International Seminar on Nuclear War And Planetary Emergencies: The 32nd Session of International Seminars And International Collaboration (The Science ... - Nuclear Strategy and Peace Technology)

INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON

NUCLEAR WAR AND PLANETARY EMERGENCIES 32nd Session:

The 32nd Session of International Seminars and International Collaboration International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies-32nd Session: Limits of Development: Mi ation and Cyberspace; in Euro e, Synoptic European Overview; From and Within Asia; Globalization -Climate: Global&;anning; a Chronology;Simple Cfkate Models; Energy and Electricity Considerations-T. S. E.: CJD and Blood Transfusion;BSE in North America; Gerstrnann-Straussler-ScheinkerDisease -The Cultural Emergency:innovations in Communications and IT Cosmic Objects: Impact Hazard; Close Approaches; Asteroid Deflection; Risk Assessment and Hazard Reduction; Hayabusa and Follow Up -Aids and Infectious Diseases: Ethics in Medicine; InternationalCo-operation; LaboratoryBiosecurity Guidelines; Georgian Le 'slation; Biosecurity Norms and International Organizations, Legal Measures Against Biocrimes -Water and Pollution: Cycg Overview; Beyond Cost and Price; Requirements in Rural Iran; Isoto e Techniques; Clean and Reliable Water for the 21st Century -Permanent Monitoring Panels Reports - Workshops: &obal Biosecurity;Cosmic Objects

THE SCIENCE AND CULTURE SERIES Nuclear Strategy and Peace Technology

Series Editor: Antonino Zichichi

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International Seminar on Nuclear War - 1st Session: The World-wide Implications of Nuclear War

1984 -

International Seminar on Nuclear War - 2nd Session: How to Avoid a Nuclear War

1981 1982

1983

InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War - 3rd Session: The Technical Basis for Peace International Seminar on Nuclear War -4th Session: The Nuclear Winter and the New Defence Systems: Problems and Perspectives

1985

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InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War - 5th Session: SDI, Computer Simulation, New Proposals to Stop the Arms Race

1986

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InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War - 6th Session: InternationalCooperation: The Alternatives

1987

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InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War - 7th Session: The Great Projects for Scientific Collaboration East-West-North-South

1988 - InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War - 8th Session: The New Threats: Space and Chemical Weapons -What Can be Done with the Retired I.N.F. Missiles-LaserTechnology 1989 1990

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International Seminar on Nuclear War - 9th Session: The New Emergencies International Seminar on Nuclear War - 10th Session: The New Role of Science

1991 - International Seminar on Nuclear War - 11th Session: Planetary Emergencies 1991 - International Seminar on Nuclear War - 12th Session: Science Confronted with War (unpublished) 1991 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 13th Session: Satellite Monitoring of the Global Environment(unpublished) 1992

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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 14th Session: Innovative Technologiesfor Cleaning the Environment

1992 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 15th Session (1st Seminar after Rio): Science and Technology to Save the Earth (unpublished) 1992 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 16th Session (2nd Seminar after Rio): Proliferationof Weapons for Mass Destructionand Cooperation on Defence Systems 1993

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International Seminar on Planetary Emergencies - 17th Workshop: The Collision of an Asteroid or Comet with the Earth (unpublished)

1993

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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetaty Emergencies - 18th Session (4th Seminar after Rio): Global Stability Through Disarmament

1994 - International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 19th Session (5th Seminar after Rio): Science after the Cold War 1995

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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 20th Session (6th Seminar after Rio): The Role of Science in the Third Millennium

1996

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InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 21st Session (7th Seminar after Rio): New Epidemics, Second Cold War, Decommissioning, Terrorism and Proliferation

1997

- InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies-22nd Session (8th Seminar after Rio): Nuclear Submarine Decontamination,Chemical Stockpiled Weapons, New Epidemics, Cloning of Genes, New Military Threats, Global Planetary Changes, Cosmic Objects & Energy

1998

- InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies- 23rd Session (9th Seminar after Rio): Medicine & Biotechnologies,Proliferation & Weapons of Mass Destruction, Climatology & El Nino, Desertification, Defence Against Cosmic Objects, Water & Pollution, Food, Energy, Limits of Development, The Role of Permanent Monitoring Panels

1999

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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies- 24th Session: HIV/AIDS Vaccine Needs, Biotechnology,Neuropathologies,Development Sustainability- Focus Africa, Climate and Weather Predictions, Energy, Water, Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Role of Permanent Monitoring Panels, HIV Think Tank Workshop, Fertility Problems Workshop

2000

- International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies-25th Session:

2001

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InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War and Planetarv Emeraencies- 26th Session: AIDS and Infectious Diseases - Medication or Vacknation for DevelopingCountries; Missile Proliferation and Defense; Tchernobyl - Mathematics and Democracy; Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy; Floods and Extreme Weather Events Coastal Zone Problems; Science and Technology for Developing Countries;Water TransboundaryWater Conflicts; Climatic Changes - Global Monitoring of the Planet; Information Security; Pollution in the Caspian Sea; Permanent Monitoring Panels Reports; Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Workshop; AIDS and Infectious Diseases Workshop; Pollution Workshop

2002

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InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies- 27th Session: Society and Structures: Historical Perspectives Culture and Ideology; National and Regional Geopolitical Issues; Globalization- Economy and Culture; Human Rights - Freedom and Democracy Debate; Confrontationsand Countermeasures: Present and Future Confrontations; Psychology of Terrorism; Defensive Countermeasures; Preventive Countermeasures;General Debate; Science and Technology: Emergencies; Pollution, Climate - Greenhouse Effect; Desertification, Water Pollution, Algal Bloom; Brain and Behaviour Diseases; The Cultural Emergency: General Debate and Conclusions; Permanent Monitoring Panel Reports; Information Security Workshop; Kangaroo Mother’s Care Workshop; Brain and Behaviour Diseases Workshop

2003

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International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies- 29th Session: Society and Structures: Culture and Ideology - Equity -Territorial and Economics - Psychology-Tools and Countermeasures-Worldwide Stability - Risk Analysis for Terrorism The Asymmetric Threat - America’s New “Exceptionalism” - Militant lslamist Groups Motives and Mindsets-Analysing the New Approach The Psychology of Crowds - Cultural Relativism- Economic and Socio-economic Causes and Consequences-The Problems of American Foreign Policy UnderstandingBiological Risk Chemical Threats and Responses - BioterrorismNuclear Survivial Criticalities - Responding to the Threats - National Security and Scientific Openness -Working Groups Reports and Recommendations

Water - Pollution, Biotechnology- Transgenic Plant Vaccine, Energy, Black Sea Pollution, Aids - Mother-Infant HIV Transmission, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy,Limits of Development - Megacities, Missile Proliferationand Defense, Information Security, Cosmic Objects, Desertification, Carbon Sequestration and Sustainability, Climatic Changes, Global Monitoring of Planet, Mathematics and Democracy, Science and Journalism, Permanent Monitoring Panel Reports, Water for Megacities Workshop, Black Sea Workshop, Transgenic Plants Workshop, Research Resources Workshop, Mother-Infant HIV Transmission Workshop, Sequestrationand DesertificationWorkshop, Focus Africa Workshop

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2004

- InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies-30th Session: Anniversary Celebrations: The Pontifical Academy of Sciences 400th -The ‘Ettore Majorana’ Foundation and Centre for Scientific Culture 40th - H.H. John Paul I1 Apostolate 25th -Climate/Global Warming: The Cosmic Ray Effect; Effectson Species and Biodiversity; Human Effects; Paleoclimate Implications; Evidence for Global Warming - Pollution: Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals; Hazardous Material; Legacy Wastes and RadioactiveWaste Management in USA, Europe; Southeast Asia and Japan -The Cultural Planetary Emergency: Role of the Media; Intolerance; Terrorism; Iraqi Perspective; Open Forum Debate - AIDS and Infectious Diseases: Ethics in Medicine; AIDS Vaccine Strategies -Water: Water Conflicts in the Middle East - Energy: Developing Countries; Mitigation of Greenhouse Warming Permanent Monitoring Panels Reports -Workshops: Long-TermStewardship of Hazardous Material; AIDS Vaccine Strategies and Ethics

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2004

- InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies -31st Session: MultidisciplinaryGlobalApproach of Governmentsand InternationalStructures:Societal Response -Scientific Contributionsto Policy - Economics - Human Rights Communication - Conflict Resolution- Cross-DisciplinaryResponses to CBRN Threats: Chemical and Biological Terrorism - Co-operation Between Russia and the West - Asymmetrical Conflicts - CBW Impact - Cross-DisciplinaryChallenges to Emergnecy Management, Media Information and Communication: Role of Media in Global Emergencies - Emergency Responders - Working Groups’ Reports and Recommendations

2005

- InternationalSeminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies - 32nd Session: Limits of Development: Migration and Cyberspace; in Europe; Synoptic European Overview; From and Within Asia; Globalization- Climate: Global Warming; a Chronology; Simple Climate Models; Energy and ElectricityConsiderations- T. S.E.: CJD and Blood Transfusion; BSE in North America; Gerstmann-Straussler-Scheinker Disease -The Cultural Emergency: Innovationsin Communications and IT Cosmic Objects: Impact Hazard; Close Approaches; Asteroid Deflection; Risk Assessment and Hazard Reduction; Hayabusa and Follow Up -Aids and Infectious Diseases: Ethics in Medicine; International Co-operation; Laboratory Biosecurity Guidelines; Georgian Legislation; Biosecurity Norms and InternationalOrganizations, Legal Measures Against Biocrimes - Water and Pollution: Cycle Overview; Beyond Cost and Price; Requirements in Rural Iran; Isotope Techniques; Clean and Reliable Water for the 21st Century - Permanent Monitoring Panels Reports - Workshops: Global Biosecurity; Cosmic Objects

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T H E SCIENCE AND CULTURE SERIES

Nuclear Strategy and Peace Technology

"E. Majorana" Centre for Scientific Culture Erice, Italy, 19-24 Aug 2004

Series Editor and Chairman: A. Zichichi

Edited by R. Ragaini

1@World ; Scientific N E W JERSEY

LONDON

SINGAPORE * B E l J l N G * S H A N G H A I * HONG KONG

TAIPEI * C H E N N A I

Published by

World Scientific Publishing Co. Re. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224

USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON NUCLEAR WAR AND PLANETARY EMERGENCIES 32ND SESSION: LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENT: MIGRATION AND CYBERSPACE; IN EUROPE; SYNOPTIC EUROPEAN OVERVIEW; FROM AND WITHIN ASIA; CLIMATE: GLOBAL WARMING; A CHRONOLOGY; SIMPLE GLOBALIZATION CLIMATE MODELS; ENERGY AND ELECTRICITY CONSIDERATIONS-T. S. E.: CJD AND BLOOD TRANSFUSION; BSE IN NORTH AMERICA; GERSTMANN-STRAUSSLERSCHEINKER DISEASE - THE CULTURAL EMERGENCY: INNOVATIONS I N COMMUNICATIONS AND IT - COSMIC OBJECTS: IMPACT HAZARD; CLOSE APPROACHES; ASTEROID DEFLECTION; RISK ASSESSMENT AND HAZARD REDUCTION; HAYABUSA AND FOLLOW UP - AIDS AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES: ETHICS I N MEDICINE; INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION; LABORATORY BIOSECURITY GUIDELINES; GEORGIAN LEGISLATION; BIOSECURITY NORMS AND INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS,LEGAL MEASURES AGAINST BIOCRIMES - WATER AND POLLUTION: CYCLE OVERVIEW; BEYOND COST AND PRICE; REQUIREMENTS IN RURAL IRAN; ISOTOPE TECHNIQUES; CLEAN AND RELIABLE WATER FOR THE 21ST CENTURY - PERMANENT MONITORING PANELS REPORTS - WORKSHOPS: GLOBAL BIOSECURITY; COSMIC OBJECTS

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Copyright 0 2005 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Re. Ltd.

All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereoJ may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

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CONTENTS

1.

OPENING SESSION

Antonino Zichichi The 32nd Session of the International Seminars and International Collaboration Richard L. Garwin Science and National Intelligence

Rolf K. Jenny Statement on Migration

2.

3

6

17

LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENT: MIGRATION

Ahmad Kamal Migration and Cyberspace

27

Hiltrnar Schubert Migration in Europe

32

Nigel Harris Migration and Development: A Synoptic European Overview

38

K. C. Sivamarakrishnan Migration From and Within Asia

45

Geraldo G . Serra Migration and Globalization

66

3.

CLIMATOLOGY: GLOBAL WARMING

John S.Perry From Curiosity to Concern: A Chronology of the Quest to Understand Global Climate

vii

77

viii

Tom M.L. Wigley Simple Climate Models

84

Garth W Paltridge Old Physics for New Climate Models -Maybe

95

Hisham Khatib Energy and Electricity Considerations-Global Warming Perspectives

4.

102

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY: PRIONS

Robert G. Will Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease and Blood Transfusion

115

Maura N. Ricketts BSE in North America

120

Bernardino Ghetti Role of the Polymorphism at Codon 129 of the Pnon Protein Gene in the Phenotypic Expression of Gerstmann-StrausslerScheinker Disease Associated with the F198S Mutation Herbert Budka Update on the Pathogenesis of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies

5.

133

137

THECULTURAL EMERGENCY: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS -ENVIRONMENT

Axel Lehmann Innovations in Information and CommunicationsTechnologies: Benefits and Threats

143

ix

6.

COSMIC OBJECTS

Clark R. Chapman Recent Perspectives on the Hazard of an Asteroid Impact

155

Donald K. Yeomans Recent Close Approaches of Asteroids to the Earth

162

Russell L. Schweickart Asteroid Deflection: Hopes and Fears

177

Alan

W Harris The Near-Earth Object Impact Hazard: Space Mission Priorities for Risk Assessment and Reduction

Hajime Yano Hayabusa and its Follow-up Plans by JAXA

7.

185

186

AIDSAND INFECTIOUS DISEASES: ETHICSIN MEDICINE

Diego Buriot Limiting Access to Dangerous Pathogens -The Need for International Cooperation

215

Reynolds M. Salerno The U.S. Select Agent Rule and an International Opportunity to Develop Laboratory Biosecurity Guidelines

221

Lela Bakanidze New Georgian Legislation on Biosafety Bradford Kay International Biosecurity Norms and the Role for International Organizations Barry Kellman Legal Measures to Prevent Bio-crimes

229

232

237

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8.

WATER AND POLLUTION

Soroosh Sorooshian Overview of the Hydrological Cycle and its Connection to Climate: Droughts and Floods

25 1

Ronald B. Linsky What is the Real Value of Water? Reaching Beyond the Global Dilemma of Cost and Price

266

Amir I. Ajami Agrarian Transformation and Shifts in Water Requirements in Rural Iran: A Case Study

212

Pradeep Aggarwal Sustainable Water Resource Management and the Role of Isotope Techniques

284

Andrew EB. Tompson Scientific Challenges for Ensuring Clean and Reliable Water for the 21st Century

289

9.

PERMANENT MONITORING PANEL MEETINGS AND REPORTS

AIDS and Infectious Diseases Permanent Monitoring Panel Guy de The' AIDS 2004 -Pressing Financial and Ethical Challenges

301

Climatology Permanent Monitoring Panel William A. Sprigg Implications of Climate Variability and Change: A Policy Maker's Summary

309

Cosmic Objects Permanent Monitoring Panel Walter E Huebner Panel Report

318

xi

Energy Permanent Monitoring Panel Bruce Stram Panel Report Abul Barkat Bangladesh Rural Electrification Program: A Success Story of Poverty Reduction through Electricity Richard Wilson Sustainable Nuclear Energy - Some Reasons for Optimism Information Security Permanent Monitoring Panel Henning Wegener Chairman's Report Ktaly N. Tsygichko Information Revolution in the Military Field and the Establishment of an International Legal Regime for Information Security Limits of Development Permanent Monitoring Panel Hiltmar Schubert Panel Report

323

331

371 387

392

398

Mbareck Diop West African Point of View on Migration

400

Christopher D. Ellis Impacts of Migration on Megacities in the United States

403

Stephen S. Y Luu Inter-regional Migration in China in the Post-Deng Economic Era 1990-2000

410

Alberto Gonza'lez-Pozo Migration in Mexico: Slower Trends to Megacities; Higher Flow to the U.S.

424

xii

Mother and Child Permanent Monitoring Panel Nathalie Charpak Panel Report

433

Christiane Huraux Using the KMC Programme’s Database in Developed Countries: An Illusion?

436

Juan G. Ruiz Quality of Health Care Assurance: The Kangaroo Mother Care Program Experience

437

Pollution Permanent Monitoring Panel Lome Everett, Richard C. Ragaini Panel Report

446

Risk Analysis Permanent Monitoring Panel Terence Taylor Panel Report

449

10.

GLOBAL BIOSECURITY WORKSHOP

Barry Kellman The Bio-Science Dilemma -Precious Opportunities and Dire Threats

453

Terence Taylor Biological Safety and Security -Advances in the Life Sciences - Reaping the Rewards and Managing the Risks

455

11.

COSMIC OBJECTS WORKSHOP

Mario Di Martino Detection of Transient Phenomena on Planetary Bodies

465

xiii

Raymond Goldstein Proposed Ground-Based Experiments for Asteroid Seismology

12.

SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS

495

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1.

OPENING SESSION

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THE 32NDSESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEMINARS AND INTERNATIONAL.COLLABORATION

ANTONINO ZICHICHI Dear Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to welcome you to this 32"d Session of the International Seminars on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies and declare the Session to be open. There are many interesting topics to be debated during this Seminar and its associated meetings. Some are related to non-scientific problems to which we are trying to bring scientific solutions. This can only be achieved through our interdisciplinary groups and through the methods elaborated in our symposiums on complexity. The main topics of this Session are: MIGRATION This is a worldwide phenomenon, which has been with us for a very long time. It was left to fester until it became a major problem to societies and a burden on economies. You will hear more on this from Dr. Rolf Jenny, Director of the Global Commission on International Migrations in Geneva, Drs. Ahmad Kamal and Hiltmar Schubert as well as from other members of the Limits of Development PMP. GLOBAL WARMING This is an ongoing debate, here in Erice. We have heard many one-sided arguments offered separately, without any real debate. Many possible factors and suggestions, some of which I offered myself during the August Seminars, have not been sufficiently elaborated or pursued. The Italian Government has now instituted a special commission to study the Global Warming issues to be presided by our colleague Professor Enzo Boschi. Many questions require precise answers, which need to be sought dispassionately in a purely scientific environment, without political and economic bias. This engenders a continuing debate for the WFS. You will hear more on this from Professor William Sprigg of the Climate PMP, Dr. Hisham Khatib from the Energy PMP and other eminent international experts. BRAIN DISEASES AND TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY Prions were first described to a scientific audience in 1996, here in Erice, by Professor Stanley Prusiner who discovered them. Since then, a few dedicated WFS workshops have been organised and we have closely monitored the results of the research undertaken in that domain. Professor Robert Will and other PMP members will report on the latest results. COSMIC OBJECTS This suddenly became, as you can imagine, a very hot topic during the Star Wars era. We keep discovering proof of global catastrophic events in the past, which wiped out most of the existing life, and were due to large meteorites crashing into our planet.

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4 This Planetary Emergency is one of a very few of its kind that could bring a brutal and rapid end to our civilisation with very little notice. It could happen at any moment, and yet it receives relatively little attention or funds for research. We are still almost totally unprepared to avoid a disaster coming from deep space. Professor Walter Huebner and other PMP members will elaborate on this during the dedicated session. AIDS AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND GLOBAL BIOSECURITY STANDARDS Security standards for handling sensitive biological material in our laboratories have always been a concern. Now, with the advent of large-scale terrorism, we must also ensure the safety of biological material against its misuse. Dr. Diego Buriot and his colleagues will give you a rundown of the measures adopted in various countries. WATER The essence of life itself, Water, has always been one of our going concerns. Professor Soroosh Sorooshian and members of the PMP, together with other eminent colleagues, will report on the current situation. As an example of our interactions with International Organisations, let me now single out an important milestone for the World Federation of Scientists, concerning the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, which will be held in Kobe, 18-22 January 2005. Quoting from the announcement, the Conference aims at providing: ‘‘ a unique opportunity to promote a strategic and systematic approach at the national level to address vulnerabilities and to reduce risk to natural hazards”. The announcement further stipulates, “Human and economic losses due to natural disasters continue to rise and remain a major obstacle to sustainable development and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). New risks are emerging. The WCDR is expected to guide and motivate governments and their policy makers to pay more attention to such vital issues, identifying practical ways to incorporate risk reduction measures into action to reduce poverty ”. We do, of course, agree with the above. Now, looking at the measures to be investigated and the kind of recommendations to be proposed, they seem to us highly commendable but almost systematically and resolutely on the passive side, i.e.: how to manage the disaster once it has happened. The Italian Government, and especially the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Franc0 Frattini, believes in a more pro-active policy of identifying the causes for a disaster in order to mitigate its effects or avoid its happening altogether. T h s is in perfect agreement with the role of Science in the fight against the Planetary Emergencies, which has been stressed and put in evidence during our Erice Seminars in previous years. I would like to invite the chairs of the World Federation of Scientists’ PMPs to discuss this issue with their colleagues and remit, by the end of the Seminar, a note with their suggestions aimed at increasing the awareness of the Conference institutions of the role of Science and the WFS action. Please note that we have already addressed our comments to the report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee to the member states.

5 We commented on Sustainable Development and Terrorism, on addressing the danger of Cosmic Objects, Floods and Extreme Meteorological Events, Water and Partnership Mechanism. These suggestions, along with those presented at the end of the Seminar, will be presented by ow delegation to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee, which will be held 11-12 October 2004 in Geneva.

SCIENCE AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RICHARD L. GARWIN' IBM Fellow Emeritus, Thomas J. Watson Research Center Yorktown Heights, USA Those who have followed the American scene in recent months have witnessed an extensive discussion of intelligence "failures" for lack of prevention of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the two World Trade Towers and the Pentagon, which killed 3000 people of many nationalities. An addtional aircraft had been hjacked and would have been used, probably, to attack either the White House or the Capitol in Washington, DC. Reports of other Commissions have been dedicated to failures of intelligence in regard to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, and the reasons and logic for initiating war there. Of course, "WMD" is a term that makes little sense, since a nuclear explosion (even of the magnitude of the 1945 bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki), if smuggled in and detonated near ground level, would kill 100,000 to 500,000 people in a densely populated city. Similarly, an appropriately chosen biological weapon such as anthrax, properly disseminated, or the smallpox virus, could kill as many, and perhaps far more. In comparison with these nuclear and biological threats, the current threat from chemical weapons such as Sarin is almost negligible. In fact, a reasonable rule of thumb is that there would be about as many deaths and non-fatal casualties kom the use of a chemical weapon as from a modem high-explosive weapon such as cluster bombs, and the like. By "WMD," therefore, we should understand nuclear and biological weapons, excluding radiological and chemical weapons. Why "Science and National Intelligence," and what is "National Intelligence" anyhow? National Intelligence is that information and interpretation that can guide decisions at the national level. This is distinct from Tactical Intelligence and Military Intelligence. Tactical Intelligence guides the actions of a platoon, company, brigade, or even of an army, as a result of knowledge and analysis of the deployment and capabilities of the opposing forces. Military Intelligence provides additional information on the overall structure of opposing military forces, the characteristics and efficacy of the weapons with which they are provided, and the detailed information as to command structure, likely ability to carry out detailed and large-scale plans, and the like*. The point is that National Intelligence goes far beyond Military or Tactical Intelligence to inform the leadership of a country as to its options in negotiating, befriending, defending, or, for that matter, conducting military operations against another power. At a time when U.S. television channels (especially the Cable Satellite Public Affairs Networks (CSPAN)) are full of congressional hearings which feature former directors of (US) Central Intelligence and other experts, it may make some sense to consider the past and potential future contributions of science to National Intelligence. Science enters not so much as science itself, which is, by definition, the acquisition of new insights and knowledge, but largely in the form of science codified in the form of

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7 technology and other tools. Just as the science of condensed matter physics has been incorporated into the miracles of this video projector, computers, and many of the amenities of modem life dating back to Galileo and even Archimedes, so science is taken for granted in the tools available for National Intelligence. But it is there, as the finest flower of optics, of mathematics, chemistry, and, increasingly, of biology. Intelligence involves the acquisition of information, its preservation and review, and its continual interpretation and reinterpretation in view of various hypotheses as to meaning and significance. In this it has a lot in common with the means by which we understand the secrets of the universe. Sometimes the information is in view for all to see, as was the case with the laws of falling bodies at the surface of the Earth, explored by Galileo and Newton. Sometimes it is hidden until a new tool makes it apparent, as is the case with the signals and “noise” in the radio spectrum, to which humans were blind and deaf until the advent of sensitive of radio receivers and amplifiers. Sometimes it is necessary in the acquisition of Nature’s secrets to travel to hostile environments, in order that the signal be received at all, or to be made more prominent against the local background noise. So it is in the sending of Soviet probes to the surface of Venus, OT to the ocean depths in the exploration of the mid-oceanic ridge and the black smokers of recent decades. So it was with the introduction of intelligence satellites, the first of which flew in June, 1960, in the form of a so-called “Galactic Radiation and Background (“GRAB”) satellite, the real purpose of which was the acquisition of electronic intelligence on the radars of the world, and in August, 1960, the CORONA satellite to photograph the Earth from space. These early satellites have been fully declassified (that is, the information and in most cases the “product” made publicly available by the United States in 1995 in the case of CORONA, and in the year 2000 in the case of the GRAB satellite). They are discussed, for instance, in the article by Mark Moynihan3. The CORONA system was fully described in an article by Albert D. Wheelo4 who as the first Deputy Director for Science and Technology of the Central Intelligence Agency, from 1962-1966 played a key role in the ongoing development of CORONA, as well as in the development of a titanium aircraft that traveled thousands of kilometers at a speed of Mach-3 (three times the speed of sound). The imaging satellites (providing “image intelligence“ or IMINT) and the Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) satellites had quite different origins. The first ELINT satellite was the product of the US.Naval Research Laboratory, NRL, where scientists and engineers had the idea that they could obtain useful intelligence about the Soviet radar system for early warning against aircraft, by flying some relatively simple satellites. Recall that in the 1950s the state-of-the-art was vacuum tubes rather than transistors. Once these satellites were in operation, additional contributions were made, and additional launches of these relatively short-lived satellites could benefit from the rapid evolution of technology for military and civilian purposes, that have brought us from the first multi-million dollar digital computers of the 1950s to the $1000 marvel of today. The modem imaging satellites took form in the minds of a few consultants to the President’s Science Advisor in the 1954-1956 era, who had conceived the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and persuaded President Dwight D. Eisenhower to develop it as a secret program assigned to the CIA. The subsonic jet-engine U-2 fleet first flew in 1956

8 through Soviet air space and that of other countries, publicly unacknowledged until May, 1960, when it was shot down by the SA-2 missile system near Sverdlovsk. These remarkable individuals included Edwin H. Land, inventor of polarizing film material and the Polaroid instant photographic system; Edward M. Purcell, Professor of Physics at Harvard University and Nobel Laureate for the invention of nuclear magnetic resonance; and James G . Baker, optical scientist and engineer par excellence, also of Harvard University. Their observation was simple. It was that lenses of the 1950s could be built to provide resolution on the film comparable with the wavelength of light, and that ultrafine grain film could also be made. So instead of the typical eight line pairs per millimeter (lp/mm) of military reconnaissance cameras flown by the U.S. in the Korean War, one could build systems that would record information at 200 lp/mm. The difference made by the factor 25 is astonishing, since the amount of film required to record a given scene is reduced by a factor 625. Therefore, it makes sense to go to very thin-base film, and suddenly it is possible to record from a high flying aircraft at 20 km altitude horizon-to-horizon coverage continuously as the aircraft flies over the scene to be photographed. Recognizing that aircraft would not long be invisible to radar (and, in fact, the U-2 was detected by Soviet radars from its first flight over the Soviet Union), the "Land Panel" conceived also the Mach-3 SR-71 aircraft, which brought entirely new challenges to the acquisition of IMINT. These included the extreme heat from the adiabatic compression of the air at this speed, bringing the surface temperature of the aircraft to the softening point of the titanium skin, and photography through the turbulence of the boundary layer adjacent to the aircraft. Ultimately, even the SR-71 would be vulnerable to being shot down, and so an additional secret program was instituted, that would record not from 25 km within the atmosphere but from 160 km altitude, outside the sensible atmosphere, from the first Earth satellites, dubbed CORONA. CORONA was initiated in the deepest secrecy, accompanyng the cancellation of an Air Force program for the return of TV images from space. The technology of those days imposed stark limitations on what could be used in the satellite. There was essentially no "electronics" in CORONA. Rather, batteries operated electrical motors to drive the complicated film path, the rotating drums of the panoramic cameras, and the cams and switches of the timers that controlled the cycling and eventual reentry of the "bucket" containing the exposed film. The first man-made objects retrieved from orbit were these reentry vehicles (RVs) of the CORONA system, that used ablative technology to survive the fiery heat of reentry. These packages were fitted with parachutes that would open at subsonic speed over the Pacific Ocean, so that the dangling film bucket could be retrieved by a kind of trapeze deployed from a C-119 aircraft of a special detachment operated for that purpose. The CORONA system is well described in numerous articles following its 1995 declassification, not least by Wheelon in his 1997 article. Here are a few illustrations from that article:

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Mid-air

10

A view ojojthe Kremlin. At the left is a narrow line ojpeople awaiting entrance to Lenin s tomb. The CORONA system was operated from 1960 to 1972, in more than 145 successful flights, returning almost 2000 lan of film. By 1972, CORONA delivered a ground resolution of two meters (2 m), and was replaced by other systems, not yet declassified, both for broad area search and for high-resolution imaging from space. Those now operating no longer depend on film return, but instead use imaging technology similar to that in your digital camera, typically employing charge-coupled devices (CCD) of silicon technology. The resulting images are returned in "near-real time" via radio downlinks from long-lived satellites in space. Instead of mean mission duration on the order of one week for CORONA, the satellites provide images for many years. For their part, ELINT satellites have evolved as well. The evolution of satellite technology no longer leads that of commercial applications, in view of the long lifetimes of satellites, and the special-purpose nature of their operation. Furthermore, there are limitations and hazards involved in the apparently benign space environment, since satellites are not shielded from cosmic ray radiation by the Earth's atmosphere, equivalent to a water depth of ten meters, nor from occasional collision with a micro meteor or piece of orbiting space debris. The magnetic field that prevents most of the cosmic rays even from striking the atmosphere instead traps energetic electrons and protons that provide a heavy dose of radiation (on the order of a megarad over several years) to satellites in certain orbits. Nevertheless, ELINT satellites have evolved to real-time return of information that not only pinpoints radars and other emitters on the Earth's surface, but also captures both Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). The import of this is evident from the daily newspaper, with the implication that much useful information in the "global war on terrorism" is derived from such sources. Naturally, communications that travel via satellite (including some mobile systems) can be intercepted by ground-based antennas looking at the cell-phone relay satellites. In this activity the U.S. National SecurityAgency (NSA) plays an important role. Accompanying the acquisition of intelligence is the required evolution of processing capability, dissemination, and the like. Ultimately, however, the intelligence product is reflected in various bulletins or estimates, that come to the desk of decision-

11 makers at all levels and must result in national action or decision not to act, and be provided to other governments and to elements of the United Nations. Unfortunately, many of those involved have little understanding either of the sources of the information or the limitations of the processes, including the possibility of denial and deception (D&D). Thus the analyst assigned to watch for threats to the Information Technology infrastructure (IT) would have, in principle, access in this case not so much to IMINT, but to COMINT or SIGINT and would try to determine what resources are being expended by which foreign powers or terrorist groups, which individuals are involved, whom they communicate with, what test incursions have been made, and the like. Another analyst looking for wayward nuclear explosives would concentrate on security of those sites where nuclear explosive materials are to be found in declared nuclear powers and in others. Most of the plutonium or highly enriched uranium exists in Russia or in the United States, so such an analyst would be alert to COMINT or suspect groups and nations traveling to Russia or dealing with middlemen in Russia. There might in addition be “sting” operations set up in order to determine interest in the acquisition of nuclear materials contrary to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Another analyst might be assigned to look for preparations for military activity or for genocide in an African country. In all these cases, the analyst would be concerned with foreign newspapers, foreign broadcast information, as well as information regarded as secret by the group or nation that originated it. Here is a problem, since the state of Information Technology is such that in practice in the United States a person with a computer with access to a secret (classified) governmental network cannot use that same computer for access to unclassified information, such as the Internet. For this reason, “air gaps” must be created. Officials have testified recently that they have four or even six computers under their desk, and can switch the keyboard and the display (monitor) from one to another. This is already an advance, because a few years ago it was necessary for each computer to have its own display and monitor. But copying from one network to another is typically forbidden, unless the material has been printed and then scanned optically for transfer to the other network. As one might expect, the efficiency of working under these conditions is much reduced, even though the IT tools, in principle, can be very powerful. Insufficient effort has been invested to provide a secure computing framework that would allow flexible access to information at multiple levels, including unclassified and highly sensitive material in the same information system. It should be possible for information to be identified, with its security classification appended, and composite documents or files thus prepared for the analyst’s display. In any case, IT has brought us a long way from the “shoe box” era (still occupied by some analysts) in which material on a given site or topic was filed in the form of clippings or images literally in a shoe box, for future access by the analyst. Whatever the mechanization, however, an analyst must form hypotheses and then determine their probability. “Alternative Competing Hypotheses” is a summary term for this approach. Is there to be a military attack tomorrow? If there was not one yesterday or the previous day or the previous year, it seems inherently unlikely that there will be one

12 tomorrow. It is said that British intelligence charged with warning of a military attack was wrong only twice in 50 years, but such an error can be very significant. In general, the most rigorous framework for determining the validity of a hypothesis in science or in intelligence comes down to Bayesian Analysis. Here one asks for the probability of a hypothesis given the prior probability before the most recent “fact” and the likelihood that the new intelligence datum is correct or that it is wrong. It can be wrong in one of two ways (for a “yes-no’‘decision): it can have a Type-1 error, in which the datum may say “no” but the hypothesis may be valid; or it may have a Type-2 error, for whch the datum reads ”yes” and the hypothesis is invalid. An example of a Type-1 error is a bit of disinformation stating that all troops are in their rest areas, when in fact they have been mobilized. An example of Type-2 error is a finding that troops have been mobilized, when in fact the motion that was observed was from one rest area to another. A recent article by Bruce Blair, President for the Center for Defense Information in the United States (www.cdi.org) nicely illustrates the details of Bayesian Analysiss. In this case, one assumes a prior probability (without any intelligence data) of 99.9% that an attack is in process. If one has then a bit of intelligence saying that it is, and one knows or assumes that the source of the intelligence is correct 50% or the time, incorrect 50% of the time (in the sense that 25% of the time it indicates an attack is in process if it isn’t, and 25% of the time indicates that an attack is not in process when it is), then the likelihood according to Bayesian Analysis after 1,2,3,4 and so on negative intelligence alerts is as shown in “0.999” line of the table. The mechanism of Bayesian Analysis is shown in the first figure, with the symbols having the following meaning: a term P(AIW) signifies the probability P of an attack A given that the warning W has been received. Bayes taught that this can be obtained from the more physically determinable P(WIA), the probability that the warning signal would be received if the attack were really in process. Important is the initial “prior (A)”, which is the assumed likelihood that an attack is in process, to be refined by intelligence data. The a posteriori probability “Post (A)” is then the Bayesian update of the probability before the most recent information.

13 Our application of Bayes theorem is as follows: Definitions: Prob (attacklwarning) = P ( A W Prob (attacklno warning) = P(A\NW) Prob (warninglattack) = P(WJA)= 1 - prob (type i error) Prob (warninglnoattack) = P(W1NA)-type II error Prob (no warninglattack) = P(NWIA)-*type II error Prob (nowarninglno attack) = P{NWINA) = 1 - Prob (type II error) Prior initial subjective expectation of an attack: prior (A) Posterlor subjective expectationof an atlack after either receiving or not receiving warning: Post (A) Formulas: Given warning is received during warning report period: P(W1A) prior (A) Post(AIW)s P(WIA) prior (A) t (P(W/NA)(l - prior(A)] Given warning is no1 received dUring warning report period: P(NWIA)prior (A) post (A'NW) P(NW1A) prior (A) t [P(NWINA)(l - prior(A)]

From Bruce Blair, The Logic of Intelligence Failure, http://www.cdi.org/blair/logic, c$m

In this case, nine successive negative reports are required to convert an initial 99.9% probability of attack to a 95% judgment of no attack. It is thus very hard for fact (even facts with a pretty good probability of being correct) to overcome an initial bias of this magnitude.

14

Example I of Bayesian updating

Perhaps one imagines that a decision-maker would do better never to have such a fixed idea with a probability of 99.9%. The second example illustrates graphically the degree of conviction he or she would properly infer, as intelligence data came in one at time, in the case of attack or no attack.

15 Baywan Upttatina of Attack EXpBCtafions. Average over Far& SICal Run Expectation of Attack

0

Warning raport peiiod

Example 2 of Bayesian updating Even in this example, something like 17 data points would be required on the average to raise the expectation of attack from 50% to 95% (averages over a 40-trial run) if an attack were truly in process. But these are only averages. If now one looks at an atypical trial run,one can see that in case of an attack, four data points, all reporting “no attack,” reduce the mferred probability from 50% to only about 2%, whereas an attack was really in process, and the data ultimately (on the 17th repeated sampling) correspond to 99% probability of attack. fiayeslan Updatingof Attack Expectations, One Atypical Triai Run Fxpclalinn of Atlack 1 .OO

.

..-.------.,----

0.90

0.80 0.70 0.60

0.50

0

5

10

15 20 25 Warning “port period

30

35

40

16 These are truly cautionary findings, little understood by analysts or decision-makers. Indeed, not every piece of intelligence data has the same value or the same Type-1 and Type-2 error rate. All the more reason for each piece of data to be identified with its assumed rates, and the analyst and decision-maker should be able to use a simple tool such as a spreadsheet in order to determine not by “group think“ but for himself or herself the likely spread of probabilities of what the intelligence data may seem so strongly to imply. In conclusion, science and technology have revolutionized intelligence, as they have changed most aspects of modem life. At the national and international level, the consequence of actions that might be taken on the hasis of intelligence (and the consequences of inaction) can he enormous, imposing a heavy load of responsibility on officials charged with the provision and interpretation of intelligence. Better preparation of such officials would be desirable, but is difficult because relatively few in the educated population are accustomed to dealing quantitatively with uncertainty, and there is the difficulty that persons who occupy a position of power are too busy exercising that power to take the time to learn something new or even vital. Perhaps new tools of simulation and video presentation might be devised to provide virtual experience with examples close to the problem at hand- attack or no attack; the decision to prevent a person from traveling on a commercial flight; the cancer risk posed by this or that environmental contaminant. REFERENCES

’ Recipient in 1996 of the R.V. Jones Award for Scientific Intelligence, and in 2000 named one of ten Founders of National Intelligence.

’A useful source is the Center for Studies in Intelligence, operated by the U.S. Government at http:llwww.cia.govlcsi/

’ Mark F. Moynihan, “The Scientific Community and Intelligence Collection,” Physics 1.html) Today, December 2000. (http://www.~hysicstoday.org/pVvol-53/iss-12/p5 Albert D. Wheelon, “Corona: The First Reconnaissance Satellites, ”Physics Today, February 1997, pp. 24-30, ISSN 003 1-9228. h~://www.physicstoday.or~pt/vol50liss-21vo15Ono2~24-3O~art1 .vdf, http:/lwww.physicstoday.orgipt/vol-50/iss-2/vol5Ono2p24-30part2.pdf Thomas Bayes, “An Essay towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 53 (1764). Bayes (1702-1761) was a Presbyterian preacher and a member of the Royal Society. See http://www.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/phisci/Gallery~ayes-note.h~,

STATEMENT ON MIGRATION DR. R.K. JENNY Executive Director, Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) Geneva, Switzerland Let me first thank you, Professor Zichichi and Ambassador Kamal, for having invited me to address this esteemed forum of scientists and international personalities, and to talk to you this morning about one of the principal global, or perhaps I should say planetary, challenges of today: that of international migration. I will do so on behalf of the Global Commission on International Migration which was launched by the United Nations Secretary General and a number of governments on 9 December 2003, in Geneva, and which is tasked, among many other things, to present a report to the Secretary General with recommendations aimed at providing the framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive and global response to migration. THE BROADER PICTURE OF MIGRATION Let me begin by making a few general comments on the broader picture of migration and the challenge it presents today as an issue that is intrinsically interlinked with the global economy, international and national development and poverty reduction policies, population policies, trade, conflict prevention, human security and human rights, and international co-operation. In a time of profound global interdependence -and amazing technological developments- one could imagine a better quality of life for the majority of the world’s people. And yet, the stories we read portray a growing divide between the rich and the poor, between peoples of the North and the South. There can be no international stability, no peace, no human security, when a few rich countries with a small minority of the world’s people alone have access to high living standard, while the large majority live in deprivation and want, shut off from opportunities of full economic and human development, but with expectations and aspirations aroused by easy access to information about life and opportunities abroad, low cost travel and ongoing communication with migrant communities abroad. I think we first have to look at international migration -at least the part that seems to pose problems both for states and individuals- from this broader perspective of persistent economic disparities and imbalances between the South and the North which, combined with the demographic equation, set the stage for the ever-growing migration pressures that we are currently witnessing across the globe. We know that population growth will for the foreseeable future be significantly higher in developing regions than in developed countries, thus compounding pressures on local labour markets in the south. Over the next decade, between 700 million and 1 billion young workers are expected to join these labour markets in developing regions. Many of these young people will not find employment in their home country due to economic stagnation that results from, inter a h , failing governance, current trade policies, including agricultural subsidy policies that affect negatively the export capacity of developing countries, and reduced or mismanaged financial and development aid. To put it differently - and as others have said before - if you look at our today’s economy in a globalized world, the biggest failure of globalisation so far has probably been the persistent inability to createjobs where people live.

