Simultaneously, the waste storage area should be equipped with a network of environmental monitoring stations for the timely detection of leakage enabling the appropriate measures to be taken. Merely storing the waste within protective zone borders and setting up a physical protection system will not always prevent the waste impact on the environment. In the latter case, additional measures are taken aimed at waste localization as follows: the erection of additional dams, shelters, screens, etc. A similar approach is used at the Combine “Mayak” with regard to the open surface liquid radioactive waste storage places. At the Siberian Chemical Combine, and at the Mining and Chemical Combine, the closedown of open basins with liquid radioactive waste has been successfully performed by filling the basins with clayish rock and simultaneously sending the displaced liquid into the deep well injection reservoir horizons. In the repository location semi-solid waste remains - sludge covered with clayish rock and actually unmovable. Liquid radioactive waste disposal in porous geologic formations by injecting waste through deep bore wells in reservoir horizons allows the waste to be insulated from the environment and prevents penetration of the waste into the biological cycles. The technology described has been used in atomic industry enterprises of Russia for 40 years. Experience gained in deep well injection of liquid radioactive waste was used to create deep injection sites for non-radioactive waste at other enterprises. In Table 1 some characteristics are given of the waste disposal locations of liquid radioactive waste that have arisen as a result of implementation of the defense programs. Creation of deep injection sites was preceded by a special geologic investigation that illustrated the possibility of waste injection. According to the opinion of a number of experts, there is also a possibility of deep liquid waste injection in the vicinity of Combine “Mayak” in the Ural, however the appropriate decision has not been made for a number of reasons. That appeared to be one of the issues that led to a complicated environmental situation in the region of the Combine.
531 The ultimate stage in the management of radioactive waste is its emplacement as solid waste in impermeable geological formations, with a high degree of multibarrier isolation from the environment. Practical work on defense waste handling is performed under the projects developed after the study and justification of the principal possibilities of work and work safety are accomplished. The projects comprise technical decisions; the design of engineering systems and facilities; the justification of safety; cost estimates. The projects pass expert review and can be implemented as soon as they are approved. Table 1.: Deep repositories (Deep Well Injection Sites) of liquid radioactive waste at Minatom enternrises Injection Injection Removed Enterprises Type of waste depth, m start, waste year. volume, million m3 Siberian Chemical Combine liquid radioI 270-320 I 1963 I 42.0 314-386 active waste Mining and Chemical Combine liquid radioI 180-280 I 1967 I 6.1 active waste 355 - 500 State Scientific Center RF “NIIAR” (Scientific and active waste 1440 - 1550 Research Institute of Nuclear Reactors)
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FUNDING OF WASTE HANDLING ACTIVITIES Arrangements for funding the defense waste handling activities present a complex issue. The waste in question was generated in the time of the USSR - a State that no longer exists. As the assignee of the USSR, the Russian Federation must bear all the expenses of the waste handling, however under market economy conditions, with the State budget reduction and the private capital predominance, it appears difficult to allocate significant funds to waste handling. More and more it has to be done at the expense of other budget items, such as the eradication of poverty, health care, education, etc. Motions to increase the inherited waste-handling budget are not always seconded in parliaments and in government structures. Under the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, atomic industry enterprises have to look for funds to support safe conditions for radioactive waste produced in the USSR during the defense program implementation. That is accomplished by cutting back social programs, raising tariffs for NPP-generated electricity, increasing the cost of other goods manufactured by the atomic industry. However the funds raised that way are not sufficient for the ultimate solution to the inherited waste issue. In recent years, projects were prepared for international cooperation to handle the spent nuclear fuel of foreign NPPs. A significant part of the funds obtained from the payments for the import, storage, and subsequent fuel reprocessing was supposed to be used to solve the radioactive waste handling issue. Great assistance in resolving the radioactive waste issues is rendered to the Russian Federation by the European Union countries and the U.S.A.
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532 A possibility of attracting private investments to solve the radioactive waste issue has also been considered. After the waste is removed and disposed of, the territories of the former waste location could be offered on preferential terms to the businessman who invests in the solution of the problem. LEGAL BASIS OF WASTE HANDLING All the work on waste handling should be supported by a system of Federal Laws and regulatory documents created on that basis. Due to the lack of laws regulating waste handling, all activities could be blocked by bureaucracy, court decisions, or public protests. Whereas the availability of laws clearly regulating the legal relationship between the subjects involved in the activity in question, would make it possible to implement optimum decisions on radioactive waste handling and to somehow solve the funding issues. The laws currently in force in the Russian Federation that allow effective regulating of the waste handling activities are as follows: Federal Law “On Atomic Energy” Federal Law “On Radiation Safety of the Population” Federal Law “On the Protection of the Environment” Federal Law “On Industrial and Consumer Waste” Federal Law “On the Interior of the Earth” Federal Law “On the Environmental Expert Review”. The regulatory documents developed on the basis of those laws are the following: “Radiation Safety Norms”; “Basic Sanitary Rules for Providing Radiation Safety” “Sanitary Rules for Radioactive Waste Handling; “Sanitary Rules and Technical Conditions for the Disposal of Liquid and Solid Radioactive Waste of Atomic Industry Enterprises”; and a number of others. Implementation of laws, norms, and rules is controlled by the agencies under the Ministry of Health Care of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation, by the State Atomic Inspection Authority, by the State Mining and Technical Inspection Authority within the scope of issues regulated by those agencies. Nevertheless a decision has been made on the development of a law that would govern legal relationships in the radioactive waste handling area. The development and adoption of the law has met considerable obstacles associated with lobbying the corporate interests by lawmakers. Nevertheless, work on the law is near completion.
RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC AND POPULATION Opinion of the public and population on the proposed large-scale projects could play a key part in the adoption or rejection of projects or other forms of waste handling activity. Under the democratization of the public and the development of the electoral system, politicians at different levels become, to a considerable extent, dependent on public opinion of the actions performed with radioactive waste and are forced to take that opinion into account, regardless of wrong it may be. Hence, the
533 work with the public and population during the implementation of radioactive waste handling projects is considered to be an important and specific form of activity. The information provided to the population and public organizations should objectively reflect the core of an issue - the condition of the environment, the projects or works planned in the waste handling area, the safety assessment made, etc. Along with that, the information should be comprehensible to an outsider and available for examination and verification by an independent researcher or organization that could be recruited upon request by the population or public organizations. The centers for public information within the enterprises of the atomic industry justified all hopes. In a widely available and convincing form they provide various information about the work of the enterprise, various reference literature, videos, exhibitions addressing the environmental impact and the health of the population. Implementation of the joint international research projects on the assessment of the impact of the Russian atomic industry enterprises is of great assistance. The authority of foreign agencies and experts in Russia is rather high. As an example, one could refer to the work conducted under the programs of the European Commission and the International Center for Applied System Analysis on the defense waste disposal practices of the Mining and Chemical Combine, Siberian Chemical Combine, Scientific and Research Institute of Nuclear Reactors in Dimitrovgrad City, Ylianovskaya Oblast [3,4, 51.
REFERENCES 1.
Bradlay D.J.: Behind the Nuclear Curtain: Management in the Former Soviet Union. Edited by Payson D.R. Battelle Press, Columbus, Ohio, 1997.
2.
Rybalchenko A.I. et al.: Deep Injection Disposal of Liquid Radioactive Waste in Russia. Battel Press, Columbus, Ohio. USA, 1998.
3.
Compton K.L.et al.: Deep Well Injection of Liquid Radioactive Waste at Krasnoyarsk-26. v 1, International Institute for Applied System Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 2000.
4.
Evaluation of the Radiological Impact Resulting from Injection Operations in Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26. Final report, European Commission, EUR 18189 EN, 1999r.
5.
