America Or Europe?: British Foreign Policy, 1739-63

America or Europe?

Also by Jeremy Black and published by UCL Press European warfare, 1660–1815

America or Europe? British foreign policy, 1739–63 Jeremy Black University of Exeter

© Jeremy Black, 1998 This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. No reproduction without permission. All rights reserved. First published in 1998 by UCL Press UCL Press Limited 1 Gunpowder Square London EC4A 3DE UK and 1900 Frost Road, Suite 101 Bristol Pennsylvania 19007–1598 USA This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. The name of University College London (UCL) is a registered trade mark used by UCL Press with the consent of the owner. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data are available ISBN 0-203-49947-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-80771-5 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN: 1-85728-185-3 (Print Edition)

Contents

Preface Abbreviations Maps

vii ix xi

1

Introduction

1

2

International developments

8

3

Britain and the War of the Austrian Succession

29

4

Anglo-French relations, 1740–56

45

5

The crown and Hanover

81

6

Parliament

104

7

Diplomats and ministers

131

8

Pitt and moves towards new strategies, 1755–63

144

Defence, foreign policy and strategy

164

Conclusion: Europe or America?

175

Notes Index

185 213

9 10

v

For Bill Gibson, Robert Harris and Murray Pittock

Preface

I began working on a sequel to my British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole (Edinburgh, 1985) soon after it was published. The book has been longdelayed, however, because of the complexity of the period, the range of sources I had to consult, and my own interest in other projects. I am most grateful to Steven Gerrard for his patience. The passage of time has made the book more topical. This reflects both greater historical interest in the development of Britain’s imperial power and also modern awareness of the importance, complexity and contentious nature of foreign policy and international relations. I am most grateful to the British Academy and the University of Durham for their support of the research on which much of this book is based, to Merton College, Oxford, for electing me to a visiting fellowship in 1986, enabling me to read relevant pamphlet material in the Bodleian Library, to the Huntington Library for appointing me to a visiting fellowship in 1988, which permitted me to work in relevant collections, including Grenville, Loudoun and Montagu papers, and to the Beinecke Library for giving me a visiting fellowship in 1991, which enabled me to work on the Weston papers at Farmington. I am most grateful to Her Majesty the Queen for permission to work on the Cumberland and Stuart papers in the Royal Archives, to the late Duke of Northumberland for permission to work on the Alnwick papers, the Marquess of Bute for permission to work on the papers of the 3rd Earl, to the late Earl Waldegrave for permission to work on the papers of the 1st Earl, to the Earl of Malmesbury for permission to work on the papers of James Harris, to Lady Lucas for permission to work on the Lucas papers in Bedfordshire Record Office, to John WestonUnderwood for permission to work on the papers of Edward Weston, to the Trustees of the Bedford Estate for permission to work on the papers of the 4th Duke, and to Robert Smith for granting me early access to the Bowood and Wolterton collections after their deposit in the British Library. I am very grateful to two anonymous readers for their reports and to Wendy Duery for vii

PREFACE

her secretarial support. I have benefited from the opportunity to advance some of the ideas in this work in lectures at the University of Cambridge and the Institute of Historical Research. This book is dedicated to three other eighteenth-century specialists whose scholarship I greatly respect and whose friendship I value.

viii

Abbreviations

Add. AE AN Ang. AST, LM, Ing. Aylesbury Bayr. Ges. BL Bod. Bowood BVC Chewton Cobbett CP CRO Cumb. P. Dresden Eg. EHR EK Farmington HHStA HL HP

Additional Manuscripts Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris Archives Nationales, Paris Angleterre Turin, Archivio di Stato di Torino, Lettere Ministri, Inghilterra Buckinghamshire Record Office, Aylesbury Bayerische Gesandtschaften British Library, London Bodleian Library, Oxford Papers of the 1st Marquess of Lansdowne, originally held in Bowood Bibliotheque Victor Cousin, Paris Waldegrave Papers, papers of James, 1st Earl Waldegrave, Chewton Hall, Chewton Mendip W.Cobbett (ed.), Parliamentary History of England [36 volumes] (London, 1806–20) Correspondance Politique County Record Office Cumberland Papers Hauptstaatsarchiv, Geheimes Kabinett, Gesandtschaften, Dresden Egerton manuscripts English Historical Review Englische Korrespondenz Lewis Walpole Library, Farmington, Connecticut Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilung, Vienna Huntington Library, San Marino, California History of Parliament Transcripts, London ix

ABBREVIATIONS

KS Leeds, Vyner Marburg MD Munich NeC NLS NSTA Pol. Corr. PRO, SP RA SRO sup. Trevor WW

Kastan Schwarz Vyner MSS., Archive Office, Leeds Staatsarchiv, Bestand 4: Politische Akten nach Philipp d. Gr., Marburg Mémoires et Documents Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich Clumber Papers, University Library, Nottingham National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh Niedersachsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Hanover R.Koser (ed.), Politische Conespondenz Friedrichs des Grossen [46 volumes] (Berlin, 1879–1939) Public Record Office, State Papers, London Royal Archives, Windsor Castle Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh supplément Trevor Papers Wentworth Woodhouse MSS., Archives, Sheffield

Note on dates All dates given are new style aside from those indicated as old style by (os). Old style dates were eleven days behind.

x

Chapter One Introduction

For several decades the study of international relations has not been at the centre of historical inquiry, the position it once enjoyed, or, as in Britain, shared with constitutional history. As a consequence, the perspectives that the study of foreign policy can offer to those interested in other aspects of political history have been generally neglected, while the scholarship, suppositions and received wisdom of the great age of the subject, 1870–1930, are reiterated with little refinement. Whereas once every scholar of eighteenth-century Europe had a view on the terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, now few, if any, know them and students are referred to the musty pages of Sir Richard Lodge’s epic of erudition, though not insight. The foreign policy of the period is seen largely in terms of tedious and inconsequential diplomacy, while interest in international relations has been replaced with social, economic and cultural concerns. Britain, particularly England, is generally regarded as a “polite and commercial” society, not a bellicose one, and the ties that bound her to the Continent are neglected in line with the common tendency to treat her as distinct, a country separated from Europe by more than the dictates of syllabuses, those mute sustainers of outdated intellectual baggage. And yet, foreign policy was crucially important in the eighteenth century, especially in its middle decades. Between 1739 and 1763 Britain was involved in two major wars. In 1739 British ministers had gone to war with Spain unwillingly, fearing that Spain’s ally France would intervene to decisive effect and that Britain would be exposed to defeat and possibly invasion on behalf of “James III”, the Stuart claimant to the throne. Western Europe appeared to be dominated by France, and Britain was widely seen as unstable, or, at least, an undesirable alliance partner. The Champion, an influential London opposition newspaper, railed at British impotence in 1741: When I compare our present deplorable plight with the august figure we made in the last general war [War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–13] — 1

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1739–63

When I look back and see France, so lately at our mercy, a miserable suppliant, and now behold her enthroned among the stars, with almost all the princes of Europe kneeling at her footstool. When I behold Great Britain, on the other hand, who was then a queen among the nations, with fortune, victory, and empire in her train, when I behold her, now without interest, without importance, without allies…scarce the shadow of what once she was, I am tempted to think our triumphs were imaginary, our glory a dream, and our very power itself but a castle in the clouds, which melted with the first breeze that blew… The universal monarchy we have so long dreaded, thanks to our own supineness, is nearer being accomplished than ever. And yet, by 1763, France and Spain had been defeated in European waters and in the colonies. Jacobitism had been crushed and French attempts to exploit it had been unsuccessful. The naval struggle between Britain and the Bourbons had been settled twice, in 1747 and 1759, in successive wars, in favour of the former. Britannia really did rule the waves. Thanks to this naval success, Bourbon colonies had been vulnerable to attack, forced to rely for their defence on British logistical problems and the strong grasp of silent diseases, such as malaria and yellow fever, rather than on reinforcements from Europe. British gains in the War of Jenkins’ Ear with Spain, which had begun in 1739 and broadened out in 1743, when fighting began between Britain and Spain’s ally France, into an aspect of the multi-faceted War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48), had been modest: Porto Bello, an important port on the Caribbean shore of the Isthmus of Panama, had been seized temporarily from Spain in 1739; Louisbourg, the fortress guarding the mouth of the St Lawrence, had been captured from France in 1745 and retained for the rest of the war. And yet these acquisitions had demonstrated that, although the commitment of British forces to conflict on the Continent with France could be as unsuccessful and costly as domestic critics claimed, it was nevertheless possible to use British naval strength in order to make a decisive contribution to the trans-oceanic struggle for mastery. This had not been the case in previous British conflicts with France (1689–97, 1702–13) and Spain (1718–20). The following war was for Britain the inappropriately named Seven Years’ War (1756–63): fighting with the French in North America in fact began in 1754, while hostilities with Spain did not commence until 1762. In the conflict, British naval power could not save the British-ruled Mediterranean island of Minorca from French capture in 1756, but it was decisive elsewhere. French plans to invade Britain were smashed in naval defeat in 1759, while maritime hegemony enabled British amphibious forces to shatter French power in Canada, the West Indies and West Africa. In the brief war with Spain, Havana and Manila, the two major island centres of the Spanish overseas empire, were both captured, while a seaborne British army saved Portugal, 2

INTRODUCTION

Britain’s vulnerable but economically crucial ally, from being overrun by Spain in 1762. At the close of the war, Britain had avoided subordination to France and had defeated her in the maritime and colonial struggle. Britain was the major European power in both India and North America, the most powerful European state on the world scale. The causes and consequences of these events are contentious and involve complex questions about both the nature and capabilities of the British state relative to other powers, and developments in international relations. As such they indicate the multifaceted nature of the study of foreign policy, its position at the crux of a number of crucial and interrelated questions. Among those that will be examined in this book are how far and why did Britain become increasingly concer ned with colonial questions and how far this complemented or clashed with issues of continental diplomacy and national secur-ity and, in wartime, with a distinct Euro-centric strategy? In short, in peace and war was it a question of Europe or America, or Europe and America? Secondly, what were the most influential pressures and ideas in the formulation and execution of foreign policy and how far did they alter during this period? These questions obviously raise important points about the nature of the British government and state, and the functioning of the political community in this period. How were different ideas and pressures reconciled? Did they clash, and, if so, why, to what effect and with what changes through time? How far did political practice accord with constitutional theory? How influential was the public discussion over foreign policy and what light can a consideration of public opinion throw on the openness of government to external ideas? What did public opinion mean? Foreign policy is a crucial sphere for the discussion of these and other questions, not only because it was important but because it was believed to be so. Foreign policy was a sphere in which monarchs and ministers had both considerable interest and ideas of their own and, in so far as this led to clashes over policy, it provides an opportunity for assessing the nature of power and influence within the political community. However, views were far from static, and the causes and impact of changes in ideas concerning foreign policy are themselves important questions. This is especially so in considering the extent to which, first, views within Britain were based on a shrewd assessment of the situation abroad, and, secondly, the extent to which the extent and nature of changes on the Continent were appreciated. The relationship between foreign and domestic problems and pressures was a dynamic one. The extent to which there was an informed debate within Britain requires examination, as does its relationship with ministerial and partisan politics, but so does the whole question of the development and influence of a “Patriotic” discourse in the field of foreign policy. This is related to wider questions of the nature and growth of nationalism and the impact of xenophobia. Rule Br itannia was political slogan as much as 3

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1739–63

patriotic exhortation. Foreigners kicked into the filthy gutters of London were aware of the vigour of British xenophobia. Xenophobia did not win wars. The third issue that must be faced is why Britain won her struggle with France. Political, governmental and financial considerations are clearly central, but so also were diplomatic and strategic issues. The two powers were not alone in the international “system”, and the relationship between British foreign policy and the Anglo-French struggle needs to be stressed. It is related to the fourth question, namely, why hostilities began between the two powers. If Britain is assumed to have been on an inevitable course for maritime hegemony, a power fuelled by commercial growth and bellicose nationalism, then this question might appear unnecessary, as indeed is any serious discussion of foreign policy, for the course, if not the timing of conflict with the Bourbons, seems clear. In short, Britain and France were bound to be adversaries in both peace and war in a struggle inspired by mercantilist goals. However, any serious examination of the period reveals the central role of policy options and gover nmental choice. Ministr ies might appear inconsequential: Britain and Spain began war in 1739, Britain and France fought from 1754, although, in both cases, most of their ministers sought the continuation of peace. This has to be discussed in the context of the origins of eighteenth-century wars and, more generally, in light of the nature of the international relations of the period. Here, a stress on system and predictability appears inappropriate, and, instead, the insecure and often kaleidoscopic nature of diplomatic alignments can be related to the insecure and frequently volatile character of court policies. The extent to which British policy should be seen in this light requires examination and raises the contentious question of parallels and contrasts between Britain and the Continent and the related, largely overlooked, issue of convergence or divergence. Given the importance of foreign policy to all the states of the period, this question can be raised profitably and discussed in terms of both the formulation of policy and its execution. Both Br itish politics and European international relations changed substantially in this period. Britain witnessed the triumph of stability in the 1740s, a decisive decade in which the Whig “Old Corps” survived both unpopularity and the toppling of its leading political figure, Sir Robert Walpole, while a modus vivendi between monarch and ministers was successfully sketched out and Jacobitism was crushed. After the turmoil of the 1741 general election and the subsequent fall of Walpole in 1742, the Whigs triumphed in the elections of 1747 and 1754, and, although Jacobite intrigues continued, the ministerial crisis of 1754–7 did not raise fundamental questions of political stability. On the Continent the period witnessed the Austro-French “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756, a diplomatic realignment whose importance has been somewhat exaggerated, and, conversely, in the earlier War of the Austrian 4

INTRODUCTION

Succession, an attempt to recast the territorial situation in central Europe fundamentally by partitioning the Austrian dominions. The significance of both the attempt and its failure has been somewhat overlooked. Britain’s role in both the War of the Austrian Succession and the “Diplomatic Revolution” requires re-examination, not least in order to prevent too insular an interpretation of the development of her foreign policy. The last is a danger if attention is centred on colonial struggle and the discourse of patriotism. Instead, it is appropriate today to consider the nature of change in a past multipolar international “system” dominated by rivalry. The study of mid-eighteenth-century British foreign policy therefore offers a number of perspectives. They are held together by the issue of the political relationships between the government of Britain and that of other states (an abstraction that frequently dissolves under scrutiny into the often arbitrary and changeable views of unpredictable monarchs), and the factors that influenced these relationships. It is surprisingly difficult to establish these. The sense that somehow diplomatic history must have been “done” in the past, that a complete and comprehensive nar rative exists that simply requires reexamination in light of the priorities of succeeding generations, is misplaced. The sequence of events is often unclear, let alone their cause. Although some subjects have been studied in detail, many were not and much is still obscure. For example, Britain’s continental policies in the last years of Walpole’s ministry require examination, and there is no decent study of either Lord Carteret, who effectively directed foreign policy in 1742–4, or his foreign policy. The question of George II’s role during the War of the Austrian Succession underlines the pressing need for a scholarly biography of the king. British policy towards Italy and in the confused Baltic politics of the mid1740s, the tenuous but significant contacts between Britain and France in 1742–6 and the abortive Anglo-Spanish discussions after the death of Philip V in 1746 are all lacking in clarity. In the postwar period (1748–54), the Imperial Election Scheme and AngloFrench colonial disputes have been studied in detail, but they have not been set within the context of a comprehensive study of British policy, of which important aspects, such as Britain’s role in the Baltic crisis of 1747–51, remain unclear. The outbreak of war with France and Britain’s continental diplomacy in 1755–6 have been extensively studied, as have been Anglo-Prussian relations during the Seven Years’ War, but the seriousness of the crisis in British foreign policy of 1756–7 has been generally underrated and the policies and attitudes of George III and the Bute ministry (1762–3) not placed in the context of a long-lasting debate over Britain’s continental policy. If particular aspects of policy remain obscure, the same is also true of much of the public debate. There is need for more detailed attention to the content, development and impact of Tory and “Patr iot” views and for study of parliamentary debates. However, as with politics and government more generally in this period, there are significant problems with the surviving 5

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1739–63

sources. First, the “official” sources, the diplomatic and other governmental correspondence, are concerned rather with the execution of policy than its formulation. Diplomatic instructions are often infrequent, elliptical or bland, and conciliar records are relatively rare and generally provide little indication of the discussion that took place. There is no equivalent of the French Mémoires et Documents series in the records of British foreign policy. In a small political society, in which government took place in the context of the royal court and its ethos and methods, policy was frequently decided orally, not by an exchange of memoranda. Secondly, the surviving records of individual ministers and other politicians are very patchy. Wary of governmental interception of the post, politicians in opposition preferred to rely on face-to-face discussion, which, anyway, was the obvious medium for everyone during the parliamentary session, the most sustained period of political activity, when everyone who counted was in London. The preservation of the papers of those who held important office is patchy. If it is very extensive for Newcastle, Holdernesse and Hardwicke, this is not the case for Carteret and, still more, Harrington, a long-serving Secretary of State. Very little correspondence survives for George II, a man who preferred hunting and reviewing soldiers to writing memoranda. The nature of the surviving evidence ensures that in many cases the scholar should advance his or her views with caution. To be definite is often to base too much on a small selection of sources and to overlook their limited value, if not ambiguity. Any assessment of cause and influence is necessarily indefinite, a central part of the educational value of history. This study will reveal that approaching the major questions from a number of perspectives can lead to subtly differing conclusions. That is scarcely surpr ising. Contemporary commentators were divided in their analyses, they were not fools, and it is inappropriate for the historian to assert certainties. They are certainly not a reflection of the surviving sources. The crucial questions are approached more than once in this text, precisely because they yield different interpretations in particular contexts. This explains the structure of the book. A series of chapters that are organized in a chronological fashion are followed by several organized around themes, before another chapter moves on to consider the somewhat different situation during the closing conflict of the period. The advantage of adopting this approach is that it ensures that what may appear clear-cut from one angle, for example the role of Parliament, is revealed as more complex, and sometimes therefore more important or a more fruitful way of approaching the subject. The structure of the work also seeks to suggest another variety of approach. The book is designed to be read as a whole and it is best to do so, but it is also organized so that those wishing to approach particular topics or periods can do so without having to read the remainder of the work. This approach, followed also in British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole, may make the book appear as a series of essays, but it reflects the manner in which books frequently are read or used. 6

INTRODUCTION

The structure of a book guides its readers; the terms employed by historians also necessarily influence them. The use of national units, such as France or Spain, or of institutional groups, such as the French government, entail implications of consistency, stability and unity that are misleading. Similarly, the language of growth and decline suggests a rhythmic, even predictable, flow of affairs. “Policy” suggests consistency, “decisions” choice. The use of such phrases as aggressive or expansionist also imply judgements that have not always been demonstrated. It is simple to state these points, less easy to suggest how they should be confronted. To discuss, each time policy or decisions are referred to, the nature of the group that took the decision is not possible in any project that seeks to range widely. Vocabulary is limited, no word without connotations. Inevitably the old phrases and words recur. Nevertheless, when they do so, it is necessary to remain on guard against the implications that too easily flow. In addition, periodization always involves difficulties. Historical figures do not all conveniently die or discern new problems and opportunities or respond to a new context at the same moment. The balance of change and continuity that all were aware of is difficult to delimit.

7

Chapter Two International developments

…he who will judge rightly of the conduct of affairs, must not judge of this or that particular part alone, but must consider the general principle on which our conduct proceeds, what the effects of it have been and will be. —Viscount Bolingbroke, former Secretary of State, 17361 …the Parties are so jumbled together, and the one rule, which is left to judge by I mean that of interest, is become so perplexed and doubtful, that I should be sorry to be obliged to give my opinion where we ought to be. —Edward Weston, former Under Secretary, 17482 Politics must change with the situation of things… —Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, and effectively British Foreign Minister, 17493 A brief account of international relations and the course of British foreign policy is an essential preliminary to any analysis of this policy. British policy has to be understood in the context of the wider developments that provided challenges and opportunities. It is also appropriate to judge the relevance and success of policy in this context, although, equally, it is crucial not to lose sight of the domestic context and the resulting requirements and expectations upon policy. However, brevity can be misleading, especially given the complexity of developments in this period. The danger of any summary is the tendency to create a schematic impression. Major events, or rather those that appear full of importance and consequence in hindsight, necessar ily provide the chronological structure of such a summary, dictate the emphases and thus appear to occur as a result of preceding such events. Issues and developments 8

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

that greatly concerned contemporaries, for example, in 1736–40 the JülichBerg question or in 1749–50 Russo-Swedish relations, are omitted or understated because they did not appear to have direct consequences, or at least those anticipated at the time. Even those that were important in their consequences, for example, the “diplomatic revolution” of 1752, the settlement of differences between Ferdinand VI of Spain and Maria Theresa of Austria, are slighted because the standard schematic interpretation places more weight on other developments, in this case the more f amous “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756, the new Austro-French alignment. Yet the settlement of Austro-Spanish differences was an important prelude to the improvement of Austro-French relations. It was also to be important to Britain, ensuring that the divisiveness that had provided her with a major entrée into the politics of Souther n Europe, and also provided an opportunity for securing the alliance of Austria or Spain, was no more. Furthermore, a shortage of space and a desire for clarity and explanation produce an emphasis on order and policy, causes and results, as opposed to disorder and confusion. This is matched by the tendency to simplify decisionmaking processes and to see policies as arising directly from pressures. The ambiguity of influence is replaced by the need and desire to attribute cause briefly. Policy, the government, mercantile influence, Parliament, the aristocracy, the court, the army, are all presented as clear and distinct activities, influences and bodies whose conscious interaction determined events, for example, the outbreak of war with Spain in 1739. Moreover, there is a strong tendency to simplify, consolidate and reify attitudes or ideas, whether, in the case of Britain, assumptions that can be described as isolationist or interventionist, “blue water” or continental, or, more generally, moods and policies, ranging from aggressive to pro-Prussian. Chronological shifts in emphasis are often neglected. The whole problem culminates in the understandable use of countries or monarchs as a shorthand term for complex processes of decision-making. There is comparable stylistic pressure to prefer the staccatos of active assertion to the more balanced equivocations of subordinate clauses and the passive tense. All these drawbacks can be found in the following survey. The statements made could be clarified and qualified at length, just as individual footnotes could easily stretch to page length. The survey should therefore be seen as a short introduction, some aspects of which will be discussed subsequently, that serves to present the protagonists and to offer only the briefest of accounts of their motives and policies. Brevity makes this introduction excessively mechanistic, and, at all times, it is necessary to appreciate the fluidity of “policies”, the existence of debate and dissension and the prevalence of choice in uncertainty rather than system and predictability. In the period 1683–1789 there were three decisive confrontations in European international relations. The first was the defeat of the Turks in 1683– 99, a defeat that was consolidated by Austrian victories in the war of 1716–18. 9

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1739–63

Though the Turks were not driven from the Balkans, as was hoped, their defeat at Vienna (1683) and their subsequent loss of the kingdom of Hungary marked a dramatic alteration in the European relationship between Christendom and Islam, one that subsequent Austrian failures in 1737–9 and 1788 were not to reverse. The second decisive confrontation was between Peter I of Russia and his enemies in the Great Northern War (1700–21). Peter not only decisively defeated Charles XII of Sweden and conquered the eastern Baltic provinces of the Swedish empire, but he also both destroyed the Swedo-Polish-UkrainianTatar alliance that Charles had sought to create in 1707–9, and repelled in 1719–20 an Anglo-French attempt to organize a European coalition that would force him to return his Swedish conquests. Challenged unsuccessfully by Sweden in 1741–2, the effect of Peter’s triumph was farreaching. The buffers between Russia and the German states had been fatally weakened, and Russia was thereafter to dominate eastern Europe until confronted by western or central European powers. Economically directly linked to the west through Peter’s Baltic conquests, such as Reval and Riga, Russia developed considerably in ways that would have surprised Peter’s predecessors. The third decisive confrontation was more drawn out. It was between Britain and France, and, though it involved both conflict and rivalry in Europe, not least in the British Isles, through France’s sponsorship of the Jacobites, its most decisive consequences were in the colonial and maritime sphere. In 1740 Britain and France were both important colonial and maritime powers, though neither ruled the extent of territory or number of people that Spain possessed. By 1815 Britain was clearly the leading European commercial, colonial and maritime power. Her success owed much to the course of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (1792–1815): the successes of British naval power, the pressure of French commitments and demands, and vulnerability to Britain that the conflicts placed on Spain, the United Provinces and Denmark, and the longevity of the wars that allowed Britain to mount numerous amphibious operations once the maritime structure of the French empire had been destroyed. However, British predominance had already been clearly established in the period covered by this book, especially during the Seven Years’ War (1756–63). This maritime predominance was reflected in Britain’s conquests during the conflict, the position of strength from which she negotiated and the ability of her naval power to intimidate France and Spain in the immediate postwar years. This success was to be challenged dur ing the War of Amer ican Independence (1775–83), though the effectiveness of the maritime threat posed then by the Bourbons (France and Spain) has generally been exaggerated. The situation in 1778–9 was definitely one of the Bourbons challenging Britain and seeking to take advantage of her American difficulties. It was not initially a conflict between powers in an equal position, and, for the Bourbons, success was to be measured in forcing Britain to return past gains, an aspiration reflected in the determination of Vergennes, the French foreign 10

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

minister, that the Peace of Paris of 1763 should not serve as the basis of the eventual negotiations. The period 1739–63 saw two major wars in the European world, and Britain played a major role in both.4 The conflicts are generally known as the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War, and the dates usually given are 1740–48 and 1756–63, but these titles and dates suggest a false coherence, a deceptively united European international “system”. Britain, for example, went to war with Spain in 1739–the War of Jenkins’ Ear—but did not begin hostilities with France until 1743. The War of the Austrian Succession takes its name from the struggle over the Habsburg inheritance that followed the death of Emperor Charles VI on 20 October 1740, and the succession of his elder daughter, Maria Theresa. The Habsburgs ruled a number of territories that are collectively, though somewhat inaccurately, referred to as Austria. They included most of modern Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Silesia (modern south-west Poland), Transylvania (north-west Rumania), Slovenia, Croatia, the Austr ian Netherlands (Belgium and Luxemburg), the Duchies of Milan, Mantua, Parma and Piacenza in northern Italy and a number of small territories in south-west Germany. In addition, since 1438 the elected position of Holy Roman Emperor had been held by a Habsburg. By the early eighteenth century this post was a source of prestige and a measure of judicial authority rather than of power in the Empire (essentially modern Germany and Austria), but, as it was held by men, its fate became uncertain with the death of Charles, for he left two daughters but no sons. In 1713 Charles had promulgated the Pragmatic Sanction, by which he stipulated the indivisibility of his inheritance, the reversion to female in the absence of male descendants and the succession of his children rather than Maria Josepha and Maria Amalia, the daughters of his elder brother and predecessor Joseph I.Maria Josepha married the heir to a leading German ruler, the Elector of Saxony, the future Augustus III of Saxony-Poland in 1719, and Maria Amalia married Charles Albert, the heir to another, the Elector of Bavaria, in 1722. Though Charles ensured that the marriages were accompanied by solemn renunciations of all claims to the succession, Augustus and Charles, who succeeded in 1733 and 1726 respectively, were eager to press claims. Maria Theresa married Duke Francis of Lorraine, who in 1737 became Grand Duke of Tuscany, a consolation for the loss of Lorraine to the father-in-law of Louis XV of France. They were not alone in casting eyes on the Habsburg inheritance. Charles Emmanuel III, king of Sardinia (1730–73), and ruler of Savoy and Piedmont as well as that island, sought gains at the expense of the Milanese and of the republic of Genoa, an Austrian ally. Philip V of Spain (1700–46) wanted Austrian Italy, including the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, for his sons by his second marriage to the Parmesan princess Elisabeth Farnese. The eldest son, Don Carlos, had in 1734, during the War of the Polish Succession, conquered the 11

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kingdom of Naples from the Austrians, but the second son, Don Philip, was still unprovided for. Ger man, Italian and Spanish ambitions had to wait for a suitable opportunity. That was provided not so much by the death of Charles VI but by the willingness of France to abandon the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction she had accepted in 1738 as part of the Third Treaty of Vienna, and thus to destroy the entente between France and Austria that had followed their conflict in the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5). Initially the pacific octogenarian Cardinal Fleury, who had been first minister to his former charge Louis XV of France (1715–74) since 1726, had intended simply to deny the Imperial election to Francis, rather than to support claims on the Habsburg succession. Edward Finch, the British envoy to Russia, observed that “the fate of Europe may greatly depend on his faith or ambition” and “that guarantys like young beauties with small blemishes in their character have now a fine opportunity to reestablish their reputation”. It was and is unclear whether Fleury would have died as the peacemaker who goes to see God, as Finch wondered,5 because the unexpected invasion of Silesia on 16 December 1740 by Frederick II (the Great, 1740–86), the young new ruler of Prussia, dramatically altered the situation by substituting action for negotiation and by forcing other powers, including France and Britain, to define their position.6 The state known as Prussia stretched from the Rhine to the Niemen. It included Brandenburg, one of the eight Electorates of the Holy Roman Empire, with its capital at Berlin; the actual kingdom of Prussia, otherwise known as ducal or East Prussia, with its capital at Königsberg; most of Pomerania; the Hohenzollern share of the Jülich-Cleve succession: the Rhenish Duchy of Cleve and the counties of Mark and Ravensberg; and a number of Westphalian territories, including the secularized prince-bishopric of Minden. Under Frederick William I (1713–40), the army had risen to 80,000, the second biggest, after that of Austria, of any German state. The state was internally stable and the nobility were accustomed to the idea of state service, especially in the army. However, although the growth of Prussian power had been a marked feature of the previous century, Prussia was not unique in this respect. Austrian Habsburg territorial expansion had been considerable; it centred on Italy and Hungary. Russian power expanded east, south and, crucially for Europe, west. The efforts of Tsar Alexis in the Thirteen Years’ War (1654–67) to gain a Baltic coastline by driving the Swedes from Livonia and to dominate Poland had been thwarted by both powers, but they had been overcome by Alexis’s son, Peter I, the Great (1682–1725) in the Great Northern War (1700–21). Thereafter, Prussian rulers were uneasily conscious of Russian strength, and those who wished to put pressure on Prussia, for example George II in 1733– 4, turned to Russia.7 Austria and Russia had been allied since 1726, but the Tsarina Anna (1730– 40) died three days before her ally Charles VI, to be succeeded by her great12

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nephew, the two-month-old Ivan VI (1740–1), and a weak and divided regency. When Guy Dickens, the British envoy in Berlin, stressed Prussian vulnerability in February 1741 and thus the need for caution, Frederick replied that he was certain of Russia and therefore not worried about his other frontiers,8 which included that with Hanover. Frederick’s invasion of Silesia, on parts of which there was a long-standing Hohenzollern claim, was successful. However, initial attempts to force Maria Theresa to accept territorial losses failed, despite British pressure on Austria to end the conflict by making concessions to Prussia before other powers, principally France, took the opportunity to attack. As a result, Frederick signed the Treaty of Breslau with France on 5 June 1741, renouncing his claim to Jülich-Berg (the succession to which by the Wittelsbach claimant was supported by France) and agreeing to support Charles Albert of Bavaria in the Imperial election. In return the French guaranteed Prussian possession of Lower Silesia, and promised military assistance for Bavaria and diplomatic pressure on her ally Sweden to attack Russia. The Swedes did so in July 1741. On 15 August 1741, French troops began to cross the Rhine. In addition, France and Frederick successfully encouraged other powers to join the attack on Maria Theresa. A grand strategy, both military and diplomatic, was being put in place. A French advance towards Hanover forced George II to abandon his attempt to create an opposing coalition, and on 25 September 1741 he was obliged to promise neutrality and his support for Charles Albert as Emperor. The designation of the conflict as the War of the Austrian Succession therefore appears well founded, although the initial attempt to reconfigure much of central Europe was unsuccessful. In late 1741 the Austrian empire appeared close to dissolution, Linz falling on 14 September, Prague on 26 November. There seemed to be only one issue in international relations: the redrawing of the map of the Empire in order to destroy the chance of any revival of the Anglo-Dutch Austrian alliances of 1689–97 and 1702–13 and thus to give France diplomatic hegemony. In October 1741, Sir Charles Wager, the First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote angrily of the German princes, “what destruction is coming upon them; if they tamely submit to be pissed upon by an insolent nation; to whom they are superior in all things, could they but join together”.9 With French backing, Charles Albert of Bavaria was crowned at Frankfurt as the Emperor Charles VII on 12 February 1742. However, the possibility of achieving decisive victory had been exaggerated, while Austr ian military resilience had been underrated. The Austr ians recaptured Linz in late January 1742, seized Munich on 12 February and in July began to besiege Prague, which the French abandoned on 16 December. Arthur Villettes, British envoy in Turin, had complained on Christmas Day 1741 that “the general system of politics at present reaches no farther with most princes, than to come in for a share of the spoil”,10 but, by the following year, it was no longer clear who would be able to allocate gains. As alliances dissolved, the war became less focused. From 1742 the war was 13

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more clearly a number of confrontations and conflicts, with different causes, chronologies and consequences, interacting to a considerable extent but far less than was hoped by those who sought to benefit from such interaction. Louis XV was abandoned by some of his allies, Frederick II in June 1742, Augustus III in July 1742, Sweden in August 1743, and the new Elector of Bavaria, Maximilian Joseph, in April 1745, although Frederick attacked Austria again in the Second Silesian War (August 1744–December 1745). Spain fought on alongside France, but other powers came to the assistance of Maria Theresa. British troops landed in the Austrian Netherlands on 20 May 1742, and both marched into the Empire and began fighting with the French in 1743, although war was not declared until the following year. In order to fight France, the British government effectively abandoned the pursuit of the conflict with Spain over Caribbean trade, the War of Jenkins’ Ear, that they had begun in 1739. Under the pressure of rapidly altering diplomatic and military situations, rulers and ministers changed their policies or emphasized different aspects and approaches. This was not simply a necessity for the weaker powers, forced to respond to developments that it was difficult to control. Indeed, Frederick II complained in October 1745 that so many unexpected events occurred that he could not judge anything with certainty. Andrew Mitchell, British envoy in Berlin, wrote to a fellow diplomat in 1763 “I think in great affairs and between great princes, whilst anything remains unsettled, nothing can be said to be done”.11 A lack of consistency was also apparent at the level of the strongest powers. Despite the tendency among foreign commentators to misunderstand Russian policy as largely a matter of responses to financial inducements and to act accordingly, it was far from constant. It is easy to appreciate why a scholar of Russian policy wrote, more generally, of Europe in this period that the conduct of diplomacy between battles is a phantasmagoric frenzy of confusion. It poses the ser ious problem of separating traditional objectives from expedient bargains, and cleaving doctrine concepts from empirical moves…entering the pirouette spirit prevailing in most cabinet councils, one finds it exceedingly inappropriate to render those dogmatic statements on such terms as inevitable partnerships, long-time historical trends and immutable drives.12 Nevertheless, although there is much that is still unclear, and modern research had cast new light, for example, on Austro-French negotiations during the war,13 it would be inappropriate to see only confusion. Instead, an inability to achieve and secure objectives was the dominant theme, an understandable consequence of the multipolar nature of international relations and the difficulty of achieving decisive victory. A window of opportunity for a major shift had been lost in late 1741. British mediation helped to produce the secret Austro-Prussian Convention of Kleinschnellendorf, by which the ground was 14

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laid for a separate peace. Though Frederick’s path thence to the AustroPrussian Peace of Breslau of 11 June 1742, by which he gained most of Silesia, was far from straight, his betrayal of France fatally weakened her cause. The Bavarian envoy in Paris complained that Frederick, in violating everything that had been established to ensure the fulfilment of their promises, had disgraced mankind.14 The successful Russian invasion of Swedish-ruled Finland in 1742 and the determination of the new British ministry led by Lord Carteret to support Austria were also important. However, it was not only French plans that were thwarted. The prospect that Austria would follow up her successes in 1742–3 by dominating the Empire and seeking to regain Silesia was ended when Frederick defeated her again in the Second Silesian War (1744–5) and forced Maria Theresa once more to recognize the loss of Silesia in the Treaty of Dresden (25 December 1745). Similarly, British hopes that they would be able to follow up the landing of troops in the Austrian Netherlands in 1742 and the victory of Dettingen over the French the following year by decisively pushing back France’s eastern frontier, possibly forcing her to accept the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, thus reversing the gains of nearly a century, proved illusory. French schemes for a retaliatory invasion of Britain in support of the Jacobite (Stuart) claimant to the throne, both in early 1744 and in the winter of 1745–6, were thwarted by poor weather and the British navy respectively, while the Jacobite rising of 1745 was defeated the following year at Culloden. With Francis of Lorraine’s election as Emperor in 1745, the Austro-Bavarian Treaty of Füssen and the Treaty of Dresden, hostilities largely ceased in Germany. The war in Italy was far from static, although the ambitious plans of both sides, including the Austrian attempt to drive Carlos from Naples and the Spanish plan to conquer Milan, Parma and Piacenza for Don Philip with the assistance of France, proved abortive. British pressure on Mar ia Theresa obtained the promise of Piacenza and part of the Milanese for Charles Emmanuel III in the Treaty of Worms of September 1743, and, although the king signed a secret armistice with the Bourbons in February 1746, he swiftly repudiated it, and the Austro-Sardinian victory at Piacenza on 16 June 1746 crushed Bourbon hopes in northern Italy. The attempt to exploit the victory by invading Provence at the end of the year was a failure, and the Austrians were expelled from captured Genoa by a popular revolt in December 1746. North of the Alps, the centre of attention had shifted from Germany to the Austrian Netherlands, which had been neutral in 1741–3, as earlier when France attacked Austria in the War of the Polish Succession in 1733–5. Hostilities began there in 1744, but the Anglo-Dutch-German forces were hindered by quarrels over strategy and financing and by serious failures to maintain the stipulated size of their contingent, or to produce it on time on the part of the Austr ians. These problems helped to ensure that, after an unsuccessful offensive in 1744, the allies were generally on the defensive. The French, under the most distinguished member of Augustus II’s large 15

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illegitimate progeny, Marshal Saxe, scored a number of successes and were more successful than Louis XIV had been. After winning the battle of Fontenoy on 11 May 1745, Saxe obtained the capitulations of Ghent (15 July), Bruges (19 July) and Ostend (23 August). In 1746 most of the Austrian Netherlands fell to France, Brussels on 21 February, Mons on 10 July, Charleroi on 2 August, and Namur on 1 October. Saxe defeated the Duke of Cumberland, second son of George II, at Roucox in 1746 and at Laffeldt in 1747, a year which also saw the overrunning of Dutch Flanders and the fall of the great Dutch fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom, while Maastricht fell in 1748. These failures exposed the folly of assuming that it would be possible to revive the successes of John, 1st Duke of Marlborough at the head of an AngloDutch-Austrian alliance in the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13). Defeat helped to lead to an Orangist coup in the United Provinces in 1747, William IV reviving the authority once enjoyed by William III after 45 years of republican control. This was encouraged, abetted and applauded by the British, Newcastle, then Secretary of State for the Southern Department, being sure that it “must give more weight to the king, and more stability to the affairs of Europe than any event that has happened this century”, except the Hanoverian succession. William was George IV’s son-in-law and the British had supported his coup. Their hopes were to be cruelly disabused. There was no Dutch revival,15 and by 1748 the prospect of the French conquest of more of the United Provinces helped to lead the Dutch and the British to push through peace with France, despite the unwillingness of their Austrian ally. The preliminaries of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle were signed on 30 April, the definitive treaty on 18 October 1748. Given the extent of French conquests—far greater in the Low Countries than at the end of any previous war—the ter ms they accepted were sur pr isingly favourable for their opponents. The French were concerned at the movement of a Britishsubsidized Russian army towards the Rhine, and they needed peace. The French economy had been hit by a poor harvest, her finances by the costly war and her foreign trade by British naval victories in 1747. The peace stipulated the return of all conquests, which included, besides French gains in the Low Countries, Madras in India, captured by the French from the British East India Company, and Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island, seized by the British from France in 1745. In comparison to the peace settlements that had ended the wars of the Spanish and Polish successions, and the bolder plans of the combatants in the early stages of the conflict, relatively little land changed hands. Despite Austrian reluctance, Charles Emmanuel III received the lands he had been ceded at Worms, bar Piacenza, which Don Philip gained with Parma. Louis XV had to agree to recognize the Protestant succession in Britain and to expel Charles Edward Stuart (Bonnie Prince Charlie), the elder son of the Jacobite claimant James “III”. Disputes over the frontier between the French colony of Québec and the British North American colonies were referred to commissioners.16 16

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The diplomatic alignments of the postwar world had already been established. The Austro-Russian alliance of 1746, and its Swedo-Prussian and Swedo-French counterparts of the following year, cemented two conflicting blocs that confronted each other until 1756. As a result, British hopes in 1748 of recruiting Frederick II to the Anglo-Austro-Russian alignment were misplaced. The Russian Chancellor Alexis Bestuzhev-Riumin planned war to overthrow the hostile Swedish government in 1749. However, Danish, Austrian and British unwillingness to support Russian action, which in light of French and Prussian backing for Sweden would have caused a major war, led the Russians to desist from the scheme. The “Hats”, the anti-Russian party that controlled the Swedish government, in turn abandoned changes that might strengthen royal authority, a course Russia feared, and tension between the two powers, and between Sweden and Denmark, slackened considerably in 1749–51. The situation in Sweden demonstrated the interrelationship of foreign policy and domestic political developments in a state like Britain with a powerful constitutional assembly and a developed public politics.17 International hostility also diminished in Italy, although without the serious crisis that had characterized Baltic affairs in 1749, and in line with the 1748 peace settlement. A treaty of defensive alliance, based on the settlement and guaranteeing each other’s Italian possessions, was signed at Aranjuez on 14 June 1752 by representatives of Maria Theresa, Francis I, Charles Emmanuel III and Ferdinand VI, Philip V’s successor as King of Spain. This settlement ended the Italian question and ensured that Italy was mostly peaceful until 1792. The long period of peace reflected the acceptable division between Spanish and Austrian spheres of influence established in 1748 and the crucial shift in Spanish policy following the succession of the pacific Ferdinand VI (1746–59). He had little sympathy for his half-brothers, Don Carlos and Don Philip, and was less quixotic than his father, Philip V.Ferdinand was in turn succeeded by Carlos, as Charles III (1759–88). He was more interested in colonial than Italian questions, an interest that was to lead him to war with Britain in 1762 and 1779. The element of compromise present in the Baltic and Italian settlements was lacking in that devised for Germany and the Low Countries by Newcastle, who, after he succeeded Carteret as the most influential Secretary of State in 1744, was in effect Britain’s foreign minister. Rather than negotiating with France or her ally Prussia, whose alliance with France was not as solid as was feared,18 Newcastle sought to strengthen what he called the “Old System”, the alliance of Britain, Austria and the United Provinces. Newcastle believed that what he saw as the French challenge could be contained only by such a system.19 He did so in a consciously anti-French and anti-Prussian fashion. Under the Barrier Treaty of 1715, Dutch garrisons had been accepted in a number of fortresses in the Austrian Netherlands in order to defend the Low Countries from France. The Barrier had failed the challenge in 1744–6, the 17

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Earl of Sandwich, one of the British Plenipotentiaries at Aix-la-Chapelle, writing to Newcastle in October 1747 that “the great point of France during the whole war, has been the destruction of the Barrier…we shall then be entirely open to their attack, whereas they will have a chain of fortresses that will render their frontiers impenetrable”.20 The resultant French advance only made Newcastle more determined to rebuild and strengthen the system and to obtain Austrian assistance to that end. Newcastle also actively sponsored the Imperial Election Scheme, a plan for the election as King of the Romans, and therefore next Emperor, of Maria Theresa’s eldest son Joseph, the future Joseph II.21 This was not a new plan. George II had advocated the idea in January 1745, after the death of Charles VII,22 but it was not taken up until after the war. Then the support of most of the Electors was obtained as a result of major British diplomatic efforts and, in part, through the payment of British subsidies. However, a lack of Austrian enthusiasm ensured that propitious circumstances in 1749 were not exploited and, thereafter, French, Palatine and, in particular, Prussian opposition, the difficulty of keeping the willing Electors in line and a lack of determination on the part of the Austrians, who objected to the idea of obtaining Electoral votes by concessions, led to the failure of the scheme. A much disappointed Newcastle, who had put a great deal of effort into the scheme, blamed the Austrians for its failure.23 Newcastle really needed Frederick’s support, but Austro-Prussian animosity rendered that unlikely, and the collective security system the British supported helped to exacerbate Frederick’s hostility towards Britain and make him hope unrealistically that a counter-league could be created. Frederick was reduced in 1752 to asking for French pressure on the Turks to declare war on Austr ia and Russia. While the French government was distracted by domestic, constitutional and religious disputes, especially controversies over Jansenism, Frederick felt that he was having to respond to apparent threats, such as the Imperial Election Scheme or in 1752–3 the prospect that Maria Theresa’s brother-in-law, Charles of Lorraine, would become next king of Poland and make it a hereditary kingdom to the great benefit of Austria.24 Although the Anglo-Austro-Russian alignment had serious weaknesses, its apparent strength intimidated Frederick and therefore offered Hanover some security against Prussian attack, which was indeed feared in 1753. The Imperial Election Scheme had not achieved its purpose, the nullification of the consequences of the Franco-Prussian alliance, in part because the Austrians felt it unnecessary. Br itish support for the “Old System” can be seen as anachronistic, a repetition of ideas made outdated by the rising importance of Austro-Prussian competition and the decline in French interest in continental terr itorial expansion. If the Austrian government, especially under the influence of Count Kaunitz, envoy in Paris 1750–3 and chancellor from 1753, is seen as actively seeking French backing for the reconquest of Silesia, a 18

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dynastic, religious, economic and geopolitical duty for the Austrians, then British hopes of keeping the Anglo-Austrian alliance alive appear futile.25 However, Kaunitz sought British support for action against Frederick, and, far from getting steadily worse, Anglo-Austrian relations were actually better in 1754 than in 1748.26 In addition, although the British found Russian financial conditions for any alliance exorbitant, both powers remained interested in strengthening their links. Tsarina Elizabeth (1741–62) was bitterly opposed to Frederick, who had thwarted her on a number of occasions, and her enmity coincided with Maria Theresa’s desire to regain Silesia and George II’s wish to protect Hanover. Thus, British talk of shared interests and the “Old System” was not redundant, although they placed excessive weight on the benefits to be gained from the support of the United Provinces. In fact it was divided politically, especially after the death of William IV in 1751, and increasingly weak in military strength and government finances. Nevertheless, in any likely future conflict with France and Prussia, the Dutch would be of strategic importance, their army and navy were not inconsiderable, and the country, if not the federal government, was still wealthy. Frederick II appeared the likeliest cause of conflict in 1753–4, and the shared animosity of George II, Maria Theresa and Elizabeth towards him offered a strong and stable response.27 The breakdown of these shared views helped to precipitate the “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756. The crucial new developments that constituted this revolution were alliances between Britain and Prussia, and France and Austria, both negotiated in 1756: the Convention of Westminster of 16 January and the First Treaty of Versailles of 1 May. These treaties can be traced to skirmishes over the Anglo-French frontier in the Ohio valley in 1754. There is no reason to believe that the “revolution” would have occurred in the form it did but for the chain of events that began with the flaring up of what had hitherto been an inconclusive dispute over a distant frontier. Had Maria Theresa and Elizabeth attacked Frederick anyway, as they had intended to do, George II would probably not have joined them (unless Frederick staged a pre-emptive stroke as he was to do in 1756), but he would certainly not have allied with Prussia. Similarly, Louis XV would probably have felt obliged to support his ally Frederick. Kaunitz did not want to break with George II, and in 1755 he was still devoting considerable attention to the alliance with him, because he feared that attempts to improve relations with Louis XV, at whose court anti-Austrian attitudes were well-established, would fail. The Commissioners instructed to settle Anglo-French disputes over North American frontiers had failed. Tension increased as the British encouraged the Miami and Huron Native Americans to trade with them and the French responded vigorously, while the British feared that French plans to link their colonies of Canada and Louisiana by a series of forts would create a barrier against British expansion. Concern increased in 1753 when the French began to establish new posts in the upper Ohio valley, and Robert Dinwiddie, the 19

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Governor of Virginia, was ordered to use force to defend British claims.28 In July 1754, a force of Virginia militia under George Washington sent to resist French moves was defeated, and the British ministry responded by sending troops to North America. Newcastle wanted only limited action, but pressure from bellicose colleagues led to an expansion of plans into a major attack on French America. 29 This reflected a political atmosphere in which North America seemed of growing direct interest to Britain, her economy, her maritime and global strength and the balance of her power with France. The French government did not want war but felt obliged to respond to British preparations by, in turn, preparing an expedition to reinforce French North America. Negotiations in early 1755 were hampered by mutual distrust and it proved impossible to devise a satisfactory solution to the Ohio dispute. British ministers stressed the strength of bellicose domestic pressure.30 Rouillé, the French foreign minister, argued correctly that the chance of successful negotiations was really ended by the British refusal to suspend military steps.31 On 21 April 1755 Admiral Boscawen sailed for American waters, ordered to prevent French reinforcements from reaching Canada. On 3 May the French fleet sailed from Brest and on 10 June they were attacked by Boscawen, although he failed to inflict serious losses, a failure that left the French stronger in Canada and was thus to be important in the subsequent course of the struggle in North America. 32 This led to a breach in diplomatic relations, Mirepoix being recalled from London and Bussy from Hanover on 18 July. War was not declared by Britain until 17 May 1756 and by France until 9 June 1756, and contacts continued until then in a vain attempt to maintain the peace that has received insufficient attention. Other rulers, such as Frederick II and Maria Theresa, were inclined to doubt the possibility of war.33 However, both gover nments tur ned their attention to diplomatic and militar y preparations for conflict. In 1755–6 the possibility of a French attack on Hanover, the Low Countries or mainland Britain, and of supporting Prussian action against Hanover, obliged the British ministry to seek firm commitments of support from their allies. Fear of French attack and a lack of sympathy for the British position in America made the Dutch unwilling to offer help,34 while Kaunitz had no intention of being dragged into war for the sake of Britain. Refusing to reinforce the Austrian Netherlands, and thus cover the United Provinces from French attack, he made only vague offers to protect Hanoverian neutrality.35 The British government had more success with Elizabeth of Russia, who was not exposed to French attack and for whom much-needed British subsidies would be useful in preparing for war with Frederick. Negotiations, begun in 1753 under the pressure of fears of a Prussian attack on Hanover, had flagged due to disputes over the size of the subsidy and over the causes that would oblige Russia to deploy troops outside her frontiers. They were revived by the new envoy, Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams, who reached St Petersburg in June 1755. 36 Br ibes, the promise of larger subsidies and Elizabeth’s 20

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willingness to grasp the opportunity led to the conclusion of an agreement on 30 September 1755. This renewed the treaty of defensive alliance of December 1742 and provided for a British subsidy of £100,000 per annum in return for Russia maintaining an army of 55,000 men in Livonia, from which East Prussia could be threatened.37 The British ministry hoped that the agreement would have a favourable impact on Austrian policy.38 The agreed terms reflected the standard goal of British negotiations with Russia since 1741–acquiring the support of the Russian ar my in any confrontation with Frederick II and, more generally, the major role of Russia in European affairs in the eyes of outsiders, namely as opponent to France’s allies, usually Sweden, Poland and Turkey, but also and indeed principally Frederick since 1741. As Elizabeth and her Chancellor, Bestuzhev-Riumin, wanted to seize East Prussia in order to exchange it with Augustus III of Saxony-Poland for Courland, the agreement was welcome to her. However, George II and his ministers saw Russia as a means to a different end—the security of Hanover—and, unexpectedly, in late 1755 a chance of supplementing this by gaining the support of Freder ick was offered. Concerned about improving Anglo-Russian relations, Frederick approached George II through the Duke of Brunswick39 in June 1755.40 Still bound to France and unwilling to provide a unilateral guarantee for Hanover, Frederick was cautious, until he received in December a copy of the Anglo-Russian agreement and British proposals for better relations with Prussia. The British sought a Prussian guarantee for Hanover.41 Alliance with George II would apparently free Frederick from the Russian threat, whereas he would be exposed to a British-subsidized Russian attack if he provided Louis XV with assistance. As a result, Frederick responded favourably to the British approach and, by the Convention of Westminster of 16 January 1756, Britain and Prussia guaranteed their respective possessions and agreed to maintain peace in the Empire by jointly opposing the entry of foreign forces. Neither Frederick nor the British saw the Convention as the cause of any fundamental change in international relations or as incompatible with their existing alliances. For the British, it simply strengthened the existing collective security system, achieving what had been hoped for in 1740 and 1748. For Frederick, it made Russian attack less likely. However, the new agreement led to major changes, although not a complete change round or “revolution” in international relations, for Austria and Russia remained close allies until Elizabeth’s death in 1762. The Convention helped drive Louis XV towards Austria. Despite Kaunitz’s efforts, relations between the two had hitherto not improved significantly. On 10 August 1755 Count Starhemberg, the Austrian envoy in Paris, reported that he was certain France would attack Austria. Three days later his opposite number, Aubeterre, responded sceptically to Kaunitz’s assurances of good wishes, suggested that Austria would act if France attacked Hanover and added that Maria Theresa would never abandon George II. Rouillé was sceptical about Austrian promises that they would not take part in 21

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any Anglo-French conflict. 42 Kaunitz also approached Louis through his influential mistress, Madame de Pompadour. Louis found Frederick an irritating and presumptuous ally and was tempted by the idea of dividing Britain from her traditional ally, but it was not clear that Austria would be a reliable ally for France, and strengthening her by accepting a reconquest of Silesia contradicted traditional French assumptions. The situation was changed by the Convention of Westminster. The Prussian envoy in Paris had warned Frederick in November 1755 that the French gover nment was ver y wor r ied by reports of Anglo-Prussian negotiations, but Frederick does not appear to have appreciated the likely reaction in Paris: on 20 January 1756 he told the French envoy Nivernais, who had been sent to renew the Franco-Russian treaty, that he was keen to do so.43 However, French anger led Louis’s council to decide on 4 February not to renew the alliance with Prussia. The Convention also angered the Austrians, who still sought to regain Silesia. On 6 March Maria Theresa ordered her envoy in Russia to hinder the implementation of the AngloRussian treaty, while Starhemberg was informed that she was prepared to accept a French attack on Hanover. On 1 May France and Austria were linked in a defensive alliance, the First Treaty of Versailles. It specifically excluded the Anglo-French war, which had passed its initial limited and somewhat phoney stage on 18 April 1756, when French troops landed on the British-ruled Mediterranean island of Minorca. Maria Theresa was therefore not obliged to take part in the war on the side of France, but her promise of her neutrality destroyed the “Old System”.44 When Robert Keith, the British envoy, reproached her with this, Maria Theresa retorted that the British had done so by the Convention of Westminster, that the account of that treaty had struck her like a fit of an apoplexy …she would own freely to me, that she, and the king of Prussia, were incompatible together, and that no consideration upon earth, should ever make her enter into an alliance where he was a party. Keith replied that this attitude laid Freder ick “under a necessity of endeavouring to secure himself, by the ruin of the House of Austria”.45 The new Austro-French alliance helped Russian plans for war with Prussia, as it appeared increasingly likely that such a conflict would benefit from Austro-French support, not least crucial financial aid. On 26 March 1756 the newly established “Conference at the Imperial [Russian] Court” produced an extensive plan for war.46 At the same time, the Russian government made it clear to Hanbury-Williams that they regarded the Anglo-Russian agreement of the previous September as relating only to action against Prussia and would therefore not provide assistance against any other power, an interpretation that he rejected without effect. Elizabeth lent her support to her ViceChancellor, Count Voronzov, who favoured a French alignment and sought to overthrow 22

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Bestuzhev-Riumin and his anglophile policies. 47 Frederick stressed the importance of retaining the Russian alliance to the newly-arrived British envoy in Berlin, Andrew Mitchell—“while Russia was secured the peace of Germany was safe”48—but it became increasingly clear that British influence in St Petersburg had collapsed.49 Convinced, with reason, that Elizabeth and Maria Theresa were planning to attack him, Frederick decided on a pre-emptive stroke, despite British advice that he remain on the defensive. 50 Rather than attacking Maria Theresa, George II wanted Frederick to assemble a corps in his Rhenish territories, Cleves and Mark, in order to block a possible French advance towards Hanover.51 However, as so often, the British found that their allies had a different agenda. Frederick was already withdrawing troops from the Rhineland,52 and on 28 August 1756 he invaded Saxony in order to deny a base to his opponents: Saxony was a sphere for manoeuvre between Prussia and Austrian-ruled Bohemia. This was a dangerous move. Louis XV felt obliged to help Augustus III, his heir’s father-in-law, and Freder ick’s move helped to precipitate both rapprochement between France and Russia, between whom relations had been cool since 1725, and a deepening of the Austro-French alliance. Elizabeth acceded to the First Treaty of Versailles on 30 December 1756, and concluded an offensive alliance with Austria the following month. On 1 May 1757, by the Second Treaty of Versailles, Louis XV promised Maria Theresa an army of 105,000 and a substantial subsidy to help effect a partition of Prussia.53 In so far as the British ministers had anticipated war with France in 1755, they had hoped that their continental allies would deter France from compensating for her colonial and maritime weaknesses by attacking Hanover and the Low Countries. In what was certainly a case of looking at the last war, George II and his ministers wished to avoid a repetition of French successes in 1741 and 1745–8. However, thanks to Austrian and Dutch reluctance and to the British failure to consider the problems of reconciling Elizabeth and Frederick, they had failed. In consequence, the continental and Anglo-Bourbon conflicts in 1756–63 were more closely aligned than was necessary. Furthermore, this interaction worked to the disadvantage of Britain. The notion that Br itain conquered America in Germany has been repeated frequently, and employed, in addition, to explain why an isolated Britain was unsuccessful in the War of American Independence. However, this analysis ignores both the extent to which the notion was advanced by contemporaries for partisan reasons and the dangers that faced British policy as a result of the continental commitment. William Pitt the Elder, 1st Earl of Chatham, who was identified, both then and subsequently, with the policy of conquering America in Ger many, was in fact very hesitant about military and diplomatic intervention on the Continent. Justifying his views in 1756–7, Pitt told the House of Commons in December 1761 that he had then opposed the AngloRussian agreement “upon this principle: that the forwardness of this House to 23

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engage itself to defend the electoral dominions [Hanover] would bring on the invasion of them as a certain consequence”. He added, The German war proved a millstone, I say, as it was then managed, for when I opposed the sending of British troops into Germany, your business was so far from being done then as it has been since in America and in the East Indies, that you had not even sufficiently provided for the preservation of your own coasts or colonies anywhere.54 The loss of Hanover at any stage in the Seven Years’ War would have exposed the British government to the politically hazardous task of regaining it at the subsequent peace by making and then returning colonial gains; rather as Cape Breton had been returned in 1748. In addition, by being allied with Frederick, in place of Elizabeth and Maria Theresa, George II had acquired both an unpredictable and a vulnerable ally. In 1743–8 George fought Louis XV as part of the stronger European bloc; in 1756–63 as part of a distinctly weaker one, and this contrast must be heeded in any discussion about the advisability of conquering America in Germany. George and his ministers were swiftly made aware of their difficult situation. In 1756 Minorca was lost. British naval power was humiliated when, in the face of a French fleet, Admiral Byng failed to relieve the defenders on 20 May. Outnumbered, they surrendered on 29 June. The political consequences were serious, helping to precipitate the fall of the Fox—Newcastle ministry. In 1757 the victor of Minorca, the Duke of Richelieu, invaded Hanover. The vulnerability of the Electorate had led to consideration of neutrality, but the French would only accept that if they were granted a right of transit for their troops, terms that were judged unacceptable. 55 An outnumbered Army of Observation of Germans, mostly Hanoverians, Hessians and Brunswickers, under Cumberland, was defeated at Hastenbeck on 26 July 1757 and retreated. On 8 September Cumberland agreed to the dissolution of his army by the Convention of Klosterseven.56 Hanover had fallen. As British forces had failed to seize Louisbourg as planned, there appeared no possibility of exchanging colonial gains for Hanover. There was both despair and anger in London. The Earl of Hardwicke, former Lord Chancellor and long friend and adviser to Newcastle, wrote to him that “to propose a peace to a victorious enemy under such a losing game is a most disagreeable disadvantageous thing, but a mitigated ruin is better than a total one”.57 The Convention was to be disavowed, the bulk of the Electorate recaptured. Nevertheless, the events of the autumn of 1757 are a reminder both of the rapid changes of fortune that characterized a conflict that is too often discussed without sufficient stress on this volatility, and also of the difficulties facing British policy. The relationship between continental and colonial commitments posed major problems for the British government. The political storm over Klosterseven led to a greater British military, diplomatic, financial and political 24

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commitment to Germany. Under a subsidy treaty signed on 11 April 1758, Frederick and George agreed not to carry on separate negotiations, the British agreed to pay a subsidy of £670,000 and George II, as King and Elector, promised to maintain an army of 55,000 in Hanover to cover Frederick’s flank. Under this treaty, renewed in 1759 and 1760, Britain provided valuable financial and military assistance to the outnumbered and financially exhausted Frederick,58 absorbing the bulk of the French military effort. Victories such as Minden (1 August 1759) and Wilhelmstah (24 June 1762) denied the French control of Hanover. Attacks on the French coast, designed to divert forces from the war with Frederick and actively pressed by Pitt, were less successful, though Cherbourg was temporar ily seized in 1758 and its fortifications destroyed, while the island of Belle Île off the Breton coast, captured in 1761, was held until the peace. A planned French invasion of Britain in 1759 was thwarted by the British naval victories of Lagos (Portugal) on 19 August and Quiberon Bay on 25 November 1759. Trans-oceanic naval and army superiority, and growing success in the handling of amphibious forces, led to the capture of all the major centres of the French empire bar New Orleans: Louisbourg and the West African slaving base of Goree (1758), Québec and Guadeloupe, an important West Indian island, (1759), Montréal (1760), Pondicherry, the major French base in India (1761) and Martinique, another important island in the Caribbean (1762). British success against France owed much to the neutrality of Spain, which had “been nursed like a tender child” in the early 1750s.59 However, Charles III, who succeeded to the throne of Spain in 1759, was no anglophile, and he was concerned about a fundamental shift of maritime and colonial power towards Britain. His attempt to mediate in the conflict was unsuccessful, while Anglo-Spanish relations were embittered by a number of disputes, including that over the British presence on the Mosquito coast of Nicaragua, whence logwood was exported, an aspect of the long-standing Spanish concern over Br itish breaches of the Spanish commercial and territorial position in the New World.60 Charles’s attitude helped to encourage French firmness in the face of stiff British territorial demands during abortive Anglo-French peace negotiations in the summer of 1761. Similarly, the French devoted major efforts to securing Charles’s alliance, the Duke of Choiseul, foreign minister 1758–61, writing that he had applied most effort to this end.61 On 15 August 1761 the Third Family Compact and a secret convention were finally concluded, obliging Louis to support Charles in his commercial and colonial disputes with Britain, and Charles to declare war on Britain by 1 May 1762 if peace had not been concluded.62 Attacks on Gibraltar, Ireland and Jamaica were discussed, as was pressure on Portugal, a leading commercial partner of Britain, to abandon her alliance. The determination to hit British trade is especially interesting. This was seen as a way to harm British public credit, and the Bourbons accordingly tried to put pressure on Portugal, Naples and Tuscany.63 25

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Pitt, the volatile and egocentr ic Secretary of State for the Southern Department, responded to the new alliance by proposing a pre-emptive attack on Spain, resigning on 5 October 1761 when his plan was rejected. However, the failure of negotiations led to a British declaration of war on 2 January 1762. The Spaniards proved far worse prepared than they had assured the French and lost Havana and Manila to British amphibious attacks in 1762. Charles III hoped that gains in Portugal would compensate him for losses elsewhere, regaining colonial losses in Portugal, but his army was not in a position to repeat Frederick II’s success in Silesia. The invading forces had some success in April and May, but a British expeditionary force helped to stiffen the Portuguese defence and thwart Charles.64 Anglo-French discussions through Sardinian intermediaries reflected the financial exhaustion of both powers, their desire for an end to the war and their unhappiness with their allies. The last was especially acute between Frederick and both George III, who had succeeded to the throne on 25 October 1760, and his leading minister, the third Earl of Bute, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, March 1761–2, and First Lord of the Treasury, May 1762–Apr il 1763. Preliminar ies of peace, signed at Fontainebleau on 3 November 1762, led to the Peace of Paris (10 February 1763). The terms were better than any that Britain had hitherto received from the Bourbons, reflecting her greater success in this war and the absence of any need to make concessions for her allies. France agreed to restore lands captured from Britain’s German allies: Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick, but not from Prussia; to return Minorca and to recognize the British gains of Canada, Senegal in West Africa and the West Indian islands of Grenada, Tobago, Dominica and St Vincent. Britain returned several important conquests— Guadeloupe, Martinique, St Lucia, Goree, Belle Ile and Pondicherry—to France and left the French a part of the valuable Newfoundland fishery, which was believed to be a vital way of training sailors for royal navies. Havana and Manila were restored to Spain, but she yielded East and West Florida to Britain, receiving Louisiana from France in compensation. 65 Though not free of controversy, the terms fortified the impression created by the war: that the colonial and maritime balance of power had been destroyed and that Britannia ruled the waves. Frederick had not been so fortunate, although, given the odds against him, he had done remarkably well. Whereas Britain was able to cope with her enemies separately, defeating France before fighting Spain, Frederick faced simultaneously the enmity of Russia, Austria, France and, from 1757, Sweden. He received Br itish financial and military support, but although of considerable assistance against France, British, Hanoverian and Hessian forces played no role against Frederick’s foremost military rivals, Austria and Russia, and the British refused to send to the Baltic the fleet that he demanded

26

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repeatedly. Indeed, although British relations with Austria, Russia and Sweden were very poor, war was not declared.66 Frederick’s survival was the product of good fortune, determination and military success, not only a number of stunning victories, such as Rossbach, Leuthen, Zorndorf and Torgau, but also the advantage of fighting on interior lines against a strategically and politically divided alliance. Russian interests entered on East Prussia and Poland, the Austrians were most concerned by Silesia, and, after Rossbach and the repudiation of Klosterseven in late 1757, the French devoted their efforts to the Westphalian conflict with the Britishfinanced and partly manned Army of Observation. Frederick’s task was far harder than in the First and Second Silesian Wars. He told Mitchell on 28 June 1759 that “what chiefly distresses him is, the number of his enemies”.67 Russian enmity was crucial, but so also was that of Maria Theresa, because he was very much the major target of Austrian action, as he had not been for most of the 1740s. Thus the opportunistic diplomacy which Frederick had then used so skilfully was of little value during the Seven Years’ War. Although Frederick survived the war, he faced serious setbacks during the conflict. In 1756 he benefited from surprise and his opponents’ lack of preparations. The Saxon army was forced to capitulate on 16 October 1756. The summer and autumn of 1757 was a period of particular difficulty, with a Russian invasion of East Prussia, a Swedish invasion of Pomerania, the French conquest of Hanover, the raising of the siege of Prague and the end of the Prussian invasion of Bohemia after the Austrian victory at Kolin (18 June), and the Austrian capture of Berlin and most of Silesia. There was despair at the Prussian court, Frederick’s eldest brother, August William, who was to be disgraced for failure, writing to the former French envoy of the need for peace and criticizing his brother.68 Frederick himself was driven to negotiations with the French, seeking to bribe Madame de Pompadour, while he also pressed the British to stage a diversionary attack on the French coast.69 Concern was felt throughout Britain, Richard Tucker writing to his MP brother from Weymouth about how “greatly mortified” people were.70 Frederick urged the British to negotiate with the French, adding “everything must be done to dissolve this triumvirate of France, Austria, and Russia: while that lasts, there is no safety”,71 a clear warning that the continental war could not be left to take care of itself while the British pursued the maritime struggle with France. Frederick’s victories at Rossbach (5 November) and Leuthen (5 December 1757) stabilized the situation and encouraged the British to commit troops to Germany, rather as the American victory at Saratoga and their creditable effort at Germantown in 1777 were to encourage French intervention. Though the Russians conquered East Prussia in 1758, their invasion of Brandenburg was blocked by Frederick at Zorndorf. Thereafter, Frederick was hard—pressed throughout and desperate on many occasions, but an absence of co-ordination by his opponents and Frederick’s determination to fight on prevented the overthrow of Prussian power. 27

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Although Frederick survived, the Anglo-Prussian alliance did not. Tensions in what had anyway been a weak link based largely on expedience could not be contained when the growing desire for peace led both powers to concentrate on their own interests and to consider alternative alliances.72 Britain thus ended the war with the Bourbons defeated at sea and in the colonies, and with the French system in disarray on the Continent. However, greater national confidence in Britain could not disguise Britain’s isolated position and the dangers of a Bourbon revanche warned of by critics of the Peace of Paris were to excite governmental attention.73 In the 1760s, however, this concern focused far more on the maritime and colonial dimension and far less on Europe than had been the case in the late 1730s.

