Crisis Management in the European Union: Cooperation in the Face of Emergencies

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Crisis Management in the European Union

Stefan Olsson (Ed.)

Crisis Management in the European Union Cooperation in the Face of Emergencies

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Dr. Stefan Olsson Swedish Defence Research Agency Gullfossgatan 6 SE-16490 Stockholm Sweden [email protected]

ISBN 978-3-642-00696-8 e-ISBN 978-3-642-00697-5 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-00697-5 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2009926024 # Springer-Berlin Heidelberg 2009 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Cover design: WMXDesign GmbH, Heidelberg, Germany Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Preface

The interest in the European Union as a crisis manager has grown intensely during the last years. Large-scale accidents – floods, forest fires and terrorist attacks – do not recognise national borders, and policy makers have increasingly realised that cooperation within the Union is a necessary prerequisite for efficient crisis management. As an agency for defence and security studies, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) has for more than a decade closely followed the development within the sphere of European crisis management, and is today regularly engaged as a consultant on security issues within the Union by the Swedish Government. Based on our experience, we have come to understand that knowledge of the features of the EU crisis management system is not widely spread, either among the Member States or within the EU itself. The system is still being developed and basic information on how the system works is not easy to obtain. Therefore we decided to write this book. The content is based on our work as advisors to government agencies in Sweden. It gives a basic introduction to the system, both to specific details and to its overall context. We hope that it will be useful for anyone interested in the working of crisis management within the EU – policy makers, researchers, journalists and students. As the authors, we would like to thank FOI for giving us the opportunity to write this book. FOI is a Swedish government agency, but the responsibility of the contents of the book rests solely with the authors. We thank Professor Bengt Sundelius from the Swedish National Defence College and Doctor Mark Rhinard, Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, for reviewing the book. Further, we would like to thank the following persons for expert advice and for reading and commenting on the manuscript: Giorgio Porzio, EU Joint Situation Centre, Mats Lundstro¨m, Swedish Ministry of Defence, Thomas Enestro¨m at the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and Karl So¨renson, Carolina Sando¨, Jo¨rgen Lindstro¨m and Eva Mittermaier at FOI.

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Finally, we would like to encourage readers to communicate to us comments and suggestions of possible future editions. The field of crisis management in the European Union is constantly changing. This book is our portrait of the system as it is today, and we would be happy to include insights from all the corners of Europe. Stockholm, May, 2009

Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1

Understanding the Crisis Management System of the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Per Larsson, Eva Hagstro¨m Frisell, and Stefan Olsson

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The EU Policy-Making Process and Crisis Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Eva Hagstro¨m Frisell

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The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Madelene Lindstro¨m

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Rapid Alerts for Crises at the EU Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Sanna Zandeń Kjelleń

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The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection and the European Union Solidarity Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 ˚ hman and Claes Nilsson Teresa A

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EU Consular Cooperation in Crisis Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Madelene Lindstro¨m

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The Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Per Larsson

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Counter-Terrorism in the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Anna Utterstro¨m

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The Future of Crisis Management within the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Stefan Olsson and Per Larsson Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

About the Authors

Stefan Olsson (editor), is Doctor of Philosophy in political science. He is currently active at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) as Researcher. Previously he was an assistant professor at the Department of Government, Uppsala University. Stefan has published works on the crisis management system of the health care sector of the EU and on the rule of law during crisis decision making. Per Larsson, holds a PhD in political science from Lund University. He has since 1997 worked as Analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). His main area of research is different aspects of crisis management in the public sector. Lately focus in his research has been on crisis management cooperation on the European level and integration with the national crisis management system of Sweden. He was expert at the Swedish Tsunami Commission which evaluated the handling of the tsunami by the Swedish Government and central agencies. Eva Hagstro¨m Frisell, works as Senior Analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Her main area of research is the development of the European Union crisis management capability. She has published works on EU military capabilities, crisis management, counter-terrorism and EU-Russia relations. She holds a Master of Social Sciences and has previously served as Research Assistant at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and as intern at the European Commission. Sanna Zandeń Kjelleń, works as strategic adviser on EU affairs at the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). She holds a Master of Political Sciences, major in Political Science Department of Government, Uppsala University. Her main research interest is in the field of European security and crisis management. She previously held a position as European security expert at the Swedish Ministry of Defence and as an analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Madelene Lindstro¨m, works as an analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). She holds a Master of Political Sciences, major in Political Science Department of Government, Uppsala University. She has previously served as intern at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Department for European

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About the Authors

Union and the correspondent section and she has also written a Minor Field Study for Uppsala University and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. Her main research interest is in the field of European security and crisis management. Claes Nilsson, works as Analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) specialising in crisis management and civil-military coordination. His research has involved different aspects of European Union crisis management, ranging from humanitarian aid to peacekeeping operations. Claes is currently working with conceptual development regarding civil-military approaches to crisis management. He holds a Master of Political Sciences from So¨derto¨rn University College. Anna Utterstro¨m, works as an analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). She holds a Master of Political Sciences from Uppsala University and a law degree from Stockholm University. Anna’s research involves a broad spectrum of issues within the framework of European Union crisis management, ranging from humanitarian aid and civil protection to different aspects of the the European Security and Defence Policy. She currently holds a position as European security expert at the Swedish Ministry of Defence. ˚ hman, works as an analyst at Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Teresa A She holds a Master of Political Sciences from Uppsala University including a Bachelor of Political Science from the European Studies Programme, from So¨derto¨rn University College. She has studied at the Institute of Political Studies in Bordeaux (l’Institut d’E´tudes Politiques de Bordeaux, IEP) and has served as intern at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Departement for Security Policy. Her main research interest is in the field of European security and crisis management. She is currently holding a position as European security expert at the Swedish Ministry of Defence, where she works on matters related to EU civilian crisis management.

Abbreviations

ADNS ARGUS ASEAN CCC CCA CECIS CI CIP CIWIN CNI COCON COREPER COREU COSI CVO DG DG JLS DG RELEX EADRCC EAS ECDC ECHO ECI ECURIE EEA EFSA EPCIP ESDP EUROJUST

Animal Disease Notification System The Commission’s internal general rapid alert system Association of Southeast Asian Nations Cross-cutting criteria Crisis Coordination Arrangements Common Emergency and Communication Information System Critical infrastructure Critical infrastructure protection Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network Critical national infrastructure Working Party on Consular Cooperation Permanent Representatives Committee Correspondance Europeénne Committee on internal security (Treaty of Lisbon) Working group of Chief Veterinary Officers of the Member States Directorate-General Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security Directorate-General for External Relations Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response and Coordination Centre European External Action Service (Treaty of Lisbon) European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department European critical infrastructure European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange European Economic Area European Food Safety Authority European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection European Security and Defence Policy European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit xi

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EUROPHYT EUROPOL EUSF EWRS FRONTEX GAERC IAEA ICT JHA JRC MEP MIC ODA OIE OSP PPCT

PROCIV RAPEX RAS RAS BICHAT RAS CHEM RASFF SG/HR SitCen SLO UN OCHA WHO

Abbreviations

European Network of Plant Health Information Systems European Police Office European Union Solidarity Fund Early Warning and Wesponse System for Communicable Diseases European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders The General Affairs and External Relations Council International Atomic Energy Agency Information and communication technology Justice and Home Affairs Council European Commission Joint Research Centre Member of the European Parliament Monitoring and Information Centre Official Development Aid World Organisation for Animal Health Operator security plan Prevention, preparedness and consequence management of terrorism and other security related risks (i.e. the financial programme connected to EPCIP) Working Party on Civil Protection Rapid Alert System for Non-Food Products Rapid alert system Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats Rapid Alert System for Chemical Threats Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed Secretary-General/High Representative EU Joint Situation Centre Security Liaison Officer United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs World Health Organisation

Chapter 1

Understanding the Crisis Management System of the European Union Per Larsson, Eva Hagstro¨m Frisell and, Stefan Olsson

Introduction In less than a decade, Europe has witnessed a series of large-scale natural disasters and two large terrorist attacks. Traditionally, incidents of this kind have been the sole responsibility of the individual Member States. However, a growing concern among the members of the European Union about the trans-national effects of these incidents has caused them to ask for more cooperative arrangements within the field of disaster and crisis management. As a result, during the last years, the European Union has gradually developed a system of common arrangements for handling large-scale emergencies or disasters. It is a system still under construction. Some parts are in place and operative on a daily basis, some parts are ready to be used but have never been tested and some parts are still being developed. These common arrangements are new and original insofar as they not only tie the national crisis management systems of the Member States together, but also crisis management arrangements within different policy sectors of the Union, and with an all-hazard approach. European cooperative arrangements for managing emergencies within specific sectors have been present for many years. What is new is the ambition to tie them altogether into a coherent crisis management system of the European Union. This development towards a common system for crisis management has come about rather quickly and very much in an ad hoc manner. The result of this irregular growth of new common arrangements has been the creation of a system that seems disorganised. Different types of cooperative initiatives exist almost everywhere, they overlap, they are founded on different legal documents or different treaties, and they play different roles in different stages of a crisis, some are operative on a daily basis while some are sleeping until activated. It is an unfortunate trait of the system that it appears impenetrable for most people. For newcomers to the field of crisis management within the EU it is very easy to get lost. The system itself, as it is today, is confusing, but things are not made easier by the fact that it is hard to find comprehensible information on how everything

S. Olsson (ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union, DOI: 10.1007/978‐3‐642‐00697‐5_1, # Springer‐Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

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works. As yet, the European Union as an organisation has not developed a selfimage of its own system of crisis management. There are no brochures, no website and no guidebook that can give an accurate and complete description. Anyone who enters the field is left on his own. One can hear even experienced researchers complain loudly about how hard it is to get basic information about the design of the system. The purpose of this book is to provide exactly this very much needed introduction to the crisis management system of the European Union.

Crisis Management By and For the Union When writing about crisis management it is initially necessary to sort out some concepts, the most important one being ‘‘crisis’’. It is a word used in many contexts and sometimes even overused. What we refer to as a crisis is the large-scale incident that comes unexpectedly, calls for immediate action and threatens the fundamental values of the society. Examples of typical crises are earthquakes, out of control wild fires, terrorist attacks or pandemics. Characteristic of these types of incidents is that they cannot be handled through everyday routines and existing resources.1 Accordingly it is already important, here at the outset of the book, to explain that this book is about crisis management understood as disaster management or emergency management, i.e. the handling of large-scale incidents. The book does not cover military or civilian crisis management in response to crisis situations in third countries. We need to point this out since the general field of crisis, disaster and emergency management does not have any commonly accepted definition on how to use different terms. In addition to these three concepts, one can find even more: civil contingency, business management contingency, societal security, societal resilience, etc. In addition, in the EU context, the concept crisis management has primarily been used in reference to military and civilian interventions within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy, ESDP. Thus, the book takes its starting point in the midst of a conceptual confusion. One way to solve this problem would have been to accept the language established by EU scholars, which would have meant that we would have refrained from using the concept of crisis management and instead talked about disaster management. We decided not to do this for two reasons. First, although EU scholars and many civil servants in the Member States and the EU think of crisis management as interventions within ESDP, this group is still a minority in relation to all the other people who work with crisis management issues in some respect. We expect this book to be read by government officials all over Europe (and maybe also in other parts of the world) who work with all types of crises: hurricanes, earthquakes, 1

Compare for example: Drennan and McConnell (2007, pp. 14–17); Smith and Elliot (2006, pp. 1–7); Boin et al. (2005, pp. 1–4); Hillyard (2000, pp. 1–8).

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pandemics, nuclear accidents, etc. People working with ESDP operations are not alone in using this concept. Second, although disaster management, as the most frequently used concept in the English language, may have suited the book well, it is somewhat too narrow. It primarily refers to preparing for and managing the consequences of a disaster. Focus is on the operations of the agencies at the ground level. The crisis management of the EU also covers the political dimension. As will be noted by the reader, one of the EU’s main responsibilities is to coordinate and support measures taken by the Member States. This is done not only with the purpose of assisting the Member States but also to sustain the stability of the political system of the Union. The idea is that the EU itself, the political system of the Union, should be able to handle large-scale incidents which affect more than one country. This is often referred to in the literature as crisis management.2 Many of the EU arrangements portrayed in this book also bear the word crisis in their names such as Crisis Coordination Arrangements, Crisis Steering Group or Crisis Coordination Committee. The type of crisis management referred to in this book can in rough terms be defined as crisis management by and for the Union. As mentioned above, the EU crisis management system as a whole covers many different policy sectors. Cooperative arrangements can be found within sectors such as the nuclear industry, public health, consumers’ safety, animal health and many more. In this book, however, we focus on the arrangements that connect all these sector-specific arrangements into an integrated whole. These types of arrangements are generally referred to as all-hazard arrangements. All-hazard means that they are supposed to handle all kinds of incidents. The most typical example is the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. This arrangement (presented in Chap. 5) connects civil protection agencies of the Member States and coordinates mutual assistance. It does not deal with a specific type of crisis. Civil protection is about protection against all types of hazards. An arrangement like ECURIE (see Chap. 4) on the other hand handles only nuclear incidents. ECURIE is a joint arrangement for crisis management between the Member States but only in one specific policy sector. Both sector-specific and all-hazard arrangements make up the EU crisis management system. The all-hazard arrangements though are the ones tying the system together. It is these cross-sectorial arrangements with an all-hazard profile that are the focus of this book. These are the arrangements that make the joint EU crisis management initiatives a system rather than just a heap of different cooperative arrangements, stacked on top of each other, with no cross-sectorial organisation at all. Taken together, these cross-sectorial and all-hazard arrangements resemble, although in vague terms, the type of crisis management system one can find at the national level. Similar to the national systems, its focus is on the Union itself,

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See for example Drennan and McConnell (2007); Smith and Elliot (2006); Canton (2007, pp. 305–333); Moore and Lakha (2006, pp. 83–106); Hillyard (2000); Boin et al. (2005).

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rather than on disasters and crises in other countries. It is a system for the protection of the Union together with its Member States and citizens. This is the system that we refer to as the crisis management system of the European Union. Perhaps it is too early to talk about such a system at all, since there is no grand master plan behind it. It is a system that has evolved more or less spontaneously, but gradually it has come to take on more and more characteristics of an integrated crisis management system similar to the ones at the national level.

The Emergence of a Crisis Management System As a political union, the EU deals with a great many policy sectors that have steadily increased in number since the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 laid the foundation for the present Union. Today, cooperation in the EU does not cover all the policy sectors of a national state, but cooperation is nonetheless conducted within more than 30 main policy sectors, including, for example, such different sectors as Foreign and Security Policy and Food Safety. A number of these policy sectors can be subject to transnational crises. The EU has therefore established different crisis management arrangements within and between policy sectors. Cooperation concerning crisis management has, however, evolved very slowly since the signing of the treaty of the ECSC, which initially was not at all intended as a community to manage societal crises. It is only in the last decades that such cooperation has been raised as an important policy issue for the Union. The main driving force behind this development has been a number of largescale crises that have taken place in Europe, or in other continents, which have forced the Member States and the EU institutions to pay attention to the development of a crisis management capability within the Union.3 Disasters and crises that have spurred the development of crisis management arrangements are, for example: the disaster in a chemical industrial plant in Seveso in Italy 1976; the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster 1986; the outbreak of BSE (‘‘mad cow disease’’) in 1996; the flooding in Central Europe 2002; the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003; the Avian flu; and to a high degree the terror attacks in the USA 2001 (9/11), Madrid 2004 and London 2005. In the aftermath of the BSE and SARS crises, the EU intensified its efforts to address the cross-border effects of human health and food safety risks. The EU established links between national health officials, created rapid alert systems, formulated common protocols for dealing with epidemics in the Member States, and established the European Centre for Disease Prevention (ECDC).4 The EU

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See for example: Boin et al. (2007); Larsson (2007); Boin and Rhinard (2008). Boin and Rhinard (2008, p. 12).

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response to the 9/11 attacks in 2001 was to enact the Plan of Action on CounterTerrorism, which included increased cooperation on air transport security and several measures in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. After the US anthrax attacks in 2001, new initiatives were formulated in the area of bioterrorism and chemical weapons. Administrative units were created in the EU, both in the Commission and the Council, to coordinate national reactions to the spread of dangerous pathogens. The terror attacks together with the tsunami disaster 2004/2005 revealed the lack of crisis management arrangements for coordination at the highest political level, which triggered the establishment of the socalled Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) in 2006. The tendency of the EU to establish crisis management arrangements after crises have occurred makes the nature of crisis management cooperation in the European Union highly event driven and reactive, which is normally also the case for national crisis management. Another important driving force for increased cooperation on crisis management is the Member States’ growing understanding of their interdependency, for example regarding the energy, transport and financial infrastructure. This has occurred at the same time as the Member States have become increasingly aware of the fact that a growing number of threats against their societies are of a transnational nature and that they can only be prevented or managed at the European level.5 At the same time, yet another driving force behind the improvement of the EU’s capability to combat terrorism and manage the consequences of a terrorist attack has been the massive political pressure that the US has put on the European Union after the 9/11 attacks. An in-built tension in the EU cooperation on crisis management relates to the division of responsibilities between the national and the EU-level. On the one hand, the Member States are in many instances unwilling to give up policy-making autonomy in exchange for coordination at the EU-level. Security and crisis management issues are usually regarded as the core responsibility of the nation-state by the citizens of the Member States. Political leaders in the Member States are therefore very sensitive about being accused of giving up national sovereignty even if it can be regarded as the most rational thing to do from a crisis management perspective.6 The situation is especially complicated in federal Member States where the responsibility for crisis management matters is the primary responsibility of the federal governments and not of the central government. This is the case for example in Germany regarding civil protection. This state of affairs means that even the domestic negotiation processes in the Member States concerning crisis management cooperation can be intricate and protracted and negatively affect the EU policy-making process. On the other hand, the notion of solidarity between Member States has over the years become increasingly important. The large-scale disasters affecting the Union have increased the willingness of the Member States to support each other in crisis

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Boin and Rhinard (2008); Larsson (2007). Boin and Rhinard (2008, p. 11).

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situations. This development paved the way for the introduction of a specific Solidarity Clause in the proposed constitutional treaty in 2003. The Solidarity Clause stated that the Member States must act jointly and in the spirit of solidarity if one of them is the victim of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster. The notion of solidarity reappeared in the Declaration on Solidarity against Terrorism, which was proclaimed by the Heads of State and Government after the Madrid bombings in 2004.7 This declaration applies exclusively to terrorist attacks, but in 2007 the Solidarity Clause was reintroduced in the Treaty of Lisbon.8 The inclusion of the Solidarity Clause provides the ground for enhanced cooperation on crisis management in the EU and may be used by actors supporting such a development. Since the treaty lacks specific instructions regarding the implementation of the solidarity clause, its effect on crisis management cooperation at the EU level is, however, uncertain at the time of writing this book.9 Despite the introduction of a number of crisis management arrangements in different policy sectors and at different levels in the EU, today, as mentioned earlier, no crisis management machinery in the EU exists that comes close to the nature of the Member States’ national crisis management systems. What we can distinguish today is a system under construction. It initially developed within the different policy sectors without a clear strategy for how crisis management arrangements in the separate sectors should be coordinated with each other. It is only in recent years that coordination of separate crisis management arrangements in the EU has come into focus.

The Added Value of Cooperation at the EU Level For the individual Member State and its citizens, cooperation at the EU level may in several ways provide an added value to national crisis management measures. Our previous research efforts have identified at least six reasons why increased cooperation can strengthen the single Member State’s crisis management capabilities.10

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Declaration on Combating Terrorism, European Council, Brussels, 25 March 2004. Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, article 222. The solidarity clause reads as follows: The Union and its Member States must act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or a victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union must mobilise all instruments at its disposal, including the military instruments of the Member States, to: (a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; (b) protect the democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; (c) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack; (d) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or a man-made disaster. 9 Instead, it is stated that such instructions must be determined by the Council on a joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy when ˚ hman and Larsson (2008). the treaty has become legally binding. A 10 Larsson (2007). 8


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The added value of cooperation presented below do not constitute a complete list and are not ranked in order of importance. They can, however, illustrate some of the reasons that come into play when Member States decide to cooperate on crisis management. It should be noted that some benefits may also apply to cooperation within other multilateral organisations, such as the UN, and to bilateral cooperation between states. The first added value is the formal and informal exchange of knowledge and best practices that take place between the Member States at meetings, conferences and exercises within the EU-framework. The EU gives the Member States’ national agencies, corporations and experts the opportunity to discuss crisis management problems, and to exchange experiences and bench-marks with their counter-parts in other Member States. This exchange of knowledge and best practices also gives the Member States an opportunity to influence the other Member States’ views on crisis management in a direction favourable to them. A second added value, closely related to the first, is the opportunity to benefit from the output of research conducted within the EU-framework and the possibility to finance national crisis management research by EU funds. The EU conducts crisis management-related research at the Joint Research Centre and supports crosssector research through its extensive research framework programme, in which a particular security theme was introduced in 2007. A third added value is that cooperation within the EU can lead to improved alertness and situation awareness in a Member State when it comes to detecting and managing a crisis. The Member States’ national capability to detect threats and comprehend a crisis situation is improved as national agencies function as contact points in the rapid alert systems that the EU has set up in different policy sectors. Improved crisis alertness and situation awareness can also be obtained through the EU-CCA and through direct contacts between the Member States’ national crisis management agencies. In short, the collective capacity of 27 Member States to detect threats and grasp the development of a transnational crisis situation is far more effective than the capacity of one single Member State. A fourth added value is that specific national crisis management measures may have an improved effect through coordination with other Member States. First, the effects of national measures to prevent crises are strengthened if they are coordinated at the European level with other Member States. For example, the improvement of security standards for airports and harbours in all Member States gives better national security for each Member State in comparison with improvement of isolated national standards. Second, the effect of national crisis management activities in response to a transnational crisis is strengthened if they are coordinated with other Member States’ corresponding activities. One example would be common policies for quarantines along the EU border during a pandemic. A fifth added value is that a Member State during or after a crisis can boost its own crisis management resources by requesting the support of other Member States. The EU has today different arrangements to coordinate and to facilitate such assistance, for example the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection and the procedures for consular cooperation in crisis situations in third countries.

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A sixth added value is the possibility to procure and pool certain crisis management resources, for example airplanes to fight wild fires, which otherwise constitute a heavy economic burden for many Member States. To pool such resources at the EU-level may lead to improved cost effectiveness. This idea is, however, very controversial in the EU and subject to intense debates in the field of civil protection.

Potential Problems with Cooperation at the EU Level While crisis management cooperation at the EU-level may provide an added value to the Member States’ national crisis management systems, there are also some potential problems and risks. These problems relate to the fact that international cooperation on crisis management also takes place outside the EU, for example in other multilateral organisations, such as the UN and NATO, and bilaterally or regionally between a limited number of states. Cooperation at the EU level may also draw resources from the improvement of national crisis management systems. As with the added values, the perceptions of these problems and risks vary between different Member States and EU actors and may change over time. Similarly, the list is not exhaustive, but illustrates some of the problems that Member States need to take into consideration.11 A first problem with the development of crisis management cooperation at the EU level is that such cooperation might duplicate international agreements and arrangements that already exist within the UN framework. In several sectors, the UN has developed advanced systems for crisis management which cover not only the EU Member States but also neighbouring countries and the rest of the world. In many instances, such broader international arrangements are essential for also improving crisis management in Europe, for example when it comes to nuclear security or the prevention of communicable diseases. The added value of duplicating such arrangements at the EU-level may therefore be questioned. A second problem with the promotion of cooperation at the EU level is that the Member States face different threats to their security. If Member States make different threat assessments and risk analyses, the added value of developing common arrangements or procuring common resources decreases. For instance, countries around the Mediterranean are threatened by wild fires whereas countries in Central Europe are more affected by floodings. Such regional variations may call for the development of regional or bilateral cooperation rather than cooperation at the EU level. A third problem with the development of collective crisis management arrangements at the EU level is the risk that Member States may benefit from the common system without making the proper national contribution. It is therefore essential that the development of a common crisis management system and the procurement of

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See Hagstro¨m Frisell and Utterstro¨m (2008) and Larsson (2007).


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common resources do not relieve the Member States of their national responsibility for providing security to their citizens. Finally, a fourth problem with EU level cooperation is that the EU policymaking process puts extensive demands on the national ministries and central agencies in charge of crisis management issues.12 In order to efficiently participate in the policy-making process and influence decision-making, national officials have to be updated on the issues that are on the EU’s agenda, process a large amount of both political and technical information, determine national positions and feed these back into the EU process. In addition, policies and standards agreed at the EU level need to be implemented at the national level and if necessary the Member States have to adapt existing national rules and regulations to EU requirements. This is particularly complicated if the national systems build on different organizing principles than those developed in the EU. Put together, cooperation at the EU level may draw scarce resources away from the necessary improvement and development of national crisis management systems. To conclude, the Member States and EU actors need to take both the potential added values and the potential problems with crisis management cooperation at the EU level into account when developing the EU crisis management system. It is by striking a balance between the two that an effective system can emerge.

Introducing the European Union’s Crisis Management System – a Map As will be evident by reading this book the system for crisis management of the EU is composed of a myriad of committees, directorates, agencies, units or offices. They are too many to keep in mind and it is difficult to keep track of where in the organisation of the European Union a particular instance has its place. It is therefore fitting to initially present a picture of what the crisis management system of the Union looks like framed as an organisational chart. Figure 1.1 presents something that could be called an aerial photography of the EU crisis management bureaucracy. This is what the system looks like from above. It shows a picture of the system, but it is not self-explanatory. It says nothing about how the system works. The role and functioning of the different parts of the system will be further explained in the different chapters. The map has some limits. Crisis management is an activity that encompasses many policy sectors and consequently involves many participants. But not all parts of the organisation that in some way come in contact with crisis management issues can be included, only those that in some way are directly involved. We have also limited the map to the Council and the Commission, since these are the two most important institutions for the crisis management system. The European Parliament and 12

Compare Jacobsson and Sundstro¨m (2006); Larsson (2007).

The European Commission

10

The Council of the European Union

Secretariat General of the European Commission Crisis Coordination Committee Crisis Management Unit (ARGUS)

Coreper

Presidency Directorates General

Crisis Steering Group (CCA)

Secretariat General of the Council of the European Union High representative/General Secretary SitCen Terrorism Coordinator

Working groups and committees PROCIV

Article 36 committee

COTER

TWG

(Working party on terrorism)

(Terrorist Working Group)

COCON

DG Environment Civil Protection unit MIC

DG Justice, Freedom and Security

DG Regional Policy European Union Solidarity Fund

DG Health and Consumers

DG Personnel and Administration Security Office (ARGUS)

There are in total 46 Directorates General and Services.

Implementing committees

Member States

Fig. 1.1 The crisis management bureaucracy of the European Union

P. Larsson et al.

Representatives of the Member States participate directly in the committees and working groups of the Council and the implementing committees of the Commission.

Agencies of the European Union (with crisis managements responsibilities) Europol (Police) Eurojust (Judicial cooperation) Frontex (Border control) EASA (Aviation Safety) ECDC (Disease prevention) EFSA (Food Safety) EMSA (Maritime safety) ENISA (Information security) ERA (Railroad safety)


11

the European Council (Head of States and Governments) only play a limited role in the policy making process. Another important thing to remember when studying the crisis management system of the European Union is that, when a crisis strikes, the system’s organisation changes to some extent. Responding to a crisis requires a different organisation than the regular one. This means that some of the arrangements at work during the response phase are sleeping. They do not really exist until activated. An example in point is the Crisis Coordination Arrangements, CCA, presented in Chap. 8.

The Crisis Management Cycle as a Conceptual Framework The EU crisis management arrangements and policy programmes that we present in this book are categorised on the basis of a conceptual framework that perceives crisis management as a cyclic phenomena that includes different phases. The phases are not, however, to be regarded as strictly separated from each other, they are in reality somewhat overlapping. The phases of the crisis management cycle are, as presented in Fig. 1.2 prevention, preparation, response and recovery.13 The prevention phase includes eliminating such conditions in a system (e.g. the transport system) that makes it vulnerable for different kinds of threats and malfunctions that in the worst case can trigger a crisis. It can, for example, include procedures for risk analysis and threat assessments. Such a procedure helps to identify and assess factors that can jeopardise an organisation’s operations. The

Prevention

Recovery

Preparation

Response

Fig. 1.2 The crisis management cycle

13

Drennan and McConnell (2007, pp. 25–26). See also Alexander (2002, pp. 1–11).

12

P. Larsson et al.

procedures also help to define preventive measures to reduce the probability of these factors from occurring. In other words, different systems can, on the basis of output from risk analyses and threat assessments, be designed or redesigned so that the unwanted conditions are eliminated or reduced. After threats have been reduced or eliminated, the next logical step is to strengthen capabilities to handle crisis incidents. The preparation phase thus includes making plans, developing arrangements and educating and training how to manage a crisis situation. It can, for example, involve contingency planning, which means making back-up plans that include strategies and actions how to handle an emergency situation and how to recover from such an emergency situation within the minimum amount of time and with the minimum cost and disruption. It can also include the development and implementation of organisational crisis management arrangements and procedures and educating and training the people and organisations that will work within those arrangements. The prevention phase and the preparation phase should not be seen as two phases that must occur at different points in time. The everyday work of identifying and reducing risks and preparing plans for dealing with risks is something that can be done simultaneously. From a strict logical point of view, however, one phase needs to follow the other. It is, of course, not possible to make contingency plans for threats that have not yet been identified. Thus, even though crisis management organisations work with identifying and reducing threats and making preparatory plans at the same point in time, it is, for the purpose of clarification, useful to think of these two phases as different parts of the crisis management cycle. The response phase covers the work during an actual incident, with the purpose to get control of the situation and to mitigate its negative consequences. It can, for example, be communication with media, strategic and operational coordination, priorities and management of measures and resources aimed at taking control of the situation. A distinction can in this context be made between the crisis management that is conducted at a high political and strategic level or at a lower administrative agency level in the EU. Finally, once the incident is over, the recovery phase follows. This phase covers measures taken in order to rebuild and restore what has been ruined or damaged during the crisis. The phase also includes evaluating strengths and weaknesses in the handling of the crisis and giving feedback for future improvements, in other words to learn for the future. These four phases characterise the work process of crisis management. They describe the logical work order for crisis managers. This does not mean, however, that the EU crisis management system described in this book is organised accordingly. Many of the arrangements and policy programmes we describe have relevance for more than one phase. For example, the Union’s rapid alert systems, which are described in Chap. 4, are mainly response oriented, but also act as guardians against upcoming crises, which also make them effective in the prevention phase. Another example would be the Union’s policy on consular crisis management (i.e. consular assistance during crises) that is described in Chap. 6. It is also mainly


13

oriented towards the response phase, but as is described in the chapter, consular crisis management includes work within all phases.

Arrangements, Institutions or Structures? Crisis management arrangements is a fundamental concept in the book, but far from unproblematic. When studying EU cooperative arrangements one faces a plethora of concepts in trying to define their character. Cooperative arrangements are called structures, initiatives, mechanisms, organisations, etc. From a strictly academic point of view, a useful concept covering all these types of arrangements, formal and informal, would be institutions. However, in the context of the European Union, institutions refer to the five branches of the Union as a political organisation (for example, the European Parliament or the Council). Only these are referred to as institutions. Thus, for the sake of clarification, we have decided to call all undertakings with the purpose of establishing some form of organisational cooperation arrangements. Organisational initiatives such as the European Union’s many rapid alert systems (Chap. 4) or its Community Mechanism for Civil Protection (Chap. 5) are consequently called arrangements regardless of what they are called by the EU agencies themselves. The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Chap. 3) and The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Chap. 8) are also both in some respect organisational initiatives. But so far they have not led to the establishment of any permanent organisational structures. Because of this, we have decided to refer to them only as policy programmes. Thus, arrangements refers to cooperative organisational structures that are put in place, and policy programmes to cooperative initiatives at the policy level.

The Organisation of the Book: The Chapters The focus of the book, on cross-sectorial and all-hazard crisis management arrangements and policy programmes, together with the crisis management cycle, have shaped the contents and outline of the book. As already mentioned, the crisis management system of the European Union as a whole is very large with cooperative arrangements in many corners. The idea guiding this book is not to cover all aspects of this myriad of arrangements and policies, but to give a picture of what the system looks like if regarded as an integrated system (or at least as integrated as it gets) where different arrangements and policy programmes interact. Accordingly, the selection of areas to cover has followed the idea that the book should cover all phases of the crisis management cycle and only include arrangements and policy

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programmes that have an all-hazard and cross-sectorial approach. We view these arrangements as the parts of the system that tie it together. Saying this, we think it is important to stress that this selection of areas to describe does not come naturally as a result of the EU’s own perspective on its system for crisis management, since it is doubtful whether the Union has such a perspective at all. It is also important to keep in mind that focusing on all-hazard arrangements will leave significant sector-specific arrangements out of the picture. For instance, one of the most developed sectors of joint crisis management is health security. And anyone who wishes to know everything about the EU crisis management system should of course also study each policy sector. Our book has not been written with this ambition in mind, but we do agree that there is also a need for an encyclopedia covering all crisis and security issues in the European Union. The order of presentation of the chapters follows the crisis management cycle. But before the actual presentation of the different arrangements and policy programmes, Chap. 2 presents the policy making process of the EU in order to describe the policy making side of crisis management within the Union. It presents the institutional setting, how different proposals are shaped and how they are implemented. The chapter also gives a summary of the changes that will come about if or when the Treaty of Lisbon is accepted by all Member States. Chapter 3 presents the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, EPCIP. As with many other initiatives for increased cooperation, this policy programme was initiated as a result of the increased concern for the threat of international terrorism. The establishment of the policy programme started in the aftermath of the Madrid and London bombings and is still under development. The aim of the programme is to identify infrastructures which are of critical importance for more than one Member State and to propose measures for their protection. In Chap. 4, the web of rapid alert and information exchange systems is introduced. Early warning and instant sharing of information is something that raises the capability of the Member States to respond to a crisis. For this reason, a number of communication systems have been implemented within different sectors in the EU. Through the different systems, the Member States are linked to each other and are able to communicate with all other Member States in a swift manner. Some of the systems are facilitated by computerised technology, others are mainly routines on how to share information. Alongside the alert systems of the different sectors, the Commission has also developed a cross-sectorial communication system, named ARGUS, which may be used in major crises when several policy sectors are affected. One of the most central pieces of the crisis management system is the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. The Mechanism, as it is called for short, is the cooperative arrangement for providing assistance for civil protection. Crises differ from normal emergencies in that they may exhaust a country’s resources. If that happens, a Member State may use the Mechanism to ask other Member States for help. This is done through the Directorate General for Environment and its Monitoring and Information Centre. How this works is explained in Chap. 5.


15

The same chapter also presents the European Union Solidarity Fund. If a country has been hit with a large natural disaster that has caused serious damage to living conditions, the environment or the economy, it may turn to the fund for financial assistance. The fund is managed by the Directorate General for Regional Policy and can only be used for major natural disasters. A very new field of cooperation that is likely to grow in the future is consular crisis management, which is presented in Chap. 6. By consular crisis management we mean assistance to private EU citizens affected by a crisis while being abroad. Today, cooperation in this field is limited, mainly consisting of voluntary cooperation regarding information exchange during evacuations. In view of incidents such as the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004 and the Lebanon Crisis 2006, more cooperative arrangements in this area are likely to come. EU citizens are travelling all over the world and are likely to become aware of their right to turn to any Member State’s embassy for assistance. In Chap. 7, the Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) are described. Although formally two sets of arrangements it is easier understood as one. It is the cooperative arrangement for crisis coordination at the highest political level. The CCA is not a permanent institution, but rather the work order that should be used if a major crisis erupts which affects several Member States and several policy sectors. It is not a decision making body per se, but an arrangement within the Council with the purpose to coordinate decision making between the Member States and EU institutions. The EU counter-terrorism policy is the only chapter deviating from the logic of following the crisis management cycle. As will be evident to the reader, the threat of international terrorism has played a major role in advancing EU crisis management cooperation in most sectors. For this reason, we have devoted a chapter on its own to the Union’s counter-terrorism policy. It can be described as the only common crisis management policy that focuses on all four phases at the same time. How this works is explained in Chap. 8. The final chapter concludes the book with a modest discussion on how to characterise the EU system of crisis management, and addresses some questions regarding its future development. The Treaty of Lisbon contains suggestions which will change several areas of crisis management if or when it is accepted. In addition there are also other ideas about where the EU crisis management system should go in the near future. These and other questions will mark the end of the book.

References ˚ hman T, Larsson P (2008) Lissabonfo¨rdragets konsekvenser fo¨r skydd och beredskap [The A Lisbon Treaty and Civil Protection]. Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm Alexander D (2002) Principles of emergency planning and management. Oxford University, New York

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Boin A, Rhinard M (2008) Managing transboundary crises: what role for the European Union. Int Stud Rev 10:1–26 Boin A, ‘t Hart P, Stern E, Sundelius B (2005) The politics of crisis management: public leadership under pressure. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Boin A, Ekengren M, Rhinard M (2006) The commission and crisis management. In: Spence D (ed) The European Commission. John Harper Publishing, London Boin A, Ekengren M, Rhinard M (eds) (2007) Protecting the European Union: policies, sectors and institutional solutions. National Defence College Acta B 38, Stockholm Canton L (2007) Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs. New Jersey, Wiley Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union Declaration on Combating Terrorism, European Council, Brussels, 25 March 2004 Drennan LT, McConnell A (2007) Risk and crisis management in the public sector. Routledge, New York Hagstro¨m Frisell E, Utterstro¨m A (2008) Svenska myndigheter – akto¨rer i EU: Handlingsplan fo¨r framtida kunskapsuppbyggnad och kompetensutveckling [Swedish Government Agencies – Actors in the EU: Road Map for Enhanced Knowledge and Training]. Krisberedskapsmyndigheten, Stockholm Hillyard MJ (2000) Public crisis management: how and why organisations work together to solve society’s most treating problems. Writers Club Press, Lincoln Jacobsson B, Sundstro¨m G (2006) Fra˚n hemva¨vd till inva¨vd: Europeisering av svensk fo¨rvaltning och politik. Liber AB, Malmo¨ Larsson P (2007) Fra˚n hemva¨vd till inva¨vd krisberedskap: Mo¨jligheter och utmaningar vid en europeiserad svensk krisberedskap [Europeanized National Emergency Preparedness: Oppertunities and Challenges for Sweden’s Emergency Preparedness]. Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm Moore T, Lakha R (eds) (2006) Tolley’s handbook of disaster and emergency management: principles and practice. Elsevier, Oxford Smith D, Elliot D (eds) (2006) Key readings in crisis management: systems and structures for prevention and recovery. Routledge, New York

Chapter 2

The EU Policy-Making Process and Crisis Management Eva Hagstro¨m Frisell

The cooperation on crisis management in the EU is the product of a unique policymaking process. This process can be described as an ongoing negotiation process involving a large number of participants both at the national and the EU-level. The results of the EU negotiation process are numerous and affect many aspects of the Member States’ national crisis management policies. In order to support improved crisis management, the EU may, for example, adopt rules and regulations, disburse funds or develop cooperative practices and arrangements. There is also a value in the process itself, as it creates a network where national and EU crisis management actors exchange information and best practices. This chapter will describe how new policies on crisis management are formed, drawing on examples from the different policy sectors in focus of this book. It will introduce the institutional set-up of the EU and explain how the EU institutions interact in the policy-making process of today. Although there are several informal influences in this process, the chapter will focus on the formal structure of the process since this structure constitutes the framework through which the Member States and other actors can influence policies. The newly proposed Treaty of Lisbon will, however, alter some of the basic features of the EU policy-making process. Although the Lisbon treaty is still pending ratification by all Member States, the changes it entails for crisis management will be discussed throughout the chapter. One fundamental characteristic of the EU policy-making process on crisis management is that it is to a large extent reactive. Policy initiatives on particular programmes and arrangements for crisis management are developed in the aftermath of crises that have affected the union. This is, however, no different from national policy-making processes on crisis management which also tend to be driven by recent events. In the EU, policy proposals can be put forward at the highest political level in order to demonstrate the willingness of the EU to address a particular threat. This is the case of the Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism, which was launched by the European Council shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. The experience of previous crises can also spur the EU institutions to prepare comprehensive policy proposals in order to improve the crisis management


17

E. Hagstro¨m Frisell

18

capacity in different policy sectors. For example, in 2005, the Commission, making reference to recent terrorist attacks, proposed a programme to enhance critical infrastructure protection in the union.

Introducing the EU Policy-Making Process of Today In order to explain how EU policies are formed, this chapter describes the EU as a political system. The notion of a political system was initially used to describe policy making in a nation state, but since the 1970s, political scientists increasingly apply the notion of a political system to the EU.1 Although the EU political system differs from that of individual states, it consists of the three basic components of any political system. In the EU, the political interests of the citizens of the union are the first component of the system. The citizens are represented by, for example interest groups, political parties and Member State governments, which pursue their political interests. This forms the input for the political decision making carried out by the EU institutions, which constitute the second component. The EU institutions in turn agree on political decisions, which are the third component of the system. These decisions lead to different outcomes which affect the Member States and thus the citizens, such as regulatory policies, disbursement of funds or policy coordination. In the end, these decisions feed back and affect the political interests of the citizens.2 This chapter focuses on the second component of the system, i.e. the role of the EU institutions in the policy-making process. However, the distinction between the three components of the system is not always clear cut. It is, for example, obvious that the EU institutions can also pursue particular interests in the policy-making process. The EU has, by formal definition, five institutions: l

l l l l

The Commission (or the European Commission, formally the Commission of the European Communities) The European Parliament The Council (formally the Council of the European Union) The Court of Justice The Court of Auditors

In addition, the European Council, which brings together the Heads of State and Government of the Member States and the Commission President, is an important body in the EU. Although not formally an EU institution, the European Council provides the general political guidelines for the development of the union.3 The 1

See for example Lindberg and Stuart (1970, pp. 63–65); Hix (2005, p. 2) and Tallberg (2007, p. 13). 2 Hix (2005, pp. 2–9). 3 Article 4, Treaty on European Union (consolidated text).

2 The EU Policy-Making Process and Crisis Management

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European Council should not be confused with the Council, which consists of ministers from the national governments of the Member States and formally adopts EU decisions and legislation. The EU institutions and their main functions are illustrated in the Fig. 2.1. All these institutions interact in the EU policy-making process, which is formed by both formal structures and informal practices. The formal structure of the process is determined by the treaties of the EU, consisting of the Treaty on European Union (originally the Maastricht treaty) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (originally the Rome treaty). By signing these treaties, the Member States have agreed to delegate decision-making powers to the EU in certain policy sectors. In this sense, the treaties are the starting point for proposing new policies in the EU, in particular when it comes to new legal acts. The EU institutions thus have to refer any new proposal to a particular article in the treaties. The width of policy sectors in which the EU has policy-making competence is often illustrated by a model consisting of three so-called pillars (see Fig. 2.2). The cooperation within the first pillar – the European Community – originates from the Rome treaty and consists of several different policy sectors. The cooperation within the second and third pillars – the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Police and Judicial cooperation – was introduced by the Maastricht treaty in 1992.