Measurements, Modeling of Migration and Possible Radiological Consequences at Deep-Well Injection Sites for Liquid Radioactive Waste in Russia. Final report. EUR 17626 EN, 1997.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO ADDRESS THE RADIOACTIVE LEGACY IN STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
DAVID K. SMITH, RICHARD B. KNAPP, NINA D. ROSENBERG, ANDREW F.B. TOMPSON Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, USA The end of the Cold War allows a comprehensive assessment of the nature and extent of the residual contamination derivative from the atomic defense and nuclear power enterprise in the former Soviet Union. The size of the problem is considerable; some 6.3 x lo7 TBq (6.4 x 10' m3) of radioactive waste from the Soviet Union weapons and power complex was produced throughout all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The resulting Contamination occurs at sites throughout the former Soviet Union where nuclear fuels were mined, milled, enriched, fabricated, and used in defense and power reactors. In addition, liquid radioactive wastes from nuclear reprocessing have been discharged to lakes, rivers, reservoirs and other surface impoundments; military and civilian naval reactor effluents were released to sea as well as stabilized on land. Finally, nuclear testing residuals from atmospheric and underground nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya test sites and peaceful nuclear tests conducted throughout the area of the former Soviet Union pose risks to human health and the environment (Figure 1). Through a program of international scientific exchange, cooperative approaches to address these threats provide former Soviet scientists with expertise and technologies developed in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere to design comprehensive and long term remedial solutions. The role of the international community to address these challenges is essential because the emerging states of the former Soviet Union share common nuclear residuals that cross newly established national borders. In addition, the widespread post-Soviet radioactive contamination hampers economic recovery and - in some cases - poses proliferation concerns. Also important is the widespread perception throughout these countries that the Soviet nuclear legacy poses a grave threat to the human population. A new paradigm of "national security" encompasses more than the historical activities of nuclear weapon production, testing, and deterrence and now includes the environment, human and economic health, and the proliferation of weapons-of-mass destruction'. For these reasons the fall of the Soviet Union provides a new imperative and opportunity for systematic, comprehensive and interdisciplinary international efforts to begin to solve these important environmental problems. The environmental degradation from nuclear contamination affecting states of the former Soviet Union is a large topic, and a full description is outside the scope of this paper. A comprehensive overview of environmental concerns and radioactive waste production, inventories, and impacted sites is provided by others'2334.Portions of the summaries provided here are drawn from these works. Table 1 summarizes the current extent of radioactive contamination and state of waste management practice in the former Soviet Union'.
534
535
Table 1.: Summary of Radioactive Contamination in the former Soviet Union Source in Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Radioactive Contamination and Waste Management
Uranium mining and milling
Waste storage in tailings piles. Liquid waste stored in impoundments or discharged to the environment. Total activity is 3.7 x103 TBq. Liquid and solid waste stored at specific site facilities. Total activity is 1.48 x lo2 TBq.
Uranium conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication Commercial nuclear power plants Commercial spent fuel Defense reactors Reprocessing wastes
Nuclear submarines Nuclear icebreakers and container ships Medical, research, and industrial sources
Liquid wastes stored on-site in tanks; solidification of liquid waste. Solid wastes stored on-site. Total activity is 1.5 x lo3 TBq (liquid concentrates). Stored at reactor sites. Total activity is 1.5 x 10'TBq. Cooling water discharge to lakes at Mayak Site. Liquid waste discharged to ponds, lakes and rivers. Widespread releases at Mayak to Techna River and Lake Karachai. Other releases at Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26. Total activity is 2.1 x lo7 TBq (liquid wastes). Liquid and solid waste storage facilities; liquid waste discharged to sea. Total activity is 36 TBq. ~
Liquid and solid waste storage facilities; liquid waste discharged to sea. Total activity 2.0 x lo4 TBq. Stored at generation sites then shipped to treatment, solidification, or disposal facilities near major cities. Total activity is 7.4 x lo4TBq.
Problems associated with the residual contamination are many and have been exacerbated by the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union2. These include: The majority of existing and newly generated radioactive waste is not being treated or stabilized. Engineered storage facilities are no longer considered safe. Inadequate storage capacity for wastes from nuclear power plants, nuclear icebreakers, and submarines. Lack of remedial solutions for liquid radioactive wastes, slurry storage, and liquid tank wastes. The absence of an automated system for accounting and control of radioactive wastes and stored materials. The lack of systematic and standardized procedures for radioactive waste management. The lack of regional repositories for radioactive wastes produced by the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear power generation; existing repositories are aging or are at, or near, capacity.
536 The significant quantity of accumulated wastes and the inadequacy of treatment or storage options for these contaminants increase the risk of accidents and human exposures. In order to illustrate the complexity of these outstanding problems and the role of international approaches to their solution, three case studies involving remedial activities at different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle are described. Each of these studies represents different post-Soviet waste source terms and unique stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. In addition each relies upon multi-lateral international cooperation to effect a long-term solution. This paper extends the approach described by Tompson et al.' by equipping emerging post-Soviet republics - stressed by Cold War environmental degradation - with tools to promote regional stability as well as improve economic conditions, educational opportunities, and public health.
.Pieparhe Nuclear F 3 &Assemblies D - Repmcessing01 Spent Nudear Fuel E -Nuclear Research Centers
B RadiDactiie Waste BuW Sues C Enteiprises Remve Uranlurn and
F -Nuclear Fleet Bases & Plank
500 Slalule Milss
Figure 1. Nuclear waste and contamination sites in the former Soviet Union including the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan, the Ulba Metallurgical Plant, Kazakhstan, and Mailuu-Suu, Kyrgyzstan4.
MAILUU-SUU, KRYGYZSTAN Kyrgyzstan was an important source of uranium to the former Soviet Union since the mid-1940's. Currently there are no active uranium mines. However, 23 tailing deposits and 13 waste rock dumps from Soviet uranium mining operations are located
537 within the town of Mailuu-Suu in kyrgyzstan Nearly 2 x lo6 m3 of radioactive waste, equal to the quantity of processed ore, is prone to release through landslides to tributaries of the Syr-Darya River which is a main source of irrigation water for much of Central Asia. The effect of this debris on the health neighboring populations is not yet completely understood. Mailuu-Suu, with a population of 26,000 people, is situated in a narrow valley, prone to landslides, that drains the Mailuu-Suu River. More than 200 landslides have occurred at Mailuu-Suu over the past 30 years. The Mailuu-Suu River is a tributary of the Syr-Dana River which is the primary source of irrigation for the densely populated Fergana Valley and its agricultural lands which provide crops for neighboring parts of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The large-scale release of radioactive tailings from landslides could severely contaminate the river and downstream areas. Naturally occurring radionuclides include 238Uand its daughters 226Ra,222Rn,230Thas well as '"Pb its daughter 210P07. 222Rnis also released as a gas from subaerial tailings piles. In 2002 a tailings landslide 1.2 km up-gradient of the town dammed the MailuuSuu River; flooding was avoided when the river incised and breached its blockage. While the Mailuu-Suu tailings piles are entirely within Kyrgyzstan, the environmental consequences from these spoils potentially affect neighboring countries. Ethnic tensions in the Fergana Valley are likely to be amplified by the compromise of the main source of surface water to the region. The government of Kyrghystan has acknowledged the regional environmental threats at Mailuu-Suu. Similar practices were used to mine uranium - and dispose of wastes - throughout the Soviet Union and the United States during the height of the Cold War. Tailings were typically accumulated on the banks of majors rivers where they were prone to episodic flooding5. In the late 1970's the U.S. Department ofEnergy established the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) program with responsibility for reducing levels of contamination in surface waters and groundwater at sites of uranium mining and milling in the United States. Tailings were either stabilized in place or excavated and relocated to remote disposal sites. The management experience and technical information gained from clean-up at the UMTRA sites in the United States will be invaluable in planning a remedial program in Mailuu-Suu. ULBA METALLURGICAL PLANT, KAZAKHSTAN The Ulba Metallurgical Plant (UMP) is situated in Ust-Kamenogorsk, in eastem Kazakhstan. In its SO-year history of continual operation, the facility has dominated the industrial base of the city through the production of processed uranium and specialty metals such as beryllium, tantalum, and niobium. The Ulba Plant was founded in 1949 to process zinc bearing monazite ores and produce thorium oxalate. The production of thorium was soon discontinued and, in January 1951, the facility started to produce hydrofluoric acid and beryllium. By 1956, commercial processing of beryl ores allowed the large-scale production of high-purity beryllium oxide. Since this time, tantalum and niobium have also been refined from local ores and regularly produced as metal powders and ceramics, along with the beryllium products. Uranium production at Ulba started in 1953 when the facility began to process uranium ore concentrates for the production of natural U3Og and UK. These processes
