China Threat - Perceptions, Myths and Reality

The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality Since the end of the Cold War, one of the most significant debates in...

Author: Herbert Yee

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The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality

Since the end of the Cold War, one of the most significant debates in international relations has been the question of whether the rise of China as a major economic, political and military power will be a force for stability or instability in the international system and the East Asian region. Forceful arguments have been put forward on both sides. This book examines perceptions of the ‘China Threat’, and governments’ policies in response to the perceived threat in a wide range of countries, including the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan, South Asia, South-East Asia and the Middle East, as well as the perceptions of the Chinese themselves. For each country current security concerns and policies, especially the policy of engagement, are examined in detail, and future prospects for relations with China are assessed. As the Bush administration in Washington increasingly focuses on China as a ‘strategic competitor’ and Sino-US relations become increasingly tense, the ‘China Threat’ issue has come to dominate the security agenda in the Asia-Pacific region, and now poses the biggest foreign policy challenge of the twentieth-first century. Herbert Yee is Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University. His research interests are China’s foreign policy, political culture, political development, and national minorities. His recent publications include China in Transition: Issues and Policies (coeditor, 1999) and Macau in Transition: From Colony to Special Autonomous Region (2001). Ian Storey is a Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. His research interests include Asia-Pacific defence and security issues, international relations and ASEAN-China relations. He has published articles in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Parameters and Jane’s Intelligence Review.

THE CHINA THREAT: PERCEPTIONS, MYTHS AND REALITY Edited by Herbert Yee and Ian Storey

First published 2002 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Publisher’s Note This book has been prepared from camera-ready copy provided by the authors. © 2002 Herbert Yee and Ian Storey; individual chapters © the individual contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record is available for this book from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-64279-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-67854-0 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-700-71738-2 (Print Edition)

Contents

Acknowledgments

vi

Contributors

vii

Abbreviations

xi

Tables Introduction Herbert Yee and Ian Storey

xiv 1

Chapter One

Chinese Perspectives of the China Threat: Myth or Reality? Herbert Yee and Zhu Feng

21

Chapter Two

American Perceptions of Chinese Military Power Jonathan D.Pollack

43

Reflecting Mirrors across the Taiwan Straits: American Perspectives on a China Threat Edward Friedman

65

Chapter Four

Russian Perceptions of the China Threat Alexander Lukin

87

Chapter Five

The China Threat—A European Perspective Joachim Glaubitz

115

Chapter Six

Changing British Perceptions of the China Threat, 1945–2000 Brian Hook

130

The Japanese Assessment of the ‘China Threat’ Wenran Jiang

152

Chapter Three

Chapter Seven

v

Chapter Eight

South Korea and a Rising China: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects Taeho Kim

168

Chapter Nine

Indonesia’s Perceptions of China: The Domestic Bases of Persistent Ambiguity Rizal Sukma

183

Singapore and the Rise of China: Perceptions and Policy Ian Storey

208

Chapter Eleven

Malaysian Perceptions of China: From Hostility to Cordiality Abdul Razak Baginda

231

Chapter Twelve

Perceptions of a China Threat: A Philippine Perspective Aileen San Pablo-Baviera

253

Chapter Thirteen

Vietnamese Perspectives of the ‘China Threat’ Carlyle A.Thayer

270

Chapter Fourteen

The China Threat: A View from India C.V.Ranganathan

293

Chapter Fifteen

The China Threat: A View from Pakistan Perviaz Iqbal Cheema

308

Chapter Sixteen

Much Ado about Nothing: Middle Eastern Perceptions of the ‘China Threat’ Yitzhak Shichor

319

Index

339

Chapter Ten

Acknowledgments

This volume is the product of an international conference on ‘China Threat Perceptions from Different Continents’ held at the Hong Kong Baptist University on 11–12 January 2001. Twenty-five scholars from more than twenty countries participated and presented papers at the conference. The sixteen articles included in this edited book have all been revised and updated by the authors. The editors would like to thank all those who participated in the conference and contributed valuable ideas and suggestions to this volume: Brian Bridges, Gilbert Chan, Joseph Cheng, Chulacheeb Chinwanno, Klara Khafizova, Hermenegildo Gamito, Tai Hwan Lee, Sonny S.H.Lo, Werner Meissner, Melina Nathan, Danny Paau, N.N.Pandey, Jaime Nogueira Pinto, Alvin So, James Tang, Ting Wai, Ignatius Ts’ao and Andrew Yang. The editors are grateful to the Hong Kong Baptist University for funding the China threat conference and the preparations for publishing this book. Herbert Yee Hong Kong, PRC Ian Storey Geelong, Australia August 2001

Contributors

Abdul Razak Baginda is Executive Director of the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre. He was previously Head of Strategic Studies and International Relations at the Armed Forces Defence College, Kuala Lumpur. His research interests cover the political, economic and societal trends in Asia. Razak has been awarded the Légion d’Honneur by the French government in recognition of his intellectual contributions. Aileen San Pablo-Baviera is Associate Professor at the Asian Centre, University of the Philippines, and Executive Director of the PhilippineChina Development Resource Centre. From 1993–1997 she was head of the Centre for International Relations and Strategic Studies of the Philippine Foreign Service Institute. Her publications include Comprehensive Engagement: Strategic Issues in Philippines-China Relations (2000), and Philippine Perspectives on the South China Sea Disputes (editor, 1990). Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema is President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute. He has also held positions at Heidelberg University, the Australian National University, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), Johns Hopkins University, and Illinois University at Urbana-Champaign. Cheema’s forthcoming books include Guardians of the Nation: The Armed Forces of Pakistan and Simla Agreement (coauthored). Edward Friedman is the Hawkins Chair Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He specialises in Chinese politics. Edward’s most recent book is What if China Doesn’t Democratize? Implications for War and Peace (co-authored, 2001). Joachim Glaubitz is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at Munich University. His former appointments were at the Goethe Institute in Tokyo, the Federal Institute of Eastern and International

viii

Studies, Cologne, and the Research Institute for International Relations and Security, Ebenhausen. Joachim’s research interests include international relations in the Asia-Pacific region, the foreign and security policies of China and Japan, and Russian policy in Asia. His publications include Between Tokyo and Moscow: The History of an Uneasy Relationship, 1972 to the 1990s (1995). Brian Hook is a Visiting Professor in the Business School, Middlesex University. He was formerly a member of the Hong Kong administration, founding member of the Department of Chinese Studies at the University of Leeds, and editor of The China Quarterly. His current research is on the British legacy in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong under Chinese sovereignty. Wenran Jiang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Adjunct Professor of East Asian Studies at the University of Alberta, Canada. His research interests include the foreign policies of Japan and China, and international relations in East Asia, especially the changing strategic environment. He is currently working on a new book entitled Japan’s China Policy 1978–2000. Taeho Kim is a senior China analyst and Director of Research Cooperation at the Korea Institute for Defence Analyses in Seoul. He is coeditor of the Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, and his publications include China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for ‘Superb and Secret Weapons’ (co-written, 1995) and The ROK Defence Policy after the ROK-PRC Normalization (1993). His research interests focus on SinoRussian military co-operation, Chinese arms acquisitions, and China’s relations with Northeast Asian countries. Alexander Lukin is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Moscow State Institute of International Relations in the Russian Foreign Ministry. He has worked at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Soviet Embassy to the PRC, the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Brookings Institute. He is the author of Russian Democrats: A Study in Political Culture (2000). Jonathan D.Pollack is Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies, Chairman of the Strategic Research Department, and Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the Naval War College, Rhode Island. Jonathan specialises in East Asian political-strategic affairs, and his recent publications include In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development (contributor and editor,

ix

1998) and The United States and Asia: Towards a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (contributor, 2001). C.V.Ranganathan was a member of the Indian Foreign Service from 1959 to 1993, and the Indian Ambassador to the PRC from 1987 to 1991. After retirement he was awarded a Nehru Fellowship for a research project on Sino-Indian relations. He is the co-author of India and China: The Way Ahead (2000). Yitzhak Shichor is Michael William Lipson Associate Professor of Political Science and East Asian Studies at the Harry S.Truman Research Institute of the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has published on China’s Middle East policy and its defence modernisation, and is currently researching Chinese defence conversion, Sino-Uighur relations in Xinjiang Province and abroad, and China’s international oil policy. Ian Storey is a Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. His research interests include Asia-Pacific defence and security issues, international relations, and ASEAN-China relations. He has published articles in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Parameters and Jane’s Intelligence Review. Rizal Sukma is Director of Studies at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta. He has written extensively on Southeast Asian security issues, ASEAN, Indonesian foreign policy and domestic political change in Indonesia. Rizal’s latest book is Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship (1999). Carlyle A.Thayer is Professor of Politics at University College, the Australian Defence Force Academy. During 1999–2001 he was on leave as Professor of Southeast Asian Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii. He is the author of over 275 publications including Multilateral Institutions in Asia: The ASEAN Regional Forum (2000) and War By Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam (1989). Herbert Yee is Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University. His research interests are China’s foreign policy, political culture, political development, and national minorities. His recent publications include China in Transition: Issues and Policies (co-editor, 1999) and Macau in Transition: From Colony to Special Autonomous Region (2001). Zhu Feng is Associate Professor and Director of the International Security Programme in the School of International Studies at Peking

x

University. Zhu has published extensively on international security issues, Sino-US relations and East Asian security.

Abbreviations

ABM ABRI AFP APEC ARF ASEAN ASEM AWACS BBC CBMs CCP CEP CGI CIA CNP CPM DPP EAEC EEZ EU FAC FCO FDI FPDA

Anti-Ballistic Missile Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) Armed Forces of the Philippines Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meetings Airborne Warning and Control Systems British Broadcasting Corporation confidence-building measures Chinese Communist Party circular error probability Consultative Group on Indonesia Central Intelligence Agency comprehensive national power Communist Party of Malaya Democratic Progressive Party East Asia Economic Caucus Exclusive Economic Zone European Union Foreign Affairs Committee Foreign and Commonwealth Office Foreign Direct Investment Five Power Defence Arrangements

xii

HE HKSAR JLG IAEA ICBM ICCPR IDV ILO IMF JDA KFOR KMT LOAC LST MAF MTCR

High Explosive Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Joint Liaison Group International Atomic Energy Agency Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Soviet Academy of Sciences International Labour Organisation International Monetary Fund Japan Defence Agency Kosovo Intervention Force Kuomintang Line of Actual Control landing ship tanks Malaysian Armed Forces Missile Technology Control Regime

MEP MFN MGIMO MPR MTW NAM NATO NEP NGO NMD NPC NPT ODA PKI PLA PLAN PN PPP

Member of the European Parliament most favoured nation Moscow Institute for Foreign Relations People’s Consultative Assembly major theatre war Non-Aligned Movement North Atlantic Treaty Organisation New Economic Policy non-governmental organisation National Missile Defence National People’s Congress Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Overseas Development Aid Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia) People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Navy Philippine Navy purchasing power parity

xiii

PRC QDR R&D ROC ROK RFE SAARC SAF SEANWFZ SEATO SLOC SSM TMD TNI TSEA UK

People’s Republic of China Quadrennial Defence Review research and development Republic of China (Taiwan) Republic of Korea Russian Far East South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Singapore Armed Forces Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone South East Asia Treaty Organisation sea lanes of communication surface-to-surface missiles Theatre Missile Defence Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) Taiwan Security Enhancement Act United Kingdom

UN UNCLOS UNHRC US/USA VCP VFA VPA WMD WTO

United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations Human Rights Commission United States of America Vietnamese Communist Party Visiting Forces Agreement Vietnamese People’s Army weapons of mass destruction World Trade Organisation

Tables

1.1 Number of Articles and Commentaries on the ‘China Threat’ Appearing in the Chinese Press and Journals (1991–2000) 4.1 Attitudes towards the Influx of Chinese Immigrants 4.2 Public Opinion of Russia’s Relations with Various Countries 10.1 Defence Expenditure in the Asia-Pacific Region, 1999 13.1 Exchange of High-Level Military Delegations Between China & Vietnam, 1991–2000

22 100 106 213 285

Introduction

Herbert Yee and Ian Storey

China is the fastest growing economy in the world, with what may be the fastest growing military budget… China is now in the process of transforming itself from a weakling to one of the strong. It will have the opportunity to do what it wants instead of what it must. Nicholas D.Kristof1 China is not replacing the Soviet Union as a threat to the United States. It is emerging as a separate and different kind of challenge, more difficult to deal with in its way because, in striking contrast to the Soviets, the Chinese are not a powerful military power founded on a weak economy, but a powerful economy creating a credible military force. The key is the steady growth of Chinese power, not just in China itself, but throughout Asia and elsewhere in the world. Richard Bernstein and Ross H.Munro2 The People’s Republic of China is the most serious national security threat the United States faces at present and will remain so into the foreseeable future. Bill Gertz3 Since the early 1990s the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has maintained one of the world’s fastest growing economic rates. At the same time, the idea that the PRC as a rising power represents a source of regional and international instability—the so-called ‘China threat’—has periodically been voiced by observers in the West and among China’s neighbours. Not surprisingly, it remains a controversial issue. Some

2 HERBERT YEE AND IAN STOREY

critics dismiss the PRC as economically and militarily too weak to pose a challenge to the West.4 Instead of posing a threat to its neighbours and the region, Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross have argued that China remains a vulnerable power, crowded on all sides by powerful rivals and potential foes.5 In any event, China’s long-term prospects to successfully modernise its small and dated strategic nuclear force depend on its success at modernising the country’s economy, infrastructure, technology and human capital. Therefore, China is not likely to pose a challenge to US strategic primacy in the first two decades of the twenty-first century.6 Those observers who subscribe to the China threat point out that the PRC has an aspiration to become a hegemonic power because of its authoritarian socialist political system, rapid economic growth and historical role as a great power. The China threat has thus become an open excuse or a latent factor affecting many countries’ policies towards the PRC. The main concerns of China threat advocates are: Will China become a responsible member of the international community? Will China challenge the existing international order? Will China pose a security threat to its neighbours and to the region? Factors Contributing to the China Threat Perception The issue of the China threat emerged in early 1993 in the United States. The background to the issue was the PRC’s rapid economic growth following the introduction of economic reforms in the late 1970s. From 1978 to 1992, China recorded an average growth rate of 9.5 per cent, which further increased to 10.2 per cent during the four-year period of 1992–1995. In fact, China was the world’s fastest growing economy in the 1980s and 1990s. According to a 1992 World Bank report, in purchasing power party (PPP) terms, China’s total GDP was already approaching that of major Western developed states. It was projected that should the PRC maintain its growth rate, by 2020 its GDP would surpass that of the United States and become the world’s largest economy.7 Some analysts in the West are unnerved by China’s fast growth rates, believing that the country will one day become a powerful competitor. They also believe that China’s rapid economic growth will quickly translate into increased military power. The second factor contributing to the China threat issue is the PRC’s authoritarian socialist political system. Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, China has assumed the position of the last major communist power. At the same time, the ‘third-wave’ of democratisation overturned

INTRODUCTION 3

a number of authoritarian regimes in East Asia. South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines made good progress in their democratisation efforts in the early 1990s, whilst in 1998 Indonesia became the world’s third largest democracy. By comparison, the PRC has made little progress in the sphere of political reform: it refuses to adopt Western democratic values or to share its centrally controlled political power with the people. Those who were desirous of peaceful political reform in China have been disappointed and frustrated, especially when liberal democratic ideas and values have prevailed in other parts of the world. As far as the West is concerned, socialism is no longer a viable political system and the PRC’s continuous resistance to democratisation is simply unacceptable. The June 4 1989 Tiananmen Square incident was a turning point in Western perceptions of China, and policies towards the PRC became a controversial political issue. During the 1992 US presidential election, the direction that Washington’s China policy should take became a campaign issue for the first time in two decades. The basic tenets of America’s China policy debate were deeply affected by the crushing of the prodemocracy movement and the different political systems and ideologies of the United States and the PRC. As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton criticised the Beijing leadership and swore he would not compromise with the Chinese government. In the West, the image of China was greatly tarnished by the Tiananmen Square incident; politicians and the general public alike urged their respective governments to adopt a hardline towards Beijing, thereby forcing the Chinese government to liberalise its political system and improve its human rights record. As a result, the debate lacked an objective and rational assessment. A few Western Sinologists posited that the PRC might follow the Soviet Union, and disintegrate after the death of Deng Xiaoping. It was feared that a military regime might seize power in post-Deng China.8 In the early 1990s, other China specialists pointed out that the Chinese government was under severe domestic political pressure and that the prime concern of the communist regime was to consolidate its rule and maintain political order and social stability. Few China watchers doubted the crucial role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Chinese politics: political reforms cannot be conducted in the PRC without the support of the PLA, which is generally regarded as the stronghold of conservative political forces. Moreover, despite China’s large land mass and diverse regions, there was a strong belief among provincial and local governments that it was in the interests of the country as well as the


regions for China to remain unified under a central, authoritarian government.9 It was thus very unlikely that any drastic political reforms would be affected in the PRC. In short, there was no sign that political liberalisation was imminent, which was very frustrating to those who wished for swift democratisation. Among Western international relations scholars, it is widely held that democracies never fight each other.10 In other words, democracy means peace and dictatorship means war. Thus, an undemocratic socialist state like China remained a threat to regional and world peace. The third factor contributing to the China threat debate is the PRC’s increasing military capability and its impact on regional security. There is little doubt that China’s capability to influence regional affairs has significantly increased over the past few decades. A number of developments have contributed to the PRC’s increasing influence in the region: (1) China has increased its share of the regional economy and hence its impact on economic development in the region; (2) China’s territorial disputes with other countries in the region have intensified; (3) China’s rapid economic development has also accelerated its military modernisation process; and (4) China has elevated reunification with Taiwan as a higher priority following the retrocession of Hong Kong in July 1997 and Macau in December 1999. The last three factors are sometimes interpreted as signalling the beginning of China’s strategic expansion in the region. The PRC’s territorial claims in the region, especially on the islets in the South China Sea, are often interpreted by its neighbours as evidence of strategic expansion. Likewise, China’s military modernisation programme, such as the purchase of state-of-the-art fighters, surface vessels and submarines from Russia, have been perceived by some observers as indications of the PRC’s strategic desire to dominate the region. Beijing’s hardline policy towards Taiwan, especially its refusal to abandon the threat of military force, has strengthened the image of China as a war prone state. Moreover, Beijing’s pursuit of the retrocession of Hong Kong and Macau was perceived by some observers as proof positive of an ambition to build a ‘Greater China’. Some linked the Greater China concept to Beijing’s alleged attempt to restore the historical greatness of the Chinese empire. According to Harry Harding: The rest of the world has viewed the prospect of a Greater China with both fascination and considerable alarm. Some see it in benign

INTRODUCTION 5

terms, as a dynamic common market which provides growing opportunities for trade and investment. More frequently, however, there has been concern that the combination of economic and military resources available to a Greater China will pose a significant threat to the commercial vitality and the strategic stability of the rest of the world.11 The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario—nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world. The fifth factor contributing to the notion of a China threat is rising Chinese nationalism, especially rising anti-American feelings. During the first decade of China’s open door policy, the Chinese admired almost everything Western, from rock and roll to arts and philosophy. Thousands of young people went abroad to pursue graduate studies in the United States, Canada, Australia and Europe. Some liberal Chinese intellectuals, such as the famous dissident Fang Lizhi, even openly advocated the complete Westernisation of China to hasten the country’s modernisation drive. However, this ‘love’ relationship with the West was short-lived. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, and the subsequent economic sanctions imposed on China by Western countries, pro-Western voices inside China were silenced. Meanwhile, anti-Western and anti-American nationalist feelings grew stronger following Beijing’s failed bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games, an outcome which is


generally believed in China to be the result of a Western anti-China conspiracy and the ‘face off’13 between the PRC and the United States in the Taiwan Straits in the spring of 1996. In the mid 1990s Chinese nationalism or chauvinism was symbolised with the publication of China Can Say No, a book with a strong antiAmerican tone and which quickly became a bestseller. Many in the West believe that the book was given tacit support by the Chinese government.14 Some China watchers also believe that the Chinese leadership has manipulated strong nationalist sentiments among the populace to bolster its legitimacy, and has taken advantage of incidents such as the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 by a US warplane, and the collision of an American spy jet with a Chinese fighter off the coast of Hainan Island in April 2001.15 What China watchers in the West and some Asian countries fear most is the broad appeal of Chinese nationalism to ethnic Chinese both inside and outside mainland China, and the rise of Chinese power throughout Asia and the world.16 Origins of the China Threat Theory In contemporary international relations theory, three theoretical positions can be employed to help illuminate the emergence of the China threat: (1) the historical approach; (2) the realist school; and (3) the culturalinstitutional perspective. The historical approach attempts to deduce from the patterns of history that the rise of a great power like China is inevitable. Scholars often refer to the rise of Great Britain, Germany and France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the rise of the United States, Japan and the Soviet Union in the twentieth century as examples of the rise and fall of great powers.17 The rise of new great powers often results in global instability and the re-structuring of the international political and economic order. A rising China, it is argued, will likewise challenge the international status quo created by the West and threaten the established interests of the existing great powers. Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers is probably the most widely-read historical study of the subject.18 Kennedy’s conclusion is that great powers fall due to ‘imperial overstretch’—economic decline caused by too many strategic commitments. The inference is that one day the United States’ predominant global position will be eroded, allowing other great powers, such as China or India, to take its place.

INTRODUCTION 7

The historical approach, however, is often criticised as lacking theoretical rigor. In comparison, the realist school of international relations offers a more rigorous explanation underpinning a China threat. Realists regard the rise and fall of great powers as the basic norms of change and development in interstate relations.19 They also retain the paradigm of treating nation-states as the central players in contemporary global politics. It is exactly for the above inclinations for power struggle among nations that realism seems to provide a compelling explanation for the emergence of a China threat. Within a realist theoretical framework, the rise of China, and the resultant threat of instability in the international system, is inevitable. According to classical realists, relations between nation-states are primarily political and governed by the basic characteristics of human nature such as selfishness, greed and the pursuit of power. According to Hans Morgenthau, the tendency to dominate is an element of all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations and local political organisations, to the state.20 The essence of international politics is identical with its domestic counterpart: both are a struggle for power.21 A nation-state will pursue its political power and national interest by all available means or instruments. The pursuit of national interests is the prime concern of all nation-states, yet the only means to attain them is through power. In Morgenthau’s realist tradition the pursuit of, and the struggle for, power in international politics is both reasonable and natural. The absence of a superordinate authority (i.e. a world government) in the international system has forced great powers to pursue their national interests by increasing their power. Indeed, when national interests can only be pursued by power, the pursuit of power itself becomes a national interest, or in Morgenthau’s terms, statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power.22 The pursuit of power in world politics is thus regarded by realists as both natural and justified. Indeed, the use of power to pursue national interests is at the core of realism and its view of global politics. Realism was the dominant school in Western international relations from the 1940s to the 1970s, and it still has many followers in academic and political circles. In a power oriented international society, a nation-state’s foreign policy objective aims at either maintaining the status quo, seeking imperial expansion, or enhancing the prestige of the nation. According to Morgenthau, all politics, domestic and international, reveals three basic patterns: ‘A


political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power’.23 Proponents of the China threat assert that the PRC seeks, or will seek, to increase and then demonstrate power in the international arena. As a latecomer in the game of great powers, China is not satisfied with the existing global power structure and is thus bound to challenge the current power relationships by adopting a policy of imperial expansionism aimed at attaining both regional and global hegemony. An imperial power can accomplish its strategic objectives though military force, or through economic and cultural means. Military conquest is of course the oldest form of imperialism. In the realist tradition, A.F.K.Organski’s power transition theory is often used by advocates of the China threat to support their assertion that a great power like China is bound to become a political and military force once its economy is fully developed.24 Organski’s view of interstate relations does not differ markedly from that of other realists. He believes that nation-states can be distinguished from each other by the power they possess because ‘power determines a nation’s role in international politics’.25 However, Organski holds that different progresses in industrialisation are more important than power politics in generating power redistribution in the international system. New great powers emerge after achieving industrialisation. In short, all realist scholars are concerned with the change of power relationships between nation-states and believe power change is the main factor causing the redistribution of power in international politics. In their view, the rise of new great powers will cause instability in the existing international system. That is, rising powers will ‘threaten’ the old international power configurations. If the established powers do not take preventive measures, then the new challengers will expand their regional influence or hegemony to the international system level.26 The third theoretical explanation for the China threat is the cultural factor. For some time, the cultural approach failed to become a persuasive interpretive norm in international relations, as cultural analysis was often vague and ambiguous. However, since the 1980s there has been a trend in international relations to combine cultural analysis with foreign policy research. Constructivism tends to use cultural analysis to investigate the directions and patterns of development of various issues in international relations; in particular it seeks to examine the effects of socialisation and cultural identity on various international actors and institutions.27 Constructivism holds that only a comprehensive cultural analysis can

INTRODUCTION 9

provide a rational explanation for a nation’s behaviour. According to Marco Verweij: ‘It seems more appropriate to develop a theoretical framework that incorporates a variety of rationalities—a plurality of cultural logic—and this is where Cultural Theory can help’.28 Alastair Johnston believes that a nation’s strategic culture has a great impact on the strategies it pursues. He argues that the nature of China’s strategic culture is expansionist, and includes the major characteristics of realpolitik: ‘The Chinese case suggests that to the extent parabellum is cross-cultural and learned we should begin to treat realpolitik behavior as a “cultural realist” norm—a historically and temporally bounded, though impressively powerful, ideational source of state behavior’.29 In the perspective of Chinese history, this strategic culture is very different from the philosophy of Confucianism. To quote Johnston again: It seems fairly evident that the operative Chinese strategic culture does not differ radically from key elements in the Western realpolitik tradition. Indeed, the Chinese case might be classified as a hard realpolitik sharing many of the same tenets about the nature of enemy and the efficacy of violence as advocates of nuclear warfighting on both sides in the cold war, or late nineteenth century social Darwinian nationalist.30 To summarise, the theoretical underpinnings of the China threat can be found in the historical interpretation of the rise and fall of great powers, realist power transition theory, and the strategist’s cultural explanation of Chinese strategic behaviour. However, it is interesting to note that neorealists argue that contemporary great powers are denied a suitable international environment to launch such a ‘threat’. In the evolving process of the contemporary international system, the PRC must possess sufficient industrial and technological prowess to pose any serious threat to the existing international order. Furthermore, there must be good reason for China to challenge the existing status quo; that is, China must conceive that it can gain from posing a strategic threat to the international system, and only then will a latent threat from a rising China become a real threat. The PRC now and in the coming two or three decades clearly does not possess the economic prowess to challenge the status quo even if its leaders wanted to pursue such a path. Moreover, Kenneth Waltz argues from a constructionist perspective that any Chinese attempt to threaten the international order will be rejected by the structure of the contemporary international system. Indeed, it would be


highly problematical for the PRC to develop counterweights to the dominant power, presently the United States.31 At the same time, in an age of nuclear weapons, a rising power can no longer change the structure of international power relations by launching a war. As a new great power, China can only challenge other great powers through political or economic means.32 From the neorealist perspective, the anarchic situation in international politics does not mean that individual nation-states can pursue unlimited power; indeed behavioural norms at the national level are subject to the ‘organisation principles’ at the international system level as shared by all nation-states. Thus, the pursuit of power by individual nation-states is constrained by the international system. The rise and fall of industrial and military powers at best may only change the characteristics of the international system.33 When war is no longer a basic instrument in changing the international system, the traditional logic of international relations will be replaced by a new one; that is, all nation-states have no interest in war. As John Mueller remarks, ‘substantial agreement has risen around the twin propositions: that prosperity and economic growth should be central national goals and that war is a particularly counterproductive device for achieving these goals’.34 If war is no longer a realistic instrument in changing the international system, then any change in the contemporary global power configuration must be incremental and propelled or constrained by non-political force. Economic and technological development will replace war as an instrument in making power changes within the international system. However, if China’s rise as a great power is meaningful only in the area of economic and technological competition, then it is at most a ‘competitor’, not a ‘threat’. In international relations theory, a ‘threat’ has real meaning only in the military-security arena. Economic competition is a motivating force propelling the world economy towards prosperity. Only a military threat is destructive. The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality Few advocates of a China threat would suggest that the PRC poses a threat to other countries at present, with the notable exception of Taiwan. To most countries, including China’s neighbours, a China threat, real or imaged, is at most a potential and remote one. Denny Roy divides the arguments advanced for or against the China threat into two categories: soft arguments, which primarily concern the intentions of the PRC, and

INTRODUCTION 11

hard arguments, which deal with the capabilities of the PRC.35 From an international system-level perspective, the soft arguments are largely irrelevant: all countries basically have the same intentions: namely, to maintain or, if possible, to increase their security and prosperity. However, even assuming that all nation-states have common national interests or foreign policy goals, Roy rightly points out that states still have the option of adopting an aggressive or conciliatory policy orientation. Instead of forcing its will upon its weaker neighbours, a strong state can choose to achieve its goals through co-operation and compromise. It is a matter of ‘perception’ rather than ‘intention’ of policymakers whether an aggressive or conciliatory approach will better serve the country’s national interests.36 On the other hand, a strong state is sometimes perceived as a friendly giant or as an aggressor by other countries and its weaker neighbours, depending on situations and relationships between the big power and other countries. This book, as the title suggests, deals with perceptions of the China threat from various countries and regions. The focus is on perceptions and policies in the United States, Europe, Russia, Northeast Asia (Japan and South Korea), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam), South Asia (India and Pakistan) and the Middle East. The Chinese perspective of the China threat is also examined. In Chapter One, Herbert Yee and Zhu Feng examine the PRC’s response to the China threat issue from the perspectives of the government, the public and the academic community, and the arguments that have been advanced to refute the notion. The Chinese government reiterates that China does not have, and never will have, the intention to become a regional hegemon, and that the country needs a peaceful international environment to develop its backward economy. The Chinese public are upset by the China threat allegations and express an increasingly strong sentiment against the West, particularly the United States. The response of academicians to the notion of a China threat is the most articulate and diversified. Some trace its origins to the ideological, political and cultural prejudices held by the West against China. Overall, the Chinese dismiss the China threat theory as groundless, a myth created by the Americans, who need an ‘enemy’ to replace the former Soviet Union in their quest to maintain global hegemony. Yet the Chinese rebuttals are long on rhetoric and short on critical analysis. Furthermore, the Chinese do not systematically explain how, and in what way, China


can become a responsible regional actor when it becomes strong and powerful, the main concerns of all China threat advocates. As the twenty-first century unfolds, arguably the most important bilateral relationship in international relations will be that between the United States and China. In Chapters Two and Three, two leading American scholars assess the extent of US threat perceptions towards the PRC. In Chapter Two, Jonathan Pollack examines US perceptions of Chinese military power. As the modernisation of the Chinese armed forces gathered pace in the 1990s, analysts increasingly turned their attention to assessments of how this process would affect the regional balance of power and the force structure and deployment of the US military. Jonathan argues that China still faces considerable constraints in its efforts to bring its armed forces into the modern age, including cost, priority and technological know-how. Nevertheless, China’s growing military power means that it will ‘constitute the most credible prospective rival to the United States in the decades to come’. Given China’s inherent weaknesses though, and US strategic predominance, Beijing is unlikely to directly challenge America any time soon. Instead, Jonathan forecasts a Sino-American relationship characterised by geopolitical manoeuvring for influence, compromise over some issues, and the enhancement of military capabilities on both sides. However, without a longer term political and strategic accommodation between the US and China, he concludes that Beijing may simply bide its time until ‘it feels more able to contest American strategic predominance’, with worrying implications for regional security. In Chapter Three, Edward Friedman examines Chinese and Taiwanese threat perceptions from the perspective of the November 2000 US presidential election. In that election, Taiwan hoped for a Bush victory, believing that the Clinton administration had been too accommodating towards the PRC; China, on the other hand, hoped for a Gore victory and a continuation of Clinton’s ‘constructive engagement’ policy. In fact, both Beijing and Taipei failed to distinguish between campaign rhetoric and the importance of continuity in America’s relations with China and Taiwan. Following the Bush victory, Beijing returned to a position in which it painted America as a threat to its national interests in Asia, no matter who held office. However, according to Edward, the real threat in East Asia is from a Chinese attack on Taiwan, a threat which compels the US to arm Taiwan and strengthen its alliance relationships in the region. Though continuing to support engagement with China, Edward worries

INTRODUCTION 13

that Beijing’s leaders, responding to rising nationalism, may have painted themselves into a corner, and that the only way out is through war. In Chapter Four, Alexander Lukin discusses Russian threat perceptions of China from the mid-eighteenth century to the present day. During Tsarist times, China was perceived as less of a military threat than a demographic one; Chinese ethnic expansion and the ‘Sinification’ of Russia’s Far Eastern territories. Following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Moscow and Beijing formed a military and political alliance, though this relationship soon soured, and by the end of the 1960s both countries perceived each other as a major military threat. With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the strategic rivalry between the two countries evaporated, but fears of Chinese ‘demographic expansion’ in the Far East resurfaced. At present, anti-Chinese sentiment does not determine Russia’s official policy towards the PRC. Indeed, Moscow today sees China as an important partner in balancing the global influence of the United States. However, Alexander contends that unless the Russian leadership implements effective strategies to develop the country’s Far Eastern provinces, perceptions of a China threat may once again influence Moscow’s policy towards the PRC. Though geographically far removed from China, European countries have an important and growing relationship with the PRC. In Chapter Five, Joachim Glaubitz assesses the China threat issue from a European perspective. Although China does not pose a direct military threat to any country in Europe, the enhancement of the PRC’s power poses a number of security concerns in Europe, both traditional and nontraditional. The traditional political-military security concerns include Chinese military threats towards Taiwan (an important trading partner of the EU), the PRC’s extensive claims in the South China Sea (through which much of Europe’s trade with the Asia Pacific passes) and, in the longer-term, whether China will position itself for regional hegemony. Europe’s non-traditional security concerns vis-à-vis China include the threat of retaliation by China to European countries’ business interests over human rights criticisms, environmental degradation in China, and Chinese organised crime, piracy and intellectual property rights infringements. Though a member of the EU, the United Kingdom has played a more influential role in Chinese history than its European partners, principally because of Hong Kong’s colonial status between 1842 and 1997. In Chapter Six, Brian Hook assesses changing British threat perceptions of the PRC during 1945–1997, and the issue of threat perception in Sino-British relations in the aftermath of Hong Kong’s


historic reversion to Chinese sovereignty on 1 July 1997. In particular, Brian looks at the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British House of Commons published in November 2000 for evidence of current threat perceptions. Both Joachim and Brian agree that, for Europe at least, the key to mitigating perceived threats from China is through multilateralism. Chapters Seven and Eight assess Japanese and South Korean perceptions of the China threat. In Chapter Seven, Jiang Wenran argues that Japan, in common with many of China’s neighbours, has to balance the benefits derived from a healthy economic relationship with China whilst trying to keep on good terms with both the US and the PRC as the strategic rivalry between those two countries increases. Since the early 1990s a China threat debate has been joined in Japan, precipitated by the PRC’s rapid economic growth, its military modernisation programme, and assertive policies in the South China Sea and Taiwan Straits. At the same time, the idea that Japan poses a security threat has gained ground in the PRC, leading to the development of ‘a dangerous dynamic of a bilateral threat perception’. In dealing with a rising China, Wenran argues that Tokyo has adopted a dual track policy, using economic and political engagement to steer the PRC down a developmental path beneficial to Japan, whilst at the same time enhancing its own military power and strengthening the US-Japan security alliance. In Chapter Eight, Taeho Kim argues that the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) perceptions of the China threat are informed by its geographical proximity to the PRC, Beijing’s influence on North Korea, growing SinoSouth Korean ties, and stresses in the Sino-US relationship. Sino-ROK ties have improved dramatically since the early 1990s, and the idea that China poses a military threat to the Korean Peninsula is held by only a minority. Indeed, as Taeho suggests, the dominant public perception of China in South Korea is that of a ‘benign, pragmatic economic partner’. Nevertheless, because US and Chinese views of the future of the Korean Peninsula are likely to diverge (especially over a reunified Korea), Seoul’s most pressing security challenge in the twenty-first century is likely to be the balancing of its own strategic and economic interests between those of a ‘regional superpower’ and those of the ‘global superpower’. Chapters Nine to Thirteen are devoted to Southeast Asian perceptions of the China threat. Given the region’s geographical proximity to China, long historical interaction with its giant neighbour to the north, and territorial disputes with the PRC, it is not surprising that China factors heavily in the geopolitical calculations of all Southeast Asian countries.

INTRODUCTION 15

However, perceptions of China, and the notion that it poses a threat to regional stability, differ among the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In Chapter Nine, Rizal Sukma explores how Indonesian perceptions of China have remained relatively unchanged since the 1950s, and that changes in Jakarta’s China policy have been wrought by transformations in domestic politics. As perceptions are difficult to change, this suggests a pessimistic future for Sino-Indonesian relations in the twenty-first century. In Chapter Ten, Ian Storey examines Singapore’s security concerns vis-à-vis the rise of China, and the strategies it has adopted to mitigate these concerns. Because Singapore is reliant on external trade for its continued prosperity, it has been concerned by the prospect of instability arising from conflict in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea, as well as a more confrontational Sino-US relationship. Therefore, Singapore has adopted a two-track policy towards the PRC; engaging it at the economic, political and security levels in order to integrate it into the regional community, whilst at the same time ensuring the United States maintains a military presence in the region to act as a balance. In Chapter Eleven, Abdul Razak Baginda charts the evolution of SinoMalaysian relations from one of hostility in the 1950s to cordiality in the 1990s. Hostile Malaysian perceptions of the PRC in the 1950s and 1960s stemmed from the PRC’s support for communist insurgents in Malaysia. Even though diplomatic relations were established in 1974, Malaysian suspicions of China lingered for another two decades, as Beijing continued to support the Communist Party of Malaya. Moreover, from 1979, the Spratly Islands dispute emerged as a further irritant in the bilateral relationship. Under Prime Minister Mahathir, however, SinoMalaysian relations have improved considerably, due mainly to a convergence of economic and political interests in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, since the early 1990s, Mahathir has consistently rejected the notion that China poses a threat to Malaysia, or any other country in the region. According to Razak, Malaysian threat perceptions today are increasingly focused on Islamic militancy rather than the growth of Chinese military power. In Chapter Twelve, Aileen San Pablo-Baviera looks at the China threat issue from the perspective of the Philippines. Manila’s relations with Beijing were generally cordial in the twenty years following the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1975. However, in 1995 relations took a dramatic turn for the worse when Chinese-built structures were discovered on Mischief Reef, one of the Spratly Islands lying close


to the Philippines. The occupation of the reef, and the subsequent upgrading of the structures into a permanent facility, has created negative perceptions of China in the Philippines. According to Aileen, though few in Manila consider that the PRC has expansionist designs on the Philippines itself, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, coupled with its growing military capabilities, has aroused real fears, and the burden of responsibility for assuaging these fears rests with Beijing alone. Among the countries of Southeast Asia, none has had a more troubled relationship with China than Vietnam. In Chapter Thirteen, Carlyle A.Thayer traces the roots of Sino-Vietnamese hostility and the driving forces behind the normalisation of relations in the early 1990s. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1991, relations between Hanoi and Beijing have demonstrated a great improvement across a broad range of issues, despite their on-going territorial dispute in the South China Sea. In the twenty-first century, the goal of Vietnam’s China policy is to forge a comprehensive relationship with the PRC which is neither dependent nor confrontational, as neither serves Hanoi’s long term interests. The authors of Chapters Fourteen and Fifteen examine the China threat issue in the context of India-Pakistan rivalry, a rivalry which has intensified over the past few years over the Kashmir dispute and the nuclearisation of the subcontinent. In Chapter Fourteen, C.V.Ranganathan examines the broad issues in Sino-Indian relations that have bedevilled relations between the two countries since the late 1940s. These include the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 (and the Dalai Lama’s subsequent flight to India), border disputes leading to conflict in 1962, and PRC military assistance to Pakistan (especially its nuclear and missile programmes). However, since the late 1980s, mutual threat perceptions have eased somewhat. Ranganathan contends that there are many issues about which India and the PRC can co-operate, such as the problems posed by globalisation and the need to strengthen economic ties. He concludes by offering a prescription for a healthier bilateral relationship based on a system of comprehensive security, which should allay real or imagined threat perceptions. In Chapter Fifteen, Pervaiz Iqbail Cheema traces the development of cordial Sino-Pakistan relations. Bilateral relations have prospered since 1962 due to a convergence of strategic interests vis-à-vis both countries rivalry with India. Pakistan has looked to China as an important source of arms, whilst Beijing has used its ties with Islamabad as a form of pressure on New Delhi. Over the past few decades, the PRC has also

INTRODUCTION 17

provided Pakistan with significant economic and technical aid. Although there are some irritants in the relationship (largely connected with Pakistan-based Islamic extremist groups) Islamabad does not perceive China to be a threat. Pervaiz concludes that given the warming of IndiaUS relations and continued Sino-US tensions over Taiwan, relations between Pakistan and China can only strengthen. In Chapter Sixteen, Yitzhak Shichor examines the China threat from the perspective of the Middle East, and argues that the PRC is not perceived as a threat by countries in the region, despite some US views suggesting otherwise. China has neither the capability nor the intention to directly ‘threaten’ any country in the Middle East. In terms of whether PRC arms sales to the Middle East pose a threat to regional stability, Chinese-made conventional weaponry are relatively unsophisticated and, in any case, Western and Russian arms sales to the region far outweigh those of China, both in terms of quality and quantity. As for sales of nonconventional weapons to the Middle East, China’s role has been overplayed, particularly by the United States and Israel. Yitzhak concludes that China contributes little to regional instability, and that given the importance of oil to its economic modernisation efforts, Beijing has much more to gain by playing a stabilising role than a threatening one. Conclusion Perceptions of a China threat are the product of a complex amalgam of factors. These factors include the theoretical dispositions of observers, geographical location, historical interaction with China (both ancient and modern), domestic political issues, economic interests, competing territorial claims, assessments of China’s military power and long-term intentions, and the shifting contours of the geopolitical environment. As the authors of this volume demonstrate, these factors differ in intensity from one country to the next. As a result, there is no uniform perception of a China threat. Since 1978, the rise of China has been accompanied by both positive and negative trends. For the majority of people in China, the abandonment of central planning has brought newfound economic opportunities and rising standards of living. Economic growth has also given China a heightened political profile on the world stage, and the means to improve its security environment through military modernisation. For the West and China’s immediate neighbours,


Beijing’s opening up to the outside world has created lucrative trade and investment opportunities. It has also turned the PRC into a more responsible and responsive international actor. On the negative side, however, the enhancement of Chinese economic, political and military power has precipitated problems, both for the Chinese government and the international community. For China, the reform process has been accompanied by social dislocation, increased crime, unemployment and bankruptcy, environmental degradation and, as was demonstrated so tragically in June 1989, rising aspirations for political pluralism. For the West and China’s neighbours, it has raised a number of security concerns, specifically how and in what ways Beijing intends to exercise its newfound military muscle in the decades ahead. In the twenty-first century, the central challenge facing China is how to continue delivering the economic goods through interaction with the outside world and enhance its own security (including the resolution of outstanding territorial issues) without alarming neighbouring countries. For the other countries in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, the most important foreign-policy balancing act will be to forge a mutually beneficial economic relationship and engage China so that it gains a stake in the international status quo, whilst at the same time pursuing prudent military-security hedging strategies which do not transform a potential China threat into an actual China threat. In sum, contributors to this volume, though differing in their interpretations of a ‘China threat’, tend to agree that China at present poses no immediate threat to global and regional security. More importantly, perhaps, their expert accounts of China’s relations with the West and its Asian neighbours all tend to refute the realist arguments that the emergence of an economically and militarily strong China will necessarily be a threat to global peace. Without outright military confrontation a China threat, real or imagined, is only a matter of perception, especially the perception of Chinese strategic intentions. ‘Intention’, however, is a very elusive concept which is difficult to pinpoint. Moreover, according to the authors of this volume, perceptions of a China threat are often affected by domestic political factors. At best, the power transition theory in the realist tradition can only partly explain the presence or absence of a China threat. In short, the emergence of a China threat is not pre-determined.

INTRODUCTION 19

Notes The editors are indebted to Zhu Feng for his views and research assistance in writing this chapter. 1 Nicholas D.Kristof, “The Rise of China”, Foreign Affairs (November/ December 1993), pp. 59–74. 2 Richard Bernstein and Ross H.Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A.Kropf, 1997), p. 19. 3 Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2000), p. 199. 4 See, for example, Gerald Segal, “Does China Matter?” Foreign Affairs (September/October 1999), pp. 24–36; and Robert S.Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power”, Foreign Affairs (March/April, 1997), pp. 33– 44. 5 Andrew J.Nathan and Robert S.Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York and London: W.W.Norton, 1997). 6 Vice Admiral Thomas R.Wilson (Director, Defence Intelligence Agency), “Global Threats and Challenges through 2015”, Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Service Committee, 8 March 2001. See also Chapter Two of this volume by Jonathan D.Pollack. 7 World Bank, World Development Report, 1992: Development and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 220–222. Recalculating GDP according to the purchasing power of its currency at home, the IMF concluded that China’s GDP in 1992 was US$1.66 trillion. The World Bank, applying PPP differently, arrived at a figure of US$2.6 trillion. 8 A.Doak Barnett, After Deng, What? Will China follow the USSR? (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1991), pp. 8– 11. 9 Ronald N.Montarperto, “Wither China? Beijing’s Policies for the 1990s”, Current Policy 20, no. 3 (Summer 1992), p. 29; and Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institute, 1992), p. 215. 10 Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983), p. 213. 11 Harry Harding, “The Concept of ‘Greater China’: Themes, Variations and Reservations”, in David Shambaugh (ed.), Greater China: The Next Superpower? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 33. 12 Kristof, “The Rise of China,” op. cit., p. 60. 13 “Face Off” is the title of a book focusing on the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis. See John W.Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997). 14 Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, op. cit., pp. 48– 49. 15 See, for example, Gertz, The China Threat, op. cit., p. 2. 16 Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, op. cit., p. 19.


17 See, for example, Paul Kennedy’s classic study The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). 18 Ibid. 19 Kenneth N.Waltz points out that ‘for more than three hundred years, the drama of modern history has turned on the rise and fall of great powers’. See “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 44. For a similar view see Robert Giplin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chapter 1. 20 Hans, J.Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Fifth Edition) (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1973), p. 35. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., p. 5. 23 Ibid., p. 40. 24 A.F K.Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1968). 25 Ibid., pp. 101–102. 26 James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Harpen and Row 4th Edition, 1997), pp. 135–155. 27 Peter J.Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1–32. 28 Marco Verweij, “Whose Behavior is Affected by International Anarchy?” in Michael Thompson, Gunnar Grendstad, and Per Selle (eds.), Cultural Theory as Politics Science (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 28. 29 Alastair I.Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 31. 30 Ibid., p. 258. 31 Waltz, “The Emerging Structure”, op. cit., p. 68. 32 Ibid., p. 76. 33 Kenneth Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory”, Journal of International Affairs (Spring/ Summer 1990), p. 37. 34 John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 291–222. 35 Denny Roy, “The ‘China Threat’ Issue: Major Arguments,” Asian Survey XXXVI, no. 8 (August 1996), p. 758–771. 36 Ibid., p. 770.

CHAPTER ONE Chinese Perspectives of the China Threat: Myth or Reality? Herbert Yee and Zhu Feng

Introduction Before 1995, few Chinese leaders or scholars publicly refuted the ‘China Threat Theory’ (Zhongguo weixielun). The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) official newspaper, first responded to the China threat issue in October 19921 after the Bush administration decided to sell 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan, and the publication of an article by Ross Munro sounding the China threat alarm.2 The People’s Daily article pointed out that the Bush administration had used the ‘China threat’ as an excuse to sell warplanes to Taiwan. Yet the response of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the China threat issue remained sporadic during 1993 and 1994. Until the end of 1994, only five articles in the People’s Daily directly responded to the issue (with titles containing the characters ‘China threat’), while only one scholar addressed the issue.3 However, the PRC’s responses to the China threat issue rose sharply in 1996, especially after the face-off between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and US aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Straits. In 1996, twelve People’s Daily articles directly refuted the China threat, while fifty-six news reports and analyses mentioned and criticised the China threat accusations. The quantity of scholarly articles also reached its peak in 1996; eight journal articles directly addressed the China threat issue. However, the Chinese responses gradually declined after 1996 as indicated in Table 1.1. This chapter examines Chinese responses to the China threat issue and the arguments with which it has been refuted. Chinese views from three different perspectives will be examined, namely the official, scholarly and societal. We refer to official views as those derived from articles or commentaries appearing in the People’s Daily and other CCP press organs

22 HERBERT YEE AND ZHU FENG

Table 1.1 Number of Articles and Commentaries on the ‘China Threat’ Appearing in the Chinese Press and Journals (1991–2000)4

as well as those expressed by Chinese leaders and diplomats in speeches and policy statements. The academic views are mainly derived from articles published in mainland journals by international relations scholars, while the views of the Chinese populace are reflected in opinion polls, popular best sellers, and essays or commentaries on Chinese Internet sites. Admittedly, it is sometimes difficult to clearly distinguish among these three groups, and there is a degree of overlap. The Official Chinese Response Chinese leaders or spokesmen for the PRC government normally refute the China threat allegations by stressing China’s independent and peaceful foreign policy, often through elements of the CCP’s propaganda machine such as the state controlled mass media or news agencies. Few Chinese leaders publicly refuted the China threat notion before 1996.

CHINESE PERSPECTIVES OF THE CHINA THREAT 23

However, as mentioned above, when US allegations of a China threat escalated in 1996, responses from the Chinese government also increased sharply. Since 1996 Chinese leaders on official visits abroad or on receiving foreign leaders or journalists in China have often mentioned and refuted the idea that China poses a threat. For instance, in an interview in March 1997, President Jiang Zemin pointed out: Some circles in the West have deliberately exaggerated China’s economic capability and spread the so-called ‘China threat’ alarm. This allegation is completely groundless. China’s current reform and open policy and its modernisation efforts need a prolonged period of stability and peace in the international environment. Even when China becomes strong and powerful it will not threaten other countries.11 Similarly, Premier Li Peng responded to the China threat in an interview in December 1997: In order to realise China’s development strategy and its basic objective of raising the level of material well-being and cultural life of the Chinese people, we need, on the one hand, a stable and harmonious domestic political environment and, on the other hand, a peaceful international environment, especially a good environment along China’s borders. These are the prerequisites for China’s continuing development. The Chinese people highly value peace and stability. We oppose great power hegemony and China as a socialist state will never seek hegemony nor a sphere of influence. This is a solemn promise made by the Chinese government to the world. China does not pose a threat to any country or region. Some people spread the ‘China threat’ allegations for other purposes. China’s military capability and posture is defensive—if other people do not attack us, we won’t attack others.12 When Premier Zhu Rongji visited the United States in 1999, he also refuted the China threat as a groundless allegation in a speech delivered in New York. Zhu suggested that it would be better to think of China is an opportunity rather than a threat given the opening of China’s huge domestic market to Western capital and goods, and that China and the United States should be co-operative partners.13


Besides direct rebuttals by Chinese leaders and diplomats, the Chinese government has used its propaganda organs such as the People’s Daily, Liberation Army Daily, and the Xinhua News Agency to refute the China threat. Most articles or commentaries appearing in the official press merely reiterate the PRC’s position—that the allegations are completely groundless, a myth created by the Western anti-Chinese forces, and that: (1) China is a peace-loving country and needs a peaceful international environment for its economic development; (2) China is not a hegemonic power and will never seek hegemony in the region; (3) China’s military capability is defensive and poses no threat to its neighbours; and (4) China will not use nuclear weapons against countries which do not possess nuclear weapons and that it does not have a single soldier or military base overseas. Another common strategy of the official press is to quote the views or opinions of friendly foreign leaders, diplomats, or scholars on the China threat issue.14 By and large, the Chinese official response to the China threat theory is reactive, defensive, and lacks a rigorous and critical theoretical analysis. However, besides verbal rebuttals the Chinese government has also taken concrete measures to alleviate concerns associated with China’s rising power. First, in 1995, 1998 and 2000 the PRC issued a series of defence white papers explaining China’s good-neighbourly foreign policy tradition, its defensive national defence policy and military modernisation, as well as a plan to reduce the size of the PLA and China’s military expenditure. Secondly, in 1997 the Chinese government set up a ‘Comprehensive National Power Research Group’ consisting of more than a hundred scholars and experts in various fields. The research group used numerous indicators to compare the comprehensive national power (CNP) of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan and China during the period 1988–1998. The group, which published its report in August 2000, concluded that the PRC, in terms of CNP, should be ranked number seven in the world, and has about a quarter of the United States national strength, less than half of Japan’s, and about two-thirds of Russia’s (Russia was ranked number six). 15 Thirdly, Chinese officials have deliberately avoided mentioning the term ‘Greater China’—a vague concept which normally includes mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, but sometimes is also said to include ethnic Chinese residing in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.


The Views of the Chinese Populace In contrast to official rebuttals of the China threat, the response from ordinary Chinese citizens to the issue has been largely emotional. Indeed, the issue has aroused a strong wave of nationalist feelings among a significant portion of the Chinese populace, especially among young intellectuals, and helped to change their views of the world, and especially of the United States. In May 1996, China Can Say No was published and quickly became a bestseller. The book was written by young intellectuals and severely criticised America’s China policy, especially the advocation of a policy of containment by some sections of the US mass media in response to an alleged China threat.16 The authors described their personal experiences in changing from a pro-American to an anti-American stand because of increasingly hostile US policies and attitudes towards the PRC. They also criticised pro-American political forces in China. The popularity of the book and its anti-American overtones immediately drew worldwide attention. It also drew critical reviews from both inside and outside China, which in general regarded the book as too emotional and irrational. Many were quick to point out that the sentiments expressed in the book might not necessarily represent mainstream Chinese feelings towards the United States. Nevertheless, most Western observers were shocked by the authors’ strong anti-American sentiments. Moreover, many believed that the Chinese government had given its tacit support to the book’s publication.17 The Hong Kong-based Asiaweek took a more neutral position, stating: ‘Perhaps, not all Chinese youth are so radical, but as indicated in several opinion surveys conducted in China last year, most Chinese youth regard the American attitude towards China as hegemonic and most unfriendly. It is thus not unreasonable to say that the sentiments as expressed in China Can Say No generally reflect the feelings of the Chinese populace’.18 Following the publication of China Can Say No, several books with similar titles were published later in the same year, namely Why China Says No,19 China Can Still Say No20 and China Can Not Only Say No.21 These books more or less carried the same theme of criticising Washington’s China policy and urging the Chinese government to stand firm against the United States. They served to further fan anti-American sentiments. However, the publication of Behind the Demonisation of China in December 1996 pushed Chinese nationalist feelings to a new height.22 The book targeted its criticisms at the American mass media. It asserted that there exists a strong anti-Chinese current in American academic, publishing,


and mass media circles which deliberately distorts China’s image and tries to sell this ‘demonised’ image of China to the American public. If the China-can-say-no books published in 1996 reflect the vitriolic, chauvinistic, and anti-American feelings of young Chinese intellectuals in the mid 1990s,23 the publication of China’s Future in the Shadow of Globalisation in 1999 signalled a subtle change of attitude among young intellectuals.24 Two of the four co-authors, Qiao Bian and Song Qiang, were co-authors of the first China-can-say-no book. From that book to China’s Future one can discern a change in Qiao and Song’s position from a simple, emotional exclamation of ‘no’ to a more subtle, rational and indepth analysis of the reasons behind the China threat allegations. The four co-authors try to find a new meaning and role for Chinese nationalism or patriotism in Chinese foreign policy. An unintended consequence of the China threat allegation is the rising dissatisfaction among the Chinese public towards their country’s foreign policy, especially its US policy. The Chinese government has faced increasing pressure from the public to take a more hard line stance in its dealings with the United States. Over the last few years, a number of articles and commentaries have appeared in academic journals and on the Internet reviewing Chinese foreign policy and suggesting alternative strategies. Some commentaries accuse the Chinese government of being too ‘soft’ in refuting anti-Chinese allegations, and suggest that it should go beyond mere verbal rebuttals. For instance, a commentary by one anonymous writer appeared on the Internet severely criticising the government’s ‘rightist pro-American policy line’, which had, in his opinion, sacrificed Chinese national and strategic interests on the Korean Peninsular, and in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits for a stable relationship with the United States.25 After the spy-jet incident of April 2001, Ezra Vogel, a seasoned Sinologist, observed: [M]any Chinese, even with increasing access to outside information, are becoming more anti-American. They admire the openness of America, the opportunities it provides to learn and to make money, but they are patriotic and are increasingly convinced that the United States is trying to contain China… They ask me why US officials and members of Congress are so anti-Chinese. They find it hard to believe that the pinpointed target bombing of the part of their Yugoslav Embassy with the most sophisticated electronic equipment was an accident. Why are so many US spy planes flying so near to China? …Why is the United States so suspicious of Chinese-


Americans? Why do so many in Congress want to keep us from holding the Olympics? Don’t they see that if we hold the games it will strengthen our desire for positive international cooperation?26 The Academic Response in China Understandably, in China’s political environment, many scholars tend to support the government’s stance towards the China threat issue, whilst some even hold views similar to those of the general public. However, by and large the academic response to the China threat issue differs from the official and popular views in two important aspects. On the one hand, unlike the official response which is largely aimed at explaining China’s foreign policy orientations, academics tend to engage in more substantive and theoretical analyses. On the other hand, unlike the emotional and sometimes irrational Chinese public, PRC scholars tend to be more restrained and rational. Chinese scholars’ responses to the China threat issue can be roughly divided into two stages: those made from the early 1990s to 1996 and those made since 1997. Before 1997, international relations scholars in the PRC more or less followed the official position and refuted the China threat allegations. Mainstream views among academics before 1997 were as follows: 1. The nature of China’s socialist system determines that China will never seek hegemony

From the Western perspective, a China that insists on retaining the socialist ‘dictatorship’ and resisting the transition to a democracy is itself a major source of threat. In response to the above view, General Xing Shizong, President of the National Defence University, has written: China’s socialist system determines that my country will always adopt an independent and peaceful foreign policy, aiming at maintaining world and regional peace as well as a goodneighbourly policy towards our border states. China’s socialist system also determines that my country will always adopt a defensive national defence policy and military strategy. Now and in the future, my country will not seek global or regional hegemony, will not join any military alliances, will not participate in any form of arms race, will not station troops or establish military bases abroad, and will not start a war to invade another country.27


2. China ’s development needs a peaceful international environment Chinese officials and scholars normally agree that since China opened up to the outside world and switched from political struggle to economic modernisation in the late 1970s, the country has needed a prolonged period of peace and a stable international environment to accomplish its strategic objectives. 3. The level of China’s economic development is still very backward

In response to the view that, according to purchasing power parity (PPP) calculations, the PRC is already the world’s third or second largest economy, scholars are quick to point out China’s low per capita GDP, which still ranks amongst the lowest in the world. Furthermore, Chinese scholars point out that China’s economic development is very uneven, which results in a widening income disparity between the rich coastal provinces and poor inland and western provinces, while millions of people are still below the poverty line. Meanwhile, because of its large population base, China’s population will increase by 100 million people every seven years until it reaches 1.6 billion before starting a gradual decline. China is thus confronted with the problem of rising unemployment, education costs, and energy consumption as well as a deterioration in its living and natural environments. In short, China will be too preoccupied with domestic economic and social development in the first half of the twenty-first century to seek regional hegemony. 4. China’s defence expenditure, which is necessary to ensure national security, is always kept at a low level.

China’s defence budget is a matter of dispute among Western analysts. Using PPP calculations, some analysts suggest that China’s actual defence spending is three or four times greater than the official figure. Some analysts point out that China’s defence budget excludes many items that are normally contained in the military budgets of Western countries, such as military R&D, equipment purchases from abroad and pensions. Some believe that China’s actual defence budget is between ten and twenty times the official figure, which would put China’s military spending at around US$100 billion per year, or about one-third of the US military budget.28 The Chinese government and scholars’ response to these allegations of hidden military spending is surprisingly subtle and indirect. The Chinese reiterate that, according to the official exchange


rate, China’s defence spending is only equivalent to about 3 per cent of US spending and 15 per cent of Japan’s defence expenditure. General Xing Shizhong addressed the issue of hidden military spending in the following manner: ‘Countries have different defence systems and hence have different ways of calculating their respective defence expenditures. In any event, this shall not have a great impact on evaluating a country’s overall military spending and also should not be used as an excuse to accuse China of hiding its military expenditures’.29 5. China is a peace-loving country with no intention to invade other countries

Many Chinese scholars have pointed out that the perception of the PRC as a threat is not supported by China’s past or present relations with other countries. From a historical perspective, they argue, China is a peace-loving country; since ancient times China has adopted a goodneighbourly foreign policy towards its neighbours and does not interfere in other countries’ domestic affairs. Unlike the former Soviet Union, China has never ‘exported’ revolution to other countries nor organised its own military alliance system.30 Moreover, China has ‘shelved’ the territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands and has expressed a willingness to jointly develop the natural resources in South China Sea with the other claimants. The Chinese stress that unless it is provoked or attacked, the PLA will not start a military confrontation. If the scholarly response to the China threat issue before 1997 appeared rhetorical, dogmatic and close to the official line, then it has changed significantly since 1997. Scholars have since been involved in more indepth and serious studies of the China threat issue, especially its origins and the implications for China’s foreign policy. Furthermore, and probably affected by the rising dissatisfaction among the Chinese populace, some scholars have become more critical of government policy and have urged it to adopt a stronger stance towards the United States. For example, the noted Chinese scholar He Xin has traced the origins of the China threat to the rise of commercialism in contemporary China.31 According to He, modern capitalism has its origin in commercialism that relies on international trade and is hence expansionist. Without trade or a global market, modern capitalism would not have arisen. Citing the rise of Japan as a successful capitalist country which relies almost totally on international trade, He points out that China is also following Japan’s developmental path and has, in recent years, become an important trading country and is on the way to becoming one of the biggest players


in the global economy. In fact China has already won over some export markets previously held by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. This trend has alarmed many Western countries. They fear that the PRC will keep growing and accumulate more and more capital, which will enable it to influence and eventually dominate the international capital market. According to He, this is in fact the basis for Western concerns and fears vis-à-vis a rising China. In other words, the so-called China threat is not a concern about China’s growing military capability but rather a concern about China’s growing economic might. Yang Guangbin of the Chinese People’s University has traced the source of the China threat from Western international relations theories. Yang points out that advocates of a China threat derive their arguments from the theories of stable hegemony, balance of power, and geopolitics in the realist tradition of the discipline, which all predict a rising China will challenge the existing regional and international order.32 Scholars in the liberal tradition of international relations also regard a socialist China as a potential threat, while multilateralists are critical of China’s inclination to solve international disputes through bilateral channels. In sum, Yang concludes that most Western international relations theories, which are based on Western experiences, tend to support the idea of an emerging China threat. Xie Yixian, a professor at the Beijing Foreign Affairs College, worries that the American public may also believe in the myth of a China threat because they have been misled by the government’s anti-Chinese propaganda and the media’s distorted view of the country.33 Xie is concerned about the increasingly hostile international environment in which China finds itself. He suggests China should readjust its foreign policy strategy to cope with the new international environment. Western notions of a China threat have aroused strong nationalist feelings among the Chinese populace, especially among young intellectuals. This rising Chinese nationalism or chauvinism is often criticised by Western as well as by Chinese scholars.34 However, some Chinese scholars point out that there is a positive side to nationalism. For instance, Liu Jinghua, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believes that the United States has adopted a two-pronged strategy towards the PRC: on the one hand it wants to take advantage of the expanding Chinese market for economic and commercial reasons; on the other hand, Washington wants to ‘contain’ an increasingly strong China for strategic reasons.35 According to Liu, China should develop a healthy, rational, and modern nationalism or patriotism which can serve


to unite China in the twenty-first century and prevent it from adopting a radical and narrow-minded attitude towards other countries. A recent commentary on the Internet pointed out that from October 1999 Chinese foreign policy became a matter of intense and heated debate within the Chinese government.36 The debate involved officials and scholars from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the International Liaison Department, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The debate lasted for four months. One of the foci of the debate was the strategic relationship between the PRC and the United States. Younger officials and scholars criticised anti-American sentiments or what they branded as a ‘leftist’ tendency in the government’s policy. They argued that whenever SinoAmerican relations deteriorated, the Chinese rather than the American side suffered. According to this group of younger generation officials and scholars, China’s policy towards the United States since the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 has been over-reactive, inflexible, and overly concerned with the ‘conspiracy’ of Western countries to transform the PRC into a democracy through ‘peaceful evolution’. They further criticised those scholars who have used ‘a trend towards multipolarity’ as a disguise to advocate anti-American policies. As a result, they argued, China has lost its policy initiatives and Sino-American relations have deteriorated from one of co-operation to confrontation. However, some scholars hold different views. On 11 May 2001, the Global Times, a subsidiary of the People’s Daily, published a commentary by Zhou Jianming entitled ‘[We] must consider our country’s national security strategy from the worst possible [scenario]: observe closely the American strategic trends’.37 Zhou criticised pro-American officials and scholars who have misjudged and under-estimated the administration of President George W.Bush’s determination to move the centre of American strategic policy away from the Atlantic to the Pacific, increase the level of US military assistance to Taiwan, and adjust its strategic arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region with China as the target enemy. In the eyes of the Bush administration, China is America’s strategic competitor or opponent, not a strategic partner. As a result, it is dangerous to indulge in wishful thinking towards the United States. The commentary explains why some officials and scholars have failed to notice adjustments in US strategic policy. According to Zhou, for too long many scholars and officials have tended to believe that ‘peace and development’ is the mainstream theme of the post-Cold War international


order. Consequently, some scholars have over-estimated the possibility of a continuous liberal policy in the White House and overlooked the rise of realist thinking in the United States. Moreover, some scholars are too optimistic about the trend towards multipolarity and globalisation, which they mistakenly believe can restrain global and regional hegemonism, and exaggerate the growth of a peaceful force in world politics. Ultimately, China is caught unprepared by the United States’ strategic determination to dominate the world and to treat Beijing as the main opponent and obstacle in the American quest for global hegemony. Zhou ends his essay by warning: The security situation we face now is that we are being treated as the main opponent, not the secondary opponent, by the world’s only superpower. This situation is not temporary but will continue for a long time. When faced with such a situation, we must consider our country’s national security strategy, national development strategy and national unification strategy from the perspective of a worst, not best, possible [scenario], and from a practical situation rather than idealistic principles. Only then can we stand firm and face the current severe situations.38 It should be pointed out that some elements of Zhou’s essay are not new. For instance, Shi Yinhong, an international relations specialist, has also criticised the tendency of some Chinese scholars and officials to be overly optimistic about the trend towards multipolarity, as well as the tendency to exaggerate the decline of US power, the contradictions between the United States and its European allies, the diminishing influence of ideology in world politics, and the declining utility of military force and the increasing influence of economic factors in resolving international disputes.39 Misperceptions of political forces in the global environment have led China, Shi argues, to be too optimistic about and put too much hope in Washington’s China policy, while neglecting the fragile relationship between the two countries. Zhang Wenmu, a researcher at the Institute of Contemporary International Relations, takes an even harsher stance towards the United States. Like Zhou Jianming, Zhang questions the wisdom of perceiving ‘peace and development’ as the main characteristics of post-Cold War interstate relations. Zhang believes that the world still has a long way to go before achieving the necessary conditions for peace and development.40 Zhang argues that since the end of the Cold War, and


especially after the war in Kosovo, the United States and its allies have escalated the strategy of ‘containing’ China in East Asia. At the beginning of the twenty-first century Sino-American relations have reached a new low. If the present situation continues to deteriorate, Zhang warns, then direct confrontation between the PRC and the United States or its proxies might occur.41 Zhang poses a provocative question: if, one day, the United States and its allies decide to interfere in China’s efforts to reunify the country, as they did in Kosovo, then can China successfully face the challenge? Zhang urges that China must prepare militarily for a future showdown with the United States and its allies.42 What makes Zhou Jianming’s commentary different from that of other scholars is that while they published their articles in academic journals, Zhou’s essay appeared in a subsidiary newspaper of the People’s Daily. According to one commentator, Zhou’s essay was the first of its kind in twenty-three years to deviate from the official policy line.43 The Dangers of a China Threat It is very unlikely in the foreseeable future that China will pose a threat to world peace. On the contrary, the Chinese believe that China’s economic development over the past two decades has made a positive contribution to global economic development and prosperity. China has attracted a large inflow of foreign capital and has become the second largest receiver of foreign capital after the United States. China has so far given priority to economic development over defence modernisation. It has been preoccupied with the Taiwan question, and its military strategy is almost entirely oriented towards Taiwan, posing little threat to its neighbours. There is no indication that the PRC will use military force to settle territorial disputes along its borders. For instance, China has demonstrated restraint in its row with the Philippines over the disputed Spratly Islands. Although China’s defence expenditure has steadily increased over the past decade, it remains one of the lowest in the world on a per capita basis. Indeed, it will be many years before China can develop an effective blue water navy to project power far from its shores. Furthermore, China’s economic and social development is a heavy burden to its leadership. In the process of China’s development, the demand for resolving internal problems far exceeds its pursuit of national interests in the international arena. For the foreseeable future, China simply does not possess the capabilities, even if it wanted to do so, to launch an aggressive foreign policy.


The danger is that an imagined or hypothetical China threat will hinder normal relations between the PRC and other countries. It will distort China’s image in the world, which in turn may have negative impact on China’s open door policy and democratisation process. Many Chinese, including China’s leaders, find it difficult to understand and cannot accept Western ideas of a China threat; they are confused and annoyed, if not outraged.44 The average Chinese citizen feels that the West wants to ‘demonise’ China, while Chinese leaders interpret the China threat as a threat to China: a Western creation of a hypothetical ‘enemy’ in the post-Cold War era when a real enemy does not exist.45 Moreover, the China threat allegation is generally interpreted inside China as an unfriendly gesture from the West towards China, and an indication that Western countries do not want China to become strong, powerful and prosperous. In fact, the so-called ‘China threat’ has backfired and become a motivating force for the development of a radical Chinese nationalism or chauvinism. Following the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by a US warplane on 8 May 1999, a wave of Chinese chauvinism and anti-Western demonstrations spread across China. Admittedly some of the antiWestern demonstrations and protests were orchestrated by the government. Nevertheless, many protests, especially those held on university campuses, were genuine and spontaneous actions. The origin of Chinese chauvinism can be traced to the Opium War of 1840. Since then China has had difficulty in finding a psychological balance between its internal development and the external reaction to its development. The following view is quite representative of Chinese feelings: when China was backward and weak it was invaded and bullied by Western imperial powers; when China begins to develop and make significant progress in its quest for modernisation it is demonised by an imagined China threat. In other words, many Chinese believe that regardless of whether China is backward or developed it will never be fully accepted by the Western powers. Thus, advocating a China threat will only create unnecessary conflict between China and the West, and will not facilitate the process of integrating China into the international community. Over the Taiwan question, many mainland Chinese support a hardline policy including the use of military force against the island. This radical nationalistic feeling towards reunification reflects a somewhat unbalanced emotion among Chinese citizens. Any political or cultural confrontation between China and the West will further push the Chinese towards chauvinism.


Since the early 1990s, negative feelings among Chinese citizens towards the West, especially the United States, have significantly increased. Many feel that Western countries are not very friendly towards China. In a nation-wide survey conducted in August 1995 among Chinese youth, 87 per cent of respondents felt that the United States was the most unfriendly country towards China.46 In retaliation, some Chinese have demonised the United States. Ordinary Chinese citizens normally derive their knowledge of the outside world from the mass media or government policy statements. Their attitude towards international events is simple and straightforward. For instance, many Chinese believe the United States is opposed to the PRC’s reunification with Taiwan because it does not want to see a strong and united China. They believe that both the United States and Japan support the Taiwanese separatist movement. They object to and distrust European accusations against the Chinese government’s poor human right records. This unfriendly attitude towards the West was certainly not helped by the renewal of the US-Japan military alliance, continued US arms sales to Taiwan and Japan’s military build-up. China’s eagerness to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the numerous concessions that it made to Western countries during the lengthy negotiations have already been severely criticised by conservative and nationalist forces inside China. The advocation of a China threat in the West will only add fuel to the fire and help conservative, nationalist and anti-American voices to win over the more liberal and pro-Western voices in China’s US policy debate. Faced with the emotional attitudes of its citizens, the Chinese government’s choices of rational policies is limited. Against this background, any discussion of eliminating the China threat by a ‘Westernising.’ China is dangerous and out of touch with the reality of Chinese politics and society.47 The Chinese believe that the PRC’s sustained economic growth has merely transformed it into a new competitor, not a threat, in the global economy and international system. In fact, due to the interaction of global economics and politics, a rising power like China will inevitably bring some changes to the international order. However, this kind of economic competition should not be treated as a threat. If competition from all new comers is treated as a threat, the Chinese argue, the vitality of the global economy and international relations will be jeopardised. Moreover, from China’s current economic scale and technological level, for a long time to come China can only pose limited competition pressure on developed countries. The PRC is still a weak competitor in the global


economy, especially in the new ‘knowledge economy’ era. In fact, in the foreseeable future China’s prime concern will be to develop its backward economy. In the area of security, a stable and prosperous China will more likely be a constructive force in regional stability. The spread of the China threat thesis has its roots in ideological prejudices and the pursuit of self-interests in international relations. In the immediate future, the PRC cannot possibly adopt a Western-style democratic system. China will travel at its own pace down the paths it has chosen for political, economic and social development. Any sentimental or unfriendly criticisms of China’s current development from the standpoint of Western values or interests will do more harm than good to China’s long-term integration into the international community and its efforts to become a responsible actor in global politics. The United States and its allies should take the advice of former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew seriously: The Chinese are a different people with a different culture and a different history. They will change at their own pace in their quest for technology and a modern economy, preserving their values and traditions, and maintaining continuity with their past. Chinabashing by constantly denigrating them for their lack of democracy and human rights will only antagonize a whole generation of Chinese and make them anti-American and xenophobic.49 Conclusion Denny Roy has succinctly summed up the arguments for viewing China as a threat. He wrote that (1) Chinese defence spending has risen significantly in recent years, prompting many analysts to ask why military funding is increasing when external threats to the PRC’s security are at an all-time low;50 (2) the Chinese government’s alleged hostile attitude towards modern values that are thought to promote peace and prosperity such as political liberalisation, human rights, the free flow of information, multilateralism, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and responsible global citizenship;51 and (3) from a simple geopolitical perspective that the mere emergence of an economically fortified China will enable it to exert more control over its surroundings and hence upset the current equilibrium of power in Asia.52 In response to the above concerns, the Chinese government has reiterated that: (1) China is a peace-loving country and that it will


never seek regional or global hegemony; (2) China’s military build-up is defensive and its military spending is only a fraction of that of the United States; (3) the PRC’s CNP is only a quarter of that of the United States and two-thirds of Russia’s; (4) China will not export its socialist ideology to other countries; and (5) China is still very poor and backward, and for a prolonged period needs a peaceful and stable international environment for economic development. Overall, the official Chinese response to the China threat allegation is defensive and rhetorical, long on denying any intention to become a regional hegemon, while short on arguing for a more positive and constructive role for China in the region. Ordinary Chinese citizens, on the other hand, are confused and outraged by the China threat issue and the apparently hostile Western attitude towards the PRC. Chinese nationalism or chauvinism, especially anti-American feelings, arose during the 1990s. Unlike official rhetoric, popular Chinese responses to the China threat issue have been straightforward, spontaneous and emotional. They overwhelmingly support China saying ‘no’ to unfriendly Western countries, particularly the United States. However, these emotional reactions against the allegation of a China threat help little to alleviate Western concerns. In contrast, heightened nationalist feelings have further alarmed Western observers, many of whom fear the authoritarian socialist Chinese government may manipulate popular nationalist feelings to bolster its regime legitimacy. If the officials are rhetorical and ordinary people appear to be emotional or irrational, Chinese scholars tend to be more critical and diversified in their rebuttal of the China threat. Before the open door policy, Chinese academia echoed the official policy line. Since the early 1980s, however, the academic community has become more diversified. The older or more conservative academics still follow the official position and dismiss the existence of a China threat as merely a Western creation. They blame the Western media for distorting or demonising China’s image. They advocate a hardline policy towards the United States and its allies. Young liberals, however, have argued for a more conciliatory policy towards the United States. They point out that China’s past inconsistent, erratic, and sometimes irrational US policy has partly contributed to the current poor relationship between the two countries. They criticise hardline policies, especially those informed by nationalist, anti-American sentiments, which they believe have inadvertently given anti-China forces in the West an excuse to demonise China.


Despite emphatic rebuttals from nearly all sectors of Chinese society, the Chinese arguments against the China threat allegations are weak and not very convincing. They all tend to focus on denying China’s intention to become a hegemon, yet few respond to the geopolitical argument that once the PRC becomes a great power it will behave like a great power. What is conspicuously missing is a systematic, theoretical, and critical analysis of the origins, evolution, and strategic implications of the allegations behind the China threat. What is also missing, at least openly, is a systematic and soul-searching review of, or reflection on, Chinese foreign policy strategies in the twenty-first century. For instance, instead of being merely defensive and rhetorical, how and in what way can China play a more constructive role and contribute to world peace and regional stability? Wu Guoguang, a former Chinese official now teaching at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, has offered a prescription for solving the China threat issue: to adopt a more assertive, rigorous and powerful foreign policy strategy. Wu argues, ‘China must persuade Western countries to accept China as a good partner and that China is yearning for peace and concentrating on domestic economic construction; China must open itself and must not engage in confrontation with other countries, yet, at the same time, should not let itself be ordered around by Western powers’.53 ZhengYongnian, another China-born scholar now working in Singapore, urges the Chinese government to establish a positive ‘big power’ image and to engage in multilateral relations with its neighbours including diplomatic, economic, military and security co-operation.54 China must, Zheng argues, persuade its neighbours that its military build-up is defensive and not expansionist by increasing the transparency of China’s military spending and strategic deployments. While a conciliatory and co-operative Chinese foreign policy posture may create a more positive image of China, the image of a steadily growing, expanding and increasingly threatening China is not likely to go away. The following story from ancient China is illustrative: A man one day lost an axe and he suspected his neighbour had stolen it. He then observed his neighbour closely for a while and found his neighbour, no matter from what angle, looked very much like a thief. The man later found the axe in his own house. He then took a good look at his neighbour again and found that, no matter from what angle, his neighbour did not look like a thief!55


China does not pose an immediate threat to its neighbours or the West. Whether China is a threat in the twenty-first century is a matter of perception. If the PRC is considered a threat to world peace, then no matter how the Chinese respond, such perceptions will remain until the day that the West realises that world peace has been maintained despite, or even because of, a powerful China. Viewed from this perspective, there is some truth to the Chinese claim that the China threat is a myth created by its neighbours and the West rather than a reality. Delivering the opening speech at the Third Conference of Europe- Asia Foreign Ministers held in Beijing on 25 May 2001, President Jiang Zemin stressed: ‘Yearning for peace, stability, development, and co-operation is the trend of the time and the common wishes of people in all countries’.56 Many analysts and sceptics in the West may dismiss Jiang’s statement as rhetoric and not take it seriously. This is precisely the crux of the China threat question. When and only when the West begins to take the Chinese seriously will prejudice against, or misperceptions of, the Chinese disappear. Many in the West do not take the Chinese seriously, partly because they believe that China needs the West more than the West needs China. However, some do take China seriously. To quote Vogel again: The United States cannot stop China’s economic growth, and as China gains strength there are plenty of reasons we need its cooperation. We do not need an and-American public in China, determined to build a huge military to counter a perceived US threat. The United States can have a realistic combination of co-operation and competition, but for it to work, we need to find a way to get the positive co-operation of the Chinese public.57 Notes The authors are grateful to the Hong Kong Baptist University for a research grant which made research for this chapter possible. We would also like to thank Tan Hongqing, a Ph.D candidate in international relations at Peking University, for his research assistance. 1 Wu Jin, “Put an end to the China threat theory” (“Zhongguo weixielun keyi xiuyi”) People’s Daily (Renmin Ribo), 10 October 1992. 2 Ross H. Munro, “Awaking Dragon: The Real Danger in Asia is from China”, Policy Review, no. 62 (Fall 1992), pp. 10–17


3 Ge Yi, “An analysis of the China threat theory” (“Qianxi Zhongguo weixielun”) International Politics Studies (Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu) no. 3 (1994). 4 The number of articles or commentaries in Table 1.1, unless otherwise mentioned, is derived from a ‘title index’ using ‘China threat’ as the indexing words. Table 1.1 lists figures from five major databanks in China. All databanks derive their figures from Chinese journals and newspapers. The figures in Table 1.1 are therefore not exclusive. Furthermore, no databank has exhausted all Chinese journals or newspapers. The table thus only serves the purpose of indicating the trend of China’s response to the China threat question during the 1991– 2000 period. 5 The number of articles and commentaries appearing in the People’s Daily for the 1991–1996 period is derived from a data bank at Peking University Library; the figures for 1997 and after are from the New China (Xinhua) News Agency data bank. 6 If we use ‘content index’, the total number of articles or commentaries which mention ‘China threat’ is 56; however, some mention the term only in passing without detailed discussion. 7 The website address for the Xinhua News Agency databank is: http:// www.info.xinhua.org/xhdb_tripvisitor/frame.html. 8 The website address for the Special Topics in Chinese Journals Data Bank (Zhongguo xueshu qikan zhuanti quanwen shujuku) is: http:// www.chinajournal.net.cn. 9 The People University’s Articles Reprints Data Bank (Renda fuyinziliao zhuanti quanwen shujuku) (until 1997) is from the Peking University Library. 10 Chinese Social Science Articles Databank (Zhongwen baokan pianming shujuku) (1993–2000) is from the Peking University Library. 11 The Economics Daily (Jingji Ribao) (Hong Kong), 14 May 1997. 12 People’s Daily, 30 December 1997. 13 Jiefang Ribao, 15 April 1999. 14 See, for instance, commentaries appearing in the People’s Daily on 9 February 1996 and 23 January 1997. 15 China’s Youth Daily (Zhongguo Qingnianbao), 10 September 2000. 16 Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang,Qiao Bian, et.al. China Can Say No (Zhongguo keyi shuobu) (Beijing: Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 1996). 17 Richard Berstein and Ross H.Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1997), pp. 48–49. 18 Asiaweek (Hong Kong), 14 July 1996, pp. 20–23. 19 Peng Zhiqian, Yang Mingjie and Xu Deren, Why China Says No (Zhongguo weishenme shuobu) (Beijing: Xinshijie chubanshe, 1996). 20 Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, Qiao Bian, Tang Zhengyu and Gu Qingsheng, China Can Still Say No (Zhongguo haishineng shuobu) (Beijing: Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 1996). 21 Jia Qingguo, China Not Only Say No (Zhongguo bujinjin shuobu) (Beijing: Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 1996). 22 Li Xiguang, Liu Kang, et al., Behind the Demonization of China (Yaomohua Zhongguo de beihou) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1996) 23 Berstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, op. cit., p. 221.


