Capacity Building in Developing Countries
Capacity Building in Developing Countries HUMAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS EDITED BY
Valentine Udoh James
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Capacity building in developing countries : human and environmental dimensions / edited by Valentine Udoh James. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–275–95791–8 (alk. paper) 1. Sustainable development—Developing countries. 2. Developing countries—Social policy. 3. Developing countries—Economic policy. 4. Medical policy—Developing countries. 5. Environmental policy— Developing countries. I. James, Valentine Udoh, 1952– . HD75.6.C357 1998 338.9'009172'4—dc21 97–33707 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright 1998 by Valentine Udoh James All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 97–33707 ISBN: 0–275–95791–8 First published in 1998 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7
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To Comfort Akai Inyang for many years of assistance during my fieldwork in Nigeria and for the hospitality she and her husband extended during my sojourns in Nigeria.
Contents
Tables and Figures
xi
Preface
xv
Acknowledgments 1. Building the Capacities of Developing Nations through Empowerment Valentine Udoh James
xvii
1
I. Sociopolitical Issues 2. Ethnicity in the Politics of a Nation: Nigeria and the Problems of Social Transformation Babatunde Oyinade
13
3. The State and Interplay of Gender and Class on the Emergence of Women as Political Leaders in Developing Countries Ifeyinwa E. Umerah-Udezulu
27
4. The Difficulty of Consensus Building in Developing Countries: The African Dilemma Valentine Udoh James and Melanie Marshall James
47
5. Democratization and the Grass Roots: The Case of the Jomoro District Assembly Cyril K. Daddieh
56
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II. Economic Issues 6. Economic Theory and the Growth Ethic: Proposals for Alternative Measures of Economic Performance Michael A. Burayidi 7. A Reassessment of the Impact of Structural Adjustment in Ghana Benjamin Asare and Clifford L. Staten 8. Pineapple Production, Labor, and Marketing Relations in the Periurban Economy of Accra, Ghana Cyril K. Daddieh 9. Maintaining the African Wealth: A Natural and Human Resource Sustainability Issue Valentine Udoh James
79 90
99
129
III. Development Issues 10. Modernizing Influences and Traditional Villages in Sarawak: The Need for a Paradigm Shift in Development Strategies Lee Boon Thong and Tengku Shamsul Bahrin 11. Exceptional Kerala: Efficient and Sustainable Human Behavior William Alexandra
143 152
12. Measuring Development Policy Organizational Effectiveness in Third World Countries Ambe J. Njoh
175
13. Communications and Democratic Governance for Sustainable Development in Africa Nwafo Nwanko and Babatunde Oyinade
194
14. The Role of Indigenous Education in Development: The Tanzanian Case Charles Bwenge
206
15. The Role of Food Self-Sufficiency in Sustainable Development in Africa in Readiness for the Twenty-First Century Bassey Ekpono
216
16. Management Capacity Building: A Strategic Imperative for African Development in the Twenty-First Century Felix Edoho
228
17. Manpower Development in Nigeria: A Research Note on the University James Etim
252
ix
18. Rural Population and Economic Development in Africa: An Analysis of Some Policy Issues Paul Kanjo and Agber Dimah
267
References Index
287 307
About the Contributors
319
Tables and Figures
TABLES 1.1
Global Health Expenditure, 1990
1.2
Strategies for Early Childhood Care and Development
5.1
Educational Level of Respondents
5.2
Occupational Background of Respondents
64
5.3
Monthly Income of Respondents
65
5.4
Candidate Campaign Promises
66
5.5
Number of Political Meetings Attended
67
5.6
Political/Election Information Sources
68
5.7
Reasons the DA Should Be Nonpartisan
69
5.8
Number of Meetings Held by District Assemblyman
71
5.9
Responses to the Question: ‘‘Did You Attend a DA Meeting?’’
72
5.10
Candidate Choice in 1992 Presidential Vote
73
5.11
Main Election Issues: Local Level
74
5.12
Main Election Issues: National Level
75
6.1
Alternative Indicators for Measuring Economic Performance and Development
87
6.2
Alternative Indicators for Measuring the Social Impact of Economic Development
88
Environmental Indicators for Measuring the Effect of Development on the Environment
88
Institutional Indicators for Measuring the Effect of Development on Local Autonomy
89
6.3 6.4
4 6 63
xii
Tables and Figures
8.1
Quantities of Major Agricultural, Nontraditional Export Commodities Exported—1988 to 1990
103
8.2
Tenure State of Farms
107
8.3
Distribution of Total Landholdings
109
8.4
Principal Land Use Summary
110
8.5
Food Crops on Farm
111
8.6
Use of Agricultural Inputs
113
8.7
Leading Pineapple Exporters
117
8.8
Technical Advice
119
8.9
Crop Incomes
121
8.10
Distribution of Crop Incomes
122
8.11
Summary of Household Occupations
123
8.12
Household Assets
124
8.13
Household Amenities Present
124
9.1
Contribution of Mining to Selected Sub-Saharan Countries in 1987
134
9.2
Debt-to-Export Ratio
135
11.1
Population, Economics, and Fertility
155
11.2
Infant Mortality, High School Enrollment, and Life Expectancy
156
11.3
Religious Identification in India and Kerala
159
11.4
Sri Lanka Compared with Kerala
160
11.5
Average Nutrient Consumption: Kerala, 1990
165
11.6
Malnutrition of Preschool Girls in Selected Indian States
166
11.7
First World and Kerala Contrasts
169
16.1
Expatriate Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment of Trained Manpower, c. 1967
240
16.2
Incidence of Expatriates in High-Level Manpower in Gambia, 1975
241
16.3
Technical Cooperation Personnel by Category: Selected Countries, 1988(a) or 1989(b)
246
16.4
Types of Technical Cooperation Expenditures: Selected Countries, c. 1989
247
17.1
Growth in Universities by Year and Ownership
253
17.2
Total Student Enrollment in Nigerian Universities by Major Disciplines
254
17.3
First Degree Awards by Nigerian Universities
254
17.4
Postgraduate Awards by Nigerian Universities
255
17.5
Ratio of Manpower Production by Area
256
17.6
Production of Graduates in Engineering and Agriculture as a Percentage of Total Graduates by Year
256
Placements for First Degree Courses by Region and Year
257
17.7
Tables and Figures
xiii
17.8
Number of Applicants and Number of Placements by Year
259
17.9
Estimated Extent of Unsatisfied Demand for University Education in Nigeria, 1980–1983
259
17.10
Percent Undergraduate Engineering Degrees
261
17.11
Perception of Preuniversity Curriculum and Present Curriculum
262
17.12
Students’ Perception of Educational Access
263
17.13
Students’ Educational Fears
263
17.14
Problems of the University System by Rank Order
265
FIGURES 5.1
District Map of Ghana
5.2
Map of Nzimaland
8.1
Map of Ghana Periurban Economy: Survey Area
60 62 102
10.1
Models of Change in Unmobilized Periphery
146
11.1
Map of Kerala, India
153
11.2
Human Behavioral Alternatives
154
11.3
Applying Human Time to Produce High Life Quality
157
11.4
Relation between Rise in Female Literacy and the Decline of Infant Mortality in Kerala
167
Population Pressure Arising from Land Use Patterns and Labor Transportation Difficulties
277
18.1
Preface
The subject of development in Third World countries is a convoluted matter, especially because it involves many participants who have different interests and come to the table of discussion about development with very different viewpoints, expectations, and commitments. For some interested parties, the duration for involvement is for a short term, for others it is for a medium term, and still for some others the involvement is for a long term. For the majority of the developing countries, if not all, many of their development projects have sponsored foreign loans. Thus, the partnership that this type of development fosters may or may not build necessary indigenous capacity needed for sustainable development. Many years of work by governments of developing nations have put into place some significant institutions, social structures, and economic parastatals that are essential in building strong economic growth. However, the current situations for many developing countries could be described as stagnant economic growth or declining economic conditions. The industrialized donor countries have provided some technical assistance from time to time, but such efforts have not really ignited the comprehensive development that is necessary to provide the growth that could propel many developing countries into being major players in the global economic order. The challenge, then, for developing countries, as well as for the assisting/ donor international community, is to attempt to enhance the ability of the people of developing nations to develop essential policies and management skills necessary to build their nations’ human, economic, social, political, and cultural structures so as to take their proper place in global affairs. Sustainable growth requires guidance from trained personnel to assist with the technical skills and knowledge needed to build institutions. These aspects of the society would be
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critical in developing the bases for agriculture, environmental protection, education, health, and human resources. With the growing population in the developing countries, it is essential to build the capacities to meet the needs of the population. The beginning point to fill the gaps in policy analysis and development management, which are the two major areas that need to be addressed, is capacity building. In this volume, the term ‘‘capacity building’’ refers to enabling the indigenous people of developing countries to carry out development processes successfully by empowering them through strengthening domestic institutions, providing domestic markets, and improving local government efforts to sustain infrastructures, social institutions, and commercial institutions. Capacity building also means that we need to recognize indigenous interest groups, encourage local efforts, provide incentives for privatization, and link local, regional, and international strategies to enhance productivity and wise use of natural and human resources. Above all, a ‘‘bottom-up’’ or grassroots effort for sustainable development must be encouraged in developing countries. The grassroots effort begins with the family unit. Capacity building addresses all areas of economic, sociocultural, political, and environmental processes through a holistic approach. The chapters in this book address these important issues of the developing world societies. This book is organized in such a way as to provide the reader an opportunity to examine the ideas surrounding the capacity building concept and to provide country examples of how aspects of development are dealt with in order to sustain development efforts. The main objective of this volume is to explore the problem confronting developing countries when dealing with capacity building in order to guide development for the purposes of sustainability.
Acknowledgments
The idea for this book began as a result of many intense discussions with colleagues who thought that a book on capacity building in developing countries would be timely because of the current global trends in democratization, environmental protection and conservation, resource management, governance/politics, and general economic development. It was obvious to those who listened to my arguments that the thesis of this volume would be that capacity building in developing countries would lessen dependence on external financial and technical assistance. Capacity building would foster indigenous talents and skills and would allow developing nations to direct their destinies through their own policies and collaborative efforts whenever and wherever necessary. Thus, I must acknowledge all those who directly or indirectly participated in this sometime ‘‘involuntary’’ dialogue. One person who shared his extensive insight with me was Dr. Bud Prince. I benefited from his many years of working with international agencies and in developing countries. I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude for his pointing me in the direction of efforts of the United Nations Children’s Fund with regard to capacity building of health services in the developing countries of Africa. My graduate and undergraduate students at the University of Virginia listened and reacted to my discussions of development theories and capacity building concepts. Their responses to my ideas helped in informing my perspectives on capacity building issues. I would like to thank them all for their young and refreshing insights. The contributors to this volume deserve immense gratitude for having worked very hard to provide me with chapters that address aspects of capacity building in the sustainability of Third World communities. I am very fortunate to know them through our common interest—development scholarship.
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Acknowledgments
Melanie, Marshall, and Jonathan have always been supportive, and I would like to thank them for their unwavering support. Their encouragement always makes a difference in completing a book project. Special thanks to Melanie for her continuing role as project coordinator.
Capacity Building in Developing Countries
CHAPTER 1
Building the Capacities of Developing Nations through Empowerment Valentine Udoh James
NATURE OF THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS The people of developing countries have witnessed the decline in the social, political, economic, and environmental conditions of their communities. The human difficulties that are the result of the decline are enormous. The current situations in Rwanda, Burundi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Angola portray the demise of millions of people—many of whom have become environmental refugees. The manifestations of sociopolitical, economic, and development problems appear in the degradation of the quality of the urban and rural areas of the developing countries. The increasing foreign debt and budgetary problems have crippled the ability of developing countries to manage their institutions effectively. Many Latin American countries are experiencing significant economic problems. Mexico’s economic crisis required the assistance of the United States in order for the peso to be sustained. Investment in countries with enormous financial instability is problematic, and foreign entrepreneurs shy away from such countries. In order to stabilize the economic climate and encourage foreign investment, political stability is a prerequisite, and new paradigms for encouraging democratization are needed in developing countries. The roles of the United States and other developed/industrialized countries are paramount in this endeavor. The manifestations of political instability are not just economic problems, but the social malaise of the developing countries has direct and indirect connections with the political crisis of the Third World. The auspicious signal for the decline in the social processes that hold communities together can be seen in the social/ cultural norms that have lasted for centuries. The family structures are changing
2
Capacity Building in Developing Countries
in developing countries, crime is on the rise, and vandalism is escalating. Governmental and nongovernmental organization efforts must recognize these new phenomena and be prepared to offer new ideas on how to tackle the problems. Old management strategies for dealing with emerging social crises will not work. Many of the current government policies in African countries have not eased the social unrest. The nagging questions that some chapters in this volume will attempt to answer are: How do governments and agencies provide urgent answers to the social unrest in developing countries? More important, how do they operate in such a turbulent social climate in developing countries? One area of concern is in the metropolitan or urban centers of the developing world. The cohesion of communities is determined by the ability of communities to maintain aspects of their cultural values that sustain their lives. The erosion of these values could prove to be disastrous to the communities. Experience in the developing countries, especially in Africa, indicates that the rapid rate of cultural destruction is alarming. Communities are falling apart because of the destruction of traditional values that hold them together. How can institutional restructuring restore social cohesion and community survival? It is imperative that the capacities of communities to strengthen themselves by maintaining strong social processes be enhanced by governmental and nongovernmental efforts. The chapters in this volume provide insightful, new, and provoking perspectives on how to accomplish this goal even under the stressful and difficult political climate of civil strife. Another problem that is growing in developing countries and that is due to political and economic problems is the environmental decline. The environment of developing countries is suffering from a severe amount of destruction at the hands of its inhabitants and multinational corporations. In the past century members of our society have often overlooked the problems they are creating, solely focusing on the benefits of their actions. Past and current extractive activities of multinationals that disregard the significance of equilibrium between development and the ecosystems have led to disastrous conditions of developing nations’ environments. In some cases such development is not regulated by governments, and in many instances subsidies and concessions are provided to the multinationals. However, the long-term effects of these actions may, in the future, cause significant costs. As a result of this lack of concern, the environment is already experiencing a great deal of irreversible damage. In response to these damages, during the last two decades, there has been a broad-based effort to tackle environmental concerns. The need to sustain the environment calls for building the capacity of institutions and communities in order to maintain the integrity of the environment. In many developing areas of the world, civil strife has led to environmental calamities such as ‘‘environmental refugees.’’ Millions of people have moved into savanna and forest areas, thus leading to the destruction of these places. Rwanda and Burundi provide prime examples of where this has happened. Wildlife habitats that were set aside for protection and conservation purposes are now
Building Developing Nations through Empowerment
3
degraded and may never recover. Their delicate carrying capacities have been exceeded. The regenerative and assimilative capacities of the natural areas have been surpassed by exploitative human behavior. IS CAPACITY BUILDING NECESSARY? The industrialized countries arrived at the position of commanding the direction of global affairs because they built the educational, industrial, and economic capacities of their societies. These capacities undergo regular and periodic renewal through research and innovation that have the commitment of the governments of these countries. Theoretical and empirical evidence shows that deliberate and continuous government and private sector efforts are put into enabling citizens to gain the needed expertise in policy and management. The public and private investments that are linked with other development factors produce the mechanism to foster sustainable development and economic growth in the industrialized countries. For the developing countries, the problem of poverty appears to be perennial. In tackling this problem, efforts must be placed on eradicating hunger and malnutrition. In order to achieve this goal the emphasis must be on improving the standard of living in developing countries so that the basic needs of shelter, clothing, and food would be met. Comprehensive development offers tremendous solutions to most economic problems because the objectives of basic needs could be met, and, at the same time, economic growth can be achieved through a sound development plan. Secondary and tertiary industries could spin off a primary development project that requires sophisticated technical and managerial skills. Thus, it is necessary to build the capacity of the people of developing countries in order to encourage economic growth and improve the general health of the people and increase life expectancy so as to have healthy and productive societies. The governments of developing countries must understand the importance of spending on health. It is a justifiable expenditure from an economic standpoint because the improved health of developing countries contributes significantly to their economic growth. Healthy citizens make productive workers. There are basically four benefits that accrue from such investments: economic losses due to worker illness are reduced; natural resources that had been totally or nearly inaccessible due to disease are made available because of government expenditure on health matters; education of children is enhanced because enrollment would increase as many children would be healthy enough to attend school; and, finally, it saves money in the long run because the emphasis is on prevention of health problems instead of focusing on the treatment of health problems (World Bank, 1993c). In order to appreciate the significance of government policies in health issues in developing countries, Table 1.1 displays global expenditures on health issues. The third column shows that a total of $170 billion was spent in 1990 on health
4
Capacity Building in Developing Countries
Table 1.1 Global Health Expenditure, 1990
Note: SSA⫽Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: World Bank, 1993a: 52 (Appendix Table A.9).
issues. This portrays the importance of health when decisions are made on economic investment. However, it should be pointed out that in the fourth column, which shows health expenditure as a percentage of world total, the developing countries still spend less on health problems. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa’s expenditure represents 1 percent of the total, while the expenditure of the former Soviet region of the world represents about 3 percent. The established market economies of the world spent a significant amount on health issues. Column 6 shows that 9.2 percent of the gross national product (GNP) was spent on health by the established market economies. There is a need to invest more money in the developing regions of the world in order to achieve maximum potential of
Building Developing Nations through Empowerment
5
the people. The investment in people’s health will reduce the dependency of developing nations on developed nations for expertise. Healthy, well-trained, and educated individuals will add a much needed skill to the societies of the developing world. Foreign investors would find developing countries attractive to establish their businesses. Examples such as Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have done well in building their capacities through very comprehensive development processes that have made them attractive to investors and competitive. The significance of capacity building can be examined from the standpoint of healthy citizens who are contributing to the economic growth of their communities and are not depending on public funds to take care of illnesses. Thus, when governments have intervention programs that target early childhood development, they should be seen in the light of capacity building for the future of the countries. Table 1.2 shows early childhood care and development program strategies that have been adopted in several developing countries. The models depicted in the table have enabled these countries to make progress in capacity building. The children’s capacities to learn and become useful contributors to their societies are improved when the community, policymakers, and special groups of people involved with childhood care and development are committed. The models focus on empowering the groups or individuals in order to achieve the set goals and objectives. WHAT SHOULD DEVELOPMENT POLICY CONSIST OF? Since capacity building involves the contribution of policy to direct positive development, the policy must address four main areas: 1. It must create a positive condition to allow development to flourish. Building the capacity of a community through education and information would definitely provide such favorable conditions. Developing countries, especially those of Africa, are lagging behind in the information age. Automation through the use of computers, fax, and telephone has revolutionalized the way the contemporary world functions. Development would now depend heavily on how much and how quickly information is available to make rational decisions. The most successful countries in the twenty-first century will be those that lead the way in formation technology. Trained and educated individuals would be crucial to move the developing countries forward in their quest to develop and be economically independent. Developing countries’ education policies must address the problems of education. The educational systems in many developing countries are experiencing dramatic setbacks because of economic and political problems. Countries such as Burundi, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zaire have many problems in maintaining sound educational systems. Civil unrest has compounded educational problems. Scholars and educators are leaving these countries for other places where they can be adequately rewarded financially for their work. The universities and public libraries do not have current information, books, and periodicals. The data necessary to base planning forecasts and projection are not avail-
6
Capacity Building in Developing Countries
Table 1.2 Strategies for Early Childhood Care and Development
Source: Modified from Psacharopoulos, 1995: 32.
able, and efforts by the public and private sectors must concentrate on improving databases and the methods of dissemination of information. 2. Another objective of development policy is to provide the government with useful information for developing secondary and tertiary development projects that will continue to enhance the capacity of the citizens to play significant roles in the economic growth of their countries. Thus, the business community will continue to thrive because of the available expertise and the potentialities of the society in general.
Building Developing Nations through Empowerment
7
3. The third objective of the development policy with regard to capacity building is to provide basic investment in order to meet those primary needs of the citizens. The investment could be in areas of education, health, nutrition, technology, science, or infrastructure. 4. The fourth aspect of what the policy should consist of is mechanisms to facilitate privatization. Investment by the private sector would encourage competition, which creates jobs, lowers the cost of products to consumers, and stimulates other economic activities, especially in the informal sectors of the developing countries’ economies.
The basic characteristics needed to facilitate capacity building and, thus, sustainable development are community security and stability. A well-informed society would have a good financial and monetary policy. There is no doubt that the potentialities of some developing nations are enormous, given the amount of mineral resources and forest resources that are available in these countries; but in order to take advantage of the potentialities, data and information gathering must take place. Capacity building requires the ability to conduct economic surveys, analyze economic data, and make projections for future development. The results of statistical investigations must be part of setting policy for programming of development plans. Such an elaborated and sophisticated strategy requires a trained and skilled population. Only through capacity building can such development efforts be achieved. In designing development schemes for economic growth, efforts should be made in programming to encourage the training of key decision makers who will formulate the best policy choices for the country. Generally, capacity building initiatives should include methodologies for interventions and the strengthening of institutions. For the African Capacity Building Initiative (ACBI) as advanced by the World Bank (1991a: 1), there are six principal components: 1. The rehabilitation and improvement of selected national institutions. 2. The building or strengthening of a small number of regional institutions for policy analysis and development management. 3. The strengthening or creation of government policy units in the Office of the President, Ministries of Finance, Planning, and Central Banks. 4. The provision of fellowships to support selected Africans in their research and training needs. 5. The expansion of in-service training and work experiences for African professionals. 6. The strengthening of local consulting firms and professional associations.
In order for the six components of the ACBI to succeed, several things need to take place. First, there must be an environment conducive for policy to be sustained. In other words, a stable government must be established. Second, bilateral agreements on external support must be available initially to enable economic growth to occur. The external support is usually in the form of tech-
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Capacity Building in Developing Countries
nical expertise in policy strategies and in management of institutions. Financial support is usually part of the package. For instance, donor countries have invested billions of dollars in development projects in the developing countries, and technical assistance has been on the increase in many developing areas of the world. These are good reasons for capacity building to be pivotal in development planning in the developing countries. The problems that many institutions of government are facing in the developing countries are compounded by the absence of adequate capacity to perform the needed managerial work. The ideas put forward by the World Bank are not completely new, because some of these efforts were going on during the colonial period and the time immediately after colonialism (before the political and economic problems) in many parts of the developing world. PROGRAMS OF ACTION IN CAPACITY BUILDING The most difficult aspect of building the capacity of people in developing countries is getting the program started. In outlining the main objectives of action programs associated with capacity building in Africa, the World Bank (1991a, 1991b) discusses several points that are germane to the successful implementation of capacity building programs. This is based on foreign help to build capacity. It is worthwhile to institute a consultative atmosphere in which host country citizens can participate as equal partners in establishing the priorities for development and for developing policies for capacity building. Each developing country has its development problems. Education in different fields such as economics, agriculture, medicine, engineering, and so on would be necessary to form the critical mass of professionals necessary for development. The whole idea of capacity building is to create a cadre of indigenous professionals necessary for the task of setting policies and sustaining capacity building. In efforts to achieve the goal of sustaining the capacity building in developing countries, it is imperative for trained personnel to coordinate projects funded by different entities so that duplication of efforts is avoided, and efficiency and effectiveness of projects are attained. Because there are many foreign assistance programs in developing countries, it is necessary to coordinate the activities for maximum gain. Many capacity building efforts are, and will continue to be, focused on intervention, but it should be noted that new actions must be taken in order to establish new institutions and to link the efforts of research with the realities that take place in communities across the developing world. This calls for identifying funding sources and making resources available for the necessary effort of capacity building. Sustained government policies can lead to the establishment of long-lasting programs to seek local as well as foreign funding for programs. In order to sustain development, private and public sector efforts must con-
Building Developing Nations through Empowerment
9
centrate on rehabilitating and upgrading institutions of higher learning that deal with policy analysis and economic management. Because these institutions of higher education are critical for development on national, regional, and global economic levels, they should be made so as not to be affected by (or insulated from) political instabilities. Experience in many areas of the world has shown that when these institutions can no longer train professionals and give them the skills necessary to lead and formulate public policies, the public and private sectors suffer immensely, and economic, social, and environmental crises ensue. The chapters that follow deal with issues of identifying, designing, and promoting systematic national and regional capacity building in areas pertaining to sustainable development. The sections of this volume (sociopolitical issues, economic issues, and development issues) form the template for addressing several issues that relate to capacity building. In order for the developing countries to alleviate the problems of poverty, health, nutrition, agriculture, education, and industrial revolution, many development issues have to addressed through empowerment of citizens to take control of the direction of their desired development.
PART I
Sociopolitical Issues
CHAPTER 2
Ethnicity in the Politics of a Nation: Nigeria and the Problems of Social Transformation Babatunde Oyinade
INTRODUCTION The colonial balkanization of Africa, coupled with the ethnic mosaic, continued to produce severe tensions in all African states years after independence. This remains so, because one group or another felt left out by the sitting government. Many African countries have yet to have any kind of peace since their colonial masters relinquished power to the natives. Angola, Chad, Sudan, and Zaire, to name a few, continued to suffer the outcome of independence; Africans have become disillusioned about what independence really means. Every country on the continent has one problem or the other. Ethnicity in its different forms has contributed to these problems. Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa, has been prevented from a normal political, economic, and social life due to ethnic strife. As a result, the complete social transformations needed for democracy to flourish have been hampered. This chapter sheds light on some of these problems and what can be done in preparation for the twenty-first century. Prior to Nigeria’s independence in 1960, from the late 1930s to early 1940s, ethnicity began to rear its ugly head when one group or another was trying to dominate the National Youth Movement (NYM). However, the goal to free Nigeria from the British temporarily united the people, especially those educated elites from the south, with the vast majority of traditional rulers and political groups from the north offering lukewarm support. The reason for the situation in the north was the level of education and the number of educated people available. The fear of southern domination of the north was an early concern among Nigerians from the north. When self-rule was granted to both the western region and the eastern region in 1957, the northern region did not accept self-
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Capacity Building in Developing Countries
rule until 1959, just one year before Nigeria’s independence in 1960. Immediately after independence was achieved, the fragile unity that had helped win freedom crumbled. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (from the eastern region) became the first native president. Alhaji Tafawa Balewa from the northern region became the prime minister, and Chief Obafemi Awolowo from the western region was the official opposition leader in the Parliament. In the first federal cabinet, the Yorubas of the western region were shut out. From then on, ethnicity became the name of the game. Government corporations’ chairs were dominated by the ruling government loyalists, especially individuals from the eastern region who were highly educated. The Yoruba leaders thus concluded early that efforts were being made by the other two large groups—namely, the Ibos and the Hausa/ Fulanis—to exclude them from Nigeria’s government despite their high level of education. It was payback time. Earlier, the Action Group (AG), Chief Awolowo’s political party, won a majority to the Western House of Assembly in the 1951 regional election. In Lagos the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) won five seats, in which Dr. Azikiwe, the NCNC leader, came second behind Dr. A. B. Olorunnimbe. As a rule, the Western House of Assembly must select two out of the five NCNC members of the federal House of Representatives. Instead of selecting numbers one and two, the Yoruba majority in the House selected number one, Dr. Olorunnimbe, and number three, Prince Adeleke-Adedoyin (both Yoruba men), and Dr. Azikiwe (NCNC leader and an Ibo) was left out. This became what was known, according to Sklav and quoted by Akintunde (1991), as ‘‘Seeds Discard’’ to this day. From then on, the majority of the Ibos of eastern Nigeria never trusted Chief Awolowo and the Yorubas. Other occurrences in later years simply intensified their distrust. The failure or inability of Nigerian early leaders to work closely together after independence showed the division created by colonization. Overlapping ethnic units were unable to coexist in a democratic system due to different traditional forms. As Potholm pointed out, ‘‘There was a most delicate balance between the hierarchical forms of the Northern areas, such as the Hausa, the segmented forms of the east, such as the Ibo and Ibibio, and the federated monarchies of the west, such as the Yoruba’’ (Potholm, 1979).
ETHNICITY The three political parties that emerged in Nigeria—the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (later changed to National Council of Nigeria Citizens [NCNC] when Cameroon broke away from Nigeria), and the AG—were all regionally based in the north, east, and west, respectively. What this did to Nigeria was the entrenchment of ethnic loyalty, which became the precursor of the political decay and the erosion of democracy Nigeria is facing today. Ethnic and personal rivalries dominated postindependent Nigeria, and attention was drawn away from establishing a political
Nigeria and Social Transformation
15
system that will serve as a foundation for a future, peaceful democratic field on which everybody would play. Each of the three parties just mentioned faced competition in its region by forming alliances with minority groups in other regions. The AG wooed the people of the middle belt areas of the north as well as the people of Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers areas of the east. The NCNC, which had already had a single and steady following in the west, intensified its penetration, while the NPC supported groups in the west that were disenchanted with the ruling Action Group. The new political competition, before long, collided with traditional political forms in each region, and it became very explosive. In some quarters, the efforts to gather support angered traditional rulers, religious leaders, and political groups. The first five years of independence thus saw Nigeria in turmoil. The 1965 regional election in the west resulted in the division of the House. The Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP), a party formed by the breakaway premier from AG, Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, locked heads with the new AG leaders Alhaji Adegbenro. It will be recalled here that Chief Awolowo, the AG founder and opposition leader in the Federal Parliament, had been jailed in 1962 for treason, thus strengthening the opportunity for the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) to support the NNDP. The result of the election, which was won by the AG but rigged by the NNDP, brought down the Western House of Assembly and started the political riot that claimed many lives and the destruction of valuable property. The hope that independence would bring national integration, economic development, and improvement of the people’s life became a nightmare. On January 15, 1966, the Nigerian military intervened by seizing power in a coup d’e´ tat. The coup took the lives of Tafawa Balewa, the prime minister from the north, Sardauna of Sokoto, premier of the north and the leader of the NPC, Chief S. L. Akintola, premier of the west, and Chief Festus Okotieboh, finance minister from the midwest and NCNC member. Others were killed, especially senior military officers who refused to cooperate with the coup. It was a big relief to all Nigerians when the news of the coup broke. Major General Aguiyi Ironsi (an Ibo) became the head of the federal military government and commander in chief of the armed forces after lengthy negotiations with the coup plotters. To most Nigerians outside the military, the belief was that the coup was an attempt to rid the country of corrupt leaders and troublemakers. It soon became apparent that no Ibo political leader was killed in the coup. As a result, the January 15 coup was dubbed ‘‘Ibo coup.’’ This outlook led to a countercoup on July 29, and Major General Ironsi and Lieutenant Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi (the military governor of the west and Ironsi’s host) were slain at Ibadan. To replace Ironsi, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Christian from the north, became the ‘‘compromised head of state.’’ The countercoup plotters accused Ironsi of an attempt to make a reality of the Ibos’ dream of one day being in control of Nigeria. Ironsi’s failure to deal with the January 15 plotters se-
16
Capacity Building in Developing Countries
verely, according to Madiebo (1980), and his attempt to impose a unitary system of government on Nigeria were unacceptable to the northerners. Gowon’s ascendancy to the top did not please some quarters, especially Colonel Ojukwu, an Ibo and the military governor of the eastern region. Ojukwu refused to recognize Gowon as head of state. This stalemate between Ojukwu and Gowon led to a civil war, which lasted 30 months after Ojukwu declared the eastern region a new country called Biafra, on May 30, 1967. Efforts to resolve the issue both internally and internationally failed. The civil war took more than 1 million Nigerian lives, mostly those from the eastern region. After the war ended in January 1970, Nigeria began to rebuild with the hope of overcoming its problems, but little did Nigerians realize that the military had come to stay indefinitely. At the time of this writing, 36 years after independence, the military has ruled for 26 years. The preceding brief background history is to help in focusing on the political, economic, and social problems, the political governance emanating from the turbulent years, and the resultant impact on overall social transformations, which Nigeria has failed to achieve since independence. POLITICAL PROBLEMS Nigeria’s political problems had existed long before independence, and Balewa’s administration was unable to control the situation because the ruling coalition between the NPC and the NCNC was ethnically incompatible. The Ibos dominated the government at the ministerial level: six out of nine ministers were Ibos, with no Yorubas. The big government corporations were headed mostly by the Ibos. The police were headed by an easterner, though not an Ibo. Northern Nigerians felt uncomfortable with the composition of the government. The civilian government was dominated by southerners. The military at that time was dominated by the northerners in numbers. As far as the commissioned officers were concerned, it was apparent that the easterners had an edge. At independence, out of the 80 commissioned officers in Nigeria’s army, 65 were from the east. It was obvious from the beginning that Nigeria’s political foundation was on a shaky ground. The Yorubas, especially the leaders, felt left out, and the idea of secession was floating around, but no concrete move was made. Chief Awolowo said in his book, Nigeria’s Path to Freedom, that ‘‘Nigeria is not a Nation. It is a mere geographical expression. . . . ‘Nigeria’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who are not’’ (as cited in Akintunde, 1991). It is obvious that Chief Awolowo did not recognize Nigeria as a true political entity. He was not the only one with this idea. James S. Coleman (1971) in his book Nigeria: Background to Nationalism also makes this assertion. In 1948 Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, a leader of the NPC, affirmed in the legislative council that: since 1914, the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, relig-
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ious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite. . . . Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country. The British knew of these incompatibilities and were not planning for Nigeria’s independence at the time the pressure came. Through its divide and rule system, the colonialists helped to maintain the status quo by preserving the Muslim North in its pristine Islamic purity by excluding Christian missionaries and limiting Western education, by denying northern leaders’ representation in the central Nigerian legislative council during the period 1923–1947, and by minimizing the contact between the northern peoples and the more sophisticated and nationally-minded southerners. (Coleman, 1971: 322)
The British thus helped in perpetuating the individuality and separateness of the north. The south, which was divided into western and eastern regions in 1939, became the arena for both political and ethnic struggle, and every move made by one became a tribalist move to the other. The tension between the Ibos and the Yorubas led to damaging remarks from both sides, and the West African Pilot (Azikwe’s paper) and Daily Service (NYM paper) engaged in a press war of unprecedented violence. As Coleman (1971: 346) puts it, ‘‘from July to September 1948, Yoruba–Ibo animosity bordered on violence. At the height of tension, radicals on both sides descended upon the local markets and bought all available machetes.’’ Such was the political situation in Nigeria in those days, while agitation for independence was forming, without any clear resolve of the cold war between the Yorubas and the Ibos. Many Nigerians continue to feel the effect of these social and economic ills as a result of these disparities— hence the emergence of a conspicuous division along ethnic boundaries. The problems arising from the instability, economic deprivation, and lack of ethnic unity in a host of other African countries consistently led Mazuri and Pa´ tel to write that ‘‘ethnicism, unfashionably called ‘tribalism,’ and a retreat of nationalism are the present problems and are too engrossing to permit sufficient time and energy for reflecting on the future’’ (1974: 4). Mazuri believed that ethnicity is an integral factor that would foster national goals. The struggle for independence put the tensions on a back burner until 1960, when independence was achieved. Quickly, the tension crawled back into Balewa’s administration, and before long, independence became a nightmare. Efforts to dominate, rather than develop, the country were the sole aim of the ruling coalition between the Hausa/ Fulani (NPC) and the Ibos. This soon led to ineptness and massive corruption. Independence thus became an opportunity for Nigerian ruling elites to steal and cheat. The British were aware of this attitude among Nigerians, but they could have done little. A work by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1960 pointed out that ‘‘corruption among Nigerians in all walks of life had continually presented the British Administrators with a serious problem’’ (1960: 53). Its occurrence in public life has been due to the rapid pace of the independence movement, ‘‘which has not allowed a sufficient period in which to build up a tradition of incorruptibility both in and out of office’’ (1960: 53). The corruption at the center also spread to the regions, especially the west and the east. Political
18
Capacity Building in Developing Countries
assassinations ensued. Awolowo and his Yoruba lieutenants were jailed for treason. Tension between the ruling coalitions emerged. By the time of the general election of December 1964, it became obvious that the center could no longer hold. The NCNC had formed a joint party called UPGA (United Progressive Grand Alliance) with the AG, but the NPC won the election. Once again, the NCNC members broke rank with the AG to support Alhaji Tafawa Balewa. This time, the important ministerial positions went to the northerners. Some Yoruba NCNC members were named to the cabinet. Balewa’s regime at this time was shaky and probably moribund. The western region election of 1965 was the turning point for the country. The rigged election was supported by Balewa’s administration, and the fallouts from the riots in the west led to the January 15, 1966, military coup discussed earlier. When the military regime of Ironsi divided the country into eight provinces, only a few people knew that the move conformed with Dr. Azikiwe’s idea, as noted by Coleman (1971: 347), that ‘‘between 1943 and 1948 Azikiwe had advocated a federal system for Nigeria, with eight protectorates, some of which would roughly coincide with tribal boundaries.’’ As a result of this move by Ironsi, the northerners felt that the general was attempting, according to Graf, ‘‘to extend Igbo hegemony into unitary civil service, education and commerce’’ (1988: 41–42). At this point, northern secession from the federation was considered. Instead of secession a riot broke out in May 1966, and many Ibos living in the north were killed, and their properties were destroyed. Finally, in July, Graf continued, ‘‘Northern officers successfully carried out a second military coup, killing in the process General Ironsi . . . and during a four-day period practically all Igbo army officers stationed outside their own region were (often brutally) murdered’’ (1988: 42). The essence of the preceding discussion is to show how ethnicity, which caused the failure of the first republic, found its way into the Nigerian military establishment. The soldiers who took over power to solve the political, economic, and social problems of the country became the center of ethnic conflict. With Gowon at the helm, the first few years were problematic due to the civil war. The end of the civil war brought about renewed hope; especially, the oil revenue helped in the post–civil war rebuilding. The same oil boom spelled doom for Nigeria’s politics. The soldiers who were responsible for political activities became caught up in the same societal ills that affected Balewa’s administration. The civil servants thus became the policymakers as well as implementers. Massive development programs were put in place, and these brought nepotism, tribalism, and, of course, corruption. Democracy became ‘‘cleptocracy,’’ which is interpreted in this chapter as politics of stealing, cheating, bribing, and lying. The years 1970– 1975 saw the first period of massive human greed in the history of Nigeria. During this time every Nigerian became a money addict. Every agency of the government became a den of thieves. With money, there is nothing one cannot buy in Nigeria. The civil servants were ruling the country indirectly. The per-
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manent secretaries became too powerful, to the extent that one of them challenged General Gowon’s order that oil be sold for revenue at about eight dollars per barrel. The permanent secretary of the Ministry of Mines and Power said, ‘‘No one sells the oil unless he says so.’’ He was later found to have stolen millions of naira (currency). Military intervention in Nigeria’s politics was a curse because it enabled ethnicity to firmly entrench itself in future political activities; Shagari’s administration showed how ethnicity entrenched itself in Nigeria’s political activities. The military government of Nigeria is in complete control of political activities in the country. Unless military interventions are abandoned in Nigeria (which is highly unlikely), any suggestions of nonmilitary intervention reform radically altering the role and structure of politics and communications in enhancing democratic governance in Nigeria will be illusory. For political harmony in Nigeria, the military must step aside and allow the intellectuals to sit down together and plan the future of the country. The opportunity to do so happened twice, once under Balewa (1960–1966) and the second time under Alhaji Shehu Shagari (1979–1983). Both times were messed up by civilians. It could be argued that under Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, the country was yet to outline which way to lead politically after more than 70 years of British rule. The division created by the colonialists supplanted ethnic conflict that needed more than six years to resolve. The fear of southern domination by the northerners and the bigotry between the southern elites resulted in divided efforts to rule Nigeria. Political instability remained unchecked despite a military intervention. The Shagari administration was like waking up a bear from hibernation. The military government’s efforts to appear united did not translate into a national unity. Under the military, civil servants had the opportunity to become masters rather than servants. The masses remained unchanged as to their tribal loyalties. The northerners remained convinced that they were born to rule Nigeria, even if they continued to provide the wrong leadership. The Ibos remained bitter about how they were treated during the civil war (the war they started) because their dreams to rule Nigeria did not materialize. The Yorubas continued to be blind about the faults of people they supported for the presidency. The Yorubas considered ethnic loyalty to be more important than the security of their wouldbe leaders. It appears that the Yorubas adored the charismatic personalities of their leaders. Personality worshiping remained their political goal. The Shagari administration that was imposed was a remnant of Balewa’s. Every Nigerian knows that whenever anything goes wrong in the civilian administration, the soldiers are around the corner to strike again. This fear among the ruling elites translates into ‘‘steal as much as you can before the soldiers strike again.’’ After all, all the probes and inquiries landed only scapegoats in jail. Another military government or civilian let them out of jail. Some were allowed to participate in the new administration. The military is not the answer; in fact, they are part of the problems. How could the army be in a position to correct the political ills of Nigeria when they failed to eliminate corruption,
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Capacity Building in Developing Countries
when they are more corrupt than the civilians, and when they cannot preserve law and order among themselves, not to mention the society? The military failed as the corrective tool they planned to be; they failed to restore order, discipline, stability, and unity to economic and social life, according to Graf (1988). Those who expected the military to succeed must have forgotten that at the time of the first coup in 1966, the army was relatively inexperienced. Eighty percent of its officers had no more than four years in service, they were poorly educated (66 percent of combat and noncombat officers had no more than a secondary education before being commissioned), and they were young (62 percent were between 20 and 24 years old) (Graf, 1988: 41). These people took over a country that has been producing intellectuals since the 1920s. All the atrocities committed during and after the war and the ‘‘susceptibility of many officers to bribery and corruption hardly vindicated the military leaders’ claims to be suprapolitical moral force in national life’’ (Graf, 1988: 45). The soldiers are Nigerians in uniforms with the advantage of guns on their side. The creation of states did not result in a well-managed central administration. The states are just as bad as the central government. One mistake committed by the soldiers over and over again when leadership changed hands is the inclusion in the new administration of people who have been accused and found guilty of misappropriation of public funds. This is where the masses should learn a lesson. To rid the society of corruption, the government must be ready to do away with any Nigerian, regardless of his ethnic group, who has misused his office or position for personal gain. If this can be done effectively, then politicians or any citizens would realize that once they are found guilty of mismanagement, there will be no second chance. Everybody will think twice before he or she steals. Nigerians are being taken for granted. The disease of poverty blinded the people from reality about a person’s conduct. He who stole once will steal again if given a chance to get close to the same source from which he stole. Nigeria has thousands of untainted intellectuals who can rule the country. Nigeria’s political problems remain unresolved due to the military officers becoming civil servants and their subsequent rise to the ruling elite. The civil servants knew that the policymakers, in the absence of elected professional politicians, had abandoned their political neutrality and were no longer the rational and efficient implementers of politics but more involved in politics than serving. The military has lost its image as a united moral force above politics, and its internal struggle for power surpass the need to hand over power to the civilians at large. The fear of handing over power to a civilian who will probe military activities continues to hamper resolution of the political problems in Nigeria. For example, Obasnjo’s regime, as was rumored, handed power to Shagari instead of Awolowo out of the fear that the latter would look into the military’s past deeds. In 1993 Babangida refused to hand over power to Abiola because it was obvious that Abiola would look into the past activities of the military. Although other reasons were given for the cancellation of the June 12, 1993,
Nigeria and Social Transformation
21
election result, fear and apprehension of the results of any probe of the military’s past were one of the reasons. Another reason for the persistence of Nigeria’s political problems is corruption. Corruption has reached an uncontrollable level in Nigeria. In the government it has been institutionalized; in the private sector, it is as pervasive as in the public at large. According to Guy Arnold, it is a common operation for businesses to ‘‘simply write into their budgets appropriate sums of money to be used for bribery’’ (1977: 144). No country is perfect in this world. There is corruption in every society, but the problem of corruption is so pervasive in Nigeria that there is difficulty in knowing precisely how to address the issue. Around the world, one hears of corruption cases: in Japan, the United States, Britain, the Philippines, and in most African countries; in Nigeria the problems exist because of the inability of the government to investigate and bring to justice anyone considered guilty. Most government agencies have become business centers where corruption is so rampant that legitimate work cannot be accomplished without paying off someone. No one is exempt, not the military, the civil servants, the business elites, the politicians, or society at large. Everyone does it. It is part and parcel of daily life in Nigeria. Unless Nigerians cease to justify corruption as normal, efforts to eradicate it will fail. Poverty remains the vehicle for corruption. In Nigeria economic inequity puts an unnecessary burden upon any moderately well off person, because his many relatives depend on him. One then finds politicians, civil servants, and other professionals like teachers, doctors, and engineers becoming part-time businesspeople. Having got out of hand, no one seems to know how to wage war against corruption. In Nigeria the Department of Justice has become the department of injustice. Judges, for fear of losing their jobs, have become part of the corrupt system. They are Nigerians, too, and they want a share of the national cake, thus rendering justice ineffective. It is rumored that each Supreme Court justice was given a Mercedes Benz by Babangida’s administration. No wonder the court threw out Abiola’s challenge to the cancellation of the June 12, 1993, election results. Public accountability is another way to check corruption. In the United States the Government Accounting Office (GAO) serves as a watchdog for Congress on government activities. Many irregularities in the government are exposed by this agency. The press or mass media are also important outlets to expose wrongdoings. In Nigeria every administration, from Gowon to the present, has tried one way or the other to silence the press. According to University of Dakar’s communication professor El Hadj Diouf, most African governments tend to misunderstand what the real danger is in giving or not giving their population a voice and listening to what they have to say. Governments fear that once communication channels are opened, they will be used to organize resistance and even overthrow sitting governments. But according to Diouf, it is more dangerous to keep the population mute, ignoring their input and making cosmetic changes. The glorification of full and free information is a healthy step forward
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Capacity Building in Developing Countries
in democratic governance. Communication may reveal problems as well as eliminate them. Communication should be seen not as a process occurring between the senders of messages and potential recipients but in relation to the social systems in which it occurs and the particular function it performs in that system. In some cases some members of the press are co-opted into the system as ministers of information. Some were jailed, while some were even murdered. Without concerted efforts to correct the political inadequacies that have been described, Nigeria will continue as the chaotic society it is today. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS One need not belong to the who’s who of the economic field in order to comprehend Nigeria’s economic problems. Nigeria is not a poor country, but poverty is very severe due to the economic activities of the ruling elites (both military and civilians). It could be rightly said that the glory of Nigeria is spoiled by those in high places. Cheating, stealing, dishonesty, lying, bribery, and gross mismanagement pervade Nigeria’s society so much that open corruption in every walk of life dictates Nigeria’s economic affairs. Prior to Nigeria’s independence and the years immediately following it, agriculture was the main story of the economy. The aftermath of the civil war led to massive production of crude oil. By the early 1970s, oil revenue became the main story of Nigeria’s economy. The oil boom also brought Nigerians to a new level of corruption and mismanagement. The Nigerian economy after the civil war became buoyant as a result of the oil boom. Nigeria did not owe any external debt in conducting the 30-month civil war, so there was no debt to be paid. From then on, the effort to nationalize the economy began. The socialistconscious elites led by the late chief Awolowo, the finance minister under General Gowon, directed the economy toward active state participation in what Peter Waterman called ‘‘the period of peripheral capitalist industrialization and which I. V. Sledzevski terms a special stage in the development of state capitalism in Nigeria’’ (quoted by Graf, 1988: 53). The postcolonial government in Nigeria wanted to control the economy, which was dominated by foreigners. The path chosen to achieve this goal created doubts and contradictions, well defined by Aboyade: ‘‘That part of the recent doubts and confusion can be traced to this incongruous, if not ludicrous situation of a people (or rather their government) trying to pursue socialist ends with capitalist instruments’’ (quoted by Graf, 1988: 59). The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, otherwise known as indigenization decree, promulgated in February 1972, was a wrong foundation on which to base Nigeria’s economic future. The idea of Nigerians’ being in charge of their economy sounded good, but were Nigerians ready technologically to handle large-scale production? Not at that time. The foreigners who were to relinquish their controlling positions were not ready to do so willingly; hence, the economic nationalization strategy simply pushed Nigeria’s economy more into dependency on foreign interests.
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The overall framework that allowed Nigerians to buy shares in foreign companies took place, but the effort favored only the military elites, the bureaucrats who had access to financial institutions, and others: ‘‘professionals, top civil servants, big businesses, some military officers, traditional rulers’ families, politicians, state commissioners and employees and distributors of companies selling the shares’’ (Graf, 1988: 58) became share owners in those companies not made public. What was formally a program to carry out a national economic dependency, as charged by Graf, ‘‘has been transformed into a more complex and in many ways more irresistible nexus of dependency’’ (1988: 58). It was found out that transnational corporations and Nigerian elites have conspired during the Second Republic, as demonstrated by Graf (1988), to circumvent both the letter and the spirit of the indigenization decree. By following Thomas Biersteker’s incisive study, Graf, recorded the conspiracy as follows: [S]trategies evolved to the decree included (i) retention by the foreign partner of the right to choose and the technology used, (ii) fragmentation of enterprise ownership among many Nigerians (market allocation of shares) as opposed to bloc ownership of 40% of the shares by the participating transnational corporation, (iii) negotiation of special arrangements and exemptions for foreign companies: special schedules, complete exemption, particularly in industries like oil, with little international competition [NNPC took this part over in latter years], (iv) fronting or placing of Nigerians in positions of apparent ownership or responsibility as cosmetic fronts to provide legitimacy, (v) various practices aimed at subordinating, coopting or corrupting Nigerian partners: grooming of a comprador elite, non-productive but well paid positions for Nigerian managers, selection of board members from different ethnic groups to forestall unified opposition, simple bribery etc., and (vi) unilateral violation of the law . . . by not only partly complying with or by totally ignoring . . . indigenous requirement. (1988: 58)
As a result of this conspiracy, indigenization had deepened Nigerian independence, concluded Biersteker (quoted by Graf, 1988: 58–59): Essentially, indigenization has stiffened the financial risk burden of new and existing investments onto Nigerian investors without any appreciable increase in their control over the enterprises. Rather than import capital or obtain it from local sources, on their own, transnational corporations have been provided with capital from Nigerian shareholders or partners, and, accordingly, indigenization may have contributed to a decrease, rather than an increase, in Nigerian control of the economy.
The economic independence Nigeria is pursuing thus becomes an illusion. Today Nigeria’s economy is in shambles. Indigenization simply favored the elites to become the fronts for the owners of the means of production while depriving the masses of the opportunity to be involved in the economy of Nigeria, agriculture became abandoned, and private, indigenous industries could not compete with the transnationals. One military administration after another
24
Capacity Building in Developing Countries
failed to turn the country around, since it lacked conflict-resolving capacity. Development sagged, and economic corruption continued to go hand in hand with political corruption. Today Nigeria’s external debt is well over $30 billion. It is rumored that about $40 billion of Nigerian money is deposited in foreign banks by individuals of Nigerian nationality. The cases of Umaru Dikko, Akinloye, and others reveal stolen moneys from Nigeria. Nothing is done to stop this. This chapter cannot adequately cover all the economic atrocities committed against Nigeria. Nigerians are known all over the world for their corrupt practices, drug trafficking, and money laundering. The military has failed and should step aside for Nigerians to begin anew. When the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) was adopted by Nigeria, it was meant to turn Nigeria’s economy around. The outcry from some quarters among Nigerian intellectuals helped to derail SAP. Babangida’s regime failed to provide the necessary infrastructure contained in SAP’s plan for success. The wrong interpretation of SAP to the illiterate masses dealt a final blow to the plan. It was abandoned, and corruption under Babangida’s regime got out of hand. From the outset Nigeria has taken a wrong approach to the country’s postcolonial and postindependence economy. Economic crimes in Nigeria involve government officials, the banking system (including the Central Bank of Nigeria), and foreign banks and foreign nationalities, especially Asian merchants. Many government agencies, such as customs, the Nigerian National Supply Company, the post office, and state agencies, all participated in defrauding Nigeria. One can rightly say that Nigerians brought upon themselves the economic hardship the country is facing today. Every decree that the military promulgated to check or control the malpractice was sabotaged by Nigerians. In 1992, when the BCCI scandal rocked the world economy, the branch of the BCCI in Nigeria had its name changed one week after the outbreak of the scandal. That was the end. Unlike in the United States or Britain, where extensive investigations exposed the dubiousness of the BCCI in international financial dealings, a name change was the only thing heard in Nigeria. When Buhari’s regime got tough with government officials or public officials, Nigerians felt a little bit of relief. It did not last long before Babangida and Abacha toppled Buhari’s regime because of its rigid and tough punishment. Abacha, a general in the army, is now the new head of the military government. He started out to be as tough as he could be by setting up probes of customs, NEPA, the postal services, and the Central Bank. This conforms to the actions always taken by a new military regime. So it is very early to predict which way General Abacha is going to lead the nation politically and economically. One move he has made was the exclusion of many military officers at the federal level, although he committed one of the mistakes of the past regimes in bringing back a retired military officer to participate in his administration. Samuel Ogbemudia (a retired brigadier, now a lawyer and the minister of labor) was accused of financial mismanagement when he was the military governor of the
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midwest state. This is the kind of thing that angers those officers who want to participate in the governing process by the soldiers. We hope Ogbemudia’s presence will not spark another factional conflict in the army that could lead to another coup before Abacha makes his goal known to Nigerians. To sum up this economic problem, attention should be drawn to the continuous existence of the bureaucratic-technocratic-military subclass versus the subclass of politicians and allied business groups whose economic interests have become fractionalized, self-centered, and ethnically prone to dominations. Every member of the ruling class must be held accountable for his or her actions. If the Abacha regime fails to transform Nigeria’s economy, the military must accept its failures and leave the scene with guarantees that any military intervention should be treated as treason. After all, Awolowo and his group were jailed in 1962 for attempting to topple the Nigerian government by force. There is no difference between the attempt then and the subsequent takeover by Nigerians in uniform. Without a stable political system and a sustainable economic system, Nigeria will continue to face social problems that cannot be controlled by any decree. SOCIAL PROBLEMS Nigeria today faces tremendous social problems. Massive poverty has affected the quality of life. Even affluent Nigerians cannot enjoy their wealth due to threats to their lives. Many live behind bars while not in jail. Houses have extra protections to avoid break-ins and armed robbery. Security in Nigeria has been compromised by the ruling elites. The police force has been criminalized because it can be bribed at any level to avoid being arrested or prosecuted. It must be recalled here that under colonial rule, the police were the tool of oppression for the rulers. They still remain so 36 years after independence. The society has no respect for the police because the police have soiled their hands with briberies. The military governments have not done enough to improve the images of policemen and policewomen. The treatment the police receive from soldiers is very demeaning. Frequent confrontations between the police and the military have disgraceful outcomes for the police. On several occasions, confrontations have resulted in the death of an army officer, in most cases shot by the fully armed police. The repercussion for such actions is devastating to the police. Ordinary arrest of a military officer could result in the beating of policemen by the army. There is a bad relationship between affluent Nigerians and the police. Police who arrest a prominent Nigerian for any offense could lose their jobs, because most affluent Nigerians have no respect for the police. They can go directly to the highest authority to make their case. These attitudes of the society, coupled with poor conditions of service, pushed the average police officer, who would have done a good job, to become less caring. In Nigeria, therefore, where abuse of power has corroded public institutions, the police must bear some of the
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Capacity Building in Developing Countries
blame for the corruption. Once a democratic society deteriorates, the result is a breakdown in the rule of law. From local governments and security forces to the top level of Nigeria’s administration and the judiciary, the laws of the land have been compromised for personal gain. For effective policing, the federal government must allow states to start having their own police force. The time has passed when politicians were against such moves under the pretense that state police will be used as political tools against each other. The federal government is in a position to monitor police activities in the states and bring to justice any abuses. This can be done only if the current Nigerian police force is reformed and given better conditions of service. It is ironical that most Nigerians blame only the government for all the problems the people face. I believe that everybody has contributed in one way or another to the problems in Nigeria. Some Nigerians, out of frustration, have suggested the country be divided into three or four countries. I am against such a move. Instead, the country could still be divided into more states—up to 45 states can still be achieved. If more states are created, say 45 states in all, it must be written in the constitution that at the beginning of every fiscal year, between N500 million and N1 billion should be transferred to each state. Nigerians must remember Bosnia whenever they make moves that will affect the lives of almost 150 million inhabitants of the country. Investments in agriculture, private industries, and education are the only solutions to Nigeria’s economic and social problems. These would be achieved only by a stable political system, which the military rulers must consider in handing power back to the civilians. They must ensure that the right people are allowed to lead the country in the next civilian administration when the opportunity comes. Nigeria’s social problems are the result of dubious political and economic practices. These problems as outlined earlier have hampered the social transformation required by any country to function freely and fairly. Finally, regardless of contextual differences or differences on resource availability to foster permanent democratic governance in Nigeria, the goals and the objectives of a true democracy will continue to elude Nigeria unless the Nigerian government and leadership are ready and willing to make the necessary commitments required to solve the ethnic and economic problems facing the country.
CHAPTER 3
The State and Interplay of Gender and Class on the Emergence of Women as Political Leaders in Developing Countries Ifeyinwa E. Umerah-Udezulu
INTRODUCTION The purpose of this chapter is to develop an alternative interpretation of how some women in developing countries have managed to emerge and fare as political leaders. In explicating the state, scholars have basically adopted two major frameworks—the Marxist and classical (realist) approaches. For Marxist analysis, conflict is basic in explaining the nation-state. The state is seen as an instrument of the ruling class, which monopolizes the power structure at the expense of the proletarian majority, whose labor power sustains the society. The workers are exploited through the use of their labor power to such an extent that they become destitute, while the elite or the capitalists get richer. Therefore, the gap between the worker and the owner of the means of production (land, labor, and capital) keeps widening to such an extent that the frustrated and exploited workers revolt to establish a stateless society. The opposing viewpoint, the classical view, holds that states as the unit level of analysis are rational egoists. Although the state is neutral, it acts to protect its national interests as it mediates among divergent interests in the society. The theoretical inadequacies in the major frameworks illustrate that gender is not seen as central to the state and is ignored by state-centered authors. The prevalent discourses are androcentric. One cannot successfully evaluate the state without taking into account the majority of the state’s population, who are women. Women as a group constitute over 50 percent of the world’s population. The place of women in the system should therefore be addressed and cannot be reduced merely to interests and classes. The presence of women in the state system includes these dimensions of interest and class but also exceeds them,
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embracing gender and ethnic differences in the society. However, the conventional analyses hold that only class and interest are vital to state power. FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE AND WOMEN IN GENERAL For many years there have been demands for a change in the way in which the state-centered theorists explain the state. People subscribing to the womencentered ideas argued that gender issues should be included in the debate. For instance, Theda Skocpol has called for ‘‘paradigmatic reorientation’’ (Skocpol, 1985; Lyn, 1989) to address the fundamental problems existing in the state system, as modern scholars investigate the social, political, and economic facets of the state. Such concerns should explore how the state excludes women in all these sectors and how these problems should be resolved. Nancy Frazer’s interpretation of the welfare state sheds more light on the inadequacies of the prevalent theories. She argues that power, as elucidated by power and class theorists, is deeply rooted in the citizens who are part of the diverse state institutions: economic, social, and political (Frazer, 1986). She contends that the study of citizenship explains power distribution in the state system, and whichever group possesses economic, social, and political power controls the state. According to Frazer, such power is concentrated in the hands of males. Therefore, the state’s power is male power. Women as a group are not positioned equally with men. The state is structured into two spheres, the private and public. These sectors are intertwined and dependent on each other, and male supremacy is apparent in both. Males are the heads of household, the ‘‘statesmen,’’ and also chief executives of diverse international political and economic institutions. Women are not positioned in relation to the state as are men. As a matter of fact, the contribution of women is devalued at the state level. Gender is central, therefore, in analyzing the nation-state, especially the minimal engagement of women. Again, the state cannot merely be reduced to class and interests. Therefore, it is the duty of the women-centered theorists to eliminate bias in political philosophy and in the conventional arena. Alison Jaggar notes that there are many voices of women, and they have disparate policy prescriptions as to how the state relates to women (Jaggar, 1988). The most significant articulations are their views on human nature, the nature of social order, and the nature of inequality (factors perpetuating sex inequality). Of importance, too, are their variant assessments of the good society, strategies for actualizing that goal, and, finally, their prescriptions for sex role changes. According to Jaggar, three major schools have emerged—liberal, radical, and socialist feminism. For the liberal feminist tradition, the state is perceived as a neutral arbiter. These scholars are satisfied with the status quo and therefore desire to enhance women’s situation by lobbying for laws that would protect women’s interests. Instead of arguing for a complete transformation of the existing political system,
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the liberal feminists see their solution in a political process in which the federal government would increase its role in integrating women into the state system (Costain, 1993). Their task is to extend to women the democratic political values of liberty, equality, autonomy, self-fulfillment, and justice (Mitchell, 1975). While the liberal feminists desire to use laws to resolve gender-based discrimination, they do not view the oppression of women as a structural feature of the capitalist system. Women’s freedom, according to this school, would be brought about by the state itself, as limited legal reforms are directed at upgrading women’s status. Radical feminists, as the name suggests, adopt a different approach to settle the lack of integration of women into the system. They argue that the operation of the capitalist system makes it impossible for the genuine establishment of liberal political values and allows only partial alterations. This ideology contends that capitalism supports values of individual competition that are inconsistent with the feminist values of interdependence and nurturance. The basic assumption of radical feminism is rooted in the liberal belief that sex roles stem from individual freedom of choice. Individuals possess the power to actualize themselves apart from societal values (Koedt, Levine, and Rapone, 1973; Firestone, 1970b). Some radical feminist theorists believe that sexual division of labor is deeply rooted in biology, that women are essentially inferior to men due to their reproductive capacity, and that women and children must depend on their male heads of household for survival. Furthermore, they argue that men’s economic power gives control of the state and allows them to use it to perpetuate the subordination of women in the society as a whole. The state is perceived as the instrument of patriarchy and therefore cannot safeguard women’s interests. The election of a few women to policy-making positions does not negate this problem, as men still retain economic and political power. Because women are depicted as being under sexual slavery and as being forced into motherhood, and because men are seen as having control over women’s bodies, women’s liberation can be accomplished only by separate and autonomous women’s organizations. Women as a class must unite to overhaul the status quo. This analysis calls for the revolutionary demise of the existing order and the establishment of a gender-free society. Even though there has been an agreement by various women-centered writers on the need to restructure the state, the means of actualizing that objective differ. The radical restoration of the status quo reinforces disorder, a deviation that has constantly plagued humankind for many generations. However, the change of consciousness fosters avenues for a stable relation between genders in the state system. This is where the socialist feminism comes into play. This framework purports an alternative means other than violent demise of the existing system. Emerging in the 1970s, socialist feminism is still in the developmental process. It has as its basic objective the development of an eclectic political theory capable of synthesizing the most substantial contributions of radical feminism
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and traditional Marxism. Jaggar argues that this framework holds a prospect of establishing a unique advancement of political theory and practice for women’s emancipation (Jaggar, 1988). Like the radical feminists, their socialist counterparts are addressing issues as varied as sexuality and reproduction (mothering); however, the socialist feminists elucidate the traditional Marxist, historical, materialist approach in a mode that reflects the insights of radical feminism. For instance, traditional Marxism posits that the struggle for feminism strongly corresponds to class conflict (Millet, 1973). Radical feminism asserts that women’s liberation must be primary to any other type of injustice in the system. Socialist feminism disagrees. Nonetheless, it does not purport to substitute socialism for feminism, or vice versa. Rather, it juxtaposes these issues. For example, these writers see capitalism, male dominance, racism, and imperialism as interchangeable. Any effort to address an aspect of this problem is incomplete unless such an attempt seeks to eradicate all forms of oppression in the system. In addition, they acknowledge diversity by sex, age, class, nationality, and racial and ethnic origins not only as part of modern-day phenomena but as deeply intertwined with historical materialism. This concept, according to socialist feminist theory, depicts the dialectic relationship between sex and society, which is gender-based. Gender is socially derived. The state, according to socialist feminism, is not a neutral arbiter between conflicting forces but rather the condensation of a balance of forces. The strongest of these is male dominance. They recognize that the differences between women and men are not presocially conferred but are socially fabricated and therefore socially modifiable. The abolition of capitalism and male dominance must be precursory to the attainment of freedom and equality in the state system. For instance, by abolishing capitalism and male dominance, one creates an equitable society. They argue that the absence of women in the state’s executive positions is a perfect example of alienation. They, therefore, call for a society where all the members are able to freely and fully participate in every aspect of the state’s apparatus. The socialist feminist framework seeks a society where masculinity and femininity no longer exist. The vitality of this theory is in raising questions for other political traditions (Lugones and Spelman, 1982), which fully attracts my attention. They call for an ultimate democracy, a process in which all people’s needs will be equitably addressed, and seek a society where people can integrate their capacities for intellectual and hand-operated labor, for work, for sexuality, for art, and for play, until those categories no longer describe and separate human activities. The weakness of this perspective stems from its failure to state exactly how the valid democratic procedures can be initiated to abolish all social ills, including age-related prejudice, racism, sexism, socialism, capitalism, and other forms of bias (Jaggar, 1988). The major difference is that these groups diverge as to the extent of women’s alienation and how the state could better address these concerns. There is a consensus among variant aspects of feminism that women’s interests are not
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fairly articulated in the state system. They argue that sexism in the state system creates a kind of dualism where the elites are blinded by gender differentiation. The state is divided into two hierarchical spheres, the private and public. In the private sector, the male is the traditional head of the household, and the female bears and raises children. In the public sphere, which includes the economic, social, and political institutions, there are capital-oriented activities and projects which encourage individual competition at the expense of the less viable group. In this carefully structured order, the male is the political and economic elite. This analysis is classified as the dialectical sex ordering, another terminology for capitalist patriarchy. Therefore, the workplace and home are hierarchical, and both structure each other. According to the United Nations’ report, women rarely account for 1 or 2 percent of senior management positions in the economic sector. The report stated that it will take a century of hard work and serious planning before women are fully integrated in the system (United Nations, 1995). Also, even if women represent over 50 percent of the global population, and one-third of them are in the paid labor force, women receive only one-tenth of world income and own less than 1 percent of the world’s resources. Men dominate the key positions in the workforce and the political arena. In most cases men are generally better paid than women, and as some women are unemployed, women are described as the army of reserved labor. In any case where women are employed, they are found in the lowest rank of the labor pool. In a nutshell, the feminist theory of the state argues that the state is gendered. The female constitutes a separate class from the male. The female is the proletariat, whereas the male is the elite (Delphy, 1984; Eisentien, 1989). In the public sphere, the male, who is also the traditional head of household, is the secretary-general of the United Nations, chairman of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the president of a country. Generally, in feminist thought, the concept of capitalist patriarchy is most frequently employed to denote a structure of masculine domination or a sexual system of power (Rowbotham, 1983; Disch, 1991). Even though their conclusions may differ, there seems to be a consensus among feminist theorists that the contemporary state system, whether socialist or classist, is patriarchal (Kramarae and Treichler, 1985; Bledsoe and Herring, 1990). Carole Pateman argues that the concept of ‘‘patriarchy’’ best ‘‘captures the specificities of the subjection and oppression of women and distinguishes this form from other forms of dominations’’ (Pateman, 1989; Simon and Landis, 1989). Such a concept has to be retained in any political philosophy of women, moreover, because it addresses the problem of sexual domination in the state system, whereas the individualist and class theorists fail to address such issues. The contemporary liberal state system has evolved from the traditional to the modern, a progression that Carole Pateman has summarized as a transformation from a paternal version of patriarchy to a new, specifically modern or fraternal form, which she calls ‘‘patriarchal civil society’’ (van Wagner and Swanson, 1979). The state at the primitive
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stage was patriarchal. With the onset of the Industrial Revolution, the state progressed from a simple to a more complex mode of political economy, still maintaining the patriarchal configuration of the nation-state. According to this view, the contemporary era is depicted by high technology and advanced capitalism. The state as the arbiter has not yet significantly altered its patriarchal structure when compared to the earlier period. The actors in the state’s arena are largely male. While Pateman focuses on modern, liberal, civil society as a contract among men, Zillah Eisenstein (1979) argues that the contemporary liberal state system can best be classified as capitalist patriarchy on the basis of its transformation from feudal to capitalist modes of production. Her analytical focus centers on changes undergone by America and England in the mid-nineteenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively. Eisenstein contends that these eras mirrored the interchange and metamorphosis of patriarchy and industrial capitalism: the modes of production developed from a single farm-unit system, to large-scale agriculture, and advanced to the complex industrial system. The current system, even if it appears to have division between public and private spheres, is actually a conglomeration of families and their modes of production and the politics emanating from such interactions. According to Eisenstein, patriarchy denotes a pattern of social interaction closely linked to hierarchical relations between men and women. This occurs in such a fashion that men benefit more than women in the system. Women are workers and reproducers. They sustain the system. Women are controlled at home and at work by men. In this sense, patriarchy (or the sex-gender system) is a system of male oppression of women. It is a system in which men control the labor of women and children in the family. In addition, under capitalism, men extend the patriarchal techniques of hierarchical organization and control learned from the family structure to the economic sphere. This is manifested in the hierarchical sexual ordering in the workforce: men dominate numerically in the workforce and are better paid than women. As some women are unemployed or underemployed, women are viewed as the army of reserve labor and are found in the lowest rank of the labor pool. Commitment to patriarchal structures, the hierarchical relation of the workplace, and capitalism also infiltrate the home on the most intimate levels. The domains of family and market structure each other and subsequently filter through the political process. Because men are the prevalent actors in these sectors, modern states uphold this type of sex-order division of labor and wage labor system in the nature of prevailing social, political, and economic institutions. Therefore, capitalist patriarchy does describe this politicoeconomic gender ordering. The concept of capitalist patriarchy, according to Eisenstein, supersedes the ‘‘division of class, sex, private and public spheres, domestic and wage labor, family and economy, personal and political, and ideology and material conditions’’ (Eisenstein, 1979: 23). The woman is both a worker and mother—producer and reproducer. Capitalist patriarchy emphasizes the mutually reinforcing, dialectical relationship between capitalist class structures and hierarchical sexual
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structuring (Eisenstein, 1979). In a nutshell, the concept explains the gendered nature of the state. Women constitute a separate class from men. The woman is the proletariat, whereas the man is the elite. Understanding the interdependence of capitalism and patriarchy, therefore, is essential in feminist political analysis. The family and the state are interrelated; one cannot separate the two. Each reinforces the other, but in both sectors, male power is supreme. Sandra Goldberg (1979) argues that capitalist patriarchy is universal if one defines the concept to mean any system of organization—political, economic, industrial, financial, religious, or social—in which the overwhelming number of upper positions in the hierarchy is occupied by males. If we adhere to Nancy Frazer’s critique of the welfare state, she argues that capitalist patriarchy depicts an elaborate network at states’ disposal, whereby citizens are subjects positioned as economic and political agents competing against one another. The consequence is one group (men) dominating the other (women). Women in this case become citizens with limited rights (Frazer, 1986). The state in this regard has the responsibility to preserve life. The services provided by the state were supposed to reflect the interests of all its citizens, but women and men as citizens do not receive equal shares of the state’s resources. Rather, women are expected to become passive laborers and to be submissive, while men are active participants. Women, thus, have no political base because of the nature of the state systems. The socialist feminist perspective provides the most logical hypothesis to explain the relationship between the state and women and how, despite the apparent contradictions, a few women have managed to make headway as policy initiators in the Third World. Insights on the problematic of gender and class on political behavior highlight the minimal participation of women as national leaders. In gaining an understanding of these gender differences, women can change their consciousness of themselves, as well as their positions in the state system. Therefore, a study on women as national leaders is both timely and necessary. This chapter focuses on several contemporary women who have officiated over the highest echelons of national decision-making positions. An unprecedented number of women governing their countries and also women stepping down from national leadership was witnessed between 1966 and 1994. Only fifteen women emerged during this epoch as their nations’ heads. They included, in no particular order of significance, Bangladesh’s Khalida Zia (Mohammed Zia-ul-Hag’s widow); Sri Lanka’s Sirimavo Bandaranaike (Solomon Diaz Bandaranaike’s widow); Chandrika Kumaratunga (Solomon Diaz Bandaranaike’s daughter and Kumaratunga’s widow) (U.S. News and World Report 1994); Pakistan’s Benazir Bhutto (Ali Bhutto’s daughter); the Philippines’ Corazon Aquino (Benigno Aquino’s widow); Violeta Dona Barrios de Chamorro (Cardinal Pedro Joaquin Chamorro’s widow) in Nicaragua; Eugenia Mary Charles in the Dominica; Haiti’s Ertha Pascal Trouillot; Isabel Peron of Argentina (the wife of President Peron); Bolivia’s Lidia Gueiler; Burundi’s Sylvie
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Kinigi; Indira Gandhi (Jawaharlal Nehru’s daughter) in India; Golda Meir of Israel; Tamsu Ciller of Turkey; and Agathe Uwilingivi Mana, who, like Trouillot in Haiti, was appointed interim prime minister, in this instance of Rwanda (‘‘Woman Chosen,’’ 1993). The family affiliations noted are of importance and are expanded later. Umerah-Udezulu (1995) explores four of these national leaders, situated in South Asia and Latin America. The research on the Philippines, India, Pakistan, and Nicaragua involves an in-depth assessment of gender/class issues. These regions provide examples of different forms of political development, ranging from the open and democratic (but not entirely perfect) systems of India and Sri Lanka, to the frequently authoritarian governments of Pakistan and Bangladesh and the democratizing systems in the Philippines in Southwest Asia and Nicaragua in Central America. In addition, the wide range of political development examples in a compact area of South Asia permits comparison among these nations and other ones under inquiry. In order to avoid repetition, Umerah-Udezulu (1995) omitted Mrs. Bandaranaike because of similarity with India in terms of open and democratic (parliamentary) regime types, and because of the closeness in time of the leadership of Mrs. Gandhi. Bandaranaike served Sri Lanka from 1960 to 1965 and 1970 to 1977. She lost power when the Jayawardena-led United National Party (UNP) government accused the former prime minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike of abusing power while in office from 1970 to 1977. In October 1980, her right to participate in politics was removed for a period of seven years. Following that development, Mrs. Bandaranaike’s absence is well noted on her country’s political scene. Mrs. Gandhi’s political quest commenced in 1966 and lasted until 1977, when she was voted out of power. However, she successfully reemerged as a significant player on the Indian political scene in 1979 and ruled until her assassination in 1984. India is examined due to the dynastic politics between the descendants of Jawaharlal Nehru and the rest of the masses and because such politics affected the stability of the family, leading to the assassination of Indira Gandhi as well as her son Rajiv Gandhi. Such a hostile political environment is caused by India’s diverse ethnic groups, whereas its southern neighbor Sri Lanka is more homogeneous. Khalida Zia’s leadership in Bangladesh came about as a result of her husband’s sudden death. Bangladesh is dominated by Muslims, and Ziaur Rahma’s (who led the country from 1975 until his assassination in 1981) constitution recognized this Muslim majority. It also made clear, however, the rights of minorities to practice their faith. The constitution thus established has become increasingly atypical of Muslim-majority nations, making the system less rigid to women’s acceptance and competition in the multiparty system. This atmosphere, in addition to her family background, paved the way for Mrs. Zia’s rise to power. Benazir Bhutto, on the other hand, faced tremendous challenges as a result of her predecessor, Zia’s, Islamic reforms. Such reforms proved to be a stumbling block to Bhutto’s success in office, as is discussed elsewhere, and
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this was a major reason for evaluating her leadership as opposed to Khalida Zia’s in Bangladesh. Haiti for six months was temporarily headed by a woman, Justice Ertha Pascal Trouillot. Her term in office was too short to warrant any significant analysis. For this same reason Tamsu Ciller of Turkey and Agathe Uwilingivi Mana of Rwanda were also excluded, as they both assumed power in the spring and summer of 1993. Lastly, the Dominica’s present leader, Eugenia Mary Charles, came to power through a peaceful democratic process. She did not come to power following the death of a popular family member. Moreover, due to unavailability of traveling and research funding, I have had to rely on sources accessible largely from U.S. government documents, scholarly journals, and so on. While most of the cases illustrate situations where wives head nations due to their husbands’ assassinations, Mrs. Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto exemplify rare circumstances where daughters led their nations due to the loss of their fathers. Moreover, Benazir Bhutto was chosen due to her long involvement in Pakistan’s political process and the resultant regime change following the death of her political enemy General Zia. Her emergence marked the first time, in the modern period, a woman had led a predominantly Muslim nation. Aquino’s unprecedented ascendance pointed to the Filipinos’ frustration with the ills of Ferdinand Marcos’ regime, highlighted by the murder of Benigno Aquino. It also revealed the extent of the Catholic Church’s influence in the country. Chamorro’s rise in Nicaragua is similar to that of Mrs. Aquino in the Philippines in the sense that both came to power as a result of their deceased husbands, neither of whom was head of state or government. Nicaragua is crucial to this study due to Mrs. Chamorro’s commitment to the formerly war-torn Nicaragua, as explained later, and the role she played to bring democracy to the nation. As did Aquino’s Chamorro’s emergence brought an end to an authoritarian leadership and paved the way for the nation’s transition to democracy. So far, since the Second World War, only sixteen women have emerged as heads of governments in developing nations, compared to over 100 countries in this era where women have never ruled their nations. The number is proportionately small, taking into consideration that men had governed in most of the countries, even though women constitute over half of the entire world’s population. Various feminist theorists concur that women do not fare equally with men at the state level; hence, they constantly challenge or reject exclusion of women in policy areas. THE STATE AND RELATIONS TO WOMEN IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Gender is necessary also to the conception of state in the developing nations. These states were parts of the imperialist system of the West and now exist as parts of the international capital exchange. Consequently, their modes of pro-
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duction do not differ from those of the advanced economies of the West. Most of the states are, in fact, highly permeable to both indigenous and international capitalist forces. Women in the developing nations were impacted by the preand postcolonial eras, especially by the resultant cultural, economic, and political orders that followed. Women in these areas have no representation, no voice, and, as a result, no political and economic base. Essentially, the states in the Third World are shaped by gender struggles (Onora, 1990). The states create special gender ideologies through time, which guide resource allocation and decisions in ways that affect gender relations. Ideologically, women are defined largely in terms of their affiliations with the family (Lewis, 1985). For example, women are depicted as mothers, daughters, sisters, and wives and are therefore relegated to the processes, best described as the moral economy of kinship, that regulate women and their work (Afshar, 1985). The legal and material effects that emerge from these ideologies are used as tactics by the states to encourage the mobilization of certain groups and issues. This advancement often favors men rather than women. Catharine MacKinnon’s (1983: 658) perspective, even though aimed at the liberal capitalist state, reveals, for instance, how the state enacts laws as a means of controlling women and, as a result, controlling genderbased opposition. She argues that ‘‘the state will appear most relentless in imposing the male point of view when it comes closest to achieving its highest formal criterion of distanced aperspectivity.’’ That is to say, the state as an autonomous entity monopolizes decision making in such a way as to reinforce its masculine characteristics. It has adopted formal measures in conformity to this rule. The use of law to control women in the developing states manifests in such legislation as prohibition of abortion, regulation of property rights during divorce (Newberg, 1995; Agarwal, 1995), or regulating and/or abolishing divorce in predominantly Islamic (Paider, 1995; Villalon, 1995) and Catholic nations. Even though divorce is a central tenet in Koranic family law of love and marriage, the laws monitoring such process often favor men; and in 1995 the United Nations (UN) enacted laws to readdress these concerns. The state also passes voting laws that further restrict women’s ballot powers. Other analysts maintain that the connection between states and gender manifests at three basic stages: the upper class, which makes decisions that reinforce the state’s positions; statutes and their impact on gender division; and the conglomeration of guidelines, regulations, ideologies, and mechanisms that pattern policy outcomes of the states (Charlton, Everett, and Staudt, 1989). In terms of gender difference, women occupy state positions in minute numbers, women’s interests are rarely represented in the state, and they are seen as primarily, if not purely, familial. Therefore, Charlton et al. (1989) argue that women are not central to state power. The ruling elites are males in these states. The states, as sovereign powers, claim to give social meaning and equal worth to the formal juridical and political rights of all citizens; yet, women are incorporated into the states differently than are men. Women are not equally represented in the policy arena as either policymakers or interested parties.