538 evolved to emphasize the production of low-enriched uranium during a period when large-scale applications of nuclear power were being developed by the former Soviet Union. Ulba produced significant quantities of propulsion fuel for the nuclear navy fleet of the Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia. In 1976 the plant started to produce fuel pellets for nuclear power plants on a commercial scale. The Ulba Metallurgical Plant produced most of the fuel for nuclear reactors constructed in the USSR between 1976 and 1990. Accompanying the production of these metals is a significant amount of liquid waste residues, which have been, and continue to be generated and disposed of in several retention basins adjoining the facility. The discharge basins are located 3.2 kilometers from the Ulba River and 5.4 kilometers from the Irtysh River. The engineered containment barrier underlying one of the basins has failed and allowed accumulated liquid wastes in the basin to percolate into groundwater and pose a significant threat to nearby potable groundwater supplies in Ust-Kamenogorsk. Although this basin is no longer used, precipitated and other solid forms of the wastes remain in the basin, are entrained in accumulated rainfall and snowmelt, and continue to be discharged into the local groundwater as a persistent and lasting source of contamination. The three main water supply wells for the city of Ust-Kamenogorst are situated between 3.7 and 8.2 kilometers from the basins. The water table is between 3 and 9 meters below the bottom of the disposal basins. Contaminants suspected to have originated from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant have already been detected in nearby monitoring wells and private water supply wells near the city, and the potential for contamination of public water supplies and the Irtysh and Ulba Rivers is serious. Because they were known to be hazardous to human health and the environment, the large volumes of liquid wastes were neutralized to pH 8 and disposed as liquid slurries into a specially designed disposal-basin facility located approximately 3 kilometers north of main production yard. The uranium concentrations in the effluent do not exceed 15 milligrams/liter. The long-term efficacy of the disposal facility relies on the delicate balance between a continuous input of the slurry-based wastes from the plant and a continuous volume reduction due to the evaporation of water from the lined and impermeable storage basins on the other. In this way, solid phase wastes that settle out in the basin or accumulate as precipitates and their corresponding dissolved waste forms remain contained in the disposal facility for long periods of time, unable to percolate into groundwater, and unable to be entrained as particulates into the atmosphere. Egorov et al.4 estimate the Ulba solid waste residuals at 1,135,000 tons with an activity of 38 TBq and liquid residues at 939,000 m3with an activity of 2.3 x lo-’ TBq. A significant portion of the effluent is insoluble and precipitates stratigraphically in the basin along the bottom and adjacent to discharge points as exposed particulate “beaches” (Figure 2). Several years ago, the delicate balance between input and evaporation rates was interrupted in the case of basin “1-3” due to a significant decrease in plant production. As a result, water levels declined to the point where some of the contaminated sediments, particularly along the edge of the basin, were exposed to the atmosphere, leaving uncovered toxic “beaches” vulnerable to wind erosion and dust resuspension. More significantly, the reduced water levels led to the desiccation and partial failure (via cracking) of the clay barrier materials, which was further exacerbated by freezing conditions over one winter. The failed barrier promoted the loss of waste
539 fluids from the basin, allowing contaminants to percolate into the local water supply aquifer and move toward nearby municipal and private water wells. Although this situation was monitored and waste streams were quickly diverted into another viable basin, rain and snowmelt have continued to accumulate in the basin and percolate downwards, entraining contaminants from the sediment “beach” materials and facilitating a steady and long term source of groundwater contamination.
Figure 2. Particulate “beaches” adjoining retention ponds formed from the precipitation of liquid effluent accompanying uranium and beryllium production at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant. Remedial efforts call for the development of a conceptual and numerical model of groundwater flow and chemical transport that can be used to analyze the migration of contamination in the water supply aquifers underlying the Ulba disposal basins. The model will be used ultimately as a means to protect local groundwater quality by facilitating the design of an intervention program as well as the stabilization and control of contaminant discharges from liquid waste ponds at the plant. In addition, the model will also be used, in its initial stages of development, to determine the need for, and guide the acquisition of additional characterization and model calibration data, and later in the design of groundwater monitoring strategies. SEMIPALATINSK TEST SITE, KAZAKHSTAN The former Soviet Union conducted atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons tests at the Novaya Zemlya islands in the Russian Arctic, at the Semipalantinsk Test Site in eastern Kazakhstan, as well as peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) throughout its territory. The weapons program supported a Cold War program of nuclear weapons development and testing as well as, in the case of PNEs, scientific studies that included
540 seismic research, creation of underground storage cavities, and the enhanced recovery of mineral resources. The Soviet Union conducted 715 nuclear explosions from 1949 to 1990. This includes 130 explosions at Novaya Zemlya, 456 at Semipalatinsk, and 129 conducted elsewhere (primarily PNEs)*,~. The total explosive yield of all detonations conducted at Novaya Zemlya and Semipalatinsk is 265 megatons and 17.4 megatons, respectively. PNEs have a total yield of 1.6 megatons. These compare to the 200 megaton total yield from atmospheric and underground tests conducted by the United States'. While more information has been recently published on the nuclear testing program on the absolute amount of of the former Soviet U ~ ~ i o n ~, ~little ' ~ ~data " ~ exists '~ radioactivity affecting surface waters or groundwaters adjacent to these nuclear test sites. The first, and the majority (- 65%), of nuclear tests conducted by the former Soviet Union were conducted at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS). STS was selected as the location of the first Soviet nuclear test (a plutonium device code-named RDS-1 with a 22 kiloton total nuclear yield) in August 1949. The test site was selected in 1948 due to its desert-like setting, a large remote expanse more than 200 kilometers in diameter, and with proximity to an airfield and railhead; the site is 160 km west of the town of Semipalatinsk on tributaries of the Irtysh River. From 1949 until 1962 atmospheric tests were conducted; from 1962 to 1989 STS hosted underground tests. In total, 456 atmospheric and underground nuclear tests were detonated there; of these 70% were underground tests. Testing was confined to distinct and spatially separated experimental areas. The northern "Test Field" was used for atmospheric and ground testing of nuclear weapons. Proof-of-principal experiments were conducted there as were nuclear weapons effects studies on simulated civilian and military targets. Surface explosions conducted in 1949, 1951 and 1953 released some 8.33 x 10' TBq of 90Sr, 1.2 x lo3 TBq of 137Csand 34.8 TBq of Pu of radioactivity (decay corrected to 1994) to the environment4. Neighboring cities, including Dolon to the northeast of the test site, were exposed to large doses of radioactivity; nearly 10,000 people of a total population of 70,000 received radiation during the atmospheric testing periods from 1949 to 19632. Subsequent international radiological monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1993 and 1994 determined that radioactivity from these atmospheric tests is currently confined to areas immediately surrounding ground zeros and no longer poses a health risk to nearby pop~lations'~. Underground nuclear testing was conducted in tunnels and adits 200m to 2 km long cut in the Degelen Mountain massif, at the bottom of 200m to 2 km deep vertical shafts, 1 meter in diameter, drilled in the Lake Balapan test area, and within auxillary vertical shafts in the Murzhik Site. 209 tests were conducted at Degelen Mountain, 105 tests were conducted at Lake Balapan, and 26 underground tests were conducted at Murzhik. Degelen is a granite rock intrusion that is characterized by geologic faults and extensive fracturing; surface water actively recharges this area and results in perched groundwater with flow rates in excess of 3000L/minute in some areas". The geologic setting of the Balapan area is equally complex with steeply dipping and faulted sediments and metasediments. Groundwater is located in areas of tectonic faulting; the depth to groundwater is between 5 to 15 m below the ground surface.