24 Wang Xiaodong, Fang Ning, Qiao Bian and Song Qiang, China’s Future in the Shadow of Globalization (Quanqiuhua yinyingxia de Zhongguo zhilu) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1999). 25 “Viewing Chinese foreign policy strategic mistakes from the perspective of Sino-American competition in Indo-China,” http://news.fanso.com/ News/All News/2000–12–5/15207.htm. 26 Ezra F. Vogel, “Courting the People of China”, The Washington Post, 14 May 2001. 27 Xing Shi Zhong, “Put an end to the China threat theory” (“Zhongguo weixielun keyi xiuyi”), Qiu Shi (March 1996). 28 Berstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, op. cit., pp. 70– 71. 29 Xing Shizhong, “Put an end to the China threat theory”, op. cit. 30 Wu Guoguang and Liu Jinghua, “Containing China: myth and reality” (“Weidu Zhongguo: shenhua yu xianshi”), Strategy and Management (Zhanlue yu guanli), no. 1 (1996). 31 He Xin, “The true meaning of the China threat” (“Zhongguo weixielun de zhenshi hanyi”), Daily Central and Provincial Ministries Important Policy News (Meiri zhongyang ji shengbuwei zhengce yaowen), 28 June 2000. 32 Yang Guangbin, “Western international relations theory and the China threat” (“Xifang guoji guanxi lilun yu Zhongguo weixielun”), World Economy and Politics (Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi), no. 4 (1999). 33 Xie Yixian, “The crisis consciousness and foreign policy strategies” (“‘Youhuan yishi yu duiwai zhanlue celue”) Journal of Foreign Affairs College (Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao), no. 3 (2000). 34 Shen Jiru, China does not want to be “Mr No”: Contemporary China’s International Strategic Problems (Zhongguo budang buxiansheng: Dangdai Zhongguo de guoji zhanlue wenti) (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo chubanshe, 1998). 35 Wu and Liu, “Containing China: myth and reality”, op. cit. 36 Zhong Wei (probably a pseudonym), “The big debate on Chinese foreign policy thinking” (“Zhongguo waijiao silu da bianlun”), http:// home.lz.gs.cninfo.net/twhch/weihua/jiekaimsh/dabianlun.html, no date. 37 Zhou Jianming, “[We] must consider our country’s national security strategy from the worst possible [senario]: observe closely the American strategic trends” (“Bixu cong zuihuai de kenengxing lai kaolu women de guojia anquan zhanlue: zhuyi guancha Meiguo dongxiang”), Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao), 11 May 2001. 38 Ibid. 39 Shi Yinhong, “To analyse correctly the world situation and its development trend” (“Zhengque guji shijie daju ji qi fazhan fangxiang”), Da Gong Bao, 16 June 1999. 40 Zhang Wenmu, “Thinking about problems of the new era at the turn of the century” (“Guanyu shidai wenti de kuashiji de sikao”) World Problem Studies (Shijie Wenti Yanjiu), no. 6 (1999). 41 Zhang Wenmu, “The Taiwan problem and China’s future” (“Taiwan wenti yu Zhongguo qiantu”), Strategy and Management (Zhanlue yu Guanli), no. 5 (1999).


42 Zhang Wenmu, “The Kosovo War and China’s security strategy in the new century” (“Kesuowo zhanzheng yu Zhongguo xinshiji anquan zhanlue”), Strategy and Management (Zhanlue yu Guanli), no. 3 (1999). 43 Lu Jiaping, “About Sino-American relations: different voices in the official press” (“Guanyu Zhong-Mei guanxi: guanfang baozhi shang de butong”), (www.fanso.com), 17 May 2001. According to Lu, the last time that a different voice appeared in the official press was the famous article entitled “Practice is the standard to test truth”, which was published in Guangming Ribao on 11 May 1978. 44 See People’s Daily, 7 January 1995 and 4 February 1996. 45 The Chinese leaders have reiterated that the spread of a ‘China threat’ intends to contain China or to stop China from developing and that it is harmful not only to China but also to the security of Asia and the world. See People’s Daily, 24 December 1995, 20 March 1996 and 5 May 1997; and Zhongguo guofangbao (Chinese National Defense Daily), 5 January 1996. 46 Peng, Yang and Xu, Why China Can Say No, op. cit., p. 27. 47 Michael Mandelbaum, “Westernizing Russia and China”, Foreign Affairs, (May/June 1997), pp. 80–95. 48 Robert S.Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power”, Foreign Affairs, (March/ April, 1997), p. 34. 49 Lee Kuan Yew, ‘America has a choice, to have China friendly or hostile. When dealing with an old civilization, it is wise not to expect swift changes’. Fortune, 13 November 2000, p. 96. 50 Denny Roy, “The ‘China Threat’ Issue: Major Arguments”, Asian Survey XXXVI, no. 8 (August 1996), p. 759. 51 Ibid, pp. 760–761. 52 Ibid., p. 761. See also Paul Dibb, “Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia”(Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995). 53 Wu and Liu, “Containing China: myth and reality”, op. cit. 54 Zheng Yongnian, The Rennaisance of Chinese Nationalism in China: Where Do Nation-States Go? (Zhongguo minzuzhuyi de fuxing: Minzuguojia xiang hechuqu?) (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1998), pp. 226–230. 55 The story is from Lie Zi. This is an abridged version of the story. See Chen Puqing et al. (eds.) A Selection of Ancient Chinese Stories (Zhongguo gudai yuyan xuan) (Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991), pp. 112–113. 56 People’s Daily, 26 May 2001. 57 Vogel, “Courting the People of China”, op. cit.

CHAPTER TWO American Perceptions of Chinese Military Power Jonathan D.Pollack

Introduction Among the factors shaping the Asia-Pacific strategic environment and US regional security interests in the twenty-first century, China’s position and role as a major power loom very large. China’s pursuit of autonomous major power status has been a long held and deeply felt conviction of Beijing’s leaders, but the modernisation of Chinese military power per se has not been a major concern of US decision makers for decades. The Sino-American rapprochement of the early 1970s, and the presumed backwardness of China’s defence technology base, meant that Chinese military capabilities posed no inherent or insuperable risk to American regional security interests. If anything, a weaker, more vulnerable China was deemed adverse to America’s declared pursuit of a stable and secure East Asia. Indeed, for much of the 1980s the United States actively facilitated China’s scientific and technological advancement, including a direct US role in assisting China’s military modernisation in four separate mission areas.1 With the United States intent on cultivating China as a counterweight to Soviet power in Asia (or at least hoping to render China a substantial, continuing preoccupation for Soviet military planners), few considered whether or how China might ultimately complicate American regional security interests. For the most part, therefore, Chinese military development during the 1970s and 1980s was generally judged either inconsequential or marginally beneficial to American security interests. China’s military capabilities (but not its weapons sales or involvement in missile proliferation) were still deemed largely tangential to US national security calculations during the waning years of the Cold War. With China’s predominant energies in the 1980s focused on economic development

44 JONATHAN D.POLLACK

and threat reduction with its East Asian neighbours, there seemed little reason to modify this overall policy assessment. Indeed, evaluations of Chinese military power have remained conspicuous by their absence from most major US strategic reviews of the post-Cold War era, which have focused more on generic challenges that the United States might confront in future warfare, rather than a specific national security threat2. However, China’s military power and potential is now beginning to generate heightened interest among analysts and (to a lesser extent) among defence planners. Following two decades of self imposed isolation and a third decade in which military modernisation remained almost wholly subordinate to the requirements of economic development, China has undertaken a selective but meaningful enhancement of its military power. This modernisation process is linked to long gestating changes in the institutional structure of the Chinese armed forces: the reduction and consolidation of ground force units; major shifts in defence strategy and doctrine; enhanced professionalisation and inter-service co-ordination; the introduction of new technologies into the Chinese military system; and renewed efforts at defence industrial reform.3 All these changes are expected to contribute to the building of a numerically smaller but more potent Chinese military force in future years. These trends are also linked to hardware procurement and technology enhancement. After decades of nearly glacial change in Chinese weapons development, Beijing has embarked on its first major defence acquisitions from abroad since the latter years of the Sino-Soviet alliance, including the procurement and co-production of advanced fighter aircraft; transport planes outfitted with Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) capabilities; modern destroyers equipped with antiship cruise missiles and air-to-air missiles; more advanced tanks, helicopters, and surface-toair missiles; and modern diesel electric submarines.4 In addition, the Chinese have accelerated indigenous production of several versions of short range ballistic missiles capable of targeting Taiwan; are developing in-flight refuelling capabilities for their combat aircraft; have tested a new solid fuel ballistic missile with a range of approximately 5,000 nautical miles; and appear intent on substantially advancing their intelligence, surveillance, and information warfare assets, with particular attention to space based programmes.5 In their totality, these acquisition and development activities seem impressive, but they are hardly unexpected. They reflect the first tangible results of an incremental transformation of China’s national defence capabilities appropriate to the strategic and technological

AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF CHINESE MILITARY POWER 45

potential of Asia and the Pacific in the twenty-first century. Unlike the past, when Chinese military power focused on mass, redundancy and territorial defence, and when the advancement of Beijing’s defence capabilities was predominantly inertial, Chinese strategists now view national security in a more complex and demanding light. A credible capacity to assert and protect China’s declared national security interests (though still justified by an official defence policy characterised as wholly defensive) will require a much broader spectrum of capabilities intended to ensure what the Chinese term ‘a favourable peripheral environment’.6 Indeed, Beijing’s actions appear congruent with the modernisation programmes being pursued by other ascendant military powers in East Asia, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, and (not least) Taiwan.7 For China, these developments presuppose more advanced air, naval, missile, communications and intelligence capabilities, and a demonstrated proficiency in employing such power. Chinese officials assert that their defence modernisation objectives remain limited and pose no threat to regional security. The Chinese argue that there is no inherent contradiction between ensuring their own security and influencing how neighbouring countries, as well as the United States, perceive the role of Chinese military power. Nor do the Chinese view their new programmes as stimulating a major regional arms competition; in Beijing’s estimation, the defence modernisation process elsewhere in East Asia antedates much of China’s renewed military development. In the leadership’s view, the enhancement and diversification of China’s military capabilities represent an imperative need. Without them, China could be locked into a passive position should its vital interests be judged at risk. This perception lies at the heart of Chinese strategic calculations. It is a defence planner’s staple nightmare, and one that China seeks to avoid. The question is no longer whether China should modernise its military power, but the priority, scope and pace of these activities. The Chinese also appear increasingly mindful of how changes in defence technology and organisation are transforming the contours of international strategy. The most pressing threats to China’s security interests are no longer the threat of invasion or direct military attack, but of potential inhibitions about how China might employ its military capabilities in a future crisis, especially as the range, lethality, and accuracy of Chinese weapons systems increase. Reducing potential constraints on China’s future freedom of action ineluctably entails the acquisition of capabilities that will alter the defence planning calculations


of China’s neighbours as well as those of the United States. The consequences of these developments, however, are only beginning to be felt.8 China is therefore trying to make up for lost time. Its R&D personnel are seeking to adapt to profound technological changes that bear little relation to China’s traditional emphasis on defence in depth. Warfare in the twenty-first century will be very different in its scope, purposes, and consequences. The Chinese cannot preclude a future military conflict in which an adversary seeks to quickly degrade China’s defences, or where the Chinese opt to initiate decisive actions to pre-empt an adversary’s options. The investment and resource allocation decisions that the Chinese are currently undertaking will help determine the parameters of their national security planning for decades to come. Much will depend on where and how the Chinese seek to deter the use of force, how they might employ capabilities in a conflict, or on how others perceive and respond to future Chinese capabilities. Even if no wars are fought, the results of China’s military modernisation will have a substantial and potentially pivotal influence on the future regional security environment, and (quite possibly) on how the United States views its longer term defence requirements in East Asia. However, the transformation of China’s defence capabilities is contingent on a host of factors, uncertainties, and outright unknowns. China must organise, equip, and train its military forces in fundamentally different ways, much of which will severely disrupt long standing Chinese policies and practices. At the same time, many of China’s defence acquisitions (primarily from Russia) have followed lengthy, unsuccessful efforts at indigenous design and production of newer weapons systems, bespeaking the limitations and (at times) outright failures of China’s defence industrial system. Russian assistance has only begun to fill prodigious gaps in Chinese military hardware relative to other major powers. The sheer scale and expense of China’s modernisation requirements could also impose serious constraints on Chinese programmes. In addition, the degrading of Russia’s scientific and industrial base over the past decade has created uncertainty about the timeliness and responsiveness of Russian assistance. Although the scope of Russian involvement in China’s defence modernisation has measurably increased in recent years, the Chinese also continue to exhibit ample wariness about fully opening their defence R&D system to outside assistance. These enduring concerns about dependence on external sources of hardware and know-how could slow the rate at which China


absorbs new defence technologies and integrates them into the Chinese armed forces. 9 There is, moreover, an ongoing if subliminal debate in Beijing on the relevance of enhanced defence expenditure to China’s security and international standing. Few dispute that China will continue to confront serious challenges to its national security. A larger unresolved issue is the salience of various prospective threats to Chinese interests. China’s defence industrial system remains ill prepared (at least in the nearto mid-term) to compete with more dynamic technological powers. A more realistic goal may be to achieve China’s broader economic advancement and to selectively and somewhat experimentally explore scientific and technological domains that are likely to shape international security in coming decades. At the same time, the Chinese recognise that avoiding renewed international isolation and enhancing the well being of the Chinese populace will produce more tangible political and security benefits than any effort to emulate the capabilities of others. However, the institutional power of the Chinese armed forces ensures that national security needs and interests will continue to receive substantial support in the future. If anything, this support has grown significantly in recent years, with China more prepared to allocate increased foreign exchange to such programmes. Too much remains contingent and problematic in China’s regional security environment for the leadership to assume benign outcomes. The question is how the Chinese seek to balance their potential security requirements in relation to the country’s larger policy agenda. Despite perceived security challenges, the Chinese do not want to invest unduly in a particular course of action, and they do not want to undertake military development on a scale that undermines China’s goals in economic modernisation and infrastructure development.10 The Chinese also seem far less inclined towards the magical thinking that often pervaded their national defence planning in the past. Creating the institutions and infrastructure for a self-sustaining modernisation effort will take decades, and it will require the ability to impose discipline and oversight on an unwieldy, sprawling and highly duplicative network of military laboratories, factories and facilities. For example, China’s successes (especially in nuclear weapons and missile development) are the result of programmes that are far more focused and integrated than most areas of Beijing’s conventional weapons development. The breakthroughs in missile R&D and production reflect years of effort, rather than a crash development programme. The Chinese are seeking to


replicate this success in other areas, including domains where technological change is unusually rapid and highly disruptive of previous weapons development strategies. The question is whether such a goal is realistic or feasible. Chinese planners, for example, are increasingly attentive to how revolutions in telecommunications and information technology are transforming the battlefield, rendering industrial age military forces ever more vulnerable in potential future conflicts. The 1991 Gulf War and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) air war against Yugoslavia constituted the bookend conflicts of the 1990s, and the results of both campaigns were deeply disquieting to Chinese military commanders. Indeed, Chinese strategists appear to believe that their nuclear weapons and missile capabilities could provide Beijing with a critical margin of security that they might otherwise lack in a conventional military conflict. Yet it is far from certain that the Chinese will be able to adapt fully or successfully to looming military-technical transitions. The Chinese are asking how they can simultaneously diminish their own vulnerabilities while exploiting the potential weak links in the capabilities of potential rivals. Despite brave talk in some Chinese strategic circles, the answers are far from certain.11 Thus, notwithstanding the infusion of new budgetary and manpower resources, the Chinese know they are following in the wake of military powers possessing an ample technological lead, even as military innovation continues to race ahead. Different trajectories of national power and development are therefore affecting the policy choices of the Chinese military establishment. China’s two decades of rapid economic growth, a decade of double digit increases in the official defence budget, the increased availability of modern weapons systems from abroad, and China’s enhanced centrality to the regional future have provided unparalleled opportunities for Beijing to advance its security goals. Yet the Chinese have entered unfamiliar terrain. They are being compelled to think about military power in new and potentially unanticipated ways. They are confronting unprecedented institutional agendas and, quite possibly, heightened challenges from American defence programmes (for example, the development of US information warfare capabilities and ballistic missile defence). Despite the more propitious security circumstances that the Chinese appear to enjoy at present, it is far from certain whether they are fully confident about the longer term.


The outcome of the Chinese modernisation process will ultimately entail the creation of a more capable, externally oriented Chinese national defence force. China will for the first time possess conventional military capabilities whose reach and mission will extend beyond homeland defence. The implications of this transition will be symbolic as well as operational. Equally important, the strategic consequences of this change are being quietly but unmistakably acknowledged by security planners all along China’s periphery. However, the range of opinion on China’s re-emergence as a major power remains exceptionally broad. These issues entail basic measurement considerations (e.g., estimating the size of the Chinese economy); the extent to which China’s economic growth can be sustained and channelled towards military development; the posited goals of China’s military modernisation and the pride of place of military modernisation in a hierarchy of policy goals; China’s capacity for technological innovation both in the civilian and defence sector; and the trade-offs among alternative national security objectives. At the same time, given that there is little consensus among professional analysts on the ‘base case’ upon which all longer term projections are premised, the uncertainties about such projections may only be compounded with time. The purpose of this chapter is to explore some of the major dimensions of Chinese military modernisation, and then to assess the potential implications of China’s future military development for the longer-term security interests of the United States. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States no longer faces a global political-military adversary around whom to organise and rationalise its strategic needs. Few observers believe that China constitutes such a threat, but given its size, strategic location, independence as a major power, and continued sharp dissent from American national security goals, it would imprudent to preclude a future Chinese strategic challenge. It would be equally imprudent to assume the inevitability of such a challenge, but an understanding of the possibilities must begin with an assessment of China’s defence potential, since without enhanced military capabilities the prospect of a Chinese strategic challenge appears exceedingly remote. At the same time, overly aggregated scenarios of economic, technological, and military development may miss the mark. Such estimates could mischaracterise how longer term competition between Chinese and American power might emerge; they could also understate the incentives of both countries to maintain a collaborative relationship,


or to constrain the elements of potential competition. Uneven levels of development, major differences in strategic culture and military organisation, and pronounced geographic and strategic asymmetries will also shape the potential contours of any prospective rivalry. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the United States indisputably remains the world’s dominant power. The Chinese, as well as other major powers, must decide how they interact with such a singular power. This will not be a simple question of the military capabilities that China is able to develop, acquire and deploy. The future imprint of Chinese military power will also depend on how the Chinese evaluate longer term American strategy and how US policy makers judge Chinese strategic objectives; the US capacity to sustain a major military presence in the Western Pacific; future patterns of alignment in East Asia; the incentives of neighbouring powers to conciliate Beijing or to build a countervailing coalition against it; and the circumstances in which Chinese military power (or the threatened use of its military power) will shape regional defence planning in the Asia-Pacific region. Even more fundamentally, the Chinese face questions of the future viability and legitimacy of their political and economic system, and the relevance of modern military power to defending the interests of the state. In the final analysis, comparisons of particular military capabilities or balance assessments will matter less than the purposes to which such power can be put, the circumstances under which enhanced capabilities could be brought to bear, and how China’s future military capabilities will shape the strategic calculations of states all along its periphery. Different power and influence dynamics that could be at work over the longer run will be determined by more complex calculations of gain and risk than during the Cold War. Indeed, even a hypothesised political or strategic challenge from a more powerful China need not entail the overt use of force, though the credibility of any such challenge would likely depend on demonstrated military capability. Chinese Power and American Defence Strategy How should the United States view the re-emergence of China as a major power? In what ways could it affect American national security interests, those of major US allies, or the distribution of power and influence within East Asia? What are the appropriate criteria by which the United States should assess rates of change in Chinese military development, and under what conditions would these warrant explicit shifts in US security


strategy? Indeed, is the enhancement of Chinese military power intrinsically worrisome to US national security interests? If so, how much of a hedge against the emergence of an overtly antagonistic China is warranted, and what are the risks that such actions might prove selffulfilling? Over the course of the 1990s, attention to the consequences of the growth of Chinese power has increased measurably.12 Some analysts believe that this reflects an American temptation to shoehorn China into a Cold War defence planning template, and such an explanation should not be totally discounted. However, China does not remotely approach the ideological, military, or geopolitical challenge represented by the Soviet Union, a fact acknowledged even by those deeply sceptical of longer term Chinese intentions. Its conventional and nuclear capabilities are incalculably more modest than the Cold War forces assembled by the Soviet Union. There is no political-military confrontation equivalent to the central front in Europe. Indeed, short of China developing major military assets and employing them in overtly coercive ways, the logic of a containment strategy against Beijing seems unpersuasive to virtually all states, including China’s immediate neighbours. With China already a major trading power (perhaps most tellingly, with the United States), the Chinese are ‘dual capable’ in a manner utterly unlike the Soviet Union. A satisfactory understanding of China’s power trajectory and its implications requires a more differentiated set of judgments. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Cold War military forces inherited by the Russian successor state conferred a singular strategic advantage on the United States: US military forces no longer confronted a global adversary able to contest American military predominance. The central questions for future US defence strategy are whether these circumstances will persist in coming years; the factors that might seriously complicate America’s current advantage; and specific developments or geopolitical trends that would necessitate a major reassessment of US defence planning assumptions. On the assumption that US alliance relationships in Europe and Asia persist over the longer run, Russia and China are the only states that seem remotely capable of mounting a serious challenge to America’s global position. Yet most strategic observers would regard the prospect of a near-to mid-term challenge from either state as highly implausible. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and extraordinary implosion of Russian military power during the subsequent decade turned American assessments of Russia on their head: the country is now viewed as an


American security concern more out of weakness and aggrieved nationalism than out of strength. China, though enjoying far more favourable economic circumstances than Russia, faces prodigious challenges in national development. In comparative terms, China is still an underdeveloped economy, and its military forces remain severely constrained in terms of technology, skilled manpower, and know-how. In addition, the leadership faces mounting challenges to its legitimacy; the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not rule with assurance or selfconfidence. Despite this very mixed picture, scholars and strategists are increasingly preoccupied by the implications of the development of Chinese power. According to realist theory, China is the quintessential ascendant power that will ultimately seek to supplant American hegemony over the international system. Many, however, question the relevance of this theory. By most objective measures, for example, both the United States and China have been rising powers over the past decade, in as much as their respective strategic and economic trajectories relative to all other major powers have been noticeably enhanced. Indeed, given that America’s economic growth of recent years has built upon a far larger absolute base, China may not have appreciably narrowed the disparities between its power and that of the United States, even in aggregate terms. For the sake of argument, however, we will accept some of the broad tenets underlying realist theory. According to this logic (and assuming continued Chinese economic and technological advancement), China’s aggregate and relative national power will ultimately enable it to challenge the United States for a preponderant position and influence. To proponents of this view, precise estimates or predictions of when such a challenge might materialise are less important than the acknowledgment of its prospect. Thus, some analysts (though conceding the large uncertainties in China’s projected economic and military capabilities) believe that the United States must begin to prepare now for the prospect of a future Chinese strategic challenge, even if the form and timing of such a challenge is impossible to specify.13 These issues assume substantial and potentially growing significance in American national security calculations. According to the Department of Defence’s Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) of 1997, a defining assumption of US security strategy is that:


between now and 2015…[no] ‘global peer competitor’ [will be] able to challenge the United States militarily around the world as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. Furthermore, it is likely that no regional power or coalition [of states] will amass sufficient conventional military strength in the next 10 to 15 years to defeat our armed forces, once the full military potential of the United States is mobilized and deployed to [a] region of conflict. The United States is the world’s only superpower today, and it is expected to remain so throughout the 1997–2015 period. 14 As planning assumptions, these judgments seem largely unexceptional. It is almost unimaginable that any state, or presumptive political-military coalition, could aspire to military capacities equivalent to those of the United States over the next two decades. Equally or more important, it seems highly doubtful that any nation is prepared to directly challenge American military power in a major international crisis. Moreover, the factors determining comparative political-military advantage during the Cold War seem much less relevant to the strategic setting of the twentyfirst century. There will be an increasing premium on new skills, technologies and capabilities by which states will seek to thwart the strategic objectives of potential rivals. The ability to exploit location, time and information will assume increased and potentially decisive importance. In all such areas, the United States enjoys ample advantage. However, the capacity of a state to deny or pre-empt a rival’s presumed military advantage could rapidly and unexpectedly erode that rival’s strategic position. Perceptions may matter as much as actual capabilities, with military lags and leads potentially subject to rapid and unanticipated change. Ensuring US technological and operational advantage in future crises therefore constitutes a continuing preoccupation for American security planners. By virtue of its size, strategic autonomy, extant military capabilities, geographic position, latent power potential and economic growth over the past twenty years, China will constitute the most credible prospective rival to the United States in the decades to come. This does not mean that such a challenge is either inevitable or guaranteed of success. At the same time, there is no intrinsic reason why a hypothetical challenge to US dominance must be direct or even predominantly military. Yet the possibility of such a challenge warrants careful consideration as China’s power grows—less as a characterisation of the world that will emerge, and more as one that could emerge. Moreover, the United States might


not be able to anticipate the precise way in which its strategic primacy could be challenged. The prospect of such an outcome has been somewhat circumspectly acknowledged in US policy reviews. American planning assumptions remain rooted principally in the assessment of power attributes and national capabilities, rather than trying to specify a given situation or contingency in which US military power might be challenged by a major power. In the QDR, for example, Russia and China were identified as the only states possessing the inherent potential to emerge as a peer competitor of the United States over the next two decades. Neither, however, was judged an especially credible candidate for this status over the period under review, principally because of the domestic constraints facing both countries. China, the report observed, ‘is likely to continue to face a number of internal challenges, including the further development of its economic infrastructure and the tension between a modern market economy and authoritarian political system, that may slow the pace of its military modernisation’.15 On this basis, US defence planners assert that the aggregate balance of American military capabilities will continue to comfortably exceed those of China, even assuming that China in relative terms is ultimately able to narrow the current imbalance between Chinese and American power. However, China would appear to be the most plausible candidate for emerging as a ‘near peer competitor’, a category that does not presume a capacity to challenge American interests on a global basis. As defined by William Lynn, the Department of Defence’s Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation, such a power ‘would not be quite a return to the Soviet threat, but some threat that exceeded regional bounds. Some potential threat in Asia or Europe that got up to not quite the superpower standard but above an Iraq or North Korea’.16 Although China was not specifically identified in this somewhat generic assessment, it unquestionably possesses the requisite attributes. Should American strategic primacy in East Asia be called into question, this would constitute a major transformation in the East Asian balance of power, and one that could prompt major changes in the behaviour and policy expectations of states throughout the region. How might American primacy be undermined? What specific circumstances or policy developments might lead China’s leaders to pose a direct challenge to the United States? The answer to these questions seem based less on specific military power comparisons, and more on whether leaders in Beijing at a future point judge their vital national


interests at risk, what actions they would be prepared to undertake to defend these interests if jeopardised, and how American responses might in turn induce longer term reactions from the Chinese. Viewed in these terms, projections of peer or near peer competitor status would reflect the outcome of acute conflicts of national interest between the United States and China, rather than a pronounced or decisive shift in the overall balance of economic and military power between the two states. Thus, posited assumptions about peer or near peer status may be the wrong question to pose. China does not view equivalence with American military power as a realistic or compelling national security objective in the foreseeable future. Beijing hopes to raise the political and military costs to the United States should American power challenge its vital interests, but this does not require symmetry with American military capabilities in order to contest US policy actions. China therefore seems highly unlikely to pursue an overtly adversarial stance towards the United States, or to risk confrontation in an area where the United States possesses unquestioned superiority. Indeed, it retains substantial incentives to collaborate with the United States in future years. Yet the Chinese remain deeply troubled by American strategic predominance, and by the growing US predilection for unilateral action. China is therefore seeking to inhibit the exercise of US power in areas proximate to its territory, without provoking major adverse responses from the United States. It will also remain keenly attentive to potential American courses of action that could undermine its vital interests over the longer term. Therefore, two underlying conditions must be met to posit China as a credible political-military competitor of the United States: first, China would need to pursue national security objectives that directly conflicted with the vital interests of the United States; and second, China would have to possess sufficient military capabilities to put core American political-military interests within the Asia-Pacific region at risk. These two factors constitute the irreducible building blocks of a presumptive Chinese strategic challenge. But the implications of Chinese military development for US interests will also depend on whether and how Chinese capabilities exert a discernible effect on future US defence planning assumptions. This is not a straightforward proposition. Indeed, US policy assessments still seem to be predominantly configured with assessment tools developed during the Cold War. For example, the United States presently enjoys singular


strategic advantage. The question is whether the Chinese possess realistic options for appreciably diminishing this advantage. What might a Chinese strategy designed to erode US predominance entail? Three different components could prove decisive in such a strategy: (1) economic interdependence on a scale that would raise the costs of US military actions along China’s periphery to prohibitive levels; (2) political efforts by China to severely weaken the credibility of US regional alliances; and (3) sufficient military capabilities to inhibit or preempt the US use of force in a major East Asian crisis. Thus, the questions for US defence strategy over the longer term are: (1) whether the highly favourable present circumstances (i.e., the lack of a peer or near peer competitor) will persist beyond the coming decade; (2) the conditions and factors that might reduce or seriously complicate the current strategic and operational advantage enjoyed by the United States; and (3) actions, policies or geopolitical circumstances that would necessitate a major reassessment of US strategic goals or defence planning assumptions. To consider these issues and their implications, we must turn to Chinese strategic calculations, and the specific factors that might impinge on Chinese defence decisions in future years. Assessing Future Regional Contingencies In gauging China’s strategic potential, there is an understandable tendency to focus on readily measurable attributes and comparisons of national power. In the final analysis, however, strategic evaluations need to concentrate on the factors that seem most likely to shape a country’s longer term actions as well as its specific decisions. The Chinese have outlined their broad international strategies in a straightforward fashion. China’s leaders see an unparalleled opportunity to restore their country to the front ranks of the world’s powers. They hope to achieve this longterm objective without acute internal dislocation, highly distorted resource commitments or involvement in a major war. Chinese strategic calculations, though oriented towards all points on Asia’s geopolitical compass, focus first and foremost on Northeast Asia (i.e. security concerns that impinge immediately on China’s relations with the United States, Russia and Japan; with Taiwan; and with the Korean Peninsula). However, domestic considerations and an incremental logic remain uppermost in Chinese policy calculations, though such assumptions are premised on ensuring the viability and security of the Chinese state.


A comparison with Russia (the other candidate major power rival of the United States) seems appropriate. Though Beijing and Moscow both confront American predominance, and both seek to ensure the integrity of their core strategic assets (especially nuclear weapons capabilities), their circumstances otherwise differ profoundly. Russia is a greatly diminished major power that is seeking to halt or reverse its acute strategic decline. Its leaders have foregone a leading international position over the past decade; there are few illusions about restoring the country to its past imperial role, with Russia generally intent on achieving renewed status as a major power in a more multipolar world.17 However, this is where the similarities between the two states diverge. Russia has a keen strategic awareness of what it has lost; China has a keen strategic awareness of what it has begun to acquire. Russia cannot expect to mount a serious challenge to vital US interests; it instead seeks to defend the integrity of the Russian state and to avert direct challenges to Russian interests. By contrast, China does possess an inherent capability to put vital US interests at risk. Of the two major theatre wars (MTWs) for which the United States currently plans, one (Korea) is literally on China’s doorstep; to assume an essentially passive or acquiescent China in relation to acute instability or outright military conflict on the peninsula constitutes historical amnesia and strategic wishful thinking.18 The second major case concerns the possibility of armed conflict in and around the Taiwan Straits. Taiwan is crucial for two primary reasons: the Chinese regard this as an issue involving national sovereignty and territorial integrity to which the United States has concurred in word and deed; and the United States insists that any unification of China must be achieved without resort to force. Depending on the future evolution of relations among Washington, Beijing and Taipei, there is a clear potential for a serious clash of interests, potentially with major implications for US forces deployed in the region. The accelerated military modernisation programmes of both China and Taiwan make these circumstances especially fraught with risk.19 Thus, the strategic stakes in Korea and in the Taiwan Straits entail a centrality to long-term US relations with China that those between Russia and the United States lack, except with respect to nuclear weapons. There is also a latent and potentially growing divergence of SinoAmerican strategic interests obscured in anodyne joint pledges to move both countries towards a ‘constructive strategic partnership’ in the twenty-first century, though most policy makers and commentators now avoid this label. The essential strategic geography of Northeast Asia (i.e.,


a divided Korea and the competition between rival Chinese governments in Beijing and Taipei) was fixed in the last week of June 1950, and has remained intact ever since. The shared incentives of the United States and other powers (including China) to ensure regional stability are voiced principally in this context: no one has an incentive to perturb the territorial status quo. Yet what degree of confidence is there in prevailing circumstances, especially in Korea? Is it reasonable to assume that North Korea—notwithstanding its capacity to inflict major harm on its neighbours, and the prospect of further development of its ballistic missile capabilities—will remain a viable regime a decade from today? Absent a profound internal transition in the North, or the readiness of other states to indefinitely sustain in power the world’s sole surviving Stalinist state, the longer term outlook for Pyongyang seems highly problematic. For example, if Korean unification were to follow the dissolution of the North Korean state, the artful circumlocution of US security strategy in Northeast Asia would be largely rendered null and void. Without a North Korean threat, on what basis can the United States retain a robust forward presence, justify a substantial augmentation of its regional alliances, or pursue Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) collaboration with Japan? To an extraordinary degree, US regional security strategy presumes the persistence of adversarial relations with North Korea. Indeed, some Chinese strategists assert that North Korea provides convenient political cover for a continued US presence in Northeast Asia, given the latent prospect of a much larger strategic challenge from China. In view of North Korea’s missile threat and its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, this argument seems overly facile, but it should not be blithely dismissed. Korean unification would therefore pose a major challenge for US policy planners. China already openly challenges the US bilateral alliance logic. Beijing expresses growing wariness about the purposes of the USJapanese alliance, in particular the enhanced guidelines governing Japanese assistance to US forces in a regional crisis, an augmented Japanese regional security role, and prospective US-Japanese collaboration on TMD. Beijing characterises US regional alliances as legacies of the Cold War, insisting that they should be supplanted by a ‘new security concept’ that would seek to delegitimise the US forward military presence in the Western Pacific. 20 Indeed, it seems entirely plausible that the Chinese would seek to achieve long-term strategic understandings with a unified Korean state, hoping to foreclose US


deployment options on the peninsula that might be judged deleterious to Chinese interests. Thus, the Chinese are putting down markers for the longer term. Chinese disgruntlement over US regional security strategy is not an intrinsic reason to modify it, especially if US regional security partners voice a clear desire to retain close ties with the United States. However, American policy makers should not assume easy or automatic Chinese concurrence with longer-term US strategic goals. China’s increasing dissent from US regional security policy therefore seems a portent of things to come. China’s insistence that its strategic intentions remain entirely defensive may be literally true in relation to Beijing’s official territorial claims. However, in the absence of negotiated regional security norms or explicit restraints on future Chinese military actions, it is doubtful that any of Beijing’s neighbours view enhanced Chinese air, naval and missile forces with equanimity. Slowly but inexorably, the Chinese are acquiring the requisite military capabilities that will enable Beijing to assume a more pivotal role in shaping the future security contours of East Asia. These capabilities are not fully realised at present, nor would they automatically translate into a more assertive state intent on intimidating its neighbours, but the emergence of China as a more capable military power is a core component of East Asia’s ineluctable strategic realignment. China seems determined to assume what it sees as its rightful place in the regional political and security order. Its position will be rooted both in its future military capabilities and in the political-economic role it has already begun to assume throughout the region, including with important US allies and security partners. These developments underscore the centrality of future US-Chinese relations to the regional order as a whole. The United States has substantial incentives to seek larger security understandings with Beijing, given that China will ultimately have the capability to challenge or to complicate American strategic primacy in East Asia. American policy makers have yet to achieve closure on how best to ensure long-term US interests in a region of genuine strategic import to the United States, but where US strategy cannot reflexively assume (as in Europe) a coalition of the like minded. Nor is there a clear consensus on what the United States deems within the legitimate scope of China’s future military capabilities, or whether both countries will prove able to reconcile their respective security interests over the longer term. The United States hopes to preserve its current strategic advantage, which presumes the absence of a major power adversary (or adversaries)


who by intention, action or capability could put US vital interests at risk. The pivotal policy question, therefore, is how to retain America’s existing advantage without incurring strategy and resource commitments that are neither warranted nor sustainable. This will require a prudent hedging option that is not self-fulfilling. In essence, the United States seeks fallback without lock in. A benign outcome with China, though clearly preferable, cannot be assumed; but an insurance strategy in relation to China must not render meaningful security collaboration with Beijing impossible. Squaring this circle will remain among the pre-eminent international challenges that the United States will face in the decades to come. There are three basic approaches to retaining America’s current advantage in relation to China: (1) integration or inclusion that diminishes Chinese incentives to challenge American interests and disposes Beijing towards more active co-operation with the United States; (2) prevention or inhibition that explicitly seeks to constrain or limit China’s emergence as a more powerful political and military power; and (3) retention of political-military options to insure against a major failure of US strategic assumptions. The first option posits a largely collaborative future with China. The second option assumes a high likelihood of adversarial relations. The third option remains agnostic, leaving open whether a stronger China poses an inherent risk to US vital interests, or whether China proves a much weaker, more vulnerable state incapable of realising its long-term goals, including those of national security. These three posited alternatives each reflect different answers to a central question: how does the future development of Chinese power and the interests that flow from this power affect US strategic goals? Each, in turn, reflects the uncertainties and potential unknowns associated with China’s internal transition. American influence over internal outcomes in China, though far from decisive, could nonetheless prove significant. Despite widespread unease about the implications of a more powerful China, an internally unstable China is potentially far more dangerous to American interests. Indifferent or sluggish economic performance could produce internal instability and weakness, possibly triggering a more assertive, overtly nationalistic foreign and defence policy. A wary, weaker leadership would also very likely have fewer incentives to pursue accommodation with its neighbours, much less with the United States. The United States must therefore remain highly attentive to the implications of its actions and decisions on China’s longer-term future.


Chinese decision making does not take place in a vacuum. The resentment of American strategic dominance within China is more than a pose. Thus, the manner in which the United States exercises its power will directly influence the capacity and incentives of Chinese leaders to collaborate with the United States. Unilateral decisions and actions that undermine Beijing’s interests will meet with commensurate (and quite possibly equivalent) responses. At the same time, a credible long-term strategy towards China must be coalition based: the absence of clear understandings with allies and security partners is certain to open the door to Chinese efforts to degrade these relationships. None of these observations defines an optimal strategy for future US relations with China, but they suggest how Beijing seems likely to respond to American technological, economic and military dominance. However, focusing on the potential emergence of a peer or near peer competitor could obscure or ignore the much more complex dynamics at work in future decades. China seems unlikely to serve as a textbook example of a state embarked upon coercion or overt aggression towards its neighbours, though the latent possibilities of unilateral Chinese actions persist, and could be enhanced as Chinese military capabilities grow. Beijing appears to be seeking an enhanced international position somewhere between increased strategic stature and outright strategic deference. The absence of an unambiguous security threat from Beijing at present reflects the realities of a sole superpower world that the Chinese seem disinclined to challenge in direct fashion. The question is whether present power dynamics will persist indefinitely—in essence, whether the Chinese are simply husbanding their strength until the time when they feel more able to contest American predominance on less disadvantageous terms. This will depend both on American policy and on the internal dynamics of China, as influenced by future US security policies. Thus, US strategic investments in the near-to mid-term will affect what the Chinese undertake over the longer term, and the assumptions Beijing seems likely to make about future US intentions. For example, a unilateral US decision to abrogate the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) treaty and accelerate both theatre and national missile defence programmes (actions which the Chinese are essentially powerless to prevent) would very likely prompt the Chinese to accelerate their future missile programmes, and render next to impossible meaningful joint understandings with the United States on nuclear policy. Leaders in Beijing thus exhibit a mix of weakness and strength in their external strategies, with contradictory signals directed at the United States.


On the one hand, Beijing seeks increased strategic recognition by Washington, combined with much closer relations with neighbouring states as insurance against a major Sino-American strategic reversal. This ‘walking on two legs’ strategy seems likely to persist, but the Chinese are often oblivious to, or remarkably maladept at recognising, how their actions contribute to the wariness of their neighbours as well as the United States. As a consequence, the United States and other powers are often less disposed to accord Chinese policy concerns the consideration they might otherwise receive. This phenomenon is increasingly evident in the growing US-Chinese strategic divergence over missile defence.21 Beijing repeatedly asserts that future TMD programmes (especially upper tier programmes) will degrade the credibility of its ballistic missile capabilities, and potentially reintegrate Taiwan within a US-led regional security alliance directed against China. Accusations that such missile defence programmes entail an automatic infringement on Chinese sovereignty escalates the political rhetoric on both sides of the Pacific, and inhibits the ability of either leadership to achieve credible understandings and compromises on this issue. The evident inability of Washington and Beijing to achieve a tolerable centre of gravity in security relations spurs policy commitments in both countries that diminish flexibility in any prospective negotiations. It is also highly worrisome to China’s immediate neighbours, who have few incentives to be whipsawed by strategic disputes between rival major powers. These developments also reinforce more pronounced movement in both capitals towards explicit hedging strategies. The question for the longer term is the manageability of Sino-American strategic differences, upon which longer-term assumptions about regional stability and security seem ever more likely to depend. However, Sino-American relations in the coming decade are unlikely to be characterised by an overt Chinese challenge to American strategic primacy. A more probable outcome is one of continued manoeuvring for geopolitical advantage by both states, intermittent tactical accommodation that obscures unresolved (and potentially unresolvable) conflicts of interest, and the prudent accumulation of military power by both states over the longer term. This forecast does not seem especially edifying, and it could sharply limit the prospects for achieving a more durable and equitable security order in East Asia that the United States and China both profess to seek. Without a more durable set of Sino-American political and strategic understandings, both countries will seek to ensure their security interests


through a combination of national level strategies and political-security relations with other Asia-Pacific powers. Though not necessarily a worst case outcome or a recipe for renewed polarisation in the region, it suggests that a shared security concept will continue to elude both states. China may thus be planning for the day when it feels more able to contest American strategic predominance. Such a prospect ought to sober leaders in both states, and induce much more creativity and maturity than either leadership has yet evidenced. In the final analysis, international security will be determined by the cumulative results of discrete actions and decisions. A major crisis would most likely be the last move in a long sequence of policy developments, rather than a single precipitating event. The balance of power may therefore shape ultimate outcomes, but it is the balance of interests that affects what both countries do with their power today, thereby shaping the longer term contours of East Asian security in the process. Notes The opinions in this paper are my own, and should not be attributed to the Naval War College or the US government. 1 On this long neglected history, see Eden Y.Woon, “Chinese Arms Sales and U.S.-China Military Relations,” Asian Survey XXIX, no. 6 (June 1989), pp. 601–618; and Jonathan D.Pollack, “The Cox Report’s ‘Dirty Little Secret’”, Arms Control Today 29, no. 3 (April-May 1999), pp. 26–27, 34–35. 2 See, for example, Transforming Defense-National Security in the 21st Century, (Arlington, VA: Report of the National Defense Panel to the Secretary of Defense, December 1997). 3 For two recent assessments, consult James C.Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (eds.), The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica: RAND, CF-145-CAPP/AF, 1999); and James R.Lilley and David Shambaugh (eds.), China’s Military Faces the Future (Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1999). 4 For a very useful summary, see Shirley A.Kan, Christopher Bolkcom and Ronald O’Rourke, China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, October 10, 2000). 5 US Department of Defense, Selected Military Capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Report to the Congress Pursuant to Section 1305 of FY97 National Defense Authorization Act, n.d.); Mark A.Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 1999).


6 See, China’s National Defense, Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, July 1998, especially pp. 10–14; and idem., China’s National Defense in 2000, October 2000. The latter document assumes a decidedly more pessimistic tone, especially with respect to Taiwan. 7 Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 329, July 1999). 8 Paul H.B.Godwin, “From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy, and Capabilities Towards 2000”, The China Quarterly 146, (June 1996), pp. 464–487. 9 Some researchers, however, argue that the scope of Sino-Russian defence ties is far more extensive than generally reported. See, in particular, Alexandr V.Nemets and John L.Scherer, Sino-Russian Military Relations— The Fate of Taiwan and the New Geopolitics (Washington, DC: Portculise Books, 2000). 10 David M.Finkelstein, China Reconsiders Its National Security: The Great Peace and Development Debate of 1999 (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, December 2000). 11 See, for example, James Mulvenon, “The PLA and Information Warfare,” in Mulvenon and Yang, The People’s Liberation Army, op. cit., pp. 175–186. 12 The literature on this topic is voluminous, and no effort will be made here to summarise or cite most of it. For a useful synthesis, see A very Goldstein, “Great Expectations—Interpreting China’s Arrival,” International Security 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/1998), pp. 36–73. 13 For one such effort, see Zalmay M.Khalilzad et al., The United States and a Rising China-Strategic and Military Implications (Santa Monica: RAND, MR-1082-AF, 1999). 14 Secretary of Defense William S.Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, May 1997, Section 2. 15 Ibid. 16 Lynn is cited in Defense Week, 16 December 1996, p. 9. 17 Jonathan D.Pollack, “The Evolving Security Environment in Asia: Its Impact on Russia,” in Gennadiy Chufrin (ed.), Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 447–473. 18 For more extended discussion, consult Jonathan D.Pollack and Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications (Santa Monica: RAND, MR-1040-A, 1999). 19 Chinese analysts are hardly oblivious to the consequences. For a particularly candid assessment, see Shi Yinhong, “Difficulties and Options: Thoughts on the Taiwan Matter,” Zhanlue Yu Guanli [Strategy and Management], 1 October 1999, pp. 1–4. 20 China’s National Defense, especially pp. 3–9; David M.Finkelstein, “China’s New Security Concept: Reading Between the Lines,” Washington Journal of Modern China 5, no. 1 (Spring 1999). 21 Evan S.Medeiros, Missiles, Theater Missile Defense, and Nonproliferation (Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 1999).

CHAPTER THREE Reflecting Mirrors across the Taiwan Straits: American Perspectives on a China Threat Edward Friedman

How ruling groups in Beijing and Taipei perceive the other as a threat is mediated by how they comprehend the policies of Washington. Much was revealed about the hopes and anxieties of China and Taiwan by their understandings of the year 2000 presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore. The people and government on the island of Taiwan tended to champion Bush, while their counterparts in mainland China mostly rooted for Gore. The preferences were manifest in the media of Taiwan and China. At first blush, this line-up may seem uninteresting. Beijing analysts have learned that their rulers are not in good odour with America since the contrasting performances of Beijing and Moscow between 1989 and 1991.1 While a responsible American government deals with China on issues of mutual interest, e.g. peace in Korea, advancing the trade relationship, still a challenger for the US presidency attacks the incumbent’s acting responsibly as a ‘soft on China’ policy. Meanwhile the incumbent has already paid for accommodating China’s international reality, a rapidly rising, emerging economy, a major power without whose co-operation vital issues such as missile proliferation cannot be settled. Hence, China prefers the American incumbent, Bush the elder over Clinton/Gore and Gore over Bush the younger in 2000. But how much of campaign rhetoric reflects real policy agendas? Would a change of president bring a change in Taiwan policy? Taipei hoped so; Beijing feared so. Taiwan saw Clinton moving in the wrong direction; Beijing did not. Yet the government in Taipei in 2000 did not seem to think that Beijing was an immediate military threat. While China’s policy is to threaten Taiwan, warning openly that, if Taipei does things Beijing would not like, then Beijing would attack, still, officials in Taipei follow a policy of constructive engagement with China, hoping that growing mutual economic interests will lead Beijing to refrain from military actions,

66 EDWARD FRIEDMAN

hoping that Beijing instead will find a peaceful modus vivendi for getting along with Taipei to be in China’s most basic interest. Even after the March 2000 election of Chen Shui-bian, the presidential candidate of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the candidate Beijing most opposed, China was militarily unprovocative in the Taiwan Straits. This sanguine Taiwan approach was criticised in January 2001 by the Clinton Administration Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia: ‘There is still a tendency [in Taiwan] to believe that economic issues can outweigh political issues’.2 Apparently Washington believed that Beijing was more of a military threat to Taipei than did ruling groups in Taipei, who found China abandoning a 1999 posture in which time was on Taiwan’s side. American law makes explicit what would turn China into a threat in the Taiwan region. The 1979 act establishing non-official relations between America and Taiwan declared in Section 2(b)(4) that ‘It is the policy of the United States…to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States’. While China is not experienced in Taiwan as an immediate military threat, while officials in Taipei see Beijing counterparts as capable of choices other than war, while Taiwan acts to make war less likely and beneficial economic interaction more likely, Taiwan does worry about China’s rise, its growing wealth and strength, an eventual capacity to isolate and weaken and then impose its will on Taiwan. People in Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, India and Japan likewise are concerned that Chinese are imagining themselves as restoring a lost greatness, an Asian predominance, an ability to insist that neighbours respect Beijing’s wishes as under the tributary system when, while the American Constitution was being drafted, imperial China intervened in Vietnam on behalf of one imperial claimant and against another. Americans are insensitive to how Asian attitudes are informed by prior subservience to China. Consequently China’s neighbours seek a regional balance of power to preserve the sovereign independence of the nation state era. Taiwan too seeks a balancer in the USA. Expecting a return to Asian predominance, China sees America not as a balancer but as an obstacle to a just, glorious and natural Chinese future. Beijing and Taipei interpreted the year 2000 American presidential election from these contrasting perspectives.

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In Taiwan, during the late 1990s, the Clinton administration was portrayed as an appeaser of Beijing, willing to sacrifice Taiwan to woo China. This Taiwan attitude needs explaining since, in fact, Clinton had ordered a reassessment of America’s Taiwan policy soon after taking office, leading to a 1994 upgrading of Taiwan’s relations with the USA. Also, in 1998 Clinton made explicit, as no US president ever had, that the people of Taiwan should have the democratic final word on the fate of Taiwan. However, Taiwan’s attitude towards Clinton/Gore during the US presidential election fixated on Washington’s policy towards Beijing only after Clinton dispatched aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Straits area to restabilise the region when PRC missile exercises in March 1996 threatened to destabilise the Western Pacific.3 Clinton then concluded that America’s region-wide interest in regional peace and prosperity required persuading Beijing that Washington had not, in embracing Taiwan, abandoned commitments to China made in good faith ever since Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon first negotiated with the Chinese authorities in 1971–1972.4 On Taiwan, this Clinton administration effort was interpreted as an abandonment of democratic Taiwan and being soft on communism. Decades of Cold War propaganda on Taiwan about fellow-traveller liberals made such an understanding popular on Taiwan. Taiwanese came to believe that Clinton had sold out Taiwan for Chinese communist money, that he had intentionally allowed China to steal missile and nuclear secrets so that particular American multinationals that had funded his re-election campaign could get rich doing business with China. Clinton purportedly allowed China to upgrade its weaponry, undermining Taiwan’s security. This nonsense forgot that all do business with a rapidly growing China, including Taiwanese, the largest investors in China since the 4 June 1989 Beijing massacre. Taiwanese were reinforced in their negative assessment after Clinton made a prolonged 1998 visit to China in which he noted on a Shanghai radio programme America’s continued commitment to the ‘3 no’s’ a US policy of not promoting Taiwan’s declaration of independence. But, as revealed in James Mann’s About Face, the ‘3 no’s’ was US policy ever since 1971. Clinton held to the same course as all American presidents since Nixon. Kissinger secretly surrendered the ‘3 no’s’ to Beijing at his first meeting with Premier Zhou Enlai. This covertness probably reflected not only Kissinger’s penchant for the clandestine but also a judgment call by

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Nixon. He believed that to make his administration’s secret 1971 concession to China public might lose him the congressional and media support needed for the 1971–1972 breakthrough to China. Because of the secrecy, subsequent American candidates for president imagined, while running for office, that they had more flexibility on Taiwan-China relations than they actually did. Beijing used the diplomatic record of Kissinger’s ‘3 no’s’ to constrain subsequent American presidents.5 Clinton merely ended a situation that allowed China to blackmail America. Yet Clinton’s aides handled the issue so as to wound Taiwanese sensitivities because of anger towards Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui, a feeling that he had sparked the 1996 missile crisis by misleadingly assuring the US Congress that his 1995 visit to Cornell, his alma mater, would have no untoward effects. The Clinton administration more than once felt snookered by President Lee and warned him that American support for Taiwan rested on Taiwan’s not destabilising the region. The Taiwanese president did not appreciate America’s tough talk or the Americans in Washington that President Lee’s people held responsible for the unwelcome message. Washington urged Taipei not to make it seem that Taiwan did not understand the difficult realism and the complex ambiguities inherent for all in the Western Pacific, who fully engaged China in an effort to strengthen its peace prone forces and to integrate China in a realm of peaceful interchange. Taiwan was asked not to act as a bull in a fragile China shop, to understand that a balanced policy was required in dealing with China’s surging chauvinism, a policy of quiet vigilance accompanied by public all-around engagement with an economically emerging China. To mend what his aides believed Taiwan’s President Lee had shred, Clinton allowed President Jiang Zemin in Beijing to use Clinton’s 1998 Shanghai re-statement of the ‘3 no’s’ to show politically conscious Chinese that Clinton had not tilted against China, that there was continuity in Sino-US relations, that, most importantly, Jiang was not selling out Chinese nationalism in accommodating Clinton. Given nationalistic angers towards America in China, given popular American dislike for Chinese political behaviour, good Sino-US relations needs choreographed summitry. This requires co-ordination between highest leaders. President Clinton gave President Jiang face. American policy continuity was hard to swallow on Taiwan in the 1990s because of the euphoria that accompanied democratisation. Taiwan’s late 1980s democratic emergence was coincident to Beijing’s June 4 1989 massacre and subsequent international isolation. Hopes


rose on Taiwan that, as South Africa ended its isolation when democracy replaced apartheid (Lee Teng-hui’s KMT helped bankroll Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress), so it should be with a democratic Taiwan. When Taiwan’s dreams were dashed (South Africa recognised the PRC and Taiwan was further isolated), as China’s global economic weight and influence rose, Taiwanese scapegoated the Clinton/Gore administration. Thus, despite Clinton’s actual support of a democratic Taiwan, Taiwanese embraced presidential candidate George W.Bush as an alternative to a supposedly back-stabbing Clinton/Gore administration. The Republican Party was imagined on Taiwan as a long term supporter of freedom against communism. Forgetting that George Bush the elder did not even welcome sanctions against the Beijing regime after its June 4 massacre of peaceful demonstrators for democracy, Taiwanese latched on to George W.Bush the younger’s insistence that, in contrast to Clinton/ Gore’s commitment to strategic partnership with China, Bush would treat China as a strategic competitor. However, campaign sloganeering is not policy. As with ‘most favoured nation’ status, meaning normal trading relations, the Clinton goal of strategic partnership with China was mostly diplomatic theatre, something, again, to give China’s President Jiang some face. Jiang wanted such a phrase to be able to sell his openness policy to the Chinese people as making China a great power, proving that he knew how to deal with the Americans. In reality there was little difference between Clinton’s very diplomatic use of the term ‘strategic partnership’ and Bush’s catch phrase of China as a strategic competitor, which was theatre aimed at the militant right wing of the Republican Party, who were crucial to Republican candidates during presidential election voter mobilisation. The Bush administration dropped its campaign rhetoric as soon as it was in office. In championing Bush, Taiwanese also persuaded themselves that Republicans would sell more and more desirable weapons to Taiwan, tighten military links with Taiwan, and pass the ‘Taiwan Security Enhancement Act’ (TSEA) to formalise the sales and the links. In power, the Republicans, however, immediately backed away from TSEA. Republicans were also seen during the campaign as more likely to rapidly develop and deploy a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) in Asia, theoretically a check on real and intended mainland missile threats to Taiwan. China’s military purchases from Russia and its missile deployments across from Taiwan are regularly described in Taiwan’s

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media as ‘a serious threat’. The China threat is discussed prominently in Taiwan politics. Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian explained ‘we cannot ignore … greater pressure from China because of its greater missile force, state- ofthe-art weapons and overall arms build-up. They are still likely to miscalculate…and launch a war in the straits’.6 Republicans are seen on Taiwan as far more likely to include Taiwan in a missile defence arrangement, a policy which, however, would come perilously close to breaking American commitments to China since the Nixon era, commitments of ending security pact relations with Taiwan. Such a provocation of China was defanged when President Chen’s foreign minister let it be known that Taiwan did not need missile firing destroyers. Taipei and Washington do, however, want to improve their military communications to avoid repeating the problems of co-ordination revealed during America’s response to China’s March 1996 threatening missile bombardment. Beijing military actions inevitably have an impact on how the threatened behave. Military events have prolonged security impacts. China interpreted America’s defeat of Iraq in Kuwait in 1991 and Serbia in Kosovo in 1999 as rehearsals for military intervention against China, in Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan. America’s wars even out of the region spurred advanced weapons purchases by the PRC, larger investment in upgrading China’s weaponry, a missile build-up across from Taiwan and the creation of a military capable of deterring the US Navy in the Taiwan Straits region. China more aggressively confronted US reconnaissance missions, hoping to keep America from gaining the data that allowed it to bypass Iraq’s and Yugoslavia’s air defenses. Military actions have large consequences, some unforseen. Mao’s early 1950 military co-operation with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in preparing and approving Kim II Song’s march into South Korea led American President Harry S.Truman to change policy on Taiwan. Before the Sino-Soviet bloc backed war in Korea, Mao’s military had been amassing for an attack on Taiwan to finally defeat the CCP’s civil war adversary, Chiang Kai-shek, whose Kuomintang (KMT) had retreated to Taiwan, 100 miles distant from the Chinese mainland. The USA was not going to intervene. But the invasion of South Korea by a Sino-Soviet bloc member re-defined Taiwan. It became part of America’s global security responsibilities. It was an international issue, not merely the final episode of a civil war in China.


Cognisant of Mao’s desire to prove to Stalin that he was a real international communist and not a Titoist nationalist, people within elite circles in Beijing criticise Mao for losing Taiwan. The author has heard members of the Ministry of National Defence criticise Mao for putting international communism before Chinese nationalism. Mao is said to have conceded Chinese territory many times—Korea, Burma, India and Mongolia. Given Taiwan’s subsequent economic rise and democratic transition, American diplomatic historian Michael Parrish notes, ‘We were probably fortunate in 1950 that Mao did not move against Taiwan’.7 Taiwan has proved a major, positive force for stable prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Patriots seldom have a critical comprehension of their own behaviour. As Chinese feel no responsibility for the impact of North Korea’s 1950 aggression on America’s Taiwan policy, so Taiwanese do not focus on how President Lee’s 1990s risky diplomacy led to a reaction against him in American foreign policy-making circles. Taiwanese consequently do not appreciate Clinton’s late 1990s policies on arms sales. Both congress and the president believed that Lee Teng-hui had been misleading in his 1994–1995 assurances that his visit to Cornell University would not destabilise cross-straits relations. Although Beijing was going to respond toughly to Lee’s slighting of President Jiang’s recent moderate overtures even if Lee did not visit Cornell,8 China’s subsequent 1995 and 1996 threatening military exercises in the Taiwan Straits did impel the Clinton administration to seek assurances from Lee against future destabilising initiatives. Consequently, the Clinton administration was greatly perturbed by Taiwan President Lee’s rupture of the crossstraits dialogue through a declared commitment to ‘special state-to-state relations’ in July 1999. Clinton withheld some weapons from Taiwan to return President Lee to a dialogue and reconciliation policy. Many in Congress considered that an over-reaction. The 1999– 2000 Republican-promoted TSEA, which failed, pressured Clinton to make more weapons available to Taiwan. However, there was no Clinton policy to leave Taiwan vulnerable to Chinese military blackmail. He delayed certain weapons sales to bring Taipei back to a policy that would deter China, not provoke it. As Taiwan was pro-Bush, so Beijing was pro-Gore in the 2000 US presidential election. Yet with China, as with Taiwan, the outsider’s perception did not quite capture American reality. Prior to the US election, President Jiang portrayed the Clinton/Gore administration as having restored positive and constructive relations with China after a

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difficult period punctuated by the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. This Chinese praise for Clinton/Gore seems extraordinary. Beijing had long portrayed the Clinton administration as a superpower hegemon which supported human rights intervention to subvert China’s developmental dictatorship. The Beijing line was that Clinton’s policy was to keep China from rising. America was enemy number one. Clinton was depicted in the PRC as a Hitler. China’s anti-American rhetoric was so outlandish and unrelenting that Clinton’s secretary of defence, William Cohen, denounced China’s America-bashing in a speech in Beijing in July 2000. Hence, it was startling to find Beijing, after years of bashing Clinton/ Gore, suddenly declaring Gore a statesman. Beijing proclaimed its antipathy to a Bush candidacy. But where is the realpolitik in denouncing a presidential candidate of the nation which is a partner in one’s most important international relationship? In 1999 8.7 per cent of China’s GDP, a huge amount, was earned in exports to the United States. China’s President Jiang abandoned paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s policy of making economic growth China’s top priority and therefore conciliating America, China’s top market, to facilitate China’s growth. Instead, Jiang confronts America, stopping just short of provoking war. He mobilises chauvinistic backing by targeting a purportedly evil America,9 while trying to avoid a blowback effect that targets him for being too soft on America when he concedes to the international imperatives of growth. Like riding on a tiger’s back, it is a risky posture. Given chauvinistic legitimations, President Jiang has not reciprocated American gestures which gave him and China face. Beijing returns friendship with denunciations. Jiang’s America policy was many sticks and almost no carrots. Beijing’s momentary praise of Gore’s statesmanship was tactical. China’s condemnation of a potential Bush presidency would have turned into a lambasting of President Gore had Al Gore won and continued Clinton era policies. Chinese analysts said so after the election.10 Beijing concluded that Bush would be worse for China because he would become a captive of ‘the blue team’. ‘Blue team’ refers to a group of right wing journalists, congressional staffers and security analysts who oppose the thirty to fifty year steady course in US policy on cross-straits relations. The blue team describes the entire set of policy-makers throughout the presidencies of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan (yes, even Reagan), Bush and


Clinton as a ‘red team’, a group supposedly soft on communism, virtually treasonous, so-called ‘panda-huggers’. The blue team opposes the engagement policy initiated by Kissinger/ Nixon. The blue team favours treating China as America’s adversary in Asia. Analysts in Beijing imagined a Bush presidency as adopting blue team policies that would give Taiwan the confidence to declare independence, an event that would lead on to a Sino-US war. Bush’s top policy team did not include blue team people. A few blue team members won middle level jobs in the Bush administration. China’s exaggerated fears may reflect the chauvinism that pervades Chinese propaganda.11 Or, it may mainly reflect Chinese domestic politics— theatre for patriots at home.12 As soon as Americans voted and it seemed that Bush might win, Beijing changed its tune. Press ‘leaks’ appeared about a trip by security analyst Robert D.Blackwill to China. He was said to have had a large input on the China section of the Republican presidential platform. Although Blackwill was portrayed in Taiwan (because of condemnation by the blue team?) as soft on China, he actually promoted co-ordinating America’s Asian allies to confront China and proposed despatching US troops should China attack Taiwan. However, the leaks from China portrayed him as having backed off from automatically sending US troops to the Taiwan region. He was said to only support an American commitment to help defend Taiwan. He was said not even to have directly denounced Beijing’s ‘one China principle’, the ruling CCP’s hard-line stance that the only basis for relations with Taiwan was Taiwan’s accepting that there was only one China, that Taiwan was part of that one China, and that the rulers of this one China were the CCP government in Beijing. That is, Blackwill was transmuted into a partisan of the long-standing American policy in crossstraits relations of ambiguity and non-provocation, hoping to engage China and find a formula for and interlocutors who would avoid war and who would institutionalize peaceful win-win relations as the best hope to serve an autonomous, democratic and prospering Taiwan.13 Suddenly, the Bush campaign rhetoric of abandoning Clinton’s China policy, actually abandoning the like policy of all American presidents starting with Nixon, or perhaps Truman, seemed mere rhetoric, something to run on to achieve office and then run away from in office, when one had to act responsibly. This was not the first time Taiwanese had been taken in by American campaign rhetoric. In 1980, they had been fooled by Ronald Reagan’s anti-communist, pro-Taiwan campaign

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declarations only to find Reagan in power in 1982 promising Beijing that Washington would reduce arms sales to Taiwan. Again in 1992 Taiwan had been fooled by Clinton’s campaign rhetoric denouncing the ‘butchers in Beijing’, only to see him continue the Nixon policy pursued by all presidents since. Some Taiwanese do understand that deeply entrenched American policies which reflect long established vital interests do not disappear because of presidential election campaign rhetoric. Only a change in politics of a major disruptive sort could alter this successful long-term policy. Soon after the year 2000 presidential election, Beijing changed its line on Bush. Chinese analysts of American strategy announced that the longstanding American policy actually would continue. The director of the America Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Science quickly told a Taipei daily that America’s ‘policy towards China will not be considerably adjusted. Stable bilateral relations can be maintained…the Bush administration will not considerably adjust America’s consistent policy towards Taiwan’.14 A PRC reporter informed the Chinese people that There is not much difference between the two parties on this issue… that US China policy will always undergo readjustments within the framework of “containment and engagement”…[is] a strategy that has consistently been followed’. Chinese were informed that the new national security adviser agrees with ‘the policy pursued by each US administration since the 1970s’. The Chinese reporter quoted a ‘blue team’ critic who mockingly noted that Rice ‘believes that we cannot stand giving Clinton and Gore another four years of fawning on Beijing. Her solution is to let the Republicans have four years of fawning on Beijing’.15 American international relations specialist Ralph Cossa agreed. He told readers in Japan that President Bush’s China policies would be the ‘policies [that] have been consistently followed for years by Republican and Democratic administrations alike…there is no reason to believe that any future US administration is going to change them, absent some dramatic destabilising action by Beijing’.16 A researcher at China’s Institute of Contemporary International Relations explained that George W.Bush’s campaign rhetoric actually ‘was much gentler than…[that of] Nixon and Reagan…’ Consequently, under Bush, ‘there will not be any major retrogression in Sino-US relations and the kind of real “strategic confrontation” that people worry about will not easily arise either’. President Bush ‘will not develop the relationship with China into a kind of antagonistic relationship and the overall framework of Sino-US relations will continue to be upheld’.17


However, the Chinese were also informed that American continuity was not a good thing for China since, as with the Clinton/Gore era, antiChina forces were said to be deeply entrenched in America. That is Gore and Bush were dangerously similar on China policy. Both would try to maintain America’s position as the sole superpower and to use that clout to constrain China. Beijing was back to treating America as enemy number one. The Congress was said to be so anti-China that it would pass the TSEA in whole or in part, no matter who was president. The United States would still try to impose its will in Asia, a cause that supposedly forces the US to demonise China in order to establish American hegemony in Asia. China’s Premier Zhu Rongji declared that it had not really mattered which American candidate won because both were no good. The notion that Clinton/Gore were statesmen disappeared. Once again China bashed America in the poisonous way that had won the condemnation of the US secretary of defence in July 2000. The head of Qinghua University’s Institute of International Studies in Beijing, Yan Xuetong, someone close to senior leaders, warned that if Bush continued Clinton’s policy on cross-straits relations of ambiguity, this would ‘add to the likelihood of Washington being dragged into the clashes’. Indeed, that ambiguity—not Taiwan President Lee’s visit to Cornell—was held responsible for China’s March 1996 ‘military confrontation’ with America in the Taiwan Straits. If Bush did not change, if he did not stop meaningful arms sales to Taiwan to balance China, ‘the possibility of the United States being dragged into cross-Straits clashes will be enormous’. Yan demanded that America allow China to intimidate Taiwan, that Washington end its policy where ‘Every time the mainland makes headway in military modernization, Washington sells modern weapons to Taiwan’.18 America had no right to help Taiwan defend itself or to deter Chinese attack. This threatening posture from Beijing makes clear that the real problem in cross-straits relations is in the balance of political forces in China and not in who is the president of the United States. The big question remains how far China will go in its effort to re-establish its predominance in the Western Pacific region, whether or how it will use its military to bully Taiwan. Given the continuing challenges that painfully bedevil China and the chauvinistic sentiment in China which has latched on to a new left anti-Western world view, it is not obvious that reformers in China will invariably have their way.

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In this rising nationalism, the PRC asserts that the deepest wish of all the Chinese people, including those on Taiwan, is reunification. Taiwan President Chen is then portrayed as obdurate for rejecting the one-China principle, the insistence that Taiwan be a local government of a state whose ruling group is the CCP in Beijing. America is blamed for selling arms to Taiwan in supposed contravention of a 1982 agreement, making Taiwan believe it need not concede to Beijing. A China seeking peace claims to confront forces courting war. Beijing concludes it may have to defend its sovereign claim to Taiwan by attacking Taiwan. The United Nations Charter does, as Beijing claims, recognise a right to use force in self-defence. That right, however, is defined as a response to a prior armed attack. But no nation is preparing a pre-emptive strike against China. The Chinese nation is more secure than ever before in the modern era. Yet it openly threatens Taiwan with a resort to military force and prepares for such a war,19 a threat to regional peace. Is it reasonable to expect Taiwan, which is vulnerable to attack from a nuclear-armed, missile-happy rising China of 1.3 billion people to disarm when confronted by such a danger? The 1982 agreement between America and the PRC includes a US promise to decrease arms sales to Taiwan as peaceful conditions in the region warrant. But since 1995 and 1996 PRC military exercises against Taiwan, Beijing regularly threatens Taiwan with attack and builds a force across from Taiwan capable of attack. Exercises for an invasion took place in the summer of 2001. That China-created threat compels America to provide arms to help Taiwan deter the threat and leads America to strengthen alliance planning with Japan on how to act in case of unprovoked Chinese attack. However, the Chinese have been socialised to imagine themselves as always a victim of foreign aggression, never an instigator or aggressor. Chinese history is taught to omit not only the numerous, bloody, northern wars of conquest and incorporation of the south, but also to omit Chinese aggression such as the Ming dynasty invasion of Vietnam and the slaughter of seven million Vietnamese or the Qing dynasty gunpowder empire expansion to the west that included the annihilation of the Zunghar Mongols and the extermination of millions of Muslims. Others see China as a normal nation,20 a large and powerful country because it expanded overland by conquest, as have all large nations, America, Russia, Brazil, etc. But Chinese imagine themselves as unique. The laws of historical development are believed to exempt Chinese. While everyone knows how ridiculous it is when the French explain their imperialist expansion as a civilising mission, Chinese expect others to


take seriously their similar story of imperial growth as the peaceful spread of a superior civilisation sought by others. Whereas Showa era imperial ambitions have long left Japanese hearts and minds, Qing dynasty imperial ambitions beat strongly in the hearts of today’s Chinese patriots. While it is wise for America, Taiwan and Japan to continue policies of engaging China, hoping to strengthen the entrenched power of interests in China that prefer peace to war,21 increasingly Chinese leaders may be backing themselves into a corner out of which the only escape may become, in their view, war. This poisonous web began to be woven in 1978–1979, with new paramount leader Deng Xiaoping making a top priority of resolving the Taiwan problem by making Taiwan part of a Chinese fatherland whose salvation was the CCP. The Taiwan issue then became central to the Beijing regime’s nationalistic legitimacy. Then in 1995, after Taiwan did not respondpositively to President Jiang’s eight point offer, Jiang was attacked as too soft on Taiwan. After that, there have been few if any soft-liners in Beijing power circles on Taiwan policy, only degrees of hardness. In the context of Hong Kong’s and then Macau’s retrocession to the PRC, and stimulated by Taiwan President Lee’s July 1999 insistence on ‘special state-to-state relations’, Beijing leaders, feeling that time was not on their side, began to discuss a date certain when the Taiwan issue would have to be resolved. Analysts who contend that none of this militarisation of Taiwan policy by China, mobilisation of patriotic support for military action and locking the Beijing leadership into a date certain for military action makes China a threat, instead reason that the PLA is merely playing a role in a script to prevent Taiwan’s leaders from declaring independence or that the actual military balance precludes military action no matter what Beijing military leaders threaten or that the Chinese military is merely using the nationalistic atmosphere of Chinese politics to pressure Party leaders to raise their budgets or that the civilian leaders in Beijing still have economic priorities but are utilising the military to raise nationalistic feelings required both for national unity and for a stable economic transition through a difficult and painful era of reform. There may well be a piece of truth in each and every one of these apologies. But it is inconceivable that China’s threatening policy statements and the chauvinistic political atmosphere that magnifies the threats combined with military purchases to make the threats credible do not infuse the policy discourse in Beijing.

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Ruling groups in Beijing regard America’s Taiwan deterrent as a threat to China’s sovereignty. They imagine themselves as defending against a foreign threat to a great and united China. They believe that only traitors would not respond to this alien threat. It matters to them not a whit that no nation, not America, Japan or Taiwan, harbours any interest in military action against China. Chinese patriots have imagined their Chineseness in a way that makes them feel threatened. Increasingly, the maintenance of the peaceful status quo is treated by analysts such as Yan Xuetong as a cause of war. To the Chinese leadership, China is patient but Taiwan is obdurate and traitorous. Feeling innocent and pure, Chinese see their war preparations as the fault of Taiwan and its supporters. One can only hope that cooler heads will prevail in China when some leaders argue that it is time at last to take military action against Taiwan or its American guarantor. It is almost a certainty that such moments and debates will occur. In contrast, Beijing’s moderate reformers, China’s peace camp hopes to win Taiwan without a war. Reformers hope that peace in the Korean Peninsula will lead Seoul to request that the US remove its military from Korea. Beijing’s peace camp also hopes that a warming of economic relations between Tokyo and Beijing will combine with pressure from China’s friends in Asia to compel Japan, too, to ask America to remove its bases from Japan. The doves want America out and Taiwan isolated, peacefully. They believe time is on China’s side such that Beijing need not precipitate a military conflict. Many in the south believe war would be a disaster for China. One hears the slogan that Beijing is the war camp, Shanghai the peace camp and Xiamen the surrender camp. Some analysts even in the north fear that a Chinese confrontation with America over Taiwan would take China down the Russian path to heavy military expenditures, economic weakness and national disintegration. Some analysts on Taiwan agree, hoping that Beijing will spark a war with Taiwan that will lead to the disintegration of the PRC, as the USSR and Yugoslavia before it. Some in the US military hope for a war so that there will be a pretext to destroy the Chinese navy and secure the Western Pacific for the USA for another generation. As a British analyst put it, ‘there is a real fear in Europe that if Beijing overplays its hand, Mr. Bush will bow further to the hard-line conservatives in his administration who believe it is America’s destiny and duty to confront China’s regime’.22


Even China’s peace prone forces are increasingly captured by rising super-patriotic expectations. They have to promise other leaders not only great benefit to China from avoiding war with Taiwan, but also that Taiwan can be pressured to accept a status within one China almost as passive and submissive as Hong Kong. They argue that Taiwan already is growing economically dependent on China, that the forces of history are on China’s side. Taiwanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the PRC is somewhere in the range of US$40–70 billion. The future prosperity of Taiwan business so greatly requires Chinese co-operation that, over time, Taiwan tycoons, as Hong Kong tycoons earlier, will have to act, in this Chinese perspective, as Chinese ‘patriots’ to protect their business interests. They will be compelled to support Beijing’s one China principle. Even Taiwanese President Chen is said to be making concessions he once opposed. He is already allowing Taiwan banks and insurance firms into China. Electronics and IT are already there. The three direct links and World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership for both Beijing and Taipei will, it is claimed, intensify Taiwan’s dependence on China. There is, after all, no way for Taiwan to achieve its goal of becoming a regional service hub in East Asia except for China to allow it. China increasingly will call the shots. Already China takes 20 per cent of Taiwan’s exports. The economic rise of China, therefore, must bring with it the economic subordination of Taiwan, as the peace prone forces in China see the evolving situation. This inevitable gradual surrender of Taiwan is symbolised by the joint venture in semiconductors in Shanghai which makes partners of the son of the president of China and the son of the billionaire head of Formosa Plastics. Even Taiwan’s Stan Shih and his Acer computer firm had to flee from ties to President Chen in order to win further life and death access to China. Beijing has grown confident it can isolate Taiwanese President Chen such that Chen’s successor in 2004 will be willing to concede to Beijing. Beijing ruling groups could in 2000–2001 see President Jiang’s policy of carrots and sticks as a success. Beijing therefore can believe that its political stick—not a military one— for beating President Chen as insincere will drive his DPP from office. Beijing can believe that its carrots and sticks are bringing to power in Taiwan a coalition that will concede to China Taiwan’s subordination in terms of a ‘one China principle’. Yet because Chinese diplomats are flexible and interested in peace with Taiwan, they have already tried to get a bit away from the one China principle, a formula which is unacceptable to

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Taiwanese, and to begin to discuss a China composed of two political entities, the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Ironically, the forces of engagement in Taiwan, America and Japan have to bet on China’s peace policies and ally with them. That is, partisans of peace have to hope that the outcome of China’s relative economic integration with Taiwan will be more global and regional interdependence, not Taiwan dependence, that the result will be the strengthening of China’s forces of peace and co-operation, not the surrender and subordination of Taiwan to a military-oriented China. It is a bet that business enterprise in Taiwan is not as craven or as stupid as some in China hope and others on Taiwan fear. Beijing seems unprepared for a Chen re-election in 2004 or the rise of his party to become the largest on Taiwan in the 2001 legislative election. Can Beijing move from isolating President Chen to dealing with him, to seeing that he wants to compromise and make a deal with China? A force in Beijing politics that may undermine the peace project is China’s new left. There could develop a backlash in China leading ruling groups in Beijing to turn against reform, openness and global integration, to turn towards political survival premised on a legitimation based on militarily protecting a pure, unique and treasured Chineseness. Already in 2000–2001, reformers had to accept that chaos was such a threat to stability that retrenchment had to come before reform. People grow nostalgic about (and also suffer amnesia over) the orderly, stable Mao era. In such an atmosphere, an autonomous Taiwan—or WTO disorders or untoward political events on Taiwan—could be defined as an alien threat to China’s survival, a cancer that must be removed. This new left began as a mere academic current of a few scholars who disliked some of the nastier, unintended consequences of reform. The new left understood these pains as the essence of capitalist modernisation, a bad but inevitable system outcome—caused by Deng Xiaoping’s programme of reform and openness, not, as they actually were, results of a difficult transition away from Leninist economic irrationality. The new left used the language of post-colonialism and postmodernism to embrace Mao Zedong’s anti-capitalist project as a superior alternative to polarizing capitalist inhumanity. While this rebirth of Maoism was appalling to Chinese liberals who hoped instead for an evolution into a more pluralist, tolerant, open and dynamic China, it was appealing to some conservative opponents of reform. They co-opted the new left and used it to bash openness as surrender, supposedly turning China into a dependency of American


hegemony and world capitalism, a loss of all the gains of an equalizing socialist revolution. The new left began to sound much like third world theorists of the 1970s and 1980s who chose to delink their economies from the wealth-expanding forces of technological progress, thereby wounding their nation, locking their people into stagnant misery and statist corruption, a pure, independent national security state.23 But as brutal corruption and inequality have deepened, new forces joined this expanding new left coalition. Rejecting die contention of liberals that China’s ills were the inevitable outcome of the inherited Leninist political-economic system which could only be imploded by a fuller embrace of the market and a policy commitment to very gradual democratisation, these new joiners of the surging new left argued that China’s pains were the consequence of reform and openness, that China should make an anti-reform grappling with supposedly concomitant inequality and social injustice a top priority. The analysis was popularly appealing. Much wise commentary on corruption and inequities followed, such that the new left coalition gained great prestige. Liberals were seen by many as insensitive to the pains of reform in their championing of the market. A similar re-legitimation has strengthened communist parties in democratic Eastern Europe.24 After the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by an American plane in May 1999 ignited widespread Chinese outrage, the new left became a movement with mass support. Chinese of the new left, as in the Mao era, rejected the value of joining an international order defined by the enemy. They want a uniquely Chinese path ahead. Indiginisation was preferable to globalisation and the WTO. This is the political sentiment that Mao too had mobilised in his self-wounding commitment to an alternative to capitalist modernity. Chauvinism of a militarist sort infused the new left coalition, bringing it adherents even in China’s military and security forces who disliked openness and reform, policies supposedly of compromising with the enemy of China. The new left has become large, diverse and complex. Some few, brave and perceptive intellectuals have expressed their anxieties about the threat dynamising new left chauvinism. Neoconservative Xiao Gongqin sees a strengthening in China of forces favouring survivalist closed-door policies that make possible a ‘reenactment of the rise of twentieth century leftism in twenty-first century China’. Professor Xiao fears this prevalent irrational nationalism will lead ‘the Chinese nation to lose its direction of modernisation…

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opening-up, and calm rational thinking, thus leading to uncivilised irrationalism’.25 In like manner, but from the liberal end of the Chinese political spectrum, Zhu Xueqin finds in China a resurgence of ‘leftist xenophobia’, a’fanatical nationalism’ which links up politically with a massive populism, facilitating a turn towards and return to the left. The liberal Zhu understates his anxieties for a China returning to self-wounding radical ways, producing ‘serious chronic fits…bringing more burdensome historical costs’. If I may use a more standard and transparent political vocabulary, the shared concern of the conservative Xiao and the liberal Zhu is of a rise, as in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s, of a rightist, racist, authoritarian, militarist, fascist-tending regime. They also see why such a politics can be very popular in China. A Chinese debate, since 1999, over joining the WTO has won new support for the surging new left coalition from people worried that globalisation will intensify unemployment, bankruptcy and social turmoil. While all international integration is always a compromise that only brings partial integration and includes protecting some vulnerable domestic interests, while no nation ever simply opens up to outside forces, what was at issue in China was not how China too should make its compromises but an ideological assault on globalisation as an American plot to subvert and weaken China and prevent its return to greatness. Fear of seeing the Chinese nation victimised yet again blinds many Chinese to the palpable reality that China has been a uniquely successful beneficiary of globalisation. However, voices of fear may drown out voices of hope. Liberals advocating marketisation, the theories of Hayek and neo-liberalism were discredited for not focusing on the need for a strong state capacity to build a social safety net, protect China’s vulnerable people and promote sunrise industries. The liberal discourse did not seem populistically patriotic, as the dominant discourse required. As with the popular new left insistence on dealing with inequality, here too, shrewd explorations of how China should protect itself from things like volatile, short term capital which so injured Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea starting in July 1997 served the cause of a chauvinistic new left opposition to more financial reform and openness, thereby decreasing the room for maneuver of the reformist leadership, turning the dominant discourse on board the Chinese ship of state yet further in a right, populist authoritarian direction.


