Defining and Defying Organised Crime: Discourse, Perceptions and Reality

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Defining and Defying Organized Crime

Organized crime is now a major threat to all industrial and non-industrial countries. Using an interdisciplinary and comparative approach this book examines the nature of this threat. By analyzing the existing official institutional discourse on organized crime it examines whether or not it has an impact on perceptions of the threat and on the reality of organized crime. The first part of the book explores both the paradigm and the rationale of policy output in the fight against organized crime, and also exposes the often ‘hidden’ internal assumptions embedded in policy-making. The second part examines the perceptions of organized crime as expressed by various actors; for example, the general public in the Balkans and in Japan, the criminal justice system in the United States and circles within the international scientific community. Finally, the third part provides an overall investigation into the realities of organized crime with chapters that survey its empirical manifestations in various parts of the world. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, criminology, security studies and practitioners. Felia Allum is Lecturer in Politics and Italian at the University of Bath, UK. She is co-editor of Organized Crime and the Challenge to Democracy (also published by Routledge). Francesca Longo is Professor of Political Science and Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Public Policy at the University of Catania, Italy. Daniela Irrera is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Catania, Italy. Panos A. Kostakos is a doctoral candidate at the University of Bath, UK.


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Defining and Defying Organized Crime


Discourse, perceptions and reality Edited by Felia Allum, Francesca Longo, Daniela Irrera and Panos A. Kostakos


First published 2010 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.

© 2010 Edited by Felia Allum, Francesca Longo, Daniela Irrera and Panos A. Kostakos for selection and editorial matter; individual contributors their contribution All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Defining and defying organized crime: discourse, perceptions, and reality/ edited by Felia Allum … [et al.]. p. cm.—(Routledge advances in international relations and global politics; 83) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1 Organized crime. I. Allum, Felia, 1971HV6441.D44 2010 364.106—dc22 2009029799

ISBN 0-203-86034-9 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-54852-7 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-86034-9 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-54852-6 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-86034-2 (ebk)


Contents

List of figures and tables Notes on contributors Foreword by Monica den Boer Acknowledgements List of abbreviations Introduction: deconstruction in progress: towards a better understanding of organized crime?

xi xii xv xviii xix 1

FELIA ALLUM AND PANOS A. KOSTAKOS

PART I

Discourse and definitions 1 Discoursing organized crime: towards a two-level analysis

13 15

FRANCESCA LONGO

2 The criminal not the crime: practitioner discourse and the policing of organized crime in England and Wales

29

CLIVE HARFIELD

3 The evolution of the European Union’s understanding of organized crime and its embedment in EU discourse

43

HELENA CARRAPIÇO

4 International policy discourses on transnational organized crime: the role of an international expertise AMANDINE SCHERRER

55

x

Contents

PART II

Perceptions 5 Transnational organized crime and the global security agenda: different perceptions and conflicting strategies

69 71

DANIELA IRRERA

6 Evolving perceptions of organized crime: the use of RICO in the United States

85


JOSEPH WHEATLEY

7 The Yakuza and its perceived threat

99

SAYAKA FUKUMI

8 The social perception of organized crime in the Balkans: a world of diverging views?

113

JANA ARSOVSKA AND PANOS A. KOSTAKOS

PART III

Reality 9 The fire behind the smoke: the realities of human trafficking in Northern Ireland

131 133

LOUISE DEEGAN

10 Organized crime in transition-era Bulgaria: the elites and the state

144

MARINA TZVETKOVA

11 Local politics and organized crime in contemporary Italy: willing or unwilling bedfellows?

161

FELIA ALLUM

12 The crime–terror nexus: do threat perceptions align with ‘reality’?

180

TAMARA MAKARENKO

Conclusion: getting to grips with the deconstruction of organized crime

194

DANIELA IRRERA AND FRANCESCA LONGO

Bibliography Index

200 224


Figures and tables

Figures 5.1 The diffusion of drug policies among EU members (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction) 7.1 An organizational chart of the Yakuza (author’s adaptation) 8.1 Interrelationship between identified threats in Kosovo (2006) (Cleland et al. 2006) 8.2 Economic situation in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia (2000–5) (Arsovska 2009) 8.3 Unemployment rates by sex and age group in Kosovo (2003–4) (Cleland et al. 2006) 8.4 Trust in government (International Commission on the Balkans 2005) 11.1 Organized crime and local politics in 2000s: ‘totalizing’ 12.1 The crime–terror nexus 12.2 Where/how the nexus poses a threat

79 101 118 119 120 120 178 185 186

Tables 6.1 International organized crime threats as identified by the Strategy 8.1 Most frequent ten collocates of ‘organized crime’ ranked by frequency (only lexical lemmas) 9.1 Newspaper articles on trafficking in Northern Ireland (2005–8) 11.1 Theoretical models 11.2 Number of councils dissolved due to Mafia infiltration (1991– 2007) 11.3 Dissolved councils per region (1991–June 2008) 11.4 Dissolved councils per province (1991–June 2008) 11.5 Number of councils dissolved twice (1991–2008) 11.6 Councils per region dissolved (2000–7)

95 117 141 164 166 167 168 169 170


Contributors

Felia Allum is a Lecturer in Politics and Italian at the University of Bath, UK where she is politics section coordinator. Her research interest are organized crime, Italian and European politics. She has published various articles on these topics in English, French and Italian academic journals as well her book, Camorristi, Businessmen and Politicians: the transformation of organized crime in post war Naples (Leeds: Maney Publisher, 2006). Together with Fabio Armao (Turin University) she set up the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group on Organized crime in 2001. Jana Arsovska is an Assistant Professor in International Criminal Justice in the Sociology Department at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York (CUNY) in New York. Her research interests are the role of cultural codes in the evolution of ethnic Albanian organized crime groups. She has published many articles on different aspects of organized crime in, among others, Global Crime and Trends in Organized Crime. Helena Carrapiço is a PhD researcher at the European University Institute (EUI), in Florence. She is currently working on the European Union’s understanding of organized crime as a threat and on the process of such construction. She is also a research assistant to Professor Friedrich Kratochwil, at the Department of Social and Political Sciences of the EUI. Louise Deegan completed her MA in European Studies at the University of Exeter in 2003, and is now researching a PhD in Politics on human trafficking in Northern Ireland. Her broader interests include international relations, international migration, transnational crime, EU policy and human trafficking. Sayaka Fukumi is a Lecturer in Security Studies at Asia University, Japan. Her research interests are in the field of non-traditional security threats, particularly transnational organized crime. Her book CocaineTrafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses was published in 2008 by Ashgate. Clive Harfield is an Associate Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia, where he is also a Research Associate in the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention. He has an operational

Contributors xiii


background in uniform policing, criminal investigation, intelligence management and covert operations and has served in various policing agencies at local, national and international level. His research interests include mutual legal assistance, international law enforcement cooperation, transnational criminal investigation and police intelligence, and through each of these arenas runs the common theme of human rights compliance. He is widely published on a number of policing and organized crime related topics (Covert Investigation, OUP, 2008; Intelligence: investigation, community and partnership, OUP, 2008). Daniela Irrera is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Catania, Italy. Her research interests are on transnational organized crime, political terrorism and global security. She is currently working on the influence of non-state actors in the peace missions deployed by international and regional agencies. Panos A. Kostakos is a doctoral candidate at the University of Bath. His thesis examines the historical and contemporary evolution of organized crime in relation to social transformations and capital accumulation in Greece. His is the author of various articles on illegal arms trade, cocaine smuggling, illegal migration and terrorism in the Southern and Eastern European contexts. Francesca Longo is Professor of Political Science and Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Public Policy at the University of Catania. She is a member of the Academic Board of the Doctoral Programme of Political Science – Comparative and European Politics, –at the University of Siena as well as being a member of the executive of the ECPR Standing Group on Organized Crime. Her current research interests are theories on the European Integration Process and on the Internal and External Security of the European Union. She has published extensively in this area. Tamara Makarenko is an Honorary Research Associate in the Politics Department at the University of Dundee. She is also a partner at West Sands Advisory LLP, a corporate intelligence firm. She has conducted research on the crime–terror nexus since 1996, and has published widely on related topics. Amandine Scherrer obtained her PhD in Political Science (Sciences Po – Paris) in 2007. She is currently an Honorary Research Fellow in Politics at the University of Manchester (UK). She has published extensively on transnational organized crime and policing and her first book G8 Against Transnational Organized Crime will be published in May 2009 by Ashgate. Marina Tzvetkova is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Advanced Study (CAS) in Sofia. She completed her MSc degree and her doctoral dissertation ‘Wrestling for Supremacy: the evolution of extra-legal protection in Bulgaria (1989–99)’ at the Department of Sociology, University of Oxford. Prior to that Marina worked on various projects related to human trafficking, including as a member of the European Commission Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings.

xiv

Contributors


Joseph Wheatley is a trial attorney in the US Department of Justice, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Washington. He has published various articles on the fight against organized crime in the US (in, for example, Policing, 2008 and Les Cahiers de la Securité Interieure, 2009).

Foreword


Monica den Boer1

Organized crime has become a core element of international law enforcement vocabulary and rhetoric. Semantically, however, the notion is still ambiguous in its meaning and interpretation, which translates itself in diversified law enforcement priorities and strategies across the globe. Despite the transnationalization of organized crime and the response of law enforcement authorities, what is generally regarded as organized crime is embedded in widely divergent local contexts, where politics, markets and culture present a wide range of challenges and opportunities for illicit activities. Perhaps it is a coincidence that the French school of the ‘écriture feminine’ adopted a strategy of difference and opposition and sought to deconstruct discourse with a view to disentangling and understanding the relationship between power, authority and language. Perhaps it is also a coincidence that the majority of authors in this book are female academics. By means of their collective effort to deconstruct organized crime into different discursive layers, including definitions, perceived realities and the rhetoric of law enforcement strategies, they have decomposed the body of a hybrid concept and have turned themselves into true masters of linguistic anatomy. This book tackles the issue from a variety of perspectives. One finding that emerges from several chapters is that the political and law enforcement discourse tends to be rather iterative when it concerns the use of the term organized crime. Repetition, almost verse-like, is an effective method of mentally ingraining the minds of professionals as well as that of the public. The frequency with which concepts are propelled into public space is a constructive element in building folktales and master narratives about organized crime, and supports a persuasive rhetoric when placed in the authoritative mouth of interlocutors like politicians and senior law enforcement officials. Hyperactive in the media and other public spaces, they are the legitimate preachers of powerful messages which can be massaged into several different shapes. One powerful discursive strategy is articulation and prioritization, particularly by describing organized crime as a phenomenon which continues to continue globally to a security deficit. Another discursive strategy, often used in combination with authoritative articulation, is that of concatenation. Organized crime verses are linked with other securitized domains, such as terrorism, radicalization


xvi

Foreword

and irregular migration, which turns into a conceivable nexus rhetoric and into the creation of security hybrids. A third discursive strategy, which also comes to the fore in this book, is the codification of the concept of organized crime in laws, regulations and training modules: concepts about the cause of and strategies against organized crime become discursive stills anchored in a codified body of transferable knowledge. Handbooks on the investigation of organized crime are authoritative sources in educational environments, and they are turned into dogmatic perspectives on how to handle criminal investigations. Hence, a fourth discursive strategy is to turn knowledge into operational practice: in other words, the analytical semantics are transformed into performative (speech-) acts. How we define and see it is how we do it. The chapters in this book invite the reader – be it an academic, lawyer or law enforcement professional – to perceive organized crime from a variety of angles. A ‘broken mirror’ perspective – which famous authors like Italo Calvino and Salman Rushdie have worked with – may help us in adopting a multi-perspective interpretation of organized crime. Individual and collective rationality may for instance lead to very different choices in different environments: in unstable, fragile, corruptive contexts which are marked by a chronic lack of education, employment and emancipation, individuals may encounter a very low threshold to enter venues of crime, and it may be difficult for them to exit the venue when attractive alternatives remain absent. A view from the bottom rather than the top also helps us in better understanding the deeper dynamics of organized crime: several communities are also ready to accept organized crime as a fact of life, especially in environments where governments are not trusted or regarded as failing in their capacity to provide essential public services to their citizens. Historical perspectives reveal yet other threads, for instance the sheer chameleontic fashion with which former paramilitary troops or terrorist organizations in war-ridden territories adapt to new circumstances, adopt new market opportunities, and even fold themselves neatly between the sheets of politics and administration. Several of these multicultural and historical perspectives have laid bare why organized crime can sometimes remain relatively immune to law enforcement intervention: simply because there are often too many business and administrative interests involved. The awareness and understanding of such an undercurrent rhyme helps us in identifying another dominant discursive strategy: that of de-articulation, de-prioritizing interest, de-mobilizing law enforcement effort, often accompanied by an all-too-often heard (not invalid) argument that police lack human resources and that the intelligence exchange is not yet up to standard. If there is one issue that everyone seems to agree on, it is that organized crime is a very complex phenomenon, which requires a coordinated international effort. But how to arrive at international – if only European – definitions of organized crime without harmonized international legislation? Within Europol, for instance, joint efforts are taken against organized crime against a pluralistic background of several national, cultural and professional perspectives. It is excessively difficult in such an environment to come at joint views, definitions and modus operandi, mainly because national law enforcement agencies nurture their own traditions and


Foreword xvii are not always happy with resetting priorities which may show a discrepancy with local, regional and national criminal justice agendas. Interesting in this regard is also the counter-current, whereby national politicians territorialize international forums for the promotion of anti-organized crime strategies, a battle which may be much more difficult to fight within the domestic arena where organized crime is often pushed off the limits of the attention radar. A dominant image which presents itself is that of various international bodies, multilateral forums and networks, where law enforcement professionals meet and greet and find a common place (if not safe haven) for the exchange of views about the tackling of organized crime. The cross-fertilization of law enforcement discourse that takes place within these venues is extremely interesting and provides further food for thought, but perhaps even more interesting is how international law enforcement training environments act as a vehicle for the dispersion of powerful professional vocabulary on organized crime. These processes are obviously subject to a great deal of politicization. This book also invites readers to go back to basics, and to resist the seduction to consume easily digestable narratives about organized crime. For instance, what is the evidence for the claim that organized crime groups have adopted a business model, and that they seek to expand and diversify? How true is the new mantra that organized crime groups have refashioned themselves into ad hoc, flexible, network-type coalitions? How reliable are signals that terrorist organizations create alliances with organized crime groups? Another task is the reconstruction of the rhetoric on emerging transnational organized crime (TOC) hybrids: are we not deliberately creating semi-intangible phenomena in order to conceal the relative lack of success against organized crime? All these questions are shrewd and unpopular questions, encouraged perhaps by an all too conspirational view. As an academic and interlocutor in international environments, I wish to take full responsibility for mystifying discourses about organized crime. Hence, my wish is that everyone who is even remotely interested in the dynamic of organized crime reads this book with great enthusiasm, resulting in the adoption of an even more reflective perspective on this deeply troubling social phenomenon. The challenge for the international community is ultimately how we can make life better for everyone, and how we can seek to make strategies of difference commensurate with strategies of convergence.

Note 1 Academic Dean of the Police Academy of The Netherlands and Professor on the Internationalization of the Police Function, VU University Amsterdam.


Acknowledgements

The editors would like to thank the authors for contributing to this project. They also like to thank the ECPR Standing Group on Organized Crime for their continuing support as well as the ECPR, without which this project would not have got off the ground. This book is dedicated to all those who suffer and who have suffered at the hands of ‘organized crime’.


Abbreviations

ACPO AFSJ BGDN DEA DOJ ECPR ESS EU FATF GangTECC HAC HMCE

ILEAs INL Interpol JHA MDW MOI NCIS NCS NGIC NSBOP NSS OCTA OSCE OSCG PCN PPP PSNI RCIB RCS

Association of Chief Police Officers of England and Wales Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Black Gangster Disciple Nation Drug Enforcement Agency Department of Justice European Consortium for Political Research European Security Strategy European Union Financial Action Task Force Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise (operated until April 2005; since then has been part of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, HMRC) International Law Enforcement Academies Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs International Criminal Police Organization Justice and Home Affairs Multidisciplinary Working Party on Organized Crime Ministry of the Interior National Crime Intelligence Service National Crime Squad National Gang Intelligence Center National Service for the Fight against Organized Crime National Security Strategy European Organized Crime Threat Assessment Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Organized Crime Strategy Group Political–Criminal Nexus Purchasing Power Parity Police Service of Northern Ireland Regional Criminal Intelligence Bureaux Regional Crime Squads

xx

Abbreviations


RICO SOBT SOCA TOC TSE UKHTC UN UNODC WMD

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Specialized Squad for the Fight against Terrorism Serious Organized Crime Agency transnational organized crime Tokyo Stock Exchange United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre United Nations United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime weapons of mass destruction

Introduction Deconstruction in progress: towards a better understanding of organized crime? Downloaded by [INFLIBNET Centre] at 06:06 30 August 2012

Felia Allum and Panos A. Kostakos This book is the result of collaboration within the ECPR Standing Group on Organized Crime which seeks to break down barriers between disciplines, nationalities, academics and practitioners working in the area of organized crime. There is a debate about the usefulness of this kind of project; however, we seek to develop a dialogue so that our understanding and ideas about organized crime can evolve in order to improve, in turn, the ‘fight against organized crime’. Many of the chapters in this volume were developed after discussions at the ECPR’s fourth general conference in Pisa in September 2007 where topics such as measuring organized crime, perceptions of organized crime and the relationship between organized crime and terrorism were examined. From these discussions, we were left intrigued by the relationship between political discourse, social perceptions and the reality of organized crime and wanted to pursue this further. In particular, using these concepts we wanted to deconstruct organized crime so that we can define and analyze it better, but also so that society and the polity can defy it more efficiently. Developing the notions of perception, discourse and reality, we contend that the dialectic between the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ reality leave us with puzzling problems about the way we study, define and analyze organized crime. Does organized crime exist? Can it be an objective fact or is it always a subjective interpretation? And as for reality, what is real in all this? The aims and objectives of this book are primarily to raise questions about the use of these different concepts in relation to organized crime. At the turn of the millennium, the French sociologist Alain Touraine (2000) posed an insightful problem: ‘Can we live together?’ The last decade’s explosion of terrorist attacks, conflicts and wars across the world, as well as the rapidly changing political, economic and social order, suggest that this is becoming increasingly difficult. Historians and political scientists have not hesitated to label the last century ‘the most cruel of all remembered in history’, during which violence and annihilation were employed to sustain, in Brzezinski’s words, ‘arrogantly irrational goals’ (1993: 5). In addition to new forms of terrorism, changing risks, threats and insecurities have emerged. From the extensive list of such risks, we can consider a handful of issues that have regularly appeared in the headlines, such as crime, poverty, random violence, fraud, epidemics, immigration, ecological disasters and food scandals.


2

F. Allum and P. A. Kostakos

Yet possibly no other issue has raised so much controversy as organized crime. Notwithstanding the hysteria and subjectivity that often precede public debate on the topic, there is little doubt that the changes we are witnessing have had a major impact on daily lives. Organized crime is often used as a portmanteau term to capture many of these new issues, which most countries are now facing. Like an ‘old school’ organized crime, that is to say, ‘rural banditry’, contemporary organized crime is a product of transformation and social change. Addressing the former, Hobsbawm explained: ‘[banditry] seems to occur in all types of human society which lie between the evolutionary phase of tribal and kinship organisation, and modern capitalist and industrial society’ (1969: 14). Indeed, the catalytic events of the 1990s, the opening of the EU’s political borders, the timeless problem of maintaining social order and the subsequent collective effort towards global policing have transformed the texture of society: ‘just as modernization dissolved the structure of feudal society in the nineteenth century and produced the industrial society, modernization today is dissolving industrial society and another modernity is coming into being’ (Beck 1992: 10). This new modernity is shadowed by a seeming decline in the sovereignty of the traditional territorial nation-state in comparison to previous epochs. States do not have the power to control all that is going on in their own territories or the capability to monitor everything and everyone who is crossing their borders. As in the pre-capitalist era, pockets of lawlessness exist in many countries, yet now most of these pockets are well-connected to global networks. The transformation of risk in meta-modern times undermines fundamental ideas which support the status quo of the current system. The power and sovereignty of the state and the idea that it can provide security are indeed being challenged. In a porous and state-centric world, with approximately half of the world’s population condensed in urban areas, it is inevitable that the state will increasingly be perceived as a ‘weak’ institution, disinclined or unready to manage these risks and consequently unable to provide and guarantee total protection and security to its citizens (United Nations 2007). Anxiety is readily evident in the ever-increasing discourse and global initiatives implemented by states and the institutions of global governance. Thus the ‘fight against organized crime and terrorism’, some would argue, has become the pièce de résistance of contemporary global policing. However, after reflection, we are confronted with the following question: is this yet another tendency of contemporary political rhetoric aiming to support ‘arrogantly irrational goals’? Security and insecurity are major concepts that we seek to understand and define. From a semantic point of view, there are different and multidimensional ways of conceptualizing what ‘security’ means. Referring to this problem, Zedner notes: Because security in either objective or subjective guises can rarely be said to be attained, the word ‘pursuit’, be it of national, military, public, community or personal safety, perhaps better describes the ongoing venture that is security. Finally, security has a symbolic quality which varies by, and within,

Introduction

3


jurisdictions, as well as over time. It is the product of local conditions and local understandings of what threatens and how best to protect against it. (2009: 13) This approach can help us to understand better organized crime which is a subform of security: if we look at the academic literature and practitioners’ experience, we see that organized crime exists both as an objective, measurable phenomenon but also as a subjective construction (by the media, novelists, law enforcement officers and academics, for example). It is not a pursuit in itself (such as money or power) but it has become a symbol of the darker side of modern capitalism in the twenty-first century. This pragmatic approach is best captured in the old proverb: ‘If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is probably a duck’. It is this general post-modern aspect of the objective-subjective dialectic of organized crime which we address in this book. Organized crime exists and affects lives. Of this there appears to be no doubt: victims see their livelihoods at stake and endure psychological and physical violence; the perpetrators – who are themselves victims of their own identity – run the risk of spending at best a lifetime in prison; drugs are produced and trafficked into large metropolitan markets; counterfeit goods are copied, mass produced and shipped off; arms are stolen, smuggled and sold; and illegal profits are made and recycled into the legal economy through complicated bank transactions, legal fronts and offshore bank accounts. However, as Kleemans and van de Bunt remind us, ‘organized crime does not operate within a social vacuum’ (1999: 19). Since the US’s ‘war’ against the five Mafia families in the 1930s and the subsequent efforts to institutionalize or Americanize this fight on a global scale, organized crime has become a permanent issue in civil society, political debate and election campaigns. Moreover, due to its intriguing and multifaceted nature, organized crime has entered into popular culture and, as such, is a phenomenon which is open to interpretation and is interpreted by all. The extent of this interpretation becomes even more comprehensible when we consider the exceptionally large segments of society, drug users, police officers, politicians, lawyers, businesses, NGOs, academics, journalists, to name only a few, which constitute the clientele of organized crime. Thus, by being a social phenomenon, it does not remain neutral, isolated, independent and detached from personal and institutional biases, political interests, culture and ideology. Following the American criminologist A. K. Cohen’s (1977: 100) initial reasoning, it has now become commonplace to regard the borderline/outline of organized crime as coterminous with that of society itself. Subsequently, we all are ‘organized crime’ and we all live, see, feel, perceive and articulate it in different ways. Let’s consider a few concrete examples which are indicative of how relative the ‘reality’ of organized crime is. First, the reality of ‘organized crime’ can be seen through the views of people who have been directly involved as actors in the process of organized crime, namely, the judiciary and offenders. Raffaele Cutolo, the former leader of the Camorra group la Nuova Camorra Organizzata (NCO), has always defended


4


his sister Rosetta’s role and participation in his group. In an interview with the Neapolitan newspaper Il Mattino he argued: ‘Rosetta has never been a camorrista … she only listened to me and sent a few suitcases [of money] to prisoners as I instructed her to do’ (4 November 1992). Another view of her role is provided by a close criminal associate of Raffaele who puts it like this: ‘What has Rosa Cutolo got to do with it, what have women got to do with the Camorra?’ (Sentenza Sabato Saviano + 142, 1985: 394). However, the investigating magistrate putting a case together to prosecute Rosa as a member of the NCO argues that: ‘the situation of La Cutolo has undoubtedly been influenced by her brother’s way of life … which by no means excludes the determination and skills which she deployed in the realization of the NCO’s projects’ (ibid; see also Allum 2006: 121). This example highlights the type of problems involved in trying to understand this social phenomenon. In sum, cross-cultural variations make it difficult to derive a general understanding of organized crime. Establishing what constitutes facts and motives in the courtroom setting becomes highly problematic. Second, there is the objective–subjective dialectic as visible in official perceptions of organized crime. Here we can consider an illustration of what appears to be a core difference within the EU in official perceptions regarding the links between crime and terrorism. Greece is one of the few – if not the only – EU country that regards (at the political and legislative level) ‘organized crime’ and ‘terrorism’ as two closely linked, almost identical phenomena. Indicative of this perception is the way in which political institutions have legislated on organized crime and terrorism over decades. A recent review of this legislation demonstrates that the official perception-definition of ‘criminal organization’ extends to both organized crime and ‘terrorist’ groups. Legislation and the political debate on the issue of controlling criminal organizations in Greece reflect primarily political concerns that derive from the activities of groups and networks with hybrid political and criminal characteristics. In 1946, amid an outbreak of ‘criminal’ incidents involving multi-ethnic rural banditry, a newspaper headline quoted the then head of the government, Mr Gonatas, as saying: ‘We are up against an organized conspiracy against the state’ (1946: 4). Some 60 years later and following an unprecedented outbreak of riots, looting, kidnappings, bombings, prison breaks, social theft and other violent incidents, the current Prime Minister, Karamanlis, maintains a similar view: ‘It is proven – and this is apparent from the arrests – that extremism and common crime are “linked containers”’ (2009). Third, there exist variations in perceptions of organized crime among scholars. It is not an overstatement to note that ‘there seem to be as many descriptions … as there are authors’ (J. S. Albanese quoted in Allum 2006: 1). The American historian Charles Tilly, who drew parallels between the successes of nation-states, war making and protection, provides us with another good example of different perceptions of organized crime. He critically states: ‘If protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war-making and state-making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of organized crime’ (1985: 169, 170).

Introduction

5


His view on what constitutes organized crime deviates from most mainstream definitions, which reject the ideological basis of organized crime, and is certainly in contrast with most official state perceptions and definitions of organized crime. It seems unrealistic, not to say naïve, to expect that ‘state-organized crime’, as defined by William Chambliss (1989) in his 1988 Presidential address to the American Society of Criminology, will ever become recognized in law as a criminological category. Our example here indicates the extent to which organized crime is pliant to perceptions, reasoning, culture, power and ideology. So where does this leaves us?

A ‘critical turn’: neither cop nor state? Robert Merton argued that there are two sets of independent bodies of theory which are consciously or unconsciously employed when carrying out empirical social research: first, questions about specific phenomena and, second, questions about the accumulation of evidence about these phenomena (quoted in Tilly 2002: 249). The same typology applies to the study of organized crime. If we are to investigate, for instance, the links between ethnicity and organized crime, we need first to conceive of a theory of this relationship, and second to proceed with the research, having in mind a theory of how knowledge on the links between organized crime and ethnicity come into being. The relationship between these two theories is evident. However, the study of organized crime is mostly preoccupied with theorizing questions and concepts in the first category, while the second one is often taken for granted. It is evident that the literature on models, paradigms and images of organized crime has a much greater impact on academic debate than the literature on how knowledge and evidence of these events or models come into existence. The same reasoning applies to the increasing literature on the structure of organized crime, the expansion of related activities and criminal markets. This is supported by a recent content analysis of 66 international publications on that topic (von Lampe, et al. 2006). Once a ‘social problem’ emerges in the public discourse as a ‘security threat’, there are strong incentives to politicize the phenomenon. In the final analysis, the executive branches of the state care mostly about results, maintaining social order, press headlines and voters’ satisfaction with the government and the political system. Consequently, some aspects of this ‘security threat’ become more popular than others. As a result a hegemonic discourse emerges which is not necessarily guided by reason and objectivity but driven by political agendas, ideology and pragmatism. To put it simply, the reality of organized crime is to some degree constructed by the ‘policy-oriented empiricism’ which predominates. There is one strand of thinking that suggests that subsequent to this period of epistemological flux, criminology has, because of changes in the funding mechanisms for such research, become committed to routine research competence in the service of policy-oriented empiricism (POE). Sheptycki (1998: 485)


6


Indeed, there are many organized crime scholars who have collaborated with parliamentary committees in the past and subsequently published their findings, triggering considerable debate in academic circles. The symbiosis between organized crime scholars and the state requires further attention and research to improve our understanding and correct the distortion caused when ‘talking like cops’. Innovation in the study of organized crime has always been scarce in comparison with other research fields. It is perhaps more convincing to argue that it takes time for organized crime scholars to borrow innovative concepts from other research fields and apply them to the study of organized crime. It took time for scholars to realize that the reality of organized crime is ‘trapped in the folds of discourse’ (Kelly 1992). Subsequently, over the past couple of years there has been a slow but constant flow of research based on constructive criticism of issues relating to gender, race, ethnicity, social class and political agendas in relation to organized crime. The main idea behind this ‘critical turn’ is the notion famously encapsulated by Gilbert and Suillivan that ‘things are seldom what they seem, skimmed milk masquerades as cream’. The proposition that the threat posed by organized crime and mafias are constructed by sensational press coverage and influenced by political (electoral) motives is not new. Donald Cressey, who is regarded as one of the scholars behind the construction of the image of La Cosa Nostra, explains: it is only a slight exaggeration to say that ‘a social problem was created because certain data were assembled’, rather than ‘data on a social problem were assembled’. From this perspective, one important goal of the Commission’s Task Force on Organized Crime was the creation of a social problem … A social scientist who is given access to information ordinarily inaccessible must be prepared to shift his role from that of scientist to ‘social problem perceiver’ and then to ‘social problem creator’. (1967: 106) This turn in our thought signifies primarily a critique of the dominant theory of knowledge justified by ‘policy-oriented empiricism’. Concepts such as discourse and perceptions are gaining scholarly interest while retaining a constant effort to understand the claims that mirror reality. Several authors have addressed some of these issues, such as Woodiwiss (2000) who identified different trends in the discourses elaborated in the US since the beginning of the twentieth century. Recently, he argued (2003) that the US has developed the discourse of transnational organized crime in order to justify its foreign policy. Edwards and Gill have also identified competing international discourses about transnational organized crime and were interested in understanding how ‘social-political problems can be narrated and what it is about such narratives that interest or repel potential political support’ (2002b: 250). Sheptycki goes further and suggests that ‘the problematics of immigration, terrorism and drugs have been fused together in the discourse of transnational organized crime’ (2003: 131). We are interested in deconstructing organized crime using these three concepts: discourse, perception and reality.

Introduction

7


Our use of different ‘looking glasses’: reality, perception and discourse Each of these terms is problematic: ‘reality’ would appear to be the less contested of the three and yet it is just as complex as the other two. It would appear indeed that reality can be defined as a measurable, ‘objective’ fact: there are undeniable facts which can clearly be interpreted and distorted, but there are some quite simple facts which exist when it comes to the reality of organized crime: organized crime gangs use violence, they undertake murders, they terrorize and threaten citizens in different ways, they sell commodities in the marketplace. Law enforcement agencies, journalists and researchers will analyze these facts differently for their different purposes. Law enforcement officers use their information to prosecute, journalists use it to relay information and engage with their readers and researchers use the information to understand it better. However, while it can be argued that reality is objective, neutral, measurable and a fact, everyone will see it differently and digest it differently. From a pragmatic point of view, realities shape, inform and produce public discourse and social perceptions. They are the starting point but at the same time are interpretations of how we see society and the world. Social perception is a very abstract concept to define. But it is important for us to try to define it if we can. Social perception is a psychological-biological phenomenon. Whereas both reality and discourse are outside of the body, reality is what we see but is also there and discourse is what is narrated about something else. Social perception is the product of interaction between the inner self (mind, stimuli) and the outer environment. There are two main approaches to analyzing social perception: the structuralist approach, which believes that ‘perceptions derive from elementary sensations’ (Zebrowitz 1990: 4) and is ‘data driven’, and the constructivist approach, which argues that we need to go beyond biological sensations: ‘perceptions are “holistic” and “theory-driven”’ (p. 5). They are ‘organized and constructed by the mind’ (p. 5) and therefore ‘reflect(s) the constructive processes of a perceiver, who actively imposes a holistic structure on the observable cues’ (p. 5). An ecological approach combines both these approaches but in this book we adopt a constructivist approach. Indeed, Jussim believes that social perception has an influence on social reality when he argues ‘social perception is a major force in the creation (construction) of social reality’ (1991: 54). Everyone and everything has a personal discourse, a narrative: a specific way of talking about themselves, their environment and the way they interact with the world around them. It is because of this that discourse is, as Richardson points out, ‘a contested concept’ (2007: 21). In this book, we are specifically focusing on institutional discourse on organized crime; in other words, how different national and international political institutions and law enforcement agencies define, formulate and use language to describe, deal with and tackle organized crime. There are two main approaches to discourse analysis: first, a formalist or structuralist approach which looks at the features which link sentences together; the formal features which make two sentences ‘a discourse rather than just two unconnected

8



phrases’ (Richardson 2007: 22). The second approach, and the one we are interested in, is the functionalist-narrative approach: this approach sees language as ‘active’. It is the analysis of what people do with language. In this approach language is used to mean something and to do something and that this ‘meaning’ and ‘doing’ are linked to the context of its usage … we need to do more than analyse the interrelations of sentences and how they hang together as a cohesive text … We need to work out what the speaker or writer is doing through discourse and how this ‘doing’ is linked to wider inter-personal, institutional, socio-cultural and material contexts. (Richardson 2007: 24) In the last two decades, different schools of thought using discourse analysis and theory have developed in political science, inspired by post-Marxism and Foucault (such as Fairclough 1989). This approach developed so much that Gootenberg noted that academics in the 1990s believed ‘that social realities are wholly constructed by the language, categories or representations used to depict them, and, hence that everything, somehow, is intrinsically functional to social or state control’ (2009: 20). The view that language is an engine of action in its own right is becoming more credible. The implications of this statement have a profound effect on research design and on our findings and understanding of organized crime. Simply put, it means that we should search to find truths by studying the language. Sheptycki explains: Apparently, crime is now ‘transnational’ – rather than ‘national’ or ‘international’ – and it is ‘organized’, as opposed to ‘random’ or ‘disorganized’. These categories represent an important shift in somebody’s thinking. In accepting them, we are accepting not merely their neat phonetic arrangement but, much more importantly, the assumptions built into them[;] these terms are a way of looking at the world. (2003: 121) In this book, we will use the looking glasses of institutional discourse, social perception and reality which will allow us to take a step back to see, understand and hopefully defy organized crime better.

Taking a step back ‘Through the Looking Glass’ Organized crime exists, and we do not want to diminish its importance or understate its current threat. In-depth studies are fundamental and are to be encouraged, but so are studies that take a step back and deconstruct the phenomenon. By identifying the discourses, the perceptions and the reality, we hope to see organized crime in a clearer way. However, these are complicated and abstract concepts and thus controversial: it is probable that not everyone will accept or agree with our definitions and approach.


Introduction

9

The aims of this book are also to contribute to the debate on organized crime as a security threat. The question is what kind of security threat. We believe that the lenses of discourse-perception-reality are helpful, as they can help us to question the different aspects of organized crime. We believe that there is a relationship between our three terms discourse, perception and reality, but that they are forever changing and mutating. There are different ways of using them and they are controversial, subjective and loaded. In this book, we have organized our chapters into three sections, adopting a ‘top-down approach’; we start our analysis at a general level and then zoom in on specific cases at the local level. In Part One, ‘Discourse and definitions’, we look at the question of definitions and at the institutional discourse of organized crime involving national, European and international actors. We seek to show how discourses are not only not neutral but loaded and shaped, and also influence greatly social perceptions. Francesca Longo in her chapter on definitions asks a lot of questions about the state of research on organized crime. She challenges traditional approaches and institutional discourse and believes that the way forward is to develop a partnership between academics and practitioners so that we can define and defy organized crime better together. This gap and difference of approach/ opinion has existed too long between academics working on organized crime and practitioners. She proposes a helpful two-level approach which might aid us to analyze organized crime in a more efficient manner: this model seeks to answer the questions ‘who?’ and ‘how?’. Level 1 adopts an organizational approach to organized crime gangs and level 2 adopts a social network approach to understand the dynamics of transnational gangs. The other three chapters in this part engage with problems relating to institutional discourse: the origins and the development of institutional discourse and what influences them. Clive Harfield presents a chronological overview of aspects of the development of institutional discourse in the policing of organized crime in Britain since the 1960s. He examines how ‘police practitioners themselves have contributed to the debate and to the formation of official policy in respect of organized crime’ by drawing upon a variety of official sources. In demonstrating the origin and evolution of the ‘criminal not the crime’ mantra so often asserted by those policing organized crime, the sources reveal a practitioner debate characterized by agency, political agendas and performance accountability frameworks rather than by organizational understanding of the nature of organized crime and how it might best be addressed. In illustrating that intelligence and understanding of the problem has always taken second place to the prosecution of individuals, the sources also give rise to the question of whether the policing of organized crime has ever been truly intelligence-led. Although not evident on the basis of the official sources examined here, Harfield argues that practitioners can play an active part in the understanding of organized crime and the development of institutional discourse, but they must be given the strategic freedom and resources to do so. Helena Carrapiço moves from the local to the international level and analyzes the evolution of the institutional discourse of the European Union on organized crime. She explains how this discourse originated and developed: she identifies a


10


shift away from random police cooperation to a set of EU institutionalized policies which form part of a more general securitization trend present in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. She adopts a social constructivist approach to argue that organized crime policy in the EU is constructed through a specific discourse and understanding of the concept of security. Amandine Scherrer tackles another aspect of institutional discourse: who influences, shapes and actually constructs discourse? She argues that institutional discourse at international level, in particular at the G8/Lyon Group, is shaped by a small intimate circle of restricted experts. She is very critical of the power of these experts to elaborate discourse in this area because of the lack of transparency and accountability which surrounds them. She warns against these problems. Part Two, ‘Perceptions’, seeks to understand and question social perceptions of organized crime. Social perceptions are very abstract and complex to measure and quantify. For this reason the perceptions addressed in the various chapters relate more to the relationship between perception and institutional discourse than simply the social perceptions of organized crime in different countries. Daniela Irrera in her chapter analyzes transnational organized crime (TOC) in the context of the international security agenda and argues that social perceptions of organized crime change while the international institutional discourse remains confused and incoherent. She argues that there is not a common international perception or discourse but ‘any internationalization process of crime definition and crime control is the outcome of the export of domestic perceptions and definitions’. Therefore the only way to bridge the ‘gap between discourse and perception of TOC’ is to adopt a multilateral approach which reconciles these abstract and complex differences. Jana Arsovska and Panos Kostakos, using a top-down and bottom-up approach, examine both EU and Balkan perceptions of organized crime, arguing that different realities emerge when one looks at the two perspectives. They compare the EU perceptions of organized crime as reflected in the language of more than 1,000 EU press releases, with the social perceptions of the phenomena in the Balkans as recorded by public surveys. Their findings indicate significant disparities between the two views. They point to the paradox that the source of this perceptual disparity about organized crime is rooted in the same political condition, namely the development of a strong institutional identity for the EU and the effort to develop sovereign nation-states in the Balkans. Joseph Wheatley explores evolutions in the use of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law (RICO) in prosecuting organized crime groups in the US. Use of the RICO law, originally enacted to dismantle the American Mafia, has evolved as the country’s perceptions of organized crime have evolved. In recent years, street gangs and international organized crime groups have been identified by the federal government as threats meriting a concerted federal response. This shift in perception may be attributed in part to society’s own growing recognition of the threats. The RICO law possesses considerable flexibility to prosecute members and associates of these new and emerging criminal groups, since the law names no particular group as liable for prosecution. Sayaka Fukumi describes and analyzes the changing perception of the Japanese Yakuza pre- and post-1991


Introduction

11

which she argues has taken place. She argues that 1991 represents an important milestone thanks to the introduction of anti-organized crime law (Bouryoku-dan Taisaku-hou) which changed and affected the social perception of this criminal organization. Pre-1991, the Yakuza was generally accepted by society but after the introduction of the law, it was perceived as an enemy to society because the law clearly identified the Yakuza as a criminal organization. In Part Three, ‘Reality’, less visible and less stereotypical aspects of the reality of organized crime are presented and analyzed. However, we must note that while this part is entitled ‘reality’, the reality presented is a subjective one as it is elaborated by different authors. What they have tried to do is to present facts that are removed from institutional discourses and social perceptions. Louise Deegan analyzes the reality of human trafficking in Northern Ireland as a form of organized crime. She argues that there is a lot of media hype about these types of crimes but the question she asks is whether this is well-founded. What is the reality? Is it that bad? She seeks to ‘capture a picture of the situation’. After having defined human trafficking, she focuses on the case of Northern Ireland. While it is clear that this is a complex case study due to the presence of paramilitary groups, she identifies five perceived realities which she examines to show how real they are. She concludes that ‘human trafficking is a reality’, but argues that it is very difficult to eliminate it if we have problems determining its existence. Moreover, researchers still base their research on ‘perceived threats’ and therefore their analysis remains limited. This chapter ‘looks behind the smoke’. Marina Tzvetkova and Felia Allum’s chapters touch upon two very similar realities which are often ignored in Western Europe: the relationship between political and economic elites and organized crime groups in Bulgaria and Italy. Bulgaria is a new member of the EU and Italy is a founding member; they both have realities of political-organized crime corruption at local and national level. Marina Tzvetkova highlights the importance of these economic-political elites in the development of organized crime in Bulgaria. They provided the basic conditions without which none of these corrupt networks could have developed. Felia Allum also shows how Italy, a so-called modern democracy, has a serious organized crime problem. She concentrates on understanding the mechanisms of the relationship between local politicians and organized criminals. She argues that even with the introduction of anti-mafia laws in the early 1990s and new police and judicial tools to fight organized crime, the relationship between local politicians and organized criminals is flourishing more than ever and, in some cases, a true union of interests and agendas has taken place even more than in the 1990s. It is a sinister reality. Tamara Makarenko analyzes the relationship between the social perceptions of the crime–terror nexus and reality. Do they match up? In particular, she asks whether the interaction of a nexus increases the security threat or acts to make the two more efficient as a combined criminal force. She challenges the lack of interest and attention paid to this reality and believes it should be taken as a serious threat-reality. These four chapters help to understand different aspects of the reality which is organized crime, aspects often ignored or misunderstood by state institutions, the media and academic researchers.

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What we have tried to do in this edited book is present some aspects of organized crime using new looking glasses that have not often been used. We hope to have raised some questions which will contribute to the academic debate on organized crime and hope to have put organized crime back on the political agenda so that we can both define it and defy it better – and, more importantly, make sure that it does not continue to destroy society, the economy and politics.


Part I

Discourse and definitions


1

Discoursing organized crime Towards a two-level analysis


Francesca Longo

A systematic investigation into the activities for tackling organized crime shows that we need to understand it better and this means understanding its key features today, in particular its transnational dimension, as well as describing its specific local features. If the perceived threat of organized crime, and of TOC in particular, has increased in importance on the agenda of policy-makers and social scientists in the last two decades, there is as yet little consensus over the definitions, the key characteristics and the appropriate models which should be used for controlling them (see Edwards and Gill 2002b). Organized crime is a very complex phenomenon: it affects the social, economic, political and cultural spheres and the attempts to provide an adequate definition of this concept have given rise to a very controversial debate. ‘Complexity’, as a specific dimension of organized crime, could be considered as an impediment to reaching a shared definition of the concept. Von Lampe lists over 100 definitions of organized crime on his website ‘Organized Crime Research’,1 stressing that several difficulties arise in finding a generally accepted definition of organized crime because of the wide range of relevant but different variables of which it is composed (von Lampe 2001). Some authors have even questioned the scientific usefulness of such a concept (van Duyne 1996a). Nevertheless, if ‘complexity’ is adopted as an epistemological perspective, it connotes a multi-factor and contextual analysis aimed at understanding the multifaceted phenomenon through a systemic approach. The definition of theoretical foundations and conceptual parameters of organized crime/TOC using an analysis aimed at explaining the complexity and the characteristics of the term is necessary for two reasons. First, there is a methodological requirement of finding an exclusive meaning of a term which is not yet unanimously defined either by those scientific disciplines involved in this topic or by the different judicial systems (see Burnham 2004; Peters 1998; Sartori, Riggs and Teune 1975). International relations, sociology, criminology, international law, penal law, among other disciplines, have organized crime on their research agenda. Each of these fields of study engages in a definitional debate about the features that distinguish this kind of criminality from other forms of illegal activity. This debate has long been a source of contention probably because each discipline has different scientific requirements. A clearly defined term able to capture the complexity of the structures, activities and social


16

F. Longo

context of organized crime/TOC could facilitate collaboration between different disciplines and activate a synergic action or energy between them. Second, efforts aimed at conceptualizing organized crime and TOC are associated with the relationship between academics and practitioners and, in a broader sense, with the connection between ‘science’ and ‘reality’. In particular, the debate is about whether the ultimate aim of research activities and findings has been to help policy-makers. Should scholarly research settle on policy aims? Or should it produce ‘pure’ knowledge? This chapter is based on the notion that academia and practitioners need to engage in a continual dialogue in the field of TOC: practitioners would gain from a consolidated scientific knowledge and academics would find data and research incentives from the practical activity. Our academic task is therefore to search for a theoretical definition of organized crime which helps towards the production of useful knowledge aimed at increasing the effectiveness of counter-organized crime policies. A common definition is considered a preliminary step in order to look more systematically at the subject of TOC and to organize a policy agenda in a more coherent way. As Feltes argues ‘if we do not share a common understanding of organized crime, we are not able to analyse it properly because we are not able to find the necessary theoretical framework’ (2008: 152). Academics need to know what they are searching for and practitioners need to know what they are fighting in order to find the best solution at national and international levels. A common definition of organized crime does not even exist in different national and international juridical systems and law enforcement agencies. This lack of a theoretical as well as an operational definition generates scientific and policy problems because how the problem of organized crime is defined goes a long way toward determining how laws are framed, how investigations and prosecutions are conducted, how research studies are done, and, increasingly, how mutual legal assistance across national borders is or is not rendered. (Finckenauer 2005: 68) In this chapter, we develop a two-level approach for the analysis of TOC: the first level focuses on the definition of organized crime as a specific form of criminality; and the second level focuses on the study of the process of ‘transnationalization’ (here it is intended as a mode of behaviour adopted by organized crime groups in order to adapt to the global system and exploit fully the incentives of a globalized market). To do this, we present an overview of the various definitions of organized crime and TOC as they have developed in the social sciences since the 1960s (Albanese 2004). In addition, an analysis of the various meanings that organized crime and TOC have had in international documents since the beginning of the 1990s is also presented. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to test and verify whether a two-level approach is feasible either at the theoretical level or at the operational level in order to link, with a semantic and theoretical interaction between science and institutions, the study and the practice of the organized crime tackling policy agendas and governance.

Discoursing organized crime 17


Approaches to organized crime in the social sciences Before looking at the different schools of thought that study organized crime, it may be helpful to outline our understanding of organized crime. Finckenauer (2005) lists and illustrates eight analytic defining variables of organized crime: lack of ideology, structure/organized hierarchy, continuity, violence/use of force or the threat of force, restricted membership, illegal enterprises, penetration of legitimate businesses and corruption. The first feature can help to illustrate the difference between organized crime and terrorism. Even if organized crime and terrorist groups may collaborate and exchange illegal goods, nevertheless organized crime groups ‘did not have political agendas of their own … They did not espouse a particular radical, liberal, conservative, or other political ideology. Their interest in government was only in its nullification – through bribery, payoffs and corruption’ (Finckenauer 2005: 65). The hierarchical structure and the continuity of the organization, despite the disappearance of specific individuals who are replaced by others, gives organized crime a well-defined collective identity and collective tasks, and permit it to adapt to changes in the external environment. The use of force and corruption are to be considered as complementary tools for acquiring power and controlling territory. A restricted membership in organized crime groups is based on ‘relations of ritual kinship’ (Paoli 2001: 94) that imply a lifelong commitment for its members and that is generally formalized through a ritual of affiliation in many cases. The violence, use of force and intimidation strategies compel some scholars to consider organized crime as an ‘anti-state’ activity which threatens national institutions’ capability to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In this perspective, organized crime is to be considered a political challenge to the state and its role of governing and controlling territory: ‘it has been a mafia that has assumed responsibility for such otherwise governmental functions as contracting for public works, dispute resolution (via an informal court system), and especially for providing protection (Finckenauer 2005: 74). If organized crime is considered as a kind of criminality which needs to exercise territorial control, use or threaten violence, and use deterrent methods in order to make economic profits and, at the same time, maintain its influence, it could be argued that these objectives are only reached with a stable and hierarchical organization made up of institutionalized roles going beyond the participation of specific individuals. Nevertheless, Catanzaro (1993: 162) stresses that the use of violence as a form of territorial control needs a centralized organization in order to be effective but, at the same time, the good fit of the organizational dimension is located at sub-national level in order to avoid direct conflict with the state. Catanzaro argues that organized crime is not interested in defeating the national state. Rather, it needs a weak state system to succeed in its activities. The local dimension of organized crime is useful for preventing conflicts with the central institutions but, at the same time, it represents an obstacle to profit and organizing activities in a globalized economic system. In this perspective, a contradiction stems from organized crime’s need to


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maintain a sub-national dimension of the organization and, at the same time, to act in a global economic system and to link its performances and strategy with global economic activities. At this point, the focus shifts from the definition and analysis of organized crime as a national or local phenomenon to the definition and analysis of TOC or the supposed transnational dimension of organized crime. The two-level approach proposes a framework for the definition of organized crime and its transnational dimension passing through two methodological stages. The first stage focuses on the identification of the semantic meaning of the term ‘organized crime’ by looking at the analytical variables which distinguish this phenomenon from other forms of criminality. The second stage seeks to specify the conceptual ‘transnational’ dimension in terms of identification of the specific dynamics which permit the identification of organized crime as part of transnational processes and as an issue for the global political agenda.2 The search for a theoretical definition of organized crime by social scientists has given rise to five main approaches to this topic. Each one of them starts from a different ontological vision of the phenomenon and produces many different ways of defining and understanding it. The first approach uses organizational theory for the study of organized crime. It considers organized crime as a classical organization and emphasizes the associative dimension as the main variable of this kind of illicit activity. It focuses on the permanent and well-defined associational structure, on the existence of collective tasks, on the division of work among its members and on the reproduction of the internal roles over time by processes of internal socialization and adaptation to the external environment. In this theoretical framework, the organizational variables, such as the degree of formalization, hierarchy, differentiation and flexibility, have variously been used to stress the differences between organized crime and other forms of criminality (Lyman and Potter 2000). Johnson (1962) stresses the continuity of criminal conduct as the main descriptive element. Reuter meanwhile defines organized crime as ‘organizations that have durability, hierarchy and involvement in a multiplicity of criminal activities’ (1983: 175). The second approach adopts the ‘patron–client’ model of relationships among members of the groups as the main feature of organized crime (Mcillwain 1999: 303) and as a conceptual foundation for understanding the practice of corruption (Matjaž 2004). The third approach is based on a different epistemological perspective: it moves from the analysis of the structure to the analysis of the objectives: it conceptualizes organized crime starting from its specific aims which have an entrepreneurial nature. According to this view, organized crime is an economic and financial enterprise which adopts rational, even if illegal, choices and strategies aimed at maximising benefits and reducing costs of its (illegal) business, following the economics rationale. As Smith (1975) pointed out illicit enterprise is, at the same time, the response to a latent illicit demand and an extension of the legal market beyond the limits of law. In this approach, we can discern two main groups of theorists. The first group (Arlacchi 1983; Hess 1973) describes an historical evolution of organized crime which moves away from a ‘traditional form’ towards


Discoursing organized crime 19 ‘entrepreneurial crime’. Traditional organized crime used power to protect specific interests, punishing ‘deviant’ behaviour and providing social mediation in a traditional environment. Since the 1970s, organized crime has transformed itself into an ‘entrepreneurial mafia’ which has accumulated capital and entered the production of services and goods, transferring the ‘mafia methods’ (Arlacchi 1983: 109) into the national economy by gaining sustainable competitive advantages through illegal activities. The second group considers the entrepreneurial nature as the original feature of organized crime which is to be considered as an illegal firm acting in the national economy from its formation (Catanzaro 1988). Paoli (2002) contests the concept of organized crime as a well-organized large-scale collectivity primarily engaged in supplying illegal commodities and services. She claims that the definitions of ‘criminal organization’ and ‘provision of illegal goods and services’ must be kept separate. She argues that organized crime is heavily involved in illegal businesses, but that this kind of criminality is not the product of illegal market dynamics. The absence of rules, controls and security in the illicit market makes it very unlikely that the establishment of an organized illicit framework for supplying illicit good and is largely carried out in an unorganized way. Moreover ‘the very criminal organizations that are assumed to be the prototype of organized crime … cannot be reduced to their involvement in illegal entrepreneurial activities’ in that these groups existed prior to ‘the formation and expansion of modern illegal markets’ (Paoli 2001: 63) and they have played many non-economic roles: protection from their own threats or from other threats, or supplying of votes, among others (Paoli 2001). The fourth approach adopts a social network theory in the study of organized crime. Mcillwain (1999) stresses the relevance of the relationships that link people in the organized crime structure and defines this latter as a social system based on a set of relationships among individuals and groups aimed at providing illegal goods and services. In this perspective, organized crime is considered as a set of multiplex, fluid and interdependent network connections. The patterns of the relationships are dependent on the environment in which organized crime is structured. Block states ‘mafia could not have become what it was independently of these other groupings with which mafiosi formed specific configurations of interdependent individuals’ (Block 1974: 9). The role of ‘power brokers’ that organized crime plays between individuals and groups which do not have direct reciprocal relationships and which use the mafiosi as the intermediary node has been described by Block (1974) and Hess (1973). This model derives from the description of organized crime in terms of interpersonal power relationships based on a main person, the capo-mafia, who manages the network structure through the monopoly of communication. The capo-mafia has dyadic relationships with each single individual of the network and the connection among the people of the network forms an ‘ego-centric model’: individuals are connected to each other via a single intermediary node, the capo-mafia. According to this approach, organized crime is a sort of ‘confederation’ of several dyadic relationships in which one of the components is always the capo-mafia (Catanzaro 1993). The last approach applies systems theory to the analysis of organized crime. It

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considers organized crime as a complex societal phenomenon and analyzes it with the conceptual tools of system analysis. Scarpinato (1996) defined organized crime as a criminal complex system, made up of connecting criminal power subsystems, able to elaborate long-term global strategies and to react to the changes in the external environment. Bruno (1993: 70) states it is more helpful to substitute the expression organized crime with criminal system (Armao 2000; Allum 2006).