28

Chapter Three Britain and the War of the Austrian Succession

Having provided an overview, it is necessary to turn back from the relatively well-studied 1750s and 1760s, because British foreign policy in the 1740s is a subject that has received relatively little attention.1 Since Sir Richard Lodge’s Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy, 1740–1748 appeared in 1930 there has been little of importance devoted to this subject. His book, although firmly based on thorough research, was flawed on several counts. In a text of 411 pages it was extraordinary that Lodge reached 1743 by page 4. His perfunctory treatment of the events of 1740–42 and his neglect of trends in British foreign policy in the late 1730s led to an unbalanced account that suffered from its failure to assess elements of continuity and change. Those accustomed to Lodge’s other works could not have been surprised by his failure to consult diplomatic archives in other countries.2 This was an extremely unfortunate omission, as it is impossible to provide either an adequate narrative or an intelligent assessment of the foreign policy of a state if the archives of its allies and opponents are neglected. Furthermore, it was by no means, uncommon in the interwar years for scholars to consult archives in more than one country. Paul Vaucher had done so to brilliant effect in his Robert Walpole et la politique de Fleury (Paris, 1924) and Arthur Wilson was to do so in his French Foreign Policy during the Administration of Cardinal Fleury (1936). Given the role of Hanover in British foreign policy, it was unfortunate that Lodge did not choose to work there, doubly so as the bombing and floods of the 1940s destroyed most of the material that would have been so useful.3 Lodge’s account of foreign policy centred on British diplomacy. Foreign policy was the prerogative of a small group, and domestic pressures on the formulation and conduct of foreign policy were substantially discounted. Lodge did not consider the extent and nature of parliamentary and mercantile influence, nor did he study the impact of public opinion. This largely reflected the prejudice that so many diplomatic historians of the period had in favour of their accustomed sources and their lack of interest in the workings of the 29

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Br itish political system. More recently, Graham Gibbs has shown how eighteenth-century foreign policy can be better understood when diplomacy is placed in the context of the politics of the period, and in particular the role of Parliament and of the press. There is a clear need for his lead to be followed in order to examine the way in which foreign policy was influenced by the views and interests of the political nation. This is especially important in the case of the War of the Austr ian Succession, when domestic British politics were in turmoil and ministries unstable. Foreign policy was a major element of political debate within the ministries, in Parliament and in print. The conduct of foreign policy was not protected from the impact of political strife. Secretaries of State and many diplomats, such as Robert Trevor, were political figures subject to removal for political reasons. Foreign policy was not conceived or conducted by a large bureaucracy, but by a small group of men, most of whom were parliamentarians and acutely aware of the sensitivity of the political nation to issues of foreign policy. The two Secretaries of State sat in the House of Lords and were expected to play a major role in defending ministerial policy, particularly foreign policy, whilst several diplomats were MPs. It is clear that Lodge’s approach is an unsatisfactory one, and that British foreign policy during this period is a field that requires research. This is apparent when general works on eighteenth-century British foreign policy are considered. They are forced to depend heavily on Lodge, and suffer as a consequence. J.R.Jones produced the surprising comment that the causes of the War of the Austrian Succession “largely lay well outside the range of British knowledge and interests”.4 The causes of the war were indeed complex, but they were closely related to some of the major preoccupations of British foreign policy in the 1730s, and, indeed, the 1740s as a whole provided an opportunity to test, during a period of crisis and war, assumptions and expectations engendered during the previous period of peace. Between 1725 and 1735 British foreign policy in the age of Walpole has been well covered, but after 1735 there has been far less attention, except in the important field of relations, principally colonial and commercial with Spain. Vaucher’s study, mentioned above, devoted its section on Anglo-French relations in the late 1730s largely to the Spanish issue, a subject that was also covered ably by Richard Pares.5 There are no major works on relations with Austria and Prussia in the period. 6 Lodge’s book on eighteenth-century Anglo-Prussian relations suffers from a failure to consider Prussian sources adequately and has little to say about this period.7 Hanover in the 1730s requires study, and there is nothing comparable to Uriel Dann’s interesting work on the relationship between Hanover and Britain in the period 1740–60.8 As a result it is difficult for historians to appreciate the relationship between, foreign policy in the late 1730s and during the War of the Austrian Succession. The supposedly pacific and isolationist policy of the late 1730s has been 30

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associated with the ministry of Sir Robert Walpole (1721–42), while the more aggressive and pugilistic policy of 1742–4 has been associated with Lord Carteret, Secretary of State for the Northern Department in those years. As a result, it is easy to suggest that the change in British policy corresponded with and was a consequence of the change in the ministry. However, a consideration of the foreign policy of the late 1730s suggests that the conventional view of Walpole’s foreign policy requires correction. The fact that Walpole was opposed to military intervention in the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5) has been used to character ize him as isolationist. In fact, the British attempt to end the war by the use of good offices, and the active policy Britain followed during it, in encouraging states such as the United Provinces and Denmark to oppose the French, in staging a major naval mobilization and in intervening actively to attempt to thwart French schemes in Russia, Sweden and Turkey, would suggest that the situation was more complex. Walpole was ready to send a substantial naval force to the Tagus in 1735–7 to support Portugal against a threatened Spanish attack, and in the late 1730s the British ministry took steps towards the development of an alternative to the Anglo-Austrian alliance, which had collapsed in 1733. Approaches were made to Russia for an alliance, and interest was displayed in better relations with Prussia, where it was hoped that the eventual death of Frederick William I and the accession of Frederick II, George II’s nephew, would lead to an alliance. This interest in a northern alliance system, which owed much to Walpole’s brother Horatio, indicates the extent to which foreign policy in the late 1730s was by no means stagnant, and calls into question the view, expressed by Stephen Baxter and, for a later period, Michael Roberts, that eighteenth-century British foreign policy was conservative, trapped in a straitjacket of past concepts and unable to innovate.9 By suggesting that foreign policy in the late 1730s was different to the accepted interpretation, it becomes necessary to re-examine the diplomacy of both the last three years of the Walpole ministry and of Carteret.10 It is wrong to argue that Carteret’s policy of a strong alliance against France originated in the spring of 1742 when Walpole fell. The opposition indeed condemned Walpole for allegedly failing to halt French progress in Europe. Sir James Lowther, an opposition MP, wrote to his Cumbrian agent in April 1742, “The troops are getting ready to embark immediately for Flanders. The French seem to be startled now, we should have [had] no chance of preserv-ing the liberties of Europe, if Sir Robert had continued in the direction of foreign affairs.” In fact, the Walpole ministry had set out to create such an alliance in late 1739, when it became clear that war between Britain and Spain was inevitable. It was widely believed by the ministry, British diplomats and the press that France would support Spain, and that a united Bourbon pact would prove a redoubtable opponent. In August 1739 Newcastle informed Hardwicke, “We take it for granted, that France will join Spain, and that we shall be attacked at home…” Freder ick William I drew the attention of Dickens to the 31

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consequences of French intervention, “if France joined with Spain we [the British] should to be sure stand in need of land forces”. The British envoy in Paris, James, 1st Earl Waldegrave, sought to persuade Fleury “that his siding with Spain in her unjust practices is the sure way to engage a general war, which will probably end in a general alliance against France and Spain. I have put him in mind of past times, and the distresses France was in the years 10 and 11, [1710–11]…”11 Far from relying on the pacific instincts of Fleury, the ministry feared war with France. Newcastle told the House of Lords in November 1739, in an interesting speech which throws light on the British perception of the French constitution, …notwithstanding the great age of the present prime minister of that Kingdom, notwithstanding his present peaceable disposition we cannot entirely trust to it: we know he can alter that disposition, when he finds it proper or necessary so to do; we know the animosity that has so long subsisted between that nation and this: we know the regard the people of France have for the royal family of Spain; and therefore the prime minister of that Kingdom, notwithstanding the arbitrary form of their government, may, like the ministers in other countries, be forced to chime in with the general inclinations, perhaps the general whim, of his countrymen. Many things may induce the French to alter their present measures, and as their king is absolute master within his dominions, the effects of that alteration may, and probably will be instantaneous.12 The ministry believed that it would be impossible simply to fight a naval war against the Bourbons. France could threaten Hanover with ease and, by menacing the United Provinces, could prevent them from offering Britain the assistance she considered herself entitled to by past agreements. Foreign troops might be needed to defeat an invasion, for, as Newcastle pointed out in the speech above, “the coast of France lies more convenient for invading this kingdom, than any other coast in Europe”. Convinced that they would need military assistance, the British ministry sought in late 1739 and in 1740 to construct an anti-French alliance. This policy was the product neither of the War of the Austrian Succession nor of Carteret. Furthermore, the Secretaries of State of this period, Newcastle and Harrington, were to hold that office throughout much of the War of Austrian Succession. By the spring of 1740 the diplomatic strategy that was to be associated with Carteret had been clearly enunciated, and in March Fleury told the Swedish envoy Tessin, “L’Angleterre voudrait voir toute l’Europe contre nous.” The despatch of a French fleet to the West Indies to prevent Britain overthrowing the Spanish Empire increased tension. The Lord Privy Seal, Lord Hervey wrote “so black a prospect I never saw”. Hardwicke told the House of Lords that war with France was likely “unless His Majesty can form such a confederacy upon the continent, as will make it dangerous for any power in Europe to disturb the tranquillity thereof”.13 32

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The search for an alliance system represented a rejection of pressure for a policy of national self-sufficiency that had played a major role in the agitation for a maritime war with Spain in 1738–9. The notion that such a war could be successful was linked to a sense that Britain could abstract herself from European diplomacy and its commitments, and, indeed, that it was desirable to do so. Sir William Keith wrote in the Citizen of 27 July (os) 1739: every transaction of that kind during the last century, has operated strongly to the disadvantage of Britain, by draining her of her treasure, and encouraging other nations to become her rivals in trade; he judiciously prefers a powerful armament by sea, and looks on a British admiral, at the head of his fleet, to be by far the best ambassador and plenipotentiary, that can be made use of in a conjuncture such as the present’. An emphasis on self-sufficiency was linked to a sense of the transience of international relations and the ingratitude of allies. Thus, Keith found such an universal change in the face of public affairs throughout all Europe, from what it was thirty years ago: the political views of every state seem to be inverted, and their former schemes wholly abandoned. Great Britain, which then made so glorious a figure at the head of a grand and powerful alliance, in defence of the liberties of Europe… is now insulted by some, and despised by others, of those very powers, who at that time acknowledge themselves to have owed their preservation to the benignity of her councils, and the force of her arms. An anti-French alliance intended to intimidate France was not the same as an alliance intended to fight France, but the French decision in 1741 to exploit Maria Theresa’s accession by attacking Austria produced this shift. The situation was made more complex by the unexpected Prussian invasion of Silesia in December 1740, and by the Hanoverian neutrality negotiated in September 1741 when Marshall Maillebois’s army threatened to invade Hanover. During the Wars of the Spanish and Polish Successions, Hanover had been able to rely for its defence on the army of the Empire, which had operated against France on the Rhine with a substantial Austrian contingent. In 1741, however, that army did not exist. Charles-Albert of Bavaria, one of the French-supported pretenders to a share in the Austrian inheritance, was elected Emperor as Charles VII in January 1742. The impact of the double crisis of 1741–the apparent imminent collapse of Austria and the vulnerability of Hanover—on British policy and on British public attitudes was serious. In late 1741 there was in Britain a collapse of credibility in ministerial foreign policy. The successful Spanish invasion of Italy, despite the presence in Spanish waters of a substantial British fleet, was blamed 33

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by the opposition on the Hanoverian neutrality, and ministerial denials had little impact. Furthermore, the progress of the war with Spain in the Caribbean had failed to live up to initial British hopes. The deteriorating international situation played a role both in the general election of 1741 and in the parliamentary crisis of 1741–2 that led to the fall of the Walpole ministry. Of the opponents of Walpole who came to power in the 1740s, two, Carteret and Stair, greatly influenced foreign policy in 1742, whilst another two, Chesterfield and Sandwich, were to be very influential in the later stages of the war. The manner in which those self-styled Patriots who came to power failed to implement Patriot plans for domestic reforms, such as triennial parliaments and place bills, is well known. There was also a process of compromise and adaptation in foreign policy, but, in fact, the Patriot position was less clear and consistent than is generally appreciated. The positions of Stair and Carteret indicate some of the ambiguities of the Patriot legacy. Though Stair had served as envoy in Paris in 1715–20 during the negotiation and first years of the Anglo-French alliance of 1716–31, he had always been critical and suspicious of the French, sufficiently so as to lead to ministerial reprimands and the eventual French demand for his recall.14 During the Walpole ministry there had been no doubt of Stair’s opposition to France and partiality for Austria.15 In March 1742 he was appointed envoy to The Hague, charged with bringing the Dutch into active measures against France, his appointment a clear sign of the desire for action. Until November 1743 Stair, both at The Hague and in command of the Pragmatic army, the largely British force that was sent to help the Austrians, fervently urged the prosecution of the war with France with the utmost vigour. In August 1742 the well-informed, long-serving Sardinian envoy in London, Ossorio, referred to Stair as disposing of all the states of Europe as if he was ruler, and in November Stair wrote to Trevor, I am sure it is both the Interest and the Glory of the King our Master and of our Country, to remain fir mly united, according to our Engagements, with the Queen of Hungary. If we continue to govern ourselves by that plain and simple politick, we shall have all the weight that we can desire to have in Europe, we shall be lookt upon by every Prince and State as the disinterested restorers and Protectors of Liberty, and in a little time, we shall come to have a great deal of influence on the Counsels of the Republick [United Provinces], much more than we have had for twenty years past, whilst we valued ourselves upon our skill of negotiating more than upon our good faith, in following the interest and honour of the Nation.16 Stair’s vigour was applauded by the opposition press, but it fell foul of George II’s concern for Hanoverian interests and of the reality of betrayal, compromise and difficulties which characterized the kaleidoscopic international relations of the 1740s.17 34

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Carteret’s vigorous espousal of the anti-French cause was marked by a certain degree of pragmatism. Secretary of State in 1721–4 during the period of alliance with France, Carteret had been regarded as untrustworthy, if not pro-Austrian, by French diplomats, whilst he had proclaimed his support for Austria to the Austrian diplomat Pentenriedter. 18 An anonymous French memorandum of 1736 claimed that he was less pro-French than most British politicians, and this was to be proved correct.19 In the House of Lords in May 1739 he argued that the recently signed treaty with Denmark was “only a good beginning. Not of use on the continent, unless you gain Prussia.” In 1741 he called in Parliament for help to be given to Austria, and wrote that Parliament looked upon it “as a national concern”.20 When Carteret took over the effective conduct of foreign policy, he sought to implement ideas that have been subsequently praised by historians. More pragmatic than Stair and the Opposition, he was prepared to accommodate himself to George II’s Hanoverian interests. Therein probably lay the source of his influence over the king, for, as with Townshend in 1729–30, and Newcastle in the early 1750s, George II was happiest with Secretaries of State who appreciated his Hanoverian concerns.21 These were not simply schemes for aggrandisement, as they were often portrayed by opposition spokesmen. George was primarily concerned with the security of Hanover, particularly after Freder ick II’s invasion of Silesia drove home the power and unpredictability of Hanover’s Prussian neighbour.22 However, Carteret’s policies provide a classic instance of the significance of one of the most important but neglected fields of research in this period, the relationship between domestic and foreign policy. For an exper ienced politician, a former holder of high ministerial office and a long-standing parliamentarian, Carteret’s neglect of the domestic context of foreign policy was remarkable. This was particularly so as the country where he had served as British envoy with considerable success, Sweden, was one where the close interrelationship of domestic politics and foreign policy was clear. Abroad with George II in 1743, Carteret failed to keep his ministerial colleagues in London informed of policy; “the Coffee House joke is that Ld C was looking over the map and by some accident the ink fell down and blotted out England, since which he has never thought of it”. Carteret claimed that international relations moved too fast for consultation with the ministers in London.23 Carteret’s adventurous policies for an anti-French league led him to seek to arrange territorial settlements of disputes in Italy and the Empire, the boldness of which was criticized in Britain. He was compared on several occasions with Don Quixote.24 Carteret’s alliance strategy would arguably have been harmless enough during peacetime, not too different from the Anglo-French-Spanish alliance he had been involved in during the early 1720s, or Newcastle’s Imperial Election scheme of the early 1750s. However, his wide-ranging plans were far more dangerous because they were developed in war. Like his former patron, James, Viscount Stanhope, whose intellectual ability 35

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and ambitious foreign policy played a major role in landing Britain in a war with Spain in 1718 that coincided with a domestic political crisis, Carteret helped to create a very dangerous situation. His vigorous anti-French policy led to war between Britain and France, and thus French support of the Jacobite invasion plan of 1744, support that was more dangerous than the Spanish support for Jacobite schemes that Stanhope provoked in 1719. There had always been French sympathy for Jacobitism and a willingness to contemplate military support for the Jacobites. It was the policies of the Carteret ministry that turned the sympathy that had failed to produce action in 1733 and 1740, when the Jacobites urged the invasion of a divided Britain, into the support that led to French troops being assembled near Dunkirk for an invasion in the spring of 1744. If Carteret underestimated the Jacobite threat this was true of most of the ministers of the period, but not of Walpole. Furthermore, Carteret’s policies were threatened by his failure to understand the danger posed by Jacobitism and by French support for it.25 Carteret’s failure fully to appreciate the difficulties of alliance politics is surprising given his experience. He underestimated the difficulties of settling differences between the two major pillars of his alliance strategy, Austria and Sardinia, and also between Austria and Bavaria. Carteret also failed to grasp the difficulties of bringing the United Provinces to escalate hostilities with France. In August 1743 the British envoy in Vienna, Thomas Robinson, reminded Carteret that he had repeatedly said, that in a triple alliance it is not sufficient for one, or other, or two of the parties, to be of this or of that sentiment; and that notwithstanding that the greatest complaint of this Court is the want of a system at this time of day, yet nothing more can be said, till the Courts of Vienna and Turin are upon such a footing, as to have a confidence in each other jointly with the King, when, and when alone the only plan to be formed, may be laid upon that true foundation.26 Parliamentary speakers and the press returned constantly to the theme of the French threat to the international system and discussed it in terms of the balance of power and the liberties of Europe.27 Public and ministerial war aims and discussion of international relations interacted. In 1744 Trevor wrote from The Hague that French support for the Jacobites gives a flat lie to the boasted moderation, and innocence of her views; and must convince every subject of the Republick as well as of England, that not only the possessions of the House of Austria, and the Balance of Power, but even our own liberties, and religion, are struck at by that ambitious power. The following year Harrington blamed French support for Jacobite efforts 36

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against George II on their “resentment for the generous stand he has made in the defence of the Liberties of Europe”. The language used by contemporaries was very ambiguous, doubtless part of its attraction. Phrases such as “Balance of Power” and “Liberties of Europe” were capable of many interpretations. In 1746 Frederick the Great told Thomas Villiers, then Minister Plenipotentiary in Berlin, that he hoped the Austrians would lose territory in Italy. Villiers commented, “His Prussian Majesty acknowledged, that a Balance of Power should be maintained in Europe, but is jealous of, and dreads the great weight of Austria.” Villiers tried to persuade Count Heinrich von Podewils, the Prussian foreign minister, that French ambitions in the Austrian Netherlands threatened the whole of Europe “by representing in a true light the danger to all Europe, particularly to His Prussian Majesty, from the increasing power of the House of Bourbon, to prevail on him to persuade his master to save the Low Countries from the ambition of France”. However, Podewils told Ginkel, the Dutch envoy in Berlin, that he disagreed “as he sincerely wished for the preservation of a just Balance of Power in Europe; but would not allow, that a like equilibrium was endangered by the progress of the French arms in the Low Countries”. The ambiguity of the language employed was obvious, and Villiers himself told Podewils “that if we and His Prussian Majesty really pursued different systems, no great service, no cordiality, whatever expressions might be employed, could be expected on either side”.28 Many of the key parliamentary debates of the early 1740s were devoted to foreign policy. Only a minority of the MPs and peers spoke in the debates, and it is unclear how far the language used in the debates was an attempt to persuade undecided parliamentarians. Clearly there were constraints created by the royal prerogative in foreign policy, but the record of debates suggests that most topics were touched on and that the opposition displayed very little respect for the royal prerogative. The information available to parliamentarians was of high quality, given the difficulties of procuring reliable information concerning the plans of other states. It was not too different from the infor mation available to the ministry. Foreign envoys sought to keep parliamentar ians sympathetic to their cause by providing them with information. In 1741 several MPs asked Haslang, the Bavarian envoy, for Bavarian memoranda, whilst Parliament could expect to receive information from ex-diplomats. 29 In the November 1745 debate on the navy, Horatio Walpole “went thro’ the whole state of Europe”.30 Ministers frequently used anticipated parliamentary opposition as an excuse to refuse requests from other powers, but it is also clear from other correspondence between ministers that, even when the ministry possessed a workable majority, it was concerned about the parliamentary implications of foreign policy and the likely views of domestic critics. In 1740 Newcastle stressed, in a letter to Hardwicke, the need not to give any handle, by any engagements we should contract with Prussia, to the Court of France, to say they had, and always intended, to observe a 37

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perfect neutrality, with regard to our disputes with Spain; But that we had forced them into the war, by entering into engagements with Prussia, directly contrary to those, we knew, they had contracted with the Court of Palatine; and this would be resounded here, much to our disadvantage. In 1745 Harrington, a minister not noted for expressing concern about Parliament, reported to Newcastle on talks he was conducting at Hanover with the Bavarian envoy, Count Königsfeld: “I see no great prospect of our being able to conclude anything with that Prince, which will be justifiable in Parliament.” In 1747 Henry Pelham, brother of Newcastle and from 1743 1st Lord of the Treasury, drew attention to the interrelationship of foreign affairs, ministerial strife and parliamentary peace, Our Parliament is undoubtedly a good one; and could the King’s servants but agree in what is proper to be offer’d to them, I am confident they would meet with no negative. But the perplexed and dangerous situation of affairs abroad makes it very difficult to reconcile minds as to the proper remedy. It was generally agreed that news of the situation abroad affected parliamentary business.31 In addition, ministers were aware that foreign powers paid great attention to parliamentary developments. In November 1740 Hardwicke made this point in the House of Lords: the weight His Majesty’s councils may have at present with the several courts of Europe: and can anything add to this weight so much as a prevailing opinion abroad, that there subsists an entire harmony between His Majesty and his Parliament; that his people place an entire confidence in his wisdom and conduct, and that the whole power of the British nation will be applied as he shall think fit to direct it. The following March Fleury and the French foreign minister Amelot discussed Parliament with Anthony Thompson, Waldegrave’s chaplain, who was responsible for British representation in Paris from November 1740 until the rupture of diplomatic relations in March 1744, his low rank indicating the poor state of relations. In 1743 Carteret wrote to Newcastle from The Hague and attributed the “happy change in this Country since I was here in October last” primarily to parliamentary developments, They have a good opinion of the stability of our affairs in England, which they had not when I was here last, but the great majority which His Majesty had in Parliament all the last session had an excellent effect here, and the more because it was not expected; this they have frankly owned to me. 38

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Carteret returned to the theme of the impact of domestic support on the foreign perception of British strength and determination in 1762.32 It is clear from foreign diplomatic correspondence that European states did indeed place great weight on Parliament, though it is apparent that continental rulers did not find it easy to appreciate the workings of the Br itish parliamentary system or the issues at stake. They were also conscious of the significance of British ministerial instability. In March 1746 Villiers reported from Berlin, On the 2d inst. Count Podewils told me, that he was informed by a courier from M.Andrie, that many of His Majesty’s principal Ministers and high Officers of State had resigned their employments; which extraordinary event he thought was very unfortunate, as it must retard the dispatch of business in a most critical time, and might put our Allies under great difficulties and doubts, very pernicious to England. He asked who could tell but what the Dutch, dispirited by the loss of Brussels, might now send orders to M.Twickel to sign immediately a peace, or a neutrality, with France. To Podewils’s suggestion that the ministerial change might affect British policy, Villiers replied that the noblemen, said to have flung up their posts, had ever been, and were still I was convinced, so zealous for the present reigning family, that it could in no respect relate to the unnatural rebellion in Great Britain, or occasion the least alteration in the principles of our government with regard to the King of Prussia.33 The impact of Parliament on the British ministry and on other states was the most important instance of the influence on policy of the British system of government. Another more nebulous sphere was that of the impact of the press and of public opinion, especially in the major cities.34 There are important conceptual problems in the discussion of public opinion. Public opinion on foreign policy intersected most obviously with dissension over domestic politics in the dispute over the role of Hanover and of Hanoverian troops, an issue that was raised in Parliament, the press and within the ministry.35 It is difficult to assess the effects of the agitation. Opposition politicians claimed that their moves to prevent a continuation of subsidies to Hanover were popular. George Bubb Dodington warned the Commons in December 1743: If every man in this House were to be silent upon that head the people without doors would soon find out what tools they were made of; they would soon perceive their being sacrificed to the interests and views of 39

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Hanover; and this would render every honest man in the nation not only discontented with our public measures, but disaffected to the illustrious family now upon our throne; the necessary consequence of which would be, that our present constitution must overturn our present establishment, or our present establishment must overturn our present situation. The following month, Sandwich called upon the Lords to heed the general voice: It may be hoped that these sentiments will be adopted, and these resolutions formed by every man who hears, what is echoed through the nation, that the British have been considered as subordinate to their own mercenaries, mercenaries whose service was never rated at so high a price before, and who never deserved even the petty price at which their lives used to be valued; that foreign slaves were exalted above the freemen of Great Britain, even by the King of Great Britain, and that on all occasions, on which one nation could be preferred to the other, the preference was given to the darling Hanoverians. In the same debate, the Duke of Marlborough declared: It is not possible to mention Hanover, or its inhabitants, in any public place, without putting the whole house into a flame, and hearing on every hand expressions of resentment, threats of revenge, or clamours of detestation. Hanover is now become a name which cannot be mentioned without provoking rage and malignity, and interrupting the discourse by a digression of abhorrence.36 James, thirteenth Earl of Morton, a keen supporter of Sir Robert Walpole (by this stage Earl of Orford), agreed that the people were opposed to the continuance of the Hanoverian subsidies, but argued that “the man who would gain the people’s favour by injuring their interest, is not a friend, but a sycophant”. The Swedish scholar Kalm, visiting England on his way to America in 1748, went on a trip from London to the countryside near Little Gaddesden and “saw a watermill at one place, which differed in nothing from ours more than that here there were quartered a frightful number of large rats, which they called Hanoverian rats”. A sixpenny opposition ballad of 1744 claimed Abroad our gallant Army fights In Austria’s Cause, for G-rm-n Rights By English Treasure fed Hessians and Hano— too The gainful Trade of War pursue, With C—T [Carteret] at their Head.37 40

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The Pelhams were probably encouraged in their opposition to Carteret’s policies by the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary agitation, Chesterfield, in opposition, praised Newcastle for his opposition to the Hanoverian subsidies. Newcastle, however, was careful to maintain the formalities of ministerial advice. In June 1745 he wrote to Harrington, then with George II in Hanover, that the ministers in London offered suggestions “from a sense of our duty to His Majesty, and a just concern for his service, and that of our country”. The following month, the ministers emphasized their “duty to the King” when pressing the importance of detaching Frederick II from France.38 The issue of Hanover is a good instance of the manner in which eighteenth-century British foreign policy was debated widely. As royal concern was most marked in the case of Hanoverian interests, the issue also provides an opportunity to assess the role of the King in foreign policy and his strength in domestic politics. In recent years there has been a substantial reassessment of the role of the eighteenth-century British monarchy, with important work by Blanning, Clark, Gregg, Hatton and Mackesy. Light is thrown on George II’s influence in foreign affairs by work by Black, Dann and Owen.39 It could be suggested that the ministerial instability of 1742–6, although it exposed George to defeats in the field of domestic politics, in particular his failure to support Carteret effectively in both 1744 and 1746, gave him more leeway in the field of foreign policy than he would otherwise have possessed. It is instructive to compare 1729, when the ministers in London sought to influence George’s and Townshend’s negotiations in Hanover with the Wittelsbachs, 1735 and 1741, when there was anxiety in London over George’s negotiations whilst in Hanover, and 1743, when the impotence of the London ministers was seen clearly. The extent to which ministers were forced to defend the Hanoverian subsidies in the sessions of the 1740s is an indication of the power of George, for there is little doubt about their disquiet on the subject. The issue of Hanoverian subsidies was the public expression of much wider disquiet about the influence of Hanover on British foreign policy and the role of Hanover in British public life. Subsidies were an issue that could be readily grasped and on which a popular campaign could be mounted. It was, in contrast, far more difficult to debate the major impact of Hanover on policy, namely, the attempts in 1744–7 to create an alliance directed against Prussia that in some forms included the idea of a partial partition of Prussia. These schemes, strongly supported by George II, could be defended on diplomatic grounds. Prussia had shown that it was hostile to Britain and an unpredictable force; her enmity to Austria distracted Austrian attention from the war with France. In 1741 it had been hoped that a lasting Austro-Prussian settlement could be negotiated. Horatio Walpole had written to Trevor of Frederick II, “Europe is undone if he once joins heartily with France; and we must gain him as the only way of salvation.” Trevor himself had noted that the Dutch were “sensible how absurd, and unnatural it was for the Maritime Powers, unless in a case of the last necessity, to come to any open breach with the House of Prussia”.40 41

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George II was less prepared to tolerate Prussian aggrandizement. His longstanding quarrel with Prussia was exacerbated by personal pique, specifically the rejection of his patronage by his nephew, Frederick II. On 6 January 1741 George responded to the Prussian invasion of Silesia by telling the Saxon envoy, Utterodt, that Frederick could not be trusted, that the flimsy nature of his pretexts over Silesia meant that no one could feel secure in their German possessions, that Hanover was exposed and that Frederick was a ruler for whom ambition and aggrandizement were the sole guides. Opposition to Prussia became George’s leitmotif in the war, but it never became one of the British war aims, in so far as the latter were ever officially articulated. Frederick was convinced, with reason, that George worked secretly to defeat his British ministry’s efforts for better Anglo-Prussian relations.41 If ministerial speeches in Parliament can be taken as a source for war aims, then it is clear that opposition to Prussia was never given the priority that France enjoyed, although there is no doubt that many politicians and, in particular, diplomats became very concerned about Prussian policy. Hardwicke wrote of the 1744 Prussian invasion of Bohemia, That your Ladyship may see Monsr. de Prusse’s reasons for disturbing both the queen of Hungary’s repose and mine, I take the liberty to send you inclosed one of his authentic manifestos, printed at Berlin, which he has dignified with the new affected title of Exposé. But new ways of acting require new terms to justify them; and he must find out still more, before he will be able to convince the world that perfidy is Patriotism, or that an enterprize manifestly concerted in time and manner only to create a diversion in favour of France, was design’d merely to preserve the rights of the Germanic Body and its head. However, the London ministers urged the subordination of opposition to Prussia to the war with France, Newcastle writing in 1745, “We are sensible, that many arguments may be used, to shew, how desirable it would be, for the good of Europe, to reduce the power of the King of Prussia: But, as we humbly apprehend, there cannot be shewed any possibility of doing it at present; all those arguments are out of the question.”42 Flemming, the influential Saxon envoy in London, argued in 1745, in a dispatch intercepted and deciphered by the British ministry, that the only way to get Britain to act against Prussia, as the Saxons wished, was by co-operating behind a “mask” that stressed the French threat. Newcastle regarded moves against Prussia as a dangerous diversion: how little…was to be expected from France, if the King of Prussia was not previously detached…We are sensible, that many arguments may be used to shew, how desirable it would be for the good of Europe, to reduce the power of the King of Prussia: But as we humbly apprehend, there cannot be shewed any possibility of doing it at present; all these 42

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arguments are out of the Question…the Question appears to us, not to be, whether the King of Prussia shall retain Silesia, or not; But whether H.M. and the States should have the merit of obtaining it for him.43 The ambiguity in British aims, which essentially put George II in opposition to most of his ministers, was matched by one within the alliance. Austria was most concerned with Prussia, and, as Robinson had warned in August 1744, was ready to consider a unilateral peace with France in order to concentrate her efforts against Prussia.44 Uneasy about Austro-French peace feelers, the British ministry was very concerned about the military consequences of Austria’s priorities, the withdrawal of Charles of Lorraine from the Rhine in 1744 in order to confront Frederick and the poor state of Austrian forces in the Austr ian Netherlands. 45 Austr ian policy prefigured the “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756 and represented a continuation, to a certain degree, of the preoccupation with east-central Europe that had played such a major role in Austrian policy in 1726–33, and of the Austro-French alliance of 1735–41. Newcastle complained in August 1745, the behavior of the Queen of Hungary, in totally abandoning the Netherlands; and the refusal of the Court of Brussels to let the places there have the defence, which the nature of their situation gives them, by the inundation; have raised here the utmost resentment against the Court of Vienna, and rendered their cause much less popular, than it formerly had been. And when it shall be known, that the Court of Vienna has formally refused to lessen the number of their enemies, at present so numerous, by making up with the King of Prussia, and persist in pursuing their own particular views, and interests, at the expence of their allies, there will be very little room for them to hope for any assistance from this country in the support of those measures. Trevor hoped that the Austrians would send troops to the Austrian Netherlands in order to “sweeten humours in England”. When in September 1747, Sandwich, British Minister Plenipotentiary at the peace talks at Breda, had a long conversation with his French counterpart, Puyzieulx, he did not hide British anger at Austrian conduct. The following month George II told Ossorio that he was totally fed up with the Austrians.46 Such attitudes were not new. In the late 1730s the British responded to the Austro-French alignment by hoping that relations with Prussia and Russia could be improved and by talking of a Protestant alliance. As the Russians were not Catholics, they could be incorporated into the idea of a Protestant alliance. Frederick II’s policies made such a solution difficult during the 1740s, though there was still considerable press support for the idea of a Prussian alliance. The renewed efforts devoted to winning Russian support at the end of the war were a response to both suspicion of Prussia and anger with Austria. 43

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Part of the problem in assessing the 1740s is psychological. The War of the Austrian Succession lacked the heroic qualities and the successes of the War of the Spanish Succession and the Seven Years’ War. It appears to many to be of limited significance. Such a view is a false one. The conflict was of great importance in European international relations, British policy and the British public debate about foreign policy, as will be discussed in the next chapter. In domestic British politics the war was of major significance, as is shown in the chapters on the Crown and on Parliament. It was a vital element in ministerial and parliamentary politics, and in the crucial issue of the relationship between the Crown and the rest of the political system.

44

Chapter Four Anglo-French relations, 1740–56

When it is once taken God knows what will be the consequence, but the least bad must be bad enough. —Chesterfield on impending fall of Bergen-op-Zoom, 17471 the taking the proper measures for maintaining and improving the Old Alliance…only solid system of Europe…I am afraid your Royal Highness will find this more difficult with our friends in England, than your Royal Highness imagines, I doubt the great objection to me and my politics is my known and firm resolution never to vary from that principle —Newcastle to Cumberland, November 17482 Any account of how Britain achieved naval and colonial mastery by 1763 must necessar ily include a discussion of such matters as naval strength and administration, military planning, the neutrality of Spain until 1761 and the too-oft overlooked question of respective financial strengths.3 It is important to remember the role of chance, not least in the defeat of the French invasion plans of 1759 at Lagos and Quiberon Bay. It is also necessary to look at the objectives of British policy and power, not least the deter mination to concentrate resources on North America. This constituted an obvious contrast with Britain’s previous conflict, her participation in the War of the Austrian Succession. Britain signalled her commitment to fight in 1742 by sending troops to the Austrian Netherlands, whereas in 1755 she ordered her ships to prevent the despatch of French reinforcements to Canada. In 1743 Britain’s military effort had centred on the western parts of the Empire, where George II fought an unexpected battle at Dettingen, in 1744–8 on the unsuccessful defence of the Low Countries. In the Seven Years’ War, in contrast, there was no possibility of Britain defending the Low Countries. The Austrian-ruled Netherlands were then allied to France, while the United Provinces were neutral. As an ally of 45

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Frederick II and in order to protect Hanover, British troops did campaign in Ger many from 1758, 4 but the military commitment to the Continent was relatively far less than in the previous war. This was due to the interwar shift in British views on foreign policy, and indeed on Britain’s place in the world. Another shift was that in Anglo-French relations. The two powers had been allied in 1713–14 and 1716–31. Thereafter relations were poor for a decade, but conflict was avoided, both dur ing the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5) and on account of the outbreak of the Anglo-Spanish War of Jenkins’ Ear in 1739. 5 However, from 1742 until 1763 relations were dominated by war and the threat of war. The cross-currents and ambiguities that had affected British diplomacy and debate about foreign policy in 1713– 31, with Austria, Spain and Russia at times appearing as serious threats, were replaced from the early 1740s by a concentration on France that was to last until after the Napoleonic wars despite inter national changes and a ministerial anti-Russian interlude in 1789–91 during a period of French weakness.6 Though not to the same extent, British enmity rose as a priority for French foreign policy. Two other important topics can be discerned in a consideration of AngloFrench relations in 1740–55. The first is the causes of war, for Britain and France went to war twice in this period, though in the second case formal hostilities were not declared until the French invasion of Minorca in 1756. Secondly, the per iod invites consideration of the relationship between shortterm developments in international relations and those in the longue dureé. It also invites discussion of the extent to which an international system existed and the relationship between that, the activities of particular states and the actions and views of individual monarchs and ministers. There have been valuable studies of British public7 and ministerial8 attitudes towards mid-century foreign policy, including two centring on changing attitudes towards colonial commitments.9 However, there is room for a fresh re-examination of the subject based both on a wide range of manuscript sources and on the contemporary word of print, and by looking at the situation against the background of a period when hostility to France and concern about the colonies had not been axiomatic. Indeed the impetus behind British foreign policy in the years 1714–39 had been distinctly continental rather than specifically anti-French. This owed much to a generally unwanted feature of the Protestant Succession, the defence of Hanover, which had aroused considerable public debate.10 However, though the Hanoverian Succession altered the political context of the debate about Britain’s relations with the Continent and specifically interventionalism, the essential direction of British policy had been laid by William III following his invasion of 1688, the most successful early moder n example of the combination of domestic intrigue and external intervention. 11 William had ensured that Britain would be concerned about continental developments, 46

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specifically French progress, though the negotiation with Louis XIV of the partition treaties for the Spanish Succession in 1698 and 1700 demonstrated that this did not have to be through conflict. This was to be underlined in 1713–14, in the brief period of co-operation that followed the Peace of Utrecht, in 1716–31 during the Anglo-French alliance, and in 1734–5, in the negotiations at The Hague during the War of the Polish Succession. There was no obvious reason why this pattern should not be maintained: r ivalry moderated or even diminished by negotiations, but such a pattern did not characterize Anglo-French relations during the period 1740–55, and when it was next seriously attempted, in 1772–3, in response to the First Partition of Poland, it rapidly proved a non-starter.12 The failure to ease relations in mid-century was not due to the French. As in 1772–3 and 1786, it was the French who launched the major attempt to improve relations, that made by their foreign minister, Puysieulx, in the aftermath of the War of the Austrian Succession. There was no comparable effort by the French in Walpole’s last years as minister or when he fell in 1742, but the situation then was hardly auspicious. France trod a difficult course in 1739–40, neither seeking to tie her foreign policy to the interests or quixotic policies of her ally, Philip V, by joining him in his war with Britain, nor wishing to needlessly antagonize Spain or, more dangerously, allow Br itain to make major Car ibbean gains by maintaining a str ict neutrality. The message that France did not wish to see such gains was delivered and backed up by the dispatch of Antin and a powerful French fleet to the West Indies in 1740. However, the British ministry, under the pressure of a bellicose public opinion that had played a role, albeit not the sole one, in leading to war with Spain, 13 was in no position to accept French guidance, let alone French mediation. Waldegrave made it clear to Newcastle that French restraint owed a lot to Fleury, “I can observe no disposition in him to quarrel with us, adding they know, they cannot undertake anything against us, but at a great expense and hazard; for they cannot depend upon any support from Spain.” Fleury told Waldegrave that “he was under a sort of necessity of having everything done under his eye, hinting that he could not be sure any other way, that his directions would be followed”.14 Whether or not an understanding could have been reached with France over the Caribbean in 1740, there was no basis for one over the Austrian Succession, once Fleury’s pacific inclinations had been swept aside. Frederick II’s invasion of Silesia suddenly and unexpectedly made international relations more volatile and abruptly increased the opportunities, the stakes and the dangers, not least the danger that, by not acting, France would not only be unable to advance her own interests but would lose the possible support of other powers. This raised volatility increased the pressure for action on Fleury. Just as in Britain politicians had to consider the possibility that Walpole would not survive the Parliament due to be elected in the elections of 1741, so the 47

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octogenarian Fleury appeared an inappropriate first minister for a period of opportunity. As French policy moved towards war with Austria, the scope for any AngloFrench understanding diminished. This was highlighted by the domestic political situation in Britain. When in 1741 the threat of a French invasion of Westphalia led George II to sign a neutrality convention for Hanover, abandoning his attempts to create an anti-Prussian alliance and agreeing to vote for the French-supported Charles Albert of Bavaria as next Emperor, in short accepting a French-inspired German settlement, this caused a political storm in Britain and was not welcomed by the British ministry. Harrington, the Secretary of State who accompanied George II to Hanover, informed Thompson that the Convention “is purely an Electoral affair, and does not in the least tie up His Majesty’s hands, as King, or engage him to anything relating to his future conduct, as such, or to the affairs of England”. 15 This constitutional distinction convinced few in 1741; no more than it was to do so at the time of the Fürstenbund (anti-Austrian League of German princes) in 1785. Politically the episode was charged with significance. It was believed to provide concrete demonstration of the way in which Hanover controlled British policy. The domestic storm over the episode, and the manner in which the new ministry that replaced that of Walpole in 1742 pressed successfully for the abandonment of the Convention, set the tone for AngloHanoverian relations for the rest of George II’s reign. It was made clear that Britain could not be bound publicly by a Hanoverian arrangement, and that even the suggestion that such was a possibility had to be avoided. This was a marked contrast both to the period of George I’s diplomacy in the Great Northern War and to the episode in 1729 when British support had been promised against a threatened Prussian attack on Hanover.16 George II was forced to conceal his anti-Prussian diplomacy in the latter stages of the War of the Austrian Succession. In addition, in 1757 the Convention of Klosterseven, by which Cumberland, commander of the Army of Observation that had failed to defend Hanover against a superior French force, agreed to disband the army, was disowned by George II under pressure from his British ministers, despite the fact that the army included no British troops.17 The reception of the neutrality convention of 1741, and later of Klosterseven, demonstrated that it would be impossible to arrange an understanding between Britain and France through Hanover or by threatening Hanover. British ministers were not open to suggestions or pressure this way, or at least did not wish to be, and most, but not all, British ministers were not interested in centring Britain’s foreign policy on the defence of Hanover. This was a marked contrast to the role of the Hanoverian minister Münchhausen in 1748 in fostering the idea of British diplomatic intervention in the Empire in order to create a collective security system aimed against France and Prussia, an idea

48

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that was to serve as the basis of the Imperial Election Scheme but that would also protect Hanover.18 The failure to maintain pressure on George II via Hanover served like the fall of Walpole to exacerbate Anglo-French relations in 1742. It would be wrong to attribute this to France. She could no more control British politics than prevent Frederick II from settling with Austria, thus altering the military balance in the Empire, to the advantage of Hanover and the detriment of Bavaria. Louis XIV might have helped to bring down Charles II’s leading minister Danby, but Britain in 1741–2 was a different political world to 1678– 9. In 1741 the French envoy Bussy denied reports that France had sought to finance opposition electoral activity.19 While it was in France’s interest for Britain to be weak, and there was also much support for the Jacobites in French political circles, it was not in French interest for the Walpole ministry to be replaced by the more bellicose opposition Whigs. If political attitudes made compromise with France difficult in 1740–42, it is reasonable to consider the source and strength of these attitudes, for antiFrench feeling dur ing the war s of 1689–1713 had not prevented a subsequent reconciliation. A major problem was that the Anglo-French alliance of 1716–31 had not been based on empathy and had put down no political roots. This was even more true of the attempts to improve relations in the 1730s, and in not only The Hague conferences of 1734–5 but also the discussions of 1736–7: the suggestions of co-operation over the Jülich-Berg question, the replacement of the provocative French envoy Chavigny by the more conciliatory Cambis, the British attempt to bribe the French foreign minister Chauvelin—all had been part of the world of largely secret diplomacy. There had been no ministerial defence of good relations with France, no attempt to explain the need for an understanding with her. The ministry’s public position had not been helped by divisions within the government over neutrality in the War of the Polish Succession and by the need to rely on essentially prudential reasons when defending Br itish neutrality. As a result, the public debate over foreign policy in 1733–5 had been largely surrendered to the opposition, as it was also to be at the time of the controversy over Spanish depredations on British trade in 1738–9; or at least they had been able to take the initiative with their reiterated and related charges of ministerial failure to defend national interests and a serious deterioration in international relations. The French refusal to press their military and diplomatic advantages in the 1730s20 had ensured that there was then no international crisis leading Britain close to war in which the British ministry would be forced to take note of domestic political views, as it was obliged to do over Spanish depredations. During the War of the Polish Succession, the neutrality of the Austrian Netherlands had been respected, and Belle-Isle’s successful campaign in the Moselle valley in 1734 had not been followed up by an invasion of northern

49

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Germany. In order to obtain peace with Austria in 1735, France had allowed her alliance with Spain to collapse. In 1741, however, the situation was very different. In place of the distant throne of Poland, the integrity of the Habsburg inheritance was at stake. The French might respect the neutrality of the Austrian Netherlands until 1744, thus denying the British the most obvious invasion route into France, but it was not clear that this respect would last, while elsewhere a comprehensive recasting of the European system appeared to be a prospect. This apparently vindicated hostile British views of France and made the task of suggesting any accommodation with her impossible, despite the fact that Britain was already involved in a popular war with another power, Spain, and that, as was pointed out, opposition to France would necessarily reduce the effort made against Spain. The Commons motion of 1741 for a subsidy to Maria Theresa saw both government and opposition speakers in harmony. Walpole’s protégé Pelham, then Paymaster General, warned of what may be expected from an emperor whose elevation was procured by the forces of France…they may all conspire to dismember the empire into petty kingdoms, and free themselves from the dread of a formidable neighbour, by erecting a number of diminutive sovereigns, who may be always courting the assistance of their protectors…Thus will the House, by which Europe has been hitherto protected, sink into an empty name, and we shall be left to stand alone against all the powers that profess a different religion, and whose interest is opposite to that of Great Britain. William Pulteney, the leader of the opposition Whigs in the Commons, replied, “I shall not delay, for a single moment, my consent to any measures that may re-establish our interest on the continent, and rescue Germany once more from the jaws of France.”21 That May, however, Bussy sent a lengthy report to Amelot, explaining why it was in the British interest to try to negotiate differences with France. He pointed out British vulnerability to invasion, the financial strains of war and the difficulties of relying on Austria, and suggested that it would be in Britain’s interest to settle the pretensions of the various claimants on the Austrian succession jointly with France.22 This vision of Anglo-French cooperation was to be offered on a number of occasions during the century, but, as in 1741, it ignored not only British domestic political pressures but also the state of international relations. There was no basis of trust in Anglo-French relations, a situation exacerbated in 1741 by the suspicion that France was supporting the Jacobites.23 Nevertheless, despite the absence of any AngloFrench co-operation, Bussy argued that the fall of Walpole would be bad for France. He stressed national antipathy to France, in contrast to Chavigny, who had stressed popular hostility to Walpole in his reports in the 1730s. On 1 January 1742 Bussy wrote of the hostile views of the nation towards France and the black jealousy with 50

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which French superiority was seen, especially at sea, and doubted that France could find a more favourable ministry.24 It might therefore be asked whether the move towards Anglo-French hostilities should be seen as inevitable, a necessary consequence of Walpole’s fall in early 1742 and the rise of Carteret and of Stair, men who in 1723 had been referred to as members of la cabale autrichienne by the French charge d’affaires.25 In qualification of this view it should be pointed out that the two powers did not formally declare war until 1744 and that eighteenth-century international conflicts included numerous instances of incomplete hostilities, combatants who were not at war with all their allies’ enemies or who were fighting as auxiliaries only. There was also the obvious points of political choice and international circumstances. In 1742 the new ministry had the choice of escalating the war with Spain, over which Walpole had been criticized for not prosecuting it vigorously enough, or of sending military forces to the Continent to oppose France in a commitment whose future extent it would be difficult to envisage or control. International circumstances might not be propitious for British intervention, though Austrian successes in the winter of 1741–2 helped to encourage a sense that the French might have been overambitious. The unpredictable nature of the situation and the extent to which a measure that might appear clear in its likely meaning and/or consequences was not necessarily so to contemporaries were suggested in a letter written by John Drummond MP, an important figure in London mercantile circles who had been a supporter of Walpole and was now one of the new government. He mentioned the British troops to be sent to the Austrian Netherlands, adding “this shows our readiness to do our duty to the Queen of Hungary and to secure the Barrier of which our King is guarantee…this will rather prevent a war with France than bring it on”.26 Bussy promptly warned Paris that the new ministry intended to assist Austr ia, 27 though the rumours that flourished in the volatile political atmosphere that accompanied and followed the fall of Walpole ensured that contrary reports were received, including the inaccurate suggestion that an envoy, possibly Chesterfield, would be sent to Paris to attempt to negotiate a peace favourable to Maria Theresa.28 The French ministry was, however, under no illusions about the intentions of the new ministers, Amelot writing to the French envoy in Madrid that the government was considering the state of its frontier defences.29 An important feature of the discussions about Anglo-French relations in this period, especially at ministerial level, was that they centred on the state of continental affairs. There was scant consideration either of Anglo-French relations in the colonies or the impact on them of conflict between the two powers. Indeed, one consequence of the events of 1742 was a move away from concern with the colonies. Not only was the Caribbean war with Spain substantially abandoned, but the fact that Britain and France were not formally 51

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at war, but were instead involved as auxiliaries, limited the possibilities of transoceanic confrontation between them. As Thomas Anson pointed out in 1743, “We have been fighting all summer in Germany with the French, without a war.” At that stage, there was no conflict between the two powers in North America, the West Indies or the Indian Ocean. Carteret set out the objectives of the new ministry clearly in a letter to Stair of May 1742, His Majesty and this whole nation being fully convinced that it is upon the preservation of the House of Austria in a condition to resist the mischievous attempts of that of Bourbon, that the maintenance of the common liberties of Europe, the support of the Empire, the continuance of the Protestant religion, and the security and independence of both the Maritime Powers [Britain and the Dutch] do chiefly depend.30 Thus Br itish interests were to be identified with a particular state of continental affairs, one that in the circumstances of 1742 dictated conflict with France. This was a radical shift from Walpolean precepts and indeed from William III’s willingness to settle the Spanish Succession with Louis XIV without consulting the Austrians, although Carteret, in his successful pressure on the Austrians to yield territory to Prussia and Sardinia, was to reveal that his view of the “preservation of the House of Austria” was not that held in Vienna. Stair was also clear about his anti-French views, writing in June 1741, while in opposition, I was always of opinion that it was absolutely necessary for the very being of this nation to support a balance of power in Europe, and that it was the interest of this nation to be on the side of the House of Austria, both because the House of Austria was the weakest, and because the House of Austria was not our rivals in trade, nor could be our rivals in point of power at sea. In office the following May, Stair wrote to Robinson, I have never been nor understood to be a partisan of the House of Bourbon; I have almost always had occasion to consider that House as too strong, and therefore I have been of opinion, that it was the interest of the king and of the nation of Great Britain, to put their weight into the scale of the House of Austria; this doctrine I have preached at a time when it was neither safe nor fashionable so to do, I think so still. In 1757 the Earl of Holder nesse, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, described France as “the constant…enemy of England”.31 Such remarks might suggest an immutable hatred of France located firmly in a longue 52

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dureé of attitudes that constituted an important factor in the structure of British foreign policy, but Carteret and Stair, like Newcastle, who was to organize a continental anti-French diplomatic strategy of containment in 1748–55, had held responsible posts during the period of the Anglo-French alliance, Carteret and Newcastle as Secretaries of State and Stair as envoy in Paris. Carteret and Stair had eventually fallen in large part because of their views, while Newcastle had keenly supported the reconciliation with Austria in 1731, but all had been prepared to act in accordance with the alliance. This willingness and the subsequent vigour and str idency of their antiFrench views can be considered from a number of aspects. In the 1720s and 1730s France definitely became a more vigorous, powerful and diplomatically active power, the contrast between her military forces at the time of the War of the Quadruple Alliance with Spain (1718–20) and during the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5) being especially instructive. Thus, a rational explanation of views changing in response to alterations in international relations can be advanced, though it scarcely testifies to the quasi-emotional force of the arguments advanced. It is also possible to locate a shift in the British political context. In its early days, the Anglo-French alliance had appeared to be closely linked to the Hanoverian Succession, as indeed it was. The French had refused to support Jacobite schemes and the Pretender had been unable to base himself near Paris, as he had done under Louis XIV. After the suppression of the Jacobite Atterbury Plot of 1722 the Succession appeared to be less under threat, a view confirmed by George II’s peaceful accession in 1727 and by the Jacobite failure to benefit markedly from the Anglo-French breach of 1731.32 This encouraged a consideration of national interests that did not centre on the defence of the Hanoverian Succession and thus, diplomatically, on the maintenance of the Anglo-French entente. That entente had not of course been solely intended or maintained for that purpose, but royal and ministerial concern about the defence both of Hanover and of the Hanoverian Succession had given it an impetus and located it in the world of domestic politics. The other important reason for a shift in consciousness was the development and definition of opposition Whig views. There had been opposition Whigs before 1725, both in 1717–20 and in the Cowper Group of the early 1720s.33 They had not, however, concentrated their attacks on foreign policy, largely because there were more tempting targets: the radical domestic programme of the Stanhope—Sunderland ministry and the attempt to “screen” the South Sea Company. The “new” opposition that began in 1725 devoted far more attention to foreign policy. This was a measure of Walpolean caution in domestic policy, the sense that policy could now be criticized without accusations of Jacobitism and a growing concern about the implications of British foreign policy. It was one thing to fight Spain and seek to resist the advance of Russia in the late 1710s, quite another to appear ready in alliance with France to attack Austria after the negotiation of the Treaty of Hanover in 1725. Support for Austria was to be the central theme of opposition Whig 53

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thinking on foreign policy. It was glanced at in the pseudonymous name of the author of the Craftsman, the most influential opposition newspaper, Caleb d’Anvers (of Antwerp, a leading town in the Austrian Netherlands), and repeated in press and Parliament. As a cause, support for Austria lacked the immediacy, emotional fervour and populist possibilities of the Spanish depredations on British trade, which were to create political difficulties for Walpole in 1729 and 1738–9, but it did offer a means to analyze international relations and British foreign policy while providing a historical framework that linked the opposition critique to the anti-French Whig heroes, William III and Marlborough. These views were developed in 1725–42 without having to confront the reality of difficulties in Anglo-Austrian relations.34 They were to guide foreign policy from 1742 until 1755, providing the crucial politically acceptable or plausible continental anchor for an interventionalist diplomacy that support for Hanover and opposition to Prussia could not offer, as George II was made to realize. Carteret and Stair, therefore, acted with the vigour of men who had been preaching in the political wilderness for a long time a policy that suddenly seemed to be both really necessary and possible, thanks to a happy combination of domestic and international circumstances. In such a situation, talk of AngloFrench ar rangements and negotiations appeared both dangerous and superfluous, and Carteret failed to follow up discussions with Bussy in March 1742.35 This was to remain the case until difficulties and failure in war and growing problems with allies lent urgency to the possibility of peace negotiations. It was believed that France could not afford a long war,36 and the French were well aware of the determination of the new ministry. In June 1742 Amelot wrote to Fénelon, the French envoy at The Hague, that France wanted peace, but did not doubt that the principal opposition would arise from the British, who, he wrote, wanted “rétablir la Cour de Vienne dans son ancienne splendeur, mais qui de plus sont animés contre la France d’une fureur qui va jusqu’ au fanatisme”. Fénelon, employing language similar to that which the British opposition had used against France for several years, wrote that Britain wished “se rendre arbitre despotique des affaires de l’Europe”.37 The mood in Britain in the summer of 1742 was optimistic. Drummond wrote in June, “our present great comfort is the King of Prussia’s accommodation with…the Queen of Hungary [Maria Theresa] and her Hungarian Majesty’s forces good success against the French and their allies in the Empire …our army which is shipping off with all expedition…will be increased if necessary”. George Harbin added in August, If our politicians have good intelligence, the French are to be driven out of Germany: confined to their own country: Germany to be parcelled out to confederate princes: The new works of Dunkirk entirely to be demolished: and the ambition of France rendered incapable of disturbing the peace of Europe for some ages.38 54

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This optimism flew in the face of the recent experience of the war with Spain, namely deflated hopes, but reflected the hopes of a new government and an apparently propitious international situation. Optimism was to last until late 1743, when the failure to exploit Dettingen, the realization that the issue of f avour for Hanover would cause a parliamentary storm and growing divisions within the ministry over Carteret’s failure to consult his colleagues all led to an appreciation of the domestic political implications of the war. The following year, the international situation deteriorated when France supported the Jacobites openly, Britain became a pr incipal in the conflict and Freder ick II’s attack on Austr ia f atally handicapped her war effort against France and, therefore, her ability to further Britain’s goals. The British found, as the French had earlier done, both in the War of Spanish Succession and in that of the Austrian Succession, that the window of opportunity created by favourable diplomatic and domestic circumstances in the early stages of a conflict could not survive the problems and exigencies of alliance politics and the pressure of failure. The British lost the ability to determine how far they should intervene because interests they judged vital were directly affected by French support for the Jacobites and by successful French military action in the Austrian Netherlands. In October 1743 the veteran diplomat Horatio Walpole sent his former protégé Trevor, now envoy in The Hague, the accurate prediction that the ministry would survive parliamentary attacks “but yet I don’t see so clearly as I could wish how we shall make a good end of this war”. Carteret was needlessly optimistic about the value of Britain’s alliances and her relative diplomatic strength vis-à-vis France, although necessarily so from his own point of view as his views about France had not diminished in their intensity and he argued that it was crucial to maintain a balance of power against her. Carteret told the House of Lords in December 1743 there is an enemy at once nearer and more powerful, an enemy which equally in peace and war endeavours our destruction, and whose trade and armies are equally to be dreaded; an enemy so artful, that even the utmost friendship which can subsist between us, is only an intermission of open hostilities.39 However attractive this view might be for a domestic audience, especially at a time when Carteret was trying to restore his domestic credentials in the face of criticism for apparently favouring Hanover, it was one that was to cause considerable difficulties for British foreign policy. The argument that France could not be trusted limited Britain’s room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis both her allies and France, and that at a time both when wars generally ended as a result of unilateral negotiations and when such negotiations were common during a war.40 British intransigence also made subsequent compromise at a time of 55

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peace politically less palatable, and encouraged the French to concentrate their efforts against Britain, in particular by supporting the Jacobites in 1744–6.41 French support for the Jacobites was the immediate cause of the formal outbreak of war in 1744, just as the French attack on Minorca was to be in 1756. In neither case were these immediate causes the first instance of fighting, let alone of confrontation or hostility between the two powers. In both cases, they were of importance, however, because there was no sharp divide between war and peace in this period, but rather a continuum, including states of undeclared war, that could enable powers to retain a degree of freedom of choice about their commitment to the struggle. A formal declaration of war lessened this dramatically, as well as ensuring that a conflict would have to be waged in order to obtain the best peace terms. French support for the Jacobites was an unambiguous declaration of hostility, and one that caused Britain very considerable problems in 1744–6. It marked the culmination of Jacobite aspirations and the French recognition that their conflict with Britain was not a limited war subject to limitations and compromise. By supporting the Jacobites, the French were seeking a radical solution, a total victory both diplomatically and militarily, in stark contrast to the usual portrayal of ancien régime warfare and international relations as limited in their aim. The 1744 war was a failure, a French invasion attempt thwarted more by Channel storms than by the British navy, but French successes in the Austrian Netherlands the following year offered the prospect of a militarily more secure road to victory. Rather than relying on the vagaries of wind and naval success, as in 1744, or on the unpredictable nature of the relationship between George II and his British ministers by threatening Hanover, as in 1741, and as was suggested again in May 1745,42 it was clearly possible for the French to achieve success in the Low Countries. Chesterfield reflected in July 1745, I look upon Flanders now as gone and whatever else the French have a mind to, as going. Where then are we? What will our friend Louis XV say to us? I fear he will think himself in a situation to dictate, rather than propose. The only way therefore in my opinion to converse with him upon equal terms is first to whisper and agree with Antimac [Frederick II]. Newcastle was struck by the melancholy and almost desperate situation of things in every part of Europe.43 In that situation the government was willing to negotiate with France, though the ministers in London expressed a clear preference for settling with Prussia first, Newcastle writing in July 1745, were it possible to flatter ourselves with the hopes of making a tolerable general peace under these disadvantageous circumstances, it would, undoubtedly, be best of all; and as we consider the detaching of France, in 56

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no other light, than that of making a general peace; it is from the difficulty, or impossibility, of doing this, at present, upon tolerable terms, that we give the preference to that which we think may be obtained, vizt an accommodation with the King of Prussia.44 The context, ministerial correspondence in a period of anxiety about a deteriorating military situation rather than a parliamentary statement designed to elicit support, was different, but Newcastle’s language was not that of Carteret, who had indeed been forced out in February 1744 by opposition from his fellow ministers. Newcastle’s language was that of prudential assessment, of finding the best time for successful negotiations. He was willing to support talks through Bussy, while writing “no kind of judgment can be formed either as to the real intentions of the court of France, to come to an accommodation at all; or, if they were so disposed, as to the conditions upon which that accommodation was to be made”. 45 However, the prospect of exploratory talks was swept aside by the ‘45, the landing of Bonnie Prince Charlie in Scotland and his subsequent invasion of England. There is no scholarly account of Anglo-French discussions or negotiations during the war, with the exception of Lodge’s book, which concentrates on the last years of the war and omits French and many British sources.46 The very infrequency of earlier direct contacts suggests that hostility between the two powers had become one of the most pronounced elements in international relations. The events of 1745–6 set the tone for the rest of the war. The Frenchsupported Jacobites were unable to challenge the Hanoverian Succession successfully, although the British government remained concerned about Jacobite schemes for the remainder of the war. Conversely, the British and their allies were unable to defeat the French in the Low Countries, and by 1747 the French had successfully invaded the United Provinces, an ample demonstration of the strength and success of the French military machine. Hopes that the British-supported Orangist takeover of Holland and Zeeland in 1747 would lead to a great strengthening of the Dutch state, closer relations with Britain and a revival of the anti-French alliance, proved misplaced. The French success further exacerbated the security situation in Britain. Newcastle’s private secretary, Andrew Stone, wrote from Whitehall in August 1745, We hope we shall soon have a pretty strong squadron in the Channel: But I know too well, the great delays and uncertaintys that service is liable to, to depend very much upon it. When Ostend is gone (as it will soon be) I tremble to think of the constant alarms we shall be subject to; and of the effects those alarms will naturally produce.47 Indeed Ostend, a possible invasion base, fell to the French soon after. Any peace would have to be a compromise. The dream of a dictated peace, 57