New left chauvinism infuses policy towards Taiwan. Chinese super patriots who concern themselves with cross-straits relations see Taiwan from the perspective of the dying cultural right wing of the opposition New Party in Taiwan. President Jiang has allied with this isolated element on Taiwan. He as they hate the notion of Taiwanese civilisation. They identify with an eventual unity of a great Chinese civilisation. They see Taiwanese patriots, President Lee and Chen, as race traitors. Beijing will not accept the notion of a Taiwan identity. The stage could be set in China for Taiwan’s President Chen to be stigmatised and for American arms sales to be held responsible for an unacceptably independent and democratic Taiwan, portrayed in the PRC as corrupt and chaotic, an alien essence and a foreign (American, Japanese) dependency, protected, if China does not act soon, supposedly by an American National Missile Defence (NMD), with a TMD including Taiwan and with Aegis antimissile destroyer sales to Taiwan. Actually, here too, President Bush is not breaking away from Clinton policies. As the British Chief of Defence Staff General Sir Charles Guthrie pointed out on NMD, ‘President Clinton was going to do it and President Bush says he’s going to do it’.27 That is, there is in the United States a broad consensus on policy towards China and Taiwan. Whatever Bush decides on these issues, there is little reason to believe that Gore would have decided otherwise. Neither would seek a confrontation with China. Both would pursue a policy of engagement with China including crossstraits talks, that is, should the Chinese side allow it. But Beijing’s chauvinism, as expressed by Yan Xuetong, expects more on Taiwan. The big question is how Beijing politics will work when it does not get the surrender it wants. Taipei seems sanguine, persuaded that after all the bluster, threats and military build-up, China cannot afford to abandon a peace policy that privileges international economic relations because China’s economic rise is the basis for social stability in the PRC and a Chinese return to greatness. China’s rise is impossible without good economic relations with its Asian neighbours and with America. But the first priority of people in power is to stay in power. Even the peace forces in Beijing have been compelled by China’s super-chauvinist political atmosphere to promise changes in Taiwan that will probably not happen. What then? The politics that could emerge from such a confluence of expectations and frustrations in China might endanger the peace and prosperity of the region. But the threat would not emanate from democratic presidential

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politics in America or from Taiwan democracy but from the nondemocratic politics of a wounded and worried China where the legitimating logic of new left chauvinism could yet produce a threat to the peace and prosperity of the region. For the longest time, from 1950 into the 1990s, the government of Japan did not accept the Washington view of a threat from China to Taiwan and the region. China under Mao seemed in Tokyo to be weak and poor. And China under Deng Xiaoping seemed willing to conciliate its neighbours in order to facilitate success in economic growth, China’s top priority. But Deng’s policy of respecting the present status of Taiwan and not mentioning the liberation of Taiwan, a policy of peaceful reunification, was transformed under Jiang Zemin into a policy of ‘positive defence’ which requires China to present itself to Taiwan as a threat so Taiwan will concede. In the 1990s, China militarised the Taiwan issue. Leaders increasingly give voice to an emotional nationalism that demands an immediate reunification of Taiwan and compels China to purchase the weaponry to accomplish the task of seizing Taiwan, including the deterrence of American action on behalf of Taiwan’s security. That policy focus has become the main military mission of the PLA. The Japanese therefore have become worried about this new Chinese threat to the peace and prosperity of the region. Popular attitudes in Japan towards China have changed. Tokyo has strengthened its security alliance with America because of anxiety about a Chinese threat. The China threat, however, is not a sufficient reason for America, Taiwan or Japan to abandon peace-prone policies of constructive engagement with China. It must bet on peace forces in China which believe time is on their side. Given future uncertainties and the debates within Chinese politics, it is still everyone’s best hope to bet on the strength of the forces of peace. But political vicissitudes in Beijing compel actors in the region to be quietly vigilant. Unfortunately, new left chauvinists in China and their conservative allies could well interpret such quiet vigilance as more than a threat to China, as, in fact, a provocation and even a spark to and legitimation of Chinese military action against Taiwan. Talks and understandings, not waiting for Taiwan to surrender, are needed because otherwise a threatening Chinese discourse could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is the threat to the peace to be avoided and thwarted.


Notes 1 Beijing’s image was captured by the picture of the powerless individual standing and trying to block the advance of a row of tanks, whereas Moscow’s change from Cold War adversary is depicted by the happy people dismantling the Berlin Wall. 2 “Top US official attacks cross-straight strategy”, South China Morning Post, 19 January 2001. 3 Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995–1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999). 4 For critical views of Clinton era China policy, see James Mann, About Face (New York: Knopf, 1999), and Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New York:, The Century Foundation, 1999). 5 According to Mann, ‘Recently declassified records show… Kissinger pledged that the United States would not support independence for Taiwan… What Kissinger told Chou…contradicted the official position of the U.S. government…that sovereignty over Taiwan was “an unsettled question subject to further international resolution”. According to Holdridge Kissinger said “no two Chinas; no one China, one Taiwan; no independent Taiwan”’. These are the three no’s surrendered by Kissinger without Zhou Enlai asking. See Mann, About Face, op. cit., p. 33. 6 Taipei Times, 13 February 2001. 7 Michael Parrish, “Soviet Espionage and the Cold War”, Diplomatic History 25, no.1 (winter 2001), p. 117. 8 Edward Friedman, “The Prospects of a Larger War: Chinese Nationalism and the Taiwan Strait Conflict,” in Zhao, Across the Taiwan Strait, op. cit., pp. 243–275. 9 Edward Friedman, “Post-Deng, China’s Right Populist Authoritarian Foreign Policy,” in Lai Chung-ming and Jiunfa Shen (eds.), China Review 2000 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2000) chapter one. 10 Yan Xuetong, “Peace must top Bush’s Taiwan policy,” China Daily, 1 January 2001. 11 Orville Schell, “Why are Sino-US Relations so different?”, San Francisco Chronicle, 8 April 2001 12 Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 13 Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (eds.), Engaging China (New York: Routledge, 1999). 14 Lien-Ho Bao (United Daily), 14 January 2001. 15 Xue Fukang, “What steps will the Bush administration take in China policy in 2001?”, Guangming Ribao, 29 December 2000, translated by FBIS. 16 Japan Times, 10 January 2001. 17 Xi Laiwang, “Trend of Bush’s China policy”, Zhongguo Pinglun, 1 March 2001, translated by FBIS. 18 Yan, “Peace must top”, op. cit. 19 You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (London: I.B.Tauris, 1999). Analysts differ about whether military influence is increasing in Zhongnanhai.

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20 Charles Horner, “China and the Historians”, National Interest, Spring 2001, pp. 86–96. 21 Edward Friedman and Barrett McCormack Jr. (eds.), What if China Doesn’t Democratize? Implications for War and Peace (New York: Routledge, 2000). Ted Carpenter and James Dorn (eds.), China’s Future (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2000). 22 Philip Stephens, “Bush’s principles get stretched,” Financial Times, 6 April 2001. 23 Ben Xu, “Postmodern-Postcolonial Criticism and Pro-Democracy Ben Xu, Enlightenment”, Modern China 27, no.1 (2001), pp. 117–147. 24 One could argue that this East European outcome suggests that the CCP One could argue that this East E could win democratic elections. 25 Xiao Gongqin, “Nationalism and Ideological Polarization at the Turn of the Century”, China Affairs 1, no.1 (spring 2000), pp. 97–98. 26 Zhu Xueqin, “The Spiritual ‘Foci of Infection’ since the May Fourth Movement,” in ibid., pp. 107, 108. 27 John Deane, “US determined to go ahead with ‘son of Star Wars’,” PA News, 11 February 2001.

CHAPTER FOUR Russian Perceptions of the China Threat

Alexander Lukin Introduction The influence of public opinion in a country about the conduct of foreign policy, be it the perceptions of the mass public or the beliefs of the political and academic elite, has been a legitimate and important branch of the study of foreign relations since the time of Walter Lippmann.1 Mutual perceptions play an especially important role in bilateral relations between neighbours with long and complicated histories, and Russia and China surely belong to this category. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent political changes in Russia make an understanding of perceptions even more important because democratisation has given the mass public, and especially various elites, an opportunity to express their views—including those on foreign policy—through such means as elections, lobbying and the mass media. For centuries the image of China has played an important role in Russian thought. While influencing foreign policy concepts, China (sometimes as part of a wider notion of ‘the East’) has played a more general role as a reference point for Russian thinking about Russia itself, its place in the world, its future and the essence of ‘Russianness’. A study of the evolution of Russia’s image of China, including Russian perceptions of the China threat, is important from both a theoretical and practical point of view. As a case study of an element of Russian political culture, it can contribute to discussion about the problems of continuity and change in Russian politics. In practical terms not only can this research help clarify Russia’s current intentions and expectations, but it can help predict Russia’s future foreign policy actions, as well as shed some light on future developments in Northeast Asia.

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Nineteenth Century Russian Views of the ‘Yellow Peril’ Although contacts between Russia and China had already existed for hundreds of years, a comprehensive image of China only began to emerge in Russia during the eighteenth century. However, until the mid eighteenth century China was not perceived as posing a military or political threat. Russia was too strong, China was too distant, and occasional clashes between Russian and Chinese forces in the Far East were not regarded as a major problem in Russia. However, in Russian intellectual circles, especially among those intellectuals who believed in a European model for Russia (the so called Zapadniki or Westernisers), China was perceived as a symbolic cultural antipode and a challenge to Western civilisation. This image played a role in Russian political discussions and was greatly influenced by the Enlightenment view which divided the world into the progressive West and the stagnant East. During the eighteenth century, the official Russian view was that Russia itself was an enlightened European country which was bringing civilisation to the East. This view was developed in the writings of nineteenth century Westerners who argued that China did not have a civilisation or culture in the real, European sense, and that it was politically and socially stagnant. By the end of the nineteenth century, China had become both a theoretical and an acute political problem for Russia. The rapid development of Russia’s Far East provinces, which was greatly stimulated by the building of the Trans-Siberian railway, including the portion which went through Chinese territory (the Chinese Eastern Railway), and the emergence of several Russian settlements including the city of Harbin in this area, the deployment of Russian troops in Manchuria during the Boxer Rebellion, and the establishment of a Russian naval base in Port Arthur—all these measures were taken partly as a result of strategic concerns. It was thought that if Russia did not penetrate further into China, then other major powers would do so and undermine Russia’s position. At that time, Russian threat perceptions were mainly focused on a rising Japan, not on China which was militarily weak. However, in various circles of Russian society there existed another fear: Chinese ethnic expansion and the ‘Sinofication’ of Russian territories in the Far East. The Russian government reacted to such worries. The government of Petr Stolypin, for example, approved measures guaranteeing Russian

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peasants certain privileges and advantages in order to stimulate Russian migration to the Far East. While these measures were adopted as a part of Stolypin’s policy of weakening the communal use of land in central Russia and encouraging the development of private land ownership, strategic considerations also played an important role. Speaking in the State Duma on the situation in the Far East in 1908, Stolypin argued: Nature does not tolerate emptiness… Our distant and stern border territory is at the same time rich—rich with gold, wood, fur and vast spaces good for agriculture. And under these circumstances, gentlemen, having a densely populated country as our neighbour, this border territory will not stay deserted. The foreigner will penetrate it unless the Russian comes there before him, and this penetration has already begun. If we are lethargic, the area will become saturated with alien saps and when we awake it may already be Russian in name only.2 As a result of these measures, more and more Russians gradually settled in the Far East. From 1900 to 1908, 172,000 peasants from the European part of Russia migrated to the Far East provinces.3 In addition, the government also adopted some anti-immigration measures. A 1910 law banned the hiring of foreign nationals for public works. However, despite these measures the number of Chinese in Russia continued to grow, as workers were still hired by private companies. Between 1910 and 1914, the Chinese population in the Russian Far East grew to 80,000– 100,000, the majority of whom resided in the Maritime and Amur regions. Perceptions of a China Threat in the Soviet Era After the creation of the Soviet Union in 1917, relations with China played an important role in Moscow’s foreign policy. However, until the split with communist China in the 1960s, China was not perceived as a major threat. A number of clashes with the weak army of the northeastern warlords over the ownership of the China Eastern Railway took place in the late 1920s. However, this army (dubbed by official Soviet propaganda as ‘white-Chinese’) were seen at the time as part of the worldwide struggle between the progressive pro-communist and regressive anti-communist forces which did not represent China as a whole. In 1937, Joseph Stalin cleansed the Soviet Far East of its Korean

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and Chinese populations (most Koreans were relocated to Kazakhstan whilst the Chinese were sent back to China). There was no official explanation for this action, but in view of Stalin’s other policies, it is reasonable to assume that it was to get rid of potential ‘fifth columnists’ in case of war with Japan. China itself, with most of its territory occupied by Japan, could hardly be seen as a threat at that time. In 1950 the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) entered an alliance directed against the United States. Although relations between the two countries gradually worsened after the death of Stalin in 1953, Moscow officially saw Beijing as a close ally until the first half of the 1960s. However, by the end of the 1960s the Soviet Union viewed China as a bitter enemy, and Moscow began to prepare for a major war with its former ally. Soviet fears of a major war with China became especially acute after the bloody border clashes of 1969. From that time on, official Soviet theorists began to view the PRC as a threat to world peace, and a large Soviet military group was deployed in the Soviet Far East. The fear of conflict with China was not just propaganda. There are numerous indications that in the late 1960s and early 1970s the idea of a China threat had spread throughout educated Russian society. Official propaganda heavily influenced the views of many Russians, some of whom began to rethink nineteenth century fears in a new context. The fear of China as a strong military power which was preparing to invade underpopulated areas of Siberia and the Soviet Far East became commonplace among Soviet intellectuals not necessarily sympathetic to the Kremlin authorities. Independent opinion polls were not conducted in the Soviet Union at that time, so it is hard to gauge the true intensity and extent of these feelings. However, there are some indirect indications of their role. For example, these views were expressed not just in official propaganda materials, but also in the banned writings of many dissidents that were not affected by censorship. According to dissident historian Roy Medvedev, the danger of total war with China at the end of the 1970s ‘alarmed Soviet dissidents and occupied an important place in their thinking, as well as in their letters and articles’.4 One representative essay of this kind was Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984? by dissident historian Andrei Amalrik. Amalrik’s manuscript was disseminated in Moscow in 1969, the year of the Sino-Soviet border clash, and was later published abroad. Amalrik is remembered today for his prediction that the Soviet Union would collapse as a result of dissatisfaction from the newly educated middle class which the government was deliberately creating in order to develop the science and


technology necessary for maintaining a strong military force. However, it is not often mentioned that, in Amalrik’s view, the Soviet Empire would disintegrate as a result of a coming war with the PRC.5 The image of China in dissident and non-official works reflected the mood that existed in the 1960s and 1970s among the Soviet intellectual elite. Naturally, Communist Party officials were not immune from these feelings. For example, academician Georgy Arbatov, who was close to the country’s leadership and worked for the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee International Department in 1964–1967, acknowledged that although later, on the basis of new information, he understood that neither the PRC nor the Soviet Union planned a military attack on each other in the 1960s, at that time ‘we lived with the fear and danger of a military conflict… We faced a combination of real political threats and our fear and ignorance of what was going on in China. This pushed our diplomatic crisis onto centre stage in the minds of both politicians and the public’.6 The Sino-Soviet conflict not only had a profound impact on the Soviet elite’s world-view, but on Soviet intellectuals as a whole. Moreover, perhaps for the first time in the history of Russian-Chinese relations, the awareness of the danger of having a vast, densely populated and hostile neighbour in the east permeated public opinion, not only in the border areas, but over the entire country. Communist Party Conservatives and the ‘Chinese Threat to Socialism’ Political stabilisation and the beginning of economic reforms in China during the late 1970s created a new situation for Soviet China watchers. Official groups maintained that the new Chinese leaders were merely continuing Mao Zedong’s anti-Soviet policies and therefore remained a threat. The indisputable leader of this school of thought was the deputy head of the Department of the Cental Committee, Oleg Rakhmanin. Rakhmanin’s group was closely connected with the military-industrial complex which had a vested interest in maintaining fears of a Chinese threat because it helped to insure permanent increases in defence spending. Proponents of this group argued that Deng Xiaoping’s economic and political reforms had failed to change the anti-Marxist character of the Chinese regime. Major supporters of Rakhmanin included his direct subordinates in the department, Mikhail Titarenko and Boris Kulik; the high ranking diplomat Mikhail Kapitsa (who in 1982

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was appointed deputy foreign minister); most of the China experts at the Institute of the Far East of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (IDV), including its director, Mikhail Sladkovsky; the influential senior diplomat and academic Sergey Tikhvinsky (who at the time headed the official Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society), and others. They defined the new Chinese leadership’s course not as ‘leftist’ (as Mao’s policy was usually labelled), but as ‘right-wing Maoist’. In Soviet newspeak this meant that the Chinese leaders were doubly wrong: first, by being rightists and deviating from the correct mainstream socialist course, and second, by being Maoist—that is non-Marxist. The fact that they had previously defined Maoism as a form of ‘leftism’ was not seen as a contradiction. They argued that ‘the right nationalist forces in the Chinese leadership intend stubbornly to follow the old and trite route of Maoism’,7 that Beijing had entirely gone over ‘to the position of imperialism’8 and, moreover, ‘Beijing’s foreign policy [had] entered a new stage, which is even more hostile to the forces of peace, democracy, and socialism and more dangerous for them’ .9 However, when Mikhail Gorbachov assumed power in 1985 and initiated wide-ranging political and economic reforms, this anti-Chinese group lost influence. Gorbachev’s leadership wanted to improve relations with both China and the West, thus creating stable conditions for internal reforms. Moscow was also interested in China’s experience of economic reforms. Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing in May 1989 signalled that China was no longer perceived as a threat. Post-Soviet Fears of China in the Russian Far East The Rise and Fall of Border Trade Following the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989, the prospects for economic co-operation were met with great enthusiasm in Russia’s border regions with China. Both local elites and the population in general hoped to take advantage of their close proximity to China, and to gain from the development of border trade and direct contact with the authorities and businesses of neighbouring Chinese provinces. This interaction flourished during the final years of the Soviet Union because visa restrictions were relaxed. This had the effect of opening the border which had been closed for decades. After the signing of a bilateral agreement in 1992, companies in the Russian Far East (RFE), with the approval of local authorities, began to hire Chinese contract workers.10


However, Russian enthusiasm for trade with China soon changed to apprehension. There were several reasons for this growing scepticism. First, after the intitial inflow of Chinese goods was followed by the growth of imports from other countries, people in the RFE began to appreciate the superior quality of Japanese, South Korean and American products, and the higher professional standards of businessmen from these and other countries. Second, the uncontrolled flow of Chinese traders and labourers, some of whom stayed in Russia for extended periods of time or even settled there, revived old fears of the Sinofication of the under-populated Far Eastern regions. Third, local administrations, for internal political reasons, began a fierce campaign against the RussianChinese border agreement. The local media was filled with news and commentary devoted to these problems, and every local politician had to formulate a clear position on them. Anti-Chinese feelings in the RFE grew steadily. Articles in the local press reported that the original enthusiasm for co-operation with China had now been replaced with disillusionment, that Russians were tired of turning a blind eye to their Chinese business partners’ practices and at the low quality of Chinese goods, and that now Russians preferred products from other countries even though they were often more expensive. An article in a Vladivostok newspaper entitled ‘The love of things Chinese has passed’ argued that Russians had now acquired an allergy to everything Chinese.11 The Question of ‘Demographic Expansion’ Flourishing cross-border trade led to a growing Chinese presence in the border areas, and this precipitated fears among the local population of a Chinese ‘demographic expansion’. Local newspapers and even academic journals began publishing articles which argued that China, under the guise of economic co-operation, was pursuing a deliberate policy of resettling its surplus population from its northeastern provinces to the RFE and Siberia. This policy was allegedly aimed at solving China’s unemployment and overpopulation problems at the expense of Russian labourers. It was also claimed that this policy was intended to create the conditions necessary for China to claim those territories which, according to the Chinese, had belonged to China before 1860. To achieve this aim the Chinese allegedly used false tourist trips (during which they did not return to China but settled in Russia), fake invitations from Russian universities, and fake marriages in order to get residency permits. It was

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claimed that the Chinese authorities either at the provincial or even ministerial level had adopted a programme of establishing Chinese towns and villages in Russian territory. Furthermore, it was alleged that Chinese joint ventures were controlled by the Chinese secret service and organised crime syndicates who supposedly used Russian shell companies to buy up Russian businesses, real estate and land in order to further China’s national interests.12 Far Eastern specialists criticised virtually any co- operative project that required a Chinese presence on Russian soil. The United Nations-backed Tunmen development project, located where the Russian, Chinese and North Korean borders meet (and which was supported by many Moscow specialists) came under particularly strong criticism in the Maritime Territory, since its creation would ‘significantly change the ethnic composition of the population of the [Territory]’, jeopardise Russian economic and political interests, ‘unavoidably leading to chaos and a loss by the Maritime Territory of its Russian appearance’.13 Former Maritime Territory Governor Yevgeny Nazdratenko severely criticised the project and lobbied against it.14 Far Eastern demographers feared that the decrease in the population of the RFE, which had resulted from the movement of people to central Russia in order to escape economic and climatic hardships, made the region insecure. They pointed out that in 1993 the total population of the RFE was less than eight million and was steadily decreasing, while the combined population of the three neighbouring northeastern provinces of China exceeded 100 million and was growing fast. Since the Chinese authorities were thought to be encouraging migration to Russia in order to solve their economic and social problems, this situation was perceived as a threat. Far Eastern newspapers often provided contradictory and obviously exaggerated figures of the Chinese population of the RFE (from tens of thousand to hundreds of thousands and even a million), which were not usually based on reliable sources. Real figures provided by the immigration service and border authorities were much lower and in any case the number of ethnic Chinese living in the RFE was nowhere near the number before 1937.15 While during the years of border openness the number of Chinese residents in the RFE naturally increased, no reliable evidence of an official Chinese plan of Sinofication of the Russian border areas has ever been revealed. Even the best documented articles on ‘Chinese expansion’ usually cited dubious data ‘provided by Russian special services’ (with no specific citation), certain Chinese secret documents (the existence of which could not be verified), interviews with


self-proclaimed members of the Chinese mafia, or articles in the Chinese press and academic journals which stated that the use of Chinese contract workers and the creation of Chinese rural settlements in the RFE could benefit the economies of both countries (which was surely true from a purely economic point of view). The belief that China had adopted a state programme of ‘moving to the north’ became broadly accepted in many of the border regions of Russia, both among elites and the wider population. According to one survey, 64 per cent of those polled in the southern RFE expressed fears of Chinese expansionism.16 This rhetoric was used by some regional leaders to improve their flagging popularity, which had been damaged by the deteriorating economic situation. In May 1994, Khabarovsk Territory Governor Viktor Ishaev argued that ‘today a covert Chinese expansion in the RFE is being perpetuated and it hurts and humiliates Russians’. His colleague, Governor Nazdratenko, claimed that among recent Chinese arrivals to his region there were ‘many criminals, sick people and drugaddicts’.17 An official document, issued by the Maritime Territory in 1997, stated that the RFE had always been seen as desirable territory by neighbouring countries, and that China was one of the main predators. The authors of the document believed that there existed both objective and subjective reasons for Chinese expansionism: first, Chinese demographic and ecological problems which were pushing the population north, and second, the official Chinese policy of encouraging the migration of Chinese people to neighbouring countries. According to the document, 25 per cent of Chinese who came to the Maritime Territory broke the law: ‘Chinese citizens create stable criminal groups, actively engage in criminal activities, encroach on Russia’s national wealth and create an intelligence infrastructure for operations against Russia’.18 The Maritime administration sponsored several publications which described the RFE as a besieged fortress surrounded by enemies, China being one of the most dangerous.19 Public opinion, and the fears of regional administrations, led to the introduction of stricter border crossing procedures. In January 1994, a visa system was reintroduced.20 Later that year several regional authorities adopted measures against illegal Chinese emigrants. In February 2000, new and even stricter border crossing procedures were agreed to with the Chinese side.21 These measures led to a significant decrease in the number of Chinese citizens travelling to Russia and also the number of Chinese residing in the RFE. Consequently cross border trade and co-operation declined sharply.22

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Feelings about Border Demarcation While negative feelings caused by the Chinese presence in the border regions originated, at least partly, from the public, local leaders exploited the border demarcation question to promote their own political agendas. In 1991 a treaty on border demarcation was signed between the Soviet Union and the PRC. By its terms, Russia and China were to exchange several areas of land, with Russia giving up slightly more than China. Two years later, the governors of the Khabarovsk and Maritime Territories launched a fierce campaign against the treaty. Khabarovsk Governor Viktor Ishaev expressed his dissatisfaction with the 1991 treaty which allowed Chinese ships, including military vessels, to sail along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers near the Khabarovsk side.23 In a letter to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in September 1993 he charged that the treaty had enabled the Chinese to violate Russian security, fishing and other rights. He alleged that in private conversations, Chinese officials were quite open about their aims: to end the Russian presence on the Bolshoi Ussuriisky and Tarabarov Islands. He urged the Russian leader to reject the 1991 border settlement and ban the Foreign Ministry from discussing any territorial questions connected to his region without the approval of the regional authorities, and to work out new rules for Chinese ships in the Amur.24 According to the treaty, the ‘competent authorities’ of both sides were to formulate specific maritime regulations. However, Ishaev believed they had been too slow in doing this, and that the Chinese had unilaterally introduced a system of authorisation for Chinese vessels to sail along the Amur in the Khabarovsk zone. Governor Nazdratenko openly swore that, contrary to the 1991 treaty, he would never allow the fifteen square kilometres of Maritime Territory land to be transferred to China. Nazdratenko claimed that this transfer would deal a serious blow to Russian interests and ‘break the balance of economic and political forces in the Asia-Pacific Region’ because the fact that these two pieces of land are controlled by Russia ‘make it impossible for China to build a major port here’.25 Therefore, according to Nazdratenko, ‘the transfer to the PRC of the strategically important section of the border in the Khasan area means the consequent death of Maritime ports and, in the not so distant future, Russia loosing its position in the Far East’. 26 In fact, the anti-Chinese rhetoric of regional administrations in the RFE stems mainly from their anti-Moscow rhetoric. However, the position of local leaders influences the local media and public opinion. The role of the defenders of local interests and the logic of fighting for the ‘territorial integrity of the region’ led regional authorities to adopt an increasingly


xenophobic and anti-Chinese stance. The Maritime and Khabarovsk press, obviously encouraged by the regional authorities, began warning of catastrophic consequences if Russia transferred land to the PRC. They described the Chinese as crafty opportunists who wanted to take advantage of Moscow’s lack of patriotism. Many local industrialists and newspapers supported Nazdratenko’s warnings that the transfer would give China access to the sea and an opportunity to build a port and a railroad through Kazakhstan to Europe, which would supposedly destroy the local RFE economy.27 Some argued that the Chinese had initiated the border talks because they had this insidious plan in mind all along.28 Others predicted that demands for the fifteen square kilometres were only a prelude to reviving much greater territorial claims that the Chinese government had never relinquished. Writers in Khabarovsk feared that, after obtaining the territories in accordance with the treaty, China would immediately demand the large islands of Bolshoi Ussuriisky and Tarabarov (which are controlled by Russia but claimed by China, and the status of which was deferred in the 1991 treaty) and the city of Khabarovsk itself, since Chinese often refer to it as ‘the former Chinese city of Boli’.29 Moreover, it was felt that any Russian concession to China would lead to territorial claims from Russia’s other neighbours.30 Some articles expressed the opinion that the transfer of land to China, which contained Russian graves and monuments to the 1939 Russo-Japan conflict and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clash, was a national disgrace.31 Expressing the dominant mood of the regional elite, a newspaper in Vladivostok concluded: ‘The transfer of land to another state is a national humiliation of all Russians and [represents] the digging of an economic grave for all residents of the Far East with our own hands’.32 Public Perceptions of China in the Russian Far East It would be wrong to conclude, however, that the attitudes towards China described above were unanimously accepted everywhere in the RFE and Siberia. Some local public figures, journalists, academics and businessmen interested in co-operation with China, and Russian diplomats working in Northeast China often challenged them. These people stressed the mutually beneficial character of Russian-Chinese economic co-operation and argued that Chinese trade fairs, new nonbarter forms of trade, and joint ventures played an important and positive role in the regional economy.33 They warned that if these

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negative perceptions persisted, the RFE would be marginalised in the developing Asia-Pacific region.34 They maintained that Chinese goods filled an important gap in the RFE market and despite their poor quality, were cheap and affordable to people with lower incomes. Despite massive anti-Chinese propaganda, the attitude of people in the RFE towards Chinese and foreign immigrants in general was not entirely negative. In 1992, 80 per cent of respondents in the southern part of the Maritime Territory agreed with the assertion that ‘It is not important what nationality my neighbour is, the main thing is that he should be a good person’.35 Despite some disillusionment with Chinese people, the image of China in the RFE was still quite positive. In the same poll, more than half of the respondents said that their general attitude towards China was ‘good’, while only 13 per cent admitted harbouring a ‘bad’ impression. The situation had not changed significantly by the end of the 1990s. In 1999 only a minority of respondents expressed concern over the influx of Chinese. Even in the Far East, where the authorities and the media had been inflating the Chinese threat for some time, the majority of people were not generally hostile towards the Chinese. While few people think that Chinese immigrants can help Russia’s economic development, many believe they play a positive role in the growth of local trade (see Table 4.1). At the same time, the difference in attitudes between the residents of Moscow and the RFE towards the Chinese led the authors of the study to the alarming conclusion; that ‘the more frequent and intensive the contacts of the local population with the Chinese, the less it is inclined to evaluate positively the immigrants’ character’.36 An earlier study conducted in 1992 showed that only 32 per cent of respondents in the southern part of the Maritime Territory thought ‘good’ of the Chinese people, while 23 per cent thought of them ‘negatively’ and 38 per cent were ‘indifferent’.37 On the whole, Russians living in the border areas do not have a very high opinion of the Chinese. The fact that people over sixty years old and supporters of the Russian communist party are most interested in friendship with China, while younger people prefer South Korea, the United States, Japan and Germany,38 shows that attitudes towards China in the region are still dependent on general ideology, and not on pragmatic considerations. It also demonstrates that China has not yet succeeded in persuading the most active and dynamic part of the Russian population that the PRC is a developing market economy free of an


ideological agenda, and that co-operation with China can bring real profit. Current Perspectives of the China Threat in Moscow The view that China poses a major threat to Russia is not only found in the RFE, but has also penetrated some circles in the capital. This view can be found among representatives of different political groups and ideological trends in Russia who invariably hold opposing positions on most other issues. The contrast is more striking since this view of China can be based either on the most radical Westernism which aims to convert Russia into a model Western society and a faithful ally of the West, or on equally radical nationalism, for which even China is too proWestern, and which sees an alliance with anybody (even an anti-Western alliance) as an unacceptable subordination of Russia to outside influences. An article representative of this radical-Westernising view was written by Andrey Zagorskiy, Anatoly Zlobin, Sergey Solodovnik and Mark Khrustalev, who are all experts at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Relations (MGIMO), a university under the Russian Foreign Ministry. Published in a foreign ministry journal just months after Andrey Kozyrev became the first Foreign Minister of independent Russia, it was meant to provide a theoretical basis for Russia’s new foreign policy.39 In the authors’ opinion, China’s development cannot be taken for granted, and in the future Beijing may switch from ‘co-operative behaviour to attempts to consolidate the regime through external expansion’.40 The views of these experts were very close to the position of the former acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar and his Russia’s Choice party. Following the line of most Russian radical Westernisers, Gaydar wrote extensively on the necessity for Russia to depart from its ‘Oriental’ past and its ‘Asiatic mode of production’ and to join the civilised Western world.41 According to Gaydar, Russia found itself between the ‘democratic Wes’ and‘poor, non-democratic countrie’ of the East. Russia has nothing to fear from the former but has good reason to fear the latter. In Gaydar’s opinion, China was the country that Russia should fear most. Gaydar noted that Russian fears of a war with the PRC during the 1960s and 1970s were at the time exaggerated and premature, but not altogether groundless. Openly subscribing to the theory of China’s ‘population threat’, he suggested that the real reason for this confrontation is ‘much more serious’: China’s population was eight times larger than that of Russia, and its density in the border regions was one

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Table 4.1 Attitudes towards the Influx of Chinese Immigrants

Source: Vilya Gelbras, “Predvaritel’nye itogi Izucheniya Problem Kitayskoy Migratsii v Moskve, Khabarovske, Vladiviostoke i Ussuriyske (Resul’taty Anketnykh Oprosov)” [“Preliminary Results of the Study of Chinese Migration Problems in Moscow, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and Ussuriysk (Results of Answers to Questionnaires)”], in Moscow Carnegie Centre, The Prospects for the Far Eastern Region: The Chinese Factor (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1999), p. 35.

hundred times higher. Since, in Gaydar’s view, ‘China in the near future will not become a stable, prosperous market economy,’ he argued that Russia should refrain from cutting its military budget and armed forces but transfer its ‘containment potential’ from the friendly democratic West to the Far East. Gaydar believed that Russia’s main ally in Asia should have been Japan (and to win Japanese support he was even ready to cede the Kuril Islands), and suggested the containment of China and the development of the economic and military potential of the RFE and Siberia.42


A member of Gaydar’s Russia’s Choice Party, Sergey Blagovolin, who at that time headed a major television company, argued: ‘China is turning into the principle threat to the West, Japan, the entire Asia-Pacific [region] and Russia. It is high time to start forming a tacit understanding between Moscow, Washington and Tokyo aimed at deterring the growing China threat’.43 A specialist in security and a deputy from the Yabloko movement, Aleksey Arbatov, holds a similar view. He believes that in the future China could pose a serious threat to Russia since its undemocratic political structure makes its development unpredictable as opposed to Japan a ‘democratic country and an integral part of the West’. Although Arbatov believes that China does not yet pose a threat, he warns that eventually ‘nothing will be able to prevent China from turning to the north’.44 Many experts in Moscow support the idea that a strong China will inevitably become expansionist, or that it is already practising ‘latent expansionism’. The authors of a study of illegal migration in the RFE claim that the ‘penetration of Chinese into Russian territory is detrimental to Russia’s state interests in the region and should be strictly regulated by law at both federal and local levels’.45 This position is advocated by the deputy director of the IDV, V.S.Myasnikov, who doubts the usefulness of border co-operation, claiming that ‘the very transformation of the border into a zone of active economic interaction radically diminishes the level of its security’. 46 The groups that are most hostile towards China are the radical nationalists. Although many nationalists see China as a prospective partner in an anti-Western alliance, the most radical of them believe China is too Westernised, has always constituted a geopolitical threat, and is one of the hostile forces encircling Russia. Typical in this respect is the opinion of the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who holds that ‘Today Russia has two main adversaries; the USA and China, who want to destroy us’.47 In June 1997 the leader of a radical All-Russia Movement of Support for the Army, Servicemen, Defence Industry and Military Science, Chairman of the State Duma Defence Committee General Lev Rokhlin wrote an appeal to President Yeltsin warning: In the Far East, squeezed within its territory, China with its one and a half billion people is developing at enormous speed. It is literally suffocating in its limited territorial space… China only needs us, as we are, for about five years, while we still possess some advanced

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technologies which can be extracted from us. Or rather, China also needs Russia as a raw material supply… As a result of your attitude towards the country’s defence, in the beginning of the third decade of the new millennium Russia may lose the Far East and Siberia up to the Ural Mountains.48 Another example of this trend of thought is the writings of Alexander Dugin, the chief theorist of a small but high-profile radical group, the National-Bolshevik Party. In his book The Fundamentals of Geopolitics, Dugin advocates the creation of a powerful anti-Western Russian-Muslim alliance (naturally under Russian leadership) which he calls ‘the heartland’. According to Dugin, China and the West are the main enemies of this alliance. In a chapter entitled ‘The Fall of China’, Dugin argues that in the mid 1970s China joined ‘the structure of the Atlantist geopolitics’. In Dugin’s view China is dangerous to Russia for two reasons: as a ‘geopolitical basis of Atlantism’ and as ‘a country of high demographic density in search of ‘no man’s lands’.49 To meet this danger, Dugin proposes to weaken China by supporting separatist movements and eventually separating Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria from the PRC, thus depriving China of a base for a potential ‘dash to the north’. Although such anti-Chinese sentiment in the federal government is rare, it is occasionally used by political figures in Moscow. The former vice-chairman of the Federation Council, Vasily Likhachev, seems to share some of Myasnikov’s views.50 Construction Minister E.Basin, describing the natural treasures of the RFE, wrote in an official newspaper in 1995: ‘After developing [the RFE] the region can be made extremely rich. The Chinese and Koreans were very quick to understand this and they have literally occupied our Far East. It looks as if soon they are going to declare it a sovereign narrow-eyed republic’.51 Former Russian Defence Minister Igor Radionov once listed China among the ‘main potential enemies of Russia’.52 Stanislav Govorukhin, a well-known film director and a Duma deputy, wrote in his book: There are already more than a billion Chinese. In the end their only hope for survival from the historical perspective is us—our natural resources and our territories! Already we have ceded to them (just in the Maritime Territory) one and a half thousand hectares of Siberian pine forests and fertile land—the so-called “straightening of the border”. Damansky Island, washed with our children’s blood, is


Chinese already! Real Chinese expansion is going on, a massive Sinofication of the region. How many Chinese do you think hang about in the eastern part of our country right now? About a million! And this is according to the most modest estimates. Meanwhile, if I am not mistaken, the entire Russian population from the Ural Mountains to the Kamchatka Peninsula is about 18 million. Let’s estimate, how many years it will take for the Chinese population to exceed this number. And no war will be necessary.53 Alexander Solzhenitsyn expressed similar concerns on several occasions after his return to Russia, as did prominent film director Nikita Mikhalkov.54 In June 2000, the State Duma Committee on Federal Affairs and Regional Policy published a report on the situation in Amur Province, alleging China’s ‘covert expansion’ into Russia.55 Fear of Chinese ‘demographic expansion’ occasionally finds its way into the pages of national newspapers and magazines. Sensational headlines such as ‘Silent occupation’ and ‘China is filling Russia up with narcotics’ are not uncommon, even in respected national newspapers.56 A typical passage from one such article, entitled ‘You show Chinese the door, they come through the window’, devoted to the alleged Chinese invasion of the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk, stated: ‘The yellow-faced billion assimilate [RFE] villages which are close to the Chinese border excessively quickly. But up to the Yenisei River the sound of the iron tread of the colonialist battalions from the East is not yet that strong’.57 It is worth noting that the author of this publication was not particularly nationalistic or anti-Chinese. Moreover, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, which published the article, is considered a serious newspaper, not a tabloid. The abstract simply reflects the widely accepted sensational style of ‘liberated’ Russian journalism. Although the idea of a China threat has its proponents in Moscow’s academic community and in the government, they do not represent the mainstream official Russian position and policy. Moreover, many scholars and journalists in Moscow do not express any concern about China and even see it as a source of cheap labour which should be used for the development of Russia’s border regions. This is the opinion of the deputy director of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, Dimitry Trenin. Trenin advocates opening up the Sino-Russian border, not closing it. In his view: The Russian federal government must realise not only that the stakes are extremely high, but also that old recipes will no longer

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work. Having stopped the subsidies and opened the region, Russia now has to go even further. The broadest possible internationalization of the development of the Russian Far East and Siberia would not only accelerate the process but will prevent unilateral Sinofication of the region.58 Notions of a Chinese threat are often refuted by journalists who describe the discriminatory policies of Russian authorities in dealing with the Chinese,59 or attribute high threat perceptions of China to Russia’s internal situation and the political games of politicians in the Far East. One such author, Galina Kovalsksya, suggests that the main reason behind anti-Chinese feeling in the Maritime Territory is simply part of the envy towards its dynamically developing and prosperous neighbours, who only a few years ago were much poorer. Kovalsksya explains that while it is widely accepted in Russia that Europeans, North Americans and Japanese live a more prosperous life than Russians, it is hard for Russians to accept that the formerly poor Chinese are beginning to enjoy higher standards of living. Kovalsksya concludes: ‘A threat from the East is a reality. But it is not in the mythical “expansion”, but in the national inferiority complex which [has] emerged in the souls of the Maritimers and which is about to grow into neuroses and phobia’.60 Russia’s Official Policy towards the PRC At present, radical anti-Chinese feelings do not determine Russia’s official policy towards China. On the contrary, the Russian leadership is actively working to develop political and economic co-operation with China. In July 1995, President Boris Yeltsin outlined the basic Russian position on China. Yeltsin stated: China is the most important state for us. It is a neighbour, with which we share a long border and with which we are destined to live and work side by side forever. Russia’s future depends on our co-operation with China. Relations with China are extremely important to us in global politics as well. If we can rely on the Chinese shoulder with our relations with the West, the West will be more considerate to Russia.61 During Yeltsin’s visit to China in April 1996, the two sides announced their desire to develop ‘a strategic partnership directed to the twenty-first century’. Yeltsin explained that the purpose of this partnership was to promote a multipolar system and oppose hegemony, a codeword used to


describe the United States.62 Since then, both sides have officially recognised the strategic partnership. Speaking in 2000 in Dushanbe at a meeting of the Shanghai Forum, a regional organisation that includes Russia, China, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, President Vladimir Putin declared ‘China for us really is a strategic partner in all spheres of activity’.63 Inthesame year Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, whilst recognising that there were some problems in the economic relationship with China, said that ‘in the strategic sense we do not have any problems and we do not envisage the emergence of such problems in the near future’ and that ‘relations between Russia and China are on the rise’.64 At the same time the problems of the RFE, which is lagging behind its neighbours, are recognised by the leadership in Moscow. Speaking at a conference of the development of the RFE and the Trans-Baykal region held in Blagoveshchensk in June 2000, President Putin acknowledged the failure of Moscow’s previous attempts to step up regional development and called for a global perspective of the region, taking into consideration the long-term interests of the country. Echoing the words of Prime Minister Stolypin almost a century before, Putin warned: ‘I do not want to dramatise the situation, but if we do not make every effort, even the indigenous Russian population will soon speak mostly Japanese, Chinese and Korean’.65 While some Russian experts express concern about military cooperation with China, especially massive Russian arms sales, which in their view cause problems in relations with Moscow’s Western partners,66 are detrimental to regional security, have already provoked an arms race in the East Asia,67 and may even stimulate China to claim Russian territory in the future,68 virtually everyone recognises the importance of the money earned for mitigating Russia’s social and economic problems. Most experts see arms sales as a major driving force in promoting Russian-Chinese co-operation, and even critics usually do not call for a total ban on arms sales but for better controls and a more selective approach. The government claims to adhere to this line, and, according to Foreign Minister Ivanov, provides China with ‘arms and military equipment of exclusively defensive character and within the framework of international agreements’.69 Recent opinion polls show that the majority of the Russian people do not subscribe to the view that China poses a threat. According to an allRussia survey conducted in 2000, China was seen as the friendliest of twelve countries, far ahead of the United States and even the Ukraine. Of

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Table 4.2 Public Opinion of Russia’s Relations with Various Countries Question: Do you consider Russia’s relations with the following countries to be friendly or difficult?

Source: Department of State, Office of Research. Opinion Analysis, 14 March 2000, p. 4. The survey was conducted by ROMIR between 29 January and 11 February 2000.

those polled, 52 per cent said relations with China were ‘friendly’, and only 9 per cent saw them as ‘difficult’ (see Table 4.2). However, it would be wrong to conclude that perceptions of a China threat do not play a role in Russian politics. They surely do play a major role in the RFE. During the Yeltsin era the power of regional authorities was so strong that, as discussed earlier, they were able to take unilateral measures to change the border regime. On the whole their influence and vigorous anti-immigration propaganda created an atmosphere unfavourable for developing relations with China, and combined with Moscow’s inconsistent and convulsive actions, created confusion over border issues. Nevertheless, from a purely political point of view, Russia for the foreseeable future will continue to develop close ties with China. Forces which see China as a threat, be they at the radical nationalist or radical Western edge of the Russian political spectrum, have little chance of coming to power. Nor can we expect a significant increase in their influence, unless a political cataclysm occurs in Russia. In the Kremlin, power is likely to be maintained by supporters of the policy of maintaining a balance between West and East.


However, the problem of growing anti-Chinese sentiment in Siberia and the RFE should be taken seriously, especially in view of the growing autonomy of the Russian regions. Some scholars, both in Russia and abroad, tend to simplify RFE attitudes towards the Chinese ‘demographic threat’. They often view them as either instigated by the local authorities pursuing their own political agendas, as products of the intrigues of Russian nationalists, or as remnants of traditional Russian political culture, an unenlightened approach of people who do not understand the benefits of international economic co-operation based on free market principles.70 However, as local opinion polls show, these feelings are not related to the traditional fear of the West, which was largely confined to the Russian elite, but more to the recent history of Soviet-Chinese confrontation and to contemporary economic and political realities. Local authorities may fuel them because they seek popular support, but their position would not have been possible without the growth of antiChinese sentiments among ordinary people. Anti-immigrant feelings are not necessarily a feature of backwardness or traditional feelings. In fact, as most studies on nationalism show, ethnic awareness and ethnic hatred is a modern phenomenon.71 Antiimmigrant sentiments are not at all unique in the modern world, and exist mostly in the developed Western world, to where most immigrants from poorer parts of the world go. They have led to serious disturbances in Germany (towards Turkish contract labourers), in France (directed mainly against Arabs from the southern Mediterranean), and on the West coast of the United States where they have resulted in the passing of legislation aimed at preventing illegal immigration. The idea of a ‘Chinese threat’ as a part of a broader ‘yellow peril’ is also not of Russian origin. At the end of the nineteenth century, concerns over massive Chinese immigration were prevalent in many places, such as California and Australia.72 Such feelings continued well into the twentieth century.73 Observers (including those in the United States) who recommend that Russia should loosen restrictions on the Chinese border in the interests of economic development do not see a contradiction between this proposal and the fact that the United States maintains a strict system of control on its border with Mexico. There is a fear in some US states that the ‘Hispanicisation’ of its population could lead to problems and, in an extreme scenario, even to a territorial dispute. This situation is very similar to that in the RFE, the difference being that Russia is getting weaker while China is getting stronger. As the United States can hardly loose its superior position in relation to Mexico, Russian

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fears about China are more realistic. Analysed within a general historical and political context, the fears of the Russian population in the RFE seem quite natural and cannot be simply disregarded or ignored. Anti-Chinese sentiment in Russia, especially in the border areas, can be better understood in the context of China threat perceptions in the countries neighbouring China, or those situated nearby. As shown by the authors in this volume, anti-Chinese feelings or fear of China’s future policy in the region exist and play (or used to play) an important role in most of China’s neighbours. Similar to Russia, some analysts in those countries are concerned about territorial disputes, illegal Chinese immigration and the role of the ethnic Chinese population, the possibility of a strong China returning to its traditional policy of regional hegemonism, as well as the danger of economic collapse in China. In some countries (such as Indonesia) the collapse of authoritarian regimes has led to serious anti-Chinese disturbances, whilst in others (such as Malaysia) the government has pursued a discriminatory policy against the Chinese minority (the so called ‘affirmative action’ policy). Over the last two decades illegal Chinese immigration, Chinese organised crime and the role of local Chinese communities have become important themes of internal political discussion in Australia, and have recently become a controversial issue in Canada, which is being pressed by the US government to impose stricter controls.74 While one can criticise the antiChinese rhetoric of Russian political and public figures as unreasonable and unhelpful for the development of Russian-Chinese economic cooperation, the perceptions of a China threat in Russia and societal concerns in general should not be seen as something unprecedented or completely outdated in the twenty-first century. The real problem for the Russian government is not to approach its Chinese dilemma with abstract and impractical principles, but to elaborate and pursue a strategy of co-operation with China, and foster economic development in the Far Eastern region that will not compromise Russia’s national security or political and social stability. As contributors to this volume argue, several of China’s neighbours, such as India, Malaysia, and Vietnam, have made significant progress in solving similar problems, and their experience deserves the attention of Russian leaders. The Chinese side, which for its own reasons is also interested in a partnership with Russia, has recently begun to show more understanding towards the psychological problems plaguing the relationship. It consistently maintains that no central plan for the Sinofication of Russian territories exists, and has demonstrated a readiness to co-operate with the


Russian authorities in preventing illegal immigration. During a visit to Moscow in February 1998, Chinese Premier Li Peng confirmed this position and called on Chinese citizens who stayed in Russia to adhere to Russian rules and emigration laws. Thus, there exist good grounds for believing that popular fears and distrust in the Russian border regions will only have a limited influence on the overall development of RussianChinese relations. However, the pattern in the evolution of Russia’s image of China has for a long time been that China threat theories gain popularity when Russians think their country is weak and unable to develop its Far Eastern regions enough to withstand a challenge from China. If the current Russian leadership fails to stem the country’s economic decline and to implement a development strategy for the RFE, these theories may once again influence Russia’s official policy towards the PRC. Notes 1 See, for example, Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1960), first published in 1921; K.E.Boulding, “National Images and International Systems”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, no.2 (June 1959), pp. 120–131; Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 2 P.A.Stolypin, Rechi v Gosudarstvennoy Dume [1906–1911] (Speeches at the State Duma) [1906–1911] (Petrograd: 1916), pp. 132–133. 3 Mikhail Nosov, “Rossiyskiy Dal’niy Vostok i Kitay” (‘The Russian Far East and China”). Paper presented at a seminar “Problems of Security and National Identity in the Post-Soviet Space” (Moscow: Moskovskiy Tsentr Karnegi, 1995), p. 9. 4 Roy Medvedev, China and the Superpowers (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 51. 5 Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 44–45. 6 Georgy Arbatov, The System: An Insider’s Life in Soviet Politics (New York: Times Books, 1992), pp. 94–95. 7 M.A. Il’in, Pekin—Vrag Mira, a, Razryadki i Mezhdunarodnogo Sotrudnichestva (Beijing—An Enemy of Peace, Détente and International Co-operation) (Moscow: Znanie, 1982), p. 6. According to an informal rule, Soviet officials often used pseudonyms when writing on sensitive issues, including relations with China. Some of them were disclosed by Gilbert Rozman. See Gilbert Rozman, “Moscow’s China-Watchers in the Post-Mao Era: The Response to a Changing China”, The China Quarterly (June 1983), pp. 215–241. In fact,

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8

9 10 11 12

13

14 15 16

17 18

19

they were not really meant to disguise the authors, but to avoid official reaction from China (and other countries). The real authors were well known to both Soviet and Chinese specialists. M.A. II’in, for example, was widely believed to be the pen name of M. L.Titarenko. O.E.Vladimirov, M.A.Il’in, Evolyutsiya Politiki i Ideologii Maoizma v 70-kh— Nachale 80-kh Godov (The Evolution of Maoist Politics and Economics in the 1970 and early 1980s) (Moscow: 1980), p. 21. According to Rozman, O.E.Vladimirov was a pseudonym of Oleg Rakhmanin. M.A.Il’in, Pekin, op. cit., p. 16. Mikhail Nosov, Rossiyskiy, op. cit., p. 10. Raisa Eldashova, “Lyubov’ kitayskaya proshla” (“The love of things Chinese has passed”), Tikhookeanskaya Zvezda , 21 April, 1991. Vladimir Shcherbakov, “‘Velikiy brat k nam tyanet ruki” (“The Great Brother Stretches Out His Hands towards Us”), Vladivostok, 1 September 1993, pp.1, 5; Gilbert Rozman, Russian Populist Reactions in 1993–94 to the Coming of the Chinese. Paper presented at the conference “Recent Demographic Trends in Eastern Siberia: The Question of Chinese Immigration”, 12–13 December 1994, Atlanta, Georgia. L.V.Zabrovskaya, “Proekt ‘Tumangan’ i ego Vozmozhnye Posledstviya” (“The Tunmenjiang Project and its Possible Consequences”), in Kitay, Kitayskaya Tsivilizatsiya i mir (China, Chinese Civilization and the World). Proceedings of the IV Conference (Moscow: IDV, 1993), Part 1, p. 101; See also, Ludmila Zabrovskaya, “The Tumenjiang Project: A View from Primorie”, Far Eastern Affairs, no.1 (1995), pp. 34–38. See A.P.Derevyanko, Rossiyskoe Primor’e na Rubezhe Tret’ego Tysyacheletiya (Vladivostok: Dalnauka, 1999), p. 258. Vladimir Portyakov, “Are the Chinese Coming? Migration Processes in Russia’s Far East”, International Affairs 42, no.1 (January-February 1996), pp. 132–147. V.L.Larin, “Rossiya i Kitay na Poroge Tret’ego Tysyacheletiya: Kto Zhe Budet Otstaivat’ Nashi Natsional’nye Interesy? Vzglyad s Dal’nego Vostoka” (“Russia and China on the Threshold of the Third Millennium: Who Will Fight for our National Interests? A View from the Far East”), Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka, no. 1 (1997), pp. 24–25. Nosov, Rossiyskiy, op. cit., p. 18. “Predlozheniya Administratsii Primorskogo Kraya po Zaversheniyu Demarkatsii Rossiysko-Kitayskoy Granitsy v Predelakh Ussuriyskogo i Khasanskogo Rayonov” (“Proposals of the Administration of the Maritime Territory on Completing the Demarcation of the Russian-Chinese Border in Ussuri and Khasan Districts”), in A.P. Derevyanko, Rossiyskoe Primor’e na Rubezhe Tret’ego Tysyacheletiya (The Russian Maritime Region on the Threshold of the Third Millennium) (Vladivostok: Dalnauka, 1999), p. 276. The document does not cite the source of its statistics. See, for example, Zheltaya Opasnost’ (Yellow Peril), compiled by B. D’yachenko (Vladivostok: Voron, 1996); B.I. Tkachenko, Rossiya-Kitay: vostochnaya granitsa v dokumentakh i materialakh (Russia-China: Eastern Border in Documents and Materials) (Vladivostok: Ussuri, 1999); Derevyanko, Rossiyskoe Primor’e, op. cit.


20 Formally, the new rules restricted the use of official passports that did not require a visa, a system which had been introduced in 1988. See Galina Vitkovskaya, Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya and Kathleen Newland, “Chinese Migration into Russia” in Sherman W.Garnett (ed.), Rapprochement of Rivalry? Russia-China Relations in Changing Asia (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), pp. 355, 357. 21 Igor Ivanov, “Nashi Vzaimootnosheniya Svobodny ot Emotsiy” (“Our relations are emotions free”), Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, no. 10 (155), 22 July 2000. 22 A.Adminin, E.Devaeva, “Rossiyskiy Dal’niy Vostok. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya i Inostrannye Investitsii” (“The Russian Far East: Foreign Trade and Foreign Investments”), Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka, no.5 (1995), pp. 24– 25. 23 See Soglashenie mezhdu Soyuzom Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublic i Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respublikoy o sovetsko-kitayskoy gosudarstvennoy granitse na ee vostochnoy chasti ot 16 may a 1991 (A Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of China on the Soviet-Chinese Border in its Eastern Part, 16 May 1991), in B.I.Tkachenko, Rossiya—Kitay: vostochnaya granitsa v dokumentakh i materialakh , op. cit., p. 357. 24 Gilbert Rozman, “Turning Fortress into Free Zones,” in Sherman W. Garnett (ed.), Rapprochement or Rivalry?, op. cit., p. 193. 25 Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, “Radi Nashikh Potomkov” (“For the Sake of our Descendants”), in Nekotorye Problemy Demorkatsii Rossiysko-kitayskoy Granitsy (Some Problems of the Demarcation of the Russian-Chinese Border) (Moscow: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1997), p. 4. 26 “Nazdratenko schitaet demarkatsiyu sdachey territorii Rossii” (“Nazdratenko believes demarcation to be surrender of Russia’s territory”), Kommersant Daily, 21 March 1997. 27 “Vse porty Dal’nego Vostoka mogut ostat’sya bez raboty” (“All ports of the Far East may become redundant”), Krasnoe Znamya, 16 March 1995. 28 Vladimir Rybakov, “U Kitaya v dolzhnikakh?” (“Indebted to China?”), Vladivostokskoe Vremya, 7 March 1995. 29 Georgiy Levkin, “Kitaytsam khochetsya plavat’ pod oknamy khabarovchan” (“Chinese want to sail under the windows of the people of Khabarovsk”), Dal’nevostochnyy Uchenyy, no. 12, 12 June 1995. 30 Ivan Yegorychev, “Demarkatsiya granits ili peresmotr istorii” (“Demarcation of borders or a revision of history”), Utro Rossii, 18 March 1995. 31 See, for example, Yevgeniy Kul’kov, “Kogda Dzhen’ Bao Dao byl Damanskim” (“When Zhenbao dao was Damansky”), Vladivostok, 1 March 1995. 32 “Vse porty Dal’nego Vostoka mogut ostat’sya bez raboty” (“All ports of the Far East may become jobless”), Krasnoe Znamya, 16 March 1995. 33 See Galina Romanova, “Russia and China: Natural partners in the Russian Far East”, Vladivostok News, 22 July 1994, 29 July 1994 and 5 August 1994; Vladislav Verchenko, “Severo-Vostochnyy Kitay i Rossiya” (“The Chinese North-East and Russia”), Vladivostok, 22 November 1994.

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34 Vladimir Gnibida, “Primor’e riskuet okazat’sya v ATR ne u del” (“Maritime Territory risks finding itself out of business in the Asia-Pacific region”), Vladivostok, 4 April 1996. 35 Ye. I.Plaksen, “Integratsiya Primor’ya v economicheskuyu strukturu ATR. Obshchestvennoe mnenie naseleniya i osobennosti vzglyadov rukovodstva” (“Integration of the Maritime kray into the economic structure of the Far Eastern Region: Public opinion and the peculiarities of the views of the authorities”), Rossiya i ATR, no.2 (4) (December 1993), p. 48. 36 Ibid. 37 Larin, “Rossiya i Kitay”, op. cit., pp. 24–25. 38 Plaksen, “Integratsiya Primor’ya v economicheskuyu strukturu ATR,” op. cit., p. 40. 39 Andrei Zagorski, Anatoli Zlobin, Sergei Solodovnik and Mark Khrustalev, “Russia in a New World”, International Affairs, no.7 (July 1992), pp. 3–11. 40 Ibid., p. 10. 41 See Yegor Gaydar, Gosudarstvo i evolyutsiya (State and Evolution) (Moscow: Evraziya, 1995). 42 Yegor Gaydar, “Rossiya XXI veka: Ne mirovoy zhandarm, a forpost demokratii v Evrazii” (“Russia in the 21st Century: Not a World Policeman but an outpost of democracy in Eurasia”), Izvestiya, 18 May 1995. 43 Zasedanie Soveta po Vneshney Politike, “Problemy Bezopasnosti: Stabil’nosti i Integratsii v ATR i Interesy” (Meeting of the Council of Foreign Policy, “Problems of Security, Stability and Integration in the AsiaPacific Region and Russia’s Interests”) Proceedings, Moscow, 15 November 1994, p. 18. 44 A.Arbatov, “Rossiya: Natsional’naya Bezopasnost’ v 90-e gody” (“Russia: National Security in the 1990s”) Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, no. 8–9 (1994), p. 15. 45 L.L.Rybakovskiy, O.D.Zakharova, V.V.Mindogulov, Nelegal’naya Migratsiya v Prigranichnykh Rayonakh Dal’nego Vostoka: Istoriya, Sovremennost’, Posledstviya (Illegal Migration in the Border Regions of the Far East: History, Present, Consequences) (Moscow: Institut sotsial’no-politicheskikh issledovaniy, 1994), p. 37. 46 V.S.Myasnikov, Dogovornymi stat’yami utverdili. Diplomaticheskaya istoriya russko-kitayskoy granitsy. XVII-XX vv. (Confirmed by the Articles of the Treaty: Diplomatic History of the Russian-Chinese Border, XVII-XX centuries) (Moscow: RIO Mosobluprpoligrafizdata, 1996), pp. 411–419. 47 V.G.Gel’bras, Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskiy region: problemy ekonomicheskoy bezopasnosti Rossii (The Asia-Pacific Region: Problems of Russia’s Economic Security) (Moscow: Institut mikroekonomiki pri Minekonomiki RF, 1995), p. 43. 48 Quoted in Tkachenko, Rossiya—Kitay: vostochnaya granitsa v dokumentakh i materialakh, op. cit., p. 273. 49 Alexander Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe Budushchee Rossii (The Fundamentals of Geopolitics: Russia’s Geopolitical Future) (Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997), p. 360.


50 Vassily Likhachev, “Russia-China Strategic Partnership”, Far Eastern Affairs, no. 2 (1997), pp. 39–40. 51 As quoted in Gelbras, Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskiy, op. cit., p. 22. 52 See Igor Korotchenko, “Igor Radionov vystupil za sozdanie oboronnogo soyuza v SNG” (“Igor Radionov proposed creating a CIS defence alliance”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 December 1996; Aleksandr Platkovskiy, “Generaly v Pekine raskusili igru Moskvy” (“Generals in Beijing got to the core of Moscow’s game”), Izvestiya, 29 May 1997; Ivan Shomov, “Partnerstvo s prishchurom na Zapad” (“Partnership with the West in Mind”), Segodnya, 25 March 1997. 53 Stanislav Govorukhin, Velikaya kriminal’naya Revolyutsiya (The Great Criminal Revolution), (Moscow: 1995), p. 10. 54 Vladimir Slapentokh, “Russia, China, and the Far East: Old Geopolitics or a New Peaceful Cooperation?” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 28, no. 3 (September 1995), p. 309. 55 See the official web site of the Russian Foreign Ministry at www.mid.ru. 56 See Aleksandr Platkovskiy, “Kitay zavalil Rossiyu narkotikamy,” (“China has filled Russia up with narcotics”), Izvestiya, 3 April 1997; Vladimir Chesnokov, “Tikhaya okkupatsiya: kazhdyy vos’moy ussuriets— vykhodets iz Kitaya” (“Silent occupation: One in every eight citizens of Ussuriysk comes from China”), Novyye Izvestiya, 26 November 1998; Evgeniya Lents, “Tol’ko dlya kitaytsev! V Primor’e vse chashche govoryat o ‘tikhoy kitayskoy ekspansii’” (“Only for Chinese! In the Maritime Territory they talk about a ‘quiet Chinese expansion’ more and more often”), Segodnya, 14 October 2000. 57 Yuriy Chuvashev, “Kitaytsev—v dver’, ony v okno” (“You show Chinese the door, they come through the window”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 April 2000. 58 Dimitry Trenin, Russia’s China Problem (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p. 46. 59 See, for example, Vyacheslav Kuzmin, “Otdayte millionchik! Trebuyut prodavtsy-kitaytsy u rossiyskoy nalogovoy politsii” (“Give us back the million! Demand Chinese traders from the Russian tax police”), Izvestia, 14 May 1999. 60 Galina Kovalskaya, “U strakha glaza uzki” (“Fear has narrow eyes”), Itogi, 21 September 1999, p. 52. 61 “Yeltsin daet ukazaniya diplomatam”, in Diplomatiya: Nauka i Praktika, no. 4, (1995), p. 4. 62 Izvestiya, 26 April 1996. 63 Quoted in Igor Ivanov, “Nashi Vzaimootnosheniya Svobodny ot Emotsiy”, op. cit. 64 Ibid . 65 Vladimir Putin, Vystuplenie na soveshchanii “O perspektivakh razvitiya Dal’nego Vostoka i Zabaykal’ya” (Speech at the conference “On the Prospects of Development of the Far East and the Trans-Baykal Region”,

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66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

74

Blagoveshchensk, 21 July 2000). See President Putin’s official web-site http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events/50.html. Sergey Trush, “Prodazha Rossiyskogo oruzhiya Kitayu: rezony i opaseniya” (“Russian Arms Sales to China: Reasons and Worries”), Nezavisimoe Voennoe Oobozrenie, 25 April 1996. Alexander A.Sergounin, Sergey V. Subbotin, “Sino-Russian Military Cooperation: Russian Perspective”, Regional Studies 15, no.4 (1997), pp. 55– 65. K.E.Sorokin, “Rossiya i igra geopoliticheskikh interesov v areale Velikogo okeana” (“Russia and the Game of Geopolitical Interests in the Area of the Great Ocean”), Politicheskie issledovaniya, 1994, no.4, p. 23. Igor Ivanov, “Nashi Vzaimootnosheniya Svobodny ot Emotsiy”, op. cit. Such views were expressed by many participants at a conference on Russian-Chinese relations held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC on 30 October 1997. See, for example, Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1961). As quoted in Patricia Buckley Ebrey, The Cambridge Illustrated History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 252. See, for example, William F.Wu, The Yellow Peril: Chinese Americans in American Fiction, 1850–1940 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1982); Bill Homage, The Yellow Peril: A Squint at Some Australian Attitudes towards Orientals (Dubbo, NSW.: Review Publications, 1976). See Lachlan Strahan, Australia’s China: Changing Perceptions from the 1930s to the 1990s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Andrew Mitrovica, “Critics blast Ottawa as people-smugglers tribe”, The Globe and Mail, 4 January 2001.

CHAPTER FIVE The China Threat—A European Perspective Joachim Glaubtiz

Introduction From a European perspective China is a far away place, not only in the geographical sense, but also culturally. This is one reason why Europe has for centuries been interested in and even fascinated by the Middle Kingdom and its culture. The European perception of China up to contemporary times has often shifted from one extreme to the other. However, more often than not this reveals more about the position of the observers than about the object being observed. With the notable exception of Jesuit writings, the image of China in Europe, particularly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was that of an inferior country far below European standards. Western arrogance, influenced in part by Anglo-Saxon conservative Protestantism, informed this perception. In 1860, for instance, the British magazine Punch published a cartoon entitled ‘What we ought to do in China’ depicting Saint George killing a huge ugly dragon.1 After the First World War the perception of China in Europe, and in the industrialised Western world in general, began to change. Doubts about Western moral superiority surfaced; misery and hopelessness caused by the Depression of the 1930s fostered a mental attitude that idealised ancient China as a better world. A fascination with mystical Taoism was a typical consequence of this development. However, the actual situation in China during these chaotic years did not garner too much attention. In the 1930s, however, China’s image in the West improved further. An increasing number of Chinese students poured into American and European universities; Christian missionaries working in China completely changed their attitude towards their host country, founding schools and hospitals and co-operating with Chinese intellectuals.

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Moreover, Japanese aggression against China led the United States and other Western countries to side with China. Indifference changed to engagement, despise into sympathy. In 1949 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded and Mao Zedong led his country into an alliance with the Soviet Union. The democratic West faced a communist block stretching from East Berlin to Beijing. During the Korean War (1950–1953) Chinese troops fought against Western forces under US command. In addition, China’s domestic political situation did not show any inclination towards democratic development. On the contrary, numerous campaigns against intellectuals and so-called bourgeois elements displayed the well known characteristics of a communist dictatorship. Again China’s image in the West underwent a transformation. At that time, Western countries, particularly the United States, perceived the PRC as a threat. This threat perception was reinforced when the PRC developed its own nuclear capability. In the mid to late 1960s, Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution exercised a strong influence on some segments of the younger generation in Europe and the United States. These people idealised China, regarding it as a country where anti-authoritarian dreams were destined to become reality. History is replete with instances where intellectuals have not hesitated to try and justify even the greatest nonsense. It was no surprise, therefore, that among China specialists there were some who defended Mao and ignored the excesses of his terrible regime. Once again we encounter the phenomenon of an idealised China. At the same time political observers recognised that the Sino-Soviet alliance was breaking down. Deep-seated ideological rivalry between the two huge communist powers led to an estrangement and finally to a series of military clashes along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969. In consequence of this geopolitical transformation, the West adopted a new position vis-à-vis the PRC. The Chinese leadership perceived the Soviet Union to be a more dangerous threat than the world’s leading imperialist power, i.e. the United States. A dramatic change in China’s attitude towards the non-socialist world occurred in 1971 when President Richard Nixon’s secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, made a secret trip to Beijing. Mutual threat perceptions of the Soviet Union paved the way for Nixon’s historic visit to the PRC in 1972, and a Sino-US rapprochement. In the Western world the image of China was once again completely transformed. The PRC ceased to be a ‘totalitarian monster’. Human rights violations were no longer an issue. China had become a strategic partner

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against the Soviet Union; its new anti-Soviet policy was greeted enthusiastically by the West. China supported the Western position against Moscow. The Chinese leadership adopted a hardline policy towards the Soviet Union, and supported those military alliances directed against the Soviet threat, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the US-Japan security alliance, and regional organisations aimed at countering Soviet influence, like the European Community. Western conservative politicians known for their anti-Soviet views were received in Beijing with open arms. Chinese leaders warned them of the dangers of Soviet expansionism. They also lectured them on the importance of a strong NATO in order to deter the Soviet threat, about a strong unified Europe and the need for a unified Germany. The Chinese leadership even called upon Japan to double its defence budget in order to counter the ‘threat from the North’.2 This turnabout in China’s policy had an enormous impact on how it was perceived in the West. The West was very pleased with China’s antiSoviet stance, and considered the PRC as a member of an informal coalition aimed at containing the Soviet Union. The Chinese leaders skilfully managed to create this image. They utilised this sentiment in order to achieve a key foreign policy goal: full diplomatic recognition by the United States. Beijing succeeded in this, and in 1979 President Jimmy Carter recognised the government in Beijing as the sole legitimate Chinese government. Beijing had reaped a rich political harvest. Having achieved that goal, the Chinese leadership now turned a new page of relations with their erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union. Shortly after Washington and Beijing had agreed to exchange ambassadors, the Chinese leadership signalled to Moscow that it was prepared to resume talks on political normalisation without preconditions.3 China’s antiSoviet rhetoric was toned down, and eventually disappeared. China strove for a position that permitted it to exercise normal relations with both superpowers. It wanted to be recognised and respected by both the United States and the Soviet Union as an equal. Thanks to skilled diplomacy, Beijing managed to achieve this aim during the 1980s. This process of freeing itself from a rather one-sided orientation towards the US and its allies in the following years was accompanied by two important developments in domestic politics: Beijing’s decision to embark on a programme of fundamental economic reform, and opening China up to the outside world. Both measures proved to be successful. The opportunities for private businesses and for personal decisions were considerably broadened during the 1980s.


From a Western perspective, China’s image was continuously enhanced. Media coverage reflected euphoric expectations of an irreversible process of democratisation in China. On 4 June 1989 this development reached its peak when the pro-democracy movement was violently suppressed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Tiananmen Square. In the wake of the massacre, Western governments strongly condemned the Chinese leadership. Again the image of China had shifted from one extreme to the other. The West had to acknowledge that it had completely misjudged China’s internal situation. Euphoria was replaced by disappointment. In the years following the Tiananmen Square massacre, foreign observers made more sober appraisals of China. However, it seems unlikely that this will last. Again voices can be heard idealising China, portraying it as the next superpower and disregarding its enormous internal problems. On the other hand there are those who have downplayed China’s significance.4 This leads us to the conclusion that an evaluation of power, and consequently of a threat emanating from power potential, is more often based on perception than on hard facts. The China Threat as Seen from Europe Does China pose a threat to Europe? This may seem like a strange question, but there has been so much discussion about the ‘the China threat’ it is necessary to examine it from a security perspective. Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has been broadened considerably. Now it goes beyond purely military security to encompass economic, social and ecological elements. Military Aspects of the China Threat It goes without saying that in a strict military sense, Europe does not perceive a direct threat from China. Even though the PRC possesses Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) capable of reaching Europe, it is not realistic to regard China as a country directly threatening Europe. Nevertheless political analysts cannot ignore China’s military potential. If China’s neighbours, notably Japan, Taiwan and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are increasingly concerned about China’s growing military power, then this will also affect Europe.


When China challenged Taiwan by crudely attempting to influence the outcome of the March 1996 presidential election through military threats, this was also a challenge to the wider world, including Europe. It is doubtful that China ever planned to really attack Taiwan or even to take Taiwanese territory, but the intention to intimidate another country in order to hinder a democratic process is unacceptable from a European perspective. Although the population of Taiwan is less than a fiftieth of China’s, Taiwan is no midget. It has the world’s third-largest foreignexchange reserves, is its twelfth biggest trading entity and conducts almost as much trade with the United States as does mainland China. Taiwan is also an important trading partner of the European Union (EU).5 For all these reasons North America and Europe, as well as East Asia, have a keen interest in Taiwan’s future well-being. When China closed air and sea-lanes around Taiwan in 1996 it obstructed international trade with the island. Even for those who believe that Taiwan is an integral part of China, using military threats to pursue reunification is a gross breach of international norms of behaviour. China needs to be reminded that any military action will not only put at risk massive Taiwanese investment on the mainland, but also China’s lucrative trade with the world’s richest economies. Although China in military terms is still an inferior power, Europe is concerned about its behaviour. Nevertheless the EU recognises that the only power capable of providing a military deterrence to the PRC in the Taiwan Straits is the United States.6 Another issue that is related to China’s behaviour vis-à-vis Taiwan is Beijing’s claim to almost the whole of the South China Sea. This body of water is one of the busiest corridors for international sea transport from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region and vice versa. An interruption of these trade links would have serious consequences for Europe as well as for countries in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s slow but steady expansion in the South China Sea since the 1970s is made up of a seamless web of military build-ups, the occupation of small islands and reefs, the establishment of administrative and logistical networks, military exercises and military clashes (specifically with Vietnam) and diplomatic manoeuvres. How will China behave after it has reached the status of a fully fledged military power? Will it respect the South China Sea as international waters? Europe does not feel this to be a direct threat at the moment, but it is concerned. The PRC has repeatedly pledged never to become a hegemonic power. However, it is China that feels free to define


hegemony. In the past, China has displayed hegemonic activities. In 1956, when Vietnam was recovering from the first Indochina War, China seized some of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The remaining islands of this group were seized in 1974 when the Saigon regime was weakened following the American withdrawal.7 When in 1979 China invaded northern Vietnam, the Chinese leadership arrogantly declared that it was necessary ‘to teach Vietnam a lesson’. These incidents can be labelled as hegemonic behaviour. There is a concern not only in Europe, but generally among democratic countries in the world, that some day China may feel strong enough to pursue regional hegemony in East Asia, thereby disrupting the international order. Besides the threat derived from a militarily strong and hegemonic China, European governments perceive another security aspect of the China threat: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). China’s arms sales appear to be commercially motivated, with little regard for regional stability. China’s sales are directed towards developing countries like Algeria, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. By supplying missile parts to Iran and Pakistan, China has violated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an agreement which Beijing has not signed but by which it has agreed to abide. European politicians welcomed the recent declaration by the Chinese Foreign Ministry that ‘China has no intention to assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons’. It further pledged to put into effect a formal system of export controls, including restrictions on dual use technology.8 Observers in the United States and Europe hope that China will follow through on this statement opposing the proliferation of WMD. This would drastically reduce a long lasting concern among European politicians. The Political Dimension of the China Threat There remain other, non-military areas of China’s conduct that are perceived in Europe as sources of concern or implicit threat. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has certain rights and responsibilities to shape international politics. Beijing demonstrated its position during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, much to the chagrin of the EU. From the outset of the crisis, Beijing opposed Western intervention in any form. Even UN decisions aimed at peacefully resolving the ethnic tension did not receive China’s support. Beijing also refused to contribute military units to the UN-mandated Kosovo Intervention Force (KFOR).


In May 1992 China also refused to support UN membership for the newly established republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and BosniaHerzegovina. Although it was well known to the Chinese leaders that President Slobodan Milosevich of Serbia had abolished the autonomous status of Kosovo and had started a campaign of genocide against the Kosovo Albanians months before NATO attacked Serbia, they blamed NATO for the expulsion of Kosovo’s ethnic majority.9 Beijing simply ignored the facts and adhered to the abstract principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This principle was more important to the Chinese leadership than measures aimed at preventing Serbian security forces from committing genocide. The fact that in the UN Security Council China and Russia opposed a UN mandate for NATO intervention in Kosovo caused a debate in Europe about the misuse of the veto. Referring to the principle of non-interference, China is obviously willing to accept genocide when it happens within a state. The rationale behind this is that China wants to avoid an international precedent that could be applied to its policy of ethnic suppression in Tibet and Xinjiang. Another event in the Balkans demonstrates that China follows a rather parochial policy towards its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. When Macedonia established diplomatic relations with Taiwan in January 1999, Beijing was so incensed that it vetoed a six-month extension for the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEF) mandate. This did not enhance China’s image in Europe, and a decision of international relevance had been dictated by narrow domestic political interests. The PRC has also tried to force its views on the status of Taiwan on European lawmakers. In 1995 a delegation of Taiwanese members of parliament was received by the European Parliament in Strasbourg. The Taiwanese lawmakers had been invited privately by a group of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Beijing objected to this meeting and mounted a huge lobbying campaign in which every MEP was urged to ostracise the Taiwanese visitors. Although Taiwan, unlike the PRC, is a democracy and also an economic success story, it is not officially recognised by any European country. Despite Chinese pressure fifty MEPs held a reception for the Taiwanese delegation. On the following day the European Parliament embraced it even more warmly at a plenary session. The delegation sat in the section reserved for official visitors, and the chairman of the day, the former Danish Prime Minister Paul Schlüter, delivered a gracious welcoming speech. However, Schlüter’s speech was not recorded in the official record of proceedings. The president of the


European Parliament, the German Social Democrat Klaus Hänsch, instructed the Parliamentary Bureau to remove it from the record. According to Hänsch: ‘The bureau decided that the welcome would not be recorded, as the delegation was not an official one’. During a later session an MEP mentioned the name of a Taiwanese delegate, but that too vanished from the record. His reference to Taiwan appeared as ‘the People’s Republic of China’.10 This shameful incident recalls the communist practice of erasing the faces of disgraced politicians from official photographs. Whenever political institutions or influential politicians in Europe have to decide on issues Beijing regards as its internal affairs—such as Taiwan, human rights or Tibet—it utilises all means to try and shape the outcome according to its own political interests. In meetings between political leaders from Europe and the PRC, issues of human rights are regularly raised. One reason for this is the obvious discrepancy between human rights as stipulated in the UN Charter on Political and Civil Rights, which are guaranteed by the PRC’s Constitution, and the reality in China. It is not easy for representatives of Western societies to criticise China for two reasons: first, human rights are based on the historical experience of Greek, Christian and occidental societies, i.e. a cultural background different to that of China. Second, after World War Two, Western criticism of human rights violations was aimed at Eastern Bloc countries, and human rights violations in Mao’s China were not an issue in the Western media. The Helsinki accord of 1975 with its famous ‘Basket 3’ on civil rights was confined to Europe. The West focused on human rights violations in China as a political issue only when China had lost its strategic importance to the United States and Western Europe in their confrontation with the Soviet Union. This occurred in the late 1980s after the easing of superpower tensions. Following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the Western world reacted with indignation. Since then, human rights issues have played a significant role in the political dialogue between Western governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the one side, and China on the other. Western observers familiar with the development of the PRC are aware of the enormous problems facing the Chinese government in its efforts to transform the economy and modernise society. However, it remains difficult to accept that China, as a member of the UN, claims the right to define universal human values in its own way. By doing so it often violates its own constitution. As China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council it has a special political responsibility; Western Europe


cannot accept the continued violation of basic human rights such as the suppression of religious activities and restrictions on freedom of speech. The EU is obliged to respect and fulfil the requirements of the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights. Further, in 1995 the EU decided that all future treaties would contain a clause on human rights. In accordance with this clause, the EU can temporarily suspend the treaty should the other signatory be found to have violated human rights. Any new member to the EU must have a human rights record in accordance with the convention. If the EU in its economic, political and cultural relations with China did not insist that the Chinese government observed human rights norms, then it could not ask the same of potential new members. The EU Commission in Brussels, for instance, could not criticise the suppression of the Kurdish minority in Turkey whilst at the same time overlooking the treatment of the Tibetan or Uighur minorities in China. Within the Western world, the United States is the most outspoken critic of China’s human rights record. As is well known, the Chinese government rejects any criticism of its human rights record as interference in its internal affairs. Since 1989 in particular, it has continuously demanded a strict separation of economics and politics. However, it is the Chinese leadership that uses its economic potential to achieve political goals. One of these goals is to court the EU as a counterweight to the United States. Another goal is to exploit the differences among EU members concerning their respective policies towards the PRC. 11 The annual conference of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva illustrates the tactics China uses to achieve these goals. China always heavily lobbies other countries to prevent the passage of resolutions condemning its human rights record. The 1997 Geneva conference was especially deplorable. The conference took place against the background of disagreements among European countries over a common foreign and security policy for the EU. The lack of solidarity among the member states left Denmark as the sole sponsor of a resolution critical of human rights violations in China. As a result, Denmark had to face the threat of political as well as economic sanctions from the Chinese government. As French President Jacques Chirac was going to visit China soon after the conference and hoped to sign major business contracts, France refused to support the resolution. Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece followed suit.12


Although China is interested in continued economic relations with the EU and in technological assistance from its member states, the Chinese leadership is in a comfortable position. They are well aware of the growing competition among EU member states. Understandably, China exploits this situation. Vis-à-vis a divided Union it is not very difficult for the Chinese leaders to dismiss any linkage between trade and human rights. Within this context, the threat to the EU is not China but the political weakness of the Union itself. As long as the EU lacks solidarity in exercising trade and foreign policy decisions, China will successfully use the tactic of playing EU member states off against one another. This could produce another dangerous side effect: a widening discrepancy between Western Europe and the United States concerning China. China as an Environmental Threat Another kind of threat perceived in Western Europe results from China’s destruction of its natural environment and its thirst for natural resources. China suffers from severe air pollution because it is highly dependent on coal for its increasing energy demands. Coal, which has a high sulphur content, provides almost three-quarters of China’s energy, and the sulphur in the coal produces acid rain. China is the top acid rain producer in the region, causing the destruction of forests in far-off Siberia, Korea and Japan. The problem of acid rain from China has not affected Europe yet, but air pollution is a global problem, and the PRC is already one of the most intensive producers of pollution. Another serious problem is the massive water pollution caused by rapid industrialisation. In China more than two-thirds of household and industrial waste water is dumped untreated into rivers, lakes and the sea. This practice is causing damage to the nation’s production as well as its health. Shortages of clean water and clean air are lowering agricultural yields and pushing up manufacturing as well as social costs. China’s irresponsible water resource management and air pollution have already begun to affect neighbouring countries and the global environment. Coastal pollution is increasing all along the East and South China Seas, and the pollution is sure to hit the fishing industry in the near future. Beijing has started initiatives to curtail pollution. However, many of the already existing environmental rules and regulations are ignored by corrupt cadres, or turn out to be ineffective because of poor enforcement.13


The threat to Europe results indirectly from the consequences of the continued destruction of the living conditions of the Chinese people. If China’s economic growth is endangered by irresponsible exploitation of natural resources, a mass exodus of Chinese people could become a real threat to the world. If only 0.1 per cent of China’s population felt compelled to emigrate, it would mean the release of 1.2 million more people in a world where too many migrants are already searching for a better life. At present this is still a potential threat; however, if—in addition to other social problems like unemployment and decreasing social welfare— agricultural production reaches the point of stagnation and the gap between production and demand widens to several 100 million tons of grain per year, a situation could arise where unrest spreads and people want to leave a destabilised society. In view of this worst-case scenario, not only the EU but the whole Western world has a genuine interest in the social stability of China and in the continued development of its economy. The Threat Posed by Chinese Organised Crime and Piracy Finally, a phenomenon should be mentioned that is not limited to China, but nevertheless is linked with Chinese society and perceived as a threat in both Western Europe and the United States: organised crime. In China organised crime syndicates known as triads have a long tradition. Information about triad activities in China is difficult to obtain. However, over the past decade triad activities have spread all over the world. Previously, the triad problem was limited to cities like Hong Kong, New York, Amsterdam and London. They are still there, but they have extended their reach to other countries such as Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, Germany, Italy and Russia. For the societies in which they operate, the damage is tremendous. The areas of crime in which Chinese gangs are mostly involved with are drug smuggling, people smuggling, piracy on the high seas and the manufacture of counterfeit products. Foreign governments have complained about China’s inability to control the flow of drugs through its territory. China has also emerged as a major trans-shipment route for Southeast Asian drugs, and until the mid 1990s Beijing refused to share counter-narcotics intelligence with foreign governments.14 There is some hope among European governments that recent high-level contacts with Chinese leaders at the


annual Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEMs) and other international gatherings will lead to better co-operation and more concrete results. Not only the United States and Canada, but also European countries are threatened by increasing illegal immigration. Of course, not only Chinese gangs are involved in smuggling people, but for businessminded triads, human trafficking is a lucrative crime. A large number of Chinese criminal syndicates offer passage to anyone who can pay the fee out of the mainland to eventual so-called asylum. Several years ago the fee was US$30,000 for passage to the United States; now the price has doubled.15 According to estimates made by the US Immigration and Naturalisation Service, 30,000 illegal Chinese aliens enter the United States every year. In addition, it is estimated that more than 100,000 Chinese leave for other countries each year, European destinations included. In June 2000 the horrific death of fifty-eight illegal Chinese immigrants who suffocated in the back of a lorry while trying to enter Britain from the Netherlands brought the issue to the world’s attention in a dramatic fashion. The people-smuggling gangs are also exporting, under the guise of political refugees, an unknown number of people forced to co-operate with the gangs, such as drug couriers and prostitutes.16 It goes without saying that the activities of Chinese organised crime are regarded in Europe with serious concern. Another serious threat to Europe’s relations with Asia stems from the problem of maritime piracy. The Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, the Gulf of Tonkin and Northeast Asian waters have witnessed a growing number of pirate attacks against commercial vessels in recent years. According to figures provided by the London-based International Maritime Bureau, of the 229 piracy incidents that took place in 1997, 110 occurred in East Asia. Maritime piracy involves serious crimes such as armed boarding, hostage taking, and physical attacks against crewmembers. It causes a great deal of concern both regionally and internationally. The triangle that covers the waters between Hong Kong, Luzon and Hainan Island is increasingly regarded as the most pirateinfested region in the world. Attacks in that area are characterised by a high degree of precision and sophistication, and most attackers are well armed and trained, and highly organised. This does not mean that Chinese gangs are exclusively involved in maritime piracy, but the incidents quoted in the report by the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation show that many ships hijacked by armed pirates between 1995 and 1998 disappeared into ports along China’s southern coast.17


Another field of organised crime activity in China is the manufacture of counterfeit goods. During the first half of 2000, the number of product piracy cases increased by 20 per cent compared to the previous year. Half of the 319,000 cases belong to the category of ‘unfair competition’, such as the counterfeiting of trademarks. The cost to companies around the world is about US$650 million. According to William Dobson, vice-chairman of the China Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, China is the worst offender in the world when it comes to the production of counterfeit goods.18 One of the underlying reasons for this is that the concept of intellectual property rights is not well-developed in Chinese culture. In spite of repeated promises made by the Chinese government to amend the laws of patents, trademarks and copyright to World Trade Organisation (WTO) standards, the situation has worsened over the past few years. In 1998, fake products worth more than US$17 billion were available on the Chinese market. 19 However, fake products are not restricted to the domestic market; they increasingly find their way to other countries. The consequences are obvious. China not only ruins its own reputation but also looses billions of dollars in taxes. Further, the damage done to investor confidence is incalculable. Who will invest in a country where counterfeiting and cheating is normal practice? The decreased interest of foreign companies in establishing joint ventures in China is partly explained by the problem of product piracy. The stealing of know-how by Chinese business partners and the selling of products illegally using foreign trademarks is a typical problem in joint ventures. Foreign partners are frustrated because the legal system is not well developed and official corruption is endemic. As a result of this situation, in 1997 the number of independently operating foreign companies exceeded the number of joint ventures for the first time.20 Conclusion The subject of this book focuses on many negative aspects of China’s political system, foreign relations, society and economy. This tends to produce a rather one-sided picture. Beyond the concerns and threats there is, of course, hope and cautious optimism that the Chinese leadership will understand that there are a number of tasks vitally important for the PRC if it wants to gain the respect of the international community. These include strengthening the legal system, expanding the role of parliaments, strengthening civilian control over the military and


police, fostering a free press, and ending the suppression of religious freedom. There is cautious optimism that as a member of the WTO China will gradually become an integrated part of the international community, and that this process will also improve the domestic political culture. If China in practice refuses to accommodate human rights standards as stipulated by the UN, then it will remain a source of instability, with negative consequences for Europe-China relations. Notes 1 Wolfgang Franke and Brunhild Staiger, China Handbuch (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1974), p. 207. 2 For more on this phenomenon see Joachim Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow: The History of an Uneasy Relationship, 1972 to the 1990s (London: Hurst & Co., 1995), p. 160. 3 Xinhua News Agency, 3 April 1979. However, before normalisation could take place the Chinese side demanded that Moscow withdraw from Afghanistan; that it stop supporting the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia; and that troop levels be reduced along the Sino-Soviet and SinoMongolian borders. These demands had been fulfilled by and large when President Gorbachov visited Beijing in May 1989 and both sides agreed to resume normal relations. 4 Gerald Segal, “Does China matter?”, Foreign Affairs (Sept./Oct. 1999), pp. 24–36. 5 See “EU forges stronger trade ties with Taiwan”, Taipei Journal, 15 December 2000, p. 7. 6 See Jonathan D.Pollack’s chapter in this volume. 7 Mark J.Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, Adelphi Paper No. 298 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1995). 8 International Herald Tribune, 23 November 2000. 9 CHINA aktuell, Monthly, Institut für Asienkunde, Hamburg XXVIII, no. 2 (February 1999), p. 112; Oskar Weggel, Chaos, Ratlosigkeit und Angst vor Präzedenzwirkungen. Chinas Haltung im Kosovo-Konflikt, ibid., XXXVIII, no. 3 (March 1999), p. 262. 10 The European, 24–30 March 1995. 11 Stefan Friedrich, “China’s Policy vis-à-vis the European Union”, CHINA aktuell XXVI, no. 11 (November 1997), p. 1094. 12 Stefan Friedrich, Europa und China in den neunziger Jahren. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, Bonn, B 27/98, 26. Juni 1998, pp. 41–42. 13 The Trilateral Commission, An Emerging China in a World of Interdependence (New York, Tokyo, Paris: The Trilateral Commission 1994), p. 58.


