Democratic Policing in Transitional And Developing Countries (Interdisciplinary Research Series in Ethnic, Gender and Class Relations)

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DEMOCRATIC POLICING IN TRANSITIONAL AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries

Edited by NATHAN W. PINO Texas State University – San Marcos, USA and MICHAEL D. WIATROWSKI

© Nathan Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Nathan Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski have asserted their moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Democratic policing in transitional and developing countries. – (Interdisciplinary research series in ethnic, gender and class relations) 1. Law enforcement – Developing countries 2. Police – Developing countries 3. Police – Government policy – Developing countries 4. Democratization – Developing countries I. Pino, Nathan II Wiatrowski, Michael D. 363.2'3'091724 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Democratic policing in transitional and developing countries / edited by Nathan Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski. p. cm. -- (Interdisciplinary research series in ethnic, gender and class relations) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 0-7546-4719-6 1. Police -- Developing countries. 2. Democratizatoin -- Developing countries. 3. Community policing -- Developing countries. 4. Police-community relations -- Developing countries. 5. Crime prevention -- Developing countries -- Citizen participation. I. Pino, Nathan. II. Wiatrowski, Michael D. III. Series. HV7921.D45 2006 363.2'3091724--dc22 2006007626 ISBN-10: 0 7546 4719 6 ISBN-13: 978-0-7546-4719-5

Printed and bound by Athenaeum Press, Ltd. Gateshead, Tyne & Wear

Contents List of Tables and Figures List of Contributors Acknowledgements and Dedications Part 1

vii viii xi

Prospects for Democratic Policing

Introduction Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski

3

1

Assessing the Obstacles Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski

11

2

Policing and Police Reform in the US: Adequate for Export? Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski

43

3

The Principles of Democratic Policing Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski

69

4

Implementing Democratic Policing and Related Initiatives Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski

99

Part 2

Country Case Studies

Introduction Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski

129

5

Policing and Institution Building in Iraq Rehan Mullick and Rabia Nusrat

131

6

Crime, Power, and Policing in South Africa: Beyond Protected Privilege and Privileged Protection 149 Robert Shanafelt

7

Human Rights and Democratic Police Reform in Northern Ireland Steven T. Engel

8

Creating Police Partnerships with Civil Society in Kazakhstan through US-Funded Domestic Violence Training: A Step Toward Democratic Policing Edward Snajdr

165

179

vi

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The Role of the Police in Promoting the Rule of Law Heath Grant, Jane Grabias, and Roy Godson

Part 3 10

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Conclusion

Conclusion Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski

Bibliography Index

211 219 247

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1.1 Table 3.1 Table 8.1

Factors Affecting Democratic Police Reform by Level of Analysis 12 The Democratic Policing Model and Related Goals 80 Training Program Implemented in Almaty, Kazakhstan 188

Figure 9.1 Educational Goals of Rule of Law Training

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List of Contributors Dr. Steven T. Engel is an associate professor of political science at Georgia Southern University. He earned his Ph.D. in political science from Loyola University Chicago in 2000. His research interests span political science, political philosophy, and policing. He has conducted field research on police reform in Northern Ireland and has presented that research at conferences in the U.S. and Northern Ireland. He is the author, with George Burruss, of the 2004 article “Human Rights in the New Training Curriculum of the Police Service of Northern Ireland” in Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management. Dr. Roy Godson is a professor of government at Georgetown University, founding director of the Culture of Lawfulness Project, and president of the National Strategy Information Center. He works with education officials, police officers, journalists, and religious leaders throughout the world on the development of educational programs to promote the rule of law and counter crime, corruption, and terrorism. He has served as a consultant to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Dr. Godson has written and edited 25 books and numerous articles, most recently Menace to Society: Political-Criminal Collaboration Around the World (2003). His previous work, Organized Crime and Democratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands (2000), is available in both US and Mexican Spanishlanguage editions. He is also the founding editor of Trends in Organized Crime. Jane Grabias is a program officer for the Culture of Lawfulness Project. A specialist in the analysis of public security policy in Latin America, Ms. Grabias has concentrated on efforts to reform police forces in Peru, Colombia, El Salvador, Brazil, and Mexico. Previously she worked as a professional writer and editor for the Vera Institute of Justice in New York City. Fluent in Spanish, Ms. Grabias has a master’s degree in public administration from Columbia University. Dr. Heath Grant is currently a Deputy Chair in the Department of Law, Police Science and Criminal Justice Administration at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. In his former capacity as Senior Research Associate of the Criminal Justice Research and Evaluation Center, Dr. Grant was involved in evaluation and technical assistance efforts to law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies nationwide. Many of his projects have involved the development of law enforcement/community partnerships to address a host of issues, ranging from economic development, substance abuse/ trafficking, and sex offender management, to juvenile gun violence and school-

List of Contributors

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based programming. Current projects include serving as a trainer and technical assistance provider in an international school-based effort to combat organized crime and corruption, beginning in Mexico but since expanding to Columbia, Peru, El Salvador, and the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. He is also currently coprincipal investigator on a DOJ funded effort to assess nationwide best practices related to cultural diversity and policing, in partnership with the police departments of New York, Houston, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Atlanta. A recent Fulbright/NIJ project involves working with the law enforcement agencies internationally to create a counter-terrorism training program that highlights the need for human rights and community mobilization strategies. Dr. Rehan Mullick is a founding associate of Bridges Development Consortium. He received his Ph.D. in sociology from Iowa State University and has expertise in survey design, data analysis, civil society, local governance, institution building, and economic development in transitional economies and the Middle East. Dr. Mullick worked for the Humanitarian Coordinator at the United Nations Iraqi-based office and oversaw the implementation of the Oil-for-Food program. He also assessed and monitored humanitarian conditions and studied the impact of “Oil for Food” supplies in Iraq. He returned to post-war Iraq in 2002 to carry out the “quality of life” survey for USAID. Rabia Nusrat is a staff person at Bridges Development Consortium. Dr. Nathan Pino is an assistant professor of sociology at Texas State University - San Marcos. He received his BS in applied sociology from Texas State University and his MS and Ph.D. in Sociology concentrating in deviance, crime and development from Iowa State University. His research interests include democratic policing in an international context, sexual violence, and the attitudes and behaviors of college students. Dr. Pino is the author of numerous articles, including the 2001 article “Community Policing and Social Capital” in Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management. Dr. Robert Shanafelt received his Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Florida. His experience in southern Africa dates back to the early 1980s, when he lived and worked in Lesotho as a Peace Corps volunteer. His publication most relevant to this volume is “‘life is war’: Human Rights, Political Violence, and Struggles for Power in Lesotho,” in Ronald Cohen, Goran Hyden, and Winston P. Nagan, eds. Human Rights and Governance in Africa, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida,1993). Presently he teaches at Georgia Southern University. Dr. Edward Snajdr (PhD., University of Pittsburgh) is an assistant professor of anthropology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY. His research focuses on domestic violence, gender, and civil society in post-communist cultures and the application of anthropological perspectives to the fields of development,

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legal reform and criminology. He has conducted fieldwork in Slovakia funded by the Fulbright IIIE Program, the International Research and Exchanges Board, the National Science Foundation, Anthropology Division, and in Kazakhstan by the National Science Foundation Law and Social Science Program. From 1999 to 2003, Dr. Snajdr co-directed a U.S. State Department INL Domestic Violence Training Program for Law Enforcement in Kazakhstan. His publications have appeared in the journals American Ethnologist, Problems of Post-Communism, Crime and Justice International, and in several edited volumes. Dr. Michael Wiatrowski received his Ph.D. in Urban Studies at Portland State University in 1978 with a concentration in criminology and urban sociology after receiving a Masters in Criminology at Florida State University in 1975. While studying under the preeminent Dr. Don C Gibbons, he began a lifelong interest in delinquency, crime prevention and theories of social justice. He was deeply affected by the era of the Vietnam Conflict, serving in Vietnam as a company commander in the 720th Military Police Battalion. As a University Professor, he published in the areas of delinquency, community policing, and crime prevention. In 1997 he served as a Lieutenant Colonel with the U.S. Army in Bosnia and began to develop his interests in policing and democracy. The images of the destruction of Sarajevo and the genocide of the Bosnian people in the name of nationalism and MarxistLeninism brought his focus to this book. He continues his scholarship in the area of developing approaches, founded in democratic principals, to policing in emerging democracies and post conflict societies.

Acknowledgements and Dedications

Nathan Pino I could not have written this book without the loving and intellectual support of my wife, Kyong Hee Chee, and my parents David and Carol Pino. I would also like to thank my brother and his wife, Aaron and Victoria, for their support. I dedicate this book to all of them. Special thanks must also go to Miranda Scott for helping us get our bibliography right, and Abby Johnson and Yolanda Early for their assistance in formatting the bibliography. We also thank Robert Shanafelt for his assistance in editing the manuscript and formatting endnotes, and F. Erik Brooks for his comments on our manuscript. Many thanks also go to David Pino for proofreading the manuscript and rescuing us from our use of split infinitives. We would also like to thank Biko Agozino, Mary Savigar and all others at Ashgate for their support of this book. My intellectual mentors from my graduate work at Iowa State University, Robert F. Meier and Robert Mazur, also deserve my thanks because they guided and encouraged my interest in both crime and socioeconomic development. Finally, I would like to personally thank Michael Wiatrowski for his willingness to collaborate with me. It is rewarding to meet someone with similar interests and values. His insight, knowledge, and ideas have inspired me. Michael Wiatrowski In February 1997 in Sarajevo, Bosnia I saw a New York City police officer embrace a Serbian Police Officer. He declared that they were both “brother police officers”. As an American military officer charged with training international police officers to monitor the Dayton Agreement, I was shocked that this American police officer had so little understanding of his role in a democratic society or the role the police in totalitarian societies play in the oppression of their people. As an American military officer who had taken an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States, with that scene in my mind, I began my search for understanding the role of policing in a democratic society. I have been deeply influenced by Sir John Alderson, the foremost scholar on democracy, policing and freedom. Sir Alderson, a police officer for 36 years, Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall and former Assistant Commissioner of Scotland Yard, has written extensively about police theory and practice. I am privileged to

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know Sir Alderson as a friend and scholar who has deeply influenced my thinking on the role of policing in a democratic society. I would like to dedicate this to my parents, Betty and Hillard Wiatrowski and my sister Janet and brother Chuck Wiatrowski. I also dedicate this to Becky Fisher, who encouraged me to write this book when she told me about the book she was writing about her experiences with cancer, and my friends who have always provided understanding and caring and friendship: Nancy Kloos, Toni Wolfe and Jo Judy. I am very thankful to have had all of you in my life. Dr. Nathan Pino helped me take an experience and mélange of ideas and meld them with his scholarship to produce this book where we challenged and influenced each other in a collaboration which I appreciate most highly. I appreciate his dedication and commitment to academic and democratic values, freedom of inquiry and a commitment to make the world a place where democratic and human rights will be respected and come to prevail, and where totalitarian and autocratic societies will be loathsome footnotes in ancient history books. We formed a collegial partnership in the production of this book. It is truly a collaboration of two individuals with two unique and contrasting sets of experience and knowledge. An incredibly diverse universe of ideas was developed, shared, debated and then placed in this book. The whole truly is more than the sum of the parts. Individually we probably would not have completed this book. Collectively we have both grown in many ways as a result of this project. We would appreciate noting that the order of authorship simply reflects that we equally contributed in different ways towards the development and completion of this project.

PART 1 Prospects for Democratic Policing


Part 1

Introduction Nathan W. Pino Texas State University – San Marcos

Michael D. Wiatrowski

Democratization has become one of the dominant international issues of this new century (Barber 2000). The fundamental precept of democracy is that of human freedom and to develop the capacity to enjoy that freedom. But it is not the freedom that Anatole France (1916) noted when he stated, “The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.” Prior to the democratic revolution aristocracies were concerned with the Divine Rights of kings, but for the first time on a large scale the rights of mankind became paramount. After 4,000 years of hereditary forms of rule, most of which were not benign, we are now experiencing an era where individuals constitute their government and attempt to maximize their freedom. This same era, however, has also seen many autocracies of unparalleled savage callousness, where a small group imposes and maintains its will on those it oppresses. These autocracies frequently emerge from some vision of society that is maintained by an infrastructure of repression as we have seen in Nazi Germany, Stalin’s Russia, Hussein’s Iraq, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, or Pinochet’s Chile. There is also a laundry list of vicious tyrants in post-colonial Africa who learned the tools of oppression from their colonial masters and who have kept a continent of unmatched richness mired in corruption, oppression and poverty. Fortunately, numerous countries with historical legacies of autocracy, dictatorship and state-failure have started down the road towards democratic development. This is best viewed as a process as countries struggle to implement some of the most basic democratic ideals. These ideals include developing and protecting individual freedoms and civil liberties, insuring citizen safety and security, promoting the rule of law, direct and representative democratic institutions, the establishment of justice systems and the deprivation of freedom only through due process, creating institutional accountability, promoting institutional transparency, fostering legitimacy in institutions and establishing the subordination of the military and police to institutions of civil democratic authority. This is part of a much larger framework for the creation of civil society which supports economic, social and political development.

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We have seen statements of human rights first enumerated in the Magna Carta and later in documents such as the American Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. The defeat of the Axis in World War II saw the emergence of the United Nations and in 1948 the exposition of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet while these words existed in the U.S. minorities were deprived of rights and oppressed with Jim Crow laws, segregation, and the Ku Klux Klan. These words also existed in authoritarian socialist autocracies with fiendishly efficient secret police who murdered dissent and expression. Countries which bring developmental assistance frequently do so through the lens of their own national experience, which may be inapplicable or irrelevant. This is made worse when countries attempt to bring democracy to other countries through a monopoly of force or other coercive methods. In many cases, democracies are not the product of these endeavors. US involvement in Iraq presents a recent example. In Karbala, a largely Shiite area of Iraq, religious and community leaders met after the U.S. invasion, selected a city council, and set up a security force in order to attempt self-rule. According to the CBS television program 60-Minutes (December 4, 2003), US troops disarmed the protection force, arrested popular city councilmen and installed in power Baathists that had served under Saddam Hussein’s regime (even though the process of De’Ba’athification was starting to take shape). One US government explanation for this practice was that already-trained people were needed to restore order quickly, although it appeared that order may have already been restored there. No attempt was made to assess the legitimacy of this council in complete contravention of US Army Civil Military Operations doctrine. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights states that individuals have rights and societies have an obligation to improve the quality of life in a humandevelopment framework that provides specific benchmarks and measures of development (Fukuda-Parr and Kumar, 2003). The rights in this and other similar documents only can exist if they are protected and nurtured. The freedom to eat and the shelter of a family exist only where it is protected by various institutions (including the police) which have as their mission to provide a safe and secure environment. Sir Robert Peele is well known for arguing that the police did on a full time basis what was the responsibility of all: to maintain order. But this order must respect human rights and develop democratically. Without democratic forms of security and justice, we can have repressive forms of security as part of a policing apparatus, such as the Janjuwib in Sudan, sweeping from the hills burning villages and crops, raping and impregnating women to violate the sanctity of women in Islamic culture, and to shame them when they cannot resist or protect themselves. We also have images of doors bursting open at 4am, the hour that those in Stalinist Russia feared. The idea of security entails both protection of freedom and the removal of freedom only through a highly articulated system of due process that is continually evolving to higher standards. Security does not grow as a seed grows but must be conceptualized in a framework of institutions that meet the goals of all institutions in a democratic society. In emerging democracies, police and justice institutions that

Part 1 Introduction

5

do not abide by these principles can be extraordinarily coercive and corrosive of democratic freedoms. Measures such as the United Nations human-development index provide a benchmark against which development in a society can be judged. We seek to provide a key theoretical and empirical link between security and development in one critical area: that of policing. In reality the presence or absence of security at the level of the street can both make a host of activities difficult or impossible. Security and freedom are not attainable if food and other items are stolen, children are forced to work instead of going to school, and medicines are looted from clinics. We seek to describe foundational principles on which the police should be constituted and describe them in a model of democratic policing consistent with the principles of democratic societies. We will provide a model for the transformation of the police from an institution which is largely self-defined and unresponsive to the community to one which is responsive to the society from which it defines its authority and from which it seeks its legitimacy. Simply stated, the institution of democratic policing should support the development of democratic societies. This transformation of policing should be one part of a larger strategy that supports democratic, economic, and human development. We argue that the control of crime and disorder problems in transitional and developing societies will improve only if functional criminal-justice systems are established, democratic policing is implemented, and forms of restorative and community justice are established or enhanced where they already exist in indigenous forms. These steps can help to create a foundation for independent socioeconomic development, for the establishment of civil society to enable citizen empowerment, the building of social capital, and the resolution and reconciliation of intra-state conflicts. These steps are necessary because of the problems that transitional societies often face: unemployment and uncompetitive economies, governmental institutions which do not represent the newly enfranchised members of society, educational and public health systems which cannot cope with the masses seeking to improve the prospects for their children, and food systems which cannot feed and distribute food or provide basic sustaining levels of nutrition. “Experts have recently recognized the need to address problems of violence, insecurity and injustice in order to advance processes of socio-economic development” (Call 2000:1). Violence and insecurity are economic burdens, put the establishment or continuation of democracy at risk, and threaten the social fabric of communities (Neild 2001; Neild 1999). Democratic development that is consistent with the social, political and economic conditions of an impacted country is necessary because assistance from other nations often appears to be largely based on the interests of those giving aid (Carothers 1999). Findlay (1999) notes that proponents of the development agenda want a selfinterested approach: a lack of government regulation and control over economies, while at the same time advocating a strong apparatus for controlling crime when that crime affects the market structures and social cohesion of the developed world. The World Bank and other international development banks are concerned about law-and-order issues in developing countries because of their effects on economic

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confidence rather than their inherent connection with developmental paradigms (Findlay 1999:58). In academe, social sciences such as economics, anthropology, criminology, and others can be used to give legitimacy to the activities of more powerful states. Agozino (2003) argues that criminology as a discipline is largely absent in African societies because imposed justice systems were used by colonial powers to repress and control emerging democratic leaders and their movements. Because more than half of the world’s population lives in post-colonial states (Cole 1999), it is imperative that these legacies are torn down. But even states somewhat farther removed from colonialism, such as many of those states which recently emerged from military dictatorships in South and Central America, still appear to meet the needs of economic and landed elites. Finally, few can argue that the criminal- and civil-justice systems of Russia and China mirror more closely their repressive socialist antecedents, and appear to be used to insure the autocracy of the Communist Party in China, and Vladimar Putin’s control of the police and military and the intimidation of civil society in Russia. In order to promote democratic policing around the world, we must develop a comprehensive model that links different levels of analysis and the factors associated with crime, policing, human, social and economic development, and democratization, in order to promote the development of social justice and human rights, which are the foundation of democracy. We need to bring different academic literatures together to understand fully the problems facing these emerging democratic societies. Activists, policy makers, and other actors need to broaden their focus. Many concerned academics, policy makers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and others have an understandably limited approach that limits focus and ignores interrelated issues. For example, many NGOs address development but not security (Neild 2001), and other groups and think-tanks address security without adequately addressing the problems associated with socioeconomic development. These issues do not occur in a vacuum. Theoretical frameworks and strategies are needed that link the factors impacting crime, policing, development, human rights, and democratization in order to achieve justice. The right to individual safety and freedom from fear may become a new human right (Nield 2001). Human-rights organizations are now recognizing that crime and social violence and responses to them constitute the most significant threat to fundamental liberties, the rule of law and democratic consolidation (Neild 1999). Democracy is undermined and further violence is generated when abuses are committed, but those democracies that focus entirely on issues of accountability often do not consider how to fight the crime itself that poses a serious threat to democracy (Neild 1999). The challenge of dealing with citizen-security issues has been imposed on the human-rights movement rather than something sought by the movement. Human rights and other groups must now grapple with what the police do instead of just what they should not do, and this new focus could lead to changes in the roles of many NGOs in less developed democracies (Neild 1999). All of these interrelated issues have prompted us to write this book. We hope to outline ideas for implementing policing practices based on a democratic policing

Part 1 Introduction

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philosophy. We want to transform the police. These policing practices will be proposed in concert with other democratic reforms involving social, political, and economic development in transitional and developing societies. It is our intention to spark a dialogue among academics, policy makers, NGOs, activists, think-tanks, and other interested individuals and groups in order to democratize policing and other institutions comprehensively with careful attention to human rights. We met in 2002 at the American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting and realized that we had similar interests in democratizing the police and promoting democratic development. We understood the role of social capital in emerging democratic societies, and the limitations of traditional police strategies based on patrol and arrest. We understood community policing to be a good beginning but one that did not understand its relationship to the emerging democratic policing paradigm. Whereas community policing began a dialogue between the police and the citizenry that had been destroyed by the professional model of policing (Bayley 1994), it has ultimately stalled and failed to transform policing. The early pioneers of policing such as Sir Robert Peele and Alderson understood the relationship between the people and the police in the co-production of public safety, and we need to bring this understanding back. The literature on democratic policing is a work in progress, much as Robert Trojanowicz’s first promulgated principles of community policing were in the late 1980s. We seek to extend this process of police transformation and will develop theory and practices that address all of the relevant factors affecting the development and implementation of democratic policing strategies. This is a large task, so we have begun the first steps but do so with the guidance of pioneers such as Goldstein, Trojanowicz and Alderson, as we decided it was necessary to attempt to describe the parameters of a comprehensive vision of democratic policing that would include the necessary initiatives to help increase the chances of success. We must be cautious not to state that there is only one model of democratic policing. There are universal principles that we will seek to describe as the foundation for this work. These are embedded in the language of human rights, which are the foundation of democracies although the forms of these democracies are different. Each country or state should find what works best for itself based on its history, capacity, and so on. We lack the arrogance to state that we know best, although we seek to question and promote democratic development as we understand it. Our education will continue as we have the opportunity to interact with others who share a vision of expanding freedom and opportunity. A “this is how it should be done” approach would not be appropriate because it could doom any chances of success in many parts of the world. Organization of the Book We divided the book into three parts. Part 1 is written by us and outlines our overview of the problem of policing and democratic development. In Chapter 1,

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we note the obstacles hindering the development of a definition of democratic policing and its translation into a comprehensive democratic policing strategy. We view the strategy operating around the world from different levels of analysis (international, national, and sub-national/individual). In varying degrees, there are a number of factors that make the transformation of the police to the democratic model difficult. We consider these obstacles when developing reforms. These obstacles include the underdevelopment, or nonexistence of, democratic institutions. This may manifest itself as a dysfunctional criminal-justice system, a weakened and unempowered civil society, and low levels of social capital or trust which are the bases for civic engagement. These societies are rife with crime and fail to provide basic security for all of the citizens of society (particularly women, children, and other socially disenfranchised groups). In varying degrees numerous countries lack effective methods for resolving social and cultural conflicts, and political systems in these situations rarely if ever make equitable and just decisions as majorities oppress minorities. They do not understand that human rights are the foundation of democratic societies, and their social institutions lack legitimacy or the belief by the citizens that social and political institutions function fairly and effectively. International pressures such as debt-repayment incurred by earlier corrupt regimes, and the presence of armed groups and criminal gangs can also weaken the capacity of states to act independently on behalf of their citizens. In Chapter 2, we argue that many current policing strategies and forms of police training offered by the developed world (professionalism and various forms of community policing) are currently not appropriate for export to other countries. Their implementation has not adequately addressed issues such as the role of the police in democratic development, conflict resolution, the provision of security and the trust of citizens, human rights, citizen engagement in crime control strategies, the control of police corruption, and other similar goals. Even if the theoretical and philosophical goals of democratic policing include commitments to human rights and democratic development, the elements of these strategies have not been seriously implemented in many parts of the world, and the local context of these different countries has not been taken into account due to the use of “one-size-fits-all” strategies. We do argue, however, that there are immutable democratic principles by which all institutions in a society should abide, and we describe them as the basis for assisting other nations as they embark on the path of democratic development. Even in the United States, police reform has not adequately addressed concerns with human rights, equity, co-productive activities between the citizenry and the police, effective accountability or citizen review processes, openness, and organizational change in the transition to this model. After hurricane Katrina ravaged New Orleans and surrounding areas of the gulf coast in 2005, the police in many cases did not protect the citizenry. In one case reported by the New York Times (September 10, 2005), around 200 civilian evacuees were trying to cross a bridge on foot from New Orleans to one of its suburbs (Gretna), but the suburban police had barricaded the bridge and shot guns in the air in order to scare away the fleeing pedestrians. People in New Orleans were told by the media and other agencies that the bridge was one of

Part 1 Introduction

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the few safe places to evacuate. The officers ordered the evacuees to abandon their encampment and then confiscated their food and water. According to a paramedic who was there, the police would say, “We don’t want another Superdome” and “This isn’t New Orleans.” The chief of the Gretna police department confirmed that his officers sealed the bridge and said that “there was no place for them to come on our side.” According to witnesses, passenger cars were allowed to pass through, but pedestrians were not. As reported by the Independent (September 12, 2005) on the same story, one paramedic at the scene viewed the police action as racist, callous, and cruel. Most all of those in the pedestrian crowd were African-American. In the United States, policing is incredibly decentralized and there may never be a shift from a bureaucratically unresponsive model of policing to a more open and accountable model. This is why we argue for the implementation of what we call democratic policing that renews the focus of all of those involved in the reforming process, and countries ought to be able to create their own versions of policing based on standards embedded in democratic principles while tailoring their reforms to their own socially determined goals and needs. In Chapter 3, we offer our version of the democratic policing philosophy, which attempts to do more than just democratize the police and encourage co-productive activities with the citizenry that promote stability and development. We argue that the police can provide, in conjunction with the cooperation of public and private institutions and the citizenry, the framework to build social capital and social capacity. This is the basis of a foundation for social and economic development that benefits the whole of society. The lessons learned in democratizing the police will inform how to democratize other institutions, involve women and marginalized groups, and protect children. A core-capacity of policing should be to assist in reducing conflict. The core-mission of policing as espoused by Sir John Alderson (1979) is the maximization of freedom and the protection of human rights. Democratic policing requires that the police must be as democratic as other government institutions. The police must be committed to the rule of law that limits their powers. They must also have legitimacy, transparency, accountability, a commitment to human rights, and be subordinate to civil authority. Other goals that support democratic development such as co-productive activities with the citizenry, problem solving, collaboration with various public and private organizations, decentralization, and continual evaluation must also be a part of democratic policing. Finally, there should be local autonomy in developing policing and other strategies in order to take into account the local context while being mindful of international standards of human rights and democratic principles. Realizing these goals increases the chances that a democratic police force can be created and sustained over the long term and become part of a larger democratic society. Chapter 4 presents ideas from various academic and other literatures on how to go about implementing democratic policing in concert with the other stated goals such as building social capital, reducing ethnic conflict, and promoting independent socioeconomic development. This is not a “how-to” chapter, because we feel that each country or area must develop its own course of action. We can, however, provide

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some general lessons from research in different disciplines to help academics, policy makers, NGOs, activists, and others develop their own strategies. Part 2 is edited by us, and includes five case-study chapters from experts of the countries being studied. These case-studies examine the state of policing in a country in question, in addition to many of the other factors we present in Part 1. In Chapter 5, Rehan Mullick and Rabia Nusrat detail the status of reforms in post-war Iraq and examine the Iraqi situation from an historical perspective. In Chapter 6, Robert Shanafelt explores the state of policing in South Africa from an anthropological and historical perspective. Steven Engel examines Northern Ireland and the policing reforms that have been going on there in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8, Edward Snajdr examines policing in Kazakhstan since the post-socialist transition and examines the effectiveness of police-work on issues of family conflict and violence against women. Finally, in Chapter 9, Heath Grant and his colleagues detail a training program they have developed for use in various places around the world to promote democratic forms of policing. A more detailed summary of the chapters is presented in the introduction to Part 2 of this volume. In Part 3, we detail the lessons we have learned from the case-studies presented in Part 2 and assess the prospects for the implementation of democratic policing around the world in transitional and developing societies. We summarize the obstacles facing these different countries as well as prospects for success, noting similarities and differences among countries. While being optimistic, comprehensive, and global in focus, we must also be realistic in order to identify adequately what might be needed in order for democratic policing to flourish in transitional and developing societies.

Chapter 1

Assessing the Obstacles Nathan W. Pino Texas State University – San Marcos


To do injustice is the greatest of all evils. Plato Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails, and where any one class is made to feel that society is in an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob, and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe. Frederick Douglass

It is our contention that democratic values are the basis for growth and development, and the police and other actors in the justice system must conform to these values in order to promote development. It is therefore necessary to examine factors that can hinder or promote the development of democratic policing strategies. International and national policies can strengthen or harm civil society, sustainable development, and democratic policing policies at the national and community levels. In this chapter we will explore the linkages between globalization, civil society, crime, and socioeconomic development in transitional and developing societies by level of analysis (international, national, and sub-national/individual). We must try to understand these various phenomena in order to understand the implementation and sustainability of democratic policing in various contexts. While examining these issues, it is important to utilize what Goldsmith (2003) terms “grey analysis” to avoid simplistic explanations of phenomena. For example, we must avoid making claims such as, “civil society is always a moral victim and the police always repressively lack the will to change.” These statements often avoid the complexities of these issues and can lead to bad policy. Lack of capacity may be misunderstood for lack of willingness. We must also not assume that all states are the same. Each state has its own history and problems that must be studied and dealt with on a state-by-state basis. Table 1.1 summarizes the various factors that can affect reform in transitional and developing countries. These factors are not prioritized by level of importance because the importance of each factor depends on the country in question.

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Table 1.1 Factors Affecting Democratic Police Reform by Level of Analysis International Level Capitalist globalization Geo-political nature of the world system Global demographic shifts National Level Ripeness for democracy Level of socioeconomic development Levels of corruption and other state crimes Levels of human, social, financial, and cultural capital Level of participation of civil society in major social institutions Political stability Dynamics of ethnic conflict Amount of political and other forms of oppression Dynamics of patriarchy Institutional legitimacy Relative autonomy of the state in the world system Police structure Elite and Street crime rates Subnational and Individual Levels Local economic and political autonomy Community levels of social and other forms of capital Collective efficacy level of local communities Amount of quality police-citizen cooperation Citizen participation in local institutions Levels of social disorganization Interpersonal and family violence and victimization Dynamics of patriarchy Fear of crime Development and Crime at the International Level The crime and disorder problems that plague transitional and developing societies must be viewed within the context of globalization (Findlay 1999). Globalization is a process whereby world society becomes increasingly interdependent (Giddens, Duneier, and Appelbaum 2003). Howard-Hassmann (2004) notes that globalization is altering the conditions under which politics and the world economy integrate

Assessing the Obstacles

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societies. Globalization has occurred within the context of modernization, which involves a militarized order, industrialism, and a capitalist system of commodity production (Giddens 1991). The major social institutions of virtually all societies are affected by global interdependence, and crime and disorder are therefore a part of this complex equation. Increases in urbanization and urbanism, inequality, and other forms of social differentiation are logical explanations for the apparent increase in crime in many countries since World War II. Braithwaite (1989) noted that in both developing and developed societies, crime is more likely to be committed by males, those between 15–25 years old, unmarried people, those experiencing high residential mobility, those less attached to school and who do more poorly in school, those who have criminal friends, those with less attachment to their parents, and those from the bottom of the class structure (pp. 44–49). In fact, criminal victimization is a universal experience for those who live in urban areas all over the world (Zvekic and Alvazzi del-Fate 1995). International actors largely focus on trans-national crimes, often involving drugs and terrorism, in states related to their own geo-political interests (Neild 1999). Research in these areas, however, offers hope that crime and other development issues become linked in policy-making. Even British Prime Minister Tony Blair has noted that U.S. and European agricultural subsidies make it difficult for developing countries to compete, so local farmers in these developing countries are uprooted and must head to overcrowded cities to find work. This in turn can increase the crime rate and other related social ills. Many scholars argue that development and crime are related and are affected by globalization. According to Jaffee (1990), socioeconomic development “…refers to the ability to produce an adequate and growing supply of goods and services productively and efficiently, to accumulate capital, and to distribute the fruits of production in a relatively equitable manner” (p. 3). Development is a measurable form of progress. One measure often used is the gross national product (GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP), but economic growth itself is not necessarily a good measure of development because it can obscure growing inequality and other structural obstacles that developing countries face (Jaffee 1990). Rapid growth is often accompanied by a decline in standard of living, quality of life, increasing poverty, rising inequality, and political repression. Other measures of socioeconomic development that take quality of life into account include the poverty rate, infant mortality, literacy, educational enrollment, caloric intake, access to medical care and the availability of housing and sanitation facilities (p. 8). Even if economies are growing, large sectors may still be considered to experience underdevelopment. Underdevelopment “denotes a socioeconomic structure characterized by a reliance on the export of raw materials and primary products, regional disparities in economic growth, poorly integrated economic sectors, domination by external forces (foreign governments and transnational corporations), a poorly developed class structure (including low or practically nonexistent social mobility), and a chronic balance of payments crisis fueling the accumulation of debt” (Jaffee 1990: 8–9).

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One of the goals of democratic development is to balance the need to encourage capital formation and economic growth with the need to work against economic concentration and the ability to influence and corrupt political and social institutions. This is why socioeconomic development is important for transitional societies seeking democratic reforms. Economic concentration easily weakens the capacity and participation of civil society, and can corrupt or at least influence the police in ways that can be detrimental to marginalized elements of the citizenry. Social and human capital must also be enhanced in order for economic development to occur without economic concentration. This is made more difficult when after independence many post-colonial societies were faced with low levels of education, suppressed indigenous identity, and little if any independent development opportunities. The complexities of and issues regarding socioeconomic development are too numerous to be addressed adequately here, but a brief historical account of development and a discussion of the two main theoretical traditions that try to explain how countries develop and how they could best develop is needed. These two main theoretical traditions are labeled as the neoclassic and political economy approaches (see Thomas-Slayter 2003). They are also the basis for the two prevailing theories that try to explain the relationship between development and crime. McMichael (2004) traces how nations have changed and developed over time. Examining these changes is integral to understanding the crime and criminal justice issues in these countries. McMichael’s (2004) examination of change is based on tracing what he terms the development project, which he defines as “an organized strategy of national economic growth, including an international system of alliances and assistance established within the competitive and militarized terms of the cold war” (p. 345). When a large number of countries in the southern hemisphere were colonies of Western powers, these countries were forced to organize their labor systems for export production (McMichael 2004). After social movements succeeded in gaining political independence for their countries the countries remained economically dependent with extractive industries and agricultural economies. Developing countries had to industrialize (including industrializing agriculture), and in order to gain developmental assistance adopted a western model of development based on modernization theory (described below). An international economic and military aid network was established to link the developed and undeveloped world, and attempts were made to bring different groups to adopt the prevailing economic model. Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) helped arrange bilateral aid programs that worked toward this goal. Many development projects involved infrastructural improvements, including roads, bridges, dams, and electric power. The developing world was incorporated into this strategy despite variation in available resources, current levels of development, cultures, and ideologies (McMichael 2004). The developed countries exported food aid and agricultural technology on a global scale to the developing world.


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Modernization theory and crime Modernization theory is an influential neoclassical theory of development. This theory is at the core of the ideology utilized by developed countries to promote their version of development in the developing world. Modernization theorists believe that ideas foster social change and development, much like Weber’s famous thesis that the Protestant ethic of hard honest work influenced the development of capitalism (see Jaffee 1990). According to modernization theory, Individual beliefs and actions are the primary causal forces explaining social change, and development depends upon the diffusion and adaptation of modern Western values (Jaffee 1990). Scholars associated with this theory argue that entrepreneurs are the ones who will spur economic growth by utilizing their human capital and taking risks in developing alternative ways to produce good services (see Hoselitz 1957; McClelland 1961; Rostow 1956; Schumpeter 1949). Inkeles and Smith (1974) argue that these entrepreneurs need to be what they call “modern men” who are informed, independent, open minded, cognitively flexible, participate as citizens, and possess personal efficacy. According to modernization theorists, nations need to modernize by creating specialized institutions and structures for the purpose of producing goods and services, and by promoting a Western ideology based on achievement and universalism. Smelser (1963) argued that sustainable development requires advances in technology, the evolution from subsistence to commercial farming, the transition from human/animal power to industrial power, increased specialization of labor for more efficiency, and increased migration from rural to urban areas. Gillis, Perkins, Roemer, and Snodgrass (1987) argued that economic growth (increase in GNP) is needed for development. According to this argument, growth in per capita GNP would soon lead to political and social progress. Taxes on the wealthy would be reduced, and recession, higher unemployment, and reductions in quality of life for workers are justified in the name of growth. The idea is to grow first, and then redistribute wealth more equitably later. Criminologists have attempted to utilize modernization theory to explore links between development and crime. Clinard and Abbot (1973) see increased crime rates as a natural consequence of modernization and development. They note that property crimes and crimes against persons were increasing in developing countries because of the development of private property rights and relationships. Property crimes also increase because there is more property to steal as countries become more affluent. Clinard and Abbot (1973) argued that uneven development produces societal conditions that promote crime. As inequality increases legitimacy decreases, which can in turn increase crime rates. These conditions include massive urban migration and inequality between urban and rural areas in developing countries, increasing population growth without adequate job creation, formal social control increasingly overtaking informal control mechanisms, a lack of human capital, and a spreading of the fatalistic attitude that one can never affect one’s life chances. Basically, there is an increase in young males migrating to urban centers with weak job markets,

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and because of rapid population mobility, social ties and informal controls weaken, allowing crime to flourish. For example, Ma (2001) noted how increased crime rates (especially property offenses) in Chinese cities are often attributed to migrants moving from rural to urban areas, and that the severity of official punishment rises as a response. Shelley (1981) argued that all developing nations experience the same developmental changes that core countries experienced in the nineteenth century. As industrialization begins in these nations, urbanization disrupts family and community structures, which in turn weakens formal and informal social controls. The movement of youths to the cities increases violent crime, but especially property crime. In countries where mild improvements in medicine and health reduced infant mortality rates, uncontrolled population growth exacerbates these problems. Findlay (1999) argues that squatter settlements that develop in these urban centers are conducive to crime as well due to a lack of legitimate employment opportunity, high living costs, high amounts of alcohol and drug abuse, young males, and youth gangs, the break down of informal social controls leading to permissive attitudes towards certain forms of deviance, and an often hostile relationship between settlers and formal criminal justice system agents. Modernization theory has been strongly criticized on a number of fronts. Modernization theorists have had to wrestle with the fact that nations do not develop similarly, and that developing nations have not taken on the same development patterns as core countries (see Neopolitan 1997). The theory posits that values precede development, and that is not necessarily the case (Jaffee 1990). Portes (1976) notes that Weber actually situated the emergence of ideas squarely within the context of historical-structural forces, and thus modernization theorists are mistaken in evoking Weber for the purpose of positing the primacy of ideas. Portes (1976) also argues that modernization theory is additive, where the transition to a modern industrial society is seen as a function of the number of people who adopt a particular set of Western values. This additive approach is faulty because the ability to develop a modern work ethic is mediated by the socio-economic position of individuals (Portes 1976). Furthermore, Western values such as consumption might retard economic growth via fraud and cooptation, and of course there are numerous structural constraints that limit a country’s capacity to engage in economic growth. Finally, Morishima (1983) found in Japan that Western values are not required for economic growth. Argentina’s recent economic collapse illustrates the failure of the neo-liberal model as well. Part of this was due to the 1995 Mexican peso crisis, the Asian financial crisis in the late nineties, and the decision by the IMF in 2001 to stop loaning more money for structural adjustment programs (geared toward privatizing the economy) that had not worked (McMichael 2004). Attempts to create parity of the peso with the dollar collapsed, and from 1998–2002 Argentina’s economy shrunk by twenty percent, forty-three percent of the country was impoverished, and official unemployment was twenty-two percent and rising. In 2002, 8,000 poor people entered Buenos Aires daily from surrounding provinces, and homelessness increased (McMichael 2004).


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Indeed, despite assistance from the rich countries, inequalities between the developed and developing countries expanded, and some developing countries responded by attempting to export manufactured goods (McMichael 2004). The World Bank redefined development as participation in the world market, meaning that countries had to participate on the global market instead of specializing their economic activities within a national framework. Some countries have succeeded in achieving some upward mobility by attracting foreign investment with stable but repressive governments, and a labor force that was relatively skilled but highly controlled (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore). Multinational corporations (MNCs) took advantage of the global situation and now play a very substantial role in the global economy in all areas (manufacturing, agriculture, and services). States now had to try to operate in a corporate-based global economic system. From the 1970s into the 1980s the gap in growth and incomes increased within poor nations as some countries were able to achieve economic growth while most other poor countries saw declines (McMichael 2004). The group of nations considered in the developing world now had different interests. Along with this trend, the organizational features of the global economy were consolidated with lending institutions such as the IMF and World Bank assuming a powerful trusteeship role in peripheral countries with massive amounts of debt. In the 1980s lending sources dried up as countries went further and further into debt as they tried to industrialize in a global economy dominated by corporations based in developed countries. Agricultural subsidies and other forms of protectionism from developed countries also made it difficult if not impossible for developing countries to compete on world markets. This is especially problematic when many developing countries have rural economies with only one or two primary export products. Developing countries would attract MNCs with tax breaks, weakened environmental and labor standards, and equipment and other incentives to reduce start up costs. People were often displaced from their land to create the free enterprise zones where the MNCs would operate. Corporate profits would be taken out of the country by the MNCs to be invested in other activities, leaving countries further in debt. The IMF and World Bank responded to this debt crisis with a set of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) geared toward paying off debt. These SAPs have had devastating consequences on developing economies. State run economic activities had to be privatized, financial power was concentrated in the hands of multilateral agencies, and an ideological framework to support these activities was established (McMichael 2004). International Banks and MNCs increased their power over local economies due to their ability to move capital out of the reach of nation states. The IMF regulated this flow of international currency. States were unable to establish stronger labor protections and had fewer financial protections. States could still be a part of the regulation of market exchanges, but only if they agreed to restructure their institutions and priorities. SAPs mandated that the social functions of states in debt were downgraded in order to increase exports and pay back debt. So in the developing world we saw the cancellation or reduction of education, health, and food subsidies as well as producer credit. As McMichael (2004) points out, states

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became only surrogate managers of the global economy. International and regional trade agreements weakened a state’s ability to respond to the extraction of their capital by MNCs, and due to SAPs, inequalities within countries rose, and mandated currency devaluation (promoted supposedly to make a nation’s goods more attractive on the global market) increased competition among states that limited the capacity of unity among these states to fight these reforms. The consensus among powerful global policy makers was that development strategies had to be market based, global market rules had to be managed centrally by the most powerful states, global financial institutions and multilateral agencies (IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organization) were to implement rules, market power was to be placed in the hands of MNCs and financial power in the hands of transnational banks, and the mandate that all states would be subjected to global forces in varying degrees (McMichael 2004). Each country had its own role to play in the global market place in terms of what it produced, imported, and exported. This global economic and political system has produced instabilities within many countries, and these instabilities have an effect on crime and justice. Due to increased competition in the global market, we have observed technical upgrades, movement to cheaper labor zones, and constant product innovation, all of which help to undermine the stability of labor markets (McMichael 2004). The reduction of labor forces due to technological innovations and the stagnation and downsizing produced by SAPs has helped increase the proliferation of informal economies and political and ethnic conflict. Labor is now unorganized and fractured due to these problems. Jobs that do exist are often part time and insecure. The informal economy and forms of informal political and social activity are responses to these problems. State legitimacy is in crisis as well, because of their reduced capacity and in cases willingness to confront these problems. With ethnic rivalries and competition on the increase, we also see nationalist and ethnic political movements forming around the world from both the left and the right. The international diffusion of capitalism emphasizing multinational corporate investment has unleashed effects that have largely harmed independent socioeconomic development (Jaffee 1990). There has been a dispersion of manufacturing all over the world where the bulk of the output is destined for export as inputs into other production processes or as consumer goods for external markets. This sends wage costs to low-wage nations that have weak labor standards and engage in tax and other incentives to entice business. Female workers are hired by many of these factories to lower the number of labor problems. One major problem with this for national economic development is that fact that no human capital is invested because the work is low-wage and low-skilled. Dependency/world economic theories and crime Dependency and world economic theories are political economy theories of development that attempt to examine the historical pattern of less-developed societal integration into and interaction with the capitalist world economy, examine external


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factors of broader world economic structures, rather than internal factors, that shape national development, and to explain the global system as an unequal distribution of power and influence (Jaffee 1990). Prebisch (1950) argued that the international trade structure that requires a specialization of labor between nations contributed to economic decline and stagnation among less developed countries. This assists wealthy countries in exploiting the periphery and makes those poor countries economically dependent on the rich countries. When less-developed countries would specialize in only one or two primary export products it did not lead to improved socio-economic development. Specializing in the export of a few primary products impeded economic growth and development, made nations vulnerable to downward pressure on their terms of trade, created instabilities in export revenues as world commodity prices fluctuate, and therefore hampered sustainable economic growth (Galtung 1971). Prebisch (1950) argued for the policy of import substitution industrialization, which is a strategy of protecting domestic industries through barriers such as tariffs to overcome the specializing effects of the colonial division on labor. Furtado (1973) examined this strategy and found it did not work, because after a while a market would become saturated and dependent on multinational corporate investment and other forms of foreign capital, furthering dependency. Frank (1969) extends the dependency argument by arguing that the legacy of colonial relations between developed and underdeveloped nations places the underdeveloped world in a qualitatively different position than was the case for pre-industrial Europe and North America. Europe and North America benefited from exploiting the underdeveloped South, and in the global capitalist economy, development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin. Frank (1969) argues that those countries with the closest ties to their ex-colonizers are the least developed, because the more powerful countries extract resources from the less developed countries for a low price and sell products based on those extracted resources for a much higher price. So, the argument is that if countries were able to operate their economies more independently, they would develop more successfully. Independent development is favorable to investment and trade dependence, which are seen as major barriers to development. Multinational corporations (MNCs) are seen as major actors in these forms of dependence. In many dependency formulations MNC investment is said to promote underdevelopment, stagnation, and economic backwardness (Jaffee 1990). The basic argument is that MNCs drain surplus from the less developed nations. They own and control enterprises in other nations. The profits derived from these ventures do not remain as capital resources for the host countries, nor are they used to expand production in other sectors. Rather, profits are typically exported back to the core or placed in more profitable investment outlets (repatriation of profits), which retards development because the surplus is unavailable to fuel further economic expansion and other spin-offs (Frank 1969). Because MNCs control and decide upon the major investments in the countries they penetrate, this reduces the autonomy of the host country and may run counter to national goals. Also, MNC activity and foreign investment distorts the

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allocation of the labor force and the distribution of economic activity (Jaffee 1990). Foreign investment in agriculture replaces workers with machines and forces small independent producers out of rural areas, creating a rural labor surplus. This creates more migration from rural to urban areas. Cardoso and Faletta (1979) noted that countries can develop while being dependent. This process is called dependent development, characterized by highly uneven growth, increasing income inequality, and balance of payments crises. Cycles can be observed where some nations increase wealth while others go into poverty, capital is both accumulated and lost, and employment is gained and lost. Wallerstein (1979) famously wrote on the global world system and how it operates. He developed what is known as “world systems theory”, where he argues that nations are seen as open systems that are heavily influenced by economic forces and patterns of exchange at the international level. Nation-states are simply the interacting parts of a larger global capitalistic system. The parts (nations) carry out particular functions dictated by an international division of labor. Therefore, the essence of the world system is the production for sale in a market in order to seek maximum profit. The economic systems of individual countries do not matter that much because all nations are embedded within a global capitalist system. Wallerstein (1979) provides three classes of nations, each with a different role in the world system. The highest of the classes is the core, which consists of the advanced capitalist states of North America and Western Europe. The Periphery is the bottom class and these peripheral nations are militarily weak, have low per capita GNP, and tend to specialize in the export of agro-mineral primary products. The semi-periphery acts as a middle class that is exploited by the core but also exploits the periphery. The nations that make up the semi-periphery have relatively strong governmental structures and moderate levels of GNP, and are moving toward greater levels of industrial production (countries such as South Korea would be in the semi-periphery). According to Wallerstein, the world would work much the same without the semi-periphery, but it would be more politically unstable because the semi-periphery serves as the buffer zone between core and peripheral nations. The semi-periphery also acts as support for world capitalism because it is made up of nations that have experienced some upward mobility. Jaffee (1990) notes that all nations regardless of the economic system are structurally constrained by their need to produce and exchange products in a world market, and that the imperative of economic accumulation overrides political ideology. Jaffee (1990) does criticize Wallerstein, however, because his argument does not account for intra-class differences within societies and how those affect development. Even if nations are highly constrained by the world system, states and their internal dynamics still matter. There are important national variations within the global system related to internal class relations and the political and economic policies of national governments (MacEwen and Tabb 1989). Class, politics, and national policy need to be addressed while retaining a global perspective. Wallerstein has other critics as well. For example, Bergesen (1990) argues that the logic of world systems theory is backward. World systems theorists assume that


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state power precedes the emergence of international economic and political relations. However, for the vast majority of the world’s states, the international system preceded their existence and moreover made that existence possible in the first place. It continues to reaffirm/reproduce their global position and resultant level of national development. Bergesen (1990) goes on to argue that trade, unequal exchange, or long commodity chains do not construct the core-periphery structure of power and domination, but the core-periphery domination relation makes possible the surplus extraction and the directionality of its flow – that is, makes unequal exchange possible and reproduces it over the centuries. Arrighi (1990) also disagrees with Wallerstein in terms of how the semi-periphery is conceptualized. The assumption that the semi-periphery consists of newly industrializing countries is misleading since industrialization should not be seen as equivalent to development. Also, unilateral transfers of labor and unilateral transfers of capital are equally important as unequal exchange in the core-periphery division. In a sense, Arrighi (1990) is arguing that the world system behaves more as a caste system than a class system. A worsening of conditions for peripheral states as a group is a requirement of the success of semiperipheral states to attain and retain democratic wealth. Hence, not all states can be or become semi-peripheral. Ups and downs in relative income may mean very little from the point of view of the underlying hierarchy of wealth, which in fact may remain quite orderly. So, by taking relatively short periods as the unit of analysis (20–25 years) studies of development may easily mistake for generalized economic advancement what in fact is just an upswing in a pendulum-like movement that simply brings the situation back to where it was forty to fifty years before. Scholars have utilized political economy theories in order to link crime and development, and their attempts are characterized in the criminological literature as dependency theories. These theorists argue that core countries exploit developing states for their own benefit, leading to uneven development across the world. This dependence and exploitation in turn determines crime patterns in developing countries. Sumner (1982) argued that development differs across nations because many peripheral nations are no longer able to develop internally. These countries are dependent on core countries for their development in the world system. So, crime in developing nations results from the poverty, inequality and political oppression that accompany dependent development (Sumner 1982). Dependent development leads to political oppression, selfishness, and cultural alienation. The capitalistic values of competition and individualism contribute to crime (Messner and Rosenfeld 2001), and those same forces allow the elites in these developing countries to treat the poor unjustly. As Quinney (1977) argues, because of frustration born out of lack of legitimate opportunity, the poor in these countries will commit street and gang related crimes for economic gain, violence increases (rather than decreases as modernization theorists argue) due to the anger and frustration that results from inequities, and political crimes and other forms of rebellion such as strikes are also likely to occur. In order to control these dangerous populations within their own societies, developing countries will define more of their behaviors as criminal and control them through the criminal justice system.