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Accessible information justifies my claim of minuscule participation of women at the national level. For instance, in 1969 there were only four women in cabinet-level positions in the whole of Latin America. In March 1986 the president of Peru, Nerves, had no women in the cabinet. But 1995 ushered in a new era for Peru, when 5 percent of members of Congress were women. Even though three women in 1995 occupied important positions in Peru’s Parliament, with one of them becoming the president of Congress, the number of female participants remains significantly small compared to the number of women in the country. To illustrate this point further, data from other parts of Latin America support this claim. President Sarney’s Brazilian cabinet in February 1986 was exclusively male. Colombia and Chile successfully elected only two women, both serving as ministers of education (Europa Year World Book, 1987). Only one woman officiates in the current Chilean government, heading the Department of Women’s Affairs (Israel, 1993). In 1994 Guatemala nominated 19 women ministers, and Honduras, 11. For the Caribbean region in 1994 Bahamas had 23 female ministers; Dominica, 9; Guyana, 12; Trinidad and Tobago, 19; and Jamaica, 5. In Africa women constitute only 2.8 percent of national cabinet or equivalent posts (Parpart and Staudt, 1989; United Nations, 1995). Even when women do hold such posts, they preside over nonstrategic positions such as community development, education, and women’s affairs. Seychelles made history in 1994, when 31 women were nominated into the nation’s cabinet offices. In the same year Central African Republic had 5 women ministers; Guinea Bissau had 4; Lesotho, 6; Niger, 5, Zimbabwe, 3; Seychelles, 27; Swaziland, 20, and South Africa, 25 (United Nations, 1994). Over half of African states in 1994 had no women in the cabinet. Some of these included Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Comoros. Sylvie Kinigi and Agathe Uwilingiyi Mana made history in 1993 when they became the interim prime ministers of their respective countries, Burundi and Rwanda. But the positions were only temporary and did not change the nature of the state in postcolonial Africa. The situation is not different in Asia, where women have made slight progress toward occupying state positions. In 1994 women held less than 2 percent of the cabinet posts in the region. For example, Eastern Asia had 0.6 percent of women in chief executive positions; Southeastern Asia, 1.9; Central Asia, 0.0; Southern Asia, 5.7; Western Asia, 0.7; Oceania, 8.8 (Worldwide Government Directory, 1994). China has 21 percent women’s parliamentary representation; and Korea Democratic Republic, 20 percent. Women’s representation at the highest levels of government was generally weakest when women presided as heads of governments. For instance, apart from Mrs. Gandhi, India had only one woman minister between 1952 and 1975. It was reported that eleven others were ministers in the union government, and two were chief ministers in the state government (Randall, 1987). During the first era only one woman was elected into Mrs. Gandhi’s cabinet. However, women did not preside over the cabinet in Mrs. Gandhi’s 1980 appointments. When Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his
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mother following her assassination in 1984, he nominated only Mrs. Moshina Kidwa in his fourteen-member cabinet. He later included two other women as cabinet members. According to Kearney, there were only four women ministers in Mrs. Bandaranaike’s regime (Kearney, 1981). Women have not been completely excluded from the highest level, however. Despite all the constraints stated earlier, a few women have managed to emerge as policymakers in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Nicaragua, the Dominica, Bolivia, Burundi, Haiti, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Argentina, Rwanda, and Israel. In spite of this presence, it is widely recognized that women form a tiny minority within the political elites. India, in order to ensure women’s incorporation at least in the local government and the state levels, has established a quota for women. In terms of state actions to integrate women in the system, Charlton, Everett, and Staudt (1989) argue that the lack of representation has a direct bearing on gender struggles, because policies accruing from this angle benefit (as well as serve as detriments to) women. Even though the state can support women’s advancement in economic sectors and help women in subsistence and employment, in efforts to develop, states generally do not have cohesive plans to equally incorporate women into the system. John Humphrey’s analysis of the Brazilian economy, on the other hand, asserts that women are not integrated into the economy. Such an assertion points to my main contention, that due to lack of economic power women are excluded from the political arena. He claims that between 1950 and the 1970s women found jobs in service sectors and were working in schools and hospitals or as domestic workers employed as housekeepers. In the industrial sector, women made up one-third of all employees in the manufacturing sector (Humphrey, 1985). Despite this claim, women in actuality were found clustered at the bottom of the system in low-paying jobs. The linkage to the political arena is explicit because these women’s lack of economic mobility directly impacted their political progress. They make up onethird of the labor sector yet are deprived of economic and political power. These analyses support the argument that women are not incorporated into the economy in the same manner as men. Humphrey’s explanation helped reinforce the feminists’ view that women are laborers and producers and are never central to the state’s politics. As economics is linked to politics (Spero, 1985), economic power therefore commands political influence. Women posses neither economic nor political influence and are thus excluded from the policy arena. Hilary Standing (1985) contends that women are heavily concentrated in informal sectors or home-based types of work. Women are disadvantaged in the public sector, where they occupy positions as schoolteachers and clerical workers. They work in small units in service sectors and as sales workers and occupy governmental positions in minute proportion to men. In most developing nations, the number of women in informal wage employment has increased in the past 20 years, but the proportion still remains low in comparison to men. Women are found in such light industries as textiles, clothing, and electronics (International Development Review, 1979), but the type of work accessible to women
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in this area remains unskilled in comparison to men (Frobel, Heinrich, and Kreye, 1980; Tompkins, 1987). While some of the women in these low-paying jobs are often more educated than many men, they do not have access to state positions. Critics charge that states’ educational systems also do not correspond to the needs of women. Such systems are either too specialized, and women have to compete in a limited job environment, or they are too generalized, and women are educated to receive the lowest-paying jobs. In this way the existing educational system of capitalist patriarchy has failed women. Women are educated to promote the status quo but are not supplied with the devices to comprehend and evaluate systems that adversely impact them (Jayawardena, 1986). The peripheral relationship of women to state interests and policies can also be seen in the area of family planning and nutrition, where much of the information is provided by men. Reproduction information and services made available to women are mainly male-established and -controlled. Moreover, the contraceptive devices permitted are not necessarily suited to the lifestyles and bodies of the women receiving them. Governments as diverse as China, India, Nigeria, and many others have initiated policies in favor of birth control. In China women do not have a choice as to the number of children they may have; such initiatives remain in the hands of the state. In spite of the known dangers of some current contraceptives, women are not properly informed of these dangers but are persuaded to use these devices. The source of contradictory policies for women can be found in the way the state establishes goals in order to maintain stability, while simultaneously fostering female dependency on the system. Women’s control over their own fertility has been affected by many policies established by the state’s regulating marriage, childbearing, and property ownership. Because the state is largely male, the interests of the male override those of the female. In Latin America there is an established Roman Catholic presence, which has legal ramifications as the states adopt certain laws to protect the church’s interests. For instance, some states such as Nicaragua and El Salvador manipulate the church’s doctrines and use them as tactics to foster national interests. These two countries prohibit abortion as a way of encouraging population growth in war-torn areas. As a result, abortion was driven underground as women reverted to dangerous measures to terminate unwanted pregnancies. Evidence suggests that illegal abortions became rampant as states strove to regulate abortions. Illegal abortions are responsible for a high percentage of maternal deaths in the developing countries (Umerah-Udezulu, 1996/1997). In Brazil it is estimated that one-third of all pregnancies end in abortion. Following such reports, the government introduced studies and policy reorientation resulting in efforts to liberalize abortion in Brazil. Mexico had also adopted a similar policy stance. Similar steps were taken in Chile in 1973 and in Bolivia in 1977 (Francome, 1984). Brazil and Argentina currently have successful networks of family planning centers. Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria developed comparable networks, overwhelmed
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by high annual birthrates estimated at 3.3 percent. Syria and Iraq (prior to the 1990 war with the West) adopted the same procedures to reduce what they perceived as a galloping birthrate of 3.6 (Minces, 1982). In India the state has long legalized abortion. However, due to high fertility rates, many women were subjected to extreme pressure to be sterilized under the state’s oppressive campaign, which resulted in the Emergency Rule of 1975–1977 (Davis, 1985). Moreover, the states sanctioned birth control devices supplied by foreign nations; these are mostly developed by men who do not experience firsthand the issues of fertility (Lopate, 1993); women-centered scholars argue that the recipient nations are not aware of the controversies surrounding them (Savara, 1985). These constraints are not restricted to the state level. While some women welcome these methods, they may face considerable resistance from their husbands. Reports indicate that women may conceal from their husbands the fact that they are using birth control. When their husbands do find out, these women are sent back to the hospital to have such devices removed. All these examples show that the state may make policies to guarantee its control over women, even their sexuality; that capitalist patriarchy affects every aspect of women’s being, in both the private and the public sphere; and, specifically, that every stage of women’s life is controlled by males at home and outside. This does not come as a surprise to feminist scholars, who see the state as male. Indeed, Shulamith Firestone identifies the causes of patriarchy in relation to reproduction, arguing that patriarchy will prevail unless there are changes in reproductive technology (Firestone, 1970a). According to Charlton et al. (1989: 15), ‘‘[T]he state defines the parameters of politics both through its institutions and through ideology. The state is typically the chief promoter of the accepted political reality; it also fosters certain relations of production that reinforce that reality.’’ Relations that divide the means of production on the basis of gender perpetuate sexual ordering. The kinds of policies emerging from this one-sided environment discourage women as active participants in the state system. Yet women are perceived as citizens of these states. The former United Nations secretary-general Kurt Waldheim reported that while women represent over half of the global head count and onethird of the paid labor force, women receive only one-tenth of the world’s income and own less than 1 percent of its property. Women are also responsible for two-thirds of all working hours (Waldheim, 1981). Their labor power sustains the status quo, but the state does not adequately represent women’s interests. Women, as an exploited class, form a free labor pool for the developing states. Yet, women do not participate greatly in the state’s apparatus, although some women in these areas have challenged the state’s position in relation to their gender. The theoretical contributions by the feminists evaluating the conditions of women in the developing countries are summed up in the following. They supported the use of feminism to strategically strengthen women and argued that because of racism, victimization, sexism, sexual violence, wife abuse, and in-
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equity in the state system, women’s situations in these areas have deteriorated, despite claims by some nations to have upgraded the trend (Anand, 1982; Begum, 1990; Cleland and Mauldin, 1991). These past decades (1970s to 1990s) are earmarked by the United Nations as the ‘‘developmental decades’’ (Galey, 1986, 1989). The UN has sought ways to improve the situation of women and has established strategies to combat problems in the developing countries. In the 1995 UN Women’s Conference at Beijing, consensus was reached by participants, and documents were drafted urging nations to enforce laws ensuring equity at workplace and property rights and safeguarding women from sexual violence and spousal abuse. Such positions remain to be actualized, as various nations will have to individually implement these objectives. Also, very little has been accomplished in the attempts to coordinate a cohesive network in which women would advance in the state systems. The major debates have centered on the following: electing women into decision-making positions, establishing financial networks to fund women’s projects, and introducing laws that would create more opportunities for women. Despite these assertions by the UN to upgrade women’s status, women in the developing nations still face serious challenges (Anand, 1982; Galey, 1989). Many women remain uneducated: their incomes are relatively low; women’s health and nutrition needs remain unmet; family planning programs developed by men continue to be below standard; many women are still victims of sexual violence and wife abuse; and, lastly, very few women have progressed as policymakers. Writing in the World Health Magazine, Benazir Bhutto reiterates the importance of including women in world affairs (Bhutto, 1990). She explains that problems such as illiteracy, adverse economic conditions, regional biases against women, and substandard health care systems all operate in alignment against women’s opportunities to progress in the state systems. Accordingly, Benazir Bhutto urges these countries to redirect their strategies to resolve these challenges. Paying close attention to the lack of women’s progress in developing countries, women-centered authors have concluded that women’s subordination in developing areas would be reduced only when these issues are fully addressed (Davis, 1983, 1985; Jayawardena, 1986). It has been firmly established that the state is an arena of unequal association of conflictual social forces in which women have emerged as the victims of at least two of those powers, capitalism and patriarchy. Presently, class categories are primarily male-defined, and women are assigned to an economic or a political class on the basis of their husbands’ relation to the means of production. Therefore, women are perceived not as autonomous beings but as affiliates (not full citizens). Out of this misconception and inconsistency, women have been denied access to the strategic areas of decision making, and their contributions have been undervalued. Hence, there exists a contradictory relationship between the devaluer (men) and the devalued (women). The fact that the political elite are largely male provides a telling account of the underlying motives of the state
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and its subsequent policy interests. Out of the utmost desire to preserve the family on the part of the ruling class, which is also a commitment to a division of labor on the basis of profit accumulation and sexual hierarchy, a few women have risen and fallen as policymakers in the developing nations. WOMEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS AND THE STATE In developing countries, women’s economic and political typings are generally formed on the basis of their fathers’ or husbands’ relation to the means of production. A woman’s status in the society is defined basically by the status of her male kin (father, husband, and brother). Chiefly on this basis women become politically involved or uninvolved at the national level. Hence, the hierarchical economic ordering simultaneously trickles down into the sexual, political differentiation. The woman with a prominent male kin automatically belongs to a higher political class than a woman whose male kin belongs to a lower economic and political class; therefore, women with prominent male kin are not positioned equally with the majority of women, who are at the bottom of the political ladder. Class differences between women in general and women possessing ‘‘superior family’’ backgrounds (who, due to their family names, have emerged as heads of governments) further complicate gender/class analysis. For instance, Fatton (1989: 50) insists that ‘‘women have a contradictory insertion into the social structure. While women as a group suffer from the effects of patriarchy, they do not experience equally the ravages of class domination.’’ Their status in terms of class affiliation is accorded in terms of patriarchal relation to the means of production. This is to say that special material and social circumstances surrounding women’s classification in the state system are, to a greater extent, influenced by women’s family backgrounds (Petchesky, 1981; Aviel, 1981). Class division in the state system originates from the exploitative relationship between the owners of the means of production and the workers. Such a relationship structures male wage labor, which consequently affects social ordering in terms of power structures and, of course, class and gender divisions. The capitalist class or the elite group acquires resources, power, and privilege in the society. Their status is passed down to their kin. Generally, women as part of the capitalist patriarchy acquire the socioeconomic status of their fathers, husbands, or brothers (Eisenstein, 1979). There are, however, ones who have achieved a different socioeconomic status other than that inherited from their kin, but this number has remained marginal. Benazir Bhutto, Corazon Aquino, Indira Gandhi, and Violeta Chamorro typically adopt their male kin political legacy. Hence, in the hierarchical, political, gender-based ordering, women with a prominent male kin are not positioned equally as the majority of women, who are located at the bottom of the political structure. Therefore, just as there is class differentiation between men and women, there is a class distinction among women on the basis of economic and political success of their male relative. This kind of insertion further complicates gender analysis.
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Women’s family backgrounds influence their economic and political classes, in terms of gender differences that enlist them to a separate class from their male kin and men in general. On the grounds of the contradiction, some women emerge as policymakers in the Third World. Benazir Bhutto’s father, Ali Bhutto, was the former prime minister of Pakistan. Her father’s position in the political system enhanced her chances of participating in politics of that country, a predominant Islamic nation. During her campaign for election, after Ali Bhutto’s brutal assassination, Benazir Bhutto constantly identifies herself as the daughter of the martyr Shah Nawaz Khan Bhutto, and ‘‘I am your sister as well.’’ When she was alienated from the country’s politics during her first leadership, her campaign slogan read, ‘‘[S]urrounded by conspiracies, is she not the daughter of Asia?’’ During her second attempt to govern Pakistan, her mother asked her to step down for her brother to govern, a decision that was gender-based. Corazon Aquino’s husband, Benigno Aquino, was a popular senator and a presidential hopeful when he was brutally assassinated under President Marcos’ leadership. This sudden death enlisted Aquino into politics, and this factor, in conjunction with gender, plus a number of other factors, paved the way for her leadership. Jawaharl Nehru, Indira Gandhi’s father, was the prime minister of India, a patriarch who played a crucial role in India’s sovereignty. When he passed on, his daughter was chosen by the syndicates, mainly from the desire to ‘‘have a Nehru in office.’’ They also thought that being a woman, Indira Gandhi would be easily manipulated. But they were wrong, and that caused problems for her. Finally, Chamorro’s husband, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, was an influential political activist and a newspaper editor who constantly denounced the evils of Somoza’s regime. When he was murdered due to this problem, Violeta bore his political mantle and was voted into power because of this, in combination with her saintly image and with the United States’ full backing. These women’s class affiliations are different from those of the majority in their countries. Their linkage to the capitalist patriarchy enlists to a different class of women they represent, successful and powerful women, and this linkage immensely contributed to their ascendance and their decline. This claim is substantiated by Eisenstein’s analysis of the ruling class. She insists that the ‘‘ruling class desire to preserve the family reflects its commitment to a division of labor that not only secures it the greatest profit but also hierarchical sex ordering of the society culturally and politically’’ (1979: 31). Therefore, these women’s presence in the political arena in the cases studied helps reinforce the patriarchal structure, a structure threatened by instability as a result of these assassinations and national conflict. According to Keohane, Rosaldo, and Gelpi (1982: 8–9), capitalist state systems treasure women’s contribution according to male criterion, especially when women’s presence satisfies the ‘‘needs of emergency, [when] women then become men’s equal, only to regress when the urgency recedes.’’ In order to stabi-
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lize the system due to turmoil precipitated in these states by the sudden departure (assassination) of their fathers or husbands, these women were elected into office to reinforce the interests of the ruling class. While they were in power, the gender difference constantly affected their performance as national leaders. Their presence does not suggest that the state is neutral; rather, it supports the capitalist, patriarchal nature of the state (Reif, 1986). FEMINIST STANDPOINT AND THE CRITIQUE OF THE STATE An ongoing struggle by feminist theorists has been to eliminate bias from theory (philosophy, science, and social sciences alike) and practice, by establishing a common voice for women (Hannigan, 1979). As Alison Jaggar (1977) has noted in her work, however, there are many concerns raised in relation to women’s situation in the state system. These political, philosophical voices are rooted in theories of human nature and have differing policy outcomes. The opinions are delineated by Jaggar. Each of these distinctive views—liberal, radical, and socialist feminist positions—is deeply rooted in a theory of human nature with particular epistemological precepts. Drawing from the socialist feminist premise of the clash among the state, class, and gender, I hope to furnish solid grounds for the necessity for a particular feminist standpoint. A feminist standpoint, according to Kramarae and Treichler (1985), is a vital epistemological device for combating all types of dominance in the state system. Kathy Ferguson (1989: 302) notes that current thought on the subject of politics typifies ‘‘the bounded agent of rational self-reflection and autonomous action,’’ which feminist theorists have exposed as reflecting masculine experience rather than a universal analysis of human nature. Since the prevailing knowledge is androcentric, it then becomes imperative to establish its opposite (androperipheral view), which supersedes the biased opinion dominating contemporary scholars. The question, thus, is focused on woman’s position about life. Such a standpoint is a premise capable of establishing the androperipheral view and must supply a blueprint from which ‘‘women must theorize, strategize, and ultimately mobilize force,’’ according to Terry Winnant (1987: 124–26). A common voice, therefore, must embrace a woman-centered notion on the basis of shared experiences (i.e., activities that women generally engage in as a result of their gender). Nancy Hartsock essentially paraphrases class consciousness in discussing the commonality among women as the basis for establishing a feminist unmasking of the status quo. She analogizes the commonality of women and experience to the class experience of the worker and purports that women and workers inhabit a world in which the emphasis is on change rather than static, a world marked by interaction with natural substances rather than separation from nature, a world in which quality is more important than quantity, a world in which the unification of mind and body is inherent in the activities performed. (1983: 234)
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There are, however, some important differences. One cannot overlook, for example, the extent of male labor. The proletarian, if male, is engaged in the labor process only when he is working for the capitalist. For the woman, her experience goes deeper. In the private sphere the situation of the woman transcends the class explanation of Marx to include the patriarchal relations governing her existence. In this context the woman is the worker, the wife, and the mother. In order to meet the basic demands of day-to-day activity, women as mothers and wives are engulfed in the realm of physical labor and in tedious housework. A woman’s work is never done (Chodrow, 1978; Dinnerstein, 1977; Eisenstein, 1981). This sexual division of labor indicates that women, as their gender suggests, are institutionally expected to produce, and are responsible for producing, goods and human beings. In their work as reproducers women exist within what is best classified as a ‘‘complex relational nexus,’’ one in which, according to Hartsock (1983: 234–38), ‘‘the boundaries between self and other are blurred and the capacity for empathy is built into their primary sense of themselves.’’ Parenting as a sexual division of labor goes beyond the fact that mothers produce daughters who become mothers themselves, and men do not. Tradition holds that men are essential in social and family arrangements, and such dogma originates in the parapsychological makeup of individuals. Male dominance in general is reinforced, especially through the unequal prestige enjoyed in the domestic and nondomestic spheres. This is so because the male child at adulthood learns to differentiate himself completely from his mother’s worldview. He eventually grows up to become ‘‘a man’’ who has been inculcated to become achievement-oriented and well groomed to work both inside and outside the home. A girl grows up to become a woman whose psyche (mental orientation) is patterned into subjecting to emotional work in both spheres (Hartsock, 1983). In a nutshell women’s exclusion from the public sphere, even though rarely absolute, is a result of childhood association, which is reinforced by societal expectations on women’s role. Women are brought up to be mothers and wives, while males are raised to become heads of families and corporations, presidents, and the UN secretary-general—hence, their access to the public sphere. As long as modern states exclude the interests of women, establishing women’s standpoint is an epistemic device for reclaiming women’s importance in the state system. Women’s contributions to the states’ structure as mothers and workers would then be acknowledged, not written off. The standpoint emanates from shared experiences and knowledge that are sociopolitically derived. Women’s role as reproducers, mothers, and wives has been used to justify treatment of them as second-class citizens based on their domestic obligation, a task that should have provided them with privilege and dignity. The gender-based division extends to women’s activity in the public sphere. Because of this gap, women emerge late in the political and economic sectors. Due to their late advent in the political and economic spheres, women constitute an exploited class. Women are underpaid, they are unpaid as homemakers, and they are not fairly represented in the state positions because the political arena is contradic-
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tory. Consequently, women’s interests are crippled by the state due to its patriarchal environment. For this purpose the author suggests that there are structural differences between genders and that, as a result of such disparity, women have become victims of their environment. To put it another way, the nature of sexual inequality in the state system is one where women are poorly represented, and their interests are overlooked. Too, this palpable neglect lays the groundwork from which women as a group must struggle. The assumption here implies that the material world is structured into two spheres, masculine and feminine, which are essentially conflictual on the basis of an acquired tradition that presumes one gender’s domination over another. The preeminence of men fosters the subjugation of women—hence, the predetermined practice of hierarchy. Moreover, the dominant group exploits and subjects the less viable one and imposes its worldview on the latter. As a result there are two perspectives: one, as perceived by the dominant group, which Nancy Hartsock (1983) dubs ‘‘surface appearance,’’ and the other, as perceived by the subordinate group, which she calls ‘‘deeper essence.’’ The deeper essence reflects the ways in which women work as producers and reproducers, the awareness that emerges from their experience as part of material reality, and their perception of being closely linked to nature. Women have been exploited as workers but are also conscious of their values as women, as well as of the incomplete but prevailing male supremacy—hence, the duality, which allows a sort of ‘‘triangulation’’ (Ferguson, 1979). Triangulation in this context stems from the two worldviews created by the divergence and allows the development of a third worldview, which is what feminists are purporting. Feminist scholars perceive the contemporary state system to be shadowed by gender inequality and to be partial as a result. They claim that their androcentric opponents fail to realize such division. Therefore, the basic task of a feminist standpoint is systemic uncovering, the rejection of the common masculine assessment of existence as authoritative. Drawing an analogy to political economy, we can see women as workers who are underpaid and exploited and whose labor as mothers is undervalued. The proletariat (women in this regard) are impartial. They recognize these dual levels of reality where one gender dominates the other. Therefore, such a viewpoint can be used to explain the misrepresentation of the socioeconomic system that originated from inaccurate, material-based interactions that distort states’ politics. The socialist feminist theorists, recognizing this disparity, call for a united voice among women on the basis of commonality of experience in order to refute discrimination across class, race, and gender. This evolution of women is highly significant in the state system because it establishes a scale of justice capable of enhancing the system by incorporating the untapped potentials of women when they are granted full opportunity to actively participate as citizens of the state system.
CHAPTER 4
The Difficulty of Consensus Building in Developing Countries: The African Dilemma Valentine Udoh James and Melanie Marshall James
INTRODUCTION There is a growing demand by citizens of developing countries for their inclusion in the governance of their countries. This demand is bringing a new trend to these countries because this wave is a demand for a more participatory process of government that makes room for accountability and responsibility. African countries have arrived at a point in their development where it is crucial to deal with the difficult problem of building a consensus that requires addressing the social, political, and economic problems they are facing. Policy making in Africa, for a long time since independence, has been concentrated in the hands of the elite. Open discussions about development priorities have not been exposed to the scrutiny of the public through debates and dialogues because of the strong military presence in government. The future must be inclusive of different viewpoints and interest groups. The problem of building a consensus in order to achieve the goals and objectives of development, although difficult, is certainly achievable and not insurmountable. Several schools of thought have attempted to explain this necessity for consensus building.
SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM The sources of developing countries’ consensus building problems are two in nature. First is an endogenous source in which the problem emanates from inside the developing countries because of the many diverse ethnic groups with very strong identity, cultural, customary, and linguistic pride. There is a history of possible distrust due to past conflicts or oppressions. A history of conflicts over the right to resources such as land, minerals, and other renewable and nonre-
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newable natural resources is common in the developing countries and seems to reinforce the need for conflict resolution mechanisms. Second, the exogenous source for the creation of difficulty with consensus building is the colonial legacy. The artificial creation of regions, states, and towns based on political grouping accentuates the problems of consensus building. When people who are very different in their traditions and customs are forced to occupy an area or place, building the capacity for tolerance and understanding is fundamentally difficult, and conflicts usually result in the long run. Colonial rule introduced trade-oriented economies to many developing countries in which the indigenous people had little control because of lack in ability or gap in the capacity to direct the trade. Such a system brought about an atmosphere whereby those who were in contact with the colonialists benefited from the training that was provided by the latter. This further increased the differences between groups in the society. A region of the developing world that experienced this type of uneven development is Africa. Colonial administration established systems of ruling developing nations in such a way that the political, economic, social, cultural, religious, and environmental structures of developing countries were disrupted, and new ways began to emerge. This chapter argues that this is part of the reason it is difficult to build a consensus in many developing countries: because of the new ways of governance brought about as a result of colonialism. Abernethy (1988: 15–19) argues that colonial policies in some way exacerbated the current inability of developing nations of Africa to establish stable government and the effectiveness in struggling governments to resolve their problems, whether within the countries or on a regional basis. But Abernethy also contends that the powerful legacy of colonialism would be the mechanisms for resolving Africa’s problems in the future. One can examine the contradictions presented by Abernethy in the light of the current dismantling of the cultural, political, legal, and educational structures that existed in the villages of Africa and then the imposition of large bureaucracies that are currently struggling and need assistance in order to perform effectively. The latter stage concerns the topic of this book, which is the building of capacity through the strengthening of existing institutions and the establishment of new institutions. Through the institutions, human capacities will be improved in order to cope with the changing global milieu. Although Abernethy expresses the thought that aspects of colonial legacy will help to solve Africa’s problems, he contends: The colonial state in Africa was placed atop a host of small-scale, mutually insulated units of production, consumption and political identity. The problem for the state when its status shifts from colonial to post colonial is that relations between state and society are likely to be particularly unhappy for all parties concerned. (1988: 18)
This situation is one of disarray in which small units such as clans and villages do not have their interest represented in national affairs. The large ethnic groups
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are fighting over who rules the countries, and corrupt practices predominate the political, social, and economic scenes in the developing countries. THE AFRICAN CRISIS When discussions about Africa come up in academic circles and business gatherings in the 1990s, there is much Afro-pessimism about the continent. The pessimism covers the spectrum of all political matters and business issues. Of all the regions in the world, Africa has received the most criticism, although it is not only region experiencing civil strife. The African crisis appears to be an unending rash of civil unrest that erupts from time to time. This dilemma began after independence as an elite group in each major ethnic group struggles for power at the expense of the masses. When power is gained by individuals (civilian or military), the ruler wants to remain the ruler for life. The oppressed and economically marginalized then form an alliance for conflict. One recent account of the horrors of Africa is given by Keith Richburg: Africa. Birthplace of civilization. My ancestral homeland. I came here thinking I might find a little bit of that missing piece of myself. But Africa chewed me up and spit me back out again. . . . Now when I hear the latest reports of the latest African tragedy—a tribal slaughter in Burundi, perhaps, a riot in a refugee camp in a remote corner of Zaire, maybe a new flood of refugees streaming across a border in Uganda or Sierra Leone— I can watch with more than casual interest because I have been there. . . . Maybe if I had never set foot here, I could celebrate my own blackness, my ‘‘African-ness.’’ Then I might feel a part of this place, and Africa’s pain might be my own . . . I have lived here and seen Africa in all its horror. . . . I am an American, a black American, and feel no connection to this strange and violent place. (1996: 225–27)
Although this is a personal account of one newspaper correspondent of his experiences and perceptions of Africa’s ethnic problems and how such problems destroy societies, Richburg is not alone in his assessment. Millions of people think Africa’s problems cannot be solved and would not want to be burdened with them. On the political front there is a general agreement that the political and civil strife is causing irreparable damage to African societies, and such situations only exacerbate the marginalization of the countries of Africa. Ethnic differences within countries create enormous instability that must be rectified if economic progress is to be achieved. Because so many conflicts exist in Africa, several governmental and nongovernmental organizations are engaged in finding solutions to the seemingly never-ending conflicts in Africa and establishing peacekeeping mechanisms on the continent. Specialized agencies such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Carnegie Corporation of New York, the International Committee of
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the Red Cross (ICRC), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canadian Council for International Peace and Security (CCIPS), the German Research Institute for International Affairs, and the Freidrich-Naumann Foundation have been attempting to build some strategies for resolving conflicts in Africa. Recently industrialized governments such as French, Dutch, Swedish, British, and American have been assisting in efforts to enable warring factions in Africa to find peaceful solutions to their conflicts. The mediation efforts are commendable, but it must be stressed that the root causes of these problems must be addressed and that permanent solutions must be found for the conflicts in developing nations. The problems of the developing nations revolve around political power, resource distribution, and human rights. The disunity in many of the developing countries comes from the inability to devise the necessary political framework that is based on democratically elected government. The types of democratically elected governments do not have to be like those of the industrialized nations but should reflect the culture and aspirations of the countries of the Third World. A region of the developing world that portrays some of the worst political unrest is Africa. Countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone, and Zaire, to name a few, have very serious political problems that have led to civil wars or some form of unrest that has worsened human and environmental conditions. Because of heterogeneity in ethnicity, it has been difficult to have a stable government in the developing countries of Africa. The differences in languages, customs, and laws create volatile circumstances for conflicts. Sharing political power is problematic. How did many African and other Third World societies get to this point? To arrive at the answer, one has to begin with the concept of the roots of identity in the developing countries. The interaction of foreign influences with indigenous, developing nations’ conditions resulted in the necessity for the people of these emerging countries to acquire their identity (Wiedner, 1962). The early periods of the European and African contact, for example, destroyed or subordinated the existing African development patterns or identity. The colonial period absorbed the Africans into the European economic and cultural milieu without giving the African cultural identity an opportunity to evolve naturally. In setting out to govern African countries and develop some parts in order to extract the exhaustible and renewable natural resources, Europeans unintentionally created an environment that made Africans more curious and interested in their identity. Colonial implementation of political boundaries imposed difficulties that had impacts on the traditional tribal allegiances. Established trade route were confused by European-designed political boundaries, and traditional trading and social structures were disrupted. Wiedner makes the following observations when examining the impact of colonialism on African societies: The homogeneous Hausa concentration, for centuries an integrated commercial power dependent upon established markets and caravan routes to the north, was partitioned in
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a race among competing European powers; the greater portion of Hausaland, joined without precedent to the coastal rain forest, had to develop entirely new outlets and a substantially different economy. Routes running inland from the Gold Coast continued to be important, but the introduction of new crops substantially altered the nature of the trade that was conducted. New routes in the Congo, French West Africa, the Zambezi basin and elsewhere served to reorient the economic and political life of all indigenous people. Each colony strove to become a viable economic unit, as self-contained as possible, intentionally isolated from its neighbors, and dependent upon the products and markets of the mother country. Since European boundaries and commerce dictated the means of livelihood as well as the lines of communication, daily life depended upon the peace and prosperity of a whole colony. Administrators expected the Africans to identify themselves with the new economic and political units rather than the traditional associations, and assumed that they would become loyal to the ruling power. (1962: 318)
The parceling out of Africa’s land in the 1880s divided the continent into roughly 40 colonial territories. These territories existed more on paper than on the ground. The scramble for Africa and subsequent partition was supposed to secure European countries’ future. It should be pointed out that the policies of different colonial powers varied with regard to the style of ruling. Scipio (1965: 28–29) contends that the purpose behind the French rule was to romanize; establish provinces and maintain a small, educated, elite population initially but increase the population of assimilated elite; ensure the existence of French administration; and enable the participation of African Frenchmen in the processes of government of the French Empire. The British, on the other hand, allowed for indigenous rule but under the guise of indirect rule. African institutions and administrations were allowed to flourish under the British colonial rule. While it is important to recognize that there were differences in the colonization style of European countries, the experiences of the colonial rule could be described as essentially similar. The experiences of Africans with colonialism cover a wide range, but it is often argued that the most significant contribution of the brief era of colonialism is its tradition of order over large areas of the continent. In the precolonial period such order did not exist; villages were entities on their own. The colonial rule bequeathed unto Africans money economy, towns and cities, plantations, and mines. The contacts of Africans with colonialism and agents of Western civilization resulted in the creation of an elite class who had Western education and who were of a heterogeneous origin. The elite groups in Africa learned the different elements of Western civilization and were assimilated into high positions or precolonial established order (Scipio, 1965). As was mentioned earlier, members of this group were descendants of paramount chiefs, traditional rulers, and highly respected individuals in the African societies. Initially, these highly educated and Westernized Africans did not form any united group to demand changes in their societies, but as colonialism progressed, Africans began to have a sense of detribalization. In describing the problems created by the detribalization of Africans, Wiedner claims:
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Although the detribalized Africans and the tribesmen have separate identities, they do share a common resentment of the occupying power. The diverse groups in colonial Nigeria—Hausa and Fulani, small Delta clans and the larger Yoruba tribe, and the urban dwellers of Lagos and Ibadan—had no political or economic tradition to hold them together. (1962: 320)
Thus, the difficulty of building consensus in Africa has both an exogenous as well as endogenous root. Exogeneously, the difficulty in uniting people of very diverse groups could be said to have been exacerbated by colonialism. It could be argued that colonialism brought people of different ethnic groups together and united them through a common language—French, English, or Portuguese, depending on which country is under consideration. Nonetheless, it is quite possible to give a counterargument that ethnic hostility and tensions were exacerbated when people of different backgrounds were brought together under one colonized area or country. Endogenously, ethnic rivalry for sharing resources and political power has been on the rise since independence. Rapid but uneven economic development resulted from colonialism, but the economies of the emerging African countries were distorted, and this increased the tension among ethnic groups. Because the economies of African colonies were not developing to satisfy the local markets and needs, local skills were not simultaneously developed with the exploitation of the local resources. Most African colonies were increasingly becoming dependent on foreign expertise and outside capital in order to grow and industrialize. The free trade and economic specialization increased African dependency on foreign expertise. WHAT DEPENDENCY PRODUCED The result of colonialism was a growing demand by different ethnic groups to govern, agitation on different fronts, and the urban elite began to struggle among themselves as to whose ethnic group would be in control of the export of commodities and minerals and have the largest representation in the direct or indirect rule system created by the colonial rulers. Nnoli’s work clearly demonstrates this ethnic issue: Generated by factional struggles among the ruling classes, ethnicity was used to mobilise the population behind ethnic factions of these classes in their competition for a share of the national cake. Recently, ethnic violence has erupted at boundaries between ethnic groups where in precolonial times assimilationist tendencies dominated inter-ethnic relations. In these conflicts, the peasants of one ethnic community are pitted against those of another ethnic community. It is no longer a question of the various factions of the ruling classes pitted in a life and death struggle for a piece of the national cake. (1995: vi)
It is important to recognize that, although it is easy to see how the educated elite in Africa discovered the powerful influence of colonialism in changing their
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societies, it is not that easy to explain the benefits and costs of such changes. Detribalization might have resulted from colonialism, but it is equally true that ethnic identity was reinvigorated through colonialism. This is because the educated elite discovered the significance of their ethnic allegiances. Hence, ethnicity could be said to embody some merits and demerits with regard to strengthening society building. For instance, ethnicity promotes some characteristics of democratic governance. Simply put, the equitable distribution, allocation, and exploitation of resources are central in the ethnicity principles. Nnoli argues that issues of domination, exploitation, and oppression are confronted by ethnic identity ideology. He notes: the people’s protest against the remoteness of the government from the people’s local conditions, their powerlessness in publicly expressing their views and having such views incorporated into public policy, their dissatisfaction with the extent of their own, and local, participation in politics, as well as the effects of such participation. (1995: 6)
The end of colonialism left Africa with a small ruling elite who, although they had political power, were not necessarily rich. This group was determined to amass wealth at the expense of the country. Many individuals have used the state to acquire wealth. Thus, different ethnic groups struggle for political power in order to get their share of financial power. The ruling elite focused their attention on their particular ethnic group by mobilizing the rural population behind their private and very individualized plans. Multiethnic countries of Africa face difficult problems in resource allocation, distribution, and governance. When resources are scarce, and competition for political influence and economic access is intense, civil unrest usually ensues. A brief illustration will help to make this argument. Modern-day Africa is faced with rapid population explosion, a declining economic base, and severe political problems. In West Africa alone the situations in Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso depict serious crises. The different ethnic groups in these countries think that the only way that they would be able to solve their problems is by controlling the parastatals of government—hence, the classic African problem of ethnic-political unrest. Contemporary ethnic issues hinge upon who runs the government, since the government is the largest employer.
CONTEMPORARY ETHNIC PROBLEMS The headlines in newspapers around the world have focused attention on the plight of many hundreds of thousands of Africans. Their problems have come about as a result of warring factions’ trying to gain political power. Coups and countercoups are common occurrences, and in many instances these problems have their roots in ethnic issues. These problems make it difficult to deal with the pressing problems of national development. As Nnoli aptly notes:
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Divisiveness has plagued all efforts of concerted action directed toward national development, with deleterious consequences for the morale of the population and their commitment to hard work. National resources that are critical for the implementation of development projects are wasted on the internecine struggle of the ethnic groups for the national cake. In Africa, the competition for this cake is so fierce that it has polluted the political process, distorted the economic process and generated a great deal of tension and violence which are not conducive to foreign investment. (1995: 8)
Probably the most challenging task for African governments is to establish policies and mechanisms for the many linguistic groups in Africa to identify more with their countries in order to achieve national unity and sustainable development. Such an endeavor would focus on education and information dissemination, which would enable the youth of African nations to concentrate on nation building as well as state building. CONCLUDING REMARKS Many dangerous situations unfolding in Africa and other parts of the developing world require immediate and global efforts in order to address root causes of the problems while providing temporary solutions or relief. Rwanda and Burundi’s problems offer lessons for the world to note and to permanently establish mechanisms to resolve conflicts in the developing world. These two countries are proofs of the necessity for a quick response to dangerous conditions in Africa. The result of the Burundi civil strife is that over 1 million people were refugees in neighboring Zaire (now called the People’s Democratic Republic of Congo), and the three-year civil war in Burundi between the minority Tutsis and the majority Hutus has claimed the lives of more than 150,000 people. By the time of the writing of this chapter, Mobotu’s Zaire is presenting a very serious conflict that could once again put one of Africa’s countries in a precarious position where millions of lives could be lost. Kabila’s government has taken over power in that country. African and other international efforts made the departure of Mobutu result in very little bloodshed. Given the domestic and international origins of the problem of building consensus in developing countries, the framework for consensus building in Africa must recognize the significance of domestic perspectives in building communities and nations and the significance of the legacies of colonial and transnational influence. It is important to realize that developed countries must play important roles in the stability of developing countries. Their role in building democracies and providing the impetus for establishing democratically elected government is crucial. The problem of ethnicity and class conflicts could be resolved through the appropriate method of negotiation, resource allocation, and distribution. These are areas where developed nations can help in building capacity. One country that is working toward improving the status of a group of people who have traditionally been neglected is Norway. It has made a donation of $24 million to the
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United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund’s (UNICEF) African Education for All Program to educate girls in nineteen African countries that are among the poorest in the world. Other developed countries such as the United States are examining ways of establishing an African military force to intervene in situations that are deemed imminent for war crises. Such efforts, backed up with African strategies for peaceful negotiation, will prove to be helpful in the future of building consensus in the developing countries of the world.
CHAPTER 5
Democratization and the Grass Roots: The Case of the Jomoro District Assembly Cyril K. Daddieh
For the first time, we are seriously shifting the focus of decision-making in the areas which directly affect our lives from the all-powerful center to the grassroots. Flight Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings (December 31, 1987) We will continue to stress participatory democracy to ensure the responsiveness and accountability of Government to the governed. The district assemblies which were established as the centers of local political authority have since their inception been initiating, coordinating, managing and executing policies in all matters affecting their localities. The effectiveness of the district assemblies depends largely on the successful translation into reality of the decentralization of the machinery of Government. President Rawlings (April 29, 1993) Ghana’s decentralization program is aimed at providing the people at the grassroots, and mainly in the rural areas with the machinery to address the issues of their poverty and underdevelopment P. V. Obeng, Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) member The decentralization program, as all Ghanaians are aware, is an allembracing political move to devolve power and decision-making from the center in Accra to every nook and corner of Ghana, to the ordinary people so as to enable them to take charge of their own lives. Francis Korbie, Deputy Minister of Local Government and Rural Development It is the conviction of the Government that if people are properly involved in the decision-making process, and are given the opportunity to discuss
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issues that affect their lives at both the district and national levels, they would show greater commitment to the national transformation efforts. Justice D. F. Annan, PNDC member
INTRODUCTION From the moment he exploded like a meteor on the Ghanaian political scene on June 4, 1979, Flight Lieutenant (now President) Jerry John Rawlings seemed obsessed with notions of popular democracy and returning power to the people. Although such notions ran counter to the process of transition he had inherited under which recently legalized political parties were vying for the right to form the next civilian government, Rawlings was forced by the prevailing national mood and political circumstances to preside over it and transfer power to the eventual winner, Dr. Hilla Limann, on October 24, 1979. Watching from the sidelines after the handover ceremonies, Rawlings became increasingly frustrated by the results of the return to civilian rule. His concern with what he perceived as the politicians’ lack of probity and accountability, combined with the overall ineffectiveness of the Limann administration, only intensified his contempt for politicians and political parties and the associated Western model of democracy, which he characterized scornfully as the mere exercise of putting a piece of paper inside a ballot box (Oquaye, 1993). Not surprisingly, since his second coming on December 31, 1981, Rawlings and other high-ranking PNDC officials have waxed eloquent about their resolve to fashion a real homespun democracy that fosters genuine popular participation by ordinary Ghanaians and ensures accountability of government to the governed, thereby preventing elites from running roughshod over the masses. The PNDC government was convinced that it could accomplish both goals with far more effectiveness than the predecessor civilian government had demonstrated. Meanwhile, the grassroots democracy project had to be postponed while the new government struggled for sheer survival. The PNDC felt compelled to attend to the pressing need to consolidate the fragile ‘‘revolution,’’ which was in constant danger of being snuffed out by one plot after another. Consequently, the blueprint for grassroots democracy was not unveiled until November 1988. This appeared in the form of the Local Government Law, otherwise known as PNDC Law 207. The essential provisions of Law 207 were later incorporated into the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic. As entrenched somewhat awkwardly in paragraph 240 (1) of the Constitution, ‘‘Ghana shall have a system of local government and administration which shall, as far as practicable, be decentralized’’ (1992: 150). In conformity with the new Constitution, Parliament enacted into law a New Local Government Act in 1993, known as Act 462. Act 462 created a new local government system consisting of three metropolitan assemblies (population over 250,000), four municipal assemblies (one-town assemblies with population over 95,000), and 103 district assemblies (DAs) (population 75,000 and over). The
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103 district assemblies were envisioned as the highest political authority in each district and endowed with deliberative, legislative, and executive powers. Among other things, the DAs were given responsibility for the overall development of the district and a role in the formulation of the district composite budget, the mobilization of the district’s resources, the promotion of productive activity, the development of basic infrastructure and provision of municipal works and services, and the development and management of human settlements and the environment. As well, they have been assigned a role to play in maintaining security and public safety in the district (Ministry of Local Government, 1993, Act 462: 13–14). The DAs are mixed bodies of popularly elected and appointed officials. An innovative approach to local government elections was adopted. For the first time, elections to the DAs were to take place on nonparty bases every four years, with the proviso that DA and parliamentary elections shall be held at least six months apart. Moreover, the nonelected or appointed members were not to exceed 30 percent of the total membership of the assembly. The appointments are made by the president, presumably in consultation with the traditional authorities and other interest groups in the district. Apparently, the motivation behind this coupling of the electoral and appointment principles is that it would allow the government to co-opt qualified, skilled, and competent citizens who may otherwise not be inclined to get involved in the rough-and-tumble world of competitive DA elections. In this way, local participation could be promoted without sacrificing efficient delivery of public goods and services (Jonah, 1995). This brings us to the goals sought by the new local government reforms, which may be summarized as follows: grassroots participation in decision making through nonpartisan elections and regular close contact and consultations between assembly members and their constituents, meeting the development needs and aspirations of local communities, and accountability of the government to the governed. The purpose of this chapter is to assess how well these goals are being met by focusing on the perceptions and attitudes of the voters in one electoral district, Jomoro. We seek to ascertain the impact of the Jomoro district assembly (JDA) as a community development institution. We seek as well to evaluate the degree to which the JDA is becoming a genuine avenue for local participation in decision making by looking at the nature and levels of popular participation. Since political participation hinges on political awareness or knowledge and a strong sense of political efficacy, the chapter analyzes the level of voters’ political awareness and their self-confidence in their ability to influence decision making in the Jomoro district. In short, to what extent are the desired goals of the government and the constitutional provisions and related legislation, Act 462, being honored, as viewed from the grass roots in the Jomoro district?
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THE SETTING The Jomoro district (Western Nzima), with its capital in Half Assini, lies in the extreme southwest corner of Ghana (see Figure 5.1). It has always been arguably one of the most tepid backwaters of the country. According to the 1984 population census, Jomoro consisted of 214 localities. The total population was 70,881. Only 20 of these localities had populations that exceeded 1,000. Half Assini, the district capital and largest town, had a population of 8,816, followed by Bonyere, with 4,172 people. Tikobo I and II rank third and fourth, with 2,684 and 2,488 people, respectively. Beyin, the traditional capital and the seat of the traditional ruler, had a population of 1,410. The enumerators identified a total of only 5,936 houses in the district. Indeed, several localities had between 1 and 4 houses (Republic of Ghana, 1989b: 1–4). The level of development in Jomoro is one of the lowest in the country. One measurement of this lack of development is that at the time of the 1984 census, only three localities (Elubo, New Kabenla Suazo, and Bonyere Junction) had pipe-borne water. Not even the district capital could boast of pipe-borne water at the time of the census because the old water system had broken down. The main source of water supply for virtually all of the towns and villages in the district was either a bore hole, well, river, or stream. A majority of residents had never seen a health care professional in their lives. There were only six clinics, one rural health center, and one hospital in the entire district. The lone hospital was in Half Assini. The district fared no better with respect to education; the census identified eight primary schools and 27 combination primary and middle schools but inexplicably missed the only secondary school in the district, also at Half Assini. There were no commercial or technical schools anywhere in the district (Republic of Ghana, 1989a: 1–4). Not surprisingly, illiteracy is quite high in the district. The female population here is even worse off than their male counterparts when it comes to literacy. It is also instructive that more than a decade after the last census, the development picture has not improved in any significant way. The district has not been hooked up to the national electricity grid, despite numerous promises in the past. One might say that the residents of the district are still in the dark both literally and figuratively, especially given poor educational facilities, high dropout rates, and even higher rates of illiteracy. Transport and communication systems range from inadequate to nonexistent. The district still cannot receive a signal from the national television station or from the FM station in the regional capital. With the exception of the telephone, which made its appearance in the waning months of 1996 at the district administration, the district as a whole is not linked to telecommunication. Moreover, throughout much of its history the district has been characterized by a poverty of infrastructure, especially a drivable road system. The single main road linking the district to the regional capital remained an untarred dirt road that was rendered virtually undrivable during the height of the rainy season. The district is
Figure 5.1 District Map of Ghana
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one of the wettest areas of the country, receiving over 2,000 millimeters of rainfall annually. The virtually annual ritual of being cut off by the rains was a constant reminder to residents of their isolation from the rest of Ghana and neglect by successive governments. The irony is that the first postindependence government of Ghana was led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, who was a ‘‘native son’’ of the district. Parts of that road have only recently been tarred; parts are currently under construction. The remaining portions, according to the government roadside billboard, are under contract to be tarred. The district employment situation is, to say the least, dismal. Not surprisingly, most of the educated young men migrate to Coˆ te d’Ivoire and to urban areas in Ghana in search of jobs. It has been estimated that a quarter of Nzimas live in Coˆ te d’Ivoire (see Figure 5.2). Coconut farming has become the single most important occupation in the district. Teams of men and women have found a niche in the coconut industry—earning their livelihood by extracting coconut oil, using less efficient, traditional techniques. Others collect and transport the coconut oil to urban market centers elsewhere in Ghana. Fishing is also widespread, but the fishermen are, more often than not, Ewe and Fanti migrants from elsewhere in Ghana rather than Nzimas. Apart from teaching, most of the jobs in the district are to be found in the informal sector and consist of hairdressing, dressmaking, and trading for women and, for young men, tailoring, commercial driving, retailing, auto mechanics or ‘‘fitting,’’ and theft of coconuts. THE SOCIOLOGY OF JOMORO VOTERS Having highlighted the goals of the local government reform and the overall developmental context within which elections take place in the Jomoro district, we can now report the findings from a survey administered in October–November 1995 to 150 randomly selected voters from four locations in the district. A total of 100 respondents were selected from the two largest towns, Half Assini, the district capital, and Bonyere. Each provided 50 respondents. The remaining 50 were split between Tikobo I and Beyin. While Half Assini and Tikobo I are located on the main road, Beyin and Bonyere are off the main road. This choice reflected a deliberate effort to minimize potential roadside biases. The gender distribution of the sample reveals that there are 109 male (72.3 percent) and 41 female (27.3 percent) respondents. About 45 percent of the sample is over 40 years of age. Roughly 7 percent is between ages 36 and 40. Another 17 percent is between ages 31 and 35. Those between age 25–30 and 18–24 account for 19 and 11 percent, respectively. The vast majority (71.3 percent) of our respondents are married; 17.3 percent indicate that they are single. Nearly 8 percent report being divorced, and the rest are widowed. The educational attainment of our respondents are what one might expect from a district that is rural and poorly served by educational facilities. As Table 5.1 illustrates, some 17.3 percent of our respondents (a total of 26) have no formal education. Another 41.3 percent (62 respondents) have only elementary
Figure 5.2 Map of Nzimaland
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Table 5.1 Educational Level of Respondents
education. While 26.7 percent or 40 respondents have had secondary/technical education, only 2 respondents have a university education. Furthermore, respondents who have attended a teacher training college account for only 6.0 percent of our sample (a total of 9). An additional 2.7 percent (4 respondents) have vocational training. The occupational status of most respondents also reflects the limited educational achievements as well as limited employment opportunities in the district. Table 5.2 reveals that the single largest number of respondents is farmers, accounting for 27.3 percent (41 respondents) of our sample, followed by traders, accounting for 14.7 percent (22 respondents). Teachers represent the third most important category of occupation in our sample, with 16 respondents (10.7 percent of the total). Drivers account for 4.7 percent of the sample. Significantly, while 6 percent of our sample indicate that they are self-employed, an even higher number (9.3 percent) admit to being unemployed. The remaining occupational distribution includes a catchall category of artisans, fishermen and fish sellers, housewives, coconut oil producers, and so on. It should come as perhaps no surprise that the income levels of our respondents are remarkably low. As Table 5.3 reveals, among those who report their incomes, 29.3 percent (44 respondents) earn less than C10,000.00 a month. Another 20.7 percent (31 respondents) have personal incomes of over C50,000.00 a month. Meanwhile, 6.7 percent, or 10 people gave no response.
VOTING We have adumbrated how underdeveloped the Jomoro district really is, even by Ghanaian standards. It is a rural economy and society in dire need of infrastructure and employment opportunities. Against this backdrop elections to the DA and the national legislature have been conducted. Voting is universally recognized as the most basic level of political participation. As such, it represents an important indicator of grassroots interest and the people’s involvement in the affairs of their district and nation. A number of important characteristics of the 1994 vote are worth noting.
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Table 5.2 Occupational Background of Respondents
First, the elections appear to have been keenly contested. While some seats were more highly contested than others, there were no constituencies in which a candidate ran unopposed. In all, 85 candidates vied for the 30 electoral seats in the DA. While the candidates may have faced real competition, the turnout suggests that voters were not particularly turned on or energized by the apparent competition. In fact, turnout was relatively low. Out of a total of 63,680 registered voters, only 20,746 voters, or 32.6 percent, cast their ballots. Some 1,055 ballots or 5.1 percent of the total, were rejected. Normally, ballots are rejected because they are not thumbprinted or handled properly. This large number of rejected ballots is another reflection of the pervasive illiteracy in the district. Altogether, the winners obtained only 52.1 percent of the votes cast, hardly a ringing endorsement. By contrast, the 1988/1989 district assembly elections seem to have generated more interest and participation. It is interesting to note that despite the low turnout, the 1994 DA elections produced some surprises. First, it produced a significant turnover of legislators. Only nine incumbents were returned to the assembly. Twenty-one new members were elected. Second, for a district in which women outnumber men, according to the census data, women were woefully underrepresented in the DA. The election featured a single woman among the 30 elected members. This represents two fewer women than in the previous DA. In short, rather than improve their representation, women lost ground to men in 1994, making the legislature and politics at the Jomoro district just as male-dominated as those at the national level. These election results are remarkably similar to those produced by the parliamentary election contest in the district in 1992. In that election, of the 62,189 registered voters, 18,389 cast ballots. There was a total of 690 rejected ballots.
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Table 5.3 Monthly Income of Respondents
That number translates into a turnout of a remarkably low 29.6 percent. The winning candidate, a National Democratic Congress (NDC) member, polled 9,521 votes versus 8,178 for the National Convention Party (NCP) challenger. With only 1,343 votes separating the two candidates, the NDC member won with 51.8 percent of the votes (District Election Committee [DEC], 1992). Low voter turnout is not unique to Jomoro. Kwesi Jonah (1995) has argued persuasively that beyond the peculiarities associated with each community or electoral area such as market days, types of occupation, and local politics and culture (funerals and festivals), the 1994 district assembly election was the fourth election in three years, coming as it did on the heels of the referendum that approved the Constitution and the presidential and parliamentary elections. According to Jonah, voters everywhere were tired of voting in so many elections within such a short period of time, especially when they could not see a direct connection between frequent voting and qualitative improvements in their wellbeing. Jonah further argues that they also assumed that once presidential and parliamentary elections had been held, whatever happens in the district would be determined in Accra by the holders of central government power.
CANDIDATE CAMPAIGN PROMISES It seems that no matter where they are, candidates have a tendency to make campaign promises that they may never be in a position to keep. Especially in a rural setting, unkept promises can backfire and either lead to the rejection of an incumbent in the next election or, more than likely, alienate voters altogether from the process and discredit the resultant assembly in the minds of the electorate. Were candidates in Jomoro more mindful of the potential damage to their reputations and the DA so that they kept their promises to a minimum? Did they try to outbid each other by making promises that they could not possibly keep? Opinions were divided on this issue. Nearly 61 percent of our sample (91 respondents) reported that candidates made promises. About 37 percent (56 respondents) indicated that the candidates made no promises. Fifty-nine persons offered no responses. As Table 5.4 indicates, provision of pipe-borne water was
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Table 5.4 Candidate Campaign Promises
KVIP⫽Kumasi Ventilated Integrated Project.
the top item on the list of promises, followed by KVIP, electricity, and schools. While such promises tap into the core needs of the district, it appears voters were not taken in by them: they hardly constituted the most important determinant of how people actually voted.
KNOWLEDGE, INTEREST, EFFICACY, AND PARTICIPATION LEVELS Again, political participation in general and the choices voters make are highly influenced not only by having personal knowledge of the candidates and familiarity with the issues but also by a sense of political efficacy, the belief or selfconfidence that one can make a difference. Given the rural nature of the district, one would expect personal contact or face-to-face encounters to form the basis of voters’ knowledge of candidates and voting decisions. When asked whether they personally knew the candidate they voted for in the 1994 DA election, an overwhelming 96.7 percent (145 respondents) said yes. Just how did they know the candidate? Approximately 25 percent (25.3) said they knew the candidate as a neighbor. Fourteen percent (21 respondents) said they met at a political rally. The majority of the people (48.7 percent) said they knew the candidate as a member of the town or village or were related to him through the extended family. Seven people did not respond. To double-check the evidence of political awareness, we asked respondents to identify by name the head of state, their member of Parliament (MP), and the district chief executive or district secretary. While 93.3 percent of respondents could identify President Rawlings by name, the percentage of respondents who could name their MP dropped to 75.3 percent. A similar percentage of respondents (74 percent) could correctly identify the district chief executive by name. While President Rawlings (or J. J.) may be the most recognizable political figure in the country, the assembly members have an even higher name recognition. It is worth noting that if name recognition is taken as closeness to the
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Table 5.5 Number of Political Meetings Attended
electorate, an outcome intended by the local government reforms, then the DA has met an important goal of its architects. In our sample, we were pleasantly surprised to find that only two respondents could not identify their elected assembly representative by name. The choice of which candidate to support appeared to hinge on the perceived ability of the candidate to serve his or her community well. Indeed, 69.3 percent (104 respondents) indicated that ability to serve well was the primary reason for voting for the candidate. Another 22.7 percent (34 respondents) were influenced by the honesty or patriotism of the candidate. Only 4.7 percent (7 people) admitted to voting for the candidate because he is a neighbor. To ascertain the level of political awareness, we first asked voters if they had attended any political education meetings prior to balloting. The responses, as reproduced in Table 5.5, indicate that 44.7 percent (67 respondents) had attended no political education or election meetings. Among those who had attended meetings, 44 percent had attended three or more meetings. Another 24 percent had attended two meetings, and 13 percent had attended only a single meeting. It must be noted that most of the attendants appear to have been passively involved. Only 29.3 percent indicated that they had asked questions at these meetings. Another 29.3 said they did not ask questions. The rest did not respond to this question, an indication that they were not actively engaged. When we probed further to find out why they did not ask questions, a majority simply said that they did not find it necessary. For the most part, as is true of most rural districts, most of the voters got their information from the radio and the National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE) (see Table 5.6). Response to several questions designed to gain insight into voters’ perceptions of what was at stake in these DA elections to bring them to the polls reveal that they expected the elections to contribute to the solution of the development deficits of the district. Most voters bemoaned the lack of development of their village or town. The elections were seen as a vehicle for gaining access to clean water, electricity, roads, health posts, and so on, all amenities that the district lacked. Not surprisingly, when asked to identify the major issue in the DA election, 88 percent pointed to the development of the district. Nearly 5 percent leaned in the same direction but emphasized getting a fair share of the national
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Table 5.6 Political/Election Information Sources
cake. For this group, then, development of the district is not altruism but a matter of equity in national resource allocation. Similarly, when we asked our respondents what raised their interest in the 1992 parliamentary elections, 82 percent pointed to the lack of development (water, electricity, roads, health services, etc.) in the district.