European Council -Agrees on treaties -Initiates -Coordinates

Council

Commission

-Initiates -Decides -Implements

-Initiates -Implements

European Parliament

Court of Justice -Interprets legislation -Settles disputes

- -Gives opinion - -Co-decides

Fig. 2.1 The role of the EU institutions

Court of Auditors

--Audits and assesses the collection and spending of EU funds


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The European Union

1st pillar

2nd pillar

3rd pillar

European Community

Common Foreign and Security Policy

Police and Judicial cooperation

Supranational process

Intergovernmental process

Intergovernmental process

Fig. 2.2 The three pillars of the EU

When it comes to crisis management, the first pillar encompasses most of the policy programmes and arrangements in the focus of this book, for example critical infrastructure protection, rapid alert systems, civil protection and the solidarity fund. Consular cooperation is part of the second pillar while many policies relevant for Counter-Terrorism have been developed within the third pillar. Since the adoption of the Maastricht treaty, the cooperation within the third pillar has developed substantially and some policy sectors in the area of Justice and Home Affairs have been transferred to the first pillar by subsequent treaty reforms. This has lead to a situation where policies on internal security, relevant for CounterTerrorism, are split between the first and the third pillars (for further discussion, see Chap. 8). The division of the policy-making competence of the EU into three pillars also illustrates the role of the EU institutions and the Member States in the policymaking process. Their relative importance is determined by the treaties and varies between different policy sectors. In general, policy-making in the first pillar is characterised by a supranational process where the Member States have handed over decision-making powers to the EU institutions. In this processs the Commission has the sole right to take the initiative for new legislation and ensure the implementation of legal acts. Decision making is performed jointly by the Council and the European Parliament. The Council often decides by qualified majority, which means that individual Member States lack a veto right over common decisions. Finally, the Court of Justice has the power to interpret legislation and settle disputes, and the Court of Auditors assesses the collection and spending of EU funds. In contrast, policy making in the second and third pillars is characterised by an intergovernmental process in which the Member States retain the ultimate decisionmaking power and the EU institutions have a more limited role. In this process, the


21

Member States propose new policies in the Council, which decides by unanimous vote and ensures the implementation of agreed policies. The role of the other institutions is limited. The Commission can present policy ideas and has increasingly become an important actor within the third pillar where it shares the right of initiative with the Member States. The European Parliament is informed without being a co-legislator. The Court of Justice has a limited responsibility. However, the division of EU policy making into these two different processes is in many ways an over-simplification. For example, the policy-making process and the role of the common institutions also vary within the first pillar depending on the policy sector involved.4 This implies that it is important for those trying to understand the EU policy-making process to determine which process is used in the relevant policy sector. In addition to this formal structure, the policy-making process is influenced by several informal practices. The informal influence most often mentioned is that of different lobbyists and interest groups. They can represent everything from individual companies to sector-based associations, administrative regions in Member States, non-governmental organisations or loose associations pursuing particular interests. The lobbyists are active in the whole process, seeking to influence inter alia the Commission, the European Parliament and Member State governments. The influence of these lobbyists and interest groups is often considered to be legitimate in the EU as they provide knowledge and expertise which can improve proposed policies. When it comes to crisis management, sector-based associations, representing for example the security industry, are increasingly becoming active at the European level. However, there are not yet any significant interest groups or parties which promote the interests of the citizens in the field of crisis management. Another informal attribute of the EU policy-making process is that some of the EU institutions have increased their level of influence in a way that is not reflected in the treaties. The European Parliament, for example, increasingly makes statements and proposes new policies in areas where its formal influence is limited. During recent years, the Parliament has on some occasions debated and adopted resolutions relating to natural disasters affecting the union. The European Council has also increased its relative level of influence when it comes to crisis management. As previously mentioned, the European Council has, after recent crises, tasked the other institutions to develop new policies and ensured coordination at the highest political level. This is related to the fact that the EU is not a static organisation restricted to the policy sectors covered by the treaties. In fact, the EU has evolved over time and new policies have been developed because of a changed environment both inside and 4

Researchers have therefore attempted to categorise the EU policy-making process in different ways. For example, Helen Wallace has identified five policy modes in the EU: a traditional community method (e.g. the Common Agricultural Policy), the EU regulatory mode (e.g. the single market), the EU distributional mode (e.g. the structural funds), policy coordination (e.g. the Lisbon strategy) and intensive transgovernmentalism (e.g. the development of the Economic and Monetary Union). Wallace et al. (2005, pp. 77–89).

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outside the union. Such new policies may subsequently be incorporated in the treaties. This is important particularly in the field of crisis management, where recent events have led to improved crisis management arrangements at the EUlevel.

The Lisbon Treaty and the EU Policy-Making Process In December 2007, the EU Member States agreed upon the so-called Lisbon treaty, which will reform the current treaties of the EU if it is ratified by all Member States. The process leading up to the Lisbon treaty had already started with the signature of the Treaty of Nice in 2000, when the European Council called for continued reform of the EU to make the union more effective and democratic and to prepare for enlargement. As part of this process, the European Convention, consisting of Member State representatives, met and, in 2003, proposed a draft treaty establishing a constitution for Europe. The constitutional treaty was, however, put on hold in 2005 after its rejection in public referenda in the Netherlands and France. In 2007, the issue of treaty reform was again debated by the Member States and the resulting Treaty of Lisbon was signed in December the same year.5 In order to enter into force, the treaty has to be ratified by all Member States in accordance with their constitutional processes. In June 2008, the Irish public rejected the treaty in a referendum and at the time of writing this book the future of the Lisbon treaty is uncertain. However, as it may significantly influence the policy-making process on crisis management, the Lisbon treaty will be referred to in several chapters in this book. This section provides an overview of the Lisbon treaty and its implications for the policy-making process. Most of the new provisions in the Lisbon treaty build upon those proposed in the constitutional treaty. However, in contrast to the constitutional treaty, which was supposed to simplify and replace the existing treaties, the Lisbon treaty amends the treaties. This means that the basic structure of the existing treaties will persist, although the Treaty establishing the European Community will be renamed to the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. In addition, the EU, instead of the European Community, will assume a legal status and will thus be able to enter into international agreements. One of the most important changes in the Lisbon treaty is that the different policy-making processes and the three so-called pillars are replaced by one regular policy-making process, resembling the supranational process. The most significant change is that this process will encompass the area of police and judicial cooperation, the current third pillar, which becomes an area of shared competence between the EU and the Member States. The Common Foreign and Security Policy, the current second pillar, will, however, retain most features of the intergovernmental 5

˚ hman (2009). This section on the Lisbon treaty builds on A


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policy-making process, although with a stronger influence of common institutions, such as the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the new External Action Service.6 In this sense, the current three-pillar system is replaced by a system with essentially two different policy-making processes. In the Lisbon treaty, the regular policy-making process in the EU is called the ‘‘ordinary legislative procedure’’. This procedure is similar to the current supranational process of the first pillar and will be guided by co-decision by the Council and the European Parliament, which means that an approval from both institutions is required in order to adopt new laws.7 The Council will, most often, decide by qualified majority, and the current weighting of the Member States votes in the Council will be replaced by a new system starting from 2014.8 It should, however, be noted that the Lisbon treaty also provides for the use of a ‘‘special legislative procedure’’, which is specified in the treaties for certain policy sectors. At the same time, so-called passerelles enable the European Council to change the decisionmaking procedure from the special to the ordinary legislative procedure and from unanimity to qualified majority in the Council without renegotiating the treaties. However, the Member States remain in control as these decisions need to be adopted by unanimity.9 In addition, the Lisbon treaty enhances the role of the national parliaments and the citizens in the policy-making process. The national parliaments are given a role to check that draft proposals for legislation comply with the principle of subsidiarity, which means that action should only be taken at the EU-level if the same effect cannot be achieved at the national or lower levels. According to this procedure, the Commission will be obliged to review a proposal if one-third (or one-fourth when it comes to police and judicial cooperation) of the national parliaments considers that the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity.10 In order to increase the democratic legitimacy of the EU, the Lisbon treaty also creates the opportunity for initiatives taken by the citizens of the union. By collecting at least one million signatures from a significant number of Member States, citizens may request the Commission to put forward a specific legislative proposal.11 6

The External Action Service is supposed to support the High Representative and will consist of staff from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the Member States. The organisation and working methods of the External Action Service will be determined by the Council once the Lisbon treaty has been ratified. Article 27.3, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. 7 Article 294, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 8 This system requires a double majority of 55% of the Member States (consisting of at least 15 Member States) representing at least 65% of the union population in order to approve legislation. A blocking minority must in turn consist of at least 4 Member States that represent 35% of the population. Until 2017, a Member State may, however, request that the current system for qualified majority should be used. Article 16, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. 9 The treaty also stresses that these passerelles may not be used for decisions having military or defence implications. Article 48.7, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. 10 Article 7, Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 11 Article 11, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union.

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The Lisbon treaty further changes the institutional set-up of the EU. According to the treaty, the European Council formally becomes an EU-institution and will be lead by an elected President instead of the current rotating presidency. The President will be elected by qualified majority in the European Council for a period of two and a half years, with the possibility to renew this term of office for one further term.12 In the case of the Commission, the treaty stipulates that the number of commissioners will, starting from 2014, be reduced to represent only two-thirds of the Member States. However, as a result of the Irish rejection of the treaty in June 2008, the Member States have agreed to keep the ‘‘national’’ commissioners provided that the treaty is ratified by all Member States.13 In addition, the European Parliament will extend its influence when it comes to the appointment of the President of the Commission. It will elect the President of the Commission on the basis of a proposal from the European Council. In this process, the European Council must consider the results of the elections to the European Parliament, which may lead to a greater coherence between the political majority in the Parliament and the set-up of the Commission. The Lisbon treaty also introduces several specific legal provisions which may enhance the EU’s role when it comes to crisis management. Firstly, the treaty establishes civil protection as a policy sector and gives the EU the right to propose actions that support, coordinate and complement actions undertaken by the Member States.14 Secondly, it introduces a solidarity clause, which stipulates that the Member States must act jointly and in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.15 Thirdly, the treaty calls for the setting-up of a standing committee on internal security in the Council, which is tasked to promote and strengthen operational coordination within the union.16 At the same time, and fourthly, the treaty stresses that the EU must respect the national identities of the Member States and particularly their essential state functions, such as, inter alia, safeguarding national security.17 The significance of these new provisions for crisis management will be determined in the practical implementation of the Lisbon treaty if it is ratified by all Member States.

Taking the Initiative: The Primacy of the Commission In order to illustrate how new policies on crisis management are formed, the policymaking process can be divided into three phases. Firstly, in the initiative phase, the 12

Article 15, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. Council of the European Union (17271/08). 14 Article 6, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 15 Article 222, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 16 Article 71, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 17 Article 4.2, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. 13


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Commission and other actors undertake several activities which lead to the proposal of new policies in the EU. Secondly, in the decision-making phase, a proposal is adopted by the Council and to a varying degree by the European Parliament. Thirdly, in the implementation phase, an agreed policy is put into practice by the Commission and/or the Member States. The Commission plays a key role in the development of new policies in the field of crisis management. In the supranational process of the first pillar, the Commission alone has the right to take initiatives in the interest of the union. Such proposals, however, need to be based on the current treaties of the EU. In the area of crisis management, proposals on new policies sometimes refer to the existing provisions in the policy sectors established by the treaties, such as public health, consumer protection and regional development. In other instances, proposed policies do not fall within any existing EU policy sector. This is, for example, the case when it comes to civil protection and critical infrastructure protection, where instead, proposals on new policies have referred to the so-called flexibility article stipulating that the EU institutions can propose actions which are necessary to obtain one of the objectives of the Treaty establishing the European Community.18 Proposals based on this article, however, need to be adopted unanimously by the Council after the European Parliament has been consulted. In this sense, the new article on civil protection and the solidarity clause of the Lisbon treaty give the Commission a stronger mandate to propose actions in the field of crisis management. When developing new policies, the Commission has to choose the form of legislation that will be proposed in order to achieve the intended outcomes. Within the first pillar, it may propose three different forms of legislative acts, which are legally binding for the Member States. Regulations are directly applicable in the Member States once they have been adopted. Directives focus on desired outcomes and allow the Member States to choose the appropriate form of national legislation to achieve these outcomes. Decisions are more limited legal acts focusing on specific issues and are directly applicable to those they concern. In addition, the Commission may adopt recommendations and opinions which are not legally binding. Before concrete legislation is proposed, the Commission may inform the other institutions and interested parties by presenting other types of policy proposals, such as green papers, white papers and communications. Green papers are discussion papers which outline proposed actions in a policy sector. They often include several policy options and can be subject to public consultation (see below). White papers consist of a comprehensive set of proposals for a specific policy sector and can be used to outline the desired development in that sector. Finally, in

18

The so-called flexibility clause states that: ‘‘If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council must, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures’’. Article 308, Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated text).


26

communications, the Commission presents the actions it intends to take in a specific policy sector, including forthcoming proposals for legislation. Proposals prepared by the Commission have to be adopted by the College of Commissioners before being presented to the other institutions for opinion or decision-making. The 2004–2009 Commission consists of 27 commissioners responsible for different policy areas. The commissioners are senior politicians or high officials nominated by the Member States, but once in office they are supposed to act independently of their national governments. The College is lead by the Commission President and adopts decisions by simple majority (the majority of the votes cast). The College is supported by an administrative structure consisting of 46 Directorates-General (DGs) and services (see Fig. 2.3). Each DG is responsible for a policy sector and prepares proposals for new policies in its area of responsibility. Of particular interest for crisis management are: the DG for Energy and Transport (nuclear and transport security); the DG for Environment (civil protection); the DG for Health and Consumers (health security, animal and plant health, food safety and consumer protection); the DG for Justice,

Commission Directorates-General and Services Policies (DGs) Agriculture and Rural Development Competition Economic and Financial Affairs Education and Culture Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Energy and Transport Enterprise and Industry Environment Maritime and Fisheries Health and Consumers Information Society and Media Internal Market and Services Joint Research Centre Justice, Freedom and Security Regional Policy Research Taxation and Customs Union (6 Executive Agencies)

General Services Communication European Anti-Fraud Office Eurostat Publications Office Secretariat General Internal Services Budget Bureau of European Policy Advisers Informatics European Commission Data Protection Officer Infrastructure and Logistics – Brussels Infrastructure and Logistics – Luxembourg Internal Audit Service Interpretation Legal Service Office for Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements Personnel and Administration Translation

External Relations (DGs) Development Enlargement EuropeAid – Co-operation Office External Relations Humanitarian Aid Trade

Fig. 2.3 Commission Directorates-General and Services Source: European Commission, ‘‘Directorates-General and Services’’


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Freedom and Security (counter-terrorism and critical infrastructure protection); and the DG for Regional Policy (the solidarity fund). In addition, the Secretariat General has an important role to ensure coordination between different DGs and services when it comes to crisis management. Although the Commission has a significant amount of power when it comes to formulating new initiatives, it normally consults a wide range of players, including national authorities, interest groups, sector-based associations and other stakeholders, before launching new proposals. Such consultations may take the form of direct contact with Member States authorities, public consultations on the internet, open consultative meetings and Member State forums and expert meetings. When it comes to the development of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), the Commission, for example, organised a public consultation on the internet on the basis of a Green Paper outlining different policy options for the programme. This was followed by a series of expert seminars in which Member State representatives and EU officials participated. In the field of civil protection, the European Civil Protection Forum, organised in 2002 and 2007, has gathered a wide range of crisis management participants. In addition, the heads of the Member States civil protection authorities meet twice a year for high-level discussions.19 Besides the Commission, other EU institutions and the Member States also play an important role in the initiative phase. As mentioned earlier, the European Council has, in the aftermath of recent crises, tasked both the Commission and the Council to put forward proposals in certain policy sectors. In the intergovernmental process of the second and third pillar, the Member States further have the right to propose new policies in the Council. When it comes to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and, for example, consular cooperation, the Member States alone have the right of initiative. For police and judicial cooperation, the right of initiative is shared with the Commission. In the field of crisis management, many important actions have been initiated by the Member States in the Council. For example, in 2005, the UK was instrumental in developing the EU CounterTerrorism strategy and in, 2005–2006, the UK, Austria and Finland took the initiative to develop the Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA). As the Commission, the Member States can organise expert seminars in order to prepare initiatives in the Council. The Member States may also get support from the Council Secretariat, especially in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Lisbon treaty will, however, further strengthen the role of the Commission in proposing new policies in the field of police and judicial cooperation at the expense of the Member States as the third pillar will become subject to the ordinary legislative procedure. In addition, the European Parliament has increasingly become active in the field of crisis management. It has on some occasions during recent years requested the Commission to develop proposals relating to natural disasters (see the section on

19

˚ hman (2009, pp. 37–38). A


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the European Parliament). The Lisbon treaty further attempts to increase the public influence over the initiative phase. Firstly, the national parliaments are tasked to check if Commission proposals for new legal acts comply with the principle of subsidiarity. In particular, the Commission will make the national parliaments attentive to the use of the so-called flexibility article. Secondly, through the citizens’ initiative, the public can request the Commission to put forward a particular proposal. At the moment, there are no significant interest groups representing the citizens pursuing the issue of improved crisis management, but it is not unlikely that the one million signatures required for a citizen’s initiative may be collected in the aftermath of a serious crisis affecting the Union.

Council Decision Making: From Unanimity to Qualified Majority After the Commission has taken the initiative and presented a proposal for a new policy, it is handed over to the Council and the European Parliament for decision making, including the adoption of legal acts. The Council is the highest decisionmaking authority in the EU. The relative importance of the European Parliament depends on the decision-making procedure that is prescribed for each policy sector in the treaties and is described in the following section. Decisions in the Council are formally adopted by ministers of the Member States national governments. In principle, the Council is a single body authorised to take decisions in all policy sectors, but in practice its work is divided into nine different Council configurations (see Fig. 2.4). In the field of crisis management, the Justice and Home Affairs Council is the main decision-making body as it adopts decisions on CCA, Counter-Terrorism, civil protection and critical infrastructure protection. The decisions taken by ministers are, however, prepared by Member State officials in lower level working groups and committees. Proposals for new policies are first discussed in the more than 250 working groups that have been established

Council configurations General Affairs and External Relations Economic and Financial Affairs Justice and Home Affairs Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Competitiveness Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Agriculture and Fisheries Environment Education, Youth and Culture

Fig. 2.4 Council configurations Source: Council of the European Union, ‘‘Council configurations’’.


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for different policy issues. The Working Party on Civil Protection (PROCIV) is of particular importance in the field of crisis management as it inter alia deals with critical infrastructure protection, the civil protection mechanism and CCA. The Article 36 Committee has an overall responsibility for policies relating to police and judicial cooperation relevant for Counter-Terrorism and coordinates the work of several working groups. The Working Party on Consular Cooperation (COCON) deals with consular issues and the Budget Committee decides on the solidarity fund. After the proposal has been discussed in the appropriate working groups and committees, it is raised at the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER I and II) consisting of the Member States EU ambassadors and their deputies. COREPER is the only Council body handling proposals in all policy sectors and is, as such, able to ensure coordination between different sectors. The ambition of the Member States is to agree on common positions already at the working level. Thereafter, COREPER and the appropriate ministerial Council can adopt the agreed position without discussion. Particularly controversial issues where the Member States fail to agree at working level, however, need to be discussed in COREPER and eventually at ministerial level. The work at all levels of the Council is led by the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council, which rotates every six months according to an agreed schedule. The Member State holding the Presidency has significant influence over Council decision making as it plans the work during its presidency, sets the agenda and chairs all Council meetings. The Presidency is supported by the Council Secretariat which assists in the planning work. In addition, Commission representatives take part in the respective working group meetings in order to give the Commission opinion on the matters discussed. The decision-making principle in the Council varies between different policy sectors. In most areas related to crisis management, decisions are taken by unanimity in the Council, but measures may also be adopted by qualified majority in specific sectors, such as health security and consumer protection. In general, the Member States also strive to achieve consensus in areas where qualified majority suffices, but this procedure may nevertheless increase the willingness of the Member States to compromise and suggest amendments rather than to block decisions.20 The expansion of qualified majority as the decision-making procedure to several new policy sectors and the new system of determining qualified majority introduced by the Lisbon treaty may thus lead to more efficient decision making in the Council. At the same time, decisions adopted by qualified majority will require the support from a significant number of Member States, which may encourage the Member States to build broad coalitions outside traditional alliances.

20

Wallace et al. (2005, p. 61).

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Enhanced Role for the European Parliament In recent years, the European Parliament has gained importance in the decisionmaking phase by subsequent treaty reforms. According to the current treaties, there are four basic procedures for the adoption of legal acts, which determine the relative influence of the European Parliament: consultation, cooperation, co-decision and assent. Here, focus is on the consultation and the co-decision procedures, which are the two most frequently used.21 In the consultation procedure, the Parliament can give its opinion on a Commission proposal and suggest amendments before the proposal is passed on to the Council for adoption. The Parliament, however, has no right to reject a proposal and the Council is not obliged to take the Parliament’s suggested amendments into consideration.22 This procedure is used for sensitive issues where the Member States want to retain a high degree of influence, for example when it comes to agriculture policies, issues relevant for internal security which belong to the first pillar and proposals which are based on the flexibility article, for instance civil protection and critical infrastructure protection. In the co-decision procedure, the European Parliament and the Council have equal powers to adopt new legislation. According to this procedure, a Commission proposal can be debated several times in the Parliament and the Council until they agree on a common text. After the Parliament’s first reading, which is similar to the consultation process, the Council may adopt the proposal if it accepts the Parliament’s proposed amendments. If not, the Council agrees on a common position, which the Parliament in its second reading can accept, amend or reject. If the common position is rejected by the Parliament, the proposal fails. If the common position is amended by the Parliament, the Council has to reconsider the proposal. If the Council agrees with the Parliament’s amendments, it can adopt the proposal. If not, members of both the Council and the Parliament form a Conciliation Committee to discuss the proposed amendments. If the Conciliation Committee is able to agree on a common text the proposal can subsequently be adopted by the Council and the Parliament in a third reading. If the Conciliation Committee cannot agree, the proposal fails.23 Currently, the co-decision procedure is only used in some policy sectors relevant for crisis management, such as public health and consumer protection. However, the influence of the European Parliament in the decision-making process will be further strengthened by the Lisbon treaty. The new ordinary legislative procedure, which corresponds to co-decision, will according to the treaty apply to most policy

21

The cooperation procedure has to a large extent been replaced by the co-decision procedure and is today only used for issues related to the economic and monetary union. The assent procedure is applied when the European Parliament must approve in one vote, for example international agreements or new Member States. 22 Nugent (2006, p. 242). 23 Nugent (2006, p. 243).

2 The EU Policy-Making Process and Crisis Management Fig. 2.5 European parliament standing committees Source: European Parliament, ‘‘Standing Committees’’

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European Parliament Standing Committees Foreign Affairs - Human Rights - Security and Defence Development International Trade Budgets Budgetary Control Economic and Monetary Affairs Employment and Social Affairs Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Industry, Research and Energy Internal Market and Consumer Protection Transport and Tourism Regional Development Agriculture and Rural Development Fisheries Culture and Education Legal Affairs Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Constitutional Affairs Women’s rights and Gender Equality Petitions

sectors, including, for instance, civil protection and police and judicial cooperation. In addition, the rules for the use of the so-called flexibility article will be modified. Proposals based on this article will require the consent of the European Parliament, whereas the current treaties stipulate that the Parliament must be consulted.24 Decisions on legislative acts are taken by the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) during the Parliament’s monthly plenary sessions. After the enlargement of the Union, the parliament in early 2009 has 785 MEPs. The Parliament normally adopts resolutions on legislative acts by simple majority (the majority of the votes cast). However, under the co-decision procedure, the Parliament needs to adopt decisions by absolute majority (which requires an affirmative vote of a majority of the total number of MEPs) if it wishes to reject or amend a common position adopted by the Council. Decisions taken in plenary are, however, first prepared in parliamentary committees. In the 2008/2009 session, the Parliament is organised into 20 specialised standing committees (see Fig. 2.5), but the Parliament may also set up sub-committees or temporary committees. Of particular relevance for crisis management are the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (responsible for civil protection, health security, animal and plant health and food safety), the Committee on Regional Development (responsible for the solidarity fund) and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (responsible for policies relevant for Counter-Terrorism).

24

Article 352, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

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Each Commission proposal for a legal act is assigned to a MEP who acts as rapporteur. He or she is tasked to draw up a report containing the suggested amendments to the proposal, the draft legislative resolution and an explanatory statement. The report is first debated and agreed in the relevant parliamentary committee before it is presented at the plenary session for a final decision. The rapporteur normally presents the proposed parliamentary resolution in the plenary session and takes a place on the Conciliation Committee if such a committee is formed.25 In addition to decisions on legal acts, the Parliament can issue debates on current affairs and make recommendations for EU actions. Over the years, the European Parliament has on some occasions debated and adopted resolutions relating to natural disasters affecting the union.26 In addition, parliamentary committees have organised public hearings, for example in relation to the report authored by Michel Barnier proposing a European civil protection force.27

Implementation by the Commission and the Member States After a proposal for new policy has been adopted by the Council and the European Parliament, the policy needs to be implemented both at the EU-level and in the Member States. The implementation phase includes several different activities, such as the application of new legislation, the disbursement of funds or the development of cooperative arrangements. In the implementation phase, the Commission plays an important role as many legal acts are of an overarching character and need to be coupled with detailed rules for implementation or specific priorities for the disbursement of funds. In many instances, implementation committees are set up under the so-called comitology process to oversee the Commission’s implementing decisions. These committees consist of Member State representatives and are led by the Commission. The widespread use of the comitology process ensures the influence of the Member States over the Commission’s implementing decisions. The relative importance of the Member States, however, varies depending on the type of procedures that is prescribed for the committee.28 Should the Commission and the Member States fail to reach an agreement in the relevant committee, the issue is raised to the appropriate Council working group for discussion. As the comitology 25

Nugent (2006, pp. 274–276). See, for example, European Parliament, resolution on forest fires and floods, 7 September 2006, and European Parliament resolution of 4 September 2007 on that summer’s natural disasters. 27 In January 2006, Michel Barnier, the former Commissioner, was tasked by the Commission and the Austrian Presidency to examine the EU’s ability to manage large-scale crises. The results were presented in the so-called Barnier report, which contained several propositions for the development of cooperation on civil protection within the EU. Barnier (2006). 28 Advisory committees can only advice the Commission, management committees can block Commission decisions by qualified majority, regulatory committees must approve Commission decisions by qualified majority. See (Nugent 2006, p. 178). 26


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process plays an important role in the implementation of legal acts, the European Parliament has requested more information and insight into these committees. In the field of crisis management, implementing committees have, for example, been set up in relation to the legal acts establishing the Community mechanism for civil protection and the civil protection financial instrument. In the committee established for the community mechanism, decisions relating to the procedures of the mechanism are discussed and agreed upon. With regard to the financial instrument, the committee decides on the annual work programme for the allocation of funds and grants. It also discusses financing decisions when it comes to the transportation of Member States civil protection resources.29 In addition, there is a trend to delegate certain aspects of implementation to the numerous EU agencies that have been set up in different policy sectors. These agencies provide specialised expertise and have a more operative role than the Commission. In the field of crisis management, some of these agencies are linked to the rapid alert systems which have been set up in different policy sectors, for example the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). When it comes to internal security, agencies such as the European Police Office (EUROPOL), the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST) and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX) promote information exchange and operational coordination between the relevant Member State agencies. Finally, the Member States are ultimately responsible for the implementation of decisions taken at the EU-level. The Member States must apply EU legislation nationally and need to establish national working methods that are in tune with EU requirements. At the national level, government ministries and agencies are often in charge of the implementation of EU policies.

Concluding Remarks on Future Trends Today, EU policies on crisis management are formed in a complex process involving several players. According to the treaties, the EU institutions perform different roles within this process. As the cooperation on crisis management has developed in the EU, the institutions have, over time, become more active in this field and have presented numerous proposals for enhanced cooperation. The not yet ratified Treaty of Lisbon will amplify this trend by changing the relative importance of the EU institutions in the process and bring crisis management policy making closer to the supranational process. The following aspects are of particular importance for the future. Firstly, the Commission is already today the main driving force for enhanced cooperation in several policy sectors where crisis management policy programmes 29

Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom and Council Decision 2007/162/EC, Euratom.

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and arrangements have been set up. The Lisbon treaty will further strengthen the Commission’s role as proposer and developer of new policies in this field. The establishment of civil protection as a policy sector and the inclusion of the solidarity clause in the treaty will give the Commission a stronger mandate to propose deepened cooperation. The inclusion of the current third pillar in the ordinary legislative procedure will also amplify the Commission’s leading role in the development of policies relevant for Counter-Terrorism. Secondly, the current procedure of unanimous decision making in the Council guarantees that the Member States are in control when decisions on crisis management are taken. By the Lisbon treaty, the decision-making procedure will shift to qualified majority in several policy sectors relevant for crisis management. This may lead to more efficient decision making in the Council, but will reduce the possibility for individual Member States to block new proposals. In order to retain their influence, the Member States will have to become more proactive, formulate strategic visions and influence proposals already in the initiative phase. Once the proposals have been forwarded to the Council, the Member States must seek broader coalitions in order to influence the decision making. Thirdly, the formal influence of the citizens’ directly elected representatives in the European Parliament has up to now been rather weak in the area of crisis management. The Parliament has, however, on some occasions taken an active role and has increasingly debated crisis management issues. The Lisbon treaty will increase the European Parliament’s formal influence as it will receive co-decision-making power in several policy sectors relevant for crisis management. The citizens’ influence will further be strengthened as national parliaments are tasked to perform a subsidiarity check on all new Commission proposals. In addition, by collecting one million signatures, engaged citizens may task the Commission to put forward a specific proposal. It is, however, an open question whether these new provisions will lead to a greater public engagement in crisis management issues and whether interest groups or political parties will become more active in this field.

References ˚ hman T (2009) The Lisbon Treaty and Civil Protection in the European Union (forthcoming). A Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm Barnier M (2006) For a European civil protection force: Europe aid Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (9 May 2008) Official Journal C115 51 Council Decision 2007/162/EC, Euratom of 5 March 2007 establishing a Civil Protection Financial Instrument Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) Council of the European Union (17271/08), Brussels European Council 11 and 12 December 2008, Presidency Conclusions, 12 December 2008 Council of the European Union, ‘‘Council configurations’’, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=427&lang=en&mode=g (accessed 17 December 2008)


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European Commission, ‘‘Directorates-General and Services’’, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs_en.htm (accessed 17 December 2008) European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 4 September 2007 on this summer’s natural disasters, P6_TA(2007)0362 European Parliament, resolution on forest fires and floods, 7 September 2006, P6_TA(2006)0349 European Parliament, ‘‘Standing Committees’’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/committeesList.do?language=EN (accessed 17 December 2008) Hix S (2005) The political system of the European Union. Macmillan, Houndmills Lindberg LN, Scheingold SA (1970) Europe’s would-be polity: Patterns of change in the European Community. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs Nugent N (2006) The Government and Politics of the European Union. Macmillan, Houndmills Tallberg J (2007) EU:s politiska system. Studentlitteratur, Lund Treaty establishing the European Community (24 December 2002) (consolidated text), Official Journal C325 Treaty on European Union (24 December 2002) (consolidated text), Official Journal C325 Wallace H, Wallace W, Pollack MA (2005) Policy-making in the European Union. Oxford University Press, Oxford


Chapter 3

The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection Madelene Lindstro¨m

The terrorist attacks in Madrid 2004 and London 2005 drew attention to the risk of attacks against European critical infrastructure (ECI). In order to counter-act potential vulnerabilities, the European Council asked the European Commission to prepare an overall strategy and an action plan to improve the protection of ECI. As a result of this request, the Commission proposed the establishment of a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). The programme consists of three main parts: a Directive for the identification and designation of ECI, a financial programme and a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN). This chapter starts off with a description of the background that accentuated the need for the establishment of a European cooperation on critical infrastructure protection (CIP).1 This introduction is followed by an account of how the overall identification procedure of ECI is supposed to work in practice and the obligations the Directive2 imposes on the owners/operators of designated ECI as well as relevant government authorities. Finally, CIWIN and the financial programme including the establishment of a European Reference Network for CIP (ERN–CIP) are presented. After this brief overview of the different components of the programme, the chapter is summed up with some concluding remarks on possible challenges the EU has to overcome in order to become an influential CIP-actor.

1

Critical infrastructure protection and the internationally accepted shortening ‘‘CIP’’ will be used as synonyms in the chapter. In the same way, European critical infrastructure will be shortened to ‘‘ECI’’. 2 When in this chapter reference is being made to ‘‘the Directive’’ this refers to the Council directive (2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008) on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve their protection.


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38

M. Lindstro¨m

Introduction: Protecting ECI As has been mentioned previously, descriptions of the European crisis management system usually begin with an enumeration of different accidents and crises that have intensified cooperation at the EU-level. This is also valid for the development of EPCIP which can be directly connected to the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September 2001 in the United States of America, the Madrid train bombings in 2004 and the London underground attacks in July 2005. These events all showed how terrorists can target infrastructures such as transport, energy and communication and cause both civilian casualties and severe material damage. As a result, in June 2004 the European Council requested the European Commission to prepare an overall ‘‘strategy’’ to improve the protection of critical infrastructures.3 In response, in October 2004 the Commission adopted a Communication on CIP in the fight against terrorism.4 One year later, in November 2005, the Commission moved further and launched a Green Paper on a EPCIP.5 The Green Paper provided policy options on the establishment of a Community programme for CIP. On 12 December 2006, the Commission adopted a Communication to improve the protection of ECI, which set out the overall framework for EU-level CIP-activities. On the same day, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Directive on the identification and designation of ECI from terrorism.6 Together, these documents set out the framework for the Council Directive. Following the development of guidelines for implementation of the Directive, the actual legal instrument was formally adopted by the Council in December 2008 and entered into force at the beginning of 2009. The 2006 Communication sets out the framework for EU level work on crosssectoral CIP within the EU. Based on these documents, the Commission, lead by the Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security (DG JLS), has prepared a set of initiatives which resulted in a European Programme for CIP (EPCIP). As mentioned, the EPCIP framework consists in principle of three parts; the key element is (1) the proposal for a Directive on the identification and designation of ECIs and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. As the caption indicates, the Directive establishes a common procedure on how to identify and designate ECIs as well as assess the need to improve their protection. The two other parts of the programme are (2) the establishment of a financial programme and (3) a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN). While the Directive constitutes the core of the programme, the other two components are foremost measures designed to facilitate the implementation of the Directive. Looking at our conceptual framework for understanding the EU crisis management cycle, EPCIP falls under the prevention and preparedness phases.

3

Presidency conclusions of the European Council (17 and 18 June, 2004) [10679/2/04 REV 2]. Critical infrastructure protection in the fight against terrorism [13979/04]. 5 Green paper on the European programme for critical infrastructure protection 14910/05. 6 Euractive critical infrastructure. 4

3 The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection

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The EU and CIP The primary responsibility for protecting critical infrastructure in a country lies with the Member States’ their national authorities and the owners/operators of such infrastructures. This is also recognised in the Directive. The principle of subsidiarity and the fact that CIP is closely interlinked with the questions of national defence is one explanation to why Member States are partly unwilling to share information and give up supremacy in the area.7 However, due to the fact that infrastructures of today are closely interlinked, and crises therefore often tend to have a transnational impact, an EU involvement has been perceived as justified, although foremost as a coordinator. To describe the EU’s work with CIP is very difficult since it is only the establishment of EPCIP that explicitly focuses on CIP. At the same time, there has been a long tradition of efforts which can be seen as CIP within each individual sector.8 As a result, researchers have described the development of the EU’s CIP-work as gradually evolving within clearly distinctive sectors which lately have moved toward a cross-sectoral coordination.9 This previous lack of cross-sectoral structures is often explained as a result of the Member States’ attitudes to what should be handled on a supranational level and what should remain at the national level.10 The CIP-cooperation at the EU-level varies a lot between the different sectors: in some sectors, the cooperation is far reaching with, for example, extensive rules, regulations and EU-led inspections while the cooperation in other areas has the character of a regulatory framework which the Member States themselves decide on how to implement and control. Also much of the EU work has been oriented to measures for the insurance of ‘‘safety’’ rather than ‘‘security’’. In general, it could be said that the security work has been well developed in international sectors such as aviation and maritime security, although most existing measures focus on ensuring the security of passengers rather than infrastructures.11 Increasing the CIP-capability in the EU was the main concern for the European Commission and the EU Member States when launching EPCIP. The objective of the Programme is to ‘‘stimulate’’, ‘‘promote’’ and ‘‘develop’’ measures on CIP in areas such as crisis management, environment, public health, transport, research, technological development and so forth. EPCIP is based on an ‘‘all-hazards approach’’ while terrorism is given priority. The all-hazards approach means that both man-made and technological threats as well as threats caused by natural disasters should be taken into account.12 The security and economy of the European Union as well as the well-being of our citizens depend on certain infrastructure and the services they provide. The disruption of such infrastructure could mean the loss of lives, the loss of property and a collapse of public

7

Eriksson and Barck-Holst (2005). Ibid. 9 Larsson (2007, p. 9 and p. 24). 10 Jarlsvik and Castenfors (2004, p. 64). 11 Eriksson and Barck-Holst (2005, pp. 39–47). 12 Council Directive (2008/114/EC). 8

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confidence in the EU. The package we present today aims at ensuring that any eventual disruptions or manipulations of critical infrastructure remain as brief, infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated and minimally detrimental as possible.13

Even though EPCIP has a clear cross-sectoral approach, most of the implementation takes place at the sector-specific level. As it was first presented, the Commission had identified 11 sectors to be covered by EPCIP: (1) energy, (2) nuclear industry, (3) information- and communication technologies (ICT), (4) water, (5) food, (6) health, (7) financial, (8) transport, (9) chemical industry, (10) space and (11) research facilities.14 However, during the negotiations and as a result of the Member States’ resistance, the scope of EPCIP was reduced to just comprise the energy and transport sectors since these two sectors were of horizontal significance and also the most advanced in terms of the development of sectoral criteria. It was, however, agreed that a ‘‘step-by-step approach’’ should be taken and that other sectors should be eventually included.15 The EU’s CIP work falls under the first pillar within the EU structure, and at the Commission the work is led by the DG JLS. The Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) has supported DG JLS in the elaboration of EPCIP. At working group level the negotiations have been held in The Working Group for Civil Protection (ProCiv).

CIP at Member State Level In order to understand the environment in which EPCIP is being established, it is important to get an overview of the current state regarding CIP within the different EU Member States.16 13

Quotation by former Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, Franco Frattini. EurActive Critical Infrastructure. 14 Eleven sectors as presented in the first draft proposal for a Directive. 15 The identified subsectors in the energy sector are (1) electricity (infrastructures and facilities for generation and transmission of electricity in respect of supply electricity), (2) oil (oil production, refining, treatment, storage and transmission by pipelines) and (3) gas (gas production, refining, treatment, storage and transmission by pipelines, LNG terminals). In the transport sector the subsectors are (1) road transport, (2) rail transport, (3) air transport and (4) inland waterways transport and ocean and short-sea shipping and ports. Important to notice is, however, that the list of ECI sectors does not commit Member States with an obligation to designate an ECI in each sector. 16 The section is based on an investigation ordered by the European Commission, (DG-JLS) performed by Unisys Belgium, with CIVI.POL as a subcontractor. See UNISYS (2007). In the study the EU Member States were asked to explain their national concept and understanding of ‘‘critical infrastructure’’, its national legal and/or policy basis, the sectors included in national plans for the protection of such critical infrastructures and the composition and basic operating principles of the countries’ CIP community. See also Wenger and Mauer (2006) International CIIP Handbook 2006 where an inventory of 20 national and 6 international critical information infrastructure protection policies are made, as well as Lindstro¨m (2008a) where four EU-Member States CIP-work is highlighted.


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CIP at the national level varies a lot among the EU’s 27 Member States: while some Member States are at an early stage, others have national CIP-programmes that are even more advanced than EPCIP. Nonetheless, many similarities also exist between the countries regarding, for example, the CIP community composition. For instance, all countries share the basic principle that responsibilities are divided per sector with each governmental and/or supervisory authority in charge of the sector it is covering. But again, the measures taken and protection plans implemented differ widely between the countries.17 A recent investigation of CIP at Member State level showed that, out of 25 Member States, 14 countries all had cross-sector national critical infrastructure definitions while 11 countries indicated that no national critical infrastructure definition exists. However, most of these countries were in the process of initiating legislative or policy work to foresee the adoption of a national definition of critical infrastructures in line with the principles mentioned in EPCIP. However, it is important to note that the lack of a national definition for critical infrastructure does not mean that these countries do not have specific security measures in place for the protection of important sites and objects but rather as an indication that no cross-sector approach has been developed. Concerning those countries that had a national definition of ‘‘critical infrastructure’’, the main difference in interpretation was between the countries which define critical objects or infrastructures on the one hand and those that rather point at ‘‘functions vital for society’’ on the other hand. Next to that, there are differences between the Member States’ focus concerning CIP. In some countries, the focus is on the insurance of safety of the objects/ infrastructures, whereas in other countries the focus lies mostly on the insurance of security.18 The investigation further showed that nine of the EU Member States had a national list of identified critical infrastructures within their territory. All countries that had a national definition of critical infrastructures divided them into different sectors and – in some countries – subsectors. The sectors most often occurring in national CIP-programmes are: energy supply, information and telecommunication systems, provision of food, transport and distribution systems, finance and banking, health and social welfare systems and water supply. This indicates that most countries focus on the protection of those sectors related to the provision of fundamental societal services and less on the protection of ‘‘symbolic’’ infrastructures such as national monuments (contrary to, for example, USA, Australia and Canada).19 Regarding the basic composition of every country’s community of CIP players it is similar in all Member States. In every country, a central CIP body or coordinatiing authority has been identified although these coordinating bodies differ in nature, responsibilities and the political authority to which they are responsible: in some

17

UNISYS (2007). Ibid. 19 Ibid. p. 21. 18

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countries, the coordinating body, for example, has a supporting role while in another it has an active role in setting standards and evaluating criteria for security plans. Further, in some countries, the coordinating body is part of or responsible to the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Defence, while in others the body is situated in the national civil protection centre.20 Next to that, different ministries, departments and agencies hold the responsibility to ensure the protection of critical infrastructure within the subsector(s) for which they are responsible. In every country, the private sector is involved in CIP as most of the infrastructures are owned or operated by private actors.21 In five countries, a cross-sector legal basis for CIP is implemented (or adopted but not yet implemented). Of those countries that lack a cross-sector CIP legislation or policy, several countries indicated that work was ongoing to draft such a legislation or policy. In eight countries, CIP was considered as part of the national strategy for crisis management or the counter-terrorism strategy. Next to that, eight countries indicated that no cross-sector legal and policy initiatives existed but that some initiatives were developed on a sector basis. Three countries did not have any legislative or policy basis for CIP.22 As indicated before, the protection of critical infrastructures is very much decentralised within the different Member States. In every country, a considerable part of the critical infrastructures are owned and operated by the private sector why the need for cooperation between infrastructure owners and operators on the one hand and the government on the other is acknowledged by all governmental officials. The level and type of involvement of the private sector in CIP does, however, differ. Whereas in some countries representatives of the private sector are actively and systematically involved in policy development, the private sector in other countries is invited on an ad hoc basis and its roles and activities are mainly restricted to the implementation of minimum protection standards as set by the public sector. For example, the same study showed that the number of sectors enlisted in the Directive of the responsibilities is distributed over around nine different administrations for an average Member State. Especially ministries/departments/agencies responsible for transport, economics and health cover a large part of the sub-sectors mentioned in the proposal for a Directive.23 The next section will examine the procedure for the identification and designation of ECI as set up with the Directive.

20 See UNISYS (2007) table 2 pp. 25–26 for an overview of coordinating bodies and legislative/ policy basis for CIP in 25 of the EU Member States. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 UNISYS (2007).