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Rogers (1989) points out that there are problems with both modernization and dependency theory and their attempts to link crime and development. First, one cannot assume that modernization and crime are inextricably linked. Depending on the country one examines, modernization and development seem to have reduced certain types of crime while increasing other types (Rogers 1989). Both perspectives generalize from case studies, and assumptions are too rigid (Rogers 1989). Modernization theorists assume that the social disruption of industrialization and urbanization leads to crime, while dependency theorists assume that capitalistic developing countries expand their definitions of crime and create more criminals (Rogers 1989). The processes of development and law making and crime are too complex for these simplistic theories (Rogers 1989), and due to a number of methodological and theoretical problems these theories are hard to test (Neopolitan 1997). While understanding that the effects of globalization on state policy is critical for thinking about policing, examining the national level of analysis can help us appreciate the complexities in understanding the linkages between economic and democratic development, crime, and policing. This is where we turn next. The National Level Crime and insecurity Transitional and developing societies are experiencing rapid change associated with modernization and globalization, especially in urban areas. Many of these changes may be contributing to increases in victimization in these societies, including inequality, rapid urban/rural migration, refugees, population growth and other demographic factors (such as relatively large numbers of young males in the population), the loosening of some authoritarian controls, decreases in job opportunity, inadequate health and educational services, rapid change in family and neighborhood structures, the proliferation of organized crime, and the legacies of conflict (Neild 1999; Zvekic and Alvazzi del-Fate 1995). It is generally known that the police cannot be expected by themselves to control crime. Lack of good data within countries hinders the ability of police even more to combat crime as well. These various problems increase the likelihood that the police will resort to repressive measures and support regimes more than the people. A number of transitional and developing societies could be considered weak states (in varying degrees): countries without social cohesion or the state capacity or willingness needed to protect citizens as they live their daily lives (see Buzan 1983; Goldsmith 2003). In many of these weak states, a variety of communal groups (ethnic, tribal, religious, etc.) attempt to gain supremacy over others. Each group must provide its own security, the regime in power lacks significant popular support or legitimacy due to generally favoring one group or interest, the state lacks the institutional capacity to deliver peace, order, or basic needs, and the largest threat to


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security is perceived to be from within the society rather than from some external source (Job 1983: 17–18). Weak states can contribute to the erosion of citizen safety by giving regime stability and narrow sectional interests more attention than considerations of general public safety (Goldsmith 2003: 4). Competing groups and interests have distinct definitions and goals regarding security, making the state more vulnerable. Increases in crime are an even greater concern in post-conflict situations, and can help collapse weak states because it inhibits the development of democratic institutions (Neild 1999). Disarmament and demobilization of combatants are two of the major issues in this context. The dynamics of political, religious, and other forms of violence exacerbate these problems in a number of states as well. With the downfall of totalitarian regimes, and after peace agreements are signed in newly post-conflict or post-colonial societies, there can be an upsurge in internal violence and instability, as has been seen in countries such as Cambodia, South Africa, and El Salvador (Neild 2001). Much of this conflict takes the form of class and ethnic conflict. Stavenhagen (1996) defines ethnic conflict as “a protracted social and political confrontation between contenders who define themselves and each other in ethnic terms; that is, when criteria such as national origin, religion, race, language and other markers of cultural identity are used to distinguish the opposing parties” (p. 284). Stavenhagen (1996) found that ethnic conflict was common in nation states after independence from colonial rule. During colonialism, traditional, relatively more stable societies were weakened, and ethnic identities and ideologies competed with or became a part of nationalist ideology. Major conflicts are therefore incubated slowly over time before boiling over (Stavenhagen 1996). While militaries are often used immediately to take care of these problems, internal police agencies are often expected to maintain order after the military withdraws (Jackson and Lyon 2002). Colonial regimes both controlled and exploited ethnic issues because it was seen as contributing to the profitability of colonies, and control of one group over others was thought to bring stability. When these regimes are removed there may be no underlying understanding of human and democratic rights, which result in many cases of ethnic conflict as groups compete for power. Ethnic tension is an important factor in explaining conflict, instability, and state failure (Jackson and Lyon 2002). The protection of human rights is central to democratic development, but ethnic conflict threatens this protection. Ethno-political conflict can obviously exacerbate the problems in establishing stable democracies via political instability, underdevelopment, violence, and other forms of instability. Identity-based conflicts in Israel, Kosovo, Macedonia, East Timor, and Somalia have resulted in police misconduct, human rights violations (revenge killings, arson, rape), refugee crises, and the crippling of economic infrastructures (Jackson and Lyon 2002). Special police units were instrumental in this repression. The recent tenth year anniversary of the Rawandan conflict and the more recent genocide in the Sudan reminds us that terrible atrocities can occur if the international community is not responsive to internal conflict and terror. In many countries where there is ethnic conflict, one of the factors triggering it is the emergence of ethnicity itself as

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a politically mobilizing force and in some cases the development of ethnically based political parties (see Stavenhagen 1996). Countries with lower levels of development (ranking lower on the Human Development Index for example) are more likely to have violent and protracted ethnic conflicts (Stavenhagen 1996: 160), and if a particular group’s elites benefit from the economy even if the general population suffers, those elites have a stake in perpetuating the conflict. Use of the criminal justice system by these elites to repress another ethnic group is one method to perpetuate such conflicts. One example is Brazil, where in Rio upper-class city-dwellers demand that the increasingly militarized police (who are controlled at the state and federal rather than local level) use force in the Favelas (slums and squatter settlements) (Da Silva 2000). There are also reports of militarized units executing homeless street children engaged in petty crimes. Sources of crime in transitional societies are as complex as in developed societies. In Central America, for example, sources of crime are known to include the effects of war such as availability of weapons, a sizeable number of demobilized ex–soldiers and ex-guerrillas trained in violence that need new jobs, a history of violence being used to solve conflicts, and a disrupted legal system (Call 2000: 12). Sources of crime in Central America also include its location and penetrability, making it vulnerable to international organized crime, extreme inequality, and deficient judicial systems that are unable to arrest, convict, and incarcerate criminals (pp. 13–14). When demobilization plans do not include assistance for the transition to legitimate work and education in the public or private sector significant problems may remain. Emergent democracies are confronted by crime as the old social order breaks down and a new one develops. Crime in these countries can involve street crime, violence which is facilitated by weapons from the era of conflict, police and governmental corruption where civil authority is violated by those in authority, criminal organizations which challenge civil authority and operate with impunity, and rivals for control such as warlords and terrorist groups (Shaw 1997; Kumar 1996). Of course, opportunities for elite crimes, such as corporate, governmental, and white-collar crime, increase in these situations as well. Totalitarian societies, in contrast, can have low crime rates. This is due to social control systems which attempt to provide for basic human needs while insuring that criminality is controlled through repressive police forces, as well as prosecutorial, judicial and correctional systems which preserve the totalitarian status quo unimpeded by notions of due process, individual rights and internationally recognized human rights conventions. Countries such as North Korea are not even able to feed their own populations. Of course, this totalitarian form of governance may reduce some forms of crime, but it does not promote justice or human rights. Additionally, black markets and organized crime might help provide for the illegitimate needs of powerful groups and regimes through activities such as drug production and distribution, money laundering, and unlicensed sales of weapons. Core countries are not immune to the effects of globalization and disorder on crime and social capital. In the United States, the problems the poor must face are


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in part a product of the socio-spatial effects of racism and economic changes due to the restructuring of the global economy and the decline of manufacturing in areas such as automobiles, aerospace, and textiles (Gottdiener 1994: 210). There have been increases in the concentration of poverty and inner city joblessness since 1970 (Wilson 1996), but these problems are not strictly confined to the nation’s inner cities. Many communities have been hit by suburbanization, fiscal crises, boom and bust cycles, the flight of middle-class tax-payers out of the central cities, privatesector capital-flight, red-lining, housing segregation, and other urban problems (Gottdiener 1994). These problems have been occurring while the amount of social capital in the US has been declining (Putnam 2000). US citizens are less connected with democratic institutions, and spend less time with family members and friends, know their neighbors less, and belong to fewer civic organizations. If the U.S. is to restore order and justice, it must take these and other factors associated with crime into account. Simply concentrating on crime and order-maintenance alone assumes that crime and disorder occur in a vacuum. For example, Buerger (1998) notes that taking the unwanted off the street will not solve underlying problems and that these unwanted groups would return to the same streets. Peripheral states still face the greatest crime problems. Zvekic and Alvazzi delFate (1995), utilizing the International Crime and Victimization Survey (ICVS), found that people in peripheral countries are more frequently victims of virtually all types of crime (including sexual violence against women, fraud, and corruption) than those in countries considered developed (industrialized). National crime patterns also indicate, however, that each country has its own development and crime problems. Zvekic and Alvazzi del-Fate (1995) attempted to group developing countries that participated in the ICVS together based on region. However, this was very problematic due to the complex nature of differences between the countries. Nevertheless, some interesting patterns emerged. They found that Asian countries in urban areas (Bejing, Bombay, Jakarta, and Manilla) have the lowest crime rates while those in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kampala, Dar Es Salaam, and Johannesburg) have the highest rates. Sub-Saharan African and Latin American cities have the highest rates of violence, respectively (including sexual violence against women). In terms of violence against women, sexual incident rates were higher in the developing world where the status of women in society was lower. Other research suggests that the problem of increased violence against women is in part an effect of post-conflict situations (Amnesty International USA 2004). The lack of security in Iraq after the US occupation in 2003 resulted in increased violence against women and young girls both in the streets and at home, and the atrocities against women by the Taliban in Afghanistan are well known and documented. During periods of armed conflict, women are targeted as the spoils of gang warfare, political uprisings, and war. To make matters worse, those in law enforcement or other branches of government are seen as unresponsive to violence against women, or are even involved in the trafficking of women (Amnesty International USA 2004). Much of the limited research that tests these theories or tries to find crime rate patterns in transitional societies rely on faulty data. Research by Arthur (1991),

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Bennett (1991), and Steffensmeier, Allan, and Streifel (1989) rely on INTERPOL data, which is notoriously unreliable (Neopolitan 1997). Neopolitan (1997) also notes concerns with ICVS data, especially in its usefulness for comparing crime patterns of different countries. A theory addressing variation in crime rates across nations would explain the similarities and differences in crime rates across nations over time. Variables used to explain such crime variation would account for individual, cumulative, and interactive associations, would consider historical context, and be linked to empirical results (Neopolitan 1997: 82–83). Unfortunately we seem to be a long way from reaching this lofty but necessary goal. Democracy and development Riley (1995) notes that democracy and development are inextricably linked. Diamond (1993) argues, however, that while there was a wave of democratization during the 1980s and 1990s, there has been a subtle erosion of democratic institutions and norms in many developing countries in recent years. Countries that gained independence from colonization found themselves with largely illiterate and rural populations with few opportunities for building centers of economic power independent of the state (Pinkney 2003: 61). Currently many economic and social problems remain, including the resurgence of virulent nationalist passions that stand in the way of democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe and the periphery (Diamond 1993). Many of these countries are not ripe for democracy because of the following factors in varying degrees depending on the country: underdevelopment, a small middle class, an undereducated population, a weakened and uninformed civil society, a lack of commitment among elites, a lack of institutional autonomy from the state, class conflict, a widening ideological divide between the military and ruling politicians, and reaction by other countries to rulers deemed unacceptable along with ambiguous support from core countries for democratic reforms (Diamond 1993; Pinkney 2003). There have been many attempted transitions to democracy, but many failures as well (Diamond 1993). Fragile economies and skewed distribution mechanisms have reinforced International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity measures, foreclosed populist options, and discouraged the redistribution of wealth (Riley 1995). As state-centered development strategies wane, interest shifts to markets, free-trade agreements, and regional trading blocs, all of which are seen by many scholars as benefiting the core while hindering the periphery. While it is true that some countries without social capital (characterized by a lack of trust, high levels of political apathy and cynicism, weak norms of reciprocity, and corruption) can be stable, these countries are unlikely to develop a “comprehensive democratic system that enables citizens to fully exercise their rights of expression, conscience and participation” (Stolle and Hooghe 2003: 232). On the contrary, these countries are likely to have governments less responsive to citizen demands, higher levels of police indifference and abuse, and offer fewer chances for economic development. Furthermore, citizens who are treated poorly by their government are


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less likely to trust each other, and this inhibits the development of social capital (Stolle and Hooghe 2003). International assistance International donors rarely offer comprehensive forms of aid to post-conflict states. For example, donors supplying help for security and civilian police monitors and trainers do not offer other forms of developmental assistance (Neild 2001). Also, the lack of a normative framework for police reform hinders the development of a more strategic plan that would support filling the gaps between security-sector reform and the building of the rule of law (Nield 2001: 38). This also hinders the ability to learn from and improve on past initiatives. International support for public security reform appears to be increasing since development banks and others realize that security issues are linked with development, but Neild (1999) argues that international banks and other donors do not yet seriously deal with the relationship between economic policies and the causes of, and remedies for, crime. Economic and political policies pushed by core countries on the rest of the world have largely had negative effects on not only crime policy but also on attempts to reduce inequality, to promote economic and political stability, and democratization. The U.S. plays a major role in policy-making in these transitional and developing societies as part of the process of capitalistic globalization (Mandle 2003). Westernled international organizations such as the WTO, IMF, and World Bank have been instrumental in this process. The World Bank and IMF were constructed at the Bretton Woods Conference in July, 1944. According to Rich (1994), these financial institutions were created to help rich countries dominate the world economy by helping reconstruct Europe and by providing loans to developing countries. Williamson (2000) developed what he called the Washington Consensus, which outlines the set of policies pushed by the U.S. on transitional and developing societies. The Washington Consensus includes reducing public expenditures that subsidize social needs such as education, health care, and infrastructure, increases discipline in governmental spending in general, reduces marginal tax and interest rates, switches from fixed to market-determined exchange rates, liberalizes trade and foreign direct investment, promotes privatization of public enterprises and deregulation of output markets, and implements private property rights. Capitalistic globalization requires less governmental regulation of the economy and submits entirely to market forces. The Washington Consensus policies ensure that capitalist globalization becomes more entrenched around the world. Labor, environmental, and legal protections would hinder this process, so they are not part of the consensus. As part of the Washington Consensus, countries in debt must take on structural adjustment programs if they are to get loans from the IMF to pay off debts and get out of other bad economic circumstances. While states do enter into agreements with the IMF due to economically hard times (high deficits, low foreign reserves, high debt, low investment, etc.), they also make agreements in order to force reforms and silence opposition to those reforms (Vreeland 2003). It is very costly to go against

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IMF mandates, and this makes it harder for those with alternative strategies to fight for those alternatives. Many of the countries receiving these loans are dictatorships and other totalitarian societies, so the loans and the mandates that come with them are used as a way to consolidate power internally. The policies associated with adjustment programs imposed by the IMF include export promotion, trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation, wage restraint and budget and credit cuts (Rich 1994). Structural adjustment loans reduce the state’s role in the economy, lower barriers to imports, remove restrictions on foreign investments, eliminate subsidies for local industries, reduce spending for social welfare, cut wages, devalue currencies (to make goods more attractive on the world market), and emphasize production for export rather than for local consumption (Bello 1994). Protectionist barriers to core country imports and restrictions on foreign investment are reduced, and tightly integrated internal economies are forced to compete on the capitalistic world market. The goal is to be more efficient, increase economic growth, and raise cash to pay off debts. What are the effects of IMF structural adjustment programs on states? In a nutshell, the programs have led to a deepening and spreading of poverty around the globe and intensified environmental damage (Rich 1994). The number of unemployed people has grown rapidly around the world, wage levels have plummeted, often to levels half as low as at the beginning of the 1980s, small producers have been displaced by larger-scale export schemes, and education and health care systems have deteriorated (Rich 1994). The result has been a rapid expansion of poverty, a concentration of national incomes, and a redistribution of financial resources from the global South to the North (Bello 1994; Rich 1994). Vreeland (2003) found that IMF programs negatively impact economic growth and distribution. The lack of economic growth takes wealth away from labor and the poor, and redistributes it to the wealthy, reducing the incentive for the local elites to stop the programs. Economic growth is hindered possibly because of public sector cuts, and by the spending of public monies on short term rather than long term goals (building a new road quickly and cheaply rather than maintaining existing infrastructures) (Vreeland 2003). In addition, capital flight occurs to take advantage of a devalued currency, and increased interest rates puts some out of business. Budhoo (1994) notes that manufacturing primarily for export has caused the overproduction of primary products and a steady fall in their prices. It has also led to the devastation of traditional agriculture and to the creation of landless farmers in virtually every country where the World Bank and IMF operate. Structural adjustment loans bring drastic cuts in social expenditures, and remove subsidies to the poor on basic foodstuffs and services such as rice, maize, water, and electricity (Budhoo 1994). Tax rates become more repressive, and real wage rates fall sharply. The presence of large commercial ranchers, timber loggers, and the construction of dams have managed to drive millions of indigenous people out of their ancestral homelands. More than twice the people in the world live in absolute poverty than in the mid-80s, and the gap between rich and poor doubled during the 80s as well (Budhoo 1994).


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Danaher (2001) found that IMF programs did not benefit a single country that participated in structural adjustment programs, including supposed successes in Chile and South Korea. While some millionaires were created and some debts were paid off, the majority of the populations in these countries suffered from increased inequality and reduced social spending (Danaher 2001). It is argued that the IMF continues these failed policies because it serves the interests of itself, core countries, and/or international financiers (see Stiglitz 2003; Vreeland 2003). Bello (1994) argues that it is because the programs ensure that transitional societies never challenge the economic and geo-political dominance of core countries. Petras and Veltmeyer (2001) argue that capitalistic globalization is a new method of imperialism. Regardless of these explanations, in the end, the consequences of these programs are that an emphasis on growth increased inequality within these countries (especially harming laborers, peasants, and women in general), and that market driven policies reduced democratic decision-making and weakened civil society. Corruption increased, inequality between developed and transitional states increased, global economic instability increased, and negative effects on the environment were substantial (Danaher 2001). Gershman (1994) notes that structural adjustment policies lay the political and economic groundwork for the policies that free trade agreements institutionalize. Southern elites need northern markets to make money because the domestic market is saturated, and this leads to trade agreements that are supposed to provide access to foreign investment and the maintenance of debt payments. Chang (2003) points out that while core countries push for free trade as a strategy for nations to develop, these same core countries did not engage in free trade practices while they were developing. Through tariffs, subsidies, conferring monopoly rights, cartel arrangements, directed credits, investment planning, research and development supports, and other measures, these countries supported their national industries. So, these countries used interventionist practices to develop successfully but still argue for free trade for everyone else. Chang (2003) calls this process “kicking the ladder.” A study by Elabor-Idemudia (1994) in Nigeria provides an example of how these austerity agreements affect people, particularly women, at the local level. Nigerian women are estimated to perform approximately 70% of total farm work. However, while Nigeria’s structural adjustment process was oriented towards agriculture, and particularly peasant agriculture, women were neglected or ignored in the process, and deprived of access to resources (inputs, extension, credit). The structural adjustment program was geared toward green revolution technologies (tractors, new strains of seed, etc.), but female access to formal credit facilities did not improve, and dependence on relatives for credit increased. Women were turned away from banks for not having collateral or not having a husband’s permission. Access to farming inputs decreased, and a reduction of subsidies raised prices. Men received all access to training. Women remained dependent with limited access to markets and transportation networks, household expenditures increased, and infant mortality

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and disease rates increased. So, because of a deteriorating rural economy, cultural biases, and poor implementation, the programs did not meet basic needs. These socioeconomic problems affect the capacity of states and their citizenry, hindering the chances that genuine democratic police reform will succeed. We now turn to the difficulties of police reform. The difficulties of police reform Goldstein (1977) wrote that democratic societies have an authority granted by law to maintain a democratically determined order. If the power of the police is misused, however, this abuse is potentially harmful or even destructive to the structure and processes of democratic societies. In totalitarian and authoritarian societies, police authority is used to maintain the authority of tyrants. In transitional societies, police authority can either promote the development of democratic processes and institutions through the promotion of the police role in civil society or crush its development (Barber 2000). As Goldsmith (2003) noted, “…if a regime is unable to satisfy the many, it may be forced to repress the few more troublesome elements within the society from time to time in order to stay in charge.” But Goldsmith (2003) also argues that due to inequalities, internal conflicts, the provision of small arms, and so on, the private sector or other elements of civil society cannot be seen as an effective replacement for state-run police forces. During the process of “modernization,” nation-states develop formal criminal justice systems seen in core countries. These systems use formal police forces and prosecute crimes on behalf of the community rather than that of the victim (Findlay 1999: 44–45). Despite the influence in core countries of community-based corrections and other diversionary punishment methods, criminalization without adequate rehabilitation is on the increase in developing nations and many core countries as the state expands its reach with more formalized agencies to deal with criminalized individuals. As Call (2000) points out, violence (particularly interfamilial violence) and insecurity are major concerns in Central American countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Honduras, where homicide rates are among the highest in the world. While there has been necessary attention on the political violence that has occurred in these countries, violent crimes independent of political violence have not been given the same attention. Despite numerous reforms, these problems persist. Criminal justice system agents often lack legitimacy, which in times of increased violence leads to more vigilantism and the proliferation of private policing. Judicial systems are corrupt, partisan, and inaccessible to marginalized populations (Call 2000). The police lack effectiveness and have not been able to establish trust with the citizenry. Furthermore, civil society organizations and governments lack the expertise and policy-making skills necessary to deal with these problems, and international programs are not addressing the comprehensive nature of the problems that exist (Call 2000). These problems are apparent when we examine historic colonial systems and how they were problematic for post-colonial situations. While all colonial police


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systems were different in their own way, there are some similarities one can find when comparing them. Some police systems were developed in places that were annexed for the purpose of settlement while others were developed in order to subdue colonies annexed primarily for trade (Cole 1999: 89). Civilian police systems were largely set up in colonies with settlers (North America, Australia) while para-military policing was common in the subdued colonies largely in Africa, Asia, and Central and South America (Cole 1999). Para-military systems were established so that the local population would be pacified and local interests for the colonizers could be protected. Police leaders were recruited from imperial armies, and the police forces and the military worked along side one another (Cole 1999). Concessionaire and chartered companies were established to maintain law and order, defend colonial territories, and to hold rights over land and people. The companies, depending on where they were, organized armed guards, private militia, and para-military forces, suppressed political activities, and supplied cheap labor and a host of other things that benefited colonizers (Cole 1999). Colonial police agencies, as with militaries, have been insulated from the rhetoric and reality of democratization by concentrating on professionalism. New reforms often reflect this trend despite occasional rhetoric, further isolating the police from democratic reform. Police-community relations in much of the developing world is characterized by a circle of violence and repression where policing is used as an instrument of state violence and corruption (Mendes 1999). Militarized policing in Asia, the Americas, and Russia has harmed macro-level social capital. The socio-economic inequalities in these countries are taken advantage of by the state as certain sectors of the population are criminalized and therefore brutalized by the state (Mendes 1999). There is no community involvement with the militarized police and there are no accountability measures. This perpetuates a circle of violence and state corruption through repression and a lack of accountability. Elite police leaders (who have had a considerable amount of political power) have used their position to police aggressively the “dangerous classes” (such as free slaves and the poor) since the early nineteenth century (Bretas 1999). Silva (1999) argues that state violence in Brazil against the lower socio-economic classes is likely to continue, and that progress on these issues is not demonstrable. There are a number of reasons why the police are not accountable in Brazil: those who are most repressed by the police have yet to empower themselves, the police service in Brazil is a state function rather than a local or national one, and Brazil and other countries in Latin America tend to be authoritarian and militarized (Silva 1999). South America is not the only place where the legacies of colonialism still haunt the population. The excessive use of deadly force by police is practiced by police forces all over the world (Mars 2002). Newly democratic governments, such as those in Hungary, South Africa, and Brazil, have increased rather than decreased police powers such as the ability to detain suspects longer, to search and seize property, and to conduct undercover surveillance (Stone and Ward 2000). Guyana is no exception, where the legacies of colonialism remain a factor in explaining the police subculture of violence (Mars 2002). After independence in Guyana, the culture of violence was

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further strengthened and legitimized because the state assumed a more active role in the production of such violence. The policing model in Guyana still adheres to a quasi-military function geared toward enforcing control through coercion and force. “Both during and after the colonial period, police violence was at its highest when coercive state rule, state repression, and population control were most pervasive” (Mars 2002: 174). When examining policing studies all over the world, one finds that police forces change during periods of economic, social or political change, as well as a result of pressures from within the country for reform (Shelley 1999). The rapid change occurring in post-communist Europe provides examples. These diverse countries come from a Soviet legacy characterized by demoralizing and corrupt forces with little respect for human rights (Shelley 1999). Some post-communist states have tried to establish democratic forms of policing (Germany, Estonia) while others haven’t (Uzbekistan, Tadzikistan). Unfortunately, “the problems of crime, corruption and organized criminality are now so severe in most former socialist states that it undermines possibilities for positive change” (Shelley 1999: 76). Authoritarian governments may appear to restore order, and the lack of change away from authoritarian legacies of the Soviet period limits attempts to democratize institutions including the police. Crime and nationalistic violence has increased in a number of these countries, and ethnic and other conflicts are antithetical to democratic policing. Western European and U.S. assistance has attempted to train these post-communist police forces in the areas of organized crime, investigation, forensics, management, and counter-narcotics (Shelley 1999). An international law enforcement academy was created as well, but some worry that training of corrupt officers is not adequate (see Shelley 1999). There are numerous obstacles to reform in transitional and developing states, including insecurity, poverty, economic underdevelopment, pressure from foreign states, a lack of social cohesion, and political instability (Goldsmith 2003; Neild 2001). These problems reduce legitimacy, and a lack of state capacity affects policing (regardless of good or ill intentions) due to shortages of resources and functioning equipment (Goldsmith 2003). These shortages affect training, morale, operations, and the lure of corruption, neglect, and indifference. Weak policing institutions within weak states are the result, which creates further instability. Even though more Latin American countries have become democracies, crime is on the rise. The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) (1996) argues that this is because of economic policies promoting free trade and limited government interference that started in the 1980s. Growing poverty and inequality have increased crime rates and more fear of this leads to increased abuse among the police. Official violence continues, but while political dissidents were the primary targets under military rule, today victims of official violence are more likely to be from the country’s “undesirables” (the poor, homeless, landless peasants, homosexuals, and other minority groups) (Pinheiro 1996). Pinheiro (1996) calls these kinds of countries democracies without citizenship, and the justice system is seen as representing the wealthy and powerful at the expense


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of marginalized groups. Courts and Prisons play their role in this process (see Ungar 1996; Weiner 1996). As long as fear of crime creates an environment where the law is disregarded in order to let the police do their job as they see fit, this cycle is likely to continue (Chevigny 1995). In attempts to reform the police in post-communist Europe, three common problems emerge: political legitimacy, accountability, and police-public violence (Uildriks and Van Reenen 2003). There is a strong lack of perceived legitimacy in post-communist Eastern Europe (Uildriks and Van Reenen 2003). If the police in these countries continue to be distanced from the civilian population and a lack of trust remains, it will be much harder to develop democratic forms of policing. Citizens indicate that distrust comes from perceptions of corruption, unprofessionalism, unwillingness to protect citizens, and abuse of authority. This limits citizen willingness to work with the police. Police officers feel mistrusted by the public, and they feel forsaken by the government, distrusted by their supervisors and distrusted by other criminal justice system agents (Uildriks and Van Reenen 2003: 199). This is because the police are no longer part of an interconnected state apparatus that had massive cooperation between different agents in the criminal justice system, and this has weakened police power. The police also suffer from a lack of resources in these countries. Guarantees such as free housing are disappearing and this has undermined morale (Uildriks and Van Reenen 2003). Trust in the police and police legitimacy is necessary for democratic policing. Zvekic and Alvazzi del-Fate (1995) found that the propensity to report crimes to the police in the developing world depended on a number of factors, including the perceived seriousness of the crime, past personal and/or otherwise acquired experience with the police, the perceived general relationship between the police and citizens, the existence of alternative ways to deal with the criminal act, and the relationship the victim has with the offender. There are more victims who are dissatisfied with the ways in which the police handle reported cases of victimization in the developing world (Zvekic and Alvazzi del-Fate 1995). Citizens in the developing world are also dissatisfied with the way the police control crime in their area of residence. Developing countries have higher levels of fear of victimization than developed countries, except for the case of Asian countries, where fear of crime is lowest. Because the developing world appears more crime-ridden, and because of a more narrow range of sentencing options, citizens of developing countries are more likely to prefer imprisonment as a method of punishment (Zvekic and Alvazzi del-Fate 1995). Unfortunately, due to a conflictual or colonial past, there are few local experts in many countries, such as policy makers, academics, NGOs, and other civilians with expertise that can assist with reforms (Neild 1999). There are few civilian oversight initiatives as well. This can lead to an almost total control by the police themselves over reforms. The success of civilian review can depend on the quality of leadership, resources, analytical capability, political support, and level of police resistance (Neild 1999). Civilian review boards do not appear to influence institutional-level reforms that are needed, but they can help strengthen internal police discipline, offer valuable

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information, and offer recommendations for reform based on analyses instead of on ideology only (Neild 1999). In an important article, Neild (1999) characterizes the new security debates in postconflict societies in terms of four broad phases: The first is regime policing, where police and similar others are geared toward protecting a regime’s interests. Human rights and other groups arguing for democratization criticize this form of policing and argue for political transition. Second, during political transitions, attention to police reform varies. In some cases, attention centers around building security and stability while others devote time to civil-military relations while leaving police institutions and practices unchanged (this latter form of attention is common among less-stable democracies). Third, as crime and the control of it becomes an increasing concern, the legacies of regime policing reappear in an attempt to improve law enforcement and crime prevention policies, which all too often threatens the democratic transition process. The fourth phase involves an active reform effort to create a new model of democratic citizen security in response to the other three phases. This fourth phase has yet to reach many countries (Neild 1999). How this fourth phase is carried out will determine whether there is progress toward democratic development or a reversion to the status quo. During the cold war, superpower competition led to the development of public order policies and institutions intended to protect pro-U.S. military regimes instead of the citizenry (Neild 1999). Police and military forces were closely linked, both engaged in abusive behaviors and other forms of repression, and crime fighting was ineffective and lacked a commitment to human rights. Even after reforms are instituted, demands for order-restoration lead to the return to old practices, and crime rates in the periphery rise as ineffective and under-regulated police forces engage in old tactics. What unfortunately can happen is that rising crime leads to the perception that government is weak and ineffective, while repressive old policing measures lead to the perception that no change is occurring, which also reduces legitimacy (Neild 1999). Regime policing easily flourished in weak post-colonial states that were underresourced, and contained authoritarian and paternalistic institutions, including paramilitary police agencies (Neild 1999). Regime policing develops from a legacy of authoritarian or military rule, or from violent internal conflicts and sectarian differences. Developing countries are faced with inadequate criminal justice systems because of regime policing, politicization, and institutional underdevelopment. Corruption becomes institutionalized as well. This failure to deepen democracy, the rule of law, and civic participation weakens public confidence, the rule of law, and support for democracy (Neild 1999). Goldsmith (2003) notes that foreign military and security aid often work toward militarizing the police to deal with drug and other problems. Anti-crime measures become more repressive, and media attention on crime increases the amount of fear of crime and the amount of mistrust citizens have in public institutions. The poor may end up supporting repressive police measures to reduce crime even though they are the most likely to suffer from such treatment (Neild 1999).


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Police reform in these societies emerges out of the need to provide security for different political groups and participants and to demobilize former combatants and organized crime. Former combatants often have no civilian skills, have easy access to weapons, and cannot find legitimate employment due to the economic and social legacies of war (Neild 2001). Major police reforms are necessary because former military and police forces have typically been involved in varying degrees with domestic and political spying, torture, illegal detentions, death squads, ethnic cleansing, and failing to act on known human rights abusers (Neild 2001: 22). Police reform is made more difficult by the fact that judicial reform tends to occur more slowly than police reform, and if the justice system fails to engage in legal tactics such as issuing warrants, the police will often resort to illegal actions to carry out regular functions (p. 31). Judicial authorities on the other hand often accuse the police of inadequate evidence gathering and a lack of technical documentation that is necessary for convictions. Police leadership can be weak in these societies as well, and inexperienced officers need stronger leadership for adequate training. Furthermore, due to a lack of adequate data, the police and other actors are not likely to have accurate figures on crime rates. Even if police reform occurs, crime is not likely to be reduced if, as in many post-conflict situations, citizen-police relations are troubled and citizen attitudes toward the police are negative (Neild 2001). During times of reform, there is a strong emphasis on the importance of police professionalization, a western approach that emphasizes non-partisan, high-tech, information-driven policing (Neild 2001: 22). Democratic policing as a philosophy or strategy is rarely mentioned. When creating a new force in post-conflict situations, two immediate concerns necessary for credibility are: 1) what the composition of police personnel will be (number of new recruits as opposed to those in the old force, the military, and from insurgent or guerrilla forces), and 2) the process of carefully examining and possibly retraining former combatants and members of other forces accused of human rights violations (Neild 2001: 24). Creating a new and inexperienced force from scratch is time-consuming and expensive, and this can lead to further credibility and legitimacy issues. Furthermore, former soldiers and police officers that face unemployment may find ways to increase instability (Neild 2001). What kind of international assistance is provided for police training in transitional societies? Typically, an international group of “professionals” imparts skills to new police forces. These individuals may be qualified to transfer operational and tactical police skills. However, it is very questionable whether they are qualified to design police institutions and structures conducive to democratic development. Institutional weaknesses, the general post-conflict environment, authoritarian nationalist cultures, and the difficulty of imparting skills to new officers all work to hinder the police reform process (Neild 2001). In many of these countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala, local communities appear to welcome these new police forces and see them as an improvement over previous forces (Neild 2001). Still, very quickly, these forces can be corrupted, unless they are placed in a framework that emphasizes their role in terms of a democratic society. Obstacles to legitimate and sustainable

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reforms still remain. In many of these countries the police are still seen as weak and ineffective, and public demands for order can lead to the old repressive policies that erode rights and militarize the police. Various movements and other elements of civil society are not working very hard to keep these reforms going, either (Neild 2001). Human rights groups and others, due to past histories, are reluctant to work with the new police forces other than setting up watchdog groups on police abuses. Demands for strong action fueled by fear of crime are likely to make the police engage in more misconduct, which in turn leads to perceptions that the status quo remains, which reduces legitimacy for the new, weakened and corrupt police system (Neild 2001). Fear of crime and lack of legitimacy also leads to the increased use of under-regulated private police forces sometimes staffed by demobilized soldiers, which increases inequalities by physically separating the rich from the non-rich and can lead to various kinds of repressive policing. Overall, this leads to less legitimacy for the state as a whole (Neild 2001). Community policing is another export from the west, but as in the U.S. the effects of community policing on the developing world is mixed (Neild 1999). While some improvements have been made in various countries, including the treatment of female victims, there are serious obstacles to its implementation in developing countries (Neild 1999). Many of the problems associated with community policing in the West also occur in transitional societies (lack of participation and social capital to sustain reforms, lack of assessment and other forms of evaluation, continued abuse, lack of organizational change in police departments, and so on). Brogden (2004) argues that peripheral countries cannot easily adopt U.S. systems of policing and criminal justice. U.S. aid providers often ignored local context and realities, and the motives for U.S. aid have been suspect. Mendes et al (1999) point out that, “the attempt to convince police forces in countries such as Brazil of the value of democratic policing is not helped by recent moves in the U.S. and Canada to backtrack on commitments to such a form of policing” (p. 10). While those in the developing world are searching for democratic forms of policing, cities such as New York City in supposed havens for democracy are reverting to militarized forms of policing (see Chapter 2). Increases in violence in Central America have coincided with sweeping security and justice reforms, including steps to demilitarize internal policing, reducing partisan influence over the criminal justice system, new police doctrines embracing human rights and citizen protection, the creation of government offices geared toward protecting human rights, new laws providing civil rights guarantees, criminal penalties for family violence, and the establishment of more open criminal justice procedures (Call 2000: 1). While these countries have made their police systems more civilian, professional and accountable, and civil society is more engaged and informed, violence has increased, mistrust in criminal justice institutions remains high, private security agencies have proliferated, police forces remain relatively ineffective, judicial systems remain corrupt, partisan, and inaccessible to marginalized populations, civil society organizations lack expertise to combat these issues, and international programs have not fully recognized these problems in full (Call 2000: 2).


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Another problem with international aid is that the repressive nature of Brazil’s police has been partially guided by U.S.-based foreign police training (Huggins 1998). Foreign police training was used to promote specific U.S. national security political interests and objectives (solidifying U.S. hegemony of the Americas by preventing communist insurgencies), but the militarized form of police training made the police more repressive rather than more democratic. Since local communities do not trust the police in Brazil, for example, they do not help the police (Arruda 1999), and even though there was a transition to democracy in the 1980s in Brazil, institutional violence has grown (Clark 1999). The oversight that does exist in Brazil is from the top down and not very effective. Numerous NGOs and others also assume that U.S. style community policing is the answer to human rights problems in transitional societies, and the IMF and other Bretton Woods institutions have occasionally mandated that countries receiving loans need to implement community policing (Brogden 2004). NGOs have other problems in implementing police reform. NGOs and governments have tenuous relationships, making collaboration tricky. Also, if many changes in reform take place within police management, it is unlikely NGOs will have much access to those decisions (Neild 1999). NGOs tend to be inexperienced in a number of countries and need more assistance. Police reform tends to be slow, erratic, and partial, and as NGOs both attempt to assist the police while monitoring them, there is more opportunity for weakened relations between the two. See chapter 2 for further discussion of U.S. policing and police reform. Police and judicial processes remain abusive, corrupt, and ineffective in the developing world even though many of these countries have gone through democratic transitions (Neild 1999). Neild (1999) describes these democratic countries with abusive justice systems and state failure to provide protection and services as uncivil or low intensity democracies. High levels of crime and a lack of security in weakened democracies can lead to political instability, and many citizens demand action even if it negatively impacts human rights. The police become brutal and ineffective in weak democratic systems where they continue to engage in regime policing and counterinsurgency operations, and in multi-ethnic or religious states with large indigenous populations the backgrounds of police officers will affect policing practices (Neild, 1999). Confidence in the justice system and the police weakens, the reporting of crime decreases, and police forces themselves lack self-efficacy and are faced with inner turmoil, poor working conditions, faulty or non-existent essential equipment, and low salaries. Those working in transitions toward democracy have not given adequate and timely attention to the need for reforming public order institutions and practices (Neild 1999). Reasons for this include that democratization processes are often partial in nature, police institutions are viewed in an instrumental fashion, and the police role in maintaining order continues to be characterized by social injustices. In South Africa, for example, Shaw (2002) notes that despite the implementation of various reforms, many problems still remain. Community policing practices were established, but within a single unitary police service. Crime prevention initiatives

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were of poor design and under-resourced, so the repressive practices of the professional model returned to combat immediate goals of reducing crime. Specialization led to greater fragmentation and competition among agencies. Innovative ideas were likely to be blocked due to increased police control over their operations, with “turfism” triumphing over more sound policies. So, even after numerous reforms, the old and centralized system that exists without adequate citizen input has remained, hampering efforts to reduce crime and gain trust and legitimacy (Shaw 2002). Neild (1999) rightly laments that old police structures and abusive practices remain after reforms have taken place, and that some NGOs concerned with human rights fail to address law and order issues to the detriment of the human rights process. Foreign assistors often bring in their own model of policing (often focusing on technology instead of co-production), thinking that it will easily translate in a different country. Chevigny (1995) notes from his study in Latin America that even when the police are no longer linked with the military the social order and other structures of the police often remain in place, hindering reforms. The negative effects of regime policing have not been as strong in Asia as in Africa and Latin America because Asia has higher levels of economic growth coupled with better service delivery, less rapid urbanization, and (some argue) because of the tradition of Confucianism (see Neild 1999). In other words, many of the factors affecting crime rates have little to do with criminal justice policy. After independence, many post-colonial states preserved several features of the colonial states, including police forces. Many states have retained para-military forces, primarily as special police units in predominantly colonial-like civilian police structures (Cole 1999: 96). Unlike their colonizers, post-colonial states have national police forces under central government control. Legitimacy is linked to political authority of central governments, so we have a situation where one authoritarian government replaces another (Cole 1999: 98). Political policing remains, with the police as the most visible symbol of repressive governmental power. Marginalized groups, such as trade unionists, the unemployed, students, children and adolescents, and the homeless, remain targets of police activity. Unfortunately, there seems to be a lack of political will to change the way policing operates in these countries, and we have seen that innovations such as community policing have yet to take hold in many post-colonial states (Cole 1999). Since many populations seeking changes are marginalized and lack access to participating the process, the chances for genuine reform can appear highly unlikely. Interestingly, it appears that colonial policing had an impact on the policing structure of colonizing countries instead of only vice versa (see Cole 1999). For example, many of the officers who served in the colonies came back to fill senior positions at home, and this can help explain the increased use of para-military policing and special units in colonial countries. We do have to keep in mind, however, that sometimes this process of creating a new force works fairly well. Police reform in post-conflict societies is more serious when the international community supports the peace process and provides assistance to public security reforms (Neild 1999). In El Salvador, ex-combatants from both sides were allowed to join the new force (See Neild 2001). The military was reduced


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and mandated to deal only with external threats, and the new police force consisted of no more than 20% former police. The rest of it was comprised of 20% former FMLN combatants and 60% new civilian recruits. All were vetted to remove human rights violators and new recruits underwent background checks. However, in Guatemala, there were few restrictions on the number of former police officers who could join the new force, and reforms concentrated on technical issues and largely ignored issues of civilian control and the role of armed forces in a democratic society (Neild 2001). In Uganda in 1986 the new president undertook massive reforms supported by human rights activists and civil society groups (Neild 1999). Police personnel were reduced to 3,000 and then built up to 15,000. Community policing programs were established with help from the British, officers were transferred regularly to reduce corruption, human rights training was established, and proactive strategies were instigated. Unfortunately, morale remained poor due to low salaries and poor barrack conditions, public complaints of abuse remained high, and vigilantism was common in rural areas (Neild 1999). Barriers to an equitable role for women When examining police reform and other related issues, it helps to have a feminist perspective. Much of the criminological and in particular the policing literature ignores women’s issues. Increasingly, the multiple dimensions of the victimization of women and children in transitional and developing societies are coming to be understood, but in numerous places the voices of women and their potential contributions to the processes of reform are often ignored. Women’s rights are human rights, not a special class of civil rights granted by the state. Academics, policy makers, NGOs, and other activists should understand how policing and crime in general are interrelated with patriarchy, ethnic conflict, socioeconomic development, and democratic institution-building. The obstacles to female participation in democratic policing and related efforts are many and are rooted in the varied patriarchal structures of societies. Some of these obstacles that need to be overcome include currently low levels of female participation in decision-making in general and the distinct harms women disproportionately suffer from in the areas of crime (domestic violence, rape, etc.) and social and ethnic conflict. Correspondingly, their positions with respect to employment, education, and health must be viewed directly as it frames how they are viewed in society if they are not protected. Most societies, including those in the core, have lower rates of participation for women. The relatively new field of women’s studies is a testament to this state of development and directs attention to these issues. If women are excluded from government and other decision-making positions as well as participation in civil society, their local knowledge and knowledge of the crimes and problems that confront them in their communities are lost. Their voices must be listened to and their participation must be encouraged because they are as likely as men to have valuable local knowledge that can be used for social and economic

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development projects and as agents that can help reduce crime and insecurity in concert with the police and other actors. When women lack access to knowledge, assets, services, and decision-making authority it impacts their ability to fulfill their economic and care-giving roles, which in the aggregate reduces human and economic growth (International Fund for Agricultural Development 2003). Womens’ inability to fully participate in the decisions that affect their lives is a measure of the extent to which democracy does not exist in a society. This inability to participate is notoriously found in some states where religion is used to justify totalitarianism or to limit female decision-making in supposedly democratic societies. The current struggle with the post-war Iraqi constitution over the role of women speaks to this issue. Women in the U.S. were not allowed to vote until the 1920s, so the Islamic world is not the only place where we find the law limiting suffrage and other decision-making activities. The failure to fully achieve a potential is a failure of democratic development. When patriarchy and religion limit female power, it also increases the chances that women will become victims of crime from domestic abuse, rape, honor crimes, and other forms of violence. As women are not protected, children will undoubtedly be victimized as well. Children would be more likely to face physical, psychological, and sexual abuse, as well as recruitment into armed forces and drug markets. This further exacerbates the problem because crime and fear of crime limit social activities that can be used to improve livelihoods. The Sub-National and Local Levels Now we turn to factors at the sub-national (community) and local level that affect development and crime. Findlay (1999) notes that it is the social context of urbanization (what some call urbanism), which involves social disorganization, dislocation, and rapid change that is criminogenic about urban areas. Transitional societies are more likely to experience these criminogenic effects of rapid urban migration and social change. One issue that has been noted repeatedly is that as communities deteriorate or are destroyed such as in many post-conflict situations, they lose the capacity to form and utilize social capital. A lack of social capital is one of the primary features of socially disorganized communities (see Sampson 1992). One of the most important factors of social capital is the connectedness of social networks among families, children, neighbors, and local organizations in a community (Coleman 1988). Social capital from a crime prevention framework is an organizational approach which views local communities and neighborhoods as a complex network of friends, kin, and acquaintances with formal and informal associational ties rooted in family life and ongoing socialization processes. If we assume that locality-based social networks constitute the core social fabric of human ecological communities (see Bursik 1986), we can argue that when residents form local social ties, their capacity for community informal social control


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is increased. This is because residents are then better able to recognize strangers and are more apt to engage in guardianship behavior against victimization. One major consequence of crime is fear, which has important reciprocal effects on communities and neighborhoods (Bellair 2000). Violence and the fear of it limits economic and physical well-being, restricts movement and access to jobs and schools, weakens social ties and interaction, deters investment and reduce economic output, weakens legitimacy in social institutions, and threatens the rule of law (see Neild 1999). This increases the use of vigilantism and the use of private security. Residents who fear crime may limit their round of activities, avoid and move away from perceivably dangerous places in need of socioeconomic development, and participate less in local affairs. This can lead to low or decreasing housing values, low or decreasing socioeconomic status of incoming as compared to current residents, and high or increasing vacancy rates. All of these consequences of the fear of crime create fewer opportunities for local networks and organizations to take hold, thus undermining the social and economic fabric of urban areas (see Skogan 1990). Although it is difficult to study the intervening mechanisms of social disorganization, several studies have found that the availability of community support and resources to deal with neighborhood crime problems alleviated fear, particularly in highly threatening residential environments (see Greenberg 1986; Taub, Taylor, and Dunham 1984). This reduction of fear allows social-capital-building, trust, and the courage to work to reduce crime. The idea of collective efficacy (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997) has been offered to describe the capacity for self-regulation and the resolution of issues that affect the community. Skogan, in Disorder and Decline (1990), has noted that in high-crime areas, the middle class that once had the skills to engage in associational relationships, form committees and community groups, and resolve problems, leaves when the fabric of a community begins to tear, removing perceived hopes of positively impacting the community. Based on this argument, the disorder and destruction of collective efficacy will precede the increase in crime. In the article “Broken Windows” (Wilson and Kelling 1982) the importance of preventing the metaphorical windows from breaking and eroding community efficacy is laid out. Social disorganization theory best organizes these problems into a conceptual framework. The basic essence of social disorganization theory is that crime varies with a neighborhood’s inability to self-regulate the behaviors of its members. Specifically, social disorganization theory attempts to explain the inability of a neighborhood effectively to control itself as due to the damaging effects of certain environmental characteristics. Paramount to social disorganization theory is the premise that disorganized neighborhoods are unable to promote the normative values of their residents and are unable to solve common problems, a situation which leads to higher crime rates and other social problems (Kornhauser 1978; Shaw and McKay 1969).

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Summary To summarize the arguments in this chapter, there are a number of factors that may limit a transitional or developing society’s ability to implement a democratic policing strategy. In varying degrees, these factors include underdevelopment, a lack of sufficiently democratic institutions (including criminal justice agencies), a weakened and unempowered civil society, low levels of social and other forms of capital, pressing crime and other security problems, social and cultural conflict, political instability, a lack of legitimacy in social and political institutions, and international pressures that weaken the capacity of states. All of these inter-related problems need to be addressed comprehensively if genuine change toward sustainable democratic policing is to be achieved, but so far this kind of comprehensive effort has not been undertaken. In our next chapter we focus on police reform in the western world, and in the United States specifically, to see if the forms of policing advocated by these countries are adequate for export to transitional and developing societies.

Chapter 2

Policing and Police Reform in the US: Adequate for Export? Nathan W. Pino Texas State University – San Marcos


The police must obey the law while enforcing the law US Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren

The United States and other Western powers are exporting their indigenous models of policing to transitional and developing societies. It is important to examine how policing developed in these core countries over time. Below we argue that current policing strategies offered by the developed world (the professional model and community policing) are not appropriate for export to other countries because the practice of those strategies has not adequately addressed the following issues: human rights, equity, co-production with the citizenry and other public and private sector organizations, accountability, openness, and organizational change, to name a few. Instead of trying to import these models of policing, nation states ought to be able to create their own versions of democratic policing based on international standards while tailored to their own goals and needs. We start with a basic introduction to the historical evolution of policing, and then discuss the various problems with the implementation of the professional and community policing models. The Historical Evolution of Policing in the US Starting in the 1830s, as the US slowly started to become more urban, there was a need for order in rapidly growing cities that were beset with crime, disorder and riots (Monkkonen 1981), but the emergence of the police coincided with the development of the spoils system and popular democracy (Kelling and Moore 1988). The era from the 1840s to the early 1900s was replete with corruption and abuse of police authority both by the police and public officials through partisan politics (Walker 1977). Correspondingly, in the reform period that followed, mechanisms were developed to control the police and refine the development of the police as a social institution. Arguments for reform centered on four issues: 1) the removal of the police from partisan politics through civil service reform, 2) the promotion of police

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professionalism, 3) the managerial revolution, which sought to develop and apply administrative structures and procedures to supervise and control police activities from an organizational perspective, and 4) the emergence of the “crime fighter and law enforcement officer ” model and the paramilitarization of the police. The goal of civil service reform was to remove the police from partisan politics. Police officers and other municipal workers were to be hired through competitive merit examinations and not political patronage. Police chiefs were to be insulated from the machinations of politicians through various mechanisms to insure their independence. In some areas chiefs were appointed for life and in others they could be removed only upon conviction of a crime. While ostensibly the police were part of municipal government they were also independent from other parts of government. This independence has impeded innovation and modernization (Geller 1997). This isolation from politics has resulted in the organizational goals of the police being determined largely by the police rather than by the citizens in consultation with the police. Others would argue that it has also significantly decreased the amount of accountability in policing compared to other social institutions (Skolnick 1999), which is antithetical to democracy. The police are largely against relating budgeting and manpower inputs to any type of identifiable outcome measures (Bayley 1994). Instead police wish to be evaluated only on the basis of their inputs such as calls for service, officers per thousand population and so forth. Their present actions in relation to security and terrorism are probably even less quantifiable. In instances of alleged brutality, they prefer to investigate themselves rather than involving more objective and impartial outside parties. While the intent of these reforms was to insulate the police from partisan politics, it was not intended to separate the police from the political processes that characterize democratic societies. Until recently, the strategies of the police such as preventive patrol, emphasis on arrest rather than prevention and response times were determined solely by the police and then marketed by them (Kelling and Moore 1988). In the professional model, the police determined their goals and objectives and how best to obtain them largely in isolation from the political process and the community which gives them their authority. Community concerns, such as fear of crime, quality of life, disorder, incivilities and crime prevention have only recently become police concerns, primarily because of the emergence of community policing (Skogan and Hartnett 1997). As we will explore below, these concerns have been clumsily grafted onto the professional model by the police and do not represent any fundamental rethinking of the political basis of the professional model and how poorly it responds to the crime problem in the community. The issue of police corruption and the misuse of police authority has been an ongoing issue in the United States since the creation of the first police force in Philadelphia in 1833 (Trojanowicz and Dixon 1974). Whereas Great Britain created policing in 1821 with the Metropolitan Police Act, in the United States there was no single mandate for the creation of police forces other than attempting to imitate the experience that other cities had as they authorized and created their own police forces. Police forces were created through enactments of local government as towns

Policing and Police Reform in the US: Adequate for Export?

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reached a critical size where the rural sheriff system was no longer adequate to maintain public order. When the first American police forces were being formed, the municipal politics of this era were generally synonymous with partisan politics. With the election of General Andrew Jackson to the presidency, “Jacksonian Democracy” became synonymous with the political idea that the winners of an election took advantage of the spoils of political victory. Partisan politics became characterized as ‘the spoils system’. Party supporters were given available jobs in municipal government and this included positions in the police department. The consequence of this was, at best, a benign reward for working for the ascendant political party (Kelling and Moore 1988). At its worst, it created corrupt police forces that were then used by political parties to influence elections by intimidating voters and collecting information on opposition candidates. Quite clearly, this process was antithetical to democratic processes and the ‘rule of law’ in the developing democratic system in the United States of America. “Jacksonian Democracy” also extended the political franchise to a general public that earlier had not owned enough property to qualify for voting rights and had therefore been disenfranchised since the founding of the American republic. This led to an era of political corruption in the United States in which presidents and Congress were tainted as votes were sold and the benefits of government accrued to those who could pay. In many respects, this era was similar in magnitude to the corruption that many countries are now confronting in their own democratic development as they struggle to pass laws and develop political and social mechanisms to control corruption. In the United States, the response to the problem of misconduct and corruption has been ongoing. Civil service reform started changing the nature of government in the United States in the late 19th century. As Woodrow Wilson promulgated the concept of a science of public administration to improve the quality of service administered by government, changes in policing were also taking place in response to the problem of corruption. The initial reforms attempted to remove the police from partisan politics and isolate them from partisan political influences (Walker 1977). It can be argued that this insulation from partisan politics later caused the police to be unresponsive to democratic processes. At the turn of the 19th Century in America, August Vollmer proposed the use of college-educated police officers who would use scientific methods to detect and solve crimes (Walker 1977). Vollmer created the first criminal justice program in a university and established the first police crime laboratory. The idea was to create a police profession that would be comparable to other professions having selfregulation, codes of professional ethics and public stature as their core characteristics. The ethical base of the profession allows it to investigate and censure those who commit misconduct. This was the proposed mechanism to solve the problem of corruption and misconduct of police in a manner similar to that existing in the legal and medical professions. Professions have the core capacity to regulate internal misconduct through disciplinary committees investigating misconduct of attorneys

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or medical review boards that establish standards of medical practice and investigate malpractice. Despite Vollmer’s proposed reforms, policing was still a creature of local government through the 1930s. However, with the process of urbanization, improvements in communication and greater mobility, police departments grew and developed more modern administrative processes. O.W. Wilson was responsible for adapting administrative theory to the problem of management of police departments and solving the continuing problem of corruption as delineated in his book Police Administration (1950). Wilson advocated the use of a structured hierarchical model of organization with military ranks to provide direct external supervision to the police. This was thought of as a way to reduce opportunities for misconduct and police deviance. In turn, it created an environment in which subordinates attempted to evade supervision, and the result was the development of a police subculture (Crank 1998). Police authority is extraordinary in both democratic and totalitarian societies. In democratic societies, the police derive their authority from laws enacted through democratically elected legislatures. As such, the police should be accountable to those who grant them their authority. In totalitarian societies, the police protect the interests of a group that achieved and continues to maintain its position through force, fear or other non-democratically derived methods. In totalitarian societies, the “order” in that society represents the interests of a non-democratically elected minority. In both types of societies, however, the police are given the authority to utilize force, command information and demand compliance with “police authority”. Historically, in both totalitarian and democratic societies the police have rationalized their low pay and low status as a justification for corruption. In America, the corruption initially was both economic and political. The police were involved with bribes and protective rackets for saloon owners and houses of prostitution (Fogelson 1977; Walker 1977). The corruption was either for the non-enforcement of laws or simply to avoid arrest. Political corruption took the form of conducting investigations on political opponents and collecting information that gave one candidate an advantage over his political adversaries. Police authority was also used to intimidate voters and to suppress and disrupt legitimate political organization, political assembly and freedom of speech. During the Civil Rights movement in the United States, in and outside the South, police authority was closely tied to the suppression of those seeking social, civil, and political rights as white police officers supported an almost apartheid-like separation of the races in southern states (McWhorter 2001). Next we turn to a more detailed examination of the professional model of policing in the US, which has been exported through training programs in other countries, and was intended to professionalize police forces, and reduce corruption and misconduct. Following that review, we will examine the most recent popular trend in policing, namely community oriented policing (COP), which was developed to compensate for the failure of the professional model.


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The Professional Model of Policing Professionalism in policing has not resulted in an effective police system. The police respond to crime at the individual level with arrest, investigations and victim assistance. They respond to violent crimes such as robberies, burglaries and assaults with force sufficient to contain the emergency. These police reactive activities were developed by the police and represent the core activities of the professional model. It is almost impossible, however, to relate these to higher order strategies that can be shown to impact levels of crime at the strategic or aggregate level. Training under the professional model Professions are based on a body of specialized, scientific knowledge. August Vollmer developed the idea of police professionalism in response to the “Keystone Kops” caricature of the police that contained more than a shred of truth in parody. Vollmer argued for college educated police officers and police command structures versed in management and public administration theory. The present educational requirements of policing, however, are based in forms of “training” which are closer to those of trade schools than a college or professional curriculum (Walker 1977). An example of “police professionalism” is the FBI National Academy where officers are exposed to some innovative thinking about policing, and where rising through the ranks occurs via political and merit-level based appointments to the National Academy. This is analogous to a merit badge for Boy Scouts. While some police officers do earn advanced degrees at the MA and Ph.D. level and utilize the knowledge they have gained to impact their organizations, this is relatively rare. In fact, it is not uncommon for educated police to be scorned given that most departments only require a high school diploma for employment. Professional police development strategies along the lines of American military academies or Bramshill in England that expose police executives to innovative graduate level police education do not exist in American policing. In the US military, baccalaureate degrees are a prerequisite for commission as a lieutenant, and senior military officers attend senior level military schools with education at the masters degree level. Furthermore, military officers are sent to receive graduate education to provide a type of cross-intellectual fertilization that does not exist as a core value in American policing. Lawyers at one time “read law” and clerked for an attorney before being examined by the bar to determine if they were prepared to practice law. This model also existed in medicine, nursing and education where those degrees are now earned at the university (Ciocarelli 1998). As an occupation, policing may more closely reflect the trade union movement rather than a profession. This has ramifications, especially in terms of misconduct and corruption. For instance, in Australia, the problem of police misconduct has been attributed to the pervasiveness of the police culture supported by police control over its own training. It has been proposed that to counter this, police training and education be placed in a university environment (Ciocarelli 1998). It is ironic that

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an occupational field that has the enforcement of the law as its mission would not have ethics education emerge as a leading issue in administration and training until the 1990s (Delattre 1989). Police training is the first formal exposure that recruits have to the values of policing. It is not uncommon, however, for new police officers to be told to forget everything they were taught in the academy and to learn now what it is really like on the street. No other profession tolerates this disjuncture between training and job performance and the existence of a value system that is at variance with its stated professional values. This is especially important within the military and police forces because of their capacity to use force as a core institutional characteristic. The American military has promoted a “warrior” ethos in the past decade. While this should promote swift and decisive actions in combat situations, it also places on the military a specific requirement to insure that their conduct is consistent with legal and ethical standards. The “Tailhook” episode where American Naval aviators sexually assaulted women at a convention in Las Vegas was an example of this military culture gone awry. In My Lai, Vietnam, in the late 1960s, non-combatants were brutally massacred and one of the major defendants, Lieutenant William Calley, was allowed to serve his sentence while under house arrest. Correspondingly, the paramilitarization of the police may have significant and harmful consequences in terms of ethics and corruption as a “warrior” culture is promoted without effective institutional controls. Assessing effectiveness If officers trained under the US system go to another country to train or re-train new police, can we expect the training to be effective or adhere to democratic values? Kelling and Coles (1996) note the unfortunate emergence of the term “law enforcement officer” as a shorthand term for both the police and sheriffs in the United States. An unintended consequence of this term is that it alters the police perception of their social role from maintaining order in the community to that of only “enforcing the law”. Kelling and Moore (1988) frame this in terms of a unilateral action by the police to reduce their interaction in socially ambiguous and conflicting areas such as order maintenance and improving their perception by the public. Unfortunately, as law enforcement officers, the police may view their role as that of not arresting on the basis of probable cause but of enforcing the law to include adjudication and punishment. Societal consensus must be built in order for informal social control to be sufficient enough that police do not become repressive in disadvantaged neighborhoods. In an attempt to achieve status and the illusion of organizational effectiveness, the police have sought to be perceived as “crime fighters” rather than “social workers or community service officers.” While the majority of police interventions are in the service role, the crime fighter role allows the police to demand resources and status in much the same way the military responded to the Cold War with demands for more tanks, airplanes and submarines. Unfortunately, the treatment of the citizens as


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the enemy can provide support for repressive police tactics such as profiling (Harris 1997). This is probably made even worse by police unions that support judges and prosecutors who are “tough” on crime, rather than candidates who promise to be fair and promote justice. The recent scandals about police misconduct in the Los Angeles Ramparts division notes that police fabricated evidence that was obviously false. This misconduct was not significantly challenged by either the judiciary or prosecutors, nor was it officially condemned by their fellow officers. The militarization of the police is evidenced by the proliferation, without much justification, of SWAT and tactical squads in municipal policing (Kraska and Cubellis 1997). There has been no widespread public debate about the appropriateness of this development. Kraska and Cubellis (1997) have documented that more departments are developing paramilitary capabilities even though they lack the training and expertise to supervise effectively the activities of those units. Furthermore, they demonstrate that the use of those squads increases the probability that deadly force will be used, and it may be used ineffectively or inappropriately. While most all professions develop the internal capacity to monitor the effectiveness of their own methods, the police did not adequately initiate critical examinations of their core strategies. Critical examinations about police work have come from outside police organizations and have been generally conducted by university-based researchers. Examinations of levels of random patrol (Kelling, Pate, Cieckman, Brown 1974), police response time (Spelman and Brown 1984) and police investigative processes (Greenwood, Chaiken and Petersilia 1977) have demonstrated that police activities have little impact on aggregate crime rates in the community. In the general management sector, forms of “knowledge management” are developing (Allee 1997; Davenport and Prusak 1998). In the health sciences, “evidence-based medicine” is emerging to describe an empirically based practice of medicine rather than one based on clinical intuition. Correspondingly, the development of evidence-based policing as described by Sherman (1989) is in its nascent stage and was developed by a university-based researcher. Innovations in policing such as community policing (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1993), problem-oriented policing (Goldstein 1990), innovative responses to domestic violence (Jolin and Moose 1997), hot spots and repeat calls for service (Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger 1989) and so forth, have not come from the police profession. Attempts to improve policing have originated in universities and private research and development foundations such as the Ford Foundation and public research institutions such as the National Institute of Justice. Indeed, the organizational rigidity of police organizations and their inability to “learn” and “change” is now becoming more than a small factor to those concerned with the ability of police systems to respond to the crime problem in the community (Geller 1997). In some respects, the police are like emergency room workers who do commendable and socially important work in treating emergencies, wounds and accidents. In policing, however, these individual events generally do not translate into improvements in public health and safety. In contrast, medicine developed public health medicine based on a preventive model initially to control the transmission

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of diseases and to improve sanitation. Prevention and the development of strategic interventions represent at best only a minor emphasis of the police. The professional model of police is still largely reactive based on arrest and deterrence. Bayley has noted that police departments do not engage in much strategic planning or research and development to evaluate the impact of their interventions on the problems that they choose to attempt to impact (Bayley 1994). Even though Vollmer proposed the creation of a police profession based on the development of knowledge about crime and the community, bureaucratic control was substituted for professional control. O.W. Wilson was largely viewed as responsible for the creation of the field of police administration. As police organizations grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s in response to urbanization, he made important contributions with respect to educating police administrators with his book, Police Administration (1950). The dominant problems confronted by the large police organizations were how to control relatively uneducated patrol officers and how to develop complex organizational structures that insure some accountability in relation to the multiple demands placed upon police organizations. When the organizational charts of large police organizations are examined, the creation of large numbers of little special units that take officers off the streets and out of touch with the public becomes apparent. The proliferation of special units may even be encouraged by departments because of the low status of police patrol in police organizations and the desire to “get out of the bag (uniform)”. The core activity of the professional model, patrol, has been given little status in policing. Moreover, interaction with the citizenry who give the police their authority is generally looked down upon as unimportant to advancement in the organization. Patrol is often seen as the dumping ground for those who cannot get transferred to specialty units. The police in the professional model have been known to refer to law-abiding citizens as civilians and law-breakers as “scum bags” and worse. The term “civilian” is significant because it does not connote any special status or respect although these civilians give the police their authority. In contrast, officers accrue a special status when it is noted that they are “sworn” and accorded special privileges in the performance of their duties. It serves to differentiate the police and set them apart. It does not denote that they have drawn the authority to perform their duties from civilians as originally noted by Rowan and Mayne who administered the first police force in London, England, in the 1830s. They summarized the relation between the police and the public as follows: To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence (Trojanowicz and Dixon 1974: 28).