17

18 Yes, industrialised and more developed countries need immigration, but it is unlikely - if you look at the figures I just mentioned - that the surplus labour available in developing countries, present and future, could in any sizable manner be absorbed through migration to industrialisedcountries. It is also true that essentially all industrialised countries face serious population decrease and consequent reduction in their active national labour force, resulting in growing difficulties to maintain current levels of social security and related welfare systems through national labour alone. However, in many industrialised countries the political, social and cultural costs of significantly increased labour in-migration from developing countries are still being perceived as too high, in particular in those countries whose societies and economies have not traditionally been built through immigration, early access to citizenship and an open attitude regarding migrant acceptance and integration. In short, there exists an important imbalance between the supply, or surplus, of migrant labour available in the south, and the actual demand for such labour in the north, an imbalance that cannot be resolved through whatever new and innovative global migration policy the international community might be able to develop, but that requires action in a much broader context of global economic development, international stability and international co-operation. I make these general remarks just for the purpose of reminding all of us that we cannot look at the phenomenon of human mobility in isolation, but that we must address international migration in an inter-disciplinary context of comprehensive, sustained and coherent international policy and action in a multitude of areas, many of which are spelled out, by way of example, in the Millennium Development Goals. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION - TRENDS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES This being said, I am here to talk to you about migration, including current trends, the principal challenges posed by migration, but also the opportunities than migration offers and the important contribution that migrants make to both their host societies and their countries of origin. You are familiar with the most recent statistics according to which the number of international migrants in the world increased by 14 per cent between 1990 and 2000, having reached some 175 million migrants by 2000, with a projection of 230 million by 2050. While South-South migration persists, more migrants are moving from developing to developed regions with an annual average of 2.4 million migrants moving from the less developed to the more developed areas. Currently, 60 per cent of migrants live in the more developed regions, where migrants make up almost one in every 10 persons. By contrast, migrants make up nearly one of every 70 persons in developing regions. In terms of population growth between 1990 and 2000, migrants represented 56 per cent of the overall population increase in the more developed regions, but only 3 per cent of the overall population growth of the less developed regions. Net immigrants represented 89 per cent of the population increase in Europe. As people become more mobile, traditional assumptions and concepts in the field of international migration are steadily breaking down. It is no longer possible, for example, to draw a sharp distinction between countries of origin, transit and destination, as many states now fall into all three categories. Nor is the notion of

19 nationality as clear-cut as it once was. A growing number of people around the world have dual citizenship, and migrants who have settled in another country increasingly retain close economic, social and cultural ties with the families and fiends they have left behind. Capital, goods, images and ideas are moving more and more keely around the world, as are highly skilled personnel in sectors such as information technology, higher education and health care. But other people who want or who feel the need to move - lower-skilled workers, asylum seekers and people who would like to join family members who have already moved abroad - are confronted with many obstacles in their efforts to migrate. Because of these obstacles, growing numbers of people seek to move in an “irregular” manner from one country and region to another, using the services of a growing migration industry that includes human smugglers and traffickers. In doing so, they are obliged to spend large amounts of money and to run numerous risks, including that of being detained and deported during or at the end of their journey. Those who manage to reach their intended destination may have little alternative but to live a life of clandestinity, exploited in the workplace and marginalized in society. The arrival of such ‘irregular’ or ‘undocumented’ migrants is currently a major concern for the world’s upper and middle-income states, many of which need a cheap and flexible labour force to undertake unattractive jobs and to compensate for their diminishing and ageing labour force, but whch at the same time perceive the arrival of such migrants as a threat to social cohesion and a challenge to the right of states to control the movement of people onto their temtory. Less developed countries have quite a different set of interests and concerns in relation to international migration. These include 1) the departure of educated young professionals to regions which can offer them a much higher standard of living (according to L O estimates, developing countries are currently experiencing a 1030% loss of such skilled manpower through “brain drain”); 2) a desire to maximize the volume and developmental impact of the remittances which many migrants send home; 3) a concern to protect the rights and working conditions of citizens who have found employment abroad; and 4) in some cases a fear that diaspora communities will engage in activities which represent a threat to the established social and political order in their country of origin. Given these different interests, it is not surprising that international migration has become an issue of some contention between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’, a situation which, for example, has so far limited the scope for a global dialogue on the issue in the United Nations. I shall come back to this aspect in a few minutes. MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT The link between migration and development is not a new one. Economic improvements in countries of origin are tied to easing of migration pressures. More recently, this assertion is qualified by the fact that a “migration hump” exists such that economic development can, at least over the medium term, spur migration as acquisition of skills and means offer greater access to foreign markets. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that improving economic conditions in countries of origin in particular through job creation will assist in reducing migration pressures by providing people with the option to work domestically. Part of this debate pertains to trading practices between States, since it argued that more balanced trading relations between developed and developing countries

20 would in fact assist in promoting States’ economic competitiveness and development potential. Thus, the potential for reducing migration pressures in countries of origin could be further assisted through a more equitable trading system. Another important dimension to this discussion relates to migration as a development tool for countries of origin. With increased global mobility, more attention is brought to migrants’ contributions as in most cases they maintain vigorous economic, social and cultural ties to their countries of origin. These links result in reverse flows of financial, technological, social and human capital back to their countries of origin. The World Bank estimated the global flow of remittances to developing countries in 2002 at US$ 88 billion. Remittances are projected to exceed US$90 billion in 2003. This implies that remittances exceed Official Development Assistance (ODA) and constitute the largest single source of financial flows to developing countries after FDI, indeed even exceeding FDI flows in many countries. In addition to their sheer volume, remittances manifest several other key characteristics which make them interesting as a development tool, including their stability as they appear to be less vulnerable to economic up and down turns than other sources of external funding; their growth which is increasing in tandem with growing migration; and the fact that remittances are unilateral transfers that do not create liabilities unlike other types of financial flows such as debt and equity flows. Also, unlike foreign aid, remittances go directly to the people who need them and to whom they were directed without any intervening and costly bureaucracy. Beyond the significant transfers of capital through remittance flows, migrant diasporas have also been instrumental in channeling flows of FDI to their home countries. For example, the Indian diaspora contributed 9.15% of FDI flows to India in 2002. The Chinese diaspora contribution to FDI in China was even higher. MIGRATION AND SECURITY The events of 11 September 2001 focused attention on whether greater international human mobility represents a security threat to States and societies, and may increase the likelihood of incidents of international terrorism. States are thus strengthening their borders through pre-clearance, at the border and internal measures. They are developing improved technologies to screen identity documents, data and communications systems, and training of relevant personnel. Greater security concerns have translated into more restrictions on mobility by checking immigration applications against criminal and terror databases more thoroughly. In the U.S., for example, the backlog of immigration applications has increased by nearly 60 per cent between 2001 and 2003, for a total of 6.2 million applications. Furthermore, security changes have raised a host of questions with regard to the lawful detention and treatment of individuals who can be mistreated and falsely charged. Tightening of security measures also is associated with the declining use of regular migration channels, such as the amnesty application processes, and an increase in irregular migration channels, such as human trafficking and smuggling. In addition, states are focusing on how to strengthen inter-state relations (cooperation) on this matter for greater transparency and information exchange, coordination of procedures, etc. A growing perception that immigrants and asylum-seekers are more likely to be involved in international terrorist activity, or in activities that might otherwise

21 undermine the security of the hosting State has, in many countries, had a negative impact on migrants’ human rights. Events related to 11 September 2001 and thereafter have also exacerbated some human rights abuses by contributing to heightened levels of xenophobia and suspicion of migrants in a number of countries. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia has documented changing attitudes towards Muslims in the “Summary Report on Islamophobia in the E U A f e r 11 September 2001.” The report shows an increase in hostilities directed at those who appear to be Muslim or of Arab descent, as measured by several indicators, including opinion polls, documented physical and verbal attacks, and news media analyses. Similarly, the profiling of migrants in some countries has had negative consequences on migrants, for example, in some cases programmes have required males of predominately Arab and Muslim countries to register with immigration authorities upon arrival in the country. MIGRANTS IN SOCIETY One of the principal policy challenges of contemporary migration relates to the impact of international migration, in its different forms, on host societies and culture, and the potential tension that exists between social diversity on one hand, and social cohesion on the other. Current government policies and practices related to assimilation, integration (and non-integration), multiculturalism, trans-nationalism, citizenship, etc. differ widely in this regard. Some states that admit migrants actively encourage them to integrate and naturalise in their adopted country, ascribing to its values, language and general way of life. Other destination countries place less emphasis on notions such as ‘assimilation’ or ‘integration’, and have adopted a policy of multicultural tolerance, which allows and even encourages ethnic minorities to practice their own languages, cultures and lifestyles. A third group of states rejects any notion of integration or even long-term migrant settlement. While such states may tolerate the presence of migrant workers for fixed contractual periods, they are keen to ensure that such migrants have little or no opportunity to become part of society or to become naturalised citizens. Temporary contract migrants then may not wish to become an integral part of societies with cultures and lifestyles that are quite different from their own. These different approaches have triggered a lively debate about the role, rights and responsibilities of migrants in society, and with regard to the expectations that states, societies and migrants can legitimately have of each other. The debate includes the notion of mutual acceptance and multi-cultural tolerance, but also encompasses a variety of other aspects, including the respect for national law and customs (e.g. equality in law and practice between men and women, prohibition of polygamy, preeminence of civil marriage over religious mamage, respect for the rights and physical integrity of children), the learning of the national language and, in some cases, the acceptance of basic values that prevail in host societies. At the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR), held in Durban, South Afnca in September 2001, states singled out the need to combat manifestations of a generalized rejection of migrants and actively discourage all racist demonstrations and acts that generate xenophobic behaviour. The Durban Declaration urges states to take measures in order to foster greater harmony and tolerance between migrants and host societies, to review

22 and revise, where necessary, immigration laws, policies and practices so that they are free of racial discrimination. How host communities react to the presence of newcomers constitutes an essential element in ensuring successful integration. National and local administrators are generally encouraged to emphasize open and participatory discourse on societal transformations. Church groups, migrant associations and non-governmental organizations play an important role in facilitating integration and fostering understanding between newcomers and host communities. However, social cohesion is often difficult to achieve and maintain, in particular during periods of economic strain, and/or when migrants are considered “different” to nationals in their cultural habits, religious faith, political beliefs, etc. Migration then becomes an extremely sensitive and emotional issue; it is often politicized, as politicians play on the fears of the electorate, pitting them against migrants as the source of their problems and predicament. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION BASED ON SHARED INTERESTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES International migration is a complex and far reaching issue that transcends national borders and jurisdictions. In a globalized world, policies relating to international migration and associated issues (labour supply, employment, economic growth and development, human security, state security, public health, etc.) must be based upon common understandings and accepted principles, as well as a recognition of the shared responsibilities and interests of all states and other stakeholders. International migration should consequently be addressed in a collaborative and cooperative manner. A key question here if of course is how to develop the policy and practical modalities of such a collaborative and co-operative approach at the multi-lateral level. In other words, how can the respective interests of sending, receiving and transit states (or combinations thereof) be elucidated and articulated, and how can the competing or conflicting interests of different states be effectively and equitably reconciled? A number of regional and global initiatives have been focusing on this issue over the last few years, many of them promoted and supported by relevant international institutions, such as ILO, IOM and UNHCR. The United Nations General Assembly has been discussing this matter more concretely since the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), including proposals to hold a global conference on international migration and development. A series of resolutions and action recommendations on international migration were adopted, without reaching agreement, however, as to whether a global conference was indeed required at this juncture. THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

In view of the developments described above, there has been a growing recognition of the need to examine the potential for global approaches to the issue of international migration, and to identify ways in which the effective and equitable governance of migration can be promoted at the national, regional and international levels. It was precisely this consideration which led United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to identify migration as a priority issue for his office and the

23 rest of the international community in his 2002 report on ‘Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change’. Following the publication of that report, in early 2003 an expert working group was established by the Secretary-General, which identified a number of options in relation to the way that the UN and other international organizations might strengthen their role in this field. The group proposed, inter alia, the creation of a high-level and independent international panel that could look more deeply into issues related to migration. The Commission was launched by the Secretary General and a number of interested governments on 9 December 2003 in Geneva.

Purpose and Mandate THEOVERALL AIM OF THE COMMISSION IS TO PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE FORMULATION OF A COHERENT, COMPREHENSIVE AND GLOBAL RESPONSE TO MIGRATION ISSUES. The Commission’s mandate is: To place international migration on the global agenda by promoting a comprehensive dialogue among governments, international organisations, academia, civil society, private sector, media and other actors on all aspects of migration and issues related to migration; To analyse gaps in current policy approaches to migration and examine inter-linkages with other issue-areas by focusing on various approaches and perspectives of governments and other actors in different regions, and by addressing the relationship of migration with other global issues that impact on and cause migration; and To present recommendations, by mid-summer 2005, to the United Nations Secretary-General and other stakeholders on how to strengthen national, regional and global governance of international migration. To test the Commission’s own findings and identify areas of emerging consensus for consideration by the international community, we will over a 14-month period organise five broad-based regional consultations with governments, NGO’s, regional organisations and experts, media, corporate sector, trade unions and other stakeholders. Other thematic seminars will also be held and two to three additional Commission-only meetings are planned. The first regional consultations for the Asia and Pacific region took place with some 150 participants in May 2004 in Manila. Further regional meetings are planned for the Mediterranean and Middle East, Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas. While it is too early to be specific at this stage, the Final Report of the Commission is likely to put forward a series of strategic options, together with a set of ‘actionable steps’, for consideration by the Secretary-General and other stakeholders. The Commission will also produce interim reports, undertake and commission specific research activities, publish background studies and other relevant materials, and develop an extensive information sharing activity, including running a web-site. It is anticipated that the Final Report will first be considered by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005. The report could then be the subject of further discussion in the March 2006 Population and Development Commission and, more particularly, in the High Level Dialogue on International Migration of the 2006

24 General Assembly. Following the submission of the report to the Secretary-General by mid-Summer 2005, the Commission Secretariat and concerned United Nations officials will actively disseminate the report's findings and recommendations with governments and other stakeholders in order to ensure full understanding of and support to the proposals made by the Commission.'

The Commission is based in Geneva. It is independent and is comprised of 19 internationally renowned members, drawn from all regions and bringing together a wide range of migration perspectives and expertise. It is co-chaired by Dr. Mamphela Ramphele from South Afiica, and Mr. Jan 0. Karlsson from Sweden. The Executive Director is Dr. Rolf K. Jenny from Switzerland.

2.

LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENT: MIGRATION

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MIGRATION AND CYBERSPACE AHMADKAMAL Senior Fellow, United Nations Institute of Training and Research New York, USA The history of migration is one of the most exciting chapters in human development. It is the story of mankind's exploding movement outwards, from its origins in East Africa across vast distances and entire continents. It is the story of the pioneering spirit that led migrants to brave inhospitable climates and spaces, and the fear of an unknown world, not just to satisfy their wanderlust, but more essentially in search of a better future for themselves and their children. For hundreds of years, it was this migration that was the driving force which led to the establishment of new human settlements in virgin lands and spaces. Each one of us is the product of that essential human expansion, as our ancestors progressively moved outwards in repeated circles and waves into the lands and territories in which we find ourselves today. The development of townships was a natural consequence of this migration. It was in the establishment of these new townships that a balance was struck between man's individual desire to tap newer economic resources, while at the same time seeking relative safety in gregarious kinship and company. The industrial revolution changed all that. The townships which hitherto were the focal points for agricultural and h-ading communities, changed into economic enterprises in their own right. Towns gave way to cities, as burgeoning economic activity took on a life of its own. We then witnessed the second most extraordinary phase of migration, away from the agricultural countryside and township into the urban industrial city. This urban migration, which thus began just a few hundred years ago, has now reached its epitome in the urban sprawl of mega-cities, with all the unsolvable problems that they exemplify. The habitat is thus in a state of crisis. In its essence, the crisis is due to the uncontrollable, and a seemingly unstoppable, process of urbanization. Millions are agglomerating in already over-packed cities, which are increasingly unable to provide basic civic amenities. The planning and provision of adequate transport, water, sewage es are becoming an impossibility. As a result, human habitations are slowly but inexorably turning into environmental hazards, into seething hot-beds of social tension, and into chronic sources of political unrest. The crisis has particularly ominous features. It is rapidly involving those who are least able to cope with it, namely, the developing countries. At present, the list of the dozen largest cities in the world includes only some that are in the developing countries, but by 2015 all but one shall be located in these very developing countries. Even more worrying is the fact that the crisis is not amenable to traditional solutions. Conventional wisdom does not work. Almost all industrialised countries, faced with the problem of providing proper civic amenities to an exploding urban populace, have attempted to do so in three manners: First, there was an attempt at "investment", by pouring more money into the problem. Larger sewage plants were built, bigger hospitals erected, elaborate mass

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transport systems put in place, and massive costs incurred to bring in water from increasingly distant reservoirs. With every improvement in infrastructures, ironically, the result was that even more people gravitated towards the cities, soon stretching the urban facilities again to breaking point. Second, there was an effort at "devolution". Attempts were made to move parts of urban populations into outlying "satellite" townships, which were supposed to take the pressure off from the mother cities themselves. Unfortunately, in most cases, the townships soon merged with a rapidly growing central urban area, merely becoming enclaves with relatively better facilities than the adjoining older neighborhoods. Third, there was an attempt at "decentralization". Outlying small towns were privileged with incentives, in the form of tax breaks and subsidized civic services, in an effort to relocate industries in these regions. In effect, the state moved in to counteract the operation of economic forces which, left to themselves, led inevitably to the creation of mega-cities. These measures, which have had rather limited success even in industrialised countries, have had no meaningful impact in developing countries. The reasons are obvious. In the first place, the magnitude of the problem is far greater in developing countries. Industrialization, and its accompanying urbanization, is taking place in a compressed time frame. What occurred in developed countries over several decades, is happening in developing countries within just a few years. Also, urbanization is occurring in the presence of much larger and faster growing populations. The pressure of urbanization in developing countries thus exceeds by far anythmg seen in developed countries. At the same time, the resources available to the developing countries are much more limited. There is just not enough of capital available to constantly upgrade civic infrastructure, or to establish alternative urban centers. Despite this, policy makers in developing countries persist in resorting to these conventional measures. It is a dispiriting sight. Intelligent people are taking steps that are doomed to failure, waging battles that are lost even before they are commenced. It is clear that the solution to the urban crisis, in developing countries in particular, does not lie in persevering with existing traditional approaches. These can, at best, be palliative band-aids. More viable solutions can perhaps be found if we pay closer attention to the radical changes taking place in the global economy. These changes could affect the shape of human habitation in as fundamental a manner as the industrial revolution itself. Properly exploited, these changes may provide meaningful solutions even to the urban crisis in developing countries. The global economy is rapidly moving into what is being termed as the postindustrial era. This is resulting in as dramatic a break, away from the industrial economy, as the latter was from its preceding agriculture-based economy. In this post-industrial era, the older manufacturing sector is slowly being overtaken by the new services sector as the basic engine for growth. Marketing, banking, insurance, shipping, tourism, consultancy, in fact a whole range of industries that perform various functions for customers, but do not involve the sale of any tangible product, are becoming the leading sectors of major economies. This is not to say that manufacturing is becoming unimportant, or that it shall disappear in the post-industrial economies. It is just that recent technological advances make it possible to dramatically increase productivity in

29 the manufacturing sector, while devoting far lesser resources in terms of labour, time, and capital. This is exactly what happened to the agriculture sector with the advent of the industrial revolution. It became possible to dramatically increase agricultural output, which was an essential requirement for all human beings, with a fraction of previous levels of resources, especially in terms of labour inputs. The quantum increase in the new productivity of the manufacturing sector is largely due to recent advances in information technology. The advent of personal computers, faxes, electronic mail and video-conferencing, has led to a revolution in traditional modes of production. Machines driven by computer programmes can cut more pieces out of the same amounts.of steel or textiles than any average human operator. Rapid information can be obtained about the changing needs of the market; production lines can be adjusted accordingly, and customized products can be provided at optimum cost. By improving the speed of communication, and by decreasing the reaction time for factories as they adjust to market needs, shorter production runs become economical, and it becomes possible to reduce the inventories sitting idle in warehouses. Efficiency increases dramatically. Similar changes become possible in offices also. Most office work can now be performed much closer to peoples homes. Instead of office workers moving to cities, office work can move out from cities into homes. In the process, the freeing of physical space and the lessening of the burden on transport and accommodation facilities in cities can be significant. This is already happening in developed countries. In North America, major banks are handling credit cards in one state, clearing checks in another, and performing data processing in a third. In Europe, major airlines are shifting their data processing centers into distant locations. Almost everywhere, one after the other, major companies are rapidly shifting their labour-intensive departments to the outskirts of metropolitan areas. All this has been made possible by the ability to move information rapidly and cheaply. It is clear that in a post industrial society the new economic and technological forces can lead to a significant lessening of the pressure on cities. The question then is, to what extent is this relevant to developing countries ? Can some of the solutions tried out in developed countries be applied to developing countries also in a globalised and shrinking world. Even the most advanced among these developing countries are still struggling merely to industrialize their economies. The expectation that these countries shall soon graduate towards post-industrial modes of production may appear unrealistic. But this is true only if we assume that development takes place in a standard linear fashion, that all countries must move mechanically from the agricultural, to the mercantile, to the industrial, and finally to the post-industrial stage. This does not have to be so. There are many instances, even in past history, of countries that have leap-frogged certain stages of development, in some cases straight from a feudal economy to a modem industrial one. But the question still remains. Can the developing countries of today move towards a post-industrial economy even though they have not yet fully industrialized? Unlikely as it might appear, this is possible. Post-industrial economies are informationbased and not capital-based. Human beings, of which developing countries have an abundant supply, are the key resource. The critical inputs required are a literate work force, a good communications network, and a relatively inexpensive source of energy.

30 These are already available in many developing countries, and increasingly accessible in others. The major new development is the revolutionary discovery of cyberspace and the linked invention of the Internet. During many of the past phases of economic development in the world, we have frequently seen the Malthusian doomsday scenario being neutralised by outward migration, or overtaken by quantum improvements in agricultural and industrial techniques. Noticeably, however, these decreases in population pressures or increases in output occurred in the same developed societies in which the Malthusian scenario had been originally cast and feared. Some of the most advanced countries in Europe, for example, were major exporters of migrant labour just a few decades ago. That is no longer so. The problems of population pressures on economic resources are now concentrated in the developing countries, while the solutions, in the form of capital, industrial know-how and market access, lie in the developed countries. Mutual contact between problems and solutions, between the developed and developing countries, is largely broken due to the protectionist policies that the former are deliberately following in a vain effort to shut out the rest of the world from the benefits of better standards of living. New hope has, however, emerged for developing countries in the form of the informatics revolution, and cyberspace. This is a new virtual layer in the atmosphere, with its own network of virtual highways sitting astride the world, available to all and sundry against a simple outlay in increasingly cheap hardware. With that hardware in hand, and access to electricity, the poorest in the most outlying comers of the world can have the same degree of access to information and services and technology, as the very richest and most privileged. Never, in the history of mankind, has it been so easy to access all the technological information and databases on such a democratic and equitable basis as is afforded by the Internet of today. The political commitment to move beyond industrialization is thus likely in developing countries. The realization shall soon set in that, not only can the developing countries move towards a post-industrial economy, they must, and they can. To be truly developed, and to end the chronic state of dependency in which they presently find themselves, mere industrialization shall not be enough. Modes of production based on new information technologies shall have to be adopted, and they are readily available. Once the developing countries embark on a post-industrial path, intriguing new possibilities shall open up for tackling the seemingly intractable problems of uncontrolled migration and urbanization. The city in the developed world would no longer be the main center of economic opportunities, or the focus of unrelenting migration from the hinterland. This still leaves many questions unanswered. To what extent could these postindustrial changes make an actual dent in the problems of the mega-cities? In quantitative terms, what effects may be anticipated, say in regard to rural-urban migrations? What is the existing data on the impact of incipient post-industrial forces on the urban problems of developing countries? There is insufficient information on these questions, and obviously a need for further study of these matters. What is even more troublesome is the growth of poverty in the world. The United Nations estimates that the “gap” has doubled in the past thirty years alone, and the World

31 Bank affirms that more than a quarter of the countries of the world have seen per-capita incomes actually decline in the past decade. Other than its obvious effects on hunger and jobs and human rights and welfare, poverty is intimately linked with disease. It is no surprise that more than 90% of the AIDS pandemic is now located in developing countries, some of whom report as much as a quarter of their total adult populations affected. Poverty also generates frustration, and when this frustration is super imposed on the visible political injustices being unabashedly practiced around the world, it becomes a breeding ground for terrorism, and a magnet not just for the poor but also for the relatively well-off youth. This disturbing trend is clearly seen in the profiles of recent suicide bombers. The frustrations created by poverty and injustice are further compounded by the protectionism that is now increasingly practiced by the developed countries against migrant labour. Movement of humans is becoming progressively difficult day by day. The restrictions that are imposed, and the short-sighted refusal to discuss these in a global discussion on migration issues, are subjecting developing countries to “double-jeopardy”, with no jobs at home, and no possibilities of seeking them elsewhere. At this stage, all that one can assert with some surety, is that the best hope of addressing the problems of rampant urbanization and poverty and migration, lies in a system in which the new economic and technological forces are harnessed to work against the current unhealthy concentrations of work units and people, and the vast gaps between the developed and the developing. Let us hope that policy makers, especially in developed countries with their aging populations, will look afresh at this crisis, seeking solutions in the forces of the future and in open discussion, rather than persisting with the failed protectionist and mercantilist practices of the past.

MIGRATION IN EUROPE HILTMAR SCHUBERT Fraunhofer ICT, Pfinztal, Germany INTRODUCTION Migration only occurs if the demographic potential of a region cannot be absorbed by its economic and social systems. Migration then takes place to a region or country with higher economic potential and demographic development, which can support additional foreign labour. Political, religious or ethnographic pressures on special parts of a population can also cause migration. Europe has changed since the middle of the last century fiom an emigration to a (de facto) immigration region due to its more or less decreasing population and because it is an industrial region of high prosperity. Migration influences the social, economic and ecological situation of both immigration and emigration countries. The overall aim is a form of development leading to a sustainable situation in both kinds of countries. Sustainable integration of the immigrants will be one of the most important tasks in reaching this goal. THE SITUATION IN EUROPE The population of our world is increasing and will reach 6.45 million people this summer; the overall growth-rates has decreased in the last 40 years from 2% to 1.18%, but the average growth rate of the 50 poorest countries of the world is still 2.4%, meanwhile industrial countries have an average rate of 0.25%. The prognosis is that world population in 2020 will reach 7.5 million. The different changes in population between 2005 and 2020 (prognosis) are the following in millions:

Africa Latin American and the Caribbean Europe North America Asia Oceania

2005 12020

Growth rate in %

8871 1188 558 1659 725 1705 332 I380 3917 14570 33 138

34 18 - 2,8 14 17 15

These numbers show where we may expect migrations in the world. History Migration in Europe can be divided into different phases: Thefirst phase: In the 19th and early 20th centuries large waves of emigration took place. Between 1815 and 1930, more than 50 million Europeans emigrated for economic or political reasons; only 38 million people found their new home in the USA. Workers from Poland and the Ukraine migrated to the West European centres for coal-mining and steel production. After World War I, 6 million Europeans emigrated as a result of

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33 the war: for ethnic reasons, repatriation and forcible relocation (Greeks from West Turkey; 1.5 million because of the Russian October Revolution). Before World-War 11, 0.5 million Jewish and politically persecuted people emigrated from Germany and Austria. During Wold War I1 about 8 million foreigners were forced to work in Germany. The secondphase: Between 1945 and 1949 12 million East Germans and members of the German ethnic group emigrated from East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia to Germany. 2 million of them lost their lives during repatriation: 10.5 million “displaced persons“ went back from Germany to their home countries. 1.2 million Polish people had to leave East Poland and were settled in the former German East Prussia and Silesia. Prior to 1961 when the Berlin wall was built, about 3.5 million Germans crossed the internal border from East to West Germany. In the 50s and ~OS,after the original colonial countries became independent, about 1 million people went back to their countries of origin. (Examples: French people from Algeria to France, people of the Portuguese colonies to Portugal, people in Indonesia to the Netherlands and inhabitants of the Belgian colonies to Belgium. English people also returned to England.) Many of these people settled down in the large European cities. Due to this migration these towns became multicultural centres. The thirdphase: Because of the economic boom in Western Europe, a very high number of qualified workers were needed. The first immigrants came from Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, and later on also from Turkey and Yugoslavia. In 1973 due to the “mineral oil shock” a drastic limitation of immigration into Europe was introduced. These regulations have caused only a retardation of immigration but never a halt. This internationalization of the Western European labour market has caused an overall immigration of 30 million people. Currently, 19 million foreigners are living in West Europe, mostly people at a lower social level. The east-west conflict gave rise to a high number of immigrants to Europe. Internal political strife has produced ethnic and political refugees in Eastern Europe, who were accepted by the countries of Western Europe, through the Geneva Convention, as candidates for asylum. For this reason alone, about 1 million refugees immigrated to Western Europe between 1956 and 1990. (Hungary ca 200.000; Czechoslovakia 170.000; Poland 250.000; 400.000 Bulgaria; and only in the year 1989, 385.000 Germans.) This large migration by DDR citizens in 1989 was one of the reasons for the breakdown of the communist regime in East Germany. As a result, 19 million inhabitants of Western Europe are not citizens of their country of residence. Thus history shows that Europe was, over the last 110 years, an emigration region first and then, for 70 years, more or less an area of immigration of increasing importance. Demographic Changes Emigration and immigration will be influenced by a pull and push factor. The increasing growth rates of countries around Europe create a pressure of immigration in the European region. On the other side, low natural decrease of population causes an economic need of additional manpower. “Eurostat” gives an overlook (Fig. 1) about the growth rate of European countries. It is shown that Germany, Italy and Greece have negative natural rates, and that, on the contrary, France, Ireland and the Netherlands have the largest positive rates. It may be of interest that the new EU countries have a negative average growth rate. The migration balance is so positive in

34 all the countries of the EU, that the overall growth in Europe is marginally positive. According to these numbers and influenced by different political directions, individual European countries also have different immigration policies (Fig 1). The treaty of the European Union gives all European citizens the right to move to any member state. In practice, over the last 10 years, the mobility between member states is estimated to range between 0.1 and 0.2 % of the total population per year. For the people of the new member countries (May lSt, 2004), different transition regulations are installed. To keep the population numbers constant, a birth-rate of 2.1 children per woman is necessary. The rates in Spain (1.22), Italy (1.25) and Germany (1.34) are below this figure. The problem of demographic development in Europe becomes apparent if the population of a country is extrapolated into the future by using today's growth rates. Using Germany as an example: up to 2050 the population will decrease by about 10 million. Economic Consequences For those countries that decrease in population, the question arises as to whether such a country can maintain its social sustainability and economic power. Another important figure will be the aging of the population. In recent decades industry has produced more products, of better quality and quantity, and with less manpower. The number of employees in the tertiary sector has also decreased, while maintaining the same or a better level of service. The important point is the percentage of working population in relation to the elderly population. This ratio will be further influenced by the unemployment percentage and will also have an impact social sustainability. Example: for a constant population figure in Germany, the immigration of 325.000 people per year would be necessary. But the evaluation of all these figures show that the decrease in birth-rates of the population of a country must not be completely replaced by immigrants. The number depends on the educational level of the immigrants, on the aging and the percentage of employment of the population on the BSP, as well as the favourable turn of the market. Therefore an intensive discussion in the European Union and in most of the member states may continue. IMMIGRATION INTO EUROPE

Africa The growth rate of the population in Africa 3% is per year with a stagnating standard of living, the consequence of which is dramatic internal migration. 100 million Africans are without jobs and 10 million southern African people have emigrated to other African countries. Because of the strong cultural and economical interaction of the states bordering the Mediterranean, the North African population will cause considerable immigration-pressure on the South European member states of the EU. North Africa has an emigration potential dependant on the job market of 0.8 to 1 million people per year. Therefore this region is an important immigration region for Europe and, in spite of the restrictive immigration policy of the EU, the number of North Africans will increase until 2025 to 65 million maximum (10 % of the whole population). France, Spain, and Italy are the favoured areas of immigration for these African emigrants. To overcome this problem, the EU is taking the following measures: 1. Integration of North Afiican immigrants already in the EU. 2. Passive policy that controls and halts immigration.

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Suitable actions in the emigration countries to decrease the potential by technical, social and financial cooperation. The efforts of the member states of the EU to protect the population against terrorism cause a more restrictive immigration policy of Muslim people and will strengthen the restrictive immigration policy of the EU member states. Turkey and the Arab States The immigration from Turkey to Europe has been taking place since the beginning of the 60s. These “Guest Workers” came mostly from a rural background. The intention was to earn money, go home and found a new existence. This emigration of Turkish workers to Western Europe continued until 1974, but an important part of them have become permanent residents with their families and now, in the second and third generations, many have acquired the citizenship of the host countries. For the time being some 3.5 million Turks are living in Western Europe. Because of their Muslim religion, most of them have not integrated with the host population. Turkey has requested membership in the EU, but the opinions about this diverge in the EU. The Arab world has a population of about 280 million and, by 2020, will grow to 400-450 million. 38 % of the population is under the age of 14. The conservative rule of the administration cannot follow this development, and therefore social, economical and educational situations will decline and there is a real threat of instability. Besides this negative development, the long lasting conflict between Israel and Palestine will worsen any chance for future solutions. The acceptance Arab immigration into Europe is decreasing because of the fear of terrorism. Others After Germany had absorbed Russian citizens of German origin, the legal immigration of Russians and Ukrainians decreased noticeably. After the Eastern European countries become members of the EU, the outer border will be with Russia and the Ukraine. We will see in the future if there is a tendency of transit immigration from east to west. During the first years, regulations will prevent legal immigration. The illicit nature of migration is unsettling. The international mobility of the Roma and Sinti is a special problem. There is no statistical data available because these people are rarely specified as ethnic groups. INTEGRATION Because of its demographic development, Europe will also be more or less a region of immigration in future. The European Union is trying to establish some mutual directives concerning immigration. Examples are a directive for the right to family reunification, the status of third country nationals who are long time internal residents, and on the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities, The successful immigration of third country nationals is closely connected to their integration into their country of residence in Europe. It should be successful in their 2”* or 3rdgeneration. Most European states have made major efforts in recent years to improve the integration of immigrants and persons enjoying international protection, by developing national integration policies, but many of them consider that the policies they have put in place so far are not sufficiently effective.

36 However, more sustained immigration flows are increasingly likely and necessary. The trend towards a shrinking working age population in combination with various push factors in the developing countries is likely to generate a sustained flow of immigrants over the next decades. The successful integration of immigrants is both a matter of social cohesion and a prerequisite for economic efficiency. Low employment and high unemployment rates even among the second generation of immigrants are characteristic examples of these problems. Integration is a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legal residents and members of the host society to provide full participation of the immigrants. That means, on the one hand, that the immigrants must have the possibility to participate in economic, social, cultural and civil life and on the other hand, the immigrant must respect the fundamental norms and values of the host society. Integration involves the development of a balance of rights and obligations. Access to the labour market is crucial for the integration of third country nationals into the host country's society, and education and training are key factors of successful integration. A core concern in most of the European states is the ability to speak the language of the host country. Poor language ability is seen as the main barrier to successful integration. A special problem concerning integration is the families of immigrants of Islam faith. It is a tradition supported by the Islam religion that the female side of the family, in many cases, must be separated from the social life of the host society. As large European towns have become more and more multicultural, these immigrants live together in specific areas of the city. In turn, the lack of assimilation leads to internal immigration in the host country even in the second or third generation. A special concern is the education of immigrant's children in the elementary schools with the children of the host society. Normal teaching becomes impossible if children of immigrants reach a certain number, and sometimes, in these neighbourhoods, the percentage of immigrant children is higher than the number of children from the host society. In more rural parts of the host country, the children of immigrants do not impede education to a large extent, but they are left behind in education and the cycle of problems continues. It is urgent to improve this situation by special language courses (teaching the language of the host country), but very difficult to accomplish. The holistic approach of immigrants' integration, and in consequence also immigration itself, is greeted sceptically by the European population who maintains an attitude of reserve. This situation be aggravated in times of economic problems and under threats of terrorism. Consequently, politicians hold different opinions about how to solve this problem. CONCLUSION Since the middle of the last century, Europe has changed from a region of emigrants to countries of immigration due of the demographic development. Such migrations follow the "Push and Pull Phenomenon". Therefore the European politicians, and especially the EU, are prepared to accept in future this situation in principle. To continue sustainable development in Europe, immigrants from so-called third countries must be integrated into their hostcountries through economic partnership.

37 Favourable conditions imply a good education and knowledge of the host country’s language. Experience has shown in the past that integration of families takes time, money and an open labour market. European people and their politicians know about the holistic approach and the necessity of immigration from third countries into Europe, but they are very sceptical due to the moderate economy in Europe and the threat of terrorism from Muslim countries.

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: A SYNOPTIC EUROPEAN OVERVIEW

NIGEL HARRIS Development Planning Unit, University College London, UK MIGRATION It is now generally agreed that the European labour force is set to decline over the next three decades- to different degrees in different countries and at different times. Efforts are underway to increase the employment of adults currently not working, to raise retirement ages, and increase intra-European migration; business is also, to different degrees, outsourcing activities and services, innovating to replace labour, etc. But, even if these measures are successful, the deficits in labour supply are still likely to be economically deleterious. The more dynamic the European economy is - the faster the rate of growth and the more rapidly economies restructure - the more severe the problems of labour supply become. Most public attention has been focussed exclusively on the problems of scarcity of skilled and highly skilled workers, but the educational systems of Europe are continually upgrading the nativeborn workforce so that there are steadily fewer workers willing, at the rates of pay on offer, to undertake low-skilled jobs. The shortage of complementary low-skilled workers can severely reduce the capacity of the skilled to attain optimal levels of productivity. The present system of migration controls, put in place in the 1970s, is no longer capable of accommodating both the dynamic but unpredictable domestic demands for workers of different skills, and the global demand for work in Europe, an incapacity illustrated in the perpetual changes in statute and regulation governing entry and residence. The system is increasingly costly, bureaucratic, opaque and arbitrary. Intensifying controls only increases the criminalisation, brutalisation and militarization of the process of entering Fortress Europe (changes no less apparent on the border between Mexico and the United States). In sum, the workers are needed, and developing countries have available a ready supply of willing and literate workers. Furthermore, there is evidence of major potential gains to the world economy from lowering migration controls'. The reluctance of Europeans to avail themselves of this obvious remedy arises, at a minimum, from fears that the workers would want to settle and would impose burdens on systems of social security, housing etc; at a maximum, that increased ethnic diversity will undermine that social homogeneity seen as the foundation of the nationstate. However, in terms of long-term settlement, contrary to popular opinion, many migrants, possibly a majority and particularly the low-skilled, do not wish to go into permanent exile', but only to secure access to work, to earn in order to support families left at home or meet other major expenses (to marry, purchase a house, pay for hospital treatment or education, etc). This is particularly important where purchasing power values are markedly different between source and destination countries - a poorly paid worker in Europe has a middle income at home, provided he or she is able to spend the incomes earned abroad at home. Most migrants would seem to prefer to circulate rather than settle (of course, this generalisation is powerfully affected by conditions at home3). Circulation is the most ancient form of worker

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39 migration, and there are many schemes that have worked with great reliability in this field (not least, employer-run contract labour scheme^)^. However, the effect of immigration controls is, perversely, to force migrants to settle, to accept exile until such time as they can secure citizenship and thus the freedom to circulate’. It has been commonly noted that Spanish, Portuguese and Greek migrant workers settled permanently in Germany until their countries entered the European Union and they won the right to return home without jeopardising their freedom to circulate and return to Germany if they wished. Thus, preserving the freedom to circulate is a condition of workers being willing to return home (as a number of European governments have found in the disappointing results of schemes to encourage return). However, the modem nation-State is ill equipped to accommodate circulation. Governments assume and seek to preserve a sharp distinction between a clearly defined body of citizens, the basis for the exercise of democratic franchise and the privileges of nationality, and those who are foreigners and should leave. The instinct of government is to enforce either departure or “integration”, immobility and incorporation into the historic nation. However, despite the problems attached to the idea of migratory circulation, it provides a way both of spreading the benefits of migration over much larger numbers of people and meeting the fears of Europe’s native-born population. Furthermore, the decline in international transport costs - and in ordinary communication - makes feasible the keeping of family and other social relationships intact while a worker is working abroad, and thus the social basis for return. DEVELOPMENT In the 1990s, the dynamic of Europe’s labour market attracted much larger numbers of regular and irregular workers from outside Europe - lobalisation has, as it were, become inescapable on the streets of Europe’s big cities . The by-product of this change has been an extraordinary increase in the flow of worker remittances to their home countries (increasing rapidly, and now - including estimates of unofficial transfers in cash and kind - worldwide, possibly two and a half times the levels of official development aid). Given the differences in purchasing power parities between developed and developing countries, this global sum is immensely increased at the point of expenditure. Furthermore, the multiplier effects of such spending are firther magnified (by two to three times according to one study of Mexico). In development terms, this is a remarkable and unexpected increase in the revenues of developing countries. In addition, remittances are, in contrast to other revenue and investment flows, counter-cyclical (they increase in a recession), do not generate counter-flows (payments for imports, profits on foreign investment), and go directly to those in need in some of the poorer localities (Suro, 2003). Governments in developing countries, after some reluctance, have become eager to hamess this new source of revenues for development7. The four hundred or so hometown clubs of the Mexican diaspora in the United States have mobilised to finance development projects in their home localities - to pave a road, build a health clinic, primary school, etc. Mexican local, State and Federal governments have, in some States, offered three dollars to match each dollar remitted by a worker abroad, and re-aligned domestic anti-poverty, health and educational programmes (Progresa, now Opportunidades) to magnify the effect of remittance flows (Escobar et al., 2003; O’Neil, April 2003). The Mexican government after long years of shame at the scale of emigration of its citizens, has moved to track their destinations, keep in touch,

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40

supply Mexican identity cards (for irregular migrants), facilitate cash transfers and offer advice. Other countries have developed schemes to utilise the scarce skills of their most highly skilled citizens abroad to upgrade universities and the professions, and to start industries of high technology (Lindsay Lowell, Dec. 2001; Findlay, 2001). There are many other schemes for collaborative transnational partnerships to extract development and other benefits from emigration (see Grillo, 2002, Grillo and Riccio, 2004). However, migration can remove from the labour force of a developing country the most skilled, energetic and enterprising workers, making very much more difficult the task of conquering poverty. It would be quite wrong for Europe to purchase the welfare of its inhabitants at the cost of developing countries. However, there are means, discussed below, to turn circulatory migration into a deliberate positive reinforcement for development efforts.