TOC: towards a new dimension of organized crime? The outcome of our conceptual analysis, therefore, is twofold. Some defining variables of the concept of organized crime have been identified which sometimes conflict with each other. At the same time, a core notion of organized crime has emerged as a result of a combined analysis of two different dimensions. The first one concerns the ontological dimension of the phenomenon and refers to the shape of the structure framing the criminal activities. These comprise the durable organization, the collective tasks, the stability over time and the restricted membership. These are the ontological variables describing the specific nature of organized crime.3 The second dimension concerns some distinctive modalities of behaviour in order to achieve the collective tasks: the use of violence to secure obedience and impose its order and rules; the strong control of the territory of influence; the linkages with the licit economy; and the political organizations which, in same countries, are involved in money-laundering activities, the infiltration of legal business; the affiliation of political personnel; the gathering of votes, the control of public contracts. As a result, the expression ‘organized crime’ should be used to refer to those criminal groups that have all these dimensions so as to avoid including in the theoretical category of organized crime other forms of criminality. The suggestion by Paoli (2004: 27) of discussing theory and the practice of defining and fighting new forms of ethnic entrepreneurial crime as if they were organized crime is important and relevant. If the definition of organized crime is pertinent in order to clarify the empirical evidence and, at the same time, to identify the juridical meaning of a very frequently stereotyped concept, the conceptualization of TOC has to be developed in order to explain the new forms of illicit transnational activities. In this sense, the most appropriate perspective for reaching an understanding of what constitutes TOC is to search for the existence (or absence) of some distinctive elements which transform occasional alliances among national organized crime groups into transnational crime that, as affirmed by the United Nations, is ‘a new dimension of more “traditional” forms of organized crime’ and ‘has emerged as one of the most alarming … challenges for the safety of humanity’ (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1994: 3). The notion of ‘transnational’ is generally used in the study of international relations to refer to those non-governmental actors who operate across national boundaries or to those actions carried on across national boundaries by non-governmental actors (Risse-Kappen 1995). Keohane and Nye (1971) defined transnational relations as networks and associations that transcend national societies while fostering


Discoursing organized crime 21 connections between various groups, communities and nation-states. The concept of TOC must come either from the identification of a global criminal organization acting across national frontiers (actor-based definition) or from the recognition that transnational illicit movements and dynamics exist (action-based definition). As Sheptycki notes (2003) the concept of TOC emerged in the 1990s from a complex process of interlinked historical conjunctures coming from the end of the Cold War order with the rise of the perception of the globalization of all kinds of movements. The ‘pax mafiosa’ (Sterling 1994) labels the phenomenon of alliances among national organized crime groups which worked together since the early 1990s transcending national borders, dividing the transnational illicit business between them and violating the jurisdictions of several countries. Giovanni Falcone (Falcone and Padovani 1993) described the operational link strategy4 which he discovered during his investigations of the Sicilian Mafia whose aims were to rationalize the use of the Mafia’s economic and human resources and activity in a globalized economy. The drawing up of the pax mafiosa (Sterling 1994) between national organized crime groups went beyond the phase of conflicts to established cooperative relationships based on the division of labour, areas of influence and common strategies on some issues such as global money-laundering activities and illicit financial transactions. The ‘transnational’ feature started to be delineated or outlined by the setting up of a stable agreement among ethnic groups with the aim of facilitating transactions through a division of tasks and common use of logistical facilities. The question of the characteristics of this agreement is a key point for understanding what TOC is and how organized it is. If Sterling’s approach stresses the pax mafiosa, a global conspiracy which reflects at global level the hierarchical model of national organized crime groups, Phil Williams describes a paradigm for defining TOC ‘centered around the networks that organize the supply of illicit goods and services, the theft and trafficking of licit goods and the unrestricted trafficking of restricted commodities’. TOC is the result of the structuring of cooperative links among organized crime national organizations for facilitating flows of information, providing facilities and enlarging the scope and the level of business. ‘Networks transcend borders and are the perfect means of conducting business in a globalized world’ (Williams 2001a: 74). Despite the fact that law enforcement agencies suggest that some meetings have occurred among the leaders of different ethnic groups at transnational level, Williams suggests that TOC is not an organized, monolithic and hierarchical transnational organization: the network model suggests TOC is a way of shaping and organizing relationships among different illicit organized groups rather than a tangible actor. According to this perspective, the term ‘transnational crime’ does not describe ‘global organizations’ without a national-based structure. Rather, the right definition of the term transnational is the network dynamics of those criminal activities which are carried on across national borders. Thus, TOC is to be considered a network rather than a global organized structure which connects ethnic groups and facilitates either the illicit activities or the link with a licit environment. Letizia Paoli (2002) described TOC as a paradox: it


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is a ‘fluid network’ characterized by low levels of organization but nevertheless there is an element of organization. The paradox is implied in the terminological dyad of ‘organized crime’. Catanzaro (1993: 163) notes that the organizational structure, which is based on common interests, appears to be incompatible with the management of criminal activities for the high level of concurrency occurring in the illegal market. Nevertheless, this paradox is, for the most part, solvable with the local and limited dimension of each single ethnic group. The limited dimension is to be considered as a descriptive variable of the internal relationships of the criminal groups (for example, Italian famiglia, Turkish clan, Chinese gangs), permitting each single organized group to maintain ‘political power’ and control a limited territory, to influence the external environment through the strategy of the use of deterrence, to corrupt and influence and to preserve local ties. However, it does not dispense with the ‘disorganized feature’ of organized crime, the ‘invisible hand’ (Reuter 1983) that coexists with the organized structure and that is needed when organized crime acts in the competitive illicit economic environment: ‘In the illicit market the fundamental rule is competition and, therefore, the non-organization, the impossibility of centralization’ (Catanzaro 1993: 163).5 Our two-level analysis allows us to solve the paradox of the fluid networks of organized crime. TOC is the fluid way of acting of several organized ethnic groups which have links with each other for strategic, tactical or logistical reasons, which work across national borders and which violate the laws of several states. Moreover, since the level, duration and intensity of the cooperative relationships among different groups changes over time, it is possible to affirm that the level of fluidity of the network is highly changeable: it goes from the long-term ‘strategic alliances’6 (Williams 2001a) based on a highly structured agreement to short-term relations based on a temporary coincidence of interests or on tactical or logistical needs.7 As the United Nations stresses ‘transnational criminal organizations range from highly structured organizations to more fluid and dynamic networks’. Moreover, each ethnic group is different in the level and shape of its internal organization, ranging from the strongly hierarchical Italian Mafia or Chinese Triads (Becucci 2001 and Lintner 2004) to the loose organization of the several groups of the Russian mafiya (Vitale 1995; Galeotti 2004). Therefore, the notion of ‘transnational’ is not referred to as a new actor emerging from the old form of ethnic organized crime. It refers to a new operational dimension of the ‘traditional’ organized crime or, more clearly, of the new and old organized crime which, acting in the new pathways of the globalized market, structure a network of alliances and interdependencies. A clear understanding of the nexus between ‘fluid network’ and ‘organized crime’ can be gained by approaching TOC with this two-level analysis: (1) the local level, described by the organizational model of different ethnic groups, and (2) the global dimension, described by the dynamic of the relationships among the different national organized crime groups. At the first level, organized crime has internal embedded ties, continuity, control of the territory, collective tasks and, in some cases, strongly hierarchical organizations, as defining variables distinguishing them


Discoursing organized crime 23 from other forms of criminality. The second analytical level describes the transnationalization of organized crime’s activities and the global dimension of several types of crime which occur across national boundaries and which are committed by networks where the nodes are the different national organized crime groups. According to this approach, organized crime is not ‘globalized’. Criminal interests and activities of the organized crime have been globalized. Paoli noted (2002: 60), organized crime has been used for describing either the organization or the methods of managing the illicit activities. This misleading use of the concept confuses the definition of organized crime with the specification of its methods of action. The definitions of TOC which are based on the observation that several national organized crime groups act at global level and commit crime by using territories of several states or transgressing several national judiciary systems confuses the who with the how.

Organized crime and its transnational dimension in international institutions The discourse on the rise of a global crime threat and the need to develop global instruments to face it is not unanimously accepted. Edwards and Gill (2002a) argue that there is little consensus over the character, or even the existence, of this global threat and two competing conceptions of TOC exists. The first conception is based on the data on transnational criminal activities. Jamieson (1995), for example, states that ‘by the mid-1990s there could be few regions of the world untouched by Italian Mafia pressure or influence surveillance of particular criminal organizations and their activities in and across different nation states’ (quoted in Edwards and Gill 2002a: 207). Conversely, there is a group of scholars who believe that the scope of organized crime groups and activities remains contained within local territories. Hobbs (1998), among others, stresses the local character of the actual organized criminal relations rather than their transnational form. Nevertheless, if transnational is intended as an element of the complexity of the organized crime and it is considered as a way of acting in terms of creation of functional links, it is possible to go beyond these conflicting perspectives. An overview of the international juridical documents on TOC seems to confirm the usefulness of the two-level approach. In fact, all the formal definitions of TOC adopted by international and regional institutions consider the ‘transnationality’ of organized crime not an ontological defining character but a specific modality of acting and, at the same time, they consider the organizational structure as the ontological defining variable of organized crime. In 2000, The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (‘Palermo Convention’) did not define TOC as a tangible direct referent object of its norms. Article 2 defines ‘organized crime group’ as … a structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes

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or offences in accordance with this Convention in order to obtain, directly or material benefit. It must be noted that this definition operates at the first level of the proposed theoretical approach in that it captures the nature of the phenomenon in its structural form of stable organization but without referring to the transnational variable. The term ‘structured group’ means a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure (United Nations 2000: article 2 paragraph c). The concept of ‘transnational’ refers to the nature of the committed offences, rather than to the nature of the organized group and it is used to define the ‘scope of application’ of the Convention in article 3. This states that This Convention shall apply … to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of … serious crime as defined in article 2 of this Convention, where the offence is transnational in nature and involves an organized criminal group …; an offence is transnational in nature if: (a) It is committed in more than one State; (b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another State; (c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or (d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State. In the EU, a juridical definition of TOC does not exist. The Tampere Program states: ‘The European Council is deeply committed to reinforcing the fight against serious organized and transnational crime’ but it neither defines the phenomenon nor uses the same label for referring to it. Point 3 of the same document states: ‘international organized crime (including the activity of terrorist groups) does not recognize national borders or competencies …’. Nevertheless, the EU’s strategy on the prevention and control of organized crime,8 adopted by the Council of JHA in 2000, describes the concept of ‘organized criminal activity’ as ‘dynamic by nature. It need not be confined to rigid structures. It has shown itself to have the capacity to be entrepreneurial, businesslike and highly flexible in responding to changing market forces and situations’. Furthermore, it states: Organized criminal groups are generally not confined by national borders. They often form partnerships within and outside the territory of the European Union, either with individuals or with other networks for the commission of single or multiple offences … Moreover, they are taking advantage of the free movement of money, goods, personnel and services across the EU. As a result of the increased sophistication of many organized criminal groups, they are able to utilize legal loopholes and differences between Member States, exploiting the anomalies in the various systems.


Discoursing organized crime 25 So, while the relevance of the transnational illicit activities carried out by organized crime is stressed, the notion of ‘transnational’ is nevertheless not adopted to describe the change in the nature of the traditional local-based organized crime groups but it is considered as a reorganization of traditional organized crime activities driven by the need to respond to a whole range of political changes. Even the concept of cross-border crime as it has been developed in EU documents appears to be an operational definition to describe the characteristics of criminal activities carried out by the organized crime groups transgressing several national laws and requiring an intensification of the cross-border operational police cooperation (Hague Program 14292/1/04 REV 1). As far as organized crime is concerned, the EU defines it for the first time in 1998 with a Joint Action (1998/245/JHA)which states: a criminal organization shall mean a structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons, acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, whether such offences are an end in themselves or a means of obtaining material benefits and, where appropriate, of improperly influencing the operation of public authorities. (Council of the European Union 1998) As this document points out, the EU’s definition of organized crime matches the description adopted by the UN two years later:9 Even in this case, the defining variables of organized crime are the relevance of the structured organization on the individuals, continuity and common tasks. In 2008, the EU revisited its definition of organized crime with a framework decision10 that confirms the rationale of the former definition: ‘criminal organization’ means a structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit; 2. ‘structured association’ means an association that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence, nor does it need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership, or a developed structure. The OCTA published in 2007 and edited by Europol provides us with a clear analysis based on the distinction between organized crime and its transnational and international level of action. This document distinguished three different categories of organized crime groups: (1) traditionally indigenous organized crime groups or EU-based groups; (2) traditionally non-indigenous or non-EU-based groups; (3) the intermediary situations including both second-generation organized crime groups and traditionally indigenous groups that integrally exploit an international dimension.


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The first category encompasses those criminal groups whose leaders and assets reside inside the EU. They are described as ‘often efficiently structured and support task diversification and specialization’. The second category encompasses groups in those criminal organizations that ‘have a strong international dimension so that both leaders and assets of the group are placed outside the EU’. Indeed, this kind of traditional organization maintains its leadership and returns the proceeds of their crimes to their country of origin and their level of organization inside the EU is still relatively low. The third category describes a new development of the ‘transnationalization’ of the organized crime activities: it includes either the ‘second-generation non-EU-based groups’, which are becoming more embedded in the societies of their countries of activity even if they maintain links with the countries of origin or the EU-based groups with a strong international dimension. In all these definitions, it is evident that there are differences between the ‘structure’ of each group and its modus operandi. The first element (structure) describes the nature of the group and its geographical location. The second element (modus operandi) illustrates the way of acting or its behaviour (OCTA 2007) This analysis confirms that there might be a two-level approach in defining TOC: the first level defines the internal structures of the organization and aims at distinguishing organized crime from other forms of serious crime. The second level identifies a mode of action, a form of behaviour of organized criminal groups at a global level. Thinking about TOC in term of transnationality of the activities of organized crime does not seek to deny the existence of illicit ‘fluid networks’ or illicit ‘ad hoc coalitions’ or illicit ‘flexible individual entrepreneurs’ (Klerks 2003: 99) which are to be considered as the results of logistical and tactical networks which have been described above. This approach is intended to avoid theoretical confusion between the identification of actors and the recognition of methods of action. Some authors, indeed, warn us of the risk of establishing a transnational governance system for tackling organized crime. Sheptycki, in analyzing the emergence of a transnational crime control system, applies the idea of the American political scientist Tilly, who made an analogy between the state building process and the protection racket. Sheptycki affirms that ‘the protection analogy that Tilly used to cast light on nation state building … must be modified in order to take account of these transnational institutions of global governance (which) claim the responsibility to govern crime’ (2003: 45). His ultimate aim is to stress how the identification of a ‘transnational organized crime’ problem, made by policing agencies, has the result of moving the policy of controlling organized crime away from the national levels to the supranational level. This process of transnationalization poses serious problems of transparency, legitimacy and accountability of police activities.

Some conclusions: from TOC to transnational networks of organized crime Baker notes that ‘we may not be able to define what we mean by TOC but we recognized it when we see it’ (2003: 183). The difficulty in defining TOC could


Discoursing organized crime 27 derive from the research question: ‘who’ is/are TOC? This chapter has presented an alternative approach to understanding what TOC is and, moreover, it recognizes in the relevant international documents the seeds for consolidating this approach. The two-level approach proposes to operate at two different methodological and theoretical levels for defining TOC. At the first level, organized crime must have been acknowledged in order to identify what exactly it is and in what ways it is different from other forms of serious crime (Dorn 2009). At this level the organizational approach is considered as the main and appropriate methodological approach for attaining a core notion of organized crime. This core notion does not imply that the differences among different organized crime groups are ignored. Moreover, it is useful to create theoretical boundaries for connoting concepts and avoiding the risk of ‘stretching concepts’ (Sartori 1970; 1991) which deprives notions of their explanatory capabilities. In this sense the ‘organizational structure’ of organized crime, namely its durable establishment, its collective tasks, its stability over time and its restricted membership, are the ontological variables distinguishing organized crime either at a theoretical or at an operational stage. The second analytical level focuses on the explanation of ‘transnational’ operative dimension of organized crime. Here a network analysis provides a useful methodological ‘tool box’. Starting from the ‘paradigm of complexity’ introduced by Santino (1995) who describes the Italian Mafias as both an industry and an institution, a hierarchical structure and a cultural attitude, we arrive at explaining the adaptation capabilities of organized crime and its growing tendency to create links throughout the global system in order to exploit incentives of globalization and to adapt to the changing structure of the global economy. Thus, the notion of ‘transnational’ refers to the networks created by different organized crime groups which establish links, contacts and relationships. These networks have nationalbased organized groups as nodes and they can vary in terms of intensity, duration, tasks and complexity. The clear distinction between ‘who’ and ‘how’ is the key argument or justification for the two-level approach and it has a twofold outcome: first, it permits us to go beyond the paradox of the ‘glo-cal’ dynamic which affects organized crime. Organized crime is, at the same time, a contextualized phenomenon which is strongly connected with local dynamics, and a transnational reality in that different organized groups create reciprocal links, structures of interdependency and forms of cooperation which affect the global system. Second, it permits us to govern in a more coherent way the activities of prevention, tackling and combating organized crime and TOC both at national and/or international levels.

Notes 1 http://www.organized-crime.de/OCDEF1.htm#duy 2 Global Political Agenda is defined in terms of issues that states and international organizations consider as relevant topics for international politics and on which they agreed to share collective rules and standard of governance (see Attinà 1999). 3 It is possible to observe some relevant differences in the intensity of some of these variables among ethnic organized crime groups as regards the level of centralization

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F. Longo of power, the acceptance of the internal hierarchy or the institutionalization of the affiliation processes. For this proposal see Paoli (2001) and Longo (2004). Falcone’s original definition is ‘saldature operative’ (literal translation: operational welding). ‘Sul mercato illegale la regola fondamentale è la concorrenza e quindi la non organizzazione, l’impossibilità di centralizzazione’ (translation by the author). The agreement among Sicilian Mafia and Colombian Cartels on drug trafficking in Europe is an example of a long-term strategic alliance (see Sterling 1994). Agreement among Turkish drug traffickers in Belgium and Georgian car thieves in order to facilitate the transportation of drugs is an example of a logistic network (see Williams 2001). ‘The prevention and control of organized crime: a strategy for the beginning of the new millennium’ published in OJEC C 124, 3/5/2000. EU ratified the Palermo Convention in 2004 (Council Decision 2004/579/EC). Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA, published in OJEC L 300, 11/11/2008.

2

The criminal not the crime Practitioner discourse and the policing of organized crime in England and Wales


Clive Harfield Academic discourse on organized crime is varied. The concept has excited many attempts to understand it, define it and ponder the issues the concept poses for academic researchers (see, for instance, Levi 2002; Allum and Siebert 2003, von Lampe and Johansen 2004; Edwards and Levi 2008). There is both academic and popular media interest in types of crimes committed (Arsovska 2008; Starkey 2008) and in particular criminal groups or the characterization of organized crime in different nations and regions (Albanese 2004; Bagley 2004; Lintner 2004; Phillips 2008; von Lampe 2008). Just as political rhetoric links organized crime and terrorism so academics have examined this relationship (Björnehed 2004; Makarenko 2004; Picarelli 2006; Clarke and Lee 2008). Others have sought to analyze organized crime from the perspective of local communities rather than international relations (Hobbs 1998; Gilmour 2008). Those with organized crime careers have contributed to overall understanding, either directly or indirectly, through autobiographical and biographical studies (Barnes, Elias and Walsh 2000; Johnson 2005). So, too, have journalists (Glenny 2008). Alongside these varied studies have been explorations of the statutory countermeasures and the policing of organized crime (Findlay 1995; Ashworth 2002; Levi and Smith 2002; Rijken 2006; Block 2008; Brady 2008; Harfield 2008a, 2008b; Wheatley 2008) including recent analyses drawing particular attention to the political use of hyperbole and to ‘alarmist rhetoric’ in official briefings to the media about organized crime (Sheptycki 2007; Woodiwiss and Hobbs 2009: 119) and how the post-9/11 shift in emphasis towards the policing of terrorism has been at the expense of policing organized crime (Bratton 2007). But understanding of how police practitioners themselves have contributed to the debate and to the formation of official policy in respect of organized crime is less well developed and it is in this area that the present chapter begins to make a contribution. Rhetoric to influence public opinion is one thing; practitioner discourse to inform policy implementation, while not entirely divorced from the former, is nevertheless quite another. For that analysis documentary sources, both published and unpublished, have been relied upon, producing a picture multifaceted and episodic and almost certainly incomplete. These sources present a patchwork of perspectives drawn directly from testimony to parliamentary committees or government departmental reviews, or indirectly through academic or governance evaluations founded upon


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practitioner contributions and participation; their general character focuses on the role of practitioners in investigating organized crime, rather than debate about the phenomenon itself. Beyond the scope of this study, although undoubtedly an area that would reward future research, are the individual experiences of practitioners whose careers spanned the period under consideration. The elements of the discourse considered here reflect individual practitioner views to the extent that such views informed representations to formal reviews and consultations. Coordinated policing of organized crime in England and Wales began with the creation of nine Regional Crime Squads (RCS) (Home Office Circular 249/1964, 14 October 1964), the first of which became operational in November 1964 with the final squad commencing duty in October 1965.1 Collaboration between different police forces was not unprecedented. A Metropolitan and Provincial Crime Branch established in 1954 investigated crimes committed on the outskirts of London and in the provinces by London-based criminals. This successful experiment prompted similar squads in Birmingham, Bristol and Tyneside (Critchley 1967: 257–58). But whereas these early squads were staffed by lending personnel between organizations, the RCS were the first formally structured, multi-organization collaborative arrangements in which detectives were seconded to an entity set aside from the established police forces and with a degree of operational autonomy. The Home Office and police service, unpersuaded by the dissenting opinion in the Royal Commission on Policing report (1960–62) that there should be a national police force, were coming to terms with a significant consequence of the socio-political preference for local policing locally delivered: increasingly mobile criminals were proving to be beyond the capacity and capability of local forces to investigate and prosecute. The chronological starting point of the discourse comes with an evaluation of the early months of RCS operations by the Home Office Research and Planning Branch (to which senior police officers were seconded and which had been instrumental in the creation of the RCS (Critchley 1967: 312–13)). The evaluation, based on observation of and interviews with RCS officers, was conducted between 1 April 1965 (when five RCS became operational and joined the three squads operational since November 1964) and 31 March 1967 (Home Office Research and Planning Branch 1967) (hereafter, ‘the 1967 Review’).2 The conceptual starting point inherent in the RCS paradigm was that organized crime could only be tackled by way of investigation leading to a criminal trial prosecution. This is the overarching context (until the twenty-first century) for the themes now discussed: the focus of investigations; the infrastructure enabling such investigations; intelligence supporting such investigations; and, latterly, whether criminal investigation is effective as an exclusive approach to tackling organized crime.

The criminal not the crime ‘It is our view’, wrote the 1967 Review authors suggesting revision of the initial terms of reference for the RCS, ‘that the effort of the crime squad should be


The criminal not the crime 31 orientated towards the criminal rather than towards the committed crime’ (paragraph 47). A pincer strategy was envisaged: local forces investigating committed crime in ‘the more orthodox way’ and thus approaching criminals from the other direction as it were. It was ‘hoped the lines will eventually cross, leading to a successful prosecution’ (the 1967 Review). This defining conceptual demarcation, that police forces investigate reported crimes (such as domestic burglaries, criminal damage, assaults) while the RCS investigated criminals suspected of being in the process of planning or committing serious crimes (such as armed robberies of cash-in-transit) prevailed up to the creation and early years of the National Crime Squad. Nearly 30 years later, in evidence to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (HAC), the Association of Chief Police Officers of England and Wales (ACPO) asserted that ‘targeting the criminal rather than the crime is the established method by which career criminals are brought to justice’ (Home Affairs Committee 1995: volume ii, p. 123. See also Questions 81, 86 and 89). The RCS noted that since individual criminals exploited more than one crime type in their pursuit of profit, it was logical to focus on the criminal not the crime (HAC 1995: volume ii, Q204; Q238). Investigating individuals would, the argument goes, reveal the true extent of their personal criminality whereas investigating individual criminal acts (reported crimes) would not. This has implications for sentencing and punishment upon conviction. The criminal-not-the-crime mantra justifies having specialist squads employing specialist investigative methods. It removes the territorial constraint imposed on police forces obliged to investigate crimes committed in their force area. It is an argument that facilitated, without offending the local policing paradigm, the investigation of criminals who crossed police force boundaries to commit their crimes; the original rationale for having RCS (Home Office Circular 249/1964) before the 1994 HAC enquiry swung the policy spotlight from the practical problem of criminals who travelled across force boundaries onto the political problem of ‘organized crime’. A second advantage for the police practitioners of the criminal-not-the-crime approach was that it did not need to define organized crime. The 1994 HAC enquiry into organized crime sought, in the first instance, to identify whether organized crime as understood in the US existed in the UK. Expert evidence indicated it did not. That did not mean that there was not serious crime being committed that demonstrated levels of organization, merely that US-conceptualized exclusive and often ethnically based organized crime groups did not seem to be operating in the UK in the same way or to the same degree that they operated elsewhere, nor was there evidence of an indigenous UK equivalent of the ‘Mafia’ (HAC 1995: ii, Q6, Q80). In 1994, UK law enforcement practitioners had their own working definition of ‘organized crime’ founded on the premise of individuals working in concert rather than upon specific crime types: ‘Organized crime constitutes any enterprise, or group of persons, engaged in continuing illegal activities which has as its primary purpose the generation of profits, irrespective of national boundaries’ (National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) evidence, HAC 1995: ii, p. 141. See also p. 101, 117, 135).3


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A very broad definition with no legal or criminalization purpose, it served specific law enforcement agencies’ objectives in influencing policy-makers. It defined an investigative need that local police forces could not address; a need that called for specialist agencies; a need founded upon the premise that the way to deal with criminality that was serious and organized was no different from the way that local, minor crime was dealt with: prosecution. Inserting ‘national boundaries’ in the definition additionally served the purpose of HM Customs and Excise (HMCE). HMCE assumed a role in organized crime law enforcement through its remit to prevent the importation of illegal commodities, including narcotics. While HMCE were at pains to highlight the ‘quality’ of the criminals they prosecuted, equally they denied the existence of any ‘Mr Bigs’ and asserted that, in their experience, organized criminals specialized in single crime types (HAC 1995: ii Q25, Q50 and p. 101). HMCE sought to distinguish their responsibility for prosecuting illegal importation of drugs and related activities such as money laundering from a police role in prosecuting supply, manufacture and possession of controlled drugs ‘when linked to other serious crimes’ (HAC 1995: ii p. 103). In doing so HMCE were acting to ensure their continued prominence in criminal (as opposed to administrative) law enforcement by simultaneously arguing that there was an alternative perspective to the criminal-not-the-crime approach and that the latter constrained police investigation of drugs trafficking to those instances where the criminal concerned was also involved in other criminality. It was, the HAC concluded, an artificial distinction. The criminal-not-the-crime approach had other critics in the government machinery. Arising from the 2000 Comprehensive Spending Review were supplementary reviews including one into serious and organized crime intelligence. The interdepartmental Organized Crime Strategy Group (OCSG) commissioned the latter which is understood to have made the point that a thorough understanding of both criminals and criminality was required to make any significant impact against organized crime proliferation. Intelligence community practitioners regarded the enforcement strategic dichotomy (criminal versus crime) as flawed. For the while, however, the political priority of performance accountability continued to drive policy-maker thinking. In the early 1990s the Audit Commission promoted the criminal-not-the-crime philosophy as a suitable basis for intelligenceled local policing, arguing that most crimes were committed by a minority of criminals, and that focusing on those individuals would provide the greatest cost–benefit returns in numbers of crimes detected for investigative investment (1993). Local police forces were assessed against crimes detected; organized crime enforcement agencies in terms of numbers of persons prosecuted: each performance regime premised upon a version of the criminal-not-the-crime orthodoxy. The 2004 White Paper proposing the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) confirmed a subtle change in emphasis discussing not individual criminals but criminal lifestyles, groups, enterprises and markets. The glossary noted that the National Crime Squad (NCS, established in 1998 by merging the RCS) targeted ‘criminal organizations’ (Home Office 2004: 62), although elsewhere it observed that operational prioritization should be based on intelligence assessment of an individual’s criminal capabilities (Home Office 2004: 29). This change in language


The criminal not the crime 33 indicates an evolving understanding of how to police organized crime, but in one key respect nothing had changed. Individuals are prosecuted at trial, criminal networks or criminal organizations are not. The 2004 White Paper sought views on whether conspiracy laws should be changed to follow the US lead in being able to prosecute membership of a criminal organization (Levi and Smith 2002). Such an approach was fraught with difficulties, not least the lack of a statutory definition of ‘organized crime’ and what actions constituted ‘membership’ amounting to ‘criminality’, and of proving the existence of an illicit organization, as opposed to being able to demonstrate association between persons committing crime. From a prosecutor’s perspective, being able to charge substantive offences with provable actus reus and mens rea is preferable to engaging with wider, less precise notions of extended criminal liability inherent in concepts such as conspiracy. Within this paradigm, connecting mens rea and actus reus for individuals commissioning yet not getting directly involved in (organized) criminality is particularly problematic for investigators and prosecutors. None of these wider criminality considerations features in the available police practitioner discourse for which inter-agency politics provides the parameters.

Remit, responsibility and relationships: defining practitioner infrastructure In a jurisdiction in which policing, locally delivered and locally accountable, is the dominant political preference criminality transcending local policing structures is immediately problematic. So strong is the popular and political opposition to a ‘national’ police force in the UK, until 2006 all attempts to address the investigation of cross-border organized crime started from the premise that such activity must be amenable to local governance frameworks. Local accountability has been privileged over national effectiveness. This conflict of interests has been exacerbated by the US-influenced positing of organized crime as a national security threat, following President Reagan’s declaration of a ‘war on drugs’ and President Clinton’s declaration of a state of national emergency in response to the perceived external threat of organized crime (Executive Order 12,978, 21 October 2001). From this politicking arise fundamental questions with which documented practitioner discourse engages obliquely if at all. How can collaboration be structured so as to respect the local accountability principle? If the perceived threat of organized crime is externalized to the extent that it is seen as a national security issue, should not those agencies engaged in national security (as opposed to local policing) be involved in protecting the nation from organized criminality? Given that such agencies in the UK were not originally envisaged as law enforcement agencies, what are the implications of their involvement in what might be seen as essentially law enforcement work? Practitioner discourse, unsurprisingly, considers such issues through the prism of organizational self-interest. Cultural context is also required. Policing is about solving problems to preserve order. In respect of criminality, the principal and privileged solution is prosecution. That is the purpose of criminal investigation. Individuals indicted demonstrate


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the police doing their job. Successful problem solving feeds off a can-do attitude. Necessary prologue to the following discussion is the understanding that in the creation of the RCS a can-do attitude was married to the notion that success is measured in arrests and charges. In respect of intelligence, as will be seen below, it is arguable that the intelligence-led policing concepts subsequently articulated as fundamental to twenty-first century policing were in fact prenatally hobbled in the mid-twentieth century when the cart was put before the horse, bequeathing a paradigm legacy of policing-led intelligence. Absence of effective intelligence was just one of the issues of concern identified by the 1967 Review. Concerning infrastructure, the Review’s anxiety concentrated on conflicting interests within the RCS terms of reference. RCS were expected to deal not only with travelling and top-echelon criminals but to provide immediately on demand staff for local force investigations into major crime. The 1967 Review noted that the terms of reference ‘are to some extent incompatible with each other … and therefore inclined to reduce the effectiveness of the Crime Squads’ (para. 41). Regular abstractions to reinforce local major crime enquiries detracted from RCS capacity and capability to cultivate and maintain relationships with informers. It was also noted (para. 46) that the desire to locate RCS offices so as to be inclusive of all contributing forces and provide nationwide coverage necessitated some offices being geographically remote from centres of criminality and the domiciles of potential informers. Amalgamation of some individual RCS branch offices was proposed. Amalgamations of a number of whole RCS was in progress at the time of the HAC enquiry into organized crime, reducing the original nine to six. The concept of a national crime squad, or at the very least executive authority for the national coordinator of the RCS, was being advocated (HAC 1995: i, Recommendation 20; ii, Q183). At issue were accountability, governance and funding of any national crime squad and how it would relate to local forces. RCS answered to committees of local chief constables, an arrangement infeasible for a national crime squad.4 The call for a national crime squad was a potential threat to the role of HMCE in organized crime enforcement. A greater threat to HMCE came from the suggestion that too many agencies were trying to deal with drugs trafficking into and distribution within the UK and that this dysfunctionality could be addressed by establishing a new US-style drugs enforcement agency (HAC 1995:ii, Q51, Q123, Q127, Q129, Q182, Q283, Q292). HMCE opposition to this proposal was supported by the RCS but on the basis that drugs trafficking could not be separated from other forms of criminality. Thus diametrically opposed views of the criminal-not-the-crime debate were used in arguing the same policy point, an indication of how practitioner discourse in 1994 focused on agency remit and responsibility in tacking organized crime rather than on the phenomenon of organized crime itself, a fact not lost on the HAC members but which they also did not pursue (HAC Q283). Policing was assumed to be the solution to organized crime. Practitioner discourse did not challenge this premise but concentrated on how different elements of policing might be structured to that end, not on whether the nature of organized criminality was vulnerable to alternative interventions.


The criminal not the crime 35 Beyond establishing some mechanism of national executive command over the RCS, there appears to have been no appetite among the agencies contributing evidence to the HAC for a new agency or amalgamating existing agencies, particularly the RCS (or the putative NCS) and the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS, in 1994 a non-operational unit hosted by the Home Office: HAC Q192), a suggestion that the RCS felt would not best serve other members of the law enforcement community and a concern with which NCIS concurred (HAC Q419). The HAC recognized significant rivalry existed between enforcement agencies (leading to a lack of effective collaboration and cooperation), which the HAC at times seemed in danger of exacerbating (Q131), notwithstanding protestations of harmonious relations (Report pp. 2–3; Q127, Q201–2, Q416). Only one agency, HMCE, sought to apportion blame, criticizing the police service as a whole for the lack of investigative capacity and capability in the regional arena: which might be taken as oblique criticism of the RCS increasingly engaging in national-level crime (and therefore encroaching on territory HMCE regarded as its own) at the expense of undertaking their original 1964 remit. In exploring the threat of organized crime the HAC coincidentally exposed tensions within the practitioner community that, arguably, enhanced the threat. The documentary record illustrates these tensions defining practitioner discourse. Far from reducing the number of agencies tackling organized crime, both the RCS and NCIS suggested a potential role for the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), particularly in border control and countering illegal immigration (HAC Q255–56, Q361). The newspaper Police Review (10 June 1994) adopted a different angle, suggesting the NCIS was to be disbanded and that the Director-General of MI5 had publicly expressed interest in taking over organized crime intelligence functions. Home Office officials, seemingly irritated by this suggestion, robustly denied any plans for MI5 involvement – but only described the suggestion that NCIS should be wound up as ‘very remote’ (HAC Q262–64). The following year, the Security Services Act 1996 extended MI5’s statutory responsibilities to include assistance to law enforcement in matters relating to organized crime. MI5 duly assigned a dedicated unit to this function. The practitioner community came to accept that multiple organizational vested interests were counterproductive. Consultation preceding the 2004 White Paper discovered ‘a general consensus that if we were starting again, we would not design the institutions in the way they have developed over time’ (Home Office 2004: 22). After consulting a number of government departments and practitioner agencies, the OCSG review of criminal intelligence concluded that the present structure gave rise to turf wars between agencies; it also noted, however, that structural change combining intelligence and operational functions within one agency was undesirable (Bennetto 2001). Rationalization of agency infrastructure was nevertheless Government’s preferred solution (David Blunkett MP, Hansard (Commons) 9 February 2004, col. 59WS) and in asserting the need to amalgamate the NCS, NCIS and elements of HMCE, MI5 and HM Immigration Service into the proposed

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SOCA, a Government Minister reported existing agencies felt they


have gone as far as they can in partnership working: to make a real difference and move on, they need to recognize that there are too many overlaps between what the different organizations do and that their cultures sometimes prevent them from working together effectively. (Caroline Flint MP, Hansard (Standing Committee D) 11 January 2005, col. 35) If problematic relationships between different agencies answerable to different government departments could be resolved at national level by amalgamation, it was not a solution available at sub-national level within the police service. The 1962 Royal Commission had argued, in majority, against a national police service thus preserving the local policing paradigm but consequently leaving a legacy of force boundaries as barriers to coordinated policing. As part of a national political imperative against drugs crime (following the US declaration of the war on drugs), which included new legislation and new drugs squads in every police force, the police service attempted to conceptualize the issues of coordinating police responses to deal with drugs-related cross-border criminality (Wright and Waymont 1993). ACPO established a working party on drugs-related crime under R. F. Broome, Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset, which undertook practitioner consultations during 1984–85 (ACPO 1986). The working party recommended, inter alia, establishing a national drugs intelligence unit (which was eventually to evolve into NCIS), and the creation of drugs wings in every RCS, proposals which prioritized external political initiatives over established practitioner doctrine. Broome’s working party also defined policing remit and responsibility in three levels: local divisional policing (level 1), force-wide (level 2), and regional/ national (level 3) in an attempt to devise a more integrated model of policing deemed necessary because of the evolving nature of drugs-related (organized) criminality. This hierarchical model structured appropriate police responses to perceived corresponding levels of drugs distribution (Wright and Waymont 1993: 22–23; 39).5 Broome accepted drugs distribution would overlap such police structural partitions but, as Wright and Waymont point out (1993: 40), did not address the apparent contradiction between the ambiguous reality of the drugs market and the proposed rigidly structured model. The promulgated rationale of the evolving drug market notwithstanding, the real driver for the hierarchical model was the non-evolving structure of policing. A national policing problem had to be policed using only local structures or regional entities firmly founded in localism. Rules of engagement and demarcated responsibility had to be devised for divisional policing, specialist squads and the RCS in order to work towards a coordinated response. It is surely no coincidence that revised terms of reference were issued for the RCS in the wake of the Broome report, clarifying the nature of the relationship between the RCS and police forces and re-emphasising the need for any RCS aid to forces to be short term and exceptional (HOC 28/1987, 1.5.1987). Practitioners, their discourse reveals, struggled


The criminal not the crime 37 to resolve infrastructure incongruities inherent in preferences that were political rather than practical. The three-level policing taxonomy introduced by Broome was subsequently adopted (with slight adaptation) for subsequent practitioner discourse on the National Intelligence Model (ACPO/NCPE 2005), thus identifying and labelling the ‘level 2 gap’ that continues to bedevil policing in England and Wales: the absence of coordinated and dedicated entities dealing with crime that transcends force borders at the sub-national level (HMIC 2005). For the time being, in the absence of central policy, forces (the can-do attitude to the fore once more) are engaging in a variety of ad hoc collaborations with equally varied success (HAC 2008: i, 4; ii, Q172, Q795, Appendix 21).

Maintaining a sterile corridor: intelligence and operations The functional relationship between intelligence and operations (criminal investigation) was no less problematic. The 1967 Review is very clear. The strategic policy intention from the outset was to set up Regional Criminal Intelligence Bureaux (RCIB) that would inform the activity of the RCS (para. 32). The RCIB were, according to the policy documents initiating the RCS structure, to be established and operational before the RCS were set up. Indeed, the RCS were envisaged to be the operational arm of the RCIB (para. 47). It is a measure of the failure to implement this policy that the 1967 Review found it necessary to recommend that RCIB be established in each RCS region. The policing (and political) desire to achieve arrests and prosecutions (visible, superficial success) overwhelmed the strategic desire to establish a workable framework for sustainable, effective success. Intelligence-led policing was stillborn. Instead of intelligence providing strategic impetus for investigation, investigation demanded operational intelligence to identify evidential opportunities. This dynamic ensured intelligence served the prosecution of offences rather than wider prevention and reduction of organized crime, a relationship that those whose raison d’être was to investigate and prosecute were unlikely seriously to call into question in their discourse. The suggestion that the RCS should be the operational arm of the RCIB did not go away. The HAC, when deliberating organized crime, wondered whether a putative NCS should operate under the direct control of the NCIS (Q192; Q276). The Home Office responded that it was more likely that the NCIS should operate under NCS control, an outcome robustly opposed by NCIS trying to position itself as an honest broker of intelligence between different agencies (Q419). The RCS were equally opposed, fearing that an organization with both intelligence and operational functions would become self-centred. Less hypothetically, the RCS argued that intelligence and operations should be separated because intelligence sources had to be protected from exposure or compromise through trial evidence (Q192), a view also expressed by intelligence agencies in the OCSG review. This separation of functions generated logistical problems. NCIS was expected to enhance and develop intelligence passed to it by other agencies but lacked the


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capacity and capability to do so (para. 96; Q139; Q189–90; Q400–401). Although 13 non-police agencies had access to mobile surveillance capabilities (Q412), NCIS was restricted to static surveillance because, as the Home Office explained, ‘there obviously has to be a cut-off point between intelligence-gathering activity and operational activity’ that would lead to evidence being acquired (Q266).6 NCIS staff could operate a static observation post monitoring premises or fixed locations frequented by suspected criminals but could not monitor the suspects as they moved to and from such surveillance arena. Challenged with the fact that MI5 had both static and mobile surveillance capability for intelligence purposes, Home Office officials argued the situation was not analogous, although they did accept that both organizations existed to gather and develop intelligence, not investigate crime and arrest suspects (Q266–69). HMCE always combined intelligence and evidence-gathering functions and had sophisticated surveillance capability. The sub-plot being played out was whether NCIS should be given extra resources in order to develop a mobile surveillance capability rather than rely on police forces and the RCS to conduct mobile intelligence operations on behalf of NCIS (in direct competition with those organizations for use of their resources). The HAC noted that the NCIS was ‘the Cinderella of the police service in terms of funding’ and that there had been no meaningful investment in intelligence-led policing (Q273).7 Too astute to ask for extra resources on their own behalf, NCIS left it to others to plead the need (HAC 1995: ii para. 101). That practitioner discourse here may have been stage-managed on the basis of mutual aid and non-aggression is hinted at from the opening remarks of ACPO’s written submission, deliberately intended to complement the submissions of the RCS and NCIS, although some repetition (reinforcement?) was thought unavoidable (HAC 1995: ii Appendix 5). Not all of the discourse reveals such harmony. Concerned that its existence was seen by other intelligence agencies as a threat, NCIS proposed a Home Office Circular, produced in conjunction with other government departments, should be published to clarify the situation (HAC 1995: ii Q416). It is unclear whether MI5 and MI6 regarded NCIS as a serious organizational threat or as incompetent amateurs playing out of their league, but irritation on their part with its existence was still apparent at the time of the OCSG review (Bennetto 2001). CPS prosecutors trying to unravel the disclosure implications of a major investigation discovered jealous protection of intelligence as a commodity between investigation teams within the same agency as well as between different agencies (interview, CPS prosecutor, 20 August 2003). The creation of SOCA disestablished the paradigm of the sterile corridor between intelligence and operational agencies. Its senior executive team is drawn from both police and intelligence communities. Part of the founding rationale was that combining intelligence and operational functions within a single agency would now achieve ‘clarity on the relationship between central strategic intelligence resources and the tactical and operational intelligence teams working with individual investigations’ (Home Office 2004: 30). That dissatisfaction with the status quo had prompted change is all too apparent from the documented discourse: what


The criminal not the crime 39 is not apparent, at least from sources currently publicly available, is whether any, and if so which, practitioners argued for the solution that was SOCA. A leitmotif throughout the discourse on intelligence and organized crime was how little practitioners and Government actually knew about organized crime from the intelligence they gathered. The 1967 Review took the view that the RCS needed RCIB as a matter of urgency, the better to direct efforts effectively. Despite emphasizing their success (HAC 1995: ii Q13), in their evidence HMCE officials could not estimate the scale or extent of organized crime, even conceding uncertainty as to ‘whether there is a United Kingdom organized crime issue’ (HAC 1995: ii Q44; see also Q50; Q62–63; Q68–69). Nor could police witnesses enlighten the Committee (HAC 1995: ii Q100). The 2004 White Paper noted ‘there has been virtually no work anywhere in the world so far to measure the scale of organized crime and the harm it does’ (Home Office 2004: 8). It also noted, without dwelling on the inconsistent logic that since organized crime harm could not be measured there was no benchmark, that there had ‘not yet’ been any reductions in the overall harm caused by organized crime in the UK and that the government’s ‘straightforward objective’ was ‘to reduce significantly the harm done to the UK and its citizens by organized crime’ (Home Office 2004: 2–3). Clearly, this is a task for SOCA and in order to help answer the question, SOCA confirmed it is establishing Regional Intelligence Units (evidence to the HAC 29 January 2008: Q27), recognizing (once again) that knowledge and understanding of organized crime methodology, not yet as sophisticated as criminals’ understanding of law enforcement methodologies, is key to being able to tackle organized criminality (ibid. Q38). Throughout the 40-year history of the coordinated policing of organized crime in England and Wales, the effectiveness of the relationship between regional intelligence capability and regional intervention capacity has always been in doubt. The picture emerging from this element of the discourse is of an uncertain understanding about the relationship between intelligence and evidence gathering, hardly surprising given that the relationship is often ambiguous but with consequent implications for investigation management and case preparation. There is also obvious uncertainty about the nature and scale of organized criminality against which agencies are being asked to intervene. Such uncertainty about the character of the problem makes strategic planning difficult and the evaluation of success almost impossible, unless it is assessed in terms of outputs (arrests, charges, seizures) rather than outcomes. Despite policy intentions in the 1960s to police organized crime on the basis of strategic intelligence, the tactical need for prosecution evidence superseded it because the demand for convictions was irresistible and the intelligence machinery for a strategic approach did not then exist. The discourse since 1967 reveals a history of law enforcement trying to secure the proverbial stable door in a less than timely fashion. Intelligence became not so much a tool for holistic harm reduction as it was a justification for law enforcement agency remit. What should have been a debate about the strategic purpose and relationship of intelligence and investigation was in fact a discourse mired in the tactical politics of agency remit. Even when an entity, NCIS, was established that could have coordinated strategic intelligence, its

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birth and early years were suffocated by inter-agency politics inhibiting its potential and consequently influencing future discourse on the basis of failure rather than success. The theoretical model bequeathed by NCIS, the National Intelligence Model, was itself an expression of this, being not a model for intelligence work so much as a business process for managing departmental and agency responsibilities (see, for instance, Maguire 2000; Ratcliffe 2002; Innes and Sheptycki 2004; Maguire and John 2006).


Harm rather than crime: the new discourse? But what does successful policing of organized crime look like? Is it prosecution and conviction of the criminal masterminds (inevitably creating job vacancies for successors) or is it something more than mere metrics? Scholarly discourse has moved on, a little jerkily perhaps, from trying to understand the origins of crime (overlooking the social construction of such a concept) to harm prevention and reduction (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Hillyard and Tombs 2007). In 1994 the HAC did not consider harm. The 2004 White Paper mentions it 34 times in 64 pages: a frequency rendering it suspiciously like a buzz-word rather than a paradigm foundation, particularly given that no mention was made of the concept in SOCA’s evidence to the HAC in January 2008. Is organized crime a crime problem or a social harm? And what consequential social harms arise from authorities’ attempts to curtail organized crime given that ‘undue attention to events which are defined as crimes distracts attention from more serious harm’ (Hillyard and Tombs 2007: 12) and that issues such as drug and human trafficking, while characterized as crimes are nevertheless fundamentally public health and labour market issues (Woodiwiss and Hobbs 2009: 122)? Political presentation of threats – such as the rhetorical linking of organized crime and terrorism (an issue on which practitioner discourse considered here is all but silent)8 – can be used to expand recourse to intrusive powers because arguments appealing to public fear and perceptions can be more persuasive than empirically proven risk (Ashworth 2002), superficially legitimizing the expansion of crime control while simultaneously eroding the legitimacy of law enforcement. Policy responses based on social harm, argue Hillyard and Tombs, ‘might allow greater consideration to be given to appropriate responses for reducing levels of harm’ opening up potential responses to organized crime to actors outside the criminal justice system (2007: 19). But this takes the discussion outside the parameters of practitioner discourse constrained by the premise that prosecution is the ultimate intervention – for which one needs suspected criminals to be rendered liable and amenable. Given the political context of accountability and performance frameworks imposed on law enforcement agencies, practitioner perceptions of harm may be focused more on averting adverse consequences to poorly performing agencies than addressing wider harms to society in general. This might explain such practitioner discourse as can be linked, perhaps only tenuously, to the concept of harm reduction: discussion of disruption as an alternative to detection leading to

The criminal not the crime 41 prosecution (HAC2: Q19; Home Office 2004: 35). If there is insufficient evidence to prosecute an individual for a specific crime or for conspiracy, is there sufficient information available to disrupt their activities through other means, such as business regulatory enforcement or tax-evasion enquiries, to demonstrate the value of an enforcement strategy? Once again, the extent to which criminality can be ‘disrupted’ is articulated only in terms of some form of regulatory, enforcement or (as with asset recovery) punitive action.


Convention and constraint in the criminal justice system In a written submission to Lord Justice Auld’s 2001 review of the criminal justice system, ACPO noted that ‘the rate of attrition to organized crime [from prosecution] is so small that it represents little threat [to the criminals]’ (ACPO written submission para. 6.2). ACPO’s complaints, and the extent to which Auld addressed them, warrant a paper in their own right. It is sufficient here to note the level of frustration evident among law enforcement practitioners whose only tool against organized crime was prosecution, a process to which they contributed and by which they were measured but over which ultimately they had no control. It is the issues over which practitioners did have some vestige of control that populate their discourse on the policing of organized crime. To the extent that agencies could justify their existence in terms of enforcement and intelligence activity, they were masters of their own destiny. Hence the 1967 Review, the 1980s research on drugs squads, and the 1994 HAC enquiry are all dominated by practitioners asserting the need for specialist responses to the investigation and prosecution of episodes of organized criminality. Yet they were constrained by political parameters imposed upon them: the paradigm of local policing and performance measurement in terms of outputs rather than outcomes to name but two that ultimately contributed to the policy about-turn made manifest in SOCA. The rhetoric of various agency annual reports and strategic plans corroborates this, although the NCS attempted to go beyond mundane formulaic self-justification in devising a strategic plan that attempted to link politically set objectives with organization rationale, strategic principle and specific costed actions delivering the outcome of an organization consolidating after the early years following RCS amalgamation (NCS Strategic Plan 2002–3). It has been argued elsewhere that SOCA represents a paradigm shift in British policing (Harfield 2006). Whether there can be a concomitant shift in practitioner discourse on organized crime depends on whether a strategic intelligence understanding of organized crime, its harms and how they might be responded to can be achieved that rises above the intelligence discourse that has so far prevailed and which has so frequently been found wanting in terms of understanding the scale and extent of organized crime. Practitioners can contribute to that wider understanding but only if they are empowered to do so. Such empowerment will only come with the luxury of being able to allocate resources to the development of such strategic intelligence free from abstraction to the prosecution cause. Only then will practitioner discourse rise above the foreground of accountability to the horizon of achievement.

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Only then will practitioner discourse be able to focus beyond the criminal to be prosecuted and on to the harm (of which crime is just a facet) to be addressed.


Notes 1 Scotland and Northern Ireland are separate criminal jurisdictions with their own policing arrangements. 2 I am grateful to the Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, for the research grant that enabled the digitizing of these records which facilitated their analysis in Australia rather than in London. 3 This definition was accepted by all organizations and representatives giving evidence to the HAC. If individual practitioners dissented from this official consensus, that is not apparent from the available records. 4 The solution eventually arrived at was a Service Authority, mirroring functions of local police authorities, comprising stakeholders including police authority representatives. 5 The study into drugs policing in England and Wales by Wright, Waymont and Gregory was undertaken on behalf of the Police Foundation during the late 1980s and published in 1993. Its source material included extensive consultation with police officers and thus constitutes an indirect source of practitioner discourse. 6 When challenged as to why the restriction simply could not be lifted, NCIS seemed rather vague about its origins, implying that it had been a joint decision at policy level by ‘the Home Office and the police’ having first indicated that it was a decision derived from the tripartite structure (Q407–9). 7 It still is: see MacVean and Harfield 2008: 94 for an example of where efficiency targets dictated the under-resourcing of a system of intelligence-based working intended to render policing more efficient. 8 ACPO’s written submission to the HAC’s 1994 enquiry mentions a possible revenueraising connection in passing, HAC2, p. 122.

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The evolution of the European Union’s understanding of organized crime and its embedment in EU discourse


Helena Carrapiço In light of current levels of threat assessment applied by the EU to the phenomenon of organized crime and the importance this phenomenon has come to hold within the European Commission’s Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), this chapter will examine the origin and development of such discourse, as well as the policy responses adopted during its path from random police cooperation to a set of EU institutionalized policies. More specifically, this text argues that the EU antiorganized crime discourse is perfectly in line with the securizing trends of EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Considering that anti-organized crime policies are directly linked to specific understandings of what organized crime is and do not constitute simple reactions to external independent events, this chapter proposes to approach the concept of organized crime as a social construction enabled through the power of discourse. Basing itself on this idea, this text analyzes key documents of the EU discourse on organized crime, as well as interviews with EU officials, by underlining how they reproduce a specific concept of security. This chapter is divided into four parts: the first describes the onset of police cooperation among European nations on an intergovernmental level and how the latter decisively influenced both the structure and the content of the AFSJ. We will then look at the creation of this specific space and its structuring through a number of official documents. The subsequent section will describe the security crescendo brought about by the continued strengthening of the security apparatus and the increase in powers of security-related agencies. The final part will attempt to look at what the future holds for the area of EU JHA by considering the context of the Treaty of Lisbon and, in particular, the restructuring of the AFSJ through the disappearance of the pillars and the communitarization of Third Pillar provisions.

From sporadic information exchange to institutionalized police cooperation The origins of police cooperation in Europe Member states chose, up until the mid-1980s, not to delegate powers in the field of JHA to any European institution. As a result, discussions in this area were mainly


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carried out at member state level, independently of each other, or in the framework of intergovernmental institutions or working groups. Sporadic cooperation, however, between European police bodies had started taking place long before the creation of these institutions (Occhipinti 2003). Despite this occasional cooperation, the first institution providing a structured framework for permanent cooperation in criminal matters was only created in 1923, in Vienna. Initially called the International Police Commission, it would be renamed some years later as the International Criminal Police Organization, also known as Interpol, and would become an information centre for ongoing criminal investigations. Surprisingly enough, it was not within Interpol that the most substantial developments in terms of police cooperation would take place, between the 1950s and 1970s, but in the framework of the Council of Europe (Walker 1998). Created with the purpose of protecting human rights, democratic values and the rule of law, it rapidly developed activities related to judicial cooperation and to the fight against the trafficking of drugs and human beings. Its Group to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit Traffic in Drugs, created by the French President, Pompidou, in 1969 is a good example of one of its initiatives (Occhipinti 2003). The results of the Council of Europe’s meetings started, however, to be considered in the 1970s as ‘meager and slow and the instruments adopted frequently reflected little more than the lowest common denominator’ (Uçarer 2003: 296). Ad hoc group intergovernmental cooperation Although the outcome of the Council of Europe’s initiatives was considered to be rather discouraging, it should still be recognized as one of the first signs of European countries’ political will to cooperate more closely in the area of criminal justice. In fact, this was probably the starting point for a number of other initiatives, such as the Trevi Group (1975).1 These were platforms where European Economic Community member states cooperated, exchanged information and discussed best practices in the areas of terrorism, organized crime, immigration and Home Affairs in general without having to go through the framework of the Community. The existence of such meetings, as well as their content, was often covered by a veil of secrecy, considered as essential to the good functioning of the information exchange, but which made them unaccountable to parliaments and thus undemocratic (den Boer 1998). Although these groups met only occasionally and were simply advisory, their influence over national strategies and policy trends was quite impressive. Concerning the groups’ internal structures, it is interesting to point out that the way they were organized might have contributed substantially to the current spillover of meaning between terrorism, organized crime and immigration. Coined by Bigo as a ‘security continuum’ (1996: 263), this transposition of threat meaning from one concept to another has allowed for the transformation of subjects as diverse as immigrants, asylum-seekers, victims of human trafficking and organized crime in general from non-politicized issues into high-ranking threats to European society. In the JHA literature, little attention is usually paid to this constellation of ad hoc


The evolution of the European Union’s understanding of organized crime 45 groups, due not only to their level of confidentiality but also to the mainstream idea that associates the origin of what would later be called the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice with the introduction of the Schengen Agreement in 1985. There is a tendency to study the evolution of the AFSJ as an isolated process. Furthermore, authors that take into account the influence of such groups usually look back at history through a functionalist lens. That is, they usually attempt to provide explanations for the development of these intergovernmental groups and the ensuing construction of the AFSJ by establishing causal links with external factors (Uçarer 2003).2 The internal factor of member states’ helplessness in dealing with these external problems autonomously is also usually alleged. As just mentioned, the literature usually establishes a connection between the coming into being of the Single Market and the creation of the AFSJ, which posited a so-called rational need to compensate for the disappearance of borders by introducing increased security measures. Nevertheless, looking back at crime reports at that time, there does not seem to be any coherent trend, giving rise to the formulation of a functionalist explanation on the development of the AFSJ (den Boer 1992). Still, and independently from whether this functionalist view was based on real or imagined threats, it is important to underline that this perspective became dominant within the European discourse and, as it did so, it was identified with a specific understanding of security (Huysmans 2004). It is, in this sense, important to try to understand, then, not why this functionalist vision became dominant, but how it managed to penetrate the discourse on JHA so effectively. In particular, it is relevant to identify how specific ideas circulated, as well as the key moments that allowed them to become embedded in the AFSJ. Where the ad hoc groups are concerned, it is important to underline the type of cooperation they developed, as well as the specificity of the information exchanged, in order to realize how much the current JHA structure of the EU has inherited from these intergovernmental working groups in terms of their understanding of how security can be achieved and their consideration of the relation between security and freedom. The gradual institutionalization of intergovernmental cooperation The period of intergovernmental cooperation through these independent ad hoc groups lasted until 1988, when member states decided to formalize the existence of such structures and put them under the umbrella of the European Economic Community (EEC), through the creation of a Coordinator’s Group (den Boer 1998). This does not mean that the ad hoc groups were dissolved; on the contrary, they were integrated into the EEC structure with a format roughly similar to the one they had up until that moment, and continued in the same line of work, as can be seen through the issuing of the Palma Document in 1989.3 Shortly after, the preparation for Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty, on Interior and Justice Matters, was initiated by the Coordinator’s Committee. The latter was composed of one representative per member state plus one representative from the Commission and was divided into three working groups echoing the same working structure, culture and methods as those of the Trevi Group (Bunyan 1993).4

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In a parallel intergovernmental initiative, France, Germany and Benelux decided to take a step further in their integration and sign the Schengen Agreement (1985), aimed at enabling a ‘de facto’ free movement of people within their territories. The cornerstone of the agreement was the idea that the freedom given to citizens should be closely protected and compensated with security measures. Thus, as member states abolished all internal borders, replacing them by a reinforced external border, they also adopted common standards for patrolling the latter, such as harmonized procedures for border checks and conditions for entry.