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Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructure The Directive establishes a procedure that each Member State must follow in order to identify and designate ECI. The formal identification procedure can be illustrated as a four-step process (See Fig. 3.1 for an illustration of the four-step identification process). According to the Directive, each Member State must identify potential ECI in the energy and transport sector which both satisfy the cross-cutting and sectoral criteria and meet the definitions of ‘‘Critical Infrastructure’’ and ‘‘ECI’’ which are set out in Article 2(a) and 2(b) in the Directive (see below).24 To support the Member States, non-binding guidelines has been developed in order to provide guidance with the application of the Directive.25 In the first step each Member State is obliged to apply the sectoral criteria in order to make a first selection of critical infrastructures within the sector. Four different kinds of sectoral criteria are used: the most traditional form of criteria is that of specific properties (for example, dimensions, capacities and distances which an infrastructure should have in order for the criteria to be met); however, it can also apply to identification of networks of which ‘‘key elements’’ must be determined or specific infrastructure assets that have to be named directly. The sectoral criteria are classified and therefore not available to the public. Step 1

Member States applies the sectoral criteria in order to make a first selection of critical infrastructures within a sector.

Step 2

Member States apply the definition of critical infrastructure.

Step 3

Member States apply the transboundary element of the definition of ECI.

Step 4

Member States apply the cross-cutting criteria to the remaining potential ECIs.

Fig. 3.1 Illustration of the four-step identification procedure26

24 The identification procedure is described in Article 3 and Annex III to Council directive (2008/ 114/EC). 25 The non-binding guidelines will be updated as and when the need arises, based on experience gained through the implementation of the Directive and the reviews to be undertaken. 26 Non-Binding Guidelines for the application of the Directive on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, Brussels, 31 October 2008 [14808/08] p. 15.

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Worth noticing regarding the sectoral criteria is the differences that exist concerning their character: while stakeholders within one sector can have precise and measurable criteria to lean on in their judgement the sectoral criteria within other sectors are to be made on case-by-case judgements. One reflection is that the absence of measurable criteria in a sector may lead to a tendency among the Member States to directly apply the cross-cutting criteria in their judgement and more or less exclude the first ‘‘sectoral step’’ within the identification process. In practice, this could lead to situations were the identification process probably differs not only between the Member States but also between the different sectors within a country. It is therefore of great concern that neighbouring Member States have a common view on how the identification process must be led and how the voluntary criteria are to be interpreted and applied. Further, even though the Commission should not have access to information concerning the identity of a potential ECI, the lack of precise thresholds and measurable criteria can further lead to tendencies among the Member States to turn to the Commission for some sort of ‘‘confirmation’’ that they have made the right judgement of whether or not the infrastructure is to be classified as an ECI. This would go straight towards the centralised development that many Member States opposed during the negotiations of the EPCIP.27 In the second step of the identification process, each Member State must apply the definition of critical infrastructure to the potential ECI. The Directive defines critical infrastructure as; . . .those assets, systems or parts thereof located in the EU Member States which are essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.28

In other words, critical infrastructures provide services which are essential for our society. The term ‘‘criticality’’ is therefore directly connected to the delivery of service and the potential effects that a loss of such a service would create. This notion of ‘‘service’’ is important because it limits the infrastructures that will fall under the scope of the Directive. The Directive further states that ‘‘. . . for infrastructures providing an essential service, the availability of alternatives, and the duration of disruption/recovery will be taken into account’’. As a result of this second step, only infrastructures which are perceived as nationally critical are considered. The third step in the identification process provides a check to see if the disruption or destruction of the infrastructure would have a significant transboundary impact on other Member States: in order to explore this, each Member State are to apply the definition of what is regarded as ECI. According to Article 2(b) in the Directive, the definition of ECI is:

27

Lindstro¨m (2008b). Article 2(a) in Council directive (2008/114/EC).

28


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. . . critical infrastructure located in the EU Member States the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact on at least two Member States of the EU. The significance of the impact must be assessed in terms of cross-cutting criteria. This includes effects resulting from cross-sector dependencies on other types of infrastructure.29

If the impact remains national, then the associated critical infrastructure will not be designated as ECI. In other words, it is the ‘‘transboundary nature’’ of the impact from the loss of service of a critical infrastructure that makes it an ECI. In the fourth and last step of the identification process, each Member State is encouraged to apply the cross-cutting criteria to the remaining potential ECI. The cross-cutting criteria, which are voluntary for the Member States to adopt, must take into account: how severe the impact would be if the infrastructure was hit; the alternatives that would be available to replace the infrastructure in question in case of a disruption; and the duration of the disruption and how long it would take to ‘‘restore’’ or ‘‘recover’’ the infrastructure. The cross-cutting criteria consist of three families: casualties criteria;30economic effects criteria;31 and public effects criteria.32 Indicative thresholds for the cross-cutting criteria have been developed by the Commission together with the Member States as voluntary guidelines; however, the precise thresholds to be used must be established on a case-by-case basis between the involved Member States. Like the sectoral criteria, the cross-cutting criteria (CCC) are classified. In order to minimise the level of work required, the Member States are encouraged to start with the most relevant of the three CCC (i.e. the one expected the most likely to be met). It is sufficient that one of the cross-cutting criteria is met to satisfy step 4 of the identification procedure. If none of the CCC are met, the infrastructure is considered ‘‘non-ECI’’. A question that has been raised with regard to the judgement of the cross-cutting criteria is whether or not it is possible to merge the CCCs. For example, to make a collected judgement for the infrastructure in question (i.e., for example, if an potential critical infrastructure is very close to the economic criterion and also is close to the casualties criterion one can argue that one can be complemented with the other. An interviewed representative for the Commission emphasised that it probably would depend on if it was the originating Member State (OMS) or the affected Member

29

Article 2(b) in Council directive (2008/114/EC). The casualty criterion is assessed in terms of the potential number of dead or wounded people. See Article 3:2 in Council directive (2008/114/EC). 31 The economic criterion is assessed in terms of the significance of economic loss and/or degradation of GDP; including potential environmental effects. See Article 3:2 in Council directive (2008/114/EC). 32 Public effects are assessed taking into account the number of people impacted (including how severe and how long they are impacted). This is further assessed in terms of physical suffering, the impact on public confidence and disruption of daily life; including the loss of essential services. Public effect shall in each of these three effect categories be measured on a severity scale using three categories that express the magnitude of the impact ranging from low to medium to high. See Article 3:2 in Council directive (2008/114/EC). 30

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State (AMS) that wanted to make this type of cumulative judgement.33 There is also an opportunity to re-evaluate previous work on the criteria with different participants or at different national levels. However, designation can only occur if the Member State in which the ECI is located agrees: if the OMS does not agree, the infrastructure is considered a ‘‘non-ECI’’ even though it has been identified as such. In other words, the OMS has the right to ‘‘veto’’ an ECI-designation. The process of identifying and designating ECI must be completed within 24 months after the Directive has entered into force and it must also be reviewed on a regular basis. No estimation of the number of potential ECI within the EU as a whole has been made, however, a representative for the Commission let us know that rather few ECI are expected in the transport sector as a whole.34

Obligations that Follows with an ECI-designation The Member States are ultimately responsible for the implementation of the Directive. The legal basis for the Directive is Article 308 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (also known as the ‘‘flexibility clause’’). Since it is a first pillar issue, this means that the Commission can take a Member State before the European Court of Justice which follows up the implementation of EU regulations ensuring that they are implemented in the same way in all EU Member States. This appears, however, most likely to come about only after some kind of ‘‘name-andshame-exercise’’ within the Council.35 This section gives an account of the obligations that follows with an ECIdesignation for (1) owners and operators of designated ECI and (2) the Member States and their governmental ministries and authorities.

Obligations for Owners and Operators of a Designated ECI The Directive imposes three specified requirements on the owners and operators of a designated ECI: to establish an Operator Security Plan (OSP) and conduct a risk analysis based on major threat scenarios and, to appoint a Security Liaison Officer (SLO). The first requirement stipulates that each designated ECI must have an established OSP which identifies the critical infrastructure assets of the ECI as well as the security measures that exist to protect the infrastructure in question.36 The OSP has 33

See Lindstro¨m (2008b). Interview DG JLS 9 July 2008 in Lindstro¨m (2008b). 35 See Lindstro¨m (2008b). 36 The minimum requirement of an Operator Security Plan is set out in Annex II in Council Directive (2008/114/EC). 34


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to be in place within one year after an infrastructure has been designated and is then to be reviewed regularly.37 Connected to the need to establish an OSP, the second obligation is to make a threat assessment.38 The third obligation that comes with the Directive is that the owners and operators of a designated ECI must appoint a SLO. The SLO will communicate on security related issues between the owner/operator of the ECI and the relevant Member State authority. Further, each Member State must establish a ‘‘communication mechanism’’ between the relevant Member State authority and the SLO in order to exchange information concerning identified risks and threats in relation to the ECI in question.39 For all the above mentioned obligations the Directive prescribes that the Commission must support the owners/operators of designated ECIs by providing access to best practices as well as training and the exchange of information on new technical developments related to CIP.40

Obligations for the Member States and their Governmental Ministries and Authorities The Member States are ultimately responsible for the implementation of the Directive and must make sure that the state carries out the obligations the Directive set out within two years. In addition to this overall obligation, four specific tasks are generated for the Member States and their governmental ministries and authorities. First and foremost, the Member State has to engage in the identification procedure. In addition to the practical identification of potential ECI within the Member State, this also includes discussions with affected Member States. A second task is to nominate a European CIP Contact Point. The third task is connected to the exercise of control, i.e. to supervise that owners and operators of designated ECI have established OSPs and SLOs and fourth make a threat assessment and report to the Commission on a generic basis.41 The first direct obligation that comes with the Directive is that the Member States have to identify potential ECI within the Member State but also infrastructures on other Member States territory that can affect themselves. The first ‘‘identification round’’ has to be completed within two years and after that a review must be done regularly. When a potential ECI has been identified, the Member State on whose territory it is located in must inform the other Member States that are affected by a potential ECI about its identity and why they consider it should be 37

Annex II in the non-binding guidelines document lists existing Community measures which fulfil the demands for an appointed SLO and an established OSP (this list may also be amended). 38 See Article 7:1 in Council Directive (2008/114/EC). 39 See Article 6 in Council Directive (2008/114/EC). 40 See Article 8 in Council directive (2008/114/EC). 41 See Article 5 (OSP), 6 (SLO) and 10 (contact points) in Council directive (2008/114/EC).

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designated as an ECI. Evidently the same information obligation applies with regard to the owner/operator in charge of an infrastructure if one is identified as an ECI within the national borders. An infrastructure is considered designated as an ECI following an agreement between the concerned Member States.42 The nomination of a European CIP Contact Points is a second obligation that falls on the Member States. The nomination of a European CIP Contact Points is a measure aimed to ensure an effective protection of ECI through communication and coordination. The main task for the contact point is accordingly to coordinate European CIP-issues between three actors/levels – internally within the Member State, with other Member States and with the Commission.43 In most countries, this contact point will have its organisational domicile within the Ministry of the Interior, governmental authorities/agencies like emergency management agencies or already existing centres for the protection of national infrastructure. With regard to the role as a national European CIP Contact Point, it assumes that the coordination is functioning well since the function involves several sectors and different areas of responsibility. Even though a contact point is appointed it does not have any exclusive right to CIP-matters, on the contrary other authorities in a Member State are encouraged to engage in European CIP-issues.44 The third obligation for the government authorities is to supervise established OSPs and SLOs. If a Member State finds that a OSP/SLO or equivalent does not exist or is not reviewed regularly it must ensure ‘‘by any measures deemed appropriate’’, that an OSP/SLO or equivalent is prepared.45 The fourth obligation that follows with the Directive is that it requires each Member State to compile and submit three types of report to the Commission: first of all each Member State is obliged to report annually the number of infrastructures within each sector for which they have held discussions concerning the CCC thresholds; secondly, the Member States must inform the Commission of the number of designated ECI per sector and how many other Member States that are dependent on each designated ECI; thirdly, each Member State must, every second year, give the Commission basic data on the types of risks, threats and vulnerabilities they have encountered per sector. Each of these three reports must be classified ‘‘at an appropriate level as deemed necessary by the Member State’’. Based on these reports, the Commission and the Member States must judge whether further protection measures at the EU level should be considered.46

42

See Article 4:1; Article 4:2; Article 4:5; Article 4:3; and Article 4:4 in Council Directive (2008/ 114/EC). 43 See Article 10 in Council Directive (2008/114/EC). 44 Lindstro¨m (2008b). 45 See Article 5:3 and Article 6:3 in Council Directive (2008/114/EC). No timeframe has been set up for the appointment of a SLO but it is assumed that the designation of the SLO is carried out as quickly as possible since the SLO is considered a pre-requisite for discussions on the availability and creation of the Operator Security Plan (OSP), and a SLO should thus be established in time to deliver the OSP. See Article 5 (OSP) and 6 (SLO) in Council Directive (2008/114/EC). 46 See Article 3.2, Article 4.4 and Article 7.2 in Council directive (2008/114/EC).


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In addition to these direct obligations, the EPCIP also brings a number of indirect and voluntary tasks for the Member States to handle which are worth noting. For example, Member States are encouraged to establish national CIPprogrammes and can be asked to participate in expert groups. In other words, even though the EU-level actions focus on those critical infrastructures having an EU importance, the Member States are being encouraged to adopt similar approaches concerning their national critical infrastructure. The Directive therefore provides a push for moving forward with the cross-sectoral approach and also coordination of CIP at a national level. A reflection in this regard is that the Commission’s approach to the establishment of EPCIP tends to be best suited for countries that (1) already have national CIP-programmes and therefore do not have to change their own systems in any decisive way to adapt these for the European dimension which is added with EPCIP, or (2) countries that more or less do not have national CIP-programmes and can now build up one with EPCIP as some sort of template. However, for those Member States that do work with CIP, but not in the same way/following the same structure, it will be more problematic.47 To conclude, a comparison of the statutory and the voluntary tasks related to EPCIP indicates that it is possible that the voluntary tasks in the long run result in more Member State activity than does the statutory tasks. For example, EPCIP will not bring about any new rearrangement of responsibilities concerning the protection of critical infrastructures since the primary and ultimate responsibility for protecting ECI will still fall on the Member States and the owners/operators of such infrastructures. Further, many parts of EPCIP are voluntary for the Member States to follow and the Directive in itself does not raise demands on extended physical protection (for example, measures such as fencing, security gates, computer firewalls, fire protection, flood barriers, etc.). Nor does the Directive demand national legal acts or regulations of minimum levels on the OSP and the SLO. All in all this contributes to the national consequences of EPCIP to be depending on the Member States’ own ambitions and political will. If there is a will, Member States can use EPCIP as a ‘‘heave’’ to intensify and raise the standard at the current national CIP-work, but in the case of the opposite, there is also space and gaps to more or less avoid the Directive. This can, for example, be done through minimising the number of designated ECI on the territory or in general insufficiently ensure that the obligations that the Directive imposes on the owners and operators of ECI are being properly fulfilled. This would, however, require that a group of Member States would have to agree among themselves not to designate any ECI – but there would still be a risk that some other Member State would come and request a dialogue on other potential ECI. Regarding the consequences for the owners and operators of designated ECI, many experts highlight that it is most reasonable to think that the relatively large objects and infrastructures that will be identified already have these types of arrangements so the practical workload should be quite limited.48

47

Lindstro¨m (2008b). Lindstro¨m (2008b).

48

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The Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network49 Another part of the EPCIP is the discussion of the establishment of a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN).50 As the name reveals, CIWIN is proposed to consist of two functionalities: an electronic forum for CIPrelated information exchange and a rapid alert function that enables participating Member States and the Commission to post alerts on risks and threats to critical infrastructure.51 A Commission report on the results of the EPICP Green Paper consultation showed that the Member States had somewhat differing views concerning the setting up of the CIWIN. The biggest difference lay in the fact that a group of Member States supported CIWIN as both a rapid alert system (RAS) and an electronic forum for the exchange of CIP ideas and best practices while a number of Member States favoured limiting CIWIN to simply a forum for the exchange of CIP ideas and best practices. The alignment to date is that CIWIN will mainly provide for sharing experiences and enhancing contacts and information exchange between the members, but it is also possible that it will be optional in the future to use it for rapid alerts related to critical infrastructure. As the next chapter will show, there already exist various sectoral RAS at the EU-level. The added value with the establishment of CIWIN is its cross-sectoral character since none of the prevailing warning systems contributes with a horizontal perspective. In technical terms, CIWIN is proposed to be composed of five fixed areas: (1) a Member State and Commission area offering each participating Member State the possibility of creating its own area in the CIWIN portal. The organisation and use of the Member State area depends on the needs of the respective Member State but can, for example, constitute a virtual space for cooperation and communication between CIP officials at a national level; (2) sector areas (with 11 separate sectors) as well as a cross-sector area (for generic topics and issues of relevance to multiple sectors); (3) a ‘‘CIWIN Executive area’’ serving as a strategic coordination and cooperation platform designed to promote and enhance the CIP-work (accessible exclusively to CIWIN Executives); (4) an external cooperation area (focusing on raising awareness of external co-operation in CIP and of CIP standards outside the EU); and (5) a contact directory to facilitate the search for contact details of other CIWIN users or CIP experts. These above-mentioned fixed areas are to be permanent but their content may be adjusted.52 49 The section is based on (UNISYS 2007) Study on the establishment of the Critical infrastructure warning information network (CIWIN), Proposal for a Council decision on a critical infrastructure warning information network (CIWIN), Non-paper. Brussels, 26 June 2008 and UNISYS (2008a, b) CIWIN Prototype User Manual for the CIWIN Executive. 50 Although the establishment of the CIWIN will be set up through a separate Council decision it shall be considered as part of EPCIP. 51 The USA has a similar system CWIN, operational since 2003. See Euractiv Critical Infrastructure. 52 Ibid.


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Separated from these fixed areas, the dynamic areas are supposed to be created on demand and can be deleted when they have fulfilled the purpose for which they were set up. The dynamic areas must for example be (1) an expert working group area (to provide support to the work of CIP expert groups); (2) a project area (containing information on projects financed by the Commission); (3) alert areas (which may be created in the event of an alert being triggered in the RAS and will constitute the channel of communication during CIP-related activities); and (4) a special topics area (to focus on specific topics).53 The fundamental purpose with CIWIN is to collect information from different sources and make it available to CIP actors. It is important to notice, however, that this will only work as long as the actors are willing and interested in sharing information and experiences, as well as in consulting with each other. Participation in and use of CIWIN is open to all Member States. The Commission estimates that CIWIN would have about 70–80 users in each Member State. The identified users are Member States’ governmental authorities, supervisory authorities, experts in CIP matters and the European Commission. However, not all users will have access to all areas of CIWIN. The access rights are distributed on a ‘‘need to know basis’’ which means that different users will have different views depending on their role.54 Participation in CIWIN must be conditional upon a signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that contains technical and security requirements applicable to CIWIN, and information on the sites to be connected to CIWIN.55 The obligations and tasks that are assigned to Member States participating in CIWIN is that they must designate a ‘‘CIWIN Executive’’ and a ‘‘CIWIN Support Officer’’. The CIWIN Executive must function as a coordinator and will be the signatory of the MoU which also includes a responsibility for granting or denying access rights to the CIWIN within its Member State. The CIWIN Support Officer in turn will be more of a technical support for the CIWIN users and manage education of the CIWIN system. In addition to these two appointments, the participating Member States will further provide and regularly update CIWIN with relevant CIP information of common EU interest (a translation function will enable users to read documents in languages other than their own).56 The Commission for their part will be responsible for the technical development and management of the CIWIN. The Commission will also, in cooperation with the Member States, lay down guidelines on the terms of use of the system and establish procedures for granting full or selective access to the CIWIN. The Commission is

53

Ibid. Most of the fixed areas are cross-European which users from all 27 member states have access to. The organisation of the Member State area (and the area for the Commission) is left exclusively to the users of the respective Member State/Commission. 55 Lindstro¨m (2008b). 56 Proposal for a Council decision on a critical infrastructure warning information network (CIWIN). Non-paper. Brussels, 26 June 2008. 54

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also to be responsible for the formal approval of the appointed CIWIN Executive in each Member State. In addition to these tasks, the Commission must, like the Member States, provide and regularly update relevant CIP information of common EU interest.57 The costs incurred in connection with the operation, maintenance and central functioning of the CIWIN will be borne by the Community budget, whereas costs related to users’ access to CIWIN within participating Member States will be borne by participating Member States. The CIWIN-hardware will be installed at the beginning of 2009 and the Member States will get access to a prototype of the system during the spring of 2009. As is the case with the Directive, the Commission will review and evaluate the operation of the CIWIN every three years and submit regular reports to the Member States.58

The Annual Financial Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism59 In 2007, the Council established the programme ‘‘Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security related Risks’’ (PPCT)60 (hereafter referred to as ‘‘PPCT’’ or simply ‘‘the Financial Programme’’) in order to provide funding opportunities for CIP-related measures. This is the third part constituting EPCIP. In order to facilitate the overall purpose with EPCIP, the Programme will support Member States’ efforts to ‘‘prevent, prepare for, and to protect people and critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks and other securityrelated incidents by providing funding for relevant CIP-measures’’. What is expected is that the projects that are allotted money, in addition to the general achievement, will contribute to the development of instruments (at EU-level), strategies and activities/measures in the field of the effective protection of critical infrastructure (at both EU- and national-levels) and/or the development of a common framework for the effective protection of critical infrastructure at EUlevel. In addition, the projects should develop methods, techniques and instruments for operational and training use in this particular field; exchange information, experience and best practices; develop and improve the relationship between public authorities and private sector in the field covered by the Programme; improve the mutual knowledge of the Member States’ protection systems; enhance the capacity

57

Ibid. Ibid. 59 The section is built on Annual work programme 2007 – Prevention, preparedness and consequence management of terrorism and other security related risks. 60 Council Decision No 2007/124/EC, Euratom. 58


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to share good practices; create informal contact networks between authorities; and develop a culture of trust and cooperation.61 The financial programme is a part of the general Programme on ‘‘Security and safeguarding liberties’’ and the total budget is close to 140 million euro for the seven-year period 2007–2013.62 Calls for proposals connected to the Programme are regularly published on the European Commission’s website. The Member States are given around three months to submit their project proposals. The Commission has called upon the Member States to better encourage authorities and companies to apply for financial support and have also discussed the possibility of arranging more education on how to apply in order to promote more applications. The third annual work programme decision for 2009 amounts to a total of 177 million euro. All areas identified in the financial PPC-programme are open for proposals. However, in 2009, a number of priorities have been identified. In order to receive financial support, some conditions have been set up. For example, the maximum rate of co-funding by the Commission is 70% of the total eligible costs of the project, the Commission grants are given for non-commercial purposes only and projects must be strictly non-profit making (bodies and organisations which are profit-oriented may submit projects only in conjunction with non-profit-oriented or state organisations, and the project susceptible to be awarded a grant must present a non-profit budget). With regards to transnational projects, they must involve partners in at least two Member States, or one Member State and one other State which is an acceding or a candidate country. Third countries and international organisations may participate as partners, but are not permitted to submit projects. National projects in turn are only eligible as starter and/or complementary measures to transnational projects, or if they contribute to developing innovative methods and/or technologies. Also, projects cannot last more than two years.63 Based on a number of selection criteria, the proposals for projects will further be evaluated on the basis of, for example, the applicant’s operational and profes-

61 Regarding the energy sector and the action grants to be awarded the programme stipulate that it deals with both transnational and national projects such as ‘‘restoration of externally disrupted power generation plants; assessment and mitigation of risks for disabling of control centres vital for the security and restoration of large power systems’’ and ‘‘studies on interdependencies between EU ICT infrastructures and electricity generation and transmission systems’’.Within the transport sector it deals with ‘‘training of Member States’ actors involved in high risk transport of hazardous materials and goods’’ and ‘‘evaluation of best practices and exchange of experiences’’. 62 The programme prevention, preparedness and consequence management of terrorism and other security related risks amount to 12.7 million euro. Important to notice is that this programme does not apply to matters that are covered by other financial instruments in particular by the rapid response and preparedness instrument for major emergencies (now renamed to civil protection financial instrument) and by the research activities in the areas of security and space in the 7th RTD framework programme. 63 Annual work programme 2007 – prevention, preparedness and consequence managemet of terrosim and other security related risks.

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sional competencies and qualifications as well as its financial capability. The proposals that are eligible and meet the selection criteria will after that be assessed by an evaluation committee and ranked on the basis of a number of award criteria such as ‘‘conformity’’, ‘‘quality’’, ‘‘value for money’’ and ‘‘impact of the expected results on the general objectives of the Programme’’. Also, larger projects, in terms of, for example, ambition and participants, will be favoured. There is also a criterion on the need for a European dimension where, for example, projects with a wide geographic scope (in terms of partners, participants and the target groups) will be favoured.64

The European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERN–CIP) One proposed project to be financed through the financial programme is the establishment of a European Reference Network for CIP (hereafter referred to as ‘‘ERN–CIP’’). The proposal on the establishment of ERN–CIP originates from the Commission which argues that there is a major deficit regarding the availability of security data on the vulnerabilities and potential attacks to infrastructures. Protecting critical infrastructures requires information on which to base analysis such as engineering design, architecture, procedures, etc. However, much of this type of information is security-related in one way or another, and also for several reasons scarce. For example, infrastructures are often large and complex systems-of-systems which result in their vulnerabilities not always being easy to identify. To further complicate matters, technologies such as ICT evolve rapidly and operators in general are unwilling to report security events.65 The direction at this time of writing is that the network will keep together already existing test centres within the different Member States and enable more organised and advanced physical CIP-testing within the EU (today, there is a big dependency on the testing facilities in the United States). The Commission’s JRC in Ispra, (Italy) will coordinate the establishment of the planned network. Both public and private stakeholders will have access to the testing facilities of the ERN– CIP. The ERN–CIP would inform all Member States about all conducted experiments; however, it would then be up to interested Member States to contact the experiment originator and ask for access to the results of the experiment. The experiment originator would then decide on the need to know and, consequently, on whether to share the information with the requesting party.66

64

Ibid. The European Commissions internal working paper: European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (June 2008). 66 Ibid. 65


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In addition to exploring ‘‘weaknesses’’ and the potential effects an attack could have on different systems, ERN–CIP is planned to develop tests of standards and best practices; demonstrate systems and risk scenarios; and support research and development and industrial innovation projects. The establishment of ERN–CIP will involve participants at several levels – the Directorates General, the Member States, critical infrastructure operators, technology vendors, certification bodies and research parties.67 A working group of experts from the Member States has been put together with the JRC to form a task force and an inventory of existing European laboratories and facilities, in order to review and consolidate the needs and requirements of a reference network. According to the Commission, a few security laboratories are known to work on CIP-issues; however, the information about them is limited due to the sensitive nature of the contents of the work. According to the Commission, these national laboratories are further characterised partly by difficulties in accessing industry, critical infrastructure operators and technology providers and partly by only taking the national dimension into account. The inventory work made by the established task force will take place in the first half of 2009 and the intention is that a project plan will be ready for the Member States to decide upon in December 2009. If the Member States at that point consider the project proposal to be justified and approves of it, the Commission will proceed to an implementation phase in order to, ultimately, establish the ERN–CIP.68

The EU Member States’ Views on EPCIP Differ The Commission’s report of the results of the EPCIP Green Paper consultation in February 2006 showed that the 22 Member States which provided official responses to the EPCIP Green Paper welcomed the Commission’s initiative and work on the development of EPCIP.69 In general, most Member States stated that EPCIP should support and facilitate work on CIP and provide the tools necessary to improve the protection of critical infrastructures. However, the importance of the principle of subsidiarity was repeatedly stressed. Several Member States further made reference to the different legal traditions and organisational systems present in each Member State and underlined that EPCIP should take into account these differences. Several Member States also underlined the importance of the confidentiality principle especially vis-a`-vis the private sector. Also during the negotiations, several differences about the scope of the programme have been made visible.

67

Ibid. Ibid. 69 Commission Report (2006), Results of the EPCIP Green Paper consultation Responses of the Member States. Official responses were not received from Greece, Italy and Malta. 68

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One big dissonance among the Member States concerned whether EPCIP should be of a voluntary or obligatory nature and if there was a need for a Directive.70 A closely related stumbling block was the requirement for a OSP and a SLO where some Member States argued that the OSP concept should be used as a best practice (especially for those critical infrastructure owners/operators who have little experience in dealing with similar issues) and therefore not be obligatory. The fundamental argument for this line was that it is only through a voluntary partnership that sufficient levels of trust will be built up and that mandatory rules will risk damaging the public–private dialogue. Also, the list of CIP-sectors caused discussions and a number of reductions and amendments were proposed.71 Another difference in opinion, which contributed to the relatively long and comprehensive negotiation phase that has characterised the EPCIP-process, was the discussion of the definition of ECI; here, the Member States were divided concerning the question of whether ECI should be a infrastructure that has a potentially serious cross-border impact on two or more, or three or more, Member States. In the end, the final outcome was that it should have an impact on at least two Member States to be regarded as ECI (see ECI definition presented earlier). As previous researchers have described it, the EU’s emerging CIP-policy is represented by either a Commission-controlled centralised top-down process to identify and protect critical infrastructure with a database on identified ECIs in Brussels on the one hand or on the other hand a decentralised system with a bottom-up process where the EU’s role is to promote coordination and the exchange of best practices but where the ultimate control over CIP is left with the Member States.72 During the negotiations, one can establish that the Commission’s proposal for a Directive bit by bit has changed its character to a more decentralised approach. The Commission for their part emphasise that this is natural and that it takes time to create acceptance for community competence in a new area such as this.73 When establishing EPCIP, two arguments were frequently emphasised by the Commission: the first argument was that weak links in CIP have to be eliminated especially where transboundary effects come into play. The second was that additional costs for companies operating in more than one Member State, resulting from differing security measures, need to be minimised. An important 70

Seven Member States (Cyprus, Spain, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovakia) expressed their support for some sort of legislative approach, seven were against (Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and eight did not offer a clear opinion. Some of the Member States were of the opinion that parts of the common framework could be obligatory (the views varied however concerning exactly which parts of the framework that could be obligatory). Also some Member States were of the opinion that the framework could be voluntary at first and become obligatory once it is tested and well established. See Commission Report 2006, Results of the EPCIP Green Paper consultation responses of the Member States. 71 Ibid. 72 Eriksson and Barck-Holst (2005, p. 10). 73 Interview, DG JLS, 9 July 2008 in Lindstro¨m (2008b).


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challenge in this last regard is, however, that differences in implementation level can lead to ‘‘gold-plating’’ or ‘‘insufficient implementation’’. In an EU context, gold-plating refers to an implementation of EU legislation which goes beyond what is required by that legislation. Since the Member States have a large discretion when implementing the Directive in question this may, for example, lead to increased reporting obligations or added procedural requirements. Gold-plating is usually presented as a bad practice because it imposes costs that could have been avoided.74

Concluding Remarks: The EU as an Influential CIP-Player The events of 9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings gave a major boost to EU engagement in CIP-matters. Since then, several policy papers has been prepared and a common program for CIP has been established. However, whether or not the EU will be a relevant CIP-player in the future depends on a range of different factors. Starting with the most crucial, the EU’s ability to develop competence in this area will ultimately depend on the Member States’ will to give the EU a mandate. As this chapter has shown, the national CIP-work varies among the EU’s 27 Member States and they have diverging opinions about where to draw the line in how much the EU should be involved in CIP-matters. A closely interlinked factor that could jeopardise the EU cooperation on CIPissues is whether disputes between Member States regarding, for example, the designation of an ECI or fulfilment of the Directive will occur. Here, it can be argued that differences and disagreement among Member States would be rare if EPCIP is prepared and implemented correctly, but this is also dependant on whether neighbouring countries have the same view on how to implement and interpret the goal with EPCIP. A collective action problem can easily be imagined if Member States refrain from making the ‘‘first move’’ because of doubts about others’ commitments.75 Another test that could either justify or overturn the programme is whether it is perceived as providing an added value to the already existing sector-specific and national work. This question has already been brought up in connection with the planned three year review of the Directive. As was mentioned earlier, the current version of the Directive concentrates only on the energy and transport sector. However, within three years, the Directive will be reviewed to evaluate its impact and the need to include other sectors (inter alia the ICT-sector). The result of this review will most likely be dependent on whether or not the Commission can go on with its ambitions to expand the scope of the Directive to several sectors.76 It is 74

European Commission Glossary Gold plating. Lindstro¨m (2008b). 76 The energy and transport sub-sectors are identified in Annex I of the Council directive (2008/ 114/EC). 75

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important to note regarding the process around the establishment of EPCIP that it has, however, been highlighted that there has been a lack of a thorough mapping of the already existing sector-specific CIP-work since the initiative came about, which makes it difficult to assess and estimate the added value with EPCIP.77 What the future will bring in terms of common testing protocols and certification standards, or if the scope of the cooperation goes beyond the EU, is hard to tell. Further, since the programme has not yet been implemented, practical experience of related problems are missing. However, regarding the EU’s future as a CIP-player there are several indications that the Commission’s objective is that the common European Programme for CIP is here to stay. For example, and as has been mentioned before, it is the Commission’s goal to extend the scope of the programme to include further sectors in connection with the three-year review (and the preparatory work is already on-going).78 Another clear signal of the EU’s future engagement in CIP-matters is that the High Representative, Javier Solana, has expressed his willingness to incorporate CIP in the revised European Security Strategy. In the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy from 11 December 2008, the heavy reliance of modern economies on critical infrastructures including transport, communication, internet and energy was highlighted, and this section ends up with an emphasis that ‘‘more work is required in this area, to explore a comprehensive EU approach, raise awareness and enhance international co-operation’’.79

References A secure Europe in a better world – European security strategy. Document proposed by Javier Solana and adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council, Brussels, 12 December 2003 Annual Work Programme (2009) Prevention, preparedness and consequence management of terrorism and other security related risks. http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/cips/doc/ awp_cips_2009_en.pdf, accessed 19 Jan 2009 Commission Report Results of the EPCIP Green Paper consultation responses of the member states. JLS/D1/PR/vdb D(2006) 4675, Brussels, 14 March 2006 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European parliament, Critical infrastructure protection in the fight against terrorism. Brussels, 20 October 2004. 702 Final Council Directive (2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008) The identification and designation of European critical infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. http://www.infrastrutturecritiche.it/aiic/images/DocArticoli/directive%20epcip%20en_12_01 _2009.pdf, accessed 2 Feb 2009 77

Lindstro¨m (2008b). During the negotiations on the Directive some Member States have emphasised that nuclear facilities should be considered as ECI and should be included during the scheduled review of the Directive in three years’ time. 79 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World. Brussels, 11 December 2008 (S407/08). 78


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Eriksson P, Barck-Holst S (2005) Politik fo¨r skydd av kritisk infrastruktur i EU och Sverige – en ja¨mfo¨rande analys. English edition: Politics for critical infrastructure protection in the EU and Sweden – a comparative analysis. Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm EurActive Critical infrastructure. http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/critical-infrastructure/article140597, accessed 31 Jan 2009 European Commission Glossary Gold plating http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/ glossary_en.htm. Accessed 1 Feb 2009 European Commission Green paper on a European program for critical infrastructure protection. COM (2005) 576 final European Commissions Internal Working Paper Guidelines for implementation of the Directive on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve their protection European Commissions Internal Working Paper (2008) European reference network for critical infrastructure protection European Commission Joint Research Centre Checklist for supporting identification and protection of European critical infrastructure. Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen Traceability and vulnerability assessment ˚ , Ljungkvist K, Boin A, Rhinard M (2007) Protecting Europe’s critical infrastructure: Fritzon A problems and prospects. J Contingencies Crisis Manage, 15(1) Larsson P (2007) Europeanized National Emergency Preparedness: Opportunities and Challenges for Sweden’s Emergency Preparedness. Swedish edition: Fra˚n hemva¨vd till inva¨vd krisberedskap: mo¨jligheter och utmaningar vid en europeiserad svensk krisberedskap. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency. Lindstro¨m M (2008a) A review of four EU member states views on the European programme for critical infrastructure protection. Swedish edition: En granskning av fyra EU-la¨nders syn pa˚ det europeiska programmet fo¨r skydd av kritisk infrastruktur. The Swedish Emergency Management Agency Lindstro¨m M (2008b) National consequences of the European programme for critical infrastructure protection. Swedish edition: Nationella konsekvenser av det europeiska programmet fo¨r skydd av kritisk infrastruktur. The Swedish Emergency Management Agency, Dnr. 283/2008 Prevention, preparedness and consequence management of terrorism and other security related risks 2007–2013. Call for proposals action grants 2009. http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/ funding/cips/doc/call_2009_action_grants.pdf, accessed 19 Jan 2009 Proposal for the sectoral criteria to make a first selection of potential European critical infrastructure within a sector. [7252/1/08 REV 1]. Brussels, 7 March 2008 Proposal for a Council decision on a critical infrastructure warning information network (CIWIN). Non-paper. Brussels, 26 June 2008 Report on the implementation of the European security strategy: providing security in a changing world. Brussels, 11 December 2008 (S407/08). UNISYS (2007) Study on the establishment of the critical infrastructure warning information network (CIWIN). Interim report. Approved version. Contract Number: JLS/D1/2006/02 ABAC Number: 30-CE-0080088/00-03 UNISYS (2008a) CIWIN prototype user manual for the CIWIN executive: study on the establishment of the critical infrastructure warning information network (CIWIN) UNISYS (2008b) CIWIN prototype user manual for the CIWIN executive Wenger A, Mauer V (2006) International CIIP handbook 2006. An inventory of 20 national and 6 international critical information infrastructure protection policies, vol I and II. Center for Security Studies. ETH, Zu¨rich


Chapter 4

Rapid Alerts for Crises at the EU Level Sanna Zandeń Kjelleń

In the EU today, there is an abundance of systems1 for information exchange, early warnings and rapid alerts on serious events that could have severe implications for many Member States and their citizens. These systems are important components of the Member States’ national crisis preparedness since they involve many players within the national emergency management systems, and since they enable the Member States to quickly react to possible threats. Although the aim of the systems is to enable swift response at the EU level, it can be argued that they have other purposes than purely responsive. Since the basis of the systems is that a Member State experiencing an emerging or already developed crisis informs the other Member States, such an alert might bring about measures in other countries for actually preparing for the crisis. Moreover, the systems could have a preventive effect since they enable the Member States to prevent crises from entering their country, for instance when the EU isolates areas where a pandemic outbreak has been discovered. On a psychological level, the rapid alert systems can also be seen as preventive since they can put pressure on Member States to work more on preventive measures in order to avoid the somewhat shameful process of informing other countries that they have, for instance, failed in the maintenance of critical infrastructures such as nuclear plants. The rapid alert systems have developed sector-wise and their creation is often the result of specific events that have had a serious impact on the EU Member States. The EU’s rapid alert system for radiological emergencies was, for instance, initiated shortly after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Since crisis management within the Union has traditionally been largely sector-based and not an all-encompassing structure or policy, few people outside each sector has had the knowledge about functions such as rapid alert systems. Accordingly, not many people have

1

The word ‘‘system’’ will in this chapter be used for describing a set of measures for achieving a rapid spread of information. Hence, the word ‘‘system’’ in this context does not specifically imply a technical or web-based system; it could, for instance, also refer to the standardised procedure to place a phone call to a number of people in case of emergency.


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looked at already established structures in other sectors when developing new rapid alert systems in the aftermath of a crisis. This means that the systems in place today all function very differently, with various procedures and solutions. The Commission has, in recent years, started working on a more comprehensive internal coordination for serious events with consequences for many different sectors. This enhanced focus on business continuity management2 within the Commission has brought about the establishment of a network of different Directorates-General (DG) and other Commission services. In order to make sure that important information on a serious cross-sectoral event, regardless of character, is rapidly spread to all sectors concerned, a Web-based system called ARGUS was introduced in 2006. ARGUS receives input from, among others, the sector specific rapid alert systems. Before a brief discussion on the above-mentioned development within the Commission, this chapter will outline the features of a number of rapid alert systems in the EU. Delimitation has been made so that automatically operated early warning systems will not be discussed. Automated systems can, for instance, scan Web news pages in order to detect newly published articles on possible crises worldwide or within the Union. Other systems provide meteorological information in order to foresee severe weather conditions; there are systems for measuring levels of radiation in the environment and for detecting earthquakes, etc. Such automated systems are essential for crisis management since they provide useful information for relevant players before, during and after a crisis. Nevertheless, the focus of this chapter is primarily on socio-technical systems where there is a political commitment for the parties involved. Hence, the chapter describes the rapid alert and information exchange systems where the EU Member States, the European Commission and relevant EU agencies are politically and, most often, also legally obliged3 to take active measures in order to inform their counter-parts of perceived threats. It is important to note that the majority of events that are reported through the rapid alert systems presented in

2

Business continuity entails activities within an organisation in order to ensure the maintenance of critical functions in case of a disruption, and a swift recovery after this. The aim is to identify key functions and services and what threats could be facing them, as well as to plan and perform exercises for possible risk scenarios. It is considered important that business continuity is integrated in the regular processes of an organisation and not something which is only activated in the event of a crisis. Business continuity is also often referred to as contingency management or crisis management. For more on this subject, see Borodzicz (2005). 3 This political commitment does not imply that a Member State has to take action on the political level in case of an alert. The political obligation merely refers to the fact that there has been an agreement on the political level that Member States should take action on whichever level is most suitable for the event in question. Most events reported through the rapid alert systems do not demand action on the political level and are handled by, for example, sector specific government agencies. The legal obligation in its turn entitles the Commission to bring a Member State before the European Court of Justice if that Member State has neglected to report a potential crisis. The Commission has so far not taken such measures which could signify that the threat of this happening is sufficient to make the Member States follow the reporting obligation. Whether this is the case or whether most Member States simply find it in their interests to quickly inform their EU counter-parts is, however, somewhat difficult to determine. Nevertheless, the legal obligation can be seen as a token for the importance that the Union attaches to the existence of rapid alert systems.

4 Rapid Alerts for Crises at the EU Level

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Rapid Alert and Information Systems Civil protection incidents Radiological emergencies Chemical and biological threats Contagious diseases in humans Threats to animal health Threats to plant health Threats in food and feed Threats to consumer health and safety

CECIS ECURIE RAS BICHAT, RAS CHEM EWRS ADNS EUROPHYT RASFF RAPEX

DG Environment DG Energy and Transport DG Health and Consumers

Threats against critical infrastructures

CIWIN

DG Justice, Freedom and Security

Commission internal crisis coordination

ARGUS

Commission SecretariatGeneral

DG DG DG DG DG

Health Health Health Health Health

and and and and and

Consumers Consumers Consumers Consumers Consumers

Fig. 4.1 Rapid alert and information systems

this chapter never evolve into an EU crisis but can be limited to the country reporting the event. Nevertheless, the systems give early notice to other countries in order for them to prepare for and to detect a potential crisis on a larger EU scale. The chapter will also mention whether the described EU systems in question have any connections to significant similar systems outside the EU, which is quite common since many threats tend to be global and not EU-specific. It is rather difficult to make a distinction between a rapid alert and an early warning and there is no consensus on the matter. Even if a distinction is made, many of those involved disagree on whether a certain system is actually directed towards one purpose or another and the names of the various systems offer little guidance. To further confuse the reader, most rapid alert systems also contain a platform for information exchange on events that are not as acute as the events demanding a rapid alert. Moreover, some systems are used primarily for information exchange with additional structures kicking in if a crisis of great magnitude is about to occur, for example in the area of animal health. Therefore, this chapter will use the concept of early warning, rapid alert and information exchange without offering the reader clear definitions. As an introduction to the areas that will be described in this chapter, Fig. 4.1 gives an overview of the EU rapid alert systems and their primary Commission counter-part.

Serious Incidents in the Field of Civil Protection Within the framework of the EU Community mechanism (see Chap. 5) created in 2001,4 the EU has developed a system for communication and rapid alert regarding 4

Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom and Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom.