-
-
-
-
541
Containment of underground nuclear tests at the STS was inadequate. After the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, standard practice called for all underground nuclear tests to incorporate measures to prevent the release of radionuclides to the atmosphere. Containment required the nuclear explosion to be conducted in rock with sufficient strength and spacing between tests that it would not mechanically fail due to the force of the detonation. In addition, the tunnels or boreholes were further sealed with backfill and grouting materialsI0. However, only 50% of Soviet underground tests qualified as '111 camouflet explosions' where radioactivity was fully contained underground. 45% of the explosions were 'partial camouflet explosions' where there was some leakage of radioactive noble gases (e.g., l3lrnXet = 11.9 days; 133mXe t 112 = 2.2 days; 133gXe t112 = 5.2 days; 135gXe t 112 = 9.1 hours; 37Art 112 =i 35.0 days) from ground zero to the atmosphere (Figure 3). Thirteen tests at STS were 'partial camouflet explosions' with non-standard radiation releases to the environment. These containment accidents deviated substantiallyfrom standard testing practice and resulted in radiological exposures to neighboring human populations in excess of maximum permissible concentrations.
Figure 3. Schematic of gas release and venting through a geologic fault from a nuclear test conducted in a tunnel at Degelen Mountain. 1 = tunnel; 2 = zero room; 3 = damaged rock radius; 4 = surface spa11 zone; 5 geologic faults; 6 and 7 containment stemming; 8 = radius of gas transport; 9 = gas flow through tectonic fault". The International Atomic Energy Agency has determined that surface quickl contamination from atmospheric nuclear test contamination (- 185 GBq h2) falls back to ground in a radial direction away from the center of these explosions' Y. However, the radiological effects of nuclear testing are yet to be fully understood. Recent reports indicate the presence of large uantities of unsecured plutonium metal available on the surface of parts of the test sitj2. The health and proliferation threat is only compounded as the local nomadic population of eastern Kazakhstan repopulates the lands of the SemipalatinskTest Sites and reverts to traditional livelihoods of grazing and agriculture. In addition proven mineral reserves of Cr, Cu, Pb, W, Mo and Au exist in more than 30 mapped ore deposits. Coal mines within the borders of the STS are also actively being mined. Due to the poor record of containment the potential for contamination of groundwater and the ensuing risk to down-gradient receptors remains high. At Degelen Mountain, nuclear testing resulted in severe structural damage to the rock itself. Twenty
542 seven tunnels are discharging water and 24 tunnel entrances (out of 127 adits) are contaminated by measurable levels of 90Sr, 137Csand 239Pu. Deterioration of the aging tunnel workings has only hastened the migration of radionuclides. At the Balapan test area, the release of gaseous radionuclides due to venting was widespread; like Degelen, the force of the explosion has weakened the structural integrity of the rock surrounding the explosions and has increased the likelihood of radionuclide migration in groundwater. Methane present in some boreholes due to the breakdown of organic-rich shales and coals has also resulted in spontaneous combustion and burning of some shafts". The maximum extent of groundwater contamination requires further study; however, ambient groundwater velocities are enhanced by the permeability afforded both by tectonic and test-induced fracturing. Concentrations of tritium, 90Sr,and 137Cshave been measured in groundwaters of the Degelen and Balapan testing areas. At the Balapan test area groundwaters produced from an unused borehole (no. 1419) have a tritium concentration of 1.4 x lo6 Bq/L and a 90Srconcentration of 2.0 x lo3 Bq/L; the nearest nuclear test was 1 kilometer distant. Clearly, groundwater is currently mobilizing radionuclides, but the nature, extent, and velocity of the transport is unknown and requires comprehensive investigation. For these reasons, scientists from the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan, the Russian Academy of Sciences and the U.S. defense programs national laboratories (with support from U S . Government) have initiated a collaboration to address the problem of the extent of groundwater contamination from the underground nuclear tests conducted at the STS. These efforts incorporate a combined approach that relies on field and laboratory investigations to retum data on the extent of radiochemical contamination of groundwater. In turn this data will be used to construct hydrologic flow and coupled contaminant transport models that can be used to assess and manage the present and future spread of contamination as well as effectively plan for long-term radiological monitoring to best protect human health and the environment. These methods have proven successful to address the migration of radionuclides in groundwater, and dose to potential down-gradient receptors, at sites of underground nuclear tests conducted by the United S t a t e ~ ' ~ . CONCLUSIONS
In describing several case studies of radioactive contamination in states of the former Soviet Union, the role of the international community to address these problems cannot be underestimated. The residual contamination described here is daunting, affects large numbers of people, crosses political borders, is hydrochemically complex, as well as requires critical strategies (and technologies) for effective long-term solutions. For these reasons, cooperative approaches using science and technology provide common tools that combine the capabilities of military, academic, ministerial, private organization, and other partners'. The long-term viability of emerging post-Soviet governments hinges on their ability to effectively solve legacy environmental problems and best protect their citizens by promoting responsible environmental and economic practices. As such, this is also very much a national security issue. Due to the new access afforded to the territories of the former Soviet Union by the end of the Cold War, as well as organizations and fimding to promote international partnerships, the many threats from radionuclide
543 contamination within the former Soviet Union can now be fully evaluated and potentially mitigated. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract No. W-7405-Eng-48. REFERENCES Tompson, A.F.B., Richardson, J.H., Ragaini, R.C., Knapp, R.B., Rosenberg, N.D., Smith, D.K., and Ball, D.Y., 2002, Science and technology to advance regional security in the Middle East and Central Asia, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-JC-150576, 17p. Bradley, D.J., 1997, Behind the nuclear curtain: radioactive waste management in 2. the former Soviet Union, (D.R. Payson, ed.), Battelle Press, 716p. Bradley, D.J., Frank, C.W., Mikerin, Y, 1996, Nuclear contamination from 3. weapons complexes in the former Soviet Union and the United States, Physics Today, v. 49, p. 40-45. Egorov, N.N., Novikov, V.M., Parker, F.L., Popov, V.K. (eds.), 2000, The radiation 4. legacy of the Soviet nuclear complex, London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 236p. Buckley, P.B., Ranville, J., Honeymaq B.D., Smith, D.K., Rosenberg, N. and 5. Knapp, R.B., 2003, Progress toward remediation of uranium tailings in MailuuSuu, Kyrgyzstan. In Proceedings of Tailings and Mine Waste '03, Vail, Colorado, 12-15 October, 2003. Rotterdam: Balkema. Knapp, R.B., Richardson, J.H., Rosenberg, N., Smith, D.K., Tompson, A.F.B., 6. Saranogoev, A., Duisebayev, B., Janecky, D., 2002, Radioactive tailings issues in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In Proceedings of Tailings and Mine Waste '02, Fort Collins, Colorado, 27-30 January, 2002. Rotterdam: Balkema. 7 U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM), 1999, radiological sources of potential exposure andor contamination, TG-238, 285p. 8. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), 1998, Exposures from man-made sources of radiation, 47th Session of UNSCEAR, 130p. Tsaturov, Y.S., Matushchenko, A.M., Dubasov, Y., Krasilov, G.A., Logachev, 9. B.A., Maltsev, A.L., Safronov, V.G., Filippovski, V.I., Smagulov, S.G., 1998, Semipalatinsk and northern test sites in the USSR integrated program of radiation and ecological studies on environmental consequences of nuclear tests, in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests: Environmental and Human Consequences, (C.S. Shapiro, ed.) Springer-Verlag, p. 199-218. 10. Adushkin, V.V. and Leith, W., 2001, The containment of Soviet underground nuclear explosions, U S . Geological Survey, Open File Report 01-312, 52p. 11. Shkolnik, V.S. (ed.), 2002, The Semipalatinsk Test Site: creation, operation, and conversion, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND 2002-3612P, 396p. 1.