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such as Louis XIV had nearly been brought to accept in 1709–10, was clearly no longer on the agenda. However, the realization that peace would have to entail compromise helped to awaken divisions within Britain over foreign policy. These centred on what should be the top priority in the peace negotiations. Essentially the clash was one of America versus the Continent (of Europe), national interests versus those of allies and the maintenance of a collective security system. Such a contrast in Anglo-French relations was new, although there was a significant precedent in Anglo-Spanish relations. By the Treaty of Seville in 1729 the Walpole ministry had agreed to support Philip V’s interests in Italy, against the wishes of Austria and her British supporters, in order both to seal the dissolution of the Austro-Spanish alliance of 1725 (the Treaty of Vienna) and to obtain a satisfactory settlement of Anglo-Spanish differences, particularly over Caribbean trade. However, this was not a case of the British government prefering maritime to continental interests, because the logic of the British alliance system, especially the alliance with France, dictated an effort to win over Spain and such an effort required a settlement of commercial and colonial differences. In contrast, Anglo-French colonial disputes had played little role in AngloFrench relations, either in the wars of 1689–1713 or in the creation, course and collapse of the Anglo-French alliance of 1716–31. The opposition attempt to inspire a parliamentary storm in 1730 over French aggression in St Lucia had failed. Concern over French schemes in the West Indies lacked the political resonance and popular interest aroused by Spanish policies there or, in 1730, by French works at Dunkirk. The situation was to be very different by the late 1740s. The retention of Cape Breton Island and the French base of Louisbourg on the island was to be a major political issue in 1745–8. The capture of Louisbourg, the leading French fortress guarding the approaches to Canada, was popular in Britain, Philip Yorke writing to his brother Joseph in August 1745 “the surrender of Cape Breton has put our merchants in high spirits…being the best managed expedition of any that has been undertaken during the whole course of the war”. Its capture had been suggested to the Privy Council in 1740.48 Aside from the intrinsic importance of the gain, the political climate was propitious for a new stress on the value of colonial conquests. By 1745 both public and ministerial disenchantment with Britain’s allies, continental commitments and the role of Hanover were all far advanced. The hope that the fall of Carteret in 1744 would both ease these concerns over Britain’s continental policy and would lessen George II’s zeal for both Hanover and anti-Prussian policies was not realized. Old England, a leading London opposition newspaper, painted a dire picture in August 1745, we may soon expect to see England the wretched appendix of a despicable corner of Germany; we may expect to see the Hanoverian sergeants beating up for recruits on the streets of London, and a bill 58

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brought in for cancelling the few articles of the Act of Settlement still in force…a Broad-bottomed ministry, whose sole merit in the opposition was to oppose the encroachments of Hanover, and whose merit in the administration has been to encourage them.49 The Opposition press was obliged to concentrate on Hanover, because it was not informed of the details of Britain’s troubled relations with her allies, but ministers who were also complained about them. Newcastle drew attention to the role of political opinion in his complaints about the failure to defend the Austrian Netherlands adequately, the behaviour of the Queen of Hungary [Maria Theresa], in totally abandoning the Netherlands; and the refusal of the court of Brussels [the government of the Austrian Netherlands], to let the places there have the defence, which the nature of their situation gives them, by the inundation [opening dykes]; have raised here the utmost resentment against the Court of Vienna, and rendered their cause much less popular, that it formerly has been. And when it shall be known, that the court of Vienna has formally refused to lessen the number of their enemies, at present so numerous, by making up with the king of Prussia, and persist in pursuing their own particular views and interests, at the expense of their allies, there will be very little room for them to hope for any assistance from this country in the support of those measures. And yet, Newcastle also asserted the strategic need for the support of continental states that he felt Britain had “in all events, the recovery of Flanders is so capital a point for this country, that we cannot but humbly hope, that it will take place of all other considerations”.50 This view was shared by Stair, who wrote the same month that he was not afraid “of the Pretender nor of an invasion on any part of Great Britain but if the machine of the alliance should happen to fall to the ground I’m afraid the affairs of this nation will be found to be in a very dangerous situation whatever some people have been in use to say”.51 Thus, the guidelines of a future clash were already evident. Whatever the problems with Britain’s allies, ministers held that they were needed. The maintenance both of these alliances and of the strategic situation in the Low Countries threatened to compete with overseas priorities. This was to become a pressing diplomatic and political problem, because of the failure to reverse France’s gains in 1745 and also her subsequent success in making further gains. This owed something to the diversion of British troops to fight the Jacobites in 1745–6, more to the Austrian failure to meet their quotas, and much to French military skill, especially that of Saxe. The French attempt to regain Cape Breton by a naval expedition fell victim to Atlantic storms and disease in 1746, but they were to succeed in their goal as 59

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a result of their campaigning in the Low Countries. Furthermore, British hopes of an expedition to Canada in 1746 were abandoned. Indeed, the following year the President of the French Council of Marine suggested that French pressure in the Low Countries would prevent the British from sending troops to North America, that, in short, the French could hold Canada in Europe.52 The peace negotiations of 1748 served to reconcile the different political expectations and contrasting military successes of the combatants. France returned her acquisitions in the Low Countries, Britain Cape Breton. This was criticized in Britain, where the propaganda and polemic of naval strength against Spain in 1738–9 was now employed against France. Thus, any stress on a shift in British attitudes towards France and a newfound emphasis on transoceanic rivalry has to be contextualized by reference to a continuation in the maritime and colonial discourse of British power and interests. This striking shift reflected, first, naval and colonial success against France in 1745–8, a contrast to the situation during the last war with France, that of the Spanish Succession, which had been essentially characterized by victories on land; secondly, the compromising of the only major victory on land— Dettingen (1743)–by accusations of royal favour for Hanover; and, thirdly, the growing importance of maritime and colonial affairs in the British perception of France. The power that in 1733 and 1741 had appeared poised to repeat Louis XIV’s triumphs on the Continent was, by 1748, increasingly seen as a maritime rival; and whereas the warfare of 1743–8, particularly 1745–8, had shown that Britain could not resist France’s power on the Continent, this had not been the case at sea. Typical of the jingoistic propaganda was a ballad of early 1748 that was dubious about the likely results of the peace negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle, preferring to rely on naval strength If Britain’s sons all Gallic arts despise, Why listen we at Aix to Gallic lies? If on our navy Heaven confers success, Why this long quibbling, and this fine address? … Why not our wooden world in motion keep? Say, is not Britain regent of the deep? Superior force invincible is ours. … If the Grand Monarch will insist on things Beneath the dignity of generous kings; Let him insist—and if he’s e’er so stiff Man well the fleet.53 Such arguments ignored the practical problems of employing naval power to achieve diplomatic ends, 54 and therefore played no part in the British ministerial debate of 1747–8 over the peace negotiations, but they helped to shape public attitudes towards France. The extension of the application of such views from Spain to France was arguably the most important shift in public 60

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consciousness in the 1740s. The public was eager to see Britain as a successful naval power. The authorized account of Anson’s circumnavigation of the world in 1740–44, in which the latterday Francis Drake successfully and profitably attacked the Spaniards in the Pacific, appeared in 1748 and went through five printings. The extent of the public under discussion is difficult to assess. It was essentially urban,55 and the notion of there being only one public opinion is of course misleading, although the public culture of the period emphasized a homogeneity of proper opinion as of proper conduct. Furthermore, just as the voices of those who did not want conflict with France, such as most Catholics and those who traded with her, were muted, so the public voice of those who were opposed to aggressive policies and war was less obvious than those who stridently proclaimed a definition of national interests in terms of hostility to France. Opposition to high taxes and concern about the size of the national debt could be a coded or not so implicit call for peace, but they were not dominant themes in the public debate, though they were important considerations for Pelham, First Lord of the Treasury from 1743 until his death in 1754, as they had been earlier for Walpole. Carteret, now Earl Granville, told the Sardinian envoy in December 1751 that Nova Scotia might be a second Jenkins’ Ear, an issue over which the nation drove the government to war. Mirepoix reported that Newcastle sincerely wished to settle the issue, but would be more affected by other pressures, such as parliamentary opinion.56 Yet it would be wrong to place too much weight on the public debate and the role of public opinion. They are too often employed as explanatory devices when the structure of the political system and the detailed development of affairs have not been adequately probed. Hostility to France and the call for “blue water” policies against her neither prevented the government from negotiating peace in 1748 and, subsequently, successfully defending its terms in Parliament, nor stopped Newcastle from developing and following an agenda for British foreign policy in 1748–53 that centred on continental affairs. Newcastle was able to concentrate in 1748–53 on planning means to prevent a repetition of the varied strategic problems of 1745–8, ranging from the weak state of the Barrier in the Austrian Netherlands to the need to confront the possibility that both France and Prussia would be hostile. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suggest that altering perceptions played an important role in explaining the difference between the Anglo-French conflict that began in 1754 in North America and escalated to a full-scale war and earlier conflicts whose origins, course and consequences were essentially European. However, the causes of the conflict of 1754 should be related to the background of recent Anglo-French relations, in particular efforts to ease tensions in Europe. Eighteenth-century wars commonly ended as a result of collapses of alliances, and the coming of peace, in turn, further exacerbated this situation. Thus the Franco-Spanish alliance that had challenged Austria for control of 61

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Italy during the war of the Austrian Succession was replaced by an AustroSpanish understanding that excluded France, while Spanish neutrality for much of the Seven Years’ War crucially helped to swing the balance of maritime advantage against France. Puysieulx, French foreign minister at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession, hoped to improve relations with Britain. Hardwicke’s son, Joseph Yorke, Cumberland’s aide-de-camp at Culloden, who was sent to Paris in early 1749 as Secretary of Embassy, wrote to his influential father, a key ally and confidant of Newcastle and Pelham, in March 1749 to convince your lordship how much the French ministry have deceived themselves with false hopes of drawing England into a connection with them, since first the negotiation was begun at Aix-la-Chapelle, that St. Severin, their plenipotentiary there, had returned from the Congress saying that he founded his glory on having sowed the seeds of dissension between the courts of London and Vienna, and having made an irreparable breach between them and that from this notion came French offers to unite with us, in pacifying the rest of Europe. Later that month Yorke reported his discussions with Puysieulx: that minister is not displeased with what I told him, though he certainly wished a little more readiness to connect with them; however I hope this way of proceeding will take away those violent jealousies, he certainly had conceived of the designs of England in the North [the Baltic], and I really believe he is satisfied, at present, of the king’s desire to maintain the public tranquillity. Yorke added the following month that Puysieulx had told him both that Austria would draw Britain into a war and that she had approached France at Aix-la-Chapelle: it appears to me very plain, that Mr. Puysieulx wants to persuade us, to enter into some defensive, if not offensive engagements with his court…he went even so far as to say, he thought that England and France should tell the rest of Europe, that they would unite their force against whoever should attempt to disturb the peace; that we should always find them ready to oblige us, in everything, and he hinted, though they were only hints, at some marine disputes, which he gave me to understand, they should be ready to determine amicably, and in our favour. Yorke regarded the approach as dangerous, informing his father, “I am really always alarmed, when anything is said to me that tends to separate us from our allies.”57 62

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French good wishes were to be demonstrated by their efforts to keep the peace in the contemporary Baltic crisis caused by the prospect of an attack by Russia, a Br itish ally, on France’s ally Sweden, although Puysieulx was concerned about the British failure to consult France adequately in the crisis.58 Puysieulx’s views are of considerable interest in the prehistory of the “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756. They indicate a conviction that diplomatic links were not immutable, an equally correct assessment that the AngloAustrian alliance, which had essentially revived from 1741 under the pressure of war, was weak, and a belief that France could best defend her interests in a changing international system by co-operating with Britain. This analysis was facilitated by the strains in France’s alliance with Frederick II. Furthermore, Frederick’s relations with George II had not improved after the war and thus did not represent an impediment to better Anglo-French relations.59 Puysieulx’s attitude suggests that the eventual French acceptance of the Austrian approaches that led to the First Treaty of Versailles of 1 May 1756 should not be seen as revolutionary as it is sometimes presented. Indeed, in July 1748 Richelieu wrote to Puysieulx proposing an Austro-French rapprochement. Furthermore, the discussions and suggestions of new alignments in 1748–9, which included possible agreements between Britain and Prussia, Austria and France and Britain and France, throw a new light on the somewhat schematic arguments used to explain the events of 1756 from a systemic perspective.60 It is clear both that different arrangements were envisaged once peace had been negotiated and that the order of realignments that occurred in 1755–6 was not the sole possible one. The extent to which opportunities were missed in 1748– 9 is open to discussion, but the role of chance in 1755–6 is worth underlining because it encourages caution in adopting too forthright an approach to the questions of 1748–9. It was the unexpected Anglo-French North American crisis of 1754–5 that led Britain to turn to Prussia in 1755 when hopes that Austria would agree to protect Hanover proved misplaced. Had this crisis not occurred then the British ministry would probably have maintained its hopes about Austria. That would not have prevented the planned Austro-Russian attack of Prussia, but such an attack would not have led Britain to come to Frederick’s assistance, though she would not have assisted Austria either, unless possibly France had attacked the Austrian Netherlands. If chance played a major role in 1755–6, it is inappropriate to mimic the Duke of Newcastle in his certainties about British national interests in 1748– 54. Newcastle did not subscribe to a view of international relations as fixed, although he clearly felt that they ought to be. He put so much effort into fostering Anglo-Austrian relations 61 precisely because he believed that if Austria was mishandled the alliance would not survive. Newcastle wrote to Cumberland in October 1748, I can see the follies, and the vanity of the court of Vienna, but I see the danger and ruin of being dependent upon France. I was once catched in 63

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the year 1725 when the Hanover treaty was made. I got out of it in the year 1730 [sic for 1731] by the [Second] Treaty of Vienna …no considerations shall ever catch me again. Whenever it will go no longer upon the old foot I shall not help its going at all.62 His commitment was shared by Cumberland, and in July 1748 Pelham wrote that both had a very commendable partiality for that power [Austria], founded upon principles of the truest policy, and most extensive good to Europe, but I flatter myself I shall not offend, when I suggest that you have met with but unequal returns. They [the Austrians] have never come up to their engagements in any one particular.63 Newcastle’s commitment to what he termed the “Old System” was personal, but he also had specific, pragmatic reasons for querying suggestions of better relations with Prussia and France. The former he feared would endanger Anglo-Austrian and Anglo-Russian links, while he was also concerned about the strength of “the military party in France”. 64 The threat of improved relations with France and a peace signed without Austria could be used by the British to push Austria into accepting the terms of Aix-la-Chapelle,65 but suspicion of France remained strong. On that ground Newcastle opposed George II’s suggestion that France be asked to make a promise not to oppose his views on Osnabrück, telling Münchhausen, the head of the Hanoverian administration, of the difficulties that from the experience of above twenty years together both in the present and late reign, had arose to the King, as King and Elector, from applications of this sort to the court of France, who had never failed to give into them, in order to embarrass affairs, and influence the King’s conduct with regard to the great system of Europe, and that the same experience had also showed us, that these facilities in the part of France had never been of any service to the Electorate, but to distress and confound them.66 The matter was not pursued, and Newcastle’s attitude revealed the wishful thinking in Puysieulx’s suggestions of better Anglo-French relations and implied that as the Imperial Election Scheme was defined and developed by Britain it would not be in association or even co-operation with France. While it might be possible for the British government to make transitory use of France, as in setting peace terms or easing the Baltic crisis, difficulties in Anglo-Austrian relations were also seen by the government as temporary. Sandwich wrote in 1748 to Keith, the newly-appointed minister at Vienna, “in the sort of scene that you and I are engaged in fluctuations will frequently 64

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happen, but where people mean the same thing at the bottom, and pursue a system, matters generally subside in the end, which I flatter myself is the present case”. The press recalled problems with allies during the recent war, Henry Fielding writing in February 1748 that, when the “Broad Bottom” ministers had joined the government in November 1744, they had found “that of our allies, all of whom were weak, some of them indifferent, and those who were most in earnest, were pursuing interests separate from that of the common cause”. Yet this criticism of Carteret’s policies did not prevent his successors from seeking to maintain his alliance system, both during the war and subsequently.67 It could be argued that Anglo-Austrian differences over the following seven years were to prove Sandwich wrong, but, equally, it could be said that the alliance served Britain’s purpose until the crisis of 1754–5 pushed the defence of Hanover to the forefront of ministerial attention. The assessment hinges on the questions of whether Britain had any viable alternatives, and what would have happened had she not had her Austrian alliance. That, of course, would have depended on the degree of royal and ministerial commitments to the Continent, but, given that these were strong, it is reasonable to point out that the British position would have been weaker but for the Austrian alliance, however imperfect that might have been. Hanover would certainly have been more vulnerable to the Prussian attack that was feared in 1753. The notion floated in late 1748 of a German collective security system without Austria was not credible. It was proposed by the Ansbach envoy, Baron Seckendorf, to Münchhausen, Newcastle commenting, The immediate business is to preserve the Margraviates of Bareith and Ansbach from falling into the King of Prussia’s hands, but he has opened a very extensive scheme to His Majesty’s German ministers, of creating a party in the Empire, which I am afraid might give some umbrage to the Emperor and the Court of Vienna, as if the Imperial authority was infringed. Münchhausen was told by Newcastle very plainly that “we had spent twenty millions for the support of the House of Austria this war and that I hoped that would not be all set aside by a coup de plume”. He put much effort into easing Münchhausen’s suspicions of the Austrians and indeed claimed the credit for bringing the minister “off from all his resentment to the Court of Vienna and prejudice against a King of the Romans”.68 In contrast, in 1756–7 the British government, by then leaning towards Prussia, was concerned to block links between Austria and Hanover. Policy was different in the early 1750s. A German alliance system without Austria could only be credible if Prussia was a member, but an alignment with Frederick would bring the enmity of Austria and Russia, and, without an alliance with Austria, it would be impossible to win Russia over. As France was 65

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allied to Prussia and Sweden, the danger of heeding her suggestions of cooperation was that Britain might lose her freedom of manoeuvre and become committed in the Baltic crisis to hostility to Russia and thus Austria. In July 1750 Puysieulx argued that if only Britain and France could develop mutual confidence they would realize the futility of their alliances, which, according to him, were both valueless and costly.69 Indeed, the British failure to align with France later in the century has been criticized and there has been reference to “the series of sterile confrontations with Britain’s colonial rivals, France and Spain”.70 However, though it may seem attractive and plausible to portray the two traditional rivals co-operating against the rising powers of eastern Europe, the practicalities of this prospectus appear to have been largely overlooked. Had Britain accepted French leadership, then she would have been obliged to support France’s traditional protégés, Sweden, Poland and Turkey, powers that it would have been difficult to assist other than by what had already appeared in Peter I’s reign and was to appear again in 1791 as the overrated factor of naval power. Co-operation with France in 1748–9 would also have entailed support for Frederick II, a course that was scarcely likely to recommend itself to those who envisaged a stable collective security system, for Fredrick was still seen, with much reason, as an aggressive and unpredictable ruler. The failure to reach an understanding with France did not lead to a rapid deterioration in relations. The French government was absorbed in domestic problems and, to the irritation of Frederick, averse to taking an assertive role in international relations. Prepared to defend their diplomatic interests and unenthusiastic about the Imperial Exchange Scheme, the French were nevertheless not the active force in diplomacy they had been in the late 1730s, nor were they seeking to assemble a coalition of allies that would stand them in good stead in an imminent or developing crisis, as they had been in 1732–3 and 1741. In Europe, France acted as a satisfied power, not one seeking territorial expansion. Indeed, the French settled their frontier differences with a number of weaker powers, including Geneva (1749), Salm (1751) and Württemberg (1753). It was not surprising that the principal panic to affect British foreign policy in the period 1749–53 arose, in 1753, from suspicion of Prussian actions rather than French. Prussia appeared more of a problem than France to George II and his ministers in this period. Valory, the French envoy in Hanover, reported in June 1750 that Newcastle believed, or seemed to believe, that Frederick was a dangerous ruler determined to animate other powers against each other in order to be able to fish in troubled waters.71 The collective security system developed by Newcastle had thus overcome what had been a major political problem during the War of the Austrian Succession, the contrasting concerns of George II and his ministers about Prussia and France respectively. Hanover now seemed secured by British policy. In April 1751 the Austrian and Russian envoys gave Newcastle Austrian and Russian declarations containing a guaranty 66

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of Hanover in case it was attacked on account of George II’s accession to the 1746 Austro-Russian treaty, and all three agreed that the declarations “were considered as part of the treaty of accession and equally binding with that treaty”.72 As the likeliest attacker of Hanover was Frederick II,73 this agreement, and indeed the entire thrust of British policy, could be seen as serving to protect Hanover, without implying that that was the sole purpose. As such it could be seen as part of the gradual process of reconciliation between George II and the Pelhams that included such moves as accepting the appointment of Carteret, now Earl Granville, as Lord President of the Council in June 1751. This process was one in which the Pelhams had made much of the running, and indeed they had been criticised from 1744 for continuing the broad direction of Carteret’s foreign policy. Newcastle saw the Imperial Election Scheme and the other policies he fostered as designed against both France and Prussia, but much of the impetus behind the policies derived from the anti-Prussian attitudes of George, Cumberland and the Münchhausens. The policies were essentially formulated in 1748 when George and Newcastle visited Hanover, and major efforts to forward them were made on the subsequent visits in 1750 and 1752. These visits served to provide a context of policy-making in which the immediate focus of concern with Hanover and German politics then detracted from other issues. The stress on the Imperial Election Scheme helped to exacerbate relations with France and Prussia, both of which sought to prevent the Electors from lending their support. In July 1752 Newcastle wrote from Hanover to his fellow Secretary of State, Holdernesse, the King is far from thinking that the Court of France has acted with that fairness and sincerity which His Majesty’s behaviour towards them (particularly in this last negotiation), has deserved: in which the King has performed every part, that was to be expected from him; and the court of France have done the reverse, throughout the whole…this behaviour in the Court of France, this departure from their most solemn promises, is, in a great measure, owing to that ascendance, which the King of Prussia has gained over their councils…There is too much reason to fear, that, however justified His Majesty’s conduct will undoubtedly be, in the opinion of all the world; the disappointment of this measure will, and must, tend to increase his Prussian Majesty’s credit, and influence over the French councils; and, jointly, create such a power, as may not only affect the independency of the Empire; but, in its consequences, that of all Europe. And the Court of France have sufficiently show’d, by the return which they have made, in this instance, to the King’s confidence and communication with them, the little dependence, that is to be had upon them; and, consequently, how dangerous and impracticable, any system, to be formed with them, must prove in the event. 67

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The letter also included a reference to royal support for a firm stance towards the French in West Africa.74 Yet less attention was devoted to such disputes than they merited. The Imperial Election Scheme, a project that did not command wide support within the British ministry, thus served to provide instances that apparently demonstrated the accuracy of Newcastle’s fears of French intentions. Had Britain not supported the scheme it is possible that her continental foreign policy would not have given rise to such occasions, but, equally, the alignment with Austria and Russia and the link with Hanover would have served to maintain tense relations with Prussia and, therefore, her ally France, while Anglo-Russian relations would have led to tension with France’s other allies, Sweden and Turkey. It might appear paradoxical to argue, on the eve of an Anglo-French war that was to break out as a result of colonial differences, that it was Britain’s continental policy that principally served to exacerbate relations. There were important colonial disputes, in North America over the Canadian border and Nova Scotia, in the West Indies over Tobago, in West Africa and India, and they featured in Anglo-French diplomacy in 1749–53.75 The British government pressed for satisfaction on contested colonial issues, especially in 1749 over Tobago. That year, the government founded Halifax in order to strengthen the British presence in Nova Scotia. The recent peace treaty had confirmed the cession of Acadia to Britain, but had not specified its boundaries, and this proved a basis for dissension. It would be possible to paint a dire picture of mutual mounting concern, especially in North America, that appears to point towards inevitable conflict.76 However, it is worth noting that ministerial attention in both Britain and France was directed rather to European affairs and that there were signs of a relative absence of anxiety on colonial matters, Newcastle writing to a colleague in July 1750 “our late enemies seem disposed to be quiet, and… to do us justice in America, which is a great point”.77 Yorke, writing to his brother the following month from Paris, was less optimistic, but also less alarmist than William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, an influential advocate of a forward policy in America, who argued, in Yorke’s words, that the fate of North America and indeed of our marine depends on the success of Nova Scotia. I believe it is of great consequence, but I can’t imagine it is so nice an affair as he represents it. We continue to say here that we desire peace, and so we do I believe, but we shall not be so ready to give up any pretensions we may have in the New World, of which England is so jealous.78 Newcastle did not want war with France, and he argued that, by strengthening Britain’s continental position, he would make France less likely to challenge her: 68

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I was always of opinion that the more we strengthened ourselves, and our system upon the continent, by measures, and alliances, pacific and justifiable in themselves, (provided as the same time, that we adhered strictly and religiously to the terms of our Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle), the more France would covet our friendship, and be more disposed to preserve the peace, and this, the present experience shows to be the case.79 Thus, Britain could maintain her position in America through alliances in Germany. This analysis overlooked the role of developments within France and failed to give any weight to the possibility of what actually occurred, an escalating trans-oceanic crisis that neither government wanted. Indeed, Newcastle’s policy of deterrence through strength, both in Anglo-French relations in general, and in continental international relations, was to fail precisely because the mechanistic, systemic approach he adopted was inadequate. It was unable to cope with the strains and ambiguities of alliance politics seeking to reconcile different interests and to comprehend adequately the possibility of an unwanted crisis in which both governments felt it impossible to back down. The French were not to be deterred from reinforcing Canada in 1755 by Britain’s European alliances, although they helped to prevent France from attacking Hanover. In the meantime, the tension that led to the development and strengthening of the alliance system, and was created by it, did not create an atmosphere in Anglo-French relations that would be conductive to their peaceful settlement. This argument can be pushed too far. Newcastle was not the hawk in Anglo-French North American disputes, while negotiations over the North American border were conducted in Paris. Yorke wrote in September 1750 about Nova Scotia, “I hope as this Court seems really desirous of living at peace with us, that we shall be able to settle these points amicably, I dare not flatter myself that it will be speedily.”80 However, while proclaiming that they were fulfilling their obligations, for example, over the demolition of the works at Dunkirk,81 the French saw no basis for trust in Anglo-French relations. Puysieulx complained in December 1750 that British policy since the signature of peace scarcely suggested any desire to develop good relations. Instead, he claimed that Britain negotiated alliances as if on the eve of war, pursued the Imperial Election Scheme in an offensive fashion and treated French support for Prussia as a crime. Puysieulx added that Britain appeared to be preparing an invasion of Canada.82 The optimistic hope of better relations, of a new international order, had therefore been replaced by 1750 by French resentment at Br itain’s continental diplomatic strategy and by anxiety about her American plans. It was this anxiety that helped to lead to French projects that were viewed in turn as aggressive by Britain, and that led to confrontation in the Ohio river valley. However, conflict did not come for several years, and indeed, in December 1750 Mirepoix, the French Ambassador, sought to reassure Puysieulx about 69

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British intentions. He argued that Britain was not in a state for war and stressed the role of George II’s concern about Hanoverian vulnerability to Prussian attack as the basis for British diplomacy. This diplomacy was thus presented as essentially defensive, despite the suspicions it gave rise to. Mirepoix also argued correctly that Britain had no offensive plans in Canada, but he warned that domestic factors might affect her policy towards Nova Scotia and other problems, specifically that concern about parliamentary criticism would prevent any acceptable settlement. Mirepoix argued that of the four most influential ministers, Bedford, Hardwicke and Pelham sought peace, while only Newcastle would support George II’s desire to take a major European role. He added, nevertheless, that, although British policy was essentially defensive, it might lead to offensive action by Britain or her allies.83 Mirepoix’s analysis was a perceptive one, but it was not to guide French actions in North America. Arguably, had France had more confidence in the extent and purpose of British intentions, provocative moves and, ultimately, war would have been avoided and France would not have lost Canada. However, British policy appeared especially transitory in this period, because of the advanced years of George II, born in 1683, and the opposition of his heirs, Frederick, Prince of Wales, and, later, Frederick’s son, George, to his ministers. More to the point, yielding pretensions was regarded as a dishonourable step, and moreover one that was imprudent, because it would encourage further demands for concessions. The tradition in Europe was of long-standing legalistic disputes, especially in the Empire and Italy, while colonial controversies, for example, that over Sacramento, the Portuguese colony on the north shore of the Plate estuary, could be both long-lasting and conducted without leading to hostilities in Europe. This was also the experience of Britain and France. Conflict in India in the early 1750s between their East India Companies played little part in diplomatic relations between the two powers, and did not lead to war between them. Newcastle noted in June 1753 of negotiations concerning India, “This negotiation was purely between company and company; though the East India Company would (as became them) do nothing without His Majesty’s permission.” The French were concerned that the pressure of British westward expansion in North America would undermine the security of their colonies there.84 They saw no reason to yield points that would assist this process, and were anyway aware that the central concern of British policy in 1749–53 was European. Despite Puysieulx’s fears in late 1753, there was no reason to anticipate a Br itish attack on Canada, and the number of reports and instructions devoted to American affairs in the French diplomatic series Correspondance Politique Angleterre does not jump until 1754. Other colonial quarrels in the years before were settled or conducted without the outbreak of war, Yorke writing in September 1752, “I am very easy about the coast of Africa. France will never attack us where we are strongest, and therefore we are 70

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mad, if we are not so everywhere, where we can.”85 In the winter of 1752–3 the British appealed for French pressure on Frederick II to moderate his threats to Saxony and Hanover, action that did not stem from any trust in French intentions, but that would hardly have been taken had negotiations over America been so tense that the ministry feared to show any weakness.86 Indeed Newcastle argued that there was a relationship between Britain’s colonial and continental strength, that America could be endangered if Hanover was lost, when in February 1753 he expressed the hope that France would interpose with Prussia.87 Yet Newcastle did not trust the French. He feared that French military encampments might be connected with those of Prussia,88 and that Frederick II would press for French support over the eventual succession to the crown of Poland, “though perhaps, this may be too strong, and too uncertain a measure, for France to come into at present; there is, however great reason to believe, that the court of France are preparing measures so, as to be able to strike, and with effect, whenever the case shall happen”.89 Given that a major war had broken out when the Polish throne was last contested in 1733, it was sensible for rulers and ministers to anticipate that another conflict might thus arise, and it was reasonable for Newcastle to anticipate that Britain might not be neutral as she had been during the last Polish succession war. Allegations of French works at Dunkirk in clear breach of treaty obligations also aroused distrust. Yorke thought them worth fighting over, while the London press discussed the issue, the opposition Protester bitterly criticizing, the government.90 There is no doubt from Newcastle’s correspondence that he distrusted France, even though he appreciated that her government was less aggressive that that of Prussia: The late letters from Mylord Albemarle [envoy in Paris], have brought nothing, that can give any room to guess, what may be the final resolution of the court of France, upon the two material points, now depending; the election of the King of the Romans; and the particular disputes with the King of Prussia. Mor. de St. Contest [French foreign minister] varies his manner of talking almost in every conversation. Sometimes he talks plausibly, and pretty satisfactory upon both points; and afterwards, in the next conversation, appears as difficult, and as unreasonable as ever. I think, their present view is, not to break the peace; but the King of Prussia will certainly carry them great lengths, if he shall think proper to insist upon it; and, therefore, we should always endeavour to prepare for the worst.91 This was scarcely an optimistic assessment, and it helps to explain both why Newcastle continued his attempt to breathe life into the Anglo-Austro-Russian system and why he was to be filled with foreboding when the situation in America deteriorated. However, as Anglo-French hostility still revolved around continental issues in 1753, it was not surprising that Newcastle, who had been 71

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more interventionalist than his ministerial colleagues for a number of years, especially over the issue of subsidies for possible allies, should inform the Sardinian envoy, Perron, in August 1753 that he was alone in his view that Britain should adopt a firmer view in order to make France more tractable while his colleagues feared war.92 As 1754 opened, Mirepoix was not greatly concerned about British policy. He reported that the British government had no plans which could threaten peace, that Pelham was too occupied with domestic and financial problems to support Austrian and Russian schemes and that George II’s concern about Hanover, and the need for possible Austrian and Russian pressure on Prussia, had not led to ministerial support for these schemes.93 Mirepoix did however touch on British domestic sensitivity to colonial issues, though the problem in question was not North American. He reported that news of French naval moves led the British government to press for the despatch of help to the Indies, principally in order to end criticism in London. Mirepoix nevertheless warned that, although the British government wished to settle disputes, France should take precautions, while St Contest wrote that Britain would be unable to intimidate France over the Indies. 94 Mirepoix’s confidence in British passivity was somewhat hit by Pelham’s unexpected death, 95 but he was hopeful that domestic political problems would dissuade the government from taking a more forceful role abroad.96 Rather than suspecting colonial trouble, Mirepoix reported that Newcastle sought good relations, and that the only danger came from his complaisance towards George II’s pro-Austr ian sentiments, an analysis whose stress on the Continent accorded with Newcastle’s views of the previous September.97 Bar the affairs of India, there was little diplomatic activity in Anglo-French relations in May or early June 1754, and Mirepoix took leave of absence as a result of this lull. St Contest was unhappy about this, but because of his concern about developments in India, not America.98 North America had been a cause of diplomatic activity and ministerial concern for a number of years, but its sudden rise to prominence in the summer of 1754, with the outbreak of fighting in the Ohio valley, was a surprise. Nova Scotia had not been a serious point in dispute since 1751. Horatio Walpole, a diplomatic veteran of the Anglo-French alliance, was aware of the importance attached to the issues at stake but hopeful that they could be settled without war. He wrote in July 1754 to Robert Dinwiddie, LieutenantGovernor of Virginia, of his concern at the unjust attempts of the French upon the boundaries of our colonies; if they go on in the project they seem to have in view, they will encompass all our norther n colonies in the back by a chain of communication between the rivers Canada, and Mississippi, and come masters of all the Indians, and the trade on that continent, which require our utmost attention, and exertion of strength to prevent it, but as it is a 72

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common cause to all our northern colonies…they might I am fully persuaded, consider ing their connection and the number of their inhabitants, soon disperse the French and their Indians, and disappoint their dangerous schemes, which at the beginning may be done, if cordially undertaken, without any great expense, and they might think fit to retire at once; before the councils of France shall have openly owed it, and made it a matter of state; but if they are suffered to make a strong settlement there and get together forces enough to support it, it may occasion troubles between the two nations of such expense and extent as may make it difficult to put an end to.99 North American differences were not, however, as easy to overlook as problems in India. St Contest’s replacement, Rouillé, certain that the French had only maintained their rights and repelled force by force, argued that border problems could be dealt with by the commissioners already empowered to do so, but added ominously, but accurately, that once clashes had begun their consequences would be difficult to contain. He stressed French moderation,100 but in late September 1754 the British decided to send two regiments to America in order to conduct offensive operations. The most recent discussion of the subject has concluded that this was due to the bellicose views of Cumberland and two ministers, the Earl of Halifax, President of the Board of Trade, and Henry Fox, the Secretary-at-War. Halifax, a keen supporter of a British presence in Nova Scotia, had pressed in 1751 for the permanent stationing of British warships there.101 Weakened by the death of Pelham, Newcastle was unsettled by the difficulties created by an increasingly contentious political situation. Foreign diplomats less well-informed about ministerial disputes stressed the danger of parliamentary opposition.102 The session was imminent, problems of management considerable in the volatile political world created by Pelham’s death and, as over policy towards Spain in 1739, the prospect of parliamentary difficulties interacted with ministerial disputes. The imminence of the session obliged the ministry to have a policy, though it would be misleading to suggest that Cumberland and Halifax were pr imar ily swayed by parliamentary considerations. Halifax had long been associated with Nova Scotia, while Fox was Cumberland’s ally. Knowing that military matters were under the sway of George II and Cumberland, Newcastle gave way to Cumberland, ensuring that “from mid October American issues suddenly ceased to matter in the struggle for the leadership”. Furthermore, Sir Gilbert Elliot wrote of the first day of debates in the Commons that the opposition “expostulated …chiefly upon the American affairs, but declared they would not directly oppose it, as the appearance of unanimity was at present very necessary with regard to our foreign affairs”.103 The decision to send reinforcements to America and to adopt an aggressive plan of operations made war with France more likely, though Newcastle hoped 73

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that an escalation in stages would leave room for negotiations.104 There was an element of wishful thinking, comparable to his hope in 1731 that France would accept the Anglo-Austrian Second Treaty of Vienna, but Newcastle had no choice in light of George’s support for Cumberland. Whereas in 1744 and 1746 it had proved possible for the Pelhams to drive George into parting with Carteret, in 1754 Newcastle was not supported by a united ministry, while the point at dispute, opposition to apparent French aggression in North America, was one that was popular. The specific political impact of the shift in public consciousness over colonial disputes, especially North America, was limited, but there seems little doubt that in late 1754 the prevalent opinion in political circles was of a need to stand up to France, and that this was not really related to the more general problems of Britain’s diplomatic standing towards France and other European powers. The fall of Cape Breton in 1745 and naval victories over France in the War of the Austrian Succession had encouraged an optimistic assessment of Britain’s chances in a future conflict, one that was fully reflected in the press. 105 A front-page essay in the opposition London newspaper Old England on 15 December 1750 (os) began, The all-grasping views of the House of Bourbon have been so manifest for half a century past, that it is equally the duty of politicians to watch over and expose, and of princes to obstruct and restrain them…The two heads of France and Spain are continually aiming at new encroachments…The practices now on foot to wrest from us the best part of Nova Scotia, and establish French colonies in defiance of our better right, and a mutual agreement to leave them in a neutral state, in the islands of Tobago, St. Lucia, and others, cannot but raise the indignation of every Briton at this time.106 The French had indeed occupied Tobago and St. Lucia. The French ministry was kept fully informed of this agitation. One set of newspaper verses surviving in the French archives ended with a call for naval action against France: To settle this point send out forty good sail, With Warren or Hawke [leading admirals] to inspect each minutia: They’ll teach us to whom shall belong without fail Tobago, Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia,107 the last a reference to a dispute in the West Indies. Such items carried no reference to the cost of conflict, the difficulty of keeping hostilities local, the possibility of French pressure on Hanover and the Low Countries and the danger of invasion of Britain. The experience of 1739, when the United Provinces had refused to provide assistance to Britain against Spain, was a warning of possible isolation, and in March 1754 the French envoy in Vienna 74

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reported Austrian displeasure with British naval preparations, on the grounds that Britain might be thus distracted from European affairs and that hostilities, once begun, would spread to Europe.108 Yorke wrote from The Hague that France “feels too strongly her own force in this part of the world, where the false politics of the Court of Vienna leaves us naked and defenceless”, a reference to the weakness of the Barrier fortresses and the vulnerability of the Austr ian Netherlands and, therefore, the United Provinces. European commitments would also entail a level of expense that would test the ministry’s parliamentary strength, as the Bavarian envoy warned in October 1754.109 The French, however, as Newcastle correctly told Perron, did not wish to fight. Rouillé could not imagine that the British would use open force and he decided to send Mirepoix back to London, whence Boutel, however, meanwhile warned that the British reinforcements sent to America and the terms of the royal speech suggested that George would not keep the peace.110 Mirepoix arrived in London on 8 January 1755, his mission made more important by the death of the Earl of Albemarle, the British envoy in Paris, the previous month. In his audience with George II on 10 January, the King told Mirepoix that he sought peace but was determined to protect his subjects, goals that the ambassador unsurprisingly declared were shared by Louis XV. The same day Newcastle told Mirepoix of his desire for peace, but he added, untruthfully, that the troops being sent to America would only be used for defence, and that they were destined less against France than to contain the colonists who for long had shown scant obedience to the orders of the British government. The better-infor med Robinson, now Secretary of State for the Souther n Department, drew attention to the differences between British and French maps of the interior of America.111 Newcastle and Robinson told Mirepoix, and Newcastle and Holdernesse told Perron that the ministry was affected by the domestic pressure for action,112 and Mirepoix stressed the need for France to take precautions. Naval armaments by both powers increased tension and distrust. Robinson wrote to Benjamin Keene, the envoy in Madrid, “We have, on one side, polite and handsome professions, from M. de Mirepoix, of His Master’s sincere desire for peace; on the other hand, every letter from Paris, and other ports, brings advice of the great armaments making at Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort…. We shall not, we must not, be behind with them.”113 While Mirepoix stressed the need for speedy action to stem the developing crisis, the French ministry was unwilling to make the sort of concessions that were necessary. Rouillé correctly argued that the Br itish were not telling the truth about the reinforcements they were sending to America, suggested that Britain would accept an armistice only in order to reinforce her American colonies and claimed that the French position on the Ohio was no threat to these colonies. He pointed out that the Appalachians were a considerable obstacle.114 However, such remarks were no longer appropriate. Robinson pressed 75

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Mirepoix on the need for a quick and definite settlement, citing the position of the ministry “vis a vis la nation”, while Mirepoix wrote of the need for both speed and precautions. He argued that the British nation was strongly animated against France and the government weak.115 Rouillé however replied in terms of distrust and argued that George II should assure Parliament of France’s sincerity.116 Conferences between Mirepoix and the British ministers failed to provide a satisfactory solution to the Ohio dispute, while Rouillé pressed the need for the government to oppose popular agitation for war.117 On 25 February 1755 Rouillé sent a long instruction to the Due de Duras, the French envoy in Madrid, which revealed his opinion of the role of British domestic pressures. He noted that the British ministry cited the clamours of the nation to justify their considerable armaments, but he argued that it was only a pretext and that Britain sought war. Rouillé claimed that the king’s speech to Parliament, and “indecent writings” the government made no effort to suppress, were responsible for inciting the hostility of the people to France, and he stated that the ministry could stop this agitation, which had no reasonable foundation. Rouillé’s mistaken assumptions about the nature of British politics and the degree of control the government could exert ensured that he failed to appreciate the pressures under which the British ministry felt it was operating. Rouillé continued by arguing that the Spanish colonies were the true British objective and that French America was simply a preliminary barrier for them, an obvious plea for Spanish support that also testified to concern about the likely scale of British intentions. More generally, the French consistently argued that British support for the balance of power was a sham, as the British sought no such balance outside Europe, but, instead, maritime hegemony and colonial conquest. Bonnac reported from The Hague that Yorke had said that Britain would never yield over the Ohio, while Yorke clearly laid out a major obstacle to successful negotiations when he reported being told by Bonnac that what had alarmed his court, was, the refusal we made to send orders to the governors in America, to suspend hostilities, which we avoided by offering to treat upon those orders, whilst our succours would have an opportunity to arrive in those parts, and perhaps obtain a superiority, which would render the negotiation more difficult and complicated; He added the most pacific declarations In short, the resort to force ensured that the need for an armistice was as much an issue as the points at dispute. Yorke replied that what seemed to me to have given rise to the expressions which had alarmed his court, was the idea that France meant to continue in possession during the negotiation, of what their governors had unjustly possessed themselves of.118 76

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The French had already decided to send reinforcements to Canada, a decision that accorded with Mirepoix’s warning of the need to prepare the defence of Cape Breton and of the despatch of British reinforcements,119 but that made the success of negotiations unlikely. Though certain of Mirepoix’s desire for peace, the British ministry had already concluded that France was unwilling to offer acceptable terms. Robinson noted that France sought “to confine the present negotiation to a bare provisional cessation des voyes de fait [an armistice], in order to find the means afterwards, for an amicable conciliation”, while Britain sought a definitive settlement, adding, “The pretext of the war will be, la Gloire du Roi. The truth will be, their desire to keep les pretentions et droits, founded upon Mr. de la Salle’s discoveries, eternally undecided; and more particularly to have an opening into the Bay of Fundy.”120 Six days later, on 17 March 1755, Rouillé ordered Mirepoix to make no overture and informed him that Louis XV regarded the negotiations as completely broken off, unless, as seemed unlikely, the British proposed more reasonable conditions. He also argued that there was a danger that Britain would take French moderation as timidity. Rouillé was sceptical about the position of Newcastle and Robinson, being convinced that they sought to justify to the nation the heavy costs of their armaments, and unimpressed by the value of any ministerial pacific intentions that “could not defeat popular clamour”. 121 Perron reported that both Mirepoix and the British government thought war inevitable and that Newcastle was being swept along by a bellicose torrent.122 Negotiations continued in London between Mirepoix and Robinson,123 at the same time as both powers prepared their forces. Preparations and public hostility themselves did not have to lead to war, as the Anglo-Bourbon crises over the Falklands (1770) and Nootka Sound (1790) were to illustrate, but in both those cases it proved possible to negotiate an agreement before there had been any clashes, other than the initial precipitants of the crises. In 1755, in contrast, as Rouillé pointed out, the chance of successful negotiations was really removed by the British refusal to suspend military steps.124 Whereas the initial check to distant British interests in 1770 and 1790 did not expose other British possessions to attack, concern about the American frontier in 1754 was rapidly transmitted to the centres of colonial life in North America. A military response by the British army seemed more necessary, if only to lend support to, and control, the likely actions of colonial forces. On 5 May 1755, two days after the French fleet had sailed from Brest for Canada, Mirepoix reported that Boscawen, who had sailed on 21 April, had been ordered to attack it, orders that the British ministry denied having given.125 The London negotiations served to reveal the incompatibility of the two governments’ views on America, at the same time that Mirepoix remained convinced that George II and Newcastle wanted peace.126 Holdernesse, who accompanied George to Hanover as Secretary of State, wrote thence on 20 May, referring to the Mirepoix—Robinson negotiations, “You will see His 77

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Majesty is still willing, if possible, to bring these matters to an amicable conclusion and to prevent the melancholy effects of a general war,” but, having mentioned the sailing of the Brest fleet, he added that “as far as human foresight can reach, every measure has been taken that may enable His Majesty to resist the efforts of the French in that part of the world, and to recover such of His Majesty’s possessions, as have been unjustly invaded”. Later that month, Holdernesse added, the operations at land, on the continent of America, will probably have been begun by His Majesty’s troops during the course of the month of April; and I will not take it upon me to prophecy, whether the French will, or will not, look upon voyes de fait in that part, as justifiable causes of a declaration of war on their side, against His Majesty, or of their taking violent measures against his allies in Europe, or against his dominions upon the continent.127 Any idea of a predictable international system had clearly broken down, while, as towards Spain in 1739, the British were having to consider the consequences of continuing negotiations and preparing for war at the same time. Robinson wrote on 16 June: we have not been amused; every thing is in motion, to recover selfevident encroachments in America. Our colonists, with the few regular troops there, will be beginning to beat up the French quarters, in five or six places, at a time, where they have been silently creeping in upon us. What may happen at sea, God knows. We look upon our American colonies in the north, as blocked, if not besieged; We have indeed thrown some few troops into them, but shall hardly be in a disposition to let the French reinforce the troops they are besieging us with. We have acted steadily and uniformly…If France is willing to do us justice; she may do it with honour, by doing it at once, before she knows, that we have done it for ourselves in North America. If she only waits to know what is done there, in order to revenge herself here—alors comme alors.128 This was the language of one of the more pacific members of the British ministry, but, by June 1755, it was difficult to envisage successful Anglo-French negotiations and, therefore, from the British point of view, it was necessary to act swiftly against French encroachments. Rouillé argued that French policy would be determined by British action.129 On 10 June 1755 Boscawen attacked the French ships sailing to Canada, although the main fleet was not sighted. Before the news reached the French court at Compiégne on 17 July, Mirepoix had already been ordered to tell the British government that he would only remain in London if serious negotiations began. On 18 July he was recalled, as 78

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was Bussy from Hanover. Robinson had told Mirepoix that it was impossible England could see with indifference so great a reinforcement of French troops sent to North America, and assured him that Boscawen had misinterpreted his instructions, but unsurprisingly the French were unimpressed. Holdernesse refused to give Bussy the explicit answer he demanded that Boscawen had not received orders to attack the French ships.130 Contacts continued after the breaking off of Anglo-French diplomatic relations, an example of negotiations on the brink of full-scale war.131 However, both gover nments tur ned their attention to diplomatic and militar y preparations for war. The diplomatic moves were to provide an instructive lesson in the fragility of international links. Not only were the French to be disappointed by the response of their Prussian and Spanish allies, but the British were to find that their Austrian and Russian alliances collapsed. The diplomatic realignments of this period, commonly summarized by the phrase “Diplomatic Revolution”, have been discussed in terms of long-term shifts in the international system.132 These were clearly of considerable importance, but it would be foolish to ignore the role of chance and of short-term problems in this period. Just as British diplomatic strategy in the post-war period had been concerned with continental problems, especially the Imperial succession and the security of Hanover, and had not considered adequately the possibility of a colonial war, so Austria and Russia had seen Britain in terms of continental relations, as indeed had Frederick II France. Given the immediacy of diplomatic activity over continental issues, and the apparent success in 1749–53 in solving colonial disputes or letting them continue without apparently serious consequences, this was not surprising. Britain and France could present themselves as “satisfied” powers, with no aspirations for Continental conquests (though France sought gains in the Austrian Netherlands during the Seven Years’ War),133 but this did not describe their colonial position, and it was difficult to relate colonial aspirations to the desire of eastern European allies for greater power. It was not surprising that alliances based on essentially European problems and issues failed in 1755–6 to meet requirements resulting from an unwanted and unexpected colonial war. Equally, it was not surprising that Newcastle, the British minister most concerned with continental diplomacy, should have been disinclined to support a forward policy in America. However, his anxiety about possible European consequences was not shared by the bulk of the British political nation. There had been a definite shift in consciousness towards knowledge of and interest in the situation in Nova Scotia or west of the Appalachians, rather than in Flanders or the Rhineland. It is unclear how strong the latter had been in the 1740s: the apparently remorseless pressure of Louis XIV and the wars fought against him in which Britain had played a prominent role had arguably raised interest earlier, only for it to be dissipated after 1713, as attention switched to the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Caribbean and as concern about France declined. 79

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Nevertheless, North America had not been a key political issue in the early 1740s, as it was to become a decade later. Then, North America served to focus concern about Anglo-French colonial rivalry at a time that public anxiety about their respective continental positions had diminished. This had little effect on the ministry during the years 1749–53, a period of relative diplomatic and domestic quiescence, and its impact on government policy in 1754–5 should not be exaggerated. Nevertheless, the political world in London influenced the British response in North America, even if years of diplomatic distrust were also of great importance, as was the intractable nature of the particular points in dispute. However, had war broken out in the Baltic in 1747 or over Hanover in 1753, it is difficult to see the same alignments that were to develop in 1756 existing earlier in these very different situations. The role of chance and short-term problems should not be discounted in discussing the “Diplomatic Revolution”. If that was true of Anglo-French relations, it was also true of those between other powers. One does not need to dwell solely on the role of monarchs, for example, an earlier accession by the pro-Prussian Peter III of Russia. Much of the diplomatic agenda, though presented in terms of immutable long-term interests, was more transient, either in its importance or in the extent to which particular views were pressed at specific junctures. As it was those junctures that led to war, the reasons for specific concurrences of events are of considerable scholarly interest.

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Chapter Five The crown and Hanover

A substantial reassessment of the role of the monarchs has been central to the study of eighteenth-century British high politics in recent years. This reassessment has rested on an examination of the political position of the rulers, not on a reappraisal of the constitutional consequences of the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 and the subsequent Revolution Settlement. Foreign policy is important to this re-examination, for it was in that field that the monarchs were of greatest constitutional and political importance and were most concerned and active. This concern owed much to the foreign origin and continental commitments of William III (1689–1702) and the Hanoverians, especially George I (1714–27) and George II (1727–60). George III (1760– 1820) was far less concerned with Hanoverian interests and continental commitments. The monarch’s role in foreign policy also reflected the central concern of rulers in ancien régime Europe. The defence of a monarch’s inheritance and people in peace and war was foremost among his duties. By the eighteenth century this defence was generally more pressing than the defence of the faith, and certainly more urgent and feasible than the preservation of law and order and the administration of justice. Ancien régime European governments were particularly subject to the friction of distance, the dissipation of authority in the face of unresponsive subjects, and officials and landowners whose willingness to co-operate could not be taken for granted. Foreign policy offered an attractive alternative. It was a field in which, generally, there was relatively little need to seek co-operation. Diplomats were appointed, paid and dismissed by, and answerable, to rulers. However much the fighting of wars might depend on financial support from constitutional assemblies, the Estates of Continental Europe, they commonly had no authority in the field of foreign policy, nor any wish to acquire any. The extent to which many “states” were in fact amalgamations of areas with distinct histories and constitutional identities, politically united only in the 81

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person of their joint sovereign and in his court, further increased the importance of monarchs, because it was only in foreign policy that these entities truly acted as one “state”. It is important to consider Britain-Hanover in this light. Prior to the Union of 1707 England and Scotland had acted as one in foreign policy, although there had been tensions between the two Parliaments. However, the position involving Hanover was far more complex and was to be one of the leading political problems in the mid-eighteenth century, one that threw the role of the monarch into prominence. Given the contentious nature of the Hanoverian connection, especially in the 1740s and 1750s, it is impracticable to separate the issue of royal influence in the formulation of foreign policy from that of Hanoverian concerns, for the latter gave force and direction to royal initiatives and concern. The Electorate of Hanover was geographically part of the north-west of modern Germany and was constitutionally one of the eight Electorates in the Holy Roman Empire, the loosely united assemblage of terr itories that comprised modern Germany and Austria and some bordering areas and was presided over by an elected Emperor, a post filled for over two centuries by the ruler of the Habsburg territories. As with most German principalities, Hanover’s frontiers were established by feudal, not geog raphical, considerations, but most of the Electorate was between the Elbe and the Weser, the North Sea and the Harz mountains. However, there were also important sections between the Elbe, Mecklenburg, Holstein and the Baltic, and also west of the Weser. These frontiers lacked strong natural defences and had not been supplemented by any system of fortifications. As a result, Hanover was vulnerable to attack, and dependent for its defence on the size of its army. This was, like that of most German principalities, modest in size, 21,000 strong in 1739, 26,400 in April 1742.1 Such a force did not place too heavy a burden on a primarily agrarian economy that was not particularly advanced, by the standards of the age, and it was sufficient for pursuing small-scale quarrels with weak neighbours, such as the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin or the PrinceBishop of Hildesheim. However, other, and more powerful, German rulers could intervene in such quarrels and Hanover suffered from its military weakness. The Hanoverian army offered no real protection against attack by powerful rulers, while Hanover’s geographical and international position made it liable to pressure. The Electorate’s trans-Elbean terr itory, the Duchy of Saxe-Lauenburg, occupied in 1689, made Hanover particularly sensitive to developments in the Baltic, especially in Mecklenburg and the Schleswig-Holstein isthmus. Her western possessions made her concerned about events in the Westphalian Circle. Hanover lay astride any Russian advance into northern Germany, any Danish moves south into Lower Saxony, any French attack on the western frontier of Brandenburg, and any attempt by the Electors of Brandenburg

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(Kings in Prussia) to amalgamate or otherwise link up their widely separated territories in Westphalia and the Lower Rhineland with Brandenburg. Some rulers wished to create geographical links between their territories. Augustus I of Saxony, who became Augustus II of Poland in 1697, and his son Augustus II/III (1733–63) both wished to create a land bridge across the Austrian-ruled Duchy of Silesia, between Saxony and Poland. Irrespective of such aspirations, it was clearly worrying for the Electors of Hanover that there were Danish possessions not only to the north of Hanover but also to its west: Oldenburg and Delmenhorst; Prussian territories to both east and west. If Hanoverian security dictated a search for allies, it was by no means clear whom to turn to. The usual pattern was two-fold: alliances with neighbouring second-rank powers—Denmark, Hesse-Cassel and Sweden—and the search for a more substantial friend. In 1741 the Danes were pressed to send assistance against a threatened invasion. However, the first group was simply not powerful enough. Bereft of a major ally in 1741, George was forced to accept an ignominious neutrality convention. Only four states were powerful enough to offer convincing assistance—France, Prussia, Austria and Russia—and much of the course of British foreign policy in 1714–56 arose from the efforts to win such assistance and their implications. After the end of the Anglo-French alliance in 1731, Austria was the obvious choice, but by 1732 it was clear that Austria would not endanger her Prussian alliance for the sake of Hanover. Austrian military defeats in 1733–4, 1737–9 and 1741 underlined a diplomatic failure that was apparent before the Austro-French reconciliation in late 1735 and, more obviously, their alliance in 1756. Hanoverian vulnerability in the face of continued Prussian antagonism in the 1730s led George II to plan for the accession of Frederick II and to seek Russian support. The concomitant of the latter was a downplaying of AngloSwedish relations. The British were fortunate that French attempts to woo Russia, as in 1733 and 1741, were less persistent than those of Britain: in the late 1730s the French preferred to seek the alliance of Sweden. The British search for Russian assistance not only helped Hanover. Russia was a useful partner for Britain, as it could act in a variety of spheres. It was also vital to prevent Russia from joining Britain’s enemies. The Russian refusal to join the powers attacking Austria in the early stages of the War of the Austrian Succession was crucial to Austrian survival. As France made gains during the war, so British ministers and diplomats became more anxious for Russian intervention. In 1742 Carteret hoped that the Russians would make a secure peace with Sweden “that they may have their hands free to act in a greater, more useful and more salutary manner”. Five years later, Cumberland’s secretary, Sir Everard Fawkener, noted, “We should never negotiate anything for good without a force. That from Petersburg will be an essential one, if we can have it.” Hanbury-Williams also sought Russian intervention: “We have too long fought with the French upon unequal terms. Shall we never come into the field with equal numbers.”2 A Russian alliance was seen by the mid– 83

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1740s not only as a protection of Hanover, but also as vital for the European balance of power. As a result, British relations with Denmark and Sweden, especially the vexed question of the Swedish succession, became substantially an extension of Anglo-Russian relations. The pivotal nature of Russia in both British policy towards the Baltic and Hanoverian security was now established. Geographically exposed, Hanover was also threatened as a consequence of the dynastic link with Britain in 1714. An attack on or threat to the Electorate was an obvious pre-emption of or response to unwelcome British moves, an apparently safe way to influence the conduct of Britain by intimidating the King-Elector. Conversely, the dynastic link provided a dynamic to BritishHanoverian policy that posed both opportunities and threats. Throughout the union there were always two distinct international realities. It was always clear, when a formal treaty was signed with other powers, which country was committed by its King or Elector, and separate treaties were signed on occasions when the head of state committed both countries at the same time. The administration of the two units was also separate. Nevertheless, too much can be made of these distinctions, and it is wrong to see the designation of the successive Georges as His Royal and Electoral Majesty as mere etiquette.3 Although British ministers struggled to maintain the distinction, both in discussion with foreign envoys and when faced with domestic criticism,4 it is not surprising that their arguments were greeted with general scepticism, and such issues as marital links with other ruling families eroded the distinction.5 Furthermore, at times ministers sought to stress the common interests and bonds of Britain and Hanover. In 1751, when Newcastle complained of Prussian conduct, he wrote “one sees the affectation of distinguishing the King from the Elector”. Six years later, the British ministry pressed its hostility to a Hanoverian neutrality, although constitutional niceties were observed: this transaction, which His Majesty has, in the most gracious manner, condescended to communicate to his English servants, who, though they did not dare to presume to offer their humble advice to the King, in regard to the affairs of his Electorate, yet they thought it their duty to lay at His Majesty’s feet their opinion, as to the support England ought to give the King, if His Majesty should be advised, by his Electoral servants, no longer to understand a Convention made under the circumstances of that of the 10th September, and already broke by the enemy, to be binding upon the King.6 The personal union of Britain and Hanover was but one instance of a common pattern in the period 1680–1770. William III of Orange had ruled Britain and been stadhouder of most of the Dutch provinces between 1689 and 1702. Saxony and Poland were ruled by the same man between 1697 and 1704, 1709 and 1763; Sweden and another German territory, the Langraviate of Hesse84

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Cassel, by Frederick I of Sweden between 1730 and 1751. None of these links was sustained, but, in contrast, the dynastic link between England and Scotland in 1603 led to the union of the two crowns and to that of their parliaments in 1707, while the Electorate of Hanover was itself the recent product of the fusion of the inheritances of several branches of the house of BrunswickLüneburg and did not subsequently divide. Dynastic accretion was the classic route to growth in the early modern period, as the history of Spain, Austria, and seventeenth-century Prussia, or rather of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern families, demonstrated. However, territorial amalgamation through dynastic means posed serious political problems, in terms of management as much as policy, and it is in this light that much of the debate over foreign policy in Hanoverian Britain can best be understood. Though George I in his will stipulated an eventual division of Britain and Hanover after the death of his then sole grandson, Frederick, later Frederick, Prince of Wales, the electorate going to Frederick’s second son, if he had one, and, failing that, to the Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel branch of the house of Brunswick, he had, in the meantime, essentially created a new state. In common with the general European trend, this did not lead, however, to novel constitutional, political or administrative arrangements. Instead, it was a personal union, a territorial agglomeration, given common purpose at the international level by the dynastic concerns of the ruler. This was recognized by foreign diplomats, impatient with the attempts of their British counterparts to differentiate between the two dominions. In January 1742 Hardenberg, the Hanoverian envoy in Paris, assured Fleury of the Elector of Hanover’s good intentions, but refused to answer questions about the King of Britain. Amelot commented in a letter intercepted by the excellent British deciphering department, that Fleury made it clear that pushing the idea of one person having two roles created an impression of bad faith. Faced by AustroHanoverian moves in 1745, Frederick II asked his envoy in London whether he should regard the King of England as one or two people,7 in short whether Britain was not, through the King, a party to these moves. Hanoverian ministers were aware that their views were judged abroad in the light of responses to British policy and interests. They were faced in 1727, 1729, 1730, 1741, 1753, 1757 and 1772 with threatened attacks designed to influence British conduct. The monarchs appreciated the consequences of the personal union, but the bulk of the British political nation, understandably, did not, and this provided a basis for political discord. The rule of the Hanoverians posed not simply a question of dynastic legitimacy, but also one of political intention. Intended to stabilize the Protestant Succession after the failure of William III and Anne to produce direct heirs, Hanoverian dynasticism was a destabilizing force in British politics. As the modus operandi of this dynasticism was foreign policy, it is scarcely surprising that the latter constituted a major topic of political debate. The royal role in the for mulation and conduct of foreign policy, a 85

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characteristic of all monarchical states in this period, and a long-standing source of controversy in Britain, was thus given point as an issue in British politics by the diplomatic and domestic consequences of royal intervention arising from the interests of the personal union. It is this that dynasticism really denoted, but in British political debate it was commonly misunderstood as Hanoverianism. However, the charge of Hanoverian counsels failed to do justice to the divisions within the government of the Electorate, divisions that were at times quite marked. It also neglected the extent to which dynastic interests were often different from those of the Electorate, as understood by Hanoverian ministers, and also the degree to which the royal conception of Hanoverian interests was different from the ministerial conception, not least because it was often subsumed within these dynastic views. It has been argued that on occasion Hanover suffered as a result of the connection with Britain, 8 and this was certainly a view held at the time. Harrington, the Secretary of State who accompanied George II to Hanover in 1741, claimed that “there is no manner of doubt but that the measures His Majesty shall pursue, as King, will be revenged upon him, as Elector, unless timely care be taken to prevent it”. He was correct. The advance of a French army towards Hanover forced George to agree to support the French candidate for Emperor. To a certain extent, however, the question of how far Hanover suffered as a result of the connection is poorly posed, because the Electorate’s difficulties arose as a result of the personal union and the interests and views that this represented, as interpreted by the successive Georges. The period 1739–63 saw fresh challenges to the position of the Electors of Hanover in northern Germany after a decade when the situation had generally not seemed too alarming. Frederick II’s invasion of Silesia in December 1740 launched a period of instability in Germany and war across much of Europe, and Hanover was affected both directly and indirectly. Although peace came in 1748, Hanover’s position remained precarious, thanks to the recent growth of Prussian strength, and it was also seen in this light as Frederick II was believed to be unpredictable and was allied to France. When Frederick William I of Prussia had threatened to invade Hanover in 1726–7 and 1730, Georges I and II had been able to turn to French support, but the collapse of the AngloFrench alliance in 1731 had meant the end of such assistance and reassurance. However, although Prussian invasion of Hanover was feared in 1752 and 1753, it was French troops that were to invade, in 1757 during the Seven Years’ War. North-west Germany remained a sphere of operations for the remainder of the conflict, the Electorate’s position strategic because it covered Prussia’s western frontier, and part of the Electorate was still occupied by the French at the close of hostilities. Given these challenges, it was not surprising that George II took an active role in continental diplomacy, but until the mid–1750s this looked back to the position in 1714–30. Then Hanoverian concerns had been pushed to the top of the agenda of British diplomacy by the later stages of the Great Northern War 86

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(1700–21), the rise of Russian power in the Baltic and its direct impact in Germany in 1716–17, and the attendant conquest and distribution of much of the Swedish empire. A stress on Hanover had subsequently arisen from the British confrontation with Austria in 1725–31 and with Prussia in 1726–31. This emphasis was domestically controversial. Particular diplomatic and military moves, such as the confrontation with Austria, were judged unwise by some. Furthermore, the pursuit of interests and acceptance of commitments that did not accord with traditional British ones and that could be presented as Hanoverian provided critics of successive Whig ministries with an opportunity for arguing that they were betraying both national interests and their supposed role as balancers of royal power. These arguments were to be repeated in the 1740s, and, indeed, opposition writers of the period, such as James Ralph, as well as speakers in Parliament, directly referred to the events of 1714–30 when discussing current issues in foreign policy.10 In part, the controversy was familiar, but it was also different, looking back in one respect to the disputes over William Ill’s foreign policy, but also suggesting a new agenda for debate with the r ising prominence of the contrasting of continental and oceanic commitments. Whereas in 1714–30 the response to the growing power of Russia and Austria was the central issue in British diplomacy, and one that did not strike any favourable resonance in terms of British public debate over foreign policy, in the 1740s and 1750s a traditional theme was dominant: how best to respond diplomatically and militarily to French power. This had been a central question during William Ill’s reign and, in one respect, relations with Hanover were simply a more acute form of the commonplace problem of co-operating with allies and defending the exigencies of alliance diplomacy from domestic criticism. However, in the 1740s and 1750s the problems of French power and the response to it were increasingly seen more in global terms and less in European. Frederick II’s invasion of Silesia was made without the support of France, and George II’s hostile response to his nephew and one-time hoped-for protégé threatened to open a gap between his own policy and that of the British, then at war with Spain and fearing the entry of her ally France. George took a major role as Elector in trying to create an anti-Prussian coalition, but, although he threatened the use of Hanoverian troops, 11 such activity could only be convincing if supported by Britain. On 26 December (os) 1740 Trevor was ordered to stir up the Dutch against Prussia and to ascertain from their leading ministers whether, if George II acted in support of Austria and “His German Dominions should be attacked, as they lie by their neighbourhood to those of Prussia, so much exposed, in resentment”, the Dutch would provide assistance. In April 1741 Parliament offered support to Hanover, as part of a plan designed to help Maria Theresa against her Prussian assailant, thus prefiguring Pitt’s support from 1758 for the despatch of British troops to Westphalia to support Frederick II in the Seven Years’ War. As on the latter 87