AID Official aid programmes to developing countries play a great variety of roles, from supporting macro economic balance and reforms, financing responses to emergencies, and projects. Project aid has a mixed record of achievement and can, in certain circumstances, lead to the subordination of the perception of the developing country’s requirements to the interests of the donor. This does not happen with remittances that carry no political strings. Furthermore, the lack of local development agents can jeopardise the outcome of aid projects. Donors employ governments in developing countries, consultants, and increasingly, NGOs to play the role of local implementing agents. However, with circulatory migration, there could be an immense number of development agents in returnees. Aid programmes could then be employed to reinforce the efforts of returnees, of remittance flows and, as now, the efforts of developing countries’governments and NGOs8. Enhancing human capital is widely seen as one of the most important issues in economic development, and circulatory migration can contribute to this aim. On the one hand, temporary migration includes a large number of students who come to Europe to study. In many cases, they are also allowed to work. On the other, if we were to think of all circulatory migrants on the model of students (including in study, work-experience, on the job training, and enhancement of professional skills), then migration could simultaneously meet Europe’s requirements for workers and enhance the human capital of developing countries through returnees. In addition, treating all migrants on the same basis would militate against the current tendency to create a two class system in which the highly skilled are able to move fairly freely, work and settle, but the low skilled are expected to be tied to the soil of their native place. Aid programmes in conjunction with host country educational institutions, could be enlisted to organise the training, education and professional development programmes of migrants, track returnees, and offer follow-up programmes in the student’s country of origin, of aid and support for development projects’. LESSONS FOR EUROPE There are many issues not resolved here - for example, how far families can migrate with temporary workers, how far extensions in the period of work are permitted, how people who wish to stay on a more permanent basis are to be permitted to make the transition from migrant to settler, how conditions of work and

41 pay are to be regulated, monitored and policed, how migrants are to be accorded health protection during their work period (whether within or without existing social security arrangements) . Ideally, employers should be obliged to bear the risks and costs of recruitment and repatriation, but this may not satisfy European electorates. Partnerships between home and host country governments, relevant trade unions and NGOs may be a formula for establishing a fair, well-regulated and well-policed system of circular migration. However the central principle remains - to turn migration from a problem for both Europe and for developing countries into an opportunity for the reduction of world poverty. MIGRATION AND ANTI-GLOBALIS ATION Between about 1970 and 2050, Europe is undergoing wrenching processes of social and economic change involved in the emergence of a single integrated world economy. European electorates have accepted much of this process already in terms of deindustrialisation (and the relocation of part of the manufacturing capacity to Asia), in trade and capital movements, and now the “out-sourcing” of services. Major reforms in Europe’s social security and pension schemes can also add to a generalised sense of insecurity. Still to come are the full effects of declining population and ageing. In retrospect, the 1990s may be seen as witnessing the beginning of a major transition in terms of people, particularly in Europe’s large cities. An emerging world labour market is in continual collision with the political order of the world as embodied in political boundaries. After two hundred years or so of creating national States and the appropriate national identities, it is hardly surprising if the combination of these processes did not threaten to destabilise the psyche. The economics of labour migration could become disastrously intertwined in the politics of personal identity. In fact, the process may be less destabilising for the majority of Europeans who belong to countries, than to those Europeans to whom those same countries belong, or rather to the intelligentsia whose role it has been to articulate and sustain the national idea - a respectable xenophobia may be more dangerous today than popular resentments. This would be enhanced for the population at large by the real or invented association of border crossing with terrorism. The danger of terrorism is less with the threat of particular acts of violence and rather more with the maintenance of a continual state of popular panic in electorates to which political leaders are obliged, if they are to survive politically, to react with “tough measures”. Decisions on migration are affected by how far we see the nation-State as constituting in the future the primary organisation of the world’s population, so that national social homogeneity should be shored up, or new nations created out of ethnic diversity. If we accept that states may be superseded by other sub-national or supernational bodies of governance and identity, then it may be more important to facilitate greater circulation rather than pursue integration. Not dealing with migration in a timely and publicly transparent way thus has the potential for disaster, pulling down the temple on our heads. On the other hand, converting the issue into an opportunity for a sustained attack on world poverty can mobilise the idealism of Europeans for this task.

42 ENDNOTES 1

2

3

4

5

The theory of international trade turns on the proposition that where there are differences in factor endowment (raw materials, labour, capital, entrepreneurship, etc), between countries or localities, disproportionate economic gains result f?om exchanging factors. This is the rationale for liberalising world trade and the mobility of capital. A number of studies have endeavoured to put figures on the gains arising from the liberalisation of labour migration. Hamilton and Whalley (1984), using 1977 data and a set of strict assumptions, estimate gains to gross world product (then US$7.8 trillion) arising from lifting all migration controls at between 4.7 trillion and $16 trillion. Recent reworking of more up-to-date data confirms these broad magnitudes (Moses and Letnes, 2002; Iregui, 2002). UNDP, in the Human Development Report 1992 (pp.57-58), present a different calculation of more limited changes. Walmsley and Winters (2001) present a model in which worker migration to employment in services in developed countries equal to three per cent of the developed countries labour force would yield benefits of $156 billion, shared between developed and developing countries, compared to the estimated $104 billion generated by a successful outcome of the Doha trade round (and the roughly $55 billion granted in aid to developing countries by the OECD group). The precise figures are no better than the assumptions made, but the direction of change, and the magnitudes, are important. Without controls, it is commonly observed that migrant workers circulate. Thus, with the decline in trans-Atlantic transport costs of the 1890s, 40-50 per cent of Italian migrants to the United States up to 1914 returned to Europe; and 30-40 per cent of Portuguese, Croatians, Serbs, Hungarians and Poles (Baines, 1991). Constant and Zimmerman (2003) estimate that 60 per cent of contemporary guest-workers in Germany are repeat migrants. See also Eichengreen (1994) and Dustmann (1996). However, steady progress in many developing countries, in the provision of basic infrastructure, telecommunications, etc, is narrowing the gap with developed countries. The availability of cheap support workers - maids, nannies, gardeners, cooks, drivers - may already mean, for example, that standards of living for software programmers in Bangalore - at lower levels of remuneration - are higher than in Silicon Valley. The German guestworker case is often cited to support the proposition that “there is nothing so permanent as a temporary worker”. However this is a misjudgement since (i) employers pressed the government to keep workers because the suspension of the programme meant that there could be no replacements; (ii) workers tried to stay because they recognised that, if they left, there would be no repeat opportunity to work in Germany; (iii) in any case, a significant proportion of guestworkers did leave Germany - see Werner (2001); Constant and Massey (2002). There are many other schemes of circular migration that have worked effectively - for example, the US-Mexico Braceros scheme, contract labour schemes in the Persian Gulf, etc. In the case of the Mexico-Canada agricultural labour programme, in the 28 years of its operation (with 12,500 workers involved in 2002), no Mexicans overstayed their visas, and 5 per cent returned to Mexico before their visas expired - O’Neil(2003). In the American case, Mexicans are estimated to have stayed in the US on average three years in the early 1980s, but in the late 1990s after major steps to

43

6. 7

8

9

tighten border controls, nine years - and as a result, bring spouses, put children into schools and seek US citizenship. On the general case, see Cornelius (2001) and Massey et al. (2002): “Immigration policies should recognise that most international migrants are not initially motivated to settle in developed nations, and that hardening the borders through police actions only undermines the inclination to return, ultimately reducing the flow of people and migradollars back to sending regions to choke off their development. A smarter strategy would be to counter the natural inclination to remain abroad by facilitating return migration and the repatriation of funds” (Massey et al., 2002: 157). But also, migrants are increasingly saving parts of the European rural economy - see for example, Kasimis, Papadopoulos, Zacopoulou, 2003. As also have financial institutions, development banks and aid donors see the DFID-World Bank conference in London, Oct.2003. The EU has made efforts to relate aid programme to migration, but these have usually been directed at preventing emigration from source countries, or encouraging return migration, rather than reinforcing development. There have already been schemes here - see, for example, the Belgian Migration for Development programme; working holidaymaker schemes in Belgium, the UK, etc.

REFERENCES

1. 2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

8.

Baines, D.E. (1 991): Emigration from Europe, 1815-1930, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Constant, Amelie and Douglas S. Massey (202): Return Migration by German Guestworkers: neoclassical versus new economics, International Migration, 40/4,2002:5-39.Constant, Amelie and Klaus F. Zimmermann (2003): Circular movements and Time Away from the Host Country, IZA DP 960, Forschung Institut zur Zukunfi der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn, Dec. Cornelius, Wayne (2001): Death at the Border: efficacy and unintended consequences of US immigration control policy, Population and Development Review, 27/4., Dec.: 661-685. DFID-World Bank (2003): Report and Conclusions, International Conference on Migrant Remittances: Development Impact, opportunities for the financial sector and future prospects, Oct.9/10, London. Dustmann, Christian (1 996): Return Migration: the European experience, Economic Policy: A European Forum 22, April 1996: 215-250. Eichengreen, Barry (1994): Thinking about migration: European migration pressures at the dawn of the next millennium, in H. Siebout (Ed.), Migration: a Challenge for Europe, Mohr, Tiibingen. Escobar, Agustin, Philip Martin, Peter Schalzer, Susan Martin ( 2003): Migration: moving the agenda forward, International Migration, IOM, 41(2), 2003). Findlay, Alan (2001): From brain exchange to brain gain: policy implications for the UK of recent trends in skilled migration from developing countries, International Migration Programme 43, ILO, Geneva, Dec.

44 9. 10. 11.

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18. 19. 20.

21.

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Grillo, Ralph (2002): Transnational migration, multiculturalism and development, Focoal - European Journal of Anthropology. No. 40,135-148. Grillo, Ralph, and Bruno Riccio (2004): Translocal development: Italy-Senegal, Population, Space and Place, 10,99-111. Hamilton, C., and J. Whalley (1984): Efficiency and distributional implications of global restrictions on labor mobility: calculations and political implications, Journal of Development Economics, 14 (1-2): 61-75. Iregui, Ana Martes (2002): Efficiency gains from the elimination of global restrictions on labour mobility: an analysis using a multiregional CGE model, World Institute id Development Economic Research conference, Poverty, International Migration and Asylum, Helsinki, Sept 27th-28‘h. Kasimis, Charalambos, Apostolos G. Papadopoulos, Ersi Zacopoulou(2003): Migrants in rural Greece, Sociologia Ruralis, European Society for Rural Sociology, 4312, April: 167-184. Lowell, B. Lindsey (2001): (a) Some development effects of the international migration of highly skilled persons, International Migration Programme 46, ILO, Geneva., Dec. (b) Policy responses to the international mobility of skilled labour, International Migration Programme 45, ILO, Geneva, Dec. Massey, Douglas, Jorge Durand, Nolan J. Malone (2002): Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican immigration in an era of economic integration, Russell Sage Foundation, New York. Moses, Jonathan W. and Bjom Letnes (2002): The economic costs of international labor restrictions, paper for WIDER conference (see Iregui above). O’Neil, Kevin (2003): (a) Using remittances and circular migration as drivers of development, Center for Contemporary Immigration Studies, University of California: San Diego, Apr.l 1/12th.(b) Migration and Development, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, Dec. Suro, Roberto (2003): Remittance senders and receivers: tracking the transnational channels, Pew Hispanic Center and Multilateral Investment Fund, Washington DC, Nov.24”. UNDP (1992): The Human Development Report 1992, UNDP: New York. Werner, Heinz (2002): From the German ‘LGuestworker”programmes of the Sixties to the current “Green Card” initiative for IT sprcialists, International Migration Programme1 1, ILO, Geneva. Walmsley, Teme L. and L. Alan Winters (2002): Relaxing restrictions on the temporary movement of natural persons: a simulation analysis, unpublished paper, University of Sheffield. Winters, L.Alan, Terrie L. Walmsley, Zhen Kun Wang, Roman Grynberg (2003): Liberalising labour mobility under GATS, Economic Paper 53, Commonwealth Secretariat, London.

MIGRATION FROM AND WITHIN ASIA K.C. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN Visiting Professor, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, India This paper’s main purpose is to serve as an introduction to the scale and patterns of migration from and within Asia. Its focus is international rather than internal migration, which is touched upon only briefly. The paper relies heavily on published data from a variety of sources such as World Migration Reports, Human Development report, regional migration surveys, numerous publications and articles. No separate research has been undertaken for preparing this paper. The World Federation of Scientists, a prominent international body of scientists has been organising an annual conference at Erice for the past several years to consider some serious problems of planetary significance. In recent years, some of the conference themes have dealt with socio-economic and socio-political issues. Perceptions of international migration, its attendant problems and prescriptions for dealing with them usually tend to pay more attention to cross border movements into North America and recently into Europe. Given the preponderance of Asia in world population and the huge labour force in many of its centres, at least a preliminary understanding of the dimensions is essential for any serious discourse on migration. It is hoped this paper will serve that purpose. In preparing this paper I acknowledge with thanks the assistance of Mr. Kamal Jit Kumar, Librarian in the Centre for Policy Research and Mr. Karthikeyan, Researcher in the Institute of Social Sciences in compiling the data from numerous sources and Mrs Sarala Gopinathan for secretarial assistance. INTRODUCTION Migration has a long history. The Chinese, Korean and Hindu settlements in Asia, the movement of the Bantu speaking peoples from the north to the south in Africa and the European colonization of the Americas are all a part of human history. However, it is the scale of international migration in recent years that has added new dimension and complexities. The United Nations policy division estimated that migrants defined as those residing in foreign countries for more than one year accounted for only about 75 million persons in 1965. For 10 years since then international migration grew at 1.16% per year compared to the general growth in global population of 2.04. However, in the next 5 years global migrant population increased by about 2.6% per year compared to only 1.7% in general population growth. Today the number of international migrants is estimated at 175 million, of whom 16 million are refugees. The bulk of international migrants are thus voluntary as distinct from involuntary migrants or refugees forced by war, ethnic strife or other conflicts, natural calamities etc. The principal motive is economic, which, it must be emphasized, is shared by the originating as well as the receiving country. The phenomenon is across the world.

45

46 Figure 1: Graph on International Migration.

The export of Afiicans as slaves to the Americas, the large-scale industrial labour from China after the opium wars and the recruitment of Indians to work in the plantations of the West Indies, Ceylon or Fiji Islands, and similar migratory movements have all been prompted by economic considerations. As Harris rightly points out, in the 19'h century, economists and politicians would have been astonished, if told these movements were unnatural. Yet during the past few decades more and more governments, rich or poor, developed or less developed have been viewing immigration as 'too high' and adopting policies to control and reduce migration. Asia is no exception to this trend. Three broad streams of international migration are considered in this paper (Figure 2) First is the flow of migrant labour from various Asian countries to the Gulf region. The large scale of these flows has been maintained for several years though the Gulf War of '91 was a temporary set back. The second is the migration to a few countries, especially in East and South East Asia such as Japan, Korea, and Singapore as also the Taiwan and Hong Kong areas. The main originating countries are the Philippines, Indonesia and Bangladesh. The third item focuses on South Asia where migration, both voluntary and involuntary, has occurred on a large scale during the past few decades. Figure 2:

0 South Asia

I

(B

Prospects and Policies for the future

.I

47

ASIA TO MIDDLE EAST The rise in oil prices in 1973 and the consequent flush of funds enabled the oil producing Arab countries to undertake massive infrastructure development and construction programmes. Since these countries, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, had limited populations and even more limited supply of labour and skills, they turned to several Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Philippines. Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Thailand were also significant sources. In the case of Korea, Korean companies were successful in securing several construction contracts in the Middle East and, as part of these contracts a large number of Korean construction workers were sent to the Gulf countries. Starting with about 70,000 in 1977 and peaking to 197,000 in 1982, about 1.4 million such contract labourers went to the Middle East in the ten-year period from 1977 to 1987. The decline began in 1985 due to demographic changes in Korea, consequent labour shortages and rising incomes, which rendered labour export unattractive. By 1981, about 2.5 million workers had gone from various Asian countries. Thereafter the annual flow was about one million for the next several years. Figures 3 and 4- map and table -Middle East Magnet.

I

MIDDLE EAST MAGNET

I

48 THE MIDDLE ERST MAGNET

0 Gulfwar, i)temp0taryretbackfwlndi+ Pakirtan.Bangladesh 0 Tlghteningoftheregimeandrepatriatlon: aboutl million Sentbackundermnedy Mhemerduring

1996-98 0 still, ann~alR o w t r o m Sovth Asian muntris exceed half million: much less from EastAda" 0

Covntries Stock of migmnti from South Aria estimated about 4 mlllloni

Q Remlarncesfr~mUlemlddleEasfamajorpartofLeGNP andexpartearnings

The demographic and economic features of these labour exporting countries of Asia merit attention. The combined 1975 population of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines was about 956 million. Population growth ranged from a low of 1.3% in Sri Lanka to 2.8% in Pakistan. Total fertility rates were 6 or more in Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Philippines. Given the low per capita GDP and the large labour force, emigration to the Middle East in response to the demand became an attractive option (see Figure 5-table on Features of Labour Exporting Countries). The South Asian countries of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and to a lesser extent Sri Lanka became the principal sources of labour export to Middle East. From a modest figure of a little over 50,000 in 1976, by 1985 the figure had reached close to a million. Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand were the other important sources of labour supply to the Middle East, with the volume exceeding 800,000. The flow for some of the years during the period are contained in tables for South Asian countries (see Figure 6). Figure 5: Features of Labour Exporting Countries.

FULTURES OF LABOUR EXPORTING COUNTRIES (popJanon fgures ~nrnilons

I

Source Human Development Report 2004

49 Figure 6

SOUTH ASIA EMIGRANTSAND %TO MIDDLE EAST

Source: World MigrationReport 2000, InternationalOrganisation for Migration I

However, political uncertainties did affect the migrant flows from some countries. After the Gulf war, workers from countries that supported Iraq were expelled. Expulsion of about 350,000 Palestinians from Kuwait and nearly 800,000 Omanis from Saudi Arabia changed the nationality composition of foreign workers. Kuwait banned the return of 5 nationality groups i.e. Iraqis, Palestinians, Jordanis, Omanis and Sudanese. The resulting vacuum in the labour market was filled by Asians and Egyptians. Given this large supply, it was inevitable that the composition of the work force in the Gulf countries would undergo perceptible changes. As of 1996, the non-national component was as high as 76.5% in Qatar to 26.5% in Oman. The position obtaining in 1996 is presented in a table (see Figure 7). It is not easy to establish what part of the nonnational labour force is regular and what part is irregular including the unauthorised entry or stay. Figure 7

I POPULRTIOHAWD LABOUR FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EIBT COUNTRIES I

Source: World Migration Report: 2000, International organisationfor Migration

50

Between 1996 and 1998, the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries also undertook several measures to clamp down on unauthorised migrants and to jail undocumented workers. During this period nearly 1.023 million workers were repatriated to their countries. The number of workers affected was the highest in Saudi Arabia, accounting for 752,000 (see Figure 8). Figure 8

I

-

GULF WAR AND AFCER -AMNESTY RETURNEES1996 98

Source: World Migration Report 2000, International Organisation for Migration.

Notwithstanding these measures, as well as the 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath, the remittances from the migrant workers have kept the migrant flows to the Middle East high. For India, Pakistan and Bangladesh alone, remittances currently total more than 16,000 million U.S. dollars. (See Figure 9 for the table on Remittances from the Middle East). For the South Asian as well as East Asian countries, the Gulf countries have therefore remained major labour export destinations. ' e r e 9: Rernittancesfiornthe Middle East.

REMlllANCES FROM THE MIDDLE EASTMIGRANTS

Remittances accounted for 26% export earnings Important in meeting balance of payments attimes of crisis Remittances use both f o n d and informal channels For India, Pakistan and Bangladesh remittances total 16,000 miiiion US$ as of 2003 Sources. Based on country sludies underthe Asian Regional Migration Pmject. 0 0 0 0

51

Nevertheless, the huge volume of migration to the Gulf countries underwent some change, not because of what happened there, but because of the demographic and economic development far away, in some East Asian countries. Fertility and declining populatiodworkforce accompanied by rapid economic growths brought about the changes. Korea made a transition from a labour exporting to a labour receiving country. So did Thailand to a lesser extent. Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore came to need workers in some categories (see Figure 10 for the table on fertility decline). Alternative destinations became available to labour exporting countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Thailand (see Figure 11 for the table on Migration Shifts). Figure 10

China(Main Land) Hong Kong' Japan Republic of Korea Taiwan

1950.55 6.11 4.44 2.75 5.18 6.53

1960-65 1970.75 5.61 4.76 5.31 2.89 2.01 2.07 ,

5.40 4.83

1980-85 1985-90 2002 2.50 2.41 1.8 1.80 . 1.31 1.76 1.66 1.3 . 1.73 -. 1.4 2.40 4.11--2.83 1.89 1.81 ,

.

Hong Kong, Taiwan 0 Economic growth and rising incomes Source: United Nations (1955), World Population Prospects: The 1994 Revision, Human Development Report, 2004

Figure I I

I

MIGRATION SHIFTS FROM MIDDLE EASTTO EAST ASIA

0 tmpactdGuifWarand~ebeginningsdashin

0 For Bangladesh, Indonesia,Philippinesand Thailand, shifl significant Soume: InternrtlondMlmUon Policlar in Asia

I

52

EAST ASIA An overview of East Asia is necessary to establish the context of migration streams

within this part of the continent. In any such overview China looms large, with its population of 1.3 billion and a labour force of 700 million. Since the Opium War, largescale migration through indentured labour to engage in various infrastructure works in North America, such as the construction of the railways, has been a prominent phenomenon. Migration within the East Asian region such as the Indo-China countries, Malaysia and Singapore, has also been significant. As of 1990, it was estimated there were 30 million Chinese overseas. Large as this number is, it is still small compared to the mainland population of 1.3 billion (see Figures 12 and 13 for East Asia overview chart and map on migrant flows). Figure 12

EASTASIA OYERYIEW

B China loom large; population gmwth rak projected. 0.6 during 2 0 5 1 2 0 Indonesia ind Phlippines with large labour foce

B Migrationfrom China and the region, of long history: since the opiumwar. 0 By 1590, abed 30 million Chinese overseas: many in the region; still small compared tomainland popllation. 0 Internal migration significant within China; from 2 million in mid '80s to 80 by 2001

-

Fimre 13

MIGRANTFLOWS IN EASTASIA

I

' Bangladesh to Malaysia C h i n a

' Myanmar to Thailand ' Indonesia to Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand 1

Philippines to Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore

53 It is estimated that about 300,000 to 400,000 Chinese migrate to other countries annually, including contract workers, settlers, students, unauthorised workers etc. Roughly a third of these emigrate legally to the US., Canada and Australia. Excluding Hong Kong and Macao, Chinese workers recruited for other countries in East Asia are small. Though China did not participate in labour export to the Middle East, after the economic reforms of 1979, China began to apply its vast labour resources. By the mid 90s, Chinese migrants abroad generated about US$ 7 billion foreign exchange for the mainland. During the 1990s, international immigration from China is estimated to be about 3.15 million, of whom half a million were job seekers. Yet this is a small proportion of the country’s labour force of 700 million. lnternal migration within China is significant. From a modest figure of 2 million in the mid 8Os, it is estimated, according to household surveys of the Ministry of Agriculture, that by 2001 such migration was of the order of 88 million, which is about 13% of the labour force. The causes, patterns and consequences of the migrations need an understanding of the development strategy of China, which is beyond the scope of this paper. The Philippines and Indonesia are the other populous countries in the East Asia region from which migration flows within the continent have become significant. Myanmar and Bangladesh are the other countries of relevance. Regarding receiving countries, mention has already been made of declining populations and labour force in Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. These have become important receiving countries of migration. Malaysia and the oil-rich, but small, Sultanate of Brunei are also important destinations because of their labour needs. Among the destination countries, by 1997, 27% of the work force in Singapore comprised foreign workers who numbered more than half a million. Singapore has consistently encouraged highly skilled foreigners, providing incentives for them to acquire permanent residence. Singapore’s approach has been pragmatic recognizing that migrants perform jobs which local workers are either not willing or unable to do and thus migration adds to the flexibility of the labour market. Figure 14: Table on Singapore worvorce.

SINGAPORE POPUIATIONFOREIGN WORKFORCE Approx. 2716 of total workforce Thailand, Indonesia. Sri Lanka, India, Philippines, Mainland China and Malaysia are the main source countries. About 55,000 professionals Participation of local female labour force rose from 37X to 51 %during 1976.1997 due to Imported domestic help.

I

Source: Hui, Weng.tat(l998), The RegionalEconomic Crisis and Singapore: Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal.

54 In the case of Malaysia, it is estimated that there are about 1.2 million migrant workers. Out of these, Indonesia alone accounted for about 700,000 followed by Bangladesh with about 300,000. Unlike Singapore, Malaysia has not formulated a coherent migration policy, but highly skilled immigration is encouraged Figure 15: Table on Malaysia workforce MAULVSIII: FOREIGNWORKFORCEBY OCCUPATION AND NATIOHULIPI, 199

L

..

Source: Kassim, A. (1998). Paper presented at the Technical Symposium on International Migration and Development, The Hague, Netherlands.

Hong Kong is another area of concentration for migrants. Apart from workers from the mainland, workers from Philippines and other Asian countries totalled 250,000 in 197'1, which doubled in 1998. The small state of Brunei, with a population of just about 300,000, has one of the highest per capita incomes in South East Asia. Its economy is dominated by oil and Brunei has been used to migrant labour for .a long time. While the local population is invariably involved in public offices, migrant labour comprises more than 70% of the private sector work force. Thailand is another country that has become both an immigrating and emigrating country. During the 198Os, it was an important exporter of labour to the Middle East, particularly to Saudi Arabia. However, from the 1990s on, migration from Thailand has shifted towards Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Migration into Thailand is a recent phenomenon with people coming mainly from Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam. The migrant workforce was 67,000 in 1993 and rose to 270,000 in 1997. Thailand was one of the countries seriously affected by the Asian economic crisis. In 1998, unemployment affected nearly about 8.5 % of the work force, i.e. about 2 million workers. The crisis had its impact on migrant workers as well. However, as the economic crisis eased, some of these measures were slowed down. As for labour exporting countries, Indonesia, because of its large population, continues to be an important source of emigration to Asian destinations as well. During the 1980s, much of this migration was to the Middle East. Malaysia is the most important destination for Indonesian migrants with annual figures exceeding 300,000. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia continues to be another important destination with annual flow of about 116,000.

55 The Philippines has been long regarded as a major source country. The Middle East, of course, has been an important destination with about 200 to 250,000 Filipino workers deployed annually since 1984. But other countries in Asia have also become an important destination with the 1997 deployment level of 235,000. Filipino population resident in South East Asia is estimated to be about 350,000. Hong Kong alone has a large proportion. Though the region is still to fully recover from the economic crisis, migrants have been less affected than local workers mainly because they have occupations avoided by local workers as being ‘dangerous, demanding and dirty’. In reality, these jobs can be characterized as poorly paid, insecure and boring. So even in times of economic crisis, they serve as a work platform for international labour. SOUTH ASIA Both voluntary and involuntary movements in South Asia have been on a large scale. As shown in an earlier table, the combined population of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka was 780 million in 1975. Today it is about 1362 million. If Nepal is added, the figure will go up by another 25 million. Fertility rates have always been high and population growth across the subcontinent, considerable. The last two decades have seen strenuous efforts in population planning, yielding significant results, but the population remains large. Economic disparities within the region as well as within the countries have been sharp and the share of agriculture to the GDP has been on the decline compared to services and manufacturing. It is therefore to be expected that movements within and across the borders will be significant in absolute numbers, though small when compared to the population base. Adding involuntary migrants, migration within South Asia has exceeded 30 million in the past 50 years. Given such a scale, the causes and categories of migration cannot be precise. Ghosh has attempted a useful categorization such as imperial surgery, failed states, military interventions, ethnic conflicts, statelessness, etc. (see Figure 16 for the chart on South Asia Overview). The single most important act of surgery, (though Ghosh acknowledges this is too benign a word to be used) has been the partition of India and the carving out of Pakistan (see Figure 17 for South Asia map). The aftermath was a harrowing experience. Within the space of a few months, some 13 million people moved between the two new countries, roughly half and half. Another million are estimated to have lost their lives in the communal riots, close to a 100,000 women were abducted or raped, several thousand families were separated and properties were lost and looted.

56 Figure 16 ~

~

~

SOUTHASIA OVERVIEW Some Causes and Categories 0 IMPERIAL SURGERY

Partition of India and Pakistan (1947); Some 13 million moved between the two

8 FAILED STATES:

Pakistan loses the eastern part in 1971; 10 million estimated as fleeing to India

0 MILITARY INTERVENTIONS: Afghanistan conflict in 1979

3.5 million moved out: mostly in Pakistan; By 1997,2.6 million returned with UNHCR help; Tibetan Refugees (about 100,000) in India 17

Q

ETHNIC CONFLICTS:

0 STATELESSNESS:

Sri Lankan. Tamil conflict since 1983: 164,000 moved into Tamil Nadu People declared "non.citizens": Tamils in Sri Lanka (975,000); Shastri Sirimavo Pact of 1964: 375,000 will be granted Sri Lankan Citizenship; rest Indian; Biharis in Bangladesh (235,000) Pakistan HRC report of I 9 9 5 'Geneva'ca mpo across the Country; Indians in Myanmar (1960s): about 150,000 had to leave

0 OPEN BORDERS:

India.Nepal; Nepali born, about3 million in India

CAUSES COMMON TO MIGRATIONAND REFUGEES: LARGE VOLUME DEMOGRAPHICS OPERATE DURiNG BOTH PEACE AND CONFLICT

I

Source: Parba. S.Ghosh, 'Unwanted and Uprwted,Sanskriti,Delhi2004.

57 Figure I 7

r

SOUTH ASIA

The agony of displacement and shift did not cease following these months. Over the next two decades, as strife continued in different parts and the two governments tried unsuccessfully to either regulate or stem the flow, another 5.5 million are estimated to have moved. Altogether about 18 million people were thus involved in one of the largest exodus of people in human history. Pakistan lost its eastern wing in 1971 and Bangladesh emerged as an independent country. In the struggle for liberation, another 10 million are estimated to have fled from East Pakistan to India. To add to the travails of the sub-continent, the military intervention in Afghanistan and ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka brought more refugees into Pakistan and India. It is estimated that South Asia has one of the largest concentrations of refugees in the world. Pakistan has refugees from India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. In addition to these, India also has refugees from Tibet, Nepal and Myanmar. “Statelessness” is another dimension of migratory movements in South Asia. From time to time, governments in the region have declared categories of people as “noncitizens”. The Tamils in Sri Lanka, Biharis in Bangladesh and Indians in Myanmar are examples. More than 1.3 million people are affected, An important geo-political aspect of South Asia is that much of India’s boundary with Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh is a virtually borderless situation. The Nepal-India border is officially open permitting movement of nationals of both countries with minimum checks and regulations, but the other borders are supposed to be international, requiring valid travel papers. However, the terrain is mostly desert in the west and riverine in the east, rendering fencing expensive to build and maintain. Especially in the case of Bangladesh, the demographics and economic comparisons with India are such as to make migration to India very attractive.

58

Figure 18: India-Pakistan-Bangladeshflows.

INDIA- PAKISTAN- BANGLADESH FLOWS .13 million moved: roughly half and half between India and Pakistan

0

Oufflom to and from East Pakistan:

. 5 million during the 1950's .1.7 million during the 1960's

0 War of Liberation (1970.71):

. I 0 million refugees into India: Number of returnees not

0 Birth of Bangladesh and after:

.High demographic pressure in Bangladesh:

established 800 per sq.km.; 300 In Assam

I

.High fertility, high density, limited livelihood opportunities; contrast In India .I300 km border: all but 50 kin demarcated: but riverheterrain, difficult to fence and maintain: border only on paper .13 million estimated as inflow inta India: .Highly contested figures; virtually impossible to verify

-

0 India Pakistan:

.1817 km border, again on paper but terrain difficult and inhospitable; movement m a i l and seasonal

Because it is impossible to physically distinguish a Bangladeshi from an Indian, the numbers of people moving across are very difficult to estimate. Indian officials and researchers have attempted such estimates from time to time, which are either flatly denied or hotly contested in Bangladesh. One estimate places the figure at over 13 million since the birth of Bangladesh. About 5.4 million among them are reported to be in West Bengal, another 4 million in Assam, and 0.8 million in Tnpura, all being border states. The balance is to be found in other states like Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Bihar and Delhi. Various reasons have been advanced to support this large presence such as the high population density in Bangladesh, which has about 800 personshq. km compared to 300 or less in Assam; better employment opportunities and better wages in India; the push factor of a large labour force in Bangladesh; the decline of traditional manufacturing industries like jute; the increasing demand for unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in some parts of India like Delhi; Maharashtra and Gujarat looking for cheap labour, etc. It is also believed that local political interests in the Indian border districts encourage vote banks of migrants and assist them in securing food rations or voter ID cards which render any subsequent action against illegal migrants impossible. The 1971-81 Indian Census figures revealed that in eight districts of West Bengal bordering Bangladesh, population grew by 30% as compared to 20% or less in other districts as warranted by natural growth. The 1981-91 figures c o n f m the position. The recently held 2001 Census also shows that in seven of the eight districts, decadal growth exceeded the state average. Migration-wise, the border zone including Assam and Tnpura have become highly sensitive, resulting in several controversies and struggles in the past two decades, including some which were violent. On some occasions the census could not take place in certain areas: electoral rolls had to be deferred or cancelled.

59 Figure 19: Map of the Migration Sensitive zone.

A MIGRATIONSENSITIVEZONE

I

CURRENT AND FUTURE OUTLOOK Traditionally many of the countries in Asia have been regarded as labour exporting countries. Even in the case of Japan between 1868 and 1942, about 750,000 Japanese workers and their families migrated to work in Latin America, the US, Canada etc. The Republic of Korea was also a major exporter of labour during the 1960s and 70s when two million workers left for employment abroad. China has been another significant exporter of labour. However, as demographic and economic conditions changed, some of the labour sending countries became labour receiving countries such as Japan, Korea Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan (see Figures 20 and 21 for tables on Labour Exporting and Receiving Countries in East Asia). The distinction between labour exporting and receiving countries became blurred. Figure 20

DESTINATIONS OF LABOUR EXPORTINGGOUNTRESOF EAST ASIA

60 Figure 21

.

(apart from mainland China)

0 Thailand: 1

Transition from 'immigration't o 'emigration' 67,000 migrants in 1993 270,000 migrants in 1997 Long land border with Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam Economic crisis of 1998 some repatriation, but temporary "There is nothing as permanent as a temporary worker"

. 1

1

At the beginning of the present century, the volume of migration from and within East Asia is nearly four million. Battistella estimates that in some countries migrant labour constitutes a significant percentage of the work force, accounting for 27% in Singapore, 11% in Malaysia, 9% in Hong Kong and 4% in Taiwan. Given the large volume, illegal or undocumented migration has been a constant companion of authorised migration (see Figure 22 for table on unauthorised migrants). In the case of Thailand, for instance, which shares a large land border with Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, it is estimated that for every authorised migrant, there are at least five unauthorised workers. Data on legal and illegal migration however, is not easy to compile because the policies and regulations change from time to time. The norms and regulations about who is authorised and who is unauthorised also change. Figure 22: UnauthorisedMigrants.

AUTHORISED I UNAUTHORISEOMIGRANTS IN EAST ASIA

61 The regulatory regime in regard to migration has some broad similarities between the labour exporting countries in formulating policies and measures to promote employment, protect emigrants and also maximize the development impact of migration. Abella has broadly categorised these measures that are listed in a table (see Figure 23) for labour exporting countries. Receiving countries on the other hand follow a generally restrictive policy encouraging highly skilled workers but discouraging semi-skilled or unskilled workers (see Figure 24 for the table). The political and social mindset behind these measures reflects a mismatch between these policies on the one hand and economic needs and labour requirements on the other. Though migrants may represent only a proportion of the total labour force, their ethnic and cultural characteristics promote significant resistance to inflow. Some countries permit migrant workers only from selected countries. Japan, for example, experimented with recruitment and import of about 300,000 ethnic Japanese born overseas mainly from Brazil and Peru. These people called 'Nikkeijin' looked Japanese, but their behaviour patterns were more Latino. Many of these were employed in the automobile industry. This rather unique effort towards reverse migration has been the subject of separate sociological studies. Figure 23

62 Figure 24

1

MIGRATIONPOLICIES - LllBOUR RECElYlNGCOUNTRIES :

Malaysia

UnskiilefflSemi.shilledlimited to few sectors and nationals: tough border controls

Singapore :

More open for high and more restricted for low end migrants: tough border controls

Thailand

:

Alien employment allowed in all but 39 sectors: undocumentedworkers from Myanmar, Vietnam. Laos in some iobs and areas Penitted: tough border controls for olhers

Japan

:

Highly restrictive migration policy: foreign workers only as last resort, no unskilled labour. temporary workJtrainee system in some segments:

“Nihkeijin” :

tough border controls

Hong Koog :

Highly restn’ctive:quota system for expatriates, professionals; no quota limit for foreign domestic workers, daily quotas for worken from mainland

Korea

:

Highly restrictive: guest worker scheme in some segments.

laiwan

:

Foreign workers from limited countries: more open for professionals

0 international Convention on Migration adopted by UN GeneralAssembly in 1990: ratified by

many: followed by few.

21

It is generally believed that economic conditions affect migration but in the Asian case, it is seen that even the economic crisis of the 80s did not affect migration flows for any length of time. This could be because in certain segments of the labour force, the demand does not vary much and even at times of crisis migrants are prepared to adjust to lower wages. An expression frequently used therefore is “there is nothing as permanent as a temporary worker”. The economic effects of migration within Asia are apparent so far as labour exporting countries are concerned. Remittances from migrant workers continue to be the most ostensible feature. To illustrate, during the 1990s, the Philippines, Thailand, China and Indonesia received as much as U.S. $ 80 billion in remittances from migrant workers. As of 2000, these remittances accounted for 7.6% of the GNP in the Philippines, 3.8% in Bangladesh and 1.2% in Thailand. Even in the case of a large economy like India, remittances from migrant workers accounted for 2.5% of the GNP as of 1999. A less noticed aspect is the significant improvement in the economic performance of labour receiving countries. By permitting worker needs in segments of the economy to be filled by migrants, these countries have been able to overcome the problems of adjustment in the labour market. As a U.S. National Academy of Science study points out ‘‘ The gains to the domestic economy come from a number of sources. On the products side, immigration allows domestic workers to be used more productively facilitating specialization. Specialization in consumption also yields a gain”. As a result, the overall economic performance of labour receiving countries is enhanced. Singapore, for example, whose GDP was only 30% compared to Japan in 1980 increased to 62% by 2000. Similarly the GDP of Korea and Hong Kong, which was 16% and 30% of Japan’s GDP in 1980, rose to 26% and 55% respectively as of 2000. Looking towards the future, it appears migration will be an enduring and established social and economic phenomenon in Asia. Demographic pressures alone will be an important determinant. A UN report on replacement population estimates that over the next five decades, as birth rates fall below the required replacement rates, Japan

63 would need more than 300,000 migrants every year to maintain a constant total population. Singapore may need to boost its work force by about 19000 per year to maintain its growth rates. The Republic of Korea may need at least 30,000 per year. The phenomenon is not unique to Asia. Western Europe's working population will fall by 2 million over the next 20 years and it will have to double its intake of migrants. Though it is unlikely that migration flows will reach such volumes, the demand from the economy will sustain migration at least at current levels. The Asian experience also shows that migrants do not always compete with nationals in the labour market. It is also observed that even when conditions become adverse due to economic or political factors, migrants tend to remain in the destination countries

Figure 25: Table on Current and Future Outlook.

CURRENTAND FUTURE OUTLOOK B Economic Benefits Apparent 1 1

. 1

US$80 billion during 1990s from Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia 7.6% GNP for Philippines, 3.8% for Bangladesh, 2.5% for India Singapore GDP rose from 30% of Japan's in 1980 to 62% in 2000 Korea's from 16 to 30% Hong Kong's from 26 to 55%

6 Labour force needs are compelling

1 1

Japan needs 300,000 migrants per year to maintain constant population Singapore 19,000 Economic demand will keep up the volume atleast in past

0 Barriers to goods and capital being removed 1 But labour migration "solidly national" 8

Despite all the trends towards globalisation and economic liberalisation, resulting in the removal of barriers for goods and capital, migration policies tend to be a solidly national affair (Abella). The International Covenants on economic, social and cultural rights have not been adequate in dealing with the problems of migrants. The UN General Assembly Resolution of December 1990 adopted the International Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and Families. The covenant ratified by many countries by 2003 provides some rights to migrant workers, including irregular migrants, to liberty, personal security and the procedures followed in the event of arrest or imprisonment. The UN also appointed a special Rapporteur to monitor human rights of migrants and the ILO conventions provide further safeguards. Yet for most receiving counties, regulation of migrants continue to be ad hoc, short term and unfavourable to semi- or unskilled migrants. Bilateral trade and other agreements appear to be the preferred approach. This is an important feature of Asia where attempts have been made from time to time for regional cooperation to regulate the process. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have established the BIMP-EAGA for this purpose. A wider coalition for Asia Pacific economic cooperation, assisted by the International Organisation for Migration, adopted the Bangkok declaration focusing on irregular migration. While countries of origin such as Indonesia, the Philippines and recently Myanmar depend on remittances as an essential source of foreign exchange, receiving countries such as

64 Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand also rely on migration for the functioning of their own economies. Migration is also a significant factor in the integration of a region with diversity of history, traditions and cultures but with increasing economic relations and mutual interest. In recent years, data, analysis and exchange of information between international organisations and researchers has been considerable. The International Organisation for Migration, ESCAP, and bilateral agencies like DFID have been very active in this regard. There are also individual organisations like the Scalabrini Institute of Migration Studies in Rome and various university centres in Asia. However, new information appears to prompt country governments to reinforce, rather than relax, their policies of migration and the general tendency to prioritize high-end migrant workers and minimize low end ones. As one scholar has observed, migration policies are a matter of ‘benign neglect’ by most Asian governments, so long as they can keep the flows at the present levels. REFERENCES 1. 2. 3.

World Migration Report 2000: International Organisation for Migration (1.O.M). Human Development Report 2004: W P , Oxford. Facts and Figures on International Migration, IOM in Migration Policy Issues: March 2003. 4. Asia Labour Migration Pipeline to the Middle East, editors Fred Arnold and Nasra M Shah; Westview Special Studies in International Migration, Honolulu. 5. Labour Migration in East Asian Economies; Monolo I Abella; International Labour Organisation, paper submitted in the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics-Brussels: May 2004. 6. Asia’s Regional Labour Tensions Grow; John Berthelsen; Asia Times Online: 2003. 7. India and Bangladesh Migration Matrics; Jyoti Pathania; South Asia Analysis Group; paper No.632; March 2003. 8. Migration Patters and Policies in the Asian and Pacific region; UNESCAP, Bangkok; Asian Population Studies Series No.160, 2003. 9. To the Gulf and Back Studies on the Economic Impact of Asian Labour Migration, editor Rashid Amjad, ILO, Delhi 1989. 10. Unwanted and Uprooted; A political study of Migrants, Refugees, Stateless and Displaced of South Asia; Partha S Ghosh; Samskriti, Delhi 2004. 11. Migration Development and Pro-poor Policy Choices in Asia: Conference organised by DFID in Dhaka, Bangladesh; June 2003. The following papers for this conference have been accessed for source material Migration and Migration policy in Asia; a synthesis of selected cases; Ronald Skeldon, University of Sussex; UK; An overview of migration in India, its impacts and key issues; Ravi Srivastava, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; China Migration country study, Huang Ping; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Beijing and Frank N Pieke, Institute for Chinese Studies; University of Oxford;

65

-

A Review of migration issues in Pakistan; Hans Gazdar; Collective for Social Sciences Research, Karachi; Migration as a livelihood strategy of the poor: the Bangladesh case, Tasneem Siddiqui, Dhaka University, Bangladesh; International migration policies in Asia; Clare Waddington, Independent Consultant, UK.

MIGRATION AND GLOBALIZATION GERALD0 G. S E W Universidade de S b Paulo, Silo Paulo, Brazil ABSTRACT This paper presents migration as an aspect of globalization and shows that while international circulation of information, capital and goods are generally considered as very positive and an indication of progress, migration is seen as a difficult problem to be controlled. Migration is presented as something inherent to human history from the very beginning and a part of globalization. Modem migration is a form of economic and social promotion to the migrant, but even so it could deplete human resources at their origin. Finally, it presents a general view of the Brazilian viewpoint on international and domestic migration. GLOBALIZATION:A MANIFOLD CONCEPT Nowadays, globalization is a polysemy used in many and different senses. In this text we employ this word referring to a process based on the relatively recent technological development in communications and transportation fields, and characterized by a growing international and global movement of information, goods, capital and labor. The Technological basis of globalization The infrastructure basis of globalization is formed by developments in communications and transportation of people and goods that have made them much easier and cheaper than in the past. Radio and TV were important contributions to the diffusion of ideas and information, but satellites and the global web of computers have made communications cost independent of distance. The incredible spread of mobiles telephones all over the world has improved the process to an even greater extent. Fast and cheap transportation of people and goods is the second most important development in creating the infrastructure basis of globalization. Airways cross the atmosphere for lower and lower prices. Therefore, it has never been so easy to move from country to country, and inside the same country from one province or state to another, from one town to another. The information flow Nowadays information flows instantly through the global space, making control by governments and international entities very difficult, and resulting in nervous market answers to any changes in the political and economic scenario as well as cultural clashes. It promotes and motivates capital, goods and labor flows. The movement of capital The first obvious consequence is the permeability of national borders to money and values. Most governments have reluctantly accepted their inability to control the movement of investments and values across borders, which today is a reality all over the world. Instant information turns the speculative capital flow continuous throughout world markets.