Because of the political isolation of the police, the police have lagged behind other branches of government in terms of modernization. The reinvention that has taken place in other parts of government at the state and local level has not


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taken place in policing (Geller 1997; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). The continued resistance to community policing speaks to the ability of the professional model to resist demands for change and accountability that are confronting the educational, welfare, healthcare and economic systems of society. While this may be common in strong professional organizations such as the American Medical Association, which has been an antagonist to various health care reforms, the police resist change and accountability on the basis of their unions and sub-cultural definitions about “real police work” (Crank 1998). Another manifestation of the impoverished state of police administration is the poor utilization of information and crime analysis. This makes it difficult to break out of the “calls for service and response set,” which seems to characterize most police work, and engage in a strategic analysis of their operations and social functions. In the private sector global positioning systems are placed in notebooks to locate sales people and insure that they are making sales calls to businesses. There is technology used by trucking companies to locate their trucks. Yet it is not uncommon for police patrol cars to be “out of service” even after they have responded to a call, reflecting the officer’s discretion and the lack of accountability. Research on what both community police and “professional” police actually do reveals that there is a great deal of discretion in police activity, and the level of analysis and management of their activities is very low (Parks, Mastrofski, DeJong and Gray 1999). A college professor (Goldstein 1990), not a police administrator, pioneered the analysis of repeat calls for service. While administrators complained about going from call to call, they never noted that many of the calls are repeat calls at the same address frequently for the same reason. In effect, the professional model rewarded those wasteful expenditures of community resources. This still represents productivity for the professional model. Problem-oriented policing (Goldstein 1990) was conceived as a new approach to develop and present solutions to these wasteful expenditures of scarce police resources. A class system has emerged with respect to the consumption of police services, with a veritable explosion in the growth of private policing (Bayley 1994). The more affluent have chosen to purchase security systems on their houses, live in gated communities with private security, shop in malls where part of the purchase price of an item pays for freedom from panhandlers and or drunks, and gain protection in the parking lots and so forth while the public police by default provide a much lower and more aggressive level of services in public spaces. We see this in the developing world as well. Citizens in upscale communities are given a more serviceoriented style of policing, especially when they form public service districts and tax themselves for the services that they directly consume (Kelling and Coles 1996). Citizens in lower working class communities get the more aggressive model directed at crime control (Wilson 1973). There has been no architect or theoretician who has described a model or theory of policing who has come from within policing in the United States since August Vollmer. This is due in large part to the inherently decentralized nature of municipal policing as it developed in the United States. Historically, most large municipal police

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forces developed independently and separately. In the latter part of the twentieth century, the police unilaterally narrowed the scope of their mission from a larger “safety and order” role to a “law enforcement role” (Kelling and Coles 1996). This development would be analogous to garbage men saying that they will only pick up garbage that is placed in hermetically sealed containers so that they will not get dirty. While the police continue to mediate disputes, provide information and respond to calls for service, they prefer to emphasize crime and the paramilitary aspects of their role that constitutes a small portion of it rather than the larger and perhaps more important role of maintaining peace and mediating change in American society. One can learn more about how the professional model operates in the US by comparing policing with the US military. In a number of transitional societies the military and the police are intimately related. In the United States they are seen as separate, but a comparison of the two systems in the US is warranted because of how they are different. There are, of course, numerous problems in the US military. The controversy over the curriculum of the School of the Americas, ongoing problems with sexual harassment and “don’t ask, don’t tell,” the individual soldier’s participation in hate groups, Iran Contra and Oliver North, the Tailhook sexual harassment scandal, and the failure of the military system of justice to incarcerate any high-ranking officials in the My Lai Massacre or the recent Abu Ghraib scandal is evidence that no system is perfect. Nonetheless, within the military profession and the general public there is an ongoing dialogue about these problems that does not exist to the same extent within American policing. The American military has fundamentally changed its strategy based on information theory. It has become information-intensive, recognizing the importance of command and control of resources in fighting wars. It has spent huge amounts of resources to gather information about the characteristics of enemy positions and strengths through AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control Systems) and JSTARS (Joint Services Targeting and Reconnaissance Systems) systems. By analogy, crime mapping is still very limited in its application and analysis although there are some indications that there is a developing perspective relating to “places” in criminology that might be able to utilize global positioning technology (Miethe and McCorkle 1999). In contrast, the military recognized that information is more important than simply having more people. By analogy the police are fighting a WWI-style war where they charge the machine gun nests rather than fighting a Desert Storm engagement which emphasized the destruction of command and control capabilities to immobilize the ability of the enemy to coordinate the movement of its resources. The police continue to ask for more officers rather than trading those marginal expenditures in officers for more resources to acquire and manage information better. For example, a new development might be the merging of information systems which document and locate domestic violence, crime, probationers and parolees, students expelled from school, drug addicts, building code violations and so forth in the community and developing computer tools to depict and analyze their relationships in new and dynamic ways. The US 9/11 Commission has documented the poor organizational and command response to the tragic terrorist attack that took place on


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September 11, 2001. First, the disaster was foreseeable. In 1993, a huge explosive device was detonated in the basement of one to the World Trade Center towers, and this should have warned police and other security agents of future attempts on large numbers of people in office buildings. This appeared, however, to result in no fundamental improvement of the ability of the police and fire departments to control and coordinate their resources to respond to an attack of this magnitude. The issue of joint operations is an ongoing issue in military exercises and operations, yet it has failed to occur in the largest municipal police organization in the United States. In contrast to the paramilitarization of the police, most major decisions rendered by the American military are in consultation with the executive and legislative branches of government. Furthermore, a range of private “think tanks” is capable of providing more objective information about proposed policies of the military. No independent think tanks exist to promote change in thinking, strategy or tactics of the police except for perhaps the Police Foundation that is generally staffed by former police officers and executives. The relationship between the police and organizations that have some insight into police practices such as the ACLU, Amnesty International or the NAACP are frequently adversarial and not used to promote change in police thinking. Historically, the concept of civilian control of the military has characterized American civil military relations (Huntington 1964). This is an explicit recognition of the potential harm that the military can have on democratic government. In contrast, the police have not embraced the concept of civilian control and instead consistently utilize the metaphor of isolation from partisan politics to resist interactions with citizens and to do what the citizens view as important. While citizen review boards are becoming more common, they have historically been anathema to the police. The boards are also generally very weak in contrast to similar boards in the United Kingdom which have a great deal of authority and autonomy to investigate police misconduct (Bayley 1994). The military has progressively promoted the control of illegal behaviors through the internalization of values and self-control and the development of professional ethics and values: ie civilian control of the military through the political process, honor codes and ultimately an independent system of military justice. In the military it is wrong to have knowledge of unethical conduct and not report it. In contrast, the police rely extensively instead on external control or supervision to regulate misconduct. American military organizations have a system of justice represented by the Uniform Code of Military Justice while the police have “internal affairs”. The legal basis for this system recognizes the independence of the military legal system from “command influence” or the ability to shape and influence outcomes. Police administrators do not have the ability to adjudicate police officers, except through administrative channels. In the military, there is also the possibility of congressional investigations of misconduct that can be quite independent. In this system are military prosecutors and defense attorneys with an ethical and legal responsibility to investigate misconduct by the members of the military. This includes both criminal

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offenses and crimes that are unique to the military such as violating international conventions on the treatment of prisoners and civilians. Corruption and other forms of misconduct One of the most pressing problems for police organizations is the potentially coercive nature of police authority when not controlled by democratic ideals (Collins 1998; DeLattre 1989). Perhaps with the exception of the military, the police have the greatest potential to impede the process of democratic development. The abuses of police authority include arrest without cause, extralegal punishment, corruption, and the misuse of confidential information among others. Fundamentally, the misuse of police authority erodes an even larger goal of civil society that is ultimately the willful rather than coercive compliance of the citizenry with the laws that are created through democratic rather than autocratic processes. The issue of police corruption is increasingly being viewed in the context of a larger framework that covers police misconduct and misuse of authority (National Institute of Justice 1997). These are now viewed as factors that encompass the concept of police integrity. In turn, the issues of police integrity and police misconduct are among a host of even larger problems that societies may be experiencing with respect to their police forces. In addition to corruption, the relationship of the police to organized crime and their use of brutality and violence, human rights violations, discrimination and unresponsiveness or bias towards one group are part of a broader pattern of police misconduct and are subsumed within the issue of police integrity. This is quite simply because the authority that police have, if not regulated, can lead to this set of abusive behaviors. “Police deviance is more often than not group behavior grounded in established arrangements which are embedded in the structure of policing as a work situation and as a professional culture” (Kersten 2000: 241). In part, police corruption is a function of the corruption of power, meaning that the police have extraordinary authority and that there is little day-to-day supervision despite the supervisory structures developed by O.W. Wilson. This has been exacerbated by the historical pattern of poor treatment of the police by police managers that resulted in the creation of police unions and labor management relations reminiscent of trade unions rather than professions (Bopp 1978). Until the 1960s the police were denied the power to organize and engage in strikes. They served at the whim of municipal government and police administrators. In the years since then, they have become inordinately powerful and politically active with officers giving votes of “no confidence” to administrators and elected officials who are not perceived to represent their interests. Line police officers may then resist supervision and develop an “us vs. them” mentality against the police command structure. In turn, a major part of supervision is to attempt to find officers violating rules and procedures. The “blue shield and blue code” emerges from this conflicting situation to describe the solidarity of police officers and their unwillingness to testify against each other when fellow police officers break the law (Crank 1998).


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Ostensibly there is a police code of ethics, but when confronted with an ethical situation, this code seems to have little impact on police conduct (Delattre 1989). In recent years police managers have begun to teach ethics to the police within the professional model of policing. This can only be viewed as an admission of the failure of the police to achieve the theoretical and ethical model of professionalism. The emergence of ethics in police training is a tacit admission of the failure of the police to embed ethics as a core value of the police. The problem is still embedded in the professional model because, as stated earlier, the role of the rank structure is generally to monitor the conduct of those supervised (MacGregor 1960). The relationship of corruption to democratic development is by no means a new issue. Huntington (1969) noted the relationship between corruption and economic, political, and social development. In societies where change is occurring and where the existing economic and political relationships do not reflect the emerging realities, corruption may be viewed as a way of getting things accomplished. A bribe may expedite passage through a check point, “fix” a speeding ticket, secure release for a minor offense, or cause evidence to be “lost” for a major offense. An entrepreneur may seek to acquire export licenses quickly. The normal process takes six months when it should only take two weeks. A bribe expedites the process or secures a desired outcome. In turn, civil servants who have seen their salaries eroded through inflation as economies attempt to make the transition from centrally planned models to market models may feel as justified in taking a bribe as do police officers. Existing political and social relationships benefit certain groups and existing political relationships. In the democratic development process, groups that were formerly not part of political and social institutions and seek to participate in society and government are now included. Expanded participation means that groups that formerly benefited by a set of relationships now have to renegotiate those relationships to include these new groups. Newly included groups demand their share of resources, reducing the resources of other groups. From an economic development perspective, this means that jobs may now have to be divided among a larger group. The solution is to create more jobs, a solution that may be easier said than done. The ability to give jobs to certain groups and exclude others is a form of corruption. In the United States, for example, minorities continue to be under-represented in civil service positions in many jurisdictions. In Brazil, Panama, and Mexico, indigenous people are excluded because they may not meet height standards while in India lower caste members are not allowed to become police (Verma 1999). These incidents result in more positions for the dominant racial and ethnic groups. Corruption in policing may be viewed as a special case of corruption. This is because of the authority given to police officers to use force, the threat of force, and the ability to restrict the freedom of people through arrest. Police officers also can inflict summary “street justice,” and worse, become involved in or knowledgeable of “death squads.” These are inherently undemocratic examples of police abuse because they restrict freedom in a society. As an example of the hypothesis of institutional democratic development, Vincente Fox, the President of Mexico, directed an inquiry into the disappearance of “liberals” and students in the 1960s and 1970s by the

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police and army. In so doing, he sought to differentiate his politics from those of the PRI or Institutional Revolutionary Party that had become synonymous with institutionalized corruption in Mexico. It is not uncommon for police as well as others to explain this corruption in terms of the low salaries they receive. In countries as disparate as Mexico, Haiti and Bosnia, low pay has been advanced as an explanation of police corruption. In developing countries, the standards of living are by definition low because of the low levels of economic development in those countries. In Mexico, the anti-corruption campaign of President Fox has resulted in large numbers of police officers being fired for corruption. One could argue that these police officers were not poorly paid within the context of a country where 40 percent of the population lives below an already low poverty level. When compared with other parts of society such as teachers, farmers and so forth, the issue of police corruption does not legitimately seem to be related to their income. Rather, it seems to relate to the special position that the police have in society, the opportunities for corruption and the lack of a broader framework for viewing the corruption, and its control in view of the special characteristics of policing in democratic societies. Of course, other occupations in developing countries may also utilize their positions to benefit themselves personally in means that are essentially corrupt or illegal. Accountants manufacture dual sets of books in Russia to evade the internal revenue authorities, contractors in Turkey dilute concrete resulting in both greater profits and catastrophic collapses of buildings, and medical technicians in hospitals divert drugs for personal use or sale to those with hard currency. However, the police are supposed to uphold the law. Accountability Accountability is the process through which behavior is related to standards of conduct (Brodeur 1999). This means that a system must exist that has the ability to relate specific police behaviors to standards of conduct. This is a critical issue in contemporary policing because many officers believe that they are accountable to themselves or their peers rather than to the public. Perhaps police hold this view because they believe that no one but another officer can understand what is entailed in being a police officer. The resistance by the police to most systems of public review is demonstrable proof of this contention (Bayley 1994; Walker 2001). This is in contrast to the public demand for accountability in most other arenas of public service. For instance, teachers must demonstrate that test scores are improved, hospitals must reduce medical errors, and in business, productivity must be improved and profits must increase. Accountability systems take several forms. There may be internal systems such as internal affairs or external systems such as civilian oversight, civilian review boards and the courts. In the absence of such systems, the extraordinary powers of the police cannot be related to those standards, resulting potentially in the use of police authority for personal gain, or worse, the police system becoming organized to extract wealth for personal gain. In the United States the problem of accountability


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is made more complex by the political activity of the police and their labor unions. While these organizations serve a legitimate function in articulating protections for police who are subject to investigation, in the past the protections offered have been abused. For example, the police are protected from interrogation for periods of time, which allows them to rehearse their testimony. The police unions negotiated this “protection” in collective bargaining agreements. Repeatedly, this has resulted in almost identical testimony in court and written statements as alibis making it exceptionally difficult to convict the police in state courts for misconduct except in the most egregious cases such as the videotaped Rodney King beating. In that incident the officers were exonerated in state courts and only later convicted on federal civil rights charges. Another element of this discourse is the recognition of the historical limitations of professionalism as a mechanism for police reform. While the rise of police professionalism did deal with some of the more problematic elements of police corruption in the political era of policing, it did not succeed in transforming policing into a profession that is internally regulated and capable of compelling change from within. Undoubtedly, the issue of police solidarity in the face of accountability is problematic. One element of professionalism is that accountability is monitored internally through the profession. In theory each professional is supposed to “police” the profession. With the exception of Frank Serpico, there is an almost complete absence of police officers who are willing to come forward to expunge their profession of misconduct. This absence indicates that the issue of police accountability should become an even higher priority. Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant, was sodomized with a handle of a toilet plunger by a New York City police officer, who then walked around the police station bragging about his actions. That none of the officers who heard the comments reported the incident was reprehensible and an indication of the misunderstood nature of professionalism amongst the police. The code of silence among officers states that officers will not provide testimony against each other for misconduct. This makes it very difficult to conduct investigations, particularly when fellow officers may be the only witnesses to brutality and corruption. The common investigatory tool to break what are basically criminal conspiracies is to interrogate defendants separately. The police, however, may be able to meet before being questioned under conditions not afforded to other criminal defendants. Or they may simply be knowledgeable enough about the criminal law to provide the least amount of information possible, making it difficult to conduct an investigation. While many occupations develop cultural perspectives that represent the unique nature of their work, the notion of subculture conveys the perspective that values are more than just “solidarity” and that the occupation may deviate from expected social norms of conduct. While this may be a function of unique occupational characteristics such as difficult training, the need for teamwork and the exposure to danger, it may also be engendered by the perception that the organization is closed to public scrutiny. The difficulty in penetrating a culture can contribute to the

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emergence of a subculture and provide the veil behind which corruption takes place (Punch 2000). The argument for security and secrecy to protect operations is the antithesis of transparency. The emerging “paramilitarization” of the police (Kraska and Cubellis 1997) may serve an explicit “means justifies the ends” mentality. In this mentality, due process and justice may be subverted to “necessity and expediency” and miscarriages of justice hidden under “secrecy”. This, of course, can be dealt with by the requirement that those who make decisions are accountable for their decisions and cannot invoke, without review, “secrecy and security” in denying a democratic public access to information and decision criteria. This lack of transparency may directly affect the ability to detect and investigate corruption that rises to the level of an organizational norm with police directly or indirectly involved in corrupt and criminal enterprises (Punch 2000). These problems can all lead to the fragmentation of citizen-police relations. Skolnick (1966) described how police who are not familiar with their patrol areas treat the citizens who give the police their authority as “symbolic assailants.” In a democratic society, any restriction on liberty based on the use of police authority is a serious matter and demands some form of accountability. Clearly, due to the many problems of the professional model in terms of training, effectiveness, corruption and accountability, this model in practice is not ideal for promotion to other countries attempting to become more democratic, and in practice is not appropriate for use in the US either. Is community policing an adequate alternative? This issue is addressed next. Is Community Oriented Policing the Answer? Due to the limitations of the professional model of policing, many scholars and professionals over the past twenty years have advocated the community-oriented policing (COP) philosophy. Is COP more democratic than the professional model? Our argument is that COP has emerged as an alternative to the professional model and is inherently more democratic. Yet, it suffers from a fatal flaw in that in practice it has not been able to transform the professional model of policing. COP has not reached its full potential for a number of reasons. COP is usually not practiced according to its rhetoric, and the rhetoric of COP can be used to mask traditional approaches that may be overly aggressive and threaten civil liberties. COP is also marred by inequitable outcomes and unequal participation. COP is based on a philosophy that encourages a working partnership between police officers, community residents, and other actors for solving the problems of crime, fear of crime, and disorder. COP has been defined and applied in so many different ways, but while labels vary and emphases differ from city to city, COP has been consistently defined by the concepts of partnerships and problem solving (Ramsey 2002). The COP philosophy assumes that the most effective basis of order and control in society is at the community level (Murphy 1988), and that crime


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control is best accomplished as a collaborative effort between community residents and police personnel (Kelling and Coles 1996). The police cannot prevent crime on their own (Bayley 1994), so they must rely on citizens in many ways, such as for the authority to police neighborhoods, for information about the nature of neighborhood problems, and for collaboration in solving problems with citizens (Kelling and Coles 1996). COP is also supposed to represent a renegotiation of the social contract between the police and the citizenry, because communities help define police work, establishing a new center of political power (Bayley 1994). In COP the police proactively act beyond simple crime fighting and law enforcement, rely on the citizenry, engage in tactics to target specific problems identified by the whole community, decentralize to the neighborhood level to be more accessible, maintain constant contact and cooperation with the citizenry, work with other public and private sector organizations, and continually evaluate strategies and community relations (Kelling and Coles 1996; Goldstein 1990; Spelman and Eck 1987; Birzer 1996; US Department of Justice 1993; Fleissner and Heinzelmann 1996). Individual police officers and police units are responsible for geographic areas that correspond to communities, neighborhoods or areas with some identifiable community characteristics. This establishes accountability of the police for the areas they police. In the professional model there was generally a response or dispatch to a problem, but never any responsibility for the solution, resolution or reduction of the problem. Goldstein (1990) notes that problem oriented policing (a precursor to COP) promotes democracy by linking the police with the reduction of problems that impinge on freedoms. To the extent that crime and fear of crime cause a reduction in freedom through the loss of life, injury or property or even freedom of movement, they are inherently undemocratic. As the police work with the community to identify community problems that lead to crime and disorder and foster the solution of community problems, this results in more freedom and the promotion of democratic values. In addition to promoting freedom, community policing is inherently more democratic than the professional model because it involves the interaction with the community in the determination of police goals. More recently, crime prevention has become a part of the COP model (Wiatrowski and Vardalis 1995). The model argues for crime prevention strategies at the officer, supervisor and department levels corresponding to primary, secondary, and tertiary crime prevention. This model integrates community policing with the crime prevention model developed by Brantingham and Faust (1977) who borrowed their conceptual model from the public health field. In this model, the primary function of crime prevention and the community police officer is to keep the community healthy and to stop disorder that violates community standards. If activities such as loitering, petty theft, public drunkenness and drug use are viewed as a problem they are dealt with by a variety of methods that promote order and are consensually agreed upon by the community (Braga, Weisburd, Waring, Mazerolle, Spelman, and Gajewski 1998; Mazerolle, Kadleck, and Roehl 1998). Secondary prevention promotes activities such as at-risk youth being directed to youth centers, those unsupervised after school directed to community after-school programs, and women who have been threatened

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directed to programs for domestic violence. Finally, tertiary prevention is directed at offenders who are in the community. According to restorative justice an offender is directed to an employment or drug treatment program, which may reduce the risk of recidivism. This potentially increases the amount of freedom in the community by reducing the risk of reoffending (Van Ness and Strong 1997). Community policing is thought to break down the primacy of bureaucratic policing by reinventing and reorganizing the police and flattening out police organizations. It promotes resolutions to problems by using arrest as a last resort rather than as a first resort (Wiatrowski and Vardalis 1995). The professional model of policing, in contrast, used arrests as a measure of productivity rather than alternative measures of public safety in the community. The issue of ethics has also emerged within community policing. This is due to the fact that community police officers are expected to perform their functions independently without the direct supervision associated with the previous era of police professionalism. At least within the perspective of community policing, the failure of police integrity to control misconduct has been recognized. While the emphasis on ethics training in community policing is probably too narrow, the potential for abuse in community policing has at least become a topic of discussion (National Institute of Justice 1997). This stands in marked contrast to the professional era of policing where corruption and misconduct were viewed as a product of a few errant officers rather than a product of police culture, police organizations, and the relationship of policing to civil society. Community policing is supposed to create a more ethical officer by stressing the role of internalized norms and values and self control rather than bureaucratic and military control and a subculture that may be antithetical to democratic values. The traditional organizational theory that is used in most police departments treats officers as lazy, needing motivation, and prone to corruption. In contrast, community policing treats officers as being more responsible and self-motivated, needing less supervision and being less susceptible to corruption because they are treated as professionals. In COP, the police should no longer represent coercive state power, but while COP celebrates collaboration between the police and community residents, “the ideal of being responsive to individual community groups often conflicts with the equally important ideal of equity, which directs police to provide fair service to all segments of the public” (emphasis added) (Thacher 2001: p. 3). In traditional policing, citizens wondered if they received an equitable share of police services, but for many active community groups, equity is more about participatory management and power sharing. “This perspective raises the question of equity to a new level: towards citizen involvement in decision-making, in community defense, in problem solving, and in various community empowerment schemes” (Brogden 1999: p. 170). There are many departments across the country that have implemented new programs and administrative policies that are “consistent with the spirit of the wider reforms” of COP (Moore 1994: p. 285), but the rhetoric of COP must be separated from the reality of COP in practice (Reed 1999). We must question whether or not


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these new programs are implemented with true co-production (citizens and police working together as relatively equal partners), equity, and the upholding of civil liberties, or whether they were the new public relations project of the same police strategies. Furthermore, we must question whether or not an exclusive focus on crime and disorder reduction can reduce crime over the long term. COP and the status quo It appears that new policing strategies such as COP often fail to promote anything different from the status quo because they have not incorporated a theory of change within the organization. The impetus for COP developed from university-based research and theory pointing to the isolation of the police from the public and the ineffectiveness of the core strategies of the professional model (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1993). But to date, when COP has been taken over by the police, typically it has been very poorly implemented, often being little more than window dressing or new door-stickers on the patrol cars rather than a case of overall reform. After 10 years, no police department in the United States can be characterized as entirely organized around the community police model (Swanson, Territo and Taylor 1998). This would indicate that those who adhere to the professional model lack the capacity for organizational change. While other segments of the American public and private sector have undergone massive downsizing and reinvention, the police have remained largely unchanged. More specifically, other branches of municipal government have been forced to reinvent themselves, but the police have been largely resistant to efforts to become more efficient and effective. They have resisted developing identifiable outcomes for which they will be held accountable (Bayley 1994). There are multiple reasons for why we see the continuation of the status quo. One is that many officers have negative attitudes toward COP, despite changes in the racial, gender, and educational composition of police personnel and fragmentations of the supposed continuity of police culture (see Paoline, Myers, and Worden 2000). This is obvious evidence of how isolated the police culture has become from the public it serves and from which it derives its authority. Negative views toward COP can therefore come from a variety of sources, including job strain (lack of administrative support), other failures to change the working environment in COP, perceptions of COP strategies as social work instead of police work, COP strategies not conforming to established expectations of police work, and mid-manager loss of authority (Decker, 1998; Lurgio and Skogan 1998; Yates and Pillai 1996). Even if officers are convinced to engage in COP, we must ask whether or not departments actually practice it. Defining and promoting COP has been easier than getting it fully implemented in police departments and communities (Ramsey 2002). Maguire (1997) found that between 1987 and 1993 there were only minimal changes in organizational structures of police departments, and there were no significant differences in levels of change between agencies that claimed to practice COP and those that did not.

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Because of their isolation and fragmentation, police organizations are resistant to change. Departments that have undertaken COP have succeeded typically in articulating mission statements but they have failed to understand the entirety of the change process (Senge 1990). Reed (1999) argues that COP is revolutionary in its rhetoric, but in actuality is reformist and attempts to maintain the status quo. There is even a lack of evidence for the theoretical rhetoric of COP, because of the lack of evidence for the order maintenance approach (rooting out disorder to reduce serious crime) (Harcourt 2001). It has been argued that COP serves an ideological function by masking power relations while serving as a primary means by which police departments are able to continue the implementation and maintenance of their power over the populace (Saunders 1999). Actual practices that expand the capacity of police officers to observe citizens and that attempt to build partnerships with some residents must be attached to the rhetoric in order to convince the citizenry that COP as it is sold is in fact occurring (Saunders 1999). In particular, according to Barlow and Barlow (1999), image management and maintaining order through different strategies, and gaining African American support and assistance in controlling their own people is used to help obtain legitimacy (Barlow and Barlow 1999). The rhetoric of COP and quality of life is used to gain legitimacy, allowing racism to become institutionalized while appearing less visible (Barlow and Barlow 1999). It is also apparent that numerous police departments are taking an aggressive stance via paramilitary units behind the rhetoric of COP in order to get support for it (Greene 1999; Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Miller 1999). Zero tolerance policing (attacking minor forms of disorder to reduce serious street crime) is considered successful in reducing crime by some city leaders in New York City, but there is little evidence that COP is what reduced the crime rate, despite claims by writers such as Kelling and Coles (1996) (see Greene 1999). The number of citizen complaints filed with civilian review boards has increased, and so has the number of lawsuits alleging police misconduct and abuse of force (Greene 1999; Harcourt 1998). Increased police discretion in COP can also lead to increased complaints of police misconduct (see Kelling and Coles 1998; Mastrofski, Snipes, Parks, and Maxwell 2000; Mastrofski 1996; Skogan 1995). If the police are seen as too aggressive, support from the populace for COP in communities affected are likely to decrease (Greene 1999; Miller 1999). The paramilitary structure of police departments can also impede creative and innovative programs (Reed 1999), and aggressive order maintenance can lead to abusive practices by those officers who practice it (Kelling 1999). Policing is less democratic when the police unilaterally determine what they will accomplish without consultation with, or the consent of, the governed. The decision by the New York City Police to impose policies such as Zero Tolerance against a community without consulting the community was totalitarian and oppressive. Zero tolerance strategies such as those used in New York City are not applied equally throughout the city and against the entire spectrum of law-breaking behaviors. The use of profiling strategies means that people of color are targeted for invasive stops and searches much like the police of totalitarian societies asking for papers. Because


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these stops are largely undocumented and conducted at the discretion of the officer with no official guide lines, the premise that they are accomplished on the basis of intuition and street knowledge is unacceptable in a democratic society. In that context, the definition of good police work in the professional model and totalitarian societies is indistinguishable. The violation of the rights of large numbers of citizens, such as the detention of immigrants post 9–11, to accomplish a small number of arrests and even fewer convictions, meets the standard that are characteristic of policing in totalitarian countries. The development of Zero Tolerance as a crime control strategy was based on a misunderstanding of the work of Kelling and Coles (1996) in Fixing Broken Windows. In this work, the authors describe the importance of social norms in regulating behavior. They note that these norms must be declared by the community and then enforced throughout the spectrum of informal and formal social controls. Norms are enforced informally by requests to comply and by demonstration of prescribed forms of behavior. Community norms dictate that trash is deposited in garbage cans and those who litter are requested to place their garbage in an appropriate container. If litterers do not respond to requests, the community dictates the possible forms of enforcement to the police. The “zero enforcement of norms” is not dictated unilaterally by the police, but in consultation with the community. When “zero tolerance” does not include community consultation, it is simply police repression consistent with the most totalitarian police regimes. Duffee, Fluellen, and Roscoe (2000) note that the police can build as well as destroy community. The police can destroy community through inadequate experiences in civic partnership, which reduces the energy necessary for collective problem solving (Duffee et al 2000). The police can also contribute to a narrow and incomplete definition of neighborhood problems, emphasizing the residents’ characteristics and behaviors and de-emphasizing the withdrawal of resources from those neighborhoods (Duffee et al 2000). “To take community seriously and to take steps to empower neighborhoods represents actions that are contrary to 50 years of urban politics and policing tradition.” (Duffee et al 2000: p. 355). It appears, then, that we are faced with the status quo in numerous places that claim to practice new strategies. Citizen groups and co-production The citizenry are a necessary component of COP and other civic strategies, and citizens appear to want COP in their communities and to like COP programs (Moore 1994; Pino 1999; Skogan 1994). Community cooperation may be the most critical factor in implementing COP (Carter and Radelet 1999; Green and Pelfrey 1997), and positive interactions between the police and the citizenry (such as talking with people in schools, on the streets, and as a part of community programs) that offset the unavoidable and necessary negative interactions have a number of benefits, including the building of trust, familiarity, and confidence on “both sides” (Cordner 1997: p. 458). If both sides can build trust, familiarity, and confidence, then co-production

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between the police and the community becomes a real possibility. Unfortunately, Duffee et al (2000) note that police policy that concentrates on traditional approaches in COP limits neighborhood sustainability. These traditional approaches in COP limit neighborhood sustainability by establishing incomplete internal coordination and external linkages, de-emphasizing economic policies responsive to neighborhood needs and neighborhood consciousness of the relationship between neighborhood politics and crime, limiting neighborhood autonomy by relying on experts, and assuming that neighborhoods cause their own problems alone (Duffee et al 2000). COP can be designed to support community development and democracy: to enact the belief that the police should enhance public safety, manage disputes to everyone’s satisfaction, reward police for diversified service, and hold police accountable to their citizenry (Pepinski 1991). “As community members gain power to interact and cooperate to meet one another’s needs and concerns, this flow of current generates energy in the form of compassion, essentially the bond of interpersonal cohesion, which alone inhibits violence, including crime and retaliation for crime” (Pepinski 1991: p. 100). Community groups can serve a number of functions in COP partnerships. They inform the police about crime and disorder problems, can help identify these problems as well as analyze and document the extent of them, bring political pressure to the issues and make collective statements about taking control of the streets from criminals, help the police educate others about crime and disorder and enlist public cooperation, allow people to ventilate grievances against the police without bureaucratic interference, experience self-empowerment by taking an active role in solving neighborhood problems, and assist in evaluating the impact of crime prevention (Bayley 1994; Bennet 1995; Buerger 1998; Stewart-Brown 2001). While keeping this in mind it appears that citizens want a number of things out of COP. These things include a regular beat officer patrolling their neighborhood area who gets to know residents, improved relations between officers and citizens, reduction of the fear of crime, crime fighting (many of these crimes are less serious offenses including loitering, unsolicited automobile window washing, prostitution, and so on), increased political and economic support, improved local government services, and increased community interest in crime prevention (Bohm, Reynolds, and Holmes 2000; Grinc 1998; Kelling and Coles 1998; Pino 1999). Community groups do differ, however. While these groups tend to have a consensus on defining community problems, they differ on the seriousness of these problems (Bohm et al 2000). Even though there is evidence that COP is popular, it appears that COP is not popular enough among citizens to ensure that they will participate in it (Grinc 1998). Reasons for not wanting to be involved are numerous, including high levels of fear of retaliation from criminals, skepticism that COP will be more than a brief and soon-forgotten program, the heterogeneous populations and social disorganization we find in many communities, and a much less than perfect relationship between community residents and the police that has existed for 150 years, especially in poor, disorganized, and minority neighborhoods (Grinc 1998). What often ends up


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happening is that two kinds of people attend beat meetings: core members and those who only attend during crises (DuBois and Hartnett 2002; Pino 1999). When community groups and the police have attempted to work together, it has been a very bumpy road, especially when mutual distrust and miscommunication existed before co-production began. Community groups and the police have been known to differ on the focus of police training and the perceived levels of trust between police and minority residents (Kerley 2002). In a number of studies, citizens and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were largely unaware of COP in their communities, had little contact with the police, were not contacted to be involved in COP strategies, and were largely ignorant of their proper role in COP, even though many departments in these areas claimed to be practicing COP (Grinc 1998; Kerley 2002; Sadd and Grinc 1994; Williams 1998). COP is often defined as a police initiative, and the citizenry, citizens groups, and other public and private agencies are therefore excluded from the process that is supposed to involve the entire community (Sadd and Grinc 1994). Even when citizens do participate in problem solving, their role is often limited. In one study, the public was most often used as an information source so that officers could carry out a response, limiting the active role of community residents (Capowich and Roehl 1994: p. 145). This is further evidence that COP strategies may exist more in rhetoric than in actual practice (Kerley 2002; Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Maguire 1997). Though improved attitudes should not be perceived as a major end goal for COP, healthy citizen attitudes toward the police are necessary for trust-building and collaborative efforts. Trust is a major factor, and the lack of it has prevented social capital-building between the police and community residents, especially in lower class areas (Grinc 1998; Pino 2001). Reports of brutality and corruption also erode police legitimacy to control behavior by subverting the foundation of trust used to maintain legitimacy (Jesilow and Parsons 2000). It is difficult to build trust if it was not there to start with. In a survey of over 100 high school African American males (who did not report high levels of delinquency or antisocial/delinquent values), it was found that these youth found the police as a repressive agent through personal encounters as well as encounters experienced by friends and relatives (Jones-Brown 2000). In cases where increasing police presence is used in order to implement repressive approaches to the crime problem, COP “becomes its own problem” because youth contacts with the police occur in enforcement situations rather than in service situations (Jones-Brown 2000: p. 224). Negative attitudes and distrust therefore leads to an absence of co-productive activities and other forms of cooperation with the police. To improve citizen attitudes some departments have attempted citizen police academies with some success (Cohn 1996). However, in areas where trust has been weakened by anger from police shootings or other events, citizen police academies may be fruitless. In a study based in Iowa, one focus group respondent said the following regarding trust and citizen police academies: “The community policing academy is not gonna do it. I would not ride in no car with them, I would get shot! Seriously, that is how much I trust these police officers” (Pino 2001: p. 212). Civilian

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review boards are also seen as a way to build trust and accountability, but civilian review boards have their own challenges, including group conflict between minority/ civil rights groups and police unions/administrators, as well as the somewhat contradictory mission of review boards to investigate impartially and objectively complaints in a legalistic manner while at the same time representing the interests of community groups (Beattie and Weitzer 2000). Equity COP originally was based on the idea that the whole community must be committed to improving all of the community, not just select neighborhoods trying selfishly to protect themselves (Trojanowicz 1994). This is easier said than done, especially since it appears that some neighborhoods do not have the capacity, trust, and networks necessary to organize and work with the police as independent actors. Community, neighborhood, and block organizations are difficult to form and even more difficult to maintain (Buerger 1998), and ordinary citizens cannot always take effective action (Bayley 1994; Robin 2000). Poor and minority community members do not have a track record of cooperating with police officers (they are understandably often more interested in watchdog activities), and poor and high crime areas often lack the proper infrastructure of organizations necessary to help start cooperation efforts (DuBois and Hartnett 2002). In addition to the above problems, crime and fear promote withdrawal from community life and inhibit involvement. Only a small fraction of a resident pool tends to be represented in citizen group membership, and homeowners and white residents in mixed areas tend to be overly represented. Neighborhood capacity is highly related to “the pattern of privilege and privation that characterizes American society in general” (Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser, and Lovig 1999: p. 223). In terms of race, it is more complex than just a white/non-white dichotomy. There are also differences in participation between minority groups. For example, in Chicago, African Americans were more likely to attend beat meetings than Latina/os (Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium, 2000), and while there has been some success in the African American community in Chicago, especially in middle class African American areas, Latina/os have been largely left out of the process and have enjoyed the fewest benefits from the program there (DuBois and Hartnett 2002). Evaluations of COP around the country find a risk of inequitable outcomes and unequal participation (DuBois and Hartnett 2002). It is quite apparent that COP is a political process, and that the more powerful segments of society (white, upper and middle class, homeowners) dominate COP partnerships and benefit the most from co-production with the police relative to other segments of society (Bohm et al 2000; Brogden 1999; Buerger 1998; DuBois and Hartnett 2002; Lyons 1999; Miller 1999; Reed 1999; Schneider 1999; Skogan 1994; Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser, and Lovig 2000; Skogan et al 1999; Thacher 2001; Williams 1998). More powerful segments have more positive attitudes toward the police, engage in more COP activities, dominate COP activities in lower-capacity neighborhoods


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(excluding less powerful segments from the process and sometimes defining those segments (minorities and renters) as part of the problem), and have the social capital and capacity to organize and pursue their interests with local government. The police also find it easier to work in areas where they are more accepted, exacerbating the race and class divisions, and if COP benefits the more powerful segments it may do so at the expense of the poor. Thus, COP is “fragmented by race, class, and lifestyle” (Skogan 1994: p. 179). Equity is one of the major barriers to COP’s success, and the theoretical problems associated with COP are part of the issue. Goldstein’s “quasi-functionalist” approach to community policing based on discretion and problem-solving assumes that we live in an equitable society (Brogden 1999: 169). It has been argued that COP theories and programs incorrectly assume that society is pluralistic and that all communities have similar problems, needs, and access to political and economic resources (Schneider 1999). According to Brogden (1999), Goldstein’s work does not answer how to resolve the problem of delivering equal services in an unequal society such as the United States with its inequities in wealth and political power. Public officials and police may end up withdrawing support from neighborhoods that cannot be organized easily and traditional policing may return to those areas (Brogden 1999). The difference in knowledge, language, and experience between residents and police officers creates communicative obstacles and a lack of understanding between the police and the community (Schneider 1999). “The concentration of economic inequality and political powerlessness in some residential areas has nurtured a spatial and interpersonal inequality of crime and victimization, while negatively influencing the ability of these communities to collectively address their local problems” (Schneider 1999: p. 362). Furthermore, the “…approach that is inherent in COP does not address the causes of crime and community apathy within socially disadvantaged neighborhoods that are rooted in the structural foundations of advanced western countries” (Schneider 1999: p. 362). Summary The above survey of the literature shows that COP implementation is flawed in a number of ways. These flaws demonstrate the inherent limited focus and capacity of COP strategies to reduce crime and solve other social problems, especially in transitional and developing states marred by the problems outlined in the first chapter. Assuming that consensus is achieved between powerful and less powerful groups in a community on perceived crime and disorder problems and their solutions, COP efforts may still prove ineffective in reducing larger social problems that are theoretically linked to crime because COP does little to address fundamental social problems (see Skogan 1990). Major political and economic changes would be needed in order to get at the root causes of crime, disorder, poverty, and so on, and in the absence of those changes, all that COP can do is temporarily suppress symptoms of these underlying social problems (Bohm et al 2000). This would be especially true

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in post-conflict, post-colonial, and other unstable societies, where the establishment of COP has often become the same repressive and undemocratic policing practices under a new label, and where the wealthy partake in COP while marginalized groups are excluded (Brogden 2004). Much of the current literature continues to assume that COP occurs in a vacuum, and that problems with COP are largely due to problems within implementation itself including a lack of organizational change, insufficient co-production between the community and the police, lack of funding, and so on. Edited volumes such as Skogan’s (2004) Community Policing: Can it Work? are great summaries of the literature but do not move beyond the methodological and theoretical problems that plague COP research. Even some of the recent works that attempt to develop more democratic forms of policing around the world fail to address properly issues of socioeconomic development, improving social, human and other forms of capital, and the lack of US interest in reforming its own domestic police forces. To hold on to the quasi-functionalist notion that COP can truly succeed in all neighborhoods without attempts at genuine social change or to address socio-economic and other structural factors in research and theory is naïve. The implementation findings on the failure of COP in America’s inner cities highlight the problems of practice as well as the barrenness at the central theoretical core of the quasi-functionalism of its academic proponents (Brogden 1999). COP failures appear to have socio-structural origins in inequality via economic and political institutions. We must contend with inequality, social disorganization, and social justice issues if we want to fight disorder and crime, and strong leadership coupled with social capital-building would be necessary for any kind of comprehensive strategy to be successful. If the above American style policing strategies are exported to transitional societies they are likely to fail. It would be a mistake to assume that a single model of policing could be exported to a diverse set of countries without attention to local traditions or circumstances. One cannot advocate a Western legal structure and ideology in a context which, irrespective of local failings, perceives the structure and ideology as simply reinforcing the rule of neo-colonial elites (Brogden 2004). Much of the thinking surrounding current policing reform is stuck in these undemocratic practices. Some scholars, however, have begun to extend the best ideas of COP into a new concept called democratic policing (see Bayley 2006 for a recent attempt). With a democratic model of policing discussed in the next chapter, we provide specific theory and links to economic, political and social development which makes this transition possible. The current lack of linkage to larger social issues is another reason for abandoning the current COP model and replacing it with a democratic model. We realize that police reform must not occur in a vacuum, and that is why reform must be imbedded within a holistic model that includes democratic and socio-economic development. This model could apply not only to transitional and developing societies but also to core countries that face numerous social problems, including crime, disorder, and inequality.

Chapter 3

The Principles of Democratic Policing Nathan W. Pino Texas State University – San Marcos


Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary. Reinhold Niebuhr

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 it was fully realized that the conditions to create democracy could be promoted and spread. The Helsinki accords developed by President Jimmy Carter developed rudimentary mechanisms for assessing the state of human rights. As these ideas progressed, it made the idea of a democratic and human rights-centered form of policing a realistic possibility. One outcome of globalization is that ideas about democracy are exported, however imperfectly. Ideas that are also exported include labor rights, environmental protection, and the expansion of education. These ideas take root very slowly if at all in areas where there are high levels of corruption and crime, and this is one of the reasons why development and democracy are related. Democracies cannot develop properly if there is economic instability and high crime rates, but in emerging democracies, policing must not be seen as a quick fix or a way to use repression to restore order. Emerging democracies obviously need democratic institution building, including the transformation of the police. Police practices that are not consistent with the rule of law and democratic principles cannot support democratic development and in fact may undermine development through corruption and the ability to erode the foundation of emerging civil societies. The history of the evolution of policing reveals that policing has developed in response to institutional crises rather than through a conscious process of design and development (Kelling and Moore 1988; Wiatrowski 2002). The further development of the police should not be left solely to the police but should be embedded in a democratic framework in the creation of civil society. While police reformers often talk of police professionalization they imply that as a profession the police are highly capable of self-regulation. The recurring historical cycles of corruption in policing and the recent emphasis on “police integrity” training do not support this assertion. Democratic policing is increasingly seen as a preferable concept because professional police forces in underdeveloped countries can and have

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enforced repressive political systems via regime policing (Nield 2001). In the existing professional model of policing, the influence of individual citizens, communities and groups on police policy is very limited at best. Indeed, the emergence of notions such as police-community relations in the 1960s was an explicit admission of how isolated the professional model of policing had become from the communities that they supposedly served. “Police-community relations” was an idea based on the creation of another organizational specialty in the police bureaucracy that would mitigate the isolation from the community perpetrated by the professional model (Radelet and Carter 1986). As we saw in Chapter 2, however, community oriented policing (COP) has not fared much better in terms of transforming the professional model. Even though countries around the world have implemented various forms of COP, crime analysis, victimization surveys, civilian review boards, prosecutions of police for violating rights, integrity units within police forces, mandatory arrest laws for domestic violence, among others, these alone are not sufficient for the transformation of policing (Stone and Ward 2000). For the police to be considered democratic the foundations of the concepts must be understood in terms of how it can be applied to all institutions. There must also be a democratically oriented civic culture, social structures that support democratic practices among the citizenry, and political will among civilian leaders to enforce accountability (Stone and Ward 2000). When supposed transitions to democracy occur, it is common that significant numbers of former police officers remain in their positions, or demobilized soldiers are given positions in the newly formed police forces. The problems associated with changing police philosophy enough to bring on more democratic practices are further exacerbated by the lack of articulated democratic principles to govern and guide police conduct. Mere training on policies and procedures does not articulate the broader philosophy of specific police roles in society. In Haiti, Bosnia, and Eastern Europe, one author (Wiatrowski) observed that the “new” police continued to stop people without cause to question them and ask them for identity papers. In part it appeared that these officers did not know what other normal activities they were to take in the new regime. The issue of police misconduct is critical to societies that are making the transition to democracy (Nield 2001). Yet this issue is not restricted to countries making this transition. Even today, some dimensions of the problems confronting American policing are caused by its failure to develop a human rights perspective (Palmiotto 2001). Major police departments in the United States continue to suffer recurring episodes of corruption and the misuse of authority. Civilian oversight of police activities in the United States is practically nonexistent even though that oversight is a central characteristic of social institutions in democratic societies. Previous efforts at police reform and the emergent emphasis on “ethics” have failed to reform or transform the corruption, integrity and use of force issues in the United States. The primacy of human rights in democratic societies provides a more compelling mandate for that change. We argue that American policing must acquire the same mechanisms that the police in transitional countries need to develop if they are to

The Principles of Democratic Policing

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make law enforcement abide by the same standards of all institutions in democratic countries; that is, to adhere to standards of human rights and support a process of democratic development (Kritz 1995; Ottaway and Carothers 2000). COP, when examined in a democratic context, has the ability to support change towards a more fundamental human rights basis for policing and the administration of justice. While COP has provoked much thinking about policing in both Europe and the United States, however, it has resulted in relatively little change. As a result, perhaps a more fundamental and compelling appeal to democratic values and human rights will cause the police and society to examine their fundamental role in the creation of a democratic and civil society, hence the emergence of the term “democratic policing.” In helping to develop democratic police forces in other societies, facilitators must recognize that the poor and vulnerable suffer disproportionately from the effects of crime. They also suffer disproportionately from police violence as evidenced by police death squads murdering street children and juvenile delinquent gangs in the fevellas in Brazil, El Salvador, and Columbia. What is necessary is a more holistic approach that includes the public and the rest of the formal justice system and other governmental agencies, a large commitment from police, government, and civil society for successful co-productive activities, and long-term, strategic approaches that involve disadvantaged groups (Clegg, Hunt, and Whetton 2000). The issues of policing are interrelated with other issues, and collectively these issues must be addressed together. We turn to these issues below, starting with a brief introduction to basic concepts and how they are interrelated. Democracy, Human Rights, Social Capital, and Policing There are some similarities among various transitional and developing countries in terms of high crime rates, severe social disorder and physically deteriorated conditions. Police officers that are assigned to those communities have the daunting task of attempting to find social resources and to mobilize them. The officers may also be confronted with groups that control the streets and illicit markets for drugs, organized crime, violence and corruption at all levels. Two broader perspectives in policing have emerged. The first is that of a post-COP perspective that stresses the role of democratic values and the protection of human rights as core principles of policing (Alderson 1998; Palmiotto 2001; Wiatrowski 2002). This perspective stresses the need to inculcate in policing the same principles that characterize any institution in a democratic society. The second is the emerging relationship between social capital and democracy (Paxton, 2002) and the potential relationship between social capital and policing (Pino 2001). Given a proper base in democratic values and an organizational structure consistent with democratic values, police strategies can support democratic values, create the conditions that support economic, political, human and social development, provide safety and security and create the associated

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networks of capital or investment, and ultimately reduce crime (Mendes, Zuckerman, Lecorre, Gabriel and Clark 1999; Nield 2001; Pino 2001). We argue that in a democratic society there are actions that can affect the levels of crime in the community through the construction of social capital (Paxton 2002), informal social control, community justice (Clear and Karp 1999), and community policing (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1994). These concepts are important because they recognize that social order is part of a complex and fragile web of relationships and not a function of force, or fear and coercion supplied by the secret police, secret tribunals, inhumane prisons, summary executions, or humiliation and confinement under inhumane conditions. In transitional states, the police and military may have to restore “order”, but they are not the sole determinants of social order. We must then examine the concepts of democracy, human rights, and social capital when discussing policing. Defining democracy Democracy “... is the political system that can best accommodate the conflicts of a divided society in the long run, preventing the collapse of the state” (Ottaway 1995: 244). But what is democracy? Various definitions of democracy exist, and the attempt to reach a consensus view may be impossible to achieve. One definition of democracy is that it is a system of government where the people have the ability to participate directly or influence indirectly, through a representative process, in the major decisions and institutions that affect their lives within a collectively derived framework (Jones, Newburn and Smith 1998). In theory, the purpose of a democratic society is to maximize the freedom of the people who created that form of government. While there is an assumption of majority rule, there is also a framework that protects the human rights of the individual. The Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution is an explicit statement of these “inalienable” human rights. Special attention to how the role of the police can affect those rights is needed because of the impact of policing on democratic processes (Alderson 1994; Alderson 1979; Crawshaw, Devlin and Williamson 1998). There are a number of underlying democratic values (Held 1987): the ability to participate in political decisions, responsiveness of policy to representative bodies, the dissemination of information in decision making and the distribution of power between different actors in decision making, redress in instances of injustice or institutional unresponsiveness, the effective delivery of outputs that results in an improvement in the quality of outputs in the system, and equity or fairness (Jones, Newburn and Smith 1998: 185–186). The functioning of democratic institutions must be consistent with democratic criteria that include the idea that the people create the institution through a deliberative process and in turn that the institution must be accountable to that process, that it must have organizational processes which are transparent or open to public review, that its authority should be subordinate to the civil or legislative authority which creates it, and that the public should view it as legitimate or carrying out the functions for which it was created, causing the citizens to voluntarily comply with


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the collective decisions and authority which has been created. The founding fathers of the U.S. recognized the critical issue of criminal justice processes and freedom in a democratic society. The constitutional protections relating to self incrimination, trial by jury, unreasonable searches and seizures and their relationship with criminal justice processes and police authority are still being articulated, modified, limited and advanced in case and statutory law almost 200 years later. Democratic societies are created on the basis of human rights. These rights relate to both individuals and systems. These rights are viable within a system of social responsibilities and obligations that are conditional and not absolute. For example, the right to liberty is contingent on people obeying laws. Where they do not, liberty can be taken away through a system of due process. Human rights were viewed as foundational in the American Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. Those rights describe the standards of conduct and responsibilities of individuals to participate in civil society. They also describe the recourse for individuals who feel deprived of their rights without due process. Democratic societies have as their fundamental premise the idea that rights are for all individuals and not just a privileged few. They attempt to maximize freedom and limit restrictions in that society. Police corruption and other forms of misconduct fundamentally deny people of their human rights by reducing the amount of freedom available to them. Social capital and democracy The idea of social capital in this discussion is critical. Coleman (1990) developed the modern conception of social capital. He noted that personal relations and networks of relations are important in generating trust and enforcing norms, and that individuals use strong and weak social ties with others for personal gain. These ideas are used to define social capital: Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital [human, financial, physical], social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence…. Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between persons and among persons. It is lodged neither in individuals nor in physical implements of production (Coleman 1990: 302).

Social capital is created when the relations among persons change in ways that facilitate social activities (Coleman 1990: 304), so social capital can be utilized to make the most use of the human capital among people who work together and trust each other. There are various forms of social capital, and they include: 1) Obligations and expectations (trust and reciprocity), 2) Information potential (the potential for information that facilitates action that inheres in social relations), 3) Norms

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and effective sanctions (supporting pro-social behavior and deterring anti-social behavior), 4) Authority relations (leadership), 5) Appropriable social organization (forming organizations to further a purpose), and 6) Intentional organization (voluntary organizations that produce a public good) (Coleman 1990). These forms of social capital have the potential to create social capital. The concept of social capital is related to the idea of democracy in terms of associational networks that allow for exchange or social relationships. These networks build trust and empowerment, which create the capacity to act for both individual and collective interests (Barber 2000; Paxton 2002). Individuals who develop the trust to interact with each other can form groups to represent their interests and form higher levels of associations such as representational organizations that solve problems without conflict. This recognizes the complex web of voluntary relationships in non-coercive and non-totalitarian democratic societies. As trust, associational skills, mediation, problem solving and related skills are developed, so too are the capacities to create other important social institutions such as exchange or economic relationships, educational institutions, legal systems, and so forth. As social capital strengthens and networks and interactive and multidimensional relationships develop, people can enhance their human capital (education and training) and cultural capital (cultural knowledge), strengthening networks and institutions. Tyler (1990), in Why People Obey the Law, describes compliance with the law not based on fear or deterrence but through the opportunity of the individual to invest in community and society through work, participation in civil society and the achievement of a position that reflects the work that the citizen has performed. Tyler discussed the ability of the individual to accumulate human and social capital and that when gathered would not be risked by engaging in criminal behavior. Only those with no capital are free to deviate or break the law. Tyler appears aware of the consequence that social structural inequities can have in the development of stakes in conforming social behavior. Pino (2001) more fully develops the potential that policing can have on the foundations of community life through social capital building. Fundamentally, Pino argues that policing can be a lead element in developing the type of social relationships that are foundations for democratic principles in communities whose efficacy has been shattered. His thesis is part of an evolving theoretical perspective which develops parallels between economic capital and economic development, human capital and human development, and finally, social capital and social and community development. These foundational characteristics include social norms such as reciprocity, civic engagement, social trust, civic engagement and collective action. These involve the establishment of social networks that are the basis for the development of social action in democratic societies. Scott (2002) found in a study on COP that policing can be positively associated with neighborhood social capacity: police have the potential to generate trust, efficacy, and cohesion within neighborhoods. Policing can therefore provide a means for residents seeking to improve neighborhood conditions.