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occasion, this approach was seen as a means to help Hanover without inspiring serious controversy. In 1741 Parliament provided a vote of credit to enable George as king to fulfil his obligations to Maria Theresa, and assured him of support in the event of an attack on Hanover. Moving the Address in the Commons, Thomas Clutterbuck, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, declared that “we ought to pronounce that the territories of Hanover will be considered on this occasion as the dominions of Great Britain, and that any attack on one or the other will be equally resented”. Pulteney, however, sought to separate the issues of Austria and Hanover in order to provide a focus for attacks on the government. He supported aid to Austria, but was opposed to giving any guarantee for Hanover. Pulteney referred to the Act of Settlement of 1701, the constitutional basis of the Hanoverian succession, which stipulated that the monarch should not enter into a war for the sake of foreign dominions not belonging to the British crown.12 Nevertheless, support for Austria covered the gap between George’s views and British hostility to the Bourbons. Furthermore, the Franco-Prussian alliance of 1741 and British success in 1742 in breaking this and in reconciling Prussia and Austria, albeit temporarily, helped to lessen tension over disparate aims. A somewhat far-fetched parallel was provided by the French entry into the War of American Independence in 1778. That lessened domestic political opposition to the British government’s use of force in America. However, from the outset in the 1740s there were clearly differences in emphasis, if not policy, between ruler and ministers. It is necessary, first, to consider how and to what extent George II was able to advance his views and what the political consequences were. Subsequently, attention will be devoted to George III, who came to the throne in 1760, and for whom Hanoverian concerns were not foremost, at least in his early years as monarch. George II had two different sets of ministers and diplomats whom he could use to advance his views, and he was also able to do so through his frequent meetings with foreign envoys. Although his opportunities for personal diplomacy with other monarchs were slight—none came to London, and on his frequent trips to Hanover, unlike his father, he was never invited to Berlin—George II’s continental trips did provide opportunities for meeting foreign ministers and senior diplomats and gave him a chance for taking a fresh look at affairs. Furthermore, both in Hanover and en route, George could meet British diplomats, especially those accredited to The Hague. British envoys at nearby courts, especially Berlin and Dresden, travelled to Hanover when the king was there. As king, George was also able in Britain to discuss diplomatic relations with British ministers other than the relevant Secretary of State and thus at times to undermine the position of that minister. George also saw foreign diplomats in London. In January 1750 he told the Sardinian envoy he was furious with Austria, but, at the same time, he sought to lessen AustroSardinian differences.13 88

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The importance of Hanover ian diplomatic representation has been underestimated. Although no longer regularly represented in, for example, France and Russia, Hanoverian diplomats were present at crucial moments, for example, in Paris during the winter of 1741–2, while the regular representation in Vienna and Regensburg underlined the continued importance of German disputes and matters of Imperial jurisdiction. Hanoverian diplomats provided George II with sources of information and channels of communication that were outside the control of the Secretaries of State. This ensured that it was important for British ministries to win the co-operation of their Hanoverian counterparts. British diplomats encountered difficulties as a result of the actions of their Hanoverian colleagues; although it was also convenient to blame them for problems that were not their fault. Thus, in 1739, at a time of poor Anglo-Austrian relations, Robinson complained about the consequences of the pursuit of one of George II’s favourite goals, the succession to East Friesland, over which he was in dispute with the Hohenzollerns, the Electoral Minister has had orders to desire of this court [Vienna] the confirmation of the Electoral Pacta Conventa about the succession of Ostfrise, which both for the timing of it, and the manner of doing it …and that too when this court thought that all had been asked of them that was wanting at present, gives a real concern to those here who wish well to us, and a pretext to others to countercarry us in everything else. The following January Robinson was concerned about Hanoverian policy in the forthcoming election of a new Emperor. He wrote to one of Harrington’s Under Secretaries, You will easily imagine why I trust with you for Lord Harrington’s use, rather than to a dispatch, the inclosed papers. One a letter from the Regency at Hanover without the King’s order, to the Elector of Mainz …The King our master has not yet declared his personal view, not even, as appears by the letter, to his own Regency, which makes it the more extraordinary that they should so hastily adopt a doctrine, that for what they may know or foresee may thwart his Majesty in quite different views…what you will easily perceive is, that the Elector’s Minister very often comes across the King’s. This is and has been so much the case that I have often seen by one blind and random shot overturned his own best endeavours. In September 1741, Frederick II drew attention to serious discrepancies between what he was told by the royal and Electoral envoys, telling the British envoy, the Earl of Hyndford, “when you My lord call a thing white that Sweicheldt calls it black, and when you call it black he calls it white”.14 The following spring, Hardenberg continued to act in accordance with the Hanoverian neutrality until the new British ministry was able to 89

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persuade George II to abandon the policy.15 Although sympathetic towards Maria Theresa, 16 Hanoverian ministers had been greatly affected by the Electorate’s vulnerability. Horatio Walpole commented on the Hanoverian response to the Prussian invasion of Silesia in December 1740, our master is divided between resentment and fears; he cannot bear to think of augmenting the ter r itor ies of his Electoral neighbour [Brandenburg-Prussia] on one side, and he justly apprehends that his own dominions should fall first a sacrifice should be stir on the other. His servants I think are all here of one opinion, blame and abhor the extravagant step, but see no remedy but palliating and accommodating remedies. Exposure to possible French and Prussian attack in the summer of 1741 had a serious effect on Hanoverian self-confidence, leading to support for neutrality and its maintenance. Ernst, Freiherr von Steinberg, head of the Hanoverian Chancery in London in 1737–48, spoke with regret of British efforts in the last days of the Walpole gover nment to encourage the Austr ians and the consequent delay in negotiating peace.17 Significant differences between, and a sense of a clear clash between, British and Hanoverian objectives were not restricted to 1740–2, but can be found throughout the period.18 They were most acute in the case of relations with Prussia and most serious during the War of the Austrian Succession and again in 1756–7, when the issue of Hanoverian neutrality again became prominent. Differences were least serious during 1748–53, when the close relationship between Newcastle and the most influential Hanoverian minister, Gerlach Adolph, Freiherr von Münchhausen,19 and their shared interest in the Imperial Election Scheme and in giving an anti-Prussian direction to British policy reduced tension. George II continued to entrust his Hanoverian envoys with confidential tasks. George was also, however, able to instruct British diplomats to further Electoral goals, a situation that helped, as much as clashes with Hanoverian diplomacy, to sustain criticism by British envoys. In addition, his views were of considerable importance in the composition of the British diplomatic corps, all appointed by him, in theory his choice, and all paid out of the king’s civil list, which accounted for George’s reluctance to promote diplomats to more senior and expensive ranks. Diplomats could find it time-consuming and irritating to be instructed to support Electoral interests. In October 1747 Hanbury-Williams reported, “I have the Hanover affairs at this court [Dresden] put into my hands,” adding, next month, that it had obliged him to postpone a journey to Vienna.20 The same year, Sandwich successfully pressed the Dutch to hire a German regiment in accordance with George’s wishes. 21 The attempt in 1747–8 to persuade Spain to pay money it owed to Hanover was more time-consuming and led 90

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Horace Walpole, an MP as well as a letter writer, to complain that the ministry was seeking repayment of this debt rather than reparation for attacks on British trade.22 It would be mistaken, however, to suggest either that relations in this period were invariably poor or that the British ministry necessarily yielded to Electoral demands. In 1748 Newcastle encouraged Sandwich to ignore orders about preventing Frederick II from obtaining any guarantee from the peace negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle for his possession of East Friesland. Frederick had seized East Friesland in 1744 on the death of the last duke, to the impotent fury of George.23 And yet, co-operation between British and Hanoverian ministers was the dominant theme in 1748, one to which George II contributed, and which set the scene for close relations between Newcastle and Münchhausen in the following years. After six days “wading through the mud of Westphalia” to Hanover, on his way to Berlin, Henry Legge was given very useful information about the situation there by Münchhausen. In July George sent Bussche, his envoy in Vienna, to the congress at Aix-la-Chapelle. Newcastle was not shown his instructions, but was informed that they related to the Elector’s interests in Osnabrück and East Friesland. However, George clearly did not wish to complicate Sandwich’s negotiations with the French Plenipotentiary, St Severin, Newcastle writing to the Earl, ‘I am persuaded you will give Mor. Busch all the assistance you can in carrying it through. But as it is a very nice and delicate affair and ought to be conducted with great prudence and discretion; I have the satisfaction to assure you that Mor. Busch is directed to take no step, nor make any application to Mor. St. Severin, but in concert with you and by your advice: And therefore, at the same time, that I am very earnestly to recommend to you, to give Mor. Busch all the assistance in your power; I am persuaded, you will take great care not to give Mor. St. Severin any advantage over you, nor to put it into his power to make any ill use of the confidence reposed in him: For His Majesty has the immediate conclusion of the general pacification so much at heart; and is so desirous, that the negotiation should not be obstructed. By 1748 Hanoverian ministers could be praised. Aside from Newcastle’s high opinion of Münchhausen, he also found “Mor. Busch a very sensible and discreet man…with the rightest notions…for supporting the true system, that ought to be observed and followed by the Maritime Powers”. Pelham was “sorry to lose” Steinberg when he resigned his London post, because “he was a good natured innocent man”.24 The implicit bargain between king and British ministers that had helped to bring governmental stability in the latter stages of the War of the Austrian Succession was to be sustained in the post-war years: a degree of mutual understanding and co-operation to which Newcastle’s willingness to play an 91

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active role as standard-bearer of continental interventionism and opponent of Prussia was crucial. Horace Walpole complained in 1749 that Newcastle “Hanoverizes more and more every day”,25 but, once a German league was seen as important and the Imperial Election Scheme centred on just such a league, Hanoverian advice and assistance was valuable, to an extent that had not been the case for the British ministry for many years. However, there was an undisclosed tension between Electoral goals and those of Newcastle in 1748–56. This tension was to have serious impact in 1756–7, under the strain of a deteriorating international system and a breakdo wn of co-operation between the British and Hanoverian ministries. The Hanover ian ministers were most concer ned about the secur ity of the Electorate, and, to that end, supported better Anglo-Austrian and AngloRussian relations and a league of German princes. In contrast, Newcastle’s prime purpose was creating an alliance system aimed against France. The position of Prussia was crucial. Newcastle was angered by Prussian conduct in a number of disputes with Britain, especially over financial and commercial issues—the Silesian debts and the Emden Company, but was essentially concerned about her as an ally of France, to him the principal threat, while the Hanoverians considered Prussia as the major challenge to their position. Evidence for George II’s views is less than complete. The political history of monarchical attitudes and the royal courts is rarely easy to study, but the problem of sources is more serious for the first half of the eighteenth century than for the second. For a var iety of reasons that are unclear, the correspondence of European monarchs in the later period was more extensive and has been printed at length, in contrast to that of their predecessors in the first half. This contrast is particularly marked in the case of Frederick II (1740– 86), when contrasted with his father, Frederick William I (1713–40), though it is also true of those of Catherine II, “the Great” (1762–96), Joseph II (1765– 90) and Gustavus III (1771–92). Possibly it owed something to the differing styles of eighteenth-century kingship, as Enlightened Despotism replaced lateBaroque monarchy, and to the interest of late nineteenth-century historians in what then appeared to be a heroic period of national monarchy, only a century distant. In the case of Britain, the heroism was attributed to the opponents of George III, but the position with regard to sources was similar. George III’s correspondence runs to eleven fat volumes although they include letters to the king. The surviving letters of George I and George II are very scanty. Their preference for reviewing troops and hunting rather than the convenience of future “history bigots”, as Hervey termed them,26 ensured not only that it is difficult to provide a standard against which the supposed novelty of George III’s attitude towards his position as king and consequent policies could be judged, but also that the role of the two monarchs in foreign policy, as in much else, is obscure. Even that expert champion of continental sources, Ragnhild Hatton, made little of the last six years of George I’s reign, summarized very 92

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cursorily in her biography, and it remains one of the most obscure periods in eighteenth-century British political history. The few surviving items of correspondence in the hand of George II are very brief, and consist largely of scribbled comments on pieces submitted to him for approval.27 It is ironic that the Royal Archives in Windsor Castle contain more material on the Jacobites than the Hanoverians for the reigns of George I and George II. Little survives for Frederick, Prince of Wales, and the Cumberland Papers at Windsor are substantially devoted to military matters. They appear to have been weeded for political items, although there are two other reasons why Cumberland’s papers are more plentiful for 1747 or 1757 than 1750 or 1753. First, he was away from London in 1743, 1745–8 and 1757, and, secondly he held important official positions in 1745–8 and 1757, and these produced institutional correspondence. Absence of monarchs and ministers from the centre of government generally led to an increase in correspondence, of both institutional and personal nature. Thus, there are usually more letters surviving between British politicians for the summer months, especially the late summer, when many were away from London, than for the early months of the year, when all who were fit were generally in London for the parliamentary session. In this respect, the fact that George II, like his father and like George III in his early years as king, rarely travelled far in Britain is important. The monarchs might move between the royal seats in the Thames Valley, but none was far from London, unlike Compiégne, where Louis XV went on a number of occasions, which was some distance from Paris. When in England, George I and George II were usually to be found at St James’s or, in the spring and summer, Kensington Palace and Hampton Court. Neither visited the north of England, the Midlands or the West Country; let alone Scotland, Wales or Ireland, which did not see a British monarch at any time during the century. In contrast, George II visited Hanover while Elector in 1729, 1732, 1735, 1736, 1740, 1741, 1743, 1748, 1750, 1752 and 1755. Each trip lasted several months. George was accompanied by a British Secretary of State, Townshend in 1729, Harrington in 1732, 1735, 1740 and 1741, Carteret in 1743, Newcastle in 1748, 1750 and 1752, and Holdernesse in 1755. In 1736 Walpolean distrust of Harrington led to Horatio Walpole accompanying George as acting Secretary. Although George II’s absence from London did not lead to his writing letters to ministers there, the Secretary of State accompanying him corresponded with his opposite number in London, as indeed did the Under Secretaries and these papers have survived in State Papers Regencies.28 They provide a valuable guide to policy-making, while the Secretary in Hanover frequently commented on the views of the monarch. In addition, the Secretary in Hanover corresponded, separately from his London counterpart, with British diplomats, the correspondence surviving in State Papers Foreign but bound in separate volumes. State Papers Regencies can be supplemented by confidential correspondence between the Secretary in Hanover (and others 93

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with him) and politicians in Britain. This is especially valuable for the years when Newcastle went, for he was a man devoted to self-justification and had a mistaken belief in his ability to persuade others. Holdernesse’s correspondence is also helpful, Harrington’s less so, while Carteret’s refusal to explain what was going on aroused fury in London. The wartime destruction of Hanoverian material, especially the series Hanover 9, the post–1705 foreign policy documents, exacerbates the problem for the modern scholar. Government papers were also destroyed in a fire at the palace in Hanover in 1741.29 These losses increase the importance of British sources for understanding the impact of Hanover, although that also ensures that Hanover as an issue is overly seen in, and from, a British perspective. The survival and importance of State Papers Regencies directs attention to the role of institutional practice, in this case the correspondence between Secretaries of State, in providing records for royal activity. However, the fact that the king settled matters in discussions with his ministers and the oral nature of court politics creates serious problems. Military and diplomatic correspondence were generally handled outside the cabinet. There are accounts of what George II said in meetings. Newcastle often told Hardwicke and Pelham what the king had said, and foreign diplomats who were granted audience would report at length on what they were told, but these accounts were dependent on memory, not note-taking, and were not made by the king. They can be supplemented by comments about royal attitudes, but these have to be used with care, especially those in well-known sources, such as the Memoirs of Hervey and of Horace Walpole. It is going too far to claim, as has been done, that “such writings are on the whole vindictive nonsense” and that “contemporary memoirs and letters can only be used occasionally in the study of administrative history of this period”.30 The surviving sources for the “administrative history” of foreign policy, the diplomatic correspondence, do not suffice as a source for the study of foreign policy. It has been argued that the very nature of diplomatic documents is not helpful in ascertaining the link between diplomacy and “profound causes”, because diplomatic correspondence is most likely to emphasize the immediate and tactical, while the language employed reinforces the assumption that non-diplomatic calculations are of little use and throws no light on unspoken assumptions. 31 There is much truth in this, although, in fact, the instructions sent to British envoys often included a lengthy discussion of the central themes of British foreign policy. These were necessary because the nature of eighteenth-century communications ensured that it was not sensible to emphasize the immediate and tactical. Diplomats, especially those at some distance from London, had to be given discretion to discuss and negotiate. However, the value of these instructions to historians has to be questioned. First, the explanations of Br itish policy were often intended for communication to foreign monarchs or ministers, and thus tended to 94

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emphasize good intentions and common diplomatic interests. Secondly, they provide little guidance as to the priorities of British policy. Thirdly, they offer few suggestions as to the process by which policy was formulated. Fourthly, they were often designed to be understood in the light of supplementary private instructions, which do not always survive, or not always with them. In addition, the value of diplomatic correspondence in general was limited by the reluctance to commit material to paper, especially in secret negotiations. Sir Cyril Wych reported from Russia in 1742 “of the danger of giving anything in writing to this court, so liable to revolutions, and of naming persons, who by a sudden change may rise from nothing to the head of affairs”. Carteret replied by instructing him to avoid written communications.32 The following year, Count Finckenstein, Prussian envoy in Hanover, found it impossible to get anything in writing from Carteret about possible measures to negotiate a peace for Charles VII (Charles Albert of Bavaria as Holy Roman Emperor). Advocating negotiations with Prussia in August 1740, Sir Robert Walpole and the Lord President of the Council, the Earl of Wilmington, both experienced politicians, proposed discussions rather than the exchange of memoranda, as the former method was better “for opening and explaining the sentiments on both sides”. Nine years later, Keene reported, I shall punctually observe His Majesty’s injunctions to be cautious in treating by for mal offers in wr iting, and being appr ised of the inconveniencies that method is subject to, I never intended to follow it, but in commercial affairs where it is necessary because memorials of that nature are usually remitted to other places.33 One important cause of reluctance was fear of loss of secrecy on the part of allies, the Austrians being hesitant about confiding in the Dutch for that reason in 1743,34 and the danger either that the threat of compromising material would be used in order to exert pressure or that it would be exposed in order to create embarrassment.35 In early 1743 the British government discovered from postal interception that their domestic opponents were seeking copies of documents about the 1741 Hanoverian neutrality from the French, and that the latter were willing to agree provided that their revelation would help France.36 On the other hand, Frederick II was worried about the imprecision of oral negotiations, in terms both of precision of thought and accuracy in reporting, and in 1752 instructed his envoy in Paris to ensure that memoranda were used by both powers.37 Frederick’s comments are an instructive qualification of many sources, for much correspondence consists of subsequent accounts of audiences, council meetings and conversations. However, these are still useful, like contemporary letters and memoirs in general, because they can be evaluated, whereas much that might have been of value was either never commented upon in writing or the accounts have been destroyed, at the time 95

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or subsequently. Knowledge of the government’s postal interception system led to hesitation about committing ideas to paper. In the 1730s Townshend noted, I never write anything but what I desire the ministry may see. There is no great skill nor dexterity in opening of letters, but such is the fate of this administration that they have managed this affair in such a manner as to lose all the advantage of it. Sir Robert having complained to a friend when he was last in these parts, that they had lost all the intelligence they used to get by the Post-Office which was owning plainly that people were grown wiser than to write anything of consequence by the post.38 Not all injunctions to destroy letters were heeded, many letters surviving with such instructions on them, but an unknown number were observed. Newcastle wrote to Sandwich in January 1748, “I will begin with giving you the satisfaction of knowing, that the moment I had read your letter twice over, I bur nt it myself; so that affair is safe.” 39 Much mater ial was destroyed subsequently, in order to avoid possible political retribution or inconvenience. Keene’s papers were burned in 1739, Sir Robert Walpole’s hastily weeded when he fell in 1742, Cumberland’s when he died in 1765. The accidents that a civilization vulnerable to fire suffered frequently could also be fatal,40 while heirs could destroy papers that they felt it would be inconvenient to have kept. After the death of Frederick, Prince of Wales in 1751 his papers were burned. When William Pulteney, 1st Earl of Bath, died in 1764 his brother, General Pulteney, destroyed all his papers, thus preventing Bath’s chaplain, John Douglas, from writing his biography. This was particularly unfortunate because, certainly in the 1740s, Bath had kept significant records: Lord Bath is wonderful angry at the disgrace of his friends, complains of the perfidy of the Pelhams, says he kept a journal of all that passed between the Duke of Newcastle and him in the spring of 1742…as to the journal I am assured he has kept one these ten years, setting down each night the day’s conversation.41 As a result, while surviving papers of the period can give us in all cases only an imperfect account, for many individuals we have mostly only the imprint in the rock. Nevertheless, it is possible to discuss George II’s attitudes and thus to probe the problems that they created for his British ministers. In the Commons debate of 6 December (os) 1743 on continuing Hanoverian troops in British pay, Dodington, a former diplomat and Lord of the Treasury, argued that a good minister considers only the true interest of his master, and endeavours to make his passions and affections subservient to his interest; whereas a parasitical and bad minister considers only the governing 96

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passion of his master, and in order to gain personal favour applies himself solely to the indulgence of that passion.42 Dodington’s argument helps to explain the continued political importance of the monarch, while Hanover was the “governing passion” he referred to. At the outset of the period, the position of the Electorate was apparently relatively favourable. The Emperor Charles VI had abandoned his attempt of the late 1710s and 1720s to enforce and extend Imperial authority and challenge the Protestant princes and was deeply involved in an unsuccessful war with the Turks (1737–9). Although George II had very poor relations with Frederick William I, he hoped that the accession of the latter’s son Frederick, George’s nephew and second cousin, whom he had secretly provided with money, would lead to an alliance, a hope shared by British ministers. It was also hoped to win the alliance of Russia. Such a pact would guarantee Hanoverian security, while hopefully leaving George free as Elector to maintain his interest in aggrandisement, specifically East Friesland, which he very much wanted to gain.43 Conflict involving Hanoverian troops broke out not over East Friesland, but over the territory of Steinhorst on the frontier of Saxe-Lauenburg and Holstein, which was disputed between George and Christian VI of Denmark. Rejecting George’s suggestion of negotiations, the Danes sent troops to occupy Steinhorst in late 1738, but they were driven out with casualties by a larger Hanoverian force. George used Trevor to obtain Dutch pressure on Christian, Trevor being instructed by Harrington, who was given information on George’s orders by Steinberg.44 Although there were military moves and talk of war, including hopes in Sweden that a conflict might enable the Swedes to regain Bremen and Verden, which had been lost to Hanover in the later stages of the Great Northern War,45 a settlement was reached. The major German rulers, Charles VI and Frederick William I, had both urged peace,46 which was arranged through Christian’s cousin and friend, Count Stolberg of Wernigerode.47 The significance of the episode was twofold. First, as pointed out in the press, it had threatened the attempt to thwart French approaches and to renew the Anglo-Danish treaty of 1734, 48 which was now of greater importance because of Sweden’s move into the French camp in 1738. Thus, the pursuit of Hanoverian ends had compromised British foreign policy. Secondly, the crisis clearly indicated that George’s success in defending, let alone advancing, Electoral interests would depend on the position of Hanover vis-a-vis international alignments. He was fortunate that Charles VI, then relatively close to France, and Frederick William I, who was being approached by her, did not seek to exploit the crisis. Aside from the Rhineland, the Empire had been peaceful for the 1730s: Frederick William had followed a cautious policy in the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5), and the conflict anticipated over the succession to the Rhenish duchies of Jülich and Berg, contested by Frederick 97

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William and the heir to the Elector Palatine, had been averted. This relative calm had allowed princes without much military power, such as George as Elector, to overlook their weaknesses, although there had been Prussian threats to invade Hanover during a Jülich-Berg crisis in 1738. The situation was to be less favourable after Frederick II brought war to northern Germany and greater uncertainty to George and Hanover. In 1739 British foreign policy was dominated, not by developments on the Continent but, by deteriorating relations with Spain; and these related to the New World, not the Mediterranean. As was invariably the case, George took far less of an interest in maritime and colonial affairs than in their continental counterparts. The potential clash between, on the one hand, his determination to defend Electoral pretensions over East Friesland and his opposition to Prussian gains from Jülich-Berg, and, on the other, hopes for a Prussian alliance among his British ministers, was postponed by a general sense that nothing could be expected from the splenetic and unpredictable Frederick William. Although five years younger than George II, his health was poor, and his imminent death had been widely anticipated since 1734, when he had had a severe illness. Furthermore, as Karl Philipp, Elector Palatine, whose apparently imminent death was expected to trigger the Jülich-Berg crisis, did not die until 1742, the Empire remained deceptively calm. The Hanoverian ministry was worried about French diplomatic moves in Denmark and Sweden,49 but it was only the prospect of France joining Spain in war with Britain and attacking Britain’s continental dependencies— Hanover and the Dutch—that really excited concern in London about the situation in Europe. Furthermore, this was less urgent in early 1740 than the threat of French naval intervention in the Caribbean. Indeed that summer the balance of military need was suggested by discussion of the possibility of Britain purchasing arms from Hanover, although the idea was rejected by the Lords Justices, the ministers left with responsibility for government in Britain while George II was abroad, because they were “afraid of impertinencies here upon it”.50 The death of Frederick William in 1740 appeared to offer George an opportunity to escape from his isolation and initially provided no threat to Hanover. At first, there was optimism about the chance of better relations, and in June 1740 Münchhausen went to Berlin in order to win Frederick II’s support.51 However, difficulties were soon anticipated on account of Electoral interests. In July Harrington sent a private letter in his own hand from Hanover to Newcastle: I will venture in great confidence to acquaint you there are certain disputes and pretensions subsisting betwixt the Houses of Hanover and Prussia, which though they may appear to the rest of the world not to deserve so immediate an attention as other matters of a more general nature I fear however that till those are adjusted, in which I foresee great 98

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difficultys like to arise, the general matters will go on but lamely and this is one principal reason why I am not overfond of a journey to Berlin as yet. Four months later Count Osterman, the Russian foreign minister, himself a German by birth, told the British envoy, Edward Finch, that he was very worried that “there might be a difference of interest between the two Electorates which might have some influence on the counsels of the two kings”.52 These comments echoed those made earlier about East Friesland by Horatio Walpole, and might suggest that a clear case could be made out of Hanoverian concerns preventing alliance with Prussia, yet another example of the Electorate preventing British attempts to win the support of the powers of eastern and central Europe. The situation was in fact more complex. There is little sign of pressure for aggrandizement from the Hanoverian government,53 and, far from there being a simple question of arranging the terms for a reconciliation between George II and the Hohenzollerns, Frederick was in fact seeking the best terms for his alliance from both George and Louis XV. The crucial issue was the Jülich-Berg inher itance, towards which France was best placed to help Prussia. Furthermore, far from there being a clear contrast between British ministerial enthusiasm for winning Frederick by making concessions and reluctance on the part of George unless he won equal concessions, as has been argued,54 the British ministry was itself split. Fears were expressed that Frederick would expect too much and that supporting him over Jülich-Berg would lead to war with France in the interests of Prussia and Hanover.55 George II, like his ministers, hoped to win Frederick’s support, but was concerned about the extent and implications of his demands. Long-held vague views about how Prussia could join in to support the balance and “liberties” of Europe, repeated to Frederick in August 1740 by the British envoy, appeared redundant in light of Frederick’s stress on the interests of rulers. His demands for British support over Jülich-Berg, Mecklenburg and East Friesland 56 threatened not only Electoral interests, but also British relations with other powers. To build up the strength of a ruler who could not be relied upon was dangerous, and, in part, unnecessary, because, although it is not clear how far the connection was made by contemporaries, there were signs of a possible major improvement in Austrian relations with both Britain57 and Hanover,58 as well as the successful negotiation of an AngloRussian alliance.59 The last was seen as an important deterrent to any Prussian pact with France.60 As conflict with France in the West Indies appeared more likely in September 1740, however, the ministers in London became more interested in the idea of winning Frederick’s alliance. 61 However, given the extent of Prussian expectations, this was unrealistic, and criticism of George II for his attitude towards Frederick62 is misplaced. The situation changed on 20 October 1740 with the death of Charles VI. George was a guarantor of the Pragmatic 99

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Sanction. Co-operation with Frederick on this basis was sought,63 but his invasion of Silesia was to compromise such hopes. The complex differing interests, cross-currents and tensions of 1740 were to be repeated on other occasions in the period; indeed, in 1741 George II’s negotiation of a neutrality for Hanover undercut attempts to create a league to support Maria Theresa. Towards the end of the War of the Austrian Succession, Horatio Walpole made a major effort to regain influence and to press the case for a Prussian alliance and for Britain refusing to allow Austrian opposition to Prussia to prevent such an alliance. George II, however, proved a formidable opponent. Horatio wrote to Pelham in August 1747 that “the master will not hear of Prussia, and the servants, partly will not, and partly dare not propose it”.64 Later, the tensions within the “Old System” can in part be considered against the background of the ambiguous Hanoverian response to Imperial authority, the difficulties of reconciling German patriotism, loyalty to the Emperor, confessional feeling and particular interests. The “System” served royal and Hanoverian ends by essentially acting as a deterrent of Prussia, while appearing also as an anti-French step, thus being acceptable to British opinion. The coming of peace in 1748 enabled the shelving of differences between anti-French and anti-Prussian goals. Indeed the position was eased from the point of view of the British ministry, for accusations of a subordination to Hanoverian ends were less publicly convincing in the period 1748–55 as a result of an agenda of Anglo-Prussian differences, including the Emden Company (a Prussian East India Company), Silesian debts and maritime prizes. Hanoverian commitments focused the issue of royal control, and did so in a fashion that was often contentious within both the formal mechanisms of politics and the wider public political world. If only for that reason, George III’s public distancing from his grandfather’s Hanoverian commitments helped to “depoliticize” the issue of the royal role in foreign policy, although this owed more to the rise of the king’s domestic political position and views as a source and issue of contention. Furthermore, foreign and domestic policy were in part joined in that George III’s favour for Bute was blamed by many for the replacement of Pitt in 1761 and for the peace negotiations in 1762–3. Nevertheless, it proved easier to sustain a critique of Bute’s supposed influence on domestic matters rather than his role in foreign policy. Foreign policy and the Electorate of Hanover clearly contributed to royal unpopularity in mid-century, especially in 1743–4, but it may be asked how far they weakened the crown. Certainly the contention arising from Hanoverian issues made it unlikely that British resources could be extensively used to serve Hanoverian ends. If that is seen as the prime objective of the monarchs then they failed. The period was one in which the gap between Hanoverian and Prussian power widened, and was brutally displayed with the fate of East Friesland. Yet, Britain-Hanover was not like England-Normandy in the late eleventh century: circumstances and political cultures were totally different. If 100

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George II adapted with difficulty to the rise and manifestations of Prussian power and to Frederick the Great’s wilfulness, he was guided to that end by the majority of his British advisers, and those who viewed Prussia unkindly were convinced that they did so for British ends. Clearly such ends were open to multiple interpretation and to contention, but it is striking how clear ministers were on the need to advance Hanoverian interests only if they corresponded with those of Britain. George II was certainly weakened in the successive domestic political crises that accompanied and followed the fall of Walpole by the degree to which Hanover was both involved in European power politics in a period of war and change, and vulnerable. This made it far less likely that he could sustain a breach with politicians, in or out of office, who enjoyed the confidence of Parliament. Carteret failed to cope with the compromises and nuances that the situation called for. He understood the implications of the Hanoverian link in diplomatic, but not domestic, terms. Yet it may be argued that both monarchs and monarchy were less weakened by the Hanoverian connection than might otherwise be anticipated. Indeed one consequence of greater political and public concern with the maritime and trans-ocean world was that it became easier to pursue British foreign policy on the Continent in the early 1750s with less public contention. Nevertheless, Hanover was a cause of significant political and printed debate in both 1755 and 1757 as Britain went to war again. Hanover remained a central concern of George II in his less active last years, but this helped to define his grandson and heir’s hostility to Electoral considerations, a response, as with his opposition to involvement in British general elections, that was at once pragmatic and idealistic. As Prince of Wales, the future George III wrote to Bute in 1759, “as to the affairs on the Weser they look worse and worse; I fear this is entirely owing to the partiality [George II] has for that horrid Electorate which has always lived upon the very vitals of this poor country”. As king, George III showed his determination to end Britain’s involvement in the German part of the Seven Years’ War: though I have [Hanover ian] subjects who will suffer immensely whenever this kingdom withdraws its protection from thence, yet so superior is my love to this my native country over any private interest of my own that I cannot help wishing that an end was put to that home …I think if the Duke of Newcastle will not hear reason concerning the German war that it would be better to let him quit than to go on with that and to have myself and those who differ from him made unpopular.65 George III’s largely indifferent attitude towards Hanover indeed worried British ministers concerned about the policy and its political resonances.66 George III’s break with his grandfather’s ministers was intertwined with the 101

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break with the policies of the 1750s. It was not only that the alliance with Prussia was lost, but that the gap was not filled by an alliance with another major continental power. The motives for such an alliance—George II’s anxiety about Hanover, ministerial concern about this anxiety and the sense that defensive arrangements for Hanover could and should serve as the basis for a British alliance system—had been largely lost, certainly in so far as activity was required to mould circumstances. More generally, the interventionist habit of mind and the concomitant diplomatic assumptions had been lost as far as Europe was involved.67 George III might be very gracious to Carteret, now Earl Granville, soon after his accession, but he had little interest in the views that that minister had once stood for. Though Lord President of the Council until 1763, Carteret was one of yesterday’s men. In March 1761 Haslang pointed out that the pr ince-bishopr ic of Hildesheim, which the neighbouring Electorate of Hanover had long sought, was both vacant and actually occupied by George III’s forces. George II had wished to gain the territory, but George III did not share his grandfather’s views. Three weeks after reporting that Hildesheim was vacant, Haslang observed that the predilection for Hanover was no longer so strong and suggested that there would be no territorial cessions elsewhere in order to make gains for the Electorate. Three months later, when Bussy began peace negotiations with the British ministry, he was told by Carteret that the British had little interest in Hanoverian affairs. In July Haslang noted that whatever happened in the Empire would have little effect on British government policy, adding, “It is no longer the times of George II.”68 Bute told the Sardinian envoy, Count Viry, in October 1761 that France would not gain better terms if she captured Hanover, a statement given authority by its source, the royal favourite. A month later, Newcastle referred to Bute and his supporters when he wrote to the Marquess of Rockingham, a political ally, “There are many who are for abandoning the German war, and giving up Hanover, and our allies. That is what I can never consent to, nor, I believe, any of our friends. I have talked very plainly to the King, and My Lord Bute upon it.”69 Although Hanover did not play a major role in British diplomacy or public debate in the 1760s, the very role of the king in ensuring this indicated the continued importance of the crown in the field of foreign policy. In some respects, the shift was as abrupt and striking as that of France from hostility towards alliance with Austria in 1756 or that of Russia similarly toward Prussia in 1762. Yet this shift was both accomplished by a monarch whose constitutional and political positions were more circumscribed than those of most of his continental counterparts and also led to far less unpopularity than that resulting from Louis XV’s change of policy. Whatever his supposed naïveté in domestic political management in the 1760s, George III was personally responsible for a shift in foreign policy that was both to contribute to the revival of royal popular ity dur ing his reign and to ease the situation confronting British diplomacy. 102

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An emphasis on the position and policies of the monarch offers an important link between foreign policy and political history. It widens our understanding of the former and, by making clear the continued role of the monarch in a crucial sphere, underlines the significance of foreign policy for both the political history and debates of the period and contemporary assessments of the constitution. In 1753 Frederick II, whose central concern with Britain was its foreign policy, wrote to his envoy in London that “when you say that such a thing could make an impression on the nation I regard the word nation as inappropriate, as I know that at present the king gives whatever impression he pleases to the nation which he governs absolutely”. Two years earlier, Frederick had been convinced that Britain would not be able to sustain its alliance system, both because of its financial problems—the national debt— and because the death of George II would lead to a minority. In 1753 Yorke wrote to his brother from The Hague, I am convinced that the constitution of no country is so little known as that of England, half the world imagine that all government is confusion with us; and the other half that our kings are as arbitrary as any other, and that all they do in a view to satisfy the nation is pure grimace.70

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The country, which supplies the crown with the sinews of war, has a right to inspect into the conduct, and to demand satisfaction, of those who either in the field, fleet or Cabinet abuse their trust. The sovereign, no doubt, has the right in himself to make peace, and to declare war; but the subject has reserved the power to try and to punish those, who dare to give him bad advice: by which the blood and treasure of the nation shall be misapplied or squandered away; and the glory and interest of the crown and kingdom be diminished and injured. —Monitor, 15 October 1757 To turn from crown to Parliament, monarchs to parliamentarians, is to adopt another perspective on foreign policy, and, again, one where theory and practice did not always coincide. The influence of Parliament on the formulation and conduct of foreign policy was both direct and indirect. Parliament had responsibility in the field of finance, and, thus, of supporting the military expenditure and subsidies to foreign powers that were judged necessary for the pursuance of policies. In addition, foreign policy was debated in both chambers of Parliament, being, generally, the single most important topic in the major parliamentary debates, such as those on the Addresses of Thanks at the crucial start of the session. Foreign policy also played a major role in debates over the size and funding of the armed forces. Thus, foreign policy posed in an acute for m the serious problem of parliamentary management. Parliament’s indirect influence is difficult to gauge and was an issue over which contemporaries were divided. The extent to which British policy, and the foreign response to British views that played such a large role in shaping British policy, was affected by the existence of Parliament, and the consequent need for government to consider how best to win parliamentary support or reply to parliamentary criticisms, was unclear to contemporaries. Parliament 104

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was often cited in their discussion of foreign policy, whether by ministers stressing the need to settle matters before sessions, British diplomats concerned about the detr imental consequences for their gover nment’s image of parliamentary contentions, or foreign diplomats seeking to assess the stability and intentions of the British ministry. Joseph Yorke observed in 1754 that it was “very agreeable…to see the supply voted as it is…it puts a stop to all disadvantageous reports in the foreign world, where it was imagined that some difficulties would be thrown in the way of the administration”. The major setpiece occasions of the debate over foreign policy occurred in Parliament. Ministers emphasized the problems posed by parliamentary management, Holdernesse responding in 1749 to Dutch pressure for a subsidy to the Elector of Cologne by laying “great stress upon the difficulty I supposed His Majesty would be under from the nature of our constitution in granting subsidies to foreign princes in time of peace”. Five years later, Holdernesse’s reasons for delaying talks for renewing the subsidy to Bavaria included “His Majesty, having called a new Parliament, is desirous of knowing the sense of his people before any final determination is taken upon any measures of expence”. Indeed, there was considerable public criticism of such subsidies. The very practice was presented as alien to national interests. However, foreign envoys sometimes argued that British ministers encouraged parliamentary pressure in order for the government to be able to use it as an argument to gain its ends.1 The Lords was more securely managed during this period than had been the case, for example, during the reign of Queen Anne, and it was in the House of Commons that the government was most seriously assailed, especially over subsidies held to benefit Hanover in 1742, 1744 and 1755, or over peace with France in 1762; in the last, the Lords, unlike the Commons, did not divide. In 1758 Hardwicke noted a limitation of the role of the Lords in a crucial sphere when he suggested to Newcastle that there would not be any debate there over the issue of a subsidy to Prussia: “As this will be a message of supply, Your Grace knows better than anybody that the return of the House of Lords can only consist of assurances of support.”2 As far as the political position of Parliament was concerned, there were no significant constitutional and institutional changes after the Septennial Act of 1716 established that general elections had to be held at least every seven years, instead of three as under the Triennial Act of 1694. The influence of Parliament as a crucial institution and a sphere of politics, and in terms of its impact on policy at specific conjunctures, var ied in response to domestic and inter national circumstances, but there were no fundamental changes. Parliament’s importance was greatest in periods of international crisis, for it was then that it was necessary to demonstrate governmental strength and to obtain specific acts of support, especially backing for treaties and grants for increased military expenditure or for subsidies to foreign allies. Thus, at the height of the political crisis of early 1742, occasioned by Walpole’s fall, John Drummond MP assured Onslow Burrish, a British diplomat, “we voted 105

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unanimously I may say 35,000 land forces, above 10,000 marines and everything else on the same foot as last year”.3 Four years later, the need to consider parliamentary views was indicated by Trevor when he wrote to Burrish about the latter’s negotiations with German rulers for troops to help in the war with France: if you can anywise in the Title, Preamble, or [word obscure] hook in, that these troops are to be an accretion to the strength of the Maritime Powers [Britain and the Netherlands], though in fact paid by the Republic [Netherlands], and to the Common Cause, rather than as it was an augmentation of the National Militia of the States, it would have a good appearance, and effect in our Parliament.4 The political crisis that preceded, accompanied and followed the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War led to a renewed emphasis on the international value of parliamentary backing for the government, necessarily so in light of foreign concern about the stability of the government, voiced by Frederick II among others. Thus, after the formation of the Pitt-Newcastle ministry in 1757, Holdernesse wrote to inform Burrish that the Addresses of Thanks had passed unanimously in both Commons and Lords, adding that it “cannot fail of having the best effects, by showing their steadiness and zeal, to enable His Majesty to act with the utmost vigour, in the prosecution of such just, and necessary measures”. Parliamentary support could also appear useful for domestic reasons. In October 1762 the capture of Havana led to debate within Britain as to whether peace with Spain should be made without a territorial gain in return for the restitution of the conquest. Henry Fox argued that if the Cabinet consisted of persons who had weight and courage, I would certainly propose what I thought best for the King and his people and pursue it without previously consulting Parliament. But, besides what has lately appeared of irresolution, the Cabinet is composed of persons who bring no weight to the scale of gover nment, either of author ity or connections…I shall be glad then, in this ugly situation to have the sense of parliament. Not for security but to remove difficulties. The objection of its letting down government is obviated by its having been done before, and in times when prerogative was carried high, and it would obviate the great difficulty because the greatest coward would sign what the Parliament authorised, without considering that he was not secured by it. In addition, there was always interest in the composition of the parliamentary opposition. Thus, in November 1761 Newcastle was concerned that speeches in the Commons indicated “that the measure of abandoning the continent is not entirely the produce of these young hot heads”.5 106

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The constitutional possibilities of Parliament’s role in limiting governmental plans could not, in general, be pushed because of the political fact of ministerial power. In 1751 Yorke wrote from Paris, “The Parisians say their Parliament [Parlement] is less corrupt than yours, for that their remonstrances are different from your polite addresses.” However, in 1762 Bute felt it necessary to warn that for Parliament to interfere “with respect to the manner in which the war is to be carried on” was a direct infringement of the royal prerogative. Ministerial control of parliamentary proceedings could not be taken for granted, and both parliamentary management and policy choices were important for this reason. In 1749 Newcastle referred to it costing him “a great deal of pains to get” a payment for Mar ia Theresa through the Commons.6 Until the death of Charles VI, and more obviously the commencement of the War of the Austrian Succession in December 1740, the parliamentary debate in the field of foreign policy was dominated by the question of AngloSpanish relations, first in peace and then in war. Waldegrave was certain of the interrelationship of the negotiations with Spain and the parliamentary situation. In June 1739 he wrote to his counterpart in Madrid that the latter’s reports I fear will bring our friends at home under great difficulties…the warmth which has been expressed in the House of Lords upon the past delay of the payment of the ninety five thousand pounds, will…leave no room for future management in case this last dispatch arrives before the Parliament be up.7 A common theme united the parliamentary discussions, namely, the extent to which the government could be relied upon to defend national interests. The decision to go to war with Spain initially undercut the opposition, as it was what they had been pressing for. In the Commons’ debate on the Address in November 1739, Pulteney indicated a dislike for the past measures, yet spoke warmly for the present Establishment and Royal family and for vigorously and unanimously supporting the King in the war, and letting every thing give way to the common national cause and the support of this Government. He concluded with saying I third the motion and when the question was put Sir John Hynde Cotton8 gave the only negative. Pulteney’s counterpart in the Lords, Carteret, told the house that “no war was ever entered into with greater unanimity amongst all ranks and degrees of men”. The opposition leaders, however, had to try to maintain a distinct position, and Pulteney said “he would not have it thought he was making advances to some Gentlemen (meaning the Ministry). He scorned it, and he 107

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also despised any unjust mean suspicions from any other quarter (meaning his own party, or rather perhaps the Torys).”9 The marked divisions in opposition ranks prior to the shattering of their unity in 1742, divisions that helped to lead to the latter, were revealed in the Lords’ debate on the Address in November 1739. The debate also indicated the range of information available to peers. Lord Carteret spoke in the House of Lords in the same way that Mr. Pulteney spoke in our House and was not for dividing, but the Question on which they divided, was moved by Lord Chesterfield and seconded by Lord Scarborough. Lord Talbot made a speech an hour long most of which he read out of a large paper like a lawyer’s brief, he went over all the treaties that have been made, and all the forces and taxes that have been raised for near twenty years. He voted with the Minority but his speech might have served many other occasions as well as this.10 The divisions within the opposition could however be papered over by attacking the ministry. After an initially quiescent start to the 1740 session, due to poor weather delaying the return of many from the Christmas recess and a sense that there would not be any major debates,11 the attack was mounted on “that old and stale question the place bill”. The decision to focus initially on a well-established measure designed to reduce the government’s influence in the Commons reflected the greater appeal of this issue once war with Spain had broken out, for domestic issues were “safer” in political terms, less likely to be affected by unexpected international developments. The government’s majority was smaller than predicted,12 attendance in the Commons at a high level,13 always a good sign for the opposition, and they then decided to raise the issue of the Convention of the Pardo by which the government had mistakenly announced that it had settled differences with Spain in 1738. This reflected one of the principal problems facing the opposition in their discussion of foreign policy, their limited access to information about policy and the extent to which it was therefore difficult to mount an informed critique. This accounts for their frequent request for papers, which served to demonstrate the restrictions under which they operated, and the sense that the government had followed, and was following, secret, and thus suspect, policies. On 21 February (os) 1740 Pulteney introduced a motion for an enquiry into the conduct of the authors and advisers of the Convention of the Pardo. His point that “discontents at present lie smothering under the hopes of a successful war, but they are far from being removed or extinguished” was both a confession of the opposition’s difficulties and a warning to the ministry. Pulteney attacked the ministry from the perspective of the Whig legacy by comparing the Convention with the Peace of Utrecht of 1713, a Tory measure abhorrent to Whigs, and he made his motion in the very words of the first motion for an enquiry into the 108

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earlier peace. Sir Robert Walpole, in reply, addressed the question of the unpopularity of ministerial policy, offering a sceptical assessment of public opinion and a prudential defence of the government’s position. Walpole also cast doubt on the value of popular views on war, defended his position over the Convention and attacked Utrecht.14 By the last, he asserted ministerial commitment to the Whig legacy and trying to unite the Whigs against the Tories, or, at least, to increase tension between opposition Whigs and Tories. These arguments were to be deployed not only in reply to criticism of policy toward Spain in both peace and war, but also, later, in response to the agitation over Hanoverian subsidies in 1742–4. The latter was the highpoint of parliamentary agitation over foreign policy in the period, but it was one that took place against a very different international background to that of 1739– 40. The conduct of the war with Spain provided opportunities for allegations of a lack of ministerial effort and competence, attacks that did not appear stale, but that instead focused the events of the day on a continued critique of a ministerial failure to defend national interests. On the other hand, the outbreak of war on the Continent produced a less certain situation. In the Commons’ debate on 13 April (os) 1741 on a motion for a subsidy to Maria Theresa, Pelham asked “how can we know what may determine the course of that flood of power, which is now in a state of fluctuation, or seems driven to different points by different impulses?” He also commented on the difficulty of discussing the situation, saying, “It is not to be supposed that such members of this House as are not engaged in public affairs, should receive very exact intelligence of the dispositions of foreign powers.” In reply, Pulteney offered an ambitious but, in terms of domestic politics, acceptable definition of national goals in which “we may become once more the arbiters of Europe, and be counted by all the Protestant powers as their protectors; we may once more subdue the ambition of the aspiring French, and once more deliver the house of Austria from the incessant pursuit of those restless enemies.” However, although he was correct to argue that it was necessary to reconcile the interests of Austria and Prussia, Pulteney can hardly be blamed for failing to explain how this could be achieved. His assertion of British capabilities was more problematic: our fleets are sufficient to keep their dominion of the ocean, and prescribe limits to the commerce of every nation. While this power remains unimpaired, while Great Britain retains her natural superiority, and asserts the honour of her flag in every climate, we cannot become despicable, nor can any nation ridicule our menaces or scorn our alliance. We may still extend our influence to the inland countries, and awe those nations which we cannot invade.15 The repetition of such remarks indicated the problem of expectations that confronted all British ministries in this period. It also indicated how the fate of 109

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military operations could provide opposition politicians with a basis for criticism of the government that was far easier than that provided by the complexities and secrecy of diplomacy. It was easier to criticize in war than in peace, easier to attack military operations than diplomatic negotiations, although, in reply, in wartime ministerial supporters could press home the charge of encouraging national enemies against critics. This was very much the case after the fall of the Walpole ministry of 1742. It was not easy to grasp the details of Carteret’s interventionist diplomacy in 1742– 4, but it was possible to understand the argument that the payment of subsidies for Hanoverian troops, the terms of these subsidies and the conduct of George II when in command of his Anglo-German army in 1743 all constituted proof of a failure to heed national interests. This took on added weight because of hostility within the ministry to Carteret, not least on the grounds of his interventionist policies. While ministers did not publicly oppose Carteret’s policies in Parliament, they benefited from the clear warnings being sent to George II about the weaknesses of his minister and the liabilities of his policies. The discussion of Hanoverian subsidies led to the raising of broader issues of foreign policy. In the Commons debate on the Address on 18 November (os) 1742, the issue of parliamentary authority was raised, a reflection of what has been pointed out in another sphere, namely, the unsettled nature of constitutional conventions in this period.16 John Tucker recorded, There were some warm expressions of a too dangerous use of the Royal Prerogative and endeavours used to show those Ministers had not given wholesome council who advised the King to prorogue the last session in that precipitate manner while it was in the midst of an enquiry from which the nation had very great expectations, or to order the Hanover troops to march in the manner and at the time these had done without previously mentioning it to the Parliament, that they were bad precedents and might be attended with the worst of consequences. To quote only such arguments would suggest that the debate was somewhat abstract and uninformed by any knowledge of or reference to specific international developments. However, the same letter included an account of the speech of Sir John Barnard, an independent Whig who was a prominent London marine insurer and had been Lord Mayor. The notion of displaced effort he advanced was not novel, but its use in the War of the Austrian Succession was important and prefigured Pitt’s wider employment of the idea. Sir John Barnard told us that though no other nation would give any assistance, it was our interest to use single endeavours to prevent the growth of an exorbitant power in France and that this step His Majesty had taken to cause this body of Hanoverians to march into the Low Countries was the wisest and best measure that could be followed and 110

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that our sending the English forces last summer into Flanders had effectually prevented the French from sending any succours to their distressed armies in the Empire and given the Queen of Hungary an opportunity of making that head against them which has brought her into her present advantageous situation—he took notice as well as many other people of the inconsistency of giving any opposition to this measure with the repeated desires of this Parliament last year to persecute the war with vigour. John Campbell, a member of the “Old Corps” of ministerial Whigs and a Lord of the Admiralty under Walpole, recorded Barnard making his point with a homely image: “... said in supporting the Queen of Hungary we did not fight others’ battles but our own, as we would exert ourselves to the utmost to extinguish a fire in our neighbours’ house to prevent our own being burnt next.”17 One marked change in the political atmosphere in the early and mid–1740s was the growing sense of international crisis. Opposition writers had long sought to inculcate such a sense, but the immediate threats that had been depicted had been largely domestic ones, dangers to the constitution. There had been dire warnings of the threat posed by French intentions and rising power, but their immediacy had been lessened by the cautious nature of French policy, especially after 1735. More generally, it had been difficult to sustain an atmosphere of threat in the 1710s, 1720s and 1730s except in so far as commentators were concerned about foreign support for Jacobitism and its domestic support. Alliance with France had lessened concern about both French policy in Europe and Jacobitism. Spain and, even more, Austria were difficult to prevent as serious threats to Britain on the Continent and with regard to Jacobitism, particularly after the failure of the Spanish invasion plans in 1719. There was no serious challenge to British naval dominance. Ministerial writers had sought to rouse concern, especially during the confrontation with the Austro-Spanish Alliance of Vienna in 1725–9, but there was nothing that approximated to earlier fears of Louis XIV. Once the Anglo-French alliance collapsed in 1731 fears of France rose, but they were lessened by Fleury’s cautious policies in both peace and war. As a consequence, opposition commentators, having castigated the government for failing to act against France during the War of the Polish Succession, were able from 1738 to present France as not sufficiently threatening to prevent war with Spain. Furthermore, once the war had broken out, these same commentators urged that all military resources ought to be employed against her. In contrast, ministerial spokesmen had pressed for caution, emphasizing the danger of French intervention. Thus, in 1739, as Newcastle pointed out, it was the government that warned of a dangerous international situation, while the opposition saw threats to British trade but, more vociferously, opportunities for imperial expansion at the expense of Spain. 111

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The situation altered dramatically in 1741 as Austria appeared near collapse under the threat of French, Bavarian and Prussian power, thus making readily apparent and accentuating what had hitherto been hypothetical dangers from France. Opposition politicians continued to argue that Britain’s international agenda should be dominated by Spain and continued to press for a concentration of military effort against her, but their attitude appeared increasingly inappropriate. Indeed, opposition views were to fracture with the reorganization of the ministry in 1742. Those who remained in opposition continued to focus on the need for effort against Spain, while their former colleagues, led by Carteret and Pulteney, joined a ministry that had already shifted its attentions to the situation on the Continent, regarding a war in which Britain was not involved as more important to her interests than one in which she was a key combatant. This division in the opposition was not the central factor that explained why only some of its members were willing to join the ministry. Domestic political factors, specifically the treatment of Walpole and the extent of incorporation of the opposition within the government, were more important, and opposition views on foreign policy were to diverge along these already existing fault lines. Yet these differences were to provide important issues for dissension and debate once the new political alignment became clear: those still in the opposition, whether Tories or Whigs, criticized the ministry, including their former colleagues, for continental interventionism, support for Hanover and the greatly diminished resources devoted to the “Blue Water” war with Spain. The political realignment therefore brought together all those who believed Britain should play an active role in continental diplomacy. Indeed, from 1742 commitment to such a view was an implicit condition of active membership in the government at the senior level. This was one of the reasons why the demands of Pitt for senior office proved so contentious in the mid– 1740s and mid–1750s. The belief that Britain should play an active role was linked to concern about developments on the Continent. This was related to anxiety about the secur ity situation in Br itain. Rising alar m on the part of minister ial parliamentarians was to reach two peaks, a short one at the time of the French attempt to invade England in February 1744, and a more sustained one, from the landing of Bonnie Prince Charlie and the fall of Ostend in the summer of 1745 to the thwarting and defeat of the Franco-Jacobite threat to Britain early the following year. However, concern about the possibility of Bourbon action on behalf of the Jacobites did not commence in 1744. It existed from the outset of the war with Spain in 1739 and indeed played a major role from then in naval strategy and in ministerial attention to Franco-Spanish relations. By 1742 anxiety about the possibility of a Spanish invasion on behalf of the Jacobites had abated, and it was clear that France was too busy in her new war with Austria to aid Spain against Britain, as had been feared in 1740–1. At that point, there was little prospect of French support for the Jacobites. However, 112

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the raising of the Hanoverian issue in Parliament served to excite concern among ministerial parliamentarians and to move the issue of the succession to a more central place in political debate. Thus the opposition parliamentary campaign acted as a focus for constitutional, political and international fears and expectations across the political spectrum. Campbell wrote to his son in December 1742, I am well infor med that the gover nment know the Pretender’s instructions are to run down Hanover as much as possible, and say nothing of him, which is no doubt the wisest counsel that ever was taken by his Court, for if the present settlement was overturned, he must come in; and it is a much easier task by false assertions and suggestions to set the People against the Government they live under; than to raise a zeal for him, in any but old women (whether in petticoats or breechs) upon the old absurd notions of indefeasible hereditary right, and absolute passive obedience to lawless tyranny…I have intended to write to Brett about the garden ever since I came to town, but could never find leisure, as he is one of the Political Club, he will not wonder that public affairs take up all my time, and that I am more concerned to preserve the Queen of Hungary’s dominions than to improve my own.18 Rather than treating the Hanover agitation of 1742–4 and the response to the Jacobite threat in 1744–6 as separate, it is appropriate to note that they were related problems as far as many parliamentarians, both “Old Corps” and Jacobite, were concerned. The issue of the succession thus played a major role in the public debate in 1742–6, one that was far more wide-ranging than any concentration on the immediate crisis of 1745–6 might suggest. The resonances of the Hanoverian issue helped to decide, and thus weaken, the opposition, especially once Britain’s situation in the war deteriorated. When the Hanoverian issue had been raised in Parliament in late 1742, the situation was not too bad, but by January 1744 it was clear that George II’s victory over the French at Dettingen the previous year was not going to lead to a collapse of the French position, as had originally been hoped. The worrying international situation helped divide the opposition. Pitt and George Lyttelton, both still opposition Whigs, argued that the Hanoverian troops in British pay should be discarded, but that British troops should continue to be stationed in the Austrian Netherlands, a measure that was designed to serve tactical political ends and yet also reflected the changing military situation. Pitt wished to appeal to the Pelhams and to encourage them to act against Carteret, but he also felt that the Tories and other all-out opponents of the ministry were failing to appreciate the need to abandon rigid views in face of changes in British policy and were unable to distinguish sufficiently between help to Hanover and a national commitment to the anti-French cause on the Continent. The need for the latter also led Horatio Walpole to complain about 113

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the way in which British parliamentary news was being published in the Amsterdam press. He especially regretted the publication of a translation of the Lords Protest about the subsidies paid for Hanoverian troops.19 Thus the parliamentary debate reflected international as well as domestic changes. John Owen’s presentation of the political history of the period largely in terms of domestic, factional manoeuvres is less than the complete picture.20 The Hanoverian issue in its broadest sense helped to drive the Whigs together. It made it clear that Carteret’s foreign policy was vulnerable in Parliament, that the Pelhams needed to recruit opposition Whig support if they were to feel secure there, and that co-operation with the Tories in a dangerous international situation was not without hazard for opposition Whigs. These related realizations, driven forward in an atmosphere of growing crisis, lay behind the consolidation of the Pelham ministry, based on widespread Whig support, between 1744 and 1746, and they also helped to ensure the marked slackening of the public debate that followed the consolidation. In February 1744 Haslang sent details of the very strong Lords protest over the Hanoverians, but added that it would have no consequences other than that of raising tension, because the ministry was certain to gain its point, thanks to its secure majority.21 The new policy of comprehension that the political crisis occasioned led in December 1744 to the inclusion of several Tories in the ministry under Earl Gower, and consequent divisions among the Tories.22 Carteret’s fall in November 1744 was followed by a less tense parliamentary atmosphere in the discussion of foreign policy. The reconstitution of the ministry brought several prominent Opposition Whigs, including Bedford, Chesterfield, Pitt and Sandwich, into office. The direct payment of Hanoverian troops was ended. George II was obliged to be more cautious in his unpopular plans for action against Prussia. These changes helped to ensure a different agenda of parliamentary discussions, one in which dissension over foreign policy became less politically significant. This remained the case for the remainder of the decade, with the prime locus of conflict over foreign policy becoming the Council, not Parliament. Tucker noted in December 1746, “The army was voted yesterday without opposition.”23 These political changes ensured that the parliamentary debate over the peace terms was muted. There was to be no controversy akin to that over peace terms in the last major struggle in which Britain had been engaged, the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13). The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was not to have the resonance of the Treaty of Utrecht in terms of the British public debate, either then or subsequently. This owed much to the differing nature of the political alignments of the two periods, and also to the extent to which the succession was still apparently an open issue in 1713,24 while in 1748 that was no longer the case. In addition, the sense of betrayal of purpose that underlay the “No Peace Without Spain” argument in the War of the Spanish Succession had been already exhausted in the War of the Austrian Succession, as the war against Spain, with its intoxicating prospect of Caribbean conquests, had been 114

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effectively abandoned without lasting gains from 1742. Furthermore, the successes of the earlier conflict, which had made Utrecht seem such a disappointment to many, had not been matched in the War of the Austrian Succession. There was therefore little sense that victory had been thrown away. The government also helped to defuse a possible political crisis by calling the next general election a year earlier than necessary. They did so because they feared the electoral and thus parliamentary consequences of a bad peace, Newcastle writing to Cumberland: any final conclusion of the war, by almost any peace that can be obtained, would undoubtedly give strength to opposition, raise some flame in the nation, and render the choice of a Parliament more difficult…The present New Opposition is yet unsupported, unconnected, and not in high reputation; what the course of a year may produce nobody can tell; unfortunate public events, or private disappointments, and personal views, may render that opposition formidable, what at present is far from being so.25 By 1748 it was generally, and indeed correctly, believed that peace was necessary and undesirable terms inevitable, and, in addition, Parliament posed few problems of management. In November 1748 Newcastle wrote about the likely parliamentary view, “I think we can have no opposition. There are few, very few, who don’t seem pleased, and own how well, and how soon, our great affair has been brought to a conclusion.” William Murray, the Solicitor General, later Earl of Mansfield, speaking in the debate on the Address on 20 November 1748, claimed that peace had been necessary because of the vulnerability of Britain’s Dutch ally and the dangerous state of public credit, both reasonable claims: we had for three years preceding met every year with a signal defeat, and every defeat was attended with the loss of whole countries, and many fortified towns. One of the Under Secretaries, John Potter, wrote that even “those who are constantly inclined to grumble…were glad to find the affair so well over”.26 As from 1710 in the War of the Spanish Succession, and from 1761 in the Seven Years’ War, there had been a growing political and public desire for peace, and the interaction of the two created opportunities and difficulties for politicians. However, whereas there were major changes in ministry on the other two occasions, in 1710 and 1761–2, changes that were necessary in order to push forward the peace process, in 1748 peace was obtained without any such alteration, and this helped to ensure political stability over the following six years. Pelham in particular was sensitive to public concerns. He wrote in 1748 after a visit to his Surrey constituency, “we had a full meeting of 115

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gentlemen, and almost all in good humour. Our peace is popular with all parties.” This was not, of course, the case. There was criticism, although more of the failures of the war than of the fact of peace. An Ode for the Thanksgiving Day by “Titus Antigallicus”, complained of “Britain’s eclipse and England’s lost, lost glory”. Nevertheless, peace was widely sought. 27 Pelham declared, “Peace you know is my mistress; and war a rival I fear, as well as watch.”28 He was the man for the moment, a minister who could see through peace without sowing political discord, dividing the government or losing control of Parliament. The relative quiescence of the parliamentary response therefore reflected more than just the strength of the ministry after the 1747 general election, although that was definitely important. Replying to Murray in the debate on the Address in November 1748, Dr George Lee, who argued that there was not “one English article” in the peace, explained the pessimism of the opposition speakers, “all questions must, in this House, be determined by numbers”.29 Whatever its internal disputes over foreign policy, the Pelham ministry was far from weak, and was therefore not vulnerable to opposition parliamentary campaigns, especially as peace lessened the scope for attack. The government did indeed face parliamentary criticism of its foreign policy over the next few years, but its solid control of both chambers combined with the absence of any grave crisis, to leave the ministry in a strong position. There was a significant difference between parliamentary attacks that were unrelated to any urgent problem, the situation in 1748–53, and those that interacted with a grave crisis, as in 1739 or 1742–4. There was criticism of the terms of Aix-la-Chapelle, but foreign envoys of long standing were struck by the absence of anything interesting in Parliament to report,30 and by the government’s secure control of the Commons. 31 Zamboni noted popular concern that Gibraltar would be exchanged with Spain for an equivalent, but argued that, even if the ministry sought to do so, they could count on Parliament’s support.32 As no such plan was attempted, Zamboni’s assessment was not tested, but it indicated the apparent strength of the government’s position, because the Walpole ministry’s belief that it would not be able to push through such a plan had been an issue in the 1720s. Given that one of the most important aspects of Parliament’s role in foreign policy was the impression created either of the strength and stability of the government, or of the opposite, the situation in 1747–53 was very notable. The reports of foreign envoys in general presented a picture of a ministry securely in control of Parliament and little subject to extraparliamentary pressure. This contrasted not only with the situation in the obviously tumultuous years from 1739 to 1746, but also with the preceding period of Walpolean stability, when diplomats had frequently commented on newspaper and other criticism of the government. The contrast is particularly apparent in the despatches of long serving envoys, such as Zamboni, who had sent reports from Britain since 1723, Ossorio, who had arrived in 1730, and Alt. Indeed, a marked feature of 116

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the diplomatic reports on British politics in the period 1747–53 was their overwhelming concentration on struggles within the ministry rather than a discussion of Parliament or extra-parliamentary developments comparable to that earlier in the century. Parliament was not neglected. In April 1749 Puysieulx ordered the French envoy, Durand, to be very attentive to what happened at the end of the session, as government policy was then often revealed. Puysieulx added that one of the principal objects of Durand’s mission was the acquisition of information about British domestic affairs, specifically divisions in the Council, the strength of the political parties, the views of merchants and of public opinion, national resources, government finances and, in particular, the state of the national debt.33 Thus, Parliament was of value to foreign governments because of the light it could throw on British policy and the indications it could provide about the strength and stability of the ministry, but by 1749 a more discriminating assessment of its importance was being offered. The extent to which Parliament was not kept informed, but was instead managed, was more readily apparent. The var ious measures of minister ial strength and stability were better appreciated. Parliament, which had so long served as the central sphere in which these could be judged, an obvious product of its prominence and its historical and constitutional importance, was less obviously crucial during the Pelhamite ministry. Cumberland’s assessment in April 1749 of “the weak and virulent minority”, that it had “diverted themselves and teased us”, was of wider applicability than the particular issue he was referring to.34 The state of the nation’s finances, judged serious and therefore likely to lead to a pacific policy by Durand35 and of the ministry, seemed of greater consequence than the situation in Parliament. Given George II’s age, it is not surprising that the reversionary interest was of consequence. Frederick, Prince of Wales’s views were sought by foreign envoys, and in February 1750 he promised Haslang that he would not oppose subsidies to Bavaria, 36 in contrast to his usual opposition at this stage to government policies. However, the parliamentary impact of the reversionary interest was lessened by the strength of the ministry and the absence of any serious international or domestic crisis, a marked contrast to the situation in 1717–20 during the Whig Split, when George II had been Prince of Wales and in opposition to his father. Dodington, who left the government to join Frederick in 1749, soon complained to the Prince about the state of the opposition and thus helped to divide it further. He criticized the impracticability of uniting any four efficient persons, upon any principle, or plan that may serve, or save their country: The disregard I have met with in endeavouring to unite them; the want of concert in the Lords, even in this great point: the total neglect of the Commons, in not so much as asking what we would do, or our opinion what was to be 117