Isn’t it ironic? The creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and its labelling Changes introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in the area of JHA The Treaty of the EU, signed in Maastricht in 1992, introduced a number of changes with relevant consequences for the EU’s fight against organized crime. The most important of these, as just mentioned, is probably the institutionalization of the ad hoc groups which had been responsible, up to that time, for cooperation in JHA, through the inclusion of this area in the Treaty and the creation of the Third Pillar. Among the results of such institutionalization, we can underline the enhancement of police, customs and judicial cooperation, which attempted to reach common positions regarding asylum, immigration policies and the crossing of the external border, as well as the considerable effort that was made to develop more effective instruments to counter the trafficking of drugs, illegal immigration, terrorism and organized crime. The last, however, was not explicitly identified in the Maastricht Treaty as being a major problem. As we can see from Art. K1 of the Treaty of Maastricht, European Community priorities were mainly related to immigration (points 1, 2 and 3 of Art. K1), whereas organized crime is only mentioned in the last point (point 9). There is a reference in point 3(c) to the combating of unauthorized immigration, but this should be interpreted not in the sense of fighting organized crime structures enabling this act, but as the fight against the act itself of migrating illegally (Treaty of Maastricht, Title VI, Art. K1). The priority was given to the fight against drugs, with the introduction of a common strategy in this area. The Treaty of Maastricht was also characterized by the putting aside of former attempts to develop a common definition of organized crime and by the decision to adopt, instead, an empty signifier which was increasingly expanded until the introduction of the Amsterdam Treaty. It thus came to include not only new activities such as the counterfeiting and trafficking of art, but also hooliganism and racism (den Boer 1996). Although there was an attempt to democratize JHA and improve its transparency, through the closer involvement of the European Commission and the Parliament, the outcome was rather different: an approach was developed outlining the need to compensate possible negative consequences of the construction of the Internal Market through the setting up of a JHA structure characterized by an increased control of the population. The Third Pillar was structured around the same balance between freedom and


The evolution of the European Union’s understanding of organized crime 47 security which the ad hoc groups had already established. On the one hand, the European Community considered that an important part of its objectives was to ensure the free circulation of its people through eliminating the obstacles to its movements. To this effect, it took on the responsibility of developing its citizens’ rights, as well as specific instruments in order to grant them more liberty. On the other hand, however, it also defended the idea that a comprehensive security culture needed to be developed in order to protect this newly created freedom. It did so by creating other forms of control (such as databases) and by demonstrating ‘an excessive concern with repressive instruments of security and order’ (Walker 1998: 236). Indeed, looking at the nine articles that compose Title IV of the Maastricht Treaty, one feels obliged to agree with Walker’s idea, as they are all about hampering the circulation and not on facilitating it. As Huysmans puts it, the way JHA has evolved entails ‘a particular understanding of freedom and its relation to security. It conceptualizes the relation between security and freedom as being simultaneously competitive and functional’ (2004: 297). Considering that freedom is usually understood as the absence of constraints on one’s existence or capacity for acting and that socialization has led us to restrain that freedom in order for life in common to be possible, one is led to the idea that a balance between one’s freedom and that of our neighbour must be achieved. This belief that there is a need to find the right balance between freedom and security entails bearing in mind the possibility of abuse to that freedom. It is in this sense that we can say that there is a competing relation between the longing for more freedom and the enforcement of limits to that freedom. As a consequence of this argumentation, the relation between freedom and security is not only ‘competitive’, it is also ‘functional’ because the limitations to one’s freedom are the granters of that exact freedom. The governing of the European JHA is the result of a particular understanding of how freedom should be managed and of the translation of this understanding into a successful discourse and practices outlining the importance of security technologies. The fact that the Coordinator’s Committee (which laid the Treaty foundations for this area) was essentially based on the work of a set of groups more related to the security apparatus than to that of civil liberties makes the result far from a coincidence. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as a fundamental treaty objective Given the perception of the existing lack of transparency and accountability in the area of JHA, preparations for the Treaty of Amsterdam were particularly careful to reposition European citizens at the centre of the European project and to involve the main European Community’s institutions (Intergovernmental Conference 5, December 1996). In order to achieve this goal, the areas concerning immigration, visas, asylum and the free movement of people were moved from the Third Pillar to the communitary one, thus forming Title IV, Art. 61 to 69 (Consolidated Treaty of the European Community 2002). The latter probably constituted the most significant


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change brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam: the creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Although the Treaty of Maastricht had already led the way for cooperation in this specific area, its justification was still at that point highly dependent on the Single Market. The Treaty of Amsterdam instead remodels this connection by presenting the AFSJ as an objective in its own right (Treaty of Amsterdam, Art. B). However, the communitarization of the provisions in Title IV constituted only one small step in the direction of greater transparency and accountability. All the provisions concerning police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters were, however, kept in the intergovernmental pillar, in Title VI. This implied that the Parliament and the Court of Justice had ‘no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement services’ (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, Art. K7, 5). In other words, it is not difficult to see that the Amsterdam Treaty, with its complicated overlap between the First and the Third Pillars, did not contribute substantively to the transparency of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Where organized crime is concerned, the Treaty of Amsterdam considerably prioritized this phenomenon. While the immigration, asylum and visas provisions moved to the First Pillar, the new Treaty focused on ‘preventing and combating crime, organized or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offenses against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud’ (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997: Art. K.1). This prioritization led to an acceleration of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, namely through the increase of Europol’s competences (Art. K. 2). Although the focus on organized crime seems to constitute a new development of the Treaty, it had in fact already been addressed by the Dublin European Council in December 1996, which ‘underlined its absolute determination to fight organized crime and stressed the need for a coherent and coordinated approach by the Union’ (Action Plan to combat organized crime 1997: Chapter I, paragraph 2). The delineation of a strategy to counter what was perceived as a growing transnational threat to society, its citizens and values had first come about with the 1997 Action Plan, developed by the High Level Group on Organized Crime (Action Plan to combat organized crime 1997). It contained 15 political guidelines and 30 specific recommendations which stated that urgent responses to organized crime were necessary to accurately develop the future Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The document mainly underlined the importance of cross-pillar information exchange, of developing a common methodology in order to facilitate the recognition of organized crime, of the reinforcement of the ‘Union’s armoury’ and of accelerating implementing procedures (Action Plan to combat organized crime 1997, Chapter III). These recommendations served as an agenda for the development of Title VI of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Through the reading of the latter and the 1997 Action Plan, we can already observe the development of an understanding of organized crime as an extremely serious threat to the entire European society and the subsequent need to tackle it with extraordinary measures.

The evolution of the European Union’s understanding of organized crime 49


The Tampere Programme and the ‘freedom to live in a law-abiding environment’ The projection of a specific image of organized crime and how it should be tackled was further developed in two ensuing documents: the ‘Action Plan on how best to implement the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty establishing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (European Council 1998), which was brought about by the Vienna European Council and the Tampere European Council conclusions of 1999. The 1998 Action Plan resulted in the adoption by the Council of a ‘Resolution on the prevention of organized crime with reference to the establishment of a comprehensive strategy for combating it’ (December 1998). As its name suggests, this text focuses on prevention and on the greater involvement of civil society. The meaning that the 1998 Action Plan attaches to the concept of freedom is particularly worthy of mention: ‘freedom to live in a law-abiding environment in the knowledge that public authorities are using everything in their individual and collective power … to combat and contain those who seek to deny or abuse that freedom’ (Part A, Paragraph 6). The question here is not whether freedom and security are two faces of the same coin, but what it means to be secure, who decides which are the best security measures to be taken, and what the consequences for freedom are. The 1999 Tampere conclusions were very much in line with the 1998 Action Plan. Despite a formal attempt to promote a ‘shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law’ (European Council 1999: The Tampere Milestones, paragraph 1), the Presidency continued to promote the notion of freedom through an increase in security. Looking at the provisions regarding organized crime, there is a clear reference to the idea that ‘a balanced development of union-wide measures against crime should be achieved while protecting the freedom and legal rights of individuals and economic operators’ (European Council 1999: paragraph 40). The presidency, at that time, pushed for the development of a roadmap to implement all the provisions and instruments designed for the AFSJ, which took the final form of a five-year Tampsere Programme (1999–2004). The conclusions of this Programme mainly underlined that the development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice should be maintained as one of the most important objectives of the Union and that it should stay at the top of political agendas (European Council 1999). Organized crime constituted one of the four sections of the Tampere Programme. The title ‘A Union wide Fight against Crime’ expresses quite well the EU’s intention to pursue a global strategy against crime, already previously introduced by the Dublin European Council in 1996. The Programme’s priorities were the ‘prevention of crime at the Union level’, aimed particularly at juvenile, urban and drug-related crime, ‘special action against money laundering’ – considered to be the basis for organized crime activities – and the ‘stepping up of cooperation against crime’. The text also proposed to develop the already existing security apparatus at EU level by encouraging the organization of joint investigation teams laid down by the

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Amsterdam Treaty, by further increasing the capacities of security-related agencies, such as Europol, and by creating new ones, such as Eurojust, the European Police Chiefs Operational Task Force and CEPOL (the European Police College) (Tampere Programme 1999). It equally pushed for the establishment of common definitions, not of organized crime as a general phenomenon but of sub-areas like financial crimes and trafficking of drugs and human beings. In overall terms, the most important trend to remember from the Tampere conclusions is, nevertheless, the increasing technicality of JHA and the continued development of a legitimizing discourse by law enforcement experts, reinforcing the seriousness of specific threats in order to justify a new approach to security (Elvins 2003).

From the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice to the Area of Security, Justice and Freedom The acceleration of the security apparatus The Tampere Programme efforts to deal with organized crime were then followed by the publication of The Prevention and Control of Organized Crime. A EU Strategy for the beginning of the New Millennium. Produced by the Council of the EU in 2000, the text introduced little novelty, but tried to bring together, and in more detail, all that had been done previously in this area (Elvins 2003). It put forward 39 recommendations, divided by areas of concern, and formulated on the basis of the political guidelines set for each of the areas, as well as on the existing mandates and initiatives (Council of the EU 2000). The Millennium Strategy also made numerous references to the current trends in organized crime, namely to the evidence of the increase in this phenomenon, its dynamic and transnational nature, its capacity to intertwine licit and illicit activities and its ability to take advantage of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice which is still not unified. The text also transmitted an image of organized crime which echoes that of a global criminal conspiracy to disrupt the good functioning of European society: organized crime groups’ ‘concerted efforts to seek to influence and hamper the work of law enforcement and the judicial system illustrate the extent and professional capability of these criminal organizations’ (Council of the EU 2000: 3). Since the publication of the 2000 Millennium Strategy, most of the documents issued have constituted an attempt to control the implementation of this proposal and to verify that the Union’s strategy is being followed. A joint report from the Commission and Europol, published in 2001, continued to develop the topic of the definition of organized crime. Towards a European Strategy to Prevent Organized Crime (Commission and Europol 2001) was very similar to the 1997 Action Plan, although it also introduced some new elements: it underlined, namely, the importance of harmonizing the definition of organized crime as a means to develop the ‘union-wide’ approach to the phenomenon. According to this logic, measures, instruments, plans and information can only be put together and be commonly developed, by different agents, if the latter agree on the object to be tackled and its characteristics. The joint report listed the


The evolution of the European Union’s understanding of organized crime 51 idiosyncrasies that it considered most representative of organized crime, under the form of 11 points. The main points were numbers one, three, five and 11, which it held as essential features for a group to be classified as organized crime: ‘collaboration of more than two people’, ‘for a prolonged or indefinite period of time’, ‘suspected of the commission of serious criminal offences’ and ‘determined by the pursuit of profit and/power’ (European Commission and Europol 2001: 41). This was an important step in the evolution of an understanding of organized crime since it marks the Union’s clear will to shape the existing national definitions, as a means to develop standardized security mechanisms. This move revealed the vagueness and broadness of the definition the Union is using in order to justify the development of security technologies and the increase in security agencies’ powers. The Hague Programme and the cost of freedom In 2004, an attempt was made by the Dutch Presidency to create a new strategic concept for dealing with organized crime and to set key priorities for this strategy. In fact, there had been numerous complaints concerning the incapacity, on the Union’s side, to respect the calendar that had been stipulated for the Tampere Programme. This disappointment resulted, in May 2004, in the adoption of the Hague Programme, which set the objectives to be achieved in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice during the period 2004–9. The objective of this Programme is to pursue more effectively the Tampere commitments. It is divided into three parts, one on ‘strengthening freedom’, another on ‘strengthening security’ and a last on ‘strengthening justice’. Bigo makes an interesting analysis of how these different concepts are treated within this text and how they relate to each other. Namely, he looks at the way the text draws on a specific interpretation of freedom, which is very much in line with the security interpretation (Bigo 2006). Indeed, we can observe that despite dedicating its largest number of provisions to freedom, the Hague Programme proposes a very limited definition of this concept. Not only is freedom simply freedom of circulation and residence, it is also only applicable to those who hold a EU passport (European Council 2004). Furthermore, most of the provisions within the text further limit this already quite narrow interpretation. What the text actually says is that in order for freedom to exist within the AFSJ, it must be controlled by security, especially if we are talking about the freedom of individuals who are perceived as not belonging to this space. In the end, we find ourselves with not much freedom left, especially if we are illegal African immigrants trying to improve our living conditions. Even for EU citizens, this concept of freedom is presented as a right that is imposed by the EU and the member states on their subjects, who are passive (Bigo 2006). There is, above all, no doubt regarding the way freedom, security and justice have been tied together and made inseparable: ‘Freedom, justice, control at the external borders, internal security and the prevention of terrorism should henceforth be considered indivisible within the Union as a whole’ (European Council 2004: 4). The Hague Programme does not contain, however, any specific guidelines on how these proposals should be implemented. With a view to achieving this

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implementation, the Presidency of the European Council asked the Commission to prepare an Action Plan, which was submitted in May 2005 (European Commission 2005), as mentioned above. The latter contained ten policy recommendations to be adopted over the following five years, as well as a timetable for their implementation. Organized crime is listed among them, with the indications that a ‘European model for criminal intelligence’ and the boosting of the cooperation between member states’ law enforcement agencies should be part of the pressing ‘strategic concept on tackling organized crime’ (European Commission 2005).

From the Area of Security, Justice and Freedom to the Area of Security, Security and Security? From Constitutional Treaty to Lisbon Treaty: just a matter of different names? The Constitutional Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (hereafter called Constitutional Treaty) was signed in 2004 by all the member states and subjected to ratification. In 2005, both France and the Netherlands voted for the rejection of the text, thus creating a cascade effect, eventually leading to a period of reflection on the European project. Had it been ratified by all member states, the Constitutional Treaty would have accelerated the decision-making process in the area of the fight against organized crime, terrorism and migration, as it planned to change the voting rules in the Council, on most issues from unanimity to qualified majority voting (Lang 2008). These provisions were put under Title IV: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. According to Arts III-270 and III-271, the priority was to approximate member states’ legislation in this area, through mutual recognition, and to produce ‘minimum definitions of criminal offenses and sanctions’ (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 2004). The period of reflection ended officially on 23 June 2007, when the member states decided to organize an Intergovernmental Conference to prepare a new treaty. The latter, entitled the Lisbon Treaty, was expected to come into force on 1 January 2009, but was delayed, as it almost suffered the same fate as its predecessor. The Lisbon Treaty, or Reform Treaty as it is also called, did not differ greatly from the Constitutional Treaty where the field of JHA is concerned (Lang 2008). Its objective was to render the AFSJ more unified and democratic by extending the roles of the European Parliament, national parliaments and the European Court of Justice. It also aimed to modify the institutional and policy-making arrangements, which had failed to come about with the Constitutional Treaty and had started to be perceived as urgent (Carrera and Geyer 2007). These changes were to be introduced through the abolition of the pillar structure, which had up to that moment separated topics that were understood as connected, by giving them a different decision-making treatment. The transposition of the provisions on police and judicial cooperation into the Title on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, already carried out by the Constitutional Treaty, was maintained in the Lisbon text. The most important difference between the two treaties was probably the


The evolution of the European Union’s understanding of organized crime 53 possibility for member states to opt out on certain issues (Lang 2008). As a result, a structure was approved which was, officially, no longer characterized by three pillars, but which comprised so many derogations, exceptions, different speeds and opting out clauses that it becomes unclear how the Lisbon Treaty could be considered as contributing to the development of a unified AFSJ. Although most countries chose to ratify the Treaty through their parliament, this did not prevent the Treaty of Lisbon from being rejected in Ireland. A new referendum took place in this country, in October 2009, approving the Lisbon Treaty. The latter entered into force on 1st of December, despite the delays and controversy caused by new demands on the part of Poland, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. Where is the Union heading? Immigration and asylum feature as the main items on the Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security’s Annual Management Plan 2008. In the latter, priority was given to the construction of a more secure EU through the limitation of illegal immigration, negotiations with migrant exporting countries and the application of common asylum rules (DG JFS 2008). The subsequent objectives were the protection of EU citizens’ rights and the prevention of terrorism and crime, which seem to have given place to a more urgent migration policy. The continuity of this trend seems to have been ensured in the Commission’s 2009 Policy Strategy. In a surprisingly short section on Freedom, Security and Justice, this institution lays down its intention of increasing the budget allocated to ‘external borders’, ‘visa policy and free movement of people’ and ‘common immigration and asylum policies’. The Commission also mentions that this increase will mainly be devoted to the development of new ‘large-scale IT systems’, such as ‘SIS II, VIS and Eurodac’ (European Commission 2008). In other words, not only are Fundamental Rights listed after the strengthening of the immigration policy, they are also outbalanced by the prioritization given to security instruments and by the solving of political issues through technological solutions. Bearing this idea in mind, it comes as no surprise that Jacques Barrot’s speech before the European Parliament, at the time of his appointment as Justice, Freedom and Security Commissioner, underlined that ‘freedoms and fundamental rights cannot be effectively exercised without security and an effective guarantee of collective protection’ (2008: 5). He concludes by stating that he is ‘happy and proud to be able to work … for this Europe that we want to see, serving the human person, human dignity and inalienable human rights’ (Barrot 2008: 8). One cannot avoid asking whose rights he is referring to.

Conclusion Throughout this chapter, we have tried to go beyond tracing, historically, the EU’s discourse on organized crime, by establishing its relation with a wider discourse on the creation and development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The


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objective of the chapter was, thus, to critically understand how both discourse and technologies of government are constituting the EU’s understanding of organized crime. In view to achieving this, we started by looking at the origins of the discourse of police cooperation and at how the EU gradually saw the need to legislate in this area. Furthermore, we tried to draw out the evolution of the EU’s justification for constructing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, namely how it was earlier associated with the development of a European citizenship and later became directly linked with the improvement of the internal market. In particular, we tried to point out how the rationale for AFSJ’s deeper integration was the need to compensate for the negative externalities of the internal market and to protect the liberty of movement from abuse. This trend led to the definition of a balance between freedom and security, characterized by a gradual EU institutionalization of JHA and a permanent struggle between the intergovernmentalization and the communitarization of this area. At the same time, this chapter also intended to underline the changes introduced by the main legal texts, with a view to identifying a tendency to frame freedom in security terms and to creating a spillover of meaning between the different policy areas contained within the AFSJ. Finally, there was an attempt to look at current developments and to question whether the democracy and transparency objectives proclaimed by the Union were being achieved.

Notes 1 Other similar initiatives would be the European Political Cooperation Group (1970), the CAHAR (Committee of Experts on the Legal Aspects of Territorial Asylum, Refugees and Stateless Persons) (1978), the Informal Consultations (1985), the Group of Co-coordinators (1988) and the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration (1986). 2 External factors such as the growing presence of organized crime in European societies, the increase in terrorist incidents, the attractiveness of the EEC for both extracommunitarian immigrants and asylum seekers and the acceleration of transactions. 3 The Palma Document led to the development of a detailed Programme of Action in JHA. 4 The three working groups were: Immigration and Asylum; Security, Police and Customs Cooperation; Judicial Cooperation.

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International policy discourses on transnational organized crime


The role of an international expertise Amandine Scherrer Introduction Within the context of the ‘war on drugs’ launched by the United States in the 1970s, what was referred to as ‘international crime’ or ‘cross-border crime’ mainly encompassed drug trafficking and the proceeds of such crime: money laundering.1 At the beginning of the 1990s, however, political discourses on international crime began to gradually change and the shift away from the ‘war on drugs’ to the fight against TOC as a whole began to occur (Woodiwiss 2003a: 25–6; Mitsilegas 2003a: 76–7; Sheptycki 2003: 129–30). The 1994 UN Naples Conference certainly marked a key moment in the process of internationalizing the challenge posed by TOC because for the first time at global level it formalized the perception of what TOC was by offering a common working definition. ‘Transnational organized crime’ was thus defined as comprising: the organization of groups for criminal purposes; the presence of hierarchical or personal links that allow certain individuals to direct the group; the laundering of illicit proceeds; the potential to expand into new activities and beyond national borders; cooperation with other organized transnational groups (Sheptycki 2003: 123–4). This endorsement at international level of TOC has raised challenging questions and debates. Among them, the question of the social construction of TOC remains at the core of most critical analysis devoted to this issue. Numerous scholars have, for instance, convincingly challenged the very nature of the concept of organized crime, underlying its historical origins and developments at the political level (Woodiwiss 2003a, 2005; Sheptycki 2003; Mitsilegas 2003a), or questioning the characteristics associated with it, such as the degree of organization (Reuter 1983; van Duyne 1996b; Fijnaut, et al. 1998; Beare and Naylor 1999), or the supposed monolithic and monopolistic aspects of it (den Boer 1997; Desroches 2003). In addition, explanations have been developed in order to give an account of the shifts in political discourses and the arising of an international mobilization against the rather vague concept of ‘TOC’. Some scholars, for instance, have insisted on the latent failure of the ‘war on drugs’ launched by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s in order to explain the broadening of the US agenda among international arenas in the field of criminal justice (Nadelmann 1993). The alleged existence of a ‘new threat’, TOC, which had been present in


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US political discourses since the early 1990s, thus led to the broadening of the concept of organized crime to encompass a whole set of transnational criminal practices, thereby making it possible to ‘excuse’ the failure of national and international anti-drugs efforts at the same time as justifying their expansion to other areas (Woodiwiss 2003b: 25–8). Studies also turn to the prevailing context at the end of the 1980s in which the security assumptions of the Cold War era were being called into question in order to explain the success of the international mobilization against TOC (Anderson, et al. 1995; Bigo 1995; Edwards and Gill 2003). All these well-informed approaches have in common to challenge the image of TOC as a homogeneous threat, as most of the political and practitioners’ discourses at the international level suggest. Moreover, and in relation to such cautious apprehensions of the phenomenon of TOC, another major identifiable academic debate in the literature has revolved around analysis of the institutional approaches set in place to combat TOC at the international level. Contrary to a good many of the academic studies that have contended that the shifts in international agendas have been a consequence of the spread of mafia-type phenomena across the globe (Williams 1994; Lupsha 1996), many scholars have challenged methods of analysis that simply reiterate the content of official discourses, which present all action taken as being an appropriate response to a known and recognized threat (i.e. a functionalist approach). These scholars have pointed to the use of the label ‘TOC’ as justification for increasing international cooperation, especially at the level of the judiciary and police, thereby allowing institutions to reposition themselves on the international stage at a time when a particular view of the world (the bipolar view) had been shaken. This has been particularly studied in the context of the EU (Anderson, et al. 1995; Bigo 1996; Mitsilegas 2001; Mégie 2006), the UN (Edwards and Gill 2003; Mitsilegas 2003a), or the G8 (Scherrer 2009a). The 1990s indeed certainly saw an increasing mobilization against TOC, as well as the development of significant international regimes in this field.2 Even though international policy against TOC seems to be more guided by a ‘ritual incantation than a knowledge-based process’ (van Duyne and vander Beken 2009: 261), the space for alternatives appears to be narrow. The aim of this chapter is therefore to investigate and understand the apparent international consensus in the TOC international regimes, a consensus mostly relying on a peculiar functionalist interpretation of the threat that, as seen, has been heavily called into question. In so doing, this contribution seeks more specifically to explain the impact and influence of actors who participate in international institutions that construct international and legal norms in relation to TOC. By focusing on these ‘experts’ who gathered regularly at international-level meetings over these questions, their socio-professional origins and tangible aspects of their professional biographies, it has been possible to discern common frames of reference that are conducive to achieving consensus, thereby enabling these actors to adopt joint positions with regard to what needs to be done to combat transnational crime and thus facilitate collective mobilization. In taking this approach, the intention here is not to seek for any rationale for the joint action of these actors, but rather to reveal the points of convergence that exist between their perceptions of TOC and their views

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on how to combat it. These points of convergence do not prevent the experts from holding a broad range of views on the subject. The main purpose of this chapter is therefore to answer the following: how and by whom policy discourses on TOC are framed and shaped? This chapter will first focus on the establishment of specific forms of expertise at the international level. In particular, the first part will analyze the cooperative imperative that has led to the justification of such experts groups and will portray some of the main characteristics of these experts. The second part will explore how experts’ knowledge has an impact on international regime dynamics, and to what extend logics of framing and codification at the international level have been built.

The establishment of specific forms of expertise against TOC on the international stage The current state of international regimes against TOC shows a strong, if not exclusive, focus on law enforcement powers and capabilities. Special techniques of investigation, justice and police cooperation, and an extensive use of surveillance, are tools that have been constantly promoted and reinforced at domestic and international level. The RICO Act, which had been adopted in the United States in 1970 and gave the police and intelligence services increased powers, particularly with regard to surveillance (phone-tapping, greater use of informers, the seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime, etc.), were, for instance, used as a basis for discussion at the UN Naples Conference in 1994. The use of special techniques of investigation in the fight against organized crime has been constantly advocated by law enforcement agencies and justified both at domestic and international level since then. This approach is far from gathering consensus in the academic community (Beare 2003; Edwards and Gill 2003; Sheptycki 2003). Beyond these critics concerning the trend followed in international regimes, one should also question the logics of this consensus. We thus suggest that one possible explanation of this consensus is certainly to be found in the socio-professional characteristics of the ‘expertise’ provided at the international level. The cooperation imperative What have been presented as ‘new transnational threats’ in many international discourses certainly benefited from pre-existing hegemonic discourses on the ‘cooperation imperative’ since the Second World War.3 According to the main features of international discourses on TOC, the chief issue underlying any international action in the field is quite clearly the cooperation imperative. This imperative indeed follows from political discourses on the ‘new transnational threats’ and is a cogent example of what can be referred to as the ‘globalization of (in)security’ (Bigo 2006). By creating a cooperation imperative, discourses on the ‘new threats’ have had a significant effect on how the roles and responsibilities of the police and investigation services are defined. Law enforcement officials, as well as those


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working in the justice sector, now have to ‘manage the internationalization of the world’ (Bigo 2003) and are often involved in investigations and proceedings that extend far beyond the national or local context. In this context, civil servants have sometimes become part of what can be referred to as a ‘transnational bureaucracy’. Expert-level exchanges on the international stage (within, for instance, the European Union, the OECD, the United Nations, or the G8) in the area of Justice and Police cooperation have led to the establishment of professional networks of expertise that gather regularly officials from Justice and Home Affairs departments.4 The concept of ‘security field’, understood in its sociological sense, is therefore a useful analytic tool in order to encompass and understand these social interactions. This concept was initially used by Didier Bigo to explain how, in the EU member states, some law enforcement officials have become ‘Europeanized’ (Bigo 1996). Drawing inspiration from Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory, a security field is a social space that transcends the internal/external, national/international divide … This field is determined not so much by the possibility of using force as by the ability to produce statements about who the enemy is, in other words by the ability to impose one’s authority on the definition of who or what is provoking fear. (Bigo 1996: 48) In this approach, a great emphasis is delivered on the diversity of the actors in the security field (they can be politicians, senior officials, police officers, legal specialists, diplomats) as well as forms of competition occurring among them, that serves to point out that what these actors have in common is a shared belief in their own singularity, in particular their unique ability to identify and deal with threat. Such networks of experts have been justified by the cooperation imperative and are constantly legitimized by the need of improving gaps in judicial and police cooperation. The setting of a Multidisciplinary Working Party on Organized Crime was justified, for instance, by ‘the need to improve the implementation at national level of the instruments adopted within the framework of the Union and elsewhere’.5 The establishment of a specific experts group on TOC within the G8 was similarly justified, in the G7 Halifax Summit Communiqué (G7 Halifax Summit declaration 1995) by the need to ‘look at existing arrangements for both bilateral and multilateral cooperation, to identify significant gaps and options for improved coordination, and to propose practical action to fill such gaps’. Another issue, arising from the determination of threat, concerns the direction the ensuing work of those international networks of expertise takes. From an analysis of the main international bodies involved in the global fight against TOC, such as the UN, the EU, or the G8, it appears that most of these international groups focus mainly on two areas, namely the securitization of borders and ways in which the room for manoeuvre available to alleged or potential criminals can be limited. The need to secure borders in order to protect against a criminal threat that is perceived as coming mainly from outside is an important aspect of the


International policy discourses on transnational organized crime 59 rhetoric on transnational organized crime that broadly underlies the vast majority of international discourses on TOC. References to border protection in order to reduce cross-border crimes are constant features of international narratives on this so-called threat. At its Denver Summit, in 1997, the G7 announced, for example, the following measures: ‘We also will develop additional methods to secure our borders’ (Denver Summit Communiqué 1997). The issue of border protection was also a key point in the conclusions reached by the Interior Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1998.6 On the prevention side, the principal tool promoted in order to prevent cross-border criminal activity is the extensive use of intelligence capacities (notably through the use of special techniques of investigation and data exchanges).7 From a repressive point of view, the use of extradition and mutual legal assistance to facilitate the pursuit of criminals is deemed as indispensable, in order to prevent criminals finding ‘safe haven anywhere in the world’.8 The second focus of these international meetings is concerned more with depriving criminal groups of the means by which they commit their crimes. The focus on money laundering (legitimized by the belief on the deterrence effect and the will to deprive criminals of their economic resources) and the limitation of the technological support and opportunities offered by constant progress in telecommunication (mainly what is referred to as ‘cybercrime’) have, for instance, constituted one of the main targets of law enforcement experts group and have been at the core of the global standards in the field.9 These two main focuses (the securitization of borders and the tracking of criminal means and methods), which follow from the cooperation imperative created by asserting the existence of a common enemy, have thus been the watchword of the international community for combating TOC since the end of the 1980s. In this orientation of the international regime against TOC, the lexicon and methods of law enforcement appear to have acquired a high degree of legitimization and political acceptance. In that regard, and as underlined by numerous academic studies, the main problem that appears when dealing with TOC is the question of sources and knowledge. Numerous criminologists have laid great stress on the all-powerful role played by the police as far as what was known about organized crime is concerned (Reuter and Rubinstein 1978; Beare and Naylor 1999; Beare 2003). Many have insisted on the fact that the available knowledge is inaccurate, often originating from sources that are biased and statistics that are unreliable or ‘slanted’ in favour of particular (especially professional) interests. Numerous scholars have therefore convincingly developed this problematic reliance on police assertions (Beare and Naylor 1999; Edwards and Gill 2003; van Duyne and Vander Beken 2009). The problematic prevalence of law enforcement officials’ views within the elaboration of international regimes in the field thus deserves fuller attention. In particular, the backgrounds of the practitioners involved in international experts meetings, as well as their socio-professional distribution, introduce insightful aspects on the knowledge conducive to international regulation.

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Towards a sociology of expertise A careful analysis of this world of international expertise on TOC has made it possible to identify some points of convergence and similarity among these experts. Of course, as emphasized in the introduction, the similarities among these experts are not meant to paint this world of expertise as a homogeneous group. Noticeable differences appear among them (e.g. their experience, their skills and their knowledge in the field, and, of course, their national backgrounds). Nevertheless, the qualitative approach used in interviews, as well as further research on professional biographies of some of these key state officials, mainly led to identifying some convergences that are strong and useful for understanding the logics of the international regime’s dynamic. Even if these results mainly concern the G8 experts group on TOC (Scherrer 2009a),10 further investigations have demonstrated that these strong similarities are also common to other international expert groups on this issue, especially within the EU or the UN frameworks. It is nevertheless important to stress that these experts do not constitute a common front against a common enemy. In fact, even though there seems to be consensus about the nature of the threat and how it should be managed, it masks genuine differences over implementation. Following a sociological perspective, the field of security professionals is certainly not a quiet arena, and competitions, rivalries and backlashes are numerous. The G8 experts group does not escape these sociological realities. According to the vast majority of the G8 experts interviewed on their perception of the nature of TOC, organized criminal groups take advantage of modern means of communication in order to forge alliances, launder money and cross borders that have become increasingly porous. The rhetoric adopted is in this sense consistent with the political statements emanating from summits and uses the same explanatory processes in order to determine the threat posed by transnational organized crime, namely that in an increasingly open world, new opportunities, in terms of action as well as methods and means, abound for criminal groups. Whether with diplomats, justice sector officials or law enforcement practitioners, there is a common thread to the interviews: nobody questions the existence of a threat to international security from transnational organized crime and its criminal groups. Most of them see a genuine ‘adversary’ and the problems associated with it are interpreted as being ‘the impact of criminal groups on the stability of states’ or a matter of ‘international public security’. They thus favour taking a very broad-based approach to transnational organized crime, and stress the urgent need to cooperate in the face of such an international challenge. The fact that there appears to be consensus among the G8 experts as far as identifying threat is concerned should not, however, obscure the existence of a certain degree of discomfort on their part about the use of the expression ‘TOC’. Indeed there are some indications that some of these experts encounter difficulties because of the vague and ill-defined nature of this term. In this regard it is worth clarifying the different approaches identified during the interviews with the actors. Noticeable differences, derived more from the particular office those concerned come from rather than their nationality, are thus evident in the views expressed.


International policy discourses on transnational organized crime 61 The delegates to the G8 experts group who come mainly from police departments of their respective administrations, for instance, tend to place greater emphasis on operational difficulties. Their approach is first and foremost pragmatic and they have no hesitation in swiftly disposing of the sensitive issue of the definition of transnational crime. The problem of definitions should not be minimized. Many studies have convincingly underlined the fact that working definitions of organized crime have been developed firstly by law enforcement agencies in order to justify the increase of special powers during investigations. Some scholars have thus usefully reminded us that, in many countries, specific operational police responses have been undertaken before making a legislative response and that legal specialists are constantly struggling to find a definition of organized crime (Bigo and Hagedorn 2002; Sheptycki 2002; Kinzig 2004). The absence of a clear definition of organized crime is indeed not just a problem of rhetoric. In the case of the EU, for instance, terms of definition remain very broad and highly flexible, and do not provide any legal certainty.11 This placing of greater value on the operational rather than the legal framework was confirmed on many occasions throughout the interviews, particularly in those conducted with the actors from law enforcement agencies. Tension between the judicial cooperation experts and the law enforcement specialists is therefore clearly noticeable in the discourse of these actors. The actors interviewed from the Justice sector focused much more on the difficulty of defining transnational organized crime. The fact that justice sector specialists are struggling to find a strict universal legal definition, while at the same time being confronted with a cooperation imperative that puts pressure on them to make it easier to carry out police and judicial investigations at international level, puts them in a tricky position which supports the following argument: namely that, in the face of pressing operational needs, police views prevail over the views of legal advisors. This is particularly evidenced in some of the standards, norms and ‘best practices’ promoted at the international level. The promotion of data sharing, for instance, is often not consistent with the protection of individual privacy (Bigo, et al. 2007). More generally, the empowerment of police capabilities in the field of organized crime has led to important departures from the rule of law (Beare 2003 introduction; Mitsilegas 2003a: 82–5), and the fact that some norms and standards promoted at the international level may be seen as soft law instruments that are not binding on member states doesn’t necessarily minimize their impact in terms of habitualization and dissemination (Scherrer 2009b). This difficult position of the legal experts regarding the quasi monopoly of police practitioners is strengthened by the socio-professional distribution of the expertise found in these international gatherings. According to an internal unpublicized list of all the G8 experts on TOC, issued in 2005, it is clear from the document that the Interior, Police and Intelligence services officials then represented more than 70 per cent of each delegation. This socio-professional distribution reflects a significant change in the G8 experts group. From 1995 to 2001, the Lyon Group consisted of four main subgroups: one devoted to migration issues, one devoted to law enforcement, one devoted to legal and judicial matters, and one devoted


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to cybercrime. After 9/11, the Lyon Group merged with the Roma Group, its G8 equivalent on counterterrorism, that led to the new Lyon/Roma Group comprising a fifth subgroup: the intelligence practitioners subgroup. According to some of the interviewed G8 actors, before 9/11 there was an equilibrium in most of the G8 delegations between officials from Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice Departments.12 Simply put, the demographics and the actual professional make-up of the organization strongly strengthen the position of law enforcement practitioners in these arenas. This socio-professional distribution of the expertise, and the weight of intelligence officials within the delegations, furthermore provides an explanation as to why more preventive and proactive strategies have been adopted by the G8 experts group after 9/11.13 These sociological elements of the international expertise certainly reinforce the argument that, in the global fight against TOC, police assertions prevail. However, further explanations on the effects these elements have on international regime dynamics are required.

Experts’ knowledge and international regimes’ dynamics A rather surprising element while studying international policy discourses on TOC is the degree of convergence that has emerged within international institutions that have been tackling this issue since the 1990s, especially the UN, the EU and the G8. As outlined earlier, attempts to harmonize criminal justice and law enforcement matters have been at the core of the international mobilization against TOC. If the law enforcement perspectives have prevailed and if this prevalence has been partly explained by the socio-professional qualities of the actors and the distribution of the expertise provided, the general consensus around the regime against TOC certainly deserves further analysis. The world of expertise An element that certainly helps to explain how such consensus has been reached at the international level is the fact that the actors involved in the international expertise on TOC often hold many different positions on the international stage. Indeed, the study of professional trajectories and professional biographies14 shows how significant the circulatory effect is on discourses and practices. The familiarity with international negotiating processes that characterized most of the international experts on TOC also means that some experts play many different roles. Some of them have participated or participate in meetings on subjects connected with transnational crime that are organized by bodies other than the G8 experts group, for instance under the auspices of the OECD, the EU or the UN. For instance, most of the law enforcement practitioners involved in G8 meetings also meet within the EU working groups, such as the Multidisciplinary Group on Organized Crime. Similarly, most of the chairs of UN ad hoc committees on TOCrelated issues have been at the same time chairs, participants or, at least, observers in other international gatherings. Other examples can be found in the anti-money laundering regime. The deputy director of the Financial Action Task Force (the


International policy discourses on transnational organized crime 63 FATF), the leading authority in the field of anti-money laundering in 2005 was formerly a specialist in criminal matters at the World Bank and had previously been active in the G7 working group on money laundering, as well as in the French delegation to the OECD on corruption matters. In 1995, the chair of the G8 experts group on TOC for institutional and legal matters was at the same time the chair of the UN ad hoc committee for the preparation of the Palermo Convention. All these examples reinforce the argument that the intensification of exchanges on the international stage in the area of international cooperation against TOC has led to the establishment of professional networks of actors who are generally officials of member states and who gather regularly within the numerous ad hoc committees, expert groups, task forces and the like mentioned above.15 Professional biographies thus interestingly highlight how such networks are created, gathering key officials that become inevitable in international negotiations, and therefore give authority to their status of ‘experts’ given in the official documentation of international institutions. This mobility and authority, which constantly fuel one another, undoubtedly provide an explanations as to why the international regime against TOC seems to be so consensual on the international stage. As some of the actors interviewed have pointed out, this world of organized crime experts is indeed a small world. As indicated by several experts, they keep seeing each other at one meeting after another. Creating an even more elaborate picture, one of the actors said that ‘experts are not interchangeable, it’s like when you go to fashion shows, you find the same models at Lacroix or Saint Laurent, even if the dresses are not the same’ (interview, February 2006, Paris). The emergence of groups of actors with authorized expert knowledge certainly creates standards, and the instruments of regulation they promote create meaning and a common understanding, and are strongly related to social practices (Scherrer 2009b). Indeed, examination of policy discourses and standards at international level invites consideration of the frames of reference being used by the actors who are responsible for developing them. The working framework being proposed here is an invitation to pay more attention to the instruments (norms, standards, recommendations promoted at the international level in order to enhance cooperation) themselves and reconstruct their historicity, their cognitive and normative content, the networks of actors who develop them and the effects they produce. Indeed, it should be realized that, rather than being reduced to its ‘pure technical rationality’ (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2004, 13–14), an instrument cannot be dissociated from the agents who put it into use and carry on developing it. Actors involved in the drafting of international regimes do not just ‘adjudicate between technical options but between a selection of values’ (Castel 1985: 92). None of the instruments promoted by these actors is in fact neutral inasmuch as each responds to a preestablished frame of reference that reflects a particular perception of transnational organized crime. From this viewpoint, ‘the expertise has no sense in itself outside of the contexts in which it has been constructed and deployed’ (Dumoulin, et al. 2005: 10); it is a valuable resource, the main purpose of which is

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(Dumoulin, et al. 2005: 10) Actors involved in the elaboration of international norms against TOC are not in fact simply ‘crime technicians’ whose expertise is objective and apolitical: on the contrary, they determine which instruments should be adopted in accordance with their beliefs. Their expertise entails ‘first and foremost knowing what to do and, still more, knowing what to say’ (Veitl 2005: 15) and are consistent with ‘a logic of framing, a logic of codification, of objectivization’ (2005: 17). The fact that the international expertise in the field is mainly trusted by a small world of civil servants surely enables these peculiar representations and knowledge to be rooted in bureaucratic practices. Expertise and legitimacy Common sense suggests that an expert is someone who possesses important knowledge and know-how with regard to a particular profession or discipline, all of which have been acquired as a result of long, or at least attested, experience in that field. Such a person is nevertheless not just a sum of these supposed skills; he or she is also someone who, in the view of a particular body, is qualified to give an opinion about an issue that requires special knowledge. These two features (the person’s intrinsic skills/the recognition of their expert status) give the expert a particular place in decision making. Underlying this justification of the use of expertise is the idea that experts possess specific knowledge and are the ideal candidates for the job; in other words, the fact that they are seen as objective means their appointment is legitimate and justified. However, if one accepts that experts are called on in ‘situations in which it is deemed impossible or inappropriate to deploy a strictly political argument or rationale for ruling on an issue’ (Robert 2003: 59), it can also be a means of turning political challenges into technical issues for tactical reasons and implementing a strategy of depoliticization and legitimation (Robert 2003: 60–63). The issue of TOC and the apparent technicity that surrounds the tools declared as appropriate mustn’t therefore hide the fact that TOC is indeed a highly political issue. Therefore, the global trends built by these international experts against TOC should be questioned. In particular, the power given to law enforcement agencies, the priorities set in international agenda, and the legitimacy of these international experts should receive careful attention. The focus on law enforcement capacities has been at the core of the cooperation imperative built against TOC. The repeated promotion of the establishment of domestic and international databases for law enforcement purposes, the use of electronic surveillance or other forms of technology during investigations, and the tracing of networked communications, can be found in every international


International policy discourses on transnational organized crime 65 institution that has tackled the issue of TOC since the 1990s. These are methods often not consistent with the protection of civil liberties and individual privacy. In that regard, the fight against TOC, reinforced by the current fight against terrorism, has allowed most governments to give legitimacy to some procedures that have previously encountered many obstacles, specifically when it comes to the respect of fundamental rights.16 The repeated attacks on fundamental rights in the post-9/11 context have been the subject of numerous critiques, many of which have brought to light the following paradox: the growth of illiberal practices in liberal regimes (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). More broadly, the law enforcement point of view is questionable. As many criminologists stress, a strictly judicial and police perspective is certainly not the best solution to cure criminality worldwide. However, due to the lack of openness of the world of expertise at the international level, alternative conceptions of global security, which, for instance, emphasise the underlying conditions that produce crime in the first place, are discredited or simply excluded from political debates (Edwards and Gill 2003). The possibilities of developing more effective crime-reduction strategies in respect of organized crime are an area in which law enforcement rather than prevention continues to dominate the thinking and the practical responses of the police and other relevant agencies (Levi and Maguire 2004). Furthermore, the trends followed in international regimes demonstrate a peculiar international agenda that is guided by unclear logic and understanding. From a careful analysis of the different steps taken in international regimes against TOC, it appears that some illicit activities are untiringly tackled, whereas others regularly escape international regulation. For instance, the apparent global unanimity in the fight against money laundering and, more recently, terrorist financing, is rather surprising considering the numerous critiques that have been put forward by a wide range of academics who have convincingly challenged, not only the efficiency (Levi 2003; van Duyne 2003; van Duyne, et al. 2005; Passas 2006) but also the shortcomings of the international regulation in the field (Naylor 2006; Wade 2007; Bierstecker and Eckert 2008). By contrast, little or nothing is undertaken, for instance, in the field of environmental crime, or corporate crime. The silence over the latter is particularly striking at the international level. Recent examples (such as Enron, WorldCom) demonstrate that fraud and corruption can sweep through a number of industries, leaving thousands of victims with massive financial losses, as well as hundreds of indictments (Tillman 2009). As usefully reminded by some scholars, there are few legal constraints on the depiction of white-collar crimes as ‘organized’ crimes: the EU and UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention definitions apply to a broad range of offenders and offences with quite modest thresholds (three or more participants), but the overwhelming social and police institutional construct of ‘organized crime’ remains of Mafia-type organizations, consisting stereotypically of social outsiders (Levi 2008). Several studies have indeed convincingly demonstrated how the perceptions of organized crime have evolved, and how the genuine involvement in organized crime of officials, or ‘respectable’ classes within society (what is commonly referred to as ‘whitecollar crime’), has been removed from political discourses, media attention and

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practitioners’ practices (Sutherland 1983; Woodiwiss 2003a, 2005; Levi 2008). The use of international expertise, the numerous international calls for task forces and ad hoc committees, constantly reinforce strategies of depoliticization and legitimation. As a consequence, if Murray Edelman’s argument concerning the influence bureaucratic structures have on the construction of enemies is taken up, it can be contended that the establishment of international expertise on the specific issue of TOC also ensured that the supposed dangers that allegedly accompanied it would be seen as genuine. According to Edelman to establish governmental agencies to deal with external or internal security is to guarantee that their top officials will see serious threats to security and so preserve a function, a budget, and careers. The point is not that officials invent threats that do not exist, but rather that security threats are usually ambiguous and that organizational functioning influences interpretations. (Edelman 1988: 85).

Conclusions International regulations against TOC comprise a whole array of best practices, recommendations, conventions and norms that have been put forward by the law enforcement and intelligence services within experts groups, mainly with a view to ensuring that the supposedly overriding need for effectiveness when combating transnational crime and terrorism prevails over other trickier issues concerning respect for fundamental rights. It is this same search for effectiveness that has served to justify the use of special investigative techniques, emergency procedures and data exchange.17 In other words, operational urgency in the face of what are presented as global threats has made it possible for practices that were in the past seen as exceptional or at least used in moderation to be employed almost routinely or, quite simply, become the supposed norm. As a consequence, the centres from which these controversial tools and methods have emerged should be objects of careful attention, and the absence of transparency that surrounds them should be challenged. Indeed, most of these international gatherings are totally opaque for the outsider. This is particularly true in the case of the G8 experts groups. This absence of transparency should be questioned, as many instruments promoted as the international level, such as recommendations, principles or standards, provide guidelines, not uniform rules legally binding for the member states. Therefore, each state, or group of professionals, is encouraged to experiment on its own and to shape solutions that fit its social, structural and historical contexts. Therefore, action through the use of these soft law-type instruments, strongly related to social and professional practices, is freed from parliamentary and judicial scrutiny (Scherrer 2009b). As constantly underlined by scholars studying the rather discreet world of international expertise, the emergence of groups with authorized expert knowledge has indeed its dangers in terms of depoliticization, technicalization and regulation without responsibility (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000).

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Notes 1 The establishment of an international public policy on drugs is indeed quite old and dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century. For an account on this anti-drugs policies at the international level, see Nadelmann 1990, 1993; Favarel-Garrigues 2002, 2003; Dudouet, 2003. 2 ‘International regimes’ are here classically understood as ‘sets of rules, norms and procedures around which the expectations of actors converge in a certain issue area’ (Krasner 1983). 3 See the abundant International Relations literature in this field since the 1970s, notably on the issues of cooperation and interdependences (the neoliberal institutionalism approach). See, among others, Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1984; Oye 1986; Rittberger and Mayer 1995; Axelrod 1997. 4 This type of experts-level meetings is, of course, not new. As Didier Bigo points out in his study on the police Europeanization (1996), such groups existed back to the 1970s (such as the TREVI). However, the multiplication of international conventions (such as the UN Palermo Convention, or the Merida Convention), as well as the appearance of TOC on the European agenda (conducive to the setting of specific actions plans and experts groups) or the G8 agenda (with the creation of the Lyon Group in 1995) for instance, have generalized the setting of such international gatherings. 5 See Joint Action of 5 December 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism for evaluating the application and implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against organized crime (97/827/JHA). 6 See Pan-European police co-operation, Conclusion, 5–6 November 1998. 7 Cooperation in investigations and prosecutions, as well as data sharing, have been, for instance at the core of the EU strategy in the field. See den Boer 2002; Scherrer, Mitsilegas and Mégie, 2009. 8 ‘Our governments will also move further ahead with efforts to strengthen international legal regimes for extradition and mutual legal assistance, to ensure that no criminal receives safe haven anywhere in the world’ (G7 Denver Summit Declaration, 1997). 9 See at the European level, the numerous regulations against money laundering (Mitsilegas and Gilmore 2007), as well as the standards elaborated by the FATF (available online: http//:www.fatf-gafi.org). The focus on cybercrime has similarly mobilized almost every international agency active in the field of TOC. See the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime of 2001, the OECD initiatives, and the G8’s action against cybercrime. In these international arenas, specific experts group were created on the matter, such as the G8 experts group on High Tech Crime (part of the Lyon Group) and the Council of Europe committee of experts on cybercrime. 10 The G7 countries (Russia was not yet included) set up a Group of Experts in 1995: the Lyon Group. Our analysis of this G8 experts group is based, not only on official documents (available online at www.g8.utoronto.ca) and internal documentation (obtained during interviews), but also on a series of interviews (conducted between 2003 and 2007, in France, UK and Canada) conducted with its members. Further interviews were conducted in Brussels, with EU officials who where observers at G8 meetings. The detailed results of this Lyon/Roma group, its genesis and its evolution, are available in Scherrer, A., G8 against Transnational Organized Crime (2009a). 11 This creates a potentially very extensive criminalization of organized crime across the EU. What is more worrying is that this may lead to considerable diversity in implementation at a time where organized crime is an offence for which dual criminality has been abolished under the mutual recognition instruments. Moreover, the vague offence of organized crime is among the offences included in the mandate of Europol and Eurojust – which may be called to action for behaviour which is referred to as

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A. Scherrer organized crime in one member state but not in others. On that matter, see Mitsilegas 2001, 2006. Further details on this socio-professional distribution of the expertise within the G8, as well as the problematic merging of terrorism and organized crime issues, are provided in Scherrer 2009a. The Lyon/Roma Group has, since 2002, focused on ‘best practices’ with regard to the development of biometrics and their use in travel documents, the enhancement of special techniques of investigation, the sharing of information and databases, including DNA information, and the protection of migration procedures (available online at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca). This study of professional trajectories and professional biographies is based on a prosopographical analysis, with data gathered through semi-directed interviews and further research on the Internet. Similar efforts to map the institutions and their actors, in order to explain discourses and practices’ circulatory effects, have been produced in the specific field of EU internal security. See for instance Bigo, et al. 2008. Indeed, many scholars have emphasized the window of opportunity provided by the 9/11 attacks for the extension of police and judicial powers at the domestic and international level. See, for instance, Beare 2003 (introduction) and 2005; Guild 2003a and 2003b; Bassiouni 2005; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Bigo, et al. 2008. The notion of emergency, ‘State of Emergency’ in the War on Terror has been thoroughly investigated and discussed among the CHALLENGE Network. See Bigo (2004); Jabri and Walker (2004); Walker (2004). See also Bunyan (2005) and Neal (2008, 2009).


Part II

Perceptions


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Different perceptions and conflicting strategies1 Daniela Irrera The management of global security is becoming a fundamental issue and requires more responsibility and involvement from the international community. Major global challenges include increased pressure from non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. This can contribute to democratization and openness to civil society’s needs; at the same time, it can strengthen ‘uncivil’ groups, as organized crime can be defined. Organized crime is progressively increasing its ability to perform at a global level (moving resources, activities and incomes), to combine forces with other seditious groups (terrorists, paramilitaries, etc.) and to establish its ‘free areas’ inside failed and weak states, marked by ethnic and/or religious conflicts. Nevertheless, there is no common definition of organized crime or a common strategy to fight it. Even if it is part of the global political agenda and is increasingly associated with transnational terrorism and security issues, organized crime is not a special policy priority. The difference among the positions of the most important political actors (US, EU, EU member states, UN) is significant. This can contribute to a dangerous lack of awareness of the problem and, consequently, a lack of real global commitment. Even though the institutional discourse on TOC is still very vague and tentative, the transformations affecting the concept of global security are modifying governments’ understanding, pushing them to include TOC more and more on the list of global threats. In other words, there is a significant gap between the discourse and the perception of TOC within the international political system. This chapter aims to define and discuss the relationship between TOC and global security in the broader context of multilateralism. First, TOC will be analyzed in the context of the rise of non-state actors, the crisis of state sovereignty and new threats, namely ethnic wars and failed states. Second, in order to describe how perception is changing while discourse tends to remain rigidly confused, International Relations theories on global security will be used as a theoretical framework to analyze the most important strategies and documents produced by the leading political actors. I argue that any internationalization process of crime definition and crime control is the outcome of the export of domestic perceptions and definitions which reflect the relations among political powers. Thus, it has been essentially based on the attempts of Western powers to export their domestic definitions, expressed in political, economic and moral terms. The US and the EU security agenda – in the


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form of their official documents – will be examined and compared. Their shifting perceptions of global threats, in which TOC is increasingly present, will be at the core of the analysis. Moreover, the contribution of the most important global agency – the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – will be studied. Third, these considerations will be used, to provide some conclusions about the political implications as outcomes of the different perceptions within the political agendas at a global level. Even though TOC is still perceived as a national law enforcement issue, multilateral cooperation (defined as the conduct founded on universal principles, equal participation of states in collective mechanisms, and no discrimination in putting principles into action (Attinà 2008: 6)) as it has been shaped by the US and the EU can be the only way to match perception to discourse as well as the only political framework within which a coherent and efficient counterstrategy can be conceived and developed.

Global security and global threats At the end of a long period of war and military operations between the most important European countries (the Thirty Years War from 1618 to 1648) the representatives of the winning countries met in Westphalia, with the aim of signing a Treaty and establishing a peaceful pact for all of Europe. The agreement should have been able to stop hegemonic attempts by any state, and to guarantee new borders and alliances, but, in the subsequent period, despite the peace agreement, wars and divisions spread over the whole continent once again. Nonetheless, this geopolitical asset succeeded in clarifying some important principles, and it settled the relationships between citizens and their governors, defining the modern nationstate in its constituent elements: the territory, the people and the government. This entity, the nation-state, as established by the Westphalia Treaty, became the dominant political arrangement and, through the centuries, expanded its sovereignty. In the period between the two world wars and even later, during the Cold War, the nation-state remained the most important actor within the international system, determining foreign policy and global decision making (Roberts 1991). But, in the 1960s and 1970s, some significant changes started to affect the identity of global political actors. Following popular ferments in the social, cultural, economic and political field, states had to recognise that new and different actors were evolving, imposing their requirements in the international arena and demanding to be involved. The processes of globalization contributed to the rise of these actors, making problems more widespread, more difficult to solve by individual entities and requiring a collective approach to problem resolution. In this sense, globalization had a democratizing effect: states started to govern as members of regional and/or international organizations, and shifted their decision making to a supra-national level. In so doing, states sought to guarantee several goods to their citizens, including a higher level of security, better living conditions and greater political stability. Without losing its constituent elements or its traditional functions, the state tacitly agreed to transfer part of its sovereignty, in order to achieve a superior goal. However, globalization did not produce only positive effects: it


Transnational organized crime and the global security agenda 73 instigated differences among states and among the continents that increased fragmentation, separatism and national struggles. States were not sufficiently prepared – especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall – to face these new issues (Gellner 1994; Bartelson 1998). Thus, the result was a ‘sovereignty crisis’: traditional political and normative powers were less effective, borders could be more easily crossed, and more citizens wanted to be involved than in the past (Strange 1996). The state, still important within the global system, is not disappearing. It continues to remain as the most solid and implemented political management system, yet it appears to be necessary to go beyond the traditional elements of the state in order to face modern challenges, firstly the rising of non-state actors.

The rise of non-state actors International organizations, lobbies, corporations, NGOs and non-profit organizations can be considered non-state actors who have posed these challenges. They have members and an internal management structure but no territory. They are autonomous but not sovereign. Through their stance and behaviour, since the 1950s and 1960s they have been able to influence international policies (Galtung 1987; Trentmann 2000; Boyd 2004; Müller 2006). Some of them are extremely powerful: the UN, the European Economic Community, later the EU and the International Monetary Fund to name a few. Others are important in specific fields (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in the area of human rights; Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund regarding the environment). Such organizations involve many people internationally and their high participation in decision making has led some scholars to say that ‘group policy’ is no longer made only by sovereign states but also with the help of such different types of actors (Bull and Watson 1984). One logical evolution from this globalization of issues and problems is that the traditional nation-state may retreat in the face of other actors, reducing, in small or large measure, its sovereignty (Strange 1996; Attinà 1997). By working with positive non-state actors, retreat as a mechanism fosters the accomplishment of major goals and contributes to introducing democracy and pluralism but, with ‘uncivil’ actors, results will necessarily be different. Criminal clans, terrorist groups and/ or paramilitaries can be considered such non-state actors. They are usually based on the territory of a state but they have no borders; yet they do have an internal structure, they represent some interests – even if illegal or subversive – they are autonomous and, by pursuing their aims, they are able to influence the global system. The nature of their activities has, however, a very negative influence. Nonstate actors must dialogue with national institutions in order to function, and, at the same time, they challenge legal systems and rules (Rosenau 1990). In order to escape those challenges, states have to struggle against organized crime. They can fight it, through their national legislation and/or international conventions, as most states certainly do. Those states which have a long-standing problem of criminal activity have developed several means of combating it: laws


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and regulations, police officer codes and specialized agencies, such as the Italian DIA or the American DEA. These solutions are usually part of a broader strategy of forming agreements between two or more states. Such agreements are established in order to control frontiers and borders, enact cooperation between police officers and promote UN conventions and declarations. The EU countries have created EU regulations and international and/or European police organizations such as Europol and Interpol. Unfortunately, in some cases, organized crime is not opposed by states and, therefore, it can interact with them. How it interacts depends on the ‘strength’ of the state as well as of its vulnerability and can produce different levels of criminalization. Several analyses made about the wider range of possible cases can be summarized using the following taxonomy (Irrera 2007): •

•

•

•

• •

•

Weak states: in the first step in the criminalization process criminal groups prey on state weaknesses when institutions are able to function, but in a less efficient way. For example, this occurred in the post-colonization period of African states (Jackson 1990). Fragile states: the political and institutional dimensions are absent, but the economic and financial ones are lacking too; for example, as in Central Europe after the fall of communism, and in some Latin American countries (Sorensen 1999). Kleptocratic states: increased vulnerability to criminalization is evident where illegal activities produce the most significant or only economic resource and are necessary to guarantee services to the citizens; for example, as in Serbia and Kosovo (Grossman 1999). De-structured states: with such a chaotic situation, institutions, in some sectors, are not able to function at all and they retreat completely in the face of organized crime groups. In other words, they accept being replaced by criminals; for example, as is happening in Russia and other former Soviet Republics, like Moldova or Transnistria. Captured states: criminal overtaking increases further as, in some sectors, institutions are replaced by organized crime groups (Williams 2001). Mafia states: merging of criminal elements with the corrupted state, a crime group is able to corrupt and manage political activity and combine with the political system which has abandoned its legitimate functions. Failed states: with the total absence of legitimate state characteristics, institutions and public services are no longer existent and criminal organizations, in effect, replace the legitimate governance of the state.