THE NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPERIMENT: TO BE OR NOT TO BE PARTISAN? As indicated earlier, a major innovation introduced by the local government reforms is that elections are to be contested on a nonpartisan basis. No doubt, this provision is a concession to Rawlings, whose antipathy toward political parties was an open secret. While his attempt to avoid partisan politics at the national level was repulsed by Ghanaians, he managed to get his vision of nonpartisan politics endorsed for the districts. According to section 7 (1) of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462: 11), ‘‘A candidate seeking election to a District Assembly or to any lower local government unit shall present himself to the electorate as an individual, and shall not use any symbol associated with a political party.’’ This position is somewhat reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson, who had written in 1789, ‘‘If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not go there at all’’ (Jefferson, 1789). Like Jefferson, Rawlings went on to create a party and contest presidential elections as an NDC candidate. The comparison perhaps ends here because while Jefferson was motivated by rugged individualism, Rawlings was presumably looking for the best ways to safeguard communal or grass roots interests. Relatedly, political parties are prohibited from endorsing, sponsoring or offering a platform to, or in any way campaign for or against, a candidate seeking election to a DA. Failure to comply with this provision is an offense punishable by disqualification of the candidate. Furthermore, a political party that contravenes this provision commits an offense that, on conviction, carries a penalty not exceeding C5 million (Act 462: 11). In view of the fact that Ghana has opted for a nonparty local government
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Table 5.7 Reasons the DA Should Be Nonpartisan
system but embraced partisan politics at the national level, it was necessary to test the level of support for the experiment at the grass roots and also probe the degree to which national partisanship may have infected district assembly elections. Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not the present nonparty local government system in Ghana should be retained. While a clear majority endorsed the nonpartisan nature of DA elections, the support was less than overwhelming. Only 69.3 percent (104 respondents) were in favor of nonpartisan elections, while 25.3 percent (38 respondents) opposed it. Opinions vary widely about the benefits of nonpartisan elections. Among those who favored maintaining the nonpartisanship of the DA elections, Table 5.7 shows that nearly 25 percent (a majority) anticipated that it will put an end to bickering and division; almost 11 percent felt that it would facilitate the election of the right kind of people. Only 9 percent thought it would bring development to the district. Another 9 percent said that it would make it possible for people who might be interested in service but are not inclined to join a political party to do so. It is instructive that a majority of those who were opposed to the nonpartisan requirement of district assembly elections theorized that the government would be more responsive to local needs if the elections were partisan. This would be true, they claimed, irrespective of whether or not the district voted for the government, because the government would want to woo it for subsequent elections. On the whole, the nonpartisan principle seems to have been upheld. Only 10 percent of those surveyed reported that a party campaigned for a candidate. Only 8 percent of respondents identified the NDC as the guilty party. Less than 2 percent pointed an accusing finger at the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Nearly 95 percent of our respondents said they had no knowledge of any political party’s sponsoring a candidate during the district assembly elections. Again, the 5 per-
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cent of our sample that reported party sponsorship all identified the NDC as the culprit. DISTRICT ASSEMBLY AND DEVELOPMENT As suggested earlier, the interest in DA elections is fueled by its potential impact on community development. As a result, we wanted to test local perceptions of the developmental impact of the JDA. When we asked whether or not the JDA had carried out any development project in their area, 80 percent of respondents said yes. The most frequently mentioned development project undertaken by the JDA was KVIP toilet, followed by school, rehabilitation of schools, markets, culverts for gutters, and market construction. According to sources in the district administration, between September 11, 1994, and February 8, 1995, the district had taken in C376,304,818.18 as its share of the District Assemblies Common Fund (interview, 1995). This represents Jomoro’s portion of the 5 percent of total national revenue that is earmarked for development in the districts (Act 455: 2). At the time of the research, the JDA had funded 35 projects from those funds either on its own or in collaboration with the communities. These included two day care centers, ten classroom blocks, five KVIP, four schools rehabilitated, three hand-dug wells, two markets renovated, one electrification project at Half Assini, construction of psychiatric office at Half Assini, and some work on clinics at Elubo and Egbazo. While these projects were widely dispersed throughout the district, Half Assini, Bonyere, and Tikobo I topped the list of beneficiaries with eleven, five, and two projects, respectively. In addition to the assembly’s own projects, the DA is the principal implementing agency for development projects funded by national government agencies and by international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It is able to get some of the shine from the commissioning of these projects, as residents do not ordinarily make distinctions between donors and implementing agencies. ASSEMBLYMAN The district assemblyman has been given an awesome responsibility by the new Local Government Act. Act 462 stipulates: A member of the District Assembly shall as appropriate (a) maintain close contact with his electoral area, consult his people on issues to be discussed in the District Assembly and collate their views, opinions, and proposals; (b) present the views, opinions and proposals to the District Assembly; (c) attend meetings of the District Assembly and meetings of sub-committees of which he is a member; (d) meet his electorate before each meeting of the Assembly; (e) report to this electorate the general decisions of the Assembly and its Executive Committee and the actions he has taken to solve problems raised by residents in his electoral area; . . . (i) maintain frequent liaison with organized
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Table 5.8 Number of Meetings Held by District Assemblyman
productive economic groupings and other persons in the District; and (j) take part in communal and development activities in the district. (1993: 16–17)
For a district that lacked adequate transportation and communications infrastructure, we might expect close contact and consultation to be kept to a bare minimum, if not honored in the breach. To our utter astonishment, most assemblymen made strenuous efforts to maintain close contact and to consult constituents. Nearly 79 percent of our respondents confirmed that their assemblyman had held meetings in their town or village. Only 18 percent were not aware that any such meetings had taken place. Asked how many meetings had been held, 6 percent said a single meeting; 10 percent reported two meetings; 17 percent reported three meetings; 14 percent reported four meetings; 32 percent reported five or more. About 21 percent did not respond. Again, considering the difficulty of getting around in the district, these figures amount to an impressively high level of contact and consultation by assemblymen (see Table 5.8). What is the level of participation in these meetings? Our data in Table 5.9 show that while 58 percent of voters attended these meetings, nearly 21 percent stayed away. Another 21 percent did not respond, generally a sign of nonattendance. Among those who attended, 29.3 percent reported asking questions; an identical percentage reportedly did not ask questions; 41.3 percent had no response. Asked why those who attended did not ask questions, the answers ranged from ‘‘I had no question,’’ ‘‘It was not necessary’’ (the majority response), and ‘‘I understood what was being discussed,’’ to ‘‘I just wanted to hear what the member had to say,’’ to deafening silence. Such responses suggest that grassroots participation may be more passive in the Jomoro district. Such passivity may be taken as a sign of lack of efficacy on the part of local voters. In the Beyin electoral area, the 25 voters were asked to rate the performance of their assemblyman and their member of Parliament (MP). There was a resounding endorsement by 84 percent of respondents of the work the assemblyman was doing (84 percent rated him ‘‘good’’; 8 percent rated him ‘‘fair’’; only 8 percent rated him ‘‘poor’’). Many of them paid him the highest traditional compliment by getting up from their seats as they mentioned his name, a sign of great admiration, as opposed to ‘‘sitting down on his head.’’
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Table 5.9 Responses to the Question: ‘‘Did You Attend a DA Meeting?’’
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE While grassroots participation remains to be deepened, voters in the Jomoro district have displayed a fair amount of interest and knowledge. In contrast to the general Jomoro electorate, our data show that 77.3 percent of respondents voted in the 1992 parliamentary elections. Only 22 percent failed to vote. Among those who revealed the name of the party that received their vote, 54 percent indicated that they had voted for the NDC; 20 percent voted for the NCP; however, 26 percent had no comment. With regard to the 1992 presidential elections, 89.3 percent said they voted. Among these voters, 62.7 percent (94 respondents) said they voted for Rawlings. The leading opposition candidate, Professor Adu Boahen, garnered only 6 percent of the vote among these voters, while former president Hilla Limann and Kwabeno Darko each received 7.3 percent of the votes. Fourteen percent of our respondents did not comment (see Table 5.10). In an effort to anticipate the voting trend in Jomoro, we asked respondents to identify whom they were likely to vote for in 1994, assuming the candidate lineup is the same as in 1992. Although the NDC leader’s numbers were down, his showing still far outpaced that of his opponents, with his support still holding at 55.3 percent; 10.7 percent indicated that they would vote for Limann; 23.3 percent had no response. Often this reluctance to divulge information about the party or candidate for whom they voted was prefaced by the remark that ‘‘their vote is secret, so they cannot tell interviewers.’’ It is worthy of note that a majority of voters in Jomoro did not identify with a particular party. Indeed, 64.7 percent of respondents claimed that they did not belong to a political party. Only about 33 percent acknowledged that they belonged to a political party. Among those who acknowledged their membership in a political party, 22 percent identified with the NDC. No other party had more than 5 percent. This figure was overshadowed by the large number of voters (68 percent) who kept their party affiliation to themselves. Surmising that trying to get voters in rural Jomoro to admit to belonging to a political party might be a tough sell, we tried another approach. We asked which political tendency they generally supported. Surprisingly, the figures are not far apart on both scores: 39.3 percent indicated
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Table 5.10 Candidate Choice in 1992 Presidential Vote
that they supported Nkrumah; only 2 people (1.3 percent) supported the Danquah-Busia tendency; 23.3 percent supported Rawlings (P)NDC; the rest would not reveal their support for any of the political tendencies. Again, anticipating the December 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections, we asked voters to look ahead and identify the main local and national issues over which those elections should be fought. As Tables 5.11 and 5.12 show, on the local front, 28.7 percent of respondents identified lack of infrastructure as a priority concern. Some 22.6 percent identified the lack of electricity as the second main local issue. Additionally, nearly 13.3 percent identified unemployment as another main local problem. Meanwhile, the high cost of living/inflation topped the list of issues on the national agenda for 42.3 percent of our respondents. Another 15.8 percent were concerned about unemployment. On the surface, these critical concerns seem to open up possibilities for the opposition to exploit. Yet the electoral fortunes of the opposition have been damaged in the district insofar as the overwhelming majority (73.3 percent of respondents) either did not know of, or could not identify, any major policy differences or felt there were none between the NDC and the opposition parties. Those who identified differences had only vague notions that the opposition stands for something different, but, beyond that, they could not articulate what the exact differences were. Education was most frequently cited as an area where there may be differences. But again, these differences are more inchoate and are offered by a paltry 12 percent of the respondents. The opposition’s uphill battle in the district is compounded by responses to our question: ‘‘Do you think that if the NPP came to power in 1996 there will be MORE OR LESS 1. Respect for human rights? 2. Economic Recovery Program (ERP)? 3. Rural Development? 4. Corruption?’’ These are clearly difficult questions to elicit answers to, and large numbers of respondents failed to comment. Nevertheless, while 30 percent said there will be more respect for human rights, almost 37 percent disagreed. The rest had no comment. On the (P)NDC government’s ERP, 33.3 percent said there will be more ERP under an NPP government; 31.3 percent disagreed. More than 35 percent had no response. On rural development, 30.7 percent thought there will be more, while 37.3 percent
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Table 5.11 Main Election Issues: Local Level
anticipated less of it. Again, 32 percent declined to answer. On corruption, 50 percent thought there will be more of it. Only 23.3 percent felt there will be less corruption. When we asked, ‘‘Who do you think is likely to win the next presidential election?’’ 44 percent thought that the incumbent (NDC-Rawlings) is likely to win. Only 5.3 percent felt that Adu Boahen (NPP) is likely to win. A sizable 30 percent did not make known their views on who is likely to win the presidential election. Asked to give reasons the particular party or candidate was likely to win the election, wide-ranging answers were given: 25.3 percent felt that Rawlings’ programs are working; 4.7 percent said he is keeping his promises; 5.3 percent said they liked J. J. as a person; another 4.7 percent said he is helping the district; 3.3 percent said the incumbent government always has an advantage. Nearly 37 percent declined to respond. CONCLUSIONS We have demonstrated that the single most important influence on Jomoro voter participation in elections, whether presidential, parliamentary, or district, is a utilitarian one. It is premised on the ability of such elections to produce developmental outcomes that ease some of the burdens of rural existence and improve the quality of socioeconomic life in Jomoro. The disappointments of the past have made voters cautiously optimistic about the new local government dispensation. There is ample evidence to suggest that Jomoro voters are politically fairly knowledgeable and seem to have an interest in local politics. To be sure, political knowledge and keen interest in local political and development issues, coupled with active involvement through organizing, attendance at meetings, and persistent questioning of local authorities and district
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Table 5.12 Main Election Issues: National Level
assembly representatives, are the stuff of capacity building at the grass roots. If so, Jomoro voters have some way to go before they can hold the district administration and their assembly accountable as well as become truly masters of their own destiny. They have made a good start. The extent of participation is growing, but the nature of that participation remains rather passive. It needs to be deepened further. Over time, as voters in Jomoro debate issues of development, raising of taxes, and the expenditure patterns of the administration, they will acquire even greater knowledge about the workings of local government and the capacity to influence local government decisions. In the meantime, they wait to see whether the new DA will make qualitative changes in their lives or will go the way of its predecessors. There are some hopeful signs that the development deficit of the district is in the process of being redressed by the DA and the national government. In that case, most of the voters may give the NDC their vote in the December 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections and then wait and watch. (As was anticipated, the NDC carried the district in both the presidential and parliamentary elections.) ACRONYMS DA
District Assembly
DEC
District Election Committee
JDA
Jomoro District Assembly
KVIP
Kumasi Ventilated Integrated Project
NCCE
National Commission on Civic Education
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NEC
National Electoral Commission
NDC
National Democratic Congress
PNDC
Provisional National Defence Council
NPP
New Patriotic Party
PCP
People Convention Party
PART II
Economic Issues
CHAPTER 6
Economic Theory and the Growth Ethic: Proposals for Alternative Measures of Economic Performance Michael A. Burayidi
INTRODUCTION The pursuit of growth has permeated all spheres of economic life. From the local to the national and international level and from rural to urban communities, economic development agents and institutions are set up with the sole objective of promoting growth in their localities. Levy observed that ‘‘there are about 15,000 organizations in the United States devoted to the promotion of local economic growth, and their number appears to be increasing rapidly’’ (1981: 1). The folk wisdom seems to be, ‘‘If you are not growing, then you are dying!’’ Despite this fervor, economic indicators for measuring growth, derived in the form of national accounts in the 1930s, have not responded to the changing worldview of what actually constitutes growth and how it should be valued (see, e.g., Daly and Cobb, 1989; Anderson, 1991). As a result, the measures of growth have continued to stress quantitative changes in output of commodities without regard for its long-term consequences on the environment, its impact on the distribution of welfare, or the composition of national output. Moreover, in developing countries, quantitative economic growth may be secondary to other values that are held dear by these societies. This chapter discusses reasons for the emergence and dominance of the commodity-based growth ethic and argues a case for broadening the scope of the growth ethos. The shortcomings of the conventional measures and strategies for promoting economic growth and development in both First and Third World countries are examined, and alternative indicators are suggested for measuring economic performance that respond to changes in the conception of growth and that could become useful tools for measuring progress if sufficient effort was committed to designing the institutional framework for designing and measuring
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national and community development using these indicators. In this effort, the chapter expands on the work already started by Daly and Cobb (1989), but with its operationalization at the local level. THE DOMINANCE OF THE GROWTH ETHIC The genesis of the growth ethic can be traced to classical utilitarianism. Coats notes that since its inception, economics has been dominated by a single paradigm, ‘‘the theory of economic equilibrium via the market mechanism’’ (1969: 292). Hence, the maxim of the ‘‘maximizing individual in a relatively free market’’ (Gordon, 1965: 123) has dominated the field. Classical utilitarianism is consequentialist (deontological) in that it measures the outcome or consequences of an action and is best defined by Mill: ‘‘[A]ctions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness’’ (1935: 10). For classical utilitarians, the purpose of economic action is to maximize happiness or welfare via wealth creation. The yardstick for measuring a society’s success is how much wealth has been generated, regardless of how this end was achieved or even apportioned among members of a community. Such a criterion, of course, is based on assumptions of a frictionless market in which individuals and nations make rational economic decisions. Utilitarianism has, however, been confounded by problems of interpersonal comparisons of welfare (Lionel Robbins, 1935). Sen (1988) provides a recent discussion. He has argued that the use of utility as the source of value rests on the assumption that the concept can be equated with well-being. He claims that even on theoretical grounds, such an assumption is demonstrably false on two fronts. First, well-being is not the only thing that is valuable, and second, utility does not adequately represent well-being. Sen (1988) makes the case that the well-being or happiness of an individual is contingent, not absolute, and varies with the person’s circumstances at any given time. Similarly, such arguments have been leveled against welfare measurements via the use of quantitative increases in output (Hicks, 1940), but, despite these objections, the index of welfare continues to be measured based on total volume of output within the exchange economy. Thus, public policy is often oriented toward the promotion of ‘‘exchange values’’ to the detriment of ‘‘use values’’ in local economic development. When Adam Smith (1776) first made the classification of economic activity into ‘‘use values’’ and ‘‘exchange values,’’ he provided perhaps two important criteria for public policy evaluation. Use values are the sentiments that one derives from the use of a place, commodity, or service. Exchange values, on the other hand, are pecuniary in nature and are measured by the financial rewards one obtains from the purchase and sale of goods and services. Exchange values tend to promote quantitative changes in economic activity, are easy to measure, and are more visible in the formal market economy. By contrast, use values are often unmeasurable, are not within the
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domain of the formal exchange economy, and are more qualitative in nature. In the pursuit of economic development, use values and exchange values are often seen as incongruent since ‘‘the simultaneous push for both goals is inherently contradictory and a continuing source of tension, conflict, and irrational settlements’’ (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 2). There is no reason to suppose that high exchange values yield better utility or improve the welfare of a local area more than use values. Yet, in the pursuit of economic development, use values are frequently sacrificed at the altar of exchange values. Thus, welfare is measured in terms of gross national product (GNP), GNP per capita, industrial production, output per man-hour worked, output per unit of labor and capital, and real, disposable personal income per capita. While such measurements are necessary, they are not in themselves sufficient for valuing the welfare of a community and may sometimes denigrate economic activity that does not occur within the exchange economy. This is even more evident in Third World situations. For example, between 1960 and 1980, beef production in Honduras more than doubled, and exports increased over 500 percent, while per capita consumption of beef declined (Chomsky, 1986: 39). Thus, increased output did not translate into higher protein intake by the residents of the country. High economic growth rates may also have very little to do with the socioeconomic progress of a country. Sri Lanka, for example, has a per capita income of $400 but recorded a life expectancy of 71 years and an adult literacy rate of 87 percent. Brazil, on the other hand, has a per capita income of $2,020 but a life expectancy of only 65 years and an adult literacy rate of 78 percent (UNDP, 1990). Such findings led the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to state that ‘‘the link between economic growth and human progress is not automatic’’ (UNDP, 1990: 124). We thus see that the reductionist development philosophy that equates the pursuit of ‘‘the good life’’ with the pursuit of wealth in the conventional measures of growth is untenable, for ‘‘the life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else’’ (Aristotle, as cited in Sen, 1988: 3). In calculating social welfare, however, economists argue that the summation of individual utilities is an inappropriate way for gauging total welfare because of problems of interpersonal comparison of utility. In order to evaluate the desirability of an action, the criterion to be used is that if no one is hurt by the action, while at least one person is made better off, then social welfare is maximized or at least improved. This principle, also called the Pareto-efficiency criterion, will, however, have to rule out the existence of malice or envy, for if a person harbors a bad feeling simply because someone else has become better off, then the principle will not hold. Later developments of the Pareto-efficiency criterion by Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1940) operationalized it in a form that lends it better to measurement in
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the real world but even further removes it from the original basic concept of welfare. For Hicks, a policy should be adopted if it will not be in the interest of the losers to bribe the winners from pursuing the action. According to Kaldor’s formulation, however, a policy should be adopted if those who will gain from it could fully compensate the losers and still remain better off than they would otherwise have been. In measuring welfare through the utilitarian conception, then, economists have strayed away from the basic objective. Not only have they neglected the importance of use values in improving welfare, but they have also failed to adequately measure even what they have chosen to measure, which is ‘‘exchange values’’ as the proxy for measuring welfare. In what follows, a few examples of the operationalization of utilitarianism and the shortcomings of its measurement in public policy and economic development are discussed. THE PURSUIT OF MAXIMIZING DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY Growth-oriented development strategies fail to fully comprehend the range of economic activity that takes place in a community, especially the nonmonetized activities within them. Efforts to measure development using the yardstick of the measurable and quantifiable economic activity in a community or country ignore an array of community resources: the entrepreneurial skills of the local people, self-help, mutual aid and reciprocal relationships, and the productive capacity inherent in family solidarity and cooperation, sharing, and community. These interactions have historically raised, and currently continue to raise, productivity in rural communities and in nonindustrialized countries. By contrast individualism is characterized as a driving force of economic development in a modern state. The emphasis on the individual and on competition at the expense of cooperation seems out of place in any nominally cooperative community setting. Three characteristics are common to strategies designed to operationalize the growth ethic: (1) efficiency is preferable to equity, and more growth is always better than less growth; (2) private sector (business) values tend to represent community values; and (3) the short term takes precedence over the long term in the promotion of economic growth. These three criteria are now discussed. Unqualified Economic Growth First, the pursuit of growth is often regarded as an unquestionable community objective. Maximizing the use of scarce resources is evidently a useful criterion for resource deployment, but such strategies usually do not take cognizance of the environmental and social disruption created or the negative externalities resulting from the maximization of resource use. Peterson, an advocate of the growth ethic, rightly noted that
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the pursuit of a city’s economic interests, which requires an efficient provision of local services, makes no allowance for the care of the needy and unfortunate members of the society. Indeed, the competition among local communities all but precludes a concern for redistribution. (1981: 37–38)
Lately, however, communities are realizing that growth may not necessarily, and definitely is not always, desirable. At the local level, communities are beginning to redress their problems not through growth promotion but by limiting growth. In a study of fifteen rural counties’ development strategies, Finsterbusch and Kuennen observed that some counties are taking measures to curb unrestrained growth: Kent County of Delaware, . . . has the potential to be a future growth machine county; in 1988 the conservative and environmental forces, however, provided some restraint on its economic growth forces. St. Mary’s county is not enthused about growth. . . . Talbot County is quite concerned about growth and would like to stop it. (1992: 222)
What this means is that, given a certain level of standard of living, people are likely to sacrifice economic growth for a better environment and quality of life. The reasons for such a shift in attitude toward unrestrained economic growth are not hard to find, even when growth is evaluated using deontological criteria. Power (1987) has argued convincingly that growth does not necessarily benefit local residents, while Summers (1973), Scott and Summers (1974), and Summers and Clemente (1976) have demonstrated that economic growth has differential impacts on different segments of the population. Economic growth tends to benefit men more than women, the young more than the old, and people in the higher occupational categories more than those in the lower occupational categories. Ross and Usher (1986) have similarly argued that quantitative economic expansions may be deceptive. For example, the commodification of domestic work as more women enter the labor force has meant that household chores that were previously undertaken within the household are now provided by commercial units outside the household. As such, these activities are counted as completely new activities in the estimation of economic growth. Monetary output levels will thus rise, even though real improvements in welfare have not occurred. Rather than seeking to maximize exchange values, some communities are now marketing their use values as a way to promote economic development. As Galston (1992) has observed, amenity values are becoming the most important propulsive factor for rural economic development. There is also an increasing realization that there is more to development than mere increases in economic activity. As Reid and Sears have noted, ‘‘[D]evelopment implies an expansion in the ability of an area to sustain, largely through its own efforts and with its own resources, improved performance along one or more key economic and social dimensions.’’ (1992: 211). Implicitly, at least, these key dimensions are
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those selected by the residents of that area as their priorities. Traditional economic development strategies that emphasize exchange values, such as raw material availability and transportation advantages, are now less useful for promoting local area development, as quality of life has assumed a far more significant role in influencing where people choose to live and where enterprises locate than was the case when most of the industrial cities grew up. Globally, international organizations are now advocating a limit to growth. The Brundtland Commission, while not rejecting growth per se, cautions that ‘‘what is needed now is a new era of economic growth—growth that is . . . socially and environmentally sustainable’’ (1987: 343). Such sustainable economic growth will ensure that the needs of the current generation are met but yet will not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The Business Ethos as Community Ethos The second dominant growth philosophy equates business prosperity with community prosperity and business values with community values. The private business sector is regarded as the harbinger of economic growth, and the role of the public sector is simply to facilitate the development of the private sector. Accordingly, ‘‘the goals of job creation and tax base expansion are the most popular rationales for engaging in local economic development since they do not challenge the popular idea that economic development is synonymous with business development and real estate development’’ (Malizia, 1986: 491). Several examples of business development promotion, however, indicate that business prosperity does not necessarily translate into community prosperity. In New Orleans, Smith and Keller demonstrate that the city’s use of public subsidies to entice business ‘‘altered the economic base of the city in such a way as to make life harder for low-income residents’’ (1986: 160). In Poletown, Detroit, the promotion of business (GM’s) interests led to the destruction of 1,021 homes, 155 businesses, and other community facilities. About $200 million in local, state, and federal funds was expended, plus another $170 million in tax abatements. The benefits to the city were to occur in the form of increased job creation by GM. However, Detroit’s residents have not reaped the benefits envisaged. The city’s population continues to decline, with about one-third of city residents on welfare (Krumholz, 1991: 298). At the international level, Vernon (1971: 172) disputes any gains from direct foreign investment of multinational corporations (MNCs) in Third World countries. According to Vernon’s ‘‘decapitalization thesis,’’ MNCs, on balance, reduce the supply of funds available for investment in the host country by burdening the national balance of payments. Cross-national studies by Bornschier (1980) and Stoneman (1975) all show that increased MNC investments are related to lower economic growth rates in the host (Third World) countries. MNC investments in the Third World were also found to closely relate to unequal distribution of personal income and to
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sectoral income inequalities (Bornschier, 1980; Rubinson, 1976; Chase-Dunn, 1975). At base, then, the growth ethic that equates community welfare with business welfare may not always hold true.
The Short-Term Focus of the Maximizing Development Philosophy The long term is heavily discounted in favor of short-term gains in the promotion of economic growth. Usually, economic development is defined in terms of short-term prosperity, with little or no consideration for the long-term economic structure of sustainability of the local community (King and Harris, 1989). Such a thrust in development philosophy is inconsistent with the underlying human concern for sustainability. One area that has been heavily discounted in the pursuit of maximizing economic growth on the environment. Until the late 1960s no concern was given to the effect of growth on the environment. In 1961, for example, the United Nations (UN) called on member countries to ‘‘intensify their efforts to mobilize and to sustain support for measures to accelerate progress towards self-sustaining growth of the economy of the individual nations’’ (UN, 1961: art. 1). At this time, no concern was raised about how growth in the economies of member countries might adversely affect the environment. A number of development projects were undertaken in both developed and Third World countries without regard for their long-term consequences.
WHAT NOW FOR ECONOMIC THEORY? The need for a new economics is clear. This need has been sounded across the globe but was succinctly stated by Fleming: ‘‘Up to now the goal of economic management has been economic growth. From now on it should be economic maturity—the ability to make economic choices without the unchallengeable, binding control of the exchange price vector’’ (cited in Ekins, 1986: 17). This new economics requires new ways of thinking and of valuing welfare. It is possible to demonstrate a useful alternative to the dominant economic development strategy. It is primarily an economic public policy orientation that promotes job creation through community-based development. It would increase overall economic activity that serves to maximize total work incomes with targeted economic development programs stimulating diversification by local entrepreneurs and business people directed by active local public leadership. This theoretical alternative would maximize ‘‘decoupling’’ of the local area—and perhaps whole national economies—from world-system economic forces and constraints. As Anderson has rightly observed, ‘‘[W]e now have a high degree of precision in the measurement of one particular form of progress—growth in
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GNP—but a failure to appreciate sufficiently the need to situate that form of progress within its larger human and natural context’’ (1991: 45). While several arguments have been made for a ‘‘new economics,’’ the proposals have not caught on in the field mainly because advocates of the new economics have not provided alternative and plausible measures for tracking progress. So while policymakers and development practitioners may be sold on the idea of the new economics, they cannot demonstrably show to their constituents how progress is being made in their lives, since they lack indicators to measure and back up their claims. The need for appropriate measures of welfare is shared by several players in the economic development field: (1) local politicians who are eager to demonstrate progress to their constituents; (2) senior levels of government that like to see that funds allocated to lower levels of government are efficiently utilized; and (3) the international banker, who, while admitting the failures of past efforts, still has to ask, What measurably works? in order to compare the returns on investments in alternative development projects. An exploratory list of some principles for developing useful and meaningful development indicators as well as suggested tools for measuring economic performance are discussed later. CRITERIA OF A GOOD MEASURE OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Building on Anderson (1991), the following criteria are useful in assessing well-being: (1) the indicators, or the information from which it is calculated, should be already available, or else it should be possible to make the information readily available; (2) the indicators should be relatively easy to understand; (3) indicators should measure aspects of social life that a community or country considers important; (4) there should be a short time lag between the state of affairs referred to and the indicator’s becoming available; (5) well-being indicators should measure local consumption capacities, not just incomes; (6) indicators should be sensitive to, and vary with, the extent of local control over development programs, such as local participation and involvement; (7) the indicators should measure structural and institutional change in directions desired by local people, not merely local ‘‘growth’’; (8) the indicators should permit measurement of the efficiency of local utilization of community resources and the sustainability of local economic activity; and (9) well-being indicators should provide a means for measuring the rate of human depreciation and environmental degradation in community economic development. These factors speak less to the characteristics of the indicators than to the facets of change that need to be measured to accurately assess economic performance and development.
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Table 6.1 Alternative Indicators for Measuring Economic Performance and Development
WHAT SHOULD BE MEASURED IN ASSESSING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE? No one set of indicators will serve all local purposes adequately, and the indicators that are provided later are not exhaustive. They, however, lay the foundation for the design of a more comprehensive set of indicators for measuring economic performance. The indicators and their measures are provided in Tables 6.1 through 6.4. Economic Indicators: The purpose of economic indicators in the measurement of community development is to determine the welfare of the people who live in the community or country. The economic indicators should also make it possible to determine the distribution of this welfare in the community. The following indicators enable these objectives to be met. Social Indicators: Social indicators are relevant in measuring the level of social disruption that may result in the development process of a community. Ideally, economic development and social progress must go hand in hand. However, it is often the case that economic development creates social upheavals whose impact on the community is tremendous.
Table 6.2 Alternative Indicators for Measuring the Social Impact of Economic Development
Table 6.3 Environmental Indicators for Measuring the Effect of Development on the Environment
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Table 6.4 Institutional Indicators for Measuring the Effect of Development on Local Autonomy
Environmental Indicators: The effect of economic development on the environment deserves serious consideration, especially in developing countries. Environmental indicators enable the adverse impacts of development to be factored into the cost of economic growth. Institutional/Governmental Indicators: In some instances, economic development necessitates a modification of the institutional structures that existed prior to the introduction of new methods of production, distribution, and consumption. Ideally, these institutional changes must not result in the loss of local autonomy.
CONCLUSION Communities will vary in the weight they attach to each of these indicators, and comparison across different communities may not be feasible. It is, however, possible to derive a composite index that indicates the level of development of each community. The new indicators for measuring ‘‘development’’ are (1) less concerned with maximizing economic output than they are with the utilization of this output; (2) give greater weight to community welfare than to business prosperity; and (3) are more relevant for gauging the long-term, sustainable utilization of resources than current economic indicators. For this reason they offer a means for identifying and mitigating problems before they become endemic. Nevertheless, the measurement of development by these indicators is currently problematic because most countries, especially developing countries, lack the institutional capacity to gather, analyze, and interpret these data and make them available to decision makers. Thus, the usefulness of these forms of data hinges on the development of new institutional capacities for gathering and processing ‘‘development-related’’ data. In the meantime, existing institutions could be restructured to enable them to respond to the new global concerns of sustainability, community participation, and a grassroots development philosophy.
CHAPTER 7
A Reassessment of the Impact of Structural Adjustment in Ghana Benjamin Asare and Clifford L. Staten
INTRODUCTION The World Bank declared that ‘‘. . . its [Ghana] adjustment program is one of the most successful in Sub-Saharan Africa’’ (1993a) and as early as 1989, in the Per Jacobsson Lecture, Ghana’s high commissioner to the United Kingdom, Dr. J. L. S. Abbey, commented on the successful structural adjustment process in Ghana during the 1980s: Since . . . [1983] . . . real output has expanded by about 40 percent; real per capita income by more than 20 per cent; the inflation rate, while still bothersome, has been dramatically reduced; the balance of payments in surplus and the initial large stock of external arrears has been virtually eliminated. The net domestic public debt has been almost eliminated. In this and other ways we have begun to repay our debt to future generations. (Abbey, 1989)
Ghana has been lauded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as the model for structural adjustment among the developing states of the world. But what is the reality of this structural adjustment? This study seeks to go beyond the reporting of macroeconomic indicators of growth in order to illustrate the continuing problems in the cocoa industry, such as its inability to meet production targets, the continued market bottlenecks, the problems created by the semifeudal land tenure system, and the impact of the lack of direct access to the world market by the cocoa farmer. The chapter also focuses upon the declining terms of trade in food, the negative impact of structural adjustment on traders, and the impact of the budget cuts in the areas of health and social needs.
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GHANA AS THE MODEL OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT By 1982 the economy of Ghana had deteriorated to the point that structural adjustment was necessary. Real per capita income was lower than in 1970 by 30 percent, real export earnings by 52 percent, and import volumes by 30 percent (Heller et al., 1988). Agricultural output declined at a rate of 0.3 percent per year through the 1970s (Green, 1989), per capita food production in 1979–1981 was 74 percent of that of 1969–1971 (World Bank, 1983b), and the average daily caloric intake was 86 percent below the minimum standard of 3,000 calories a day (Asare, 1989). Allocations to economic infrastructure declined from a level of 20 percent of fiscal expenditures in 1953–1960 to 7 percent by the end of the 1970s (Akoto, 1987). Runaway inflation estimated at 80 percent between 1976 and 1981 (World Bank, 1984), low investment levels, a shift by producers away from tradables to nontradables, and reduced access to foreign borrowing also characterized the economy of Ghana in the early 1980s. Ghana’s major export—cocoa—experienced a decline from 36 percent of the world market share between 1960 and 1965 to around 17 percent by the early 1980s. Cocoa production declined from a high of 403,000 tons in 1969–1970 to 179,000 tons by 1982–1983 (Asare, 1986). By 1982 cocoa growers were receiving less than 17 percent of the 1960–1963 real price, and the smuggling of cocoa to neighboring countries was common due to the rapid appreciation of the cedi during the 1970s (Green, 1989). Factors that contributed to this economic decline include severe droughts, the influx of emigrant workers returning from Nigeria, declining terms of trade, an overvalued exchange rate, depressed real wages, and a misaligned domestic relative price structure (Heller et al., 1988; Green, 1989). The design of the economic adjustment and recovery program that was developed with the IMF and supported by adjustment loans from the World Bank focused upon both stabilization and economic growth. Stabilization was achieved through devaluations of the cedi (the cedi depreciated 471 percent from 1980 to 1990–1991 and by more than 1,000 percent by 1996), an increase in official producer price (the price of cocoa), liberalization of imports, a curtailing of domestic deficit financing, an incomes policy, and tax reform (World Bank, 1994a). Tax reform, an incomes policy for the entire economy, and restraints on imported ‘‘conspicuous consumption’’ items such as luxury cars were developed to create the perception that the burden of adjustment was being placed on all sectors of society. The promotion of real economic growth focused primarily upon the production and marketing of the primary foreign exchange earner—cocoa. This was achieved through higher producer prices, providing farmers with hybrid seedlings to replace those trees lost through brush fires in 1983 (loans from World Bank were crucial here), a streamlining of the organization of the Ghana Cocoa Board that enabled it to reduce its share of the revenue from cocoa and thus
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allow the cocoa farmer a higher price, and the expansion of extension services to cocoa farmers (Okyere, 1990). The IMF and World Bank cite macroeconomic growth indicators as evidence in support of the success of the adjustment program in Ghana. Such statistics may include the following: real gross domestic product (GDP) exceeded the IMF target figures and grew by 8.7 percent in 1984 and by 5.1 percent in 1985; and domestic inflation was reduced by 39.7 percent in 1984 and by 10.3 percent in 1985. The inflation rate had been reduced by 25.7 percent from 1981–1986 to 1987–1991 (World Bank, 1994b). The overall fiscal position improved significantly (Heller et al., 1988; World Bank, 1994a). Statistics focusing upon the cocoa industry indicate that between 1984 and 1987–1988 nominal cocoa prices increased by five times, although real cocoa producer prices did not increase until 1985–1986 (Green, 1989), and cocoa production increased from a low of 159,000 tons in 1983 to 228,000 tons in 1987 (Green, 1989; Okyere, 1990). These data (and other growth indicators) are used to promote Ghana as the model for structural adjustment in the developing world. CASTING DOUBT UPON GHANA AS THE MODEL OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT Macroeconomic indicators of economic growth, reduced inflation, and balance of payments indicators cannot tell the entire story of structural adjustment, and, in the case of Ghana, it should be noted that growth indicators overestimate increased outputs and income because producers have shifted from the black market to the official market. Cocoa production is a case in point. Prior to structural adjustment, a significant amount of cocoa was sold by producers on the black market to neighboring Togo and the Ivory Coast. This was largely due to the fact that the cocoa farmers could receive a higher price on the black market than from the official price paid to them by the Ghana Cocoa Board. The World Bank and IMF admit that the growth in income and output indicated by the official data significantly overestimates the actual increase because it may represent a shift away from the black market and a return to the official market (Heller et al., 1988). In 1984–1985 cocoa production was only at 80 percent of its targeted levels, and, according to Commander, Howell, and Seini (1989), much of that increase was due to the return to official marketing channels. Cocoa production in some areas of Ghana declined under structural adjustment. For example, production in the Ashanti region (a prominent cocoa-producing region in Ghana) declined from 36 percent of the nation’s total in 1981–1982 to 25 percent in 1985 (Commander, Howell, and Seini, 1989). Finally, if one accepts the increase in cocoa production at face value, it is still below the peak levels of the late 1960s (Commander, Howell, and Seini, 1989). A more important criticism of the focus on macroeconomic indicators is that economic and social development indicators are just as important, if not more so. Some unanswered questions include, Has growth been skewed? In other
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words, which sectors of Ghanaian society have benefited, and which have not? Has income been redistributed, and in what direction? How has it impacted indigenous food production? What about social programs? Have they suffered under structural adjustment? Is there a gender bias in the consequences? Answers to these types of questions will give one a more complete picture of structural adjustment in Ghana. Mining and extractive industries and service sectors have grown at a faster rate and at the expense of the other sectors of the economy (Manuh, 1992). Those farmers who produce food for local consumption have not fared well during the structural adjustment process due to a 50 percent decline in real prices. There is no incentive to produce food for local consumption at current prices. Even though food is plentiful now, at current consumption levels and price trends, it is estimated that Ghana will experience significant food deficits by the turn of the century (Commander, Howell, and Seini, 1989). The lack of access to credit by local food producers also exacerbates the future situation. In a survey of food producers in 1991, 91 percent stated that they had no access to credit facilities. The survey was part of an assessment of the Tono Irrigation Project conducted in Ghana (Asare, 1991). A staff study by the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa issued in March 1989 noted a worsening of social inequality and poverty among some sectors in Ghana, despite impressive economic growth. Manuh (1992) points out that the higher cocoa prices worsened the differences in rural incomes because 32 percent of cocoa farmers earn 94 percent of cocoa income. In fact, this skewing of income among cocoa farmers is made even more dramatic when one notes that cocoa farmers receive only 30 percent of the total income from cocoa (the Ghana Cocoa Board receives 35 percent, and the government receives the remaining 35 percent) (Commander, Howell, and Seini, 1989). What this means is that 32 percent of the cocoa farmers’ share is 28.2 percent of the total income, while 68 percent of the cocoa farmers’ share is only 1.8 percent of the total income from cocoa. In addition, devaluation of the cedi has resulted in higher costs to the cocoa farmers because tools, insecticides, sprayers, and other necessary items are imported. Traders (most of whom are women), who play a vital role in the economy because they serve as a link between producers and consumers (Clark, 1988), have witnessed a declining quality of life as a result of the structural adjustment program. Falling demand and low purchasing power by the general population for their products caused by the devaluation of the cedi have resulted in no significant increase in the volume of trade before the structural adjustment program was implemented. A lack of capital (about 90 percent have no access to institutional credit and must rely on moneylenders or relatives and kin) and increased taxes have adversely impacted traders. Higher costs for water, electricity, transportation, and health care have also adversely affected the standard of living for many traders and Ghanaians. Goods are more available, and there is a greater choice, but higher prices bar access to goods and services. Traders
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are excluded from the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). Manuh (1992) argues that this exclusion reflects the historical pattern of the group’s lack of power in the Ghanaian political structure. Capital outlays by the government collapsed to less than 2 percent of GDP by 1986 and had increased to only 3.1 percent by the end of 1991 (World Bank, 1994a: 224). As a result, there has been a deterioration in basic infrastructure. Health and education expenditures have remained virtually the same throughout the period of structural adjustment. Health expenditures fluctuated between 0.8 and 1.3 percent of GDP between 1981 and 1990, and education expenditures increased from 2.2 to 3.4 percent during the same period, notwithstanding an estimated population growth rate of almost 3 percent (Republic of Ghana Statistical Service, 1988, 1989; World Bank, 1994a). Real allocations in health and education fell considerably in the first phase of the structural adjustment program. By 1987 spending on health by the government was half the 1979–1980 level if measured on a per capita basis (Commander, Howell, and Seini, 1989). Per capita incomes for urban inhabitants and non-cocoa farmers have fallen (note that income benefits for cocoa farmers have been terribly skewed toward the large cocoa farms). Unemployment has continued to rise, some of that due to the layoffs in the public sector (Heller et al., 1988). A CRITIQUE OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN GHANA A look at the macroeconomic indicators of structural adjustment presents a very different picture of Ghana than if one looks at the economic and social development indicators. Short-term growth masks the economic and social indicators that show that future economic development in Ghana is in question. There are three major problems identified with the structural adjustment program of the IMF/World Bank in Ghana: (1) the failure to address adequately the institutional bottlenecks to the development of agriculture—in particular, the continuing lack of supporting inputs for agriculture, such as insecticides and extension services, the land tenure system, and the operation of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board; (2) the failure to use existing information sources, such as the Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research at the University of Ghana, which would prevent the IMF from repeating past mistakes; and (3) the continued focus upon short-term growth rather than long-term economic development in Ghana. Institutional Bottlenecks The structural adjustment program in Ghana has failed to address the bottlenecks in the production of food for local consumption. Adequate extension services are crucial for the future production of food, but, in a 1991 survey of farmers in the Tono region, 50.5 percent of the farmers indicated that there had been two or fewer visits by extension officers to their farms in the last season,
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and 28 percent indicated that there had been no visits by extension officers in the last season (Asare, 1991). This, coupled with a decline in real prices, will produce food shortages in the near future. Another problem is the lack of modernization in the production of traditional foods for local consumption. The structural adjustment program has focused on foods for export, such as rice. The production of rice has been modernized through the introduction of hybrid seeds that yield quicker and greater volume. Yet, the production of traditional foods for local consumption, such as casava, plantain, and yams, has not been modernized. Production of these foodstuffs, remains on a primitive basis in Ghana. Institutional bottlenecks in the production of cocoa have also not been addressed. Between 1982–1983 and 1986 the price of pesticides quadrupled in nominal terms, and the cost of mist blowers tripled in nominal terms from 1984– 1985 to 1986–1987. The high cost and the unavailability of insecticides have led to a decline in their use, thus reducing the yield from the cocoa trees (Asare, 1986; Commander, Howell, and Seini, 1989). This is perhaps a blessing for the environment and wildlife in Ghana. Another major obstacle to increasing the output of cocoa is the semifeudal nature of the land tenure system. All land in the forest belt is communally owned by the local people and administered by the local chief, who is the sole authority in the allocation of that land. A local citizen can establish a permanent right to the land as long as he or she cultivates it on a more or less continuous basis. Land not being used reverts back to the chief. Nonlocal citizens or migrants gain acquisition to the land through tenancy. In most parts of the country, tenancy is the predominant mode of land acquisition. A study of the Sankore and Sehwi Asawinso districts indicates that 65 to 70 percent of the cocoa farmers are migrants (Asare, 1988). They must pay rents, tributes, and/or land taxes to the local chief. Commercial timber, minerals (note that in recent years the central government has allocated mineral concessions), and other natural resources from the land always remain the local and exclusive properties of the chiefs. The implication of this is that, at any time, for example, the chief may grant the same land as a concession to a timber contractor. The timber contractor can cut down cocoa trees and destroy crops without compensating farmers. In the Asafo and Benchemaa districts, tenant farmers cannot pass the land to their heirs. Since these tenant farmers do not hold titles to the land, it cannot be used as collateral for farm improvement loans. This makes access to credit even more difficult for cocoa farmers. Rent paid to the chief amounts to 10 percent of the proceeds of the farm (note that there is an effort to increase this to 33.3 percent) (Asare, 1988). In a survey of cocoa farmers, 67.5 percent indicated that the rent was too high and was not conducive to growth in cocoa production (Asare, 1988). In addition to rent, the migrant farmers must pay all expenses in any litigation that may involve the chief, and they have social obligations that in-
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clude bearing the cost of funeral expenses of any royalty and contributing toward the annual festival of the chiefs. As a result, the land tenure system discourages innovation and development in the cocoa industry. Rent based on a fixed proportion of the produce deters hard work because the more a farmer works and harvests, the more he or she must turn over to the rent collectors or the landowning group. Most farmers are unwilling to spend money on improving their crop and increasing their productivity. The uncertainty of cocoa production and prices is aggravated by the uncertainty of landholdings and titles. Long-term plans and investments are discouraged under such a system. Neither the government nor the IMF has addressed the land tenure problem. Future development of the cocoa industry and agricultural development in general will require a change in the land tenure system in Ghana (Asare, 1988). The Ghanaian government operating through the Cocoa Marketing Board, which originated during the colonial period, determines the price the cocoa farmer receives for his produce. This prevents the farmer from gaining access to the world market. The income the farmer receives from his produce is the result of a bureaucratic decision, rather than a function of the world market price. Thus, currency devaluation under IMF structural adjustment has no effect on the producer price and incomes of cocoa farmers (Asare, 1986). Recent IMF/World Bank reforms of the Cocoa Marketing Board include a partial privatization. The Cocoa Marketing Board now sells licenses to producer buying agents (PBAs), who purchase cocoa on behalf of the Marketing Board. The Marketing Board still determines the price that PBAs can offer to cocoa farmers, but widespread corruption by PBAs continues to hurt the farmers. It is quite common for PBAs to manipulate the weighing machines. Thus, farmers are paid for a volume of cocoa that is less than that for which they should have been paid. The Cocoa Marketing Board does not regulate these corrupt activities by the PBAs.
Existing Information Sources The Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research at the University of Ghana contains a wealth of information concerning past experiments and studies of the cocoa industry, privatization, and economics in general. The IMF should establish a working relationship with the institute and make use of the already existing pool of data. This would avoid duplication of effort and prevent the IMF from making mistakes that have been made in the past. A case in point involves the current effort to privatize the distribution of insecticides and other inputs to cocoa production. Past efforts and evidence indicate that privatization has failed for the following reasons: (1) given the nature of price fixing concerning inputs to agriculture, there are no incentives for private individuals to enter this economic sector, and (2) the need to establish depots (not to mention
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other infrastructure problems) throughout the country is cost-prohibitive (Asare, 1986). The IMF must address these problems before privatization will occur.
Focus on Short Term Rather Than Long Term Perhaps the major criticism of the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment program in Ghana is its short-term stabilization and growth orientation, rather than the emphasis being placed upon a long-term economic development strategy. Typically, once the IMF becomes involved in the economic and political processes of a developing country, it is an on-again, off-again relationship over several years. Future development (access to loans from the World Bank and other multilateral banks and private banks, as well as future private investment capital) is also dependent on the IMF’s issuing a ‘‘bill of good health.’’ Since the IMF is, for all practical purposes, in the business of long-term development, it makes sense for the IMF to begin with the assumption that a long-term plan focusing upon development is necessary. In Ghana the IMF has been preoccupied with cocoa and cocoa production (cash crops in general). The primary reason for this focus is that it earns foreign exchange and in theory corrects the balance of payments. The problem is that this reflects the short-term growth orientation, which will contribute very little to long-term economic development. If Ghana remains dependent on the export of one primary commodity—cocoa—with its relatively inelastic demand structure and increased production elsewhere (Ivory Coast, Malaysia, and Brazil), it will remain poor. A brief survey of other developing countries that export one primary commodity that has an inelastic demand structure will show that the countries have one thing in common—they are all poor. What is needed is a strategy for economic diversification, which will allow Ghana to begin to move away from dependence on cocoa. Without this, Ghana is forever doomed to repetitive or continuous structural adjustment programs administered by the IMF. Another problem created by the structural adjustment program is the growing external debt of Ghana. Total debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services increased from 24 percent in 1985 to 61.4 percent in 1988 (World Bank Debt Tables, 1988–1989). This will have a debilitating impact on the future prospects for the economic development of Ghana.
CONCLUSION This brief study indicates that if one compares aggregate, macroeconomic growth data with social and economic development data, there is a mixed picture concerning the ‘‘success’’ of structural adjustment in Ghana. There are three shortcomings of the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment program in Ghana. The program does not adequately address the structural bottlenecks in the cocoa
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industry, it does not take advantage of existing data concerning the cocoa industry, and it focuses upon short-term growth rather than long-term development. Long-term development of the cocoa industry will not improve until the semifeudal nature of the land tenure system is addressed and until the cocoa farmer has direct access to the world market. It is also important that the IMF take advantage of the expertise and data that already exist in Ghana. This will save time and duplication of effort, and, perhaps more important, it will allow local experts to participate in the design of the program, not just in its implementation. The major criticism of the structural adjustment program in Ghana (and in most of the developing countries, for that matter) is that it is preoccupied with short- and medium-term stabilization and growth rather than long-term economic development. Future development in Ghana is dependent on diversification of the economy, the ability to meet its own food demands, a favorable international environment, and a population that has confidence in the government’s ability to meet its needs. Even if the bottlenecks in the cocoa industry are solved, this will not benefit Ghana in the long run. The IMF and World Bank have been working with Ghana for many years now; it is time to develop a long-range plan in cooperation with local officials rather than a continuing series of short- and medium-term stabilization and growth plans.
CHAPTER 8
Pineapple Production, Labor, and Marketing Relations in the Periurban Economy of Accra, Ghana Cyril K. Daddieh
INTRODUCTION The rather lackluster performance of Africa’s agricultural sector over the past several decades has highlighted one of the most critical challenges facing African states: the urgent need to transform the peasantry from an overburdened, ill-equipped, and largely neglected subsistence class into a dynamic, technically competent, and innovative one, capable of producing a diverse range of commodities than is currently the case to meet domestic consumption needs as well as provide raw materials for local agro-processing industries. Moreover, for the foreseeable future, most African states will be hard-pressed to find employment for the burgeoning population of school-leavers and dropouts without a lead role being assumed by the agricultural sector. In the Ghanaian case, different governments have long recognized the limitations imposed by traditional agriculture as reflected in both commodity concentration (cocoa) and periodic market and price depressions and have tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to deal with this twin problem. In recent years, in a renewed effort to stimulate increased production, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) government of President Jerry Rawlings began to pay some attention to the stagnant, nontraditional export (NTE) subsector as part of its overall strategy for economic recovery. Under the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), a number of policy changes designed to improve export performance were unveiled. The government banked its hopes on the Ghanaian peasantry and others’ responding positively to the new economic signals by substantially increasing the output of both traditional (cocoa) and nontraditional crops. Using pricing as the focal policy instrument, the government first tackled the issue of the overvalued exchange rate. The cedi was put through a series of
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massive devaluations, the impact of which was soon felt not only in higher farm gate prices but also in prices of imported farm inputs such as fertilizers and herbicides. Meanwhile, as Anyimadu (1993: 62) points out, there were not many sector-specific policies targeting export promotion and infrastructure rehabilitation during Phase I of the ERP (1983–1986). The most significant policy changes were initiated as part of the second phase of the program (1987–1989). Beginning in 1988, the subsidy on fertilizers was reduced by 60 percent, coupled with privatization of the distribution system for farm inputs at the retail level. These measures were complemented by a further reduction in the fertilizer subsidy in 1989, ratcheting it down to 15 percent. The following year, fertilizer was completely desubsidized, along with the discontinuation of the minimum price policy. Finally, in 1992, the importation of fertilizer was fully privatized, alongside the introduction of wholesale trade (Nyanteng and Dapaah, 1993: 91– 93). Meanwhile, the government attempted to give the export sector much needed fillip by raising, first, the foreign exchange retention rate for NTEs to 35 percent in February 1986. Second, in January 1989 it created an Export Development and Investment Fund to assist any local industry with the potential for producing exportable goods and/or import substitutes at competitive prices. Third, in August 1989 the government created the Export Finance Company Limited to finance NTEs. The company became operational at the end of July 1990. Fourth, there were additional incentives to the export sector in the form of corporate tax rebates, which were raised from their previous highs of 30–40 percent to between 60 and 75 percent for agriculture, depending on the proportion of exportable output. Finally, the Customs Duty Drawback rate was increased to 100 percent. This package of budgetary, fiscal, and export promotion policies and the general thrust of the liberalization policies were intended to unleash the productive energies of the Ghanaian peasantry to achieve substantial productivity gains and export growth and pull the country out of the economic doldrums. Peasant responses to these policies have so far been mixed but generally encouraging. As a recent study noted: In 1989, 61 agricultural commodities featured in the non-traditional commodities that were exported. The number, however, declined to 50 in 1990 but the volume and in some cases the value increased. Consequently the foreign exchange earned rose from U.S.$21.17 million in 1989 to U.S.$28.78 million in 1990, an increase of about 36 percent. (ISSER, 1992: 77)
While Ghana has the potential to increase the production of NTEs, progress will require appropriate policy interventions in support of particular commodity subsectors, such as pineapples or yams. In particular, the condition of the ecosystem can restrict the amount of use of natural resources. Close monitoring of the sector is essential to its future sustainability. As the ISSER study cautioned,
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‘‘In general terms, however, while agriculture’s contribution to foreign exchange earned through the non-traditional export commodities increased, the proportion to the total declined steadily from about 73 percent in 1986 to 46 percent in 1990’’ (1992: 77). In this relatively new subsector, as in other areas of Ghanaian agriculture, the policymaker is hamstrung by a dearth of empirical investigations of systems of production, levels of participation by different segments of the labor force, and their actual and potential contributions to export earnings and employment generation. Limited documentation of the constraints under which producers labor, the incomes accruing to different strata of the farming population, and the investment decisions of farmers and others engaged in various forms and levels of agricultural production and marketing make policymaking difficult.
THE STUDY This chapter makes a modest attempt at providing answers to some of these critical areas of concern. It presents some of the major findings of a study of smallholder pineapple farmers in the periurban area of Accra, Ghana. Field data were collected between May and September 1994 in two key locations in the periurban area. Eighty-three households were randomly selected from thirteen villages in the main pineapple-producing belt of Ghana, with the main concentration found along a gradient running from Nsawam to Aburi in the Greater Accra and eastern regions, respectively (see Figure 8.1). The samples ranged from five to seven households, depending on the size of the village, with Pukrom-Nsaba accounting for the largest percentage of households, or roughly 11 percent of the total. Nsawam and Aburi are the two core towns in the pineapple belt. Along with the capital city of Accra, these two large towns constitute the main local markets for the pineapple industry. The pineapple belt is also within an hour’s drive from the international airport in Accra, which serves as the main staging area for handling and air freighting of Ghanaian pineapples to Europe. There is considerable official and popular excitement about pineapples in Ghana these days. While fresh pineapples had been exported from Ghana as far back as the 1950s, the crop had been eclipsed by cocoa, Ghana’s premier crop. However, production has rebounded in recent years. It has been estimated that pineapple exports grew at an annual rate of 36 percent from 1985 to 1989 (AMEC, 1989: 3). Contributing to the excitement is the prognosis that further growth in production and export is possible, given the current favorable agricultural, agroecological, and market conditions. The Ghana Living Standards Survey revealed that pineapple is grown in all three of the country’s ecological zones—coastal, forest, and savanna—with twice as many households (12.8 percent) producing pineapples in the forest as in the coastal zone (6.4 percent). The savanna appears to be the least hospitable zone for production. As a result, it lags behind the others, with only 3.7 percent of households producing the crop.
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Figure 8.1 Map of Ghana Periurban Economy: Survey Area
Nevertheless, the data confirm that the ecology is conducive to increased production in at least the coastal and forest zones (Republic of Ghana, 1989: 99). Additional supporting evidence is provided by Table 8.1, which indicates that pineapples have, indeed, become Ghana’s leading NTE, surpassing kola nuts and cottonseeds in importance. It is worthy of note that while the other NTEs have either stagnated (kola nuts) or regressed (cottonseeds), pineapple continues to show significant gains. However, as AMEC (1989: 1) had earlier reported, there are a number of serious constraints, including the absence of handling and transportation infrastructure and the lack of capital for expansion of the industry, that can derail the realization of Ghana’s potential as a major supplier of pineapples to the world market.
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Table 8.1 Quantities of Major Agricultural, Nontraditional Export Commodities Exported— 1988 to 1990
Currently, the lion’s share of the pineapple that is exported from Ghana comes from a handful of large commercial farms. The owner-managers of these farms also dominate the marketing side of the industry. Meanwhile, the active involvement of scores of smallholders is essential to the long-term viability of production for both the export and local markets. The issue of viability is crucial for two reasons. First, here, as elsewhere in rural Ghana, widespread commercialization of land is frowned upon. This means that the large exporters must secure the cooperation of smallholders if they expect to expand production and exports in the future. Second, while there is apparently no shortage of land intended for the use of smallholders in the periurban area, ownership patterns make it extremely difficult for commercial farmers to secure access to very large tracts of land in one contiguous location.
SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PERIURBAN SMALLHOLDERS A major focus of this study was to provide documented evidence of the social bases of production in order to ascertain the participation of different categories of periurban farmers in the export pineapple industry. The role of smallholders in pineapple production in general and the export subsector in particular was of special interest because of our overall concern with the long-term sustainability of production, along with the employment and income benefits for the producers and the country as a whole. In general, the employment and income impacts of high-value horticultural production are limited because of the tendency for production to be captured by an agrarian capitalist class that, over time, comes to control vast land resources and reduces access to peasant producers, engendering a problem of landlessness among the peasantry to boot. In this particular Ghanaian case, however, the traditional land tenure system has both been permissive
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of some large-scale commercialization but also acted as a break on the spread of this phenomenon. Again, this suggests that long-term viability of production for export will hinge on the continued involvement of smallholders. HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES The households in our sample are relatively large, averaging 8 people per household. Households actually ranged in size between 1 and 23 people. While some household members indicated that they had migrated into the area, most residents are autochthons. On average, survey respondents have lived in their current villages for 26.5 years. The most recent immigrant has lived in his current village for one year. The oldest member of our sample is an 80-yearold man who has lived in his village all his life. Significantly, it turns out that most of those claiming to have migrated came from nearby areas in the Greater Accra region. Farming or reunion with family members who were farmers accounts for 48 percent of cases of migration. Farming was also identified as the main occupation for an even greater percentage (88 percent) of household heads. Altogether, 61 percent of household members were reported as farmers. Furthermore, farming was reported as the main occupation for 58 percent of spouses of households heads; only 18 percent were reportedly engaged in ‘‘other types’’ of occupation such as trading. These data make it abundantly clear that agriculture is the single most important economic pursuit of virtually all households. AGE, GENDER, AND MARITAL STATUS Of the 83 households in our sample, roughly 84 percent were headed by men, while less than 16 percent were female-headed. The overwhelming majority of the farmers were married. Among the married population, more than 68 percent are reported to be in monogamous marriages, while about 11 percent revealed that they practice polygamy. Slightly more than 7 percent of the farmers are widowed, while about 5 percent are divorced. Many of the farmers involved in pineapple production are relatively young, with an average age of about 43 years. The farmers range in age from 23 to 80 years. These figures might have been lower had the survey captured a number of the very young school-leavers who had only recently ventured into production on very tiny plots. The relative youth of the pineapple smallholder population bodes well for future gains because production is highly labor-intensive. The younger farmers are also much more likely than older farmers to accept the investment risks associated with production for the export market based on the rationalization that they have plenty of time ahead of them to recover any losses. Most older farmers are quite understandably risk-averse. Younger farmers are also more likely to seek to gain the specialized technical skills that are required for production for the export market.
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EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS While the age profile and marital status of the smallholders are conducive to the long-term sustainability of pineapple production, their educational levels should give Ghanaian policymakers pause because the technical know-how required for export pineapple production is considerably higher than anything most of these farmers may have experienced in their previous farming practices. One would expect the ability to count and literacy to be helpful in the acquisition of the necessary technical skills. Instead, the average length of time of schooling is a mere eight years, with a range from none to sixteen years. Remarkably, 27 percent of our respondents have absolutely no formal education. While eighteen smallholders have educational levels ranging from four to nine years, only sixteen smallholders, or 19 percent, had completed all ten years of elementary schooling. Another thirteen smallholders, or 16 percent of our sample, had managed two more years beyond elementary schooling. LAND TENURE AND PRODUCTION Having provided a brief overview of some of the sociological characteristics of smallholders, we turn now to an examination of the land question, which is one of the chief concerns, since land remains the single most important factor of production in rural Africa. Land availability or access to land remains an essential determinant of what can be produced, how much is produced, and, ultimately, how much income a household can generate. In Ghana access to land is generally established in one of three fundamental ways. First, an individual can purchase land and be legally entitled to it. This is especially true of areas where land is commercialized, such as in urban centers and some periurban areas. In such areas land is primarily used for residential purposes and highvalue economic activities. Since land values in such areas are generally high, access to land requires large sums of money and is therefore restricted to the affluent few and/or those with excellent political connections. The second mode of access is through customary tenure, where an individual has the right to cultivate unexploited land owned by his or her clan or lineage. As a member of the clan or lineage, the individual normally does not pay for the usufruct right to the land. By the same token, he or she cannot lay permanent claim to the land, thus enabling other members to someday cultivate the same plot after a period of fallowing. In the third instance, an individual can lease land from stools (lands belonging to chiefs) and clans (abusua) or lineages for a period of time. The individual pays an annual rent, which is variable in different parts of the country and may even vary with the types of crops being cultivated or land use patterns. As an alternative to leasing, a ‘‘stranger’’ or non-clan member may be allocated land for farming by a clan or lineage head in his capacity as custodian of the land. The proceeds from the farm are subsequently shared in the form of
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cash or produce. Much less is at stake in this form of sharecropping because it does not entail alienating a portion of the common patrimony, since produce or cash proceeds, rather than land, actually change hands. In the case of perennial crops such as cocoa, coffee, or coconuts, however, sharecropping invariably involves the division of the cultivated land at some future date, usually when the farm is just about ready to produce the first harvested fruits. The alienation of the lineage or clan land in this indirect way results in intraclan controversies and tensions. As a result, this alternative mode of access is fraught with dangers for the parties and especially for the custodian, who must be able to convince other clan or lineage members that, rather than undermining clan interests, the land deal actually preserves their interests. The case may be easier to make if these land transactions result in the creation of agyapadie (inheritable property), such as an established cash crop farm or modern cement house, which would otherwise not have been possible (Daddieh, 1984). Two kinds of sharecropping, locally known as abunsa and abunu, are practiced in Ghana. Abunsa is generally viewed as more equitable than abunu and is practiced much more extensively because it rewards the individual who brings the land into productive use with two-thirds of either the proceeds or the farmland, whereas abunu is a 50–50 distribution. The degree of alienation of farmland is greatest when outright sales occur. Hence, it is a transaction of last resort. Critics of African tenure systems have often bemoaned the fact that they fail to provide sufficient security of access and ownership to enable farmers to make long-term investment decisions. It has also been suggested that the lack of legal title to land under customary tenure removes any incentive for farmers to make qualitative improvements to the land (Daddieh, 1984). Such claims are not corroborated by the evidence from our survey. Although much of the land in the survey area is owned by both stools (Akwapim stools or thrones for Aburi area and Ga/Teshie stools for Nsawam area) and individual families, the system has accommodated many different arrangements, including short- and long-term leasing, borrowing, sharecropping, and even some outright sales. As Table 8.2 reveals, 41 percent of farms were rented, by far the largest share, while only 8 percent were owned and managed by households. Meanwhile, 17 percent were borrowed, and 29 percent of farms were under ‘‘other’’ tenure status, including using a family member’s land. Partly because of the pineapple’s special features as a crop, sharecropping is seldom practiced. Our survey found only 2 percent of farms under abunsa. Another 1 percent are under abunu. Land alienation through outright sales is also very rare. Only one plot, consisting of thirteen acres, was purchased in 1993 at a price of C300,000.00, or roughly C23,000.00 per acre. In short, the customary tenure system in the survey area is characterized by considerable flexibility in terms of both access modalities and contract provisions. Moreover, these different modalities have been quite stable and secure over time. The result is that conflicts over land have been kept to a minimum in the area.
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Table 8.2 Tenure State of Farms
LAND RENTS Again, land may be leased for farming. Chiefs and elders fix rent for stool lands, while family or lineage heads determine rents for lands they control through negotiations with prospective renters. Although rents vary according to patterns of land use, type of ownership (stool or lineage), the negotiating skills of renters, and extent of felt financial need by stools and lineages, what one observer had termed ‘‘the pressure of cash’’ (Arhin, 1976/1977), they have been sufficiently stable as well as relatively affordable. Currently, the annual rent is fixed at C20,000.00 per acre for land used to produce food crops such as cassava or maize and double that amount for pineapples. I have estimated that these figures understate the actual transaction costs because there are ancillary costs that farmers routinely neglect to include in their accounting, partly, I suspect, because they are incurred only occasionally or intermittently. These costs include annual gift-giving to chiefs or elders as a show of gratitude for use of these lands or transfers on important occasions such as an annual festival or death in a landowner’s family. Such contributions may come in the form of cash, food crops, or alcoholic beverages (preferably imported gin or whisky). It is significant that there were no reported complaints about these practices. The average rental price was C9,902.00 per acre. Among all farmers who rented, the total cost of rent per household amounted to C26,251.00. Although there have been periodic adjustments, rents have remained remarkably stable, a surprising finding for an economy that has experienced considerable inflationary pressures for a number of years. When we asked whether or not land rents have increased over the past three years, we received apparently conflicting answers, with nearly 45 percent of farmers saying yes, while 55 percent said no. FLEXIBILITY AND CONFLICTS To be sure, some farmers have had their rents revised upward. The more salient point is that there was no evidence of rent gouging. Furthermore, farmers
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themselves generally applauded the flexibility of the tenure system. The whole system seems to be based on mutual trust. One measure of both flexibility and mutual trust is that tenants are responsible for informing landlords when land use patterns change from staple food to pineapples, and vice versa. Another attractive feature of the farmer–landlord relationship is that in the event of crop failure or financial distress, the landlord invites the farmer for consultations in order to work out possible payment options. It was apparently not unusual for a tenant farmer to be in arrears for several years without being evicted. In this case, flexibility is matched by security of tenure. Security is also fostered by the ability of farmers to lease on long-term bases, usually for up to 10 years. Some commercial farmers have even been able to lease land for 99 years (the maximum allowed under the law). When asked whether land was easy or difficult to obtain now, almost 82 percent reported that it was easy. Even though 17 percent of farmers reported that they found it difficult to obtain farmland, there were no reported cases of the ‘‘very difficult’’ category. Given the central position that land occupies in the production systems and associated welfare of rural residents, we might expect it to loom quite large in conflict episodes. To be sure, conflicts over land can be mediated by access, which, in turn, depends on availability, rents, flexibility, and security of tenure. Since these are the very hallmarks of tenure relationships in the pineapple belt, land has yet to become a litigious subject. The data confirm this. Only 12 percent of farmers perceived land disputes to pose a serious problem. It is worthy of note that this positive assessment of land relations does not appear to have changed much over the years. Only about 10 percent of farmers felt that disputes over land were more severe today than they were ten years ago. By contrast, close to 70 percent of farmers were of the view that land conflicts do not exist. Furthermore, 18 percent of those who had encountered some conflicts over land attributed the cause to some ‘‘other’’ factors, including ‘‘the owner wants his land back’’ in the case of inherited or borrowed land. In sum, land remains relatively accessible to producers willing to go into production. The dominant method of acquisition is leasing from a stool or lineage head. The rent is relatively affordable. Leases can be arranged for short as well as longer periods. The terms of leasing, including payment schedules, are also sufficiently flexible. There is no more eloquent testimonial to the security afforded by customary land tenure in southern Ghana than the fact that there have been so few conflicts over land in this periurban pineapple belt. This is all the more remarkable because there is widespread recognition among residents that land for pineapple production is in high demand and that the crop itself is quite lucrative. Somehow, even in the current context of the intensification of the ‘‘pressure of cash,’’ landowners have refrained from taking advantage of emerging land demand and market trends to raise rents, ask for return of lands, seek to renegotiate already agreed rental prices, or demand unwarranted contri-
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Table 8.3 Distribution of Total Landholdings
butions. Such relative stability in land relations augurs well for the future of pineapple production.
RESOURCE USE AND FARM MANAGEMENT At the same time, it must be acknowledged that traditional land tenure systems have a tendency to produce quiltlike, fragmented patterns of landholding because land is rarely owned in a single contiguous location (Daddieh, 1984a). This pattern has been reproduced in the pineapple belt. On average, each household in our sample had access to a total of 3.05 farms. The actual number of farms ranged from one to seven plots. The net effect is that farmers have to walk to different farm locations. There are also significant inequalities in landholding in the pineapple belt. While the average total landholding per household is 12.71 acres, there are huge disparities ranging from 0.33 to 105 acres. As we can observe from Table 8.3, 63 percent of households farm between 0 and 10 acres, compared to the 100 acres or more that are owned and cultivated by a small minority of 2.4 percent. Still, most of the farmers surveyed are genuine smallholders, with about 41 percent cultivating between 0 and 5 acres. Export pineapple producers have slightly better access to land. They own an average of 3.2 farms, compared to 3 farms for nonexport producers. Moreover, the average total farm size among the smallholders who produce for export is 17.5 acres, compared to 5.5 acres among the nonexporters. These land distribution data point to emerging land disparities being driven by high-value export pineapple production. The significance of pineapple production in the lives of smallholders is confirmed by land use patterns, as summarized in Table 8.4. A relatively high
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Table 8.4 Principal Land Use Summary
proportion (40 percent) of the farmland was devoted to pineapple production, while 22 percent was under domestic staples. The average pineapple farm size was more than double that of other food crops (nearly 5 versus 2.2 acres). When the data are disaggregated according to farm plots, as in Table 8.5, it can be observed that 49 percent of farmers used their number one plot for pineapples. Significantly, nearly the same number of farmers opted for different food crops in their land use decisions for plot 1. In short, these three crops—pineapple, cassava, and maize—dominate local land use decisions, accounting for 90 percent of all crops cultivated. With respect to the second farm plot, food crops are the most important, accounting for nearly 80 percent of all crops grown. But even here pineapple holds its own, coming in at a respectable 19 percent.