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12. Stone, R., 2003, Plutonium fields forever, Science, v. 300, p. 1220-1224. 13. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 1998, Radiological conditions at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan: preliminary assessment and recommendations for further study, International Atomic Energy Agency STVPUB/1063, 43p. 14. Tompson, A.F.B., Bruton, C.J., Pawloski, G.A. (eds.), 1999, Evaluation of the hydrologic source term from underground nuclear tests in Frenchman Flat at the Nevada Test Site: the CAMBRIC test, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-ID-132300,3 19p.
CONTAMINATION AND VULNERABILITY OF GROUNDWATER RESOURCES IN RUSSIA DR. IGOR S. ZEKTSER, PROF. Water Problem Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Russia
In the last few years in Russia, large-scale research programmes have been carried out to allow the regional quantitative assessment of natural groundwater resources. The hydrogeological natural and safe yield groundwater resources are estimated. Natural resources (dynamic resources) characterize a value of groundwater recharge by infiltrated atmospheric precipitation, river runoff and leakage from other aquifers, totally expressed by flow intensity value or water table thickness, inflowing to groundwater level. Therefore, natural resources are the factors indicating groundwater spreading, showing its main mineral ability to recur. Groundwater natural resources are an upper border that defines recharge of constant wells with nolimit exploitation terms (excluding wells with debits forming with the help of additional resources used during exploitation). Under regional estimation, groundwater is mainly expressed by annual average and minimal values of groundwater modules (litres per second per 1 h2). Regional estimation of groundwater safe yield is made by determining the volume of groundwater withdrawal from the aquifer, provided that groundwater level decline by the end of exploitation does not exceed a specified value (determined in advance, basing the data on water-bearing-later parameters), and water quality must satisfy certain standards. Under regional estimation, calculation of both potential and predicted potential reserves is usually made. What is the difference between them? Potential exploited reserves characterize maximum possible groundwater withdrawal out of the aquifer, and predicted resources point at possible groundwater use under a certain location of consumers or considering a concrete water demand. Here, a regional assessment of predicted potential reserves is made either for conditional wellfield location, or (if it is known) taking into account a scheme of particular water consumers’ location and water demand. Lately, considerable work has been done in Russia on regional assessment of groundwater potential reserves of artesian basins. Maps on different scales with potential reserves moduli have been compiled. Module of potential reserves means water yield that can be obtained fiom 1 sq. km of the aquifer area. Under regional estimation of potential reserves for separate prospective regions, water demand of concrete water consumers and possible location of future well fields were taken into consideration. As a result, for most hydrogeological regions of the country, a principal possibility for groundwater use has been revealed and a base has been made for planning prospecting and exploration works for water supply of concrete objects. However, it should be noted that a decision for designing and drilling groundwater well fields is taken up, not based on the results of regional assessment of its natural or potential reserves but only after conducting special works with an obligatory approval of groundwater safe yield by a state or territorial commission for mineral resources. As a result of regional natural groundwater resources estimation, groundwater runoff maps of different scales were made. They show values of groundwater flow area, the share of groundwater in total river runoff and total water rate on 1 h2 balance in different nature and domestic conditions. Important work is done for
545
546 regional estimation of all groundwater exploitation resources of artesian basins and country hydrological massifs. These research programmes allowed present and prospective natural groundwater population supply of different Russian Federation constituentsto be identified. During the last few years in Russia, groundwater gravity increase is observed in the general balance of drinking water supply sources. At the moment the share of groundwater in the country’s water supply for the population i s on average 46% (41% for municipal and 83% for agricultural water supply). However, the drinking water supplies of many cities, especially large ones, including Moscow and Saint Petersburg, are based on surface water unprotected from pollution, and part of these cities have no dissolved ground sources of water supply. In Russia, since 1979 (earlier - on the USSR territory), the data of operational stocks of groundwater, their use and quality (it is part of the State monitoring of the country’s underground conditions) are annually generalized within the framework of State water cadastre. The received data are published in annual brochures. The data given below are taken from a brochure published in 2002, made by Gostsentr “Geomonitoring”. The total value of forecasting natural and salt groundwater resources with mineralization to 3 s/l is estimated at 870 mln.m3/day.However, the total quantity of proved exploiting groundwater resources used for drinking and technical water supply, irrigation and stock-water development in country average is not over lo%, and for the first January 2002 is about 89.4 mln.m3/day. Development of groundwater in 2000, including mine and open pit pumping, was 33.1 mln m3/day. However approximately 27.2 mln m3/day were used (82% of the extracted water), the others, mainly taken out of mines and pits, were dumped without use. From the total quantity of groundwater withdrawn, about 76% is used for drinking water supply, 22% for technological water supply and 2% - for the irrigation of crops and pastures. On average, one person uses 188 litres of groundwater per day, including 145 litres per day for drinking water supply. There is a valid Water Law in Russia that regulates the use of the country’s water resources, including groundwater. According to this law, natural groundwater is of high priority when making decisions about the population’s water supply. Natural groundwater can be used mainly for drinking water supply. The use of groundwater for other purposes not connected with drinking water supply (for example, industry or irrigation), is only permitted in cases where there is a sufficient quantity of groundwater to supply both present and future needs for the drinking water supply. It can also be allowed under a special license issued by the Environmental Body. At the present time, more than 60% of cities and towns in the Russian Federation have groundwater sources of water supply. Groundwater is the main source of water supply in small and average towns, however, in some regions, its function in the domestic and potable water supply of large cities, including those with population exceeding I million people, is very limited. Let us discuss in more detail a pattern of public water supply in the largest cities of Russia (with a population of more than 250,000) as noted in Table 1. The water supply of 34 of the 77 cities is predominantly based on surface water (more than go%), and 24 cities meet their water demands mainly by groundwater (more than 90%).
547
table 1 water supply of cities and towsn with different Less than 50th~ Mainly groundwater (more 74 than 90 %) Mainly surface water (Over 15 90 %) 11 Ground and surface water Water-supply sources
51lOOths
101251501th~ Over 250th~ 500th~ -1mln lmln
57
46
37
3
0
21
24
37
39
82
22
30
26
28
18
Groundwater pollution, occurring in recent decades in many regions, is a serious hazard, essentially limiting the possibilities and perspectives of groundwater use for a potable water supply. An increase in the concentration of compounds of nitrogen, iron, manganese, strontium, selenium, arsenic, fluorine, beryllium and organic matter is most often observed in groundwater and makes it useless for drinking purposes without special treatment. The reason that groundwater contamination is a threat to potable and domestic water supplies is, in many cases, petroleum-products leakage from gasoline tanks and pipelines. For example, in the territory of Russia, more than 100 sources of groundwater contamination have been found [mainly sulfates, chlorides, nitrogen compounds (nitrates, ammonia, ammonium), petroleum, phenols, iron compounds, heavy metals (copper, zinc, lead, cadmium, and mercury)]. Areas of groundwater pollution extend, in some cases, over tens and even hundreds of square kilometres. Groundwater pollution in these operating well fields is most hazardous. At present, groundwater pollution is found in about 140 well fields that supply 87 Russian towns with water. Industrial plants are the main source of groundwater contamination, amounting to 42% of all the contaminated sites. This is followed by waste accumulators and filtration fields, wastewater irrigation from cattle-breeding farms and filtration from the agricultural use of pesticides, manures, and fertilizers (20%). Fourteen percent of the sites are contaminated with wastewater and public service wastes. Non-standard groundwater also serves as a source of contamination because of its leakage to the well fields when the production is disturbed. In addition to groundwater pollution in separate wells and well fields, regional groundwater pollution occurs. Regional changes of groundwater composition and properties are usually caused by both point and areal pollution sources. Close interaction of groundwater with the environment and other components has been especially well demonstrated, as was obvious in recent decades, when the impact of man-induced factors on the environment progressed greatly. For example, urban impact on groundwater quality on a regional scale is the most intensive. This results fi-om increased mineralization of precipitation in urban areas and “acid” rain, oil-products leakage, and the impact of industrial and sewage waste. Groundwater salinity in urban territories is usually 2-3 times higher than in rural areas. The impact of acid rain is the second example. It is known that atmospheric emission of chemicals doubles every 10 years, which results in an increase in their concentration in atmospheric precipitation. Under the heading of infiltration of
548 atmospheric precipitation and snow-melt water, lie many different elements that change the groundwater’s hydro chemical regime, its composition and quality. The most tragic example is associated with the impact of atomic power stations. The Chernobyl disaster’s impact on groundwater was observed at a great distance from the site of the catastrophe. Considerable radionuclide accumulations were formed in the upper soil level in the Chernobyl area. Radionuclide migration through the vadose zone resulted in the growth of their concentration by several tens and even hundreds of times and even at large depth (up to 100 m), as compared with the situation before the failure. There are many similar cases. All these examples show that regional environmental pollution results in regional groundwater pollution. This makes it clear that problems of groundwater protection from contamination are closely related to a general problem of environmental protection from contamination.