14 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1995/1996, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS), p. 176. 15 International Herald Tribune, 26 June, 2000. 16 Time, 1 February 1993. 17 Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Responding to the New Security Agenda: An Asian Perspective” in A Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC) Task Force Report, Strengthening International Order. The Role of Asia-Europe Co-operation (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 185–187. 18 “China—ein Paradies für Fälscher”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 August 2000. 19 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 August 2000. 20 For more detailed information see Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 7 November 2000.

CHAPTER SIX Changing British Perceptions of the China Threat, 1945–2000 Brian Hook

Introduction This chapter has three main aims. The first is to review, retrospectively, British perceptions of the threat from China to the interests of the United Kingdom (UK) from 1945 to 1997. This period begins with the end of the Second World War and culminates with the retrocession of Hong Kong.1 The second aim is to examine the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) of the British House of Commons, published in November 2000, for evidence of current British perceptions of the threat from China.2 The significance of the FAC report lies in its being the first from that important cross-party committee of Members of Parliament (MPs) since the retrocession of Hong Kong. The third aim is to draw tentative conclusions from the trends evident in the chronological review and the documentary examination that may offer pointers to sources for threat perception in Anglo-Chinese relations in the early twenty-first century. British Perceptions of a Threat from China, 1945–1997 For Britain, the end of the Second World War also marked the beginning of the formal end of empire. At home, the outstanding wartime political leader Winston Churchill failed in a bid to lead the Conservative Party to election victory in 1945 when the Labour Party swept in with a landslide. With Labour in power, the trend was towards creating a semisocialist system with far reaching implications for the worldview of its government. Shortly after the end of the war, preparations were made for the granting of independence on the Indian sub-continent to the two new states of India and Pakistan. Elsewhere in the British Empire, the policy was to introduce or improve forms of representative government under the existing colonial system.

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As far as British interests in China were concerned, this policy was to be implemented in Hong Kong. Shanghai, the other principal location of British interests, was not sovereign territory, although in practice its foreign settlements had enjoyed a residual degree of extra-territorial local administrative and legal control. There, the international settlement had been managed by an elected Municipal Council. This model was deemed by many as eminently suitable for Hong Kong. This view did not, however, carry universal conviction among Hong Kong expatriates and local residents. From 1946 until 1952 the Hong Kong government and its advisors, led successively by Sir Mark Young and Sir Alexander Grantham, havered over the question of whether and how best to introduce a form of municipal government offering a greater degree of local representation than presently existed. The issue also subsumed consequential reform to the Legislative Council, and posed the question of risk to existing vested interests.3 In retrospect, the failure of the efforts to introduce constitutional reform during the 1945–1952 period, i.e. pre-dating the restoration of civil administration in 1946 until the scheme was withdrawn, was due partly to the success of its detractors and doubters, many of whom may have had their own covert agendas, and partly due to the rapidly changing political scene in China and elsewhere in East Asia. At one point, for example, it was possible to link reform to a perceived threat that Chinese, meaning Kuomintang (KMT), politics could find a platform in Hong Kong. In theory this could have happened through reforms providing for elections to a Municipal Council and the Legislature, resulting in a loss of political control. At times during the exchange of views, the British Foreign Office feared that the prospect of constitutional reform in Hong Kong would excite demands for retrocession. As the tide turned unexpectedly against Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT, and a victory for Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became a reality, the question was posed as to whether the time was opportune for constitutional reform. By 1948 the threat of KMT opportunism in Hong Kong politics had been replaced by the threat of CCP opportunism. This led to further delays in considering modified proposals for reform. On 17 October 1949, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) eventually reached the northern border of Hong Kong and there was no indication that their halt was permanent. The perceived threat to British interests in China was clearly acute and increasing. The foci were Shanghai and Hong Kong.

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The British response was practical and realistic. The Hong Kong garrison was strengthened to the point that it could only have been overwhelmed by a swift and determined attack. This carried a twofold message. Firstly, any PLA attack would have to be approved at the highest level of command, and would therefore have had to be seen as strategically important by Mao Zedong and his closest comrades. Secondly, the success of any attack could have been sufficiently delayed by a counter-attack to enable the US to join the UK in support of a conflict with the nascent communist state. Given the vulnerability of the CCP at that stage, and the potential for its making use of British Hong Kong in the future, the hope was that Hong Kong could have survived in the short term. As regards the longer term, Britain moved in the autumn of 1949 to extend diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), an initiative that was taken in January 1950. Although politically divisive both at home and abroad, it was hoped that this would provide greater balance to the diplomatic relations of the PRC, by now ‘leaning to one side in world affairs’, and give weight to efforts designed to reduce the threat to British interests in China. This rationale lost credibility when the PLA entered the Korean War in November 1950. Before long, British troops among the United Nations (UN) forces were in battle against PLA contingents. In the context of the constitutional reforms proposed for Hong Kong, the war was a further cause of delay. In view of the risk of general conflict in the area, the Foreign Office cautioned against action that the PRC might deem provocative to the extent that it could induce retaliation by one means or another. Before long, the war was to have wider repercussions for the UK. British Far Eastern colonies, including Hong Kong, were dependent on trade with China. This eventually gave rise to a serious controversy between the US and the UK over the content and extent of such trade. Of particular concern was trade in strategic goods such as Malayan rubber. In June 1951, following a UN resolution urging an embargo on all military and strategic items, the UK introduced an export licensing system, which was extended to dependent territories including Hong Kong, to control trade with China. Although trade in non-strategic materials and merchandise was not affected, the embargo on trade in goods classified as strategic brought some hardship to Hong Kong and other UK territories. The controversy had an adverse effect on US-UK relations; the war and the embargo did nothing for Anglo-Chinese relations. The consequences for the PRC were long-term containment, political isolation and the emergence of Taiwan

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as a political and economic challenge. Throughout the controversy between the US and the UK it was evident that, viewed from the former, the main threat was the potential for communist domination of East Asia unless resolutely checked by democratic forces. Viewed from the latter, while the threat from communist domination was readily acknowledged, there was also the perception of the threat to established British interests to be taken into consideration.4 The war delayed progress on the constitutional reform programme in Hong Kong until the end of 1951. In the UK, a general election towards the end of 1951 returned the Conservative Party. Both the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office were supportive of modified proposals drawn up in 1950, the latter having noted that there was no danger of provoking PRC criticism of the Hong Kong administration as it was already virulent. It is evident, however, that enthusiasm for the reforms had waned. This is aptly shown in a letter from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office in which the writer, defending the revival of the programme, stated ‘the balance of disadvantage now lay on the side of continued inaction’. Although the proposals were approved by the cabinet, an intervention by unofficial members of Executive and Legislative Councils in Hong Kong induced the UK government to withdraw the scheme.5 The precise reasons for this volte face remain obscure. The most plausible explanation is that although the proposals had been diluted, this had not dispelled fears, understandably intensified by events, that constitutional reforms could lead to disruptive political activity that in turn would increase the existing threats to the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Among international events that would have intensified this perception of threat were the Korean War and the possibility of imminent PRC intervention in Hong Kong. From that juncture onwards, a perception began to emerge of Hong Kong as a ‘borrowed place, in borrowed time’ .6 Consequently, the question of constitutional reform, though considered, was not seriously revisited until the 1980s.7 By then Hong Kong had not only survived, but prospered under colonial administration. Moreover, it had succeeded in making itself indispensable to the rational operation of the PRC economy. During the 1950s and 1960s, Hong Kong had accommodated waves of refugees from the mainland, among them outstanding talents whom the CCP could ill afford to lose. These talents benefited from the British system, which was by now developing a sui generis form of representative government, characterised as the ‘administrative absorption of polities’. They created a manufacturing base and a flourishing export economy. Hong Kong

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became an indispensable source of foreign exchange for China and a window on the world for the CCP. Those factors enabled the Hong Kong authorities, with difficulty but confidently, to meet the challenge of the Cultural Revolution. There was no perceived strategic threat to the survival of Hong Kong. This fact is confirmed by the refusal of the CCP, at the time, to negotiate the retrocession of Macau by Portugal, lest it destabilise Hong Kong. By the 1980s, however, a new generation of Hong Kong residents had emerged. Many wished to challenge the justification for the perceived unreconstructed colonial administration under whose benevolent but conservative auspices their prosperity and stability had been gained. With the certainty conferred by the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, it appeared possible to revisit the question of constitutional reform leading to democratisation. Accordingly, this process was initiated by the Hong Kong administration but blocked in 1985 by PRC intervention. Elections from functional constituencies had been introduced in 1985, but those from geographical constituencies were postponed until 1991. By then, the events of 1989 had rekindled the embers of Leninism in the PRC. It was left to the last governor, Chris Patten, to constitutionally prepare for the implementation of the agreement in the Joint Declaration which stated that the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) should be constituted by elections. The Patten years in Hong Kong provide clear evidence of differing UK perceptions of the China threat. There are two positions to be considered. The first is that adopted by Patten. The second is that argued most forcefully and convincingly by the British ambassador who negotiated the text of the Joint Declaration, Sir Percy Cradock. The last governor was the first professional politician to hold that office. He was also the first recent incumbent to be unversed in Sinology. He was eulogised on his appointment and from time to time throughout his term from some quarters, particularly the media, for his straightforward, courageous, challenging and even confrontational attitude to the CCP and its representatives in dealing with the Hong Kong question. Three of his predecessors, Sir Murray MacLehose, Sir Edward Youde and Sir David Wilson were seen by some as Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) mandarins among whose stock-in-trade was an unnecessary predisposition to seek harmony in Anglo-Chinese relations, regardless of the effect on democratisation in Hong Kong. Before the FCO had become the principal source of Hong Kong governors, a shift that indicated the destiny of Hong Kong, the four

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previous post-war governors had all risen through the old Colonial Service.9 With the exception of one, Sir Mark Young, these governors had all contributed, in one way or another, to the policy of keeping the question of constitutional reform on the back-burner. None of them was a Sinologue, but all were experienced colonial administrators. Each would have acquiesced in, if not contributed to, the official explanation that the reason for not having representative institutions was that there had been no overwhelming local demand for such a development. Moreover, unofficially, they might well have agreed that the PRC would have objected to free elections and that Britain had found it expedient to take heed of this. The rationale offered for the PRC position was that constitutional democratisation would have been interpreted as a step in the direction of independence. Accordingly, no progress could be condoned that might preclude or weaken the resumption of the exercise of Chinese sovereignty. The PRC had been swift to indicate its intentions on resuming the China seat in the UN in 1972. Latterly, the example of Taiwan could be used to support that applied rationale. While the whole truth for doing nothing before the arrival of Patten was never admitted by British ministers in office, references had been made in parliament to the ‘good reasons’ for not having developed representative institutions. The perception was: ‘Beijing would have viewed such a development with alarm’. This implicitly conveys the sense of a China threat to UK interests in Hong Kong. It remained strategically persuasive in UK politics, at least until 1997. Against this background, the last governor argued for and implemented a programme of sweeping constitutional reforms. The intention was to generate an elected legislature in 1995 which could span the 1995–1999 period. This was the concept of the ‘through train’ based on the principle of ‘convergence’ (between the Hong Kong constitutional reform programme and the Basic Law, the constitutional basis for the HKSAR).10 In practice, history shows there was never any hope that the Chinese government would, or indeed could, accept the interpretation of the Joint Declaration and the subsequent official correspondence between the two sovereign governments, on which the Patten reform programme was based. This position, or versions of it, was adopted by many of Patten’s critics. Among the most serious opponents of his programme was Sir Percy Cradock. The Cradock position was that not only was there little if anything to be gained but also that confrontation, in the run up to the retrocession,

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and the certain reversal of the programme thereafter, would amount to a serious loss. Hong Kong would be in a less advantageous position than would have been the case had the initiative not been launched, and had the envisaged ‘convergence’ and ‘through train’ strategies been allowed to proceed. This view assessed the Chinese government’s threat to set up a ‘second stove’ at its face value. In the event, Cradock, who enjoyed support in local Chinese, expatriate and UK business constituencies, was, in this context, proved right. Moreover, supporters have argued that more heed should have been taken of the threat, not only in the context of the future of Hong Kong but also in the context of the future of the Anglo-Chinese relationship. By pushing through the reforms, all of which were reversed, the UK had risked more than what was at stake in Hong Kong: the process was deemed to have engendered a threat to UK business interests in the PRC during the rapid economic growth of the 1992–1997 period. Supporters of the Patten position could respond that to have retroceded Hong Kong in the anomalous and anachronistic constitutional form required by the CCP interpretation of the treaty and subsequent correspondence would have been discreditable. It was best in this judgement to proceed in an honourable, transparent way in the direction of democratic reform, hitherto delayed, leaving the incoming sovereign the choice of dismantling or tolerating the degree of democracy achieved. Furthermore, supporters would agree that it was better for Hong Kong to have had the experience of all the democratic reforms in the Patten package, since this would enrich the debate over, and the response to, their reversal after retrocession. The Patten-Cradock controversy is of particular interest in assessing the changing British perception of the China threat. Patten had in view a fixed five-year term and an agenda before the handover to another administration. History would focus on this period and on the achievements of the British administration at the point of retrocession. The quest for an internationally acknowledged honourable withdrawal from a possession whose acquisition 150 years earlier was less than honourable was, therefore, well-motivated and carefully conceived. The principal threat from China was indeed to Hong Kong, but the circumstances of 1997 were manifestly very different from those of 1952. Its execution would be in the full glare of international attention, in particular that of the US, whose Hong Kong Policy Act carried with it an element of counter-threat.11 Furthermore, besides international opinion, the PRC had internal opinion and Taiwan opinion to consider.

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This equation led Patten, in a sense, to call the bluff of his adversary. Cradock was as aware of the factors in the equation as Patten but considered, in all the circumstances, the balance of advantage lay in accepting the Chinese government’s view of the treaty. This would have placed it in the position where it had the responsibility to consider acceding to adjustments to its preferred policy, to facilitate the UK requirement for an honourable withdrawal. This approach implied a level of confidence, gained from experience, that were there to have been no UK-PRC confrontation over the constitutional reform programme, there would have been some movement towards facilitating the UK requirement and a better climate in post-handover Hong Kong. Furthermore, the diplomatic approach could have averted any threat to, and indeed been beneficial to, UK business interests in the PRC as a whole.12 In this controversy, Patten prevailed. The PRC executed its threat to dismantle the outcome of the constitutional reform programme in the HKSAR. As the HKSAR enters a crucial period in its political development, it remains to be seen what legacy remains of the 1992–1997 experience of democratisation. Meanwhile, the UK entered a new phase in its relationship with the PRC. The Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons13 The introduction to the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) report makes a number of important points about Anglo-Chinese relations. It notes that when Labour was elected in May 1997, it would have been surprising had there been no move to formulate a new China policy. Although there would have been scenario planning to meet every contingency, even the worst, in the Hong Kong handover, the issue that had dominated British relations with China for over 50 years was set to become much less important. At the same time, the importance of China as a huge market whose society, politics and economics were changing, was growing. There was therefore the need to engage China, in a shift to other policy areas including the environment. Speaking in the House of Commons on 10 January 1997, the minister of state, the late Derek Fatchett, indicated: ‘the UK wanted to open a new chapter of more constructive relations across the board, addressing both trade and more difficult issues such as human rights’. Accordingly, as Patten left Hong Kong, the new government sought to initiate a fresh policy. Engagement and the integration of a modernising PRC into the world system were key features

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of the policy. The most visible sign of a new beginning was the exchange of visits by the heads of government. Tony Blair visited the PRC in October 1998 and President Jiang Zemin visited the UK in October 1999. The earlier visit was characterised by references to partnership and a constructive dialogue. Trade, investment, the environment and other issues dominated an 18-paragraph joint statement. The thorny issue of human rights formed part of one paragraph in the statement, despite the rhetorical emphasis on an ethical foreign policy for which the government was to become noted. Public dissatisfaction over human rights in the context of Tibet and democratisation was to become a major issue during the second visit. Methods used to restrain human rights demonstrators by the UK police were deemed unlawful. There were accusations of FCO and police complicity to suppress free expression during the visit. Consequently, popular sentiment shifted against the Chinese government. Questions were raised about the nature of the so-called UKPRC partnership. Among the issues FAC sought to clarify in its inquiry into the role and policies of the FCO in relation to China were whether human rights had: ‘Slipped down the bilateral agenda of our relationship with China by being confined to a box labelled “dialogue” while the main forces of the government effort was to be devoted to a new assault on the market opportunities China offered’. The enquiry sought therefore to examine the balance between concern for human rights and the commercial benefits accruing from good relations. Among other matters covered were the UK’s continuing responsibilities towards the people of Hong Kong, and the ‘welcome democratic developments in Taiwan’.14 Addressing the FAC, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook justified attaching importance to Anglo-Chinese relations on the grounds that the PRC was: one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council; a nuclear power and thus relevant in the context of efforts to maintain a global nonproliferation regime of weapons of mass destruction; and the largest and most populous country in the world whose impact on global issues, for example on climate change, would be immense. The FAC noted the past costs of an isolationist PRC, citing its support for the Korean and Vietnam Wars. These episodes were contrasted with the benefits accruing from the PRC’s constructive stance, citing the recent developments on the Korean Peninsula. The FAC noted the concept and implications of the PRC as a ‘defence superpower’, of the decay of communism as an ideology, and consequently of the greater role of patriotism and nationalism.15 Regarding human rights, the FAC noted that despite general improvements in standards of living, it was not possible to record steady

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progress on human rights in China. The exercise of the key rights of freedom of expression, assembly, association, conscience and religion had deteriorated. The experience of the FAC during its visit to the PRC in June 2000 led it to conclude: ‘the way in which we were prevented from meeting human rights activists during our visit was a graphic illustration for us personally of the absence of human rights in China’. The ‘way’ to which reference was made included summoning the UK ambassador to a meeting to inform him that the wish to meet activists was ‘inappropriate’, carried ‘negative consequences for the bilateral relationship’, and would ‘definitely not be allowed’. Apparently, the ambassador queried the legal basis for preventing FAC members meeting Chinese citizens. The response is not recorded. Acknowledging the threat implied, the FAC did not proceed with any meetings. Instead, the FAC challenged a vice minister on the Chinese government’s stance. It was told to respect the wishes of its host, the National People’s Congress (NPC). Dissidents, it was stated, were hostile to the Chinese government and ‘friendship would be prejudiced if the FAC met such people’. The vice minister indicated that China welcomed criticism based on goodwill but establishing relations with those hostile to the government was ‘not a way of fostering goodwill’. The FAC found that explanation ‘chilling’.16 With human rights placed at the centre of UK foreign policy, the FAC report proceeded to address the areas where, in its view, respect for human rights fell below international norms, noting the PRC response to criticism of its record. The first sections cover the suppression of democracy activists. It concluded: ‘The actions against democracy activists are entirely out of keeping with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), with its guarantees of freedom of opinion and expression, and of the right to take part in public affairs through free elections’. Regarding workers’ rights, it noted that the PRC had still to meet a number of core labour standards set by the Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). It drew attention to the causes of labour unrest, including increasing disparities in wealth, job insecurity, redundancy and unemployment. It concluded that the ‘suppression of workers’ rights is not in keeping with the rights under Article 22 of the ICCPR to freedom of association to form trade unions’. The next section dealt with human rights in Tibet, repression in Xinjiang, and aspects of political control and economic expropriation in Inner Mongolia. It concluded that practice in respect of national minorities ‘are not in fully in keeping with the spirit of Article 27 of the

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ICCPR’ which seeks to uphold the rights of minorities to enjoy their own culture, profess or practise their religion and to use their own language. Subsequent paragraphs focus in detail on the suppression of religious beliefs, the legal system, detention conditions and torture, the death penalty, reproductive rights and media freedom. In each case, the FAC finds reason to criticise practices in the PRC. It concludes with the view that the PRC record must be judged by the standards in the human rights instruments it has signed or ratified. In its conclusion, the FAC also notes the view that China is attempting an impossible balancing act of encouraging economic modernisation while preventing political change. While noting the argument that a beleaguered leadership might be expected to suppress any perceived threat to its power, the FAC suggested an alternative view, namely: that the international balance had tipped in favour of the Chinese government due to the perception, by other countries, of the market opportunities created by an economically liberalised PRC.17 Having described areas where human rights were abused, the FAC next reviewed areas of clear progress. The report acknowledged greater freedom of information, of choice, rights under the judicial system, freedom from want, and improvements in rural local governance through village elections. It recorded a vice minister’s assertion that the people probably enjoyed an unprecedented quality of life, and the view that the West should give greater credit to the process of development of rights rather than being obsessed by one or two individual dissenters. Regarding human rights mechanisms, the PRC had, in its international behaviour and collaboration, symbolically acknowledged that they were an international concern which was a significant advance on the position in 1994, the time of the previous FAC report. Covenants had been signed, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, had visited the PRC in 1998 and 2000. Robinson had signed a technical cooperation agreement with the PRC on human rights in November 2000. Balancing the cultural, historical, developmental and economically determinist arguments, and factoring in the possibility of exaggeration in the reporting of the abuse of human rights, the FAC made the following recommendations. The UK government should continue to strongly endorse the principle of the universality of human rights, regardless of the political, economic and cultural systems of individual states, as reaffirmed in the Article V of the Vienna Declaration of 1993 (which followed the UN-sponsored World Conference on Human Rights and which was endorsed by the PRC).18

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The next section of the report addressed the UK government’s approach to human rights conceived as a ‘constructive but critical dialogue’. Although more tangible overall progress could have been made, the report acknowledged the success from a programme of cooperation in the sphere of law. The FAC concluded that this was a sensible way to advance the human rights agenda. It urged that legal cooperation in the sphere of commerce must not eclipse the human rights aspect of legal cooperation, and recommended that the UK government should commit itself to a long-term co-ordinated programme of such cooperation. Regarding the policy of dialogue on human rights, the report recommended in the interests of transparency and evaluation for the government to set out each year its objectives together with its achievements over the past year.19 So far, the references to human rights abuse can be described as a UK perception that this amounted to an unacceptable systemic threat to the development of better governance. The Chinese government flatly rejected the factual basis for such a perception, linking dissidence to disorder and instability. The importance of stability in the PRC, both for its citizens and for the international community, was evident in some statements delivered to the FAC, and not exclusively by members of the business community. In the first direct reference to threat perception in the UK, it noted that some people believed any attempt to tackle China over tough issues such as human rights would alienate the Chinese side and threaten international stability. The example of the Chinese government playing on FCO fears that it might withdraw from bilateral dialogue to constrain the UK government’s ability robustly to apply pressure was also cited. On balance, the FAC acknowledged that while it was absurd for any foreign government to try to lay down rules for China, to abandon basic principles and leave it to go its own course would, in practice, also be irresponsible. The question was, what could realistically be done? There was a view that aspects of the existing dialogue approach actually threatened to delay progress on vital issues by forming a tie that bound the UK government to a Chinese approach. To dispel doubts, the FAC recommended the publication of a forward work plan from which evidence of achievements through dialogue could be judged. To strengthen the UK approach, it was also recommended there should be closer co-ordination between major European Union (EU) powers, Japan and the USA and, where relevant, the ILO. It was acknowledged,

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however, that a united stance to put pressure on the PRC would run the risk of increasing friction.20 In this context, there was a clear threat from the PRC to the process of dialogue should the EU or any dialogue partner co-sponsor a resolution criticising the PRC’s human rights record at the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in 2001. The British foreign secretary asserted that a critical motion was an alternative to dialogue: the two could not coexist. In the past, there had been a failure by the EU to present a united front that did not reflect the lowest common denominator. In 1997, the UK had backed a Danish motion that was blocked. Subsequently, the PRC had imposed limited commercial sanctions on Denmark. In 1998, under the UK presidency, the EU decided to suspend the tabling of resolutions in favour of dialogue. Notwithstanding the clear threat to the present arrangements, and in the light of doubts about their effect, the FAC recommended that the UK government should publicly state its willingness to support EU sponsorship of a motion drawing attention to continuing human rights abuses in the PRC. The FAC also indicated that the UK and the EU should make plain that the human rights record of a country was a factor in determining its suitability to host the Olympics, believing at this time that it would be inappropriate for China to host the games.21 A further indication of threat perception occurred in the paragraphs discussing what could be done about Tibet. The UK remained the only country not to recognise PRC sovereignty over Tibet, regarding it as ‘autonomous while acknowledging the special position of the Chinese there’. When the Dalai Lama visited the UK, he was, however, treated as a spiritual leader and not as the leader of Tibet. The All Party Parliamentary Group to Tibet, claimed that the FCO’s ‘deep apprehension of the Chinese aggressive style of diplomacy’ meant that the prime minister, alone among heads of government in Europe, felt the need to have a bishop present when he met the Dalai Lama, to assuage Chinese anger.22 Concluding the section on human rights, the FAC, notwithstanding conflicting views as to the potentially negative effect for UK business, recommended that the UK government, whose support for a number of positive developments in human rights was acknowledged, now needed to work in concert with EU partners to toughen its stance in response to the deterioration in standards over the past two years.23 The succeeding sections dealt with commercial interests, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and UK representation, followed by the FAC’s conclusions. The first four of these

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are examined in the following sections for evidence of threat perception. Commercial interests are described as being at the heart of the new China policy. The focus here is on the reality of the stake (size, potential, allocation of resources) and the ‘price the UK would have to pay if a tougher line is adopted on human rights, given the link the Chinese government makes between political relations and the allocation of contracts and licences’.24 The FAC noted that state control of business created an opportunity to exert pressure on other governments by granting licences or contracts to companies from favoured states, while denying them to companies from countries which acted in an ‘unfriendly manner’. The authorities did not see a clear distinction between official UK bodies and UK companies, a reflection of the rather blurred distinction in China. Two sources referred to the negative impact on business of the disputes over Hong Kong. It may be inferred from the FAC report, however, that economic growth, restructuring, and the effect of multilateral rules under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), would reduce the perceived threat to commerce generated by difficulties in the bilateral relationship.25 The section on Hong Kong appeared particularly significant for the territory’s having been so dominant in pre-1997 perceptions of the threat from China. In this context, the report recorded that, with the resolution of the Hong Kong issue and from a business promotion point of view, bilateral relations with China had become easier. The UK legacy there included some 25,000 nationals, 3.5 million British National Overseas (BNO) passport holders, and a total stock of investment amounting to around £14 billion. Hong Kong has an investment stock of around £643 million in the UK generating around 18,000 jobs. Hong Kong remains the UK’s second largest export market in Asia after Japan, taking over £2 billion of UK exports annually, as well as being a conduit for an estimated £635 million or some 34 per cent of UK exports to the PRC. In the FAC view, upholding the Joint Declaration and ensuring that it was respected were clearly important in the protection of these and other related interests. The following passages covered the UK assessment of events since the handover, democratisation, upholding the rule of law, passports and consular support, and mainland intervention in Hong Kong politics. Arguably the most significant items from the aspect of threat perception were firstly expressions of concern about developments in the legal field, and secondly the reaction of the FAC to ‘counsel’ (i.e. advice) offered to it by the Foreign Secretary.

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As for the first item, the report recorded concern about developments that were beginning to cast doubt ‘in some quarters’ on precisely those principles and values which the UK and the PRC had agreed in the Joint Declaration to uphold. The quotation continued that it was therefore too soon to make a definitive judgement about whether the achievements of the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) were ‘secure and durable’. The FAC contrasted the tone of this statement with the more upbeat tone of those of the foreign secretary himself, and the prime minister. Regarding the second, the foreign secretary had ‘strongly’ counselled the FAC, in the context of seeking an increase in the pace of democratisation, against pressing for anything that disturbed the agreements of the Joint Declaration or Basic Law because ‘the moment we start pressing for a rearrangement of it, the Chinese will start pressing for it’. Quoting from the Joint Declaration to illustrate there was no conflict between what it permitted and the view of the FAC, the FAC found the argument that nothing should be done to disturb the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration unconvincing, and recommended accordingly.26 Evidence of threat perception was also clear in the section on Taiwan. UK interests were reflected in exports of £867 million in 1999, and inward investment in 170 companies employing 15,000 people. The UK did not, the FAC noted, recognise Taiwan as a state. In 1972, the UK had acknowledged the PRC position on Taiwan. In contrast, France and Germany had ‘agreed with’ China’s definition of ‘one China’. Regarding official ties, however, the price of diplomatic relations with the PRC was a prohibition on those with Taiwan, and it remained in the UK interests to pay it. The PRC remained very sensitive to any development that appeared to exceed existing unofficial links, as the visit in 2000 to the UK by the former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui had revealed. In that event, the PRC had decided to interpret certain engagements as political and retaliated by cancelling a number of planned visits including that of the economic secretary to the treasury. From the aspect of threat perception, the greatest danger to UK interests, and indeed to the global interests, could arise from hostilities across the Taiwan Straits. As unlikely as they may seem in the light of the very favourable trends in commercial relations, the possibility of the use of force could not be wholly discounted. The PRC had indicated at the time of the presidential election in 2000 that the ‘indefinite refusal to negotiate on reunification’ could be a pretext for military action. PRC frustration was the more intense because of the nationalism and

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patriotism engendered by the recovery of Hong Kong and Macau, and the lessons implicit in the exercise of democracy in Taiwan. Addressing the need to make clear the stance of the UK in the event of confrontation, the FAC noted the view that it would make a difference if it was apparent that opposition to the use of force was not limited to the US and Japan. It recommended that in the event of further threats, the UK should publicly clarify the political and economic costs of military action ‘preferably but not necessarily in concert with our European partners’. Lastly, the FAC urged more should be done by the UK to acclaim the development of Taiwanese democracy. While not proposing any change of position, it recommended an incremental strengthening of relations, including enhancing the status of inward and outward visits. 27 In addition to references to the jamming of BBC World Service broadcasts, inhibitions on the free availability of BBC World television, and allegations that the BBC has compromised its independence and integrity by developing a closer relationship with the PRC authorities, the section on UK representation contained an important reference to a new example of threat perception. This appeared in the discussion on visa arrangements. It referred specifically to the difficulties posed by illegal immigration from the PRC. The authorities had a difficult balancing act to perform between the protection of interests, fairness to all applicants and a system that did not impact on legitimate travellers. The FAC did not comment on the case of the bodies of the fifty-eight young people discovered in the back of the lorry in June 2000 as it was sub judice. That case did, however, illustrate the importance of co-operation with law enforcement agencies. The FAC noted that a problem existed in convincing the PRC authorities to provide replacement documentation to their nationals who arrived in the UK without travel documents, and recommended continued pressure to resolve the situation.28 Conclusion The conclusions that may be drawn from the chronological review in this chapter are reasonably clear. Regarding the 1946–1952 reform programme, while there was an opportunity to proceed to implementation soon after its unveiling in the mid 1940s, once that had been missed the perception of threat from China was so great that constitutional reform, though considered, was not strategically revisited until the 1980s. Whether this level of conservatism was justified remains debatable—many think not. Hong Kong could have started along the

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road to local democracy some time before the PLA halted at the gates. The question is, if the governance of Hong Kong had been different, then would or could the PLA have remained outside? In this context it could be argued that Hong Kong was indeed fortunate that reforms had not been implemented before 1949. Reforms would have signalled to some the distant possibility of British withdrawal. They would have involved elections. Elections would have generated partisan politics. Partisan politics could have assumed a role for those elected in the governance of Hong Kong. Had the KMT benefited to any degree, would the PLA have respected British sovereignty? The balance of probability is that the calculation made by the PLA leaders would have been different. The CCP could co-exist with a colony ruled by the British but not with one in which the KMT participated in governance. Had that been so, there would have been no Hong Kong as it came to be. British interests would probably have been treated as were such interests in Shanghai during the 1950s. Instead, the colonial regime continued. The business community, including British interests, flourished for almost five decades under an enlightened form of colonialism. For over three decades until the signing of the Joint Declaration, there was no serious development in partisan politics. Once the declaration had been agreed, however, the way appeared to be clear to proceed towards constitutional reform. The text appeared to sanction such reform and, for a short while, there was no intervention from the PRC. By the mid 1980s, however, it was clear that the pace and shape of reforms envisaged were unacceptable to the PRC. To have proceeded would, it was judged, have carried too great a threat to the ultimate success of the Joint Declaration in satisfactorily resolving the Hong Kong question. The recently restructured Hong Kong economy, heavily dependent on the PRC, would have suffered. British interests would have been harmed. In judging the level of threat perception in the second half of the 1980s, it is also important to factor in political developments in the PRC, elsewhere in the communist system, and the intelligence available to the British Hong Kong authorities in arriving at a decision to yield to PRC wishes. The suppression of the democracy movement in the PRC in 1989 increased the pressure for constitutional reform in the approach to 1997. The British response was, however, measured. The aim was to stabilise Hong Kong with three major initiatives. These were the world’s largest infrastructure programme, the Port and Airport Development Strategy.

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This focused attention on the future of Hong Kong. It promoted business confidence, created employment and, thanks to the economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s, was affordable. The second was the Bill of Rights Ordinance, which was designed to entrench a better level of human rights protection in Hong Kong legislation. The third was the British Nationality Selection Scheme to stem the flow of talent from Hong Kong. In retrospect, although those initiatives were essentially practical and were a measured response to threat perception, given the political climate, each became highly politicised in bilateral relations. This became the background to the term of office of the last governor. Whether the constitutional history, including the preparedness to take calculated risks, would have been similar with any other incumbent is on balance extremely unlikely. As a very senior and charismatic figure in the Conservative Party, his views on Hong Kong policy and his perceptions of threat and the appropriate responses prevailed over those held in the FCO. This was evident in the bitter clash with Sir Percy Cradock. Patten still has a ‘fan club’ in Hong Kong: he is seen by many ordinary people as a champion of their interests. His critics, mostly from the business community are, however, in the majority. Similarly, the most persistent of his critics in the UK are also from the business community. In summary, their view is that the pursuit of a doomed constitutional reform provoked confrontation and, unnecessarily, led to threats to British business interests. This view was echoed in the proceedings of the FAC.29 The FAC report is the first on relations with the PRC since the handover. The most noteworthy aspect of this report is that Hong Kong is no longer the main source of threat perception for the UK in the bilateral relationship. Important though it remains for treaty reasons and for the legacy of business and other interests, it is no longer a significant liability in the relationship. Consequently, this report is not dominated by Hong Kong matters. In the substantial section devoted to them, while concern is noted about certain developments in the HKSAR affecting its governance, there is no record of a serious perception of threat. The capacity for Hong Kong matters to complicate the bilateral relationship and even to engender threat perception remains, however, as the contretemps between the FAC and the foreign secretary over the permitted pace of democratisation revealed.30 In place of the dominance of threat perception from matters related to Hong Kong that was present in earlier reports, this publication reveals a very important trend. This is the likelihood of a much greater involvement in, and reliance on, multilateral mechanisms to minimise the

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threat perception engendered by complex bilateral diplomacy. Hong Kong could be cited as an example. Before 1997, apart from an active US involvement, the issue was seen to be bilateral. The UK and the PRC both subscribed to this procedure. Although the UK remains more closely involved in the implementation of the Joint Declaration than any other state, the EU has become as interested a party as the US, and monitors both the HKSAR and the Macau SAR.31 The subjects to have attracted the greatest attention in this report are human rights and commercial relations. Both are increasingly subject to international mechanisms. Human rights regimes are addressed through the UNHRC and trade through the WTO. From the evidence in the FAC report, it is possible that increasing pressure on the PRC to improve human rights will be exerted through the UNHRC with clear implications for the current bilateral and multilateral dialogues.32 Similarly, once the problems encountered over WTO accession are resolved, and it is noteworthy that they are already in the multilateral forum, issues arising will be also treated at that level. 33 Pending the WTO accession, there remains a range of problems in commercial relations that give rise to threat perception. It appears, however, that the promotion of UK trade in the PRC has become easier after the resolution of the Hong Kong issue. During the confrontation there had been a perception that the UK was at a disadvantage in commercial relations with the PRC. This has now receded. Even so, it is clear from the evidence that the prevailing political culture in the PRC is perceived as a threat to the principle of reaching decisions with regard to normal business criteria.34 Among the other sources of threat perception noted in the FAC report were those affecting the broadcasting of BBC material, both radio and television. Although not admitted, it is perceived that this is a retaliation for past broadcasts of material relating to the PRC, but either proscribed there or gathered by unauthorised means. The FAC noted a representation that the BBC had sought to improve its working relationship with the PRC authorities at the expense of the quality of its programmes, implying that the execution of threats worked. This practice (threats to bilateral relations) was also claimed to have been the basis for the handling of demonstrators during the presidential visit to the UK.35 Two other important perceptions of threat are recorded in the report, one a pre-existing threat, the other a relatively new threat. The preexisting threat arose from the view expressed in the PRC at the time of the presidential election on Taiwan, that an indefinite refusal to

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negotiate reunification could lead to the use of force. The perceived threat was of the use of force in one form or another that could escalate and involve the US, indirectly affecting the whole of the Western world.36 The new threat arose from the scale of illegal immigration from the PRC to the UK. This was exposed by the tragedy in which the bodies of fiftyeight young people from Fujian were discovered in a lorry at a channel port in the UK. There was not only a direct threat from the effect of such immigration on the resources of the UK, but also an indirect effect on the immigration services when, because of the need for enhanced vigilance, the interests of bonafide travellers were adversely affected.37 Lastly, it is significant that the response to both these threats reflected the multilateralism to which attention has already been drawn. In the case of the threat to use force to resolve the Taiwan problem, there was little the UK could do on its own. The course that could have been followed would have involved a joint response with EU partners alongside the US and Japan.38 Similarly, in the case of illegal immigration, while evidently something could be achieved bilaterally, it would not have been wholly effective without co-operation and collaboration on a multilateral basis with law enforcement agencies in states through which the trafficking is conducted.39 For the UK at the start of the twenty-first century, the concept of ‘cohesion among partners’ increasingly appeared to be a key factor in shaping responses to threat perception generally, and to the perception of threat from the PRC in particular. The effectiveness of this tactic is expected to be enhanced by the PRC’s greater involvement in, and dependence on, global systems in the course of modernisation. Notes 1 In accordance with the terms of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, the UK undertook to restore Hong Kong to the PRC from 1 July 1997. 2 Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tenth Report. The Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) is appointed to examine on behalf of the House of Commons the expenditure, administration and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (and any associated bodies). Its constitution and powers are set out in the House of Commons Standing Order No. 152. Its membership was seven Labour, four Conservative and one Liberal Democrat MPs. The Report was published on 29 November 2000. It contains over 200 paragraphs based on extensive written and oral evidence, as well as a visit to China. It is published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO) but all Committee Publications, including Reports, can be found on the Committee’s website at www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom/

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3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10

11 12 13 14 15

fachome.htm which is the source of the text to which references are made in this chapter. Brian Hook, “From Repossession to Retrocession: British Policy towards Hong Kong 1945–1997” in Li Pang-kwong (ed.), Political Order and Power Transition in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1997), pp. 1–29. Brian Porter, Britain and the Rise of Communist China, A Study of British Attitudes 1945–54 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 85–132. N.J.Miners, “Plans for Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1946– 52”, The China Quarterly, no. 107 (September 1986), pp. 463–483. The proposals to reform the Hong Kong constitution over the period 1945– 1952 and the reasons why all but the last modest proposal were rejected are examined in Steve Yui-sang Tsang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China and Attempts at Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1945–52 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988). Richard Hughes, Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time: Hong Kong and its Many Faces (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976). Report of the Working Party on Local Administration, Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Government Printer, 1966). Green Paper: A Pattern of District Administration in Hong Kong, June 1980’, White Paper: District Administration in Hong Kong, January 1981. Between 1966 and the 1980s, save for the overspilling of the Cultural Revolution, Hong Kong prospered. Administrative change was within tradition: Brian Hook, “The Government of Hong Kong: Change Within Tradition”, The China Quarterly, no. 95 (September 1983), pp. 491– 511. The reforms, initiated in the 1980s and extending to 1995, enjoyed popular support but aroused suspicion and eventually antagonism in the PRC. Brian Hook, “Political Change in Hong Kong”, The China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993), pp. 840–863. The Colonial Service was the overseas administrative arm of the Colonial Office. In the UK, the evolution and transformation of the empire is reflected in the titles of the offices of state. The Dominions Office was established in 1925 and replaced by the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1947. This was merged with the Colonial Office in 1968 to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC was adopted on 4 April 1990 by the National People’s Congress (NPC). Consultations and drafting had been conducted from 1985 onwards. The Basic Law incorporates the agreements in the Joint Declaration. The adopted version reflects, however, a hardening of the PRC position after the suppression of the 1989 Democracy Movement. The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, 22 USC 5731 as amended. This interpretation of the two positions is based on impressions gained at private meetings with their respective advocates and public and published statements. Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tenth Report, op. cit. Ibid., A New China Policy, paras 1–10. Ibid., Integrating China into the International System, paras 11–18.

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16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Ibid., Human Rights, Introduction, paras 19–23. Ibid., Human Rights Concerns, paras 24–45. Ibid., Human Rights in China: The Case in Mitigation, paras 46–61. Ibid., The Government’s Approach: The Policy of Dialogue, paras 62– 76. Ibid., Human Rights. Beyond Dialogue, paras 77–86. Ibid., UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution, paras 87–94. Ibid., Action on Tibet, paras 97–100. Ibid., para 108. Ibid., para 109. Ibid., Advancing British Commercial Interests. State Control, paras 120– 125. Ibid., Hong Kong, paras 142–174. Ibid., Taiwan, paras 175–191. Ibid., United Kingdom Representation in China, paras 198–208. Ibid., para 120. Ibid. Conclusion: Ready for Democracy?, paras 158–160. The first annual Report by the European Commission (EC) on the HKSAR was published in 1999 (COM (1998) 796 final) and the second in 2000 (COM (2000) 294 final). The SAR of Macau gains visibility in Europe through the 1992 EU-Macau Trade and Cooperation Agreement. See also The EU and Macau beyond 2000 (COM (1999) 484 final). Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tenth Report, op. cit., paras 87– 94. Ibid., paras 139–141. Ibid., paras 143 and 120–125. Ibid., paras 203–208 and para 4. Ibid., paras 183–187. Ibid., paras 201–202. Ibid., para 187. Ibid., para 202 Ibid., para 91.

CHAPTER SEVEN The Japanese Assessment of the ‘China Threat’ Wenran Jiang

Introduction Japan has been paying close attention to the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a world power. Tokyo wants to make sure that it has a smooth relationship with its close neighbour Beijing. As the second largest economy in the world, Japan seeks to benefit from China’s huge market while minimising the mainland’s ‘competitive advantage’. As the most important ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan has to tread a delicate line between Washington and Beijing, as the tension between the two has been heightened since President George W.Bush came to power in early 2001. This chapter examines Japanese perceptions of a potential China threat. First, it considers the issue of threat perception in Japan’s foreign policy in general. Second, it discusses threat perceptions in Sino-Japanese relations. Third, it examines in detail the Japanese debate on a potential China threat. Finally, it considers changes in Japan’s China policy as the outcome of this debate. Threat Perception in Japanese Foreign Policy There are a number of factors that affect Japan’s threat perceptions in general. First, as an isolated and resource-poor island state, Japan is constantly sensitive to all forms of threat to its national security. The Meiji Restoration movement in the 1860s was primarily a response to the threat posed by the United States and other Western countries to Japan’s national survival. The entire modern history of Japanese diplomacy has been, in a sense, a process of responding to perceived threats from abroad. Japan’s preoccupation with national security has become more sophisticated over the past fifty years. In the late 1970s, Japan adopted a

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new definition of security—‘comprehensive security’ (sôgô anzen hoshô), which held that any threat to life was a national security concern.1 The second factor is that Japan is known for its so-called ‘perception studies’. When these studies began there was an effort to translate large amounts of foreign literature, especially that in the English language, into Japanese in an attempt to better understand the world. In the 1970s, with Japan rising to the status of a major power, the Japanese began to focus on how they were perceived by the outside world. Initially, they primarily dealt with foreign perceptions of Japan’s success, and later on foreign perceptions of it as a threat. Nowadays, any sizeable bookstore in Japan will have a special section on Nihonron or Nihonjiron (studies on Japan or the Japanese), most of which are written by foreigners. The third factor is Japan’s alliance relationship with the United States over the past fifty years, which has in many ways defined and shaped Japan’s threat perceptions. In the 1950s and 1960s, Japan followed the US Cold War strategy and regarded the Soviet Bloc and the PRC as primary threats to world security. In the 1970s and the 1980s, a de facto strategic relationship developed between Tokyo, Washington and Beijing designed to contain the USSR. Since the early 1990s, the ‘China threat’ theory has gained currency as the PRC itself has emerged as a major world power. Japan has closely followed the US debate on the China threat.2 Now, Japan’s foreign policy makers must face China’s charge that the newly strengthened Japan-US alliance is an effort to strategically contain China. As will be shown later, China may be viewed as a potential threat by the United States, but Japan has not been so explicit.3 Finally, Japan’s changing domestic environment will also likely influence how it perceives external threats. Since the 1990s, the Japanese economy has been in serious trouble, with no signs of recovering soon. The Japanese political map has also become unpredictable, giving no clear indication of which party or party coalition will exercise control in the coming decades. A new generation is in the process of taking over Japan’s foreign policy making (the politicians, the bureaucracy, the business community, academics and the press), and their perceptions of the world might be quite different from the older generation. These uncertainties and changes will leave their marks on the debate of Japan’s national goals and its future role in world affairs in the new century.

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Threat Perception and Sino-Japanese Relations Japan has had a long historical relationship with China—a relationship that has been mostly marked by friendly exchanges but also complicated by Japan’s aggression against China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.4 Historically, China was not perceived as a threat to Japan but mainly as a teacher, a trading partner, and for most of the time a dominant power in the East Asian international system to which most other neighbouring countries paid tribute. The rise of Japan in the middle of the nineteenth century was accompanied by the Qing dynasty’s decline and China’s descent into turmoil. China posed a threat to Japan in the sense that it had become too weak to resist the invasion of other major imperialist powers, thus threatening Japan’s position in competing with Russia, Germany, the United States, and other powers. How to deal with this threat led to a major debate in Japan between the pro-Western and Pan-Asian schools of thought. The consequent Japanese policy to eliminate this ‘threat’ was to take China by force, which was justified either by concepts of survival of the fittest, or by the ‘Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’ against Western imperialism. Threat perception has been a preoccupation in the post-war period. Although Japan was not as enthusiastic in advocating a threat from ‘Red China’ as the United States was in the 1950s and 1960s, it nevertheless followed the US-Japan security arrangement. At the same time, Beijing constantly warned of the possibility of renewed Japanese militarism. The process of normalising diplomatic relations in the early 1970s was also a process of dealing with an external threat.5 A major strategic calculation of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to normalise relations with the United States and Japan was to counter the threat of nuclear attack by the Soviet Union against the PRC. Even after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972, there were intense negotiations on whether a so-called ‘anti-hegemony’ clause should be included in the peace and friendship treaty that was signed in 1978 between China and Japan. Both Tokyo and Beijing implicitly, and often explicitly, acknowledged a Soviet threat to their national security in the 1970s and 1980s. During this period, China actually approved the existence of the US-Japan alliance, and sometimes praised its defensive function in the face of the ‘threat from the north’, i.e. the USSR. However, this has changed since the end of the 1980s, especially since the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1996. By the early 1990s, Japan was searching for a new post-Cold War direction, as well as a suitable relationship with the PRC and the United

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States. However, by the middle of the 1990s, a number of events reinforced Japanese concerns of China as a potential threat. This engendered a debate concerning the existence of a ‘China threat’ in the Japanese press, academic communities, think tanks, and foreign policy circles. According to the Japanese account, events which strengthened the idea that China posed a threat to Japan included the PRC’s rapid economic expansion; its increased defence expenditure over the years and lack of transparency concerning its military modernisation programme; China’s 1992 Territorial Waters Law by which Beijing claims sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (which Japan also claims sovereignty over and has actual control of) and the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea; the Chinese navy’s increased maritime operations in the South China Sea; China’s testing of nuclear weapons; the Chinese military’s large scale war games and launch of missiles near Taiwan; and strong anti-Japanese sentiment in China. Today, despite nearly three decades of close interaction, the bilateral strategic relationship is at its lowest point since the early 1970s. Public opinion in both countries shows a more negative sentiment towards the other. Despite all the talk of peace and friendship, a dangerous dynamic of a bilateral threat perception is developing: both sides increasingly view each other as a potential national security threat. The Chinese side has generated a large volume of literature on the subject in recent years. Most of this is very negative, and hostile towards Japan.6 There is a small group of Japan experts, most of whom are not security specialists, who tend to advocate a more co-operative relationship with Japan, but they are not influential in shaping public opinion in China. The debate holds that there is indeed a credible Japanese threat, although this may not be the case in the top leadership circle. This in turn has alarmed the Japanese side in its own debate on a potential China threat. The Japanese Debate on a China Threat Japanese perceptions of a threat from China must be studied in the broader context of Japan’s China policy development. In Japan, different schools of thought on how Japan should conduct its relations with China have existed for a long time.7 Many mainstream China specialists and older generation diplomats advocate a closer relationship with the PRC.8 A group of academics and security experts, small in number yet influential, have doubts about Japan’s overall approach in dealing with China, and they perceive China as a threat.9 Some people on the left of


Japanese politics, such as those in the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party, criticise Japan’s China policy.10 Those on the right of Japanese politics, be they anti-communists, traditional right-wingers, or pro-Taiwan lobbyists, also criticise Japan’s China policy.11 Although Japan’s ongoing China threat debate is largely a reflection of how various developments in the PRC in recent years have been assessed by these different schools, there are indications that the voice of a younger generation of scholars, diplomats, and Japan’s defence establishment, is being heard more often. Analytical Frameworks As is the case elsewhere in the world, the theoretical dimension of the China threat is not well developed in Japan. There are attempts to develop theoretical explanations, but at best they can be seen as analytical frameworks. The best academic work so far in both theorising and in-depth analysis is a large volume edited by leading China expert Amako Satoshi.12 Most studies, however, focus on empirical evaluations of China’s domestic and foreign policies, and their implications for Japan. Japanese discussion of the China threat fits into two sets of analytical frameworks. The first set deals with the levels of analysis or the conceptual aspects of a China threat. The threat can be perceived in the following dimensions: 1) Threat as image—There is almost a consensus of views at this level. Most agree, including those who do not believe that there is a China threat, that China’s image in Japan has been increasingly tarnished since the late 1980s. The June 4 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, resumed nuclear testing, increased military spending, the launch of missiles near Taiwan, and naval activities in the South China Sea and near Japan’s territorial waters, among others, are generally cited as indications of China’s assertiveness and the reason for the Japanese public’s falling opinion of the PRC as reflected in public opinion polls. The debate is whether this ‘bad image’ constitutes a threat. Opponents warn that it is very dangerous to regard an image as reality. 2) Threat as intention—In other words, concerns about what the Chinese leadership intends to do should the PRC become a substantial political, economic and military power. This is the most controversial and difficult question. The Japanese have argued both sides of the story: some perceive a responsible China that will never use nuclear weapons first or seek hegemony in East Asia, and some perceive a China that is preparing

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for a military takeover of Taiwan, confronting the United States, taking control of major see lanes to secure energy supplies and shipping routes, and occasionally ‘teaching lessons’ to its neighbours. 3) Threat as capability—This dimension covers whether China, with or without hegemonic intentions, has the capacity to be a credible threat to Japan and others, or will have that capacity in the near future. The second analytical framework concerns the tangible forms of threat, that is, leaving the questions of image, intention and capacity aside, how would a China threat materialise in the context of East Asian international relations and world politics? There are three identifiable forms of threat scenarios: China as a hegemonic superpower; China as a weakened or disintegrated power; and a crisis over Taiwan. We now turn to look at each of these debates in detail. 1) China as an Expansionist Hegemonic Superpower For those who are convinced that a China threat is imminent, there are two significant forms of expansionist tendencies. The first concerns expansion as a result of continuous economic growth. Most of the works on China as an economic threat were published after the World Bank’s optimistic prediction of Chinese economic strength in the early 1990s. Some saw a greater Chinese economic zone emerging, centred on China and supported by ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Others pointed out that Chinese economic dominance may come in the form of low priced Chinese products being dumped in neighbouring countries’ markets.13 The Japanese have also noticed that the so-called ‘flying geese’ formation, the dominant Japanese view of East Asian economic growth pattern, is now being disrupted with China’s enormous capacity to compete for foreign investment in high-tech industries. China, being at the end of the formation behind the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), is now taking a lead in high-tech related sectors, taking over that position from, and at the expense of, the ASEAN states.14 In fact, there are concerns that these economic expansionist activities may threaten Japan directly. For example, the Japanese argue that the Chinese goods being dumped in Southeast Asia are eating away at Japan’s export market share in the region. The Japanese also note that China became an oil importer in 1993, leading to a competitive relationship with Japan in terms of international energy supply.


Those who disagree argue that China’s economic performance has great potential but it has been over-rated by threat advocates. They point to all the major problems embedded in the Chinese economy and conclude that there is no economic basis for a threat scenario.15 The second form of expansion tendency is military, as judged from Chinese behaviour in recent years. Threat advocates contend that the PRC has moved to fill the power vacuum in Southeast Asian that was left after the downsizing of US forces and the almost complete withdrawal of Russian forces in the early 1990s. The Japanese are particularly sensitive about the Territorial Waters Law passed in 1992 by the Chinese People’s Congress, which makes territorial claims to disputed islands in South China Sea, as well as the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. They argue that even after the Nye Report and later the renewed US-Japan alliance that went someway towards strengthening the US position in East Asia, the China threat has not faded. There are detailed analyses of China’s military strength.16 Some analysts already see China as a credible threat to the United States, and suggest that the only way to deal with the threat is to contain the PRC.17 However, the degree to which China poses a military threat is hotly contested. Moderates emphasise that Beijing’s military expansion should be watched closely. There is a lack of transparency in China’s military modernisation process, and there are concerns over its nuclear-missile capabilities. Nevertheless, China cannot compete with the United States and Russia in the short term. China’s ambitions may only be limited to its neighbouring waters and Taiwan. Moderates do not see China as a credible military threat, but they do blame China for creating a threatening image by bullying Taiwan and being more assertive in the South China Sea. They fear that China’s long term stable foreign policy has been eroded in recent years and that it shows signs of ‘taking the natural place of being a superpower’, feeding the threat theory from abroad.18 Those who disagree with such arguments point out that expanding military capabilities and a strengthened nuclear arsenal cannot be viewed as a threat. Nakae Yôkai, a former Japanese ambassador to the PRC, criticises the assertion that China’s expanding military power is a threat to Japan. He dismisses the argument as too simplistic, given that Japan does not view the United States as a threat with all its nuclear and military might. He warns that Japan should not adopt a narrow approach, which he defines as ‘preparing for the possible threat’ (kyôi ni sonaeru), by focusing on the PRC’s military strength and national defence policy.

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Rather, Japan should work out a comprehensive approach in dealing with threat, which he defines as working ‘to eliminate threat’ (kyôi wo nakunuru).19 To take such a broad approach, the only way for Tokyo to eliminate mutual suspicion in Japan and the PRC is to continue to support China’s reform and its open door policy.20 Others simply contend that there are embedded problems with Japan’s perception of the China threat. They point out that increases in China’s military spending were greater in the early 1980s, and the number of nuclear tests carried out by the PRC (44 as of June 1996) has been far less than that of the United States (1,320), the Soviet Union/Russia (750) and France (210). It is dangerous to draw a China threat conclusion from a simple image rather than from balanced and objective analysis.21 2) China as a Weakened or Disintegrated Entity The Japanese have paid much attention to the potential threat of a weakened China, a disintegrated China, or a China where the central government has lost control and the country has degenerated into chaos. They cite China in the 1920s and more recently in 1989. The very sensitive issue of refugees concerned Japan greatly in the post Tiananmen period when several thousands of Chinese refugees who were seeking to enter Japan landed on Kyushu and Okinawa. This leads to a related question that is crucial in studying any country’s foreign policy: what is the relationship between domestic stability and external threat? According to Amako Satoshi, there are four hypothetical combinations in the case of China: (1) Domestically stable with a low level of external threat. This scenario sees a China that is physically capable but has no intention of being aggressive towards other countries, which may be an ideal and desirable outcome for both China and the world. Alternatively, this may be seen as a liberal view of Beijing’s foreign policy behaviour. (2) Domestically stable with a high level of external threat. This scenario holds that China has both the capability and the intention to threaten others, which is the most dangerous scenario to the outside world. This view is clearly close to the realist explanation of how Beijing conducts its foreign relations. (3) Domestically unstable with a high level of external threat. In such a situation, China may not be capable of threatening but has the intention to do so, which is the most complicated and least desirable outcome.


(4) Domestically unstable with a low level of external threat. In this case, China is perceived as neither capable of, nor wanting to, pose a threat to neighbouring countries, which is the least dangerous scenario to the outside world.22 As Japanese perceptions of a China threat put special emphasis on China’s internal environment, it is worth pointing out their major concerns. To most Japanese observers, factors that may contribute to China’s weakening, slide into turmoil, or disintegration are: (1) The weakening of the dominant communist ideology since the late 1970s, and the potential inability of the central government and top leadership to cope with a major crisis. (2) Different forms of regional disparities and conflicts such as the north versus the south, the coastal areas versus interior; ethnonationalism versus Han majority rule, and the central government versus local and provincial interests. (3) The dissatisfaction of migrant and unemployed workers. Some observers predict that it is more likely that unemployed workers in urban areas, rather than peasants in rural areas, will cause social instability and turmoil.23 (4) A future food crisis. This is the familiar problem of ‘who feeds China’ as raised by some pessimists in the second half of the 1990s. The Japanese conclusion is that Japan would suffer the most should this scenario become a reality.24 (5) Continuous environmental degradation as a result of economic development and decentralisation.25 Considering a weak China rather than a strong China as a threat, many observers advise the Japanese government to continue to work closely with Beijing to actively avoid these scenarios. However, others advocate that China should be contained, and that Japan should not take a onesided policy of seeking friendship with China.26 3) A Crisis in the Taiwan Straits Japanese analysts worry that should Beijing take, or be forced to take, military measures against Taiwan, it is likely that the United States will become involved, thus making China hostile to the US-Japan alliance. In fact, new guidelines governing the US-Japan alliance in 1996 expanded Japan’s role in providing logistical support to the United States in the country’s ‘surrounding areas’. Tokyo has left the definition of the

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surrounding areas intentionally vague. Rather than treating the term in a geographic sense, the official Japanese position states that Japan’s responses will be ‘situational’, which is left.open to interpretation. To a certain extent, this stand reflects the dilemma Tokyo is facing on the Taiwan issue. Although pro-Taiwan groups in Japanese politics are a strong voice advocating the support of Taiwan in case of an ‘emergency,’ there are serious reservations about whether the new US-Japan guidelines have made Japan more secure in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Straits.27 Ambassador Nakae warned that Japan should not respond to crossStraits tensions by increasing its own military readiness.28 The above examination reveals a number of unique characteristics in Japanese perceptions of the China threat. First, the Japanese follow China’s strategic thinking very closely.29 Japan’s assessment of the China threat is somewhat unique in comparison to those of other countries. This is primarily due to the unique position that Japan occupies in both its status and its relations with the PRC and the United States. Second, Japan’s assessment of the China threat is closely linked to assessments of its own national security situation. Third, Tokyo is very concerned with the short and long term stability of China. Fourth, Japan is extremely sensitive to the possibility of a flow of refugees from the PRC. Fifth, Japan is moving steadily, although taking a low profile, towards military readiness in case of a confrontation. Finally, Japanese perceptions of the China threat are much more low-key than those in the US debate on the issue. Japan’s Changing Policy towards the PRC Japanese scholars and specialists have proposed different solutions based on different perceptions of the China threat. However, it is very difficult to identify which school of thought is the most dominant in shaping Japan’s policy towards the PRC. As a reflection of the China threat debate in Japan, we can identify the following signs in Japan’s changing policy towards the PRC since the second half of the 1990s. First, there has been a gradual upgrade in Japan’s official assessment of a potential China threat. In late 1995, the Japanese government approved a National Defence Program Outline for the period after 1996, the draft of which referred to the renewed US-Japan Security Treaty as ‘indispensable for safeguarding our country’s security, considering there is a large military power with nuclear capabilities in our country’s surrounding area’.30 This not-so-implicit reference to the China threat caused a major


debate in the Japanese parliament. The Social Democratic Party of Japan viewed it as hostile towards China and insisted that this sentence be removed. Eventually, the Outline was adopted without this portion. However, the episode itself demonstrated how the Japanese defence establishment perceives China. Second, Tokyo and Washington reconfirmed their security alliance relationship in 1996, with Japan having an increased role. Japan also entered into a joint research programme with the United States on Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) in late 1998 in the wake of North Korea’s launch of a satellite, which Tokyo regarded as a missile launch. It is widely acknowledged, although never officially claimed, that the longterm concern is China’s missile forces. A comparison of Japan’s defence white papers over the last two years highlights Tokyo’s increased sensitivity to China’s missile potential. The Defence of Japan 1999 edition summarised China’s missile capabilities as follows: ‘…China at present possesses a total of around 100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles whose range takes in the Asian region…’31 However, the 2000 edition puts it in the following way: ‘…China maintains about 70 intermediaterange ballistic missiles whose range takes in the Asian region, including Japan…’32 The mere addition of the phrase ‘including Japan’ caused immediate media attention. It stirred up a small but intense controversy in the bilateral relationship. The Chinese side protested, and was not satisfied with the four-point explanation given by their Japanese counterparts in an unofficial bilateral military exchange after the release of the white paper.33 Third, Japan is modifying its Overseas Development Aid (ODA) programme to China, and a general review has been carried out by two committees to give the Japanese more control over the process.34 While the total amount of ODA committed to the PRC has been reduced, the existing programmes will emphasise more projects related to the environment and other projects that are perceived as being vitally important in maintaining social and economic stability. Fourth, a public opinion war is being waged demanding that China tone down its anti-Japanese sentiment, that China should show more appreciation for Japan’s ODA, and that China should restraint its maritime activities near Japanese-claimed territorial waters. However, it would be overly simplistic to regard these as definite trends that revealed a move in Japan’s China policy towards a more confrontational approach. In the cabinet of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Tanaka Makiko, daughter of the late Prime Minister Tanaka

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who normalised relations with China, was appointed foreign minister. There is a clear indication that Tanaka wants to have a more conciliatory relationship with the PRC. She reportedly made remarks that contained friendly gestures towards Beijing and a critical attitude towards the Bush administration. Tanaka is now being criticised as ‘pro-China’ by bureaucrats in charge of foreign policy making in her own ministry and from her Liberal Democratic Party colleagues. It is still too early to know whether the remarks are merely Tanaka’s personal views or whether they mark a new direction in Japan’s foreign policy formation in dealing with the PRC and the United States. Conclusion The debate on whether China constitutes a threat to Japan continues today, and we are sure to see more books, articles, and opinions expressed on the subject in the future. What can we learn from the discussions so far? First, there are some interesting comparisons that can be made regarding how Japan and China perceive each other as a threat. China has long warned that Japan’s economic superpower status will inevitably and naturally translate into political and military power. China’s rapid economic growth has led many Japanese scholars and policy makers to look at China in the same way, which raises the question of how Beijing intends to use that power. Second, Japan seems to be heading towards a carrot and stick solution in dealing with a potential China threat. An engagement solution is to use ODA, other incentives, and close relations with China to assert influence and encourage the PRC to pursue a path that benefits Japan. At the same time, Japan must be alert and prepared. Japan has been building up its military force steadily. This has been accompanied by efforts to modify Japan’s constitution, which will allow a bigger role for Japan’s Self Defence Forces (SDF) in the international arena. There was also a demand, during the reorganisation of the Japanese bureaucracy to make it smaller, to upgrade the Japanese Defence Agency (JDA) to the level of a Ministry, reflecting the increased role of the defence establishment. The TMD programme, despite strong criticism from China, is on schedule, with the deployment cost under study (but not available to the public at present). Third, to put the Japanese debate about the China threat in a global context, it is worth noting that the Japanese are particularly good at


taking into consideration domestic developments in China. However, the Japanese discussion suffers from the problem common to many countries of focusing almost exclusively on Chinese behaviour (and its domestic roots), and hence makes little or no effort to critically examine Japan’s own foreign policy behaviour, or look at the extent to which Chinese behaviour might be a response to Japanese behaviour. Fourth, Japan is in a delicate trilateral relationship with China and the United States in dealing with mutual perception, the Taiwan issue, and the status quo in East Asia. As one Japanese scholar has observed, there will be a mixture of a managed alliance engaging China on the one hand, and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance in case of an unpredictable situation on the other. This has been labelled as the ‘new realist approach’.35 From a much broader perspective, we are observing an unprecedented situation in the history of East Asia. There are now two major power centres—Japan and China—in the region. Both must try to co-exist and deal with each other on equal terms. To sort out which perception reflects reality in this complicated bilateral relationship will remain a major challenge in the foreseeable future. Notes 1 For a comprehensive survey of Japan’s security thinking and policies, see Tanaka Akihiko, Anzen hoshô: Sengo 50 nen no mosaku (The Search for Security in the Past 50 Years since the End of War), (Tokyo: Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1997). 2 On the China threat debate in the United States, see Richard Bernstein and Ross H.Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997); Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997). 3 For an interesting discussion of the similarities and differences between Japan and the United States in their perceptions of China in the last two decades, see Nakai Yoshifumi, “Chûgoku no ‘kyôi’ to Nicchû Nichibei kankei” (“The China ‘Threat’ and Japan-China/Japan-US Relations”), in Amako Satoshi, (ed.), Chûgoku ha kyôi ka (Is China a Threat?), (Tokyo: Keisô shobô 1997), pp. 105–39. For an in-depth track-two analysis of Japan-US-China relations, see Okabe Tatumi, Takagi Seiichirô and Kokubun Ryôsei (eds.), Nicchibeichû anzen hoshô kyôroku wo mezashite (Aiming at Japan-US-China Security Cooperation) (Tokyo: Keisô shobô, 1999). 4 For a critical and detailed assessment of Japan’s conservative view of China, see Wakamiya Yoshibumi, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the Political Right Has Delayed Japan’s Coming to Terms With its History of Aggression in Asia, (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1998).

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5 Although the normalisation of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relationship occurred in 1972, the two countries took another six years to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship which formally ended the hostile relationship. 6 For a sample of recent publications in China that are very critical of Japan see, Tang Hui and Liang Ming, Dahe ‘chouba’ mon (The ‘Yamato Supremacy’ Dream) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 1996); Shi Jie, Zhongguo Gaosu Riben (China is Warning Japan) (Beijing: Kunlun Chubanshe, 2000); Ning Hai, Yeshin yu mimou: Shi ‘Zhongguo weixie’ haishi weixie Zhongguo? (Ambition and Conspiracy: Is ‘China a Threat’ or China is Being Threatened?), (Beijing: Zhongguo Huachiao Chubanshe, 2000); Zi Shui and Xiao Shi, Jingti Riben junguo zhuyi (Be Alert of Japanese Militarism) (Beijing: Jingcheng Chubanshe, 1997); Xio Jiwen, Chen Xianci and Yi Mingxing, Riben: Yige Buken Fuzui de Guojia (Japan: A Country that Does not Come to Terms with its Guilt) (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renbin Chubanshe, 1998); Yin Xiehua, Riben Jiojing Xing Gan Shenmo? Riben de mimi (What Does Japan Really Intend to Do? The Secrets of Japan) (Beijing: Zhongguo Dianying Chubanshe, 1999); Ying Xong, Sui zai Wexie Zhongguo Anchua (Who Threatens China’s Security) (Beijing: Shinhua Chubanshe, 1999). 7 On Japanese perspectives of postwar Sino-Japanese relations, see Furukawa Mantaro, Nichû sengo kankei shi (A History of Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations), revised ed., (Tokyo: Hara shobô, 1988); Tanaka Akihiko, Nicchû kankei 1945– 1990 (Japan-China Relations 1945–1990) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1991); Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992); Christopher Howe, (ed.), China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 8 For an elegant explication of the necessity for a close relationship between Japan and China, see Takahara Akio, “Nihon to Chûgoku: Sono fukabun naru kankei” (“Japan and China: The Relationship that has Become Indivisible”), Gaiko Fôramu, no. 134 (Oct. 1999), pp.14– 23. 9 For a collection of essays that are explicitly concerned with a China threat to Japan, see Bungeishunju, (ed.), ‘Dai Chûgoku’ ha do naru (What will a Strong China Become?), (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1996). 10 For a critical assessment on Japan’s China policy from the left, see Asai Motofumi, Nihon gaiko: hansei to tenkan (Japanese Diplomacy: Reflections and Transformations) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1989). See also articles from the left-leaning monthly magazine Gunshuku mondai shiryô focusing on security issues in Japan’s foreign policy. 11 For a conservative view of Japan’s relations with China, see Nakajima Mineo, Chûgoku ni jubaku sareru Nippon (The Japan that is Bound by China) (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1987). 12 Amako Satoshi, (ed.), Chûgoku ha kyôi ka (Is China a Threat?) (Tokyo: Keisô shobô, 1997). 13 On China’s threat to ASEAN countries in the form of a expanded Chinese economic empire, see Hiizumi Katuo, “Tôajia no chizu ha Ôdai chôka keizai ken’ ni” (“Will East Asia Become a Greater Chinese Economic Zone?”), in Bungeishunju, (ed.), ‘Dai Chûgoku’ ha do naru, op. cit., pp. 235– 261.


14 Asahi Shimbun, 10 January 2001. 15 See Katô Hroyuki’s chapter, in Amako Satoshi, (ed.), Chûgoku ha kyôi ka, op. cit. 16 For the view that China poses a military threat, see Hiramatu Shigeo, “Sono kaku senryoku gunjiryoku wo anadotte ii noka” (“Should China’s Nuclear and Military Capabilities be Overlooked?”), in Bungeishunju, (ed.), “Dai Chûgoku” ha do naru, op. cit., pp. 189–215. 17 On the view that the China threat goes beyond the regional context, see Hidaka Yoshiki, Chûgoku ni furimawasareru Amerika (How China has America Wrapped Around its Finger) (Tokyo: PHP kenkyôjo, 2000); For the view that China is pursuing hegemony and it should be contained, see Nakajima Mineo, “21 seki Chûgoku ha Ôhaken kokka’ to naru” (“Will China become a Hegemonic State in the 21st Century?”), in Bungeishunju, (ed.), ‘Dai Chûgoku’ ha do naru, op. cit., pp. 7–34. 18 See the chapters by Kayahra Ikuo and Asano Ryô, in Amako Satoshi, (ed.), Chûgoku ha kyôi ka, op. cit. 19 Nakae Yôkai, “Nihon no gaikô to Chûgoku no gaikô” (“Japan’s Foreign Policy and China’s Foreign Policy”), Tôa, no. 347 (May 1996), p.75. 20 Ibid., pp. 85–88. 21 Kokubun Ryôsei, “Chûgoku to Nicchibei tômei” (“China and the Japan-US Alliance”), in Tôa, no. 350 (August 1996), pp. 22–24. 22 Satoshi, Chûgoku ha kyôi ka, op. cit. 23 Bungeishunju, (ed.), “Dai Chûgoku” ha do naru, op. cit, p. 60. 24 See Shiraishi Kazuyoshi, “Juni oku jibin wo osou shoku ryoku kiki” (“Will China’s 1.2 Billion People be Assaulted by a Food Crisis?”), in Bungeishunju, (ed.), Dai Chugoku” ha do naru, op. cit., pp. 61–90. 25 See Yafuki Susumu, “Mondai nano ha ekkô sanseiu dake ka?” (“Is the Acid Rain that Crosses the Borders the Only Problem?”), in Bungeishunju, (ed.), Dai Chûgoku” ha do naru,op. cit. pp. 163–86. Also, Togiki Hajime, “Chûgoku ni okeru kankyô mondai to Nihon no senryaku deki taiô” (“Japan’s Strategic Response to China’s Environmental Problems”), in Satoshi, Chûgoku ha kyôi ka, op. cit., pp. 317–39. 26 See Nakajima Mineo and Hasegawa Keitarô, Kaitai sum Chûgoku (The China that is Falling Apart), Chapter One (Tokyo: Tôyô keizai shinpôsha, 1993). 27 For concerns that Japan may become involved in a Taiwan Straits crisis, see Kagami Mituyuki, “Ajia taiheiyô chiiki no anzen hoshô: Kiki no naka no Nichibeichû sankakukankei” (“Security in the Asian Pacific Region: JapanU.S.-China Trilateral Relations in Crisis”), Gunshuku mondai shiryô, no. 228 (Oct. 1999), pp. 4–7. 28 Nakae Yôkai, “Nihon no gaikô to Chûgoku no gaikô”, op. cit., pp. 86– 88. 29 For a good example of a Japanese scholar’s detailed study of strategic thinking in Chinese foreign policy, see Asano Ryô, “Chûgoku no taigai seisaku: anzen hoshô seisaku wo chôshi ni” (“China’s Foreign Policy: Centred on Security Policy”), in Satoshi, Chûgoku ha kyôi ka, op. cit., pp. 75– 102. 30 See Asahi Shimbun, 25 November 1995; and Okabe Tatumi, Takagi Seiichirô and Kokubun Ryôsei, (eds.), Nicchibeichû anzen hoshô kyôroku wo mezashite, p. 26.

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31 The Defence Agency, Japan, Defence of Japan 1999 (English edition) (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 1999), p. 39. 32 See Bôeichô (Japan Defense Agency), Nihon no bôei (White Paper: 2000 Defense of Japan), draft edition in Japanese, Tokyo, 2000, p. 53. 33 Interviews with the author at the Japan Defence Agency, August and September 2000. 34 One committee was commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while the other was organised by the ruing Liberal Democratic Party. 35 Nakai Yoshifumi, “Chûgoku no ‘kyôi’ to Nicchû Nichibei kankei” (“The China Threat’ and Japan-China/Japan-US Relations”), in Satoshi, Chûgoku ha kyôi ka, op. cit., pp. 105–139.

CHAPTER EIGHT South Korea and a Rising China: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects Taeho Kim

Introduction In post-Cold War Asia few issues have generated more debate than China’s growing wealth and influence. Be it China’s rise, its future, or the ‘China threat’, the debate has gained greater currency over the years in the media, and in policy and academic circles in Asia and beyond. The accompanying theoretical, historical, and policy questions have also been so numerous and diverse—as well as inconclusive—as to render redundant any attempt to summarise them.1 Suffice it to say that underlying the debate over the rise of China are its economic, cultural, and other challenges to the regional and international order, but the main thrust is the assumption that a militarily strong China, backed by its growing economic base, would likely pose a threat to regional security. However, in order for the thesis of a rising China (in particular a militarily strong and hegemonic one) to hold, three core variables should be present: credible capability, the will to use it, and the acceptance of Chinese hegemony by other powers.2 None of these variables are likely to emerge in this decade or even the next. This, however, does not suggest that China will not seek to increase its economic, diplomatic and military influence in the region and beyond in the new century. For both historical and security reasons, China will continue to improve its military capabilities, while seeking to increase its regional influence as its comprehensive national power (zonghe guoli) grows in the years ahead. As China’s role in and influence over the region’s future loom so large, it is necessary to periodically subject it to an impartial, detailed analysis. This chapter focuses on a rather modest issue: how does South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK) perceive the ‘rise of China’ and its evolving bilateral relationship with the country? After briefly reviewing

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the ROK’s perceptions towards China and the latter’s changing relationships with both North and South Korea throughout the 1990s, this study places Korean issues into the larger context of Sino-US competition and examines the ROK’s emerging security challenges of balancing its commitment to the alliance with the United States and Chinese cooperation. South Korean Public and Elite Perceptions towards China To most Asian countries, China is seen as a great power, whose sheer population and geographical size predominate the landscape of Asia. The region remains the locus of China’s economic and diplomatic activity. China’s foreign policy and security concerns also revolve around Asia, to which its current and likely future capability to project power is confined, and rarely extend to such remote areas as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Instead, the extent of Chinese involvement in Asia’s sources of tension ranges from territorial disputes to arms proliferation, and from the Korean Peninsula to the South China Sea. In light of the prospects for China’s power potential, cultural influence and nationalistic ambitions, it is not surprising to find that many Asian nations have legitimate concerns and worries about the long-term consequences of China’s growing power—even if they and Western nations have also been thrilled by the prospects of benefiting from China’s new economic dynamism since 1978. Particularly worrisome to its Asian neighbours since the early 1990s has been the coincidence of China’s growing regional and international profile with the demise of the Soviet Union and the United States’ ambiguous role in the region. On the other hand, regional perceptions of and reactions to China’s diplomatic and military behaviour have not been uniform. Each regional actor’s relations with China are shaped by a wide variety of factors, including geographical proximity, historical and cultural inheritance, territorial disputes and economic relations. Moreover, their strategic calculus has often been significantly influenced by their respective security relations with the United States. It is the interplay of these diverse factors that helps to shape South Korea’s bilateral ties with China. Fundamental factors underlying the South Korean calculus of the China issue are China’s geographical proximity to the Korean Peninsula, its continuing influence on North Korea, its growing bilateral ties with

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South Korea, and its fragile relations with the United States. Furthermore, China is highly likely to remain a major actor in Korean affairs, including the reunification process. These considerations underpin South Korea’s views on its relations with China and on the rise of China. Popular South Korean images of China are difficult to generalise, to say the least. Reflecting its chequered relationships with the outside world in general and China in particular throughout the twentieth century, South Korea eyes China in essentially three different ways: as a traditional great power—an image which was built upon largely unequal yet amicable pre-nineteenth century ties; as a Cold-War adversary represented by the hostile experience of the Korean War (1950–1953); and as a new, pragmatic country with the so-called ‘good-neighbourly, friendly relationship’ formed after the Sino-ROK normalisation of 1992. In addition, there exists a spectrum of opinion within Korean society regarding the most desirable state of bilateral ties between the ROK and China. A relatively small but growing number of human rights advocates, together with religious and environmental groups, are highly critical of China’s policies in their respective issue-areas. China’s (mis) handling of North Korean refugees as well as its opposition to the visit by the Dalai Lama to Seoul are the most recent examples.3 A score of recent bilateral agreements over fisheries, trade and investment, which would otherwise guide their growing economic interactions, may also generate displaced interests within South Korean society. At the opposite end of the spectrum are a sizeable number of people who subscribe to the concept of a ‘co-operative partnership’ (hezuo huoban guanxi) between the two countries. Those with commercial, governmental and other institutional ties with China tend to be in favour of a stable and prosperous relationship. As elaborated below, a rapid improvement in Sino-ROK ties throughout the 1990s have generated a dense web of individual and institutional interests within South Korean society that remain sympathetic towards Beijing. The ‘China threat’ argument, on the other hand, is distinctly a minority opinion aired by only a few people scattered in the media, military, and ideological communities. Few foreign-policy analysts in Seoul, including both China and non-China academicians, institutional specialists and journalists, are vocal about the possibility of a Chinese military threat to the Korean peninsula or advocate policies to ‘deter’, ‘contain’ or ‘constrain’ China, unlike their counterparts in the West, particularly the United States.