LABOR ISSUES Next to land, control of labor and labor market conditions are the most important determinants of agricultural performance. It is often mistakenly assumed that labor is plentiful for African production units simply because household sizes tend to be large. In reality, many household production units lack adequate labor supplies; they are forced to compete for labor on open markets. For such households, labor availability and associated costs are matters of real concern. Fortunately for them, different modalities exist for gaining access to labor that combine both precapitalist and capitalist forms. For instance, labor contracts may include the provision of boarding and lodging by the employer as part of the wage package. Alternatively, farmworkers might be given accommodations on the farm but no food, in which case workers are expected to produce some of their own subsistence right there on the farm. Some agreements call for monthly or yearly payments, with the employer serving as a surrogate bank that disburses payments to workers out of their wages in small installments as their financial circumstances dictate. Workers may also be compensated with a portion of the crop in the form of either abunsa or abunu. Elsewhere, such practices had made it possible for smallholders to hire the necessary labor for expanded
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Table 8.5 Food Crops on Farm
production and promoted a sense of embourgeoisement among the peasantry, thus obfuscating the peasants’ own capture and exploitation at the hands of the state (Daddieh, 1988: 125–26). Given that labor is so critical to successful production of high-value horticultural crops such as pineapples, with demanding, precision timetables for planting, weeding, and harvesting, growers must have access to household labor, which is generally unremunerated, or have enough capital to pay for wage labor. The nub of the labor question in the survey area is one of cash rather than supplies. Labor can be hired on a ‘‘casual’’ or ‘‘as-needed’’ basis. Possibilities also exist for long-term hiring, with such ‘‘permanent’’ workers residing either on the farm, in the household of the farmer, or elsewhere in the village. ‘‘Casual’’ workers perform specific tasks as needed, such as planting, carrying seeds or suckers from roadside to farm, weeding, harvesting, and carrying crops from farms to designated collection points. More permanent workers are utilized in all phases of the production process. Farmers’ reliance on either casual or permanent workers is dependent on the number and size of farms and the availability of disposable income. Nevertheless, it is rather symptomatic of loss of the control that heads of households once exercised that, despite large household sizes, they have to turn increasingly to the labor market. Running almost parallel to the rent issue, labor availability has introduced more flexibility into wage negotiations and other labor arrangements. Our data show that 71 percent of farmers relied on hired hands. Another 23 percent used some type of reciprocal labor arrangement, or nnoboa. We found a striking gender bias in hiring decisions. Male workers were five times more likely to be hired than female workers. On average, 3 male laborers are hired per household, with the range from 0 to 25. The average annual household labor expenditure was C140,254.00 However, there were significant disparities
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between household labor expenditures, ranging from no money spent to C2,275,000.00. Understandably, farmers generally concentrated their wage labor on those crops with proven income benefits. Thus, 65 percent of smallholders used paid or hired labor for their pineapple crop. However, some 55 percent of farmers also use hired labor on their food farms, attesting to the growing profitability of the staple food market. It is instructive that only a paltry 7 percent of farmers reported hiring labor for ‘‘other’’ crops, such as groundnuts and oil palm. To recapitulate, labor availability is not a major problem for growers. The real constraint is the wherewithal to purchase it. With sufficient cash, farmers could easily find workers. When asked if it was difficult to find sufficient labor during the past agricultural season, more than 78 percent said no. INPUT SUPPLIES AND USE PATTERNS While land tenure and labor market conditions are generally conducive to pineapple production, the same cannot be said for input supplies and farm implements. African agriculture has long been wedded to the vagaries of Mother Nature. With little or no irrigation, there is a greater propensity for crop failure when the rains do not come or when they arrive too late. Locusts are also known to inflict incredible crop damage. In addition, labor productivity is undermined by the continued dependence on the use of traditional implements, including the hoe and cutlass. Now more than ever, there is a need to adopt improved technologies to raise productivity levels. In this connection, it is imperative that every effort be made to ensure that smallholders have access to adequate supplies of vital inputs, including fertilizers, pesticides, and improved seed varieties, at appropriate times. For a time the Ghanaian government posture was to subsidize chemical inputs, especially fertilizer, in order to make them affordable. In recent years, however, as part of the implementation of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), most African governments have abandoned such commitments in favor of privatization of input supply markets. While the removal of subsidies reduces the pressure on government budgets, it fails to resolve the issue of ensuring access of financially distressed smallholders to input supplies as prices invariably move up with liberalization. Farmers in the periurban area are aware of the potential productivity gains from the appropriate use of chemical inputs. In the special case of export pineapple production, they even recognize that the adoption of new technologies is indispensable. Not surprisingly, about 57.32 percent of respondents in Farm 1 use chemicals. As Table 8.6 indicates, chemical use drops rather significantly when it comes to other crops. Less than 20 percent of farmers use chemicals for even the main food crops—cassava and maize. Similarly, while 47.5 percent of farmers made use of pesticides on their pineapple and cassava farms, pesticide use declined markedly to about 20 percent on secondary plots. The cost factor remains the single most important determinant of use of fer-
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Table 8.6 Use of Agricultural Inputs
tilizers, pesticides, and herbicides. The high cost has created the rather anomalous situation in which smallholders try to stretch limited supplies of inputs to cover entire farms in the mistaken belief that half a loaf is better than none at all. While this strategy of cutting back on recommended quantities of inputs may appear sensible in the face of limited cash reserves, its impact on productivity is most likely negative. Unlike the problems associated with imported inputs, the supply of maize seeds and pineapple suckers appears to be adequate, and prices are affordable. The primary reason for the low expenditures on these inputs is that except for those entering production for the very first time or embarking on a major expansion, most farmers reserve a portion of the previous season’s maize crop to be used for planting the following year. Similarly, pineapple farmers get the bulk of their suckers from their own existing and mature farms. In short, the cost of seeds or suckers is a relatively small proportion of the input burden that farmers have to bear. Production costs have also been kept down by the nonuse of either animal traction or tractor services.
THE PROBLEM OF INPUT PRICES The single most important problem facing the smallholder pineapple producer remains access to adequate and reliable supplies of inputs at affordable prices. As indicated earlier, the PNDC government withdrew fertilizer subsidies in the late 1980s and privatized fertilizer imports in 1992. Those policy initiatives raised the cost of production for smallholders because the much anticipated reduction of prices from increased competition did not materialize. As a result, smallholders complain bitterly about vital inputs being out of reach, because each year their prices keep skyrocketing almost uncontrollably. Farmers attribute these price increases to (1) the small number of suppliers, (2) exchange rate movements, (3) price gouging by business, and (4) limited imports. The gap between policy intent and the practical realities of the privatized market of input supply in Ghana has been captured quite succinctly by Nyanteng and Dapaah: Charging the real input price to farmers was expected to be matched by increased output price determined by market forces of supply and demand. However, the match has not
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been perfect, at least in the short run, as the input prices have increased faster than the output prices. . . . The resulting decrease in the output-input price ratio will, theoretically, reduce the use of the purchased inputs. The mismatch of the input and output prices has occurred in the short run because the level of competition which is expected in the private sector distribution system of inputs that should lower the farm gate prices has not been achieved. (1993: 84)
Under current credit conditions, the plight of most smallholders cannot be expected to ease. Less than 3 percent of farmers had received credit from buyers of their crop. Moreover, commercial and rural banks have failed to pick up the credit slack (see Ohio State University, 1994). Our data reveal that less than 6 percent of farmers have ever received a loan from a bank. Meanwhile, the traditional method of pooling local resources through susu (it is a traditional method of [gathering] pooling resources to assist members) has lost its attractiveness. As a result, only 3 percent of farmers still practice it. Its gross inadequacy even for those still practicing it is reflected in the fact that the average value of susu per household was a paltry C370.00, a figure that was below the official daily minimum wage. The government’s inability to channel bank credit to cash-starved smallholders is already having a chilling effect on expanded production of most crops, especially pineapples. In 1991 the sum total of commercial and secondary bank loans and advances to the entire agricultural sector was C12,254.4 million, or roughly 16 percent of the banks’ total loan portfolio (ISSER, 1992: 101). This was woefully inadequate to meet the credit needs of the country’s many peasant producers. As we saw earlier, under conditions of credit crunch, smallholders tend to be much more discriminating in their use of inputs, including decisions about which crops to favor in the application of inputs (pineapples versus food crops; maize versus cassava and cocoyam, etc.). There is also a tendency to try shortcuts to increase productivity, which may prove elusive because inputs utilized in less than their full complement may not produce the desired effect.
MARKETING RELATIONS Although the lack of access to credit is a major liability, its effects can be mitigated to an extent by access to sufficiently attractive produce markets. The latter can create incentives for farmers to seek loans to purchase inputs, even when input prices are escalating. The strategic location of the pineapple belt allows farmers to take advantage of market opportunities for food in such urban or regional centers as Nsawam, Aburi, Accra, and Tema. For pineapples at least, these local markets are supplemented by an increasing number of exporters. The market for export pineapples has grown by leaps and bounds over the years to the point where that there are now at least 50 exporters at any one time (ISSER, 1992: 68). The addition of the large number of entrepreneurs who fill consign-
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ments as and when requests come from Europe brings the actual figure of exporters closer to 75. There is a third, albeit relatively minor, outlet for pineapples in the form of local processing companies and very small-scale juice extraction operations commonly associated with catering services. Until Ghanacan (also known as Nsawam Canneries, a division of GIHOC, Ghana’s state-owned holding company) ran into financial difficulties and was placed on the auction block, it offered a third significant buying outlet. Its role has been inherited by ASTEK, a private processing enterprise, in the last couple of years. However, none of these local markets or outlets are as important or as lucrative for pineapple sales as the export market. Not surprisingly, farmers who grow to export specifications turn to the local market only as a last resort for export rejects or when export buyers fail to turn up. Almost 65 percent of all farmers, many of whom do not grow specifically for the export market, currently sell some pineapples to exporters. By contrast, only 11 percent reported selling to a processing company or juice factory. The preference for the export market is not hard to understand. There are significant differences in price levels between the two markets. Local market prices for a kilogram of pineapple are generally 25–50 percent of the price offered by exporters. Worse yet, there is a tendency for the local market to turn into a veritable buyers’ market, especially in July, when the harvest is at its peak. Fortunately for farmers, local buyers are much less discriminating as to the size and coloration of fruits. In addition, the costs associated with production for the local market are significantly lower than those experienced by export pineapple producers. This is primarily because farmers who produce for the local market can (and they generally do) eschew the use of expensive chemical inputs. The research had anticipated that production and marketing relations would be governed by formal written contracts, as in most high-value horticultural relationships (Little and Watts, 1994). Instead, we found an industry characterized by informality or gentleman’s agreements. Only 3.5 percent of smallholders had written contracts with exporters that specified production and marketing relations. Consequently, during a three-year period, a majority of smallholders had dealings with more than one exporter or large farm. On average, smallholders have worked with the same exporter(s) for more than 2.5 years, an indication that purchasing arrangements are not entirely devoid of content, stability, or continuity. The ten smallholders who had previously worked under contracts gave a plethora of reasons for their termination, including ‘‘cheating by cooperative members; cheating by export farmer; exporter started own farm and no longer needed to buy from smallholder; inconsistent demands by exporters; lack of sufficient money/credit to meet demands; suspension of farming activities; lack of market in the off-season; difficulty managing farm while working at a job in Accra; and the withdrawal of credit facilities by exporters.’’ What is astonishing is that the absence of formal or secure contracting did not appear to dampen the enthusiasm of most smallholders. Apparently, the
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driving force behind smallholder production decisions is the rather widespread and reassuring belief that as long as markets exist out there, they will find buyers for their pineapples. Most smallholders have been at it long enough to be able to read market signals. Still, this is hardly an ideal buying situation, and farmers know it. The resultant uncertainty, however small it may be, has dissuaded some smallholders from risking limited disposable income on the purchase of inputs to meet export market demands. This is an area that deserves official attention if the progress achieved thus far is to be sustained. Output pricing is the other related marketing issue that can spell trouble for any agricultural subsector. In the case of pineapples, prices are apparently determined prior to the beginning of the production season. The farmers are quite knowledgeable about such prices; they are able to recite prices for the last three years with ease. Among smallholders who sell to exporters, close to 88 percent reported that they had a preagreed price. However, we discovered that these prices are far from being guaranteed. They are best seen as reasonable barometers of what farmers can expect to be paid for their crop during a particular growing season. There is room for renegotiating prices, with the outcome of the bargaining hinging very much upon the particular circumstances faced by both buyers and farmers. It is instructive that about 30 percent of farmers reportedly agreed on a price at the time of ‘‘forcing,’’ a local term for the chemical spraying undertaken prior to harvest that is intended to accelerate the ripening process. Roughly 39 percent reported that the price is fixed before the season begins. Since so-called fixed prices are not always paid by exporters, they can hardly be called ‘‘preagreed’’ or ‘‘guaranteed.’’ For instance, the export market price for a kilogram of pineapple in 1994 was C120.00. Depending on prevailing market conditions, smallholders could be paid anywhere from C60.00 to C100.00 per kilogram. While the fixed export pineapple prices for 1992–1994 were C90.00, C100.00, and C120.00, respectively, the corresponding average prices were C81.79, C96.77, and C120.00. The leader in the pack of marketeers of smallholder output is, as Table 8.7 indicates, Combined Farms, accounting for 22 percent of all pineapple purchases from smallholders, followed closely by Koranco. The rest of the export market is distributed fairly evenly among several large farms. The category ‘‘others’’ consists of a hodgepodge of 22 different buying companies and individual agents. Unlike formal contract farming schemes, smallholders here rarely received inputs from exporters. Long-standing grower-exporters provided transport services (i.e., carted fruits from the farms to the buying station) as well as assumed responsibility for spraying the crop. About 58 percent of smallholders benefited from transport services, while nearly 81 percent had their farms sprayed by exporters. ‘‘Forcing’’ is an important phase in the production process because, as indicated earlier, it ‘‘forces’’ the fruits to ripen faster and on schedule as well as helps to regulate the sugar content. Meanwhile, only 3.5 percent of small-
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Table 8.7 Leading Pineapple Exporters
holders received suckers from exporters. These few essential services were provided by exporters at virtually no cost to smallholders except that the latter were often compelled to give tips ranging from C4,000.00 to C6,000.00 as incentive to workers who carried out the spraying. Whether or not exporters were aware that their employees were extracting these rents was hard to tell. Smallholders were convinced that they were aware but looked the other way because it is a way for them to supplement their incomes, which negates the need for them to demand wage increases. Furthermore, only slightly more than 16 percent of smallholders received a cash advance—essentially, a loan—from exporters. In the absence of formal contracts and with limited supply of inputs by exporters, smallholders appear to have the advantage of not being captured and therefore being able to decide which buyers would get their fruits based on the attractiveness of price offers. The majority of smallholders have dealt with more than one exporter during the past three years; some have had to deal with multiple exporters during the same growing season. Rather than being a blessing in disguise, this relative autonomy to choose among different buyers can make smallholders vulnerable when harvest time arrives if an exporter does not come calling. Such circumstances often push smallholders to compete against each other in order to clinch sales agreements, often driving down the price. They also generate pressures for smallholders to pay buying agents between C5,000.00 and C10,000.00 to get them to select their crop in order to avoid the undesirable prospect of having to sell to a processing company or the local market. All smallholders have an interest in getting exporters to buy their crop because, as more than 83 percent of them readily acknowledged, the export market remains the most important and lucrative market for pineapples. The income data can attest to the reliability of local perceptions of the profitability of pineapple production for the export market. Some 17 percent of smallholders indicated that the local market is more important, but that judgment was based on the increased absorption of pineapples locally. Another important area of marketing relations involves payment schedules.
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Our data show that more than 65 percent of smallholders are not paid until well after the crop has been exported. Only 4 percent reported being paid in full at the point of sale. On average, smallholders wait over a month before receiving full payment. Delays in payment can range from a few days to six months, the latter being an ‘‘eternity’’ for most smallholders. Several farmers also reportedly gave up trying to collect money they were owed by certain exporters. In addition, 20 percent of farmers reported that they had stopped growing pineapples because of difficulties experienced in collecting payments. A particularly notorious incident was recounted by farmers in Pukrom-Nsaba, who apparently took matters into their own hands and impounded the transport vehicle of a most delinquent exporter. It took the timely intervention of the local chief for a payment arrangement to be negotiated and for the truck to be released. Delayed payments, defaults, or unilateral reductions in agreed levels of payment have combined to drive some smallholders from the export pineapple subsector, despite the widespread recognition that it is the most profitable agricultural activity in the periurban area. We hasten to add, however, that although the institutional bases of contractual relations, including legal enforcement, remain weak, and a few exporters have engaged in serious malfeasance, these are relatively isolated rather than pervasive; they have affected a very small number of farmers. It is also worth emphasizing that farmers are generally much more likely to experience these difficulties in dealings with first-time buyers who are filling orders for clients in Europe. The more established grower-exporters are generally more reliable because they have a proven track record and a local presence and are known by officials in Accra. As a result, they have a much better appreciation for the importance of maintaining reliable suppliers among the smallholder population. As long as improper payments and agreements remain reasonably infrequent, as is currently the case, they should have no enduring negative impact on smallholder production. Market systems may be periodically rocked by scandal or other unpleasant experiences without eroding smallholder confidence and causing wholesale exit from pineapple production. To date, smallholders have been very successful in raising their output to meet the demands of the export market. Among all pineapple growers, only 22.5 percent acknowledged difficulties in meeting demand. Half of the farmers blamed their supply problems on the timing of requests that occurred during the off-season, when smallholders normally would cut back on production because market prospects were generally poor. At the same time, about 72 percent of farmers have noticed a recent increase in the number of pineapples supplied by the export farms to the local market. About 78 percent of farmers view this development with concern because of the greater competition that it promotes. Increased competition from the large export farms was identified by at least 55 percent of farmers as posing a serious threat to their market share. They are apprehensive that these major exporters would cease buying from them once they have sufficiently expanded their production to meet their export needs. Currently, the growers for the local market are feeling the most pressure from
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Table 8.8 Technical Advice
competition because the large commercial farmers have been dumping export rejects on the local market, thus depressing prices and local incomes even further. Understandably, smallholders have been complaining about dumping of ‘‘surplus’’ pineapples on the local market. While the volume of production and levels of supply have been rising steadily, the quality issue has not been seriously addressed. The quality of smallholder pineapples is considered by exporters to be rather uneven. Quality is primarily a function of the technical acumen of smallholders in producing a high-value horticultural crop. It reflects the limited possibilities smallholders have for acquiring the requisite technical skills for producing high-quality pineapples on a consistent basis. On one hand, the export market is much more unforgiving when it comes to quality; it places a high premium on fruit quality, rewarding those at the high end with more attractive prices and greater market shares in a highly competitive European marketplace. On the other hand, very little concerted effort has been made either by the government through the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) or by the exporters themselves to ensure that all potential producers receive the necessary technical advice (TA). As Table 8.8 illustrates, there is a dearth of technical support services. Nearly 22 percent of farmers were producing without the benefit of any technical assistance whatsoever. An identical number cited ‘‘other farmers’’ as their only source of technical knowledge. Comparatively few farmers (only 14 percent) identified extension workers of grower-export farms as a source of TA, even as fertilizer trials are conducted by MOFA on plots belonging to some of the large grower-exporters. In any case, the relevance of such research efforts for smallholder production remains dubious. It is highly unlikely that they are among the intended beneficiaries because the size of their operations and the conditions under which they operate are remarkably different from those of the large exporting farms. This is a serious policy lapse. This is neither the first time nor will it be the last time that smallholders are bypassed by technologies intended to improve production and productivity for mainly large growers. Nevertheless, similar to the other aspects of pineapple production in the periurban area, such as the flexible and secure land tenure arrangements, adequate
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land availability, relatively unlimited supplies of labor, and flexible labor relations, the export and local markets have been reasonably robust and profitable; marketing relations have been equally flexible. Payments can be delayed, sometimes for up to six months, before full restitution is made, thus allowing a large number of buyers to enter the market, even though some may have very little cash on hand to execute these buying transactions. This flexibility has fostered growing competition among a large number of buyers, who include growerexporters, individual freelance exporters (those who buy on consignment), local traders, and processing companies. The downside is that some of these market transactions can go awry, for example, when potential buyers fail to show up at appointed times, fail to make payments for deliveries, or delay payment for an unconscionably long period of time. An important reason for some of the extant marketing problems is the lack of formal contracts in the pineapple subsector that specify the obligations of producers and buyers. As a result, spraying and transportation are about the only services provided by the exporters. While informal contracts have advantages for both buyers and producers and have displayed not only flexibility but also durability, they have a tendency to generate uncertainties at certain periods. They also can involve unequal enforcement when power is monopolized by one party. The informal nature of contracting is implicated in the uneven quality of smallholder produce, since it fails either to obligate the buyer to provide much needed TA or credits or to bind the smallholders to the use of costly critical inputs. WHAT BENEFITS FOR SMALLHOLDERS? Despite production and marketing difficulties, there is tremendous peasant interest in pineapple production. Anticipated income gains have clearly played an important role in nurturing this interest. There is, therefore, a need to ascertain how individuals and households are faring in the new liberalized environment of production and marketing. Has the growth in high-value horticultural activity in this periurban area contributed to raising smallholder incomes? How has income distribution among different households engaged in different levels and types of crop production been affected? In short, what has been the household economic impact of all this extensive agricultural activity? The revenue, incomes, and employment data should give us some clues as to the overall impact of production activities in the pineapple belt. The income data from crop sales indicate that the total annual gross crop revenue per household exceeds C930,000.00 (U.S. $979.00). At the time of the study, the exchange rate averaged C950 ⫽ $1.00. It currently (February 1997) averages C1,700 ⫽ $1.00, a sum that is considerably large by rural Ghanaian standards. It should be noted that net incomes are probably 30 to 40 percent lower. Nonetheless, incomes vary greatly, ranging from less than a few thousand cedis to over C11.5 million. As can be inferred from Table 8.9, income earnings from crops sales are also highly uneven. The picture that emerges from focusing
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Table 8.9 Crop Incomes
on different crops is clear: the highest incomes are generated from pineapple sales (C1,573,197.00), followed by maize sales at a distant second place (C459,409.00). Cassava’s position as the third highest income generator is probably explained by its importance as the leading domestic staple, whereby much of the production is consumed by smallholders themselves. Table 8.10 reveals that 21 percent of households earned more than C1.0 million per year from crop sales, while slightly more than 44 percent of households earned less than C100,000.00 (U.S. $105.00). These figures demonstrate that the majority of growers earn relatively low incomes, while a minority earn very high revenues. Among pineapple producers, the data confirm the widespread perception that the export market is more lucrative than the domestic one. According to the revenue data, the highest incomes come from sales to exporters. Export producers, many of whom owned large farms, earned an average income of C1,490,545.00. The average gross income from pineapples sold to exporters was C1,357,748.00, compared to an income of C585,646.00 from pineapples sold on the local market. The data make it clear that farmers who sold pineapples to exporters earned more than twice as much income as those who sold on the local market. It should come as no surprise, then, that more than 95 percent of all farmers were unequivocal about the profitability of the export market for pineapples. Pineapple production and other agricultural pursuits provide the bulk of the income and employment opportunities available to residents of this periurban area. As Table 8.11 illustrates, 61 percent of all household members above the age of 16 are engaged in farming. Nearly 88 percent of household heads list cultivation as one of their main sources of livelihood, while 59 percent of spouses or second major income earners in the household also pursue agriculture. In addition, export farms provide wage employment for more than 13 percent of household heads in our survey. A comparison of the incomes from crop sales of those who sell and those who do not sell pineapples to exporters reveals that export pineapple producers earn, on average, eight times as much income as those who do not sell to exporters. The indicative average income data are C1,592,223.76 for export pineapple producers compared to C188,650.00
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Table 8.10 Distribution of Crop Incomes
for nonexport pineapple producers. Among those who sold pineapples, their average income was C1,649,202.00 per year. Thus, in terms of income, it is clearly advantageous to produce for export. While there is little doubt that income gains accrue disproportionately to those who produce and sell pineapples to exporters, it is important to note that such farmers also have access to significantly larger landholdings than their counterparts. Whereas the average total number of farms owned by all farmers is roughly 2.9, that of export pineapple producers is about 3.2. Even more significantly, the average farm size among those who sell pineapples to exporters is 17.5 acres, compared to 5.5 for those who do not sell pineapples to exporters. These findings are consistent with evidence from studies of contract farming (CF) elsewhere in Africa, which suggest that CF does raise incomes for a ‘‘middle’’ stratum of growers but does not reach the smaller landowner/poorer farmer (Little and Watts, 1994). Meanwhile, as farmers’ perception of potential income and welfare gains is a powerful incentive that sustains expanded production, the prospects for production growth are enhanced by the fact that about 60 percent of smallholders reported that their incomes have increased during the past four years; 26 percent estimated that they had stayed the same; and only 14 percent reported a decline in their incomes.
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Table 8.11 Summary of Household Occupations
ASSETS AND PROPERTY If smallholders are doing as well as the data suggest, we should expect this well-being to be reflected in household assets and property. Household assets and property are significant, as they can serve as collateral for bank loans or generate funds that can be reinvested in further pineapple production. What do disparities between household assets and property tell us about social class differentiation in this periurban area? These are important issues to raise because they have implications for different levels of commitment to agriculture and the ability and willingness or reluctance of households to take risks by investing in such a high-value horticultural crop. On this issue, the evidence is not very encouraging. It is true, as Table 8.12 indicates, that most smallholders (roughly 46 percent) own their homes. Another 24 percent live in houses that are owned by another family member. Consequently, only 6 percent of our respondents pay rent. However, when one goes beyond the simple fact of ownership to inquire into the quality of the buildings or the overall level of assets enjoyed by smallholder households, a different picture emerges (see Table 8.13). The structural features of the homes are instructive in this regard. Nearly 76 percent of households had houses with cement floors, but only 55 percent of the houses had cement walls. Close to 94 percent of the houses had metal roofs. Furthermore, despite the pineapple belt’s geographic proximity to the national capital, Accra, none of the houses had access to electricity or had indoor plumbing (water closets). Aside from the apparent irrelevance of proximity as a determinant of quality improvements in household
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Table 8.12 Household Assets
Table 8.13 Household Amenities Present
assets, this finding is all the more intriguing because it does imply that very little differentiation among households has taken place. How do we reconcile this finding with the evidence from our data that also suggests, as was indicated earlier, that a distinct stratum of export pineapple growers is emerging? There are several plausible explanations for this apparent contradiction between rising crop and household incomes and the poverty of household assets and property. It may be that farmers are plowing back their meager profits into further production or into other economic pursuits. But more than likely, it is because accumulation is still in its infancy; it has yet to reach the stage of critical mass to permit reinvestments in both production and the kind of consumption represented by changes in physical assets that are typical of greater affluence. A further complication is that farmers who still have links to family compounds in Accra or elsewhere in the region view the periurban area as an inappropriate place to invest in expensive home improvements. Some combination of the preceding explanations seems plausible in light of the fact that even at 49 percent, the number of respondents who indicated that they have a bank account is remarkably small. Moreover, just over 26 percent indicated that they owned another house. In addition, of those who owned a second house, 50 percent identified the location as being in the eastern region, and slightly over 44 percent identified Greater Accra as the location. It is instructive, indeed, that only 49 percent of our sample kept bank accounts. With respect to ownership of other assets, such as retail shops, levels of frequency are low. For instance, only a paltry 5 percent of the households in our survey own a shop. Among shop owners, 21 percent also operated another
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business venture. What is significant, however, is that the return on investment from these supplemental activities seems to pale in comparison with incomes from food crops or pineapples. According to our data, an average of C451.81 per week was earned from operating a shop, with earnings ranging from zero to C17,500.00. Given the preceding evidence, it is no wonder that only relatively large farmers, rather than smallholders, own capital farm equipment, such as tractors or transport vehicles. CONCLUSIONS The growth in Ghanaian pineapple production over the last several years is a function of the uncanny ability of smallholders to recognize and take advantage of market trends and the variable profitability of different crops. The vast majority of households in the region have been drawn into pineapple production because of its perceived profitability. Almost every household is associated with the pineapple subsector in one form or another: as producer, trader, or laborer. The combination of existing market outlets and the lucrativeness of pineapples has made the crop an important consideration and, for the most part, the obvious choice in local farm management decisions. The evidence for this is simply unmistakable: the countryside has been blanketed by lush green fields with neat rows of pineapple plants on hillside terraces, on flatlands near villages, and even in household gardens. During the peak harvest season, one is bombarded by the strong aroma of sweet-smelling pineapples at every corner. Moreover, African hospitality, for which Ghana is legendary, is expressed in this countryside in the form of offers of freshly cut pineapples. An important development that bodes well for the future of pineapple production in Ghana is the growing number of young school-leavers who are willing to venture into production. What they lack in capital they make up for in considerable entrepreneurial spirit, energy, and ambition. Commanding little or no capital, they make do with very small plots (less than 0.5 acres). While much of the credit for the production gains in pineapples has to go to the producers themselves, the neoliberal economic agenda of the government has had a positive impact. In short, expanded pineapple production in Ghana reflects peasant responsiveness to the liberalization of market forces. While our survey points to lingering unease and some dissatisfaction with aspects of existing marketing relations, Ghanaian pineapple producers now have more options in selling their produce than growers in other West African countries. It is now possible for them to sell to a wider variety of buyers, including large exporterfarmers, private traders, and small export firms whose number currently exceeds 75 (ISSER, 1992: 68). Equally helpful is the growing domestic market for pineapples in Ghana, although fruits that are first primed for the export market are not always in great demand locally. As a last resort, farmers can turn to local private juice factories and canneries, the most important being ASTEK, located in Nsawam. Most farmers use the option of selling to factories only under market duress, since prices paid are generally lower, often less than 50 percent of those
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offered in the export trade. Still, this contrasts sharply with the Gambian experience, where small-scale horticultural producers are compelled to rely on no more than four or five exporters (Little and Dolan, 1994). On the downside, unscrupulous freelance buyers and exporters in the ‘‘liberalized’’ Ghanaian marketplace pose a problem to smallholders. Occasionally, horror stories were recounted by farmers about unbearably long delays in getting paid, nonpayment, or reduced payment based on buyers’ claims that the shipment arrived in Europe in poor condition: some got rotted while still on the ground in Accra or Tema, or the chartered plane or ship failed to turn up at the scheduled time. Overall, however, export pineapple production has a bright future, especially if it is given the necessary institutional supports such as smallholder-friendly credits and technical assistance. SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS Pineapple production by smallholders does have an important part to play in developing the export sector in Ghana, but it should not be perceived as a panacea for solving agrarian and rural development problems. The heterogeneity of the pineapple subsector, which includes a range of different actors and institutions, must be acknowledged in any policy discussions, and smallholders tend to be the weakest actors in the configuration of the subsector. Policy discussions in several different areas could improve the benefits to smallholders involved in export agriculture in the periurban areas. These include the following. Supporting Producer Associations It has been noted that local institutions are crucial for enhancing incomes and employment in the periurban areas but that such organizations may be weak and ineffective. The use of grower associations has been shown to reduce input delivery and marketing costs, thereby increasing overall revenues for schemes, and to improve the bargaining power of smallholders vis-a`-vis exporters. This is an area where government and donors could make contributions through training of association personnel in accounting procedures, marketing strategies, and other relevant subjects. In some cases governments may have to strengthen statues and laws regulating cooperatives/associations, in order to permit them to negotiate on a more equal basis with export firms. Improved Access to Capital Pineapple production is very costly, and most smallholders have been seriously hampered by lack of capital, largely due to the unavailability of financial markets that serve their particular needs. There is little outside financial assistance in the form of either institutional lending by commercial banks, the agriculture Development Bank, or remittances from migrant relatives resident in
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urban centers in Ghana or abroad. The limited availability of the capital needed to sustain/expand smallholder export pineapple production has been exacerbated by the lack of an effective local or national pineapple farmer organization to advocate specific policy interventions in favor of the subsector. In short, what is sorely lacking is an effective mechanism for group action to induce favorable policy on agricultural input supply at reasonable cost. Improved Smallholder Access to Technical Assistance An additional impediment on the production side is the dearth of technical advice. In fact, most smallholder pineapple producers are self-taught men and women. They have learned their skills by either watching other farmers, working on commercial farms, helping a friend or neighbor with his farm, or attending the occasional workshop run by either the Extension Department of the Ministry of Agriculture or extension agents of large export farms. Improved Institutional Environment for Contract Farming Formal contracting between growers and buyers is virtually nonexistent in the Ghanaian pineapple industry. Production has been largely sustained by a series of oral agreements or informal understandings rather than written contracts. Nevertheless, informality has been accompanied by a modicum of durability, even if it has not removed completely the sense of uncertainty felt by some smallholders. Among the consequences of the lack of formal contracting is that inputs are not provided to farmers. Many smallholders find it very difficult to obtain inputs, not because of unavailability but because they cannot afford them. The liberalization and privatization of the input supply market have left most farmers vulnerable to the upward pressures on the price of agricultural inputs in the context of ongoing devaluation of the national currency. ADDITIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS There is some scope for governments and donors to support smallholder pineapple production through financing research, training, and infrastructure programs. International donors and the government of Ghana should continue to facilitate growth and export by improving handling facilities at both Accra Airport and Tema Harbor, finding a mechanism for supplying critical inputs to farmers at cost, and using local farmer organizations to funnel credit to smallholders, as well as embarking on targeted upgrading of road systems in producing areas from red earth feeder roads to tarmac roads. In sum, smallholder farming of pineapples has emerged in response to complex market and production conditions, rather than as a mechanism to improve the welfare of smallholders. To facilitate the latter, donors, government institutions, and private firms must be willing to support policies, infrastructure,
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organizations, and services that can capitalize—in terms of development—on the large amounts of revenue generated from this activity. ACRONYMS ERP
Economic Recovery Program
MOFA
Ministry of Food and Agriculture
NTE
Nontraditional Export
PNDC
Provisional National Defense Council
SAPs
Structural Adjustment Programs
CHAPTER 9
Maintaining the African Wealth: A Natural and Human Resource Sustainability Issue Valentine Udoh James
INTRODUCTION This chapter builds on the assumption that Africa is endowed with human as well as natural resource wealth. What is needed to transfer this ‘‘potential’’ is a conducive environment that would create higher productivity within the limits of the social and ecological systems of the continent. Thus, capacity building of African nations must focus on three distinct areas germane to development because in these areas Africa has not done particularly well. The World Bank (1989: 54) summarizes the areas where African countries need to improve: • Human development, especially the provision of basic health, education, nutrition, and technical skills • The restructuring of many public and private institutions to create a context in which skilled workers can function effectively • Political leadership that understands that institutions are fragile entities, painstakingly built up, easily destroyed, and therefore requiring sustained nurturing.
Probably one of the most endowed continents of the world is Africa, but this blessed continent is facing some of the worst economic, social, political, and environmental difficulties of the contemporary world. It is sometimes very disturbing to imagine that in many of the countries of Africa south of the Sahara, human suffering occurs on such a large scale, and yet the region is endowed with some of the most precious resources of the world. For instance, although Zaire (now the People’s Democratic Republic of Congo) is well endowed with mineral resources, it is riddled with social, political, and economic problems of enormous proportions. Africans, African governments, and the world at large
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have taken the region for granted and have not invested adequately in preserving, conserving, protecting, and managing the resources of the region adequately. The issue addressed in this chapter is precisely how wealthy Africa is south of the Sahara and what needs to be done in order to maintain the wealth before it vanishes in the next 50 to 100 years. AFRICA’S WEALTH—WHAT WEALTH? For generations Africans have lived in their rural villages completely selfsufficient because the forests and savannas provided the necessities of life: food, shelter, and resources for clothing. Although the fragile African soils are not known for their great depth of rich, productive soils, some areas of the continent have proven for centuries that if their carrying capacities are not exceeded, they can be productive in perpetuity. Some areas in the central region of the continent can serve as breadbaskets for the continent if cultivated properly. The wealth of Africa is precisely the many natural resources that are either renewable or nonrenewable and the human resources—the people who contributed to the diversity of many cultural and ethnic backgrounds and talents. In African countries natural resources are the backbone of economic development, but appropriate steps have not been taken to manage the resources efficiently and sustainably. Hence, the continent has suffered great losses. Mismanagement of the resources has been the major culprit of the deteriorating conditions of the resources and the declining quality of the environment. What would have been the impetus for economic takeoff has been squandered unnecessarily. The mistakes have resulted in economic, social, and political malaise of the countries of Africa. One source of foreign exchange for some countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, and South Africa has been the minerals. For example, Ghana’s gold has been reported to earn more foreign exchange than cocoa in recent time. Data from 1995 show company total cumulative receipts for gold for the first three quarters of that year to have been better than that of cocoa. A comparison of gold and cocoa earnings shows gold earnings to be $467.786 million, while cocoa’s earnings were $362.26 million (West Africa, 1996a: 346). Thus, African nations are benefiting from their renewable and nonrenewable resources. However, the exploitation of mineral resources and the expansion of cash crop production bring about environmental degradation. It stands to reason that African governments and multinational corporations must invest in the protection and conservation of Africa’s environment. The threat of losing the renewable resources such as the forest and destroying the African landscape and all that is on it and within it is forcing new partnerships. For instance, in order to encourage the protection of the environment, the World Bank is choosing more carefully which project to fund with financial resources and technical assistance. In recent times, the bank has been aggressive in its efforts to facilitate environmental conservation. For instance, the Global Environment Facility provides public information on proposed projects so that
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good and rational decisions are made about the projects. Such efforts led to the decision by the bank to drop 20 percent of the projects that were approved to be carried out by the bank in 1991 (West Africa, 1991: 811). In that year a planned Global Environment Facility (GEF) grant for natural gas flaring reduction was canceled when the Royal Dutch/Shell and the Nigerian government could not find suitable buyers for the liquefied gas exports to Europe. GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EFFORT The majority of African countries now find themselves at a point in their development process when they have to emphasize aggressive extraction of natural resources such as mineral and use their land in ways to encourage the exploitation of the resources. Because the past implementation of resource exploitation strategies has resulted in the damage and degradation of the environment, many African governments, with the assistance of industrialized nations, are emphasizing environmental programs, strategies, and policies that would promote the protection of the ecological systems of their countries. Ghana, a country that has recently reopened its gold and diamond mines for exploitation, has found it necessary to institute environmental guidelines in order to enable mining companies to be more efficient in their production process, protect the environment, and promote ideas of sustainable development. Such environmental guidelines are as follows: Exploration will be carried out by a company with a valid prospecting licence. Where exploration will be carried out in either a forestry reserve or a timber concession prior to the start of field work, the company shall contact the Forestry Department to determine the department’s requirements. Where exploration will be carried out in a wildlife reserve, prior to the start of field work the company shall contact the Department of Game and Wildlife to determine the department’s requirements. At least 14 days in advance of field exploration commencement, a company representative shall meet appropriate landowner or landuser representatives and outline the nature and timing of the proposed exploration programme and its different phases, the likely environmental effects of each phase, the proposed compensation arrangements, the general opportunities for casual employment and the supply of goods and services. The company shall obtain from the Minerals Commission a set of forms entitled Environmental Overview, which are required to be filled in and submitted to the Minerals Commission prior to the commencement of field exploration. At least seven days prior to the commencement of each phase of work, a company representative shall again visit the relevant landowner or landuser representatives and describe and/or determine the following: • The impending phase of work • The area of land to be explored • The expected effects on vegetation, land use, air and water quality and noise levels
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• The applicable compensation rates. When the amount of compensation will be determined and paid • The number of casual labourers required and the need for goods and services • The location of any sacred groves, burial grounds or other fetish lands • The location of any area of environmental sensitivity to local people • The address and telephone number of a locally based company’s representative. (West Africa, 1994: 1926)
In the last decade, the mining industry in Africa has grown in its significance because of the need to use revenue from these natural resources for development purposes. For instance, the Ashanti Goldfields company has increased its productivity, and profits have assisted both multinational corporations and the Ghanaian government to expand their development agendas. Ghana’s prominent role in global economic order has garnered it international recognition as a key power broker in West African affairs. However, it took the reorganization of its institutions and economic policies for Ghanaian mining industries to be doing well. In discussing past problems that made development difficult, Vieta notes: A number of these debilitating problems of the mining sector were removed in 1983 with the launching of the Economic Recovery Programme and other measures which had massive financial support from the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the World Bank and other donor agencies. The Minerals and Mining Law of 1986 (PNDC Law 153) can be said to be one of the measures that have provided the framework for the resurgence of the mining sector. The law which has the underlying aim of creating a positive enabling climate for both local and foreign investment in the industry, provided for numerous incentives and benefits for mining companies. (1994: 1922)
Many financial reports on mining profits and opportunities seem to indicate that companies that are involved in operation of extractive activities are profiting from such ventures. For instance in Southern Africa companies such as De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited and De Beers Centenary AG have been making substantial profits (West Africa, 1994). These profits have come as a result of consistent investment in the economies of South Africa and other mineral-rich Southern African countries. But caution must be exercised in terms of measuring the financial gains. A question that should be answered by mining companies as well as government officials is, How much environmental damage has resulted from the mineral extraction in these countries? Experience from Ghana shows that a great deal of environmental damage has occurred since that country decided to reopen the gold and diamond mines. Although mining companies are making profit, local or individual prospectors are exposed to the degraded ecosystems, which are poisoned with arsenic and cyanide used by the companies to process the mineral (gold). Thus, in order to maintain Africa’s wealth, attention must be paid to the consequences of environmental degradation. Steps to
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minimize the destruction of the ecological systems and the negative impact on human health must be taken. The necessity for instituting adequate and enforceable laws and regulation is paramount if Africa’s wealth is to be maintained and protected. Africa’s resources, such as the lakes, rivers, savannas, forests, minerals, beautiful lands, and its people make up the wealth of the continent; but realizing, benefiting from, and enjoying that wealth depend on achieving political stability, ability to transform the raw materials into tangible products, and ability to manage the resources effectively and efficiently. Some people argue that nations can create wealth only through the application of their people’s knowledge to extract and manage the resources under a stable political climate. African countries, they argue, have not provided sound political environments for wealth and strength to be created regardless of the existence of the natural resources (Asomani-Abrokwah, 1996; Darko, 1996). Asomani-Abrokwah emphatically points out: The prerequisite for any meaningful wealth production is understanding, peace and harmony among all the productive segments and institutions of the society. . . . The wealth and strength of the world’s advanced countries today are the result of their long standing political cohesiveness and sanity. (1996: 549)
Maintaining Africa’s wealth must recognize that even for countries like Nigeria, Garbon, and Ghana, with enormous amounts of natural resources, maintaining stability can be tricky. Distributing resources among numerous ethnic groups can be very difficult. For example, Nigeria, with a population over 100 million people of about 250 different cultural and linguistic groups, is still struggling to maintain social and political tranquillity. The formula for good governance should recognize the needs of all interest groups, and an environment for civil conduct and privatization must be created. EXTRACTING AND DEVELOPING AFRICAN RESOURCES TO CREATE WEALTH AND DISCOURAGE ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION It is generally agreed that in terms of mineral resources, Africa’s potential is equal to, or surpasses, the potential of the other continents of the world (World Bank, 1989). The high-value minerals in Africa such as gold, diamonds, and other gemstones indicate enormous potential for wealth and strength: Botswana’s diamond deposits are among the richest in the world. Guinea has some of the world’s highest quality bauxite reserves, and its iron ore deposit at Mifergui Nimba is exceptionally high grade. Ghana has considerable potential in gold, as do other countries (such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Sudan) in the precious metals. Another major gold belt has recently been found in southern Ethiopia, while western and northern Ethiopia
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Table 9.1 Contribution of Mining to Selected Sub-Saharan Countries in 1987
Note: Mining includes smelting and refining. *Excludes aluminum. Source: Adapted from World Bank, 1989: 123.
contain promising mineral belts that have been barely explored. Zimbabwe has platinum potential. The copper ore in Zaire and Zambia is generally three to four times higher grade than that in North America and is frequently rich in cobalt. Zaire not only has copper reserves sufficient for 40 years, but has the world’s richest undeveloped copper deposits at Tenke and Fungerume. (World Bank, 1989: 122)
The extraction of natural resources contributes significantly to the economies of many African countries. A quick examination of Table 9.1 shows that many African countries do benefit from the mining industry. It stands to reason, then, that private and public investment must be put into building the capacities of Africans to manage their natural resources for the purposes of sustaining their economies and societies at large. There is no doubt that the natural resources needed to rectify Africa’s economic problems are within Africa, but in order to set the continent on the right development path several issues need to be addressed before ‘‘true wealth and strength’’ can be created in Africa. The rapid rape of African forests is linked with a lack of concrete environmental plans and the debt crisis confronting the countries of Africa. Despite the conversion of African forests into plantations for export crops and the conversion of forestlands to other land uses, production and export have
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Table 9.2 Debt-to-Export Ratio
[x] ⫽ 1985; [o] ⫽ 1994; [⫽] ⫽ 1995. Source: World Bank Debt Tables, 1996.
not kept pace with the rate at which external debt has been rising in Africa. As a matter of fact, it is argued that out of the 40 heavily indebted countries in the world, 33 are African countries (World Bank, 1996). Bilateral assistance in the form of grants and loans from international lending agencies has focused on improving conditions for international trade to occur. This emphasis has resulted in increased indebtedness and poor planning for resources exploitation. World Bank (1996) statistics indicate that in 1995 the debt for Sub-Saharan African countries increased by 5 percent. Table 9.2 shows the indebtedness of African countries. But it should be pointed out that South Africa accounted for a lion share of this debt, while the rest of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa showed a decline or no increase in the debt problems.
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Nigeria and South Africa have been the region’s major beneficiaries of private capital flow, estimated to be about 20 percent of the net resource flow to the region. West Africa contends: Aggregate resource flow to the region according to the tables rose by 10 per cent in 1995 to an estimated $22 billion, of which 78 per cent came from official creditors. The region was the second largest recipient in aggregate resource flows in non-debt creating flows after Europe and Central Asia (an estimated 70 per cent in 1995), predominantly in the form of grants. Private capital flows to the region over the last two years have received a major boost, but are largely concentrated in a handful of countries, particularly South Africa. (West Africa, 1996a: 475)
Despite resource flow to the continent and the agreement on debt stock reductions, which has made it possible to reduce eligible debt by 67 percent, many African countries still have serious development problems. Many loans have been used to fund projects that have devastated Africa’s ecosystem. The forests of Africa are being denuded by project after project. For instance, Cote d’Ivoire has lost over 10.5 million hectares of its estimated 12 million hectares of forest estate (Environment Watch, 1992). Infrastructure development such as the Grand Lahoe-Sassandra road project, which was approved and funded by African Development Bank for an estimated cost of $170 million, threatened the coastal ecosystem of Cote d’Ivoire and further decimated the forest of that country. Cash crop production has been on the rise in this country. For example, huge plantain plantations are converting the virgin forestlands into agricultural land. Environmental mitigation measures must be fully carried out in large development projects. This is necessary in order to prevent environmental degradation and to use natural resources sustainably. The Cote d’Ivoire experience with regard to the road construction showed that, although environmental impact assessment was conducted, recommendations as to how to avoid environmental degradation were not taken seriously and that the Ivorian government, like most African governments, was in too much of a haste to carry out development without carefully undertaking all the necessary precautions for averting degradation and pollution. As noted earlier, most of Sub-Saharan Africa is blessed with large amounts of mineral deposits. Nigeria, for instance, has about 31 solid minerals but exploits tin, columbite, feldspar, gold, barite, talc, clay, limestone, silical/sand, coal, and zircon ilmenite. Other minerals have been identified to exist in the country, and some have been estimated in quantity. These include lead, zinc, kyonite, phosphate, ilmenite, iatomite, wolfram, thorite, pyrochlore, monazite, florite, beryl, mica, graphite, sillimante, salt, asbestos, molybdenum, abrasives, and gypsum (Ogwa, 1996). In describing Nigeria’s mineral resources Ogwa notes: Although Nigeria is today well known to the outside world because of its oil wealth, it also has an estimated mineral wealth of over N80,000 billion or $1000 billion in its soil.
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But over the years, exploration and exploitation have largely been done by a few organisations which have had to battle against many odds. (1996: 550)
In exploiting the minerals, tremendous care should be exercised in causing the least amount of environmental degradation, and government policies should be instituted to curb the illegal activities of companies with regard to illegal mining activities and smuggling so that revenues are not lost, and human and ecological losses are not experienced. The mineral resources should be seen as points of departure or means for diversifying local African economy and for involvement in regional and international trade. Several African countries qualify to be examined individually in this chapter, but only a few are briefly discussed. Gabon, like Nigeria, obtained its independence in the early 1960s and is endowed with a large number of forest and mineral resources. The country is 85 percent forested, and timber has been contributing to the country’s economy in a large proportion. The country ranks fifth behind Finland, Canada, Sweden, and New Zealand in the production of timber. But it should be emphasized that in order to continue to log its forest sustainably, Gabon has instituted a systematic approach to harnessing its forest resources. It has a forestry plan (West Africa, 1996a). Besides oil, minerals exploited in Gabon include manganese, uranium, phosphates, niobium, iron, and gold. These minerals are found in large quantities. Harnessing Africa’s natural resources with minimum disruption of ecological, economic, and social systems of the continent is pivotal to the sustainability of the continent. One country that has attempted to do just that—minimum disruption—is Ghana. In an article by Environment Watch (1993: 25) a case is made for the need to establish environmentally friendly industry. Ghana’s goldmining industry has been polluting the environment for decades. In the processing of gold, toxic sulfur dioxide is emitted into the atmosphere. The introduction of bacteria into the processing method has led to the reduction in the amount of sulfur dioxide released into the atmosphere because the bacteria uses the sulfur dioxide. The technology has led to increase in the production in the Obuasi-Ashanti gold mines. Such steps in the improvement of the production technology would enhance the conservation and protection of the African environment. This type of success story and information should be made available to all African countries regardless of the stage in their development. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INDUSTRY Creating the climate for the successful expansion of the industrial sector in Africa is certainly the responsibility of government. Attracting industries and retaining foreign industries mean encouraging investment from Africans as well as foreigners. Industrial expansion must stem from the establishment of a strong and vibrant agricultural base in African countries. Past experience in countries blessed with natural resources (minerals) has been that the agricultural sector is
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often abandoned in lieu of the exploitation of the natural resource. A good example is Nigeria, which put too much emphasis on the petroleum industry and little emphasis on the continuation of strong investment in food and cash crops. The diversification of the economic base could be done by using income generated from strong agricultural production to finance industries that support agricultural production. In the Lagos Plan of Action (1976) African leaders clearly laid down some important steps to be taken in order to transform Africa into a strong industrial giant. However, many political, economic, and social setbacks have made it difficult to achieve rapid industrialization in Africa. World Bank suggests that three issues must be addressed in order to encourage industrialization in Africa: 1. Markets need to be expanded so as to increase agricultural income, 2. Enabling environment must be created to provide the physical infrastructure and services to spur industries to succeed, and 3. Capacities must be built through relevant education, training, research, technology transfer and partnerships that would enhance industrialization success. (1989: 108)
These recommendations or suggestions, like many that have been put forward, clearly indicate where Africa’s and international communities’ efforts need to be placed. CONCLUSION The challenge for industrialization that would maintain Africa’s wealth lies in several areas. First of all, African nations must select the appropriate industries for their development. The industries that must be sought should be peoplecentered. The focus must be in making sure that the workers have the necessary skills and training to continue to provide the needed managerial and technical skills. International investors should be willing to be committed to a long-term investment in the country and should be willing to diversify their investment. The wages must be such that African workers are given the incentives to be a part of the industry’s success. Human development is pivotal to the long-term sustainability of industries in Africa. Thus, for industries to operate in Africa, it is of utmost importance to encourage African entrepreneurship. The extraction of minerals creates numerous opportunities. These opportunities are sometimes not quite obvious to the indigenous people because they are not quite familiar with the modes of operation of the foreign companies. Foreign companies that strive to build partnerships with Africa on all levels stand a chance of being very competitive and successful. In this chapter, it is clear that capacity building must be approached from understanding what it takes to encourage human development and establishing the public and private institutions required to build industries and sustain development. The development should be in concert with
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the ecosystems and, most important, build the political leadership necessary to govern. The industries, both foreign and domestic, need to be assured of the availability of the aforementioned conditions in order for them to be willing to contribute to Africa’s future. Attractive conditions and stable environments must be created in Africa. Well-crafted and sound economic and environmental policies are needed in order to encourage investment. African countries need effective economic management, as was noted in World Bank: African governments have depended heavily on external agencies and foreign consultants for the analytical work on which key policy decisions have been based. If governments are to become more self-reliant, their capacity to undertake this work for themselves must be improved. (1989: 95)
Investment in the appropriate education of Africans is paramount in the effective management of African societies and their natural resources. Training in modern development and managerial strategies is needed, but training is necessary in the traditional or indigenous areas in order to enable the different and diverse cultures within African nations to exist together and to reflect African traditions in the strategies of development so as to incorporate the local people of African communities and to gain their support for development efforts.
PART III
Development Issues
CHAPTER 10
Modernizing Influences and Traditional Villages in Sarawak: The Need for a Paradigm Shift in Development Strategies Lee Boon Thong and Tengku Shamsul Bahrin
INTRODUCTION Sarawak, the largest state in Malaysia, has, for a long time, been considered the backward state of Malaysia. Generally, it may be said that the area is inhospitable, with extensive coastal swamps and interior mountainous regions covered with dense tropical forests. In fact, three-quarters of the land is covered with tropical rain forests. Rivers, which are plentiful, have always been the main mode of transportation for those living in the interior to travel to and from the lowland coastal towns (Lee and Bahrin, 1993). The 1.8 million population is ethnically diverse and generally scattered, with a major concentration on the coastal urban areas. About two-thirds of the population are indigenous, and the rest are immigrants. In the interior, about a quarter of the indigenous group is still involved in slash-and-burn agriculture, hunting, fishing, and food gathering. However, a substantial number of the indigenous people have converted to some forms of sedentary or semisedentary agriculture. Until the early 1970s, internal migration was negligible (Grupstra, 1976). Few indigenous people left the rural areas for the towns. This phenomenon may be due to the general economic backwardness of the entire state. Up to the 1970s, there were little industrialization, limited large-scale commercial plantations, few roads, and limited public services, which, if available, were focused in the small urban nodes in the coastal areas. It is a situation of ‘‘benign neglect’’ (King, 1990). This stagnation may be traced back to the era of the Brookes (the White Rajahs), whose main preoccupation was to settle themselves and not be concerned with economic development (Reinhardt, 1970). Although Chinese immigrants were encouraged to participate in commerce and agricultural development, the natives were left alone. Little was done to change
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their traditional way of growing paddy in shifting cultivation. Education was neglected. Until 1946, roads were confined to the towns. The brief period of British colonialism from 1946 to 1963 also contributed little toward economic development. A trunk road was constructed outside Kuching for the first time. Although there was a general desire to develop the rural areas, it was hampered by the lack of finance and information, not to mention the shortage of skilled labor and staff. After Sarawak joined Malaysia in 1963, more funding was available for development purposes, but lack of infrastructures and the general ruggedness of the terrain still hampered serious development efforts until lately. THE NEW CURRENTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SARAWAK Since the late 1970s and especially from the 1980s, the pace of economic development in Sarawak has intensified, with increased offshore mining of petroleum and natural gas, logging activities in the interior forested areas, and industrial activities in the lowland areas. For instance, the industrial sector contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP), which was 6 percent in 1987, rose to 14 percent in 1994. However, many of the locations of major industries, such as the liquefied natural gas, ammonia urea, middle-distillate plants, plywood and sawn timber, veneer, and other value-added products, were all found within the lowland coastal regions. They have provided employment opportunities for some 30,000 workers. Besides the industrial sector, some RM60 billion have been spent on major infrastructural developments such as the Pan-Borneo Highway, ports, and the provision of amenities. The implication of these developments, which are largely located in the lowland areas, is that they act as magnets for movement of labor from the interior. It is also obvious that with such strong currents of development the peripheral interior areas would be swept into its orbit. Not only that, the ensuing regional disparity that takes on an ethnic and political dimension causes the authorities to institute developmental and modernizing projects with the intention of bringing the indigenous groups into the mainstream of development and to raise the standard of living. This chapter examines the consequences of modernization and economic development on the demographics of traditional settlements using out-migration as an indicator of response to the changes. It is argued that, although it may not be possible to avert impacts on settlements in the interior, a shift in the developmental paradigm taking into account the local context and regional disparity may be a more effective strategy of change. This should be accompanied by more proactive responses on the part of the locals. REEXAMINING THE MODELS OF CHANGE From a spatial-geographical point of view, the process of development may be said to involve primarily the interaction between three geographical units:
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(1) the major urban areas, (2) the primary circulation system (i.e., the network of high-density transaction flows of goods, peoples, and ideas), and (3) a mobilized periphery (those areas interacting most intensely and generally in close proximity to the urban areas) (Soja and Tobin, 1975). Sarawak is interesting in that it is still possible to identify quite distinctly a relatively unmobilized periphery—a peripheral backwater that has yet to interact with the growth and development of the mainstream flow, at least until recently (Lee and Bahrin, 1992). This is the interior upland region, where poor communications and difficulties in transportation have kept the area relatively immune to the development that is taking place in the lowland primary circulation system. A gradual transformation is, however, slowly taking place in this unmobilized peripheral area as innovations, values, and ideas begin to penetrate into the interior hinterland. It is possible to put forward three models of settlement change among the traditional villages of the unmobilized periphery area in Sarawak (Figure 10.1). Model A is a situation where the currents of development have little effects on the traditional settlement structures and communities by virtue of their extreme isolation and inaccessibility. It remains a well-integrated social unit because very little outmigration has occurred. This situation was common when Sarawak was relatively undeveloped. Models B and C (Figure 10.1) are the transition models that this chapter intends to illustrate with actual case studies. In case B, the diffusion of innovations into such settlements had brought about a ‘‘gradual,’’ ‘‘normal,’’ or ‘‘steady’’ adaptive change in the structure of the settlements. Changes are accepted proactively, for instance, the use of cylinder gas instead of firewood for cooking. In case C, the traditional settlement faces the sudden onslaught of development forces from outside (e.g., logging activities, land settlement schemes), and changes occur at a much faster rate than in B. These forces normally tend to improve the geographical accessibility of the settlements through the construction of a road infrastructure. In this case, the structural discrepancy between the traditional subsystem and the main system is less than that of case B. However, both settlement types have yet to be incorporated into the larger system of development by virtue of their relatively inaccessible locations. As long as the individuals in the settlements do not respond in a substantial manner through geographical mobility, the settlements may be able to adopt some adaptive strategies. However, in most instances, the population of such settlements would begin to respond to the larger system (Lee and Bahrin, 1992, 1993). The results of both processes, whether a gradual diffusion or the intrusion of exogenous forces, are more or less the same. Young adults have begun to migrate to the lowland areas in search of further education or employment opportunities, leaving behind the older folks to tend to the fields. The sociological impact is, of course, a gradual disintegration of patterned ways of acting among the people who share some common sentiments. Village life changes with an increasing value placed on monetization and materialistic accumulation. Televisions and audio equipments of those who stayed behind have transformed the once-tranquil villages. The older folks bemoan the dearth of life in the villages
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Figure 10.1 Models of Change in Unmobilized Periphery
[xx] ⫽ Structural discrepancy between subsystem and primary system.
compared to the yesteryears. Is this process inevitable? Can, or should, it be arrested? Should active government interventions in the form of rural development projects be viewed as threatening the traditional settlements? Should traditional settlements be more proactive in their responses to the winds of change? THE BARAM MODEL OF RAPID CHANGE The 440-kilometer-long Batang Baram is one of the main rivers in Sarawak. Located about 150 km from the estuary of Batang Baram are the tributaries of
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Sungai Tutuh and Sungai Apoh. Along these tributaries are found pockets of native Kayan settlements. The Kayans are the second largest indigenous groups in Sarawak. For a long time, the Kayan villages in the interior Baram basin have served as examples of peripheral backwaters that resisted the influence of development and modernization so much that the traditional villages remained intact. The Kayans are basically a closely knit, riverine, longhouse community. Initially, they were involved in fishing, hunting, and some forms of shifting cultivation, moving from place to place as dictated by some superstitious beliefs. Eventually, they became semipermanent agriculturists growing hill paddy, coffee, rubber, and other subsistence crops such as maize, vegetables, and tapioca. Although these settlements are located relatively deep in the interior of Sarawak, marketing of their produce, if need be, was not really a problem as Chinese middlemen would come upstream by boat regularly to buy their coffee, rubber, and paddy. The Chinese middlemen also brought along much-needed daily supplies. Later, the Kayans also learned to market their own produce. Although they had contacts with the outside world through trading their produce, they were still fairly secluded from external influences that would disrupt or change their lifestyles. Christian missionaries who came after the war succeeded in converting entire Kayan communities. Pagan practices and superstitions gave way to a village life centered around a church whose activities further consolidated social interaction. Education was also introduced at about the same time, and a small number who passed their primary examinations eventually filtered down to the lowlands to continue their studies. However, from the early 1980s, the bulldozers came into the forests. As the timber industry penetrated deeper and deeper into the interiors, the effects on the Kayan settlements were basically threefold. First, more timber tracks were opened up, which increased the geographical mobility of the Kayans. Settlements began to be realigned to land transportation instead of river transportation, which was less efficient. Second, the settlements normally benefit directly from the timber companies, which pay compensation for intrusion into communal land or damage to the environment in the form of either money or the provision of basic amenities like electricity. Third, the locals became directly involved in the timber activities, which offered attractive wages. The overall result is that the Kayans became more and more aware of the outside world. Suddenly, the obstructions to participation in the lowland activities seemed to disappear as the Kayans began to move out into the lowland areas. A survey conducted by the authors confirmed this trend—an average of three persons per migrant household was reported. This is a rate twice that of outmigration from small towns in Peninsular Malaysia (Lee, 1981). Whereas outmigration started even in the 1970s, it is obvious that the number of out-migrants was significant only after 1982, at the time when logging activities began to penetrate the interior. This points to the early 1980s as the watershed from which this unmobilized periphery began to respond to extra-Baram development. About one-third moved within the Baram ‘‘outback’’ as logging companies made jobs available. Another two-thirds moved to the lowland towns either to
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resume further studies, to follow their spouses, or to seek employment opportunities. The latter had contributed substantially to the enlargement of the urban informal sector. They also represent a structural transformation from rural to urban-type occupations. More than two-thirds of the migrants were in the age group of between 16 and 35 years, underlining the loss of able-bodied labor from the villages. Of interest is the fact that migration is unidirectional. None of the migrants would want to return to their former place of origin or occupation except to pay social visits on festive occasions.
THE BARIO MODEL OF GRADUAL CHANGE Bario is the main settlement of the Kelabits, one of the minority indigenous groups in Sarawak. Located in the Kelabit Highlands about 1,000 meters above sea level, it is deep in the interior of Sarawak. Unlike most other interior areas of Sarawak that are accessible by rivers, this area is beyond the farthest reaches of the navigable rivers of the Baram district. There is, yet, no road to Bario. One must be prepared for a week’s walk through the forest and highlands to reach Bario. Consequently, prior to the Second World War, the entire Kelabit population of 1,612 was found in the highlands. In fact, historically, the Kelabits were isolated from other native groups for more than 500 years (Bulan and Labang, 1979). That was until 1943, when outside influences remained rather restricted (Harrison, 1954). During the Second World War, however, external influences began to penetrate the relative isolation of the Kelabits. Some of the more obvious influences were the spread of Christianity into the highlands and the use of the uplands as guerrilla bases against the Japanese. Gradually, educational and medical facilities were introduced. In fact, it has been suggested that, up to about 1940, there was probably not one Kelabit who could read or write (Morrison, 1957). Today, literacy is widespread. In 1953 the missionaries opened up an airstrip in Bario. During the period of confrontation with the Indonesians in the early 1960s, the proximity of Bario to the Indonesian border led to the stationing of soldiers at Bario. This further opened up the area to outside influences. For instance, the British soldiers and the Gurkhas brought with them a whole new world—candles, movies, bread, and canned food (Idris, 1995). Since 1961 the introduction of a regular small aircraft service between Bario and Miri (the main coastal town in close proximity) remains the only means of easy access to Bario and facilitates the movements of people and goods in and out of the Kelabit highlands. In 1980 the total Kelabit population in Sarawak stood at 3,821, estimated to have increased to about 5,300 in 1992. But as the area became more and more exposed to outside influences, many of the inhabitants migrated to the lowland areas in search of jobs and further education. Saging and Bulan (1989) estimated
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that more than 50 percent of the Kelabits have migrated from their original settlements in the highlands to the lowland urban areas since the 1970s. A survey conducted by the authors in 1993 found an average of 3.9 persons per migrant household—a rate very much higher than the three persons per migrant household of the Kayans in the Baram River basin (Lee and Bahrin, 1992, 1993). Some significant trends of the migration process may be highlighted. The proportion of ‘‘interior’’ movements, that is, to another longhouse within the interior areas, is negligible. The bulk of the migrants (85 percent) moved away from the highlands to the lowland urban areas. This shows that lowland development has a substantial impact upon the highland dwellers. What is also interesting about the migration to urban areas is that it is largely dominated by males who moved in order to seek job opportunities (70 percent were males). The study also revealed that out-migration was of increasing significance only after the early 1970s—a trend confirming the observation by Saging and Bulan (1989). The years 1972–1973 appear to be the cutoff point when the number of out-migrants doubled and tripled. In fact, more than 91 percent of the migrants moved only after this date. Contrasted with the Kayans, whose outmigration became substantial only after the impact of logging activities in the early 1980s, out-movements from Bario were not the result of logging, because logging had not reached the area yet. Instead, they may be viewed as the result of the impact of education (Raja, 1979). Although a primary school was introduced to the Kelabit community as early as 1946, there was initial reluctance by parents to send their children to school. Later, in the early 1960s, their attitudes began to change, and school enrollment began to increase. By 1967 a secondary school was necessary. As examination results improved in the early 1970s, a greater number of Kelabit students began to continue their studies in urban centers in the lowland areas. Others, armed with some degree of education, began to filter to the lowland centers in search of jobs. The process of education might also have contributed to a more urban-oriented outlook and an increasing aspiration that the longhouse environment could not fulfill. It also appears that the trend of migration is unidirectional and of a permanent nature. Only 17 percent of the total respondents indicated they would go back to Bario to work on the farms. In reality, only one migrant reported returning to work in Bario because of the inability to find work or employment in the urban area. Similar to the case of the Kayans, return migration is not expected because of the higher remuneration in the destination areas (a median income of RM900 [Malaysian Ringgit] compared to the self-sufficient economy of the highlands). This better remuneration irrefutably motivates and accentuates migration processes. IMPLICATIONS NECESSITATING A PARADIGM SHIFT It is obvious from a comparison of both the Baram and Bario scenarios that settlements cannot continue in their traditional mold, given the momentum of
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development and modernizing influences that are taking place in Sarawak. Regardless of whether or not there are active logging activities in the interior, change is happening. The nature of the migration stream has far-reaching implications for the rural settlement matrix. Conceptually, these areas represent the hitherto unmobilized periphery. But today, improved, high-powered boat transportation, air connections, and new logging tracks spreading out like tentacles into the remote interiors have caused the traditional population to become more fluid. The consequences is a slow but sure breakup of self-sufficiency and isolation. The ecological landscape of the interiors is also changing with the encroachment of logging activities. Rivers become polluted, and fish become depleted. The traditional mode of hunting and food gathering can no longer be sustained as animals become scarce. Seeking jobs elsewhere is not the only alternative left but is more lucrative, especially among the younger generation, who showed a growing disinclination to work on the farms. Education and the work of Christian missionaries have also contributed to the growing aspirations of the local people. Thus, a selective migration process involving the more energetic, more motivated, and better qualified drains the traditional settlements of ‘‘elitist’’ elements and leaves behind an aging demographic structure. Consequently, productivity and economic surpluses decline. As population continued to flow out, the total population of the traditional villages began to decline. In one longhouse in Baram, 58 longhouse units were left vacant. The population of 1,000 dropped to only 200 or 150 older folks and young children. In Bario more than half of its population moved to the lowlands. Since interior settlements are small clusters of closely knitted minority communities ranging in size from 20 to about a thousand or so population, depopulation is threatening the survival of local traditional cultures and communities. In the past this process was seen as the inescapable consequence of change and development. Presently, however, there is an increasing antagonism to these changes, especially if they are goaded by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations that argue that the tribal people have become victims of change and development. Resource exploitation, especially logging by outsiders, will destroy and degrade the environment and the life support system of the minority groups in the interior. The authors argue that whether or not there are encroachments on forest resources, changes are inevitable. There is no way a traditional society can be shielded from the onslaught of modernization. Logging certainly accelerates the process of transformation. Geographical mobility appears to be the logical means to accumulate sufficient savings to cope with the demands of a modernized lifestyle. Thus, there is no justification to stop longhouse to urban migration if the people choose it. However, if the economic reasons for out-migration far outweigh others, then it would appear that a paradigm shift in development strategies would be necessary to ascertain that population can be maintained in the interior. In other words, opportunities for effective utilization of labor resources should be created to bring them into the mainstream of development. In this respect, land devel-
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opment schemes and an intensification of the rural growth center strategy should be realized, especially in priority and potential areas. The latter strategy should especially focus on the development and diversification of the rural economic base through increased commercial activities in production, processing, and services, besides providing better basic infrastructure and social amenities. Usually, these efforts have been viewed as attempts to impose change from above and to destroy traditional rights and privileges (Cleary and Eaton, 1992). To overcome these suspicions, on one hand, ‘‘modern’’ development techniques should attempt to understand local sensitivities and local knowledge, for instance, the issue of native customary land tenure, where, traditionally, land rights are not supposed to be alienated outside the community. But because the Land Code contains limited provision for the protection of customary rights, customary land has in the past been alienated for a number of development purposes. This caused insecurities, dissatisfaction, and mistrust. On the other hand, local groups should respond proactively to developmental efforts. Creating opportunities and choices based on this strategy appears to be the logical paradigm shift, perhaps in a desperate attempt to ward off the pull of the primary circulation system, which some writers predict would give rise to considerable problems in destination areas in future years (Cleary and Eaton, 1992). CONCLUSION Traditional settlements frequently come under pressure from economic change and the transition from a subsistence to a monetary economy. This process is accelerated when there are active external impulses such as logging activities. However, even without such exogenous factors, it is not possible to shield villages from the tides of rapid economic development. The consequences are similar—a sure and gradual depopulation of traditional settlement. Depopulation is inevitable because the geographical isolation of these interior areas makes circular mobility impossible. Thus, a more effective utilization of labor within the interior is needed. A paradigm shift in development strategies to create opportunities and choices within the rural interior may help to alleviate depopulation problems, even though the efficacy and results of such a policy are, as yet, uncertain.