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When social capital building occurs, it can be a catalyst for civic engagement geared toward crime and disorder reduction. “Both social capital and democratic policing are central to issues such as trust and genuine dialogue between different groups of unequal power, the ability to tap collectively into various resources and decentralize a complex organization, and the ability of people to work together to solve various problems” (Pino 2001: 202). Putnam (2000) argues that voluntary organizations generate social capital by supporting trust building, norms of reciprocity and civic engagement, and collective action. Social capital is an aspect of social organization (including trust, norms, and networks) that enhances cooperative actions, persists over the long term, and has the ability to reassert itself (Putnam 2000). Therefore, when citizens and their groups, police officers, and others in the public and private sector work together to reduce crime and disorder, one could argue that this is evidence of social capital-building. When this occurs, it also increases the collective efficacy of an area which has been shown to lower crime even in very poor neighborhoods (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). If social capital-building does not occur among and within these different agents, then democratic policing is not likely to be successful. As Hagan (1989) has noted, the lower the amount of social capital in a neighborhood, the more crime-ridden the neighborhood will be. Neighborhoods characterized by residential segregation, racelinked inequality, and concentrations of poverty discourage social capital-building (Hagan 1989), but those same neighborhoods are the ones that need social capitalbuilding and democratic policing the most. In community development there must be related human capital factors like educational systems to provide trained workers, capital markets for investments, and legal systems to protect and enforce contracts. The parallels between social capital and democracy and social capital and democratic policing are important. Safety and security are still needed conditions for stable democracies, and in this context Nield (1999) describes how safety will come to be viewed as an emerging human right. Social capital and cultural capital are essential for democratic governance (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995). Norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement that foster self-reinforcing patterns of trust and cooperation are needed to develop a civic-minded society, which can then keep democracy going. It is important to understand that in both transitional and developing societies, social capital has been systematically destroyed, both through the collateral effects of the conflict, but also through systemic processes involving state-sponsored terror and corruption (Nield, 2001; Uildriks and Van Reenen, 2002). There is a reciprocal effect between social capital and democracy (Paxton 2002). Social capital-building enhances democracy, and more democracy enhances the strength of social capital. However, Paxton (2002) found that associations and networks isolated from the larger community negatively affect democracy, while networks and associations connected to the larger community have a positive effect. Paxton (2002) warns donors that a singular focus on funding NGOs and grassroots organizations may not alone produce democratization. The institutional environment in which NGOs are imbedded must be considered. Are these NGOs connected with

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the larger community? What proportion of the involvement in projects comes from community members and is this proportion increasing or decreasing? Other strategies can indirectly affect the democratization process, such as promoting the rule of law, assuring respect for human rights, and encouraging transparency (Paxton 2002). Democratic development and policing We argue that democratic development is highly complementary to democratic policing, building civil society, and stabilizing economies, and that democracy, human rights, cultural capital, and social capital are all related to policing. Shortterm, quick fixes that fail to be comprehensive, such as solely concentrating on police reform or elections, will not lead to effective, sustainable, democratic policing because the police are not part of a larger developmental process. In the 1830s Alexis de Tocqueville recognized that in the emerging democracy of the United States there was a developing network of relationships that were interconnected. Civic organizations promoted problem-identification and solutions based on consensus and cooperation as the newly founded American democracy was developing its institutional structures. One of the significant problems emerging democracies confront is caused by the transition from the old totalitarian regime. Transitional societies frequently see the crime problem explode as the countries attempt to create a democratically determined society in this chaos (Nield 2001). In grasping for solutions, the failed tactics of the professional model should be avoided. While this model is certainly attractive, it has been demonstrated to be a failure, except in its capacity to respond to crime and emergency situations. This model has taken on that which it may not be able to directly affect: the control of crime. This potentially leads to situations where the police then resort to repressive methods that are not consistent with democratic values and emerging standards of human rights. The result is the need for a new paradigm that seeks to promote the conditions under which democracies can develop. The police should not be the sole determinants of what they do. In a democratic society, the citizenry creates the institution and its mandate. As a profession the police are to be responsive to the public that creates them and gives them their authority. This mandate can continue to evolve in the United States, in advanced industrial societies, in developing countries, in emerging democracies, and in countries that are seeking to replace autocracies and establish democratic institutions (Uildriks and Van Reenen 2003). In post-conflict societies, however, there is frequently an unrealistic set of expectations concerning what the police will accomplish. The creation of the conditions for public order will challenge the police in transitional societies that have few, if any of the determinants and components of social order that characterize established democracies (Carothers 1999). This is not to say, however, that those countries must adopt the models of existing democracies, but that the complexity of order should be recognized and that the countries be assisted in the process of


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developing their institutions and networks which are consistent with democratic values to confront their crime problem and to promote democratic development. The police are central and critical actors in transitional and developing countries because of the need for governments to meet effectively the security and safety needs of its citizens. Social order creates the conditions where social development can take place and civil society can be fostered. When comparing democratic and nondemocratic societies, the issue of public order and who determines it is significant because the failure to discuss whose order is being maintained may obscure the fundamental difference between the two political systems. In totalitarian systems the police are part of a system of autocratic control designed to preserve the political and social dominance of a small non-democratically selected group. Both left- and right- wing political systems may utilize their police forces in a remarkably similar manner. In sum, the development of a democratic model of policing is critical in emerging democracies for the following reasons: 1) Crime and corruption may erupt in emerging democracies creating social chaos, 2) The police may embark on repressive crime control strategies which suppress crime at the expense of civil liberties and the creation of civil society, 3) Police corruption may foster organized and transnational crime groups that challenge an emerging civil society, and 4) Police strategies, organizations and activities should be dictated by civil society and democratic practices and not unilaterally by the police themselves. This means that civil society is needed for democratic policing to work as well. Democratic institutions are fragile and require constant tending. Abuses of police authority are potentially very corrosive of democratic societies and as such special attention must be paid to policing and how it is conducted in a democratic society. A democratic approach to policing in the United States can be an alternative to the current approaches of using utilitarianism, authoritarianism, or those based on “law enforcement.” The practice of racial profiling and zero tolerance are significant indicators of the vacuous nature of “law enforcement” to a legitimating basis for American policing, as these practices were never reviewed by the legislative branch of government prior to being implemented (Harris 1999). The policy discourse on confronting the crime problem should not be separated from human rights discourse (Neild 1999). The United Nations has long recognized the importance of human rights in policing and the administration of justice. The charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains explicit statements about the conduct of the state in relation to the administration of justice. Many countries have ratified the Charter of the United Nations as a legally binding treaty. By extension they have acknowledged the importance of documents that provide guidance in the administration of justice such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These documents include the right to life and liberty, prohibitions against torture and degradation, rights to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, and prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention. What is critical is that these are international standards and not practices defined by local police departments

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or national governments. More importantly, these are values which in theory are international standards derived from a collective and representative process whose moral persuasiveness is preeminent. The United States, as a signatory, is bound by these standards. While some nation-states explicitly incorporate the ascendancy of international law and the charter of the United Nations in their constitutions, the United States does not. Other countries, including members of the European Union, have acceded to the final authority for some legal decisions involving human rights issues to the European Court of Human Rights (Henham 1998). The implications of this for the police are simple. Instead of simply “enforcing the law”, their actions must be consistent with this higher authority of democratic values and human rights. “Law enforcement” is no longer an adequate basis on which to formulate policing. It fails to address issues relating to the legitimacy of laws, their basis or origin and their impact on democratic values. For too long, substantive issues in the control of crime have been phrased in a due process or crime control dichotomy (Henham 1998) which has allowed for the creation of a situation where due process is traded off for arrest and conviction as a utilitarian good and in which individual rights are violated in the name of the greater welfare of society. This lays the framework for police and prosecutorial misconduct because they value conviction more than justice. It also lays the foundation for zero tolerance policies such as profiling where public order is valued more than individual justice and human rights (Harris 1999). The post-World War II period contained discussion on the importance of individual liberty and autonomy (Shestack 1998: 217). John Rawls (1971) attempted to determine basic rights that would not be subjected to utilitarian bargaining or political interest. He observed that freedoms or basic liberties were the primary principle and that they could be restricted only if that restriction provided more liberty. A priori grants of authority to search and seize, unequal resources between defense and prosecutors in criminal defenses, or the use of less qualified or overburdened public defenders would be unacceptable. Kelling and Coles (1996) note that the police are instructed by the community on which norms to enforce, rather than the police unilaterally enforcing their opinions about standards of behavior. The police in democratic societies are created by that society and the police are therefore accountable to the citizens of that society. The evolving standards of human rights in a democratic society therefore describe the process through which the police are created and to whom they are accountable. The promotion of democracy should affect the structure of policing, its inherent values and the improvement of methods to ensure police integrity. It is not the case that if the police create more safety it automatically results in less freedom for citizens and that more efficiency automatically leads to loss of rights (Kersten 2000). As Kersten (2000) puts it, “The citizens’ expectation of safety is a prerequisite for the exercise of rights in a civil society and this safety must be guaranteed by accountable and effective forms of policing.” (p. 238). During a time of unprecedented opportunity, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted (Sheptycki 2000). One of the consequences of the


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declaration is that it began to erode the apparent sanctity of the doctrine of state sovereignty, where the state could abuse its citizens with impunity, and this gave rise to the idea of humanitarian intervention (the use of force can be used on other countries to uphold universal values) (Sheptycki 2000). The US (along with other western powers, of course) appears to invoke humanitarian intervention selectively, however. The United States, while often seen as a champion of rights, was the last country to ratify the Genocide Convention and still has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Sheptycki 2000). The massive increase in malnutrition in Iraq in 2004 can only be laid at the feet of the United States and its “coalition of the willing” in view of its poor record of post-conflict planning. Perhaps if the US were a signatory of this convention, its importance would have been imprinted on those in the Defense and State Department responsible for post-conflict planning. The US would then have been declared in violation of that convention. The abuse of Iraqi and Afghani prisoners in the War on Terror and the difficulty that international human rights monitors and the International Red Cross have in examining US prisons adds to the selective upholding of human rights standards by the US and other western powers. So, people in transitional and developing societies should not be asked to rely on Western core countries to ensure their rights. It is not just policing, however, where human rights is an issue. Although it is complex, we must also examine the relationship between human rights and economic globalization (Sheptycki 2000). “The values of human rights, free trade and policing are linked since they share the inherent objective of improving the quality of life” (Sheptycki 2000: 5). So, the WTO would need to welcome NGOs seeking to advance the ideals of human rights to trade deliberations as equals. Since police often uphold these agreements by cracking down on protesters, throwing people off their land to establish “free enterprise zones,” and so on, these issues are indeed linked. Consent and accountability are two concepts that help form the foundation of human rights-based policing (Sheptycki 2000). The police must respect and protect rights, and this respect for rights could be done through recruitment, training, and supervision. They must understand that force is used when normal persuasion fails and is used to bring a person to the next stage of this justice process. “Street curb justice” is not only illegal, but is inconsistent with democratic values. Sir Robert Peel spoke of this in the 1800s in England, because he wanted to minimize police use of force. The police arrest and restrain on the basis of “probable cause” while judges adjudicate and punish on the burden of “beyond a reasonable doubt,” which is a higher legal and social standard. This puts police in a difficult position, however, since use of force is sometimes necessary in carrying out duties. However, in respect for human rights, police should only use enough force to subdue suspects. This can only be taught through realistic training, and we must pay close attention to the political structures for fostering police accountability and the different levels of accountability and control (local, regional, national, and even transnational) for enhancing not only human rights but also public safety (Sheptycki 2000). Obviously, if the police need to be accountable, other sectors of the state must be as well. There must be financial, political, and administrative accountability, coupled with transparency and integrity

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to promote openness, accessibility, legitimacy, and to reduce corruption (Cheema 2003). The police cannot be expected to be solely responsible for the protection of rights. Government must be committed to implementing international covenants on social, economic, cultural, civil and political rights as a pre-requisite for any future democratic policing initiative (Clegg et al 2000). Principles of Democratic Policing In this section we will outline the principles of democratic policing and how these principles relate to political, economic, and social development and human rights. Social capital, policing, and democracy are related and social capital can be used to strengthen democratic institutions and civil society for improved economic, social, and political development and lower crime rates, as well as improved human rights and equitable participation to sustain improvements. Equitable co-production geared toward reaching goals and genuine cooperation is necessary, with goals determined jointly rather than unilaterally. Table 3.1 summarizes the principles of democratic policing and related goals. There appear to be some fundamental criteria that social institutions must have if they are to be characterized as democratic (Alderson 1994). We posit that the extent to which these principles are recognized and answered to will create a framework in which the structural and cultural conditions promoting police corruption will be reduced. A group of scholars is examining how to transform fundamentally the organization and philosophy of policing. At the core of this discussion is the role of democratic values and human rights in creating, to paraphrase Bayley, “The Police Table 3.1 The Democratic Policing Model and Related Goals The rule of law Legitimacy Transparency Accountability Subordination to civil authority Police safety Local autonomy in developing policing and other strategies Various community policing goals, including problem solving, collaboration with various public and private organizations, decentralization, and continual evaluation A commitment to democratizing all public institutions, including the police A commitment to human rights Independent socioeconomic development Social and human capital building within and between the citizenry and the police Equitable co-production, including the participation of women and other minority groups


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of the Future”. These are police who will understand that their authority comes from the citizenry they police rather than from their status as a sworn officer. Police officers would use minimum amounts of force, be ethical and intolerant of extralegal punishment and police misconduct, fight for justice rather than crime, seek to prevent crime rather than merely respond to it, and seek high degrees of accountability for individual and organizational activity. The police would join in the dialogue with citizens and other actors on these issues. The term Democratic Policing is chosen specifically because it emphasizes that policing must support and be consistent with democratic values. The core values of democracies are inalienable human rights: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These are human rights that are at the core of democracies. Democratic institutions must be transparent, accountable, legitimate, and subordinate to civil authority and the rule of law. Democratic societies value freedom and create institutions to protect that freedom. Crime, in all its forms: street, organized, corporate, economic, white collar, and international, by definition, takes away or detracts from freedom through physical injury, loss of property and fear of harm. The goal of democratic action is therefore to maximize freedom by minimizing physical and psychological threats to safety and controlling crime in a multidimensional framework. Sir John Alderson forcefully presented this perspective in his books Policing Freedom (1979) and Principled Policing (1998), where the values of a democratic society and the challenges of respecting freedom that carry out police activities are developed. One of the fundamental premises of the democratic model of policing is that it is derived from democratic values, but also that policing when practiced in accordance with democratic values can promote the development of democracy. The ability to engage in the reciprocal social relations that create the capacity for growth and democratic values is a desired end of this developmental process. The nature of these democratic values has been discussed (Jones, Newburn and Smith 1998; Wiatrowski and Pritchard 2002) but includes ideas such as the expansion of freedom, the co-production of safety, the limitation of freedom only through a due process determined by the citizenry rather than the arbitrary or unilateral decision of a person with authority, accountability, transparency, legitimacy and subordination to civil authority. Democracies are based on principles of human rights and not on the rights of autocratic groups, states, or inherent characteristics of the police. The purpose of the social and political framework described for democratic societies is to expand freedom and to preserve the social order in a framework that provides for orderly change in response to problems. A human rights perspective will serve to provide a legitimating authority inclusive of and equally as compelling as police professionalism to promoting change in policing. By placing policing in a framework that describes its democratic principles, policing can promote the development of democratic principles that serve to create a civil society. In placing policing in this larger democratic framework, policing will have an incentive to abide by the ideas of accountability, transparency and legitimacy and fewer inducements for misconduct and corruption.

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When pressure is put on states to improve human rights and citizen safety, plans for action must take local conditions and contexts into account (Goldsmith 2003). We should also appreciate the challenges of living and working as a police officer in the society in question (p. 18). These challenges include lack of personal safety, having inadequate resources and other forms of capacity, and a lack of legitimacy. So, we need to realize the difficulty of reforms by addressing structural and systemic factors impacting policing and police willingness and/or ability to implement a democratic policing philosophy. Brogden (2004) rightly argues that local legal structures must be reformed so that indigenous practices and forms of legitimacy are taken into account. If Western forms of policing and other practices are imposed it smells of neo-colonialism and would likely fail to consider local problems adequately. Police reform as it is often designed in the West would not be relevant to many parts of the world, leading to ineffective implementation (Brogden 2004). Even notions of what community and other important concepts are, can differ by country, so police reform in other places may measure success differently than in the western world. In democratic societies, the police must protect rather than impede freedoms, and do their best to preserve safe communities as well as to apply the criminal law equally to all people (UN International Police Task Force 1996). The UN International Police Task Force (1996) provided principles for policing in emerging democracies that can be used to create standards for police behavior. These principles include that the police must conduct themselves in accord with democratic principles consistent with the constitution and law, that police are professionals who must be governed by a professional code of conduct, that their highest priority is the protection of life and property and the prevention of crime, that the police are accountable to the public and that based on their actions the people should know, understand, and accept police measures that are taken, and that the police must conduct their activities with respect for human dignity, fairness, and human rights for all. Clark (1994) summarized the UN (Committee on Crime Prevention and Control) Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials drafted in 1976. The code of conduct stated that force, especially through firearms, should only be done when necessary and to the extent required for the performance of a police officer’s duty. Officers cannot inflict, instigate, or tolerate acts of torture or other degrading or cruel treatment or punishment. Officers may not invoke orders from superiors or exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or threat of war, threat to national security, political instability, or any other public emergency to justify torture or other inhumane or cruel punishments, either. COP practices can be integrated into broader reform processes so that they support the democratization of policing (Neild 1999). Democratic policing works in concert with democratic government within a symbolic and symbiotic relationship (Nield 2001). Democratic policing cannot create a democratic regime, but police conduct is a major component of the state’s relationship with its citizens. Police reform is dependent on democratic development rather than a determinant of it (Neild 2001). Policing will be effective in controlling crime only if it respects the rights of all


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citizens and is responsive to their needs. The social structure of the police must change when democratic policing is enacted. Otherwise, police forces are likely to revert to abusive practices under the guise of democratic policing, just as repressive forms of policing are often touted as COP in the United States. We want to develop a model of policing that can support political, social and economic development, the promotion of civil society and human rights and the development of social capital. The proposed democratic model of policing frames policing in terms of the requirements of an institution in democratic society. These requirements include the rule of law, legitimacy, transparency, accountability, and subordination to civil authority. Requirements of institutions in democratic societies 1. The Rule of Law: This means that laws and legal institutions created through a democratic process should be used to regulate individual, systemic and organizational behavior and resolve disputes. The rule of law also defines due process and proscribes extralegal sanctions. The police respond, investigate and where supported arrest according to legally defined criteria such as probable cause. The police do not adjudicate and punish (Ottaway and Carothers 2000), and the police are accountable to the law rather than to the government or particular regime members or parties (Bayley 2001). It is important to understand that being a law enforcement officer does not necessarily mean that a police officer understands the rule of law. In 1997 in Bosnia, one author (Wiatrowski) observed that an American police officer approached a Serbian police officer and declared “under the different uniforms we are both police officers.” The American officer did not understand that the Serbian special paramilitary police units had been instrumental in the Bosnian crimes against humanity. These police used their knowledge of the community to identify males aged between 15 and 60 who might be used by the military to defend Bosnia and gathered them for execution in places like Srebrenica. It was appalling that the American police officer had no understanding of the role of the police in a democracy. The police in totalitarian societies often view themselves as simply enforcing the laws without understanding the illegitimacy of the government and its laws. One of the deficiencies of the professional model has been in enforcing laws that are illegitimate when doing things such as directing attack-dogs and fire hoses at civil-rights demonstrators, enforcing racial profiling and zero tolerance. These far exceed the concept of rule of law because these practices were not enacted through a democratic process. In transitional societies, there is typically an upsurge in crime and a subsequent demand to restore order. Some may hark back to earlier times when there was both less freedom and less crime because of repressive society’s crime control policies (Nield 2001). Police in totalitarian societies may state that their function is to enforce the law and to preserve order without determining who made the laws and who defines the order. In fact, “law and order” as a term can be misleading because there

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are incompatibilities between the two ideas (see Skolnick 1999). “Order achieved through democratic policing is concerned not only with the ends of crime control, but also with the means used to achieve those ends” (p. 6). So, it is critical that the police understand that their authority is derived from democratically enacted laws. The rule of law also requires the police to protect activities by citizens that are essential to the protection of democracy, such as freedom of speech and assembly, freedom from arbitrary arrest, impartiality in the administration of law, and so on (Bayley 2001). 2. Legitimacy: This is the perception that those exercising authority are doing so in accordance with the defined purpose of a social institution or law. Legitimacy comes with the consent of the governed. Based on an extensive study of democratic experiments around the globe, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1995) found that “in contrast to all other regime types, democracies depend for their survival almost exclusively on a widely shared belief in their legitimacy” (p. 57). Legitimacy is passed down through the generations, but it must be renewed in each generation through practice, performance, and adaptive reforms. The police must recognize that if they violate their democratically created charge, they may lose their legitimacy or the ability to demand voluntary compliance with legal orders. The criteria of police legitimacy was first advanced by the Englishman Sir Robert Peele who spoke of the willing compliance of the citizenry to lawful orders: “To recognize always that the extent to which the cooperation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving public objectives” (Trojanowicz and Dixon 1974: 28). Legitimacy is important because its most significant dimension is to compel the public to comply willingly with police orders. Furthermore, legitimacy is crucial for democracy, because officers would be less likely to feel the need to use excessive force and would be more likely to restore order peacefully if they are viewed by citizens as legitimate (Uildriks and Van Reenen 2003). Legitimacy can be created through behavior that is consistent with the mandate or intended purpose of a law. Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne, appointed by Sir Robert Peele in 1832 as commissioners to oversee the creation of the new metropolitan police force, developed a series of principles to govern the conduct of the police. The general principle of legitimacy, vis-a-vis police misconduct, was described by Rowan and Mayne. The police were: To seek and preserve public favor, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and good humor, and by ready offering of individual sacrifice or in protecting and preserving life. (Trojanowicz and Dixon 1974: 28).


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3. Transparency: Transparency means that government operations should be visible by the public. From the perspective of democratic theory, the citizens create the government (McDonald and Paromchik, 1996), and therefore have an inherent right to view the internal operations of governmental agencies. Openness to the citizenry should be a primary ideal of democratic policing (Skolnick 1999). As an occupation the police have no more reasonable expectation of privacy or secrecy while on the job in the conduct of their duties than any other occupation (aside from protecting police operations where security requirements have been reviewed and found necessary). There are, of course, limitations relating to the right of privacy of the police as citizens and to the need for protection of police operations that might be compromised if disclosed to the public. In policing and intelligence operations, ongoing investigations and legitimate intelligence activities related to the investigation of criminal activities would be subject to such confidentiality. Transparency is made legitimate through oversight mechanisms that provide ongoing review. In civil intelligence operations in the United States, oversight is exercised through House and Senate congressional oversight committees that review intelligence issues and operations on a regular basis to insure that activities are not hidden because of national security. It might further be argued that civilian oversight goes far beyond notions contained in civilian review boards that typically deal with complaints and the use of force. While the history of civilian review boards has been very uneven in the United States, in England and Australia it has been made part of police administration and increasingly operates in police departments with the net effect of inculcating into the police the concept of civilian review (Walker, 2001). Oversight, however, goes beyond this and might go so far as incorporating into police planning the discussion and development of different approaches to reviewing police operations from the perspective of the standards of democracy such as transparency. 4. Accountability is an obvious corollary of transparency and legitimacy. Accountability means establishing systems that ensure responsiveness with citizens, elected officials, and the news media (Kersten 2000: 240). The police should be accountable for their plans and actions geared toward crime prevention and apprehension, and answerable to accusations of violations of rules, laws, and civil and human rights. The issue is more complex, however, because of the possibility of citizens making false accusations (more likely in conventional policing because of the adversarial role that may characterize police/citizen interactions). This does not mean that accountability systems should not be discussed. Nonetheless, it can be argued that if the police do not promote the most transparent and complete system of accountability, they have failed to grasp the issue of accountability in a democratic society and its impact on the public’s view of their legitimacy. According to Stone and Ward (2000), there are three mechanisms to which the police must be accountable simultaneously: internal or departmental (police leadership and training, ethics codes, integrity units), state or governmental (oversight, operational direction by political officials, budget authorities, prosecutors, legislative committees, criminal and civil liability, exclusionary rules of evidence),

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and social or civil society (neighborhood groups, community based organizations, media, policy and research institutes, civilian review boards, human rights monitors, external auditors) (p. 16–17). If only state or internal mechanisms operate, corruption, partisan influence, and so on can develop. Social or civil society control as well as governmental checks and balances (state vs. federal, etc.) are necessary in a democratic system. Accountability is more than seeing police apprehend criminals. Kersten (2000) notes that it is largely determined instead by police behavior and attitudes in the streets, and contacts with citizens whether the contacts are during crises or as a part of everyday life. For example, the police should be required to provide a reason (rather than just a hunch or suspicion based on racial or ethnic background) for stopping and searching someone (Skolnick 1999). Indeed, a standard is evolving that may require the police to document any use of their authority in interaction with citizens. Civil rights consent decrees against police departments typically use this requirement because of the abuse of this authority. This authority includes requests for identification, to conduct searches, and so on. These practices are directed disproportionately against minority groups when there is no accountability. The use of patrol car cameras is an addition to the use of authority documents and has been used (along with media and private cameras) to document egregious examples of police misconduct. 5. Subordination to Civil Authority: The highest operational priority of the police should be to service the needs of individual citizens and private groups (Bayley 2001). This supports democracy by making policing accountable to the most diverse set of possible interests, and enhances the legitimacy of government by demonstrating that state authority will be used in the interests of the people (pp. 13–14). While generally not used or even discussed in relation to the police, in democracies the concept of the subordination of the military to civil authority is a criteria that characterizes the relationship of the military to civil society (Huntington 1995). The military recognizes that they take their orders from democratically elected public officials and derive their authority from the citizenry that creates them. The ability of the military and police to take over and maintain control of societies is limited only by the recognition of the importance of this concept. Again, the potential for coercion that is inherent in the police role is limited by recognition that it will be used to further not self-determined police goals but rather goals determined by democratic processes in democratic societies. Reforms are more likely to be successful if police are seen as community-owned rather than state-controlled (Brogden 2004). This idea of the subordination of the police to civil authority counters a perception that the police have sometimes promoted: that policing should be removed from politics. While the police should not be involved in partisan politics, this does not mean the police should not be accountable to legislative, community, and legal processes. The public, not the police, should determine police objectives. Some have argued that a major force in the emergence of COP was the perception that the police were unresponsive to the public who gave them their authority (Trojanowicz and


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Bucqueroux 1993). This isolation of the police in their patrol cars going from call to call had resulted in the police being separated from the public, and some saw this as a factor in the American urban riots in the 1960s and 1970s. Democratic policing involves the public in the codetermination of police goals and police operations. This serves as an excellent example of the subordination of the police to civil authority. Transparency removes opportunities for corruption by denying the police unnecessary secrecy. Police operations would be open to public scrutiny and it would be expected that the public would be in a better position to monitor an individual officer’s activities, as reports of favors become common knowledge among the public. There is a danger, however, that the police may become involved in activities that represent the interests of one group over another. This can, however, be dealt with by strong leadership monitoring the appropriateness of police activities. Police safety In post-conflict and other transitional situations, the safety of the police as they perform their duties is one of the critical issues. As the fragile web of interpersonal relations that constitute social capital is being constructed the police can be especially vulnerable as they are targeted by illegitimate insurgent groups and criminal organizations. While being a police officer in the US is not as dangerous as farming, construction work, truck driving, and so forth, in transitional and developing nations it can be very dangerous depending on the situation. This is particularly true when weapons and demobilized soldiers are not incorporated into transition strategies that seek to employ and integrate them into society. The armed forces of the country may lack the capacity to confront these emerging threats. The forces may lack tactical capacity, may be infiltrated with spies through poor vetting, may lack intelligence to locate and eliminate these groups, and may not be sufficiently organized to conduct the transition to civil operations to delegitimate these threats. Placing police officers in this environment may be counterproductive because they become leading targets in the destruction of the emerging civil society. The protection of these officers and the recognition of their vulnerability are therefore important. The response, however, may not be to “paramilitarize” these police: to give them heavier weapons, less restrictive rules of engagement and heightened powers to arrest and detain. This may erode the fundamental premise of the police, which is to promote the capacity of the society to maintain peace and order rather than to engage in civil conflict. The doctrine in this area is very sparse. One observation, though, is that in Haiti, some American Special Forces units were situated in the central part of the country and became very adept at community organization, problem identification and conflict resolution. While they were heavily armed, they understood as a function of the doctrine in which they had been schooled that force was a last resort. One significant contribution was that they took control of the tax collection machinery and ensured that the majority of the funds were retained in the local community. The money was spent on local schools, refuse removal, clean

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water, the creation of an agricultural coop and road improvements. In one instance they resolved a dispute involving a “hex” that had been placed by one person on the chickens of another. The reason this discussion is significant is that the literature on the paramilitarization of the police appears to reinforce an archaic and outdated perception of the military centering on the use of force. While small highly trained units must exist in all societies to confront terrorists, criminal groups and hostage situations, generally, the level of training required to maintain the proficiency of these elite units is complex and expensive. This capacity cannot be extended to all police units. The result appears to be that when this orientation becomes pervasive that it is used inappropriately and drives a wedge between the people and their police. Furthermore, it becomes embedded in the police culture and makes any type of change even more difficult. The importance of female involvement The philosophy of democratic policing presented here is also feminist, and requires the equal participation of female civilians in democratic policing and other areas of democratic decision-making. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2003) notes that in order to fight against global poverty we need not only to address structural inequities but also “release women’s potential as agents of change” (p. 3). Women need increased access to, control over, and benefits from basic assets such as land and credit, and increases in investments in infrastructure and services such as water, health and education because limited access to those needs places a particular burden on poor women and girls. Finally, IFAD (2003) argues that women need more say in community affairs and at higher political levels. If women are involved in decision-making this reaffirms rights of association and expression, builds awareness and support of women’s rights, questions gender stereotypes, and requires further positive actions towards female participation (IFAD 2003: 3). Female civilian participation in democratic policing strategies in concert with the police can help women participate in decision making, promote female involvement in the safety and security of neighborhoods and communities, and dispel the stereotype that women cannot be involved in crime fighting and order restoration. Police officials may also learn that women can be valuable assets in the fight against crime. As females participate in this kind of decision-making, it can open the doors for more female police officers and leaders. The participation of women and other minorities also promotes the idea of equity in democratic participation. Social capital can be enhanced within and between different groups of civilians and the police, which in turn can improve social cohesion and democratic local governance. Once security is sufficient, democratization can start to improve. If security is obtained through a democratic and grassroots fashion with the active input of women and other marginalized groups, then women and other marginalized groups would more likely be encouraged to participate in other forms of democratic decision-making.


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Women have recently gained recognition of their own basic rights, and are recognized increasingly for their active participation in social movements, NGOs, and other similar social endeavors. In communities women must be engaged with the police in the co-production of solutions to problems which affect them and their families. A role in restorative and community justice reflects their emergent equality in justice issues. They can also play a significant role in community dispute and conflict resolution. Female involvement in these areas might help increase awareness of and plans to deal with social problems such as domestic violence, rape, illegal trafficking of women and girls, forced prostitution, and other crimes that further marginalize women. NGOs and police should work together with other elements of civil society and government to make these plans to resolve problems which directly and indirectly affect women. With increased female participation, democratic policing and democratic reform in general may be facilitated. Differences between the democratic, community, and professional models Democratic policing obviously differs greatly from the professional model. It also differs from COP, often in subtle but important ways. In democratic policing, citizen security is elevated to a basic human right and the core of police activity is directed at analyzing the determinants of this security. Unlike in COP practice, it tries to mediate the tensions between freedom-limiting searches and other forms of aggressive enforcement with democratic freedoms and consultation with the community. Crime prevention activities are linked to other community institutions and activities, and there is a high standard of evaluation and accountability to determine whether crime prevention activities such as zero tolerance affect safety and human rights. More emphasis is placed on residents making decisions in concert with officers while ensuring that essential human rights are not violated. In contrast, COP appears to support community residents identifying problems while the police ultimately make plans of action independently. As with COP, information is gathered through trust and cooperation with the community, but in democratic policing, gathered information is linked to other sources that provide information about institutional accountability. This is because it is meant to be enacted in concert with other strategies of democratization. For example, strategies can be in place for situations in which offenders returning from jail or prison are confronting problems with employment, housing, drug use, and so on. Democratic policing can in theory reduce corruption and abuses associated with increased officer discretion in COP by emphasizing accountability, legitimacy, transparency, and subordination to civil authority. If these components are strongly adhered to, corruption and other abuses of power should decrease. Also, because democratic policing emphasizes these components, terrorist groups may find it much harder to recruit members. Enhanced legitimacy, accountability, and subordination to civil authority create conditions conducive to the reduction of terrorist legitimacy. Finally, in democratic policing, there is active consultation with the community in a framework of co-production in the creation of new institutional forms to promote security and to respond to crime as well as other activities that are developed in consultation with the community. Essentially,

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because it is linked with other democratization efforts, democratic policing becomes more oriented towards sustainable democratic development. Below we provide a summary list of some of the core differences between these different models of policing. Crime response and crime control Professional – Responds to crime, controls scene, writes report, conducts investigations. No evidence that proactive action controls crime. Community – Responds to crime, and interacts with the crime scene on the basis of knowledge and familiarity. Situational crime and problem analyses are implemented. The officer obtains additional information, and views this as an opportunity to educate the public about prevention issues. The officer improves citizen cooperation. Democratic – Responds to community, assesses impact on community, enters it into an information system which links it with other community activities. The police allow citizens and other agencies to help shape the general responses if a pattern appears to be developing. For example, if a child is victimized and should be in school, the school would be contacted to determine why the truancy was not reported to the officer. Citizen contact Professional – Random patrol through different communities based on assignment. Does initiate contact with the community, but only in the context of stopping suspects and field interrogations. The officer does not know the law abiding public. Community – The officer is knowledgeable about the community, both good and bad. Initiates contact to increase knowledge of the community about the officer and his or her role in the community. Confronts fear issues. Democratic – Knowledgeable about community as with COP. The officer is concerned about the impact of contact, especially with respect to fear and intimidation. The community does not fear to approach the officer even if, for example, they are illegal immigrants. Citizen security Professional – Police were unaware of accurate measures of crime or the fear of crime Community – Deals with fear of crime and the analysis of recurring patterns of crime and problems that are identified by the community. Developing and implementing activities in consultation with the community, and then assessing to determine whether the activities have their desired impact.


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Democratic – Security is elevated to a basic human right and the core of police activity is directed at analyzing the determinants of this security and then directing their activities to achieving this. Crime prevention Professional – There is a crime prevention section in the department. Community – Crime prevention is viewed as an integral part of the community policing officer’s responsibility. Democratic – Crime and fear of crime detract from community freedom. Successful responses, derived in consultation with the community expand freedom. The tension between COP measures which limit freedom such as searches are balanced with democratic freedoms and consultation with the community. These activities are also linked to other community institutions and activities. There is a high standard of evaluation and accountability to determine whether crime prevention activities such as zero tolerance affect safety and human rights. Coproduction of public safety Professional – There is no coproduction as the police have a monopoly on police services. Note the explosion of private policing. Community – There is consultation with the community on the identification of problems but ultimately the police make the decision. The police see it largely as a public-relations tool (Bayley 2006). Democratic – The community is consulted in the identification of problems, the development of priorities, the development of strategies and tactics, and their implementation and evaluation. The community may force the police to compete with other service providers. Collection and analysis of information Professional – Reports of crime, crime mapping. Community – Information is obtained through trust and cooperation with the community in addition to traditional resources. Democratic – As with COP, this will be further developed as information is linked to other sources which provide information about institutional accountability. For example, if returning offenders are experiencing problems with employment, housing, education, drug rehabilitation may be offered.

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Corruption and police misuse of authority Professional – Corruption and the abuse of authority is a constant problem because of the isolation of the police from the public. Military models of control and external regulation and internal investigation result in the creation of a police subculture. Community – The independence the community police officer has resulted in great attention being placed on integrity issues. Democratic – This perspective argues that the extent to which the police become a closed, non-responsive organization does the abuse of authority occur. As accountability, legitimacy, transparency and subordination to civil authority are increased, the probability of corruption decreases. Counter terrorism Professional – Tactical response SWAT teams, infiltration of terrorist organizations. Community – Contacts with community promote cooperation, prevention, information and intelligence flows. Democratic – The model may de-legitimize the claims of terrorist organizations and promote cooperation, prevention, information and intelligence flows that are the basis for effective counterterrorism operations. Democratic development Professional – The police force in a government is a social institution created to fulfill a social function. It is self-regulating and may become isolated from the public which gives it its authority. The model is reactive rather than preventive. Community – This is more democratic because it promotes interaction with the citizenry which creates it. The community police through problem solving and may develop the capacity in socially disorganized communities to act and function as a more cohesive society. Community social capital can be created and preserved. Democratic – Through the accountability mechanism institutional forms are evaluated to determine if they are accomplishing the function they were created to affect. There is active consultation with the community in a framework of coproduction in the creation of new institutional forms to promote security and to respond to crime as well as other activities that are developed in consultation with the community.


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Dispute resolution and ethnic conflict Professional – Little interest in resolving interpersonal and inter-communal disputes because it was not viewed as “real police work”. Some police officers became adept, but it was not recognized by the organization. Community – Recurring disputes take up significant amounts of time and resources. They can escalate to violence. Alternative dispute resolution and community justice are utilized. Democratic – Officers can articulate and protect human rights. Disputes can escalate, so the police maintain contact with different communities in order to get first knowledge of threats which can provoke larger violence. Needed Initiatives in Concert with Democratic Policing Democratic policing must garner adequate funding, accountability measures, and a commitment to human rights. These policies should be aligned with democratic, community socio-economic development, and social and human capital-building. Reducing crime this way increases citizen capacity so that citizens can empower themselves. Citizens can then participate in power on a regular basis. Safeguards are needed so that more powerful segments of civil society do not use democratic processes to marginalize others, especially along ethnic, religious, and other lines. Women should have equal opportunity (education, etc.) and equal participation in decision-making. Governments can facilitate the replacement of authoritarian behavior with democratic behavior by “…facilitating public criticism, governmental accountability, and the redress of grievances; restraining the power of armies; and establishing means of removing rulers, not just on the grounds of unpopularity but for reasons of constitutional violation” (Pinkney 2003: 203). This can be done without the eradication of poverty and other social injustices. Bayley (1994) argued that the preventative role of the police must be focused and concrete, with greater macro-social solutions being left to governments as a whole. However, this does not explain how unequal communities will build social capital and work with the police successfully if these macro-social solutions are dismissed as something governments do and are not seen as a part of democratic co-production. Simply concentrating on crime and order-maintenance alone assumes that crime and disorder occur in a vacuum, and that police initiatives need to be separate from other community initiatives. Instead of seeing strategies for socioeconomic development as something added on to democratic policing, we must see policing as something that is only one important part of a larger holistic strategy that attempts to reduce crime and disorder as well as promote sustainable socio-economic development that benefits all citizens. This is important because development can be viewed from competing perspectives. The idea that the poor benefit when the upper classes see their incomes

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rise can ignore or mask increases in inequality during periods of economic growth. Phillips (1991) noted that there are limits to the amount of inequality a democracy can tolerate before it becomes unviable. Crime-prevention is not just part of a development strategy, and vice versa. They are both important and reinforce each other because increased democratization and economic development can increase certain crimes while reducing others (Shaw 2002). Still, empowering the citizenry with social capital and strengthening civil society can economically develop an area while reducing crime. Criminological theory and research demonstrate this. We therefore conclude that locally constructed civic strategies that concentrate on all neighborhoods and their strengths are needed in order to foster sustainable economic development and permanently reduce crime and disorder. Policing would be one important part of this process. Ideally, these plans would be constructed and modified by community members, community based organizations (CBOs), NGOs, civil liberties groups, the police and other public-sector agencies, and the private sector in a democratic grass-roots “bottom-up” fashion. In such a plan, in addition to the implementation of democratic policing, local governments would ensure that its different agencies work together and share resources, use legislation to help the revitalization and restoration of order in neighborhoods, foster socioeconomic development, and generate funds through grants and possibly taxes to pay for the costs of restructuring and program creation. Federal and regional governments could assist local governments with resources and knowledge, and reprioritize their budgets to increase social spending and end unfunded mandates and other actions that deplete local resources. The private sector could be encouraged to reinvest in its local communities, hire locally, and stop redlining and housing segregation practices. Foreign governments, international bodies such as the G-8, and global financial institutions such as the WTO and IMF need to ensure that countries can have the necessary autonomy to develop independently. Community-based and other non governmental organizations can help fight for social justice, form citizen watchdog groups, involve the citizenry in most all aspects of planning and collaboration, especially at the neighborhood level, and form community development corporations for the purposes of economic and social revitalization. All of these initiatives are dependent on the development of social capital, and strategies such as those outlined by Stewart-Brown (2001) and others that work on developing networks, trust, equity, and cooperation are examples of how this could occur. These strategies should be built on neighborhood strengths. Scholars are increasingly recognizing that neighborhoods matter in crime prevention (Elliott, Wilson, Huizinga, Sampson, Elliott, and Rankin 1996; Wilson 1996). This support for community and neighborhood-based action against crime is based on several assumptions: that the police alone cannot create safe communities, that communities are an appropriate arena for crime prevention efforts, and that the police are more effective when they act with residents jointly to produce safe communities. Neighborhood development and preservation strategies can reproduce inequalities unless they are part of broader metropolitan-level planning (Angotti 1993). Such a plan should be constructed at the local level because each community has a unique


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set of problems that have been generated over time (Marston and Towers 1993), and neighborhood-level specific plans should be imbedded within an integrated plan, because neighborhood problems within a community are unique as well. It has been demonstrated that community models which treat crime prevention as something that can be done independently of government institutions and social-scientific thinking avoid issues such as co-optation and goal deflection, and models such as this have also faced isolation and poor results (Lewis, Grant, and Rosenbaum 1988: 133). Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser, and Lovig (1999) argue that there must be projects that encourage the development of stable communities through home-ownership and private investment. It is difficult to organize high-rise apartments and public housing projects, so future public and other forms of housing should be built with the object of building community while ensuring security in the citizens’ minds. The community cannot shoulder the burden of controlling the most dangerous elements of the community through informal social control (Buerger 1998). Formal social control from the police will be the most effective with those individuals, but the capacity for internal control must still be developed. Capacity will not be built simply with regular meetings, either (Buerger 1998). Human capital must be developed in these areas by tapping into public and private networks and non-governmental organizations to rebuild infrastructure and combat other social ills. Urban improvements would be difficult in areas where there is little community to work with, but it is possible (Duffee, Fluellen, and Roscoe 2000). Whether policing efforts succeed depends on whether neighborhoods improve rather than on whether the police execute their mission adequately (Duffee et al 2000). The police can take some steps to enhance neighborhood sustainability, but there is little they can do alone. Ultimately, in order to work with the citizenry and other public and private organizations, it is argued that the police need to move beyond their narrow focus on crime and disorder and focus their efforts on broader community, social, and political developmental goals of poor and disorganized neighborhoods in concert with other actors (Schneider 1999). The police need to encourage independent action by other components of the state, the private sector, and neighborhoods (Duffee et al 2000). There is evidence that in some neighborhoods the active development of partnerships between the police and neighborhoods is possible. For example, the police could interact with other city agencies and the private sector to promote holistic attention to neighborhood life and to provide encouragement, and neighborhood quality of live, shared culture, and autonomy can be enhanced (Duffee et al 2000). If actors focus more on root causes, it will provide a much more effective solution to crime, disorder, and underdevelopment, and these efforts ought to be placed in the context of addressing structural inequities (Schneider 1999). In addition to the ideas presented here based on social disorganization theory and the concept of social capital, some writers have suggested utilizing Habermasian critical theory (Schneider, 1999) or peacemaking criminology (Jesilow & Parsons 2000) to promote mutual understanding and genuine co-production between the police and the citizenry as equal actors. Instead of focusing on the rational and

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positive approach often used in COP, Schneider (1999) instead argues that policing is better served through the infusion of Habermasian critical theory to overcome the communicative obstacles that perpetuate the asymmetrical power relations between the police and residents of poor and unempowered neighborhoods. Instead of engaging in one-way dialogue with residents and lecturing to them, police would engage in a self-reflective process where they learn to speak comprehensively, sincerely, appropriately, legitimately, and accurately, emphasizing conversation and avoiding lecturing and allowing mutual learning to occur (Schneider 1999). In areas where there are numerous non-native speakers, the police may serve these groups in their native language. Policing has been linked with peacemaking criminology (Jesilow and Parsons 2000), as policing can be a mechanism for starting the peacemaking process. Peacemaking criminologists wish that policymakers listened and responded to those who are affected by the actions of policymakers (see Pepinski 1999), and it does appear that democratic policing would work best when its policies are formulated through negotiations, where officers and citizens come to understand each other’s perspectives and officers empathize with the citizenry (Jesilow and Parsons 2000). If officers and departments are evaluated on their ability to keep the peace and build community, how officers listen to citizens and treat wrongdoers may become less repressive, and adversarial attitudes might erode (Jesilow and Parsons 2000). In other words, officers would be making peace in order to reduce crime, rather than declaring war on it and failing to reduce crime substantially. While globalization has not benefited much of the world’s poor, this does not mean that we can abandon globalization, because that is not possible or desirable (Stiglitz 2003). Globalization and international financial institutions must become more just, democratic, and transparent. Recent reviews of the World Bank’s agenda show some progress in that the bank is supporting more community-level strategies aimed at improving social capital rather than strictly funding large-scale growth projects such as dams that can be supported undemocratically. Mandle (2003) argues that we should identify elements in the globalization process that are harmful and then move to minimize those harms, and representatives of core and peripheral countries as well as members of the “anti-globalization” movement should be involved. People ought to work toward figuring out how growth can benefit all citizens in a more or less equitable manner. The state must play a larger role in development, and global problems (underdevelopment, environmental problems, health crises, etc.) require global alliances to tackle them. Stiglitz (2003) is correct that the mind-sets of people need to change toward caring about the environment, allowing the poor to participate in decision-making, and worrying more about poverty and hunger than inflation and bailing out banks. Danaher (2001a) calls for “people’s globalization,” a democratic and grassroots form of globalization that is not dominated by corporate and other elite interests. A mass movement that is growing against the current form of globalization is pushing for fair trade and socially responsible investments that attempt to reduce harm to the environment and to increase quality of life for all. Grassroots organizations,


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trade unions, and similar organizations should continue to pressure international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO to establish labor rights, environmental standards, and to eliminate structural adjustment programs that empower undemocratic regimes and multi-national corporate interests at the expense of sustainability (Danaher 2001b; Danaher 1994). As Sen (2001) argues, “development can be seen…as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” (p. 3). In the end we ought to focus on human freedoms instead of simply development, and when we think of development we should think about removing major sources of “unfreedom” such as poverty, tyranny, neglected public facilities, poor economic opportunities, and so on (Sen 2001: 3). One must also remember that we should not be strictly concerned with urban areas in transitional societies. Rural areas have their own development problems, and policing is just as important an issue there. Uphoff, Esman, and Krishna (1998) contend that rural development projects that fail do not do so because of a lack of intrinsic capacity among citizens but instead from the ways that governments, NGOs and international agencies operate in these areas (often top-down rather than bottomup in style). Citizens should still collaborate with other agencies, but in a more respectful and amicable collaboration. More specific ideas on linking democratic policing with socioeconomic policies are discussed in the next chapter. Conclusion The ideas presented here (summarized in Table 3.1) may seem overly optimistic and idealistic. Are these principles applicable or transportable to other countries and cultures? One size definitely does not fit all. Each country has its own history, crime and developmental problems, linkages to core countries and other peripheral and semi-peripheral states, and so on. But these basic principles of human rights, democracy, and so on are universal. An ongoing point has been made about the perspective of development: that nations and police forces can change from less democratic to more democratic by increasingly embedding the principles discussed here into police training, police education and police culture. These principles are not unique or limited to Western civilizations, but can become globally significant as the relationship between principles of policing and democratic civil society is increasingly better articulated.


Chapter 4

Implementing Democratic Policing and Related Initiatives Nathan W. Pino Texas State University – San Marcos


If liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost. Aristotle

Introduction This chapter explores how societies can help generate and sustain democratic institutions, socioeconomic development, social capital, and democratic policing while integrating human rights and strengthening civil society. A discussion of how to implement this vision of democratic policing is needed, but we must note that each country will have its own unique situations. The transformation of societies and institutions is a long process, and it is naïve to think that quick solutions or concentration on only one or two areas will accomplish this transformation. There is a gap in thinking that must be bridged: few talk about socioeconomic development, democratic transformation, and crime prevention as part of the same issue. Many policing scholars write about policing without mentioning economic or democratic development in general, and NGOs, scholars, and others talk about democratic development but rarely mention crime reduction. We noted earlier that some COP scholars such as Trojanowicz, Skogan, Goldstein, and Kelling did have a larger view of the community than many other policing scholars, but their scholarship did not specifically link changes in policing with macro-social, political, and economic change based on democratic principles. We hope to help start the process of bridging this gap. Transforming Policing There are many challenges facing those who wish to change a police organization: keeping it separate from the military, preventing corruption, controlling the

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police subculture, and increasing transparency, accountability, and legitimacy. Organizational change is a necessary component of the transformation to a democratic model of policing. The challenges facing transitional societies of both a global and local nature require strategic but targeted responses to be effective and credible (Zvekic and Alvazzi del-Fate 1995). More attention is needed to collecting accurate information on crime-risk, victim support, and crime prevention. Citizens need encouragement to respond to crime risks via participation in community crime-prevention programs, adoption of individual or family-based precautionary measures, and increased cooperation with and confidence in police and other criminal justice agencies (Zvekic and Alvazzi del-Fate 1995). Criminal justice policy makers should promote efficient, acceptable, and credible programs to the community while developing democratic, accountable, and community-service-oriented law enforcement that pays special attention to prevention and respect for citizens and victims of crime (Zvekic and Alvazzi del-Fate 1995). Individual and community needs and rights must be on the official agenda (Zvekic and Alvazzi del-Fate 1995). Furthermore, Mars (2002) argues that law reform and removal of military influences from police operations need to be expanded into procedures which regulate the use of force and minimize discretion. Change to a more democratic form of policing can occur if democratic forces from within are allowed to nurture the change (Mendes et al 1999: 10). If the U.S. and other Western countries continue to conduct the kind of foreign policetraining Huggins (1998) found in Brazil, democratic policing may not be possible. Other countries in South Asia, South America, and Africa are closely watching the experiments in Brazil concerning civilian oversight, and if Brazil fails, those nations may decide that democratic policing is not feasible in developing countries that have huge socio-economic disparities and are also enmeshed in their own circles of violence (Mendes et al 1999: 10). Many argue for community policing (COP) principles and strategies to be incorporated within the broader concept of democratic policing (for an example, see Stone and Ward 2000). This could be problematic, however. In crime-ridden societies or societies plagued with conflict, citizens may demand that police aggressively deal with criminals even if it is at the expense of their own liberties (p. 36). Other scholars, such as Van den Broeck, Fischer, and Kelley (see Einstein and Amir 2001) also believe that COP has not conformed to democratic ideals and that it is unlikely that community policing will ever equal democratic policing. We argue, however, that if the democratic aspects of COP are indeed incorporated within a democratic policing framework with multiple accountability mechanisms, then it could work. Many of the policing recommendations listed below come from evaluation studies of COP in the U.S., but within a democratic policing framework these recommendations would help improve policing and citizen involvement in a number of ways and should therefore be considered. The democratic model of policing has its core values grounded in human rights and democratic principles. These principles correspondingly argue that police organizations should have accountability and transparency in the architecture of

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police organizations and police operations. To the extent to which these principles are compromised, the potential exists for corruption and the misuse of authority in police practices and organizations. Thus, the newly developed police organizations must model their philosophy, organizational structure and operations to be consistent with these democratic principles. We now turn to specific policies that can reform institutions, strengthen management and leadership, provide quality, relevant training, and involve citizens in the process. Institutional reform, strong leadership, and effective management Stone and Ward (2000) wrote that, “police tactics themselves are perhaps best developed at a local level, but building the structures of democratic accountability is our common project.” Bayley (1985) argues that improving accountability at the departmental level is necessary and preferable to other forms of control because police can hide from external inspection, and internal regulation can be more extensive, where both formal and informal social control can be utilized. Uildriks and Van Reenen (2003) argue that in order to democratize the police and increase police legitimacy institutional and organizational problems within the police forces need repairing, public-police relations need improvement via collective goal-setting, and long-term investments are needed in improved management, recruitment, training, equipment, and officer salaries. There must be a strong commitment to transparency, police accountability, and human rights for suspects. Police officers must also be treated with dignity, and local autonomy of civil society must be strengthened (Uildriks and Van Reenen 2003). How do we go about making these changes? While there is no single way to structure a police force democratically, there does need to be accountability to both localities, civilians, elected officials, and the courts (Stone and Ward 2000). Regardless of organizational structure, funding from multiple layers of government helps keep police accountable to national and local constituencies (p. 19). Marks (2000) developed the idea that police organizations can be changed from within by promoting the empowerment of disenfranchised police officers to compete for power and to promote change in police organizations. As disenfranchised groups in police organizations develop the capacity to participate, they succeed in changing the organization to comport with these principles. Officers committed to human rights, community policing and democratic values should be allowed to compete for influence and power in police organizations. Thus police organizations can be changed as their culture changes. Shearing and Shaw (1998) have argued that competition for police resources can also promote change in police organizations. Presently, the police have a monopoly on the provision of police services. In South Africa, Shearing and Shaw (1998) argued that if a portion of the public-service contract for communities were opened up for competition from other private or new forms of public service providers, the police would be forced to alter the manner in which they interacted with the community and thus would become more responsive to the community which enfranchises

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them to enforce the law. Perhaps if the professional model of policing were forced to compete with the democratic model in terms of civil society, crime control and human rights, the nature of policing would change. Organizational change is one of the most daunting challenges of police reform. It is a necessary reform, however, because there must be an organizational structure conducive to reforms. Bayley (2001) has summarized many of the lessons learned about organizational reform. “Reform programs must be based on a clearly articulated understanding of the connections between the objectives to be achieved and the actions proposed” (p. 19), and sustained and committed leadership by senior management is required to produce actual change. Organizational policies must be clearly stated, accompanied with appropriate positive and negative sanctions. Organizational change must create the conditions conducive to behavioral change for it to be effective. In other words, the system itself must help change the police culture, and training and recruitment must be matched with reform of management systems. Furthermore, Bayley (2001) argues that police are more likely to believe that a new program is valuable if it is stated by word of mouth rather than through statistical evaluation. Support and acceptance across ranks and assignments in a department are needed for significant reform, because one does not want to create unhealthy competition between different divisions or units, and extensive and genuine consultation with officers helps gain acceptance of new programs (bottomup management style). Support is also more likely to be sustainable if officers are shown that new programs will do a better job at reducing crime and disorder. All of this entails more than just changing the formal organizational chart, because that does not change police culture. All of this does not necessarily require a lot of financial support, but additional funding can increase morale and support for changes, and change is more likely to occur when new resources are allocated, instead of merely redistributing existing resources that can penalize already existing good projects. Bayley (2001) argues that pilot projects must be undertaken with committed leadership and personnel so that its activities become institutionalized rather than just a short-term special program. Reward structures must be put in place that reward officers for working within the new changes, or officers will not perceive the changes as being related to their personal interests. Also, police unions or other labor organizations within the police should be included in the development of any reforms so that the reforms seem to be fair and legitimate (Bayley 2001). Officers must be treated with respect and not denigrated. An experimental mindset and continual evaluation can help managers keep from denigrating officers too much when mistakes are made, and evaluation (if not too burdensome) allows programs to change midstream if needed instead of after it is too late. Bayley (2001) notes that continual evaluation should emphasize outcomes (what is achieved) rather than outputs (what is done) in order to allow for organizational creativity and flexibility. Finally, increasing contact between officers and citizens is a good way to encourage the development of a democratic force committed to accountability and service, and reform is more easily achieved if police officials are networked with progressive regional, national, and even global police leaders (Bayley 2001).


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Numerous authors have argued that departments need to establish policy guidelines and a set of department values: strong leadership is needed in order to help maintain bureaucratic rules and to make officers responsible for their assigned neighborhood areas in order to control police abuses of power (Kelling 1999; Kelling and Coles 1998; Skogan 1995; U.S. Department of Justice 1993). Police guidelines have traditionally concentrated on what not to do, leading to officer resentment and the belief that guidelines are only used to punish officers (Kelling 1999). Police guidelines should therefore include prescriptive as well as proscriptive norms, and by doing so departments can more easily wrestle with the complex moral and legal issues that arise when one engages in policing in a democratic society (Kelling 1999). These guidelines might include recognizing the complexity and discretion of police work, recognizing and confirming how police work is conducted, advancing values, emphasizing police adherence to a process, establishing accountability, and receiving recognition as an ongoing process (Kelling, 1999). Police departments would be better able to gain community support and involvement if these changes were made known. We argue that democratic values, if understood, can provide the police with significant guidance and legitimacy in the performance of their duties. When crime problems are being ignored at the local level, or corruption and misconduct are severe and widespread, state control (through courts, executive branches, legislatures, and so on) may prove effective in combating the problems. Police chiefs must answer directly to elected officials, and federal officials act as a control mechanism on state and local organizations through funding, oversight, special knowledge and special commissions (Stone and Ward 2000). Oversight commissions should be able to take concrete action (refer cases to prosecutors, provide guidance on training, regulations, and so on) in addition to issuing public reports (p. 32). Even though it may compromise public confidence in their independence, the commissions must work closely with the police and prosecutors in order to fulfill their duties. In order for courts to make police accountable to the rule of law, prosecutors and other court officials need support and training to try officer suspects adequately, and civil litigation should be an option where criminal trials are ineffective to improve public confidence and oversight (see Stone and Ward 2000). Research shows that the most important factor in determining successful program implementation in the U.S. is effective leadership, particularly the leadership of beat sergeants (Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser, and Lovig 2000). Leadership from administrators is needed if departments want more support for officer efforts in democratic policing, and the management of employees is an important component. Managers are advised to reject the management strategy of Taylorism, or what Robin (2000) calls theory X, where officers are treated as factory workers with no input. Theory Y replaces theory X by encouraging officer initiative, prudent use of discretion, and exploiting local resources and knowledge (Robin, 2000; also see Wycoff and Skogan’s (1994) discussion of participatory management). This is important because we would argue that as internal management is made more democratic and less authoritarian, the police may learn to improve their interactions with the public. The act of talking with the public in fact may improve the ability to

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intervene authoritatively in a dispute if previously the police have interacted in the context of other community activities. In theory Y or participatory management, promotion becomes based on success in problem-solving, crime prevention, fear-reduction, resolving confrontations without using force, instances of obtaining community cooperation in apprehending felons, and performing new tasks associated with police reform (Robin 2000). Evaluation criteria would also include creation of partnerships with community leaders and residents and the stimulation of community process in addition to traditional measures such as crime-rate reduction and a reduction in fear of crime (Kerley 2002). Another way to provide links with the community is to provide officers incentives to live in the area they police and to become involved in daily life there (Ferguson 2002; Reed 1999). Dealing with protective and closed police sub-cultures that shield accountability is yet another concern. Departments vary widely in the health or pathology of their police cultures (Stone and Ward 2000: 20), but all departments can take steps to reduce negative influences and increase positive ones. Anticorruption units within police departments need to do more than just investigate complaints after they happen. Units can also conduct undercover investigations and utilize random integrity tests of all officers (Stone and Ward 2000). We argue of course that these units must act in accordance with the law and respect the rights of officers, just as we expect officers to respect the rights of citizens. We argue that police organizations become corrupt not because of low pay but because of their relationship to society and the powers invested in them. Leaders for example do not become corrupt just because of low pay. Wiatrowski, Feder, and Lenz (2002) argue that corruption arises from the lack of core-democratic characteristics in police organizations. The extent to which police organizations are not transparent or accountable, or do not understand the origins of their authority, they become closed, creating the conditions for corruption and autocracy. The use of computer technology, while rapidly growing in core countries, has yet to catch on in the periphery or semiperiphery for numerous reasons. While neighborhood patrols, face-to-face contact, and communication with residents are necessary for combating crime, computers can provide very useful information regarding repeat offenders, identifying crime patterns and trends, and keeping track of repeat calls for service, arrests, and so forth over time (Stone and Ward 2000). COMSTAT (computer statistics), used in New York City, is seen by many as a useful tool in combating crime, but Parenti (1997) notes that it can be used improperly. In New York, there are weekly Comstat meetings where captains must report progress, and pressure on captains is then placed on lieutenants and on down to line officers to make more arrests. This can lead to increases in quality of life arrests that can further marginalize the poor and people of color (Parenti 1997). So, the use of computer technology must be in accordance with other standards and practices (such as offering alternatives to arrest for minor offenses) or it may exacerbate problems in the community.