66

67 Illegal paybacks and corruption funds and laundered money have easily found their ways to banks and tax heavens where, protected by numbered accounts, they finance drug traffic and terrorism. Of course, the total amount of this illegal capital flow is unknown, but it is estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars. A blanket of hypocrisy and cynicism covers the entire operation. In terms of the movement of capital and information, globalization is heralded by developed countries as the beginning of a new era of progress and peace. In terms of the movement of goods, it is something that needs strong international regulation in order to preserve their own selfish interests, making the economic differences that stimulate migration even worse. Yet, the movement of labor is considered a very risky issue which requires urgent and strict rules and regulations enforced manu militari, building new “walls of shame” if necessary. MIGRATION IN THE TIMES OF GLOBALIZATION A specter is haunting the world - the specter of uncontrolled movement of people from poor countries to the richer countries and from rural areas to cities. However, there is nothing more rational and natural than these movements, both nationally and internationally. After all, migrants are only pursuing happiness.. . Indeed, throughout the territory, income gradients are formed by economic development, creating large areas where a predominance of unemployment, underemployment and misery exist, as well as a few centers of economic dynamism desperate for cheap labor: therefore, demographic movements are not different from water flowing from highlands to lowlands, from poor countries and regions to richer ones. The consequence of these gradients of economic development and job opportunities is a flow of legal and illegal migrants from Latin America, Africa and some poor Asian countries to the US, Canada and Europe, but also from poorer to richer regions inside many developing countries. This dynamic is particularly noticeable in emergent economies where many social and economic changes are taking place. Migration in the past A few years ago, descendents of Italian immigrants organized a commemoration of 150 years of Italian immigration to Silo Paulo and adopted as their slogan “Siamo tutti oriundi” meaning that, not only they, but all of us came from somewhere. Of course, in the case of S b Paulo this is particularly true. But is it true only for the cities of the American continent? Surely not! Asia, Europe, Africa and Oceania have been the scenario of many migration flows which have completely changed the ethnic structure of every region, before and after the formation of national states. Slave traders sent around 20 million people from Africa to the American colonies during a period of almost 400 years. The last century saw entire populations changing home forced by political turmoil, wars, misery or attracted by hope of a brand new life elsewhere. After the war, a new wave of refugees and migrants left their homes. At least 50 million people had to leave their homes during the 20th century. So migration is not a new issue at all! It has been P part of world economic and social dynamics since the very beginning. Indeed, humanity began with nomads seeking food, and many centuries passed before the first settlers appear. So what is new? Novelty resides in size, pace and awareness.

68

Modem mimation The number of people living outside their countries of birth has grown from approximately 80 million to 185 million during the last 30 years (United Nations, 2002). Both nationally and internationally, labor movements are promoted by expulsion and attraction factors. Expulsion factors are what make an emigrant move fiom her or his homeland. The Earth does not have the same level of resources everywhere; on the contrary, inequalities are the rule. Although many countries with very few natural resources manage to maintain high levels of life for their people, underdeveloped economies and the lack of natural resources very often mean poverty and very high levels of unemployment and social and economic marginality. These are the expulsion factors that put migrants on the road. The main attraction factors are also economic. First of all, job opportunities and then other aspects related to the standard of living. Distance or facilities to enter a country would also play a role in the destination decision. Until the time of globalization, migrants had very bad or imperfect information about opportunities in other countries, and migration presented many risks. Nowadays, in a world of global and real time information, people know very well the countries where job opportunities are. Thus, if their movement is started by expulsion factors, the direction of this movement is determined by very good information. Another aspect is the trend to concentrate. Domestic flows are eminently rural urban and from small towns to larger cities. Internationally, the trend is also to emigrate to the main cities and capitals of developed countries. As a consequence, migration is the main factor in urban growth and in the formation of megacities and large urbanized areas around the world. Populations of most developed countries are aging and presenting low fertility rates, making the influx of migrants very important to maintain work force numbers and make social services and retirement payments feasible. The awareness of the immigration importance is clearer and clearer in certain countries. Therefore, the world economic landscape is seen as a sort of topological surface reflecting gradients of economic underdevelopment, job opportunities and hope. Migrants move like a liquid mass: they leave places with high levels of unemployment and poverty and look for a brand new life in the green valleys of prosperity and job opportunities. Either from their viewpoint or from the viewpoint of the world economy, nothing seems more natural and positive. The most important targets for immigrants are Australia, Canada, Sweden, the USA and the Netherlands, in terms of proportion of immigrants to the native population. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands Filipinos and Mexicans live outside their borders, mostly in the United States.’ There are more than 22 million refugees and other forcedly displaced people (US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Report, 2002). Criminal “traffic” moves around 4 million people per year (IOM 2002). Globalization therefore has a powerful influence on the increase of people movements around the world. Except for criminal traffic and warfare, migration seems to have a positive effect both on their personal lives and economies. However, a number of studies reveal that emigration is selective, i. e., emigrants seems to be the more skilful sector of the population, which could have a long term negative effect on the economy of the country they come from.

69 REACTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES Many governments from underdeveloped or developing countries see migrants as an important source of hard money for their debilitated economies. Indeed, migrants send their families billions of dollars each year. “Last year, immigrants working in the United States sent $31 billion to relatives in Latin America - more than $13 billion to Mexico alone. Salvadorans, Dominicans and Guatemalans send home billions more.”* Every year Brazilians send around 3 billion dollars to relatives in Brazil. “The total amount of money flowing from developed nations to developing nations through remittances has nearly quadrupled in the last seven years.”3Formerly, although immigrants occasionally sent money to relatives, it was not such a large amount and not on such a regular basis. But not everybody is happy with these arrangements! Some people see migration as linked to terrorism, particularly from Muslims. Cultural clashes are taking place, as is absolutely natural. Integrating minorities into society is one of the more difficult problems facing Europe social development. Borders management improvements, stricter regulation on legal immigration, struggles against illegal immigration and pressures on the Third World countries are not enough to confront the problem. Integration needs to be carried out, because otherwise changing gender roles, low fertility rates and an aging population will not let the region maintain its pace of development. A sound policy for the assimilation and adaptation, providing information, complementary education and job procurement help is needed. A common prejudice against immigrants is that they put pressure on health and social services, without making any contribution to the respective funds. The rationale is that immigrants are not taxpayers but put a severe burden on social services. Indeed, the situation described is true for any kind of unemployed people, whether they are immigrants or of local origin, and thus there is no correlation between this situation and immigrants. Cultural consequences Peripheral areas are more susceptible to cultural influences from centers where innovation is being created and introduced. More than 50% of all web sites, for instance, are located in the US, and nearly 72% of all web sites use English as their language. On the other hand, although we still have around 6500 languages, estimates are that we are losing 2 of them every month5, together with 2 world views. From those 6500 languages, 1700 have fewer than 10 speakers each. Ostlers calls “the triumphalism of Empire”, the attitude of those that see this loss as representing the spread of civilization, a belief shared by Spain between the 15th and 17th centuries, and England in 19th century India. Of course, language is probably the most important cultural aspect, but there are others like movies, pop music, fast food and clothes where global uniformity and conformism are the rules. Therefore, in terms of culture, globalization is not only the discovery of new and different arts and expressions, but is also cultural colonization and lost of diversity. Social consequences In most cases, the social consequences of the migration processes for the migrant means economic improvement. They are fleeing from unemployment or poor economic and social conditions, and therefore even menial jobs seem wonderful

70 opportunities. But there is some evidence that migrants were previously the best part of the work force in their original country or region. This implies a lost of valuable workers to these countries and regions. As a consequence, migration worsens the social and economic situation of an already depressed and underdeveloped region and improves it in an already developed region, city or country. Demographic consequences Ethnic and cultural changes provoked by immigrants depend on their origin and on the ethnic characteristics of the local population. In countries like Brazil, and particularly in big cosmopolitan cities like SLo Paulo, although immigrants can have some cultural impact, it is not perceived as something unusual or difficult to accept. EXTERNAL, AND INTERNAL MIGRATION IN BRAZIL The Historical importance of immigration Brazil, like all countries in the American Continent, is a land of immigrants. In colonial times, most immigrants were Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch and Africans. The second half of the 19th century saw the arrival of Italians and Germans. At the end of the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century, immigrants came from a large number of countries but with a majority of Japanese, Italians, Poles and Lebanese. Other groups came from Central Europe and Syria. From 1884 to 1933,4 million immigrants disembarked in Brazil. A new wave happened during and after World War 11, including many Jews from Germany and other Central and East European countries. The most recent immigrants have come from Korea and China. Approximately the same number of African slaves6 entered Brazil over four centuries. Internal migration and social improvement However, in order to understand the Brazilian contemporary reality, domestic migration is a major issue. First of all, rural-urban migration has transferred more than 47 million inhabitants over the last 60 years to towns and cities. The following graphs show the dramatic rate of this migration.

I

I

BRAZILIAN POPULATION

1940

1950

1960

1970 YEARS

1980

1990

2000

71

BRp9LbW POPULATION %

1940

1950

1980

1970 1980 YEARS

1890

2000

A large part of this migration is concentrated in the big cities of the southeastern region, particularly S b Paul0 and Rio de Janeiro, and this population flow has resulted in an intense population growth in these cities. From a small city of 1.3 million inhabitants in 1940, S5o Paul0 grew to a metropolitan region of more than 17 million inhabitants in 2000. The last decades saw a new wave of migrants to the western states. Rapid urbanization and infrastructural deficits Such a powerful and dramatic population dynamic radically changed the character, ethnic composition and cultural aspects of the entire country, and especially of these large urban areas. Slums and “favelas”, inhabited by a marginal population, grew up around the old city center. During the economic boom periods, it was possible to assimilate these newcomers, but from 1980 onwards, economic stagnation could not give any hope and perspective to these people. The result is informal work, marginality and criminality. Towns and cities, confronted with increasing social demands for new hospitals, schools and social centers, tried to pay for them through heavy debts. Nowadays, pressed by the federal government, they are paying their debts and have no money for new social investment. Emigration: a new reality A new phenomenon is confronting Brazil: emigration. Indeed, more and more Brazilians are looking for a better fate in other countries, particularly in Europe, the U.S. and Japan. For many years, they looked for jobs and opportunities throughout Brazilian temtory, moving to other states and towns. Now, facing economic stagnation, they have to look elsewhere. Rural-urban migration Other social movements that result from this situation are the MST, initials for “movement of the landless”, and also the “movement of the homeless”. The first is a consequence of two main elements: improved productivity in agribusiness, which cut many jobs; and improved industrial productivity associated with economic stagnation, which also eliminated jobs. In recent years, these jobless workers gave up migrating to cities because they know the high level of unemployment there. They are being organized by the MST and other social movements that promote invasion and occupation of large farms.

72

Causes, consequences and solutions Of course it is not pleasant to leave one’s homeland, relatives and friends. When somebody decides to move elsewhere, he is being pressed to take this decision by very powerful reasons. Apart from political pressures or wars, which do not exist in Brazil, the main reason is lack of jobs and perspectives. The direction of the movement is determined by the level of information on job opportunities. While we look for a feasible plan to contain these movements, the situation goes from bad to worse because gains in productivity follow cutting jobs in agriculture and in industry. Efforts to promote the service sector, mainly tourism, do not have enough potential to absorb such a mass of unemployed workers. Any solution implies the reduction of personal income differences and the creation of a certain level of development at the origin. It is not necessary to make income and development equal or to diminish or to stop migration because there is always a certain difficulty to be overcome by the migrant. It is not easy to implement such a program, because many difficulties must be overcome, from differences in natural resources to political questions. CONCLUSIONS Migration as a human promotion process Migration is not a problem, but a solution, both for the migrant and for the economic activity at the destination. Historically, migration has been a strong incentive for development and cultural change. At the same time, globalization makes international borders permeable to capital, allows people to obtain current information on social and economic situation all over the world and makes it easier to move to other regions and countries. It is comprehensible that local people are initially afraid of the foreigners’ invasion of their towns and womed about their own jobs. But, in most cases, a consistent policy to receive and to help the assimilation process could make it easier. How to reduce migration trends The migration flow is in direct proportion to the difference of job opportunities, personal income and economic development between origin and destination. Therefore, international support for underdeveloped countries, particularly in activities that generate more jobs, is an important deterrent to the migration trend. In addition, emergent economies need better trade conditions with more open markets for their products. A scientific approach to migration The migration phenomenon is a very complex system and process: a large set of variegated areas linked by a large and diverse set of links where we can observe a large number of different flows. A characteristic of complex systems is the permanence of complexity on different scales. Indeed, either when we observe the system on a global satellite image scale or when we observe it on a restricted regional scale, it is still complex. Even when sociological analysis concentrates on the specific cases of migrants, the phenomenon maintains its characteristic complexity. Although a mathematical analysis would only produce a quantitative description of a very complex socio-economic process, it would greatly help to have a general framework, with a better knowledge of the characteristics of migration flows, origins and destinations. This framework could help us to better understand the gradient

73 surface, with its “ridges of poverty” and its “valleys of prosperity” between which “creeks” and large “rivers” of migrants flow. This paper points to a large cooperative research program bringing together investigation centers f7om developed countries and emergent or undeveloped countries.

REFERENCES I 2

3 4

5

6

htlu:~//www.ncir.or~about immigrationiworld map intro.htm Sanchez, Marcela. “Desde Washington - Immigrants’ money could serve hemispheric cohesion”, WashingtonPost.comThursday, April 1,2004; 9:39 PM. “New York Times. “Dollars without borders”. May 13,2004. O’Neill et al. “Trends in Evolution of the Public Web”, D-Lib Magazine, April 2003. Ostler, N.. “Endangered Languages - Lost worlds”. Contemporary Review, Dec 2001. A lencastro, L. F. de. “0 trato dos viventes”. Companhia das Letras, S l o Paulo. 2000.

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3.

CLIMATOLOGY: GLOBAL WARMING

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FROM CURIOSITY TO CONCERN: A CHRONOLOGY OF THE QUEST TO UNDERSTAND GLOBAL CLIMATE’

JOHN S. PERRY National Research Council (ret.), Alexandria, USA The second half of the century recently concluded brought measurements of rapid atmospheric changes, worries about human influences on the atmosphere, projections of troubling future changes in global climate, a myriad of fragmentary hints of global changes actually in progress, and a plethora of meetings, reports, studies, conferences and programs to respond to these challenges. A naive citizen - or non-specialist scientist for that matter - might assume that concern about climate somehow emerged as an unexpected global hazard like AIDS or fast-food restaurants. In fact, humans have pondered about climate for as long as they have pondered about anything at all. Even the dimmest-witted of our distant ancestors must have taken note of the annual march of the seasons, and guided their hunting and gathering by knowledge of climate’s regularities. The rise of agriculture surely tuned this understanding far more precisely. Moreover, any degree of wandering over the face of the globe must have revealed that climate varies from place to place. Since the life of our species has spanned at least one glacial cycle, we all may somehow have a deep memory of climate change. Thus, humanity’s quest for an understanding of climate is surely as old as humanity itse1f. In this brief account, I will highlight a few of the many milestones on the long road from our species’ first perception of climate through the beginning of ow present era of frenetic research and heightened concern. Throughout, the story of climate and mankind has centered on three persistent streams of speculation, research, and concern: The physical explanation of climate, the influences of climates on humans, and the influences of humans on climate. CLIMATE AND HUMANKIND - AN AGE-OLD PARTNERSHIP The first documentation of thought about climate dates - like practically everything else - from the Greeks, who saw climate as primarily depending on the height, or inclination (klima in Greek) of the Sun. This first model of climate explained much of the data available to them: It’s hot in the summer and in the tropics, where the sun is high; it’s cold in the winter and in the north, where the sun is low. A second line of thought attributed to Aristotle held that the air and the climate were also linked to the “vapors” emanating from a country. Interestingly, recent research supports Aristotle’s view, suggesting that perceptible human influences on the atmosphere began 5000 to 8000 years ago as early humans cleared forests and developed agriculture (Ruddiman, 2003). Moreover, the Greeks linked climate strongly to human health and national character. Thus, over two thousand years ago the Greeks had a viable climate model and two hotly debated topics in today’s dialogs on climate - human influences on climate and climate’s influences on humans - were active topics of discussion. If Aristotle’s ghost is perchance

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78 eavesdropping on us today in this former outpost of his Greek world, he will feel quite at home! This conceptual framework of closely interlinked climatic and human systems simply determined by geography persisted through the darlush ages following the fall of the Greco-Roman world, and well into the “enlightenment” of the 18‘h century. Both aspects of human-climate interaction were explored. The Abbe Jean-Baptiste du Bos held that the emergence of “genius” in the arts and sciences depended primarily on the nature of the air, soil, and especially the climate of a region. (Aficionados of wine will recognize the concept of terroir so treasured by French vintners to this day.) Hence, the differences in the character of nations corresponded to the differences in their climates. An implication was that colonization of foreign climes by Europeans was fraught with great risks of damage not only to the health of the settlers, but also to their character and culture. These notions, elegantly and forcefully expressed by du Bos, influenced many other writers, most notably Montesquieu and David Hume. The latter, however, reemphasized the Greek notions on the influence of a country’s development on its climate. He saw evidence that the climate of Europe had warmed significantly since ancient times, and attributed it to the gradual advance of agriculture across the continent. The colonization of North America brought these concepts into sharp focus. Lying mostly at lower latitudes than Europe, these virgin lands were initially expected to have warm and gentle climates conducive to wine, sugar, olives and spices. Instead, the early settlers found the climate far more severe than suggested by the Greek klima-based model. Survival, rather than over-abundant harvests, proved to be a challenge. Januaries were quite different in Boston and Roanoke than in London and Nice, Julys hotter and wetter, and storms far more severe. Moreover, these new lands were covered with dense and fearsome forests, inhabited by strange bronze-colored and often unfriendly savages. Surely the severe climate, the hostile landscape, and the uncivilized population - all so different from settled and serene Europe - were somehow interlinked. If a primitive landscape creates a primitive climate, and a primitive climate creates a primitive populace, then it should be expected that the process of civilization should favorably transform all. Indeed, many European and American writers confidently expected that the transformation of chaotic nature into orderly pastoral settlements would improve both the climate and the people who lived in it. In 1771, for example, Harvard scholar Hugh Williamson held that the clearing of New England forests had significantly warmed the climate, and predicted that this would enable American civilization to compare favorably with the great republics of the past. Thomas Jefferson agreed fully, and proposed a system of climate measurements to document this benign change. Not all scholars agreed, of course. Studies based on observations by the US Army found no evidence for correlation between long-term climate trends and the expansion of American settlements. Nevertheless, this conviction that the evolution of climate and human society were closely interlinked was probably the strongest motivation for the notable expansion of weather and climate observing networks that took place in the 19‘hcentury. No history of thinking about climate and humans would be complete without mention of the century-later work of Ellsworth Huntington (1896-1945), a vastly traveled and awesomely prolific American geographer of the first half of the 20thcentury, and his almost evangelistic promotion of a theory of climatic determinism. Huntington’s travels

79 and research in Asia had impressed upon him a conviction that the rises and falls of civilizations and empires were primarily brought about by fluctuations in climate. He attributed variations in initiative, creativity, stability, honesty, and all the virtues needed for civilization almost exclusively to favorable climates characterized in terms of “climatic energy,” an empirically derived amalgam of a grab-bag of climatic parameters. He then compared the distribution of “climatic energy” with the distribution of “civilization,” as determined by polling people whom he deemed “civilized.” Amazingly, he found a remarkable correspondence between these favorable climatic zones and populations of people closely resembling himself! As Fleming remarks, Huntington’s links to long-dead writers such as Du Bos and Montesquieu are obvious, and to our eyes he simply cloaks the same ethnocentric wishful thinking in a specious wrapping of data and charts. However, his theories fitted well with the colonialist mentality of the time, and had remarkable influence. FROM SPECULATION TO SCIENCE In parallel with these mainly philosophical and speculative ruminations on climate, a considerable body of fundamental science was slowly being built, so let us backtrack to follow the stream of thought about the causes of climate. In the lgthcentury, Halley and Hadley explained many of the principal features of atmospheric circulation and global climate on the basis of differential heating between equator and pole, coupled with the earth’s rotation. With later elaboration by Ferrel, the tropical trade winds, the subtropical deserts, the mid-latitude westerlies were plausibly explained. By the early 19thcentury, the operation of the Earth’s heat engine driven by differential heating between tropics and poles was fairly well understood in broad outline. But what about the global climate itself! Why was the Earth as a whole neither too hot nor too cold? One of the earliest hints came from De Saussure’s 1774 observations of greater solar intensity in the high Alps, as indicated by thermometers in glass-lidded boxes. In the 182O’s, Fourier drew on this data to suggest that the interposition of the atmosphere between earth and space augmented the temperature of the earth’s surface, since light seemed to penetrate the air more readily than did heat. Later, Pouillet measured differential absorption of solar and thermal radiation by air, and reinforced Fourier’s insight. These two scientists are often cited as the first to elucidate the “greenhouse effect.” However, the broad analogy between the earth-atmosphere system and a garden hothouse was apparently drawn earlier by a number of writers, and neither Fourier nor Pouillet developed a full theoretical explanation of the radiative processes involved. The processes underlying the greenhouse effect were elucidated much more fully by John Tyndall in the second half of the 19thcentury. Beginning in 1859, Tyndall made careful measurements of the radiative properties of various gases, including water vapor, carbon dioxide, ozone, and various hydrocarbons. He discovered that these gases with complex molecules were far more powerful absorbers and emitters of thermal radiation than oxygen and nitrogen, the predominant constituents of the atmosphere. Taking into account their concentrations in the atmosphere, he concluded that water vapor is the strongest absorber of radiant heat, and hence the most important gas controlling the

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Earth’s surface temperature. In a famous passage, he vividly depicts the greenhouse effect in terms that can hardly be bettered today: “It is perfectly certain that more than ten percent of the terrestrial radiationfrom the soil of England is stopped within ten feet of the surface of the soil. This one fact is sufficient to show the immense influence which this newly-discoveredproperty of aqueous vapours must exert on the phenomena of meteoroloa. This aqueous vapour is a blanket more necessary to the vegetable life of England than clothing is to man. Remove for a single summer night the aqueous vapour from the air which overspreads this country, and you would assuredly destroy every plant capable of being destroyed by a freezing temperature. The warmth of our fields and gardens would pour itself unrequited into space, and the sun would rise upon an island held fast in the iron grip offiost. ” With Tyndall’s work, building on that of Fourier, Pouillet, and others, the principal elements of the atmospheric greenhouse effect that gives the Earth a habitable climate were identified and characterized. But how could we quantify the physical processes involved and assess their possible changes over time? QUANTIFYING THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT In 1891, Svante Arrhenius returned to Stockholm after a period of post-doctoral study abroad to take a post at the Stockholm Hogskola. His brilliant early work in electrochemistry would eventually lead to a Nobel Prize. In Stockholm, however, he soon expanded his horizons, turning to a broad field of investigations then termed “cosmic physics.” This was seen as an interdisciplinary effort to bring the study of natural phenomena, with all their complex interrelations, into the domain of the physical sciences - a prospectus remarkably similar to the objectives of today’s International Geosphere-Biosphere Program. Arrhenius founded the “Stockholm Physics Society,” which brought together a remarkably diverse and expert group of local scientists for lectures and discussions of “cosmic physics.” The late 19” century was a time of rapidly growing data on the Earth’s past and present. The immense antiquity of the Earth had been well established by Horton, revealing a past in which the only constant was change. It was clear that great ice ages had come and gone, scouring the Swedish landscape. Geological data, notably the work of his colleague Hogbom, indicated that the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere had changed markedly over time. Tyndall, Pouillet, and Fourier had shown that these changes might be important to climate. But others such as Croll held that variations in the Earth’s orbit caused climate changes (a hypothesis eventually put on much firmer ground by Milankovitch). Here was an interesting problem: Could plausible fluctuations in carbon dioxide produce climate changes large enough to explain the ice ages? Arrhenius set out to calculate the temperature changes that would result from specified changes in atmospheric carbon dioxide. He knew from Tyndall’s work that water vapor was also a major factor, and moreover varied markedly in time and space. Given the available meteorological data and laboratory measurements, direct calculation of the radiative effects of small changes in either gas through the entire atmosphere would be clearly infeasible. However, the American astronomer Langley had made numerous observations of thermal radiation from the moon in several wavelengths (characterized in

81 terms of the angle of deviation from a rock salt crystal) at many times, seasons, and lunar altitudes (corresponding to various slant paths through the atmosphere). These data allowed Arrhenius to estimate the absorption by the whole atmosphere of thermal radiation by carbon dioxide (presumably well-mixed) and variable water vapor, the latter of which he related to surface temperature. He then constructed a conceptually simple one-dimensional model based on Stefan’s formula for thermal radiation and a dazzling smorgasbord of approximations to account for surface albedo (e.g., snow cover), clouds, and the distribution of radiation with height. After a year’s work with pencil, paper, slide rule, and logarithmic tables, he produced the sought-for estimates of temperature changes resulting from changes in carbon dioxide? Arrhenius’ most famous result was his estimate that doubling atmospheric carbon dioxide would produce a global temperature increase of roughly 6 deg C, a figure not far from today’s estimates. However, his original question related to the ice ages, and his results seemed to c o n f m that plausibly lower carbon dioxide concentrations could indeed trigger glaciation. Interestingly, the American geologist Chamberlin had been studying the same questions in parallel, but with a primary focus on the natural sources and sinks of carbon dioxide. Although the motivation for Arrhenius’ arduous year of model-building had been to elucidate the cause of the Ice Ages, it is the former result that has been cited by many in calling Arrhenius the “father” of the greenhouse effect. Indeed, after publication of his 1896 paper, he drew on Hogbom’s work to consider the effect of fossil fuel burning on atmospheric carbon dioxide and climate. Not surprisingly for a Swede, he took a rather benign view of global warming: “By the influence of the increasingpercentage of carbonic acid in the atmosphere, we may hope to enjoy ages with more equable and better climates, especially as regards the colder regions of the earth, ages when the earth will bringforth much more abundant crops than at present, for the benefit of rapidlypropagating mankind.” More detailed examination of carbon dioxide and climate had to await the attention of Britain’s G.S. Callendar who carried out in the 1920’s a wide range of studies of temperature trends and the concentrations and radiative properties of carbon dioxide. In 1938, he pointed out that combustion of fossil fuels had produced a six percent increase in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide since the beginning of the century, and by 1949 he found an increase of over ten percent. Using a simple radiative model, he estimated that a doubling of carbon dioxide would result in a temperature increase of 2 deg C, so that the observed carbon dioxide increase could account for about 60 percent of the temperature increase experienced in the century. Like Arrhenius, he viewed the prospect of global warming as a mostly beneficial process - better prospects for cultivation at high latitudes, better productivity through carbon dioxide fertilization, and indefinite deferral of the next ice age. By integrating studies of temperature trends, atmospheric composition, radiative properties of the atmosphere, the carbon cycle, and modeling of the climate system, Callendar essentially laid out the foundation for the subsequent decades of research and discussion that have led to our present assessments of climate change. Callendar’s work ushered in what I will arbitrarily call the “modern era” in climate modeling research, with rapidly increasing capabilities in high-resolution modeling of the climate system, narrowing focus on anthropogenic climate change, extensive exploration of a wide range of future scenarios, entrainment of other disciplines such as economics,

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sociology, biology, and agronomy into climate studies, and - above all - exploding public and political interest. International conferences highlighted the need for carbon dioxide monitoring, and meticulous measurement programs were initiated. The exchanges of carbon dioxide between ocean and atmosphere were elucidated. Increasingly sophisticated models of the climate system were developed, including from the 1950’s onwards - fully three-dimensional general circulation models. A wide range of proxy data sources - ocean sediments, ice cores, lake cores, borehole data, phenomenological observations, historical records - was exploited to yield a rich history of climate variation. Social scientists were entrained into research to project scenarios of human social and economic development, estimate human influences on the climate system, and assess implications for human society. A vast global infrastructure of research, assessment, analysis, dissemination, and bureaucracy that the late Roger Revelle termed a “cottage industry” developed. A complete history of this complex and turbulent era is beyond the scope of this brief note. Those interested may refer to Spencer Weart’s superb book and HTML hypertext. As we begin the 21” Century, Aristotle’s agenda - understanding climate, our influences on climate, and climate’s impacts on us remains alive and well. CONCLUSION In this whirlwind sprint through the centuries, I have tried to demonstrate that curiosity and concern about climate are by no means a tabloid-fed fad of the electronic age. Rather, humans have been concerned about climate for about as long as they have been concerned about anything at all. Moreover, as they struggled to learn how climate affected their affairs, they soon began to speculate that perhaps their own activities influenced climate itself. Elaborate speculations on the origins of climate and the mutual influences of climate and mankind abounded and persisted. Expansion of European settlement into foreign landscapes, climates and cultures severely tested these ideas, but the notion of an intimate connection between climate and human affairs persisted. Meanwhile, the rapid development of the natural sciences turned attention toward physical explanations of climate and climate change. By the end of the 19’hcentury, the fundamental processes determining climate were qualitatively understood, and brave attempts at quantitative modeling and prediction were undertaken. By the middle of the next century, a very substantial body of knowledge, technique, and technology had been developed, and the stage was set for the intense era of modeling, projection, and assessment that has extended into our own time. This evolution from curiosity to concern has in part been driven by imaginative speculation and theorizing. However, as the blank areas on the maps became filled and interconnected, observation, data, and simple modeling based on fundamental physics, heroic assumptions, and artful mathematics increasingly informed discussions of climate. Prior to Norman Phillips’s pioneering simulations of the mid-l950’s, our ideas about climate and climate’s interactions with human society came from simple models, pencils, paper, thermometers, and slide-rules, liberally aided by tradition, history, prejudice, chauvinism, ingenuity, and imagination - but not from massive computing machines. Indeed, if the digital computer had never been invented, our curiosity and concerns about climate would have been little altered.

83 The climate agenda that was evident to the Greek citizens of Athens and colonists of Sicily in classical times is still vital today. Climate importantly influences our welfare. What we do can importantly influence climate. Our climate is a product of our planet’s unique composition and situation, and we need to understand how climate works. These questions have endured for two millennia, and will doubtless persist for generations to come. If this seminar should reconvene in August of 2104, Aristotle’s ghost would still find himself quite at home. REFERENCES 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Ausubel, Jesse H., 1983. Historical Note, Annex 2, Changing Climate. Report of the Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee. Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, National Academy Press, Washington, pp. 488-491. Fleming, James Rodger, 1998. Historical Perspectives on Climate Change. Oxford University Press, New York. 194 pp. Kutzbach, John E., 1996. Steps in the Evolution of Climatology: From Descriptive to Analytic, in Historical Essays on Meteorology 1919-1995, James Rodger Fleming, ed., American Meteorological Society, Boston, pp. 353-378. Rodhe, Henning, and Robert Charlson, 1998. The Legacy of Svante Arrhenius: Understanding the Greenhouse Effect. Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences and Stockholm University, 276 pp. Ruddiman, William F., 2003. The Anthropogenic Greenhouse Era Began Thousands of Years Ago. Climatic Change. 61 (3): 261-293, December 2003 Weart, Spencer R., 2003. The Discovery of Global Warming. Harvard University Press, 228 pp. (An expanded version of this work is available as an extensively hyperlinked HTML document from the author at the American Institute of Physics, American Center for Physics (ACP), One Physics Ellipse, College Park, MD 20740-3843). ENDNOTES

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2

The content of this brief review is drawn almost entirely, and with great admiration and appreciation, from the superb scholarly histories of James Rodger Fleming (1998) and Spencer Weart (2003). The reader may turn to the excellent bibliographies in the above-cited works for full citations of the various works referenced in this paper. Review papers by Ausubel(l983) and Kutzbach (1996) also provided many illuminating insights. See Rodhe and Charlson (1998) for a fascinating collection of papers on the climate-related work of Arrhenius, including a reproduction of his famous 1896 paper.

84 SIMPLE CLIMATE MODELS T.M.L. WIGLEY National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, USA ABSTRACT Simple climate models, from a one-box energy balance model (EBM) up to a multibox upwelling-diffusion (UD) EBM, are described. The latter is illustrated using the MAGICC (Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change) model, which couples a UD EBM to a range of gas-cycle models to investigate future climate change due to anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosol precursors. MAGICC is able to emulate the global-mean temperature responses of more sophisticated coupled Atmosphere/Ocean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) with hgh accuracy over a wide range of forcing scenarios. Because of their computational efficiency, simple climate models are valuable when a large number of climate simulations are required, as is the case for probabilistic projections of future warming. Some examples of probabilistic projections are given. INTRODUCTION Modeling the climate system is an extremely complex problem involving both physical and chemical processes operating and interacting over a large range of spatial and temporal scales. It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a hierarchy of climate models of increasing complexity and sophstication that is used to tackle different aspects of the climate problem. Each class of model has a role to play. The simplest, ‘energybalance’ models capture only the grossest aspects of the problem, the balance between (or changes in the balance between) incoming and outgoing energy at a global scale. Since such models require only minimal computational resources they may be used to run multiple scenarios for past and future change and to assess the importance of different sources of uncertainty. The most complex models, coupled Atmosphere/Ocean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) represent both oceanic and atmospheric processes on a three-dimensional grid over the whole globe. The latest generation of such models has a spatial latitude-longitude resolution in the atmosphere of about 1-2’ by 1-2 but even this is not fine enough to model important components of the system like individual clouds (which must be represented in approximate or ‘parameterized’ form). AOGCMs are computationally intensive and it usually requires many days of wall-clock time to run a single simulation of a few hundred years on the world’s most powerful computers, limiting the number of simulations and sensitivity studies that may be performed. The present paper will give an introduction to the models that lie at the simplest end of the hierarchy. A useful summary of simple climate modeling is given by Harvey et al. (1997). O,

85 BASIC CONCEPTS At the global-mean level, the state of the climate system may be represented by the global-mean (area-averaged) temperature near the Earth's surface (T). Changes in this quantity (OT(t)) are closely tied to changes in the mean temperature of the troposphere where the atmosphere is well-mixed in the vertical through convective processes. The prevailing value of T is determined by a balance between net incoming (short-wave) solar energy, which is largely independent of T, and outgoing (long-wave) energy, which depends linearly on T. If the balance is disturbed, for example by some external forcing agent such as an increase in solar irradiance, then an increase in T will increase the outgoing energy and act to restore the balance. The simplest possible climate model therefore would be to represent the climate system as a radiating black body via

where 0 is the planetary albedo (= 0.3). Qs,l,, is about 342W/m2,one quarter of the solar output since the intercepted heat (Or?) must be distributed over the whole Earth's surface (40?). Hence, a perturbation in Qs,l,, (OQsolar) will lead to a temperature change OT given by

... (2) Unfortunately, the planet does not behave like a simple black body. If the system is externally forced, many of the characteristics that determine how much energy is absorbed and emitted by the system will change. For example, an increase in energy received at the top of the atmosphere will change the albedo of the planet through changes in clouds, the area of snow and ice, and (more slowly) vegetation, and so modify the amount of energy absorbed. In addition, changes in clouds, which are absorbers of long-wave radiation, will change the amount of outgoing energy and the relationship between outgoing energy and temperature. Processes like these are referred to as climate feedbacks, and the eventual response of the climate system to a change in external forcing depends to a large extent on the magnitude of these (and other) feedback processes. Furthermore, the climate system has, through the ocean, a considerable thermal inertia, so it will respond only slowly to any imposed external forcing. A more general form for equ. (2) therefore is ATequil = AQ/h

..... (3)

where ATequilis the eventual change in global-mean temperature in response to some general external forcing AQ, and h is the climate feedback parameter, the net effect of a number of individual feedback processes. Conventionally, we use the concept of climate sensitivity (S) rather than feedback parameter,

s = Ilh

..... (4)

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where S is the equilibrium warming (K or "C) for a unit change in radiative forcing (W/m2). Further, since one of the primary concerns in climate science is the effect of increases in carbon dioxide (C02) concentration, it is common to express the sensitivity in terms of the equilibrium warming (ATzX) that would occur if the atmospheric concentration of C 0 2 were doubled. If AQzx is the forcing for a C02 doubling (= 3.7W/m2), then equ. (3) gives

ATzx = AQ2xlh = S (AQ2x)

..... (5)

The value of ATzX is subject to considerable uncertainty because of the difficulty in modeling and/or empirically quantifying feedback processes, particularly those associated with clouds. In many reports and publications it is stated that ATzX lies in the range 1.54.5"C, but the confidence interval associated with this range is rarely given. My own judgment is that this range represents, approximately, the 90% confidence interval (Wigley and Raper, 2001), but there are a number of different opinions (e.g., Andronova and Schlesinger, 2001; Forest et al. 2002). ONE-BOX MODELS The next step up the ladder of complexity is to introduce time-dependent behavior into the system. This may be done using a simple one-box model of the energy balance

... C dATldt + AT/S = AQ(t)

.....(6)

where C is a heat capacity term, AQ(t) is the applied external forcing, S is the climate sensitivity, and AT(t) is the change in global-mean temperature. Equation (6) is the simplest form of Energy Balance Model (EBM). The steady-state solution to equ. (6) is simply equ. (3) (with S replacing Ih).AT(t) must be a function of C and S, and we can show that the relative importance of these two terms depends on the characteristic time scale for AQ(t). To do this, suppose that AQ(t) is sinusoidal, AQ(t) = A sin(ot). The solution to (6) is then

AT(t) = [(or)2/(1+(07)2)] exp(-ffz) + [S/(l+(oz)2)][A{sin(wt) - ot cos(ot)}] .. (7) where z is a characteristic time scale for the system, z = SC. (Note that the sinelcosine term can be written in the form sin(wt+$), showing that the asymptotic response follows the forcing with a lag, 4.) We now consider two end-member cases, for high-frequency and low-frequency forcing. For the latter (o > I/T) the solution is AT(t)

= [A/(wC)] sin(ot - 7d2)

..... (9)

showing a quarter cycle lag of response behind forcing, with the response being independent of the climate sensitivity. (A more general analytical treatment in the frequency domain, accounting for ocean mixing as an upwelling-diffusion process - see below - is given in Wigley and Raper (1991). The results are qualitatively the same as derived here.) If representative values are used for C and S (via ATzx), then we find T = 1 to 5 years. This means, for example, that the response to the seasonal cycle of solar forcing should be largely independent of the sensitivity and lag behind the forcing by about 3 months (the lag is a little less than this, about 2 months, partly because the thermal inertia term, C, is not a constant). For slower cyclic forcing, such as the response to the 11-year sunspot cycle of solar irradiance changes, sensitivity is far more important and there is a smaller but still non-negligible lag of response behind forcing. UPWELLING-DIFFUSION EBMS In a one-box EBM, the box represents the globe, and C is the global heat capacity. In reality, however, the climate system has a large number of boxes each with a different heat capacity. For example, the atmosphere has very little heat capacity; and the land surface also may be considered to have, effectively, a very low heat capacity (because the generally low conductivities of rocks and soils mean that externally imposed heat changes affect only a small near-surface layer). Most of the system’s heat capacity is in the ocean. Here lies a complication, since the effective heat capacity of the ocean depends on the time scale of forcing (see Wigley and Raper, 1991). Rapid forcing changes, such as those associated with the seasonal insolation cycle, will affect only the top layer of the ocean (the mechanically mixed ‘mixed layer’), while slow changes will penetrate much deeper and so experience a much larger effective heat capacity. A one-box model cannot capture these important aspects, so it is important to account somehow for the processes that transport heat below the mixed layer into the deeper ocean. The simplest way to do this is to consider heat transport in the ocean as an upwelling-diffusion process (Hoffert et al., 1980). An upwelling term is necessary because the ocean’s thermohaline (density-driven) circulation (THC) provides a short cut for heat transport. In high latitudes, colder surface ocean temperatures and lower salinities lead to higher density water that sinks to considerable depths before being entrained into deep-ocean horizontal ocean current systems. To compensate for this geographically-restricted sinking water, there is a general ocean-wide upwelling (at a rate of about 41dyear). In addition to heat transport by the THC are large-scale mixing processes that transport heat across and along iso-pycnal (constant density) surfaces. Although physically unrealistic, these processes can be characterized by vertical diffusion in a onedimensional model (see, e.g., Harvey, 2000, p. 262). The net result is a model that

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assumes that ocean mixing can be represented by a one-dimensional upwelling-diffusion (UD) process. Mathematically, a UD EBM may be written as . ..

C dAT/dt + AT/S = AQ(t) - AF AF = K, [a(Ae)/az],=o a(Ae)/& + wa(AO)/az= K,

.... (10)

Here, A refers to changes from an initial equilibrium state, T(t) is the temperature of the ocean mixed layer, AF is the flux of heat below the mixed layer into the deeper ocean, z is a vertical coordinate measured downwards from F O at the bottom of the mixed layer, e(t,z) is the ocean temperature profile, and w is the upwelling rate. Because of their relatively low heat capacities, it is reasonably assumed that the land-surface and tropospheric temperature changes follow those in the ocean mixed layer. In the following, I will give results based on a somewhat more complex UD EBM in which the land and ocean areas in each hemisphere are considered separately (with exchanges between these four boxes quantified by linear exchange coefficients), and where various gas-cycle models are coupled interactively to the climate model (to account for possible climate feedbacks on the sources and sinks of, e.g., COz and C h ) . Incorporating coupled gas-cycle models means that AQ(t) is calculated internally by the model for radiatively active gases like COz, based on emissions input information. The need to separate the globe into land and ocean boxes arises kom the fact that the climate sensitivity over land is larger than over the ocean (by approximately 30%), and the hemispheric separation is an advantage because some forcings (such as sulfate aerosols produced by SO2 emissions) have quite different values in the northem and southern hemispheres. This model (MAGICC - Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas bduced Climate Change; Wigley and Raper, 1992; Raper et al., 1996) is the model that has been used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for all of its projections of future global-mean temperature and sea level change. A user-friendly version of MAGICC that runs on a PC may be downloaded from www.cad.ucar.edu. As noted above, the computational efficiency of models of this type (MAGICC runs a 300+ year simulation in about 0.1 seconds) makes them ideal for carrying out multiple simulations for different emissions scenarios, and for investigating uncertainties associated with the carbon cycle, ocean mixing, and climate parameters like the climate sensitivity, and forcing uncertainties such as those for aerosol forcing. Another advantage is that these models are deterministic so they give the signal due to external forcing directly. AOGCMs, on the other hand, produce output that is a combination of both the extemallyforced signal and internally-generated weather ‘noise’. To obtain the underlying signal from an OAGCM requires running an ensemble of simulations and averaging these results to reduce the noise. AOGCMs, however, are physically more realistic, and they give the full spatial details of future climate change for all variables. For the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) a number of improvements were made to MAGICC to ensure that its science was consistent with the state of the science as represented by the TAR (Wigley and Raper, 2002). MAGICC was also calibrated against a number of AOGCMs using results from a standard forcing experiment in which COz

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concentration was increased at a compound rate of l%/year, equivalent to a linear forcing increase (Raper et al., 2001; see also Cubasch and Meehl, 2001, Appendix 9.1). As an example of the success of the model calibration process, Fig. 1 (from Wigley et al., 2004) shows how MAGICC can reproduce the results for a specific AOGCM for forcings that differ radically from the linear forcing considered in the calibration exercise. Here, the AOGCM is the NCAR/USDOE Parallel Climate Model (PCM; Washington et al., 2000), and the forcing is that due to the major explosive volcanic eruptions of the past 100+ years (from Ammann et al., 2003). The AOGCM signal is obtained by averaging results from 16 different simulations or combinations of simulations. A considerable amount of noise still remains after this averaging process. Note that the calibration involves forcing changes on the decadal to century time scale, while the test simulation employs forcing changes on a monthly to annual time scale, quite a stringent test. The agreement between the two models is excellent. 03

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120

240

360

480

600

720

840

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1320

MONTH (JAN. 1890=1)

Figure 1: Comparison of the simulated response to volcanicforcing calculated with MAGICC (bold line) and with PCM. The PCMresult is the mean of 16 independent realizations, but this still leaves considerable month-to-month and year-to-year background variability that masks the underlying volcano signal. Thefour largest 2dh century eruptions are identified.