Of greater relevance to this study is how the South Koreans perceive the value of China and of the US-ROK alliance in comparative terms.4 A series of annual public opinion surveys, as well as perceptual studies conducted among the public, the media and the policy elite, have consistently indicated that the South Korean public’s view remains ‘somewhat critical’ towards the US and ‘fairly friendly’ towards China, whereas the policy elite air the opposite view—that is, ‘somewhat critical’ towards China and ‘fairly friendly’ towards the United States. More specifically, favourable public perceptions of the United States are positively correlated with age, while those towards China tend to be age indiscriminate. For example, in two surveys conducted in 1993 and 1996 that asked which country should be the closest to Korea in the twenty-first century and by 2006 respectively, the respondents in their twenties in 1993 chose China (34.8 per cent) and the US (22.8 per cent), and in 1996 the same age group chose China (46.6 per cent) and the US (19.3 per cent). On the other hand, those in their fifties or older in 1993 selected the US (54.8 per cent) and China (27.7 per cent), but in the 1996 survey their preference changed to China (41 per cent) and the US (32.1 per cent).5 These and other surveys unmistakably indicate that throughout the 1990s the popularity of the US declined and that of China rose. The media proclivities are divided between the ‘progressive’ (proChina) and the ‘conservative’ (pro-American) newspapers, even if the majority of all major South Korean newspapers are critical of US trade policy towards South Korea. Interestingly enough, younger Koreans, who are the most vocal about US policy towards South Korea, have fairly consistently supported the continued presence of US military personnel in Korea for security and other practical reasons. The vast majority of the South Korean public and elite, on the other hand, have responded that China’s influence over peninsular affairs would grow in the future, and that South Korea’s military-to-military exchanges and co-operation with China should be expanded. Public opinion surveys conducted after the historic North-South Korean summit in June 2000 have shown a continuation of similar perceptual tendencies on the part of the South Korean public. According to a survey conducted by the JoongAng Daily,6 respondents believed that the country which would be most helpful in Korean reunification was China (30 per cent), followed by the US (26.5 per cent) and Japan (14.1 per cent). For the country least supportive of Korean reunification the respondents selected Japan (39.3 per cent), the US (28.1 per cent) and

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China (9.2 per cent). These survey results unmistakably indicate that throughout the 1990s and beyond the South Korean public maintained a fairly favourable view of China in general and of the its role on Korean peninsular issues in particular, even when they also believed that the US security commitment remained important to the future of the peninsula.7 China’s Changing Relations with North and South Korea Korea’s divided status, coupled with China’s own power potential, continues to influence the prevailing South Korean perception that China will maintain its privileged position over both Koreas. In a similar vein, South Korea’s approach to China has been conducted with an eye to the possible linkage between China’s relationships with North Korea and with South Korea, even if in the post-Cold War period dramatic changes have mostly occurred in the latter. For most of the Cold War, relations between China and South Korea were locked in mutual hostility and suspicion. The Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the bipolar configuration of the world’s power structure, and China’s continuing rivalry with the Soviet Union for influence over North Korea made Sino-ROK relations a negligible factor for nearly three decades after the cessation of hostilities on the peninsula. As China recognised North Korea as the only Korean state on the peninsula, there were no contacts between South Korea and China until the late 1970s. Towards the end of the late 1970s, however, two major developments presaged major changes in China’s policy towards the peninsula. One was China’s adoption of a reform and open door policy in 1978, which was the time when unofficial and indirect trade between China and South Korea began, albeit slowly.8 During the early to mid 1980s, China gradually but unmistakably pursued a de facto ‘two-Korea’ policy, which included cultural, academic and sporting contacts with South Korea. The other principal development was an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations in the mid to late 1980s, which undercut the erstwhile rationale behind the rivalry over North Korea. By 1988, the growth of the still unofficial but substantial ties between China and South Korea had become unmistakable. Indirect trade between the two countries exceeded US$3 billion; China participated in Seoul’s 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics; and the ROK government


announced a major diplomatic initiative known as ‘Northern Diplomacy’ or nordpolitik.9 Northern Diplomacy, in particular, was aimed at creating a condition favourable for Korea’s peaceful reunification through improved ties with then socialist countries. Beginning with Hungary in January 1989, South Korea established diplomatic relations with all of the East European states, the Soviet Union (September 1990) and, finally, China (August 1992). From Beijing’s point of view, the domestic economic imperative was the primary factor motivating its decision to normalise relations with South Korea.10 The passing of the Cold War not only enhanced the value of economic ties with South Korea, but entailed the end of Sino-Russian competition over North Korea. Another important motive was to expand China’s diplomatic influence in the region in the aftermath of China’s post- Tiananmen diplomatic isolation by consolidating ties with its neighbours such as South Korea, a major US ally in Asia. To the ROK government, normalising relations with China was a diplomatic tour de force. First and foremost, Sino-South Korean normalisation helped culminate its Northern Diplomacy and symbolised South Korea’s victory in its decade-long diplomatic competition with North Korea. Furthermore, the ROK hoped to bring China’s influence on North Korea to bear in facilitating North-South Korean dialogue, opening up North Korean society, and restraining North Korea’s provocative actions against South Korea. Less immediate but still important considerations were the economic and political benefits that flowed from strengthened relations with China.11 By now, it is well known that since the normalisation of relations in 1992 China and South Korea have remarkably expanded their ties on all fronts. A US$6.4-billion bilateral trade in 1992 grew over 30 per cent annually and reached US$18.4 billion in 1998, US$22.6 billion in 1999 and US$33 billion in 2000, making the countries each other’s third largest trading partner.12 Over 1.5 million people from each country visit the other annually, and the round-trip passenger airlines fly over the Yellow Sea more than 150 times per week. By the end of 1999 over 1,500 Korean companies operated in China, and registered, long-term Korean residents exceeded 59,000, including 13,000 students. Growing economic and social ties are further buttressed by an increase in investment, tourism and sea/ air routes. To help consolidate these growing economic and social ties, Chinese leaders such as Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and Hu Jintao have visited Seoul since the mid 1990s. In fact, with the October 2000 visit to Seoul by

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Premier Zhu Rongji all seven members of the current Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo Standing Committee have visited South Korea. In the so-called ‘military exchanges and co-operation’ field, there have been more frequent, more regular and higher-level visits in recent years.13 In August 1999, in particular, Korean Defence Minister Cho Seong-Tae made a visit to China to attend the first-ever ROK-PRC Defence Ministerial Talks with his counterpart, General Chi Haotian, who in turn made a reciprocal visit in January 2000—which made him the highestranking Chinese military officer to visit Seoul in the history of Sino-South Korean relations. It is noteworthy at this point that these remarkable developments between the two nations for the past few years have resulted in a shift of the South Korean public’s perception of China to that of a benign, pragmatic economic partner. It should also be remembered that China’s post-Cold War policy towards the Korean Peninsula derives from its overall foreign policy emphasis on economic priorities. For the sake of its own national interests, China throughout the 1990s supported the inter-Korean dialogue, called for the resolution of the 1992–1994 nuclear crisis through negotiation, and encouraged the North Korean leadership to pursue reformist measures, all of which were orchestrated towards enhancing continued stability on the peninsula and China’s own economic development. For most of the past decade, however, there has been an increasing gap between official rhetoric and objective reality between China and North Korea. On the economic and diplomatic fronts, Sino-North Korean relations are constrained by different economic structures, North Korea’s economic and financial problems, and North Korea’s self-imposed diplomatic isolation after the July 1994 death of Kim D Sung. On the economic front, for instance, even if China remains North Korea’s largest trade partner accounting for approximately 30 per cent of the latter’s total trade, their twoway trade fell from a high of US$900 million in 1993 to US$413 million in 1998, US$379 million in 1999, and US$488 million in 2000 respectively.14 In a similar vein, since the early 1990s, and particularly after the death of Kim II Sung, security and military ties between China and North Korea have increasingly been subject to the rigidity of their political relations, and China’s national interest-based policy towards the Korean Peninsula. The lack of a mutually beneficial agenda, North Korea’s domestic problems, and growing Sino-ROK ties have also militated against the continued development of their bilateral relationship.


Since the death of Kim II Sung in July 1994, the non-military, workinglevel contacts between the two sides have mostly been made amongst their respective international liaison, foreign affairs, economic and provinciallevel units. Overall political and military contacts between Beijing and Pyongyang have shown a gradual but unmistakable decline. Even the military-to-military contacts between their ranking officers are mostly good-will visits and of a symbolic and ceremonial nature, not taskoriented meetings on salient military and security issues.15 This and other constraints strongly indicate that for the mid- to long term, China seeks to transform its traditional ties with Pyongyang that are based on ideological affinity and particularistic bonds to a more mutually beneficial, state-to-state relationship. At the same time, the same Chinese goal of continued stability on the Korean Peninsula seems to have led Beijing to the conclusion that further isolation of North Korea from the outside world would be detrimental to China’s national interests.16 Thus China has adamantly opposed any measures, initiated by either North or South Korea, that would disrupt the current stability on the peninsula, and instead has consistently attempted to stabilise the peninsula: that is, address North Korea’s predicaments. North Korean leader Kim Jong II’s May 2000 visit to China—his first since June 1983— which was followed by another visit to China in January 2001, as well as the country’s feverish diplomatic activities in recent months, are undoubtedly intended to alleviate the growing pains of deepening economic and diplomatic vulnerabilities. The Korean Peninsula in the Context of Sino-US Competition Since the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre there has been a widespread and ongoing discussion among Chinese strategists and scholars over how best to assess a series of ‘adverse currents’ in China’s external security environment, and the kinds of policy options that remain open to China to cope with them. Of particular concern is US global ‘hegemonic’ behaviour, which clashes directly with China’s national interests (e.g., its economic priorities, reunification with Taiwan, and continued CCP rule) and its strategic visions (e.g., multipolarity, ‘anti-hegemonism’, ‘anti-power polities’, and pursuing the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence as the basis for a new world order). In particular, US regional ‘hegemonic’ behaviour in East Asia—which is the

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locus of Chinese diplomatic and economic activity—including the strengthened US-Japan alliance, their joint development of the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system and, most seriously, its continued weapon sales to Taiwan, both reinforces and reflects US ‘hegemonic’ posture around the globe.17 In particular, the TMD is viewed by Chinese strategists as having the potential to strengthen Japan’s ‘remilitarisation’ and for US-Japanese ‘interference with China’s internal affairs’—that is, Taiwan.18 Furthermore, as many China scholars have noted,19 there was a steady but sure growth in Chinese nationalism throughout the 1990s. In particular, the Chinese calendar for the year 1999 was replete with an array of historic events and political anniversaries. That Japan has long been a rallying point for occasional renewal of nationalism in contemporary China is well known. However, the current flood of Chinese nationalism contains strong anti-US sentiment, which has rarely been found even in its overall strained, confrontational relationship with the US since June 1989. Underlying the Chinese anger over a series of events including NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the embassy bombing in Belgrade, and the mid-air collision between a US EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese J-8 fighter aircraft near Hainan Island in April 2001, has been the frustration that China’s national interests and sensitivities have remained unattended or even disregarded by the sole superpower, notwithstanding its own remarkable rise in power and prosperity for the past two decades.20 In short, China’s more confrontational posture towards the United States and Japan is likely to endure for years to come. In particular, a sustained confrontation between the regional superpower and the global superpower could sharply exacerbate the potential and real differences between China and the US over a host of regional issues.21 On the Korean Peninsula, while the United States and China remain the two most important outside actors in the post-Cold War period, the latter has not failed to maintain its influence over the two Koreas. Unlike a global America on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, China shares an 800-mile border with North Korea. As noted earlier, not only does China retain its geostrategic interest in North Korea, but it is also acutely aware of the potential dangers of a renewed conflict on the peninsula to its own security. For the sake of external stability conducive to China’s economic modernisation, Chinese leaders have consistently called for an easing of tensions on the peninsula. A combination of Chinese assets including its geographical proximity, its diplomatic ties


with both Koreas and its diplomatic subtlety, has allowed it to become a major player to be reckoned with on the peninsula and in the broader Asia-Pacific region. Ideally, an amicable relationship between America and China, especially renewed security co-operation, would contribute to regional stability, the attainment of their respective objectives in East Asia, and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In reality, and contrary to popular belief, the prospects for an improved Sino-US relationship remain quite cloudy, if not bleak, for the foreseeable future.22 Few of their outstanding issues, including Taiwan, human rights, trade, nuclear and missile proliferation, and espionage show signs of an early or conclusive resolution. On the contrary, there seems to be some fundamental differences between the two countries in terms of political systems, social values and strategic objectives. Given the ongoing leadership transition and internal political dynamics in Beijing and Washington, compromise on these differences will also be difficult to achieve in the near future. Viewed in this light, the Korean Peninsula should be seen as occupying a central place in the crowded bilateral and regional agendas of the US and China. On the other hand, notwithstanding the long list of their outstanding disputes at both bilateral and regional levels as noted above, China and the US have time and again argued—at the official and declaratory level at least—that they share a set of common interests in the Korean Peninsula, namely peninsular stability, North-South Korean dialogue, and peaceful reunification. In light of their vast differences in strategic visions, political systems, social values and strategic objectives, let alone their diverging interests over bilateral and regional issues, it is far more logical and—I would argue—more empirically valid to make a case that the US and China will remain divergent over peninsular issues as well. Beneath the facade of the ‘constructive strategic relationship’, moreover, their interests could be significantly in conflict with one another when confronted with some concrete issues and longer-term agendas. Prominent examples include, but are not limited to, a North Korean contingency, the future status of US forces in South Korea, the question of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in North Korea, and the military capability and strategic orientation of a reunified Korea.

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Balancing American Alliance and Chinese Cooperation: The ROK’s Tact? In light of sustained and likely future discord between the United States and China, their policies and interests over the Korean Peninsula are far more likely to diverge than converge over the coming years, especially when it comes to concrete policy issues and longer-term agendas. This could complicate, rather than benefit, Korea’s security planning, as it requires co-operation—or acquiescence at minimum—from both countries in resolving a panoply of salient peninsular issues. The ongoing political thaw on the peninsula could also accentuate, and at a minimum has increased uncertainty over, a host of issues that involve America, China and the Koreas. Therefore, in light of the continuing SinoAmerican competition, their likely diverging interests over the peninsula, and the ‘rise of China’ (which is largely a fact of life, not an assumption, for most East Asian states including South Korea), the ROK’s continued ‘strategic prioritisation’ in its relations with the US and with China would most likely be the optimal strategic choice, even if it also continuously and systematically pursues a specific set of confidence-building measures with the latter. While the governments of Beijing and Seoul have long maintained that they see eye to eye with each other on a host of peninsular issues—at least in their official proclamations and high rhetoric—there exist subtle but important differences between the two on the issues of Korean unification, the Four-Party Talks, US forces in South Korea, North Korean missiles and the US-Japan alliance ties, to name but a few. In a similar vein, the ongoing changes in inter-Korean relations could have a significant impact on the future course of the peninsula and the ROK-US security relationship. Notwithstanding the current thaw on the peninsula, preparing for future contingencies arising out of North Korea’s dilemma will still be one of the most pressing challenges for ROKUS ties. In addition, while both the ROK and the US governments do not explicitly espouse the role of US military forces in a unified Korea, both sides seem to share the understanding that the primary goal of the ROKUS security relationship will shift from peninsular deterrence to cooperation for regional security. Changes in both domestic and external dimensions in recent years have not only influenced the nature of the alliance, but have also raised new issues or old issues in a new form which are endogenous to the security alliance. While those substantive issues are largely subordinated to the national interests of both countries, they could become sources of


strain for the alliance if left unresolved. It is thus fortunate to note that the countries held the Kim-Bush summit early on, have successfully managed the outstanding issues in their bilateral alliance, and are strongly committed to an early and satisfactory resolution for the sake of the security alliance.23 To repeat, the US commitment to Korean defence and unification remains strong and is highly likely to remain so in the future. However, as their divergent perceptions of and policies towards a series of recent North Korean issues best illustrate, the ROK and the US governments need to coordinate their policy towards North Korea more tightly and coherently than has been the case. Policy differences over North Korea do not augur well for the long-term development of the ROK-US alliance, especially if they have to prepare for the day when they ‘run out of enemies’. It is these kinds of specific policy issues and longer-term questions that South Korea needs to take into consideration in formulating a strategic plan for its future security environment. In conclusion, a sustained confrontation between the regional superpower and the global superpower could sharply exacerbate their potential and real differences over a host of peninsular and regional issues. In particular, China’s growing influence over and interdependence with Korea amid the continuing rivalry between the United States and China could well make untenable the proposition that the countries can jointly co-operate in resolving a plateful of concrete policy issues and longer-term questions on the peninsula. Korea’s balancing act between its alliance with the US and its co-operation with China, in short, could well turn out to be its most prominent security challenge in the twenty-first century. Notes The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s own and do not represent the positions of the KIDA, the Mershon Centre or any other organisations with which the author is affiliated. 1 The most recent single volumes on a rising China (particularly the ‘China threat’) include Steven W.Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000); Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2000); Edward Timperlake and William C.Triplett, Jr., Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to America (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1999).

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2 This line of argument can be found in Taeho Kim, “A Reality Check: The ‘Rise of China’ and Its Military Capability Toward 2010”, Journal of East Asian Affairs 12, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 1998), pp. 321–63; David Shambaugh, “Chinese Hegemony over East Asia by 2015?”, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 9, no. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 7–28; Denny Roy, “The Foreign Policy of Great-Power China”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 19, no. 2 (September 1997), pp. 121–35. 3 The Chinese government’s position is that there are no North Korean ‘refugees’, let alone defectors, in its territory. It position has triggered strong protestations from various NGOs based in South Korea and elsewhere. See the editorial in Chosun Ilbo, 11 December 1999. The latest attempt by Korean religious groups to invite the Dalai Lama was apparently foiled due to the ROK’s concern over Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s October 2000 visit to Seoul. See Chosun Ilbo, 19 October 2000. 4 An excellent perceptual study on this critical issue of Korea’s emerging strategic problems is Jae Ho Chung, The Korean-American Alliance and the “Rise of China”: A Preliminary Assessment of Perceptual Changes and Strategic Choices, Asia/Pacific Research Center (Stanford University) Discussion Papers, February 1999. 5 Ibid., p. 12. 6 JoongAng Daily, 14 August 2000. 7 It is interesting to note that unlike the South Korean public, their counterparts in Japan and the US have held a fairly negative perception towards China throughout the 1990s. For an overview of American and Japanese perceptions towards China in the 1990s, see Michael G. Kulma, “The Evolution of U.S. Images of China: A Political Psychology Perspective of Sino-American Relations”, World Affairs 162, no. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 76–88; Hideo Sato, Japan’s China Perceptions and Its Politics in the Alliance with the United States, Asia/Pacific Research Center (Stanford University) Discussion Papers, September 1998; Alvin Richman, “American and Japanese Publics Assess Security Issues”, US Foreign Policy Agenda 3, no. 1 (January 1998), p. 30; and Asahi Shimbun, 22 September 1997. 8 For the origins and evolution of Sino-South Korean economic relations, see Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1996), Chapter Five; Jae Ho Chung, “South Korea-China Economic Relations: The Current Situation and Its Implications”, Asian Survey (October 1988), pp. 1031–1048. 9 The term Northern Diplomacy or Nordpolitik was coined by Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk in a speech to National Defence College in June 1983, the tenth anniversary of the ‘June 23 Declaration’. For the background of President Roh Tae Woo’s Nordpolitik, see “July 7 [1988] Special Presidential Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity”, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea (Seoul: ROK National Unification Board, 1988), pp. 381–403; B.C.Koh, “Seoul’s ‘Northern Policy’ and Korean Security”, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 1, no. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 127–43. 10 For the calculations behind China’s approach to Sino-South Korean normalisation, see Taeho Kim, “New Sino-South Korean Relations:


11

12

13

14 15

16

17

18

Enhancing Security Beyond Nordpolitik”, unpublished mimeo (1993). For South Korea’s views, see Hakjoon Kim, “The Establishment of South Korean-Chinese Diplomatic Relations: A South Korean Perspective”, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies (Summer 1994), pp. 31–48. For an argument that Sino-ROK normalisation in particular, and the growing bilateral ties in general, are the result of South Korea’s successful engagement policy to ‘manage’ China see, Victor D.Cha, “Engaging China: The View from Korea” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S.Ross (eds.), Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 32–56. Unless noted otherwise, all figures and statistical data concerning China’s interactions with both North and South Korea come from the various publications of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. For the most up to date data, which became available during Premier Zhu’s October 2000 visit, see Chosun Daily, 19 October 2000, p. 3. This does not mean, however, that their military-to-military ties are balanced or symmetrical in terms of frequency and the ranks of the visiting officers. For a comprehensive treatment of the PLA’s military diplomacy in the 1990s in general, and China’s military relations with both Koreas in particular, see Kenneth Allen and Eric A.McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, October 1999), esp. pp. 66–68. Korea International Trade Association, Major Trends in Trade 1999 (Seoul: KITA, 1999). For North Korea’s trade and economic statistics throughout the 1990s, see Dong-a llbo, 27 October 2000. For a detailed analysis on the military-to-military relationship between China and North Korea up to 1997, see Taeho Kim, “Strategic Relations Between Beijing and Pyongyang: Growing Strains amid Lingering Ties”, in James R.Lilley and David Shambaugh (eds.), China’s Military Faces the Future (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1999), pp. 295–321. Over the years Chinese Korea specialist Xiaoxiong Yi has cautioned against the Western underestimation of North Korea’s important place in China’s strategic calculus. See his “A Neutralized Korea? The North-South Rapprochement and China’s Korea Policy”, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 12, no. 2 (Winter 2000), pp. 71–118 and “Dynamics of China’s South Korea Policy: Assertive Nationalism, Beijing’s Changing Strategic Evaluation of the United States, and the North Korea Factor”, Asian Perspective 24, no. 1 (2000), pp. 71–102. Xie Wenqing, “Observing US Strategy of Global Hegemony from Nato’s Use of Force against FRY”, International Strategic Studies, no. 53 (July 1999), pp. 1–9; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Beijing Wary of ‘East Asian Nato’ Threat”, South China Morning Post, 31 May 1999; “Paper Comments on US Hegemonism”, Beijing Review, 14 June 1999. For Chinese views on TMD, see Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2000 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, October 2000), pp. 5–6; Gu Ping, “Japan: Find a New Excuse to Participate in Constructing TMD”, Beijing Review, 21 August 2000, pp. 10–11; and Kori J. Urayama, “Chinese

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19

20

21

22

23

Perceptions on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for Japan”, Asian Survey (July/August 2000), pp. 201–23. Pyongyang, together with Beijing and Moscow, takes a similar position on the TMD issue. See Minju Chosun, 20 September 2000, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 18 October 2000. Suisheng Zhao, In Search of a Right Place? Chinese Nationalism in the Post-Cold War World (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997); Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C.Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands”, International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998–1999), pp. 114–46; and Jonathan Unger (ed.), Chinese Nationalism (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1996). This point has been made in National Intelligence Council (NIC), Recent Chinese Leadership Priorities and Their Implications for the United States, Memorandum NIC 512–99 (12 July 1999). For Chinese reactions on the plane standoff, see Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Beijing Declares Victory but Chat Rooms are Skeptical”, New York Times, 13 April 2001; Erik Eckholm, “Chinese Claim a Moral Victory, Describing a Much Bigger Battle”, New York Times, 12 April 200; Bruce Gilley and David Murphy, “Power Play in Hainan”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 April 2001, pp. 16–20. For a series of Chinese articles asserting the possibility of China’s reversing its current policy course toward the US, see Wu Xinbo, “U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China-U.S. Relations”, www.brookings.org/fp/ cnaps/papers/2000_wu.htm; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Beijing Vows to Beat Back NATO”, South China Morning Post, 13 May 1999; Sa Benwang, “The Impact of the Kosovo War on International Situations”, International Strategic Studies, October 1999, pp. 1–9-For a comprehensive but focused discussion on the current state of relations between, and different internal political dynamics in, Washington and Beijing, see David Shambaugh, “The United States and China: A New Cold War?”, Current History 94, no. 593 (September 1995), pp. 241–47; Denny Roy, “Current Sino-U.S. Relations in Strategic Perspective”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 20, no. 3 (December 1998), pp. 225–40; Arthur Waldron, “Bowing to Beijing”, Commentary 106, no. 3 (September 1998), pp. 15–20; Melvin Gurtov, “Fragile Relationship: The United States and China”, Asian Perspective 23, no. 2 (1999), pp. 111–41; Harry Harding, “The Uncertain Future of US-China Relations”, Asia-Pacific Review 6, no. 1 (1999), pp. 7–24. For Chinese perspectives, see Zhu Chenghu, ed., Zhongmei guanxi de fazhan bianhua ji qi qushi (Development and Change of Sino-US Relations and Their Trends) (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1998). For a Chinese ‘democratic peace reversed’ perspective, see Liu Jixian and Xu Xikang (eds.), Haiyang zhanlue huanjing yu duice yanjiu (Research on Maritime Strategic Environment and Counter-measures) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1996). For a diversity of views on the nature and consequences of the Bush-Kim summit, see David E.Sanger, “Korean to Visit Bush, but They Could Be at Odds”, New York Times, 7 March 2001; Edwin J.Feulner, “Commemoration of Kim Dae-Jung’s Presidency”, Heritage Lectures, no. 696 (7 March 2001), pp. 1–5.

CHAPTER NINE Indonesia’s Perceptions of China: The Domestic Bases of Persistent Ambiguity Rizal Sukma

Introduction A few hours after his surprising election as Indonesia’s fourth president on 20 October 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid told the American Ambassador, Robert Gelbard, that the improvement of relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would be a foreign policy priority for his government. A few days later, during a meeting with national and international business leaders in Bali, President Wahid announced that his government would work towards the establishment of a new ‘Asia Coalition’ involving Indonesia, China, and India, and possibly Japan and Singapore. In early December, President Wahid chose China as the destination for his first overseas visit. While in China, Wahid delivered a speech at Beijing University in which he declared that his ancestors had in fact come from China, implying that he himself had Chinese blood.1 Such remarks inevitably gave the impression that Wahid’s view of China stood in marked contrast to those of President Suharto. This led to speculation that Indonesia under President Wahid would abandon Suharto’s cautious and suspicious approach towards China and move towards the re-establishment of a close partnership between the two countries similar to that of the Sukarno era in the early 1960s. Speculation strengthened when Wahid framed his proposal for a closer relationship with China in terms of the need to balance America’s domination of world politics and the global economy, especially in East Asian affairs. Wahid seemed serious about this proposal when in early December 1999 he again asserted that if the five countries of the ‘Asia coalition’ united and worked together—by combining the resources of Indonesia, China and India with the capital, technology, and managerial expertise of Japan and Singapore—then they could ‘face other countries in the world eye to eye’.2

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Wahid’s overture towards China was well received by his domestic audience. The call for an ‘Asia coalition’ was warmly welcomed at home. For example, a leading Islamic activist, Nasir Tamara, expressed his support for what he saw as Wahid’s ‘attempt to restore Indonesia’s status and respectful place in the front row of the world’s major powers’.3 Wahid was also praised for his desire to restore Indonesia’s national pride by moving closer to Asian countries.4 The move was seen as ‘original and brilliant’5. It was also suggested also that Wahid’s diplomatic manoeuvres should be followed by concrete measures.6 Amien Rais, Chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and a fierce critic of the President, also welcomed Wahid’s foreign policy agenda.7 In short, it appeared that President Wahid’s intention to move Indonesia closer to China had received support from a wide spectrum of the political elite. This chapter addresses Indonesia’s perceptions of China since the collapse of Suharto’s New Order government in May 1998. It seeks to examine whether President Wahid’s overture towards the PRC reflected a real and significant change in Indonesia’s perceptions of China, both at the governmental and societal levels. The discussion is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the failure of the Sino-Indonesian partnership in the 1960s and the genesis of the New Order’s suspicion of China in the 1970s and 1980s. The second section explores the historicaltraditional and internal-social dimensions of Indonesia’s perceptions of China that sustained Indonesia’s ambiguity towards the PRC. The third section examines the domestic context of Wahid’s overture towards China and assesses the potential obstacles—both domestic and external— that might affect the future of Indonesia-China relations. Indonesia-China Relations Until the 1990s: The Structure of a Troubled Relationship8 China was the first communist country with which Indonesia sought diplomatic relations immediately after the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch in December 1949. However, the fact that Indonesia established diplomatic relations with China as early as August 1950 did not necessarily mean that relations proceeded smoothly. They were fragile, replete with problems, and subject to various upheavals. Indeed, the management of bilateral relations proved to be difficult for both sides. More strikingly, those relations were subject to pressures stemming from Indonesia’s domestic political arena. Furthermore, the question of

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perceptions—both public and elite—served as the most important context within which Indonesia’s policy towards the PRC was formulated and carried out. The importance of Indonesia’s domestic pressures was felt immediately after the establishment of diplomatic ties. In fact, the establishment of diplomatic relations itself was subject to strong domestic objections, especially from Muslim groups. They were suspicious that relations with China would bring problems for Indonesia. What they feared most was that the presence of a Chinese embassy in Jakarta could intensify ethnic Chinese sympathies for mainland Chinese nationalism, whatever form such nationalism might take.9 They also feared that diplomatic relations with China would facilitate the revival of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which had been crushed after its involvement in the rebellion against the central government in 1948. Moreover, Muslim groups were of the opinion that Indonesia should not have diplomatic relations with any communist countries. In fact the first post-independence cabinet under Prime Minister Muhammad Hatta was anti-communist and keen to develop close co-operation with Western countries.10 In short, the Indonesia government and the majority of the political elite were suspicious of China’s intentions in Indonesia. Such suspicions were confirmed when the first Chinese ambassador, Wang Renshu, who had been born in Indonesia, sought to reorient the loyalty of the ethnic-Chinese minority towards the Beijing government. This policy provoked concern in the Indonesian government over the question of the nationality and loyalty of the ethnic Chinese minority. The Chinese embassy’s policy towards this minority was not the only source of concern for the Indonesian government. Wang Renshu was known as a fanatical communist who believed that it was his mission to revive the demoralised PKI. For this purpose, Wang provided financial help and advice to PKI leaders. It was widely believed that financial help was funnelled through Chinese nationals living in Indonesia.11 In 1951, a serious row erupted when the Chinese embassy intervened in an internal Indonesian matter. Wang condemned the Indonesian government when security forces launched a raid against the PKI, and he granted diplomatic protection to a PKI leader who had taken refuge in the Chinese embassy.12 Events in 1959–1960 and in 1963 showed that the foundations of the Jakarta-Beijing relationship were unstable and vulnerable to pressures from within Indonesia. During outbreaks of anti-Chinese fervour, Beijing’s responses were interpreted as interference in Indonesia’s

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domestic affairs. Indonesia’s response to China’s intervention in respect of the ethnic Chinese was always uncompromising. It refused to be influenced or dictated to by China, and even showed a readiness to risk the relationship. Indeed, it was during this period that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia came to be seen as a persistent source of instability in Indonesia-China relations.13 Relations between the two countries improved between 1960 and 1965 when President Sukarno’s international ambitions pushed Indonesia into making common cause with China against imperialism and for transforming the international system.14 However, support for this de facto alliance came only from the PKI. There was never any genuine popular support in Indonesia for close relations with China. More importantly, the de facto alliance was deeply resented by the armed forces, the ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia), who saw the relationship as strengthening the position of the PKI in its attempt to undermine the role of the military. In that context, the ‘Jakarta-Beijing Axis’ became entangled in Indonesian politics especially when it served as a major complicating factor in the PKI-ABRI rivalry on the one hand, and Sukarno’s attempt to balance the two sides on the other. Indeed, deepseated suspicions of China held by the majority of Indonesians ran beneath the apparently close Jakarta-Beijing relationship. As one analyst noted, Indonesia-China relations were vulnerable to prejudice, political emotion, and partisan manoeuvring in Indonesia’s domestic politics.15 Following the failure of the attempted coup in September 1965, in which the PKI was implicated, Indonesia-China relations deteriorated rapidly. This was the inevitable consequence of the anti-communist momentum that arose in Indonesia after the failed coup, during which six senior ABRI generals had been murdered. The Indonesian military quickly crushed the PKI and eventually removed President Sukarno from power. The new Indonesian government, led by Major-General Suharto, accused China of complicity in the coup. Bitter diplomatic exchanges ensued, and on 23 October 1967 Jakarta declared relations between the two countries were ‘frozen’. On 28 October, Beijing formally announced the suspension of its own ties with Indonesia.16 From then on, the strategic importance of the PRC in Indonesia’s foreign policy declined dramatically. China, which had once occupied a special place in Sukarno’s foreign policy, was now portrayed by President Suharto’s New Order regime as the main threat to Indonesia’s national security. There was a widely held belief that the so-called ‘China threat’ to Indonesia would come mainly in the form of subversion. This


subversion was to be carried out by the remnants of the PKI and, to a lesser degree, the ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia. The New Order maintained that until China abandoned its interventionist policy, there could be no normalisation of relations. The government and military repeatedly stated that two main problems for Indonesia’s internal security—the Chinese minority and the PKI—would have to be solved first because they could be used as an entrée for subversion by Beijing. Indeed, it was this logic of ‘triangular threat’—from the PRC, the PKI, and the ethnic Chinese—that prevented Jakarta from restoring diplomatic ties with Beijing for almost twentythree years.17 Positive changes in the regional and international environment from the mid 1970s onwards, especially in the nature of Beijing’s relations with non-communist states, failed to alter Indonesia’s attitude. When the PRC abandoned its Maoist revolutionary foreign policy in favour of economic modernisation in 1978, Indonesian leaders were not impressed. In other words, relations with China were dictated more by domestic politics than by external factors. More than two decades passed before Sino-Indonesian relations were finally restored in August 1990.18 This, however, did not necessarily mean a complete break from the old pattern of relations. Nor did it reflect a significant change in Indonesia’s perceptions of China. For Indonesia, ‘vigilance’ remained the code word in dealing with China. President Suharto, prior to the official restoration of diplomatic ties, still maintained that Indonesia ‘must remain alert to the possibility of a PKI revival after the normalisation of ties with China’ 19 and ‘should continue to be vigilant’.20 The military and Muslim leaders issued similar warnings.21 Indeed, the decision to normalise relations with China did not receive unanimous support at home. Some prominent military figures and Muslim leaders continued to harbour doubts. In the wake of the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, for example, the governor of the National Resilience Institute, General Subijakto, called for a review of the decision. He stated: ‘China will not abandon its efforts to lead [the] global communist movement. Do not forget that’.22 A similar view was also expressed by the former chief of the Indonesian Intelligence Coordinating Board (BAKIN), General Yoga Sugama.23 Such views clearly suggest that Indonesia’s political elite, especially the military, remained suspicious of China. Therefore, it came as no surprise when Indonesia declared that it had no intention of giving China a special place in its foreign policy.24 This implied that in the future, as in the past, Jakarta would not hesitate to abandon relations with Beijing should they no

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longer serve Indonesia’s national interests, let alone be detrimental to them. Indeed, in the immediate years following the restoration of diplomatic relations, Indonesia-China relations did not improve significantly. Suspicion and sensitivity continued to characterise Indonesia’s attitude towards China. An event in April 1994 illustrates this point well. In the wake of labour unrest, which developed into an anti-Chinese riot in northern Sumatra, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issued a statement of ‘concern’ and called on Jakarta to defuse the situation.25 Jakarta responded angrily to the Chinese statement, and accused China of interfering in its internal affairs. It warned that 'China had better mind its own internal affairs’.26 As for China, the episode clearly demonstrated the lack of understanding in Beijing regarding Indonesia’s sensitivity on issues involving the ethnic Chinese minority. After the restoration of diplomatic ties, there was a change in the structure of Indonesian threat perceptions of China. As mentioned earlier, before 1990 Indonesia had been worried about the linkage among the PRC, the remnants of the PKI, and the ethnic Chinese minority. Normalisation of relations was possible partly because Jakarta no longer saw any linkage between China and the PKI, and the PKI and the ethnic Chinese minority. However, the government was still worried about the possible link between the PRC and the ethnic Chinese minority. Moreover, there was a new dimension to Indonesia’s view of China. Jakarta was now also worried about China’s regional role and policies in Southeast Asia, especially concerning its behaviour in the South China Sea, and its growing military capabilities. If the re-establishment of ties was not a manifestation of change in the notion of China threat in Indonesian perceptions, then the reasons for the normalisation should be located in other areas. In this context, the pressure for change was once again found in the domestic politics of Indonesia. The decision reflects changes in four areas: a change in the basis of legitimacy; changes in economic interests; changes in power relations in Indonesia’s domestic politics; and the desire to play a more active and assertive role in the international arena, especially within the developing world. First, change in Indonesian policy towards China was made possible by a change in the basis of the New Order’s legitimacy, according to the logic of stabilitas (stability) for pembangunan (development). This claim served as a rationale for unrelenting vigilance in safeguarding Indonesia from any threat. Since the PKI remnants were perceived as a threat from


within, and in the past the party had been strongly supported by China, Beijing was necessarily construed as the threat from without. By the end of the 1980s, however, remarkable economic development led to a reordering of emphasis in the basis of the New Order’s legitimacy. The New Order now believed that pembangunan should continue in order to maintain stabilitas. As a result, legitimacy based on the threats posed by the China-PKI connection became less relevant. The reliance on an external threat to reinforce domestic legitimacy no longer sat well with the re-ordering of the basis of legitimacy from ‘stabilitas for pembangunan’ to ‘pembangunan for stabilitas’. Second, the decision to normalise relations with China was in part motivated by Indonesia’s determination to sustain economic development. The fall in oil prices in the early 1980s forced Indonesia to restructure its economy and place more emphasis on industrialisation and manufacturing. Such a change required Indonesia to diversify its external economic relations. In that context, China’s growing market provided an attractive alternative. Indeed, there was considerable emphasis on trade relations during the process of normalisation, and this has continued since 1990. Both sides have benefited considerably from it, and economic cooperation has now moved beyond trade to include investment. Third, normalisation was also made possible by a significant change in Indonesia’s domestic power structure, which had significant implications for foreign policy-making. Until the mid 1980s, any attempt to restore diplomatic ties with China had been thwarted by ABRI, the power centre of the New Order. For President Suharto, who was still primus inter pares within ABRI and relied on the institution for political support, the normalisation of ties with China would not have done him any good. However, by the end of the 1980s, Suharto was at the apex of the power pyramid and his relationship with ABRI began to change. After twenty years of rule, Suharto emerged as a political force quite independent from ABRI, the influence and power of which vis-à-vis the president had begun to decline. Because of this, Suharto easily overrode ABRI’s objection to the restoration of diplomatic ties with China in 1990. Finally, as Suharto’s power grew to an unrivalled position at home, his interest in foreign policy and international affairs began to develop. Economic success had bred new confidence, and the New Order government began to feel that it was time for Indonesia to play a more active role in regional and international affairs. Within that context, the restoration of diplomatic ties with China was seen as necessary for

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Indonesia to fulfil such a role. The absence of diplomatic ties with China had become a constraint to two important items on Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda: the resolution of the Cambodian conflict, and Jakarta’s bid for chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).27 Indeed, as the broad-based political elite also shared the desire for a more active and assertive international role, it was easier for the government to convey the impression that the decision to restore diplomatic ties with China was a logical consequence of, and justified by, a growing domestic drive to enhance Indonesia’s role in international affairs. In conclusion, it can be said that Indonesia’s policy towards China was influenced more by domestic political requirements than by perceptions. The above survey clearly demonstrates that although Jakarta’s policy changed from hostility to reconciliation, elements of suspicion remained evident in Indonesia’s perceptions of the PRC. In other words, the change in Jakarta’s attitude and policy towards Beijing was not necessarily a function of change in Indonesia’s perceptions of China. Even in the period after the normalisation of diplomatic relations, Indonesia continued to display an ambiguous attitude towards the PRC. That persistent ambiguity was partly a result of Indonesia’s perceptions of China and the Chinese. Indeed, as demonstrated in the following discussion, persistent ambiguity in Indonesia’s perceptions of China was sustained by historical-traditional and internal-societal factors. The Historical and Societal Foundation of Suspicions In examining Indonesia’s perceptions of China, it is important to make the distinction between the historical-traditional and internal-societal dimensions. Although in reality the two dimensions are closely interconnected, this distinction is significant in two ways. First, it helps to identify the basic or pre-existing images of China held by most Indonesians. These pre-existing images of China are derived largely from their impressions of Imperial China and the ethnic-Chinese minority living in Indonesia. Second, it helps to determine the extent to which current Indonesian views of China and the ethnic-Chinese have also been built upon traditional perceptions. The Historical-Traditional Dimension The traditional view prevailing among Indonesians can be seen as the product of long historical encounters between Indonesia (as a collective


name for the various Indonesian Kingdoms) and China. The first contact between Indonesia and China can be traced back to the third century BC.28 Such early contact resulted mainly from Chinese traders visiting Indonesia. However, the formation of a ‘negative’ historical image of China was influenced more by relations between the two countries during the thirteenth century, specifically the conflict between the Indonesian Kingdom of Singhasari and China’s Yuan dynasty. By this time, China had already established a working international order in Asia based on its hegemony. Under its Second Emperor Kublai Khan, the Yuan dynasty attempted to extend its territory and influence deep into Southeast Asia. A strong navy that had been inherited from the Song dynasty made it possible for Kublai Khan to initiate military conquest overseas. To this end, the kingdom in Java was identified as one of the countries to be incorporated into the Yuan sphere of influence, together with Champa.29 King Singhasari refused to bow to Kublai Khan’s demands, and cut off his envoy’s ear. Javanese forces subsequently repelled the Chinese naval expedition. This historical episode occupies a special place in Indonesian history. It is not an exaggeration to say that it is quite familiar to many, if not most, Indonesians who have attended at least junior high school.30 It constitutes a basic element of Indonesia’s perception of traditional China, namely the image of China as an expansionist power. From a historical point of view, therefore, it is understandable why Indonesia has been concerned with the so-called ‘China threat’ to the region. In the eyes of many Indonesians, China has always tried to establish a ‘sphere of influence’ in Southeast Asia, and will continue to do so. Such negative perceptions are often reinforced by the tendency to invoke similar traits of China and the Chinese in standard texts on Indonesian history.31 These texts have been an important source of information for Indonesians. Their role in influencing the way that Indonesians perceive China is not insignificant. In addition to the perception of China as an expansionist power, Indonesians are also quick to point out that their ancestors were themselves victims of such expansionism. In describing the end of the Kingdom of Sriwijaya, for example, one text explains: ‘Palembang fell under China in Southeast Asia. Some thousands of Chinese from Fukien and Canton were brought in and established a colonial administration. In 1377, the head of the colony was Liang Tan Ming from Kwantung’.32 The same text also notes that during Admiral Zheng Ho’s expedition to Southeast Asia in the early fourteenth century, he captured many

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Southeast Asian kings, including the King of Palembang.33 These views implicitly suggest that Indonesia was itself the victim of Chinese expansionism. Although there have been some positive elements in Indonesian perceptions towards China (such as its long civilisation and the 1911 Revolution) these have been outweighed by the negatives. In this regard, the most persistent impression of Imperial China, which has existed until the present day, is that of China as an aggressive and arrogant power. Most Indonesian leaders still believe that China continues to perceive itself as ‘the centre of the world,’ or Zhongguo. In this regard, whenever the question of a ‘China threat’ is raised, there is a tendency to recall the old days when China demanded tribute from the Nanyang (southern) countries in Southeast Asia.34 The Internal-Societal Dimension Indonesia’s policy towards China cannot be fully understood without an understanding of its perception of the domestic Chinese. It has been asserted, for example, that Indonesian perceptions of China are the result of the projection of its image of domestic ethnic Chinese due to a lack of knowledge about China among Indonesians.35 In that context, Indonesian perceptions of the domestic Chinese have been significant in sustaining the ambiguity in Indonesia’s policy towards China. In this regard, there are at least five major stereotypes of the Chinese in Indonesian society.36 First, Indonesians tend to perceive the ethnic Chinese as a separate bangsa (race, nation), the bangsa Cina. This perception owes much to the Dutch colonial era when the ethnic-Chinese assumed a privileged position within Indonesian society. According to Dutch law, the Chinese belonged to a different social stratum from the indigenous Indonesians. The Chinese were classified as ‘Foreign Orientals’ (Vreemde Oosterlingen) while Indonesians were classified as ‘native’ (inlander).37 The Dutch deliberately took this position because they needed the skills of Chinese merchants to fill the gap in Indonesian society which, at the time, lacked an entrepreneurial class. The Chinese played the role of ‘middlemen’ between the Dutch and the pribumi (indigenous) Indonesians. Since the Chinese were given a privileged position, the categorisation implied that the Vreemde Oosterlingen were superior to that of the inlander. Indeed, the term inlander was regarded as an insult by pribumi Indonesians. Second, the privileged position of the Chinese enabled them to become a powerful economic force in the country. A prominent Indonesian


analyst has asserted that the Chinese completely dominated Indonesia’s rural economy, and exerted a strong influence on all areas of business in the cities.38 As a result, they were able to enjoy a standard of economic well-being that was inconceivable for the majority of Indonesians living under Dutch rule. This privileged economic position became a major source of resentment and hatred among pribumi Indonesians. Moreover, due to their role as ‘middlemen’, the pribumi Indonesians viewed the Chinese as kakitangan (henchmen) of the Dutch colonialists. Third, the discriminatory social structure of the colonial era also created a deep social division between the Chinese community and the pribumi Indonesians. The majority of overseas Chinese identified themselves with the Dutch, while those who were anti-colonialist identified themselves with mainland China.39 Very few were prepared to identify themselves with the indigenous population. This social preference among the Chinese implied that they also perceived the pribumi Indonesians to be inferior. Therefore, it was natural for the pribumi Indonesians to perceive that the Chinese were arrogant and exclusive people who tended to maintain their ‘kinship’ links with mainland China. Fourth, many Indonesians, if not most, believe that the Chinese are changeless. The expression ‘sekali Cina, tetap Cina’ (once a Chinese, always a Chinese) is familiar to most Indonesians. The belief that the Chinese have tended to maintain their kinship links with mainland China reinforced the Indonesian perception of the changeless nature of the Chinese minority. For example, it has been asserted that ‘this strongly uniform, cohesive race, separated by seas and frontiers, is essentially one people with a shared heritage, the Chinese civilisation’.40 In other words, there is a strong view that no matter where the Chinese live, they remain committed to the cultural values of their ancestors. Finally, the Chinese minority were seen as an ethnic group whose primary concern rested with their own safety and economic well-being. This perception grew out of the ethnic-Chinese position during the struggle for independence. The Chinese were regarded as indifferent to the Indonesian nationalist movement, and played a relatively minor supporting role.41 It has been asserted, for example, that during the revolutionary era ‘Many overseas Chinese preferred to stay on the fence at least and seemed desirous of reaping the greatest possible profit during these disturbed times. During the four years of struggle, while the Indonesian people were fighting hard, with great loss of human life, against the Dutch colonial troops, the Chinese concentrated their attention on safeguarding their privileged economic position’.42

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These stereotypes ultimately led Indonesians to question the political loyalty of the Chinese. In the context of Indonesia-China relations, it was commonly held that Chinese loyalty rested with the PRC, and various events during the 1950s and 1960s tended to reinforce this perception. In the 1970s and 1980s, the New Order portrayed the ethnic Chinese minority as the third side of a triangular threat together with the PRC and the PKI. It maintained that the ethnic Chinese represented the ‘fifth column’ through which threats to Indonesia’s national security from the PRC and the PKI could be carried out. In the 1990s, when the threat from the PKI had dissipated, suspicions of China and the ethnic Chinese persisted. In the post-Suharto era, those perceptions did not undergo significant change. The downfall of Suharto was preceded by the worst anti-Chinese riots since 1965. And, despite the attempt by the new Wahid government to display a new approach towards China, it is still too early to conclude that Indonesia’s perceptions of China have undergone a significant change. Indeed, the following discussion demonstrates that recent changes in Indonesia’s policy towards China have been shaped more by pragmatic domestic requirements than by significant changes in perceptions. Indonesia-China Relations After Suharto: Change, Continuity and Prospects Events in Indonesia prior to the downfall of President Suharto were devastating for the Indonesian Chinese. As mentioned earlier, the collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998 was preceded by three days of rioting during which the ethnic Chinese minority became the target of inhuman and brutal mob attacks. While the riots were clearly triggered by economic distress caused by the Asian financial crisis, many saw the event as the culmination of anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia. Indeed, in the less than three years since that devastating manifestation of anti-Chinese feeling, it is difficult to believe that anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesian society has faded away. In that context, domestic perceptions of the ethnic Chinese have continued to colour Indonesian perceptions of mainland China. It would be too simplistic, therefore, to argue that President Wahid’s overture towards Beijing was the result of a significant change in the structure of Indonesia’s elite and public perceptions of China and the Chinese. As clearly evident during the Sukarno and Suharto eras, the


more persuasive reasons for Indonesia’s apparent change in attitude towards China can be found within the context of domestic requirements and changes in domestic priorities. These two factors are well reflected in Wahid’s foreign policy agenda. Wahid’s Foreign Policy Agenda and Domestic Requirements In his inaugural speech, President Wahid laid down the foreign policy guidelines and strategic directions that his government intended to pursue. The basic objectives of Indonesia’s foreign policy under the Wahid government have not shown a sharp departure from its predecessors. First, the new government continues to stress the importance of maintaining Indonesia’s territorial integrity. Second, President Wahid pledged to restore Indonesia’s dignity as a sovereign state and regain the respect of the international community. He maintained that his government ‘would do its best to safeguard national unity, uphold the country’s territorial integrity and preserve Indonesia’s dignity in a world marked by a fierce competition among nations. Such an agenda would be pursued in accordance with the principle of mutual respect in inter-state relations’.43 Third, that the country’s foreign policy facilitates the restoration of international confidence in Indonesia and seeks to accelerate economic recovery.44 The foreign policy agenda reflects the domestic concerns of the new government over a number of pressing issues. The priority of safeguarding the country’s territorial integrity clearly reflects worries concerning the potential for territorial disintegration. Growing resentment against the central government in several provinces and demands for independence pose a serious threat to national unity. Such demands for independence have been strongly expressed in the provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya (West Papua), and to a lesser degree, Riau province. With the separation of East Timor in 1999, the future of Indonesia’s territorial integrity can no longer be taken for granted. The emphasis on the need to restore Indonesia’s dignity as a sovereign state is very much linked to the recent historical context. When Wahid assumed power, Indonesia was facing serious challenges to its status and identity, both as a respected member of the international community and as a sovereign state. The Asian financial crisis, with its attendant political turmoil, had tarnished Indonesia’s international image. There was a degree of frustration and resentment when the country had to rely on

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assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in overcoming the economic crisis. When international pressure was imposed on Indonesia over East Timor, resulting in the Australianled intervention force, many felt that Indonesia’s sovereignty had been compromised. They resented the fact that Indonesia had become so helpless in the face of international pressure and intervention. At a time when national pride was seriously hurt, it was only logical that the new government sought to instill a new sense of national dignity and pride as the basis of its legitimacy. The rationale behind Wahid’s intention to make economic recovery a key foreign policy objective is self-evident. With the economy in poor shape, Wahid realises that the legitimacy of his government will depend on his government’s ability to accelerate the recovery process. For that purpose, Wahid has to face the reality that a quick recovery is dependent on the return of international confidence and the flow of international assistance. Both requirements depend on the ability of the new government to demonstrate its credibility in undertaking necessary domestic political and economic reforms. Foreign policy serves as a vehicle by which the government’s commitment and credibility can be demonstrated abroad, and by which international assistance can be secured. Indeed, as Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab has admitted, Indonesia cannot yet abandon the strategy of ‘using foreign resources to solve domestic problems’.45 Wahid’s overture towards China should be understood within the context of those domestic requirements. His desire to work closer with China and India registers a degree of dissatisfaction with the dominant role played by the West in international affairs. Indeed, many of Indonesia’s elite felt betrayed by the West, especially Australia, over East Timor.46 They felt that instead of supporting Indonesia’s territorial integrity, the West had taken advantage of its troubled situation to separate East Timor from the Republic. Even prior to the East Timor debacle, there was also a sense of frustration among the political elite over Indonesia’s ‘excessive’ dependence on the West, especially the United States.47 In this context, Wahid’s proposal for an ‘Asia coalition’ is seen as an attempt to ‘balance American and Western influence’ and ‘limit the scope for external forces to undermine Indonesia’s sovereignty’.48 In other words, the move corresponds with domestic requirements that necessitate the government to display a degree of independence in dealing with the outside world (the West) on the one hand, and to induce a local sense of dignity and pride on the other.


The new found enthusiasm for forging a closer relationship with China also serves to accelerate economic recovery by strengthening domestic and international confidence in the Wahid government, especially among the Indonesian Chinese and the Chinese business community elsewhere. Wahid understood that economic recovery would accelerate if the Indonesian Chinese repatriated their money and started doing business in the country once more. He also understood that the Overseas Chinese business community has an important role to play in that process. In his attempt to regain the confidence of Indonesian Chinese, President Wahid dismantled discriminatory regulations imposed by the New Order regime. This change in attitude on the domestic front was matched by a change in attitude towards China. President Wahid expected to generate support from Indonesian Chinese once Indonesia forged better relations with Beijing. While the assumption of the linkage between Indonesian Chinese and Beijing might be unfounded, the gesture did send a significant message—to Indonesian Chinese both at home and abroad— that his government would not be discriminatory towards the Chinese. The need to preserve Indonesia’s territorial integrity was partly served during Wahid’s visits to neighbouring Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) countries and China. During those visits, Wahid managed to secure international support for Indonesia’s attempts to overcome separatist challenges to the country’s territorial integrity, especially in Aceh. In Beijing, for example, President Wahid was told that China supported ‘the Indonesian government’s efforts to maintain national unity and territorial integrity’.49 ChineseVice President Hu Jintao offered further support when he visited Jakarta in July 2000. He stated that the Chinese government would always support the Indonesian government and people in maintaining national integrity and sovereignty, especially in the face of possible intervention by big powers.50 However, when Wahid’s intention to make Asia, especially China, Indonesia’s primary partner to reduce dependency on the West is defined in terms of domestic requirements, it represents the ‘form’ rather than the ‘substance’ of foreign policy. The substance of Indonesia’s foreign policy remains the reality of dependence on the US and the West. Indonesia’s economic recovery, for example, is still dependent on the IMF and the World Bank. In order to cover its deficit, Indonesia continues to rely on foreign loans, especially from the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI),51 and also the IMF. Foreign Minister Shihab acknowledged the paramount role played by America in the Indonesian economy when he

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stated that Jakarta’s decision to open trade ties with Israel was really aimed at American investors.52 Indeed, for the Wahid government, the declaratory policy of forging closer relations with Asia (including China) serves the purpose of compensating domestic resentment against dependence on the West. In other words, Indonesia’s foreign policy under President Wahid cannot escape the primacy of domestic politics and requirements. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that during the first year of Wahid’s presidency, Indonesia-China relations improved significantly. For example, both countries signed an agreement on bilateral co-operation in May 2000. Exchanges of high-level government officials also increased significantly. Indonesia has further expressed an interest in purchasing military equipment from the PRC in order to reduce its dependence on the US.53 In that context, it has been noted that ‘the prospects for SinoIndonesian relations under Indonesia’s new President, Abdurrahman Wahid, seem much brighter than during the New Order era’.54 However, given the primacy of domestic politics in Indonesia’s foreign policy and Indonesia’s perceptions of China, it is important to note that the future of those relations cannot be taken for granted. The Challenge of Incompatibility: Domestic and Regional Dimensions As in the past, the future of Indonesia-China relations remains subject to developments in Indonesia’s internal political arena. In a period of uncertain political transition in Indonesia, any genuine reconciliation with China, let alone a strategic partnership, requires both sides to anticipate the challenge of incompatibility stemming from the problem of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese minority, the changing domestic context of the post-Suharto era, and Indonesia’s concerns over China’s intentions in Southeast Asia. Perceptions of the Ethnic Chinese Minority President Wahid’s sympathetic view of China and the Chinese is probably genuine. Indeed, Wahid was known for his consistent defence of minority rights in Indonesia long before he became president. During his tenure as the chairman of the largest Islamic mass organisation, the Nadhlatul Ulama (The Awakening of Religious Leaders), Wahid represented the most influential wing of the traditional stream of


Indonesia’s Islamic movement. In that capacity, he relentlessly led a campaign for an ideology of tolerance as the basis for modern Indonesian society. In open opposition to the New Order’s habit of distinguishing between pribumi (native) and non-pribumi (non-native),55 Wahid clearly held the view that ‘Indonesianness’ should be defined in terms of citizenry, not of ethnicity, race or religious identity. Therefore, for many Indonesian Chinese, who politically have always been the most vulnerable minority group, President Wahid represents a model for an ideal leader in an extremely diverse society like Indonesia. However, the logic of change in Indonesia’s attitude towards China under President Wahid cannot be seen merely as a direct manifestation of his personal beliefs. The story of the ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia is one of unfortunate success. They are quite successful economically, but discriminated against and vulnerable politically. The story of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is one of a minority group that has been subject to persistent racial and economic resentment. This community has often been the target of mob violence. That violence would not have taken place without the presence of a ‘permissive condition’—the negative perceptions of the Chinese. That condition serves as an important context within which violent actions were justified by the perpetrators and tolerated by the political elite and the general public. The case of the May 1998 riots is illustrative. While the riots can partly be seen as a form of popular uprising against the Suharto government, the ethnic Chinese community became the main target. It was estimated that several hundred Chinese were killed or wounded, and several dozen Chinese females were raped. Hundreds of thousands fled the country taking with them billions of dollars.56 Despite widespread condemnation by important segments of Indonesian society, there has been no significant legal or political will to punish those responsible. Moreover, there is a tendency among the political elite and the general public to downplay the event.57 Indeed, many even supported the view that the brutal attacks against the Chinese in May 1998 were ‘understandable’ due to the social and economic gap between the Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians. Indeed, even though the overall level of anti-Chinese violence declined drastically after the May riot, ‘anti-Chinese sentiments [in Indonesia] have remained strong’.58 The perceptions of the general public and political elite continue to be coloured by various stereotypes associated with the ethnic Chinese minority. The Chinese, for example, are still seen as a minority group who exercise the principle of ‘the ends justify the means’ in conducting

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their business and ‘their presence has not entirely brought about positive consequences. Some of them bring about negative impacts on the nation, both on the state of the economy and on the nation’s morality’.59 Resentment and suspicion against the Chinese, especially against rich ethnic Chinese businessmen, remain strong. Their loyalty to Indonesia continues to be questioned, especially when those who fled the country after the May riot began to return to Indonesia.60 National Police Chief General Roesmanhadi, for example, stated that ‘fleeing the country is not ethical in terms of nationalism’.61 Thus, there has not been a significant change in public and elite perceptions of the Chinese in Indonesia. The course of Indonesia-China relations in the future will be influenced by Indonesia’s persistent perceptions of the ethnic Chinese minority, and the sensitivity of the ethnic Chinese minority problem. Beijing’s position and attitude on this issue, and how Indonesia reacts, constitute an important factor in this regard. The main challenge might come from the rise of nationalism in China.62 Beijing’s reaction to the May riots in Indonesia, for example, cannot be separated from this development. Due to strong public pressure, the Chinese government had no choice but to express its concern over the anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia and urge the government to investigate, arrest and punish the perpetrators.63 As Indonesia was preoccupied with internal political turmoil, there was no strong reaction from the Indonesian side. In the future, however, it is likely that such remarks by Beijing will invite a strong reaction from Jakarta. In other words, the challenge of incompatibility between Indonesia and China will likely come from the intersection between the rise of nationalism in China on the one hand and Indonesia’s sensitivity over the question of the ethnic Chinese minority on the other. The Changing Domestic Political Context Indonesia-China relations might also be influenced by the changing domestic political context in Indonesia. In this regard there are three significant trends that might complicate bilateral relations in the future. The first is the process of democratisation in Indonesia, especially the link between the increasing role of civil society and the growing importance of democracy and human rights in domestic politics. As a result of strong public pressure, the concept of greater respect for human rights will gradually enter Indonesia’s foreign policy. If the process of democratisation in Indonesia is finally consolidated, then it is more likely that Indonesia’s foreign policy will also become increasingly ‘intrusive’


with regard to human rights issues. President Wahid, for example, has already expressed an intention to ‘mediate’ in the Tibet problem.64 This scenario, should it prevail, will run counter to China’s jealously guarded principle of national sovereignty and non-interference. Second, the increasing role of Islam in Indonesian politics also constitutes a major factor that might affect the course of Indonesia-China relations in the years to come. Some Islamic political forces in Indonesia draw their strength and legitimacy by invoking a sense of identity and unity among the believers (ummah). Such identity and unity transcend and defy the notion of traditional territorial boundaries to include all Muslims across the globe. In a world divided into sovereign states, the notion of a united and single Islamic entity is often expressed in terms of the concept of the solidarity among Muslim brotherhoods (Ukhuwah Islamiyah). In the context of growing concerns over human rights issues, these groups might also express their solidarity over the plight of Muslims in other countries, including China. In that context, how the Chinese government manages its own Muslims in Xinjiang Province, for example, may come to the attention of Indonesian Muslims. The third factor is the uncertainty of civil-military relations in Indonesia. It has been mentioned earlier that the Indonesian military is wary of China. At present, the military’s viewpoint has not surfaced because its role in the policy-making process has been seriously curtailed. Since the downfall of Suharto, the armed forces (now renamed TNI) have been forced to limit their role in politics and policy-making. However, in the context of the messy transition towards democracy, there is no guarantee that the military will eventually surrender to the principle of civilian supremacy. Indeed, there are signs that the TNI’s position vis-àvis civilian politicians has been consolidated. In other words, while the prospect for a return to a military-dominated authoritarian system seems remote, it is possible that the civilian elite may yield to the TNI’s demand that civil-military relations in Indonesia be based on an equal partnership. In such a case, the TNI would regain its strong position in the decision-making process, including foreign policy. This means that the TNI’s perceptions of China could once again colour Indonesia’s attitude and policies towards Beijing. China’s Regional Role In addition to factors stemming from Indonesia’s internal political arena, Indonesia-China relations will also be influenced by China’s policy in

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Southeast Asia. As seen in the period of the frozen Indonesia-China diplomatic relations, Jakarta repeatedly made it clear that it was suspicious of China’s intentions in Southeast Asia. The normalisation of relations in 1990 did not lead Indonesia to abandon the notion of ‘vigilance’ in dealing with China. On the contrary, this sense of ‘vigilance’ has been perpetuated by China’s assertive policy in the South China Sea. In that context, Indonesia has also expressed its concerns over the rise of China’s military capabilities and how China might employ them in the future.65 Indeed, as one observer has rightly pointed out, China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in the South China Sea ‘was also interpreted as an indication of how an economically strong and militarily powerful China might act in the future’.66 The clearest manifestation of Indonesia’s perception of China’s regional intent was expressed by vice-governor of the National Resilience Institute, Juwono Sudarsono,67 in August 1996 when he stated: ‘My pessimistic projection is that barring the possibility that China can gain access to resources other than the South China Sea area, then ASEAN countries will have to face the possibility of imminent military confrontation with China’.68 The largest joint military exercise conducted by Indonesia’s armed forces in and around the Natuna Islands shortly after Sudarsono made these remarks was partly driven by the ‘China factor’.69 Indonesia was concerned that China’s claim in the South China Sea may also infringe upon its sovereignty over the Natuna Islands. However, Indonesia clearly recognises China’s security and economic interests in Southeast Asia. It earnestly hopes that the policy of engagement, aimed at drawing China deeper into a web of regional interdependence in economic co-operation and multilateral security dialogues will lead to greater mutual understanding between China and ASEAN, including Indonesia.70 Indeed, such ambiguity in Jakarta’s attitude towards Beijing suggests that ‘Indonesia’s post-Cold War relationship with China has been conducted on the basis of evident misgivings and within a context of national limitations’.71 Conclusion Over the course of the past forty years, Indonesia and China have experienced ups and downs: from mutual suspicion in the 1950s, to a short period of diplomatic liaison and friendship in the mid 1960s, to bitter enmity marked by the freezing of diplomatic ties for twenty-three years from 1967 to 1990, and to a gradual improvement of relations in the


1990s. Indeed, the management of bilateral relations proved to be a difficult one for both sides. More strikingly, those relations were subject to pressures stemming from Indonesia’s domestic political arena. And, the question of perceptions—both public and elite—served as the most important context within which Indonesia’s policy towards the PRC was formulated. Changes in Indonesia’s policies towards the PRC were more a manifestation of various changes in domestic politics than a reflection of changes in elite and public perceptions. They also served as a function of change in China’s policy, especially on the question of the ethnic Chinese minority, and its policy towards Southeast Asia in general. Sukarno’s diplomatic alliance with China in 1963–1965, for example, was motivated by Indonesia’s foreign policy interests in challenging the existing international order; those foreign policy interests were a function of revolutionary domestic politics. The subsequent breakdown of diplomatic ties under President Suharto resulted from significant changes in Indonesia’s domestic politics and served to strengthen the legitimacy of his regime. When the basis of that legitimacy changed, Suharto also changed his policy towards China by restoring diplomatic ties in 1990. The shift in Wahid’s policy has also been shaped more by changes in Indonesia’s domestic politics and requirements than by significant changes in perceptions of China. In conclusion, it is important to note that the future course of Indonesia-China relations, despite recent improvements, will continue to be subject to changes in Indonesia’s domestic political arena. Judging from current trends in Indonesian politics, the challenges to IndonesiaChina relations will likely come from the unresolved problem of the ethnic Chinese minority, the democratisation process, the nature of civilmilitary relations, the growing role of Islam, and Jakarta’s perceptions of China’s regional policy in Southeast Asia. Indeed, an understanding of domestic forces in Indonesian policy towards China is of paramount importance to any understanding on how bilateral relations will develop in the years to come. Notes 1 Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter cited as FEER), 16 December 1999, p. 18. 2 Kompas, 4 December 1999. 3 Nasir Tamara, “Politik Luar Negeri Baru” (“New Foreign Policy”), Republika, 8 November 1999.

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4 Abubakar E. Hara, “Arah Politik Luar Negeri Gus Dur” (“Gus Dur’s Foreign Policy Direction”), Republika, 4 November 1999. 5 Ben Perkasa Drajat, “Skenario Diplomasi Presiden Gus Dur” (“Scenario for President Gus Dur’s Diplomacy”), Panji Masyarakat, no. 31, 17 November 1999, p. 21. 6 Ben Perkasa Drajat, “Diplomasi Luar Negeri ala Gus Dur,” Kompas, 11 February 2000. 7 Media Indonesia, 3 November 1999. 8 This section draws heavily from Rizal Sukma, “Recent Developments in Indonesia-China Relations,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 1 (June 1994), pp. 35–45. 9 For a more detailed discussion on the establishment of Indonesia-China diplomatic relations, see David Mozingo, Chinese Policies Towards Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 78–98. 10 Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 20. 11 See Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945–1965 (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), p. 410 and Woo Jung Joo, “The Rise and Fall of the Djakarta-Peking Axis, 1949–1966”, Ph.D. dissertation, Mississippi State University, 1967, pp. 124–125. 12 Arnold C.Brackman, “The Malay World and China: Partner or Barrier?” in A.M.Halpern (ed.), Policies Towards China: Views from Six Continents (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 270. 13 See, Sukma, Indonesia and China, op. cit., pp. 24–33. 14 For a comprehensive discussion on how Indonesian and Chinese foreign policy objectives and interests converged during this period, see Sheldon W.Simon, The Broken Triangle: Peking, Djakarta, and the PKI (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1969) and Peter Christian Hauswedell, “The Anti-Imperialist International United Front in Chinese and Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1963–1965: A Study of Anti-Status Quo Politics” (Ph.D. dissertation Cornell University, 1976). 15 Hauswedell, ibid., p. 159. 16 For an excellent discussion on the breakdown of Sino-Indonesian diplomatic relations, see Justus M. van der Kroef, “Sino-Indonesian Rupture”, China Quarterly, no. 33 (January-March 1968), pp. 17–46. 17 For a more detailed analysis of this ‘triangular threat’ in Indonesia’s perceptions of China, see Sukma, Indonesia and China, op. cit., pp. 47– 53. 18 The decision to restore diplomatic relations with PRC was in fact made in February 1989 when President Suharto met Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in Tokyo while attending Emperor Hirohito’s funeral. 19 Jakarta Post, 27 February 1989. 20 Antara, 27 February 1989. 21 For example, a week after President Suharto’s decision to restore relations, Indonesian Armed Forces Commander General Try Sutrisno stated that this did not mean that Indonesia would lower its vigilance. See Kompas 2 March 1989. Earlier, the Chairman of the Muslim-based Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP or United Development Party), H.J.Naro, had


22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32 33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41

maintained that ‘we should be cautious of the PRC’. See Kompas, 28 February 1989. Jakarta Post, 27 June 1989. Kompas, 16 October 1989 and Angkatan Bersenjata (Armed Forces), 16 October 1989. See statement by President Suharto in Suara Karya, 27 February 1989. Jakarta Post, 22 April 1994. Agence France-Press, dispatch from Jakarta, 26 April 1994. See Sukma, Indonesia-China, op. cit., pp. 147–151. For a discussion of these early contacts, see, among others, Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), especially Chapter Two. Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), p. 107. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the detailed history of this event. For a comprehensive treatment of this issue, see, among others, Hidajat.Z.M. Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Cina Indonesia (The Society and Culture of Indonesian Chinese) (Bandung: Tarsito, 1971); and Satyawati Suleiman, Concise Ancient History of Indonesia (Jakarta: The Archeological Foundation, 1974). Sartono Kartodirdjo, Marwati Djuned, and Nugroho Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia [The National History of Indonesia], Vol. II (Jakarta: Departemen Kebudayaan and Pendidikan, 1977), pp. 253– 254. Hidajat, Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan, op. cit., p. 64. Ibid., p. 65. The Indonesian government’s decision in 1972 to use the term ‘Cina’ to refer to China rather than ‘Tiongkok’ can be seen as an attempt to eliminate the impression of China’s superiority. The term ‘Tiongkok’ which means ‘the Middle Kingdom’ was widely used by the Chinese in Indonesia during the pre-war period. This term reflected a concrete manifestation of the emerging Chinese nationalist solidarity and at the same time was seen as a reflection of arrogant Chinese attitudes. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see, Charles A.Coppel and Leo Suryadinata, “The Use of the Terms ‘Tjina’ and ‘Tionghoa’ in Indonesia”, in Leo Suryadinata, The Chinese Minority in Indonesia: Seven Papers (Singapore: Chopmen Enterprise, 1978). Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority, and China: A Study of Perception and Policies (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1978), p. 165. For a more comprehensive discussion, see Charles A.Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983). Ibid., p. 3. Agung, Twenty Years, op. cit., , pp. 426–427. See Lie Tek Tjeng, “Hubungan Baru RI-RRC Dilihat dari Jakarta” (“New Indonesia-China Relationship as Seen from Jakarta”), Kompas, 6 August 1990. Cited in Coppel, Indonesian Chinese, op. cit, p. 8. For a more comprehensive discussion of the ethnic-Chinese and the Indonesian revolution, see Mary F. Somers Heidhues, “Citizenship and Identity: Ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian Revolution,” in Jennifer

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42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

63 64 65 66

Cushman and Wang Gungwu (eds.), Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988), pp. 115–138. Agung, Twenty Years, op. cit., p. 427. Kompas, 21 October 1999. See statement by Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab, Media Indonesia, 3 November 1999. Ibid. Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia, East Timor, and the Problem of National Disintegration”, Paper Presented at Workshop on East Timor, National Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS), Tokyo, 13–15 December 1999. Drajat, “Skenario Diplomasi,” p. 21. Kompas, 26 October 1999. FEER, 16 December 1999. Kompas, 25 July 2000. CGI is an international consortium formed under the aegis of the World Bank to provide loans for Indonesia. The majority of its members are Western countries. Jakarta Post, 27 October 1999. See http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2000/12/20001211–193948.shtml. Ian James Storey, “Indonesia’s China Policy in the New Order and Beyond: Problems and Prospects”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (April 2000), pp. 165. The term non-pribumi is, however, generally used to refer to the ethnic Chinese minority. Indonesia’s Crisis: Chronic but not Acute (Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group Report No. 2, 31 May 2000), p. 19. An editorial in a tabloid, for example, stated that ‘only three Chinese women were raped during three days of rioting’ while ‘in Jakarta, more than 10 women are raped every day’. See Adil, 12–18 November 1998. Indonesia’s Crisis, op. cit., p. 19. See, Zaim Uchrowi, “Gus Dur Menoleh Tionghoa,” Adil, 12–18 November 1998, p. 3. For a report that reflects this feeling, see “A was, Taipan ‘Perampok’ Balik Lagi” (“Beware, the Taipan ‘Robbers’ Are Back”), Sabili 7, no. 12, 1 December 1999, pp. 64–78. Pos Kota, 20 May 1999. For an interesting discussion on how the rise of nationalism, as expressed in the reactions by internet users in China to the anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta, threatened the nationalist credentials of the Beijing government, see Christopher Hughes, “Beijing Rides a Nationalist Cyber-Tiger”, Asian Wall Street Journal, 21 September 2000. Straits Times, 4 August 1998. See http://www.astaga.com. See, for example, statements by Indonesia’s Military Commander-in-Chief General Feisal Tanjung, in Antara, 20 November 1995 and Straits Times, 22 November 1995. Storey, “Indonesia’s China Policy”, op. cit., p. 164.


67 Juwono Sudarsono was later minister of defence in Wahid’s first cabinet. 68 Jakarta Post, 7 August 1996. 69 See, Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia Toughens China Stance”, FEER, 5 September 1996 and Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia’s Bebas-Aktif Foreign Policy and the ‘Security Agreement’ with Australia”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 2 (1997). 70 See statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas, Suara Pembaruan, 12 September 1996. 71 Michael Leifer, “Indonesia and the Dilemmas of Engagement”, in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S.Ross (eds.), Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 104.

CHAPTER TEN Singapore and the Rise of China: Perceptions and Policy Ian Storey

Introduction Since the end of the Cold War, the implications of China’s rising power have come to dominate the security agenda of the Asia-Pacific region. Will the ascendancy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a major economic, political and military power be a force for stability or instability in the international system? This question led to the emergence of the so-called ‘China threat’ debate in the early 1990s, a debate that seems destined to continue well into the twenty-first century.1 China threat proponents, largely drawn from the realist school of international relations, see the PRC as a rising hegemon whose growing power and sense of regional entitlement will inevitably lead it into a confrontational relationship with the United States and Japan in East Asia. A hegemonic China, it is argued, may seek to resolve outstanding territorial disputes in its favour, and may not entreat neighbouring countries as equal sovereign states. On the other side of the debate are those who see the rise of China as a stabilising factor in world politics. They argue that economic growth in the PRC enhances the country’s internal stability, and fosters an interdependent relationship with the rest of the world, the fracturing of which would be highly damaging to China’s developmental aspirations. The ‘China threat’ is not a new concern for the PRC’s neighbours in Southeast Asia. For much of the Cold War period the five founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)— Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines—perceived China to be a direct politico-military threat. This threat perception had both an internal and external dimension. China was perceived as an internal threat because of its support for communist insurgent movements throughout Southeast Asia. The aim of these insurgent movements was the overthrow of the region’s fragile post-colonial

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governments through armed force, and the establishment of communist regimes. China was also perceived as an external threat because of its support for North Vietnam in its war against South Vietnam in the 1960s. At that time, the ASEAN leaders all subscribed to the ‘domino theory’; that the fall of South Vietnam would set off a chain of communist uprisings throughout the region. The establishment of ASEAN by five like-minded national leaders in 1967 was in direct response to the perceived threat posed by the PRC. In order to cope with the China threat the ASEAN states prioritised economic development (thereby reducing poverty which was seen as the breeding ground of communism)2 and supported the US-led containment strategy against China. ASEAN threat perceptions of the PRC eased somewhat with the 1972 Sino-US rapprochement, and especially after the launching of economic reforms in China in 1978. In the reform era, China downgraded the importance of the communist ideology, gradually ended its support for regional communist insurgent movements, and began pursuing closer economic relations with the ASEAN states. During the 1980s ASEANChina relations also improved as the two sides entered a de facto alignment designed to effect a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. In the post-Cold War era Southeast Asian countries no longer perceive China to be a direct politico-military threat. However, the PRC’s growing power (especially its military power), increasing nationalism, irredentist claims in the South China Sea, and proximity make it loom large in the geopolitical considerations of all ASEAN states. In terms of threat perception today, analysts in the ASEAN capitals perceive China to be more of a potential threat than an actual threat. However, in order to promote good relations with the PRC, ASEAN officials seldom articulate the word ‘threat’ when discussing the security dimension of ASEANChina relations, instead preferring to identify a number of ‘concerns’, ‘problems’ and ‘challenges’. This chapter examines Singapore’s security concerns vis-à-vis the rise of China, and the policies it is pursuing in order to mitigate these concerns. Since the early 1990s, Singapore has been ASEAN’s most articulate advocate of engagement with China. The Singaporean leadership believes that economic growth in China should be encouraged, not only because it creates valuable trade and investment opportunities for the ASEAN states, but also because it keeps China stable, facilitates its integration into the world economy and regional community, and gives Beijing a stake in the international status quo. At the same time, however, Singapore recognises that China is destined to become a major

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military power, and this could upset the regional balance of power. The Singaporean government is also concerned at how China intends to resolve the Taiwan issue and its territorial claims in the South China Sea. Singapore believes that regional stability can best be provided for by a balance of power among the PRC, Japan and the United States, with the latter acting as the key balancer. Background: Singapore-PRC Relations during the Cold War Singapore’s ethnic composition, geographic location, small size and state ideology shaped the basic contours of its relationship with the PRC during the Cold War. Singapore became an independent sovereign state on 9 August 1965 following its split from the Federation of Malaysia. The majority of the new republic’s population (more than 70 per cent) was ethnic Chinese. At that time, Southeast Asia’s greatest security threat was posed by communist insurgents, most of whom received both moral and material support from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Singapore’s first and most influential prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, himself an ethnic Chinese, was acutely conscious of how the country’s two most important neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia, perceived the new republic. In their eyes, Singapore represented the ‘Third China’ after the PRC and Taiwan. Both Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur feared that Singapore might become a base for CCP subversive activities in the region, especially if a PRC embassy were ever established in Singapore. Lee strove hard to disabuse his neighbours of the perception that Singapore was ‘an agent of influence for China’.3 His government played down the new republic’s ‘Chineseness’ in favour of a more Southeast Asian identity. Lee refused to establish diplomatic relations with China, even after Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand had done so in the mid 1970s. Lee made a public commitment that Singapore would be the last ASEAN country to establish diplomatic ties with China. In practice, this meant waiting for Indonesia, which had suspended diplomatic ties with the PRC following the 1965 Gestapu Affair.4 Like his ASEAN counterparts, Lee was a committed anti-communist. Throughout the Cold War he lambasted China’s links with regional communist parties, and banned all books and periodicals from the PRC. However, despite ideological differences between the two countries, there was a strong element of pragmatism in their relationship—trade. Singapore’s economic development depended on external trade, and it was willing to


conduct trading relations with all countries. China was no exception, and during the 1960s and 1970s, Singapore was an important source of foreign exchange for Beijing. In 1978 Deng Xiaoping assumed power in China and initiated a comprehensive policy of economic modernisation. In order to achieve this goal, Deng ascribed much less importance to the communist ideology, allowing China to pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy. Singapore was quick to recognise that the PRC after 1978 was a country following very different policies to that of Maoist China. During the 1980s, Singapore stepped up trade and investment links with China. Singapore hoped to fill a niche in Deng’s modernisation plans by selling managerial and technical know-how to China. By 1988 Singapore had become China’s largest ASEAN trade partner, with bilateral trade amounting to US$2.8 billion.5 The Chinese government made no secret of the fact that it considered Singapore a good role model for the PRC to emulate. China was keen to learn how Singapore had successfully managed to combine economic development, one-party rule, and the absorption of Western technology and business practices whilst seemingly maintaining its Asian character.6 Sino-Singapore relations also improved in the 1980s due to a convergence of strategic thinking over the Cambodian issue. Conscious of its own size and position, Singapore strongly condemned Vietnam’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia. Singapore believed that only China had the military capabilities necessary to pressurise Vietnam into withdrawing, and that ASEAN should align itself with the PRC, over this issue at least. Finally, in October 1990, Singapore and the PRC established formal diplomatic relations, two months after the unfreezing of Sino-Indonesian relations.7 The Post-Cold War Era: Singapore’s Security Concerns vis-à-vis the Rise of China By the time Sino-Singaporean ties were formalised, it had become clear to the Singaporean leadership that the PRC had completely abandoned its support for insurgency movements in Southeast Asia, and that communism no longer posed a threat to prosperous Singapore. However, Lee Kuan Yew had long been of the opinion that an economically and militarily strong China might pose other security concerns for the region in the mid to long-term—in other words, it was a potential threat to regional stability. These security concerns, shared, to varying degrees, by Singapore’s ASEAN partners,8 are intertwined, but for the sake of

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analysis may be conveniently divided into four main areas: first, China’s military modernisation programme; second, the Taiwan issue; third, the South China Sea dispute; and fourth, China as a potential regional hegemon. China’s Military Modernisation Programme China’s military modernisation programme began in the early 1980s in response to Chinese perceptions of the growing Soviet military threat in Asia. Although the Soviet threat dissipated in the mid to late 1980s, China’s efforts to upgrade its armed forces continued unabated. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 removed the ‘northern threat’ altogether, allowing China to concentrate its strategic focus on issues in the east and southeast; namely, the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea. Since 1990 Chinese defence spending has experienced an annual average double-digit growth. Although official defence expenditure now stands at US$17 billion,9 many defence analysts estimate the true figure to be at least three times this amount, as official figures exclude associated expenditure such as R&D, arms purchases from abroad and income generated from the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) commercial activities.10 Singapore recognises that it is China’s sovereign right to upgrade its defence capabilities, as much of the PLA’s inventory dates from the 1970s and 1980s and is largely obsolete. However, it is the nature and pace of China’s defence modernisation programme that has aroused some concern in Singapore, as well as in other ASEAN capitals. Since the early 1990s, China’s defence priorities have been the enhancement of air and naval forces. Improved Sino-Russian relations have enabled China to purchase state-of-the-art weaponry from Moscow, including SU-27 and SU-30 fighters, Kilo-class submarines, Sovremenny-class destroyers, air transport planes and in-flight refuelling technology. These weapon systems have enabled the PLA to improve its power projection capabilities. Singaporean defence analysts worry that China may employ these forces to resolve the Taiwan issue or dominate the South China Sea. The pace of China’s defence spending is also a source of concern. If present trends continue, and the Chinese economy continues to grow by 8– 10 per cent per annum, China will have the largest defence budget in East Asia two or three decades hence. China already spends much more on defence than the combined total for all ten ASEAN countries (see Table 10.1).