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It is important to note here that in the process of reform it is imperative that the police organization is separated from the military. Reducing the capacity for violence in post-conflict situations is initially the province of a partnership between the police who may be outgunned, the military, and the public. This needs to be communicated to the public if conflict and violence still exist. Accordingly, it may be appropriate to use the tools of information warfare to delegitimate warlords or similar leaders and promote the goals of the emergent democracies. They have a responsibility to promote this at every level as part of the legitimization process. Initially, the public has little basis for trust and may be caught in the cross fires between armed militias and criminal gangs competing for power and control of criminal commerce and the police and new governments which are attempting to gain control. At some point, it may be counterproductive for the police to be armed with heavy weapons and armored vehicles if warlords have a greater military capacity. First, it diminishes the ability of the police to interact with the populations. Secondly, the level of training and intelligence to minimize casualties simply rarely exists in police organizations. It may be more appropriate to take military forces and train them in civil military operations so that once forces are eliminated they can provide the security required to transition to civil authority. If the police are to be used in paramilitary operations, then perhaps there should be a level of policing and military theory which recognizes the much more specialized level of training to carry out this type of operation. Carabinieri and Gendarme-type forces that exist in Italy and France represent a special case and should be considered from a separate organizational development perspective. Perhaps the old police types should represent only a portion of the new police because the ability to use weapons will represent only a portion of the activities of the new police and their duties. While some vetting may take place, it is imperative that the oppressors of the previous regime not penetrate the new organization. Being trained and able to use force should be a minor factor in the selection of police for the new society. To be sure, the police do retain the responsibility for responding to dangerous individuals and situations. It is part of their core mission capability. Yet it also represents as Bayley (1994) notes, only a fraction of their activities. What then do the police do the rest of the time? They also respond to citizen’s concerns as victims of crime and fear, and they maintain order. The police also perform a larger social mediation function where they respond to the social conflicts which arise between people when less authoritative methods of conflict-resolution are deemed ineffective. The police must also engage in a great deal of bureaucratic functions such as filling out paperwork, working with prosecutors on cases, and testifying in court, even if the police do not see these tasks as part of their main role. In response to the terrorism threat, the police may increasingly assume the aspect of a paramilitary organization: the increased capacity to use force (Kraska and Cubellis 1997). The danger of this posture is that they may give up their ability to interact closely with the public after having established trust in the community. This trust, in a democratic society, is basic for the collection of information, which is necessary for effective terrorism counteraction.

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These above forms of control over police power are necessary because civil society alone does not guarantee that policing is respectful to human rights (Stone and Ward 2000). Civil society oversight is still crucial, through the media, civilian review boards, private businesses, advocacy and research organizations, and community based and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Civilian review boards help get civilians involved in the process, and can offer recommendations and mediation (Stone and Ward 2000). Human rights groups can work with police in transitional societies to help develop democratic policing standards, monitor their implementation, and develop plans to root out crime (Stone and Ward 2000). This happened in New York, where civil rights groups worked out new codes with the police, building a less adversarial relationship (Kelling and Coles 1996). In fact, a wide variety of NGOs can assist in oversight of and working with the police, such as women’s rights groups. However, the creation of women’s precincts in Brazil, while well intentioned, may have isolated crimes against women from other types of crime, and not all women live near these precincts (Stone and Ward 2000). Recruitment and training The poverty of some institutions in transitional states to confront disorder creates a situation where the police may be charged with controlling situations when the experience in Western societies is that the police are only one factor in the control of the level of crime. In few instances are police organizations created wholly from a new cloth. Instead the attempt is frequently made to retool and retrain the police of the old regime in order to make them the “new” police. But being trained and able to use force should be a minor factor in the selection of police in transitional states. The use of demobilized soldiers in policing should be severely limited as weapons utilization is only a small part of police work and can be learned in training. It is probably much more difficult to take a demobilized soldier who has been involved in human rights abuses and teach him that his actions were criminal than to teach a new civil service applicant to shoot a weapon, resolve a conflict, or restrain a drunkard. Recruitment strategies are important to consider during times of reform, and can be used to reduce unlawful use of force. Based on anecdotal reports, Stone and Ward (2000) argue that older recruits with more experience and education appear to misuse force less frequently and perform better in general than younger recruits, but new recruits of any age are more likely to conform to existing police culture than to change it, so obviously more is needed than just recruitment strategies to reduce use of force. Still, one other recruitment idea is that forces should try to hire diverse employees, especially those from groups under-represented (Stone and Ward 2000). This should include female recruits. In a diverse workforce, coworkers perhaps can learn to respect each other and therefore treat community members from different groups fairly. Recruitment processes should be transparent and fair, and salaries should be adequate in order to attract qualified candidates (Neild 2001). To develop a good relationship with local communities, recruitment standards should


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be set on issues such as educational levels and ethnicity (especially ethnic groups with a history of marginalization). Training must be backed up by standards set by strong, effective, and committed leadership willing to hold officers accountable and to set examples through good behavior (Neild 2001). A clear and unified chain of command is essential to establish authority, and special units should not operate outside of this chain of command. It is also necessary to enact reforms in the judicial and other criminal justice system areas so that corruption does not move down to the police. Reforms must be seen as a long-term process, and as an issue of democratic governance (Neild 2001). As with police reform in general, violence reduction in post-conflict societies requires multidisciplinary, preventive approaches involving multiple governmental agencies working in concert with civil society over a number of years (Call 2000). During the process the problem of uneven and unequal access to justice and security needs attention as well as the enhancement of civil society capacity, roles and input. Education on ethics and police integrity must continue to be offered to police officers. This allows the organization to emphasize its values and to make them known as operational standards of conduct. Kerley (2002) argues that police officers should receive more training in the areas of humanistic skills and building community partnerships, and police leaders should move the departmental value system away from traditional professional-paramilitary models and toward a community-oriented model. At the mid-level, professional development must be offered to mid-level supervisors in the form of professional development and professional education. This should be offered in a forum that is not construed as training where the supervisors are passive participants who receive a certificate. Instead, progressive police administrators, citizens and educators should emphasize that the police are not solely responsible for police integrity. We need to create an environment where democratic values are inculcated into the organization and culture of police. Efforts can be made to take police education past the level of basic training out of police academies and into a university environment. This would impress upon the recruits the democratic nature of the police. Concurrently, undergraduate and graduate education in criminal justice for leaders and commanders should be founded in understanding the nature of policing and criminal justice in democratic societies, and providing executive education in universities instead of police academies can reinforce the importance of openness. Training will have little impact unless there are also practical reforms in management, deployment, and supervision, and training courses would have to prepare new recruits adequately for what occurs on the street so that officer actions on the street mirror what was learned in training (Stone and Ward 2000). Daily practice with realistic scenarios is needed for training to remain relevant. For example, learning about constitutional and international human rights standards is not enough. New recruits would have to observe these rights in daily work. Stone and Ward (2000) note that numerous advocates argue for human rights training to be incorporated into other training courses (interrogation, firearms, etc.) to avoid the problems with having single courses on rights that are later forgotten. When training a new group

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of inexperienced recruits, a continuing period of field training by international police monitors and trainers is needed to help the new police gain experience and skills without resorting to or falling back on, inappropriate, ineffective, or abusive patterns of behavior (Neild 2001). Rapid deployment and shortened training may be seductive, but it is not effective. Once this initial effort is completed, training should shift to skills-transfer so that local capacity can be strengthened to maintain professional structures and practices (Neild 2001). Examples include building management and operational infrastructures, information systems, budget and resource management training, and administrative structures. While technological innovation can be a useful tool, studies show that public cooperation with the police is far more important than improvements in technology (Neild 2001). Training can also focus on alternatives to using lethal force such as “verbal judo” (using language rather than violence to subdue suspects), virtual reality technology can be used to improve officer decision-making ability in use of force, and investigation and techniques of legitimate interrogation are needed in training to reduce the use of unnecessary force in extracting confessions (Stone and Ward 2000: 22–23). Strategies for increased citizen involvement in the process Citizen involvement in democratic policing is obviously crucial, and ideas of citizen involvement from COP can be incorporated into a democratic policing framework (many of the ideas cited below come from the COP literature). Citizen involvement can function as an accountability mechanism because community members can create their own safety priorities and hold police accountable for helping deal with them, especially when elected officials are also involved (Stone and Ward 2000). Establishing citizen review boards can help to democratize policing, increase collaboration, foster openness, and reduce police misconduct. Civilian oversight bodies can incorporate the accountability theme of the democratic model of policing. Police power can be easily corrupted without democratic safeguards, and civilian oversight can give the police more credibility in the community (Goldsmith 1999). Civilian review offers numerous benefits: 1) it plays a role in strengthening internal police discipline, 2) it can be a valuable source of information that secretive police forces are reluctant to release, and 3) it provides a source of recommendations for reform of police policies and practices based on collected data (Neild 1999). In order for civilian oversight to work properly and survive, however, it needs political, moral, and financial support, and cooperation between internal review processes by police and external civilian oversight groups (Chevigny 1999). So that police departments do not fall back on traditional police-community relations, we would apply to the community the same types of strategies that are used internally in police departments to train officers for co-production (Ramsey 2002). Otherwise, reforms in training will be useless because officers are likely to continue the tradition of learning “how it really is” on the street. These strategies include generating understanding and support, providing residents with the knowledge and skills needed to implement reforms, making information available through


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cooperative information technologies, and encouraging community involvement in the latest tools and tactics developed for reform. Democratic policing provides frameworks for interpreting street level actions. The police should work with the community and keep it informed through open channels of communication, and help develop a foundation of mutual trust and understanding (U.S. Dept. of Justice 1993). Friedman (1994) argues that there should be grassroots community organizing, informed local leadership, the presence of independent organizations that can support local efforts through providing training, education, and technical assistance, and an appropriate problem-solving target. If these necessities are in place, the police will not be overburdened and true collaboration with the citizenry can occur. In terms of marketing democratic policing to community residents, DuBois and Hartnett (2002) found that large media campaigns through television and radio generate awareness but not participation. However, networking via personal contacts, word of mouth, and through churches and schools encourage participation, even if they are more time consuming and less pervasive than radio and television (DuBois and Hartnett 2002; also see Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Twedt-Ball, and Gudell 2000). The youth are a key element in the solution to combating youth-related problems including violence and drugs (Rudoff and Cohn 2002). The youth need more meaningful social participation (Bynum and Thompson 2002), and if youth are not involved in policing efforts, they may be targeted as the problem rather than the solution, with adults representing the dominant group imposing its political will (see Jones-Brown 2000). Kessler (1999) found that when officers help build community partnerships it can reduce tensions between the public and the police. Before this can happen, however, police organizations must overcome some of their natural antipathies toward outside organizations. For example, instead of constantly fighting with civil liberties groups, police organizations could work with them in developing crime prevention plans and legislation (see Kelling and Coles 1996). Working with community groups and other non-governmental organizations also allows the police to tap into community resources. In San Diego, California, residents in one area wanted change, but few were actively participating in trying to create change (Stewart-Brown 2001). Many residents revealed a lack of trust between each other and with the police, and fear of retaliation and disorder was present as well. However, the police department was able to help form a neighborhood alliance comprised of the police, community organizers, and problem solving experts that greatly increased participation and reduced crime (Stewart-Brown 2001). The captain and lieutenants of the police department exhibited leadership by overseeing and assisting sergeants and officers. Community organizers engaged in community mobilizing through door-to-door outreach, facilitated community meetings, provided specialized training in problem solving, and mentored and trained leaders. Problem-solving experts provided beginning and advanced training in problem solving, worked closely with community residents to build trust, helped facilitate community meetings, targeted and patrolled problem locations identified by residents, helped develop trust with the youth and mentored

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them in community involvement. The project coordinator oversaw the whole project and acted as a liaison between different actors (Stewart-Brown 2001). Because of this set-up, residents were involved not only in problem identification but also in the solutions (patrol, clean-up, collaborating with agencies on quality of life issues, and so on). This sort of strategy can be utilized to build community and neighborhood strengths in general. Democratic policing for all neighborhoods In order for democratic policing to be successful community-wide, it has been argued that we must avoid engaging in practices that only target the neighborhoods that need it the least. Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser, and Lovig (1999) point out that in Chicago there was a concerted effort to include all neighborhoods in COP strategies, and the same must be done in democratic policing. “The potential payoff of the city’s choice to be inclusive was the increased responsiveness of local government to the concerns of all the city’s neighborhoods as well as increased effectiveness in actually improving the lives of all city residents” (Skogan et al 1999: p. 241). Neighborhoods also need to have the capacity and social capital necessary to act on behalf of itself without everything being implemented from the top-down. Skogan et al (1999), as a part of their ongoing study of COP in Chicago, defined neighborhood capacity as the main component of community self help. There are three dimensions to neighborhood capacity: 1) individual, 2) collective, and 3) political. Residents need to feel that their neighbors would intervene to protect the safety or property of others, networks need to be dense and tightly bound, and residents must also have the ability to have their voices heard by local government. One way to foster dialogue and action in neighborhoods is to establish a position or group similar to that of the “safe-streets coordinator” described by Pino (2001) in his COP study in a small city in Iowa. The safe-streets coordinator bridged the communication gap between the police and the community, helped keep both groups involved in co-productive activities, and used her networks in the community to keep neighborhood groups informed. Without her presence in the COP initiative, it is unlikely any co-productive activities would have occurred (Pino 2001). In order for democratic policing strategies to work social capital building among and between the police, the citizenry, and other private and public organizations must be at the core of the democratic policing model. Pino (2001) notes that if communities build trust, networks, and norms of reciprocity within and between these groups, these can be a catalyst for civic engagement geared toward crime and disorder reduction. “Both social capital and COP are central to issues such as trust and genuine dialogue between different groups of unequal power, the ability to collectively tap into various resources and decentralize a complex organization, and the ability of people to work together to solve various problems” (Pino 2001: p. 202). Without social capital-building within and between these groups, democratic policing will likely fail to meet its objectives. Democratic policing is more than just broken-windows-style COP where one just conducts meetings or says “hello,” every


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now and then. Genuine attempts at community organization and capacity building recognize that the residents who remain in a disorganized community simply do not have the ability or resources to leave. For safety reasons they have withdrawn from public life where they do not perceive it safe to let their children play in playgrounds controlled by gangs or fear victimization if they go to a meeting scheduled at 8 p.m. Poor and disorganized neighborhoods that need reform the most are also the most likely to face major obstacles in implementing policies based on the democratic policing model. It is not always the case, however, that those with the social capital necessary to participate must be linked with elite interests. One organization that was effective in implementing reforms (SSCPC in Seattle) was supported by business interests, had a closed elite membership, and held beliefs and values that were aligned with the police department. In Oakland, however, an effective organization (PUEBLO) had a multi-ethnic inclusive approach that was grassroots-oriented and forged common ground across racial and ethnic lines (Bass 2000). Another Oakland study found that the effects of collective action and police efforts on crime act independently, meaning that police efforts can effectively reduce crime and disorder regardless of the social climate of an area, and that collective action can do the same independently of police efforts (Mazerolle, Kadleck, and Roehl 1998). Still, police efforts that build working relationships with a core group of citizens that can discourage criminal events will have more successful long-term effects against crime than if the police attempt to build one-on-one relationships with individuals (Mazerolle et al 1998). One major obstacle to success community-wide is the involvement of well-todo neighborhoods and the exclusion of poor, alienated neighborhoods. Neglected and blighted neighborhoods must be reintegrated into the larger community if crime control is to be effective (Buerger 1998). Intentioned strategies of inclusion appear to be necessary, and those who have the resources must extend to those who have none in order to build a network of trust and obligation across geographic, racial, ethnic, religious, and class lines. Broker organizations (such as Habitat for Humanity in the U.S.) outside of the geographic community may be able to build this network successfully because they are often able to recruit volunteers from outer neighborhoods (Buerger 1998). Democratic policing and just outcomes Even though inequality exists in our communities, and it is extremely unlikely that all residents could be involved in democratic policing, it may still be possible that police-community relations can arrive at just outcomes (Thacher 2001). For just outcomes to occur, the police must focus their partnership on the question of what is in the public good, investigate the needs and wants of social groups that are absent from the process, and ensure that the dialogue between citizen groups and the police is of high quality (the dialogue is guided by norms geared toward the common good whether or not everyone is equally represented) (Thacher 2001).

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Public decision-making needs to be well informed and should rest on debate and persuasion rather than on who is most represented at a meeting. Furthermore, it is not that the citizens demand certain things and then the police carry it out. The police are a part of the decision-making process, rather than being merely the hammer or the nail. In this capacity, the police could approach these partnerships with a set of ethical commitments that helps them participate in, and shape the dialogic process between, the police and the citizenry to help ensure just outcomes (Thacher 2001). While the police learn about community problems from residents, the police can educate residents with information they were unaware of, leading to a broader understanding on both sides and a focusing of the debate on the common good. It is understandable to believe that it is unrealistic to assume that the police can adopt this sort of principled stance, but Thacher (2001) argues that it would help if a central part of leadership training sessions and police training focused on these strong ethical commitments. In order to make community meetings count, one could hold meetings where it is considered safe on a regular schedule, and at a regular location in all areas of the city (DuBois and Hartnett 2002). It also helps to appoint an individual who is responsible for creating an agenda and leading the meetings (DuBois and Hartnett 2002). At “beat” meetings, discussion of general community information (such as announcements of upcoming events as well as reports on the progress of problemsolving efforts) is important as well, because it helps convey the message that it is worth the effort to attend meetings (DuBois and Hartnett 2002). Finally, networking is an important feature of beat meetings (DuBois and Hartnett 2002). If meetings are social gatherings with informal discussions in addition to the serious neighborhood problem discussions people get to know one another, improve networks, and build community. Community residents should define community problems, rather than outsiders or the police (Buerger 1998). Otherwise, the program may target the wrong problem from the wrong angle. Foreign police assistance Police assistance from the US to transitional societies has increased since the collapse of communism (Marenin 1998). This assistance generally includes technical and managerial experience, and the creation of civil, police, and criminal justice systems. Dobbins et al (2003) found that initiatives varied in scope and scale, but that it can take a year or more to build up and deploy a civil police force once military combat has ended. While one would want to take the time to develop a good civilian police force, the delay may create a short-term lack of law and order that increases the pressure on nation builders to use their military forces to maintain internal security (pp. 151–152). Based on past attempts to create democratic and civil police forces, Marenin (1998) offers seven principles, or guidelines, of democratic policing assistance. First, police reform programs should start with the police themselves rather than foreign policy contexts, goals, or rhetoric. This is because the most crucial issues, as


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we have seen earlier in this volume, involve discretion, police culture, and the ordermaintenance role. Changing the police culture requires the commitment of police managers (upper and middle managers) as well as a change in the political contexts that hold police accountable (Marenin 1998: 159). Just telling the police what to do will not work. “Policing has to be understood as the recipient police see and evaluate it before reform and reconstruction will have an impact” (p. 160), because even after extensive training the police are still likely to have power while being underpaid and facing danger, and are likely to face ethical dilemmas. Second, Marenin (1998) argues that policing reform can lead to a wide variety of legitimate forms of policing. Just as each country and municipality is different, policing that works for that country and/or municipality will likely be different. One size does not fit all. Larger local contexts must be taken into account. Third, principles still count more than techniques, skills, technology or programs. Principles of good police work should be taught in police aid, and tactics can serve as examples, but not necessarily policy. Fourth, there should only be one goal: civil, democratic policing. If other programs and rhetoric are added on, such as terrorism and fighting drugs, all messages are diluted and there may be funding competition for different units. Fifth, police reform is a long-term and difficult process. Short-term aid (courses for police leaders, etc.) will have little effect. Sixth, not all implementers and trainers are alike. The idea that experience as a police officer or lawyer or judge translates into effective teaching is “fundamentally detrimental to aid and training” (p. 163). Trainers must be trained first so that they can learn to challenge their occupational biases. Finally, reform itself cannot be relied upon to change the police alone. Reform must include their connections to the other agencies in the criminal justice system, local populations, and to the state and its institutions (p. 164). Just as we have been arguing in this volume, policing cannot operate in a vacuum. Reform is the same way. In a nutshell, as we see it, if foreign assistance is to be provided, it must be genuine. Democratizing Societies and Extending Human Rights Reforming policing into a democratic form is not likely to succeed unless we also work on democratizing the state and its institutions in general, reducing corruption, building social capital, including marginalized groups and women, reconciling ethnic and other forms of conflict, and working towards genuine socioeconomic development and the enhancement of citizen and institutional capacities. Initiatives must be sure to take on all of these goals comprehensively, in concert with police reform. Below we offer policy ideas from the literatures of different academic disciplines, NGOs, think tanks, and others that can help start the dialogue on how to start initiatives in a given country.

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Local governance One area that requires attention is local governance. The Bridges Development Consortium (2004) developed a local governance model (see bibliography for web access to the model) that is intended to benefit ordinary citizens through democratic processes. The model calls for local participatory democratic processes (establishment of interim advisory councils at the local level and increased participation of those councils in policy process and oversight of public institutions), transparent and efficient local governance (increased citizen access to government information and ethical practices, and increased government responsiveness to delivering municipal utilities and services at the local level), civil society involvement through community-supported organizations (CSOs) and media/civic awareness (more effective CSOs), and more effective policy advocacy (strengthened legal and constitutional recognition for local governance). This kind of model for local governance is appropriate for democratizing the relationship between the public and the police. If such a comprehensive model is put into practice, democratic policing as well as other democratic initiatives are more likely to succeed. Building social capital during economic reforms There are different forms of capital and they include economic, human and social capital. Agosin and Bloom (2003) note the need for coupling economic growth with growth in human and social capital. An adequate safety-net is needed for the most vulnerable groups during economic reform, and opportunities to enhance and increase civil participation through education, targeting of health crises, support for small business, micro-lending groups, participation of women, and so on (Agosin and Bloom 2003). It is important to determine how various entities can build social capital. One way is by encouraging individuals to be a part of multiple organizations in their community. Hooghe and Stolle (2003) found that there was a relationship between membership in voluntary organizations and the attitudinal aspect of social capital. Having multiple or overlapping memberships leads to the development of civic attitudes, which can be used to create social capital. Of course, not all types of interactions with others matter equally and not all associations or memberships are equally related to attitudinal aspects of social capital, but membership in multiple organizations is definitely crucial (Hooghe and Stolle 2003). Under certain conditions, social institutions also play a role in the development of social capital (Hooghe and Stolle 2003). Strategies for increasing the amount of social capital in a given society include fighting income inequality, constructing fair institutions and procedures, influencing local infrastructure, and so on (p. 11). Societies that have implemented more egalitarian programs and that allow citizens to participate equally in public life have citizens that are more trusting of each other (Stolle and Hooghe 2003). There is no surefire way to do this, however, as the generation of social capital is dependent on a “sustained and synergistic interaction between civil society and government institutions” (Hooghe and Stolle 2003: 11). The amount


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of interplay between citizen engagement in civil society and the creation of more open and egalitarian institutions determines the amount of social capital. In order to gauge the level of social capital in a community, one could make use of the Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) advocated by the World Bank and available on the internet. Fighting general governmental corruption There are a number of things that could be done to reduce governmental corruption. Cheema (2003) noted many ways to combat corruption through reform. Many of these ideas could also apply to the police, including the simplification of government programs and procedures and minimizing or in some cases eliminating discretion. Public servants could be given decent wages and efforts must be made to reward good performance. Educating the public of its rights and obligations is necessary, and programs known to be corrupt could be eliminated and loopholes in laws filled. An independent anti-corruption commission could be developed that would have broad powers and be headed by someone with broad support and legitimacy. Independent investigators, prosecutors, and adjudicators are needed to investigate and enforce laws, and channels for effective complaint-making or whistle-blowing with incentives and protections are needed. Internal reforms are necessary as well, including the strengthening of oversight institutions, improving the working conditions of civil servants, establishing independent and impartial election commissions, allowing police forces to work well with oversight bodies, ensuring an independent judiciary, and instituting a set of governmental checks and balances that include openness. Cheema (2003) also mentions the extreme importance of a free press and freedom of information to help with citizen awareness and support. Building democracy How can one build democracy in a state suffering from near collapse and conflict? It is not a good idea to start with elections, because losers find it easy to reject election results, and voters often have little choice but to vote on the basis of ethnic or religious identity (Ottaway 1995). Unfortunately, this appears to be the current strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. One must instead confront the issues directly, considering the fragmentation of the elite, whether self-determination is defined in terms of group or individual rights, and economic concerns. In situations of heightened ethnic conflict, promoting self-determination in terms of individual rather than group rights would be extremely difficult, so defining it in terms of group rights may be necessary (Ottaway 1995). Creating economic groups with interests in political stability and access to a broad market instead of raw political power is possible, but not likely in the short term, so short-term solutions may not be able to be democratic yet, but could be geared toward setting up the capacity for democratic development (Ottaway 1995). Examples of this include enhancing participation, compromise, and policy debates. Ottaway (1995) also argues that power sharing may also have to occur

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in the beginning without elections, as it would create a negotiating forum where conflicting groups would have to consider long term agreements. This can plant the seeds for stable and fair elections with legitimate political parties later. Zartman (1995) adds that power structures should be reconstituted from the bottom up, with a temporary agent at the top providing a provisional framework where institutions can be built to create an effective state and return confidence and legitimacy. Legitimacy must be restored as quickly as possible through constructive participation via large, informally representative forums. New leaders should not have ties to the previous regimes (Zartman 1995). Local groups should be given time to build experience and develop political parties, and when elections come losers should still have the opportunity to still participate in government to avoid state collapse and other problems. Resources are needed to help kick-start the process, and much of it will likely have to come in the form of aid from other nation-states and international organizations. It is important, however, to try to set the conditions for independent development as soon as possible so that the new state is not reliant on aid (Zartman 1995). Reducing ethnic conflict More needs to be done about the problems of ethnic conflict that plague many transitional and developing countries. Riggs (2002) argues that democracies, compared to non-democratic regimes, are best able to handle the problems of ethnic identity posed by globalization. A meaningful devolution of power through federalism can be a way for deeply divided societies to manage and reduce conflict (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995). Opposition parties that represent marginal groups can have a stake in the system and some autonomous control over resources and local affairs. Citizens must have the right to participate in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of international social and economic policies with the goals of economic sovereignty, social welfare, and reduced inequality at all levels (Hemispheric Social Alliance 2001: 4). Human rights should be a part of the democratization process, and mechanisms and institutions are needed to ensure full implementation and enforcement of rights. Human rights must cover civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights, gender equity, and rights relating to indigenous peoples and communities where applicable (Hemispheric Social Alliance 2001: 4). Another idea would be to work towards replacing caste-like social differences such as ethnic nationalism and sacred authority with class-based social systems that work for human equality and “justify differences based on individual effort and secular rationality” (Riggs 2002: 46). Warlords seeking power and influence can exacerbate ethnic or tribal conflict. Warlords in Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan created fiefdoms and militias that taxed, extorted and intimidated people under their control, and they will continue to do so if governments cannot develop the capacity to defeat or demilitarize these groups. While these elements may not be initially fully formed, elements of former regimes without legitimate avenues to participate in newly formed processes have


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the ability to metastasize in conditions of disorder. They have weapons, connections, communications and training to carry out these illicit enterprises. Strategic thinking should then be directed to assessing the causes, maintenance, financing and strategies to disrupt these groups. In countries with histories of ethnic conflict, national and regional systems need to be able to accept the claims of excluded and marginalized ethnic and other minority groups on the legitimate basis of the universal respect for human rights and democratic process (Stavenhagen 1996: 303). Stavenhagen (1996) adds that the right of peoples to self-determination must be part of this, or we are likely to see ethnic conflict increase in different parts of the world. One way to build communities and promote peace in areas suffering from ethnic and other forms of conflict is through storytelling. Storytelling can give voice to persons at the grassroots level (Senehi 2000), and requires no formal training. Community is partly constructed through storytelling, and peace-building through stories can build community in a way that is driven forward by the parties themselves rather than being imposed from the outside (p. 97). This in turn builds a shared identity from the grassroots that can be tapped for future collective action. Stories are accessible and inclusive, can be understood by persons of all ages and educational levels, and translate well across cultures (p. 97). Senehi (2000) argues that “understanding the role of storytelling in peace-building is significant for facilitating cultural spaces where people can participate in defining their communities, voicing their experience, healing from past conflict, and shaping their future” (p. 97). Storytelling has the capacity to retain dignity and comfort for oppressed communities, and can help build respect and trust for others. Local police forces could become involved in this process as well to build trust between the community and the police. These dialogic processes for building trust the police and other ethnic groups are related to Habermasian critical theory discussed in the previous chapter. Democratic socioeconomic development Socioeconomic policy cannot be ignored in the effort to enhance democracy and the capacity of civil society. Successful rural development projects have often been started and guided in their early stages by people from outside these rural communities, but these same programs have involved rural people in the process from the beginning (Uphoff, Esman, and Krishna 1998). While providing help through simple but effective management methods, technologies, and a willingness to continue learning and adapting, outside facilitators have also helped start cooperative efforts and utilized social organization compatible with local experiences and preferences. This builds on already existing, if not previously tapped into, local capacities. By having the local population involved from the beginning and respecting their input and knowledge, the projects that are initiated can be maintained by the local population in a sustainable, long-term way, and this builds capacities and social capital that can help people work better with each other, the police, and other governmental agents. Three measures of project success include productivity, well-being, and

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empowerment (Uphoff et al 1998). Productivity is measured by the ability to produce a sustainable combination of goods and services and to reduce or eliminate the need for outside aid. Well-being refers to enhanced feelings of self-worth, fulfillment, good health, respect, and the like. Empowerment is the degree of control over the circumstances and destiny of individuals, their families, and their communities (Uphoff et al 1998: 197). According to the Hemispheric Social Alliance (2001), trade and investment should be instruments for achieving just, sustainable, and environmentally sound development instead of ends in themselves, and that citizens must have the right to participate in the development of policies, and have the ability to sue investors that violate investment rules. Basic women’s, workers’ and migrants’ rights are also needed. Part of the competitive economy in globalization involves the feminization of labor, which exposes women to various forms of exploitation (Gills 2002). Women’s movements have been a major part of the counter movement against this labor exploitation, and should be seen as an important social force that can resist unequal global trends and contribute to alternatives based on inclusion and democracy (Gills 2002). Women should also be a major force in co-productive activities with the police and other necessary initiatives. In evaluating initiatives and programs, Uphoff et al (1998: 198) offer four criteria: resource mobilization (with the aim of self-reliance and self-sufficiency), scaling up and expansion (so that larger numbers of people can benefit from organizational and technical innovations), diversification (so that organizational capabilities are applied to solving other problems in rural areas), and continual innovation (utilizing learning process and problem-solving strategies with maturing internal and external institutional relationships that enable rural people to have more control over their situations and futures). These four criteria can also be applied to evaluating democratic policing strategies as well, and emphasizes our argument that successful democratic policing requires that it not be treated as if it were in a vacuum. Building organizational capabilities, improving problem-solving strategies, and so on is empowering and helps communities deal with social problems with more vigor and ability, increasing the chances of success. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their potential for development The knowledge and potential power of civil society, NGOs, and others in demanding democratic socioeconomic development and their own efforts to do so when governments and international institutions don’t deliver can be seen through their work at various summits and conferences to develop alternatives to the current crises in economic globalization that lead to increased inequalities. While NGOs have been increasingly criticized lately for becoming more beholden to funding agencies and being technical and paternalistic in their assistance (see Kamat 2003), they have great potential for facilitating the empowerment of the poor and undereducated. NGOs need to avoid cooptation by funding agencies and remember that they are


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facilitators of others’ self-empowerment and not paternalistic change agents that “empower people.” The following policy recommendations are taken from “The Copenhagen Alternative Declaration” of 1995, which was a declaration of civil society organizations participating in the NGO forum of the Social Summit: We, representatives of social movements, NGOs and citizens’ groups participating in the NGO Forum during the World Summit for Social Development (WSSD), share a common vision of a world which recognizes its essential oneness and interdependence while wholly embracing human diversity in all its racial, ethnic, cultural and religious manifestations, where justice, and equity for all its inhabitants is the first priority in all endeavors and enterprises and in which the principles of democracy and popular participation are universally upheld, so that the long-dreamed creation of a peaceful, cooperative and sustainable civilization can at long last be made possible... In rejecting the prevailing global economic model, we do not suggest the imposition of another universal model. Rather, it is a question of innovating and devising local answers to community needs, promoting the skills and energy of women in full equality with men, and benefiting from valuable traditions, as well as new technologies. In the light of the foregoing, we consider that the following conditions must be fulfilled at the household, community, national and international levels to realize this alternative vision of development: At the household level: The new vision of development requires the transformation of gender relations, in which women are equal participants in the decision-making process. • Women and men must share responsibility for the care of children, the elderly and people with disabilities. • Domestic violence in all its forms must not be tolerated. • Women must be guaranteed sexual and reproductive choice and health. • Children's rights should be respected and enhanced.

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At the community level: • The keys to effective development are equity, participation, self-reliance, sustainability and a holistic approach to community life. • The capacity of communities to protect their own resource base must be restored. • Governmental and intergovernmental decisions must be built upon the full participation of social movements, citizens' organizations and communities at all stages in the development process, paying special attention to the equal participation of women. • Communities must gain control over the activities of all enterprises that affect their well-being, including transnational corporations. • The political, social and economical empowerment of youth, especially young women, should be fostered. At the national level: • All forms of oppression based on gender, race, ethnicity, class, age, disability and religion must be eliminated. • Governments must ensure the full and equal participation of civil society in the processes of economic policy-making and other development decision-making, implementation and monitoring.

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Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries Education must be granted as the main instrument to empower youth to take their rightful place in society, enabling them to take control of their lives. Non-formal education should be promoted, drawing on the experiences and skills of non-specialized people. Governments must ensure the full and equal participation of women in power structures and decision-making at all levels. National accounting systems should be revised to incorporate women's unpaid work. Governments must commit themselves to developing national strategies and implementation plans in order to fulfill their responsibilities under the Human Rights covenants. They must regularly report on their progress, in particular their efforts regarding marginalized groups' access to legal procedures. Governments which have not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) should do so. Governments should work for the approval of the Draft Declaration on the Universal Rights of Indigenous Peoples at the United Nations. Recognition of and respect for ancestral territorial rights of indigenous peoples and their right to self-determination is an imperative in order to ensure their existence as peoples and cultures. Territories that are colonized should likewise be accorded their right to sovereignty and self-determination. Governments must make agrarian reform the basis of sustainable rural economies and ensure access to affordable credit for the poor without discriminating on the basis of gender, race and ethnicity so that people can create their own employment and build their own communities. Governments should develop sustainable employment programmes, in full consultation with trade unions and employers' organizations. Governments of industrialized countries should reduce their countries' disproportionately large claim on available natural resources by implementing the appropriate mix of incentives, ecological tax reforms, regulations, and environmental accounting systems to achieve sustainable production and consumption patterns. Southern governments have the right to protect their people from the effects of deregulated and liberalized trade, especially in areas of food security and domestic production. Moreover, they should be able to regulate the market and take fiscal or legal measures for the purpose of combating inequalities among their peoples. Africa should be given preferential treatment in this respect. Governments should commit themselves to reducing military expenditure so that it does not exceed spending on health care and education and increase the conversion of military resources to peaceful purposes. This "peace dividend" should be distributed equally between a national and a global demilitarization fund for social development. There should be a conversion of the military economy to a civilian economy.

At the international level: A new partnership in South-North relations requires placing the cultures, development options and long-term strategies of developing countries first, and not those of the North. • It must be recognized that cultural diversity is the principal source of new strength, new actors, new social systems, and sustainable development, creating an alternative globalization from below. • There should be an immediate cancellation of bilateral, multilateral and commercial debts of developing countries without the imposition of structural adjustment

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conditionality. In the longer term, the international community should institutionalize equitable terms of trade. Policy-based-lending and the interference of the World Bank and IMF in the internal affairs of sovereign states should be discontinued. The Bretton Woods institutions must be made transparent and accountable to civil society in both the South and North; their policies and programmes should be made people-centered; and participation of social movements and citizens' organizations at all stages in the negotiation of agreements, project implementation and monitoring should be ensured. Global macro-economic policy should address the structure of poverty and stimulate the levels of real purchasing power. An alternative macroeconomic policy will have to meaningfully address the distribution of income and wealth, both between and within countries, leading to a democratization of consumption. This policy would require curbing lavish luxury-goods economies and redirecting resources towards the production of essential consumer goods and social services. Global production and consumption must stay within the limits of the carrying capacity of the earth. Political regulation is mandatory in order to prevent the global market system from continuing to reward irresponsible behaviour that cares nothing for the household, community, nation and humankind. Regulatory institutions and instruments of governance and law that are truly democratic and enforceable must be established to prohibit monopolistic structures and behaviour and to ensure that transnational corporations and financial institutions respect the fundamental rights of all peoples. In order to make this possible, TNCs must be reduced in size. Work to complete the Code of Conduct for TNCs should be urgently resumed. An international independent body and accountability mechanisms should be set up to monitor, evaluate and effectively regulate the behaviour of transnational corporations and their impact on individual nations, communities, peoples and the environment. The international community should enforce the application of a tax on all speculative foreign exchange transactions (Tobin tax) of about 0.5 %, the revenue of which should go into a global social development fund with adequate control mechanisms. Effective international machinery to promote renewable energy should be installed in the UN system. Regional and international organizations should encourage diplomacy, peaceful negotiations and mediation and promote institutions for research and training in nonviolent conflict resolution. In the 180 days between the Copenhagen Summit and Beijing Conference, we demand an independent investigation and audit of World Band and IMF performance. In the aftermath of the financial collapse in Mexico, it is essential that the international community prevent future disasters that result from the refusal of the Bretton Woods institutions to depart from the agenda set by the financial and corporate communities, the U.S. government, and Northern financial ministries.

Foreign social, economic, and political assistance The Copenhagen Alternative Declaration reminds us to consider what role foreign assistance can play in the development of various reforms. Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, Jones, Lal, Rathmell, Swanger, and Timilsina (2003) produced a number of

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findings based on their extensive study of US foreign assistance. One of the findings was that multilateral nation-building is more complex and time-consuming than unilateral efforts, but produces more thorough-going transformations and greater regional reconciliation than unilateral efforts. Obviously, unity of command and broad participation are compatible if the major participants have a common goal and shape their international institutions accordingly. Support of neighboring states is necessary for stability, and accountability for past injustices can help the democratization process, but only if it is part of a deep and long-term commitment. Etzioni (2004) argues that nation-building by foreign powers is usually doomed to failure, and is therefore a waste of economic resources, political capital, and human lives. Foreign powers should therefore reduce their ambitions, seek modest forms of intervention, and help find ways for nations to help themselves. A one-sizefits-all approach to nation building will not work because ambitious nation-building attempts to dismantle long-established social structures and institutional practices (Etzioni 2004). Etzioni (2004) has observed that nation-building works best when the foreign entity works with whoever is in power at the time rather than trying to overthrow them. In addition, agreements could be made to gain the support of various leaders (warlords, chiefs, etc.) to integrate a national army, build a connecting road, and so on. The external power should also allow the local people to work things out themselves, even if the outcome does not match what the external power normally does. This kind of approach would also lend more credibility to the external power (Etzioni 2004). In terms of the police, Neild (2001) argues that local expertise must be built at the state and society levels, as well as in the police, to take over tasks of international aid agents. Examples include building civilian police leadership, strengthening oversight and policy-making capacities of government, building capacities of civil society organizations and the media, starting civic education programs that educate people about the role of the police, and to encourage co-productive activities. Whatever foreign assistance is offered, it must be clear that countries should only borrow models from other states if the models come with attested success records and are legitimately created based on local knowledge and sensitivity to local conditions (Brogden 2004). We have argued here that Western models of assistance and current policies of powerful Western countries have in many ways had negative effects on other countries. If the West is serious about human rights and development around the world, major policy changes in various areas would be necessary. For example, the U.S. and other industrialized countries should increase rather than reduce their role in the economy by providing both domestic and international support for workers dislocated in the globalization process (Mandle 2003). Human rights should be a part of the economic development process, workers should be allowed to organize worldwide, and financial flows could be constrained through the Tobin Tax (a small universal tax on foreign exchange transactions) or something similar for purposes of stability (Mandle 2003). Micro-loans from banks like the Grameen Bank are wonderful ways to give the most destitute, especially women, access to capital (see


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Matthews 1994). Grassroots groups should help establish international health and safety standards, as well as environmental standards (Danaher 1994). Agricultural subsidies for multi-national agricultural conglomerates should be eliminated so that small producers in rich and poor countries alike can compete more equitably on the world market. Structural adjustment programs should be halted, and World Bank and IMF lending could be reoriented to support a wide variety of productive activities by the rural and urban poor, increasing local self-reliance and sustainability (Danaher 1994). Openness is essential. The IMF and World Bank, like the police, should be democratic institutions to the extent that they can be by allowing citizen involvement in negotiations for loans to their countries. International agreements and policies should not hinder the ability of nation-states to meet the social and economic needs of their citizens, and countries should be allowed to regulate the private sector and maintain public-sector corporations if they want to (Hemispheric Social Alliance 2001). Part of this involves getting rid of mechanisms such as chapter 11 in NAFTA that allows investors to sue governments directly for supposed loss of profits due to legislation meant to protect consumers. Countries should have the ability to protect or exclude staple foods from trade agreements to improve food security, and health and other needs can be protected by allowing governments to establish their own intellectual property rules to guarantee access to needed drugs and also to protect indigenous knowledge and biodiversity (Hemispheric Social Alliance 2001). In essence, nation-states need the autonomy from international banks and other agencies to meet the needs of their citizens. Global economic and political elites that have disproportionate control over the globalization process must somehow be more accountable, allow for more transparency, and so on. In order to make these elites more democratic, Teune (2002) argues that pressing them with emerging global democratic norms might help. These norms include general global rights and obligations such as human rights, norms of trade and exchange (strengthening local institutions and weakening the power and control of the WTO), scientific and engineering norms that involve standards about accessibility, visibility, credibility, and proper use of knowledge in areas such as manufacturing and medicine, and norms of accepting various forms of art, much of it political. Countries receiving debt-relief still need to be held accountable to their citizenry. One possibility would be for debtor governments to pay local currency into a local development commission (government can deposit, but not withdraw the currency), which would have strict democratic requirements. An elected board would run the organization, would hopefully contain a large percentage of women, representation of workers and small farmers would be written into the charter, and grassroots groups would play a prominent role (Danaher 2001b: 191). These ideas are geared toward securing local and popular control of capital, which would be used to provide micro-loans and grants for a wide range of small-scale enterprises and empowerment projects. Loans would be capped to deter financial exploiters. Governments would get multilateral debt reduced for an equivalent amount of hard currency deposited

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into the development commissions, and this would stop the current process of siphoning capital away from debtor countries to wealthy ones and their international financial institutions (Danaher 2001b). In places where the nation-state has not adequately solved social problems, alternative communities/states such as Kerala, India and Porto Alegre, Brazil have sprouted that find ways to improve housing, transportation, literacy, and food availability (Danaher 2001a). McMichael (2004) calls this phenomenon the direct democracy movement, where a mix of neighborhoods, small businesses and merchants, the middle class, workers, and the unemployed appropriate public spaces and maintain factory operations for the benefit of the public. Barter arrangements are started, and these groups brainstorm on how to organize and build libraries, community kitchens, schools, gardens, and so on. Governments can allow these arrangements to continue and can even help facilitate them, and there is no reason that these same alternative communities can’t work with the police to improve related crime and disorder problems. Conclusion It cannot be said enough that each country will have to take a stronger role in its development while creating more democratic institutions that are open, accountable, and follow the letter of the law. The possible solutions discussed above are mentioned here not only as ideas for tackling the problems many transitional societies face but also as a starting point for dialogue within nations that must come up with initiatives that work best for them. With collective input from citizens at the grassroots level along with experts, NGOs, the police, and other government officials we hope that genuine democratic policing, citizen capacity, and democratization in general will be attainable and sustainable. In order to support the principles of democratic policing, nations need to work on transforming policing towards a democratic form by emphasizing decentralization where appropriate, strong departmental leadership, and effective management, recruitment and training. Strategies for increasing citizen involvement equitably, especially those of under-represented groups including women, need to be formulated. States must also work on other goals in order for democratic policing to be sustainable. These goals include local governance, building social capital, reducing corruption and ethnic conflict, building democratic institutions, independent socioeconomic development, and foreign assistance that is in the best interest of the assisted country and its people and not solely in the interest of the foreign power. Bayley (2006) recently wrote a how-to book on developing democratic policing abroad (Changing the Guard). While Bayley presents many helpful and important ideas to US and UN aid-providers in an accessible style (and should be read by those interested in democratizing police forces), we think that he comes up short in a number of important areas. He does not adequately address democratic or economic development. Bayley gives these topics, especially economic development, short


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shrift. But as we saw in the first chapter economic development and its relation to democratic development must be considered, and we cannot assume good intentions or sound policy from the IMF or World Bank. Bayley also fails to address the forms of capital that are needed to build citizen and police capacity for the purposes of democratic development. As we have emphasized, scholars interested in police reform and democratic development can learn much from the socioeconomic development literature. The local knowledge of the citizenry and NGOs can be extremely helpful, and if we are to promote democracy abroad we must involve those that would give the police their authority in a democratic context. If we promote unrestrained capitalism and economic exploitation, we are not promoting democratization, state autonomy, labor rights, or fair trade. While Bayley emphasizes trainer collaboration with other law enforcement agencies he does not mention collaboration with NGOs, women’s groups, and others that represent the citizenry in these countries. Multi-lateral action for providing aid is important, but we have to assure that all of the aid givers collectively work for the interests and democratization of the country receiving aid, rather than the interests of those giving the aid. Bayley notes the potential benefit of COMPSTAT and other technologies for improving police performance, but these same technologies can increase police abuse of authority as we have seen in the U.S. The use of these technologies must be used in consultation with the community. Finally, Bayley notes that police reform results in the U.S. are mixed and weak. If that is the case, how can the U.S. export those reforms elsewhere? Bayley does a great job providing specific policy options and ideas, but the limitation of his focus in key areas makes us wonder if trainers following his advice will only continue the status quo. In Part II we turn to case studies of nations from different parts of the world and their progress and prospects for democratic policing presented by experts on these different countries. These countries include Iraq, South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Kazakhstan. In the concluding chapter, Pino and Wiatrowski examine these case studies in light of the goals set forth in Part I and draw what lessons can be learned from these case studies.


PART 2 Country Case Studies


Part 2

Introduction Nathan W. Pino Texas State University – San Marcos


In Part 2 we present case studies from countries around the world. Experts of the countries in question examine policing and other issues presented in Part 1. These case studies may inform policy makers and academics on various issues in context. These chapters also demonstrate how each country must be examined separately as a unique situation. A brief summary of the chapters will now be presented. In Chapter 5, Dr. Rehan Mullick and Rabia Nusrat detail policing and related issues in Iraq from a critical perspective. First, the authors discuss state and institution building. Next, the current Iraq experience based on the US invasion and the insurgency is highlighted. The authors find that the political and economic climate and the effects of the occupation and insurgency on the economy and political system have negatively impacted police reform efforts, and have reduced the chances that a genuinely independent and democratic state based on human rights and the rule of law will develop in Iraq. Private and paramilitary styles of policing are being favored over police organizations that are more conducive to democratic reform, and the country’s infrastructure and human capital have suffered. In Chapter 6, Dr. Robert Shanafelt examines police reforms in South Africa from an anthropological perspective. The legacies of colonialism and apartheid still haunt the country. South Africa has a notoriously high crime rate and has remained underdeveloped despite its rich natural resources. Shanafelt presents an interesting discussion on policing and discusses the history of policing from colonial conquest to apartheid. Policing and crime policy in general have failed to control high crime rates, leading to vigilantism among the poor and the hiring of private security by the rich. There have been changes in police structure and practice in post-apartheid South Africa, and sector policing is the latest approach loosely based on U.S. models of community policing. However, this approach has brought mixed results. In Chapter 7, Dr. Steven Engel examines recent policing reforms based on the Patten report in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement. Northern Ireland has struggled with its ethno-political conflicts and paramilitary violence, and the policing issue is no stranger to these problems. Engel details the historical background on the conflicts in Northern Ireland and how police misconduct played a role in those conflicts. As part of the Good Friday Agreement, an independent

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commission drafted the Patten Report. This report details a democratic policing strategy modeled on human rights. However, problems in implementation of the plan and with the plan itself have led to only limited success. Engel ends the chapter by discussing possible remedies (such as consociational democracy, nodal governance, police board reform, improving legitimacy, and the like) to the problems that still afflict policing in Northern Ireland. In Chapter 8, Dr. Edward Snajdr conducts an evaluation of a US funded program in Kazakhstan that conducts domestic violence response training for police officers. Collaborative and train-the-trainer strategies based on lessons from cultural anthropology were implemented, and the police formed partnerships with feminist NGOs to make the program work better. These partnerships and the willingness to work on them sustained the collaboration needed to work toward success. Snajdr argues that success and sustainability of such programs must be designed and implemented within the cultural context of the area and with the input of those outside the police in order to better develop these partnerships and sustain improvements. In Chapter 9, Heath Grant, Jane Grabias, and Roy Godson discuss the history of democratic police reform and the importance of the police in upholding the rule of law. They then detail the rule-of-law training they engage in around the world based on the previous discussion. This training emphasizes knowledge-, attitude-, and skill-based goals that all help police become more knowledgeable, competent and convinced proponents of the rule of law.

Chapter 5

Policing and Institution Building in Iraq Rehan Mullick Bridges Development Consortium

Rabia Nusrat Bridges Development Consortium

Introduction Since the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq, the United States and its coalition allies have put forth as their goal the creation of a stable and democratic society. As even critics recognize, such an endeavor is a monumental task that must involve the construction of a new constitution, the building of new government structures, the creation of legitimate bureaucratic systems including police and security forces, and the development of a framework for a functioning market economy (Paris 2004). However, in order to successfully implement such an undertaking, the US must be prepared for a long military stay. Yet, since they are widely perceived as occupiers, US forces must also be primed to face resistance from the various factions inside the country that continue to resist outside involvement. The American military invasion of Iraq with a small international force vanquished the vaunted Iraqi military and the Republican Guard in a period of days. President George Bush landed on the massive aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, and declared “Mission Accomplished”. The ensuing two years have seen over two thousand Americans killed and many thousands of Iraqi nationals lose their lives in the post invasion period. The promise of a unified, democratic Iraq that is a beacon for American foreign policy lies shattered in the ongoing explosions and chaos. Since the precedent in post-World War II Germany and Japan was reconstruction and the creation of stable democratic societies, the failure to plan for a similar responsibility in Iraq is inexcusable. Colonialism has been with us for a very long time in many forms, and constantly re-invents itself as the structure of global capitalism itself changes (Ahmad 2004). State-building in recent cases such as Iraq can be viewed as the latest in a long line of trusteeship-like arrangements starting in the late phases of colonialism. This new face of imperialism has emerged after the dissolution of the great colonial empires

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(mainly the British and the French) and the colonial ambitions of other competing capitalist countries (Germany and Japan). Today’s state-builders assume that promoting democratic practices and marketoriented economies will diminish social tensions by empowering stakeholders while encouraging compromise, tolerance, and limited political competition (Paris 2004). In practice, however, achievements towards democracy and open markets can produce the opposite effects. Elections and economic competition can reinforce the social divisions that led to conflict in the first place. For instance, without stable institutions to protect against the abuse of power, elections are often used to legitimize nondemocratic goals. Therefore, the foremost priority of the state-builder should be the stabilization of economic, governmental, and security institutions. The US forces have failed to acknowledge the colonial history and the nature and impact of totalitarian rule on an artificially constituted nation of conflicted ethnic and religious groups. The failure to constitute, fund, and implement such a plan has resulted in a failed calculus of post-conflict development. The result is that the conflicting Sunni and Shiite religious groups compete for power and the Kurds have tried to constitute an autonomous state to the North. The international community seems able to exert little influence over the course of events in Iraq aside from that with the powerful but limited American military can exert by force of arms. The conflicting groups seem to have no basis for consensus in an outcome of shared power, peace and stability and have reverted to the type of brutal behavior that existed even before colonialism. This time it is abetted by the huge stock of weapons which the invading forces failed to secure, disgruntled Iraqi soldiers who were demobilized without compensation, and competing images of Islamic fundamentalism and exogenous forces such as Iran seeking to influence the new wave of Middle-Eastern politics. The security sector within a country encompasses those state institutions whose primary charge is to provide safety, peace, and stability to citizens, the state, and society at large (Caparini and Fluri 2002). As a primary function, states need to offer short-term and long-term security to their citizens. Traditionally, policing is the guarantor of order within a state (see Shearing 1992). Police forces are the ultimate weapon of the rule of law available to governments. They are also the agency of government that citizens are most likely to come in contact with. The police force in any state is the most visible agency of government. If the state is truly democratic, then its police force must reflect democratic values through its actions. A democratic urban police department should also have strong recruitment strategies that do not make decisions on the basis of color, ethnicity or gender, and that reflect the diversity of the nation as a whole. There is a developing literature on the criteria of what constitutes democratic policing. This literature has developed as the previous models of policing, the professional and community police models, have left far too underdeveloped the nature of the police function in modern society. Equally underdeveloped is how the police should relate to the political and social structure. The reason this is important is that in totalitarian and autocratic states, the police along with the

Policing and Institution Building in Iraq

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military are typically instrumental in the repression and control of the population. As explained by Skolnick (1999), two of the fundamentals of democratic policing are openness to all citizens and accountability. These should serve as the guiding principles of democratic policing. The role of police power in a democracy should be the expression of social consensus. There should be accountability to communities being policed, to tax payers who pay the bills, and to the legal order governing their authority. Police should also be accountable for the means used to achieve crime control. Democratic policing requires that police should be able to articulate a reason for stopping and searching someone other than on a mere hunch or a suspicion based on racial, ethnic, or religious background. How to achieve all of this in practice is always the hardest question. The coalition forces have sought to reconstruct Iraq into a democratic and stable country. To fulfil their long term developmental goals, the establishment of security and stability is the foremost in their agenda. However, the task of constructing a policing institution that would ensure stability, democracy, and legitimacy will not be easy. Examples such as those of Ireland in the 1920s and El Salvador, Namibia, and South Africa in the 1990s show that interim arrangements have a tendency to enshrine or encourage a policing model that is coercive and repressive, promoting stable hegemonic control through anti-democratic measures (Edwards 1998). In Iraq the question is whether the current indicators of state-building and policing are likely to encourage a positive outcome, or if they will ultimately shackle the state with a legacy of imperialism. This chapter aims to explore the wide scope of policing in Iraq. The first section examines state and institution building. As discussed above, the reconstruction process needs to address institutional development, yet this cannot come only from the top down. Only if there is a strong demand for an institution will the governing body be motivated to supply it. There must be a sincere commitment to building effective and open institutions. Institutional development should enhance socioeconomic and democratic development, and should not be fostered by ulterior imperialist motives. The second section of the chapter traces the legacy of colonialism and addresses the present form of colonialism-imperialism in Iraq. The last section of this chapter examines the current situation in Iraq in light of the discussion carried out in the first two sections. Specifically addressed are political and economic issues and the impact of police reform. State and Institution Building According to Fukuyama (2004), ‘stateness’ has two dimensions: scopes of state activities and strength of state institutions. The scope of state activities refers to the different functions and goals of government, whereas the strength of state institutions lies in their ability to plan and execute policies and enforce laws in a transparent manner. Institutions constitute and legitimize political actors and provide them with

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consistent behavioral rules, conceptions of reality, standards of assessment, affective ties, endowments, and therefore a capacity for purposeful action (Hill 1997). Weak, incompetent, or failed states are a major source of the problems existing in the world today. Although most developing countries are fragile in some ways, the Department for International Development’s (DFID) (2005) working definition of fragile states covers those countries where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. The most important functions of the state for poverty reduction are territorial control, safety and security, the capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves. One of the indicative features of a fragile state identified by DFID (2005) is lack of state authority in maintaining safety and security. Such a state lacks clear international sovereign status and cannot control its external borders or internal territories. As characterized by the World Bank’s World Development Report (1997), maintaining law and order within its borders is a minimal function of the state. Yet, as noted by Weber, while the state claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory, such violence cannot be uncoupled from legitimacy. If the population no longer finds the state to be legitimate, they do not tend to obey the police (Seabrooke 2002). As soon as private security becomes a social ingredient, confidence in the rule of law tends to break down. Closed groups emerge as safe havens and these closed groups tend to form their own enclaves of “legitimate violence” that are inclined towards zonal purification. Regardless of their stage of development, all countries need to enhance institutional capacity so that they can keep up with advances in this age where the rate of change is greater than at any previous time in history (Corkery 1997). Good institutions enable societies to choose growth-enhancing policies and sound development strategies. Countries with authoritarian governments, however, have long-term problems with institutional legitimacy. Though many of these authoritarian regimes have sought to legitimize themselves through their ability to enhance economic growth, as soon as a decline in growth is experienced, legitimacy disappears and is replaced by instability, as we have seen in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Insufficient domestic demand for institutions is the single most important obstacle to institutional development in developing countries. When a strong domestic demand does not exist, the need for institutions has to be generated externally (Fukuyama 2004). External aid can come from external aid agencies, donors, or through the direct exercise of political power by foreign authorities. There are, however, solemn limitations to the ability of external powers to create demand for institutions (Fukuyama 2004). In fact, external sources can lead to the destruction of the institutional capacity of developing countries. Any effort to strengthen administrative and accountability systems will have to fit country-specific constitutional structures and patterns of political, social, and economic interests. Among great powers, the United States is perhaps the most active nation-builder. However, it often appears that Washington decides to replace or support a regime in a foreign land to defend its core security and economic interests and not to build


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democracy or strengthen institutions. In Haiti, Cuba, and Nicaragua, for example, brutal dictatorships, albeit friendly to Washington, emerged in the wreckage of botched nation-building efforts (Pei & Kasper 2003). A major mistake here was the failure of the external source to make clear that local government institution and capacity building was their primary motive rather than their own self-serving interests. While planning for nation-building, the state capacity of the target nation cannot be ignored. This capacity includes the organizational effectiveness and discipline of the military, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. In the case of target states with weak state capacity, the involvement of external powers ends up being reduced from nation-builder to quasi-colonial ruler. Obviously, this also fosters local resentment. Yet, given that effectual state institutions are a by-product of social structure, cultural norms, and distribution of political power within a given society, the chances that political engineering by outsiders can succeed in properly identifying, let alone reforming, the underlying conditions contributing to the ineffectiveness of the state are very low. A comparative investigation carried out by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) concluded that different types of colonization policies create different sets of institutions. Dividing colonial occupation in two extremes, the investigation points out that at one extreme, European powers set up “extractive states,” exemplified by the Belgian colonization of the Congo. The main purpose of the extractive state was to transfer as much of the resources of the colony to the colonizer with the minimum amount of investment possible. At the other extreme, many Europeans settled in to live in some colonies, creating what the historian Alfred Crosby (1986) calls “NeoEuropes.” Settlers tried to replicate European institutions, with a great emphasis on private property and checks against government power. Primary examples of this include Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. In short, the nature of the colonization strategy was influenced by the feasibility of settlements and the nature of indigenous resources. In either case, the institutions of the colonial state persisted in ex-colonies even after independence. Rehabilitating Colonialism It is important to examine the development of colonialism over time because this history has shaped the way in which the US and its allies have currently come to relate to Iraq. The present situation of the United States as a world power must be seen in the context Europe’s move towards the establishment of a world economy during the colonial era. The new economic system subsequently expanded to envelop the entire world. The driving force behind this process of expansion and incorporation was capitalism. The new capitalist world system was based on an international division of labor that determined relationships between different regions as well as types of labor conditions within each region.