Within states, what is public (institutions, funds, taxes, etc.) is clearly separated from what is private. The two dimensions cannot be merged together and nobody who has a public charge can act for a personal or private benefit. But, if the state retreats in the face of an illegal actor, on an illegal issue, this separation becomes increasingly less clear. The retreat can be gradual: beginning from the lower level (i.e. a public administrative officer illegally accepting money in doing his/her job), to the middle level (i.e. a private company benefiting from public funds or engaging


Transnational organized crime and the global security agenda 75 in vote management in local political elections) to the upper level (i.e. politicians and party leaders involved in illicit affairs) (Chiottolini 1995). Corruption is defined as the act of a public charge to gain a private benefit, and is the mode used by organized crime to spread throughout the state, and reach its apex. The most serious results are evident when every sector and every institution of a state have become corrupted. In other words, the state has become privatized. While the political dimension here is very important, the economic dimension should also be addressed. When regular productive capacity is reduced and competent national institutions are unable to manage resources on their own, the fiscal system becomes inefficient or non-existent. In such a case, the most likely probability is an economy where any resource and activity, legal or illegal, will be accepted to maintain survival. This grave situation is often associated with total corruption (Gupta, et al. 1998; Rose-Ackerman 1999). In conclusion, fragmented political and economic contexts, with neither cohesion nor autonomy, represent the best ground on which an organized crime group may enter the state, gain a footing and conquer it. The retreat of the state and the rise of these actors produce detrimental effects, firstly, on the state itself and, subsequently, on the whole international system. Even though the fact is rarely reported by the international media or discussed in debates, for several years TOC has positioned itself silently to make dangerous global threats. The consequences it is able to produce should be linked to the transformation occurring in the concept of global security (Migdal 1988).

The new concept of security and failed states The traditional concept of security is associated with the state, the images of the enemy and with military power. The technological improvements, the rising of non-state actors, and the political innovations introduced during and after the Cold War contributed to change this perception, by changing the nature of contemporary civil conflicts, as well as the importance of weak, collapsed and failed states. Institutional weakness, no rule of law, and economic backwardness became the cause of ‘new’ wars (Holsti 1996). These wars do not share the same characteristics, but some common traits distinguish all of them from traditional wars. The most important trait, frequently mentioned by scholars, is the shift from the interstate to intrastate war dimension. This distinction does not imply that the effects of conflict are contained within state borders. On the contrary, conflict normally spreads from a country to neighbouring countries and the region. An additional and important common feature of these wars is the active, and sometimes conditioning, presence of non-state actors. New wars are fought by a wide range of political and social groups that have different identity and alliance relations. Conflicting parties are sometimes inclined to change alliance alignment (Kaldor 1999). In many cases, states are not the aggressor, and have no role in the causes and development of conflict (Monteleone and Rossi 2008). Lastly, in these wars, the clear distinction between civilians and combatants dramatically disappears. Organized crime groups can easily join fighters, by exploiting the grey areas


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which dramatically rise in deprived conditions or by establishing stable relationship with terrorist groups or local paramilitaries. In so doing, the possibility of exerting a significant influence on the conflict is high. It is clear that these new wars affect different levels of security which cannot be reduced only to the military dimension and, consequently, require a more adequate global strategy. Buzan started analyzing security by agreeing with Waltz (1958) and stressed the existence of three levels of analysis (individual, state and international system) as well as of a series of dimensions (political, economic, social) which are parallel to the military ones (Buzan 1991). Later, he continued his analyses within the Copenhagen School. The concept of comprehensive security became more diversified and enriched; a wide range of sectors (they identified security through its military, environmental, economic and political spheres) implies different actors involved as well as different actions. In weak states, security does not involve the state but mainly the antagonist groups and individuals (Kaldor 1999). At the same time, a diversified concept of security requires a proper set of actions; the Copenhagen School stressed securitization, arguing that an issue is securitized when it is considered as an actual threat and emergency measures are adopted to answer it (or prevent it). The ensuing theoretical debate continued to take this concept into account and by adding new aspects and elements. Knight affirms that terms like comprehensive security, common security or human security ‘are being utilized to embrace the range of issues that are being placed on a revised security agenda of an emerging global polity’ (2001: 14). However, the concept of comprehensive security means not only protecting people from armed violence; it ‘must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater focus on people’s security from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security’. Human security is, therefore, perceived more and more as a multilevel dimension, both in a vertical sense (different threats shape the state by involving the individuals) and in a horizontal one (threats engage different sovereign states). Evidently, some securitization processes remain ineffective and inefficient if included only in national political agendas. The dangerous potential conveyed by TOC is a very good example.

Political agendas Crimes are defined and created by state through law. Thus, any internationalization process of crime definition and crime control is, first of all, the outcome of the export of domestic perceptions and definitions. In the aftermath of the Cold War, this process occurred according to the same rules which dominated the relations among political powers. In other words, it was essentially the attempts of Western powers to export their domestic definitions, expressed in political, economic and moral terms. This happened in an official way through the production of formal definitions and documents. At the same time, this procedure is based on the governments’


Transnational organized crime and the global security agenda 77 understanding of organized crime itself. The notion of perception of organized crime is the basis of our analysis and it will be used to explore the different attitudes of the leading political actors. The different policies, produced by the US and European states – as well as EU member states – reflected their dissimilar perceptions of organized crime, as well as dissimilar approaches to security. However, the shifting perceptions of the security environment, together with the parallel transformation of the global system, have pushed the prominent states to change their attitudes and to strengthen multilateral cooperation for developing adequate responses to new threats. The events of 11 September 2001 dramatically contributed to change the perception of threat. This happened more easily with some threats, like terrorism; it is still occurring – slowly but relentlessly – with organized crime. The US security agenda and TOC Since the first articulated analysis, made by the Kefauver Committee in 1951, the American perception of organized crime as a domestic issue has significantly changed. The alien conspiracy has turned into a larger involvement in illegal migration and border control issues, especially in the relationship with Mexico and other Central American countries (Bynum 1987; Finckenauer 2005). However, drug trafficking and money laundering continue to be the most important targets. In so doing, the US developed an international strategy which has been essentially based on the protection of American interest, the strengthening of law enforcement and information systems, as it reflected the development of internal and international structures of organized crime groups. As Anderson affirms: ‘In America, the traditional Mafia has evolved into a relatively complex organization which perpetuates selected features of the older peasant organization but subordinates them to the requirements of bureaucracy’ (Anderson 1965: 310). The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is part of the structures created by the Department of State for reinforcing the international network of laws and conventions against the narcotics trade and corruption, through a wide range of bilateral, regional and international initiatives aiming at strengthening law enforcement capabilities of foreign governments. Moreover, a worldwide network of International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) was built to combat international drug trafficking, criminality, terrorism and corruption through regional cooperation. In the aftermath of 9/11, US officials started to include counternarcotics in a broader security strategy, focused on lawless zones. In March 2003, General James Hills described this change as follows: Today’s foe is the terrorist, the narco-trafficker, the arms trafficker, the document forger, the international crime boss, and the money launderer. This threat is a weed that is planted, grown and nurtured in the fertile ground of ungoverned spaces such as coastlines, rivers and unpopulated border areas. This threat is watered and fertilized with money from drugs, illegal arms

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sales, and human trafficking. This threat respects neither geographical nor moral boundaries. (quoted by Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 198) The US National Security Strategy (NSS), issued by President Bush in 2002, marked the formalization of this change and contributed to linking new global challenges, including organized crime activities, to fertile grounds which can be easily found in weak or failed states. In the latest document, published in 2006, this affirmation is confirmed and globalization becomes the new force which is shaping more and more national security. However, any strategy against TOC and its consequences is still related to information systems and transport control: Illicit trade, whether in drugs, human beings, or sex, that exploits the modern era’s greater ease of transport and exchange. Such traffic corrodes social order; bolsters crime and corruption; undermines effective governance; facilitates the illicit transfer of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and advanced conventional weapons technology; and compromises traditional security and law enforcement. (White House 2006: 47) The EU security agenda and the perception of TOC The internationalization of EC/EU crime control started at the beginning of the Cold War, through the development of cross-border policing institutions, and the extension of its own practices to its neighbours. The deepening and widening of the European integration contributed to the increasing of this twofold process. As far as the first element is concerned, Didier Bigo observed that an ‘internal security field’ was emerging in Western Europe, dealing with a continuum in which organized crime, terrorism and illegal migration were placed together, by urging the need of more structured joint policies (quoted by Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 178). The nuclear deterrence strategy and arms control negotiations of the Cold War and subsequent détente era, the three-decade-long Helsinki process, and the formulation of national and multilateral defence policies in the 1990s in response to new security threats, like new wars, the rise of civil conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction contributed to the increasing will of the European countries to strengthen their cooperation in the key issue of drug trafficking (Shelley 1995). As shown in Figure 5.1, during the 1990s the number of member countries which started to have single national documents increased and during the following years, a trend in producing joint policies increased as well. The adoption of the EU Drug Strategy in December 2004 witnessed the existence of a larger political concern about drugs across the EU countries, beyond the different approaches among member states. The two successive EU Drugs Action Plans are based on the same


Transnational organized crime and the global security agenda 79

Figure 5.1 The diffusion of drug policies among EU members (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction).

set of basic principles: a balanced approach to reducing the supply and demand for drugs, and the founding values of the Union: respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, solidarity, the rule of law and human rights. The measures prescribed for establishing joint policies includes the enhancement of judicial cooperation in the area of combating drug trafficking and law enforcement and the strengthening of Europol, Eurojust and other EU structures (Council of the European Union 2008). As far as the second element is concerned, the tradition of close cooperation with underdeveloped countries, in the field of aid and relief, offered an already exploited platform and expertise for improving cooperation with countries and international organizations in the field of drugs through closer coordination of policies within the EU. In other words, the perception of organized crime within and outside EU borders cannot evade the set of principles which is the basis of integration and civil power.


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The internationalization of EU organized crime control passes also through the document A Secure Europe in a Better World, issued by the European Council in December 2003, in which the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, points out the main elements which are required to build a strong and solid European Security Strategy (ESS). The abovementioned set of principles is used also for enlarging EU capabilities and contribution to global security. Therefore, this can be envisaged as a message to the world, aimed at explaining how the EU is able to face global challenges and threats, including TOC. The ESS stresses European responsibility for global security, the need for effective multilateralism and the extension of the international rule of law, considering that: ‘the post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked’ (Solana 2003). The ESS lists five key threats to Europe: terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, failed/failing states, and organized crime. This last one, in particular, is strictly linked to the conditions that cause conflict, fear and hatred, a criminalized economy that profits from violent methods of controlling assets, weak illegitimate states, the existence of warlords and paramilitary groups.

Political implications As previously shown, in the security agenda of the most important political actors, TOC continues to essentially remain a law enforcement issue. However, in response to it, its presence in the official documents is increasing and its link with the management of global security is deepening. Therefore, the emphasis has been placed on one hand on the relationship between law enforcement agencies on a bilateral and multilateral basis, and on the other on the definition of TOC control as one of the key measures to strengthen security at the global level. United Nations and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, signed in Palermo in 2000, represents the first global attempt to convey all different perceptions into a unique formal definition and set of rules. For the first time, a criminal group is defined as: ‘a structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with the Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’ (UNCTOC 2000: art. 3). On that occasion, politicians, police officers, experts and scholars faced the problem of organized crime by articulating its identities, resources and links. The UN have tried, through its agencies and units, to provide specific technical assistance projects to support specialized organized crime units in countries which are severely affected by problems of organized crime. The Anti-Organized Crime and Law Enforcement Unit assists states in taking effective, practical steps, in line


Transnational organized crime and the global security agenda 81 with the provisions of the Convention, to fight organized crime. Its main functions deal with facilitating the assessment and revision of national legislation to ensure compliance with the Convention and its Protocols; enhancing international cooperation among criminal justice practitioners; and collecting and disseminating best practices. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) continues to remain the most efficient specialized agency in the field of drug trafficking. It has been active in the promotion of the Convention, making member states aware of their obligation under its ratification and promoting regional meetings in Algeria for African countries, in Ecuador for Latin American and Caribbean countries, in Guatemala for Central American countries, in Latvia for Eastern European countries and in Japan for Asian countries. National-level meetings on legislative and other issues related to the ratification were held in cooperation with the governments of Cape Verde, East Timor, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Mali, Nigeria, Romania and Indonesia. The involvement of civil society has represented a great recent innovation. In February 2005, UNODC and the Vienna NGO Committee signed a Memorandum of Understanding for legitimizing the key role of NGOs in effective drug control. An electronic NGO database listing over 2,000 NGOs concerned with prevention, treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts, alternative development, crime prevention and criminal justice reforms has been established by UNODC, aimed at spreading information on operational projects. Among the initiatives promoted by NGOs, ‘Beyond 2008’ is an international project led by the Vienna NGO Committee on Narcotic Drugs, in partnership with UNODC, with the support of the European Commission and other donors, for monitoring and reducing drug effects, especially in developing countries.2 Therefore, the enlargement of cooperation to other political actors reflects, to some extent, the need for greater cooperation, which continues, however, to be ruled and shaped by the US and EU. Transatlantic cooperation and multilateralism Even before 9/11, the transatlantic law enforcement infrastructure was actively working, through several joint initiatives against money laundering and cybercrime. The terroristic attacks contributed, however, to change the characteristics of those initiatives, because it modified the security dimension. As already seen, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the security strategies of the US and EU presented some significant differences but, at the same time, some potential sources for cooperation, too. The ESS was essentially produced in response to the challenges posed by the US about the Union’s involvement in the sphere of security policies. The list of key security issues are basically identical in the two texts. They consist of terrorist threats, WMD and state failure as key dangers. However, the documents use different tones to describe the same need for a more joint cooperation. The ESS argues that ‘the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states’ and for strengthening international


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order ‘spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights’ are necessary (Solana 2003: 10). The NSS affirms that ‘the United States must start from the core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty’ (White House 2002: 3). Moreover, while the US stresses the term rogue states, the EU document refers to ‘failed’ or ‘failing states’, to indicate the fertile grounds in which terrorism and organized crime can be nurtured. There are many ‘enemies’ in the NSS, compared with many ‘challenges’ in the ESS. Finally, the EU explicitly includes regional conflicts and organized crime in the list. As has happened in the past, the US documents and declaration show a more authoritative language, which takes the lead but at the same time requires allies to take their own responsibilities. In the latest NSS, issued in 2006, national security is no longer defined in traditional terms but is associated with the globalization of threats and with greater cooperation. This evident shift in the language and in the approach is also affecting the perception of TOC as it establishes new patterns of cooperation and a relaunch of multilateral structures. According to Attinà, multilateralism is a step along the road of civilizing politics among states, if it is considered as several states acting together, and this accords with the political science view of multilateralism as conduct founded on universal principles, equal participation of states in collective mechanisms, and no discrimination in putting principles into action (Attinà 2008: 6). In so doing, multilateralism is first a commitment to common ways of working and agreeing on rules: common rules and norms are commonly created for solving problems. Second, multilateralism means coordination, instead of rivalry or simply juxtaposition. If the human security approach is considered as the most efficient to face global threats, then a greater coordination of policies in different fields, including external relations, trade, development and security, is required (Keohane 1990; Caporaso 1993; Ruggie 1993; Lake 2006). These considerations have some important political implications. The responses and the new partnerships created for responding to global threats and emergencies should be addressed, first of all, to solve a specific problem, but, at the same time, can serve also as a catalyst for changing the existing political conditions to tackle other problems, for establishing new rules of conduct, and, in the long term, for enforcing the rules themselves. The US leadership in mobilizing the Regional Core Group to respond to the Southeast Asian tsunami of 2004 contributed, for example, to create a more structured international response to global emergencies. The efficacy of the response to the tsunami as well as to the earthquake in Pakistan developed new channels of communication and cooperation at a local level, which had been exploited also in other fields, namely in the long-standing regional conflicts in Aceh and the Kashmir (Koivusalo and Ollila 1997). Attempts to facilitate greater cooperation in crime control on an international level necessarily involve multilateral arrangements on a regional and global level. Those kind of arrangements are also created, however, for promoting enhanced communication, establishing guidelines and best practices, and regularizing cooperation (Hignett 2008).

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The US played an important role in motivating and developing new agreements in criminal law enforcement issues. In parallel, EU members agreed to strengthen cooperation and increase its relationship with the US by creating joint investigative teams to supplement the activities of Europol as well as initiatives like the five-year Hague Programme (issued in 2005) for fighting illegal migration and terrorism. The road to a common perception of TOC can be conceived only through a multilateral process of building up joint policy initiatives and rational exploitation of international institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF and regional institutions.

Conclusions In this chapter, we have argued that TOC is still perceived as a national law enforcement issue. Some significant changes are, however, occurring within the international system. The shifting of the perception of TOC from a domestic public order issue to a global threat is due to some broader transformations affecting, first, the relations among states and, second, the concept of human security. The internationalization of crime control was essentially the export of law enforcement rules – namely the domestic definition of security and of organized crime – from the Western powers to the rest of the world. Even though they tried to collaborate on various initiatives, since the Cold War, the US and the EU offered contrasting views of the threat and of the way they should be tackled. The EU was mainly focused on cross-border law enforcement and judicial cooperation; while US security power was based more on information systems and transport. Both the US and the EU contributed to shape the international set of definitions and rules in the field of organized crime, by using their different but leading roles. The globalization process, the rising of non-state actors and the consequent development of the human aspects of security, as well as the events of 9/11, pushed the main international political actors to change this composite structure of relations. The security agendas they produced were, apparently, divergent, but both focused on the need to strengthen regional and global cooperation and to relaunch transatlantic relations. In this framework, even though TOC has started to be perceived as an increasing challenge and even though it is not yet at the core of joint priorities, as terrorism is, the danger it represents for the whole international system is more and more agreed. A significant gap between the discourse and the perception of TOC within the international political system is increasing. Multilateralism – defined as the conduct founded on universal principles, equal participation of states in collective mechanisms, and no discrimination in putting principles into action – may represent the only tool for filling this gap as well as the only political context within which a coherent and efficient global counterstrategy can be conceived and developed.

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Notes


1 The rationale of this chapter was conceived during a Fulbright Study of the United States Institute on US National Security, which I attended at the University of Delaware in January–February 2009. I am grateful to Mark Miller and other University faculties for their suggestions and impressions on this topic. 2 See the website http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ngos/beyond2008.html (accessed 28 March 2009).

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Evolving perceptions of organized crime The use of RICO in the United States1


Joseph Wheatley The U.S. government’s crackdown on the American Mafia continues, but two additional and different kinds of organized crime groups have also emerged and posed their own threats: street gangs and international organized crime groups. In recent years, such entities have been identified, by the federal government, as threats meriting a concerted federal response. As the federal government’s perceptions of organized crime threats have evolved to include street gangs and international groups, so may the U.S. government’s laws and strategies evolve to thwart such crime. In the context of such perceived threats, this chapter explores evolutions in the application of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (RICO). First, the chapter examines whether RICO, originally enacted to dismantle the Mafia, may be used against street gangs. Second, the chapter discusses whether RICO may be used against international organized crime groups. To be clear, this chapter’s analysis of RICO’s application is rooted in the government’s evolving perception of organized crime threats as embodied by initiatives and documents, such as The Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime, released by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2008. Granted, evolving societal perceptions of organized crime, such as community concerns regarding the threats of gangs in local neighborhoods, help shape the government’s own perceptions, and this chapter recognizes them. Law enforcement authorities do not exist in a vacuum, separate from society. However, for the sake of space and clarity, this chapter focuses upon the government’s ongoing identification of organized crime threats, and upon the flexibility of RICO in responding to such evolving threats. Section 1 reviews the history and statutory language of RICO. Section 2 discusses street gangs and how they may qualify for prosecution under RICO. Section 3 examines the threats posed by various international organized crime groups, and whether RICO may be used to prosecute such groups. Section 4 offers concluding remarks about how RICO’s flexibility permits the federal government to respond to varying forms of organized crime groups, such as gangs and international organized crime groups.

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The origins and statutory language of RICO In 1970, the U.S. Congress passed the Organized Crime Control Act, which created RICO, and signaled a new approach for conceptualizing and prosecuting organized crime. To paraphrase, RICO’s most frequently used section prohibits participating in or conducting the affairs of criminal enterprises, through a pattern of racketeering activity, or conspiracies to commit such conduct. Through its focus on criminal enterprises, among other aspects, RICO is distinguished from the various laws targeting organized crime that pre-dated it. The government utilized RICO to strike at the heart of a quintessential enterprise that existed solely for criminal purposes, the Mafia, a group with Italian origins also known as ‘La Cosa Nostra,’ and commonly translated as ‘Our Thing’ (S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36–43 [1969]). As shown by such RICO prosecutions, the Mafia represents a certain conception of organized crime. It is a hierarchical organization, characterized by continuity, a strict chain of command, membership requirements, and codes of conduct. Moreover, the Mafia has historically engaged in certain racketeering crimes that distinguish it as a criminal group, such as: extortion, loan-sharking, gambling businesses, manipulation of labor unions, sales of black market goods, and money laundering. Law enforcement authorities continue to undermine the crime families by frustrating their efforts to recruit and retain leaders and underlings, or secure assets – which in turn, hinders the families’ capacity to commit crimes.2 RICO’s criminal enterprise model represented a new approach in the government’s prosecution of organized crime groups. Before the passage of RICO, federal criminal laws did not punish individuals for their conduct in connection with criminal enterprises per se. However, such laws were sometimes insufficient at hindering or dismantling organized crime groups. For instance, the elaborate structure of certain organized crime entities could insulate high-level members, such as bosses, and assets, from prosecution and forfeiture. As a result, with its high-level members and assets largely unscathed, a sophisticated criminal enterprise, such as the Mafia, could generally sustain the loss of low-level members and continue the conspiracy with new recruits. Such challenges posed by the Mafia and other sophisticated criminal entities helped prompt Congress to enact RICO, which enabled the government to target members and assets of organized crime groups that may have otherwise eluded prosecution and forfeiture under previous laws (U.S. Code Tit. 18, Secs. 1961–68). The law states that it is unlawful for ‘any person’ to: (1) use income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, or derived from the collection of an unlawful debt, to acquire an interest in an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce; (2) acquire or maintain, through a pattern of racketeering activity, or through collection of an unlawful debt, an interest in an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce; (3) conduct or participate in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity, or through collection of an unlawful debt; or (4) conspire to commit any of the violations listed above (U.S. Code Tit. 18, Sec. 1962).


Evolving perceptions of organized crime 87 RICO defines an ‘enterprise’ broadly to ‘includ[e] any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity’ (U.S. Code Tit. 18, Sec. 1961). Since Congress stated that RICO should be construed liberally, the courts have held that the statute’s definition of an enterprise is not a comprehensive list, but instead a sample of the types of entities that can qualify as a criminal enterprise. To qualify as an association-in-fact, as opposed to a legal entity, the association generally must fulfill requirements that the courts have read into the statute, such as: (1) “a purpose”; (2) “relationships among those associated with the enterprise”; and (3) “longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose” (Boyle v. United States, 556 U. S. ___ [2009]; see also United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 772 [4th Cir. 1998]; Bonner v. Henderson, 147 F.3d 457, 459 [5th Cir. 1998]). Although RICO did not explicitly name the Mafia as liable for prosecution, the group’s characteristics and criminal patterns made the group a likely subject of prosecution under the statute, which Congress enacted with the intention of dismantling organized crime groups (S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36–43 [1969]). Investigations by Congress and law enforcement authorities had identified the Mafia as the most significant organized crime group in the United States. Accordingly, early uses uses of RICO were primarily directed against members and associates of the Mafia. However, different types of organized crime groups have emerged, such as street gangs and international organized crime groups, and have been identified, in publicized initiatives and documents, as threats meriting a concerted response by the federal government.

Street gangs In certain communities around the United States, street gangs have emerged as organized crime groups. Although street gangs have existed in various forms as criminal groups for centuries (Taylor 1990: 1–4), their evolution into sophisticated criminal groups, and the federal government’s recognition as such, is a comparatively recent phenomenon. This shift in perception may be attributed in part to society’s own recognition of the significant threats posed by gangs in neighborhoods around the United States. The first sub-section below describes how the federal government has identified street gangs as a threat, and the steps that it has taken in response to the perceived threat, including using RICO to prosecute gangs. The second sub-section will examine such gangs using the organized crime framework, as articulated by the President’s Commission on Organized Crime in 1986. The third sub-section will analyze how members and associates of street gangs may be liable for prosecution under RICO, a flexible statute with no definitions of ‘street gang’ or ‘organized crime.’ The government’s perception of street gangs as a threat The federal government has identified street gangs as a significant threat, and has taken various steps in response to the perceived threat, including using RICO


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to prosecute gangs. The federal government has employed various strategies to hinder and dismantle street gangs, including charging individuals for immigration, firearms, and narcotics offenses, but this chapter will primarily focus on the use of RICO. RICO prosecutions of members and associates of street gangs date back to at least the mid-1980s, but such prosecutions appear to have become more common in recent years. The federal crackdown on gangs is a multi-front effort, composed of prevention, enforcement, and prisoner re-entry programs. On February 15, 2006, then U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced the creation of the Justice Department’s Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative to combat gang violence. As part of the Initiative, the Department provides anti-gang resources for: (1) prevention programs to discourage gang membership; (2) enforcement programs to prosecute violent gang members; and (3) prisoner re-entry programs to reintegrate ex-convicts into society (U.S. Department of Justice 2007a; 2007b). For instance, the Department has established institutions that coordinate antigang efforts on a national level, gather intelligence, and prosecute the most significant gangs. First, led by the Department’s Criminal Division and created in 2006, the Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center (GangTECC) coordinates investigations. Second, the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), created in 2004, integrates the Department’s intelligence assets regarding gang activity. Third, the Department’s Criminal Division in 2006 created a Gang Squad, composed of experienced attorneys, who help prosecute the country’s most significant gangs (U.S. Department of Justice 2007a). Early federal RICO prosecutions of gangs, such as El Rukns in Chicago, and the Westies in New York City in the 1980s, were not part of a coordinated federal program against gangs. However, in recent years, RICO prosecutions have formed part of the federal government’s crackdown on street gangs, often in unison with state and municipal law enforcement authorities. In one of the well known cases, Mara Salvatrucha, a street gang commonly known as MS-13, has been the subject of a RICO conspiracy prosecution in Maryland. As of January 12, 2009, Marylandbased federal prosecutors have secured 23 convictions of MS-13 members for RICO conspiracy charges in that case (U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Maryland 2009). Elsewhere, members of MS-13 and other gangs have been convicted of RICO violations (e.g. U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia 2006). The United States Code does not contain a definition of a street gang that applies across the entire code; however, the Code defines a ‘criminal street gang’ in a sentencing enhancement, to paraphrase, as an ongoing group, club, organization, or association of five or more persons formed for the purpose of committing a violent crime or drug offense, with members that have engaged, within the past five years, in a continuing series of violent crimes or drug law violations that affect interstate or foreign commerce (U.S. Code Tit. 18, Sec. 521). The statute does not prohibit gang membership, and it does not mention ‘organized crime.’ The terms ‘organized crime’ (e.g. Finckenauer 2005) and ‘street gang’ have varying definitions, often depending on the academic discipline that is supplying the definition (e.g. North Carolina Justice Analysis Center of the Governor’s Crime

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Commission 2000). A report by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance remarked that most of the street gang definitions include a portion, or all, of the following factors: 1) 3 or more individuals associate periodically as an ongoing criminal group or organization, whether loosely or tightly structured, 2) the group has identifiable leaders, although the leader for one type of criminal activity may be different than the leader for another, 3) the group has a name or identifying symbol, 4) the organization’s members, individually or collectively, currently engage in, or have engaged in, violent or other criminal activity and 5) the group frequently identifies itself with, or claims control over specific territory (turf) in the community, wears distinctive dress and colors, and communicates through graffiti and hand signs among other means. (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance 1997: 30) Such definitions may contribute to an analysis of how a gang engages in organized crime. However, RICO contains no such definitions of ‘gangs’ or ‘organized crime,’ which gives law enforcement authorities flexibility to respond as new criminal threats are identified and prosecuted. Gangs: how do they qualify as organized crime groups? Gangs are not necessarily unsophisticated groups. Indeed, a street gang may resemble, or eventually resemble, traditional organized crime groups, such as the Mafia, and commit crimes that the Mafia members and associates have historically committed – extortion and loan-sharking, for instance. An author of RICO, G. Robert Blakey, has remarked that the Mafia itself was once a gang that evolved over time: ‘[Gangs are] in the process of growing into Mafias … The Mafia started out as a gang’ (Gibeaut 1998: 65). Mara Salvatrucha, commonly known as MS-13, is a street gang in the United States with a growing national presence. Newsweek labeled MS-13 the ‘fastestgrowing’ and ‘most violent’ street gang in the United States (Campo-Flores 2005: 22). Composed predominantly of Salvadorans and other Central Americans, MS-13 possesses approximately 8,000 to 10,000 members in 33 states around the United States, and reportedly tens of thousands of members in Central America (ibid.). Although the gang initially appeared decentralized, law enforcement authorities have observed increasing coordination between MS-13 chapters in Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, DC (Narcotics Digest Weekly 2005); which would be in line with MS-13’s sophisticated structure in El Salvador. Paul McNulty, then-U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, stated that ‘in some of the violent crimes, there seems to be a kind of approval process in some kind of hierarchy beyond the clique’ (Campo-Flores 2005: 22). Among the gang’s alleged crimes are: smuggling of narcotics, primarily cocaine and marijuana, into the country; transportation and distribution of drugs; alien smuggling; assault; homicide; and robbery (Narcotics Digest Weekly 2005).

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In 1986, the President’s Commission on Organized Crime released a report, which listed six characteristics for entities engaging in ‘organized crime:’


The criminal group is a continuing, structured collectivity of persons who utilize criminality, violence, and a willingness to corrupt in order to gain and maintain power and profit. The characteristics of the criminal group, which must be evidenced concurrently, are: [1] continuity, [2] structure, [3] criminality, [4] violence, [5] membership based on a common denominator, [6] a willingness to corrupt and a power/profit goal. (President’s Commission on Organized Crime 1986: 25–29) The six characteristics are not limited to a particular entity, such as the Mafia, thereby leaving room for other groups to qualify as an ‘organized crime’ group. The President’s Commission on Organized Crime’s six characteristics may contribute to an analysis of how a gang engages in organized crime, and may aid decision-makers in setting priorities and focusing resources as new criminal threats are identified and prosecuted. First, the President’s Commission on Organized Crime’s continuity characteristic requires that a group operate with a criminal purpose over a period of time. A gang’s criminal purpose need not resemble the Mafia’s criminal purpose. Chicago’s Black Gangster Disciple Nation (BGDN) gang demonstrates continuity, since the gang operated with a criminal purpose for several decades (e.g. Gibeaut 1998: 68). However, a gang may operate for less time and still qualify as an organized crime group. A gang does not have to operate with a criminal purpose for decades in order to fulfill the continuity requirement. A bright-line rule of that sort would limit the definition of ‘organized crime’ to only the most mature groups, such as the Mafia. The principle behind the continuity requirement is that a gang will not qualify as an organized crime group if its activity is occasional and unrelated. As long as a gang’s activity appears connected over time, the gang may satisfy the continuity requirement. Second, the structure characteristic requires that the criminal group possess a decision-making structure. The structure of gangs, such as the BGDN’s, may be sophisticated, with a chain of command (e.g. Gibeaut 1998: 68). For instance, the BGDN has a management structure that resembles the structure of a corporation, including a board of directors, and officials called governors and regents, who are responsible for the supply of drugs in various Chicago neighborhoods (ibid.). In contrast, MS-13 may not possess such a defined hierarchy, but this does not mean that the gang lacks structure altogether (Campo-Flores 2005: 22). Moreover, the structure requirement does not dictate that the group’s structure be exclusively vertical, but merely that it have some form of structure. A gang may have subgroups, diffuse leadership, and some horizontal decision-making authority. In certain respects, MS-13 may currently be such an organization, although it may be evolving into a more bureaucratic group, as a 2004 report by the National Drug Intelligence Center speculates (ibid.). Its fairly fluid decision-making structure would fulfill the structure requirement.


Evolving perceptions of organized crime 91 Third, the President’s Commission on Organized Crime’s report also states that members of a criminal group must use criminal activity to finance the group. The Mafia, for instance, originally acquired most of its funds from loan-sharking and gambling operations (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967: 2, 4). The Mafia has also acquired funds from prostitution, labor racketeering, and sales of black market goods (Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce 1951). By the 1980s, drug trafficking had became the most significant source of funds for the Mafia (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967: 11). As for BGDN, the group allegedly operated a $100 million annual narcotics business, originating from Chicago and extending into other cities, that sustained the group (Gibeaut 1998: 68). While perhaps less motivated by money than the Mafia, and likely less profitable than BGDN, MS-13 acquires funds from alien smuggling, narcotics distribution, and robbery, among other activities (Narcotics Digest Weekly 2005). Fourth, the President’s Commission’s organized crime framework also requires that a group employ violence in the pursuit of its goals, in order to qualify as an organized crime group. For instance, the Mafia imposes strict rules and penalties for misconduct; members risk being executed if they disobey their superiors, or if they vouch for the membership of someone who betrays or fails the Mafia (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations 1963: 2). As for MS-13, federal prosecutors in Virginia presented evidence that Brenda Paz was murdered by MS-13 members after she attempted to cooperate with the government against the gang; two defendants were convicted for her murder (U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia 2005). Fifth, to qualify as a group engaged in organized crime, the gang must also limit its membership in some fashion. MS-13 may require prospective members to be ‘jumped-in,’ meaning that the recruits have to endure an assault to join the group; some prospective female members are reportedly also required to have sex with male gang members to join the group (Cosby 2006). Additionally, MS-13 is predominantly composed of people with Salvadoran ethnicity, although other Central Americans have also become members (ibid.). Sixth, an organization also must be motivated by power and profit to qualify as an ‘organized crime’ group. The Mafia, for instance, acquired and maintained power using funds from illegal activities, including infiltration of legitimate businesses. MS-13 likewise obtains power and funds through criminal activity, such as drug distribution and robbery; and through violence, such as murdering witness Brenda Paz, to maintain its authority. The report of the President’s Commission on Organized Crime’s six organized crime characteristics are not limited to just one criminal group. Accordingly, the six-part framework provides flexibility in identifying and prosecuting threats that may not have been contemplated when the six characteristics were first articulated by the Commission. Judging from the report’s six-part framework, street gangs such as MS-13 may indeed qualify as another form of organized crime group.

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Application of RICO to street gangs As discussed previously, street gangs such as MS-13 may appropriately be called ‘organized crime’ groups, but it is still necessary to analyze whether RICO applies to conduct committed by street gang members and associates, and whether RICO prosecution is appropriate under the circumstances. Terms such as ‘street gangs’ and ‘organized crime’ may help decision-makers set priorities and focus resources to prosecute certain criminal groups. However, the terms do not determine which conduct RICO criminalizes, since the statute contains no such definitions, and is limited to no particular criminal group. Just as the six-part framework for organized crime groups is not limited to a particular group, RICO identifies no particular group as liable for prosecution. An author of RICO, G. Robert Blakey, once commented that RICO is suited for gang prosecutions (Gibeaut 1993: 65). Street gangs such as MS-13 are suitably advanced to be called organized crime groups; but how do the provisions of RICO apply to conduct by members and associates of street gangs, if at all? First, with respect to RICO’s ‘enterprise’ element, the group must fulfill requirements that the courts have read into the statute, such as: (1) ‘a purpose’; (2) ‘relationships among those associated with the enterprise’; and (3) ‘longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose’ (Boyle v. United States, 556 U. S. ___ [2009]; see also United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 772 [4th Cir. 1998]; Bonner v. Henderson, 147 F.3d 457, 459 [5th Cir. 1998]). As demonstrated in the previous sub-section, a street gang such as MS-13: (1) is united in a common purpose, such as drug distribution and violence; (2) functions as a continuing entity; and (3) has relationships between associates in the form of a fluid decision-making mechanism, with certain vertical and bureaucratic qualities observed by law enforcement authorities. Second, RICO’s ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ element requires a ‘relationship plus continuity’ (United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1104 [3d Cir. 1990]), meaning that there must be a relationship between the acts committed, and continuity in the commission of the acts. Since members and associates of an active street gang, such as MS-13, may commit numerous offenses – narcotics distribution, for instance – on a regular basis, the ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ element is often readily provable. Finally, offenses committed by members and associates of a street gang such as MS-13 may indeed fulfill RICO’s statutory elements, but does prosecution of such conduct comport with the intent of the statute? Congress enacted RICO with the intention of eliminating organized criminal groups and their detrimental influence on the United States (S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36–43 [1969]). Street gangs indeed differ from the Mafia that helped lead to the enactment of RICO, yet such gangs still exert a destructive influence on the country in their own ways – by alien smuggling, distributing drugs in neighborhoods around the country, and robbing people, for instance. RICO’s liberal interpretation clause accommodates evolving conceptions of organized crime groups – in this case, gangs such as MS13 that pose threats to society.

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International organized crime In recent years, international organized crime groups, ranging from West African scam-artists to Chinese human smugglers and Russian money launderers, have been identified, by the federal government, as significant threats to the United States. This shift in perception may be attributed in part to society’s own growing recognition of the threats; for instance, news accounts have widely reported about Americans being victimized increasingly by international fraud groups. The first sub-section describes how the federal government has identified international groups as threats, in the form of The Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime, published by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2008. The second sub-section will cite examples of such international groups and the challenges facing law enforcement authorities that are posed by such groups. The third sub-section will analyze how members and associates of such international groups may qualify for prosecution under RICO. The government’s perception of international organized crime groups as a threat International organized crime groups have also emerged as threats to the United States. This chapter will examine the threats in the context of The Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime (the ‘Strategy’), which was released by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) on April 23, 2008. The Strategy, which provides a framework for investigating and prosecuting international organized crime, drew upon a threat assessment of international organized crime to which various agencies contributed.3 The Strategy sets forth four priority areas for the federal government in its efforts against international organized crime: (1) marshalling information and intelligence; (2) prioritizing and targeting the most significant international organized crime threats; (3) utilizing the resources of the government with concerted action partnered with foreign counterparts; and (4) using the enterprise theory of investigation and prosecution to dismantle entire criminal enterprises, including their leadership. In keeping with this chapter’s analysis of evolving conceptions of organized crime, it will focus on the Strategy’s second priority area, regarding the federal government’s prioritization, and targeting, of international organized crime. According to the DOJ, ‘[the Strategy] aims to create consensus among domestic law enforcement in identifying the most significant priority targets,’ and create ‘unified and concerted action among domestic and international law enforcement in significantly disrupting and dismantling those targets’ (U.S. Department of Justice 2008a). The Strategy, as such, provides a working definition of ‘international organized crime’ and identifies eight strategic threats posed by international organized crime. With respect to the definition, the Strategy states that: ‘international organized crime’ refers to those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate internationally for the purpose of obtaining power,

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influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/ or violence. There is no single structure under which international organized criminals operate; they vary from hierarchies to clans, networks and cells, and may evolve to other structures. The crimes they commit also vary. (U.S. Department of Justice 2008b: 2) The Strategy’s definition shares terms in common with the President’s Commission on Organized Crime’s six characteristics, such as continuity, structure, and pursuit of power as a goal; and shares terms in common with the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. As for the threats posed by such groups, the Strategy identifies eight international organized crime threats, which are not ranked in any particular order (see Table 6.1). International crime groups: examples and challenges A strength of the Strategy is that the organized crime characteristics are not limited to just one group or organizational model. Moreover, like the President’s Commission on Organized Crime’s six characteristics, the Strategy’s definition helps inform an analysis of different types of international organized crime groups, and may aid decision-makers in setting priorities and focusing resources upon certain organized crime groups. Investigating and prosecuting such groups pose various challenges to law enforcement authorities. Consider two examples of international organized crime groups cited by the Strategy: West African fraud groups (Threat 6), and a Los Angeles-based kidnapping ring with international ties (Threat 8). First, the Strategy cites counterfeit prize schemes and counterfeit investment schemes perpetrated by West African organized crime groups based in Nigeria and elsewhere (Threat 6) (McNerthney 2008: B5). The scheme typically begins with the victim receiving a ‘spam’ e-mail, ‘announcing [that] the victim has won a prize or can share in a business opportunity.’ The victim then receives a counterfeit check or money order, with a request that the victim wire funds overseas, to pay taxes on the prize to be received, or to make advance payment on the business opportunity. In some cases, victims of these fraud schemes have been kidnapped and killed (U.S. Department of State 1997: 8). Various countries and investigative agencies, including the U.S. Postal Service, have partnered to investigate the West African fraud schemes since January 2007. Since then, approximately 77 arrests have been made, and more than 600,000 counterfeit checks have been seized, valued at more than $2.5 billion (Wagner 2007: B02). Second, the Strategy cites Iouri Mikhel and and Jurijus Kadamovas, who were sentenced to death in Los Angeles, on March 12, 2007, for their leadership role in an international crime group responsible for abducting and murdering five people in the United States (Threat 8). From 2001 until 2002, the two criminals and their co-conspirators abducted and held the victims for ransom (Bartholomew

Evolving perceptions of organized crime 95 Table 6.1 International organized crime threats as identified by the Strategy Threat 1

Control of energy markets and other strategic sectors of the economy


• Such influences tend to undermine the functioning of such markets, and ‘have a destabilizing effect on U.S. geopolitical interests’ (U.S. Department of Justice 2008b: 2). Threat 2

Logistical and other support to terrorist groups, foreign intelligence services, and governments

Threat 3

Smuggling/trafficking people and contraband/counterfeit goods into the United States • Smuggling and trafficking compromise the border security of the United States, exploit and endanger human beings, and cost U.S. businesses billions of dollars per year.

Threat 4

Exploiting the U.S. and international financial systems to transfer illicit funds • Exploitation of the system has a corrupting influence upon the financial systems.

Threat 5

Use of cyberspace to target U.S. victims and infrastructure • Such activities impose costs upon individuals and the U.S. economy, and jeopardize personal information, business and government infrastructure, and financial markets.

Threat 6

Manipulation of securities exchanges and sophisticated frauds • Such activities steal money from U.S. individuals, businesses, and government agencies.

Threat 7

Corruption and attempted corruption of public officials • Public officials in the United States and other countries, ‘including countries of vital strategic importance to the United States,’ may be targeted by such corruption (U.S. Department of Justice 2008b: 8).

Threat 8

Use of violence and the threat of violence • Groups using violence endanger the economic well-being and physical security of the U.S. public, and jeopardize the ability of law enforcement to investigate crimes.

2007: N3). The funds received from the victims were laundered through various countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Barbados, and Switzerland. Even after receiving ransom payments, Mikhel and Kadamovas murdered their victims by asphyxiation or strangulation, and with the help of co-conspirators, disposed of the bodies in a California reservoir. At trial, prosecutors presented evidence that the perpetrators were involved in similar homicides in Cyprus and Turkey in 2000 and 2001.


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Both groups satisfy the definition of ‘international organized crime’ in the Strategy. They exhibit continuity, operate internationally and do so for criminal gain, have a structure, and protect their activities through a pattern of corruption and violence. On April 23, 2008, then-U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey called attention to the unique challenges presented by international organized crime groups to law enforcement, in a speech before the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, coinciding with the release of the Strategy: ‘International organized crime poses a greater challenge to law enforcement than did the traditional mafia, in many respects. And the geographical source of the threat is not the only difference. The degree of sophistication is almost markedly different’ (Mukasey 2008). Among the challenges are the diverse jurisdictions that such groups cross, which complicate the government’s efforts to gather evidence and prosecute cases. For instance, organized crime groups operate across international borders with relative ease, in contrast with the limited jurisdiction of law enforcement authorities, which rely upon the cooperation of foreign governments to investigate crimes. The federal government’s process for gathering evidence varies from country to country, and is subject to a bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, where available. These differing processes may affect which types of evidence may be obtained, and how quickly it may be obtained. As a result, the evidence that investigators gather regarding an international organized crime group may be uneven from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and may arrive too late to be of use. In addition to such jurisdictional challenges, investigations of the international groups’ complex personnel and financial structures may require significant resources and expertise. Complex international investigations may accumulate voluminous documents, recordings, and other evidence. Translating such materials from a variety of languages into English is very costly, as are interpreting services, especially since the federal government may have to resort to expensive contractors. Travel expenses can be high for U.S. prosecutors and investigators to visit far-flung sites where evidence, suspects, and victims are located. Moreover, analyzing the evidence regarding international groups, including digital evidence and money transfers, requires the involvement of experienced agents and forensic specialists. Application of RICO to international organized crime groups As with street gangs, the international groups discussed above may appropriately be called ‘organized crime’ groups, but it is also necessary to analyze whether relevant provisions of RICO apply to conduct committed by group members and associates, and whether RICO prosecution is appropriate. Do the provisions of RICO apply to an international organized crime group, if at all? First, with respect to RICO’s ‘enterprise’ element, a group must satisfy requirements that the courts have read into the statute, such as: (1) ‘a purpose’; (2) ‘relationships among those associated with the enterprise’; and (3) ‘longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose’ (Boyle v. United States, 556 U. S. ___ [2009]; see also United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765,


Evolving perceptions of organized crime 97 772 [4th Cir. 1998]; Bonner v. Henderson, 147 F.3d 457, 459 [5th Cir. 1998]). As shown previously by the Strategy, an international organized crime group, such as the Mikhel and Kadamovas group: (1) is united in a common purpose, such as kidnapping and murder; (2) functions as a continuing entity; and; (3) has relationships between associates in the form of a decision-making mechanism. Second, RICO’s ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ element requires a ‘relationship plus continuity’ (United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1104 [3d Cir. 1990]); namely, there must be a relationship between the acts committed, and continuity in the commission of the acts. Since members and associates of an active international group, such as the West African scam-artists, may commit a significant number of offenses – fraud, namely – on a regular basis, the ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ element is often readily provable. Finally, offenses committed by members and associates of an international criminal group may indeed fulfill RICO’s statutory elements, but does prosecution of such conduct comport with the intent of the statute? As discussed previously, Congress’ intent in enacting RICO was to eliminate organized criminal groups and their destructive influence on the country (S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36–43 [1969]). Although they differ from the Mafia that helped spawn RICO, international organized crime groups nonetheless exert a destructive influence on the country in their own ways – by alien smuggling, corrupting the financial system, and defrauding people, for instance. RICO’s liberal interpretation clause accommodates evolving conceptions of organized crime groups – in this case, international organized crime groups that pose their own types of threats to society.

Conclusions The federal government’s perceptions of organized crime threats have evolved to include street gangs and international groups. Both types of entities have been identified, by the federal government, as threats meriting a concerted federal response. In the context of these perceived threats, this chapter has explored evolutions in the application of RICO. First, the chapter has examined whether RICO, originally enacted to dismantle the Mafia, may be used against street gangs. Second, the chapter has discussed whether RICO may be used against international organized crime groups. The statute possesses substantial flexibility to prosecute members and associates of varying types of criminal groups, since RICO names no particular criminal group as liable for prosecution. In keeping with that flexibility, RICO does not criminalize membership in a criminal enterprise (nor have previous statutes), lest it penalize status, which would run afoul of the Constitution; instead, the statute criminalizes conduct on behalf of a criminal enterprise. In fact, a federal court noted in United States v. Mandel (415 F. Supp. 997, 1018–19 [D. Md. 1976]) that, were RICO applied solely to members of organized crime, it would likely be unconstitutional. This focus on conduct, as opposed to a focus on membership in an organized crime group, demonstrates the flexibility of RICO, which is not bound by a defined list of banned groups. Projects such as The Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International


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Organized Crime may serve to aid decision-makers in setting priorities and focusing resources upon dangerous and significant organized crime groups. The federal government has prioritized the crackdown on gangs and international organized crime groups, and may use the spectrum of law enforcement tools at its disposal, including RICO, to address such threats. As reflected by the statute’s liberal interpretation clause, RICO’s use is contemplated in prosecutions of members and associates of new and emerging criminal organizations, such as the groups examined in this chapter. Granted, RICO may not be applicable to members and associates of every criminal group. However, where such groups fall within the intent and text of the statute, RICO is an appropriate and effective statute to prosecute crimes committed by members and associates of street gangs and international organized crime groups.

Notes 1 This chapter does not make allegations regarding, or otherwise take a position upon, any indictments pending in courts of law. All persons are innocent unless and until found guilty in a court of law. 2 Congressional investigations greatly expanded the government’s knowledge about the Mafia in the 1950s (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations 1963, also known as the McClellan Committee Hearings; and Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce 1951, also known as Kefauver Committee Report). Up until that point, the nature and scope of the Mafia as an organized institution were largely unknown to legislators. The Kefauver and McClellan Committees’ investigations helped expose the Mafia’s infrastructure and organizing principles, which the group uses to advance the criminal enterprise. With respect to its governing principles, the Mafia is a complex hierarchical organization of career criminals that demands complete obedience and loyalty from its members. Mafia organizations, also called ‘families,’ in a given city or region are organized hierarchically, with divisions of labor, along the lines of a legitimate business. When joining the organization, members swear an oath of allegiance to the Mafia, to the exclusion of all other loyalties, including loyalty to family and country. The rules and penalties of the organization are strict; members face the risk of execution if they fail to abide by the commands of their superiors, or if they sponsor the membership of someone who disappoints or betrays the organization. Those who wish to be ‘made,’ or inducted into the Mafia, generally have to establish Italian lineage, and commit a crime to prove their mettle. The Mafia’s culture and chain-ofcommand demands that subordinates show their superiors respect and deference. By acting through subordinates, the family’s decision-makers shield themselves from prosecution and scrutiny by law enforcement authorities. Subordinates also insulate their superiors from prosecution by not cooperating with law enforcement authorities, even if they face imprisonment for not doing so. 3 The agencies are: The Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the DOJ’s Criminal Division, in conjunction with other sections of the Criminal Division; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Internal Revenue Service; the Postal Inspection Service; the Secret Service; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security; the Department of Labor/Office of the Inspector General; components of the State Department, the Treasury Department, and the intelligence community.

7

The Yakuza and its perceived threat


Sayaka Fukumi

The Yakuza (known officially as Boryoku-dan; literally, ‘violence group’) has been a part of Japanese society since at least the Edo period.1 The modern Yakuza, however, established itself in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the government lacked the ability to control its territory. Until recently, the Yakuza has been tolerated in Japanese society and used for its services of aggressive persuasion or its organizational influence. The members of the Yakuza used to walk down the street openly showing their affiliation. The Yakuza’s existence and its activities were recognized as a ‘grey area’ in Japanese society, and its services were requested when coercive power was needed. Society’s attitude toward the Yakuza, however, has changed from acceptance to rejection in the last 18 years. The reason for this change may have been triggered by the introduction of the Law Regarding the Prevention of Unjust Acts by Boryoku-dan Members (or the ‘Organized Crime Countermeasures Law’) in 1991. The Yakuza’s social status has been affected. This law prohibits activities commonly associated with the Yakuza, such as coercion and blackmailing in business. Following the implementation of this law, Japan has tried to exclude the Yakuza from society. Consequently, the Yakuza has been forced to change the way it operates its businesses. There has been a definite move away from more traditional types of business to new modern ones in which there is a clear emphasis on economic ‘grey areas’ and legitimate businesses. These changes have given the impression that the Yakuza has disappeared from the surface of legitimate Japanese society. This chapter will examine to what extent Japanese perception of the Yakuza and its threats changed pre-1991 and post-1991. Unlike the works of Hill (2003) and Siniawer (2008) who studied the organizational characteristics of the Yakuza as violence specialists in Japanese history, the focus of this chapter will be on the perception of the ‘enemy’. To some extent, this chapter will investigate the ‘securitization’ of the Yakuza, looking at its social image and impact using a social constructivist approach. The 1991 anti-organized crime law is chosen as a milestone for Japanese society and its relationship with the Yakuza because it is the first law to officially outlaw the Yakuza; in other words, the first law to label the Yakuza as ‘immoral’ and the ‘enemy’ of the Japanese state and society. Analyzing the securitization of the Yakuza from a theoretical perspective, the introduction of the 1991 anti-organized crime law was a policy which sought to


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eliminate the Yakuza from Japanese society. According to Durkheim, criminalization provides common knowledge of undesirable acts which threaten society (1964: 69).2 Knowledge about undesirables contributes not only to forming social norms but also to establishing a social identity by defining the ‘self’ and the ‘others’. Wendt, who extended this argument to the ‘state’ and the ‘enemy/threat’, maintains that identifying the ‘enemy’ is a necessary process for a state to justify where it belongs (1999: 272–8). Formation of a social identity leads to the alienation of certain social groups from society (Linklater 1996: 279–98). Heidensohn argues, therefore, that ‘social evils (or enemies)’ are ‘not merely socially constructed’ but also ‘in part socially concernedly constructed’ (1989: 5). Turning to our understanding of the emergence of the ‘enemy/threat’, the social construction of the ‘enemy/threat’ occurs when the ‘self’ feels insecure. According to McSweeney, ‘insecurity’ is recognized when ‘we’ encounter the disruption of the existing order and the ontological insecurity caused by ‘a cleavage or dissonance in the patterns of mutual knowledge, common norms and standards binding us in a condition of solidarity with others’ (1999: 157). The measurement of danger and threat is subjective as it depends on one’s perception of insecurity. According to Campbell, the understanding of the threat is ‘an effect of interpretation’ (1998: 2). In brief, the creation of the ‘enemy/threat’ helps a society and a state to define its identity. The ‘enemy/threat’, however, emerges when a phenomenon is widely accepted and acknowledged as the ‘enemy/threat’ by a society. The actual damage posed by the phenomenon may not be reflected accurately as the measurement of danger relies on the perception of the threat and/or the intention of the political elite who set policies. This chapter will analyze the ‘securitization’ of the Yakuza using this theoretical framework. First, the characteristics of the ‘traditional’ Yakuza and its activities will be examined. Here we examine how the Yakuza presented itself and how Japanese society understood it. Second, the organized crime countermeasures law and the changes it provoked in the Yakuza organization will be investigated. Lastly, the changes in the Yakuza’s economic activities following the introduction of the law will be analyzed.

The Yakuza pre-1991 Modern Yakuza groups emerged and were utilized in the aftermath of the Second World War. These groups were used to maintain stability when the government could not reform the police force quickly enough to keep order. The government and business regarded the Yakuza as a convenient political tool until the late 1950s – until the Miike miners’ strike and the death of a miner caused by a Yakuza member (Siniawer 2008: 150–63). Awareness and fear of the use of violence by the Yakuza peaked in the 1980s, which was an era of Yakuza disputes. The changes in the law during the 1990s were a consequence of these violent disputes in the 1980s. According to police records in 1991, there were then about 3,300 Yakuza groups in Japan. Among these, three groups were known as the most prominent and powerful – Yamaguchi-gumi, Inagawa-kai and Sumiyoshi-kai (Kunimatsu 1991a).


The Yakuza and its perceived threat 101 Yamaguchi-gumi is the largest organization (with its headquarters in Hyogo) followed by Inagawa-kai (with its headquarters in Tokyo). These organizations have a pyramidal structure with four to five layers. The groups within an organization are ranked from first to fourth or fifth depending on the size of the organization, as shown in Figure 7.1. The first groups are at the core of the organization and have a direct link to the ‘big boss’ who controls the entire organization, and is often involved in organizational decision making. The ranks are determined by the strength of the connections of the group with the boss and the extent to which they are trusted by the big boss as well as their contribution to the organization. The way in which each group is managed, however, is entirely dependent on the group boss, except for territorial and organizational disputes. Group bosses are independent from the organization as long as their group does not tarnish the reputation of the organization and completes the tasks set by the superior groups (or the big boss). If we look at the relationship between society and the Yakuza, according to Kaplan, the acceptance of the Yakuza in society is something peculiar to Japan (Asahi Shinbun 1991a: 7). The Yakuza has been both feared and admired in Japanese society. Those who admire the Yakuza emphasize its members’ discipline and loyalty to their boss and organization (family) as human virtues. Such admiration is reflected in the popularity of films about Yakuza members. The Japanese have been fascinated by Yakuza films, particularly those of the 1970s and 80s such as Battles Without Honour and Humanity (or Jingi-naki tatakai) (1973) and Wives of Yakuza (Gokudo no Onna-tachi) (1986), and there is a tendency to tolerate the Yakuza as a ‘necessary evil’ (Matsumura 2008). Films tend to emphasize the more positive aspects of the Yakuza world such as ninkyo – honour, humanity and reciprocity – a word which has a positive image for the Japanese (Ujiie 2007: 224–5).

Boss

Boss

Boss

(2nd Group)

Boss (3rd Group)

Boss (2nd Group)

(2nd Group )

Boss (3rd Group)

Boss (4th Group)

Boss (3rd Group)

Boss (4th Group)

Boss (3rd Group)

Boss (3rd Group)

Boss (4th Group)

Figure 7.1 An organizational chart of the Yakuza (author’s adaptation).