90 PROBABILISTIC PROJECTIONS It is possible to take advantage of the computational efficiency of a model like MAGICC to make probabilistic projections of future change under the influence of manmade emissions of greenhouse gases and related gases (cf. Wigley and Raper, 2001). The greenhouse gases considered are C02, CH4, N20, tropospheric and stratospheric ozone, a large number of halocarbons (CFCs and HCFCs, which determine changes in stratospheric ozone, and HFCs and PFCs), and SF6. The other gases are SO2 (which controls the level of sulfate aerosols) and the reactive gases CO, NOx and VOCs, which control (along with CH4) tropospheric ozone. Other aerosols are also considered. The future emissions of these gases are defined by a set of no-climate-policy scenarios produced as part of the IPCC Third Assessment and published in the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (NakiCenoviC and Swart, 2000). These are referred to as the SRES scenarios. Emissions are prescribed in decadal steps from 2000 to 2100. These scenarios span a wide range of emissions depending on assumptions made for future population change, economic development, technology changes, levels of international cooperation, and attitudes towards sustainable development. They assume that no policies are introduced specifically to reduce future climate change. They do, however, include the effects of policies to reduce the impacts of sulfate aerosols on urban pollution and acid precipitation (leading to substantially lower SO2 emissions than would otherwise be the case). Ironically, since these aerosols have a cooling effect, this leads to enhanced global warming. The SRES report states that the authors were unable to associate probabilities with individual scenarios, so I have assumed that all scenarios are equally likely. Emissions uncertainties are clearly a major source of uncertainty in future climate change. The other sources of uncertainty may be identified by sensitivity studies. They are: the climate sensitivity, the rate of ocean mixing as characterized by K,, the magnitude of aerosol forcing, and feedbacks on the carbon cycle. Emissions and sensitivity uncertainties dominate. To obtain a probability density function (pdf) for future global-mean warming it is necessary to assign pdfs to the various uncertain parameters that define the MAGICC climate model. Of course, these input pdfs are themselves uncertain, so there is some expert judgment required in their quantification. Details are given in Wigley and Raper (2001). The method used for obtaining the output pdf is a form of Latin Hypercube Sampling where each of the five input pdfs is divided into fractiles and the fivedimensional fractile space is sampled exhaustively with replacement (‘Exhaustive Fractile Sampling’). For emissions, there are 35 discrete scenarios. The sensitivity pdf is divided into 25 fiactiles, and the K,, aerosol forcing and carbon cycle pdfs are divided into quintiles. Sampling of fractile space requires running 3 5 x 2 5 ~ 5 ~ 5=~ 109,375 5 simulations. I will first show the results for a single emissions scenario, one constructed by using the median emissions values across the 35 scenarios at all time steps (referred to as the P50 - 50thpercentile - scenario). This requires only 3125 simulations with the model. The results, shown in Fig. 2, provide an indication of climate and carbon cycle modeling uncertainties. As expected, uncertainties increase with time. Even for a fixed emissions scenario the uncertainties are large, arising mainly from uncertainties in the climate sensitivity. In 2100, the median warming (from 1990 - subtract 0.2OC for warming from

91

2000) is 3.10"C with a 90% confidence interval of 2.00 to 4.39"C. (The precision here is for comparison purposes and does not reflect accuracy.)

2.2 2

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w 0

c 30

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0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0

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GLOBAL-MEAN WARMING FROM 1990 (degC)

Figure 2: Probabilistic projections of global-mean warming from 1990 for the P50 (SRES median) emissions scenario. The projections account for uncertainties in the climate sensitiviw, ocean mixing, aerosolforcing and carbon cyclefeedbacks.

Figure 3 (which is the same as Fig. 4 in Wigley and Raper, 2001) shows the results when all 35 SRES emissions scenarios (equally weighted) are considered. Uncertainties increase, but the medians change little. (Using a scenario other than P50 in Fig. 2 would shift the output pdfs to the left (for lower emissions) or right (for higher emissions), but would not noticeably affect the spread of the distribution). The median warming in 2100 is 3.06"C, while the 90% confidence interval expands by one third to 1.68-4.87"C.

92 2.2

ALL EMISSION: 2 1.8

2030

.?1.6 8

0)

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GLOBAL-MEAN WARMING FROM 1990 (degC)

Figure 3: Probabilistic projections of global-mean warming from 1990 for the full set of SRES emissions scenarios. The projections account for uncertainties in emissions, the climate sensitiviQ, ocean mixing, aerosol forcing and carbon cycle feedbacks. For changes over 1990-2100, the IPCC Third Assessment Report (using the same climate mode0 gives a warming range of 1.4-5.8"C.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS A simple one-box Energy Balance Model (EBM) is described and used to identify the forcing time scale boundary (1-5 years) below which the response of the climate system is controlled by its thermal inertia and above which the response is primarily determined by the climate sensitivity. The simplest type of model that can describe the time-dependent behavior of the climate system is an Upwelling Diffusion (UD) EBM in

93 which ocean heat transport is modeled as an upwelling-diffusion process. It is possible to model this transport without considering upwelling (i.e., as a ‘pure diffusion’ process), but such a model has as its steady-state an isothermal ocean, which is clearly unrealistic. The MAGICC model is used as an illustration of a UD EBM. When MAGICC’s parameters are calibrated so that MAGICC emulates the results of a particular AOGCM for the case of linear forcing, it is found that emulations for different forcings are equally accurate. An example is given using the response of the Parallel Climate Model (PCM) to the volcanic forcing history of the past 100+ years. MAGICC’s results match those of PCM accurately and provide a clearer indication of the underlying volcanic response signal. Because of their computational efficiency, models like MAGICC may be run thousands of times to produce probabilistic projections of future climate change accounting for emissions, climate sensitivity, ocean mixing, aerosol forcing and carbon cycle uncertainties. An example is given for a specific emissions scenario and this is then expanded to account for emissions uncertainties. REFERENCES 1.

2. 3. 4.

5.

6. 7. 8.

9.

10.

Ammann,C.M., Meehl, G.A., Washington, W.M. andzender, C.S., 2003: A monthly and latitudinally varying volcanic forcing data set in simulations of 20* century climate. Geophysical Research Letters 30( 12), 1657, doi: 10.1029/2003GL016875. Andronova, N.G. and Schlesinger, M.E., 2001: Objective estimation of the probability density function for climate sensitivity. Journal of Geophysical Research 106,22,605-22,611. Cubasch, U. and Meehl, G.A., co-ordinating lead authors, 2001: Projections for future climate change. (In) Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. (J.T. Houghton et al., Eds.), Cambridge University Press, 525-582. Forest, C.E., Stone, P.H., Sokolov, A.P., Allen, M.R. and Webster, M.D., 2002: Quantifying uncertainties in climate system properties with the use of recent climate observations. Science 295, 113-1 17. Harvey, L.D.D., 2000: Global Warming. The Hard Science. Prentice Hall, 336pp. Harvey, L.D.D. et al., 1997: An Introduction to Simple Climate Models used in the IPCC Second assessment Report: IPCC Technical Paper 2 (J.T. Houghton et al., Eds.), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland, 50 pp. Hoffert, M.L., Callegari, A.J. and Hsieh, C.-T., 1980: The role of deep sea heat storage in the secular response to climate forcing. Journal of Geophysical Research 86,6667- 6679. Nakikenovik, N., and Swart, R., Eds., 2000: Special Report on Emissions Scenarios. Cambridge University Press, 570 pp. Raper, S.C.B., Wigley, T.M.L. and Warrick, R.A., 1996: Global sea level rise: past and future. (In) Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Subsidence: Causes, Consequences and Strategies. (J. Milliman and B.U. Haq, Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 11 4 5 . Raper, S.C.B., Gregory, J.M. and Osbom, T.J., 2001: Use of an upwellingdiffusion energy balance climate model to simulate and diagnose NOGCM results. Climate Dynamics 17,601-613.

94 11.

12.

13. 14. 15. 16.

Washington, W.M. et al., 2000: Parallel Climate Model (PCM) control and transient simulations. Climate Dynamics 16,755-774. Wigley, T.M.L. and Raper, S.C.B., 1991: Internally generated variability of global-mean temperatures. (In) Greenhouse-Gas-ZnducedClimatic Change: A Critical Appraisal of Simulations and Observations. (M.E. Schlesinger, Ed.), Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 471482. Wigley, T.M.L. and Raper, S.C.B., 1992: Implications for climate and sea level of revised IPCC emissions scenarios. Nature 357,293-300. Wigley, T.M.L. and Raper, S.C.B., 2001: Interpretation of high projections for global-mean warming. Science 293,451-454. Wigley, T.M.L. andRaper, S.C.B., 2002: Reasons for larger warming projections in the IPCC Third Assessment Report. Journal of Climate 15,2945-2952. Wigley, T.M.L., Ammann, C.M., Santer, B.D. and Raper, S.C.B., 2004: The effect of climate sensitivity on the response to volcanic forcing. Journal of Climate (submitted).

OLD PHYSICS FOR NEW CLIMATE MODELS - MAYBE GARTH W. PALTRIDGE Institute of Antarctic and Southem Ocean Studies University of Tasmania, Australia ABSTRACT On the one hand we look at the possibility that positive feed-back within the earth-atmosphere climate system is great enough to generate an oscillating climate whose long-term behaviour is more-or-less independent of such things as enhanced greenhouse global warming. On the other we look at the possibility of applying a principle of maximum entropy production to calculate the sub-grid-scale turbulent diffusion coefficients of climate models, and thereby perhaps bypass the need for ever more detailed model resolution. Examination of either possibility requires a sizeable change in the way modem numerical climate models are handled. INTRODUCTION This talk is about two scientific difficulties still facing people in the climate prediction business. The first concerns the variety of feedback processes which have to be incorporated in a model before it can produce anything other than partialderivative forecasts of, say, the change of global temperature associated with an increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide. Researchers are still having difficulty identifying all the significant feedbacks, and indeed are deliberately avoiding some of them because they are such a nuisance. The second concerns the perennial problem of turbulence. Its detailed behaviour has that awkward characteristic of inherent unpredictability - this because fluctuations smaller than the distance between measurements in a turbulent medium have the nasty habit of growing unexpectedly into something much bigger and much more noticeable. It is not immediately obvious that either difficulty will be removed by adding ever-more detail to general circulation models of the atmosphere and ocean. FEEDBACK AND OTHER MATTERS Want to know:

du

4.0 Wm2 for doubled CQ and no feedbacks

0.3 owWm’

=

1.2 OK for doubled CQ

Figwe 1

equation in Figure

The

95

96

1 is perhaps the simplest way of looking at the climate-change problem. T is the global average surface temperature, F is the net radiant energy flux into the planet (it must be zero on average), and we will let x be the concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide whose unit of change is set to be a doubling of its value. The values of the two derivatives on the right-hand-side were worked out on the back of an envelope more than a hundred years ago, and those of you who can multiply will quickly work out that, according to this equation, a doubling of carbon dioxide would lead to a rise in global temperature of 1.2OC. People were fairly happy with such a figure in the less timorous years of the early part of last century. With Feedbacks:

O

Zfi

I .o Figwe 2

The problem of course is that there are no feedbacks in the equation as it stands, and the left-hand-side is very much a partial rather than a full derivative. Higher temperatures may change cloud cover and the concentration of water vapour and the albedo of the surface and so on, all of which changes may in turn ‘feed back’ so as to affect F. Depending on the sign of the feedback, they may amplify or reduce the initial change in T induced by the increasing carbon dioxide. Thus equation 1 should be modified to the more complicated equation 2 in Figure 2, with the sum of all the feedback factors fi appearing as shown in the denominator. Climate-change modelling is essentially a process which, at least in principle, identifies all the J and calculates reliable values of them. The table in Figure 3 gives the feedback factors that were specifically calculated as a by-product of a popular numerical climate model developed about 20 years ago. There are both positive and negative values, but when they are all added up their sum comes to +0.712. Tbe implied sensitivity to doubling carbon dioxide is an increase in temperature of 4.16 C - this both from our equation 2 and indeed from the actual simulations within the model itself. Other models over the years used different feedbacks or values of feedbacks, and indeed the range of reputable published sensitivities to doubled carbon dioxide includes values as high as 6 or 7 C . Feedback Mechanism

f,

T/ x

None

0.000

1.20

Water vapour amount Water vapour distrib. Lapse Rate Surface Albedo

Cloud height Cloud cover

0.445 0.216 -0.264 0.091 0.123 0.101

1.85 0.90 -1.10 0.38 0.51 0.42

Total

0.712

4.16

97 The first thing to recognize is that quoting the variousfi to three decimal places is rather silly. Even now we don't for certain know the sign of some of the feedbacks, let alone their magnitude to three decimal places. The second thing to recognize (referring back to equation 2 and its associated graph in Figure 2) is that the more positive is the overall feedback, the more significant can be any further addition. (As the sum of theJ approaches 1.O, the sensitivity to change of carbon dioxide increases rapidly and indeed tends to infinity). Suffice it to say that some of the more extreme positive feedbacks have been tuned out of the models over recent years, and in general the average sort of quoted sensitivity to doubled carbon dioxide is actually not all that far from the hundred-year-old figure of a little more than a degree or so. But reputable models with high sensitivity can still be found, and it is possible (not necessarily likely, but at least possible) that the overall feedback of the real atmosphere-ocean system is very large and positive. If for instance we accept the large values of positive feedback implied by those models which predict a 6 or 7 degree rise in temperature, and then add other positive feedbacks which may not yet be incorporated in those models (rainfalValbedo and rainfall/emissivity are two possibilities that come to mind) then one can conceive the system as possibly having an overall feedback greater than 1.0. It would in fact be an oscillator.

Figure 4

Such a world would have its interesting points. The climate would skate back and forth from one extreme to another at a rate determined by the longest timeconstants of the system - that is, by the centuries and millennia associated with processes in the deep ocean and the polar ice packs. The extremes would be defined by points where the total feedback once again became less than 1.O. For instance, one extreme might correspond to the dry ice-age situation when (we might imagine) there would not be enough clouds to allow positive cloud feedback. The other might correspond to some version of the relatively wet present climate where (we might imagine again) the positive rainfall to surface-emissivityfeedback could be reduced to virtually nothing. Perhaps the most interesting point about such a world is that enhanced greenhouse warming from the burning of fossil fuel would be more-or-less irrelevant to its long-term behaviour. In any event, and before consigning the whole silly idea to the rubbish bin, it is perhaps worth looking at the record in Figure 4 of the

98

temperature of the high Antarctic plateau over the last half million years - this from the Vostok ice core. People argue that this temperature record is probably similar in shape (if not in magnitude) to that of the world as a whole. The almost saw-tooth graph is remarkably oscillatory in character. Suffice it to say that various more respectable attempts to explain the dominant 1 10-thousand-year cycle in global temperature still leave rather a lot to be desired. The real point of this speculative, rather disreputable, and indeed not very original discussion is to emphasise that such ideas are not all that easy to pursue in this day of highly complicated and highly expensive numerical climate models. There have to be very serious reasons to make major changes to an operational model. Indeed it is difficult enough nowadays - some would say virtually impossible - even to analyse the sensitivity of models to the tunable parameters buried deep in the simulation of many of the thermodynamic processes of the system. Requests to try strange ideas which might run the models way outside the regime for which they are designed can, rather understandably, lead to some very funny looks from the modelling practitioners. On the other hand, ideas which are not tested on the big models tend to remain permanently within the realm of science fiction. And in the case of the present example, perhaps it is just as well.

TURBULENCE AND MAXIMUM DISSIPATION

Latitude (0

, Figure 5

Many years ago someone pointed out to me that the last resort of the confused physicist when faced with an insoluble problem was to look for an extremum principle. Such things can be used to bypass the difficulty of not having enough equations to go with all the unknowns. I won’t bore you with the details, but as a consequence of that conversation I developed back in the mid-seventies a particular version of what is known as an ‘energy balance’ box-model of the climate system. Referring to Figure 5 , in the first version of the model the boxes corresponded to latitude zones, and there were 10 of them ranging from pole to pole. The unknowns in each box were cloud cover 0,surface temperature T and (effectively) the turbulent transfer coefficient relevant to energy transfer X from the one latitude zone i to the next zone i+l. Energy balance at the top and bottom of the atmosphere provided only two equations to solve for the three unknowns of each box. Thus began a more-orless random search for any overall parameter of the system which had a maximum or

99

minimum for some particular distribution of the transfer coefficients (i.e of the Xi), and hence also of the distributions of nand T and the radiative fluxes dependent on them. Hopefully the distributions would match reasonably well the known conditions of the climate system. Suffice it to say that after a lot of running down dark alleys there emerged a parameter which seemed to fit the bill in that it had a minimum in roughly the right place. The parameter was the sum over all the latitude zones of the net radiation input to the planet ( R N ~ R Jdivided ) by the outgoing long-wave radiation RL. This was fine, but was also completely incomprehensible until a colleague pointed out that if I took the fourth root of the bottom line I would have something which at least had recognizable units - namely, units of entropy exchange (energy flux over temperature). After that it took quite some additional time to wake up to the fact that a minimum in entropy exchange so defined was the equivalent of a maximum in the internal entropy production associated with the meridional transfer of energy. Anyway, looking at the business in reverse, application to the model of a principle of maximum entropy production (MEP) produced some amazingly good simulations of the Earth’s distribution of cloud and surface temperature. You might verify that by looking at the output of a more complicated two-dimensional model of the Earth to which the principle has been applied. See Figures 6 and 7. Bear in mind that this work was done at a time when the GCM practitioners of the day made no pretence at all of generating clouds in their models. They simply pre-set cloud amount to match the observed conditions - and thereby effectively pre-set as well many of the thermodynamic conditions of the system such as sea surface temperature. Cloud Cover

Figure 6

100 Surface Temperature

Figure 7

The result created a small stir at the time, since it would indeed be rather nice to be able to predict climate and climate change without having to go to all the trouble of describing every dynamical process of the atmosphere and ocean in minute detail. But the stir quickly faded, mainly because there was no rational physical explanation as to why the earth-atmosphere climate system should actively adopt a format which maximizes its entropy production. My own published attempts to produce such an explanation were beneath contempt. Despite this, quite a number of people over the years kept looking at the question, and among other things applied the principle of MEP reasonably successfully to other planets, and as well put some real physics behind the entropy production associated with radiation transfer. But it was not until a couple of years ago that one Roderick Dewar produced what seems to be a fairly solid statistical mechanical proof of the concept - namely, that essentially turbulent systems can be expected to adopt a format (i.e. to adjust their transfer coefficients for instance) to maximize their rate of entropy production or (what is nearly the same thing) their rate of energy dissipation. The proof is still being argued about by the gurus of statistical mechanics but, if it ultimately proves to be correct, Dr. Dewar has come up with what might be called a codicil to the Second Law of thermodynamics. Such a codicil would say something to the effect that, not only does an isolated system go ultimately to maximum entropy and disorder, but given the chance it will go there as quickly as possible. So MEP has gained some measure of respectability of late, and as a consequence the literature of the last year or two on the subject has expanded rapidly. But there are still problems of application. The main problem is simply that the constraint is an overall constraint, which at face value is not very easy to incorporate directly into existing general circulation models (GCMs) which are very much based on separate calculation of local conditions every time step in order to build the overall picture. So a major question about MEP concerns the level of detail to which it can be directly applied. Can it, for instance, be applied locally to calculate the transfer coefficients appropriate to the sub-grid-scale diffusion of energy (and other scalar quantities) between individual grid boxes of a GCM? There are indications that it might, in which case the whole nasty business of requiring more and more resolution in numerical climate models might be done away with. But first it will require some fairly esoteric physical analysis to relate the concept directly to various theories of turbulence.

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MEP seems to apply usefully (as opposed to trivially) to systems which have sufficient degrees of freedom to allow an almost continuous spectrum of possible steady states - of which one steady state has maximum dissipation relative to all the others. In other words the principle concerns turbulent mechanisms, and not (for instance) the radiation streams that drive them. It is for this reason that attempts to apply MEP to the total entropy production of the earth-atmosphere system (i.e. including the essentially linear production associated with conversion of solar radiation to thermal energy at terrestrial temperatures) have failed. Having come to that realization, it is interesting also to speculate about other types of turbulent system to which MEP might apply and therefore provide some forecasting skill. The economics of complex societies seem remarkably turbulent and could be good candidates for the application of some form of MEP principle. In that event, a jaundiced onlooker might perhaps comfort himself with the thought that an economic model based on such a principle stands a fair chance of being no worse at forecasting the future than the various techniques which exist at the moment.

ENERGY AND ELECTRICITY CONSIDERATIONS GLOBAL WARMING PERSPECTIVES DR. HISHAM KHATIB Honorary Vice Chairman - World Energy Council Amman, Jordan (Ideas expressed are entirely personal) INTRODUCTION

No doubt energy is a major anthropological cause of what is termed as "greenhouse gases" particularly carbon. Fossil fuels that account for over 85% of commercial global primary energy consumption are rich in carbon at varying degrees (coal is very rich, natural gas is less rich). Human use of energy and its dependence on fossil fuels have not changed during the last few decades and are unlikely to change for decades to come. In the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to fossil fuels to satisfy global energy needs. New renewable energy sources, other than hydro, do not contribute more than 2% of global resources (less than 1% if refuse is not included) and are not likely to significantly increase their relative contribution for years to come. Such renewable sources are intermittent and, disbursed correspondingly: they are expensive and unreliable. Fossil fuels are abundant, highly concentrated, versatile and efficient, correspondingly they are relatively cheap and tradable. Geographical endowment is uneven (particularly in case of oil). This provokes serious womes about the security of supplies, but the experience of the last few years has proven such womes exaggerated (and unjustified). A concerted global action to restrain emissions is yet to come. The Kyoto Protocol, although agreed seven years ago, is still to be ratified. The U.S. decided to withdraw and Russia is wavering. The main problem is that the cost to national economies (and the global economy) of restraining emissions and of enforcing a strong carbon discipline and developing alternatives are severe and involve considerable cost. The rewards are doubtful and long term. The problem is compounded by the fact that the major share of increase in future emissions will come from developing countries, particularly countries with high population concentration and high growth - China and India. Developing countries are eager to achieve economic growth and less worried about global warming. To convince these countries to join the global carbon emissions restraint effort is not going to be easy and, without their participation, the outcome will be limited. This is a serious dilemma. Global warming, as a science, is still controversial. It is not the intention of this paper to dwell on the controversies. But calls for efforts to restrain emissions are becoming stronger and almost universal. They are concerned with: better energy efficiency, clean technologies (fossil and non fossil), switching to cleaner fuels and involving developing countries. We shall start with the last issue as being the most important in the long term. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND GLOBAL WARMING Developing countries are going to be the main player in the growth of the global energy market in the coming decades. Lead by China (and to a lesser extent India) 102

103 their energy demand, which accounted for only one third of global primary commercial energy in 2003 (it was only 27% in 1993), will surge to 43% in 2025. It will approach half world consumption by 2030. Correspondingly developing countries will, as a group, be the main emitters of COz in the coming years as detailed in the following table (Exxon Mobil). Table I Carbon Dioxide Emissions

Industri EE I FSU

12 Yo

13 %

Note: Developing countries carbon energy intensity is higher than OECD.

This, however, should not obscure the fact that all three groups will be increasing their carbon emissions in the next few years. Figure 1 projects the rising global COz emissions and various fuel contributions. Figure 1: Global CO2 Emissions 5illion Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide

History

_____

._

Projections Total

20

10

Coal 0 1970

1980

1990

2007

2010

2025

Source: Energy Information Administration (KIA) International Energy Outlook 2004 (IEO 2004). This is promoted by the following factors: Rapid Economic growth Most developing countries, particularly the countries in South Asia - China, India, Indonesia - have had and continue to have high economic growth. Because of high population increases and fact that they are in the early stages of their development they have the potential for more rapid growth. This also implies that their economic development is more energy intensive than the mature economies of

104

industrialized countries. The two following tables give indications of past economic history and future trends, and also of the extent of energy intensity.

Table 2: Global Economic Growth

Industri 1% World

11

(j 3.3 % 3.0% ___- __ Source: World Energy Outlook (WE0 - 20023 International Energy Outlook (IEO - 2004). _

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Table 3: Energy Intensity -~ -- __ Energy Intensity 1000 BTU I $ GDP (1997) 11 1977 ~

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Industri These two tables are very significant in indicating trends in global energy consumption. developing countries income is expected to increase at twice that of the rate of industrialized countries during the next few years and, because of the high energy intensity in developing countries (almost 3 times that of ICs), their energy consumption is expected to equal that of 1Cs by the year 2030 as shown in the following figure:

105 Figure 2: Energy Consumption 300

Chiadrillion Btir

250 200 150

100 50

0 1970

1980

1990

2001

2010

2025

Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) International Energy Outlook 2004.

Also because of the high carbon intensity of fuels utilized by developing countries (mainly coal in China and India), developing countries' carbon emissions will almost certainly constitute almost half of global emissions by the year 2030. From all the above it is clear that any global effort which does not have containment of carbon emissions from developing countries as its center of interest will be missing the target. RESTRICTING FUTURE EMISSIONS THE WAY AHEAD ~

Future carbon emissions can be significantly restricted by regulations, efficiency measures and technology. There are (beside the Kyoto mechanisms) many ways to restrict emissions, these are mainly, but not restricted to, the following: 1. Better and higher efficiency in energy use. 2. Electrification and fuel switching with more reliance on natural gas. 3. Resurgence of nuclear power. 4. Greater use of new and renewable energy. We shall now explore these measures in greater detail. EFFICIENCY IN ENERGY UTILIZATION Continuous improvement in energy utilization has been taking place in the industrialized world, and to a lesser extent in developing countries, throughout the last three decades with remarkable results. In the past, economic growth was accompanied by a commensurate increase in energy use. Coupling was almost one to one. With the oil shock of 1973, energy efficiency became a major issue and decoupling was achieved (WEA - 200). Over the period 1990-2001, the world economy (world domestic GDP) grew by 31.5%, i.e. 2.52% annually. Simultaneously, the world's total primary energy consumption growth was restricted to only 16%, i.e. 1.35% on average annually. This

106

signifies an average annual improvement of 1.2% in energy efficiency that is quite significant. Similar improvements are expected in the future. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) expects future efficiency improvement to be no less than that of the past, 1.2% annually (3% economic growth versus 1.8% energy consumption annually). Without this the global COz emissions of 23,900 million metric tons in 2001 would have been almost 48,600 million tons in 2025 instead of 37,000 million metric tons. An improvement of almost 11,600 million metric tons (i.e. reduced by one quarter) is expected to be achieved though greater efficiency, during the first quarter of this century. THE VALUE OF ELECTRIFICATION Electricity is versatile, clean to use, easy to distribute and to control. Just as important, it is now established that electricity has better productivity in many applications than most other energy forms. All this led to the wider utilization of electricity and its replacement of other forms of energy for many uses. Demand for electricity is now growing globally at a rate higher than that of economic growth and in many countries, at almost 1.5 to 2 times that of demand for primary energy sources. Going electric will significantly contribute towards less carbon emissions. The future is going to show a growing role of electricity as the preferred energy carrier. Growth in electricity use during recent years has been markedly higher than energy demand growth and almost identical to that of economic growth, approximately 3% annually (Figure 3). Of course such a trend cannot go on indefinitely. The growth of electricity demand will gradually diverge from economic growth as substitution and markets mature. Figure 3 Electricity Demand as a Function of World GNP (Excluding Former CPEs) TWh X lo3

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

GDP 2000 (Trillion $ 1990 expressed in purchasing power parity) Source: Khatib, H. Economic Evaluation of Projects in the Electricity Supply Industry, 2003. However, with the types of technologies and applications that already exist, there is nothing to stop electricity's advance or to stop it assuming a higher share of the energy market. Saturation of electricity use is not yet in sight, even in advanced economies where electricity production claims more than half of the primary energy use. Other than for the transport sector, electricity can satisfy most human energy requirements. It is expected that, by the middle of the 21st century, almost 70% of

107

energy needs in some industrialized countries will be satisfied by electricity (Gerholm). In the near future, electricity demand growth is expected to match the growth of the world economy. This is expected to average around 2.5-3.0% annually during the next few years. The International Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2002) estimate that global electricity production will increase at an annual average rate of 2.7-3.0% during the first decade of the 21" century. Therefore it is expected that total electricity production in 2010 will amount to around 20,000 TWh and to 25,880 TWh in 2020. Most of this growth is going to occur in developing countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, a region that is enjoying rapid economic growth. In 2030 global electricity production is expected to exceed 28,000 TWh and half of this amount will be accounted for by developing countries. Nowhere is better efficiency achieved than in electricity generation. The average world efficiency of existing power stations is around 31%. New combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) have an efficiency approaching 60%. A new modem CCGT plant firing natural gas would emit only 40% of a similar large modem coal power station that has a high efficiency of around 42%. By going electric the world economy is restricting its carbon emissions. Correspondingly, electrification and its utilization of natural gas are going to be significant contributors towards containing global warming prospects. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR POWER Despite its major contribution to the curtailment of carbon emissions, the contribution of nuclear power to the global energy supply is on the decline. Nuclear power, which produces 16% of world electricity now, is expected to see its share decline to 11% in 2025 and even further afterwards. The accidents at Three Mile Island in the United States in 1979 and at Chemobyl in the Soviet Union in 1986 pushed public opinion and national energy policies away from nuclear power as a source of electricity. In the United States, massive cost overruns and repeated construction delays - both caused in large part by regulatory reactions to the accident at Three Mile Island essentially ended the U S . construction of nuclear power plants. Similarly, both before and after the Chemobyl accident, several European governments had announced their intentions to withdraw 6-om the nuclear power area. Sweden committed to a phase-out of nuclear power in 1980 after a national referendum. Both Italy and Austria have abandoned nuclear power entirely, and Austria has also been a strong opponent of nuclear power programs that it considers to be unsafe in Eastern Europe. Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands have committed to gradual phase-outs of their nuclear power programs, although in some cases such commitments have proven difficult to carry out. Given the periodic changes in political leadership that can shift official government positions on nuclear power, it is difficult to assess the degree to which current commitments for or against nuclear power will be maintained. Many issues still impede the expansion of the nuclear power industry. Nuclear waste disposal remains a key concern. So are the dangers of proliferation and serious operational accidents in developing countries. But the future of nuclear is also blighted by its economics, although it does provide a measure of energy security its costs are high compared to CCGT plant running on gas. Nuclear power, a capital-intensive investment, is for government owned utilities and industries to undertake. Private business which are increasingly taking over the production of electrical power are not prepared to put up the huge ~

108

amount of capital and the high risks which nuclear power entails. Correspondingly, at least in the foreseeable future, the contribution of nuclear power towards solving global warming problems will continue to be limited, and much lower than its potential. BIOMASS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY AND BIOFUELS - PROSPECTS FOR NEW ENERGY SOURCES Biomass, whose contribution to global primary energy sources is significant, is not usually accounted for in global primary commercial energy consumption. However there are at least 2.40 billion people (i.e. as high as 40% of world population) is entirely dependant on biomass as their main source of energy. Biomass consumption in the world is around 1200 - 1500 m.t.0.e. (around 14% of global end use energy consumption). Biomass, which is mainly used in developing countries (mostly Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia), is a major source of local environmental degradation and emissions that injure public health (IEA - WE10 2003). Globally, the extraction and burning of biomass releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere; however, there is no net release of carbon dioxide if biomass is planted and harvested at the same rate, because growing plants remove and sequester carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. But this is subject to question. What about the burning of dung for instance? Prospects for the domination of new energy sources in the years to come are not promising, mainly because existing energy resources (particularly fossil fuels) are abundant, highly concentrated, cheap and tradable. The alternatives, particularly new and renewable energy are disbursed, intermittent and correspondingly expensive. No doubt some of the new energy sources like wind power are becoming competitive and certain applications of solar energy for water heating in sunny countries and for small electricity production by PV cells are becoming common. But this is only a small niche in a very large market. The outlook for wind and solar energy is for double-digit growth, based on both continued public subsidies and technological advances. However, because they start from a very small base, their combined contribution to total energy supplies is likely to be less than 0.5% in 2020-30. Installed capacity of wind power in Europe, where it is most popular, was around 25,000 MW in 2003, almost doubling over the last two years. It is promoted by generous subsidies and tax credits. Wind power is intermittent and correspondingly cannot be relied on as a permanent electricity supply without adequate storage. This storage will make it uncompetitive. Wind power can still be competitive and useful in countries with proper wind regimes, only as a limited source of electricity to augment existing electricity sources and save on use of fossil fuels. Its presence will add to energy security and energy independence in many countries, but only to a modest extent. Wind power can be utilized in the future for the production of (expensive) hydrogen. Photo Voltaic (PV) cells have many useful small power applications. Most importantly they can provide electricity in small amounts to many households in the world that lack it. But all this, as said earlier, will only make a small dent in the global energy scene. The two principle instruments used to promote renewables are renewable energy feed-in tariffs (REFIT) or simple quotas. REFIT is a system where the price of renewable power is politically set in advance at a level high enough to attract sufficient investment and the producers' output is purchased regardless of how much it

109 may be valued on the market. The quota system sets output levels, or as a percentage of generation, or other measures (EEn Inf). Much promise has been credited to hydrogen as a source of energy in the future. President George W. Bush pledged in his 2003 State of the Union Address, that "the first car driven by a child born today could be powered by hydrogen and pollutionfree". But is this realistic and justified! The most ambitious use of hydrogen is in a car powered by a fuel cell, a battery like device that turns hydrogen into electricity while emitting only heat and water vapor. Hydrogen can also be burned directly in engines much like those that run on gasoline, but the goal is fuel cells because they get twice as much work out of a pound of hydrogen. But where does this hydrogen come from? The main source of hydrogen is natural gas, which is in short supply, cumbersome to convert and may have better uses. Waiting in the wings is coal, burned in old power plants around the world that are already the focus of a dispute over their emissions. The long-term hope is to make hydrogen from emission-free "renewable" technologies, like windmills or solar cells. In fact, hydrogen may be an essential step in translating the energy of wind or sunlight into power to turn a car's wheels. But electricity from renewable technologies is costly. In the US, hydrogen is five times more expensive than gasoline when produced from wind power and 17 times when produced from solar. A likely source of hydrogen is from a machine called an electrolyzer, which is like a fuel cell in reverse. The fuel cell combines oxygen from the air with hydrogen to produce an electric current, with water as a byproduct, while an electrolyzer runs an electric current through water to split the water molecule into its constituent hydrogen and oxygen atoms. The problem is that if the electricity came off the national power grid to run an electrolyzer, about half of it, on average, would be generated by coal. Another problem is emissions. According to the U.S. DOE, an ordinary gasolinepowered car emits 374 grams of carbon dioxide per mile, or 1.6 kilometers, when driven, counting the energy used to make the gasoline and deliver it. The same car powered by a fuel cell would emit nothing, but if the energy required to make the hydrogen came from the electric grid, the emissions would be 436 grams per mile. Similarly, the car would not emit nitrogen oxides, a precursor of smog, but the power plant would. Correspondingly an energy future, with hydrogen as its main fuel source, has to be viewed (at least for now) with skepticism. It is not likely to come before the middle of this century, if it comes. During 2002, the EU commission proposed that there would be a 20% use of substitute fuels in road transport by the year 2020. The short-term targets are to reach 2% by 2005 and 5.75% by 2010. The commission proposed that alcohol (ethanol) be blended into petrol and that diesel oil be partially replaced by vegetable oil derivatives. There are two approaches towards the solution: the use of pure vegetable oils, and biodiesel (trans-esteified vegetable oil or animal fat). Bioenergy in the form of ethanol and similar fuels (from corn or other agricultural products) is likely to provide only a limited alternative to oil. Cultivation of crops for use as fuel requires substantial land that would otherwise be available for food, or other uses. With present technologies, ethanol is more expensive than gasoline. It also can require substantial inputs of fossil energy for production and conversion into fuels. The Brazilian experience over the last few years has mixed results. Most new cars in Brazil are now sold to bum a mixture of biofuels and 75% gasoline. Brazil now sells biofuels at a cost equal to or below petrol. But in view of

110

independent studies this could only be achieved through subsides (Baker Institute). Of course ethanol production does provide a measure of energy security but at a price. THE FUTURE OF CARBON EMISSIONS The future of carbon emissions can now be predicted without much difficulty, because the fundamentals are now known and are unlikely to change over the next 25 years. These fundamentals are not encouraging for a carbonless future, they are: 1. There is no foreseeable viable alternative to fossil fuels. 2. The future of new and renewable energy is not very promising. Too much talk, promises, conferences, etc., but very little real market achievement. Its contribution may increase gradually but will not significantly change the structure of the global energy balance. 3. The Kyoto Protocol is unlikely to be ratified in the foreseeable future. It is now seven years since the agreement, with no helpful signs for ratification. Even if ratified, there are so much flexibility in the targets and mechanisms as to limit its effectiveness. 4. Nuclear energy, which is carbon free, is still shunned by the majority of nations. 5. Technological progress in carbon containment, sequestration, storage, etc. is happening, but it will be many years before it will have a sizable effect on carbon emissions and reduced concentration in the atmosphere. 6. Most of the gowth in energy demand is going to be in developing countries. These countries are mostly concerned with economic growth and less womed about global warming. Consequently they will continue with their relatively carbon intensive economic growth using their local sources (mostly low quality coal) with little consideration for emissions. But equally there are a few (but important) bright spots: 1. Energy efficiency (low intensity in energy use) is not only continuing but also improving. This is mostly happening in electricity generation. The world is gradually becoming more electrified with electricity utilization growth of at least 1.5 times that of total primary energy usage growth. New electricity generating facilities are increasingly of the CCGT type that has relatively high efficiency and low emissions per kWh (less than half) particularly when natural gas is used. 2. Natural gas utilization (which is a relatively benign fuel) will continue to increase at a rate above that of total energy use. Natural gas demand is expected to grow at a rate at least 1.5% of primary energy growth (2.7% annually compared to 1.7% for energy). Natural gas growth rate will be twice that of coal. Trading in LNG is improving, so also prospect of gas to liquid, and in the future coal gasification. 3. There is global awareness of global warming, and carbon emissions. Even if Kyoto is not ratified, its message and mechanisms are not forgotten and will foster carbon restraint, particularly among OECD countries. A time span of 20-25 years is not long in terms of energy development. Correspondingly it is now possible to predict with reasonably accuracy the future of the emissions that are going to influence global warming. I am not going to venture new predictions of my own, but will mainly rely on US-EIA and the IEA figures. Let us start with the emissions at end of 2003. They point out to the following: 24 750 million metric tons Carbon emissions (2003)

111 Growth of emissions (1990-2003) 18.3 % Growth of emissions of U.S. (1990-2003) 19 % The future of carbon emissions may look as follows. Table 4: IEA Predictions Year

1

1-

COzmilliontons

1

__

I . _ _ _ _

Growth

%I

Industri Industri 1971 2003

I

13 654 24 700

1.74 %

The writing on the wall is clear. We are destined (at least in the medium-term until 2030) to have a relatively high growth of carbon emissions. Prospects for global warming are only warmer. REFERENCES 1. 2. 3.

4. 5.

6. 7. 8.

ExxonMobil. "A Report on Energy Trends, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Alternative Energy", 2004. Gerholm, T R 1991. "Electricity in Sweden-Forecast to the year 2050", Vattenfal, Sweden. IAEA. "Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2020", Vienna. IEA (WEIO), 2003. World Energy Investment Outlook, IEA, Paris. Khatib, H. Economic Evaluation of Projects in the Electricity Supply Industry, 2003. US Department of Energy (US DOE), International Energy OutZook 2004, (IEO 2004). WEA. World Energy Assessment, UNDP, New York, 2000. WEO. International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook 2002, Paris, 2002.

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4.

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY: PRIONS

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CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE AND BLOOD TRANSFUSION PROFESSOR R.G. WILL National CJD Surveillance Unit, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is a member of a group of diseases known as prion diseases or transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). The very fact that these conditions are experimentally transmissible raises the spectre of accidental transmission and CJD has been transmitted iatrogenically in the course of medical and surgical treatments, including via pituitary growth hormone and human dura mater grafts"] (table 1). In prion diseases the level of tissue infectivity varies, with the central nervous system carrying very high titres of infectivity and peripheral lymphoid tissues lower levels. In some tissues or fluids such as blood, infectivity has been detected only in experimental models and not in natural disease. Until recently, all cases of iatrogenic CJD have involved transfer from person to person of infectivity from high titre tissues and the transmission of sporadic CJD through blood transfusion has not been identified despite a number of, largely epidemiological, studies[']. Variant CJD (vCJD) is a new disease, which is caused by human infection with the agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)13]. In contrast to sporadic CJD, the lymphoid tissues in vCJD, such as spleen and lymph nodes, contain infectivity, raising the possibility that blood in vCJD might pose a greater risk of onward transmission of infection. TABLE 1

TOTAL CASES OF IATROGENIC CJD WORLD-WIDE

I Mode

I

Neurosurgery Depth electrodes Corneal transplant Dura mater Human growth hormone Human gonadotrophin

I

I

Cases (n)

1

I Clinical

4 2 3

Mean incubation period (years) 1.6 1.5 15.5=

136 162

6b 12b

Visual/cerebellar/dementia Cerebellar

5

13

Cerebellar

Visual/cerebellar/dementia Dementia Dementia

"Range 1.530 years. bEstimated on incomplete data. Data courtesty of Dr P Brown. Shortly after the identification of vCJD in 1996, a study was set up to determine whether vCJD was transmissible through blood transfusion. This study, the Transfusion Medicine Epidemiology Review (TMER), has been a joint project between the National Blood Services in the various regions of the United Kingdom (England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland) and the National CJD Surveillance Unit (NCJDSU). Since 1990 this Unit has attempted to identify all cases of sporadic and vCJD in the UK through a system of voluntary referral of suspect cases by neurologists and neuro-physiologists, and of confirmed cases by neuro-pathologists.