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One of the effects of the transformation toward monopoly capitalism in the 1800s was that capitalism had to be viewed in a broader international context, rather than the predominantly domestic context. It led to the creation of a two-tier structure within the world-economy with a dominant core exploiting a less developed periphery (Marx 1859). It is the location of states and classes within the structures of the capitalist world economy that constrains their behavior and determines patterns of interaction and domination between them. The greatest service provided to capitalists by states in an interstate system is protection against the free market. Stronger states can exert more power to prevent other states from conferring monopolistic advantages against certain entrepreneurs. Wars can be fought to protect capitalist entrepreneurs and corporations (Wallerstein 1997), as we have seen in the “Banana Republics” of Central and South America. Wars fought in the interests of capital constitute one form of imperialism. Doyle (1986) defines imperialism as a formal or informal relationship in which one state undermines the sovereignty of another. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, or by economic, social or cultural dependence. Simply put, imperialism is the process or policy of establishing and maintaining an empire, of which colonialism is one form. While imperialism is as old as human civilization, over time, the nature and impact of imperialist rule has undergone major changes. Rather than operating through simple plunder, the more recent imperialist nations have exploited their colonies through forcible economic and cultural transformation. Luxemburg, in The Accumulation of Capital, argues that colonialism is a necessary aspect of globalization because capitalist zones require non-capitalist zones for full realization of profits (Cox 2003). However, it is not necessary that the periphery always remains a non-capitalist zone. In fact, in the era of classic colonialism, the world was divided into industrial and agriculture zones. With the dissolution of colonial empires, these divisions changed into advanced and backward industrial zones. Institutions within a state can also create elements of temporary and imperfect order and historical continuity. They give rules communicable meaning so they can be diffused and passed onto new generations (March & Olsen 1996). The neocolonialism that replaced direct colonization followed the set precedent but with a different face. The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. Neo-colonialism is based upon the principle of breaking up former large united colonial territories into a number of small non viable states which are incapable of independent development and must rely upon the former imperial power for defense and even internal security (Nkrumah 1965). Their economic and financial systems are linked with those of the former colonial ruler. Local regimes in such states derive their authority to govern from the support which they obtain from their “neo-colonialist masters” rather than from the will of the people. They have therefore little interest in developing education, strengthening the bargaining power


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of their workers employed by expatriate firms, or in challenging the colonial pattern of commerce and industry. The twentieth century saw an awakening resistance of colonial people. Mounting conflicts within monopoly capitalism forced capitalists to surrender control over their territories. However, domination by powerful states continued. Colonial imperialism of the nineteenth century was replaced by neo-colonialism in the twentieth century, which enabled capitalists to retain direct or indirect economic control over former colonies. Economic control was exerted by giant multinational companies which used new technologies to integrate peripheries. Iraq is a country which was first constituted as a colony and then quasiindependent state on the remnants of the Ottoman Empire after WWI. The discovery of significant oil resources in both Saudi Arabia and what is now Iraq resulted in the British combining these conflicted elements of an independent and often oppressed ethnic group, the Kurds, with two highly antagonistic Islamic groups (Sunni and Shiite) into an entity of almost nonexistent intrinsic cohesiveness. For years, the US has been struggling with its capitalist rivals to maintain its dominance as the sole architect of the global capitalist system. The Middle East has traditionally been an area of interest for the US and other capitalist powers due to its oil reserves. As long as the ruling, but still internationally subordinate, classes of the Middle East did not dare to cause instability in the region, they enjoyed the support of all of the foreign powers. The rise of a hegemonic power in the Middle Eastern and Arab states would have resulted in the reinvestment of oil profits in the region and an increase in oil prices, a scenario not acceptable to the US and other developed world economies. This is precisely what the US feared would happen in the Middle East if Saddam Hussein were to continue ruling Iraq (Baram 1993). Viewing Saddam Hussein as a ‘potential enemy,’ the US attacked Iraq for the second time in 2003 in order to create a new order in the Middle East. Many critics have labeled US actions in Iraq as a blatant manifestation of its imperialist aspirations to control Middle Eastern oil, labor, and other assets. From this perspective, in the Middle East, as elsewhere, “freedom means free markets, free trade and investment, and freedom for US capital to do what it likes, where it likes, whenever it likes” (Choudry 2004). Furthermore, according to Choudry (2004), while Iraq is meant to become a model market showcase state for other Middle Eastern countries, in reality it is being reshaped into a neoliberal playground for US corporations by means of a brutal colonial war of occupation. The distinction between rising and declining economic powers helps explain the differing reactions of the major capitalist countries to events shaping the history in the last few centuries. Whereas some developed nations have been able to surpass others in the non-military technology field and have captured ever larger shares of domestic and international markets, others have just relied on investments in huge military establishments and have directed their efforts towards weapons research and production to make their mark in the international market (Mayer 1991). In particular, Germany and Japan arose as economic powers relative to Britain and the United States in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

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Studies of German and Japanese economies can indicate why these two economic giants were not enthusiastic about any military intervention in the Middle East in the early 1990s, but it has been noted that rising powers usually believe that unfettered economic processes will work to their advantage and hence discourage political interference with international markets. Declining powers, on the other hand, are usually more pessimistic about the results of un-controlled economic interaction, and are more inclined to protect their economic interests via political intervention (Mayer 1991). Both Germany and Japan have been confident that their robust economies could afford the oil price increases resulting from the Iraqi invasion and any associated economic shocks caused by an increase in oil prices. Britain and the United States, in contrast, may be considered declining economic powers and could not afford be so sanguine about the consequence of increase in oil prices and any contraction in investments on their respective economies. The United States, in particular, covets the economic advantages of its political relationship with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the oil emirates (Mayer 1991). It has been unable to devise an alternate energy policy, so its dependence on oil reserves in the Middle East in general and in Iraq specifically, is inevitable. Since no real alternatives have been seriously considered by Washington, it seems clear that the US will become ever more dependent upon oil from Arab states and the Middle East. Indeed, foreign affairs analyst Michael Klare (2004) points out that the United States cannot curb its ever growing need for petroleum products; Bush’s vaunted energy plan assumes greater US dependence on overseas sources of oil and gas in the 21st century. Given these realities, the United States had to be worried about an unpredictable leader like Saddam Hussein remaining in control of significant portions of Middle Eastern oil. If oil profits were to be primarily invested within the Middle East itself and oil prices substantially increased, the consequences for the economies of some Western states, seldom far from recession, could be most unpleasant (see Mustafa 2005). Furthermore, in the environment of renewed economic competition which has emerged over the past two decades, the fixing of international oil prices in dollars is a great advantage to the United States, strengthening the position of the dollar in the world market. The abolition of American suzerainty over oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf would threaten this arrangement and weaken the competitive position of the United States relative to its principal commercial rivals. All this suggests that the economic exploitation of colonies is not only a thing of the past. When today’s ideologues start talking about colonial administrations in oil- and gas-rich regions, analogies to the imperialism of the British Raj do not sound like rhetorical excess anymore (Selfa 2002). To fulfill its demands for oil and gas, the United States will have to involve itself in the political, economic, and military affairs of the states from which all this petroleum is expected to flow. This involvement may take financial and diplomatic forms in most cases, but it will also often entail military action. If this accurately describes the future of U.S. policy, then the new colonialism will take on aspects of the old colonialism.


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Iraq at Present The political and economic climate Since its independence from the Ottoman Empire, Iraqi politics has often been subject to extreme situations, including authoritarian monarchism, oppressive totalitarian rule, severe civil-ethnic strife, and external adventurism. Under the period of monarchial rule, from 1921 to 1958, nation-building mechanisms helped to exclusively serve the traditional landlord class while disenfranchising the modern middle and working classes. British colonial Iraq had national boundaries but no sovereignty. Emir Faisal bin Hussein was installed as a king who was expected to be happy reigning without governing. In this period, security and policing was not publicly accountable, subject to the rule of law, or respectful of human dignity (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2002). It intervened in the lives of Iraqi citizens without any limits or controls. For example, it was commonly reported that the police killed striking workers and students suspected of disloyalty to the regime. It was in the context of a military reaction against a monarchy that was subservient to British interests that Saddam Hussein would eventually find an opportunity to gain power. The monarchy was overthrown, and its leading members executed, in July of 1958 in a military revolt led by Abdul Karim Qasim. Qasim continued on in power as prime minister and head of state, but with increasingly dictatorial powers. Already by September of 1958 there was an assassination attempt on Qasim, and it has been widely reported that Saddam Hussein was part of an assassination team that attempted to assassinate Qasim in 1959. In 1963, Qasim was overthrown in a revolt and a Baathist oriented regime was established. From this time until 1968, various military factions vied for power. Following another coup, Saddam Hussein became deputy chairman of the governing Revolutionary Command Council, but with Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr holding the position of president and head of the army. Operating from its own version of Baathist ideology, the new regime proceeded to murder and “cleanse” Iraq of thousands of communists and trade unionists, purge dissidents on trumped up charges, and wage a brutal war against Kurds, thereby ushering in the worst and the longest lasting tyranny of the Middle East (al-Khalil 1989; ICG 2002). Despite the iron fisted control over Iraq that Saddan Hussein was to establish over Iraq in the next few years (he became president and had al-Bakr placed under house arrest in 1979) the country remained a weak state. In fact, its reliance on violence was a sign of its weakness. Iraq was never sovereign; it lacked established institutions, and was ruled by client regimes and dictatorships without any credible claim to legitimacy (ICG 2002). Chief among its methods, besides outright repression, was the deliberate and careful establishment of parallel structures that served both to absorb and control the state and other non-governmental bodies, thus infusing society with Baathist doctrine and belief (ICG 2002). The institutions these regimes created weakened civil society. Although representation of the middle class improved under the ruling regime between

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1958 and 1968 (ICG 2002), during the next ten years, the Baath party set about to transform all national institutions in order to consolidate power. With diluted or absent legitimacy, the government was particularly paranoid about their own security, spending disproportionate amounts of resources on policing and secret services. Fear, torture, and execution were what police were required to dispense in Iraq. The Iraqi security apparatus was least bothered by the ideals of democratic policing that require respect for the dignity of the person and restraint on the power of the state to intrude into private lives. These institutions were subservient to the regimes and were above public accountability (al-Khalil 1989; ICG 2002). Saddam Hussein’s political base, mainly staffed with members of his family and extended clan, was held together by his strong personality, drive, ruthlessness, and ability to play one center of power against another (ICG 2002). Assisted by a very sophisticated security network, he managed to rule Iraq for twenty-four years via political and economic cooptation. During Saddam’s reign most state institutions, including the cabinet, the parliament, judiciary, and military, were transformed into support structures for his rule. The nature of the bureaucratic authority structures in this state were such that the removal of the ministers did not mean that subordinates could take over and carry on. Power and authority in Saddam’s system had been too centralized and authoritarian to allow competent subordinates to emerge. However, despite a terribly skewed concentration of power, the Iraqi state under Saddam created institutions that effectively mixed the communities and diluted their sense of separateness (ICG 2002). This trend was further reiterated by the fact that the state was the largest employer in the country and filled local jobs with local people. The net result was the establishment of an Iraqi national identity amongst the middle and upper classes (ICG 2002). Saddam maintained power with help from Iraq’s growing resources. Under his rule, the economy of Iraq flourished from the wealth generated by the rise in oil prices after 1973. By 1979, Iraq was the Gulf’s largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia (ICG 2002). Saddam wielded enormous power in allocating and distributing the dividends from this wealth. The development of a state-controlled economy helped him to create a broad base of support for the regime. By the early 1980s, the state bureaucracy was about 25 per cent of the total workforce, and a new class of entrepreneurs, contractors and managers of state-owned enterprises reaped much of the benefits from Iraq’s wealth (ICG 2002). However, the distribution of wealth was not uniform across the country. Both the Kurdish North and the Shiite South suffered in comparison, even though there was a general increase in Iraq’s standard of living. Until the early 1990s, Iraq could boast of a relatively highly educated middle class and extensive access to world markets (ICG 2002), despite the toll of the war with Iran in the decade of the 1980s. Up until Iraq’s attack on Kuwait, the country had enjoyed support of foreign powers, largely in the form of weapons supplied to Iraq. However, within the next ten years, Iraq’s governing bureaucracies were hollowed out and its society was impoverished and fractured along the lines of clan loyalties (ICG 2002), and hampered by the economic sanctions imposed after 1991. While the internationally imposed sanctions undeniably limited the resources available to the


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regime, the regime was able to establish increasingly sophisticated mechanisms of contraband trade to circumvent them (ICG 2002). Paradoxically, the sanctions also deepened the population’s dependence on the regime. The creation of Iraq out of three distinct and separate provinces (two Arab and one Kurdish) of the Ottoman Empire has left behind a legacy of internal and external dispute over the nature and legitimacy of the Iraqi polity and introduced an element of arbitrariness to its borders that is still a powerful influence today (ICG 2002). The country does not divide up as neatly as people often assume, with a Shiite south, a Sunni centre and a Kurdish north, and the Iraqi people do not necessarily feel represented by the ethnically or religiously-based organizations that seek to speak on their behalf. Instead, there are tribal, ideological, and class rivalries that have given Iraq’s lack of familiarity with genuine democracy and its surplus of experience with force a means to effect political change, exemplified in violent confrontations after the occupation in 2003 (ICG 2002). An assessment undertaken by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the World Bank Group with assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2003 concluded that Iraq’s overall reconstruction needs are vast and are a result of nearly twenty years of neglect and degradation to the country’s infrastructure, environment, and social services. However, these problems have actually persisted over a longer period of time (ICG 2002). Despite trials of various ideological models by the British authorities and their successors to evolve Iraq into a modern state, politics in Iraq are an exercise of force via authoritarian measures. By 2003, Iraqi society had little experience of politics and violence as separate activities. Furthermore, economic collapse led to failure at nation-building and destruction of the civil polity (ICG 2002). International sanctions and economic mismanagement had a devastating effect on the economy and on society during the 1990s. Since the 1980s, the state had not generated legitimacy through its provision of goods and services. Therefore, Iraq was not a strong state even if it appeared to be. This bleak picture was not fully recognized by the outside world, which had limited access to Iraqi society during the 1990s (Rathmell 2005). Iraq was envisioned to have a modern bureaucratic state presiding over a middle-income economy, with abundant reserves of oil that could fund development. Because of this, the sudden collapse of the Iraqi governing structure came as a surprise to Coalition forces in 2003. Political and economic effects of the occupation Although Iraq’s previous regimes and weak institutions were responsible for the political void that appeared there, polices adopted by the ORHA (Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance) and the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) regarding institutional reforms in general and security sector in particular are also to blame (Rubin 2005). Paul Bremer, head of the ORHA after the fall of Baghdad, had abolished the Ba’ath Party, the Ministry of Defense (and thus the

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regular armed forces and the Republican Guard), the Ministry of the Interior (and thus the police, security services, and border guards), and the special security forces, including the Presidential Guard. He also had abolished the Ministry of Information, through which the regime had tightly controlled the flow of political information and communication (Jabar 2004). The CPA, following Bremer’s footsteps, continued the process of De’Ba’athification. Aside from hunting down fifty top leaders, no effort was made to summon civil and military state functionaries to their military bases and offices to check on them before any wholesale purge was commenced on the basis of party rank (Jabar 2004). Realizing its mistake soon afterwards, the CPA tried to correct the situation by reversing the process of De’Ba’athification. In doing so, Bremer traded the good will of Iraq’s 14 million Shi’a and six million Kurds for the sake of perhaps 40,000 Ba’thists. The policy of removal and then reconciliation provoked an insurgency in central Iraq (Jabar 2004). By announcing a De’Ba’athification strategy, the CPA had deepened sectarianism. De-Ba’thification had targeted large numbers of individual Sunnis on the basis of their religious beliefs rather than their past complicity in terror as government and party officials. Though many Ba’thists were Shiites and Kurds, most of those who ended up in Saddam’s mass graves were Sunni (Rubin 2005). Even so, Ba’thists were able to infiltrate sensitive positions where they could work to undermine security because of the reconciliation policy adopted after an upsurge in the insurgency. This made the insurgents feel they could win through violence what they could not achieve through the political process. In 2003, Order 39 issued by Bremer on behalf of the CPA replaced all foreign investment laws in Iraq. It decreed that foreign companies could own 100% of Iraqi companies in all sectors except natural resources (i.e. oil) (Hendren 2003). According to this order, foreign investors would be free to transfer all proceeds from profits, shares, and dividends back home, and though they would not be able to purchase land, the Order permitted companies or individuals to lease properties for up to 40 years. A subsequent order soon afterwards announced that over 200 Iraqi state-owned-enterprises would be offered up for privatization, including electricity, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, ports, and airports. In the oil sector, production sharing agreements (PSA) were promoted between the government and private companies. According to these contracts, the legal ownership of oil reserves would remain in the hands of the state. However, in practical terms these agreements deliver the same results for the oil companies (see Muttitt 2005). PSAs generally exempt foreign oil companies from any new laws that might affect their profits. These contracts often stipulate that disputes are not heard in the country’s own courts but in international investment tribunals that base their decisions on commercial grounds. All of these orders were carried out before the Iraqi people could have their say in the election, even though privatization and foreign ownership was outlawed under the Constitution and laws of Iraq. This is a breach of the Hague Regulations of 1907 that state that an occupying power must respect local laws (Muttitt 2005). CPA intentions are also under scrutiny in relation to delays in holding elections and forming an interim government in Iraq. Such delays are construed as precautionary


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measures to control the selection of the government because if the “wrong people” won, they would oppose American corporations having significant economic interests in Iraq. Furthermore, the CPA is also acting to restrict an elected Iraqi transitional government from reversing changes to laws it has imposed. The TAL (Transitional Administrative Law) includes a statement that the laws, regulations, orders, and directives issues by CPA shall remain in force (Hendren 2003). Iraq could very well be surrendering its democracy even before achieving it. Direct CPA control of the ministries had also created a sense of disempowerment among the Iraqi people. Such sentiments not only surfaced amongst state employees, but also among the burgeoning exile and native political class that cooperated with the CPA. Furthermore, Saddam’s downfall meant that the Sunnis, which constitute 15 per cent of the population, were deprived of their long-standing political hegemony (Jabar 2004). In the aftermath, they lost their prestigious and well paying jobs, were sent home humiliated, and their homes and communities were searched. They have also been largely frozen out of the Governing Council (GC) and the senior bureaucracy (Jabar 2004). The Ba’ath Party and its Sunni members had been an instrument of power, social engineering, indoctrination, suppression, and oppression, but it was also the main, though not the sole, vehicle for social mobility and the best way of securing government employment, scholarships, stipends, and even lucrative contracts. The broad-brush approach adopted first by Bremer and later by the CPA may have served the process of de-Ba’athification, but it also alienated much of Iraq’s talented and wealthy technocratic class (Jabar 2004). Domestic reaction towards the composition of the GC has also been negative and hostile, mostly directed towards the narrow consultation base of the council. When forming the GC structure, only four factors – religion, communal affiliation, ethnicity, and native identities – were taken into consideration by the CPA and its Iraqi partners (Jabar 2004). In doing so, traditional/modern affiliations, ideological orientation, and provincial representations were ignored. Since one of the tasks of the GC was the formation of a new constitution, this multilayered participatory mechanism was crucial for the creation of a more durable, stable, secular and a national political order. In addition to this, the CPA is biased when it comes to the GC’s involvement in reconstruction efforts. For example, the GC has been excluded from the process of organizing the new army and police force. This in turn implies that any future government in Iraq is likely to be weak in the organization of these institutions (Jabar 2004). Another challenge to reconstruction efforts in Iraq has been and continues to be Iraq’s heavy debt burden. Iraq’s indebtedness will jeopardize the hopes of creating a much-needed system of safety nets. It will also reduce the ability of authorities to run essential services, such as utilities, education and health care, and the provision of public goods such as security and public works.

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Police reform in Iraq Ever since the collapse of Saddam’s regime, the United States and the other coalition forces have had to cope with a number of large-scale insurgencies, massive international terrorism, and widespread, organized criminality. Therefore, it is not surprising that the security environment dominates the coalition’s agenda. The Iraqi population also considers lack of security as their biggest problem. According to the National Survey of Iraq conducted by Oxford Research International in 2004, most people identified a lack of security and instability as the principal conundrum in their lives. Because of these continuous – if short-term – security threats, there has been an inevitable distortion of long term nation-building efforts. In response, US officials in Iraq are reconstituting elements of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s secret police, the Mukhabarat, and previous police forces and integrating them into the US occupation authority (Lefebvre 2003). The Mukhabarat was and is loathed by most Iraqis and is renowned across the Arab world for its casual use of fear, intimidation, rape, and torture. Recruiting from the remnants of the Ba’athist state was probably the easiest solution available to the US. This is because the various pro-US Iraqi exile groups returning to the country have neither the manpower nor the base of support needed to help the US military, in any significant way, to police the country. Bringing the Kurdish militias who fought alongside the US in northern Iraq into Baghdad or southern cities would provoke an eruption of popular opposition from Arab populations (Lefebvre 2003). Though the government in Iraq has made progress in addressing the dearth of police, the newly created policing institution is far from achieving the desired results. The new police force is accused of being corrupt (Billings Gazette 2004) and reverting back to the tactics of Sadaam’s era. In the last half of 2004, Iraqi police killed political opponents, falsely arrested people to extort money, and systematically raped and tortured female prisoners (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2005). In one of the worst examples, police in Basra reported last December that officers in the Internal Affairs Unit were involved in the slaughter of 10 Baath Party members. Iraq’s Human Rights Minister, Bakhtiar Amin, says it will be hard to teach democratic policing because torture and other human rights abuses were “learned behavior” (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2005). Members of the police themselves are not happy with the new institution. They feel that they are underpaid and poorly equipped (Faramarzi 2003). Most of the policemen feel uncomfortable accompanying US personnel on raids and hence perform poorly against insurgents. Another major shortcoming is the lack of reliable information. The reported number of Iraqi policemen trained and equipped is not reliable (Christoff 2005). The Ministry of the Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting from police stations across the country. The departments of State and Defense no longer report on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are equipped with their required weapons, vehicles, communication equipment and body armor. Therefore, there is no comprehensive system to measure the readiness and capability of Iraqi police forces


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(Christoff 2005). The Iraqi police force structure is changing with the creation of new units by the MNF (Multinational force) and Iraqi ministries, but it is difficult to increase the capability of Iraqi forces by training and equipping and sustain changing structures simultaneously (see Christoff 2005). However, the police are not only an object of controversy in Iraq. They are also a prime target for insurgents, who have used car bombs, semiautomatic weapons, and buried roadside devices in attacking them. Police have been assaulted at station houses all over Iraq and at recruitment centers, checkpoints, and while on patrol. In September 2003, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs constructed the Jordan International Police Training Center outside of Amman to train Iraq law enforcement personnel. Sixteen nations provide a total of 352 police trainers for the center. However, as explained by Paula Broadwell (2005), there are three main reasons why these forces will never be ready to defend their country: The wary, uncommitted recruits are immature and lackadaisical about the mission, the parsimonious training is inadequate, and accountability once recruits return to Iraq is inconsistent at best and lacks the return on investment that one would expect. To resolve the instability issue in the country, the coalition forces are also trying out different policing approaches. In April 2003, American forces authorized lightly armed local militias to help patrol several cities and neighborhoods in Iraq, but some of these irregulars have evolved into fierce paramilitary groups involved in extrajudicial executions, torture, and organized detention campaigns that the Army and Marines are now grappling to wipe out (Healy 2003). Disbanding the protection force is now proving harder than some soldiers expected. From mosque imams to restaurant owners, many leading citizens say they prefer the protection force, with its comforting religious ties and familiar authoritarian style, over the police, who residents accuse of being corrupt (Healy 2003). Since the occupation in 2003, private policing is another option being explored in Iraq (Paris 2004). The second largest group of forces in Iraq today is provided not by a state but by an amalgam of private security companies (PSCs). These firms are working for the national government, international organizations, private companies, and non-governmental organizations. The roles they play range from guarding personnel and sites, to running prisons, manning weapons systems, logistics support, and providing intelligence. In a roundtable meeting held on Post war Building in Colorado in 2004, Joanna Spear highlighted the prominent role of private security forces in Iraq (Paris 2004). According to Spear, the demand for private security is in turn curbing the demand for a public security force. Individuals are more inclined towards working in private security forces because it pays more money. The pay scale for the newly constructed police force in Iraq is very low compared to these PSCs. The presence of so many private security personnel is further blurring the line between civil and military actors in the field and raising policy issues. For example, the rules of engagement for private security forces are not well established, and practice is running well ahead of policy. Private security in Iraq is presently absorbing a quarter of the Iraqi reconstruction budget (Paris 2004). The security problem requires diversion of funds from reconstruction projects. If a

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large fraction of budgets will be utilized for private policing, reconstruction of the public police will suffer. Conclusion The institutional capacity of the state to carry out its responsibilities, according to Fukuyama (2004), are dictated by (1) organizational design and management, (2) political system design (3) basis of legitimization, and (4) cultural and structural factors. Through this chapter we have tried to argue that unlike Western sovereign nations, Iraq was a British colony before independence, a sub-sovereign client state under monarchy and various dictatorships, and an occupied territory today. Iraq’s political systems, the organizational design of its institutions, and its basis of legitimatization were always undermined and determined by either external forces or the totalitarian regimes that ruled Iraq through its history without the consent of its people. In Iraq, state institutions, including the police, need to function properly so that they can be perceived as legitimate. If the population no longer finds the state to be legitimate, confidence in rule of law tends to break down. Unfortunately, the policies adopted by reconstruction agents in Iraq clearly reflect a pro-corporate bias, policing remains oppressive and increasingly privatized, and citizens have little to no say in how policing and other institutions operate. Iraqis have been colonized before and they are weary of such practices. This can severely undermine the legitimacy of the state institutions that are being created. The newly constructed police force is already doubted by the society. Further instability caused by illegitimacy of other institutions would prove detrimental for the efforts and investment made towards the establishment of security in the country, primarily through the construction of a police institution. Also, the current political process in Iraq has stretched Iraqi nationalism to its limits. Legitimacy of the political process under the watchful eye of the United States is perceived to be suspect, and the inability of the fledgling Iraqi government to counter insurgency sends a very negative signal about its capacity to deliver security. Iraq’s nervous neighbors and their plausible support to the insurgency make the equation even more complex. Future development priorities for Iraq’s reconstruction must include (i) strengthening institutions of sovereign, transparent and good government; (ii) restoring critical infrastructure and core human services destroyed and degraded by years of misrule and conflict; and (iii) supporting an economic and social transition that provides both growth and social protection (Rathmell 2005). The Iraqi people must be involved in any efforts to democratize their country. Decision makers in Washington have to realize that regardless of their real motives to invade Iraq, the country only has a chance to become a liberated nation state, idealized in the enlightenment era philosophies, and the speeches of the American leaders, if Iraqi sovereignty is respected, Iraqi nationalism is preserved, and a legitimate government, which is also perceived as one by all stakeholders, is put


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in place through legitimate means. Any effort to reenact the British experiment of a resource rich client state in the region is bound to undermine success in Iraq, with the regional security becoming its biggest casualty.


Chapter 6

Crime, Power, and Policing in South Africa: Beyond Protected Privilege and Privileged Protection Robert Shanafelt Georgia Southern University

Since South Africa’s move to end apartheid began in the 1990s, writers of popular accounts of the country often emphasize its severe crime problems (Malan 1990; Cohen 2004). Although some might see this emphasis as a result of lingering racism or of an “Orientalist” orientation toward crime in non-Western contexts (Agozino 2003), South Africans from all groups have long recognized crime as a serious concern (Kynoch 2003; Shaw 2002; Singh 1999). Indeed, it should not be particularly controversial to observe that South Africa has one of the worst crime problems in the world. Murder statistics, for example, which tend to be among the best recorded of crime statistics in any country, indicate that between 1997 and 2000, South Africa’s murder rate was nearly 56 per 100,000, roughly comparable to that of drug and civil-war plagued Columbia, and far above that of other high-murder-rate countries such as Russia and the United States (Barclay and Tavares 2003; World Health Organization 2002). However, even if such statistics are accurate and do indeed need to be emphasized, it also clear that South Africa presents one of the best examples in the world of the structural determination of crime and of the role that policing has to play both in creating and curbing it. This chapter will show how social disorganization at the local level is a product of historical forces at sub-regional, national, and international levels. Despite its great wealth in diamonds and gold, South Africa never became fully developed, not only because of its semi-peripheral status in the world economy, but also because it created an internal political-economy that was premised on the systematic exploitation of blacks. However, we cannot be quite satisfied with generalizations. Our models – whether based on critiques of core-periphery-semi-periphery, modernization, or of race-based apartheid capitalism – are only grand frameworks that allow us to gloss over crucial ambiguities of lived experience. Crime is a creative, rational, response to urbanization, poverty, and radical inequality – yes. And yet it is not rational at all, but a reflexive manifestation of knife-jabbing pangs of hunger and the heart-thumping insecurity of tin-roofed shacks and screams in the night. On the sociological level, criminality is both a response to bad conditions and a bad

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condition that makes bad conditions worse. High rates of crime and violence are understandable consequences of poverty and anomie, but they also are a spiraling helix that turns back upon itself. The history of South African policing presents a disturbing story, but with a few hopeful signs for the future. The bad news, which comes first, concerns colonialism, the forcible dislocation of indigenous peoples, apartheid, and the apartheid legacies of policing and corruption. The good news is that in the first ten years after the end of apartheid some positive steps towards improving policing and reducing crime have been made. Unfortunately, the story cannot end here as in a fairy tale. It is by no means clear that the South African crime behemoth can be vanquished, as were the great cannibal beasts of African folktales of old, or even brought down to more comparable international levels. Dramatically reducing crime simply by means of improvements in institutional policing, without radical improvements in education, health care, and general economic opportunities, seems an impossible dream. What is Policing in the South African Context? Policing concerns the enforcement of group values and the protection of material interests within a territory by a given group of regulators that have at least some power to do so. Of course, such a definition is too simple and begs many questions, but I want to start simple and beg some questions that can lead us to examine some interesting assumptions. Take the assumptions behind the words “enforcement,” “values,” and “interests,” for example. These words are exquisite in their generality and lack of specificity, both as words in-themselves and in terms of their relationships to one another. They beg questions like: How are the values enforced? Where do those values come from? What values are so important that they need to be enforced? Why do I say “values” and “interests” instead of laws, or even rules? Who is the segment of the polity that enforces the values and interests? By what authority and what means of power? How do the people operating in the policing domain obtain their positions? The given definition suggests that policing should not only mean “the police” as an institution of uniformed men and women who are employed to do the job of enforcing law and order. Policing, as the enforcement of group values and interests within a polity by a segment of that polity, exists in all societies whether or not a formal police force exists as a functioning bureaucratic institution. More to the point, some form of informal policing can be expected to arise in any community where institutional support is lacking or even antagonistic to the maintenance of peace (Pacotti et al 2005). Rather than absolutely dichotomizing policing as formal or informal, however, we can say that policing ranges between poles. On one end is the small scale and informal, including regulation of household actions by family members and the social sanctions that evolve informally over time in face-to-face communities. On the other end is highly bureaucratic and state-based institutional policing, varying from that which is based on legitimately conceived laws in true

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democracies to the strict government monitoring and control of personal behavior, material goods, and symbolic expression that typifies more totalitarian regimes, on the other. In the middle are various more inchoate policing forms, from inept, inadequate and corrupt police institutions to vigilante associations. Policing is also not only about what people do to control the behavior of others through their actions. It is about the technological power it takes to defend and control space and material resources as well, not only in the form of weaponry, but also in the form of physical barriers constructed to inhibit or monitor movement through space – barriers such as alarms, locks, walls, gates, fences, and the like. Further, policing can be expanded to include aspects of the behavior of groups, even including vigilantes and street gangs, that are usually only seen as existing in opposition to the police. In fact, the history of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa, in accord with the histories of many other oppressive regimes throughout the world, shows that there is merit in identifying the policing functions of many social forms not traditionally associated with them. No matter what the setting, institutional police, “the cops,” are merely one form of power in a wider social field of power and authority relationships. In some cases, the wider social networks of power in which policing is enmeshed may actually engulf the policing function, so that the police become an arm of a different type of “gangster,” elite powerholders who police the police in order that their primary values – staying safely ensconced in power at whatever price – continue to be dominant.1 While it may be that our evolved capacities for violence and aggression make crime likely (Buss 2005), it is also the case that bad social conditions make criminals out of people who have no more natural inclination to follow a life of coercive antisociality than anyone else. Even the most cursory outline of South African history, such as that which follows below, can demonstrate how this came to be. In fact, a good way to think of the broad sweep of South African history prior to the end of apartheid in 1994 is to think of it as the story of how Europeans came to regulate, control and displace Africans from a diverse set of polities from a variety of ethnic backgrounds, turning the bulk of them into impoverished farmers, laborers, low level professionals or criminals who were unified in law and status primarily because of the fact that they were seen by Europeans as lesser sorts of beings. No account of South Africa’s high crime rates would be adequate without taking this history into account. South African Policing: From Colonial Conquest to Apartheid European settlement in South Africa’s Cape began in 1652 when the Dutch East Indies Company authorized a small number of its employees to establish a provisioning station there for its passing merchant vessels (the company, chartered by the Dutch government, already had some six thousand ships by this time that needed refreshment as they made their way from Europe to lucrative trade in South East Asia) (Thompson 1999: 33).

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Initially covering only a territory that did not even encompass the entire Cape peninsula, white settlement expanded gradually northwards over the succeeding decades and centuries, not coming to a halt until the modern boundaries of South Africa (and Africa as a whole) were drawn in the late 19th century. Although this colonial expansion proceeded by trade and by conquest, it was facilitated by major smallpox epidemics that decimated the first Africans the Cape settlers encountered, the herding and foraging Khoekhoe and Khoesan, people Europeans came to refer to as Hottentots and Bushmen. Not only were the Khoekhoe reduced to vassal-like status, but the Europeans also imported slaves from Madagascar and other African regions as its main source of labor. Although Europeans – by the early 1800s including the British as the new colonial power in charge – were not always hostile towards Africans, it was conquest and a European sense of superiority in religion and civilization that lay the foundation for an evolving society in which vast inequity in wealth and status came to be seen as natural consequence of race. The culmination of this as worldview and practice was the establishment of a “apartheid,” racially segregationist, state in 1948, with the white Afrikaner leadership controlling the government and most of the key political positions. In the next few years, the regime enacted a number of segregationist laws designed to limit the employment and educational opportunities of blacks; to rigidly control black peoples’ movement within the country; and to forcibly establish a purely segregated society through the creation of reservation-like “Bantustans,” as well as the forced removal of entire communities deemed to be residing in the “wrong” racial areas. Although never officially accepted internationally, these policies came to be more and more condemned, first, implicitly with the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and then explicitly, with the General Assembly’s 1973 resolution that proclaimed apartheid a crime against humanity.2 After winning a number of wars fought over the control of land in the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries, the Dutch/Afrikaners and the British were able to fashion the law and its policing to their particular values and ways of life as well as to their more crassly acquisitive aspirations. For example, during the era of frontier expansion and wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, colonial control took on the features of combined military, police, and vigilante action. The general thrust of this period is perhaps best exemplified by the word “commando,” a word originally used in South Africa in the eighteenth century to refer to a kind of police action in which a posse of colonists was formed to go after stolen property, particularly livestock, thought to have been taken by Africans. In fact, a commando “often was simply a means for frontiersmen to take the law into their own hands” in a punitive manner. In addition to seizing cattle from Africans who had nothing to do with any original theft, commandos also were given extraordinary license to kill and to capture young children and adolescents (Mostert 1992: 219). Commandos during a war in 1739, for example, indiscriminately attacked all Khoekhoe they came across, on one occasion remorselessly massacring 30–40 under a flag of truce. By the end of the campaign they had killed more than 100 and seized so many of their cattle that survivors were


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forced to become enslaved workers on white farms (Elphick and Giliomee 1989: 26). Thus, the early history of the Cape shows why it can be useful to think about policing as existing whether or not there is a legitimate entity called a police force. And one polity’s police can be another’s thief and murderer. Clearly, contrasting values, senses of justice, and notions of just policing were at issue between European and African from the very early years of the settlement, even when there were no commandos. Most basically, the early colonists did not understand the deep meaning cattle had to Cape herders nor their lack of individual property rights in land. On the other hand, from the first Europeans were deeply acquisitive, and the herders had little difficulty understanding this. They came quickly to understand that the Cape Europeans were settling in and expanding their power through forcible expropriation of the land. As an instructive example of this reality, consider that the First KhoeKhoe-Dutch War (1659–60) can be considered as two distinct police actions from the points of view of the two divergent polities. The Khoe, upset over the theft of their land, and seeing oxen being used to plow their rich pastures, responded in what they saw as a reasonable fashion by confiscating the oxen used for the plowing. The Dutch, on the other hand, saw the Khoe as cattle thieves, and the land theirs by right of conquest. They therefore responded by calling out the militia (Boonzaier, Malherbe, et al. 1996: 71–72). The Khoe view could have just as easily prevailed, except that they lacked the requisite military might to validate it.3 Despite their violent desire for land, Europeans in the centers of South African power saw themselves as operating within the legitimate confines of the laws they created. Indeed, as a recent historian has noted, “apartheid was evil written in the ink of bureaucratic memoranda, laws, and procedures of a governmental state” that functioned coldly to strip non-whites of their humanity and their rights (Crais 2002: 222). Perceptive Africans, of course, saw through this, especially as white acquisitiveness became more expansive over time. In witnessing the effects of the South African Natives Land Act of 1913 (an act which forced Africans off of most of their land and made them give up much of their livestock), the black journalist, novelist, and early African National Congress (ANC) leader Sol Plaatje (1982 [1916]: 84), for example, aptly observed that “now it is only as serfs that the natives are legally entitled to live here.” Although segregation and apartheid generated considerable debate among whites,4 a taste of the extreme coldness that the bureaucratic and instrumental rationality of such legalized expropriation could give to individual South African police and military forces can be gathered from a sampling of statements from a range of time periods made by participants in draconian military and police actions: 1835. “I view them [South Africa’s Xhosa people] as irreclaimable savages…whose extermination would be a blessing; although if circumstances hereafter identify me with them, my study and exertions should be for their information, improvement and consequent happiness.” Harry Smith, a commanding officer in charge of a territory that had recently been taken after a short war and the killing by British forces of the unarmed paramount chief Hintsa (Peires 1981: 113).

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Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries 1960. After the Sharpeville Massacre. “If we did not act,” said a constable who participated in the shooting of unarmed men, women, and children who had gathered peacefully, but in large numbers, around the Sharpeville police complex to protest the pass laws, “the blacks would have killed us – and then gone on to slaughter our women and children” (Frankel 2001: 122).5 1985. During the State of Emergency. “The South African Police are the guardians of law and order. In spite of the fierce and unfair criticism and the mistakes we have made… we shall continue to maintain law and order firmly but fairly, and with restraint. Chaos and anarchy will not be tolerated. Peace-loving and law-abiding people can rely on the protection of the South African Police.” A.J. Vlok, Deputy Minister of Law and Order (Quoted in Malan 1990: 140). 2003. “White society had a good life … They were quite happy with what they got, and now they are not so happy with who made it happen … As long as they were … safe and they had their nice houses and their second cars and their third cars and their swimming pools and kids at good government schools and university, they had no problem with crossborder raids and other counterinsurgency operations.” Eugene de Kock, commanding officer of South Africa’s counterinsurgency death squads during the 1980s, now serving a 212 year sentence in a maximum security prison Pretoria, in a jailhouse conversation with the psychologist Gobodo-Madikizela (2003: 111).

Crime, Victimization, and African Responses During the apartheid era, the police service for African communities was underfunded, crude, and haphazard. The vast majority of police concerned with Africans were employed in internal security and in the monitoring of their movements through enforcement of the pass laws. In the 1980s, only about a tenth of police were said to be involved in the interdiction of crime or in criminal investigation (Shaw 2002: 1). On the other hand, police protection more typical of industrialized democracies was reserved for whites and their neighborhoods. Indeed, a report issued by the new democratic government in the late 1990s revealed that 74 percent of apartheid-era police stations were located in white areas (Gordon 2001: 129). As Africans began employment in the emerging mining, industrial, and service economy of the late nineteenth-century, as modernization theorists would suggest, they encountered the same problems of crime that must be faced by members of any industrializing society. However, in addition to a lack of policing, Africans faced the added burdens of government and private sector policies that deliberately hindered their economic autonomy and fostered dependency on menial employment. Such policies included those that promoted heavy alcohol use (Hausse 1988), those that inhibited agricultural development (Bundy 1979), and those that separated husbands from their families in the migrant labor system that propelled gold production (Crush, et al. 1991). The affect of all this in fostering crime is well depicted in the social history of banditry and gangs (Onselen 1982; Kynoch 2005). Youth gangs, for example, are known to have formed in all of South Africa’s major cities by at least


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1900. The forced removals of entire black communities, which began in the 1950s, led to further pressure on youths to form gangs for self-protection in the featureless new landscapes they found themselves in. Violent gangs in South Africa proliferated and became more deadly particularly in Cape Flats, near Cape Town, for example, after the mixed-race community was forcibly removed from their more congenial neighborhood of District Six. In the late 1950s, crime reportedly skyrocketed in other areas of the country as well where people had been forcibly uprooted by the government. This includes the major removals from Johannesburg neighborhoods to Soweto and from Durban to KwaMashu and Umlazi (Shaw 2002: 4–5). Not surprisingly, there was also an unprecedented upsurge in criminal gangs operating in rural areas as a result of apartheid dislocations (Crais 2003: 167–8). While the impact of this on ordinary people is still only partially described (often in the form of contemporary fiction), no account of contemporary crime problems in South Africa would be adequate without some idea of what the experience of crime has been like for honest Africans in the apartheid-generated locations. As has already been suggested, the statistics are staggering. Picking from them more or less at random, for example, one can point to the fact that there was an average of about 80 murders per month and over 2,000 assaults in Soweto in 1971. On a larger scale, in South Africa as a whole in the 1980s, people of the mixed-race “coloured” category were 10 times more likely to be murdered than whites, and Africans 20 times more likely that whites to be murdered (Shaw 2002: 3). But statistics are not enough to give a sense of what it is like for ordinary people to try to lead a peaceful and productive life under these circumstances. The descriptions given below are provided to give a sense of what everyday life in Soweto was like for young people in the 1970s and early 1980s: June 1973 to September 1975: Mr. S. Sechefo, headmaster of Phiri Higher Primary School, observed that young toughs were mixing with his students at the nearby shops during their daily breaks. The tsotsis (South African slang for gangster, derived from “Zoot Suits”) regularly extorted money from the boys and assaulted the girls. On more than one occasion Mr. Sechefo had to drive wounded students to Soweto’s only hospital for treatment. He reported this to the police on numerous occasions. Over the course of more than a year property was repeatedly stolen from the school and school facilities were regularly vandalized. The police did nothing. Eventually students and teachers organized to fight back. After one of the gangsters was killed in retaliation, two teachers and seven students were charged with the homicide. (Rand Daily Mail, September 27, 1975, quoted in Sikakane 1977: 28–29).

Crime and scenes of violent deaths have been regular features of the urban experience of urban Africans for many years. The following short accounts are from diary entries kept by young Sowetans in 1982, and subsequently published in a book by the poet and educator Mbuyiseni Mthsali (1988). I.M. 14-year-old boy. August 4, 1982: “Arrived at home at 4:25 – went to the shops bought meat and tomatoes – on my way home saw two men fighting with knives. The other was bleeding hard. He got a bad wound on his chest. The other was bleeding on the head.”

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Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries (Mtshali 1988: 21) … August 27, 1982. Left school at 3:30 p.m. … There was a boy who was boasting with knives at the shops. Two boys went to him with knives in their hands. He tried to fight them, but all was in vain, because they stabbed him and he fell. His boastfulness disappeared within a second. I felt pity for the boy who was bleeding to death (p. 25). W.M. 13-year-old girl. Morning, August 10, 1982: “While walking to school, a car came and offered a lift. I thought about things that happened at Venda. A teenage girl was abducted and gang raped by ten men, and then slain … My uncle told me that lifts from strangers were not good – the drivers will lure me with something. I was very frightened” (Mtshali 1988: 53). M.S. 14-year-old-boy. August 22, 1982: Went to church – after the service I went to buy a bus ticket – there was a lot of pushing there … when I arrived home – I had my lunch – there were people killed at the shebeen [makeshift “bar”]. R.M. 13-year-old girl. August 22. 1982: “Woke up early in the morning – went to play tennis on my way I met somebody who was stabbed to death” (Mtshali 1988: 61). M.N. 13-year-old girl. September 13, 1982: “Going to school I saw a crowd of people running. They were the Baygon Greens (street gang ) … They were going to fight against the people who live at Dube Hostel. They were carrying axes and knives with them. We were all frightened and ran away … Going back home – saw four policemen hitting two boys who were smoking dagga [marijuana] in the street. They took him to the police station. When I went to sleep, I saw them again in a dream arresting me (Mtshali 1988: 10). H.M. 12-year-old girl. August 31, 1982: “In the afternoon – was going to the police station … saw the police kicking somebody – looked at him – found out that he is my sister’s boyfriend. [The police] say that this guy has raped my sister’s friend – that is why they hit him like this (Mtshali 1988: 34).

Clearly, the lack of effective policing here is dramatic. Even when the police did take action, it was often in the form of rough vigilante-like retaliation. Later, as the early 1980s led into mass protests and the ANC supported campaign to make the country ungovernable, handguns and automatic weapons became widely available. Then, as is typical of people living under regimes in political crisis, rates of homicide, robbery, and assault also rose steadily through the years of transition. More recently, robbery typically has involved the use of a handgun (Shaw 2002: 15, 43–50, 58). It should come as no surprise then “vigilantism,” should have a long tradition among civilians trying to protect themselves in places like Soweto. Where institutional policing is lacking in such a dangerous environment, people will try to form their own policing associations. Unfortunately, what can be expected from these is rough justice. Since the inception of democracy, some of these associations have attracted widespread national attention for setting off major conflicts with gangs. In the Cape Flats, for example, the group People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) became notorious in the late 1990s for its use of pipe bombs against suspected gang


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leaders and other of its suspects. Soon thereafter the PAGAD came under the control of political-religious Muslim extremists and engaged in a brief campaign terror bombings against civilians in Cape Town. Another widely publicized group, known by the Sotho name “Mapogo,” was founded in 1996 by black businessmen from the Northern Province who felt threatened by what they perceived as increasing rates of carjackings, thefts, assaults, and murders. Since its inception it has spread to at least three other provinces. A recent report suggests that it “has become infamous for its brutal methods of apprehending and ‘punishing’ alleged criminals” (Schnitzler et al. 2001). Vigilante style associations have also been growing in rural areas to combat livestock theft. They typically work by rounding up stock theft suspects, and beating them until confessions are extracted that reveal the whereabouts of the missing animals. One group in Kwa-Zulu Natal called in Zulu “Shanyela Amasela” (Sweep out the Thieves) claims for itself an 80 percent recovery rate of stolen cattle as compared to a meager 2 percent rate said to be typical of the police. However, even if true the cost of this in human life and suffering is great. One community leader suggested that “something like five people” had died in the first few months of the group’s operation. And, in February 2003, an entire family, including a grandmother and her daughter and five grandchildren were gunned down and set on fire, apparently for their efforts in support of a family member who was a suspected cattle thief (Mail & Guardian 2003). Whereas black and mixed-race areas tended to form “self-policing associations”, wealthier white ones turned toward the hiring of private security (Shaw 2002: 102 – 118). Because they are mostly economically privileged and employed as a group, there is some justification for white fear of crime. Indeed, the idea that it is acceptable to steal from whites makes sense in the light of apartheid injustices, and the view has been promulgated informally for decades that only whites who demonstrated their humanity and friendliness were not fair targets (Mayer 1971: 145). Furthermore, the idea that white property was fair game was given fresh currency during the anti-apartheid struggle of the 1980s when activists spoke favorably of the violent expropriation or redistribution of whites’ property. Black criminals continue to express a high level of resentment against whites, and often justify their actions against them in quasi-political terms. Even among whites today, it has become something of a cliché to speak of theft only half jokingly as “redistribution” (Shaw 2002: 59–61). In the years since 1994, there has also been a heightened sense of what Adam Ashford (2005) calls “spiritual insecurity.” In insightful work based on the personal experience of living for many years in Soweto, he points out that for most Africans crime cannot be divorced from general ideas about the causes of evil. “Spiritual insecurity” is a feeling – partly vernacular African, partly Christian, and partly universal – that there are pervasive evil forces that are manipulated by one’s enemies and rivals to cause harm. It is of relevance to note this here because it is an issue that arises in community policing and is important in how informal or vigilante policing-groups think of criminality.6 That, plus the cathartic effects of the Truth and

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Reconciliation Commission hearings on the human rights abuses of apartheid, may help explain why Africans have not engaged in widespread and violent retaliation against whites for what was done to them under apartheid. New Models for the South African Police “Everyday I wake up and look at my blue uniform, and I feel inadequate because the sacrifices so many people made so that I could enjoy this freedom are forgotten…We need to act as a society to fight against the abuse of women and children and all who cannot fight for themselves.” – Constable Jabulani Mamela (2004)

Constable Mamela’s sentiments express the best of those that the post-apartheid government is attempting to foster in its police, namely, empathy for victims and a determined desire to fight crime based on a deep and inclusive sense of justice. To that end, since the implementation of the new constitution in 1994, the South African police have undergone a number of structural changes and efforts to distance itself from the old ethic of the apartheid-era police. The obstacles they face are many and the planned changes in some ways may be overly ambitious, but few can argue that genuine efforts are not being made to create positive change. Here I will provide a quick overview of structural changes in police administration and policies from 1994 to the beginning of 2005. In this short time there have been three different periods characterized by different administrative tasks and policing philosophies. First was the period from 1994–2000. This saw the restructuring of the national police and the creation of new crime prevention strategies. The second period began with the start of the tenure of a new police commissioner and the introduction of his “National Crime Combating Strategy“ (NCCS). This period saw a return to more authoritarian police tactics managed from the new administrative centers. Lastly, since 2004 there has been a stress on sector policing. This approach does not abandon paramilitary actions, but combines them with other strategies that include community policing. Although it is early in the process, I will conclude this paper with a review of one of the first reports to emerge about the effectiveness of sector policing in one peri-urban area near Johannesburg. During the years 1994–1996 a major amalgamation of the separate forces established under the apartheid was begun. The goal was to create a single national “South African Police Service,” with a National Commissioner in charge. This was a mammoth undertaking that involved combining 11 forces established in connection with the “separate development” or “homelands” policy as well as incorporating some elements of the ANC’s armed wing, MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe). Since decentralized police branches were suspected in involvement in some of the most repressive activities of the apartheid government, centralization was seen as crucial in the monitoring police political involvement. To aid in this process, an Independent Complaints Directorate was also created (Shaw 2002). The first National Commissioner, George Fivaz, who served from 1994 until 2000, oversaw these first changes. Particularly difficult was incorporating so many


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diverse elements into a single functioning whole. On the one hand were police whose background was as “instant constables” (kitskonstabels), recruits who had been hurriedly hired with a minimal training in the mid-1980s for the primary purpose of assisting in the quelling of mass popular protests. On the other hand were the highly radicalized former soldiers of the ANC, many of whom had fled the country as young students, thereby giving up their secondary school educations to join the anti-apartheid struggle. In 1999, Commissioner Fivaz complained that the police force he had inherited lacked the “functional capacity to do their job” and that as many as a quarter of his force were functionally illiterate (quoted in Steinberg 2004). It was also reported in the late 1990s that police were actually perpetrating crimes at a rate much higher than the general population (Gordon 2001: 129). In 1996, Nelson Mandela’s cabinet approved a National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), the first national crime prevention plan in the nation’s history. Although criticized for being more abstract in its proposal’s than concrete, the NCPS reflected the best intentions of anti-apartheid activists and scholars. It outlined a new attitude toward how to deal with crime in that for the first time crime was defined as a social problem with negative social consequences for all, not just for a caste of racial elite. Among the worrying social tendencies critiqued was what was called an increasing tendency towards “self-imprisonment and self-protection” that “serves to break down potential sources of mutual support” (NCPS, quoted in Singh (1999)). The long-term strategy was for improved education, better data collection and distribution, crime prevention through environmental design, swift apprehension and adjudication of crime, and more effective control of borders and illegal immigration. On the ground, the NCPS led to the launching of a number of local crime prevention projects (Shaw 2002: 127–8). Following on the heels of the NCPS was a “White Paper on Safety and Security” which suggested that local governments be responsible for “bylaw enforcement as well as the coordination and initiation of crime prevention projects” (Masuka and Maepa 2004). This became policy in 1998 when parliament modified the initial act from three years before that had established the South African Police Service to allow for the development of local police forces. Unfortunately, no money was provided at this time, and no authorization of criminal investigations was given (Shaw 2002: 123). In the short term, the success of crime prevention programs may be difficult to measure, although early attempts to evaluate prevention activities in Kwa-Zulu/ Natal (Goodenough 2003) and Eastern Cape (Masuka and Maepa 2004) suggest mixed results. Community involvement itself has been difficult to monitor given the pervasiveness of vigilantism. Community crime watches, for example, sometimes are no more than vigilante patrols of civilians that “beat up the wrong people because they do not investigate the cases properly” and enforced an implicit rule that “‘criminals do not go free’” (Masuka and Maepa 2004: 37). A possible corrective to this problem is the mutual monitoring of police and civilian volunteer actions in community policing. One success in this has been reported recently from Soweto, where citizens of Naledi extension formed a community anti-

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crime association and actively encouraged police monitoring from the start. Civilian patrols there have also reportedly been handing over suspects and captured stolen goods to the police (“A Tale of Two Towns” 2004). However, this type of mutual involvement has not always been encouraged. Although mentioned in the Interim Constitution, suggestions for community policing was not in the NCPS, and regularly scheduled meetings between the police and crime watchers only regularly began to be held in the late 1990s. There has also been some confusion over the role of these “Community Policing Fora” in policy, as the Interim Constitution of 1993 contained a clause giving citizens the authority to both “monitor“ and “advise” the police. In any case, in practice Community Policing Fora seem to have often functioned primarily as a valve in which to vent complaints about police ineffectiveness and/or abuse (Gordon 2001: 132). At their worst, they may even promote crime rather than contribute to reducing it. In one precinct on the West Rand, for example, a criminal group reportedly took over a police forum and used it to effectively hinder police patrols in the area (Steinberg 2004). With legitimate skepticism, therefore, some politicians and veteran police view these “soft” attempts at policing with some disdain. Such is the power of public pressure as a domain of power external to policing (but affecting it directly) that in a few short years, police policy was brought back towards an emphasis on aggressive tactics (Gordon 2001: 128). In 1999, for example, Thabo Mbeki, fresh into his first term as president after Nelson Mandela, launched an FBI-style independent crimefighting unit, the “Directorate of Special Operations,” informally known as the “Scorpions.” Also indicative of the new mood were statements made in January 2000, by the ANC’s Minister of Safety and Security. Among other provocative public claims was his statement that the government would use “all means, constitutional or unconstitutional” to hunt down hard-core criminals who had turned themselves “subhuman” by their actions (Gordon 2001: 122). This kind of talk served as the background for the implementation a few months later of “Operation Crackdown.” Operation Crackdown was the first major initiative to be implemented under the watch of the new National Police Commissioner, Jackie Selebi. It involved major paramilitary style raids on areas identified as high crime. In its 2003/2004 report, for example, the South African Police Service claimed that it had searched nearly nine million people that fiscal year, nearly one in five South Africans (Leggett 2004). In practice, this “searching” means showing up in force in a purported trouble spot in the middle of the night, throwing up roadblocks and cordons and searching everyone, without any specific probable cause. Whatever guns, drugs, suspected stolen property, and undocumented people found are then seized (Leggett, cited in Steinberg 2004: 22). Despite the similarity of these “joint police/military saturation patrols” to apartheid-era raids on townships, they have achieved some popularity with the public. Although researchers have found that Operation Crackdown was not all that it was cracked up to be in stopping crime, victimization surveys of high crime areas in Johannesburg and in the Cape Flats have indicated that people believe the raids have helped (Leggett 2004). It is also good news to the public that the South African


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government committed to the hiring and training of more than 37,000 new police officers in the five-year period starting with the year 2002. Although some scholars expressed the fear that the shift toward more paramilitary tactics marked a lost opportunity “to deepen democracy through innovative approaches to community policing” (Gordon 2001: 147), starting in 2004, the most recent phase of Police Commissioner’s Selebi’s NCCS has been less draconian and more eclectic. Calling it “normalization,” and planning for it to last until 2009, the new emphasis has been on sector policing. In examining the effects of this, I will especially follow the insightful monograph of Jonny Steinberg (2004). According to Steinberg, South Africa’s sector policing model is based on models for American policing that emerged in the 1970s. It is a composite of approaches that combines community policing, problem-oriented policing, “hotspot” or targeted patrolling, and the control of risk factors. Given the SAPS’s strong central structure and weak periphery, Steinberg argues, it is understandable that it “has come to rely on high density, high visibility paramilitary policing operations” (Steinberg 2004: 3). However, the leadership realized that this was a stopgap measure and was not content with using it alone. Since 2004, rather than simply talking tough about beastly criminals, Selebi has been more actively involved in approaching criminal and disruptive behavior in fresh ways. In striking contrast to the rhetoric of 2000 that accompanied the initiation of Operation Crackdown, for example, the new style of sector policing was exemplified at the onset of 2004 by Selebi’s handling of the “traditional” New Year’s Eve celebration’s in central Johannesburg’s notoriously crime-ridden Hillbrow area. In recent years, something of a hooligan tradition had developed in the high-rise apartment buildings of Hillbrow, that of throwing old appliances and other brokendown household goods out of high windows onto the street in celebration of the New Year, just to watch them crash. In response, the police have used strong-arm tactics that involve rolling out army trucks and heavily armed police to try to stop it. Leading up to the 2004 celebrations, however, Selebi made different plans. First, on the night before New Year’s Eve he met with residents and told them that anyone throwing things out of buildings would be forced to clean up their mess. Then, on New Year’s Eve he carried out this threat. He had his men cordon off the area and identify the places from which things were being thrown. The miscreants were then brought down to clean up. While this took the fun out of it for the mess makers, watching them added to the fun for those who had complied with Selebi’s request. Sector policing and community policing are meant to take off from such small victories. One of the most significant things that sector policing has involved in South Africa is the development of station sub-precincts. By operating in smaller and more concentrated areas, police get to know people by name and to recognize repeat offenders. Acceptance of this has been facilitated by the fact that a large number of the police working in the new sub-precincts are new recruits who have known no other ways. The new recruits are also all high-school graduates (Steinberg 2004: 3, 23).