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done: the impropriety, as well as total inutility of appearing in publick, alone, or with a very few, and those, of no consequence, nor following the same method and plan of reasoning.37 The opposition sought issues on which they could attack the ministry in Parliament for failing to defend national interests. In February 1750, twenty years after Walpole had been criticized on the same head, the opposition complained that France had failed to fulfil her undertaking to destroy the defences of Dunkirk, as agreed by the Peace of Utrecht and confirmed by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Pitt, as Paymaster General, replied on behalf of the ministry that the sole alternative to negotiation was war, that Britain was in no state for conflict, that the motion was dangerous as it would incite popular pressure, and, in reply to Egmont’s claim that Pitt had formerly adopted the same position, added that it was necessary for nations to follow a prudential course, a novel position for Pitt.38 The ministry won the division by 242 to 115. Mirepoix was sure that the parliamentary strength of the ministry would encourage Newcastle to press for a more interventionist role for Britain.39 Indeed, the fact that, as Earl Granville (as Carteret now was) noted in January 1750, “there is no appearance of any considerable matters to come on” in Parliament40 can be seen as a condition of British support for the Imperial Election Scheme. It is doubtful that Newcastle would have been able to prevail over Pelham’s hostility to peacetime subsidies, a contentious policy, had there been more parliamentary hostility to the ministry. Parliament provided an opportunity for attacking government policy, but it was also the body to which the ministry had to bring financial requests. Whereas Walpole had followed the apparent conclusion of the international crisis that had begun in 1725 and ended in 1731 with a new Anglo-AustroSpanish alignment by ending the controversial subsidies to Hesse—Cassel,41 Newcastle did not abandon the expensive and controversial policy of subsidies that had been employed during the War of the Austrian Succession. Instead, these subsidies were now focused on the Imperial Election Scheme and Parliament was asked to vote them. On 22 February (os) 1751 the Commons debated the subsidy to the Elector of Bavaria. It is clear from accounts of the debate that it was an informed discussion. Indeed, the debate can stand as an example of the nature of the parliamentary discussion of foreign policy. The surviving sources also offer a warning about the problem of the nature of the evidence. If the historian had only Horace Walpole’s brief account to rely upon, he would be able to say little about the content of the speeches, an all too common problem. The far longer account in Cobbett’s Parliamentary History is much more valuable, although it offers no guidance as to the quality of the speeches, and thus of their impact. The report sent to Newcastle by his Under Secretary and general factotum, Andrew Stone, himself an MP, is also very important. It offers a lot of guidance as to what was said in the debate. 118

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Mr. Pelham opened the Debate; He said, that he was no friend to subsidies in time of peace and that he should not have been for this subsidy, if it had not been of a different nature from most others. That the great object with him, was the preservation of the Peace, and that this subsidy had an immediate tendency to that: that the uniting the Elector of Bavar ia to the House of Austria (who had so often been the instrument of France to embroil Europe) and the securing the Imperial dignity to the House of Austria, by the election of the Arch-Duke, would probably be the effect of this treaty—that he neither knew nor believed, that there would be any other demands of this nature, and that, if these great points could be secured, for so small an expense, as our quota of this subsidy; he could not but think, that they would be very cheaply purchased. He entered into the particulars of the treaty—explained the affair of Mirandola—and the transaction with the Court of Vienna for bringing them to contribute to the subsidy—and accounted for the Empress Queen’s not being a party to the treaty—He said a great deal in defence of the measure—that he believed, France was, at present, sincere for preserving the peace and that he was not at all apprehensive that this would make France alter their system. But possibly, that this great work might, at last, be concluded by the general consent of all parties. Samuel Martin, a follower of the Prince of Wales, made some sensible points in return: He represented the success of the Election as doubtful—The ways, by which it was pursued, inconsistent with the Laws of the Empire; and the aggrandising the House of Austria, as an object, that might be dangerous to this country—But that, supposing it right, The Imperial Dignity was nothing but a name—and the real strength of the House of Austria consisted in the Hereditary Dominions etc. He was answered by Lyttelton, now a Lord of the Treasury, who revealed a knowledge of the Imperial constitution: showed that the election was not inconsistent with the constitutions of the Empire, which he supported by good authorities—that it was a great and useful measure, and that the expense was inconsiderable. That nobody would be more against a subsidiary system, than himself but that this was not to be considered in that light, but as a means of preserving the peace of Europe, and establishing a system for that purpose. Murray “seemed to give general satisfaction” with his speech, which, judging by the account in Cobbett, showed a considerable knowledge of German history and the Imperial constitution. As Stone noted, “He went into the 119

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particulars, that had been mentioned relating to the laws of the Empire, about elections.” Egmont, in reply, raised some practical points and also the role of Parliament. He asked how could we depend upon the Elector of Bavaria? Would not he still be French, in his heart, as his family had always been?…would not other Electors, Saxony, Palatine, Mayence, and Treves, expect to be paid also? and who could find money for that? that he acknowledged, there would be some utility in this election, if it could be obtainedBut that, otherwise this subsidy would be flung away. If we had subsidies to give, why did not we give one to Denmark? But that his greatest objection to this Treaty was, that it was made without the consent of Parliament and that, (if Parliament could have concurred no other wise) it would have been better, to have applied for a vote of credit, with a view to have applied it to this object, than to have taken no notice of Parliament at all. Egmont’s intelligent observations about inter national diplomacy were countered by Pelham’s suggestion that Egmont was opportunistic, that the government had tried, but failed, to gain the alliance of Denmark, “though he doubted not, if it had been done, it would have found fault with”.42 Pelham’s claim was not without point, but it is also clear from Stone’s account, and that in Cobbett, that the Commons was offered both a wide range of infor mation and a reasoned account of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposal. This is worth stressing as there has been a tendency to underrate the sophistication of parliamentary debates of foreign policy, and thus to present parliamentary pressure as essentially political in origin but uninformed by any particular analysis of the problems facing the country. This is misleading. It does less than justice to the knowledge of many parliamentarians, which in part stemmed from their own experience. A number of Secretaries of State and diplomats, both serving and former, were members of one or other house, and some took an active role in debate. This can be seen in January 1752 in the debates over the subsidy to the Elector of Saxony. Two former experienced envoys, Walpole and Robinson, and one less experienced diplomat, Legge, spoke in the Commons on 22 January (os). Another speaker, Sir William Yonge, formerly a Lord of the Treasury, a Lord of the Admiralty and Secretary of War, and then, for reasons of health, holder of the sinecure post of Joint Vice-Treasurer of Ireland, was provided with copies of the documents relating to the treaty by Newcastle. Another government speaker, Murray, offered the Commons details of French subsidies. Horace Walpole recorded that his uncle Horatio “showed how well he knew where the weakness of such treaties lay”. The government’s majority was very substantial, 236 to 54, Newcastle writing that the treaty was approved “by a majority of five to one in the House of Commons; and the arguments in favour 120

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of this measure were so strong, and so well supported, that I am persuaded, it will meet with universal approbation throughout the whole kingdom”.43 Yonge’s account of the debate throws valuable light on the issues raised: It was opened and the motion for the subsidy moved by Mr. Pelham: who spoke extreamly well, and urged the advantage of a King of the Romans very strongly, but I thought rather coolly of subsidy treaties in general, but pressed the compliance with this as a consequential measure of the treaty with Bavaria, which had received the approbation and sanction of Parliament. He was answered by our old friend Horatio Walpole who spoke ¾ of an hour against the treaty and exhausted all that could be said on the subject. But I was sorry for his indiscretion, when he spoke against subsidy treaties in too extensive a manner, and put every man in mind of the preventive measure of his brother, which included many such. But the weakest part of his speech, in my opinion, was his examining seriatim the articles of the treaty…However he ended with declaring he should vote for the question…His reasons were that as the treaty was made he would not subject the King to any disgrace from his Parliament, nor lessen that influence which he actually had, and always ought to have with the powers of Europe. He was answered by the Solicitor General who spoke well to the point…I got an opportunity of speaking, as I had been desired by the Duke of Newcastle who had enabled me to do so, and in answer to another gentleman who examined the value of the articles of the Treaty I said, that if we obtained nothing by it, but what was in the Treaty I would not have given my vote for one farthing; but if in consequence we had the word of a king [Augustus III] for what was of the g reatest consequence to this nation, explicitly and free from all objectives, it was worth double the sum, and the word of a sovereign prince so solemnly given, was as satisfactory to me, as any treaty, for that one was easily broken as the other. And that I had confidence and reason for that confidence, that such assurances were given. This I had foundation for saying, the Duke of Newcastle having put into my hands very kindly all the letters and documents relating to this treaty, from beginning to end both in and out of cypher. And I had a hint, that it was properer to come from one who was not a minister than from one who was. The debate was concluded by Mr. Legge, who spoke short, but with great weight, who told us from his own knowledge, that all had been done that could be done to conciliate the King of Prussia, and particularly the obtaining the guarantee of the Empire for his possessions in Silesia, in hopes it might have produced a harmony between him and the House of Austria, without which it could not have been obtained; and which would not have been obtained, but from the influence of our king on that court and on other princes of the Empire. That as the option, which was easy to 121

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make, between a very great and permanent power, and a great power indeed but very precarious, depending on the life of one able man [Frederick II], with the support of another great power of an opposite interest [France], and subject to be reduced by any one or two shocks which time or accidents might produce…Upon the whole the opposition was trifling.44 Foreign envoys had correctly predicted large majorities, Alt arguing that unless some unexpected incident arrived the session would be very tranquil.45 The government was not seen as unstable. When the Lords debated the treaty on 28 January (os) 1752, the opposition was opened by Bedford, until recently a Secretary of State, and other speakers included a current Secretary, Newcastle, another former Secretary, Granville, and a former diplomat, Sandwich. Bedford spoke very well, offering a skilful account of the international situation and Britain’s position. Newcastle’s speech, in which he attacked reliance only on “our wooden walls”, was muddled, and Granville was criticized for displaying “much wit but no argument”. On the other hand, he pointed out with reason that guarantees were of limited value in international relations. Despite Bedford’s able speech, the motion was rejected without a division, a reflection of the government’s strength in the Lords, while George II refused to speak to Bedford for some time, itself a valuable help to the ministry.46 The following day the ministry displayed its strength in the Commons, easily defeating a Tory motion for declaring against subsidy treaties in time of peace. The debate revealed Tory concern about taxation. Subsidy treaties continued to be an important focus of parliamentary discussion of foreign policy until the breach with Frederick II in 1762. They provided the major occasion for such discussion, and served to raise both general questions of the purposes of British foreign policy and specific points about the value or otherwise of particular alliances in different conjunctures. The need to win parliamentary approval for such treaties ensured that the debate over foreign policy was often presented in terms that related to cost and value, but that also reflected a more general approach to the discussion of policy, one that was appropriate to a commercial society where national taxes played a major role. Old England, an opposition London newspaper, in its issue of 1 August 1752, referred to “that ridiculous balance of power, to maintain which we are at this juncture so solicitously lavishing away our time and treasure”. A facetious essay in the issue of 8 February 1752 stated, As the disapprobation of foreign subsidies has, we have seen, found itself in the senses or understanding of Britain, it will demand our closest attention effectually to countervail these operations of nature, or, as Mr. Locke would say, these prejudices of education. The structure we are here to raise for the public good, will therefore find its basis in that great 122

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man’s system of no innate ideas…the present purpose, which is to make us approve foreign politics, demands no more than that all the books which have been wrote, regarding the particular interests of this kingdom, should be burnt. Polity, History, and Geography, are all the offensive studies…all knowledge of men, of the trading interests, and of the advantage of our situation, are utterly lost and dead. The quality of the parliamentary debates was, as already indicated, reasonable but varied. Precisely because the debates could serve to raise both general and specific points, the content of speeches was very diverse. If it is assumed that all speakers should have offered a detailed account of the international situation in order to throw light on the diplomatic problems and choices facing Britain, then it is clearly possible to adopt a critical attitude. However, a uniformly critical approach is inappropriate precisely because speakers presented the situation in different lights, not least in order to make very disparate political points. This helps to explain why it is so difficult to judge Pitt, a speaker whose oratory should not be treated as if it were a thesis. Aside from the scanty nature of the sources, there is also the problem of bias in those that survive. It is likely that many sources, particularly the press, simplified the arguments in order to present two clear-cut positions, and deliberately stressed rhetorical stances at the expense of cautious discussion and the use of evidence. It has been argued that the legislative approach to foreign affairs is more partisan and less intellectual than the executive approach.47 This is possibly the case, but it does not preclude intelligent discussion of foreign policy by a legislative assembly. Alarmist sentiments were frequently voiced by opposition speakers, but not only by them. In December 1743 Lord Raymond told the Lords that the opposition were “the favourers of France, and the betrayers of the great cause of universal liberty”. 48 Other ministerial speakers also implied that their opponents helped France, either deliberately because they were Jacobites, or, without intention, because they were more concerned to weaken the government than to consider the possible detrimental consequences of their criticisms. In judging opposition rhetoric it is necessary to consider the particular problems opposition peers faced. As the Tory Earl of Lichfield correctly told the Lords in December 1743, “as this House has not of late years been let into any secret relating to our foreign transactions…we can judge from nothing but public appearances”.49 It is therefore not surprising that, as Hardwicke pointed out, opposition speakers offered little proof in support of their arguments.50 Furthermore, criticism of the role of the monarch had to be indirect. The opposition were also appealing to a wider public of the British public nation, European powers and posterity, and, in appealing to such an audience, it was possibly felt best, either by the speakers or the reporters, to adopt a broad and rhetorical approach. 123

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The nature of the international system was part of the problem in discussing foreign affairs. Dynasticism provided the principal theme and idiom of the system, and the monarchical control of foreign policy in most states kept it secretive. Given their volatility, it was difficult to assess, let alone predict, the policies of other states. Dramatic reversals of policy produced an atmosphere of uncertainty in which rumour flourished and conspiracy was believed in because often true. In such a situation it was necessary to judge actions and policies that seemed contradictory, ambivalent and difficult to establish. As a result, it was simpler to adopt a broad brush approach, and also to discuss policy in terms of history and to assess intentions in the same terms. Thus, it was argued that the plans of France could be gauged by considering her past policy, an analysis aided by the belief that for each state there was an obvious natural interest dictating a particular course of policy. Parliamentarians who discussed international relations in such a fashion were simply sharing in the common terminology and analytical methods of the day, devices employed by statesmen as well as journalists. The frequent discussion of past events was also a function of a political society where legitimacy derived from such events, for example, the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, and the response to them. More generally, to suggest that parliamentary discussion of foreign policy was designed to serve a political purpose does not imply that it was without standards or quality. Given the similarities between some of the crises facing Britain, it is also inappropriate to criticize the speakers for returning to the same themes. Themes recurred, such as the extent to which foreign powers should be subsidized, and the respective importance and value of “Blue Water” and continental problems and strategies. On 10 December 1755, when Parliament debated the subsidy treaties with Hesse Cassel and Russia, Henry Fox, recently appointed Secretary of State for the Southern Department, attacked Pitt and said that “the fatal distinction, if it had prevailed, of Englishman and Hanoverian…had been attempted again without success this summer”. The Commons discussion on 10 December included references to the international position in George I’s reign, that on 12 December to Edward III and Elizabeth I’s use of German troops, evidence of the sense of continuity that was such a feature of the period. Pryse Campbell was in no doubt of the importance of the domestic political context of the debates. On 18 December he ascribed his recent faults as a correspondent to the “Hessians, Russians, Cossacks and Calmucks, [who] last Monday put the finishing strokes to the Treaties, which lost several gentlemen their places, and gave places to others, I have got nothing and only lost my dinner every day they came before us”. 51 The government’s majorities were substantial, 318 to 126, 289 to 121, 263 to 69 and 259 to 72 in the Commons, 85 to 12 in Lords. The parliamentary weakness of the opposition in both chambers was therefore readily apparent in December 1755. The political crisis that had followed the death of Pelham on 6 March 1754, a major domestic 124

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discontinuity, did not offer the opposition opportunities comparable to those present in 1741 after the general election and the failure to secure a reconciliation of George II and the Prince of Wales. Nor should the necessary parliamentary consequences of the parlous international position in 1756 and early 1757 be overemphasized. The very difficult situation in 1747 and early 1748 had not led to a collapse of the ministry’s position in Parliament. It was instead the crisis within the government that was so serious in 1756–7; although the creation of a viable leadership in the Commons was a key issue. Parliamentary debates were largely of consequence only in so far as they influenced this crisis, providing opportunities for trials of strength. Once the political crisis had been resolved in the shape of the stable Newcastle-Pitt ministry (1757–61), then Parliament became of less political consequence, though it remained important as a crucial component of the system of assured public finance that enabled the British government to fight the Seven Years’ War with such persistence.52 Parliament might have been the scene for more serious attacks on the ministry had the limited military success of 1755–7 not been subsequently transformed into glorious victory, but, as a consequence of both victory and ministerial stability, Parliament was quiescent, certainly compared to the situation during the Nine Years’ War, the War of the Spanish Succession and in 1741–5. Government unity was only lost in 1761–2, with the crises that led to the resignations of first Pitt and then Newcastle, but, again, that was a crisis within the ministry. Furthermore, their hesitation in attacking the new ministry, the general desire for peace, 53 the popular ity of the new king and the government’s success in both war and peace blunted the force of parliamentary criticism. The Peace of Paris encountered more parliamentary attacks than that of Aix-la-Chapelle had done, a measure of the loss of government unity and the stronger sense that Britain had had a bad deal, but the situation was essentially the same. The ministry carried the Address of Thanks in the Commons by 319 to 65. Claims that this majority was obtained by bribery were inaccurate. As so often in Hanoverian Britain, it was the parliamentary strength of the government rather than the vigour of its critics that was most strikingly apparent to observers, both domestic and foreign, and their view of ministerial power owed much to this strength. The government was sufficiently confident of its majority to discuss the terms of the Definitive Treaty before Parliament had considered the Preliminary Articles.54 It is important not to present a crude contrast of parliamentary pressure and government conduct of foreign policy, to exaggerate the difficulties of parliamentary pressure or to ignore the advantages that Parliament offered. In 1747 Horatio Walpole noted governmental reliance on parliamentary support, although the ability to win such support did not necessarily entail success abroad, a valuable qualification on any argument that presents domestic structural features alone as responsible for Britain’s rise to great power status: “Our ministers in England have no plan for peace or war, but we shall depend 125

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upon a great majority in Parliament; for God’s sake what will that do, why vote what you please; will votes without means and men extricate us from these endless difficulties.”55 The decision in 1748 to return the popular gain of Cape Breton to France, despite vociferous demands that it be retained, suggests that domestic opposition was far from being a determinant of policy, as also does the success in pushing through peacetime subsidies to allies in the early 1750s, despite claims that Parliament would never accept them. Government success at general elections and the resources available for parliamentary management did not prevent serious criticism of British foreign policy, but it lessened their impact. It is salutary to contrast the criticism of peacetime subsidies with their minor role in the general election of 1754. In general, successive governments enjoyed the support of Parliament, and foreign policy was no exception. This ensured a degree of financial support that was crucial. The British system of public finance rested on a parliamentary-secured public national debt, and this enabled successive governments to finance war expenditure by borrowing at a lower interest rate than that open to their rivals. Furthermore, British tax rates were higher than those in France, and the ability to sustain these was a consequence of both the strength of the economy and the degree to which the role of Parliament facilitated consent. Parliament thus helped to enlarge the power of government. “No Pelham, no money, was the City cry” in 1746 when George II attempted to engineer Carteret’s return. With Pelham at the Treasury, however, large sums were raised. When First Lord of the Treasury, Newcastle also took care to “talk to the most knowing people in the City …upon the present state of credit”.56 The Monitor claimed on 6 September 1755 that “he who has the longest purse will wear the longest sword”. On 15 July 1758 the paper crowed What a prodigious sum of money! No less than ten millions four hundred thousand pounds and upwards has been cheerfully and expeditiously granted and raised for the service of the current year. Such is the spirit of this nation, when they are satisfied with a minister, and approve of the measures pursued by the Cabinet. By regarding Parliament partly as a sphere in which the disputes of politicians in and out of favour could be contested, it can be seen as a stage for, rather than a source of, political difficulties. These difficulties were not unique to Britain, but were an essential feature of court-based political systems that lacked the organization and attitudes of disciplined parties. Conversely, Parliament offered a solution to the most serious domestic problem of the states of eighteenth-century Europe: public finance. It provided a means for linking government to the politically powerful throughout the country, a means whose constitutional and institutional expression was the voting of substantial sums for approved policies. 126

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The contrast between Britain and her continental counterparts was not solely a matter of sums raised and the speed with which they were voted and produced. It was also a matter of lower rates of interest, flexible financial methods, sources of revenue that could be anticipated without difficulty and relatively low collection costs, in both administrative and political terms. Politically, this led to the voting and collection of large sums without significant levels of public disorder. Parliamentary financial arrangements and taxation were accepted as legal even if they could produce criticism. While many continental states, not least France, found it difficult to devise politically acceptable methods to raise taxation, largely because the politically and socially powerful were unwilling to increase their commitments, parliamentary taxation and a parliamentary-funded national debt raised the substantial sums that funded Britain’s wars without creating political, regional and social divides. More generally, the ability of the British state to provide subsidies to other powers 57 was an indication of the fundamental strength provided by the combination of parliamentary government and burgeoning commerce. In 1757, before the period of repeated success in the Seven Years’ War, Newcastle, then First Lord of the Treasury, noted that there appeared to be no difficulty in meeting the new commitment to provide greater support to Prussia, “towards that I have already been offered near six millions…and all this money will be borrowed (if necessary) something under 3½ per cent; when France gives 11 per cent and cannot fill the subscriptions”. He made the same point to foreign envoys. The role of trade was such that in wartime great pain was taken to protect British and attack enemy trade, and this policy was also pressed in Parliament and print.58 Yet it is necessary to be cautious before assuming that British foreign policy served the ends of commerce. Any stress on royal influence in foreign policy, on strategic considerations and on the exigencies of alliance politics lessens the role of commerce. There is no doubt that the latter was of great importance, but its importance in foreign policy has been exaggerated. Commercial interests often had contradictory views, for example, those of the Royal Africa Company and private traders over the regulation of the trade to West Africa. In 1752 the Steadfast Society of Bristol agreed to spend up to £200 in lobbying Parliament against the monopoly of the Levant Company in the Turkey trade.59 Much lobbying was at cross—purposes. Furthermore, the vociferous and public nature of lobbying should not lead to its impact being overemphasized. It is true that British diplomats frequently intervened on behalf of their merchants. In 1748 the consul at the crucial Mediterranean port of Leghorn (Livorno) was ordered to preserve British commercial privileges from any innovations whatever, and his efforts were supplemented by the envoy in Florence. The following year, Bedford instructed Keene in Madrid to “insist that the trade between the two nations should be on the same footing as it was before the war”. Keene indeed sought to do so. His negotiations led to the 127

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commercial treaty of 1750. This both settled most outstanding differences and led to a reduction in tension that greatly helped trade. This was not the limit of British governmental efforts. Newcastle moved in 1752 to protect the export of paper hangings to Russia and also discussed with merchants the challenge posed by Frederick II’s plan for an East India Company: “Everybody here, and, particularly, the trading people of all kinds, are most zealous for taking all possible measures for discouraging, at once, the new Emden Company, as far as the Law of Nations will justify us, in so doing.” The following year he wrote to Keith in Vienna concerning the situation in the Austrian Netherlands, “our manufacturers in Yorkshire are already full of complaints upon their head; and if they were, by such a Convention, to be precluded from all hopes of redress, there would be no standing their importunities”. Holdernesse observed in 1755, “I am too sensible of the consequence of our trade to India to suffer it to be diminished”.60 Ministers were expected to heed commercial pressure, and frequently did so. In early 1749 Bedford was pressed by a general meeting of London merchants engaged in the West Indies sugar trade over the position of certain Caribbean islands, and received from Hardwicke “the third volume of the British Merchant, in which are contained the tracts concerning the Spanish duties”. Two years later, Newcastle instructed the envoy in The Hague “to follow the directions of the East India Company in helping them in their quarrel with the Dutch company”. Requests from British merchants trading with Hamburg in 1762 led to pressure on Denmark not to attack the city in order to pursue its demand for a loan.61 However, ministers could be resistant to mercantile pressures. In 1746 Viscount Barrington, a Lord of the Admiralty who was to have a long ministerial career, took part in a parliamentary debate on convoys and escorts in which he “spoke much of the disposition in merchants to complain of government—and abused insurers extremely”.62 Commercial tended to be subordinate to political interests. For example, complaints over Danish and Swedish protectionist legislation did not lead to the serious reprisals that were threatened.63 In 1742 the Swedish envoy in London was incorrect when he feared that British mercantile complaints about Swedish privateering would lead to the despatch of a British fleet to the Baltic.64 Indeed, as far as the Baltic was concerned, although British envoys complained about commercial grievances, the ministry rarely made then a central plank of policy, and most complaints were far from effective. The Baltic was primarily a sphere of political interest for George II and his ministers, and that dictated British policy. To that extent, British critics of the Hanoverian orientation of foreign policy were justified. This was not, however, an issue in commercial relations elsewhere in Europe, while, outside Europe, British ministries were more willing to heed maritime and imperial interests. Considering how best to settle 128

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disputes with Spain over the British cutting of logwood in Central America, Keene could not conceive any other method than that of calling for such people as Alderman Baker and his friends who know by practical experience the whole scope and nature of this logwood business, recommending to them the form of as many proposals as they can prudently imagine or to serve instead of another in case the more advantageous ones can not pass. That these projects after being examined in Council may be remitted to me with proper instructions and authority.65 Baker was one of the leading London merchants trading with North America and bought much land in Georgia. He had been Chairman of the East India Company and was then Deputy Governor of the Hudson’s Bay Company as well as a government supporter in Parliament. Although it was often difficult to detect, individuals like Baker wielded considerable influence, and thus fuelled contemporary concerns about a “monied interest” dictating policy. It was sometimes argued that a policy of continental interventionism was necessary for commercial reasons, although such an argument could serve to defend both a general line of policy and specific moves that could also be seen as detrimental towards trade. Criticizing Austrian conduct over the Barrier, Newcastle wrote in 1753, “The power and influence of this country depends upon the extent of our trade. It is that consideration that engages us in the support of the Continent, and it is for that reason that we are so strictly and I hope ever shall be united to the House of Austr ia.” The economist Josiah Tucker, author of The Important Question Concerning Invasions (1755), was another opponent of the notion of maritime self-sufficiency. The support given to Portugal in 1762 was justified on the grounds of its commercial importance to Britain. In 1750 the prolific political writer John Campbell argued that the reciprocal connections resulting from trade have quite altered the state of things and produced within these two, or at most these three centuries past, a kind of system in Europe, or in the Christian parts of Europe at least, by which every state is led to have a much greater concern than formerly for what may happen to another…we may therefore safely say that the balance of power…was created by trade, and must continue to be the object more especially of trading countries, so long as they preserve their commerce and their freedom.66 However, the argument that Britain’s continental trade should lead her to intervene in disputes there was rejected by some commentators, such as the London Chronicle of 26 January 1762. An anonymous contribution in the issue of 27 February 1762 asked whether “it is idle and absurd to think of exerting 129

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our power in the defence of the Portuguese, merely because they are our best customers, and pay us annually a considerable balance in treasure”. Parliament and Trade, the state in the mid-eighteenth-century world with the most effective representative system and the growth in Britain’s global power: the connections are seductive.Yet, as already suggested, the situation was far more complex than a schematic interpretation might suggest. It is necessary to return these various factors to their several contexts, to rediscover the play of contingency, to recover narrative. In addition, it is important to appreciate the role of choice, to understand that national interests were disputed and policies subject for controversy. The growth of Britain’s power was achieved in a competitive world in which policy choices were debated and frequently the cause of political contention. Foreign policy was a matter of process as well as structure and individuals played a major role. The role of chance is frequently presented in dynastic terms: What would have happened had such a monarch died? However, the parliamentary process can also be seen in such a light. Pitt was the most famous mid-century parliamentarian but his rise owed much to the death of a man of different capabilities and views, Henry Pelham. The variety of possible standards that existed is suggested by a letter of 1748 from Legge to Pelham: a minister with your intentions and possessed of the means, as you are, who will take every opportunity of retrenching expenses, reducing interest, adding to the Sinking Fund and paying our debts as fast as is at all consistent with public safety, will in a few years deserve better of Great Britain and make a much greater future himself than all the heroes whose ashes repose in Westminster Abbey have ever done.67

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Chapter Seven Diplomats and ministers

That ministers and men in power grow callous after a certain time, I am well convinced, as that misers do, and will equally stand the laugh; nay, even laugh themselves first. Prints, pamphlets, caracaturas, burlesque songs, and all the train of booksellers, or rather scribblers’ venom, is as indifferent to them as the hiss of an upper gallery to a very impudent player; who calls them canaille, fellows of no taste, spirit or genius. —Centinel, 17 October 1757

Diplomats In this period Britain became the most powerful maritime and trans-oceanic power in the world, but her diplomacy remained centred on Europe. Diplomatic relations with non-European powers became more frequent, but they were generally ad hoc and much less common than with European states. Furthermore, they were often handled by military personnel or by the agents of British commercial companies, particularly the East India Company in Asia, rather than by diplomats accredited by the crown. This reflected a lack of certainty about how best to handle relations with non-European powers. The calibre of diplomats is difficult to assess, especially if their necessary social skills are considered: ability in negotiation was tested less continually than court skills, for influence often reflected the ability to make the right impression at court. Rulers and ministers frequently complained that envoys exceeded instructions, for example, Legge in Berlin in 1748, but it was difficult to provide orders that would comprehend all eventualities. In practice, any account of British diplomacy in this period has to take note of two aspects, first, permanent or “structural” factors that affected its conduct and, secondly, specific political crises. Structural factors were of varying 131

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intensity. At the level of the individual diplomat, the most important was the financial. The private correspondence of diplomats was dominated by issues of pay and expenses. Both were commonly in arrears and each, especially the latter, was regarded as insufficient. Such complaints were of course not unique to the British, but they reflected several more general facets of the diplomacy of the period that are important. First, much of early modern government was undercapitalized. It is of course true that most government in most periods has been short of funds, but, in comparison to the nineteenth and twentieth century, governments did not benefit from an important industrial base, the infrastructure of credit was less developed and their creditworthiness was limited. The financial problems of British diplomacy were however exacerbated by another “structural” feature of British foreign policy: the role of Parliament. After Henry VIII failed to use the despoliation of the monasteries permanently to increase the capital base of British monarchy, the crown was generally dependent, especially in periods of warfare and international confrontation, on financial support from Parliament. This was rarely adequate, and fiscal exigencies therefore affected the operations of all areas of British government, including the diplomatic service; although such exigencies were scarcely unique to Britain. If Parliament is also taken as the symbol and fulcrum of public politics and public political pressures in the period, then it is important to consider the impact on British diplomacy of the reluctance of the political nation to support a substantial standing army. There were of course other reasons why the British army should be smaller than that of France. Britain had a smaller population, as an island, had both an important alternative of military commitment in the shape of the navy and was faced with the problems of amphibious operations. Nevertheless, the growing gap between British and French military capability on land in the seventeenth century is instructive, and the same was true, after 1660, in comparison with Austria, Prussia and Russia. Whereas Henry VIII in the 1540s and Oliver Cromwell in the 1650s had been able both to deploy substantial forces and to send them to the Continent, the British forces sent thereafter were increasingly effective only as part of coalition armies arrayed against France (as with the forces sent in the 1690s, 1700s, 1740s and 1750s), were a smaller percentage of the French army and were dependent on a favourable political environment in Britain. When this was lost, then the consistency and thus effectiveness of British diplomacy appeared compromised. It is difficult to point to any change in the calibre of British diplomats during the period under consideration.1 Instead, variations in their importance and success can be more directly ascribed to Britain’s relative power. Aside from direct representation by George I and George II when they travelled abroad, diplomats, whatever their merit, were most heeded when Britain was seen as powerful: more important for example in 1750–2 than in the late 132

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1730s. The situation also of course reflected more general facets of the diplomacy of the period, especially the extent to which individual diplomats were seen as representing the views of the crucial figures in the British government. This issue remained a problem after the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, as first William III and later the Hanoverians sought to pursue their own agendas in foreign policy and clashed accordingly with ministers and politicians. Nevertheless, despite serious clashes over the alleged role of Hanoverian interests, it proved easier to reconcile royal and parliamentary differences, or, looked at differently, to finesse royal views, than had been the case under the Stuarts. In part, this was because the “Glorious Revolution” had settled the religious issue. It was no longer the case that a royal foreign policy could be presented as Catholic or crypto-Catholic, and this greatly lessened the severity of disagreements over foreign policy, not least by weakening its ideological dimension and by ensuring that it could not be placed so centrally in domestic politics. As continental European commentators pointed out, the British had a hypocritical notion of international relations. Successive governments sought to create and sustain what they termed a balance of power in Europe, while seeking unrestricted power in the oceanic and colonial spheres. In theory, this subverted the logic of British diplomacy, but, in practice, there were more pressing reasons why continental states would not support British interests and respond to British approaches. The most significant were, first, repeated British refusals to make the commitments required by putative allies, indeed to see alliances as mutual and dynamic, and, secondly, and related to the first, the nature of European power politics. States such as Austria, Prussia, Russia and Savoy-Piedmont had little interest in Britain’s trans-oceanic policies and were not outraged by British gains in this sphere. Indeed the major expansion of the British empire in mid-century aroused little response in much of Europe: the rise of Prussia was of greater concern. This was not true of other major European colonial powers—Portugal, Spain, France and the Dutch—and, to a considerable extent, they formed a different diplomatic system alongside the British. British diplomats had few problems in seeing Britain as part of a European system guided by common rules, rather than as separate from such a system. The value and beneficial nature of such a system was outlined by many commentators, especially after the abatement of religious hostility at the level of international relations led to a search for secular rationales of diplomatic policy. The maintenance of “the” (not a) balance of power became the end of diplomacy. The apparent precision and naturalness of image and language of balance greatly contributed to their popularity in an age in thrall to Newton and mechanistic physics. Furthermore, balance served as an appropriate leitmotif for a culture that placed an emphasis on the values of moderation and restraint, and for an international system and diplomatic culture organized around principles of equality or at least the absence of hegemony. In 1769 the 133

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influential historian William Robertson, in his History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V, presented the balance as a product of political science…the method of preventing any monarch from rising to such a degree of power, as was inconsistent with the general liberty …that great secret in modern policy, the preservation of a proper distribution of power among all the members of the system into which the states of Europe are formed…From this aera [the Italian Wars of 1494–1516] we can trace the progress of that intercourse between nations, which had linked the powers of Europe so closely together; and can discern the operations of that provident policy, which, during peace, guards against remote and contingent dangers; which, in war, hath prevented rapid and destructive conquests.2 Robertson’s book provided empir ical underpinning for the notion of contemporary Europe as a system that had devised a workable alternative to hegemonic power, and an alternative that was better, not only because it facilitated internal development, but also because competitive, but restrained, emulation gave Europe an edge over non-European powers. Thus Edward Gibbon, who stood unsuccessfully for Parliament in 1761, subsequently argued that the balance of power will continue to fluctuate, and the prosperity of our own or the neighbouring kingdoms may be alternatively exalted or depressed; but these partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts, and laws, and manners, which so advantageously distinguish, above the rest of mankind, the Europeans and their colonies…The abuses of tyranny are restrained by the mutual influence of fear and shame…In peace, the progress of knowledge and industry is accelerated by the emulation of so many active rivals; in war, the European forces are exercised by temperate and indecisive contests.3 This perspective, a European version of universalism particularly suited to a Britain that did not seek continental conquests, described the ideal vision of the diplomatic world of Europe between the Peace of Westphalia and the French Revolution. It was expressed in such diplomatic concepts and devices as collective security and the congress system. Yet, just as Gibbon’s account excluded the “barbarians” from his “one great republic” of Europe, so also the diplomatic world was very brittle. That it excluded women and the bulk of the male population and reflected the world of orders and privilege that dominated and manipulated society is scarcely surprising, but was to ensure that revolution, nationalism, people’s warfare and people’s diplomacy all were to pose serious challenges. Simultaneously, the combined effect of Eurocentric ideologies and a diplomacy of force and 134

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coercion was to ensure that it remained natural to resort to violence as European horizons widened.

Mid-century diplomats In European diplomacy the Br itish followed similar practices to their continental counterparts. Issues such as appointment, control, remuneration and training were similar and handled essentially in a common fashion. However, foreigners in the service of the British crown became less common in the diplomatic service. One major difference arose from Britain’s island nature. This could lead to serious problems in communications. Adverse winds could prevent messengers sailing or lead to them being blown off course. At a crucial moment, a courier from Berlin landed in Whitby not Harwich in November 1757. The following month, Mitchell found himself under “the greatest perplexity” because contrary winds had detained Holdernesse’s instruments and the “state of affairs” had recently changed considerably.4 Diplomacy was not taught, but was an adjunct of gentility, a consequence of breeding. Diplomats were the personal representatives of the sovereign and their readiness for office was seen as a product of their social rank. This was often closely related to the diplomatic rank of the official appointed, and thus selection was an expression of regard, respect and reciprocity. Thus poor relations were reflected by George II being represented at Berlin only by a Secretary in 1745 and 1747, and by nobody from May 1747 until the following April, again from November 1748 until 1750, and from 1751 until May 1756, and at Paris by Antony Thompson, the former ambassador’s chaplain, from October 1740 until the French declaration of war in March 1744. Diplomatic representation in 1739–63 naturally divides into three periods, defined by war. In 1739–48 war led to the end of diplomatic relations with both Spain and France and had effects on links with their allies. In contrast, as the British government made a major effort to create and sustain antiBourbon alliances and to ensure that they had the desired military consequences, so British diplomacy became much more active, certainly in contrast to the position in 1736–8. Peace in 1748 brought a resumption of relations with France and Spain, but those with Prussia and Sweden remained cool. The active Br itish diplomacy of the interwar period, particularly the attempts to win Spanish support and to push through an Imperial Election Scheme in the Empire, placed considerable pressure on diplomats. Several, especially Keene (Madrid 1749–57), the Earl of Rochford (Turin 1749–55), Yorke (Paris 1749–51, The Hague 1751–80) and Keith (Vienna 1748–57), were impressive diplomats, though by no means always successful. In some respects, the interwar period represented a peak in British diplomatic activity, but it ended in failure and 135

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isolation. Only a limited amount of the blame attaches to individual diplomats, and indeed, with the possible exception of Hanbury-Williams and Russia, no Br itish diplomat of the per iod was as responsible for the deterioration of relations with a foreign state as, for example, St Saphorin had been with Austria in the mid–1720s. The third period was that of the Seven Years’ War. Britain had few allies and much of Europe was opposed to her or unsympathetic. Diplomatic relations were cut or diminished. Missions closed and much of the business of diplomacy was limited to wartime details, for example, the conduct of neutral trade. Attempts to reawaken diplomatic links or to divide opponents were generally tackled by special missions. The ver y scale of diplomatic correspondence diminished and was certainly in no way comparable with the position during the War of the Austrian Succession. Professionalism is an important theme in cur rent studies of eighteenthcentury Britain, and it is appropriate to consider diplomacy in this light, both because of its importance and because there were aspects of the career that required knowledge. It is certainly possible to detect elements of career progression and specialization in the records of some diplomats. Robinson served in a junior capacity in Paris (1723–30) before taking on responsibility at Vienna (1730–48), being a Plenipotentiary at Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) and serving as a Secretary of State (1754–5). Andrew Mitchell proceeded from Brussels (1752–5) to Berlin (1756–71). Rochford served at Turin (1749–55), Madrid (1763–6) and Paris (1766–8) and became Secretary of State (1768–75).5 Long tours of duty at particular posts encouraged a degree of familiarity with their problems and language. Appointed to Madrid in 1749, Keene had earlier served there in 1727–39. Walter Titley served at Copenhagen from 1729 until his death in 1768. Such long tours created a danger that diplomats would “go native” and become overly sympathetic to the views of the court to which they were accredited. It was certainly the case that some diplomats became very popular at their posts: Titley was possibly the best example. In 1758, when Mitchell was recalled in response to Pitt’s wishes, Frederick II made it clear that he wanted him to keep his post. However, the danger was more complex. Whatever the length of their mission, there was the possibility that diplomats would become overly involved with a group or faction at their post and that this group would be unsuccessful. The fault was most excusable if the group was pro-British, but diplomats risked totally alienating other ministers or courtiers if they overly committed themselves to such a group. This proved a particular problem for British envoys in St Petersburg, Vienna and Stockholm, but less so for counterparts where government was less divided and where factions were under greater control, for example, at Berlin. HanburyWilliams’s links at St Petersburg in 1757 to the young court of the heir, the future Peter III, and his wife Catherine harmed Anglo-Russian relations: the reversionary interest in Russia had to wait until Elizabeth died in 1762.6 136

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In most spheres of public life, training was on the job. Some diplomats acquired experience through posts on the staffs of envoys, such as Trevor with Horatio Walpole and Keith with Sandwich, though there were examples of aristocratic and non-aristocratic envoys appointed to responsible posts without any such experience. Envoys were also briefed in London. En route for Vienna in 1752, the Earl of Hyndford wrote to Onslow Burrish, then at Munich, “Before I left London I went through all your correspondence for above eighteen months past, with the Duke of Newcastle, and I admire your distinctness and punctuality.”7 That year Burrish had to select a secretary. The recommendations he received throw light on what was expected and on the role of personal connections in filling posts. The eventual choice, William Money, was “very sober, honest…wr iting a ver y tolerable hand, which is capable of improvement…having some knowledge both of the French and German languages, but, particularly, of the latter”. The son of a clerk in the office of the Southern Secretary, Money was only 15, but he was recommended by Newcastle. Arthur Villettes, Minister in Switzerland and for merly first Secretary and then Resident in Turin, wrote on behalf of a Mr Barbauld, When he came to me at Turin, I already had a secretary who was every way qualified for business and the entire trust I reposed in him, but could not go through with the extensive correspondence and the immense load then on my hands. Mr. Barbauld therefore came only as an assistant…My other secretary had the cyphering and decyphering of all the letters I trusted out of my own hands, and the copying over fair my dispatches to His Majesty’s ministers at hand. To Mr. Barbauld’s share fell most of those I sent to the King’s ministers abroad, and to the fleet, together with the copies of them all for my own use…He writes a very fair hand, having been bred to trade; and was not slow in copying of my letters or other papers either in English or French which he understands well.8 Language was less of a problem than might have been expected, as French increasingly became the diplomatic lingua franca. However, there were courts where this was not the case, and German, Italian and Spanish were important diplomatic languages: many British diplomats were insufficiently familiar with other languages than French. The choice of envoys was not easy. Royal support was generally necessary and envoys who fell foul of the monarch could lose their posts. In 1748 George II was furious with Legge’s conduct in Berlin. Confidence in envoys was particularly important because the so-called “English plan” of conducting diplomacy was for negotiations to be handled by Britain’s envoys rather than by foreign diplomats in London. The latter were suspected as likely to intrigue with British opposition politicians, and at times their conduct could lead to 137

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serious tension, as with the collapse of Anglo-Prussian relations at the close of the Seven Years’ War: Michell, the Prussian envoy in London, actively intrigued against the government. Most British diplomats appear to have discharged their tasks to the satisfaction of the Secretaries of State. As several of the latter had been diplomats, they were well aware of the problems of diplomacy. Diplomatic skill and influence are difficult to assess. Diplomats could be influential at courts with which diplomatic correspondence was episodic, but there was also room for influence when instructions were more frequent and ministers in London more concerned. The emphasis placed by modern scholars on individual diplomats varies in part in accordance with their conception of how the international system operated. Any stress on such impersonal factors as geopolitics or long cycle theory can diminish the role allocated to individuals, but other approaches are possible. It is sufficient to note that British diplomacy in mid-century was not obviously worse than that of other major powers. No major British diplomat provided information for foreign powers as the French diplomat and foreign office official François de Bussy did for the British to whom from the 1730s he was agent 101. A numerous Scottish contingent, particularly Keith and Mitchell, was especially talented and energetic.9 British diplomats disagreed with each other, but this was not unique to Britain and it ensured that different expert opinions were presented to the government.

Ministers On my own account, I would not give three farthings to make one man Secretary of State rather than another. Lord Holdernesse is as agreeable to me as Sir Thomas Robinson, and Sir Thomas as Lord Holdernesse, or any other. I shall look upon you as the Foreign Minister in both cases, and who writes the letters to the foreign courts is no concern of mine. —Pelham to Newcastle, 1750 For mal minister ial responsibility for foreign policy belonged to the Secretaries of State for the Northern and the Southern Departments, and was divided between them on geographical grounds. The Secretar ies were generally talented and many had diplomatic experience, a ready contrast with British Foreign Secretaries in the twentieth century. In 1754–5 both the Secretaries had such experience and at least one had such experience until 1748 and from 1751 until 1761. This did not necessarily mean that the Secretary was therefore more competent. Robert, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Secretary of State 1751–61, had not been a distinguished diplomat at Venice (1744–6) or The Hague (1749–51), and his secretarial position was largely 138

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due to his compliance with Newcastle’s views. Holdernesse wrote to Yorke from Hanover in 1755, You will now see…why I have remained silent so long; I wanted to hear from England…I did not know myself what to write or what to advise, till I knew how far our friends would authorize me to go; and I am sorry to tell you that I meet with little comfort from thence …I hope the Duke of Newcastle will let you know his thoughts upon the present very critical situation of affairs, for my opinion is of little consequence. Newcastle was certainly very pleased with the choice. Holdernesse was a pliable peer without political weight, and Newcastle was disenchanted with secretarial colleagues who thought for themselves: he had broken successively with Townshend (1730), Carteret (1744), Harrington (1746), Chesterfield (1748) and Bedford (1751). Horatio Walpole commented on Newcastle’s “humours” in 1740. In 1749 Newcastle complained about Bedford both failing to consult him and sending absurd instructions, although he was later to claim that the decision to dismiss him was taken by George II. The following year, Newcastle made clear his opposition to Halifax gaining the post: “He is so conceited of his parts, that he would not be there one month, without thinking he knew as much, or more, of the business than any one man; and I am sure it would be impracticable to go on with him”. Pelham was convinced that Newcastle was happy to receive Granville’s advice “provided he is not in office to give him disturbance”. 10 Yet pliability alone was not enough. Robinson, Secretary for the Northern Department in 1754–5, had had a distinguished diplomatic record and was close to Newcastle, but he was a poor House of Commons manager and did not hold his post for long. James, 2nd Earl Waldegrave, noted of Robinson, “Sir Thomas, tho’ a good Secretary of State, as far as the Business of his Office, and that which related to foreign affairs, was ignorant even of the language of an House of Commons controversy.” 11 The last point was crucial. The particular problems facing the government varied in nature and intensity and this led to different pressures on Secretaries of State, but the defence of the government’s position in Parliament was one of the most important tasks. This was less serious for an individual Secretary if he had a more active colleague in the same House. While Newcastle was one of the Secretaries of State, his counterpart, if in the Lords, was liable to find himself with limited political responsibilities. It was therefore possible for Harrington (1730–42, 1744–6) and Holdernesse (1751–61) to concentrate on foreign policy and play a relatively minor political role. Office was not the key. A pamphlet of 1756 referred to those ingredients which compose the power a British statesman may aim at. It is not any peculiar office, rank, or station, but a secret energy and confidence annexed to it, without which that office or station may not give 139

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the possessor that full sufficiency and content that may be the object of his ambition. Therefore be not surprized that a man with us may be Secretary of State, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Paymaster of our Forces, or in any other post to which you are used to annex the idea of our Premier, and yet not possess that plenitude of power which constitutes a minister, and which ambition may think its due. Indeed the terms minister and ministry are so vague and ill-understood in our language, as well as constitution, that I find it difficult to form, much more to give a true idea of it.12 The Secretaries who were of greatest importance as policy-makers were Carteret, Newcastle and Pitt. Each sought to dominate policy-making and Newcastle’s determination to have his way was in part responsible for the fall of several Secretaries: Carteret (1744), Chesterfield (1748) and Bedford (1751). Newcastle continued to take a close interest in foreign policy when he moved to the Treasury in 1754.

The Duke of Newcastle Carteret and Newcastle were both interventionists and were both obliged to adapt to the views and concerns of George II. There were significant differences between them, but the similarities were more important. Having successfully displaced Carteret in 1744 and resisted his return in 1746, the Pelhams continued both to concentrate successfully on the war with France rather than Spain, and to confront France on the Continent. However, though maintaining the main themes of Carteret’s anti-French policy, the Pelhams discarded George II’s hostility to Prussia as a needless diversion of resources and efforts that should be directed against France. This was to be a policy for peace as well as war. Frederick II noted in July 1748 that when Newcastle had recently left London for Hanover he had said, “il fallait aussi travailler a un concert dans l’Empire pour établir la tranquillité sur un pied solide en faveur de la reine de Hongrie”.13 Newcastle felt that the crisis of the Austrian Succession War, with all the problems it had posed for Britain, had arisen from Austrian weakness. This had been due to two developments—the particular problems that had affected Austria, the crisis of Maria Theresa’s succession, which had revealed domestic political and military weaknesses, and, arguably more serious, the failure of the Austrian alliance system in 1740–1. Newcastle devised his diplomatic strategy to keep the peace by avoiding the repetition of the crisis of 1740–1. This was to be achieved by two means. Most importantly, a strong collective security system was to be created that would assist any individual member if intimidated. Secondly, and this arose more slowly, the Imperial Election Scheme would be supported.14 140

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Newcastle intended to subordinate other objectives to this plan, as he made clear in response to the prospect of serious negotiations with Prussia in 1748. He wrote to Pelham that July, My friend Legge [envoy in Berlin], is tempting us in his private correspondence: But I do not think, that the bait will take. I really hope, and believe, everything will be done, that I think right: That is, that the King of Prussia will have his guaranty, for Silesia, and Glatz; and, if, afterwards, he will concur with the Maritime Powers, and the House of Austria, in the support of the Old System; (in which, he ought to think himself as much interested, as anybody,) he will be admitted. But, if nothing will satisfy him, but overturning the House of Austria; and entering into separate measures with the Maritime Powers, for that view; the receiving him, upon that foot, would be destruction; and the giving him the least expectation of it would create the greatest confusion imaginable…Don’t imagine, I say this, to make my court [to George II]. It is my real opinion; and you know, it has always been so.15 Two days earlier, Newcastle had told the Prussian envoy at Hanover that an alliance of Austria, Britain and Prussia was a necessity,16 but it is clear that he was only interested in such an alliance if, as Frederick was clearly not willing to do,17 Prussia was prepared to surrender her room for diplomatic manoeuvre and became a staunch supporter of stability and the Anglo-Austrian axis. Newcastle wished to plan for eventualities, indeed believed it necessary in face of what he saw as nefarious French and Prussian schemes, but was averse to committing Britain and her allies to measures that might provoke the very threats he feared. In a volatile international situation this approach was to prove unsuccessful in 1755–6. A question mark can therefore be placed against the capacity of Newcastle and his ministerial colleagues to appreciate fully the problems of alliance diplomacy. It is necessary to be cautious before decrying the capacity of past ministers, faced as they were by a great variety of problems and uncertain of the views of other powers. However, this very dynamic character of alliances made any rigid analysis of international relations unsatisfactory. Newcastle can be criticized for advancing just such an analysis, although so long as the Franco-Prussian alliance continued the antagonism of Austria and Russia towards Prussia and of Austria and Britain towards France appeared to make an effective alliance between the three powers necessary and practical. However, as with the Anglo-French alliance of 1716–31, such a collective security system operated best when the powers felt threatened and was conversely prone to tension and to unilateral negotiations at other times. The Austrian refusal to see the Imperial Election Scheme in the urgent and challenging light that Newcastle saw it in led to their unwillingness to commit themselves to the degree that he considered essential. 141

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Similarly, the Russian refusal to dispense with subsidies as the price for their military preparedness against Prussia harmed Anglo-Russian relations. The government found the Russian proposals of 1753 for an alliance unsatisfactory. Newcastle, who was pressed hard by Pelham on the cost, explained that the proposals departed from what was for him the central point of any alliance, a partnership of mutual interest: That the interest of Russia is particularly concerned (independently of all other considerations) that the peace should be preserved and that no further encroachments or acquisitions should be made, in defiance of it, by the King of Prussia, sufficiently appears, by the solemn and unanimous opinion of the Russian Senate. That that can be done, no way, but by having a strong force in Livonia, must be notorious to everybody who knows the situation of those countries. That that was the measure generally followed by Russia, is also beyond dispute…From these premises it is very surprising to the King, that a subsidy of £230,000 per annum should be demanded, singly for having such a body of troops in those places, where the interest of Russia required they should be, and where from your accounts, His Majesty had reason to think they actually were.18 Alas, from Newcastle’s point of view, his foreign policy was to fall foul, first, in 1755–6 to the refusal of allies to subordinate their views to those of Britain and, more generally, to the kaleidoscopic nature of international relations,19 and, secondly, in 1761–2, to the collapse of domestic political support for interventionism and expense. 20 These failures were all the more striking because in each case the situation had appeared promising. A pamphlet of 1755 that defended British commitments on the Continent claimed “it would be no purpose to be constantly sending fresh reinforcements to the New World, if we did not first appoint proper checks upon the power of France in Europe”.21 Newcastle was optimistic at the outset of 1756. He anticipated co-operation with Prussia if the French invaded Germany and wrote that “all the good consequences which we proposed from the Russian treaty have already in great measure happened”. The ministry hoped that the treaty with Prussia would effectually secure the “peace of Germany” and, indeed, saw no reason to renew the subsidy with Bavaria.22 However, the policy of “checks” failed and instead it was France that was to be allied with the strongest states on the Continent. The Duke was bitterly criticized for his foreign policy by contemporaries. One anonymous pamphlet of 1757 addressed to him, A Letter to His Grace the D-of Ni-E, claimed of his administration that the Treaties concluded in it have shown neither knowledge in the interests of England, of Europe, nor of human kind; it has been attended 142

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with endless expense, and incredible increase of debts, dur ing unsuccessful wars, unretrieved in times of perfect tranquillity…a general contempt for England, her politics and powers, has taken place of esteem in the minds of all the kings and potentates of Europe.23 It is dangerous to judge with the benefit of hindsight, but in 1755–6 Newcastle suffered from his tendency to calculate the affairs of Europe as if they were those of Parliament, and in 1761–2 he failed to understand and respond to shifts in domestic political opinion. A French visitor described him as very vivacious and in perpetual motion, “the man in the world the most fertile in ideas, but the most incapable of combining them, of establishing a policy and of executing it”.24 Similar criticisms were voiced by others. Old England of 1 July (os) 1749 referred to “the over busy agitations that appeared in his mien” and predicted that Bedford would be dismissed for failing to support Newcastle. Owen’s Weekly Chronicle of 15 April 1758 emphasized “the perpetual fluctuation of human affairs which makes it necessary to vary the regards of nations, according to the coincidence of repugnancy of their several interests” and commented on the short-lived nature of the alliance systems that followed the War of the Austrian Succession, adding “how vain is all human policy!” The Whiggish tendency to assume that it was possible to create a predictable system, and to improve it through intervention, reached a high point during British diplomacy in mid-century. It was not a diplomacy that was to succeed.

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Chapter Eight Pitt and moves towards new strategies, 1755–63

The failure of a system, 1755–56 Keeping the peace by, in Anglo-Hanoverian eyes, keeping France and Prussia in their places through a collective security system entailed two major linked problems. It made Britain dependent on her partners and it left unclear which of France and Prussia was to be regarded as the major challenge. A similar difficulty had faced the Alliance of Hanover in its confrontation with Austria and Spain in 1725–9, and had also affected British foreign policy during the War of the Austrian Succession. However, rather than being able in some fashion to choose what should be seen as the major challenge, the British were obliged in part to act with reference to their allies. Similarly, shifts in the attitude of Britain’s allies towards France and Prussia affected relations with these allies. This was to be crucially demonstrated in 1753–5, when a decisive shift occurred from regarding Prussia as the major challenge to seeing France in that light. In 1753 Austrian and Russian support had been sought to intimidate or dissuade Prussia; by 1755 Britain was in effect at war with France and her concern with keeping the peace in Europe centred on the need to stop the war spreading there. Britain thus sought Austrian support against France, a vital difference from her earlier anti-Prussian policy, which had accorded well with the Austrian desire to reconquer Silesia. All systems for keeping the peace naturally encompass different interests and aspirations, and their success is difficult to assess. Arguably, Frederick’s betrayals of treaties, the shock of his invasion of Silesia in 1740 and his attack on Austria in 1744 led Britain and Hanover to exaggerate the threat Prussia posed to international peace and to them in the post–1748 period. Frederick was clearly not averse to further gains, but the Prussian strategic position had deteriorated markedly since 1740, for Prussia was now the principal enemy of the Continent’s two largest military powers, Austria and Russia, and both made 144

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major improvements in the effectiveness of their armies in the early 1750s. It was not obviously the case that this made it impossible for Frederick to risk other entanglements, but Anglo-Hanoverian fears of him can appear slightly implausible in the light of Prussian vulnerability. The effective ending of the Italian question as a result of the settlement of Austro-Spanish differences further strengthened the Austrian position, and was seen in this light by the British.1 Leaving aside the question of exaggeration, British concern for Hanover and the Low Countries appeared to dictate alliances with Austria and Russia, but what it did not do was clarify the terms upon which such alliances should be based, nor did it suggest the direction in which they should develop. Essentially, Britain-Hanover sought reactive alliances that would maintain the peace by responding to real and threatened breaches of it, but it was difficult to bind allies to what might appear an essentially passive and fruitless diplomatic strategy. Given Russian determination to influence developments in Poland and Sweden, and Austrian aspirations for the reconquest of Silesia, this peace strategy was likely to collapse in the long term, even had the unexpected outbreak of hostilities in distant North America not led Britain to seek unilaterally a change in the direction of both her foreign policy and her understandings with other powers. The Austrians were assured in 1755 that “His Majesty adopts the general principle laid down by the Court of Vienna; that the assistance the allies are to give each other, ought to be mutual and reciprocal, and not unilateral”,2 but, in practice, the British request that the Austrians help them to preserve the peace on the Continent was a unilateral demand, for there was no real reason for an Austro-French conflict in 1755, unless Austria chose to attack Prussia. The British ministry had been provided with plenty of warnings about Austrian concern with Prussia. In May 1755 Keith reported from Vienna, this Court have always their eyes upon the King of Prussia;—they are in perpetual uneasiness about him, and his motions; and their measures are, and always will be, determined by what they think their interest with regard to that Prince. Monsieur Kaunitz said the other day, that he hoped His Majesty did not consider the Empress [Maria Theresa], as his ally only against France, but likewise against the King of Prussia, who, though not so powerful as the other was fully as dangerous. He observed that this new power had quite changed the old system of Europe; and that nothing could set it to rights, but making ourselves sure of the Russians. Kaunitz had been warned about domestic pressure for Britain to concentrate on maritime and colonial disputes with the Bourbons, not on German affairs.3 He discerned correctly the major change that resulted from the rise of Prussia and the consequent inappropriateness of the “Old System”. Whereas in the Nine Years’, Spanish Succession and Austrian Succession wars it had been 145

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possible for Britain to treat France’s allies as essentially subordinate to her and therefore a facet of the problem posed by France, as seen for example in the treatment of Charles Albert of Bavaria in the 1740s, 4 this was no longer plausible in the case of Prussia; for, although Britain might still regard her thus, Austria and Russia saw her as an entirely different problem. The failure of British foreign policy was therefore related to a major shift in the European system. The problems this shift created had been grasped by exponents of approaches to Prussia, such as Horatio Walpole. In seeking an understanding with Frederick in 1755 in order to preserve the peace of the Empire and the security of Hanover, George II and his British and Hanoverian ministers revealed flexibility, but it was flexibility that was circumscribed by the policy of protecting Hanover and the Low Countries, and it was a policy that was to leave British foreign policy dangerously exposed in 1756. This crisis was to provide Pitt with opportunities and problems.

Pitt and foreign policy He was and is to be associated with a very different foreign policy than that of Newcastle. He was seen as the strategist of empire. His rise to office owed much to the apparent failure of the Pelhamite system. In 1751 and again in 1754 Pitt had been denied the Secretaryship of State he sought by George II and the Pelhams. In December 1756, after the resignation of Newcastle in October, Pitt was appointed Secretary for the Southern Department. Thus, it is understandable that Pitt’s policies are seen as different from those of Newcastle. That was true to a considerable extent, but Pitt had in fact been an office holder in 1746–55. Although his post, Paymaster General, was not a leading one and did not relate directly to foreign policy, Pitt was obliged to defend government policy in the House of Commons. The shifts in his position during the 1750s reflect not only the pressures and expediencies of his own career, but also the problems and uncertainties affecting British foreign policy. In February 1750 Pitt replied to charges of inconsistency arising from his defence of the government’s position over Dunkirk: upon some former occasions I have been hurried by the heat of youth, and the warmth of debate, into expressions which upon cool recollection, I have deeply regretted…Nations, as well as individuals, must sometimes forbear from the rigorous exaction of what is due to them. Prudence may require them to tolerate a delay, or even a refusal of justice, especially when their right can no way suffer by such acquiescence. In December 1759, responding to pressure for the retention of Louisbourg, Pitt was to argue, “he could not foresee what might happen, nor could anyone 146

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engage what might be the terms of a future peace which depended on contingent events”. 5 When, in January 1751, the opposition attacked the Anglo-Spanish commercial treaty of October 1750, in which the Spanish claim to a right to search British merchantmen in the West Indies had not been explicitly denied, Pitt defended the treaty in the Commons. He argued that he had been wrong to criticize Walpole in 1739 for failing to secure the same repudiation: “I have considered public affairs more coolly and am convinced that the claim of no search respecting British vessels near the coast of Spanish America can never be obtained, unless Spain were so reduced as to consent to any terms her conqueror might think proper to impose.” Pitt defended the treaty because of the favourable terms obtained for British trade and because it would serve as a basis for better Anglo-Spanish relations, a departure from standard opposition views. It had been a commonplace that good relations with France and/or Spain were impossible and that instead they were to be regarded as enemies. In contrast, for many decades, ministers had argued not only that good relations, however difficult to obtain, were possible, but also that they were essential in order to keep France and Spain apart: diplomacy was thus expected to compensate for the failure to keep the Bourbons from Spain in the War of the Spanish Succession and for the consequent danger of cooperation between the two leading naval powers after Britain. In 1751, as over Dunkirk the previous year, Pitt did not shirk the unpleasant task of explaining the limits of national power, even if he knew he could rely on the solid Pelhamite parliamentary majority. He also had to avoid the easy recourse of demagogy with its litany of historic hatreds and ancestral rivalries. This was not only an issue for the British. Keene wrote from Spain in 1755 that “long habitudes of being slaves to France and of hearing ill of the English create prejudices not easy to be eradicated”. He pressed for “much circumspection and complaisance on the part of our officers towards Spaniards and Spain. Much depends upon it, and I hope they will be taught to forget the Spaniards are our enemies.” Keene, however, had little time for Pitt. He referred to “the noise and malice of the Pitts of Europe and the Pitts in America, with all their abettors”.6 Pitt faced a more difficult task in defending the subsidies negotiated in order to win German support for the Imperial Election Scheme. In January 1751 he was described as making “a great panegyric on the Duke of Newcastle’s German negotiations”. The following month, Pitt defended the subsidy to the Elector of Bavaria as necessary for the preservation of the peace. Pitt’s stance was criticized, both then and subsequently. Horace Walpole criticized Pitt for praising Newcastle’s interventionism in German politics and pro-Hanoverian foreign policy, when he had condemned Carteret for the same policies in the mid 1740s. In 1743 Pitt had told the Commons that, although it was in Britain’s interest to preserve the balance of power, “as we are the most remote from danger, we ought always to be the least susceptible of jealousy, and the last to take the alarm”. In 1751 Pitt was to be attacked by Egmont: “How 147

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thus having thrown off all regard to former character or professions he remained an advocate for that lamentable Peace of Aix la Chapelle. How strenuous an advocate to subsidies to Saxony and to Bavaria in lieu of professed peace.”7 It was easy, as Egmont did, during wartime to condemn the earlier compromises of peace, but Egmont also exaggerated Pitt’s influence. Pitt certainly indicated unhappiness with Newcastle’s policy. He wrote to Horatio Walpole, praising him for his Commons speech criticizing the Saxon subsidy treaty, which, Pitt claimed, breathes the spirit of a man who loves his country. If your endeavours contribute to the honest end you aim at, namely, to check foreign expenses, and prevent entanglements abroad, under a situation burdened and exhausted at present, and liable to may alarming apprehensions in futurity, you deserve the thanks of this generation, and will have those of the next.8 As so often in his career, Pitt was torn between the claims of posterity and the pressures of the present. Pitt certainly gave indications of concern over the Bourbons. In 1750 he pressed on Newcastle his concern about French threats to Nova Scotia. In January 1751 he attacked and voted with the opposition against Pelham’s successful attempt to reduce the size of the naval establishment. In September 1753, although Pitt pressed for “some savings in the army in Scotland and Gibraltar, in order to provide for the expense of” a projected subsidy to Russia, he also urged Newcastle “to adhere to our points with France, as to Dunkirk and the West Indies”. Pitt’s argument that a Russian army able to intimidate France’s ally Prussia would help achieve this aim9 accorded with Newcastle’s diplomatic strategy, but his concern about France was instructive. This concern was to interact with Pitt’s thwarted ambition and the deteriorating international situation in 1754–6. The failure to appoint Pitt Secretary of State when Pelham died in 1754 angered him, but the worsening international situation led to attempts to win him round in 1755. However, Pitt made clear views on foreign policy that did not accord with those of the government, particularly George II. On 9 August 1755 Pitt outlined to Hardwicke his views on the support of the maritime and American war, in which we were going to be engaged, and the defence of the King’s German dominions if attacked on account of that English cause. The maritime and American war he came roundly into, though very onerous, and allowed the principle, and the obligation of honour and justice as to the other, but argued strongly against the predictability of it; that subsidy treaties would not go down, the nation would not bear them; that they were a chain and 148

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a connection, and would end in a general plan for the Continent, which this country could not possibly support.10 These views and his lack of parliamentary support, ensured that Henry Fox, not Pitt, succeeded Robinson as Secretary of State in September 1755. Two months later, Pitt launched a bitter parliamentary attack on the subsidy treaties and contrasted the defence of Hanover with that of Britain and America. His speeches helped to make such a contrast a major public issue and also defined Pitt’s position in totemic terms. The issue of Britain’s relationship with the Continent was not only intertwined with domestic politics; it was also, under the pressure of war, increasingly posed as a contrast with commitments to America, and with a view of Britain’s present and future as an imperial power that was a trading, trans-oceanic, maritime polity. Power was increasingly seen as a function and cause of wealth, maritime strength and colonial possessions and trade. Thus the choice was no longer largely defined in terms of continental interventionism versus a Tory, agrarian withdrawal from abroad, albeit one that was tempered by a degree of “blue water” raiding and cheap colonialism. Instead, “blue water” was transformed into Britain’s destiny. It was to be a feature in which the state invested heavily and took a major role. This was seen most clearly in the dramatic shift in the despatch of regulars abroad. Prior to the Seven Years’ War, very few regulars were sent to Canada and India, and in military terms the direct trans-oceanic British impact was essentially naval. This altered with the despatch of the regulars that conquered Canada, Bengal and the Carnatic. The reconceptualization of Britain, her role in the world and empire was one of the major changes that took place in the mid-eighteenth century. It was to be as far-reaching in its impact on British history as the long period of demographic growth that began in the early 1740s, and it was to be a shift closely linked to Pitt. When in October 1756 failure in the initial stages of the Seven Years’ War and a collapse of nerve within the ministry led to a government offer of the Secretaryship to Pitt, he replied by demanding a rejection of the past: Newcastle must resign and an inquiry be established into setbacks in Minorca and North America. Foreign troops in British pay must be dismissed.