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major accidents or catastrophes – CECIS (Common Emergency Communication and Information System). Examples of these could be chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, technical and radiological failures, oil spillages at sea and other environmental disasters. The mechanism can be activated by any country in the world in need of assistance. In addition to the EU Member States, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland participate in the Community mechanism. DG Environment in the Commission, with its Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), operates CECIS. Although CECIS is primarily used for requesting assistance, the Council Decision regarding the Community mechanism obliges EU Member States to inform the EU in the event of a serious accident. The countries must, without delay, inform the MIC as well as other Member States that are at risk of being affected by the accident. However, it is difficult to enforce the obedience of the Council Decision since the definition of a major accident is not very clear-cut.5 Hence, each Member State could interpret differently whether the scope of an event is serious enough to inform the MIC and those states that may possibly be affected. However, it rarely happens that an affected state informs the EU without also requesting assistance, which means that the EU is practically almost always informed in case of disasters within the Union. When CECIS became operative in 2007, the previous system of e-mails and faxes was abandoned. CECIS is a secure Web-based system for the transfer and storage of information where participating states and the MIC enter messages about serious incidents. Thereafter, the system generates an e-mail to all its members. The MIC is on stand-by, but not manned, around the clock, where the on-duty officer must report for duty within 20 minutes in the event of an emergency. If a Member State should forget to use CECIS when alerting about a disaster, the Commission’s Security Office6 is the recipient of telephone calls, faxes and e-mail messages, whereupon the Security Office contacts the officer on duty at the MIC. Alerts that are not entered into CECIS cannot reach all Member States simultaneously and the MIC has to forward them. Thereafter, the MIC can require Member States to give notification that they have observed the dispatch. The Directorates-General (DG) ECHO (Humanitarian Aid), RELEX (External Relations) and Communication as well as the Commissioner Cabinets receive all CECIS alerts and information. The MIC receives alerts from the rapid alert systems for radiological emergencies, ECURIE, and for biological and chemical attacks, RAS BICHAT, although these systems do not receive alerts from CECIS. If the alert is of a very serious nature, those on duty set up an information notice on ARGUS, which is a communication system within the Commission for crises that might affect a number of DirectoratesGeneral.7 ECURIE, RAS BICHAT and ARGUS will be described later on in this chapter. 5

Kjelleń (2007). The Security Office, also called the Duty Office, is embedded in DG Personnel and Administration, as a part of its Security Directorate. The physical security of Commission staff and buildings lie within the scope of the Security Directorate’s work tasks. Since the Security Office is manned around the clock, it has been chosen as the operative point of contact for many of the Rapid Alert Systems. 7 Interview at DG Environment, Monitoring and Information Centre (July 2007, October 2008). 6


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Radiological Emergencies In 1987, as a consequence of the Chernobyl disaster the year before, the EU agreed on a system for European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange, ECURIE. In addition to the EU Member States, Switzerland and Croatia are now also members of the system. The founding decision8 states that a Member State taking actions for the protection of its own population is obliged to give immediate notice to all members of ECURIE. Based on a subsequent Directive,9 a Member State discovering exceptionally high levels of radiation in the environment, or that has been affected by an accident which results in, or may result in, release of radioactive substances, must inform the Commission and Member States concerned of any measures for protection of and information to the public. Given the reporting obligation, the Commission could bring an EU Member State before the European Court of Justice if it has failed in this aspect.10 In the Commission, DG Energy and Transport is in charge of the ECURIE system, while the Joint Research Centre (JRC) operates the system’s technical elements. Alerts and information messages are dispatched from the Commission ECURIE central computer to the ECURIE network computers in the Member States. Smaller countries usually have one such computer whereas larger countries can have several ECURIE computers. ECURIE messages are encoded and the on-duty radiation protection officer in each country must use the ECURIE computer to receive clarification on the message content. Encoding not only prevents unauthorised access but it also allows each country to send and receive the information in their national language.11 ECURIE computers are not used for any purpose other than ECURIE, which is designed as an e-mail program. ECURIE is complemented by the information network EURDEP, where participating states report gamma dose rate readings from their national measurement stations.12 In order to send an ECURIE Alert message, Member State officers in charge must open the system’s ECURIE Alert page, whereupon an extensive questionnaire is displayed. The information is then sent to the Commission, which forwards it through the ECURIE system and by fax to all participating states. No alarm is dispatched directly from one country to another unless these states have a bilateral agreement for this purpose. The system has the capacity to automatically forward messages to all ECURIE states, but the current policy is to have all the information go through the Commission. This is so that its personnel can make sure that the alarm has been dispatched from an authorised source and that it has not been sent accidentally. ECURIE messages are forwarded directly to CECIS and RAS BICHAT, since they

8

Council Decision 87/600/Euratom. Council Directive 89/618/Euratom. 10 Interview at DG Energy and Transport, Radiation Protection Unit (May 2007, October 2008). 11 Kjelleń (2007). 12 The European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE), at the Commission website (2009). 9

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are usually concerned. Other rapid alert systems are contacted only if needed, for example the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed, RASFF, if there is contamination of the food chain.13 The Commission’s Security Office, manned around the clock, is the primary ECURIE alerts recipient whereas DG Energy and Transport has an on-duty ECURIE officer. When the ECURIE computer receives an incoming message, an alarm is generated to both the on-duty ECURIE expert and to the Security Office. These can both also be contacted by Member States via mobile telephone. An incoming alarm to the Security Office is immediately forwarded via mobile telephone to the on-duty ECURIE expert in order to ensure that the alarm has reached its destination. This expert has a reaction time of one hour, in which he or she calls in the Emergency Team and makes sure that the points of contact in all Member States have been informed. DG Energy and Transport can receive assistance from the Security Office to speed up the process of distributing the information to the Member States. The two ECURIE computers of the Security Office can also be used as back-up should the computer systems within DG Energy and Transport fail. If a Member State does not respond to an alarm within one hour, the Commission will phone the national points of contact in order to inform the country in question that an ECURIE alert message has been issued. Information that is important but does not merit an ECURIE alert can also be sent, although not as an alert but as an ECURIE Information message. An example of such a message could be if a Member State has discovered that a high-activity radioactive source has been stolen or found. The other ECURIE members should be aware of this discovery but are not obliged to acknowledge the message.14 In 2006, the EU and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into an agreement on mutual early warning for radiological emergencies, where information is exchanged via fax between ECURIE and IAEA’s warning system ENATOM. Due to this agreement, an ECURIE member state only needs to alert one of the systems about an incident, whereupon that system should inform the other. The criteria for alerts are somewhat higher within the IAEA15 than within the EU since notice through ENATOM is only required in case another country could be affected by a radioactive release. Nevertheless, the Commission chooses to inform ENATOM about alarms which by definition do not exceed the IAEA alarm threshold. The intention is to harmonise the data formats of the two warning systems in order to achieve automatic information exchange. However, since the systems currently function very differently, such synchronisation will probably not be seen in the near future.

13

Interview at DG Energy and Transport, Radiation Protection Unit (May 2007, October 2008). Kjelleń (2007). 15 Regulated in the IAEA convention EMERCON. 14


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Biological and Chemical Threats The 9/11 attacks in 2001, followed by the incidents of intentional dispersion of anthrax spores, immediately intensified EU cooperation regarding biological and chemical threats and attacks. Only two months after the terrorist attacks in the US, the Commission was tasked by the EU Ministers for Health Affairs to prepare a programme of preparedness and intervention for biological and chemical threats. In December the same year, the Health Security Committee16 adopted what then became the Council and the Commission’s BICHAT programme (Programme of Cooperation on Preparedness and Response to Biological and Chemical Agent Attacks).17 The programme includes, among others, the Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats, RAS BICHAT, which became operative by mid-2002.18 Through RAS BICHAT, members can post alerts about possible or verified releases of biological or chemical substances following an attack. The system must store and modify all information with the aim to quickly discover, trace and evaluate threats as well as send out advance warnings before an event has been officially confirmed. RAS BICHAT links the Health Security Committee, DG Health and Consumers at the Commission, the EU countries and Norway’s national points of contact. Notifications must be disseminated when a Member State suspects danger, when an incident might be of cross-border character, when an incident could require a collective EU effort and when a country might be in need of assistance. RAS BICHAT not only spreads alerts and information but can also be used for coordinated Member States crisis management operations. Since RAS BICHAT is based on the previously mentioned BICHAT programme and not on any legally binding documents, Member States are not obliged to report on the abovementioned threats. However, there are intentions to formalise and update the programme within a year or so, which might bring about a legal reporting obligation.19 When a Member State has posted an alert in RAS BICHAT’s Web-based system, it generates a text message to all officers concerned at DG Health and Consumers. Member States must additionally phone the Commission’s Security Office, which then contacts the officer on duty. To begin with, only that officer needs to act on the warning and he or she must present him/herself at the office within one hour. The Security Office also makes sure that this is the case. Once on site, the on-duty officer examines the alert and verifies that it has been sent from an 16

The Health Security Committee is an informal cooperative body under the Member States’ Ministers for Health and the EU Commissioner for Health, created by a Council Decision (2001). The committee consists of Member States officials, observers from ECDC, EMEA and WHO as well as candidate countries, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Its mandate was recently prolonged until 2010 and the committee is expected to be institutionalised. 17 Programme of Cooperation on Preparedness and Response to Biological and Chemical Agent Attacks (2001). 18 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Health Threats Unit (July 2007, October 2008). 19 Kjelleń (2007).

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authorised source, whereupon a phone call is placed to the issuing Member State to ensure that the message is correct and that no important information is missing. If the on-duty officer makes the assessment that reinforcements are necessary, additional staff are brought in. After this procedure, the warning is disseminated through RAS BICHAT to all Member States’ points of contact and to the Health Security Committee, which must be convened in a case of emergency. Dissemination is done by a system-generated e-mail that indicates that something has happened, after which the designated points of contact must visit the protected RAS BICHAT website to obtain the full information on the incident. The Member States must respond within an hour, and should a Member State neglect to do this, the Commission will telephone the country in question for a follow-up. Should there be a serious crisis, the Commission’s Health Emergency Operations Facility (HEOF) is used. This consists of both a crisis and communication centre and an extensive personnel organisation. The physical equipment is used on a daily basis whereas the personnel only are activated when there is a severe crisis. The HEOF staff is activated by the director general of DG Health and Consumers and consists of 80 people who are pulled from their ordinary duties to work in shifts at HEOF.20 In case of a serious risk with regard to chemical and biological attacks, the Commission will also inform the members of the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI). This is an informal structure for a rapid spread of information on CBRN21 terrorist attacks between WHO, the EU Commission, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, United Kingdom and the USA. The designated points of contact for each country/organisation exchange information via telephone.22 Since RAS BICHAT only concerns chemical threats in relation to terrorist activities, the Health Security Committee has decided upon the creation of a system dealing with all types of chemical threats: RAS CHEM. This system is still under development and implementation is planned for mid-2009. In this Web-based system, Member States poison centres will quickly be able to inform one another and DG Health and Consumers of serious chemical incidents. A warning entered into the system will reach all members simultaneously. The exact procedures, including how an alert may or may not be acted upon, had not been established at the time of writing.23

Contagious Diseases in Humans In the 1990s, shortly after the United Kingdom major outbreaks of mad cow disease (BSE) and of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in people who had eaten

20

Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Health Threats Unit (July 2007, October 2008). Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear. 22 Kjelleń (2007). 23 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Health Threats Unit (July 2007, October 2008). 21


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BSE-contaminated beef, the EU started discussions on a system for information spread on discoveries of contagious diseases in humans. 199824 saw the establishment of the early warning and response system for communicable diseases, EWRS, as part of the Community Network for Epidemiological Surveillance and Control of Communicable Diseases, which also embraces long-term and surveillance measures. EWRS is used for immediate information to the affected EU players on outbreaks with possible cross-border consequences, as was the case when avian influenza in people and SARS were discovered. The system connects Member States, DG Health and Consumers of the Commission and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Any discovery of a communicable disease involves a reporting obligation, although the definition of an immediate notification has not been established. However, should the Commission be of the opinion that a Member State has failed to fulfill the reporting obligation when faced with a serious risk, the Commission could bring the Member State in question before the European Court of Justice. To guide the Member States in fulfilling their obligations, the case definitions for reporting a number of communicable diseases to the Community network have been agreed upon.25 Following a 2009 update of the case definitions, these now include around 60 diseases to be reported, including anthrax, novel influenza and, as mentioned above, vCJD, avian influenza in humans and SARS.26 Following a 2008 agreement,27 Member States posting a notification in EWRS can also, through the system, direct it to the World Health Organisation (WHO) if required. WHO, on the other hand, is not authorised to enter information into EWRS. The agreement between the two is a result of a WHO revision of the existing International Health Regulations (IHR), which came into force in 2007. The revision incorporated new regulations into national legislation of all WHO members, among others regarding an increase in information exchange on infectious diseases between all 193 WHO members. IHR stipulates that those responsible for people’s health are obliged to report suspected international threats to their respective National Boards of Health and Welfare. These will in turn forward the information to WHO with the aim of preventing threats to people’s health from spreading across borders. The WHO members have, to date, only selected national points of contact that can be reached around the clock, but the intention is to establish an information system of some kind within WHO. It remains to be seen whether such a system would be technically linked to EWRS.28 EWRS consists of a Web portal for protected information where the Member States’ national health agencies can inform other members of the network about

24

Decision No 2119/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. The subsequent Commission Decision 2000/57/EC established the operative procedures for EWRS. 25 Kjelleń (2007). 26 Commission Decision 2009/363/EC. 27 This agreement was incorporated in the operative procedures through Commission Decision 2008/351/EC. 28 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Health Threats Unit (July 2007, October 2008).

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outbreaks of infectious diseases that threaten to spread within the Union. Any alert posted on the Web page generates an automatic e-mail to all EWRS members, indicating that something has occurred. Thereafter, members of EWRS must enter the website in order to get information on the incident. EWRS entails three levels of warning, where level 1 corresponds to the possible risk of an outbreak occurring, level 2 a potential threat and level 3 a confirmed threat. Member States must immediately give notification if an incident corresponds with any of these levels. For the two latter levels of threat, the nature and scope of the threat as well as intended measures in the reporting country must be indicated. Once a year, Member States must compile and enter a report on all incidents that have occurred during the past twelve months.29 When DG Health and Consumers receives a EWRS message about a possible threat, an on-duty officer attends to it. The Commission has also set up a function allowing all officers at the Health Threats Unit to receive an immediate text message when a level 2 or 3 warning has entered the system. Nevertheless, only the officer on duty is obliged to act at a primary stage. In very urgent cases, Member States can contact the person on duty by telephone, as well as the Commission’s Security Office which will make sure that the on-duty EWRS officer has noticed the alert. If the person on duty considers the situation to be serious, he or she will contact the ECDC for its appraisal. As in the case of RAS BICHAT, the Commission’s Health Emergency Operations Facility (HEOF) is used in the event of a severe crisis.30

Threats to Animal Health The work on reporting threats in the area of animal health started in the early 1960s. Unlike many other mechanisms and systems within the area of crisis preparedness and crisis management, the development of a reporting system was not primarily a result of a number of major events with severe consequences for the EU Member States. Instead, the procedures were introduced in order to avoid hindrance of the free movement and trade with live animals in the Union, and to ensure that the competition was being upheld to the widest possible extent in case of animal disease outbreaks. This is still an important factor and the Commission therefore puts a lot of effort into narrowing down, as far as feasible, the size of possibly affected regions before taking measures such as closing borders or isolating areas where epizootic outbreaks have been discovered.31 The legal basis of a formalised reporting system was not established until a 1982 Council Directive.32 This Directive has later been supplemented through 29

Kjelleń (2007). Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Health Threats Unit (July 2007, October 2008). 31 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Animal health and standing committees (October 2008). 32 Council Directive 82/894/EEC. 30


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Commission Decisions33 on, for example, the procedures and codification for reporting within the system, which is called Animal Disease Notification System, ADNS. In addition to the EU Member States, other participants are Andorra, Switzerland, the Faeroe Islands, Iceland, Turkey, Norway and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). There is also a progress of connecting the Western Balkan countries to ADNS.34 The founding Directive instructs participating states to inform the Commission and all other participants, via ADNS, of outbreaks of epizootic disease as listed in the Directive. The list of diseases to be reported is not static and was recently changed through a Commission Decision in July 2008,35 when a number of diseases in aquatic animals were introduced for the first time. Currently, nearly 40 epizootic diseases have been identified by the EU, including BSE, foot and mouth disease and avian flu. When there is an outbreak not connected to earlier outbreaks in a region, or when a completely new outbreak is discovered, a warning must be sent to DG Health and Consumers at the Commission and to the participating countries as soon as the outbreak is confirmed. This shall be done within 24 hours, but given the difficulty of gathering all the information within this time frame, a primary notification is often followed by supplementary notifications. For outbreaks subsequent to a previous outbreak in an already affected region, the information must be entered into the ADNS on every first working day of each week. Based on this, the veterinary authorities in each participating country execute a risk appraisal, whereas the responsibility for any subsequent risk management is shared between the Commission and the Member States. Notifications are registered by the participating states either directly into the system or through e-mail to the Commission. When registered, the notification is automatically sent to all parties of the ADNS. In addition to informing the ADNS in the case of an outbreak, Member States must inform the general public, affected neighbouring countries, industries, slaughter houses, county and district veterinarians, politicians and the EU working group of Chief Veterinary Officers of the Member States (CVO).36 ADNS has the character of an information system rather than a rapid alert system, but structures have been established for very urgent warnings. These structures draw on the same personnel as the ADNS in both Member States and the Commission. In extremely urgent cases, Member States via their representatives in the CVO, contact the director in charge at DG Health and Consumers, who can call in the unit managers since they are available around the clock via mobile telephone. Thereafter, the ADNS team sends text messages to all CVOs and faxes all Member State contact points. Should there be a serious risk, a Commission

33

Commission Decision 2004/216/EC and Commission Decision 2005/176/EC. Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Animal health and standing committees (October 2008). 35 Commission Decision 2008/650/EC. 36 Kjelleń (2007). 34

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Decision on isolating a certain region, closing borders and banning exports can be put in place within hours. The majority of all worldwide veterinary agencies are connected to the early warning system of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).37 Since ADNS is not automatically linked to OIE’s network, affected ADNS countries must inform both EU and OIE in the event of an incident. During spring 2008, the EU Member States decided to start working on ways to technically link OIE and ADNS to one another in order to make information-sharing more efficient. OIE was also awarded financial means to start analysing possible ways to do this. It will most likely take a few years before a new system can be in place.38

Threats to Plant Health In 2000, it was decided that the Commission would create a network for the notifications on threats to plant health,39 which developed into the European Network of Plant Health Information Systems, EUROPHYT. The founding Directive did not state what obligations such a network would impose on the Member States, and there has not been any subsequent decisions formalising the legal grounds for procedures and routines within the Web-based system. The scope of reporting within EUROPHYT covers diseases regulated by EU plant health legislation, for example bacterial diseases, fungal and viral diseases, as well as pests and harmful organisms within agriculture, horticulture and forestry. DG Health and Consumers is the Commission counter-part and, apart from the EU Member States, Switzerland also participates. The European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation (EPPO) is another recipient, but not a sender, of some of the notifications. National plant organisations in any country worldwide where the infected species is believed to originate are also informed. EUROPHYT is primarily used for imports from outside the EU market. Not only cases of harmful organisms and diseases are reported, but also import consignments that do not meet Community standards, for instance if proper documents are missing, when documents are not filled in correctly or if the consignment is not marked properly. In the system, Member States also report on consignments within the EU which contain verified harmful organisms or diseases that another Member State wishes to keep out of its territory. Member States not affected by a certain harmful organism or disease can try to prevent the potential contaminator from entering the country by establishing a protected zone, in which any consignments bearing a risk regarding this particular case must not enter. Thus, all Member States 37

OIE is the intergovernmental organisation responsible for improving animal health worldwide, bringing together 172 Member Countries and Territories. 38 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Animal health and standing committees (October 2008). 39 Council Directive 2000/29/EC.


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must report on any movement of harmful organisms or diseases that could be a threat to other Member States’ respective protected zones. All discoveries within the EU of harmful organisms meriting quarantine must also be reported. Notifications in EUROPHYT should be made within 24 hours after the discovery of a suspected case. In extremely urgent cases, a Member State that has discovered harmful organisms has the possibility to report this via mobile telephone to the Commission. Given the need of laboratory results for confirmation of a possible threat, this span is difficult to achieve in certain cases. Hence, one can report unconfirmed cases which must then be supplemented. A notification from a Member State immediately generates an e-mail to all members of EUROPHYT. Each country then makes an assessment of the possible consequences domestically. Should a notification prove to be of a non-emergency character, it is still an indication of what countries and consignments could be worth observing carefully for the time being.40

Threats in Food and Feed The EU has had structures for rapid alerts in the food area since 1979, but it was not until 2002 that the current Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed, RASFF, was established through EU Regulation.41 The previous system related more generally to product safety, including food and industrial products, but feed was included only after 2002. Apart from the fact that such a system is beneficial for the EU inhabitants’ health and well-being, the maintenance of free movement of food and feed products was another important factor when deciding upon the establishment of RASFF.42 The system enables the EU Member States, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, DG Health and Consumers at the Commission and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to send information and warnings regarding serious health risks in foodstuffs or fodder products. All parties connected to RASFF must immediately report to the Commission when a questionable product has been discovered. Since RASFF is based on a regulation, the reporting obligation is legally binding for the EU Member States. Therefore, if the Commission deems that a Member State has neglected this, it could bring the country in question before the European Court of Justice.43 Nevertheless, it is not defined in the regulation what an ‘‘immediate notification’’ means in practice, which makes it difficult to assess whether a Member State has failed to fulfill its obligations. Moreover, notifications from Member States could take days due to the need to examine and analyse the product. Other parts of the regulation are also rather loosely defined, which sometimes results in differing criteria assessments between Member States

40

Kjelleń (2007). Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 42 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, RASFF (October 2008). 43 Kjelleń (2007). 41

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and the Commission. These ambiguities will be corrected in a new regulation, currently still in the draft stage.44 The system does not allow for the Member States to send e-mails with notifications to all members of RASFF directly, and any warning only reaches the Commission. DG Health and Consumers makes an appraisal of the information before deciding whether to dismiss it or to immediately forward it to all parties. When examining an incoming notification, the Commission decides what level of the threat it implies, and categorises the message accordingly before disseminating it in the e-mail generating system.45 The messages are divided into ‘‘alert’’, ‘‘information’’ and ‘‘border rejections’’, where the first usually concerns products already on the EU market. Information messages cover food or feed in a Member State market containing an identified risk, but for which the members of the network do not have to take immediate action. The reason for this could be that the product does not pose an urgent threat that the product no longer exists in the market or that the product has not reached other member countries’ markets. Border rejection messages relate to food and feed that have been tested and rejected by competent authorities at border posts at the external borders of the European Economic Area (EEA).46 Alerts are sent immediately whereas a summary of all information messages and border rejections are sent once daily. All types of notifications are also published on DG Health and Consumers’ website. There is also a ‘‘news’’ category for information not concerning specific findings confirmed by a Member State, but which has for instance been picked up by the media. Most messages in the ‘‘news’’ category later become either information or alerts since the news often draw attention to certain products. Adjustments to the current scale are being discussed in connection with the negotiations on a new regulation, for instance on the inclusion of an appraisal of the threat risk level before disseminating an alert. In November 2008, non-binding guidelines for scale criteria on different types of alerts were adopted, where A represents a serious risk in food, B a potential risk in food and C a potential risk in feed. Another ongoing process in the field is the creation of a Web-based system for an even faster dissemination of structured information to members of RASFF. This will possibly be up and running in 2009. The Commission has the obligation to disseminate all messages regarding foodstuffs and fodder/feed not meeting the requirements set out in the foodstuffs/fodder/ feed safety regulations and thereby posing a health risk. Should a container or a shipment be rejected by an EEA border post authority, the Commission must inform all other EEA border posts, as well as the country from where the consignment originates. RASFF informs third countries of origin through the Commission delegations all over the world. These means of communication are also used if RASFF receives information that hazardous food and feed products have been spread to third countries. 44

Interview at DG Health and Consumers, RASFF (July 2007, October 2008). Kjelleń (2007). 46 EEA entails the EU Member States, The European Community and Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. 45


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After receiving an alert, Member States must inform the Commission of the measures taken domestically and if the product has been further spread to other countries. There is a considerable responsibility for companies to act if it turns out that one of their products might imply a risk, and most companies are prompt to both report, stop deliveries and inform the public. National agencies also have a responsibility to inform the public in cases where a company does not fulfill its obligations.47 Should an emergency occur outside of office hours, Member States must without any delay telephone the RASFF group’s on-duty officer, who is on-call around the clock. Should the situation appear to have implications for many Member States, the officer on-duty places a telephone call to all Member States’ points of contact, who should be reached at all times.48 Given the fact that many notifications in RASFF concern products originating from third countries, there has been progress since 2007 on establishing national RASFFs for those non-EU or EEA countries interested, which could build regional networks and eventually a worldwide network.49 For instance, China is positive to the development of a domestic RASFF that would include relevant Chinese actors in the field. In this respect, the Commission has started working on an online application that will allow Chinese authorities to see notifications on Chinese products at the latest one day after they have been transmitted in RASFF. There is also a process regarding the establishment of RASFFs in Latin America and within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).50 The RASFF group at DG Health and Consumers is the EU designated point of contact for alerts and information exchange regarding foodstuff safety between the EU and WHO’s international food safety network, INFOSAN.

Threats to Consumer Health and Safety The outlines of a system for alerts regarding non-food products were set up as a result of the single EU market, created when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in January 1993.51 In the beginning, information on hazardous products was exchanged via fax, but by the year 2001,52 the Rapid Alert System for Non-Food Products, RAPEX, was established. RAPEX encompasses a network of DG Health and Consumers of the Commission, the EU Member States, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. Communication is managed through an IT-based system as well as on 47

Interview at DG Health and Consumers, RASFF (July 2007, October 2008). Kjelleń (2007). 49 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, RASFF (July 2007, October 2008). 50 The Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) Annual Report 2007. 51 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Product and Service Safety (October 2008). 52 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council is the legal basis of RAPEX. Commission Decision 2004/418/EC draws up the guidelines for the administration of RAPEX and serves as the basis for each Member State’s risk appraisal. 48

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the Commission’s website where reports and publications are published. RAPEX aims at a swift information exchange in the event of a serious risk to consumer health and safety at the EU level such as, for instance, a widespread product suffering from a major electrical fault or toxins. Any Member State limiting the release of a product onto the market, or banning or recalling the product in question, must notify the RAPEX group at DG Health and Consumers of these measures. Since RAPEX is based on a Directive which states that Member States must report on any risk, the Commission could bring a Member State before the European Court of Justice if it does not fulfill this reporting obligation. When a potential risk has been found domestically, the country concerned must as soon as possible, and at the latest within three days, inform the Commission through the Web-based system.53 For less urgent risks, the time span for Member States to report is between 10 and 45 days, whereas the Commission must provide feedback to the Member State in question between 5 and 45 days. All notifications entered into RAPEX are displayed immediately to the Commission, whereupon the Commission validates the completeness and correctness of the incoming message and sees if there have been previous warnings regarding the same product by other Member States. The Commission wishes to avoid duplication and only disseminates one alert for a product regardless of the number of Member States that have reported on its risks. After examining a notification, the Commission forwards it as soon as possible, and within three days at the latest. Hence, Member States never communicate their alerts to each other directly but through the Commission.54 Member States should categorise what degree of severity a notification implies by indicating whether it is a ‘‘serious risk’’, a ‘‘non-serious risk’’ or ‘‘for information only’’. For very serious situations, a fourth category, ‘‘notification requiring emergency actions’’, is used. This category has never been used but in such urgent cases measures would have to be taken within minutes. This would also compel the Member States to phone the RAPEX team on-duty officer, who would then phone the national points of contact. Revised guidelines on risk assessment and on RAPEX are expected in 2009.55 All participating countries must investigate if a product that has been banned by other Member States is present on the domestic market. If so, relevant national authorities must act on the warning and, through their national point of contact, report to RAPEX on the measures taken. This includes actions from both national authorities and by producers and distributors. The Web system recognises whether a Member State has received a dispatched message or not and thereafter passes this

53

Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Product and Service Safety (July 2007, October 2008). Kjelleń (2007). 55 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Product and Service Safety (July 2007, October 2008). 56 Kjelleń (2007). 54


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on to the Commission, which will then follow up on this. All notifications are compiled and being published on a weekly basis on the Commission’s website.56 More than half of the number of products reported through RAPEX have been imported from China, which has led to the creation of RAPEX China. Members of RAPEX cannot enter this system apart from the Commission which uses it for rapid notifications to the Chinese national point of contact on hazardous Chinese products. Relevant agencies in China can therefore quickly withdraw and recall these products from the market, warrant export prohibitions and take other measures. The system does not entail exports from the EU to China since the number of dangerous products in this regard is negligible. Apart from this international dimension of RAPEX, the EU and the USA also have a formalised e-mail information exchange on dangerous products since they often import the same products.57

Threats Against Critical Infrastructures Although the rapid alert systems in place today embrace large parts of critical infrastructures, they are all focused on societal functions in specific sectors and therefore lack a cross-sectoral approach. Thus, the Commission proposed the creation of a system for information exchange on threats to critical infrastructures, as a part of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, EPCIP58 (see Chap. 3, where CIWIN will be described more in detail). In a 2006 message, the Commission put forward the need for the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network, CIWIN, which has been under development since then. As a first stage, CIWIN will mainly focus on the exchange of best practices regarding protection of critical infrastructures, but an additional rapid alert function on possible or confirmed threats could be introduced eventually.59 The rapid alerts part has, though, been put in question by a large number of Member States that do not see the added value of such a function. Hence, up to now it remains unclear whether such a platform will actually be established. The legal basis of this voluntary network will be provided by a Council Decision in spring 2009, and the system will not be up and running until late 2009. It remains to be seen whether Member States will join or not, and to what extent the system will be put in practice. The Commission counter-part will be DG Justice, Freedom and Security.60

57

Keeping European Consumers Safe (2007) Annual Report on the operation of the Rapid Alert System for Non-Food Consumer Products RAPEX. 58 Kjelleń (2007). 59 Lindstro¨m (2008). 60 Interview at the Swedish Ministry of Defence (December 2008).

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Commission Coordination During a Major Cross-Sectoral Crisis In the light of the Madrid bombings in 2004, discussions were initiated on how to improve the coordination within the Commission during cross-sectoral crises. By late 2004, DG Justice, Freedom and Security had presented a proposal on strengthening its role in crisis management by acting as the Commission coordinator in case of a severe incident. This function would include the establishment of a cross-sectoral Web-based network for rapid information exchange between the different Commission DGs and services. After the London bombings in July 2005, further pressure was put on the EU institutions when the Council demanded that the Council Secretariat and the Commission step up their engagement in the field of crisis management. This sparked the creation of a number of initiatives such as the Manual on EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination, as well as further discussions on how to improve the crosssectoral crisis management within the Commission. Eventually, it was decided that placing the coordinating role in a DG, as in this case DG Justice, Freedom and Security would not be sufficient in order to embrace all types of threats within a wide range of sectors. By the end of 2005, this task was instead assigned to the Commission Secretariat-General which then also became the operator of the Web-based network proposed one year earlier. This system, ARGUS, was phased in during 2006.61 The Commission’s Security Office is the operative point of contact for ARGUS with staff on call around the clock. ARGUS allows for a rapid information exchange between the various Commission departments and it is a means of communication when ensuring high-level political coordination during a major cross-sectoral crisis. Another important part of the work on better coordination was the 2008 establishment of a crisis management unit in the Secretariat-General with the aim of boosting the Commission’s internal crisis management. At the same time, a business continuity network with representatives from all parts of the Commission was created. Those DGs dealing with crisis management on a more or less regular basis are naturally more involved but all DGs have a designated point of contact. However, not all DGs are allowed to enter information into ARGUS, and within those DGs, few people have that authority: the so-called ARGUS correspondents. These are normally at the level of director or deputy director. Apart from the more internal coordination measures which are communicated through ARGUS, the system also entails a Web portal where non-classified information is open to the Council Secretariat and to the Member States’ permanent representations to the EU in case of a crisis.62 Should there be an incident in a sector which might lead to consequences for a number of other sectors, the ARGUS correspondent of that DG alerts the other DGs via ARGUS, whereupon the information is disseminated all across the Commission services. The sector-specific rapid alert systems are important sources 61 62

ARGUS was established through Commission Decision 2006/25/EC, Euratom. Interview at the Commission Secretariat-General, Crisis Management Unit (October 2008).


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for information and might provide input. In these cases, the staff in charge of each rapid alert system contacts the ARGUS correspondent at the DG, who will then put a warning into ARGUS if deemed necessary. (In some DGs, the on-duty officer of a rapid alert system is also the ARGUS correspondent). Accordingly, the national points of contact for the respective sectoral rapid alert systems are not in any way in contact with ARGUS. Moreover, the sectoral rapid alert systems are far from the only sources of information for ARGUS since there are events for which no rapid alert systems exist. For instance, a DG might pick up something through the media and thereafter post a warning if the information concerns an event with possible consequences at the EU level. Warnings through ARGUS are issued according to crisis level I or II. A level I crisis is not considered to be cross-sectoral and the DG mainly affected should deal with it according to normal procedures, for instance through a rapid alert system if such a system exists. Other DGs should be kept informed. The ARGUS correspondent has the final responsibility to decide whether a level I message should be posted or not. There are no clear criteria specifying when ARGUS is to be activated, other than common sense and consultation with the officers requesting that ARGUS should be activated. When the DG effecting the warning in the Web system posts a level I warning, the system generates e-mails, as well as text messages to those who have requested this service.63 Level II warnings concern more serious events affecting various sectors, therefore calling for more coordinated internal Commission activities. Should a DG wish to request an activation of level II, it must contact the officer on duty at the Security Office. This officer will contact the President of the Commission who has the authority to activate this level. An activation could also be on the President’s own initiative or at the request of another member of the Commission. Should level II be activated, the Security Office disseminates the information in the system, which generates a text message to all members of ARGUS. No one but the on-duty officer at the Security Office is authorised to do this. The President will then decide which Commissioner will retain overall responsibility for a level II situation, if not the President him/herself. Subsequently, the President will bring in the Crisis Coordination Committee made up of top officers from the various sections of the Commission (primarily DG directors). The committee will supervise the situation and make decisions internally depending on what the situation demands. The Security Office must continually inform the ARGUS members of the President’s decisions throughout the process. Level II has, as of November 2008, never been activated apart from during exercises.64 ARGUS is also used in the warning process prior to the activation of CCA (Crisis Coordination Arrangements), described in Chap. 7.

63 64

Kjelleń (2007). Interview at the Commission Secretariat-General, Crisis Management Unit (October 2008).

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Concluding Remarks Over the course of several years, the EU and its Member States have developed a significant number of structures for information exchange on crises that may have cross-border effects. The varying fields of application of the systems bring about big differences in the frequency in which they are used; ECURIE is, for instance, being used far less than RAPEX since radiological emergencies are less frequent than hazardous consumer products. The extent of the use also depends on whether the system is designated primarily for rapid alerts or for information exchange. There have been thoughts on linking the sectoral rapid alert systems together on a technical basis in order to allow for an information exchange of a more crosssectoral character not only for the internal coordination of the Commission but for all Member States. Nevertheless, as the systems have existed for various lengths of time, they all function very differently, which would make it virtually impossible to connect them all to one another. Experts also question the added value of this, since a too widely extended area for information could drown the recipients in information, risking the relevant participants overlooking a serious threat. A rule within crisis management is usually that the crisis will be dealt within the framework of normal procedures, i.e. that an organisation’s regular activities will be the basis of the crisis management organisation even when there is an extra strain. Likewise, it has been argued that the sector-specific rapid alert systems are best suited to manage the crises they know best, as opposed to assigning this task to a more cross-sectoral function that might not have the specialised competence that is needed for a crisis in that particular area. Moreover, some observers point to the fact that the Commission can use ARGUS to notify CCA, and therefore implicitly recommending it be triggered, which might be enough to ensure the political coordination in both the Commission and the Council. Coordination at the expert level has most likely already been achieved since national players and agencies should spread information on any threat that might have consequences for several societal sectors, not only to the Commission and to the other Member States but also to national agencies dealing with crises in these other societal sectors. In addition, some of the systems developed within some sectors, are not per se sector-specific. CECIS for example, deals with threats ranging from terrorism to accidents and disasters, thereby covering a majority of societal threats within the framework of only one system. Hence, many players in the field of crisis management find it unlikely that the Member States will ever agree on the establishment of a cross-sectoral rapid alert system covering all sorts of threats that could have implications for many Member States. In general, the Commission tends to be more positive than the Member States when it comes to establishing new systems for rapid alerts. This was evident during the negotiations on CIWIN, and examples can also be found in discussions on the establishment of a European law enforcement network dealing with public order and security matters (with the working name LEN). The Commission pushed for this system which would be utilised by EU crime-fighting agencies, but the proposal


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met a lot of resistance from the Member States, putting the development to a halt for now. To some extent, the saturation point for rapid alert systems, cross-sectoral as well as sectoral, might have been reached since the existing ones together embrace a large number of threats in different areas, and since they sometimes overlap and relate to one another. That being said, the creation of any new rapid alert system has in the past been highly dependent on the content of a newly occurred crisis. Should a future crisis be only slightly different from previous crises, few experts find it unlikely that there would at least be discussions about the need of establishing a system for that particular purpose.

References Borodzicz EP (2005) Risk, crisis & security management. Wiley, Sussex Commission Decision 2000/57/EC of 22 December 1999 on the early warning and response system for the prevention and control of communicable diseases under Decision No 2119/ 98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, established the operative procedures for EWRS Commission Decision 2004/216/EC of 1 March 2004 amending Council Directive 82/894/EEC on the notification of animal diseases within the Community to include certain equine diseases and certain diseases of bees to the list of notifiabled diseases Commission Decision 2004/418/EC of 29 April 2004 laying down guidelines for the management of the Community Rapid Information System (RAPEX) and for notifications presented in accordance with Article 11 of Directive 2001/95/EC Commission Decision 2005/176/EC of 1 March 2005 laying down the codified form and the codes for the notification of animal diseases pursuant to Council Directive 82/894/EEC Commission Decision 2006/25/EC, Euratom of 23 December 2005 amending its internal Rules of Procedure Commission Decision 2008/351/EC of 28 April 2008 amending Decision 2000/57/EC as regards events to be reported within the early warning and response system for the prevention and control of communicable diseases Commission Decision 2009/363/EC of 30 April 2009 amending Decision 2002/253/EC laying down case definitions for reporting communicable diseases to the Community network under Decision No 2119/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Commission Decision 2008/650/EC of 30 July 2008 amending Council Directive 82/894/EEC on the notification of animal diseases within the Community to include certain diseases in the list of notifiable diseases and to delete porcine enterovirus encephalomyelitis from that list Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) Council Decision 87/600/Euratom of 14 December 1987 on Community arrangements for the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency Council Directive 2000/29/EC of 8 May 2000 on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community Council Directive 82/894/EEC of 21 December 1982 on the notification of animal diseases within the Community

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Council Directive 89/618/Euratom of 27 November 1989 on informing the general public about health protection measures to be applied and steps to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency Decision No 2119/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 1998 setting up a network for the epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases in the Community Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general product safety European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE) at the Commission website, http://rem.jrc.ec.europa.eu/40.html, accessed 29 January 2009 Interview at DG Energy and Transport, Radiation Protection Unit in May 2007 and in October 2008 Interview at DG Environment, Monitoring and Information Centre in July 2007 and in October 2008 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Animal health and standing committees, in October 2008 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Health Threats Unit, in July 2007 and in October 2008 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, Product and Service Safety, in July 2007 and in October 2008 Interview at DG Health and Consumers, RASFF, in July 2007 and in October 2008 Interview at the Commission Secretariat-General, Crisis Management Unit, in October 2008 Interview at the Swedish Ministry of Defence in December 2008 Keeping European Consumers Safe (2007) Annual Report on the operation of the Rapid Alert System for Non-Food Consumer Products RAPEX http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/ rapex/docs/rapex_annualreport2008_en.pdf, accessed 30 January 2009 Kjelleń S (2007) Survey of EU warning systems. The Swedish Emergency Management Agency, Stockholm Lindstro¨m M (2008) National consequences of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. (Swedish titel: ‘‘Nationella konsekvenser av det europeiska programmet fo¨r skydd av kritisk infrastruktur’’). The Swedish Emergency Management Agency, Stockholm Programme of Cooperation on Preparedness and Response to Biological and Chemical Agent Attacks (Health Security). Luxembourg, 17 December (2001) Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) Annual Report 2007 http://ec.europa.eu/food/ food/rapidalert/report2007_en.pdf, accessed 28 January 2009

Chapter 5

The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection and the European Union Solidarity Fund ˚ hman and Claes Nilsson Teresa A

This chapter gives an introduction to the EU Community Mechanism for Civil Protection (the Mechanism) and the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF). The Mechanism is a structure that aims to facilitate civil protection assistance between Member States and to third countries in response to major crises, whereas the EUSF makes possible financial support for actions undertaken in the immediate recovery phase of a crisis. The Mechanism may be described as the most practical dimension of EU crisis management and also as one of the first initiatives in the area. Although the Mechanism and the EUSF were established separately, roughly ten years apart, and constitute two different EU crisis management instruments, the context in which they were founded was similar, as are their roles in the wider development of crisis management in the EU. As a consequence of major natural and man-made disasters that have struck Europe and other parts of the world in the last decade, the importance of solidarity has been accentuated among the Member States. Moreover, the awareness has increased regarding the necessity to cooperate at a European level in order to manage major crises. As a result, efforts have been made to enhance cooperation at the EU-level in the areas of prevention, preparation, response and recovery – an ambition which has been materialised through, e.g., the creation of the Mechanism and the EUSF. Seen in a wider context, the Mechanism and the EUSF are examples of the rising ambition among several actors, both Member States and EU institutions, to develop, improve and deepen cooperation at the EU-level regarding crisis management. In addition to the rising significance of solidarity, development in the area is also to an important degree influenced by the Member States’ reluctance to give the Union authority over national civil protection resources. The possible introduction of the Solidarity Clause and the implementation of the Solidarity Declaration (presented in Chap. 1) would further highlight the tension. Civil protection is a politically sensitive area, where issues regarding sovereignty play a central role. Choices sometimes need to be made between sovereignty and solidarity (or between


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national and supranational authority). This is one of the main factors shaping cooperation in the area of civil protection.1 While the utility of the Mechanism lies predominantly in the response to a crisis, the usefulness of the EUSF is mainly found in the recovery phase. Both instruments do, however, have elements that also make them relevant in other phases; the Mechanism for example facilitates training, which is part of the preparation phase, and the EUSF could possibly finance activities that take place in the response phase. Several proposals have been presented by the Commission, the European Parliament and some Member States which together contain an ambition to enable a more integrated approach to civil protection. To that end, it has been suggested that instruments like the Mechanism and the EUSF should be further integrated into a comprehensive civil protection ability at the EU level. Therefore, since the Mechanism and the EUSF were established in similar contexts, and as there seems to be a convergence between the development of the Mechanism and the EUSF, they are presented in the same chapter. The first section describes the evolvement of the Mechanism, its different components and how it has been applied in practise. The second section describes the development of the EUSF since 2002 and how it has been implemented. The third section discusses the future of the Mechanism and the EUSF in the wider context of crisis management in the EU.