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Steinberg’s (2004) work is a case study of three approaches to sector policing in the area west of Johannesburg known as the West Rand. He looked at sectors in the towns of Randfontein, Roodeport, and Kagiso. Each has its own peculiarities and has consequently implemented the sector-policing plan in different ways. However, the ideal is for each sector to have eight uniformed patrol officers, at least one vehicle, and one manager. The job description of each officer is quite demanding. In addition to patrol duties, each is expected to “attend every Sector Crime Forum (SCF) in their sector, to have a working knowledge of the crime patterns and risk factors in their sector, to participate in sector-specific problem-solving exercises at monthly meetings, to gather sector-based intelligence, and to establish crime prevention initiatives with citizen networks” (Steinberg 2004: 28). As a part of his study, Steinberg went on patrol with police from a different sector of each of the towns in the region. One sector was the township of Toekomsrus, a community of some 30,000 residents, most of them of a so-called Coloured or mixed race background. The second sector was within Roodepoort, an area of urban sprawl (residential suburbs, strip malls, informal settlements, population about 300,000) that can be described as “a cross-section of the social profile of Gauteng” (p.44). The third sector was within a primarily black township of Kagiso, an industrial and mining center of some 190,000. Steinberg’s observations and conclusions include the following: (A) Paramilitary actions are still part of the overall strategy as a “substitute for poor policing on the ground” (p.24). (B) A drawback of sector policing is that police and repeat criminals can get to know each other too well. When this happens, individual police and their families can be targeted for victimization. (C) As police become aware of crime frequencies, they focus their patrols on high crime areas (53). (D) More attention needs to be paid to the legacies of self-policing practices that affect policecommunity relations. For example, it appears that many people in Toekomsrus use police primarily to find suspects. Rather than press charges, they employ informally developed methods of adjudication (often money compensation). Police are frustrated by this response. (E) The effectiveness of sector policing was hampered because police were pulled off sector patrols to engage in large-scale paramilitary cordon/searches. (F) The Sector Community Fora effectiveness was quite variable. For example, while one sector in Kagiso appeared to have an effective community watch, in the poorest sector in Roodepoort it was a disaster. Steinberg’s description of what happened there is worth quoting in full: During the first half of 2004, attempts were made by the Roodepoort police to establish a SCF (Sector Community Forum) in Princess. A group of residents that had historically controlled the informal settlement by force – demanding protection money from shebeens, and claiming to be the settlement’s political leadership – insinuated itself into the emerging SCF and attempted to take it over. Some time in July, a sector patrol vehicle entered the settlement in response to a complaint at a shebeen [alcohol-selling spot] controlled by the settlement’s local mafia. When the responding officer attempted to make an arrest, he was attacked and injured. The following week, the shebeen in question was raided. The police conducting the raid had their vehicles pelted with stones and had to retreat from


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the settlement. This cycle continued in the weeks that followed…The SAPS has been reduced to policing the area with the only means left. Month after month, a large quasimilitary contingent invades the area and casts a giant net over it, hoping to find guns, stolen goods and people with outstanding warrants against them. Every shack is searched. Scores of residents are subjected to electronic fingerprint tests. Shebeens are raided, their owners arrested and their stock destroyed. Both sides regroup in preparation for the next confrontation” (p. 50)...In other townships, however, policing in sectors was leading to heightened respect for the police as individuals. Police were also carrying out multiple tasks in support of the community. Although some police might not see this as a good thing, they were acting as “lay-counselors, instructors in civil law, financial advisors, and, at times, disciplinarians” (57).

Conclusions Although what constitutes policing in South Africa has been radically transformed in the post-apartheid era, the social disorganization that developed under apartheid, and the criminality created in response, are not things easily overcome. Indeed, South Africa under apartheid provides a perfect example of how crime is fostered by lack of social investment in community and by the deliberate undermining of civil society by government policy. Apartheid legacies of particular concern to policing include continued vigilantism and ineffectively monitored civilian patrols, high levels of crime within the police force itself, and recourse to paramilitary approaches to crime interdiction.7 Furthermore, as if apartheid legacies are not enough, South Africa also has to contend with conditions of economic dependency. For example, the country’s traditional reliance on gold and diamond export has not been working to create new jobs; unemployment rates have in fact increased dramatically since 1994 (Streak and Westhuizen 2004), and new problems are continually emerging as a consequence of international drug and weapons trafficking. At its most positive, however, post-apartheid policing reflects a new vision of South Africa in which all peace-loving South Africans are for the first-time conceived as unified in a fight to maintain order and improve social conditions. However, from a policy perspective, it may be time to stop trying to implement too many new plans and to just work on the options that have already been put on the table, saving what works and modifying or abandoning what does not. Recent evidence suggests that the move towards sector policing has begun to yield real results. Still, this method can only be truly effective with the further development of an educated, professionally trained, and reasonably paid police force with strong ties to the communities in which they operate. Notes 1. Policing here is considered as occupying a field of power within other fields of power. In South Africa, one still only incompletely understood field of power behind apartheid and its security apparatuses was the Broederbond, a secret organization established by Afrikaners

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in 1918–1919. In general, police work must be seen as having its own internal dynamic as well as existing in relationship with external forces (such as those coming from wealthy powerbrokers, other organs of the state, civic organizations, or the media, for example) that need to be empirically examined. This is an approach to power suggested by the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1998a; 1998b). 2. The full document is called the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and can be seen http://www.anc.org.za/un/uncrime. htm. Thus, there is formal justification for criminologist Mark Shaw’s characterization of the apartheid state itself as an illegitimate “criminal state” (Shaw 2002:1–2). 3. In recent years, Jared Diamond’s (1997) book Guns, Germs, and Steel has become the main source for those seeking to understand why the world’s economic and technological development over the course of the millennia was so uneven. 4. See Beinart and Dubow (1995) for a collection of classic articles about the history of segregation and apartheid policy. 5. While such views were certainly common enough among the police and military during colonialism and apartheid, they cannot simply be taken as the only opinions to be found that rationalized police actions. Frankel’s (2001) study of the Sharpeville massacre, for example, shows that some of the police did not shoot at the black crowd out of an overwhelming sense of racial animosity but had other less coherent reasons such as impulsive action under stress, herd mentality, or police machismo. And, a few chose not to shoot at all. Still, as Frankel (2001: 128) points out, the fact remains that most police were “minor agents of an invidious racial history not entirely of their creation” that produced in them a “viciousness” that numbed them and dehumanized their victims to such an extent that they were willing to “fire repeatedly into a fleeing and terrified crowd which no longer presented a threat.” (Officially, 69 people were killed, although the numbers were undoubtedly higher [Frankel 2001: 151].) Black policemen were also not immune from the numbing effects of their position. Their “callous brutality” was reported as a regular feature of South African urban life already by the early twentiethcentury (Onselen 1982: 89, 200). 6. There was an epidemic of vigilante killing of people suspected of causing magical harm (“witchcraft”) in the northern area of the country in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Of the hundreds of people attacked, women and older men seemed to have been the majority of victims. Ashford suggests that the occult underpinnings of such actions are under reported, and gives a particularly dramatic example in which the mother of a murdered gang leader was herself brutally murdered because she was thought to have been protecting her son with magical potions (muthi) [Ashford 2005: 243–244). However adequate or inadequate they may be, the South African Police Service now has special directives for the “investigation and prevention of occult-related crime” (See http:www.saps.gov.za/youth_desk/occult./occult. htm.) 7. As one example of high level problems, one can site the recent investigations of the elite crime-fighting unit, the Scorpions. In October, 2005, police administrators testifying before a commission of inquiry into the activities and management of the unit said that elements within it were using it to “advance personal and political vendettas.” As a result, the SAPS sought to have the unit placed under their control. However, South African journalists have noted that impetus to investigate the Scorpions only occurred after they began investigating senior African National Congress officials for various charges of corruption. (Sole 2005)

Chapter 7

Human Rights and Democratic Police Reform in Northern Ireland Steven T. Engel Georgia Southern University

In 1998, multi-party talks resulted in an historic peace agreement among the various factions in Northern Ireland (Good Friday Agreement 1998). Among the most significant aspects of this agreement was the creation of a power-sharing government for Northern Ireland which would bring nationalists and republicans (predominantly Catholic) who want to see Northern Ireland eventually joined with the Republic of Ireland, together with unionists and loyalists (predominantly Protestant) who want to see Northern Ireland remain part of the United Kingdom. What has received comparatively less international attention, but perhaps is more significant, is the attempt to embark upon a wide-scale reform of policing in Northern Ireland. This reform process is a fine illustration of a number of aspects of the democratic model of policing. Of course, any attempt to engage in a program of policing reform must be attentive to the circumstances of the society in which the reform is to take place. This is particularly true for police reform in transitional societies. As the other chapters in this book illustrate, the process of fostering democratic norms in policing is ambitious and complex, and requires implementation over an extended period of time. The police reform process in Northern Ireland provides am interesting case study which allows one to explore the varied dimensions of democratic policing. Policing reform in Northern Ireland, unlike some of the other cases in this book, does not emerge from an authoritarian backdrop (in the proper sense of authoritarian). Still, it is a society in transition – transition from ethnic conflict, paramilitary violence, and what might be called a low-level civil war. It is this fact of ethnic conflict that figures prominently in the police reform process. This is the case because to understand the dimensions of police reform in Northern Ireland, one must first understand the nature of the conflict and the nature of the transition from that conflict for the broader society. Police reform in Northern Ireland, like most places, is not occurring in a political vacuum. Quite the contrary, it is influenced by and influences the broader peace process as the following discussion will illustrate. To address these concerns, this chapter first explores the nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland arguing that the conflict should be understood as primarily, though not exclusively, as an ethno-national conflict. Second, the role of the police during

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this conflict and the concerns with police behavior have pointed to the need for reform. Prior to the reform process, the Royal Ulster Constabluary (RUC) faced the difficult task of providing security in the face of a violent uprising. As is too often the case in these circumstances, the response of the police included controversial practices which often provoked a backlash. A summary of these concerns is outlined here. Third, the place of democratic police reform in Northern Ireland is discussed. Primarily, this section analyzes the Patten Commission report outlining the proposals for police reform focusing on the role of human rights in the reforms. This discussion illustrates the difficulties in applying a general model of democratic policing to a specific society. Nevertheless, the Northern Ireland case points to some interesting features of democratic police reform that should be considered when applying the model to other cases. Conflict in Northern Ireland Any attempts to institute police reform in transitional societies face obstacles. In some societies, economic instability, numerous refugees, and infrastructure problems create a difficult context in which to implement police reform (Jackson and Lyon 2002: 222). In Northern Ireland, while there are economic issues of concern, it is a society that does not face the levels of economic depravation as some societies in the global south face. Nevertheless, the context for police reform is framed by the experience of ethnic conflict. Understanding, therefore, the nature of that conflict is necessary in order to grasp the context for police reform. Northern Ireland, the political entity, was created in 1920 as a result of the Irish Rebellion. The forces fighting for Irish independence succeeded in defeating British forces enough to lead the British to surrender their claims over most of the island of Ireland. The victory was not convincing enough, however, to drive the British out of the entire island. The peace treaty which ended the war of independence created a border between the six counties in the North of Ireland and the twenty-six in the South of Ireland. The border was controversial at the time and a civil war broke out within the new Irish Free State over the terms of the treaty. Nevertheless, the border stood and still stands today. For many nationalists and republicans in Northern Ireland, the border separating the two parts of Ireland can be considered the source of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, from 1920 until 1968, while there was tension in Northern Ireland as a result of the policies of the Northern Ireland Parliament (which was controlled by Unionists and often engaged in discriminatory policies against Catholics), the tension was of relative low-intensity compared to later years (Ranelagh 1994). It was not until the late 1960s that the violent conflict became widespread in the period commonly referred to in Northern Ireland as “the troubles.” From 1968–1998 over three-thousand people were killed and thousands more injured during a conflict among a variety of paramilitary forces on both sides of the divide (like the Irish Republican Army [IRA] and the Ulster Defense Association [UDA]), and the security forces (including the police and the army).

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In Northern Ireland, there is clearly a religious dimension to the conflict given the historical relationship between Catholics and Protestants in Ireland dating back several centuries. These roots, however, have not been the main factors driving the conflict over the past 30–40 years. Certainly the divisions in society continue to divide along these lines and dominate the lexicon of the conflict. Nevertheless, most scholarship on the nature of the conflict tends to look to two models: the history of colonialism and the role of ethno-national identities. Those who argue that the colonial past is key to understanding the conflict in Northern Ireland point to the way in which the unionists in Northern Ireland have structural similarities to settler populations in other colonial settings (for a discussion of the colonial argument, see Clayton 1996, 1998; Weitzer 1990). To be sure, the plantation policies in the 17th century accelerated a migration of Protestant people into the north of Ireland leading to a displacement of and dominance over the indigenous Irish (typically Catholic) population. Those distinctions, which began in that period, remain the key identifiers for partisans in the conflict. Most importantly, the structural relationship between the two groups has retained a central role in the conflict with a very vocal part of unionism saying, “No” in response to any proposal to change that relationship. In other words, the settler people in this case did not come to integrate with the local population and in fact both sides continue to stress their differences. The argument concerning the colonial aspects to the conflict are particularly relevant to the topic of policing since the RUC maintained much of the structure, appearance, and operations of the colonial force that it grew out of (McGloin 2003; Ellison and Smyth 2000; Weitzer 1990). The ethno-national argument focuses on the way in which ethnic and national identities come into conflict in Northern Ireland (see especially McGarry and O’Leary 1995). While there may have been a colonial past fostering the creation of these identities, what animates the conflict today (and has for the recent past) is the fact that unionists see themselves as a part of the United Kingdom and only accept that as the sovereign state, whereas nationalists see themselves as Irish, refuse to accept the sovereignty of the UK over Northern Ireland, and would like to see the Republic of Ireland have political sovereignty over Northern Ireland. The ethnonational argument forwards the proposition that where there are identity groups each with contending political claims, there is likely to be conflict. These contending claims, so the argument goes, are not easily reconciled or down-played as a result of cross-cutting cleavages (McGarry and O’Leary 1995). In fact, as Wright (1987) has argued, Northern Ireland is an “ethnic frontier” where the role of external states can intensify the conflict if they champion one side or the other (like the UK for the unionists and the Republic of Ireland for the nationalists). These seeds for conflict are further exacerbated by the fact that one side in the conflict, the unionists, have historically held the upper hand in terms of political and economic power. This is one of the key ingredients that help contribute to ethnic conflict (Horowitz 1985). Both of the colonial and the ethno-national argument have a strong argument behind them. Surely, no one particular approach can explain a social and political conflict as deep and complex as the one in Northern Ireland (see Clayton 1998,

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Ruane and Todd 1998). Nevertheless, the ethno-national argument seems to point out a significant fact about the conflict that shapes any possible attempt to achieve peace. If the conflict has a strong (if not dominant) ethno-national character, there can be no peace without due recognition of both of the major forms of identity in Northern Ireland (McGarry and O’Leary 1993). The conflict in Northern Ireland, while including several dimensions, centers on what is commonly called the “constitutional question.” This question can be put in these terms: “What political entity should have sovereignty over the people and territory of Northern Ireland”? While this is primarily a political question, that has ethno-national roots, it is a question that also concerns the role of the police in Northern Ireland. Policing and Conflict in Northern Ireland Since the creation of Northern Ireland and the organization of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in the1920s, the police have been played a key role in the conflict in Northern Ireland (Ellison and Smyth 2000). Criticisms of the RUC intensified during the period of the troubles beginning in the 1960s (Ní Aoláin 2000; McGarry and O’Leary 1999; Murray 1998; O’Rawe and Moore 1997; Weitzer 1995). These criticisms have tended to focus on the ways in which the practices and behaviors of the RUC harmed human rights. The problem was two-fold. On the one hand, the police were apparently abusing peoples’ basic rights. On the other hand, there seemed to be little oversight over the police with the result that few, if any, people were ever called to account for the behavior of the police. In other words, there was an absence of democratic policing norms. Perhaps the most infamous cases concerning allegations of police misconduct concern the potential role of the police in the assassinations of human rights lawyers Pat Finucane (in 1989) and Rosemary Nelson (in 1999). Each of the murders were claimed by loyalist paramilitaries yet from the beginning there were concerns over police (and army) collusion in the murders. An independent inquiry into the allegations of collusion conducted by John Stevens, the Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police, found that police failed to do their job to cooperate with the investigations of these murders (Stevens 2003). In the Finucane case, the European Court of Human Rights has found that there was a violation of Mr. Finucane’s basic human rights by failing to conduct a prompt and independent investigation into allegations that there was collusion by the security forces in his murder (Finucane v. United Kingdom (1 July, 2003, Application No. 29178195)). More recently, an independent inquiry headed by retired Canadian Supreme Court Justice Peter Cory into the question of whether there was enough evidence to hold a public inquiry into these and other cases of police collusion found that there was sufficient evidence and the public inquiries should take place. In addition to allegations of collusion, there are several other areas of concern identified by critics of the way in which the RUC behaved during the troubles. In the early 1980s, there were allegations of police engaging in a “shoot-to-kill” policy in


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which they would shoot first and ask questions later. The independent investigation into these charges was carried out (initially) by John Stalker, Deputy Chief Constable of the Manchester Police. After consistently battling a police wall of silence during his inquiries, he was removed from the case when he may have uncovered evidence of potential misconduct (Stalker 1988). The European Court of Human Rights also found violations of human rights in several of the cases involving alleged shootto-kill practices (McCann, Farrell, and Savage v. The United Kingdom (1995) 21 ECHR 97; see also Ní Aoláin 2000). Another area of concern with police behavior involved the interrogation practices practiced by the police. The European Court also found a violation of rights with policing interrogation in the 1970s (Ireland v. United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25). On top of these specific, high-profile cases, there has been a general sense that the police behaved in a biased manner toward people in nationalist/republican/Catholic communities (McGarry and O’Leary 1999; Murray 1998; O’Rawe and Moore 1997; Weitzer 1995). These allegations of police bias intensified during the troubles as a result of counter-insurgency practices by the police (Weitzer 1995). Weitzer argues that the policy of anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency promoted violations of human rights by creating a siege mentality among police officers. Unchecked by institutions of accountability, the RUC as a whole and its institutional ethos, not merely a few bad apples, were to blame for misconduct. In fact, into the late 1990s, there was difference of opinion regarding whether police treated the two communities equally. About 70% of Protestants saw the police as treating people equally, whereas only 25% of Catholics saw them as unbiased (Patten Report 1999: 14). To describe how divisions over policing have resulted in a dysfunctional style of policing in Northern Ireland, Weitzer (1995, 5) identifies seven elements of a “divided society model” of policing. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Systematic bias in law enforcement Politicized policing Dominant group monopoly of top posts and general over-representation Dual responsibility for internal security and law enforcement Latitude in use of powers including use of force Absence of effective accountability mechanisms Polarized communal relations

Each of these factors can be seen in a variety of practices of the RUC during the troubles (Ellison and Smyth 2000; Weitzer 1995; O’Rawe and Moore 1997). Weitzer’s point is that police in societies divided by ethnicity and nationality often are react to this environment by identifying with the dominant side in the conflict (McGloin 2003 makes a similar argument cast in terms of a colonial model of policing). A related account of how police operate in these kind of situations is Neild’s (2001b) regime model of policing. In this approach, police see their primary job as supporting the existing regime. This support goes beyond law enforcement and often includes extra-judicial killings (assassinations) and a variety of other forms of

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human rights violations. This model can be seen as related to Weitzer’s point that in a divided society, policing is politicized. Nevertheless, Weitzers model is more appropriate to describe policing in Northern Ireland because of the divided aspect of the conflict there. Neild’s model seems more appropriate when considering policing in an authoritarian society. While the RUC clearly played the role of supporting the dominant regime and its interests, there is more to the role of the police in conflict than support for the regime. The emphasis on a divided society model of policing in Northern Ireland’s past is not a mere academic exercise. This characterization of the police helps pre-figure the kinds of reforms that would seem necessary. Democratic Police Reform in Northern Ireland Police reform in Northern Ireland grows directly out of the broader peace process. In the Good Friday Agreement (1998), there is a great deal of detail describing the political institutions that are (were) to shape the political future for Northern Ireland. In addition to these political reforms, the Agreement calls for the creation of an independent commission to propose reforms for policing looking to the following factors: accountability, transparency, opportunities for public input, effective and fair policing, cooperation with the police agency in Ireland, and better management of public order situations. Of primary importance was the attempt to put the police on course to transition to “policing in a peaceful society.” The Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland (commonly called the Patten Commission after its chair, Christopher Patten) issued its report in 1999: “A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland” (commonly called the Patten Report). Given the terms of reference for the commission in the agreement, it should be no surprise that the democratic model of policing can be found in the Patten Report. The democratic model of policing is an approach to policing which a variety of scholars and policy-makers argue is needed for transitional societies (Call and Cook 2003; Uildriks and van Reenen 2003; Wiatrowski 2002; Wiatrowski and Pritchard 2002; Jackson and Lyon 2002; Call 2002; Neild 2001a, 2001b; Call and Stanley 2001; Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg 1998; Jones, Newburn, and Smith 1996). This model takes a variety of forms in the literature, but the core elements seem to include public participation in governing policing powers, accountability mechanisms to ensure the police live up to the goals set by the public, transparency in police policy making and conduct, adherence to human rights standards, and equity and fairness in with regard to both input into policing strategies as well as policing behavior. Without doubt, most of the police reform proposals in Northern Ireland fit into this model. For example, there is a new sense of police accountability with the creation of the Police Ombudsman and the Policing Board. The Police Ombudsman is an independent agency that investigates allegations of police misconduct. This office actually had been proposed and was in the process of formation prior to the establishment of the Patten Commission (Hayes 1997). With the Ombudsman’s office in place, no longer will the police police themselves, nor will the people of Northern Ireland have to rely


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on the shaky foundations of ad hoc investigations of police misconduct like in the Stalker case. The Policing Board is a representative civilian board that has authority to set policies and goals for the police. While the day to day operation of the police is in the hands of the Chief Constable, he must account for his actions and decisions to the Policing Board. The Ombudsman’s office provides accountability and a degree of transparency as the data concerning police complaints (how many, how they are handled, indictments are made public, etc.) are made available to the public. The Policing Board meets in public and most of its documents are available for public scrutiny on its website. Public participation is ensured through both the Policing Board as well as the creation of District Policing Partnerships. The membership of the Policing Board consists of 10 representatives from the political parties with the seats distributed based on the level of support the part garnered in the previous assembly elections. There are also 9 other, non-political, seats on the board to ensure a level of public input that is not necessarily driven by partisan interests. At a level closer to the people, there are twenty-one District Policing Partnerships (DPPs) in Northern Ireland. These bodies coincide with police district commands as well as with local government councils. The DPPs serve as a vehicle for citizens to provide input into decisions about local policing policies and practices. The membership of the DPPs is also broadly representative of the communities in which they operate because they are appointed by the local government councils (which are democratically elected) and approved by the Policing Board. The police reforms attempt to achieve equity in a number of ways not the least of which is the attempt to make the membership of the police more nearly represent the people they serve. Prior to the Patten Report, on 8% of the RUC was Catholic, whereas Catholics made up 42% of the population in Northern Ireland (Patten Report 1999; McGarry and O’Leary 1999). One of the ways to try and achieve greater equity is through a recruitment process that seeks to encourage more Catholics to join the police with an eye to creating a more representative agency. The attempt to achieve this goal was pursued through a policy of encouraging early retirements (through buy-outs) and the recruitment of new officers on a 50/50 basis with at least 50% of each recruiting class being made up of Catholics. Perhaps the most prominent attempt to achieve equity in both input and operations is the emphasis on human rights in the Patten Report: “It is a central proposition of this report that the fundamental purpose of policing should be, in the words of the Agreement, the protection and vindication of the human rights of all” (Patten Report 1999: 18). Given the importance of human rights to police reform, they constitute the first seven recommendations of the Patten Report (1999: 18–21). These recommendations are: 1. A comprehensive program to focus policing on human rights. 2. A new police oath incorporating explicit commitment to uphold human rights.

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3. A new code of ethics incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights. 4. The incorporation of human rights into every module of police training. 5. Human rights awareness and respect for human rights as an element of assessment of individual police performance. 6. Appointment of a lawyer with human rights expertise to advise the police on human rights matters. 7. Human rights performance of the service as a whole to be monitored by the Policing Board. The new oath of office attempts to place human rights at the core of the duties of a police officer. The Patten Report calls for all police officers to take a new oath which emphasizes human rights. The oath in use prior to 1998, officers swore to: Well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady the Queen and not to belong to any association in anyway disloyal to our Sovereign Lady the Queen.

In the new oath, officers make the following declaration: I hereby do solemnly and sincerely and truly declare and affirm that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of constable, with fairness, integrity, diligence and impartiality, upholding fundamental human rights and according equal respect to all individuals and their traditions and beliefs; and that while I continue to hold the said office I will to the best of my skill and knowledge discharge all the duties thereof according to law (Police (Northern Ireland) Act 38(1)).

While Patten suggested that all officers be required to take the new oath, in the first Implementation Plan (2000), however, the Northern Ireland Office changed this recommendation, requiring only new officers to take the new oath. The argument was that since the serving officers had already been attested, they could not be required to take a new oath of office. In the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 38(2) and in the second Updated Implementation Plan (2001) the government reminds the police that while existing officers will not be required to take the new oath, the Chief Constable is responsible “to bring the terms of the new oath to the attention of serving officers. He must also ensure that they understand it and understand the need to carry out their duties in accordance with it. A record will be kept” (Updated Implementation Plan, 2001, 1). This statement reassures all interested parties that human rights norms should be the standard for all officers in the Police Service of Northern Ireland. To hammer home the importance of human rights, the Patten Report calls for extensive human rights training for police officers. “The human rights dimension should be integrated into every module of police training” (Patten Report, 1999, 20). In fact, the report even calls for a new police college to be created with an emphasis in professional and human rights training. Early evidence points to limited success in developing a holistic approach to the teaching of human rights norms and values (Engel and Burruss, 2004). One of the key aspects of human rights training will derive from the new code of ethics and oath of office.


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Sharpening the Democratic Model Without doubt, these elements of police reform (and many others too numerous to cite here) point to the development of a democratic model of policing in Northern Ireland. If this was the end of the story, however, the place of policing in the conflict would remain outstanding. Democracy and democratization appear to be the answers to authoritarian regimes and regime policing in these kinds of societies. Yet, when making the transition from a society faced with ethno-national conflict and a police structured along the lines of the divided society model, simple democracy does not address the problems. This is the case because, in its simple form, democracy rests on the notion of popular sovereignty. On this view, the people in a particular geographic area have the ultimate power over the laws (and policing) in their society. Yet, in a deeply divided society, simple democracy is not so simple. Democratic theory, in its pure forms, too often presupposes a preexisting unified sovereign “people” (for a development of these issues, see Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Kymlicka 1995; Tamir 1993). The assumption in democracy of popular sovereignty is particularly problematic when the divisions in society are a result of conflict over the nature of sovereignty itself. Fortunately, the Good Friday Agreement and the Patten Report are attentive to this difficulty. There are three ways this question of conflict over sovereignty is addressed in Patten: 1) through the implementation of aspects of the consociational model of democracy, 2) through the development of aspects of nodal governance, and 3) by placing human rights at the core of police reform. Consociational democracy is an approach to democracy for societies faced with deep divisions in the society. With consociationalism different groups share power in one society without losing their different group identities. As described by Arend Lijphart (1977), consociationalism involves a brokered peace between the political elites where simple majority rule is set aside in favor of voting procedures that ensures all groups are represented, and that no important decisions can be made in society without the consent of the major groups in society. It is clear that certain key features of the Belfast Agreement, such as the Assembly and Executive, are best explained by the theory of consociationalism (O’Leary 2001, Wolff 2001). Furthermore, several aspects of the police reforms reflect this consociational approach. For example, the 10 political seats on the Policing Board are distributed on the basis of proportional representation (using the d’Hondt method) insuring that all of the major parties, representing all of the major divisions of political opinion, are on the Board. Like the Policing Board, the DPPs serve a consocational role by giving political representatives from the different parties input into local police policy. Like consociationalism, the “nodal” approach to governance can help reconcile democracy to divided society situations. This concept of governance is mean to account for the fact that individuals in modern democratic societies do not find themselves living within clearly defined unitary states (Shearing 2004, 2001; Shearing and Wood 2003). Typically, individuals as well as governmental structures are organized into a variety of layers which have differing as well as overlapping spheres. For example, policing power in society is usually conceived as deriving

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from the sovereign power of the state, but it clearly also operates in the “private” sphere as well with multiple forms of private security firms that, in North America, outnumber public police (Bayley and Shearing 1996). In sum, the nodal model of democracy creates multiple nodes of governance that coincide with the varied ways in which people in society operate in many overlapping spheres at once. That the concept of nodal governance can be discerned in the Patten Report is no surprise given the fact that the Patten Commission included in its membership the scholar most associated with this approach: Clifford Shearing. Shearing argues that the aspects of the Patten Report that most embody this nodal approach to governance are the ways in which the Policing Board and the District Policing Partnerships function (Shearing 2001). By allowing the Policing Board the budget and regulatory authority to develop policing structures outside of the formal police service, multiple approaches to policing and multiple networks of policing can develop. In other words, because Patten calls for a Policing Board and not a Police Board, it conceives of the role of the Board as inclusive of policing entities which are not necessarily rooted in the context of the sovereign state. Similarly, the Patten Report proposes that DPPs be permitted to develop local policing strategies and to fund those strategies through independent taxation procedures. This would further allow for the development of multiple networks of policing and multiple nodes of policing power and authority. In essence, the nodal approach to the governance of policing recognizes the role of private institutions in exercising police powers at the same time as it introduces democratic oversight into police functions not supplied by the state. Consequently, nodal governance can accommodate ethnic division and newer developments in the way policing is practiced today. While Brogden (2001) argues that the Patten Report should be praised in a number of ways, he criticizes it for not going further with regard to developing multiple levels of policing in Northern Ireland. Brogden’s point is that in response to the ethnic division in Northern Ireland, police reform should have permitted more shared and localized forms of policing governance. Similarly, Walker (2002) argues against a state model of policing that assumes that power and authority of policing derived from and provide support for the sovereign state. In its place he proposes a plural model of policing that accounts for multiple sources of authority and allegiance. While Walker’s argument is cast primarily in terms of the relationship between the European Union and the nationstates of Europe, it can be applied to the context of a divided society (Walker 2002: 315). For example, in the Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland is officially recognized as part of the United Kingdom but there is also a role for the Republic of Ireland in the affairs of Northern Ireland through the creation of a number of crossborder governmental entities. These provide the context for, if not co-sovereignty (O’Leary 2001), perhaps a post-sovereignty situation requiring a plural approach to the governance of policing. Finally, human rights, while a core concept in the democratic model of policing, has a dimension which helps address the concerns of policing in a divided society. One of the dilemmas concerning human rights concerns the source of those rights.


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Traditionally, individual rights were guaranteed by the sovereign state (often referred to in this context as civil rights). In fact, Michael Ignatieff (2001: 23) argues that “stable states provide the possibility for national rights regimes, and these remain the most important protector of individual human rights.” Yet, for much of contemporary human rights theory and practice, the tendency is to be wary of the sovereign state as a prime threat to individual rights. The recognition of this fact has been addressed, for instance, in Article 8 of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC), where the court has been granted jurisdiction over war crimes even in the context of an “internal” war (see, for example, Schabas 2001: 44). The problem is that, the ICC notwithstanding, the policing of a society typically occurs in the context of a sovereign state. Again, this points to a tension at the core of policing in Northern Ireland, a society divided over the question of state sovereignty. As Walker and Telford (2000: 17) claim, “it is the nature and identity of the state which is at the very heart of political controversy in the North.” In other words, the problems in Northern Ireland, while often popularly depicted as pitting Catholic against Protestant, are really about who has power and what they have done with that power. As Weitzer points out, “For Republicans and Loyalists alike, the legitimacy of the RUC is heavily dependent on the nature of the state. Republicans consider British rule beyond the pale. … Yet it is not only the state as such that concerns Loyalists, but also the nature of state intervention in policing” (Weitzer 1995: 116). It would appear, then, that police reform requires some separation between policing and the state. This is, however, easy to propose, but hard to accomplish. The primary problem with attempting to divorce policing from the state is that they have been co-identified for so long. As Walker and Telford (2000: 54) explain, “Traditionally, the legitimacy and viability of the overall polity and that of its criminal justice system have been regarded as closely intertwined, even symbiotically linked.” They go on to give three key reasons for this link (pp. 54–55). First, the state, as Max Weber points out, has the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in society. The most visible manifestation of that monopoly is the police. Second, the state in the modern era has taken on extensive governing power and with that power has come increased policing powers. Third, because criminal justice is crucial for the security and governance of a society, the criminal justice system is integral to state legitimacy. Given this identification of the state and the criminal justice system, the two broad reform options emerge: First, one could reform the state to make it more acceptable or, secondly, one could reform the police in such a way that it no longer is identified with the state. In Northern Ireland, incidentally, both of these paths are being followed. That the purpose of the human rights element of police reform is to attempt to separate policing from conceptions of state sovereignty can be seen on the second page of the Patten Report where this telling statement is made. This identification of the police and state is contrary to policing practice in the rest of the United Kingdom. It has left the police in an unenviable position, lamented by many police officers. In one political language they are the custodians of nationhood. In its rhetorical

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Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries opposite they are the symbols of oppression. Policing therefore goes right to the heart of the sense of security and identity of both communities and, because of the differences between them, this seriously hampers the effectiveness of the police service in Northern Ireland (Patten Report 1999: 2).

What Patten is saying is that one of the chief problems for the legitimacy of the police in this divided society has been its identification with the state. They are proposing then a divorce of the police from the state. Human rights is the instrument of this divorce. Make no mistake, for Patten, human rights “should inspire everything a police service does. It should be seen as the core of this report” (Patten Report 1999: 20). Walker (2001) refers to this as post-sovereignty policing and identifies it as part of the attempt to separate politics from policing. As he points out: “If Queen and country can no longer offer rallying calls around which to inspire the duty and valor of police officers, then a new morality must take its place and one which can appeal across the sectarian divide. That new morality lies principally in human rights” (Walker 2001: 150). The notion of post-sovereignty policing allows for the development of a policing structure and identity that is free from identification with either of the ethno-national traditions in Northern Ireland. In this sense, what Patten proposes with regard to human rights is the development of a move away from policing as law-enforcement toward a model of policing as human rights-enforcement. This move is necessitated by the controversial status of the nature of sovereignty in Northern Ireland. Neither side can seemingly agree on the nature of sovereignty and, therefore, of the source of law. If the source of the law, however, derives primarily from a supranational source, the potential is there for shared allegiance and commitment. Conclusion While the Patten Report clearly offers the prospect for novel dimensions in democratic policing, some of the implementation has fallen short of the goals of the plan. Many of the consociational elements were put into place with the creation of the Policing Board and the District Policing Partnerships. Unfortunately, one of the major nationalist political parties, Sinn Fein, has refused to participate in these bodies, leaving them as less than fully representative. These oversight bodies have performed significant tasks, even during the suspension of the other consociational institutions in Northern Ireland, indicating that if Sinn Fein ever does agree to join, they may provide a more substantial source of consociational democracy for Northern Ireland. The elements of what Shearing has called nodal governance identified in Patten were not included in the Police (Northern Ireland) Act (2000). Not surprisingly, neither the Policing Board nor the District Policing Partnerships have explored the development of further nodes of policing activity (Policing Board 2003). In other words, these bodies have restricted themselves to working with the unitary node of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. While this could be amended at some later


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point, in the near future it appears as if this novel form of democratic control over policing will not be explored in Northern Ireland. The role of human rights in the context of democratic police reforms in Northern Ireland provides, perhaps, the most promise of all these novel dimensions. Given the prominence of human rights in the new code of ethics and in the framework for monitoring developed by the Policing Board (2003), one would expect that human rights may serve, as Walker identifies, as a motivation for the entire police service. Without doubt, the fundamental fact of conflict over sovereignty in Northern Ireland must be appreciated to move forward with a new beginning to policing. A human rights ethos provides that potential. The Patten commission issued its report in September 1999. Since that time, the police reform process has progressed in fits and starts. Substantial changes began in summer 2000 when much (but, significantly, not all) of the report was incorporated in the legislation. In fall 2001, additional advances resulted in the changing of the name of the police organization as well as the initiation of the operation of the Policing Board. Nevertheless, the police reform process remains questioned by many in the unionist community and by Sinn Fein on the republican side. This continued division over police powers has hampered the reform process. Sinn Fein seems like it will not cooperate with the policing institutions until policing power is devolved completely to the Northern Ireland Assembly – it remains in the hands of the UK representative, the Northern Ireland Secretary. It will be difficult for policing powers (and other criminal justice powers) to be devolved until the threat of Provisional IRA operations is completely and finally ended. They seem unwilling to do that until they are comfortable that their perceived threats from the UK government are removed – that is, until policing power is devolved. There is, in the peace process a catch-22: power over policing will not be devolved until the threat of paramilitary violence is minimized, but the paramilitary organizations are unwilling to disband until power over policing is devolved. While this is not the only set of issues constraining the police reform process, it is provides a stark reminder that police reform does not occur in a vacuum. If democratic policing reforms are to take hold, they must be accompanied by democratic reforms throughout the political and economic system. Democratic approaches to policing are an obvious advancement over the structures and practices exemplified by the regime model of policing. The democratic policing model, with its emphasis on participation, accountability, and human rights also has advantages over a purely professional model of policing. The democratic policing model is limited, however, when it assumes a unified sovereign state as the locus of democratic activity. The case of police reform in a deeply divided society like Northern Ireland helps illustrate ways in which the democratic policing model can be sharpened to account for the ways in which ethno-national conflict can be accounted for in democratic structures. Simple democracy is often not the way to deal with these forms of conflict. As a result, consociational democracy and nodal governance can be seen as avenues to help peacefully regulate conflict within democracy. Human rights, also, does not need to be seen in terms of mere individual rights but can also be seen as a vehicle for transcending the debates over sovereignty

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in divided societies. While attempts to develop democratic police reforms will vary from society to society in order to attend to the particular circumstances of those societies, the case of police reform in Northern Ireland helps to remind democratic policing scholars that the model can and must address the problems of ethnic conflict if it is to be applied in other divided societies.

Chapter 8

Creating Police Partnerships with Civil Society in Kazakhstan Through US-Funded Domestic Violence Training: A Step Toward Democratic Policing Edward Snajdr John Jay College of Criminal Justice City College of New York

This chapter examines the relationships between law enforcement, democratization, and civil society in Kazakhstan’s post-socialist transition. It focuses specifically on the emergence of new partnerships between police and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have developed in Kazakhstan around the issue of domestic violence and particularly within the context of US-funded police training programs. Using ethnographic data from participant observation and interviews during fieldwork in Kazakhstan in 2000–2003, I describe how local police, as representatives of the state, and women’s activists, as representatives of an emerging civil society, engaged with the process of democratization in confronting domestic violence as a social problem. Although the primary impetus for these police-NGO partnerships has come from the availability of US assistance for law enforcement, local interest in the problem, and a willingness on the part of Kazakhstan’s police agencies and civic communities to cooperate at the grassroots level played significant roles in sustaining such collaboration. Assistance from the US to encourage such police collaboration has important implications for the creation of new forms of social capital, or personal relationships of trust and mutual respect, which help to facilitate the process of democratization in Kazakhstan.1 One note of caution, however, is that the success and subsequent sustainability of international assistance programs focused on police training depends on how they are designed and implemented. In Kazakhstan, a train-the-trainer model, a tool commonly used in development work, was specifically adapted to the postSoviet and cultural context using an integrative approach drawing on principles of anthropological research. This model utilized the existing practices of local police and the emerging activist communities in Kazakhstan with some degree of success.

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At the same time, a collaborative training project allowing for input from and participation in non-traditional or non-official protocols helped to strengthen police and civic partnerships based on clear and realizable goals. Such partnerships can provide an important arena for changing the culture of law enforcement, and may have an impact beyond the issues of violence against women. I conclude that while political reform on a macro level may provide the groundwork for transforming law enforcement bodies after the fall of the Soviet Union, culturally-informed education and training that can encourage the production of social capital at the local level is a proven strategy for taking steps toward lasting democratization in this Central Asian state. Post-Soviet Policing in Kazakhstan Although Kazakhstan’s post-socialist society has certainly experienced significant changes after the collapse of the USSR, it may appear at first glance that very little has changed among its law enforcement bodies. For example, even more than a decade after the transition from Soviet rule, the basic composition of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of the Interior (MVD) has remained more or less intact. In fact, the organizational charts in Louise Shelley’s (1996) monograph on the evolution and operation of Soviet police, the first book to examine, in depth, the “militsia,” still quite accurately describes the structure of Kazakhstan’s police force. As was the case in the Soviet Union, Kazakhstani law enforcement bodies are highly centralized. The MVD is a national police agency with a republic-wide jurisdiction and a mandate to enforce Kazakhstan’s criminal code. Other law enforcement bodies in Kazakhstan include the custom or border police, housed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Security Agency, or what used to be the KGB. The MVD itself is further divided into criminal and administrative divisions, each handling the investigation of crimes or violations depending on the severity and type of the offense. MVD departments in major urban centers such as Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city, include branches of the criminal and administrative divisions. The latter division is broken down further into traffic units, a juvenile crime division, and the community police, which patrol local neighborhoods. Outside of larger urban areas, MVD departments are based in towns with broader jurisdictions that also cover local village and rural areas. In terms of MVD personnel, many of the same individuals who held leadership positions under the communist regime are still in power. Additionally, the country’s criminal code remains largely based on that of the Soviet period.2 But an overemphasis on structure can be deceptive, and there have been key transformations in the function, status and resources of law enforcement in Kazakhstan as well as the public’s perception of police since the breakup of the Soviet Union. These transformations are quite significant for understanding the process of democratization in this newly independent Central Asian state. To begin with, the fall of communism shattered the pillar of party loyalty that supported Soviet police agencies. Thus, Shelley’s (1996) important characterization of Soviet period

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police as both servants of a centralized state and loyal participants of a political organization requires some modification. Like their counterparts in other member republics of the USSR, Soviet Kazakhstan’s MVD was accountable not to the law but to the Communist Party. As a political institution, law enforcement closely followed the state’s mission to maintain ideological order. For example, Soviet period police focused heavily on enforcing economic transgressions and political crimes. Interventions into daily familial life were a “central task” of the MVD (Shelley 1996:139) and were reflected in the responsibilities assigned to police including the administration of licensing and printing, as well as the monitoring of individual mobility. In this sense, police in Kazakhstan symbolized the party’s power to control public behavior (Shelley 1996:181). 3 At the same time, the Soviet regime promised an ordered society with little unrest and a very low crime rate. Thus, a strong police force was part and parcel of Soviet cultural values cultivated under a totalitarian regime. During my fieldwork in Kazakhstan it was not uncommon to find civilian informants describing Soviet-era police as effective responders to crime, dissidence and disorder. The accountability of the MVD to the regime/party apparatus, which tightly regulated police personnel, may have played an important role in this effectiveness. For example, Shelley notes how administrators were deemed directly responsible for incidents of violent crime (1996:40). But cases of repressive violence against the public also occurred. For example, in December 1986, police, along with Soviet troops, brutally suppressed demonstrations in Almaty by young ethnic Kazakhs protesting the ouster of the republic-level party chair by Moscow. In addition to overt repression of the public during the Soviet period, police operations were marked by secrecy and limited public access to official records. These themes of law enforcement secrecy and social control were carried over to the post-Soviet period but were manifested in new ways and related to issues that were quite different from the past.4 First, while Kazakhstan became independent in 1993, there was a degree of continuity with the Soviet period power center. Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had been head of the country under communism, became president of the new republic. He was formally elected to office in 1991 and again in 1999, but with little opposition in both cases. As Kazakhstan’s leader during the late Soviet period, Nazarbayev maintains an autocratic hold on power in the post-Soviet era with the rationale that “you can’t just declare democracy, you can only build it through hard work” (an indirect quote from Kanat Saudabayev, Kazakhstans Ambassador to the United States in The Washington Post, Friday, August 20, 2004, page A21). The first supposedly free national elections took place on December 4, 2005, and Nazarbayev was later sworn in for another seven-year term in January of 2006. The US is watching this closely in light of the recent upheaval following similar elections in Ukraine. Kazakhstan has approached democratization cautiously, with Nazarbayev, its former Soviet period leader, maintaining significant control over of all levels of government and civic life during the country’s transition. Nazarbayev’s justification for this gradual process includes: Kazakhstan’s delicate geopolitical position wedged between Russia, China and the rest of Central Asia, a vast and

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highly sought after oil reserve requiring a careful move towards privatization, a moderate and secular Muslim society with some fundamentalist elements, an ethnic Russian community largely located near the Russian border (suggesting a very small but possible separatist threat), and a significant rural and mostly poor ethnic Kazakh population. Nazarbayev has enjoyed a great degree of popularity among much of the population which has no democratic tradition in its past, and who support their leader’s slow approach to reform. Nazarbayev maintains a tradition of authoritarianism, but also represents, as an ethnic Kazakh, an emerging national consciousness among the country’s Central Asian population. This new arena of identity politics is perhaps reshaping police loyalty issues. Although Kazakhs make up 47% of the country’s 16 million citizens, there are also over 5 million Russians (34%).5 In addition to these groups, there are also sizeable numbers of Ukranians (4%), Germans (3%), Uzbeks (3%), and Tatara (2%). Uighurs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Koreans together make up the remaining 7% of Kazakhstan’s population. Additionally, within Kazakh ethnic identity are further subdivisions based on traditional culture, called zhus (clans or hordes), the largest of which has been rumored to control the post-Soviet bureaucracy (Schatz 2004). While Nazarbeyev’s government tries to explicitly balance relationships between ethnic groups, the state quietly supports a growing Kazakh nationalism, which most certainly affects the large Russian minority. Thus ethnicity may be playing an increasingly important role in the composition of Kazakhstani law enforcement, particularly in terms of who may hold on to leadership roles, as well as who is admitted to police academies and universities. A second significant break from the past is a sharp decline in police resources, coupled with a rapid rise in crime. Organized criminal gangs are flourishing in the new system and nascent social problems such as drugs and prostitution linked to crime continue to grow.6 The public interpret the rising crime of the transition to capitalism as a process of disorder, danger and insecurity (Nazpary 2001). Finally, both of these developments have influenced public perceptions of law enforcement as being both helpless in the face of criminals and as holding undue power over citizens. Police are viewed by many Kazakhstanis as both ineffective and undermining the process of democracy. For example, a 1997 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) report claims that “corruption…in the lower echelons of government service…is rampant” (HRI 1998). In support of this, civilian informants have also remarked that bribe-taking among police is widespread. In one case recounted by an informant, an officer, stopping a driver on the road outside Almaty, demanded money for not carrying identification papers. The driver paid him the ‘fine’ but did not receive a receipt or any official record of the penalty. Another informant was stopped for a parking violation, paid the officer, and also did not receive notice for the fine incurred. Border police who patrol airports and trains are most notorious for bribe-taking. One American visitor recalled how when he failed to write down an accurate accounting of cash as he was exiting the country, border troops pointed out his error and fined him, but did not received a formal receipt or record of his transgression or the transaction.


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Whether it is as widespread as people believe, bribery must be understood in the broader context of both Kazakhstani culture and the transition economy. First, police officers, in addition to being poorly equipped, are also poorly paid, and some say that this is one reason for corruption. Some salaries are as low as $50 per month. In many cases, police are victims of payroll shortages and, despite the state’s promises to pay, do not receive compensation for their work for months at a time. Some police officers therefore try to supplement this dismal and uncertain income with personal “bribes.” But this corruption does not take the form of open intimidation or random and unjustified harassment of the public. Rather, fines are collected as unofficial or unrecorded penalties usually paid to officers in the context of actual transgressions of the state code. Judges and prosecutors are thought to receive bribes from special interests as well. At the same time, such bribery may be performed as part of the traditional system of gift-giving among Kazakhs. Because gifts reinforce and symbolize social relationships, Werner (1999) cautions against reading unofficial exchanges as inherently corrupt acts. Instead, she notes that Kazakhs often characterize small bribes as an extension of a traditional system of gifts, favors and rewards. In any case, the problem of bribe-taking is well-known to administrators in higher levels of the MVD and these individuals are beginning to crack down on the practice. For example, in 2002, a general in the customs division of the border police personally led a sting operation at Kazakhstan’s southern border with Uzbekistan to catch officers demanding bribes. He disguised himself as a civilian trying to enter the country. Despite crackdowns such as these, it is also the case that bribery exists among higher police officials as well as in other branches of the criminal justice system.7 The low expectations among the public regarding police effectiveness and a growing mistrust of law enforcement agencies become even more salient with the opening of borders and the rising importance of ethnic identity.8 These tensions are further exacerbated by the state’s continued centralized control of criminal justice discourse. For instance, Nazarbayev’s government has expanded the power of police to perform secret searches of private residences (Shelley 1996: 197). In 1997, a new criminal code was drafted and approved, tightening and clarifying several laws and procedures. In fact, several recent cases of police repression have occurred against foreigners and citizens who belong to religious groups thought to be subversive by Nazarbayev’s government. For example, in 2002, a sect of Baptists was targeted by MVD. Police arrested the group’s leader in 2003, charging him with not being registered with the government, a requirement for all religious and civil organizations in Kazakhstan. The group continues to refuse to register resulting in ongoing police surveillance and harassment (Human Rights Watch 2004).9 In addition to religious groups, opposition party leaders and civic activists have also accused police of brutality and repression. According to Human Rights Watch, in one case, the entire leadership of a community group championing the rights of mothers was allegedly unlawfully detained by the MVD (Eshanova 2002).

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Centralization, secrecy and accusations of repression, however, do not mean that Kazakhstan’s law enforcement bodies are merely robotic structures blindly following power centers, totalitarian or otherwise. Nor does the presence of low-level bribery mean that the entire institution is corrupt. The MVD is a policing organization that, in general, takes seriously its task of enforcing the country’s criminal code. Law enforcement education and training is of high quality and most officers have college degrees. Community police come to know most of the people in the districts to which they are assigned and officers work frequently with residents and businesses owners in local neighborhoods in which they themselves grew up. All of these issues play a role in shaping the current face of police in a society that is rapidly changing both politically and socially. In terms of democratization, the police in Kazakhstan inhabit an ambivalent position between the past Soviet-period culture of acquiescence and order, and the challenges of the present comprised of danger and distrust. Reform in this context appears to be dependent upon authority at higher levels in the transition government. As will be described below, however, new gender activism in the nascent civil sector along with recent US aid efforts addressing violence against women have provided police with one opportunity to engage in the process of democratization. Police reform in Kazakhstan is in a number of ways oriented towards a human rights approach, and in fact is perhaps more human rights oriented than US policing, especially in terms of detaining minors and special needs individuals. When Kazakhstani police visited a Juvenile Justice processing center in Florida, they were appalled at the treatment of children, one of whom, who was about 11 years old, was shackled at the hands and feet as a six-foot, 280 pound officer with gun, looked on. Domestic Violence, Policing and International Development in Kazakhstan In the 1990s, the former Soviet republics of Central Asia were of particular interest to the US in terms of development policy. While US national security issues such as terrorism did not yet reach the level of prominence it would until after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the future of post-Soviet economies and political reforms to shape them attracted the attention of the American development community. Kazakhstan in particular is of primary importance to the US government because of its nuclear capacity and anticipated oil reserves. While most of the aid funneled into (or offered to) Central Asian states consisted of direct economic and political assistance, a few small-scale programs focused on law enforcement. For example, the FBI initiated a drug trafficking intervention training program partnering with several Central Asian states. The Justice Department also began a police training program to help fight the growing problem of organized crime in the region. But the 1990s also witnessed the rise of women’s issues after the 1995 meetings in Beijing and it was the US State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) that initiated a novel series of grants focused on former Soviet states and geared towards combating the problem of violence against women, including


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domestic violence and human trafficking.10 In 1999, Florida State University (FSU) was awarded a grant from these funds to conduct domestic violence training in Kazakhstan (Snajdr and Vyortkin 2001).11 The availability of US funds for domestic violence training coincided with internal efforts to address the problem of violence against women. In 1999, President Nazerbayev directed the MVD to establish domestic violence police units throughout the country. These units would focus on family abuse and other forms of violence in which women were primarily the victims. Directives to prevent certain crimes were nothing new in the administrative flow of Soviet and post-Soviet policy, and consequences to fail to address these orders were clear. Shelley (1996) mentions a 1970 directive in Russia to make preventive visits to apartments to curtail violence in the home. In Kazakhstan and the former Soviet states there was little public information about domestic violence and police were generally reluctant to interfere in family quarrels. Only cases in which violence escalated to the level of criminal assault or homicide attracted any serious police attention. Officers in Almaty noted that organized criminal gangs and rising drug use among teens were more pressing police problems. The same could be said, of course, for police departments in the US, but with changing ideas about the rights of women and increasing civic pressure to address the issue of violence in the home, American police officers throughout the 1980s and 1990s were shifting their attitudes and procedures regarding the problem.12 Nazarbayev’s initiative to create domestic violence units was in response to perhaps several developments in the late 1990s. On the international level, Kazakhstan signed and ratified a UN protocol on the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1998. Nazarbayev’s creation of domestic violence units within the MVD was a gesture to support this convention. Such a move made sense in an international environment demanding ideological ambiguity between Russian power and US interests. These units were also part of a measure to update police structures as Kazakhstan became a member of Interpol. New NGOs such as the Feminist League and the Women’s Information Center – who worked to produce shadow reports on the status and rights of women (Feminist League 1997) – were also perhaps instrumental in bringing about Nazarbeyev’s directive to change police structure and practice. Kazakhstan’s women’s NGO community was small, but it had been working on the issue of gender violence and women’s rights since the early 1990s. For example, Podrugi, a grassroots organization in Almaty, began offering informal services to victims of domestic violence in their community. Podrugi also collaborated with other women’s groups such as the Feminist League and the Women’s Information Center to educate the public on the issue of battering. Nazarbayev’s move was reminiscent of the old regime in terms of its top-down and cosmetic approach to reform and did not translate into substantive changes at the lower levels of the MVD. The fact that no additional resources were provided from the MVD budget to equip or train these new units was a particular challenge

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to police administrators. Most department chiefs simply informed officers in local juvenile crime divisions to add domestic violence to their current duties. In Almaty, for example, the female colonel who headed the city police department’s juvenile crime office now was ordered to oversee a new domestic violence unit. She assigned six officers to the task and placed them in a separate office on her floor. Her staff received no additional equipment with which to assist them in their new roles. The unit began to collect data on the problem of domestic violence within Almaty. In Petropavlovsk, in northern Kazakhstan, a similar situation unfolded, but with even fewer personnel. One male captain was chosen to spearhead the new unit in this mostly Russian city. Other precincts, particularly in rural areas, delegated the task of responding to domestic violence to female officers who worked primarily with juvenile offenders. Supported from above by Nazarbayev’s directive to create new domestic violence units, Florida State University’s INL project appeared to close a needed gap at an opportune moment. With permission from the central MVD administration in Astana, the Almaty City police accepted FSU’s offer to set up the project in Kazakhstan. The FSU project team, which consisted of myself and two other codirectors, began by conducting ethnographic research in early 2000 on the scope and content of Kazakhstani police efforts to address domestic abuse, with the goal to devise a training program that could provide new methods and practices. A Collaborative Training Project The FSU project sought to create a training program that did not simply or blindly transfer so-called “expert knowledge” from the US to police in post-Soviet Central Asia. Rather, the primary starting point of the effort was to better understand the existing practices and experience of local law enforcement. Thus the first step to build a training program was to find out what resources this group could bring to a curriculum. The team’s ethnographic approach confirmed the severe lack of funding and material among law enforcement. In the winter of 2000, when the team visited the colonel who headed Almaty’s domestic violence unit, two of her staffers were compiling statistics from case files using pencils and graph paper. The unit had only two computers, each about ten years old. The colonel gestured to her staff and to the stack of files on a shelf next to her desk and remarked: “As you can see, we still do things by hand around here!” Yet, her six-member team was responsible for all six sectors of Almaty that together totaled more than 1.5 million residents. Moreover, Almaty police had only a handful of patrol cars. And items, such as laptop computers and cameras, which are routinely used in combating domestic violence in the US, were non existent in most precincts until only very recently. The plan to implement training developed with these realities in mind. At the same time, following from the lessons learned in the U. S., which emerged largely due to domestic violence activism at the grassroots, the FSU team chose to utilize the experience of local NGOs such as Podrugi and the Feminist League. The team


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then devised an intercultural train-the-trainer model which drew from principles in cultural anthropology. This model integrated local expertise with US and international experiences in responding to violence in the home. This meant that in addition to the training content, the method and style of delivery was cross-cultural as well. Working in stages, the project team moved from simply describing the issue and demonstrating what was being done in the US to building a collaborative curriculum delivered by local officers and NGO leaders. The trainings would begin with US trainers taking on most of the tasks and then gradually shifting responsibility to local trainers who would be expected to perform more autonomously, without the direct assistance of their US teammates. The team would then revise the curriculum over a series a sessions. Throughout the project, eight training sessions were held during a two year period from 2001 to 2003. Each session consisted of three-days, during which a class of 20 officers was trained. In order to achieve as broad an impact as possible, these sessions were carried out in cities or towns in several regions of Kazakhstan, including Almaty, Astana, Petropavlovsk, and Ust-Kamenogursk. With the exception of the furthest western reaches of the republic, these four locations covered most of the country.13 Police units that worked in urban contexts as well as those officers assigned to mostly rural villages would both be involved in each training session. The curriculum covered, as comprehensively as possible, the broad range of issues regarding domestic violence and how police could address the problem (see Table 8.1). The first day, for example, introduced trainees to definitions of domestic violence and placed the phenomenon in a larger context of gender inequality, victim and aggressor motivations and local customs that play a role in what has been termed “the cycle of violence.” On the second day, trainees heard from Kazakhstani police about cases and outcomes, and the improvisations by some officers using the existing criminal code and department protocol. In one module, a Kazakh trainer would recount how aggressors could be legally detained without formal charges from the victim, resulting in at least a brief period of safety during which women can figure out the next steps to take according to their needs. In another module, a local MVD trainer would stress the application of specific articles, such as Article 128, covering ‘hooliganism.’ This article could be used by police to exercise direct control over abusers through official charges of criminal behavior. As one might expect in a former Soviet country whose residents still remembered Cold War politics, the highlight of the training for many police was being introduced to their US counterparts. Officers were visibly excited to meet the US sergeants and captains brought in by the team as US trainers. While these officers played the formal role of instructors, exchanging professional knowledge and expertise in the classroom, they were also able to engage with Kazakhstanis on a more direct and informal basis beyond the structure of the curriculum. During coffee breaks, posttraining dinners hosted by local authorities, and small cultural excursions around the city or town of the training site, US and Kazakhstani police exchanged more personal information as well as discussed their views and opinions about policing, family, society, and their differing cultural worldviews.