Pitt as Secretary of State George II rejected the terms, but, convinced of the difficulty of the situation, Newcastle resigned anyway, leading to the creation of a ministry around Pitt and the Duke of Devonshire, a Whig stalwart. In office there was to be a contrast between Pitt’s public position and the policies of the government. This 149

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was a frequent feature of his career that led to charges of hypocrisy and inconsistency. However, in part they reflected the exigencies of the international situation and, more particularly, the extent to which there was never a government of Pittites. The King’s speech to Parliament, written by Pitt and delivered on 2 December 1756, promised that “the succour and preservation of America cannot but constitute a main object of my attention and solicitude”. Yet, alongside this, the government supported subsidies for an Army of Observation composed mostly of Hanoverians and Hessians, designed to protect Hanover and to cover Prussia’s western frontier. The criticisms this aroused reflected sensitivity to the Hanoverian issue and the extent to which commitment to the Continent was seen in those terms. For tactical political reasons, Pitt sought to refute this assessment, but his arguments also revealed the extent to which, as with his comments on Russia in 1753, he was willing to see continental allies as a device to secure British interests. Pitt did not offer a vision of Europe as a collective security system, but instead saw the Continent as a series of problems the solution to which had to serve British interests. On 17 February 1757, on his first appearance in the Commons as Secretary of State, Pitt delivered a message calling for extraordinary supplies to meet the French threat “against His Majesty’s Electoral dominion, and those of his good ally the King of Prussia”. Support for an Army of Observation to protect Hanover was presented as a means to enable George to fulfil his engagements with Frederick II, and on the 18th £200,000 was obtained without any opposing vote. Pitt’s tactics were successful: Frederick was regarded very positively by many of those who had views on foreign policy, being widely seen as a Protestant hero.11 The consistent development of a domestic and foreign policy system was, however, swept aside by ministerial instability. This was due not to Pitt’s inconsistency, but to that of George II and Newcastle, both of whom wished to get rid of him. In addition, Cumberland was not happy at the prospect of going to command the Army of Observation in Hanover while Pitt remained in office. On 6 April 1757 Pitt was dismissed. This dismissal ushered in a period of acute confusion. As with the shortlived appointment of Carteret in 1746, governmental change was flawed by the absence of a stable and strong ministerial team that could be put in place. Furthermore, domestic opinion was volatile and divided. The press was contentious, and, in addition, Pitt’s dismissal was followed by the so-called “rain” of gold boxes, the presentation to him of the freedom and compliments of thirteen cities: an assertion that Pitt was popular.12 A stable and peaceful international system might have permitted the creation of a ministry strong enough to resist Pitt and his discourse of Patriotism, but the war that Britain was involved in was central to the crisis, not least because it ensured that there was no sense of predictability in developments. The deterioration in Britain’s position in 1755–6 had exposed a serious weakness in the political system, the limitations of parliamentary 150

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management, specifically the inability of Newcastle to lead the “Old Corps” Whigs through an acute crisis. The situation in 1757 was no better. That July, Charles Townshend wrote to his mother, How do projectors, for all ministers are little more in times of so much danger and national weakness, propose to continue even a disadvantageous war for another year; when the siege of Prague shall be turned into a siege of Berlin; Hanover garrisoned by France; Ostend a French port; and England, sinking’ under its own debt and expences, shall be the only fund and purse for carrying on every other prince’s war in our alliance? Indeed, Lady Townshend we are undone.13 France was a member of a coalition that appeared to face the happy prospect of continental invincibility, and there was no reason to believe that Cumberland and the Army of Observation would be any more successful than George II had been in Hanover in 1741. Furthermore, the initial stages of the colonial war had yielded little success. Aid to Hanover was George’s vulnerable point. He hoped that Frederick would send Cumberland assistance, but Frederick himself was hard pressed. Success in obtaining parliamentary support on 18 February 1757 did not lessen governmental vulnerability on this score. George and Newcastle swiftly realized that the best solution was a ministry in which Pitt played a role but accepted most of their views, including a central position for Newcastle. Pitt returned to the Secretaryship in June 1757 in a ministry dominated by the Old Corps. This ministry was swiftly to face a serious crisis in foreign policy, in many respects a repetition of that of 1741. Cumberland was defeated by a larger French force at Hastenbeck on 26 July, Hanover was overrun, and on 10 September Cumberland agreed to the disbanding of the Army of Observation by the Convention of Klosterseven. This exposed Prussia’s flank, but Hanover also threatened to abandon Prussia as a result of George II’s interest in negotiations with Austria for a neutrality for the Electorate. This was a crisis akin to that which Carteret had cut through in 1742. Pitt did likewise, demanding the repudiation of the Convention and the abandonment of the approach to Austria. Had Pitt been an isolationist, he might have welcomed Hanoverian neutrality, as it would have freed Britain from a need to consider the Continent. In January 1758 the French foreign minister argued that if Britain no longer had to bear the cost of the defence of Hanover to send assistance to Prussia, she would be able to concentrate on her navy and on fighting France overseas, in short that Europe was an alternative to America. 14 A belief in Britain’s “blue water” destiny unconnected in any fashion to Europe might have led to a willingness to consider the abandonment of Prussia. This had been the implications of Pitt’s public “Patriot” stance when in opposition, and it was one that was still advocated by “Patriot” newspapers. In its issue of 30 July 1757, the Pittite Monitor had 151

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warned against being involved “in a war on the Continent for the pretended preservation of the balance of power”. Returned to office as a colleague of Newcastle, Pitt, however, was seeking to establish a different policy, to define an interventionism and an alliance system that would serve British interests without the overreach associated with Carteret. Pitt sought to combine prudence abroad and acceptability at home, treating himself as the prime definer of both. Such a policy was difficult given the international system. Indeed, in August 1757 Pitt secretly adopted a controversial policy earlier associated with his uncle, James, Vis-count Stanhope, the return of Gibraltar. Pitt was ready to return the base if Spain provided help in reconquering Minorca, and thus went to war with France. Ironically, he sent his instructions to Benjamin Keene, the perennial envoy in Spain, who had negotiated the Convention of the Pardo that Pitt had attacked in the Commons in 1739. Pitt offered a pessimistic account of the situation, but also a defence of interventionism and the interests of Hanover: the formidable progress of the arms of France, and the imminent dangers to Great Britain and her allies resulting from a total subversion of the system of Europe…it is impossible to pass in silence that affecting and calamitous part of the subversion of Europe, namely the French conquests and desolations in Lower Saxony, which affords the afflicting spectacle of His Majesty’s ancient patrimonial dominions, transmitted down with glory in his most illustrious house through a long series of centuries, now lying prey to France…nothing can shake His Majesty’s firmness, or abate…concern for…his crown, and the rights of his kingdoms; nor can any events withdraw the necessary attention of his consummate wisdom from the proper interest of Europe, or divert his generous cares from endeavouring to prevent the final overthrow of all system and independency among the powers of the Continent. Despite governmental hopes about the possible results, especially an alliance between the two powers, Pitt’s approach did not need to be followed through: the Spaniards were not interested and, in part, Pitt was trying to win their good wishes. However, the proposal indicated the extent to which Pitt was willing to compromise traditional Patriot opinions. Indeed the Monitor was reminding its readers about Spanish depredations on British trade.15 In the winter of 1757–8 Pitt played a major role in securing a political settlement that tied the defence of Hanover to British direction and identified it with the Prussian alliance, a policy he had anticipated when earlier supporting the grant for the Army of Observation. This was crucial to the disavowal of the Hanover neutrality convention and thus to the revival of a commitment to Prussia and the Continent that had in effect been surrendered. The alliance with Prussia served to legitimate the commitment to the Continent for Pitt and many others. It diverted attention from the issue of 152

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Hanover and provided a plausible basis for policies that would have been condemned had they been linked only with the Electorate. The Monitor claimed on 22 April 1758 that under the direction of Providence, this nation has after a course of sixty years bad policy in the support of the popish house of Austria, been forcibly driven by her natural-enemies to an alliance with the only power upon earth that is capable of assisting us in the defence of the Protestant faith, and by his military capacity, to reduce the common enemy…to an incapacity of disturbing the peace of his neighbours for the future. Such alliances are agreeable to the constitution and interest of these kingdoms. They are according to that model of sound politics, which were laid down by the ministers of our Elizabeth [I], who could never be persuaded to take any further share in the troubles on the continent, than was necessary to facilitate the schemes of their own government. But it is very wide of those continental measures, which of late years have loaded this nation with heavy debts for the support of armies in the time of peace, and for taking upon us the greatest burden in every quarrel raised by the house of Austria. Such comments might be regarded as an example of what Richard Rigby MP, the Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, referred to as “all the trite nonsense of popularity”.16 However, they also demonstrate the extent to which the Prussian alliance provided the possibility for bridging the traditional antithesis of pro-Hanoverian ministerial continental interventionism and “patriot” isolationism, a br idging that Pitt represented and helped to popularize. At the cabinet on 7 October 1757, Pitt’s suggestion that Britain agree to pay the entire cost of the Army of Observation provided the Convention was disavowed was adopted.17 A subsidy for Prussia was agreed, but Pitt rejected Frederick’s pressure for the despatch of British troops to cover his western front. This policy, agreed at the cabinet on 23 February 175818 was in turn reversed under the pressure of apparent military necessity when British troops were committed to defend the Prussian North Sea port of Emden, a goal pressed by Freder ick and by Ferdinand of Brunswick, Cumberland’s replacement in Germany. Pitt presented the despatch of troops as a necessary step that did not divert manpower from North America, and this was necessary for both himself and public opinion. In the summer he agreed to the despatch of substantial British reinforcements to Ferdinand’s army. Yet this was a more limited commitment to continental warfare than that of Britain in the Wars of the Spanish and Austrian Succession. This reflected the diplomatic situation—the narrower base and more restricted range of Britain’s alliance system, but, although that was substantially due to shifts in European power politics, it also in part accorded with developments in British political 153

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attitudes. In late 1758 George II and Pitt made sympathetic noises about better relations with Bavaria, and in January 1759 George went as far as to say to Haslang, the Bavarian envoy, that it was time to think of another Emperor, as the present one, Maria Theresa’s husband, Francis I, was a threat to the constitution of the Empire.19 This approach, which was without result, was a measure of desperation at the alarming state of the war in Europe and also indicated the manner in which the Austro-French alliance made George search around for allies. The commitment to Prussia and to Ferdinand’s army was the backdrop to Britain’s colonial conflict with France, a conflict that became the focus of public attention in a manner that had generally proved elusive in 1743–8. Louisbourg fell in 1758, followed by Québec in 1759 and Montréal in 1760. The French fleet was heavily defeated in two battles in 1759: Lagos and Quiberon Bay. There was also success in India. Robert Clive’s victory over the Nawab of Bengal, Surajah Dowla, at Plassey on 23 June 1757 is well known, but was in fact the culmination of a period of concerted land—sea operations that reflected the effectiveness of the British military system and its range. The Nawab had stormed Fort William at Calcutta on 20 June 1756. Robert Clive was sent from Madras with a relief expedition, but Fort William itself was regained largely thanks to the guns of the British naval squadron under ViceAdmiral Charles Watson. Close-range fire from Watson’s warships was also instrumental in the fall of the French fort at Chandernagore in March 1757. Pitt was not responsible for the initial build-up of British strength there, but he sent reinforcements to India in 1759 and 1760, was more aware of the importance of India than George II or Newcastle, and was rewarded when France’s remaining possessions there fell in 1760 and early 1761. The French bases in West Africa had already fallen. There was nothing inevitable about the disposition of British troops: the threat of French invasion until 1759 and the pressure of the French in Germany ensured that there were powerful alternative calls to those for transoceanic deployment. Pitt was determined to maintain substantial forces in North America, and the British devoted far more military and financial resources to North America in 1755–60 than the French: British expenditure on the conquest of Canada has been estimated at £80 million. After the fall of Minorca to the French in 1756, Newcastle had hoped to regain it as part of a peace in which North American conquests gave the British a strong position. Pitt was even more convinced of the value of such conquests, not least because he was readier to grasp the value of Britain becoming a stronger imperial power. Pitt’s priorities also reflected the direction of public attention. An officer in North America was informed by a London correspondent that “the great and favourite object is your continent of North America”.20 Pitt had helped to free Britain from the mesmerized state of 1756 when the prospect of French invasion had led to an essentially reactive strategy. 154

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The appropriate choice of military objectives and the winning of public support for policy were both important because Britain did not enjoy a lead in military capability sufficient to guarantee success. Indeed, the British navy was very similar to its opponents in the weaponry it employed. Sir Thomas Slade, Surveyor of the British Navy 1755–71, worked from Spanish and French warships captured in the 1740s to design a series of two-decker 74-gun warships that were both manoeuvrable and capable of holding their own in the punishing close-range artillery duels of line of battle engagements. Fourteen were in service by 1759 and they played a major role in the British victories of the war. This was part of a system in which European powers copied each other’s developments in weaponry and tactics. A gap in weaponry capability was therefore not responsible for British success. However, the British showed in the Seven Years’ War that they could be more effective than their European opponents—France and, in 1762, Spain— in conflict outside Europe. The British revealed a greater capability to apply force at particular points. The British navy was more effective than its opponents. This was largely due to its extensive and effective administrative system, to the strength of public finances, to a more meritocratic promotion system and more unified naval tradition than that of France, to good naval leadership and to the greater commitment of national resources to naval rather than land warfare, the last two both encouraged by Pitt. Commitment to naval and colonial warfare was a political choice that reflected the nature of public culture and national self-image, but was not made inevitable by them. Pitt played a major role in this choice. Essentially, he cut across the monarchical emphasis on conventional land campaigning on the Continent. In the War of the Spanish Succession the focus of fame and heroism had been the Duke of Marlborough’s campaigns in Germany and the Low Countries. In the period 1739–48 there had been considerable public support for Vernon’s capture of Porto Bello in 1739 and Warren’s of Louisbourg in 1745, but the centre of military attention in the later stages of the war had been George II at Dettingen and then Cumberland’s campaigns in the Low Countries. The Seven Years’ War was different. Cumberland was defeated at Hastenbeck and thereafter played no military role. Britain was not without heroes on the Continent, and the Marquess of Granby’s fame and popularity is still today reflected in pub signs, but the commander at the greatest “British” victory on the Continent, Minden (1759), was Ferdinand of Brunswick. He was popular in Britain, but his resonance in terms of British politics and public culture was limited. The same was true of Frederick the Great, whose fame surpassed that of any British commander on the Continent. Instead, on land it was Wolfe at Québec, a colonial conquest, and at sea Boscawen at Lagos and Hawke at Quiberon Bay, who came to personify and focus British notions of heroism and leadership and thus to play a major role in British self-identification. Pitt was their political counterpart, his significance 155

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symbolic as much as to be found in his actions. Pitt was obviously flawed, but he could serve as a hero in a way that George II and Newcastle could not. Thanks to his commitment to the Prussian alliance from 1758, Pitt was no isolationist, but he was determined to ensure that British policy was not distorted for Hanoverian ends. When Bussy told Pitt in June 1761 that France would expect compensation for her Hanoverian conquests, on the grounds that France had diverted resources from the defence of her colonies in order to pursue her operations on the Continent, Pitt replied that the argument would have had a great effect during the reign of George II, but that the situation had changed. This was a position that Choiseul, the French foreign minister, found difficult to accept, though he had already commented in February 1760 that it would not matter to Pitt if France devastated Hanover. Bussy returned to the subject when he saw Pitt on 23 June 1761. He claimed that the Electorate of Hanover should be regarded as a province of England, because George II, as King, had broken the 1757 Convention of Klosterseven for the disbandment of the Hanoverian Army of Occupation, and because the army commanded by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick for the defence of Hanover acted in accordance with George’s orders and for “the cause of England”. Bussy reiterated the charge that French losses in the colonies were due partly to their operations on the Continent. Choiseul was determined to establish the principles of compensation and equivalence. Pitt was willing to offer the return of Guadeloupe as compensation for the French evacuation of occupied Hanover ian, Hessian and Prussian territories,21 but that reflected his understanding that such territories had to be regained and was part of a determined policy of retaining most colonial gains. Success helped to redefine Britain. There had initially been no plan to conquer the French empire, still less that of Spain. Indeed, the British had taken pains not to anger Spain for most of the war. The East India Company’s rise to dominance in Bengal and the Carnatic was also unexpected. Yet once won, these gains appeared natural and necessary, so much so that in the latter stages of the conflict there was a bitter debate about which conquests to hand back at the close of a war22 that few had earlier anticipated winning. By the close of 1759 Britain really did rule the waves, and optimism about her naval capability and potential grew. “Constantia Fearnought” in the Union Journal: or, Halifax Advertiser of 27 May 1760, urged the despatch of a fleet to the Baltic “to act with vigour and spirit, and push the Empress of Russia home”, a bold and foolish proposal that would have greatly extended Britain’s commitments, but that reflected the sense of potency that followed the victories of 1759. In addition, Britain was also the most successful transoceanic land power. Spain might rule more territory, but Britain was a dynamic and growing trans-oceanic power with extensive possessions in both Asia and the New World. The possible future need to make difficult choices had been anticipated as 156

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soon as conquests were made. The Monitor in its issue of 19 November 1757 condemned the restoration of Cape Breton in 1748: that of 7 October 1758 stressed the necessity of retaining Cape Breton at the even-tual peace whatever Prussia’s requirements then were; in short that Britain was to make peace on the basis of the uti possidetis, not the status quo ante bellum. There was to be no compromising exchange of gains as in 1748, and no return to an unsatisfactory past. Victories, and the prospect of fresh success, led to calls for the retention of additional gains. Increasingly, these were presented as designed to prevent any future Bourbon war of revanche from being likely to succeed. “Ibericus”, writing in the London Chronicle of 7 January 1762, pressed for the conquest of Spanish Florida and French Louisiana in order to complete the British empire in North America: “it will fix our colony’s security beyond the reach of rival states in future times to endanger”. In the London Evening Post of 25 May 1762, “Anglicus” made the same point about Louisiana. The failure of the 1761 Anglo-French negotiations threw fresh pressures on British finances and military resources, and raises questions about the intentions of the ministry. In June 1761 the French government had offered the cession of all of Canada bar Cape Breton Isle. The latter was to be retained so that French fisher men could dr y their catches from the valuable Newfoundland fishery. It was to remain unfortified. Thus its proposed return would have been very different to that after the War of the Austrian Succession. In addition, the French offered to return Hanover and to exchange Minorca for Guadeloupe and Goree. Pitt, however, did not wish to return Goree, a valuable slaving station, and was opposed to France retaining her fishing off Newfoundland, which was seen as a crucial training ground for sailors, and thus a vital source of naval manpower. Pitt’s negotiating position was handicapped by differences of opinion over terms within the ministry and by the attempt to widen the situation to include Spain. Bussy argued that a satisfactory settlement of Anglo-Spanish maritime and colonial differences would have to be part of any Anglo-French agreement, an idea Pitt rejected in late July when he reiterated his view that France should be totally excluded from the Newfoundland fishery.23 Despite this, the French insisted on the right to retain her Newfoundland fishery, and on 19 August the British cabinet agreed, Pitt unwillingly concurring for the sake of unanimity.24 It was too late. On 15 August 1761 France and Spain had signed the Third Family Compact.25 This was a serious blow for Britain. France and Spain were the two strongest naval powers after Britain. Spain’s entry into the war altered the strategic situation in European and Caribbean waters. The separation of France and Spain had been a crucial goal of British policy since 1748, and on many occasions earlier in the century, and, as Secretary of State, Pitt had striven to keep Spain out of the French camp. United, the two powers were both in a stronger position to press their claims on Britain. Spain was committed to helping France militarily after eight months, a period long enough to permit 157

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negotiations, but there was little incentive now for France to be conciliatory. Unlike in the War of Austrian Succession, Spain was not distracted by Italian interest and ambitions. In fact, Spain’s entry into the war was to make little difference: Britain was to triumph in the subsequent conflict. Yet this was far from inevitable, and indeed the Monitor exaggerated what could be achieved at the expense of Spain. The British government did not want war with Spain, and in 1761 it failed to prevent it. Part of the blame for the situation was directed at Pitt. Choiseul was offended by Pitt’s “hauteur” and his “shocking” projects, the Spanish envoy Fuentes blamed the war on Pitt, while Richard Wall, the Irishborn Spanish Secretary of State, was also angered by his “hauteur” and described Pitt as a devil. Elizabeth Montagu, no friend of Pitt, made a different criticism when she wrote to her MP husband that “our pretty conquests in America though they serve to make rejoicing and illuminations do not give us power to control the Grand Monarque in his conduct towards Spain as the Duke of Marlborough’s victories did”.26 Pitt certainly lacked any mastery of the conciliatory diplomatic arts, and ministerial colleagues, such as Newcastle, Hardwicke and Granville, thought his instructions to the British envoy in Paris, Hans Stanley, intemperate and offensive. The public, demonstrative aspect of Pitt’s personality and politics and his craving for popular support were seen as having much effect on his ministerial conduct.27 Pitt had no experience as a diplomat and his instinctual distrust of the Bourbons exacerbated the consequences of his autocratic temperament. Yet, the Bourbons displayed a less than total commitment to peace. At the ministerial meeting on 14 August the disagreement over Pitt’s strident draft was interrupted when Bute read a letter from Choiseul to the French envoy in Stockholm, a copy of which had been obtained by Britain’s excellent postal interception system: Choiseul stated that France was determined to continue the war, but would negotiate with Britain in order to conceal her purpose. The central question in 1761 was not whether Anglo-French differences could be settled, but whether France would be able to win Spanish support and thus, it was generally thought, fight on with more success and oblige Britain to be more accommodating. Pitt can be criticized for his failure to prevent a deterioration in AngloSpanish relations, but, like Britain, Spanish policy had changed with a new monarch. Charles III (1759–88) was more concerned with maritime and colonial issues than his predecessor had been, and in 1760 Spanish policy became less conciliatory. Spain claimed rights under the Peace of Utrecht to the Newfoundland fishery and refused to accept any longer what she saw as illegal British cutting of logwood in Honduras. Pitt was not accommodating on either head, although he did seek to avoid provocations, pressing the Admiralty to respect Spanish territorial waters and arranging for the release of a Spanish ship held at Portsmouth. However, he felt the Newfoundland fishery important 158

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and Spanish claims in the matter undeserved. In addition, Pitt’s position was undermined by the Spanish belief that his more pacific ministerial opponents would overthrow him. Pitt was to break with his colleagues in October 1761 over relations with Spain, not the previous summer over negotiations with France. That reflected his willingness to settle with France if satisfactory terms could be obtained. Arguably Pitt overly delayed the offer of reasonable terms, but in 1762, without Pitt, a pacific ministry was still to find negotiations with the Bourbons difficult and divisive. The failure of the negotiations forced the government to confront the possibility of war with Spain. Pitt, supported by his brother-in-law Richard, 2nd Earl Temple, the Lord Privy Seal, pressed for an immediate declaration of war, telling the cabinet on 18 September 1761 that “loss of time [is] loss of opportunity. Whatever is dangerous will be more so 6 months hence; no safety but acting with vigour…an immediate action gives us the best chance to extricate ourselves”. They had a clear sense of the danger posed by closer Franco-Spanish relations. The other ministers disagreed. They did not want to widen the war, were especially concerned about the possible financial burdens, and hoped that Spain would not take action against Britain. The exact details of the Family Compact were unknown, and the ministers doubted that Britain had sufficient grounds to attack. Instead, they proposed pressing Spain to deliver a categorical assurance of her friendly intentions. It was hoped that this would not drive Spain closer to France. Unwilling to agree with their colleagues, Pitt and Temple declared they would draw up a separate minute for George III, an unconventional step. This stated that the combination of France and Spain in enmity to Britain required “necessary and timely measures”, the breaking of diplomatic relations. When the issue was debated anew on 21 September, Pitt pressed for the recall of the British envoy and then an immediate declaration of war, and made it clear that he would not be bound by the collective decision, an attitude that was seen as unreasonable. Pitt and Temple then signed their minute and withdrew.28 On 2 October Pitt attended the cabinet for the last time prior to his resignation. He argued that Britain must attack Spain while she was unprepared for war, and then the other ministers reiterated their view that this would only drive Spain and France together. Newcastle voiced his fear that war with Spain “would render the present load of expense much more insupportable”.29 Pitt’s resignation on 5 October 1761 stemmed from his unwillingness to follow a policy that he believed wrong. As was predicted, Pitt was in part vindicated by the outbreak of war that winter. Lyttelton identified that as likely to be the crucial element in the public response: I want much to know whether it is probable that by Pitt’s going out we 159

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shall be saved from a war with Spain. The opinion of the public as to the wisdom of his conduct will greatly depend on that question. For, if it be inevitable, some will think he was in the right to desire to act a la Prussienne and strike first, while the enemy was unguarded and more vulnerable than afterwards. Our people naturally love violent and spirited measures, without troubling themselves much about forms. But if Spain is not determined to make war upon us, few persons I believe will approve of our making it upon them.30 In both 1743 and 1755 the British had fought the French without being at war. However, Pitt’s attitude to the conduct of government in 1761 made it impossible to hold the government together. In light of tensions within the ministry, the hope of averting war with Spain and a growing desire for peace with France, Pitt’s determination to force the pace for war was inappropriate. Pitt resigned over war with Spain, rather than the continuance of subsidies to Prussia and other aspects of continental interventionism. As a consequence, success in the war with France, with which Pitt was closely associated, was not compromised as far as most contemporaries were concerned by continental interventionism. Instead, Pitt was associated in 1762 and, subsequently, not only with a war with Spain that appeared inevitable in hindsight, but also with a war that brought great success in 1762. This success, and continued victories over France in 1762, especially the capture of Martinique, lessened public concern over the failure to secure peace in 1761. This was important in the anchoring of a public perception of Britain as a necessarily imperial maritime power. The situation was in fact very dangerous. It was difficult to be optimistic about the position on the Continent. There was little reason for confidence that Frederick the Great would be able to hold off his assailants for ever or to negotiate a satisfactory peace. Spain was a major power whose energies had not been dissipated by recent conflict, and Portugal appeared a vulnerable British ally. Although France had been gravely weakened as an imperial power by the collapse of her position in Canada and India, she had felt able to reject British terms in 1761. For all these reasons, the failure to negotiate peace in 1761 was serious. It was not of course simply or solely Pitt’s fault: French and Spanish policy and responses were not dictated by the views of Britain, whatever many British politicians and commentators might imagine. Yet it was precisely this blinkered attitude that ensured that the fortuitous success of 1762 was important in leading to an absence of any serious widespread critique of the commitments assumed to arise from Britain’s apparent maritime destiny. The successes of 1762 might appear inevitable. The French navy had already been devastated, its British counter part had been battle-hardened and considerable experience had been built up in amphibious operations. Britain was far more prepared for war than had been the case in 1755–6 and far more 160

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ready for attacks on the Spanish empire than in 1739–42. Cartagena successfully resisted British attack in 1741, but Havana fell in 1762. In 1739 the British government decided not to attack the Philippines; in 1762 Manila was captured. According to the Salisbury Journal of 4 October, the news of the surrender of Havana arrived during a choral concert in the city’s annual music festival: to shouts of applause, the choir at once burst into the song “Britons, strike home”. It is therefore easy to treat 1762 as a second “year of victories” that was an inevitable postscript to that of 1759, a necessary consequence of Pitt’s policies and British naval dominance. This would be misleading. Havana proved a difficult objective and a third of the British force was lost to malaria and yellow fever. The force sent against Manila was small and vulnerable to the weather, and it was necessary to rely upon a rapid attack rather than a protracted siege. These and other problems were not made obvious to the British public; no more than those created by the defence of Portugal. In the autumn of 1762 the Portuguese pressed for more British military support and Treasury backing for Portuguese borrowing in London. Hardwicke pointed out that Britain could hardly conquer Peru or Mexico,31 but the jingoistic press suggested otherwise. The London Evening Post of 30 January 1762 contributed to a heady sense of potential when it reported: As the Spanish colonies on the South-Sea [Pacific] are extremely ill fortified and badly garrisoned, depending for their preservation more upon their situation than strength, a company of merchants in Bristol and Liverpool are fitting out a large fleet of privateers, to sail immediately against them. There is scarce any risk but doubling Cape Horn, and, provided they choose the proper season, they may even clear that without danger. This once effected, nothing can hinder them from laying the whole coast under contr ibution, or taking possession of their settlement, if they find it convenient. In the following issue, that of 2 February, the paper proposed the conquest of the isthmus of Darien. It was easy in 1762–3, and subsequently, to adopt the position that peace was appropriate because of the cost of war, but, also, thanks to British success. In such a context, it was reasonable to debate whether the peace terms were overly lenient to the Bourbons, but there was little public sense that the war had been a risk. The glow of success had shadowed the problems and failures of the early stages of the conflict with France. This attitude led to a post-war confidence, indeed complacency, that was to have serious consequences for Britain’s international position. It is usual to trace the American Revolution in part to the Seven Years’ War, specifically to the desire by the British government to address the financial 161

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strains created by the war,32 and to the lessened need of the colonies for British protection once the French had been driven from Canada. The security of the colonies had been the British objective when troops were sent to North America in 1755. There were additional factors that affected the British ability to handle controversies with the colonies and the subsequent conflict. First, a sense of confidence in Br itain’s inter national position led successive governments to neglect the danger and dangers of such controversies. Alongside specific concerns about the danger of a war of revanche by the Bourbons, not least in North America,33 there was a degree of confidence resting on Britain’s recent success. This received powerful support from the marked reduction in interest in continental international relations and in concern about Hanover that followed the accession of George III and the decision to abandon the Prussian subsidy. This shift in attitude closed a major source of vulnerability. Secondly, the British failed in the post-war period to match Bourbon naval construction. This was to have dire consequences in 1778–81, contributing directly to the failure at Yorktown in 1781.34 It may seem paradoxical to note a failure to match the naval schemes of opponents as part of an argument that Britain became more clearly a maritime state with imperial aspirations and ethos, but this failure owed much to the strong position of the British navy in the early 1760s and to the Bourbon realization that it was necessary to beat the British at sea. It was clear from the Seven Years’ War that threatening Hanover and Portugal was no substitute and that the Jacobite ploy was finished. It was also clear that a powerful Britain would be in a position to take more Bourbon colonies in any future conflict. It was far from clear that the next AngloBourbon war would arise from a revolution within the British empire and thus find Britain vulnerable, or, indeed, that the following war would see Britain as part of an unsuccessful coalition challenged by the dynamism of Revolutionary France. Instead, it was possible that in any resumed Anglo-Bourbon conflict the British would retake the gains handed back in 1763 and continue by attacking Louisiana and Latin America. In Britain, there was some concern about the expansion of the British empire, especially on the grounds that it might lead to a weakening of the state by introducing a weakening craving for luxury or by emigration. George Bubb Dodington, a former Lord of the Treasury created Lord Melcombe in 1761 who had influence with Bute, sent him a memorandum that argued, As to colonies, in general, it may be worth serious consideration whether the trading part of the world is, or is not, large enough to employ every branch of trade which you can furnish, in its most ample extent? If it is, ought you to be over-fond of new settlements, unpeopled, or (which is full as bad) peopled by savages, where you must furnish not only manufacturers, but hands to prepare the returns for them; and lose more, 162

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possibly, by the diminution of your people, than you gain by the returns of your merchandise?35 This, however, was not a view that prevailed in the midst of war and victory. Most commentators were only too delighted to see evidence of Britain’s strength and imperial expansion. The Monitor saw the fall of Martinique as a mark of providential support.36 Given the shift in Britain’s global position, it is not surprising that British public opinion did not look back on 1761 as a year of failure and mixed opportunities. As a result, the problems created that year by Pitt’s attitude both towards the Bourbons and to his relations with this ministerial colleagues were not appreciated.

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Chapter Nine Defence, foreign policy and strategy

how misguided and erroneous a notion…which has crept into the minds of our people, and only of later years…that Britain can, with safety to herself, be wrapped up in her own natural and internal strength, however great, or be detached from every other part of the world; and particularly that she can, without hazard, lose or renounce all connections with the continent. —Anon., Occasional Reflections on the Importance of the War in America, and the Reasonableness and Justice of supporting the King of Prussia (London, 1758), p. 48 Foreign policy must be approached from a number of different angles, but one of the most important in this period was that of the national defence. Indeed, a stress on this point helps to overcome the somewhat artificial distinction between peacetime diplomacy and wartime planning and action. Much peacetime diplomacy was a preparation for, or, more commonly, against war, while the exigencies and options of wartime planning arose in part from the successes, commitments and failures of earlier diplomacy. Britain was at or close to war for much of this period and her impact on the Continent was then felt most forcefully. It was also then that Britain’s relations with her allies and enemies had their greatest impact on British politics and public debate, on her economy and society. Large numbers of men served in the armed forces, both the army and the navy. Many were sent abroad, but those who remained at home, both regulars and others specially mustered, such as the militia, still faced the threat of action. Large sums were raised in taxation, but war and military preparations still had to be financed largely on credit. It was directly as a result of war that the national debt rose from £50 million in 1720 to £76 million in 1748 and £133 million in 1763. This debt, and other related financial problems, overhung the political system and played a major role in a government policy in peacetime. 164

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War then had its consequences everywhere: they did not cease with the end of hostilities. From the price of every taxed good to the sight of crippled exsoldiers seeking alms, the after-effects of conflict pressed home throughout the country. Crime rates rose as disbanded soldiers and sailors were cast adrift with few resources.1 In wartime the impact was also universal: fewer farm hands for the harvest; an interruption of coastal trade bringing less coal to London; the anxiety for those who served that it too often overlooked in a society mistakenly defined as habituated to pain, loss and suffering. And yet the costs of war did not prevent Britain from engaging in conflict, nor did they stop some politicians from urging a resort to hostilities. Sometimes the politicians were out of favour and seeking an opportunity to embarrass the government for essentially domestic reasons. This was an important element in pressure for war with Spain in 1739 and with France in 1754. At other times, such pressure arose essentially from within the ministry and in general reflected international rather than domestic concerns. This was true of the decision to fight France in 1744. There was no ideological aversion from war in the British political system: it was always an option. In considering conflict, British ministers tended, however, to see it largely in defensive and reactive terms; indeed, both diplomacy and war were seen largely in terms of the defence of national interests. This was a characteristic feature of British policy after the Glorious Revolution, and marked an abrupt shift from the more aggressive attitude that had characterized participation both in the three Anglo-Dutch wars and in the Anglo-Spanish conflict of 1655–60. In contrast, governments after 1688 saw themselves as essentially concerned to defend national interests, not least as represented by the maintenance of current international boundaries, rather than as required to act in any aggressive manner to that end. This stress on a reactive position was epitomized in the treaties Britain signed. In peacetime, they were invariably defensive, not offensive. Governments did not only think and negotiate in a defensive framework; they also presented themselves in that light. For British policy to be defensible, politically moral, it had to be defensive. That was the theme of innumerable ministerial speakers in Parliament. It was also the theme of progovernment writing, such as the pamphlets produced to defend a peaceful settlement to Anglo-Spanish differences in 1738–9, or Samuel Johnson’s Thoughts on the Late Transactions respecting Falkland’s Islands (1771). Appeals to the national past presented England/Britain not as pacific but as responding to foreign threats. Thus Elizabeth I, a heroine of the eighteenthcentury press, was seen as a robust assertor of national interests and defender of Protestantism against Philip II. Her war with Spain was held up to the Commons as a model by Pulteney in his speech in the debate on the Address on 15 November (os) 1739. The press tended to offer an account in which defence rested on selfreliance, not alliances. This self-reliance was generally seen to centre on naval power, but there was also support for a militia, for the people under arms, 165

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rather than a regular army under the control of the government. The Daily Post of 16 August (os) 1745 asked When Charles the Great of France [Charlemagne] had conquered the greatest part of Italy and made himself master of all Germany, what notions had the people of England of the balance of Europe? They undoubtedly thought themselves safe enough; everybody fit to bear arms was a soldier; and so they did not dream of making alliances with either the Greek Emperor, or the Saracens, to pull down the Emperor of the West, lest he should, for want of other employment, pay this island a visit. This defensive mentality was not restricted to British policy towards the affairs of the Continent; it also characterized trans-oceanic relations with European powers. Thus, of her wars with Spain, the world’s leading colonial power, that of 1718–20 arose from the apparent need to resist Philip V’s aggressive schemes in Italy, that of 1739–48 from pressure for action against Spanish restrictions on British trade in the Caribbean, and those of 1762–3 and 1779–83 in response to a decision by Charles III to support his principal foreign ally, France, which was at war already with Britain. In 1770 and 1790 Britain and Spain nearly went to war, in each case as a result of British anger about what appeared to be an act of aggression: the Spanish seizure, first, of Port Egmont, the British settlement on the Falkland Islands, and later of British merchantmen in Nootka Sound on Vancouver Island. Similarly, the conflict with France that broke out in 1754 and broadened into the Anglo-French aspect of the Seven Years’ War arose from British concern that her North American colonies would be restricted to the Atlantic littoral by French attempts to link their colonial bases in Canada and Louisiana. Any presentation of policy as defensive faces the criticisms, first, that all powers adopt that approach in order to put the best gloss possible on their policies and, secondly, that British policy, both in peace and in war, was not seen in that light by many contemporary commentators. There is considerable force in the for mer argument, not least because such presentation was necessary in order to activate the defensive clauses of one’s own treaties and prevent opponents from doing the same. The need for a defensive presentation of foreign policy was readily apparent in states, such as Britain, Sweden and the United Provinces, where the constitutional need to explain foreign policy in a representative institution provided opportunities for domestic criticism. The second point reflects both the extent to which there was an active public debate over international relations, in which the actions and apparent intentions of all participants were scrutinized and judged harshly, and the alleged specific characteristics of British policy. She was attacked for seeking maritime and commercial dominance, for extolling the balance of power on the Continent of Europe, whilst destroying it on the oceans of the world. In 1749 the Spanish government objected to British plans for an expedition to 166

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the Pacific and the establishment of a base on the Falkland Islands. French envoys in Spain argued that the British intended to attack the French colonies first and then to move on against those of Spain, and therefore that the Spaniards should help preserve the French empire as “their barrier”.2 The notion of a maritime balance was not new. Indeed, the Citizen, which had as a subtitle “The Weekly Conversation of a Society of London Merchants on Trade, and other Public Affairs”, in its issue of 9 February (os) 1739 warned that “The just balance of power amongst the European nations might as eventually be broken and destroyed, by an unjust and partial monopoly of the medium of commerce, as by any particular state engrossing to itself too large an extent of dominion, and other branches of power.” This was intended as a warning against France, as earlier in the seventeenth century such comments had been directed against the Dutch, but in the eighteenth century it appeared most appropriate to direct such remarks against the British. This criticism became of greater weight in the mid-eighteenth century. The force of the argument owed much to anger about the British treatment of neutral trade during her wars. It also reflected two mid-century shifts in an international system that was far from constant, and that it is very misleading to treat as such. First, Britain’s crushing defeats of French naval power in 1747 and 1759 and her capture of most of the bases of the French and two of the leading bases of the Spanish overseas empires in 1758–62 seemed indeed to destroy any sense of a maritime balance and thus to justify criticism of the British position. French trans-oceanic trade suffered greatly. The French Company of the Indies had a major loss of assets as its ships and commercial installations were destroyed, incurred a heavy debt and collapsed in 1769. It was in no position to compete with the British East India Company. Secondly, there was a shift both in France’s position in the European system and in her foreign policy, one in which she came to play a smaller and less assertive and aggressive role. As a result, the French challenge that had helped to lead other powers, most obviously the Dutch and Austria, to look to Britain for support, ceased to figure in international relations, other than for Britain. In addition, although individual British moves might arise in response to hostile acts by others, as in 1754, 1770 and 1790, British policy can be seen as aggressive from two points of view. First, the actual response was bellicose, reflecting a clear determination to get her way by intimidation, if not force. Second, there was a more ambiguous sense that the expanding nature of British trade and settlement, the dynamic character of her empire, were themselves aggressive in a world of competing empires and a close mercantilist relationship between territory and trade. Thus, British interests with a degree of governmental support pressed to open the Spanish empire to trade, legal or illicit, helping to lead to war in 1739, sought to open both the transAppalachian hinterland of North America and unsettled parts of Spanish 167

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America to trade and settlement, helping to lead to war in 1754 and nearly to conflict in 1770 and 1790, and sought to make the Pacific an ocean open for opportunity, not closed to all bar Spain. These varying impressions complicated and at times confused the response of contemporaries, who were anyway affected by the partisan pressures of specific domestic and international debates. In hindsight, the theme of aggression may appear apparent in a period in which more of the world came to be ruled by Britain. In 1688 the British empire was comparatively modest. Aside from a few possessions in Sumatra, India, West Africa and the Caribbean, and the island bases that naval power helped to secure, such as Bermuda, the Bahamas and St Helena, the empire was essentially restricted to North America: barren wastes round Hudson’s Bay, and a thin strip along the eastern seaboard. This inheritance was to grow by conquest and settlement. The most dramatic growth was in North America. Georgia (1732) was founded, the frontier of settlement pushed often far from the coast, and new towns included Baltimore (1729), Richmond (1733) and Savannah (1733). The claims of the Hudson’s Bay Company were recognized by the Peace of Utrecht of 1713, as was British possession of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. The Seven Years’ War (1756–63) and the subsequent Peace of Paris (1763) added Canada and Louisiana east of the Mississippi, both from France, and Flor ida from Spain. Br itain had clearly supplanted France as a North American power, was best poised to profit from difficulties in the apparently weak Spanish American empire, and now shared with Russia and Spain the position of a major power on the frontier between European and nonEuropean societies. Thanks to her mid—century gains, Britain became clearly the strongest of the European maritime and colonial powers. Only thus was she able to resist Napoleonic France. In the long-term, it was this feature of Britain’s international history that was most distinctive and important. Aside from the myriad consequences for British society, economy and public culture of this colonial and maritime success, the impact of empire as a proof of providential favour and a pointer to mission and purpose, themes that can readily be sketched out throughout the following centur y, there were also the consequences for the Continent. What has been recently ter med the Napoleonic integration of Europe 3 failed in large part due to British opposition. The political, cultural and social consequences were crucial: the distinctive feature of European society was its division among a number of competing states, and this was to remain the case as industrialization, urbanization, mass literacy and mass politics spread. If this opposition to Napoleon was the most important contribution that pre-Reform Britain made to European history, it is all too easy to see it and her related imperial strength as the obvious theme of the previous century, an end planned and pursued. Such an interpretation is misleading, but it is appropriate in one respect to stress the long-term consequences of the wars 168

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being discussed. By indicating their central importance, both for Britain and for Europe, it is easier to understand why foreign policy and war were so important to the politicians and political nation of the period, and why it is so misleading to marginalize them or to treat them essentially as an aspect of apparently more significant autonomous developments, such as economic growth. Instead of focusing on maritime and colonial growth leading to an imperial struggle with France that was to culminate in a major role in the defeat of the first serious modern attempt to conquer, or unify, depending on one’s viewpoint, Europe, it is possible to adopt a different perspective on British foreign policy. This analysis is centred more obviously on fear and defence, and on short-term responses to particular crises that in sum suggest a far weaker state, less clear in its objectives and less abstracted from shifts in European power politics than the former interpretation implies. The need to defend what successive governments defined as vital national interests arose from two related problems. The first was the recovery of French power under Louis XIV after just over a century (1559–1661) of domestic division and international weakness. By 1688 Louis XIV had the largest army seen in western Europe since the days of Imperial Rome. He had also developed the strongest navy hitherto seen by France, a navy supported by good logistical and manning systems. France, the most populous state in western Europe, was now reasonably united and her government relatively prosperous. Foreign rulers sought the patronage and pay of Louis. This recovery, which was maintained under Louis XV, was made more threatening for Britain by the direction of French interest. Whereas Louis XIV’s predecessors had concentrated on seeking Italian gains in 1494–1559, Louis XIV was more interested in the Low Countries. He wanted to dominate, though not acquire, the United Provinces (modern Netherlands), while the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium and Luxembourg, though with important differences) were seen as a likely acquisition, either from territorial gains as a result of war, or as a consequence of the French claim on the Spanish succession on the death of the childless Carlos II. The French threat was not an idle one. The potential reach of French forces had been shown by the invasion of the United Provinces in 1672, French forces advancing to seize Utrecht and to threaten Holland. This challenge, or variations thereon, was to remain a major problem for Br itish foreign policy throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It played a major role in causing war between the two powers in 1702 and 1793. The British were to devote much effort in both peace and war to thwarting France. Spain’s inability to defend the Netherlands led the British to support their acquisition by Charles VI, the ruler of Austria, at the Peace of Utrecht. The vulnerability of the region led Britain to support the Bar rier, the Dutch-garrisoned fortresses near the French frontier. The protection of the Austrian Netherlands was seen by the British as the central 169

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task of the “Old Alliance”, the new defensive system of Britain, Austria and the Dutch, created in 1689 and lasting, though with some very bumpy passages, until 1756. And yet the region continued vulnerable. French forces advanced into it during the Nine Years’ War (1689–97), occupied it at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession, and in 1745–7 overran the Austrian Netherlands. Indeed the last conflict amply demonstrated the vulnerability of the Austrian Netherlands, and yet also its importance to Britain, for from there invasion of both Britain and Britain’s crucial Dutch ally could be threatened. In the summer of 1745 Marshal Saxe took Ghent, Bruges and Ostend with little difficulty. The following year Brussels, Antwerp, Mons and Namur followed. Far from being inconclusive, as often presented, ancien régime warfare was delivering decisive military victory to the French. In 1747 they invaded the United Provinces, storming her principal fortress, Bergen—op—Zoom. Maastricht fell the following year. Richard Rolt, a contemporary historian of the conflict, claimed in 1750 that France “could only promise Great Br itain what Polythemus did to Ulysses, ‘To be the last devoured’”. French forces were not to mount a comparable challenge in the Low Countries until November 1792, although then, following their victory at Jemappes, the Austrian Netherlands fell even faster. French success in 1745–8, however, served both to demonstrate the vulnerability of the Low Countries and to focus attention on the deficiencies of the interventionist theme that had characterized Br itish policy towards the Continent since the Glorious Revolution. In the short term this led to major British efforts to strengthen the Barrier after the War of the Austrian Succession. To the British, this was a crucial aspect of the “Old System”. Sandwich and Robinson claimed in 1748 that “the possession of the Low Countr ies by the House of Austr ia conformable to the Barrier Treaty, is so absolutely connected with the necessary dependence of the Maritime Powers, and of that family upon one another”.4 Unfortunately, the Austrians were disenchanted with their position in the Austrian Netherlands, angry with being asked to accept a strategic situation that essentially favoured others, while unable to enjoy the economic benefits that they felt they deserved. Tripartite negotiations over the Austrian Netherlands, involving Austria, Britain and the Dutch, were to play a large role in post–1748 diplomacy. They centred on trade5 and defence, specifically the state of the Bar rier fortifications, to the upkeep of which the Br itish government did not wish to contribute.6 It is easy to overlook the negotiations in a period when histor ians search for intimations of the Diplomatic Revolution, because they did not lead to anything major, but, instead, they played a role in the continuing process of frustration and tension that marked relations within the ‘Old System’. Concern about the Austrian Netherlands also led in 1755, when war with France seemed imminent, to major attempts to secure the defence of the Low Countries. The failure of these attempts played a major role in the shift in 170

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British alignments that year towards first Russia and then Prussia, a shift that was an important part of the so-called Diplomatic Revolution of 1756. In the long term, French successes in 1745–8 exposed the limitations of the entire thrust of British policy since the Glorious Revolution: the interlinked creation of a European collective security system in which Britain played a major role, and a definition of British national interests that include first the somewhat nebulous preservation of the balance of power in Europe and, secondly, as an epitome of this, the exclusion of France from the Low Countries. Paradoxically, France was to be excluded from the Low Countries not by Britain, but by a diplomatic development that was not welcomed by British ministers and politicians: the Astro-French “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756. This neutralized French expansionism in French, Germany and northern Italy. Indeed, it was a precondition of British colonial gains, for a vulnerable Austrian Netherlands would otherwise have offered the French gains that could have been exchanged for British colonial conquests, as in 1748. This underlined the role of contingency and indeed served to prefigure a second chance event in European international relations that facilitated the growth of British power: the failure of Napoleon and his continental opponents to agree terms in 1813 or early 1814.7 In late 1757, at a moment of crisis in the Seven Years’ War, Mitchell reported from Prussia, “If the Empress of Russia should die, I hope not a moment will be lost to improve an event that may still save the whole. How melancholy it is to think that the fate of Europe should depend upon such accidents!”8 The mid-century defination of British interests and of the agenda for British policy was not abstracted from the bitterly partisan nature of British politics and public debate. Any association of specific views with particular political groupings invites qualification, understandably so in light of the amorphous nature of political parties and the shifts in international relations. Nevertheless, especially after the exclusion of Tories from office and thus the responsibility of power in 1714, it is reasonable to discern a basic distinction between an interventionism associated with Whigs and a more circumscribed sense of national interests held by the Tories. The latter was in part cause and consequence of both Tory reluctance to see Britain take an active role in continental affairs and their scepticism about the chances of a successful resolution of international problems.9 The collapsing of Whig/Tory political distinctions that was particularly associated with George III began earlier. The Jacobite strain in Toryism, which had done much to sustain Whig/Tory distinctions and divisions, collapsed. A British pamphlet of 1756 addressed to Louis XV claimed that The race of your old friends, whom you used to know by the name of Tories, is extinct and lost. If a love of liberty, zeal for the commerce and glory of Britain, and for that basis of it, the Protestant succession in the 171

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illustrious House of Hanover, are criterions of Whiggism; we are a nation of Whigs. The decline in Whig/Tory distinctions was linked to shifts in attitudes towards national interests and foreign policy. In 1748, Viscount Tyrconnel, a prominent Lincolnshire landowner and long-serving Whig who had both supported and opposed the government as an MP in 1729–41, observed that “if a nation can ever learn wisdom by past sufferings, we shall never more enter into a consuming land war, we shall leave the balance of power upon the continent, and the liberties of Europe, a couple of cant words”. Cr iticism of interventionism and support for “blue water” policies within ministerial circles, for example, by the 4th Duke of Bedford, Secretary of State for the Southern Department 1748–51, was picked up by foreign envoys.10 In 1757 Cumberland complained, “I am very fully convinced that the Tory doctrine of a sea-war, which we are following, will be repeated by our childrens’ children.”11 He had opposed Pitt’s rise to power. Support for a “sea war” reflected not simply a view on strategy,12 but also a sense of identity and interest. The sea was “our proper element”, according to an article in Old England of 1 June (os) 1751 attacking the conduct of the recent war. The shift in political attitudes reflected in part the impact, both on government and more generally, of Tory views via the intermediary of opposition Whig politicians and journalists. Many of the politicians entered government in the 1740s and 1750s. George Grenville, an influential supporter of disengagement from war on the Continent, was an opposition Whig who had gained office at the end of 1744. Newcastle resignedly wrote in April 1762, “let Mr. Grenville carry on his mar itime war as he pleases”. 13 Furthermore, there was a prudential as well as a polemical dimension to this shift. Continental interventionism had not worked. It had not won the War of the Austr ian Succession, nor fulfilled the expectations of the Br itish government during the subsequent peace. The alternative appeared more promising, and not solely to British commentators. Bussy, who had a long experience of British politics, reported in 1751 that a “blue water” policy would be favourable precisely because Britain would not need to concert operations with allies.14 The terms of the domestic political debate and the constitutional and institutional limitations and problems created by the role of Parliament were dynamic features in the formation of British foreign policy, not abstracted from it and acting simply as negative constraints on an otherwise clear set of objectives and priorities. In their own way, they increased the sense of threat and danger referred to already. A paranoid sensibility has been discerned in Anglo-American culture in the second half of the eighteenth century, and, without being fanciful, it can be extended throughout the whole period. It drew on both international and domestic sources, and its most potent impact was in contributing to the anxiety that was characteristic of the discussion of 172

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foreign policy in the period. There was frequent emphasis on a threat from France. “Camber” referred to the “encroaching ambition” of the French when warning of their moves in the West Indies in the London Evening Post of 27 May (os) 1749. He warned of the possible loss of the sugar trade and also drew attention to the threat to the Newfoundland fishery posed by the French recovery of Cape Breton. Later that summer, Bedford responded to news of Spanish warships searching British merchantmen in the Caribbean off Nevis by writing to Keene, “You know how extremely jealous this nation is of the least encroachments of this nature…the least spark of this sort must, if not timely prevented, kindle a flame.” Pressing for efforts to separate Spain from France, Old England claimed on 21 December (os) 1751 that “the exorbitant power of the House of Bourbon is a subject worn…threadbare by my indefatigable brethren of the quill”. Such an emphasis could also serve domestic political purposes by creating the impression that the government was failing to respond and was thus part of the threat.15 Widespread paranoia owed much to tension over the second set of vital national interests and related problems. In addition to concern over the situation on the Continent already referred to, a separate issue was posed by the British question, the struggle over who was to rule Britain and what the relation between the constituent parts of the British Isles was to be. This question brought a measure of unity to the per iod from the Glorious Revolution of 1688 to the effective crushing of Jacobitism as an indigenous military option at the battle of Culloden in 1746 and in the subsequent “pacification” of the Scottish Highlands. After that, concern about Jacobitism markedly lessened, in part also thanks to the coming of peace in 1748. Nevertheless, the government maintained its surveillance, and Frederick II’s interest in supporting Jacobitism gave rise to particular concern. Newcastle commented in 1753, “As it is possible that some encouragement may be given to the Jacobites from thence, care is taken to have all the coast of Scotland watched and well guarded.”16 Thus, it is possible to present British strategic thinking and foreign policy in the period 1739–63 from an essentially defensive viewpoint, certainly until after the defeat of the French Brest fleet at Quiberon Bay in 1759. In 1756 Newcastle was concer ned about the possibility and consequences of cooperation at sea between the two Bourbon powers. Indeed his question, “Where would have been our superiority at sea?” was justified. In 1746–55 France and Spain launched warships with a total displacement of around a quarter million tons while Britain only launched about 90,000 tons. Naval power was more than a matter of numbers of warships, but, on that head, Britain had lost her clear superiority. To that extent, critics of the government’s concentration on continental affairs were justified.17 That the period was one of growing imperial power does not detract from this viewpoint, and to concentrate on this strength and power would be to misunderstand the perspective and anxieties of contemporar ies, both 173

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politicians and commentators. It was not clear to foreign commentators that Britain could afford another war. Doubts about the stability of her finances were voiced by Mirepoix and Frederick II. 18 Furthermore, there was anxiety within Britain about French plans and activities outside Europe, especially in North America and India. In 1752 the British government was concerned about French expansion at Britain’s expense in West Africa. Newcastle wrote from Hanover that George II “extremely approves the directions for fitting out, with the greatest expedition, a stronger squadron for the coast of Africa, than the French will have there. In the present circumstances, there is no other certain way of doing with them, but by being stronger where we can”.19

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Chapter Ten Conclusion: Europe or America?

I have had the honour of first pointing out to the public a deception, which had generally prevailed over the kingdom…your Lordship, upon the present happy change [said] that I now saw the fruits of my work. Israel Mauduit, author of the isolationist Considerations on the present German war (1760) to Bute, December 1762 America was the choice made in 1762–3. The Bute ministry negotiated the Peace of Paris, its gains including Canada, from France, and Florida, from Spain. It also abandoned the Prussian alliance, making little effort to keep relations cordial with Frederick the Great.1 George III was closely identified with a specific “Patriotic” agenda, the rejection of his grandfather’s tradition of intervention in German affairs for Hanoverian ends and, more generally, a wish to limit Britain’s commitments to European allies. The break with this tradition was dramatized by the controversy over the Peace and, in particular, the rejection of the Prussian alliance. Pitt and his supporters, now in opposition, defended the alliance in Parliament and the press. On 9 December 1761 Pitt refuted criticism of his subsidy treaties and “justified the German war, both as Hanover had been invaded on our account, and as a diversion—spoke of the burden it was to France…justified his phrase about Hanover’s being a millstone round our necks, that it was now so round that of France—gave the highest encomiums of the King of Prussia and Duke Ferdinand”.2 The following May, when the vote of credit for the war was debated, Pitt insisted that Britain could and should continue financing her German war at the same time as she continued to fight elsewhere. He pressed for the maintenance of good relations with Prussia and claimed that “Continental measures had been practised by all our great princes”.3 Yet, no longer in office, Pitt was routinely in the minority. As in 1713, peace was popular and support for allies limited. War-weariness and the greater popularity of “blue-water” 175

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policies had sapped public support for the British commitment to Prussia. Pitt’s intransigence and the obvious preferences of George III reduced support within political circles, and in so far as the cause of allies commanded favourable attention it was that of Portugal, threatened by Spain, rather than Prussia. The reassessment of the Prussian alliance was linked to renewed criticism of Hanover. Having served to distract attention from Hanover and to limit antagonism towards continental engagements, the disintegration of the alliance was linked with both. However, in obvious contrast to earlier periods of marked hostility towards continental commitments, in 1762 Hanover played only a relatively minor role and the king was not criticized. The move to restrict British commitments and to limit policy to recognizably British goals came from the monarch. Bute emphasized the role of George III and the continuation between criticism of continental interventionism during the successful last years of George II’s reign and the policy of the new government. In April 1762 he sent Mitchell, still envoy in Berlin, a letter stressing the financial costs of interventionism, a topic on which he had taken care to inform himself carefully, There were not in the late reign wanting many worthy men, who though unable to stop the torrent, saw with great anxiety the vitals of this country daily exhausting; without the least prospect of putting an end to a war that however proper under certain limitation became frightful when carried to the annual expense of 20 millions, and that part of it alone regarding Ger many above 8, a sum almost incredible when compared to the utmost laid out in any one year of Queen Anne or King William’s wars; the King on mounting the throne beheld with the utmost horror the situation he was to act in. Bedford complained in the Lords that Frederick II was paid “for fighting his own battles against our natural allies”.4 Financial concerns were not new. Indeed, 13 years earlier, Newcastle had linked political reluctance to taxation with the problems facing his foreign policy when he told the Sardinian envoy that he was completely discouraged by the obstacles he encountered not from the opposition in Parliament, where the government had a massive majority, but within the majority itself, “because most of them only think of making themselves popular, and to that end only seek the means to cut taxes”.5 Such an attitude hindered, but did not prevent, Newcastle’s efforts to grant peacetime foreign subsidies; by 1762 hostility to expenditure, specifically foreign subsidies, in both war and peace, had greater public voice and had become government policy. This shift was part of a process in which cost became more central to the public discussion of foreign policy. In 1746 Trevor had expressed his concern: “What will, I fear render this land war unpopular in England, and consequently impracticable, is our allies 176

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presumption upon our opulence; and expecting to be paid and prayed for fighting their own quarrels.” In the event, this had not proved crucial in the public debate in the latter stages of that war, but the situation was to be different towards the close of the Seven Years’ War. Sir William Irby, who had stood down as an MP and was about to be created Lord Boston, wrote to another MP in March 1761 that “our expences to carry on the war are beyond conception, millions after millions must and will be raised …it is difficult to know how we shall be able to carry on the war much longer or how to make a safe and honorable peace”.6 The Briton, a weekly newspaper established by Bute, admitted in July 1762 that there was a danger of Hanover being invaded if Britain refused to assist Prussia, but added it is the duty, the interest of the Germanic body to see justice done to any of its constituent members that shall be oppressed: but should they neglect their duty and interest on such an occasion, I hope the elector of H.....r will never again have influence enough with the K?g of G…t B…?n, to engage him in a war for retrieving it, that shall cost his kingdom annually, for a series of years, more than double the value of the country in dispute. The paper calculated the annual cost of the “herculean task” of the defence of Hanover as £6 million. The previous month, the paper had condemned the Monitor for using the “old hackneyed expressions of the balance of power, the Protestant religion, and the liberties of Europe”. Such criticism indicated the paradigm shift in attitudes towards foreign policy.7 At the same time as George III and the government sought to disentangle themselves from the “German war”, they were willing to consider a revival of the search for allies. This was not intended to repeat the subsidy-offering diplomacy of Newcastle, but the major powers whose alliance was sought were the same: Austria and Russia. An alliance with Austria offered the prospect of Austrian attacks on Spanish interests in Italy. The Earl of Buckinghamshire was appointed envoy to Russia, Viscount Stormont to Vienna and Steinberg, who had represented Hanover at Vienna before the war, resumed his mission. These approaches were in part a reaction to the end of the Anglo-Prussian alliance, and a natural response to the sense of reopened diplomatic possibilities that the prospect of every peace brought in this period.8 There was, however, no comparable attempt to use British diplomatic assistance to support Hanoverian interests in north-west Germany. There, the death on 7 February 1761 of the Wittelsbach pluralist Clement-Auguste, Archbishop-Elector of Cologne and Prince-Bishop of Hildesheim, Münster, Osnabrück and Paderborn had produced a tremendous opportunity not only for ecclesiastical place-seekers and the advocates of secularization, but also for those who wished to enhance their influence in this region. However, George III made little attempt to 177

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intervene in the elections, in marked contrast to the position in the 1720s when they had last been conducted. Furthermore, despite reports of plans in 1761 and 1764, George did not visit Hanover. As a result, his British ministers also did not go there and Hanover ceased to be the episodic focus of British foreign policy. The possible importance of royal visits was indicated by the role of Frederick, Duke of York and Prince-Bishop of Osnabrück, George III’s second son, who went to Hanover in the 1780s and then helped to improve relations with Frederick II. Moreover, the suggestion in September 1762 of the Hanoverian minister Baron Behr that a German league of at least the leading Electors be formed so that the participants were not always at risk of being invaded on the slightest pretext9 was not followed up. Ironically, Pitt, a politician who had made his name by attacking Hanoverian commitments, was in turn strongly criticized from 1761 for his support for continental measures.10 This was not simply a matter of those in office being castigated by opponents, as was indeed in part the case with Pitt when troops were sent to Germany in 1758. Instead, Pitt was being criticized by the government and its supporters in Parliament and the press. Furthermore, this criticism aroused little response. Pitt’s supporters preferred to focus on the return of captured territories, such as Martinique and Guadeloupe, to the Bourbons, rather than on the breakdown of Continental measures. There had been a major shift in both attitude and policy. The shift in policy was an aspect of the sea-change in politics that followed George III’s accession in 1760. There was a sea-change in generations: the political leaders of the 1760s, such as George III, Bute and Grafton, were not men who looked back to, or indeed remembered, the crises and anxieties of the 1710s and 1720s, as George II and Newcastle had done. To the new generation the succession was not and had not been in danger. Factious opposition and party rule were seen as threats, not Jacobitism. This had a direct consequence in the field of foreign policy. There was no longer any question of a Bourbon-supported Jacobite invasion or rising, and thus no need to win foreign support to thwart it. Equally, the ghost of Louis XIV had been laid. France no longer appeared a great threat in Europe, although Newcastle conjured her up as such when, in January 1762, he emphasized the continued importance of the British commitment to the Continent: the recalling our troops from Germany and abandoning the continent entirely would now render the House of Bourbon absolute master of all Europe, enable them to oblige every neutral power to submit… We should be reduced to that miserable condition of defending ourselves at home…excluded from all commerce abroad, and all connection with the other powers of Europe. This view was dated, and Newcastle complained of being ignored by Bute.11 It 178

CONCLUSION: EUROPE OR AMERICA?

reflected geopolitical assumptions rendered anachronistic by the crushing of Jacobitism, the defeat of the French navy and the growth in British amphibious capability, and exaggerated the threat from France. She had emerged from the War of the Austrian Succession without any gains or an alliance system that served aggressive purposes, and was to do the same after the Seven Years’ War. The prestige of French armies, high after the victories of 1746–7 (which had compensated for earlier defeats in the War of the Spanish Succession), had been shattered by Frederick the Great at Rossbach in 1757 and further damaged by the British at Minden in 1759. France now seemed a lesser power, and the rising states of central and eastern Europe did not appear a significant threat to British interests. In 1791, in the Ochakov Crisis, Britain was to come close to war with Russia in an attempt to force her to return gains from the Turks. There was no hint of any such development three decades earlier. Europe no longer seemed a threat in the early 1760s, certainly no longer a threat to Britain. Yet this was more than simply an exercise in calculation and realpolitik. There had also been an important shift in emphasis. Interest in the notion of a balance and of a British-led and sustained alliance system determined to maintain such a balance or, better still, to preside over a reality and process of collective security, had collapsed. Newcastle was certain there had been a major change of policy. In August 1762 he told Lyttelton that his difference of opinion with My Lord Bute did not singly depend upon the peace; for that I should be equally zealous after the peace, for establishing some plan of connection with, and support of the Continent; that that was contrary to My Lord Bute’s opinion, and that of those he consulted, and was directed by. Hardwicke was more specific when he told Bute the previous month that Newcastle and his friends adhered to the two grand points, upon which the great difference had broke out viz. the support of the German war and the preserving of the connection with the King of Prussia, united as he is, with the Emperor of Russia [Peter III]; and England’s availing itself of both those powers in war and in peace. However, in February 1763, Newcastle was more interested in a return to the Grand Alliance with Austria and the Dutch. He had indeed taken soundings of such a possibility in January 1762. The Austr ian response had been unfavourable. Though desirous of better relations with the major continental powers, George III and his new ministry were not willing to bind Britain to extensive diplomatic commitments. This was revealed clearly by the unwillingness to 179