15. AIDS VACCINE STRATEGIES AND ETHICS IN INFECTIOUS DISEASES WORKSHOP
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JOINT WORKING GROUP REPORT OF AIDS AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES PMP AND MOTHER AND CHILD HEALTH PMP* 2003 ETHICAL ISSUES IN AIDS-HIV EPIDEMICS
GUY DE THE Institut Pasteur, Paris, France NATHALIE CHARPAK Instituto Materno Infantil, Bogoti, Colombia Other Panel Members: R. Anderson, F. Buonaguro, I. Franca Jr., J. Hinkula, J. Hutton, U. Schuklenk, W.A. Sprigg, R. Thorstensson, E.Vardas, I. Warren, R. Zettenstrom INTRODUCTION The World Federation of Scientists held a workshop on mother to child transmission of HIV (reference) in 2001. Control of HIV by both ARV treatment and vaccine development has progressed, but the epidemic still expanded with 800,000 babies infected in 2002. More on the currentfigures of the epidemics (references). This article presents the common views of a diverse group of scientists, with different training, experience and interests, on the key issues to be addressed concerning HIV vaccine research and antiretroviral therapy in both developed and developing countries. These issues can logically be considered on a "temporal" scale: short-term and long-term issues. Each scale has individual and community aspects. However, there is no dichotomy of individual versus community, vaccine versus treatment, or even short-term versus long-term. All issues are inter-related. The earliest legislation on the protection of subjects of medical research is that of Germany in 1900. In 1947 the Nuremberg Code was published. Informed, voluntary consent is the first of its ten points. Scientific rigour, careful and continuing evaluation of benefits and risks are also required. The World Medical Association made the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964. Many versions of this extended document have followed. There are few, if any, new ethical principles; the additions address implementation and medical responsibilities. By 1981, the WHO - CIOMS (Council of the International Organization of Medical Sciences) published guidelines for application of the Declaration of Helsinki in different cultures, with particular concern for developing countries. These medical codes focus on people as patients or subjects. In contrast, the International Statistical Institute's Declaration of Professional Ethics (1985) states obligations to four groups, all of whom must be considered: society, subjects, colleagues and employers or funders. Statisticians must be familiar with the codes of ethics of those with whom they work. Current work on a revision of this declaration includes making explicit the collective professional responsibility to comment publicly on errors of omission as well as commission. The Royal Statistical Society Code of Conduct (1993) requires Fellows to address human rights, consequences of ignoring statisticaljudgements and the needs of fellow members. In many areas of public health, a genuine tension exists between the wishes of the individual (a freedom of action of the individual), and the well being of the
.
551
552 community in which an individual lives. Individual behaviours may affect the wellbeing of the community as a whole. In the past year we have witnessed a very important example: quarantine for suspected SARS patients, applied voluntary in many countries, but imposed in others. In the context of HIV/AIDS, the issue emerges in many areas, including: contact tracing of infected people to reduce secondary or tertiary transmission events, the need for anonymous HIV screening, care of people and their partners who were not informed of their serostatus, and the need to counsel those participants in an HIV vaccine trial to ensure that vaccination (or administration of a placebo) does not encourage unprotected sexual contact which concomitantly generates secondary infections. The resolution of any such tension must be considered within the prevailing political and social context of any given society. Solutions will depend on these prevailing conditions. NEW ETHICAL ISSUES AIDS Vaccines trials In vaccine research and development, only a small number of vaccine preparations are being tested in Phase I and I1 clinical trials. There are very few Phase I11 clinical trials. As we do not know which preparation will be effective for prevention and therapy, we urge the European Community to finance the testing of several existing vaccine preparations to speed up the emergence of a good candidate. The effort of the NIH and of the Global Fund must be complemented by a major EC effort. Cooperation between funding agencies or institutions must be achieved to allow clinical vaccine trials. Study trials must include education and technological transfer to the clinical trial sites in the developing countries to avoid neocolonialism. Work on outcome measures for vaccine and therapies is urgent, as specific endpoints are required to compare different vaccine candidates and regimens tested in different studies. International agreement on which outcomes must be used for evaluation is necessary, because meta-analysis of publications with individually selected results can be seriously misleading or wrong and hence unethical (Hutton and Williamson, J. Roy Stat SOC2000). Clinical endpoints could range from prevention of the infection to disease prevention or maintenance of the low virus titer during structured ARV interruptions. An ethical issue that has been highlighted in phase VII HIV vaccine trials that are being planned in developing countries is that of intercurrent HIV infections of participants. Participants will receive compensation for “trial-related injuries”, usually for the duration of the trial, and in selected cases of severe side effects for longer periods of time. For example, in South Africa there is currently (August 2003) no government antiretroviral policy in the public sector. Agreements between sponsors, researchers and regulatory authorities in South Africa have been reached. This policy accepts that sponsors will provide funding for a trust fund to be established. Money from the trust fund would provide treatment of individuals becoming infected during phase VII HIV vaccine trials once they become ill with AIDS (using CDC criteria for the initiation of therapy). The debate is therefore focused around when to give treatment and also for how long and how this will be administered (i.e. by the researchers or physicians outside the research environment). This policy that the ethical prerogative for these intercurrent infections during phase I/II HIV vaccine trials is placed purely on the sponsors/researchers. This occurs even though these types of trials are purely safety trials with candidate vaccines that have no proven
553 efficacy and this is clearly explained during the informed consent process. (Eftyhia must give some clarifications and a shorter version.) Experimental vaccines or antiretroviral drugs must pass the standard FDA (or equivalent) regulations for medical products, which require testing on small animals. This implies a right of access to experimental animals. Each vaccine candidate under consideration should be justified by its endpoint use, to improve human health. Analyses aimed at improving the quality of therapeutic or preventive agents in animal models such as mice or primates must be performed under the highest ethical standards. Legislation on the care of experimental animals must be evaluated by exploring the restrictions imposed on vaccine and treatment development and by explicitly assessing alternative opportunities for gaining knowledge. AIDSLHIV related stigma exists at all levels of prevention and treatment, and affects recruitment and follow-up of study participants. It must be vigorously opposed so that vaccines and therapies can be correctly and effectively developed. Experience with Phase I trial participants in the USA and South Africa highlights the diverse responses in different communities. In the USA, many HIV vaccine trial participants found it difficult to reveal their participation in these trials to their friends and colleagues, and chose to maintain confidentiality. However, in South Africa trial participants feel that by publicizing their participation in phase I vaccine trials they can convince their communities of the good they are doing in the face of a devastating epidemic which decimates their communities. In South Africa these participants are seen as heroes doing significant and good work for the HIV epidemic. Differences in stigma should be addressed in informed consent procedures, as they vary with cultural diversity and social habits. Various cultural approaches to informed consent are evolving as the number of international collaborative projects increases. Particular consideration must be given to implementing informed consent with people whose literacy is limited. Some vaccine trials are community-based. The associated ethical issues are discussed in WHO CIOMS (1993) and in the UK Medical Research Council guidelines for clustered randomised studies (2002). Access to anti-retroviral treatment We must remember that HIV/AIDS treatment is a lifetime commitment for the patient and society. Lessons learned from the Brazilian experience of 6 years treatment showed that a developing country can reverse the AIDS crisis. We support access to local production in order to provide full treatment for everybody in each country affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemics. The moral obligation of ensuring access to anti-HIV drugs for deprived populations should be linked to the need to ensure mechanisms to monitor HIV drug resistance. International and regional cooperation is needed to strength the capacity to produce drugs. If a country cannot produce drugs or vaccines, nonprofit production for regional distribution should be allowed. We recognize the need to control exports of drugs between regions. As anti-viral treatment of pregnant women leads to a significant reduction of mother-child HIV transmission, we feel that the MTCT HIV must be prevented by the pursuit of ART in the mother and the follow-up of the children. One issue has to be urgently, scientifically, evaluated is the risk of breastfeeding when the mother is treated adequately. A further MTCT issue is the fight against the stigma of nonbreastfeeding of mothers. International collaborative projects helped that.