The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection The Evolvement of the EU’s Cooperation within Civil Protection Civil protection is here defined as activities to prepare and carry out the rescue and relief of people, property and the environment in the event of a crisis. Member States’ civil protection or emergency management agencies, which have access to both personnel and equipment tasked to quickly respond to a crisis, perform these tasks. The organisation of civil protection resources and personnel vary between Member States and can be centred at local as well as regional and state level. These capacities include, for example, search and rescue teams, as well as experts and equipment to manage heavy floods and forest fires. Moreover, food, medical aid, shelters and strategic transportation such as airplanes and helicopters are other examples of capacities that may fall within the area of civil protection.2

1

See for instance, Ekengren et al (2006). The definition of civil protection, as it is applied within this book, is composed by the authors. The definition is based upon official EU-documents on civil protection, e.g.: Council Decision 2007/ 779 European Commission Decision 2008/73 and from the DG Environment website. 2

5 The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection

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Cooperation at the European level within civil protection could be traced to the end of the 1970s and the managing of marine pollution. Civil protection was formally established as an area of cooperation in the EU (at this time the European Community) at a ministerial meeting in Rome in 1985. The Member State governments hereby agreed to coordinate their civil protection strategies. As the initial cooperation within civil protection mainly focused on managing major natural disasters, the Directorate General for Environment (DG Environment) of the Commission held, and still holds, the responsibility for matters concerning civil protection. In 1991, a Council resolution established operational cooperation in the area.3 The resolution stipulated that the Member States should, if requested by another Member State, provide assistance in the event of natural or technological disasters. In 1999, the cooperation was further consolidated. In this year, the Council approved a Community Action Programme in the field of civil protection.4 Prior to the endorsement of the Action Programme, the Commission had expected that the Community’s activities would be increased in the fields of civil protection and environmental emergencies. This was anticipated in the so-called ‘‘Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development’’ (also called the fifth EC Environmental Action Programme).5 Through different projects, workshops and training courses, the aim of the Action Programme was to support and complement the Member States’ civil protection efforts at national, regional and local levels in order to enhance the protection of people, property and the environment. Areas included in the Action Programme were, for example, the facilitation of cooperation between Member States in the field of civil protection through the exchange of lessons learned and best practices regarding, techniques and methods of response to an emergency. Thematic priorities and projects were also set up every year within the framework of the Action Programme. These included, for example, public information and awareness, preventions of risks and response and rehabilitation techniques.6 The projects were carried out by interested Member States and were financially supported by the Commission.7 The Action Programme expired in 2006 but was replaced by other instruments containing similar goals,

3 Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council 1991 on improving mutual aid between Member States in the event of natural or technological disaster. 4 Council Decision 1999/847. 5 European Commission, Towards sustainability – A European Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development (1993). 6 Projects within these areas, among others, were completed during the Action Programme extending from January 2000 to September 2002. DMP Ltd., Consultants for Development Monitoring and Planning 2002. 7 France and Italy were active in initiating projects but Spain, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland also initiated projects. DG Environment website.

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such as the Civil Protection Financial Instrument. One important effect of the Action Programme was the effort of generating knowledge and increased cooperation within the EU through inter alia the gathering of civil protection officials from different Member States. As a consequence of a number of crises, the operational cooperation within civil protection has been gradually strengthened and developed. The earthquakes in Turkey in 1999 and the terror attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 are examples of major crises that triggered the establishment of the so-called Community Mechanism for Civil Protection in 2001.8 This decision in many ways codified what was already taking place to facilitate mutual civil protection assistance in the event of major crises. It did, however, for the first time oblige the Member States to a minimal level of cooperation in the field of civil protection, for instance an obligation to warn other Member States of events with possible cross-border effects. It also raised the profile of civil protection cooperation within the EU. Furthermore, the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London as well as the devastating tsunami in South-East Asia led to calls for further enhancement of the cooperation in the civil protection area by Member States, the European Council and the European Parliament as well as by the European Commission (see Chap. 2). Subsequently, a number of initiatives have been presented to that end. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon recognises civil protection as a specific policy area of the EU, hence providing civil protection with a proper legal basis in addition to endorsing cooperation already taking place, should it be implemented (see Chap. 2). In conclusion, the initial coordination of national civil protection strategies at a European level in 1985 has by now grown and deepened into a broader cooperation in the area of civil protection. Thus, civil protection is, and has been, a longstanding concern for EU crisis management.

The Mechanism and its Different Components The Mechanism constitutes the basis for cooperation within the area of civil protection. It is first and foremost a tool to collect and disseminate information; it increases awareness and facilitates decision making in Member States’ civil protection agencies. The most important information is the request for assistance and assessment of needs in the event of a crisis. In addition, participating countries may voluntarily pool their civil protection capacities to crises-stricken countries inside or outside the EU with the help of the Mechanism, turning it into a coordination tool to help avoid duplication of efforts. However, the requesting Member State is responsible for directing assistance interventions if needed.9 8

Council Decision 2001/792/EC. Council Decision 2007/779.

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The Mechanism involves the participation of all EU Member States as well as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Each participating state has a national contact point that represents the national civil protection authorities. The national contact point serves as a focal point for coordination and communication between the national level and the EU-level. Ministries of Interior or national agencies responsible for civil protection issues often serve as these contact points. In 2008, the Council invited the Commission to strengthen the cooperation with candidate and potential candidate countries to the EU. Among other things, it was suggested that national contact points for civil protection should also be identified in these countries.10 The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), set within the DG Environment, is the operational node of the Mechanism.11 The MIC serves as the focal point for the participating states’ national contact points. It is accessible 24 hours, 7 days a week. First, the MIC serves as a communication hub by providing access to and the sharing of information between the participating countries. Second, it provides early alerts and information on interventions carried out through the Mechanism as well as updates on ongoing emergencies.12 Third, the MIC facilitates co-ordination of assistance by matching offers of assistance put forward by participating countries to the needs of disaster-stricken countries requesting help. The national contact points have got the task to provide the MIC with information on the availability of civil protection assistance, including military assets and capabilities. Finally, the MIC can within a few hours mobilise and dispatch small teams of experts to assess the specific needs in a crisis area. The Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) is a web-based alert and notification application through which the MIC and the national contact points communicate (see Chap. 4). Furthermore, a training programme13 has been established with the objective of improving the coordination and compatibility, among other things, between participating countries’ work within the area of civil protection. The programme consists of training courses, joint exercises and an exchange system for civil protection expertise. All civil protection institutions and organisations within the EU and Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland may participate. The main objective is to encourage the Member States to learn from each other to a greater extent regarding for example different techniques and approaches within civil protection.14

10

It was also suggested that countries would be able to participate in training and exchange of best practices in the area. Council Conclusions 2008. 11 DG Environment website. 12 Ibid. 13 The training programme consists of four steps – Community Mechanism Induction Course, Operational Management Course, Assessment Mission Course and High level co-ordination course. DG Environment website. 14 Exchange of experts’ websites.

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Moreover, a database with various civil protection capacities, equipment and personnel, which the Member States on a voluntary basis have listed as available, has been created. The database provides an overview of existing resources. There is, however, no guarantee that these resources actually will be available in the event of an emergency since they may be needed or already in use in other national or international emergencies. Also, the Member States often have additional resources that remain unlisted. Because of this, the database has proven to be of limited use in actual crises. The database can, however, serve as a tool for capacity building and as a way for the Member States to make their contributions more visible. In order to make the EU’s crisis response more efficient, the European Council endorsed the general concept of civil protection modules. The Commission has in a decision defined 13 modules and one technical assistance/support team. The decision stipulates the main components of each module and what actions the modules should be able to perform. Modules can be described as packages of predefined civil protection capacities, including both materiel and personnel, tasked to deal with specific crises. The establishment of modules is made on a voluntary basis by the Member States. The modules consist of resources of one or more Member States and should be able to function self-sufficiently within a defined period of time as well as together with other modules, EU bodies and international institutions. The organisation, direction and the command of the modules will lie on Member State level. Technical assistance support teams will perform the tasks required on site and support the civil protection modules. The modules could also be understood as an attempt to standardise civil protection resources across Member States.15 In February 2009 the Commission presented a communication on a community approach for the prevention of natural and manmade disaster within the EU. The aim is to identify different measures, which could be included in a ‘‘Community strategy’’ for prevention in the area of civil protection. These measures contain for example: creating conditions for the development of knowledge based disaster prevention policies at all levels of government; linking actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle; making existing instruments perform better for disaster prevention and reinforcing international cooperation in the field of prevention. Prevention is primarily a national responsibility but the Community strategy would serve as a complement to the national efforts regarding prevention. Prevention is likely to become an important aspect of the further development of the civil protection cooperation in the EU.16 The guiding principle regarding financial issues in relation to the Mechanism within the EU is that the country having requested assistance must also bear its costs. The principle is, however, differently applied among the Member States – some 15

The 13 modules cover the following capacities: high capacity pumping, water purification, urban search and rescue, aerial forest fire fighting, medical support, medical aerial evacuation of disaster victims, emergency temporary shelter, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear detection and sampling (CBRN) and search and rescue in CBRN conditions. For further details, see European Commission Decision, 2008/73. 16 European Commission (2009).


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choose to act in concordance with this principle whereas others choose to offer the assistance without any cost. More lucid and transparent arrangements have been requested in order to avoid the arbitrary application of different financial arrangements. Unclear rules may cause unnecessary misunderstandings in the event of a crisis.17 It may also affect the idea of solidarity underpinning the cooperation within the civil protection area. As for the usage of the Mechanism outside the EU, the guiding principle is that no cost shall fall on the receiving country in interventions in Official Development Aid (ODA) recipient countries.18 Finally, a Civil Protection Financial Instrument was adopted in 2007. The Financial Instrument enables financial support for activities regarding prevention, preparedness and response to a crisis. The activities may include the sharing of best practises, training, workshops, public information and education as well as the dispatching of expert teams. Up to 50% of the total transportation costs for civil protection operations, with exceptions for materiel, may also be financed through the instrument. The Instrument covers a period from 2007 to 2013 and amounts to approximately 190 million Euro.19

The Mechanism and Other Actors Assistance carried out through the Mechanism is not the only assistance coming from the EU in the event of a crisis. The European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) manages the EU’s humanitarian aid in relation to major emergencies. Focus of the ECHO is on the financing of humanitarian aid while the practical implementation is mainly managed through the cooperation with the United Nations, the Red Cross and other non-governmental bodies, among others.20 Although having considerable budgetary means, the ECHO has a limited operational capacity of its own, consisting mainly of networks of expertise. Even though the areas of activity of ECHO and the Mechanism for most parts differ, demands were raised by, e.g., the European Court of Auditors after the tsunami to better define the areas of responsibilities as well as to make the internal division of duties clearer.21 Especially troubling was the fact that both Commission services dispatched assessment experts to the field that had no contact with each other. Proposals have also been forwarded to integrate ECHO and the Mechanism in order to enable further coordination between their activities.22 However, the ˚ hman (2008). A See e.g. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC) website. 19 Council Decision 2007/162. 20 Larsson, Jarlsvik, (2005, pp. 32–33). So far, the ECHO has not yet offered financial support to civil protection missions carried out through the Mechanism. 21 See e.g. European Court of Auditors (2006). 22 Barnier (2006, p. 18). 17 18

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differences between civil protection and humanitarian aid make an integration of the ECHO and the Mechanism complicated.23 From ECHO’s perspective it would possibly be perceived as difficult to ensure that humanitarian imperatives of impartiality, neutrality and independence could be guaranteed through a possible integration with the Mechanism. A possible solution that has been elaborated is to organisationally bring together ECHO and the Mechanism, but at the same time maintaining a division of duties. It was further suggested that the Mechanism could focus on EU internally, whereas the ECHO could focus on external interventions. However, from the MIC’s perspective, this may not be perceived as a preferable solution, since it would limit the scope of the Mechanism.24 One step towards a more integrated relationship between the ECHO and the MIC was taken through the endorsement of a Joint Declaration, referred to as ‘‘The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid’’ by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission in December 2007.25 The Joint Declaration offers a common vision that is supposed to guide the overall action by the EU in the field of humanitarian aid in third countries, both provided for through the EU as well as through the Member States bilaterally, including civil protection assistance missions. Civil protection missions outside the EU means that coordination with other international involved organisations such as the UN also becomes desirable and necessary. The EU has recognised that the UN has the responsibility for the overall coordination in disasters outside the EU. In practise, this is true only in ODArecipient countries where the UN has a presence. UN humanitarian structures are themselves complicated and subject to rivalry between various UN agencies. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNOCHA, has been tasked to coordinate UN humanitarian action and is the main point of referral for the DG Environment when dealing with the UN.26 Discussions point at a further strengthening of the relations between the EU and the UN in the area of crisis management.27 NATO countries and partners also cooperate in the area of civil protection which is based within the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response and Coordination Centre, 23

While many of the activities that are defined as civil protection are the same as humanitarian operations, there are some important differences. Civil protection assets are state-owned while humanitarian interventions most often are carried out by Non-Governmental Organisations or International Organisations like the UN. Since civil protection is carried out by states they cannot be said to fully adhere to the humanitarian imperatives, e.g. neutrality, impartiality, etc, that guide humanitarian interventions. Furthermore, the line between civilian and military resources might be more blurred in civil protection; the use of military assets is a highly debated topic in the humanitarian community. 24 For more information on the subject see Sando¨ (2007). 25 The Presidents of the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2007). 26 Regarding civil protection missions outside the EU, the UN Guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets in disaster relief do also apply to the European Union. See, United Nations (2007) Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – ‘‘Oslo Guidelines’’. 27 Notes, PROCIV meeting, 8 October 2008.


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EADRCC. The EADRCC is the focal point for civil protection coordination within NATO. There is, however, no formalised forum where the MIC and the EADRCC coordinate and communicate.

The Mechanism in Practice Any country, inside or outside the EU, affected by a major crisis may initiate a request for assistance through the MIC. When assistance is requested the mechanism becomes ‘‘activated’’. In the event of a crisis inside the EU, the MIC immediately forwards the request to the network of national contact points using CECIS as well as e-mail. The contact points in turn consider their available resources and inform the MIC and sometimes the requesting Member State directly whether they are able to assist or not. The MIC informs the requesting country about offered resources. If the assistance is accepted by the requesting country, arrangements are made directly between the requesting and the offering country. If help is requested from outside the EU, the Commission has to consult the Presidency of the Council in order to establish whether the crisis should be considered as a matter for ‘‘normal’’ disaster management or if it should be treated as a crisis to be dealt with using the instruments under Chapter V in the treaty. In the latter case, the Council is responsible for coordinating the EU’s assistance using structures within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), otherwise the MIC proceeds as usual. Since its establishment, the Mechanism has been activated in several natural and man-made disasters both inside and outside the EU. Regarding crises inside the EU, these include, for example, the oil spill following the Prestige accident in 2002, the forest fires in Portugal in 2003/2004/2005, the floods in Central and Eastern Europe in 2005 and 2006, the storm in northern Europe in 2005 and the forest fires in Greece in 2007. Examples of disasters outside the EU are the earthquakes in Algeria and in Iran in 2003 as well as in Pakistan in 2005, the tsunami in 2004/2005, the hurricane Katrina in the USA in 2005, the explosions in the arms storages in Albania in 2008, the typhoon in Burma in 2008 and the terrorist attacks in India in 2008.28 Regarding the last example of India, it is worth noting that the Presidency (France at the time) actually activated the Mechanism in order to request assistance for the medical evacuation of injured EU-citizens from the country. As a rule, the Mechanism is activated when a request is made by the country having been struck by the crisis, in this case India. Hence, this was the first time the Mechanism was activated in order to offer consular protection to EU citizens (see Chap. 6). Next, two examples will illustrate how the Mechanism has been applied in practice inside as well as outside the EU. The first example is the tsunami 2004/ 2005 that triggered a further development of the cooperation within the area of civil protection. Questions concerning, e.g., the development of the capacity of the 28

For more information visit DG Environment website.

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Mechanism and closer coordination between the ECHO and the Mechanism were highlighted in relation to the EU’s assistance in the aftermath of the tsunami. In fact, the tsunami has been an important driving force for enhancing the EU’s overall ability to respond to a crisis of such magnitude. The second example is the forest fires in southern Europe 2007, focusing on Greece that was especially affected. The capability to respond to forest fires has been particularly present in the discussions about the further development of the Mechanism as these crises have tended to occur frequently in Europe, especially in the southern Member States of the EU. The forest fires have triggered the discussions about whether or not it is necessary for the EU to acquire additional and collectively owned capacities (see below). The two examples also highlight weaknesses and strengths of the Mechanism.29 It shall be stressed that these examples are described from the perspective of the MIC solely and have not been compared to the view of, e.g., the UN or the Member States.30 Example 1: The Tsunami, 2004/2005 The Indian Ocean tsunami, which caused the deaths of approximately 200,000 people and left hundreds of thousands homeless and in need of water, shelter and medical treatment, led to the activation of the Mechanism. Before engagement, the MIC had been warned by automatic earthquake alert and contacts had been established with the UNOCHA. On 26 December 2004, Sri Lanka made an international request for assistance and the MIC sent out a request to the national contact points of the participating states. Following the request from Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia and the Maldives also called for assistance through the Mechanism. The same day as Sri Lanka requested help, EU assessment teams, mobilised and dispatched following a request from the Commission, headed for Asia. The first teams were in place the next day, on 27 December. Around 10–12 persons took part in the assessment teams, which included experts from Sweden sent out to Sri Lanka, from France sent out to Sri Lanka and to Indonesia, from Italy sent out to Thailand and finally from Germany sent out to the Maldives. Their main tasks were assessing needs, efforts to coordinate with local authorities, and other actors in the region such as the ECHO and UNOCHA. According to DG Environment, additional assistance being offered contained: a support team of 60 people, sanitation equipment and medical assistance (France), high durability tents (Sweden), material and medical assistance (Greece), a relief shipment (Hungary), two Hercules aircraft (Italy), tents and medical assistance (Slovakia), relief shipment (Malta), 8 tons of bottled water (Czech republic) and additional

29 The text is based on following sources: DG Environment Website; European Commission Memorandum, 05/6/2005; European Commission Press Release, IP/04/1543/2004; Ekengren et al (2006); Greek initiative for enhancing European cooperation for the prevention of and response to natural disasters and emergencies (2007). 30 For a different perspective, see, e.g., European Court of Auditors Special Report No3/2006.


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rebuilding material (Bulgaria). The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany also provided assistance via contributions to the Red Cross. During the tsunami, the Mechanism was, according to DG Environment, said to serve as a facilitator of communication and coordination. However, some weaknesses were also revealed. These consisted of a lack of transportation means, a problem which is still highly relevant, insufficient information about the access of military means and different notions of the EU’s coordinating role among the Member States. It is claimed by the MIC that some Member States preferred that the EU coordinated the Member States before submitting to the overall coordination of the UN, whereas other Member States did not see it as necessary and preferred to work directly with the UN or through bilateral arrangements. Example 2: Forest Fires in Greece, 2007 In 2007, hot and dry weather conditions caused extreme forest fires in southern Europe. Greece was especially affected and requested help through the Mechanism four times between June and August in 2007. At the time of the first request, 27 June, there were already approximately 120 fires in the country, according to figures presented by the MIC. Following the first request, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain made available a total of seven fire-fighting aircraft. In relation to the second request, on 5 July, Italy made available two fire-fighting aircraft. Following the third request, on 18 July, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain made available a total of 11 fire-fighting aircraft. By the time of the fourth request for assistance, on 24 August, the forest fires had caused severe damage and the loss of several lives. This would become the largest operation for the Mechanism to date. The assistance deployed in Greece at the fourth request consisted of around 13 aircraft, 12 helicopters and more than 400 specialists, including, for example, experts and fire-fighters. France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Norway, Germany, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands, Romania, Cyprus and Slovenia, among others, offered assistance to Greece at that time. From a Greek perspective, the forest fires in 2007, revealed short-comings regarding the Mechanism. In order to make it more efficient, a Greek initiative was developed and forwarded to the Commission after the forest fires. For example, the initiative called for the establishment of a “European pool of forces” consisting of national modules based on collectively agreed methods and procedures for logistical support, a strengthened role for the MIC, and enhanced coordination between national civil protection structures as well as better interoperability between Member States’ civil protection systems. The initiative also suggested a reinforcement of the MIC through the secondment of experts from the Member States as well as the examination of funding possibilities for the acquisition of common (European) resources such as planes, helicopters and water pumps. Finally, a simplification of the EU co-financing procedure of transport was proposed.

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Possible Added Values and Weaknesses of the Mechanism These two examples give a certain notion of the possible added values the Mechanism offers in the event of a crisis. First of all, when national capacities are not sufficient to manage a crisis, the Mechanism can facilitate the provision of additional resources from the participating countries. Second, it renders the response to a crisis more efficient by coordinating and matching assistance offered by Member States to the needs of the requesting country. This is true within the EU where the MIC can provide a complete picture of requested, offered and dispatched aid. Third, the MIC as a communication hub eases the flow of information between the country requesting assistance, the participating countries of the Mechanism and the EU-level. The two examples also illustrate that the Mechanism has been shown to contain certain weaknesses. The availability of transportation, notably strategic air transport, is one important example. The issue of transportation is problematic at two levels. First, there is a worldwide shortage of strategic air transport in times of large-scale crises. Second, there is a budgetary problem in the EU and many Member States. In many cases, the proposed aid from Member States is taken from existing surplus supplies or by using existing personnel and material that are provided for through, for instance, civil protection budgets. However, the main cost for an intervention is often the chartering of aircraft. This is seldom foreseen in Member States’ civil protection budgets and thus restrains their ability to dispatch civil protection resources over long distances. In most cases when civil protection assistance has not been delivered due to lack of transport, there has been ample transport available for those who could or would foot the bill. This is a question that has led to considerable debate among the Member States. It has, for example, been suggested that additional and collectively shared equipment such as aircraft should be acquired in order to solve this short-coming.31 The insufficient information to the MIC about the access of military means is, according to MIC’s own evaluation, another weak spot. However, many Member States suggest that availability of any asset, and certainly military assets, can only be determined on a case by case basis upon request. Some Member States, often those who are often affected by natural disasters, have questioned to what extent the Member States are actually prepared to act in the spirit of solidarity and offer assistance to another Member state in the event of a crisis. This discussion was not least highlighted by the Greek initiative for strengthening the Mechanism. Other Member States suggest that civil protection is above all a national responsibility and the Mechanism should not, in the name of solidarity, become a redistributive tool in so far as some Member States end up paying for other Member States’ deficiencies in preparedness and prevention.32

31

Interview official in charge of MIC at the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 16 October 2008. The shortage of air transport is not limited to civil protection but also has a major impact on, e.g., ESDP deployments. 32 ˚ hman (2009, p. 19). Ibid.; A


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Clearly, the added values and the weaknesses of the Mechanism are in the end a question of interpretation, and not least a question of how Member States and other actors perceive the functioning of the Mechanism in specific crises situations. Member States’ relations to both NATO and the UN also affect how these aspects are understood in relation to interventions outside the EU. Thus, the added value of the Mechanism will most likely differ depending on ‘‘who you ask’’ and ‘‘when you ask’’.

The European Union Solidarity Fund Background In 2002, a devastating flood, caused by a period of heavy rains, hit Central Europe. The flood was exceptional and cost several people their lives, while at the same time causing damage in the region amounting to billions of Euros. The EU responded relatively quickly to the crisis and signalled the need to establish a financial instrument for the recovery of the stricken areas. Previously, there had been no fund or programme available in the area of civil protection at the EU level, an area which had been exclusively the competence of the Member States. The Commission, on the basis of European solidarity, therefore proposed the establishment of the EU Solidarity Fund, in order to quickly respond to natural disasters. In August the same year the Council and the Parliament both supported the proposal from the Commission and the EUSF was subsequently established 15 November 2002.33 The proposal from the Commission had by then been amended by the Council and the Parliament, which among other things meant that the EUSF was limited to mainly cover major natural disasters. Also, the Commission had proposed that, in order to be eligible for aid from the EUSF, the disaster had to cause damage amounting to at least one billion Euros. That threshold was raised to three billion Euros.34

The Solidarity Fund The Commission, through the Directorate-General for Regional Policy, operates the EUSF. The aim is to contribute to a rapid recovery in the affected country or region after ‘‘major natural disasters with serious repercussions on living conditions, the natural environment or the economy. . .’’.35 Since there were already mechanisms in place to assist in the area of risk-prevention or long-term recovery efforts (see below), the EUSF was specifically established to assist in a ‘‘rapid, efficient and flexible 33

Council Regulation 2012/2002. European Commission (2004) 397 final. 35 Council Regulation 2012/2002. 34

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manner’’,36 financing activities in the immediate recovery phase after an emergency situation. The beneficiary state is always responsible for the implementation of the financial aid. The type of activities for which a country or region could be granted assistance from the EUSF are quite wide but focus on: the restoration of central infrastructure; temporary accommodation and rescue services to meet immediate needs; immediate securing of preventive infrastructures and protection of the cultural heritage; and short-term restoration of disaster-stricken areas.37 The EUSF thus funds activities in the recovery phase, but some activities, such as accommodation and rescue services, could be relevant for the response phase. However, countries usually have to wait around a year before receiving financial assistance from the fund which makes it questionable to also place the EUSF in the response phase. The EUSF is not limited to EU Member States, candidate countries can also benefit from it. Furthermore, there are different categories that an application could fall under, each with different criteria that must be met. It should, however, be noted that the categories are not clear-cut and neither are the criteria defining them. Here, the categorisation is based on a definition provided by the European Court of Auditors in its evaluation of the EUSF in 2008.38 The first category, ‘‘major disaster’’, is defined as one where the total costs of the damages amounts to over three billion Euros (in 2002 prices) or more than 0.6% of a country’s Gross National Income (GNI). The second category applies when a neighbouring country or candidate country is seriously affected by the same crisis, but does not suffer damage that meets the criteria set up for the first category. An application filed under this category can, by way of exception, be granted financial assistance from the EUSF. The third category applies to regions39 that are seriously affected by disasters. They could also, under exceptional circumstances, benefit from the EUSF. The total annual assistance to regions can amount to a maximum of 7.5% of the total budget for the EUSF, which is set to a maximum of one billion Euros per year.40 Aid from the EUSF is taken from the EU budget and there are thus no ear-marked funds set aside for the EUSF each year. As stated in an evaluation of the EUSF in 2008,41 the categories are rather vague, and there have been several attempts to make both the categories and the criteria simpler and more precise. The EUSF is limited to measures that are non-insurable. The grant is calculated in relation to the total damage suffered by the state. Under the category ‘‘major disaster’’, the rate of the financial assistance is 6% of the total damage when the costs are greater than three billion Euros and 2.5% when the costs are lower than

36

Ibid. art. 1. Ibid. art 3 and 5. 38 European Court of Auditors, Special report No 3/2008, p. 5. 39 There is no set definition for ‘‘regions’’; the Commission defines applicable regions on a case-bycase basis. Remote and isolated regions are specifically mentioned as applicable in this category. 40 Council Regulation 2012/2002, art. 2. 41 European Court of Auditors, Special report No 3/2008. 37


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three billion Euros. For the categories ‘‘neighbouring state’’ or ‘‘regional disaster’’, the rate is always 2.5% of the total direct damage.42 A grant from the EUSF has to be used within a year from the date when the grant was given. No later than six months after this period, the beneficiary state or region must present a report which clarifies what action has been taken and what has been done or proposed to prevent (or limit the damage of) future similar disasters. Any payments from the EUSF that may be in excess (or if costs are met by other parties or funds) are recovered by the Union.43 The EUSF is the only fund available for the immediate relief and recovery in the stages after a disaster. For more long-term recovery, reconstruction and prevention, there are other EU funds that Member States or candidate countries can look to for aid after natural disasters. The primary focus of these funds and programmes lie within other policy areas than crisis management, such as strengthening remote or less developed areas, but can be used as a way to support countries or regions in the aftermath of major disasters. Examples are the European Regional Development Fund which can co-finance preventive actions, productive investments and rebuilding of infrastructure and the Rural Development funds that can provide financial support for preventive measures.44

Implementing the Solidarity Fund The floods in 2002 triggered the initiation of the EUSF. In the aftermath of the disaster, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic and France were granted financial assistance immediately after the EUSF was established. Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic (then as a candidate country) were granted assistance through the first category, i.e. ‘‘major disasters’’. France was granted assistance through the third criteria, i.e. as a region that had been seriously affected by the disaster but where the damage did not meet the quantitative criteria set up for the EUSF. From 2002 to 2008, the Commission received a total of 50 applications from 19 countries for assistance from the EUSF. Out of these 50, half the applications were approved and a total of well over one billion Euros has been granted. Most applications, 29, have fallen under the ‘‘regional disasters’’ category, while only two applications have been for the ‘‘neighbouring state’’ category.45 Flooding has been the type of disaster that has rendered most applications for assistance, followed by forest fires.46 Countries from southern Europe have applied somewhat

42

Ibid. Council Regulation 2012/2002, art. 3 and 8. 44 European Commission, DG Regional Policy, The European Union Solidarity Fund and European Commission (2008) 130 final. 45 European Commission, DG Regional Policy (2007, p. 29). 46 European Court of Auditors, Special report No 3/2008, p. 4. 43

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more frequently for aid from the EUSF, even though countries from all parts of Europe have requested support from the fund during the period. The Member States rarely question the Commission’s decisions regarding what applications should be approved for aid from the EUSF. The way the Commission handles applications is generally seen by Member States as efficient and correct.47 In 2008, the European Court of Auditors evaluated the EUSF, focusing on its ability to provide assistance in a ‘‘rapid, efficient and flexible’’ manner.48 The Court studied all applications between 2002 and 2006, and evaluated how the Commission had handled the applications. The criteria of efficiency were evaluated in terms of how burdensome the requirements for beneficiary States were and how costly the administrative costs within the Commission were. The ‘‘flexibility’’ criteria were mainly evaluated by studying the ability to adjust to situations differing from the ‘‘major disaster’’ category.49 The evaluation found that the EUSF had not lived up to its aim of providing rapid assistance, highlighting among other things the fact that it had taken an average of more than a year for the successful applicants to receive assistance from the EUSF. The most time-consuming phase was the Commission’s assessment of the applications (an average of 148 days) which was due to administrative rules, working procedures in the Commission and the promptness and quality of the applicants’ information and requests.50 The Court’s measurement of ‘‘rapidity’’ could, however, be questioned. The Court concluded that the first four cases of grants from the EUSF in 2002 had been treated much more swiftly (an average of 131 days from application to payment) than in subsequent years, and thus came to the conclusion that EUSF did not meet the ‘‘rapid’’-requirement. These four cases could, however, be seen as exceptional since they were the very reason the EUSF was established and the momentum for assisting the stricken countries was great. Still, the Fund was set up to ‘‘contribute to a rapid return to normal living conditions’’51, an ambition which the Court of Auditors did not consider the EUSF to have yet realised. The Court did however find the EUSF to be both efficient and flexible. The procedures for applying for grants from the fund were deemed to be less complex than the procedures that applied to other EU funds. Furthermore, the cost of managing the EUSF amounted to less than 0.1% of the approved grants which led the Court to consider the EUSF to be efficient. The Court found the fund to be flexible, even though it found the criteria for applying for grants under the ‘‘regional disaster’’-category to lack in clarity.

47

Interview, Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2 December 2008. Also, it might be politically sensitive for Member States to refuse support to another Member State affected by a crisis even if it does not reach the required thresholds. 48 European Court of Auditors, Special report No 3/2008, p. 9–11, and, European Commission, DG Regional Policy, The European Union Solidarity Fund. 49 Ibid. 50 European Court of Auditors, Special report No 3/2008, p. 5–6. 51 Council Regulation 2012/2002, (1).


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Last, the Court had sent questionnaires to all applicants for the EUSF up to 2006 to see how rapid, efficient and flexible the applicants thought the fund was. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, all applicants that answered were satisfied or very satisfied with the EUSF which indicates that it has served its purpose of being a demonstration of solidarity in disaster situations.52

Development of the Solidarity Fund In 2005, the Commission proposed a new regulation for the EUSF. In a larger effort to make the Union more efficient and comprehensive in dealing with major emergency situations, the Commission sought to strengthen the solidarity aspect of EU crisis management by extending the scope and improving the operation mechanisms of the EUSF.53 The Commission considered current Union programmes and funds to be inadequate in dealing not only with major natural disasters but also man-made disasters, such as the bombings in Madrid and London, and major emergencies that threatened public health, such as possible outbreaks of SARS or nuclear accidents.54 Accordingly, the Commission viewed the current regulation of the EUSF as too narrow and wanted to widen the thematic scope to cover major natural disasters, industrial/technological disasters, public health threats and acts of terrorism. The Commission also regarded the thresholds for being granted assistance as being ‘‘extremely’’ high. This had contributed to more than two-thirds of all applications thus far being rejected and it was also deemed to have obscured the rationale behind the EUSF by making most countries base their applications on the ‘‘regional disaster’’ category, where the budgetary limitations of no more than 75 million Euros per year being granted under the category restricted the possibilities of assistance.55 Furthermore, it was proposed that the thresholds be lowered from damages amounting to more than three billion Euros to more than one billion Euros, or from 0.6% of a stricken country’s GNI to 0.5% of GNI. For emergencies where the damage did not amount to costs meeting the criteria, the Commission proposed a new criterion, based on political consideration. The Commission would then be able to declare a disaster to be ‘‘major’’ even if it did not meet the total cost criteria described above. The reason for this new criterion was, according to the Commission, that the financial costs following situations like terror attacks or major health crises may not initially be that high, but might in the long run, for example in the event of a pandemic, prove to be extreme. There was also a proposal for more

52

European Court of Auditors, Special report No 3/2008, p. 11. The other strand of the Commissions initiative was the establishment of a ‘‘Rapid Response and Preparedness Instrument for major emergencies’’, European Commission (2005) 113 final. 54 European Commission (2005) 108 final, p. 2. 55 Ibid. (pp. 2–3). 53

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flexibility through a possible advance payment of 5% (not exceeding five million Euros) of an estimated grant immediately after a disaster had struck.56 The Parliament approved, with a set of amendments, the proposal from the Commission. The Parliament agreed with the need for a wider scope of the EUSF and it also agreed with the lowering of the thresholds for applications. It was, however, not willing to let the Commission decide whether a disaster could be called ‘‘major’’, were it not to meet the thresholds described above. Furthermore, this criterion was seen as applicable only in the event of a terrorist attack. Other amendments, including, for example, a more flexible budget mechanism, were also brought forward.57 The Council, however, did not proceed with the proposition for a new regulation, and the issue of strengthening the EUSF is still pending. Several Member States have been reluctant to revise the EUSF, both among countries that generally support further EU integration of crisis management and among those who wish to limit the role of the EU in the area. The latter has sought to keep the relatively high thresholds in order to avoid broadening the usage of the EUSF. Even though several Member States would want to make the criteria for applying for aid from the EUSF clearer, and with that discard the ‘‘regional disasters’’ category, a revision of the EUSF might lead to other changes that might not be desirable, e.g. more funds, an expansion of areas or looser criteria. Since the Commission’s proposal for a strengthened EUSF would make the ‘‘regional disaster’’ category void, several other Member States, traditionally supporting an increased responsibility for the EU in crisis management, have been somewhat reluctant to endorse the revision since they have frequently applied for funds using this category.58 Still, as the development of the EUSF has been driven by disasters within and outside the EU, future emergencies might make it difficult for the Member States to avoid the question of a strengthened and broadened EUSF.

Civil Protection: Differing Perspectives The ambition to enhance the EU’s ability to respond to a crisis has increased among several Member States and perhaps even more so within the Commission and the European Parliament since the establishment of the Mechanism and the EUSF. A growth in the number of countries requesting assistance through the Mechanism, coupled with the fact that major crises have become more frequent, severe and border-crossing, has been seen as raising the incentives for a further development of the Mechanism and the cooperation in the area of crisis management. Regarding the EUSF, it was, like the Mechanism, introduced as a practical means to show solidarity with countries affected by major disasters. Even though the financial aid only covers a 56

European Commission, (2005), 108 final, pp. 3–4, 7. European Parliament A6–0123/2006 Final, Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund. 58 Interview, Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2 December 2008. 57


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small part of the total costs from today’s sometimes devastating disasters, it seems as though the fund has served its initial purpose. There are also debates regarding the EUSF and other funds, concerning their further integration in the Union’s crisis management system through, e.g., a widening of their scope and aim. In May 2006, Michel Barnier presented a report containing several suggestions for the strengthening of civil protection cooperation. According to the Barnier report, the Mechanism relies too much on help that is offered spontaneously in relation to a request for help through the MIC and that existing resources are not always offered when needed. Barnier therefore suggested that a European civil protection force, Europe Aid, should be established. Europe Aid would be held in readiness for civil protection missions inside as well as outside the EU. Barnier also suggested that the EUSF could become more integrated in the operational aspects of crisis management by making some of its funds available to the proposed European civil protection force. It was further suggested that the EUSF should fund civil protection training and purchase of equipment.59 The report was not given any closer notice during the Austrian Presidency, which extended over the first six months of 2006. However, aspects of the ideas presented in the report were re-launched through, inter alia, a resolution forwarded by the Parliament in 2007 and a communication presented by the Commission in 2008.60

EU-Institutional Positions As indicated previously, both the Parliament and the Commission have sought to strengthen and develop the Mechanism and the EUSF. In this context, it is relevant to note that the Commission is often referred to as the ‘‘engine’’ of further integration within the EU in general. In 2005, the Commission highlighted the need for an improved EUSF, an initiative that was supported by the Parliament. The Council was not able to reach a decision about the proposal and the issue is therefore still not resolved. The Commission has not given up on its suggestions and the DG Regional Policy stated in its annual management plan for 2008 that it, together with the Parliament and the Council, would ‘‘reactivate’’ the discussion on the future of the EUSF.61 The Commission’s communication presented in 200862 proposed a strengthened MIC and collectively shared capacities in line with Barnier. For example, the Commission proposed future common EU resources for fire fighting, among other things. A pilot project funded through the EU was therefore carried out by the Parliament in 2008 in order to test such arrangements.63 The establishment of a 59

Barnier (2006). European Commission Communication (2008). 61 European Commission, DG Regional Policy (2007), p. 29, 30. 62 European Commission Communication (2008). 63 DG Environment website. 60

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European Disaster Response Training Network that would interlink existing centres of excellence of the Member States was also proposed. Finally, the Commission in 2008 addressed the need for a more integrated approach to civil protection. Instead of only focusing on the response to a crisis, it was suggested that prevention, preparedness and recovery measures should be considered further.64 The Commission subsequently assessed the EU’s capabilities within the area of prevention. The ambition was to identify within which areas preventive measures could possibly be undertaken on an EU-level. To that end, two external studies were carried out.65 These studies suggested, inter alia, that there should be a single framework for prevention within the EU. Furthermore, it was proposed that the EU should contribute to the development of shared EU standards and methods regarding prevention and that there should be more frequent sharing of information and best practices among the Member States. The studies also suggested that EU funding of existing arrangements, such as the Mechanism and the EUSF, should be continued and broadened. It was, however, concluded that there was no need to establish new arrangements. Finally, the studies recommended that the EU should grant more funds for research in specific topics of priority within the area of prevention. In addition, an amount of four million Euros was earmarked from the Commission’s budget for 2008. The intended aim was to make it possible to hold the modules and other resources on standby during periods estimated as especially ‘‘critical’’, and thereby enhancing the collective preparedness of the EU for major crises. The Commission suggested that this preparatory action should preferably pave the way for an EU civil protection force.66 In this context, it may be worth noting that the area of cross-cutting prevention work is also being claimed by the Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security of the European Commission (DG JLS) with the initiative on Critical Infrastructure Protection.67 Like the Commission, the Parliament has also proved supportive of both a strengthened Mechanism and EUSF. In 2007, the Parliament called for the creation of a European civil protection force, in line with Barnier’s proposition, in order to make the EU’s response to a crisis more efficient. It was also suggested that the Commission should examine the possibility of acquiring shared capabilities to complement the national civil protection resources, especially aerial means to combat forest fires. The strengthening of prevention within the area of civil protection was also underlined. The Parliament also stressed the need for strengthening and improving the EUSF. In a resolution, the Parliament called on the Commission to mobilise the EUSF and other Community funds available to disaster-stricken countries in the most flexible and rapid manner possible. Furthermore, the Parliament again urged

64

European Commission Communication (2008). Consulting within Engineering, Environment, Science and Economics, COWI (2008a, b). 66 DG Environment website. 67 See Chap. 3. 65


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the Council to reach an agreement on the proposed new regulation for EUSF and found ‘‘. . .the Council’s delay in this respect unacceptable’’.68

Member States’ Point of View The cooperation in the area of civil protection contains certain political tensions among the Member States regarding how the cooperation should develop. In essence, there is a north-south division within the EU. Member States in southern Europe tend to stress the importance of enhancing the EU’s capacity to respond to crises and to that end advocate the establishment of common EU civil protection capacities to complement the national capacities. Member States situated in northern Europe tend to stress the importance of the EU as a driver to encourage an improved national capability as regards the ability to respond to a crisis and to carry out preventive and preparedness measures. They often support initiatives that aim to increase the sharing of experience and lessons learned and have generally been positive to the EU as a financer of research in the area of civil protection. The north–south division may also, to some extent, be explained by the fact that the southern European countries have been stricken by natural disasters, such as forest fires, more frequently than the northern European countries. This certainly contributes to these countries’ call for an enhanced EU support to the Member States’ crisis management efforts. However, although some of these countries are in favour of commonly owned equipment, few would accept the Commission in a ‘‘commanding’’ role in the area of civil protection. Member States situated in the northern Europe tend to downplay the need for commonly owned EU resources and the EU’s role as a coordinator in the area of civil protection. For instance, some of these countries argue that the frequent occurrence of these types of crises should be seen as raising the incentives for further developing national crisis management ability instead of relying on the EU for help when national resources are not enough. Moreover, these countries often have civil protection authorities which have had a standing relationship directly with the UN as stand-by partners for a long period of time. Consequently, they are reluctant to submit to any EU coordination when cooperating with the UN. These countries have at the same time in many ways been an important driving force behind the prevention initiatives within civil protection. Prevention is indeed a complicated matter, not least since many sectors are reluctant to take advice in safety and security matters, especially from civil protection actors.69 The lack of a shared attitude among the Member States of what the cooperation within the EU should focus on renders the further development of both the Mechanism and the EUSF uncertain.

71

European Parliament Resolution (2007). Interview with official in change of the MIC at the Swedish Rescue Services Agency 2008.