CHAPTER 11
Exceptional Kerala: Efficient and Sustainable Human Behavior William Alexandra
INTRODUCTION The Malayalam-speaking people of South India offer an example for the whole earth. Extraordinary efficiencies in the use of the earth’s resources characterize the high life-quality behavior of the 29 million citizens of Kerala. Kerala leadership shows the way to prudent human behavior, producing and maintaining high life quality through the twenty-first century. A search among the significantly large populations with well-defined characteristics led scientists to the Malayalam-speaking state of Kerala, facing the Arabian Sea on the Indian subcontinent (see Figure 11.1). At very low consumption levels, the 29 million Malayalees have achieved a modest fertility standard, two children in the lifetime of each female. This study shows the potential for human behavioral success in the twenty-first century. The examination of the behavior in this exceptional society was initiated by the Institute for Food and Development Policy in 1989 and sponsored by Earthwatch Expeditions two years later. The contributions of 81 North American and European participant observers and the Kerala research staff headed by Drs. P. K. Nambiar and C. R. Soman are gratefully acknowledged. We believe that the diverse behaviors of different human population groups are a necessary condition for sustainability and that standardized human behavior is not sustainable. Accordingly, we do not see Kerala as a model for detail replication by other Indian states or in other world nations. Rather, at this moment in history Kerala offers the most hopeful example of humans’ sharing the limited bounty of the earth. Lessons from the Kerala experience can benefit and encourage diverse human populations—other states and nations also facing
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Figure 11.1 Map of Kerala, India
shortages of earth resources and surpluses of human life. We are duty-bound to share the Kerala success story with all humankind. The participant observation method of this field research worked well, but explaining our observations remained an extremely difficult problem. In order to spare the cursory reader from these research explanations, this chapter is divided into three conventional parts: (1) why study Kerela? (2) the story of Kerala, and (3) conclusions. Kerala study terms are defined in the appendix. The chapter as a whole, validates and illustrates the conclusion of John Ratcliffe, who wrote that Kerala refutes the common thesis that high levels of social development cannot be achieved in the absence of high rates of economic growth. . . . Indeed, the Kerala experience demon-
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Figure 11.2 Human Behavioral Alternatives
strates that high levels of social development—evaluated in terms of such quality of life measures as mortality rates and levels of life expectancy, education and literacy, and political participation—are consequences of public policies and strategies based not on economic growth considerations but, instead, on equity considerations. (1978: 140)
WHY STUDY KERALA? A small matrix of behavioral alternatives directs our attention to the urgent need to study Kerala. The two human behavioral patterns critical in relationship to the ecosphere are the amount of consumption and the total human numbers. Both must be small relative to a finite earth. In earlier times the world norm for human behavior was low consumption and large families, represented by the upper right box in Figure 11.2. In modern times the First World is defined by high consumption and small families, shown in the lower left box. In the upper left box we have a short time anomaly, Saudi Arabia, with both large families and high consumption. Low consumption and small families are the quality of life possibility in the near future of the whole earth. In addition to Kerala, China and Sri Lanka have been nominated as containing sustainable human behavior patterns (Maddox, 1980: 69–82). Kerala was chosen as the outstanding exception in the current world pattern of high consumption on the
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Table 11.1 Population, Economics, and Fertility
simple criteria that both the family sizes and the consumption levels are smaller in Kerala than in either China or Sri Lanka. Comparative Data The current comparative data establish Kerala as a true exception pointing the path toward a satisfactory human species survival in the twenty-first century. In order to display this exceptional behavior, we compare Kerala with other nations (with good statistical measurements) closest to Kerala in population size. The numbers displayed in Table 11.1 are drawn from the 1994 World Population Data Sheet (Population Reference Bureau), The Environmental Data Book, 1993 (World Bank), and the Economic Review 1993 (Government of Kerala). In Column I we locate Kerala in the middle of the population range for the sixteen world nations selected for similar size. We also show all India data (including Kerala) separately for local comparison. In Column II we show Kerala within this set of size mates ordered by per capita gross national product. The per capita product measured for Kerala is actually lower than the all-India figure. However, since Kerala receives more repatriated income (not included in state product figures) than other states, the per capita income figure for all
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Table 11.2 Infant Mortality, High School Enrollment, and Life Expectancy
India is used. We have chosen to display the highest Kerala per capita income estimates for these comparisons. A careful examination of the ranking by our standard of living measure (Column II) for the sixteen comparison nations shows a high correlation with the quality of life measures that follow (Column III [as shown in Table 11.1] and Columns IV, V, VI [as shown in Table 11.2]): fertility, wellness, education, and life expectancy (as shown in Table 11.2). Kerala is the clear exception. The fertility ranking of Kerala (Column III) does correlate with the quality of life performances ranked in Columns IV, V, and VI. Including Kerala in the sample of population size mates, we may say that high life quality is a cause of low fertility rates. Explaining Kerala requires us to direct our attention away from standard of living and toward quality of life. We have good news: high life quality and low fertility are possible without overconsumption of the earth resources. If income level (and inferred consumption of earth resources) determined the Kerala wellness and educational behavior, as it evidently does for other nations, Kerala should have remained in the lowest income set established in Column II. An additional comparison, geographically and historically similar populations, all-India data, is shown separately at the foot of each column. Holding
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Figure 11.3 Applying Human Time to Produce High Life Quality
per capita income measures constant, Kerala is shown to be two to five times more efficient. If we hold the wellness and educational measures constant and compare to gross national product (GNP) per capita measurements, even larger Kerala efficiency ratios appear.
Efficiency We may also note that those populations that do not have wellness measures equal to, or better than, Kerala lack either the necessary resources and/or the efficiency in the use of these resources to attain a self-actualization threshold. Given that the shortage of earth resources in Kerala (relative to the First World) precludes a material economic growth solution, we are bound to consider the use of the other resource, human time. Is human time being used efficiently? Anticipating the conclusion of the Kerala story that follows, a four-place matrix displays the strategies for applying human time (see Figure 11.3).
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THE SOCIETY AND POLITICS OF KERALA: THE STEADY STATE ECONOMY The Kerala story has been told by others. The two best accounts are Richard Franke and Barbara Chasin (1989) and Venessa Baird (1993). The brief Kerala story told here is limited to essential points about Kerala and how to study explanations. Background As India freed itself from the British Empire, the three Malayalam-speaking areas, Malabar and the former princely provinces of Travencore and Cochin, were merged into the state of Kerala. Kerala made international headlines when a communist-dominated coalition romped into power in the state’s first parliamentary elections in 1957. The chairman of the Kerala Communist Party, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, became the chief minister, the first major success for communism in a free and democratic country. The 40-year Stalinist record of suppression of free democratic processes did make the communist electoral success in Kerala an exception. Even more amazing was a second exception. There was no dictatorship of the proletariat; the proletarian majorities of Kerala retained to themselves power over their communist leadership. The electoral majority in Kerala enthusiastically adopted the communist ideology—the proletariat should overcome the bourgeois in order to level the playing field, opening to themselves an opportunity to participate in the markets and free exchange of their goods and services. Visitors from green places find the lush vegetation supported by the frequent rains refreshing. The rains, the breezes, and the warm sunshine give Kerala the ambience of the island states of Fiji and Seychelles. The streets are hot, but most people live in rural Kerala; the shade of coconut trees is everywhere. The form and appearance of human institutions—shops, banks, police, government, schools, universities, media, telephone and postal service, railroads, airlines, temples, churches, mosques, and so on—are very much Indian. Thoughtful visitors to Kerala, especially those familiar with lifestyles throughout India and the south, do notice Kerala lifestyle differences. Except in areas for foreign tourists such as Kovalam Beach, visitors appreciate the absence of beggars and hustlers. Visitors notice the better quality of the homes and their distribution throughout the countryside as contrasted to the bunching of houses in village India. As they encounter the people, the strength and the independence of the women are noted. Contrasted to their experience in high-consumption societies, visitors notice the slow, infuriatingly deliberate pace of task completion. In spite of repeated assurances of best intentions, those tasks requiring resources not readily available to all (or not preallocated for visitor use) probably will not happen.
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Table 11.3 Religious Identification in India and Kerala
Religion In our search for the causes of the Kerala efficiency that produces wellness needs, we were bound to look about in the rest of India. Kerala, like the rest of India, is a Hindu culture (see Table 11.3). At the same time, it is different. Perhaps the unusual proportion of other major religions present in the Kerala mix offers a clue. Outside Kerala there is no pattern showing that either Muslims or Christians are more modest consumers and have smaller families as compared to Hindus. Still, we might argue that somehow the mix is synergistic. That is to say, perhaps a Hindu culture with a large admixture of Muslims and Christians is different from the Hindu culture of India at large. For another clue, let us glance at the near neighbor of Kerala, Sri Lanka (Table 11.4). The agricultural base and climate of Sri Lanka are much like those of Kerala. More important, the lifestyle and wellness measures are similar, although a little less efficient. What is different about Sri Lanka compared to India? Recall that we are seeking efficiency in the production of human needs, not higher GNP per capita. Buddhist culture and practice are dominant in Sri Lanka. Buddhist and Hindu teachings have many parallels and similar origins; to the unsophisticated the teachings seem alike. Given the lifestyle similarities of Sri Lanka and Kerala, is there a difference between the Buddhist experience in Sri Lanka and Hindu life in India? The striking difference is the absence of the Hindu institution of caste in Buddhism. Accordingly, the high presence of caste in India and the low presence of caste in Kerala became an organizing hypothesis explaining the high life quality found in Kerala as contrasted to India. Perhaps the unusual Kerala mix of Muslim, Christian, and Hindu faiths acted with synergistic strength, overcoming the economic impediment of caste boundaries in Kerala, making Kerala different from all India.
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Table 11.4 Sri Lanka Compared with Kerala
Gender Equality The status of women within the Hindu culture of Kerala is slightly different from that of India as a whole. Matrilineal customs within the powerful Nayar caste either preexisted or permeated into the practices of the entire society (including Christian and Muslim families). In Kerala the status of female deities from earlier times has survived a Hindu patriarchal transformation in India. The strong patriarchal practices of the small but ritually dominant Hindu caste in Kerala, the Nambudiri Brahmins, contrasted to the matrilineality of the large and powerful Nayar caste, suggest that the patrilineality of the Brahmins, not the matrilineal practice, was new in Kerala (Gough, 1962). This background certainly contributed to the maintenance of female status, that is, gender equality, an equality practice adding strength to the movement that has united people across former caste boundaries in Kerala. Caste in Kerala In the nineteenth century the caste system in Kerala was the most restrictive in all India. Not only were there untouchability restrictions but also unapproachability and unseeability. Struggle The ‘‘revolt against their suppression’’ was under way as Gandhi wrote. As early as 1820 a protest was organized by untouchable women seeking the right to fully cover their bodies in public. By 1898 a low-caste social reformer, Ayyankali, was organizing strikes of field-workers seeking permission to use the public roads and marketplaces and demanding an opportunity for their children to attend school. Most significant of all were the organization of caste improvement associations among the Hindus and parallel improvement efforts among the Muslims and Christians.
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The Ezhavas, a very large lower caste, were organized into the Ezhava Social Reform Movement by the famous Kerala social reformer Sri Narayan Guru. In addition to extensive effort for improvement within the castes, the improvement associations sought for themselves and untouchables the privilege of worship in Hindu temples. These temple entry marches were huge protests extending over years, some led by Mahatma Gandhi. Their fervent and nonviolent pressure produced the Temple Entry Act of 1936, legally opening all Hindu temples within the jurisdiction of Travancore. Opening the temples to all Hindus was an event of epic importance for the future Kerala. The oppressed had succeeded at the highest religious and political levels. By their own action the lower castes and untouchables had created among themselves a powerful force; they were empowered. At first glance the creation of caste associations might seem as a retrograde step in a process of abolishing caste boundaries. The caste associations brought together hundreds of subcastes in the name of caste improvement, blurring the lines between subcastes. Those experiencing fellowship across subcaste boundaries found it easier to reach across caste boundaries. The Nayars and other relatively high-caste improvement associations set up public ‘‘inter dining’’ events where high- and low-caste economic barriers for the oppressed were breached along with the religious ones. As India moved toward independence from Britain in 1945 into the process of restructuring a renewed Indian nation, several otherwise disparate forces joined into a synergistic movement for unity and equality within Kerala. This was a union of democratic forces organizing and leading the downtrodden of Kerala. The leadership contributions of Christians, Muslims, Gandhians, and communists deserve special note. Christians Some Christians date themselves from the visit of the apostle Saint Thomas in A.D. 52. These Christians built for themselves a niche in the larger Hindu culture as farmers and traders, rather like a middle-level caste. The Portuguese brought Catholic rites in the sixteenth century with successful conversions in the fishing communities. As has been the case throughout India, the Christians made converts among the numerous untouchables, those with no caste advantages to lose. The London Missionary Society (LMS) came to Kerala following the British invasions of the eighteenth century and performed a great service establishing English medium Christian schools and colleges. LMS teaching rejected caste as a heathen institution. As the administrators and trading companies of the British raj arrived in Kerala, they traded with, and hired, English-speaking Indians as local supervisors. Many of these Indians had been trained in the Christian schools and colleges that treated untouchables as if they were equals. In defense of their privileged positions in the economy of Kerala, the high-caste groups accelerated
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the educational opportunity of their children, adding English, mathematics, and the sciences to the curriculum. Christian leadership built an early demand for universal education in Kerala. At the same time the Christians infused the idea of ‘‘equality before God’’ among their untouchable converts.
Muslims Like the Christians, the Muslims are also largely converts of earlier times from among the untouchables with no caste privileges to lose. Like the Christians, Muslims in Kerala share culture with their Hindu neighbors yet see themselves as religiously separate. Also like the Christians, they have felt an isolation from the power centers of high-caste Hindus. The Muslim League served like a caste improvement association in the past and as a political party today. On the criteria of income and education Muslims have been below the Kerala standard. Muslim disinterest in the temple entry protests may have added stability to Kerala during the years of the passionate Hindu temple entry struggles. At the same time, they did not experience empowerment until they shared in the Kerala election victory of 1957. Since 1957 the Muslims have fitted neatly into winning political coalitions led by communists and have profited much from the alliance.
Gandhians Mahatma Gandhi returned to India from his adventures in South Africa determined to strike hard at India’s great sin, caste. As events turned out, Gandhi and his many faithful disciples in the struggle against caste were caught up in the fight for Indian independence. Gandhi taught that Christians, Muslims, and Hindus of all castes must work together against British oppression. Gandhi’s anticaste disciples acting in this spirit joined with vigor and enthusiasm in the struggle against caste oppression in Kerala.
Communists An incidental legacy of British imperialism was wage labor, the separation of labor from labor’s product, a basis for labor consciousness and communist political organization. Most of the union leaders in the few industries of Kerala were high-caste radicals and communists. While the Congress Party leadership preached an end to untouchability, the communists ate in the homes and tea shops of the oppressed, organized drama clubs among them, undertook legal action on their behalf, and agitated for higher wages and a share of the land. An untouchable villager recalled events of 1951:
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The influence of Communism brought a new shape to the life of my village. Some of the high caste Nairs became the spokesmen for this new ideology. My father and uncles also joined them. They, the leaders of all castes, conducted meetings in Pulaya houses, slept in Pulaya houses etc. This phenomenon actually swept away caste feeling in my village, especially untouchability. I have gone to the homes of my high caste friends, and they come to my house also and accept food. We have many Nair friends who come to my family house, take food and sleep overnight. (Mencher, 1980)
In their analysis of the sustained assault on the caste system of Kerala, Franke and Chasin (1989) give special credit to the militant, organized, progressive forces. A particularly central role was played in the land reform and anti caste struggle by the cadres of communist parties, who developed a reputation, even among their opponents, of being relatively honest and uncorrupt. Communist parties have, in fact, been voted into offices and become vital pillars of reformist governing coalitions several times in the last 30 years.
Democracy An evident quality of life factor in Kerala is the vigorous democracy maintained by a politically sophisticated and active electorate, more than 90 percent of those old enough to vote. Democracy is an attempt to reconcile the natural phenomena of human diversity and the belief in human equality before God. Given that an electoral majority should have the power, and given that poor majorities everywhere see themselves as victims of unfair market rules, it would logically follow that democratic majorities would seize power, rewrite the rules, and level the economic playing field. They did. In the vision of democracy, the earth is seen as a human habitat owned by all humans on an equal-share basis. A primary entitlement allows each a share of the resources that may allow the basis for life quality, wellness needs. The secondary democratic entitlement offers each a fair opportunity to compete for the use of the balance of the available resources. Democratic processes can create and maintain fair opportunities for this competition, a level playing field. This is the simple story of Kerala politics, beginning with the empowering election of 1957. Empowerment Communists provided the winning political leadership for the first Kerala election, 1957. They assembled a huge proletarian majority, the untouchables, the lowest caste groups, the Muslims, and a large part of the Christians. They won. They leveled the playing field. They were empowered. Empowerment of a suppressed majority has two important political consequences. First, as the winners savor their victory, reaping the benefits, they are
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motivated to vote again to maintain and reinforce their victory. Second, the issues are defined. Any political opposition wanting to win in a subsequent election must support the winning issues. Names of candidates and party labels may change, but the fundamental purpose of the government has been defined— to serve the interest of the electoral majority, in this case the formerly oppressed. Empowerment happened in Kerala. The winning platform of the first communist government of Kerala (1957) was elimination of caste restrictions, especially economic discrimination and disabilities. In telling this story it is crucial to emphasize that the legislative processes of democratic governments provide a focus for the public dialogue as they are led by public sentiment. Thinking about wellness needs and psyche wants, the adjustments and reassignments of provider status occurred as families and neighborhoods reached across former caste boundaries, supporting each other. The Kerala government offered visible institutional support for these dramatic social and economic changes. Notable were the efforts supporting land reform, food distribution, health care, and education. Land Reform An issue on which Muslims and Christians joined low-caste Hindus was land tenancy. In an agrarian society, land is a reality of life. Before 1969, 8 percent of the landowning households controlled 44 percent of all rented land and 62 percent of the best-irrigated lands. The actual cultivators were in a most difficult position. Despite some British and state legislation to protect them, their leases could be arbitrarily terminated by a class of middlemen tenants or by the titled landowners above them. Exorbitant rents were the order of the day. In Cochin, for example, the cultivators paid at least 50 percent and sometimes 75 percent of the gross product of the land to landlords and their middlemen. When the new state of Kerala elected a communist majority to the state legislature in 1957, the government included cabinet members who were themselves seasoned militants of peasant and worker movements. They were set on a course of radical land reform. In reaction, the landlords organized demonstrations and within two years persuaded the New Delhi government to dismiss the communist state government. In the late 1960s the tenants with communist leadership took matters into their own hands, planting red flags on their tenancies and claiming the right to farm the land without paying rent. Pressure organized by the communists and their allies became so great that India’s then ruling Congress Party enacted the land reform law in 1969. The reform compensated the landlords. For rice fields, they received sixteen times one year’s fair rent. The compensation for house compound land was 29 percent of market value, half paid by the tenant and half from a government trust. For the new owners of the rice paddies, half or more of their families’ food needs were now assured. For their part, the former landlords transformed themselves into teachers, government administrators, and midsized farmers and continued their contribution to the Kerala economy (Franke and Chasin, 1989).
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Table 11.5 Average Nutrient Consumption: Kerala, 1990
Source: Soman, 1992: 86.
Food Equity A system of ration shops established under the British in 1941, now called ‘‘fair price shops,’’ has been vastly expanded. This system offers rice, wheat, sugar, palm oil, and kerosene at controlled prices. The location of the 13,000 fair price shops within walking distance of every Kerala home contrasts with the assistance offered in the other progressive Indian states, which began to extend ration shops into rural areas only in 1980. Each household receives a ration card allowing the purchase of limited amounts of basic commodities at fixed prices. Although all households buy some items through this distribution system, the poorest one-third of the households buy two-thirds of their cereals through the fair price shops. Some shops are cooperatives, but most are privately owned. The parallel private market provides a full range of foodstuffs. The equitable distribution of food is only part of the story. Studies carried out by the National Nutritional Monitoring Bureau of the Indian Council of Medical Research have consistently ranked Kerala lowest in food intake among Indian states (see Table 11.5). We should expect these low levels of per capita nutrient consumption to be associated with severe growth retardation and nutritional disorders. We are able to report, however, quite the opposite. Kwashiorkor has virtually disappeared, and the prevalence of marasmus has declined dramatically in recent years. As shown in Table 11.6, Kerala has the highest proportion of normally nourished and the lowest proportion of severely undernourished children under five years of age. The comparison states in the table are Kerala’s close neighbors with equal or better per capita incomes and higher food intakes. The combination of low food intake and good growth performance is offered to substantiate the claim of food equity in Kerala. Since more food is not the cause of the superior child growth patterns, we must look for other causes. Of
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Table 11.6 Malnutrition of Preschool Girls in Selected Indian States
Source: Soman, 1992: 86.
all the explanations of healthy children, female education is the most powerful. The following two-part graph (Figure 11.4) clearly illustrates the association of increasing female literacy and our best wellness measure, declining infant mortality. A description of the many factors causing high female literacy would provide a more complete explanation for Kerala food equity. The significance of female literacy as an important indicator can be further illustrated by pointing to the comparisons of female literacy—39 percent for all India contrasted to 86 percent for Kerala. Female literacy is the one best indicator for declining fertility in all low-income populations. The two summary explanations for the nutritional success of Kerala despite the meager food input are (1) equitable food distribution and (2) more efficient utilization of the available nutrients in a positive interaction with effective health care. Females are the principal family managers for both. Health Care The governments of Kerala have supported the Ayurvedic and homeopathic health systems while enthusiastically adopting the best of Western medical practice. Smallpox vaccination was undertaken in 1879, and by 1936 nearly everyone in southern Kerala was protected. Kerala was the first Indian state to entirely eradicate smallpox, in 1970. Successful health and education measures have wiped out cholera and malaria, and in contrast to many parts of India there has been no recurrence. A lively private health care sector is backed by a comprehensive public sector offering services throughout Kerala—health care centers within four kilometers of every home. The high female education levels are related to the excellent maternal understanding of health care services. As evidence of prenatal care in
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Figure 11.4 Relation between Rise in Female Literacy and the Decline of Infant Mortality in Kerala
Source: Soman, 1992: 89.
the state, 92 percent of births take place in public and private health care institutions, and breast-feeding is nearly always practiced for the first six months. To the foreign visitor the visiting nurse system is impressive, with regular checks of every household for good health practices, making sure the ill get adequate treatment and monitoring recovery.
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Education In order to explain the successes of food distribution and health care systems, it was necessary to refer to the high education levels achieved. The curve showing the increase in female literacy also shows that literacy was less than 40 percent in 1951 (see Figure 11.4). Earlier in this chapter it was shown that 93 percent of the females of high school age are now attending high school. The current generation is more than literate; it is well educated. As contrasted to many low-income countries that have lavished their public funds on university training, the funding in Kerala has been directed to primary and secondary education. This does not mean that higher education is neglected. There are 41 arts and sciences colleges with government support and 133 privately financed for a total of 174. In addition there are nine engineering colleges, four in the government sector and five private, and a host of polytechnic training institutes. There are more women than men enrolled in the colleges and universities, even in the engineering programs. Kerala’s citizens make great use of education. They boast a high newspaper and journal consumption in both Malayalam and English. For those who cannot afford books or a newspaper, there are nearly 5,000 recognized and supported village libraries—more libraries than in all of the other Indian states combined. Educated professionals and skilled workers are exported to employment opportunities in Bombay, Delhi, and the Gulf states. Remittances from this well-paid employment are significant in Kerala income. Characteristic of Kerala, one of its important educational institutions remains independent of government. Eschewing both political party connections and foreign funding, the Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishad (KSSP) involves hundreds of thousands of people. The KSSP popularizes science to serve the needs of society. Using innovative and colorful methods, the KSSP brings science and technology into the everyday life of Kerala and actively engages in environmental protection campaigns (Parayil, 1990). Contrasts Next consider a list of six contrasting characteristics—successful lifestyles of high-consumption cultures contrasted to the successful lifestyles of Kerala— displayed in Table 11.7. These differing characteristics contrast highconsumption behavior in the left column, moving toward a modest consumption on the right. These six contrasts elaborate on the effect of the variables earth resources and human time in the efficiency estimates described earlier. These contrasts show how additional human time is utilized to fill the gap in declining earth resource and maintain high efficiency in the production of life quality. The economic objective shifts from producing more goods and services to careful distribution. Provider status is accorded with an eye to fulfillment of the wellness needs of all as a first priority. In fulfilling these needs, the providers
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Table 11.7 First World and Kerala Contrasts
leave much earth resource for distribution via market competition for fulfillment of psyche wants. Probably most symbolic of the change from unlimited resources to limited resources will be the contrast of the tools used. There is a shift from technological hardware to intellectual software (Sakaiya, 1991). The enormous investments of earth resource in machinery and equipment are replaced by increasing investment of human time. In Kerala (and in our earth future) investments of human time are placed in extensive knowledge of the wellness needs and psyche wants of all others and the value to each of an equitable distribution of goods and services. This knowledge is necessary to motivate the efficient distribution of each scarce resource item. A premium is placed on the correct decisions and most efficient distribution of resources, not on quick decisions. The delay in the process of making the correct decision is a time investment by all. The time investment is also part of the process by which an enormous information system is cross-checked at each change of circumstances, every new opportunity. Nearly all humans in Kerala serve as storehouses and rapid transmitters of this necessary information. In
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organizational terms each human is on a net receiving and sending messages by direct and indirect routes to and from all others. Organization refers to the decision system, that is, who listens to whom and who tells whom what to do. Organization in Kerala may be called intense community, with everyone making decisions in full knowledge of the interests and preferences of everyone else. In contrast, the ideal First World decision organization is a hierarchy of executives making rapid decisions for subordinates, executives following commands received from superiors. Many goods and services are allocated to serve the psyche wants of executives, and much is held in reserve for their possible use. Executive hierarchical decisions work well so long as the total product of goods and services is great enough (sufficient resources available). Under these conditions, all may have their wellness needs met. On the other hand, observed disparities in the distribution of goods and services create anxiety—imagined needs known as ‘‘keeping up with the Joneses.’’ There is reason to be pessimistic about the future if we seek to maintain the customs, rules, regulations, and laws fixing the materially wealthy humans in their high consumption status. On the other hand, if customs, regulations, rules, and laws are shifted in the direction of human equity, there is reason for optimism. The potential for human equity is evident, given the enormous disparity in economic power worldwide measured in income as currently distributed. Eighty-five percent of the world population subsists on average incomes of $1,000 a year; the remaining 15 percent utilize an average of $21,000 per year. The three remaining contrasts observed between the First World and Kerala, although only indirectly connected to the use of earth resource, are nonetheless important. Placing the individual on a high pedestal as against the importance of family (and larger groups such as tribes and communities) means that needs and wants should be satisfied separately (privately). In contrast, joint satisfaction of wellness needs can and does occur in large family groups; water and housing are examples. Psyche wants are also well served in group activity, for example, group singing as contrasted to passive listening to paid artists. In Kerala as contrasted to the First World, there is less confusion about whether work is an unpleasant exchange of human time for wellness needs or whether work itself serves important psyche wants. The economy of Kerala is motivated by the fulfillment of psyche wants, not payment. In addition, the pay associated with work in Kerala is accepted more as a sinecure, payment for the wellness needs of their families, not so much an obligation to perform assigned tasks. Approved task performance, paid or not, fulfills psyche wants. Leisure choices, usually thought of as fulfilling psyche wants, can clearly use more of fewer earth resources. Leisure toys like automobiles and audiovisual systems use more earth resources than visiting and playing. The latter also significantly contributes to the emphasis on comprehensive information about the wants and needs of friends and neighbors. In turn, this supports the deliberate decision systems within the Kerala experience.
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CONCLUSIONS: KERALA LESSONS LEARNED A best-selling book of 1993 entitled Your Money or Your Life (Dominguez and Robin) describes a choice for modest consumption learned in North America—living lightly on the earth. The goal of this study offered Kerala as an analogy for such successful human behavior in 2050. What are we able to report? The lessons learned on the Earthwatch-sponsored research in Kerala, 1991–1993, direct attention to standard of living and lifestyles. The lessons reported are a straightforward assessment of relationships of humans to each other on a finite earth, lessons about community. The people of Kerala show us that it is possible to enjoy a good life beyond our fading dream of endless material wealth. The people of Kerala have set a high standard of efficiency—careful use of small amounts of resources to produce high life quality. The explanation for the high efficiency is like the innocence of the child crying, ‘‘The emperor has no clothes.’’ Kerala efficiency is easily understood by some. Others are in denial like the emperor’s yes-men, addicted to highconsumption status. Surely, a good life opportunity is more than a right to consume the earth. Community The habitual practice of community best explains the Kerala good life success. Community may be properly defined as human relationships. We mean our families, our friends, our neighborhoods. Large numbers of interlocking and overlapping relationships make a group of humans into an intense community. Given skillful application of human time, human community can be expanded to the whole earth. An important motivation for the millions of interrelationships that make up community is the need for services and goods that we can provide each other. We mean families, friends, and neighbors—community that has been expanded on a very large scale in Kerala. On the downside, youth highly motivated for change often find close community stifling. A society that controls much earth resource going far beyond wellness needs seeks and allows privacy and individualism. In a society short on earth resource, humans build and maintain community, a means to share goods and services, accepting the discipline of community. Although community does impinge on privacy and individualism, community has psyche wants compensations of its own—family, friends, neighborhood, and selfactualizing tasks. We state the Kerala lessons in the language of differences between strong community observed in Kerala and the weaker personal interrelationships known in North America. The following 22 statements summarize the lessons learned by the ten Earthwatch research teams, first background statements and then current evaluation.
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Background 1. Within the gigantic entity of India, Kerala is a small state with uncommonly high quality of life. 2. Kerala is a lush, green place with a dense rural population. 3. The per capita incomes are very low in Kerala but not the lowest in the world. 4. The Kerala mix of religious traditions includes more Muslims and more Christians than the rest of India. 5. Some matrilineal traditions persist in Kerala. 6. Beginning in the nineteenth century there was an epic and successful struggle against the division of human communities formerly enforced by Hindu religious practice, caste. 7. Life quality improvements were initiated within caste associations (i.e., Ezhava Social Reform Movement), and the processes of improvement were maintained by across-caste organizations (i.e., Kerala Science for Social Revolution). 8. Christians led the way to universal education. 9. Muslims supported the struggle against oppression. 10. Gandhians provided anticaste leadership. 11. Communists forged the untouchables and lower castes into an effective political majority against inhumane caste discrimination and economic disabilities. 12. Communists accepted democracy by majority rule. In Kerala they did not create a dictatorship of the proletariat. 13. Effective land reform, land to the tillers, was instituted. 14. Food, health care, and education were equitably distributed. Evaluation 15. The preceding successes empowered the former untouchables and lower castes into a powerful democratic majority, a durable defense within Kerala maintaining an agenda of economic democracy. 16. As caste boundaries were destroyed, a very large community was created, fostering and nourishing life quality improvements for all in Kerala. 17. Human time can be utilized to create and maintain organization and information systems that efficiently distribute scarce earth resource filling human needs. 18. This empathic and sympathetic use of human time satisfies psyche wants, adding more efficiency to these processes. 19. The enormous disparity in income distribution under current customs, rules, regulations, and laws worldwide shows much latitude for redistribution in our future— plenty for all wellness needs plus enough for psyche wants. 20. Numbers 16 and 17 were the most difficult lessons for the Earthwatch researchers to learn. 21. Kerala strategies based on equity considerations noted by John Ratcliffe are the limited equality conditions delineated in Herman Daly’s steady-state economics.
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22. Improvement in life quality allows some (particularly those with higher caste origins) to wander away from strong community into individualism, a basis for hierarchy and class. This erosion may lead to a decline in Kerala life quality.
CONCLUSION In the pursuit of these successful human strategies, it has been the hope of this Earthwatch research effort to promote the sustainable human behavior phenomena of Kerala from an anomaly oblivion into the status of an exception seriously studied. Others should ask, Is there any other positive exception (low consumption and small families) that has established a life quality equal to, or better than, that found in Kerala? Is there a better possible future for our grandchildren? The goal of showing Kerala as an analogy for successful human behavior in 2050 is not complete in this chapter. The next steps are measurements in Kerala and external to Kerala. The external measures are required to establish measurement baselines, that is, observable contrasts. We should measure consumption efficiency, small amounts of the earth resources skillfully distributed to maximize life quality. These can be calculated from measures of resource use and measures of quality of life. The use of resources in Kerala should be measured as throughput, the rate of withdrawal of earth resource (including the waste deposits of humans and their artifacts). Quality of life should be measured as needs and wants. Actual needs should be measured against high standards of wellness and education at minimum-use levels of earth resource. Wants should be measured in terms of general satisfaction and contentment. Further measures of wants should be sought in terms of caste, class, and gender with particular attention to the hierarchy (or absence thereof) of the decision systems utilized. APPENDIX: GLOSSARY OF KERALA STUDY TERMS Ecological Self. A contextual self that perceives holistic transaction between persons and all the environment, including other persons. No boundaries are set between persons and environment (or between self and nature). The ecological self focuses on consumption efficiencies minimizing the use of earth resource and substituting surplus human time. Quality of Life. A desired human condition or lifestyle. In this study quality of life is defined in terms of resources, analytically considered as earth resource and human time. Resources. Everything that may be described as part of the earth, including the atmosphere, regular supplies of sunlight, and all living things, including humans. Earth Resources. That part of resources available for human support on a sustainable basis and specifically excluding the activities of humans called human time. Sometimes called carrying capacity.
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Human Time. The activity of humans. Included in resources and excluded from earth resource. Provider. A human who supplies goods or services to others. Nearly every member of the human species provides something of value to others. Higher provider status may be accorded by families, communities, and governments to certain providers, that is, mother, farmer, manager, owner, or policeman. The motivation of a provider may be generous, not necessarily selfish or greedy. Tools. Technological and social means conceived by humans to increase the efficiency in the provision of quality of life. An investment (education) of human time that may be applied to increase the efficiency of the use of earth resource and/or human time. Needs and Wants. A measured meaning is attributed to needs and wants by equating these self-perceptions to amounts of resources. Wants and needs cannot exceed earth resource plus human time. Needs. Needs are the minimum amount of earth resource and human time that can allow a human body to reach the self-actualization threshold. In this study the amount of resources required for needs is conceptualized as the per capita consumption level of Kerala. Wants. Wants are all amounts of earth resource and human time beyond the needs requirements. Wants are thus limited to the difference between the allocation to needs and resources available. Wellness Needs and Psyche Wants. ‘‘Wellness’’ and ‘‘psyche’’ are used to add clarity distinguishing between needs and wants. To the extent that human time is generously given to and for others, such provision may satisfy both the psyche wants of the provider and the wellness needs of the other. Throughput. A time-based measurement of the amount of resources (including sinks) consumed from, and dumped into, the earth ecosystem by human activity. See Herman Daly (1991). Limited Inequality. A social relationship among humans necessary to motivate limited throughput and limited population measured against an equality standard. Also called equity and fairness.
CHAPTER 12
Measuring Development Policy Organizational Effectiveness in Third World Countries Ambe J. Njoh
INTRODUCTION Effectiveness questions are at the heart of most of the administrative reforms and institution-building efforts that have taken place in developing countries since the 1950s. On a larger scale, these questions have engaged the minds of economists, organization theorists, management analysts, consultants, and practitioners since 1776, when Adam Smith published his famous treatise Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. More recently, concerns with organizational effectiveness, productivity, efficiency, or excellence have been inspired by the works of Frederick Taylor (e.g., 1911). Its relatively long history notwithstanding, the concept of organizational effectiveness remains fraught with several problems. Some of the most nagging of these problems have to do with measuring phenomena in organizational research in general and defining and measuring the concept of organizational effectiveness in particular. Yet, the need for measuring organizational performance, defined as ‘‘the regular collection of information about the efficiency, quality, and effectiveness’’ of institutional bodies (Martin and Kettner, 1996: 3), has never been more urgent. The need for performance measurement is accentuated in developing countries, where it is increasingly being recognized that the problem of underdevelopment is associated more with a lack of effective institutional frameworks for development policy implementation than with the lack of resources. In fact, a recent World Bank study noted: Failures in the coverage and quality of urban services in developing countries are the result of more than a lack of resources. The evidence shows that, in many cases, the resources devoted to urban services are substantial but used inefficiently. Therefore, it is
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essential to look to the system of mobilizing and managing these resources: the institutional arrangements for urban service delivery. (1995: vii)
The question, however, remains, How do we measure organizational performance? While measurement problems are present in all organizational settings, they are accentuated in the context of less developed countries (LDCs) for obvious reasons, a number of which are alluded to later. MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH Measurement in the social sciences in general and organizational research in particular is often undertaken by assigning numerals to objects or events based on certain agreed upon rules. Four levels of measurement—nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio—have traditionally been adopted. However, with the advent of more sophisticated statistical techniques, these levels have become somewhat anachronistic. Currently, a dichotomous categorization scheme including discrete variables, on one hand, and continuous variables, on the other, is deemed more useful (Price and Mueller, 1986). Included under the discrete variable category are variables that in the traditional scheme would be considered nominal variables. Such variables classify people, things, or events into types, kinds, or quality of their attributes. Discrete variables can be either orderable or nonorderable depending on whether or not the phenomenon in question can be rankordered in terms of more or less. Continuous variables encompass variables that would traditionally be considered interval or ratio variables. A ratio or interval classification scheme assumes that the variable in question is continuous and allows for fractional values. Examples of continuous variables in organizational research include number of interactional episodes between organizations, employees’ salaries, absenteeism rate, and annual budget. The terrain of organizational measurement is not as neatly charted as the foregoing discussion apparently suggests. Some variables do not lend themselves to neat compartmentalization schemes such as those just discussed. In practice, it is not uncommon to encounter variables for which the level of measurement is unclear. In some cases this problem is compounded by the absence of any consensual meaning for important concepts. For instance, despite its theoretical and practical importance as well as its wide use in the literature, the concept of organizational effectiveness has no consensual meaning. Hence, operationalizing and quantifying the concept in a consistent fashion present certain serious problems. Certainly, as suggested earlier, efforts to measure organizational effectiveness are not new. However, different researchers and practitioners concerned with organizational effectiveness tend to employ different measures and/or models. In this chapter we seek to accomplish three main objectives. The first is to determine the suitability of three leading models of organizational effectiveness,
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namely, the goal model, the resource control model, and the multiple constituency model for use in developing countries. The second is to propose consumer satisfaction as an important indicator of organizational effectiveness in developing countries. The third is to identify and discuss some of the data and methodological and practical issues relating to consumer satisfaction as a measure of development policy organizational effectiveness. We are interested in addressing two main questions: (1) how appropriate are contemporary models of organizational effectiveness for measuring organizational performance in the context of developing countries? and (2) how important is consumer satisfaction as an indicator of development policy organizational effectiveness? By development policy organizations (DPOs) we mean all institutional bodies involved in the process of conceiving, formulating, and implementing social, economic, and cultural development policies. We, however, limit our discussion to the agencies or organizations involved in the implementation process. These agencies are located in both the public and private sectors. A number of important points need to be made about models that have thus far been employed in evaluating the performance of DPOs in developing countries. First, we note that the models were developed without these countries in mind. Second, the models generally ignore a very important dimension of the effectiveness construct, namely, consumer satisfaction. Finally, despite claims to the contrary, none of the models and, in fact, no single model are capable of dealing with the effectiveness construct from all conceivable perspectives. MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS Over the years, there has been a steady growth of models purporting to deal with the effectiveness construct. Two of these, the goal model (Etzioni, 1964) and the resource control model (Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967), have received the widest attention in the literature. A third model, the multiple constituency model (Pennings and Goodman, 1977), which has not received quite the same degree of attention, is of relevance here, especially because of the claims it makes with respect to dealing with the effectiveness construct from varying perspectives. The Goal Model The goal model of effectiveness makes two explicit assumptions about organizational functioning (Campbell, 1977: 19): • the goals of the organization not only are identifiable but can also be clearly defined and attained without difficulty; and • the organization’s owners and managers (its most powerful constituencies) are capable of making rational decisions in view of selecting and pursuing organizational goals.
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Based on these assumptions, gauging organizational effectiveness entails developing criterion measures to assess how well the organization is progressing toward, or is attaining, its stated goals. Amitae Etzioni, who was instrumental in developing this model, defines organizational effectiveness as ‘‘the degree to which an organization realizes its stated goals’’ (1964: 8). While this definition and underlying assumptions of the model appear reasonable and susceptible to analysis, they are difficult to defend in the face of reality. Organizational goals, in general, do not easily lend themselves to being defined in rather narrow and specific terms. This problem stems largely from the fact that organizations, especially those in the public sector, have a multiplicity of goals. On this subject Richard Hall has written: First, all organizations have multiple and usually conflicting goals; second, the multiplicity and conflict among goals, plus other constraints, prevent any organization from being fully effective; third, organizations that are effective for one set of constituents may be ineffective or dangerous for another. (1977: 67, quoted in McKinney, 1986: 36)
In addition, as Hannan and Freeman (1997) have observed, organizations have private or operational goals that deviate from official goals. Operational goals are those goals that organizational managers actually pursue in daily practice. In other words, these are unofficial goals of which organizational behavior is a function, as opposed to official goals, which are statements meant for public consumption (Perrow, 1961). Such statements are usually contained in annual reports, organizational charters, or the speeches of the organization’s most powerful constituencies. Another problem with the goal model of organizational effectiveness relates to the fact that organizational goals lack specificity. Consider, for instance, a developing nation’s Ministry of Planning’s goal of ‘‘improving the quality of life of the nation’s citizens.’’ Such a goal is not only open-ended but also ambiguous, thus lacking the specificity necessary to make it meaningful for conceptual purposes. Yet, such lack of specificity is what students of development administration such as Bryant and White (1982) have observed as a common characteristic of organizational goals in LDCs. That organizational goals are nonspecific implies that they are multidimensional and, in fact, sometimes conflicting. For instance, since the 1960s, organizations in the development policy field in LDCs have had as two of their main goals reducing the levels of socioeconomic inequalities and the promoting of economic growth (defined as a rapid and sustained rise in real output per head). These two goals are conflicting. Attaining the former goal often entails programs designed to improve the lot of the less well off or the poor, usually in the form of welfare assistance, which is antithetical (at least in the short run) to rapid economic growth. Programs designed to accelerate such growth often give priority to increased commodity output as opposed to the human beings involved in the production process (cf. Mabogunje, 1981).
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Yet another problem relates to the fact that organizational goals are anything but permanent (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). This temporal feature is a function of the fact that organizational goals, more often than not, reflect the preferences of the organization’s most powerful constituencies (i.e., proprietors and managers). Thus, as these preferences change over time, so do the goals. Given the highly dynamic nature of LDCs, their organizational goals are most likely to be in a constant state of flux. The second assumption is also another major source of the problems of the goal model. Organizational managers and proprietors are seen as rational decision makers. The model of a human being as a rational decision maker holds that she or he is a utility maximizer whose relations to others must be seen in purely instrumental terms (Friedmann and Hudson, 1974; Saasa, 1985). The model further assumes that the decision maker is confronted with a well-defined problem, has a full array of alternatives from which to select a solution, and has complete information about the values and preferences of citizens and a sufficient supply of needed skills and resources (Forester, 1984). The hallmarks of this model, as Lindblom (1959), Etzioni (1968), and Forester (1984), among others have pointed out, are clarity of objective, explicitness of evaluation, quantification of values, and mathematical analysis. Yet, the goals of public organizations, especially those in LDCs, because of their complexity, hardly lend themselves to quantitative analysis. Consider the goal of providing citizens with decent housing, which can be found on the official agenda of most public housing organizations in LDCs. This goal cannot be subdivided into elements that can then be rank-ordered and satisfied in order of importance until resources are exhausted. All the elements that make up the housing package are of equal importance in most cases. The ‘‘four walls and a roof’’ are, for instance, just as important as ‘‘reasonable location.’’ Hence, one can neither be easily ranked above, nor substituted for, the other. In other words, protection of the users from adverse weather conditions is just as important an objective of housing policy as their access to jobs, services, and other opportunities necessary for their social, economic, and cultural well-being. Despite its intellectual appeal, the rational model is seriously incapacitated in practice by the bounds imposed on it by limited knowledge (Friedmann and Hudson, 1974; Etzioni, 1968; Lindblom, 1959, 1979; Simon, 1957). Knowledge entails the ability to handle uncertainty and information as well as determine the consequences of decisions. This ability is often lacking in organizations, especially those in the public sector in developing countries. This is because resources (e.g., finance and skilled labor) are often in extreme short supply in these countries. Thus, the capacity to collect the quantity and quality of data, as well as maintain the caliber of up-to-date data bank necessary for rational decision making, is absent. Even if there was sufficient capital with which to secure the needed resources (as may be the case in the oil-rich LDCs), critics of the rational model (e.g., Lindblom, 1979; Etzioni, 1968) argue that the limits of
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human intelligence heavily restrict the amount of information that can be handled at any given time. A closely related problem concerns knowledge about what the ‘‘ideal organizational goal’’ is. Usually, the constituencies of an organization disagree on what goals the organization should pursue. This disagreement stems from the diverse reasons that different groups have for participating in the organization in the first place. Proprietors of private firms usually have an interest in profit making. Politicians and top-ranking government officials, who may be considered the proprietors of public organizations, are usually interested in political stability. In either case, the employees are interested in job satisfaction. Job satisfaction may be a function, among other factors, of ‘‘good wages’’ and decent working conditions. The organization’s primary beneficiaries are likely to be interested in ‘‘good services’’ or ‘‘quality products.’’ It is highly improbable that anyone possesses the knowledge necessary to formulate organizational goals to the equal satisfaction of each of these constituencies. It is impossible within the limited parameters of this discussion to exhaust the list of problems that plague the goal model. Suffice to say that these problems incapacitate the model as a tool for gauging public sector organizational effectiveness. This is especially true in the case of developing nations, where, as noted earlier, public organizations are often required to pursue multiple and often conflicting goals. Nevertheless, the importance of goals for guiding organizational activity is acknowledged, although we do not equate effectiveness with goal achievement. The Resource Control Model One of the most forceful arguments for conceptualizing organizational effectiveness in terms of an organization’s ability to secure from its environment the resources it needs in order to function is credited to Ephraim Yuchtman and Stanley Seashore. In advancing this argument, the authors underscored the importance of the organizational environment and organization–environment interaction for resource acquisition and, hence, for organizational performance. They stated thus: We propose, accordingly, to define the effectiveness of an organization in terms of its bargaining position, as reflected in the ability of the organization, in either absolute or relative terms, to exploit its environment in the acquisition of scarce and valued resources. (1967: 899)
While we agree with the central tenet of Yuchtman and Seashore’s argument, we do not consider the ability to acquire resources synonymous with organizational effectiveness. Rather, we consider this ability an intervening, as opposed to a predictor, variable in an equation linking organizational environment to organizational effectiveness.
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Shortcomings of the resource control model include the fact that, by equating the ability to acquire resources with effectiveness, there is the tendency to confuse organizational effectiveness with the size of an organization (Price and Mueller, 1986). This is because size is sometimes measured in terms of the amount of resources (e.g., employees, land, equipment, assets) that an organization owns. Therefore, a measure of organizational effectiveness based on this conceptualization scheme is likely to be systematically biased in favor of larger and/or financially viable organizations. To assume that by simply possessing resources an organization automatically becomes effective is naive. How these resources are utilized is perhaps just as important as possessing them. Consider, for instance, the case of a hypothetical planning agency that is richly endowed with such vital resources as infrastructure, office equipment, and funds. Suppose the morale of the personnel is so low that their productivity is inhibited, making it difficult for such routine tasks as building site inspection, the issuance of land certificates, building permits, and so on to be executed on a timely basis. It is very likely that if clients who have experienced unnecessary waiting periods for, say, their sites to be inspected or permission to build are asked to evaluate the agency, they would consider it ineffective. Yet, one can imagine a case in which a similar agency may not possess quite as much resources, but the staff is so dedicated that they go out of their way to ensure that routine tasks are executed with minimal delay. It is possible to think of more examples in which the acquisition or possession of resources does not automatically translate into effectiveness, but this is unnecessary. The point is that the underlying assumption of the resource control model that a distinct link exists between inputs and results is questionable. In this connection Kim Cameron and David Whetten contend that ‘‘some organizations are judged to be effective even though they fail to acquire resources whereas others are deemed ineffective even when resources are acquired in abundance’’ (1983: 3). The Multiple Constituency Model The multiple constituency model conceptualizes organizational effectiveness in terms of the degree to which an organization satisfies its (multiple) constituencies. According to Pennings and Goodman, ‘‘[O]rganizations are effective if relevant constraints can be satisfied and if organizational results approximate or exceed a set of referents for multiple goals’’ (1977: 160). The origin of this model can be traced to a workshop on organizational effectiveness held at the Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, in 1976. Its substantive orientation is, however, credited to a 1952 article by B. M. Bass. In the article, entitled ‘‘Ultimate Criteria of Organizational Worth,’’ Bass articulated the importance of expanding the criterion of organizational effectiveness to encompass measures relevant to the organization’s constituencies. This model is
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considered relevant for the purpose of the present study because it is the only one in the relevant literature that articulates the importance of other members of an organization’s constituencies, other than the proprietors and management, for the purpose of evaluating the organization’s performance. The model explicitly recognizes the fact that each of the various constituencies of an organization contributes in some form to the organization’s survival and functioning. Each of these constituent groups has a bias toward assessing the organization’s effectiveness from its respective perspective. This line of reasoning led Bass to suggest that the criteria for assessing organizational effectiveness must include some measures of how well the organization is serving the interests of its management, employees, and the society at large. In echoing this theme, Friedlander and Pickle contend that ‘‘Clearly effectiveness criteria must take into account the profitability of the organization, the degree to which it satisfies its members, and the degree to which it is of value to the larger society of which it is part’’ (1967: 293). A fundamental strength of this model resides in the fact that it embraces multiple value perspectives of performance under a unifying framework. Unfortunately, however, this strength can also represent a major source of weakness where such perspectives are diametrically opposed to one another. For instance, the proprietors of an organization are likely to be interested in increasing productivity, while employees may desire job satisfaction. But, as Steers (1975) notes, studies reveal that, at least within the short run, exerting pressure on workers to perform at their maximum (which is necessary for increased productivity) results in decreased job satisfaction. Similarly, a profit-maximizing organization—that is, one that is highly effective in terms of profits—will rarely be effective from society’s point of view. This is because to maximize on profit, a construction company in a developing country, for instance, may require the use of capital-intensive technology that conflicts with the societal goal of reducing levels of unemployment—a goal whose achievement hinges tightly on the use of labor-intensive technology. This suggests that it is difficult, if not impossible, for an organization to maximize its effectiveness on all dimensions simultaneously. ‘‘If we accept such criteria for effectiveness, organizations by definition cannot be effective! They cannot maximize on [all] dimensions at the same time’’ (Steers, 1975). The task that the multiple constituency model attempts to accomplish is, therefore, rather too ambitious, as some problems are imminent. First, there is the problem of knowledge—the limited capacity of human intelligence discussed earlier. A second problem concerns the practical utility of the model. Pfeffer and Salancik have attempted to address this question. Identifying the central questions of organizational action as ‘‘who wants what and how important is it that the demand be satisfied? and what are the implications of the satisfaction of one demand for the satisfaction of the other demands?’’ they prescribe a four-step process for decision makers to follow (1978: 85–87).
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Step 1 consists of identifying organizational constituencies, which the authors note as being of unequal importance to the organization. Hence, as step 2, they suggest that the decision maker develop a system for weighting the preference of organizational constituencies according to their relative importance (to the organization). Weights may be determined by one of two ways. One approach entails having representatives of each constituency assign scores to other constituencies according to their perceived importance to the organization and then computing the averages of these scores. A second approach involves ‘‘identifying the critical resources which the organization needs and analyzing which groups or individuals control them’’ (85). In step 3, the criteria or preferences for performance that each of the organization’s constituencies would use in judging the organization’s effectiveness should be identified. The final step consist of determining the reaction of each constituency to any particular organizational action. The severe limitations of the practical utility of the multiple constituency model can be appreciated by examining the major assumptions it makes about organizations. One is that it is possible to rank the constituencies of an organization in order of their importance to the organization (see step 1). It is difficult to defend this assumption. This is because, as far as the survival and success of any organization are concerned, all its constituencies command equal importance. For example, suppliers of inputs such as raw materials are no less important to the organization than are the employees who transform the materials into finished products; nor are the consumers of these products any less important than any of the other two. A second assumption is that members of the organization’s constituencies not only know other constituencies but are able to determine their importance to the organization (see step 2 first approach). Based on this assumption, the consumers of an organization’s outputs are supposed to know and be able to assess their relative importance to the organization, other constituencies such as the organization’s suppliers of raw materials, its creditors, and owners. This assumption is out of touch with reality. It is highly unlikely that residents of sites and services projects such as Dandora in Kenya; Chawama in Lusaka, Zambia; New Georgia in Liberia; Quartier Nylon in Douala, Cameroon; and most others in different parts of the developing world know that the housing units in which they live were developed with financial assistance from the World Bank in Washington, D.C. Similarly, it is equivocal that the customers of a retail food store would know the store’s owner(s), let alone other constituencies such as the store’s creditors, bankers, and insurance agents, to name but a few. It is more improbable that these customers can assess the relative importance (to the store) of each of these groups. Besides the problems associated with the major assumptions of this model, another shortcoming of the model relates to the tendency to disregard the less powerful constituencies of the organization. Even advocates of the model acknowledge this shortcoming. Alluding to the second method of weighting the
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preferences of constituencies (see step 2), Pfeffer and Salancik admit that ‘‘one problem with this method, however is that the less visible interest groups may be ignored or underestimated’’ (1978: 85). Perhaps the major problem with the multiple constituency model is the fact that it promises more than it is capable of delivering. For instance, it claims that it can deal not only with the preferences of those directly connected to the organization but also with those of the society at large. A proponent of the model, Walter Nord, maintains: Most treatments of organizational effectiveness have ignored macroquality criteria and proceeded as if greater microquality effectiveness is preferable to less without discussion of the extent or process by which such effectiveness has failed to meet . . . a necessary criterion for any organization theory—the specification of the relationship between organization and larger society. (1983: 87)
This raises several questions associated with the community welfare function—questions that become more complicated when examined in the context of developing societies. Where resources are scarce, such as in these societies, it is obvious that some trade-offs must be made among people’s preferences for different objectives. Economists call the calculation of these trade-offs the ‘‘community welfare function.’’ Under formal democratic conditions, a community welfare function may be logically derived from premises that are in conformity with formalized rules of political democracy (Friedmann and Hudson, 1974). In the advanced societies of the West, an organization may approximate a community’s preferences for different objectives through majority voting. On the contrary and to risk understatement, democracy is a rare characteristic of developing nations. This renders impossible the approximation of the values and preferences of the citizens—the society at large. A related problem has to do with determining social, environmental, and other intangible costs and benefits of organizational actions to the larger society. The cost-benefit analysis technique, a direct mathematical formulation of the rational model, because of its quantitative bias, cannot adequately deal with this problem. Thus, the multiple constituency model’s claim that it can deal simultaneously with the preferences of all constituencies of an organization, including the larger society, is an illusion. The foregoing analysis reveals that extant models of organizational effectiveness are inappropriate in the context of developing countries. Perhaps more noteworthy in this connection is the fact that the models ignore consumer satisfaction as an indicator of organizational effectiveness. Yet, the importance of this indicator in the context of developing countries cannot be overstated.
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CONSUMER SATISFACTION AS AN INDICATOR OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS Effectiveness is conceivably the highest form of performance accountability in the public service delivery sector. A clear-cut distinction exists between traditional program evaluation schemes and performance measurement (Martin and Kettner, 1996). The former are typically one-shot assessments of program outcomes or impacts. The latter, in contrast, perceives the effectiveness of any organization as inextricably intertwined with the environment in which the organization operates. Thus, unlike traditional measures, the perspective of organizational performance adopted here views organizational effectiveness not as a scientifically defensible cause-and-effect relationship that can be divorced from the organizational environment. Rather, organizational effectiveness is seen as a basic, practical question concerned with how well an organization is doing, given existing preferences, constraints, and limitations. This perspective is identical to what Zammuto calls an ‘‘evolutionary view of organizational performance and effectiveness’’ (1982). An evolutionary view of organizational performance draws its inspiration from the development and behavior of biological organisms particularly, the process by which such organisms fill empty niches. Niches are viewed in this case as the interstices of elementary conditions in the biological, physical, and social environment. In this scheme of work, biological and social evolution comprises the filling of empty niches through mutation (Zammuto, 1982, citing Boulding, 1978). A by-product of the interaction process occurring among conditions in the biological, physical, and social environment is the limit it places on what is possible with respect to performance at any given time. The time element is crucial here because what may be deemed effective at one time may not be considered as such at a different time. Thus, the concept of performance is certainly not a constant. Rather, it is a variable, as it changes or evolves with time. CONSUMER SATISFACTION: MEANING AND ESSENCE We define consumer or primary beneficiary satisfaction as a construct describing a service or product recipient’s subjective emotional state occurring in response to an evaluation of a set of experiences connected with the service or product received (cf. Njoh, 1990, 1994). The importance of consumer satisfaction both as a concept and as a guide for policy making in LDCs can hardly be overstated. Underlying most consumer theories is the assumption that consumption is undertaken in order to satisfy some need (Stearns, 1981: 15). Employed as a measure of effectiveness for public sector organizations, this indicator can assist policymakers and other authorities in LDCs in several ways. The following
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ten advantages associated with employing consumer satisfaction as an indicator of public sector organizational effectiveness in LDCs come readily to mind. • Information on public service consumer satisfaction can be a barometer of public sector performance by providing an evaluative dimension for ratings of the quality of goods and/or services produced by organizations in this sector. • The maximization of public service consumer satisfaction should be the goal of governments in LDCs since this is likely to contribute to political stability. In housing, for instance, Geoffrey Payne contends that one of the objectives of programs such as settlement upgrading in LDCs is to win the political support of ‘‘entrenched and increasingly active slum or squatter communities’’ (1984: 3). To ascertain that consumers are satisfied with public goods and services, therefore, is to foster this objective. • Because citizen satisfaction with public goods and services contributes to overall wellbeing (Marans and Rodgers, 1975), it is important for governments in LDCs to maximize this satisfaction. • In the public service delivery sector measures of consumer satisfaction can help generate a more accurate picture of basic service needs in LDCs. This picture has always been distorted because public officials and other parties concerned with basic need satisfaction rely on preconceived, pseudo-Western, middle-class standards for service quality and quantity. • Information on consumer satisfaction could not only constitute valuable input for social indicators but also provide project/program administrators in LDCs additional information about the effectiveness of their efforts. • As valuable inputs to the planning process, consumer satisfaction measures can help keep planners and leaders in LDCs abreast of shifts in the preferences and needs of the citizens. • A measure of public service consumer satisfaction is capable of providing leaders in LDCs the information necessary for avoiding a crisis of confidence in their leadership. Such information serves as an early warning system for shifts in preferences, needs, and attitudes concerning the quality, quantity, and kind of goods and services offered by the government (through public organizations). • As one approach to strengthening their capacity for development policy administration, organizations in LDCs need to be knowledgeable about their environment. A measure of consumer satisfaction is capable of performing the environmental scanning function for organizations that are interested not only in reactive but also in proactive policy making or planning. • ‘‘Good planning’’ and ‘‘good intentions’’ are not enough. Planners in LDCs need to gauge the extent to which the ‘‘planned-for’’ actually like the products of the planners’ efforts. A measure of public service consumer satisfaction is a logical tool for making this determination. • The fact that, with a few exceptions (see Stearns, 1981), consumer satisfaction studies have been limited to the private sector means that there exists a need for studies to focus on the subject with respect to the public sector in general and the public sector in LDCs in particular.
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AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS Thus, an appropriate model for assessing development policy organizational performance in developing countries incorporates consumer satisfaction. Such a model has been proposed by Njoh (1994). The model deviates from others in the field, particularly the three leading ones discussed earlier, in one fundamental way. Rather than examine organizations and organizational performance as if they were two distinct constructs, thereby directing attention away from the ecological effects of organizational functioning, account is taken of organizational environment. Thus, the model recognizes the fact that the existence of any organization is tied to its social and physical environment. In fact, within the open systems framework, an organization is viewed as tightly connected to its surrounding environment. At the same time, the model honors and shares some of the principal features of extant models in the field. In this respect the proposed model may be seen as building on extant models in the field. For example, it recognizes, as does the goal model, that there should be some goals or objectives against which an organization’s performance can be measured. It, however, does not subscribe to the notion that these goals must be those of the owners and management of the organization. Rather, at the heart of the proposed model is the contention that other goals, such as the satisfaction of consumer preferences, are equally important, and, thus, should be pursued by organizations. The importance of this goal is magnified in the case of service delivery agencies whose raison d’eˆ tre is (or should be) meeting the service needs of the citizenry. The model further differs from the goal model in that, in contrast to the latter, which concerns itself with the official goals of the organization, it perceives operative goals as a more appropriate background against which to measure organizational effectiveness. This is because, as mentioned earlier, operative goals are the goals that organizations actually pursue, while official goals constitute nothing more than statements about what organizations intend to do or would like the public to believe they intend to do. The same holds true for official versus operative policies. Thus, to deal with operative policies is to deal with the actions, hence, the actual, as opposed to the intended, behavior of organizations. The importance of resource acquisition for organizational success is also recognized in the proposed model. The ability to acquire resources is, however, not equated with effectiveness, as is the case with the resource control model. Rather, an organization that is able to acquire, or indulges in activities aimed at acquiring, the resources it needs in order to function is considered potentially effective. In other words, such an organization is not regarded as effective but as likely to be effective. The model further subscribes to some of the primary assumptions of the multiple constituency model. For example, it accepts the argument that organizations comprise different constituencies, each of which places different
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demands on the organization. The constituencies that constitute a typical development policy organization in a developing nation may be grouped into three categories. First, there are the employees, seeking improved working conditions and better remuneration for their labor. Second, there is the state or government, which expects the organization to contribute to the maintenance of public order by ensuring that the other constituencies (e.g., employees and consumers) are satisfied. Finally, there are the consumers, who desire maximum satisfaction from the use of public goods and services. That any single model can effectively deal with the question of organizational effectiveness from the perspective of all possible constituencies of the organization simultaneously, as held by the multiple constituency model, is, however, rejected in the proposed model.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS Although questions involving research methodology in the social sciences are generally difficult, they attain an extraordinary level of complexity in developing countries. The particular difficulties of conducting social scientific research in these countries derive from their socioeconomic, political, and cultural structure (cf. Casley and Lury, 1987). Some suggestions on how to overcome some of the most common problems inherent in collecting and analyzing data on consumer satisfaction in developing economies are provided in the next segment. COLLECTING CONSUMER SATISFACTION DATA As far as the collection of data on consumer satisfaction goes, it is recommended that reliance on primary data as appropriate secondary data on most social phenomena including consumer satisfaction is often unavailable or of poor quality. Thus, researchers and others interested in gauging the level of consumer satisfaction with any particular public good and/or service will do well to collect their own data.
Method of Data Collection The survey method, in particular, the questionnaire, is ideally suited for studies dealing with consumer satisfaction in developing nations. The survey method is not simply a data-gathering technique. Rather, it encompasses the systematic collection and analysis of social research data (Marsh, 1982; Njoh, 1990). The questionnaire, as a survey strategy, raises a number of important questions. For instance, it is common knowledge that a complete and up-to-date sampling frame is a prerequisite for efficiently designing a survey sample. Yet, sampling frames are rare in most subject areas of interest to social scientists working in developing countries. Another problem has to do with mutual trust. To be sure, this
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problem is not unique to developing countries. However, the problem is compounded in these countries due to other problems, such as high levels of illiteracy and a general distrust of the government and researchers, whose motives the average resident questions. Yet, mutual trust is crucial for sincere and honest responses to questions designed to elicit a consumer’s opinion about a public good or service. Some creativity is necessary to overcome the problem of sampling frame. First, it is important to isolate the specific subfield of interest within the development policy field at large. For instance, the subfield may be health, housing, agriculture, or education. Next, a list of all the institutional actors in the specific subfield within any given locality should be developed. Finally, a list of the primary beneficiaries or consumers can be developed by examining the relevant official documents of the various institutional actors. In the housing policy subfield in Cameroon, for instance, Njoh (1990, 1992) notes that housing policy agencies keep a ledger wherein the names, addresses, and other relevant information associated with building permit applicants are kept. Such a ledger can serve as an appropriate sampling frame for any researcher interested in gauging the level of consumer satisfaction with housing goods and/or services. The researcher can overcome the second problem by taking time to first understand and familiarize himself or herself with the group under study. There is hardly any substitute for intimate knowledge of the local environment. In fact, it is highly recommended that individuals indigenous to the area be trained to administer the questionnaire. Apart from its ability to win the trust necessary for sincere and honest responses, this strategy will also help promote comprehension of the questions, as translation of the items into the native language(s) may be necessary in most cases. Questionnaire Administration One of the strategic decisions in survey research has to do with selecting the specific means to be used in data collection. Some of the best-known methods in this connection include the (physical) mail, telephone, and face-to-face. With recent technological advancements, it is safe to add the electronic mail (e-mail) to this list. Although the telephone is a popular mode of contact in North America and, to some extent, Western Europe, it is not a recommended means of contact in developing countries. One reason for this is the fact that the level of telephone penetration is considerably low in these societies. Even in the rare event that the survey is limited only to consumers of telephone services, respondents may be skeptical about discussing their personal feelings with an ‘‘invisible’’ stranger. The (physical) mail survey enjoys reasonable legitimacy where the literacy rate is close to 100 percent (Bulmer and Warwick, 1983). However, as mentioned earlier, one of the defining characteristics of developing societies is the widespread level of illiteracy. Also, the mail delivery system in most developing
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nations is very unreliable and underdeveloped. One factor accounting for this is the fact that, in these countries, buildings are often without numerical identity, while streets are usually nameless or have names that are not sign-posted. Therefore, researchers or others interested in eliciting information on consumer satisfaction will do well to avoid dependence on the post office as a means of distributing the survey instrument. Administering the questionnaire face-to-face is arguably the ideal path to follow. In a good number of cases, as indicated earlier, respondents will need help or further clarification in order to meaningfully respond to certain items. Additionally, because individuals in certain societies may not be accustomed to condensing their thoughts into preformed categories (Bulmer and Warwick, 1983), there will often be a need on the part of the researcher to jot down ‘‘bythe-way’’ comments volunteered by the respondents. When the respondents include literate individuals who may need no help completing the questionnaire, the face-to-face strategy should be complemented with what we call ‘‘researcher drop off and pick up’’ (of the instrument). The latter strategy is one in which the researcher or his or her assistant personally drops off the questionnaire at the respondent’s office or residence and returns on an agreed upon date/time to pick up the completed questionnaire. This method guarantees a high return rate, inter alia, as some (e.g., Njoh, 1994) have personally experienced. MANIPULATING CONSUMER SATISFACTION DATA At the outset of this chapter it was stated that measurement of social scientific phenomena is permitted through the assignment of numerals to objects or events. Such an undertaking is a crucial part of manipulating consumer satisfaction data. Njoh’s (1994) model for gauging client satisfaction includes three major steps, namely, identify important attributes of a given good or service; sample and survey consumers of the good or service; compute the satisfaction scores. Identifying Important Attributes of the Good or Service This entails isolating attributes of the good or service such as quality, quantity, accessibility, and so on. The study by Njoh cited earlier, for instance, isolated five attributes of housing services for analysis. The attributes included ‘‘quality,’’ ‘‘cost,’’ the time (necessary for obtaining the service), ‘‘trips’’ (the number of trips consumer must make in order to obtain the service), and ‘‘information’’ (the amount of information provided to consumer to facilitate access to the service). Sampling and Surveying Consumers This entails selecting the specific consumers who will actually respond to various items on the questionnaire. Here, much will depend on common sense,
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as textbook approaches to sampling are not likely to be of any help. As suggested earlier, some of the reasons for this include the fact that sampling frames, central registries of citizens, census tracts with home addresses, comprehensive directories of who’s where, and so on are often lacking or of poor quality in developing countries (Bulmer, 1983). Once the necessary service/goods attributes have been identified, and a reasonable sample has been drawn, the process of actually administering the questionnaire can begin. The questionnaire should typically contain items requiring the consumer to specify his or her level of satisfaction with an attribute of a good or service. Computing Satisfaction Scores A useful approach to computing satisfaction scores for the purpose of evaluating public service delivery organizational performance has been suggested by Njoh (1994). The approach entails four main steps. The first consists of assigning different weights to different levels of satisfaction. Thus, the satisfaction levels of ‘‘unsatisfied’’ (US), ‘‘somewhat satisfied’’ (SS), and ‘‘satisfied’’ (SA) are assigned the weights w1, w2, and w3, respectively, where w3 is greater than w2, and w2 is, in turn, greater than w1. The second step consists of dividing the consumers into different groups based on their expressed levels of satisfaction. The third step consists of multiplying the percentage in each group by the corresponding weights. For instance, if, for a given attribute, 30 percent of all the respondents indicated that they were ‘‘somewhat satisfied,’’ multiply 30 by w2 for that attribute. Finally, the products for each group are summed. The entire process can be summarized in the following mathematical terms: SAS⫽ n / 100 (USw1 ⫹ SS w2 ⫹ SA w3)
where SAS represents satisfaction score; n represents the number of consumers expressing an opinion with respect to the good/service attribute in question; US, SS, and SA represent the number of consumers stating that they are ‘‘unsatisfied,’’ ‘‘somewhat satisfied,’’ and ‘‘satisfied,’’ respectively, with the good/service attribute in question; and w1, w2, and w3 represent the weights associated with the levels of satisfaction, ‘‘unsatisfied,’’ ‘‘somewhat satisfied,’’ and ‘‘satisfied,’’ respectively. CONSUMER SATISFACTION: THE QUESTION OF ‘‘OBJECTIVITY’’ VERSUS ‘‘SUBJECTIVITY’’ By electing to rely on the views and opinion of consumers as a means of measuring development policy organizational performance, we drive head-on into a panoply of questions. One such question has to do with what are often called ‘‘objective’’ versus ‘‘subjective’’ measures in social scientific research. Despite its popularity in the social sciences, the issue of ‘‘objectivity’’ versus
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‘‘subjectivity’’ remains fraught with confusion and ambiguity. This is particularly the case in organizational research, where the distinction between the two concepts is, at best, fuzzy. In a rather futile attempt to draw a line of demarcation between the two types of measures, some analysts (Price and Mueller, 1986) state that, while objective measures involve the direct assessment of organizational properties as well as interviews with ‘‘experts’’ such as top managers, subjective measures involve assessment of these properties through the eyes of employees and/or other stakeholders such as the clients. One cannot help but ponder why the views of experts or top-level officials are considered ‘‘objective,’’ while those of other stakeholders are perceived as ‘‘subjective.’’ It would appear that the difference between the two measures is exaggerated in the relevant literature. In fact, it has been said that ‘‘any objective measure is a subjective measure once removed’’ (Campbell, 1977, quoted in Price and Mueller, 1986: 7). Another question has to do with the reliability and validity of so-called subjective measures. The bulk of the literature either states or implies that objective measures are more valid and reliable than subjective ones. We are in no position to argue to the contrary. However, we deem it necessary to draw attention to the fact that ‘‘when the two types of measures are used to measure the same underlying construct, the correlations among the measures are not large’’ (Price and Mueller, 1986: 7). This leads to a highly probable conclusion: the two types of measures do not measure the same underlying constructs. To the extent that this conclusion is accurate, we believe that any meaningful attempt to assess the performance of development policy organizations must rely on both ‘‘objective’’ and ‘‘subjective’’ measures. The need for this is accentuated when citizen satisfaction is of essence. In fact, as Caputo (1973) contends, objective measures, by themselves, are insufficient evaluation measures if they are not supplemented by subjective measures, which are undoubtedly ideal for tapping citizen feelings. CONCLUSION To gauge organizational effectiveness from the perspective of an organization’s primary beneficiaries, as is being proposed here, is only to measure the organization’s effectiveness on one of several possible dimensions. Thus, in order to avoid confusion, it is important that researchers state explicitly the perspective from which they are dealing with the effectiveness construct prior to embarking on evaluating any organization. That we stress the consumer’s perspective does not imply that the other perspectives are any less important. However, it is assumed that in the development policy field in LDCs, an organization that is capable of satisfying its primary beneficiaries is likely to be effective from the perspective of the state and that of its employees. For the consumers of the organization’s products to rate the organization effective means they are satisfied with the quality and quantity of products and services delivered by the organization. Furthermore, it is reasonable
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to assume, ceteris paribus, that only satisfied workers (employees) are likely to produce such quality and quantity of goods and services. It also follows that satisfied workers and satisfied consumers are unlikely to constitute a threat to the political stability of the nation. Therefore, it is within reason to expect the state to be satisfied with such an organization. What is being asserted here is correlation, not causality. It is not being argued, for example, that consumer satisfaction determines employee satisfaction or political stability. Rather, it is being argued that, given a positive score on consumer satisfaction, one is likely to find an identical score on employee satisfaction and political stability if a nation-state is considered an organization—if only a very large and complex one. This line of reasoning is crucial to appreciating the importance of ‘‘consumer satisfaction’’ as an indicator of organizational effectiveness.