Boss (3rd Group)


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There are, in fact, some Yakuza bosses who have provided help for victims of natural disasters. Some Yakuza groups have even supported locals and victims by working with them and donating large sums of money to the affected communities. For example, in 1991, when Unzen-Fugendake erupted, the Yamaguchi-gumi collected ¥10 million in donations from bosses for the victims (Isayama 1991). Some Yakuza members also offered their services to local communities in the Kobe area in the aftermath of the Hanshin earthquake of 1995. The Yamaguchi-gumi boss in Nagata-ku helped to clear up damage and supplied food to the area (Asahi Shinbun 1995: 15). Although some speculated that these acts were strategic and used to avoid the application of the anti-organized crime law, the impression given by newspaper reports was still very positive for the Yakuza. Turning to those who fear the Yakuza, this fear stemmed from its private use of violence and coercive techniques to do business. The methods used by the Yakuza to conduct business are known as being aggressive and swift. Despite these shadowy aspects of the Yakuza, Japanese society showed a certain understanding of its activities as being solutions for ‘grey areas’ as well as being part of its cultural heritage. This is because there were distinctive differences between the businesses of katagi (non-Yakuza) and those of the Yakuza. There are 15 traditional types of criminal Yakuza business recognized in the countermeasures law, such as debt collection, requesting donations from local companies, forced removal of residents from buildings and demands for money as settlements for traffic accidents (Kanagawa-ken Bouryoku Tsuihou Suishin Centre n.d.).3 Many of these problems are solved faster with the use of coercive power and companies have been willing to pay for these faster solutions. As for the Yakuza, working for a company can offer an individual a well-paid job – a few million yen in a one to two-year period. This is certainly a ‘marriage of convenience’.4 Some of the Yakuza members, therefore, call their business ‘negative services’ – the darker side of customer services for the financial and construction sectors (Yamadaira 2006: 148–9). Although the law prohibits such ‘services’, the Yakuza is the organization which can provide them. It is possible that dispute settlements will remain the Yakuza’s speciality for as long as legitimate businesses require these services. The requests for these services, however, are usually made to the larger Yakuza gangs, such as the Yamaguchi-gumi. This is because, according to one Yakuza member, the Yakuza is an ‘image industry’ and a well-known ‘brand’ has more coercive power than unknown small groups (Yamadaira 2006: 67). The Yamaguchi-gumi received the most offers because it is the ‘brand name’ of the Yakuza world, and known for its fighting units because of the disputes of the 1980s and because of the scale of its organizational power. Showing a business card with a diamond-shaped crest is essentially a way to make a threat. This is because those who are guaranteed the support of the Yamaguchi-gumi are permitted to carry such a card.5 The effective use of this brand image assists the Yakuza’s penetration into the construction industry and the manipulation of shareholders’ meetings. The threats made by the Yakuza can be effective for short-term dispute settlements because the majority of the legal procedures require several years to be resolved. For example,


The Yakuza and its perceived threat 103 a construction company cannot operate when residents refuse to move out of a building. In such a case, according to the owner of a construction company, following the legal protocols would take several years to settle the dispute (Interview 2005b). The more time it takes to persuade resisting residents, the less money the company makes. With the Yakuza involved, however, it is settled in less than a year. Despite the awareness of it being illegal as stated in the law, the benefits and business advantages which Yakuza involvement bring are irresistible. In one example, the construction company Suruga Corporation faced bankruptcy due to the serious delay in the progress of its building project. Without the help of the Yakuza, it took the company four years to evict all residents from the construction site (Suda 2008: 97–8). While waiting for the residents to move out, Suruga faced financial problems as the contract did not cover the loss caused by the delay. The legitimate procedure took too long and the company could not afford all this waiting around (Suda 2008: 90–5). However, asking one of the Yakuzarelated companies to help evict the residents yielded results in just one year, and the Yakuza received about ¥3.7 billion for its service. This efficiency would be enough to attract any company’s attention to the services which the Yakuza can provide and, at the same time, it has provided important financial deals for the Yakuza (Taoka 1991: 18). Another business advantage of the ‘negative brand image’ of the Yakuza is its ability to manipulate shareholder and other business meetings. For example, sokaiya (racketeers, or ‘corporate blackmailers’) work with and against companies. In particular, during shareholders’ meetings sokaiya put pressure on companies or shareholders (Asahi Shinbun 1996: 27). In 2000, it became known that the machinery company Kubota had had a relationship with a sokaiya for 14 years and had paid him about ¥4 billion to make meetings advantageous for the company (Nihonkeizai Shinbun 2000a: 19).6 Sokaiya are used to manipulate shareholders’ meetings, in this case, to the advantage of Kubota. Sokaiya ensure the meeting procedures are completed without any trouble, such as being asked for details of problematic accounting reports. Sokaiya prevent shareholders from commenting or asking questions during these meetings. In short, sokaiya are hired by companies to help hide inconvenient information. The traditional and most reliable form of income for the Yakuza is protection money collected from business owners, particularly in red-light districts, such as Shinjuku in Tokyo. Protection money is decided by the size of the business and the frequency of requests for assistance (Mizoguchi 2000: 315).7 In principle, the businesses under Yakuza protection are in the same position as those having Yamaguchi-gumi’s business card. Trouble, such as fights and quarrels among customers, can be handled by Yakuza members. There are cases where this protection service benefits both sides. Therefore, as Hill argues, business relationships between the Yakuza and the business owners can be regarded as interdependent rather than simply being a case of exploitation by the Yakuza (2003: 97–8). Thus, even after the implementation of the countermeasures law, there were payments made to the Yakuza to ensure safety for some local businesses owners (Interview 2003). To disguise these payments, they are made not as protection fees


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but perhaps as the price for ice cubes in cold drinks or rental fees for hand towels. In the case of a restaurant owner, the fee took the form of rental fees for drawings, which costs ¥20,000 per month (Nagasaki Shinbun 2008d). However, not all businesses are willing to have contracts with the Yakuza. There are also cases where business owners were forced to accept rental contracts with the Yakuza or were afraid of retaliation following the refusal of their services (Interview 2003). In sum, the traditional businesses of the Yakuza have been restricted by the new countermeasures law, and the Yakuza members have found it more difficult to gain sufficient income from them. A positive aspect of this law is that business owners can now refuse the demands made by the Yakuza. However, some companies still need the use of violence or intimidation and some of the services relating to real estate management, all of which the Yakuza can provide. This relationship may make the business more efficient for the company but they also finance the activities of the Yakuza and therefore go against the efforts of law enforcement.

The Organized Crime Countermeasures Law in the 1990s For a long time, the Yakuza and Japanese society have maintained a symbiotic relationship despite the trend by police to monitor Yakuza activities more strictly. The Organized Crime Countermeasures Law (known as Botaiho in Japanese abbreviation), however, brought an end to such a relationship. Passing this law has effectively meant the criminalization of Yakuza activities, and implicitly, the Yakuza itself. In other words, the criminalization of a phenomenon means its exclusion as immoral. The alienation of the Yakuza from society reflected the fear of the government and that of society. The government was anxious about the expanding power of the Yakuza because it believed that the annual income of the Yakuza exceed ¥1300 billion with 80 per cent of this from illicit activities (Kunimatsu 1991b). In addition, Yakuza disputes resulted in the deaths of many non-Yakuza in 1990. In Okinawa, a high school student was killed because he was mistaken for a member of a rival organization (Asahi Shinbun 1990a: 31). Also, in Osaka there were similar cases in which two ordinary citizens were killed: one was believed to be the boss of the Hadani-gumi gang, and the other mistaken for a member of the same gang (Asahi Shinbun 1990b: 27; and Asahi Shinbun 1990c: 29). These three murders shocked Japanese society. Yakuza disputes had normally only targeted Yakuza members and never ordinary citizens (Suzuki 1991: 4). The reality was that now there was a possibility of public involvement in Yakuza disputes and these deaths meant Japanese citizens were no longer just bystanders, with Yakuza violence going beyond the Yakuza to affect ordinary citizens. The countermeasures law brought gradual changes to the Japanese perception of the Yakuza. The effectiveness of the law to control its illicit activities, however, remains questionable. The law did not touch the bosses of the Yakuza, and hence made little impact on the core of its activities and power. The revisions took ten years to be produced and implemented. The law was finally expanded and


The Yakuza and its perceived threat 105 strengthened with the introduction of two amendments in 2004 and 2008. The law was revised in 2004 to make it possible to punish leaders of the organization for crimes committed by lower level members (Nihonkeizai Shinbun 2004: 42). This change enabled law enforcers to prosecute higher-ranking members of the Yakuza for their responsibility in managing disputes between Yakuza organizations.8 Based on this revision, the fifth most important Yamaguchi-gumi boss was found guilty when one of his followers shot a police officer who was mistaken for a rival Yakuza member (Mizoguchi 2007: 10–11). In 2008, the Yakuza was weakened again by a further change in the law with the introduction of a new amendment. This amendment sought to expand the legal responsibilities of high-ranking Yakuza members to include responsibility for economic activities (Nagasaki Shinbun 2008c and 2007e). For example, highranking bosses can now be charged for the use of violence by members of their sub-groups while they undertake economic activities because these may reflect their decisions. The development of the countermeasures law to include wider ranging activities was triggered by the series of incidents related to Yakuza and former Yakuza members. What provoked these revisions were the deaths of ordinary citizens. The law influenced national sentiment and the reactions to the incidents were swift. These events gave the government a clear signal of how citizens were feeling after the murder of the Mayor of Nagasaki in 2007 (Nihonkeizai Shinbun 2007b: 23) precipitated the need for change. The Mayor was murdered because he refused a Yakuza organization’s requests to involve its construction companies in major public work projects (Nagasaki Shinbun 2008b and 2007d). In another case in November 2007, in a hospital in Saga, a patient (who was in a room previously occupied by a Yakuza patient) was mistaken for a Yakuza member and shot dead (Asahi Shinbun 2008a: 1). According to police reports, there were 41 shootings related to the Yakuza during 2007 (Keisatsucho 2008: 10). The particular significance of these three prominent incidents is the fact that all were civilian victims. The Yakuza’s disputes and its members’ illicit possession of guns were obvious threats to citizens. Other incidents involving civilians have caught the public’s attention. In April 2007, there were shootings between Yakuza members in council housing near Tokyo (Sankei Web 2007). Due to the fear created by such incidents in local communities, a new amendment in the regulations of council housing has been approved in various cities (Yomiuri Online 2007). This change was introduced in order to exclude the Yakuza from society: the regulations denied Yakuza members the right to rent council houses (Yomiuri Online 2007 and Osakafu 2007). Records detail 105 incidents involving Yakuza related-violence in council estates between 2003 and 2007, and local governments have decide to tackle these problems (Nihonkeizai Shinbun 2007c: 19). What is more, the incidents provoked a growing national antagonism towards the Yakuza. In 1996, one Yakuza organization was evicted from its new office in Nagasaki as a result of an anti-Yakuza campaign by locals (Nagasaki Shinbun 2007c). A Yakuza headquarters in the local community creates fear and tension in


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the area (Nagasaki Shinbun 2008a and Asahi Shinbun 2004: 33). Yakuza organizations fight each other to protect their territory, to decide who will be the next leader, and to settle disputes (Nihonkeizai Shinbun 2007a: 11). These fights often involve guns and bystanders can get in the way (Keisatsucho 2008: 10). Although there have been some success stories, most campaigns against the Yakuza have met aggressive resistance from Yakuza members. In Kitakyusyu, the premises owned by one of the anti-Yakuza campaign leaders was bombed (Nagasaki Shinbun 2007c). Threats were made to those who were actively involved in the promotion of anti-Yakuza campaigns. The possibilities of violence and continuous harassment by Yakuza members mean that there is a reluctance to become involved in such campaigns. The countermeasures law did, however, gradually help society to expose victimization. According to a police source, the law has influenced people’s attitudes, and they are increasingly willing to report activities to the police and ask for advice on how to avoid extortion and harassment by the Yakuza (Interview 2005a). Recognizing these changes in society, the government quickly passed the amendment to the countermeasures law in 2008. This may indicate how the exclusion of the Yakuza in Japanese society has progressed in the past decade, and that there has been a weakening in their social position in society. Tolerance and symbiosis are gradually being replaced by the recognition that the Yakuza is a social threat.

The changes introduced by the law The countermeasures law brought about various changes to Japanese society and the Yakuza world. In order to identify the numbers of Yakuza groups, the police registered 22 organizations as the most influential Yakuza organizations (Shitei Boryoku-dan), and who were subject to the anti-organized crime law (Keisatsucho 2008: 20). The law and the registration of Yakuza organizations started with the implementation of the anti-organized crime law in 1991, and has been revised every three years since in order to reflect the dynamics of the changing Yakuza world. This law prohibits Yakuza members identifying themselves as a member of the Yakuza or to settle business deals in a coercive manners with non-Yakuza members (Law 77, 1991). This means that the members of the Yakuza cannot wear a badge shaped like the crest of their family; refer to their family’s name in the expectation of producing fear in others; or use business cards to indicate their connection with a Yakuza family. This is because displays of these symbolic features have coercive power in society and are recognized as the equivalent to blackmail (Hill 2003: 147). This, however, meant the Yakuza lost a means of displaying its status in public, as well as it social status. This change forced the Yakuza to moderate its business operations. Being unable to display its status means that they have become much less visible in legitimate Japanese society compared with the 1980s. As a result, some younger generations cannot recognize Yakuza members, and have had difficulty constructing a stereotypical image of the Yakuza.9 Until the law was passed, Japanese society was aware of the existence of the Yakuza because of its members’ behaviour


The Yakuza and its perceived threat 107 and distinctive attire. Moreover, its headquarters were known to the locals as the entrance had a sign indicating the name of the organization above it. The law has now made this illegal. Another change was the recognition of the relationship between the police and the Yakuza. Their relationship under the pre-1991 law was one of convenience. Police officers relied on information provided by Yakuza members, particularly in the case of gun control. The majority of arrests and seizures were based on Yakuza insider information (Nagasaki Shinbun 2007a). In return, the police turned a blind eye to the petty crime the Yakuza members used to commit. In order to obtain information on Yakuza activities, police officers used to visit the Yakuza’s headquarters, and observe the changes in membership and positions through the display of name tags on the office wall (Wallace 2007). Information on the structure, activities and whereabouts of the Yakuza was disclosed to law enforcers. Compared with other criminal groups, the Yakuza was very different because it was so open and visible. The introduction of this law dramatically changed this situation, discouraging such a ‘friendly relationship’ between the two parties. These social changes alarmed some police officers who were afraid of losing significant sources for vital information which could cause problems when trying to resolve Yakuza-related crimes (Asahi Shinbun 1991c: 30). Aware of the changes, the Yakuza members also shifted their attitudes towards the police. The head of the Yamaguchi-gumi ordered members to no longer communicate with law enforcers (Nagasaki Shinbun 2007b). The Yakuza now regards the police and Japanese society as the ‘enemy’. The law clearly excluded the Yakuza from Japanese society, and left little room for it to be part of the local community. Disrupted communication between the Yakuza and the police has accelerated the Yakuza’s alienation. As Japanese society shows less tolerance of the Yakuza, it has isolated itself from society and become more secretive. Its weak existence in legitimate society, however, does not mean that the Yakuza is no longer involved in legitimate activities. Far from it: its penetration of the legitimate economy has been accelerated.

The economic activities of the Yakuza The new law has clearly affected the Yakuza’s economic activities the most. Some Yakuza organizations lost their financial means (shinogi) due to tighter controls (Asahi Shinbun 1992: 24). Others could not continue their traditional businesses and transformed themselves into fundraising groups with more legitimate methods (Asahi Shinbun 1991d: 30). Thus, the prohibition of traditional businesses made the Yakuza turn to legitimate businesses in the form of an ‘economic Yakuza’ (or kigyo-syatei). We will now examine how the Yakuza’s economic activities have been influenced by the law. In order to analyze the impact of the law, we will look, first, at the business the Yakuza traditionally engaged in and, second, the changing strategy of the Yakuza as a consequence of the new law.

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A new direction in business Tightened control over traditional economic activities by the law has redirected the Yakuza from its traditional businesses into more legitimate ones, such as establishing front companies and becoming involved in share trades. The head of the Yamaguchi-gumi, for example, established Yamaki Inc in order to avoid police interference (Asahi Shinbun 1991b: 30). According to the police, 70 out of 108 Yamaguchi-gumi offices took down their signs and family crests by March 1991 in order not to violate the countermeasures law (ibid.). They even organized seminars with lawyers to learn about loopholes in the new countermeasures law in order to find new directions for their businesses (Asahi Shinbun 2008b: 35; and McCurry 2008). The Yakuza’s involvement in legitimate business is not a new phenomenon. The third boss of Yamaguchi-gumi, the largest Yakuza family in Japan, was keen to establish legitimate businesses, such as financing entertainment ventures and developing a container transporting company in Kobe (Mizoguchi 2001: 81, 89). He also encouraged his ‘family’ to engage in legitimate business. However, the bosses who made their living from legitimate economic activities were in a minority until around the 1970s. From the 1980s, the ‘economic Yakuza’ or ‘kigyo-syatei’ began to emerge. This refers to Yakuza families running businesses in the legitimate economy. The bosses can be a member of the Yakuza or a ‘brother’ of a Yakuza boss. Mostly the owners are not formal members of the Yakuza, but may be former Yakuza members. The company workers may not even know that the company has a connection with the Yakuza at all. The economic Yakuza and front companies are important financial resources that assist the strength and growth of the Yamaguchi-gumi. It consists of two groups: one is the economic Yakuza, and the other is its fighting units; the economic Yakuza generates financial resources from legitimate businesses for the group’s fighting units (Yamadaira 2006: 59–61). In this way, fighting units do not need to worry about funding while they are risking their lives for their bosses. Allegedly, the Yakuza economy earns about ¥8–9 trillion annually (Natsuhara 2002: 175). Some Yakuza members live in a similar manner to successful businessmen. Some run companies, such as construction businesses, and others have become shareholders in legitimate businesses, and manage companies (Keisatsucho 2007a: 2). The Yakuza is flexible and adapts its businesses according to the changing economic situation. When the economy is booming, the groups focus on real estate and bonds, and when the economy is in recession, they move into areas of finance and debt solution (Keisatsucho 2008: 17). The Yakuza’s business is not necessarily illegal, but the way it operates can fall into grey areas or be illegal. The types of business which the Yakuza become involved in tend to be ones which are easy to register and where it is easy to hide your background. More importantly, they have to be lucrative. Examples include loan companies known as ‘yami-kinyu’ (literally ‘dark finance’, i.e. loan-sharks). The Yakuza remains in the background, sponsors the company and receives the profits. The average


The Yakuza and its perceived threat 109 profit of such loan businesses is ¥10 million per month and 80 per cent is taken by the Yakuza. There is an agreement between the head of the loan company and the Yakuza organization not to reveal their connection to anyone (Yomiuri Shinbun Syakai-bu 2003: 47 and 140). For this reason, it is rare for the Yakuza’s connection with loan-sharking companies to be discovered, but in 2007 there was a seizure of a yami-kinyu linked to one of the Yamaguchi-gumi groups – Goryou-kai. The total damages awarded to all victims at the trial reached about ¥2.9 billion (Nihonkeizai Shinbun 2008: 43). In 2009, there were 5,872 victims registered for compensation from the ¥29 billion confiscated from Credit Swiss Bank as Goryo-kai’s illicit earnings (Nihonkeizai Shinbun 2009: 18). The way in which loan-shark companies operate has been a serious issue in Japan considering the amount of money the Yakuza can make, as well as the extremely high interest rates charged and the violent demands made. Mobility and stability may also be significant elements. One of the businesses in the sex industry known euphemistically as ‘Delivery Health’10 (a call-girl service) became largely owned by Yakuza members. This business did not require office space as customers did not visit them directly, and having a phone was all that was required to operate. Due to the registration process, however, it was difficult to identify whether the owners had a connection with the Yakuza even though registration was conducted by the local police (Nagasaki Shinbun 2007f). This type of business is not as lucrative as loan-sharking, but it has advantages. It does not require huge finances and is less likely to be targeted by police. The more serious impact of the Yakuza’s involvement in legitimate economic activities is in the realm of share trades (Keisatsucho 2008: 17). Apart from running its own businesses, the Yakuza is known to be active in the share market. Inagawa-kai, a rival organization of Yamaguchi-gumi, held about 24 million shares of Tokyu Dentetsu – one of the private rail companies in the Tokyo area (Asahi Shinbun 1991e: 29). With their organizational power, the Yakuza can generate sufficient financial resources to penetrate the share market. According to a source, Yamaguchi-gumi, for example, can generate about ¥10 billion within a day or two (Interview, 2005c). To buy a company by being a leading shareholder might not be a difficult thing for the Yamaguchi-gumi boss. The targets of the Yakuza are likely to be medium-sized companies and small ventures that are preparing for initial public offering to the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). This is because these companies are in need of funding to meet the listing requirements (Nihonkeizai Shinbun 2000b: 26). The linkage or involvement of the Yakuza in a company, however, can ruin the company. For example, Ryowa Life Creates, a real estate company and a front company of the Yamaguchi-gumi gang, lost its status at the TSE second section when its relationship with Goto-gumi, the third largest group in the Yamaguchi-gumi, was revealed (Suda 2008: 78). The Yakuza connection was disclosed in a dispute over the ownership of the Shinjuku Building. (Harajuku Shinbun 2006).11 Goto-gumi was also behind a case in 2000 that affected the existence of a company (Asahi Shinbun 2006: 2). Liquid Audio Japan was listed on the TSE Market of the High-Growth and Emerging Stock (Mothers). A series of incidents indicated


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the connection between Liquid Audio Japan and the Yakuza: the president used to work for a front company; and the president paid ¥45 million to the front company (Asahi Shinbun 2000a: 37). Following the revelation, the share prices of Liquid Audio Japan suffered a sharp decline, and disappeared from the Mothers. This case, to some extent, showed the fear investors had in the Mothers (Asahi Shinbun 2000b: 35). The Mothers was established to provide the market with ventures to make public offerings with fewer requirements than the TSE second section. This became the weakness of the Mothers, and allowed infiltration of the Yakuza. The Yakuza involvement in shares damaged the reputation of the company and the credibility and accountability of the stock market. One of the reasons why companies with Yakuza connections suffer in their share prices is that the Yakuza is not interested in the long-term growth. What they are aiming for is to exploit the financial resources of the companies. These companies, therefore, tend to increase their debts in a short period of time. In the past, one of the Sumitomo bank branches was alleged to have about ¥400 billion debts due to its involvement in Yakuza-related business, and this was believed to be about 20 per cent of the total debts (Arimori and Group 2006: 153). More recently, a mediumsized construction company lost ¥13 billion in deals because of its connections with the Yakuza. This led to the omission of the company from the stock market (Asahi Shinbun 2008c: 10). In another case, a bicycle company paid out ¥74 billion within a year on the basis of false contracts to a Yakuza-related financial company (Asahi Shinbun 2004: 35). To summarize, the Yakuza’s engagement in legitimate business has a stronger and wider influence on the legitimate economy, particularly in the sphere of the stock exchange. This is because the impact of the sex industry and loan-sharking may be limited to their customers, but the stock exchange and the fate of a company can damage a wider range of shareholders who are unaware of the risks, and may damage the Japanese economy itself. The pursuit of self-interest by the Yakuza endangers the existence of corporations. This creates uncertainty and unexpected risks in share trades. This is one of the negative effects of the introduction of the law and its amendments. The law restricted Yakuza activities and led it to turn to the legitimate economy. Investments in shares and properties or running a legitimate company mean they can hide their true identity on the street or in the business world. The law also seems to have had an impact on the activities of foreign criminals. According to a Police White Paper in 2006, the arrests of foreign criminals have increased over the past ten years (Keisatsucho 2007b). This could mean that there are more foreign criminals coming into Japan, or it could have been triggered by the changes in the Yakuza’s behaviour under the countermeasures law (Mizoguchi 2006: 90). While the Yakuza needed to keep quiet on the street and not violate the countermeasures law, other groups have begun to develop, namely foreign criminal groups, particularly the Chinese mafia.12

The Yakuza and its perceived threat 111


Conclusion The introduction of the countermeasures law in 1991 and its implementation has led to the blurring of borders between the Yakuza and legitimate business operators. A Yakuza member now dresses like a smart businessman rather than wearing gaudy white enamel shoes and gold chains, and walks down the street quietly. Not only in the way they dress do Yakuza members resemble legitimate businesspeople but also in how they generate financial profits. Although the Yakuza has still retained its traditional activities, such as extortion and the use of violence to settle disputes, it has become less visible in society. This gives the impression that the Yakuza’s influence has decreased. On the contrary, its activities now penetrate the Japanese economy more deeply. Another unintended consequence of the new law may be the increase in foreign criminals in Japan. One of the positive aspects introduced by the law is that locals now refuse to have contact with Yakuza members. According to an official, there are now more people complaining about Yakuza activities to the police than ever before (Interview 2005a).13 After witnessing several shootouts by Yakuza members, local communities have become intolerant of its existence in their residential areas. To speak out about such matters in the media was not a common practice in the past. However, several local authorities have now introduced amendments which exclude the Yakuza from certain parts of their communities. This seems to indicate that the power balance between the Yakuza and civil society has shifted due to the introduction of the countermeasures law. For local communities, the Yakuza is not something they need to tolerate any longer but something they can fight against. The Yakuza’s use of violence is clear and so is its impact on civil society. However, the more serious danger is the development of the Yakuza’s economic activities, particularly in the legitimate economy. The activities of the Yakuza have become more invisible, although the potential threat they pose has increased. The Yakuza groups have turned themselves into corporations and engaged in legitimate business, as well as purchasing influence over corporations with their financial power. The Yakuza’s aggressive pursuit of self-interest can only affect the stability and reliability of the stock market and, worse, weaken the Japanese economy itself.

Notes 1 The Edo period was between 1600 and 1867. Yakuza originated from two different groups: Tekiya stemmed from pedlars; Bakuto made a living from gambling places. 2 Durkheim regards it as ‘an escapable feature of society’. 3 Other prohibited activities are: to request donations; to request money for not leaking scandals (blackmail); to demand an advantageous position in construction businesses; to buy company shares in illicit ways; to demand unreasonable refunds for purchased goods; to occupy buildings or rooms illegally; to force the removal of residents from buildings; to act as mediator in traffic accident settlements. 4 Marriage of convenience is a term that has also been used to describe, for example, the relationship between Colombian cocaine trafficking organizations and guerrilla groups. They trade money and protection respectively.


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5 Occasionally, there were imposters. 6 The relationship started in 1986, and at its height, Kubota used to pay more than 100 sokai-ya. 7 The fees differ according to business categories and profits made. They can range from ¥20,000 to ¥500,000 per month. 8 The case applicable to this law is limited to victims accidentally involved in Yakuza disputes, for example, someone who was shot by mistake. 9 Discussion in a seminar at Asia University on 10 July 2008. 10 ‘Delivery Health’ is a business which dispatches women to the places requested by customers for sexual services – similar to call-girl or escort services. The owners usually take about 50 per cent of customers’ payments. 11 The Goto-gumi consisted of about 1,200 members, and is notorious for the murder of film director Juzo Itami, who directed the anti-Yakuza film entitled Minbo no Onna. In the Shinjuku Building case, members of the Goto-gumi shot and killed the negotiator from the Shinjuku Building management company. 12 The countermeasures law does not apply to foreign criminals as it targets only Yakuza. 13 At the same time, it is highly possible that victims cannot come forward to the police for help due to their illicit background, such as being illegal immigrants.

8

The social perception of organized crime in the Balkans A world of diverging views?


Jana Arsovska and Panos A. Kostakos Over the past two decades, following the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, more than 20 newly independent and quasi-sovereign states were formed. During this period, headline-grabbing images of violence and a myriad of special crime reports have persuaded many that the Balkan region in particular is unstable, flourishing mainly on crime and endemic corruption. Very quickly the Balkans, often referred to as a ‘gangster paradise’, became known for its demagogues, secret police agents and thugs who profited from the regional wars, and for the smuggling of people, arms, cigarettes and drugs. The embryonic conditions of the economic and political institutions in the Balkan countries enabled the EU to emerge in the world arena as an institution that promotes normative order in ‘troublesome areas’. In the quest to promote democracy and the rule of law, EU politicians and other actors have placed great importance on the problems related to organized crime in the Balkan region. The European Security Strategy, endorsed by the European Council (2003), lists organized crime as one of the five ‘key threats’ to the EU. It implies that the threat is coming from foreign neighbours and that Europe has become a prime target for organized crime, mainly from the Balkans. The Council of the EU (2003) repeatedly claimed that organized crime is a real obstacle to stability, accountable institutions, the rule of law and economic development in the Western Balkans and a source of grave concern to the EU. According to numerous international organizations, organized crime is corroding the regulatory apparatus and is a major obstacle to legal, political and economic reforms (Europol 2003, 2004, 2005; Council of the European Union 2001, 2004). Many have acknowledged that organized crime destroys the potential benefits of introducing democracy and market disciplines. Consequently, investors, both domestic and foreign, are less willing to risk their capital. There are also political and social costs. General public mistrust of parliamentarians, public servants and state institutions reduces citizens’ respect for authority and willingness to abide by the rule of law. Organized crime has been regarded in many ways as a developmental issue in the region, reflecting the lack of adequately protected property rights, the lack of local economic opportunities and the lack of education, and the weak rule of law. Consequently, from the late 1990s onward, the EU member states have passed numerous initiatives, regulations and treaties to control organized crime in the


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Balkan countries, imposing their own norms of conduct on the region. The rhetoric adopted by the EU has been alarming. Even more alarming – in some cases ‘extortionist’ – has been the constant reminder of the higher marginal returns which the rule of law and democratic institutions provide to a country. When the EU leaders met in Thessaloniki, Greece in 2003, they concluded that ‘the future of the Western Balkans1 is within the European Union’ as long as the Western Balkan countries deal with the weak rule of law, poor governance, corruption and criminality (International Commission on the Balkans 2005). However, do people from the Balkans regard organized crime as a real problem for the development of their countries? Do they understand what the EU means when it argues that organized crime poses a threat to their society? Or do they see organized crime as an ‘institution’ that fosters social mobility, capital accumulation, economic prosperity and nation building? A different reality to that of the EU may emerge if one looks at the organized crime phenomenon from a ‘Balkan perspective’. In this chapter we argue that in order for the EU’s anti-organized crime policies to be successful in the Balkans, some criteria have to be met. First, the values behind the norms promoted by the EU need to be perceived by the local people as pragmatic, timely and necessary. Second, the exported EU norms should not be at odds with the norms of the recipient countries. The pre-existing practices of a country must be taken into consideration, since they reflect a historical continuity that shapes the way people deal with different life events. The analysis and the conclusions drawn in this chapter are based on data that derives from systematic analysis of EU press releases2 and on a comprehensive examination of existing public surveys conducted in the Balkan region.3

EU perceptions of organized crime: a top-down approach The conceptual elaboration and the meaning attached to the notion ‘perception’ in contemporary academic literature vary significantly. While modern thought claimed that problems such as crime could be discovered and solved through the scientific method, the ‘new criminology’ or ‘postmodern criminology’ rejected the belief that scientific rationality and state intervention are the main vehicles to knowledge and progress. Postmodernism argues that the modern social world and its rules of behavior, including definitions of crime and law, are arbitrary linguistic constructions made by official institutions. Reality and social actions are shaped by the written and spoken word which is not neutral (Henry and Milovanovic 2005). Therefore postmodern methods emphasize the deconstruction of the written and spoken word in order to expose implicit assumptions located in specific narratives. In this chapter we focus on the EU’s perception of organized crime as deduced from and expressed by institutional language. Our aim is to establish the nature of the rhetoric that frames anti-organized crime efforts. The perception of the EU is embedded in institutional language produced by the instruments of the European Community. Over the past years, a number of treaties and declarations have constructed the body of norms known as the Acquis Communautaire. This body of institutional discourse has traditionally been

The social perception of organized crime in the Balkans 115


examined to identify the EU norms and perceptions diffused in the international community. However, we believe that this body of discourse does not express the views of the much larger number of actors involved in that project. Thus, we decided to collect and analyze the language of EU press releases in order to have a more representative sample. In order to achieve this goal we adopted a corpus linguistic approach. This approach is helpful for achieving greater rigour and avoiding the selective nature of conventional discourse analysis (Gabrielatos and Sarmento 2006: 222). Wordlist Here we consider the 40 most frequent lexical words that appear in our corpus of EU press releases. The wordlist provides a comprehensive view of what the corpus is all about. When considering the first part of the wordlist with the 20 most frequent words, we note that although the list comprises single words, some of these words very often occur with other words from the same list and form word clusters. From subsequent semantic analysis of the wordlist a galactic configuration composed by a three-layered narrative structure was established. First, we identified clusters that describe functional attributes related to the institutional order and legitimacy of the EU, such as European Union, EU, European Council, European Commission, Member State(s), Countries, International Community, Security Council. Second, there are words or word clusters that describe actions undertaken by these legitimate structures such as International Agreements, Common Action, Community Policy, Security Policy, Economic Cooperation, Economic Policy, Economic Development, European Security. Third, there is a low frequency pattern of words which semantically entail normative elements such as Support, Cooperation, Progress, Information and Rights. Overall it can be seen that the corpus is composed of high-frequency lexis and word clusters organized and prioritized around three issues. Issues related to existential questions with statements that insert legitimacy and authority appear to form a strong core, around which a middle layer is built based on activities initiated by the EU, and an outer layer of normative discourse such as the rule of law, good governance and human rights. The data indicate that organized crime is treated and often discussed as an add-on topic that accompanies other security issues in the agenda. It is indicative that the term organized crime ranks 182nd in the wordlist and is used 1,900 times in the corpus of 1,096 articles. The analysis of wordlists and clusters is helpful in exposing various discourses and narrative structures within our corpus, but it provides very little insight into lexical patterns of the specific term we are trying to examine. We now turn to examine the lexical vicinity of the term ‘organized crime’ in order to establish which words in the corpus we have composed are more likely to accompany the phrase ‘organized crime’, and to interpret the findings.

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Collocations


Collocations index how a keyword or a phrase is structured within text in relation to other words. This measurement is helpful for indicating the syntax and the semantic of keywords and phrases that we would like to examine. The semantic of a keyword is culturally based on the norms, values and perceptions of those who produce the discourse. Baker (2006: 114) notes that When two words frequently collocate, there is evidence that the discourses surrounding them are particularly powerful – the strength of collocation implies that these are two concepts which have been linked in the minds of people and have been used again and again – perhaps to the point where even one half of the pair is likely to prime someone who hears or reads that word to think of the other half. We would like to examine the collocations of the phrase ‘organized crime’ in order to understand which words are becoming ‘glued’ into one another. From this we would like to understand the semantics and cultural messages that these collocations express. By focusing on the language in the immediate vicinity of the idiom ‘organized crime’ we can infer conclusions on the meaning and perceptions attached to it. The data in Table 8.1 show three categories of collocates. First, there is a group of high-frequency collocates – often carrying negative connotations – which refer to some kind of action aimed at ‘defying’ the threat of organized crime. From our preliminary analysis, we establish that the phrase ‘organized crime’ is often accompanied by words such as ‘fight’, ‘against’, ‘combating’, ‘tackling’, ‘control’ and ‘prevention’. Second, we identified a category of high-frequency words referring to various organized crime-related activities that often entail strong trans-border attributes (e.g. terrorism, corruption, drugs, transnational, international, trafficking, border, cross, money and migration). The interesting aspect is that the word terrorism has very high frequency, suggesting that phrases such as ‘organized crime and terrorism’ are becoming increasingly glued together and implying a very strong nexus between these two phenomena. Third, some institutional aspects were often noted, including words like ‘plan’, ‘council’, ‘report’ and ‘European’. The frequency figure on the right of the lemma column indicates how many times the lemma form of that word occurs within two spaces to the left and right of the search word To sum up, it emerges that the EU employs language that promotes its authority as a legitimate actor willing to confront organized crime across and beyond its territorial boarders. The EU language with regards to organized crime also demonstrates its political will to take action against an ‘enemy’ that allegedly poses a ‘serious threat’. This conclusion is not a new one. However, interpreting our data through another prism we could argue that the EU is using organized crime as a ‘Trojan horse’ to impose its authority and political existence beyond its territorial borders. In search of more evidence to support this last point we now turn our attention to the way people in the Balkans perceive the problem in question.



Table 8.1 Most frequent ten collocates of ‘organized crime’ ranked by frequency (only lexical lemmas) Rank

Lemma

Frequency

1

against

473

2

fight

410

3

terrorism

267

4

corruption

198

5

combating

190

6

drugs

134

7

transnational

116

8

trafficking

91

9

international

77

10

prevention

68

11

tackle

41

12

illegal

40

13

plan

35

14

border

36

15

council

32

16

cross

28

17

report

32

18

money

27

19

european

27

20

migration

24

Local perceptions of organized crime: a bottom-up approach Organized crime: a key security threat for the Balkans? This section examines whether organized crime is perceived as a threat by the local population in the Balkans. It argues that if the EU wants to successfully export its democratic norms, promoting the ‘fight against organized crime’ to other regions, it should first ensure that its demands are pragmatic. We try to answer here whether the fight against organized crime should be placed as a top priority on the political agendas of the Balkan countries in the first place.


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Figure 8.1 Interrelationship between identified threats in Kosovo (2006) (Cleland et al. 2006).

Although in the last decade the international community has focused largely on issues of inter-ethnic violence and organized crime in the Balkans, public surveys show that for many local people other threats to security are of much more importance. Public surveys (Arsovska 2009; UNODC 2008; Cleland, et al. 2006) have found that the economic situation and current demographic trends mean that the greatest security challenge in the Balkans lies in promoting economic development. These surveys ascertain that there are three major threats – among other identified threats – which citizens of several Western Balkan countries consider to be the most significant: economic security; weak rule of law/lack of judicial recourse; and political instability. Economic underdevelopment and unemployment From a list of primary security concerns affecting the people of the Western Balkans, the most important revolved around the economic situation in their countries (Cleland, et al. 2006). Although in reality absolute income poverty is low in most Balkan countries, in some of them a significant proportion of the population lives on less than US$2.15 (purchasing power parity: PPP) per day, with children being especially affected. For example, in Moldova around 53 per cent of the children and 43 per cent of the general population live on less than US$2.15 (PPP)


The social perception of organized crime in the Balkans 119 per day and in Albania around 30 per cent of the children and 24 per cent of the population find themselves in the same situation (UNODC 2008: 16). In a recent survey conducted by the first author (Arsovska 2009), most of the respondents from Albania, Kosovo and FYR of Macedonia stated that the economic situation in their country has been a serious problem in the last five years (Figure 8.2). In particular, 74.1 per cent of the respondents (strongly) agreed that the situation in their country was very bad during 2000–5; 10.9 per cent remained undecided and only 13.8 per cent (strongly) disagreed with the statement. Also, 41.1 per cent of the respondents (strongly) agreed that they do not see any future possibilities for personal economic growth in their country, whereas 22.4 per cent remained undecided (see Arsovska and Verduyn 2008). The 2006 ISSR public survey conducted in Kosovo shows that the respondents of both Albanian and Serbian communities listed poverty and unemployment among their top three biggest threats to security (18 and 19 per cent respectively of the Albanian population indicated these two factors as top two security threats and 15 per cent each for Serbs) (Cleland, et al. 2006). Survey results indicate that an endemic part of the Balkans’ weak economic performance is high levels of unemployment. Available data from Kosovo, for example, shows that since 1999 unemployment has soared to 54.3 per cent, with 70 per cent of 16–24 year olds out of work (Figure 8.3). The situation in other Balkan countries has been similar to that of Kosovo. In 2004, 37 per cent of the Macedonian population was unemployed, with 66 per cent of the population under 25 years of age being unemployed. According to EUROSTAT and UNODC estimates, in Albania in 2004 around 40 per cent of

Figure 8.2 Economic situation in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia (2000–5) (Arsovska 2009).

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the population under 25 years of age was unemployed (UNODC 2008: 29). Thus high unemployment, a lack of economic development and widespread poverty have certainly created an atmosphere of insecurity in most Balkan countries.


Weak rule of law and corruption Public surveys and other studies show that weak public trust in the judicial systems and the police of many Balkan countries has been very prevalent (Cleland, et al. 2006; Arsovska 2009). In general, people from the Balkans lack confidence in their state system and government, which often leads to the weakening of conventional bonds (see Figure 8.4).4

Figure 8.3 Unemployment rates by sex and age group in Kosovo (2003–4) (Cleland et al. 2006).

Figure 8.4 Trust in government (International Commission on the Balkans 2005).


The social perception of organized crime in the Balkans 121 In Arsovska’s survey (2009), most of the respondents believe that the criminal justice system in their country is completely dysfunctional: 62 per cent (strongly) agreed (442 out of 726) with the statement, whereas 24 per cent (strongly) disagreed. In the SEESAC survey5 the respondents were also dissatisfied with the way the police operate in their countries. To the question how efficient do you judge the police to be in solving crimes and protecting people?, 32 per cent of the respondents stated (very) inefficient and 27.6 per cent stated ‘neither efficient nor inefficient’. Perception surveys show that there has been a widespread fear of corruption and political interference in the criminal justice process. Of greater concern to the people from the Balkans is the impact that corruption can have on governance. In Arsovska’s survey (2009), 62.5 per cent of the respondents (strongly) agreed (445 out of 726) with the statement The government in my country is highly corrupt. Only 17.6 per cent (strongly) disagreed, and 17.6 per cent remained undecided. Similar results regarding political corruption were found in the World Values Survey conducted in Albania in 1998 (N = 999): 35.6 per cent of the respondents thought that there were few public officials engaged in corruption in Albania, whereas 50.9 per cent thought that most were engaged in corruption and 12.8 per cent stated that almost all were engaged. A lack of public trust in institutions and a weak rule of law6 contribute to the perception that corruption is a large-scale problem. As a result, people from Balkan countries do not feel they have the opportunity to be treated fairly or equally under the law due to corruption and a malfunctioning system. People also feel that employment opportunities are restricted by endemic corruption. According to the ISSR survey, corruption was the third biggest threat for Kosovo Albanians in their country (16 per cent), while only 5 per cent of the Serbian population expressed similar concerns. Corruption, however, is a widespread phenomenon in the Balkans and is not linked only to state institutions. In Arsovska’s survey (2009) the respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: In my country crime and corruption are flourishing at all levels of society. Not surprisingly, 65 per cent (strongly) agreed (468 out of 726), 13.4 per cent remained undecided and only 21.2 per cent (strongly) disagreed. Although corruption is difficult to measure, there are two areas where South East Europe leads the world according to crime victim surveys: payment of bribes and consumer fraud. Recent surveys have shown that a large proportion of the population continues to report paying bribes. Albania had the highest rate of annual bribe paying (66 per cent) of the 57 countries polled in the 2006 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, and the South East European average was 4.5 times as high as the West European average (see UNODC 2008). The threat of corruption is thus believed by many in the Western Balkans to be somewhere between a necessary part of life to survive and an endemic problem that contributes heavily to the dysfunction of governmental authorities, business and general life in the territory.

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Organized crime Various surveys show that organized crime is a recognized threat in the Balkans, but in comparison to other issues such as economic development, many people feel it unnecessary to voice this publicly as a major threat to their own security. Trafficking in persons falls into a similar category (Cleland, et al. 2006). For example, ISSR questionnaires collected from the public in Kosovo – allegedly a region with major organized crime-related problems – indicated that Serb and Albanian respondents rank organized crime lower than other threats such as economic instability, unemployment, corruption, political instability etc. (see Figure 8.1). Eleven per cent of Serbs felt that organized crime was a top threat and 7 per cent of Albanians ranked it among the top threats. Trafficking is also considered largely as a problem brought by the increasing number of personnel working for the UN and other international institutions. In terms of police statistics, organized crime activities have never been significant in the Balkan region despite the great emphasis placed on the phenomenon by international organizations (UNODC 2008). For example, various EU reports estimate that around 70 to 80 per cent of the heroin entering Europe passes via the Balkan route and is regulated by ethnic Albanian organized crime groups,7 although according to police statistics the average heroin seizure in most Balkan countries is very low. Moreover, international reports often state that many Balkan organized crime groups make millions if not billions of dollars annually from their illegal activities and reinvest their dirty money in the Balkan economy. However, Interpol officials have noted that it is not so clear to see where those ‘millions of dollars’ made by the criminal actors have been invested in the Balkans. Some plausible scenarios explaining the low crime figures and the lack of data are that law enforcement officials in the Balkans are ineffective, or that organized crime activities are simply ignored by the people in the region. The reason for this might be that these activities appear to be perceived by both the Balkan people and states as beneficial (Arsovska and Kostakos 2008; UNODC 2008). In Arsovska’s survey (2009), most of the respondents (strongly) agreed that ‘crime is seen as beneficial by many people in their country (not as a sinister entity)’ (525 out of 726). In personal interviews, law enforcement officials from Albania and Kosovo have stated that illegal immigration, for instance, has been helpful for the local economy of their countries. Channels for smuggling people to comparatively rich states were set up after the collapse of the communist regime in the Balkans. The deteriorating economic conditions in the Balkan countries have certainly contributed to this phenomenon. Ardian Visha, former Director of Foreign Affairs in the Prosecution Office in Tirana, reported in a personal interview that until recently illegal migration was not considered a problem in Albania because emigrant communities regularly send money back home, and are helping the local economy. Smuggling of arms, on another level, has helped the Balkan people to ‘build their own independent states’ and thus it has contributed towards their continued existence. Consequently, the booming ‘shadow economy’ in the Balkan countries (up to 70 per cent of the economy in the Balkans is a ‘grey economy’) has been seen



by many people as a ‘good thing’ and not necessarily as a threat (Cleland, et al. 2006; UNODC 2008). So far, the findings imply that various types of crime are widely accepted in the Balkan territories among a variety of people from different layers of the society. Thus, although the threat posed by organized crime in the Balkan region should not be underestimated, it is important to acknowledge local people’s perceptions of this particular threat if we are to introduce effective anti-organized crime policies.

Organized crime and the formation of the Balkan states We have already illustrated that people from the Balkan region do not perceive organized crime as a major threat to their security. The underlying reasons leading to the acceptance of certain deviant norms in the Balkans should also be investigated. One of the reasons mentioned above is that the Balkan people are more concerned with their economic development than other security issues. The second reason, discussed more thoroughly in this section, is that due to various historical and socio-political factors, people often perceive organized crime as beneficial. This is important for understanding people’s mindset and for introducing more balanced anti-organized crime policies. Our investigation into the historical development of the modern states in the Balkans reveals that organized crime-related activities have been closely linked with the formation of the Balkan states, their class consciousness and capital. Organized crime and the communist state Internal police reports indicate that organized crime is not a new phenomenon; it existed during both communist and post-communist times. Generally speaking, during communism, organized crime activities were controlled mainly by the communist states. Former Interior Minister of Bulgaria Bogomil Bonev remarked, ‘One of the reasons our criminal groups became so powerful is that they were organized by the state itself’ (UNODC 2008: 48). According to confidential police reports, certain types of organized crime activities were tolerated in communist countries for three main reasons: earning some extra money for the state; supplying the consumer needs unmet by the official economy; and destabilising capitalist societies. Also, in addition to creating the channels through which different goods were smuggled, the powerful shadow economy empowered a criminal class on which common people depended. It also generated cynicism about the rule of law and tolerance for shady entrepreneurs (UNODC 2008: 48–9). A key part of communist governance was the internal security police. According to a UNODC (2008) report, the state security police, due to the importance given to their work, operated largely above the law. Underground operators and the security services joined forces (CSD 2004; Anastasijevic 2006). It also became common practice among the security agencies to informally retain professional criminals as informants. In the former Yugoslavia, under Josip Broz Tito’s rule, the decision


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was made to ‘recruit promising young career criminals, straight out of prison, to do the dirty work of spying and occasionally killing overseas … They specialized in extortion, robbing banks and jewellery stores, stealing art and trafficking in women’ (UNODC 2008: 48). Bulgaria and Romania, now EU members, also had strong secret security services actively involved in organized crime activities during communism.8 The relations between the Albanian secret police (known as the Sigurimi) and organized crime are less well documented but are not non-existent. According to confidential reports, in the 1960s the Albanian communist state made secret arrangements with criminal organizations from Southern Italy. It provided Italian criminals with escape routes via the Adriatic Sea. When Italian Mafiosi were trying to escape from the Italian police, they were allowed to make use of the Adriatic as well as Albanian airports where they stored smuggled cigarettes. This agreement was signed between the Sigurimi and the Italian criminal organizations. The agreement was approved by the political bureau and the dictator Enver Hoxha. On the basis of this agreement a special unit was created in Albania – ‘101K’. The unit was stationed in the village of Rrushbull in Durres, 5 km from the port of Durres in Albania. It was composed of officials of the Albanian border police. The members of the unit were guarding ships full of cigarettes which were departing from Durres, as well as the cigarette storage houses located in the village of Rrushbull. Mustafaraj Ilir, the former Albanian vice minister, reported that in one year the Italian Mafia had paid US$22 million in cash to the Albanian state. The money went to the state budget, part of it going to the budget of the Ministry of the Interior. Rama Mersin, the father of Rama Luan (Minister of the Interior in Albania in the period 2002–3 and a member of the Socialist Party), was commandant of the elite group ‘101K’. The agreement between the Italian mobsters and the Albanian state was allegedly negotiated between Myftin Qazim and Nenshati Lorenc, two important agents of the Sigurimi. They were granted political asylum and are now living in Switzerland.9 Based on internal police reports, other state-controlled criminal activities in Albania were the cultivation of Papaver somniferum (opium poppy) and the establishment of parallel systems for the distribution of food. Political–criminal post-communist ties The post-communist transition from totalitarian regime to democracy is often associated with the growth of corruption, privatization fraud, protection rackets and other forms of organized crime. Rapid social, economic and political change and policy uncertainty also contribute to higher crime rates, along with conflicts and political instability. During the last two decades, the Balkan countries have undergone both of these difficult historical processes (transition and conflict) simultaneously. State security and police agents After the fall of communism in the late 1980s, members of the secret police and their criminal allies were well placed to make profits out of the ‘emerging capitalism’.



Research shows that party functionaries were awarded state-owned companies at non-competitive rates (CSD 2004). In the Balkans, these functionaries were often secret policemen, who ‘teamed their clandestine skills with their criminal contacts to create local monopolies and shady multinational conglomerates’ (UNODC 2008). They also maintained their links with those in political power, leading to a substantial merger of the political, the commercial, and the criminal. [In Serbia] at the top sit functionaries who are unequivocally loyal to Milosevic. They distribute monopolies for the import of gas, cigarettes, and other profitable merchandise among various businessmen, while taking their own cut. Policemen and customs officers, whose job is to shut their eyes when necessary, also get a piece of the action. (UNODC 2008) In Albania the abolition of the Albanian secret service Sigurimi in 1991 left around 10,000 agents unemployed.10 In 1996, one analyst noted: Liberalization had brought with it corruption and profiteering by ruthless men … It has been these men who continue to profit, and now have the means to travel in and out of Albania with relative ease. Establishing themselves as legitimate businessmen, they easily obtain travel visas from the Albanian government … [In 1992–3] the Albanian government removed nearly two thirds of [Sigurimi] personnel. Many of the ex-Sigurimi agents, once in feared positions of power, now found themselves unemployed, stripped of their state pensions. Antagonistic towards the new government, these personnel offered their services to those willing and capable of paying for them, organized crime. (UNODC 2008: 50) The wars in the former Yugoslavia and the fall of the pyramid schemes in Albania in 199711 were particularly exploited by the security agents and some criminal segments of the Balkan societies. These actors made use of international sanctions as a money-making opportunity. The UN embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in 1992 offered an immediate opportunity – organising smuggling channels to supply Yugoslavia with oil. Oil smuggling was initially organized by the Serbian State Security Service (Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti: SDB), but many ‘ordinary’ citizens also became involved in the business. The value of smuggled oil sometimes reached more than US$1 million per day – a great source of income for the Albanians. Fortunes were made importing oil illegally from Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and FYR of Macedonia under the coordination of the secret police (UNODC 2008; CSD 2004). Large-scale smuggling of cigarettes and coffee to Montenegro, using the oil smuggling routes, followed in 1993. Importantly, the various forms of smuggling were perceived by many as necessary for survival. Furthermore, in the early 1990s, smuggling channels in Croatia, BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo were created to obtain weapons and resources to supply the newly formed Croatian, Bosnian Muslim and Kosovo Albanian armies.


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Smuggling of weapons, commonly associated with ‘nation building’, was also perceived as beneficial by many Balkan people and governments. Sources point out that the first weapon smuggling channels in Bosnia were set up by the head of the KOS (Counter-Intelligence Service), Aleksandar Vasiljevic, a Bosnian Serb (CSD 2004: 47). Other countries in the region were also involved in arms trafficking, often through official government channels (see Arsovska and Kostakos 2008). Moreover, according to the Albanian government, in the period between 1997 and 2002 around 150,000 small arms and light weapons were illegally transferred from Albania, mainly to Kosovo and Macedonia. Most of these weapons ended up in the hands of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Albanian National Army (ANA) and the National Liberation Army (NLA) (Anastasijevic 2006; Zaborskiy 2007). During 2004 the then Prime Minister Fatos Nano was accused of trafficking weapons to the KLA in the late 1990s. Although he formally denied the allegations, Nano stated that it was morally defensible to assist the KLA at that time (Arsovska 2009). Paramilitaries and criminal groups Many of the distinctive features of the Yugoslav conflicts are attributable to the use of irregular combat groups or paramilitaries. These criminal combatants protected and exploited their co-patriots, while alternately trading gunfire and consumer goods with their ‘enemies’. They were able to simultaneously enrich themselves and serve their respective causes, gaining both economic and political capital. In addition to looting and smuggling, the paramilitary groups found many other ways of making money. International aid was stolen or resold to desperate communities who, paradoxically, saw their exploiters as ‘lifelines’. During the post-conflict period, local communities in the Balkans relied heavily on homegrown criminals for protection. Consequently, many of these criminals were respected by their communities. One such character was ‘Juka’, a Sarajevo racketeer who rose during the war in Bosnia. ‘Juka’ was a repeat offender who ran a collection agency/extortion scheme in Sarajevo. He was able to employ a staff of some 300 men in this racket, who would become the basis of his paramilitary unit (the ‘Wolves’) during the siege of the city. He was widely praised for his valour, becoming the subject of war-time songs (UNODC 2008: 51). Many paramilitary fighters from the Balkans also became members of the state security units, further reinforcing the link between the government and the underworld. One of the most notorious paramilitary leaders was ‘Arkan’, a Serb whose career included stints as a bank robber, international fugitive, political assassin, cake shop proprietor, paramilitary commander, indicted war criminal, soccer club owner, parliamentarian, and tabloid celebrity (UNODC 2008: 54). Many of the former KLA fighters, both criminals and honest men, also entered politics after the end of the conflict in Kosovo, or were given jobs in the state security units (Arsovska and Kostakos 2008). According to UN studies, some of those who profited the most from war have successfully ‘cleaned’ their wealth, and now present themselves as legitimate

The social perception of organized crime in the Balkans 127 economic as well as political elites in their respective countries (UNODC 2008: 53). In a personal interview with the first author, Filip de Ceuninck, an international police expert working in the EU police mission ‘Proxima’ in Macedonia stated:


After the conflict period in Macedonia [2001] and the broader region, a significant number of criminal figures were wearing ‘four hats’. Many of them started as freedom fighters and warlords, and then moved into politics. For personal gains some of these politicians became involved in different scams, including organized and white-collar crime. In summary, after the fall of communism in the Balkans a more symbiotic relationship developed as both crime groups and the modern Balkan states evolved. Political–criminal interrelations during the formation of new states in the Balkans have left a legacy of institutional ambivalence towards illicit activities. For various reasons, criminal behaviour was also reinforced by the social masses who often saw crime as beneficial for their own personal survival as well as for the creation and strengthening of their newly established states (‘nation building’).

Discussion and conclusion Our findings show that the EU regards organized crime as a serious issue that requires military responses. After analyzing the language of more than 1,000 press releases we also identified two strong narrative structures promoting the legitimacy and authority of the EU as an institution actively seeking to ‘fight organized crime’. However, we argue here that the EU cannot impose its normative order on other countries and ‘fight organized crime’ without taking into careful consideration the perceptions of local people with regards to the threats and problems addressed in the EU anti-organized crime policies; and the historical, political and social developments of the countries where the EU normative order is to be established. We consider these components vital for the effective establishment of normative order in foreign socio-cultural contexts. With regards to the first point we showed that high unemployment, a lack of economic development and widespread poverty have created an atmosphere of insecurity in the Balkan countries. Economic instability has exacerbated problems such as ethnic violence, corruption and increased crime rates and contributed to a growth in mistrust of Balkan state institutions. Because the lack of economic development and unemployment are key threats, people have tried to find ‘innovative ways’ to pursue their success goals as well as to survive. The Western capitalist societies, on the one hand, have placed enormous pressure on the local population to be rich, promoting materialistic values. The governments, on the other hand, could not offer these people legitimate opportunities to make money, which has consequently resulted in an increase in the grey economy in the Balkans. As Merton argues, ‘dominant pressure [to be wealthy] has led towards the gradual attenuation of legitimate, but by and large ineffectual, strivings and the increasing use of illegitimate, but more effective, expedients’ (1968: 199–200).