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Concluding Remarks The Mechanism and the EUSF were both established as a result of the rising ambition among Member States and EU institutions to develop, improve and deepen cooperation at the EU-level in the area of civil protection. The two instruments were both part of a growing notion of the importance of European solidarity in crisis management. While the responsibility for the Mechanism lies predominantly in the response phase of a crisis and that of the EUSF in the recovery phase, developments point to a broadened scope for both. Increasing convergence between the two instruments may also be the case in the future. The focus of the Mechanism has widened from specifically addressing natural catastrophes to also including man-made and other crises, which has also been suggested regarding the EUSF. This broadening of activities and other ongoing developments of crisis management instruments points to a momentum for further EU integration of civil protection capacities. The development of civil protection modules, the newly adopted Consensus on humanitarian aid, the proposed acquiring of shared EU capacities and establishment of a European civil protection force, the suggested financing of training and purchase of equipment through the EUSF, point in this direction. However, the actual implementation of the concept of modules, which could be seen as the next step in the development of the Mechanism, has been subject to lengthy discussions among the Member States and the north–south division has also been apparent in this question. Even though several modules have been set up so far, not all Member States have contributed. Moreover, there are diverging opinions regarding whether the modules should be held on stand-by or not and what ‘‘standby’’ actually means. Some Member States agree that the modules should be kept on hold in order to ensure their availability in the event of a crisis, other Member States are hesitant towards keeping personnel and equipment on hold if these are needed in a crisis within their own country or elsewhere. Limited access to civil protection assets makes it difficult to designate these solely to a specific crisis while acquiring more assets implies costs. Although there is a number of uncertainties today, the concept of modules constitute an important basis from which the EU’s crisis management capability could be further strengthened and developed. Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon may pave the way for new policies, and possibly also more policies, in the area of civil protection, especially considering the ambition of the Commission, the European Parliament and some Member States to develop and broaden the cooperation. Through the Treaty of Lisbon, these states and institutions would be provided with new legal grounds to pursue their ambitions in the area. In addition, qualified majority will replace consensus for the adoption of new policy. Thus, Member States, whether opposing or being in favour of further development and broadening of the cooperation, may have to coordinate more closely and act at an early stage in the policy process in order to influence the


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future of civil protection.70 It will also force more Member States to actively take a stand on issues rather than relying on more active partners. Furthermore, if civil protection were to fall within the competence of the Committee on internal security proposed in the Treaty of Lisbon, two possible consequences are possible. Either civil protection could become marginalised in relation to other policy areas covered by the Committee, or civil protection could be provided with a new and perhaps even stronger institutional base from which the area could be further developed.71 However, the further development of the Mechanism and the EUSF will most certainly continue to be event-based and dependent on up-coming crises. The importance given to solidarity among the Member States, as well as the perceived added value provided for by the EU in relation to other regional arrangements or international cooperation, will also be crucial for the future of the Mechanism and the EUSF. The north–south division reflects different opinions about the balance between the national responsibility and the collective responsibility of the EU as well as the nature of European solidarity. The importance of solidarity in civil protection, addressed in Chap. 1, will continue to affect the development of policy and practice. The implementation of the Solidarity Clause would further highlight the tension between, on the one hand, the political will to cooperate and show solidarity in times of extreme challenges and, on the other hand, the reluctance to cede national authority to the EU. As shown throughout this chapter, the friction between national and supranational authority is likely to remain a contentious issue. It remains to be seen if and how the Member States and the EU institutions will find some common ground in the area of civil protection.

References ˚ hman T (2008) Frankrike, Tjeckien och Slovenien – Tre perspektiv pa˚ EU:s krisberedskap A (France, Czech Republic and Slovenia Three perspectives of EU crisis management. Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm ˚ hman T (2009) The Lisbon Treaty and Civil Protection in the European Union (forthcoming), A Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm Barnier M (2006) For a European civil protection force: Europe aid Consulting within Engineering, Environment, Science and Economics, COWI (2008a) Assessing the Potential for a Comprehensive Community Strategy for the prevention of Natural and Manmade Disasters (final), March 2008 Consulting within Engineering, Environment, Science and Economics, COWI (2008b) Member States’ Approaches towards Prevention Policy – a critical analysis (final), March 2008

˚ hman (2009). A Ibid.

70 71

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Council Conclusions on cooperation with candidate countries and potential candidate countries of the Western Balkans in the field of civil protection, 2873rd JUSTICE and HOME AFFAIRS Council meeting Luxembourg, 5 and 6 June 2008 Council Decision 1999/847/EC of 9 December 1999 establishing a Community action programme in the field of civil protection Council Decision (2001/792/EC), of 23 October 2001 establishing a community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions Council Decision 2007/162/EC, Euratom of 5 March 2007 establishing a Civil Protection Financial Instrument Council Decision 2007/779, Council Decision of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) (2007/779/EC, Euratom) Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund DG Environment website: http://ec.Europa.eu/environment/civil/ http://ec.Europa.eu/environment/civil/tsunami.htm http://ec.Europa.eu/world/tsunami/index.htm; http://ec.Europa.eu/environment/civil/tsunami.htm; http://ec.Europa.eu/environment/civil/forestfires_el_2007.htm DMP Ltd.-Consultants for Development Monitoring and Planning (2002) Mid-Term Evaluation of the Implementation of the Action Programme in the Field of Civil Protection 2000–2004. ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/pdfdocs/actionprogr1.pdf Ekengren M, Matzeń N, Rhinard M, Svantesson M (2006) Solidarity or Sovereignty? EU Cooperation in Civil Protection, European Integration 28(5). Routledge European Commission (2009), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Community approach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters, COM(2009) 82 final European Commission Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Reinforcing the Union’s Disaster Response Capacity, COM (2008) 130 Final European Commission Decision 2008/73, Commission Decision of 20 December 2007 amending Decision 2004/277/EC, Euratom as regards rules for the implementation of Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom establishing a Community civil protection mechanism European Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a Rapid Response and Preparedness Instrument for major emergencies, (2005) 113 final European Commission Memorandum 05/6/2005, EU Civil Protection Assistance in South East Asia, MEMO/05/6, 11 January, 2005 European Commission Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund, (2005) 108 final European Commission Press Release, IP/04/1543, The European Commission Mobilises the Civil Protection Mechanism for Victims of the Earthquake and Tsunami in South East Asia European Commission DG Regional Policy, Annual management plan 2008, final version 19 December 2007 European Commission DG Regional Policy, The European Union Solidarity Fund: http://ec. Europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/solidar/solid_en.htm European Commission Report from the Commission of 26 May 2004 – European Union Solidarity Fund – Annual report 2002–03 – Report on the experience gained after one year of applying the new instrument (2004) 397 final European Commission (1993) Towards sustainability – A European Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development, 17.05.1993, Official Journal of the European Communities No C 138/5 European Court of Auditors Special report No 3/2008, The European Union Solidarity Fund: how rapid, efficient and flexible is it?


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European Court of Auditors (2006) Special Report No3/2006 concerning the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Response to the Tsunami together with the Commission’s replies European Parliament Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund, A6–0123/2006 Final European Parliament Resolution (2007) Resolution of 4 September 2007 on this summer’s natural disasters Exchange of Experts in Civil Protection website: http://www.exchangeofexperts.eu/ Greek initiative for enhancing European cooperation for the prevention of and response to natural disasters and emergencies (2007) Interview Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2 December 2008 Interview official in charge of MIC at the Swedish Resuce Servies Agency, 16 October 2008 Larsson P, Jarlsvik H (2005) Ra¨ddningsverket och Europeiska Unionen (The Swedish Rescue Services Agency and the European Union. Authors translation). Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm Notes, PROCIV meeting, 8 October 2008 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC) Website: http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_33721_1_ 1_1_1_1,00.html Presidents of the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2007) A European consensus on humanitarian aid: working together to help people in need. IP/07/1957, Brussels 18 December 2007 Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council of 8 July 1991 on improving mutual aid between Member States in the event of natural or technological disaster Sandco¨ (2007) EU:s humanita¨ra verksamhet. Analys av samarbetsformer mellan ECHO och gemenskapsmekanismen [The Humanitarian action of the European Union. Analysis of the cooperation between ECHO and the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm United Nations (2007) Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – ‘‘Oslo Guidelines’’, Updated November 2006 (Revision 1.1 November 2007)


Chapter 6

EU Consular Cooperation in Crisis Situations Madelene Lindstro¨m

Inside the territory of the European Union all 27 EU Member States are represented in all other states. This means that if an EU citizen travels to another EU Member State, he or she will find at least the embassy of his or her motherland in the capital of that EU Member State. However, outside the EU-borders there are today only three capitals in which all Member States are represented; Beijing, Moscow and Washington DC.1 At the end of 2004 when the tsunami hit South East Asia, most of the Member States did not have a representation in the countries that where affected by the disaster. In the popular tourist destination Thailand, for example, 17 Member States were represented whereas only six were represented in Sri Lanka and three in Brunei.2 Based on the experiences of recent crisis the EU has engaged in consular cooperation to improve the protection of EU citizens in third countries. Although not very well known among the citizens of the European Union, they can today receive consular assistance from any other Member State in a country where a persons’ own country lacks representation.3

1

EU initiative to strengthen consular protection for citizens outside the European Union. MEMO/ 07/551. Brussels, 5 December 2007. 2 European Commission Green Paper of 28 November 2006 on diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries 712 final. 3 Upon the request of DG Justice, Freedom and Security the Gallup Organisation Hungary/Europe in the year 2006 conducted a survey of the consular protection. The investigation showed that, among the people interviewed in the then 25 Member States of the European Union, only 23% of the people were aware that they, if they lose their passport, are being arrested, or caught in a natural catastrophe like the tsunami, in a country where their own country has no embassy or consulate, may be entitled to turn to an embassy or a consulate of another EU Member State to seek consular assistance. Important to notice regarding this knowledge is however that there is a gap between new Member States and older and also between people who plan to travel outside the European Union and those who do not. For more information about the used survey methodology view the Annex of Consular Protection – analytical report. The Gallup Organisation (2006).


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The EU consular cooperation covers assistance to solve individual problems for example in case of loss of passports or serious accidents but the assistance can also be used when European Union citizens’ lives are in a concrete danger, as in the case of a natural catastrophe like the tsunami in South–East Asia 2004 or other emergencies like for instance the Lebanon crisis in July 2006, the Chad evacuation in January 2008 and, most recently, during the terrorist attacks in Mumbai (India) in December 2008.4 As a direct result of crises such as these, the EU Member States have intensified their consular cooperation in crisis situations. Even though the cooperation is strictly intergovernmental to its character and no legal framework exists a rather extensive cooperation has been established based on voluntary guidelines. Today the EU Member States are for example encouraged to exchange information about travel advice, share information on their embassies’contingency plans and cooperate in case of an evacuation involving EU citizens. Consular services ranges from assistance to individuals in case of illness, missing persons, death abroad and issuing of passports to acting as polling stations during elections at home, provision of international legal assistance and aid in crisis resulting from natural disasters, political unrest, terrorist attacks etc.5 This chapter focuses on the EU consular cooperation in crisis situations when urgent help is needed i.e. in times of an acute crisis affecting a significant number of people. This means that a difference is made between cooperation on consular crisis management6 vis-a`-vis cooperation on more normal day-to-day consular matters where a limited number of individuals is concerned.7 The chapter begins by painting up the background to the EU consular cooperation in crisis situations. This is followed by a description of the Union’s role as well as the limits of its competence. Even though consular matters are a strict Member State competence the purely national and bilateral cooperation that takes place will not be mentioned more than briefly. After that the practice that has been developed within the EU is described and presented in terms of the four phases of crisis management; prevention, preparation, response and recovery. The chapter concludes by drawing up the different initiatives and proposals for enhancing the cooperation and discusses the future direction of the cooperation.

4 EU initiative to strengthen consular protection for citizens outside the European Union. MEMO/ 07/551, Brussels, 5 December 2007. 5 Jones-Bos and van Daalen (2008, p. 87–92). 6 The EU consular crisis management includes for example exchange of established contingency plans, travel recommendations and cooperation when urgent evacuation of EU citizens is needed. 7 The more normal day-to-day provision of support and assistance by states’ foreign missions to its nationals, or those nationals to whom it has agreed to provide assistance, who are in distress or other difficulties overseas, covers for example to help people to help themselves, i.e. with advice and information, providence of passport issuance, notarial services and visa applications, assistance in criminal cases, financial assistance etc. (this list is not exhaustive). See European Commission, DG JLS website; Consular and diplomatic protection.

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The Need for Community Action: The Development of the EU Consular Crisis Management Cooperation According to the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) EU citizens make approximately 80 million trips per year to countries outside the European Union and a rough estimation is that between 30 and 50 million EU citizens live in non-EU-countries. It is further estimated that around 7 million EU citizens per year travelling outside the EU, go to countries where their own Member State does not have any representation. In addition, around 2 million EU expatriates live in a third country in which their own Member State is not represented.8 However, not only has the travelling increased in frequency, one can also see a trend towards exploring more and more distant locations many times characterised by unstable climates and political situations. Despite these trends the EU consular presence has not increased proportionally.9 Even though most persons do not experience any trouble when travelling, situations can occur when a person needs various degrees of assistance.10 The need to strengthen consular protection for the European Union citizens became especially clear after crises such as the South East Asian tsunami in late 2004, the Bali bombings in 2005 and the mass evacuation in connection with the Lebanon conflict in 2006. These events all burdened the Member States representations on site tremendously and constituted big challenges for the consular crisis management arrangements of the affected Member States.11

The Institutional Framework Providing consular services have always been the responsibility of the individual Member States. At Member State level providing consular service is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Important to notice is however that the 8 See The Gallup Organisation (2006), Consular Protection – analytical report and EU initiative to strengthen consular protection for citizens outside the European Union MEMO/07/551, Brussels, 5 December 2007. 9 Porzio (2008, p. 97). 10 Although most Member States do not count the number of requests for consular assistance in third countries, it is estimated that around 0.53% of EU citizens need consular assistance when travelling outside the EU (around 425,000 cases per year). It is estimated that at least 37,000 of these cases concern Union citizens whose own Member States lacks representation in the third country in question. It is speculated if there is a connection between this relatively low number and citizen’s limited knowledge of the fact that they may be entitled to consular assistance by other EU Member States. See The Gallup Organisation (2006), Consular Protection – Analytical Report and EU initiative to strengthen consular protection for citizens outside the European Union MEMO/07/ 551, Brussels, 5 December 2007. 11 European Commission Green Paper (28 November 2006) on diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries 712 final.

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national legal frameworks for granting consular protection vary, as well as the scope of the assistance provided by the individual EU Member States. Some Member States for example recognise a right to consular assistance under national law while others do not; some Member States have broad definitions of whom to be entitled to consular assistance while others have more restricted. Further, some Member States charge evacuated citizens for the costs of the evacuation while others do not, just to give some examples.12 At EU level the consular cooperation sorts under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar. As a rule, consular cooperation is dealt with by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), consisting of the 27 Member States Ministers for Foreign Affairs. At working group level consular issues are dealt with by the working group on consular cooperation (COCON). COCON’s main task is to organise the exchange of information among the Member States and to ensure proper coordination of consular assistance and policies inside and outside the Union. The issues that are discussed range from information sharing and coordination on contingency planning to emergency consular assistance policies, technical equipment and supplies. During each presidency three to four COCON meetings are held. Sometimes this is combined with one or two seminars.13 At the Commission two Directorate Generals deal with consular affairs: the Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security (DG JLS) that deals with the best way of implementing the concept of European citizenship, which includes consular assistance, and the Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX), as consular assistance falls under the part of the Treaty that deals with the CFSP. Within the European Parliament questions on consular cooperation are dealt with by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Overall the EU institutions do not have any direct consular tasks but rather serve as facilitators supporting the Member States to assist their citizens, for example by providing help with logistics such as transportation and communications. Within the EU structure the Council Secretariats Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) plays the most prominent role in this regard assisting the Presidency or the designated Lead State (see below) with the management of communications, especially with Brussels and in the framework of the Crisis coordination arrangements (CCA).14 The EU cooperation on consular affairs is intergovernmental to its character. This means that the cooperation is founded on a strictly voluntary basis. As a result community legislation on the area is very limited. The protection of EU citizens by the Member States embassies and consulates has its basis in Article 20 of the

12 For example British and Dutch nationals do not have a legal right to consular assistance overseas. This means that the British Government is under no general obligation by domestic or international law to provide consular assistance. However, consular assistance is provided as a matter of policy. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2006) Support for British Nationals Abroad: A Guide. 13 Interview, Representative from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Department for Consular Affairs and Civil Law (Consular Contingency Planning Section). 14 Porzio (2008, p. 96).


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Treaty establishing the European Community, which entered into force the 1st of November 1993; Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State. Member States shall establish the necessary rules among themselves and start the international negotiations required to secure this protection.15

The current legal framework at EU level is in fact limited to Council Decision 95/553/EC in which Article 1 states that ‘‘Every citizen of the European Union is entitled to the consular protection of any Member State’s diplomatic or consular representation if, in the place in which he is located, his own Member State or another State representing it on a permanent basis has no: accessible permanent representation, or accessible Honorary Consul competent for such matters’’.16 There are three conditions that has to be fulfilled for a citizen to be entitled to consular protection: an embassy, general consulate or consulate of the citizen’s own Member State has to be absent in the third country in which the citizen requesting protection is located; an Honorary Consul competent for such matters or another State representing the concerned Member State on a permanent basis has to be absent; and the citizen requesting protection has to show a passport, identity card or other document as a proof of his or her nationality.17 Article 20 is the first direct reference being made to ‘‘EU-citizenship’’. By developing this ‘‘universal’’ consular protection, the EU Member States intensions are to make sure that no EU citizen is left unprotected and share the burden of assistance.18 In the event of violation of Community law by a Member State, and indirectly the right to consular protection, citizens may register a complaint with the Secretariat General of the European Commission.19 Despite the lack of community legislation a rather extensive consular cooperation has developed based on non-binding guidelines.21 Even though the guidelines are not legally binding recent crises have given them a ‘‘special status’’, as now all

15 Article 8c in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) later became Article 20 in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). 16 Council Decision (95/553/EC). The decision entered into force on 3 May 2002 after a long process of ratification by the then 15 Member States. 17 If these documents have been stolen or lost, the embassy concerned may accept another proof of nationality. The European Commissions (DG JLS) webpage, diplomatic and consular protection. 18 Porzio (2008, pp. 93–97). 19 European Commission, DG JLS website; Diplomatic and consular protection. 20 COCON travel risk assessment webpage. 21 Guidelines for consular cooperation in third countries was adopted and reviewed in 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2006. The guidelines are divided into two sections; one dealing with cooperation on day-to-day consular work and the other dealing with consular crisis management cooperation. The common consular guidelines are to be considered as ‘‘living documents’’ setting out recommendations on cooperation to the local representations for dealing with emergencies and crises. See COREU LON 0150/06 circulated on 28 March 2006.

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Member States follow them.22 Since these guidelines are designed to provide a framework for consular cooperation, and all embassies operate in different environments and with different resources, the de facto implementation of the guidelines are left to the Heads of Missions taking into account different local circumstances.23

The EU Consular Crisis Management Cooperation Put into Practice To offer timely and relevant travel information is usually considered as one of the most effective ways of helping people travelling to third countries to mitigate potential risks with travelling.24 Therefore the foremost cooperation on consular crisis management within the prevention phase is the exchange of travel advices. For this purpose the Council Secretariat has created the COCON Travel Risk Assessment Webpage. At the protected forum the EU Member States are encouraged to share travel advice and view each others risk assessments. At the website each third country is given a colour code depending on the risk assessment (see Fig. 6.1). When a country changes its travel recommendations to a third country an automatic e-mail is sent to all Member States. If a country advises against all or all but essential travel to a country or area they also inform other Member States by the EU communication network – COREU25 – in accordance with standard practice across the EU. Colour code

Meaning

White Blue Yellow Chequered Orange Red Black

No specific travel advice Caution Some areas may be dangerous Avoid non-essential travel to certain areas Avoid non-essential travel Avoid travel completely Leave country immediately

Fig. 6.1 Travel advice colour code system20

22

Porzio (2006). Council of the European Union guidelines on consular protection of EU citizens in third countries, Brussels, 16 June 2006 [document 10109/2/06 REV 2]. 24 United Kingdom parliament (2007) UK response to the Commission’s Green Paper on diplomatic and consular protection of union citizens in third countries. 25 COREU is an abbreviation for the French word ‘‘CORespondance EUropeénne’’ and can be described as an EU communication network between the Member States and the Commission for cooperation in the fields of foreign policy. The COREU-system guarantees that the messages reach all Member States’ Ministries for Foreign Affairs and permanent representations and, via the acronym, the right services. 23


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Today there is no collected and common EU approach on this area but rather all Member States produce their own travel information. However, many Member States take a close interest in other EU fellow Member States advices as well as relevant international bodies and often provide links to a selection of them from their own website. In many cases there is a telephone number citizens’ can call for updates, or sign up for a free e-mail, with updates in the travel information.26 There has been a discussion about whether common or centrally located travel information would be effective or necessary. However, since different EU nationalities do not necessarily face the same risks in third countries it was concluded that citizens do not benefit from the same advices and that the individual Member States are in the best position to advise their nationals on the risks they might face and how to mitigate them. Moreover, it was highlighted that travel advices raise political, intelligence and security issues which are not suitable to be discussed in a consular forum.27 For the citizens a public site is under construction. Here one will eventually find, for example, consular brochures published in all EU languages.28 Within the second phase – the preparation phase – the Member States are encouraged to share information on contingency planning and review each others national contingency plans. All embassies have individual so called contingency plans in case of emergencies. Embassies physically located close to one another are further encouraged to co-operate in terms of ongoing contingency planning to facilitate rapid co-operation in the event of an emergency.29 Also the Commission delegations are encouraged to be included in contingency planning.30 In countries at risk of a crisis where not all Member States are represented, Heads of Missions should decide amongst themselves how they will share responsibilities for ensuring that all EU citizens are covered by contingency plans.31 An example of this is the joint framework for coordination between the EU Member States to ‘‘ensure a coordinated and efficient response in the event of a manmade or natural disaster in Japan involving citizens from one or more EU Member States’’.32 Within the preparation phase the EU Member States may also participate in common emergency drills or invite representatives of other EU Member States to take part or observe their respective drills and exercises and share lessons learnt from

26 See for example United Kingdom parliament (2007), UK response to the Commission’s Green Paper on Diplomatic and consular protection of union citizens in third countries. 27 See Annex 1 in United Kingdom parliament (2007), UK response to the Commission’s Green Paper on Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries. 28 See Council Secretariat webpage http://www.travel-voyage.consilium.europa.eu/default.asp? lang = EN (under construction). 29 See Joint Framework for EU cooperation and coordination in relation to emergencies in Japan. 30 Council of the European Union guidelines on consular protection of EU citizens in third countries, Brussels, 16 June 2006 [document 10109/2/06 REV 2]. 31 This decision should be based on ‘‘pragmatism, flexibility and a fair division of the consular burden’’. Council of the European Union guidelines on consular protection of EU citizens in third countries, Brussels, 16 June 2006 [document 10109/2/06 REV 2]. 32 See Joint Framework for EU cooperation and coordination in relation to emergencies in Japan.

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such events.33 If possible, depending on the local conditions, the Member States are encouraged to arrange regular meetings with their EU Member State colleagues dealing with consular issues to exchange information and ideas and discuss the safety of EU citizens. The meetings can be used to identify emerging themes in consular work, and to discuss best practice in handling different types of cases. The EU Member States representations in third countries are also encouraged to share information on changes in local legislation which have a direct impact on consular work, and keep a folder of useful consular assistance contacts (for example including names and contact details to EU Member States consular staff, as well as local key contacts such as the police, relevant authorities, airports etc.). Regarding the division of responsibilities the Member States are encouraged to decide in advance who is going to coordinate help and who will be responsible for citizens of nonrepresented Member States.34 Within the third phase – the response phase – the EU consular crisis management cooperation consists mainly of information sharing and cooperation during the evacuation of EU citizens. The activation of the consular crisis management cooperation is made by the affected country/countries when they judge that their own capacity is insufficient to assist and evacuate its own citizens. The Presidency of the European Union has a leading role in coordinating the consular cooperation on behalf of all EU Member States, the different authorities in the EU Member States and those in place in the third country in question. In 2006 there were a total of 86 consular crises that involved some degree of EU consular crisis response.35 Effective communication between capitals during times of crisis is essential to complement planning in-country. During acute crisis situations the Presidency has the duty to arrange instant coordination via teleconferences among the crisis centres in the EU capitals. Telephone conferences can be held around two times a day during a crisis but they are only intended for exchange of information and no decisions are made during these.36 Member States who have responsibility for contingency planning on behalf of unrepresented Member States in a third country are encouraged to share significant decision-making through the use of COREUs and e-mails circulated to their count-

33

Ibid. COREU LON 0150/06 circulated on 28 March 2006. 35 Finland assumed its presidency of the Council of the European Union in July 2006. During the 6-month long presidency the EU responded to crises such as the Lebanon evacuations (July and August); Turkey bombings (August); a military coup in Thailand (September); and an earthquake measuring 8.1 on the Richter scale in Japan (November). In December, a potential evacuation in Somalia that would have involved 2,000 EU citizens threatened. However, the return of commercial flights to the area enabling people to leave voluntarily prevented the need for evacuations on behalf of the EU. See WorldReach newsletter 2007, Coordinating consular response on behalf of the Council of the European Union. 36 Interview, Representative from the Swedish ministry for foreign affairs, the department for consular affairs and civil law (consular contingency planning section) 24 November 2008. 34


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erparts in the consular crisis units. Also Member States which are not directly affected by the crisis are informed on the measures taken by other EU Member States.37 The operative link in the EU’s consular cooperation in crisis situations is the appointed chiefs of crisis in the different Member States whom shall be able to be reached round-the-clock. To facilitate the communication in general but also in times of crisis, the above mentioned secure website can be used for exchange of information and communication. In case of a very large scale crisis, the EU’s situation centre (SitCen) can play a role with regard to monitoring and information exchange.38 The EU consular group is encouraged to meet as soon as possible after an emergency situation occurs in order to facilitate information sharing. The responsibility for organising these sessions rests with the Troika (i.e. the Presidency, the incoming Presidency and the Delegation of the European Commission).39 Another important element in this phase is in the event of an evacuation of EU citizens. If it is decided necessary to evacuate EU nationals or embassy personnel and their families, the EU Member State embassies are encouraged to cooperate in arranging joint transportation to the nearest safe region.40 An important operator in this regard is the country designated as a so called ‘‘Lead State’’. To serve as Lead State is a task Member States voluntarily can sign up to. The Lead State concept aims to protect EU citizens in crisis situations particularly in third countries where some Member States do not have any representation. Up to date France, Germany and the United Kingdom are the three countries most often appointed as Lead States. It is the role of the Lead State to coordinate measures for the protection of EU citizens during a crisis for example by providing information to citizens on site and to responsible authorities in capitals but also by coordinating an evacuation if necessary. So far the concept is being tested in third countries where only one or two Member States have a representation. The first time it was put into practice was in Chad in January 2008 when France as Lead State evacuated more than 1,200 citizens from 12 Member States and third countries (60 nationalities in all).41 When it comes to the resources and abilities available for evacuation of EU citizens, the Member States have to rely on their own individual contributions, i.e. there are no joint EU-resources like strategic transport capacity for these kinds of actions. Member States themselves are further primarily responsible for transporting the assistance they provide in response to an emergency. If a Member State 37

Council of the European Union reinforcing the European Union’s emergency and crisis response capacities Brussels, 15 June 2006, [10551/06]. 38 The EU Joint situation centre (SitCen) is located within the General Secretariat of Council and belongs to the services directly attached to the High Representative. SitCen monitors and assesses events and situations world-wide on a 24-h basis with a focus on potential crisis regions. SitCen also provides information to the EU Special Representatives and other high ranking EU officials as well as for EU military and civilian crisis management operations. 39 See Joint framework for EU cooperation and coordination in relation to emergencies in Japan. 40 Ibid. 41 Only France and Germany had embassies in Chad at the time of the evacuation in January 2008. Slovenian Presidency of the EU (2008) Press release: Evacuation of EU citizens from Chad and application of the consular Lead State concept, Press Releases 11.02.2008.

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decides to send a consular or medical support team to provide with reception facilities and psychological support for its citizens they are encouraged to inform the other Member States, both at local and at central level. In certain cases however, Member States are able to offer teams of experts or equipment but have no transport to bring that assistance where it is needed. In these cases, when seeking assistance, Member States are able to draw on existing EU mechanisms managed by the Commission, in particular the Monitoring and Information Centre.42 As set up in the guidelines the Member States will reimburse those Member States which act on their behalf for expenses (e.g. hiring of vehicles to transport persons to a safe area etc.) incurred in securing the safety of their nationals in a pragmatic way. It will then be the responsibility of the requesting Member State to pursue repayment from its nationals.43 At the request of the Presidency the Commission delegations around the world could further provide logistic support to Member States’ missions.44 Another example of cooperative arrangements taking place within the response phase is that the EU Member States may decide to establish joint emergency teams and centres. These teams may decide to man and run an emergency operation room. The purpose of the emergency operation room is to establish a joint point of contact and a joint response and coordination cell in order to gather and analyse information. The EU Member States might also decide to establish a joint field office either in a crisis area or in another relevant location, or a joint point of contact for next of kin to provide briefings and offer practical and personal assistance. The EU Member States are further encouraged to immediately share information obtained (e.g. from evacuation centres, hospitals, hotels, airlines and other relevant bodies) on the whereabouts and condition of each other’s nationals. Beside seeking to cooperate on public information management and inform each other on press briefings, press releases, announcements and other issues the EU Member States’ might also decide to establish a joint point of contact for press and to organise joint information gathering.45 During the last phase of crisis management – the recovery phase – any type of crisis management, whether domestic or international in nature, is usually followed by a post-crisis evaluation. In the aftermaths of the tsunami 2004 for example, several reports have been published on the European Unions’ capability to assist its citizens in times of crises outside the European Unions’ borders.46 The crisis management is not only scrutinised by parliamentary committees but also by the

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Council of the European Union reinforcing the European Union’s emergency and crisis response capacities Brussels, 15 June 2006, 10551/06. 43 Council of the European Union guidelines on consular protection of EU citizens in third countries, Brussels, 16 June 2006 [document 10109/2/06 REV 2]. 44 Ibid. 45 See Joint Framework for EU Cooperation and Coordination in Relation to Emergencies in Japan. 46 See for example Larsson (2005) The EU and the tsunami disaster – An analysis of the EU’s capability to assist citizens in distress during disasters outside the borders of the Union’’ in Sweden and the tsunami – review and proposals: main report of the disaster Commission of 2005 (SOU 2005:104. pp. 387–415).


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general public. These reviews and audits are useful in that they can document important lessons to be learned and incorporated into future responses.

Consular Cooperation on Crisis Management with Third Parties Recognising that the consular challenges in times of crisis are more or less similar for all, the EU also cooperates with the UN, non governmental organisations and third party countries like the United States. Taking the cooperation between the US and the EU as an example, the cooperation takes place both locally between the EU and US missions as well as in the concerned capitals. Besides encouraged participation in joint exercises, it has been suggested that the US could be invited to take part in EU teleconferences depending on the nature of the consular crisis. The EU– US cooperation has been put into practice for example in connection with the terrorist attacks in Sharm-El-Sheikh and Bali, the hurricane Katrina and the evacuation in Lebanon where the EU evacuated some US citizens and the US respectively assisted EU citizens. In order to affirm mutual interest and further increase the cooperation the EU Troika and the US holds regular talks discussing cooperation on consular crisis management.47

Initiatives to Strengthen the EU Consular Cooperation on Crisis Management In the aftermaths of the tsunami crisis several reports have been published on the European Union’s capability to assist its citizens in times of crises outside the European Union’s borders. Many of these reports have also pointed at concrete examples where there is space for improvements in the EU consular crisis management cooperation. The initiatives are both technical and organisational and range from far-reaching proposals such as the establishment of joint ‘‘euro-consulates’’48 to less controversial encouragements to increased voluntary coordination. During the past three–four years the Commission has begun to highlight the need to improve the consular support given to EU citizens in third countries, particularly in crisis situations. The Commissions most recent and formal initiative to strengthen the consular cooperation is the Green Paper launched the 28 Novem47 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2006) EU troika and US ready to increase cooperation in consular crisis management. 48 Already in the Barnier report from 2006 one can find suggestion that the EU should provide consular assistance through Commission delegations or especially established ‘‘Euro consulates’’. Most actors tend to dislike the idea. Instead the French Presidency has tried to push for the idea of pooling resources (‘‘mutualisation’’) which means that several consulates might co-locate, but remain separate from a conceptual point of view.

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ber 2006. At the time of the publication of the Green Paper the Commission also launched a public consultation. The consultation showed that Member States already apply high standards of protection, but that more can be done to ensure the best possible protection to Union citizens. Besides noting the creation within the Council of a Working Party on consular cooperation (COCON) to organise exchanges of information on national best practices, the Green Paper raised a number of specific proposals to improve the EU’s joint consular response. These suggestions included for example better information to the public on the right to diplomatic and consular protection and on Member States’ representation in third countries by for example the printing of the text of Article 20 EC in national passports and directed campaigns at airports and travel agencies. Another suggestion was to extend the entitlement to consular protection to EU citizens’ family members who are third country nationals. The Commission also suggested the setting up of ‘‘common offices’’ with Commission delegations in the Caribbean, the Balkans, the Indian Ocean and West Africa.49 Already in January 2006 the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council requested Michel Barnier to study the Union’s role in responding to crises. On 9 May 2006, Michel Barnier presented a comprehensive report entitled ‘‘For a European civil protection force: Europe aid’’. In the report various initiatives were proposed to improve the EU consular crisis management cooperation for example the establishment of ‘‘joint offices’’ in four ‘‘test’’ areas (the Caribbean, the Balkans, the Indian Ocean and West Africa). These areas were proposed because of the number of European tourists visiting them, the relatively low representation of the Member States and the presence of Commission delegations, which could provide the appropriate support.50 The advantages with setting up common offices, it is argued, would help to streamline functions and save on the fixed costs of the structures of Member States’ diplomatic and consular networks. If ratified, the Treaty of Lisbon establishes a European External Action Service (EAS) with its own competences and responsibilities. The form of the EAS is not yet decided, but it is most likely that the community competence in terms of support to consular cooperation remains unchanged. This means that the EAS staff in potential EU embassies probably would have the same competence as today’s current Council secretariat and Commission staff: to support the Member States. Even though a single European consular service is not likely in the foreseeable future, since consular work is still too closely connected to the Member States domestic politics, one solution could be to have a Community approach for administrative consular affairs (visas, travel documents, certificates and so on), and leave consular crisis management to Member States.51 Today Member States have co-located some or all of their services in a few countries 49 See EU initiative to strengthen consular protection for citizens outside the European Union. MEMO/07/551. Other relevant initiatives is the Minister cites Commission Communication (2006) 331 of 28 June 2006 and Barnier (2006). 50 Barnier (2006). 51 Porzio (2008, p. 97).


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around the world.52 Another decisive factor for the EU consular crisis management cooperation in the future is that a ratified Lisbon Treaty gives the EU the right to legislate by qualified majority on measures aimed to facilitate the diplomatic and consular protection of Member State citizens in third countries where the relevant citizens’ own Member State has no representation.53 Depending on the outcome of the Green Paper and the public consultation that followed,54 the intention was that it could lead to the publication of a White Paper where the conclusions of the debate where translated into practical proposals for Community action. The civil society and the European Parliament welcomed most of the Green Paper’s proposals while the Member States have been more reluctant.55 Although Member States for a long time have held the unanimous view that the provision of consular assistance is primarily a matter for national authorities, most Member States are supportive of the principle of co-operation between the diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission delegations. However, considering that the Commission has no experience of providing consular assistance itself, the Member States tend to argue that the Commission should mainly serve as a facilitator organising seminars and conferences on areas of common concern. Unlike other EU crisis management arrangements, we have highlighted in this book, the work on consular protection is characterised by a more or less broad consensus among the Member States regarding the scope of community action. Beside the fact that some Member States would prefer legally binding decisions and more formalised agreements than there is today, there is a broad consensus that this is an area of Member State competence solely.56 The Green Paper was later followed up by the Commission with the launching of an Action Plan. The Commissions Action Plan is a ‘‘non-exhaustive roadmap’’ for measures that the Commission intends to propose in 2007–2009. Proposals on consular protection for EU citizens were among the Commission’s top priorities for 2008. The Commission is currently planning to conduct a survey of the Member States experiences of consular cooperation among EU posts in third countries. Depending on the result of this investigation more initiatives are certainly to be expected.

52

Great Britain and France for example have co-located embassies in Bosnia–Herzegovina, Brazil, Bangladesh, Botswana, Kuwait, Mozambique and Russia. Sweden, Finland and Denmark in turn have co-located embassies in Germany, Tanzania and Montenegro (situation as of November 2008). 53 Report on the Green Paper: Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries, European parliament committee on civil liberties, justice and home affairs. 54 European Commission (2007) Effective consular protection in third countries: the contribution of the European Union Action Plan 2007–2009. 55 Porzio (2008, p. 97). 56 For example there was a French push for a formal Council decision concerning the Lead State guidelines in November 2008 arguing that legally binding decision to lean against were to prefer since questions could emerge if for example an evacuation failed and if the Lead State in question was sued.

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Other proposals intended to increase consular cooperation, also identified in the aftermath of the South East Asian tsunami, are the creation of an EU database on disaster victims, a database on common definitions for warnings to travellers and procedures to communicate with travel agencies or third countries57 as well as the need to increase the EU forensic capabilities. However, no agreement has yet been established in these areas.58 The latest initiatives on the topic came under the French Presidency of the European Union 2008 when four initiatives were presented in order to better coordinate the consular resources of the EU Member States; the first initiative was to provide the Lead State concept with a legal framework and make it clear to any citizen of the EU; the second was to improve the consular assistance within the European Union; the third initiative dealt with the establishment of a consular training network in order to improve the consular training and the fourth initiative concerned pooling of consular resources and combining the consular services of Member States (for example integrating some parts of the visa sections at the Member States representation abroad).59 To conclude; taking into account the sequences of initiatives, meetings and exercises that have been held on the area, experts on the topic often tend to interpret it as a clear indicator of how important consular issues have become.60

Concluding Remarks: The Future of EU Consular Crisis Management Cooperation It is the individual Member States that has the responsibility for consular protection of their citizens. However, factors such as increasing numbers of journeys to more distant locations in combination with recent crisis pressure on the Member States representations have accentuated the need for EU cooperation in the area. Unlike other crisis arrangements we have highlighted in this book, consular protection is an area where the Member States are unanimous regarding the scope of community action. Beside the fact that some Member States would prefer legally binding decisions and more formalised agreements than there is today, there is a broad consensus that consular protection is an area of Member State competence and Member State competence solely. As a result, no formal or binding decisions are applicable on the area and the cooperation is rather funded upon non-binding guidelines drawing up good practice between the EU Member States. Up to date 57

The communication can for example be about the acquirement of passenger lists or entry cards. The Commission’s concern for quick and simple identification and repatriation of mortal remains have made the Commission encourage further research and development into DNA identification techniques, computed tomography scanning and transmission of fingerprints. See Hagstro¨m Frisell and Oredsson (2006). 59 French Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2008). 60 Porzio (2008, p. 94). 58


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the EU consular crisis management cooperation includes foremost information sharing, cooperation on contingency planning (at least information on each others plans) and, when possible, cooperation on resources such as Disaster Victim Identification expertise, joint exercises and so forth.61 There are many advantages with cooperation on consular protection at an EU level. Beside the most obvious such as exchange of best practice and the fact that joint efforts improve the response in the acute crisis the introduction of common protection arrangements for citizens of the Union helps strengthen the identity of the Union as perceived in third countries as well as the idea of European solidarity as perceived by the Union citizens.62 Elaborating on the future direction of EU consular crisis management cooperation three challenges should be highlighted; the first is the gap between the political will and the consular departments on the ground; already in late December 1995 a decision was taken on consular assistance and protection.63 However it took until 2002 before the decision could become effective. A reflection that experts on the topic have made is that the political level can be enthusiastic about cooperation in the consular area while the consular departments are more aware of the specificity of consular obligations and therefore also more reluctant. A closely adjacent second challenging factor for an increased EU cooperation in the area is the national sensitivity related to the public perception and the publics growing expectations on high-quality assistance where and when ever; when a British citizen for example was evacuated by Germany during the tsunami it immediately lead to headlines such as ‘‘Luftwaffe Flies Brits Back Home’’ in the British press and to questions of why the own country was not there if others were.64 Many of the proposals envisage a substantially increased role for the European institutions in the provision of consular assistance to EU citizens. The question is how to allow European consular cooperation to fulfill all of its promises and citizens expectations without diminishing the effectiveness and perception of national responsibilities.65 Headlines such as those above mentioned definitely tend to get ‘‘the national competence alarm’’ going. However, if peoples’ expectations continue to grow and people become more aware of the fact that they are entitled to seek consular assistance from any other Member State one can easily anticipate a growing boost of the EU cooperation. Finally a third, but not necessarily the only remaining challenge, is the difference in the Member States representation in third countries; as mentioned, while big Member States such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom have more than 100 representations in third countries others have less than ten (Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Luxembourg). Even though requests for consular assistance normally is not a problem when it is a matter of dealing with individual situations, the situation 61

Porzio (2008, p. 94). The European Commission’s webpage DG JLS Consular and diplomatic protection. 63 Council Decision (95/553/EC). 64 Porzio (2008, pp. 94–95). 65 Ibid. pp. 93–97. 62

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may be different in the case of large groups of people seeking assistance in the wake of disasters, pandemics, acts of terrorism or military conflicts. Under the heading ‘‘consular shopping’’ it has been highlighted that those Member States with large consular networks, offering higher levels of consular assistance or with a higher profile presence in third states, risk a disproportionate burden from unrepresented Member States nationals.66 Even though investigations confirm that people prefer their own country as a source of assistance67 this could be an argument for strengthening the cooperation in the area. The extent of the EU consular crisis management cooperation in the future is hard to tell but for sure further initiatives are to be expected. The fundamental question is if the improvement of the EU consular crisis management co-operation is best achieved by building on existing national capacities, and improving coordination between Member States, or by creating new systems. As a last remark it is important to acknowledge that the consular work is not developing in a vacuum – like other areas mention in the book it is highly affected by occurring crises: even though Maastricht is often referred to as the political departure for EU consular cooperation it is the crises that have occurred that has given the ultimate and decisive push to further the cooperation.68 What other actors do, such as for example international organisations, relevant civil society organisations as well as travel agencies, is also important. The Council has declared that the European Union is committed to intensifying the consular cooperation to give substance to the concept of ‘‘European citizenship’’ and help the Member States to deal more effectively with the challenges resulting from an increasing number of terrorist activities.69 However, the EU dimension within consular protection is still controversial and what happens next remains to be seen. Clear is that the Commission will further strive to continue ‘‘building a Union ever closer to its citizens’’.70

66

See for example United Kingdom parliament (2007) UK response to the Commission’s Green Paper on Diplomatic and consular protection of union citizens in third countries. 67 The investigation also showed that the preferred type of assistance varies due to the level of education, if people have plans to travel and due to age and gender. Help to immediately return home is, according to the investigation, the most desired assistance people in general would like to have followed by the possibility to communicate with somebody who talks their language. Older people prefer to communicate with someone who understands their language while younger people primarily would like to contact their family, boss, or bank. Citizens from the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium preferred their own country as source of assistance to the highest extent, while those from the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Latvia mentioned this with lower rate. See The Gallup Organisation (2006) Consular protection – analytical report. 68 The Bali bombings (12 October 2002), the Indian Ocean tsunami (26 December 2004), the Sharm-el-Sheik bombings (23 July 2005), Hurricane Katrina (August 2005), the Lebanon evacuation (July 2006), the Chad evacuation (January 2008) and most recent the incidents in Mumbai India (November/December 2008). 69 Bulletin of the European Union Council conclusions on consular cooperation between EU Member States. 70 See Council decision (95/553/EC).