Table 10.1 Defence Expenditure in the Asia-Pacific Region, 1999 (US$ billions)

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 2000-2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, 2000).

Singapore recognises that as the Chinese economy continues to grow, Beijing will have greater resources to call on for purposes of national defence. Lee’s successor as prime minister, Goh Chok Tong, highlighted this trend when he remarked: ‘China will increasingly have the means to try and shape any international environment that it regards as threatening its basic interests’.11 However, Singapore believes that the PRC has to tread a fine line between providing for its own security, and fuelling concerns among its neighbours as to how a militarily powerful China might act in the future. As far as Singapore is concerned, it is in China’s economic self-interest to allay these concerns lest they lead to a destabilising arms race in the region.12 The Singaporean government has not been reluctant to raise regional concerns brought about by China’s increasing military power, and the need for the Chinese government to be more transparent regarding the motivations behind its defence policies and arms procurements. In a speech delivered to an international forum in Beijing in 1995, Prime Minister Goh warned: In Asia, China’s rising power and arms build-up has stirred anxiety … It is important to bring into the open this underlying sense of discomfort, and even insecurity, about the political and military ambitions of China… It is not preordained that China’s military power will turn into a threat, or that it will behave like the former Soviet Union… [But] China must show through its attitude and

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action that, big as it will be, it intends to be a responsible member of the international community.13 China’s armed forces still have significant weaknesses in terms of doctrine, training and capabilities. Moreover, when compared to the military power of the United States, China is still far from being a peer competitor. However, China has made substantial progress in modernising the PLA over the past decade, and as one analyst contends, ‘If we employ a trend analysis to examine China’s armed forces, we are witnessing a strong military in the making’.14 Thisdevelopment worries Singapore, and reinforces fears that the PRC might employ its new found military muscle to resolve territorial disputes and, in the long-term, pursue regional hegemony. The Taiwan Issue One of the Asia-Pacific’s most dangerous flashpoints is the Taiwan issue, and Singapore has taken a much keener interest in the development of cross-straits relations than any other ASEAN member. A number of reasons account for this interest. First, following its cessation from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965 the Singaporean government developed very close relations with Taiwan’s governing party, the Kuomintang (KMT). In particular, Taipei provided assistance in the development of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), allowing Singaporean military personnel to train in Taiwan. Moreover, since 1965 Singapore and Taiwan have cultivated extensive trade relations, and Taipei has become one of the largest investors in Singapore. Second, since the early 1980s, the volume of Sino-Singapore trade has grown substantially. Thus, Singapore has significant economic interests on both sides of the straits, and if conflict were to break out it would stand to lose the most of all the ASEAN countries.15 Finally, Singapore is worried that if an armed clash occurred between China and Taiwan, the United States would become involved militarily. Given the close defence relationship between Singapore and the United States, Washington might request diplomatic and/or logistical support from Singapore for the US war effort in Taiwan. For an essentially ethnic Chinese country to be asked to show its support for or against China and Taiwan would put Singapore in an extremely invidious position. Lee Kuan Yew, both as prime minister and later as senior minister, has spoken about China-Taiwan relations on numerous occasions. His


comments are primarily aimed at policy makers in Washington, Beijing and Taipei. All parties see him as a figure of trust, and his advice has been well received over the years. Lee has warned Taiwan not to underestimate China’s commitment to national reunification, and its threat to use military force to retake the island if Taipei declares independence. Speaking in 1997, Lee warned: ‘No Chinese leader can be branded as the leader who lost Taiwan. I have no doubt that China will fight over Taiwan, whatever the cost’.16 Lee believes that one of China’s primary motivations for upgrading the PLA’s air and naval forces has been to make its threats against Taiwan credible. As the PRC can devote more resources to defence spending as its economic power grows, ultimately Taiwan can never win an arms race with China. In an interview in 1996, Lee predicted that the PRC would enhance its military strength over the next few decades to overwhelm and overawe Taiwan: ‘Whatever weapons the West can supply Taiwan, the array on the mainland side will become so massive in any confrontation that Taiwan must talk’.17 Moreover, Lee has warned Taipei not to assume that the US would commit itself militarily to the defence of Taiwan, as Washington is committed to a one-China policy.18 Lee advised former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui not to give China the impression that he was not interested in eventual reunification. He recommended that Taiwan abandon its annual effort to gain admittance to the UN General Assembly. He has also encouraged Taiwan to help China in its economic modernisation efforts because, as cross-straits economic linkages are strengthened, the costs of any future conflict will be raised.19 Singapore regarded Lee Teng-hui’s announcement in July 1999 that Taiwan was a sovereign state and that its relations with the PRC should be on a ‘statetostate’ basis as part of a dangerous drift away from reunification. Following the election of President Chen Shui-bian in March 2000, Lee argued that the Taiwanese leadership should accept reunification as inevitable. To do otherwise would be to risk war with China and undermine regional stability.20 Lee Kuan Yew’s advice to China over Taiwan has been to aim for a negotiated settlement, allowing for some flexibility. He has suggested China allow Taiwan some ‘international space’ in economic and cultural affairs to forestall its ‘creeping independence’.21 Although Leerecognises that China is serious about the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, he has cautioned Beijing to consider the negative consequences of such a strategy. If China were to attack Taiwan, the United States might intervene militarily in support of Taipei. A protracted war might ensue,

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which would be highly damaging to regional stability. At the very least, in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the US would be forced to place an economic embargo on the PRC, dealing a fatal blow to the country’s modernisation efforts.22 As with most other security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, Singapore sees the role of the United States as crucial in reaching a satisfactory resolution to the Taiwan issue. Lee Kuan Yew has urged the US not to encourage Taiwanese moves towards independence, and to adhere to its one-China policy. Singapore has been critical of any US moves that would either encourage Taiwan to declare independence, or lead the PRC to suspect that Washington was trying to hamper reunification. Thus the semi-official Straits Times condemned US Congressional Republicans for planning to introduce the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act’ which would mandate closer military co-operation between the US and Taiwan.23 This, in Singapore’s view, would give China a reason to launch an attack on Taiwan, before such co-operation could get underway. Lee Kuan Yew expressed concern at the enhancement of US-Japan security guidelines in 1997, which seemed to include Taiwan and its surrounding areas.24 These developments might embolden the Taiwanese independence movement and lead to greater Sino-Japanese friction, both undesirable for regional stability. Because of Singapore’s extensive interests in both China and Taiwan, Lee has used his good offices to facilitate negotiations between the two sides. These efforts culminated in April 1993 when semi-official bodies from the PRC and Taiwan held talks in Singapore. However, there are limits as to how far China will allow Lee to act as a mediator. In August 1993, Lee met with President Jiang Zemin in Beijing. During their meeting Lee offered to help restore direct shipping links between China and Taiwan through Singaporean companies. Several years later, Lee admitted that Jiang had rejected this offer, informing him that the reunification of the country was a ‘family matter’ among the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, and that Singapore was not a family member.25 Lee took this to mean that he had no further role in crossstraits negotiations.26 Since then he has rejected rumours that he will play a mediation role in China-Taiwan relations.27 The South China Sea Dispute The South China Sea dispute is without question ASEAN’s greatest security concern vis-à-vis the PRC. The dispute centres on the ownership


of more than 200 small islands and reefs in the South China Sea known as the Spratly Islands. The Spratlys are claimed in whole or in part by six countries: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Sovereignty is contested for two main reasons: first, the area includes valuable fishing grounds and is believed to be rich in oil and gas deposits; and second, the islands occupy an important strategic position straddling vital sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) which link the Indian and Pacific oceans, and through which much of the world’s trade passes. Singapore makes no territorial claims of its own in the Spratlys, but it does view the dispute with concern. Singapore has no natural resources of its own, and is almost totally dependent on international trade for its continued prosperity. As the vast majority of this trade is conducted by sea to and from the island republic, Singapore’s survival depends on the maintenance of freedom of navigation in the area.28 Although Singapore sees the political and military tension in the Taiwan Straits as much more volatile than the South China Sea, it continues to identify the Spratlys as an area of potential conflict.29 Like its ASEAN counterparts, Singapore has been concerned at China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in the South China Sea since the early the 1990s. In 1992 the PRC passed the Territorial Law of the Sea by which it claimed sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea; in May 1992 Beijing awarded the US oil company Crestone a contract to search for oil in waters off Vietnam; in July 1992 PLA forces occupied Vietnamese claimed Da Lac Reef; and, most alarming of all, Chinese built structures were discovered on Philippine claimed Mischief Reef in February 1995.30 These structures were subsequently upgraded into a permanent military fortress in November 1998.31 And in May 1996, the PRC extended its baseline claims to the Paracel Islands, thereby extending its claims in the South China Sea by an extra 965,000 square miles.32 The ASEAN states are concerned by China’s duplicitous policy in the South China Sea. On the one hand, China has expressed a willingness to shelve the sovereignty issue, work towards a peaceful resolution of the dispute based on international law, and jointly develop maritime resources with the other claimants. At the same time, however, China has expanded its physical presence in the South China Sea by laying down territorial markers, occupying reefs and building structures on them. China’s policy has been variously described as ‘creeping assertiveness’, ‘creeping sovereignty’, and by the Philippine defence secretary as ‘talk and take’.33 In keeping with its ASEAN partners, Singapore believes that China’s behaviour in the South China Sea has implications that go far beyond the

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issue of sovereignty over a few hundred uninhabited islands. In the first instance, China’s growing assertiveness arouses suspicions and mistrust in Southeast Asia as to whether the PRC intends to abide by international law and regional norms in seeking to resolve this and other issues. Singaporean minister Brigadier George Yeo spelled out these concerns when he said Asian countries had ‘become doubtful about China’s willingness to abide by internationally acceptable codes of conduct’.34 Increasingly, China’s anticipated future behaviour towards smaller countries in the region is being extrapolated from its behaviour in the South China Sea during the 1990s. Moreover, Singapore worries that tensions in the South China Sea might lead to a vicious circle of events. If China continues to pursue an assertive policy in the South China Sea, then countries in the region may opt to curtail trade and investment with the PRC. This would inhibit economic development in China and in the region as a whole. Economic stagnation in China might lead to domestic instability, resulting in a more conservative or hardline government, and greater regional instability. The second implication is that the dispute could endanger freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, damaging the prosperity of littoral states. The Singaporean government was so concerned by the occupation of Mischief Reef that Prime Minister Goh raised the issue with Premier Li Peng during a bilateral meeting in Beijing in May 1995. Goh told Li of ASEAN’s concerns that the occupation had had negative consequences for regional stability and freedom of navigation.35 That Goh, prime minister of a country which has no territorial claims in the South China Sea and good relations with the PRC, had chosen to raise the issue with a senior Chinese leader in Beijing was very significant. It sent a clear signal to the Chinese leadership that Singapore was at one with its ASEAN partners over the issue and that its relations with the Association took precedence over its ties with China. Singapore also expressed concern when the PRC announced it was drawing its baseline claims from the Paracel Islands in April 1996, an act widely interpreted as being in contravention of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Foreign Minister Shunmugan Jayakumar said that countries in the region should ‘scrupulously’ abide by the UNCLOS in resolving their territorial disputes.36 Defence Minister Tony Tan remarked that if China extended this principle to the Spratly Islands, then freedom of navigation would be endangered.37 Singapore has given its full backing to ASEAN’s efforts to find a solution to the dispute. Singaporean academics and government officials


have been active participants in the annual workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea in Indonesia. Singapore has also supported the formulation of a regional code of conduct which ASEAN would like all disputants to formally observe. However, the results of these efforts have been meagre. After more than ten years of workshop discussions, co-operative ventures designed to build confidence among the claimants have failed to be implemented, and China has hampered progress on adopting a regional code of conduct. As none of the claimants seem willing to compromise their sovereignty claims, a resolution to the dispute seems a distant prospect, with worrying implications for the future of ASEAN-China relations. China as a Potential Regional Hegemon At the heart of the China threat debate is the issue of whether the PRC will seek hegemony in East Asia once (and if) it achieves its full power potential decades hence. Hegemony can be defined as ‘primacy or leadership’ among a group of countries, and a hegemonic power is able to assert hegemony because it is the most powerful actor among them.38 Those who subscribe to hegemonic theory view world history as a catalogue of the rise and fall of great powers—periodic redistributions of power brought about by hegemonic struggles. According to Robert Gilpin, hegemonic struggles occur when there is disequilibrium in the international system between an established hegemon and a rising hegemon. This disequilibrium is resolved by war, either in favour of the established hegemon or the hegemonic challenger.39 Hegemonic struggles in the past have included the two world wars and the Cold War. Realists predict a new round of hegemonic struggle between the United States and China in the twenty-first century. The Chinese government has repeatedly rejected the notion that the PRC has hegemonic ambitions in the region, arguing that the China threat theory is part of a wider strategy of containment designed to impede the PRC’s growth and prevent it from catching up with the United States.40 China as a potential regional hegemon is very much a long-term concern for Singapore and the other ASEAN states, but it cannot be discounted. According to Lee Kuan Yew: ‘As China’s development nears the point when it has enough weight to elbow its way into the region, it will make a fateful decision—whether to be a hegemon, using its weight to create a sphere of influence in the region for its economic and security needs, or to continue as a good international citizen because it can

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achieve better growth by observing international rules’.41 Ultimately the ASEAN states see a hegemonic China as a worst-case scenario, and one that they hope to avoid through a policy of engagement and encouraging a regional balance of power. These policies form the subject of the next two sections. Singapore and the Importance of Engaging China The security concerns outlined above are uppermost in the minds of Singaporean leaders vis-à-vis the rise of China. A military clash in the South China Sea, a cross-straits war, or a hegemonic struggle involving the United States and China would inevitably plunge the region into crisis, damaging investor confidence and economic growth in East Asia. Singapore’s prosperity and hence survival depends on continued regional and global economic growth. More than any other country in Southeast Asia, Singapore recognises that if a rising China is not peacefully accommodated into the international system, the resultant tension and possible confrontation will undo decades of economic achievement. Unlike the early Cold War era, however, Singapore and its ASEAN partners have collectively ruled out a policy of containment against China. The PRC today is not perceived as a direct political-military threat. Indeed ASEAN-China relations have never been in better shape, particularly in the economic and political spheres. Containment is not only regarded as unnecessary, but also dangerously counterproductive. A policy of containment would transform China into a paranoid and hostile power, reinforcing hardliners within the government who might adopt a more aggressive stance towards resolving the country’s territorial disputes. Moreover, containment would also require the ASEAN states to sever lucrative trade and investment links with China, something they would be unwilling to countenance. Instead, the ASEAN states are each pursuing a policy of engagement with China. The aim of engagement is to integrate the PRC into the regional community at the economic, political and security levels, thereby socialising the Chinese government into accepting regional norms of behaviour, whilst at the same time increasing its stake in the status quo. These regional norms of behaviour include respecting the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, the non-use or threat of force, and diplomacy in resolving inter-state disputes.42 Economic engagement weaves the PRC into a complex web of interdependence, thereby increasing the costs to China of any future conflict between it and


Association members, say over the Spratly Islands. Political engagement increases dialogue between ASEAN and China at both the bilateral and corporate level, allowing the two sides to increase co-operation and discuss mutual concerns. At the security level, engagement aims to involve the PRC in the region’s nascent security architecture, principally the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Engagement is designed to prevent a potential China threat from becoming an actual China threat. Singapore has been ASEAN’s most articulate advocate of engagement with China. Throughout the 1990s, Singaporean leaders referred to the necessity of engagement, and its virtuous benefits, in almost every speech and interview that touched on East Asian affairs. According to Lee Kuan Yew: ‘For the world’s stability and security, integrating China into an international framework is not a question of Choice but of necessity. The world does not need another Cold War’.43 In 1995 Goh Chok Tong argued: ‘A country that has a stake in global trade and economic growth will have an interest in upholding international laws and standards. By giving China space and time, the world will accelerate, not delay, China’s ability and willingness to play by global rules’.44 In 1998, Information Minister George Yeo warned: ‘Together with the European Union, the US and Japan will have to manage carefully and strategically China’s incorporation into the global system. The alternative is global conflict’.45 Singaporean leaders have argued China needs time to develop and integrate into the global community. The West, therefore, should refrain from putting pressure on China over issues of human rights and democratic development. Singapore’s leaders argue that such pressure is counterproductive, as the Chinese government does not respond well to external pressure, and would impose even tighter controls over its citizens. Lee Kuan Yew criticised US policy towards China in the first half of the 1990s as not being driven by sound strategic and economic considerations, but by human rights issues which had become a dangerous obsession in Washington. He argued that such an approach risked turning the US and China into long-term rivals, with disastrous consequences for Asia: The baiting of China by American human rights groups…is done in a manner which ignores differences of culture, values and history and subordinates the strategic considerations of China-US relations to an American domestic agenda… Such a haphazard approach risks turning China into a long-term adversary of the US46

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By concentrating on human rights issues in Tibet and Taiwan, Lee argued that the Chinese leadership risked interpreting US policy towards the PRC as being designed to ‘dismember’ China and keep it weak.47 Singapore’s leaders believe it is crucial for countries in the AsiaPacific region to engage China at the formative stages of its development, and not to link human rights issues with trade. If Western countries link the two, then China’s economic development might be slowed down, but not completely derailed. When China emerges as a strong power, it will remember with bitterness the treatment it received at the hands of Western powers. Moreover, it would not feel bound to observe the norms of international behaviour. As Lee Kuan Yew remarked: ‘Peace and security [in the Asia-Pacific region] will turn on whether China emerges as a xenophobic, chauvinistic force, bitter and hostile to the West because it tried to slow down or abort its development, or educated and involved in the ways of the world, more cosmopolitan more internationalized and outward looking’.48 The Singaporean government thus welcomed the Clinton administration’s 1994 decision to de-link the renewal of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status with China’s human rights record. However, it has watched with concern the twists and turns in Sino-US relations during the 1990s, and their implications for regional stability. Singapore has been following a policy of engagement with the PRC since the early 1980s. It has supported China’s membership of regional and international fora such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the ARF. However, the main plank of Singapore’s engagement policy with China has been the development of economic and trade links. Increasing trade between China and Singapore is seen as mutually beneficial. Economic growth in China leads to greater internal stability, and a stable China is seen as a country more likely to co-operate with its neighbours. Moreover, increased trade with China allows the ASEAN economies to grow, thus strengthening regional prosperity and hence stability. When diplomatic relations were established in 1990, the Sino-Singaporean economic nexus was already in good shape. Since then, it has developed even further. Between 1990–1997, the volume of total trade between the two countries grew from US$2.9 billion to US$8.8 billion.49 Even during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, Singapore’s trade with China grew by 31 per cent.50 By the end of 2000, Singapore had maintained its position as China’s largest trading partner in ASEAN. It was also China’s seventh largest overall trading partner, and its fifth largest source of foreign direct investment.


Singapore recognises that engaging the PRC is very much a long-term process. During the Cold War, China was a paranoid and isolated power, absorbed by its own internal problems. Even today China remains very hesitant on the world stage, and sees the geopolitical environment as increasingly hostile. Soothing China’s fears and accommodating its legitimate interests will be a long and frustrating process for those countries seeking to engage it. To date, however, there have been many positive and encouraging trends. These are readily apparent in the economic and political spheres. The ASEAN-China economic nexus has been strengthened considerably since 1990, and ASEAN and Chinese officials hold regular meetings and summits at both the bilateral and corporate level. In terms of security, the PRC has become much more comfortable with the ARE process, and is now an active participant. However, engagement has had its limitations and disappointments. The policy does not seem to have influenced China’s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, Chinese defence spending and military modernisation continue to gather pace. Singapore and the Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific Region Although the ASEAN states are pursuing a policy of engagement with China, there is recognition among some members that this may not be sufficient in itself to mitigate their security concerns and maintain regional stability. In particular the five founding members and Brunei have adopted a hedging policy designed to maintain the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region and provide a limited deterrence against the PRC. This hedging policy has two components: first, to facilitate the US and other external powers’ military presence in East Asia; and second, to maintain credible armed forces in case engagement fails. For Singapore, the US-Japan-China strategic triangle underpins regional stability, with the United States acting as the key balancer. Despite political differences over human rights issues, Singapore regards the US as a largely benign power, as it makes no territorial claims in Asia and has a vested interest in maintaining freedom of navigation. The USJapan Security Treaty not only keeps the United States engaged in the region, but also prevents Japan from pursuing a more independent strategic policy, something the ASEAN states would not welcome given their experiences of World War Two, and because of the tension it would generate in Sino-Japanese relations.51 The US military

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presence also deters China from adopting a more aggressive stance in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea.52 Singapore has also argued that the US military presence actually benefits China. The withdrawal of US forces would inevitably precipitate a Japanese arms build-up. China would be forced to respond, diverting valuable resources away from economic modernisation.53 When the Cold War ended, Singapore argued that US forward deployed forces were still vital to regional security. In the early 1990s, with the downsizing of US and Russian military forces in the area, many in Southeast Asia feared the creation of a power vacuum. This idea certainly found currency among Singaporean ministers. Brigadier Lee Hsien Loong, son of Lee Kuan Yew and second minister for defence, warned: ‘Without a persuasive US presence, there will be a power vacuum which other powers would scramble to fill’.54 In 1991, Singapore was the only ASEAN country willing to publicly support the continued presence of US bases in the Philippines. Prime Minister Goh urged President Corazon Aquino to persuade the Philippine Senate to extend the lease on the bases, as their presence played ‘a major role in maintaining peace and stability’ and that ASEAN should not ‘abandon tried and tested formula for regional stability’.55 Singapore has been ASEAN’s most enthusiastic supporter of the US military presence in East Asia, and has played a significant role in facilitating that presence. In November 1990 Singapore and the United States signed an agreement giving US naval vessels and aircraft access to Singaporean military bases. 56 In January 1992 Singapore agreed to the relocation of US Command Task Force 73, a unit supervising the repair and re-supply of naval vessels, from the Philippines.57 In January 1998, Singapore announced that US aircraft carriers and submarines would be allowed to use docking and maintenance facilities at the new Changi Naval Base when completed in 2000.58 Although Singapore has keenly supported the ARF, Lee Kuan Yew has argued that the region will not take responsibility for its own security in the near or medium-term future. Hence regional stability will depend on the presence of US military forces for several decades to come.59 In addition to supporting US forces in Asia, Singapore has also favoured maintaining defence links with other external powers. In particular, it has emphasised the continued relevance of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), a military relationship linking the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand with Singapore and Malaysia. Rising tensions in the South China Sea from 1992 onwards underlined


the importance of the FPDA for Singapore as a mechanism to help safeguard freedom of navigation. Speaking in 1992, government minister George Yeo said that developments in the area that year had made the dispute ‘a more likely flashpoint’, and ‘with such uncertainties ahead, the FPDA continues to be an effective ballast for stability in the region’.60 During the April 1997 FPDA combined military manoeuvres, Defence Minister Tony Tan once again underlined the importance of the arrangement as one of the building blocks of regional security.61 Singapore is also committed to maintaining a credible defence force to guarantee its sovereignty and to protect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The SAF is the best trained and equipped force in Southeast Asia, and can call on significant air and naval assets. In concert with other countries, Singapore could play a valuable role in ensuring that the SLOCs remained open in any future conflict in the South China Sea. The Singapore Navy has stated that it is ready to escort merchant vessels through the South China Sea if conflict erupts.62 Conclusion For Singapore, the rise of China poses a potential threat rather than an actual threat. During the Cold War era, the island republic perceived the PRC to be a major security threat to Southeast Asia because of its support for regional insurgent movements and North Vietnam. Today, however, regional communist groups have all but died out, Vietnam is a member of ASEAN, and China is committed to economic modernisation and opening up to the outside world. However, like its ASEAN partners, Singapore harbours a number of security concerns vis-à-vis the PRC in the post-Cold War era. These include the growth of Chinese military power, how China intends to resolve outstanding disputes over Taiwan and the Spratlys, and whether Beijing will seek regional hegemony a generation or so from now. Singapore’s small size and dependence on external trade makes it extremely vulnerable to instability in the international system. The government recognises that if China is not successfully accommodated into that system, then armed conflict could occur among the PRC, Japan and the United States, with disastrous consequences for stability and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region. The Singaporean leadership believes that the 1990s and the first few decades of the twenty-first century provide a window of opportunity to engage China and integrate it into the regional community.

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However, Singapore has also adopted a very prudent approach towards the growth of Chinese power. It recognises that China will be a great military power in Asia within the next few decades, and that it will have the wherewithal to resolve its territorial claims by force. Singapore thus supports a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region among China, Japan and the United States. The US military presence in Asia underpins this balance, and Singapore has played an important role in facilitating that presence. Notes 1 The China threat debate has generated a great deal of literature since its emergence in the early 1990s. See, for example, Denny Roy, “The China Threat Issue”, Asian Survey XXXVI, no. 8 (August 1996); Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the Constrainment of China”, International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994); David Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China?”, International Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996); Robert S.Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power”, Foreign Affairs (March-April 1997); and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1997). 2 Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 2. 3 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 110. 4 In the second volume of his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew writes that Singapore waited until Indonesia had established diplomatic ties with the PRC ‘to avoid any suspicion that Singapore was influenced by kinship ties with China’. See Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First—The Singapore Story: 1965– 2000 (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 577. 5 “Singapore—shipping accord”, BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, 1 February 1989. 6 Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, on a visit to Singapore in January 1985, remarked that China had a lot to learn from Singapore in this respect. See “Chinese Foreign Minister’s talks in Singapore”, BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, 29 January 1985. 7 For an account of the restoration of Sino-Indonesian relations see the chapter in this volume by Rizal Sukma. Also see Ian James Storey, “Indonesia’s China Policy in the New Order and Beyond: Problems and Prospects”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (April 2000), pp. 145–174. 8 See Ian James Storey, “Living with the Colossus: How Southeast Asian Countries Cope with China”, Parameters XXIX, no. 4 (Winter 1999– 2000), pp. 111–125. 9 In March 2001 the Chinese government increased defence spending by 17.7 per cent to US$17 billion. See “Officers to get the lion’s share of wage


10 11 12 13 14

rises”, South China Morning Post [Hong Kong, hereafter cited as SCMP], 7 March 2001. Bates Gill, “Chinese Defense Procurement Spending: Determining Intentions and Capabilities”, in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh (eds.), China’s Military Faces the Future (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1999), p. 197. “Asian leaders fears US military cutbacks”, Reuters News Service, 14 May 1993. “China urged to temper arms spending—Singapore leader calls for transparent defence policy”, Nikkei Weekly [Tokyo], 23 May 1994. “Singapore leader warns China on military ambitions”, Reuters News Service, 13 May 1995. You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1999), p. xv. In 1996, Lee Kuan Yew stated: Chinese leaders have referred to me as an old friend of Taiwan. I am an older friend of Taiwan. If either one is damaged, Singapore will suffer a loss. If both are damaged, Singapore’s loss will be doubled. Singapore benefits when both prosper.

“SM Lee urges China-Taiwan talks”, Business Times [Singapore], 4 March 1996. 16 For the full text of the speech see “Why the China-US-Japan balance of power is so vital”, Straits Times, 13 September 1997. 17 “China will win in any confrontation with Taiwan—SM”, Straits Times, 5 June 1996. 18 Business Times [Singapore], 4 March 1996. 19 “Taiwan should help China to modernise, says Lee”, Business Times [Singapore], 30 January 1993. 20 “Lee: The Cruel Game”, Far Eastern Economic Review [hereafter cited as FEER], 8 June 2000. 21 Business Times [Singapore], 4 March 1996. 22 Ibid. 23 “Security degradation”, Straits Times, 9 November 1999. 24 “Risk if new US-Japan pact covers Taiwan, says SM Lee”, Straits Times, 5 June 1999. 25 “SM Lee—China doesn’t need mediator”, Business Times [Singapore], 28 November 1995. 26 Straits Times, 5 June 1996. 27 “Singapore will stay out of Taipei-Beijing tussle, Lee says”, SCMP, 23 January 2001. 28 In 1997 Foreign Minister Jayakumar elaborated on the importance of the South China Sea to Singapore’s economic growth: The freedom of navigation through the Malacca and Singapore Straits, as well as the South China Sea, is fundamental to the

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continued survival and prosperity of Singapore. Any threat to the freedom of and safety of navigation through these waters would have adverse consequences beyond the region and affect the entire international community. For example, the dispute over the Spratly Islands would severely affect freedom of navigation and this dispute is therefore not just a question of sovereignty over these islands

“Singapore designed state-of-the-art navy ships launched”, Straits Times, 20 July 1997. 29 In 1996, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Tony Tan, identified the South China Sea dispute as one of the three potential sources of instability in Asia. The other two were North Korea and the Taiwan Straits. See “Meshing security ties key to stability—Tony Tan”, Straits Times, 7 February 1996. 30 For a full account of the Mischief Reef Incident and its implications, see Ian James Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 1 (April 1999), pp. 95–118. Also see the chapter in this volume by Aileen San PabloBaviera. 31 See Ian James Storey, “Manila looks to USA for help in Spratlys”, Jane’s Intelligence Review 11, no. 8 (August 1999), pp. 46–50. 32 “Manila rebuffs territorial claim by Beijing”, Financial Times [London], 18 May 1996. 33 “Erap orders blockade of Mischief Reef, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11 November 1998. 34 “Yeo calls on US to retain presence”, SCMP, 1 December 1992. 35 “Spratlys issue goes beyond sovereignty”, Straits Times, 12 May 1995. 36 “Obey law of the sea in settling territorial claims—Singapore”, Straits Times, 26 July 1996. 37 According to Tony Tan: ‘If this was done around the Spratlys, then it would be of great concern to ASEAN countries and all other countries which depend on the South China Sea for the free flow of goods’. “Sino-US ties ‘key’ to East Asia’s growth”, Straits Times, 2 October 1996. 38 Graham Evan and Jeffrey Newnham, Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 221. 39 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 18. 40 See “Premier Li dismisses ‘China threat’ theory”, Xinhua News Agency, 25 August 1997. 41 Lee, From Third World to First, op. cit, p. 654. 42 Yuen Foong Khong, “Singapore: A Time for Economic and Political Engagement”, in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S.Ross (eds.), Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 110. 43 “Lee calls on West to help China, knocks Patten”, Reuters News Service, 13 October 1994.


44 “Give China time to integrate—PM”, Straits Times, 14 May 1995. 45 “Integrate China or face global conflict—Singapore”, Reuters News Service, 23 June 1998. 46 “Kuan Yew slams US policies on East Asia”, Business Times [Malaysia], 16 November 1993. 47 “US needs consistent policy towards Asia”, Straits Times, 5 June 1996. 48 “US holds key to Asian security—Lee”, Reuters News Service, 16 May 1993. 49 State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China State Stati; Statistical Publishing House, 1990–1997). 50 “New millennium, new Singapore-China links”, Straits Times 30 “New millenniu November 1999. 51 In 1990, Tommy Koh, then Singapore’s ambassador to the United Nations, said a strong US military presence in Asia was needed ‘to make it unnecessary for Japan to become an independent and great military power in its own right’. “Singapore calls for US military presence in Asia”, Reuters News Service, 22 June 1990. 52 According to Brigadier Lee Hsien Loong the US military presence ensured freedom of navigation and had kept the territorial disputes in the South China Sea ‘muted’. “US military needed in region, says Singapore”, Reuters News Service, 22 February 1990. 53 According to Defence Minister Tony Tan: ‘If China were to have to contend with other competitors for dominance or presence in the region, that would certainly impact on its own modernisation programme’. “Cohen praises strong Singapore ties”, Straits Times, 3 October 1999. 54 “US force cuts create new security worries in Asia”, Reuters News Service, 3 October 1990. 55 “Singapore backs retention of US bases in Philippines”, Reuters News Service, 11 April 1991. 56 “U.S. sign deal on bases”, Independent [London], 14 November 1990. 57 “Bush announces trade, naval pact with Singapore”, Reuters News Service, 4 January 1992. 58 “William Cohen holds joint press conference with Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan”, Federal Document Clearing House, 59 Washington Transcript Service, 15 January 1998. According to Lee: ‘I do not see an indigenous security balance emerging in Asia for the next 10, 20 or even 30 years’. “Singapore’s Lee sees no indigenous Asian security”, Reuters News Service, 18 April 1994. 60 “UK to maintain military presence in the region.” SCMP, 23 September 1992. 61 Tony Tan remarked: ‘I think the countries in this region will feel less comfortable and less secure without the FPDA. It contributes substantially towards peace and stability, not only for Malaysia and Singapore, but also for the region’. See “Biggest ever Five Power exercise starts”, Straits Times, 15 April 1997. 62 Singapore’s navy chief, Admiral Kwek Siew Jin, said the potential for conflict in the South China Sea was ‘worrisome’ and that the navy was ready to protect Singaporean merchant ships if conflict broke out:

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In the event that our merchant ships are endangered or hampered in carrying out their normal activities, it is not inconceivable that the navy would have to provide them with limited protection. We can provide them some form of escort, more to deter people from harassing them, rather than to engage in combat.

“Navy chief vows to protect ships”, SCMP, 9 May 1993.

CHAPTER ELEVEN Malaysian Perceptions of China: From Hostility to Cordiality Abdul Razak Baginda

Introduction Malaysia’s relations with China have come a long way. At present, Kuala Lumpur enjoys very close ties with Beijing, as symbolised by the reopening of the Bank of China in 2001 in the capital after an absence of nearly fifty years. This state of relations is a far cry from the 1950s, when relations were rather hostile. Despite the establishment of formal ties between the two countries in May 1974, suspicions lingered for another two decades. Only in the 1990s did ties begin to fully bloom when the interests of both sides converged. While economic ties have been steadily growing over the years, the relationship has also tended to encompass regional and international political issues. However, despite the obvious good relations that exist between the two countries, there exists some degree of hesitancy and concern over the future of China. This chapter examines the evolution of Malaysia’s perception of the PRC since independence from the United Kingdom in 1957. In examining the various stages of development, it will discuss the reasons behind the changes in perception as well as their outcome in terms of foreign and security policies. It will conclude with a prognosis of the future direction of Sino-Malaysian relations. Hostile Perceptions, 1957–1970 When Mao Zedong declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, Malaya was entering the second year of the ‘Emergency’, a period that lasted from 1948 to 1960, when British, Malayan, and other Commonwealth forces combated communist insurgents. Although militant communism had been contained by the time that Malaya achieved its independence in 1957, the threat was to last, to

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varying degrees of intensity, until 1989 when a peace accord was finally achieved. Faced with such a threat, seen not only domestically but also regionally, Malaya pursued an essentially pro-Western foreign and defence policy, which meant that it saw itself as part of the overall strategy of containment of communism in the region. As part of the talks leading to independence, the defence of Malaya was to be guaranteed by the British, as formalised in the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement During the first decade of Malaysia’s independence, Southeast Asia was embroiled in the struggle against communism, most notably in Vietnam. Based on these internal and external factors, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman (known as the Tunku) sided with the West, as illustrated by his firm support for the US stand in South Vietnam. During the only American presidential visit to Malaysia, in October 1966, the Tunku reaffirmed his country’s commitment by stating that, ‘I have never failed to give solid backing to what America is doing in South Vietnam and to help explain to the rest of the world the great sacrifices made by America in assisting freedom-loving people defend their rights and sovereignty’.1 The war against communism had an enormous impact on Malaya and subsequently Malaysia’s perception towards China. During this early period of independence, Malaya’s perception of the PRC was very much determined by ideological and internal considerations. The ideological factor was of paramount influence. Although Malaya did not become a signatory to the Manila Pact of 1954, and the subsequent formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), Kuala Lumpur was very much part of this circle of containment. Although there has never been any real evidence of direct military support given to the communists, PRC support in other forms was enough to influence Malaysian threat perceptions. China’s moral support and fraternal ties with the local communist movement of Malaya had a direct impact on how Kuala Lumpur viewed the PRC. The Tunku was vehemently anti-communist as the following statement made in 1958 revealed: We must not deceive ourselves that communism is merely local. Communism we know is an intrinsic part of an international conspiracy for world domination and so all countries, which believe in democracy and human rights and liberty, must rally together and fight it. We have to face up to the threat of communism and not wait for the time to come when we may wake up and find ourselves

MALAYSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA 233

in mortal danger. That is why we in Malaya who value our freedom cannot be neutral about communism.2 As part of this pro-Western policy, Malaya remained opposed to the PRC, which manifested itself in, inter alia, its vote against the representation of the PRC at the United Nations (UN), upon the argument that Taiwan must preserve its right to self-determination.3 The Tunku remained the chief opponent of the PRC, stating categorically at the 1967 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference that China posed a threat and remained the one country in Asia ‘that aims to dominate the rest of the continent’.4 Through out the 1960s, Malaysian suspicions of the PRC persisted, and the government even suggested that there was a necessity for external powers to maintain a military presence in the region to act as a counterweight to China. The then permanent secretary of the foreign ministry, Ghazali Shafie, argued that ‘the United States has a role as a deterrent to a Chinese nuclear blackmail or any direct conventional aggression’.5 The China issue was also seen as a factor in Malaysian domestic politics. As 30 per cent of the population was ethnic Chinese and still had strong ties with mainland China, there was caution about the influence of the PRC upon this substantial group. Issues such as the loyalty of the Chinese population, as the majority of the local communists came from this group, and the perception that segments of the Chinese were potential fifth columnists, provided additional challenges to the leadership in dealing with China. Despite the strong anti-communist views of the Tunku’s government, there were early signs that Malaysia was adopting a much more pragmatic stance towards China, especially in the mid 1960s, over the question of Beijing’s seat at the UN. Whilst remaining staunchly anticommunist, Malaysia wanted to be seen as less orthodox and rigid in its views by exploring and making positive overtures towards the PRC. In September 1966, Deputy Premier Tun Razak, as the Chairman of the Malaysian delegation to the twenty-first session of the UN General Assembly, stated that Malaysia ‘believed that the Chinese people with their illustrious civilisation, a people who number one-quarter of the world’s population, should be brought into association together with the other 118 member states of this organisation’.6 Although, heexpressed regret over China’s negative attitude towards the world body, as well as mentioning the need to consider Chinese membership together with the question of the fate of Taiwan, it was significant that he said it at that


particular time. Moreover, Malaysia was much more sanguine regarding the strategic environment, especially following the end of the confrontation with Indonesia in 1965. Talks were also on the way towards the formation of a regional grouping, with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia at its core. This led to the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967. This attitudinal shift was also influenced by the Sino-Soviet schism, which shattered the myth of monolithic communism, as well as the reexamination of Malaysia’s own foreign policy, which was already showing early signs of change. There was emerging a Third World grouping which was advocating a much more independent stance from the superpowers. Questions such as the fight against apartheid were becoming international issues that Malaysia had identified itself with. The need for solidarity influenced the Malaysian leadership to shift its strong stand and embark on a much more flexible policy towards China. Malaysia was also influenced by the apparent change in Chinese foreign policy following the return to normalcy after the chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution. According to Malaysian Premier Tun Razak: Chinese foreign policy in the closing years of the sixties was erratic, if indeed it can be said that she had followed a foreign policy which was anything more than a reflection of her domestic intra-party squabbles. Recent changes, however, have been most encouraging… Chinese attitudes…are premised upon a more sober and realistic acceptance of the international order.7 The much more stable domestic environment in China led to more than twenty countries recognising Beijing from 1969 to 1971 as the sole legitimate government of China, with another sixteen by the end of 1972.8 On a more realistic note, the British policy of withdrawal ‘East of Suez’ in the late 1960s had a direct impact on Malaysia’s pro-Western policy. In a way, it forced Malaysia to open its doors to communist countries, in order to erode its image of being part of the pro-Western grouping. Shifting Perceptions: The Road to Normalisation As already argued above, Malaysia started to demonstrate a greater degree of flexibility in the conduct of its foreign policy, although it remained essentially pro-Western. However, within these parameters, Malaysia explored a much more equidistant foreign policy. As a way to


manage regional security vis-à-vis the great powers, neutralism became a major policy thrust during this period. The secretary general of the Malaysian foreign ministry, Tan Sri Zaiton Ibrahim Bin Ahmad, argued that the region had ‘suffered so to speak a sort of cancer and the cancer has been big power interference in our internal affairs. For this reason Malaysia has advocated a policy of neutrality for Southeast Asia and we have suggested that the United States, the Soviet Union and China should guarantee this neutrality’.9 Recognising that neutralism alone meant little given the strategic location of the region, Malaysia saw the involvement of other regional countries as essential. According to one observer, ‘Convinced that this is the only viable means of promoting peace and stability in the area, it urged all Southeast Asian states to follow a policy of strict nonalignment’.10 Tun Razak, in his address to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore in January 1971, stated that ‘Malaysia is convinced that the countries in this region can by a discernable consistency policy and action reassure China that peace, stability and neutrality are what Southeast Asian nations are truly striving for’.11 Within this context, Malaysia started to improve its position towards China. Whilst there were domestic factors, this notion of neutrality became an external objective, which provided the raison d’etre for Malaysia’s China policy. R.S.Milne argued that Tun’s objective was ‘to obtain the Chinese government’s support for a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia, of which Malaysia had been the leading advocate in ASEAN’.12 According to another observer, China’s support for neutralism was predicated on its basic view that Third World countries should ‘stress independence, control of their own resources, self-reliance, especially in agriculture, mutual help and aid that is both practical and in accordance with the perceived needs of the recipient’.13 In the many international fora and platforms, such as the nonaligned conference in Dar-es-Salam in April 1970, Malaysian leaders began to articulate their position towards China. In his address at the twenty-sixth UN General Assembly in 1971, Prime Minister Tun Razak stated that ‘One of the essential pre-requisites for the realisation of the neutralisation proposal is the existence of a dialogue between the major powers’.14 He specifically singled out China’s participation at the UN, arguing that it was ‘the most important of these channels’.15 Malaysia had come to adopt a dual approach towards China. Firstly, with its initiative on neutrality, Malaysia had justified bringing China into the dialogue process. In other words, Malaysia had used the neutrality argument as a


way to engage China, and to advocate a UN seat for China, thereby providing a harness on Chinese international activities. As one senior Malaysian official put it, ‘such isolation can only lead to intransigence and bigotry’.16 It could be argued that by doing so, it placed Malaysia in China’s ‘good books’, thereby paving the way for a bilateral dialogue between Kuala Lumpur and Beijing. The PRC did not specifically acknowledge Malaysia’s efforts in its successful bid to obtain a seat in the UN, although it did attribute this to Third World countries, arguing that it was because of these countries that the UN had ceased to be a tool of the superpowers.17 To some extent this was reflective of Malaysia’s prevalent equidistance policy, and it must be pointed out that while Malaysia improved its position vis-à-vis China, it also continued to pursue a degree of balance, as there were several outstanding issues and problem areas with Beijing. The first issue was over the question of China’s support for local communists, who were still active. There had been a long dispute over the real extent of China’s support. To begin with, China had provided the ideological basis for the local communists, and this had manifested itself in the form of propaganda materials. China had also been providing sanctuary for senior Malayan communist officials, including its general secretary, Chin Ping. The most tangible form of support was the existence of a radio transmitter based in southern China, where the Suara Revolusi (Voice of Revolution) was broadcast to Malaysia. The second domestic issue involved the feelings and attitudes of the local Chinese and the specific question of the overseas Chinese, who had yet to opt for Malaysian citizenship. With more than 35 per cent of the population, the Chinese community formed a strong group within the socio-economic and political landscape of the country. The issue of loyalty and the reaction of the Malay community towards the local Chinese were significant factors in the decision-making process of the Malaysian leadership. At one point, following the establishment of formal relations between the PRC and Malaysia, the home minister felt it necessary to warn Malaysian Chinese against demonstrations of joy which might be misinterpreted by Malays and so endanger nation building.18 In a pragmatic fashion, it was decided that a rapprochement with China would only bring positive results on local Chinese attitudes towards the government. According to one observer, ‘a closer relationship with Peking is very popular among the Malaysian Chinese’.19 To another


scholar on Malaysian affairs, ‘Central to the initiative in seeking diplomatic relations with China was a belief that such an accomplishment, together with ritual reception of Tun Razak by Chairman Mao, would indicate to the large Chinese community of Malaysia that their interests would be served best by unreservedly extending their loyalty to their country of residence’.20 Despite this changing attitude towards China, there were still reservations towards Malaysia’s intentions. In his address at Indonesia’s National Defence Institute in Jakarta in December 1970, Tun Razak argued that, The countries of Southeast Asia must come together to face the threat from China. There is not one country in this region free from the danger of Chinese aggression’.21 This statement showed that Malaysia was pursuing a dual track approach. While showing positive signs towards China, due very much to its security concerns, Malaysia continued to harbour suspicions, especially when the threat from communism still loomed large. However, it was the United States monumental move towards the PRC, with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s secret meetings and the subsequent announcement of President Richard Nixon’s visit, which had paved the way for Malaysia to move forward. As the American move towards the Chinese was done secretly, the Malaysian authorities were unaware of the early development to normalise Sino-US relations. This was evidenced by the later dispatch of US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Marshall Green to the region, including Malaysia, in early 1972. He visited Kuala Lumpur to brief Malaysian officials, including the prime minister himself, on Nixon’s visit to China.22 This visit was obviously to reassure American allies and friends of its intentions and its continued commitment towards the region, albeit in a different form following its decision to withdraw from Vietnam. In a nationwide address in July 1971, President Nixon talked about Kissinger’s meeting with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in Beijing and his acceptance of an offer to visit China before May 1972. According to one observer, this announcement caused ‘worldwide repercussions, forcing political reorientation at various levels’.23 In his statement in parliament in July 1971, Prime Minister Tun Razak stated that there was a new posture in Chinese foreign policy, ‘which suddenly climaxed in the dramatic announcement of the secret journey to Peking by Dr. Kissinger and the forthcoming visit to Peking by President Nixon’.24


One of the most significant impacts of the Nixon visit to Beijing was the symbolic factor of China’s entry into the mainstream international arena, especially following its radical foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution. In fact, the Sino-American rapprochement signalled the beginning of a new era for China’s external policy. China had moved forward to forge a relationship with its ideological nemesis. As has already been discussed, Malaysia had pursued a policy of rapprochement towards the PRC even before Kissinger went to China, cautious though it may have been. No doubt the US move must have been greeted with some degree of satisfaction and acquiescence. In a specially issued statement by Tun Razak on 28 February 1972, one day after the release of the Shanghai Communiqué, he expressed his support, seeing it as ‘a hopeful first step in the efforts being made by the Chinese and the US governments to bridge the gulf which has divided the two countries for so long’. He also viewed the communiqué within the overall context of his neutrality policy by emphasising that ‘they are opposed to any effort to achieve hegemony or spheres of influence. This lies at the heart of the neutralisation proposal and it is my hope that the continuing dialogue… would serve to reconcile their interests and differences which would facilitate the realisation of the objective of a neutral Southeast Asia’ .25 While welcoming the Nixon visit, Malaysia viewed the historic journey as the beginning of a multipolar world, a clear break from bipolarity. Whether this would bring more benefit to the developing world was less clear. There were several aspects to this Malaysian perception. To begin with, the Sino-American rapprochement had been viewed within the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the one hand and US-Soviet relations on the other. There was also the immediate impact of the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations. The changes in the international arena at the close of the 1960s had led to a rethinking in strategic terms, which resulted in the re-alignment of political forces. The Sino-American rapprochement took place against the backdrop of an emerging US-Soviet détente. According to Ghazali Shafie, Nixon’s Beijing visit ‘gave the United States considerable leverage in its dealings with the Soviet Union’.26 Malaysia saw itself as being part of a great power play in which the only way to prevail was to pursue its policy of neutrality. In other words, its policy was to try and improve relations with all the great powers. The uncertainty of the environment in the early 1970s only reinforced the belief amongst Malaysian policy makers that neutrality was the best approach to managing its security dilemma.


Although the Malaysian government knew little of the move towards Sino-US rapprochement, it was appreciative of the changing strategic scenario following the end of the Vietnam War. They knew that things were going to dramatically change and that they needed to prepare themselves to face the consequences of firstly, a disengaged US in the region and secondly, a communist victory in Vietnam, which was bound to have major implications for regional security. Apart from the external factors, there were also domestic issues that influenced Malaysia’s attitude towards the PRC. Firstly, following the race riots of May 1969, Tun Razak had assumed de facto leadership of the country when he was appointed director of the National Operations Council, a body that oversaw the running of the country as parliament was suspended following the declaration of emergency. He subsequently became prime minister in September 1970. One of the first things he did was to form a consultative body that worked out the reasons why the riots had occurred in the first place. Consensus was reached that racial economic imbalance was one of the underlying causes of the riots. This resulted in the formulation of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was to determine the socioeconomic development of the country and give policy priority to the Malay ethnic group, hence giving the prima facie impression that the Chinese were to be at a disadvantaged position. Tun Razak obviously needed to address this sensitive issue, essentially to allay the fears and suspicions of the Chinese in Malaysia. He came to the conclusion that a move towards rapprochement with China would help to pacify the ethnic Chinese. In retrospect, this proved to be a success as the 1974 general election results showed overwhelming support for the ruling party. Secondly, something needed to be done to resolve the local communist insurgency movements, especially in view of the impending communist victory in Vietnam. The triumph would provide inspiration to the various communist factions in Malaysia. Although the communist insurgents had not made any headway on the battlefields, they were changing their tactics and focusing on urban areas to increase their influence among Chinese-based groups, such as students and the labour movement. The government was convinced that the communists were responsible for fuelling the racial riots as a way to destabilise the country. In the foreword to the 1971 white paper, Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister Tun Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman said that the ‘Communist efforts to produce a situation favourable to an armed insurrection have borne some results. This was due to the support given by a small section of the population who are either disloyal or misled’.27 To some extent, the


government wanted to pre-empt any additional moral support from the PRC to the communists in Malaysia. The leadership believed that by engaging China and eventually normalising relations, the PRC would drop its support for regional communist movements. Indeed, this became a precondition for normalisation. Malaysia wanted to get some kind of reassurance on the part of Beijing that it would at best sever relations with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), or at worst express its noninterference in the domestic affairs of Malaysia. Beijing insisted on distinguishing between state-to-state and party-to-party relations. Beijing also rationalised that if it cut relations with the CPM, the communist insurgents would look towards the Soviet Union, which had been trying to gain some form of influence amongst them. Malaysia continued to pursue its rapprochement with China, offering further justifications for the establishment of formal ties. In 1973, Ghazali Shafie stated that it would be ‘a curious and anomalous position indeed for the countries in the region to continue not to have relations with China when the rest of the world are doing so’.28 Finally, in May 1974, Prime Minister Tun Razak visited China and paved the way for the formal establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations. The Joint Communique, which was signed by Tun Razak and Zhou Enlai, became the basis for the bilateral relationship. Although relations improved thereafter, Malaysia’s perception towards China was not entirely positive, as apart from the outstanding domestic issues there was also the beginning of a new era of regional politics following the end of the Vietnam War. Domestically, the threat from communist insurgents was very much alive as the period following Tun Razak’s visit to China saw the re-emergence of their activities. This included a number of high profile attacks, including the assassination of the inspector general of police, as well as the bombing of the National Monument that symbolised the country’s victory against the communists during the Emergency. Dual Perceptions: The Post-Normalisation Period Following the normalisation of relations with the PRC, like many other regional countries Malaysia was preoccupied with the emerging regional security milieu. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saigon in April 1975 there were concerns over the rising tide of communism. Although there were some signs of improvement in relations between Hanoi and ASEAN, whatever gains were achieved were dashed with the Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, which catapulted the region


into a new round of threats. Indeed, the February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border conflict brought to the fore a major dispute that had been brewing during the latter stages of the Vietnam War. These uncertainties had a direct impact on Malaysia‘s threat perceptions and this manifested itself, inter alia, in the significant expansion of the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) known as PERISTA (Special Program of the Armed Forces). Malaysia perceived a significant threat from the north, but Vietnam was never specifically identified as that threat. During this period, Malaysia strengthened its air power as well as its ground forces. This period also witnessed an increased number of armed activities from the communist insurgents, which in turn led to large scale counter-insurgency operations. During this period, China began to open up to the outside world with its Four Modernisations, as articulated by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Interestingly, Deng had visited Malaysia in November 1978. At a banquet given in Deng’s honour, Prime Minister Tun Hussein Onn stated that bilateral relations ‘have been friendly, correct and proper’. On the fifth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Malaysia, Tun Hussein visited China. Deng stated, ‘Despite the different social systems in China and Malaysia, we hold that the development of Sino-Malaysian relations is in keeping with the vital interests of the people of our two countries. China and Malaysia face similar tasks and problems’.29 The opening up of China ensured a new and substantial dimension for Malaysia—that of trade relations. Although economic relations had always been present in bilateral dealings, the level had tended to be somewhat insignificant. The Four Modernisations widened the scope of contacts between the two countries. The Impact of the Spratly Islands Dispute on Malaysian Perceptions This period also brought into play another factor that would have a major impact on Malaysia’s perception of China. Malaysia began to confront the Chinese over the Spratly Islands when it first published its peta baru or new map in December 1979. The map outlined the country’s territorial waters and continental shelf boundaries. Prior to this, Malaysia had enacted two pieces of legislation addressing the question of its continental shelf claims (The Continental Shelf Act of 1966) and on the exploitation of its resources (The Petroleum Mining Act of 1966). When


these acts were promulgated, there were no protests from the PRC. One of the reasons why there were no protests following the passage of this legislation was that they were of a general nature and were not specific in the area claimed by Malaysia. While there were no disputes following the 1966 legislation, the 1979 map elicited protests from Malaysia’s neighbours. Several months later, in April 1980, Malaysia finally announced the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles, which expanded its territories overnight. According to one Malaysian observer, ‘Malaysia’s claim is presumably based on the conviction that the islands are situated on its continental shelf, well within its declared Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), security and its proximity to the mainland’.30 By such a proclamation, Malaysia had entered the Spratly Islands dispute, laying claims along side those of the PRC, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei. Following Malaysia’s position, the Chinese sent a diplomatic note stating that ‘unilateral demarcation without negotiating with the government of China constitutes a violation of China’s sovereignty’.31 In June 1983 it was reported that Malaysia had deployed twenty commandos to the island of Terumba Layang Layang or Swallow Reef, thereby strongly indicating its desire to back its claim. This deployment of a small military contingent constituted a formal occupation and permanent presence. The Chinese Foreign Ministry immediately protested this occupation and issued a statement, arguing that, ‘China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and the nearby waters and that the natural resources in these areas belong to China’.32 One of the key questions that needed to be addressed was the reason behind Malaysia’s move in the Spratlys, especially why it had run the risk of confronting the PRC. During the decision making process leading to the pronouncement of Malaysia’s claims over the Spratlys, the issue of Beijing’s reaction was a significant consideration. The Malaysian leadership knew that its claims would mean the possibility of jeopardising relations with the PRC. Despite this, the government decided to go ahead with its claims, given the cordial relations between the two countries. The leadership was sufficiently confident to declare its claims in the Spratlys, whilst at the same time being able to manage its relations with China. Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad had argued in 1993 that there was no problem with China over the Spratlys, as it was willing to discuss this matter with Kuala Lumpur.33 Malaysia felt that it could balance the situation. There appears to be no evidence to suggest that any form of


consultation was held with the Chinese before the announcement, although it is possible that during official meetings between Malaysian and Chinese leaders, the former could have provided assurances to the latter of their intentions. In retrospect, Malaysia’s claims in the Spratlys did not affect bilateral relations, with the exception of the usual diplomatic protests. Even in this aspect the Chinese were rather mild, often not identifying Malaysia specifically but providing a general statement to the effect that the islands came under Chinese sovereignty. According to Chi-kin Lo, China’s response was, on the one hand, cautious and low-key, but on the other hand there was no sign that it was going to give up its claims.34 China’s position vis-à-vis claimants to the South China Sea was discriminatory, as it applied different considerations to different states. While Chinese reaction could be described as mild towards Malaysia as well as the Philippines, it was stronger when dealing with the Vietnamese. Not only was the situation graver in the case of Vietnam, but that there was a degree of adversarial competition within the context of Sino-Soviet rivalry. By this time, the Vietnamese were clearly on the side of the Soviets, as confirmed by the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Hanoi and Moscow. China and Vietnam had also clashed over the Paracel Islands in 1974 as well as over their common border in 1979. To one observer, China was ‘more concerned about the strategic significance of the South China Sea in the superpowers’ rivalry and their policies toward China than about the sovereignty dispute… China dealt with the Spratly dispute largely as a function of its anti-Soviet diplomacy in Southeast Asia’. Despite the generally positive situation following Malaysia’s entry into the Spratlys dispute, it did influence Kuala Lumpur’s threat perceptions towards the PRC. Whereas previously there was hardly any opportunity for a direct military clash between China and Malaysia, this dispute found the two countries confronting each other. Notwithstanding China’s mild reaction towards Malaysia’s entry and subsequent occupation of some of the islands and atolls, Kuala Lumpur began to see its claims within the context of the need to defend its presence and to prepare for contingencies against any possible conflict, especially with China. According to the then chief of the Malaysian Navy: In maritime terms, there is a real and close threat which we must be prepared to deal with—one being the territorial dispute in the resources rich South China Sea. Issues of territorial disputes could be


used as a façade for the pursuance of regional superpower role by those harbouring hegemonic ambition. It would be too naïve for us to disregard the worst that could evolve from these developments’.36 Even though China does not ‘threaten’ Malaysia directly, it has not only strengthened its own presence and power projection capabilities in the South China Sea, but also demonstrated its firmness over the issue of sovereignty. Assessments of China’s intentions have been made by several Malaysians, which could have influenced government thinking. For instance, according to one Malaysian expert on maritime affairs, China ‘intends to convert the entire South China Sea area into an internal lake—an action with far-reaching consequences for the entire region’.37 It must be pointed out that before the Mischief Reef incident of February 1995,38 it was thought that Beijing only targeted the Vietnamese. However, the occupation of the Philippine-claimed reef showed that China was willing to confront an ASEAN country. Obviously this incident caused some degree of concern in Malaysia, but it appears that Kuala Lumpur was sufficiently confident that the close relationship as seen over the latter part of the 1990s would see a tacit ‘non-interference’ on the part of the Chinese over Malaysia’s claims, at least in the short term. The most significant manifestation of this was Malaysia’s decision to embark on the modernisation of its armed forces. While there were other reasons for this programme, such as the genuine need for modernisation as well as some degree of competition with its neighbours, there is evidence to suggest that the Spratlys dispute did play a role in influencing the decision. With the uncertain climate following the end of the Cold War, the China factor did loom large in the minds of many security analysts in Kuala Lumpur. However, while some observers in the United States, for instance, have explicitly identified China as a threat to regional security, statements from Malaysia have tended to be less direct. For instance, in 1992, the then defence minister, Najib Tun Razak, highlighted China’s arms purchases, stating that ‘the Chinese appear to be on a shopping spree for the purchase of military hardware… If such deals materialise in the future, China’s military capabilities, especially her air power, will be significantly improved’.39 In another statement by Najib, he said that the South China Sea dispute was ‘another area of concern’. He highlighted the passage of a 1992 law in China claiming the whole of the area, and


‘more significantly, sanctioning the use of force’. He stated that Malaysia’s stand was that, ‘first of all, disputes must be brought to the negotiating table. Second, all nations involved should offer pragmatic and workable solutions based on legal principles, not on historical ones, thereby allowing the accommodation of the strategic and economic interests of all parties’.40 His reference to the insignificance of historical principles appeared to target the Chinese insistence on historical records, which prohibited any meaningful resolution and discussion. Despite such statements of concern, mild though they may be, it must be pointed out that at the same time there were positive expressions. Minister Najib after all, became the first Malaysian defence minister to officially visit China. This visit was somewhat nostalgic for Najib as he was seen to pursue his late father, Tun Razak’s legacy towards China. In this respect, similar to their continued affections towards Nixon and Kissinger, the Chinese have remained respectful to the Razak family, including the ritual of a newly appointed Chinese ambassador to Malaysia paying a courtesy call on Tun Razak’s widow. While there may be a differing of perception within the context of bureaucratic politics, the military has tended to adopt a much more cautious view. Despite positive political perceptions, the military has been less optimistic, although it has not been direct in its views. After all, the military is unambiguously subordinated to its political masters. The military’s perception of China is very much influenced by its mission to protect the country’s territories, including its need to conduct operations in the Spratlys. The MAF’s threat perception has been further influenced by China’s plans to build up its own armed forces, which will provide it with a better power projection capability in the South China Sea. The Chinese military build up in the Spratlys has taken several forms, namely the modernisation of its South Sea Fleet, as well as the conduct of operations and doctrinal emphasis on this region. The whole of the South China Sea comes under the command of the South Sea Fleet. According to one observer, in recent years two of the three Yukong class landing ship tanks (LSTs), the newest and the largest in the Chinese navy, have been transferred to the fleet, and the assignment to it of the first of China’s modified Luda class destroyers indicates the extent to which naval authorities recognise the strategic importance of the area.41 No doubt, such developments are part of China’s attempt to project power in the area, providing a presence and a show of force, indicating its sovereignty over the area.


While the necessity of China’s military modernisation could be justified, as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operates obsolescent equipment and has not undergone any real changes since 1949, it appears that in terms of the development of its South Sea Fleet the Spratlys dispute figures prominently in the minds of Chinese defence planners. To one observer, ‘no other case can substitute for the Spratlys as a stimulus for the Navy to conduct forward operations. Inevitably, the campaigners for a blue water navy regard the capability of reaching the Spratlys as a key parameter in safeguarding China’s national interest,’42 However, despite China’s significant military improvements in the Spratlys, it is still beset with limitations. Apart from the vast area in which to conduct operations, which will require a sea and airlift capability, regional navies are also undergoing modernisation, arguably at a much faster rate than the Chinese.43 Some observers also share the opinion regarding China’s limited military capabilities. For instance, according to Michael Gallagher, ‘China, due to the distance of the Spratly Islands from major Chinese bases, would find it difficult to maintain a continuous air umbrella with a large force of aircraft over the ships of its South Sea Fleet’.44 Nonetheless, despite the debate over China’s military capabilities in the South China Sea, defence planners in Malaysia do perceive a potential threat that could emanate from the PRC. Hence, Malaysia’s own plans to modernise its armed forces. The question that needs to be addressed is whether the military has used the potential threat argument to justify its defence acquisition programme or whether it seriously believes the threat from China is credible. The modernisation of the MAF started in 1988, with the signing of £1 billion arms deal with the United Kingdom. This came immediately after the end of the recession of the mid 1980s. In March of the same year, the PLAN clashed with Vietnamese forces and occupied Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys. During this Action three Vietnamese naval ships were sunk with the loss of 72 sailors. To the then commander-in-chief of the Vietnamese Navy, Admiral Giap Van Cuong, the Chinese naval attack was designed to control the sea to the east and expand China’s strategic border into Southeast Asia.45 Given the tense nature of the Spratlys in early 1988, this factor must have been an important and genuine security concern for defence planners in Malaysia. The main thrust of the modernisation programme was to transform the MAF from a force essentially structured to deal with counter-insurgency operations to one that is conventional in nature. This has three elements. The first was the re-structuring of the armed forces itself, especially


involving the creation an MAF headquarters, where triservice appointments were established. Secondly, there was a doctrinal shift with an emphasis on joint service operations. Thirdly, the government purchased military assets that would reflect a conventional capability. While it was never made explicit, the decision to concentrate on conventional defence, with a penchant towards strengthening air and naval capabilities, suggest that defence planners had the Spratly Islands dispute in mind. The acquisition of sophisticated air assets, in particular Russian MiG-29s and US F-18s, clearly demonstrated the need for a greater reach for the country’s military. During the initial discussion within the defence establishment, scenarios involving the Spratlys were part of the procurement process.46 It is clear that Malaysian defence planners do take seriously the potential threat argument, as reflected in the defence procurement process. This thinking has also had an impact on the government, despite the more sanguine political assessments over the Chinese, especially from the prime minister’s own perspective. However, at the same time, it could also be argued that the potential threat also gave the military the necessary justification for its own defence plans. Therefore, the modernisation of the PLA has assisted the MAF’s own arguments about the need to modernise the armed forces, especially to the Ministry of Finance, which holds the purse strings. Dr. Mahathir said Malaysia’s Perception of China It has been quite obvious over the last few years that Malaysia’s official perception has been very much influenced by the views of Prime Minister Mahathir, who has consistently refused to countenance the idea of a ‘China threat’, adopting a much more sanguine outlook towards the PRC. This was very clear when the prime minister publicly announced that China did not pose a threat to the country’s security. His perception has been influenced by his own views on Asia as well as the dominance of economic factors in the future of the region. In 1993, for instance, Dr. Mahathir stated that ‘We do not look at China as our potential enemy. We look at China as a country which has a great potential for becoming an economic power’ .47 To begin with, Dr. Mahathir is very much an Asianist, truly believing in the potential of Asia and the need for Asia not only to be united, but also to play a greater role in international affairs. To Dr. Mahathir, Asia needs to reassert itself, especially vis-à-vis the dominant Western powers.


In a speech delivered in March 1994 he declared that he was a Malaysian nationalist and an Asianist. He went on to state: At the same time, I am a Southeast Asian and an East Asian. I am proud that we have together, been able to turn a battleground into a marketplace. A Southeast Asian neighbourhood of warmth and friendship has to be tended and nourished. As an East Asian, I am committed to the building of an East Asian community in which our common peace is co-operatively constructed and our common prosperity is co-operatively built, an East Asian community in which giants of our region—China, Japan, Indonesia—shall have their rightful place, discharging their rightful responsibilities, all of us living in harmony in an egalitarian community of mutual respect and mutual benefit.48 Dr. Mahathir’s policies, such as ‘Look East’ as well as his initiative for an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) have all been manifestations of his strong feelings about Asia. It is very much in this context that Dr. Mahathir’s perceptions on China must be viewed. Since becoming prime minister in 1981, Dr. Mahathir has made regular trips to China and has spoken extensively on that country as well as on Sino-Malaysian relations. According to a recent article on bilateral relations, ‘For Mahathir, improved political relations with China enabled him to draw Malaysia away from reliance on the West and fulfill his goal of achieving greater East Asian political and economic cooperation, thus staking his claim as the architect of an independent and dynamic Malaysian foreign policy’.49 Although Dr. Mahathir’s views on China have been consistent, the positive tone of recent years has become stronger. To Dr. Mahathir, it does not matter which country takes the lead in Asia, so long as it moves forward. In this context, both China and Japan are capable of filling a leadership role, even though the latter may not seek it. Malaysia’s views have tended to provide some degree of competition between Tokyo and Beijing. Dr. Mahathir’s position towards the Chinese came about only after failing to woo the Japanese to play a much more independent role in regional affairs. Dr. Mahathir’s ‘Look East’ policy, which was an attempt to emulate the Japanese and to establish close relations with Tokyo, failed to bring Japan firmly on the side of East Asia. For instance, his proposal to establish an EAEC, a regional economic grouping, was never officially accepted by the Japanese government. No doubt, Japan’s close strategic


relationship with the United States influenced its reluctance. The Chinese, on the other hand, were more forthcoming in their support for such an initiative. Dr. Mahathir’s often-strident views against the West have certainly found support with the Chinese. In other words, there was a convergence of interest between the Malaysian and Chinese leadership over regional and international issues. In a speech in Beijing during the Third Malaysia-China Forum in August 1999, Dr.Mahathir articulated his views on China. He pointed out the common stand that the two countries have taken in recent years and made suggestions on how both nations could work together, such as ‘for a stronger voice and to work with other East Asian countries to urge developed nations for a concerted effort to create a new global financial architecture’ .50 Conclusion: Towards a Tacit Entente? Increasingly, Malaysia shares common issues of concern with China, especially following the financial crisis of 1997. Over the last few years a much closer relationship has developed between Kuala Lumpur and Beijing. In 1999, Dr. Mahathir described the relationship as a ‘partnership’.51 There is now a convergence of interests and this has brought the two closer together. The Spratly Islands dispute has illustrated how Malaysia has been successful in balancing its relations with the PRC on the one hand, and pursuing its national interests on the other. This was illustrated again by Malaysia’s construction of structures on Erica Reef and Investigator Shoal in the Spratlys in August 1999. Although the Philippines protested vehemently, there was no real response from Beijing. It is interesting to note that earlier, in June 1999, Malaysia’s foreign minister was in Beijing and told reporters that both sides had agreed that tensions in the South China Sea should be defused through peaceful bilateral negotiations.52 It is a matter of conjecture whether the Malaysian foreign minister was actually dispatched to Beijing in order to ‘explain’ the latest development over Malaysia’s position on the construction of structures for scientific purposes. At around the time of the Philippines’ protest, it was interesting that Prime Minister Mahathir was in Beijing where he had high-level talks with President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji. Again, the two sides agreed that the South China Sea dispute should be resolved through peaceful negotiations without the involvement of external parties.53


Malaysia’s initial gamble of confronting the Chinese over its partial claims in the Spratlys have been well managed by developing closer ties with Beijing. Today, relations are at an all time high and this has been brought about by a convergence of interests on several international issues, including the need to reduce Western influence and to maintain an independent foreign policy. As argued earlier, although the political leadership has a positive perception of China, concerns still prevail in some quarters in Malaysia, notably in the military. While the domestic factor involving China has almost withered away, external concerns are still present. The most often quoted factor of concern involves potential conflicts with China, such as a war with Taiwan, which would have an enormous impact on regional politics and security. However, such perceptions have tended to have a limited impact on policy, including defence, especially in present day Malaysia where there appears to be a re-emergence of a domestic threat, this time from Islamic militancy. Even though the modernisation of the MAF has re-commenced following positive signs of economic recovery, there is now an increasing threat perception at a low level of intensity. Malaysia’s threat perception seems to have gone full circle, from concerns about counter-insurgency warfare to conventional warfare, and now back to low levels of threat, including piracy. Given the apparent power rivalries amongst ASEAN members, and the preoccupation with threats emanating from neighbouring countries, perceptions of a China threat in Malaysia seem to be fading away. A caveat to this sanguine picture is the internal dynamics of Chinese politics, which most would argue will have to confront major contradictions sooner rather than later, and when it does could well change the nature of threat perceptions in the region. Notes 1 Foreign Affairs Malaysia 1, no. 3 (1967), p. 101. 2 Speeches of Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, 1959 (Kuala Lumpur National Archives, 1985), p. 7. 3 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China Since 1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 40. 4 Foreign Affairs Malaysia 1, no.3 (1967), p. 48. 5 Ghazali Shafie, “Southeast Asia in the Seventies”, Foreign Affairs Malaysia 1, no.9 and no. 10 (1968), p. 7.


6 Quoted in Strategy for Action: The Selected Speeches of Tun Haji Abdul Razak Bin Dato’ Hussein, The Deputy Prime Minister (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Centre for Development Studies, PM’s Department, 1969), p. 348. 7 “Southeast Asia: Outlook for the Seventies”, Address by Tun Abdul Razak Bin Dato’ Hussein, Prime Minister of Malaysia, at the German Association for Foreign Policy in Bonn on 21 April 1971, Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 1971, p. 16. 8 Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and its Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), p. 125. 9 Quoted in Government of Malaysia, Foreign Affairs Malaysia 4, no. 2 (1971), p. 42. 10 Marvin L.Rogers, “Malaysia and Singapore: 1971 Developments”, Asian Survey (February 1972), p. 174. 11 Foreign Affairs Malaysia 4, no. 1 (March 1971), p. 15. 12 R.S. Milne, “Malaysia and Singapore in 1974”, Asian Survey (February 1975), p. 166. 13 Michael Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm, 1978) pp. 259–260. 14 Quoted in Government of Malaysia, Foreign Affairs Malaysia 4, no. 2 (1971), p. 13. 15 Ibid. 16 Tan Sri Zaiton Ibrahim Bin Ahmad, “Malaysia’s Policy on China”, Foreign Affairs Malaysia 4, no.2 (1971), p. 43. 17 Michael Yahuda, China’s Role, op. cit., p. 219. 18 Quoted in Milne, “Malaysia and Singapore”, op. cit., p. 166. 19 Rogers, “Malaysia and Singapore”, op. cit., p. 173. 20 Michael Leifer, “Malaysia After Tun Razak: Tensions in a Multi-Racial State”, The Round Table, no. 262 (April 1976), p. 155 21 Quoted in R.K.Jain, (ed.), China and Malaysia, 1949–1983 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1984), p. 150. 22 Government of Malaysia, Foreign Affairs Malaysia 5, no. 2 (1972), pp. 122– 123. 23 Sadako Ogata, Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of US and Japanese Processes (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988), p. 28. 24 Quoted in Government of Malaysia, Foreign Affairs Malaysia 4, no. 1 (1971), p. 25. 25 Foreign Affairs Malaysia 5, no. 1 (1972), p. 29. 26 Ibid. 27 Government of Malaysia, The Resurgence of Armed Communism in West Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, 1971), p. v. 28 Malaysia: International Relations, Selected Speeches by Mohd Ghazali Shafie (Kuala Lumpur: Creative Enterprise, 1982), p. 203. 29 Quoted in Jain, China and Malaysia, op. cit., p. 265. 30 B.A.Hamzah, The Spratlies: What can be done to enhance confidence? (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS, 1990), p. 7. 31 Quoted in Brian Cloughley, “South China Sea confrontation”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 May 1988, p. 1073.


32 Chi-kin Lo, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 36–37. 33 Quoted in G.Alagasari (ed), Mahathir: The Awakening (Kuala Lumpur: UniStrength, 1994), p. 311. 34 Lo, China’s Policy, op. cit., pp. 155–156. 35 Chen Jie, “China’s Spratly Policy: With Special Reference to the Philippines and Malaysia”, Asian Survey XXXIV (October 1994), p. 894. 36 Vice Admiral Dato’ Mohd Shariff Ishak, RMN, Chief of the Navy, “The Modernisation of Malaysia’s Maritime Defence: The Makings of a Maritime Strategy”, paper presented at the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs’ Maritime Security Forum, 5 April 1994. 37 Hamzah, The Spratlies, op. cit., p. 12. 38 See the chapter in this volume by Aileen San Pablo-Baviera. 39 Mohd Najib Tun Razak, “Malaysia’s Strategic Perceptions: Challenges of the Post-Cold War Era”, MIAF Lecture Series (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian International Affairs Forum, 1993), p. 6. 40 Mohd Najib Tun Razak, Asia-Pacific’s Strategic Outlook: The Shifting of Paradigms (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications, 1995), p. 47. 41 You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1999), p. 217. 42 You Ji, “A blue water navy: Does it matter?” in David S.G.Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds.), China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 79. 43 According to one observer, ‘Despite undoubted improvements in PLAN [People’s Liberation Army Navy] capabilities, its ability to conduct sustained military operations against competent, well-equipped adversaries remains very much in doubt’. See Paul H.B. Godwin, “From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities Towards 2000” in David Shambaugh and Richard H.Yang (eds.), China’s Military in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 221. 44 Michael G.Gallagher, “China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea”, International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 192. 45 Quoted in Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1997), p. 94. 46 Based on interviews and discussions with Malaysian Defence planners around the 1988–1989 period. 47 Quoted in G.Alagasari, Mahathir: The Awakening, op.cit., p. 215 48 Regional Development and the Pacific Community, Selected Speeches by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, Vol. 1 (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk, 1995), p. 41. 49 Joseph Chin Yong Liow, “Malaysia-China Relations in the 1990s: The Maturing of a Partnership”, Asian Survey XL, no. 4 (July/August 2000), p. 679. 50 Managing the Malaysian Economy, Vol 2, Selected Speeches by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk, 2000), p. 41. 51 Ibid., p. 38. 52 BBC Online Network, 2 June 1999. 53 BBC Online Network, 19 August 1999.

CHAPTER TWELVE Perceptions of a China Threat: A Philippine Perspective Aileen San Pablo-Baviera

Introduction This chapter provides a brief history of Philippine relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since diplomatic ties were established in 1975.1 It explains how, following the first twenty years of generally cordial relations from 1975 to 1995, concern has grown in Manila over the prospects of a rising China. Beijing’s occupation of Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands and other assertions of maritime sovereignty, coupled with China’s increasing military expenditure, have provided the basis for such concern. However, other strategic factors have also played a role, including the fear of a disengaging United States, and the difficulty of pursuing alternative security arrangements such as the multilateral ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Bilateral confidence-building measures between Manila and Beijing have taken place but have thus far accomplished little by way of helping manage the disputes. On the contrary, with the emergence of a new dispute over Scarborough Shoal leading to Philippine Navy (PN) actions against Chinese fishermen, the situation appears less predictable than ever. Much more effort needs to be exerted by both sides, particularly in establishing conflict avoidance measures rather than just enhanced dialogue and transparency. Because of the asymmetry in power relations involved, the image of a ‘China threat’ is bound to continue to loom large for the Philippines and China’s other smaller neighbours. How to reduce this perception, even as it continues to pursue aspirations as a regional power, is a challenge that China must learn to effectively address.