115

116 In order to identify cases that have acted as blood donors, details of all cases classified as probable vCJD (and the handful of cases identified at post mortem) are forwarded to the National Blood Services. Details of these individual cases are then circulated to all blood donor centres to identify those cases that had acted as blood donors. Information is sought on the use of these donations including the details of recipients of labile blood products, most commonly packed red cells. Details of the recipients are then supplied to the NCJDSU to determine whether any of these individuals themselves develop vCJD (a similar study in sporadic CJD and the reverse study in which vCJD blood transfusions are investigated are not described in this paper). A summary of the overall data from the study is shown in table 2, which indicates that only a minority of cases of vCJD have previously acted as blood donors, 19 out of 147 cases to date. Some of these individuals made multiple donations and a total of 50 recipients were identified by the National Blood Services. The number of recipients per year and the blood components used are shown in table 3. Some of the blood donations (N = 23, originating from 9 vCJD donors), were used in the production of fractionated plasma products. TABLE 2: vCJD DONOR SUMMARY

1

Number of vCJD cases in the UK Number who were eligible to donate (ie aged 17 and over) Number reported by relatives to have been blood donors Number of cases where donation records have been traced Number of cases from whom components were actually issued Number of reciDients identified from 16 cases where reciDient and comDonent infirmation is available

147 137 27 19* 16

I

50

*Donation records were traced on one case where the relatives had reported the case not to be a donor. TABLE 3: NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS TRANSFUSED BY YEAR AND BLOOD COMPONENT GIVEN @=SO) Year of Transfusion 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999

2000-2003

Blood component transfused Whole blood Red blood cells Red blood cells Red blood cells Whole blood Red blood cells Red blood cells - buffy coat depleted Red blood cells - leucodepleted Fresh frozen plasma Cryo-depletedplasma Cryoprecipitate Platelets Red blood cells - leucodepleted Fresh frozen plasma - leucodepleted

Number of recipients 1 1 2 9 1 15 2 2 3 1 1 1 10 1

I

117 In order to obtain information on outcome following transfusion of labile blood products all the recipients are ‘flagged’ in order that death certificates can be identified in recipients who die and these are then forwarded to the NCJDSU. Currently 18 of the recipients are still alive (figure l), often years after receiving the transfusion, while 32 have died (figure 2), the majority within 1 to 2 years of the transfusion as a result of the primary illness (as judged by the diagnosis on the death certificates). FIGURE 1

RECIPIENTS OF LABILE BLOOD COMPONENTS DONATED BY vCJD CASES (still alive, n=18)

5 4 L Q)

Q

€ 3 3

z

2 1

0

118

FIGURE 2

RECIPIENTS OF LABILE BLOOD COMPONENTS DONATED BY vCJD CASES (dead, n=32)

20

18 16

14

3

v

N

:

W

V

d

v)

V

ID

V

h

V

m V

T

d

0

‘ ,-i

N

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d

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r.

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0 rl

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0,

Interval from transfusion to death (years)

In December 2003 a death certificate from one of the recipients for the first time listed a neurological condition, dementia, raising the possibility that this could be a case of vCJDr4]. The case was also referred to the NCJDSU for surveillance purposes and brain tissues obtained at postmortem were also sent to the Unit for review. The clinical course in this patient was suggestive of vCJD, although an MRI scan was not ‘typical’, and examination of the brain from the post mortem tissues confirmed the diagnosis of vCJD. The development of vCJD in an individual who had received a blood transfusion from a donor who themselves developed vCJD raises the possibility that the infection was transfusion transmitted. The patient in question was one of the oldest cases of variant CJD yet identified, but exposure to a dietary source of infection cannot be excluded. Taking account of the size of the recipient population, statistical analysis suggests that the chance of observing a case of vCJD in such a recipient in the absence of transfusion transmitted infection is about 1 in 15,000 to 1 in 30,000 depending on assumptions. If this was transfusion-transmitted infection the incubation period was about 6.5 years, and the donor donated blood about three years prior to the development of clinical symptoms, both periods consistent with In these studies Houston and Hunter demonstrated experimental evidence in the transmission of experimental BSE by blood transfusion in sheep with the blood effecting transmission taken midway through the incubation period. All the evidence accords with the possibility that the case described was a transfusion transmitted infection. As a result of this case, the decision was made in the UK to inform surviving recipients of the vCJD blood transfusion that they were at increased risk and should not act as organ or blood donors. In 2004 an elderly patient who had received a blood transfusion in 1999 from a donor who subsequently developed vCJD themselves died of an unrelated illness, a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm. There was no evidence of a neurological disorder but in view of the fact that the patient was known to be at

119 risk of vCJD, a post mortem was carried out. A range of tissues were examined and no abnormality in relation to prion disease was discovered in the brain, tonsil, appendix or large intestine, but the spleen showed evidence of immuno-staining for prion protein, as did a cervical lymph nodec7].This may therefore have been a case of pre-clinical vCJD after blood transfusion, underlining the probability that blood transfusion may act as a mechanism of transmission of vCJD from patient to patient. Furthermore the individual with pre-clinical vCJD was discovered to be a methionine valine heterozygote at codon 129 of the prion protein gene, a genotype that has not previously been identified in vCJD. To date all tested cases of vCJD (125 out of 147) have been methionine homozygotes. This raises the possibility that the heterozygote subgroup of the general population may be susceptible to infection with BSE, and may potentially have a longer incubation period than the methionine homozygote subgroup. In conclusion, there is now sufficient evidence to suggest that there is a probability that variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease can be transmitted by blood transfusion. Because of this theoretical possibility, a range of precautionary measures have already been taken in the UK and some other countries in order to minimise the risk of transfusion transmission of vCJD. The two recent cases of transfusiontransmitted vCJD underline the importance of taking precautionary measures at a time when there is uncertainty about the scientific evidence[81. REFERENCES 1.

2.

3. 4.

5. 6.

7

8

Brown P, Preece M, Brandel J-P, Sat0 T, McShane L, Zen- I, Fletcher A, Will RG, Pocchiari M, Cashman NR,d'Aignaux JH, Cervenakova L, Fradkin J, Schonberger LB, Collins SJ. Iatrogenic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease at the millennium. Neurology 2000; 55:1075-1081. Wilson K, Code C, Ricketts MN. Risk of acquiring Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease from blood transfusions: systematic review of case-control studies. BMJ 2000; 321:17-19. Will RG, Ironside JW, Zeidler M, Cousens SN, Estibeiro K, Alperovitch A, Poser S, Pocchiari M, Hofman A, Smith PG. A new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the UK. Lancet 1996; 347:921-925. Llewelyn CA, Hewitt PA, Knight RSG, Amar K, Cousens S, Mackenzie J, Will RG. Possible transmission of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease by blood transfusion. Lancet 2004; 363:417-421. Houston F, Foster JD, Chong A, Hunter N, Bostock CJ. Transmission of BSE by blood transfusion in sheep. Lancet 2000; 356:999-1000. Hunter N, Foster J, Chong A, McCutcheon S, Parnham D, Eaton S, MacKenzie C, Houston F. Transmission of prion diseases by blood transfusion. J Gen Virol 2002; 8312897-2905, Peden AH, Head MW, Ritchie DL, Bell JE, Ironside JW. Preclinical vCJD after blood transfusion in a P R " codon 129 heterozygous patient. Lancet 2004; 364~527-529. Wilson K, Ricketts MN. Transfusion transmission of vCJD: a crisis avoided? Lancet 2004; 364:477-479.

120

BSE IN NORTH AMERICA MAURA N. RICKETTS, M.D., MHSC FRCPC Blood Safety and Health Care, Acquired Infections, Ottawa, Canada PMP TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES: FOCUS ON PFUONS Outline of the paper: 1. TSE basics 2 . Evolution of the BSE epidemic 3. Cattle and BSE in North America 4. Management of BSE TSE BASICS The transmissible spongiform encephalopathies include a number of diseases found among humans and animals (Figure 1). For many of them, the actual route of transmission is poorly understood. For those that we know well, such as BSE and vCJD, there is confidence in a number of important characteristics, characteristics that determine the most appropriate public policy to adopt to protect human populations. Figure I Scrapie Scrapie spreads relatively easily among sheep populations. Environmental contamination &om birth products has been postulated. Certain genetic characteristics confer relative resistance to scrapie. Scrapie arose, apparently de novo, approximately 200 years ago and spread in an epidemic fashion such that there are very few scrapiefree countries in the world. Australia and New Zealand are considered scrapie-free.

Kuru Kuru was intensively investigated by Professor Carleton Gajdusek in Papua New Guinea in the 1950’s. He determined that it was caused and transmitted by ritual cannibalism thus identifying the first such disease. CJD and its’ ‘relatives’ GSS and fatal insomnia (‘classical’ human TSEs) Three forms are recognized - FamiliaVgenetic, acquired and sporadic - making this human TSE the only human disease transmitted by all three such routes. Mink encephalopathy Associated with feed. Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) CWD is epidemic in parts of North America in certain deer and elk populations. It arose apparently de novo in the 1960’s in northwest USA and has been demonstrated to be spreading epidemically. The route of transmission is unclear - environmental contamination has been postulated. At this time there is no evidence that CWD can infect humans or cattle, however ongoing investigation will inform this conclusion over time.

121

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) BSE is transmitted orally by contaminated cattle feed supplements. Feline spongiform encephalopathy BSE in domestic and wild cats, transmitted orally by BSE contaminated feed Exotic ungulate encephalopathv BSE in captive ungulates (zoo), transmitted orally by BSE contaminated feed

VCJD BSE in human beings was acquired by the consumption of contaminated bovine tissues. It has now been seen, with high levels of confidence, that vCJD can be transmitted between humans via blood transfusion. This means that other iatrogenic routes (certain surgical procedures, biological products made from human tissues) can be implicated. vCJD and the other forms of human spongiform encephalopathy (referred to as ‘classical’ CJD) are distinct from each other in pathology, natural history and cause.

EVOLUTION OF THE BSE EPIDEMIC Although we do not know how the first case of BSE arose, epidemiologic and experimental evidence overwhelmingly supports the source of the epidemic as being recycling of contaminated animal feed. Since the early part of the 20th century, in developed countries, those parts of the animal carcases left after the removal of high quality human food have been converted into a wide variety of products through a process call rendering. Rendering, essentially cooking and separation of animal byproducts, results in, among others, the production of high protein feed supplements for animals. It is these feed supplements that became qontaminated with the prion agent responsible for BSE. Prions are known to be highly heat resistant; hence they survived the process of cooking that killed other pathologic agents. As the production of animal feed is relatively centralized, with subsequent distribution through an international (in the UK, initially national) market, the infectious agent found an effective route of distribution. Finally, the infective dose for cattle is very low, possibly less than O.lgm of brain tissue. This situation led to a distributed point source epidemic of BSE.

122

Figure 2 Global BSE EpidemicCurye

Peak O f BSE in Ihe UK

Figure 2 Figure 3: BSE Reports in UK and Europe, by Year

Inwuslnnd

United ingdom

TtN.,nEC I.l,W

Continent Europe

OIEOafa.10082W

Figure 3 N=l87,162

123 Figure 2 shows the classical epidemic curve of a distributed point source epidemic. The first peak is the outbreak of BSE, principally in the UK. It can be seen that the epidemic peaked at almost 40,000 cases per m u m . However, the institution of appropriate interventions such as feed bans led to the eventual decline in the UK epidemic. The long tail of the epidemic curve consists of two populations, those few UK cases that continue to appear despite control measures, and cases that appeared in other European countries. Although subtle, a slight swelling in the tail of the epidemic reveals the impact of strengthened surveillance programs, to be discussed later. Figure 3 compares the epidemic of BSE in the UK and EU. The size of the epidemics is very different - the scale for UK is in ten thousands and for EC in hundreds. Regardless, the efficacy of interventions in the UK is apparent. In addition, it is clear that the european community did no adopt the same measures, and regrettably, the number of cases of BSE began to climb in EC after the first case of vCJD appeared in 1997. Additionally, in 2001-2002, the EC implemented regulations requiring active surveillance. This important measure is responsible for the jump in case reports that can be seen in the curve. At the same time, implementation of existing measures was improved and new measures were introduced, leading to control of the BSE epidemic in a number of countries. BSE has a long incubation period; hence, while the first case was identified in 1986, modelling reveals that the first infections probably began in the late 70’s. In addition, it became clear that by the time the first 180,000 clinical cases of BSE were identified in the UK, there would have been fiom 1 million to 4 million animals infected in the 10 years or so preceding identification of the first clinical case. As most cattle are killed at two years of age, it is feared that no less than 446,000 infected animals entered the human food chain before the first control measures were introduced in November 1989 and a further 283,000 between Dec 1989 and Dec 1995. The European Union review of the epidemiology of BSE in the LJK notes that between 1988-1993, the prevalence of BSE in cattle was approximately 5% i.e. 1 in 20 animals. In the UK, BSE affected 59% of dairy herds, 15% of beef suckler herds and 34% of herds with adult breeding cattle. The risk of contaminated MBM was highest between 1986-1990, peaking in 1989 when SBO (specified bovine offals) were excluded from the human food chain but included in rendering and feed production. Studies of native cattle populations in the UK revealed that BSE is rare under 30 months of age, and very rare at under 24 months of age. Experimental studies (the pathogenesis study) of the natural history of BSE found that disease could develop in animals under 12 months, however, this has never been observed in a native cattle herd. These same pathogenesis studies confirmed that BSE infectivity is not spread evenly through the body of infected cattle. During the natural history of the disease, there is transient infection in bone marrow and the distal ileum, and possibly other tissues, however over 97% of the infectivity of cattle is found in the brain, spinal cord and associated spinal nerves. The quantity of infectivity increases during the incubation period of BSE, maximizing during clinical illness. There are lower levels of infectivity before clinical illness; however exactly when the infectivity levels pose a danger to humans (or other animals) is uncertain. Animal models demonstrate that infectivity arises at approximately 50% of the incubation period. Applied to cattle, but not known from natural history studies in native infected herds, it can be inferred that some cattle tissues may become infective around 2.5-3 years after infection.

124 There are important policy implications to the information gleaned from the natural history studies. For example, it is clear that younger animals are ‘safer’ for consumption (< 30m,

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Collection Efficiency (96)

Fig. 9: Experimental results of Hayabusa sampler collection efficiency and collected mass in I G and micro-G. Symbols: B = brick, R = regolith, G = glass beads, H = horizontal horn, V = vertical horn, S = with shoulder of the funnel, N = without shoulder, mG = micro-G (modifiedfrom Yano, at al., 2002b).

Samde Curation and Analyses However, due to impact sampling, returned samples are not like pieces of meteorites nor lunar rocks that might be picked up by astronauts. The majority of recovered samples were fine-grained (sub-mm size) particles, rather than large chips (>several mm) of rocks. Thus, micro-analysis, sample handling and contamination control of the Hayabusa samples will be more similar to those of cosmic dust samp1es.h order to maximize scientific output from recovered samples, the samples should be distributed to all qualified researchers upon proposals from all over the world. Such detailed analysis proposals must rely on general characteristics of the samples studied by the initial analysis team, the "Hayabusa Asteroidal Sample Preliminary Examination Team (HASPET)". HASPET will consist of ISAS scientists, NASA and Australian Co-Is, and Japanese researchers from outsourcing institutions, who are selected through open competitions of mostly non-destructive, microanalysis techniques in the respective disciplines needed during the initial analysis stage (Kushiro, et al., 2003). They will work as one "all-Japan'' team and are responsible for characterizing the general features of the bulk and some of the major samples. The initial analysis will investigate physical properties (e.g., mass, size distribution, morphology, color, transparency, etc.) and produce optical calibration data for the on-board instruments from 100 mass % of bulk samples by non-destructive means (Fig. 10) (Yano, et al., 2003a). Then up to 15 mass % will be consumed to characterize the representatives of Itokawa samples for more details and their results will be published within one year (hopefully in 3-6 months) after the capsule retrieval. Thus JAXA/ISAS is preparing the creation of its own astromaterial curation facility on site, which will be the second of its kind following the NASA Johnson Space Center's Lunar Sample Laboratory (Yano and Fujiwara, 2004). Given that a sufficient amount of samples (i.e., >several 100 mg) is recovered, after the initial analysis period, the peer-reviewed international

198

announcement of opportunity (AO) for detailed analyses of another 15 mass % of the samples will be released. The other 15 mass % will be used for competitive A 0 only open to Japanese scientists while the other 10 mass % will be permanently transferred to NASA. The rest will be preserved for future use (Fig. 11). The first competition was conducted in 2000-2001 (Yano, et al., 2003a) and the second competition is now in progress. Applications have included (but not restricted to) the following techniques: (1) selected isotopic measurements, (2) ion probe (including SHRIMP), (3) carbonates, (4) organics & carbon isotopes, ( 5 ) major & trace elements, (6) micro-tomography, (7) mineralogy & petrology, (8) noble gas, (9) nuclear activation, and (10) residual magnetism. Multiple international referees evaluate their reports for their qualifications to join the team. Since analytical instruments, techniques, and personnel may advance greatly in the next several years, before the 2007 sample retrieval, final membership of the HASPET should be decided at the end of 2005, right after the spacecraft leaves the asteroid. Once Japan establishes both the curation facility and the preliminary examination team expertise, ISAS will be ready to accommodate samples from sample return missions of various planetary bodies other than Hayabusa, both domestic and international plans in the near future (Fig. 12).

-

Samples

--Data

I' I I

mist imaging inside the containel Move each site samples to t r a y

I Suinplc division

I ~nternrtionalAO analyses I I=

-1 I

Fig. 10: Initial analysis procedure plan in the ISAS Astrornaterial Curation Facility (Yano and Fujiwara, 2004).

199

Fig. 11: Hayabusa sample analysis flow (Yano, et al., 2004a.

Fig. 12: World trends of sample return missions in the present (normal) and the near future (Italics). Japanese missions are underlined. “POST-HAYABUSA”, A NEXT GENERATION MINOR BODY EXPLORATION MISSION Scientific Themes for Minor Bodv Exploration in the Post-Hayabusa Era As already stated, Hayabusa is an engineering test spacecraft for key technologies needed for future planetary exploration, together with ground facility and expertise of sample analysis and curation. Indeed, Hayabusa will not answer all the major scientific questions raised in the previous chapter alone but it is just the beginning of a series of minor body explorations to follow. Many Japanese planetary scientists hope to advance Hayabusa’s heritages of sample returns as their

200

new expertise in the post-Hayabusa era. Then what kind of minor body explorations should follow Hayabusa? In 2000-2001, the Minorbody Exploration Forum (MEF) in Japan, a volunteer web-based e-group of scientists and engineers as well as any interested amateurs, hosted an open competition to design post-Hayabusa mission concepts and received seven proposals (Table 4). As can be seen, all of them addressed key questions to be answered in the next decade and most were later adopted somehow by other space agency missions, proving that MEF work was going in the right direction. Considering the international trend of minor body explorations in the 2010’s and multiple evaluation processes (Yano, et al., 2001, 2002a, 2003b), two reference missions were selected for detailed studies and combined scientific themes from other proposals whenever possible. They are (1) multiple rendezvous and sample return missions to spectra-known NEOs and (2) multiple fly-by and sample return missions to main belt asteroid family members. Common key words for both missions were “multiple sample returns” from “several asteroids” of “known spectral types”, because complete understanding of the generic relationship between asteroid types and meteoritic classes is a top priority science. Also there are increasing interests and importance in studying the chemical evolution of “life precursor” organics on primitive bodies for astrobiology aspects and the internal structure of undifferentiated asteroids for solar system formation and impact hazard implications (Table 5 ) . Therefore possible mission targets may include several near Earth objects with spectral types other than S-type, to which Hayabusa’s target asteroid Itokawa belongs (i.e., C-type, M-type, E-type, D-type, P-type, etc.), an extinct cometary coma, whose spectral features resemble some asteroids, and members of a single main-belt asteroid family. After the MEF final report was published at the end of 2003 (MEF, 2003), ISAS’s new generation minor body exploration working group was proposed to the ISAS Science Steering Committee and its foundation was approved this March. In order to increase the mission feasibility and cutting the development time and cost, the working group has noted that key technologies needed for their realization should be inherited and upgraded from those of the Hayabusa mission as much as possible, such as ion engines, autonomous navigation, surface material sampling, in-situ scientific instruments including micro-rovers, and reentry capsules. Also the working group has recognized the importance of both international collaboration at different levels, and public outreach efforts to maximize the mission success. The working group is expected to submit the complete mission proposal after determining the major technical challenges to realize the next mission before the 2006 Japanese fiscal year for evaluation by the selection committee within JAXA/ISAS. Should it be selected for starting the mission, the development, construction and testing phases will be completed in 4-5 years so that the earliest launch date is assumed to be around 20 11-2012. Apart from the newly founded working group’s initiative, ISAS has studied concepts of a new generation engineering test spacecraft (“MUSES-D’) called “solar power sail”, a hybrid propulsion system of solar sail and ion engines, to demonstrate technologies necessary to explore the outer planet region in the solar system, starting around 2010 (Kawaguchi et al., 2004 and Yano, et al., 2004b). This mission concept includes fly-by observations of main belt asteroids and Jovian Trojan asteroids, most of which are D-type asteroids without analogous meteorites found on Earth. In the following sections, two reference missions studied by MEF, including the surface science package development, and the solar power sail concept are briefly

201

explained. Table 4: Minorbody .Exploration Forum’s seven mission proposals for the post-Hayabusa missions in the 2000-2001 study phase. Comments

MEF Mission Proposals Fly-bys & Sample Returns Spectral Known NEO Multiple Rendezvous & Sample Returns Comet-Asteroid Transition Objects (CAT) Rendezvous

1 I

Vesta Rendezvous Phobos & Deimos Landing Mission

NEO Multiple Fly-bys & Martian Satellite Sample Returns M-type . - Asteroid Rendezvous

I

an asteroid with a satellite in the Koronis family “Hera” proposed as a Discovery candidate at this round Later NASA chose “Comet Nucleus Sample Return” as one of five New Frontier I1 candidates Later NASA chose as “Dawn” mission Later Russia and UK separately studied mission feasibilities for Phobos landing “Aladdin”, “Guillver”, “Phobos-Soil” and other ideas have been proposed in the past and now Later ESA’s “Rosetta” decided to flY-bY

Table 5: Major scientific goals of minor body explorations in the post-Hayabusa era. Science Goals and Reference MissionshIeasurements (A) Ground Truth for Asteroid Taxonomy & “Astromineralogy” Extension to Exo-Planetary Systems (e.g.) Spectral Known NEO Multiple Sample Return (B) Direct Investigation of Impact Disruption History of Planetesimals: Dynamic Evolution of the Solar System (e.g.) Main Belt Family Multiple Sample Return (C) Inner Structure of Minor Bodies in Large Dynamic Range of Scales: Formation Hostory & Impact Hazards (e.g.) Tomographic, Seismic, &Robotic Measurements (D) Prebiotic and Volatile Component Evolution in the Early Solar System: “Astrobiology” Implication (e.g.) CAT & C-, P-, D-Asteroid Exploration Spectra-KnownNEO Multiple Rendezvous Sample Returns One of the MEF reference missions is the multiple rendezvous sample return mission to known spectra NEOs of both primitive types (i.e., C, P/D) and differentiated types (e.g., V, M) (Fig. 13). This is a direct heritage of Hayabusa, and its main objective is to bring “ground truth” samples to connect meteoritic analysis data and ground observation archives of as many asteroid types (but other than S-type) as possible in one mission. In the previous studies, various mission scenarios were studied to achieve “multiple” NEO sample returns by changing the number of launchers, spacecraft, earth swing-bys and asteroids visited by single spacecraft, together with launcher and spacecraft propulsion (i.e., chemical and electric) capabilities (Fig. 14) (Morimoto, et al., 2004). To take advantage of experiences gained by the Hayabusa sample analyses and the ISAS astromaterial curation facility, sample returns in the short time duration are strongly desired for orbital design (Table 6 ) . Also international

202

coordination of target asteroid types is important if other space agencies also plan to send probes to spectra-known NEOs.

(1 )Single launcher(H HA), One spacecraft (S/C), Multiple asterofd visits and No Earth swing-by (SB) Earfiv AsfHoid I +Asteroid 2 Ear&..

-

(2)Single launcher(HI1A). One S / C Multiple asteroid visits and Earth SB Eafth +Asteroid I Earth SE (n trines+ Asteroid 2

-

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-

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(3)Single IauncheKHIIA), Two S/C, Multiple asteroid visits Earfh -,Earth SB a. Asferdd 1 6 Asteroid 2 +

1

-.

Fip. 13: An artist's imvression of the multiple spectra-kn&n NEO sample return spacecraft (above) Fig. 14: Mission scenarios studied for multiple NEO sample return missions (Morimoto, et al., 2004). (CG Honda di Honda, H, Yano and MEF).

Table 6: Summary of initial mission design examples of the multiple spectra-known NEO sample return mission. (Yano, et al., 2002b).

Figure 15 shows an example of a single mission to collect samples from three NEOs with different spectral types (i.e., E, C, V-types). In this scenario, an H-IIA launcher and chemical propulsion are assumed and the spacecraft, equipped with three return capsules, conducts one Earth swing-by between two destinations. At each Earth swing-by, the spacecraft release a return capsule to ground and changes its course to head a new target asteroid. In this way, ground scientists can expect

203 samples from each asteroid to be received at the curation facility after 4, 11, and 14 years from the launch, i.e., 3-7 years apart from each other. Such time intervals are comparable to cases of Hayabusa (4 years) and Stardust (7 years). Another important feature is that the total mass of scientific payloads can be of an order of magnitude heavier than that of Hayabusa (i.e., 68 kg), excluding the sampling mechanisms and the capsules (Table 7 ) . This will allow us sufficient resources to employ necessary improvements of orbiter science payloads and sampling devices. Also a new surface science package (SSP, see the later chapter) may well be

2 15

-3 0 05

4

45 I -1

5

7

-25

Fig. 15: An example of orbital sequences for three NEO rendezvous and sample return mission (Morimoto, et al., 2004).

204 Table 7: Comparison of mass budgets between Hayabusa (MUSES-C ) launched by M-V and an example of a post-Hayabusa multiple NEO sample return spacecraft launched by H-IIA (Yano, et al., 2002b).

wet Mas DtvMaS

2243 kg 1019ke

SlOkg 381 ke

1224 kg

129kg

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Its orbiter science measurements may include similar areas of interests as Hayabusa such as global/local topography, geological features at high phase angles, visible-infrared spectral maps, dust environment, gravitational anomaly, surface condition, and X-ray elemental maps. Thus initial model payloads may include NIRS, AMICA, X R S , LIDAR, and MINERVA inherited from Hayabusa. They may also include possible new developments like enhanced capability of NIRS up to 3 micron water features for C and D types, geological camera with scan mirror, 2D-scan LIDAR, gamma-ray spectrometer, dust detector, gravity VLBI, radar sounders, etc. Sampling mechanisms may also be modified for enhancing scientific values of returned samples. To do so, there are several requirements of such improvements including (1) more sample mass (>lo g), (2) collecting larger chips (especially for differentiated asteroids), (3) preserving stratigraphic information, (4) sub-surface sampling (for un-weathered materials of both differentiated and undifferentiated asteroids), ( 5 ) retaining organics and “water” signatures, (6) more strict contamination control than Hayabusa (especially for C- and D-type asteroids), (7) more severe planetary protection protocol than Hayabusa (also for D-type asteroids) and (8) in-situ estimation of collected mass (e.g., light curtains). Investigation of Asteroid Internal Structures Since understanding the internal structure of undifferentiated asteroids is both a fundamental question of the solar system formation and an impact hazard assessment of an NEO as well as its deflection options, we first investigated existing methods used for physical exploitation of underground structure on the earth (Fig. 16). However most of these rely on underground water and filling media of voids. Since asteroid sub-surface structure are “dry” and porous in high vacuum, gravity survey and radar tomography from an orbiter, and seismic network and robotic surface

205 investigation by lander/rover(s) seem sensible options, although their spatial resolutions in depth profiles to be yielded are all different from each other (Fig. 17). For this reason, the next generation minor body exploration working group is now developing a surface science package (SSP) for small asteroids, which should be able to conduct various scientific investigations in dry, vacuum, microgravity and dusty surface environments. One of the ideas for a mobile SSP to study sub-surface structure at asteroid surfaces is the robotic investigation of several tens of meter-sized boulders which are bedrocks ejected to surface by large impacts, thus providing direct windows to sub-surface structure as deep as their sizes (Yano, et al., 2004a). Cliffs and walls of large crater interiors, ridges, and grooves are other geological features to study for sub-surface structures by SSP.

Pnsriw

Fig. 16: Existing methods for physical exploitation of underground structures on the earth.

206

Fig. I 7: Strategies and technologies to investigate asteroid interior in dEfferent depth resolutions. Main Belt Asteroid Family Multiole Fly-bv and Samole Returns Another MEF reference mission is fly-by investigation and sample collection of multiple asteroids that belong to a single main-belt family (Fig. 18) (Yano, et al. 2004a). It will provide direct information of the interior as well as collision history of their parent body, a refractory planetesimal disrupted by mutual collisions in the early stage of the solar system evolution. One scenario targets the Koronis family including the Ida-Dactyl system, the only family asteroid visited by spacecraft in the past, and its dust band. Another targets the Nysa-Polana family, which has several spectral types within it (Table 8). As most of the Koronis family asteroids are classified as sub-groups of S-type, multiple visits to family members in different sizes may tell us how such “undifferentiated” bodies are formed and later disrupted. On the other hand, the Nysa-Polana family members indicate many spectral types such as M-, E-, S-, and F-types. It may be a remnant of catastrophic disruption of a differentiated object by a less differentiated projectile impact. In either case, the study of the interior of lost planetesimals or proto-planets is only possible by close investigation of asteroid families in present days. The initial mission design studies in the past assumed H-IIA launch and chemical propulsion only but there are many plausible options to visit 2-4 asteroids with large resources allocated to scientific payloads (e.g., 200-300 kg order including sampling devices, capsules and intelligent impacts) in relatively short mission durations (i.e., 3-6 years) (Table 8). The most challenging part of this mission is to design a fly-by sampling mechanism, which is completely different from the Hayabusa sampling system. However, such a mechanism was designed in the past for the Aladdin proposal to the Discovery mission to a Phobos sample return. Intelligent impactor technology is ready for the Deep Impact mission to be launched in the end of 2004 and to impact the Comet Tempel-l nucleus in July 2005. In

207

Japan, the bus system of the Lunar-A penetrator module can be adapted as an engineering baseline for the impactor with autonomous navigation and guidance-control system with image processing, which is now being tested by Hayabusa in space. Capturing media of ejecta particles are assumed aerogels, which have been space-proven in various LEO experiments including the Japanese MPAC-SEED onboard the International Space Station, as well as NASA's Stardust mission, which collected cometary coma dust samples in January 2004. Collection efficiency was studied for S-type and C-type asteroids by using Hydrocode computer simulation in the past (Yano, et al., 2000).

Fig. 18: An artist's impression of the Family mission (above; CG by MEF and A. Ikeshita) and conceptual drawing of its spacecraft (right) (llano, et al., 2000).

208

Table 8: Summary of initial mission design examples of the Family mission for the Koronis and Nysa-Polana families. All missions assumed chemical propulsion (Yano, et al., 2002b).

Figure 19 shows an example of orbital designs to visit 4 Koronis family asteroids in 6 years, including a re-visit of the Ida-Dactyl system, thus increasing success levels of fly-by sampling and scientific outputs (Yamakawa, et al. 2000). Every time the spacecraft intersects with the Koronis family orbits, it flies by one asteroid and collects impact ejecta samples fiom it. In the first three years, the spacecraft will fly-by (243) Ida and (2700) Baikonur and then return a capsule containing their samples to the earth. In the next three years, it will repeat the same for (1079) Mimosa and (993) Moultona and bring their samples to the earth 6 years after the launch.

Multi-Korons Family Asteroid Flyby

Multl-Koronis Family Astaroid Flyby (follow-on mission / post Earth swlngby)

Fig. 19: An example of orbital design for Koronis f a m i b j y - b y and sample return mission (Yamakawa, et al., 2000).

209

Solar Power Sail Mission to Fly-by Main Belt and Jovian-Trojan Asteroids Yet another future mission concept that ISAS is studying is the solar power sail mission, which will make fly-by observations of main belt asteroids as well as Jovian Trojan asteroids, most of which are D-type asteroids, poorly understood taxonomic types from neither ground observation spectroscopy nor meteoritic analyses, due to the lack of possible analog chondrites discovered on the earth (Fig.20) (Yano, et al., 2004b). Thus, the most severe planetary protection protocol (Bio-Safety Level 4) will be required if we conduct sample returns from them now. It is important to visit and look closely at them first. Jovian Trojans have never been visited by spacecraft and they are a totally unknown world. Ground observations contradict their low density, which implies water ice content with spectra reflectance lacking water signatures, and it may have organic-rich regolith covering sub-surface water-ice terrain. Understanding generic connections among the Trojans, short-period cometary nucleus and the outermost D-type asteroids in the main belt may be an important key to distinguish between asteroids and comets, depending upon where they originated in the early stage of the solar system. Based on the present mission plan, it will take about 4 years to go to Jupiter and its extended mission will reach the Jovian LA Trojan asteroids eventually (Fig. 21). Unlike conventional planetary probes, this spacecraft will not arrive at a single destination but continue cruising all the way to the outer planet region. Thus the current reference mission aims at maximizing scientific outputs during its cruising phase, by changing its heliocentric distance on the ecliptic plane. Lastly, this mission will serve as a precursor for some innovative, new planetary explorations, which may take place after the successful demonstration of key technologies in this mission.

Fig. 20: An artist's concept of the ISAS Solar Power Sail mission to fy-by an Trojan asteroid (Phoebe image is courtesy of NASA)

Its present model payloads have the following scientific objectives. The study of zodiacal light reduction as a function of the heliocentric distance, and the first observation of comic background radiation by dust-free infrared astronomy, will employ the same photometer to produce both data during the cruising, especially around 5AU. 0.5% of -2000 m2 sail film may be replaced with PDVF threshold dust impact detectors, which exposed area is two orders of magnitude larger than the largest dust detectors in the past. Interplanetary network for positioning of gamma-ray bursts in higher precision also becomes more advantageous as the spacecraft goes further away from the earth. As the spacecraft flies by Jupiter, a

210

small probe will be released and inserted to a polar orbit around Jupiter in order to make simultaneous observations of the Jovian magnetosphere and solar wind interaction with the atmosphere in the polar regions of the planet (e.g., aurora). The spacecraft will also have several opportunities to make fly-by observations of at least 2 main belt asteroids and 2 Jovian LA Trojan asteroids. At present Achilles of >lo0 !un in size is one of our targets and there are more than a dozen possible combinations of two or more L4 Trojan asteroid fly-bys found in orbital design studies.

Fig. 21: Scientijk observation plan for the ISAS solar power sail (MUSES-D) concept (rano, et al., 2004b.)

SUMMARY This paper summarized scientific rationales for asteroid explorations including knowledge, which greatly assists preparing for impact hazard issues (i.e., physical characterization of NEOs), the mission outline and current status of Hayabusa asteroid sample return mission, with an emphasis on sampling and analysis procedures, and

21 I future prospects of Japanese minor body explorations. Examples of future mission concepts include multiple rendezvous and sample returns from spectra-known NEOs, multiple fly-by and sample returns from main belt asteroid family members, and a solar power sail mission to fly-by multiple asteroids in main belts and Jovian Trojans. These can be expressed in a form of a roadmap of minor body explorations in the next 15 years as shown in Figure 22.

2003 2005

2010

2015

2020

Fig. 22: Roadmap f o r Japanese minor body exploration in next 15 years (Yano et al., 2004a).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author is gratehl to the World Federation of Scientists for kindly inviting him to present this paper at the 32"d session of the International Seminars on Planetary Emergencies. Fruitful discussions in both the Hayabusa mission team and the ISAS Next Generation Minor Body Exploration Working Group have greatly contributed to improve the context. This work is partly supported by the Japan Space Forum Ground Research Grant and the Japanese Society for Promotion of Science.

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m,

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7. AIDS AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES: GLOBAL BIOSECURITY STANDARDS

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LIMITING ACCESS TO DANGEROUS PATHOGENS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

-

THE NEED

DIEGO BURIOT MD, MPH. World Health Organisation, Geneva, Switzerland The ZOth century philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote, “Almost everything that distinguishes the modem world from earlier centuries is attributable to science”. This transformation is the result of centuries of free and open scientific inquiry and exchange of knowledge. Progress in life expectancy, disease reduction and increased agricultural outputs, to name just a few, could be directly attributable to life sciences. The rapid advances in microbiology, molecular biology, and genetic engineering are also enabling scientists to modify and manipulate fundamental life processes and have created extraordinary opportunities for biomedical research, including rapid identification tools and novel drugs and vaccines, thereby holding great promises for improving human health and the quality of life. Biological life sciences, and especially recombinant techniques, have experienced enormous growth over the last 30 years and biotechnology is truly a global enterprise. The United States of America is still leading the sector with employment reaching 191,000 by 2001 and US$Z9 billion. However, countries such as Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom but also China, India and Brazil, are becoming major players and the fundamental knowledge that emerges from them is available around the world. Efforts to protect workers and communities from the accidental release of pathogens have been a constant challenge for the scientific community. In the seventies, following the historical Asilomar Recombinant DNA Conference, the CDC and NIH encouraged the life science community to participate in a collaborative initiative to develop consensus guidelines to safeguard worker safety and public health from hazards associated with the possession and use of human pathogens in microbiological and biomedical laboratories. The initiative resulted in the publication by CDC and NIH in 1984 of the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories referred to as BMBL. Four levels of biocontainment provide increasingly stringent levels of protection to personnel, the environment and the community. The BMBL served as a model for biosafety guidelines issued by the World Health Organization and are widely accepted by scientists throughout the world and considered the gold standard for the safe conduct of laboratory work with dangerous pathogens. Since these biosafety standards were published there has been a marked decline in the number of accidental infections of laboratory workers and the escape of dangerous pathogens into the environment. Although there has been the occasional case of laboratory accidents reported, including smallpox, polio and S A R S , the practical use of biosafety norms have kept them to a minimum. Although the English terms biosecurity and biosafety are sometimes used interchangeably, they refer to different issues. Biosafety measures are intended to prevent accidental infections of researchers or the release of pathogens from a laboratory facility that could endanger public health. Biosecurity measures aim at preventing the deliberate diversion of deadly pathogens for malicious purposes, as biotechnology, like nuclear physics or chemistry, can be exploited for peaceful or nefarious purposes. 215

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In 1986, the United States Government passed the Anti Terrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act 1986 (Public Law 104-132), regulating the transfer of dangerous pathogens and toxins. It mandated the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to develop a “select agents” list of pathogens that could be used as weapons. The legislation did not receive much attention kom the scientific community, as at that time, bioterrorism was considered a hypothetical threat. Bioterrorism became a harsh reality soon after 11 September 2001, when letters containing a refined preparation of dried anthrax spores were sent through the United States’mail, infecting twenty-one people and killing five. In the aftermath of the attack, policy-makers awakened to the inherent power of biological agents and began calling for more government control and stronger mechanisms to prevent the deliberate theft or diversion of deadly pathogens and toxins for malicious or criminal purposes. Spurred on by rising concerns about bioterrorism, we are now witnessing a transition kom an environment based upon voluntary compliance with recommended practice to a greater number of statutes and regulations, particularly for the control of biological material and personnel. Under the 2001 USA Patriot Act, it is a criminal offence for anyone to knowingly possess any biological agent, toxin or delivery system that is not reasonably justified by science or medicine. The Act also makes it a criminal offence for certain persons, including illegal aliens and individuals from terrorist-list countries, to possess, transport or receive any of the threat agents on the CDC ”select agents list“. Another piece of legislation, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act passed in 2002, requires any person who possesses, uses or transfers a “select agent” to register with the Secretary of the Health and Human Services and to adhere to safety and security requirements commensurate with the degree of risk that each agent poses to public health. Furthermore, advances in genetic engineering and gene therapy, through deliberate or inadvertent means, can create organisms of greater virulence, or allow modification of the immune response system of the target population to increase susceptibility to a pathogen. Recent reports describe the inadvertent creation of an unexpectedly virulent animal poxvirus, or the creation from scratch of an infectious poliovirus by using genomic information available on the Internet with custom-made DNA sequences purchased through the mail. The US government is exploring new regulations on the conduct of research involving selected agents, including possible restrictions on the dissemination of scientific findings that could have national security implications - what has been called “sensitive but unclassified” information. The goal is to strengthen the oversight process for biotechnology research, raising the issue of the balance between scientific openness and national security. The scientific community is increasingly aware of the danger posed by the proliferation of biological weapons capabilities, its potential misuse by hostile individuals or nations and the need for deterrence and law enforcement - critical components in responding to bioterrorism. However, scientists are also concerned about the balance between the need to constrain malignant applications without damaging the generation of essential knowledge. Life sciences rely upon a culture of openness in research, where free exchange of ideas allows researchers to build on the results of others, while simultaneously opening scientific results to critical scrutiny.

217 Some scientists claim that it is futile to imagine that access to dangerous pathogens and destructive biotechnologies can be physically restricted, as is the case for nuclear weapons and fissionable material. Imposing mandatory information controls on research in the life sciences would be difficult and expensive with very little gain in genuine security. Proven measures to minimize the risk of reintroducing dangerous pathogens, such as limiting the number of sites where they are stored and studied, could be a realistic goal, but absolute containment cannot be assured. Restrictions imposed on laboratories working with "selected agents" have already requested some laboratories to destroy archived samples and to limit the exchange of material between scientists. To extend government control to the information contained in laboratory reports, conference papers and journal articles would further constrict avenues of communication, which have been an essential source of the dynamism of biological research in modem areas. Some major United States' universities have already proscribed classified research on campus, and the danger exists that the life science fields of study come to be regarded as less inviting, thereby affecting the quality of researchers entering the field or making it more attractive to work outside the USA. Lastly, without an international consensus and consistent guidelines for overseeing research in advanced biotechnology, it is feared that limitations in the USA would only impede the progress of biomedical research and undermine its own national interest. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION Worldwide, a large, but unknown number of clinical or research laboratories are keeping well-characterized strains of dangerous pathogens, either for diagnostic reference purposes or for drugs or vaccine research. The range of scientists and institutions involved would thus be hard to enumerate, let alone monitor. Most of the countries do not even have a comprehensive inventory of their national laboratories. As part of the Polio Eradication Initiative, a comprehensive survey of national laboratories was carried out in 152 countries. Over 160 000 facilities have been inventoried to date, including those in the USA and the Russian Federation, but some important middle-income countries such as China and India have not yet been included. The number of Culture Collections is also unknown. The World Data Center for Microorganisms registered 484 culture collections in 65 countries, but most former Soviet Union countries are not included. The dissemination of academic research has been carried out by over 2,000 publishers in what is called STM (scientific, technological and medical) publishing. Together, they publish 1.2 million articles a year in about 16 000 periodical journals. Several countries, including France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom have also passed national legislation making the prohibition of BWC binding, imposing penal sanctions for violations and tightening security over dangerous pathogens and toxins. However, most countries have not yet passed any legislation each country is developing and implementing its own rules, rather than fostering a set of harmonized global standards. This ad hoc approach is likely to result in a patchwork of inconsistent regulations, giving rise to security gaps and areas of lax enforcement. Because facilities that house and work with dangerous pathogens and toxins range from pharmaceutical companies to academic research laboratories, specific

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biosecurity measures cannot be developed on a “one size fits all” basis. For these reasons, guidelines for laboratory security should consist of functional requirements SO that the affected entities can implement specific measures in a tailored manner. In October 2003, the National Research Council (NRC) of the USA National Academy of Sciences published an important report on “Biotechnology Research in an Age of Bioterrorism”, in which a panel of prominent scientists acknowledged the risks associated with the potential misuse of molecular biology to develop “improved” BW agents. The authors came up with seven main recommendations, including the establishment in the USA of a voluntary process to review the security implications of potential hazardous experiments and the establishment of an International Forum on Biosecurity to develop and to promote harmonized national regional and international measures. Among the topics for this International Forum are: Education of the global scientific community, including curricula for professional symposia and training programmes, to raise awareness of potential threats and modalities for reducing risks, as well as highlighting ethical issues associated with the conduct of biological science; Design mechanisms for international jurisdiction that would foster cooperation in identifying and apprehending individuals who commit biocrimes; Development of an internationally harmonized regime for the oversight of the transfer of pathogens within and between laboratories and facilities; Development of systems to review and to provide oversight of biological research for identifying and managing “experiments of concern”; Development of an international norm for the dissemination of “sensitive” information in the life sciences. It is widely accepted that minimum global standards should include: Mechanisms to account for dangerous pathogens; Registration and licensing of facilities that work with dangerous pathogens, certifying both competency of workers and containment capabilities of the laboratory facility; Physical security of these fac Procedures for screening laboratory personnel to determine their suitability to work with highly dangerous pathogens. The ideal forum to discuss these kinds of issues would have been the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which entered into force in 1975, and banned the development, production, stockpile and transfer of biological weapons, but permitting research activities for peaceful purposes to defend or protect against BW agents. Unfortunately, the BWC was burdened with a serious birth defect: the lack of formal measures to check compliance and to punish violation. Experience suggests that a mechanism for addressing BWC compliance concerns can be effective only if implemented by an international organization that is seen as independent, objective and competent. From 1995 to 2001, an ad hoc group of interested Member States met with the mandate to negotiate a “legally binding instrument” to strengthen the BWC. However in 2001 the USA rejected a legally binding protocol, and in its place suggested a variety of largely voluntary measures to be pursued on a national basis by individual countries. This included a proposal that other countries adopt legislation requiring entities possessing dangerous pathogens to register with their own government - as is the practice in the USA.