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Thus it appears that organized crime has become a vehicle for accumulating capital and power since it provides avenues for achieving the emblematic goals promoted by the West. The main challenge for the Balkans now lies in developing a solid, job-creating economy able to support its fast-growing population and less in ‘fighting organized crime’. Organized crime and other profit-oriented activities have been seen as beneficial by many people in the Balkans, not as a key threat to security. And as Charles Tilly (1985) points out, organized crime seems to be closely linked with the development of nation-states. Paradoxically, policing organized crime can be regarded as an effort to facilitate the construction of the EU’s political identity as an international actor. With regards to the second point we show that the EU has presented the problem of organized crime as a ‘new phenomenon’, without investigating thoroughly the social and political context in which it emerged. Overall, various examples from the Balkans have shown that temporary accommodations between authorities and organized crime during the creation of new states has led to a permanent transformation of state interests into private ones and has fostered the development of non-transparent, crime-permeated societies. The research findings show that due to various historical processes (transition, conflict, etc.) the people in the Balkans still perceive many organized crime activities as beneficial. They do not understand why these activities nowadays present, as the EU claims, a major threat to their security. All this serves as an obstacle to the effective implementation of the EU anti-organized crime policies in the Western Balkans.

Notes 1 The EU’s existing member states have accepted these countries – namely Albania, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo – as potential future members. 2 The corpus analyzed comprises press releases from the Europa Rapid Database. The database was searched for articles that contained the key phrase ‘organized crime’. The links of 1096 articles were subsequently analyzed using text-mining techniques in order to extract the text of press releases in English. The output of this analysis produced a single file that contained 1006 press releases from 1994 to 2008 totalling 2,835,519 words. This corpus was subsequently fed into corpus linguistic software (Antconc 3.2) in order to identify linguistic and semantic patterns in the text. 3 In 2006, a cross-national survey on the meaning of violence and crime in an ethnic Albanian context was conducted by Arsovska (2009). A sample of 864 ethnic Albanian respondents from Albania, FYR of Macedonia and Kosovo were interviewed. Moreover, references to the findings of other public surveys such as those conducted by the Internal Security Reform Sector in Kosovo (2006), World Values Survey and the International Commission in the Balkans (2005) are made in this chapter. 4 ISSR public opinion survey completed by approximately 800 homes in Kosovo. 5 As illustrated later in this chapter, the distrust of state institutions and police is not necessarily a new phenomenon. It is deeply rooted in the Balkan history (‘state as the enemy’). 6 SEESAC Survey, Gani Bobi Institute/Safeworld, June 2006. 7 Most of the countries of the Balkan region perform very poorly in terms of the standardized indicators relating to rule of law. The World Bank provides composite governance figures. Kosovo (Serbia) and Albania fell lower in the ranking than the average in


8 9


10 11 12

sub-Saharan Africa, and the Balkan region in general scored less than the average for East Europe or the OECD countries (UNODC 2008: 20). Based on estimates provided by Europol and Interpol. The Bulgarian secret police were referred to as the Committee for State Security (Darzhavna Sigurnost, or DS). The DS engaged in state-sponsored smuggling, allegedly including drug smuggling. In Romania, the secret police were known as the Securitate, and were the largest such group in the Eastern Bloc, with some 14,000 agents and an informant network estimated at 500,000. Securitate agents were also involved in smuggling of drugs, guns and cigarettes (UNODC 2008; CSD 2004). Based on a confidential intelligence report. Investigated criminal files from Belgium (1992–2005) confirm the involvement of ex-Sigurimi agents in organized crime activities in the West (see also Leman and Janssens 2006). Some have argued that the collapse was related to the loss of revenues from sanctions busting, particularly the oil embargo, since some of the schemes derived income from this source (UNODC 2008: 52).



Part III

Reality


9

The fire behind the smoke The realities of human trafficking in Northern Ireland


Louise Deegan

‘There’s no smoke without fire.’ This is a common and widespread idiom, particularly evident in perceptions of human trafficking. The trafficking of people is an illegal and hidden activity which has recently been highlighted in media headlines. However, it is not always clear as to what foundations public perceptions of trafficking are grounded on. This chapter will examine why there is so much ‘smoke’ and relatively little ‘fire’. It will identify five major perceived realities of trafficking in Northern Ireland and examine their legitimacy. In preparing this study, some methodological difficulties were encountered due to the newness of the subject in Northern Ireland, and the absence of any earlier studies on which to draw. Research was of a qualitative nature, supported by a review of the relevant literature. Academic literature relating to human trafficking published since 2000 (when the UN protocol was signed, greatly altering the perspective on trafficking) was reviewed. Much of the literature is a grey area, originating not in the formal academic sector but in the output of practitioners working in the field of human rights, international law, migrant rights, etc. We have therefore used a variety of sources for our analysis in this chapter.1

Defining human trafficking Human trafficking, due to its illegal and clandestine nature, is difficult to define. The most widely accepted definition of human trafficking is the 2000 Palermo UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially in Women and Children. This definition is relatively precise, stating: Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other arms of coercion … exploitation shall include, at minimum, the exploitation and the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. (United Nations 2000: 1) This definition is precisely relating to the activity of trafficking, as distinct from


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people smuggling. Unlike smuggling, which is often a criminal commercial transaction between two willing parties who go their separate ways once their business is complete, trafficking specifically targets the trafficked person as an object of criminal exploitation. The purpose from the beginning of the trafficking enterprise is to profit from the exploitation of the victim. It follows that fraud, force or coercion all play a major role in trafficking. Official statistics for human trafficking vary and are difficult to attain. Sharp criticism has been directed against current global estimates. Gozdziak and Collett (2005) question the merits of producing global estimates of trafficking without a good explanation of how the figures are arrived at. The US State Department has produced widely quoted estimates of the size of trafficked populations worldwide (600,000–800,000 annually). When these were first produced they included papers with a brief description of the statistical methods employed to calculate the estimates, but they do not explain the methodology used to arrive at the baseline data sources (2002). Factors which lead to human trafficking include, among many others: poverty, conflict, demand for cheap labour and increased barriers to migration. However, it is the inextricable relationship between globalization and organized crime that has created this mass illegal movement and exploitation of people on a worldwide scale. Uneven development, economic and social changes resulting from structural adjustment programmes, the breakdown of rural economies and the feminization of poverty push people into a variety of stigmatized and exploitative professions (Kelly 2005). Human trafficking is a direct result of organized crime taking advantage of the globalized world and increased technological capabilities. International organized crime groups have globalized their activities for the same reasons as legitimized multinational companies have. Traditional criminal markets, for example those dominated by paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, are now more accessible for new crime groups, as seen in the growth in activity of the Chinese triads in Northern Ireland (Cassidy 2000). Europol, in its assessment of organized crime in Europe, investigates the possibility that the organized crime groups are ‘driving the market in search of further profits encouraging people who would otherwise have no intention of emigrating to pay large sums’ (Harvey 2007: 2). This proposes the concept of the ‘criminal entrepreneur’ who will engage in any activity if the profit to be made is sufficiently high. Serious criminals increasingly view humans as a commodity like any other and will combine smuggling and trafficking with both legal and illegal trades.

The case of Northern Ireland The question of human trafficking in Northern Ireland provides an interesting but very complex case study. It would be fair to assume that Northern Ireland follows the trends of developed destination countries which see incoming trafficking levels increase due to the demand for cheap labour. However, the history of recent conflict in Northern Ireland highlights the involvement of organized crime, leading

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to quick assumptions the existing crime structures result in higher levels of trafficking and the involvement of ex-paramilitaries. However, the case of Northern Ireland involves the same research difficulties as any other region, and while the role of ex-paramilitaries is a sensationalist conclusion to jump to, especially for the media, the data and research does not back this up. This chapter identifies the major presumptions surrounding human trafficking in Northern Ireland. These perceived realities are as follows. Human trafficking is a growing underground activity that makes it very difficult to identify This issue is not specific to Northern Ireland; it is a fact that affects human trafficking globally. Trafficking is not only a crime, but an activity that turns the victim into a criminal via illegal immigration, therefore keeping it further hidden. Northern Ireland finds itself particularly affected by the lack of data, due to the newness of the problem of trafficking in the area. The immigration trends of the rest of the UK have not affected Northern Ireland until recently, due to the conflict there. The Organized Crime Task Force (OCTF) suggest that Northern Ireland has been experiencing exploitative labour practices in recent years (OCTF 2009; Chief Constable’s Report 2009). In 2003, they noted: ‘A number of individuals based in Northern Ireland are involved in facilitating the trafficking of foreign nationals in the country for money’ (OCTF 2003: 4). With no hard evidence to back up these claims, in 2004 a cross-border assessment highlighted the following points: • • •

Evidence of exploitative work and accommodation for illegal immigrants. Evidence of exploitation of student and tourist visas into the country. Reliance on wide networks of contacts outside Northern Ireland.

Human trafficking is a widespread and growing problem in Northern Ireland There are no reliable estimates for the number of people trafficked into Northern Ireland, or the UK. The Solicitor-General suggested in a recent parliamentary speech that more than 4,000 women were trafficked in the UK for sexual purposes annually (House of Commons 2006), but this is generally accepted to be a substantial underestimate. According to Europol’s 2008 annual organized crime threat assessment, Northern Ireland is an attractive destination for traffickers. The report claims that both the UK and Ireland are favourite destinations because of demand for workers in lowskilled employment. Added to this are factors such as a recent increase in economic activity since the cessation of political violence, new migrant communities, existing organized crime structures, and a post-conflict vacuum. Data from the Police National Computer state that 266 people have been arrested for trafficking for sexual exploitation in the UK since United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre (UKHTC) records began in 2004, in contravention of


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sections 57, 58 and 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UKHTC 2009), and 92 have been convicted. However, there is also a substantial number of cases where people have been charged with trafficking and other offences, such as controlling prostitution or running brothels, and the trafficking charge has been dropped, but convictions are still secured for the other offences. In addition trafficking for labour exploitation is an offence under the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 (ss. 4 and 5), and seven convictions have been recorded under this Act (UKHTC 2009). Migrant workers are the group most at risk within the UK of becoming subject to slavery or slavery-like working conditions (Craig, et al., 2007). General estimates of the number of illegal workers in the UK range from about 300,000 to 800,000. The main sectors for employing migrant workers are agriculture, domestic labour, catering, construction and healthcare. Due to the lack of evidence, official police sources state that trafficking is not a real problem in Northern Ireland. However, Anna Lo recently criticized the Head of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), Paul Goggins: Just because not that many people have been arrested yet in relation to this horrific trade, it doesn’t mean that it isn’t a widespread problem here. The police published their signing up to the Pentameter II operation, the opening of an office in Belfast, devoted to tackling the issue, so it’s very sad to hear Mr Goggins making an assessment like this when we know how big the problem of human trafficking is here. There is real anecdotal evidence of this problem in Northern Ireland. (Lo 2008) Ms Lo points to the institutional response as a way to understand the extent of the problem. For example, a human trafficking team was set up in Belfast in October 2007 to facilitate the participation of Northern Ireland in Pentameter II. Pentameter I, which operated in 2006, resulted in the rescue of 88 victims and led to 134 criminal charges in the UK. One important outcome was the creation of the United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre in 2007. Northern Ireland did not participate in Pentameter I, but is fully involved in Pentameter II – a national, multi-agency campaign to gauge and tackle the trafficking of human beings for sexual exploitation and forced labour throughout the UK (http://www.pentameter. police.uk). Police forces from across the country are working in partnership with central, regional and local government and the voluntary sector to take forward a coordinated campaign to address the problem of human trafficking. There have been no successful convictions for trafficking in Northern Ireland. In December 2005, the first trafficking charge was brought to court. The Irish News reported that a former teacher appeared in court charged with operating two brothels in the city centre, and a third charge of making arrangements for trafficking a woman. In January 2008, a County Down man was arrested and charged with bringing a woman into Northern Ireland knowing that a sexual offence would be committed against her and controlling prostitution (BBC News 2008b). A recent operation by the PSNI, An Garda Siochana, and a police force in


The fire behind the smoke 137 Wales has led to multiple arrests. An Irish man and a South African woman were arrested in Pembrokeshire, Wales (BBC News 2008a); in the Republic of Ireland, four women and three men were arrested on suspicion of organizing and managing prostitution; and a male foreign national was arrested in Newry and detained on suspicion of immigration offences. The PSNI said the operation began last year as a result of enquiries made during Operation Pentameter II (ibid.). The PSNI believe it has identified ‘at least eight women who were trafficked into Ireland (north and south) and then forced into prostitution’ (BBC News 2008a). Seven of these victims had been rescued from brothels and, according to police sources, the women had been ‘trafficked mostly from non-EU countries’. Detective Chief Superintendent Essie Adair, head of the PSNI’s organized crime squad, said there had even been activity in South Africa in relation to the operation. ‘This cross-border, intercontinental element has been brought about because we believe this gang was using mobile phones and the internet to run its operations which involved human trafficking, controlling prostitution and money laundering’ (ibid.). Rebecca Dudley, in her report ‘Crossing Borders’, has conducted what is to date the only research into trafficking in Northern Ireland (Dudley 2006). Dudley identified trafficking patterns emerging in the UK and argues that these patterns affect Northern Ireland too. These five patterns are as follows. 1 2 3 4 5

The growth of the sex industry in ‘off-street’ locations. Concerns about levels of knowledge about, or attention to, human trafficking among police forces. The links between human trafficking and organized crime. Concerns about the increase in unaccompanied minors entering the UK. The patterns of exploitation of Eastern European young women (ibid. 2006).

Dudley concludes that generally Northern Ireland has followed other global patterns. She undertook written and face-to-face interviews with people involved in areas that are or may be touched by human trafficking. She points to the unique situation in Northern Ireland where organized crime is so closely linked to paramilitary activity and argues that both have increasing links to illegal immigration and controlling the sex trade (2006). The four main areas of concern regarding trafficking in Northern Ireland are as follows. 1 2

Adults who had been smuggled into the country and subjected to exploitative labour practices. Women and girls who had been trafficked or smuggled into the country and appeared to be subjected to exploitation, including prostitution (both a Women’s Aid staff member and a politician for the South Belfast area estimate that they have encountered over 20 women – between 20 and 50 in the case of the Woman’s Aid staff member – in the last three years; in addition, the Women’s Aid staff member estimated she had encountered between 10 and 20 women born in Northern Ireland who had been internally trafficked).

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L. Deegan Unaccompanied minors from other countries who have increased in numbers in recent years, with many questions attached to their presence here (one Health and Social Services Board area noted increasing and worrying numbers of children arriving, in parallel with both the Republic and the UK mainland). Children and young people born in Northern Ireland who are being systematically sexually exploited in Northern Ireland and/or moved into other jurisdictions for the purposes of sexual exploitation (in one Health and Social Services Board area, there is a rolling list of about 20 children) (Dudley 2006).

Dudley also reports on the death of Qu MEi Na, a 22-year-old Chinese woman who was found dead in a boot of a car in June 2004. Police confirmed that links with both triad groups and a suspected brothel in North Belfast were possible lines of enquiry. Two men were tried on charges of murder, assault and false imprisonment and assisting an offender. Dudley raises some interesting questions about the death of Qu MEi Na, claiming ‘I did ask about the young woman murdered but this was not regarded as they [the police] say she was a prostitute by consent’ (Dudley 2006: 6). Anna Lo is aware of victims of trafficking and brothels operating in Belfast. She claims trafficking into Northern Ireland involves ‘local and overseas gangs of criminals’. She also has no doubt that paramilitaries and triad gangs are involved in the facilitating of trafficking (e-mail correspondence 2008). Northern Ireland is a destination and transit country for trafficking Northern Ireland is referred to as having a ‘unique position’ when it comes to human trafficking. What is this uniqueness? It relates to its political and geographical situation. Politically, Northern Ireland is part of the UK, a country with one of the highest GDPs in the world and a multiracial, open society with a long history of immigration. Geographically, Northern Ireland shares a border with the Republic of Ireland. Organized crime groups take full advantage of the border, attempting to use the existence of two jurisdictions to frustrate law enforcement. The Republic of Ireland presents quite a different human trafficking landscape to the UK. The joint police reports from the Garda and the PSNI recognize the probability of human trafficking taking place across the border, but as yet no one has been convicted of this. The Republic of Ireland experienced an economic boom in the 1990s which led to increased demand for cheap labour, new migrant communities and an unprepared and ill-equipped immigration system. A recent multi-agency investigation into trafficking in Ireland concluded that over a 21-month period, between January 2007 and September 2008, 102 women were identified by ten services as being trafficked into or through Ireland (O’Connor and Pillinger 2009).



There is a high level of paramilitary involvement in moving people into Northern Ireland Organized crime has gone through changes in both the North and South of Ireland in recent years. Both police services point to how criminals have adapted and taken advantage of reduced terrorist activity. With peace in Northern Ireland, a vacuum has been created for those involved in paramilitary activity. Ex-paramilitary groups are complex and well organized with access to high degrees of specialization and corruption. They provide a ready-made network for crime, at both a local and international level, and a readiness to resort to violence (An Garda Siochana and PSNI 2006). Joint government reports point out how the former terrorist groups have routes into parts of the community which enable them to profit more readily from crime. A recent Times article investigates how the IRA have transformed themselves in the past ten years from ‘a ruthless terrorist group into a sophisticated crime syndicate’ (O’Neill and Lister 2005). The article claims that the IRA have established links with other criminal groups in Britain and Eastern Europe and are now heavily involved in counterfeiting and smuggling. Tupman (2009), who coined the term ‘IRA PLC’, claims that ‘successful terrorist groups survive by resorting to funding methods copied from organized criminals’. Organized crime groups are now willing to work together with little fear of terrorist intervention. Alan McQuillan, head of the UK Assets Recovery Agency, said that the Loyalist groups were generally very much at the hard end – drugs, extortion, local armed robberies and prostitution – whereas Republicans have moved much more towards excise and revenue activities and a few big robberies (O’Neill and Lister 2005). The OCTF reported in its 2006 Annual Report that all paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland ‘are heavily involved in organized crime as a means of raising finance for their organization and personal gain’ (OCTF 2006: 27). Furthermore, according to the House of Commons Third Report on Northern Ireland Affairs 2006, this is still the case (House of Commons 2006a). The Chairman of the Northern Ireland Affairs committee, Sir Patrick Cormack, claimed that both Loyalists and Republicans were involved in human trafficking. The Committee reported that human trafficking had not yet reached the dimensions of the rest of the UK but it is a disturbing new feature. Cormack said ‘Indeed, we have received quite astonishing evidence that on occasions Loyalists and Republicans work together’ (BBC News 2006). Evidence can be found in the Republic of Ireland of members of ex-paramilitary groups opening lap-dancing clubs. The Continuity IRA has tried to muscle into the sex trade in Limerick and Dublin (Cusack and Guerin 2003). During ‘Operation Quest’, investigators found that a former commanding officer in the Provisional IRA, as well as members of dissident Republican groups such as the Continuity IRA and ex-Irish National Liberation Army members, were suspected of being involved in running lap-dancing clubs (ibid.). The UK Parliament Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs Third Report provides an insight into levels of paramilitary involvement in organized crime (House of Commons 2006). The committee notes

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the continued involvement of paramilitaries from both loyalist and republican sides in organized crime. We are concerned by the control which paramilitaries or former paramilitaries continue to exercise over communities … the fear that this creates and the consequent under reporting of crime. (2006: 3) They also speak about the changing nature of crime in Northern Ireland, where there has been a shift from ‘paramilitary terrorism to paramilitary crime’ (2006: 3). The committee restates the lack of hard evidence of trafficking taking place in Northern Ireland; however, it does argue that there is ample evidence to suggest that Northern Ireland is being used as a transit route for traffickers, a ‘back-door’ to move people into the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Human trafficking is an illegal activity, therefore viewing it only as a criminal problem is the most effective strategy for states Northern Ireland and Britain have adopted the criminal view of human trafficking; i.e. primarily focusing on the criminalization of trafficking and the prosecution of traffickers. However, the successful prosecution of traffickers relies on the cooperation of the victims of traffickers, who without support, protection or means of redress are unlikely to cooperate with law enforcement agencies. Victims of trafficking have almost no entitlement to support from the state, let alone legal protection. Although some support is available on an informal basis, the statutory rights of victims are almost zero. Until victims are persuaded to come forward and speak up about their experiences, prosecutions will be very limited. The media plays an important role in ‘uncovering’ human trafficking in Northern Ireland The media plays an instrumental role in drawing attention to trafficking. However, media reports are often criticized for exaggerating and sensationalizing the issue of human trafficking in order to sell their products. Coverage focuses on victims’ stories to provide a human dimension. Photographs make coverage more visual, again to get the message across to the reader; however, when used inappropriately they can reduce the impact of the story, or send out the wrong message, creating stereotypes and hindering the support that victims might need. Initial investigations into the possibility of human trafficking are reported with sensationalized headlines, but there is very little follow-up reporting in relation to actual convictions. Examples of current media reporting include the following. •

In January 2004, the Belfast Telegraph reported that Eastern European women were ‘being smuggled across the Irish border to work in Belfast brothels’ and suggested that ‘in the greater south Belfast area detectives believed that loyalist terrorists hold a tight grip on the sex trade … If it is not paramilitaries



•

running the operations themselves, they would be paid off by criminal gangs to allow them to set up.’ In July 2005, the Irish News reported the growing pressure on the Garda in the South to close down trafficking, suggesting that ‘the number of foreign women being trafficked by criminal gangs to work in the sex industry was increasing rapidly’ (McDaid 2005: 22).

Newspaper reports must be read with caution as their stories tend to vary in accuracy, with sources often misquoted, creating the ‘smoke in front of the fire’, tending to focus on the salacious stories, the areas that will grab the most headlines, leaving the factually accurate but ‘less exciting’ stories unreported. Particularly in the area of human trafficking, tabloid reports can cause more harm then good, misconstruing facts and heightening and reinforcing stereotypes, and often stories take on a titillating quality rather than investigative journalism. Table 9.1 presents a basic outline of newspaper articles focusing on trafficking in Northern Ireland in the period 2005–8. A search was conducted of all newspaper articles relating to human trafficking in Northern Ireland between 2007 and 2009 from the Irish Times and the Belfast Telegraph. The table is a representative sample of this search. The table includes a column showing whether each report falls into the ‘smoke’ or ‘fire’ category. The aim was to divide newspaper reports into two categories, those which deal with facts and evidence, i.e. the ‘fire’ aspect, and those articles which focus on the presumed reality of human

Table 9.1 Newspaper articles on trafficking in Northern Ireland (2005–8) Newspaper

Headline

Date

Smoke or fire?

The Irish Times

Girl (12) taken into care in trafficking investigation

09/06/08

Fire

The Irish Times

Five rescued from suspected 02/07/08 trafficking ring

Fire

The Irish Times

Two trafficked women rescued in North

28/11/08

Fire

The Belfast Telegraph

Foreign Women in Sex Slavery

25/03/2009

Fire


Police and Gangsters at war on Ireland’s border

30/03/2009

Smoke

The Irish Times

Call for Increased support for 18/10/2008 Trafficking victims in NI

Smoke


Outrage at rise in human trafficking

24/07/2007

Smoke

The Guardian

Fears of Triad Link to Body Found in Car

05/06/2004

Smoke

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trafficking, the ‘smoke’ – without including in the report any evidence to back it up. Although not a scientific conclusion, it does represent the general trend of media reporting. Regarding the perceived threats of human trafficking, the general perception is that Northern Ireland is affected by international migration patterns that are shaped by conflict and gender inequality as well as increasingly globalized financial systems. There is agreement between police (on both sides of the border), NGOs and academics that Northern Ireland does follow international trends of globalization and migration. Add to that the in-built organized crime networks, and few would doubt that trafficking is also a feature of modern-day Northern Ireland.

Conclusions Perhaps the most effective way to draw any conclusions about the reality of trafficking in Northern Ireland is to look at the state’s response, if any. It appears that in recent years the state has taken the presumption of the existence of trafficking more seriously, with the participation in Pentameter II and the development of a specialist PSNI anti-trafficking division. A significant step in the state’s response to trafficking was the decision (on 18 December 2008) for the UK to ratify the European Union Convention Against Human Trafficking. This will have a major impact on the UK’s response to human trafficking. The ratification of the convention means that the UK will formally become part of a Europe-wide agreement about setting minimum standards for protecting and supporting trafficking victims. It also strengthens the UK’s ability to catch the criminals. In addition to operating within Europe, Northern Ireland operates within the international framework (including the abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957, and the United Nations Protocol, 2000), and local legal frameworks (including the National Immigration and Asylum Act 2002) and the most recent, the 2007 Border Bill. The aim of this Bill is to build stronger borders, tackle organized crime and remove incentives for illegal immigrants to come to the UK. The research and data does not support current perceptions of high levels of trafficking in Northern Ireland backed by ex-paramilitary involvement. It is evident that there is a degree of activity within the region, but the levels and nature are inconclusive. However, this mirrors generally research into trafficking. Information develops within organizations who work with migrants or prostitutes, researchers and the media, but it is a slow process before data and governments back this up. Establishing insights into the realities in Northern Ireland provides a backdrop of how human trafficking takes place in destination countries, and also the role of organized crime, both subjects which can be transferred to other case studies. The problem this research faces in Northern Ireland is reflected in trafficking research worldwide. The fundamental stumbling block in combating trafficking is the problem of determining its existence. Without reliable data, trafficking cannot be tackled, and researchers have to rely on the perceived realities of the situation. The implementation of the UN protocol will ensure that the UK takes a more ‘victimcentred’ approach to trafficking. Increased support for victims will encourage

The fire behind the smoke 143 increased reporting, and it is at this stage that real data and information will begin to emerge, and reflect the current anecdotal evidence.


Notes 1 Questionnaires were administered electronically to NGOs, journalists, academics, state bodies and police authorities involved with combating human trafficking. This then led to unstructured e-mail interviews with relevant sources. The questions posed were: 1 What is your belief or could you give me an estimation as to the number of trafficked people in Northern Ireland? 2 What is your view of the media coverage of human trafficking in Northern Ireland? (Do you consider it welcome? Relevant? Sensationalist?) 3 In your opinion, is human trafficking taking place in both the sex industry and wider labour industries? 4 Could you give me any insight into the role, if any, of paramilitaries in human trafficking in Northern Ireland? 5 What is your view of the institutional response to human trafficking in Northern Ireland? The LexisNexis search engine was used for a newspaper analysis. This focused on the following papers: Belfast Telegraph, Irish News, Irish Times, Irish Examiner, Guardian and Daily Express. These papers covered a range of opinions and perspectives relating to the UK, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. All reports of arrests and convictions of traffickers were included; reports on suspected cases were also important as they are the stories that lead to the ‘no smoke without fire’ perception of trafficking. The newspaper analysis was limited to the period after the UN protocol of 2000, but media interest prior to 2000 was in any event very limited. Finally, national and international legislation and parliamentary reports were reviewed.

10 Organized crime in transition-era Bulgaria The elites and the state


Marina Tzvetkova

This chapter explores organized crime–elite cooperation and the role of law enforcement in the evolution of certain types of criminal organizations (called silovi grupirovki – ‘groups that use violence’) in Bulgaria during the 1990s.1 The use of violence and intimidation, which helped them dominate markets, has been a trademark for the silovi grupirovki throughout their history. These organizations emerged during the rapid transition from a state ‘command’ economy to a market economy in Bulgaria in the 1990s. While transition to the market economy entailed widespread transfer of state-owned assets into private hands, this transfer was not matched with the social and legal norms or the state institutions protecting the integrity of market transactions and property rights (Hill 2003: 8). This situation allowed the growth of silovi grupirovki, which along with other illicit activities provided extra-legal protection to property rights. As this chapter will argue, however, criminal organizations would not have become so powerful in the 1990s had they not benefited from close association with members of the economic and political elites in Bulgaria. The chapter explores whether and how the elites in post-communist Bulgaria furthered the social conditions necessary for mafia-style organizations to flourish and whether and how representatives of state law enforcement agencies helped these organizations to grow. Furthermore, in light of the fact that the state has done little to effectively eliminate the criminal activities of mafia-style organizations, the chapter raises the question whether the state intentionally used such organizations for its own purposes. In order to shed light on these questions, the chapter looks at the individual involvement of representatives of the elites and law enforcement with organized crime and examines the broader relationships between the state, the elites, law enforcement and organized crime. This chapter is based on 125 semi-structured interviews with members of silovi grupirovki, entrepreneurs, athletes (known to be main participants in organized crime in the 1990s) and law enforcement officers carried out between 2004 and 2007. In order to find such informants, the method of snowballing2 was used (Coleman 1972: 260–1). In addition, the researcher approached particular individuals who are known to be experts on this topic. In most interviews a tape recorder was not used. Insisting on tape-recording sensitive conversations represented a serious constraint on the quality of the information obtained and to proceeding


Organized crime in transition-era Bulgaria 145 with a particular interview in general. Interview material included in the text is referred to in the following way: LE indicates law enforcement officer. This abbreviation is followed by the number of the informant in the list of interviewees. Similarly, E refers to entrepreneurs, S to sportsmen, and SG to representatives of silovi grupirovki. The idea of the organized crime–elites (often defined loosely) cooperation for shared benefit during the transition in Bulgaria is not novel. For example, Minev and Kabakchieva (1996) propose that the secret services, criminals and ‘agents’ (police and State Security informers) were instrumental in supporting the elites to remain in power after 1989. They argue that it was with the help of these groups that the elites managed to take over the control of successful segments of the economy (1996: 107–8). Raychev and Stoychev also point out that the managers of state enterprises, ‘in vitro’ capitalists (entrepreneurs financed and credited by the political elite) and the expelled officers of the State Security, ready to use their resources for political and economic racketeering, were involved in the appropriation of state property and helped violent organizations to emerge (2004: 18). In addition, Nikolov proposes that former policemen acquired control over the state companies registered abroad, which the communist state had created in order to circumvent embargos imposed by the Western countries and silovi grupirovki helped in this process (1997: 4). Finally, General Bonev, former Minister of the Interior, said that organized crime emerged out of the chaos following 1989, in which the ruling elites appropriated public resources. According to him, organized crime groups were created to guard the process of appropriation and to help the elites to preserve their political and economic power (1997: 3–11). Various other explanations which mention the elites have been offered for how organized crime emerged in Bulgaria. Chavdarova suggests that organized crime emerged under ‘state protection’; what is more, the state had actually created the structures of organized crime between 1986 and 1989 (Chavdarova 2001: 265). Similarly, Peykov suggests that criminal grupirovki were organized by athletes and officers from the secret services who acted on behalf of the communist elite: the elite entrusted money to selected individuals to develop businesses and used mutri (a term commonly used in Bulgaria to denote participants in organized crime) to control the collection of profits (Petrunov 2006: 181–3; Peykov 1998: 173–4).3 Finally, Ganev (2007) claims that the fact that the post-communist elites managed to transform their political power into economic power is widely documented. Understandably, the process itself and the role of mafia-like organizations in it is less visible. In what follows, I shall try to shed some light on this process.

The elites The account of a police officer from the Sofia City Directorate of the Internal Affairs, whom we interviewed in 2005, illustrates the need for protection of economic actors belonging to the elites and how grupirovki emerged to respond to such needs at the beginning of the transition period:


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M. Tzvetkova So, they opened the border, I don’t mean this literally … but in practice the border got opened; and the trucks started going; but taking the trucks across, lets say, for example of Iliya Pavlov or Lyuben Gotzev or of whoever we take … he will not go and transport the trucks himself.4 Someone has to transport these trucks! Who will transport them? Of course executors were needed. Who were the most suitable to become executors? Naturally, ‘our boys’! Who are our boys? … These are first those who have some sort of physical constitution – to be able to react adequately; then, to have the corresponding connections … so it all started, with co-workers and friends … When they created these structures, these were exactly executive structures … (LE8)

Another account of the shady transactions in which members of the elites participated is given by the investigative journalist Zoya Dimitrova (1998). She suggests that the old smuggling channels maintained by the state during communism were ‘privatized’ and continued their operation after 1989 (see also Report on the Activity of the Committee for State Security 1991, Tadarakova 2001: 206–11; Lazarova and Hristov 2007: 13–84 and CSD 2004: 15–21). Accordingly, the individuals who operated the route for the export of the drug Captagon for the Middle East on behalf of the state (channels also used for arms and other exports) remained in the same business after 1989.5 These included officers of the 3rd Directorate of the state company ‘Kintex’, ex-officers of State Security intelligence departments and foreign businessmen.6 Discussing the resources they possessed before 1989, Dimitrova writes, that they ‘had anonymous accounts and money not accounted for, many of them reported to just a few people’ (1998). A senior ex-State Security officer confirmed this explanation. He pointed out that before 1989 smuggling was controlled by the State Security and that the state was involved in and profited from illegal trans-border activity. ‘After 1989 the trade was privatized and mutri and former State Security officers participated together in the privatization of these activities. Because they were illegal in their substance, there was no legal way to privatize them,’ my informant (LE11) explained. Finally, the President of one mafia-style organization, ‘The Security Club’, summarized the link between the emergence of grupirovki and the elites in the following way: Perhaps some [athletes] were given money.7 Ognyan Doinov gave to Iliya Pavlov, Iliya to Dzhamov and VIS8 – he used them, he gave them money and helped them at the beginning, and politicians looked for their services and helped them. The scheme is the following: grupirovki emerged and they [the elites] started using them on various occasions … (SG1) Given the many accounts of covert collaboration between the elites and silovi grupirovki (see also Pisarov 1997: 29–49; Petrova 2006; Stoev 2008; and Capital, 11 April 2008), the role of the elites in the evolution of grupirovki can be summarized


Organized crime in transition-era Bulgaria 147 in the following way: certain representatives of the elites needed someone to help them with ‘their dirty jobs’. This is how Mladen Mihalev (‘Madzho’), an exwrestler and leader of the ‘SIC’9 insurance company (dubbed silova grupirovka), described the role of grupirovki: ‘The Wrestlers are all-purpose boys and they are punished when they want to abandon the dirty job and develop independent business’ (168 chasa, 1–7 May 1995). The help which the ‘all-purpose boys’ supplied included, among other assistance: protection of individuals and businesses, including the elimination of competitors; ensuring the successful smuggling of petrol and goods, especially during the Embargo on Former Yugoslavia but also afterwards; smuggling of produce, to which only few had access; and escorting the transfer of large sums of money across the border and from one place to another (SG5). The help also included corrupting and discrediting state officials, assisting ‘shadow’ privatization deals, mediation for obtaining attractive public contracts and large unsecured bank credits. Given the evidence, the following two related hypotheses are amply justified. First, members of the Bulgarian elites needed protection with respect to both the transactions they engaged in and the vast resources to which they had or could gain access during the first few years of transition. Although not exclusively, some individuals from the elites became involved in semi-legal and illegal transactions, privatized state resources and used public property for private gains during the early years of the transition. Since they could not resort to legal protection, because the nature of the transactions in which they engaged was shady, they needed someone to protect their business, to provide both security and more general protection. The elite customers, unlike other entrepreneurs, could pay for the service of criminals with a unique type of goods, namely, political protection and public resources. Second, it could be argued that the communist elites pursuing their own enrichment and survival and the post-communist elites pursuing political and economic power willingly (through intentional transactions) or inadvertently (by being incompetent in their positions) assisted the development of mafia-like organizations in Bulgaria.

Partners in business, partners in crime A role of the political elites in the evolution of silovi grupirovki are their direct, and in some cases visible, business relations, with alleged representatives of these organizations. Even if it may be difficult to disentangle protection of business transactions from actual participation in transactions, we know that business relationships of various types between criminals, businessmen and politicians existed (and continue). For example, one of the top bankers of the First Eastern International Bank (dubbed ‘the bank of mutri’), Evgeni Uzunov, was a former Vice Minister of Finance and a Vice Chairman of the Bulgarian National Bank, as well as a member of the Supreme Council and the Executive Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party. In 1993 Rumen Nikolov, partner in ‘Intergrup’ (which created the notorious insurance company – SIC), registered a firm together with General Boyko Borissov, Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) during the period 2001–5


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and a Mayor of Sofia (2005–9) (MOI information 1996; also Petrova 2006, Capital, 1 September 2001 and Mediapool, 19 March 2007). Also, in 1998, one of the largest municipal firms in Sofia, Sofiiski Imoti, became a sponsor of the Slaviya football club. The club was owned by SIC (Paragraph22, 30 August–5 September 2003 and Netinfo, 27 May 2008). In 2008 the Prosecution Service investigated Sofiiski imoti for corruption and transactions with firms linked to organized crime and discovered that it has caused substantial damage to the Sofia Municipality (Mediapool, 18 April 2008). Even if the details are often missing, more than enough trials and investigations have surfaced to indicate that the tripartite relationship between mutri business and politics has been quite pervasive and is ongoing. Media investigations and various reports, including a report of the Minister of the Interior Lyubomir Nachev from 1995, point to the fact that athletes – owners and employees of notorious insurance companies and banned private security firms – also protected prominent businessmen and their interests. For example, at the beginning of the 1990s Dimiter Dzhamov (ex-wrestler and leader of Zora Insurance) was a driver and an assistant of Iliya Pavlov, a president of Multigrup Corporation (24chasa, 27 November 2000; Tadarakova 2001: 311). Athletes also provided security services to the casino owned by Iliya Pavlov and Vasil Urumov (‘Chico’) in Hotel Pliska in Sofia (Tadarakova 2001: 311). Athletes also worked as security guards for Plamen Timev (‘Ghandi’), a controversial businessman linked to the communist elite (LE7). In addition, Dimitar Ivanov, a former State Security officer and Vice President of Multigrup, reveals that when Iliya Pavlov bought the sugar factory in Kameno in 1994 and set the price for one kilogram of sugar to 90 Levs, the leaders of grupirovki enforced the price (Tadarakova 2001: 313). A percentage of the proceeds of each kilogram of sugar sold would go to the athletes (Dimitrova 1998).10 Finally, various authors also point to the fact that the symbiosis between the emerging structures of grupirovki and the elites was strengthened during the Embargo on the Former Yugoslavia. Members of grupirovki confirmed this (SG3 and SG4). The process is described by Nikolov (1997): Resembling a peculiar ‘division of labour,’ patterns of cooperation began to coalesce along the following lines: the former nomenklatura would arrange the supply of oil and other strategic resources nominally controlled by the Bulgarian state, the ex-cops would ensure that the convoys crossed the border without inspection, and the former athletes oversaw transportation and protection. As they grew stronger, the enforcers began to invest their own money in this trade and to send their own shipments across the border to Serbia. (1997: 8; see also the statement of Ivo Karamanski in Tadarakova 2001: 294) It is worth mentioning that representatives of mafia-like organizations also helped politicians to win votes. One such instance is reported by Noshten Trud whereby Plamen Galev, a businessman from Dupnitsa and an alleged leader of the so-called ‘Officers Gang’ (168 chasa, 18–24 April 1997), paid for votes of the local Roma

Organized crime in transition-era Bulgaria 149


in order to support the election campaign of one of the candidates for Mayor of Dupnitsa. Galev told the newspaper: When Purvan Dangov stood for Mayor, between the two phases of the elections [he] came to us together with the Deputy Governor Oleg Velinov and asked us whether we could help to get the votes of the Roma. We organized a meeting with the Roma leaders in a pizzeria; there are witnesses. At the table the Roma told him [Dangov]: ‘Dangov, if you don’t give us money, we won’t vote for you.’ Then Dangov asked us to collect. We did that – some gave 500, all of us gave something and we collected 15,000 Levs (about $7,500). And he became Mayor with these votes. So I ask him – when are we mafiosos – when we collected the money or now?’ (Noshten Trud, 30–31 May 2006; see also Capital, 3–9 June 2006; Trud, 1 June 2006 and Politika, 9 June 2006). The evidence shows that selected representatives of both the political and business elites became customers of the protection which grupirovki supplied. Influential customers paid for the services with money or favours, and grupirovki gained the independence necessary to promote their service to other market participants. ‘Some people used us; we used them. We were useful to each other,’ said a leader of grupirovka (Dimitrova 1998). There is also some evidence that protection went in the other direction too and that grupirovki sponsored political parties in order to secure favours (see Tadarakova 2001: 320).11 One informant, an investigative journalist from Sofia, even suggested that there were Members of Parliament who were paid a salary by grupirovki in order to lobby for laws and to prevent laws from being voted in by Parliament and that mutri often boasted openly of these relationships (V1, V8). Another respondent told me that mutri financed local political election campaigns, for example of mayors and municipal councillors (LE11). The same respondent explained: ‘Parties are respected by everyone. Relationships are maintained with all parties but especially with the winning ones’ (LE11). Rumen Petkov, Minister of the Interior in 2007, also confirmed that the Ministry of the Interior had information about links between Members of Parliament and organized crime (Novinar, 15 Oct. 2007). Finally, according to Capital, 40 politicians were investigated by the Economic Department of the National Security Service for involvement in ‘shady’ economic activities. These investigations stopped after the Economic Department was deliberately closed ‘to prevent further inquiries’ in 2001 (Capital, 4 April 2008). A politician whom I interviewed admitted that relations with shady businessmen and criminals were maintained. He was selected by his party and sent to meet a member of grupirovka (someone who according to the Bulgarian media is a lower-level leader in VIS). The latter complained to my respondent that he had become tired of working ‘on the streets’ for ten years as a supervisor of various illegal activities. He sought to become independent from his boss (the then leader of the organization who was subsequently murdered). He asked for political support so that he could work independently and control the import of certain type of goods at a particular border point, and offered to pay for

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political protection. While the party official did not admit directly that his party would agree to take money and extend favours or had agreed to offer protection to this person, he admitted that, ‘in general the scheme is as follows: if he gives money to the party, it may be possible to help him’ (E5). These kind of roles of the political elites cannot be assessed thoroughly. Police data say nothing about them, as could be expected, perhaps because, as recent evidence indicates, senior law enforcement officials are themselves involved in such collaboration (see next section). Also, it is unlikely that politicians would ever willingly admit in public that they have accepted sponsorship from firms and individuals belonging to the silovi grupirovki.

State law enforcement and grupirovki Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior and all services and departments attached to it were reformed soon after the fall of communism. The restructuring included structural and personnel reforms. This left many skilled professionals unemployed, weakened the capacity of the institution to fight crime and had a demoralizing effect on its staff. As a result the reforms may have contributed to the rise of organized crime in the country (CSD 2004: 17–20). Observers and participants in the reforms of the Ministry of the Interior suggest that the frequent political dismissals of people should be considered among the main factors contributing to the rise of organized crime (Semerdzhiev 2001: 358). In addition, a senior ex-Ministry of the Interior officer claimed that the reforms in the Ministry were deliberately devised to weaken the institution by some circles of the Communist party (led by Andrey Lukanov), which feared that a strong security sector would have prevented the redistribution of public resources ‘into the hands of a few’, in which Lukanov and his associates (as this respondent thought) actively participated (LE7; Lukanov closed the Economic Department of State Security). Similar opinions were held by all respondents who were officers of the State Security and the police before 1989. They thought that MOI, as an institution, was placed in the scapegoat’s position in order to distract public attention from the Communist party nomenklatura (LE7, LE11, LE24, LE25, LE 26). Ex-MOI officers of various departments and level of seniority considered the reforms of the system of law enforcement a disaster. Some were angry because of the way the reforms were implemented. They told me: Lukanov, we hate him, because he delivered a massive blow to the Ministry of Interior. And Semerdzhiev, his protégé, we hate him too. Lukanov and Semerdzhiev are responsible for the greatest betrayal, the aim of which was to push the security services into a mouse-hole so that they keep quiet while watching what [theft of state property] was going on in the country. (LE25 and LE26) Successful or not, the reforms in the Ministry of the Interior left many law enforcement officers unemployed. The former Interior Minister Victor Mihaylov and


Organized crime in transition-era Bulgaria 151 various other sources suggest that more than 14,000 officers – police, operational officers, investigators and intelligence officers – left the system in the first few years after 1990. Unfortunately, there is no reliable data on exactly how many officers left, were dismissed or were pensioned off because the information, even on the total number of employees at MOI and related institutions, has remained secret (LE 29; also Jansen 2006: 2–3). It is known, however, that the total number of officers in 1989 was around 60,000–65,000 and a reduction of between 30 and 50 per cent was considered in 1990. General Krasimir Samandzhiev, Deputy Minister of the Interior in 1990, admitted that a 37 per cent reduction of staff was agreed in 1990, which would have meant around 23,000 officers being discharged in the early nineties only (Semerdzhiev 2001: 390–1, 399). In the meantime, despite the guidelines adopted by the MOI Governing Body, the renewal of cadre often depended on political decisions. As a result, from the very beginning of the reforms in 1990 officers felt insecure; they did not know whether they would be dismissed and if they remained, where they would be transferred. The vacant leadership positions in the Ministry of the Interior, previously occupied by officers of the State Security, were initially filled with cadre of the Criminal Police. According to one informant, this also created tensions between the officers from the two major ex-units in the system of law enforcement (LE7). Finally, some officers left MOI by themselves because they judged that this would be better for them in the new situation (Semerdzhiev 2001: 393). The reforms continued long after General Semerdzhiev was gone and during the whole period between 1990 and 2008 the system of the Ministry of Interior was continually abused in the struggle for power between the different political parties. The political struggle to control all levels of the state administration and the fact that each political party coming to power introduced structural reforms and made officers redundant, even people from the lower administrative and enforcement levels, resulted in law enforcement losing trained and experienced employees. This weakened the institutions of law enforcement and reduced their capacity to respond to the rapid development of illicit activities.

Formal and informal links between law enforcement and organized crime After leaving or being discharged, some former police officers and especially State Security officers set up consultancies and centres for information and analysis. Obviously, collecting and analyzing information was among the main skills and resources State Security officers had and they could sell it. According to Peter, a police officer from Sofia, the system threw police officers out and they had to adapt to the new situation, ‘so they privatized (along with everyone else in the economy) the resources which they had’ (LE8). Peter thought that while the exPrime Minister Lukanov could privatize state resources on a large scale, because he was at the top and had the opportunity, the athletes and the police officers had nothing else to fall back on but their own experience and personal connections. Researchers at the Centre for the Study of Democracy also write that former


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State Security officers possessed ‘many personal contacts at home and abroad and their own information networks and databases on individuals companies and organizations’ (CSD 2004: 19). At the same time businesses, including grupirovki and political parties, needed this kind of information and were ready to pay for it (as leaders of grupirovki also admitted, see Tzvetkova 2008). Thus, mafia-like organizations benefited from the information-gathering structures established by State Security and other police officers (SG1). I propose that in this fashion former law enforcement officers helped the development of organized crime, but how aware they were of having this effect remains unknown. It is important to point out that links between State Security and police officers on the one hand and athletes on the other were established before members of these groups assumed their new roles in the market economy (as members of organized crime or businessmen). Before 1989 representatives of State Security were assigned to accompany athletes travelling abroad (LE11). They also occupied positions in the managing boards of sports teams. In addition, some athletes acted as police informers before 1989 – informers were recruited from different professional groups and, according to senior MOI officers, sportsmen made good candidates (Tadarakova 2001: 103). Moreover, sports was considered an area of great importance for the progress of communist society and the achievements of Bulgarian athletes were considered successes of the communist system as a whole. In line with the important place of sports before 1989 athletes occupied a special position in the social structure of the communist society. They enjoyed various privileges, which they lost with the onset of transition to the market economy. As a result, before 1989 athletes managed to develop plenty of potentially useful contacts – with the political and professional elites (as well as contacts abroad), which were valuable to both sides before and after 1989 (SG6; see Tzvetkova 2008). Informal communication between MOI officers and grupirovki for mutual benefit was also established and maintained during the 1990s. One of Angelov’s police informers admits that the police had called on the leader of VIS-1 security firm, Vassil Iliev, many times when there were conflicts among the different organizations (2007: 108–9). This police informer also praises Iliev for being reliable and cooperating every time the police needed to talk to him (2007: 108–9). These informal links were maintained (and subsequently used) by both sides. The confession of Dimitar Ivanov, former State Security officer and later a Deputy Director of Multigrup, illuminates the ambiguity of these relationships further. He admits that in 1995, when there were conflicts among grupirovki, including frequent street shootings, he mediated between these organizations and MOI, which was then trying to stop the conflicts (Tadarakova 2001: 312). Conflicts spoiled the Ministry’s reputation on fighting crime. Ivanov also admitted: I am ten to fifteen years older than them [the athletes], I was a boss in the old times [during the communist era, in his capacity as a Director of the 6th Section of 6th Directorate of State Security] and at the very beginning [of transition] they started visiting me: ‘Boss, boss, boss …’ I talked to them, I advised them … I told them they should be careful not to become like the



bear which when once it tries meat becomes a meat-eating bear. I advised them that, as much as one tries to be fair, when a man allows himself to shed blood, he becomes a murderer and crosses over into a different category of a person. (2001: 311) There is also evidence of a variety of business relationships between representatives of the law enforcement and the mafia-like organizations. For example, one of the ex-directors of the National Police Directorate in the period 1995–8 worked at the security department of a bank where he was responsible for collecting bad debts. He recruited mutri to collect debts for his employer (LE1). Ex-Bareti (Bareta, pl. Bareti, is a name used for officers of the Specialized Squad for the Fight against Terrorism – SOBT), along with athletes, escorted contraband goods during the Embargo on Former Yugoslavia. Firms established by senior police officials provided security for the houses and properties of shady businessmen and criminals (LE1; also CSD 2007). Cases are known also in which police officers acted as bodyguards for leaders of grupirovki while off duty before a regulation to forbid this practice was issued by MOI. For example, eight officers of SOBT (Bareti) had to leave the Ministry of the Interior after it was discovered that they had been working for Konstantin Dimitrov (‘Samokovetsa’) (Petrova 2006: 405). Similarly, in 1996 four officers of the Investigation Unit of the Sofia Police provided security to the boss of VIS-2 Georgi Iliev (Angelov 2007: 111). Angelov also reports a curious case, in which a leader of organized crime used SOBT to punish a rival group by paying them to attack that group’s office (ibid: 112). An officer from the National Security Service was caught protecting a drug-production lab in SouthWestern Bulgaria and transporting the goods (Paragraph22, 22–28 November 2003). Finally, a police officer from a town in Southern Bulgaria revealed how he and a colleague were sent by his boss to escort a local businessman with a dubious reputation and a suitcase full of money to Sofia. The money was delivered to ‘business-looking people’ waiting in a car on the outskirts of Sofia. My interviewee believed that the money was to be used to bribe politicians (LE16). Even if this were not the case, he, in his role as a police officer, performed a private protection service for mutri on that occasion. Other examples of how alleged members of organized crime benefited from the experience and resources of former law enforcement officers have been discussed widely in the media: Iliyan Vasilev, whom the media dubbed ‘The Lawyer of the Mafia’, is a former state prosecutor and judge (Banker, 30 May 2007). A former Minister of the Interior (1992–4), Victor Mihaylov, became a lawyer for one of the most infamous cigarette smugglers (according to MOI), Ivan Todorov (‘Doctora’, murdered in 2006). Mihaylov also defended other mutri-style criminals, such as Georgi Todorov (‘Shileto’ [The Lamb]) and Plamen Dishkov (‘Kela’) (Paragraph22, 23 September 2006). Examples of this pattern are numerous. Some of them are directly linked to the continual politically influenced changes in law enforcement personnel at all levels discussed in the previous section.

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Mafia-like organizations as alternative employers for law enforcement officers


The process of ‘changing sides’, people from the state administration joining the ranks of organized crime, became an important feature of the development of organized crime groups in Bulgaria. Many police officers, customs officers and investigators who were dismissed found employment in firms associated with or established by grupirovki. Their knowledge and skills fit well with organized crime. One police officer from Sofia commented bitterly that ex-police officers had become ‘the catering staff of mutri’ (LE12). Another respondent explained to me: What the state throws away – and the political and the economic situation is such that it is left to the mercy of fate – goes to the ranks of organized crime because they have nothing else to do. And this makes organized crime stronger. Because these people have their old connections, the knowledge and the experience, they know the loopholes, how to circumvent the law, the state and law enforcement. I am telling you about that boy [a former colleague of this respondent], a customs officer. They kicked him out. He was a good boy, worked at the Sofia Airport Customs, but he was part of the staff under the previous director and they sacked him and he filed a suit against them. And I asked him: ‘What do you do in the meantime?’ ‘I am in the “Iliyantsi” market. I went to the other side’ (Iliyantsi was protected by VIS and he worked for a company managed by this organization). So now he helps mutri to cheat customs. This person was on the inside. He knows all the tricks! (LE11) A similar example is described by Angelov (2007) who suggests that in 1997 one of the MOI press officers was fired by the new Minister of the Interior, General Bonev. After the employee wrote a complaint, which was published in the media, she was employed by the press office of SIC insurance company (2007: 120). During the early nineties, although not in great numbers, ex-law enforcement officers also joined the core workforce of grupirovki. Among informants whom I interviewed there were also ex-police officers who joined grupirovki. One respondent was ‘in transit’: a recently dismissed ex-police officer, who was considering joining ‘the other side’ at the time when I interviewed him. This man admitted that when he entered the Police Academy in Sofia, he had a very romantic notion about the work of the police force. He had very good school grades and university exam results and could have become a student anywhere. Yet he chose the Police Academy and after graduation became an officer in the National Service for the Fight against Organized Crime (NSBOP). During the few years in which he worked in NSBOP, he became disillusioned (other officers from the same branch shared similar experiences). Now he mingles with local leaders of organized crime (in the town where he lives) and believes that as a medal-winning kick-boxer and one of the best marksmen in his class and being smarter and better educated than most mutri (as he said), he would be able to succeed in their line of work.


Organized crime in transition-era Bulgaria 155 It also appears that there are two alleged mafia-like organizations formed (and staffed, although information on this is scarce) by ex-law enforcement officers. One such example is the so-called The Officers’ Gang (V8; LE6; also 168 chasa, 18–24 April 1997). Its leaders are former officers of the NSBOP. Their names have been associated with racketeering and other violent incidents in Dupnitsa (see Tzvetkova 2008). They were joined by ex-policemen and anti-terrorism officers (168 chasa, 18–24 April 1997, 9 November 1997 and Paragraph22, 1 June 2006). Another case of an organization formed by ex-law enforcement officers is the so-called grupirovka of the Bareti, former officers of the Specialized Squad for the Fight against Terrorism. Their private security company, Apollo Security, was founded in 1994. Later former Bareti established the Apollo and Balkan insurance company as a successor of Apollo Security. CSD write that in 2003 the most prominent representative and one of the leaders of the Bareti, Zlatomir Ivanov (‘Zlatko Baretata’), controlled a large part of the drug trade in Bulgaria (CSD 2003: 38). Other ex-Bareti of the same circle became notorious after Nikolay Dobrev (‘Bay Dobri’) and five other people (all of them ex-Bareti) were arrested in 2002. At the place where they were arrested the police found arms, ammunition and explosives. According to data collected by CSD, Dobrev’s group would be hired to impose punishments on participants in the drug trade (2003: 38–9). One of the founders of the Bareti squad in the 1970s revealed to me that members of the ex-Bareti both protect and own many bars, shops and illegal brothels in Sofia and confirmed that they provided a wide range of extra-legal protection services in the 1990s (LE30). The movement of people from state law enforcement to the ranks of organized crime has also been discussed by senior representatives of law enforcement. Peter Iliev, former Director of the Criminal Police, explained that there was a demand for ex-officers from the law enforcement system in the criminal organizations (30 July 1996). Boyko Naydenov, a prosecutor from the Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation, confirmed that criminal grupirovki enjoyed substantial human resources coming from Ministry of the Interior and former prosecutors and judges. Naydenov said that ‘a large number of well-trained officers of MOI have gone to the other side of the barricade for one reason or another’. This trend was also discussed by the former Minister of the Interior Rumen Petkov, who explained: ‘Many people were dismissed without reason from the law enforcement institutions. They were left on the street, and they were very well-educated people. They probably needed to provide for their families, like every one of us’ (News.bg 23 October 2007). Information on what precisely they do ‘on the other side’ remains scarce. Yet, the evidence cannot be dismissed. Similar processes developed in Russia. Groups and individuals within the Russian security forces have become allies and service providers for the country’s underworld (Galeotti 2006: 473; also Varese 2001; Maksimov 1999; Litvinenko 2003).

Corruption in the police As the evidence suggests, being unemployed was not a necessary condition and police officers who remained active in the system of law enforcement also protected


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shady business activities. Thus, in March 2008 the Deputy Director of the General Directorate for the Fight against Organised Crime (Generalna direktsiya za borba s organiziranata prestapnost) (GDBOP) Ivan Ivanov was arrested for maintaining communication with and accepting bribes from ‘shady’ businessmen and warning them about imminent police operations. Also, Vanyo Tanev, the former director of NSBOP, told Parliament that many officers have been dismissed from NSBOP because they released information to grupirovki (see Hearing, p. 5, 13–14, 24, 25, Capital, 14–18 April 2008). Interviewees confirmed this information and also told me that criminals would be registered as police informers in order to protect them. ‘This is a form of “chadur” [umbrella, meaning protection],’ one respondent explained (LE1). Another officer discussed this too: ‘Some grupirovki and individuals had files opened on their name, but this was not aimed at preventing their criminal activity but at controlling and monitoring the interest of other Ministry of Interior departments in their activities’ (LE11). Yet another interviewee told me how the office of a friend of his was burgled and he helped his friend contact the police (so that they would pay attention to the case – they would not do anything otherwise). The police advised this informant that they could not do anything to help because the burglar was already registered as an informer of the police. The interviewee explained to me that while some criminals were genuine informers, others only pretended to be informers so that the officers within MOI who protected them would have a good reason to defend them (LE15). Corruption within law enforcement contributed to the rise of organized crime. Every police officer to whom I talked (N = 36) admitted that law enforcement was corrupt at all levels and said that they had witnessed (and some had even participated) in corruption. Respondents concluded that the system was often used for private goals and that both representatives of the police and the justice system protected criminals and became accomplices to organized crime groups. Thus, an officer who used to fight against organized crime recounted how once while on duty he was called by the office of the Prime Minister in order to help one firm have its goods imported tax free (LE30). Another officer told me that he and his colleagues felt very frustrated to discover that the criminals they investigated were protected by senior officers in the department in which they worked. ‘You have to join in or you have to leave, our work was of no use’, one respondent remembered (LE20; later this respondent joined grupirovki; nowadays he is a businessman). Interviewees also described other corrupt practices. An NSBOP and customs officer, whose best man was a leader of one grupirovka, admitted how the latter paid for the appointment of a particular individual to become a director of a particular Customs Office that was important for his business. The same informant suggested that each appointment at the Customs Office was paid for (by the applicant or businessmen who promoted them for the position) (LE28). Another police officer, who investigates cases of stolen cars and the trafficking of stolen cars, recounted how a criminal appeared at the door of his flat early one morning to offer him money in return for cooperation. He insisted that his address and information about him had been given by his colleagues who exchanged information on stolen cars for money (LE21).