CHAPTER 13
Communications and Democratic Governance for Sustainable Development in Africa Nwafo Nwanko and Babatunde Oyinade
INTRODUCTION Africa, with its vast mineral and human resources (Nkrumah, 1972), is usually referred to as a Third World region. The colonial balkanization of Africa, coupled with an ethnic mosaic that characterizes the continent, continues to produce severe tensions in all African states years after independence because, in each of these states, one group or another feels neglected or worse. Many African countries are yet to have any kind of peace since their ‘‘colonial masters’’ relinquished power to the natives. Angola, Chad, Somalia, Liberia, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Uganda, and Nigeria—to name just a few—continue to suffer from the outcome of their independence movements. Africans have become disillusioned because every country on the continent has one kind of major problem or another. Serious ethnic, economic, cultural, and educational development problems, along with the lack of administrative decentralization in its different forms, are common. Compounding the problems are the continuing uncertainty of military takeovers, the absence of effective procedures for changing existing civilian regimes, and the lack of effective central governments that ensure democratic governance and accountability. These factors have all helped erode and slow development on the continent. Thus, despite the wind of change that swept the world and brought the fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the division of Czechoslovakia, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the peace accord between the Israelis and the Palestinians, there is a scarcity of any significant evidence of sustained movement toward democratic governance in Africa. While some African countries are experimenting with multiparty political systems, others have leaders who are content to hang onto their hold on political power. How-
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ever, more and more African countries, expressing the goal of democratizing their societies, have been deciding to hold general elections. While some of these countries actually go through the election procedures with politicians who are determined to win by any means necessary, others simply cancel scheduled elections or fail to complete the electoral process. In the few instances in which some leaders came to power through multiparty democratic processes, effective governance is being undermined by some unscrupulous professional politicians who adopt a wait-and-see attitude, convinced that whatever democratic efforts that are in evidence have, at best, a fleeting life span. In almost all the African countries, normal political, economic, and social life has been betrayed by ethnic strife. As a result, the complete social transformation needed for democracy to flourish has been hampered. When one considers all the issues just discussed, one sees that, in Africa, all forms of human interaction should be marshaled in the total effort to improve the political process. Effective communication must accompany the transformation to democratic governance. For sustainable development to occur in Africa, concerted efforts must be made to allow the media of mass communication to contribute to the political, economic, educational, and cultural development and to ethnic integration throughout the continent. Such special areas as agriculture and social development must be given considerable attention by the mass communication system, since there is considerable agreement among social scientists and policymakers that mass communication, when organized properly, does play a vital and positive role in the development of societies (Lerner, 1958; Rogers, 1971; Melkote and Shoemaker, 1991). Mass communication has, indeed, played a significant role in the socioeconomic and political transformation of the world and in the production and dissemination of information. New and unfolding technological and other events, however, have such global significance that Africa must also take heed of them in the effort of completing transformation needed for democracy to flourish on the continent. Ethnicity remains an intractable problem in Africa, a strong evidence of the division created by the colonization of overlapping ethnic units that differ in their traditional sociopolitical forms. These units have been unable to coexist in single, modern democratic systems. In almost every case in postindependence Africa, as Potholm (1979) pointed out in the case of Nigeria, there was a most delicate balance among the hierarchal, segmented, and federated monarchical forms of traditional political organization that had to be accommodated within the new state. The differences in traditional political forms have been the basic cause of the failure of African leaders to work closely together following independence. This chapter sheds light on some of these problems and on what can be done through communication in preparation for the twenty-first century. It is argued in this chapter that the success of sustainable development efforts in Africa requires three critical conditions:
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1. African nations, individually and collectively, must develop some adequate capacity to contribute to, access, and effectively manage the vast amounts of new and relevant information that characterizes the postmodern world. 2. African nations must successfully develop effective and policy-relevant ideologies to guide the structural and administrative decentralization that is necessary for the effective management of ethnicity. 3. African nations must recognize that nonmilitary reforms and developmental adjustments cannot be effected successfully in a context of constant military interventions, since sustainable development requires a degree of political stability and a certainty of political renewal procedures.
The analysis in this chapter uses the communication processes and strategies that are needed to move Africa closer to achieving these conditions. It recognizes that the creation and organization of information are a central process in any modern society. As noted by Kraus and Davis (1980), there is a need for a smoothly functioning, well-planned communication system that effectively transmits information for the sole purpose of carrying out effective administrative processes. This position is supported by Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) and is further bolstered by the arrival of the ‘‘global village,’’ which was predicted by Marshall McLuhan (1967). The basic theoretical position of the analysis here is that sustainable development in Africa requires democratic governance, which, in turn, requires effective public communication. These should not be seen as occurring in a sequence; they should, rather, be best looked at as correlational or as mutually and simultaneously causal. None of the elements have inherent temporal priority as an independent variable in the chain of relationships that bind them together; they should, therefore, not be so designated. DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION AND GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Effective development efforts require effective institutional coordination (Nwanko, 1995: 103), and effective governance is a critical management mechanism for sustainable development efforts. Development planning is, indeed, a public policy-making activity that is centered on the coordination of institutional rules, organizations, and people as a part of the effort to manage the civic public realm more effectively. Development planning, in other words, is a special type of governance activity, an effort to cultivate and manage people’s connections with each other and the institutions of society. In their attempts to describe the processes of governance, political theorists have usually followed the practice of dichotomizing the political system into the actor dimension and the structural dimension. Although Hyden and Bratton (1992: 8) followed this practice, they recognized the weakness of the actor-
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structure analysis of governance and attempted to improve the model by introducing two new concepts, authority and reciprocity, to complement or mediate the concepts of power versus exchange in the actor dimension, and two new concepts, trust and accountability, to complement or mediate the concepts of compliance versus innovation in the structural dimension. The traditional analysis of the actor dimension of governance sees the relations between political actors—mainly those with power (the leadership), and those without power (the public or the masses)—as being either a power relation or an exchange relation. In a power relationship, those with power exercise it unilaterally over those who do not have power. In an exchange relationship, on the other hand, influence and/or other valences are bartered between the political leadership and the masses in a quid pro quo fashion. The modification of the model underscores a recognition that sociopolitical relationships based on power, that is an asymmetrical, unidirectional exercise of influence (despite resistance), or on exchange, a quid pro quo transfer of values, are not consistent with effective, democratic governance. Similarly, automatic compliance to the structural demands of the sociopolitical system discourages change and innovation, and constant innovation is dysfunctional to the system by creating uncertainty and undermining the basic values of the system, along with the policies, laws, rules, and regulations that emanate from them. The concept of authority implies that, in governance processes, power should be exercised legitimately. The concept of reciprocity similarly acknowledges the need for the political system (and its state leadership) to be susceptible to public, that is, citizen, influence. The concept of trust underscores the need for system stability through trustful identification with the state and its leadership; it also recognizes the need for that trust to be earned through accountable leadership behaviors. The intermediate concepts of authority and reciprocity serve as mediators of the extreme processes of power and exchange relations in the actor dimension, just as trust and accountability mediate the extreme processes of compliance and innovation in the structural dimension. While these modifications of the actor-structure analysis of governance improved our understanding of democratic governance processes, this chapter argues that governance cannot be understood adequately without a clear understanding of the role of communication in governance processes. How, then, does communication feature in governance? The answer lies in the understanding of the concept of governance as described earlier. Hyden defined governance as ‘‘the use of political authority to promote and enhance societal values—economic as well as non-economic—that are sought by individuals and groups’’ (1990: 246). Because the governance process, according to this definition, ‘‘refers to processes whereby values in society at different levels are being realized’’ (Hyden, 1990: 246), the processes presuppose a great deal of influential participation by nongovernmental sectors of society in the articulation and allocation of social values through public policy processes. Apparently, this logic led the World Bank to qualify its definition of governance as ‘‘the exercise of
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political power to manage a nation’s affairs’’ by acknowledging that governance requires ‘‘a rule of law, a free press, respect for human rights, and citizen involvement in intermediate associations’’ (Bratton and Rothchild, 1992: 265). Governance, in short, requires multifaceted and multidirectional communicatory influence relationships that co-orient the public perceptions, decisions, and behaviors of the government, individuals, and organizations. Communicatory influence is influence effected through leadership processes that are based on information and persuasion. Influence in human relationships is capable of being effected through a variety of processes that include force, coercion, power, authority, communication (propaganda, information, and persuasion), reciprocation, and exchange. A relationship based on force is the most asymmetrical, while that based on exchange is the most symmetrical. Influence relationships in an effective governance situation would exclude force and coercion because relations based on these influence processes are unidirectional and asymmetrical. Such a governance situation would also exclude automatic exchange and reciprocation (consummatory authority) because of their contingent and simultaneous quid pro quo nature. In contrast, authority and convenantal reciprocation (mutual responsibility) would be consistent with effective governance because they result from legitimacy that is established through previous communication, and, as such, they depend on the structural values and normative institutional rules that define expectations and demands in public relationships. Thus, when agencies, like the World Bank, talk of institution building, they usually are referring to the need to establish institutional structures that ensure legitimate authority and the convenantal reciprocity (mutual responsibility) of influence that is presupposed. While it is conceptually impossible for a relationship based on force and coercion to be legitimate, power can be exercised either legitimately or illegitimately. Legitimate (or authoritative) power is based on an authority that inheres in the propriety of institutional rules that inform it. Since such rules cannot be developed without an extensive (long-term) and/or an intensive (short-term) public communication that involves all significant sectors of the civic public, a legitimate exercise of public power cannot occur in the absence of public communication. An exercise of power that is not informed by proper institutional rules is illegitimate. The legitimacy of influence is, therefore, assessable by the quality of communicative public participation that preceded it. Thus, a communicative influence that tends toward the forceful and coercive (propaganda) should be seen as qualitatively inferior and, therefore, less supportive of legitimacy than that communicative influence that tends toward authoritative reciprocity (persuasion). Information (its production, distribution, and usage) is, of course, an essential element of all (public) communication. In fact, the quality of a public communication effort—whether it is, for example, describable as propaganda or as persuasion—is determined by the availability of information and by how that available information is used or manipulated.
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This is why it is necessary that the institutional system that serves as the context for public communication be organized to ensure that public communication is optimally open and that it is conducted with a sense of social and moral responsibility that is not merely legalistic (Nwanko, 1996: 113–36). In order to manage such an open system successfully, attention must be paid to the values and ideologies that drive policy making at all levels and sectors of society. Attention must also be paid to how the policies made are spelled out in specific laws, rules, and regulations that guide the decision making and behaviors of individuals in concrete situations. The essential importance of effective (i.e., democratic, not merely efficient) communication for democratic governance is that it ensures that the institutional rules that serve as the context of public policy making are legitimate and also that the goals of public policy and the processes for pursuing them are sustainable. Because the goals of public policy may include the development aspirations of society, we, in the analysis here, as did Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne (1993), approach development institutionally and believe that successful, sustainable development begins with efforts at building up a sustainable infrastructure that focuses simultaneously on the economic, political, and sociocultural institutional sectors of society (Nwanko, 1995: 56–110). Almost all economic and sociopolitical analyses of social change recognize the centrality of social values in effecting the special kind of sustained positive social change that is referred to as development. They also recognize that such a developmental change requires purposive, planned, or instrumental activity on the part of those who desire it to ensure its sustainability. Economic and sociopolitical analyses have, however, shown different results of the significance of social values in developmental changes and on where they fit in the development equation. While economists have tended to see developmental values as independent variables, political scientists have tended to see them as dependent variables and also to see the state as the driving force in the developmental process that they refer to as the building of institutional capacity. The emphasis on the state has been blamed on a misunderstanding of governing as ‘‘something done by governments rather than a process carried on by citizens through diverse organizations empowered and limited by institutions or rules of law adopted and modified by a people’’ (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990: 289). An exclusive emphasis on the state as the driving force in development is inconsistent with the view that sustainable development implies steady improvements in the material conditions of life for people and in the opportunities that are available to them to participate in integrated sociopolitical systems. In fact, from this perspective of sustainable development, the belief that ‘‘only the state had the capacity, the knowledge, and the vision’’ to bring about social transformation would appear to be completely erroneous (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990: 311). Democratic governance requires the encouragement and institution of diverse organizations that serve ‘‘as frameworks of rights, privileges, obligations, and prohibitions’’ and, therefore, as the basic institutional infrastructure
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through which people achieve their daily developmental needs. These developmental needs ultimately boil down to the need to eradicate poverty and its underlying causes, which Clark (1991: 12–28) believes can be accomplished only through successful efforts that see equity, democracy, and social justice as paramount objectives, alongside the objective of economic growth. Poverty itself has been seen (Clark, 1991) as associated (1) with social and physical isolation because of the absence or inadequacy of a social services infrastructure; (2) with vulnerability that results from exploitation, natural disasters, physical incapacity, or social conventions; and (3) with powerlessness that is defined by the inability to prevent exploitation because of a lack of bargaining power. Because of these associations, development efforts are seen as most likely to succeed when they are focused on providing the conditions that enable people to take charge of their own destinies. These conditions include improvement of the physical infrastructure, which makes development possible in other areas; improvement in those areas of economic activity that are vital for improving the quality of available human resources and for financing improvements in the quality of life; and natural resource base protection, which ensures the environmental sustainability of development for the benefit of future generations. While civic or voluntary organizations have central roles in these efforts, it should not be suggested that these efforts can be mounted and be successfully implemented in the absence of political leadership. While democracy requires ‘‘a whole set of rights which citizens must be afforded if government is to be open, accountable and participatory’’ (Clark, 1990: 14), ‘‘a foundation of democratic processes’’ from which people’s aspirations can be identified, people’s aspirations have to be prioritized, and political choices made by those who have authoritative power to do so. Such an authoritative power can inhere only in a legitimate and effective political leadership. The point that needs to be made, then, is that political leadership does not reside exclusively in the state apparatus; it also inheres in the organizations of the civic sector, since development is achieved by the people themselves. This is what is meant by those who say that, in popular politics ‘‘the traditional emphasis on production politics—capitalist versus socialist ownership of the means of production—is giving way to a new age of consumption politics—demanding a popular right to determine what is produced and how, and the quality of the society we live in’’ (Clark, 1990: 15). FAILURE OF GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA The kind of democratic governance described earlier has not been a huge success in modern African nation-states. The winds of change that blew through Eastern Europe and a good portion of the communist world ought to be a constant reminder for African states to take another and immediate look at the importance of democratic governance to foster national development and integration. Despite the wind of democratic revolution that found its way to Africa
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in the aftermath of recent changes in the world order, some African leaders have continued to resort to military takeovers and totalitarianism and the habit of hanging onto political power at all costs. There is an urgent need in Africa for accountability to the people and for peaceful resolution of political rights conflicts. The sense of democratization appears to be lost in Africa, despite the global popularization of democratic ideas that was energized by technical advances in mass communications. The 1980s witnessed many peculiar regime changes in Africa. In Liberia, Master Sergeant Samuel Kenyon Doe seized power in a bloody coup with a promise to reform the political system; he, instead, turned himself into a dictator and was killed in an ensuing civil war. In Ghana, Jerry Rawlings was able to eliminate all previous living presidents to run for the Ghanaian presidency himself with little opposition. In Nigeria, General Babangida canceled a hotly contested election, while Biya outplayed his opponents in Cameroon, and Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, vowing to continue his one-party state, won his reelection bid with 90 percent of the votes cast. In Zaire, Mobutu Sesse Seko tolerates no opposition; in Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe would give his opponents no inch; and from Gambia, Dauda Jawara sought refuge in a neighboring country after many years in office. In what appears to be a test of democratic norms in Africa, Dr. Kamuzu Banda was voted out of office in Malawi. Thus, many African countries, irrespective of whether they were former English, French, Portuguese, Dutch, or Italian colonies, continue to be plagued by regimes that disallow a free press and public criticism of government actions and policies. Clearly, military intervention is not the answer to the various problems plaguing Africa. The military is a part and parcel of any government, and a part cannot be better than a whole. A military takeover tends to bring the whole political system to a standstill, and the fault is not in the determination of the military to correct ills. The point is that any permanent or sustainable political change should recognize the existence of open political rivalries, legitimate rights and obligations, diversity of group interests, and oppositional efforts. In general, the military seem to have a great deal of trouble enhancing democratic governance, partly because of the way they usually come to power and partly because of their training. In many examples, including Ethiopia, Somalia, Zaire, the Congo, Sudan, Nigeria, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Uganda, and the Central African Republic, the military have historically failed in their attempt to rule without prior public mandate. DEMOCRACY, ETHNICITY, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA Do Africa’s political problems result from a political culture that is innate to the African environment? While this question is capable of eliciting a variety of answers, depending on interpretations of ancient and contemporary African history, we do know that human beings are capable of creating their own so-
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ciopolitical cultures on the bases of their own interpretations of their environment and needs. Therefore, it is important to note that the thirst for democracy continues unabetted everywhere in Africa. But Africa does not seem to have devised an operational democratic mode that fits its exact culture and needs. In those African countries where elections have been allowed, they were conducted without any fundamental change in institutional ideology; rather, cosmetic changes that favored the regime in power were made. In each of these African countries, the problem of ethnic loyalty and rivalry continued to undermine the integrity of national governance. Increased ethnic divisions are exacerbated by economic, educational, and sociopolitical disparities and general poverty. Also, the strict control of public communication media and the absence of any effective political agenda continue as the bane of the national political order. International support of African regimes has not consistently encouraged the institution of democratic processes because such has support has often been misguided and has often been given at the expense of the interest of millions of African people. Internally, the lack of administrative decentralization and its complement, the overcentralization of political power, multiply the problems of the absence of genuine participation in the public policy process and, therefore, of the lack of any real understanding of the needs and aspirations of the populace. It is imperative that effective political change and reorganization be set in motion for twenty-first-century Africa. This is not an impossible goal. Apartheid is ended in South Africa, and there are promising efforts in other parts of the continent to put in place electoral processes that would bring an alignment of democratization forces and goals. These efforts necessarily include genuine popular participation in creating new laws, new ideologies, and new political agendas that foster cultural, economic, and sociopolitical tolerance, bearing in mind that equality is an important ingredient of democracy. It should be clearly understood that states emerging from military rule face a formidable task of instituting democratic governance principles and, therefore, that such tasks require special communication efforts and strategies, especially where ethnicity and weak socioeconomic frameworks are seriously problematic. Thus, although many political parties have emerged in several African countries as a result of significant democratization efforts, these political parties tend usually to be ethnically based and tend, therefore, to entrench excessive ethnic loyalty, which serves as a harbinger of political decay and the negation of democracy. Voting has always been a true test of tribal loyalty in most African countries, and, in the current democratization efforts, the hope that a new sense of political competition would bring unity has collided with traditional political values and forms. African countries have succeeded in removing tribal divisions as a bane of political democracy. Because ethnic divisions and loyalty are there, many politicians have not hesitated to exploit them in pursuit of their stubborn and selfish political ambitions. In doing so, however, they have sacrificed the genuine welfare and interest of the people.
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Massive poverty continues to plague many Africans, and, along with gross human rights violations, there is so much breakdown of physical and social security that even materially affluent Africans have difficulty enjoying their wealth. They often have to barricade themselves behind heavily fortified homes because of constant threats to their lives and property. The police, considered in many preindependence African societies as a tool of colonial oppression, continue to lack efficacy and respect because many people in postindependence Africa consider them criminalized and susceptible to bribery at all levels. Most military and civilian regimes in Africa, including the judicial systems, are often seen by the general public to have compromised their integrity along with the police. The military administrations have, therefore, taken few, if any, effective steps to improve the image of the police. Endemic problems that relate to poor security and waste of human resources in Africa include inadequate investment in agriculture, private industries, and education. Persistent lack of drugs and other health care resource needs in hospitals and clinics compounds Africa’s health management and development problems, highlighting the fact that there can be no effective infrastructure development without effective human resource investment. Education is key to the development of a country’s human resource base, and investment in education is the most important investment that a country can make, because there can be no substitute for an adequately educated and enlightened public. Because Africa’s social and economic problems appear to result mainly from dubious political and economic practices, they can be resolved through effective governance. This is why people like Adedeji (1991) believe that the social dimension of Africa’s development and transformation is as crucial as the purely economic dimension. Because the two dimensions are, in fact, intertwined, none of Africa’s development problems can be effectively dealt with under the current context of widespread breakdown of the social and economic order. Sustainable development in Africa requires, in other words, the institution of adequate social and technoeconomic infrastructure that provides an enabling African environment of collective problem solving, self-generated development, and selfconfidence, which are necessary for the democratization of the development process. Kibuka (1990) and van Nieuwenhuijze (1979) believe, like Adedeji (1991), that development is best conceived of as a positive transformation of society in all spheres of its economic, social, and political life and that, since the human factor is of decisive importance for economic efficiency, it is right that the transformation of behavior and socioproductive forces become the point of concentration in any development initiatives. Yet, economic development remains a very critical and unsettled issue in Africa. Prior to independence and the years immediately following it, agriculture was the main economic component of the economy of most African states. The efforts to indigenize the economy after independence led, in most cases, to active state participation in what has been called ‘‘the period of peripheral capitalist industrialization’’ in the development of capitalism in Nigeria (Graf, 1988: 53).
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The idea that Africans should be in charge of their economy sounded good, but in the context of corruption and mismanagement, coupled with the unwillingness of foreigners to relinquish their controlling positions, the economic nationalization strategy simply pushed Africa’s economy more into dependency of foreigners interests. The overall framework that allowed indigenous citizens to buy shares in foreign companies took shape, but the framework favored only those who had access to financial institutions (Graff, 1988: 58). In this context, indigenization simply shifted the financial risk burden of new and existing investments onto some African investors without any appreciable increase in their control over enterprises. In fact, indigenization, through transnational cooperation, contributed to a decrease, rather than an increase, in the local control of the economy: indigenization simply favored those elites who became fronts for nonindigenous owners of the means of production while depriving the masses of the people of the opportunity to be involved in the economy. In many instances, agriculture was simply abandoned because private indigenous industries could not compete with the transnational ones. The negative effects of some of the indigenization efforts remind us that, as Rogers wrote, ‘‘development communication should be viewed as a total process that includes understanding the audience and its needs’’ (1976: 13). They also remind us that effective communication for sustainable development needs a context of democratic governance. Since effective democratic governance also requires an adequately educated and informed civil public, Africa must, today, also deal effectively with newly innovated communication technologies, because the new communication media may turn out to be the most important media of formal and informal public education. CONCLUSION It should now be clear that the formulation of effective policy-relevant ideologies is needed, if the structural and administrative decentralization necessary for the effective management of ethnicity and the fostering of democratic governance in Africa is to be carried out successfully. Education and an intellectually alert public are also needed, if national integration and economic growth are to be a reality in Africa. National development cannot occur in a context in which healthy public exchange and communication are stifled and in which the nurturing of healthy human resources is ignored. Therefore, African governments must necessarily recognize the primacy of communication and technology in the dynamics of development. The mass media must be allowed to engage the rural and urban populace in genuine public discourse that encourages the politics of inclusion. Modern societies are supported by three essential infrastructures: transportation, electric power, and communication. Effective communication not only offers a means of increasing sociocultural awareness but also serves to catalyze the development of the other essential infrastructures. Therefore, an economic
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development plan that recognizes the significance of the effective use of communication media and information technology is more likely to succeed than one that does not. The most dynamic elements of socioeconomic development, as Lerner (1958) saw it a long time ago, are the development of a nucleus of mobile, change-accepting personalities, coupled with the emergence of a viable mass media system that is capable of spreading the ideas and attitudes of social mobility and change through the interaction of urbanization. Although Lerner (1958), a modernization theorist, was wrong in seeing these elements as sequential and linear in nature, he was empirically right in seeing the mass media as ‘‘the great multiplier’’ in the development dynamics, the means that can spread the requisite knowledge and attitude immeasurably more quickly and widely than any other known means. Rao (1966) made the same point by referring to the mass media as the great smoother of transition. The meaning of a message has been said to be the change that it produces in the image. The hope is that the image that African countries have of governance and development will change, as suggested by the message in the analysis presented here.
CHAPTER 14
The Role of Indigenous Education in Development: The Tanzanian Case Charles Bwenge
INTRODUCTION Why is Africa poor? Why has Sub-Saharan Africa been becoming poorer and poorer in spite of its ‘‘immense’’ natural and human resources? This has become a typical and important item on the agenda of every conference or gathering on Africa. Even the central themes of many conferences on development justifiably suggest the same topic. Interestingly, very recently (March 1996) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the same issue was the main focus at the first conference of African ministers responsible for ‘‘sustainable development.’’ This indicates that there is a genuine problem to be addressed. In fact, this problem can be expressed in one word: poverty. While launching a campaign to eradicate poverty in Africa, March 1996, Gustav Speth, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) director, rightly called it the ‘‘modern tyrant.’’ Poverty is one of the major indicators of underdevelopment. This is the real situation existing in Africa, especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa. The major concern within and outside Africa is how to get out of this plight. In this respect, for over a long period, a number of strategies have been suggested, and more and more are being put forward today. While some have been effective, others have worsened the situation. As a matter of fact, no permanent and concrete solutions have been found so far. In this regard this chapter focuses on the education sector in relation to development. It is an indisputable fact that one of the most important aspects and basics of development is education. For example, Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), eminent American statesman and educationalist, ‘‘believed that education was the key to the survival of the new republic he had helped to frame in 1776. He reasoned that if the masses were educated they would be able to recognize
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tyranny in all its forms and thereby avoid its destructive forces’’ (Sherwood and Lasala, 1993: 9). The issue of education can also be viewed in the same way in the African context with regard to ‘‘sustainable development.’’ However, this chapter focuses on one important but somehow disregarded component of education, that is, language-in-education (medium of instruction). In other words, the chapter explores the interaction between the notions of development, education, and language-in-education: how one element acts on the other, which governs what, to what extent, for what purposes, and how relevant such an interaction would be in the process of ‘‘sustainable development.’’ For the purpose of illustration, special reference is made to Tanzania.
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS Although educational systems in various societies differ in organization and in content, the purpose is basically the same, that is, to borrow Julius Nyerere’s words, ‘‘to transmit from one generation to the next the accumulated wisdom and knowledge of the society, and to prepare the young people for their future membership of the society and their active participation in its maintenance or development’’ (1967: 1, emphasis added). Essentially, each system focuses on developing and optimizing an individual’s intellect, talents, and skills. This can never be achieved without the use of language, which is the most natural human means of formulation, expression, and communication of thoughts and feelings. Language is therefore among central components in any educational system. As the notion of ‘‘development policy’’ would invoke the notion of which ‘‘education policy’’ is to be adopted, the same would be the case with regard to ‘‘education policy’’ to the ‘‘language’’ to be used in that education, that is, language-in-education. Although the aspect of language-in-education is always embodied in the education policy, it need not necessarily be given equal importance in all societies. The issue may appear less important in those countries that are more or less monolingual such as Britain, China, France, Germany, Japan, and so on. Incidentally and interestingly, the majority of these nations fall in the category of developed/rich countries. The issue, on the other hand, becomes extremely important in multilingual societies with complex sociolinguistic settings. This category includes most of the so-called Third World countries, that is, poor countries. The whole of Sub-Saharan Africa falls in this group. Such a situation has resulted in the educational problems related to language-in-education and somehow contributes to the failure of education to function as a tool to emancipate the masses from poverty, ‘‘the modern tyrant’’ in Africa. In this connection it is very important to have a glance at the sociolinguistic setup in the region as a necessary background to the understanding of the difficult situation these nations are facing regarding education, language-in-education, and their roles to societal development.
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SOCIOLINGUISTIC SETUP Sociolinguistically, the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa is multilingual; that is, in each country there exist numerous indigenous languages corresponding to their distinct ethnic groups. So the total number of languages spoken in each country depends on the number of ethnic groups present in the country. For example Grosjean (1982: 8) reports that in Ghana there are some 50 different languages, in Nigeria some 400. Legere (1992: 99) mentions that Tanzania has some 120. As a result, unlike most countries, for instance, African political boundaries do not reflect linguistic boundaries. However, among these indigenous languages in some countries, one or two may be functioning as a lingua franca (i.e., a language used for communication among peoples of different languages). For example, Swahili in East Africa and Hausa or Wolof in West Africa are functioning as lingua francas. The complexity of the sociolinguistic setup in Sub-Saharan Africa is also multiplied by the presence of some foreign languages introduced during the colonial period and consequently adopted as ‘‘official’’ languages on becoming independent. Thus, alongside indigenous languages and lingua francas, there is at least one foreign language used as the ‘‘official’’ language. Many SubSaharan African countries, if not all, have found it difficult to adopt their indigenous languages as ‘‘official.’’ Instead, they have opted for foreign languages (notably, English, French, Portuguese, etc.). This has great implications for the language-in-education and consequently for the education system in general. First and foremost, the notion of ‘‘official’’ language implies that it will be the one used in schools. Second, the fact that it is impossible to have the whole population fluent in a foreign language leaves a question mark on the effectiveness of education provided in such a language. One would still wonder how children and young people who are supposed to be equipped with relevant knowledge cope with their learning through languages that are not much familiar to them. Certainly, there are sound reasons (historical, economic, political, etc.) for adopting foreign languages as ‘‘official’’ ones and therefore as languages of education, but the fact remains that at some levels learning cannot be effective if done through unfamiliar languages. This fact, in return, arouses the question as to which level of education is most important to ‘‘sustainable development’’ and which language should be used. In this regard we should bear in mind two types of education, that is, mass education, which would include mandatory formal education for all children and adult education, and elite education, which is essentially higher education usually provided to a very small portion of the population. EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA The newly independent Africa inevitably inherited the colonial education system, which was essentially elite, and insisted on the use of the colonial master’s
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language (i.e., English for British colonies, French for French colonies, etc.). Today most of these countries have maintained the same type of education without making significant changes to suit the existing situation in the region. The major goal of this education has been to produce highly skilled manpower in every sector. An interesting aspect of such strategy is that this education is to be provided in a foreign or international language, and the function of lower levels is to prepare those few who are to attain higher education. Consequently, little attention has been paid to making elementary and secondary education complete in themselves and prepare and enable the masses to participate actively and productively in the development process of their communities and nations at large. The question that calls for our attention here is not only the level of mandatory education but also the appropriate language to be used. It should be pointed out, however, that both types of education, elite and mass, are equally important in the process of ‘‘sustainable development’’ in such young and poor nations. They complement each other. In any case highly skilled manpower is required for managerial functions, leadership, professionals, and scientific and technical advancement. The educated masses, on the other hand, are also necessary, as they form the bases for any societal development and its sustainability. Let us recapitulate Jefferson’s great ideas that ‘‘if the masses were educated they would be able to recognize tyranny in all its forms and thereby avoid its destructive forces.’’ Most educational systems in Africa have a seven-year elementary school and six-year secondary school structure of formal education prior to university level. With regard to language-in-education the general tendency is that some countries use indigenous languages in primary education; some use both indigenous and foreign languages at this level. But all of them use foreign languages in secondary education. In many African countries today, a significantly large population of children attend secondary school. However, many people still consider it an elite education or a base for elite education. As a result they are still insisting to provide it in foreign languages, and no proper efforts are made to make it mandatory to all children. For successful ‘‘sustainable development’’ in Africa, mandatory education needs to be extended to include the current first four years of secondary education and needs to be provided in indigenous languages. In order to illustrate what we have put forward in the preceding section, let us take Tanzania as an example. THE TANZANIAN CASE In a well-detailed historical account of education in the development of Tanzania, Buchert (1994) identifies five distinct educational policies, which correspond with socioeconomic development strategies prevailing at different times in the colonial and independence periods, notably between 1919 and 1990. These are ‘‘education for adaptation’’ (1920s–1945); ‘‘education for modernization’’ (1947–1960); ‘‘education for manpower development’’ (1961–1967);
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‘‘education for self-reliance’’ (1967–1985); and ‘‘education for economic liberalization’’ (1985–today). Our interest in this context is to see how the language-in-education aspect has been handled. The ‘‘education for adaptation’’ applied only to the African population and aimed at the provision of basic reading, writing, and accounting skills in support of the indirect rule system and for improvement of the rural sector. At that time the British colonial administration made a significant effort to establish Swahili language as ‘‘semiofficial’’ in the whole of East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda). One of the motives behind this move was the desire to consolidate African education through a Swahili medium. During this period the standardization of the language began (i.e., in the 1930s), following the establishment of the East African InterTerritorial Language [Swahili] Committee (ITLC) in 1929. The period between the end of World War II and independence (1961) saw a drastic change in development strategies. Buchert summarizes that the focus on Western modernization for the British colonies after the Second World War implied an attempt to establish a development process similar to that of Britain, by which industrialization based on capitalist agriculture and the expansion of a modern urban sector were given priority over the development of the traditional rural sector. (1994: 49)
Consequently, the ‘‘education for modernization’’ policy was formulated. Important to note here is the major difference between these two educational policies adopted before independence. According to Buchert, Education for Adaptation advocated social improvement from the bottom of the educational pyramid, aiming at the development of the traditional rural sector in cooperation with the rurally based African leadership, in order to blend the existing culture with new Western elements [and] Education for Modernization supported economic development at the top of the educational pyramid, aiming at an expansion of modern urban and capitalist sector and accompanied by the introduction of Western democratic political institutions in order to establish a Western national politico-economic unit. (1994: 68)
With regard to language-in-education policies the former adopted Swahili as a medium of instruction and English as a subject, and the latter adopted English as a medium of instruction. On becoming independent, each of the former East African dependencies adopted its own social and politicoeconomic policies, including educational and language policies. In the first seven years of Tanzanian independence (1961– 1967) the educational policy remained more or less the same as the one inherited from the colonial period, that is, ‘‘education for skilled manpower development.’’ Like education for modernization, education for manpower development rested on the assumption that higher education was crucial for the country’s growth of a modern urban sector characterized by a market-oriented economy. Nonetheless, in response to the growing social differentiation resulting from the
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inherited colonial type of education, Tanzania in 1967 formulated a new focus for the development process, aiming at constructing a socialist and self-reliant nation. With the new national development strategy, renewed attention was focused on the rural sector of the economy, and the new goals centered on equality and participation by the mass of population in local and national development efforts as the basis for the construction of a socialist society. Education still considered crucial to achieve these ends, education for self-reliance, was adopted as a new policy. The emphasis now shifted from highly skilled manpower development to mass provision of education, which was seen as a channel to further national political-economic goals and a common sociocultural outlook. In the words of Nyerere, the architect of the policy, [T]he object of the teaching must be the provision of knowledge, skills, and attitudes which will serve the student when he or she lives and works in a developing and changing socialist state; it must not be aimed at university entrance. (1967: 18)
In the wake of this new strategy of development, Swahili, which was already declared a ‘‘national’’ language in 1963, became an ‘‘official’’ language alongside English. This new status allowed it to be one of the languages of education. In fact, in the same year (1967) it was declared the sole medium of instruction for the whole primary education (i.e., standard/grade I to VII) with the exception of international schools, which were catering to children of diplomats and other foreign residents. At the same time, a task force was formed to work on the preparation for the use of Swahili in secondary education by the mid-1970s, as well as in literacy campaigns. To this effect various measures were taken to facilitate the promotion and development of the language. For example, the National Swahili Council (commonly known as BAKITA, Swahili acronym for BAraza la KIswahili la TAifa) was formed in the same year, assigned a major task to coordinate all the country’s Swahili promotional and developmental activities. In 1970 the InterTerritorial Language Committee (ITLC), which had earlier moved to the University College of Dar es Salaam as its headquarters, was then declared one of the research organs of the newly established independent University of Dar es Salaam. This organ took the new name of Institute of Kiswahili Research (commonly referred to as TUKI, Swahili acronym for Taasisi ya Uchunguzi wa KIswahili). This was assigned the task of researching all aspects of the Swahili, including linguistic structure and literature, as well as culture. Also a department of Swahili within the faculty of arts and social sciences was established in order to deal with teaching Swahili courses, which, in turn, would produce teachers and researchers in secondary schools, teachers’ colleges, and other related institutions. Indeed, this was a good start. It was an appropriate move toward establishing Swahili, an indigenous language, as a language of education in primary and secondary education. This is pertinent to our conception of what should entail
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mandatory education, mass education, and the language appropriate to the provision of such education, which, in turn, is essential for ‘‘sustainable development.’’ The population educated through a familiar language learns better and may become more creative than the one that learns through an unfamiliar language. In this respect, enormous success was noted, especially in the (functional) literacy and adult education programs in the 1970s. The functional literacy concept combined the teaching of literacy with the teaching of different vocational skills, which were particularly useful for the various local economies such as farming, fishing, animal husbandry, and soon. Buchert, for instance, reports that these programs ‘‘were implemented through innovative teaching methods and were perhaps the most successful of all measures adopted to fulfill the goals of education for self-reliance’’ (1994: 15). Furthermore, the universal primary education program was launched in the early 1970s, thus enabling all children to get a primary education. Unfortunately, today secondary education has not been made universal/mandatory, nor is Swahili used as a medium of instruction at this level, consequently denying young people in secondary schools the opportunity to learn and become creative through the language familiar to them. This would have made their education more effective and, in turn, would have contributed enormously to the process of ‘‘sustainable development.’’ What went wrong, and what are the effects? Although the introduction of Swahili as a medium of instruction did not raise any significant objections or queries, the plan for Swahili to replace English in secondary education and eventually in higher education prompted a very hot debate among educators, scholars, language planners, politicians, and the public at large, as well as foreign donors who dominated the whole of the 1970s. The majority held the view that secondary education was mainly to facilitate the urban and modern sector and to prepare young people for higher education. Therefore, it was reasoned, perhaps wrongly, that such education should continue to be provided in English. Note that this was contrary to the goals of education for self-reliance and to the existing reality. As a result, while teaching through Swahili was going on quite well in primary schools, no definite decision/ policy could be made with regard to secondary education. Everything remained in suspense for almost fifteen years. Not until the year 1984 did the government announce its decision that English would continue to be the language of education in secondary and higher education. The dominant and widespread misconception of relating academic quality with the English language is made very clear in Buchert’s (1994: 147) analysis that the concern of the Presidential Commission for Education was the academic quality of education, its cost, and its training role, particularly at the postprimary level, and he adds that ‘‘this was reflected in the acknowledgment of English as the medium of instruction at the post-primary level, whereas Kiswahili was maintained at the primary level’’ (1994: 147). This standpoint has continued to be reinforced by the changing national development strategy beginning in the mid-1980s. From the mid-1980s to the present day the socialist policy was practically abandoned under the in-
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fluence of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) designed by international financial lenders (i.e., the World Bank, International Monetary Fund [IMF], etc.) as ‘‘appropriate’’ prescriptions to the socioeconomic problems of Third World countries. Such programs advocate the adoption of free market economic policies leading to politicoeconomic liberalization. This is what has been taking place in Tanzania for the past decade. This, in turn, has remarkable implications for education. The functions of education have been redirected, and, once again, elite higher education has been given priority at the expense of mass education in order to facilitate the small but expanding modern sector. This may be termed ‘‘education for economic liberalization.’’ In nature it is not very much different from the ‘‘education for modernization’’ of the 1950s! Education for economic liberalization has resulted not only in limiting the expansion of education in a climate of restricted funding and cost sharing but also in strongly discouraging the introduction of Swahili as a language of education at the secondary level. The effects are more than one can imagine. The masses are denied secondary education, which is very necessary in the current situation, especially in the process of ‘‘sustainable development.’’ Even those few who continue with secondary education find themselves in a difficult situation to cope with their learning in an unfamiliar language. One can imagine the situation where in the first seven years of school life (i.e., elementary/primary education), a child is made to explore and understand the world surrounding him or her through Swahili, a familiar language. Then, upon entering secondary school, suddenly the same person is switched to English, a language that has not yet been mastered, is rarely used outside the classroom, and in many cases has no adequate plans and means to improve its usage. Theoretically, it means that English is considered a ‘‘second language’’ as opposed to a ‘‘foreign language.’’ In such a context (and this is one of our main assumptions) this young person is intellectually disrupted and disoriented. The essential continuity of building up intellectual capacities is broken between the basic knowledge acquired in primary school and the anticipated new knowledge at the secondary level. This creates confusion, which may last not less than two years before this person fits well in his or her new environment of learning. This is not a healthy situation for attaining effective education. For example, Roy-Campbell and Qorro (1987) discovered that Form I (⫽ eighth grade) students do not have enough English competence to enable them to comprehend English texts, but when the same topic is taught in Swahili, they understand without difficulty. So why do we not want to teach them in Swahili so that they can acquire the intended knowledge without difficulty? SUGGESTIONS The situation presented here is not conducive for bringing about significant development related to education, directly or indirectly. In this respect I propose that while revisiting and reexamining educational policies, the issues of mass
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education and language to be used should be given a prominent position. In this regard, indigenous languages, which are practically functioning as lingua francas in their respective areas, such as Hausa and Wolof in West Africa and Swahili in East Africa, can be adopted as languages of education in the primary and secondary schools. Certainly, such decisions are to be planned as long-term projects. It may take 50 years or more before seeing tangible results, but thereafter our societies will not be the same. They will be inhabited by creative masses of people participating actively in carrying out ‘‘sustainable development’’ locally and nationally. This should not mean to neglect foreign languages such as English and French in our school curricula. We are advocating neither ignorance nor isolation. We are advocating developing creative and inquisitive minds, self-reliance, and cooperation. No doubt languages such as English and French are international, therefore ‘‘lingua francas’’ of the world. Because of their international roles not only do they need to be maintained in our education systems as special subjects, but they also require special teaching methods devised to teach them better. It can be one of the conditions or requirements for graduation, for example, to pass a given language subject at a specified level of proficiency. This means that secondary education can play its current roles, that is, prepare young people for higher education and facilitate the modern sector, and still equip the masses with relevant knowledge and skills to enable them to participate productively in the enhancement of ‘‘sustainable development.’’ Is this possible? The answer is yes. In Tanzania and Kenya, for example, there is already a strong base for the introduction of Swahili as a medium of instruction in secondary education. It is a language of education in all primary schools in Tanzania and in some schools in Kenya. In addition, Swahili is taught as a compulsory subject in primary and secondary schools in both countries and as a specialized field in colleges and universities. Interestingly enough, some students specializing in Swahili in Kenyan universities have been able to write their M.A. theses in Swahili. The recently established Open University of Tanzania (OUT) offers courses in both Swahili and English. A student is given an option to choose between the two. Moreover, there are well-established institutions for Swahili promotion and development, as was pointed out earlier. There has been a tradition of cooperation among these institutions for a number of years. For example, TUKI in collaboration with Swahili experts from other East and Central African countries has been conducting intensive research and organizing workshops on the Swahili terminology of various disciplines. Such efforts have already resulted in the publication of two specialized dictionaries: physics, chemistry, and biology (Kamusi Sanifu ya Fizikia, Kemia, na Biyolojia) and language and linguistics (Kamusi sanifu ya Isimu na Lugha). The institute has also undertaken a translation project of The General History of Africa from English to Swahili, a project sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
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CONCLUSION ‘‘Sustainable development’’ is for people’s advancement. But people are key players in the process. Undoubtedly, therefore, for maximum achievement in this regard, people must be wholly involved in planning and implementing their own development projects. One of the essential tools in this process is education. Both elite and mass education should be given appropriate weight, as they both contribute enormously to societal development. Mass education should involve both formal schooling and adult programs. To make it more successful and relevant to ‘‘sustainable development,’’ formal education needs to be made mandatory up to secondary level (ordinary level) and be provided in indigenous languages. This argument is based on the assumption that learners learn better and develop creative minds through languages that are familiar to them. If a school curriculum includes, for example, environmental education, health, civil education, basic technology, or basic sciences, as most educational systems are attempting to do nowadays, certainly, the results will be remarkable when the teaching is done in indigenous languages, such as Swahili. It enables a learner to relate new concepts with what she or he experiences in everyday life and at the same time to put them in action.
CHAPTER 15
The Role of Food Self-Sufficiency in Sustainable Development in Africa in Readiness for the Twenty-First Century Bassey Ekpono
INTRODUCTION In recent years, efforts have been made to transfer technology and expertise to the developing nations of Africa and to inculcate in them modern ways to improve their living standards. At times, such undertakings turn into graveyards of good intention or nightmares for the recipient nations, particularly when the innovators, presumably inadvertently, direct efforts to the treatment of symptoms rather than the causes of the problem. Conversely, lack of knowledge about the political and psychological implications of the innovations by the recipient nations before embracing them may produce adverse effects of a devastating magnitude to stifle the nations from developing. Leaders of the African nations tend to rely on foreign advice on programs to feed their people when, in fact, such advice cannot provide solutions. Although this author recognizes the ‘‘law of conservation of evil,’’ which postulates that the ‘‘total amount of evil in any system remains constant’’ in the sense that ‘‘elimination of one problem creates room for another’’ (Barnoun, 1975), the importance of food in human life must not be underestimated. For thousands of years, mankind has been improving natural and primitive agricultural varieties, seeking crops that are higher-yielding, faster-growing, better tasting, more disease- and pest-resistant, more nourishing, and otherwise superior (World Resources Institute, 1986: 58). Although there were sporadic or occasional famines in many societies during the time of Christ, they were believed to have been overlooked as local problems. The famine problems that occurred in Great Britain during the 1800s were
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dealt with or at least prevented (Pirages, 1989). But those ravaging the African nations have persisted to date and continue to make rapid and ugly impressions. It is appalling to note that famine seems to be celebrated as an endemic situation in African life. Many African nations were struck by famine between 1973 and 1974. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has identified serious food shortages in some 20 African countries, with approximately 30–35 million of the 200 million citizens severely affected. About 10 million persons have already been forced to abandon their homelands in search of food (World Resources Institute, 1986). Between 1984 and 1985 a similar catastrophe struck again and triggered the antifamine rock concert ‘‘We Are the World: U.S. for Africa’’ in 1986. Still, many areas suffer from famine and malnutrition throughout the continent so that it appears as if in Africa the major Malthusian drama of the twenty-first century is being played out (Pirages, 1989). The reason the humanitarian rock concert was organized to help in ameliorating the 1984–1985 famine is that it was reported. Other famines that occur in the rural areas and in countries where the press is censored are not known. Any child born in Africa about 1950 or earlier is a historian in the sense that throughout his or her lifetime to date, he or she is bound to have experienced ten to fifteen periods of famine, including shortages of either sugar, salt, pepper, medicine, drinking water, clothes, soap, or meat, to name just a few. Yet, the list seems endless in the midst of a popular belief that to ‘‘stumble on the same stone twice’’ is a proverbial disgrace. African nations seem to have stumbled over the same ‘‘stone of famine’’ more than a countless number of times and have lost respect among other nations in international arenas, particularly as famine continues to be a problem. THE POSITION OF THE THIRD WORLD IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS The question that must be answered with regard to food shortages is, Why cannot Africa feed its people? Is the continent haunted by the ‘‘Third World syndrome’’ or image? As one might have already noted, the term ‘‘Third World’’ is said to mean a ‘‘loser continent’’ and is believed to have been coined in France during the early 1950s. It is also used to mean ‘‘permanently less developed state’’ (Riggs and Plano, 1988). Besides, a requiem for Africa is said to be that ‘‘African nations are on their own’’ (George, 1990: 86). Under that circumstance, this chapter examines some of the factors that contribute to block African nations from achieving sustainable development, from developing strategies that could improve the negative posture accorded the continent, its leaders, and people, and also from putting an end to hunger through food self-sufficiency programs. It does so by tracing the origin of the term ‘‘Third World’’ and by examining the socioeconomic and political implications this might have on food production.
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The origin of the term ‘‘Third World’’ came about during the Cold War between 1950 and early 1960, when the East–West tension dominated the world scene (Fansworth, 1988). The West was categorized as the First World on the grounds that it consisted of the industrialized, noncommunist nations. On the opposite end was the Second World or the Soviet-led communist nations, which have recently been renamed the ‘‘Commonwealth of Independent States,’’ while India, under Nehru, took a neutral or nonaligned position, followed by other newly independent nations, including those of Africa (Fansworth, 1988: 25). For the sake of understanding this structural relationship, those nations that aligned with neither the First World (Western coalition) nor the Second World (Sovietled coalition) were collectively known as the Third World. While both First and Second Worlds had an economic and political basis, the Third World had none. For instance, the First World had the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as its organizational military center with 16 members, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with 24 members, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as its economic center. The Soviet-led coalitions paralleled the First World by establishing their economic and political basis (Fansworth, 1988: 25). But the Third World nations became the ‘‘political prostitutes’’ with no viable economic and political basis. Furthermore, although there were divisions among the three worlds, the division within the Third World’s so-called nonalliance coalitions was colossal (Fansworth, 1988: 25). With respect to the concept of political prostitutes and, with all due respect and good intentions, this chapter does not, in any way, intend to discredit the nonaligned movement or seduce readers to take that position. However, the chapter attempts to justify its claim and leave the rest for readers to decipher. By implication, while the nonaligned flag was flying, some of its member nations were freeloading and closing arrangements or cross-aligned ‘‘under the table,’’ with either of the then two superpowers thereby creating a dichotomous posture that left other nonaligned nations dismayed and scrambling in search of similar cross-alignment (Fansworth, 1988: 25–26). For instance, India, which spearheaded the nonaligned movement, had a friendship treaty with the then Soviet Union (Second World) but received economic aid from many Western (First World) countries. Cuba, on the other hand, depended on the Soviet Union for military and economic upkeep, while Oman and Somalia had military arrangements with the United States. Last but not least, Angola and Ethiopia had the help of the Soviet and Cuban troops to keep their governments in power (Fansworth, 1988: 25–26). This unstable posture is referred to as ‘‘political prostitute’’ in this chapter and perhaps the reason for the justification of the term ‘‘Third World,’’ meaning the ‘‘loser nations.’’ Furthermore, the admission of countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea into the nonaligned nations, which were signatories of the ‘‘Rio Pact’’ and in mutual defense arrangements with the United States, further complicated
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the already rambunctious state of the nonaligned Third World nations (Fansworth, 1988: 26). What are some of the economic implications of all this? It would be prudent, at this juncture, to say that the nonaligned movement was an excellent or ‘‘smart idea’’ in the sense that it was believed to be anticolonialistic and also an attempt at economic reform. But it was loose and simply a poor fit for the mission. For instance, the movement against colonialism, the support for Arab countries in their fight against Israel, the endorsement of the oil boycott imposed on the Western nations supporting Israel, the call for economic reform, and the inconsistent behavior in crossing alliance with the First World today and the next day with the then Second World marveled the then two superpowers. Consequently, the Third World countries ended up becoming more vulnerable to the very onslaught of the colonialism that they set out to fight in the first place because neither the First, nor the then Second World could trust them. Even when the Third World nations made impacts on the United Nations and caused the General Assembly to call a Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), very little, if anything at all, was accomplished due to the fact that the superpowers took a ‘‘no man’s business’’ attitude either by keeping silent or presenting muted responses (Fansworth, 1988: 120). In fact, during the first Third World meeting at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, which was attended by 29 countries, including China, the Chinese foreign minister, Chou En-lai, was accused of becoming the titular leader, leading the Third World against the West. As a result, China quickly withdrew from forming any close ties with the Third World (Fansworth, 1988: 120). The only official of a Western nation who could have listened with sympathy to the plights of the Third World nations seemed to have been the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young (Fansworth, 1988: 120). But he did not stay long enough in office. Consequently, from their meetings at Bandung in 1955, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961, Cairo in 1964, Algiers in 1973, and Nairobi in 1976 and from the Manila conference to the UNCTAD conference of 1983, nothing concrete seemed to have been accomplished. The reason lies in the following. (1) Each conference carried different agenda, when no one, in fact, knows or can even verify whether or not previous meetings accomplished their intended goals. (2) The First and Second Worlds could not transfer any adequate technologies to help the Third World get out of political and economic predicaments, including ending hunger, because of the image problem or instability in its alliances. (3) There was a problem of division within the Third World nations on the type of economic system(s) they should adopt. As a result, some groups of the Third World nations take a pro-Soviet stance, a second group favors/supports capitalism, while the remaining groups watch with awe, such that no one really knows where the line of nonalignment is drawn. (4) There was a planning problem. As the reader might have already either noted or guessed, if a plan had been in place before the movement, and if such a plan had been accepted within the nucleus of the movement, that could have served as a springboard whereby the
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newly independent nations could be induced into the movement as either ‘‘rabbi’’ or ‘‘disciples’’ to carry out the gospels of nonalliance. In the absence of such a plan, the movement became spellbound with ideological disaster. Developing strategies that would end hunger in Africa therefore involves a multitude of interrelated factors, some of which include ideological shift, or the commitment to be food self-sufficient, and education. Although it is erroneous to assign an undue weight to any single factor in isolation, at times a single factor can impact other factors to bring about a striking change. By ideological shift is meant making changes in the political culture or ethos embedded in the belief pattern, value system, and attitude. These elements are expressed in various forms in any society by way of symbols, language/dialect articulations, or mode of dress; at times, they form a resilience to change. A close look at the Third World nations reveals a reflection of all these elements, as in any of the other worlds, but they tend to be carried to the extreme in Africa, as one ethnic group may claim superiority over other ethnic groups, and, eventually, these ethnic conflicts become disastrous to any new approach or ideas that could have liberated the people. That notwithstanding, after about 40 years of independence by some of the African countries, one would expect that sufficient time has passed for these nations to revitalize their economy and to produce enough food to feed their people. But this has not been so. Instead, as years passed, the biopsycho and sociopolitical conditions in Africa worsened, due, in most part, to hunger and starvation. Therefore, in order to attain any sustainable development in Africa, the African leaders must commit resources, first of all, to becoming food selfsufficient. In confirming this belief, an eminent American senator, Daniel P. Moynihan, in his response to a question regarding hunger in Africa said, ‘‘Food growing is the first thing you do when you come down out of the trees’’ (Lappe and Collins, 1977: 75). He also denied overpopulation as a reason Africa cannot feed its people. In her article on ‘‘Better Life Program for Rural Women in a Developing Nation,’’ Gabriel quoted Ajakaiye to have said, ‘‘The economic history of developed countries has consistently proved that sustained industrialization is usually preceded by an agricultural revolution. . . . It would also be pointed out that the agricultural revolution of all countries currently classified as developed was spawned by grains such as: rice, maize, wheat, sorghum, millet, rye, barley, and oats’’ (James, 1994: 207). Similarly, Guy Arnold reported that even without modern farming techniques, Africa has the ability to feed three times its present population, but the stumbling block is that official awareness of the problems has remained theoretical and the importance of the peasant farmers has not been acknowledged . . . large scale projects with their in-built distortions seem to be on top of the government’s agenda. . . . A recent USAID [United States Agency for International Development] report pointed
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out that only 7 percent of 570 of its projects in Africa were concerned with food production. The net result of these and other developments is that food consumption in Africa is now 10 percent less per capita than 10 years ago and seems to continue deteriorating for the rest of the decade, while food imports may have trebled by the mid1980. . . . A difficulty in looking for a reason to explain Africa’s poor agricultural performance lies in the plethora of explanations which do exist. One problem which dates back to the policies of colonial times but which has continued subsequently is that priority has consistently been given to the production of export crops to earn foreign exchange at the expense of food crops for home consumption, although the logic of this policy in too many cases is simply that in the end the foreign exchange or a major part of it then has to be spent paying for imported food anyway. (1986: 79)
John Madeley’s article entitled ‘‘Africa and the Sea: A Story of Stolen Fish,’’ on the other hand, stated that ‘‘Africa is systematically cheated of wealth from its own seas by fish runners from Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan,’’ leaving ‘‘nothing for local consumption’’ (1986: 85). For instance, Madeley also pointed out: Even before the law of the Sea Convention was finalized in April 1982, the majority of coastal African States had extended their territorial waters from 12 to 200 miles from their shores, as the Sea Convention allows. The principle of the 200 miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was agreed at the Sea Conference in 1980; within that zone, countries have sovereign rights to fish and other resources. In theory, the extension to 200 miles should bring Africa enormous benefits, giving countries royalties over all the fish caught by foreign fleets in often sizeable EEZs. In reality, however, it is not working out like that. (1986: 85)
Giving an example of how Africa is cheated out of its sources of food from the sea by foreign fish runners, he said: The experience of Mauritania is an example of how the cheating goes on. Mauritania has some 800 kilometers of coastline and its EEZ therefore comprises an area of about 160,000 square kilometers. This area is recognized as one of the richest fishing grounds in the world; . . . An FAO study has put fishing reserves at 4 million tons, which means that fish could go a long way to making up the chronic protein shortage of the people of Mauritania, and to some extent of neighboring countries. . . . Most Mauritanians are unaware of this source of food; people who live inland have traditionally eaten little fish. Neither has fishing become integrated into the national economy. Catches in the EEZ are enormous, but returns to Mauritania are small. In 1981 an estimated 1,250,000 tonnes of fish were caught in the EEZ. But only 120,000 tonnes were officially declared— Mauritania was therefore cheated of 90 percent of its catches. (1983: 85)
In Ghana ‘‘import liberalization policy’’ is believed to have led to increased food imports favorable only to the rich, who have more money to spend and have more access to a wider range of high-priced food products, while, at the
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same time, the poor, who have less or no money to spend whatsoever, go hungry (Danahur, 1994). Similarly, Bello indicated that ‘‘the rollback in income and living standards that affected the people of Ghana in the 1980s has been part of a larger wave that overwhelmed much of the south during that decade’’ (1994: 51). The devastating condition of the people of the south is described by James Gustave Speth, the president of the World Resources Institute: The South is in crisis. In the developing countries, an estimated 13–18 million people, mostly children, die from hunger and poverty each year. That is, about 40,000 people a day, or 1,700 people an hour. It is also noted that, as hunger and malnutrition increase and/or escalate, tuberculosis and cholera once thought to have been eradicated by modern medicine returned with a vengeance throughout the continent, with cholera (alone) claiming at least 1,300 in 1990. (quoted in Bello, 1994: 15)
Against such historical backdrop, Lappe and Collins (1977) offered seven fundamentals that they believe are important for attaining self-reliance: (1) the allocation of control over agricultural resources to local self-provisioning units democratically organized, (2) the development of mass initiatives on agriculture as opposed to governmental directives, (3) the establishment of food selfsufficiency as prerequisite to the outgrowth of trade development, (4) reuniting agriculture and nutrition, (5) making agriculture an end but not the means, (6) embarking on rural industrial development, and (7) adopting coordinated social planning. The first fundamental calls for the allocation and/or reallocation of land and other agricultural resources on a grand scale to the local landless but democratically organized units on the premise that (1) when people own land privately or collectively, they naturally invest more time, labor, and money in it than nonowners, and that (2) only the redistribution of the control of the land can create a new breed of farmers willing to withstand the difficult challenges and no longer afraid of the bosses. The second fundamental involves mass initiatives as opposed to governmental directives. The premise here is that mass initiatives would reawaken the confidence of the people through collective work and the assurance of equal share of any benefits derived from such work and that only from such a standpoint can genuine development occur. Furthermore, it is believed that mass initiatives would eliminate individual self-seeking. Hence, equality becomes the necessary prerequisite for mass initiative. Mass initiative is ‘‘the opposite of government managed development’’ in that, if food self-sufficiency is managed from above, people tend to feel that they are working for the government, not for themselves. Hence, they think of themselves as the ‘‘clients,’’ rather than the motive force (Lappe and Collins, 1977).
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In the third fundamental, the authors called for the meeting of the basic food need of the masses before agriculture and/or food exportation. Similarly, they cautioned that for trade to be beneficial, the following must be considered: [every developing] country must choose a trading partner at a comparable level of power with complementary needs so that the chances for manipulations may be diminished. . . . Search for a trading partner should begin only after all avenues for local production have been tested. . . . When underdeveloped countries look to the industrial countries as the model, uniformity will inevitably result; whereas food self-reliance, on the other hand, will bring about diversity. (Lappe and Collins, 1977: 372–377)
In other words, they cautioned that there is no technological model or agricultural practice that can be applied universally in the sense that food selfsufficiency means accepting the challenge to human ingenuity of originating unique models for unique localities. Aside from that, Johan Galtung, a development analyst, is quoted to have said that ‘‘any loss in efficiency that might result from reinventing something already invented somewhere else is more than offset by the gain in self-confidence in accepting the challenge of being the innovator’’ (Lappe and Collins, 1977: 377). The fourth fundamental calls for reuniting agriculture and nutrition. The premise is that ‘‘as a necessity of life, food is considered as precious as life itself’’ (Lappe and Collins, 1977: 378). For food self-sufficiency to be achieved, the primary concern ought to be on how the masses could use their land to plant food for themselves rather than the concern on ‘‘what crop might have a few cents edge on the world market months or even years hence’’ (Lappe and Collins, 1977: 378). The idea is for the developing countries to feed themselves first before they devote their agricultural efforts and land in cultivating for foreign consumption, while at home the vast majority go hungry. The fifth fundamental deals with making agriculture an end but not the means. Under this heading, it is believed that in those countries where so many people today are hungry, agriculture has been seen in terms of the onslaught of colonialism or as a sector from which to extract wealth to serve urban, industrial, and foreign interest rather than for the benefit of the masses. This view is not without merit in the light of the fact that it has been confirmed that, although in theory things may have changed, in practice, agriculture in most of the underdeveloped countries continues to follow the colonial pathways and continues to contribute much more to the national income than it receives (Lappe and Collins, 1977: 379). The sixth fundamental is concerned with the rural industrial development. The premise here is to encourage the establishment of a small, need-based, dispersed industrial network in the rural areas. According to the authors, ‘‘a rural, dispersed, small-scale industrial network will grow to fill the need for
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fertilizer, farming equipment, and other simple manufactures’’ (Lappe and Collins, 1977: 380). The seventh fundamental involves coordinated social planning. The main focus here is that social planning need not follow a centrally planned pattern or mean authoritarian rule handed down from the top. Instead, effective social planning can result only from the decentralization of authority whereby each region is permitted to work out appropriate solutions. The second aspect pivotal to food self-sufficiency is education. There is no doubt that the Third World nations of Africa have had able leaders in the past, as in the present, who could have made it possible for the nations to survive economically, politically, and socially. At the same time, the survival of a nation does not depend on the extinction of its past leaders and officials, who must have accumulated a wealth of experiences that the new regime needed most for survival. But in most Third World nations, especially in Africa, it seems the persisting rules of politics tend to be contingent upon annihilation of the old regime. It is no wonder that this type of ‘‘rule of terror’’ must have been the practice of certain governments some centuries ago following Niccolo Machiavelli’s pronouncement that ‘‘rulers would fare better if they were feared rather than loved by their citizens’’ or the Prussian general Karl Von Clausewitz’s philosophy of war as ‘‘politics by other means’’ (Lopez and Stohl, 1989: 4). Contrary to Machiavelli and Clausewitz, John Locke declared that ‘‘people have God-given, or natural rights that are inalienable and therefore cannot be taken away by any government’’ and that ‘‘government exists to preserve and/or protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens’’ (Janda 1989: 7, 74). It is universally acknowledged that any legitimate government is based on the consent of those who are governed. That being the case, the governed or the masses have the right to resist or change leaders who persist in acting against those natural and inalienable rights (Janda, 1989: 74).
EDUCATION AND FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY In fact, the preamble of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) Constitution unequivocally states: We, the Heads of African States and Governments assembled in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; CONVINCED that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny: CONSCIOUS of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples; CONSCIOUS of our responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in all spheres of human endeavor; INSPIRED by a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and co-operation among our States in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brother-hood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences;
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CONVINCED that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained; DETERMINED to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms; DETERMINED to the general progress of Africa; PERSUADED that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive co-operation among States; DESIROUS that all African States should henceforth can be assured; RESOLVED to reinforce the links between our states by establishing and strengthening common institutions; HAVE agreed to the present charter. (1982: 7)
In spite of this, Africa seems to lack leaders who follow this Constitution or Locke’s philosophy of ‘‘protecting and preserving the lives, liberties, and properties of its citizen.’’ Instead, most African leaders tend to embrace the outdated Machiavelli and Clausewitz philosophies of reign of terror, fear, and taking the lives of millions of its citizens. Equally important is the attitude of the public toward their leaders, although this issue might be excused in light of the fact that, in the past, the masses had little or no say in the selection of their leaders. But if the masses want food, shelter, medicine, clean water, and other basic survival needs that constitute good life they must take the responsibility of electing leaders who are free from religious and tribal predilections and who would be willing to provide these basic needs. Once the leaders are elected, the public also ought to be willing to protect, defend, and support them especially the policies of the leaders. Other points that frequently surface whenever developments in Africa are discussed are the social and economic hegemony of colonialism. Although this is a difficult question beyond the scope of this chapter, it provides a bedrock for the discussion of the type of education needed if Africa is to become food self-sufficient. The author of this chapter advocates what is know as ‘‘mass-communication’’ dialogue between the masses and their leaders working in concert in a genuine way to solve food problems. It is more than a mere ‘‘town meeting’’ dialogue whereby leaders call ‘‘town meetings’’ to collect or solicit opinions from the masses and then turn around to use the information in the victimization of the proponents of any opposing views or identify the opposition as potential sources of threat to their administration. That is not education. CONCLUSION To be able to overcome food crisis in Africa by the attainment of sustainable development, the following strategies should be incorporated in the development
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planning: First, Article III, item no. 2 of the OAU Constitution, which stipulates ‘‘noninterference in the internal affairs of States,’’ should be amended to include ‘‘interference in the internal affairs of States.’’ Or, where the word ‘‘interference’’ becomes anathema to the respective head of states, it can be changed to read ‘‘mediation in the internal affairs of states.’’ The rationale is that most of the problems in African countries are internal problems whereby certain ethnic groups are oppressed, killed, imprisoned without trial, or forced into apostasies by the ruling ethnic groups. As such, if it is indeed true that the OAU sets out to ‘‘eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa’’ (see Article II, item d, p. 7), then it must interfere in the internal affairs of the member state. Article XIX calls for the establishment of a ‘‘Commission of Mediation Conciliation and Arbitration,’’ and under specialized commissions, Article XX indicated the establishment of a Defense Commission (see pp. 13–14). However, Part II on General Provisions, Article XII, reads: ‘‘The Commission shall have jurisdiction over disputes between States only’’ (see p. 59). That needs to be amended as well to include mediation in the internal affairs of the member state as well as between states. How else could the OAU know what political and economic ideologies each member state is pursuing and how much human right abuse is being practiced within each member state? Second, African countries should adopt a uniform and/or common currency that can compete with the U.S. dollar and pound sterling for exchange purposes in order to minimize expropriation. Third, the OAU should establish a defense organ called ‘‘Central African Military Force (CAMIF)’’ for mediation purposes and for participation in the world peace. Fourth, each African country should adopt a two-party political system, and the election of any head of state should be democratically done. In addition, no head of state should rule more than two terms or use the military in any way without the prior approval of the OAU. Such approval must be granted upon full investigation of all parties concerned. In those countries where one or two ethnic groups outnumber other ethnic groups, a rotation of the presidency should be used, and candidates must be democratically elected. It is understandable that the founding fathers of the OAU did not want to antagonize the heads of member states by giving respect and recognition to their respective territorial boundaries or sovereignty. Yet, the concept of sovereignty is said to be a ‘‘legal friction’’ due to the fact that ‘‘no state has, or can have absolute control over its population, or can completely close off all outside influences’’ (Lopez and Stohl, 1989: 8). Fifth, Africa should develop air routes and railroad networks for intercountry transportation, communications, and exchanges. Sixth, African nations should open steel mills where steel can be manufactured for use in building roads, manufacturing cars, and other things. Finally, African nations should tap or harness domestic manpower in agriculture and in all other areas enumerated earlier or negotiate with foreign governments whenever appropriate. Mention of the OAU here does not constitute a derailment or deviation from the main purpose of this chapter. Instead, it calls the attention of readers to the
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OAU as a viable political organization or basic from which all other institutions, whether social, economic, or otherwise might emanate. In his article ‘‘The Threat to Survival,’’ Robert Johansen quoted the former U.S. secretary of agriculture, Dr. Earl Butz, as saying: ‘‘Food is power. Food is a weapon’’; ‘‘it is now one of the principal tools in our negotiating kits. . . . Washington would acquire virtual life-and-death power over the multitudes of the needy’’ (Lopez and Stohl, 1989: 303). I might add that food is peace. Therefore, for Africa to be able to solve most of its social, economic, and political problems and to be able to attain sustainable development, it must first become food self-sufficient.
CHAPTER 16
Management Capacity Building: A Strategic Imperative for African Development in the Twenty-First Century Felix Edoho
During the last three decades, I have seen the emphasis in development strategies come and go. These different approaches to African development have all lacked one essential ingredient: they did not incorporate as a central feature the building of indigenous African capacities—skills, knowledge, and institutions. Capacity building has been the missing link (Jaycox, 1992: 47). In my travels in Africa, I have observed a shortage, in almost every area, of the local skills and institutions so vital to sustain development. Even when capacities are available, they seem not always to be effectively used (Conable, 1991: 11). Technologies and markets are being revolutionized. To meet this challenge, Africa needs the right kind of professionally excellent people and institutions. A technical assistance project will not do the job, nor will the short-term secondment of a foreign adviser. ‘‘Africa needs its own capacities’’ (Jaycox, 1992: 53). Can we accept the presence of 100,000 expatriate technical advisers in the region—a larger number than at independence? The trends are going in the wrong direction—and they are frightening! Let me be blunt: if local capacities are not built and sustained in Africa, there is no chance that the continent will develop as it should and as it must if it is to make it in the next century (Jaycox, 1992: 48). Despite some U.S.$4 billion spent on technical assistance every year and despite the presence of nearly 100,000 foreign ‘‘experts’’ in Sub-Saharan Africa, the record shows that not enough indigenous, sustainable African capacities exist. This must change. The challenge to help build long-term African capacity is an acid test for the donor community (Conable, 1991: 20). This chapter addresses the vexing question of capacity building in Africa.