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accept Russian demands for support in Poland and against the Turks. The Russian minister, Count Panin, told Buckinghamshire in September 1763 that when England proposed to enter into an alliance with Russia, it must be with a view of interesting herself in the affairs of the North, and, in that case, the system of Europe could not be too comprehensive, for, unless we secured Russia against the attacks of her neighbours, she would be very little able, upon any emergency to assist us. Buckinghamshire, however, made it clear that in his view Turkey, with which Russia might go to war, had nothing to do with the affairs of northern Europe. That December, Sandwich, now Secretary of State, wrote to the Earl, Your Excellency will continue the same language with respect to their idea of receiving any pecuniary aid from Great Britain, which neither the present situation of affairs in Europe, nor the state of a country, just at the end of a bloody and most expensive war, nor the necessities of alliance, given any room to expect or desire…nor does the situation of his kingdoms require that the King should purchase or solicit an alliance, in which the interests of Russia are at least as much connected as those of Great Britain. This emphasis on reciprocity represented a return to the governmental and public language of the mid–1750s, but the context was now one of more circumscribed and less active aspirations. A contributor to the Royal Magazine stated that he knew “of no alliance we have for some time made, that has been of any essential service to our nation”.12 Hardwicke warned of the danger that “having pursued too violent a system, we should come to have no system at all”. Britain was perceived by foreign diplomats as a state that did not wish to take an active role in continental disputes.13 This view was fortified in 1763 by the British response to two issues that were to cause greater concern and local conflict within a decade, the future of Poland and of Corsica. Responding in July 1763 to the movement of Russian troops into Lithuania, Kaunitz suggested that Austria, Britain and France should co-operate in preventing Russia and Prussia from dominating Poland, while the French envoy in London pressed Britain to take a stand. Sandwich told the Russian envoy that the British government was opposed to any partition of Poland, but it was clear that the government did not intend to act. In southern Europe, Sardinian hopes that Britain would take a more forceful role after the Seven Years’ War were also soon shown to be without substance. The new Sardinian envoy, Count Marmora, pressed Sandwich on the importance of keeping Corsica out of Bourbon hands, but Sandwich revealed a lack of interest and Marmora suggested that the government was not really 180

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concerned about foreign affairs. The government had already issued an order in Council prohibiting contact with Corsican opponents of the island’s proFrench ruler, the republic of Genoa.14 A British-led interventionist alliance system was not to return until William Pitt the Younger negotiated a triple alliance system with Prussia and the United Provinces in 1788. It collapsed in the Ochakov Crisis of 1791 at the first challenge: Russian obduracy. Subsequent attempts to create a league directed against first Revolutionary and then Napoleonic France failed in the 1790s and 1800s. This shift in emphasis away from Europe was the other half of the process more generally understood as a rise of interest in empire. It was in part a matter of decades, traceable back to the anti-Spanish agitation of the late 1730s, but yet also the development of a brief period, the years 1754–61, a parallel to Jonathan Clark’s emphasis on the importance of conjunctural shifts, in his study of domestic high politics in 1754–7.15 Earlier in the century, there had been concern about Catholic leagues and, more specifically, the alliance of powerful Catholic powers that threatened to dominate the Continent, for example, the Alliance of Vienna in 1725–9 and the Franco-Austrian alignment of the late 1730s. These fears were alert to the circumstances of the time, for example, to the growth of Austrian power under Charles VI, but they also looked back to a imaginative construction of a Europe that was dominated or in danger of dominance by international Catholicism and, more specifically from the 1660s, Bourbon France. Transoceanic expansion by Britain was not antipathetical to this situation, but it was largely irrelevant in imaginative terms, although the global commercial opportunities tapped by such expansion were important to Britain’s ability to play a role in Europe, significantly so from the 1700s. Indeed, the War of the Spanish Succession was in part a case of Germany and the Low Countries won through the trade of India.16 By the early 1760s Britain’s situation was seen very differently. The balance of power ceased to play a prominent role in ministerial or public discussion of foreign policy. Instead, now the crucial struggle was for maritime mastery, and this mastery was central to both competing interests in North America, the West Indies and the Indian Ocean, and trans-oceanic trade. By 1763 Britain was the most powerful European state in the world. Between 1763 and 1793, whether at peace or war, she struggled to retain and strengthen this position. However, ministers were determined to retain the ability to define what policies should be followed in order to obtain these goals and refused to yield to jingoistic pressure for war. The British stance might appear aggressive, especially to continental commentators who queried the existence of a maritime balance of power and criticised wartime Britain’s policy towards neutral traders, but there was no master plan to use naval power to drive the other European powers from their empires. No British government sought unprovoked war for the sake of seizing new ter r itor ies. Instead, the 181

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preservation and defence of existing territories were the central concern of government. In 1754–5 the government saw itself as responding to French aggression in North America. In 1761 Bedford suggested to Bute that “we have too much already, more than we know what to do with, and I very much fear, that if we retain the greatest part of our conquests out of Europe we shall be in danger of over-colonising and undoing ourselves by them, as the Spaniards have done”.17 Nevertheless, although governments saw themselves as responding to aggression, the sphere of interests they were supposed to protect had widened greatly. This was true both geographically and in terms of public assumptions. In late 1762 John Paterson claimed that The general, almost universal, cry is that the great acquisitions we have made, the flourishing condition of our trade, the spirit and experience of our troops by sea and land, and the distresses of our enemies entitles us to the most advantageous terms of peace; of which an exclusive right to the Fisheries, as the great source of trade and maritime power, is almost universally esteemed the most essential, and indeed the sine qua non. Whatever falls short of this will most certainly occasion clamour.18 Despite such claims, France retained a right to fish off Newfoundland in the Peace of Paris, and the terms were approved by Parliament. Yet, as more generally with the heated debate whether Britain should retain her conquests in Canada or the West Indies, it was the extension of the geography of concern and claim that was most striking. In 1748 members of the government had been interested in gaining Ostend, seeing it “as some satisfaction for the cession of Cape Breton”, although this was not a view that enjoyed much political, still less public, resonance. Indeed a French agent who spent the winter of 1746–7 in Britain reported public pressure for attacks on French colonies and commerce and widespread hostility to any return of Cape Breton. This was not a view restricted to London. It was disseminated throughout the country by the press.19 At the same period, as earlier in the century, there had also been public concern about the state of Dunkirk,20 although far less than in 1730. By the mid–1750s, North Amer ica increasingly excited interest and concern. Britain was presented even more clearly as a maritime power, but its maritime nature was seen as oceanic in concern and scope, not restricted to the Narrow Seas. From mid-century maritime mastery was seen not only in prudential terms, the support on which empire, security and trade rested, but also as an imaginative imperative that had political consequences. Proposals from Arthur Dobbs, Governor of North Carolina, sent to Bute by Dobbs’s brother, provide one of the most powerful examples of this consciousness. They are particularly interesting as they look ahead to nineteenth-century notions of Britain’s global role. Instead of preserving liberties in Europe, Britain was to 182

CONCLUSION: EUROPE OR AMERICA?

spread liberty in the world, using her constitution as a model. Prior to taking up his post in North Carolina in 1754, Dobbs had been an energetic Irish landowner and parliamentarian concerned to improve the Irish economy and discover a north-west passage to the Orient. In 1762 he offered a scheme for the improvement of the New World under the aegis of Britain and to her profit: to publish manifestos in the Spanish tongue on landing…declaring the Spanish colonies free states to be governed by laws framed by themselves after the model of British liberty under the protection of Britain as a perpetual ally with a free trade most favourable to Britain …to retain, as cautionary pledges of the future friendship and fidelity of those colonies, Vera—Cruz, Havana, Portobello and the isthmus of Darien, Carthagena, Hispaniola and the other Spanish islands. Spanish Florida to be entirely ceded to Britain…to send missionaries to civilize and Christianize the natives where the Spaniards have no settlements and to form them into regular polities under the direction of governors truly Christian and educated for that purpose in Britain at the expense of the public.21 Naval and colonial victories brought more of the world within Britain’s real and imaginative grasp. Greater interest was not restricted to mercantile and political circles. The commemoration of Admiral Vernon’s success at Porto Bello in 1739 and thereafter can be traced through society. In Durham, Dove and Booth increased attendance at their “mathematical lectures” by promising to exhibit fireworks in honour of Vernon’s birthday immediately afterwards. Vernon ceramics constituted the most prolific output of commemorative pieces since the beginning of the century. One of the inexpensive London newspapers, the Penny London Post, devoted several issues in March 1749 to printing Vernon’s speech on the encouragement of naval service. Maritime mastery was increasingly seen as Britain’s destiny, part of the identity of both state and people, a process to which the victories and campaigns of the Seven Years’ War contributed greatly.22 Such a claim may seem overblown. The identity of Irish farm workers or Scottish colliers, to say nothing of many others, may seem to have had little to do with the actions of Hawke or Boscawen. In part, this is true, although, at the material level, the movement of coal along the east coast of Britain and the supply of Irish foodstuffs to the British military both depended on naval hegemony. War affected the entire economy.23 The agricultural sector suffered when conflict with the Bourbons hit grain exports, although it did so less in the 1740s than in previous conflicts. The Bath Chronicle of 12 February 1761 printed an article from a “country gentleman” pressing for peace, complaining about a lack of workers and stating that “corn is sunk below what our farmers call a living price, for want of export”.24 The issue had become controversial in early 1748 as pressure mounted for a ban on 183

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exports. 25 They were attacked in some papers, for example, the General Advertiser, and defended in others. The Jacobite’s Journal of 13 February (os) 1748 ascribed the rise in the price of wheat to exports, “to the great joy of the poor farmers, whom some of their worthy countrymen wished to have deprived of this providential benefit”. Soon after the end of the war, William Mildmay saw British grain ships in Marseille.26 Supporting peace, the Briton of 3 July 1762 emphasized the fiscal strains of war and its detrimental impact on the labour market, although, in general, shortages of labour were met by the hiring of those previously unemployed. Other papers of the period, such as the London Evening Post, stressed the burden of the war on the “landed interest”. More generally, war exacerbated inflation, affected patterns of demands and created strains in the commercial and financial systems. Trade was hit by foreign privateers and the number of bankruptcies increased. War also brought benefits. The needs of the army and navy led to expenditure that stimulated demand across much of the economy, although it is difficult to assess its extent and impact. In 1744 “all the ropers at Poole” were making cordage for the navy,27 while the price of wool rose in response to demand for uniforms.28 The imperial project, or at least projects, brought economic expansion in such areas as the fur trade.29 Exports rose dramatically during the later years of the Seven Years’ War. More generally, the notion of identity, of Britain as a global state and military power, reached out into the country through the press and through the foreign goods spread in an increasingly consumerist society, especially tea, coffee, sugar and cotton.30 If the notion did not encompass everyone, it did not exist against, and in opposition to, another notion of Britain’s identity as part of Europe, with cor responding political and military interests and commitments. Instead, the notion faced a more local set of concerns and interests and one that was not articulated at the national scale. This shift in the conception of the national destiny was not understood by Newcastle and only partly grasped by Pitt. George III’s views were in accord, but that was largely due to his reaction to his grandfather and his Hanoverian identity and commitments. Yet political leadership by Pitt in the mid–1750s and by George III in the early 1760s did play a role. Their determination to break with the systems they confronted was important. However, any single explanation of what was a complex and multifaceted shift must be suspect. The imaginative recreation of Britain as a global state with a maritime destiny reflected an interaction of shifts in attitude and changes in political contexts and policies. The failure of Newcastle’s European collective security system project was crucial. That was also a failure not only of policy and of an understanding of European international relations, but also of Europe as a definition of British identity and interest.

184

Notes

Unless indicated, the place of publication for all books is London.

Chapter Two 1. Bolingbroke to Sir William Wyndham, 5 Jan. (os) 1736, Petworth House Archives, 23, p. 46. 2. Weston to Thomas Robinson, envoy in Vienna, 2 July (os) 1748, BL, Add. 23829, f. 16. 3. Newcastle to Philip, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Lord Chancellor, 25 Aug. (os) 1749, BL, Add. 35410, f. 127. 4. A recent brief introduction is provided by J.Black, Europe in the eighteenth century, 1700–1789 (1990), 289–94. A longer chronological account, as well as discussion of the mechanics of international relations and of their practice and theory, can be found in Black, The rise of the European powers, 1679–1793 (1990), 66–118, 149–207. Important recent work includes R.Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession (New York, 1993) and M.S.Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740–1748 (Harlow, 1995). 5. Finch to Robert Trevor, envoy at The Hague, 15 Nov. 1740, Aylesbury, Trevor 24. 6. J.Black, “Mid-eighteenth century conflict”, in The origins of war in early modern Europe, J.Black (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1987), 225–7. 7. W.Mediger, Moskaus Weg nach Europa: Der Aufstieg Russlands zum europäischen Machstaat im Zeitalter Friedrichs des Grossen (Brunswick, 1952). 8. Dickens to William, Lord Harrington, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, 4 Feb. 1741, PRO, SP, 90/49; Pol. Con., i, 91; H.Branig, Preussland und Russland wahrend Des Ersten Slesischen Krieges (Berlin, 1930). 9. Wager to Trevor, 18 Oct. (os) 1741, Aylesbury, Trevor 29. 10. Villettes to Horace Mann, envoy in Florence, 25 Dec. 1741, PRO, SP, 105/ 282, f. 29. 185

NOTES

11. J.Black, “The problems of the small state: Bavaria and Britain in the second quarter of the eighteenth century”, European History Quarterly 19 (1989), 5–36; Pol. Corr., IV, 312; Mitchell to Earl of Buckinghamshire, 2 Feb. 1763, Norwich, Norfolk CRO. Hobart N.R.S. 21/22 74 xl. 12. S.Horowitz, Franco-Russian relations, 1740–1746, PhD thesis (New York University, 1951), vi–vii. 13. R.Butler, Choiseul, vol. I (Oxford, 1980). 14. Grimberghen to Haslang, Bavarian envoy in London, 30 June 1742, Munich, Bayr. London 379. 15. Newcastle to William, Duke of Cumberland, 22 Apr. (os) 1747, RA, Cumb. P. 21/314; H.L.A.Dunthorne, “Prince and republic: the House of Orange in Dutch and Anglo—Dutch politics during the first half of the eighteenth century”, in Essays in European history in honour of Ragnhild Hatton, J.Black and K.W.Schweizer (eds) (Lennoxville, 1985), 28–32. 16. C.Baudi di Vesme, La pace di Aquisgran (Turin, 1969). 17. J.R.Danielson, Die nordische Frage in den Jahren 1746–51 (Helsingfors, 1888). 18. R.N.Middleton, French policy and Prussia after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1749–1753: a study of the pre-history of the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756, PhD thesis (Columbia, 1968). 19. H.M.Scott, “‘The True Principles of the Revolution’: the Duke of Newcastle and the idea of the old system”, Knights errant and true Englishmen: British foreign Policy, 1660–1800, J.Black (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1989), 60–77. 20. Sandwich to Newcastle, 17 Oct. 1747, BL, Add. 32810, f. 125. 21. D.B.Horn, “The origins of a proposed election of a King of the Romans”, EHR 52, 361–70, 1927; R.Browning, “The Duke of Newcastle and the Imperial Election Plan, 1749–54”, Journal of British Studies 7 (1967), 28–47. 22. Harrington to Philip, 4th Earl of Chesterfield, envoy at The Hague, 29 Jan. (os) 1745, PRO, SP 84/408, f. 124. 23. Newcastle to Robert, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 26 July 1752, PRO, SP 36/119, f. 138–9. 24. Frederick, Mémoire sur les affaires de Pologne, Jan. 1753, AE, CP Prusse 171, f. 112–13. 25. H.Schlitter (ed.), Correspondance secréte entre le Comte A.W.Kaunitz-Rietberg… et le Baron Ignaz de Koch, sécretaire de I’impératrice Marie-Thérèse, 1750–1752 (Paris, 1899); J.Strieder, “Maria Theresia, Kaunitz und die österreichische Politik von 1748–1755”, Historische Vierteljahrsschrift 13 (1910), 494–504; W.J. McGill, “The roots of policy: Kaunitz in Vienna and Versailles”, Journal of Modern History 43, 1971; Joseph Yorke, envoy at The Hague, to Robert Keith, envoy at Vienna, 13 June 1756, BL, Add. 35480, f. 194. 26. R.Browning, “The British orientation of Austrian foreign policy, 1749–1754”, Central European History 1 (1968), 299–323. 27. Keith to Newcastle, 31 July 1753, PRO, SP 80/192. 28. Earlier scholarship can be approached through L.H.Gipson, Zones of international friction: North America, south of the Great Lakes region, 1748–1754 (New York, 1939); G.F.G.Stanley, New France: the last phase, 1744–1760 (Toronto, 1968); W.J.Eccles, The Canadian frontier, 1534–1760, 2nd edn (Albuquerque, 1983). For more recent work, R.White, The middle ground: Indians, empires, and republics in the Great Lakes region, 1650–1815 (Cambridge, 186

NOTES

29.

30.

31. 32. 33.

34.

35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41.

42.

43. 44.

1991), 199–232; M.N.McConnell, A country between: the Upper Ohio valley and its peoples, 1724– 1774 (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1992), 61–120; C.J.Balesi, The time of the French in the heart of North America, 1673–1818 (Chicago, 1991). T.R.Clayton, “The Duke of Newcastle, the Earl of Halifax, and the American or igins of the Seven Years’ War”, Historical Journal 24 (1981), 571–603; A.Reese, Europäische Hegemonie und France d’outre-mer. Koloniale Fragen in der französischen Aussenpolitik, 1700–1763 (Stuttgart, 1988), 249–89. Mirepoix, French envoy in London, to Rouillé, French foreign minister, 16 Jan., 10 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f 21–2, 116, 120; Perron, Sardinian envoy in London, to Charles Emmanuel III, 23 Jan. 1755, AST, LM, Ing. 59. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 2 May 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 15. J.Aman, Une campagne navale meconnu à la veille de la Guerre de Sept Ans: l’escadre de Brest en 1755 (Vincennes, 1986). They are briefly mentioned in P.Vaucher (ed.), Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France…Angleterre (Paris, 1965), III, 366–7, though there is more extensive archival mater ial, for example the correspondence between Rouillé and Bonnac, the envoy in The Hague, in AN, KK, 1401; AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 385–6, 391; anon, memorandum, AE, MD, Ang. 41, f. 28–43; Newcastle to William, 4th Duke of Devonshire, 2 Jan., Yorke to Viscount Royston, 6 Jan., Fox to Rouillé, 13 Jan. 1756, BL, Add. 32862, f. 7; 35364, f. 65–6; 34728, f. 40; Rouillé to Fox, 21 Dec., Yorke to Fox, 26 Dec. 1755. Fox to Devonshre, 7, 8 Jan., 9 Mar. 1756, council memorandum, 14 Jan. 1756, HP, Chatsworth transcripts; Pol. Corr., XI, 346–7, 356. Yorke to Newcastle, 3 June, Yorke to Royston, 14 Nov. 1755, BL, Add. 35364, f. 55, 32855, f. 312–13; A.C.Carter, The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years War (1971), 31–44. Holdernesse to Newcastle, 28 May, Newcastle to Holdernesse, 11, 18 July, Keith to Holdernesse, 27 Aug. 1755, BL, Add. 32855, f. 236, 32857, f. 1, 162– 4, 35480, f 56. Instructions for Hanbury-Williams, 11 Apr. 1755, PRO, SP 91/60. C.Jenkinson, Earl of Liverpool, A collection of all the treaties of peace, alliance and commerce between Great Britain and other powers [3 volumes] (1785), iii, 30–6. Holdernesse to Yorke, 22 June 1755, BL, Eg. 3446, f. 164. As the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel is usually referred to from mid— century. Holdernesse to Newcastle, 1, 7 June 1755, BL, Eg. 3428, f 208–9; BL, Add. 32855, f. 375; Pol. Corr., XI, 286–7; Münchhausen to Newcastle, 24 Feb. 1756, NSTA, Hanover 91v. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 11 July, Aug., Instructions for Holdernesse, 9 Aug., Holdernesse to Newcastle, 21 Nov. 1755, BL, Add. 32857, f. 5, 506, 32858, f. 150, 32861, f. 59. J.C.Batzel, Austria and the first three Treaties of Versailles, 1755–1758, PhD thesis (Brown University, 1974), 72; Aubeterre to Rouillé, 13 Aug., 30 Nov. 1755, Rouillé to Aubeterre, 14 Sept., 17 Nov. 1755, AE, CP, Autriche 254, f. 254–7, 319, 279–81, 330. L.Perey, Un petit neveu de Mazarin, 3rd edn (Paris, 1890), 36; Pol. Corr., xii, 73; Bonnac to Rouillé, 6 Feb. 1756, AN, KK 1402, p. 174. Batzel, Austria, 116–25; A.Schaefer, Geschichte des Siebenjährigen kriegs (Berlin, 187

NOTES

45. 46. 47.

48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

56.

57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

65. 66.

67. 68. 69. 70.

1874), i, 584–5; Due de Broglie, L’alliance Autrichienne (Paris, 1895), 338–43, 368–74. Keith to Holdernesse, 16 May, Holdernesse to Keith, 23 Mar. 1756, PRO, SP 80/197, f. 42–3, 104–5. H.Kaplan, Russia and the outbreak of the Seven Years War (Berkeley, 1968), 47–56. Keith to Holdernesse, 7 June 1756, BL, Add. 35480, f. 181; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 7 June 1756, PRO, SP 90/65; Holdernesse to Keith, 21 June 1756, PRO, SP 80/197, f. 154–67; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 27 May, 9 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65; Mitchell to Hanbury-Williams, 3 June, 6 July 1756, BL, Add. 6804, f. 24, Newport, Hanbury-Williams papers. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 22, 23, 30 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65; Holdernesse to Mitchell, 13 July, 6, 10, 20 Aug. 1756, PRO, SP 90/65; Holdernesse to Mitchell, 13, 27 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65, BL, Add. 6832, f. 80. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 30 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 13 July, 6, 10, 20 Aug. 1756, PRO, SP 90/65. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 13, 27 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65, BL, Add. 6832, f. 80. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 30 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65. Comte de Garden, Histoire generate des traités de Paix (Paris, 1903), III, 349–75. 9 Dec. 1761, BL, Add. 38334, f. 33–4. Count Colloredo, Austrian envoy in London, to Stahremberg, 20 Apr. 1757, AE, CP, Br. Han. 52, f. 97–106; Marshal Estrées to Lieutenant-General Sporcken, 7 May 1757, BL, Add. 35481, f. 200; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 8 May 1757, PRO, SP 90/69. Cumberland to Richelieu, 29 Aug. 1757, BVC, FR 58; W.Mediger, “Hastenbeck und Zeven. Der Eintritt Hannovers in den Siebenjahrigen Krieg”, Niedersachsisches Jahrbuch fur Landesgeschichte 56 (1984), 137–66. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 7 Aug. 1757, BL, Add. 35417, f. 15. P.F.Doran, Andrew Mitchell and Anglo-Prussian relations during the Seven Years War (New York, 1986); K.W.Schweizer, England, Prussia and the Seven Years War (Lewiston, 1989). Holdernesse to Mitchell, 9 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65. A.Bourguet, Le Due de Choiseul et l’alliance Espagnole (Paris, 1906). Choiseul to Ossun, envoy in Madrid, 12 May 1762, AE, CP, Espagne 532, f. 236. AE, CP, Espagne 533, f. 270–85, 290–4. Ossun to Choiseul, 3, 17 Sept. 1761, AE, CP, Espagne 533, f. 362, 436–7. J.Black, “The British Expeditionary Force to Portugal in 1762: international conflict and military problems”, British Historical Society of Portugal, Annual Report and Review 16 (1989). Z.E.Rashed, The peace of Paris 1763 (Liverpool, 1961). J.Black, “Naval power and British foreign policy in the age of Pitt the Elder”, in The British Navy and the use of naval power in the eighteenth century, J.Black & P.Woodfine (eds) (Leicester, 1988), 100–3. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 29 June 1757, PRO, SP 90/69. August Wilhelm to Valory, 29 June 1757, AE, CP, Prusse 186, f. 65. Pol Corr., xv, 218; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 2 July 1757, PRO, SP 90/69. Richard to John Tucker, 4 July 1757, Bod, MS. Don. c.112. 188

NOTES

71. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 9 July 1757, PRO, SP 90/69. 72. K.W.Schweizer, “Lord Bute, Newcastle, Prussia and the Hague overtures: a reexamination”, Albion 9 (1977), 72–97; “The non-renewal of the AngloPrussian subsidy treaty, 1761–1762: an historical revision”, Canadian Journal of History 13 (19), 382–98; “Br itain, Pr ussia, Russia and the Galitzin letter: a reassessment”, Historical Journal 26 (1983), 531–56; and “Britain, Prussia and the Prussian Territories on the Rhine 1762–1763”, Studies in History and Politics 4 (1985), 103–14. 73. The best study of the situation from 1763 is H.M.Scott, British foreign policy in the age of the American Revolution (Oxford, 1990).

Chapter Three 1. There is a valuable account of the domestic debate in R.Harris, A patriot press: national politics and the London press in the 1740s (Oxford, 1993). 2. Lodge used material in the Public Record Office, the British Library and the family archive of the Earls of Sandwich, now deposited in the National Maritime Museum. 3. C.Haase, W.Deeters, E.Pitz, Ubersicht über die Bestade des Niedersächsischen Staatsarchivs in Hannover [2 volumes] (Göttingen, 1965, 1968). 4. G.C.Gibbs, “Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Stanhope and Walpole”, EHR 77 (1962), 18–37; and “Newspapers, Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Stanhope and Walpole’, Melanges offerts à G.Jacquemyns (Brussels, 1968), 293–315; J.R.Jones, Britain and the world, 1649–1815 (1982), 203. 5. R.Pares, War and trade in the West Indies (Oxford, 1936); J.O.McLachlan, Trade and peace with Old Spain, 1667–1750 (Cambridge, 1940). 6. J.Black, “When ‘Natural Allies’ fall out: Anglo-Austrian relations 1725–1740”, Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs 36 (1983), 120–49. 7. R.Lodge, Great Britain and Prussia in the eighteenth century (Oxford, 1923). 8. U.Dann, Hannover und England 1740–1760 (Hildesheim, 1986); translated and slightly revised as Hanover and Great Britain 1740–1760 (Leicester, 1991). 9. J.Black, “Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole”, in Britain in the age of Walpole J.Black (ed.) (1984), 145–69; J.Black, British foreign policy in the age of Walpole (Edinburgh, 1985); S.Baxter, “The myth of the grand alliance in the eighteenth century”, in Anglo-Dutch cross currents, S.Baxter & P.Sellin (Los Angeles, 1976); M.Roberts, Splendid isolation, 1763–80 (Reading, 1970). 10. B.Williams, Carteret and Newcastle (Cambridge, 1943) is the best introduction. 11. Lowther to John Spedding, 20 Apr. (os) 1742, Carlisle, CRO, Lonsdale papers, D/Lons/W; Newcastle to Hardwicke [c.ll Aug. (os) 1739], BL, Add. 35406, f. 136; Dickens to Harrington, 5 Sept. 1739, PRO, SP 90/46; Waldegrave to Horatio Walpole, 7 Sept. 1739, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 27 Feb. (os) 1740, Chewton. 12. Cobbett, xi, 29, 15 Nov. (os); Waldegrave to Newcastle, 10 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 78/223, f. 267. 189

NOTES

13. W.Hoist, Carl Gustaf Tessin (Lund, 1931), 417; Hervey to Stephen Fox, 9 Sept. (os) 1740, BL, Add. 51345; Cobbett XI, 677. 14. Destouches, French envoy in London, to Dubois, French foreign minister, 15 Dec. 1718, AE, CP, Ang. 311; James Craggs, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, to Stair, 25 Jan. (os) 1720, SRO, GD. 135/141/24. 15. Weekly Miscellany (Dublin), 9 May (os) 1734; Destouches to Dubois, 9 Apr., Dubois to Destouches, 21 Apr. 1722, Chammorel, French envoy in London, to Morville, French foreign minister, 17 Feb. 1724, AE, CP, Ang. 341, sup. 7, 347; Ossorio, Sardinian envoy in London, to Charles Emmanuel, 2 Apr. 1743, AST, LM, Ing. 48. 16. Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 27 Aug. 1742, AST, LM, Ing. 48; Report by Le Ville, French envoy at The Hague, 16 Oct. 1742, Vincennes, Archives de la Guerre, Al 2970 No. 265; Stair to Trevor, 2 Nov. 1742, Aylesbury, Trevor, 32. 17. The Oracle: or, Bristol Weekly Miscellany, 24 Apr. (os) 1742. 18. Chavigny to Morville, 5 Sept., 21, 17 Nov., Morville to Chavigny, 18 Oct. 1723, Broglie to Morville, 20 July 1724, AE, CP, Ang. 346, 348; Carteret to Pentenriedter, 3 Apr. (os) 1721, HHStA, Frankreich Varia, 11. 19. AE, MD, Ang. 6, f. 108. 20. Parliamentary collections of Philip Yorke, BL, Add. 35875, f. 436; Haslang to Charles Albert, 12 May 1741, Munich, KS 17211; Carteret to Dr Wetstein, travelling tutor of his son Robert, 30 Jan. (os) 1741, BL, Add. 32416. 21. Jones, Britain and the world, 203–4; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 10 Apr. 1744, AST, LM, Ing. 50. 22. W.Mediger, “Great Britain, Hanover and the rise of Prussia”, in Studies in diplomatic history: essays in memory of D.B.Horn, R.M.Hatton & M.S. Anderson (eds) (London, 1970), 199–213. 23. Henry to Stephen Fox, 17 Aug. (os), Henry Pelham to Henry Fox, 27 Sept. (os) 1743, BL, Add. 51417, 51379; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 10 Jan. 1744, 15 Jan. 1745, AST, LM, Ing. 50; Carteret to Newcastle, 15 Oct. 1743, PRO, SP 43/32. 24. Jacobites Journal, 6 Feb. (os), 5 Oct. (os) 1748; Westminster Journal, 13 Feb. (os) 1748. 25. For the Jacobites and France, E.Cruickshanks, Political untouchables (1979); F.McLynn, France and the Jacobite rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981). 26. Robinson to Carteret, 4, 27 (quote) Aug. 1743, 6 May 1744, Carteret to Robinson, 19 Aug. 1743, 8 May (os) 1744, PRO, SP 80/160, 163. 27. York Courant, 13 Oct. (os) 1741. 28. Trevor to Carteret, 14 Feb. 1744, Harrington to Newcastle, 26 July 1745, Villiers to Harrington, 22 Feb., 1 Mar., 21 June, 2 July 1746, PRO, SP 84/ 402, 43/46, 88/68; J.Black, “The theory of the balance of power in the first half of the eighteenth century: a note on sources”, Review of International Studies 9 (1983), 55–61. 29. Haslang, 21 Mar. 1741, Munich, KS 17211. 30. Henry to Stephen Fox, 21 Nov. (os) 1745, BL, Add. 51417. 31. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 July (os) 1740, BL, Add. 35406; Harrington to Newcastle, 29 July 1745, PRO, SP 43/31; Pelham to Philip Yorke, 15 Oct. (os) 1747, BL, Add. 35424; Lady Hertford to Lord Beauchamp, 31 Jan. (os) 1743, Alnwick Castle, Alnwick papers 113, p. 166; Walpole to Trevor, 17 Sept. (os) 190

NOTES

32.

33.

34.

35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

40. 41.

42.

1743, Aylesbury, Trevor 36; Robinson to his secretary Draper, 2 Sept. 1745, BL, Add. 23821, f. 7. Cobbett, xi, 675–76; Thompson to Couraud, 8 Mar. 1741, Carteret to Newcastle, 19 May 1743, PRO, SP 78/225, 43/36; Egremont to Bute, 11 Oct. 1762, Mount Stuart 7/170; Lord Raymond to Hardwicke, 24 Dec. (os) 1744, Newcastle to Pelham, 25 Oct. 1750, BL, Add. 35587, f. 327, 35411, f. 189. Villiers to Harrington, 5 Mar. 1746, PRO 88/68; Amelot, French foreign minister, to Fénelon, French envoy at The Hague, 20 May 1743, AE, CP, Hollande 446, f. 328; E.von Wiese, Die Englische parlamentarische Opposition und ihre Stellung zur auswärtigen Politik des britischen Cabinets, 1740–1744, PhD thesis (Göttingen, 1883). N.Rogers, “Resistance to oligarchy: the City opposition to Walpole and his successors, 1725–1747”, in London in the age of reform, J.Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford, 1977), 1–29; and “The urban opposition to Whig oligarchy”, in The origins of Anglo-American radicalism, M. & J.Jacob (eds) (1984), 132–48. Justus Alt, Hesse-Cassel envoy in London, to Frederick I of Sweden, 19 Nov. 1743, Marburg 241. Cobbett, xiii, 272, 562, 564–65. Cobbett, xiii, 617; Kalm’s account of his visit to England (1892), 300; A congratulatory ode, most humbly inscribed to a certain very Great Man, on his becoming Greater (1744), 7; Matthew Decker to Morton 16 Dec. (os) 1742, NLS, GD 150/3485, Lowther to Spedding, 11, 14, 16, 18 Dec. (os) 1742, 19 Jan. (os) 1743, Carlisle, CRO, D/Lons/W. Cobbett, xiii, 618–19; Newcastle to Harrington, 14 June (os), 19 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/37. T.C.W.Blanning,” ‘That Horrid Electorate’ or ‘Ma Patrie Germanique’? George III, Hanover, and the Fürstenbund of 1785”, Historical Journal 20 (1977), 311–44; J.C.D.Clark, The dynamics of change: the crisis of the 1750s and English party systems (Cambridge, 1982); E.Gregg, Queen Anne (1980); R.M.Hatton, George I (1978); P.Mackesy, War without victory: the downfall of Pitt, 1799–1802 (Oxford, 1984); J.Black, “George II reconsidered: a consideration of George’s influence in the conduct of foreign policy, in the first years of his reign”, Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs 35 (1982), 35–56; J.B.Owen, “George II reconsidered”, in Statesmen, Scholars and Merchants, A.Whiteman, J.S.Bromley, P.G.M.Dickson (eds) (Oxford, 1973), 113–34. Walpole to Trevor, 12 July (os) 1741, Trevor, 27; Trevor to Harrington, 6 Jan. 1741, PRO, SP 84/391. Utterodt to Augustus III, 10 Jan. 1741, Dresden, 2677 III; Frederick II to Andrie, Prussian envoy in Hanover, 29 June 1745, Flemming, Saxon envoy in London, to Brühl, Saxon minister, 11 May 1745, PRO, SP 43/36, 107/61; E.O.Borkowsky, Die Englische Friedensvermittlung im Jahre 1745 (Berlin, 1884), pp. 81, 92. Hardwicke to Sophia Bentinck, 11 Aug. (os), Philip Yorke, later second Earl of Hardwicke, to wife, Marchioness Grey, 18 Aug. (os) 1744, Bedford, CRO, Lucas papers 30/4/3/1, 30/9/113/10; Cope, envoy in Hamburg, to Carteret, 20 Oct. 1744, Newcastle to Harrington 12 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 82/67, 43/ 37; Pelham to Stair, 18 Mar. (os) 1743, Pelham to Hardwicke, 8 Aug. (os) 1747, BL, Add. 35423, f. 9, 38–9. 191

NOTES

43. Flemming to Brühl, 11 May 1745, Newcastle to Harrington, 12, 26 July (os), 18 Aug. (os) 1745, PRO, SP 107/61, 43/114, 115; Lady Car penter to Marchioness Grey, 26 Sept. (os) 1745, Bedford CRO, Lucas, 30/9/24/26. 44. Robinson to Carteret, 1 Aug., Robinson to Hyndford, 1 Aug. 1744, PRO, SP 80/164. 45. Newcastle to Harrington, 21 May (os), 14, 28 June (os), 12, 26 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/37, 114; Alt to William VIII of Hesse-Cassel, 1 Aug. 1747, Marburg 245. 46. Newcastle to Harrington, 9 Aug. (os) 1745, BL, Add. 23821, f. 457, Trevor to Robinson, 31 Dec. 1745, PRO, SP 43/115; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 10 Oct. 1747, AST, LM, Ing. 53; Pelham to Hardwicke, 12 June (os), 21 Aug. (os), undated, 7 Nov. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 35423, f. 42, 55, 75, 78.

Chapter Four 1. Chesterfield to Earl Gower, Lord Privy Seal, 6 Aug. (os) 1747, PRO 30/29/ 1/ 11, f. 307. 2. Newcastle to Cumberland, 15 Nov. 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 41/143. 3. R.Middleton, The bells of victory: the Pitt-Newcastle ministry and the conduct of the Seven Years’ War, 1757–1762 (Cambridge, 1985); J.C.Riley, The Seven Years’ War and the old regime in France: the economic and financial toll (Princeton, 1986); J.Brewer, The sinews of power: war, money and the English state, 1688–1783 (1989). 4. P.F.Doran, Andrew Mitchell and Anglo-Prussian diplomatic relations during the Seven Years’ War (New York, 1986); K.W.Schweizer, England, Prussia and the Seven Years’ War (Lewiston, 1989). 5. P.Vaucher, Robert Walpole et la politique de Fleury (Paris, 1924); J.Black, Natural and necessary enemies: Anglo-French relations in the eighteenth century (London, 1986), 21–35. 6. J.Black, British foreign policy in an age of revolutions, 1783–1793 (Cambridge, 1994). 7. M.Schlenke, England und das friderizianische Preussen 1740–1763 (Freiburg, 1963). 8. S.Baxter, “The myth of the Grand Alliance”, in Anglo-Dutch cross currents in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, S.Baxter & P.R.Sellin (eds) (Los Angeles, 1976), 43–59; H.M.Scott, “The ‘True Principles of the Revolution’: the Duke of Newcastle and the idea of the Old System”, in Black, Knights Errant, 55–91. 9. G.Niedhart, Handel und Krieg in der Britischen Weltpolitik 1738–1763 (Munich, 1979); M.Mimler, Der Einfluss kolonialer Interessen in Nordamerika auf die Strategic und Diplomatic Grossbritanniens während des 18. Jahrhunderts (Hildesheim, 1983). 10. R.M.Hatton, The Anglo-Hanoverian connection 1714–1760 (1982); A.M.Birke and K.Kluxen (eds), England und Hanover (Munich, 1986), 17–51, 127–44; J.Black, “The British state and foreign policy in the Eighteenth Century”, Trivium 23 (1988) 127–48; J.Black, “Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Walpole: the case of the Hessians”, in Black, Knights Errant, 41–54. 192

NOTES

11. G.C.Gibbs, “The revolution in foreign policy”, in Britain after the Glorious Revolution, G.S.Holmes (ed.), 59–79 (1969); J.Black, “The Revolution and the Development of English Foreign Policy”, in E.Cruickshanks (ed.), By force or by default? The revolution of 1688 (Edinburgh, 1989), 135–58. 12. M.Roberts, “Great Britain and the Swedish Revolution, 1771/2”, Historical Journal 8 (1964), 146. 13. P.L.Woodfine, “The Anglo-Spanish War of 1739”, in The origins of war in early modern Europe, J.Black (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1987), 185–209. 14. Waldegrave to Newcastle, 10 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 78/223, f. 266–9; Walpole to Trevor, 29 Sept. (os) 1738, Aylesbury, Trevor 14; Newcastle to Harrington, 12 Aug. (os) 1739, BL, Add. 35406, f. 138. 15. Harrington to Thompson, 15 Oct. 1740, PRO, SP 78/226, f. 236–9. 16. H.Schilling, Der Zwist Preussens und Hannovers 1729–30 (Halle, 1912); J.Black, “Foreign inspiration of eighteenth–century British political material: an example from 1730”, Trivium 21 (1986), 137–42; J.Black, The collapse of the Anglo-French alliance, 1727–1731 (Gloucester, 1987), 141–2. 17. Mediger, “Hastenbeck und Zeven”. 18. On Anglo-Hanoverian relations in general, U.Dann, Hannover und England, 1740–1760 (Hildesheim, 1986). 19. Bussy to Amelot, 17 May 1741, AE CP, Ang. 412, f. 63. 20. J.Black, “British neutrality in the War of the Polish Succession, 1733–1735”, International History Review 8 (1986), 345–66; J.Black, “French foreign policy in the age of Fleury reassessed”, EHR 103 (1988), 359–84. 21. Cobbett, xii, 176–8. 22. Bussy to Amelot, 17 May 1741, AE, CP, Ang. 412, f. 52–61. 23. Harrington to Thompson, 3 Sept. 1741, PRO, SP 78/226, f. 123. 24. Bussy to Amelot, 1 Jan. 1742, AE, CP, Ang. 414, f. 18, 26. 25. Chammorel to Dubois, 5, 26, Apr. 1723, AE, CP, Ang. 344, f. 181–1, 234. 26. Thompson to Onslow Burrish, 22 Mar. (os) 1742, PRO, SP 110/6. 27. Bussy to Amelot, 19 Feb. 1742, AE, CP, Ang. 414, f. 141; Bussy memorandum, 1745, AE, MD, Ang. 40, f. 107. 28. Givry, agent at Dunkirk, to Maurepas, naval minister, 28 Feb. 1742, Paris, AN, Archives de la Marine B3 406, f. 21; Bussy to Amelot, 1 Mar. 1742, AE, CP, Ang. 414, f 163. This despatch, like many of the period, was intercepted by the British, PRO, SP 107/53. 29. Amelot to Bishop of Rennes, 27 Mar. 1742, AE, CP, Espagne 470, f. 183. 30. Thomas to George Anson, 30 Nov. (os) 1743, BL, Add. 15955, f. 29; Carteret to Stair, 4 May (os) 1742, PRO, SP 87/8, f. 107. 31. Stair to Earl of Nottingham, 27 June 1741, Leicester, CRO, Finch MSS DG/ 7/4952; Stair to Robinson, 30 May 1742, BL, Add. 23810, f. 492; Holdernesse to Burrish, 18 Mar. 1757, PRO, SP 81/106. 32. J.Black, “Jacobitism and Br itish Foreign Policy, 1731–5”, in The Jacobite challenge, J.Black & E.Cruikshanks (eds) (Edinburgh, 1989), 142–40. 33. J.Black, “Parliament and the political and diplomatic crisis of 1717–18”, Parliamentary History 3 (1984), 77–101. 34. J.Black, “When natural allies fall out: Anglo-Austrian relations 1725–1740”, Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 36 (1983), 120–49; J.Black, “AngloAustrian relations, 1725–1740: a study in failure”, British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 12 (1989), 29–45. 193

NOTES

35. Bussy, memorandum, AE, MD, Ang. 8, f. 272–6, 40, f. 107–14; Thompson to Newcastle, 14 July 1742, PRO, SP 78/227, f. 276–82. 36. Thompson to Harrington, 26 Sept. 1741, PRO, SP 78/226, f. 169–71; Stair to Robinson, 30 May 1742, BL, Add. 23810, f. 492; Bussy to Amelot, 14 June 1742, AE, CP, Ang. 415, f. 24. 37. Amelot to Fénelon, 25 June, Fénelon to Louis XV, 28 June 1742, AE, CP, Hollande 443, f. 69, 102. 38. Drummond to Burrish, 21 June (os) 1742, PRO, SP 110/6; George Harbin to Thomas Carew MP, 28 Aug. (os) 1742, Taunton, Somerset CRO, TrollopBellew Papers DD/TB FT 18. 39. Walpole to Trevor, 22 Oct. (os) 1742, Aylesbury, Trevor 36; Finkenstein, Prussian envoy in Hanover, to Frederick II, 30 Oct. 1743, PRO, SP 43/32; Cobbett, xiii, 123, 125. 40. Material on Austro-French negotiations can be found in R.Butler, Choiseul (Oxford 1980), i, 327–683 passim. 41. J.Colin, Louis XV et les Jacobites: le projet de débarquement en Angleterre 1743–44 (Paris, 1901); F.McLynn, France and the Jacobite rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981); J.Black, Culloden and the ’45 (Stroud, 1990), 56–9. 42. Anon, memorandum, May 1745, AE, MD, Ang. 40, f. 122; for Hanoverian fears, Grote to Hyndford, 16 Apr. 1745, NSTA, Calenberg Brief Archiv 24 Nr. 6617, f. 44. 43. Chesterfield to Trevor, 6 July (os) 1745, Aylesbury, Trevor 49; Newcastle to Harrington, 12 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/414. 44. Harrington to Newcastle, 4, 29 July 1745, BL, Add. 32704, 419, 510; Papiers Raisonne to Har rington, 6, 8 July 1745, PRO, SP 43/36; Newcastle to Harrington, 12 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/114. 45. Newcastle to Harrington, 19 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/114. 46. R.Lodge, Studies in eighteenth-century diplomacy 1740–1748 (1930). 47. Stone to Weston, 2 Aug. (os) 1745, Farmington, Weston Papers, vol. 16. 48. Philip to Joseph Yorke, 1 Aug. (os) 1745, BL, Add. 35363, f. 91; John Sharpe, “Proposals for reducing Cape Breton and Canada”, received 7 Nov. (os) 1740, BL, Add. 33028, f. 374–5. 49. Old England, 3 Aug. (os) 1745. 50. Newcastle to Harrington, 9 Aug. (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/115. 51. Stair to Earl of Loudoun, 10 Aug. (os) 1745, HL, Loudoun papers 7609. 52. G.S.Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: the maritime struggle for North America (Toronto, 1950), 132–5; President of Council of Marine to Roland-Michel Barrin de La Galissonière, Governor of Canada, 21 July 1747, AN, Colonies B 85. 53. A.H.Buffington, “The Canada expedition of 1746: its relation to British politics”, American Historical Review 45, 1940; The Monosyllable IF, (1748) Oxford, Bod. Firth c8 (61). 54. J.Black, “The British navy and British foreign policy in the first half of the eighteenth century”, in Studies in European history in honour of Ragnhild Hatton, J.Black & K.W.Schweizer (eds), (Lennoxville, 1985), 137–55; “Naval power and British foreign policy in the age of Pitt the Elder”, in J.Black and P.L.Woodfme (eds), British Navy, 91–107; “British naval power and international commitments: political and strategic problems, 1688–1770”, in Parameters of British naval power 1650–1850, M.Duffy (ed.), (Exeter, 1992) 39–59. 194

NOTES

55. K.Wilson, “Empire, trade and popular politics in mid—Hanoverian Britain: the case of Admiral Vernon”, Past and Present 121 (1988), 74–109; M.Peters, Pitt and popularity: the patriot minister and London opinion during the Seven Years’ War (Oxford, 1980). 56. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 9 Dec. 1751, AST, LM, Ing. 56; Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 18 Aug. 1751, AE, CP, Ang. 432, f. 128. 57. Joseph Yorke to Hardwicke, 8, 22 Mar., 5 Apr. 1749, BL, Add. 35355, f. 22, 27, 34; Yorke to Bedford, 29 Mar., Yorke to Keith, 31 Mar., Joseph to brother Philip Yorke, 16 Mar. 1749, BL, Add. 32816, f. 261, 35465, f. 154–5, 35363, f. 232. 58. J.R.Danielson, Die Nordische Frage in den Jahren 1746–1751 (Helsinki, 1888); Puysieulx to Durand, envoy in London, 14 Mar. 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 425, f. 406. 59. R.N.Middleton, “French policy and Prussia after the Peace of Aix-laChapelle, 1749–1753”; R.Lodge, “The mission of Henry Legge to Berlin”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 14 (1931), 1–38. 60. Richelieu to Puysieulx, 8 July 1748, AN, KK 1372; a highly intelligent account is offered by K.W.Schweizer, “The Seven Years’ War: a system perspective”, in Black, Origins of War, 242–60. 61. R.Browning, “The Duke of Newcastle and the Imperial Election Plan, 1749– 1754”, Journal of British Studies 1 (1967), 28–47. 62. Newcastle to Cumberland, 22 Oct. 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 40/166. 63. Pelham to Cumberland, 12 July (os) 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 37/157. 64. Newcastle to Earl of Sandwich, Plenipotentiary at Aix-la-Chapelle, 10, 11 July, Sandwich to Newcastle, 14 July 1748, PRO, SP 43/48, f. 155, 209, 84/434, f. 321. 65. Pelham to Gower, 9 Aug. (os) 1748, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 311; Sandwich to Newcastle, 11 Aug. 1748, PRO, SP 84/435, f. 229. 66. Newcastle to Cumberland, 23 July 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 37/162. 67. Sandwich to Keith, 26 Sept. 1748, BL, Add. 35464, f. 55; Jacobite’s Journal, 6 Feb. (os) 1748. 68. Newcastle to Cumberland, 29 Oct. 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 40/149; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 14 July 1752, BL, Add. 35410, f. 253; Münchhausen to Austrian minister, Count Kevenhüller, 23 Mar. 1749, NSTA, Cal. Br. 24 Nr. 1740, f. 96. 69. Puysieulx to Marquis de Valory, envoy in Hanover, 2 July 1750, AE, CP, Brunswick-Hanover 50, f. 223. 70. J.R.Dull, A diplomatic history of the American Revolution (New Haven, 1985), 28. 71. Valory to Puysieulx, 5 June 1750, AE, CP., Brunswick-Hanovre 50, f. 209. 72. Sbornik imperatorskago Russkago istorischkago obshchestvo [148 volumes] (St Petersburg, 1867–1916), CXLVIII, 223. 73. This period is not really considered in R.M.Hatton’s interesting “Frederick the Great and the House of Hanover”, in Friederich der Grosse in seiner Zeit, O.Hauser (ed.) (Cologne, 1987), 151–64. 74. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 26 July 1752, PRO 36/119, f. 138–9, 143. 75. Puysieulx to Valory, 13 July, 10 Aug., 12 Sept., Valory to Puysieulx, 19 Sept. 1750, AE, CP, Brunswick-Hanovre 50, f. 240–1, 256, 290–1, 299; AE, CP, Ang. 430 passim. 76. Newcastle to Sandwich, 29 Mar. (os) 1748, John, 4th Duke of Bedford, 195

NOTES

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

85. 86.

87. 88. 89. 90.

91. 92.

93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

Secretary of State for the Southern Department, to Joseph Yorke, 23 Mar. (os), 4 Apr. (os) 1749, BL, Add. 32811, f. 434, 32816, f. 276–8, 325–6; Durand, envoy in London, to Puysieulx, 13 July 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 15; Joseph to Philip Yorke, 25 July 1750, BL, Add. 35363, f. 275; Per ron to Charles Emmanuel, 28 Oct. 1751, AST. LM. Ing. 56. Newcastle to Gower, 15 July 1750, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 320. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 19 Aug. 1750, BL, Add. 35363, f. 277. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 19 Sept. 1750, BL, Add. 35411, f. 51–2. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 26 Sept. 1750, BL, Add. 35363, f. 279. Puysieulx to Durand, 29 Sept. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 192. Puysieulx to Mirepoix, 12 Dec. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 310–11, 315; Bussy, Réflexions, 19 Mar. 1751, AE, MD, Ang. 51, f.145. Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 17 Dec. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 324–5, 334, 336–41. Newcastle to Joseph Yorke, 26 June 1753, PRO, SP 84/463; T.C.Pease (ed.), Anglo-French boundary disputes in the west, 1749–1763 (Springfield, Illinois, 1936); K.P.Bailey, The Ohio Company of Virginia and the westward movement, 1748–1792 (Glendale, California, 1939); M.Savelle, The diplomatic history of the Canadian boundary, 1749–1763 (New Haven, 1940); D.S.Graham, British intervention in defence of the American colonies, 1748–56, PhD thesis (London, 1969); J.E.Stagg, Protection and survival; Anglo-Indian relations, 1748–63, PhD thesis (Cambridge, 1984); Reese, Europäische Hegemonie und France d’outremer, 249–73. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 4 Sept. 1752, BL, Add. 35363, f. 308. Newcastle to William, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Ambassador in Paris, 18, 29 Oct., Albemarle to Newcastle, 25 Oct. 1752, PRO, SP 78/245, f. 160, 170, 175; Newcastle to Joseph Yorke, 12 Jan., 6 Mar. 1753, PRO, SP 84/ 462; Saint— Contest, French foreign minister, to La Touche, envoy in Berlin, 23 Mar., 19 Apr. 1753, AE, CP, Prusse 171, f. 188, 225. Newcastle to Yorke, 13 Feb. 1753, PRO, SP 84/462. Newcastle to Yorke, 6 Mar., Yorke to Newcastle, 10, 13, 17 Apr. 1753, PRO, SP 84/462; Joseph to Philip Yorke, 10 Apr. 1753, BL, Add. 35363, f. 326. Newcastle to Keith, 30 Mar. 1753, PRO, SP 80/191. Yorke to Newcastle, 11, 22 May, 3, 22 June, Newcastle to Yorke, 1 June 1753, PRO, SP 84/463; Whitehall Evening Post, 14 June 1753; Joseph to Philip Yorke, 3 July 1753, BL, Add. 35363, f. 332; Protester, 14 July 1753; Mirepoix to St Contest, 1 Feb. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 49. Newcastle to Yorke, 17 Apr. 1753, PRO, SP 84/463. D.B.Horn, “The cabinet controversy on subsidy treaties in time of peace, 1749–50”, EHR 45 (1930), 463–6; R.Browning, The Duke of Newcastle (New Haven, 1975), 159–80; Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 23 Aug. 1753, AST, LM, Ing. 57. Mirepoix to St Contest, 10 Jan. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 17–18. Mirepoix to St Contest, 25 Jan., St Contest to Mirepoix, 25 Jan. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f 32–3, 35. Mirepoix to St Contest, 7, 14, 25 Mar. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 76, 85, 109. Mirepoix to St Contest, 25 Apr. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 97, 109. Mirepoix to St Contest, 23 Apr. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 181. Mirepoix to St Contest, 6, 11 June, St Contest to Mirepoix, 14 June 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 220–1, 226, 228–9. 196

NOTES

99. Walpole to Dinwiddie, 15 July 1754, HL, HM 9406. 100. St Contest to Boutel, French agent in charge in Mirepoix’s absence, 9 Sept., 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 296–7. 101. Clayton, “Duke of Newcastle”, 592–403; Halifax to Newcastle, 6 Mar. (os) 1751, BL, Add. 32724, f. 165–8. 102. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 10 Oct. 1754, AST, LM, Ing. 58; Haslang, Bavarian envoy, to Preysing, Bavarian foreign minister, 11 Oct. 1754, Munich, Bayr. London 229; Boutel to Rouillé, 24 Oct. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 355–6. 103. Clark, The dynamics of change, 104; Elliot to his father, the Earl of Minto, 16 Nov. 1754, NLS, MS 11001, f. 10. 104. Clayton, “Duke of Newcastle”, 593; D.S.Graham, “The planning of the Beauséjour operation and the approaches to war in 1755”, New England Quarterly 41 (1968), 551–66. 105. Old England, 6 Oct (os), 3 Nov. (os) 1750. 106. Old England, 6 Oct (os), 3 Nov. (os) 1750; Newcastle Courant, 13 Oct. (os) 1750; R.Rolt, The conduct of the several powers of Europe [4 volumes] (1749– 50), IV, 635. 107. AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 203. 108. Aubeterre to St Contest, 2 Mar. 1754, AE, CP, Autriche 253, f. 48–9. 109. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 26 Nov. 1754, BL, Add. 35364, f. 17; Haslang to Preysing, 11 Oct. 1754, Bayr. London 229. 110. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 5 Dec. 1754, AST, LM, Ing. 58; Rouillé to Boutel, 6 Dec., Boutel to Rouillé, 19 Dec. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 399, 416–17. 111. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 16 Jan. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 15–21; Old England, 24 Feb. (os) 1750. 112. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 16 Jan. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 21–2; Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 23 Jan. 1755, AST, LM, Ing. 59. 113. Rouillé to Bonnac, 16 Jan. 1755, AE, CP, Hollande 488, f. 19; Mirepoix to Rouillé, 16, 23, 30 Jan. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 27–8, 42, 54; Robinson to Keene, 27 Jan. 1755, Leeds, Vyner 11834. 114. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 3 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 76–80. 115. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 10 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 116, 120. 116. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 19 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 152–3, 163–87. 117. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 28 Feb., Rouillé to Mirepoix, 5 Mar. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 238, 247–50. 118. Rouillé to Duras, 25 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Espagne 517, f. 153–5; Bonnac to Rouillé, 25 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Hollande 488, f. 122–3; Yorke to Holdernesse, 25 Feb. 1755, PRO, SP 84/468. 119. President of the Council of Marine to Marquis de Duquesne, governor of Canada, 17 Feb. 1755, AN, Colonies B 101; Mirepoix to Rouillé, 10, 13 Mar. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 273, 279. 120. Robinson to Keene, 11 Mar. 1755, Leeds, Vyner, 11835. 121. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 17 Mar. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 280–2. 122. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 20 Mar. 1755, AST, LM, Ang. 59; Bonnac to Rouillé, 21, 27 Mar. 1755, AE, CP, Hollande 488, f. 147, 158. 123. Memoranda of conferences on 22, 23 Mar., Rouillé to Mirepoix, 27 Mar., 197

NOTES

124. 125.

126.

127. 128. 129. 130.

131. 132. 133.

British note to Mirepoix, 5 Apr. Leeds, Vyner 5725, 5727, 5728, Mirepoix to Rouillé, 28 Mar., 1, 5, 6, 10, 16, 25 Apr., 6, 10, 15 May, Rouillé to Mirepoix, 3, 13, 24 Apr., 9, 24 May 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 339–40, 342, 344, 357, 359, 362–6, 385–6, 406–7, 440–48; 439, f. 6–11, 66–71, 76–9; 438, f. 351, 357, 359, 362–6, 385–6, 406–7, 440–48; 439, f. 6–11, 66–71, 76–9; 438, f. 351, 396, 401, 426–7; 439, f. 47–51, 96–7. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 2 May 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 15. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 5, 10 May 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 25, 71–2; Boscawen to John Cleveland, Secretary to the Admiralty, 21 Apr. 1755, PRO, ADM 1/481; Rouillé to Bonnac, 18 May 1755, AE, CP 488, f. 263. Newcastle to Lord Hartington, later 4th Duke of Devonshire, 17 May 1755, HP, Chatsworth Transcripts; Robinson to Keene, 16 June 1755, Leeds, Vyner, 11840. Holdernesse to Keith, 20, 31 May 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 3–5, 39. Robinson to Keene, 16 June 1755, Leeds, Vyner, 11840. Rouillé to Bonnac, 29 June 1755, Paris, AN, KK 1401, p. 534. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 16 July 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 252; Robinson to Holdernesse, 18 July 1755, BL, Add. 35480, f. 78–9; Rouillé to Bonnac, 20 July 1755, Paris, AN, KK 1401, pp. 572–3; Holdernesse to Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams, envoy in Russia, 24 July 1755, Newport, South Wales, Public Library, Hanbury-Williams Papers; Holdernesse to Keith, 26 July 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 137–9; Bussy to Rouillé, 29 July 1755, AE, CP, Brunswick-Hanovre 52, f. 18–25. On the likelihood of peace before spring, Lord Cathcart to the Earl of Loudoun, 13 Sept. 1755, HL, Loudoun Papers 7087. Scott, “True Principles”, 72–4; but see J.Black, Eighteenth century Europe, 1700–89 (1990), 292–3. Rouillé to Aubeterre, 17 July 1755, AE, CP, Autriche 254, f. 226; Anon., The Crisis (1756), 44. In 1756 Holdernesse tried to argue that it was not in Russia’s interest to acquire more land or people as she already had sufficient, Holdernesse to Keith, 21 June 1756, PRO, SP 80/197, f. 179.

Chapter Five 1. Thomas Villiers, envoy in Dresden, to Trevor, 20 Dec. 1739, Aylesbury, Trevor 20; Guy Dickens, envoy in Berlin, to Harrington, 6 Dec. 1740, PRO, SP 90/ 48; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, 9 Jan., 6 Feb., 3 Apr. 1741, AST, LM, Ing. 47; State of army, Apr. 1742, AE, CP, Br-Han. 49, f. 283. 2. Carteret to Wych, 18 Sept. (os) 1742, PRO, SP, 91/32; Fawkener to Robinson, 7 Nov. 1747, Hanbury-Williams to Robinson, 17 Nov. 1747, BL, Add. 23816. 3. Hatton, Anglo-Hanoverian connection, 3; I.B.Campbell, The international legal relations between Great Br itain and Hanover, 1714–1837, PhD thesis (Cambridge, 1966). On George II, see, recently, A.Newman, The world turned inside out: new views on George II (Leicester, 1988). 4. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 5 Jan. (os) 1750, PRO, SP 84/454. 198

NOTES

5. Black, British foreign policy in an age of revolutions, 89–93. For marital diplomacy see, for example, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 17 Sept. 1758, BL, Add. 35418, f. 24; Walter Titley, envoy in Copenhagen, to Bute, 10 Apr. 1762, PRO, SP 75/ 114, f. 122. 6. Newcastle to Hanbur y-Williams, 5 Feb. (os) 1751, PRO, SP 88/71; Holdernesse to Mitchell, 10 Oct. 1757, PRO, SP 90/70. 7. Amelot to Bussy, 5 Jan., Valory to Bussy, 13 Jan. 1742, PRO, SP 107/52; Fénélon to Amelot, 26 Apr. 1743, AE, CP, Hollande 446; Pol. Corr., IV, 324. 8. G.C.Gibbs, “Britain and the Alliance of Hanover, April 1725–February 1726”, EHR 73 (1968), 428; R.M.Hatton, “New light on George I”, in England’s rise to greatness 1660–1763, S.Baxter (ed.) (Berkeley, 1983), 239; R.M.Hatton, Anglo-Hanoverian connection, 12. 9. Harrington to Newcastle, 2 Aug. 1741, PRO, SP 43/101. 10. J.Ralph, Critical history of the administration of Sir Robert Walpole (1743). 11. Haslang to Charles Albert of Bavaria, 12 May 1741, Munich KS 17211. 12. Harrington to Trevor, 26 Dec. (os) 1740, PRO, SP 84/388, f. 180; Cobbett, xii, 157. 13. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 15 Jan. 1750, AST, LM, Ing. 56. For George’s interest in foreign news, Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 28 Mar. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 428, f. 243. 14. D.B.Horn underestimates the role of Hanoverian diplomats in The British Diplomatic Service 1689–1789 (Oxford, 1961), 11; Robinson to Trevor, 20 May 1739, Farmington, Weston 12; Robinson to Edward Weston, 18 Jan. 1741, PRO, SP 80/144; Hyndford to Harrington, 4 Oct. 1741, PRO, SP 90/52, f. 156; Törring, Bavarian envoy to Frederick, to his father Count Törring, Bavarian minister, 13 Sept. 1741, Munich, Bayr. Ges. Berlin 9. 15. Hardenberg to George II, 17 Apr., 7 May 1742, NSTA, Cal. BR. 24 NR. 2006, f. 51, 58; Bussy to Amelot, 13 Aug. 1742, PRO, SP 107/54. 16. Haslang to Charles Albert, 7 Apr. 1741, Munich, KS 17211. 17. Walpole to Trevor, 19 Dec. (os) 1740, Aylesbury, Trevor 24; Mediger, Moskaus Weg nach Europa, (Brunswick, 1952) 386–8; Blondel, French envoy at the Imperial election, to Bussy, 3 Jan.; Wasenberg, Swedish envoy in London, to Gyllenborg, Swedish Chancery President, 2 Feb. 1742, PRO, SP 107/52. 18. R.Przezdziecki, Diplomatic ventures and adventures: some experiences of British envoys at the court of Poland (1953), 184. 19. Steinberg to Newcastle, 17 Dec. 1748, BL, Add. 32815, f. 279. 20. Hanbury-Williams to Robinson, 20 Oct., 17 Nov. 1747, BL, Add. 23826, f. 113, 188. 21. Sandwich to Newcastle, 22 Dec. 1747, BL, Add. 32810, f. 324. 22. Chesterfield to Sandwich, 17 Feb. (os) 1747, BL, Add. 32807, f. 127; Farmington, Horace Walpole’s Commonplace Book. 23. Newcastle to Sandwich, 5 Apr. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 32812, f. 19. 24. Legge to Newcastle, 24 Apr., Newcastle to Sandwich, 13 July (os) 1748, BL, Add. 32812, f. 41, 32813, f. 5–7; Pelham to Gower, 18 Aug. (os) 1748, PRO. 30/29/1/11, f. 313. 25. Walpole to Mann, 23 Mar. (os) 1749, Walpole-Mann, IV, 39. 26. Earl of Ilchester (ed.), Lord Hervey and his friends (1950), 207. 27. Newcastle to Villettes, 3 Dec. (os) 1741, PRO, SP 92/44. 199

NOTES

28. PRO, SP, series 32, 44. 29. Manuscript newsletter, 17 Apr. 1741, AST, LM, Ing. 47. 30. S.Baxter, “The conduct of the Seven Years War”, in Baxter, England’s rise to greatness 323–4. 31. P.Kennedy, “A.J.P.Taylor and ‘profound forces’ in history”, in Warfare, diplomacy and politics, C.Wrigley (ed.) (1986), 25. 32. Wych to Carteret, 14 June, Carteret to Wych, 16 July (os) 1742, PRO, SP 917 31. 33. Pol. Corr., II, 445 n.l; Andrew Stone, Under Secretary, to Harrington, 22 Aug. (os) 1740, PRO, SP 43/98; Keene to Bedford, 30 June 1749, PRO, SP 947 135, f. 303. 34. Fagel, Dutch foreign minister, to Hop, envoy in London, 7 May 1743, PRO, SP 107/58. 35. Haslang to Charles VII, 26 Mar. 1743, Munich, Bayr. London 208. 36. Amelot to Bussy, 23 Feb. 1743, PRO, SP 107/55. 37. Pol. Corr., ix, 251. 38. Townshend to Samuel Buckley, 16 Sept. (os) [1730–38], Bod. MS. Eng. Lett, c. 144, f 267; George Quarme to Marquess of Rockingham, 18 Oct. 1757, WW RI-III. 39. Newcastle to Sandwich, 22 Jan. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 32811, f. 102. 40. Memorials of…James Oswald (Edinburgh, 1825), xi. 41. W.S.Lewis (ed.), The Yale edition of Horace Walpole’s correspondence [48 volumes] (New Haven, 1937–83), xx, 239; W.Macdonald (ed.), Select works of John Douglas (Salisbury, 1820), 56; Henry to Stephen Fox, 27 Dec. (os) 1744, BL, Add. 51417, f. 132. 42. Cobbett, xiii, 265. 43. Horatio Walpole to Trevor, 7 July (os) 1738, Aylesbury, Trevor 13; Hanoverian government to von Lenthe, envoy in Vienna, 16, 26 Apr., 10 May, George II to Hanoverian government, 2, 9 June, Hanoverian government to Lenthe, 4 June, George II to Hanoverian government, 14 July (os) 1739, NSTA, Cal. Br. 11 El No.410a, f. 80–81, 87–8, 94–100, 107, 117–19, 145–6. 44. Harrington to Trevor, 5 Jan. (os), Trevor to Harrington, 3 Feb. 1739, PRO, SP 84/378, f. 40, 117; Remarques prealables sur 1’affaire de Steinhorst, no date, AE, CP, Br. Han. 49, f. 30–40. 45. Edward Finch, envoy in Stockholm, to Titley, 23 Feb. 1739, BL, Eg. 2685, f. 244. 46. Frederick William I to Karl of Brunswick—Wölfenbuttel, 13 Jan. 1739, Wölfenbuttel, Staatsarchiv, 1 At 22 Nr. 610, f. 200; Robinson to Harrington, 25 Feb. 1739, PRO, SP 80/133. 47. NSTA, Cal. Br. 24 Nr. 1475, 1477. 48. York Courant 6 Feb. (os) 1739. 49. Stolberg to Christian VI, 9 Jan. 1740, HMC, Weston-Underwood, 436. 50. Newcastle to Har r ington, 24 June (os) 1740, BL, Add. 32693, f. 411; Harrington to Newcastle, 22 July 1740, PRO, SP 43/91. 51. Newcastle to Dickens, 3 June (os) 1740, PRO, SP 36/51, f. 10; Newcastle to Harrington, 24 June (os), Harrington to Newcastle, 29 June 1740, PRO, SP 43/90; Pelham to Newcastle, 27 June (os) 1740, BL, Add. 32693, f. 417; F.Frensdorff (ed.), “G.A. von Münchhausen’s Berichte über seine Mission 200

NOTES

52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57. 58 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

65. 66. 67. 68.