Organized crime in transition-era Bulgaria 157 Such confessions are supported by information from other sources. For example, in 1997 the then Minister of the Interior, General Bonev, said that over 20 per cent of the officers in the Petrich Regional Police Department had contacts with members of organized crime (Struma 1997, p. 1). Also, investigative journalists claim that Ivo Karamanski (‘Krastnika’ [The Godfather]) was detained thanks to money his competitors paid to the prosecutor responsible for the investigation (Dimitrova 1998; also Tadarakova 2001). Finally, Angelov wrote that the police investigator who came to the Golden Apple discothèque in Sunny Beach to investigate a murder (in June 1993), in which several ex-wrestlers and leaders of grupirovki are thought to have been involved, chased away all taxi drivers queuing in front of the discothèque first – they were witnesses to the murder. Thanks to his ‘timely involvement’, mutri avoided prosecution (2007: 117). There are many cases in which representatives of various institutions of justice have aided organized criminals.

Organized crime and the state While the evidence on this is in short supply, there were occasions in which mafialike groups were useful to the state (and intentionally used), because their goals were coincidentally beneficial to the state. Various examples illuminate the possible roles of grupirovki in the suppression of crime (and the clandestine support they received by the state). Many such crime-suppression incidents were reported by the newspapers in the 1990s. For example, a group of strong-armed men, led by Todor Zhabarov, a wrestler from CSKA, punished several Roma in Bratanitsa village, Pazardzhik district. The incident was provoked by the fact that the Roma stole some corn from the local farmers (Duma 24 September 1994, pp. 1–2). Other similar cases appear in Trud – a thief from Blagoevgrad was kidnapped and beaten by sikadzhii (members of SIC) because of theft; and in Standart – students stealing cassette players from cars were severely beaten in Gabrovo (Trud, 14 December 1995 and Standart, 22 July 1996). It is worth noting that when grupirovki undertook to enforce law and order, this often had a different purpose. In most cases their actions were profit-driven and crime control was coincidental. For example, in the latter case the students were beaten up by Ivan Mindov (‘Devetkata’ [The nine]), a manager of SIC in Gabrovo, because they were stealing from cars that were insured by SIC. Further illustration of the motivation behind such actions is the following statement by an ex-employee of The Security Club: ‘The thieves in Veliko Turnovo [a city in Central Bulgaria] – one night we beat them all.’ When I asked why, he answered: ‘Reputation, I guess. In a way, so that people would look for us to arbitrate for them and for other services. So that they would come to us … In a way that was advertising’ (SG6). On some occasions members of grupirovki were also approached by politicians and other powerful actors, including representatives of local police forces when the police could not deal with local criminals. The most striking example is in 2006 when the Minister of the Interior Rumen Petkov met with leaders of grupirovki

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to negotiate peace among the different groups and stop the public assassinations of businessmen and criminals. Bulgaria’s imminent membership of the European Union was at stake (Hearing of the Parliamentary Commission on Internal Security, p. 3, Capital 12–18 April 2008).


Conclusion The examples presented in this chapter raise further questions with regard to the roles of the elite and law enforcement in the rise of organized crime in Bulgaria. First, did Bulgarian law enforcement agencies have the capacity to fight against criminal grupirovki? Second, did leaders of the Ministry of the Interior – the main institution tasked with fighting crime (and, most importantly, the political elites who appointed them) – have the will to fight organized crime? Third, can we talk of law enforcement as a whole or should we talk about a cluster of individuals deviating from its duty? According to one of the former Ministers of the Interior, Victor Mihaylov, MOI did not have the resources to fight grupirovki. ‘What do you want us to do, to send them to camps?’ he asked. Mihaylov justified the stance of the police in the following way: ‘There were no laws. The police had no authority’ (Dimitrova 1998). Another law enforcement officer explained that the department fighting against organized crime was understaffed at the time grupirovki emerged. He also told me that criminals had no respect towards them whatsoever: ‘You show them a card and if you are not followed by an armed group with hoods, they would tell you: “Take this card in” (i.e. we don’t care)’ (LE15). While the resources which MOI had were limited and the institution was weak, the position of a senior member of grupirovki on the role of the state and law enforcement in the evolution of organized crime strongly supports the argument that the government (in fact a number of governments) did not have the will to fight organized crime: I don’t know why they did not smash us in the first years after 10th of November [1989]. Why did they leave us alone at the beginning when we were not strong. I expected every day that they would sweep us away, and they did not do it. I can tell you when they used us and didn’t try to stop us … when we fought with other grupirovki and we pushed them outside Bulgaria … Police looked on with indifference. Maybe given the crime rates they expected us to be the ‘health officers’ of the society. I don’t know. The fact remains. The state could swipe us away if they wanted. (Dimitrova 1998, emphasis added) This reflection is reminiscent of the conclusion of the Italian writer, Franchetti, commenting on the Mafia in Sicily: ‘If the upper classes wished to destroy such industry, they would have both the means and the moral authority to do so’ (Franchetti [1876] quoted in Bandiera 2003: 10). A former official from MOI concluded on the role of the law enforcement and the elites:



No government did what they should have done in order to fight against these structures and the political protection they get is transferred from one government to another. The activity doesn’t stop, it just gets different protectors. It is worst when the MOI officers, investigators and criminals work together – this is an unbeatable scheme that only political will can fight. (LE11) The insidious effects of the presence of organized crime are the gradual acceptance in society of the use of coercion and violence in business relations, and corruption as something normal; and the acceptance of the fact that state institutions are powerless to fight organized crime and are often an accomplice to many of the grupirovki undertakings. A consequence of this is also a state of affairs in which Bulgarians seems to have accepted that they could expect no protection or services from the state. Hence the embedded double-taxation: even though they pay taxes for public services, they pay extra (privately) for any service to be had. The widely advertised success of mutri along with the shady evolution of various members of the power elites into successful entrepreneurs and the many high-profile corruption scandals, which continue until the present day, also had the effect of generating immense distrust in the new democratic institutions and the rule of law. Moreover, the poor performance of Bulgarian political elites during the past 17 years resulted in a general belief that politicians were equally or even more harmful to society than organized crime. Observers point out that EU membership in 2007 started a new era for organized crime and the elites – new resources to be fought over and profit to be had for those who shared the monopoly of power. A series of governments between 1989 and 2007 declared that fighting crime and corruption was among their priorities. Yet, change is slow in coming, despite the constant institutional and legal reforms. What seems to be the missing element is genuine motivation.

Notes 1 Silovi grupirovki is a popular term, but is nevertheless used also by the police, including in some of their official statements (see Tzvetkova 2008). 2 A snowball sample is a non-probability sample obtained by recruiting one or more individuals who each recruit one or more individuals. 3 Mutri means ‘ugly faces/mugs’. 4 Iliya Pavlov was a wrestler and a businessman. Lyuben Gotsev was the Deputy Director of the 1st General Directorate of the Committee for State Security before 1989 and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. 5 Captagon is a drug used as a stimulant and an antidepressant. 6 See also Lazarova and Hristov 2007: 75. 7 There is a widespread view that selected individuals (including athletes) were given money at the onset of the transition by members of the Communist nomenklatura. 8 VIS-1, referred to often as VIS, is a banned private security firm. 9 SIC is an insurance company which, along with VIS-2, an insurance company and successor of VIS-1, was accused of being a mafia-like organization. On private security and insurance used as fronts for mafia-like activity, see Tzvetkova 2008.

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10 In its early form, mafia-style organizations in Bulgaria were staffed by many former athletes, particularly wrestlers (classic and free-style wrestling). See Tzvetkova (2008), doctoral dissertation, Chapter 4 on the role of athletes. 11 See also Mediapool from 12 December 2007.

11 Local politics and organized crime in contemporary Italy Willing or unwilling bedfellows?1


Felia Allum

The mafia does not have an ideology, it is neither of the left nor the right. It is not even interesting in political parties. It targets people … (Grasso in La Licata and Grasso 2007: 84)

Today, organized crime poses a really serious threat to most advanced democracies as it is present everywhere and in many different guises. In Italy, it wields territorial, economic and political power; in France, Spain, Germany and the UK it is above all a money-laundering business. But the alarming fact, not to be forgotten, is that in order to thrive and flourish as they do, they enjoy a form of tacit assistance and cooperation, usually from law enforcement agencies and politicians. While it is clear that Italy must not be considered an exception when it comes to politics–organized crime collusion or political corruption, it can be a useful starting point for a more general analysis and act at the same time as a warning for other states on how they must act in order to avoid the development and expansion of these phenomena. In this chapter, we will examine the kind of relationship which exists between organized crime and local politics in 2009 and ask whether the situation has changed since the early 1990s. In order to answer these questions, we will first explain why we are concentrating on the local government level and not national politics; second, we will set out a general theoretical framework; and, finally, we will present an overview of the situation pre- and post-1991 and analyze the mechanism and relationship today. We are able to study this relationship in some detail because of the new laws that dissolve local councils which have suffered Mafia infiltration and which provide a clear picture of the different power relations. We have studied in detail presidential decrees dissolving local councils since 1991. Before 1991 it was not possible to do this and therefore our understanding is less evidence-based. Our conclusion will show that not very much has changed over the last 18 years and that the relationship between politics and organized crime is more intimate and dangerous than ever.

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Why do Italian organized crime groups target local government? We have chosen to examine the relationship between organized crime and politics at local level in Italy because this is a particularly active, dynamic and resilient relationship. Why is this the case? If we take a closer look at the organization of local government in Italy, we can see that, being territorially close to the clans and managing important state financial resources, they are the main target for Mafia groups. Italy’s political structure is organized and divided into five political subdivisions which reflect the distribution of power and policy competences. All levels have elected representatives with an Assembly and a governing executive (the junta) that make policy in certain areas. The power and extent of policy competences depend on the number of constituents: there will be a smaller electorate for Neighbourhood Councils and Communes than for Provinces or Regions. However, apart from the national government, the communes are in effect the most significant decisionmaking level. They make policy on ‘social services (healthcare, personal social services, housing, limited education, cultural life); economic services (control of commercial activities, promotion of tourism, agriculture) and economic development (urban planning, public works, population control and municipal public transport)’ (Spence 1993: 79). While it should be noted that there are examples of MPs, regional councillors, provincial councillors and even neighbourhood councillors who are suspected of having links with organized crime, it is at the level of the Municipal Council that the majority of criminal clans focus their attention and political energy. Why? What is it about this level of government which makes it vulnerable or attractive to them? An easy target? The answer to this question is probably due: (1) to the economic role of the local council; and (2), its intimacy, size and accessibility. The local council plays an important role in the local economy: it decides who wins the contracts for all the local public services (such as building a new school or public transport). In particular, we have witnessed in the last 25 years an increase in tendering out of public contracts or privatizing local services. These require important sums of money which are distributed by local politicians and managed by local government officials. The size of the town and its proximity to politicians and local civil servants are also important factors. For example, whereas it might be difficult to control the Junta and Local Government officials in big communes such as Rome, Milan and Naples, it is not the case in the small communes (8 per cent have fewer than 500 inhabitants (Spence 1993: 77) which are more accessible and hence easier to influence, penetrate and contaminate. For example, in Campania there are some 9,200 candidates, 60 junta and 300 municipal councillors to elect (Global Project 2006) and it is clear that their political and economic agenda will be subject to Camorra influence because the Camorra is interested in making money. Sergio Amato, an investigating magistrate, explains that ‘the more territorial control the clans have, the more political power they can guarantee’ (Interview

Local politics and organized crime in contemporary Italy 163


31 October 2008), which also explains why clans control small Communes in the Provinces of Naples, Palermo and Reggio Calabria rather than big urban conurbations where their territorial control is diffused. Brancaccio notes that in the Communes of the Province [of Naples], we have witnessed, on several occasions, the clan that controls the territory elects the mayor or places a representative in the Junta. This behaviour is similar to the Mafia model. Whereas in the City, the large number of clans and their fragmented nature means that it is impossible for them to programme and pursue a unified political strategy, relegating in this way criminal power to a condition of constant precarity. (2006: 11) Thanks to the anti-Mafia momentum led by Judge Giovanni Falcone in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which corresponded with a phase of political turmoil in Italy, important anti-mafia laws were introduced which sought to block and dismantle the relationship between organized crime and politics at local level: in particular, law 221 of July 1991 stipulates that the Minister of the Interior can dissolve Municipal Councils which have experienced Mafia infiltration while law 55 of 1990 stipulates that no one charged with ‘Mafia association’, or subject to preventive measures, can stand for election, and law 267 of 2000, reinforcing the previous legislation, stipulates that if they are found to have any links with the Mafia, provincial and municipal councils must be dissolved. However, as LaSpina has pointed out, ‘these measures only affect political personnel, while appropriate treatment for the compulsory transfer or dismissal of civil servants colluding with Mafia is still lacking’ (2004: 650). The question remains: what kind of relationship exists?

Analyzing an ‘invisible relationship’ Trying to conceptualize theoretically and analyze the relationship between organized crime and politics is not an easy task, especially because it is, by its very nature, silent and invisible; there are no material traces or written records for us to study, apart from statements of state witnesses and detailed police work. For example, we only know about the alleged meeting between the former Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and the leader of Cosa Nostra, Toto Riina, because of the testimonies of a state witness. The subject is perceived as taboo and strikes at the heart of both democracy and the state. Although there exists a lot of literature on corruption, there is relatively little on this specific topic. However, what there is can help us to understand this real, but invisible, relationship. We have identified three models which combined together help us make this social phenomenon less abstract. These models are Della Porta and Vannucci’s ‘vicious circles’ (1997, 1999), Allum’s ‘subsystem interaction’ (2006) and Godson’s ‘political–criminal nexus’ (PCN) (2003). We believe that these three models (see Table 11.1) represent three different stages of the development of organized crime–politics relationship in Southern Italy. In this way, the


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relationship can be conceived as a developmental process: it starts as relationships made up of vicious circles and stabilizes as the interaction between the different identifiable representatives of specific systems. Della Porta and Vannucci (1997) place their analysis of this relationship in the context of the general corruption market and argue that organized crime and politics deal in a ‘hidden market’ and exchange resources where other corrupt acts take place. This is one of several other forms. For example, in the early 1990s, Italy was divided into two by its contrasting forms of corruption: in the North, political corruption and bribes between politicians and businessmen distributing public contracts (the so-called tangentopoli scandals) dominated, while in the South it was political corruption dominated by organized crime which characterized business. If we analyze this relationship as starting out as being a by-product of corrupt ‘vicious circles’: ‘a series of vicious circles leads to the parallel growth of corruption, inefficiency, clientelism and (under certain conditions) the political protection of organized crime’ (Della Porta and Vannucci 1997: 121). Initially, they appeared as casual and unsystematic relations but soon became something more regular: ‘[… in] Southern Italy, continuous and systematic exchanges between organized crime, entrepreneurs, and members of the political class’ (Della Porta and Vannucci 1999: 236) developed. Della Porta and Vannucci described this relationship as an ‘iron triangle’ (1999: 236). In other words, a sophisticated ‘cartel’ developed in which each partner received the resources (such as votes, money, protection, public contracts, etc.) they needed to become more powerful players in their sphere: politics, the economy and civil society. In this way, they ‘reinforced each other and weakened the market, the state and civil society’ (1999: 237). Della Porta and Vannucci describe a ‘continuous’, ‘systematic’ and, quoting judges in Naples, ‘constant relationship of functional interchange …’ (1997: 236). The idea of ‘circle’ transmits the notion of an ongoing relationship which can at times appear to be weak, waxing and waning in intensity according to the different players and contexts. This relationship is not exceptional but runs parallel to corruption, clientelism and maladministration; it forms part of the general hidden market. This is a useful analytical model, but it is more helpful as a starting point Table 11.1 Theoretical models Della Porta and Vannucci (1999) 1970-80s

Allum (2006) 1990s

Godson (2003) 2000s

vicious circles

subsystem interaction

nexus

• hidden market • clientelism

• hidden relationship • takeover of clientelism

• total fusion

• iron triangle • continous • cartel

• iron pact • frequent

• cooperation • alliances merge

Source: author’s own elaboration

• a cartel but some symbiosis

into one


Local politics and organized crime in contemporary Italy 165 than as an overall picture of ongoing and constant behaviour since behaviour evolves and changes; such is very much the case here. For this reason, we will use this model to describe the politics–organized crime relationship at the local level in Italy in the 1970s and 1980s. With the passing of time, the relationship becomes less casual and flexible, more regular and constant; a form of interaction occurs between different groups and different representatives as criminals take over traditionally controlled political clientelism. We can term it ‘system interaction’, in other words, the interaction between a representative of a criminal subsystem, a mafioso and a politician from the political subsystem. As the systems themselves change, this relationship changes, becoming a symbiotic one where it is difficult to differentiate between the different systems (Allum 2006: 14). This relationship in Italy, in the last 20 years, has turned into what Godson calls a ‘nexus’, a ‘political–criminal nexus’ (PCN) (2003: 1). He defines this as the collaboration between two sets of groups and institutions, the political establishment and the criminal underworld. Sometimes it is easy to distinguish between the two sets of players … When political establishment knowingly and regularly does business with gang leaders, or when professional criminals are actually elected to power, as has happened in Sicily and Taiwan, the distinction is less straightforward. The lines between the two sets of players become less distinctive; and sometimes the political and the criminal merge. (Godson 2003: 3) This overlap, blurring, fusion of politics and organized crime did not exist on a systematic basis in the early 1990s when there was still a clear distinction between different subsystems. He uses terms such as ‘cooperation’, ‘conflict’, ‘accommodation’ and ‘alliances’ (Godson 2003) to explain how the subsystems merged to become one nexus where the politician pushes the criminal’s agenda and the criminal pushes the politician’s agenda. Combining these models together in a chronological manner (circles–subsystem– nexus) is a useful way of understanding the situation. It will help us understand the extent and nature of these relationships. But is what we have today a political– criminal nexus? Or is it something else?

An overview pre-1991 As we have noted above, before 1991 it was very difficult to study organized crime’s relationship with local politics in Italy: not only because the political climate was not helpful but also because the judiciary had no powers to intervene. This changed in 1991. However, our understanding of the pre-1991 situation remains limited and sketchy. We do have evidence of collusive relationships thanks to State Witnesses: for example, the former mayor of Palermo, Vito Ciancimino, who died in 2002 while serving a sentence for external Mafia association. He is considered to have been


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a member of the Corelone Mafia while he was mayor of Palermo and is believed to have actively helped the Mafia. Ciancimino represents the exception and, in a way, represented the future of what was to come. Elsewhere, the gangs were less powerful and therefore still had limited political power. The majority of local and national politicians in the 1960s still remained in charge and used clientelistic methods to do politics and deal with mafiosi. We have the examples of Silvio Gava in Castallamare di Stabia and Achille Lauro in Naples; both came into contact with the Camorra but both controlled the relationship and dictated terms (see Allum 2006). Even in the 1970s, in the hinterlands, although the organized crime groups were becoming stronger economically and socially they were not yet dominant in the political relationship. This delicate balance would change, the clientelistic relationship would be taken over by organized crime groups as parties sought more and more votes as their partisan support declined and as local government managed more and more financial resources.

A general overview post-1991 When examining the reality of the relationship between local politics and organized crime in Italy over the last 20 years, we can see that the situation is a worrying one. Where criminal gangs control the territory, the extent of their relationship with local politics is all-pervasive, the contamination is total and the penetration is deep. The relationship has not disappeared as a result of the new legislation: indeed it has remained a constant feature of Italian democracy, a constant challenge. Between 1991 and June 2008, 177 local councils were dissolved because of Mafia infiltration (De Stefano 2008: 328). After an initial surge, this number has remained constant. For example, between 1996 and 2000 there were 31 councils dissolved and between 2001 and 2005 there were 45 councils dissolved (see Table 11.2), while many councils remain under ‘special surveillance’. Geographically, there is a clear correspondence and overlap between organized crime territory and corrupt politics. The Southern regions are the most affected,

Table 11.2 Number of councils dissolved due to Mafia infiltration (1991–2007) Years

Number of councils dissolved

1991–95

83

1996–2000

31

2001–5

45

2006–7

13

Total

172

Source: Sportello Scuola e Univerisità, Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia/consigli comunali sciolti online.


Local politics and organized crime in contemporary Italy 167 where territorial control now means political control (see Table 11.3). For example, in 2007, at a different level, 18 out of the 50 regional councillors in Reggio Calabria (councillors belonging to both left and right-wing parties) were under investigation for Mafia association and ‘barter vote’ (‘voto di scambio’) (and another nine for other crimes) (Luzzaro and Palermo 2007). We can see that not only is Campania the region with the highest number of dissolved councils but its most populated province, Naples, tops the table of provinces too (see Table 11.4). In 2006, only nine out of the 92 councils in the province were judged ‘clean’, i.e. without any investigation, Prefect control or monitoring. This translates to around 90 per cent of councils being under investigation (Marasca 2006: 12). If we take a closer look at the provinces of Caserta and Naples, we note that Camorra strongholds are also Camorra-controlled councils (e.g. around Casal di Principe or Nola in the 1990s). This is particularly clear when we look at the number of councils which have been dissolved twice (see Table 11.5). One term of suspension of political activities and an investigation by the Prefect’s team is not enough to hamper the relationship. It is often very difficult to eradicate the criminal–political relationship. In some of these areas, the law is frequently and consistently ignored (F. Roberti, interview 31 October 2008). Laws 55 of 1990 and 267 of 2000 are being systematically violated. For example, Antonio D’Auria (Partito Democratico Mayor of Sant’Antonio Abate, Naples, and former private secretary of late Democrazia Cristiana minister and local party boss, Antonio Gava, in the 1980s) and Giuseppe D’Antuono are both politicians who received prison sentences for their involvement with the Camorra in the 1990s and were re-elected to local government subsequently. There is also the example of Raffaele Riccio, Partito Democratico della Libertà Mayor of San Paolo Bel Sito (Naples) who is the son of Luigi Riccio, a former Democrazia Cristiana mayor and politician who was sentenced to three

Table 11.3 Dissolved councils per region (1991–June 2008) Region


Campania

75

Sicily

49

Calabria

37

Puglia

7

Basilicata

1

Lazio

1

Piedmont

1

Total Source: La Repubblica, 20 October 2008.

171

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Table 11.4 Dissolved councils per province (1991–June 2008)


Province


Naples

45

Reggio Calabria

25

Caserta

24

Palermo

23

Catania

9

Catanzaro

7

Bari

5

Vibo Valentia

5

Salerno

5

Caltanissetta

5

Trapani

5

Agrigento

4

Crotone

3

Avellino

3

Lecce

2

Messina

2

Benevento

1

Ragusa

1

Roma

1

Torino

1

Matera

1

Total

177

Source: De Stefano, 2008: 328.

and half years for Mafia association. However, the political parties argue that it is difficult for them to check all potential candidates and their links with clans: for example, in the 2006 May Municipal and Provincial Elections, Antonio Fantini, General Secretary of Udeur (Union of Democrats for Europe) explained ‘We consulted the relevant authorities. When you’re searching through 360 names, it’s easy to miss one’ (Global Project 2006). Mafias have no strong ideological agenda apart from sponsoring those politicians who will help them make money. They will sponsor any ideological political party which will favour their criminal activities and give them public contracts. There

Local politics and organized crime in contemporary Italy 169 Table 11.5 Number of councils dissolved twice (1991–2008) Region

Number of councils dissolved twice

Campania

14

Sicily

7

Calabria

3

Total

24


Source: La Repubblica, 20 October 2008.

are many examples of municipal councils governed by different political parties which have been dissolved for Mafia infiltration; this is not a left-wing or rightwing phenomenon. Mayors from parties as diverse as the Democratici di Sinistra (Calogero Gueli, Filippo Fecondo) and Forza Italia (Enrico Martinelli) found their communes dissolved for Mafia infiltration (Metropolis 2008). Ugo Conte, the former Forza Italia Mayor of Mondragone, was arrested for Camorra links in 2008 (Caserta News 2008). There are also examples where the clans fight it out politically, each clan sponsoring a different political party as was the case in Poggiormarino in 1993 and in San Giovanni La Punta (Catania) in 2003 (AdS, appendix 2003). Two ASL (healthcare authorities) have also been dissolved for Mafia infiltration: one in Campania (ASL Napoli 4) and one in Reggio Calabria (ASL Locri 9). Another, in Campania, Napoli 5 is considered to be ‘infiltrated’ (Il Correre del Mezzogiorno 2007). ASL have become an obvious target because they have extensive management structures with important economic resources to distribute (such as public contracts for goods and services) and it is these economic resources which the clans want to control. ASL Napoli 4 is based in Pomigliano d’Arco in the Province of Naples and provides services for 35 communes, 11 districts and 600,000 inhabitants. The ASL in Locri (Reggio Calabria) provides a good example of how, through territorial control, clans manage to control economic activities: ASL 9, which serves the population of 42 communes in the surrounding area, with a catchment zone of around 135,000 inhabitants, exists in an area which is both large and characterized by the presence of powerful Mafioso clans dedicated to controlling business activities. Over the years, they have organized dangerous pacts with local authorities in order to be able to influence their decisions and make sure that they were assigned public resources earmarked for public works and services. The interference of criminal organizations in certain communes … has meant that many elective bodies have had no alternative but to allow themselves to become infiltrated by Mafiosi. (AdS, appendix, 2006: 2) This illustrates how organized crime groups apply the same criminal methods of violence and intimidation they use with municipal councils to other authorities managing economic activities.


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Marasca (2006: 12) has argued that, over the last 18 years, there has been a developing trend which has seen organized crime groups infiltrate bigger cities, councils and urban centres as opposed to rural areas. Indeed, the picture of organized crime– politics collusion of the mid-1990s set the trend for what has developed: in 1993, we had pockets of illegality, zones (such as the Provinces of Naples and Caserta) where the relationship was clearly starting to become a nexus but more a total symbiosis, a fusion of both politics and crime. We have examples, such as Marano, Casal di Principe or Quindici where politicians and criminals were one and shared the same political and economic interests. As a prefecture document pointed out at the time: ‘in some smaller towns, we are witnessing a quasi total symbiosis of civil society with organized crime, even at the level of the local political elite’ (Prefettura di Napoli 1995: 10). But, these were still pockets rather than a general situation. Between 1996 and 2000, only 31 councils were dissolved, whereas, since 2000, the relationship has exploded again and become more widespread, intense and intimate. Maybe this is because criminals gangs have reorganized politically after Italy’s initial transition phase and strong anti-organized crime push in the early 1990s.

From 2000: a very intimate relationship? In order to see whether the situation has changed since the early 1990s, we studied all decrees of local councils dissolved for Mafia infiltration between 2000 and 2007. This gives in total 86 decrees (see Table 11.6). Between decades, there appears to have been a transformation and an evolution in the relationship. Hence, this is not a static relationship; it is forever changing. What becomes clear is that politicians who might in the past have held the upper hand (see Allum 2006) slowly lose power as criminal gangs come to control every aspect of local government. By analyzing these decrees, we can clearly see that the situation has evolved since 1991. We can now talk of a complete criminalization of local politics by Mafia groups. Indeed, as already mentioned, new legislation was introduced to reduce Mafia influence in local politics, but, as Franco Roberti, the former coordinator of the Direzione Distrituale Antimafia (the specialized anti-Mafia law enforcement agency) in Naples, has recently observed: ‘nothing has changed. We Table 11.6 Councils per region dissolved (2000–7) Region


Campania

30

Sicily

28

Calabria

27

Lazio

1

Total

86

Source: Sportello Scuola e Univerisità, Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia/consigli comunali sciolti online.



just have a clearer picture and more details about organized crime’s links with local politics’ (Roberti, interview 31 October 2008). Hence, the new legislation has in real terms had very little impact. Councils may be dissolved for Mafia infiltration but this does not mean that the Mafia has been destroyed or eliminated – indeed, far from it. From our evidence of decrees, we note that the clans are now managing to exercise total control over the local government apparatus. But what does this mean exactly? The clans, by seeking total control over local government, are actually seeking social, economic and political control. It is in this order that they take over. But is this a nexus or total fusion? Let’s take a closer look.

Social influence and control over local government Criminal gangs now exert considerable social influence over the local government structure. By social influence, we mean that they influence and dominate the municipal employees, their decisions and the way they behave. We believe that the criminals’ behaviour influences local government officials, so that their behaviour, agenda and interests become one. The municipal employees are often local persons, with limited qualifications and yet they are fundamental players in the local bureaucratic structure. They are the people who prepare the official documents for subcontracts, sign the documents to validate them and keep the local administration working. We have identified four ways in which criminal gangs influence personnel, or, in other words, have social influence over local government. First, the gangs influence who is employed as municipal employees, those who form the personnel of the administration which runs the municipal business. For example, in Afragola (Naples) many local government employees have criminal records: ‘It emerged that most municipal employees had previous convictions for crimes against the state and public administration’ (AdS, appendix 2005: 3). Moreover, in Isola di Capo Rizzuto (Crotone) for example, as in many other communes, there is a network of friends and relatives of the criminal clans who work in the council: Local criminal organizations have forced themselves onto the municipal administration by means of an intricate web of family relationships, kinships, friendships and acquaintances. They exploited their decisions and used them to work for their own interests. No part of local government was free from links to organized crime. As well as the five members of the Municipal Junta being related by family or kin to people involved in organized crime, it also emerged that some of the employees had affiliations with the local clan, while others, including the director of a strategic department of the commune, were related to Mafioso members, or those who belonged to criminal families. (AdS, appendix 2003: 2). The gangs manage to place either their own members or individuals related to the gang, who would look upon them favourably, in these roles. In Torre del Greco

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(Naples): ‘Many municipal employees had criminal records of various kinds. Three of them had committed crimes that had the Mafia stamp on them. One of these was even the brother of the clan boss’ (AdS, appendix 2005: 2). Moreover, the fact that these people are not necessarily well qualified or economically well off can mean that they can be influenced and violate important procedures, rules and regulations if necessary. In Isola di Capo Rizzuto (Crotone) [s]ome of those, who had been assigned to areas which were particularly delicate and important, demonstrated very serious administrative disorder, a perfect breeding ground for clientelism and influencing public affairs. In fact, it was found that these employees had no personnel file at all and there were serious gaps in the documentation relating to the assignment of socially and publicly useful posts. An examination of the documents relating to the recruitment of personnel reveals a number of very serious irregularities … (AdS appendix 2003: 3) Second, we have found clear evidence that these local government officials favour criminal gangs in all their activities. As we have noted, these officials make important decisions, as do municipally employed traffic wardens and policemen. There are many examples of preferential treatment on the part of the local government officials towards the clans: building permits, business permits, transport permits, etc. In Santa Maria La Carità (Naples), for example, the local government authorities ‘issue authorizations for garages and commercial activities, without the necessary checks being carried out on people with extensive criminal records’ (AdS appendix 2002: 4). As a consequence, ‘the penetration of criminal activity within local government has favoured the consolidation of a system of connivance and collusion which deprives the community of its fundamental democratic guarantees and, indirectly, puts public safety in general in jeopardy’ (ibid.). In Casoria (Naples), decisions systematically favoured the clans: they are characterized by anomalies which seem to be symptomatic of an attitude of favouritism towards certain people. This even happened with the issue of a building concession [AdS appendix 2005: 3], which, moreover, … was issued in favour of a company which had family links to the nephew of one of the henchmen of a powerful Camorra organization. (2005: 3) Third, we also find examples of local government officials who do not respect the rules and, therefore, allow the clan to do whatever it wants. This is particularly the case in the building sector. Thus, in Torre del Greco (Naples) one example of the conditioning of public officials can be found in the case in which building authorization for a sanatorium was issued to the wife of



the clan leader. She owned an apartment building which had been shut down after the police uncovered serious abuse. From the judicial documents, we can assume that the clan boss had spoken to the councillor and employee in question to ensure a favourable outcome for his wife. (AdS appendix 2005: 3) The clan is so powerful that it can even have officials who are proving unhelpful removed, as in the case of Nicotera (Vibo Valentia): ‘… the technical officer, who expressed a negative opinion of the decision, … was transferred to another job just a few months later and repeatedly subjected to intimidation. After a short time, he resigned’ (AdS appendix 2005: 3). In addition, there are now rigid Anti-Mafia Rules, whereby Anti-Mafia Certificates are necessary in order to be able to have the right to win a public contract or undertake any business in relation to municipal services. A company must have no links to Mafia activities or associates. But in the majority of the 86 decrees examined, this rule was systematically violated. All councils appear to violate this rule and Boscoreale (Naples) is emblematic of this practice: … the Communal Administration many times omitted to acquire the antimafia information required for companies competing for a contract before making an offer. Moreover, they assigned certain works to a company whose members were related to people involved in organized crime. (AdS appendix 2006: 3–4) In Afragola (Naples) ‘When you look at the documentation for the contract section, you see that Anti-Mafia certification is consistently absent …’ (AdS appendix 2005: 4). Last, the gang demands social respect and loyalty from the community. They seek a clear show of social influence and prestige. Both politicians and local government officials must openly demonstrate respect. For example, in San Luca (Reggio Calabria) local officials attended funerals of Mafiosi: ‘The regular participation of administrative and communal employees in the funeral ceremonies of well-known criminals was symptomatic of the previously noted state of connivance’ (AdS appendix 2000: 2).

Economic influence of clans We define ‘economic influence’ as being when the criminal gang can influence the economic decisions made by the council. In other words, it can determine who receives the public contracts. In this way, a total fusion of economic agendas has developed. Here, we found evidence of intricate systems to deviate public funds into the pockets of companies linked to Mafia groups: ‘organized criminals are able to influence the assignment of garages and public contracts’ (Bargheria AdS appendix: 2). Municipal employees are guilty of either simply giving a public contract to a Mafia-linked company (in other words, favouritism or clientelism) or

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bending and ignoring the rules in order to make sure that the criminal gang wins the public contract. Thus, in Afragola (Naples) Interference in business affairs and exploitation of administrative decisions find their roots in the involvement of certain local officials in criminal environments. This is further endorsed by a thick network of associations and relationships between civil servants, their dependents and those who mix in organized criminal circles. When it comes to public contracts, these are characterized by irregularities, incongruities and anomalies. (AdS appendix 2005: 2) Or, in the case of San Paolo al Belsito (Napoli) the intrusion of those linked to organized crime in the execution of contracts for hiring illuminations for the Christmas festivities, already most irregularly assigned to a company whose de facto manager had a number of convictions relating to organized crime, is symptomatic of the climate of contradictions that characterizes local gangster organizations. (AdS appendix 2002: 2) The majority of clans in the 86 communes we investigated resorted to similar techniques to deviate public funds. These are the ‘trattativa privata’ (a negotiated procedure); the ‘cottimo fiduciario’ (direct negotiation with companies), the ‘somma urgente’ (emergency procedure) and the asta pubblica (public auction). These are legal tendering-out methods which are used and managed inappropriately by the municipal employees and clans; the main object of all these different mechanisms is to give public contracts to organized crime companies. We must not forget that in order to be able to do this, Mafia clans infiltrate or befriend companies which they can use to win public contracts, as was the case in Strongoli (Crotone): In fact, it became apparent that organized crime has taken over control of public contracts by means of companies managed by people with former links to criminal circuits. These companies were in a position to be able to tender for the contracts while actually forming part of the local clans that their owners headed up’. (AdS appendix 2003: 3) The two most favoured methods are the trattativa privata (negotiated procedure) or the somma urgente (emergency procedure). The trattativa privata consists of a tendering process in which a company is chosen and given a public contract. At least 15 companies have to be involved and the contract must not be more than 300,000 euros. The clans in collusion with the local government officials can violate all these rules, as is often the case. Often, there are not 15 companies, there are larger sums of money than advertised and the winning companies have links with



Mafia groups. But, the important players here are the civil servants. In Montecorvino Pugliano (Salerno), the Junta assigned the cleaning contract for the school system by trattativa privata, which violated the principles of impartiality and transparency as well as failing to fulfil the legal requirements: Further illegalities and irregularities emerged in the assignment of cleaning services for travelling medics, which was done at public auction but without all the necessary elements … being fulfilled. All this combines to show clearly that there was no freedom of choice because of the interference of external factors in local politics. This can be traced back to organized crime, which has compromised the fundamental guarantees of democracy. (AdS appendix 2003: 4) The somma urgenza (emergency procedure) is usually applied to the building sector where there is an emergency which could endanger the public. In this case, the council can give contracts for public works to whoever they want immediately, without there being a limit to the sum of money involved. In Soriano Calabro (Vibo Valentia), ‘Those contracts assigned directly by emergency procedures were not supported by valid evidence’ (AdS appendix 2007:4–5). Occasionally, the council gives public money to clan-related activities such as cultural associations. This was the case in Boscoreale (Naples): in particular, it emerged from the checks carried out that this was the institutional asset of one of the benevolent associations, which was emblematically split into an intricate system of relationships between those representing local politics and the members of organized crime gangs or those linked to them by family ties or association. (AdS appendix 2006: 4)

Political influence By political influence we mean that the clan can control the council’s decisions either by dominating the electoral process (in many cases, they place family members in party lists) or by dictating terms. As Siebert has observed, these groups have a ‘totalizing nature’ (1996: 3). We have found evidence of clans influencing elections (through the use of violence or fraudulent means) and placing their own political representatives, as well as the clan directly influencing political and economic decisions for their personal benefit. These techniques and methods were already present in the early 1990s (see Allum 2006) but in a less systematic way. These are present in the majority of the 86 councils studied. Clans still systematically campaign for their candidates; for example, in Calanna (Reggio Calabria) it was clear that heavy forms of intimidation carried out within the territory by the local clan denied voters an unconditional expression of their vote and inhibited the free

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manifestation of the electoral process and the actions of local government bodies, which were reduced to mere instruments of power for organized crime. (AdS appendix 2004: 3) In Santa Maria La Carità (Naples) in 2002, for example, one elected councillor was served with precautionary measures and arrested because it was believed that he was responsible ‘for various Mafia-type crimes … and for having agreed to operate within the network to the advantage of organized crime clans in exchange for electoral advantage’ (AdS appendix 2002: 2). In San Paolo Belsito (Naples) in 2002, a former mayor (‘a charismatic figure who had many times assumed the role of mayor and who, in the past, had been under judicial surveillance on suspicion of being a privileged interlocutor of criminal organizations’) helps the election of his son, both of whom appear to be close to the clan: certain elements which were indicative of external interference were noted, particularly during the pre-electoral period, during which the candidate appeared to be conditioning the vote. Once elected as mayor, it emerged that the father had used intimidation and threats towards opposition candidates to persuade them to withdraw their candidatures. (AdS appendix 2002: 2) In terms of placing their own political representatives, there are many examples of politicians and local administrators who are related by blood to clan members. They become the clan’s representatives. In Soriano Calabro (Vibo Valentia) ‘two civil servants were linked by family ties to a long-term criminal, while another was linked to somebody who had been sent to prison for Mafia-type crimes (AdS appendix 2007: 2). In Terme Vigliatore (Messina) the Commission indicated, as symptomatic of the links between the aforementioned criminal and the Municipal Council, that the administration had favoured him both directly and indirectly, because he was the brother of the ex-deputy Mayor and the uncle of the then President of the Town Council. (AdS appendix 2005: 2) Marcedusa (Catanzaro) furnishes an example of the fusion, union and overlap between political and criminal worlds: The deputy mayor assumed a particular importance, because he had held local government positions without interruption since 1988 and, as such, had also been under investigation for serious crimes. His wife was the sister of two criminals who were at that time in special detention centres for their involvement in a large and powerful criminal organization operating in a number of other Italian cities and had personal contacts with members of various Mafia families. It emerged from recent investigations that … he had, in particular,

Local politics and organized crime in contemporary Italy 177 favoured the expansion of organized crime into the management of public contracts. (AdS appendix 2001: 3)


The clan’s and the politicians’ interests become one and the same; in this way, a system of ‘co-interests’ is put into place which favours the clan. In Montecorvino Pugliano (Salerno) the role of the Mayor was fundamental in favouring of the clan: The Mayor, however, has had a central role in favouring the pervasive interference of organized crime in the life of the local council. He has instigated a system of shared interests between external bodies and administrative organs for dominance in economic activities connected to the public sector. (AdS appendix 2003: 2) In Marano (Naples), the overlap is clear: Interference in the affairs of the organization and exploitation of administrative decisions have been made possible by the family relationships and friendships which link certain local government officials and elements of the administrative apparatus with members of organized crime or people suspected of mixing in Mafia circles. (AdS appendix 2004: 2) If there is any resistance, the clans use one of their natural resources, violence: for example, in Soriano Calabro (Vibo Valentia) the aggression to which a municipal councillor was subjected after he spoke out against the precariousness of the conditions of Communal buildings and, specifically, the inappropriate occupation of one of them, is emblematic in this regard. This aggression was at the hands of the very same person who was using the Communal land in an inappropriate fashion and who, moreover, was a relative of someone with an extensive criminal record, already under police surveillance and enforced reporting, and had been arrested together with the other boss and charged with crimes relating to association with delinquents and fraud. (AdS appendix 2007: 2) There are other examples. The situation in San Tammaro (Caserta) is emblematic of the new dynamic: The Mayor and the Junta assigned responsibility for key administrative posts – financial sector and staff office of the Mayor – to two directors who had mutually beneficial dealings with organized criminals and had previously been assigned to administrative sectors of similar importance by the outgoing administration. (AdS appendix 2005: 2–3)

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Some conclusions: between the devil and the deep blue sea What is the situation today? Before 1991, the evidence and picture we had of organized crime’s relationship with local politics was vague and based on hearsay. There was clearly some kind of relationship but it was difficult to document. In a previous study (Allum 2006), we compared the politics–organized crime relationship in the 1950–60s with that of the 1980–90s and showed that in the 1950–60s it was the politicians – as key actors with access to economic resources – who controlled and dominated the situation. A key example was Achille Lauro’s relationship with Giuseppe Navara, il Re di Poggioreale (Allum 2006). However, by the end of the 1980–90s, the relationship had been turned on its head: in the 1950s–60s, the criminal gangs engaged in a clientelistic relationship; in the 1980s–90s, the relationship evolved and was taken over by the clans. A symbiosis or overlap of the three spheres had begun, but the different elements and systems could still be identified. By 2000, these differences were no longer distinguishable (see Figure 11.1). This brief analysis confirms our previous findings, but draws out a more sinister picture. Rather than simply noting the ‘unacknowledged successes of the antiMafia fight’ (Paoli 2007), we must face reality: today, there is a union between criminals and local politicians whereby it becomes very difficult to disentangle the different positions and roles. The political and criminal agenda are the same. Rather than a nexus, there is fusion, an overlap in which the political and criminal agenda become one, a union, a crossover. This is more extensive than in the 1990s. The reality described goes beyond the political pact which both the Della Porta and Vannuci (1999) and Allum (2006) models describe; and is more than the nexus Godson describes (2003). Why has this intimate relationship developed? There are several factors worth mentioning briefly which may answer this question. First, Italian governments are

Figure 11.1 Organized crime and local politics in 2000s: ‘totalizing’.


Local politics and organized crime in contemporary Italy 179 responsible for not having put into place strict legislation which would bar both politicians and civil servants from entering local politics if they have a criminal record or proven links with organized crime. Second, the national political parties have not made sure that their local branches do not become involved with local clans. They have not expelled members who have these links and do not take action (where possible) to exclude them. The up and coming provincial elections will probably prove this again. Last, the presence of ‘corruptible’ municipal employees has helped organized crime in its quest for political power. Their role is fundamental in the expansion of organized crime into local politics and yet too often ignored as is this whole subject by the political elite, the national media and even academic researchers.

Note 1 I would like to thank Marco Appoggi, Panos Kostakos, Federico Varese, Clive Harfield and Francesca Longo for comments. Copyright Kate Precious 2009.

12 The crime–terror nexus Do threat perceptions align with ‘reality’?


Tamara Makarenko

The relationship between crime and terrorism is one that precedes the events of 9/11, and the subsequent transformation of how security is perceived in democracies. A crime–terror nexus, regardless of how it is defined, is not a new security dynamic, but one that has evolved over several decades. Although academic interest and government acknowledgement of this phenomenon dates back to the 1980s, debate has been sporadic at best. Discourse on the relationship between crime and terrorism has often coincided with landmark security events – such as the growth of the cocaine trade in South America; the emergence of post-Cold War grievances embodied in ‘new’ conflicts; and, the connection drawn between al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the Afghan heroin trade post 9/11. As a result, the comparatively young crime–terror debate provides an illustrative example of the gap that exists in how governments interpret and portray a security agenda, and how electorates perceive security. Somewhere on the outskirts of this debate sits the ‘reality’ of the threat posed by the crime–terror nexus. Piercing the social discourse of the crime–terror nexus, and understanding the context in which political actors have placed this phenomenon, helps provide perspective on what the ‘reality’ of the threat is. This is detrimental to security primarily because our socially induced (mis-) understanding of the ‘real’ nature of threats is often translated into misguided policy, misappropriated use of government resources, and the creation of an ill–informed (and potentially phobia-induced) public. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to ask whether the interaction between crime and terrorism increases the security faced by Western society, or whether the crime–terror nexus merely acts as a tool that makes both criminal and terrorist enterprise more effective and efficient. In dissecting this question, this chapter will simultaneously suggest that the threat emanating from the crime–terror nexus is varied, and the type of threat that emerges from the nexus is dependent on the presence of certain factors and conditions. For example, evidence indicates that the relationship between crime and terrorism is, in part, defined by geography and the characteristics of the groups involved (i.e. size, infrastructure needs, etc.). Thus it is not entirely accurate to ask whether or not the relationship between crime and terrorism exacerbates the security threat we face, but what type of relationship it is that contributes to insecurity in any given time and place.

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Policy rhetoric and academic discourse Public discourse regarding the relationship between crime and terrorism has created a very specific understanding of the phenomenon, thus pigeon-holing how the concept is perceived. Official and media statements touching on the relationship between crime and terrorism can often be traced to specific security events and subsequent attempts by government to promote policy efforts. For example, the crime–terror nexus received heightened attention in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and coalition engagement in Afghanistan. Tying together al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the Afghan heroin trade provided additional public justification for military efforts that combined targeting remnant militants/terrorists and seeking to instil a democratic government with the legitimacy and capacity to fight the drug trade. References to links between crime and terrorism have also been effectively used in connection with government debates regarding the need to bolster legal and regulatory frameworks related to money laundering and the proceeds of crime. Despite the political context surrounding when and how government officials portray the nexus, the concept has justifiably been used to highlight how terrorism and organized crime adapt in their operating environments. However, nexus rhetoric also highlights the disjuncture between government officials acknowledging the crime–terror nexus, and subsequently using that knowledge to adapt security policies. One of the first mentions of the nexus between crime and terrorism emerged in a statement given by former US President Ronald Reagan, whose administration was caught up with political unrest in many Latin American states. The concept of ‘narco-terrorism’ subsequently set the stage for a small wave of academic writing on the subject, beginning with the seminal study published by Rachel Ehrenfeld (1990) and continued in the works of observers including Kaplan (1996), Lavigne (1991), Manwaring (1991, 1993), and Raufer (1992). The declared existence of a growing menace that emerged from the alliance of drug traffickers and terrorist group was given some analytical credibility at a time when drugs, terrorism and insurgent groups were cooperating throughout the world. For example, in Latin America Colombia was faced with waves of violence perpetrated by the Cali and Medellin cocaine cartels, and FARC and M-19 began to elicit funds from the narcotics trade by protecting airstrips and taxing land used by the cartels. A similar situation was occurring in neighbouring Peru with Sendero Luminoso, and in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley where drugs transited territory controlled by Hizb’allah. In fact, official statements referring to a nexus between crime and terrorism in the pre-9/11 environment focused almost exclusively on the narcotics link to terrorism and terrorist financing. This is highlighted in President William Clinton’s 1995 address to the UN when he noted a ‘… growing nexus between terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and other international criminals’. Testifying before the US House Judiciary Committee, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) administrator Donnie Marshall (2000) stated that some ‘insurgent fronts have become little more than bands of well-armed thugs that sell their services to drug traffickers’. This was reiterated by the State Department Coordinator


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for counterterrorism, Michael Sheehan (2000), whose testimony highlighted that some ‘terrorists have developed loose mutually beneficial relationships with drug traffickers to support both the terrorists and drug traffickers’ interests’. These statements were given to bring attention to the fact that US law enforcement had evidence that narco-terrorism was evolving into a significant threat. However, despite citing Afghanistan and Colombia as noteworthy examples, the US administration did not use these findings to alter their anti-drug and counter-terrorism approaches. Writing almost 20 years after Reagan’s initial statement, David Luna (2008), director for anti-crime projects at the US State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, perceptively noted: ‘We cannot divine solutions if we fail to comprehend the full dimensions of a challenge, much less the interlinkages between narco-trafficking and terror finance …’ Although concerns regarding the security impact of narco-terrorism were identified three decades ago, many academics (i.e. Naylor 1995; Miller and Damask 1996; Hoffman 1998) and government officials insisted on drawing a sharp distinction between the two phenomena, basing their arguments primarily on the conclusion that profit and political motives of each type of group are too strong to result in any significant coming together. The events of 9/11 heralded a significant change in how government officials viewed the terrorist threat. Making connections between seemingly separate security threats provided ample justification for pushing through ground-breaking policy reforms and security measures in the name of counter-terrorism. Early official statements incorporating a crime–terror dynamic focused almost solely on crime as a source of terrorist financing, or on alliances formed between terrorist groups and criminal networks – a throwback to the 1980/90s’ debate on narcoterrorism. However, statements on the relationship between crime and terrorism have recently gone beyond the coming together of two entities, diving into the realm of heralding convergence theories and the existence of hybrid organizations. Below are illustrative examples of references by government representatives: Understanding linkages between terrorism and transnational crime is of more than theoretical importance. If the links are not acknowledged, there is a risk of nations approaching terrorism in a way that will not be in the interests of human security and risks duplicating efforts between the significant resources already existing in criminal justice systems and those special agencies established to specifically counter terrorism. (CSCAP 2003) It has become more and more difficult to distinguish clearly between terrorist groups and organized crime, since their tactics increasingly overlap. The world is seeing the birth of a new hybrid of ‘organized crime–terrorist organizations’, and it is imperative to sever the connection (Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UNODC, quoted in UN 2004). Between 2002 and 2006, similar statements were made by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UN representatives, and by


The crime–terror nexus 183 regional organizations, including the G8, ASEAN, the EU, and the Task Force on Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea Region. However, despite UNSCR 1373 (2001 para. 4) noting with concern the ‘close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime’, and the G8 Recommendations on Transnational Crime (2002) recommending member states strengthen their response to ‘the interaction between international terrorism and organized crime activities’, what is apparent is that statements regarding the nexus during this period remained quite general, underlining a lack of analytical understanding regarding the intricacies of crime–terror dynamics. Although some analytical work was completed in an effort to dissect the components of the nexus (Makarenko 2001, 2003, 2004; Dishman 2001; Curtis and Karacan 2002; Shelley and Picarelli 2002), other established academics continued to discredit this connection, arguing that the threat of a crime– terror nexus was exaggerated (Naylor 2002), and that these ‘and other political statements were beginning to brandish the fear that alliances and various forms of complicity and collaboration could form between terrorist groups and conventional criminal organizations’ (Dandurand and Chin 2004). The notion that discussions regarding a crime–terror nexus were ‘brandishing fear’ is an interesting one given the knowledge that official statements made since 1990 have been based on evidentiary links that emerged from cases compiled by various national security services and law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, investigations have led to the public dissemination of how crime and terrorism have come together, with the press coverage of the Madrid bombings in 2004 providing ample evidence that the crime–terror nexus is applicable not only to the ‘troubled lands’ of Afghanistan and Colombia, but equally to Western Europe. Arguably, it has been a lack of intricate knowledge regarding how the crime–terror nexus plays out within the international arena that invites contradictory remarks to be drawn regarding its existence. Producing commentary based on localized events and knowledge is one thing, but seeking to understand the international and strategic implications of an evolving security threat is an exercise that takes time. Although interest in the nexus has been raised within security agendas since 9/11, there is no indication that official comments have been unfounded or exaggerated – but merely overly general and lacking context. Since 2007 there has been a marked difference in how government officials refer to a relationship between organized crime and terrorism, and how that relationship is perceived within a security and threat context. For example, in a document published by HM Treasury (2007: 8), it was noted that although the extent of the links between terrorism and organized crime vary between countries, ‘together they pose a serious and immediate threat to the UK and other open societies’. Director for anti-crime projects at the US State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, David Luna, also noted in an interview (Zwaniecki 2008) that ‘there is growing evidence of convergence: terrorist organizations evolving into crime enterprises and criminal organizations resorting to radical tactics. This is particularly true in countries where corruption is rife and institutions are weak.’ He continued to urge the international community to ‘enhance intelligence and evidence collection to better understand the linkages between organized crime

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networks, corruption nodes and terrorist organizations’. Thus while the ‘debate moves forward on the extent of the crime–terror nexus, what is given is that terrorists are indeed engaging more in criminal activities to guarantee success of their actions and evolving into criminal enterprises’ (Luna 2008), both academics and policy-makers involved in the debate on the crime–terror nexus would agree that ‘we can gain a clearer picture of the criminal-terror nexus by focusing on the convergence of criminal activities by illicit actors at critical nodes – where illicit networks intersect, when corruption eases criminal transactions, and how the drug trade and other proceeds of crime are used to finance terrorist activities’ (Luna 2008).

Identifying the nexus: what and how Based on the policy rhetoric outlined in the previous section, the concept of a crime–terror nexus has been identified as something that exacerbates insecurity, but such generalizations beg the question: what exactly is the crime–terror nexus? Over the past several years a body of academic literature has emerged in an attempt to develop our understanding of the nexus, both in terms of the dynamics of how organized crime and terrorism interact, and in terms of how cooperation and confluence between these phenomena create greater complexity in the context of counter-terrorism and anti-crime initiatives. It is insufficient to remark that organized crime and terrorism interact, and in doing so create greater national and international instability. It is fundamental that the nexus is treated as a complex issue that has evolved beyond terrorist groups using criminal activities as a source of financing, and terrorist and criminal groups cooperating on the level of ad hoc alliances. Although a ‘nexus’ generally refers to a tie or link between independent entities, in the context of the connection between crime and terrorism, such a link occurs on a series of planes: one operational, one evolutionary, and one conceptual. Operationally, the nexus is understood in relation to entities, and can take one of two forms: the adoption of the tactics of the ‘other’ (i.e. a criminal network using terror tactics), or the functional merging of a criminal group and terrorist group. This merger can materialize as an ad hoc alliance or it can involve the integration of one group into the other. Evolutionally, the nexus refers to the transformation of the tactics and motivation of one entity into another – thus a terrorist group may evolve into a criminal network or vice versa. Conceptually, crime and terrorism are treated as clearly defined actions. As such, a nexus occurs when both activities occupy the same space and time. In this context of ‘convergence’, a hybrid entity emerges and simultaneously displays ideological and economic motivations by perpetrating acts of politically motivated terrorism and engaging in organized criminal activity for profit maximization. In assessing the interaction between crime and terrorism on any one plane, it may be suggested that the depth of relationship is often dependent on the nature of the geographic region in which the nexus is established (Makarenko 2007). In Western democracies the nexus is largely isolated to the operational plane, often focused on terrorist groups engaging in crime as a source of funding. In transitional states the



Figure 12.1 The crime–terror nexus.

nexus includes the operational and conceptual plane, with evidence of convergent motivations dominating groups operating in regions such as the Balkans. Finally, the nexus is at its most interactive and developed in (post)conflict territory, combining each plane of interaction – potentially evolving into a black hole scenario. For this reason, the crime–terror nexus is most obvious in parts of South America, Southeast Asia and Eurasia. Combined with these geographical determinants (or political conditions) of the crime–terror nexus is a set of additional factors that help provide a framework around our understanding of when, how and potentially why a relationship between crime and terrorism emerges. These factors fall under the general heading of ‘organizational learning dynamics’. As Rosenthal (2008: 482) amply concludes, ‘Terrorist groups are not black boxes; they are organic organizations – capable of evolution and adaptation.’ The same conclusion can be drawn for organized crime networks. Rosenthal (2008) identifies three main catalysts that have the potential to transform a politically motivated terrorist group into one that is motivated primarily by profit maximization: the destruction of the leadership structure; political transformations ‘that debunk the ideological basis of the group’; and ‘opportunities for financial gain so great that they subsume ideological motives’. Although these are important dynamics, they are subsumed within an alternative framework presented by Jackson, et al. (2005) in a study on organizational learning in terrorist groups. The characteristics that affect terrorist group learning abilities identified in this study can be used to help further define the crime–terror nexus by building an understanding of the nexus at each point of interaction. Eight characteristics were identified, and include: structure and command relationships, group culture, resources devoted to learning, connections to knowledge sources, group operational environment, stability of membership, absorptive capacity for new knowledge, and nature of communications mechanisms (2005: xiii). The nexus is about explaining how non-state actors adapt to their environment and continue to constitute a law enforcement and/or security problem by learning how to be more efficient and effective in their structure, decision-making processes and tactics. To be successful, terrorist groups and criminal networks must change, and to change effectively, they must learn (2005: 9). It is thus through the learning process that a group can react to shifts in their operating environment, match tactics to operational needs, and capitalize on new opportunities thereby increasing its rate of success. Arguably, the better an organization learns and

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adapts to its environment in the context of the crime–terror nexus, the greater the threat it is likely to pose on multiple levels. Taking these definitional and explanatory parameters into consideration, an assessment of the ‘real’ threat posed by the crime–terror nexus can be made.