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References Barnier, M (2006) For a European civil protection force: Europe aid. Bulletin of the European Union ‘‘Council conclusions on consular cooperation between EU Member States’’. Bulletin EU 11–2004, Area of freedom, security and justice (15/15) 1.4.15. http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/200411/p104015.htm, accessed 4 Feb 2009 COREU LON 0150/06 circulated on 28 March 2006. Best practices guidelines for consular co-operation between Member States in third countries Council Decision 95/553/EC. Decision of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council of 19 December 1995 regarding protection for citizens of the European Union by diplomatic and consular representations Council of the European Union, Guidelines on consular protection of EU citizens in third countries, Brussels, 16 June 2006 [document 10109/2/06 REV 2] Council of the European Union 10551/06, Reinforcing the European Union’s emergency and crisis response capacities, Brussels, 15 June 2006 Council Secretariat webpage http://www.travel-voyage.consilium.europa.eu/default.asp?lang= EN (under construction), accessed 1 Feb 2009 EU initiative to strengthen consular protection for citizens outside the European Union, MEMO/07/ 551, Brussels, 5 December 2007. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference = MEMO/07/551&format = PDF&aged = 1&language = EN&guiLanguage = en, accessed 23 Jan 2009 European Commission (2007) Effective consular protection in third countries: the contribution of the European Union action plan 2007–2009. COM (2007) 767 final. Brussels, 5 December 2007 European Commission Green Paper (28 November 2006) Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries [COM (2006) 712 final] European Commission, DG JLS website; Consular and diplomatic protection. http://ec.europa.eu/ justice_home/fsj/citizenship/diplomatic/fsj_citizenship_diplomatic_en.htm, accessed 4 Jan 2009 European Parliament (2007) Report on the Green Paper: diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries. (Rapporteur: Ioannis Varvitsiotis) 22 November 2007 European Parliament Resolution (11 December 2007) The Green Paper: diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries [2007/2196(INI)] Europa, Summaries of legislation, Diplomatic and consular protection. http://europa.eu/scadplus/ leg/en/lvb/l14010a.htm, accessed 23 Jan 2009 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2006) Support for British nationals abroad: a guide. http:// www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/2855621/english, accessed 2 Dec 2008 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2007) Committee on European scrutiny – tenth report: diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries (28304) French Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2008) Meeting of the directors of consular affairs of the European union. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/european-union_157/european-meetings_882/ french-presidency-of-the-european-union-second-half-2008_6090/meetings-during- the-presidency_6480/meeting-of-the-directors-of-consular-affairs-01–02.07.08_11612.html, accessed 1 Dec 2008 Gallup Organisation (2006) Consular protection – analytical report. http://ec.europa.eu/ public_opinion/flash/fl188_en.pdf, accessed 24 Jan 2009 Hagstro¨m Frisell E, Oredsson M (2006) Building crisis management capacity in the EU. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) Interview, Representative from the Joint European Situation Centre, Council of the European Union, 9 December 2008 Interview, Representative from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Department for Consular Affairs and Civil Law (Consular Contingency Planning Section), 24 November 2008

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Joint Framework for EU Cooperation and Coordination in Relation to Emergencies in Japan, 6 December 2006. http://www.ambtokyo.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/3FD9FE6B-4832–44D8–9D53– 9A16CF1D8426/0/JointFrameworkforEUCooperationandCoordinationinRelationtoEmergenciesinJapan.pdf, accessed 1 Dec 2008 Jones-Bos R, van Daalen M (2008) Trends and developments in consular services: the Dutch experience. Hague J Diplomacy 3:87–92 Larsson P (2005) The EU and the tsunami disaster – an analysis of the EU’s capability to assist citizens in distress during disasters outside the borders of the Union in Sweden and the tsunami – review and proposals: main report of the disaster commission of 2005 (SOU 2005:104. pp. 387–415) Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2006) EU troika and US ready to increase cooperation in consular crisis management, 5 October 2006. http://www.formin.finland.fi/public/default. aspx?contentid=81583&nodeid=15148&contentlan=2&culture=en-US, accessed 15 Jan 2009. Porzio G (2006) Presentation of EU consular protection by – GSC – private office SG/HR. http:// www.abgs.gov.tr/tarama/tarama_files/31/SC31EXP_Consular%20Cooperation.pdf, accessed 5 January 2009 Porzio G (2008) Consular assistance and protection: an EU perspective. Hague J Diplom 3(1): 93–97 Slovenian Presidency of the EU (2008) Press release: evacuation of EU citizens from Chad and application of the consular Lead State concept, 11 February 2008. http://www.eu2008.si/en/ News_and_Documents/Press_Releases/February/0211MZZ_Chad.html, accessed 15 January 2009 Slovenian Presidency of the EU (2008) Press release: seminar on diplomatic and consular protection of EU citizens in third countries – exchange of experience and best practices (27 June 2008). http://www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/Press_Releases/June/0627MZZ_ konzularna_zascita.html. Accessed 1 Dec 2008 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, EU-cooperation in consular matters and times of crisis. http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2362/a/118082, accessed 2 Feb 2009 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Memo 2005–01–17) The consular crisis and emergency preparedness United Kingdom parliament (2007) UK response to the Commission’s Green Paper on diplomatic and consular protection of union citizens in third countries. http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/ news/consulting_public/consular_protection/news_contributions_consular_protection_en. htm, accessed 4 Feb 2009 WorldReach newsletter (2007) Coordinating consular response on behalf of the council of the European Union. http://www.worldreach.com/Consularis/newsletter_apr_2007.pdf, accessed 4 Feb 2009

Chapter 7

The Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) Per Larsson

Major disasters and emergencies that occur within or outside the borders of the EU is, as mentioned earlier in this book, an important driving force for the Member States to deepen or broaden their cooperation within the field of crisis management. The 9/11 2001 attack in the USA made it clear to the Member States that the EU was lacking a crisis management arrangement for cross-sector coordination on a strategic and high political level. The process to create such an arrangement was initiated in 2004 by the European Council, which invited the Commission and the Council of the European Union (the Council) to establish an integrated EU arrangement for crisis management with cross-border effects to be implemented at the latest by 1 July 2006.1 The European Council’s invitation was followed by a declaration by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in July 2005, soon after the London bombings, that called for the development of: ‘‘. . . arrangements to share information, ensure coordination and enable collective decision-making in an emergency, particularly for terrorist attacks on more than one Member State’’.2 In the light of these circumstances, and in the light of the tsunami disaster of 2004/2005, a specific arrangement for strategic crisis management on a high political level was presented under the British Presidency in the fall of 2005. The arrangement, called Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA), was formally agreed by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in December 2005 and was officially put into use in July 2006, even if all the details concerning the arrangements were still not entirely in place.3 Even today, the CCA can still consider to be in a formative implementation phase. Even if it is expressed in plural, the CCA can best be understood as a single arrangement. The CCA concerns how the Member States and the Union’s institutions will cooperate on a strategic and high political level in Brussels in case of a crisis. The very heart of CCA consists of a specific Crisis Steering Group subordinated to the Member States’ EU ambassadors in

1

Council of the European Union, 16054/04. Council of the European Union, 11158/1/05 REV 1. 3 The European Council, 15106/05. 2


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Coreper II (Comite´ des Repre´sentants Permanents). Coreper II is the coordination and decision level next under the ministerial level in the Council and the forum where the EU ambassadors principally handle institutional and cross-sector issues.4 This chapter describes how the EU with the help of the CCA will conduct intergovernmental crisis management on a strategic and high political level in the response phase of a crisis. The chapter describes the importance of the CCA for the Member States and the EU’s crisis management, the specific aim and purpose of the CCA and its Crisis Steering Group, the composition of the Crises Steering Groups and its mandate and how and under which circumstances the Crisis Steering Group is supposed to be activated. The chapter also briefly describes the experiences gained from exercises of the CCA and the role of the arrangement (further on used in the singular) during the terror attacks in Mumbai in 2008.

The CCA and Its Importance for the Member States and the EU Since the CCA is a new crisis management arrangement still in the build-up phase, it is difficult to determine how important the CCA will become for the Member States’ national crisis management and the EU’s crisis management capacity in the future. But when it comes to added values of the CCA for the single Member State and its crisis management capability, it can be claimed that the arrangement does not bring any specific added value for handling of most types of crises that usually affect a Member State, such as flooding, wild fires and storms. This is because the CCA is, as will be explained below, not intended to be activated in this type of crisis. The CCA is only intended to be activated in extremely rare crises that simultaneously affect several Member States and which are of a rapidly spreading nature. Creeping crises, which develop slowly over a longer time, are to continue to be handled within the normal decision-making structures of the EU. For the rapidly spreading kind of crises, the CCA is intended to complement already existing arrangements on the agency level in the EU, such as the Mechanism for Civil Protection (MIC), and to serve as a specific forum for strategic discussions on the high political level. The strategic discussions are intended to focus on the Member States’ need to coordinate information to the public and media or the need to coordinate concrete national crisis management measurements (e.g. quarantine rules during a pandemic) to optimise the efforts to handle the crisis on an EU level. In this context, it is important to underline that the significance of the CCA has its limitations as an overarching strategic crisis management arrangement for the EU. This is because the Commission has a more restricted role in the Councilbased Crisis Steering Group and is not participating in the decision-making in 4

Coreper assembles and takes decisions in two different configuations: Coreper I and Coreper II. Coreper II is the configuration that handles matters concerning the CCA.

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Coreper II. In addition to introducing long-needed facilities for strategic crosssector crisis management coordination at the EU level, the CCA, in conjunction with the Union’s rapid alert systems, improves the Member States’ facilities for exchange of information about the national crisis situation thereby providing them and the Union as a whole with a more alert and nuanced crisis situation awareness when facing transnational crises. Finally, the introduction of the CCA creates an increased pressure for reforms and upgrading of the national crisis management system in those Member States in the Union that today can be expected to have problems in meeting the demands the CCA place on them, for example the ability to rapidly produce national crises situation reports.

The Aim and Purpose of the CCA The CCA is an entirely intergovernmental cross-sector oriented arrangement whose key purpose is, as mentioned above, to facilitate the ability of the Member States and the Commission to coordinate their public communication and crisis management actions at the EU level. According to the Manual on EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination, the CCA is said to fulfill the following six key functions5: l

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Facilitating information exchange between the Member States and the EU institutions. Facilitating support to Member States that do not have sufficient capabilities to deal with the particular crisis. Enabling consistency in the action taken by the Member States, the Commission and EU agencies through coordination of their crisis management actions (e.g. common recommendations and guidelines to the public in the case of a pandemic in Europe or establishing a no-fly zone over certain parts of Europe after a number of flight related terrorism attacks). Enabling debate on contentious policy decisions between the Member States and the Commission (e.g. should Member States who possess vaccines of a certain kind share them with those who do not?). Enabling debate on collective external action between the Member States and the Commission (e.g. support to a third country to try to control a pandemic virus). Media coordination between the Member States, the Commission and EU agencies to avoid conflicting messages to the public.

It is important to emphasise that the CCA does not bring about any changes in the decision-making power within or between the Union’s institutions or between the Member States and the EU. The CCA as an arrangement rests on prevailing EU treaties without being included in any treaty. It also rests on the fact that crisis management in most areas is primarily the responsibility of the Member State, but 5

Council of the European Union, 20579/08 LIMITE.

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at the same time the Member States in a spirit of solidarity should help and support each other in crises. In addition to this, it is stated that the CCA as far as possible is to build on already existing procedures and routines within the Union and to seek to achieve cross-sector arrangements and link together different information sources.6

The Crisis Steering Group To facilitate the key functions of the CCA, a Crisis Steering Group has been introduced as a new crisis management structure in the Council, serving as a preparatory body during a crisis to all the 27 Members States’ EU ambassadors in Coreper II.7 The Crisis Steering Group is consequently not a permanent crisis management structure that is in being when no crisis exists. It is important to stress that the Crisis Steering Group is only preparing and facilitating the decision-making procedure of Coreper II. The EU ambassadors in Coreper II, in consultation with their capitals, collectively make the decision on what action to take and if necessary make sure that any decision is formally taken expediently by the Council. Formal Council decisions concerning CCA are to be taken by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), which is the ministerial grouping for the Member States’ foreign ministers. In sudden and rapidly spreading crises it is probably not possible to await formal Council decisions; instead, the Member States have to act on decisions from the EU ambassadors in Coreper II as an interim Council decision. The legal basis in the treaties for such a decision-making procedure is not, however, crystal clear, but has so far not been the subject for any discussion. The tasks of the Crisis Steering Group are explicitly stated in the Manual on EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination.8 The tasks are to: l l

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Keep Coreper II informed about the crisis situation and its development. Establish a common situation awareness of the crisis among the Member States, the Commission and EU agencies to facilitate common decisions and measures. Make an initial judgment of what measures that the EU and its Member States may have to take to meet the situation. Without violating the Member States’ right of self-determination in crisis management matters, advise the Member States on suitable measures to handle the common crisis situation. Produce a list of alternatives of measures that can be taken by the EU and its Member States to meet the crisis situation and report the list to Coreper II. Ensure that any decisions taken by Coreper II/the Council to handle the crisis are implemented.

The Council of the European Union, 20579/08 LIMITE. The Council of the European Union, 20579/08 LIMITE; Council of the European Union, 11270/ 06 LIMITE. 8 The Council of the European Union, 20579/08 LIMITE. 7

7 The Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) l

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Serve as an additional information channel by which Member States affected by the crisis can inform about specific needs of support that cannot be managed through other existing crisis management structures. As far as possible ensure that a common communication strategy for EU and its Member States is produced and complied with. Direct the work of the subordinated ‘‘CCA Support Machinery’’ (see below).

The Composition of the Crisis Steering Group The representatives in the Crisis Steering Group are all Brussels-based to be able to quickly convene in the event of a crisis. The group is composed of high level representatives from the Presidency, the Council Secretariat, the Commission and Member States directly affected by the crisis.9 Note here that the representatives from the Commission and the Council Secretariat are not participating in the decision-making that takes place in Coreper II at a later stage. The Member States and the Presidency are represented in the Crisis Steering Group by their Coreper II representatives: the EU-ambassadors, or their designated substitute. The EU ambassador of the Presidency chairs the group. Consequently, some of the Coreper II representatives will have dual roles during a crisis: to take their place in the Crisis Steering Group to prepare and facilitate the decision-making for all the 27 Member States’ EU ambassadors in Coreper II and to act in their ordinary role when Coreper II at a formal meeting takes decisions on how collectively to handle the crisis. The Commission is represented by its Secretary-General or his or her designated substitute and the Council Secretariat by the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) or the Deputy Secretary-General. Each representative in the group has the right to be assisted by a certain number of staff personnel; the number of staff personnel is determined in conjunuction with the assembly of the Crisis Steering Group. If it is deemed necessary due to the nature of the crisis, the Crisis Steering Group can be expanded by more representatives from the Council Secretariat (i.e. the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in a terrorism-related crisis), the Commission (i.e. the Commissioner for Health in the case of a pandemic), EU Situation Center (SitCen), EU Monitoring and Information Center (MIC) or different EU agencies (i.e. European Police Offices; Europol). The decision to expand the group is formally taken by the EU ambassador of the Presidency. Logistic and secretariat support for the Crisis Steering Group will be provided by the Council Secretariat.10

9

Ibid. Council of the European Union, 20579/08 LIMITE; Council of the European Union, 11270/06 LIMITE. 10

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The Support Group of the Crisis Steering Group The Crisis Steering Group, can, when needed, associate different experts and specialists in the form of a body called CCA Support Machinery (even called Support Group) to support its work.11 This body of experts and specialists is a strictly preparatory and consultative body that has the role to support the Crisis Steering Group in their work by gathering information about the crisis, establishing a common perception of the crisis situation, identifying problems and requirements connected to the process of handle the crisis situation and suggesting decision alternatives. The experts and specialists, with special knowledge in different fields, will predominately come from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and if needed from the Member States. Permanent members include the Director of the SitCen, the head of the Council’s Press Office, the spokesperson of the SG/HR, the Commission’s designated spokesperson and the Commission’s ARGUS representative.

When and How to Activate the Crisis Steering Group The Crisis Steering Group is only intended to be activated in the event of major emergencies and crises. More precisely, these are crises that take place inside or outside the boundaries of EU, crises that cannot be managed satisfactorily at an agency level, crises which has a direct effect on a number of Member States simultaneously, and crises which engage the entire Union or crises where the interests of several Member States are engaged together with the responsibilities of the EU institutions.12 In other words, the CCA and the Crisis Steering Group is only a crisis management arrangement for extremely severe crises of a predominantly transnational nature. The procedure13 to alert and assemble the Crisis Steering Group starts with a Member State or EU body that has knowledge of an occurred or an imminent crisis through a certain alert telephone number informing EU Situation Center (SitCen) about the situation. SitCen is situated in Brussels in the Council Secretariat and is staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The SitCen is a body for intelligence gathering and analysis with the key function to support the Union’s ESDP operations in third country and to monitor hot spots around the world. After being informed, the Director of the SitCen, or his or her deputy, informs the Presidency, the Directors of the Private Office of the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General of the Council and the Commission (ARGUS duty service) about the situation at hand. 11

Council of the European Union, 20579/08 LIMITE. Ibid. 13 Council of the European Union, 20579/08 LIMITE; Council of the European Union, 11270/06 LIMITE. 12

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The EU ambassador of the Presidency will then confer with the Council Secretariat (Secretary-General or designated replacement), the Secretary-General of the Commission as well as with the EU ambassadors of any directly affected Member State to determine whether an crisis has occurred or is anticipated and which merits triggering the CCA and convening the Crisis Steering Group. The formal decision on whether or not to activate the Crisis Steering Group is taken by the EU ambassador of the Presidency in consultation with its government. If the Presidency decides to activate the Crisis Steering Group, the Council Secretariat (SitCen) will convene the members of the Crisis Steering Group. It will send a message to the duty officers of all the Member States’ Permanent Representations informing them that a meeting of the Crisis Steering Group has been convened. The CCA can be put in a stand-by mode (alert mode) to improve its start-up function for the Crisis Steering Group.14 The stand-by mode can be activated during the time the Presidency is considering to or not to formally activate the CCA and to convene an initial meeting of the Crisis Steering Group. In the stand-by mode, certain members of the ‘‘CCA Support Machinery’’ will convene to give the Crisis Steering Group as good a head start as possible. In the stand-by mode, the Council Secretariat (SitCen) with the approval of the EU ambassador of the Presidency can also activate a secure web page for the arrangement. The secure web page is intended to present information about the crisis situation and to enable the Member States and the institutions and agencies of EU to exchange information concerning the crisis, this as a complement to discussions in the Crisis Steering Group and the ‘‘CCA Support Machinery’’. The participants in CCA and their relationships are presented in Fig. 7.1.

The Agenda for the Initial Meeting of the Crisis Steering Group A convened Crisis Steering Group will, at its first meeting, as a minimum have the following agenda according to the ‘‘Manual on EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination:’’15 l

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Brief overview of the situation presented by the General-Secretariat of the Council and the Commission Briefing by the EU ambassadors of the affected Member States on the situation and the response by the relevant national authorities and other Member States Briefing by the Commission on assistance requested and provided through Community arrangement such as the Mechanism for Civil Protection (MIC) Whether the CCA Support Machinery needs to be convened (if it is not already convened);

Council of the European Union, 14650/1/07 LIMITE. Council of the European Union, 20579/08 LIMITE. See also Council of the European Union, 11270/06 LIMITE. 15

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Crisis Steering Group (Ad hoc group for intergovernmental crisis management. Members: the EU ambassadors of affected Member States, the Secretary-General of the Commission, the Secretary General/High Representative (SR/HR) and the EU ambassador of the Presidency. • Produces decision-making alternatives for Coreper II

CCA Support Machinery Experts from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and if need from the Member States • Assists with expertise

Coreper II

(The Member States EU ambassadors) • Take decision, on behalf of the Member States governments, on advise of the Crisis Steering Group, on intergovernmental measures to manage a crisis

The Member States The Presidency (the EU ambassador) • Chairs the work of the Crisis Steering Group

The Council Secretariat • Alert function (SitCen) • Situation awareness function (Sitcen) • Administrative support

Fig. 7.1 The organisation and function of the CCA

• Alert SitCen • National situation awareness • National measures

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Evaluation of possible action at the EU-level (by Commission/Council) Evaluation of any decision which needs to be taken by Coreper II/the Council Preparation of information at the EU-level to the media and the public Date and time of next meeting of the Crisis Steering Group (if required).

The EU ambassador of the Presidency convenes a meeting with Coreper II when he or she believes that the Crisis Steering Group has a satisfactory perception of the crisis situation and has established concrete decision alternatives for Coreper to consider.

When and How to Deactivate the Crisis Steering Group The chairman of the Crisis Steering Group, the EU ambassador of the Presidency, decides in consultation with the Crisis Steering Groups members, and if needed with the experts in the ‘‘CCA Support Machinery’’, when formally to disperse the group and end its work.16 This is done when it is considered that the acute phase of the crisis is over and it is considered that the aftermath of the crisis can be handled through the ordinary decision-making procedures of the EU.

The CCA at the Test The CCA has not yet been fully tested in an actual crisis situation, but the CCA was for the first time put in a stand-by mode during the terror attack in Mumbai in November 2008. At the stand-by mode, the SitCen opened up the web page of CCA so the Member States through the web page could inform each other of the situation of their citizens that were directly stricken by the terror attack. The CCA has been subject to annul exercises since it was introduced in 2006 (i.e. in 2006, 2007 and 2008). It has been decided that scenario-based exercises is to take place every autumn. In addition to the larger scenario-based exercises that took place in 2007 and 2008, there are also, on a regular basis, going to be more specified exercises aimed at different categories of officials within the Council Secretariat, the Commission and the Member States’ permanent representations in Brussels. Evaluations of the three conducted exercises have concluded that the CCA has the potential to become a viable crisis management arrangement for the EU and its Member States.17 The exercises have none the less revealed weaknesses in the arrangement that still have to be overcome, even if lessons have already been learned and improvement has been shown between the exercises. The earlier 16

Council of the European Union, 11270/06 LIMITE. Council of the European Union, 14703/06 LIMTE; Council of the European Union,14650/1/07 LIMITE; Council of the European Union, 13589/08 LIMITE. 17

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mentioned stand-by mode (alert mode) and a secure web page for the CCA are examples of lessons that have been learned. An important weakness that the exercises have so far revealed is uncertainty as to the distribution of work and responsibility between the ‘‘CCA Support Machinery’’, the Crisis Steering Group and Coreper II.18 Another weakness is how the EU collectively handles information to the media and the public, especially when it comes to the preceding coordination of the information.19 One lesson learned regarding unsuccessful information coordination to the media and the public has resulted in appointed spokespersons from the Council Secretariat and the Commission now being seen as permanent members of the ‘‘CCA Support Machinery’’ group. A third weakness is a cluster of more technical problems such as enhanced management of SMS messaging and adequate contact lists.20

Demands on the Member States Raised by the CCA If the CCA is going to function as intended, one prominent request is, of course, that the national agencies and the governments of the 27 Member States have the ability to swiftly determine whether and to what extent their country is affected by a crisis. The Member States also need to be able to communicate this information effectively to the Presidency and the other members of the Crisis Steering Group. The governments of the Union’s Member States therefore need to have the ability to come rapidly to decisions regarding the following fundamental questions21: l

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Is a crisis already at hand or brewing, and if so, does the character of the crisis justify the activating of the CCA and the Crisis Steering Group? In what way and to what extent is the nation and its citizens affected, or can be expected to be affected, by the crisis to justify a seat in the Crisis Steering Group for the nation? If affected by the crisis, to what extent does the nation need help and support besides the help and support that can be received through existing EU arrangements and through existing bilateral agreements with other Member States or states outside the Union? What kind of and to what extent is there a need for coordinated Member States action on an EU level to handle the crisis or potential crisis; and what specific role can the nation take in such a case?

18 Council of the European Union, 14650/1/07 LIMITE; Council of the European Union, 13589/08 LIMITE. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Larsson (2006, p. 47).

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In what way is the nation prepared to help and support other Member States affected by the crisis, both within existing EU arrangements (such as the mechanism for civil protection) and separate from such arrangements?

The procedures and routines to swiftly handle these questions must therefore be well developed within the Member States governments and the ministries. One can, however, assume that the ability to swiftly analyse a potential crisis situation and to decide on proper actions varies greatly between the different Members States. Furthermore, the CCA may call for the Member States to let national experts take part in or support the work of the ‘‘CCA Support Machinery’’, if their expertise is in demand during a crisis. This can probably be done through video conferences and other technical solutions and do not necessarily mean that the experts have to be in person in Brussels. The request from the EU level for certain experts can, of course, come into conflict with the Members States’ own need for the very same experts in a stressful crisis situation. When the CCA is not activated, the Member States need to be prepared to actively take part in the exercises that are conducted and, under their Presidency, plan and conduct exercises that are based on realistic crisis scenarios.

Concluding Remarks The CCA was introduced in mid-2006 and is still very much in a formative build-up phase. The future of the CCA will depend on to what degree the Member States are prepared to embrace the arrangement by actively taking part in future exercises and by whole-heartedly integrate it as a part of their national crisis management system. The future of the CCA also depends on the Treaty of Lisbon and the concluding negotiations on its article 71, namely a new committee on internal security (COSI). In the negotiations on the COSI, it has been up for discussion that the conceptual and technical development of the CCA should be the responsibility for COSI. The CCA should, thus, for the first time get an organisational platform in the committee structure of the Council. Such an organisational platform would improve the arrangement’s status within the EU and make it easier for concerned Member States to promote the arrangement’s development. As of today, the conceptual and technical development and administration (e.g. exercises) of the CCA are the rather vague responsibility of the rotating Presidency, Coreper II and the Council Secretariat. It is important to keep in mind here that the Commission, as an otherwise important promoter of the Union’s crisis management cooperation, is without direct influence over the CCA and its future development. This is because the CCA is an arrangement fully in the jurisdiction of the Council. Finally, the future of the CCA will ultimately depend on to what extent the arrangement will be activated in actual crises situations and prove useful. There is a great risk that the Member States will lose interest in the CCA in the long run if the arrangement never comes into use, or proves to be of little added value for them when activated in a crisis.

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References Council of the European Union, 16054/04, The Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, 13 December 2004 Council of the European Union, 11158/1/05 REV 1, Declaration on the EU response to the London bombings, 13 July 2005 Council of the European Union, 11270/06 LIMITE, Emergency and Crisis coordination arrangements (CCA) – internal GSC standard operating procedures (SOPs), 4 July 2006 Council of the European Union, 14703/06 LIMITE, Emergency and crisis coordination arrangements – CCA exercise (CCAEX06), Draft evaluation report, 4 December 2006 Council of the European Union, 14650/1/07 LIMITE, Emergency and crisis coordination arrangements – CCA exercise (CCAEX7), Final Evaluation Report, November 2007 Council of the European Union, 10579/08 LIMITE, Report and revised Manual on EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination, 11 June 2008 Council of the European Union, 13589/08 LIMITE, Emergency and crisis coordination – CCA exercises (CCAEX08) Hotwash Evaluation Report, 29 September 2008 Larsson P (2006) EU:s kriskoordineringsarrangemang (EU-CCA) ur ett svenskt perspektiv [EU Crisis Coordination Arrangements (EU-CCA) from a Swedish Perspective]. Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm The European Council, 15106/05, EU emergency and crisis-coordination arrangements, 1 December 2005

Chapter 8

Counter-terrorism in the European Union Anna Utterstro¨m

The threat posed by transnational terrorism has been one of the major driving forces behind the development of the EU’s internal crisis management capacity. Naturally, this also applies to the EU’s specific activities to combat terrorism. From a tentative approach based on incoherent initiatives, the EU’s capacity in this field has gradually grown into a more comprehensive approach during the last decade. Nevertheless, the nature and inherent tensions of the issues involved have been, and still are, limiting factors. Today, different policies aimed at combating terrorism can be found in all three pillars of the EU and in all phases in the crisis management cycle. Although several challenges remain to be resolved, and the instruments’ effectiveness and practical impact are continuosly discussed, the framework for a future comprehensive approach to combat terrorism is in place. This comprehensive approach entailing sets of measures to combat terrorism on different policy levels and in different phases of the crisis management cycle is, in the EU, referred to as counter-terrorism. From a more theoretical point of view, counterterrorism might be defined as activities and policies that underpin a strategy, ranging from diplomacy and economic sanctions to creating a robust infrastructure. Accordingly, counter-terrorism should be distinguished from the concept of antiterrorism which refers to the direct actions taken against terrorist organisations.1 This chapter examines the internal security dimension of the EU’s counterterrorism policies which means that counter-terrorism activities and structures within the second pillar (the Common Foreign and Security Policy) are not treated here. Policies and arrangements based on a specific counter-terrorism approach as well as an ‘‘all-hazards’’ approach are therefore included. Throughout the chapter, emphasis is, however, placed on policies explicitly aimed at combating terrorism. After outlining the background and developments that triggered the EU’s counterterrorism policies, the chapter describes the policies from different perspectives. First, the chapter focuses on what kind of capacity the EU can provide by describing the policy and legal framework of the EU’s counter-terrorism approach as well as the


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actors of particular importance within this framework. Second, the chapter deals with the question of how the EU can act by organising actions in relation to the different strands of work in the cross-pillar EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy.2 The chapter concludes by addressing some of the remaining challenges in the field.

From Humble Initiatives to a Comprehensive Strategy The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were one of the major catalysts for the development of a comprehensive counter-terrorism approach at the EU level. Although the threat posed by terrorism was no novelty, the 9/11 attacks, followed by those in Madrid and London, made it clear that the terrorist threat had taken on a more international and network-based character in terms of organisational aspects and potential targets.3 This underlined the need for a comprehensive cross-pillar strategy at the EU level.4 The development of an EU policy in the field had, up until then, been relatively slow and based on an array of interests and ac hoc arrangements. However, although lacking fundamental elements, this meant that there was a foundation to build on. Cooperation in justice and home affairs (JHA) was first introduced in the Treaty on European Union (signed in Maastricht in 1992) as the EU’s third pillar.5 This meant that all existing mechanisms and working groups in the field were brought under the same roof and subject to the same decision-making framework. However, the sensitive nature of the issues, combined with the unanimity-based decisionmaking in the JHA Council, often resulted in non-binding policy instruments exclusively focused on coordinating measures.6 In 1999, changes were introduced in the area by the Treaty of Amsterdam. In addition, further actions were initiated later that year at the European Council summit in Tampere, which was held in order to identify how the new provisions could effectively be translated into practice. The Treaty of Amsterdam, on the one hand, resulted in several changes in the framework such as the separation of the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters from the other areas of JHA (i.e. asylum, immigration, external border control and judicial cooperation in civil matters),7 replacement of all JHA activities by the area of freedom, security and justice and the introduction of a shared right of initiative for the Commission that had not previously been possible.8 The summit in Tampere, on the other hand,

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might be considered an equally important milestone within the field of counterterrorism as it was the first Council meeting devoted to the area of freedom, security and justice. Furthermore, several of the policy instruments and bodies specifically directed at counter-terrorism were drafted or agreed on at the summit.9 This being said, in reality, this did not immediately speed up the development of the EU’s counter-terrorism capacity since many of the drafted initiatives were not adopted or implemented.10 It was not until after the 9/11 attacks that the EU governments, in dialogue with the United States as a key partner, directed more resources to combat terrorism and made it one of the top priorities of the Union.11 The immediate reaction was the adoption of a plan of action on combating terrorism, which called for ‘‘a coordinated and inter-disciplinary approach embracing all Union policies’’.12 Within this context, several initiatives were taken. Among the most substantial ones were the agreement on an EU-wide arrest warrant introducing simpler and faster surrender procedures within the Union, and a common definition of terrorist offences which provided a starting point for all activities in the field.13 The importance of a counter-terrorism capacity at the EU level was furthermore emphasised by the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003, in which terrorism was identified as one of the key threats facing Europe.14 The security strategy also stated that better coordination between external and internal activities was crucial, thereby making it clear that internal and external policies in the area are interlinked. Following the Madrid bombings in March 2004, further steps were taken to enhance cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. The European Council agreed on a declaration on solidarity against terrorism in the spirit of the Solidarity Clause in the draft Constitutional Treaty.15 Furthermore, the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, appointed an EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and a number of strategies in different policy areas were drafted in order to enhance the EU’s counter-terrorism capacity. Even so, the area was still lacking a long-term strategy that could pave the way for an effective comprehensive approach. However, as a response to the London bombings, the development of such a strategy finally gained speed. In December 2005, the policy document referred to as the EU Counter-Terrorism

9 For example, the EU’s definition of the terrorism offence, the European Arrest Warrant and the creation of Eurojust. 10 See Ucarer (2005, pp. 301–307). 11 The cooperation with the United States remains an important cornerstone of the EU’s approach in the field of counter-terrorism. Today, some of the priorities on the mutual EU–US agenda are terrorist financing, radicalisation, visa issues and the sharing of information. See DG JLS: http://ec. europa.eu/dgs/justice_home/index_en.htm, last accessed 27 January 2009. 12 Conclusions and Plan of Action of the extraordinary European Council on 21 September 2001. 13 Keohane (2005, p. 17); Spence (2007, p. 12); Council Framework Decision (2002/584/JHA); Council Framework Decision (2002/475/JHA). 14 A Secure Europe in a better world – The European security strategy, Brussels 12 December 2003. 15 Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 25 March 2004.

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Strategy was adopted. This meant that EU counter-terrorism, although formally no independent policy area, had a framework encompassing all activities with a bearing on counter-terrorism.16

The Policy and Legal Framework As mentioned above, counter-terrorism in the EU formally has no policy area of its own, nor is it in any way a clearly defined area. Instead, counter-terrorism might be described as a broad spectrum of different policies or as an element in a number of policy areas, including several EU institutions and a large number of bodies and committees developed at different speeds over the past years. Since describing these chronologically might be more confusing than illustrative, the perspective used here is top-down, i.e. from overarching policy framework to specific actions and activities. However, the reader should bear in mind that, in reality, specific activities in many cases have preceded the policy framework. Furthermore, it is, in this context, important to stress that counter-terrorism activities and instruments take place in all three pillars of the EU. Since this book provides an overview of the EU’s internal crisis management capacity, this section of the chapter mainly describes policies and instruments within the area of freedom, security and justice, which is currently divided between the first and the third pillar. Other policies linked to counter-terrorism in the first pillar are, however, also briefly discussed. The fact that the instruments that lay down the framework for the internal counter-terrorism capacity have their institutional homes in different pillars also means that they represent different kinds of cooperation. Whereas the first pillar (the European Community) is characterised by supranationality, the third pillar (police and judicial cooperation) is intergovernmental in character. This of course adds a complexity to the area. Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon, might cause some confusion when trying to understand the counter-terrorism policy structure of today as it erases the boundaries between the pillars. According to the Treaty of Lisbon decisions in the field would also, as a general rule, be based on qualified majority and co-decision17. From a legal point of view, the internal counter-terrorism policies and instruments in the area of freedom, security and justice have their legal basis in Article 2 in the Treaty of the European Union which refers to ‘‘the prevention and combating of crime’’. In addition, Article 29 of the EU Treaty specifically points out that the objective of providing citizens with a high safety level will be achieved by preventing and combating in particular terrorism.18 Further down the policy chain, these articles are put in a more concrete form in the so-called Hague Programme, 16

Hagstro¨m Frisell (2006, pp. 19–20). This means the Parliament would share legislative power equally with the Council. 18 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 24 December 2002, ‘‘Treaty of Nice’’. 17


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a five-year plan that covers all aspects of the security and justice co-operation and accordingly also includes objectives with regard to counter-terrorism.19 Finally, a guiding principle for all activities in the area is of course the EU definition of terrorist offences in the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. The definition in a broad sense clarifies the scope of the EU’s approach in the field and consists of two conditions. First, terrorist offences are offences which due to their nature or context may seriously damage a country or an international organisation.20 Second, they must be committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population or seriously destabilising or destroying the political, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation. In November 2008 an amendment to the framework decision was adopted introducing three new offences: public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment and training for terrorism.21 In contrast to the activities in the area of freedom, security and justice, the activities related to counter-terrorism outside this area have their legal bases in different articles in the EC Treaty 22 depending on what policy area they are linked to. As discussed in previous chapters, civil protection activities, for instance, have their legal basis in the so called flexibility clause, Article 308, in the EC Treaty which means activating the MIC in response to a terrorist attack would fall within this legal context.23 At the overarching policy level, the European Security Strategy makes an important contribution to the development of a counter-terrorism capacity at the EU level by identifying terrorism as one of the key threats facing the Union and making it clear that there needs to be a shared European approach based on guidelines from the EU to fight terrorism effectively. The European Security Strategy furthermore clarifies that the approach needs to be multifaceted by stating that ‘‘dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means’’.24 The fact that the European Security Strategy identifies terrorism as a key threat also signals that terrorism is no temporary priority, which gives the area a more solid foundation. Another initiative at the top of the policy chain is the declaration on solidarity, included in the Declaration on Combating Terrorism adopted after the events in Madrid in 2004. The former lays down that in the event of a terrorist attack in one

19

Council of the European Union (16054/04). Of particular note in this context is that the Hague Programme expires during the Swedish EU Presidency in the second half of 2009. Hence, negotiations on a successor to the Hague Programme, possibly labelled the Stockholm Programme, will take place during the second half of 2009. 20 Serious offences in this context are, for instance, hostage taking, release of dangerous substances and disrupting the supply of water. 21 Council Framework Decision (2002/475/JHA), Council Framework Decision (2008/919/JHA). 22 Formally the EC Treaty is called the Treaty Establishing the European Community. 23 See Chap. 2. 24 A Secure Europe in a better world – The European Security Strategy.

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Member State, the others shall act in a spirit of solidarity and mobilise all the instruments at their disposal in order to assist the Member State subject to an attack.25 This is an important step in the development of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. Not only does the declaration state that the Member States are prepared to support each other in a crisis, but also that they have a politically binding obligation to do so. If the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, the content of the declaration will be incorporated in the Treaty in the form of the Solidarity Clause. However, in contrast to the declaration, the Solidarity Clause is based on an ‘‘all-hazards’’ approach and thus includes all forms of disasters.26 When applying the top-down perspective to the counter-terrorism area, the cross-sector EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted a few months after the London bombings might be considered the next policy level. The strategy is unique in the area as it creates a framework for a comprehensive counter-terrorism capacity, guiding the disparate EU institutions and the Member States in their work. Hence, the strategy includes policies, actions and instruments in all three pillars, as well as in all policy areas linked to counter-terrorism. Since counter-terrorism policies and instruments are needed in different phases and for different reasons, the strategy is organised in four strands of work: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. The concepts refer to preventing new recruits to terrorism, improving the protection of potential targets, pursuing members of existing networks and improving the capability to respond to the consequences of an attack.27 These concepts also guide the work at the next level in the policy chain, the Action Plan on Combating Terrorism. In contrast to the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the action plan takes a more concrete approach as it basically consists of a list of measures and instruments including short status updates.28 These are all organised around the four strands of work in the strategy and entail activities in all three pillars. Hence, the action plan includes measures in the area of freedom, security and justice aimed at promoting community policing and carrying out strategic assessments of terrorist threats, such as measures to improve and reinforce the practical application of the European Arrest Warrant, as well as measures in the framework of the Community, such as establishing a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), ensuring full implementation of the Health Security Strategy and strengthening the Civil Protection Mechanism.29 In short, the action plan provides an overview of all existing and future initiatives with regard to counter-terrorism in the EU.

25 Declaration on Solidarity Against Terrorism in the Declaration on Combating Terrorism, Brussels 25 March 2004. 26 Art. 222 in Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 30 April 2008, (Treaty of Lisbon). 27 Council of the European Union (14,469/4/05). 28 The action plan is updated every 6 months. 29 Council of the European Union 5,771/1/06.


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Mapping the Actors in the Field After outlining the policy and legal framework of the EU’s counter-terrorism approach above, this section provides a brief account of the most important EU bodies acting within this context. Apart from the institutions providing the overall framework, the bodies with mandates in the area of freedom, security and justice can essentially be structured in four different areas: police cooperation, judicial cooperation, criminal intelligence and border control whereas actors and bodies outside the area of freedom, security and justice act within numerous policy areas such as civil protection, CBRN30 protection, transport security, critical infrastructure protection and health security.

The Institutions At the top political level of the structure, there is the European Council31 providing the political oversight and the so-called high-political dialogue on counter-terrorism, which refers to meetings once per Presidency between the Council, the Parliament and the Commission in order to ensure inter-institutional governance.32 The Commission, in particular its Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security (DG JLS), plays a pivotal role at the legislative level within the internal dimension of EU counter-terrorism, both as an initiator of new policies and as a cross-sector policy coordinator. In the role as a policy initiator, the Commission drafts legislation in a broad spectrum of policy areas related to counter-terrorism. These range from measures directed at identifying European critical infrastructure to tackling money laundering and financing security technologies.33 However, since police and justice cooperation falls within the third pillar, the Commission shares a large part of its right of initiative with the Member States.34 The role of the Council is equally important, as the Council (in general the JHA Council) decides the policies and legislative measures that the Member States and the Commission propose in the field of counter-terrorism.35 Furthermore, a body specifically focused on counter-terrorism is placed within the Council structure, the so-called Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. Established in the wake of the Madrid 30

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear. It should be noted that the European Council is at present formally not an EU institution. 32 Council of the European Union (14,469/4/05): The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 33 Keohane (2005, p. 19). 34 In the areas of asylum, immigration, external border control and judicial cooperation in civil matters, i.e. the areas transferred to the first pillar by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Commission has an exclusive right of initiative. 35 The Hague Programme stipulates that the JHA Council with regard to addressing the key concerns in the fight against terrorism should have the leading role, taking into account the task of the General Affairs and External Relations Council. 31

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bombings, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator is provided with a mandate including coordination of the work of the Council, maintaining an overview of all of the EU’s counter-terrorism instruments and to closely monitor the implementation of the action plan adopted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.36 The CounterTerrorism Coordinator is also, together with the Commission, responsible for presenting regular follow-up regarding the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), which in turn is responsible for monitoring the progress on the strategy.37 Finally, the role of the Parliament to some extent differs depending on the policy area in focus. However, in general, it plays a rather limited role as most decisions that focus on counter-terrorism are based on unanimity and do not entail a right of co-decision for the Parliament.38

EU Bodies in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice At the operational level, EU bodies such as Europol (the European Police Office) within the police cooperation and Eurojust (the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit) within the judicial cooperation that have counter-terrorism as a top priority in their mandates, make a vital contribution to the EU’s counter-terrorism capacity. Europol’s main objective is to promote cooperation among Member States’ law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating terrorism, as well as serious international organised crime, mainly by collecting and exchanging intelligence with national law enforcement agencies, but also by maintaining a computerised system of collected information. Hence, Europol might be referred to as an ‘‘intelligence gatherer’’ in the field of transnational and organised crime.39 The mandate is, however, essentially restricted to supporting measures. Thus, even though Europol might be described as a body at the operational level, it has no operational mandate of its own. However, of particular note here is that Europol’s mandate will change in 2010, due to the fact that a new legal basis will then enter into force. Some of the most important implications of this change are that Europol will gain the status of an EU agency. In addition, the mandate will be extended to include all forms of organised crime.40 The police cooperation activities of the EU, in particular those carried out by Europol, are intimately linked to the judicial cooperation carried out by Eurojust. Eurojust’s objective is to aid national prosecuting authorities in their criminal 36

Declaration on combating terrorism, March 2004. Council of the European Union (14,469/4/05). 38 Ucarer (2005, p. 303). 39 Europol-convention, see also Casale (2008, p. 55). 40 EU Information Centre website, Europol. http://www.eu-upplysningen.se/Amnesomraden/ Straffratt-och-brottsbekampning/Europol/ accessed 27 January 2009. 37


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investigations of organised crime.41 With regard to counter-terrorism, Eurojust furthermore has set up a team specifically tasked with enhancing the exchange of information related to terrorism.42 Strengthening criminal intelligence is another vital part of the EU’s counterterrorism policies. Thus, the EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) within the Council structure plays a significant role in building a comprehensive counter-terrorism capacity at the EU level. SitCen has been given the task to assess the terrorist threat. Hence, the Member States’ intelligence services as well as Europol cooperate with SitCen to this end. Particularly interesting concerning SitCen, in relation to other EU bodies, is the link to both the internal and the external dimension of the EU’s crisis management capacity. In the area of border control, Frontex (the European Border Agency), provides operational cooperation between Member States in areas such as managing external borders, supporting training for national border guards and providing the Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return operations. Frontex is closely linked to other EU bodies in the field, such as Europol.43 Finally, several committees and working groups linked to the bodies above have a role in the EU’s counter-terrorism activities. Some of the most important are: the Article 36 Committee (CATS) which has a coordinating role in criminal matters within the police and judicial cooperation, the Terrorism Working Group (TWG) which deals with internal threat assessment and coordination with the second pillar working party (COTER) and the Working Party on Civil Protection (PROCIV) which deals with the full spectrum of consequence management activities.44 Finally, the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum coordinates the other working groups in the areas of migration, visa, borders and asylum.45

EU Bodies Outside the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Outside the area of freedom, security and justice, a broad spectrum of bodies and agencies have mandates linked to counter-terrorism. This link might not be as clear as in the area of freedom, security and justice. However, quite often, it appears as part of the overall objective since a large part of the institutional set-up with regard to crisis management is established in response to terrorist attacks. Hence, several of the actors mentioned in previous chapters have relevance in the framework of 41

Council Decision 2002/187/JHA. De Vries (2004). 43 Council Regulation (EC/2007/2004) of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 44 Hence, PROCIV in some cases also has a role with regard to issues in the area of freedom, security and justice. 45 The Council of the European Union (9791/04). 42

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counter-terrorism as well. For instance, some of the most important EU bodies and agencies when it comes to preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks are: DG Environment and its Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC); the Commission’s Directorate General for Health Consumer Protection (DG Sanco), the Health Security Committee and the European Food Safety Authority in relation to biological and chemical attacks; and the Directorate General for Energy and Transport (DG TREN) with regard to critical infrastructure protection.47 Finally, another body of relevance in the field of counter-terrorism is the EU’s Joint Research Centre, which together with the EU Satellite Centre, has a monitoring function with regard to natural and man-made disasters.48

How Can the EU Act? When trying to answer the question of how the EU can act, the EU CounterTerrorism Strategy EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, illustrated in Fig. 8.1, might serve as a good starting-point as it provides the general framework for the EU’s work in the counter-terrorism area. Taken together, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategic commitment To combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice

PREVENT

PROTECT

PURSUE

RESPOND

To prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, in Europe and internationally

To protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack, including through improved security of borders, transport and critical infrastructure

To pursue and investigate terrorists across our borders and globally, to impede planning, travel, and communications; to disrupt support networks; to cut off funding and access to attack materials, and bring terrorists to justice

To prepare ourselves, in the spirit of solidarity, to manage and minimise the consequences of a terrorist attack, by improving capabilities to deal with: the aftermath; response; and the needs of victims

Fig. 8.1 The EU counter-terrorism strategy46

46

Council of the European Union (14,469/4/05). Of particular note here is that DG JLS has the main responsibility for the EU’s critical infrastructure policy. 48 Rhinard et al. (2007, pp. 95–97); Hagstro¨m Frisell et al. (2006, pp. 23–30). 47


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Strategy and the Action Plan on Combating Terrorism illustrate the EU’s multifaceted approach to counter-terrorism. As the figure illustrates, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy first of all sets out a goal, or strategic commitment, for the EU’s counter-terrorism activities: ‘‘To combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice’’. In addition, the four strands of work underpinning the goal might altogether be considered as a roadmap to achieve this. Thereby, they answer the question of how the EU can act, although on a rather abstract level. If put in a time perspective, the four strands of work in a more indirect way also shed some light over the question of in which phases of the crisis management cycle the EU can act. However, of particular note in this context is that the figure in itself is not aimed at providing the answer to this question, even though some pillars might correspond with a more time oriented perspective.