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Table 8.1 Training Program Implemented in Almaty, Kazakhstan May 20–22, 2002 Day

Section

Participants

One

Introduction

KZ Police administrators Primary focus is on women’s and FSU team NGOs in Kazakhstan, but formal introduction of the training is performed by FSU Crisis Center Podrugi team together with the KZ police administrators

Pre-test Domestic violence in contemporary Kazakhstan

Two

Gender

Feminist League

Kazakhstani culture and traditions

Lawyer, Women’s Information Center

Definition and dynamics of domestic violence

Crisis Center and Feminist League

Discussion

Entire group

Examples of domestic vioence in KZ

Podrugi

Legal basis to combat DV

Lawyer, Women’s Information Center

Collaboration Areas

Note that there is immediate emphasis on existing resources and experts in form of KZ women’s NGOs. US involvement is periferal

This day included a mix of women’s NGOs, KZ police and US police experts on domestic violence. Each module presented topical material individually

Police Response KZ police team to DV in KZ Police Response US police officer to DV in US

Discussion

Entire group

Note that KZ police present prior to US trainer in order to establish credibility and evidence of existing expertise in country


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Table 8.1 Training Program Implemented in Almaty, Kazakhstan May 20–22, 2002 (continued) Day

Section

Participants

Collaboration Areas

Three

Judges and Prosecutors’ Responses to DV in KZ

KZ Judge and prosecutors

This module provides police a KZ CJ system focus

Improving responses to sexual violence

Collaborative team of US and KZ police and NGOs

Discussion

Entire group

Post-test

FSU team and KZ police Closing is again performed administrators by KZ police administration acting as co-hosts with US sponsors

Two collaborative modules integrate the different experts together in part to Intersection Same collaborative team demonstrate cooperation but between police also to emphasize common and other services issues and capabilities

At each step, police learned of the problems that they had in common as law enforcement officers. The also were exposed to important key differences in the areas of criminal investigation, arrest procedures, probable cause, and their role in representing the state. For example, US officers appeared to have more individual decision-making power to detain and charge citizens suspected of violating the law. Kazakhstani police were fascinated by one sergeant’s description of how his department could keep the cash and cars resulting from major drug arrests and convictions. These cross-cultural exchanges were certainly expected and anticipated on the part of the project team. But one of the most striking outcomes of the training process was how MVD police responded to the activists representing the NGO community. This occurred not only on the level of trainees learning about this new aspect of their democratizing society, but also, and more intimately, among the local officers who partnered with activists as project trainers. Below I describe how joining these stakeholders revealed an important arena for changing police culture and their public role in Kazakhstan’s process of democratization.

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Building Grassroots Police-NGO Partnerships At the close of the first training session held in Almaty, an officer remarked during the obligatory exchange of gifts and professional cards that he “never knew NGOs existed or what it was they did for the community.” He went on: “Now I see how these people are here to help us do our work.” This comment was repeated by trainees in more or less the same words at every session, from Petropavlovsk in the north to Aktubynsk in the east. Officers admitted that activists from Podrugi and other groups had knowledge about victim behaviors that they did not have access to. Noting this, most trainees attempted to integrate this information with their own protocols in working with crime victims. Police also learned from NGOs about the value of media coverage. During the training sessions, officers were impressed with the systematic information that NGOs had compiled on domestic violence. They also saw how activists used this information in communicating with the public about the issue. Video clips were shown to trainees that had been produced by activists. Instead of viewing journalists as people who might misrepresent them, a view the police held, NGOs urged trainees to see the media as an ally, as a tool for educating the public not only about domestic violence, but also about the MVD itself. A key strategy used by Podrugi staff was to find those reporters who focused on human interest stories, or features that would be of interest to women in the community. Rather than emphasizing scandals or incompetence, these journalists, who were mostly from among the newer generation of reporters or writers, were eager to write in support of the work of NGOs. The project team had invited reporters to visit the training sessions in each town, and many of these journalists reported about the project on local news programs and newspapers. Officers were surprised to see how they were positively represented and how the issue was covered as one of public community. After a year of doing a series of trainings with her NGO colleagues, one domestic violence officer in Almaty actually joined the assistant director of Podrugi on several radio programs that included local callers phoning in questions about the problem of domestic violence. By focusing on the human interest side of media, and programs geared toward women and family life, police discovered a new forum for representing their own departments, and the personnel involved in them. Police also learned how NGO activists could assist them in representing law enforcement needs at higher levels of government. One of the most dynamic parts of the training program involved a module on improving legislation and providing police with better statutory tools to combat crime. Activists presented draft laws that they had authored and which they used to lobby legislators in the majilis (parliament). After the first training session, Almaty’s colonel in charge of Almaty’s domestic violence unit volunteered to work personally with several NGO leaders to improve these legislative proposals. Over the next several months, this colonel and a team of activists revised several sections of the proposed “domestic violence law” and managed to convince an officer in the MVD’s central office in Astana to not only endorse it, but to circulate it among lawmakers in the capital.


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The classroom dialogues throughout the training program revealed several things about law enforcement relationship with the process of democratization in post-Soviet transition. First, most Kazakhstani officers are not trained to think individually or creatively in terms of solving crime problems or responding to the social needs of their communities. Their questions and concerns during the training sessions reflected the high quality and professionalism of their law enforcement training in the areas of discipline, uniformity and consistency with respect to the criminal code. For example, most trainees demonstrated their knowledge of proper procedures, particularly with regard to written rules and practices. Some officers were so emphatic about the need to go ‘by the book’ that they protested the suggestions by American trainers to improvise during investigations as patently illegal. At the same time, there was an anxiety among trainees regarding the lack of statistical information about the problem of domestic abuse in Kazakhstan. They were concerned about what administrators considered to be abuse and whether a formal definition was available to ‘test’ real life cases. When US trainers insisted that perhaps as high as 9 out of 10 victims do not report abuse, the trainees appeared justified in insisting that they first confirm this estimation before policies could be set. Third, going beyond the so-called ‘blue line’ in fighting crime, was a novel, but challenging concept introduced by American officers. As in the US, the MVD remains a conservative institution, but US trainers urged the Kazakhstanis to work with civilian organizations. By demonstrating the value of information and services beyond what police traditionally offer, Kazakhstanis learned how their own efforts could benefit from non-standard or novel community partnerships. The most transformative experience of the training sessions from the perspective of new notions of democracy was the interaction between police as servants of the state and the community, and judges and prosecutors as the enforcers and practitioners of the law. This tension surfaced several times as police were afforded the opportunity to confront other representatives of the criminal justice system in the course training. In every single session, presentations made by judges and prosecutors were met with a host of complaints by police trainees. Most of these were in reference to legal tools or limitations in their abilities to enforce the existing criminal code. In several cases, however, police challenged judges and prosecutors to resist the bribes given to them by husbands or to look at cases from the victims’ perspectives. Police argued that too often prosecutors in the system relied on traditional assumptions about male authority and autonomy in Kazakhstani society. While some judges and prosecutors were indignant at these accusations, others apologized for their colleagues’ transgressions of lack of respect for law enforcement units. One judge fought back vigorously and reprimanded police for not carrying out their duties in the most thorough and official manner. This type of exchange between components of the criminal justice system was quite novel, but also highly productive on a number of levels. First, these direct engagements allowed police to confront court representatives about legal procedures, the law and their own responsibilities toward citizens. Such confrontations were relatively impossible outside of the training environment, where police and judges

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have limited and controlled access to each other. Second, the dialogues revealed the different goals that stakeholders in the system pursued, often in conflict with other bureaucratic offices. This process was significant for many of the NGO participants, who learned about the internal politics of procedural obstacles and battles over scarce state resources. Third, it opened a discussion about cultural issues that were clearly important to the population, but that often challenged and or undermined the rule of law in the new republic. Finally, while it exposed apparent divisions within the criminal justice system, these exchanges between judges, prosecutors and police also provided a forum for highlighting common aims and values within that system. All of these levels of dialogue proved to be productive in terms of gaining mutual trust and cooperation. After the training sessions, police reported that they benefited significantly from NGOs, who had shared their resources with them on several occasions. It is important to note, however, that relationships between NGOs and the police were not always amicable. Neither were they always cooperative. During the process of drafting a curriculum, one high-ranking officer abruptly severed ties with the US project and with NGOs leaders. Participants speculated that she had been expecting a significant financial compensation in return for her cooperation. In another case, officers who were actively involved in the development of the training project were promoted to higher positions and also stopped working on the issue. But one case demonstrates how far the relationship has grown. Not long after the first pilot training, one of the officers assigned to the domestic violence unit in Almaty told the husband of a victim that his spouse was staying at a shelter for battered women in the city and he disclosed the location of the shelter. The director of Podrugi told the colonel who headed the unit about this incident. Upon learning what happened, the officer who disclosed the location was promptly reassigned to another department. Actions such as these suggested that key police officers were not only committed to this new issue, but administrators also sometimes looked to NGO activists in making important leadership decisions affecting the issue. While none of these engagements alone might do much to transform thinking and behavior, together, these collaborations present a very different picture than the world inhabited by Kazakhstan’s Soviet-period police units. By working with NGOs as partners, police learned the value of using the community as a context and a resource to build better responses to domestic violence. Democratization and New Models of Policing How has their experience with domestic violence training changed police culture beyond the scope of the issue? A key outcome of the project was the creation of new partnerships between police and NGOs to reach out to the public regarding how best to handle social problems. Domestic violence provided police and activists with a common discourse that enabled them to engage with the public. For example, NGO activists and police officers teamed up to make visits to local Almaty high schools and a couple of universities. During these visits, the teams met with teachers and students


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to discuss problems of family violence. These partnerships were not limited to large cities. An unexpected outcome of the Almaty training was emergence of local microcrisis centers, set up in police departments around the region. Educators, doctors, service workers, and employers were gaining better access to law enforcement through the issue of domestic violence. In these informal meetings, participants were able to ask police officers openly about community problems and to learn more about the profession’s responsibilities, limitations and constraints. The police also found a voice and an identity with the issue of domestic violence that went beyond standard investigations or sensationalized crime issues in the press. For example, as the project went into its second year, journalists would routinely find themselves interviewing both officers and NGO members standing together sideby-side. At the same time, it must be mentioned that these new partnerships are also quite fragile. First they rely on specific individuals, and especially those individuals who participated in the training effort. In the case of the colonel who pulled out of the effort, effectively shutting down the academy side of the project, it was apparent that there existed an academic versus practitioner politics. The team shifted emphasis to the city police and its own continuing training programs. Nevertheless, a large portion of the anticipated trainees targeted for assistance were cut off. This type of set back, however, also demonstrated the diversity within the MVD structure. Even though centralization is a key aspect of law enforcement culture, administrators in different areas and with different functions have some degree of individual autonomy in terms of working with development projects. Second, the severe lack of resources, both among police units and within the NGO community continues to jeopardize the sustainability of these developments. NGO funding is seriously limited, thus resulting in a hierarchy of decision-making that places victim services as a priority and partnerships with police at a lower level. The tasks assigned to activists, mandated by the money they receive from international agencies and organizations, go far beyond simply working with the police. This is understandable considering that the issue of domestic violence goes far beyond arresting abusers and batterers. The director of Podrugi, while clearly recognizing the need to create links with law enforcement, noted that her organization’s first mission is to provide for the safety of victims of violence, meaning making shelter and counseling available to women who experience abuse. Finally, police who create reform from below still require the support of the central MVD management. One colonel who was assigned to the central MVD office in Astana played a vital role in approving the participants that local precincts wished to include in the training project. But her approval alone was not always sufficient for allowing trainees to participate. Her superior also needed to sign forms and grant releases from other duties so that officers could attend training sessions. This structure also resulted in placing some officers in the training program who were not the best candidates for the process. In several training sessions, a couple of officers were clearly only there to get away from their regular duties or as political

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placements who would receive certificates from a US program. This kind of problem was minor, however, and did not detract from the overall training process itself. With these challenges in mind, what are the prospects for the sustainability of these police-civic partnerships? Part of the answer can be found in the very fact that something new has been created with the appearance of domestic violence units. Even though there is little funding, human resources can accomplish quite a lot, and the unit itself offers an administrative tool to expand training as the crux of the partnership between police and NGOs. Evidence of this became apparent on a follow-up visit that the project directors made two years after the first pilot training. The team spoke to several officers who had attended the first training, and who had returned to their precinct in Dostyk, a small town south west of the city. In Dostyk, the officers set-up their own crisis center for women within the police unit’s building. While no representatives of women’s NGOs were active in this village, the officers took it upon themselves to build their own service network. With these new networks in place, people can identify an individual, a representative, with whom they can speak about specific issues of concern to local communities, such as violence in the home, and to whom they can look for action, intervention or other services. At the same time, training for these officers and others like them continued. To achieve this, Podrugi partnered with officers from the City police to devise a shortened, one-day version of the collaborative training program. They implemented this training, together with police. By 2003, Podrugi staffers, together with police had trained over 100 officers (Association of Crisis Centers in Kazakhstan 2003). If changing police culture more broadly is a key task in the democratization of policing, then the issue of domestic violence may help to channel and direct such change in unexpected ways. One way to influence police culture is to allow for opportunities and tools to humanize officers in the context of their work, and at the same time to educate the public about their capabilities and limits. This does not mean that police units will become more open overnight, nor should they. But it does mean that, through issues such as violence against women, law enforcement units may begin a collaborative dialogue and engage in efforts with civic partners that can gradually lead to longer term reform. Conclusions: Opportunities and Challenges Clearly there is no magic pill that can be administered to formerly Soviet societies that can quickly wipe away the symptoms of totalitarian thinking and practice. Most observers of the collapse of communism in East Europe and Eurasia note that democratic tendencies, or the desire for democracy at the broadest levels of society, drove much of the sweeping changes of 1989 and 1991. Central Asia, however, still has the same individuals in power positions, and by and large has been quite slow to reform both the notion of authority and the practice of governing. But direct engagement with Western counterparts at lower levels of formal government can produce lasting impressions and lessons learned. The domestic violence training


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program, through its format, content and spirit, was not only instrumental in helping solve the specific problem of domestic abuse, but also valuable in nurturing an understanding of new concepts of citizenship, representation and cooperation in a democratic context. A key question is certainly how dependent these new partnerships are upon continued US support in the form of additional training programs. It may be promising to note that Podrugi, and other organizations, had established ties with individuals in the MVD prior to the implementation of FSU’s project. But one cannot ignore the fact that the development project described here amplified existing linkages and helped to direct them and improve them. Can these initial moves sustain them? The outlook is not good. Funding for law enforcement training in this region is not growing. Resources are being directed toward other areas of conflict around the globe, in particular the continuing crisis in Iraq and in the Middle East. Building sustained partnerships that intimately connect law enforcement with civic organizations at local levels and on local issues should be a primary and ongoing strategy on the part of the US to encourage democratization in the formerly Soviet republics. Projects focused on the formerly Soviet states of Central Asia are as much about demonstrating loyalties and intentions against mutual threats as they are about promoting democracy at the local level. Balancing these initiatives is important for the long term success of future efforts. The US government would do well to invest in more mid- and lower-level cross-cultural law enforcement training efforts, not only in Central Asia, but in Eastern Europe as well. At the same time, the growing marginality of domestic violence as an issue in the US might suggest that the future impact of such training may also be limited. What are perceived to be more pressing problems of organized crime, human trafficking and juvenile delinquency currently receives the greater attention of the public’s and media’s eye. Nevertheless, the training project for law enforcement on domestic violence in Kazakhstan resulted in improved police/NGO relationships, and the growth of social capital between these groups. These new networks may also provide a model for linking democratization and police in countries of the former Soviet Union. Training projects funded by the US and Western other countries may be effective on levels beyond the explicit goals of the development effort, such as changing the norms of reciprocity and increasing the level of trust between stakeholders. For example, Kazakhstani police not only learned about the role and functions of NGOs, but also about how to respond to issues of violence and crime that go beyond usual forms of police intervention. Their own colleagues began to demonstrate to them the value of working with community groups, with schools and citizen outreach programs, with shelters and crisis centers, with media representatives focused on public awareness and with politicians who control local and regional budgets. By collaborating with new NGOs in the training of their officers, Kazakhstani police administrators gained important knowledge about how to better communicate with the public, how to increase the effectiveness of local but limited resources and how to seek new opportunities for their departments by lobbying government officials

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on issues of international concern. All of these actions, however modest, may suggest a strengthening of nascent democratic principles in a formerly totalitarian state. Notes 1 See Putnam (2000) on the concept of social capital and its recent decline in the US 2 Galeotti (2003) describes how Russia’s MVD has been changed following the Federation’s experience with Chechen terrorism. Kazakhstan, while in a region considered to be an active zone for terrorist organizations and activities, has not experienced any significant problems. Uighur nationalists from Western China have comprised the most recent terrorist actions in Almaty. 3 There still remains a need for more research on policing in the USSR and in the successor states following the collapse of the Soviet system. Available studies in English have focused mainly on the organization of law enforcement and its role as a security apparatus (Conquest 1968, Knight 1988). Frank (1999) provides a comprehensive history of crime and justice in rural Russia, in the period prior to the rise of the Soviet Union. 4 This substantial transformation arrived in 1991, after the abortive coup attempt that ushered in the leadership of Russian President Boris Yeltsin resulting in the quick collapse of the Soviet Union. That same year, Kazakhstan declared independence from the USSR. 5 These population figures are from the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Statistics, 2001. There are officially 132 ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest metropolitan area has a population of over 1.1 million, with a much larger percentage of Russian and other non-Central Asian ethnic groups. 6 Much of the scholarship on police perhaps places too large an emphasis on the systemic questions rather than on local experience in context. Most studies on crime and disorder in the former Soviet region address the growing problem of organized crime (CSCE 1994; Galeotti 2002; Handelman 1994, 1995; Oleinik 2003; Serio 1992; Volkov 1999) but do not cover other emerging social problems link to an increase in other types of crime. 7 Comparatively, petty corruption among police officers may pale in comparison to other branches of the criminal justice system. One prosecutor rumored to be the recipient of bribes, drove around town in an expensive SUV, wore imported clothes, jewelry and exhibited other forms of conspicuous consumption. Whether she was actually taking bribes is not known, but the fact remains that the public considers bribery to be ubiquitous, and a practice that undermines civilian views of law enforcement authority. One civilian informant joked that “of course the police are democratic. It doesn’t matter who you are. We all must pay them a bribe.” 8 See for example Serio (2002) on the rise of computer crime in post-Soviet Russia. 9 Reports of repression have appeared in Christian-oriented media outlets. 10 Under the broader label of violence against women, INL combined the problem of human trafficking with the problem of violence in the home because staff felt these two issues were linked. By 1998, Congress earmarked $3 million in assistance funds for INL focused on the former Soviet states. 11 This grant, INL #S-OPRAQ-98-H-N163, was awarded to the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Florida State University. 12 Domestic violence training for law enforcement had been developing in the US for about a decade (Buzawa and Buzawa 1990, Shepard and Pence 1998). While there were several models being used at this time, most of the focus had been on training police about


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the basics of the issue and how best to respond to the problem. For example, a pro-arrest policy, which emerged as part of a coordinated effort model in Duluth, Minnesota, was a standard feature of this training. Victim services, which were being formulated, implemented and improved largely by activists and staff of NGOs, were only beginning to be included in these training efforts. The key feature of US practice was focused on coordinating community responses. This entailed bringing together various agencies and groups to better assist victims of violence and to address the behavior of batterers. Domestic violence, as a police issue, and as a criminal justice protocol, was slowly becoming a standard part of law enforcement culture. 13 Western Kazakhstan poses special problems for police. Western contractors are currently working in this region.


Chapter 9

The Role of the Police in Promoting the Rule of Law Heath Grant John Jay College of Criminal Justice City College of New York

Jane Grabias National Strategy Information Center

Roy Godson Georgetown University National Strategy Information Center

Introduction Traditional responses to developing professional police forces in democracies have focused on the development of skills necessary to respond to crime such as firearms tactics, criminal procedure, human rights law, investigation, and the like. While each of these areas are essential, changing the necessary attitudes and behaviors of police corps also requires building an appreciation in officers of the importance of community collaboration in effective and professional police work. Rather than lecture oriented training protocols, any effort at true attitude and skill development related to police support for the community and rule of law requires interactive formats that challenge officers to think critically about important issues and challenges to policing in their area. For sustainable results beyond the academy, training should be contextualized to the local dynamics and be part of larger reform efforts to support the rule of law within the police agency itself, as well as society as a whole. This chapter will outline the logic of a new approach to police training that has emerged from some international best practices in police training, professionalization, and community policing. Traditional View of the Role of the Police in Society Throughout the history of policing, democratic reformers have sought to professionalize the police as a means to reduce corruption and increase effectiveness of law enforcement (Kelling and Moore 1988b). However, during the past twenty

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years, “professionalization” has generally referred to improved training and education of cadets, as well as the development of in-service training programs for experienced police officers. The collection and analysis of crime and victimization statistics have also been enhanced through the adoption of computerized management systems. Most notably, increased attention to human rights has led to the development of a variety of legal education courses for all levels of police on the rights and proper treatment of victims and suspects (Crawshaw and Holstrom 2001). Growing out of these reforms, a major shift in the focus of democratic police work occurred: crime control – reducing the levels of all types of serious and petty crimes – was seen as the principal goal of the police (Grant and Terry 2005; Walker 1977; Fogelson 1977). Concerns categorized as “public order” problems, such as loitering in public areas, arguments in the street, or soliciting by vendors and children, were more likely to be seen as nuisances or distractions. These “citizen concerns” were viewed as being outside the purview of “professional” policing. Many police officers believed these public annoyances were better handled by local neighborhood associations or by other branches of the government, such as health or other welfare ministries. The hypothesis of this “professional” model of police posits that an increase in police activity and patrol alone can reduce crime (Wiatrowski 2005; Wilson 1950). This encompasses a variety of police operations: increased police presence through motor vehicle or foot patrol, random checkpoints, saturation patrols, and criminal investigations in response to incidents, to name a few. In this approach, increased public insecurity generates calls for more police to patrol the streets or investigate crime, increased salaries for police, and improvements in information technologies, among other proposals (Ericson 1982; Chevigny 1995). Politicians, journalists, and citizens in very different countries around the world echo this every day. Public pressure for more police or improvements in police information technologies contributes to important and necessary reforms. Collectively, these reforms provide more resources for public security and focus public attention on real problems. They increase the capacity of the police to respond to crime. Increasing the numbers of police on the street or those deployed to specialized directed units can also have an impact on crime. In the case of open air drug or gun markets, when police patrol a targeted area around the clock, there is an immediate deterrent effect (Barker et al 1993; Burney 1990; Sherman and Rogan 1995; Zimmer 1990). Unfortunately, this is only a short-term solution. Without understanding or addressing the factors contributing to the crime problem at a particular location, exploring the reasons why people commit those crimes, or why an individual was victimized when these emergency resources are removed, crime usually returns. In most cases, the resources eventually will be taken away because it is very costly to maintain a sustained police presence in any defined geographic area. In the case of drug markets, the sellers may move to another community or inside a nearby building. Rather than resolving the problem in the long term, this type of response to crime can actually make it more difficult to address (Curtis and Wendel 2000).

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Adding Community Participation to Crime Control Favorable views on the efficacy of increased anticrime resources generally persist, even though studies undertaken by academics and practitioners consistently show that most of the average police officer’s day-to-day activities do not revolve around crime (Whitaker 1982; Bayley 1994; Cordner and Hale 1992). Police spend most of their time handling a diverse set of circumstances involving citizens and their “public order” concerns. These include breaking up fights, issuing traffic tickets, or providing service referrals (e.g., to the mental health, welfare, or sanitation departments). The same is true for the responsibilities of the preventive police in Sinaloa and in other parts of Mexico, as well as for specialized police functions such as investigators or narcotics police. Research has shown that the presence of better equipped police in a neighborhood – a reactive response to crime – generally has a very small impact overall on reducing crime, lowering citizens’ fear of victimization, or improving citizen satisfaction with the police (Kelling et al 1974). A study by the RAND Corporation revealed that only 3 percent of crimes are solved exclusively by straightforward police investigative work. The vast majority – 97 percent of crimes – are solved because citizens report crimes and provide information (Chaiken et al 1977). These dramatic statistics show that the police need the active participation and support of their communities in order to be effective. This is an important fact for police everywhere to recognize. A recent poll of Mexico City residents underlines the need for a broadened philosophy of policing – one that promotes the trust and cooperation of citizens with the police. This survey found that 70 percent of respondents do not trust the police, and that 88 percent of all crimes go unreported (ICESI 2005). Another survey found that 57 percent of people who reported a crime to the authorities responded that they were in fact afraid to do so (Mexico Unido 2004). This lack of willingness among citizens even to report crimes and the resulting disconnect between the police and the community clearly has a negative impact on the ability of the police to respond to crime and develop effective crime-prevention programs. However, police need citizens’ support beyond their willingness to report crimes or provide information on specific incidents. Police rely on citizens to follow societal laws and rules when there is little or no police presence. Even with the best-trained agents and adequate resources, the police cannot be everywhere at every moment to prevent crime or intervene. Without citizen support for the law, the police would have to rely on coercive tactics to maintain order (Tyler 1990; Godson 2000). Such tactics – random questioning and searches of pedestrians, assumption of guilt and not innocence – would inevitably diminish the civil rights of citizens. This situation also has the potential to promote a vicious cycle in which people are less likely to support the police because they feel they are not being treated with dignity or respect. In these circumstances, when people do obey the law, they do so out of fear. A society characterized by mistrust – of police toward citizens, and of citizens toward police – decreases incentives for productive collaboration with either the police or with one’s friends and neighbors.

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Increasing recognition of the need to address crime proactively, with citizen support and participation, led to the development of problem-oriented policing strategies (Goldstein 1977). In problem-oriented policing, the police deploy patrol officers to specific areas that have been identified as crime “hotspots.” In addition, the police collaborate with other city agencies, residents, and local businesses to analyze the conditions that lead to community problems. This makes the police better equipped and informed to develop responses to crime and order problems that can achieve sustainable, long-term reductions in crime and improvements to the overall quality of life for all. An example of this community-wide approach – encompassing both crime control and public disorder – is demonstrated by what are called “Weed and Seed” programs in the United States. Weed and Seed strategies have two components. First, they target small, clearly defined areas that have been seriously affected by gang activity, drug abuse, and various types of violent crime. Usually, they begin with a traditional law enforcement response, such as intensive patrols or undercover operations. Collaboration between prosecutors and police then seeks to “weed out” serious and chronic offenders. “Quality-of-life enforcement” efforts often form part of this effort to eliminate crime and disorder in a community (for example, holding absentee landlords responsible for their tenants’ criminal activities). Such programs often involve other city agencies. Second, recognizing that crime in a particular area often has many causes, police-community collaborations plant the “seed” of revitalization in the community through a combination of prevention and intervention activities. These may include community clean-up campaigns, programs to help people make a better adjustment from jail or prison upon their return home (reentry programs), and school-based prevention efforts. Community policing activities seek to promote long-term collaborations that promote information sharing and problem solving between police and the residents they serve.1 Contributions of the Police to Upholding the Rule of Law How can the police foster and sustain the support from the community that is fundamental to effective crime prevention and response? Research and experience show the importance of both formal and informal collaboration on crime prevention between various sectors of the community and the police (Sherman et al 1997; Sheppard et al 2000). The police have an essential function in a democratic society governed by the rule of law. Part of their role in a rule-of-law society is, of course, ensuring that no one is above the law, and that individuals or groups do not violently assert their will over public order. However, police responsibilities extend far beyond this. They are the primary contact that citizens have with government and the justice system. Policing in accordance with the rule of law means that each police officer treats


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all individuals (both victims and offenders) in accordance with the values that are embodied within the rule of law: fairness, dignity, and respect. Given their highly visible public place in society, police are central in shaping the attitudes and behavior of others by offering their own actions as examples (Tyler and Huo 2004; Skogan 1990). The police themselves first need to understand what the rule of law is. Given the different educational standards for recruitment internationally, this basic knowledge cannot be taken for granted. Second, for this knowledge to influence their behavior, they have to believe in the ability of the rule of law to improve the quality of life for all members of society. The important role that police can have in shaping community attitudes toward the law has often been documented. Many studies have found that when citizens feel they are likely to be treated fairly by the police, they are also more likely to support the decisions of the police even if the outcome is not to their personal advantage (Huo and Tyler 2000; Skogan 1990). Some may think, “People will not support the police because every time we interact with them we are being made to do something we don’t want to do. The police give us traffic tickets, ask us to move along, turn down our music, and so forth.” The reality is that if we believe we have been treated with dignity and professionalism by the police officer who is giving us the traffic ticket, our attitudes towards the police will not become more negative as a result of personal experience. This same research also indicates that support for the police is directly related to a general willingness to follow the rules and laws of society – in other words, it is related to a culture of lawfulness. To bring our discussion to Mexico, let’s consider the results of the evaluation of school-based culture of lawfulness programs in Sinaloa. Of students who took the course, 87 percent said they would be more likely to support the police if the police upheld the rule of law in their words and actions (Kenney et al 2005). Public support for law enforcement is obviously influenced by high-profile cases of police corruption or involvement in narcotrafficking that appear in the media. However, police routinely taking relatively small bribes, police apathy to citizen concerns, and unprofessional conduct have far greater effects on citizen belief in the rule of law. These are the situations that citizens are most likely to encounter in day-to-day interactions with the police, and which have the greatest influence over personal opinions. Police power is not just about the use of force, which typically comes first to mind. The greatest police power derives from their ability to teach others correct behavior by example, to pass on values to society by representing the best that the rule of law has to offer: fairness, justice, and dignity (Caldero and Crank 2004; McDonald 1993). A note of caution: Most police officers set out with noble intentions to take “the bad guys” off the streets, respond to victims, and ensure the safety and quality of life of communities. Yet however serious or heinous the crime, engaging in illegal tactics to catch and put in jail a known criminal – planting evidence, subjecting suspects to physical violence, lying in written testimony – can never be justified. Further, such tactics constitute a major threat to the rule of law (Wood 2004; Kleinig 2002). Illegal

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behavior by police demonstrates to citizens that government can interfere in people’s lives with impunity and without regard for the constraints of rule of law. Although the goal of crime control is essential to the healthy functioning of society, it must be balanced with citizens’ right to due process embodied in the rule of law. Knowledge of the rule of law is merely the foundation for the greater need by the police to believe in its importance, their role in promoting it in the community, and the importance of citizen participation and collaboration. How do we achieve those goals? Fostering Cultural Change in Favor of the Rule of Law Police reforms typically focus on modifying the structures and rules that govern police activity: expanding or limiting functions of police entities, creating new offices (such as oversight mechanisms to address corruption), restructuring the bureaucracy to foster transparency or clarity of roles, increasing salaries of police officers, increasing funds to public security sector, or hiring more police (Rawlings and Stanko 1995). Many of these reforms are necessary. The legal basis and structures of the justice system need to be clear, strong, and predictable. Police need to be empowered to do their job. However, these reforms do not fundamentally change the institution itself, which is embodied in each individual police officer. What we are talking about is a need to change police culture. The role of the police is more expansive than merely providing “law and order.” In addition to addressing crime, they are responsible for encouraging and teaching citizens by setting an example as responsible, law-abiding members of society. Public security encompasses both crime control – reacting to crime that has occurred – and problem solving – working to prevent new problems from developing. In both cases, productive community partnerships are required in order for any policy to be consistently effective (Chan 1997). This expanded philosophy of policing should be reflected in the attitudes and beliefs of each individual police officer as well as in the institution as a whole. Attaining this goal would represent a significant cultural shift for police agencies in many emerging or consolidating democracies today. Education in the Rule of Law for Police Rule of law education is designed to equip new or experienced police officers with the knowledge, attitudes, and skills they need to become effective leaders. It aims to help shape police officers who, through their example and their actions, foster widespread societal support for the rule of law – known as a culture of lawfulness.2 Police, due to the highly visible and sensitive nature of their work, are on the front lines of this effort. They need to act as role models for citizens, demonstrating correct and lawful behavior in the performance of their duties. They also need to act as community leaders in promoting support for rules and law.


Knowledge-Based Goals: 1) Understand the rule of law. Explain how it helps all members of society, including the weakest. Distinguish rule of law from rule by law. 2) Understand a culture of lawfulness. Explain how it helps support the rule of law and improve a society’s quality of life. 3) Understand threats to the rule of law, particularly the consequences of exceptions to the rule of law on society as a whole, as well as individuals, families, and the police. 4) Understand the role police can play as individuals and supervisors in marginalizing crime and corruption and fostering a culture of lawfulness.

Help police become informed, convinced, and competent proponents of the rule of law

Attitude-Based Goals: 1) Believe that my actions have consequences that influence my life and the lives of others. 2) Feel a sense of control over my own life. Believe that I have the power to choose whether or not to participate in crime and corruption. 3) Believe that I have a responsibility to society and an obligation to behave lawfully.

Skill-Based Goals: 1) Decision Making: Think critically about actions and their short- and longterm consequences. 2) Problem Solving: Analyze problems; identify appropriate lawful responses. 3) Legal and Moral Reasoning: Weigh claims of competing values and needs. Articulate the principles I use to distinguish “right” from “wrong.”

Figure 9.1 Educational Goals of Rule of Law Training

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Shaping police culture begins in each institution’s academic and training programs. Police values are further reinforced on the street by police colleagues, commanders, and through the consistent (or inconsistent) application of the rules and regulations of the institution. Therefore, as a starting point, education about the rule of law and the culture of lawfulness has the potential to promote positive cultural change among the police. More importantly, this kind of education is considered to be a feasible long-term response to the challenges to police effectiveness (Haberfeld 2004). Education in the rule of law is not just about creating better people. It aims to help develop more professional and effective police forces whose every action is based on shared respect for and belief in the principles of the rule of law. Once internalized, these beliefs can help shape behavior. As a result, rule of law education also gives police different tools and methods for gaining the trust of citizens that they can use and refine throughout their professional lives. Rule of law education aims to achieve three goals: convey knowledge, affect attitudes, and build skills. The previous chart (Figure 9.1) demonstrates how these three educational goals work in unison. Each one, on its own, is of useful but limited value. Collectively, however, they contribute to the development of police who, as individuals and officers, value the rule of law and act in ways that uphold it. The foundation of a culture of lawfulness curriculum is building knowledge: therefore, cadets should understand the values and principles underpinning the rule of law and the culture of lawfulness so they can speak clearly and intelligently to community members about this shared societal ideal. In addition, we expect they will realize that police who respect the rule of law enjoy more citizen support and assistance; police who violate the rule of law only make their jobs more difficult and more dangerous. Armed with this knowledge, cadets become aware of how their behavior as police can enhance or undermine support for the rule of law, and how citizen support can make policing more effective. Simultaneously, the program should try to foster attitudes and beliefs in favor of the rule of law and the culture of lawfulness. The goal is to encourage cadets to think critically about their identity as police, and why rule of law is important to their jobs and their dual identities as policeman and citizen. They should believe in the importance of community participation in police work and accept that their role is to help change their society and maintain cooperative relationships. A program with the capacity to change the attitudes towards the rule of law is not simply promoting blind obedience to the law or a belief that current societal structures are fine as they are, regardless of the context of corruption, violations of human rights, and so on. Rather, officers should be challenged to think critically about the imperfections that exist within their local context, as well as their own role in influencing closer adherence to the ideal of the rule of law in practice. A major part of this will involve the recognition of how their own actions impact the needed level of citizen support discussed above. Finally, the program should help cadets put their beliefs into action after graduation from the academy. Given the challenges of responding lawfully and effectively to citizens’ needs in dangerous and complex environments, police should be equipped


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with some basic skills. These include problem solving, critical thinking, legal reasoning, and communication. In the curriculum, participants are confronted with moral dilemmas based on real-life situations they may well encounter in the field. Case studies, both positive and negative, will illustrate the benefits – and challenges – of working with the community. Finally, police will be asked to consider some difficult questions that they, their colleagues, or the public might ask: “Why should I be the first one to respect the rule of law? Why shouldn’t I take bribes if everyone around me does?” The interactive methodology of culture of lawfulness education is just as important as the content of the program. Participants, whether they are new cadets or experienced officers, are encouraged to participate actively and critically as much as possible to encourage their evolution into informed, convinced, and competent proponents of the rule of law. In addition, this methodology helps achieve several learning objectives at the same time – participants build skills and attitudes toward the rule of law while also imparting information and knowledge. A typical rule of law education course for an entry-level patrol cadet might cover the following general topics: 1) the role of the police in a democracy; 2) the rule of law and a culture of lawfulness; 3) the roots of a culture of lawfulness (e.g., values, norms, customs, and laws); 4) challenges to effective policing and threats to the rule of law; and 5) promoting a culture of lawfulness in the community. The course is designed to have a practical, concrete effect on cadets’ work when they become police. Cadets are expected to gain knowledge, learn skills, and understand the material to the point that it affects their attitudes toward their work. Instructors are prepared to utilize a variety of interactive and dynamic techniques in the classroom (e.g., ethical dilemmas or role-playing) to assess cadets’ progress in these areas. Conclusion What kind of police culture will rule of law education promote? Together, complementary education programs for cadets, active police, and commanders can help foster an organizational culture in which crime and corruption are discouraged, and police are rewarded for upholding and promoting the law. Of course, education does not occur in a vacuum. While police education provides an essential foundation, long-term comprehensive reforms are still needed. Knowledge, attitudes, and skills need to be supported and reinforced by police supervisors in the field and institutional mechanisms such as performance evaluations. It is also important to emphasize that the police are not responsible for everything. True, through their job they are tasked with building citizen respect for the rule of law, crime prevention, crime control, and so forth. But promoting a culture of lawfulness – widespread societal support for the rule of law – is the shared responsibility of all members of society, both government and civil society (Godson 2000; Orlando 2001; Sherman et al 1997; Walker 2001). The police are one element of what must

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be a society-wide integrated strategy to improve respect for the rule of law and improve the quality of life for everyone. Although culture of lawfulness training for police can draw upon the best practices of other countries, it will only be successful the extent to which it is tailored to and reflects the local contexts of policing within a given society. While part of this will require modifying the types of activities and examples presented in the curriculum, it will also involve providing interactive forums for officers to critically think about local challenges to policing and arrive at possible solutions or proposals for change on their own. This, in turn, must in the long term be supported by larger reforms within the agency and society itself. Promoting a culture of lawfulness is ultimately about leading by example. For the police, values are transmitted from commanding officer to patrolman, patrolman to community. Working together, all can accomplish more. Notes 1 Another example of a comprehensive strategy involving the police and multiple sectors of society is the Boston Gun Project. A broad coalition of religious leaders, businesses, residents, and law enforcement agencies from federal, state, and local levels sought to reduce escalating gun violence in the most affected areas of the city. In addition to traditional police efforts such as enhanced ballistics tracing and disruption of gun markets, police collaborated with the probation department for the first time to ensure the intensive supervision of high-risk gun offenders. A Youth Service Providers Network matched offenders to needed rehabilitative services, a street gang outreach service, among other programs. Indicative of the success of the model, deaths involving both youths and guns decreased from 152 in 1989 to 23 in 1998. For more information, see Promising Strategies to Reduce Gun Violence, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1999. 2 The four key elements of the rule of law are: 1) the laws apply equally to everyone, regardless of economic, political, or social status; 2) there is a formal means for people to participate in changing the laws; 3) the laws protect the rights of each individual, as well as the interests of society as a whole; and 4) the law provides a formal means of enforcing the law and of sanctioning violators with established punishments.

PART 3 Conclusion


Chapter 10

Conclusion Nathan W. Pino Texas State University – San Marcos


The case studies presented in this book provide important lessons for those who are trying to democratize police forces in transitional and developing countries. Democratic policing must be implemented as part of a comprehensive plan to promote democracy in countries around the world. Community and governmental policies based on the principles of democracy need to be bolstered with social and human capital-building and other goals presented in the first part of this book. There must be an interaction between the community and the government. In a democracy they represent two levels of decision making by those who create this system. Responsiveness to local problems, appropriate resources, acknowledgment of local initiatives, and the development of the capacity to do this are imperative, and institutional structures must be able to support it. The countries presented in the case studies have unique national histories, and therefore also have unique policing histories and traditions. Histories of ethnonational conflict, colonialism, and an unaccountable police force resulted in regime policing in Northern Ireland. Recent policing reforms there arose out of the Good Friday Agreement and are one part of the overall peace process. A recurring theme is the intransigent and self-defined nature of police culture and the massive difficulty in transforming non-transparent police organizations into institutions that are responsive to the citizens who give them their authority and to whom they must demonstrate their legitimacy. Kazakhstan was once part of the Soviet Union and the police were agents of a coercive state during that time. After independence, much of the power center remained intact. Currently, there is international pressure to engage in a process of democratic and social development. The difficulty is in promoting this process in an environment where there is little precedent for these practices. The same is true of South Africa, which is still haunted, despite numerous improvements, by the legacies of Apartheid, including underdevelopment, massive inequities, and extremely high crime rates. The current situation in Iraq has brought negative impacts on the political and economic health of the nation, inflaming ethnic conflict and shattering prospects for true democratic development. The US must learn a lesson here. While there are legitimate security and economic interest of any nation, the US should make

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sure to help promote the development of democratic values, rather than propping up corrupt autocratic regimes that provide military bases and material resources (such as oil reserves and diamonds), invariably destroying the promise of the overarching principles that the US was founded on. We should promote democratic development based on international models and universal principles of human rights and development. The cultural, political, social and historical context of each country must be taken into account when engaging in democratic and police reform. One strategy will not work in all countries because of the uniqueness of each country, and it is likely that the bulk of reforms should be implemented at the local level in order to achieve maximum effectiveness. National reforms must have specific methods for carrying these reforms down to the level directly responsive to the needs of those at the community level. In this chapter we will outline positive and negative developments in the police reform process in these countries, and the obstacles that these countries face in implementing these reforms. A discussion of the prospects for democratic policing in transitional and developing countries will follow. Obstacles to Reform The obstacles to reform we mentioned in the first chapter are evident in the countries outlined in the case studies. The historical, economic, and political contexts of these countries haunt and hinder reform efforts. Poor budgets and a lack of comprehensive strategies also limit progress. Political and ethnic conflicts exist in some of the examined countries, and ineffective, corrupt, or abusive policing leads to unaccountability, vigilantism and the proliferation of private policing. There are a lack of models, examples, and principles, and it is difficult to incorporate them into community and national structures. At the local level, we should be respecting local initiatives, work with NGOs, and have a proportionate share of resources to accomplish goals. At the national level there should be respect for different cultures, innovation, evaluation, and capacity building. Resentment of Western assistance may grow if it is not sensitive to the local context or responsive to local interests or needs. We advocate that universities should play a leading role through exposing students to international dialogue and seeking their involvement in the development of the country as well. Many countries export their models of policing unilaterally or through UN missions, and in some cases have imposed their models on these countries. Many have been complicit in the para-militarization of police forces and equating security forces with police forces. This has limited the chances that police forces can be democratized. All of the above issues have limited the building of social and human capital and citizen-police interaction and cooperation within a developing democratic model. Iraq has a massive security problem. A guerilla-type insurgency is still active and shows no signs of letting down, and both street and elite forms of crime flourish.

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Some Iraqis are supporting paramilitary forms of policing over a more democratic form seen by many as corrupt and ineffective. The police are constant victims of violence themselves, which obviously disrupts their capacity and resolve. The middle class has been weakened, unemployment is high, and the country is deep in debt. Police training is inadequate, and private policing costs and costs associated with fighting insurgents drain needed resources. The economic and political systems of Iraq are not being formed through a true democratic process, and this means that democratic forms of policing are not likely to take hold. Many of the old police tactics used under authoritarian regimes continue. The current Iraqi case characterized by police failure and the failure to plan demonstrates what happens when we do not comprehensively address policing and related issues, as we have suggested in Part 1. The principles of democracy are not met, and people are not participating in the rebuilding of institutions. Iraq is unable to have the capacity to self-govern or engage in independent socioeconomic development. Officials are not taking advantage of the country’s social and human capital, and ethnic and other forms of conflict do not appear to be managed properly. South Africa has one of the highest crime rates in the world due to its colonial and apartheid legacy. The police there lack legitimacy and are seen as ineffective. This has led to the massive growth in private policing by the rich and the proliferation of vigilantism and gangs among the poor. Crime prevention programs in post-Apartheid South Africa have led to mixed results, hampered by a lack of police capacity and literacy, crimes committed by the police and corruption, the use of aggressive police tactics including paramilitary strategies (with citizens in high crime areas supporting them), and confusion over the functions of citizen groups organized to monitor and advise the police. These strategies have not been well integrated into political, social, and economic development strategies at the local and national level. At the local level massive youth unemployment is coupled with low levels of education. At the national level the police forces are entrenched and difficult to change. The development of new strategies is difficult and their implementation at the local level challenging. Sector policing shows some promise by giving resources to local communities for their policing priorities. It does not go far enough, however, because paramilitary actions are still a part of the overall strategy. This takes police away from sector patrols. The police and repeat criminals know each other too well, and officers and their family members are targets of retaliatory violence. Citizens may privately handle situations through cash payments instead of pressing charges, or simply take justice into their own hands through vigilantism. In Kazakhstan, many who were in power during Soviet rule, including the current President, are still in power. The police force has been slow to change from its highly centralized structure and rampant corruption. There has been a sharp decline in police resources, and the role of the police in the new criminal justice system is not fully understood. Crime rates have increased because of unemployment and the emergence of criminal gangs. There are tensions between the police, prosecutors, and judges. The police lack legitimacy, and are seen by the public as ineffective

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and corrupt. Foreign funding for police training has been reduced as resources have been directed toward other objectives. These problems are exacerbated as borders are opened and ethnic identity becomes increasingly important among the populace. Groups compete for positions in government, access to foreign aid, and foreign investment. If this is not done equitably, nations can fracture along ethnic and religious lines. Ethno-national conflict haunts the peace process and police reform in Northern Ireland. While the Patten report calls for democratic policing, some have criticized the plan because in the state model of policing multiple levels of policing were not established to better confront the ethnic conflicts. There are also questions about the state as a source of human rights and its ability to protect individual rights. Implementation of police reform has fallen short of the goals laid out in the Patten Report. For example, nodal governance was not implemented, and Sinn Fein has refused to participate on the policing board because policing power has not devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Police power remains in the hands of the Northern Ireland secretary, who is a UK representative. Some in the unionist community also question the reform process. Power over policing will not be devolved until paramilitary violence is reduced, but at the same time paramilitary organizations do not want to disband until police power is devolved. Promising Developments In South Africa, sector policing based on problem-solving and community policing strategies has provided some small successes. In some places such as Soweto, citizens of Naledi extension formed a community anti-crime association. Sub-precincts, where new recruits who did not know the old police or their tactics, came to know residents and identified repeat offenders. There are some promising developments in Kazakhstan as well. The police training outlined by Snajdr in this volume involves training the trainers, collaboration with community members and others in the criminal justice system, and sensitivity to female empowerment and the cultural context. International pressure helped push for domestic violence training for the police. This helped reinforce the idea of a human rights approach embedded in policing. As the police, community, and NGO members interacted, trust and networking was built and enhanced which created social capital for future efforts even when resources were small. Through this process, the police felt they were making a difference and learned to work with others in the community to reduce crime and other forms of violence. These positive experiences show that foreign assistance can work if there is a genuine commitment to democratic principles, if local actors are a part of the process, and if the cultural context is taken into account. Lessons from cultural anthropology and other disciplines not directly related to policing may be used to improve police training and education. As Engel points out with respect to Northern Ireland, consociational democracy and nodal governance may be viable alternatives in places with histories of conflict.

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Human rights and other important features of democratic policing were a part of the Patten Report. For the first time they were trying to integrate and elevate human rights into a core principle of police training. Police reform and the peace process are part of the same process in Northern Ireland. This is important because policing was part of the perpetuation of the conflict in Northern Ireland. An independent commission came up with the reforms. The reforms call for core principles in a democratic model of policing such as accountability, transparency, public participation, adherence to human rights standards, and equity and fairness in police strategies and behavior. The Policing Board and the District Policing Partnerships appear to work well, but all actors must be on board for it to work best. The board is a representative civilian board that actually has the authority to set policies and goals for the police. Most Policing Board documents are available for public scrutiny online. They also tried to put more Catholics on the police force to create a more representative agency. All of these make the oath officers take more meaningful. Heath Grant and his colleagues’ rule-of-law training programs reinforce the idea to trainees that as public servants they play an essential function in upholding democracy and the rule of law. The police can also play a role in shaping community attitudes. If the police treat the people with fairness, the police will gain legitimacy and the people are more likely to work with the police. The police also learn that planting evidence, beating suspects, and other abuses of power are a major threat to the rule of law. Training must work to change police culture, and focusing on knowledge, attitude, and skill-based goals comprehensively can help the police become supporters of the rule of law. Unfortunately, promising developments in Iraq are hard to find. However, many inside and outside the country are concerned for Iraq’s future. Continued non-violent resolve against corruption, the violent insurgency, and a commitment to human rights and development, might provide Iraqis hope. Iraqis must be involved in their own development. Prospects for the Future A central thesis of our work is that the police play a special role in society. They have the legal ability to use force, restrict freedom, and take life in the protection of a larger social good. The police are the first stage in the process of the administration of justice. This capacity must be monitored carefully. The role of the police in recent history in racial and labor oppression and domestic intelligence abuse indicates the extent to which the police as a social institution must be held to a special level of accountability. We note that policing exhibits many of the characteristics of a trade or craft and that it has not been affected by critical self-examination or by transformation. Efforts toward change have typically been generated externally in the face of wide-spread failure of the police to control crime, effectively utilize allocated resources, control police corruption and violence, or to improve integrity. We also acknowledge that periodically the police place their lives in danger by responding

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to dangerous situations, and their lives can be lost in senseless violence. But other occupations are subjected to similar risks and that does not entitle them to a special dispensation or decreased accountability for their actions. We must transform policing by placing it in a context that frames police behavior against the principles of a democratic society: the rule of law, legitimacy, transparency, accountability, and subordination to civil authority. Policing in the United States is massively decentralized and the level of “professionalism” in the profession is very low. The police should be no different than other institutions such as education systems, the economic or distribution system, the legal system, and so forth. Other components of the criminal justice system must also conform to democratic principles if policing is to be properly reformed. Unfortunately, policing does little internal research and development. It does not have an infrastructure like medicine that supports research in specific areas. What limited research funds are available are likely to be directed toward political ends. From what we can tell, the National Institute of Justice does not appear to have a general interest in examining and developing the social functions of the police. When these institutions become non-transparent and unaccountable they are subject to abuse and corruption. The police can easily act in opposition to democratic values. This opposition may be a vestige of their paramilitary orientation. It may also reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of their role in the community and the misplaced “war on crime” mentality. The American military has been involved in a recurring series of lessons it has learned (in varying degrees) on the relationship between winning the war and winning the peace. The failure to plan for and win the peace can have catastrophic consequences, as the war in Iraq demonstrates on a daily basis with the loss of American and Iraqi lives. Police around the world need to be aware of this history and realize that they cannot reduce crime alone. We have argued that the police should respond to crime by working with citizens, caring for victims, mitigating fear, collecting evidence and building a case that supports the administration of justice. The police should work equally hard to exonerate as to convict. To argue that the police are warriors in a war on crime is a terrible analogy and potentially destructive to their social role as an extension of civil society and social order. These larger roles are more difficult to embed in policing because policing is a closed culture and the police actively work to keep it closed through political activism. The police should respond to crime and have a role in crime prevention at the community level. They can promote development in the community through the provision of citizen security, and therefore must integrate their efforts with other community efforts. One of the problems any society confronts is how to balance majority-minority rights. Democracies are not simply based on majority rule because they protect individual rights including those of women and minorities. In globalizing economies and societies, we will see that large-scale population migration will increasingly become a social reality. The collapse of empires in England and France has resulted in populations moving from colonial lands to the lands of the colonizers. Boundaries drawn by colonizers have put groups with histories of ethnic conflict in nation

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states of violently conflicting passions. But this form of conflict also existed before colonialism as groups became powerful, expanded, and controlled new territories. The police must contend with this migration and ethnic conflict in a way that supports democratic values. The problem of regime policing is nothing new, and paramilitary tactics have been justified as a part of community or democratic policing in the past. Human rights have often been isolated from the discussion on democratic or community policing even though human rights are the premise for democracy. The rise of democratic systems provides an alternative to the extremes of ideological and economic exploitation. Economic freedom is not the same as democratic freedom, however. Economic systems must be understood and controlled as they have the potential not only to generate huge amounts of wealth but also to concentrate it in the hands of a few. As we see in Iraq, South Africa, and numerous other countries, problems of social disorganization, vigilantism, and ineffectively monitored civilian policing, corruption, and underdevelopment prevent success. We argue that democracy means an expansion of freedom, which includes the freedom to work, to educate children, to live in a safe community, and to be actively involved in decision-making. Democracy can be seen as a fragile web of relationships that are systematically severed in totalitarian and autocratic societies. That is why we expended considerable effort in articulating the principles of democracy and how the police can promote them. Ideally, as societies become more democratic, have less inequality, and provide for security, democratic development and the nurturing of social and other forms of capital can occur. All of these developments can reduce the social disorganization that is known to cause crime. The United States is a continuing experiment in democratic development as the world’s first mass democracy. This does not mean that we have all of the answers, or that others can replicate our experience. What we can export are the underlying principles that we have sought to articulate, and that policing can support democratic development by providing for the safety and security of the people.


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