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Specifically, the chapter explores the desirability of creating management capacity in the broader context of national economic development. The need to inquire into management capacity building stems from the fact that not all kinds of skills are lacking in Africa. Yet, the availability of other kinds of skills is meaningless for economic development if they are not effectively and efficiently coordinated and systematically mobilized toward clearly defined goals—be they at the microlevel of public sector agencies and private sector firms or at the macrolevel of the society. Management capacity is the lifeblood of all organizations, irrespective of whether they are private entities, public agencies, notfor-profit concerns, or nongovernmental varieties. Management capacity building represents the most critical development challenge facing Africa today. It was the challenge of the 1960s; it is the challenge of the 1990s; and it will be the challenge of the twenty-first century. It is argued that management capacity is a strategic imperative for Africa’s economic transformation. RATIONALE FOR MANAGEMENT CAPACITY BUILDING IN AFRICA Numerous reasons can be advanced to buttress the argument that management capacity building is a strategic issue for Africa’s development future. First, the broad consensus in the international development community and within Africa is that the region is in a deep-seated crisis. Literature is well represented in the economic, political, environmental, and sociocultural aspects of Africa’s crisis. However, little or no attention has been focused on how the pervasive shortages of endogenous management capacity contribute to and deepen the region’s crisis. The pervasive lack of capability to develop and manage industrial system and economic institutions is a critical but commonly neglected dimension of Africa’s persistent crisis. The collapse of the economies of African countries, the decay of physical infrastructure, the enfeeblement of industrial systems, the unresponsiveness of public institutions to environmental changes and social demands, and the absence of a dynamic private sector all lay bare the inherent lack of management capacity, deficient management, or outright mismanagement. Drucker (1970) postulated a vital link between effective management and national economic development. Second, the lack of management capacity is the norm in virtually all African countries. The absence of managerial, entrepreneurial, and technical skills and strong public and private institutions is more than anything else, responsible for Africa’s unsalutary performance records (World Bank, 1989). This appears to be the case irrespective of whether the government is run by military juntas, a benevolent civilian dictator, or a one-party system. The experiences of Nigeria, Coˆ te d’Ivoire, and Tanzania amply illustrate this dilemma. In these countries, as Stewart et al. (1992) observed, the failure to build up local capability to initiate and manage industrial venture efficiently, the heavy dependence on foreigners, and the many inappropriate technology decisions were all common to
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manufacturing entities in these societies, despite the differences in political and economic philosophy and irrespective of whether the enterprises were in the public sector, were joint ventures, or were privately owned. Third, the lack of management capacity not only impedes industrial productivity but actually helps to perpetuate the vicious cycle of dependency on foreign expertise in Africa. This absence of management capacity in Africa is evident in both the public and private sectors and at all levels of institutions and organizations—from the top to the bottom—as Lall et al. (1994) revealed in their study of Ghana. This phenomenon partly explains why abundant human and material resources in Africa have not generated a corresponding level of socioeconomic progress. Interestingly, Farmer and Richman insightfully pointed out that a country can have a sizeable natural and manpower resources including potentially skilled labor, and substantial capital but still be relatively poor because very few competent managers are available to put these efficiently together in the production and distribution of useful goods and services. (1970: 1)
Therefore, it is not just enough for a society to have an abundance of the traditional ingredients of development (landmass, natural resource endowments, and even large population base). For these resources to contribute to human welfare, they must be mobilized and managed effectively and efficiently. Fourth, globalization is driving national markets toward convergence. This, along with the turbulent environment of the 1990s, increasingly puts a high premium on specific capabilities, including the abilities to anticipate and manage discontinuous change, optimize the use of scarce resources, and quickly adapt to a rapidly changing environment. A major force that is redefining the types of skills that are necessary for national competitiveness in this environment is the revolutionizing power of technology. Advances in technologies have transformed the dynamics of production and the nature of competition. To respond to this challenge, ‘‘Africa needs the right kind of professionally excellent people and institutions’’ (Jaycox, 1992: 47). Such people must have the skills to creatively adapt management techniques to the new competitive environment. Bello observed ‘‘One central problem that exists in most African countries is that of how managers can anticipate and respond profitably to changes taking place in their business environment’’ (1985: 4). Thus, intensifying the development of management capacity would enable Africa to anticipate and plan for technological change. With technology advancing rapidly, African countries need a large number of scientists, managers, and entrepreneurs if they are not to be left further behind. Fifth, Africa is the most technologically dependent and economically vulnerable region in the world (Edoho, 1996). The region depends extremely on industrialized countries for technology transfer as a means to incorporate technical changes into their industrial systems. To date, however, African countries have
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not mastered the techniques of effectively managing and adapting imported technology to their industrial systems. In a large number of African manufacturing firms, product design, engineering works, and management services are still controlled by expatriate staff. In the copper and smelting industries in Zaire and Zambia, for instance, it was reported that ‘‘there are still expatriates working in technical and administrative positions. . . . In addition, after nationalization of the Union Minie`re de Haut Katanga’s properties, the government of Zaire concluded management and marketing contracts with associated companies of Union Minie`re’’ (quoted in Mytelka, 1988: 106). Sixth, a study of parastatals in Tanzania noted the way in which the ‘‘lack of clear outlook of needs and absence of coordination of policy institutions have led to failure by the public sector to acquire the vital elements of foreign technical know-how and stand on their own’’ (quoted in Mytelka, 1988: 106). In Coˆ te d’Ivoire, it has been reported that the degree to which the nationals influenced the direction of industrial and technological change was seriously circumscribed by their low number in managerial positions (Mytelka, 1988). In Ghana a study found ‘‘serious deficiencies in skill availability at practically all levels of industry, from the shopfloor and supervisory levels to the highest levels of technological and managerial manpower’’ (Lall et al., 1994: 191). A study of Nigeria found that the country depends heavily on management contract as a mechanism for technology transfer. Management contract ranked second (next to technical assistance) as a mechanism used, the cost of which was over N75 million during 1984–1985 (Edoho, 1991: 198, 209). Seventh, public enterprises in Africa have betrayed all rational expectations. Instead of being technology generators and entities that provide goods and deliver services in effective and efficient manner, public enterprises in Africa are grossly inefficient and ineffectual. The abysmal record of public enterprises in Africa is attributable to poor management performance. Most of the parastatals established since independence cannot support themselves. Corruption, patronage, and nepotism have thwarted the evolution of a professional cadre of managers (Conable, 1991; World Bank, 1989). Consequently, public enterprises have caused a drain on public funds, increasing the tax burden on the citizens. Almost two-thirds of the public enterprises in 12 West African countries were reported to have recorded losses, and 36 had negative net worths. In the early 1980s public enterprise losses amounted to 4 percent of gross domestic product for both Togo and Niger. In Tanzania the commissioner for public investment lamented in 1984 that the ‘‘public enterprise sector in Tanzania has been in existence for almost nineteen years, but the performance has been disappointing’’ (Nellis, 1989: 219–20). The public sector is hobbled by poor investment decisions and management capacity. Eighth, as societies struggling to rediscover their lost identities and socioeconomic moorings in the increasingly complex global economic system, African countries are yet to develop the capability to respond decisively to environmental change. The region must come to terms with the reality that management is
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culture-bound. Therefore, Africa faces the monumental challenge of evolving its own theory and practice of management. After more than three decades of independence, Africa does not have its own endogenous set of managerial values, philosophy, and styles. What has happened in the domain of management is not different from the situation in other aspects of African existence. Even if Africa cannot develop its own management theory and philosophy, it can at least develop the skills of creative adaptation. African countries over the years have imported Western managerial techniques and swallowed them wholesale without actually digesting them in their economic and industrial bloodstreams. The general orientation has not been adaptive, but imitative, and has been predicated on the erroneous notion that management theory and practice can be transferred in their entirety from one culture to another. Africa needs endogenous management ideas to engineer economic development. Ninth, Africa lacks the skills for policy analysis and evaluation, especially in the environmental sector. As the World Bank (1991a) noted, Sub-Saharan Africa has little capacity and experience relative to evaluating the environmental impacts of projects and programs. The region also lacks the institutional framework necessary to incorporate such analyses and evaluations in the decision-making process on public and private investments. As a result of this lack of know-how and low project implementation capacity, Africa depends on foreign technical experts for conducting project analysis and evaluation as well as for advice on implementation. Consequently, African countries have bought into technical assistance projects from international agencies and foreign investments by transnational corporations without actually comprehending their environmental ramifications. Tenth and finally, Africa needs management infrastructure that encompasses an array of skill mixes of the society—managerial, scientific, technological, technical, and entrepreneurial. In essence, management infrastructure is complementary to the physical infrastructure. Physical infrastructures, such as roads, bridges, telecommunications, and utilities, are vital for commerce and economic development. However, for them to contribute to the national economic goals, they must be managed effectively. Thus, if the physical infrastructure is likened to ‘‘hardware,’’ then management infrastructure is analogous to ‘‘software.’’ Both must be present to stimulate economic growth and development. It is well known that the hardware—physical infrastructure aspect of development—is a lot easier to put in place than the ‘‘software’’—local skills and institutions—to keep it functional. This is what makes the task of management capacity building both challenging and urgent in Africa. Physical infrastructure must be maintained. Deterioration of African physical infrastructure stems from poor management capacity. This has prompted Fluitman (1990) to call for maintenance management culture in the region.
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THEORETICAL APPROACH Proper understanding of management capacity buildings needs to be grounded in the broader socioeconomic context. This section provides such a context by delineating a conceptual framework and theoretical approach for proper analysis of management capacity and its strategic importance to socioeconomic development of Africa. The term ‘‘management’’ is used here in an all-encompassing sense to include public and corporate management. Management of the not-for-profit entities and nongovernmental organizations is subsumed. In short, we are dealing with management of national resources (human, physical, financial, institutional, and so forth) at all levels (local and national), at all settings (political and economic), and in all sectors (public and private). Enhancing management capacity will boost productivity and foster sustainable development in Africa. The widening development gap between Africa and other Third World countries has prompted the international development community to focus attention belatedly on capacity building in the region. Conceptualizing Capacity Building The ability of a society to institutionalize economic development and promote social progress is determined not so much by the availability of natural resources—these are all passive agents and are abundant in Africa—but by the capabilities of its people, institutions, and organizations. In essence the capacity of a society is embodied in its people (their skills, ideas, knowledge, talents, innovativeness, and creativity); its institutions (economic, social, and political); and its organizations (public and private). These are reinforced by noncognitive factors, such as norms, values, beliefs, ideals, process, and procedures. For there to be environmental security, continuous economic renewal, and sustainable development, a society must have management infrastructure to upgrade and replenish its stock of skills and knowledge (human capital) on a continuing basis. Structural transformation of society entails proper management of human capital, natural resources, and coordination of all the societal elements. Achieving a good fit and maintaining the delicate balance between society and its environment require constant adjustment, modification, and elaboration of the institutions and overriding values to reflect the changes in time and space. These require managers who have the capacity for anticipatory adaptation to change. In the 1960s and 1970s institutional building dominated the international development assistance literature as the solution to Third World underdevelopment. The late 1980s heralded capacity building. This concept was popularized by the World Bank’s (1989) long-term perspective study of Africa. The study stated that human and institutional capacity was lacking in virtually all sectors and countries in the region. Consequently, the study proposed a radical reappraisal of technical assistance strategies for Africa and for substantially increased
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investment in endogenous human and institutional capacity. With respect to the ability to conduct environmental analysis and evaluation, the World Bank asserted that ‘‘these countries lack appropriately trained staff to carry out environmental assessments. . . . Finally, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have only very limited capacity to implement environmental controls on development activities’’ (1991b: 1). This concern for capacity building in Africa culminated in the creation of African Capacity Building Initiative (ACBI) in 1991. This framework calls for increased participation and leadership of Africans in development assistance projects. It also proposed a radical change of traditional attitudes on the part of donors toward technical assistance. In furtherance of ACBI, the African Capacity Building Foundation—a joint donor-African government entity—which had an initial capitalization of $100 million, was established. The idea underpinning this approach is set out in a 1991 report as follows: A vital gap is not being adequately filled: capacity in economic analysis and development management. Despite the achievement in education and training in Africa during the 30 years, most countries still do not have a critical mass of top-flight policy analysts and managers who can help pilot economies through the storms and turbulence that must be faced daily. (World Bank, 1991a: 58)
Without endogenous management capacity, Africa cannot boost productivity and maintain environmental integrity. Until recently, aid donors did not consider the implications of their assistance for environmental degradation. Developing policy analysis capability could be very useful in alerting the region of the potential effects of technical assistance projects on the environment. The bank provided this rationale for its capacity building initiative in Africa in the following terms: To address the cost of environmental degradation in Africa more systematically, the Environmental Division of the Africa Region (AFTEN) has initiated a special program of support to build African capacities in environmental economics. The program’s objective is to integrate economic analysis into the NEAP [National Environmental Action Plan] process. (World Bank, 1992: 29)
Capacity building has also received impetus from the epochal Earth Summit held under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) Conference on the Environment and Development on June 13, 1992, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Since then, programs on capacity building have proliferated, and clarifications of the concept have been emerging. For example, Capacity 21 initiative of the UN Development Program (UNDP) defines capacity building as ‘‘the sum of efforts needed to nurture, enhance and utilize the skills of people and institutions to progress towards sustainable development.’’ The three main objectives of Capacity 21 are (1) to assist countries to incorporate the principles of sustainable
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development into their development plans and programs; (2) to assist countries to involve all stakeholders in the development planning and environmental management; and (3) to create a body of experience and expertise in sustainable development and capacity building that will be of continued material value to (and influence the operation of) developing countries and donors (UNDP, 1996). Interestingly, the Research and Development Division of the UN Conference on Human Settlement (UNCHS) adopts capacity building in its mission statement, namely, ‘‘[t]o contribute to improving living and working environment for all, on a sustainable basis, by promoting effective human resource development and institutional capacity-building for management and development of human settlement’’ (UNCHS, 1996). The European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) has established its Capacity Building and Governance Programme. In the context of the public sector, the Programme uses capacity building to refer to the ability of a public service of a country to manage the affairs of the nation within the prevailing national and international environment. It involves a complex combination of knowledge, skills, attitudes and approaches, organizational structures and systems. It is concerned with 1) identifying the human and organizational resources, and the systems required to manage development programs, and 2) developing approaches to create or enhance these resources and systems in specific institutional environment. (ECDPM, 1996)
For this chapter, capacity building is conceptualized as continuous improvements in the ability of individuals and society to control the forces of nature and to harness them for their benefit. It has to do with developing the skill and knowledge base of the society to enable it to improve the material conditions of its citizens. Thus, capacity is an amalgam of a society’s stock of managerial, scientific, technological, entrepreneurial, and institutional capabilities. In this context capacity building entails the continuous upgrading of these capabilities so that the society can strive to actualize its ideals to enable its members to enjoy productive and fulfilled lives. The incremental skills and knowledge gained in solving simple problems lead to self-confidence and self-reliance in tackling complex socioeconomic problems. Thus, the overriding goal of capacity building is to improve the ability of society to cater to the needs of its members and to enhance their quality of life. Capacity building is not an end; it is a means. The end purpose of capacity building is the development of human beings. A fundamental objective of capacity building is to enable society to optimize the use of its resources to meet its immediate and future needs. Capacity building is characterized by three main activities: skill upgrading, both general and specific; procedural improvement; and organizational strengthening. The skill enhancement aspect includes general education, on-the-job training, and professional deepening in crosscutting skills such as accounting, policy analysis, and information technology. The procedural
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improvement component refers to functional changes or system reforms, such as introducing new budgeting arrangements or replacement of ex ante controls over public enterprises by greater autonomy and ex post supervision (Regional Bureau for Africa, 1993). Organizational strengthening encompasses institutional development—reinforcing the capacity of an organization to use available resources effectively. CONCEPTUALIZING MANAGEMENT CAPACITY BUILDING Literature is inundated with conceptual definitions of management and its functions—planning, organizing, staffing, leading, and controlling; the roles that managers supposedly play—interpersonal, informational, and decisional; and the skills that they need (technical, conceptual, diagnostic, and human). Exactly three decades ago, S. Benjamin Prasad examined economic development in Africa through the prism of ‘‘managerialism.’’ As he conceptualized it, ‘‘managerialism denotes a set of management capacities imperative to run business enterprise effectively.’’ He further stated that such ‘‘denotation . . . is more desirable than the term management which denotes corporate management as observed and described in the North American continent and Western Europe mostly’’ (Prasad, 1967: 91). Our use of the term ‘‘management,’’ however, covers both public and private sectors. The importance of management capacity in shaping the national industrial system and economic destiny in both the industrialized and newly industrializing countries is widely acknowledged. Management makes a major difference between development and underdevelopment and between industrialized and nonindustrialized countries. Lamenting the lack of management capacity in the nonindustrialized countries, Saaed states that where in these countries we observe the signs of rising socioeconomic standards, we are likely to see evidence of effective management. In the same vein, wherever we see gleams of organization, . . . we see the presence of individuals with foresight, vigor and dynamism. If there is any single thing which can and will help the developing world, it is better management of resources which is the same thing as better socioeconomic leadership. (1986: 4)
Considering the strategic importance of management to economic development, Peter Drucker, a prominent management scholar, noted: ‘‘It can be said without too much oversimplification that there are no ‘underdeveloped countries.’ There are only ‘undermanaged’ ones. . . . Management is the prime mover, and development is the consequence’’ (Drucker, 1970: 49). He also conceptualized management as nothing less than ‘‘the catalyst which makes possible rapid economic and social development in freedom and with human dignity’’ (1977: 26). Conceiving of management as ‘‘a liberating force which has given man a Promethean freedom from the shackles of the elements,’’ Saaed philos-
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ophizes that management is ‘‘the equivalent of freedom; freedom from want, freedom from oppression and coercion, freedom from exploitation and freedom from limitations on the mind’’ (1986: 5). In fact, Saaed (1986: 4) draws an apt distinction between the industrialized and underdeveloped countries on the basis of management capacity. According to him: The industrialized countries have let their own Prometheus soar into the skies for them. It is for the developing countries now to unchain the Promethean capability so that a new order for their freedom from socioeconomic want can emerge; their Prometheus is their capability to manage their resources. It is for them to let him remain chained to the rock of retrogressive attitudes, backward knowledge and outdated skills, or to release him into a future full of socioeconomic vigour and innovation. (Saaed, 1986: 5)
Through management’s efforts, socioeconomic conditions and quality of life have significantly improved in the industrialized countries. This situation contrasts sharply with what obtains in underdeveloped countries, particularly in African countries. Many analysts attribute the rapid postwar economic recovery in Europe to a reservoir of high-level management knowledge and technical skills accumulated prior to the world wars. Europe emerged from World War II beleaguered, yet, it was able to rebuild with astonishing rapidity. The European experience underscores the importance of management capacity building. Writers have observed that the single most important factor that accounted for the European rapid recovery was not great influx of capital and assistance, as commonly assumed, but Europe’s strong managerial capability. Management capacity building revolves around human resource development and capability. Three critical areas of human resource capability that are fundamental requirements for national industrial productivity, economic growth, and sustainable development are entrepreneurial, technological, and managerial (Lall, 1989). Human resource development relative to managerial capability has both cognitive and noncognitive dimensions. Cognitive dimensions include the formation of competencies (such as reasoning and analytical abilities) and the transmission of information (such as technical knowledge, theories, and facts) (Cotlear, 1989). Noncognitive dimensions refer to the values, attitudes, and beliefs underlying such capabilities. Entrepreneurial ability includes the ‘‘skills needed to identify suitable investment opportunities, master the financial, technical and other resources necessary to mount projects . . . at appropriate scale and with appropriate market orientation’’ (Lall, 1989: 132). Entrepreneurs who perceive profitable opportunities, take risks, and have the ability to manage business have played an important role in the emergence of all modern societies and therefore are critical for economic development. The 1989 World Bank report on Sub-Saharan Africa emphasized this point when it called for an enlarged role for entrepreneurs and
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improved business environment, so that enterprises of all sizes could make a greater contribution to economic development of the region (World Bank, 1989). Technological capability is necessary for a nation to develop its industrial base. This includes not only the ability to operate a plant or business but also the ability to create new productive capacity. More important, it involves the ability to innovate, adapt, modify, and improve upon existing methods and products and to develop new ones. The acquisition of technological capabilities by Africa with access to imported technology chiefly depends on training possibilities for local personnel, including those needed to manage such technology and adapt it to local needs. A significant part of technology comprises skills and knowledge embodied in human beings, and only through training can most of this ‘‘soft’’ technology be transferred. MANAGEMENT CAPACITY BUILDING IN PREINDEPENDENCE AFRICA: COLONIAL LOGIC AND LEGACY Focus on management capacity building in Africa is largely a postindependence phenomenon. The colonial logic severely inhibited the development management capacity in Africa. It also constrained the evolution of expertise and competence in planning, launching, and managing large-scale projects or institutions. Influenced by the inner logic of colonialism, its mechanisms, and structure as well as center-periphery relationship, the colonial powers ignored the need to develop endogenous management capacity and technological capability in their African territories. The patterns of industrialization that emerged in colonial Africa clearly exhibited certain unique characteristics: they were structured and oriented toward dependence on European markets for management expertise, technical skills, equipment, and other factors of production (Forje, 1989). The failure to develop management capacity was rationalized in terms of the logic of colonial relations and the manifest interest in sustaining the system. In the same vein the colonial powers in Africa justified their failure to develop endogenous scientific knowledge, technological capacity, and management capacity by arguing that exogenous expertise and talents were far more beneficial to Africa. It was also argued that Africa would reap the net benefit of not having to reinvent the wheel of progress. Emerging from this logic was the notion that management capacity and technological know-how available in the metropolis of the world system would easily be placed at the disposal of African countries to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the masses. In other words, dependence on foreign management expertise was a means toward economic salvation, not exploitation. A good educational base is a seedbed of management capacity building. Education, particularly at the university level, is admittedly a leveler of opportunities and a major instrument in the war against ignorance, poverty, and
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superstition. However, the colonial authorities in Africa felt no urgency, or even the need, to provide university education. Yet, university education is universally acknowledged as critical to developing high-level manpower in any country. In 1958, for example, only 10,000 Africans attended universities. Of this number, Nigeria and Ghana represented 65 percent (World Bank, 1981). In 1960 there was not even a single university in the French colonial territories in Africa. There were only two embryonic institutions in Zaire and a few university colleges in some British colonies—Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Southern Rhodesia, Uganda, and Kenya (Fieldhouse, 1983). The unfortunate legacy of the neglect and reluctance of the colonial authorities to foster endogenous management capacity through educational opportunities is that, on the eve of independence, Africa had very few high-level professionals and managers. Even the few Africans trained in the colonial institutions abroad lacked practical experience because they were not given the opportunity to accumulate on-the-job managerial skills. Colonial authorities constituted their African territories into employment avenues for jobless citizens in their home countries. By importing skills from their home countries, colonial administration in Africa diffused the potentially explosive atmosphere of mass unemployment in their home countries. Thus, the convention of expatriate staff’s filling even line positions in the colonial civil service in Africa was deeply entrenched. Another enduring legacy of colonialism is that it deprived Africans of the opportunities of learning-by-doing and doing-by-observation. Overall, the opportunities for evolving management talents, instilling industrial discipline, and fostering positive work habits and ethics in the local populations were all lost. Building management capacity for economic independence was definitely not part of the civilizing mission of the colonial enterprise in Africa. This situation was even worse in the private sector, where trading houses and cottage industries were owned and controlled by Europeans. In the colonial environment of the time, this had a deleterious effect: it hampered the evolution of entrepreneurial talents, effective technology transfer, and management capacity building, all of which require a long period of nurturing. Prasad had argued that developing managerial capacity is not a mechanical process but rather is somewhat analogous to the process of agriculture: ‘‘It is concerned with growing talent rather than manufacturing it’’ (1967: 91). The fundamental idea behind this reasoning, as he elaborated, is that a person grows into what he is capable of becoming, provided proper environments for growth are created. Therefore, it is imperative to note that racial barriers, both institutionalized and informal, fostered by colonialism, precluded Africans from working in industrial settings and moving into skilled and professional jobs, which could have been a laboratory for management capacity building. Economic incentives driving colonial employers to substitute cheap African labor for dear white labor or train Africans on the job were frustrated by the social conventions of colonialism. It was taboo for blacks to supervise whites. In the colonial environment it
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Table 16.1 Expatriate Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment of Trained Manpower, c. 1967
A ⫽ university degree or equivalent; B ⫽ higher secondary school examination generally taken after six or seven years of secondary schooling; C ⫽ form II plus two to four years of formal training; and D ⫽ form II or primary school plus one to four years of formal training. b Includes all non-Africans for 1964 and Western expatriates only in 1969. Source: Regional Bureau for Africa, 1993: 66. a
was customary to import skilled workers to fill shortages rather than train Africans (Regional Bureau for Africa, 1993; United Nations, 1959). MANAGEMENT CAPACITY BUILDING IN POSTINDEPENDENCE AFRICA: NATIONALIST IDEAL AND RATIONALIST SYMBOL African leaders were aware of the lack of management capacity in their countries in the postindependence era. They were also conscious of the vulnerability of their economies as a result of their heavy dependence on foreign management expertise. Tables 16.1 and 16.2 illustrate the high degree of dependence on expatriate manpower in the decade after independence. This was the situation that Africa sought to reverse through symbolic planning and manpower programming. Thus, in virtually all African countries, independence was accompanied by national development plans. Predictably, capacity building through manpower planning featured prominently in the national economic policies and development plans. Nigeria’s first Development Plan (1962–1968) typified such a concern for managerial manpower. ‘‘It is important,’’ declared the blueprint, ‘‘that Nigeria should . . . have prominently before it at all times the ultimate goals of economic independence.’’ Nigeria would accept foreign technology, managerial manpower, and materials only to ‘‘advance the time when the coun-
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Table 16.2 Incidence of Expatriates in High-Level Manpower in Gambia, 1975
*This refers in particular to mathematics and science teachers. Source: Ojo, 1985: 40.
try may become self-reliant.’’ The plan was to lay a solid foundation for steady growth without abnormal dependence on ‘‘such external factors of development as foreign financial and technical assistance’’ (FRN, 1964: 1–3). African countries understood the need for technical assistance, but they also recognized its potential dependency-enhancing attribute. As Nigeria’s development plan suggested, African countries did not want abrupt termination of their colonial relations, because they depended heavily on foreign managerial and technical expertise; rather, they preferred constructive disengagement from the colonial relations by gradually evolving national capabilities through manpower planning. The emphasis on manpower planning found expression in the establishment mechanisms for manpower planning, such as the National Manpower Board in Nigeria in 1962 and in Ghana in 1968. Such an agency was charged with assessing and determining the manpower needs of the country, designing programs for manpower development, and devising programs for effective use of available manpower. These efforts were complemented by foreign technical assistance programs. However, the bold manpower development programs initiated in the period immediately following independence were not sustained for several reasons, such as political repression, civil wars, and economic hardship. Repressive political environments in African countries have been inconducive for management capacity building in the region. Political victimization and civil wars have decimated the number of high-level professionals. Those who survive the political onslaught have fled their countries to industrialized countries for safety and security. Uganda lost more than half of its high-level professionals during the agonizing years of the Idi Amin reign of terror and is still suffering the con-
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sequences today. In 1983 the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) stated that: an improved political and social climate is not merely a guarantee for political stability, but a sine qua non for the blooming of the genius of the Africa people who, in the precolonial period, proved themselves highly resourceful in many activities . . . the creation of a peaceful and serene political and social climate is a must if the ultimate goal of development is to be achieved. (1983: 26)
Another factor contributing to the dwindling of management capacity in Africa is the harsh economic conditions. Harsh economic conditions reinforce and complement political repression by forcing critical personnel to leave the continent in search of a more comfortable and rewarding environment. Between 1960 and 1975 some 27,000 highly educated Africans left the region for the West (UNCTAD, 1979). Between 1975 and 1984 this number surged to 40,000 and then burgeoned to 70,000 by 1987. This represents almost 30 percent of the total high-level manpower in the continent today (Greg-Johnson, 1990). The International Labor Organization (ILO, 1984) report indicated that some 500,000 Sudanese work outside Africa. The report also estimated that about two-thirds of Sudanese professional and technical workers had left the country by 1985. In Ghana 60 percent of medical doctors trained in the early 1980s are currently working in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere abroad (West Africa, 1992: 749). In 1985 Guinean, Algerian, Malagache, and Beninese doctors and teachers working in France far exceeded the total of technical assistance personnel in the same fields in these countries (Jeune Afrique, 1985: 55). Governments in the early years of independence in Africa understood the need to retain high-level manpower in their economies, given the fierce competition in the international skills market. Commissions were established to study and recommend a salary structure and incentive system that would be competitive in attracting and retaining skilled nationals. Thus, in 1966 Nigeria’s Elwood Commission recommended a substantial increase in salaries for professional and technical staff to bring the scales ‘‘in line with world market values’’ and Nigeria ‘‘into competition with wealthier countries in order to secure and retain the services of its own people’’ (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1966: 9). Similarly, the Udoji Commission in the 1970s proposed a significant increase for the public sector employees. In 1967 the Mills-Odoi Commission in Ghana argued for high salaries for public sector, high-level manpower because of their ‘‘international market and scarcity of values’’ (Republic of Ghana, 1969: 28). The same logic underpinned most of the recommendations of commissions set up by other African countries, such as Kenya’s Ndegwa Commission (1972) and Sudan’s Mohammed Taha Commission (1979). The concerns for attracting, retaining, and building highlevel manpower are severely affected by the worsening of economic conditions. Real incomes in most African countries are so low ‘‘that it is difficult for the
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most frugal public servant to meet his/her family’s basic needs’’ (Greg-Johnson, 1990: 299). Migration of professionals from Africa to industrialized countries because of political victimization, civil wars, and deplorable economic conditions makes technical assistance not only an inevitability but also an absolute necessity.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND MANAGEMENT CAPACITY BUILDING IN AFRICA Many international development agencies have provided resources to assist capacity building efforts in Africa. Resources provided by international agencies for capacity building often come under the rubrics of technical cooperation and technical assistance. The UN system uses the term technical cooperation (TC), while the World Bank, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) use technical assistance (TA). The semantic difference between these terms is that TC presupposes a donor–recipient partnership, while TA implies a giver–taker relationship. Because TC and TA have the same broad goals, the two terms are used interchangeably in this chapter. Generally, foreign assistance is predicated on the noble objective of helping people to help themselves. They are designed to upgrade the level of skills, expertise, experience, knowledge, and technical know-how that are unavailable among nationals of the recipient country for a short duration until nationals have acquired the training and skills to do the job. Thus, like the ‘‘Marxist state,’’ TA was designed to wither away. Two critical assumptions emerge from this assumption. First, TA is short-term: foreign experts—most often from the donor countries—would train and groom their replacements in the shortest possible time. Second, TA is not intended as a permanent solution to the lack of managerial capacity in the recipient countries. Thus, at the end of TA projects, nationals of the recipient country should have acquired a high level of management capacity to succeed expatriate managers. Foreign assistance to Africa relative to management capacity building should have as its primary purpose the augmentation of the level of management knowledge, technical know-how, or productive aptitudes of the population of developing countries, that is, increasing their stock of human intellectual capital or their capacity for more effective use of their resources. It should also aim at the transfer of management technology and know-how and at enhancing capacity building within national institutions to undertake development activities. Given the pervasive shortages of management skills in Africa, TA should promote selfreliance in developing countries by building up, among other things, their productive capability and their indigenous resources—by increasing the availability of the managerial, technical, administrative, and research capabilities required for sustainable development. Thus, TA should be geared toward the transfer or
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adaptation of ideas, knowledge, practices, technologies, or skills to foster economic development in Africa. EFFICACY OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR MANAGEMENT CAPACITY BUILDING How has TA facilitated management capacity building efforts in Africa? Evidence of the effectiveness of TA in fostering management capacity building in Africa is mixed at best. From the donors’ perspective, TA has been a tremendous success. Given the amount of resources they have committed to this course, the donors believe that Africa would be worse off without TA. From Africa’s perspective, however, TA has achieved little in terms of its stated objectives. Evidence supports some of the scathing criticisms that TA does not foster endogenous management capacity building or transfer management technology to the locals. A 1985 study examined ILO, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and World Bank experience with capacity building projects in education in five African countries (Cameroon, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Zambia). The study found that little management capacity had resulted, largely because of inadequate emphasis on training (Auerhan et al., 1985). A 1989 review of 366 technical cooperation projects in SubSaharan Africa with institutional-development components found substantial results in only 22 percent of the cases, negligible results in 26 percent, and partial success in 52 percent (Eaves, 1989). Another study in 1989, undertaken by the Operations and Evaluation Department of the World Bank, evaluated the effectiveness of nineteen freestanding TC projects aimed at improving public sector management in seven African countries. Only five were found to be successful, and only three to be wholly satisfactory. The reality of TA diverges considerably from its ostensible goals. First, studies have demonstrated that expatriates are not often inclined to provide training and to impart management skills to their local counterparts. Turner, for example, noted that oil companies resisted the replacement of expatriates with qualified Nigerians not only because it would threaten the ‘‘communication-control structure so essential to large multinationals, but also—and more immediately— because it displaces individuals from jobs to which are attached income, status, a lifestyle and standard of living which few could enjoy in their home countries’’ (1976: 356). Thus, overall, the impact of TA is negligible and does not stand in favorable relation to its skyrocketing costs. COSTS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECTS AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN AFRICA That Sub-Saharan Africa is the most heavily aided region in the world is reflected in the cost of foreign aid and the magnitude of TA to the region. During
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1980–1989 official development assistance averaged more than 11 percent of gross national product in the region. This was 10 to 20 times more than what other developing regions received. In 1989 TA grants amounted to $3.2 billion, representing a quarter of total official development assistance in the region (Regional Bureau for Africa, 1993: 245). Since 1990, the cost of TA in Africa has surged to about $4 billion a year (Conable, 1991: 20; Jaycox, 1992: 48). Given the amount of money involved in development aid in general and TA in particular, why does Africa remain miserably poor? This question was apparently addressed recently in a commentary by Bryan T. Johnson, who stated that ‘‘about 70 cents out of every foreign-aid dollar never makes it overseas: It funds the very bureaucracy so piously arguing for preserving foreign aid’’ (‘‘Failure of Foreign Aid,’’ 1996: 4). What this means is that TA is a case whereby the receiver of aid assists the donor of aid. The other question is, Why does Africa still suffer from the acute shortages of management capacity and technical skills in view of the burgeoning number of foreign technical experts who are supposed to develop, train, or enhance management capacity in Africa? The estimate is that at any given moment, SubSaharan Africa hosts 80,000–100,000 expatriates working for public agencies under official aid programs. Edward V. K. Jaycox, the World Bank’s vice president for the African region, laments that there are more expatriates now in Africa than before independence. As he argues, the trends have undermined capacity building efforts in the region (Jaycox, 1992: 48). Table 16.3 shows the magnitude of TC personnel by category for selected African countries. Consulting on TA projects in Africa is a booming industry in Europe and North America. Consulting firms from these regions charge as much as $180,000 a year for each expert under official aid programs. More than half of the $7–8 billion spent yearly by donors goes to finance technical experts (Timberlake, 1985: 8). The UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa (1993: 245) estimates that in many countries of the region, the cost of a resident expatriate adviser now approaches $300,000 a year. Against this backdrop, the total cost of providing an estimated 80,000 foreign experts to Sub-Saharan Africa in 1989 was between $8 billion and $12 billion, about 33 percent of total Overseas Development Agency (ODA) received by the region in that year. The case of Tanzania illustrates vividly the prohibitive financial cost of TA to Africa: In Tanzania, for example, the total cost of technical assistance in 1988 was some $300 million, of which at least $200 million represented the salaries, per diems, housing allowances, air travel and other direct costs of the 1,000 or so international experts provided as the core technical assistance. In contrast, the total salary cost of the whole civil service in Tanzania in the same year . . . was $100 million. The situation in Tanzania is not untypical. . . . The time has come to rethink the purpose of aid and technical assistance within the UN system. (cited in Regional Bureau for Africa, 1993: 14)
Table 16.4 shows the pattern of how TA expenditures are allocated, substantiating the fact that not much attention is paid to training that could enhance
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Table 16.3 Technical Cooperation Personnel by Category: Selected Countries, 1988(a) or 1989(b)
Source: Regional Bureau for Africa, 1993.
capacity building. Much of the cost of TA goes for funding overgenerous expatriate salaries and fringe benefits. This appears to be the normative standard in Africa, whether it is TA provided by the international development agencies or a repayable project loan offered by the World Bank. Take the case of a World Bank loan that put the Nigerian federal government and the Kaduna state government on a collision course. The World Bank loan represented 40 percent, and the federal government 60 percent of the total cost of the agriculture project. The conflict ensued over the recruitment and remuneration of expatriates, which the state refused to allow the bank to control, given the fact that its loan would be repaid eventually. In a statement on the conflict issued by the Kaduna state government, the bank had wanted to appoint 45 of the major staff of the project. In addition, the bank had stipulated the following conditions for the 40 percent loan it provided: a. A salary of $40,000 per annum, tax free, and paid in foreign currency, in foreign banks; b. The payment of the 7.8 percent of the gross salary as cost-of-living allowance; c. N773 per annum per dependent as dependent allowance;
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Table 16.4 Types of Technical Cooperation Expenditures: Selected Countries, c. 1989 (Percentages)
Source: Regional Bureau for Africa, 1993: 85.
d. 25 percent of the gross salary as ‘‘part-allowance’’; e. 75 percent of their children’s school fees to be paid abroad in foreign currency; f. Free air-conditioned and chauffeur-driven vehicle; g. Free air-conditioned and furnished-to-taste housing; h. Free electricity and water supply; i. Free trip return air ticket to anywhere in the world for annual vacation; and j. 40 working days leave per annum.
All these, the statement added, would have cost the state government N12 million per annum, approximately a third of the total cost of the project (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985: 131–32). Expatriates who live a modest life in their home countries always live like a ‘‘pope’’ under technical assistance schemes in Africa, especially if technicians can easily pass for engineers, and supervisors qualify as managers.
STRATEGIES FOR MANAGEMENT CAPACITY BUILDING IN AFRICA Management capacity building in Africa is critical for economic development and requires certain preconditions for its flourishing. As indicated earlier, management capacity building centers on developing and upgrading human potentials. This section lays out certain strategies for creating management capacity in Africa.
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Enabling Environment Management capacity building requires an enabling political environment. This entails political stability, democratic governance, and fundamental human rights. Creating an enabling political environment requires not just sporadic efforts but a sustained, total commitment. There is a need to mobilize political support for capacity building efforts in Africa. Political support in the context of management capacity building would include stemming the tide of brain drain and creating attractive incentive system for high-level manpower. Arresting Brain Drain Political repression and harsh economic conditions in Africa have accentuated the exodus of high-level manpower, which represents substantial loss to the economy. Efforts have been made to quantify the loss, in dollar terms, of the brain drain from developing countries. Some estimates put it at approximately U.S.$50 billion between 1961 and 1972. A study by the U.S. government in 1974 estimated that in 1972, by importing skilled manpower, the United States saved U.S.$883 million in direct education expenditures that would have produced that manpower locally, while the countries of origin lost some U.S.$320 million, the amount they invested in educating these migrants. Applying the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) ‘‘imputed capital value of skills flows’’ approach, Greg-Johnson (1990) estimates the cost of brain drain to Africa over the next 25–35 years at $12.6 billion in 1979 U.S. dollars. African governments need to reverse these trends. Management Incentive System The incentive systems in African countries do not foster management capacity building. According to a World Bank report, the situation in many African countries is so bad that ‘‘many public sector employees cannot afford a balanced diet regardless of whether they spent their entire income on food’’ (1983b: 25). A vice chancellor of an African university lamented that low salaries are ‘‘generating serious pressures to leave the university’’ (Sawyerr, 1987). The World Health Organization (WHO) mentions a catastrophic outflow of health manpower from African countries caused by the hopelessly inadequate salaries, the general ‘‘inertia,’’ and the ‘‘demoralization,’’ as well as the ‘‘struggle for other ways to survive’’ (WHO, 1987: 1787). In recent years several programs have been established, mostly by the international organizations, to lure highly qualified Africans back to the region. While the goals of these programs are noble, the incentives are not, realistically speaking, encouraging. While residents in the industrialized countries, highly qualified Africans enjoy high living standards. At the very least, they would like to maintain those standards on return to Africa. The love of ‘‘motherland’’ is
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no longer a persuasive argument. Leadership in Africa has not sacrificed anything or deferred immediate gratifications. To ask those who, through hard work, have developed internationally marketable skills to sacrifice in the face of such a reality smacks of hypocrisy.
Management Development African countries need to establish management development institutions and centers to strengthen the existing ones. Such institutions can be useful in several fundamental ways. One is the need to increase the pool of managerial talents. This would reduce the existing gaps created by the shortages of managerial manpower. Another advantage of such institutions is that they provide the venue for training prospective managers. While the regular academic programs provide only the general knowledge, management development institutions can provide intensive training in specific functional areas of management (finance, production, human resource, marketing, and others). The other benefit of such institutions is upgrading the skills of practicing managers. Management techniques are constantly changing, and managers must keep abreast of the changes. Rapid changes in technology are rendering the traditional management skills obsolete. Keeping pace with new management techniques is critical to improving organizational performance and boosting productivity in both public and private sectors. ILO research indicates that accounting is unpopular in Africa mostly because it is seen primarily as a tool for ‘‘catching people out.’’ Almost all accounting in Africa is for financial control. Only a handful of the more than 3,000 public entities in Africa have analytical accounting systems that show management how to allocate resources, where to look for savings, and how much poor maintenance is costing (Fluitman, 1993: 309).
Technical Assistance TA, as currently designed, is donor-driven. It is a transaction that involves unequals. The whole operation is externally controlled through the resident expatriate experts. The fact that the recipient countries do not often have inputs in the design of project and selection of personnel has proved TA to be an ineffectual instrument of management capacity building in Africa. The general tenor of TA is that the donors believe that ‘‘he who pays the piper dictates the tone.’’ As such, African countries have exhibited an attitude of passive dependency, believing that beggars cannot be choosers. African countries should be selective in accepting TA. They should insist on their selecting TA projects, participating in designing them, and playing a major role in implementing them. If TA were intended to enhance management capacity building, then the recipient countries should be responsible for the actual management of TA projects, while the resident expatriate experts’ role should be purely advisory. This is a
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way that technical assistance can help the course of management capacity building in Africa. Education and Training To date, education in Africa is provided for its own sake. Integration of education with industry in Africa is still an alien concept. The result of this is that the knowledge gap between what is taught in schools and what is needed in industry has increased. Industry should be involved in education relative to providing inputs into the designing of curricula, especially at the university level. The lack of such inputs accounts for a situation where there is a high rate of graduate unemployment, while there are unfilled vacancies in various sectors of African economies. Underutilization of Local Talents One way of building endogenous capacity is the effective utilization of local talents. African countries have not optimized the utilization of available local skills. People may be placed in higher positions by titles, but they are assigned lower-level responsibilities. In fact, what managers are supposed to do, given their official titles, is always at variance with what they actually do in those positions. In most cases, so-called managers are no more than glorified clerical staff. Underutilization of local talents affects the degree to which decisionmaking skills can be developed. Self-Reliant Orientation The need for self-reliance in Africa is no longer a theoretical construct but a practical necessity. Africa always looks for ready-made solutions to its development problems, depending on foreign experts to do wonders. Accordingly, foreign experts always seem to provide such solutions before defining the problems to fit them. This is grossly inconsistent with the self-reliant orientation. Africa must explore all local options before looking for foreign assistance. Even where foreign assistance is absolutely necessary, Africa has to develop the capacity to define the kinds of help it needs. CONCLUSION This chapter focused on the importance of building management capacity in Africa. The region needs management capacity in all sectors of the economy and at all levels of institutions and organizations. Developing capacities for policy analysis and economic management is imperative for increased productivity and sustainable development. The global environment is becoming more hostile toward Africa. The region needs endogenous management capacity to
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succeed in this hostile environment. Developing endogenous management capacity will continue to elude African countries until they create stable and conductive political atmospheres to promote creativity and innovativeness. These will not emerge in the political environment that emasculates dialogue, criminalizes policy alternatives, and marginalizes intelligentsia and where, as Conable argues: Open political participation has been restricted and even condemned, and those brave enough to speak their minds have too frequently taken grave personal risks. I fear that many African leaders have been more concerned about retaining power than about the long-term interests of their people. (1991: 5)
African governments have fed on inefficiency and economic management for so long. Building effective management capacity requires national leadership that derives legitimacy from the citizens. This means accountability and transparency in public affairs. But it also means that the leadership must depend on its people, and such leadership must have the moral authority to challenge citizens to attain greater moral and ethical values. The acid test of effective leadership is the ability to make geniuses out of ordinary people and to mobilize ordinary people to accomplish extraordinary goals, such as turning the tottering economy around. The long-standing indictment against African leaders is their penchant for foreign experts and underutilization of local talents. Yet, African countries cannot build a strong foundation for their economies on the basis of foreign scientists, managers, and entrepreneurs. Building endogenous management capacity is central to the whole idea of national self-reliance.
CHAPTER 17
Manpower Development in Nigeria: A Research Note on the University James Etim
INTRODUCTION Western education came with the missionaries, and the first known school in Nigeria was established in 1843 (Fafunwa, 1974: 82). At the primary and secondary levels, the curriculum followed the English pattern, and the textbooks in use were mostly those written and produced in Britain. Between 1843 and 1981, when the revised National Policy on Education was produced, many commissions were set up to study and make recommendations on the Nigerian system of education. The Phelps Stokes Report (Lewis, 1962), the Ashby Commission report (1960), and the National Curriculum Conference report (Adaralegbe, 1972), found several problems with the system of education as a whole, especially in the areas of relevance, balance, and manpower production. All the commissions called for a curriculum that would include and encourage vocational and technical subjects at the preuniversity levels, while the Ashby report specifically recommended that at least 800 teachers at the first degree, bachelor of arts/bachelor of science (B.A./B.Sc.), education level be trained yearly up to 1980. This chapter sets out to 1. Discuss the role of the universities in production of manpower in Nigeria between 1989 and 1994. 2. Show that some of the problems enumerated by the commissions still persist today at the university level. 3. Present and discuss data on student perception of the university system. 4. Make recommendations based on the findings.
In most countries of the world, the university is often thought of as a place for the production of highly skilled manpower for the nation. In the National
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Table 17.1 Growth in Universities by Year and Ownership
Sources: 1990 data compiled from information supplied in Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1995: 180; 1985 data compiled from information supplied in Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1987.
Curriculum Conference objectives for the universities were suggested. These include the objectives that the universities ‘‘must be actively involved in the process of nation building; develop, transmit and reform our national and world heritage; provide intellectual life . . . develop and encourage Nigerian human resource talents’’ (Adaralegbe, 1972: xiii). Beginning in the 1960s, Nigerian universities have been involved in the area of manpower production. Phenomenal growth and expansion of the university system have been witnessed in the past 25 years. Table 17.1 shows by year the growth in the number of universities. Data in Table 17.1 show a phenomenal growth from five universities at Ibadan, Ife, Lagos, Nsukka, and Zaria in 1965 to more than 30 in 1990. Recent data reported by Ejime (1996) show that Nigeria has presently 40 universities/degree-granting institutions. Table 17.2 shows the total student enrollment in Nigerian universities by major disciplines from 1989 to 1993. Data presented in Table 17.2 show a steady growth in enrollment over the time period of 1989–1993 from a little over 174,000 to almost 228,000. The two highest areas in enrollments were in the sciences and education, while veterinary medicine had the lowest yearly enrollments. Tables 17.3 and 17.4 show first degree awards by Nigerian universities and postgraduate awards by Nigerian universities, respectively, for the years 1988 through 1992. Data presented show that, at the undergraduate level, fewer candidates graduated in 1992 than in any other year in all disciplines. For example, in the field of education, while 6,021 candidates graduated in 1988, only 4,215 graduated in 1992, a loss of 1,806 graduates. The total number of graduates for the year 1988 compared to 1992 shows the decreasing number of graduates— while 25,412 graduated in 1988, only 19,204 graduated in 1992, a net loss of about 6,000. In terms of manpower production at the graduate level, fewer graduates were produced in 1992 when compared to 1988 in almost all fields except administration and agriculture. The areas with the lowest number of graduates were pharmacy (6), law (8), and veterinary medicine (12) in 1992, while education
Table 17.2 Total Student Enrollment in Nigerian Universities by Major Disciplines
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1995: 184.
Table 17.3 First Degree Awards by Nigerian Universities (Year Ending June)
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1995: 185, Table 121.
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Table 17.4 Postgraduate Awards by Nigerian Universities (Year Ending June)
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1995: 184, Table 122.
had the highest number of graduates. Overall, while 5,149 graduates were produced in 1988, only 3,818 graduated in 1992. Data presented in Table 17.5 show that there is imbalance between production of manpower in the arts, education, and social sciences and in the basic and applied sciences. While many more people with expertise in arts, education, and social sciences were produced, fewer individuals were produced in physical, chemical, and biological sciences, and in all the years the ratio was 2:1 in favor of the arts, education, and social sciences. In 1992 fewer candidates graduated in the sciences/applied sciences than in any of the five years indicated in Table 17.5. Further analysis was carried out for two key areas, engineering and agriculture. According to Hodges and Mechlenbury, ‘‘[O]ften the nation of engineers also controls the means and source of product production and delivery—and therefore the location of jobs, and their pay levels’’ (1996: 2). Moreover, Nigeria is often thought of as an agricultural nation. In fact, before the discovery of oil in commercial quantity and, indeed, before the world oil crisis of the 1970s, Nigeria earned more in foreign exchange for exporting agricultural produce. The federal government over the years, understanding the importance of agriculture to the nation’s economy, has instituted many agricultural development projects like the Green Revolution and Operation Feed the Nation. However, production of high-level graduates in these two areas has been a little low as a percent of total graduates. Table 17.6 shows the
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Table 17.5 Ratio of Manpower Production by Area
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1995: 183, Table 121.
Table 17.6 Production of Graduates in Engineering and Agriculture as a Percentage of Total Graduates by Year
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1995: 183, Tables 121, 122.
production of graduates in engineering and agriculture as a percentage of total graduates by year and level. At the undergraduate level, production of graduates in the area of engineering averaged about 6.5 percent of the yearly total over the five years, while at the graduate level, it was less than 5 percent of the total yearly production over the period. In the area of agriculture, yearly production averaged 4.0 percent of total at the undergraduate level and 6.1 percent at the graduate level. These figures are quite low, given the importance of these two areas for national development. Thus, while it is laudable that many teachers are being produced as a result of the Universal Primary Education (UPE) Scheme and the resultant influx of candidates to all levels of education, it may be worthwhile to slow down the growth and retrain the teachers already in the field who do not have adequate training. It may also be worthwhile that emphasis be put in other areas necessary for national development.
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Table 17.7 Placements for First Degree Courses by Region and Year
Region A ⫽ states in the old eastern region; Region B ⫽ states in the old northern region; Region C ⫽ the old Midwest region; and Region D ⫽ the old western region, including Lagos. Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1995: 174, 176, 178, 179, 181.
With the creation of states by the Yakubu Gowon administration, political discussion shifted from regional imbalances to state imbalances. In the area of education and manpower development, imbalances would be best discussed from the regional rather than state perspectives. Table 17.7 presents data on placement in Nigerian universities by ‘‘regions’’ (all the states in the former northern region are classified together, while all the states in the former east are classified together). For the 1987/1988 school year, data presented in Table 17.7 show that while
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10,367 students were admitted from the former eastern region, 7,440 were admitted from the northern region, and 10,054 were admitted from the west. In 1988/1989, the disparity continues between the northern and the other two regions—8,958 for the north, 15,869 for the east, and 12,267 for the west. The disparity remains during the 1991/1992 school year: 20,356 for the east, 15,916 for the west, and 15,425 for the north. For all the years, the northern region consistently had a lower number of students admitted into the universities than the other two regions. Analysis by state shows that Anambra, Imo, Bendel, and Oyo consistently placed a higher number of their students than did other states. A closer analysis shows that two states, Bendel and Imo, placed more students in any given year than all the northern states combined. The third area of imbalance is between the number applying for admissions and the number admitted. Table 17.8 presents data on the number of students who applied for a place in the university system and the number who were admitted. The number of applicants has grown yearly, from 210,525 in 1987 to 373,016 in 1991. The number of students placed has also increased, but the calculated percentage between number applied and number admitted shows a range between 4.6 and 6.8, with stability at about 6.0. Data presented by Ede (in Pandit, 1988) show the estimated extent of unsatisfied demand for university education in Nigeria, 1980–1983. When Tables 17.8 and 17.9 are taken together, one finds that, although the number of candidates admitted has increased over the years, unsatisfied demand has also been increasing, from 80.5 percent in 1980 to 93.9 percent in 1992. Of course, one can argue that many candidates who take JAMB are not prepared for rigorous university work and may merely be taking the examination for one reason or the other. But the fact remains that many candidates who are qualified are not admitted, leading to a waste of human resources. Several commissions instituted in Nigeria between 1920 and 1980 spoke of the problems in the Nigerian educational system. The Phelp Stokes Commission recommended that one of the objectives of education should be the ‘‘acquisition of agricultural and industrial skill,’’ and the Banjo report for Western Nigeria called for technical colleges for teachers and the expansion of science facilities in junior and senior secondary schools and technical and commercial subjects in the senior secondary schools. Although these commissions addressed mostly preuniversity education, their recommendations are still useful today, no matter the level of education. There is still need to produce high-level manpower in the areas of technology and applied and basic sciences and to make the curriculum more relevant to a global economy. Onwuka, speaking about the educational system, said: Nigeria has thousands of so-called educated men and women who among them possess every imaginable certificate or degree in the world; yet Nigeria continues to run here and there looking for experts to solve some of the problems besetting the country. The country is so naturally blessed with a variety of resources, human, mineral and agricultural.
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Table 17.8 Number of Applicants and Number of Placements by Year
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1995: 173–81, Tables 111–19.
Table 17.9 Estimated Extent of Unsatisfied Demand for University Education in Nigeria, 1980–1983
Source: Ede in Pandit, 1988: 6.
. . . But Nigerians are unable to utilize their local resources. This is exemplified by the hoards of unemployed men and women everywhere . . . excessive scarcity in the midst of plenty, dependence upon outsiders for the basic necessities of life. (1988: 120)
West (1996) pointed out that as a result of a global economy, with the demands on higher education to produce personnel that ensures that the economies of the developed world continue to prosper and remain competitive, attention in the universities has shifted from a classical philosophy to utilitarianism with the provision of nontraditional courses: ‘‘Prominent among these are electrical engineering . . . industrial management, telecommunications . . . computer applications for business . . . electronics engineering, digital circuits, digital systems, microprocessors etc.’’ (1996: 1). Lindley, Van Crowder, and Doron, writing about agricultural education in Africa, pointed out that formal agricultural education is needed for the production of skilled manpower to serve the sector. This manpower will help Africa
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meet the challenges of agricultural production and food scarcity facing the continent now and the near future. According to them, university education in the field of agriculture is at a crossroads, and ‘‘the demand for higher quality education has never been greater. There is a need for greater educational relevance and higher quality graduates’’ (1996). Michael Hodges and Bill Mechlenbury (1996) bemoan the drop in the number of science courses required for graduation by American universities. They also point out that at the undergraduate level, in such fields as mathematics, science, and engineering, ‘‘approximately half the student degrees from U.S. schools are made up of visiting foreign students.’’ They also showed the following: • Other nations are more intense than the United States in developing technical talent, producing a larger percentage of graduates in the disciplines that determine future technology. • In the area of engineering at the undergraduate level, strong economic nations such as Germany and Japan are producing at twice the U.S. rate as, in Table 17.10. • Often, the nation of engineers also controls the means and source of product production and delivery. • Those nations producing research and controlling product engineering have a competitive edge, and by implication their citizens have a higher standard of living.
Given the weaknesses (in their estimation) in the U.S. system in the area of mathematics, science, and technology, they ask, ‘‘Is this the way to prepare for the future in a more competitive global economy in a higher technological era?’’ These observations are relevant to the discussion on manpower development in Nigeria. With all the technological development in the United States, Hodges and Mechlenbury insist that more needs to be done to ensure continued high living standards in the country. If ‘‘less education quality cannot equate to improved living standards’’ (1996), then Nigeria needs to borrow a leaf from the industrialized world and intensely develop manpower in the science, mathematical, and technological areas. Manpower in these areas will enable the nation to move from a less developed to a developed country. In a study conducted in 1994, an attempt was made to find out the views of Nigerian university students on current educational issues. A questionnaire was developed and administered to 250 students in three Nigerian universities, two in the south and one in the north. Random sampling was used for selection of the subjects. Students registered in general studies/English classes were given the questionnaire to complete during a class session. Only students present during the class period and in one of the classrooms selected completed the questionnaire. These two courses are compulsory for all university students, and students take them at different points of their academic careers. Of the 250 questionnaires administered, 200 were returned. Of the 200 students, 128 were males, and 72 were females, while 124 were first-year students, 59 were secondyear students, and 17 did not respond regarding school year classification.
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Table 17.10 Percent Undergraduate Engineering Degrees
Many nations, such as Germany and Japan, have a percentage rate three times larger than that of the United States. Source: Modified version from graphics provided by
[email protected] (Hodges and Mechlenbury 1996: 6).
Table 17.11 presents data on the perception of subjects of their preuniversity preparation and the present curriculum. Sixty-five percent of the respondents strongly agree that students should be able to change their majors more easily and should not be penalized for this. Over the years students in most of the universities were not able to change majors easily. Sometimes they were asked to spend two or more years before such a change could be made, or they had to complete the degree program for which they were admitted before reapplying to JAMB for a fresh admission. This has meant unnecessary expenditure of resources on the part of the Nigerian government, since university education was free. It has also meant that students were spending their time on courses that they do not consider too useful. In many of the universities remedial programs have been instituted to enable students from the catchment area of the university to be admitted and to increase science majors into the universities. Approximately 60 percent of the respondents are of the opinion that remedial programs should not be phased out. However, 60.5 percent of the respondents
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Table 17.11 Perception of Preuniversity Curriculum and Present Curriculum (n ⫽ 200)
agree or strongly agree that these programs should be for those intending to pursue courses in the basic sciences and applied science/technology. Sixty-five percent of the respondents also strongly disagree or disagree with the idea that more departments related to science and technology should be created in the older universities instead of new universities of science and technology/agriculture. Table 17.12 presents data on students’ perception of educational access. Approximately 77 percent of the respondents indicated that university education in federal institutions should continue to be free. In the 1980s, while federal universities were free, state universities were not. Attempts by the federal government to institute fees often met with some student opposition. However, the idea of instituting fees in order to improve the quality of university education and increase access to federal universities is still unresolved. About 71 percent of the respondents disagreed with the idea that students intending to study science and technology should be admitted with slightly lower qualifications. From this, although there are fewer graduates in science and technology, many of the respondents do not feel that standards should be lowered
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Table 17.12 Students’ Perception of Educational Access
Table 17.13 Students’ Educational Fears (n ⫽ 200)
(lower JAMB scores) in order to admit and produce more graduates. About 53 percent of the respondents supported the idea that women in science and technology should be given incentives in order to encourage them to enter the field. Table 17.13 presents data on student educational fears. For the respondents, frequent university closure was their greatest fear. Since 1981, university closures have occurred every two or three years. This means disruption of academic activities, including lectures or examinations (Ejime, 1996). Some of these closures have lasted for more than four months, idling students and delaying their time of graduation. Another fear concerns their inability to graduate in a high degree class (e.g., in second class lower instead of
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second class upper). This is important, for it has implications for admission into postgraduate school and production of higher-level manpower. Table 17.14 presents responses of subjects to the question, ‘‘In terms of university education, what do you see as the greatest problem?’’ For the subjects, the primary problem was the frequent closures of the universities, followed by lack of access to others and lack of adequate facilities. In an interview with Professor Ekong, Ali pointed out that frequent university closures had resulted in ‘‘the absolute deterioration of the university system,’’ (1995: 1435) while, Desmond Davies (1995: 1435) reported the poor state of laboratory conditions for science study at the University of Ibadan. These were both counterproductive to the university system. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 1. Fewer candidates graduated in 1992 than in any of the five years of the study at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. 2. There was an imbalance in production of graduates between the arts/education/social sciences and basic and applied sciences. 3. Fewer candidates from the northern states of Nigeria were admitted into the universities compared to candidates from the south. Indeed, two southern states, Imo and Bendel, placed more students than all the northern states combined for each of the years. This will eventually translate into more graduates from these two states than from all of the north. 4. Only a tiny fraction of students who applied for admission were admitted. The percentage of admission ranged from 4.6 to 6.8. The unsatisfied demand was therefore very high. 5. Students were of the opinion that (1) education should continue to be free in federal universities, (2) remedial programs geared toward admitting more students in science and technology should continue to be encouraged, (3) more universities of technology and agriculture should be opened, and (4) standards should not be lowered to allow more students into science and technology. 6. Frequent university closures ranked as the highest ‘‘educational fear’’ for the subjects, and this was also the greatest problem for the university system. 7. Students should be allowed to change their majors more easily without penalty.
In the last fifteen years, there has been a phenomenal growth in the Nigerian educational system. The number and type of universities have increased; so has the number of students in the system. The federal government has opened some universities of agriculture and several universities of technology. An example is Rivers State, which has a university of science and technology. Therefore, both federal and some state governments are making efforts to transform the system, from a basis in arts to a basis in science and technology. However, more needs to be done in several areas.
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Table 17.14 Problems of the University System by Rank Order
Access More students need to be admitted into the system, given the fact that the rate of unsatisfied demand is quite high. The rate has ranged from 80.5 percent in 1980 to 93.9 percent in 1992, meaning that considerable human resources have been wasted in the process. Fees may not increase access but may improve the quality of instruction, since more money will accrue to the system. Therefore, to increase access while maintaining some fees, the government may have to develop loan programs so that any student admitted will not be denied access as a result of his or her indigency. Agriculture, Science, and Technology Graduates Herz (1996) points out that, as a result of falling petroleum prices, agriculture is contributing 30 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) presently in Nigeria. Given also the importance of science, technology, and engineering graduates in the development of any nation and as a result of data presented in this study, there is the need to produce more graduates in these areas. Government may want to increase funding to states so that secondary school science laboratories can be improved, so that science teachers at the secondary school could receive better renumeration than teachers in other disciplines, and so that more science secondary schools can be opened. The study of agricultural science should be encouraged at the secondary school level. Indeed, it may be made compulsory, as it was in the 1960s. To encourage more women into the field, incentive programs can be established at both the high school and university levels. Over the years graduates from the polytechnics and colleges of agriculture have not been too successful in gaining admission into the universities. Many who have gained admission have had to spend three or four years for degrees
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in basic science or engineering programs, or in agriculture, respectively. There is the need to develop policy that will facilitate the admission of more graduates from polytechnic/colleges of technology and colleges of agriculture into the universities with the idea that these graduates continue their education in an area related to their disciplines in the polytechnic or college of agriculture. The university curriculum for such graduates from the polytechnics/ colleges of agriculture will need to be revised for relevance and to ensure that the needs of the individual are met. Moreover, such revisions should make it possible that the length of stay in the university before a degree is granted is not as long as for those from the senior secondary school. To close the gap between the north and the south, there is the need to open more primary and secondary schools in the north and also to develop incentive programs to get more students from the north into the educational system. As an outgrowth of this study, further work needs to be done in the following areas: 1. Attrition and graduation rates for each discipline area. 2. Curriculum relevancy as viewed by faculty, graduates, and current students for each discipline area. 3. The role and effectiveness of such agencies as Nigerian Universities Commission (NUC) and Nigerian Manpower Board in manpower development. 4. A replication of the questionnaire aspect of the study with a larger student population.
According to Pandit, such federal government institutions as the National Universities Commission, National Manpower Board, and Human Resources Center have made ‘‘significant contributions in linking the educational system to the manpower needs of the country. Despite the contributions . . . we notice today surpluses and shortages existing side by side in various categories of national manpower’’ (1988: 16). These shortages and surpluses still persist today, together with other imbalances. Some of the recommendations suggested should help to improve the university system.
CHAPTER 18
Rural Population and Economic Development in Africa: An Analysis of Some Policy Issues Paul Kanjo and Agber Dimah
INTRODUCTION In the early 1960s, when most of Africa emerged from European colonization, the population of the continent was about 254 million (Oxford Regional Economic Atlas, 1967), with a very high rural concentration. For example, the population of Zaire was 15 million, of whom only 694,000 were in four urban areas (Gailey Jr., 1967). Today, nearly four decades later, at 667 million, the population of the continent has nearly tripled (World Bank, 1994b). It is predominantly young and still concentrated in rural areas, although a relatively rapid rural-urban shift is occurring (World Bank, 1994).1 In Zaire cities now account for 28.5 percent of the population (World Bank, 1994). Current population growth rates range from 2.3 percent in Chad, Guinea, and Sierra Leone to 4.2 percent in Libya (World Bank, 1994b). These rates are considered very high by demographers and are astronomical compared to those in industrialized countries (Africa Today, 1987).2 The rural population of Africa is composed mainly of peasant farmers, while the urban segment is made up of a relatively small group of skilled professionals, bureaucrats, and a large pool of literate and semiliterate unemployed persons, most of whom continue to maintain strong rural ties, a behavioral trait that blurs the often emphasized rural-urban dichotomy (Baker, 1986).3 Except for the rare cases in which a few nonhuman natural resources have been erroneously allowed to become precariously predominant, agriculture is the mainstay of African economies. It is still the largest employer and the most important source of foreign exchange. Consequently, any efforts to improve these economies must initially weigh heavily toward the agricultural sector. People are the most important natural resource of any country. If this resource
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is wasted, every other one is inevitably also wasted. Therefore, for the time being, the rural population is more important than the urban because of its size and economic value. Failure to mobilize it reduces the rate of economic growth and distorts the pattern of development. This is particularly true in Africa, where the rates of economic growth are low,4 and there are only a handful of industries inappropriately spatially concentrated in a few urban areas of colonial origin (World Bank, 1994b). These urban industries attract rural people away from agriculture. There are two consequences of this type of population shift. First, manpower drain from rural areas decreases agricultural production. This process tends to weaken economies based largely on farming. Second, rural outmigration also causes overcrowding, unemployment, and associated negative consequences in urban areas. Out-migration is a particularly serious problem because it affects mostly the able-bodied, more productive youth. However, despite its importance, the World Health Organization (WHO) has been vigorously campaigning for population control through the stabilization or reduction of birthrates. Why should less of the most important resource be good for Africa, especially when, by comparison to other regions of the world, its population density5 suggests the continent is almost empty?6 The objectives of this chapter are to: 1. explain the significance of population to economic growth, 2. show the effect on economic well-being of differences in the rates of population and economic growth, 3. indicate errors in population resource development, 4. explain the contradiction between a low population density and population pressure, 5. explain the notion of ‘‘taking development to the people’’ as an approach to economic development, and 6. state the implications for policy of the preceding issues.