219 However, the BWC meeting of experts held in 2003 to discuss pathogen controls did not result in the adoption of a common set of standards that could have had global implications. A number of regional and international organizations are now moving to develop programmes and policies on various aspects of the problem. For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the G7 Global Health Security Action Group, the Australia Group, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the World Health Organization and others have begun information sharing and efforts to identify critical elements to include in setting standards, and mechanisms to establish global biosecurity standards and international oversight mechanisms for dangerous pathogens. Approaches must be harmonized to become effective. CONCLUSION 1.

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If the scientific community does not become an active partner in crafting the policies that involve and affect its work, it will be done without its insight, reason and wisdom. That does not seem to be the preferable choice for the continued health of science or the well-being of society. It is obvious that there is room for improved collaboration between the scientific community and the security communities at national level. The process will be far better served if both sit at the same table. Reasoning is best served when reasonable people share their points of view. A sense of proportion with these issues is certainly needed; when, for instance, decisions are made unilaterally to potentially limit bio-research in a particular country such as the USA. Censoring biomedical research will stifle medical progress - including the ability to counter the diseases that bioterrorism might unleash. There is a critical role for National Academies and for international organizations, such as UNESCO and WHO, to engage the scientific community and to address and debate issues affecting science. Scientists must come-up with a consolidated consensus on how to conduct bioscience in the new context created by recent events.

REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Tucker J. The BWC New Process: A Preliminary Assessment. Nonproliferation ReviewISpring 2004; 1-13. Ostfield M. Bioterrorism as a Foreign policy issue SAIS Review vol XXIV no 1 (Winter-Spring 2004); 131-146. Ledenberg J. Infectious diseases and biological weapons: prophylaxis and mitigation. JAMA. 278; 435-436. Editorial. Pickrell J. Imperial College fined over hybrid virus risk. Science. 2001; 293: 779-780. Jackson RJ, Ramsay AJ, Christensen CD, Beaton S, Hall DF, Ramshaw IA. Expression of mouse interleukine-4 by a recombinant ectromelia virus suppresses cytolytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox. J Virol. 2001; 75: 1205-1210.

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Fenner F, Henderson DA, Arita I, Jezeck Z, Ladnyi ID. Smallpox and its eradication. Geneva World Health Organization, 1988. Mulders MN, Reimerink JHJ, Koopmans M P , van Loon AM, van der Avoort HGAM. Genetic analysis of wild-type poliovirus importation into The Netherlands (1979-1995). J Infect Dis 1997; 176: 6 17-24. China confirms S A R S infection in another previously reported case ; summary of case to date. World Health Organization S A R S situation update 5, 30 April 04 30/en (accessed 2004. available from: htt~://www.who.intlcsrldod2004 May 11,2004). Severe acute respiratory syndrome ( S A R S ) in Singapore - update 2. S A R S in Singapore linked to accidental laboratory contamination. Available from: httr,://www.who.int/csr/don/2003 09 24/en (accessed May 11,2004). World Health Organization. Severe acute respiratory syndrome in Taiwan, China. Dec 17, 2003: available &om: http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003 12 17/en (accessed May 9,2004). Heymann DL, Aylward RB, Wolff C. Dangerous pathogens in the laboratory: from smallpox to today's S A R S setbacks and tomorrow's polio-free world. The Lancet 2004; 363 16566-68 Editorial. Steinbruner JD, Harris ED. Controling dangerous pathogens Issues in Science and Technology Spring 2003,47-54. Kwik G, Fitzgerald J, Inglesby TV, O'Toole T, Biosecurity: Responsible Stewardship of Bioscience in an Age of Catastrophic Terrorism. Biosecurity and biotemorism: biodefense strategy, practice, and science. Vol 1 number 1, 2003 Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism: confronting the dual use dilemma, National Research Council of the National Academies, 2003 National Academies Press. Home Pages of Culture Collections in the World http://wdcni.nig.ac.iDhDcc.html (accessed July 23,2004). The Economist August 7" 2004 Economic focus / Development piecemeal Finance and Economics p 63-65.

THE U.S. SELECT AGENT RULE AND AN INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP LABORATORY BIOSECURITY GUIDELINES REYNOLDS M. SALERNO, PH.D. San&a National Laboratories, Albuquerque, USA Recent natural outbreaks of highly infectious disease have had devastating consequences for public and agricultural health, the international economy, and international security.’ The consequences of an outbreak of infectious disease resulting from the use of a biological weapon would be at least as damaging as a naturally occumng infectious disease, and possibly more so. The 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States killed 5 people, injured 22, resulted in enormous economic damage, and brought bioterrorism to the center of debates on international security. If a bioterrorist were to widely deploy an agent that causes a highly contagious and lethal disease, such as smallpox or Foot and Mouth Disease, the international economic and security consequences could be catastrophic.2 The risk of infectious disease resulting from an accidental release of a pathogen from a laboratory setting or an intentional use of a biological weapon is real and g r ~ w i n g .The ~ rapid expansion of the biotechnology industry has resulted in the global proliferation of dual use biological materials, technologies, and expertise. As a result, dangerous pathogens are much more accessible to a wide range of biological weapon proliferators, including terrorists, as well as legitimate scientists who may inadvertently expose themselves or their local environments to exotic d i ~ e a s e . ~ Currently, many different methods are being used to address the global risks associated with naturally occurring and accidentally or intentionally introduced infectious disease. Most strategies-such as increasing the effectiveness and availability of therapeutics, improving diagnostic capabilities, and developing decontamination and detection technologies-focus on enhancing national responses to an outbreak of infectious disease after it has occurred.’ The international community has also implemented some preventive strategies as a means to support global efforts at countering outbreaks of infectious disease and biological weapons proliferation.6 Preventive strategies are important because they provide an opportunity to reduce the risk of an outbreak of disease that must be mitigated by emergency responders and public health officials. A comprehensive strategy to counter the infectious disease and biological weapons risk should combine identification and response techniques with preventive measures. A principal preventive strategy now regulated in the United States is laboratory biosecurity: the protection of dangerous pathogens and toxins from theft and sabotage at the facilities where they are used and stored. Laboratory biosecurity provides the first line of defense against both biological weapons proliferation and bioterrorism by making it more difficult for proliferators to acquire dangerous biological materials.’

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LABORATORY BIOSECURITY AND LABORATORY BIOSAFETY The emergence of the term “laboratory biosecurity,” used in the context of protecting dangerous pathogens and toxins, is very recent, and it is often confused with an older, more widely recognized term, “laboratory biosafety.” Laboratory biosecurity and laboratory biosafety-both critical to the operation of a modem bioscience laboratory--often overlap and should complement each other, but they have quite different objectives. Laboratory biosafety, another preventive measure that reduces biological risk, aims to reduce or eliminate exposure of laboratory workers, or other persons, and the outside environment to potentially hazardous agents involved in bioscience or biomedical research. Laboratory biosafety is achieved by implementing various degrees of laboratory “containment,” or safe methods of managing infectious materials in a laboratory setting.8 Laboratory biosecurity aims to protect pathogens, toxins, and security-related information from theft and sabotage. Laboratory biosecurity is achieved by instituting a culture of responsibility among those who handle, use, and transport dangerous pathogens and toxins, and by implementing various security measures that restrict access to these materials to authorized individuals.’ THE BIOSECURITY REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT IN THE UNITED STATES The current U.S. biosecurity regulatory environment is based on two laws, the USA PATRIOT Act and the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, which aim to improve the protection of “select” agents and toxins. Three Codes of Federal Regulations (42 CFR 73, 7 CFR 331, and 9 CFR 121, or collectively “CFR) establish lists of agents and toxins that pose a threat to humans, animals, or plants, and require any laboratory that possesses any one of these 82 listed agents or toxins to enforce and adhere to a series of specific security measures. The security requirements include facility registration, designation of a responsible official, background checks for individuals with access to the listed agents, biosecurity plans, agent transfer rules, safety and security training and inspections, notification following identification, theft, loss, or release of a listed agent, record maintenance, and restrictions on some types of experiments.” SCIENTIFIC CONCERNS ABOUT THE U.S. REGULATIONS Scientists and laboratorians in the U S . have expressed many concerns about these regulations. Some question the rationale for the regulations, since U.S. laboratory biological materials also exist in nature and are globally distributed in research laboratories, collection centers, biotechnology institutes, and clinical facilities.’ Any attempt to implement laboratory biosecurity in the U.S. cannot encompass all dangerous biological materials. Therefore, an individual does not need to steal an agent from a U S . laboratory to obtain material with which to pursue bioterrorism. Moreover, many people in the US. microbiological research community perceive

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223 the CFR as an inappropriate impediment to important research. The designation of certain types of individuals, and nationals from specific countries, as “restricted persons” who cannot handle, transport, or have access to Select Agents is often cited as particularly antithetical to the pursuit of science.” The CFR have also imposed significant financial costs and operational inconveniences on bioscience research. In addition, there is considerable concern that security will trump biosafety, increasing the risk of accidental release or exposure of dangerous organisms. Recently, many researchers and laboratories have decided to discontinue or not pursue research on regulated biological agents, rather than implement the new security regulations and bear the associated financial burden. According to the supplementary information published in December 2002 in 42 CFR 73, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) expected 817 entities to register under the new Select Agent rule. Instead, only 323 facilities are now registered with the CDC, indicating that many institutions have discontinued their work with select agents.13 For example, Stanford University has consciously chosen not to conduct research on select agents. Their collections of Francisella tularensis were transferred and/or destroyed after consultations with scientists and senior University officials who believed the administrative and security burdens of the Select Agent rule outweighed the scientific need of maintaining stocks on campus.I4 Security regulations that induce such a negative response in the research community will stifle valuable public health and biodefense research, further compromising the ability to respond to bioterrorism and infectious disease outbreaks. SECURITY CONCERNS ABOUT THE U.S. REGULATIONS The best defense against emerging infectious disease and bioterrorism is the progress of research that results in improved vaccines, diagnostics, and therapies-work that requires handling, using, and transporting dangerous pathogens and toxins. Although some of these agents have the potential to cause serious harm to the health and economy of a population if misused, all have legitimate uses for medical, commercial, and defensive applications. It is incumbent on those in the scientific community who strive to improve human, animal, and plant health to take measures to limit the opportunity for their valuable materials to be used illicitly. However, it is critically important to strike an appropriate balance between protection of dangerous pathogens and toxins, and preservation of an environment that promotes legitimate, ultimately life-saving, biological research.I5 Designing a laboratory biosecurity system that does not jeopardize microbiological operations requires a familiarity with bioscience and the materials that require protection. Security system designers must be cognizant of several challenges to protecting microorganisms and toxins.’6 Biological agents are living, reproducing organisms. These organisms can vary in quantity and quality over the course of legitimate research activities by growing, dying, and mutating. Therefore, knowing the exact quantity and quality of organisms in a laboratory is not achievable. Within bioscience facilities, biological agents and the toxins some of them produce can be isolated from a number of process streams. They can be found in Petri dishes, cell cultures, environmental samples, clinical specimens, infected animals, and animal

224 carcasses, as well as stored in refrigerated or freeze-dried forms. This wide distribution makes safeguarding all of the material a complicated task. Biological agents cannot be detected with available stand-off technologies, nor can the naked eye identify usable amounts. Therefore, intercepting someone who is in the midst of covertly and maliciously removing biological material from a laboratory or facility is almost impossible. Unfortunately, the current U S . regulations do not demonstrate an appreciation for these unique elements of pathogens and toxins. In particular, the U S . regulations apply a black-or-white standard to biosecurity: either an agent is on the regulated list and requires security or it is not on the list and needs no security. Coccidioides immitis, Bacillus anthracis, and Variola major virus are all select agents, legally subject to the same security standards. In reality, all CFR-listed agents and toxins are not equally vulnerable to BW proliferation, and therefore do not require the same level of protection. Some of these agents would be more attractive than others to adversaries interested in diverting materials that they could use to build biological weapons. Investments in security, especially if these resources come out of limited research and dia ostic budgets, should be focused on those agents that are most attractive to adversaries. ,B The nature of biological material and its use in a laboratory setting make biosecurity an extremely imperfect science. Even with the most intrusive laboratory biosecurity system, it is possible for a person with approved access to a containment laboratory to divert biological material without detection. At the same time, the wide availability of pathogens and toxins, including natural sources, makes it improbable that an adversary would overtly attack a bioscience facility to steal an organism. Yet the U.S. regulations do not reflect an understanding that the “insider” is the most significant threat and that therefore the effectiveness of a laboratory biosecurity system will depend, first and foremost, on the integrity of those individuals who have access to pathogens and toxins and those who have regular access to the facilities that contain such agents. LABORATORY BIOSECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT One of the most significant security concerns of the U.S. Select Agent Rule is that its regulatory approach does not adequately allow for variations in security based on a facility’s environment and/or its assets. Those responsible for the safekeeping of dangerous pathogens and toxins must understand that security risks are impossible to eliminate; they can only be mitigated. Since security in a biological environment can never be perfect, it is incumbent upon security system designers to employ a risk management approach to securing dangerous pathogens and toxins. A risk management approach to biosecurity recognizes that different assets at an institution may have different levels of security risk. These risks need to be prioritized through a risk assessment process. Those assets at the highest risk should receive the most protection, and lower risk assets should receive commensurately less protection. The allocation of available protection resources and the implementation of operational restrictions should be at the discretion of facility management, but the application should always be in a graded manner - protecting the assets at the highest risk more than those at lower risks.

225 Risk assessment should begin with the identification of the facility’s assets, including pathogens, security-related information, and operational infrastructure. The risk of an undesired event, generally theft or sabotage of an asset, should be determined by examining the consequences that would result and the potential threat a particular adversary poses. Each undesired event should be evaluated separately. The various events should then be ranked by risk so that managers can prioritize the institution’s investment in protection measures and operational restrictions. Laboratory biosecurity practices employed internationally should be based on a similar risk assessment methodology and graded protection philosophy. However, various institutions can achieve biosecurity in many different ways, reflecting the unique concerns and available resources of individual countries. INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE U S . REGULATIONS The concept of laboratory biosecurity was fKst discussed in an international forum at the August 2003 Experts Group Meeting of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in Geneva, Switzerland. It became evident during this meeting in Geneva that the international community could benefit fkom additional consultations on biosecurity. For that reason, an international symposium was held at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, NM, USA in February 2004 to share information and clarify international perspectives on biosecurity. The symposium, which included more than 60 scientists and policymakers from 15 different countries, had three broad goals: 1) to present the United States’ experiences in implementing biosecurity; 2) to elicit from the international participants their interpretations and concerns about biosecurity; 3) to set biosecurity in the context of biological weapons non-proliferation and counterbioterrorism. In general, the international community does not perceive bioterrorism as a serious threat; the priority, especially in the developing world, is on identifjmg and controlling natural outbreaks of infectious diseases. There is considerable apprehension within the international community that US. biosecurity methods, or an international regulatory regime, would hinder advances in basic biomedical research by increasing the cost, straining international collaborations, and restricting the sharing of information. Despite these concerns, many in the international community believe that dangerous pathogens and toxins are valuable assets for research and commercial ventures that deserve protection. There is also a widely held conviction that biosecurity can support and strengthen the biosafety agenda, and that biosecurity will help maintain the confidence of citizens and investors in the biomedical and biotechnology industries. Finally, many in the international community acknowledge that biosecurity can reduce the risk of bioterrorism and biological weapons proliferation. This latter point is particularly important because the rapid expansion of the biotechnology industry has resulted in the global spread of dual use biological materials, technologies, and expertise.

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PROPOSAL FOR ACHIEVING INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY Significant scientific and security concerns have been raised about the U.S. Select Agent Rule since it went into effect in 2003. Despite the difficulties of the U S . Select

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Agent Rule, many in the international community have recognized that laboratory biosecurity represents both good laboratory practice and an appropriate national measure for States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention. For laboratory biosecurity to succeed in reducing the risk of infectious disease and biological weapons proliferation, it must be implemented globally. Protecting dangerous pathogens and toxins in some areas of the world and not in others will only serve to drive proliferators to materials in unsecured facilities. Every country shares the burden of securing pathogens from theft, sabotage, and accidental release. In addition, successful international biosecurity will depend on willing implementation by the scientific community. Therefore, laboratory biosecurity must be designed specifically for biological materials and research, must complement and be integrated with laboratory biosafety practices, and must avoid compromising fundamental biomedical and microbiological research and diagnostics. The best method for achieving these objectives is for a respected technical organization in the public health and life sciences field, such as the World Health Organization or the World Federation of Scientists, to promulgate international laboratory biosecurity guidelines. These guidelines should avoid the mistakes of the U.S. Select Agent Rule, should draw upon the precedent of globally implemented biosafety standards, and should involve the international scientific community in their development. Finally, these international guidelines should recommend the use of a sound risk assessment and risk management methodology. REFERENCES Mark S. Smolinski, Margaret A. Hamburg, and Joshua Lederberg, Microbial Threats to Health: Emergence, Detection, and Response (Washington, DC: 2003). National Research Council of the National Academies, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the Dual Use Dilemma (Washington, DC: October 2003). The recent examples of laboratory acquired infections of S A R S in Asia in 2003 demonstrate the increasing accidental risk, and the anthrax attacks in the U.S.in 2001 reflect the increasing intentional risk. Jonathan B. Tucker, “Biosecurity: Limiting Terrorist Access to Deadly Pathogens,” Peaceworks No. 52, United States Institute of Peace (Washington, DC: November 2003). For example, see B.T. Smith, T.V. Ingelsby, and T. O’Toole, “Biodefense R&D: Anticipating Future Threats, Establishing a Strategic Environment,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, 1(3), 2003; P.A. Emanuel, C. Chue, L. Kerr, D. Cullin, “Validating the Performance of Biological Detection Equipment: The Role of the Federal Government,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, 1 (2), 2003; D.M. Sosin, “Syndromic Surveillance: The Case for Skillful Investment,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, 1(4), 2003; S.A. Hearne, et al., Ready or Not? Protecting the Public’s Health in an Age of Bioterrorism (Washington, DC: 2003). For example, see World Health Organization, Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Weapons (Geneva: WHO, 2004).

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Reynolds M. Salemo and Daniel Estes, “Biosecurity: Protecting High Consequences Pathogens and Toxins against Theft and Diversion,” Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense, R.F. Pilch and R.A. Zilinskas, eds. (New York J Wiley & Sons, 2004). World Health Organization, Laboratory Biosafety Manual, second edition (revised), 2003 (liM,://www.who.intlcsr/resources/publicationsibiosafetv/whocds csr lvo 20034/e nJ). Also see National Institutes of Health and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, fourth edition, May 1999 (http:/ibmbl.od.nih.gov/contents.htm).It is important to note that biosafety, as used here, does not refer to the management of genetically modified organisms. It is important to note that biosecurity, in this context, does not encompass efforts to protect crops and animals from natural outbreaks of disease, or efforts to protect the food supply from contamination. U.S.Federa1 Register, Rules and Regulations, Vol. 240, No. 67,42 CFR Part 73, December 13,2002 (Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General); U.S.Federa1 Register, Rules and Regulations, Vol240, No. 67, 7 CFR Part 331,9 CFR Part 121, December 13,2002 (Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service). The one exception is the Variola major virus, the causative agent of smallpox, which has been globally eradicated. The two official WHO repositories are the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia (USA) and the State Research Institute for Virology and Biotechnology, Koltsovo (Russia). Barry R. Bloom, “Bioterrorism and the University: The Threats to Security and to Openness,” Harvard Magazine (November-December 2003); R. Gallagher, “Choices on Biosecurity,” The Scientist 18/10 (May 2004). CDC’s 8” National Symposium on Biosafety, “Biosafety and Biosecurity: A New Era in Laboratory Science” Session Three: Impact of New Regulations, Atlanta, GA (January 27,2004). Private communication, David H. Silberman, Director, Health and Safety Programs, Stanford University School of Medicine, February 6,2004. Reynolds M. Salemo, et al., “Balancing Security and Research at Biomedical and Bioscience Laboratories,” BTR 2003: Uni$ed Science and Technologyfor Reducing Biological Threats and Countering Terrorism-Proceedings (Albuquerque, NM: March 2003). httD://www.biosecuritv.sandia.~ov/documentsibalancin~-securitv-and-research.udf. National Research Council of the National Academies, Biofechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the Dual Use Dilemma (Washington, DC: October 2003). Jennifer Gaudioso and Reynolds M. Salemo, “Biosecurity and Research: Minimizing Adverse Impacts,” Science 304/30 (April 2004); Arturo Casadevall and Liise-anne Pirofski, “The weapon potential of a microbe,” Trends in Microbiology 12/6 (June 2004); Susan B. Rivera, et al., “A Bioterror Risk-Assessment Methodology,” The Scientist 18/13 (July 2004); Jennifer Gaudioso and Reynolds M.

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Salemo, “A Conceptual Framework for Biosecurity Levels,” BTR 2004: Unified Science and Technologyfor Reducing Biological Threats and Countering Terrorism - Proceedings (Albuquerque, NM. March 2004). Sandia National Laboratories, “International Biosecurity Symposium: Securing High ConsequencePathogens and Toxins,” Sandia Report, SAND 20042109, June 2004.

NEW GEORGIAN LEGISLATION ON BIOSAFETY LELA BAKANIDZE, PAATA IMNADZE, SHOTA TSANAVA, NIKOLOZ TSERTSVADZE National Center for Disease Control and Medical Statistics of Georgia, Georgia Georgia, when it was part of the Soviet Union, shared all legislation, amongst which the regulations on biosafety and dealing with especially dangerous pathogens, with other republics of the country. Biosafety rules in Soviet Union were very strict, and they did not leave gaps for misunderstanding. Bioweapon facilities were well defined, they were components of Soviet offensive biological weapons program, and no other institutions were authorized to have any especially dangerous pathogens. More than a decade has passed since Georgia became independent, but not all the biosafety legislation has been adapted to the new situation. New Georgian laws were adopted, part of the sanitary norms and regulations were renewed, but the greatest part remains unchanged. For example, even the classification of pathogens by risk groups is absolutely contrary to the WHO classification. Today, when the threat of bioterrorism is more realistic, the need for a new regulatory basis for biosafety has become evident. Furthermore, scientific investigations on especially dangerous pathogens are very well funded by different donors, and sometimes they do not take into account whether the proposed recipients of their grants are eligible to carry out such investigations, and whether or not they have sufficient experience. There were not very many bioweapon-related institutions in Georgia (compared for example with Russia and Kazakhstan) - the Georgian Anti-Plague Station (now the National Center for Disease Control and Medical Statistics of Georgia - NCDC Georgia of the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia), carries out surveillance on especially dangerous pathogens in the whole territory of Georgia; Biokombinat in Tabakhmela produces live vaccines for foot and mouth disease, etc.; and, in part, the Eliava Institute of Bacteriophage manufactures different vaccines. All these institutions carry out controlled activities with dangerous pathogens. After the collapse of the Soviet Union there was a significant outflow of military microbiologists to other institutions, often to private companies, and this is the source of concern. Nowadays investigations with especially dangerous pathogens are carried out according to old Soviet regulations: (1) The Decree of the Ministry of Health of the USSR “Concerning Rules of Registration, Containment, Handling and Transfer of Cultures of Pathogenic Bacteria, Viruses, Rickettsia, Fungi, Protozoa and others, also Bacterial Toxins and Poisons of Biological Origin“ approved by the Ministry of Health of USSR, 18.05.79. (2) The “Instruction on Regime of Control of Epidemics while Working with Materials Infected or Suspected to be Infected with Causative Agents of Infectious Diseases of 1-11 Groups” approved by the Ministry of Health of USSR 29.06.1978. Among the various other duties of the NCDC Georgia, according to the Decree of the President of Georgia No. 55 of February 21, 2003, in its statute is the “Participation in drafting normative and methodological documents on surveillance, disease control and prevention, biosafetyhiosecurity”. The Department of Biosafety and Threat Reduction, together with experts from other departments of the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia drafts biosafety legislation.

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230 The new Georgian legislation on biosafety is based on WHO and American regulations on biosafety, particularly, “Laboratory Biosafety Manual” - World Health Organization - WHO/CDS/CSR/LY0/2003.4 and “Biosafety in Microbiological & Biomedical Laboratories” - US DHHS, CDC Atlanta & NIH, Fourth Edition, May, 1999. We have tried to make the new legislation comply with Georgian national legislation, particularly: Law of Georgia “on Health Care” (10.12.1997) says in C1.70 that “Providing an environment safe for public health is the responsibility of the State. The Ministry of Health of Georgia elaborates and approves sanitary and hygiene regulations and norms and controls their observance”; C1.72 - “Observance of sanitary, hygiene, sanitary-control regulations and measurements elaborated for the avoidance of negative effects on the environment or other factors on public health, that are approved, are obligatory for any physical or legal body notwithstanding its ownership, organizational or legal form or departmental subordination”; C1. 77 - “Import, export, containment, transfer and work with infectious diseases causative agents is allowed only with the permission of the Ministry of Health of Georgia”. Law of Georgia “on Export Control of Armament, Military Techniques and Products of Bilateral Purpose”, (28.04.1998), among products undergoing export control in C1.4d. “Causative agents of diseases, their genetically modified forms and fragments of genetic materials, that can be used for the production of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons according to the list of international regimes of nonproliferation”. Law of Georgia “Georgian Sanitary Code”- (08.05.2003) regulates legal relations concerned with maintaining an environment safe for human health, and also defines ways of carrying out state control on the implementation of sanitary norms and preventive sanitary, hygiene and sanitary-control measurements. It was decided that the Georgian legislation on biosafety will be a package comprising four documents: (1) Select Agents Rule; (2) Rules of Import, Export, Containment, Transfer and Handling of Cultures of Infectious Diseases Causative Agents (Bacteria, Viruses, Rickettsia, etc.), Protozoa, Mycoplasma and Genetic Materials, also Toxins and Poisons of Biological Origin; (3) Sanitary Norms For Labs Working with Especially Dangerous Pathogens; (4) Guidelines for Safe Transportation of Infectious Substances and Diagnostic Materials. Select Agents Rule is the main tool in regulating the work of laboratories with select agents, especially dangerous human and animal pathogens (list of overlapping select agents is now being coordinated with the veterinary services). The US Federal Register Part IV,DHHS “Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins; Interim Final Rule” was taken as a basis for it. It defines mechanisms of registration, security risk assessments, safety, security, emergency response, transfers, record keeping, inspections, duties of Responsible Official, training, notifications for theft, loss or release, administrative review, criminal penalties (here sufficient chapters from the Administrative Code of Georgia and the Criminal Code of Georgia were used), submissions and forms, applicability and related requirements. As a basis for “Rules of Import, Export, Containment, Transfer and Handling of Cultures of Infectious Diseases Causative Agents (Bacteria, Viruses, Rickettsia, etc.), Protozoa, Mycoplasma and Genetic Materials, also Toxins and Poisons of Biological

231 Origin”, “Sanitary Norms For Laboratories Working with Especially Dangerous Pathogens” and “Guidelines for the Safe Transportation of Infectious Substances and Diagnostic Materials” were taken from WHO and CDC regulations. The new legislation package will be agreed by all the agencies involved, such as the Central Sanitary Inspection of the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia, Ministry of State Security of Georgia, Ministry of Infrastructure of Georgia and Ministry of Interior of Georgia. New legislation on biosafety, like all other legislation, rules and regulations, can be perfect and applicable, but the community must be prepared to follow it. Mechanisms for its implementation must be created.

INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY NORMS AND THE ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BRADFORD KAY Laboratory Capacity Development & Biosafety, World Health OrganisatiodCRS Office, Lyons, France ABSTRACT The threat of infectious disease-whether naturally occurring or as a result of deliberate use - is real and growing. The global community must find appropriate ways to counter this threat without crippling the very institutions that are critical to health security. The legitimate functions of science, industry, medicine and public health must be preserved while at the same time addressing the risks they engender. In order to do this there must be an understanding that the traditional boundaries to health and security continue to be redrawn. Technology, trade and travel have inexorably linked local health issues to those of the global community, regardless of geography, economic status or ethnicity. The linkage of health with security is now articulated by stake-holders representing diverse viewpoints including economics, science, law, politics, medicine, public health and human rights. As a consequence, health security issues now drive a number of national and global activities that require careful consideration from non-traditional viewpoints. National health security activities are undertaken with the expectation that they will result in safer, healthier citizens. Global health security initiatives have essentially the same goal, but must be developed with consideration to global impact, sustainable implementation and effectiveness of reducing biorisks. It is incumbent on the international community to explore ways to develop norms that balance the valid needs of stakeholders. The development of norms by different organizations are useful examples. The UN regularly updates its model regulations for the transport of infectious materials through an ongoing consensus process. Norms for safe laboratory work practices with infectious materials are developed by WHO (WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3'd Ed.). Likewise, the revised International Health Regulations (WHO) will require signatories to pledge compliance with diagnostic and reporting standards for communicable diseases of international concern. Professional and technical organizations (Office International des Epizooties, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Air Transport Association, etc.) significantly contribute to the development of consensus standards that become normative. While instructive, none of these examples is sufficiently comprehensive in its approach to development of global Bidsecurity standards, and none offer a realistic mechanism for assuring global implementation. BACKGROUND Disease threats The threat of infectious disease-whether natural or intentional in origin-is ., real and growing. Expanding globalisation and advancing biotechnology drive the threat. These trends show no sign of abating. The consequences of the intentional use of a biological agent as a weapon would be at least as damaging as a naturally occumng emerging infectious disease, and possibly more so. The 2001 anthrax attacks on the United States killed 5 people, injured 22, resulted in enormous

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233 economic damage, and yet shook US national security to its core. If bioterrorists were to effectively deploy highly contagious agents such as smallpox or foot and mouth disease, the international consequences could be crippling. It is no surprise then that bioterrorism is now widely discussed in health, agricultural (plant and animal) and economic circles, as well as by law enforcement and security communities. However, it is difficult to identify mechanisms to counter biological threats, as no international framework exists within which they can be applied. Such mechanisms exist for other security threats. The International Atomic Energy Agency oversees the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Likewise, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons overseas the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, no encompassing means exist for the global oversight of biological organisms themselves or the technology that allows their isolation, manipulation and proliferation. The source of the threat States have traditionally been seen as the greatest source for the development and use of biological weapons. The resources to develop and deploy such weapons were considered to realistically be beyond the means of groups or individuals. Indeed, governments have recognized the potentially devastating impact a deliberate epidemic could have on an enemy. Just the threat of their use and the fear of contracting a devastating illness can be demoralizing to both military and civilian populations. Likewise, feelings of helplessness to detect andor to deter the use of unconventional weapons can have strong psychological effects. States are no longer the sole theoretical source for the development and use of biological weapons. The unprecedented acceleration of knowledge in the biological sciences has provided tools to efficiently manipulate biological organisms. Likewise, the global development and use of information technology makes mind-boggling amounts of information available to even the most remote areas. The resulting global distribution of advanced technical knowledge allows small groups and even individuals the theoretical, but real, possibility to effectively develop bioweapons. Strategies for biological security Nearly all current strategies for biological security are national in origin and focus on the response to disease outbreaks. These include increasing the effectiveness and availability of vaccines and other therapies (such as antibiotics); improving disease surveillance and diagnostics; developing improved decontamination and detection technologies; and building public and agricultural health capacities. While these response capabilities are needed, many believe that prevention strategies offer a greater return on the investment. Prevention counters the threat before it can invoke the need for scarce resources. All seem to agree that strategies for preparedness for deliberate epidemics should be built on and strengthen existing capacities for the prevention and control of natural diseases. A fundamental preventative strategy is to protect dangerous pathogens and toxins from theft and sabotage. Physical security in laboratory environments provides a first line of defence against the unauthorized possession and/or use of pathogens by reducing their availability to those who would use them for harm. Several counties, including the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France, are forerunners in the development of legislation seeking to tighten controls over the custody, storage, transfer and manipulation of pathogens and toxins, and to criminalize certain activities with these agents.

234 ISSUES AND ANALYSIS Regulations National regulations for the security of pathogens are important and should take into consideration the valid needs of national and international stakeholders. A lack of harmonization could result in the development of a patchwork of inconsistent and potentially conflicting regulations. Even as national laws should be harmonized, it is essential that international regulations be developed and implemented through a consensus process. Some of the issues to be addressed are: Accountability for dangerous pathogens and toxins Protection from theft and loss Mechanisms for transfer andor export Accreditation (registration andor licensing) of facilities working with dangerous pathogens Uniform procedures for screening laboratory personnel Uniform procedures for threat and risk assessments. The range of institutions that house and work with dangerous pathogens and toxins include laboratories in public health, hospital and clinical settings, as well as pharmaceutical laboratories, academic research laboratories, and public and private culture collections. Proscriptive and highly specific security measures will be difficult to enforce without significantly challenging the essential and legitimate functions of these institutions. As a consequence, security requirements with biological materials should, wherever possible, be performance-based and outcomeoriented, thereby allowing maximum flexibility in establishing controls and oversight. Such controls should also directly involve the active participation of scientists, physicians and laboratory workers themselves who are the backbone of sustainable security policies and procedures. Beneficial outcomes for such an approach should include: Flexibility of approaches for enhanced biological security Identification of internal security benchmarks Constructive participation of those regulated Identification of means wherein valid and essential institutional activities are preserved. International models International organizations now have a unique opportunity to engage willing global communities on issues of biological security. These international institutions have advisory and/or regulatory activities that may provide insights into needed global solutions. These organizations and their membership establish norms, standards, model regulations and regulatory instruments that govern a broad spectrum of activities with pathogenic organisms. The United Nations regularly produces Model Regulations for the transport of infectious substances. The International Air Transport Association uses these UN model regulations to develop operational standards for the airline industry. In a similar fashion, the International Civil Aviation Organization incorporates the essence of the model transport regulations into their international regulations for airlines. The World Health Organization regularly updates and publishes its recommended procedures for safe laboratory work practices with dangerous micro-organisms. The Office International des Epizooties (World Animal Health Organization) has a similar role with veterinary laboratory practices.

235 The UN Food and Agricultural Organization establishes global norms, standards and policies for agriculture and foods. Examples of means to prevent the malicious use of bioscience A variety of means exist to influence or control the actions of individuals, groups, nations, and the global community. All attempt to define and/or establish acceptable, normative behaviour. Individuals can be held accountable to norms of conduct, professional standards and national and international law. However, unfortunately there seem to exist a small number of disenfranchised individuals who will act in contradiction to accepted norms. States can be subject to international cooperative mechanisms, treaties and binding agreements and submission to international law. Each mechanism, however, relies upon an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of their requirements and a willingness by those involved to be bound by them. Treaties The Geneva Protocol (1925) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1975) represent major international efforts to limit the development and use of biological weapons. However, as neither treaty has mechanisms for verifying compliance they can only be defined as behavioural norms, not regulatory mechanisms. The Convention on Biological Diversity and the supplementary agreement known as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety are self-regulatory agreements established by the United Nations Environment Programme in order to seek protection of biological diversity against the potential adverse effects of living modified organisms (LMOs, also known as genetically modified organisms {GMO’s}) and the transboundary or international movements of these organisms. Elements of the protocol continue to be under discussion. Membership is voluntary. Trade and economic organizations Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) The OECD, a group of thirty-one advanced industrial countries that have common trade interests, has long been interested in the establishment of “Biological Resource Centres (BRC). BRCs are defined as government, industry or academic facilities that house, control, test, and use biological resources such as microorganisms, cell lines, DNA and tissue samples. BRCs are envisioned as a potential means for the distribution of biological materials in the international research infrastructure for biotechnology and life sciences. A global network of BRCs could be established by OECD to ensure the availability to member states of standardized (typical) strains of economically valuable micro-organisms as well as to provide a mechanism to share unique biological agents. This is due to the rapid disappearance of private culture collections due in part to withdrawal of governmental financial support and to legislative pressures to restrict the availability biological agents. The planned BRC network would allow the free exchange of microbial cultures among members that met certain defined criteria, and would function as a virtual lending library to enable research and sharing of valuable biological materials with known collaborators. Likewise, this mechanism could be applied to the distribution of dangerous pathogens. To this end the OECD is in the process of establishing an accreditation system to ensure that economically valuable and/or highly dangerous

236 pathogens are appropriately maintained and to design mechanisms that allow access only to those who have a legitimate need for these the materials. The OECD is aware that this process may exclude some countries to a variety of biological materials and is conducting regional consultations with non-member states on how these issues can be addressed. Technical organizations International Centrefor Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB): The ICGEB is part of the UN system and promotes the safe development and use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The ICBEB provides a nongovernmental forum wherein policy issues related to biosafetv and technology transfer can be discussed. The ICGEB works in harmony with its member states to instil good laboratory practices with GMOs in order to protect human health and the environment. The ICGEB participates in the broader forum to prevent the misuse of GMOs in the Interagency Network for Safety in Biotechnology (INSB) chaired by the OEDC. International cooperative agreements: The Australia Group The Australia Group is a voluntary membership of developed countries that cooperate in an effort to control the export and transhipment of chemicals and equipment that could be used in the production of chemical and biological weapons. The group was established in 1984 with 15 countries and now has 38 members as well as the European Commission. Members of the Australia Group work together to harmonize export controls and to share intelligence data regarding proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Their efforts are aimed to control the spread of dual-use biological equipment as well as the distribution of over 100 pathogenic micro-organisms capable of infecting humans, animals andor plants. A challenge for the Australia Group is that lists of restricted materials must regularly be revised to reflect new technologies and non-participating members that supply sensitive materials must be evaluated for membership. Likewise, intelligencesharing among current members and ideologically diverse nations such as China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia raise challenges for their inclusion. Critics argue that the Australia Group’s closed-door policies and restrictive trade practices can be arbitrary, inhibitory to free trade and an impediment to justifiable development. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Pathogenic micro-organisms -naturally occumng and genetically modifiedpresent a significant threat to global health security. There is no clear consensus on how to globally limit the distribution or availability of pathogenic micro-organisms. Development of international norms for the security of these organisms are complicated by the facts that they appear naturally and globally, can self-replicate, are difficult to detect at distance, and can be used for both harm and for good. International agencies offer many examples of activities that should be examined as potential models for global norms and standards. However, the development of security standards should be broad-based and take into consideration the needs of health, science, economics, and international and national law.