554
International cooperation There is an increasing and urgent need to combine international scientific and financial support with commitment by local governments to efficiently combat HlV/AIDS epidemics. Building health sciences capacities at national and regional levels needs new impetus. This implies not only increased funding, but also the personal involvement of the best scientists and clinicians by entering collaborative projects with colleagues om developing countries. We urge research and university organizations to recognize the value of such collaboration for the careers of the people involved.
CONCLUSIONS We recognize that the issues facing low, middle and high-income countries are somewhat different, and that decisions for implementation are influenced by their cultural patterns. Therefore, although there are universal human rights, including that of having access to existing HIV drugs, the implementation of ART requires building up the health infrastructure. The needs are different among low, middle and highincomes countries. As scientists we urge governments and aid organisations to recognise the implications of fulfilling commitments to highly indebted nations, of the provision of universal access to education and of the World Trade Organisation rules on goods and services for the spread of HIV and AIDS. Poverty accelerates epidemics. AIDSMIV related stigma and discrimination is a scientific and ethical issue, and should be addressed in study designs, because of its impact on methodology and results. A loss of even 10% of patients due to fear of stigma can substantially affect conclusions of scientific studies. Statistical methods of assessing the impact of loss to follow up should be exploited. Expert statistical involvement in the design of surveys and experiments is a moral requirement. Studies that are incorrect cannot be ethically acceptable. The scientific community needs to be aware of their vulnerability in their relationships with politicians, governments and the media. We recognized each individual’s responsibility as a scientist to avoid statements or expressing views that have major adverse public health impacts outside of the scientific community. Universities, research institutes and professional societies should recognize their obligation to educate the public about scientific issues and derived governmental policies. This obligation is especially acute with respect to controversial issues that can endanger public health and safety.
SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS
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SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Hussein A1 Shahristani
University of Surrey Guilford, UK
Professor Roy Anderson
Infectious Diseases Epidemiology Imperial College Faculty of Medicine London, UK
Dr. Giuseppe Tito Aronica
Hydrological Works Universita di Messina Messina, Italy
Dr. Scott Atran
Institut Jean Nicod CNRS Paris, France
Professor William A. Barletta
Accelerator & Fusion Research Division Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Berkeley, USA
Dr. Paul Bartel
US Geological Survey Washington, USA
Professor Benfratello
University of Palermo Palermo, Italy
H. E. Dr. Guido Bertolaso
Italian Civil Protection Rome, Italy
Professor J. M. Borthagaray
Instituto Superior de Urbanism0 University of Buenos Aires Buenos Aires, Argentina
557
558 Professor Enzo Boschi
National Institute for Geophysics and Vulcanology Rome, Italy
Dr. Vladimir B. Britkov
Information Systems Laboratory Institute for Systems Analysis Moscow, Russia
Dr. Franco Buonaguro
Fondazione Pascale Istituto Nazionale dei Tumori Naples, Italy
Dr. Diego Buriot
World Health Organisation CSR Office Lyon, France
H. E. Professor Rocco Buttiglione
Ministry of E. U. Affairs Rome, Italy
Dr. Gina M. Calderone
EA Science and Technology New York, USA
Dr. Paolo Capizzi
National Meteorological Service Rome, Italy
Dr. John P. Casciano
Enterprise Security Group Reston, USA
Professor Joseph Chahoud
Physics Department Bologna University Bologna, Italy
Dr. Nathalie Charpak
Instituto Materno Infantil Bogota, Colombia
559
Professor Robert Clark
Hydrology and Water Resources University of Arizona Tucson, USA
Dr. James H. Clarke
Civil and Environmental Engineering Vanderbilt University Nashville, USA
Dr. Massimo COCCO
National Institute for Geophysics and Vulcanology Rome, Italy
Sir Alan Cook
The Royal Society London, UK
Professor Carmelo Dazzi
Herbaceous Cultivation and Pedology University of Palermo Palermo, Italy
Professor Guy de TM
Epidemiology of Oncogenic Viruses Institut Pasteur Paris, France
Dr. Carmen Difiglio
Energy Technology Policy Division International Energy Agency Paris, France
Dr. Mbareck Diop
Science & Technology Advisor Dakar, Senegal
Dr. Allan Duncan
NIREX Waste Management Advisory Committee Oxon, UK
560
Profesor Christopher D. Ellis
Landscape Architecture & Urban Planning Texas A&M University College Station, USA
Dr. Lome Everett
Stone & Webster Management Consultants, Inc. Santa Barbara, USA
Dr. Ivan Franqa Junior
Public Health Faculty University of SBo Paulo Sgo Paulo, Brazil
Professor William Fulkerson
Joint Institute for Energy and Environment University of Tennessee Lenoir City, USA
Professor Andrei Gagarinslu
PRC “Kurchatof Institute” Moscow, Russia
Dr. Bertil Galland
Writer and Historian B u y , France
Dr. Richard Garwin
Thomas J. Watson Research Center IBM Research Division
Yorktown Heights, USA Dr. Gebhard Geiger
Applied Economics Technische Universitat Miinchen Munich, Germany
H. E. Dr. Carlo Giovanardi
Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs Rome, Italy
561
Professor Alberto GonzAlezPozo
Theory and Analysis Universidad Aut6noma Metropolitana Xochimilco, Mexico
Professor Louis J. Guillette, Jr.