254 A PHILIPPINE PERSPECTIVE

A Brief History of Philippine-PRC Relations Prior to the 1975 normalisation of diplomatic ties between the Philippines and the PRC, Manila recognised the Kuomintang (KMT) government in Taiwan as a close friend and ally while eschewing ties with the communist government in Beijing. From 1949 up until the late 1970s, the Philippines perceived the PRC to be a security threat. Successive administrations in Manila had been battling local communist movements since the end of the Second World War. China’s brand of communist ideology was especially attractive during the Cultural Revolution period to an expanding corps of radical Filipino leftists, contributing to the establishment of an underground Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army, in the late 1960s. Aside from domestic security considerations, at that time there was also a perception in the Philippines that China was prepared to use force and actively challenge the regional order. During the Korean War, the PRC and the Philippines fought on opposite sides, with Beijing supporting North Korea while Manila was an active participant in the US-led UN forces in South Korea. During the Cold War period, however, when the principal source of instability in the world was seen to be the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, Beijing’s own disagreements with Moscow, and its readiness to co-operate with the United States in an anti-Soviet front, helped blunt ideological hostility from its neighbours. The Philippines thus began to explore the possibility of opening diplomatic relations with the PRC beginning in the early 1970s. On the Philippine side, the main reasons for the normalisation of diplomatic relations with Beijing included: the desire to terminate Chinese communist support for the local revolutionary movement; the decision of the Marcos government to enhance its policy of non-alignment by expanding relations with socialist countries; recognition of the growing role and importance of the PRC in the strategic global and regional arenas following its re-entry into the UN and its attainment of nuclear weapon status; and the need to locate sources of relatively cheap oil for import during the 1970s energy crisis. Among the reservations that the Marcos government had in opening relations with the PRC was the potential security threat that might arise from Beijing’s links with the ethnic Chinese in the Philippines, who, it was feared, could become a veritable ‘fifth column’. The government therefore enacted a mass naturalisation law in 1974 that was meant to

AILEEN SAN PABLO- BAVIERA 255

encourage ethnic Chinese to choose Filipino citizenship. It was a source of comfort to Manila that unlike the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei, which maintained close links with the Chinese community in the Philippines, Beijing affirmed that the loyalties of people of Chinese descent should lie first and foremost with the countries that had taken them in.2 Relations between 1975 and 1995 can be characterised as cordial at the political level, and warm in terms of the cultural and people-topeople aspects, but only marginally successful in their economic objectives.3 Throughout this period, which roughly coincided with the most active time of Chinese market reform and integration with the global economy, the Philippine government in general did not appear to view China as an imminent threat. Nor did the two sides officially treat each other in a manner other than friendliness and good-neighbourliness, notwithstanding occasional disagreements over two important issues: the territorial dispute in the South China Sea and the handling of relations with Taiwan. From a Philippine point of view, China maintained excessive claims on the islands and waters of the South China Sea that threw into doubt assurances of its non-expansionist nature. However, the Philippines was prepared to take a pragmatic view and was in principle open to China’s proposal for joint development. On the Taiwan issue, Manila sought Beijing’s understanding of its need to maintain active unofficial relations with Taipei, given Taipei’s proximity, their close historical association, and the potential economic advantages it represented for the Philippines.4 China in turn had little option but to tolerate the very active Philippine-Taiwan relationship, while drawing the line whenever highprofile official exchanges took place. The main raison d’etre for establishing diplomatic ties had been served by the end of the 1970s. In particular, Chinese communist support for the CPP had been undermined. However, trade relations remained at very modest levels, with the Philippines suffering from persistent trade deficits. Throughout most of the 1980s, the Philippines was beset by political instability and economic malaise, and was therefore not in a position to take advantage of China’s economic liberalisation or the investment boom in East Asia. The country fell behind most of its ASEAN neighbours, whose trade and investment ties with China expanded remarkably during the period. Nonetheless, cultural and other peopletopeople exchanges with the PRC were very active from 1975 to 1995, prompting former foreign affairs undersecretary, and the current ASEAN


secretary-general, Rodolfo Severino to state: ‘With no country has the Philippines had more active interaction at the officially organised level than with China’.5 Relations between the Philippines and China continued to be influenced by regional developments. The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in December 1978 brought China and ASEAN closer together in a campaign supported by the United States and Japan to put an end to Hanoi’s bid for sub-regional hegemony over Indochina. The Philippines, a founding member of ASEAN, went along with the ASEAN-PRC collaboration against Vietnam. However, ideological animosities and sharp differences in their political systems during the Cold War period had resulted in a generalised perception by many Filipinos of China as a potential threat. The ‘yellow peril’ and ‘sleeping dragon’ images of China that prevailed among American media and opinion-makers exerted a significant influence among English-literate Filipinos. The sector that most continued to view China as a serious cause for concern was, not surprisingly, the defence establishment. At another level, in terms of perceived threats to economic security, there was an increasing recognition among the country’s business and economic leaders that economic competition from the PRC could spell trouble for certain sectors of the Philippine economy. Such fears of a gigantic and increasingly influential neighbour became more real in light of the worsening contest for the Spratly Islands. In April 1988, Philippine President Corazon Aquino made a state visit to China during which the Spratlys dispute was discussed. China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping pledged to shelve the sovereignty issue, and proposed to engage in joint exploration and exploitation of maritime resources. The two sides agreed to work towards a peaceful resolution of the issue.6 There were a few incidents in the Spratlys area involving the Philippines and China at the time, most of which involved the arrest of Chinese fishermen who had strayed into Philippine waters. In contrast, China and Vietnam clashed in the Spratlys in 1988, resulting in China seizing islands previously occupied by Vietnam. In February 1992, the PRC passed a new law on its Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone that reiterated its claim over the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, Macclesfield Bank, the Pratas, the Pescadores and the Diaoyutai Islands in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam protested the new law. A few months after, China awarded an oil exploration contract in the Spratlys area to a little-known American firm Crestone. In late 1993,


China’s South Sea Fleet held major military manoeuvres in the South China Sea, and in 1994 began building a new airstrip in the Paracels. The Philippine government delivered a more concrete response to the spate of occupations, oil exploration moves, and increasing Sino- Vietnamese tensions in the area in 1992. It was the driving force behind a statement by all ASEAN foreign ministers, known as the Manila Declaration on the South China Sea. The declaration called on all claimants to exercise restraint in the pursuit of their claims, and to explore co-operative ventures as a means of preventing conflict. In April 1993, President Fidel Ramos paid a state visit to Beijing, and among the prominent items on the agenda were security issues. PRC President Jiang Zemin gave his assurances that other countries had nothing to be alarmed about by China’s ongoing military modernisation program.7 Annual bilateral consultations were initiated between the foreign ministries of both countries at the vice-ministerial level, where a review of all aspects of the Sino-Philippine relationship was to be undertaken. In May 1994, the Philippine Department of Energy allowed the American company Alcorn to conduct a ‘desktop’ exploration of the hydrocarbon potential of Reed Bank in the northeastern part of the Spratlys just off Palawan.8 The study involved no actual field activity but caught the attention of China. Later that year, it was the Chinese occupation of a reef-1 appropriately named Mischief Reef (Panganiban to the Philippines and Meiji Jiao to China)—that became a turning point in Philippine perceptions and policy towards its Spratly Islands claims. Mischief Reef as a Turning Point in Philippine-PRC Relations Mischief Reef is a partly submerged feature in the Spratly Islands lying only 135 nautical miles west of the Philippine province of Palawan. In January 1995, a group of Filipino fishermen reported to Philippine military authorities that they had been detained by Chinese troops on Mischief Reef. This led Manila to discover that platforms consisting of octagonal bunker-type structures, and satellite equipment, had been built by China on the previously unoccupied reef. Apart from these structures, a number of civilian and military vessels were spotted in the immediate area. The Chinese Foreign Ministry initially denied all knowledge of the structures, but after several weeks claimed that they had been built by the


local fishing authorities of Hainan to provide shelter for Chinese fishermen. 9 The official Philippine reaction to the Chinese occupation was stronger than it had ever been in the past over incidents relating to the disputed areas. The PN destroyed territorial markers left by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) at various locations in the Spratlys. The PN and Philippine Air Force (PAF) stepped up patrols around the reef, whilst many key officials and politicians severely criticised China’s actions. The arrest of Chinese fishermen found operating either in the disputed area or in Philippine territorial waters were stepped up and heavily publicised. In many such cases, the offenders were arrested and tried in Philippine courts, and their vessels were impounded. Manila and Beijing lodged diplomatic protests with each other over these incidents. The Philippine government made a concerted effort to bring attention to China’s ‘bullying behaviour’ before the international community. While the PRC had sought to appease the Philippines by seeking bilateral negotiations, Manila expressed a strong preference to pursue a multilateral approach involving other ASEAN claimants, as well as bringing the matter before international bodies. However, Manila still agreed to open bilateral consultations with China both on the specific issue of Mischief Reef and on the South China Sea dispute in general. Bilateral Diplomacy on the South China Sea Dispute The first opportunity for bilateral talks came in March 1995, a month after the Chinese-built structures had been discovered. These talks, held in Beijing, were, however, inconclusive. Meanwhile, President Ramos put forward a proposal for the demilitarisation of the area under dispute. He also proposed that, until an agreement for joint development among the claimants could be reached, each disputed island should be placed under the stewardship of the claimant country geographically closest to it, on the understanding that ‘the steward-country accommodates the other claimants’ need for shelter, anchorage and other peaceful uses’.10 A second round of bilateral talks, held in Manila in August, resulted in a joint statement in which both sides agreed to abide by a code of conduct. Its principles were as follows: • that the dispute shall not affect the normal development of relations, and be settled in a peaceful and friendly manner through consultations on the basis of equality and mutual respect;


• that confidence-building measures (CBMs) be undertaken, with both sides refraining from use or threat of force in resolving the disputes; • that co-operation should be gradually pursued until the disputes are eventually resolved; • that the two sides shall settle the dispute in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and recognised principles of international law; • that other initiatives on multilateral co-operation by the region be considered at the appropriate time. 11 The joint statement also expressed a desire to co-operate in the protection and conservation of maritime resources, and that the dispute should be settled by countries directly concerned without prejudice to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Subsequently, the Philippines also held talks with Vietnam, and reached agreement on certain principles similar to those concluded with China. Other parties were invited to subscribe to these principles.12 During the annual Philippine-PRC consultations in March 1996, the two countries further agreed to establish a ‘bilateral consultative mechanism to explore ways of co-operation in the South China Sea’. Specifically, three working groups were set up to examine co-operation in fisheries, marine environment protection and CBMs.13 In order to purse CBMs, high-level visits were initiated between the two sides. These included visits to Manila by PLA Vice Chief of General Staff General Xiong Guangkai in May 1996, PLA Chief of General Staff Fu Quanyou in September 1996, Defence Minister Chi Haotian in February 1997, and a number of other ministerial level visits by economic and cultural officials. In return, visits to China were conducted by Secretary of National Defence Renato de Villa in July 1996, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Arturo Enrile in October 1996 and a Senate delegation in April 1997. President Jiang had also sent a letter to President Ramos in 1995 expressing assurances that China would only pursue peaceful means in resolving its territorial claims in the Spratlys.14 In November 1996, Jiang paid a state visit to the Philippines, following the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Summit. Diplomatic relations were upgraded when an additional Philippine consulate-general was opened in Guangzhou and the two sides exchanged armed forces and defence attaches for the first time. Also unprecedented were port visits to Manila by PLAN vessels in March 1997 and May 1998, following similar visits to Malaysia and Thailand.15


Meanwhile, the Fisheries Co-operation Working Group and the Marine Environment Working Group each held two meetings. Unfortunately, despite this active and reciprocal bilateral diplomacy, the Philippines was not only unable to move China towards a more satisfactory resolution of the Mischief Reef issue, but China even reinforced its presence in October 1998 by building a permanent multistorey building in place of the original structures that the Philippines had wanted dismantled. In November 1998, the foreign ministers of the two sides met again in Kuala Lumpur and agreed to convene the Philippine-China working group on CBMs. The Chinese side was reported in the Philippine media as having alluded to the possibility of ‘joint use’ of Mischief Reef facilities during the Kuala Lumpur meeting, a concept that Manila indicated it was willing to consider.16 However, the CBM meeting did not have an auspicious start. President Joseph Estrada had just returned from New York, where he had met briefly with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in another attempt to internationalise the Spratlys dispute.17 Moreover, prior to the start of bilateral negotiations in Manila, high-level Chinese military officials had apparently visited Mischief Reef. Photos taken by the PAF of Mischief Reef showed huge red banners hoisted on the newly renovated building which read ‘A warm welcome to the leaders on their arrival for inspection and guidance’.18 Meanwhile, the Chinese protested the continued low-altitude reconnaissance flights conducted by the PAF over Mischief Reef. When the CBM meeting convened in Manila in March 1999, there appeared to be no formal proposal from the Chinese side about any concept of ‘joint use’. Moreover, Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who headed the CBM delegation from China, said during a press conference that the use of the term ‘joint use’ by the Philippine side had been ‘inaccurate’.19 Rather than helping to narrow differences between the two sides, the meeting did not result in any progress, underscoring the huge gap in perceptions between the two sides. The Philippine side had wanted a written commitment from the PRC that the structures on the reef were for civilian use, which China resisted. Meanwhile, China had demanded that the AFP stop the arrest and detention of its fishermen, as well as refrain from conducting low-altitude flights over Mischief Reef, neither of which were accepted by the Philippine side.20 Soon after the CBM meeting, China announced a two-month ban on fishing activities in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Bohai Sea, beginning in June 1999. These fishing bans would henceforth be


imposed every year. The PRC announced that only those with special permits would be allowed to fish. However, before the ban could take place, the PN intercepted a group of Chinese fishing vessels on 23 May in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, and as a consequence of its pursuit ‘accidentally sank’ one of the boats.21 Chinese Ambassador Fu Ying contested this report and accused the PN of deliberately sinking the vessel. She further demanded that the PN personnel responsible be punished, and that compensation be paid for the sinking of the vessel.22 In a separate incident, another Chinese fishing boat was sunk on 19 July after an encounter with the PN in the Spratly Islands. Philippine defence officials insisted the sinking was accidental. In light of the poor state of bilateral relations, President Estrada postponed a state visit to China that had been scheduled for May.23 However, in a short visit to Hong Kong on 17 May, he seized the opportunity to criticise Chinese actions in the Spratly Islands during a speech before the Pacific Basin Economic Council. 24 Bilateral diplomacy may have contributed to an increased understanding on both sides of their respective positions, but did not lead to a softening of those positions, much less a compromise or resolution. The bold actions of the Philippines, at times appearing to border on brinkmanship, can not be explained by just looking at the state of Philippine-China relations, which had been amiable enough for the past twenty years, nor by a mere appreciation of Manila’s policy towards the disputed islands, which in the past had tended to be pragmatic rather than unbending.25 Rather, they can be understood best in the context of a drastically changed strategic environment which had greatly heightened Manila’s sense of insecurity and vulnerability. The Philippine’s Changing Strategic Environment Mischief Reef marked the closest point that China’s military occupation had come to Philippine shores. It came a few years after the Philippine Senate had voted not to renew the lease on Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, then the United States’ two largest overseas military installations. Following the closure of the bases in November 1992, the United States terminated practically all official economic and military assistance to the Philippines. Meanwhile, an increasingly active Chinese military had set its sights on the development of a blue-water capability that would allow it to project power far from China’s shores.


The end of the Cold War had resulted in much strategic uncertainty in the world, including East Asia, which was the site of potential flashpoints such as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits. In 1993 this galvanised ASEAN to call for a regional security dialogue forum involving all the major players from the region. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) first convened in Bangkok in July 1994, bringing together former adversarial states as the United States, Russia, China and Japan, with middle powers such as Canada, Australia and the ASEAN states also taking part. The ARF, during its early stages, was meant to encourage dialogue and confidence building among participating states, rather than to resolve existing disputes and conflicts. The creation of the ARF had set in motion a promising process of multilateral security dialogue, consultation and co-operation. It was a process that was designed to make the East Asian security environment more predictable, and therefore was a source of comfort to smaller states such as the Philippines, which had heretofore relied heavily on guarantees from the major powers for the provision of their external security. However, this hopeful prospect of greater regional co-operation for peace and stability was too soon challenged, at least from Manila’s perspective, by China’s unilateral moves on Mischief Reef. Some analysts in fact saw the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef as an attempt to test the reaction of the United States, and as a prelude to further ‘creeping assertiveness’ in the Spratlys area. 26 Moreover, the UNCLOS had only just come into force in November 1994. This convention, which Manila had signed and ratified as early as 1984, entitles the Philippines to a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This being so, Philippine jurisdictional claims to the resources of the disputed territory, vis-à-vis jurisdiction of other claimants, was strengthened by UNCLOS, regardless of the strength of the Philippine territorial claim itself. By setting up new structures—whether civilian or military—within the Philippines’ EEZ, and by continuing fishing activities in the area, China and other claimants are perceived as actively encroaching on an area of Philippine jurisdiction and contesting Manila’s exercise of rights granted to it under international law. The drastically changed post-Cold War strategic environment affected threat perceptions throughout the region, including in the Philippines. On the one hand was China’s rise as an economic power, its avowed goal of becoming a modern industrialised power, its declared efforts to modernise the PLA to address maritime defence needs, and its growing assertiveness in external relations. On the other hand were the continuing


threats to regional stability arising from a divided Korea and the separation of China and Taiwan, and a convergence of events leading to the perceived decline in the United States’ role as a guarantor of regional security. There is uncertainty and some degree of anxiety over the role that a huge and more powerful China might play in East Asia, especially in light of its unresolved territorial and sovereignty claims. In such an environment, and in light of the erosion of the Manila-Washington alliance, Manila’s sense of vulnerability to external security challenges was acute. Military Modernisation and Enhanced Philippine-US Military Ties In response to strategic uncertainties, but mainly to China’s occupation of Mischief Reef, Manila has endeavoured to prioritise the modernisation of the AFP and renew military co-operation with the United States. Since 1995, the PN has reported frequent sightings of Chinese vessels of various types—civilian research and survey ships, fishing vessels, as well as military ships—in Philippine waters, and especially in the vicinity of Mischief Reef. Arrests for illegal entry, poaching, and use of illegal fishing methods have increased, although the number may in fact be very small, as a Chinese source estimates, based on a 1994 survey, that over 300 of their fishing vessels visit the Spratlys every year.27 The same source, China’s Ministry of Agriculture, also stated that there were plans to set up cold storage plants, oil depots and fresh water supply facilities at Fiery Cross Reef to support Hainan-based fishing efforts in the South China Sea. Aside from Mischief Reef and foreign intrusions, another dispute with the PRC emerged over Scarborough Shoal, a group of uninhabited rocks lying 138 nautical miles off the coast of Zambales in Luzon. In April 1997, a team of amateur radio enthusiasts organised by the Chinese Radio Sports Association set sail from Guangzhou for Scarborough Shoal. Before they could complete their mission of sending radio signals from the shoal, PN vessels asked them to leave. China protested the action, maintaining that the area was historically subject to Chinese sovereignty.28 Since 1995 Manila has strengthened its military presence on the eight Spratly Islands that it occupies. Soon after the Mischief Reef crisis, the Philippine Congress introduced a 15-year ‘Armed Forces Modernisation Bill’ that, once passed into law, would enable the AFP to purchase multirole jet fighters, twelve offshore patrol vessels and new air defence radar


in the first five years. The bill was passed in December 1996 but the modernisation programme was suspended following the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis. To date little funds have been released for the AFP to purchase new equipment. The territorial dispute in the Spratly Islands and perceptions of the China Threat have become the most persuasive arguments used to justify the modernisation of the Philippine military. At one point, Chinese sources even accused the AFP of deliberately whipping up tensions in the area to justify huge budgetary increases, an allegation shared by certain groups in the Philippines who were also opposed to increased defence spending.29 In January 1999 the Philippine National Security Council convened for one of its rare meetings to consider the on-going situation in the Spratlys, and concluded that the modernisation of the AFP should be hastened.30 Similarly, critics of the Philippine-American military alliance have argued that certain elements in the Philippine government—in particular the defence department—were exaggerating and even creating tensions in the Spratlys in order to use the so-called ‘China bogey’ to justify renewed US involvement and support for Philippine external security.31 Whether this is true or not, the fact remains that perceptions of a China Threat did subsequently pave the way for the Senate’s ratification of a new Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in May 1999 allowing US troops back into the Philippines for training and other activities in implementation of the 1951 US-Philippine Mutual Defence Treaty. Senate President Pro Tempore Bias Ople, also chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, argued in his speech supporting the VFA that: In our own part of the world, East Asia, the Chinese colossus has awakened… There is every indication…that this giant has not only awakened but is belching forth a stream of fire—in the direction of the Philippines. One fine day in 1995, we woke up to discover that Chinese naval forces had occupied Mischief Reef… Today it is Mischief Reef and the Scarborough Shoal off Zambales. Tomorrow there might be more tempting prizes, including Palawan and the Philippines itself… The one factor that restrains China’s military hawks is the realization that the Philippines is bound to the United States by a Mutual Defence Treaty…32 In terms of public opinion in the Philippines, the dispute has helped create a negative image of China that may have seriously undermined


erstwhile friendly ties with Beijing. Developments relating to the dispute have been widely reported and commented on in the Philippine media in a manner that tends to portray China in the worst possible light. Public statements by high-ranking Filipino officials and politicians such as the one cited above, often intended for domestic consumption and at times no more than bluster, have, moreover, tended to add fuel to the fire by their bellicosity. Unfortunately, China’s treatment of the Mischief Reef issue has not at all helped reassure the Philippines of its intentions. Manila was concerned that the structures would be used for military purposes, to which China responded that they were merely fishing shelters built by civilian fishing authorities from Hainan Island. By 1998, however, the original structures had given way to multi-storey concrete buildings with visible gunemplacement platforms and what appeared to be a helicopter-landing pad. The continuing presence of Chinese naval vessels in the vicinity, and separate sightings in other areas of the South China Sea, were also regularly reported in the Philippine press. Although Manila and Beijing concluded an agreement on a code of conduct in 1995, there appeared to be dissatisfaction with the state of compliance (possibly by both sides) as tensions persisted. Some groups from the Philippine side were sceptical about the utility of the agreement because the code only outlined principles that were subject to various interpretations, failing to spell out concrete CBMs and rules of engagement. Moreover, the Chinese presence on Mischief Reef serves as a continuing reminder and warning to Manila not to relax its suspicions about and vigilance against further Chinese encroachments. This scepticism seems to have extended to current negotiations between China and ASEAN for a regional code of conduct. Despite China’s demonstration of a willingness to discuss the matter of the territorial and maritime disputes with ASEAN (four of which are rival claimants in the South China Sea dispute33), many in the Philippines now feel that China can only dispel suspicions and perceptions of threat through significant actions, and not merely words. Conclusion To summarise, Philippine perceptions of China can be attributed to several factors: history and geography; ideological and political differences particularly during the Cold War period; perceptions of both internal and external vulnerability; the general strategic uncertainty in


the post-Cold War era; and even ideational influences emanating mainly from the Western media. However, perceptions and concerns over the PRC as an imminent or potential threat to the security of the country stem largely from the observed behaviour of China, particularly in relation to territorial and sovereignty claims on Taiwan and in the South China Sea. From 1975 to 1995, Sino-Philippine relations were largely uneventful and stable. The traditional friendship and active people-topeople linkages served to sustain ties, even if other areas of diplomacy and economic exchange were found wanting. The success of China’s economic reform programme has earned the PRC much respect from the international community. That Beijing appears to be translating this newfound confidence into a heightened sense of nationalism and increasing assertiveness vis-à-vis perceived challenges to its sovereignty is, however, something that arouses concern among China’s neighbours. Mischief Reef was certainly a major watershed in Philippine perceptions of China, and quite possibly also in the perceptions of ASEAN and other members of the international community. The strategic importance of the reef itself may be questionable, but as the most concrete symbol of Chinese irredentist claims as far as the Filipino public is concerned, it has taken on a life of its own. The fact that the dispute over the reef very much played out in the sometimes sensationalist Philippine media has also meant that perceptions of China as at least a potential threat may have, for the first time, seeped down to the consciousness of ordinary citizens. Do people in the Philippines believe that China has expansionist or hegemonic designs on the Philippines as a whole? This hardly seems likely, save for a possible group of Cold War-vintage thinkers. Do many believe that China will repeat it actions on Mischief Reef and attempt to further expand its presence at the expense of other claimants and the stability of the South China Sea area? This seems highly possible, given China’s failure to offer any sort of compromise to redress Philippine concerns and the difficulty of claimants agreeing to any modus vivendi at this point. Do people in the Philippines believe that China will use force to effect reunification with Taiwan? China itself has said as much, should Taiwan be so bold as to declare independence. Because of China’s size and relative power, its own apparent dissatisfaction with the security environment in the region (particularly vis-à-vis Taiwan and the US military preponderance), and because of past links with forces hostile to governments in the region, countries such


as the Philippines will expect that the burden of responsibility for demonstrating that it is not a threat rests with China. At the same time, it is fear of an increasingly powerful and assertive China, not animosity against it, which has driven Philippine responses on the Mischief Reef issue thus far. This fear is grounded as much in the Philippines’ own vulnerability and weakness as it is in China’s territorial ambitions. Therefore, while agreements with China or other rival claimants may provide some short-term comfort, the imperative remains for the Philippines to strengthen its own internal capability to address this issue. This involves improving its capability to enforce laws in its maritime jurisdiction zones in accordance with UNCLOS and international law. It involves strengthening its legal, political and military institutions as well as technical and scientific expertise on ocean affairs in preparation for the challenges at hand. The demand for China to refrain from new occupations is a commitment that the Philippines itself, as well as all other claimants, must be prepared to give in return. If even one claimant refuses to restrain itself in such a manner, then the claimants who do exercise selfrestraint may end up jeopardising their own positions. A co-operative atmosphere cannot develop under such circumstances. This is where a regional code of conduct, involving all claimants and possibly open for accession by other interested parties, can play a vital role. Previous agreements between the Philippines and China, ASEAN and China, as well as between other pairs of claimants have thus far tended to focus on broad principles such as ‘peaceful resolution’, the ‘non-use of force’ and ‘self-restraint’. It has become apparent, from the Philippine experience, that more specific operational guidelines are required for these agreements to be satisfactorily implemented. Provocative statements and actions must be avoided by all parties concerned. The most urgent problems are those of conflict avoidance and the need to prevent the escalation of disputes. Measures to regulate military movements as well as to craft a modus vivendi pertaining to fishing in disputed areas are necessary. High-level bilateral exchanges and CBMs must indeed be undertaken, but only in the spirit of seeking true compromise rather than of hedging or ‘buying time’. Possibly the greatest foreign policy challenge facing the PRC in postCold War Asia is for it to manage its rise to great power status in a manner that will guarantee peace, rather than threaten instability and ensure mutual benefit rather than impose hegemony among smaller


neighbouring countries. As a rising power, China will find itself caught between its desire to stand up to and be recognised as an equal by other great powers, and the apprehensions of smaller neighbours that it will become an unfriendly hegemon. Notes 1 This chapter draws from earlier works by the author, specifically “The Kalayaan Islands (Spratlys) in Philippine Foreign Policy” in Panorama 2, (Manila: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1999); “Security Challenges of the Philippine Archipelago” in Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998); and “Philippine Security in the South China Sea,” in Ralph Cossa and Carolina G.Hernandez (eds.), Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea, (Manila: ISDS, 1997). 2 Aileen Baviera, “Philippines-China Relations in the Twentieth Century: History versus Strategy”. Paper presented at the 7th International Philippine Studies Conference, 12 July 2000, Manila, Philippines. 3 Aileen Baviera, “Turning Predicament into Promise: A Prospective on Philippines-China Relations” in Comprehensive Engagement: Strategic Issues in Philippines-China Relations. (Quezon City: Philippines-China Development Resource Centre, 2000), p. 23. 4 Ibid., p. 24. 5 Rodolfo C.Severino, unpublished paper entitled “Philippines-China Relations: As I See Them”, 2000. 6 “Aquino Returns from China”, Kyodo International News, 17 April 1988. 7 “Ramos Reassured on Spratlys,” South China Morning Post, 23 April 1993. 8 “Troubled Waters”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 June 1994. 9 This can be pieced together from various reports from the Philippine Daily Inquirer in the aftermath of the discovery of Mischief Reef up to news coverage of the bilateral talks in Beijing in March 1995. 10 Speech by Secretary Jose T.Almonte, Presidential Security Adviser before the meeting of the ASEAN Experts on the Law of the Sea, 27 November 1997, Manila. 11 Joint Statement of RP-PRC Consultations on the South China Sea and Other Areas of Cooperation, 9–10 August 1995. 12 Cited in Aileen Baviera, “Philippine Security Interests in the South China Sea”, in Cossa and Hernandez, Security Implications, op cit. 13 Joint Press Communiqué on Philippines-China Consultations, 13 March 1996. 14 Interview with an official of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila. 15 Cited in Baviera, “Security Challenges” in Southeast Asian Affairs, op. cit., p. 221. 16 “RP wants joint use of Sino structures,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 20 March 1999. 17 “Erap asks UN to help settle row on Spratly isles,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 March 1999.


18 Interview with an official of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila. 19 “China denies offering joint use of its structures in Mischief reef,” Philippine Star, 24 March 1995. Also, “China accuses RP of mischief,” Today, 24 March 1999. 20 Joint Statement of Philippine-China Experts Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures, 22–23 March 1999 and reports from various Manila newspapers. 21 “RP Navy sinks Sino fishing boat,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 25 May 1999. 22 “China still wants to get paid for fishing boat that sank in the Spratlys”, Today, 5 June 1999. 23 “Envoy to China stays but Estrada trip dims,” Today, 31 March 1999. 24 “Erap talks on Spratlys anew,” Today, 19 May 1999. 25 Early on, the Philippines had expressed its openness to joint development of the area among claimants. Salvador Laurel and Jose de Venecia, two prominent figures had on separate occasions raised the possibility with the Chinese government. 26 Ian James Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 1 (April 1999), pp. 95–118. 27 PRC Ministry of Agriculture, cited in Greg Austin. China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National Development. Monograph. Australian National University, 1996. 28 Cited in Baviera, “Security Challenges”, op. cit., p. 222. 29 “China blames RP military, Congress for tension over Spratlys,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 1 April 1999. 30 “NSC decision on Spratlys: Faster AFP upgrades,” Today, 22 January “NSC 1999. 31 “Roco: Estrada provoking China”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21 May “Roco 1999. 32 Senate President Pro Tempore Bias F.Ople. “The VFA: Paradigm Shifts in the Security and Freedom of Nations”. Full text of the speech delivered on the floor of the Senate sponsoring the concurrence of the Senate in the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement on 3 May 1999. Sanggunian 1(9), May 1999. 33 The Spratlys are claimed in whole or part by four ASEAN countries; the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. The PRC and Taiwan also claim sovereignty over the islands.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN Vietnamese Perspectives of the ‘China Threat’ Carlyle A.Thayer

Introduction The ‘China threat’ is a term that came into vogue in the early 1990s after the massacre of pro-democracy activists in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989. The term refers to a rising China that is growing economically stronger and militarily more powerful, and is perceived as likely to use its national power in a militarily aggressive manner.1 Some analysts view China’s military modernisation as exceeding the requirements for legitimate self-defence. Vietnamese perceptions of the ‘China threat’ are of longer standing than those of the West, and are more nuanced. Vietnamese officials, whether in the pre-colonial or contemporary periods, rarely speak openly about a ‘China threat’. As one writer has observed: Fear and distrust of China must surely be the most important emotional foundation of Vietnamese foreign policy, a feeling much older than the ideological camaraderie of the 1950s and 1960s… Yet that feeling, quite realistic in view of recent experience, is veiled when officials speak. The manifestation of growing Chinese power and self-confidence has taught them that verbal barbs are quite counterproductive.2 Given these concerns and sensitivities, it is not surprising that there is no explicit discussion of the ‘China threat’ in unclassified Vietnamese military or political-ideological journals. Vietnamese authors have yet to write a book entitled, A Vietnam Which Can Say No. Instead they thank China for its past assistance,3 and pay respect to its model of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. In assessing threats, analysts invariably distinguish between capability and intentions. In assessing Vietnamese

VIETNAMESE PERSPECTIVES OF THE “CHINA THREAT” 271

perceptions of a ‘China threat’ it is necessary to analyse not just what the Vietnamese say in public, but what they say and do in private. This chapter explores Vietnamese perceptions of the China threat in four parts. The first provides a brief historic overview of China’s relations with Vietnam that shape current strategic perceptions. The second analyses the process of normalisation of relations in 1989–1991. The third part reviews Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea in 1992, and internal debate in Vietnam about whether or not China constituted a threat. The fourth part rounds out the analysis by considering Vietnamese strategic perceptions in the current period. Historical Overview Vietnam suffers from ‘the tyranny of geography’. Vietnam is located on China’s southern border. Vietnam’s population of nearly 80 million makes it roughly equivalent to a single middle-sized Chinese province. China is large, powerful, and an enduring aspect of geopolitical reality. Vietnam came under Chinese suzerainty for a period of approximately one thousand years.4 In the tenth century Vietnam succeeded in attaining independence, it repulsed Mongol invaders in the thirteenth century, but was again occupied for roughly twenty years in the fifteenth century. Vietnam was attacked by China in the eighteenth century. Chinese Nationalist forces occupied northern Vietnam briefly at the end of the Second World War. In 1979, Vietnam and China fought a bitter border war. Their naval forces clashed in the South China Sea in 1988. Despite this history of conflict, it is a fact that China and Vietnam have shared a much longer period of peaceful relations. Vietnamese culture and society have been heavily influenced by Chinese civilisation. Vietnam’s political institutions in the pre-colonial period mirrored those of the Middle Kingdom to the north.5 Today, Vietnam and China are Asia’s only remaining socialist states; they share not only regime affinity, but China’s success in building ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ is a powerful source of legitimisation for similar efforts in Vietnam.6 Historically, Sino-Vietnamese relations were managed through a tributary system.7 While acknowledging Chinese pre-eminence on the one hand, Vietnam sought to maintain its independence of action on the other. Only in the twentieth century did it become possible to counterbalance Chinese influence and pressures by the maintenance of an ‘overthe- horizon’ alliance with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Vietnam’s freedom of movement is constrained by ever-present geopolitical reality.

272 CARLYLE A.THAYER

Hanoi must always calculate Chinese power and interests into its own national security policy equation—or pay a price. In the contemporary period, Vietnamese revolutionaries have drawn on the experience of their Chinese comrades, borrowing from their military and ideological writings.8 During the 1950s it was common for both Chinese and Vietnamese officials to refer to their relationship as ‘close as lips and teeth’. In 1963 Vietnam even ‘leaned to one side’ and supported Beijing’s position in its dispute with the Soviet Union.9 Relations between China and Vietnam began to deteriorate in the late 1960s during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969) and early 1970s as the process of Sino-American normalisation unfolded. China became less supportive of Vietnam’s drive to unify the country. After unification in 1975, Vietnam resisted Chinese pressures to condemn ‘international hegemonism’. The basic tenets of ‘Mao’s Theory of the Three Worlds’ was anathema to Vietnam. Vietnam instead chose to embrace the Soviet Union’s ‘three revolutionary currents’ as its preferred framework for analysing international relations.10 However, this was not the main or sole cause of the breakdown in SinoVietnamese relations in the late 1970s. The key issue was Vietnam’s refusal to recognise and give respect to China’s pre-eminent position in the region. The major point of contention was Vietnam’s alliance with the Soviet Union.11 Without such support Vietnam would not have been emboldened to occupy Cambodia, an act that undermined Chinese credibility as a guarantor of regional peace and stability. China sided with the Khmer Rouge and retaliated by attacking Vietnam’s six northern border provinces.12 At that time Beijing claimed it was acting defensively to restore order to its southern border in response to mounting Vietnamese provocations. There were other issues involved in the breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese relations: Vietnamese mistreatment of its Chinese minority;13 territorial disputes, both land and maritime; psychological factors (Chinese perceptions of Vietnamese ingratitude for past assistance); and ideological considerations.14 Vietnam denounced Chinese behaviour as anti-socialist and reflecting ‘great Han chauvinism’, and the two countries became adversaries for the next decade. China kept Vietnam’s border situation tense by repeatedly rattling its sabre and threatening a ‘second lesson’. Vietnam characterised this situation as a ‘multifaceted war of sabotage’ or ‘neither war nor peace’. At the fifth national congress of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) in March 1982, the party’s Political Report declared that ‘the


Chinese ruling circles unmasked themselves as a direct and dangerous enemy or our people’.15 In the mid to late 1980s Sino-Vietnamese enmity gradually began to give way. The main impetus behind this shift came from the Soviet Union and the ‘new political thinking’ ushered in by Mikhail Gorbachov. In February 1986, at the twenty-seventh congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and more particularly after his landmark speech in Vladivostok in July, Gorbachov began to press for the normalisation of relations with China, including party-to-party relations. China set three preconditions, including the resolution of the conflict in Cambodia. The Soviet Union responded by urging Vietnam to reach an accommodation. Vietnam altered its policy towards China accordingly. At the sixth congress of the VCP, which was held in December 1986, delegates approved a major strategic readjustment of Vietnam’s national security policy.16 In short, Vietnam decided to make concessions to China by withdrawing its military forces from Cambodia and Laos, demobilising half of its main force regulars, and adopting a defensive posture, including a policy of non-provocation towards China. By late 1987 Vietnamese policy began to bear fruit. Reportedly, China and Vietnam reached a modus vivendi. Armed hostilities all but ceased along their common border, and a thriving, if unofficial, crossborder trade developed. However, tensions soon emerged in the South China Sea. In March 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces clashed in the vicinity of Johnston Reef. China prevailed, several Vietnamese vessels were sunk, and about seventy sailors were killed or drowned. China then took possession of the reef and at least four other features. Despite this incident, Sino-Vietnamese negotiations, which had been suspended for a decade, were resumed in 1989. In September, four months after the Tiananmen Square massacre, Vietnam withdrew all of its formed military units from Cambodia. In 1990 Vietnam and China held several secret leadership summits to negotiate normalisation. Thus, at the very moment when US and other Western analysts were poised to invoke the ‘China threat’, Vietnam was moving in the opposite direction. Normalisation of Relations During the period from the May 1989 Sino-Soviet summit in Beijing, when relations were normalised, until late 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union following the abortive anti-Gorbachov coup, China reportedly considered the idea of forming an ‘alliance’ embracing the


USSR, North Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam, and made appropriate diplomatic soundings.17 Elements within the Vietnamese leadership, particularly the military, responded favourably. They were not adverse to joining a reconstituted Asian socialist community on ideological or geopolitical grounds. Reportedly, they were even prepared to accept a ‘red solution’—the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in a Cambodian peace settlement—as the price of admission.18 In July 1990, a switch in US policy away from support for the antiVietnamese resistance coalition produced a more accommodating posture by China. As a result Vietnam experienced intense inner-party debate on the question of relations with China, and the associated question of what shape a final settlement of the conflict in Cambodia would take. Vietnam pressed China repeatedly for a face-to-face meeting between senior leaders. China eventually agreed. A series of secret leadership summits were held—but on Chinese terms. China suggested that it might resume economic assistance to Vietnam, but only after a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in Cambodia had been reached and the details of Sino-Vietnamese normalisation had been worked out. Chinese negotiators strongly implied that, in return, Vietnam would have to agree to coordinate its foreign policy with China. China also determined that the meetings would not be held in Beijing, and key Vietnamese leaders who were perceived to be anti-Chinese, such as Foreign Minister Thach, would be excluded. The most important ‘secret meeting’ was held in Chengdu, southern China, from 3–7 September 1990. The understandings reached at the Chengdu summit were not universally acclaimed by inner-party circles in Hanoi (or Phnom Penh). In late November 1990, for example, ‘fierce discussions’ took place at the tenth plenum of the VCP Central Committee. The plenum considered, among other subjects, the foreign policy section of the draft Platform to the forthcoming seventh party congress. When released, the document was a model of understatement: it declared that after the consolidation of relations with the Soviet Union, Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam should restore co-operation with ‘the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China’.19 Argument on relations with China continued and featured prominently at the party’s eleventh plenum held in January 1991. Nguyen Co Thach led a small group who were sceptical of Chinese motives and argued for greater balance in Vietnam’s foreign relations by opening to the United States, Japan and Western Europe. Thach also opposed Chinese conditions on the resumption of aid. The pro-China lobby, aghast at


events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, condemned Mikhail Gorbachov’s reform programme as anti-socialist and argued that with the disintegration of the socialist states system, Vietnam had even more reason to ally itself with China.20 The pro-China lobby derisively called Thach ‘Ong My’ (Mr. America). Between the eleventh plenum and the seventh party congress (24– 26 June) matters were resolved in favour of the pro-China lobby. At the seventh congress, Foreign Minister Thach delivered a strong speech criticising China. He was dropped from the politburo and Central Committee, and later relieved of all government posts including his portfolio as foreign minister. The responsibility for policy on China and Cambodia was passed to Defence Minister General Le Duc Anh. The leadership and policy changes endorsed by the VCP’s seventh congress pleased the Chinese leadership. Immediately after the congress, CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin sent a congratulatory message to ‘comrade’ Do Muoi on his election as VCP secretary general. This was the first such party-to-party communication in over a decade. A confidential message dispatched at the same time requested that a politburo member come to China to brief Chinese leaders on the outcome of the congress.21 After the seventh congress, Vietnam’s new leaders not only pushed for the normalisation of relations with China, but also for the restoration of some form of ‘alliance’ relationship. In response to the Chinese request, Le Duc Anh, the former defence minister and second-ranking member of the politburo, and Hong Ha, the chief of the Central Committee’s External Affairs Department, were dispatched to Beijing to brief Chinese leaders. During their visit the two sides discussed the Cambodian question, mutual troop reductions along their border, the development of commercial relations (trade, rail and air links), territorial disputes, and the normalisation of relations including military ties. Anh found the Chinese less interested in offering aid than previously. Vietnam had to wait until after the formal signing of the Cambodian peace agreement in October 1991 before China would consent to formally normalise party-to-party ties. A summit was held in Beijing in November between party chiefs and state premiers. China rebuffed a Vietnamese proposal concerning mutual security guarantees. Bilateral relations were codified in an eleven-point joint communiqué that spelt out the principles governing bilateral relations and set the agenda for a ‘gradual improvement in the development of bilateral relations’. Both sides also agreed not to undertake any action that would impede the normalisation process.


At the time that Sino-Vietnamese relations were normalised, some members of the VCP insisted that socialist ideology was an important factor in the relationship. They continued to argue for the development of ‘fraternal relations’, but obviously not as intimate as the ‘lips and teeth’ relationship of the 1950s. They were supported by elements of the military who favoured filling the void caused by the Soviet Union’s collapse with the development of security ties with China. They once again pressed for a military relationship with China. Immediately following normalisation, the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moved to restore relations. In February-March 1992, Major General Vu Xuan Vinh, head of the VPA’s External Relations Department, went to China to discuss ‘the restoration and development of friendship between the armed forces of the two countries’. General Vinh held discussions with General Chi Haotian, who was then the PLA’s Chief of the General Staff. A return visit by Major-General Fu Jiaping, head of the PLA’s Foreign Affairs Bureau, took place in May. Unfortunately from the Vietnamese point of view, the collapse of the Soviet Union also led China to abandon the idea of forming an ‘alliance’ of Asian socialist states. In other words, as the curve of Vietnam’s support for military relations with China rose and intersected with that of China, China’s support for the idea declined. The divergence in outlook was summed up by one Chinese leader who characterised bilateral relations in 1991 as between ‘comrades but not allies’.22 After 1991, Vietnam attempted to fashion a national security policy that combined both socialist ideology and national interest. One section of the VCP held that ideology should remain an important factor in the conduct of Vietnam’s foreign relations.23 They argued that while ideology must be adapted to the changing times, its central tenets remained valid. With specific reference to relations with China, they argued that both countries shared a common commitment to building socialism, and both faced a common threat. That threat was identified as ‘the strategy of peaceful evolution’ whereby Western countries (the United States in particular) sought to overthrow communist regimes by supporting prodemocracy internal dissidents, political pluralism, international standards of human rights and the depoliticisation of the military. In short, in their view China and Vietnam should develop close party-toparty relations in order to better manage the transition to a market economy and to meet a common external threat.


In contrast, Vietnam’s realist school sought to develop relations with China within the larger foreign policy context of relations with the world in general. Their framework contained few of the ideological tenets of the past. The realist group argued that Vietnam must self-consciously formulate a foreign policy framework based on an explicit definition of national interest. Moreover, they asserted that this framework must be set within the context of acceptable norms of international state behaviour. Put simply, Vietnam should develop friendly relations with all countries regardless of social or political system. In other words, Vietnam should ‘multilateralise’ its external relations. Vietnam sought not only to develop good relations with China, but to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), restore Japanese official development assistance (suspended during the Cambodian conflict), obtain aid concessions from the European Union, and normalise relations with the United States. In brief, Vietnam sought to diversify and multilateralise its foreign relations under the expression ‘make friends with all countries’. Vietnam had achieved all of these objectives by July 1995. Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea In 1992, Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea precipitated debate between the ideological and realpolitik schools within the VCP. One key issue in the debate was how Vietnam should respond to Chinese actions that increasingly appeared ‘traditional’: that is, less like the actions of a socialist state and more like those of an imperial power. For example, on 25 February 1992, on the heels of Sino-Vietnamese normalisation, China promulgated a law on territorial waters that reiterated its claim to the entire South China Sea, and reserved the right to use force in this area to prevent any violation of its sovereignty. In the same month Chinese troops took possession of Da Ba Dau (Three Headed Rock), a previously unoccupied feature in the Spratly archipelago. The Chinese actions provoked a stormy unpublicised debate on the floor of Vietnam’s National Assembly. According to David Wurfel: ‘Some delegates advocated economic, even military retaliation. But finally—with advice from the External Affairs Commission of the Party Central Committee— the Assembly adopted an appropriate response, a mild, but firm, declaration’.25 Because Vietnam had been unable to reach consensus on Chinese intentions, it responded in a low-key manner. The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry and party media refrained from publicly mentioning the


Chinese occupation of Three Headed Rock. The Foreign Ministry responded to China’s declaration of a new law on territorial waters by issuing a routine reassertion of Vietnamese sovereignty claims. According to a Foreign Ministry insider: Throughout this difficult year, the major guideline for Vietnam’s policy was one of restraint. After it took over Da Ba Dau in February, China urged Vietnam “not to harm the new-found friendship”. So, Vietnam made no public mention of the incident and the February 28 note from Vietnam only reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands, as well as reminded China that the two countries had agreed, when they normalised relations in November last year [1991], to settle differences peacefully and refrain from moves that would complicate the situation.26 On 8 May, China granted a concession for oil exploration to a relatively unknown American firm, Crestone Energy Corporation, in a disputed area (Tu Chinh Bank) located on Vietnam’s continental shelf. The signing was witnessed by a US diplomat. This incident was particularly galling to the Vietnamese as the Crestone contract was signed in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People and was announced on the day that senior party adviser, Nguyen Van Linh, held discussions at the very same place with General Secretary Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng. In the view of some Vietnamese officials, these actions smacked of traditional Chinese imperial behaviour and were calculated to undermine Vietnamese territorial claims and disrupt US-Vietnam normalisation. In early July, Chinese troops planted a territorial marker on Da Lac reef in the Spratly archipelago. Chinese actions in the Spratly archipelago provoked heated debate within the Vietnam Communist Party. At the third plenum held from the 18–29 of June, for example, members argued whether or not to consider China a long-term threat to Vietnam’s security. Those who favoured ideology as the basis for external relations argued that China ‘has continued on the road to socialism, so we should make allies with the Chinese and ignore small conflicts’. Members of the realist school argued that China was two-faced and was using ‘socialism as a rope to tie Vietnam’s hands’.27 Party chief Do Muoi reportedly called China ‘expansionist’, the first time this expression was used in inner party circles since the early 1980s.


The third plenum remained divided and unable to reach a firm conclusion on whether or not China had ‘expansionist’ designs on the region. The Crestone affair, however, marked a watershed. The Foreign Ministry was given approval to be more vocal in making Vietnamese misgivings public, and there was a marked change in the tone of subsequent public protests. According to a Vietnamese foreign ministry source: The turning point came when Beijing concluded an agreement with Crestone. Privately, a senior Vietnamese official said: “We realise that we also need to make public protests and try to mobilise international opinion, or China will just keep expanding in the South China Sea”. When Chinese troops planted a sovereignty marker on July 4 on a tiny reef in the Spratlys, Vietnam accused China of having “seriously violated Vietnam’s territorial sovereignty”. On September 5, Vietnam hinted it would use force to repulse two Chinese vessels exploring for oil in the Gulf of Tonkin.28 On 19 July, party Secretary General Do Muoi announced that Vietnam had invited Chinese Premier Li Peng to Hanoi to discuss irritants in their bilateral relations. A month later, it was announced that Li Peng would visit at year’s end. However, in August, two Chinese ships erected a drilling platform in a disputed area of the Gulf of Tonkin that Beijing and Hanoi had earlier agreed to leave vacant. China also began impounding Vietnamese ships from Hong Kong that it claimed were carrying goods to Vietnam that would be smuggled into southern China.29 Vietnam could do little but make verbal protests. Discussions on border issues that began in Hanoi in September and continued in Beijing in October quickly stalled. How did the Vietnamese assess these developments? According to a confidential report to the National Assembly by Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam in September 1992: China desires to become one of the pivotal countries in the future. China is adopting a flexible foreign policy in order to become a superpower in the Asian-Pacific region by taking advantage of economic, military, scientific and technical weaknesses in the region, thus creating an image of China which can be judged by international standards—a China which is ready to establish cordial


relationships with other countries, a China worthy of its position as a member of the UN Security Council. China has liberalized its foreign policies targeting in particular the United States and Western Europe. It will avoid confrontation with the US except in the direct interests of China. The above remarks were taken from the general overview section of the minister’s report covering ‘the world situation’. Later, in the section dealing with bilateral relations, the Foreign Minister stated: Since early 1992, normal relations have been restored with China after thirteen years of confrontation. However, we have to deal with complications in this relationship because of Chinese incursions into our territory and the agreements signed between our two countries in November 1991. In these circumstances, we have continued to advocate a solution to the problems through peaceful negotiation in order to gradually improve our relations with China. We have endeavoured to maintain our relations with China but at the same time to defend our sovereignty and integrity. However, this has been long and complicated process. At the conclusion of his report, Foreign Minister Cam listed fourteen priority tasks. First among them was ‘to find solutions through peaceful negotiation to the problems in Sino-Vietnamese relations, but at the same time to promote co-operation between the two countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit’.30 The next opportunity to negotiate with the Chinese came at year’s end with the visit of Premier Li Peng, the first by a Chinese premier in twenty-one years. China used the visit of Premier Li Peng (30 November—4 December 1992) to Vietnam to allay suspicions in the region about its actions in the South China Sea. In the lead up to the visit, for example, China withdrew its drilling rig from disputed waters in the Gulf of Tonkin and began releasing impounded Vietnamese cargo ships. Li Peng, on arrival in Hanoi, during his stay, and at his final press conference, repeated the incantation that ‘China will never seek hegemony nor practice expansionism and at the same time it is opposed to hegemonism and power politics of all descriptions’.31 Chinese officials also portrayed Li Peng’s trip to Vietnam as one primarily concerned with trade and commercial relations, and downplayed expectations that an agreement would be reached on


territorial disputes. Both premiers agreed, however, that before the issue of territorial disputes could be solved it was necessary to reach agreement on the general principles that would guide such a settlement. This was left for later discussion. Both sides also agreed to upgrade and accelerate their bilateral dialogue on territorial matters by initiating senior-level discussions in addition to the on-going expert-level talks. Discussions on delineating the land border revealed no major differences. With respect to the Gulf of Tonkin, it was agreed to hold talks on boundary delimitation and, until final agreement was reached, to refrain from conducting development activities in the disputed area. Clear differences emerged over the question of the Spratly Islands. China strongly opposed the internationalisation of this issue. Li Peng proposed instead that it be put aside in favour of the joint exploration of disputed maritime territory. Vietnam, for its part, pressed for the settlement of outstanding questions left by history, and questions that had ‘newly arisen’. According to Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam: ‘Tu Chinh (the concession area China awarded to the Crestone Corporation) is neither a disputed area nor an outstanding problem left by history but a problem arising newly after the normalisation of relations’.32 The Chinese offer of joint exploration was therefore not acceptable to Vietnam. At his final news conference, Premier Li Peng provided an optimistic assessment of his visit. He said that a consensus had been reached that peaceful means would be used to settle disputes, and that neither side would resort to force, or the threat of force. Also, until a settlement was reached, neither side would let the disputes stand in the way of the development of bilateral relations. He stressed that ‘these two points are of great significance’, and although there are some differences ‘we have reduced and narrowed these rather than expand[ed] them… There are more points of convergence than difference between China and Vietnam’. Cam expressed Vietnam’s disappointment in brief but blunt words: ‘Premier Li Peng has stated his views in our discussions. We took note of the statements. It is our hope that it will be translated into reality’.33 In October 1993, China and Vietnam signed an Agreement on Basic Principles for the Settlement of Border Territory Issues that served as the framework for discussions on bilateral territorial disputes.34 Immediately after Li Peng’s return, China hosted a visit by Vietnam’s Minister for National Defence General Doan Khue. While in Beijing he met not only his PLA counterpart but also CCP Secretary General Jiang Zemin. General Khue’s visit highlighted the important role played by


senior military leaders in developing ties with China. In late 1992, according to a former party official, the VCP Central Committee: redefined…[Vietnam’s] foreign policy in a secret resolution that categorises Vietnam’s relations with various countries according to a list of priorities. In the first category were China, Cuba and North Korea…since they are all considered to be Marxist-Leninist states.35 The events in the South China Sea in 1992 aroused the concern of regional states (Beijing was even accused of being a regional bully). On 22 July the ASEAN foreign ministers, meeting in Manila, issued a statement of concern on the South China Sea which called on unnamed parties to the conflict to exercise restraint. The ASEAN statement was clearly aimed at China, and it was issued just after Vietnam had acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Concord. According to a Japanese scholar: Convinced that the China threat is real, but anxious to avoid hostilities, Vietnam is…trying to draw closer to ASEAN, which shares Vietnam’s concerns about ambitions in the Spratly Islands. China, it is argued, would hesitate to attack the islands of an ASEAN-related Vietnam, since such an attack would antagonize the other countries of ASEAN, which China looks on…as potential allies in its struggle with the big countries in the Asia-Pacific region.36 Vietnam’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea were now reinforced by economic measures such as the development of infrastructure and the encouragement of commercial activities. According to a Vietnamese political source: We have a lot of islands, but up to now they haven’t been occupied. We had sovereignty in principle but no people. That left open the opportunity for them to be occupied by others. Now our policy is to have a presence on all of them. Not a military presence—we don’t want to shock the Chinese. Economic means are more subtle.37 Nevertheless, both China and Vietnam scrambled to occupy as many of the unoccupied features in the South China Sea as they could. These features were then garrisoned and fortified in 1992–1993.38 After the ‘scramble for the Spratlys’, contention between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea has been lowered considerably but not ended completely. In May 1993 the two sides became embroiled in a


dispute over the intrusion of a Chinese drilling rig into what Vietnam claimed were its territorial waters. This incident occurred on the eve of a visit by China’s Defence Minister, General Chi Haotian. The rig was withdrawn prior to the minister’s visit. In early 1995, Chinese occupied and fortified Mischief Reef in waters claimed by the Philippines. This prompted party Secretary General Do Muoi, in a speech to the naval college in Haiphong in May 1995, to call for the modernisation of the navy so it could protect Vietnam’s ‘sovereignty, national interests and natural marine resources’. 39 In March 1997 another flare-up occurred when a Chinese oil rig began drilling on the Vietnamese continental shelf less than 65 nautical miles from Vietnam’s coastline. On his occasion Vietnam not only protested to China diplomatically, but it played its ‘ASEAN card’ as well. Vietnam took a relatively strong stance in public. One official was quoted as stating that, ‘this action has added another example that the Chinese expansionist policy has remained unchanged’.40 Vietnam’s diplomatic protest called for the withdrawal of the rig and discussions on disputed maritime claims. In the midst of this dispute, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry took the unprecedented step of calling in all ASEAN ambassadors to put Vietnam’s case. Basically Vietnam tried to convince other ASEAN members that ‘if China behaves this way to Vietnam, it could behave the same way towards [them]’.41 On 7 April the rig was withdrawn. According to Wurfel: The Vietnamese press, however, barely mentioned this apparent diplomatic victory. There was a reason for their reticence; they had boldly played the ASEAN card and wanted to avoid antagonizing China further by gloating over their success. This marked a new stage in Sino-Vietnamese, and in ASEAN-Vietnamese relations.42 Vietnam’s national security concerns regarding the South China Sea were made explicit in a defence white paper issued in 1998.43 According to this document, ‘there still reside potentially destabilising situations, among them disputes in the East Sea of Vietnam, which contains a latent danger of conflict’.44 Thisconcern was reiterated elsewhere in the document: ‘[disputes on the question of borders, land and maritime territories, particularly the disputes over the East Sea, have greatly affected the security and vital interests of Vietnam’.45 Finally, the white paper stated:


At present, Vietnam is facing problems of territorial sovereignty, the boundaries of its EEZ and continental shelf which should be settled with the neighbouring countries. The maritime space and islands of Vietnam in the East Sea, including the Paracels and the Spratleys [sic], are an integral part of the nation. They lie within the nation’s territorial boundaries founded for millennia now…46 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the evolution of SinoVietnamese political and economic relations in greater detail. Li Peng’s 1992 visit set the seal on the development of amicable bilateral relations. In February 1999, the CCP and VCP secretaries general signed an agreement on the framework for long-term bilateral co-operation, including the annual exchange of high-level visits. At the end of 1999, China and Vietnam reached an agreement on their land border. A year later both sides signed an agreement demarcating disputed maritime territory in the Gulf of Tonkin. Talks on the South China Sea are continuing. Vietnam’s realist school does not oppose the development of relations with China. It advocates instead that Vietnam should pursue an omnidirectional foreign policy and seek good relations with all countries. In their view, this is the best guarantee of Vietnam’s security. They believe priority should be accorded to developing balanced regional relations. In early 2001, in the lead up to the ninth national congress of the VCP, the stewardship of incumbent secretary general Le Kha Phieu came under attack. One of the issues leading to his replacement was the charge he ‘leaned too much towards China’ at the expense of Vietnam’s other relations, and that he ‘gave away’ too much in negotiations on territorial disputes. Internal party tensions emerged in February during the visit to Hanoi by China’s Defence Minister Chi Haotian. On the very day that Chi met with Secretary General Phieu, the Saigon Giai Phong newspaper, which is the organ of the VCP in the south, reported that top officials, military commanders and border guards were meeting in Binh Thuan province to discuss the defence of the Spratly Islands at the behest of the Central Committee’s Ideology and Culture Commission. The newspaper revealed for the first time that Vietnamese naval patrols reported nearly three hundred violations of Vietnamese territorial sovereignty in its East Sea during the previous year, and that Vietnam occupied thirty-two features in the South China Sea. It had been previously estimated that Vietnam occupied only twenty features. These territorial violations included


Table 13.1 Exchange of High-Level Military Delegations Between China & Vietnam, 1991– 2000

intrusions by fishing boats as well as oil and gas exploration, and exploitation activities on Vietnam’s continental shelf. The newspaper


then quoted the meeting as resolving that local government administrative structures should be set up on Vietnamese-occupied features, and that Vietnamese naval commanders had vowed to defend ‘every metre’ of Vietnam’s sea border.47 Conclusion: ‘The China Threat’ The events of the past decade, since normalisation in 1991, indicate that Vietnam and China have managed to overcome existing irritants and to codify their bilateral relations in a long-term co-operative framework


agreement. There has been a convergence of interests as both Vietnam and China have broadened and enhanced bilateral economic and commercial co-operation. They also have much in common as both are socialist systems facing similar problems in the transition to marketorientated economies. Both need a stable and peaceful external environment in which to carry out their domestic reform programmes and open to the outside world. There are at least two contending schools of thought within the Vietnamese leadership about how Vietnam should manage its relations with China. One group, centred on the military, but including ideological party conservatives, advocates going beyond mere normalisation and developing close military and security ties. The military, in particular, has pursued its own discussions with their Chinese counterparts (see Table 13.1 above). Party officials who form part of Vietnam’s pro-China lobby have also moved strenuously to develop wide-ranging bilateral linkages. This was particularly the case during the tenure of party Secretary General Le Kha Phieu (December 1997—April 2001). There is an ambivalence within Vietnamese policy-making circles about how to manage relations with China. Vietnam has sought to develop a comprehensive relationship with its northern neighbour while standing firm, just short of confrontation, on sovereignty issues. Given the disparities of power and the ‘tyranny of geography’, Vietnam has eschewed pursuing the path of confrontation or dependency. Instead, Vietnam has been sensitive to the nuances of China’s regional and global status. Priority is placed on developing breadth and depth in the bilateral relationship, with special attention given to economic relations, while at the same time balancing this relationship by developing ties with other regional states. The rationale behind this strategy was explained by a foreign ministry official in this way: Sino-Vietnamese relations will be meshed within the much larger regional network of interlocking economic and political interests. It is an arrangement whereby anybody wanting to violate Vietnam’s sovereignty would be violating the interests of other countries as well. This is the ideal strategic option for Vietnam. It is also the most practical.48 The problem confronting Vietnamese security managers is how to reach accommodation with their northern neighbour without provoking confrontation or reverting to a tributary-type relationship. One foreign


ministry official argued to the author that Vietnam had the following options: There are three possible ways of organising our relations with China: (1) confrontation (2) satellite status similar to North Korea or (3) a median position between the two. Satellite status provides no guarantees. North Korea was sacrificed by China when it turned to South Korea. Also, even if Vietnam were to be a good satellite, China would not leave us alone. They will always pressure us and try to dominate Southeast Asia. We tried for a full year to forge new relations with China but we failed. Take its occupation of Bay Tu Chinh and the Crestone affair. Okay, we distrusted China but it was only with Bay Tu Chinh that we understood that China follows its national interest. That game is in the nature of international politics.49 In Hanoi’s view, membership in ASEAN would transform a bilateral problem into a multilateral one between China and ASEAN as a group. What public Vietnamese sources do not reveal is that China’s occupation of features in the South China Sea in 1992 also precipitated a review not only of Chinese intentions but Vietnamese capabilities to meet a ‘China threat’ in the ‘Eastern Sea’. Since 1992 Vietnam has given priority to modernising its navy and air force; but given its limited financial resources its efforts have been modest by regional standards.50 The central argument of this chapter is that Vietnamese perceptions of a ‘China threat’ are based on more than two thousand years of historical interaction with its northern neighbour. Throughout this period China has always been the dominant power with the capability of attacking Vietnam. Vietnam’s ‘strategic culture’ dictates the maintenance of good political relations with China while maintaining a credible military deterrence. This means imposing unacceptable costs on a would-be aggressor. Vietnam has always tried to accommodate China while maintaining its independence and freedom of action. When China has resorted to military action, Vietnam has met this challenge successfully. Vietnam, therefore, has a less alarmist and more nuanced view of the socalled ‘China threat’ than Western powers because it does not perceive a rising China as a new phenomenon. Vietnamese national security officials must assess both Chinese capabilities and intentions. Today they are confident that they can meet a Chinese military threat along their land border, but are most concerned about matching Chinese military capabilities in the South China Sea. This


poses new challenges that the Vietnamese have tried to meet through strengthening multilateral ties with ASEAN and modernising their navy and air force. Vietnamese national security policy and diplomacy are also aimed at influencing Chinese intentions. Therefore, Vietnam conducts its external relations in a manner that minimises any pretext for armed conflict with China. However, as a Vietnamese analyst has pointed out: Vietnamese history shows that one-sided relations have led to political isolation and economic difficulties… Therefore, Vietnam’s ASEAN membership should be achieved in a way that would strengthen instead of harm Vietnam’s relations with China.51 In other words, although it may seek to balance Chinese influence by developing relations with ASEAN members, the US, Japan and Western Europe, Vietnam assiduously avoids giving the impression that these external relations are part of an effort to contain China. Notes 1 For Chinese commentary on the ‘China threat’ see: Huai Chengbo, “Behind the fear of a ‘China threat’”, Beijing Review 36, no 6 (March 1–7 1993), p. 10; Su Huimin, “View of a ‘China threat’ groundless”, Beijing Review 36, no. 21 (May 24–30 1993), pp. 10–11; “’China Threat’ fallacy refuted”, Beijing Review 38, no. 40 (October 2–8 1995), pp. 6–7; Zou Hanru, “‘China threat’ theory refuted”, China Daily, 25 December 1995; Ren Xin, “‘China threat’ theory untenable”, Beijing Review 39, no. 6 (January 29-February 4 1996), pp.10–11; Da Jun, “True threat comes from those trumpeting ‘China threat’”, Beijing Review 39, no. 46 (November 11–17 1996), pp. 7–8; and Wang Zhongren, “‘China threat’ theory groundless”, Beijing Review 40, no. 28 (July 14–20 1997), pp. 7–8. For two Western assessments see Denny Roy, “The ‘China Threat’ Issue: Major Arguments”, Asian Survey XXXVI, no. 8 (August 1996), pp. 758–771. and Paul Mann, “Hyping China Threat is Reckless Policy”, Aviation Week & Space Technology 147, no. 25 (December 22–29 1997), p. 97. 2 David Wurfel, “Between China and ASEAN: The Dialectics of Recent Vietnamese Foreign Policy”, in Carlyle A.Thayer and Ramses Amer (eds.), Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), p. 153. 3 For a recent review of Chinese assistance to Vietnam see Qiang Zhai, China & The Vietnam Wars. 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000). For an overview of Sino-Vietnamese relations in the period immediately after partition see Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956–1962 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1997).


4 Keith W.Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983). 5 For a discussion comparing the Ching and Nguyen dynasties, see Alexander B.Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 6 The Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are excluded from the list of Asian socialist countries (see note 31 below). For a discussion of parallel interests see Wurfel, “Between China and ASEAN”, pp.153–155 and Li Ma, “China and Vietnam: Coping with the Threat of Peaceful Evolution”, in Thayer and Amer, Vietnamese Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 44–67. 7 William J.Duiker, China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict, Indochina Research Monograph 1 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986), pp. 1–5. 8 Greg Lockhart, Nation In Arms: The Origins of the People’s Army of Vietnam. ASAA Southeast Asia Publications Series 17 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989), pp. 64–73 and pp. 273–274. 9 Stephen J.Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 134–136. 10 Carlyle A.Thayer, “Vietnamese Perspectives on International Security: Three Revolutionary Currents”, in Donald H.McMillen (ed.), Asian Perspectives on International Security (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), pp. 57–76. 11 Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, op. cit. 12 King C.Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1987). 13 Ramses Amer The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Sino-Vietnamese Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Forum Publishers, 1991). 14 This was a particularly salient issue during the Gang of Four period. At that time, China pressured Vietnam to join with it to condemn ‘international hegemonism’ (a code word for the Soviet Union) and to endorse ‘Chairman Mao’s Theory of the Three Worlds’, which accused the Soviet Union of colluding with US imperialism. 15 Bao Cao Chinh Tri cua Ban Chap Hanh Trung uong Dang tai Dai Hoi Dai Bieu Toan Quoc Lan Thu Nam’, Nhan Dan, March 28–29 1982, pp. 2–7 and 3–6, respectively. 16 Carlyle A.Thayer, “Vietnam’s Strategic Readjustment”, in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth (eds.), China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 185–201. 17 Carlyle A.Thayer “Comrade Plus Brother: The New Sino-Vietnamese Relations”, The Pacific Review 5, no. 4 (September 1992), pp.402–406. 18 In September 1990, at the behest of Vietnam’s ‘pro-China lobby’, Vietnam broached the idea of a shotgun marriage between the Heng Samrin-Hun Sen regime in Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge (i.e., the so-called ‘red solution’). Agence France Presse dispatch from Phnom Penh, 27 October 1990. See also Richard H.Solomon, Exiting Indochina: U.S. Leadership of the


19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42

Cambodia Settlement &. Normalization with Vietnam (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), p. 102. Cuong Linh Xay Dung Chu Nghia Xa Hoi Trong Thoi Ky Qua Do (Du Thao),” Nhan Dan, 1 December 1990, p. 3. Wurfel, “Between China and ASEAN”, op. cit., p. 150. Carlyle A.Thayer, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest,” Asian Survey 34, no. 6, (June 1994), p. 520. Author’s discussion with Vietnamese foreign ministry official, Singapore, October 1992. Based on discussions in Hanoi in May 1993. The labels ‘pro-China lobby’ and ‘realist’ are the author’s and illustrative, not definitive. They are not necessarily opposing concepts. Andrew Sherry, Agence France-Presse (AFP), Hanoi, 26 July 1992. According to Vietnamese sources, this was the eighth islet to be occupied by China since 1988. Wurfel, “Between China and ASEAN”, op. cit., p. 151. Nguyen Hong Thach, “Vietnam-China ties: a new but not easy era”, Business Times [Singapore], 31 December 1992. Murray Hiebert, “Unhealed wounds”, Far Eastern Economic Review”, 16 July 1992. Nguyen Hong Thach, “Vietnam-China ties: a new but not easy era,” op. cit. The figures on the number of ships vary from 14 to 20; see Reuters, Hanoi, 31 March 1993. Nguyen Manh Cam, “Bao Cao ve Tinh Hinh The Gioi, Cong Tac Doi Ngoai 9 Thang Nam 1992 va Phuong Huong Cong Tac Thoi Gian Toi,” Hanoi, 17 September 1992. A copy of the typescript of this speech, marked confidential, was provided to the author. Quoted in AFP, Business Times [Singapore], 2 December 1992. Quoted in Carlyle A.Thayer, “Vietnam: Coping with China,” in Daljit Singh (ed.), Southeast Asian Affairs 1994 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994). p. 360. Ibid., p. 361. Ibid., p. 362. Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh: The Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel (London: Hurst & Company Publishers, 1995), 191. Note that North Korea is included but Laos is excluded from this list; see note 7 above. Tatsumi Okabe, “Coping with China”, in James W.Morley and Mashihara Nishihara, eds., Vietnam Joins the World (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1997), p. 129. AFP, Hanoi, 27 October 1993. For aerial reconnaissance photographs of Chinese-occupied features in the South China Sea see Richard Fisher, Heritage Foundation Special Report: China’s Expansion in the Spratly Islands at http://www.heritage.org/ asiaoffice/spratly/. Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 29 May 1995. Vietnam Investment Review, 31 March 1997. Quoted in Far Easter Economic Review, 3 April 1997, p. 14. Wurfel, “Between China and ASEAN: The Dialectics of Recent Vietnamese Foreign Policy”, op. cit., p. 156.


43 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam: Consolidating National Defence, Safeguarding the Homeland (Hanoi: Ministry of Defence, 1998). 44 Ibid, p. 8. 45 Ibid., p. 14. 46 Ibid., p. 18. 47 Quoted in Carlyle A.Thayer, “China and Southeast Asia: Regional Rivalries and Bilateral Irritants,” Comparative Connections: An EJournal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific ForumCSIS), 3, no. 1, 1st Quarter, April 2001, p.59. 48 Nguyen Hong Thach, “Vietnam-China ties: a new but not easy era.” 49 Confidential, off-the-record interview, Hanoi, May 1993. 50 Carlyle A.Thayer, “Force Modernization: The Case of the Vietnam People’s Army”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 19, no. 1 (June 1997), pp. 1–28. 51 Hoang Anh Tuan, “Why Hasn’t Vietnam Gained ASEAN Membership”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 15, no. 3 (December 1993), pp. 288–289.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN The China Threat: A View From India C.V.Ranganathan

Introduction Considered from the perspective of the Indian experience of relations with China over the past fifty years, it is necessary in the new millennium to break out of a historical pattern in which both the Chinese and Indians have unilaterally projected either their best hopes or their worst fears upon the complex and mixed realities of both countries. Changing mindsets inured in sentiments of humiliation on one side or hurt feelings on the other are unhelpful in reaching objective conclusions that promote Sino-Indian relations in the best national interests of the two countries. India and China need to boldly face certain inherited challenges, while accelerating the realisation of the inherent potential in their relationship. Viewed in this light, it would be more productive for both India and China to focus on the content of desirable policies to be pursued in some issue-areas present in the relationship than using iconic and, in some cases, potentially inflammatory labels that some strategists feel exhaustively describe the nature of Sino-Indian relations. This approach would befit the management of relations between the two largest civilisations in Asia, who are also geographical neighbours and the world’s two biggest population complexes. The two countries share more similarities and transitional problems than any other neighbouring countries as they learn to cope with globalisation. This chapter looks at significant issue-areas in Sino-Indian relations before going on to examine the broader geo-political and strategic context in which both countries find themselves. Finally, this chapter proposes, from a purely non-official viewpoint, a joint Sino-Indian approach to comprehensive security and confidence building that would greatly ameliorate real or imagined threat perceptions.

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The Sino-Indian Boundary Question Among the long-standing challenges to the ingenuity of decision makers in India and China is that of disputed territory. India is in full administrative and military control over the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims. China is in possession of north-eastern Ladakh (Aksaichin), which India claims. In the collective sub-conscious of the people of both countries, and more particularly amongst political leaders and the armed forces, boundary disputes play a prominent role, inhibiting the creation of trust and confidence. These elements of trust and confidence are very necessary if the two countries are to move from a situation of non-adversarial but thinly substantive relations to those where significant vested interests are built up in both countries, thereby propelling the overall relationship forward. With the perspective of distance from unpleasant events that took place from 1959 to the early 1970s, it should be possible to take a more objective look at the past. Neither India nor China can claim to have castiron cases to the territories claimed and shown on their official maps (in the case of India on the official maps released from the mid 1950s). Neither the leaders of India nor of China in the early 1950s were completely candid with each other, when there was sufficient evidence to show that the borders as depicted on each other’s maps revealed areas of dispute. This was particularly surprising given the bonhomie and mutual support given to each other over a host of international issues at the time. Neither side consulted nor informed the other over actions taken in the other’s claimed territory that affected the latter’s interests. The assumptions by the then leaders of the two countries that understanding and co-operation over the wider issues of the emergence of a new AfroAsian order following the retreat of colonialism, and that each one’s national experience of overcoming centuries of political humiliation would provide the building-blocks of Sino-Indian and Afro-Asian solidarity, were belied by events surrounding Tibet and the differences on the boundary question. On the Indian side, the nature of its parliamentary democracy led to fractious debates when Chinese Communist forces entered Tibet in 1949. Much of the debate hinged on factually erroneous arguments based on the status of Tibet and the ideological aversion to the rise of a big neighbouring country which was led by a Communist party. The same spirit of acrimonious debate in the Indian parliament was to continue from 1959 to 1962, when the situation in Tibet deteriorated and when border clashes erupted. Although Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, enjoyed overwhelming support, he was acutely sensitive

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to domestic opposition to his China policy. On the Chinese side, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, at least from the late 1950s, the relationship between China and India was increasingly viewed through the prism of the widening ideological and inter-state disputes between China and the USSR. To teach India a lesson seemed to serve Mao’s purpose vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The discovery by Indian patrols of the Chinese-built road through Aksai Chin in Ladakh, the emergence of wide differences over the boundary issue in correspondence between foreign ministers and in letters exchanged between Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the flight of the Dalai Lama and his followers to India in early 1959, and bloody incidents along the boundary, led to a worsening of relations. Unfortunately, the opportunity for high-level negotiations to stem the adverse tide in 1960 when Premier Zhou Enlai visited India was not availed by Nehru because of opposition within his cabinet and in parliament. Many books and articles have appeared on the subject of the SinoIndian Conflict of 1962. Most of them come to the conclusion that the boundary dispute provided the proximate occasion for the brief armed conflict although the reasons for the deterioration of relations between India and China lay elsewhere. Some of these had to do with the two leaderships’ views of the evolving international order during the Cold War, their respective assessments of their roles, the domestic situation in each country, and the overall tragic misperceptions of each other’s policies and intentions.1 Suffice it to note here that such negative circumstances have almost vanished with the end of the Cold War, with the advent of a new generation of leaders, and with economic and social growth for the vast populations of India and China requiring the imperative of a peaceful neighbourhood for both countries. Since the 1962 border clash a greater measure of pragmatism has marked relations between India and China. The first step in this direction was a gradual shift away from the unproductive Indian stand that negotiations on the boundary could only take place once the Chinese had withdrawn from Ladakh, or that since borders depicted on Indian maps had a firm basis in earlier historical treaties there was no need for comprehensive negotiations. This happened in 1979 when the then Minister of External Affairs Shri A.B.Vajpayee visited China. The adversarial or sometimes even hostile relations between India and China during the period of the Cultural Revolution (1965–1975) or during armed conflicts between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 where the Chinese stood on Pakistan’s side, were not conflated in India with the


existence of a real military threat from China, thus making that visit possible. By the 1980s, the leaders of both governments wisely came to the conclusion that all-round bilateral relations between the two countries should be encouraged, pending the solution of the boundary dispute. The visit of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988 proved to be a landmark in this context, and it has set the norms for recent improvements in relations. Successive coalition governments in India have broadly adhered to the understandings reached during that visit. A status quo whereby India and China are in control and administer areas seen as vital to them in Arunachal Pradesh and in Ladakh respectively has been in place over the last few decades. Neither side has mounted serious armed challenges to the prevalence of this status quo, with a few exceptions in the mid 1980s over pockets in Arunachal Pradesh. There is broad agreement between the two governments on the general principles that should govern an eventual boundary agreement. These are that the settlement of the boundary question should be through peaceful and friendly consultations, and that both sides should create a favourable climate and conditions for a fair and reasonable solution. They also agree that the development of relations in all fields would be a contribution to the creation of such favourable conditions. Since force has been ruled out as a way of resolving the boundary dispute, both sides have repeatedly stressed the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LOAC), which emerged from the 1962 border conflict, pending an eventual agreement. Lastly, both sides agree that a solution to the boundary question should be acceptable to the peoples of both sides. Above all not a shot has been fired in anger along the boundary for more than two decades. Given the Indian system of a multi-party parliamentary democracy, any settlement of the boundary dispute with China involving territorial concessions, would need a consensus within and outside the parliament. The task of forging such a consensus and the need to win public support remains to be undertaken by the ruling party or parties in India. Fortunately, the maturity that has marked Sino-Indian relations, since the exchange of visits by the premiers of both countries and the presidents, and since 1988, has paved the way for arrangements by which the interim status-quo along the LOAC in the three sectors of the boundary can be stabilised to each country’s satisfaction. The Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas signed in 1993

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when former Prime Minister Rao visited China, and the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas signed in 1996 when President Jiang Zemin visited India, together commit the two sides to implement a series of measures that will ensure military stability in all sectors of the India-China border. There are some sections where perceptions on where the LOAC runs differ between the two sides. Hence it is necessary to have a mutually agreed definition of the line in those areas. The exchange of maps that depict each side’s perception of where the LOAC lies, and the use of data that is based on new scientific surveys from satellite imagery and remote sensing, would go a long way towards arriving at a mutual settlement. A realistic, rather than exaggerated, perspective on pockets vital to each side’s defence would inform negotiations on this matter. Since both agreements clearly lay down that the implementation is to be without prejudice to the position of each side on the boundary dispute, a constructive and imaginative interpretation of all the provisions in the two agreements would greatly contribute to the formal military stabilisation of the situation along the border areas. The recent exchange of maps on the Middle Sector, where the mutual perception is that it is the area of least dispute on the LOAC, is a good beginning. One does see reports in Indian newspapers of Chinese movements and strengthening of logistic capacities along the boundary. To a certain extent such actions can be anticipated prior to the process of serious negotiations on the LOAC, which have apparently begun. However, these would be more worrying if they took place in those areas where there are no differences between the two sides on the LOAC. Early agreement on the Middle Sector would enhance trust and confidence in each other with respect to the other two sectors. The end product of agreements on all sectors of the LOAC would have a beneficial spin-off in political terms on the conduct of the overall relationship and the build-up of trust and confidence in intentions with those sectors of the strategic establishment, where this is most needed. It is a very welcome sign that exchanges between the armed forces of both sides have resumed after the pause in 1998–1999. Indian naval ships have been received in China, and military personnel exchanges at various levels are taking place or are planned. Such exchanges will go a long way towards creating mutual confidence, the understanding of military doctrines, transparency, and the exchange of technical experience


amongst the armed forces, who have lacked direct contact over the decades. The India-China-Pakistan Triangle The overall relationship between China and Pakistan, and China’s support for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missile development programme, are matters of concern to India. This is understandable since in their origin the rationale for the development of these relations was India-centred. The conduct of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 added an extra difficult dimension to the triangular relationship. Chinese spokesmen, both official and non-official, have in recent times often referred to a readjustment in Sino-Pakistan relations subsequent to the end of the Cold War, the diminution of India’s links with the erstwhile Soviet Union, and China’s collaboration with the United States in containing the former USSR. A practical manifestation of this readjustment can be seen in China’s acknowledgement of India’s predominance in South Asia since the late 1980s. China’s strong verbal support to the success of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and its evolving attitude to the Kashmir dispute are other signs of this readjustment. In the way things have developed with the ‘Talibanisation’ of Afghanistan and its spread to Pakistan, the Chinese face a complex situation that has an impact on China’s sensitive western region of Xinjiang, which has borders with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Afghanistan.2 Chinese interests would thus need to take into account a variety of factors in maintaining an overall balance in the conduct of relations with both Pakistan and India. China would not like to see a situation of permanent armed hostility between India and Pakistan, worse still actual conflicts such as the one over Kargil, where Beijing is called upon to take sides. An internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute would affect China and promote, as it fears, Western and particularly American intervention on the PRC’s periphery. Western-led intervention over Iraq and Kosovo has left China very uncomfortable. The events in Kargil further showed a big accretion of American pressure on Pakistan that is bound to continue in the light of the nuclearisation of the sub-continent. China is also acutely aware of the threats posed to the Muslim majority in Xinjiang Province by the spread of armed terrorism, narcotics and religious fundamentalism to the sensitive social and political fabric. Its serious concern with such problems is manifested by the successive declarations on co-operation to

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prevent terrorism and fundamentalist militancy between China, Russia and some Central Asian states. These have been followed up by a series of meetings between India and China in this regard. China’s support to the Indian proposal to move the United Nations for a resolution on terrorism, a subject raised by the president of India during his visit to China, is a pointer in this direction. In the light of the above factors, China’s present position on the Kashmir dispute has imperceptibly moved closer to the position adopted by the major powers. China sees it as a dispute ‘left over by history’, and one that cannot be resolved by quick-fix solutions. The Chinese view is that only India and Pakistan can settle it through bilateral dialogue without recourse to the use of force. Pending the solution of the dispute, China advises India and Pakistan to respect the LOAC. To leave differences aside and to seek mutually beneficial relations in all fields, was advice given openly in the Pakistan Senate by President Jiang Zemin in 1996 and repeated on subsequent occasions.3 China’s assistance to Pakistan to develop nuclear and missile technology, in addition to being Islamabad’s biggest supplier of conventional military weapons, is an obstacle to building trust between the PRC and India. Chinese statements on helping Pakistan develop nonconventional weaponry have been ambivalent and of a generalised nature. In an interview with The Hindu in July 2000, the Chinese foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan, when asked whether China would reconsider support to Pakistan in non-conventional areas, replied: ‘China and Pakistan enjoy normal relations between sovereign countries including relations of military trade, which conform to international law and norms. Their relations are just like the relations India enjoys with some other countries’.4 The reference to ‘international law and norms’ is to China’s adherence to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) from 1992, and very recently to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In the only joint statement by China and the United States on South Asia, issued when President Bill Clinton visited China a month after the India-Pakistan nuclear tests in June 1998, the two countries called upon India and Pakistan not to develop and deploy further nuclear weapons, and to put a cap on producing fissile materials. In addition both reaffirmed that ‘their respective policies are to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons’, and significantly ‘…to this end, we will strengthen our national export control systems’. Since both


the United States and China have, together with the other three permanent members of the UN Security Council, taken on the mantle of enforcers of the NPT it becomes incumbent on the two to strictly supervise mutual adherence to the terms of the joint statement in the interests of achieving better Indo-US and India-China relations. The peace, security and stability that the Chinese say they seek in South Asia would be jeopardised should China’s assistance to Pakistan be intensified in the non-conventional and conventional military fields. The triangular relationship between India, China and Pakistan is interestingly poised, and opportunities have been opened up for the management of this delicate triangle to the benefit of all three. China needs to demonstrate its credibility to various Indian circles that there has indeed been a readjustment in its relations with India’s neighbours, marked by a realistic restraint and responsibility appropriate to a great power. Pakistan needs to avail constructively of the trend towards comprehensive dialogue that has been opened up by Indian initiatives on Kashmir and contribute towards the creation of the peaceful environment that would facilitate the dialogue. India needs to press forward with the initiatives without being discouraged by setbacks, and must avoid single-issue linkages in the pursuit of a better relationship with China, which is in its best interests. It must be realised that in practice China is neither going to dilute its political relationship with Pakistan for the sake of Sino-Indian friendship nor allow all of its actions vis-à-vis Pakistan to be detrimental to the conduct of Sino-Indian relations. Looking beyond the question of nuclear weapons proliferation on the sub-continent and elsewhere, there is much that is common in Indian and Chinese views on the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In 1996, China put forward proposals at the UN calling for drastic reductions of stockpiles on the part of the largest holders of nuclear weapons; a ‘no first use’ commitment by all states; an unconditional commitment of no use or threat to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states; no deployment outside one’s own country; and negotiations for the complete destruction of nuclear weapons. India could agree with all these propositions. If the moral high ground is to be captured by both India and China on questions related to nuclear weapons then they should work together in all international fora to attain these objectives. In addition, India and China are the only two states with nuclear capability to have committed themselves to respecting the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) promoted by the

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Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is hoped that the setting-up of a security dialogue forum, which was agreed to when India’s External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh visited China in 1999, will take up such issues to build mutual assurance that nuclearisation will not be a factor of added tension on the subcontinent. Incidentally, this visit also laid to rest the ‘hurt feelings’ to which official and non-official Chinese statements gave much expression in 1998, when India conducted a series of nuclear tests. Statements attributed to India’s defence minister, George Fernandes, referred to the ‘threat’ posed by China before the nuclear tests, and India’s prime minister, A.B. Vajpayee, wrote to President Clinton rationalising the tests on account of the unresolved boundary dispute and China’s military assistance to Pakistan. Jaswant Singh publicly assuaged these ‘hurt feelings’ by declaring that India did not feel militarily threatened by China. A more normal management of bilateral relations after a year’s hiatus then resumed. Unofficial Chinese spokesmen have clarified to their Indian interlocutors that Chinese discomfort with India’s nuclear posture has less to do with its tests per se but more with the manner in which China was officially dragged into the picture. Sino-Indian Relations and the Influence of Major Powers As seen from India, China’s relations with major powers such as the United States, those of Western Europe, and Japan are stable, although by no means friction-free. With America, the biggest difference is over the future of Taiwan, which refuses to re-unify with the PRC on the latter’s terms and looks to America for political and military support in case China uses force. The Chinese will no doubt watch with great care whether US president George W.Bush follows through with his very affirmative statement on China and Taiwan made during the run-up to the election. It is not a coincidence that the white paper on defence issued by China in 2000 bears a strong contrast to the one issued in 1999, and contains more adverse than friendly references to the United States. The difference can be explained primarily by the Taiwan issue, National Missile Defence (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). American plans for NMD and the possible deployment of a TMD system in Taiwan have drawn forth very strong responses from China (and from Russia), as the implementation of such plans would nullify China’s capabilities. President Clinton’s move to leave final decisions on the matter to his


successor-in-office was welcomed by China, but whether the issue will revive once again remains to be seen. Its specific implications for other regions need to be carefully evaluated. Human rights, trade, the situation in Tibet, and missile proliferation are other issues that the United States has on its agenda vis-à-vis China. In general terms, there is a complex mix of conflicting policy approaches in both China and the United States in the conduct of their mutual relations. From America’s point of view the adjustment to the diffusion of power, which the rise of China implies for America’s global interests, is yet to be worked out. While America’s primacy is keenly felt, its power to fashion a world order in its image is diminishing. From China’s point of view, America’s unilateralist approaches or attempts at shaping multilateral institutions, which affect China’s nationalist aspirations, have to be balanced by its overwhelming interest in beneficial trade, investment and economic relations with the United States. Indeed, the challenge to the entire international community is how to evolve multilateral norms and arrangements, or develop institutions that will better manage international relations in the very complex ‘deregulated’ post-Cold War era. In addressing this challenge, Sino-US relations play a very crucial role with immense implications for all. With Russia, a ‘strategic partnership’ with China has emerged, the main concern of which is directed at containing America’s global reach. Arms transfers, trade in capital goods and raw materials, a flourishing border trade, co-operation in energy, space, and high-tech areas form the substantive parts of a relationship marked by warmth and frequent exchanges at all levels of governments. With Japan, China’s relationship is full of economic content and differences and deep reservations of a political and strategic nature, such as Japan’s possible role under the defence guidelines of the US-Japan Security Treaty. China’s military and economic growth that causes concern to its neighbours in Southeast Asia are mediated through frequent dialogues with ASEAN as a group. Attempts by ASEAN and China to evolve a code of conduct over the various rival claims in the South China Sea reflects an intent to deal with this complex issue peacefully. The amelioration of tensions in the Korean Peninsula through summit level dialogue between North and South Korea has been strongly encouraged by China. All in all, China has never before enjoyed as much security as it has done during the last decade, and it is well poised on the international stage. India’s own relations with major powers and with South, East, and Southeast Asian countries have traditionally prospered when India and China are not seen as adversaries.