69. 70.

nach Berlin im Juni 1740”, Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen new series 8 (1904), 3–87. Harrington to Newcastle, 13 July 1740, BL, Add. 32693, f. 436; Finch to Harrington, 12 Nov. 1740, PRO, SP 91/26; Newcastle Journal 4 Oct. (os) 1740. Dann, Hannover und England, 26. Owen, “George II reconsidered”, 123. Harrington to Newcastle, 27 July, Newcastle to Harrington, 29 July (os), 12 Aug. (os), Harrington to Newcastle, 21 Aug., 11 Sept. 1740, PRO, SP 437 91, 92, 93; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 27 July (os) 1740, Hardwicke, 1, 243. Dickens to Harrington, 17 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 90/48. Newcastle to Harrington, 12, 29 Aug. (os), Harrington to Newcastle, 14 Aug., 4 Sept. 1740, PRO, SP 43/92–3. Harrington to Newcastle, 18 Sept. 1740, PRO, SP 43/93. Finch to Harrington, 6, 16 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 91/24. Harrington to Finch, 25 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 91/24. Newcastle to Harrington, 11 Sept. (os),—Sept. (os) 1740, PRO, SP 43/94, 36/ 52, f. 145. Dann, Hannover und England, 27. Harrington to Dickens, 31 Oct. (os) 1740, PRO, SP 90/48. Walpole to Pelham, 25 July (os), 3, 12 Aug. (os), Walpole to Cumberland, 26 Aug. (os) 1747, NeC 485–8; Walpole to Cumberland, 18 Dec. (os) 1747, RA, Cumb. P. 30/146; Walpole to Newcastle, 28 Dec. (os) 1747, BL, Add. 9147, f. 13–17. R.R.Sedgwick (ed.), Letters from George III to Lord Bute 1756–1766 (1939), 28–9, 78–9. Marquess of Rockingham to Sir George Saville, 30 Oct. 1760, Bod. MS. Eng. Lett. c. 144, f. 284. J.Black, “The crown, Hanover and the shift in British foreign policy in the 1760s”, in Black Knights Errant, 113–34. Haslang to Baron Wachtendonck, Palatine foreign minister, 10, 31 Mar., 28 July 1761, Munich, Bayr. Ges. London 238; draft to Yorke, 9 Apr. 1761, Farmington, Weston, 23; Bussy to Choiseul, 11 June 1761, AE, CP, Ang. 443, f. 176; George Grenville, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, to Mitchell, 31 Aug. 1762, HL, STG Box 16(7). Viry to Charles Emmanuel, 23 Oct. 1761, AST, LM, Ing. 66; Newcastle to Rockingham, 19 Nov. 1761, WW Rl–22. Pol Corr., x, 149–50, ix, 235; Joseph to Philip Yorke, 14 Dec. 1753, BL, Add. 35363, f. 341.

Chapter Six 1. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 10 Dec. 1754, BL, Add. 35364, f. 23; Holdernesse to Newcastle, 8 July 1749, PRO, SP 84/449, f. 68; Holdernesse to Burrish, 1 Oct. 1754, PRO, SP 81/104; Newcastle to Cumberland, 15 Mar. (os) 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 32/303; Newcastle Courant, 23 Jan. (os) 1748; Worcester Journal, 31 Aug. 201

NOTES

2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

(os) 1749; Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 22 Sept. 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 427, f. 86; London Evening Post, 23 Oct. (os) 1750; Old England, 8 Feb. (os) 1752; Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 21 Nov. 1754, AST, LM, Ing. 58. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 Apr. 1758, BL, Add. 32879, f. 27–8; D’Artagnan report on visit to Britain, 7 Aug. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 72. Drummond to Burrish, 19 Feb. (os) 1742, PRO, SP 110/6. Trevor to Burrish, 1 June (os) 1746, PRO, SP 110/6. Reporting conversation with Steinberg on need to win public support for foreign subsidies, Lascaris, Sardinian envoy in Hanover, to Sardinian Foreign Minister, 15 June 1752, AST, LM, Ing. 57. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 24 Nov., Holdernesse to Burrish, 2 Dec. 1757, PRO, SP 90/67, 110/6; Fox to Shelburne, 4 Oct. 1762, BL Bowood, 15 f. 107; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Nov. 1761, BL, Add. 32931, f. 47. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 12 June 1751, BL, Add. 35363, f. 283; Bute, speech, 5 Feb. 1762, PRO 30/8/75; Newcastle to William Bentinck, 21 Mar. (os) 1749, BL, Add. 32816, f. 272. Waldegrave to Keene, 22 June 1739, BL, Add. 32801, f. 59. Jacobite MP. John Campbell MP to Pryse Campbell, 15 Nov. (os) 1739, Carmarthen, Dyfed Archive Service, Cawdor Muniments, Box 138 (hereafter Cawdor); Cobbett, xi, 12. John to Pryse Campbell, 17 Nov. (os) 1739, Cawdor; Charles Coles to Pleydell Courteen, 23 Nov. (os) 1739, Swansea, University Library, Mackworth Papers, 548. Herbert Mackworth to Courteen, 7 Jan. (os) 1740, Swansea, Mackworth, 1301; John Couraud, Under Secretary in the Souther n Department, to Waldegrave, 14 Jan. (os) 1740, Chewton; Bishop of Chester to his son, 19 Jan. (os) 1740, HMC, Hare MSS., 254. Walpole to Trevor, 29 Jan. (os) 1740, Aylesbury, Trevor vol. 20. Champion, London newspaper, 19 Feb. (os) 1740. Pulteney, Walpole, 21 Feb. (os) 1740, Cobbett, xi, 494, 497–9, 501, 503; John to Pryse Campbell, 21 Feb. (os) 1740, Cawdor. Cobbett, xii, 177, 175–6, 181, 178–9. M.Peter s, “Pitt as a foil to Bute: the public debate over minister ial responsibility and the powers of the Crown”, in K.W.Schweizer (ed.), Lord Bute: essays in re-interpretation (Leicester, 1988), 111. John to Richard Tucker, 18 Nov. (os) 1742, Bod. MS. Don. c. 105, f. 154–5; John to Pryse Campbell, 18 Nov. (os) 1742, Cawdor. For a similar argument in 1757, Con-Test, 6 Aug. John to Pryse Campbell, 9 Dec. (os) 1742, Cawdor. Walpole to Trevor, 28 Feb. (os) 1744, Aylesbury, Trevor 37. J.B.Owen, The rise of the Pelhams (London, 1957). Haslang to Seinsheim, 4 Feb. 1744, Munich, Bayr. Ges., London 211. L.J.Colley, In defiance of oligarchy: the Tory Party 1714–1760 (Cambridge, 1982), 244; Chesterfield to Gower, 13 Apr. (os) 1745, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 290–1. A.W.Massie, Great Britain and the defence of the Low Countries, 1744–748, DPhil. thesis (Oxford, 1988), 178; John to Richard Tucker, 6 Dec. (os) 1746, Bod. MS. Don. C. 109, f. 43. 202

NOTES

24. D.Szechi, Jacobitism and Tory politics, 1710–14 (Edinburgh, 1984); E.Gregg, The Protestant succession in international politics (New York, 1986). 25. Newcastle to Cumberland, 17 Mar. (os) 1747, RA, Cumb. P. 20/415. 26. Newcastle to Cumberland, 25 Nov. 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 41/328; Cobbett, xiv, 333; Potter to Robinson, 24 Oct. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 23830, f. 98. 27. Pelham to Gower, 18 Aug. (os) 1748, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 313. 28. Pelham to Gower, 9 Aug. (os) 1748, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 311. 29. Thomas Harris to James Harris, 3 Dec. 1748, Winchester, Hampshire CRO. 9M73 G 310/24; Cobbett, xiv, 338. 30. Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 6 Jan. 1749, AST, LM, Ing. 55. 31. Giovanni Zamboni, Hesse—Darmstadt agent in London, to Ludwig VIII of Hesse-Darmstadt, 6 Dec. 1748, 4 Mar. 1749, Darmstadt, Staatsarchiv, El M10/ 6; Alt to William VIII, 7 Jan. 1749, Marburg 250; Abbé de La Ville, mémoire, 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 427, f. 411. 32. Zamboni to Ludwig VIII, 21 Jan. 1749, Darmstadt, El M10/6. 33. Puysieulx to Durand, 11 Apr. 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 426, f. 32–4. This instruction is of some consequence because it contrasts with the stress on diplomatic issues in the instruction to Durand pr inted by Vaucher in his Recueil des instructions, iii, 324–30. 34. Cumberland to Joseph Yorke, 10 Ap. (os) 1749, RA, Cumb. P. 43/191. 35. Durand to Puysieulx, 15 May 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 426, f. 125. 36. Haslang to Preysing, Bavarian foreign minister, 25 Feb. 1750, Munich, Bayr. Ges., London 224; Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 12 Mar. 1750, AST, LM, Ing. 56. 37. Dodington to Francis Dashwood, no date, Bod. D.D.Dashwood (Bucks) B/ 11/1/12. On weakness of the opposition, Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 10 Jan. 1751, AE, CP, Ang. 431, f. 32. 38. Cobbett, xiv, 694. 39. Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 13 Mar. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 428, f. 202. 40. Granville to Marquis of Tweeddale, 11 Jan. (os) 1750, NLS, MS. 14420, f. 128. 41. J.Black, “Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Walpole: the case of the Hessians”, in Black, Knights Errant, 41–54. 42. Horace Walpole, Memoirs of King George II, ed. Brooke [3 volumes] (New Haven, 1985) 1, 33–4; Cobbett, xiv, 930–70; BL, Add, 32724, f. 129–34; Haslang to Preysing, 8 Mar. 1751, Munich, KS 225. 43. Walpole, Memoirs of George II, i, 166–7; Newcastle to Hanbury Williams, envoy to Augustus III of Saxony-Poland, 24 Jan. (os) 1752, Newport, Hanbury Williams Papers; W.Coxe, Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole (1802), 398–405; Cobbett, xiv, 1152. 44. Yonge to Hanbury Williams, 24 Jan. (os) 1752, Farmington, Hanbury Williams Papers 54, f. 252–3, a fuller account than that sent the same day by Edward Digby, f. 244–7. 45. Alt’s reports, 18 Jan., 1 Feb. 1752, Marburg 253. 46. John Dobson to John Mordaunt, 30 Jan. (os) 1752, undated notes, Warwick CRO, CR 136 8/5/6, CR 136 B 3012/44; Walpole, Memoirs of George II, i, 167–73; Newcastle to Yorke, 31 Jan. (os) 1752, PRO, SP 84/458. 47. J.N.Rosenau, “Private preference and political responsibilities: the relative potency of individual and role variables in the behaviour of U.S. senators”, in 203

NOTES

48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

54.

55. 56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

Quantitative international politics: insights and evidence, J.D.Singer (ed.) (New York, 1968), 49. Cobbett, xiii, 305. Ibid., xiii, 379. Ibid., xiii, 344. Fox to 4th Duke of Devonshire, 11 Dec. 1755, Chatsworth, HP; Campbell to Mr White, 18 Dec. 1755, Cawdor. Monitor 13 May 1758. Hardwicke to Earl of Findlater, 16 Nov. 1762, Edinburgh, Scottish Record Office, GD 248/572/8/17; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 28 Nov. 1762, 1 July 1763, BL, Add. 32945, f. 176, 32949, f. 252. Lord Sandys to Lord Northwick, 11 Dec. 1762, Worcester CRO 705–66, BA 4221/26; Duke of Nivernais, French envoy, to Praslin, French foreign minister, 13 Dec. 1762, AE, CP, Ang. 448, f. 305–9; J.Nicholas, The ministry of Lord Bute, 1762–3, PhD thesis (University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1988), 220–50. Walpole to Pelham, 12 Aug. (os) 1747, NeC 487. Henry to Stephen Fox, 13 Feb. (os) 1746, BL, Add. 51417, f. 213–14; Newcastle, memorandum, 18 Apr. 1759, BL, Add. 32890, f. 133; Con-Test, 2 Apr. 1757; Anon., Letters to the estimator of the manners and principles of the times (1758), 41; Holdernesse to Mitchell, 14 Dec. 1759, PRO, SP 90/74; Newcastle to Yorke, 11 Dec., Yorke to Weston, 15 Dec. 1761, BL, Add. 32932, f 123, 58213, f. 58; P.Mathias and P.O’Brien, “Taxation in England and France, 1715–1810: a comparison of the social and economic incidence of taxes collected for the central government”, Journal of European Economic History 5 (1976), 601–50. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 17 July, Mitchell to Holdernesse, 31 Aug. 1757, PRO, SP 90/69; Newcastle to Rockingham, 27 Sept. 1757, WW Rl–103; C.W.Eldon, England’s subsidy policy towards the Continent during the Seven Years’ War (Philadelphia, 1938); G.Brauer, Die hannoversch-englischen Subsidienvertrage 1702–1748 (Aalen, 1962); P.G.M.Dickson, Finance and government under Maria Theresia 1740–1780 [2 volumes] (Oxford, 1987), II, 158–69, 172–3, 391–3, 395. Newcastle to Mitchell, 8 Dec. 1757, BL, Add. 6832, f. 31; Haslang to Preysing and Wachtendonck, 9 Dec. 1757, Munich, Bayr. Ges., London 233; Münchhausen to Prussian minister Podewils, 25 Dec. 1757, NSTA, Hannover Des 91 Nr. 38, f. 13–14; Anon., An appeal to the sense of the people (1756), 21– 2; Monitor, 20 Aug. 1757; North Briton, 20 Nov. 1762. Michael Becher to Edward Southwell MP, 31 Mar. (os) 1744, Bristol, Public Library, Southwell Papers, vol. 8; Bristol, Society of Merchant Venturers, Minutes of the Steadfast Society, pp. 56–7; Northampton Mercury, 4 June (os) 1739; Anon., An Appeal, 21–2; Monitor, 20 Aug. 1757. Bedford to Goldsworthy, 28 Nov. (os) 1748, PRO, SP 98/55, f. 96; Mann to Bedford, 16 July 1748, BL, Add. 32813, f. 41–2; Bedford to Keene, 19 Jan. (os), Keene to Bedford, 24 Mar., 5 May 1749, PRO, SP 94/135, f. 8, 123, 222–3; R.Lodge (ed.), The private correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene (Cambridge, 1933), 176, 243, 257–8, 271, 320; McLachlan, Trade and peace with Old Spain, 133–45; Sbornik imperatorskago Russkago istoricheskago obshchestvo [148 volumes] (St Petersburg, 1867–1916), CXLVIII, 399; Newcastle to Yorke, 4 Feb. (os) 204

NOTES

61.

62. 63.

64. 65. 66.

67.

1752, Newcastle to Keith, 20 Apr. 1753, PRO, SP 84/458, 80/191; Holdernesse to Robert Orme, 14 Oct. 1755, BL, Eg. 3488, f. 96. Meeting in Cornhill, 23 Jan. (os), Hardwicke to Bedford, 2 Feb. (os) 1749, London, Bedford Estate Office, papers of the 4th Duke; Newcastle to Dayrolle, 13 Sept. 1751, PRO, SP 84/452, f. 136; Grenville to Bothmar, Danish minister, 28 June, Grenville to Titley, 23 July 1762, PRO, SP 75/114, f. 236, 263–5; P.Clendenning, “The Anglo-Russian trade treaty of 1766–an example of eighteenth-century power group interest”, Journal of European Economic History 19 (1990), 475–520. Henry to Stephen Fox, 18 Mar. (os) 1746, BL, Add. 51417, f 228. Finch to Harrington, 27 Feb. 1739, PRO, SP 95/84. See, more generally, H.S.K.Kent, War and trade in northern seas: Anglo-Scandinavian economic relations in the mid-eighteenth century (Cambridge, 1873). Wasenberg to Ekeblad, 2 July 1742, PRO, SP 107/54. Keene to Robinson, 3 Mar. 1755, Leeds, Vyner 11850. Newcastle to Keith, 20 Apr. 1753, PRO, SP 80/191; G.Shelton, Dean Tucker: eighteenth-century economic and political thought (1981), 46–7; North Briton, 20 Nov. 1762; J.Campbell, The present state of Europe (1750), 24. On Campbell, see G.Abbattista, Commercio, colonie e impero alla vigilia della Rivoluzione Americana: John Campbell pubblicista e storico nell’Inghilterra del sec. XVIII (Florence, 1990). For the argument, see also Anon., The conduct of the ministry impartially examined (1760), 38; Monitor, 26 Dec. 1761, 2 Oct. 1762; Newcastle, memorandum, 4 Sept. 1762, BL, Add. 32942, f. 151. Legge to Pelham, 24 May 1748, NeC 573. For praise from Newcastle, Newcastle to Pelham, 18 Sept. 1750, BL, Add. 35411, f. 125.

Chapter Seven 1. D.B.Horn, The British diplomatic service 1689–1789 (Oxford, 1961), is the best introduction, although it is somewhat dated. 2. W.Robertson, The history of the reign of the Emperor Charles V (1769; 1782 edn.), i, 134–5. 3. E.Gibbon, The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, J.B.Bury (ed.) (1896–1900), IV, 163–6. 4. Horn, Diplomatic Service, 112–14; Holdernesse to Mitchell, 1, 8, 22 Nov., Mitchell to Holdernesse, 25 Dec. 1757, PRO, SP 90/70. 5. G.W.Rice, The diplomatic career of the fourth Earl of Rochford at Turin, Madrid and Paris, 1749–1769, PhD thesis (University of Canterbury, New Zealand, 1973); “British consuls and diplomats in the mid-eighteenth century: an Italian example”, EHR 92, 834–46, 1977; and “Lord Rochford at Turin, 1749–55: a pivotal phase in Anglo-Italian relations in the eighteenth century”, in Black, Knights Errant, 92–112. 6. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 25 Feb., Joseph Yorke to Holdernesse, 11 Apr. 1758, PRO, SP 90/71; Earl of Ilchester and Mrs Langford-Brooke, The life of Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams (1929), 311–417. 205

NOTES

7. Hyndford to Burrish, 27 Feb. 1752, PRO, SP 110/6. 8. Hugh Valence Jones, Under Secretary in the Northern Department, to Burrish, 20 Aug. (os) 1752, Villettes to Burrish, 6 Sept. 1752, PRO, SP 110/6. 9. Schweizer, “Scotsmen and the British diplomatic service, 1714–1789”, Scottish Tradition 7–8 (1977–8), 115–36. 10. Pelham to Newcastle, 28 Sept. (os) 1750, BL, Add. 35411, f. 171; M.A. Thomson, The Secretaries of State 1681–1782 (Oxford, 1932); Newcastle to Devonshire, 2 Jan. 1756, BL, Add. 32862, f. 7; Holdernesse to Yorke, 30 July 1755, BL, Eg. 3446, f. 182; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 6 Sept. (os) 1751, Horatio Walpole to Hardwicke, 16 June (os) 1740, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Mar. (os) 1749, Newcastle to Pelham, 13, 26 Sept. 1750, BL, Add. 35412, f. 19, 35586, f. 241, 35410, f. 116, 35411, f. 95, 100, 133; Pelham to Devonshire, 20 June (os) 1749, HP, Chatsworth. 11. J.C.D.Clark (ed.), The memoirs and speeches of James, 2nd Earl Waldegrave 1742– 1763 (Cambridge, 1988), 160–1. 12. Anon., A letter to the King of XXX (1756), 11–12. 13. Pol. Corr., vi, 168. There is no systematic study of Newcastle’s views on foreign policy. He can be approached via Browning, The Duke of Newcastle, and his correspondence in P.C.Yorke (ed.), Life and correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke [3 volumes] (Cambr idge, 1913) and T.J.McCann (ed.), The correspondence of the Dukes of Richmond and Newcastle 1724–1750 (Lewes, 1984). 14. D.B.Horn, “The Duke of Newcastle and the origins of the diplomatic revolution”, in The diversity of history, J.H.Elliott & H.G.Koenigsberger (eds) (1970), 247–68. 15. Newcastle to Pelham, 10 July 1748, NeC 638. 16. Pol. Corr., vi, 174, cf. 175–6. 17. Pol. Corr., VI, 176, 179. 18. Pelham, note on letter from Newcastle, 13 July 1753, Council memorandum, 21 Aug. 1753, BL, Add. 33201, f. 162, 32995, f. 27; Newcastle to Dickens, 2 Oct. 1753, Sbornik imperatorskago Russkago, CXLVIII, 493–4. 19. Black, British foreign policy in an age of revolutions 1783–1793 (Cambridge, 1994), 544–5. 20. P.Lawson, George Grenville: a political life (Oxford, 1984), 118–32; K.W. Schweizer and J.Bullion, “The vote of credit controversy, 1762”, British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 15 (1992), 175–88. 21. Anon., An answer to a Pamphlet called a second letter to the people (1755), p. 14. 22. Holdernesse to Burrish, 20 Feb. 1756, PRO, SP 81/105. 23. Anon., A letter to his grace the D-of N-E, on the duty he owes himself…(1757), 2. 24. Marquis d’Havrincourt, 25 Apr. 1749, AE, MD, Ang. 51, f. 117.

Chapter Eight 1. Holdernesse to Keith, 31 May 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 49. 2. Holdernesse to Keith, 31 May 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 37. 3. Keith to Holdernesse, 22 May 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 32; Zamboni to. Kaunitz, 7 Aug., 11 Sept. 1752, HHStA. England, Varia 10, f. 124, 140. 206

NOTES

4. J.Black, “The problems of the small state: Bavaria and Britain in the second quarter of the eighteenth century”, European History Quarterly 19 (1989), 5–36. 5. Cobbett, xiv, 694; Thomas Harris to James Harris, 14 Dec. 1759, Winchester, Hampshire CRO. 9M73/G311/7. For a similar warning by a pro-government pamphleteer against unrealistic expectations, Anon., An appeal to the sense of the people (1756), 52–3. 6. Cobbett, xiv, 801; Keene to Robinson, 30 July, 3 Mar. 1755, Leeds, Vyner 11843, 11850. 7. Walpole, Memoirs of…George II, i, 5–6, 34; Cobbett, xiii, 159, xiv, 963–70; Egmont, BL, Add. 47012B, f. 177. 8. W.S.Taylor and J.H.Pringle (eds), The correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (4 vols, 1838–40). 9. “Mr. Pitt’s points”, memorandum, 21 Sept. 1753, BL, Add. 32995, f. 29–30; J.Black, Pitt the Elder (Cambridge, 1992), 88–9. 10. Ibid., 109; Joseph to Philip Yorke, 14 Oct. 1755, BL, Add. 35364, f. 53. 11. Schlenke, England und das friderizianische Preussen, 230–49. 12. P.Langford, “William Pitt and Public Opinion, 1757”, EHR 88 (1973), 54–80; N.Rogers, Whigs and cities: popular politics in the age of Walpole and Pitt (Oxford, 1989), 106. 13. Charles to Lady Townshend, 13 July 1757, BL, Add. 63079, f. 46. 14. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 10 Sept. 1757, BL, Add. 35417, f. 54; Bernis to Aubeterre, envoy in Spain, 3 Jan. 1758, AE, CP, Espagne 523, f. 6. 15. Pitt to Keene, 23 Aug. 1757, New Haven, Beinecke Library, Osborn Files, Pitt; Holdernesse to Mitchell, 23 Sept. 1757, PRO, SP 90/70; Monitor, 24 Sept. 1757. For differing views on Gibraltar, Anon., National prejudice opposed to the national interest, candidly considered in the detention or yielding up Gibraltar and Cape-Breton by the ensuing treaty of peace: with some observations on the natural jealousy of the Spanish nation, and how far it may operate to the prejudice of the British commerce if not removed at this crisis. In a letter to Sir John Barnard (1748), Westminster Journal, 1 Apr. (os) 1749; Mirepoix to St Contest, 24 Dec. 1751, AE, CP, Ang. 432, f. 354–6. 16. Rigby to Sir Robert Wilmot, 20 Nov. 1759, Derby, Public Library, Catton Collection WH 3457; see also Monitor, 23 June 1759, 2 Jan. 1762. 17. Cabinet minute, PRO SP 90/70, 30/8/89, f. 52. 18. Schweizer, England, Prussia and the Seven Years War, 64. 19. Haslang to Preysing, 13 Oct., 29 Oct., 29 Dec. 1758, 2, 16, 30 Jan., 2 Feb. 1759, Preysing to Haslang, 18 Nov. 1758, 18 Jan. [late Jan.] 1759, Munich, Bayr. Ges., London 234–5; A. Schmid, Max III Joseph und die europäischen Mächte: Die Aussenpolitik des Kurfürstentums Bayern 1745–1765 (Munich, 1987), 415–20, 440–2. 20. W.J.Eccles, “The role of the American colonies in eighteenth-century French foreign policy”, in Atti del I Congresso Internazionale di Storia Americana (Genoa, 1978), 165, 171; Newcastle to Fox, undated, Earl of Ilchester (ed.), Letters to Henry Fox, 86; George Ross to Br igadier John Forbes, 11 Mar. 1758, Edinburgh, Scottish Record Office, GD 45/2/20/10. 21. Bussy to Choiseul, 26 June, 9, 26 July, Choiseul to Bussy, 27 June 1761, AE, CP, Ang. 443, f. 277, 339, 444, f. 67–8, 445, f. 17; Choiseul to Ossun, envoy in Madrid, 19 Feb. 1760, 30 July 1761, AE, CP, Espagne 527, f. 235, 533, f. 173; 207

NOTES

22.

23.

24. 25. 26.

27. 28.

29. 30. 31.

32. 33.

34. 35.

36.

Viry, Sardinian envoy in London, to Charles Emmanuel, 30 June 1761, AST, LM, Ing. 66. On the negotiations, Rashed, The Peace of Paris, 1763 (Liverpool, 1951). W.L.Grant, “Pitt’s theory of empire”, Queen’s Quarterly (July-Sept. 1908), 32– 43 and “Canada vs. Guadaloupe: an episode in the Seven Years’ War”, American Historical Review 17 (1912), 734–66; R.Hyam, “Imperial interests and the Peace of Paris”, in Reappraisals in British imperial history, R.Hyam & G.Martin (eds) (Toronto, 1975), 21–43. Marie Peters’s important works on Pitt include “The myth of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Great Imperialist. Part I: Pitt and imperial expansion 1738–1763”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 20, 1993, and Pitt the Elder (Harlow, 1997). Bussy to Choiseul, 26 July 1761, AE, CP, Ang. 444, f. 62–70; J.K.Hiller, “The Newfoundland fisheries issue in Anglo-French treaties, 1713–1904”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 24 (1996), 5–8; North Briton, 11 Dec. 1762. P.D.Brown and K.W.Schweizer (eds), The Devonshire diary (1982), 116. A.Soulange-Bodin, La diplomatic de Louis XV et le pacte defamille (Paris, 1894); A.Bourguet, Le due de Choiseul et l’ alliance Espagnole (Paris, 1906). Choiseul to Bussy, 29 July, Ossun to Choiseul, 10, 13 Aug. 1761, AE, CP, Ang, 444, f 84, Espagne 533, f. 235, 259; Henry Fox to Shelburne, 29 Dec. 1761, BL.Bowood, 15, f. 65; Elizabeth to Edward Montagu, 11 Sept. 1760, HL, Montagu Papers 2394. Yorke, Hardwicke, in, 318–21; Brown & Schweizer, Devonshire Diary, 111. Brown & Schweizer, Devonshire Diary, 127–31, 135; W.J.Smith (ed.), The Grenville Papers [4 volumes] (London, 1852–3), i, 386–7; Yorke to Sir John Goodricke, 17 Oct. 1761, Bod. MS. Eng. Hist. C 62, f. 12. Minute of St James’s meeting, 2 Oct. 1761, BL, Add. 32929, f. 18; Yorke, Hardwicke, III, 279–80; Brown & Schweizer, Devonshire Diary, 139. Lyttelton to Elizabeth Montagu, 8 Oct. 1761, HL, Montagu Papers 1296. D.Syrett, The siege and capture of Havana (1970); N.Tracy, Manila ransomed: the British assault on Manila in the Seven Years’ War (Exeter, 1995); Portuguese Secretary of State to Charles, 2nd Earl of Egremont, Secretary of State for the Souther n Depar tment, 27 Sept. 1762, PRO 30/47/2; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 17 Oct. 1762, BL, Add. 32943, f. 258–9. J.L.Bullion, A great and necessary measure: George Grenville and the genesis of the Stamp Act, 1163–1165 (Columbia, 1982). J.L.Bullion, “Securing the peace: Lord Bute, the plan for the army, and the origins of the American Revolution”, in K.W.Schweizer, Lord Bute, 17–39; J.W.Shy, Toward Lexington: the role of the British army in the coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, 1965), pp. 68–72. N.Tracy, Navies, deterrence, and American independence: Britain and seapower in the 1760s and 1770s (Vancouver, 1988). Melcombe, memo., 10 July 1762, Mount Stuart 2/93; memorandum by Newcastle on discussion with Lyttelton, 24 Aug. 1762, BL, Add. 35422, f. 26; I.Hont, “The rhapsody of public debt: David Hume and voluntary state bankruptcy”, in Political discourse in early modern Britain, N.Phillipson & Q.Skinner (eds) (Cambridge, 1993), 321–48. Monitor, 28 Apr. 1762.

208

NOTES

Chapter Nine 1. Sir James Kinloch to Lord Braco, 5 Jan. (os) 1749, Aberdeen, University Library, 2727/1/2/4. 2. Keene to Bedford, 21 May 1749, PRO, SP 94/135, f. 265–8; Anon., “Mémoire sur les moyens de conserver par mer la paix retablie par le Traité d’Aix la Chapelle ou projet d’union maritime entre la France, l’Espagne, la Suéde et le Danemark”, July 1749, AE, MD, Ang. 40, f. 164–7; Rouillé to Bonnac, 27 Mar. 1755, AN, K 1351 no. 88; Earl of Bristol, envoy in Turin, to Holdernesse, 30 Aug. 1755, PRO, SP 92/63, f. 152. 3. S.Woolf, Napoleon’s integration of Europe (1991). 4. Rolt, The conduct of the several powers of Europe, iii, 1; Sandwich and Robinson to Keith, 26 Sept. 1748, BL, Add. 35464, f 58. 5. Dickson, “English commercial negotiations with Austria, 1737–1752”, in A. Whiteman, J.S.Bromley and P.G.M.Dickson (eds), Statesmen, scholars and merchants, 80–9. 6. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 8 Feb. (os) 1751, PRO, SP 84/457. 7. P.W.Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763–1848 (Oxford, 1994), 485–91. 8. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 15 Oct. 1757, PRO, SP 90/70. 9. J.Black, “The Tory view of eighteenth-century Br itish foreign policy”, Historical Journal 31 (1988), 475–6. 10. Anon., A letter to the King of XXX, 5; Tyrconnel to Sir John Cust, 30 Apr. (os) 1748; L.Cust, Records of the Cust family, series 3 (1927), 129. For Bedford, C.Baudi di Vesme, La politica Mediterranea inglese nelle relazioni degli inviati italiani a Londra durante la cosidetta Guerra di successione d’Austria (Turin, 1952), 117–18. 11. Cumberland to Fox, 23 Sept. 1757, Ilchester, Letters to Henry Fox, 120. 12. Pares, “American versus continental warfare, 1739–63”, EHR 51 (1936), 429– 65; K.W.Schweizer, “The draft of a pamphlet by John Stuart, 3rd Earl of Bute”, Notes and Queries, (1981), 343–4; D.Baugh, “Great Britain’s ‘BlueWater’ policy, 1689–1815”, International History Review 10 (1988) 33–58. 13. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 10 Apr. 1762, BL, Add 32937, f. 14. 14. Réflexions de M.de Bussy, 19 Mar. 1751, AE, MD, Ang. 51, f. 141. 15. Bedford to Keene, 6 July (os) 1749, PRO, SP 94/136, f. 1; Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 23 Oct. 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 427, f. 176; Old England, 3 Feb. (os) 1750. 16. Newcastle to Yorke, 9 Mar., Newcastle to Keith, 22 Oct. 1753, PRO, SP 84/ 462, 80/192; Pol. Corr., ix, 437–8, 457. For concern in 1755, Richard Blacow to Thomas Bray, no date, Exeter College Oxford, Bray Papers. 17. Newcastle to Devonshire, 2 Jan. 1756, BL, Add. 32862, f. 6; J.Glete, Navies and nations: warships, navies and state building in Europe and Ameria, 1500–1860 (Stockholm, 1993), 266. 18. Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 3 Jan. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 428, f. 9–11; Pol. Corr., vii, 276, viii, 243. 19. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 26 July 1752, PRO, SP 36/119, f. 143; Joseph to Philip Yorke, 5 Sept. 1752, BL, Add. 35363, f. 308. 209

NOTES

Chapter Ten 1. For Bute’s foreign policy, Schweizer’s work is crucial. It can be approached through his contributions in K.W.Schweizer (ed.), Lord Bute: essays in reinterpretation (Leicester, 1988). J.D.Nicholas, The ministry of Lord Bute, 1762–3, PhD thesis (University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1988) is also very important. He emphasizes the government’s continued desire for European allies. 2. Memorandum by James Harris MP, 9 Dec. 1761, HP, transcript of material in the Malmesbury Papers. 3. Ibid., 12 May 1762. 4. Bute to Mitchell, 9 Apr. 1762, Mount Stuart, Cardiff Papers 6/143; Bedford’s speech, 5 Feb. 1762, PRO 30/8/70/5; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 14 Apr. 1762, BL, Add. 32937, f. 103; K.W.Schweizer and J.L.Bullion, “The vote of credit controversy, 1762”, British Journal of Eighteenth-Century Studies 15 (1992), 175– 88; and “The use of the private papers of politicians in the study of policy formulation during the eighteenth century: the Bute papers as a case study”, Archives 22 (1995), 39–43; Schweizer, “Foreign policy and the eighteenthcentury English press: The case of Israel Mauduit’s ‘Considerations on the present German war’”, Publishing History 39 (1996), 45–53. 5. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 1 Jan. 1750, AST, LM, Ing. 56. 6. J.L.Bullion, “Securing the peace: Lord Bute, the plan for the army, and the origins of the American Revolution”, in Schweizer Lord Bute, 30. Despite the title, Bullion’s essay includes much of importance on foreign policy; Trevor to Robinson, 26 Mar. 1746, BL, Add. 23822, f. 245; Irby to Humfrey Morice, 18 Mar. 1761, Gosforth, Northumberland CRO, ZSW 554/11. For an emphasis on cost, Nathaniel Cole to James Brockman, 9 Apr. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 42591, f. 56; London Chronicle, 5 Jan. 1762; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 1 Apr. 1762, BL, Add. 33030, f. 260. 7. Briton, 26 June, 10, 24 July, 22 Oct., 4 Dec. 1762. 8. K.W.Schweizer, “Lord Bute, Newcastle, Prussia and the Hague overtures: a reexamination”, Albion 9 (1977), 72–97; Scott, British foreign policy, 46–7. 9. Haslang to Wachtendonck and Preysing, 7 Sept. 1762, Munich, Bayr. Ges., London 239. 10. K.W.Schweizer, “The Bedford motion and the House of Lords debate, 5 Feb. 1762”, Parliamentary History 5 (1986), 107–23. 11. Newcastle to Joseph Yorke, 8 Jan. 1762, BL, Add. 32933, f. 113–14; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 8 Oct. 1761, 18 Jan. 1762, Newcastle to Devonshire, 31 Oct., 26 Dec. 1761, BL, Add. 32929, f. 115–16, 32933, f. 364, 32930, f. 221, 32932, f. 363; Nicholas, Bute, 390. 12. Memorandum by Newcastle on discussion with Lyttelton, 24 Aug. 1762 Hardwicke account of conference with Bute, 28 July 1762, Newcastle to Count William Bentinck, 24 Feb. 1763, BL, Add. 35422, f. 26, 32941, f. 87, 32947, f. 81–2; Buckinghamshire to George, 2nd Earl of Halifax, Secretary of State, 20 Sept., Sandwich to Buckinghamshire, 23 Sept., 20 Dec. 1763, PRO, SP 91/ 72, 138, 109, 237–8; H.M.Scott, “Great Britain, Poland and the Russian Alliance, 1763–1767”, Historical Journal 19 (1976), 62–9; I.de Madariaga, Russia in the age of Catherine the Great (1981), 189–90; J.Black, 210

NOTES

13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21.

22.

“Anglo—Russian relations after the Seven Years War”, Scottish Slavonic Review 9 (1987), 27–37; Holdernesse to Keith, 31 May 1755, Holdernesse to Mitchell, 9 July 1756, PRO, SP 807 196, f. 37, 90/65; [Samuel Martyn], Deliberate thoughts on the system of our late treaties with Hesse-Cassel and Russia, in regard to Hanover (1756), 49; [John Shebbeare], A sixth letter to the people of England (1757), 4; Anon., Royal Magazine, Jan. 1761, IV, 12; London Evening Post, 1 May 1762; St James’s Chronicle, 23 Oct. 1762. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 25 Feb. 1762, BL, Add. 32935, f. 76–7; Nivernais, French envoy in London, to Choiseul, 24 Sept. 1762, Chatelet, French envoy in Vienna, to Praslin, 16 July, 17 Aug. 1763, AE, CP, Ang. 447, f. 146–8, Autriche 295, f. 67–71, 201–2; Viry to Charles Emmanuel, 26 July 1763, AST, LM, Ing. 68. Chatelet to Praslin, 16 July, 17 Aug., 21 Sept., Praslin to Chatelet, 28 Aug. 1763, Count Guerchy, French envoy in London, to Praslin, 23, 28 Oct., 4 Nov. 1763, AE, CP, Autriche 295, f. 67–71, 201–2, 326, Ang. 451, f. 456–8, 473–7, 452, f 41; Sandwich to Buckinghamshire, 28 Oct., Sandwich to Stormont, 27 Dec. 1763, PRO, SP 91/72, f. 155–6, 80/119; Smith, The Grenville papers, II, 240; Marmora to Charles Emmanuel, 11, 15 Nov., 13 Dec. 1763, 6, 24 Jan., 7 Feb., 20 Apr., 18 June 1764, AST, LM, Ing. 69; Annual Register (1763), 213. Clark, The dynamics of change. D.W.Jones, War and political economy in the age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford, 1988). Bedford to Bute, 13 June 1761, Mount Stuart, 1761 Papers, no. 458. Paterson to Bute, 9 Oct. 1762, Mount Stuart, Cardiff Papers 5/4. Newcastle to Cumberland, 5 Ap. (os) 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 33/272; J.Black, “Territorial gain on the continent: an overlooked aspect of mid-eighteenth century British foreign policy”, Durham University Journal 86 (1994), 43–50; Vincent to Puysieulx, 5 Mar. 1747, AE, CP, Ang. 423, f. 86–7; Newcastle Courant, 20 Feb. (os), 5 Mar. (os), Old England, 7 May (os), London Evening Post, 15 Sept. (os) 1748. For earlier lobbying on the importance of Cape Breton and Newfoundland, BL, Add. 13972, f. 2–7. For talk of Britain purchasing Leghorn (Livor no), Mann to Horace Walpole, 16 Jan. 1742, Lewis, Walpole’s Correspondence, p. 267. Horatio Walpole to Pelham, 3 Sept. 1747, NeC 489; Newcastle Courant, 22, 29 Sept. (os) 1749; Old England, 17 Feb. (os) 1750. Richard Dobbs to Bute, 29 Jan., Arthur Dobbs to Bute, 2 June 1762, Mount Stuart, 2/73–4. For a proposal for seizing leading Spanish bases in the New World, J.Molesworth to Bute, 8 Oct. 1761, Mount Stuart, 4/121. Wilson, “Empire, trade and popular politics”; The sense of the people: urban political culture in Urban England, 1715–1785 (Cambridge, 1994); and “Empire of Virtue. The imperial project and Hanoverian culture c. 1720–1785”, in L.Stone (ed.), An imperial state at war: Britain from 1689 to 1815 (1994), 128– 64; Baugh, “Maritime strength and Atlantic Commerce”, in last, 210–11; G.Jordan and Rogers, “Admirals as heroes: patr iotism and liber ty in Hanoverian England”, Journal of British Studies 28 (1989), 201–24; B.Harris,” ‘American idols’: empire, war and the middling ranks in mid-eighteenthcentury”, Past and Present 150, 1996, 111–41. 211

NOTES

23. J.Brewer, “Commercialization and Politics”, in The birth of a consumer society: the commercialization of eighteenth-century England, N.McKendrick, Brewer, J.H. Plumb (1982), 209, 229. On the coal trade, Herbert Mackworth MP to Pleydell Courteen, 25 July (os) 1739, Swansea, University Library, Mackworth Papers 1236, A recent summary is offered in H.V.Bowen, War and British Society, 1688–1815 (Cambridge, 1977) and another effective account is that by P.K. O’Brien, Power with profit: the State and the economy, 1688–1815, 1991. 24. J.Andrews, Geographical aspects of the maritime trade of Kent and Sussex, 1650– 1750, PhD thesis (London, 1954), 170. 25. Sandwich to Chesterfield, 12 Jan. 1748, PRO, SP 84/433, f. 49. 26. Mildmay Journal, 1 Nov., 9 Dec. 1748, 1 Jan. 1749, Chelmsford, Essex Record Office, D/DM 01/19. 27. R.V.Jackson, “Government expenditure and British economic growth in the eighteenth century: some problems of measurement”, Economic History Review second series, 43, 1990, 217–35; Richard to John Tucker, 11 Feb. (os) 1744, Bod. MS. Don. C 106, f. 186. 28. Rev. Henry Gilbert to Cust, -Jan. (os) 1744, Cust, Cust Family, ii, 202. 29. W.J.Eccles, “The fur trade and eighteenth-century imperialism”, William and Mary Quarterly 40 (1983), 341–62. 30. J.Walvin, Fruits of empire. Exotic produce and Br itish taste, 1660–1800 (Basingstoke, 1997). For a recent study of the role of economic interest in expansionism, J.L.A.Webb, “The mid-eighteenth century gum arabic trade and the British conquest of Saint-Louis du Sénégal, 1758”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 25 (1997), 37–58.

212

Index

Africa, West 25, 68, 70, 127, 154, 168, 174 Aix-la-Chapelle, peace of, 1748 1, 16, 60, 62, 64, 69, 91, 114, 116, 118, 125, 148 Albemarle, William, 2nd Earl of 71, 75 Alsace 15 Alt, Justus 117 Amelot de Chaillou, Jean-Jacques 38, 50, 54, 85 Anna (of Russia) 13 Anne, Queen 85, 105, 176 Anson, George, Admiral Lord 61 Anson, Thomas 52 Antin, Antoine-François, Marquis de 47 Appalachians 75, 79, 168 army, British 40 Army of Observation 24, 150–3, 156 Atterbury Plot, 1722 53 Aubeterre, Joseph-Henri, Marquis d’ 22 Augustus III of Saxony-Poland 11, 14, 21, 23, 83, 121 Austria 9–11, 17–23, 65–6, 79, 83, 87, 140, 144–5, 153, 170, 177, 179 Austrian Netherlands 11, 15, 18, 20, 43, 45–6, 49–51, 55–6, 59, 61, 68, 75, 113, 128, 170 Austrian Succession, War of, 1740–8 see War

Bahamas 168 Baker, William 129 balance of power 20, 133–4, 147, 152, 166–7, 171–2, 177 Baltic 5, 17, 27, 62, 64–5, 79–80, 84, 128, 156 Baltimore 168 Barnard, Sir John 110 Barrier 18, 61, 75, 129, 169–70 Bath, William, Earl of 50, 88, 96, 107– 9, 112, 114, 165 Bath Chronicle 183 Bavaria 49, 105, 112, 117–21, 142, 147–8, 153 Bedford, John, 4th Duke of 70, 114, 122, 127, 139–40, 143, 172, 181 Behr, Burchard Christian von 178 Belle Ile 25–6 Bergen-op-Zoom 16, 45 Berlin 27 Bermuda 168 Bestuzhev-Riumin, Alexis 17, 21, 23 Blanning, T.C.W. 41 Blue Water Strategy 9, 61, 112, 124, 149, 151, 172, 176 Bohemia 27, 42 Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, Viscount 8 Bonnac, François-Armand d’Usson, Marquis de 76 213

INDEX

Boscawen, Admiral Edward 20, 77–9, 155, 183 Bremen 97 Breslau, Peace of, 1742 15 Breslau, Treaty of, 1741 13 Brest 20 Bristol 127, 161 Briton 177 Broad Bottom ministry 59, 64 Bruges 16, 170 Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel 26, 85 Brussels 16, 170 Buckinghamshire, John, 2nd Earl of 177, 179–80 Burrish, Onslow 105–6, 137 Bussche, Johann 91 Bussy, François de 20, 49–50, 57, 78–9, 138, 156, 172 Bute, John, 3rd Earl of 5, 26, 100–2, 107, 175–6, 178–9, 181–2 Byng, John, Admiral 24 Cabinet 106, 159 Cambis, Louis-Dominique, Count 49 Campbell, John, MP 111, 113 Campbell, John, writer 129 Campbell, Pryse 124 Canada 20, 26, 58–60, 68–70, 72, 77, 149, 157, 160, 162, 166, 168, 175, 182 Cape Breton 16, 58–60, 74, 77, 126, 156–7, 173, 182 Caribbean 47, 51, 58, 79, 98, 166, 168, 173 Carlos, Don, see Charles III (of Spain) Cartagena 161, 183 Carteret, John, Lord, later Earl Granville 5–6, 15, 17, 31–2, 34–6, 38–41, 51–5, 57, 61, 65, 67, 74, 83, 93–5, 102, 107–8, 110, 112, 118, 122, 139–40, 150, 152, 158 Catherine II (of Russia) 136 Centinel 131 Champion 1–2 Charleroi 16 Charles III (of Spain) 11–12, 17, 25, 158, 166

Charles VI (of Austria) 11–13, 97, 107, 181 Charles XII (of Sweden) 10 Charles Albert (of Bavaria), Charles VII 11, 13, 18, 33, 95, 146 Charles Edward Stuart 17, 57, 112 Charles Emmanuel III (of Sardinia) 11, 15, 17 Chatham, Earl of, see Pitt, William, the Elder Chavigny, Anne-Théodore Chevignard de 49–50 Cherbourg 25 Chesterfield, Philip, 4th Earl of 40, 45, 51, 56, 108, 114, 139–40 Choiseul, Etienne-François, Duke of 25, 156, 158 Citizen 33, 167 Clark, Jonathan 41, 181 Clement-Auguste, Archbishop of Cologne 177 Cleves 12, 23 Clive, Robert 154 Clutterbuck, Thomas 88 Cologne 105 colonial issues 25, 68, 72–4, 76–8, 129, 133, 149, 155–8, 166–8, 173, 181–3 Corsica 180 Cotton, Sir John Hynde 107 Courland 21 Craftsman 53–4 Culloden, battle of, 1746 15, 62, 173 Cumberland, William, Duke of 16, 24, 48, 62–3, 67, 73–4, 83, 93, 96, 115, 117, 150–1, 153, 155, 172 Daily Post 166 Dann, Uriel 30, 41 Denmark 17, 31, 35, 82–4, 98, 120, 128 Dettingen, battle of, 1743 15, 45, 55, 60, 113, 155 Devonshire, William, 4th Duke of 149 Dickens, Guy 13, 32 Dinwiddie, Robert 20, 72 Diplomatic Revolution, 1756 4–5, 9, 19, 63, 79–80, 171 214

INDEX

diplomats 131–2, 135–8 Dobbs, Arthur 182–3 Dodington, George Bubb 39, 96–7, 117, 162 Dominica 26, 74 Douglas, John 96 Dresden, Treaty of, 1745 15 Drummond, John 51, 54, 105 Dunkirk 36, 54, 58, 69, 71, 118, 146, 148 Durand, François-Marie 117 Duras, Emmanuel-Félicité, Duke de 76 Durham 183 East Friesland 89, 91, 97–100 East India Company, British 16, 70, 128–9, 131, 156, 167 East Prussia 21, 27 Egmont, John, 2nd Earl of 118, 120, 148 elections 105, 115 Elisabeth Farnese 11 Elizabeth I of England 165 Elizabeth, Tsarina of Russia 19–20, 23, 156, 171 Elliot, Sir Gilbert 73 Emden 153 Emden Company 92, 100 Falkland Islands 77, 165–7 Family Compact, Third, 1761 25, 157, 159 Fawkener, Sir Everard 83 Ferdinand VI (of Spain) 9, 17 Ferdinand of Brunswick 153–6, 175 Fielding, Henry 64 finance 26, 164–5, 176–7 Finch, Edward 12, 99 Finckenstein, Karl, Count 95 Finland 15 Flanders 16, 31, 56, 59 Flemming, Karl, Count 42 Fleury, André Hercule de 12, 32, 38, 47–8, 85, 111 Florida 26, 168, 175 Fontenoy, battle of, 1745 16 Fox, Henry 73, 106, 124, 149

Francis, Duke (of Lorraine and then Tuscany), later Emperor Francis I 11, 17, 154 Frederick, Duke of York 178 Frederick, Prince of Wales 70, 85, 93, 117, 125 Frederick II, the Great (of Prussia) 1 2–15, 18–28, 31, 37, 41–2, 47, 49, 55–6, 63, 66–7, 71, 79, 83, 85–92, 95, 97–101, 122, 136, 140, 144–5, 151, 160, 173–5 Frederick William I (of Prussia) 12, 31–2, 86, 92, 97–8 Fuentes, Count 158 Fürstenbund, 1785 48 Füssen, Treaty of, 1746 15 General Advertiser 183 Geneva 66 Genoa 15, 180 George I 48, 81, 85, 92–3, 132 George II 5–6, 12, 18–19, 21, 25, 31, 34–5, 41–3, 45, 48–9, 53, 63–4, 66–7, 70, 72, 75–7, 81, 83, 85–103, 110, 117, 122, 125, 132, 135, 137, 139–41, 148–51, 155, 174, 184 George III 26, 70, 81, 88, 92–3, 100–2, 159, 162, 175–9, 184 Georgia 168 Ghent 16, 170 Gibbon, Edward 134 Gibbs, Graham 30 Gibraltar 26, 116, 152 Glorious Revolution 124, 133, 165, 171 Goree 25–6, 157 Gower, John, 1st Earl 114 Grafton, Augustus, 3rd Duke of 178 grain exports 183 Granby, John, Marquis of 155 Great Northern War, 1700–21 10, 12, 87, 97 Gregg, Edward 41 Grenada 26 Grenville, George 172 Guadeloupe 25–6, 156–7, 178 Gustavus III (of Sweden) 92 215

INDEX

Halifax, George, 2nd Earl of 73, 139 Halifax, Nova Scotia 68 Hamburg 128 Hanbury-Williams, Sir Charles 21–2, 90, 135–6 Hanover 19–26, 29–30, 33, 39–41, 48, 55–6, 58, 63, 65–8, 70–1, 74, 77, 80–102, 144–6, 150–3, 156, 162, 175–8, 184 Hardenberg, Count 85 Hardwicke, Philip, 1st Earl 6, 24, 31–2, 37–8, 42, 70, 94, 105, 123, 128, 148, 158 Harrington, William, Lord 6, 32, 36, 38, 41, 48, 89, 93–4, 97–8, 139 Haslang, Joseph, Count 37, 102, 114, 117, 154 Hastenbeck, battle of, 1757 24, 151, 155 Hatton, Ragnhild 41, 93 Havana 2, 26, 106, 161, 183 Hawke, Admiral Sir Edward 74, 155, 183 Hervey, John, Lord 32, 85, 92, 94 Hesse-Cassel 26, 83, 85, 118, 124 Hildesheim, Prince-Bishopric of 82, 102, 177 Holdernesse, Robert, 4th Earl of 6, 52, 67, 75, 77–9, 93–4, 105–6, 128, 135, 138–9 Hudson’s Bay Company 129, 168 Hungary 10–11 Hyndford, John, 3rd Earl of 90, 137 Imperial Election Scheme 5, 18, 35, 49, 67–8, 90, 92, 118, 140–1, 147 India 25, 68, 70, 72, 128, 149, 154, 156, 160, 168, 174, 181 invasion 25, 56–7 Irby, Sir William 177 Ireland 26, 182 Italy 145, 158, 177 Ivan VI (of Russia) 13 Jacobites 2, 15, 36, 50, 53, 55–6, 111–13, 171, 173, 178–9 Jacobite’s Journal 183 Jamaica 26

‘James III’ 1, 17, 53, 59 Jemappes, battle of, 1792 170 Jenkins’ Ear, War of see War of Jenkins’ Ear Johnson, Samuel 165 Joseph I (of Austria) 11 Joseph II (of Austria) 18, 92 Jülich-Berg 8, 49, 97–9 Kaunitz, Count Wenzel 19–22, 180 Keene, Benjamin 75, 95–6, 127–9, 135–6, 147, 152 Keith, Robert 22, 64, 135, 137–8, 145 Keith, Sir William 33 Kleinschnellendorf, Convention of 15 Klosterseven, Convention of, 1757 24–5, 48, 151–2, 156 Kolin, battle of, 1757 27 La Salle, René-Robert, Sieur de 77 Laffeldt, battle of, 1747 16 Lagos, battle of, 1759 25, 45, 154–5 Lee, Dr George 116 Legge, Henry 120, 130–1, 137, 141 Leghorn 127 Leuthen, battle of, 1757 27 Levant Company 127 Lichfield, George, 3rd Earl of 123 Linz 13 Lithuania 180 Liverpool 161 Livonia 12, 21 Locke, John 122 Lodge, Sir Richard 1, 29 logwood 25, 158 London 154, 161, 165, 183 London Chronicle 129, 157 London Evening Post 157, 161, 173, 184 Lords, House of 105, 114, 122 Lorraine 15 Lorraine, Charles of 15, 18, 43 Louis XIV of France 47, 49, 52–3, 57, 79, 169, 178 Louis XV of France 11–12, 14, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 56, 75, 77, 93, 99, 169, 171

216

INDEX

Louisbourg 2, 16, 24–5, 58, 146, 154–5 Louisiana 20, 26, 157, 162, 166, 168 Lowther, Sir James 31 Lyttleton, George 113, 119, 159, 179 Maastricht 16, 170 Mackesy, Piers 41 Madras 16 Maillebois, Yves-Marie, Count de 33 Manila 2, 26, 161 Maria Theresa (ruler of Austria) 9, 11, 13, 17–20, 22, 27, 33, 50–1, 54, 59, 88, 107, 109, 111 Marlborough, Charles, 3rd Duke of 40 Marlborough, John, 1st Duke of 16, 54, 158 Marmora, Count 180 Marseille 184 Martin, Samuel 119 Martinique 25–6, 160, 163, 178 Mauduit, Israel 175 Maximilian Joseph (of Bavaria) 14 Mecklenburg 99 Mediterranean 79 Mexico 161 Michell, Abrahm Louis 137 Milanese 11, 15 Mildmay, William 184 Minden, battle of, 1759 25, 155, 179 Minorca 2, 22, 24, 26, 46, 56, 149, 154, 157 Mirepoix, Gaston, Duke de 20, 61, 69–70, 72, 75–8, 118, 174 Mitchell, Andrew 14, 23, 27, 135–6, 138, 171, 176 Money, William 137 Monitor 104, 126, 151–3, 156–8, 163, 177 Mons 16 Montagu, Elizabeth 158 Montréal 25, 154 Morton, James, 13th Earl of 40 Mosquito Coast 25 Münchhausen, Gerlach Adolph von 48, 64–5, 67, 90–1, 198 Munich 13 Murray, William 115–16, 119–20

Namur 16, 170 Naples 12, 15, 26 Napoleon 168, 171 National Debt 61, 126, 164 navy 2, 24, 37, 148, 155, 160, 162, 167, 173–4, 184 Nevis 173 Newcastle, Thomas, 1st Duke of 6, 8, 17–18, 24, 31–2, 35, 37, 40–3, 45, 52–3, 56–7, 59, 61–2, 64–6, 68–9, 71–5, 84, 91, 93–4, 96, 98, 101–2, 105–7, 111, 115, 120–1, 125–9, 137–43, 146, 151–2, 154, 158–9, 173, 176–9, 184 Newfoundland 26, 157–9, 168, 173, 182 newspapers 165, 175 Nivernais, Louis-Jules, Duke of 22 Nootka Sound 77, 166 North America 17, 19–20, 68, 70, 78–80, 129, 149, 153–4, 168, 174, 181 Nova Scotia 61, 68, 70, 72–3, 79, 148, 168 Ochakov Crisis, 1791 179, 181 Ohio valley 19, 69, 72, 75–6 ‘Old Corps’ 4, 111, 113, 151 Old England 58–9, 74, 122, 143, 172–3 ‘Old System’ 17–19, 64, 100, 141, 145, 170 Osnabrück 64, 91, 177–8 Ossorio, Giuseppe 34, 43, 116 Ostend 16, 57, 112, 151, 170, 182 Owen, John 41, 114 Owen’s Weekly Chronicle 143 Pacific Ocean 161, 167–8 Panama, Isthmus of 2 Panin, Count Nikita 179 Pardo, Convention of the, 1738 108–9 Pares, Richard 30 Paris, Peace of, 1763 11, 26, 28, 125, 168, 175 Parliament 6, 30, 37, 39, 48, 61, 104–30, 132, 172, 175–6 Parma 11, 15, 17 217

INDEX

Partition of Poland, First, 1772 47 Paterson, John 182 Patriots 3, 5, 153, 175 Pelham, Henry 38, 50, 61–2, 72–4, 94, 100, 109, 115–16, 118–19, 121, 124, 126, 130, 138–9, 141, 148 Penny London Post 183 Perron, Count 72, 75, 77 Peru 161 Peter I, the Great (of Russia) 10, 12 Peter III (of Russia) 80, 136, 179 Philip II (of Spain) 165 Philip V (of Spain) 5, 47, 166 Philip, Don 12, 15, 17 Philippines 161 Piacenza 11, 15–17 Piacenza, battle of, 1746 15 Pitt, William, the Elder 23–6, 88, 100, 106, 112–14, 118, 123, 125, 130, 136, 140, 146–60, 172, 175, 177–8, 184 Pitt, William the Younger 180 Plassey, battle of, 1757 154 Podewils, Count Heinrich von 37–9 Poland 18, 27, 50, 66, 71, 179–80 Polish Succession, War of the see War of the Polish Succession, 1733–5 Pomerania 12, 27 Pompadour, Jeanne-Antoinette, Marquise de 22, 27 Pondicherry 25–6 Poole 184 Porto Bello 2, 155, 183 Portugal 3, 26, 31, 70, 129, 160–1, 176 postal interception 6, 42, 85, 95–6, 158 Potter, John 115 Pragmatic Sanction 11–12, 99–100 Prague 13, 27 Protestant alliance 43 Protester 71 Provence 15 Prussia 12, 56, 61, 63–5, 67, 87, 137, 140, 142, 146, 148, 153, 160, 162, 175–7, 180 public opinion 39, 47, 72, 115–16, 125–6, 150, 153, 177

Pulteney, William, see Bath, William, Earl of Puysieulx, Louis-Philogène Brulart, Marquis de 43, 47, 62–4, 66, 69–70, 117 Québec 17, 25, 154 Quiberon Bay, battle of, 1759 25, 45, 154–5, 173 Ralph, James 87 Regensburg 89 Reval 10 Richelieu, Louis-François-Armand, Duke de 24, 63 Riga 10 Rigby, Richard 153 Roberts, Michael 31 Robertson, William 134 Robinson, Sir Thomas 36, 43, 75, 77–8, 89, 120, 136, 138–9, 149, 170 Rochford, William, 4th Earl of 135–6 Rockingham, Charles, 2nd Marquis of 102 Rolt, Richard 170 Rossbach, battle of, 1757 27, 179 Roucoux, battle of, 1746 16 Rouillé, Antoine-Louis 20, 73, 75, 77–8 Royal Magazine 180 Russia 9–10, 12–23, 63, 66, 68, 79, 83–4, 97, 99, 102, 124, 136, 141, 145, 148, 177, 179 Saint-Contest, François-Dominique Barberie de 71–3 Salisbury 161 Salisbury Journal 161 Salm 66 Sandwich, John, 4th Earl of 18, 40, 43, 64–5, 91, 96, 114, 137, 170, 180 Saratoga, battle of, 1777 27 Sardini?, kingdom of 11, 52 Saxe, Maurice, Marshal 16, 59 Saxony 23, 27, 71, 85, 148 Scarborough, Richard, 2nd Earl of 108 218

INDEX

Scotland 173 Second Silesian War 14, 27, 138–40 Secretaries of State 30, 35, 138–40 Senegal 26 Septennial Act, 1716 105 Settlement, Act of, 1701 58, 88 Seven Years War, 1756–63 2, 10–11, 62, 88, 106, 115, 155, 166, 168, 171, 177, 184 Seville, Treaty of, 1729 58 Shirley, William 68 Silesia 11, 13, 19, 22, 26–7, 33, 42, 47, 86, 90, 100, 144–5 Silesian debts 92, 100 Slade, Sir Thomas 155 sources 6, 95–6 Spain 9, 14, 31–3, 36, 46–7, 58, 60, 62, 66, 91, 107, 111, 147, 152, 156–61, 165–9 St. Helena 168 St. Lawrence, river 2 St. Lucia 26, 58, 74 St. Saphorin, François, Seigneur de 136 St. Severin, Alphonse, Count de 91 St. Vincent 26, 74 Stair, John, 2nd Earl of 34, 51–3, 59 Stanhope, James, Viscount 36, 152 Stanley, Hans 158 Starhemberg, George, Count 21–2 Steadfast Society 127 Steinberg, Ernst, Freiherr von 90–1, 177 Steinhorst 97 Stone, Andrew 57, 118–20 Stormont, David, Viscount 177 subsidy treaties 41, 105, 118, 126, 160, 176 Sumatra 168 Sweden 9–10, 13–14, 17, 63, 65–6, 68, 83–4, 98, 128, 166 taxation 61, 126, 164, 176 Temple, Richard, 2nd Earl 159 Thompson, Anthony 38, 48, 135 Titley, Walter 136 Tobago 26, 68, 74 Tories 5, 107, 112–14, 122, 149, 171–2

Townshend, Charles 151 Townshend, Charles, 2nd Viscount 35, 41, 93, 96, 139 trade 26, 111, 127–30, 152, 166–7, 170 Trevor, Robert 30, 34, 36, 41, 55, 87, 97, 106, 136, 177 Triennial Act, 1694 105 Tucker, John 110, 114 Tucker, Josiah 129 Tucker, Richard 27 Turkey 9–10, 18, 66, 68, 179 Tuscany 11, 26 Tyrconnel, John, Viscount 172 Union Journal; or, Halifax Advertiser 156 United Provinces, Dutch 16–17, 19, 31, 39, 41, 57, 74, 87, 106, 166, 179, 181 Utrecht, Peace of, 1713 47, 108–9, 114–15, 118, 158, 168–9 Valory, Louis-Guy-Henri, Marquis de 66 Vaucher, Paul 29 Vergennes, Charles, Count of 10–11 Vernon, Admiral Edward 155, 183 Versailles, First Treaty of, 1756 19, 22, 63 Versailles, Second Treaty of, 1757 23 Vienna, battle of, 1683 10 Vienna, First Treaty of, 1725 58, 111 Vienna, Second Treaty of, 1731 64, 74 Vienna, Third Treaty of, 1738 12 Villettes, Arthur 13–14, 137 Villiers, Thomas 37, 39 Virginia 20, 72 Viry, Count 102 Wager, Sir Charles 13 Waldegrave, James, 1st Earl 32, 38, 47, 107 Waldegrave, James, 2nd Earl 139 Wall, Richard 158 Walpole, Horace, 4th Earl of Orford 91–2, 94, 120, 147–8 Walpole, Horatio 31, 37, 41, 53, 72, 90, 93, 99–100, 113, 120, 125, 137, 139, 146 219

INDEX

Walpole, Sir Robert 4–5, 30–1, 34, 40, 47–50, 54, 61, 95–6, 101, 108–11, 116, 118, 120, 147 War of American Independence 88, 161 War of the Austrian Succession, 1740–8 2, 5, 11, 29–30, 43–4, 62, 83, 90–2, 107, 114–15, 136, 144, 153, 158, 179 War of Jenkins’ Ear, 1739–48 2, 11, 14 War of the Polish Succession, 1733–5 11–12, 15, 31, 47, 53, 97, 111 War of the Quadruple Alliance, 1718–20 53 War of the Spanish Succession, 1702– 13 1–2, 16, 114–15, 125, 153, 155, 179, 181 Warren, Vice-Admiral, Sir Peter 74, 155 Washington, George 20 Watson, Charles West Indies 25, 68, 99, 128, 147–8, 182 Westminster, Convention of, 1756 19, 21–2

Weston, Edward 8 Westphalia 27, 48, 88 Whig Split 117 Whigs 4 Whigs, Opposition 107–9, 112–14 Wilhelmstah, battle of, 1762 25 William III of Orange 16, 46–7, 52, 54, 81, 84–5, 87, 133, 176 William IV of Orange 16, 19 Wilmington, Spencer, 1st Earl of 95 Wilson, Arthur 29 Wolfe, General James 155 Worms, Treaty of, 1743 15–16 Württemberg 66 Wych, Sir Cyril 95 xenophobia 4 Yonge, Sir William 120–1 Yorke, Joseph 58, 62, 68–71, 75–6, 103, 105, 107, 135 Yorke, Philip, 2nd Earl of Hardwicke 58 Yorktown, battle of, 1781 162 Zamboni, Giovanni Giacomo 116 Zorndorf, battle of, 1758 27–8

220