These objectives are central aspects of capacity building in developing countries. It will be assumed throughout that, where possible, a more solid and lasting foundation for economic development must be laid on agriculture. This assumption is based on the role agriculture has been observed to play in human progress over millennia. The experience of the United States and Taiwan illustrates the importance of ‘‘agriculture first’’ and labor-intensive manufacture as the most effective ways of making optimal use of the labor resource at the primary stage of economic development, and the importance of manpower to the development process. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POPULATION RESOURCE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Development may be conceived as an improvement in the material (economic) and nonmaterial (quality) existence of a people. The quality of life of a people
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includes their culture, which is usually unknown to outsiders. This is a compelling reason that subjects of that culture must themselves be the architects of development. Foreign assistance is important but should not, as in Africa, be expected to constitute the primary mechanism for development.7 The material aspect of development involves much work, both mental and physical. Mental work here refers to good economic development planning, which is sourly lacking in Africa.8 Most work at the initial stage of economic development is usually in agriculture. The survival argument for this situation is that food is indispensable to human existence, such that not much else can be done in malnourished and hungry societies. The economic reason is that land and labor are usually the most abundant and affordable factors of production during this stage. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, farmwork was exclusively manual. At the current stage of development in Africa, as elsewhere in the developing world, the bulk of farmwork is done manually and frequently needs to remain that way for a while for three reasons. First, farm machines designed for use in temperate soils and climates are usually unsuitable for tropical Africa. Africans are still unable or unmotivated to invent suitable substitutes or adapt existing technologies. Second, the cost of modern machinery (purchase and maintenance) is too high for the average peasant farmer. Finally, lack of producer training makes the proper application of technology difficult even when it is appropriate. The greater the population of working adults, the faster the process of development can unfold. Labor is the most important factor of production because it is potentially nonexhaustible and can organize itself and the others for production. Production of goods and services or the creation of wealth either will not occur or will do so only very slowly if labor is not fully utilized. The creation of wealth in Africa is extremely slow largely because of the waste of human resources. Wrongful development and/or nondevelopment are ways in which human resources are wasted. Nondevelopment manifests mainly in illiteracy and lack of training, which prevents the resource from being fully utilized or becoming optimally productive. The generally high rates of illiteracy (ranging from 27 percent in Zambia to 82 percent in Burkina Faso [World Bank, 1994a]) illustrate this form of waste. On the other hand, wrongful population development is the kind of waste that results from a mismatch of education and training with the needs of economic development. Given the current needs of economic development, especially industrialization, the thousands of Africans with advanced education in the liberal arts and the humanities are no longer as useful to the economies as similar numbers of technicians trained in farming, machining, welding, carpentry, mechanics, and other skilled trades, who can create valuable tangible goods for domestic use or export. The mismatch consequently results in unemployment. High rates of unemployment reflect the waste of human resources, a main cause of poverty because the result is reduced productivity and product (see later). To waste labor is to cause underdevelopment. The Nigerian experience, for example, demonstrates the significance of labor
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to economic development. During the heyday of Nigerian agriculture prior to the oil boom, 69 percent of exports were composed of agricultural products (Oxford Regional Economic Atlas, 1967: 57). These export goods were produced by peasant farmers using only hoes and/or machetes! Nevertheless, Nigeria led the world in the output of palm products, peanuts, sesame seeds, and cotton, while at the same time a major producer of cocoa. However, because of ineffective government assistance, especially in producer training and finance, it was not possible to raise the industry to the next level. Despite this, Nigeria was regarded then as a relatively wealthy country, economically better off than Indonesia or Thailand (World Bank, 1994b). During the 1970s the misuse of oil wealth (by bloating the bureaucracy, theft, embezzlement, promotion of prestige projects, relaxing foreign exchange, and so on) attracted rural residents into cities where oil money was easier and quicker to make. This shift in the labor force9 caused the gradual decline of the farm industry (World Bank, 1994b). The decline was either not perceived or ignored because, with ‘‘petrodollars,’’ substitute foods could easily and readily be acquired in international markets. The dependence on oil (rather than on agriculture) for foreign exchange increased. When oil prices dropped sharply in the 1980s, the boom went burst, and the trade balance shifted unfavorably, in part, because of the cost of imported food.10 It is as if Nigerians had forgotten how to produce food and nonoil wealth. The current economic growth rate of only ⫺1.8 percent (World Bank, 1994a) leaves Nigeria far behind Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, all of which economies are growing more rapidly at 4.2 percent, 5.2 percent, and 3.6 percent, respectively (World Bank, 1994a, b). By contrast, during the initial stages of the development of Taiwan, emphasis was placed on agriculture (Li, 1988). Agricultural land was seized from absentee landlords and redistributed to peasant farmers (Li, 1988), who were then technically and financially supported by the government (Li, 1988). Additional policies encouraged vocational/technical education (Li, 1989) and nonfarm labor-intensive industries such as electronics and textiles. The result was a gradual modernization of agriculture, absorption of the labor surplus, an increase in productivity, and the enrichment of the poor majority. Concurrent policies to stimulate savings (Li, 1989) succeeded in generating a large domestic pool of savings because of the induced increases in incomes. Other policies tapped the increased domestic savings for investment, thereby reducing the need for foreign borrowing. The cumulative effect of these and other development policies mainly accounts for what is now called the economic miracle of Taiwan (Li, 1988).11 In general, Asians are succeeding at economic development mainly by taking advantage of cheap labor. Typically, for a small fraction of the labor cost in the country of the brand name, they manufacture American, European, and Japanese brand products for export. There are several advantages of export-oriented industrial development. It creates meaningful job opportunities for manufacturing valuable goods for sale. Also, earnings from foreign trade are accumulated, and
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technology is acquired. However, such an approach succeeds only if labor is technically trained and then exported repeatedly, embodied in higher-valued manufactured goods.12 In terms of nonhuman natural resources, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore13 are far less endowed than most African countries. Yet, by carefully developing and using the most important natural resource, these Asian economic minidragons have succeeded in building fairly robust economies. Adopting a development approach aimed at making the most use of its population enabled Taiwan, for example, to adjust from an agrarian to an industrial economy in only about eighteen years and to increase its per capita income from U.S.$150 in 1953 to a respectable U.S.$13,000 today. Foreign reserves, earned largely from foreign trade, are currently U.S.$100.4 billion.14 Apart from people and land, which is very scarce, there are insignificant or no known natural resources in Japan, the Oriental economic grand dragon. However, by appropriately developing and utilizing the human resource, Japan has undeniably become a preeminent economic power. Imagine the economic position of these Asian economies if they had the enormous natural resources of Africa or of the continent if, since independence, there had been a similar development and use of the population resource. The experience of the United States in the use of labor to promote economic development is also instructive. By the middle of the nineteenth century, most Americans made a living in farming, and the bulk of farmwork was manual. The Morrill Act of 1862 (Faulkner, 1960) created land grant institutions of higher learning with the single purpose of supporting agriculture. To promote rural development, farmers were encouraged to import and experiment on any crops to determine which of them could be produced domestically (Faulkner, 1960). Today the federal government still supports farmers and agricultural sciences technically and financially by subsidizing farm prices and funding research. The result of these and other farm initiatives is a very diversified and sophisticated agriculture considered one of the most productive in the world. The average American farmer can easily feed more than 100 people15 with a substantial excess for export. Also, during the depression, the U.S. government initiated public work projects to combat unemployment (Faulkner, 1960). The idea was to jump-start the economy by injecting money into it through paid work. Thus, by making the most use of the greatest resource, the United States was able to emerge from the depression successfully. In comparison, idleness and limited productivity characterize a large proportion of the African population. The high rates of unemployment and reduced production are a cost to society in terms of unearned income. Unemployment is high because agriculture, which is usually the largest employer at the primary stage of development, has been neglected16 and also because of the inability of policymakers to create adequate nongovernment employment despite the myriads of opportunities to do so. From an economic standpoint, a population of 21
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million like that of Taiwan with a high annual per capita income (U.S.$13,000) is better off than an overwhelmingly poor one such as that of Kenya (26 million) or Nigeria (102 million) with annual per capita incomes of only U.S.$310 and U.S.$320 respectively (World Bank, 1994a: 178, 258). Therefore, labor must be appropriately developed at all cost because of its superiority to the other factors of production and potential contribution to the economy. THE RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING A rapid rate of population growth can be good or bad for economic development. Because the quality and not the size determines the usefulness of the resource, a high rate of population growth is hardly good, especially for a developing country. Consider the following hypothetical example. Assume a developing country with only two citizens, a man and his wife, with a joint annual income of U.S.$600. Also, assume a zero economic growth rate. Per capita income is U.S.$300. The birth of a child reduces per capita income to U.S.$200 because of the population growth of 33 percent. As more children are born, per capita income decreases and will continue to decline as the population grows. If per capita income is used to gauge the level of material well-being, then, as it decreases, poverty increases. Kenya is a good example. In 1960 the population was estimated at 7.1 million (OREA, 1967), and per capita income was U.S.$340 (World Bank, 1994a: 2). Since then, on average, gross national product (GNP) has grown at less than 2 percent (World Bank, 1988c: 4) to U.S.$310 (World Bank, 1994a: x), while population has increased at 3.8 percent (World Bank, 1988: xi, 1994a: 4) to 26 million (World Bank, 1994a: x), making Kenya, a potentially wealthy country, one of the poorest in Africa. This pattern is typical of all African countries. One could use the inverse of the excess of population over economic growth rate as a quick and rough measure of the magnitude of poverty. If, on the contrary, we assume that in adulthood the child in the hypothetical example is gainfully employed at the same level as the parents, per capita income would continue to grow or at least be maintained. It is clear from this example that if the parents remain the only source of income, poverty will set in after a point and become abject thereafter. Thus, the rate of economic growth needs to be greater or at least equal to the rate of population growth for poverty to be avoided. An economic growth rate greater than the population growth rate ultimately results in affluence. The reverse is true and explains the high degree of poverty in Africa. The population of the continent is growing so fast, and the economies so slow that poverty is inevitable without population policy changes. For the hypothetical country, potential poverty can be averted in three alternative ways, each of which is fraught with problems. One remedy is to increase
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output or income. Now, assume a combined annual income of U.S.$1,200. Compared to the initial level, at constant prices, the increase reflects a doubling of output. Output can be increased by increasing the quantities and/or productivity of inputs. However, as already shown, increasing population as additional input can be a bad solution. It has also been argued that the application of modern technology to improve land and labor productivity is plagued with problems. Consequently, in the case of peasant agriculture, farm output can be increased only in the short run by cultivating more land using traditional methods and improving the productivity of existing labor by training. But doing this, in turn, involves other problems. For example, as we shall see, patterns of land ownership and transportation difficulties limit the amount of good farmland that can be cultivated.17 Poverty can also be avoided by limiting population growth to a rate equal to, or lower than, that of economic growth. Population control is an effective option to relieve poverty, but it too is plagued with problems. First, it is feasible only in the long run. Second, although a very effective method of population control, forced sterilization or limit to family size is extreme and controversial. Severe population pressure obliged China to adopt this approach. Controversy and potential resistance due to culture make it unsuitable for Africa also. A less drastic method of population control is sex education and voluntary birth control. But it has also been resisted. One explanation for the resistance is a culture that equates successful parenthood with the number of children born. The larger the family, the better. This aspect of African culture is identical to that of Chinese culture. But, unlike in Taiwan, it has so far not been possible to overcome this obstacle in Africa, mainly because of poor leadership. Another reason for the resistance is the economics involved. Children are a source of cheap labor and insurance against old age. But, as already shown, rapid population growth unmatched by economic growth of equal or greater magnitude makes multiple childbearing bad economics. The third alternative remedy to poverty consists in combining the other two. ERRORS IN POPULATION DEVELOPMENT There are two ways to improve the productivity of labor. One is to acquire or develop advanced technology. But it has been argued that this is an inappropriate solution for the time being. The other option is to train people first (population development). Unfortunately, education and training have been so seriously compromised in Africa that the level of returns is not commensurate with the size of investments in education.18 Human development for economic development must satisfy two conditions. The first requirement is the elimination of illiteracy because it impedes the use of technology to improve human health and productivity. After more than 35 years of independence for most African countries, the persistence of high rates of illiteracy shows that this goal has not been achieved in Africa
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(and may not be achieved anytime soon), even though there seems to have been a pervasive awareness of the importance of eradicating illiteracy as early as 1961 (Murray, 1981: 101–2). The second condition consists in emphasizing vocational technical training. It accelerates the acquisition of technology, which, in turn, increases productivity and value-added (preferably first from agriculture, then from light and heavy industries, and eventually from high technology.)19 The opposite is being done in Africa today. Immediately after independence, the departure of European colonial administrators created an employment vacuum, especially in public administration, motivating the education of nationals to assume public service and leadership. The outcome was an emphasis on advanced training in liberal arts and the humanities. For the few Africans who were trained, especially at university level, bureaucratic work was easy to find for a while. So, during a short interim, it looked as if governments could always hire everybody. In Africa government jobs are a source of enormous prestige and power and, therefore, very attractive. But such jobs cannot, by their very nature, enrich a country. Toward the end of the first decade of independence, the inability of African governments to provide civil service employment for all qualified citizens became obvious. At this critical juncture, policymakers failed to redirect the bulk of educational resources away from the training of prospective bureaucrats toward eliminating illiteracy and providing technical education for the purpose of creating an industrial middle class. Instead, the vocationalization of social sciences has persisted to date and produced additional qualified manpower governments can no longer employ. Thus, for about a quarter of a century, the pattern of human resource development became and has remained incompatible with the needs of economic development, thereby turning population and its development into a burden instead of an asset for economic development. Therefore, even the increase in labor productivity, the short-term alternative to increasing output, is unavailable as a result of inappropriate education and training. Faced with the same problem in the 1960s, Taiwan completely overhauled and reconstructed the educational system, emphasizing agricultural, industrial, and commercial vocational training (Li, 1989: 65–68). The reconstruction enabled Taiwan to acquire technology and develop a diverse manufacturing base rapidly. Kwo-ting Li believes the economic miracle of Taiwan could have been more spectacular (Li, 1989: 61) had the importance of education (especially vocational education) been understood earlier than 1966 (Li, 1988).20 A literacy rate of 98 percent shows that illiteracy has been literally wiped out of the island. Although Taiwan has lost its labor advantage in unskilled and semiskilled production (Li, 1989: 22), it has developed a substitute in heavy and high-tech industries through the creation of a large and increasing pool of well-trained, low-cost scientists, engineers, and other technicians by continuing to realign education and training with changing needs of economic development (Li, 1989: 220, 237–41). Lack of suitable employment for educated Africans encourages the emigration
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of trained nationals and discourages youth from attending school because investment in education is no longer viewed as beneficial. Unable to find agricultural employment in the rural areas for the reasons discussed later, youth migrate to urban areas, where they remain unemployed, ironically, for lack of educational skills. Thus, for Africans, too much training of the type incompatible with current needs of economic development or no training at all ends in unemployment at home. Disinterest in education decreases the rate of primary school enrollment, compounds the illiteracy problem, and, in the future, could cause shortages even in trained bureaucratic manpower arising from retirement. The conclusion is that, although output can be increased, and poverty avoided in the short run either by increasing the quantity of one of the critical factors of farm production (land) or by improving the productivity of another factor (labor), these adjustments are either not being made or being implemented incorrectly. Clearly, there are problems with each of the methods of increasing farm output for the purpose of generating economic growth in Africa. However, while all these problems are difficult to solve, some are relatively easier. For example, population development and/or resettlement is relatively easier and quicker than either population control or development of indigenous technology. It is difficult to maintain a reasonable balance between the rates of population and economic growth because, while childbearing is easy, the creation of meaningful jobs is not—hence, the need for population control in order to give development a chance. Confronted with this problem in the 1960s, the Taiwanese solved it by developing labor-intensive industries (including agriculture) to absorb surplus labor. Although this strategy initially failed because it was not possible to create as many job opportunities as the number of people entering the job market, it was eventually made successful by government-assisted voluntary birth control (Li, 1988: 66–82), notwithstanding the fact that birth control is offensive to Chinese culture, in which it is considered a blessing for a man to have as many sons and grandsons as possible (Li, 1989: 61). Recognizing the incompatibility of such a cultural trait with economic development, the Taiwanese correctly chose to subordinate this aspect of culture to the needs of economic development. The birthrate was gradually reduced from a crushing 3.3–3.7 percent in the 1950s and 1960s to a more manageable 1.5 percent (Li, 1989: 61) in the 1970s and thereafter. Today the per capita income of U.S.$13,000 compares very favorably with U.S.$150 in 1953 (Li, 1988: 47, 66– 82, 159) or U.S.$60–2,670 in modern Africa (World Bank, 1994b: x). The type of population development and the importance of human quality over quantity are important and obvious. Given the foregoing, it is rather difficult to understand why, during a period of explosive population growth unmatched by an ability to create jobs, there is continued resistance in Africa to foreign advice to control population, reform the educational systems, and readjust educational expenditures. Indeed, shouldn’t this have been understood and dealt with long ago by Africans them-
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selves? It is now very clear that the African of the early 1960s was economically better off than the counterpart of today mainly because population growth has surpassed economic growth.
THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN LOW POPULATION DENSITIES AND POPULATION PRESSURE We observed earlier that the population of Africa is very sparse. Why, then, is there a population pressure problem requiring birth control? The relationship between population and economic growth described earlier is one reason. If population grows much faster than income, population pressure is felt through the poverty thereby created. If, by some magical performance, African governments could instantly create enough meaningful jobs for all Africans of working age, population pressure would disappear almost immediately. This would happen because of the time-proven fact that, as people’s incomes increase, their desire for more children decreases, which, in turn, decreases population growth. The experience of Western Europe, the United States, and the newly industrialized nations of Asia, especially South Korea and Taiwan, bears testimony. The result of the spectacular economic growth was a severe labor shortage in Taiwan, which arose, in part, from decreasing birthrates.21 Population pressure is also explained by the fact that much of Africa is desert, such that, in some cases, people are forced to crowd in small, fertile areas. The third explanation for this contradiction is the effect of land ownership patterns and farm labor immobility on the availability of farmland. Consider Figure 18.1.
A MODEL OF POPULATION PRESSURE IN A LANDSURPLUS COUNTRY Let the big circle in Figure 18.1 be the surface area of a country, and the smaller inner circles Ei . . . EN (where i ⫽ 1, and n ⫽ the number of the ethnic groups) represent land belonging to each of the ethnic groups that constitute the country. Let fi. . . . fm (where i ⫽ 1, and m ⫽ the number of families in each ethnic group Ei) be the families in each ethnic group. Land belonging to each family is composed of one-half of the smaller inner circles. The remainder of the land in the big circle belongs to the central government.22 The dots represent the population. Note that family land within walking distance (delineated by the broken lines) is being completely used up as the population grows.23 Families can build on and/or cultivate only family land within the ethnic domain. Although for cultural and economic reasons uneducated Africans are tied to their ancestral lands and are reluctant to move, they are aided in this behavior by transportation difficulties and age. The older people left behind in the rural outmigration are understandably more resistant to relocation. The result is popu-
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Figure 18.1 Population Pressure Arising from Land Use Patterns and Labor Transportation Difficulties
lation pressure on family land within walking distance, even though there is more ethnic land in the distance, and the country is almost empty.24 There are two rather obvious solutions to this problem. One is to provide transportation to farmland beyond walking distance. Although obvious and potentially effective, this remedy has not received adequate attention because of the generalized neglect of rural development. In fact, the concept of home-tofarm roads is not different from that of farm-to-market roads of the 1960s. During that period rural residents built drivable dirt roads to facilitate the evacuation of farm products to markets. Shortly after construction, some of the roads fell into disrepair, while others were simply abandoned for lack of governmental maintenance support. Temporary or permanent population resettlement is another relief to population pressure and, like road construction, has been attempted unsuccessfully in Tanzania and Nigeria, among other places. Tanzanian Ujamaa villages failed because of cultural conflicts and the element of force involved (van Buren, 1993:
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859; Murray, 1981: 190). As stated before, Africans resist abandoning ancestral lands, and the building of Ujamaa communities required the displacement of some Tanzanians to empty government lands. The Nigerian effort collapsed for procedural reasons. With a view to settling empty federal government land, young men were recruited for training as farmers. Unfortunately, in a subculture that reveres bureaucratic work, the recruits spent more time in the classroom than in the field. The prolonged classroom exposure coupled with the rather generous allowances for personal expenses created a taste for bureaucratic, rather than hard, physical, farmwork. Upon graduation many actually became bureaucrats rather than hands-on farmers (Lawrence and Livingstone, 1984–1985: 73– 74). Addiction to bureaucracy is a particularly vexing aspect of manpower waste in Africa because very often, early in their careers, engineers and natural scientists are transformed from the curious, practical problem solvers they should be into titled administrators. Thus, the contradiction between low population densities and population pressure is due to easily solved economic, cultural, and psychological problems. TAKING DEVELOPMENT TO PEOPLE One undesirable consequence of the Industrial Revolution was the development of large, urban areas around industries. The industrial-based pattern of urban development was exported to Africa during the colonial era, although there are accounts of teeming metropolis in Africa before the arrival of Europeans (Rodney, 1982: 149–201). At independence Africans unwittingly preserved and encouraged this mode of development. Was there an alternative? Consider the Nigerian experience again. During the oil boom, accelerated, rural out-migration caused severe overcrowding and traffic congestion in urban areas, particularly Lagos, the former capital city. The government first tried to solve the problem by allowing, on the streets, on designated days, only odd- or even-numbered vehicles, respectively. This solution became ineffective because ‘‘petrodollars’’ had enriched so many people, enabling them to purchase at least two vehicles, for which they obtained both odd and even numbers. Possibly inspired by the Brazilian example, the government next decided to transfer the federal capital to Abuja. The reasoning, which is incorrect, appears to be that moving civil servants and their dependents out of Lagos would reduce the congestion. Of course, this has not happened. These solutions failed because the true cause of the problem was not correctly identified. Too much loose oil money and laxed foreign exchange control made it easy to buy vehicles. Given that civil servants and their dependents were the minority, the overcrowding was, instead, caused by rural migrants in search of what was wrongly perceived as a better life in the cities. That is, while the real problems were economic, the government prescribed political solutions. By injecting more oil money into a developing economy than it could productively absorb, the Nigerian government inadvertently made it easier and quicker to earn a living on city streets than on
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farms. This stimulated the rural exodus, a rational behavior in response to the economic incentive. By comparison, when Taiwan faced a similar problem in the western plains of the island, it was correctly diagnosed as economic (overcrowding arising from too many people seeking jobs and a better standard of living in a small area where they thought they can succeed), and an economic solution was prescribed. It consisted in creating new industries in the east and constructing transportation facilities (highways, railways, and seaports, including an artificial harbor) to match (Li, 1989: 9, 32). The result was the desired population shift to the hitherto sparsely populated eastern plains, an occurrence that seemed all too natural. What could Nigeria have done differently? Taking development to rural residents is what should have been done. As previously stated, at the onset of the oil boom, Nigerian agriculture was already a very healthy industry, although it was neither sufficiently diversified nor adequately modernized.25 Oil money could have been used to introduce other crops, especially those with opposite growing cycles from those then cultivated in order to diversify the farm economy. One objective of the invitation to Americans to import and grow other crops was to diversify the source of, and stabilize, family income in order to protect it from seasonal price fluctuations. In addition to creating jobs, the value of Nigerian agriculture could have been increased significantly by mass development of light manufacturing industries based on the processing of the same farm products exported raw. When products are exported raw, all manufacturing jobs as well as those associated with the marketing of finished products are also inevitably exported. Note, particularly, that while agriculture can be carried on repeatedly, there is a time limit to the availability of oil. This limit makes an economy too dependent on an exhaustible and nonrenewable resource very vulnerable. Shifting oil earnings into agriculture would have ensured 1. the eternal or repeated use of the oil resource embodied in farming,26 2. a more equitable distribution of the oil wealth, and 3. a more spatially balanced location of agro-based manufacturing industry.
Such use of oil money would have constituted an economic solution to what were truly economic problems. Banning the importation of cars and promoting mass transportation were another alternative. In addition to solving the transportation problem, the ban would have saved foreign exchange.27 Taking development to the people may then be defined as the use of resources to support the productive efforts of the people in place where they are, as opposed to enticing them elsewhere. In Africa this means transforming peasant agriculture into a modern industry in order to improve the living standards of rural residents. This would help solve the population pressure problem by promoting economic growth. If rural residents are lured away, instead, agricultural
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production suffers, families break apart, cities crumble under the weight of increased population, and misery is created. In trying to ameliorate conditions in the cities, governments mistakenly spend disproportionate amounts of development funds on urban areas, thereby making them even more attractive to rural residents. Premature population displacement is one reason plantation agriculture is premature in Africa.28 This kind of agriculture was initially introduced by colonizers for the economic benefit of Europe.29 The plantations were invariably located within easy access of transportation facilities (seaports and railways). Workers were then moved away from their homes to these farms. As paid laborers, they became used to wage income rather than to farm profits as agricultural entrepreneurs. When the prices of what they produced dropped, they were laid off, as in any profit-seeking business. As noted before, this mode of production was preserved and even encouraged after independence. Accustomed to an urban lifestyle or life as paid employees, these workers become reluctant to return to their original homes and were unable to support their families. Had agriculture been initially encouraged in family farms, as was the case in the United States and Taiwan, population dislocation and its negative consequences would have been avoided. If improperly timed, the transition from small family farms to large plantation and mechanized agriculture can, as in Africa, hinder rather than promote economic development. It should be cautioned that the application of the concept of taking development to the people is not a costless exercise, because other economic considerations may make an alternative location more suitable. What is paramount is whether jobs are for people, or vice versa. The concept of application cost may then be regarded as the cost of an equitable and spatially balanced development. POLICY IMPLICATIONS The most important policy issues are population control and development. Population should preferably be controlled through sex education by emphasizing family planning. However, a sex education program is faster, more effective, and economically more efficient when the literacy rate is high. This is because sex education and birth control can be taught by the mere distribution of literature on the subject, thereby reducing errors in the use of devices and eliminating the involvement of expensive health professionals. If voluntary population control is to succeed in Africa, it must be preceded or accompanied by an increase in the rate of literacy.30 Despite the difficulties, if leadership is willing to commit resources and use them wisely, the elimination of illiteracy can successfully be undertaken concurrently with population control. Although the need to eliminate illiteracy was understood in Africa more than three decades ago, efforts to raise the level of literacy have been only marginally successful for procedural reasons. One error of method is that, even though more resources have been expended on education
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(Abraham, 1995), emphasis has been on the kind of education and training that no longer promote economic development. Also, it appears the bulk of educational expenditures is lavished on salaries and service amenities of needlessly large numbers of bureaucrats rather than on the wages of teachers (the foot soldiers), infrastructure, and scholarships. What counts is how educational resources are used, not the amount expended. Second, where vocational/technical education has rarely received the attention it deserves, there has been a mismatch between the training and the kinds of jobs the economy is capable of creating. As already indicated, this mismatch inevitably leads to the unemployment of the technicians. In Cameroon, for example, the recently created Institute of Advanced Technology (Institut de Haute Technologie) is apparently meant to address the shortage of technical personnel. But the Cameroonian economy is presently unable to create high-tech jobs to match the skills of the graduates, assuming, of course, that the term ‘‘high-tech’’ has not been misunderstood. Is it not obvious that it is impossible to leap from an agrarian to a high-tech economy just by the mere creation of a high-tech academic institution? Another policy issue concerns the creation of jobs in rural areas. The ability to do this is at the core of a successful implementation of the strategy of taking development to the people. The colonial pattern of concentrating jobs in a few, usually coastal cities was, as we have seen, to minimize costs and facilitate the transportation of raw or semiprocessed materials to Europe. The postindependence goal of African governments should have been to break this pattern and promote spatially balanced development, that is, take development to people everywhere. However, to do this, a local natural resource inventory (NRI) must be taken. Such an inventory would suggest and serve as the basis for the kind of economic activities to promote in the rural area. For instance, if the geography of a particular area is suitable for growing cashew nuts,31 cashew nut farming and processing must be encouraged by the government through financial support for producer training and applied research. The education and training of farmers and technicians in the management of cashew nut businesses from cultivation, through processing, to marketing of the finished product would create jobs in the rural area. In this manner development would effectively be taken to the people merely by exploiting local natural resources, which include the people themselves. If the production area is far from the nearest port of export, then, transportation should be provided. This is the alternative to locating the factory elsewhere, attracting rural residents to the location, and precipitating the now familiar social problems. The cost of situating the factories in the village and building transportation facilities may be higher than that of locating the processing units near the port of export. However, the seemingly lower monetary costs of such relocation do not include the social costs of uprooting rural residents. A third policy concern is the approach to population development. Not only
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is the larger mass of the African population not being developed, but development of the smaller segment has become inappropriate for economic development. The returns on the education of more social scientists, particularly at advanced levels, for example, are now relatively much lower than those from higher rates of literacy, the training of technicians, natural scientists, and engineers. The possibility of higher returns justifies renewed attempts at eliminating illiteracy and emphasizing training for industrial development. CONCLUSION The population of Africa is overwhelmingly rural. The experience of the United States and Taiwan indicates that the effective use of the population resource, especially the rural majority, is a key to economic development. Unfortunately, the rural population in Africa is being wasted. The waste of human resources is revealed by the high rates of unemployment, which are due to inappropriate education and training and rapid growth in population. It is a major cause of the economic stagnation on the continent, which, in turn, explains the main problem facing Africa—abject poverty. Poverty can be eliminated by engaging the rural population in economic development, that is, by taking developing to rural areas. Above all, population can be either a most precious resource for, or a tremendous burden on, economic development, depending on how it is developed, managed, and utilized. The problem of abject poverty cannot be eliminated instantly but can be solved as soon as a government is determined not only to commit resources but to expend them efficiently. There is plenty of hope for the long term because, despite colonial exploitation, Africa remains a reservoir of enormous amounts of natural resources, perhaps now the largest in the world. But, first, agriculture must be given the proper attention it deserves. This would begin the solution of the unemployment problem and preempt a repetition of famine and the embarrassing foreign food aid associated with it. Next, educational expenses must be redirected to the elimination of illiteracy and the promotion of technical training for the acquisition of technology and development of industrial economies. Finally, there must be government-assisted, noncoercive population control to rates of growth that promote economic development and the eradication of poverty. African governments are aware of the causes of poverty and have tried at various times to deal with them. In principle the solution ideas have been excellent. But the successful implementation of good ideas frequently falters in Africa. For example, had the Nigerian government successfully resettled the population or used oil money wisely, Nigerian agriculture would have long become a modern industry, and poverty would have been significantly reduced. Or, had African governments succeeded in implementing the goal set in Addis Ababa in 1961 of eliminating illiteracy from the continent by the year 2000, the literacy rates in Africa would be much higher today. It is useful to pretend that the task of economic development in Africa is just
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beginning. Psychologically, this pretext would motivate a repetition of the good rural and population development plans drawn in the 1960s and either executed poorly or abandoned. The repetition is necessary; otherwise, progress would become slower and more difficult if the continent drifted too far in the wrong direction. NOTES 1. With a growth rate of 3.8 percent compared to 3.1 percent for general population, the urban segment still constitutes only 28.5 percent of the total population (World Bank, 1994b: 381). 2. Africa Today: An Atlas of Reproducible Pages, rev. ed. (N.p.: World Eagle, 1987), p. 44. The population growth rate of Africa was 3.02 percent compared to 0.81 percent and 0.28 percent for North America and Europe, respectively. 3. See Jonathan Baker, The Rural-Urban Dichotomy in the Developing World: A Case Study from Northern Ethiopia (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian University Press, 1986), pp. 25–44 for a detailed discussion of the difficulties of the distinction. 4. Current economic growth rates range from ⫺6.5 percent in Libya to 3.1 percent in Egypt, with the majority being negative, implying that most African economies are moving backward (World Bank, 1944b, xi). 5. 1–150 or more persons per square kilometer (Murray, 1981: 15). 6. With a surface area of 30.42 million square kilometer, the African continent is huge. Argentina, China, India, New Zealand, and the United States can fit into Africa with room to spare (Africa Today, 1987: 3). 7. For a discussion of the often ignored domestic availability of funds for industrial development, see Bryce (1965: 164–72). 8. Economic development planning in Africa today still relies exclusively on the antiquated method of listing projects. This approach often conceals interproject conflicts, which can sometimes be sufficiently severe to thwart rather promote development. When properly applied, input/output and econometric models are less prone to such errors and yield superior decision-making information. 9. Recently, the agricultural labor force declined in Nigeria by 40 percent (World Bank, 1994b: 4). In absolute terms, this is a significant change because about 70 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, and the country is suffering from labor shortages (Patrick, 1994: 641). How does an agro-based, labor-surplus economy suffer from labor shortages? The shortage testifies to the damage the mismanagement of sudden oil wealth caused the Nigerian economy. 10. Nigeria has moved from domestic food sufficiency to partial dependence on food imports, partly because the urban minority has developed a taste for imported foods. 11. It is widely believed that the emergence of South Korea and Taiwan as industrial nations was caused by massive infusion of U.S. aid. This belief is erroneous. On a per capita basis, Francophone Africa has received more aid from all sources than did Taiwan from the United States. There are no economic miracles in Francophone Africa. Egypt and the Philippines have each received more aid from the United States than did Taiwan, but without similar results. U.S. aid was important but not decisive. The economic miracles of Hong Kong and Singapore are not explained by U.S. aid. 12. As labor-surplus economies, there is also a cheap labor advantage in Africa, but
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for political reasons it has not been used. African leadership argues that if wages paid African workers by foreign corporations are less than those paid for the same work overseas, there is exploitation of Africa by the amount of the difference and that such lower wages are intended to lock Africa in poverty eternally. These arguments, which are political rather than economic, lead to the conclusion that any wage agreements with foreign employers that are not fundamentally similar to those of foreign workers constitute another capitalist ploy to continue the exploitation of the continent. Consequently, production arrangements with foreign manufacturers of the kinds in which Asians seem eager to engage are avoided, supposedly to protect Africa from exploitation. These arguments contain certain flaws. First, to invest overseas, foreigners bear enormous additional costs and risks. It is more expensive and risky to relocate a manufacturing facility overseas, train domestic workers, and transport finished goods to overseas markets. These additional costs reduce profits. Why would a rational, profit-seeking investor engage in profit reduction schemes? In similar circumstances would Africans behave differently? Most likely not. If so, why would they expect others to do otherwise? Second, even if each foreign employer agreed to pay the same wage rate as at home, how would domestic and international wage differences be reconciled when there is more than one foreign employer seeking to do the same kind of business in one host country? Third, an American, European, or Japanese family of the same size with a single wage earner making $5.00 per hour, for example, might experience financial difficulties. A similar unit in Africa similarly situated would be better off because of the lower costs of living. Finally, as the population is developed (i.e., educated and trained), and the economy grows, employer competition for workers always eventually absorbs excess labor and drives up wages. The successfully repeated Asian experience at using cheap labor to stimulate economic development is sufficient proof that the mechanism works. In the 1950s and 1960s South Koreans and Taiwanese worked long hours for a small fraction of the wages in industrial countries (fourteen hours per day for only $80.00 per month). This is no longer the case. On the contrary, wages are now sufficiently high in Taiwan to force Taiwanese transnational corporations to relocate elsewhere in Asia and to cause Latin Americans and South Koreans in Europe to search for cheaper labor. Now several years behind, African leaders thoughtlessly seek economic assistance from the Asians who exposed their workers to ‘‘exploitation’’ while they protected theirs! 13. These are the countries and nation-states commonly referred to as Asia’s economic minidragons, Japan, of course, being the grand dragon. 14. The Economist, January 1997, p. 98. These reserves can be regarded as predominantly the difference between the cost of raw materials imported, on one hand, and the revenues from manufactured goods exported, on the other. They represent the dollar amount of value-added by a suitably developed population. 15. Only about 20 percent of 260 million Americans are farmers, compared to an average of 70 percent of the more than 600 million Africans. 16. An inspection of the organization of African governments shows that with only a few exceptions, including Nigeria and Ethiopia, the Ministry of Agriculture is not as important as the Ministries of Economic and Foreign Affairs, Finance, Defense, and so on. Given that these economies are dependent on agriculture such that other ministries would not be financed without earnings from agriculture, shouldn’t agriculture be the number one ministry, at least for the time being? See Africa South of the Sahara, 24th ed. (London: Europa Publications, 1995). Also, note that, although it appears that Africa
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is the only continent still unable to feed itself adequately, agricultural professions are frowned upon. 17. Farmers adjust to the artificial shortage of good farmland in two ways. First, less fertile and usually more erosion-prone land within walking distance that would otherwise be ignored is cultivated, and/or forests are deforested. The result is environmental damage, particularly from soil erosion. This is how limited mobility effectively prevents the cultivation of additional good farmland to increase output. Second, the duration of shifting cultivation, a natural means of promoting soil fertility, is shortened, or shifting cultivation is eliminated entirely such that output can no longer be increased by improving the productivity of farmland through fallow. 18. Many African governments allot as much as, or more than, 20 percent of the national budget for education and training (see Murray, 1981: 98, 101–2; Abraham, 1995: 222–33). Also, in a 1961 Addis Ababa conference of African ministers of education, education was declared a development priority, and a projected U.S.$2 billion was to be expended on it by 1980 (Murray, 1981: 101–2). 19. This is not to suggest that work on agricultural development must be completed before that on industry is started. What is being implied is that, in development planning, most weight should be given to the sector of interest at the appropriate time. For example, at the initial stage, agriculture must be emphasized along with light industry, based preferably on the processing of agricultural products. 20. This was the year the ‘‘Population Development Plan’’ was drawn after the mismatch between the types of jobs being created in the economy and the professional skills being acquired in schools was noticed. The mismatch obliged Taiwan to revamp its educational system. Also, note that, chronologically, it appears Africans were aware of the importance of education and training to development earlier than the Taiwanese. The difference, however, is that the latter understood sooner how to make education and training serve the needs of development, a perception that has inexplicably remained a mystery in Africa to date. 21. Manpower shortages have led to a liberal immigration policy in Taiwan much the same as it did in the United States in the 1960s and Germany in the 1970s. 22. In Africa all land is owned by ethnic groups, but the central government can acquire any amount by the exercise of eminent domain. 23. Population pressure impacts shifting cultivation and, hence, land productivity and output negatively. Under shifting cultivation, a plot of land is farmed until its productivity reaches unacceptable limits. It is then abandoned for a virgin substitute and allowed to rejuvenate naturally before it is cultivated again. However, as the population grows, housing units are built on some land previously farmed. The resulting shortage in farmland causes the size of farm units per family to decrease and plots to be farmed for longer and fallowed for shorter periods. The result is lower yields. Fertilizers, particularly artificial ones, can be used to counteract this trend, but neither can peasant farmers afford fertilizers, nor because of illiteracy can they correctly apply them when they are available under government subsidy programs. A new concern now is the effect of chemical manure and pesticides on the environment. 24. For example, although the surface area of Cameroon is approximately equal to that of Japan, the population of Cameroon is only 13 million compared to 124 million for Japan. 25. One consequence of the nondiversification of agriculture is the tendency of export
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earnings to fluctuate widely with changes in the international prices of agricultural raw materials. Diversification is an excellent strategy for managing risk from this source. 26. Nigeria increased its dependence on oil revenues, while Indonesia used its oil proceeds to diversify the economy before the recent crash in oil prices. Today Nigeria depends on oil for 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings, while the comparative rate for Indonesia is 20 percent (World Bank, 1994a); see also Africa Today, 1987: 92, according to which the percentage of Nigeria’s export earnings from oil in 1986 was 98. The obvious consequence is that having thus insulated its economy, Indonesia can withstand another sharp drop in oil prices, which is imminent, given recent advances in automobile and resource conservation technologies. Nigeria might not. This is a classic example of the proverbial putting all of one’s eggs in one basket. 27. About 20 years earlier, the importation of ‘‘luxury and dangerous’’ goods was banned in Taiwan, while the importation of necessities was limited in order to redirect scarce domestic funds to more important development expenditures, particularly agrobased and light, labor-intensive industries. 28. African governments spent large sums of money promoting state-owned plantation enterprises in the 1960s and 1970s. This was not necessarily a bad thing, because had the farms been successfully managed and then privatized immediately, the experiment might have succeeded. 29. Although the primary aim was to avail European industries of raw materials, Africans were paid for what they produced, making the exchange mutually beneficial. However, whether or not the benefits were equitably distributed (i.e., whether the exchange was fair) is another issue. 30. The problems encountered with the use of baby formula to eradicate malnutrition in developing countries were mostly related to maternal illiteracy and illustrate how illiteracy can turn an otherwise effective solution to a problem into a significant obstacle to development. Although there were written instructions for preparation, illiterate mothers were either unaware of them and/or could not resist overdiluting the food. The excess dilution was motivated by economic considerations, especially the need to make the supplies last longer. As such, the food was not as effective in preventing malnutrition as formulated, although the period of use was lengthened. 31. At about U.S.$8.00 per pound, roasted cashew nuts are an expensive food and an excellent export opportunity for an African country, especially one like Nigeria, which already has some experience in producing the crop. Moreover, organically grown foods now command premium prices in North America. It is possible that, by weight, this crop is more valuable to Nigeria than crude oil.
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Index
Abbey, J. L. S., 90 Abortion, 36, 39 Abunsa, Ghanaian farming and, 106, 110 Abunu, Ghanaian farming and, 106, 110 Abuse, wife, 41 Act 462, Ghana, 56, 58, 68, 70–71 Action Group (AG), Nigeria, 14, 15, 18 Actor-structure analysis of governance, 196–197 Adaptation, education for, 210 Adegbenro, Alhaji, 15 Africa: consensus building in, 47–55; crisis in, 49–52, 229; failure of governance in, 200–201; food self-sufficiency in, 216–227; management capacity building, 228–251; rural population, 267–283; sustainable development in, 194–205; urban population, 267, 278–279; wealth maintenance, 129–139; woman in politics, 37 African Capacity Building Foundation, 234 African Capacity Building Initiative, 7–8, 234 Agricultural revolution, 220 Agriculture: Coˆ te d’Ivoire, 136; economic development and, 269; education and, 255–256, 259–260, 265–266, 274, 281;
employment in, 99, 271, 275; exports, 221, 223; Ghana, 90–98, 99–128; industrial expansion and, 137–138; Kerala, India, 164–166; Nigeria, 22, 269– 270, 279; plantation, 280; Sarawak, Malaysia, 143; self-sufficiency and, 216–227; slash-and-burn, 143 Akintola, Chief Samuel Ladoke, 15 Alexandra, William, 152–174 Amenity values, 83 Angola, alliances of, 218 Aquino, Benigno, 43 Aquino, Corazon, 35, 42, 43 Argentina, family planning in, 39 Arnold, Guy, 220 Asare, Benjamin, 90–98 Asia: labor costs in, 270–271; woman in politics in, 37 Assemblyman, Jomoro, Ghana, 70–71 Assets, of Ghanaian pineapple farmers, 123–125 Awolowo, Chief Obafemi, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 14
Bahrin, Tengku Shamsul, 143–151 Balance of payments, Ghana, 90
308
Index
Balewa, Alhaji Tafawa, 14, 15, 16–17, 18, 19 Bandaranaike, Sirimavo, 34, 38 Bangladesh, woman leader in, 34–35 Banking, in Nigeria, 24 Baram model of rapid change, 146–148 Bario model of gradual change, 148–149 Bass, B. M., 181–182 Benign neglect, 143 Bhutto, Ali, 43 Bhutto, Benazir, 34–35, 41, 42, 43 Biafra, 16 Bilateral agreements, on external support, 7–8 Bilateral assistance, 135 Birth control, 39–40 Black market, for cocoa, 91, 92–93 Boahen, Adu, 72, 74 Bolivia, abortion policy in, 39 Brain drain, 241–242, 248 Brazil: abortion policy in, 39; socioeconomic progress in, 81 Britain: India and, 161, 162; Nigerian independence and, 16–17; Sarawak, Malaysia and, 144 Brookes (White Rajahs), 143 Buddhist culture, in Sri Lanka, 159 Budgetary problems, 1 Burayidi, Michael A., 79–89 Bureaucracies, 48 Burundi: civil strife in, 54; environmental destruction in, 2 Business ethos, as community ethos, 83– 84 Bwenge, Charles, 206–215 Cabinet-level positions, women in, 37 Cameron, Kim, 181 Cameroon, 14 Canadian International Development Agency, management capacity building and, 243 Candidate campaign promises, Jomoro, Ghana, 65–66 Capacity, programs of action in, 8–9 Capacity building: conceptualizing, 233– 236; food production, 216–227; local, in Ghana, 56–76; management, 228–
251; manpower development, 252–266; need for, 3–5; through empowerment, 1–9 Capital availability, in Ghana, 102, 114, 126–127 Capital flow, 136 Capitalism: agricultural production and, 103; feminism and, 30; Nigeria, 22, 203; patriarchy and, 31–33, 40, 41, 43– 44, 45 Caste system, Kerala, India and, 159– 164, 172 Cedi, devaluation of, 91, 93, 99–100, 127 Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin, 43 Chamorro, Violeta Dona Barrios de, 35, 42, 43 Change: adapting to, 230; discontinuous, 230; management capacity and, 231; models of, 144–149; social, 199; sociopolitical system and, 197 Charles, Eugenia Mary, 35 Chasin, Barbara, 158 Childbearing, state regulating, 39 Child growth patterns, 165 Childhood development, 6 Chile, abortion policy in, 39 China: birth control in, 39; sustainable behavior in, 154 Christian missionaries, 150, 161 Christians, in Kerala, India, 159, 161–162 Citizen satisfaction, organizational effectiveness and, 185–193 Citizens, state system and, 28 Civil servants, 53; educating, 274; Nigeria, 18–19, 20 Civil strife, 49, 50, 53, 54; environmental destruction and, 2; Nigeria, 15, 16, 18 Clans, land tenure through, 105–107 Class differences: Ghanaian agricultural production, 103; women in politics and, 42–43 Classical (realist) approaches, women political leaders and, 27 Classical utilitarianism, 80 Cocoa industry, in Ghana, 90, 91–98, 99, 130 Colonialism: Africa and, 194; consensus building in Africa and, 48, 50–51; con-
Index tribution of, 51; education and, 208– 209, 239, 252; ethnic identity and, 53; Kerala, India, 161, 162; languages and, 208–209; management capacity building in Africa and, 238–240; Nigeria, 13, 14, 17; plantation agriculture and, 280; Sarawak, Malaysia, 143 Commodity-based growth, 79–82 Communication: democratic governance and, 194–205; language and, 208 Communism, in Kerala, India, 158, 162– 163, 164 Communities: cohesion of, 2; limiting growth, 83; stable, 7; sustainability of, 85 Community, habitual practice of, 171– 172 Community development: Ghana, 67–68, 70; measuring, 87–89 Community ethos, business ethos as, 83– 84 Community resources, productivity and, 82 Community welfare function, 184 Competition, capitalism and, 31 Conflicts, land tenure, 107–108 Consensus building, difficulty of, 47–55 Constituencies, organizational effectiveness and, 179, 181–184, 187–188 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, Ghana, 56 Consumers, organizational effectiveness and, 183, 184, 185–193 Consumption: local, 86; world norm, 154– 155 Consumption behavior, contrasts, 168– 170 Consumption politics, 200 Continuous variables, measurement in organizational research, 176 Contracts, pineapple, 118, 120 Cooperative community setting, 82 Corruption, 49, 204, 231; in Ghana, 96; in Nigeria, 17, 18, 19–20, 21, 24, 25– 26 Cost of living, in Ghana, 73 Coˆ te d’Ivoire: environmental degradation
309
in, 136; management capacity and, 229, 231 Cottonseed industry, in Ghana, 102 Crime, 2, 24, 25–26, 203 Cuba, alliances and, 218 Cultural destruction, 2 Cultural norms, 1–2 Cultural values, 2 Currency, devaluation of, 91, 93, 99–100, 127 Daddieh, Cyril K., 56–76, 99–128 Daly, Herman, 172 Darko, Kwabeno, 72 Data, availability of, 7 Databases, improving, 6 Debt: Ghanaian, 90, 97; increasing, 135. See also Foreign debt Decapitalization thesis, 84 Decision making, organizational goals and, 179 Decision systems, 169–170 Democracies, 54; Africa, 194; community welfare function, 184; Kerala, India, 163, 172; Nigeria, 14, 18; socialist feminism and, 30 Democratic governance, communication and, 194–205 Democratic political values, women and, 29 Democratization, 1; Ghana and, 56–76 Devaluation, of Ghanaian cedi, 91, 93, 99– 100, 127 Development: education role in, 206–215; maximizing, 82–85; problems, 1 Development management, capacity in, 234 Development planning, 196 Development policy organizations, effectiveness of, 175–193 Development projects, 6, 8 Dimah, Agber, 267–283 Discrete variables, measurement in organizational research, 176 Discrimination, gender-based, 29 District assemblies, in Ghana, 56–76 Division of labor, sexual, 29, 32–33, 43, 45
310
Index
Divorce, 36 Domestic work, commodification of, 83 Donor countries, investment by, 8 Drucker, Peter, 236 Earth Summit, 234–235 Economic activity, range of, 82 Economic analysis, capacity in, 234 Economic base, diversification of, 138 Economic conditions, management capacity and, 242 Economic crimes, in Nigeria, 24 Economic development: Africa, 203–204; labor and, 269–270; management capacity and, 229, 232, 236, 247; rural population in Africa and, 267–283; Sarawak, Malaysia and, 144–151 Economic growth: Ghana, 91–92; health spending and, 3–5; limiting, 83–84; measuring, 79–89; privatization and, 7; standard of living and, 178; unqualified, 82–84 Economic indicators, of economic performance, 87 Economic liberalization, education for, 210, 213 Economic performance, measures of, 79– 89 Economic power, women and, 38 Economic problems, 1, 22–25 Economic Recovery Program, Ghana, 99 Economics, trade and, 48, 51 Economic theory, growth ethic and, 79– 89 Economic well-being, population growth and, 272–273 Economy: colonial rule, 51, 52; Ghana, 90–98; local control of, 204 Ecosystem, destruction of, 136 Edoho, Felix, 228–251 Education: access to, 258, 265; Africa, 203; capacity building through, 5, 9; colonialism and, 239, 252; development role, 206–215; elite, 51, 208–209, 213; ending hunger through, 220, 224– 225; expenditures in Ghana, 94; female, 39, 41, 166, 167; healthy children and, 3; Jomoro, Ghana, 59, 61–
63; Kerala, India, 156, 161–162, 166, 168; language-in-, 207–215; management capacity and, 238–239, 249, 250; mass, 208, 209, 212, 213; Nigeria, 252– 266; productivity of labor and, 273– 276; professional development and, 8; Sarawak, Malaysia, 148–149; sex, 280; social scientists, 282; vocational, 281 Effectiveness, organizational, 175–193 Efficient human behavior, 152–174 Eisenstein, Zillah, 32 Ekpono, Bassey, 216–227 Elections, in Ghana, 56, 58, 63–69 Elites: education of, 208–209, 213; in ethnic group, 49, 51; indigenization and, 204; Western civilization and, 51 Employment: agricultural, 99, 271, 275; Ghana, 63, 73, 99; job creation and, 84, 85; job satisfaction and, 182; Jomoro, Ghana, 61; rural areas, 281; Sarawak, Malaysia, 144 Empowerment: capacity building through, 1–9; citizens, 9; in Kerala, India, 163 Engineering education, 255–256 English language, education in, 210, 212, 213, 214 Entrepreneurial ability, 237–238 Environment: deforestation and, 136; destruction of, 2–3; development controls and, 234; economic development effects on, 88; economic growth and, 85; Ghana, 95; management capacity and, 234–235; mineral resources and, 137; policy evaluation and, 232; protection of, 130–133; sacrificing economic growth for, 83 Environmental change, management capacity and, 231–232 Environmental refugees, 1, 2 Ethiopia, alliances of, 218 Ethnically-based political parties, 202 Ethnic conflicts, 220 Ethnic groups: consensus building and, 47, 48–49; distributing resources among, 133; languages of, 208 Ethnicity: colonialism and, 53; effective
Index management of, 196; social transformation in Nigeria and, 13–26 Ethnic strife, 52, 195, 202 Etim, James, 252–266 Etzioni, Amitae, 177, 178 Exchange, governance and, 197 Exchange rate, in Ghana, 99–100 Exchange values, 80–81, 82, 83, 84, 85 Expatriate managers, 228, 231, 232, 239, 240–241, 245–247, 249 Exports: food, 221, 223; Ghana, 91, 100– 128; Honduras, 81; Nigeria, 270
Family: land tenure through, 105–107; ruling elites and, 42–44; women’s affiliations with, 36, 42–43 Family planning, male-controlled, 39–40 Family size, world norm, 154–155 Family structures, 1–2 Famines, 216–217 Farm management, in Ghana, 109–110 Fellowships, capacity building through, 7 Female education, infant mortality and, 166, 167 Feminist standpoint, critique of state and, 44–46 Feminist theory, state system and, 28–35 Ferguson, Kathy, 44 Fertility, 40; Africa, 268; Kerala, India, 152, 155, 166 Fertilizers, use by Ghanaian pineapple farmers, 112–113 Financial aid, 8 Food equity, in Kerala, India, 165–166 Food production. See Agriculture Foreign debt, 1, 24 Foreign exchange, Ghanaian, 101–102 Foreign investment, 1; economic growth and, 84–85; Nigeria, 22–23 Forests: converting to other land uses, 134–135, 136; logging, 137, 144, 147– 149, 150; Sarawak, Malaysia, 144, 147– 149, 150 Franke, Richard, 158 Frazer, Nancy, 28, 33 Fulani, 14, 17, 52 Funding sources, 8
311
Gabon, resources of, 137 Gandhi, Indira, 34, 35, 37–38, 42, 43 Gandhi, Mahatma, 160, 161, 162 Gandhi, Rajiv, 34, 37–38 Gandhians, in Kerala, India, 162 Gender, political leadership and, 27–46 Gender bias, 29; Ghanaian farm labor and, 111 Gender differences, socially fabricated, 30 Gender equality, in Kerala, India, 160 Geographical units, process of development and, 144–145 Ghana: cocoa industry, 90, 91–98, 99, 130; food imports, 221–222; gold in, 130, 131–132, 133, 137; grass roots democratization in, 56–76; management capacity and, 231; pineapple production, 99–128; professional migration from, 242; structural adjustment impact, 90–98 Global affairs, position of Third World in, 217–224 Global economy, 230, 258–259 Global Environment Facility, 130 Global village, 196 Goal model of organizational effectiveness, 177–180 Gold, in Ghana, 130, 131–132, 133, 137 Goldberg, Sandra, 33 Government, women in, 34–38, 42–44 Gowon, Yakubu, 15–16, 18, 19, 22 Grass roots democratization, in Ghana, 56– 76 Gross domestic product: Ghana, 92; Sarawak, Malaysia, 144 Gross national product, welfare measured in terms of, 81 Growth ethic, economic theory and, 79– 89 Guru, Sri Narayan, 161
Haiti, woman leader in, 35 Hall, Richard, 178 Happiness, maximizing, 80 Hartsock, Nancy, 44, 46 Hausa, 14, 17, 52 Hausaland, 50–51
312
Index
Health, 3–5; expenditures in Ghana, 94; Kerala, India, 156; women’s, 41 Health care: Jomoro, Ghana, 59; Kerala, India, 166–167 Hindu culture, in Kerala, India, 159, 160, 161 Historical materialism, 30 Hodges, Michael, 260 Honduras, exports of, 81 Human behavior, efficient and sustainable, 152–174 Human development, 129, 138 Human difficulties, 1 Human resources, 267–268; capability, 237; developing, 269; education and, 207, 210; infrastructure and, 203; Kerala, India, 157, 169; maintaining wealth in, 129, 130, 133; management capacity building and, 228–251; organizational effectiveness and, 179–181, 182; quality of, 200; Sub-Saharan Africa, 206 Human rights, 50, 203, 248 Human time, used efficiently, 157, 169 Humphrey, John, 38 Hunger, 3, 216–217, 222 Hutus, 54 Ibos, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 Ideological shift, ending hunger and, 220 Illiteracy, 269, 273–274 Imperialism, feminism and, 30 Imports, Ghana, 91 Income: comparative data, 155; Ghana, 63, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96, 110–111, 120– 122; growth indicators overestimating, 92; human equity and, 170; Jomoro, Ghana, 63; Kenya, 272; Kerala, India, 155–156, 168, 172; management’s, 242– 243; maximizing, 85; Nigeria, 272; population growth and, 272–273; welfare measured in terms of, 81; women and, 31, 38–39, 41 Incomes policy, in Ghana, 91 Independence movements, 194 India: alliances, 218; women leaders in, 34, 35, 37–38, 42, 43
Indigenization, effects of, 204 Individualism, economic development and, 82 Industrial expansion, agricultural sector and, 137–138 Industrialization: management capacity and, 236–237; sustained, 220 Industrialized countries, capacities of, 3 Industrial production, management capacity and, 230 Infant mortality, female education and, 166, 167 Inflation, in Ghana, 73, 90, 91, 92 Information: availability of, 7; capacity building through, 5; consumer satisfaction, 186; management of, 196; mass communication and, 21–22, 195, 201; transmitters of, 169–170; women’s access to, 37, 39 Information sources, in Ghana, 96–97 Infrastructure, 204; Coˆ te d’Ivoire, 136; Ghana, 59–61, 91, 94, 100; human resources and, 203; management, 232, 233; Sarawak, Malaysia and, 144, 145; sustainable, 199–200 Innovation: renewal through, 3; sociopolitical system and, 197 Input prices, Ghanaian pineapple farmers and, 113–114, 115 Input supplies, Ghanaian pineapple farmers and, 112–113, 127 Institutions: capacity building and, 199, 228, 233–234, 235; coordinating for effective development, 196; economic development and, 89; management of, 8; measuring organizational performance and, 175–193; public communication and, 199; restructuring, 129 Intellectuals, Nigerian, 19 International development agencies, management capacity building and, 243 International Monetary Fund, Ghanaian structural adjustment and, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97 Intervention, 8
Index Investment: development projects, 8; policies, 7. See also Foreign investment; Multinational corporations Ironsi, Aguiyi, 15, 18 Jaggar, Alison, 28, 44 James, Melanie Marshall, 47–55 James, Valentine Udoh, 1–9, 47–55 Jefferson, Thomas, 68, 206–207, 209 Job creation, 84, 85. See also Employment Job satisfaction, 182 Jomoro District Assembly, Ghana, 56–76 Jonah, Kwesi, 65 Judicial systems, in Africa, 203 Kanjo, Paul, 267–283 Kayans, Sarawak, Malaysia, 147 Kelabits, Sarawak, Malaysia, 148 Kenya, income in, 272 Kerala, India, efficient and sustainable human behavior in, 152–174 Kinship. See Family Knowledge base, 235 Kola nut industry, in Ghana, 102 Labor: agricultural, 271; costs, 270–271; economic development and, 269–270; educating, 273–276; female, 31, 38–39, 45, 46, 83, 111; Ghanaian farmers, 110– 112; highly skilled, 209; male, 45; migration of, 241–242, 248; Sarawak, Malaysia, 144; sexual division of, 29, 32–33, 43, 45 Land reform, in Kerala, India, 164 Land resources, allocation of, 222 Land tenure system, in Ghana, 95–96, 103–104, 105–109 Language, colonialism and, 52 Language-in-education, 207–215 Latin America: abortion policy, 39; economic problems, 1; woman in politics, 37 Laws, controlling women using, 36 Liberal feminist tradition, 28–29 Life expectancy, 3; in Kerala, India, 156
313
Limann, Hilla, 56, 72 Lineage, land tenure through, 105–107 Literacy, 212, 280 Loans: Ghanaian pineapple farmers, 114; international lending agencies, 135 Local area, decoupling from worldsystem economic forces, 85 Local capacities, building, 228 Local consumption, 86 Local control, over development programs, 86 Local economic control, 204 Local food production, in Ghana, 93, 94– 96 Local Government Law, Ghana, 56, 58, 68, 70–71 Local natural resource inventory, 281 Local skills, 228, 250 Locke, John, 224, 225
MacKinnon, Catharine, 36 Macroeconomic growth indicators, in Ghana, 90, 92, 94 Madeley, John, 221 Male kin, women leaders and, 42–43 Male labor, 45 Male power, 28, 29, 30, 31–32, 33, 36, 39–40, 41–42, 45–46 Malnutrition, 3 Management: capacity building, 228–251; incentive system, 248–249; women in, 31 Management infrastructure, 232, 233 Managerialism, 236 Manpower development, in Nigeria, 252– 266 Market(s): competition and, 80, 169; globalization of, 230; revolutionized, 228 Marketing relations, Ghanaian pineapple farmers, 114–120, 125 Marriage, state regulating, 39 Marxist analysis, women political leaders and, 27, 30 Mass communication, 21–22, 195, 201, 202
314
Index
Mass education, 208, 209, 212, 213 Mass initiative, self-reliance and, 222 Matrilineal customs, in Kerala, India, 160 McLuhan, Marshall, 196 Mechlenbury, Bill, 260 Member of Parliament, Ghana, 71 Mexico: abortion policy, 39; economic crisis, 1 Migration: professional workers in Africa, 241–242, 248, 274–275; Sarawak, Malaysia and, 144, 145, 147–149 Military rule, 15, 16, 18–20, 201, 202, 203 Military takeovers, Africa, 15, 194, 196, 201 Mineral resources, 130, 131–134, 136– 137 Mining industry, 131–133, 134, 137 Modernization: education for, 210; Sarawak, Malaysia and, 143–151 Moral economy of kinship, 36 Moynihan, Daniel P., 220 Multinational corporations: economic growth and, 84–85; environmental destruction, 2; natural resource protection, 132; Nigeria, 23; technical assistance from, 232 Multiple constituency model of organizational effectiveness, 181–184, 187–188 Muslims, in Kerala, India, 159, 162 Nambiar, P. K., 152 National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), 14, 15, 18 Nationalization, in Nigeria, 22–23 National Youth Movement (NYM), Nigeria, 13, 17 Natural resources: agricultural sector and, 137–138; conflicts over, 47–48; Ghana, 95; inventory, 281; maintaining wealth in, 129, 130; protecting, 131–133 Nehru, J., 34, 43 Nepotism, 231 Nicaragua, woman leader in, 35, 42, 43 Nigeria: agriculture, 269–270, 279; capitalism in, 203; diverse groups in, 52; education in, 252–266; income, 272; management capacity and, 231, 240–
241; manpower development in, 252– 266; mineral resources, 136–137; oil wealth, 270, 278; private capital flow, 136; resources, 258–259; social transformation problems, 13–26; urban growth, 278–279 Nigeria National Democratic Party, 15 Njoh, Ambe J., 175–193 Nkrumah, Kwame, 61, 73 Nonaligned movement, 218–220 Northern People’s Congress (NPC), Nigeria, 14, 15, 17, 18 Norway, capacity building by, 54–55 Nutrition, 223; in Kerala, India, 165; women and, 39, 41 Nwanko, Nwafo, 194–205 Oil boom, in Nigeria, 18, 22, 270, 278 Okotieboh, Chief Festus, 15 Oman, alliances of, 218 Oppression, of women, 29, 32 Organizational effectiveness, measuring, 175–193 Organizational goals, 177–178 Organizational performance, evolutionary view of, 185 Organizational research, measurement issues in, 176–177 Organizational size, effectiveness and, 181 Organizational strengthening, 235, 236 Organization for African Unity (OAU) Constitution, 224–227 Output, in Ghana, 90 Oyinade, Babatunde, 13–26, 194–205 Pakistan, woman leader in, 35, 43 Pareto-efficiency criterion, 81–82 Partisan politics, in Ghana, 68–69 Pateman, Carole, 31–32 Patriarchal civil society, 31–32 Patriarchy, 29, 31–33, 40, 41, 43–44, 45 Patrilineal customs, in Kerala, India, 160 Patronage, 231 Peacekeeping mechanisms, establishing, 49–50 Peasant farmers, 101–128, 220, 267, 269
Index People’s Democratic Republic of Congo: refugees in, 54; resources of, 129 Periphery, mobilizing for development, 145 Periurban farmers, Ghanaian pineapple, 101–128 Peru, woman in politics in, 37 Pesticides, use in Ghana, 95, 112–113 Philippines, woman leader in, 35, 42, 43 Pineapple production, in Ghana, 99–128 Plantain production, 136 Plantation agriculture, 280 Police, 25–26, 203 Policies: analysis and evaluation skills, 232; areas of, 5–8; consumer satisfaction guiding, 185–186; educational, 207, 209–211, 213–214; effective communication and, 199; environmental protection, 131–132; Ghanaian agriculture, 100, 126–128; health issues, 3–5; population control, 280; social unrest and, 2; women and, 28–31, 36, 38–39 Political awareness, 66–67, 74–75 Political change, Africa and, 202 Political efficacy, sense of, 66, 71 Political leaders, 129; women as, 27–46 Political participation: Africa and, 202; Jomoro, Ghana, 56–76 Political parties, 194, 195, 202; Ghana, 68–69, 72–73; Nigeria, 14–15 Political power, consensus building in Africa and, 50–51 Political problems, in Nigeria, 16–22 Political prostitutes, 218 Political rights conflicts, 201 Political stability, 1, 7; Africa, 194, 195, 201, 202; consumer satisfaction and, 186; management capacity building and, 248 Popular participation, Ghanaian district assemblies and, 56–76 Population control, 268, 273, 280 Population growth, economic well-being and, 272–273 Population pressure, 276–278 Poverty, 202, 203, 206, 222; developmental needs and, 200; education and, 207; Ghana, 93; Nigeria, 21, 22, 25; peren-
315
nial problem of, 3; population growth and, 272–273, 276 Power: civil servants and, 274; governance and, 197; male, 28, 29, 30, 31– 32, 33, 36, 39–40, 41–42, 45–46; state system and, 28 Powerlessness, poverty and, 200 Prasad, S. Benjamin, 236 Pricing, of Ghanaian pineapples, 115, 116, 117, 125–126 Privatization: Ghana, 100, 112; mechanisms to facilitate, 7 Procedural improvement, 235, 236 Producer associations, for Ghanaian pineapple farmers, 126 Production, social bases of, 103 Productivity, 181, 182; Africa, 271; community resources and, 82; management capacity and, 230, 233, 234, 238 Professional(s): migration from Africa, 241–242, 248, 274–275; Nigerian, 21; urban areas, 267 Professional development, 8 Profit-maximizing organization, 182 Property: Ghanaian pineapple farmers, 123–124; women and, 36, 39. See also Land tenure Provisional National Defense Council, Ghana, 56, 57 Psyche wants, 170 Public accountability, checking corruption with, 21 Public sector organizations, effectiveness of, 185–193 Quality of life, 200, 268–269; economic growth and, 83, 84; Kerala, India, 152, 154; management capacity and, 237; structural adjustments and, 93–94 Quantitative economic expansions, 83 Racism, feminism and, 30 Radical feminists, 29, 30 Ratcliffe, John, 153, 172 Rawlings, Jerry John, 56, 57, 66, 68, 72, 73, 74, 99 Refugees: civil wars and, 54; environmental, 1, 2
316
Index
Religion: influence on policies, 39; Kerala, India, 159, 160, 161–162 Rents: for Ghanaian farmland, 106, 107– 109; in Kerala, India, 164 Reproduction, feminists and, 30 Reproduction information, malecontrolled, 39 Research, renewal through, 3 Resource control model of organizational effectiveness, 180–181 Resources: African wealth, 129–139; civil wars over, 53; community, 82; conflicts over distributing, 50; efficiencies in use of, 152–174; efficient distribution of, 168–170; flow to Africa, 136; gender relations and, 36; Ghana, 68, 109–110; Kerala, India, 152–174; maintaining wealth in, 129–139; maximizing use of, 82; Nigeria, 258–259; organizational effectiveness and, 179– 181, 183; organizational success and, 187; potentialities and, 7; Sarawak, Malaysia, 144; scarce, 230; socioeconomic progress and, 230; Sub-Saharan Africa, 206; trade-offs and, 184; women and, 31. See also Natural resources Richburg, Keith, 49 Ruling elites: end of colonialism and, 53; male, 36, 41–42, 43 Rural areas: economic development in Africa, 267–283; employment and, 281; industrial development, 223–224; outmigration, 276, 278 Rwanda, environmental destruction in, 2 Sarawak, Malaysia, modernizing influences in, 143–151 Sardauna of Sokoto, 15 Saudi Arabia, standard of living in, 154 Science, education in, 262, 265 Seashore, Stanley, 177, 180 Self-reliance: education for, 210, 211–212; fundamentals of, 222; management capacity building and, 250 Settlement structures, change and, 145 Sex education, 280 Sexual violence, 41
Shagari, Alhaji Shehu, 19, 20 Sharecropping, in Ghana, 105–106 Skills, 235, 238 Slash-and-burn agriculture, 143 Smallholders, Ghanaian pineapple growers, 101–128 Smith, Adam, 80, 175 Social class, political leadership and, 27 Social cohesion, 2 Social development, in Kerala, India, 152– 174 Social indicators, of economic performance, 87–88, 93–94 Social inequity, in Ghana, 93 Socialist feminism, 29–30, 33, 44, 46 Social life, economic performance and, 86 Social norms, 1–2 Social planning, 224 Social problems, 1, 25–26 Social processes, decline in, 1 Social programs, in Ghana, 93 Social progress, 87, 233 Social scientists, educating, 282 Social transformation, for democratization, 195 Social welfare, calculating, 81 Societal values, 29 Society, organizational effectiveness and, 182 Socioeconomic conditions, management capacity and, 237 Socioeconomic context, management capacity building in, 233–236 Socioeconomic progress: economic growth and, 81; resources and, 230 Sociolinguistic setup, of Sub-Saharan Africa, 208 Sociopolitical cultures, 201–202 Sociopolitical problems, 1 Soil productivity, 130 Somalia, alliances of, 218 Soman, C. R., 152 South Africa: debt of, 135; private capital flow, 136 Sri Lanka: socioeconomic progress in, 81; sustainable behavior in, 154, 159 Standard of living, 3, 235; Africa, 216;
Index comparative data, 156; economic growth and, 178; managers and, 247, 248; Sarawak, Malaysia, 144; sustainable development and, 199–200; world norm, 154–155 State: feminist standpoint, 28–35, 44–46; relations to women, 28–33, 35–42; women heads of government and, 34– 35, 42–44 State capitalism, in Nigeria, 22 Staten, Clifford L., 90–98 Statistical investigations, 7 Structural adjustment, 112; in Ghana, 90– 98 Sub-Saharan Africa: resources of, 206; sociolinguistic setup of, 208; technical assistance in, 244–245 Subsidies: business development, 84; food, 165; Ghanaian pineapple farmers, 112, 113 Sudan, professional migration from, 242 Sustainable development: in Africa, 194– 205; education and, 207, 209, 214; management capacity and, 228, 233 Sustainable human behavior, 152–174 Sustainable infrastructure, 199–200 Swahili language, education and, 210, 211–212, 213, 214 Taiwan: economic development in, 270; educational system, 274 Tanzania: language-in-education and, 206– 215; management capacity and, 229, 231 Tax base expansion, 84 Tax burden, 231 Tax reform, in Ghana, 91 Technical advisers, expatriate, 228, 231, 232, 241, 245–247, 249 Technical assistance, 8, 233–234, 240– 241, 243–247, 249 Technical education, 274, 281 Technical support, for Ghanaian pineapple farmers, 119, 127 Technologies, 169; agriculture, 269; education and, 262, 265, 274; Ghanaian pineapple farmers, 112; information, 5; management capacity and, 230–231,
317
238; revolutionized, 228; Sarawak, Malaysia and, 145; soft, 238 Temple Entry Act of 1936, 161 Third World: nature of problems, 1–3; position in global affairs, 217–224 Third World syndrome, 217 Thong, Lee Boon, 143–151 Timber industry, Sarawak, Malaysia, 144, 147–149, 150 Trade: beneficial, 223; colonialism and, 48, 51; Ghanaian, 93–94; international lending agencies and, 135 Training: management capacity building and, 250; nondevelopment and, 269 Transportation: Ghanaian agriculture and, 102, 116; rural areas of Africa, 277; Sarawak, Malaysia, 143, 145, 150 Tribal allegiances, 50, 51–52 Trouillot, Justice Ertha Pascal, 35 Tutsis, 54 Uganda, professional out-migration and, 241–242 Umerah-Udezulu, Ifeyinwa E., 27–46 Unemployment: in Ghana, 94; urban areas, 267 United Nations: management capacity building and, 243, 244; women’s issues, 41 United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), 55 United Progressive Grand Alliance, 18 United States, African military force and, 55 Universities, in Nigeria, 252–266 Urban areas, 2, 267; change and, 145; Nigeria, 278–279 Urban service delivery, 175–176 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), management capacity building and, 243 Use values, 80–82, 83 Utilitarianism, classical, 80 Utility, as source of value, 80 Values: economic growth and, 79, 80–82; feminist, 29; managerial, 232; social change and, 199; societal, 29
318
Index
Vandalism, 2 Violence: ethnic, 52; sexual, 41 Vocational education, 281 Voting: Jomoro, Ghana, 61–69; Kerala, India, 163; women and, 36 Waldheim, Kurt, 40 Water supply, Jomoro, Ghana, 59 Wealth, maintaining African, 129–139 Wealth creation, 80 Wealth distribution, 83; ethnic groups and, 133; Kerala, India, 172; multinational corporations and, 84–85 Welfare: maximizing, 80–82, 85; measuring, 86–89 Welfare assistance, 178 Well-being, value of, 80 Wellness measures, 156–157 Wellness needs, 169–170 Western civilization, elites and, 51
Whetten, David, 181 Wife abuse, 41 Women: death during abortion, 39; Kerala, India lifestyle, 158, 160; oppression of, 29, 32; political leaders, 27–46; working, 31, 38–39, 45, 46, 83, 111 Work experiences, capacity building through, 7 World Bank: African Capacity Building Initiative, 7–8; environment and, 130– 131, 234; Ghanaian structural adjustment and, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97; management capacity building and, 243, 244; urban service delivery and, 175–176 Yorubas, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19 Yuchtman, Ephraim, 177, 180 Zaire, expatriate managers in, 231 Zambia, expatriate managers in, 231 Zia, Khalida, 34–35
About the Contributors
VALENTINE UDOH JAMES is an Associate Professor of Social Science and Director of the African Studies Program at Kalamazoo College in Michigan. He specializes in Third World development, international development, and environmental planning. James is a recipient of the Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Award and was selected as a diplomacy fellow by the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He serves on the editorial boards of Third World in Perspective and 21st Century Review and was the 1995–1997 editor of Planning in Virginia. WILLIAM ALEXANDRA is Professor Emeritus of World Food Politics at California Polytechnic State University. He is a Consultant for the Institute for Food and Development Policy and Principal Investigator for Earthwatch Expeditions. BENJAMIN ASARE is an Associate Professor of Political/Social Science at Indiana University Southeast. TENGKU SHAMSUL BAHRIN is a Professor of Geography at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. MICHAEL A. BURAYIDI is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Affairs and is the Coordinator of the Urban and Regional Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh. CHARLES BWENGE works for the government of Tanzania. His many years of experience in the Tanzanian educational system are reflected in his current
320
About the Contributors
research. He specializes in the study of African societies with respect to language, education, and governance. CYRIL K. DADDIEH is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University. He is the author of several journal articles and book chapters. AGBER DIMAH is Director of International Programs at Chicago State University and Associate Professor of Political Science. FELIX EDOHO is an Associate Professor of Management at the College of Business at Lincoln University in Jefferson City, Missouri. He has contributed chapters on these areas to several books. He is the editor of Globalization and the New World Order: Promises, Problems, and Prospects for Africa in the Twenty-First Century. BASSEY EKPONO is an Associate Professor in the Department of Human Services at South Carolina State University. JAMES ETIM is an Associate Professor of English at Mississippi Valley State University. MELANIE MARSHALL JAMES is a Consultant and Project Coordinator for Inyang International. She serves as a Cultural Ambassador for the Speakers Bureau at the University of Virginia International Center and chairs the International Women’s Group for the International Host Programs. PAUL KANJO is an Agricultural Economist and a Consultant on Third World economic issues. AMBE J. NJOH is an Assistant Professor of Government and International Affairs at the University of South Florida. NWAFO NWANKO is a Professor of Communications at Howard University. BABATUNDE OYINADE is an Assistant Professor of Mass Communications at Shaw University. CLIFFORD L. STATEN is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Indiana University Southeast.
About the Contributors
321
LEE BOON THONG is a Professor of Geography at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. IFEYINWA E. UMERAH-UDEZULU is a Development Consultant who specializes in political science with emphasis on women and development.