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Considered from India’s point of view, China’s own threat perceptions in its East Asian neighbourhood given the uncertainties it faces from the United States and its security links with Japan and South Korea can be understood. However, what China does in practice to safeguard its security as a response to possible moves by the United States and its allies could have an impact on its relations with South and Southeast Asian countries, unless China consciously seeks to build confidence and trust with its partners in these regions. In this context, the approach to comprehensive security, suggested at the end of this chapter, should perhaps be considered. Coming to how India can conduct its policy in the above geostrategic context instead of seeking exclusivist alliances with any major power, India must strive for a substantive expansion of bilateral cooperation simultaneously with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Tokyo and the capitals of the countries comprising the European Union. There are global issues that cross frontiers, and India needs to build issue-based coalitions with major powers to advance its interests. There are many issues on which India and China can agree. Both see globalisation as an inevitable process with the internationalisation of capital, technologies, investment and trade. However, both would like to adapt globalisation to suit their respective national conditions. China has been more welcoming about its membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) than India, based on the self-confidence of a growing economy. Indeed, China is using the prospect of WTO membership at home to restructure lossmaking state-owned enterprises, reform its financial institutions, gear up industry to face global competition, and to open up sectors of economic activity that have been state monopolies. India has conducted successful negotiations with China on the conduct of bilateral trade after China’s entry into the WTO, and has gained the promise of lowered tariffs and access to Chinese markets for Indian products. When fact and fiction are separated over the recent controversy on Chinese products ‘invading’ Indian markets, it should be possible to strike a balance.5 The Chinese need to be sensitised through reasoned dialogue at the business and government levels to the regulatory frameworks under WTO regulations, and Indian small industries should be enabled to become competitive in a world where the consumer is the master of market forces. Both India and China are energy deficient and need a stable international order and affordable energy imports. Both need to cooperate more closely on lowering the costs of non-conventional forms of energy. In the process of development, neither has shown enough


awareness of the fragility of the environment and the depletion of natural resources. The agenda for co-operation as the world’s two most populous countries and as ancient civilizations is truly vast. It is, however, a fact that unlike in the case of China and its partners such as the United States, EU, Japan, the ASEAN states and Russia, where vested interests have been built up on both sides in the pursuit of dense bilateral relations, the India-China relationship is weak or deficient in the existence of similar vested interests. Bilateral trade between India and China may touch the US$2.5 billion mark in 2000 compared to US$1. 9 billion in 1999, but this is still far below the potential as the rapid annual growth from the early 1990s shows. It is a good sign that the pattern of trade shows an increasing exchange of machinery such as power-plant and petrochemical plant equipment from China to India. In the reverse direction Pharmaceuticals and agricultural commodities show a rise in India’s export basket. Mutual investment between India and China is yet to take off in any significant manner. Indian investments in China are in the fields of Pharmaceuticals, refractories and software. Chinese investments in India, which are more significant, are in the fields of metallurgy and electronics. With the expansion of global Indian software exports and of autocomponents, the scope in China for Indian companies is wide. Intense exploration followed by exchanges of business delegations are called for, and the growing field of information technology offers opportunities for mutual investments on a large scale. An initiative at the academic level to promote overland connectivity, trade and cultural interactions as part of an effort to bring about subregional co-operation between China, Myanmar (Burma), Bangladesh and India provides an interesting item on the future agenda of SinoIndian co-operation. In the second round of the academic dialogue on this subject, which was held in Delhi in 2000, there was a frank exchange on the possibilities as well as problems underlying the effort. The most interesting aspect about the dialogue was the presentations made by the Myanmar and Chinese delegations, from which one could conclude that both seek closer regional economic integration and that Chinese cooperation surrounding Myanmar and Bangladesh should be inclusive and not exclusive. Apparent geographical disadvantages, remoteness, and isolation from the continental centres of development that parts of this vast region faced with can be bridged through land links. All four partners need to develop the required infrastructure, which in turn would promote mutual economic co-operation. With the recent welcome

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improvement in India-Myanmar relations covering many fields of concern, some of India’s strategists must give up a mind-set that somehow Myanmar is a zone of exclusive Chinese development. Conclusion: Towards a New Paradigm for Comprehensive Security Some years after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, there was much criticism of Jawaharlal Nehru’s China policy. I would submit that this is only part of the story. With the wisdom of over four decades of hindsight, and with the enormous changes that the world has seen since the end of the Cold War, a sober view would be that Nehru was the proverbial prophet before his time, whose vision is better understood today. Ideological militancy, religious fundamentalism, and exclusiveness in developing India’s foreign relations had no place in Indian domestic and foreign policy. Security built not purely on military muscle, but on economic and scientific development and social justice was his belief. He dedicated himself to the possibility of the evolution of an international system that would respect nationalism, pluralism and diversity of all nations. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence that India and China evolved continue to provide the basis for mutually beneficial co-operation among nations. In an interview with the BBC given after a historic visit to China in 1954, when asked whether peaceful co-existence was possible with China for non-communist countries, Nehru replied, ‘I think that security can only be ensured by a friendly approach to each other. By an aggressive approach which has an element of threat or fear either way, security is endangered’.6 Relations between India and China are sui generis—they stand on their own; neither do they parallel the relations that either of them has with others, nor are there applicable precedents or models for their conduct. It is therefore appropriate that India and China can work together to bring about a new paradigm for the structuring of a comprehensive security based on their experience in dealing with each other over five decades, and taking into account the changed circumstance of the world of the new millennium. The following elements are suggested as components of a structure for comprehensive security, to which India and China must commit themselves: • A commitment that existing state limits either as de jure borders or as de facto arrangements will not be disturbed by force.


• A commitment not to be a party to any military alliance directed against third states and the non-use of the territory of one state to threaten, interfere, or take aggressive actions against another state. • The undertaking of a mutual responsibility not to exacerbate domestic problems of neighbouring states, while recognising that such problems need to be solved by peaceful means and assisting peaceful solutions to the fullest extent possible. • A commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons against all states as a step towards universal nuclear disarmament. • A commitment not to support militarism, terrorism and separatism. • A commitment to greater transparency and information sharing on military preparedness. • A commitment to co-operation in the fight against drugs, disease and environmental degradation, and for an enhanced relationship in diverse fields such as trade, investments, exchanges in science and technology, and cultural fields. • Dialogue leading to agreement on such a comprehensive security framework would enhance the prospects of stable and beneficial developments in the Sino-Indian relationship in the new millennium. Notes 1 See, for example, Yaacov Y.I.Vertzberger, Misperceptions in Foreign Policy Making: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959–1962 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1984). 2 The Talibanisation’ of Afghanistan refers to the puritanical and harsh implementation of a branch of Islamic law by the current holders of power in most of Afghanistan, know as the Taliban. Taliban (meaning student in Farsi) were trained in ideology and Jihad (meaning armed struggle) in northwest Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The practices adopted by the Taliban include the spread of fundamentalist ideas through militancy and armed violence in neighbouring Pakistan, Kashmir in India, Chechnya in Russia, Iran and in some Central Asian Republics. The threat posed to the stability of good relations between China and Pakistan by the spread of Taliban-inspired ideas in Pakistan is dealt with by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema in Chapter Fifteen of this volume. 3 Similar statements were made to India’s External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh in June 1999, and to the President of India, K.R. Narayanan, when he visited China in May-June 2000. On 13 January 2001, Li Peng, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, stated in an address in New Delhi: ‘As a country adjoining the South Asian region, China sincerely hopes to see enduring peace, stability and development in the region where all countries can treat each other as equals, live in

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harmony and resolve disputes peacefully through dialogue. China supports the process of regional co-operation therein’. 4 The Hindu, 22 July 2000. 5 With the rapid liberalisation of the Indian import regime, a variety of Chinese goods, ranging from electronic and electrical items, toys, textiles and fabrics etc. have entered the Indian market. They are lower priced than similar products made in India, and given rising consumer demand for such products, the lobby representing small and medium enterprises in India who had prospered under a restricted import regime, have joined in vociferous protests against cheap Chinese imports. 6 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, vol. 27, p. 89.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN The China Threat: A View from Pakistan Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

Introduction Since 1963, Sino-Pakistan relations have continued to demonstrate, with a remarkable degree of consistency, an enviable cordiality. Despite the dramatic changes in the international and regional environments in the post-Cold War world, Sino-Pakistan relations have not registered any major setbacks. Frequent assertions of mutual trust and confidence, coupled with the convergence of national interests and regional views, seem to have facilitated this positive growth. Despite differences in their political systems, and some differences in their foreign policy agendas, bilateral relations have continued to prosper over the years. While one could cite a number of reasons for the growth of this relationship, two in particular stand out. The first is Pakistan’s neighbourly policy towards China. As Islamabad was a member of many of the Western sponsored Cold War defence alliances, it was not an easy policy to pursue, especially when one of those alliances, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was specifically directed against China. The second is China’s correct comprehension of India-Pakistan relations. Unlike the Soviet Union, the Chinese were not hysterical over Pakistan’s participation in SEATO. Not only was their perception of factors intensifying Pakistan’s sense of insecurity extremely accurate, but they also correctly assessed the gravity of Pakistan’s feelings over the Kashmir dispute. This chapter begins by discussing the evolution of Pakistan’s relations with China, and then concentrates on highlighting problems and perceptions in the twenty-first century. Finally it will answer the question of whether or not Pakistan perceives China to be a threat.

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The Development of Sino-Pakistan Relations In general, Sino-Pakistan relations are often referred to as extremely cordial and time-tested. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognise the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Until Pakistan decided to join SEATO, Islamabad remained an ardent supporter of the PRC’s right to China’s permanent seat in the UN Security Council. While Pakistan drifted into the arms of the West in order to relieve its sense of insecurity, China and India rapidly drew closer towards each other and initiated an era which is commonly referred as Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai (China-India brotherhood). It should be mentioned here that China, in contrast to the USSR, was far more realistic in assessing Pakistan’s rationale for participation in Cold War defence alliances. Not only did Beijing fully comprehended Pakistan’s security compulsions, but it continued to pursue a friendly neighbourly policy towards Pakistan. Perhaps that is why Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had no difficulty in demonstrating his diplomatic skills and charming the Pakistani delegation at the 1955 Bandung Conference. The emergence of differences between China and India over Tibet not only gradually eroded the cordiality of the HindiChini Bhai Bhai era, but also resulted in a major border clash in 1962. In some ways the Sino-Indian border clash of 1962 helped strengthen ties between Pakistan and China. A year after the border war the two countries signed three agreements; a trade agreement, a civil aviation agreement and a boundary agreement. From then on the relationship steadily strengthened and bilateral co-operation in various fields increased. Not only did China provide a significant amount of economic assistance, and soon become one of Pakistan’s major trading partners, but it also supplied much needed arms and extended technical cooperation in the defence sector which enabled Pakistan to expand its defence production capabilities on an impressive scale. China also made substantive contributions in joint ventures such as the building of the allweather Karakoram Highway linking China with Pakistan. In addition, China consistently extended diplomatic support to Pakistan on many issues, including the Kashmir dispute. The United States initially viewed the burgeoning Sino-Pakistan relationship with some concern. Later, however, it began to appreciate the role played by Pakistan in the Sino-American rapprochement process of the early 1970s. Pakistan facilitated the initial contacts between Chinese and American officials. The Pakistani role in facilitating SinoAmerican contacts was heavily criticised by the Soviet Union. The then Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, cynically remarked: It is truly

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amazing that they allow themselves to be used by others, as tools in a conflict that can only damage their own national interests’.1 It should be mentioned here that before the year was out, Pakistan paid the price when East Pakistan was severed by India with the active help of the Soviet Union. Following the 1965 India-Pakistan War the Americans imposed an arms embargo on Islamabad that led to a deterioration in Pakistan’s security situation. At the time, Pakistan was heavily dependent on American arms supplies. The sudden cut in supplies created a very difficult situation for Pakistan, and compelled it to look for alternative sources of arms procurement. The PRC came to the aid of Pakistan and began to supply much-needed weapons. Although the Chinese weapons were not as qualitatively sophisticated as the Western arms, the availability of an alternative source by itself was sufficient to boost Pakistan’s confidence. This was the beginning of a lasting relationship in the defence sector. Since then, the Chinese have made significant contributions to enhancing Pakistan’s defence production capabilities. With the collaboration of the Chinese, Pakistan soon established heavy industries at Taxila and an aeronautical complex at Kamra, and upgraded and further expanded facilities at ordnance factories in Wah. Bilateral relations in the defence sector were further strengthened by a regular exchange of military delegations. Apart from forging a good trading relationship, extending diplomatic support to Pakistan on various issues, and co-operating in the defence sector, the Chinese collaborated with the Pakistanis in many other areas, such as shipbuilding; power plant construction at Guddu, Jamshoro, and Ghazi Barotha; the building of two sections of the Indus Highway; building a railway line between Pashwar and Lodhran; assisting in mineral and water exploration in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan; helping to establish Pakistan’s space programme; and the construction of the 790-kilometre Karakoram Highway.2 In addition, China also helped Pakistan to develop its nuclear industry. Many Indians, and even some Western analysts, have demonstrated a tendency to exaggerate and allege that Pakistan owes its entire nuclear weapons and missile development programme to the Chinese. This is indeed a gross exaggeration. Most of them tend to argue that the Chinese assistance in the nuclear and missile fields is motivated by a desire to countervail its Asian strategic rivals. With India’s hidden, and not so hidden, ambitions to be a regional great power, coupled with its expressed desire for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, it is


not too far fetched to assume that China may have been motivated by such considerations. While it is often alleged in many Western and Indian circles that the Chinese supplied M-11 missiles to Pakistan in 1992, there is no evidence to support this. Both governments have regularly denied these allegations. Over the years the relationship between China and Pakistan has been steadily demonstrating an upward curve. On most international issues the two countries share a somewhat similar outlook. Apart from a few minor irritants, both countries see their relationship as excellent. Problems and Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era The involvement of a superpower in any part of the world is the product of two principal categories of vital interests; those related to its global position as a superpower, and those associated with the area in the context of its foreign policy. For small powers, the major considerations for forging closer relations with the superpowers often stem from a desire to correct regional imbalances of power and to advance their economic development. The identical ideologies and the complementarities of interests make it easier for both the superpower and the smaller country to come closer to each other. Shifting perceptions of global and regional interests can not only vitally affect the durability of a given set of relationships, but also give birth to new sets of relationships. Pakistan’s relations with the superpowers have been changing in order to take into account new geopolitical realities, which are partly the product of shifting perceptions and accompanying policies of the superpowers, and partly because of the changes in domestic, regional and global environments. Many important developments have taken place since the end of the Cold War, both at the global and regional levels. These have included the disintegration of the Soviet Empire and subsequent emergence of many new Central Asian states; the expansion of the European Union coupled with the reunification of Germany; globalisation and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO); revolutionary advancements in the field of information technology; and the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan. These represent just a few of the significant developments that have initiated a process of rethinking and shifting perceptions. The collapse of the Soviet Union not only resulted into the total elimination of Moscow’s hold over Eastern Europe along with the emergence of the newly independent states of Central Asia, the Baltics and Black Sea


regions, but the successor state Russia was confronted with innumerable complex internal problems. Despite the complete evaporation of the communist threat posed by the USSR, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) opted not only to maintain itself, but also to expand and include the former communist states of Eastern Europe. In the post-Cold War era the PRC has continued to prioritise economic development. The Chinese leadership recognises that a strong economy is a prerequisite for great power status. The Chinese leadership is now concentrating its efforts towards integration with the world economy, from regulation to liberalisation, and from public wealth to encouraging the accumulation of private wealth.3 To seek a prosperous future for its citizens is not an unusual pursuit. Cognisant of its lack of political plurality, a policy of economic liberalisation is being pursued carefully. However this does not mean that national defence has been neglected. In fact the Chinese concept of power implies a strong economy as well as formidable defence. China’s policy in South Asia has traditionally focused on securing its southern borders and deterring India from undertaking expansionist initiatives. Conscious of Indian ambitions to play a great power role in Asia and its rivalry with Pakistan, it was somewhat inevitable that the PRC sought to cement ties with Islamabad to serve as a form of pressure on India. Besides, Pakistan is also a fairly large market for Chinese goods. As long as the border issue along with some minor irritants such as the Dalai Lama’s sanctuary in Dharamsala persist, relations between India and China are unlikely to improve to a level where they begin to threaten Sino-Pakistan relations. However, with the signing of a troop withdrawal treaty with India and an exchange of visiting dignitaries over the last few years, Sino-Indian relations have improved somewhat. Many signs indicate that China has started a process of restructuring its relationship with Pakistan partly because of global developments and partly because of the dictates of regional developments. At the global level, China wants to participate in the global economic system and be seen as a politically influential and militarily strong state. For this pursuit it is absolutely imperative to have major trading relations with the United States. During the latter stages of the Clinton Administration, Sino-US relations showed some improvement. On 17 November 1999 a US-China Bilateral Agreement was signed, and on 10 October 2000 President Bill Clinton signed a bill granting permanent most favoured nation status to China, thereby terminating the annual ritual of reviewing China’s trade ties with the US.4 However, China also wants a strong defensive


capability as its current calculus stem from the belief that America does not want to see China as a strong and powerful state. Many factors have influenced China’s security concerns, such as the eastward expansion of NATO; the strengthening of US-Japan defence guidelines to cover joint action in areas surrounding Japan (which apparently include Taiwan); a congressional report alleging two decades of Chinese espionage in the US; Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s visit to America in April 1999 when he failed to secure an agreement on Chinese membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO); and President George W.Bush’s commitment to build a National Missile Defence (NMD) system and a possible Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system for Taiwan.5 One of the major irritants between China and the US is China’s sale of missile technology. The United States has alleged that China has supplied Pakistan with 34 M-11 tactical missiles. Both Islamabad and Beijing have repeatedly denied such sales. While the US has provided no convincing evidence to substantiate the allegation, China is often subjected to scathing criticism from Washington. The US Congress has even imposed restrictions and penalties on China. In November 2000 the Clinton administration announced a waiver of penalties and sanctions, presumably after securing a pledge from Chinese officials to end the practice.6 What seems intriguingly ridiculous is that the United States also imposed new sanctions against Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence and Suparco under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on the grounds that they had received help from China. Thus the US rewarded the supplier but punished the receiver. China has often pledged to respect and abide by the principles of the MTCR, even though it is not a party to it. Some observers in the United States have interpreted the recent pledge to end the practice as an admission of past transgressions. China has indeed been under tremendous US pressure to terminate its cooperation with Pakistan in missile technology. In any case, the most recent pledge indicates that to support its objectives, China may try to bring about other changes that may affect the region directly. At the regional level, China would like to have a tension free southern border. While it is true that Pakistan-China relations continue to demonstrate the traditional cordiality, there exist some irritants, which need to be addressed. Among these irritants include the activities of religious groups in Xinjiang Province, diminishing diplomatic support over Kashmir, and impatience with Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. In the post-Cold War period, China does not really face a major threat from external sources, but it is confronted with a number of internal security


threats. Separatist and religious fundamentalist groups in Xinjiang pose one such threat. Acts of terrorism have been committed in the capital, Urumqi. It has been alleged that separatist elements in Xinjiang are linked with fundamentalist religious groups in Pakistan which provide arms and training.7 According to the Chinese, some of the militants arrested have provided sufficient evidence to establish a linkage with fundamentalist groups in Pakistan. However, the Chinese have been more displeased over what they deem to be Pakistan’s lack of resolve in stopping the activities.8 Islamabad has assured Beijing that it is discouraging such trans-border movements, and has undertaken remedial measures such as issuing verbal warnings and threatening to take action against all such activities that are deemed to be detrimental to Sino-Pakistan relations. However, one should be aware of Pakistan’s limitations. Being a Muslim country it can ill afford to ban the activities of religious groups within the country. Linked with the activities of Muslim fundamentalists in Xinjiang is the policy of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The Chinese leadership believes that most of the troubles in Xinjiang are primarily caused by Afghanistan. The disturbances of 1997 in the province were viewed as Taliban inspired. Convinced that fundamentalist forces are determined to destroy the peace of the region, the Chinese began to search for new allies to combat the perceived threat collectively. Not only have China and Russia recently signed an agreement to fight ethnic separatism, but the presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan have signed a collective security treaty to try and prevent the Taliban from exporting its ideology to their countries.9 In addition, the Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan) have already signed a security agreement with a view to collectively fight international terrorism, drugs, arms trafficking, illegal migration and religious extremism. Over the past decade, Chinese support for Pakistan’s Kashmir policy seems to have been pursued with less conviction. Chinese officials now stress that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved through negotiations and that bilateral talks must be continued under the Lahore Declaration.10 Since Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988, Sino-Indian relations have been steadily improving. The only major setback to befall relations took place after India detonated a nuclear device in May 1998, and when the Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes, subsequently identified China as the main motivating force behind New Delhi’s decision to become a nuclear power. Two


specific incidents clearly indicate that the Chinese policy in the post-Cold War era is undergoing a change, though not a radical one. Many Pakistanis were somewhat disappointed when Chinese President Jiang Zemin did not make any reference to the Kashmir dispute during his speech to the Pakistani Senate in December 1996 and ‘advised Pakistan to put the thorny issue aside and develop co-operative relations with India in less contentious sectors like trade and economic co-operation’.11 The second significant development was during the Kargil Crisis when the Chinese seemed to have extended what many Pakistanis thought was lukewarm support. Many in Pakistan felt that this lack of support was incongruent with the bold claims made by Beijing that the Sino-Pakistan friendship was all-weather and time-tested. Pakistan and the ‘China Threat’ The last few years have seen a gradual transformation of China’s domestic and foreign policies. China has started placing more emphasis on its developmental policies and appears to be totally convinced that the key to great power status is a strong economy. In order to expand trading relations and to strengthen its economy, China has not only decided to subordinate the goals of national defence to economic pursuits, but has also considerably improved its relations with countries like Russia, Japan, the ASEAN countries and the Central Asian Republics. However this does not mean that China is oblivious to its defence requirements. On the contrary, the Chinese recognise the American determination to prevent the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, and likewise to prevent the PRC gaining control over the strategic shipping lanes in the South China Sea. Indeed it appears that the Chinese are engaged in a delicate balancing act that requires a comprehensive economic relationship with the United States on the one hand and opposition to American policy on Taiwan and the South China Sea on the other. The Pakistanis also recognise the compulsions that are influencing Chinese policy with regard to Pakistan, and in consequence are treading the path rather carefully, making concerted efforts to minimise existing irritants. While it is not too far fetched to stress that Pakistan’s relations with China are still very good and that Pakistan does not currently perceive or even visualise a future Chinese threat to the country, some future scenarios may emerge in which the Chinese threat may appear realistic.


The identical or complimentary nature of national interests tends to promote the strengthening of bilateral relations. If these national interests are compromised, or one country’s interests are advanced at the cost of the other’s, then the chances of strong bilateral ties are considerably weakened. The commonality of interests and mutual benefits are strong cementing forces. As long as both Pakistan and China perceive a threat from India or continue to feel the need to contain India for reasons emanating from global developments, regional policies or the domestic environment, their mutual relationship is likely to remain good. Despite the steady improvement in Sino-Indian relations, it is difficult to see that China would terminate its friendship with Pakistan in order to secure India’s blessings as its Asian partner, obtain a greater share of the Indian market, or wean the Indians away from getting too deeply involved with the Americans. Many factors account for this. First, both India and China are locked up in a competition for regional leadership though both deny such a pursuit. Second, the Dalai Lama still enjoys Indian sanctuary, and Indian policy on Tibet continues to be at odds with the Chinese position. Third, while many Indian leaders and analysts have justified India’s acquisition of advanced nuclear and missile capability on the basis of the perceived threat posed by China, India’s readiness to work in close collaboration with the West in containing China can only arouse concerns and strengthen Chinese misgivings. 2 Given the existing global environment, coupled with Indian ambitions to play a much larger role than what they have hitherto done, it is not too far fetched to assume that the chances for a continuation of the closer ties between China and Pakistan are much greater than its reversal. However it is equally important not to undermine the compulsions that may be generated by rapid developments in the global, regional and domestic environments accompanied by shifting perceptions of elite groups. Sino-Pakistan relations could receive a serious setback in the future if religious groups continue to interfere in Xinjiang. Strict adherence to the traditional policy of non-interference by both countries needs to be continuously honoured. The activities of some religious groups have invoked unnecessary apprehensions among the Chinese authorities. Both China and Pakistan need to pay greater attention to each other’s sensitivities. If the situation in Xinjiang worsens and the separatist movement is strengthened because of support from Pakistan-based religious groups, then the Chinese are likely to take a very dim view of the whole situation. Such an eventuality may take a rather heavy toll on Sino-Pakistan cordiality.


Another scenario that could damage Sino-Pakistan relations is linked with the policies of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. If the Talibans foment an uprising of separatists in any part of China, or even extend full support to the incumbent indigenous separatist movements, then the Chinese are likely to adversely view Pakistan’s relationship with the Talibans. Pakistan’s support for the Taliban government may come under fire from China. No country likes to be confronted with internal instability, be it caused by indigenous sources or by external interference. A somewhat similar scenario would be if China were to withdraw its support for Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir, perhaps with a view to improving relations with India. Islamabad would be severely disappointed, and irreparable damage might be caused to Sino-Pakistan relations. Pakistan does not perceive any threat from the PRC. Instead, the two countries enjoy a time-tested, cordial relationship. Warming US-India ties and Washington’s continued support for Taiwan are likely to further strengthen Sino-Pakistan ties. An additional factor that would contribute enormously towards solidifying Sino-Pakistan relations would be the injection of greater economic aid from China. So far, the Sino-Pakistan relationship is the product of political and strategic considerations. With the relegation of political imperatives to secondary position, and the elevation of economic considerations to the primary level in the postCold War era, perhaps it would in the interests of both countries to further strengthen economic ties in a comprehensive sense and increase societal interactions. Notes 1 For a detailed discussion on the secret channel between the United States and China though Pakistan see F.S. Aijazuddin, From A Head, Through A Head, To A Head (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000). 2 See Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri, “China and South Asia in the 21st Century”, Regional Studies XVII, (Autumn 1999), pp. 3–30. 3 Farrukh Saleem, “Is China drifting away from Pakistan?”, The News, 3 December 2000. 4 Ibid. 5 John Pomfret, “China’s Military Takes a Hard Look at US”, International Herald Tribune, 11 November 2000. 6 John Lancaster, “US Waives Penalties on Beijing”, International Herald Tribune, 23 November 2000. 7 See Fazal-ur-Rahman, “Pakistan’s Relations with China” in Strategic Studies (Winter 1998), pp. 55–87.


8 Ibid. 9 Saleem, “Is China drifting away”, op. cit. 10 See M.H.Askari, “The China Factor”, in Naveed Ahmad Tahir (ed.), “Security in Europe and South Asia: Challenges and Options for the Twenty First Century” (Karachi: Area Study Centre, University of Karchi, 2000), pp. 203–209. 11 Fazal-ur-Rahman, “Pakistan’s Relations”, op. cit., pp.85–86. 12 See Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, “Pakistan-China Relations in the 21st Century”, in Regional Studies XVII, no. 1 (Winter 1999–2000), pp. 80– 95.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN Much Ado about Nothing: Middle Eastern Perceptions of the ‘China Threat’ Yitzhak Shichor

Introduction Apparently, those who subscribe to the ‘China threat’ theory are primarily concerned about its regional implications in East Asia. Many of them agree that Beijing may (now or soon) have both the capabilities and the incentives to ‘threaten’ its neighbours. Others, who closely watch China’s defence modernisation progress and arms proliferation record, consider the People’s Republic of China (PRC) a potential, if not an actual, global threat. They admit that while it does not (as yet) possess effective strategic military capabilities to ‘threaten’ others far away, China may develop power projection capacity in the long run. In the short run, Beijing is allegedly using a small number of proxies, not only to deliver a message or to teach a lesson, but also to make indirect and implicit remote control threats. Such proxies include North Korea, Pakistan, Myanmar (Burma), Iran and a few other Middle Eastern governments.1 Although its military relations with the Middle East emerged in the early 1980s, Beijing’s presence in the region had begun long before. Yet, throughout the Maoist era, China managed to win no more than a marginal foothold in the prospering Middle Eastern arms market that has, in fact, been monopolised by other suppliers both Western and Eastern. Unlike the PRC, these suppliers have had extensive diplomatic networks, political influence, economic relations, and military clients which left little room, if any, for newcomers, least of all the Chinese.2 For their part, the Chinese made no serious attempt to become involved in this region which was far beyond their primary interests, immediate concerns and practical reach. Rationalised by an ideology of ‘self reliance’ and ‘non-intervention’, China’s Middle Eastern policy consequently remained largely rhetorical and failed to develop the political, economic and military means traditionally used to create a

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‘presence’. China’s diplomatic relations evolved rather slowly, gathering momentum only in the 1970s, and as a Third World developing country it failed to compete with its adversaries in providing economic aid, not to mention arms supplies. Indeed, until Mao’s death in 1976, China’s military transfers to the Middle East were so limited, both in quantity and quality, that they failed to play any significant role in the regional security equation. Since the early 1950s, Middle Eastern countries have been receiving advanced weapons in huge amounts valued at billions of US dollars. Yet, it was only in the mid 1960s that Beijing began to provide some peripheral states and national liberation movements with small quantities of light weapons and military equipment—free of charge. In themselves, these insignificant arms transfers could by no means affect the Middle Eastern military balance. Yet, combined with revolutionary-ideological support and doctrinal-military training provided by the Chinese,3 even small amounts of rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, mines, explosives, rockets and ammunition could—and did-disrupt the delicate regional equilibrium. Consequently, modest as they were, China’s military deliveries contributed not only to the extension and complication of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, but also to undermining the stability of some Arab states, notably Jordan and Lebanon. This ‘Chinese threat’ was, however, short-lived. As soon as they realised the predominance of the Palestine problem in Middle Eastern affairs, the Soviets stepped in and immediately replaced China as the main military provider to the Palestinians. This regional change coincided with domestic changes as Cultural Revolution radicalism began to subside, leading to exchanges with Washington and the PRC’s admission into the United Nations. Correspondingly, China’s military ‘presence’ in the Middle East quickly declined and had practically disappeared by the mid 1970s. However, in the late 1970s, following Mao’s death, Beijing’s policy began to change. Overturning a timehonoured revolutionary principle, post-Mao China began to sell arms. At the beginning, arms sales to the Middle East were determined less by ideological, political or strategic considerations and more by economic and commercial incentives, though later the balance changed. Since the early 1980s, the Middle East has become China’s principal arms market. These arms sales have supposedly turned the PRC into a more significant, or even ‘threatening’, player in the regional power game. Initially, China’s penetration into the Middle Eastern arms market

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was not taken too seriously by traditional arms suppliers.4 Yet, since the late 1980s Beijing has constantly and consistently been criticised, primarily by Washington, for its alleged policy of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including non-conventional technologies, components and delivery systems.5 China has been accused of violating a number of international agreements such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).6 More specifically, Beijing has been reproached for upsetting the Middle Eastern military balance and for undermining US regional interests and eroding the security of its allies.7 A recent RAND study said that ‘through China’s help, states such as Iran have developed their own defense industrial base, making them more autonomous and threatening to U.S. allies’.8 Occasionally, Israel’s civilian and military leaders have been looking for ways and means, directly and indirectly, explicitly and implicitly, to urge Beijing to restrict or—even better, terminate—its nonconventional military co-operation with Middle Eastern countries, primarily with Iran, but so far to little avail. Beijing’s proliferation ‘policy’ in the Middle East is regarded by a number of US observers as part and parcel of the so-called ‘China threat’ syndrome reflecting, according to some foreign intelligence sources, alleged long-term strategic-global aspirations. 9 Dictionaries define ‘threat’ as a declaration of an intention or determination to inflict punishment, pain or loss on someone in retaliation for, or conditionally upon, some action or course. Given the political and economic sensitivity of the Middle East, China’s arms transfers allegedly constitute a serious ‘threat’—not only to the Middle East but also to the Western world and to Japan. However, China does not appear to have the capabilities, least of all the intentions and the reasons, to threaten Middle Eastern countries or other concerned parties directly, or even indirectly. This chapter discusses the extent to which weapons and military technology supplied by the PRC to the Middle East have been perceived as a threat that erodes international stability, the regional power balance, and especially the security of US allies, including Israel. China’s Share in the Middle Eastern Military Balance Measured by quantity,10 nearly 90 per cent of Beijing’s total arms deliveries were directed to Middle Eastern countries in the 1980s. Beijing


was quick to exploit an opportunity whereby since the late 1970s traditional arms suppliers suspended military transfers to major Middle Eastern customers, such as Egypt, Iran and Iraq. China—whose weapons are based on Soviet models familiar to many Middle Eastern countries— stepped in to fill the void. Off-the-shelf weapons were offered for sale at cut-price, in quantity, and without political preconditions. Though well below state-of-the-art military technology, in the 1980s Chinese weapons were considered a quick fix whereby quantity, simplicity and sturdiness were supposed to compensate for quality, complexity and sophistication, at least for a while. The fact that in the 1980s the Middle East became China’s predominant arms market by no means implied that China had become the predominant arms supplier to the Middle East, as sometimes suggested. Even at their peak, Chinese arms transfers to the Middle East have always been comparatively marginal. To be sure, China’s share in certain weapons supplied to the Middle East has been quite substantial (e.g., missiles attack boats and anti-ship missiles). Also, at times (e.g. in 1986– 1988) Chinese arms transfers to the Middle East reached the third place in terms of value following the USSR and the US (in that order).11 Yet, China’s share in total military transfers to the Middle East was still much smaller. At its best, the Chinese share in the total value of arms transfer agreements and deliveries reached 17.6 per cent (1987) and 13.2 per cent (1989) respectively. Chinese arms transfers represented between 4 and 5.5 per cent of all arms transfer agreements and deliveries to the Middle East in 1983–1997, ranking fifth or even sixth. Compared to China, the value of the US arms transfer agreements with the Middle East in that period was over ten times, Britain’s five times, Soviet and Russian 3.4 times and France’s over 2.5 times. Therefore, China can by no means be blamed for ‘arming’ the Middle East, let alone that its arms transfers had only begun in the early 1980s, whereas traditional arms suppliers, notably the United States and the Soviet Union, had been providing weapons to the Middle East since the early 1950s. Despite its modest arms transfers to the Middle East, compared to traditional suppliers Beijing has become a more significant arms supplier in the case of Iran and Iraq. These two countries have become China’s most important Middle Eastern customers, absorbing most of its arms transfers to the region. While Iran and Iraq’s share in China’s Middle Eastern arms sales has changed over time, they (especially Iran) remain Beijing’s main customers even after China’s arms sales declined in the late 1980s. In 1983–1986 Iran and Iraq signed nearly 92 per cent of all

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Chinese arms transfer agreements with the Middle East and received nearly 88 per cent of all China’s arms deliveries to the region (in terms of value). In 1987–1990 their share decreased to around 55 per cent for both agreements and deliveries; and in 1991–1994, while Beijing honoured its commitment to the UN-imposed embargo by cutting off military relations with Iraq, Iran’s share in China’s Middle Eastern arms transfers increased to 57 and 69 per cent respectively. In 1995–1997 Iran’s share in China’s arms deliveries to the Middle East reached nearly 85 per cent. Furthermore, the PRC has become a significant arms supplier to Iran and Iraq not only in terms of its own arms transfers to the Middle East but also compared to other major suppliers. From 1983 to 1997 the PRC was Iran’s single major arms supplier, providing between one third and one half of the entire value of Iran’s arms imports. From the early 1990s, however, Russia began to compete with China. In 1992–1994 the value of Russian arms deliveries to Iran reached US$1 billion, compared to China’s US$525 million. Yet in 1995–1997, Russian deliveries dropped to US$480 million, while China’s increased to US$725 million. In sum, Beijing’s arms sales to the Middle East were somewhat successful in the 1980s. Yet, in the 1990s the re-entry of traditional suppliers; the arms embargo on Iraq; China’s commitment to international arms control agreements; and the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War limited Beijing’s conventional arms transfer options. To regain at least part of the market share it had lost, China was practically forced to use proxies (such as North Korea and Hong Kong). Occasionally, Beijing has also overlooked ‘private’ initiatives and unorthodox offers of nonconventional or semi-conventional military technologies by China’s military-industrial complex. Finally, China has increased its military exports to South and Southeast Asia. In the 1990s, the share of the Middle East in China’s arms trade shrunk to 25–30 per cent, while that of Asia reached 70 per cent.12 Still, PRC arms transfers to the Middle East remain significant in terms of value and quantity, though less in quality. China’s Role in the Middle Eastern Military Balance Western, particularly American, officials ignored or dismissed China’s arms transfers to the Middle East until the latter half of the 1980s.13 At that time, China—whose arms are generally considered backward, obsolete and unreliable—had not been taken into account as a noteworthy arms supplier, least of all as a ‘threat’. To be sure, most if not all PRC-made weapons are endlessly recycled and upgraded versions of


outdated Soviet models from the 1950s and 1960s and as such, were not likely to challenge or compete with advanced Soviet, let alone Western, weapons. However, sweeping generalisations about the backwardness of China’s military hardware should be avoided. For one thing, some PRC weapons, especially those supplied since the mid 1980s, are not as worthless and useless as they are often depicted. For another, even ‘backward’ weapons can still be highly effective and lethal when deployed in sensitive locations. This is evident in the Silkworm missile episode, to be discussed below. The Impact of Conventional Chinese Weapons Most PRC conventional weapons supplied to the Middle East are indeed claimed to be improved versions of outdated Soviet models. For example, Type-59 and Type-69 main battle tanks, supplied to the Middle East during the 1980s in large quantities (over 1,850 altogether) are based on the 1950s vintage Soviet T-54. Still, equipped with modern fire control systems, infrared night vision capabilities, enhanced engines, etc. they can be considered as a relatively advanced weapon. Likewise the F-6 and F-7 fighter aircraft (known in China as J-6 and J-7), of which about 300 have been supplied to the Middle East, are modified copies of the outdated Soviet MiG-19 and MiG-21 respectively. Some export versions, however, incorporate more advanced avionics and other technologies (often of Western origin) that considerably improve the aircraft’s performance. Yet, despite these improvements PRC weapons are still backward compared to both Western and Eastern alternatives. Aware of this fact, Middle Eastern customers usually try to avoid using PRC-made weapons under battlefield conditions. Deployed as a second line, or as a reserve, PRC weapons have indeed played a marginal role in recent regional hostilities, save missiles. Tactical missiles are not only Beijing’s main military export to the Middle East but also the most diversified and, evidently, the most effective. At least ten different types of Chinese missiles have been supplied to Middle Eastern countries. To be sure, some of them are, like other Chinese weapons, so-called improved copies of Soviet models. Of these, it is the HY-2 ship (or surface)-to-ship missile —based on the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx—that has drawn much attention. Known as Silkworm, it has become, at least for a while, a significant threat in the Middle East.

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In themselves, the HY-2 specifications are not especially impressive.14 Yet deployed in sensitive or strategic locations to intimidate civilian targets, the HY-2 can become highly lethal and destructive. By the early 1990s, nearly 300 PRC-made HY-2s had been sold to Egypt, Iraq and, notably, to Iran.15 When in early 1987 Washington became aware of their harmful potential and urged Beijing to stop selling them, it was too late. By March at least two launchers of three to six missiles each had already been located along the narrow bend of the Straits of Hormuz, one of the world’s most congested and most sensitive oil transportation waterways. Some countries, such as Japan, Taiwan, Italy and France, are still heavily dependent on oil shipped through the Straits of Hormuz. A third launcher was spotted on the Faw Peninsula, seized by Iran from Iraq, near Kuwait.16 Obviously concerned, Washington firmly warned Iran not to deploy, let alone activate, the missiles. Admiral Ronald J.Hays, Commander-inChief of the US Pacific Fleet, considered the Silkworm a tremendous threat and a very serious escalation in the Iran-Iraq War.17 Ignoring these warnings, in September and October 1987, Iran fired seven Silkworm missiles, hitting one of Kuwait’s offshore oil terminals which had a loading capacity of one third of Kuwait’s total crude export, as well as US ships.18 This, and the resumed supply of PRC weapons, including missiles, to Iran and Iraq, soured not only Sino-US relations but also SinoArab relations. While Washington’s reaction was to freeze any further liberalisation of technology sales to the PRC,19 some Arab countries, such as Egypt, Jordan and, notably Kuwait, warned Beijing that the continued transfer of Silkworm missiles could lead to a setback in Beijing’s position in the Middle East. Yet as experience shows, such warnings—either by the US or, even more so, by the Arabs—fail to impress PRC authorities and are rather quickly abandoned and forgotten. From the mid 1990s China began to supply Iran with the more advanced C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles. These cruise missiles were test-launched from PRC-made fast patrol boats near the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf in early 1996. Reflecting its own sensitivity to potential threats in this enormously important international waterway, in March 1996 Washington considered the possibility of imposing sanctions against the PRC. A report by the US Office of Naval Intelligence said that the Chinesemade cruise missiles threatened naval forces and merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf, and a former US Ambassador to China noted that the C-802s posed a ‘clear and present danger to the United States fleet’. In his


testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on International Security and Proliferation, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn was unequivocal about the C-802 missiles, as if they have been operated by the Chinese. These missiles, he said ‘increase China’s maritime advantage over other Gulf states, they put commercial shipping at risk, and they pose a new threat to U.S. forces operating in the region’ (emphasis added).20 When visiting the United States in October 1997, PRC President Jiang Zemin stated that Beijing had no intention of selling more cruise missiles to Iran (which had already acquired nearly 200 C-801s and C802s), though these were not covered by any accord.21 His statement was reinforced in January 1998 when US Defence Secretary William Cohen visited China. He was reassured that there would be no more sales, no more military technology transfers and no technological co-operation that would enable Iran to upgrade its existing cruise missile systems. In sum, although Beijing’s conventional arms supplies to the Middle East have been relatively backward, the fact that they have mostly reached Iraq and Iran does affect the regional balance of power both actually and potentially, albeit in a relatively narrow sense. ‘Most of China’s conventional weapons are unsophisticated and do not present a significant threat to the United States if transferred’.22 Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia maintain good relations with Beijing—an increasingly important oil customer. It is unlikely that they consider PRC conventional arms supplies as a threat to their security. Likewise, these supplies could hardly affect the security of Israel which, indeed, has never complained to China in this regard. That much, however, cannot be said about semi-conventional—let alone nonconventional weapons—that have longer ranges, are practically impossible to intercept and can cause mass destruction. The Impact of Semi-Conventional Chinese Weapons Semi-Conventional Chinese Weapons are primarily surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) that, though conventional in essence, can provide launching vehicles for non-conventional (nuclear, chemical or biological) warheads. Of the dozen or so types of Chinese missiles delivered to the Middle East, only one falls into this category, the DF-3. Yet, another, the M-9 (an export version of the DF-15), has been under consideration. A short-range (600 kilometre) road-mobile single-stage solid-propellant SSM with a 950 kilogram payload, the M-9 is capable of delivering a nuclear

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warhead of 50–350 kilotons. Developed since April 1984 and flight-tested for the first time in June 1988, it has a high degree of accuracy and penetrability.23 To attract the market, the Chinese displayed the M-9 as early as November 1986, two months before its design was completed, four months before its production schedule was approved, and nearly two years before it was first flight tested. Indeed, representatives of the PRC Ministry of Space Industry had reportedly managed to sign a preliminary sales agreement with the Syrian government even before the missile was finally tested. Damascus allegedly paid a deposit on future delivery of the M-9. Some reports indicated that the deal had already been implemented.24 However, there is no sign as yet that M-9s have been actually transferred to Syria, nor to Iran which has reportedly been strongly interested in the M-9 to the point of investing in its development. This delay may be explained by a number of reasons: technological problems that complicated production of the M-9 (though no M-9 has ever failed a test); arguments over payment methods with both Syria and Iran, that could not afford to pay cash; and, most importantly, US and Israeli pressure. Confirming that negotiations on the M-9 sale to Syria had indeed taken place, Beijing had promised Israel not to proceed with the deal, and has so far kept its word.25 This restraint may also have to do with MTCR. Signed by seven US-led countries in April 1987— immediately after the production of the M-9 was given the green light— the MTCR restricted the sale of ballistic missiles with a range above 300 kilometres and a payload of over 500 kilograms. Although it had never been invited to join the talks leading to the MTCR, and was not one of the signatories, the PRC was none the less subjected to pressure and even intimidation to abide by MTCR rules, to which it was practically forced to agree in 1992. While China’s 300 kilometre-range M-11 (reportedly supplied to Pakistan, but not to the Middle East)26 is indeed a borderline case as far as the MTCR rules are concerned, there is no doubt that the M-9 falls within these rules. If Beijing continues to abide by them, then the M-9 will not be exported and, therefore, will not affect the Middle East security balance. However, Beijing’s commitment to the MTCR is vague, reluctant and superficial, and depends to a great extent on the nature of its relations with the rest of the world, and primarily with Washington. A deterioration in foreign relations, or a domestic political and economic reorientation, could lead Beijing to backtrack from its agreement. Under


these circumstances, if and when the M-9 will be acquired by any Middle Eastern country, it could affect the regional balance of power due to its accuracy, mobility and, even more so, its nuclear potential. A more ‘threatening’ semi-conventional missile is the DF-3 (Dongfeng, or East Wind), an intermediate range ballistic missile known in the West as the CSS-2, which was supplied to Saudi Arabia in the late 1980s. Many aspects of this deal, such as its value or even its size, remain obscure to this very day.27 Developed since 1964 and test-launched for the first time in December 1966, it is a single-stage, mobile, liquid-fuelled missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead of 1–5 (3.3) megatons, or a payload of 2, 150 kilograms, over a distance of 2,650 kilometres. This version became operational in, and has been deployed since, May 1971. A more advanced version, with a range of 2,800 kilometres (or even 3,000 kilometres), called the DF-3A, has since 1986 replaced the older DF-3s, about 36 of which were sold to Saudi Arabia in 1988.28 Though apparently surprised by the sale, concerned governments, primarily the US and Israel, reacted mildly. For one reason, Saudi Arabia is regarded as a responsible country and Washington’s close ally. For another, before delivery Beijing had replaced the original DF-3 nuclear warhead with a conventional High Explosive (HE) warhead. Finally, by the time the deal was signed, the DF-3 had already become outdated. It suffers from two serious shortcomings. One is that launch preparation takes no less than four hours, not including the time needed to transport the DF-3 from storage to the launch site. In the late 1970s the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) managed to reduce pre-launch preparation time to two-and-a-half hours,29 still too long and unlikely to be repeated in Saudi Arabia. Also, the DF-3 is highly inaccurate, having a circular error probability (CEP) of 2,500–4,000 metres. Still, rather than being dismissed as worthless, the Sino-Saudi missile deal has served a purpose, bilateral much more than regional, and diplomatic much more than military. To begin with, despite its other shortcomings the DF-3 has the longest range of all Middle Eastern missiles, nearly three times that of the most advanced. Based in Saudi Arabia, it covers not only the Middle East proper but also its periphery including Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, as well as parts of Pakistan and India, and even the southern part of Russia. Also, despite its high CEP, its retrofitted HE warhead, estimated at 1,600 kilograms, is much heavier than those of other Middle Eastern SSMs, and can therefore be more lethal and destructive. Finally, though vulnerable on the ground, once launched its cruising speed is too high to provide an

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adequate warning, much less for interception. Once armed with a nuclear warhead it is far more effective, and terrifying. Given the DF-3’s advantages and disadvantages, one wonders why Saudi Arabia decided to buy it at all. One reason was deterrence. Riyadh needed the DF-3 to deter real or perceived enemies, primarily Iran and Iraq, from raiding or violating Saudi territory. Another reason was retaliation, in case deterrence failed. If needed, Riyadh could strike at the enemy’s industrial and military centres and inflict painful damage. Finally, Saudi Arabia wanted the missiles, in fact any missiles, as a symbol of regional superiority, rather than for actual use. Since Washington refused to comply, Riyadh turned to Beijing, which was the only available alternative source at that time. Hindsight revokes the first two reasons. Although they had reportedly become operational at least a few weeks before the Gulf War erupted in August 1990, the Saudi-acquired DF-3s provided no deterrence whatsoever against the Iraqis when they invaded Kuwait, trespassed Saudi borders and attacked Saudi military installations and civilian centres. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has failed to use the DF-3s for retaliation, or for any other purpose. Likewise, warnings that the DF-3 deal would upset the regional military balance, trigger a new arms race, weaken the US position in the Middle East and increase tension have not transpired. In this respect, China’s missile sales to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries have proved to be no more than an inconsequential element in the Middle Eastern security equation.30 Of more concern are the reports that Beijing has provided Iran, and possibly Iraq and Syria, with missile technologies, and especially navigation systems, that could improve the accuracy of outdated SCUD SSMs supplied primarily by North Korea, or produced domestically. The Impact of Non-Conventional Chinese Weapons Displaying concern mostly about nuclear proliferation Western, primarily US, circles have been criticising the PRC since the late 1980s for its arms sales policy. By that time Beijing had already been engaged in some kind of nuclear co-operation with three or four Middle Eastern countries. Still, the Chinese insist that they have never provided any nuclear weapons or nuclear military technology to any country. These statements may be true only in the narrow sense. It is possible that China may have provided ‘grey area’ nuclear technology that could have dual use: civilian and military.


One example is Iran, whose early attempt to acquire two 20 megawatt (MW) research reactors from the PRC was thwarted by US pressure in 1992.31 Nevertheless, the PRC sold Iran nuclear research equipment that, although causing some alarm in the West, turned out to be desktop model.32 When then Chinese President Yang Shangkun (also the senior vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central Military Commission) later visited Teheran, Beijing admitted, for the first time in public, that it had been providing Iran with nuclear technology for medical, scientific, research and training purposes.33 In July 1993, following lengthy negotiations, China finally agreed to provide Iran with two 300 MW power reactors and with assistance in mineral surveying and fabrication of fuel rods for their reactors. Frequently disseminated unconfirmed reports that allegedly indicate possible military dimensions to the Sino-Iranian nuclear cooperation have been consistently and insistently denied not only by both countries but also by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials, whose annual inspections have failed to reveal any sign of nuclear weapons development. Still, Washington went on applying a similarly consistent and insistent pressure on Beijing to scrap its nuclear reactors agreement with Teheran. This considerable pressure finally paid off when US officials confirmed in late September 1995 that the PRC intended to cancel the deal. Shortly afterwards both Iran and China firmly denied this report, claiming that the deal had only been suspended and postponed due to ‘technical’ and ‘financial’ problems. Since nothing has been heard about the deal to date, these ‘problems’ have apparently not been resolved.34 Earlier, in 1986, the construction of a Chinese-designed research nuclear reactor was begun in Ayn Oussera, 250 kilometres south of Algiers. Algeria formally admitted its existence only in April 1991, following media reports. It is claimed to be a small, 15 MW, research reactor, powered by slightly enriched uranium. However, Britain’s Sunday Times alleged that it is likely to be a military facility which, by the size of its cooling chimneys, consists of a much bigger 40 MW reactor capable of separating up to 8 kilograms of plutonium a year. At such a rate of production, Algeria could have accumulated enough fissile material for a bomb by 1998. Refuting these allegations, Algeria underlined that the reactor was intended for peaceful civilian research only. Moreover, although at that time Algeria had not yet signed the NPT, it offered to submit the reactor to regular IAEA supervision. A formal inspection agreement to this effect was signed in January 1992. As little

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has been said or heard about this reactor since then, it may be assumed that it is indeed used for peaceful research. A recent RAND study confirmed that the nuclear assistance provided by China to Iran and Algeria ‘was consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)’.35 Syria is yet another example. In November 1991 China agreed to sell Syria a 30 KW research reactor. Though very small, the deal raised concern in Israel as well as in the United States. The sale, however, was not made directly between China and Syria, but through the IAEA. The IAEA initially rejected the deal in December 1991 because Syria, an NPT signatory since 1969, had not signed a formal safeguard agreement with the IAEA. Yet the deal was subsequently approved in March 1992 and Washington’s objections were withdrawn. Still, the whereabouts of this deal, which could have given Syria no more than a rudimentary nuclear capability, remain obscure. Unconfirmed reports suggest that the PRC had offered to contribute to Iraq’s nuclear development. These reports claim, for example, that in 1984–1986 Beijing helped Baghdad to conduct a feasibility study with regard to a (civilian) nuclear power plant to be built with Chinese assistance and know-how. This venture and Sino-Iraqi military relations in general were suspended following the UN-embargo imposed on Iraq. Yet, the scope of this co-operation was revealed a few months after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It was then ‘discovered’ that, among other things, China had allegedly shipped to Iraq seven tons of lithium hybrid, a chemical used in the production of missile fuel and nuclear weapons.36 Western, primarily American, sensitivity to chemical weapons was revealed in July–August 1993 when Washington warned Beijing to turn back the Yin He, a Chinese vessel that, according to US intelligence sources, was carrying at least twenty-four containers of thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride on the way to Iran. Both chemicals are used to make deadly mustard and nerve gas, and their production, transportation, accumulation and use is forbidden under a 1995 international treaty. Since China refused to comply, US warships and aircraft started shadowing the ship, while Washington applied pressure on nations in the region not to allow the ship to dock nor to assist it in any other way. The ship indeed strayed for several days along the Persian Gulf until Beijing ultimately gave in and allowed an inspection of its cargo. Undertaken by a team of Chinese, American, and Saudi officials, the inspection found none of the chemicals aboard the ship, which was then allowed to proceed to its destination.


However, CIA reports continue to reiterate that Chinese arms companies have been using Hong Kong to supply Iran with materials for chemical weapons.37 Whereas in October 1997 Beijing promised the US to stop its assistance to Iran’s nuclear programme, it continued negotiations with Iran for the supply of ‘hundreds of tons’ of chemicals to Iran’s military nuclear research centre in Isfahan, where they could be used for uranium enrichment. It was only after a strong US protest that the deal was frustrated. As a RAND report said, though they ‘could be used in the manufacturing of chemical and biological weapons’, the equipment and materials provided by China to Iran are ‘not banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention or Biological Warfare Convention’. These reports, and the Yin He episode, illustrate some of the problems and ambiguities involved in China’s arms transfers to the Middle East (and elsewhere), their role in the regional military balance and their international implications. Conclusion While Washington has often criticised Beijing for disrupting the Middle Eastern power balance, none of the countries concerned has made similar charges, at least not in public. Israel is an exception. Throughout the 1990s its military and civilian officials have often expressed concern about Iran’s nuclear programme, mentioning China (and North Korea) as Iran’s main suppliers of advanced military technology. During his visit in October 1993, Israel’s Prime Minister, the late Yitzhak Rabin, urged the Chinese leadership to stop supplying SSMs and non-conventional weapons to Iran.39 When he visited China in May 1995, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres gained a promise from PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that China would not sell SSMs to Iran and the Arab countries. President Jiang Zemin gave a similar pledge in October 1995 when he (and Prime Minister Li Peng) met Rabin again in New York. Jiang confirmed that the nuclear reactor deal with Iran had been ‘temporarily’ frozen. He reiterated China’s condition that once the deal was defrosted, the reactors would only be used for civilian purposes under international supervision, and that nuclear know-how would not be passed on to third parties. ‘I can say in full confidence and responsibility,’ he said, ‘that if the reactor would be built, it would not endanger Israel’s security’. After the meeting Rabin said that, as far as Sino-Iranian relations were concerned, he was at ease.40 Similar pledges were given to Israel’s Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu when he made a stopover in Beijing on his way to Tokyo in

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August 1997, and again when he visited the PRC in May 1998. When Qian met Israeli Foreign Minister David Levi in Jerusalem in December 1997, he reiterated Beijing’s decision not to supply Iran with military technology or equipment that could be used for developing nuclear or nonconventional weapons. Israel’s policy to demonise Iran (following Washington’s lead) does not necessarily reflect the views of some Israeli military, intelligence and civilian officials, and academics (not to mention some European and Japanese leaders). They claim that Iran’s military build-up, and even more so nuclear development, have not only been exaggerated for various purposes but are primarily directed against Iraq, rather than against the US or its Middle Eastern allies. In its nuclear programme Iran is essentially looking for deterrence, for redress of the Middle Eastern nuclear balance, and for winning regional and global respect. Viewed from a Middle Eastern perspective, the ‘China threat’ is a US invention that reveals more about Washington than about Beijing, and has little to do with Middle Eastern attitudes towards China. From a US perspective: ‘the principal concern has been China’s antishipping missiles, which threaten unarmed merchant vessels such as oil tankers… Chinese transfers of conventional weapons could threaten U.S. interests by altering regional balances of power or precipitating a conflict into which the United States is drawn’. Therefore: ‘U.S. military in general, and the U.S. Air Force in particular, must prepare for the possibility of future conflict with regional adversaries, such as Iran, who are armed with longer-range ballistic missiles and perhaps even nuclear or chemical weapons’.41 The ‘China threat’ thesis suffers from two fundamental methodological flaws. One is the artificial distinction between conventional weapons, which are not considered a serious threat, and semi-conventional and non-conventional WMD, which are considered threatening. This distinction legitimises (primarily Western) conventional arms transfers and ignores historical facts. Most—if not all—wars in the past, including those of more recent times (definitely in the Middle East), were fought with conventional weapons. So far, most ‘mass destruction’ has been caused by conventional weapons. In this respect, if PRC arms transfers constitute a ‘threat’, then traditional arms suppliers such as the United States, the Soviet Union and Russia, France and Britain should be considered a much greater ‘threat’. It is their weapons (rather than China’s) that have facilitated violent confrontations, bloodshed and


instability in the Middle East (and elsewhere) since the mid twentieth century. The other flaw is the artificial distinction between Chinese arms transfers to the Middle East (but also to Pakistan and other customers) and the bilateral context of Sino-US relations in general, and particularly Washington’s military supplies to Taiwan. In terms of military balance, both conventional and even more so non-conventional, the US is by any standard a much greater threat to China than vice versa. Since they cannot respond directly to perceived US military and political provocation in Taiwan, the Chinese respond indirectly by using proxies in other parts of the world to irritate Washington. Unlike Islam, Christianity, colonialism, and even Marxism-Leninism, China has never had the drive, whether missionary, economic or military, to expand far beyond its borders, least of all to the Middle East. To some extent this region has been, and still is, terra incognita for the Chinese. Post-Mao China no longer challenges the existing world order, or that of the Middle East. If anything, Beijing has become increasingly interested in promoting stability in the Middle East, which is China’s predominant source of oil imports.42 Even American observers admit retrospectively that ‘the destabilizing effects of Chinese arms sales to the Middle East have been exaggerated by both [US] Congress and the media,’ and add that, ‘contrary to popular perception, China is not looking to create instability in the Middle East’ ,43 In sum, instability in the Middle East has nothing or little to do with China. Genuine regional problems have been manipulated and exploited for years by foreign powers in ways that have precluded or delayed a peaceful settlement. To this very day, traditional military suppliers persist with such policies, and even increase their arms transfers to the Middle East. Compared to them, China’s ability to undermine foreign interests, its contribution to Middle Eastern instability and violence, and the socalled ‘China threat’ is virtual at best, and marginal at worst.44 Notes 1 Thoroughly revised and updated, this chapter draws from Yitzhak Shichor, “The Chinese Factor in the Middle East Security Equation: An Israeli Perspective,” in Jonathan Goldstein (ed.), China and Israel, 1948–1998: A Fifty Year Retrospective (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), pp. 153–178. See also Yitzhak Shichor, “Mountains Out of Molehills: Arms Transfers in SinoMiddle Eastern Relations”, Middle East Review of International Affairs 4, no. 3 (Fall 2000), pp. 68–79.

YITZHAK SHICHOR 335

2 For a general background, see Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy 1949–1977 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) and Lillian Craig Harris, China Considers the Middle East (London and New York: Tauris, 1993). 3 In fact, Mao’s revolutionary doctrines were more of a ‘threat’ than Chinese weapons. See Yitzhak Shichor, “The Palestinians and China’s Foreign Policy,” in Chün-tu Hsüeh (ed.), Dimensions of China’s Foreign Relations (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 156–190. See also Raphael Israeli (ed.), PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), pp. 89, 96, 142–143. 4 Yitzhak Shichor, “The Middle East”, in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow (eds.), Chinese Defence Policy (London: Macmillan; Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1984), pp. 263–278. 5 In the second half of 1996, ‘China was the single most important supplier of equipment and technology for weapons of mass destruction’ worldwide, according to a CIA Nonproliferation Center report, The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1997. 6 See, for example, Steven Dolley, China’s Record of Proliferation Misbehavior, Issue Brief (Washington: Nuclear Control Institute, September 1997); Mohan Malik, “China Plays ‘the Proliferation Card’”, Jane’s Intelligence Review 12, no. 7 (July 2000), pp. 34–36; Bill Gertz, “China Fails to Keep Vows on Arms Sales,” Washington Times, 12 September 2000. 7 See, for example, Robert Einhorn (Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation), “Impact of Missile Proliferation on Stability in the Middle East and South Asia,” paper delivered at the Second US-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation, on “Missiles, Missile Defenses and Regional Stability”, Monterey, California, 27–29 April 1999. 8 Daniel L.Byman and Roger Cliff, China’s Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications, MR1119 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999), p. vii. 9 For a controversial summary of these views, see Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regenery, 2000) and Edward Timperlake and William C.Triplett H, Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to America (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1999). See also Richard Bernstein and Ross H.Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997). 10 See, for example, R.Bates Gill, Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns, and Prospects in the New World Order (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992) and Evan S.Medeiros and Bates Gill, Chinese Arms Exports: Policy, Players, and Process (Strategic Studies Institute, August 2000). 11 The following data are based on US Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1998 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, April 2000), and previous issues by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Richard F.Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1990–1997, CRS Report to Congress 98–647F (US Congressional Service, Library of Congress, 1998), and previous issues.


12 Derived from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), World Armament and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 341. 13 They may have implicitly welcomed China’s ‘military’ intrusion that replaced the Soviet presence without constituting a threat in itself. 14 The following discussion is based on Yitzhak Shichor, “The Year of the Silkworms: China’s Arms Transactions, 1987,” in Richard H.Yang (ed.), SCPS Yearbook on PLA Affairs 1987 (Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, 1988), pp. 153–168. 15 For a detailed study, see Bates Gill, “Chinese Arms Exports to Iran,” in P.R.Kumaraswamy (ed.), China and the Middle East: The Quest for Influence (New Delhi: Sage, 1999), pp. 116–141. 16 See, for example, James Bruce, “Iran Steps Up Cover of Hormuz with Chinese-Supplied Styx,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 March 1987, p. 531; Jim Bussert, “Iran’s Silkworm Threat in the Gulf,” Ibid., 6 June 1987, p. 1113. See also Bates Gill, Silkworms and Summitry: Chinese Arms Exports to Iran and USChina Relations (Washington, DC: AsiaPacific Rim Institute, 1997). 17 Interview in Pacific Defense Reporter (August 1987), p. 10. 18 Jonathan Crusoe, “Coping with Silkworm Diplomacy,” Middle East Economic Digest, 31 October 1987, p. 19. 19 See, for example, “US Team to Combat Silkworm Menace,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 28 October 1987; and “Technology Cocooned: US Retaliates against China’s Sale of Silkworm Missiles,” Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 5 November 1987. See also Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1992), pp. 187–189. 20 International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee, US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, The Proliferation Primer, A Majority Report (January 1998), at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/ congress/1998_r/prolifbk/part01.htm 21 About 90 C-801/802s were delivered over 1996–1999. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), World Armament and Disarmament Yearbook 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 400. 22 Byman and Cliff, China’s Arms Sales, op. cit, p. xii. See also Paul Mann, “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 152, no. 3 (17 January 2000), p. 432. 23 This and the following discussion is based mainly on John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International Security 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 5– 40; Hua Di, “Ballistic Missile Exports Will Continue,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (September 1991), pp. 14–15; and Greg Gerardi and Richard Fisher Jr., “China’s Missile Tests Show More Muscle,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 9, No. 3 (March 1997), pp. 125–129. 24 The first reports surfaced in December 1989. See, for example, “Road to Damascus,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 August 1991, reported that 24 M-9s had been spotted in Syria. For similar later reports, see Mark Yost, “China’s Deadly Trade in the Mideast,” Wall Street Journal, 4 December 1996.

YITZHAK SHICHOR 337

25 Yitzhak Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers to China and Taiwan,” Survival 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998), p. 78. 26 According to the Washington Times, US Central Intelligence Agency sources claimed that in early June 1996 Damascus had received a first delivery of M-11 supplied by China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation. Washington Times, 23 July 1996. This has not yet been verified. 27 Much of the following discussion is based on Yitzhak Shichor, East Wind over Arabia: Origins and Implications of the Sino-Saudi Missile Deal, China Research Monographs, no. 35 (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1989). See also Yitzhak Shichor, A Multiple Hit: China’s Missile Sale to Saudi Arabia, SCPS Papers, no. 5 (Kaohsiung, Taiwan: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, 1991); Bernard Reich and Alexander Huang, China’s Arms Sales to the Middle East: The Case of Saudi Arabia, Research Report, no. 3 (London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, April 1989); W.Seth Carus, “Missiles in the Middle East: A New Threat to Stability”, Policy Focus, Research Memorandum, no. 6 (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 1988); P. Lewis Young, “Saudi Arabia’s Missile Acquisition: A New Stage In The Gulf Conflict,” Asian Defence Journal no. 7 (July 1988), pp. 30–38. 28 The cost of these missiles is estimated to be US$3–3.5 billion. By 2002 Beijing will replace all DF-3 with the more advanced DF-21. 29 Lewis and Hua, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs,” op. cit., pp. 22– 23. 30 It has been, however, a brilliant political exercise leading to diplomatic relations between the PRC and Saudi Arabia (in July 1990), at the expense of the Republic of China (Taiwan). 31 For China’s involvement in Iran’s nuclear programme see Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, “Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: a Profile” (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, 1998) and the Appendix: “Selected Iranian Nuclear Imports”. See also Michael Barlette and Christina Ellington, “Foreign Suppliers to Iran’s Nuclear Development”, (Ibid., November 1998), at http://cns.miis.edu 32 Yiftah Shapir, “Proliferation of Nonconventional Weapons in the Middle East” in Shlomo Gazit and Zeev Eytan (eds.), The Middle East Military Balance 1993–1994 (Tel Aviv: the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 1994), pp. 223–224. 33 For a recent discussion on China’s military relations with Iran, see Jonathan Reynhold, “China’s Cautious New Pragmatism in the Middle East,” Survival 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 106–109. 34 Mark Hibbs, “China Agrees to End Nuclear Trade with Iran When Two Projects Completed,” NuclearFuel, 3 November 1997, p. 3. 35 Byman and Cliff, China’s Arms Sales, op. cit., p. xi and pp. 235–236. 36 Gill, Chinese Arms Transfers, op. cit., pp. 112–113. 37 Daily Telegraph (London), 15 September 1997. 38 Byman and Cliff, China’s Arms Sales, op. cit., p. xi. 39 Rabin agreed, in return, to stop all military co-operation with Taiwan. 40 Based on reports in the Israeli press, 24 October 1995. 41 Byman and Cliff, China’s Arms Sales, op, cit., pp. 47, xii.


42 Yitzhak Shichor, “China’s Economic Relations with the Middle East: New Dimensions,” China Report 34, nos. 3–4 (1998), pp. 426–430. The current 60 per cent Middle Eastern share in China’s oil imports is expected to rise to 90 per cent by the end of the decade. 43 Alexander T.Lennon, “Trading Guns, Not Butter: Chinese Arms Exports”, The China Business Review, March-April 1994, p. 47–49. 44 On 21 November 2000 Reuters reported that President Bill Clinton had granted a waiver sanctions against China for past missile technology transfers, based on China’s Foreign Ministry pledge to clean up its act on arms technology exports. Instead, sanctions have been imposed on the recipient countries, Iran and Pakistan. For an earlier comment on this issue, see Phillip C.Saunders and Evan S.Medeiros, “Don’t Push China on Proliferation,” Los Angeles Times, 18 November 1999.

Index

Abdul Rahman 231, 232 Abdurrahman Wahid 182, 183, 194, 195–198, 200, 202 Alwi Shihab 195, 197 Amien Rais 183 Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) 186, 189, 201 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement, the 231 Aquino, Corazon 223, 256 Arbatov, Georgy 91, 99 Armed Forces Modernisation Bill, Philippines 263 Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the 259, 260, 262 arms manufacture China 43, 46, 47 arms sales China 15, 17, 43, 308–309, 313 to Iran 321, 322 to Iraq 321, 322 to the Middle East 318, 319, 320, 321–322 to Saudi Arabia 327–329 see also East Wind Missile, the to Syria 326–327 Russia 17, 322 US 75 Arunachal Pradesh, dispute over 293, 295 Asia-Pacific Economic Co- operation (APEC) 221, 259 Asian financial crisis, the 193, 194, 263 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 14, 118, 157, 197, 201, 202, 207–208, 209, 211, 212, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 225,

235, 239, 250, 254, 256, 261, 264, 267, 269fn, 276, 281, 282, 287, 288, 300, 302, 303, 315 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the 220, 221, 222, 223, 230, 243, 252, 257, 258, 261 Bandung Conference, the 308 Basic Law, Hong Kong 135, 143, 150fn Blair, Tony 137 Bush, George W. 31, 64, 69, 72, 73, 74, 83, 151, 301, 313 Bush, George Snr. 69

Cambodia, Vietnamese invasion of 127fn, 208, 211, 240, 256, 271, 273, 274 Carter, Jimmy 72, 116 Chen Shui-ban 65, 69, 70, 75, 78, 79, 83 Chiang Kai-shek 70, 130 see also Kuomintang Chi Haotian 173, 259, 276, 282, 284, 284, 284 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the 21, 51, 70, 73, 75, 76, 86fn, 130, 131, 133, 145, 173, 175, 209, 275, 283 Chirac, Jacques 123 Clinton, Bill 2, 66, 67, 69 71, 73, 83, 299, 301, 312, 337fn Cold War, the 9, 43, 50–51, 52, 55, 57, 66, 84fn, 152, 209, 219, 222, 225, 253, 265, 307, 308 Communist Party of Japan, the 155

339

340 INDEX

Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the 14, 239 Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP), the 253, 254 comprehensive national power (CNP) 23, 37 comprehensive security, Japan 152 constructive engagement policy, US 12, 65, 84 confidence-building measures (CBMs) 258, 259, 260, 264, 267 Cook, Robin 138 Council for Asia-Europe Co operation, the 126 Crestone Energy Corporation, the 256, 277–278, 280, 287 Cultural Revolution, the 115, 134, 150, 253, 271, 294 Da Ba Dau 277 see also South China Sea dispute, the and Spratly Islands, the Da Lac Reef 217, 278 see also South China Sea dispute, the Dalai Lama, the 15, 142, 294, 312 De Villa, Renato 259 Deng Xiaoping 2, 72, 76, 79, 83, 91, 209, 240, 256 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan 65, 78 Do Muoi 275, 278, 282 East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), the 248 East Wind Missile, the 327–329 see also arms sales, China to Saudi Arabia economic development, China 22, 23, 27–28, 29, 32, 2, 35, 37, 43, 47, 48, 51, 53, 312 economic growth, China 1, 13, 17, 34, 39, 48, 49, 53, 125, 155, 157, 168 environmental threat, China as 123– 124 Estrada, Joseph 260 ethnic-Chinese in Indonesia 184–187, 188, 190, 191–193, 198–200

in Malaysia 232, 236, 238–239 in Russia, 88, 94 in the Philippines 253–254 in Vietnam 271 European Convention of Human Rights, the 122 see also human rights European Union (EU) 12, 13, 119, 120, 141, 142, 148, 149, 220, 303 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Malaysia 241 Philippines 262 Vietnam 283 Executive Council, Hong Kong 133 Fernandes, George 300, 314 Fiery Cross Reef 245, 263 see also Spratly Islands and South China Sea dispute, the Five Power Defence Arrangements, the (FPDA) 223–225 Five Principles of Peace Co- existence, the 304 Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) report, the 130, 137–144, 147, 149fn Four Modernisations, the 240 Four-Party Talks, the 177 foreign relations, China Sino-US 11–12, 13, 30–31, 32, 42–63, 64–84, 115, 168, 176, 182fn, 208, 220– 221, 237, 238, 271, 308, 312, 325 Sino-British 13, 129–149 Sino-Indian 15, 292–305 Sino-Indonesian 14, 182–203, 204fn, 205fn Sino-Japanese 84, 151–163, 164fn, 238 Sino-Korean 13, 26, 56–57, 59, 77, 138, 167–178, 179fn, 180fn, 302 see also Korean Peninsula Sino-Malaysian 14, 230, 250 Sino-Pakistani 15, 298, 307–316 Sino-Philippine 14–15, 252-267 Sino-Singaporean 14, 207–226 Sino-Russian/Soviet 12, 86–109, 115, 116, 120, 212, 238, 294, 302

INDEX 341

Sino-Taiwanese 2, 4, 10, 11, 12, 17, 20, 32, 34, 64–84, 118-119, 121, 214– 216 Sino Vietnamese 15, 76, 119, 127fn, 269–288 Gaydar, Yegor 99 Ghandi, Rajiv 295, 314 Goh Chok long 212, 213, 217–218, 220, 223 Gorbachov, Mikhail 92, 127fn, 273, 274 Gore, Al 64, 72 Greater China 4–5, 23 Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere 153 Gromyko, Andrei 309 Gulf War, the 48, 322 Hays, Ronald J. 325 Hu Jiantao 173, 197, human rights 2, 12, 35, 71, 116, 121– 123, 127, 137–143, 200, 220–221 Hussein Onn 240 Hong Kong Act, US 136 Hong Kong, British governance of 130– 131, 134 Hong Kong, retrocession of 4, 13, 76, 129, 130, 135, 136 India-Pakistan War (1965), the 309 Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), the see Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the 184, 186, 187, 188, 193 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) 118 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the 329, 330 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 139 see also human rights International Labour Organisation (ILO), the 139 International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 195, 197 international relations theory 6–9, 51

Iran-Iraq War, the 325 Ivanov, Igor 104 Japanese Defence Agency (JDA), the 163 Jayakumar, Shunmugan 218, 226fn Jiang Zemin 22, 28, 67, 69, 71, 72, 78, 82, 84, 173, 216, 257, 259, 275, 278, 281, 295, 314, 326, 332 Joint Liason Group (JLG), Hong Kong 143 Johnston Reef 273 see also South China Sea dispute, the Kashmir dispute, the 308, 313, 314 Khmer Rouge, the 271, 274 Kim II Sung 70, 174 Kissinger, Henry 66, 67, 85fn, 115, 237 Koh, Tommy 228fn Korean Peninsula, the future of 13, 56– 57, 77, 261 strategic interests in 26, 56, 57, 59, 138, 169, 173, 174, 175–177, 302 see also, Sino-Korean relations Korean War, the 70, 115, 131, 134, 138, 169 Kosovo, conflict in 32, 70, 120, 298 Koizumi, Junichiro 162 Kuomintang (KMT) 70, 130, 145, 214, 253 Laurel, Salvador 268fn Le Duc Anh 275, 284 Legislative Council, Hong Kong 130, 133 Le Kha Phieu 284, 284, 284, 287 Lee Hsien Loong 223, 228fn Lee Kuan Yew 35, 209, 214, 215, 216, 219, 220, 221, 223, 226fn, 226fn, 229fn Lee Teng-Hui 67, 69, 71, 74, 76, 83, 143, 215 Line of Actual Control (LOAC), the 295, 297, 299 Li Peng 22, 173, 217, 278, 279–280, 281– 282, 283, 306fn, 332 Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, the 162, 166

342 INDEX

Macau, retrocession of 4, 76, 134 Mahathir Mohamad 14, 242, 247– 248, 249 Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF), the 240, 244, 245, 247, 250 Manila Pact, the 231 Mao Zedong 70, 71, 79, 83, 91, 115,122, 130, 131, 153, 231, 236, 290fn, 294 Maoism 79, 92 military acquisitions, China 43, 46–47, 212 military spending, China 28–29, 37, 155, 212, 213 226fn military modernisation programme, China 4, 11, 13, 17, 23, 32, 43, 44–46, 49, 212–213, 214, 245, 262, 269 Milosevich, Slobodan 120 Mischief Reef 15, 217, 227fn, 243, 252, 257–258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266, 267fn see also Spratly Islands and South China Sea dispute, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the 121, 299, 313, 320, 327 Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, US 221 Muhammad Hatta 184 Municipal Council, Hong Kong 130 National People’s Congress, China 138 Najib Tun Razak 243 Nansha Islands, the 241 see also Spratly Islands, the Natuna Islands, the 201–202 see also South China Sea dispute, the Nehru, Jawaharlal 294, 304, 305 New Economic Policy (NEP), Malaysia 238 New Order regime, Indonesia 183, 186, 188, 189, 193, 197, 198 Nguyen Co Thach 274 Nguyen Manh Canh 279, 280 Nguyen Van Linh 278 Nixon, Richard 66, 72, 74, 237, 238 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the 189 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO), the 48, 80, 116, 120, 311, 312 Northern Diplomacy 172 nuclear co-operation Sino-Iranian 329–330 Sino-Syrian 330 Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 299, 320, 330 nuclear weapons testing China 155, 158 India 298, 299, 311 Pakistan 298, 299, 311 open door policy, China 33, 37, 158 organised crime, Chinese 124–125 Overseas Development Aid Programme (ODA), Japan 161, 162 Pacific Basin Economic Council, the 261 Paracel Islands, the 119, 155, 217, 218, 242, 277, 283 see also South China Sea dispute, the Patten, Chris 134–137, 147 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the commercial activities 212 in relation to Hong Kong 130–131, 145 military role 20, 29, 76–77, 84, 214, 328 political role 2, 47 see also Tiananmen Square incident, the and Korean War, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, the 284 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the 257, 259, 284 Peres, Shimon 332 Philippine Air Force (PAF), the 257, 260 Philippine National Security Council, the 263 Philippine Navy (PN), the 252, 257, 255, 263 PKI, the see Indonesian Communist Party, the Putin, Vladimir 104

INDEX 343

Qian Qichen 332 Ramos, Fidel 257, 259 Reagan, Ronald 72, 73, 74 Republican Party, US 69–70, 71, 74, 215 rising nationalism, China 5, 30, 34, 82, 159, 184, 199, 206fn Russia perceived sinofication of 88, 80, 93–95, 97, 98, 103 Russian Far East (RFE) 91–95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108 Scarborough Shoal 252, 260, 263, 264 see also South China Sea dispute, the sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) 216, 225 see also South China Sea dispute, the Self Defence Forces (SDF), Japan 162 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 155, 256 Severino, Rodolfo 256–257 Shafie, Ghazali 232, 238 Shanghai Communiqué, the 237–238 Shanghai Forum, the 104 Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), the 214, 225 Singh, Jaswant 300, 301, 306fn Sino-British Joint Declaration, the 134, 142, 143, 145, 148, 149fn, 150fn Sino-Indian Conflict, the 294, 304 Social Democratic Party of Japan 155, 161 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander 102 South China Sea dispute, the 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 26, 29, 119, 155, 156, 158, 201, 202, 209, 212, 216–218, 222, 223, 225, 227fn, 228fn, 229fn, 243, 244, 249, 252, 254, 256–261, 263, 264, 266, 270, 273, 277, 281, 282 South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation, the (SAARC) 298 Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ), the 300 see also nuclear weapons testing, India Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), the 231, 307, 308

Spratly Islands, the 14, 29, 33, 155, 216, 218, 220, 225, 227fn, 241–247, 249, 252, 256, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 269fn, 277, 278, 280, 281, 283, 284 see also Fiery Cross Reef or Nansha Islands, the and South China Sea dispute, the Suharto 182, 186, 189, 193, 194, 201, 202 Sukarno 182, 186, 194, 202 Swallow Reef 241 see also South China Sea dispute, the Taliban, the 298, 306fn, 314, 316 see also Xinjiang, separatists in Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, US 69, 215 Taiwan Straits, strategic interests in 13, 17, 26, 31, 34, 56–57, 64–84, 118–119, 155, 156, 158, 160, 209, 214, 223, 254 Tan, Tony 218, 227fn, 228fn, 229fn Territorial Waters Law, China 155, 157, 256 Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) 57, 62, 69, 83, 161, 163, 175, 181fn, 301, 313 Third World, the 235–236, 319 Tiananmen Square incident, the 2, 5, 11, 85fn, 118, 145, 155, 175, 187, 269 Treaty of Amity and Concord, ASEAN 281 Truman, Harry S. 70 Tun Razak 232, 235, 236, 237, 238–240 United Nations (UN), the 75, 94, 121, 122, 123, 127, 131, 135, 140, 140, 141, 218, 232, 235, 236, 279, 299, 300, 308, 309, 319 United Nations Charter on Political and Civil Rights, the 122 see also human rights United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 218, 258, 262, 266 United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHCR), the 123, 141 see also human rights

344 INDEX

United Nations Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEF), the 121 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, the 140 see also human rights US-China Bilateral Agreement, the 312 US-Japan Security Treaty, the 153, 161, 222, 302 US-Philippine Mutual Defence Treaty, the 264 US policy, China 26, 38, 55, 182fn Vaipayee, A. B. 294, 300 Vietnam Communist Party (VCP), the 271, 273, 274, 275, 277, 281, 283, 284, 284 Vietnam People’s Army 275 Vietnam War, the 238, 239, 240 Vienna Declaration, the 140 see also human rights Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), Philippines 263, 269fn weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 57, 120, 177, 300, 320, 333 World Bank, the 1, 157, 197 World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 34, 78, 79, 80, 82, 126, 128, 148, 221, 303, 311, 312 Xinjiang, separatists in 121, 292, 313– 314, 316 see also Taliban, the Yang Shangkun 329 Yeo, George 217, 220, 223 Yeltsin, Boris 101, 104, 106 Zheng Ho 191 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir 101 Zhu Rongji 22, 74, 173, 249, 313 Zhou Enlai 67, 85fn, 153, 237, 239, 294, 308

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