U.F. Research Foundation University of Florida Gainesville, USA
Dr. Balamurugan Gurusamy
The Institute of Engineers Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Dr. Munther J. Haddadin
Ministry of Water & Irrigation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Amman, Jordan
Professor Jorma Hinkula
Karolinska Institute & Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control Stockholm, Sweden
Ms. Elizabeth K. Hocking
Argonne National Laboratory Washington, USA
Professor Reiner K. Huber
Faculty of Informatics Universitat der Bundeswehr Miinchen Neubiberg, Germany
Dr. Jane L. Hutton
Department of Statistics The University of Warwick Coventry, UK
Dr. Ahmad Kamal
Ambassador (ret.) U. N. Institute for Training and Research New York, USA
562 Dr. Ibrahim Karawan
Middle East Center University of Utah Salt Lake City, USA
Professor W. A. Kastenberg
Department of Nuclear Engineering University of California Berkeley, USA
Dr. Tomio Kawata
Office for Policy Planning & Administration Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute Ibaraki,Japan
Dr. Hisham Khatib
Honorary Vice Chairman World Energy Council Amman, Jordan
Dr. Stephen J. Kowall
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory Idaho Falls, USA
Professor Victor A. Kremenyuk
Institute of USA Studies Russian Academy of Sciences Moscow, Russia
Dr. Andrei Krutskih
Department of Science and Technology Russian Foreign Ministry Moscow, Russia
Professor Valery Kukhar
Institute for Bio-organic Chemistry Academy of Sciences Kiev, Ukraine
Professor Tsung-Dao Lee
Department of Physics Columbia University New York, USA
563
Professor Axel Lehmann
Institute for Technical Informatics Universiat der Bundeswehr Miinchen Neubiberg, Germany
Dr. Arthur H. Lemer-Lam
Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory Columbia University New York, USA
Dr. Genevieve Lester
International Institute for Strategic Studies -US. Washington, USA
Dr. Mark D. Levine
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Environmental Energy Technologies Berkeley, USA
Dr. Luca Malagnini
National Institute for Geophysics and Vulcanology Rome, Italy
Professor Michael E. Mann
Department of Environmental Sciences University of Virginia Charlottesville, USA
Professor Sergio Martellucci
Physics and Energy Science &Technology Universitzl degli Studi di Roma “Tor Vergata” Rome, Italy
H. E. Professor Antonio Marzano
Ministry of Productive Activities Rome, Italy
Professor Farhang Mehr
University of Boston Boston, USA
,564 Dr. Anton Micallef
Euro-Mediterranean Centre on Insular Coastal Dynamics Valletta, Malta
Dr. Akira Miyahara
National Institute for Fusion Science Tokyo, Japan
Dr. Andrea Morelli
National Institute for Geophysics and Vulcanology Rome, Italy
Professor Wael Mualla
Water Engineering University of Damascus Damascus, Syria
Commander W. Muller-Seedorf
Center for Analyses and Studies German Armed Forces Waldbrol, Germany
Dr. Amador Muriel
World Laboratory Centre for Fluid Dynamics Makati, The Philippines
Professor John Peterson Myers
Environmental Health Sciences Crozet, USA
Mr. Ken Nash
Nuclear Waste Management Division Ontario Power Generation Toronto, Canada
Dr. Slobodan Nickovic
Euro-Mediterranean Centre on Insular Coastal Dynamics Valletta, Malta
565
Dr. Jef Ongena
Ecole Royale Militaire Plasma Physics Laboratory Brussels, Belgium
Professor Carlos Ordofiez
Physics Department University of Houston Houston, USA
Professor Guy Ourisson
Neurochemistry Centre AcadCmie des Sciences Strasbourg, France
Professor Donato Palumbo
World Laboratory Centre Fusion Training Programme Palenno, Italy
Dr. David E. Parker
Meteorological Office Centre for Climate Prediction & Research Berkshire, UK
Professor Stefan0 Parmigiani
Evolutional and Functional Biology University of Parma Parma, Italy
Professor Margaret Petersen
Hydrology & Water Resources University of Arizona Tucson, USA
Professor A. Townsend Peterson
Ecology and Evolutional Biology University of Kansas Lawrence, USA
Professor Juras Pozela
Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Vilnius, Lithuania
566
Professor Richard Ragaini
Department of Environmental Protection Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, USA
Professor Vittorio Ragaini
Chemical Physics and Electro-Chemistry University of Milano Milan, Italy
Professor Salvatore Raimondi
Herbaceous Cultivation and Pedology University of Palermo Palermo, Italy
Professor Karl Rebane
Department of Physics University of Tallinn Tallinn, Estonia
Professor Norman Rosenberg
Joint Global Change Research Institute Baltimore. USA
Dr. Arthur H. Rosenfeld
California Energy Commission Sacramento, USA
Professor Giuseppe Rossi
Civil and Environmental Engineering University of Catania Catania, Italy
Dr. Luca Rossi
Hydraulic Emergencies Italian Civil Protection Agency Rome, Italy
Professor Zenonas Rudzikas
Theoretical Physics & Astronomy Institute Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Vilnius, Lithuania
567
Dr. A. Rybalchenko
FGUP VNIPI Promtechnologij Moscow, Russia
Professor Ilkay Salihoglu
Institute of Marine Sciences Middle East Technical University Icel, Turkey
Dr. Maher Salman
Irrigation Water Management IPRID/AGL FA0 Rome, Italy
H. E. Msgr. Marcel0 Shchez Sorondo
Bishop-Chancellor Pontificia Academia Scientiarum Rome, The Vatican
Dr. Benjamin Santer
Climate Model Diagnosis & Intercomparison Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livennore, USA
Professor Mario Santoro
Hydraulics Engineering and Environmental Applications University of Palermo Palermo, Italy
Dr. Jean B. Savy
International Institute for Strategic Studies Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, USA
Professor Hiltmar Schubert
Fraunhofer Institute for Chemical Technology Pfinztal, Germany
Professor Udo Schuklenk
Bioethics Division University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg, South Africa
568 Dr. Leonard0 Seeber
Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory Columbia University, New York, USA
Professor Gerald0 Gomes Serra
NUTAU University of Sao Paolo S b Paulo, Brazil
Professor William R. Shea
History of Science University of Padova Padova, Italy
Dr. Uri Shavit
Civil and Environmental Engineering Technion Israel Institute of Technology Haifa, Israel
Professor Nir J. Shaviv
Racah Institute of Physics Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jerusalem, Israel
Professor K.C Sivaramakrishnan
Centre for Policy Research New Dehli, India
Dr. David K. Smith
Science & Technology Dept. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, USA
Dr. Shaul Sorek
Environmental Hydrology and Microbiology Jacob Blaustein Institute for Desert Research Sde Boker Campus, Israel
Professor William A. Sprigg
Institute for the Study of Planet Earth University of Arizona Tucson, USA
569 Dr. Bruce Stram
WFS Energy Permanent Monitoring Panel World Federation of Scientists Houston, USA
Professor Michael Stunner
Friedrich-Alexander-UniversitSit Erlangen-Nurnberg,Germany
Dr. Shanna Helen Swan
Family and Community Medicine School of Medicine, University of Missouri Columbia, USA
Professor Kamran Talattof
Department of Near Eastern Studies University o f Arizona Tucson, USA
Dr. G. Gray Tappan
US Geological Surveys International Programs, EROS Data Center Sioux Falls, USA
Dr. Terence Taylor
International Institute for Strategic Studies - U.S. Washington, USA
Professor Rigmor Thorstensson
Immunology and Vaccinology Dept. Swedish Institute for Infectious Diseases Control Solna, Sweden
Dr. Larry Tieszen
US Geological Surveys International Programs, EROS Data Center Sioux Falls, USA
Dr. Bob van der Zwaan
Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands ECN - Policy Studies Amsterdam, The Netherlands
570
Dr. Eftyhia Vardas
Perinatal HIV Research Unit University of Witwatersrand Johannesburg, South Africa
Dr. Eileen Vergino
Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, USA
Dr. Frederick vom Saal
Division of Biological Sciences University of Missouri Columbia, USA
Professor Franqois Waelbroeck
World Laboratory Centre Fusion Training Programme St. Amandsberg, Belgium
Professor Andrew W. Warren
Department of Geography University of London London, UK
Dr. Henning Wegener
Ambassador of Germany (ret.) Information Security PMP Madrid, Spain
Dr. Jody Westby
The Work-It Group Denver, USA
Professor Richard Wilson
Department of Physics Harvard University Cambridge, USA
Professor Aaron Yair
Department of Geography The Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel
571 Dr. Igor S . Zektser
Hydrology Department Water Problems Institute Moscow, Russia
Professor Antonino Zichichi
CERN & University of Bologna, Italy Geneva, Switzerland