Prevent The first strand of work in the figure above, ‘‘Prevent’’, entails actions and instruments that take place before the threat has materialised, such as tackling the root causes and preventing people from resorting to terrorism. Accordingly, within the area of ‘‘Prevent’’, the need for spotting radicalisation at an early stage through community policing and monitoring people travelling to conflict zones is one priority. As a step in this direction, the Union has adopted an action plan for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism. Furthermore, addressing extremist propagation and promoting environments that do not trigger radicalisation is another way of preventing the threat from materialising. The latter to a large extent refers to environments outside the Union where conditions such as autocratic governance and lack of political or economic prospects prevail. Actions such as promoting good governance, democracy, education and economic prosperity through assistance programmes therefore have relevance in this context. Apart from the implementation of the EU strategy and Action Plan for Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, the Action Plan on Combating Terrorism contains a large number of measures within the area of ‘‘Prevent’’. In this context, it is important to point out that these are linked to both the internal and the external dimension of the counter-terrorism capacity. Thus, ‘‘Prevent’’ entails measures such as developing a comprehensive communications strategy to explain the EU’s policies, research in the field of inter-cultural dialogue and initiatives aimed at cutting off terrorist financing.49

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Protect The second strand, ‘‘Protect’’, is aimed at reducing key targets’ vulnerability to attack, as well as reducing the resulting impact of an attack. Protection measures are therefore to a larger extent than measures in the area of ‘‘Prevent’’ aimed at preparing for a crisis of a more impending nature. Hence, collective security measures in the area of border security and different cross-border infrastructures are some examples of what characterises this strand. Thus, some of the key priorities in the area are to agree on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure protection (a goal that has been achieved although its impact and effectiveness of course depends on how it will be implemented), to develop effective risk analysis of the EU’s external border and to deliver improvements to the security of EU passports. Furthermore, the Action Plan on Combating Terrorism entails measures in the areas of threat and risk assessment, e.g. referring to strategic assessments of the terrorist threat by SitCen and Europol, security in the supply chain and protection of other potential targets than critical infrastructure, such as public transport.50 All in all, several of the measures in this area concentrate on implementing the objective of the Hague Programme, i.e. to improve cross-border cooperation and data exchange between police, border patrols and the judiciary.51

Pursue The third strand of work, ‘‘Pursue’’, entails measures to disrupt terrorist networks and recruiting activities, to pursue and investigate them across borders as well as cutting off their funding and logistics. In addition, bringing terrorists to justice is of course of significant importance in the area of ‘‘Pursue’’. Thus, one of the key priorities in this area is making full use of Europol and Eurojust and continuing to integrate SitCen’s threat assessments into the counter-terrorism policies. Mutual recognition of judicial decisions is another. Translated into action plan measures, ‘‘Pursue’’ entails implementation measures with regard to the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, which is aimed at harmonising the counter-terrorism legislation in the Member States by, for instance, providing the above mentioned common definition of terrorism offences.52 Furthermore, improving information sharing on lost and stolen passports and working to improve the exchange of information on convictions is another example of the measures in the action plan.53

50

Council of the European Union (14,469/4/05). Council of the European Union (16,054/04), see also Bendiek (2006, p. 12). 52 Council Framework Decision (COM/2007/650) amending Framework Decision (2002/475/ JHA) on combating terrorism. 53 Council of the European Union (10,043/46). 51


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Put in a time perspective, pursuing terrorism in accordance with the EU CounterTerrorism Strategy refers to widely differing measures that can be used in order to prevent a terrorist attack from materialising, and at the same time, to disrupt terrorists in action and arrest them on the scene of the crime. The judicial process and terrorism convictions might also contribute to the recovery from the crisis since terrorism has a psychological effect that most likely lasts longer when terrorists are not forced to resume responsibility for their actions.

Respond Finally, the fourth strand of work refers to actions taken to respond to the threat of an attack as well as to respond to a materialised attack and minimise its consequences. In this area, the ‘‘all-hazards’’ approach to crisis management is often predominant. Thus, when it comes to responding to an incident the instruments are most likely the same whether it is a natural or a manmade disaster. The Civil Protection Mechanism is therefore an important feature of ‘‘Respond’’. Coordination of different policies and media activities is another important objective in this context. Since responding according to the strategy not only involves the situation when the crisis has materialised but also responding to the threat and the state that follows on the crisis, a broad spectrum of other measures have relevance in this context. For instance, in relation to the threat, preparatory measures such as databases listing resources and assets which Member States might be able to contribute within a crisis are important measures in the framework of ‘‘Respond’’. Furthermore, contributions to the recovery from the crisis in the form of assistance and compensation to the victims of terrorism and their families are equally important. The key priorities listed under ‘‘Respond’’ consequently range from agreeing on the EU Crisis Co-ordination Arrangements (CCA) to sharing best practice in order to improve the assistance to victims. To this list the action plan adds measures, such as the adaptation of the military database containing military resources available to the Community Mechanism, to reflect the expansion to an ‘‘all-hazards’’ approach and measures aimed at early warning, such as timely analysis of terrorist attacks.54

Concluding Remarks: Future Challenges Although a framework for a comprehensive capacity in the area of counter-terrorism is in place, several challenges remain. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the accompanying action plan are important steps ahead as, combined with the EU definition of terrorist offences, they provide an overview and starting point for all activities in the field. This is certainly a substantial achievement as such. 54

Council of the European Union (10,043/46).

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However, although the strategy emphasises measures aimed at monitoring the Member States’ performance, the lack of effective implementation remains one of the major weaknesses in this area.55 Member States are for instance still reluctant to fully implement several of the measures in the action plan. Furthermore, several decisions and programmes in the field could be criticised for being vague and too broad in scope to be effective. Assessing why progress in counter-terrorism remains slow compared to several other areas within the EU is not an easy task due to the complexity of the area and the number of issues involved. Yet, there are some overall challenges that have influenced, and still influence, the development of the EU’s counter-terrorism policies. Some of these are highlighted here.56 To begin with, several activities in the field of counter-terrorism are traditionally perceived by Member States as at the core of national sovereignty which makes it more difficult to take forward common initiatives. In particular, national justice systems have long traditions and are closely linked to the development of specific national values, practices and procedures. This makes Member States less prone to integrate counter-terrorism policies into their own national systems, especially when EU policies could interfere with national legislation or practice. Furthermore, Member States are still reluctant to share information due to fear of compromising criminal proceedings, exposing domestic failures or losing the ability to claim credit for successes.57 This, of course, affects the performance of intelligence organisations such as Europol and SitCen whose roles are crucial in order to make the policies effective. Hence, even though the EU has developed a framework for a comprehensive strategy in the field of counter-terrorism, these concerns are likely to continue to make Member States reluctant towards far-reaching EU initiatives and information sharing in the field as long as other concerns do not prevail. Furthermore, the Union’s role is and will most likely remain limited to coordinating, facilitating and supporting Member States due to the nature and above discussed sensitivities of the issues involved. However, a gradual change towards more supranational features is possible. Changes in the overarching legislation, the political environment and public perceptions of the terrorist threat are some elements that could trigger such a development. In this context, the Treaty of Lisbon might be considered the first step ahead as it introduces qualified majority decisions in the area of freedom, security and justice as the general rule rather than the exception.58 In addition, the treaty, as mentioned in previous chapters, introduces a Solidarity Clause which reinforces the Member States’ commitment to support each other when a crisis occurs. More generally, the clause might also stir up the public

55 See for instance Counter-terrorism from an International and European Perspective, No 49, 2006, 32. 56 See also Rhinard et al. (2007, pp. 98–102). 57 Counter-terrorism from an International and European Perspective, No 49, 2006, 31. 58 As a result of this, common policing activities in the Treaty of Lisbon are based on qualified majority, whereas operational policing activities are excepted from the general rule and hence are still based on unanimity.


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debate on how far Member States’ solidarity should go and thereby possibly create a new political environment for initiatives. Apart from issues related to national sovereignty and interference with national legislation and practices, another concern that affects Member States’ willingness to adopt effective measures is their impact on citizens’ civil rights and privacy. Many national parliaments fear that common counter-terrorism legislation might lead to undermining these rights. This is, of course, a strong argument. It can be derived from the fact that effective security measures in the field of counter-terrorism may sometimes correspond with restricting human rights.59 From a broader perspective, the issue of national security versus citizens’ rights is particularly sensitive since these rights belong to the core values of the Union’s identity. These concerns are likely to remain strong arguments against more far-reaching legislation in the area. In addition, a stronger mandate for the European Parliament in the field of counter-terrorism may also have an impact in this respect. On the one hand, the European Parliament’s emphasis on citizen’s rights might result in an increasingly unwieldy process forward. On the other hand, the involvement of the European Parliament is also likely to be a necessary condition for creating legitimacy for future initiatives and actions. Regardless of the future role of the European Parliament, the issue of citizen’s rights underlines the importance of a balanced approach. The final challenge discussed here is, in contrast to the other two, related to the structure of the area rather than the Member States and their concerns. As mentioned before in this chapter, there is formally no independent counter-terrorism policy area within the Union but instead a number of policies and arrangements linked to different policy areas, sectors and pillars. This creates a complex environment for developing an effective counter-terrorism capacity at the EU level. Although the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is an important step in this direction, as it creates a framework for all activities in the field, other problems remain. For instance, different institutions execute power in different pillars and several of the EU bodies in the field have not yet established their status, or at least need reinforced mandates in order to contribute in an effective way. Whether directly or indirectly linked to counter-terrorism, all these policies and actors must be coordinated in order to ensure an overall objective guiding all work in the area. The lack of a body with an effective mandate is apparent. However, the role played by the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator should be acknowledged and, if reinforced, it might be one way of making counter-terrorism policies more effective and coherent. Streamlining the structure might be another way forward, since the actors in the field today appear to be far too many to be able to provide clear leadership. Another problem with regard to the structure of the counter-terrorism area is the weak link between Commission and Council measures within the internal and external security dimension of the EU.60 Apart from SitCen, actors and policies

59

Counter-terrorism from an International and European Perspective, No 492,006, 42. For a more comprehensive analysis of the internal-external security dimension of the EU see Ekengren (2007, pp. 30-49). 60

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are to a large extent separated between the two dimensions. However, the four strands in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy make it clear that several of the measures are intertwined. Thus, reinforcing the four horizontal strands by ensuring effective implementation of, in particular, those that refer to measures linked to both the internal and the external dimension might be a way of bridging some of the problems in this regard. The Treaty of Lisbon, if adopted, entails changes with a potential to improve coordination within the EU counter-terrorism structure if effectively implemented. To start with, the treaty contributes to a more coherent architecture by putting an end to the pillar structure. Furthermore, actors such as Europol and Eurojust would be provided with clearer mandates which most likely will create better conditions for cooperation between the actors in the field. Finally, the Solidarity Clause might also contribute to better coordination as it links the internal and external dimension of the EU’s policies in the field by addressing threats both inside and outside the Union. To sum up, the Union’s effectiveness in the field can still be questioned as Member States are reluctant to implement EU legislation and make real commitments. However, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy combined with the changes in the Lisbon Treaty, including the Solidarity Clause, has the potential of further strengthening the cooperation in the field. One of the most important future challenges will therefore be effective implementation of these policy frameworks or, if the Lisbon Treaty is not adopted, finding ways of improving effectiveness outside the framework of a new treaty.

References A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003. Conclusions and plan of action of the extraordinary European Council meeting on 21 September 2001 Bendiek A (November 2006) EU Strategy on Counter-Terrorism – Steps towards a Coherent Network Policy, German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Research Paper, Berlin Casale D (2008) EU institutional and legal counter-terrorism framework. Defence Against Terrorism Review 1(1)Spring: pp. 49–78 Cini M (ed) (2005) European Union politics. Oxford University Press, New York Council Decision (2002/187/JHA) of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime Council Framework Decision (COM/2008/919/JHA) amending Framework Decision 2002/475/ JHA on combating terrorism Council Framework Decision (2002/584/JHA) of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States Council Regulation (EC/2007/2004) of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union Council of the European Union (9791/04) Working structures of the Council in terrorism matters – Options paper. Note from EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to Coreper, 25 May 2004


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Council of the European Union (16054/04): The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, 13 December 2004 de Vries G (23 June 2004) EU counter-terrorism Coordinator, at Eurojust, The Hague. Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/justice_home/ index_en.htm, last accessed 27 January 2009 Ekengren M (2007) Terrorism in the EU: the internal–external dimension of security. In Spence D (ed.) The European Union and terrorism. John Harper Publishing, London Europol: Europol Convention, http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page = legalconv, last accessed 27 January 2009 EU Information Centre website, Europol, http://www.eu-upplysningen.se/EU-upplysningen/, last accessed 27 January 2009 Hagstro¨m Frisell E (2006) Hotbedo¨mningarnas roll i EU:s krisberedskapsarbete. Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm Hagstro¨m Frisell E, Oredsson M (2006) Building crisis management capacity in the EU. Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm Keohane D (2005) The EU and counter-terrorism. Centre for European Reform, London Lugna L (2006) Institutional framework of the European Union counter-terrorism policy setting. Baltic Security & Defence Review 8 Rhinard M, Boin A, Ekengren M (2007) Managing terrorism: institutional capacities and counterterrorism policy in the EU. In Spence D (ed) The European Union and terrorism. John Harper Publishing, London Spence D (ed) (2007) The European Union and terrorism. John Harper Publishing, London Spence D (2007) Introduction. International terrorism – The quest for a coherent EU response. Ucarer EM (2005) Justice and home affairs. In: Cini (ed) European Union politics. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 294–312 von Hippel K (2005) Introduction: Europe confronts terrorism. In von Hippel (ed) Europe confronts terrorism. Macmillan, Houndmills


Chapter 9

The Future of Crisis Management within the European Union Stefan Olsson and Per Larsson

Considering the many developments that have taken place in the field of crisis management in the European Union during the last ten years, trying to depict what the future will look like is not an easy task. Nevertheless, though it might not be possible to predict where the common crisis management system will be in seven or eight years time, we do know something about the driving forces behind the developments. We know why there has been an increase in cooperative initiatives and we also know something about what the Member States want the joint crisis management system to be. Together this will not tell us exactly what will happen, but at least it will make us able to make some educated guesses. This final chapter will sum up some of the general issues that have been discussed throughout the book. The crisis management system has evolved from both the ground level and from the top. The result of this growth will be discussed in relation to crisis management as a work process. The chapter concludes with a modest discussion on what to expect of the Treaty of Lisbon and some ideas on future developments. The treaty has not yet been ratified by all Member States. Consequently, we cannot say for certain how it will affect the crisis management system, but it is likely that the sections of the treaty that concern crisis management will be brought up for discussion regardless of what happens to the treaty as a whole.

The European Union and the Crisis Management Cycle As is evident from most chapters of this book, the crisis management system of the Union is not the result of one master plan. We have tried to describe it as a system under construction. Summarising the overall picture of what the system looks like in terms of crisis management as a work cycle, it is clear that it is not a ‘‘complete’’ crisis management system. The system resembles the type of systems one can find at the national level within the Member States. But it is far from an exact copy of any existing national system.


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In Chap. 1, we described crisis management as a work process covering four phases, prevention, preparation, response and recovery. These are the four logical steps for anyone to take who is responsible for protecting the citizens from severe incidents. First, one tries to eliminate threats. If that cannot be done, the second step is to make plans on how to act if something happens. When the crisis comes one needs to be able to handle the situation, and finally once the crisis is over it is time to repair and rebuild what got lost during the crisis, and to draw lessons on how the crisis was handled. Then the cycle starts all over again. From this perspective, it is obvious that many of the joint crisis initiatives, with a cross-cutting all-hazard approach, mainly have relevance for the response phase. Figure 9.1 shows the crisis management cycle together with the arrangements and policy programmes discussed in this book. Crisis management arrangements such as the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, the CCA and the many rapid alert systems such as ARGUS or CECIS are primarily aimed at supporting the Member States’ and the Union’s response capacities. The Mechanism strengthens the Member States’ capacities for consequence management by coordinating assistance offered by other Member States. Through its Monitoring Information Centre (MIC), it also strengthens the Member States’ situation awareness. Likewise the CCA’s function is to coordinate actions by the Member States while the rapid alert systems improve their situation awareness. This focus on the response phase is a little counter-intuitive since the prime responsibility for responding to a crisis belongs to the Member States, and also since we know that most crisis management activities take place during the first two phases. Crises do not erupt very often fortunately, which means that most work is

Prevention Counter-terrorism

Recovery

Preparation

EUSF Counter-terrorism

EPCIP Counter-terrorism

Response Community Mechanism CCA Rapid alert systems Consular crisis management

Fig. 9.1 The crisis management cycle of the EU

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about making contingency plans, strengthening resilience or exercising the organisation. Much of this is also done within the different policy sectors. In food safety, for instance, animal diseases such as Bluetongue are constantly monitored and information about possible outbreaks is shared between the Member States agriculture agencies. It is also within the policy sectors that common guidelines and standards for ‘‘best practice’’ are being developed. The only all-hazard initiative with a similar preparatory purpose is the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). Why the focus on the response phase? One answer would be that this is what the Member States need. Coordination and increased situation awareness are two added values that the EU can provide. But another answer is perhaps equally plausible. Most initiatives to establish these cross-sectorial arrangements for strengthened response capacity have been initiated from the top, from the highest political level. They have come about directly after major incidents, and it is a common reaction after a crisis that organisations feel a need for centralisation of response functions.1 The Community Mechanism, the rapid alert systems and the CCA have all been implemented as a reaction to major incidents. The response phase is also the part of the crisis management work process that attracts most attention. It is the most dramatic phase and usually the only one that the media or the general public will remember. Naturally, decision-makers will feel compelled to make sure that they can control the situation during the response phase. It is also of importance to keep in mind that arrangements primarily created to strengthen the crisis management capacities in one phase also have implications for other phases. In Fig. 9.1, we have placed the joint arrangements and policy programmes in accordance with their primary focus. But, as explained in Chap. 1, activities in one phase are dependent on activities in other phases. For example, one important aspect of preparation is to perform crisis management exercises. Establishing response-oriented arrangements such as the Community Mechanism or the CCA also requires education and training, which are activities that properly should be described as preparatory. Figure 9.1 also shows that the Union’s efforts within the recovery phase are limited, but this should not be viewed as an oversight. Rebuilding, repairing, establishing accountability and evaluating the performance of one’s crisis management organisation is the responsibility of the single Member State. The EU can provide support, but then this would be within its normal mandate. The only crosssectorial recovery arrangements are the European Union Solidarity Fund with the assistance provided to victims of terrorism. Similarly, the prevention phase in Fig. 9.1 is not entirely representative of the work being done in the Union. Prevention means to reduce or eliminate threats. Most of this work is being carried out within the policy sectors. One of the most

1

Boin et al. (2005, p. 64).

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explicit examples would be protection against chemical accidents. Through DG Environment, the Commission monitors the implementation of the Seveso II directive. The directive requires Member States to reduce risks for large chemical accidents. Another example would be the monitoring of communicable diseases by DG Health and Consumers. Through the early warning system, EWRS outbreaks of serious communicable diseases are identified at an early stage and thus not allowed to develop into pandemics. The policy program on counter-terrorism cannot be placed in any specific phase either. The initiatives in this field have been developed with all phases in mind. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy covers preventive measures in terms of reducing the breeding ground for terrorism and preparatory measures such as cooperation on border control. In terms of response, the counter-terrorism policy includes increased cooperation in judicial and police affairs, and subsequently the counterterrorism policy also operates in the recovery phase with providing support to victims of terrorism. The general character of the Union’s crisis management can thus be said to be focused on supporting the Member States’ response capacities by coordination and situation awareness, and in their preparatory work within the specific policy sectors. At the same time we should be careful not to overstress this trait since this is just one way of characterising the system. We have used these four phases as a way to explain how the different crisis management arrangements relate to each other. It is not a framework for defining its inner quality or for determining how far it is from a ‘‘complete’’ crisis management system.

The Treaty of Lisbon Crisis management as a policy area within the Union is likely to change, both in the near future and over time. Most of the common arrangements now in place are still new and will most likely be remodelled as the Member States become more engaged in common activities. The general trend towards increased crisis management cooperation will also likely continue with new initiatives. On top of this there is the development of the EU as a whole. There is a strong wish among the governments of most Member States to renew the Union’s legal foundation. The Treaty of Lisbon has been signed by all governments but has, as of now, not yet been ratified by all national legislatures. The Irish people rejected the treaty in a referendum in June 2008. Still, the process towards a new legal foundation of the Union continues. The Treaty of Lisbon might not be the name of the new document. Special provisions to satisfy the Irish electorate may or may not be included. But our best guess is that the new treaty, or parts thereof, in the end will be accepted by all Member States. Consequently, we believe that most parts of the Treaty of Lisbon concerning crisis management will be implemented. In studying how the Treaty of Lisbon will


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˚ hman argues that three aspects are likely to affect Civil Protection in the Union A 2 have an impact. The first is the solidarity clause. In 2004, directly after the terrorist attack in Madrid, the Member States enacted a Declaration on Solidarity against Terrorism. This general idea of solidarity was inspired by the draft for a constitution of the Union, and subsequently the solidarity clause was also included in the Treaty of Lisbon. The first two sentences of the clause state that The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States. . .3

As of now this clause is very much open to interpretation. It establishes an idea already present among the Member States, but its concrete implications are not specified. This will be up to the Council to decide in the event of a crisis, most likely by a unanimous decision (if the matter concerns, for example, the Union’s common security and defence policy). In general, however, ‘‘solidarity’’ is defined as something that one shows by free will. The treaty states that the single Member State should have the right to decide for itself in what way it wishes to show solidarity. The clause should thus primarily be interpreted as an agreed moral commitment with no formal obligations. The interesting question though for the future is whether this symbolic statement will turn into something else. If the clause is to be more than empty words, it might require increased cooperation between the Member States in the area of crisis management. Some nations have already suggested that the clause should be interpreted in this way, as a reason for why the common crisis arrangements such as the Community Mechanism should be developed even further.4 The clause will probably also initiate a discussion on how ‘‘all the instruments at its disposal’’ should be understood. The clause mentions military means. This would probably be less controversial during a natural disaster, but terrorist attacks are politically sensitive. Should this clause be interpreted as that Member States are morally committed to provide military intelligence or armed troops if one Member State is hit by a large terrorist attack? So far the general idea of solidarity that exists between the Member States has not lead to any heated disputes as to how far-reaching should be the assistance every nation is willing to give. No situation of that kind has occurred and no Member State is likely to ask for stronger commitments as things stand today. The power of moral commitments should, however, not be underestimated. What today is understood more or less as a symbolic statement may turn into an informal, but in practice binding, requirement in the future.

˚ hman (2009). A Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, article 222. 4˚ Ahman (2009). 2 3

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A second feature of the Treaty of Lisbon that definitely will affect the Union’s crisis management, if adopted, is the suggested Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI ). It will most likely be a counter-part to the Political and Security Committee in the Council, which is responsible for coordinating policies within the European security and defence policy (ESDP) and the overall common foreign and security policy (CFSP). But how it should be comprised and what mandate it will have is not yet decided and not mentioned in the new treaty. The committee will be subordinate to the Council. As such, its members will be representatives from the Member States. The big question is what its mandate will be. One suggestion would be that the many different committees and working groups dealing with crisis management should be replaced by the committee or reorganised as subcommittees. Committees and working groups that might be replaced are SCFIA (immigration) or the two working groups on terrorism (COTER and TWG), and perhaps also the Council working group on civil protection PROCIV. Issues relating to terrorism handled by the Article 36 committee might also be transferred to COSI. A committee of this character would improve the EU’s ability to coordinate its crisis management between different sectors, and consequently strengthen its strategic leadership abilities. This would definitely be the case if COSI should also function as a body for preparing new legislation in the Council. It has also been suggested that the committee should have a coordinating role at the operative level. This in turn will likely also put the Crisis Coordination Arrangements in question. The CCA is supposed to be activated in case of an extreme crisis that needs coordination between two or more Member States or policy sectors. Its coordinating body, the Crisis Steering Group, is not a permanent body. What would happen in a real crisis is impossible to tell, but a plausible guess is that the COSI would replace the Crisis Steering Group as the main forum for coordination due to its permanent structure. But this is only if a truly severe crisis strikes. In ‘‘normal’’ crises such as floods the operative unit of the EU would rather be the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). The third aspect of the Treaty of Lisbon with implications for EU crisis management is the introduction of Civil Protection as a new policy sector with a new decision-making procedure. Today, Civil Protection is a part of the first pillar but with veto rights in the Council for each Member State. As described in Chaps. 2 and 5, the Treaty of Lisbon will do away with the pillars. Decisions in the Civil Protection sector will be taken by the co-decision procedure and by qualified majority in the Council. Civil Protection is only one section of the crisis management system, and the proposed changes will not affect the system as a whole. Civil protection is, however, very much in the centre. The changes might therefore still have a strong impact. Due to the fact that Civil Protection becomes a policy sector based on a specific article in the treaties, this also gives the Commission the right to be more proactive. The Commission is usually regarded as an engine for European integration, and this is also true for Civil Protection. For example, the Commission is in favour of giving


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the MIC capabilities of ‘‘operational engagement’’, meaning that it could take on the role of actual leadership during a rescue operation.5 The co-decision process for legislation will significantly involve the European Parliament in civil protection affairs for the first time. Of more importance, however, are the new rules for decision-making in the Council. With decisions taken by qualified majority the veto power of the national governments is abolished. For smaller nations, this means that it will be more important to be proactive at an early stage in the policy process to gain support for their causes, lest they risk being outvoted in the Council. It ought to be kept in mind, though, that most cooperative initiatives in Civil Protection is not about legislation, but rather to engage in exchange of knowledge, set up general policies, agree on voluntary action plans, etc. Much of this work never reaches the Council. In general, the Member States also try to reach consensus at an early stage, when policies are discussed in the working groups or committees, such as PROCIV in the case of Civil Protection. The Treaty of Lisbon will probably make the field of crisis management feel more like a policy sector in itself. Considering that the treaty has not yet been accepted by all Member States any guessing on future developments could be completely wrong. Still, the ideas included in the treaty have been around for some time and have their strong advocates. Whatever happens to the treaty itself, it indicates what the future of crisis management of the Union will look like.

The European Union as a Crisis Manager The European Union has during the last decade become a significant player in terms of crisis management. In this context, it is important to underline that the presentation of the crisis management system of the European Union in this book has focused on the official aspects of the system by presenting how a number of formal arrangements and policy programmes contribute to the Union’s and the Member States’ crisis management capability. But the crisis management system of the European Union is so much more than its existing formal arrangements and policy programmes. It is also a unique forum or platform for valuable exchange of knowledge, ideas and best practice. This exchange takes place in different formal or informal networks connected to formal arrangements and policy programmes. The networks include officials and experts at different levels from the Member States, ministries and central agencies, universities and independent research institutes and from the Commission and other EU institutions and agencies. The networks contribute to put pressure on the Member States and help them, when needed, to reform and improve their national crisis management system thereby

˚ hman (2009). A

5

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raising the standard of the Union’s collective crisis management. When one analyses the crisis management system of the European Union, one should keep in mind that the formal arrangements and policy programmes do not give the complete picture of the crisis management cooperation within the Union. Despite the fact that the European Union has become a significant crisis management player there is no question about where the main responsibility lies for each Member State’s protection. The responsibility is still in the hands of the national governments, but the EU is now able to support the Member States in a way that was unheard of fifteen years ago. The Union has a system of crisis management, apparently, but what can and should be expected of the EU as a crisis manager? Taken together, the crisis management arrangements that we have focused on in this book, the cross-cutting, all-hazard arrangements, present a picture of the EU crisis management system as an integrated organisation. In this respect, the system resembles the national systems. But compared to the systems of the Member States, two important differences are worth emphasising. The first is that unlike the agencies of the Member States the EU have no direct operative responsibilities, meaning that it never really carries out any work at the ground level. Within all four phases of crisis management, the prime responsibility rests with the Member States. Consequently the EU can never replace the Member States’ own agencies. EU agencies with operative capabilities, such as, for example, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, are small and only act in support to the Member States and on their request. Thus, the EU never acts as the ‘‘first responder’’ in a crisis. If something happens, the affected Member State takes the lead and the EU takes on the role of partner. Although powerful if it manages to mobilise the Union’s full resources, the EU cannot take over any responsibilities from the Member States. Even in the most extreme event when several Member States are affected the EU through its Crisis Coordination Arrangements is still supposed to coordinate the crisis management, not take charge over it. The same logic also applies where the Union has the right to issue regulations and has the authority to monitor the Member States as, for example, with the Seveso-directive for protection against chemical accidents. In these instances, the Union has the right to issue binding instructions but their implementation is still in the hands of the Member States. Second, since the EU’s system for crisis management is not the result of one master plan, but rather something that has grown incrementally, the system lacks leadership at the strategic level. This is also reinforced by the Union’s complicated decision-making structures, with its different ‘‘pillars’’, with its rotating Presidency and its embedded tensions between its institutions (the Treaty of Lisbon tries to some extent to mitigate these problems). National systems, on the other hand, are characterised by a coherent crisis management policy from the top down (or is supposed to be characterised by a coherent system). The lack of strategic leadership makes it hard for the EU to speak with one voice in crisis management issues, and leaves many questions about the overall purpose of the EU crisis management unanswered.


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Considering that the EU does have a system for crisis management, with a crosssectorial and all-hazard approach similar to the national systems, but still not of the same type, what kind of system is it? The intellectual problem facing anyone wanting to know how the EU system for crisis management works is that there is no organisational logic that one can learn and then understand its structure. There is no official organisational chart with boxes and arrows. There are no intellectual keys that unlock the mysteries of the organisation. The reason for this is that the development of crisis management cooperation in the Union has grown spontaneously within the separate policy sectors without cross-sectorial coordination. The cooperative initiatives of the different sectors have also not come equally far. Some of them are well developed, some are very new. We have in this book focused on the arrangements that somehow connect crisis management in the different sectors. They make it into something that looks like an integrated system. But it is important to also remember that these arrangements have been developed separately without a master plan in mind. This situation naturally raises the question whether the EU should develop a more coherent crisis management system. The question very much depends on what will happen in the future. If large incidents are going to be one of the main drivers for change we cannot say what will happen since these by nature are impossible to predict. Yet at least three different paths have been suggested that the EU should take. One is that the EU should acquire its own civil protection forces, its own uniformed personnel. This has been suggested by the Barnier report (commissioned by the Commission together with the Austrian Presidency in 2006). A similar proposal was also issued by Greece in the fall of 2007.6 This would mean that the Commission through the Community Mechanism would be able to play a significantly stronger role at the operative level. Crisis management is more than civil protection, but the most common crises are natural disasters which automatically gives civil protection agencies a leading role. EU civil protection forces under the direct control of the Commission would be a major step towards a new role for the Union as a crisis manager. A second less far-reaching approach would be to appoint a commissioner with crisis management as his or her prime responsibility, or to create an agency with the task to be a promoter for improved crisis management across the policy sectors of the Union.7 On an everyday basis, crisis management is about prevention and preparation. Most crisis management work is about making plans that hopefully

˚ hman (2009); Greek initiative for enhancing European cooperation for the prevention of and A response to natural disasters and emergencies (2007). For example, see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Reinforcing the Union’s Disaster Response Capacity (2008). 7 Appointing a commissioner for crisis management was suggested by the Swedish minister for EU affairs, Cecilia Malmstro¨m, in expectation of the Swedish Presidency of the Council the same year, Speech 20 January 2009. For a discussion on the merits of having a crisis management agency see Boin and Sundelius (2007, pp. 33–46). 6

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will never be implemented. Crisis management is also an activity that encompasses many different policy sectors, such as health care, agriculture, nuclear energy, transportation, border control, chemical safety, electronic communications and many more. A common problem for crisis managers is to make sure that all these sectors take risks seriously and make contingency plans, and also make sure that policy sectors that are dependent on one another coordinate their plans. Some national governments have for this reason created agencies with the duty to ensure that all sectors of the government implement crisis management policies and to coordinate the crisis management work of different sectors (for example, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the United Kingdom or the Danish Emergency Management Agency). Appointing a commissioner or creating an agency responsible for this task would mean that the Union keeps its role as an arena for coordination and cooperation. The difference from how things are done today would be that there would be a driver for more common risk assessment studies and common contingency plans. Most of these activities today take place within each policy sector, which means that how far things have come depends on how vigorous the players are in each sector. This varies significantly. Coordination between different sectors will naturally also be made easier if there is a commissioner or an agency responsible for making this work. Yet even though this might sound wise in many respects it still can be questioned if increased cooperation beyond what is going on today really is necessary. There is already a lot of crisis management work being done within the Union, and in some policy sectors the cooperation has come very far. Perhaps then the EU now has the arrangements it needs, and improved crisis management should come through increased cooperation through existing channels. A third way to improve the Union’s crisis management capacities without creating a new agency would be to initiate a process of standardisation, to adopt common strategies with common goals and streamline national agencies, so that cooperation will run more smoothly.8 The primary responsibility of all crisis management will then still be in the hands of the national governments. The Union’s crisis management capabilities will instead be strengthened by the fact that the Member States’ agencies are better prepared, better equipped and better trained to work together. The setting up of civil protection modules (described in Chap. 5) in each Member State which can easily be deployed in a crisis situation is an example of how this could work. With ready-made modules in each Member State, the MIC can respond more quickly and with more accuracy when help is called for by a Member State. Hardly anyone would argue that the EU crisis management system is perfect as it is today and that no further developments are needed. It is also true that currently there is no generally accepted idea about the overall ambition of the system, how it should work and what the next step for improvement would be. In part this is due to differences of opinions between the Member States. But it is also dependent on

8

Ekengren (2007, pp. 47–57).


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what will happen in the near future. We know that large incidents usually affect the development, but as the Barnier report shows there are also drivers for change within the EU bureaucracy. Changes might also come incrementally, step by step, within the policy sectors far from leading politicians’ or commissionaires’ sight. This means that the system will change. In this book, we have portrayed the EU crisis management system as we see it today. We have called it a system under construction due to its rudimentary character. Perhaps even to call it a ‘‘system’’ is too much since it has no overall administrative logic and since the EU itself has no self-image of its own crisis management organisation. Nonetheless, common arrangements that tie different sectors together do exist. Together, they are what one day probably will be a coherent system for crisis management.

References ˚ hman T (2009) Lisbon treaty and civil protection in the european union (forthcoming). Swedish A Defence Research Agency, Stockholm Boin A, Sundelius B (2007) Managing European emergencies: considering the pros and cons of an EU agency. In: Boin A, Ekengren M, Missiroli A, Rhinard M, Sundelius B (eds) Building societal security in Europe: the EU’s role in managing emergencies, pp. 33–46. EPC Working Paper No. 27. European Policy Centre, Brussels Boin A, t’Hart P, Stern E, Sundelius B (2005) The politics of crisis management: public leadership under pressure. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Reinforcing the Union’s Disaster Response Capacity, COM (2008)130 final Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (9 May 2008) Official Journal C115 51 Ekengren M (2007) Societal security cooperation: what role for the open method of coordination? In: Boin A, Ekengren M, Missiroli A, Rhinard M, Sundelius B (eds) Building societal security in Europe: the EU’s role in managing emergencies, pp. 33–46. EPC Working Paper No. 27. European Policy Centre, Brussels Greek initiative for enhancing European cooperation for the prevention of and response to natural disasters and emergencies, non-paper issued by the governement of Greece in 2007 Speech by Cecilia Malmstro¨m, Minister for EU Affairs, Crisis Management in the EU and the Swedish Presidency, available at http://www.regeringen.se, accessed 11 March 2009


Index

A Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, 149 ADNS. See Animal Disease Notification System All-hazard, 3, 13 Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS), 71 ARGUS, 62, 78 Article 308, 46 B Barnier, Michel, 120 Barnier report, 101, 165 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), 4 BSE. See Bovine spongiform encephalopathy C CCA. See Crisis Coordination Arrangements CCA Support Machinery, 132 CECIS. See Common Emergency Communication and Information System Chernobyl, 4 CIP. See Critical infrastructure protection Citizens, 23 Citizens’ initiative, 28 Civil protection, 84, 162 Civil protection modules, 88 CIWIN. See Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network CIWIN Executive, 51 CIWIN Support Officer, 51 COCON. See Working group on consular cooperation Co-decision procedure, 30 College of commissioners, 26 Comitology process, 32

Commission, 9, 24, 25, 32 Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS), 64, 87 Common Foreign and Security Policy, 19 Communications, 25 Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, 86, 158 Conciliation Committee, 30 Constitutional treaty, 22 Consular cooperation, 110 Consultation procedure, 30 COREPER. See Permanent representatives committee Correspondance Europeénne (COREU), 114 COSI. See Standing Committee on Internal Security Council, 9 Council configurations, 28 Council secretariat, 29, 131 Counter-terrorism, 139 Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 146 Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA), 127, 158 Crisis management, 2 Crisis Steering Group, 130 Critical infrastructure, 44Critical infrastructure protection (CIP), 37 Critical infrastructure warning information network (CIWIN), 50, 77 Cross-cutting criteria, 45 D Decisions, 25 Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 143 Declaration on solidarity, 143 DG Environment, 87 Directives, 25

169

170 Directorate-General for Regional Policy, 95 Directorates-General (DGs), 26 Disaster management, 2 E Early warning and response system (EWRS), 69 ECDC. See European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control ECHO. See European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office ECURIE. See European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange Emergency management, 2 Energy, 40 EPCIP. See European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection ERN-CIP. See European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection ESDP. See European Security and Defense Policy EU agencies, 33 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 148 EU institutions, 18 Euro-consulates, 119 Europe Aid, 101 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), 4, 164 European civil protection force, 101 European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), 89 European Community, 19 European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE), 64 European Convention, 22 European Council, 11, 18, 24 European critical infrastructure (ECI), 37 European Critical Infrastructure Protection Contact Point, 12 European External Action Service (EAS), 120 European Network of Plant Health Information Systems (EUROPHYT), 72 European Parliament, 9, 24, 27, 30 European Police Office (Europol), 146 European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), 37, 159 European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERN-CIP), 54 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), 2 European Security Strategy, 58, 143

Index European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), 95, 159 EUROPHYT. See European Network of Plant Health Information Systems Europol. See European Police Office EUSF. See European Union Solidarity Fund EU Situation Center (SitCen), 132 Evacuation, 117 EWRS. See Early warning and response system External Action Service, 23 F Flexibility article, 25, 31 Flexibility clause, 46 Frontex, 147 G Gold-plating, 57 Green papers, 25 H Hague Programme, 142 Health Emergency Operations Facility (HEOF), 68 HEOF. See Health Emergency Operations Facility High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 23 I IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency Intergovernmental process, 20 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 66 J Joint Research Centre (JRC), 7 Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), 112, 147 L Lead State, 117 Lisbon treaty, 22 Lobbyists, 21 M Members of the European Parliament, 31 Member States, 5, 7, 27, 32, 33 MIC. See Monitoring Information Centre Modules, 104 Monitoring Information Centre (MIC), 64, 87, 158

Index N National parliaments, 23, 28 O Operator security plan (OSP), 46 Ordinary legislative procedure, 23 OSP. See Operator security plan P Parliamentary committees, 31 Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), 29 Pillars, 19 Police and judicial cooperation, 19 Political system, 18 Preparation, 11, 158 Presidency, 131 Presidency of the council, 29 Prevention, 11, 158 ProCiv. See Working Party on Civil Protection Public consultations, 27 Q Qualified majority, 23, 29 R RAPEX. See Rapid Alert System for NonFood Products Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats (RAS BICHAT), 64 Rapid Alert System for Chemical Threats (RAS CHEM), 68 Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), 66 Rapid Alert System for Non-Food Products (RAPEX), 75 Rapid alert systems, 61, 158 Rapporteur, 32 RASFF. See Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed Recovery, 11, 158 Regulations, 25 Response, 11, 158

171 S SARS. See Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Security Liaison Officer (SLO), 46 Services, 26 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 4 Seveso, 4 SitCen. See EU Situation Center; Joint Situation Centre SLO. See Security Liaison Officer Solidarity, 6, 105, 161 Special legislative procedure, 23 Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI), 162 T The Council, 28 Transport, 40 Travel advice, 114 Treaty establishing the European Community, 19, 113 Treaty of Lisbon, 6, 22, 104, 120, 154, 160 Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community, 4 Treaty on European Union, 19 Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, 22 U Unanimity, 29 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 92 UNOCHA. See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs W White papers, 25 Working group on consular cooperation (COCON), 112 Working groups, 28 Working Party on Civil Protection (PROCIV), 40, 162

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