LEGAL MEASURES TO PREVENT BIO-CRIMES PROFESSOR BARRY KELLMAN Director, International Weapons Control Center, DePaul University College of Law, Chicago, USA Advisor To The Interpol Secretary-General - Preventing Bio-crimes Bio-weapons threaten mass casualties and immeasurable panic; their indiscriminate consequences will afflict civilians as horribly as combatants. A contagious disease, e.g. plague, can turn victims into extended biological weapons, carrying an epidemic virtually anywhere. More fundamentally, humanity has waged a species-long struggle against disease; to deliberately foment contagion is an act of treason - a fundamental crime against humanity. Despite the grave threats posed by bio-weapons, law enforcement’s capabilities to prevent a catastrophe are constrained by inadequate legal authorization to detect and interdict bio-weapons preparations. Although the Biological Weapons Convention prohibits States from having bio-weapons, it is legal in most nations for persons to acquire pathogens and weaponization equipment and to actually make a weapon. Without laws that criminalize bio-weapons preparations, law enforcers may not investigate disease weaponization nor pursue cooperative investigations to combat transnational bio-weapons production and smuggling. To strengthen law enforcement poses unique challenges. First, strategies must be preventive - to only manage a bio-attack’s consequences and to limit law enforcement to post-event apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of the perpetrators will not save many victims from disease and death. Second, effective measures must advance international cooperation. Criminal networks can transport lethal biological agents through any airport or customs checkpoint without detection; once released, a contagious outbreak will have no respect for borders. The key strategy, therefore, is to globally restrict access to bio-capabilities and to interdict programs in progress. This strategy must augment the capacities of national law enforcement as well as focus the efforts of international organizations. Fortunately, the United Nations Security Council, almost without notice, has set forth a framework that will map our strategies for preventing bio-crimes. Much about this framework is controversial with manifold implications whose significance has yet to be fully appreciated. But not debatable is that Resolution 1540 is now the law of the world, obligatory for all. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 - CONTENT AND OBJECTIVES U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540,’ adopted on 28 April 2004 under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, is motivated by the concern that non-State actors “may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.” S. Res. 1540 recognizes “the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security.” It requires all States to:

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238 “[Aldopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes” @ma. 2); “[Tlake and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials” These controls include: (a) measures to account for and secure such items; (b) effective physical protection measures; (c) effective border controls and law enforcement efforts; and (d) effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items. (para. 3). S. Res. 1540 establishes a Committee to receive reports from States within six months on “steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution” and to report to the Security Council. Because some States “may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution”, S. Res. 1540 “invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests.” Furthermore, S. Res. 1540 calls upon States to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation (para. 9) and to take cooperative action to prevent illegal trafficking (para. 10). Gar, That S. Res. 1540 Fills The BWC, void of verification mechanisms and lacking an international institution to set guidelines and monitor compliance, has long been the weak sibling of the three WMD treaties. During the 1990s, a policy fissure grew between advocates of establishing mechanisms to verify State non-production of BW and advocates of promoting bio-crime prevention measures. These are not inherently exclusive aspirations; certainly there are policies that advance both verification and crime prevention. Yet, disputes about the direction of treaty-related negotiations became increasingly polarized, culminating in the Bush Administration’s rejection of a verification protocol and a remarkable diplomatic debacle at the 2001 Review Conference when a last-minute U.S. proposal to terminate negotiations virtually torpedoed the treaty.’ Tempers have since cooled, but no proposals are even remotely on the table to strengthen international controls of pathogens, verify that States obey their obligations, nor prevent bio-crimes. Most important, there is no organization through which initiatives can be advanced. BWC Article IV requires implementation of penal measures. But because the primary obligations imposed on States are so vague, Article IV is wholly ineffective for preventing non-State actors from cultivating pathogens, assembling equipment critical to weaponization, or transferring highly refined and lethal disease agents. Indeed, until adoption of S. Res. 1540, it has been perfectly legal in most States to prepare lethal biological agents for dissemination. A consideration that motivated S. Res. 1540, therefore, was that there was a gap in international law - that widely appreciated constraints on State behavior do not apply to non-State behavior. Perhaps this gap was of incidental significance in an earlier era when States held an oligopoly of WMD, but non-State actors are challenging that oligopoly. As perception of the threat from non-State actors has grown, so has the realization that, in most States (especially States of greatest concern), accumulation of WMD precursor

239 materials or critical equipment has not been legally proscribed, no domestic authority is mandated to supervise access to such materials or equipment, and neither domestic law nor international law is violated by the trans-national transfer of such items. In this context, adoption of S. Res. 1540, although focusing on WMD generally not just BW, serves to fast-forward implementation of bio-security controls. Committee Monitoring of Compliance -- How Is Compliance Enforced? The resolution does not authorize action to be taken against States to compel compliance. Yet, the resolution was adopted pursuant to Chapter VII - it is of the highest concern to international peace and security. Notably, Chapter VII is rarely invoked except in the context of a particular dispute or crisis. Recent Chapter VII resolutions have dealt specifically with Iraq, Afghanistan, other conflict zones, or the attacks of September 1lth. S. Res. 1540 is not the Security Council’s reaction to any particular event or threat but is an effort to fill a legal gap. In this regard, what does it mean if a State does not fulfill its obligations? Although S. Res. 1540 gives remarkably scant definition to the committee that will receive reports from States, the experience of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) established pursuant to S. Res. 1373 is informative. Adopted in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C., S. Res. 1373 calls upon all States to implement measures to prevent terrorism. Like the committee to be established pursuant to S. Res. 1540, the CTC was authorized to receive reports about how States implement twelve counter-terrorism treaties and other pertinent obligations. To date, the CTC has received extensive reports in response to questionnaires from virtually every State specifying what they have done to prevent terrorism. The CTC can ask more detailed questions or seek clarification from States. States’ reports are posted in full on the U.N. website, available for anyone to peruse. This experience highlights the efficacy of treating “compliance” not as a verification and enforcement matter but as promotion of transparency and potential embarrassment if a State’s measures are less substantial than those of its neighbors. In the debates preceding adoption of S. Res. 1540, various delegates expressed concern about what actions might be taken to enforce ~ompliance.~ But the resolution’s proponents clarified that the resolution does not contemplate enforcement action. According to Mr. Arias of Spain, [Tlhe draft resolution in no way explicitly or implicitly gives a blank check for the use of coercive measures, including the use of force, in cases of non-compliance.” Further according to Mr. Thomson of the United Kingdom, “What this draft resolution does not do is authorize enforcement action against States or against non-State actors in the territory of another country.” Moreover, it will be up to the Security Council as a whole, not individual States, to determine the appropriate course of action. Any enforcement action would require a new Council decision. According to The President, “[Als the resolution will be binding on all Member States, the Council as a whole must remain the final arbiter of compliance. Any necessary enforcement action must be subject to a specific decision by the Council as a whole.. ..” While any Security Council determination will be the product of a unique political and strategic calculus at the time, it is worthwhile to consider what State activity, or lack thereof, constitutes non-compliance with S. Res. 1540. If a State does not implement prohibitions against bio-crimes nor implement measures to keep bio-items secure, what

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happens? What if it has enacted bio-regulatory measures but those measures fall far short of prevailing international standards as promulgated by relevant international organizations? What if it has implemented rigorous standards but failed to enforce them, whether due to lack of capabilities or more sinister reasons? Most important, if terrorists take advantage of a State’s failure to implement and enforce security standards, docs the State’s nonfeasance rise to the level of State responsibility? Offering definitive answers to these questions at this time is impossible. Yet, it is clear that a State may no longer claim, in defense of its nonfeasance, that it did not know it had a legal responsibility to take preventive action. The “defense” of purported ambiguity as to whether it has nonproliferation responsibilities is no longer available. Arguably, before adoption of S. Res. 1540, a State in which criminals or proliferators operated could distinguish between State “support” of criminality and State neglect to take action against crime - if criminals successfully gained BW capabilities from insecure facilities, the State could deny responsibility even if it took no action to encourage or enable that diversion. Now, that argument is not available. All this suggests a substantially enhanced role for inter-governmental organizations and professional associations. Indeed, S. Res. 1540 specifically calls on international organizations to provide assistance to States. At this time, at least three dozen international organizations promulgate guidelines or exercise relevant responsibilities for keeping bio-items secure. All these international organizations need to be coordinated, and the standards they promulgate should be harmonized. What may be foreseen is an integrated network of organizations working cooperatively but with specialized expertise to carry out distinct aspects of bio-security, with mutual representation and assistance. In the final analysis, if a State does not avail itself of support from States with relevant capabilities or from international organizations, nor does it adopt essential measures to satisfy S. Res. 1540, then the Security Council could determine that the State has breached its obligations and impose sanctions. These sanctions would most likely be substantively linked to the scope of the resolution and therefore would seek to impede or prohibit the State’s trade in nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile items. S. RES. 1540 REQIJIREMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS For technologically-advanced States (e.g. members of OECD or the Australia Group), S. Res. 1540 does not require much. Many of these States already have enacted measures that substantially fulfill the resolution’s mandates. But of the roughly 150 remaining States, some have substantial gaps in their legal infrastructure. Filling those gaps in order to satisfy the resolution’s requirements is not trivial. According to Mr. Lovald of Norway: “[Tlhe draft resolution places far-reaching and legally binding demands on all Member States. ... Those steps should cover areas such as national legislation, law enforcement, export controls, border controls, and protection of sensitive materials.”’ Not only must States fulfill these requirements, they must report their compliance measures to a new Security Council committee. National Legislation To Prohibit WMD Proliferation Each nation’s laws should prohibit development, acquisition, or transfer of BWcritical items and should make it a crime to violate that prohibition for hostile purposes.

24 1 Thus, bio-crimes should be illegal everywhere, powerfully reinforcing the norm against acquisition of such weapons as well as facilitating law enforcement and trans-national legal cooperation. National laws applicable to threats and hoaxes should be harmonized and should ensure prosecution of offenders or extradition to another State for prosecution. The scope of legal jurisdiction over such crimes should broadly reach the behavior of legal entities in trans-national smuggling and weapons development conspiracies. A priority question is precisely what activity should constitute a criminal offense. Clearly, the use of BW should be a crime; but it will be necessary to reach preparatory steps that can overlap innocent behavior or even legitimate scientific inquiry. Bio-crime preparations may employ the same materials, equipment and techniques as undertaking legitimate disease research. Standards must be developed to guide law enforcers as to what behavior merits criminal investigation to prevent a hostile attack. Relatedly, legal measures must define “BW’ items, including biological agents that are non-lethal but incapacitating to humans as well as agents that are lethal as to animal or plant life. Each State’s law enforcement officials must work jointly with their counterparts in other States by sharing information, conducting investigations, and prosecuting apprehended criminals. State cooperation both in gathering intelligence and using that information to prevent criminal activity is undermined, however, by lack of coherent legal instruments. There is no integrated database of State laws concerning BW incidents, threats, or hoaxes; it is difficult to know what gaps exist, much less fill them. Worse, many States, especially some of greatest concern, lack capabilities. (technical, financial, and know-how) to implement legal assistance obligations. All this suggests that, to fulfill obligations under S. Res. 1540, States must enact harmonized criminal prohibitions and authorization for law enforcement cooperation in order to establish a seamless web of security among all nations. Failure to do so implicitly poses a threat to international peace and security. Controlling Trans-National Trade of WMD Enacting coherent laws to control the export and trade in sensitive bio-materials is essential to security. Defining the content of such laws is reasonably straightforward with regard to items for nuclear and chemical weapons. But no widely accepted international guidelines apply to trade of pathogens and laboratory equipment; some States control them, most do not. The bigger problem i s that export controls pertain only to license-seekers, but resolute criminals are not likely to seek an export license for their desired items. Toughening standards for a license might discourage legitimate suppliers from knowingly assisting wrongdoers, but such standards have limited utility against covert smuggling. The real challenge, therefore, is to build a system of customs and border controls that can detect secret operations. How might relevant control authorities know what they don’t know? Law enforcers will need to gather information about bio-crimes and link that information with data about criminal networks and smuggling operations from police and customs files. New data sources are needed, gathered through cooperation with industry, stimulated by air, sea and land transportation authorities. That information must be retrieved according to specific collection methodologies and shared among intelligence, law enforcement, regulatory and health organizations. Identification of an anomaly by

242 sophisticated analysis of collected information should provoke follow-on inquiry, either by requesting clarification from a relevant State, by assigning a “task force” to gather more facts, or by authorizing an investigation. The gathering of data that enables insight as to wrongful BW preparations should not intrude on scientific freedom or personal privacy. Even contemplating how governments might undertake information-gathering initiatives has prompted considerable controversy in the United States and the European Union. Effectively globalizing those initiatives suggests an integrated system for preventing BW smuggling that is not remotely on the horizon at this time. Yet, if S. Res. 1540’s requirement that States adopt “effective national export and trans-shipment controls” is to have meaning, these issues need elaboration. Protection of Sensitive Materials Full compliance with S. Res. 1540 requires implementation of prevention measures to deny access to BW-relevant materials and equipment. States should strengthen physical security and containment measures as well as restrict access to sensitive facilities only to properly trained and screened persons. Satisfaction of such measures should be a condition for a license, and anyone having BW-relevant items without authorization should be prosecuted without need for further evidence of malevolent intent. The challenge here is how to keep critical expertise, materials, and equipment from criminals without unduly constricting those items’ non-hostile applications. At issue is the marginal utility of regulation: constraints on technology could pose substantial costs for legitimate industry but hardly impede criminals who can employ alternative technologies. All that said, however, some regulations may make sense, especially if designed to enhance information about where and for what purposes relevant expertise and equipment are being put to use. Promulgation of effective regulations will require careful and effective balancing of myriad considerations on a global scale. An initial question, therefore, is who has authority to established nuanced guidelines? A related concern involves security of critical items during transport. If such items need to be moved, international standards should control their packaging and mode of shipment. It may be appropriate to regulate carriage of BW-critical items with participants monitored for compliance with applicable handling and storage guidelines. Biological agents are almost impossible to detect. They also can be transported in a variety of containers, including as packets within the bodies of living persons or as virulent infections within the bodies of living suicide-terrorists disguised simply as tourist-travelers. Actualizing these regulatory initiatives is complex. States should consider whether to establish official supervisory bodies, information management and reporting systems, and linkages to related policies for advancing scientific progress. To know the extent of compliance within their jurisdiction, each State will need to implement a system for monitoring relevant activity and penalizing non-compliance. Underneath all this is a recognition that bio-tech is not an arcane endeavor on the fringe of commercial activity. Some technologically-advanced States already have regulatory systems that more or less oversee these sectors, but these legitimate sectors are proliferating rapidly across the globe. Requiring every State to establish comparable

243 regulatory systems to register legitimate entities and facilities that handle critical items (only if those facilities adopt rigorous security measures to prevent illicit diversion) is a breathtaking implication of S. Res. 1540. Calling on international organizations to assist this process is a radical contribution to the globalization of technology oversight. PROBLEM: INADEQUATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORIZATION AND CAPACITY Law enforcement personnel (police, customs and border officials, regulatory inspectors, etc.) comprise the primary system for effectuating bio-criminalization. Law enforcers must enforce bio-security measures, detect unlicensed activities that might constitute bio-crime preparations, interdict illicit efforts to use territory to trans-ship pathogens, gather and analyze data for purposes of expanded surveillance, apprehend perpetrators, and mitigate the consequences of a bio-attack and restore order if prevention efforts fail. While law enforcers bear these responsibilities in every State, only in highly developed States are they assisted by networks of professional associations, public health systems, and emergency responders. Unfortunately, in the vast majority of States - from where bio-crimes may be more likely to emerge - law enforcement personnel undertake these responsibilities essentially alone. To carry out these responsibilities with maximum efficacy, law enforcers need authorization and they need capability. “Authorization” refers to the legal empowerment to conduct bio-crime prevention and response functions, without which no law enforcer may legitimately act. As noted above, most States’ laws do not authorize law enforcers to conduct such functions, thereby precluding effective action. To correct this condition by implementation of proper laws and regulatory measures is necessary but is not, by itself, sufficient. Execution of relevant responsibilities demands unique capabilities that entail understanding biological science as well as the operations of research laboratories and pharmaceutical facilities. Moreover, there are challenges of knowing how to detect pathogens that are essentially invisible and are inherently dual-use. To gather, analyze, and share large amounts of technical data requires sophisticated information technology and the training to put that technology to optimal use. In the event of a bio-attack, law enforcement personnel will need sensors and diagnostic equipment and, similarly, training as to how to use it. Again, there is an unfortunate convergence that the States lacking proper authorization tend also to be most deficient in relevant capabilities. There is also a convergence in efforts to address these deficiencies. Law enforcers who propound the importance of enhanced authorization will likely perceive that they lack capabilities to carry out their new responsibilities and will demand better equipment and training. Law enforcers who receive new equipment and training to address a profound threat will likely identify the inadequacies of existing law and put pressure on legislators to broaden authorization. Thus, efforts to strengthen law enforcement should proceed symbiotically by encouraging law reform by equipping law enforcers. PRIORITIES: COMPLYING WITH S. RES. 1540 These obligations are complex and layered, compelling multilateral commitments with differentiated and mutually reinforcing responsibilities that consider the difficulties

244 of isolating legitimate from wrongful behavior as well as considering the sovereignty of States to enforce criminal prohibitions. Altogether these commitments and responsibilities will push the margins of international law. Moreover, from the perspective of prioritizing an implementation strategy, the cure - to coin a phrase - may be worse than the disease, entailing a broad set of bio-security measures that, for most States, is both costly and irrelevant. For all but the few States where research and pharmaceutical use of weapons-capable pathogens is concentrated, these requirements present burdens of establishing a regulatory authority and promulgating intricate safety and protection measures; more onerous is that the police must be trained and equipped to investigate compliance and the penal system must be capable of distinguishing inadvertent shortcomings from behavior designed to cause catastrophic harm. Of undeniable significance here is that many nations are facing urgent public health crises with radically insufficient resources; nature is manifesting disease terrors that far surpass the as yet only hypothetical fears associated with bio-crimes. It is worth noting in this regard that advanced biological science is proliferating - the number of States that are hosts to sophisticated laboratories is expanding, and that trend is likely to accelerate. Moreover, the expansion of biological science is outstripping effective bio-security standards. Promulgation of harmonized bio-security standards, therefore, connotes creating a “bargain” between States whereby the magnitude of bio-security burdens is based on the size and risk of a nation’s life sciences activities and where acceptance of these burdens is both an incentive for and a condition of encouraging new life sciences capab security of all States could improve by integrating a broad international commitment to advance the life sciences with regulatory oversight that is targeted to promote security and consistently applied. The active involvement of the life sciences communities, transcending national boundaries, is critical. The near-term future offers disquieting possibilities that mandate the attention of scientists and health professionals, both because of the potential catastrophic consequences of an actual misuse of biology and because dismissal of possible risks would leave policy making decisions to communities that might be insensitive to the value of scientific freedom. Engagement of the scientific community in this context necessarily means coordinated interaction with the international law enforcement community that is and will be directly responsible for interdicting those who might misuse biology. Bio-crimes prevention policies must respect the aspirations and requirements of scientific inquiry, the economics of producing pharmaceuticals, and the exigencies of trying to enhance public health. In return for policies that respect the aspirations and requirements of scientific inquiry, the economics of producing pharmaceuticals, and the exigencies of trying to enhance public health, the scientific community can offer guidance as to: Developing indicators of misuse that can help laboratory officials, regulators, and police to detect wrongful behavior before it becomes manifest in an actual threat or attack; Expounding a code of responsibility that defines roles and responsibilities for laboratory and related institutional officers with regard to providing information to and interacting with regulatory and police authorities; and

245 Specifying procedures for pursuing and apprehending persons who pose a threat of misuse of pathogens, including specifying rules for obtaining and handling relevant evidence and records. THE INTERPOL PROGRAM FOR PREVENTING BIO-CRIMES On July 1’’ of this year, Interpol launched the Police Training Program for Preventing Bio-Crimes, with support of the Sloan Foundation to develop police methods and strategies to prevent crimes. This Program will create within Interpol the organizational impetus and expertise to lead bio-security initiatives. It will advance law enforcement capabilities to interdict biological weapons technologies and pursue proliferators. Interpol intends to become the international center for information about bio-crimes and about national, regional, and international efforts to prevent them. This is especially important because there is now no systematic collection of incidents involving the wrongful use of biological materials, whether actual, anticipated, or fraudulently perpetrated. As a result, it is impossible to know the extent of criminal activity. A critical function, therefore, is to establish a database of bio-crime events. Interpol will develop an architecture for sharing information with due regard for the risks that information-sharing has for privacy and scientific freedom. The core of Interpol’s Program is to train national law enforcers about bio-crimes. Although the program’s focus is global, training efforts will focus on non-OECD States, especially States that can serve as regional leaders or which have unique characteristics (e.g. a well-developed bio-technology sector). Currently, law enforcers in most nations are not familiar with pathogen control or security of bio-research facilities, nor have they engaged in regulatory oversight of pharmaceutical or agricultural safety. Training will improve capabilities for detecting, deterring, and punishing bio-criminals. Moreover, providing information and training should encourage national police forces to become advocates for resources to augment their capabilities and for legal authorization to investigate illicit bio-crime preparations. The program will also promote relationships with other international and regional organizations as well as NGO’s. By forging integrated networks between national and trans-national bodies and among synergistic disciplines, the program will accelerate and focus global coordination of expertise and resources. These networks will bring in expertise to support Interpol’s missions as well as disseminate Interpol-generated information and experience. In early 2005, Interpol will convene in Lyon, France a global conference of national police chiefs, leaders of international and regional organizations, and bio-terrorism experts. The conference will broadly consider bio-threats and the opportunities for police to work with scientists, public health care providers, and other professionals to augment bio-security. Subsequent regional workshops will initiate a “train the trainers” project that will reach out, through regional organizations, to national police bureaus.

246 CONCLUSION Bio-crimes are, for the most part, an abstraction. The anthrax attacks in 2001 and other isolated crimes demonstrate that concerns are not fanciful, but far more damage has been inflicted by conventional bombings and plane hijackings. Yet, the trend lines are disturbing. Unquestionably, the availability of sophisticated scientific knowledge, materials, and technology means that criminals will find it increasingly easier to wage a catastrophic bio-attack. The global expansion of bio-research and pharmaceutical sectors means that the chances are ever-growing of finding a source of weaponizeable pathogens in a remote location. Perhaps most challenging in the longer term is that explosions in genetic research are opening opportunities for producing an immeasurable catastrophe that could scarcely have been imagined only a few years ago. If the seriousness of the threat is accepted, then the necessity of international action within a legal context cannot be denied. The inherent nature of these threats is global; little can be done to seal off any country fiom criminal conduct or its effects. Multilateral coordination and specific delineation of responsibilities and obligations, while undeniably posing diplomatic challenges, is essential to enhance security. Ultimately, to address threats of bio-crimes demands strengthening international institutions under the rule of law. That is not an ideological argument - disease has no more respect for ideological distinctions than it does for borders - it is an unavoidable implication of biology’s dangers at this time. REFERENCES

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The Security Council convened an open forum for all States to offer their views. S/PV/4950, April 22,2004, http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N04/318/07/PDF/N0431807.pdflOpenElement. This discussion continued after adoption. SPVl4956, April 28,2004, http://odsdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/NO4/327/13/PDF/N04327 13.pdf?OpenElement. Throughout this essay, diplomats’ statements are quoted from these special discussions. Quotations are preceded by reference to the speaker but are not given separate citation. For a discussion of the BWC’s tortured history culminating in the Fifth Review Conference, see Barry Kellman, An International Criminal Law Approach To Bioterrorism, 25 HARV.J. L. & PUB.POL. 721,740-41 (2002). Chapter VII has also been recently used to address prevention of conventional terrorism. See S. Res. 1455 (2003) and S. Res. 1526 (2004), both concerning threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. According to Mr. Danesh-Yazdi of Iran, “[Tlhe current state of international affairs teaches us the following crucial lesson: the follow-up and monitoring of such a resolution cannot be left to the subjective interpretation of individual States. We need common and sound understanding on the part of all States to ensure their faithful implementation of the resolution .. . Mr. De La Sabliere, representing France, offered as a response to the question of what the resolution requires of States: “The Council is establishing the goals, but htt~://ods-dds-nv.un.org/doclUNDOCIGENR\O432843.~df?~enElement.

247 it leaves each State free to define the penalties, legal regulations and practical measures to be adopted. The draft resolution does not establish those aspects.” Although not overtly disingenuous, the comment belies the fact that the goals are sufficiently far-reaching and specific such that States have freedom to “define” how to achieve them only within relatively narrow ambits.

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8.

WATER AND POLLUTION

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OVERVIEW OF THE HYDROLOGIC CYCLE AND ITS CONNECTION TO CLIMATE: DROUGHTS AND FLOODS BISHER IMAM, SOROOSH SOROOSHIAN Center for Hydrometeorology and Remote Sensing University of California, Irvine, USA INTRODUCTION Water is both ubiquitous and important to life on Earth. Through the hydrologic cycle, the occurrence, circulation, and distribution of water in various compartments of the Earth's system, affect the life of the world's increasing population. While oceans hold more than 96.5% of the global water (Shiklomanov and Rodda, 2003), fresh water, which represents a minor fraction (2.53%), is distributed among various reservoirs (Figure 1). The interplay between gravity and solar energy are the primary mechanisms forcing the lateral and vertical movement of waters between these reservoirs and across their interfaces. From the hydrologic point of view, precipitation is the key hydrologic variable linking the atmosphere with land surface processes, and plays a dominant role in both weather and climate. Three fourths of the heat in the atmosphere is contributed by the global release of latent heat (Kummerow et. al., 1998, 2000), while the distribution of water vapor and clouds control the radiation balance. Regional precipitation plays a major role in weather patterns and is, of course, the major renewable source of fresh water (both liquid and frozen). Too much precipitation, or too little, can cause significant damage to life and property through floods and droughts. These two extremes, caused by climatic fluctuations, have been constant concerns to societies since the dawn of humanity. Such concern is exemplified in the Pliny the Elder (23-79 AD) words describing the role of the River Nile in regulating the livelihood of ancient Egyptians: "The country has reason to make careful note of either extreme. When the water rises to only twelve cubits, it experiences the horrors of famine: when it attains thirteen, hunger is still the result; a rise of fourteen cubits is productive of gladness; a rise offiJeen sets all anxieties at rest: while an increase of sixteen is productive of unbounded transports of joy. The greatest increase known, up to the present time, is that of eighteen cubits, which tookplace in the time of the Emperor Claudius; the smallest rise was that offive, in the year of the battle of Pharsalia, the river by this prodigy testlhing its horror Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia, Book C: First Century AD 'I

CHANGE IN GLOBAL TEMPERATURE Concerns about extreme hydrologic events have intensified in recent decades due to increased awareness of climate variability and climate change. It is well documented now that the mean global temperature has increased by about 0.3"C to 0.6" since 1880, and by about 0.2 to 0.3 2°C in the past forty years, which represents a period of more reliable record. Figure 2 illustrates the above-mentioned trend for 3 latitudinal bands: northern, lower, and southern. The increase in temperature is noticeably higher in the northern

251

252 latitudes than in both the lower and southern latitudes. In fact, the greatest increase is found between 40"N-7OoN. Satellite observations of sea surface temperature have also confirmed that warming is evident in both sea surface temperature (Cane et. al. 1997) and land-based surface air temperatures. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2001 report, which represents a synthesis of key climate change studies, identified two distinct periods of change in temperature (1919-1945, and post-1975), with the latter being associated with a rate of change exceeding O.lS"C/decade. Furthermore, the report concluded that in most cases, the observed change in temperature is mainly due to increased daily minimum temperature, with maximum temperatures not displaying statistically significant trends. The question then is whether the changes described above have resulted in intensifymg the hydrologic cycle and in increasing the likelihood of extreme events? The question invites many follow-up questions, including at what spatial and temporal scales can change be detected and are some regions more susceptible to change than others? Developing answers to these questions requires long-term monitoring and rigorous investigation of many state-variables reflecting the interactions between water and energy fluxes at the land surface (i.e., precipitation, runoff, soil moisture, soil evaporation, and evapotranspiration).For example, changes in precipitation patterns (both in time and space), and the impact of these changes on the hydrologic cycle must be documented and understood. Similarly, long-term records must be examined to determine if droughts are becoming more common, if and where the severity of droughts is increasing, if the timing and magnitude of snow-accumulation and snow-melt onset is changing, and if changes are taking place in regional vegetation cover. Needless to say, global coverage of many state-variables over the longest possible time series is needed to understand the natural variability of the hydrological cycle so that deviations from the norm, such as a genuine progressive amplification of the cycle, can be detected with confidence. POTENTIAL HYDROLOGIC IMPACTS OF GLOBAL CHANGE As air temperature increases, the water holding capacity of the atmosphere increases due to higher saturation vapor pressure. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between temperature and saturation vapor pressure. As seen in this figure, while a change of 0.6"C in air temperature may only yield a small change in saturation vapor pressure, the projected range of change (1°C to 4°C) from the current mean temperature value during the next 80 years will be associated with more drastic changes in atmospheric moisture. This will most likely influence moisture circulation at global and regional scales. Arguably, there are potentials for more intense precipitation, which causes floods, as well as for extended periods of dryer conditions due to longer residence time and to changes in recycling ratio, which represents the amount of rain generated locally within a given region compared to moisture advection from outside (Eltahir and Bras, 1996). Satellite observation and radio-sound measurements have shown an upward trend in atmospheric moisture reaching 10% during the past three decades (Ross and Elliott, 1996). While such a trend was observed in regions associated with increased temperature over the same period (Ross and Elliott, 2001), regions where temperature decreased showed downward trends in precipitable water (Hense et. al., 1988). Trenberth et al., (2003), argue that despite uncertainties in measurements, most studies point to

253 statistically significant upward trends in atmospheric moisture consistent with observations of increased temperature. Because of increased social and economic vulnerability to extreme events, answering these questions is highly important to many flood managers and to disaster management agencies worldwide. Figure 4 was produced based on flood damage estimates published by the Dartmouth Flood Observatory (Brakenridge et. al.). It is noteworthy that according to the available estimates, a single flood event, which was the worst flood in 150 years to affect the east coast of China during June of 1998, was responsible- for nearly $210 Billion of the total $236 of economic damage. While the primary cause of damage was the flood itself, heavy rains lasting more than 13 days also induced widespread mudslides, thereby compounding the damage. Similarly, 136,000 of the 169,000 fatalities in 1991 resulted from a single tropical cyclone event that affected the Southeastern coast of Bangladesh and displaced more that 10 million people. It is not surprising therefore, that over the past decade numerous studies have attempted to quantify trends in various climatic variables. These studies have confirmed changes in annual precipitation during the past century. Hulme, et al., (1998) reported an increase of 2% in global precipitation since 1900. However, the spatial and temporal characteristics of precipitation trends point to high variability in both dimensions. For example, while the IPCC report indicates a 5% to 10% increase of mean annual precipitation over the United States during the past century, several drought episodes have punctuated the trend (Karl and Knight, 1998). Needless to say, when discussing floods, changes in the total annual precipitation are less important than changes in other characteristics of precipitation including intensity, duration, and the number of consecutive days of heavy precipitation. In fact, the sparse network of hourly precipitation gauges on a global scale hinders assessing trends of these characteristics. In the United States, where the density of a good quality precipitation network allows such analysis, the number of days with precipitation exceeding 50.8 mm (2 inch threshold for heavy rain) was found to be increasing (Karl and Night, 1998). Local analysis performed on 6 rain gauges in the Walnut Gulch experimental watershed shows an upward trend of wet days between 1956 and 1990 (Figure 5). Similar trends were observed for 9 and 39 stations within the same watershed but for a shorter record period. Some argue that the amplification of the hydrologic cycle is best illustrated by the stark differences between 2002 and 2003, particularly across Europe (Pal et al., 2004). In 2002, major floods swept the continent causing significant damage (Figure 6), while in 2003, summer droughts, caused by a combination of record high temperatures and low precipitation ravaged the continent causing major wildfires all over the continent. Trends in the number of wildfires can also be observed in the US (Figure 7), where the number of wildfires in BLM managed lands has increased significantly during the 1990s. Clearly, recent studies suggest an intensification of the hydrologic cycle. While this intensification can be attributed to increases in mean temperature, much remains to be done before the changes in the hydrologic cycle can be quantified with certainty. Most importantly, both the identification of local impacts of an intensified hydrologic cycle and the prediction of such impacts in the future require the availability of high spatial and temporal resolution data of many hydrologic variables. Paramount among these is precipitation. With respect to observation, satellites offer a unique opportunity to monitor precipitation at the required resolution. However, the spatial (0.25') and temporal (5 day-

254 monthly) resolution of most satellite based precipitation products continue to be consistent with climate models as opposed to hydrologic models. Quantifying changes in rainfall intensity as well as in the diurnal cycle of precipitation (Sorooshian et al., 2002) requires estimates at much higher resolutions. The Global Precipitation Measuring Mission (GPM), to be launched in 2008, encompasses several satellites and is expected to offer both the resolution and spatial coverage required for more accurate quantification of precipitation. In the meantime, research efforts are being carried out in the Center for Hydrometeorology and Remote Sensing, at the University of California, Irvine, to improve the resolution of precipitation estimates through the use of information from multiple satellites and through the testing and implementation of cloud classification algorithm (CCS) (Hong, et al., 2003) within the Precipitation Estimation from Remote Sensing Information using Artificial Neural Networks (PERSIA”) (Sorooshian, et al., 2000). The new algorithm, termed PERSIANN-CCS, provides hourly and 3 hourly precipitation estimates at 4 km resolution (Figure 8), thereby improving the opportunity for krther study of the intensification of the hydrologic cycle. On the other hand, predicting the impacts of potential climate change scenarios on the hydrologic cycle needs further development. Uncertainties in scenario assessment, as well as in model predictions, continue to affect our ability to reach a comprehensive understanding of the feedback cycle between the atmosphere-ocean-land surface components at the global scale (IPCC, 2001 and Smith et al., 2002), and of the dominant process on a watershed scale. Figure 9 illustrates the wide range of uncertainties associated with scenario predictions of global temperature and precipitation, greater uncertainties would be expected at a local scale, and more significantly in predicting changes in precipitation characteristics at an event scale (intensity, soil-liquid, event duration, recurrence) (Trenberth et al., 2003). SUMMARY There is evidence to suggest that the observed increase in temperature over the past century will impact the hydrologic cycle at global, regional, and local scales. As increases in temperature result in an increase of the atmosphere’s moisture holding capacity, the hydrologic cycle is expected to intensify. Observations support the notion that while total precipitation may not have changed significantly over the past century, statistically significant changes in precipitation characteristics have been observed. Arguably, such changes, coupled with increasing vulnerability to extreme events may have been responsible for some of the worst floods and drought damage observed in recent decades. Further studies are essential to improve both monitoring and modeling of the precipitation process as well as the interaction between the atmosphere-ocean-land surface components of the Earth’s system. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The authors wish to thank the various agencies in the United States (NASA, NSF, and NOAA) for their support of our research related to the hydrologic cycle.

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Brakenridge, G.R., Anderson, E., Caquard, S., Flood Summary Tables, 19932004, Dartmouth flood Observatory, Hanover, USA, digital media, http://m.darhnouth.edu/-floodslarchives. Cane, M.A., A. C. Clement, A. Kaplan, Y. Kushnir, D. Pozdnyakov, R. Seager, S. E. Zebiak, and R. Murtugudde, 1997, Twentieth-Century Sea Surface Temperature Trends, Science 275: 957-960. Eltahir, E.A.B., and R. L. Bras, 1996: Precipitation recycling. Rev. Geophys., 34, 367-3 7 8. Hense, A,, P. Krahe, and H. Flohn, 1988: Recent fluctuations of tropospheric temperature and water vapor content in the tropics. Meteor. Atmos. Phys., 38,215227. Hong, Y., K. Hsu, and S. Sorooshian, 2003, “An Automatic Segmentation Algorithm for Cloud Infrared Satellite Images: Incremental Temperature Threshold Technique”, Report, 03-020, Dept of Hydrology and Water Resources, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona. Hulme, M., T.J. Osborn and T.C. Johns, 1998: Precipitation sensitivity to, global warming: Comparison of observations with HadCM2 simulations. Geophys. Res. Lett., 25,3379-3382. IPCC, 2001: Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Houghton, J.T.,Y. Ding, D.J. Griggs, M. Noguer, P.J. van der Linden, X. Dai, K. Maskell, and C.A. Johnson (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U. K. and New York, NY, USA, 881pp. Karl, T R., and R.W. Knight, 1998: Secular trends of precipitation amount, frequency, and intensity in the United States. BAMS, 79,231-242. Kummerow, C., W. Barnes, T. Kozu, J. Shiue, and J. Simpson, 1998: The tropical rainfall measurement mission (TRMM) sensor package. Journal of Atmospheric Oceanic Technology, 15, 809-816. Kummerow, C., J. Simpson, 0. Thiele, W. Barnes, A.T.C. Cgang, E. Stocker, R.F. Adler, A. Hou, R. Kakar, F. Wentz, P. Ashcroft, T. Kum, Y. Hong, K. Okamoto, T. Iguchi, H. Kuroiwa, E. Im, Z. Haddad, G. Huffman, B. Ferrier, W.S. Olson, E. Ziper, E.A. Smith, T.T. Wilheit, G. North, T. Krishnamurti, and K. Nakamura, 2000: The status of the tropical rainfall measuring mission (TRMM) after two years on orbit. Journal of Applied meteorology, 39, 1965-1982. Pal J.S., F. Giorgi, and X.Q. Bi, Consistency of recent European summer precipitation trends and extremes with future regional climate projections, Geophysical Research Letters 3 1 (13). Ross, R.J., and W.P. Elliott, 1996: Tropospheric water vapor climatology and trends over North America: 1973-93. J. Climate, 9,3561-3574. ROSS,R.J., and W.P. Elliott 2001: Radiosonde-based Northern Hemisphere tropospheric water vapor trends. J. Climate, 14, 1602-161 1. Shiklomanov, 1.A (Editor), and J.C. Rodda (Editor), 2003, World Water Resources at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century (International Hydrology Series), Cambridge University Press.

256 15. Smith T.M, T.R. Karl, and R W. Reynolds, Climate modeling: How accurate are climate simulations? SCIENCE 296 (5567): 483-484 Apr 19,2002. 16. Sorooshian, S., X. Gao, K. Hsu, R.A. Maddox, Y . Hong, B. Imam, and H.V. Gupta, “Diurnal Variability of Tropical Rainfall Retrieved from Combined GOES and TRMM Satellite Information,”, Journal of Climate, Vol. 15, No. 9,983-1001 May 2002. 17. Sorooshian, S., K. Hsu, X. Gao, H.V. Gupta, B. Imam and D. Braithwaite, “Evaluation of PERSIA” System Satellite-Based Estimates of Tropical Rainfall,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Vol. 81, No. 9,2035-2046,2000. 18. Trenberth K.E., A.G. Dai, R.M. Rasmussen, B.B. Parsons, 2003. The changing character of precipitation, BAMS 84 (9). 19. World Water Resources at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century, Edited by I.A. Shiklomanov, John C. Rodda, Cambridge Press (available Jan 2005)

El

Ice 24364. I 69.554%

Kl Others

I3 Rivers

E3 Marshes

135.14

2.12 0.006%

0.386% 0.033%

I

I

I

Lakes

Groundwater 10530 30.06 I%

91 0.260%

I

0.037%

0 Soil I E E 1Q.U

0.047%

I

Figure 1. Distribution of terrestrial fresh water storages based on data from Shiklomanov, 2003). Upper numbers represent the total volume of each storage in 100 km . The lower numbers represent the percentage of total terrestrial fresh water.

257

to

Cn 00

1 — 23.6°N-90°N

23.6°S-23.6°N ----- 90°S-23.6°S

0.8

o 0.6

(0

0)

0.2

1

0

= Slog(q - 20)- 13.3 (19) At 400 km a blue jet has an apparent magnitude of about -0.4. The problems arising when these phenomena are observed from space are analogous to those related to the red sprites: they are geometrically projected against the stormy cell, and then the emitted radiation is dominated by the light coming from the lightning. In any case, if the sensor limit magnitude is +6, the observing height cannot be larger than 1,000 km.

Elves Elves are produced by the interaction between the mesosphere (between 75 and 100 km) and the electromagnetic fields originated by very powerful lightning. They have a flat and circular shape with diameters of about 200 km. They can be associated also with red sprites but they form before. Their duration is less than 1 millisecond. The elves power is far less than the red sprites and they can be observed only if they are viewed in profile. Viewed from orbit, elves are projected on the stormy cell and on the lightning that it generates, so their observation can be very difficult. Noctilucent clouds Noctilucent clouds (NLC) are the highest clouds observable in the atmosphere. Their average height is 83 km. NLC are formed by water ice and are similar to cirrus, but are thinner and blue or silver colored. Due to the absence of winds, their evolution is very slow, if compared to the tropospheric clouds. Due to their low optical

479 thickness, they can be observed at sunset and dawn, when the Sun height is 6"-12" below the horizon. In these conditions their contrast with the sky is maximum. NLC are usually observed during the summer from regions having latitude included between 50"-60" in both hemispheres. During one year, 10-20 NLC are visible, thus it is a quite rare phenomenon. From space they can be only visible from the terminator region, they are very thin, and so, if observed from space, their localization is very difficult. From the ground, in fact, they can be observed mainly when they are low on the horizon, a condition in which their optical thickness is higher. From space and using a large field of view, the observation of NLC is hampered from their faintness, which requires high exposure times near the terminator light. Auroras The aurora is a phenomenon caused by the interaction between the charged particles of the solar wind and the atoms of the ionosphere. When the solar wind charged particles interact with the Earth's magnetic field, most of them are reflected in the interplanetary space, but some, moving along helicoidal trajectories along the lines of the magnetic field, can penetrate the atmosphere in correspondence to the magnetic poles. In the ionosphere there are oxygen and nitrogen atoms, which emit radiation after being excited by the charged particles. The aurora spectrum is a typical emission spectrum (see Table 6).

Table 3 Me Table 6; Characteristic emission lines of an aurora spectrum.

The aurora heights span from 70 to a maximum of 1,100 km with the higher occurrence being between 90 and 110 km. The duration of an aurora can span from some seconds to some hours. The typical power of terrestrial auroras is of the order of 10" W. Using the Pogson relation (eq. 15); the apparent visual magnitude of an aurora occurring at a height of 100 km is given by: mouroro = 5log(g - 100)-28.3

(20)

Supposing that the satellite is at a height of 400 km, the apparent visual magnitude will be about -16. PLANETARY PHENOMENA They essentially consist of the same events we can observe on Earth, except impact flashes on the surface of atmosphereless bodies. Of course, these phenomena show different characteristics due to the different physical environments.

480

METEORS ON MARS As we have seen, on Earth a meteor occurs when a meteoroid interacts with the atmosphere between 120 and 75 km. Usually, meteoroids are grouped in streams associated with comet or asteroid orbits. So far, the study of meteoroid streams in the interplanetary space has been limited to those intersecting the Earth's orbit. Nevertheless, in principle, we can observe meteors on almost all the major bodies of the Solar System. Apart from Mercury and Pluto, all the other planets of the Solar System (and even the satellite of Saturn, Titan, and the Neptune satellite, Triton) have sufficiently dense atmospheres to generate the meteor phenomenon. Mars is one of the planets where meteors could be observable. Here we can anticipate that the study of the meteors on Mars from orbit would be possible using the same instruments necessary for the observation of terrestrial ones. The phenomenon is very similar, but will allow investigations of meteoroid streams at larger distances from the Sun and closer to the asteroid main belt. Mars orbits at a mean distance from the Sun of 1.524 AU, with a period of 1.88 years and an orbital eccentricity of 0.0934. Its mean equatorial diameter is 3,396 km and its mass 0.107 Earth's masses. Due to its small mass, the gravity acceleration on the planet surface is only 3.72 m/s2 (38% of the terrestrial one) and the escape velocity 5.03 !un s-' . On the Mars surface the atmospheric density varies from 7 to 10 mbar and the carbon dioxide (C02) is the principal component. The pressure can reach 14 mbar in the bottom of the deepest canyons and reaches 0.3 mbar on the top of the big Martian volcanoes, as Olympus Mons. As comparison, the composition of the terrestrial and Martian atmospheres is, respectively, as follows: 95.3% CO2, 2.7% Nz, 1.6% Ar, 0.13% 0 2 , and 78% N2,21% 02,1% Ar. The meteor height on Mars In spite of the difference in chemical composition of the Earth's and Mars' atmospheres, in the same conditions (atmosphere density, meteoroid mass and velocity), the meteors show the same luminous intensity because less than 3% of the trail emitted radiation is produced by atmospheric atoms. If almost all the radiation comes from the meteoroid ablation, even the spectra will be similar to those of the terrestrial meteors. Assuming that for the Earth and Mars the simple isothermal atmosphere model with constant gravity acceleration is valid, the atmospheric densityp in function of the height q is given by (law of the atmospheres): p(q) = p,,e(-y'H)

(21)

where po is the density at the surface (q=O km), and H i s the scale height of the atmosphere: H = -RT

(22)

Pg

where R is the gas constant, 2' the absolute temperature in "K, g the gravity acceleration on the surface, and p the mean molecular weight.

481

Table 3 Me Table 7 Parameters of the exponential atmosphere model for the Earth and Mars.

Using equation (21) and imposing the same density of the Earth's and Mars' atmospheric layers, we can compute the height where on Mars meteors occur:

The ratio of the densities can be obtained using the perfect gas law: POE -

POEPET,

POM

'OMPMTE

(24)

From the data in Tab. 8 and using equation (24), the density ratio on the ground between the Earth and Mars is 73. From equation (23) we obtain that the interval 100+40 km on Mars corresponds to the interval 120+70 km on the Earth. This range is in good agreement with that obtained by numerical simulations (Adolfsson et al., 1996). The atmospheric density intervals span from to lo-' g cm". This result indicates that at the same meteoroid mass and velocity, the meteors on Mars occur at a lower height, and that from the Mars surface the meteor apparent magnitude will be a little lower (higher luminosity) with respect to the same meteor as viewed from the Earth's surface. .

-

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'3,

. . Earth . .

8.

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