Does the nexus pose a ‘threat’: where and when? Given the various dynamics of the nexus it would be an overgeneralization to merely state that this phenomenon increases the security threat on all levels of analysis. Thus many of the quotes referenced in the beginning of this chapter draw inaccurate conclusions given the context in which they are given. Although there is little doubt that there is a growing relationship between organized crime and terrorism, to ascertain that this increases the threat faced from terrorism is somewhat premature. Depending on the context, it appears as though the greatest threat from the nexus is not that it contributes to destructive capability or capacity, but that it acts as a tool (functional and learning) to make both terrorist and criminal enterprise more efficient. This is evident when looking at how the nexus interacts in different political environments.

The nexus in unstable environments1 Criminal networks and terrorist organizations that exist in environments characterized by perpetual conflict and instability highlight the most advanced security

Figure 12.2 Where/how the nexus poses a threat.



issues associated with the nexus. Constituting de facto ‘safe havens’, weak and failed states foster nefarious collaboration, which subsequently seeks to perpetuate a condition of civil (or regional) war to secure economic and political power. At an extreme end, this is reflected in the conditions of territory in places like Afghanistan, Angola, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Indonesia and Thailand where government control is fragmented and extremely weak, if existent at all. Although unstable, but not necessarily classified as failed states, conditions in many African states also fall within this category when assessments of relations between criminal and terrorist networks are concerned. In most of these situations conflict has provided legitimation for various criminal forms of private aggrandizement while at the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in order to sustain the war. The warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both to reproduce their positions of power and for access to resources. (Kaldor 1999: 110) Conflict that besets the interaction between crime and terrorism share several common characteristics: for one, these conflicts usually have no clear military objective and lack political order. Instead, military units constitute ‘little more than marauding bands acting quite independently’ and ‘showing no discipline whatsoever in the actions they were committing.’ (Snow 1996: 109–11) Furthermore, it is evident that the perpetuation of conflict, as opposed to victory, becomes a priority in order to create ideal conditions for criminal activities to flourish (Berdal and Serrano 2002: 199) among groups equally motivated by the ‘accumulation of wealth, control of territory and people, freedom of movement and action, and legitimacy. Together, these elements represent usable power – power to allocate values and resources in society’ (Manwaring 1993: 7–8) Unlike traditional organized crime, epitomized by the established hierarchical groups such as the Japanese Yakuza, which is dependent on the international financial system and state stability, criminal networks that grew from within unstable environments have no innate loyalty to the state. As a result, the risk calculations made to cross the criminal–terrorist divide are based more on fulfilling immediate benefits rather than assessing longterm repercussions. Links between crime and terrorism in environments characterized by perpetual instability emerged as early as the 1980s – originally as specific alliances between criminal and terrorist groups. The first such documented alliances were created in Latin America between terrorist groups such as Colombia’s FARC and the Shining Path of Peru, and the infamous drug cartels (i.e. Cali and Medellin). In exchange for securing drug laboratories and airstrips, the terrorist groups collected a local tax from the drug trade. Relations between criminal and terrorist groups in South America evolved over the years, from the Medellin cocaine cartel allegedly hiring the ELN (National Liberation Army) to plant car bombs in 1993 (Clawson and Rensselaer 1996: 53), to FARC increasingly taking control over cocaine trafficking operations after the demise of the Cali and Medellin cartels and using cocaine


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as currency for arms shipments supplied by criminal groups in Mexico (Boucher 2000; Esparza 2001; Logan 2006) and Russia (Seper 2001; CNN 2000). As a result, the FARC is increasingly referred to as a group that has transformed into a predominantly criminal entity, and Colombian paramilitaries including the AUC (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) are characterized as hybrids, simultaneously seeking a political agenda while focusing a great deal of effort on expanding criminal enterprise. FARC is directly engaged in all aspects of the cocaine trade, and has made efforts to expand its criminal dossier to include heroin production (McDermott 2004). Furthermore, the focus of FARC has increasingly moved towards the acquisition of profit as opposed to conducting sustained political (and terrorist) campaigns to further its Marxist agenda. McDermott, referencing Colombian government documents, notes that more than 90 per cent of FARC’s income stems from criminal activities – bringing in an estimated US$1.36 billion in income, of which no more than US$282 million is estimated to be spent on weapons, training, explosives and bribes (McDermott 2005). This ‘disparity suggests that the group’s grand strategic objective is making money’ (Rosenthal 2008: 485) The continued existence of a narcotics economy and culture within South America will indefinitely undermine the creation of a functioning political system which is not itself implicated in corruption associated with securing, and thus perpetuating, the crime–terror nexus. Although South America is no longer characterized as an unstable environment, pockets of sustained instability, especially in the case of Colombia, set a worthwhile historical precedent against which contemporary examples could be compared. Other regions provide equally illustrative examples of how crime and terror collude and converge in environments impacted by sustained conflict or perpetual political instability. For example, various forms of the nexus can be identified in South and Southeast Asia, with extensive ties among the myriad groups operating in Thailand (Davies 2002, 2006, and the Indonesian conflict zones of Aceh, Sulawesi and Maluku (Davies 2002). The Abu Sayyaf Group and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan also provide solid examples of how groups can both morph from political into criminally dominant enterprises, or exhibit hybrid characteristics. In the case of Abu Sayyaf, the death of founder Abdurajak Abubakar Janjali in 1998 left the group without a clear ideological purpose, subsequently eroding its command structure with members of the criminal underground emerging in key leadership positions. This ultimately turned Abu Sayyaf from a group with strong separatist motivations to one whose ‘Islamic identity was subordinated to the quest for profit’ (Rogers 2004: 16 quoted in Rosenthal 2008: 483). The one example that has elicited significant attention with reference to the nexus is that of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Operationally, the group established ad hoc alliances to criminal networks from the 1980s, including ties to the Indian mafia (Prabha 2001) to sell illicit narcotics in exchange for arms. Throughout the 1990s these alliances extended to criminal groups in Pakistan, Burma and Central Asia to help the LTTE access weapons, training, established smuggling routes and corrupt officials required to facilitate the movement of human cargo and narcotics. The relationship between LTTE and organized crime


The crime–terror nexus 189 has significantly evolved through the years. Although it is believed that the group has maintained alliances with criminal groups in various parts of the world, operationally through its structure and membership base, is has evolved into a criminal organization that is arguably ‘superior to organized crime groups’ (Hutchinson and O’Malley 2008: 1102). With an established cell network throughout Europe, North America and the Middle East, the LTTE has established highly sophisticated extortion, arms and drug trafficking, fraud, piracy and human smuggling operations. In terms of institutionalizing criminal activity, the LTTE can be regarded as the most successful terrorist group in Southeast Asia (Makarenko 2005). In addition to terrorist groups evolving their operations to criminal enterprise in unstable environments, there are examples of criminal networks evolving into politically motivated organizations. One of the most interesting case studies is that of Dawood Ibrahim and his D-Company, which grew steadily since 1975 as a result of its activities in smuggling, arms and narcotics trafficking, extortion, protection rackets and illegal Hawala transfers (Clarke and Lee 2008: 385). Over time, Ibrahim began to support militant groups in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bangladesh and India; culminating in his own adoption of an extremist and militant Islamist ideology as a result of witnessing what he perceived as Muslim persecution. As a result, he was responsible for organizing the 1993 Bombay blasts, a series of explosions that resulted in the death of 257 people (2008; King 2004). Ibrahim has also been implicated in the Khan network. As Douglas Farah (2008) asserts, ‘This ability to cross relatively unimpeded between the worlds of legal business, organized criminal activities (kidnapping, extortion, drug running, smuggling of all kinds) and terrorism makes Ibrahim one of the primary “shadow facilitators” in the criminal-terrorist nexus.’

Interaction in transitional states Transitional states, generally incorporating the former Soviet Union, parts of Eastern Europe, the Americas and the Middle East, provide a different context for the crime–terror nexus. Unlike criminal and terrorist groups engaged in conflict and post-conflict societies, the nexus in transitional states is not necessarily about perpetuating instability, but about maximising short-term success. In this environment, illicit actors – regardless of whether they are characterized as criminals, or terrorists – have a driving interest in profit maximization as the route to ensure their survival. Poor border security, weak law enforcement, corrupt public officials and established smuggling networks facilitate this motivation. As such, in transitional states, the crime–terror nexus often follows the trade in high-value illicit commodities, such as narcotics and arms. Historically, transitional states have given rise to hybrid groups simultaneously seeking to attain political power and financial profit by combining terrorist tactics with criminal enterprise. In part, this is a throwback to the workings of the Communist environment wherein power was inextricably tied to one’s political and economic prowess. Albanian and Russian criminal groups are examples of ‘conglomerates of causes’ as both groups have, at one point in time or another, sought


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to produce an environment once only associated with terrorism: to ‘break or ruin the sense of social and political calm in a country’ (Harmon 2000: 54), seeking to add elements of political protest to their agendas in an effort to mobilize sufficient power to resist the state. In the case of Albania, the mafia successfully integrated its criminal and political activities to the point that the membership and recruitment base of the Albanian criminal network and the Kosovo Liberation Army were interchangeable through the mid-1990s. Of continued concern in the current environment, the former Soviet Union continues to provide black market access to an arsenal of weaponry. Controlled in most contexts by major international arms dealers, terrorists have yet to become a notable direct client of the black arms market. As a result, terrorist networks interested in acquiring weapons or related materials are reliant, at least in many transitional states, on criminal networks or individual intermediaries. This appears to have been the case in 2005 when Italian authorities uncovered an extensive arms trafficking network that supplied known Islamist militants (Shelley and Picarelli 2002). The ring supplied weapons through a network established between Bosnian criminals and the Camorra, the latter of which simultaneously sought to help the militants enter Europe clandestinely and provide them with arms and explosives. Similar concerns have emerged surrounding the smuggling of radiological materials from the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2005. With the support of the US, Georgian authorities orchestrated a sting operation in February 2006 in which ‘buyers’ were sent to the breakaway regions. Although ‘these individuals may not have been terrorists themselves, they have showed transparent willingness to do anything with anybody, so long as it generates money for their organization’ (Interviews 2007). The interest of criminal networks in transitional states to maximize profits and power has also been mirrored in South America; with South American authorities repeatedly expressing concerns regarding the willingness of criminal groups to provide services for foreign-based terrorist groups, directly engaging in the use of terror tactics, and in some cases simultaneously seeking political aims. For example, since 2005 reports have noted that Mexican and Peruvian groups – with no identifiable state or social allegiance – have attempted to specialize in establishing smuggling rings that trafficked Middle Easterners into the US. Concerns emerged when individuals with alleged ties to militant Islamist groups sought to become involved in these structures (Jamestown Foundation 2005). Human smuggling rings with the ability to facilitate the entry of militants into the US was further highlighted with the discovery of a Colombian false-passport ring which involved Colombian nationals and foreign nationals with ties to Jordan and the Palestinian territories (AP 2006). Of growing concern is the emergence of ‘political terrorism’, with the sole political motive to gain economic control over territory by ‘hollowing out the state and creating criminal enclaves to manoeuvre’ (Sullivan 2009: 2). This is currently evident with the Mexican drug cartels and the operations of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), and with the Triborder area of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina encompassing ‘the fullest development of a criminal enclave’ (2009: 3). In transitional states, the crime–terror nexus is often enhanced by the inability

The crime–terror nexus 191 of national governments to curtail corruption or assert legitimacy and authority throughout the state. Long histories of political instability and mistrust in bureaucracy and state institutions have created environments in which people are generally driven by concerns over securing the present, as opposed to concerns regarding the implications of their actions for the future. The cycle that results makes stability elusive, and in fact feeds into instability both internally and regionally.


Interaction in Western democracies2 The crime–terror nexus is most readily identifiable in environments characterized by some degree of instability – be it in a state of outright conflict, or suffering from entrenched corruption which fuels the rise of criminal enterprise and/or political discontent. In these environments not only is the existence of criminal and terrorist networks expected, but their interaction and the evolution of motivations seems natural. Identifying a crime–terror nexus in Western democracies, however, is significantly more complex. To begin with, these societies pose a host of obstacles to illicit operations, making internal group trust and loyalty more sensitive issues. Furthermore, there is a natural ideological divide between criminal and terrorist networks, highlighted by the fact that criminal groups successfully operating in the West have no interest in destroying the fabric of the society from which they prosper. As such, of all types of societies, the crime–terror nexus seems most unwelcome, and thus most unlikely, in Western democracies. That a crime–terror nexus can emerge in Western democracies, however, should not be entirely discarded. On the contrary, in addition to monitoring potential avenues of terrorist financing, there is a need to simultaneously monitor points where a potential relationship between crime and terror would be feasible. For example, in 2002 Italian authorities noted that criminal and terrorist cells were engaged in a reciprocal relationship wherein Italian criminal groups smuggled arms to Palestinian and North African groups in exchange for supporting Italian narcotics smuggling networks. That same year allegations regarding cooperation between the ’Ndrangheta and militant cells based in Italy also emerged, and in 2004 Italian authorities noted concerns regarding Neapolitan mafia converts establishing an arms-for-drugs network on behalf of Italian-based terrorist cells. The integration of these ‘types’ of individuals came to a head in 2004 when, following the Madrid attack (3/11), Spanish authorities discovered that drug traffickers were radicalized and integrated into the terrorist cell responsible – thus adding contacts and skill-sets required for successful preparation. A year later, French authorities dismantled an ‘illicit network’ which consisted of several individuals including known militants, radicalized delinquents and common criminals. The driver behind the cases of crime–terror interaction noted above is not believed to be profit maximization or a desire to secure an unstable operating environment. These connections appear to be based on a more complex equation, combining factors such as loyalties to a specific ethnic or religious community, or the emergence of sympathetic feelings – feelings often reflected in converts. These trends appear to be consistent throughout North America and Western


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Europe, and are most relevant in the context of radicalization and conversion of criminals within prison systems, as was the case with John Jose Padilla, Walker Lindh and Richard Reid. In fact, France, the US and the UK have all admitted that their prisons systems are vulnerable to charismatic radical Islamist leaders inspiring prisoners to join the global jihad. The problem of radicalization in respect to the US was succinctly established in a study by George Washington University and Critical Incident Analysis Group (2006), which identified four main radicalization processes: individual, organized, gang and para-radicalization. Potentially the most problematic in terms of the crime–terror nexus are gang radicalization and para-radicalization. In the former, pre-existing prison gangs are exploited to attract converts (thus taking advantage of an established system of trust and loyalty), and para-radicalization refers to a situation where non-radicalized individuals aid radicalized networks. Thus in addition to creating an inherent ‘home-grown’ terrorist threat, the interaction within prison systems also provides terrorist cells in Western democracies with access to the know-how required to conduct criminal activities which remain below the radar of law enforcement because they are naturally high volume and low cost (i.e. various types of fraud and petty crimes). Lacking the ‘correct’ environmental conditions and the existence of highly institutionalized terrorist groups that are engrained within the social fabric, the crime–terror nexus is least developed in Western democracies. With the exception of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Rosenthal 2008: 485), there are no indigenous groups that have had the need to build an infrastructure for survival. However, Western democracies are faced with a potentially more calculated risk from the nexus, one that is potentially more dangerous because it is less transparent and more adaptive.

Rhetoric, perceptions and reality of the crime–terror nexus With the exception of sustained concern regarding narco-terrorism, it was not until the post-9/11 environment that the relationship between crime and terrorism began to attract more focused analytical attention. Although some academics have discouraged the use of the term ‘crime–terror nexus’, a growing mound of evidence emerging from various countries is making it difficult to ignore that the crime– terror nexus is, in all reality, underplayed on the public realm. Entities embroiled in the crime–terror nexus not only ‘achieve more autonomy and resilience than groups that rely mainly on external donations’ (Richardson 2008), but they ‘find the cooperation and power they need in terms of sustaining financial efforts and goals; logistics and research; and shared tactics, techniques and operational procedures’ (Gray and Munyon 2008: 6). Whether or not the crime–terror nexus directly increases the threat posed by terrorism, especially to Western democracies, is difficult to assess. This is, in part, because the nexus complicates our understanding of security, threat and risk on an unparalleled number of levels. Within unstable environments, the level of threat that emanates from an evolving crime–terror nexus is dependent on whether or not the West is concerned about perpetual instability in specific regions. Thus a


The crime–terror nexus 193 nexus in Pakistan (because of its nuclear capability) may seem to include a higher risk to international stability and Western security than instability in Thailand. In an extreme case, the nexus threatens to create ‘black hole’ pockets akin to that which existed in Afghanistan – the associated security risks of which have become evident. Furthermore, the threat posed by the nexus in unstable environments is exemplified in other areas of policy concern. For example, the nexus has an impact on international drug policy because the areas in which the nexus operates to its fullest potential also source the majority of the global illicit narcotics trade. In the context of transitional states, the crime–terror nexus feeds into a list of more subtle threats to international stability and the security of Western democracies. As a key transit point in numerous smuggling routes, these states continue to feed unstable environments with weapons, and act as ‘intermediaries’ connecting both criminal and terrorist interests to the international financial system. Furthermore, the nexus in transitional states is not only about criminal and terrorist enterprise, but also about how these entities coexist, co-opt and converge with government and legitimate business. Weak political environments that continue to characterize transitional states subsequently sustain hybrid entities that have a ‘natural’ predilection towards combining the illicit with the licit, and attaining power through the acquisition of political and financial status. In terms of the direct threat posed by the nexus as it exists and evolves in Western democracies, this is most difficult to gauge given a lack of data from which to establish trends. The most evident threat, however, comes from localized terrorist cells engaging in limited criminal activities in order to collect enough funds to perpetrate a single terrorist attack. Given that most terrorist attacks do not cost a considerable amount of money – with the attacks on Madrid, Bali, Jakarta and the USS Cole amounting to an estimated US$10,000 to $75,000 each (Williams 1994: 5; Hutchinson and O’Malley 2008: 1099) – the amount of effort required to organize a criminal conspiracy to finance such an operation is not overly sophisticated. What is most obvious and concerning in an analytical context is that the crime– terror nexus provides a space within which both terrorism and organized crime can learn and increase the efficiency and effectiveness with which they operate – regardless of the aims and goals they seek to attain at any one defined point in time. According to Braun (2008), most DEA analysts believe that terrorist groups ‘copied their decentralized structure of cells and nodes from drug cartels’, and groups that operate within the crime–terror nexus appear to ‘have a capacity to regenerate themselves when dealt a blow, often re-emerging in a new or unrecognizable form’. Thus, although the crime–terror nexus complicates the nature of the threat faced in unstable, transitional and stable democratic states; it is through the ‘mirror effect’ of learning that the crime–terror nexus inevitably enables both organized crime and terrorism to become more efficient.

Notes 1 This section is adapted from Makarenko (2007). 2 This section is based on findings originally published in Makarenko (2007).

Conclusion Getting to grips with the deconstruction of organized crime


Daniela Irrera and Francesca Longo

The dialectic between subjective and objective reality has become a mainstream question in the social sciences since the rise of the post-positivist turn that began in the mid-1980s as a reaction to the positivist approach. If this latter considers social phenomena as a given and theories as a way of offering a solution to a given situation, post-structuralism does not view the definitions of social reality as a given and, therefore, tries to explain how a particular definition of a social fact serves certain interests. The debate between positivism and the post-structuralist approach is based on some key arguments which give rise to disagreements between them. Fearon and Wendt (2002) identify five core themes of this debate: (1) material versus ideational, (2) logics of consequences versus logic of appropriateness, (3) norms as useful versus norms as right, (4) exogenous versus endogenous actors and, (5) causal terms versus constitutive terms. This debate can be interpreted in three different ways: it can be seen from an ontological, an empirical or an analytical point of view (Fearon and Wendt 2002: 52). An ontological approach adopts a conflictual interpretation of what social life is and what the relationships between individuals and society are. An empirical approach implies a different way of interpreting the substantive issues either through the lens of the ‘logic of consequence’ or the ‘logic of appropriateness’ or using the debate about the origins of individual preferences, exogenous to the social context for rationalists and endogenous for the post-positivists. The third approach, the analytical approach, focuses on the differences between positivism and post-positivism in the interpretation of the role of knowledge: positivist scholars argue for the superiority of the ‘formalized knowledge’ that an academic discipline can provide. Post-positivists rather challenge the idea that ‘scientific knowledge’ used for policy-making is the only legitimate type of knowledge. The idea that underpins this book is that organized crime is a social phenomenon which is fully affected by this debate both in terms of it as an academic-research area and as a policy issue. All the chapters have tried to identify how this debate of ‘reality’ and ‘perception’ is reflected in the study of organized crime and in the practice of fighting it. The notion of crime and organized crime seem to refer either to the reality of an


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action or the pattern of actions affecting the law and order and security of a given society or to the conceptualization of a social phenomenon stemming from a set of values, interests and motivation. This twofold way of seeing organized crime is based on two different notions defining it: material factors or ideas. If Searle (1995) emphasizes that brute reality is logically prior to the institutional facts, George (1994) stresses how social reality is bound up with the way the agent gives meaning to it. In these terms, ‘material factors matter’ but ‘how they matter depends on the idea’ (Fearon and Wendt 2002: 58). In responding to the question of what is the ‘reality’ or the ‘idea’ of organized crime, our chapters have identified different types of discourse about organized crime, they have stressed the ways in which these different discourses interconnect and they have explored the implications of the ‘ideas’ on the ‘reality’. There are a number of explanations of how ideas affect reality and how institutions and the policy outcomes are affected by the reality of the threat. The analysis of discourse and definitions, presented in the first part of this book, opens the way for discussions about the role of academia and practitioners in defining organized crime since definitions shape policy. Chapters in Part One show that the discourse of police experts and practitioners plays an important role in defining current criminal policy at national, European and global levels. To illustrate this point, the various authors have described the development of discourse and the resulting policy paradigms which are adopted by national, European and global institutions in order to tackle organized crime. However, different chapters offer diverging perspectives on the relationship between the ‘ideas’ underpinning discourse and definitions, and the ‘reality’ of the policy outputs: is the process of developing definitions accountable enough? Is it sufficiently transparent and objective? Or, on the other hand, is it effective in tackling organized crime? Our analysis includes the description of specific realities: the Neapolitan Camorra by Allum, the Japanese Yakuza by Fukumi, human trafficking in Northern Ireland by Deegan, Bulgarian corruption by Tzvetkova; these are all social threats; in particular, when they are connected with public institutions and politicians. They pose a serious threat to the security of their societies and to the capability of the state to govern the territory. But, at the same time, it is impossible to have an effective policy aimed at tackling organized crime without a comprehensive analysis ‘investigating thoroughly the social and political context in which it emerged’ as Arsovska and Kostakos maintain in their chapter. What is the relationship between the ‘real threats’ posed by organized crime, the ‘representation of the threat’ made in discourse and its perception? Several of our chapters demonstrate that the definitions of the phenomenon are shaped by discourse and that these are not neutral. They depend on the actors’ ideas, values and objectives; and they, also, influence social perceptions and the quality of the policy output. Different narratives on crime produce various policy paradigms while policy outcomes and the relations between reality and perceptions are framed by discourse and definitions. Sheptycki (2003) warns us that discourse on organized crime has a high political value and the decisions on the resources, the practices


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and the priorities of criminal and police policies are the result of political choices which are to be labelled as values and ideas driven. Organized crime is a ‘reality’ but it should be analyzed by the means of a robust theoretical approach in order to avoid the risk of confusing reality with an incomplete representation of it. This risk can have a sizeable influence on the effectiveness of the policy output, as some of our chapters show. If organized crime is defined only by the means of statistical measurements or by stereotypical descriptions without the consideration of the social context in which it has developed, then legislation and policies will be ineffective. But there is a second risk stemming from the process of defining organized crime, namely, the lack of legitimacy and accountability of the policy for tackling it. This risk can emerge from the trend of considering organized crime as a security threat requiring extraordinary political and military means to combat it and from the establishment of supranational police agencies and bodies lacking accountability and democratic legitimacy. At this stage, attention needs to be paid to the relationship between discourse, perception and reality as well as at the close relationship between these variables which are strongly connected to each other. This book has presented some of the problems resulting from the theoretical analysis of organized crime and, in doing that, it has tried to connect reality, discourse and perceptions which could appear as competing concepts. The reality of organized crime is, as noted in the introduction, violence, terror, illicit economies and murder. But when we turn to the search for an explanation of this reality, we find ourselves in the realm of discourse: what is organized crime? What kind of threat does it pose? What are the social conditions stimulating its developments? In this sense, the adoption of ‘new looking glasses’ is needed in order to (re)conciliate reality and its description by means of discourse. The need to make such reconciliation is, however, characterized by the different sets of values, myths and prejudices which distinguish the perception of organized crime both from global/national institutions and community. As this book clearly shows, especially in Part Two, there are different levels of perception which, on the one hand, help the competent authorities to use a wide range of tools and measures for tackling TOC but, on the other, block our understanding of it as a real threat and thus negatively affect security policies. In other words, there are two different sets of perception coexisting: TOC as a global and dangerous threat, as states and intergovernmental agencies see it, and TOC as a job, power and stability provider as some societies still judge it. Both perceptions are essential for analyzing the reality and for developing discourse. As far as the first perception is concerned, it is the end result of a long process which pushed the more committed states to shift their consideration of TOC from a national law enforcement issue (namely, a domestic public order issue) to a global threat. This was due to some broader transformations affecting, first, the relations between states and, second, the concept of human security. Irrera argues in her chapter that the internationalization of crime control was the result of the export of law enforcement rules from the Western powers (US and European countries, as well as the EU) to the rest of the international system. It is true that, since the


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Cold War, the US and the EU have tried to collaborate on various initiatives; however, the views of the threat they offered, as well as the way they should be tackled, were often contrasting. While the EU has mainly focused on cross-border law enforcement and judicial cooperation, the US and its security policies were based on information systems and transportation infrastructures. The globalization process, the rising of non-state actors and the consequent development of the human aspects of security (namely the events of 11 September 2001) drove the main international political actors to change this composite structure of relations. The security agendas they produced were, apparently, divergent, but both focused on the need to strengthen regional and global cooperation. Therefore, TOC started to be perceived as a growing challenge and the danger it represents for the whole system was increasingly accepted, together with (and in some cases in parallel to) global terrorism. As indicated in Makarenko’s chapter, TOC and terror have been linked through the concept of the crime–terror nexus which has attracted intermittent official attention for almost three decades. Again, the attack on the Twin Towers represented a turning point. After this episode, in fact, the relationship between crime and terrorism began to attract more focused attention among scholars and practitioners. The evidence that the crime–terror nexus is a consistent part of reality as well as part of the public realm has contributed to increasing and diversifying the existing perception of the composite threat. What is clear is that the crime–terror nexus has opened a space within which both terrorism and organized crime can learn from each other and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their respective activities and markets (in fragmented and underdeveloped cases, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan). It is argued that a considerable theoretical and practical understanding of the nexus is lacking and this is mainly due to the fact that the nexus complicates the perception of TOC and terrorism, essentially because within unstable environments the level of threat that emanates from an evolving crime–terror nexus is dependent on whether or not the West is concerned about eternal instability in a specific region. Therefore, the nexus itself is perceived as part of the broader strategy against state failure and weaknesses. The diversified nature of the threat, as perceived by states, is asserted not only in fragmented contexts, but also in consolidated democracies. Wheatley in his chapter argues that the US federal government’s perceptions of organized crime threats have evolved to include street gangs and international groups. Both entities have been identified by the federal government as threats and concerted action has been taken. The use of RICO, in particular, was considered an appropriate and effective means to prosecute crimes committed both by members of gangs and international organized crime groups. RICO does not criminalize membership but defines conduct as a form of behaviour associated to a criminal enterprise. The increasing number of cases of human trafficking have revealed some unexpected and worrying political implications, even in countries like Northern Ireland, which has had to face over the last couple of decades different problems linked to terrorism and independence. Deegan’s chapter notes that the Ulster population


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has a strong sense of organized criminal activity. As a result, the questionnaires prepared by the Northern Ireland Official Statistics and Research department in 2006 identified that there was a public perception of high levels of organized crime in Northern Ireland and that the population was scared of the threats posed by human trafficking. The general perception is linked to the root causes of the problem: Northern Ireland is affected by international migration patterns, which are shaped by conflict and gender inequality as well as the increasing effects of the globalized financial systems. The most interesting finding is that such a perception is gradually but intensively turning into political discourse. Recently, the state’s response appears stronger and – it is claimed – the presumption of the existence of trafficking is finally being taken more seriously. It is a confirmation of the increasing trend – already elaborated in this book – driving many EU member states to strengthen cooperation and produce joint policies in such a key sector. Undoubtedly, the two leading actors in the field of security, the EU and the US, are producing apparently divergent security agendas. Nevertheless, both are focusing on the need to strengthen regional and global cooperation and to relaunch transatlantic relations. Multilateralism – defined as conduct founded on universal principles, equal participation of states in collective mechanisms, and no discrimination in putting principles into action – is presented as the only possible tool for conveying the perceptions states and agencies are developing into a coherent and efficient global counterstrategy. However, any strategy cannot afford to underestimate the strength of the second kind of perception. The traditional and – to some extent – mythical idea of organized crime is as an entrepreneurial actor able to provide jobs and social order among people in exchange for unconditional popular support. This idea has been at the core of the academic analysis of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and its relationship with political power. The same perception can be observed, even in different contexts referring to other organized crime groups. At the heart of Europe, in the Balkan region, the perceptions of local communities with regard to the threats and problems embellished by the EU regional anti-organized crime policies, combined with underdeveloped economies and extensive poverty, have created an atmosphere of insecurity in the area. Economic instability has contributed to amplifying problems such as ethnic violence, institutional corruption and increased crime rates. In order to find alternative ways of surviving, the local communities have started to look at organized crime as a vehicle for accumulating capital and power, and, consequently, a lack of confidence in the Balkan state institutions is growing. Thus, as happened in Sicily in the nineteenth century and again in the 1980s, organized crime has become the legitimate authority, in so far as it provides everyday necessities. Arsovska and Kostakos claim that the main challenge facing the Balkans is its ability to develop a solid economy able to support its fast-growing population and concentrate less on ‘fighting organized crime’. This formula seems not to be effective because it underestimates the perception of organized crime and other illegal profit-oriented activities which are seen as beneficial by the public in the Balkans. They simply do not understand why these activities present, as the EU


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claims, a major threat to their security. And this is an obstacle to the discourse the EU is trying to implement through its anti-organized crime policies in the Western Balkans. In a different context, in Japan, another form of organized crime, the Yakuza, appears equally to be accepted by Japanese society. Even here, the impression the Yakuza gives about its own activities were not always negative. The Yakuza was the local authority which the public turned to when in need, and in such cases, the state was reluctant to tackle it. At the same time, as the Cosa Nostra has showed us, the Yakuza is often also associated with violence, corruption and coercion, as it was especially throughout the 1980s. This is why the chapter suggests that the introduction of the counter-measure law contributed to separating civil society from the Yakuza and weakening its power base. Consequently, the perception of the Yakuza has shifted from a benefit-provider to becoming an enemy of the state and something they needed to tackle. This book, as emphasized in our introduction, tries to improve the scientific dialogue on the best way of understanding reality, discourse and perceptions about organized crime and investigating the way in which it can affect the fight against organized crime. While the analysis of organized crime in terms of reality has long been a central part of criminology and penal law, the study of ideas and perceptions of organized crime has become more relevant since the mid-1990s. The rise of the notion of TOC in the same period seemed to improve the debate on the reality of the threat posed by criminal organizations that operate across national borders and judicial systems, and on the construction of a reality based on values, beliefs, preferences and ideas. The institutionalization of forms of transnational and international policing drew attention to the interdependence between policies, ideas, perceptions and reality. Policies to combat organized crime is a very sensitive area of governance. It implies a series of regimes affecting individual rights and it is the area in which the binomial security–freedom reaches its highest value (see Bigo 2006 and Sheptycki 2000). In this perspective the discussion on reality and its construction appears to be very relevant for everyday life. Is it a ‘great debate’ based on a zero-sum approach or is it possible to consider it as a different analytical lens for looking at a social phenomenon? Our book has tried to contribute to such a debate with its attempt to consider the phenomenon in more empirical terms by working through a number of issues representing a common area where it is possible to develop a discussion on discourse, perceptions and reality. Our ultimate aim is not to reconcile different approaches or to find the ‘best way’ for understanding the phenomenon. We favour the adoption of new ‘looking glasses’ for continuing the ongoing discussion on all three levels of analysis of organized crime.


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Bibliography 223 15/11/2005/266); Nicotera (Gazzetta Ufficiale: 23/9/2005/222); Boscoreale (Gazzetta Ufficiale: 15/2/2006/38); San Paolo Belsito (Gazzetta Ufficiale: 21/11/2002/273); Bargheria (Gazzetta Ufficiale: 21/10/2000/247. PROROGA); Strongoli (Gazzetta Ufficiale: 25/9/2003/223); Montecorvino Pugliano (Gazzetta Ufficiale: 19/11/2003/119); Terme Vigliatore (Gazzetta Ufficiale: 14/1/2006/11); Marcedusa (Gazzetta Ufficiale: 30/10/2001/253); Montecorvino Pugliano Gazzetta Ufficiale: 15/12/2003/290)Marano (Gazzetta Ufficiale: 10/8/2004/184); San Tammaro (Gazzetta Ufficiale: 14/12006/11); ASL Locri 9 (Gazzetta Ufficiale: 17/5/2006/113)


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Index

Page numbers in bold denote figures or tables. academic discourse 29 academics and definitions 16 accountability 9–10, 26, 32–4, 40–1, 47–8, 110, 196 ACPO see Association of Chief Police Officers of England and Wales Acquis Communautaire 114–15 Afghanistan crime–terror nexus 181–3, 187, 189, 193 AFSJ see Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Albania 119, 122, 124; corruption 121; pyramid schemes 125; unemployment 119–20 alien smuggling 89, 91–2, 97 alliances between crime groups 20–2, 60; with terrorist groups 182–3, 188–9 American mafia 85; see also La Cosa Nostra; United States Angola 187 anti-gang strategies in the US 88, 92; see also Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute anti-mafia legislation 11, 163, 170, 173, 178 anti-money laundering 62–3; see also money laundering Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 43, 45, 48–9, 51–4; objective 47–8 arms smuggling 122, 125–6 Association of Chief Police Officers of England and Wales (ACPO) 31, 36–8, 41

crime–terror nexus 189–90; economic underdevelopment 118–20; European Union intervention 113–14; formation 123–7; Kosovo identified threats 118; oil smuggling 125; organized crime 122–3; organized crime threat 117–18; paramilitaries 126–7; postcommunism 124–7; secret police 124–5; unemployment 119–20, 127; weak rule of law 120–1 bank of mutri 147 Barrot, Jacques 53 BGDN see Black Gangster Disciple Nation Black Gangster Disciple Nation (BGDN) 90–1 Blakey, G. Robert 89, 92 border protection 59, 95, 189 Borissov, General Boyko 147–8 Boryoku-dan 99, 106 see also Yakuza Bosnian weapons smuggling 126 Bourdieu’s field theory 58 brand imaging 102–3 Broome, R. F. 36 Bulgarian organized crime 144–5, 158–9; business–crime partners 147–50; law enforcement crime links 150–3; mafia-like organizations 154–5; police corruption 155–7; state/organized crime collaborations 157–8; the elites 145–7 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 77, 182–3 business–crime partners (Bulgarian) 147–50

Balkans, the 113, 127–8, 198–9; arms smuggling 122, 125–6; communist states 123–4; corruption 121;

Cali cocaine cartel 181 Camorra group (Italy) 3–4, 162, 166, 190, 195; council control 167–9


Index 225 captured states 74 cartels 164, 181, 187, 190, 193 Ciancimino, Vito 165–6 civil liberties 47, 65 clan influence 173–5 cocaine 89, 180, 188; cartels 181, 187 Cold War era 21, 56, 72, 75–6, 78, 80, 83, 180, 197 collective tasks 17–18, 20, 22, 27 collocations 116–17 Columbia’s FARC 181, 187–8 communism 123–7 complexity 15, 23, 27, 184 conceptual parameters 16–17 conflict supporting the crime–terror nexus 186–9 Congress intent through RICO 86–7, 92, 97 Congressional investigations 98n2 Constitutional Treaty for Europe 52 construction industry manipulation 102–3 contemporary organized crime 2 Convention Against Human Trafficking 142 convention and constraint in UK 41 cooperation imperative 57–9, 61, 64 Corelone Mafia 166 corporate crime 65, 103 corruption 17–18, 65, 198–9; Balkans 113–14, 116, 117, 120–2, 124, 125, 127; Bulgarian 155–6, 159, 195; crime–terror nexus 183, 188, 191, 195; defined 75; Italian 161, 163–4, Northern Ireland 139 cottimo fiduciario 174 council infiltration 171–3 Council of Europe 44, 59 counterfeiting 3, 46, 139; prize schemes 94 crime groups 10–11, 16–17, 20–3, 25, 27, 31, 50, 74–5, 77, 189, 197; Albanian 122; Balkan 127; Bulgarian 145, 154, 156; international 94–7; Italian 162, 166, 169–70; Northern Ireland 134, 138–9; US 85, 87, 89, 92–3, 97–8 crime–terror nexus 1–2, 4, 6–7, 11, 17, 29, 40, 44, 46, 48, 51–3, 65–6, 73, 76–7, 180; Bulgarian 153, 155; conflict within 187; FARC 181, 187–8; identification 184–6; interaction in transitional states 189–91; interaction in Western democracies 191–2; LTTE 188–9; Northern Ireland 139–40; perceptions and reality 192–3; political rhetoric/ academic discourse 181–4; reality of

the threat 180; threat 186; unstable environments 186–9 criminal entrepreneur 134 criminal justice system 40–1, 44, 55, 62, 81, 182; Balkans 121 Criminal Police Organization 44 criminality 15–20, 22, 31–4, 39, 41, 65; cross-border 36 criminal-not-the-crime mantra 30–3 cross-border crime 25, 33, 36, 55, 59, 78, 83, 137, 197; see also international crime Cutolo, Raffaele 3–4 cyber-crime 59, 61–2, 81 D-Company 189 DEA see Drug Enforcement Agency deconstructing organized crime 1, 6, 8, 114 defining human trafficking 133–4 defining organized crime 15–20; 23–7, 31–2, 46, 61, 71, 83, 90, 195–6; Baker 26; Block 19; Chambliss 5; collocations 116–17; criminal-not-the-crime approach 31; European Commission and Europol 50–1; European Police Chiefs Operational Task Force and CEPOL 50; European Union 24–5; 46; 50; Finckenauer 16–17; Catanzaro 17; G8 experts group 61; Cohen 3; Hess 19; HM Customs and Excise 32; Johnson 18; Keohane and Nye 20; Mcillwain 19; NCIS 31–2; Paoli 19, 23; Reuter 18; Scarpinato 19–20; social science approach 17–20; systems theory 19; The Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime 93–4; transnational 23–6; Treaty of Maastricht 46; UK law enforcers 31–2; UN 23–4; UN Naples Conference 55; UN Palermo Convention 80; Von Lampe 15; Williams’ paradigm 21; see also defining security; perceptions defining security 2–3, 83; Buzan 76; NNS national security 82; security field 58; Waltz 76 defining variables 17 definitions: corruption 75; crime–terror nexus 184–5; economic influence 173; enterprises 87; human trafficking 133–4; illicit enterprise 18; multilateralism 83, 198; political–criminal nexus 165; street gangs 88–9; transnational relations 20; see also defining organized crime; defining security


226

Index

Denver Summit 59 Department of Justice (DOJ) 85, 93; Bureau of Justice Assistance 89; Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative 88 de-structured states 74 dimensions of organized crime 20–3; transnational 23–6 discourse analyses 7–9 DOJ see Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 74, 181, 193 drug trafficking 48, 55, 77–9, 81, 91, 189 Dudley, Rebecca 137–8 durability 20 Durkheim, E. 100 ECPR see European Consortium for Political Research empirical social research theory 5 England and Wales 30; convention and constraint 41; criminal-not-the-crime mantra 30–2; cultural context 33–4; definition of organized crime 31–2; harm prevention 40–1; HMCE 32, 34–5, 38–9; intelligence and operations 37–40; MI5 and MI6 35, 38; national crime squad 34–5; NCIS 35, 37–40; politics 33; RCIB 37; three-level policing taxonomy 35–6 entrepreneurial crime 18–20, 24, 26, 123, 134, 144–5, 147, 159, 164, 198 environmental crime 65, 76, 192 ESS see European Security Strategy EU see European Union European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) 1 European Security Strategy (ESS) 80–2, 113 European Union 43; Acquis Communautaire 114–15; Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 43, 45, 48–9, 51–4; Balkan focus 113; Convention Against Human Trafficking 142; drug strategy 78–9; future 53–4; Hague Programme 51, 83; Justice and Home Affairs 24–5, 43–7, 50, 52, 64; membership monopoly of power 159; perceptions of organized crime 114–17; press release word list 115; prevention strategy 24; security acceleration 50–1; security agenda 78–80; Tampere Programme 24, 49–51; Treaty of Amsterdam 46–50; Treaty of Maastricht 45–8; Trevi Group 44–5

Europol 25, 48, 50, 74, 79, 83; human trafficking assessment 134–5 expertise against TOC 57, 195; cooperation imperative 57–9, 61, 64; knowledge and regime dynamics 62–4; legitimacy of 64–6; socio-professional distribution 56–7, 59, 61–2; sociology of 60–2 failed states 74–5 Falcone, Judge Giovanni 21, 163 FARC 181, 187–8 FATF see Financial Action Task Force films, Yakuza 101 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 62–3 First Eastern International Bank 147 fragile states 74 freedom 43, 45–50; cost 51–3, 187; in security terms 54, 199 G7 59, 63; Halifax Summit 58 G8 56; Recommendations on Transnational Crime 183; TOC expert group 58, 60–3, 66 Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center (GangTECC) 88 gangster paradise 113; see also Balkans GangTECC see Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center global challenges 60, 71, 78, 80 global dimension of TOC 22–3 global jihad 192 global perception of TOC 55–6 global security 72; corruption 75; EU agenda 78–80; failed states 74–6; multilateralism context 71, 80–3, 198; nation-state formation 72–3; new concept 75–6; non-state actors 73–5; political agendas 76–80; political implications 80–3; securitization 58–9, 76; US agenda 77–8, 82, 182–3 globalization 21, 27, 57, 72–3, 78, 82–3, 134, 142, 197 Gonzales, Alberto 88 Goto-gumi 109; see also Yakuza government use of crime groups 100–4 HAC see House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Hague Programme 51, 83 Hanshin earthquake 102 harm prevention 40–1


Index 227 healthcare authority infiltration 169 Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise (HMCE) 32, 34–5, 38–9 hierarchical model 21, 36 hierarchical structure 17, 22, 27, 55, 86, 187; protecting high-level members 86; street gang 90 historical evolution 18–19 HMCE see Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (HAC) 31–2, 34–5, 37–8, 40–1 human trafficking 40, 44; defining 133–4; statistics 134; UN convention against 133, 142 human trafficking in Northern Ireland 134; 142, 197–8; convictions 136; criminal view 140; destination/transit country 138; Europol assessment 135; identified concerns 137–8; media’s role 140–1; newspaper articles 141; OCTF 135; paramilitary organisation 139–40; perceived threats 142; PSNI 136–8, 142; research 137; statistics 135–6 Ibrahim, Dawood 189 ILEAs see International Law Enforcement Academies illegal immigration 35, 46, 53, 135, 137; in the Balkans 122 IMF see International Monetary Fund Inagawa-kai 100–1, 109; see also Yakuza Indonesia 81, 187–8 INL see Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs innovation in study 6 institutionalization of intergovernmental cooperation 45–6 inter-agency politics 33, 39–40 intergovernmental cooperation in Europe 44–5 Intergrup 147 intermediary nodes 19 internal security police 125–6 international crime 55, 77; application of RICO 96–7; groups 94–5 international experts on TOC 57, 62–4; legitimacy 64–6 International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) 77 international mobilization against TOC 55–6, 62 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 83

international organized crime (US) 85, 97–8; examples and challenges 94–6; perception as threat 93–4; RICO application 96–7 international policy 55–7, 66; cooperative imperative 57–9; experts 62–4; law enforcement capacities 64; legitimacy 64–6; sociology of expertise 60–2; specific expertise 57; world of expertise 62–4 Interpol 44, 74, 122 intimidation 17, 104, 144, 169, 173, 175–6 IRA crime syndicate 139 Italian crime groups 161, 178–9; 2000 onwards 170–1; clan commune control 163; control over local government 171–3; council dissolution 166–9; crime–terror nexus 191; economic influence of clans 173–5; healthcare authority infiltration 169; invisible relationships 163–5; political influence 175–7; post-1991 165–70; pre-1991 165–6; procedures 171–5; social influence over local government 171–3; targeting local government 162–3; totalizing 178 Japan 10, 81, 99, 111, 187, 195, 199; anti-crime legislation 99–100, 102–6, 108, 110–11; dispute settlements 102; Yakuza acceptance 102, 104, 199; Yakuza exclusion 106–7; see also Yakuza Japanese economy 110–11 Japanese society 99–102, 104, 106–7, 199 Japanese stock exchange 109 JHA see Justice and Home Affairs jihad 192 jurisdiction violation 21 jurisdictional diversity 96 justice 10, 40, 47–8, 53, 61; see also criminal justice system Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 24–5, 43–7, 50, 52, 58, 64 Justice, Freedom and Security’s Annual Management Plan 53 Kadamovas, Jurijus 94–5 kidnapping scam (US) 94–5 kleptocratic states 74 Kosovo 119–20; corruption 121; identified threats 118; kleptocratic state 74


228

Index

La Cosa Nostra 6, 86, 163, 198–9 labor racketeering 86, 91 laundering see money laundering law enforcement assistance 161; see also politics–crime collaboration law enforcement capacities 64 Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime 85, 93, 97–8; threat identification 95 Law Regarding the Prevention of Unjust Acts by Boryoku-dan Members (Japan) 99; see also Organized Crime Countermeasures Law legal protection 140, 144, 147, 155 legislation 4, 36, 52, 73, 81, 163, 196; anti-IOC in the US 85–7, 92, 96–7; anti-mafia 11, 163, 170, 173, 178–9; anti-Yakuza 99–100, 102–6, 108, 110–11 legitimacy of expertise 64–6; see also expertise against TOC Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 188–9 Lisbon Treaty 43, 52–3 literature 5 loan-sharking 86, 89, 91; Yakuza 109–10 local government collusion 161–5; social influence/control 171–3 LTTE see Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Lyon/Roma Group 62 Macedonian unemployment see Balkans Mafia 6, 85; funds acquisition 91; membership 86, 163, 198–9; violence 91 Mafia procedures 171–5 Mafia states 74 management of global security 71, 73, 80 Mara Salvatrucha street gang 88–9, 190; application of RICO 92; funds acquisition 91; structure 90 McNulty, Paul 89 MDW see Multidisciplinary Working Party on Organized Crime Medellin cocaine cartel 181, 187 media 11, 29, 65, 111, 133; crime–terror nexus 181; investigations in Bulgaria 148–9; on law enforcement corruption 153–4; press release wordlist 115; role in human trafficking 135, 140–2; Yakuza films 101 membership 33; continuity 24–5; European Union 159; high-level protection 86; Mafia 86; restricted 17,

20, 27; US legislation 88, 90–1, 97, 197; Yakuza 107 MI5 and MI6 35, 38 Mikhel, Iouri 94–5 Ministry of the Interior (MOI) 147–8, 150–6, 158–9 MOI see Ministry of the Interior money laundering 20–1, 32, 49, 55, 59–60, 62, 77, 81, 86, 95, 137, 181; anti- 63–5; Russian 93 monopolistic aspects 55; 125 monopoly of communication 19 monopoly of police practitioners 61 monopoly of power 159 monopoly on violence 17 Mr Bigs 32 MS-13 street gang 88–9; application of RICO 92; funds acquisition 91; structure 90 Mukasey, Michael 96 Multidisciplinary Working Party on Organized Crime (MDW) 58, 62 multilateralism 71, 198; transatlantic cooperation 81–3 narco-terrorism 181–2, 192 narcotics trade 32, 77, 81, 88–9, 91, 181–3, 188–9, 191, 193 National Crime Intelligence Service (NCIS) 35–8; inter-agency politics 39–40 National Crime Squad (NCS) 32, 35, 37, 41 National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) 88 national security definition 82 National Security Strategy (NSS) 78, 82 National Service for the Fight against Organized Crime (NSBOP) 154–6 nation-state 2, 4, 20; formation 72–3, 128 NCIS see National Crime Intelligence Service NCS see National Crime Squad Neapolitan Camorra 3–4, 162, 166, 190, 195; council control 167–9 negative services (Japan) 102 NGIC see National Gang Intelligence Center NGO Committee on Narcotic Drugs 81 Nikolov, Rumen 147–8 9/11 influence 29, 62, 65, 77, 81, 83, 182–3, 192 non-state actors 71, 73–5, 83, 185, 197 Northern Ireland human trafficking 133–42

Index 229


NSBOP see National Service for the Fight against Organized Crime NSS see National Security Strategy objective reality 1 objective–subjective dialectic 1–4, 194 objectives of organized crime 18 OCTA see Organized Crime Threat Assessment OCTF see Organized Crime Task Force OECD see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Officers Gang 148–9, 155 oil smuggling 125 ontological variables 20 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 58, 62–3 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 182–3 organizational stability 20, 27 organizational theory 18 organized crime and communism 123–7 Organized Crime Control Act (US) 86; see also RICO Organized Crime Countermeasures Law (Japan) 99–100, 102–6, 108, 110–11; changes introduced 106–7; negative influences 110 organized crime definitions see defining organized crime organized crime–elites cooperation 145 organized crime, perceptions of 4–5, 55–6, 93–4, 114–16, 198 organized crime–politics relationship 161; local government collusion 161–5; political influence 175–7; social influence/control 171–3; theoretical models 163–4 Organized Crime Strategy Group (OSCG) 32 Organized Crime Task Force (OCTF) 135; see also human trafficking in Northern Ireland Organized Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 25–6 OSCE see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCG see Organized Crime Strategy Group Pakistan 82, 187–8; crime–terror nexus 192–3, 197 Palermo Convention 23, 63, 80, 94

Palma Document 45 paramilitaries 126–7 patron–client model of relationships 18 pax mafiosa 21 PCN see political–criminal nexus perceptions 4–5, 196–7; and reality 192–3; of organized crime 55–6, 114–17; of organized crime as a threat 93–4; 142; of organized crime as entrepreneurial 198; of street gangs as a threat 87–9; social 7, 10 performance accountability frameworks 9, 32, 41 Peru 181, 187, 190 police cooperation in Europe 43–4 Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) 136, 142; human trafficking arrests 136–7 policy-makers 15–16, 32, 184 policy-oriented empiricism 5–6 political agendas 5–6, 9, 12, 17–18, 49, 76; global 71–2; US security 77–8 political corruption 121, 161, 164; see also politics–crime collaboration political–criminal nexus (PCN) 163, 165 political implications of global security 80; transatlantic cooperation 81–3; UN 80–1 political protection 147, 150, 159, 164 politics–crime collaboration 161; Bulgaria 147–50, 153; Italy 162–5, 171–3; theoretical models 163–4 positivism 194 post-9/11 influence 29, 62, 65, 77, 81, 83, 182–3, 192 postmodernism 114 post-positivism 194 post-structuralist approach 194 power brokers 19 PPP see Purchasing Power Parity practitioners and definitions 16 President’s Commission on Organized Crime (US) 87, 90–1, 94 press release wordlist (EU) 115 prostitution 91, 133, 139; human trafficking 136–7 protection 81–2, 140; legal 140, 144, 147, 155; money 103; of civil liberties 61, 65; political 147, 150, 159, 164 protection rackets 4, 17, 19, 26, 124, 189 PSNI see Police Service of Northern Ireland Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 118


230

Index

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute 85, 197; applied to international organized crime 96–7; applied to street gangs 92; origins/ statutory language 86–7 RCIB see Regional Criminal Intelligence Bureaux RCS see Regional Crime Squads Reagan, President 33, 55, 181–2 real threats 186, 195–6 reality of organized crime 3–4, 11, 195–6; science 16 Regional Crime Squads (RCS) 30, 34–6; amalgamations 34; criminal-not-thecrime mantra 30–3; inter-agency politics 34, 37–9, 41; see also England and Wales Regional Criminal Intelligence Bureaux (RCIB) 37, 39 restricted membership 17, 20, 27 RICO see Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute rule of law 44, 49, 61, 75, 79–80, 82, 113–15, 118; weak 120–1, 123, 159 Russia 74, 188; crime–terror nexus 189–91; criminal groups 189–90; mafiya 22; money launderers 93; security force corruption 155; see also Balkans Sarajevo racketeering 126; see also Balkans Schengen Agreement 45–6 science and reality 16; see also social sciences approaches secret police 113, 124–5 secret service in Albania 125 secret service in Bulgaria 145 securitization 58–9, 76; of Yakuza 99–100 security 2–3, 60, 65–6; border 59, 95, 189; Cold War 56; freedom 47–50; see also global security Security Club (Bulgaria) 146, 157 security continuum 44 security field 58, 78 security professionals 60 security threats 5, 9, 11, 33, 66, 78, 93–4, 142, 196–7; Balkans 117–19; post-9/11 29, 62, 65, 77, 81, 83, 182–3; street gangs 87–9; terrorism 1–2, 4, 6–7, 11, 17, 29, 40, 44, 46, 48, 51–3, 180; see also crime–terror nexus Serbian 119–20; corruption 121; kleptocratic state 74; oil smuggling 125

Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) 32–3, 38–41 share trading by Yakuza 108–11 shareholder manipulation 102–3 Shining Path of Peru 187 Shinjuku Building ownership 109; see also Yakuza Sicilian Mafia 21 Sierra Leone 187 silovi grupirovki 144; see also Bulgarian organized crime Single Market 45, 48 smuggling 89, 113, 139, 189; in Bulgaria 146–7; oil 125; people 122, 134; see also human trafficking in Northern Ireland SOBT see Specialized Squad for the Fight against Terrorism SOCA see Serious Organized Crime Agency social construction of TOC 43, 55, 100, 194 social network theory 19; see also defining organized crime social perception 7, 10 social phenomenon of organized crime 3–4, 163, 194–5, 199 social sciences approaches 17–20 sociology of expertise 60–2; see also expertise against TOC socio-professional distribution of experts 56–7, 59, 61–2 sokaiya (Japan) 103; see also Yakuza somma urgente 174–5 sources of knowledge 59 South America crime–terror nexus 180, 185, 187–8, 190 sovereignty crisis 73 Soviet Union 113; crime–terror nexus 189–90; see also Balkans Specialized Squad for the Fight against Terrorism (SOBT) 153 state protection 2 state security 124–6 state/organized crime collaborations 102–3, 157–8 stock market infiltration 108–11 street gangs (US) 85; as organized crime groups 89–1; perception of threat 87–9; RICO application 92 stretching concepts 27 subjective reality 1 Sumiyoshi-kai 100; see also Yakuza systems theory 19; see also defining organized crime


Index 231 Tajikistan 187 Tampere Programme 24, 49–51 tangentopoli scandals 164 telecommunication 59 terrorism 1–2, 4, 6–7, 11, 17, 29, 40, 44, 46, 48, 51–3, 180; narco-terrorism 181–2, 192 terrorist group alliances 182–3, 188–9 Thailand 187–8, 193 theoretical foundations 16–17 TOC see transnational organized crime Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) 109; Mothers 110 transatlantic cooperation and multilateralism 81–3 transnational bureaucracy 58 transnational dimension 15, 18; international institution 23–6 transnational organized crime 6; defining 18–19; dimensions 20–3; globally defined 55; international institutions 23–7 transparency 10, 26, 46–8, 54, 66, 121, 175 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 121 trattativa privata 174–5 Treaty of Amsterdam 46–8; Action Plan 48–50, 52 Treaty of Maastricht 45–8 Trevi Group 44–5 TSE see Tokyo Stock Exchange UKHTC see United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre unemployment in the Balkans 119–20, 122, 127 United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre (UKHTC) 135–6; see also England and Wales United Nations Anti-Organized Crime and Law Enforcement Unit 80–1 United Nations Convention Against Human Trafficking 133, 142 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 23–4, 63, 65, 80–1, 94 United Nations Naples Conference 55, 57 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 72, 80–1, 119–20; communist state 123–4

United States 85, 97–8; gangs as crime groups 89–1; INL 77, 182–3; international organized crime 93–6; jurisdictional diversity 96; membership protection 88; NSS 78, 82; President’s Commission on Organized Crime 87, 90–1, 94; RICO applied to gangs 92; RICO applied to international organized crime 96–7; RICO statute 85–7; security agenda for TOC 77–8; street gangs 85, 87–9 UNODC see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Unzen-Fugendake eruption 102 Uzunov, Evgeni 147–8 violence for territorial control 17 war on drugs 33, 36, 55 weak states 74 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 78, 80–1 West African fraud groups 94 Western democracy crime-terror nexus 191–2 Westphalia Treaty 72 white-collar crime 65–6, 127 WMD see weapons of mass destruction wordlist (EU) 115 World Bank 63, 83 Yakuza (Japan) 10–11; 111, 199; charitable works 102; countermeasures law 105–7; dispute settlements 102–3; economic activities 107–10; groups 100–1; legitimate business 109–10; organizational chart 101; pre-countermeasures law 100–4; protection money 103–4; securitization 99–100; societal acceptance 102, 104, 199; societal exclusion 107; sokaiya 103 Yamaguchi-gumi (Japan) 100–3, 107–9; brand image 102–3; Goto-gumi 109; loan-sharking compensation 109; new business direction 108; police/society as enemy 107; share trading 109; see also Yakuza Yugoslavia 113, 123–4; see also Balkans

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